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PREFACE

The *American Foreign Policy* series, consisting of yearly printed volumes and microfiche supplements, presents official public expressions of policy that best set forth the goals and objectives of United States foreign policy. It includes the texts of the major official addresses, statements, interviews, press conferences, and communications by the White House, Department of State, and other officials involved in the foreign policy process.

As the authoritative official foreign affairs record, *American Foreign Policy* is intended to serve many different users. These include officials of the Department of State, the White House, and other Executive Branch agencies; Foreign Service officers abroad; members of the legislative branch, foreign governments, and international organizations; and private researchers, lawyers, journalists, scholars, teachers, businessmen and women, and the general public.

The Department of State, in collaboration with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, inaugurated the *American Foreign Policy* series in 1950 with publication of *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–1949*. Subsequently, the Department published *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950–1955*, followed by yearly editions of *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* covering 1956 through 1967. In 1983, the Department resumed the series with publication of a retrospective volume, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977–1980*. Beginning with the year 1981, annual volumes have been published and are planned for future years.

In 1985 the Department of State introduced microfiche publications to accompany the printed volumes. To date microfiche supplements to *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* for 1981 and 1982 have been released. These supplements seek to assure the permanent preservation and wider distribution of the historical foreign affairs record.

This microfiche supplement to *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983*, presents the full texts of many documents published as extracts in the printed volume, as well as other documents that were not appropriate for inclusion in the printed edition. It includes the full texts of two series publications: Department of State and White House Special Press Briefings, and Department of State Daily Press Briefings.

Department of State and White House Special Press Briefings, conducted on the record or on background by senior administration officials, address a variety of specific issues. Certain categories of press briefings or quasi-briefings are excluded: interviews, off-the-record or deep background briefings, briefings before non-press groups, or briefings by foreign spokesmen unless given jointly with U.S. officials. Department of State Daily Press Briefings, often called the "noon briefings," present the Department's positions on recent events and issues usually in the form of responses by the Department's Spokesman to questions from the press.

The printed guide accompanying this microfiche publication contains a list of the Department of State and White House Special Briefings, identifying the subject, date, time, and location of the briefing, and the briefer in cases where the session was on the record. It also provides a comprehensive index to the multi-subject Department of State Daily Press Briefings, for which a list would not suffice. The guide is also filmed as the first microfiche card in the set.

William F. Sanford, Jr., prepared the documents for publication under the general direction of David S. Patterson. Kathleen Murtaugh assisted in preparing the daily press briefings for indexing. Gloria S. Beasley and Althea W. Robinson developed the index to the Department of State Daily Press Briefings derived from the briefing coversheets. Rita M. Baker supervised the preparation of this index and the final review of the guide and manuscript before publication.

William Z. Slany
The Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1983 SUPPLEMENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY A
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
FOLLOWING A MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT
WITH PRESIDENT NAVON OF ISRAEL

January 5, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:57 P.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: We have a Senior Administration Official who will brief today on the meeting with President Navon. This is a background briefing, attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Navon met in the Oval Office at 11:30 a.m. He was joined by Mrs. Navon and they had a brief conversation with the President and photographs. Mrs. Navon then left and the two Presidents were then joined by the Senior Advisors and met in the Oval Office from 11:30 a.m. until about 11:50 a.m., at which point, they moved into the Cabinet Room for a larger plenary session which lasted from approximately 11:50 a.m. until 12:15 p.m. We then walked up to the State Dining Room for luncheon which, as you know, ended at 1:30 p.m. with the departure statements.

Now, in addition to the meeting today between the two Presidents, Mrs. Reagan is going to be giving a tea for Mrs. Navon on Friday morning at, I think, 10:45 a.m. And those are the only arrangements that have been made for meetings in the White House.

Now, as far as the meetings themselves were concerned, I'd characterize them as very friendly. You had a general exchange of views on the usual matters of common interest.

President Reagan reaffirmed his commitment to the security of Israel and his determination to pursue the peace initiative that was launched on September 1.

President Navon spoke and made it very clear that he was speaking to express the views of all Israelis, expressing some concerns and attitudes that he felt the Israeli people shared at this point in time. He particularly made reference to the views on the need for an undivided Jerusalem and the objections within Israel to an independent Palestinian state.

Aside from these points, there were some general conversations about international affairs, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China and, again, the President reaffirmed our concern over the events in the area and the United States' wish to see a very early withdrawal of forces from Lebanon and further progress on peace.

I think there is really not much more to add to that. I'll answer a few questions if you've got them.

Q Did the subject of settlements come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, in reviewing our position, did say that the -- reaffirmed what he said on September 1, that settlement activity was not helpful towards the peace process.

Q Did Navon respond at all?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was not in that meeting, but Mr. Navon did not -- President Navon, as I understand it, did not reply in any detail. You'd have to really ask him what he said because I wasn't there.

Q Did President Navon at any time express opposition to the President's September 1st peace initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to characterize anything he said in that regard. I think you should ask that question, too, to President Navon. But, as I say, in the bulk of the exchange, President Navon made it perfectly clear that he was talking from a bipartisan perspective.

Q Did he indicate any willingness to run against Begin or oppose him for political office?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no discussion of that.

Q Doesn't the way that his whole visit is being handled make it look as though he's being given the red carpet treatment here in the United States and that the United States is doing everything it can to make him look like a candidate acceptable here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I simply wouldn't agree with that characterization of it at all. This was a meeting that had been scheduled originally in September and then was postponed until November and then was postponed in November until January. And it's a quite routine visit that heads of state make to the United States and I wouldn't read anything into it at all of the character you did.

Q Isn't this the first visit ever by a President of Israel to the White House?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd have to check my facts on that, but you'd probably know better than I would.

Q Can you give us any details of the Habib-Navon meeting? What did Ambassador Habib tell him earlier?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no details of that meeting; no. You would have to ask the State Department. I really do not know.

Q They are not giving much either. Is there any way you can get us something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not right now, I cannot.

Q Can you confirm the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot; no.

Q What is the significance that you and the administration attach to the visit of President Navon? And do you see this visit as a contributor toward peace -- that you are talking about, the September 3rd initiative in the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think any time the President of the United States explains his policies to foreign leaders, and particularly leaders from the Middle East, this is a positive step in the sense that it is putting forward our position and reaffirming the President's determination to pursue the peace process come what may.

Q Could I try this one more time then? The position of Prime Minister Begin is that he will not negotiate away the West Bank or Gaza. In conversations between President Navon and President Reagan, did President Navon reiterate in any way or endorse that attitude?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q He never did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Would you characterize him from these talks as being more flexible on the whole issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I would say that President Navon -- again, really you should ask him. But he made it perfectly clear that he was speaking from a bipartisan perspective. And as you know, that covers a wide spectrum of views on all of these subjects in Israel. And it was deliberately avoided -- any discussion of controversial issues like this.

Q What I am suggesting is that what we are interested in is what the American impression is of his posture, and how it may or may not be distinguished from Prime Minister Begin's. Do you find him more flexible or more hospitable toward the President's peace initiative than Prime Minster Begin has been in his pronouncements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am only going to comment on what was said in these meetings. And there was no discussion of the controversial elements that exist in Israel concerning the President's peace initiative.

Q Is the very fact that there was no discussion of it, that it was not brought up by Navon, indicative of anything -- that he did not choose to comment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I think you should address this to him.

Q How is it being interpreted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is being interpreted here that the President was behaving impeccable in that -- (laughter) --

Q Which President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both. (Laughter.)

Q Who was at the luncheon? Can you give us a list of the people there? Was Habib there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Let me try to do it off the top of my head. I can get you a list later on. On our side -- the President, the Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Deputy Secretary Dam, Assistant Secretary Veliotes, Ambassador Lewis, Elizabeth Dole, myself, Mr. Howard Teicher, Mr. Robert McFarlane, and L. Paul Bremer from the State Department. And on the Israeli side, it was the President, Ambassador Arens, DCM Netanyahu, Political Counsellor Sabel, and two others whose names I would have to get you from the list.

Q May I ask a couple of questions? First of all, can you tell us why are you briefing here instead of your colleague, because he has always been briefing on the Middle East, and now you come along? (Laughter.) Are you doing this because you want to avoid a political element or political slant to this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I am doing this because there was a mistake -- crossed messages.

Q Crossed messages? I thought that only happened in the Carter administration. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The point was we could have gotten my colleague back. But we thought you would not want to wait for another half hour. And since, as I say, there was not a great deal going on that I think you would want to wait for --

Q May I ask another one, please? Is it fair to assume, from what you have told us, from what you heard or know about, that there was no criticism of Begin's policies in these discussions between the President of Israel and -- the whole group, between any members of the groups at these meetings this morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no discussion of domestic Israeli politics.

Q That is not the question. The question was Begin's policies.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that falls within the definition of

MORE

Israeli politics. There was -- the only discussions -- were no discussions in the sense of a diplomatic exchange. President Navon just reaffirmed for the President and his advisors what he believed to be consensus views in Israel about several very important issues. And there was no back to-ing and fro-ing on issues of controversy between the United States and Israel.

Q What did he say the consensus is regarding the West Bank?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was not discussed.

Q In other words, the really hard substantive issues that would be normally discussed between two foreign leaders, let's say, were not discussed -- pointedly not discussed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll stay with what I said already, but you can infer what you like. But I mean, I think that's right.

Q What would you suggest was the consensus on early withdrawal from Lebanon? Is there one to do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the consensus -- and again I'm not talking directly from notes since I was not in one of the meetings -- I think -- as you know, I think there is a consensus in Israel -- let's just put it this way -- that withdrawal from Lebanon as early as possible is a desired outcome that everybody wishes to achieve. The question is, as you know, what are the provisos that will be negotiated so that that withdrawal does not lead to a return to the status quo --

Q Were the details of that discussed, or did the President simply say, "We want an early withdrawal," and not go into the details of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did not go into details.

Q If you've avoided detail and avoided controversy -- I hate to beat this to death -- but doesn't it look as though you're just trying to prop this guy up and make him look good by having his picture taken with the President, which is what it comes down to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I wouldn't say that at all.

Q I have to get something from you about the substance of the -- the significance of these talks. Did -- the President says we talked about Lebanon and early withdrawal. Did President Reagan make it clear to President Navon that the longer the Israeli forces stay in Lebanon, anyway -- that as he -- okay -- himself, the President -- President Reagan said that Israeli forces are to become an occupying force in there. Was this message delivered to President Navon in these talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in that detail. The President did not reaffirm all his language of the past, but he reaffirmed his basic overall policy, which I think is well known and was well --

Q Can I follow on this? What did you gain? What did the administration gain out of this visit, if I might ask this -- the Reagan Administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think one weighs meetings like this in terms of gains and losses. I mean, this was not a session where issues of substance were being negotiated. It was an exchange of opinions between two heads of state where, clearly, in view of President Navon's position, issues of controversy were not simply gone into.

Q When President Navon -- in his departure remarks he alluded to -- despite differences of opinion in Israel about certain parts of the President's policy, he said that there was no doubt that the Israelis appreciated American support and American aid. It sounds to me that there was some discussion as to -- with President Reagan of the differences of opinion within Israel regarding his policy. Am I correct? Did they not discuss different divisions within Israel about the President's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think what was made clear was that there were differences of opinion in Israel and, therefore, the President would talk about those issues on which there was consensus.

Q Was the SAM-5 missile -- or the possibility of missile preparation in Syria discussed and the ramifications of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the best of my knowledge, it was not.

Q To what do you attribute the confusion over the basic issue of the reason for the visit -- that is, whether it was an official, informal, casual, or otherwise type of visit to the U.S.?

Q Coincidental type of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll give you my own personal view now. I think that the confusion arises because the people have been trying to read more into this meeting than meets the eye, and it has, as you know, achieved a lot of attention in Israel. But, as I say, if you look at the historical sequence of events, this was scheduled a long, long time ago and got postponed for various reasons. And I think the longer the meeting was delayed, clearly the more speculation there has been about its significance. And I would just leave it at that.

MORE

One more question -- two more.

Q Did President Navon bring any message from Premiere Begin to President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the best of my knowledge, he did not -- but ask him that.

Q A follow up to her question. Do you have anything you can tell us about the SA-5's today -- anything new about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have nothing to add to what's appeared in the press.

Q There was one report that they are en route to Syria now. Can you verify that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't. No.

Q Was there any indication when Begin might come here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q Was there any indication when Begin might come here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was not discussed.

Q No date --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Or Begin's visit at all was not discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no.

Q You said that Navon expressed a consensus view in Israel against redividing Jerusalem and against an independent Palestinian state. What other consensus views did he express besides those two issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the desire on the part of Israel, of course, to have very good relations with the United States and the view that Israel was a strong, pro-Western power in the Middle East and that this clearly had strategic implications. But again I would urge you to go and ask the Israelis the details on --

Q He didn't attempt to say there was any consensus on settlements --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, okay?

Thanks very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:13 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the White House

For Immediate Release January 7, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE LEBANON RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION GROUP

The Briefing Room

2:04 P.M. EST

MR. MCPHERSON: Good afternoon. I'm Peter McPherson, AID Administrator, and the President's personal representative for relief and reconstruction in Lebanon. Here with me are leaders of several voluntary organizations who are working with the relief and reconstruction needs in Lebanon.

The President just greeted and thanked these individuals and members of their groups for the work that they are doing. He indicated that this was an example of the kind of volunteerism that can make such an enormous contribution. He talked in terms also of the type of reconstruction -- relief and reconstruction efforts that these groups are doing to be such an important corollary to the political reconstruction, if you will, that is necessary in that country.

After the President's remarks, the charge from the Lebanese Embassy here in town delivered a message from the President of Lebanon thanking the President and these groups for the work that they are engaged in.

Let me briefly introduce each one of the people here and to tell you just in a sentence or two what their -- that they have done or are doing and then we'd like to open this up for questions to me or to members -- or to leaders of these groups.

Mr. Michel Halbouty on my left is the chairman of a group of Lebanese-Americans who are working to help in a variety of ways -- both charitable and in terms of encouraging investment by Lebanese-Americans and others into Lebanon.

Mr. Ralph Davidson, Chairman of Time, Inc. has put together a group which has completed the raising of something over a million dollars --

MR. DAVIDSON: Two million.

MR. MCPHERSON: Two million dollars. That money now having been distributed -- their job having been done and done very expeditiously and in an excellent fashion.

Behind me is Morgan Williams who is representing a group which is coordinating the private voluntary organizations -- CARE, Catholic Relief, the cooperatives and so on who are -- who have put in since the early days of this problem, extensive efforts and moneys of their own.

In addition, Mr. Lew Preston who is the President of Morgan Guaranty, who is the chairman of a group of senior businessmen who are looking at ways -- beginning to work on ways for increasing investment in Lebanon -- investment -- private sector being such an important part of the reconstruction there.

MORE

Next to him is Mr. Jack Nugent, Chairman of the Board of the American/Lebanon Private Sector Corp. which has also been doing charitable and other investment kinds of efforts.

All these are voluntary groups. All these gentlemen have other occupations and interests but have wanted to contribute. Those are the close of my remarks and we would welcome your questions.

Q How much in terms of money and materiel have gone through this effort, Mr. McPherson?

MR. MCPHERSON: As I say, two million from Ralph Davidson. There is several -- from the private voluntary organizations, there is --

MR. PRESTON: About ten --

MR. MCPHERSON: At least ten million and probably, depending upon how you want to calculate it, considerably more, but at least ten million.

The other groups are in the process of really getting organized so there is no total -- no total at this time. Jack Nugent's group has had several teams go to the country -- two teams go to the country and look at projects -- Preston's group, Lew's group that met this morning, as did Mike Halbouty's, again looking toward investment and increased charitable activity.

You've got a set of problems here. One was the relief stage which some of these groups were involved in. Now we're going into the stage of looking at completing relief or finishing and locating increasing investment, private sector activity in the country.

Q Is Israel making any effort to contribute to the relief of the country it invaded?

MR. MCPHERSON: Israel in the South of Lebanon is doing quite a lot of work especially with the Palestinians in the camps.

Q What kind of work?

Q I was afraid to ask, what kind of work?

MR. MCPHERSON: There's been this problem of housing, as you remember, that the camps were substantially or in all cases at least partially destroyed.

MORE

And so what had to be done was to put up some sort of temporary or somewhat more permanent shelter through UNRWA, one of the U.N. organizations. The U.S. has contributed a substantial -- the U.S. government has contributed a substantial amount of money to put up tents and other things.

There were a variety of problems with getting something going. The Israelis, who are being the kind of occupying party in the area, have worked closely with that and are, in fact, contributing some cement to -- and some other things to this effort to --

Q What other direct aid is the U.S. government giving the government of Lebanon?

MR. McPHERSON: The U.S. government has -- Congress has voted, or the President has allocated a total of $112 million. All but $40 million of that is committed to specific projects -- part of that, a good part of it, going with the government of Lebanon; the rest of it going through private volunteer organizations who have been contractors, in effect; and another part of it going to UNRWA, the monies to UNRWA being for the Palestinians.

Q Would all this move faster if you could get foreign troops out of Lebanon?

MR. McPHERSON: The reconstruction effort, the rebuilding effort generally, and the private sector investment, clearly, would move very well, indeed, if -- with the withdrawal of all foreign troops in the country, that foreign troop withdrawal being a major effort, certainly a part of this government and others.

Q Mr. McPherson, you're talking about -- works in southern Lebanon and contribution of your cement and some other stuff to the Palestinian refugees in south Lebanon, which, in effect, they're working against Lebanese wishes and Lebanese government to get the Palestinians out of Lebanon, especially legal residents. And contributing cement to them, you are erecting, again, illegal housing facilities for them in southern Lebanon?

MR. McPHERSON: The parties that are giving the cement and the money for purchase of building materials are the Israeli government and UNRWA. It's not the U.S. government.

However, it is clear that the Palestinians need to have some kind of temporary, at a minimum, some kind of shelter. What UNRWA is doing, as I say, is some building materials and tents.

Q Do you have a ballpark figure about how much more money the U.S. government might be asking for for this project?

MR. McPHERSON: We don't have a figure that we -- for today. Now, we're obviously looking at what amount of monies we might request from Congress for fiscal year '83 and '84. The monies which have been committed, the $112 million committed and/or to be committed shortly are all from fiscal year '82 appropriations.

Q Realistically speaking, with the situation in Lebanon being as it is, who are you going to get to invest until the foreign troops are out?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, in fact, there has been some investments already from the Middle East and from other places. The context in which, perhaps, Lew, you may wish to comment on this, but put this in the context of the banks in that country, which throughout the period of the civil war and on have continued to grow. It's an anomoly, perhaps, but that has been the case, that even during the tumultuous periods of the recent years, they have grown. And so

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we think there is a reasonable hope that this activity will come forth.

But, as was suggested a moment ago, the physical and the political reconstruction clearly, to some degree, go hand in hand. And we think that these groups' efforts, the U.S. government's efforts, others, are a very important part of -- by physical reconstruction, by political reconstruction.

Lew, did you have any additional comment about that?

MR. PRESTON: No, I think that's a good summary.

Q Why do you think the banking system grew during an invasion of a country?

MR. McPHERSON: Well, Lebanon is in a fairly unique position, really. It is a -- It's an Arab country, but really very European in a lot of ways and the Arab community have liked it, have fostered the life there. Lebanon, historically, was a place of communications and banking, financial interest. And so despite the tumultuous situation, those banks with a solid reputation of caution and so forth have continued to attract money.

MR. PRESTON: Also, a significant amount of workers remittances, from Lebanese working in the Middle East.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:18 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 10, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR PHILIP HABIB

The Briefing Room

2:38 P.M. EST

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Hi, how are you all today?

Q You got news?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Well, I don't know what you call news, Jim, but let me just -- why don't I say something briefly. As you all know, I just met with the President, Secretary and the other members who were in the meeting, and I'm leaving this afternoon. I'll leave this afternoon to return to the Middle East.

The President has asked me to return, as we continue our efforts aimed at restoring peace and stability to that troubled area.

Q What about the fact that Lebanon today --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Wait, let me finish, sweetheart.

The President emphasized the importance he attaches to achieving the prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. It is a disappointment to all of us that more headway has not been made. The President believes, and I will be stressing with the parties involved, that the withdrawal of external forces from Lebanon is essential and remains a top priority as we move ahead on the broader front to achieve a workable peace in the area.

Progress in Lebanon can add momentum as we continue our efforts for a just and lasting peace along the lines put forth by the President on September 1st. There's an urgent need to put the problems of Lebanon behind us so that other concerns can be vigorously addressed. And we will be seeking the full cooperation of all the other parties involved.

Jim?

Q Does that mean that the United States puts a low priority on the establishment or approach of normalization of relations between Lebanon and Israel and the emphasis on withdrawal first of all?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Not by any means. I think what it means is the United States believes that the various problems that have to be discussed and have to be treated in the current situation in Lebanon can be done on an urgent basis and should be done and must be done on an urgent basis so that the withdrawal of all the external forces can proceed. That means Syrian forces, PLO combattants and Israeli forces in Lebanon.

Q Mr. Ambassador --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: That's the emphasis. The emphasis is on the necessity to achieve early withdrawal.

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Q Mr. Ambassador, where are you going first --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'm going to Israel first.

Q Would you be sitting in on the next meeting?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: No, I will not. I'll be going to Israel and see what I can do about impressing upon and soliciting the cooperation of all with this sense of urgency that the President brings to the situation.

Q Do we understand from this that you see more problems from the Israeli side?

AMBASSDOR HABIB: No, I wouldn't draw any such conclusions.

Q Mr. Ambassador, can you --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I will be going to both places. It's just a question of how I choose to -- in what order I choose to go.

Q Can't we draw from this that the President at least feels that Israel's insistence upon the broader agenda is slowing things down?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: What I'm saying is very simple -- is that the problems that are involved in the agenda or in the issues that have to be discussed in order to produce the result need to be dealt with on an urgent basis and they can be dealt with on an urgent basis. What the President's -- if you want to talk about -- I wouldn't use the word, "dissatisfaction" -- the word I use is that we all believe that more headway could have been made. It's just taking too long.

Q Who's fault is it?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Well, I -- we don't want to lay any blame. Let's just simply say that the United States believes that the matter can be dealt with with the greatest sense of urgency, and that's one of the things I'm going to attempt to do, is to move the process along at an accelerated pace.

Q How long do you think it might take to --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Oh, I don't want to judge that yet. When I come back, I might be able to have a better answer to that.

Q Mr. Ambassador, there've been reports that there is some dissatisfaction on the part of either the President or members of the administration with certain members of -- Mr. Veliotes, Mr. Draper --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: You know, I don't get that impression whatsoever. I think the President has demonstrated to me a degree of confidence in the people who are working with this problem. I know I have a great deal of confidence in the two people that you mentioned.

Q When are our soldiers coming home, Mr. Ambassador?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: That's not a decision that I have anything to say about at this time. The President will make the decision at the right time. I -- that didn't come up, very frankly, in our discussions today. In our discussions today, what we concentrated on was the means of accelerating the pace of negotiations so that the withdrawal can take place.

Q You don't have any leverage at all to use with the Israelis?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Let's call it persuasion and common sense and good arguments and good rationalization and a common objective, I hope with all the parties concerned.

Q Is there a need to expand the multinational force --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Right at this point, not at this point, no.

MR. ALLIN: The Ambassador's leaving shortly. That's going to be it.

AMBASSADOR HABIB: As a matter of fact, I haven't got that much time --

Q Where else are you going other than Israel?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'll be going to Lebanon also. And I'll go anywhere else that I think will serve the purpose of accelerating the pace --

Q -- a letter from the President to Mr. Begin?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: You know, we don't talk about that before I get there.

Q How long --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Pardon?

Q How long do you anticipate this --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Oh, I haven't got any idea -- as long as it takes. Whatever I decide in terms of time is usual. But we'll see. You'll know.

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Q What of the optimistic reports earlier today and then a dampening of those?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: Yes. I think what happened is out of the morning meeting -- Now, I do not have a full report as yet as to what went on in that morning meeting -- but, out of the morning meeting there have been sort of conflicting reports. I will wait until I get the reporting cable before I can really properly answer the question. But there were some conflicting reports from Khalde itself. I don't want to misinterpret them and I don't want to mislead you until I get the full report myself, so --

Q Do you have a feeling for it at all?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: There was some discussion of alternatives of how to deal with the problems they've been dealing with, but I would just as soon wait until we get the full report.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you.

Q Could you clarify your earlier --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I'm off.

Q Bon voyage.

Q Can you clarify an earlier answer? The meeting you said you weren't going to be attending, you --

AMBASSADOR HABIB: I don't intend to -- What I said is I don't intend to attend the plenary sessions that are going on alternately -- That was the question, if I recall. That is the --

Q Could you tell us what the President meant when he called Maggie Thatcher the "best man in England"?

AMBASSADOR HABIB: He was quoting somebody, as I -- But you'd better get that from Mort. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:35 P.M. EST

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, JR.
SECRETARY OF STATE
THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1982, 12:26 P. M.

[1983]

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought I would preempt a moment or two of John Hughes' time and make a statement on behalf of the President.

Consistent with the President's firm dedication to pursuing arms controls agreements, based on equality, stability and effective verification, the President is determined that there should be no gap, no matter how short, in the leadership of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency pending the confirmation of Dr. Adelman as its Director.

The President has therefore selected Assistant Director James L. George to assume the position of Acting Director of ACDA.

To assure the best coordination within the Executive Branch of arms control policy, the President has asked Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam to provide day-to-day policy guidance to Mr. George, and to assist in assuring that ACDA's crucial responsibilities in implementing the President's arms control policy are fulfilled.

I may say, beyond that, I had the opportunity two or three days ago with Ken Dam to visit over in ACDA and talk to some of the staff members there, and I know that it's extremely important and helpful for us to have their counsel, help and expertise as this subject goes forward.

QUESTION: Could you tell why Mr. Rostow was fired?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the statements of Mr. Rostow and the President stand for themselves. There's no particular point in delving into them further.

I might say that I read the statement that Mr. Rostow made this morning in his farewell statement, and I found it to be an inspiring and eloquent statement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you clarify for us the jurisdictional arrangement between the State Department and the Arms Control Agency, and, more particularly, your personal role? Is your authority or your control, or whatever word you choose to use, increasing now with the appointment of Mr. Adelman, or is the division, so to speak, between ACDA and State about where it was under Mr. Rostow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I knew I should have had that -- do you have that language?

MR. HUGHES: I think we do.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: John really should have conducted this briefing.

MR. HUGHES: Oh, I don't think so, Mr. Secretary. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, I think it's important to recognize that the person in charge of our arms control policy is the President of the United States. He is very much involved, as I have seen, in this and in other areas. So he's the boss.

According to the statute, Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, it indicates that "The Director of ACDA shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the government for arms control and disarmament matters." So that puts the Secretary of State into this picture.

In Section 33 it states that the Director "is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other agencies, recommendations concerning United States' arms control and disarmament policy."

Within the framework the President has asked, both before and since Mr. Rostow's resignation, that I help to coordinate these matters. That is what I intend to do and am doing. So I don't think that the sort of formal structure of authority is so important as it is to recognize that the President is in charge. There's a very competent set of staff people around in the government working on this, and the senior people are personally heavily engaged in the effort.

QUESTION: What I think we're trying to find out is, what will be different as a result of the changes that have taken place in the last 24 hours?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, the policy of the United States stands. It's a very strong and firm policy, calling for dramatic reductions in armaments, for the removal of a whole class of weapons from European soil, and for the reductions in many others, not only in the strategic and missiles area, but also in the conventional force area.

That is the policy. That policy is being implemented by strong negotiators, and that policy stands.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't you agree --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Maybe I can take two more, and then I'll hand it over to --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't you agree that there is an appearance of disarray in the Administration, not just because of Mr. Rostow's resignation, but because of the nominees that were withdrawn recently? Isn't there an appearance of disarray?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's clear that we have had trouble getting the Deputy Director of ACDA confirmed. That's not the first time that's happened in this government. However, the policy of the government and the conduct of the negotiations is and has been going forward in a strong and purposeful way. That's the real point. I think in the new appointees the President has people who are very capable and will work effectively with him and others.

So I think, quite to the contrary, we have this situation firmly in control. Of course, one of the purposes of the additional statement that I've made this morning is simply to clarify the fact that there will be an acting director, who that is, and that Ken Dam, who has been working on this subject very heavily with me and others -- not only in State but the other interested agencies -- will be over there and will be helping and be sure that the ACDA staff is tied in and its capabilities fully utilized in this period that we're now in.

Maybe one more question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in a column by Joseph Kraft this morning, from apparently talking to you, he concluded or you told him -- it's not clear -- that after the German elections in March there will be a change in the American zero option position at Geneva.

I just wondered whether in fact it is your view that you should change it or wait until the German elections?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would make two comments. First of all, Joe Kraft speaks for himself, and I speak for myself.

Second, the recommendations, as I evolve them in this and other areas, I'll make to the President, and we'll conduct our negotiations in Geneva.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE OF JAPAN

January 14, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:20 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: May I have your attention, please? We will have a background briefing on the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone of Japan, who will be here next Tuesday. I want to emphasize once again that this is a background briefing. You may attribute the remarks by direct quotations or however you wish to a Senior Administration Official, but it is on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have a brief statement to start with, and then I'll be glad to take your questions.

This will be what is termed an official working visit. Prime Minister Nakasone expressed interest in visiting the United States soon after he took office at the end of November. The President in turn was delighted to have the opportunity to meet with the Prime Minister at an early date and conveyed an invitation to come to Washington at the time that Ambassador Rumsfeld visited Japan as a special emissary in early December.

The Prime Minister will arrive Monday afternoon. He will have two full working days here before returning directly to Tokyo the morning of January 20. His visit will include a meeting followed by a working lunch with the President on January 18 and after that he will meet separately with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger.

He has also invited Cabinet members concerned with economic affairs, including the Secretary of State, to come to breakfast January 19.

Those are his official executive branch appointments, but he also has meetings on the Hill, and Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe will also be having a bilateral meeting.

As you are probably aware already from the Prime Minister's public statements during his first weeks in office, Nakasone has placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of strengthening U.S.-Japan relations. He sees his visit to Washington in that light, as do we, and both sides look forward to establishing personal rapport between the two leaders.

We have been observing with very great interest the energetic manner in which Nakasone has approached his job in his first six weeks in office. He has managed to steer through tariff cuts and market opening measures on some items that are of particular interest to American exporters, particularly on tobacco products, and he managed to secure a larger increase in the defense budget than it seemed to be in prospect before he became involved.

Just today, we received word that a new policy that would open the door for Japanese defense technology to be provided to the United States has been approved by the Cabinet, making such exchange a two-way street.

Perhaps the Prime Minister's most dramatic move was to reach agreement on long-term economic aid to Korea during a personal visit that he recently made to Seoul, a visit that was precedent-setting and we understand very successful. That was not something in which we were directly involved, of course, but it is clear that good

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relations between our two northeast Asian allies contribute to the important goal of stability in a region where the United States also has enormous interests at stake, and where in fact U.S. forces are directly committed.

What all this adds up to, I think, is that Nakasone has gotten off to a very good and strong start. It does not mean that we don't continue to have some very hard problems to discuss, and we will be doing so.

The recent market-opening measures that I just mentioned are only a step toward the much more extensive action by Japan that we believe is necessary. We still feel that there is a very long way to go before U.S. products enjoy the same freedom of access to Japanese markets as Japanese products have here in the United States.

Protectionist sentiment here is growing and prompt Japanese action is required.

On the defense buildup, we still do not feel that the pace of Japan's effort is adequate to provide it in a reasonable period of time the capability to fulfill the self defense roles and missions that Japan itself has undertaken to carry out.

These issues are not going to be swept under the rug during the Prime Minister's visit. To the contrary, we anticipate some tough, frank discussion. Progress in both of these areas is a top priority for us.

At the same time, and it's very important to emphasize, we do not view this as exclusively a

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trade and defense visit. We will discuss these issues. But the President very much looks forward to the opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister on a wide range of world problems where, for the most part, we have very similar interests, and where we believe Japan has an increasing -- plays, already, an important role and has an increasingly important role to play in the rest of this decade and in the decades to come.

I would anticipate discussion taking place on relations with the Soviet Union, on the Middle East, and, of course, on the many problems of the Asian region. We are, also, very interested in exchanging views on how Japanese economic assistance might contribute to diplomatic goals that we both share, and how we might mesh our respective foreign assistance programs where that is appropriate.

We will want to discuss international economic issues -- for example, follow up on the GATT work program. And the President, I am sure, will want to talk a bit about the next summit meeting at Williamsburg. That indicates a pretty full agenda. And it, also, shows what I think is important to emphasize -- what a far-reaching relationship Japan and the United States have. It is a relationship that is significant not just for peace and security in Asia, but for our overall, global foreign policy.

I would be pleased now to take any questions. And I might add that I look forward to meeting with many of you again next week at the conclusion of the visit.

Q What level would you like to see Japan increase its defense budget over what has been projected for '83?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are trying not to talk about specific levels of expenditures, specific rates of increase. We are trying to talk about specific missions on which the Japanese have proposed a program of Japanese responsibility for the air, sea and ground self-defense of Japan and for sealane defense out to a distance of a thousand miles. And we have talked about these roles and missions and the capabilities required to fulfill those roles and missions. And what we would like to see is a level of expenditure that will bring Japan to be able to meet those missions as rapidly as possible.

We are somewhat concerned that the rate of increase recently announced, while notable as one of the only areas of the Japanese budget that was increased -- and the other area was foreign assistance, which we, also, welcome. Nevertheless, the rate of increase is not sufficient, we fear, to achieve those capabilities within what we think is a reasonable period of time. So we will very much be looking for Prime Minister Nakasone's further leadership in this as Japan approaches future defense-budgeting decisions.

Q You were referring to a summit meeting in Williamsburg. Is that a GATT?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. That is the summit of the Seven, the economic summit -- the one that was in Paris last year.

Q Beef and citrus were not addressed in the trade liberalization package. Will President Reagan personally urge Nakasone to eliminate the quotas on beef and citrus?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Beef and citrus are definitely one of the important trade items that will be pressed. It is an extensive agendum -- beef and citrus quotas -- which we are negotiating -- where we would like to see eventual, complete relaxation of the quotas, and, in any case, a substantial liberalization.

There are other issues as well -- various non-tariff barriers, the whole question of the upgrading of the Trade Ombudsman's Office, where we note in the recent package of measures announced that there seems to be some intention already to move forward with that. That is very important to us. Questions of procurement of U.S. products by Nippon Telephone and Telegraph under an agreement that was reached earlier, but where there have, so far, been very limited results -- there is a range of these issues. And I cannot predict, given the amounts of time available, how much the President will get into the specifics. But he is going to make the point very forcefully. And it is going to be made in detail in a number of the meetings with Cabinet officers, including the breakfast with the economic Cabinet officers.

Q Will the President be asking for a commitment to renew the automobile quotas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I think you know, that decision is a unilateral --

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has to be a unilateral decision of the Japanese, and it's not something that we would raise with them directly. We do have a feeling that, given the current state of the American automobile industry -- that a third year might well be appropriate. But I don't believe we'll push that matter directly.

Q You may not push it -- would you expect the Prime Minister to make a statement on that subject --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask him that question.

Q You mentioned the -- You welcomed the Japanese Prime Minister's decision to make a stronger tie with the United States about our transfer of technology. What sort of items do you really want -- like computer and -- could you elaborate on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's probably better addressed in detail to my defense colleagues. It's, at the moment though, a very important issue, first of principle, and, secondly, looking to the future. There may be certain items now, but the more important thing is that we are increasingly impressed with Japan's capability in a number of areas and expect those areas to grow in the future.

And we would like to establish a pattern of two-way exchange. A great deal of American defense technology, of course, has gone into Japanese projects and we expect would continue under this arrangement. Fibre optics is one area that I've heard mentioned a great deal but, really, any area where Japan's technology is better than ours, and there are quite a few.

Q Yes, on the auto -- surprised that you would say that there's a need for a renewal, inasmuch as the U.S. industry, according to the latest figures, is turning things around and doing quite well. Don't you see the health of Detroit as maybe not necessitating this renewal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess I think it's a little premature to come to that conclusion. But I can't -- I must say I am not sufficiently expert on the specific auto sales statistics. But we've seen some hopeful signs, but it's very early.

Q Specifically, will Japanese government subsidies to the machine tool industry and to the steel industry be raised by the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether we'd get into that level of detail, but that's -- partly you're referring to a very specific case that raises some extremely complicated and novel issues that, in fact, we are still reviewing and where the U.S. government position on those issues isn't even quite clear yet.

Q To follow up, will those issues specifically be raised at levels beneath that of the President and Prime Minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: During the course of the visit?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Probably not yet.

Q I don't quite understand why your position is that we would not bring up the automobile because, before the automobile thing was put in, if I recollect correctly, there was a lot of talk by the U.S. government asking them to do this, and now it's about to expire. And, secondly, could you tell us anything about the status of Ambassador Mansfield?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could tell you about the status of Ambassador Mansfield. He's alive and well and very vigorous. And he met with the President this morning during a Cabinet discussion of the visit and made some very strong contributions. And, as to things beyond that, neither I nor Ambassador Mansfield know anything about some of the speculation that's appeared.

Q Does he say he doesn't know anything about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q He has no intention of resigning now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask him. Beyond that --

Q Can you answer the thing about the auto debt? Why do we take this hands-off position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a voluntary -- I believe I know the more precise answer, but it is a voluntary agreement by the Japanese. And it's important that it be so, and, therefore, it has to be done at their own initiative.

Q That doesn't mean we wouldn't bring it up and talk about it, does it? I don't quite --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would not be a matter for bilateral negotiation.

Q Do you have any areas at all where you want to see any specific accord before the end of the visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would kind of like to avoid a checklist approach. As a matter of fact, there have been a number of areas like -- I just mention the technology transfer -- defense technology transfer is one where there's been specific agreement right before the visit. And focusing too specifically on the gains that can be made in a couple of days, in fact, is rather opposite to the approach that we want to take, which is to emphasize that while there is a great deal of forward progress, as I've noted in just the first -- what is it -- 50 days of the Prime Minister's tenure -- that we don't expect these problems to be solved overnight or in one visit.

And part of the purpose of the visit, in fact, is to impress the importance of moving beyond these measures, and that will take some

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time.

Q Last month in Europe, there was a lot of talk with Secretary Shultz about bringing Japan into the general security, East-West security talks. How far have those discussions gone with Japan? Where do you see things are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean the various studies that flowed out of the -- There are four different areas of study and the Japanese will be involved in all of them in different ways. There's one that will probably be conducted in the NATO framework and there the question of how Japanese views will be factored in and at what point they'll be consulted is a question we're still working out. But we expect, I think, to have some kind of solution in that fairly soon.

Q Is this going to be a particular point of discussion next week?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It might be, at lower levels.

Q If I remember right, we have repeatedly told the Japanese that if they don't do something about the beef and citrus quotas we will take that complaint to the GATT.

Now, in light of the fact that they have put forward another trade liberalization program which still doesn't address those, are we now ready to go to the GATT with that complaint?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think our decision at the moment is that this is not yet the time to go to the GATT and that it would not further the objectives we have in these negotiations. It remains an instrument that we will use if and when we think it will help.

Q Did the subject of exports of Alaska oil to Japan come up? And, if so, is the administration prepared to say that it would support these exports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we noted that it was one of the points that Prime Minister Nakasone raised in his television interview this morning; so I'm sure it will come up in the discussions. But we would not yet be in a position to have a U.S. government position on that.

Q To go back to beef and citrus one last time, is this a meeting at which we should expect some progress to be made on it? It's going to be discussed, obviously, as you said; but is this a kind of a decision-making meeting of any sort or will there be a Japanese signal of any kind at the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't venture to predict. But I think the beef and citrus issues are among the very toughest ones and they involve significant domestic problems in Japan. And I -- they're not -- they're precisely, in my thought, the examples of the kind of thing that I think will take a little more time. Although, we would like to see progress pretty rapidly.

Q Will aluminum baseball bats come up? And I know not in themselves; but as epitomizing a whole range of non-tariff area problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That whole -- The aluminum baseball bat problem has gone through a sort of interesting evolution because, where the issue was how could we get certification in such a form that it would make American imports a practicality, the issue has now been quasi-resolved by simply dropping the requirement for certification for all metal baseball bats in Japan.

But the more specific point about procedures and, as -- for example -- and this is why the trade subject becomes so difficult, it makes all the difference in the world, for example, whether your imports can be inspected in the factory in the United States or whether each individual lot has to be inspected when it arrives in Japan, whether you can come to general agreement on standards and self-certification or whether each individual item has to be re-subjected to Japanese standards. And that's one of the things that the Office of the Trade Ombudsman is designed to deal with and we'll have to see in practice how successful that is.

The general point will be raised very forcefully because I think it's a general view among U.S. experts that these non-tariff barriers are an even more serious obstacle than specific tariff barriers.

Q But the words "metal baseball bat" probably won't pass the President's lips?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think even if it were a live issue now he wouldn't get down to that detail; but, as I say, that's one that we think has been resolved.

Q What do you think of the prospect of resolving U.S.-Japan trade issues as a whole during the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's impossible.

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whether it's possible to resolve U.S.-Japan trade relations as a whole during the meeting. The issues are just too many and too complicated and too difficult to do that in one short visit.

Q The Japanese are concerned about domestic content legislation on the Hill? What will the President discuss on that issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position remains strongly opposed to that. We think it's a serious threat to the free trading system that we think is essential to our own prosperity and the prosperity of the world. I think we will also be pressing hard that it's essential to Japan's prosperity and that Japan has the responsibility at least equal to ours to help to protect that system. And we note with some satisfaction that Prime Minister Nakasone has acknowledged that responsibility in some of his early public statements.

Q You mentioned earlier the need for prompt Japanese action in order to stave off that kind of protectionist sentiment that you said was growing here. Since beef and citrus were one area where you didn't think prompt --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a difference between prompt and taking place during this visit.

Q Could you tick off a couple of things where you would expect that Japan would be able to achieve prompt action that could stave off protectionist sentiment in the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been a great deal of prompt action already up to the visit. We've, in the last few weeks had a large number of trade measures announced, some of them just a few days ago and we're still in the process of analyzing them. We note that a number of areas of considerable importance to the U.S. -- there's already been progress on. That's very prompt. And when I used the word before, I keep trying to emphasize we see the visit as an important step in a process which we hope will move over the next months to even more substantial progress but to try to measure the temperature at one 48-hour period and then say the problem is solved is not our approach.

Q What role does the administration see for private sector agreements like GM -Toyota co-production and reducing these trade tensions and resolving some of these protectionist problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess you know with this administration anything the private sector does, we will support.

Q Do you see it playing a truly important role in all of this or is it just a nice thing that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It remains to be seen,but I think that is the sort of area, in principle, where one is working with market forces rather than against them -- where inevitably you make the biggest progress. So -- but that's for the private sector to figure out. If the opportunities are there, it would be a very useful kind of step.

Q Last year, the President indicated that he would visit the Far East early this year. Would you think that that travel plan would be discussed during some meeting --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry.

Q Last year the President indicated that he would visit the Far East early this year --

SENIOR ADMINISTATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and whether his travel plans might be discussed during this meeting. I imagine they might discuss the possibility of his visiting Japan but I don't know whether --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No plans at this time. Thank you. (Laughter.)

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Q You mentioned we might be interested in what Japan's foreign economic assistance could do to further foreign policy goals. Can you elaborate a little bit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the point really is this. I think it was Prime Minister Ohira some years ago put forward the notion of comprehensive security. I may have my author wrong but it was a Japanese notion that security is something more than just defense spending -- that security, in fact, is a product of not only military factors but political stability, economic progress and that there are many efforts that contribute to the stability and, therefore, contribute to peace and the implication that there are many things that Japan can do to contribute quite apart from the restrictions on its own military effort. And essentially, that is a philosophy that we subscribe to as well that the process of securing world peace, of promoting stability is not something that is done, by any means, exclusively through military and defense efforts. And this administration has put a very high priority on its foreign assistance program. We're frankly very unhappy with the difficulties we've had getting adequate funding from the Congress. And we are urging all of our allies that can contribute to do as much as they can. Japan, we feel, could do a great deal given the resources Japan has available and given the relatively low burden of -- if one wanted to add them together, defense and foreign assistance.

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Q One thing you did not mention was the yen problem. There's been some speculation that the visit might be the occasion to try to get some greater understanding or some understanding with the Japanese about the valuation of the yen versus the dollar. Is there any anticipation that that is going to be a major topic of discussion or what is the U.S. posture on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I imagine Secretary Regan might want to get into that. The whole question is a matter of considerable concern because it fundamentally affects, the weakness of the yen and the strength of the dollar has fundamentally affected our competitiveness with Japan in foreign markets.

We do note that the yen has strengthened impressively in the last few months and the problem is much less severe than it was a little while ago. And, despite many allegations to the contrary, there's no evidence of any efforts to artificially keep the yen low.

But I think the whole question of currency fluctuations and the desirability of trying to keep stable markets is something that's certain to be discussed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll take two more questions here.

Q Your previous response to the question about Ambassador Mansfield was qualified by linking it to the present moment. Can we presume that there will be no announcement of a new Tokyo ambassador during the visit of Mr. Nakasone? That goes up to January 21.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can tell you is I know nothing about such an announcement. Ambassador Mansfield knows nothing about such an announcement.

Q Has Ambassador Mansfield indicated in any way his desire to retire from public life?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question?

Q I just want to know if you expect Prime Minister Nakasone to raise the issue of domestic content bill and, also, whether the administration is retaining its resolve against that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We already covered that question, sir. It will be in the transcript. Let's get another question that hasn't been asked. Right over here.

Q There has been speculation, particularly in Asia, that the agreement between Japan and Korea and the fact that both of them are strong allies of the United States and means a de facto military alliance of the three parties in Northeast Asia. Would you comment on that? You touched on it slightly in your opening statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm very glad you raised that specific topic because I think that, among the most dramatic and impressive things that the Prime Minister has done, the statesmanship that he's shown, not just with Korea, but really the whole Asian region since taking office is a source of great optimism.

He made what may seem like only a gesture, but a very important gesture, I think his first day in office, of placing personal phone calls to President Chun of Korea, to all of the ASEAN heads of state and I think to Premier Zhao Ziyang of China, as well. And Japan can play a major, positive, constructive role in Asia and we believe that this visit, which, if I mentioned -- the Prime Minister is coming to the United States having just made a visit to Korea. All our reports suggest that it was an impressive success, including a very warmly received short speech that he gave in Korean, which certainly impresses me.

He's really extended himself and I think healthy U.S.-Japan relations are a real contributor to stability. I think the notion that this somehow suggests a U.S.-Japan-Korea security arrangement is simply nonsensical and it is a measure of the kind of criticism that the Prime Minister has been willing to brave in order to make this step forward.

He also, in the process of that visit, announced the resolution of a longstanding negotiation between Japan and Korea over a substantially increased Japanese economic assistance package to Korea which we think will contribute to economic stability in Korea and, therefore, it's something that is certainly helpful in a general way.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:49 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER YASUHIRO NAKASONE
OF JAPAN

January 18, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:57 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Okay. I would like to begin the background briefing on the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone. This is a background briefing, attributable to a senior administration official. You may use the quotations as you wish. But they must be attributed to a senior administration official.

For your information, the briefer today is [redacted] If there happens to be anybody here who does not feel that he can comply with these general guidelines of the White House Press Office, we would suggest -- as has been done in the past -- that they not use this material, or attend the briefing.

Yes, Mr. Clines?

Q One question, a brief question -- in the light of the President's caution last week and his policy against stories that are anonymously sourced, how do you rationalize this performance with that policy?

MR. ALLIN: The President's statement said that, in most cases, it is best to have on-the-record interviews. We, generally, are doing that. As you know, Mr. Clines, it has been a very successful policy over the last 10 days. And today, we are having one of our relatively rare background sessions.

Q -- it is an exception to the President's policy. That is all that you have to say. Is that correct?

MR. ALLIN: I am not going to argue, Frank. The President's statement said -- in most cases it is best to have on-the-record interviews. For a number of reasons, we would prefer to do this on background. We feel it can be more helpful to you and to the entire press corps. And the President understands and accepts that. It is fine.

Q Are you going to move a little closer? Maybe the State Department official -- the senior State Department official --

MR. ALLIN: Senior administration official.

Q We cannot even go to the State Department?

MR. ALLIN: He speaks for the entire administration. Okay?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have got a short statement here, to begin with. And then, I will be glad to take questions.

During the meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone, the President indicated his belief in the importance of strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship, and achieving a better understanding of our mutual interests and responsibilities. The President welcomed this opportunity to deepen his personal relationship with the Prime Minister. He looks forward to meeting with him again at the Williamsburg summit.

Most importantly, the President and Prime Minister Nakasone reaffirmed the close alliance between the United States and Japan, and the importance of their cooperation in meeting the responsibilities that we both share for coping with the major global issues related to world peace and world prosperity.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that their two countries should play a major role in revitalizing the world economy, and continue our efforts to resist protectionism, to sustain the free-trading system and to assist developing countries in managing their external debts.

Constructive and very frank discussion took place in regard to the major bilateral issues between the United States and Japan. The Prime Minister explained that he had already made a number of important decisions for the solution of these issues during the short time that he had been in office -- despite considerable domestic difficulties -- having in mind the fundamental importance that the Prime Minister attaches to U.S.-Japan relations. The Prime Minister stated his intention to discharge Japan's responsibilities more than in the past, and in line with Japan's strength and importance. Although, he noted that there are things that Japan is capable of doing, and not capable doing.

The President expressed appreciation for Prime Minister Nakasone's leadership, and the efforts already made by him to make this series of policy decisions. The President emphasized the importance the United States attaches to improving access to Japanese markets, particularly at a time of economic difficulties here at home. The President and his Cabinet officers welcomed the positive steps the Prime Minister had already taken in his administration toward improving market access, as well as the Prime Minister's assurance that this would be a continuing process. The President noted that, together with the United States, Japan can play a key role in maintaining the free-trading system of which Japan is a major beneficiary. He assured the Prime Minister that he would

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continue to resist protectionist pressures and emphasize the necessity that the steps undertaken by the Prime Minister yield concrete results soon.

Prime Minister Nakasone called attention to the good cooperation that our two countries enjoy in the security area and said that it is his policy that Japan, on its own initiative, should be able to perform the self-defense missions that it has undertaken.

The President welcomed this constructive approach and the leadership that the Prime Minister has already shown in defense matters, while noting our desire that Japan should continue to move ahead more rapidly in order to obtain the capability to fulfill its defense plans.

The international situation was discussed at some length. The President and the Prime Minister noted that they shared very similar views. In regard to East-West issues, they agreed that it was important for the West to act in close solidarity, inasmuch as the Andropov regime is in the formative stages of shaping its policies and it is necessary both to seek self-restraint by the USSR and to pursue a dialogue with it.

The subject of arms control was discussed at some length and the Prime Minister expressed support for the President's efforts.

The Prime Minister mentioned his recent historic visit to the Republic of Korea. The United States welcomes the statesmanship of the Prime Minister in bringing about an improvement in their relations -- and constructing a relationship of mutual trust with this important neighbor of Japan's.

In discussing the Asian situation, the two leaders noted the importance of good relations with China and supporting China's efforts to pursue economic development in accord with moderate and pragmatic policies.

The Prime Minister said that Japan would continue to promote cooperative relations with China. And the President indicated that this conformed with U.S. policy.

They also agreed that the United States and Japan would continue their respective efforts to promote peace, stability and the relaxation of tensions in the Pacific region, considering the major roles that our two countries had to play in cooperation with each other throughout the entire region.

The two leaders agreed on the importance of sustaining close consultation between them, building on the accomplishments of this visit. And they confirmed that they would cooperate closely towards the success of the Williamsburg Summit.

Finally, as you heard in the announcement, as the Prime Minister left, there was a fairly long one-on-one meeting between the two men before the larger session. And during that meeting, the President extended an invitation to the Prime Minister to come back for breakfast tomorrow morning. And, as we understand it now, that invitation has been extended also to include the Prime Minister's wife and daughter.

Q So that's a social visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not a social visit. In fact, the intention of the visit is to have more time to pursue particularly the international issues, which we got into over lunch and which they will probably be continuing tomorrow.

Q Along with the wives and the children?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they will be present.

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Q Seriously, may I ask you -- They're going to discuss the international situation at breakfast with their wives and with the Prime Minister's daughter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the precise arrangements. I believe that the families will be present. Perhaps it's a separate breakfast for the family.

Q What were some of the things -- You said that the Prime Minister said Japan can do some things and can't do other things. What were some of the things he said Japan could not do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was less specific about those things in emphasizing the need for a pace that would conform with political realities in Japan and with what he was able to move forward. He noted that he had gone a great deal already beyond the general consensus, that he had pushed through a number of difficult decisions. He indicated his sense that Japan has important debts to pay -- it was used in a figurative sense -- and that he does not like to be a debtor and wants to pay his debts, but that this will take some time.

Q Did any of those "could-not-do's" extend to the security area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, in the security area, we discussed the general point that there's considerable agreement on the missions that we would both like to see Japan assume in the area. And the Prime Minister, in fact, elaborated at some length on those missions

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which he helped himself to define in his previous capacity as the head of the Defense Agency. The question of the pace at which Japan achieves that capability was discussed, and the President and Secretary Weinberger urged more rapid efforts.

Q Did the Prime Minister bring with him specific steps that -- additional steps that Japan can take or that he intends to take on trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister has taken a great many specific steps, as I think you know, in just the last couple of weeks. And the most important thing right now, as was stressed by both sides during this meeting, is going to be the implementation of these steps, including some very important non-tariff barriers that are to be reduced through streamlining of inspection procedures and strengthening the Office of the Trade Ombudsman. And the Prime Minister indicated that he had personally charged the Cabinet Secretary with overseeing the implementation of those measures.

Q Did he give any indication of plans to extend the voluntary limitation on export of autos to the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That subject did not come up.

Q -- talk about the subject on beef and citrus --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That subject was discussed at some length.

Q -- currency come up?

Q Can you tell us the substance of the discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm getting too many questions. Do you want to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can we just do this by recognition?

Q -- ask a question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I understand that. We're going to right now. Yes.

Q How was it discussed? Could you give me some -- on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Strong concerns of the American side in securing greater opening of the Japanese market to U.S. products, including agricultural products and including specifically beef and citrus were pressed. The Prime Minister noted that he was very aware of the strong interest the United States has expressed on those issues, that he also called attention to the very difficult political problems in Japan in making progress on those issues, that he had undertaken a great many other measures which were already the subject of some political controversy. But the two sides are clearly going to be addressing that further in government-to-government talks in the coming weeks and months.

Q Did the President discuss possibly making a trip to Japan and other countries in the Pacific area? And, if so, when? And, secondly, if Japan opens up markets to U.S. beef, did the Prime Minister talk about, perhaps, closing those same markets to other countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did the Prime Minister talk about closing markets?

Q Well, for example, if Japan takes more U.S. beef, some other allies are going to be hurt by that. Did that come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that did not come up. A further point on beef and citrus, of course, is the Prime Minister emphasized the very large share of U.S. beef and citrus exports that already go to Japan. I believe the figures are: 60 percent of our exports of beef go to Japan and some 40 percent of our citrus.

Specifically, on the question of travel, it did not come up in the meetings that I was present, but, as I say, there was a fairly long session between just the two men with, I believe, Judge Clark joining briefly at the end. And it may have been brought up there.

Q Is there any way we could find out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might just say a general word on -- or two general words on both the atmosphere of the meetings and the attitude of the two leaders toward the problems that they face. I think there was a frankness, a concreteness, and a specificity in addressing a series of very hard issues that is testimony to the sophistication of both sides and the maturity of the relationship. And the discussion got down to business very quickly and got down to details very quickly.

I think a measure of the sense of the importance of the situation that the President and the Prime Minister faced was illustrated most clearly at one point when Prime Minister Nakasone mentioned, as I believe he has mentioned in public on at least one occasion, that he feels very much -- to use an American analogy from -- drawn from an American sport -- he feels very much like the pitcher who has come up with the bases loaded and no outs. And this reminded the President of the story of the pitcher who came to bat with the bases loaded and no outs and was asked, "What are you going to do with the next batter?" And he said, "Well, it doesn't look as though there's any room to put him on the bases." And said, "I feel as though we're both very much in the same situation." I think both leaders realize that our two countries, with an extremely important relationship between them, have some very hard problems that are going to take very careful and tough management in the months ahead.

Q Can you explain why, given the President's assurance of yesterday to some of the auto industry people who were here, that the whole issue of the extension did not come up? Is there some reason why or do we have some understanding already that there is an agreement in hand or --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The whole question of -- The President met with a number of labor and industrial leaders yesterday and talked about a long agenda of trade problems, a great many of which came up in the meeting today. The one that I was specifically asked about, that I think you're referring to, is auto restraints, where the whole question involves the question of unilateral restraints by Japan and where it's not a matter of negotiating an agreement.

Q What was said about the ways the Japanese might assist the developing countries? Was there anything of that type?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was said, and this was said about a number of topics, is that our two countries have a responsibility -- and that word responsibility was used repeatedly and by both sides -- a responsibility for maintaining a stable and prosperous international economy, a responsibility for assisting developing countries to progress economically, and that, in carrying out both of those responsibilities, we face, at present, a very important problem of major debt problems accumulated by countries who, in the present world economic conditions, have great difficulty in paying off those debts, and the need for both of us to address that and to address the problem of international liquidity.

Q But, to address it in your limitation, why did you say that the automobile industry is a unilateral action by Japan? Isn't the same thing true of citrus and beef?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, if --

Q We're not setting their --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The citrus and beef, I believe, the quotas are established under agreements which expire, I think it's in March of next year, and we're in the process right now of negotiating an extension of that agreement. That is a bilateral agreement and it --

Q The automobile thing is a three-year deal, too, which the extension of is pretty interesting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The automobile thing is a unilateral restraint by the Japanese. It's not an agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mike?

Q Well, is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hold up. We'll get to you all. Mike?

Q Specifically on defense, fill in some details for us. What did the President ask Japan to do in accelerating its self-defense role? What did the Prime Minister do? What did he say about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister noted what he had done so far, which we, in fact, have noted. The Secretary of Defense noted those efforts and noted that, in fact, it had been done in spite of considerable opposition from the Finance Ministry, and we welcome the fact that, in a budget which shows no increases in any other categories, Japan has substantially increased both its defense and foreign assistance expenditures.

The point, however, is that, when we look at the specific missions that are to be accomplished and compare capability with those missions and look at at what point in the future will Japan achieve the capability to perform those missions, it's further off than we would like to see. And so we're expressing a hope, expectation that, as circumstances permit, the rate of increase, the rate of spending will be improved.

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Q What are those missions? What are the missions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What are those missions?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Specifically, the -- They are specifically defensive missions. They do not involve -- No one is suggesting that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons. No one is suggesting that Japan should project its military forces beyond Japan.

What we are talking about is the defense of Japanese territory and Japanese air space and Japanese assumption of responsibility for the defense of sea lanes and, more specifically, I think one can say the sea lanes between the Bashi Channel in Tokyo and, generally, between the Western Pacific and Tokyo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Barry.

Q Did the President make any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Barry Cunningham. Just a minute.

Q Did the Prime Minister ask for any trade concessions such as Alaskan oil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand that the subject of Alaskan oil was discussed in the meeting with the President before and I only know from what I can say of our position that the result is going to have to be that we will look into it, because we're certainly not prepared to take a position on that now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Frank.

Q Did the Prime Minister give any specific assurances or promises to the President which he hadn't already enunciated before coming to this country? Was anything further advanced in terms of trade or security in specific terms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you're talking about specifics, there were not additional specifics and, as I think I said clearly on Friday, we did not expect additional specifics. But there was a great deal of assurance about the importance that the Prime Minister attaches to U.S.-Japan relations, that he sees it as the most important element in Japanese foreign policy, and that he sees it as the major objective of his cabinet to take the actions that are needed to strengthen those relations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Frank.

Q On the question of auto, just so it's clear, are you saying that it wouldn't be proper for that point to come up and so, therefore, it's not going to be coming up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's my understanding. That's correct.

Q Did they get into the question of China, relations with China and the China-Soviet talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they did. I think, as I said in the statement, both the President

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and Secretary Shultz talked about our relations with China. And both sides expressed conviction about the importance of those relations, about taking efforts to improve those relations.

And there was some general discussion of China's talks with the Soviets, but not in detail.

Q -- question about the proposed Japanese targeting of the high tech industry in the United States. In other words, there's some talk that they're going to go after -- the next industry they're going to go after is the high tech industry. Have they had any discussion about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the discussions I heard, a great many other topics were raised. That specific one didn't come up, but it very well is likely to in the Prime Minister's meeting tomorrow with the economic Cabinet.

Q May I follow that question briefly? The attention on computers and electronics has been especially high. Did it come up in any context at all in this meeting today, anything to do with computers, electronics, high tech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think they were addressed specifically.

Q Can you say on autos whether there is any understanding here, that there is any Japanese willingness to scale back the agreement and to extend for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask the Japanese that.

Q Has the whole issue of currency conversion come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not, again, in the discussions that I heard, but I think that, in fact, is more likely to be a subject of discussion in tomorrow's meeting with the economic Cabinet.

Q One technology question -- Was there a discussion of Japan's flow of technology to this country to help the defense effort?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, there was an important decision made by the Prime Minister that eliminates the barriers that existed previously to a genuinely two-way exchange of defensive technology. And that's one of the early actions that he's taken that we very much welcome, but we believe that problem is now resolved.

There may have been some brief mention of our appreciation for the fact that it's happened.

Q I don't quite understand about tomorrow's meeting, whether it's that they weren't able to finish all they talked about or whether some thing was the President's desire to expand on in a kind of personal way or what. And, secondly, what is the U.S. assessment of this now? Do you feel that or does the President that you -- does the administration feel that Nakasone's statements and his attitude are going to be sufficient to diffuse this protectionist drive in the United States or is it uncertain about where it comes out with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it's probably also important to note that even beginning with what is normally just a brief protocol call when the Secretary escorted the

Prime Minister to his hotel, they ended up staying and talking, I believe, for over half an hour in kind of general terms about the problems that we face mutually. And it's probably partly as a result of that that it's since developed that it was important to try to get some more time between the Prime Minister and the President in these meetings. And we anticipate that tomorrow's discussions will be rather substantive since we had a really very full agenda of trade, agriculture and defense discussions in the Cabinet Room session today and then over lunch.

It's our expectation that the focus of tomorrow's meeting will be on such subjects -- more detail about East-West relations and general global problems. And it's certainly is going to be a substantive discussion.

Q Are they going --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a minute, please. Could I -- any of the Japanese journalists that have some questions here --

Q What about the -- How do you assess the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Second part of that question -- I think our assessment is, if anything, strengthened from what I told you Friday that we -- Friday, based simply on what the actions that the Prime Minister has taken and how -- strengthened by the statements that he's made and the conviction that he's shown and the obvious command of specifics and of issues that he possesses, that here's a man who understands the problems, has the political courage to take difficult decisions and certainly, therefore, gives us some grounds for optimism that the very difficult problems we face may be solved.

But they are difficult problems. There's no underestimating the difficulty. And we'll have to see how we both come out of it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Any of the Japanese journalists? Yes? Back there. Yes?

Q Concerning with the Soviet Union, the nuclear difficulty twice in the area, they talked about three known nuclear principles of Japanese responses?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no reason that that should have come up. I think, as I've said, it's clear within all the framework of all of our

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discussions with the Japanese about defense efforts that, among other things, those three principles continue in full force and there's nothing in the plans that Japan has that in any way go against those principles.

Q About tomorrow's meeting. At what point did the President decide to invite the Prime Minister? After the President saw Nakasone in their meeting, then he decided to extend an invitation. Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He extended the invitation in the approximately half-hour meeting that took -- there were three meetings. There was approximately a half-hour meeting between the President and the Prime Minister alone, with just an interpreter and with Judge Clark joining at the end. There was then a meeting of about 45 minutes in the Cabinet Room with about five of the Cabinet members present. And then there was a lunch of about an hour. And it was in the first of those three meetings that the President invited the Prime Minister for further private discussions tomorrow.

Q Who will sit in on that breakfast tomorrow beside the President and the Prime Minister -- their families?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I've told you, there's some question whether the families are going to be there, are going to be in another breakfast. Our understanding is that apart from the family, this is essentially a meeting between just the two leaders and that there will be interpreters present and as far as I know no one else.

Q Are they going to wind up these meetings with anything more than formal statements and a kind of study group appointed or task force on cooperation or anything like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly don't know of anything immediately right now. There may also be further discussions -- Secretary Shultz will be in Tokyo in just two weeks. And I would assume there will be considerable follow-up from these meetings during his visit there.

MR. ALLIN: Chris?

Q Would you characterize the discussions as --

MR. ALLIN: Leo, excuse me.

Q Oh, sorry.

MR. ALLIN: Could we try and call on folks and we'll get you and that will be the last question.

Chris?

Q Can you elaborate a little more about what the President said to the Prime Minister about the protectionist --

Q Naomi has a question.

MR. ALLIN: Oh.

Q -- tendencies here in this country and what the Prime Minister's response was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I've covered that in general terms. The emphasis was placed on how serious the situation is; that the challenge to the free trade system is probably the most serious one that we've seen since the end of World War II. And I believe it was the Prime Minister, himself, who expressed the commonly felt conviction that protectionism in the period prior to World War II not only contributed to the Great Depression but through that, in some sense, contributed to the war itself and that both sides expressed a great sense of responsibility to try to head off that kind of deterioration in the world economy.

MR. ALLIN: Naomi and then Leo and then we're going to have to call an end to it.

Q Since the Soviets have made a treaty with Japan and since the Soviets are using the carrot treatment, was there anything brought up about the Japanese country getting back the Sakhalins -- the islands in the Kuriles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that subject didn't come up specifically.

Q The question.

MR. ALLIN: A question on the Sakhalin Islands.

Leo?

Q I wonder if you could be a little bit more specific about the sense of urgency that the President expressed in terms of getting concrete results from the Japanese to head off protectionism in this country. Are you referring to that in your original description of the discussions as being very frank? In other words, was the President very forceful in urging more progress on trade liberalization to head off protectionist sentiments in this country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the President was very forceful and, not only the President, but Secretary Shultz and Special Trade Negotiator Brock, and the Special Trade Negotiator went on in considerable detail, both about the specific issues and about the kinds of sentiments that we face.

MR. ALLIN: All right, we'll take this last question. Go ahead.

Q Did Prime Minister Nakasone express the concern of the possibility of more Soviet SS-20's into Siberia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion of the problem of the SS-20's, specifically in the context of our discussion of arms control, and I think both sides expressed their notion that an arms control proposal of the kind the Soviets seem to be putting forward, that it would simply involve the movement of SS-20's from Europe into Asia, is not much of an arms control proposal at all.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:27 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER
NAKASONE OF JAPAN

January 19, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:10 A.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: The ground rules for this briefing are that it's on background, attributable to Senior Administration Official. He will now brief us on this morning's meeting with the Prime Minister.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Based on our, just a very quick reading of what the meeting covered, it was, as I thought it would be when I spoke to you yesterday, both a personal and a substantive session.

Among the substantive topics that were covered, the President expressed our interest in Japanese support for economic development projects, mentioning specifically Jamaica and Latin America more generally.

There was a discussion of the invitation for a Japanese space specialist to participate in a shuttle flight in 1988, and the President gave the Prime Minister a plaque that had flown on the first flight of Columbia.

And finally they talked about the President's general approach to peace, to negotiations with the Soviet Union, and generally emphasizing the point of the importance of seeking through negotiations with the Soviets, based on solidarity among allies and on western strength, to achieve a more constructive relationship, a more peaceful relationship.

It was also a personal meeting. Mrs. Reagan and Mrs. Nakasone were present, and Mrs. Atsumi, the Prime Minister's daughter. And I think it's worth saying a little bit more for a moment about the importance of the personal aspect of it. It is not merely to make it a pleasant social occasion, but because of the conviction on both sides that building strong personal relationships is very important to building better, stronger communications between our two important countries, and that this is important at all levels. Perhaps it's particularly important at the top levels of government, that leaders be able to speak to one another and understand one another, and not merely speak through headlines at one another.

This is a point on which the President feels strongly and on which the Prime Minister feels strongly, and in fact, it was made rather vivid last night in the dinner at the Vice President's house, in the after-dinner remarks, toast by the Prime Minister.

He talked about the whole story of his sending his daughter to the United States, one of his daughters to the United States, first for a summer and at the end of that proposing an exchange of daughters for a year with an American family, the Winskis. That's the daughter who was here with him, and another daughter, older daughter, attended Western Michigan University. So the point was strongly reinforced that this is a man who has believed at a family level and for a long time in the importance of close personal ties with the United States and the President feels equally strongly the other way.

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Q The name of that family again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Winskis, as I have heard it. And the spelling you'd have to check with them.

I know that the President came away from this personal encounter very strongly impressed with the seriousness, the leadership, and the statesmanship of the Prime Minister, and I believe that the Prime Minister also got a strong sense of the President.

You would have to ask him for more details, but I would only note in his departure statement he emphasized that he had come to appreciate the President as a man of strong convictions dedicated to peace. I believe that's the quote.

Just final remarks to emphasize that last point about the dedication to peace -- in fact, that is critical, too, and underscores our whole approach to U.S.-Japan relations, and it's important to emphasize particularly as we face difficult issues over trade, tariffs, and beef and citrus quotas, and so forth, both to keep some historical perspective on what a remarkable relationship has been created out of the ashes of World War II, and certainly few people 30 years ago, 40 years ago, would have expected U.S.-Japan relations to be the strong cornerstone of peace in the Pacific that they have become today.

And secondly, to keep some perspective about the future, and about the fact that our trade problems are acute important problems now, that our relationship with Japan is in fact something that is going to be important for peace and stability in the Pacific and indeed, I would say, in the world, not only through this decade but in the next century as well.

And now I'll be glad to take questions.

Q Did you say that the President had extended an invitation to the Prime Minister to send a space specialist to fly aboard the space shuttle in 1988?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q What was the response of the Prime Minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have the response. I don't know.

Q Are there any other details on that? Do we know whether it's going to be a scientist or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do we have any other details on who the Japanese participant will be on the shuttle? I don't believe we know that yet. It would be really up to them to nominate.

Q Was the Prime Minister specific this morning in his, what he said was a pledge of increased defense participation, or was it a general pledge to do more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a general pledge, it's not a specific one, and it's a sense that in -- I mean, these are always a matter of balancing difficult decisions. I think his convictions in the direction that he wants to go are very clear.

Q Nothing as specific as reported in this morning's Post on that matter? Stopping overflights of Backfire bombers, bottling up the straits to Soviet ships?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was some specific discussion in the meetings yesterday on this issue, and I don't think it's appropriate to get into more details except to say that I think one point that is clear, at least it's clear to all of us who are talking about the issue, and maybe it needs to be made clearer, is that Japan, in addition to being a very important country occupies a very strategic location. And merely by being able to defend itself properly and defend its airspace and territory properly it in fact can provide a great deal of protection to the rest of the region. And that is why we have said over and over again that we don't -- we see that Japan can contribute a great deal to the security of the Pacific without playing anything beyond a purely self-defensive role.

Q Did the Prime Minister speak to that point and indicate the specific things that they will do in the area of self-defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was talked about and I'm not going to go into the details here.

Q Yesterday you told us that the President welcomed both on the trade and defense issues the progress that Nakasone had made so far but urged him to move more rapidly in both these areas. On the basis of what was discussed this morning, is that still your general report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes.

Q You like what he's done so far but we still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very much so and I think if you get a copy of the President's departure statement, you'll see that message stated perhaps in subtle diplomatic terms, but that's exactly the point.

Q Now, since yesterday have you gotten anything more specific on the trade side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q There was a reference yesterday to "self-restraint" towards the Soviet Union. Could you explain that a little better? I think some people have the idea this meant restraint in extending credits to the Soviets. What does that phrase mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Can you give me the exact reference? You mean in my remarks?

Q In your backgrounder, yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to look at my remarks because the -- specific context of that.

Okay, no, it was not at all in the question of credits. It's in the question of seeking greater self-restraint in Soviet international behavior and that we are trying through a combination of negotiations and strengthening our defenses and strengthening our alliance ties to persuade the Soviets that the more fruitful the outcome, that better serves their own interests is one that is -- of more peaceful approach to international relations.

Q It's a little unclear from the departure statements. Has the President agreed to go to Japan at some unspecified time in the near future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's now, obviously, been invited to go to Japan. I don't think he's made any decision yet on whether he will.

Q When the President mentioned the 1983 agenda, is there some schedule for accomplishing certain progress on certain trade issues or defense issues by the end of 1983?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have specific timetables or deadlines. No, there isn't a schedule but --

Q What did he mean by the '83 agenda?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we think of this as a very crucial year and that doesn't mean there won't be further issues in '84, if that's what you mean, but that, for example, we have, specifically, the negotiations on beef and citrus quotas which, I guess, have -- in fact, the present agreement expires in March of '84. So, I assume, we would expect a new agreement -- we would hope to have one well before that time. There's also just a very important agenda of following through on a number of the measures that have been announced recently and most importantly the question of streamlining inspection and standardizing some of the certification procedures. And that's going to be a matter of -- I mean, we're going to have to see rather rapidly what those measures mean and to give them content.

There are some other things. We're in the midst of an agreement -- working on an agreement with the Japanese in the high technology area that would -- is an attempt to try to provide some assurances about opening markets on products in the very early stages of their development so that we don't simply wait until a technology has become a major technology, a major export industry and then try to figure out how to handle the questions of protectionism -- but to address them early on. And that agreement -- those negotiations have progressed quite far and I would assume those we will try to wrap up, in fact, in early '83.

So, there's a very full agenda and -- yes?

Q How did the -- does this meeting here affect such detailed things as that? I mean, were there agreements that we will try harder, we will meet a definite schedule or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the most important thing that the meetings here accomplished was to underscore the great importance that we attach to progress and to relatively rapid progress and to -- It was also an opportunity for, on the one hand, the Prime Minister made clear to us --

Q -- rapid progress on what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the trade issues that are under negotiation. The Prime Minister explained the political difficulties that he faces, in the first place, in getting approval for the measures that he's already taken and certainly in going further. At the same time, the President emphasized the political importance here of making that progress if we are to protect the free trade system from which we both benefit so much.

Yes?

Q Was anything said today or last night that has any bearing on the question of the Japanese automobile quotas -- the self-imposed export quotas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been asked about this many times. As I understand it, if I'm not very careful about what I say and if we're not very careful about what we say, we can be in violation of U.S. laws about the restraint of trade. And I think -- as far as I know in the meetings I've been present, that subject hasn't been mentioned specifically. Although the Japanese are, of course, aware of our concern about the U.S. auto industry and the difficult situations in --

Q Did you have a sense that when the Prime Minister said that the frictions between the two countries can be solved by consultations, that he included in that the question of the export quotas -- the voluntary quotas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Clearly the situation of the U.S. auto industry is one of the important trade problems and it -- Given the seriousness of that situation, it obviously affects the overall climate.

Q Was he suggesting that that should be a topic of negotiations between the two countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't specifically suggest that, no.

Q Did he imply that in that statement? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He used the word trade "frictions" in a general way. I think we are so familiar with the litany of problems that we don't need to be specific.

Q Coming back around to where we started, I mean, has there been any change and to whether or not that's a proper subject for negotiations between the United States government and the Japanese government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My lawyers tell me it's not a proper subject. (Laughter.)

Q They would like to increase the number of cars if they conclude from their studies that the American car market is rebounding and it can absorb more cars from abroad. What would be the administration's response if they did that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said Friday, I think it was, that I think it's rather premature to conclude that the U.S. auto industry is rebounding and --

Q But suppose they do. What would the administration do if they start -- on their voluntary limits, which they set and over which we have no controls, suppose they elect to start sending more? Then what would we -- would we communicate to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we'll face that when it comes. I don't know the answer. Yes?

Q Did you reach agreement on the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can you repeat that?

Q Did you reach agreement on restarting government to government negotiations on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those negotations will continue and I think -- the one thing that is clear is that we will continue to work on that problem. The impasse is pretty substantial at this point but we're hopeful that perhaps those talks can yield some progress in the next weeks and months.

Q Can we have specific --

Q There are dates then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the date, no, I don't think so.

Yes?

Q Did you say months?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said in the next weeks and months that we will make progress on that. I don't have a date. If I can get a date, I'll get it for you.

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Yes?

Q -- the Energy Committee, the joint committee you've mentioned of some sort, will that deal with the question of Alaskan oil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would assume, although this is a new proposal and we're just in the process of fleshing it out. But I would assume, in fact, that the question of Alaskan oil would have to be one of the big ones on the agenda of potential energy cooperation.

Q What else beyond that, would you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the one that comes to my mind. There may be others.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- gas, coal, syn-fuels , possibly --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gas, coal --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gas, coal and syn-fuels.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm told that gas, coal, and syn-fuel would also be included.

Do you want to say anything more on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that covers it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q It didn't come up at all today.

Q There seems to be some reticence on the U.S. part on the

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Alaska oil thing. Why? Does it go back to the fear of, again, a supply interruption and we don't have our own oil, or is there anything else, any other reason why we haven't been more forthcoming with the Japanese on this issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there's an issue of supply interruption. There's an issue of how it affects the U.S. transportation industry in a difficult time. There's essentially the basic question of congressional legislation that would have to be revised if anything were to be done there.

Q Would we put any conditions on it that that oil would have to go in American ships to Japan, for example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That would presumably be one of the subjects that this group would examine.

Q But is that a position that we are taking, that it must be an American bottom that carries it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have -- at the moment we have a law that prohibits the sale direct, and that we don't have a position beyond that. In fact, this group would presumably provide us input in considering whether any new position is appropriate, and among the new positions whether that one you specifically mention would be --

Q Did they make a formal request for that oil while they were here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The Prime Minister, I think, did -- let's go ahead with your question, please.

Q I was just wanting to ask, did China come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It came up yesterday at some length, but --

Q Anything on the trade business today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me? On China trade?

Q China announced this cutback today on receiving U.S. imports. I just wondered if as a matter of passing, did they talk about that at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no, that didn't come up. No, no. But the general discussion yesterday included the interests that we both have in increasing trade with China and assisting China in its development efforts. But as far -- according to my readout, it was not specifically discussed this morning.

Q Was there a discussion --

Q Presumably the Prime Minister must have explained his objective in terms of the defense of Japan. And was the explanation any different from the past explanations Japan has made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think it was completely consistent that --. Wondering whether there has been any change in the statement of Japan's objectives in the defense area. And I think the answer is, no. It's been completely consistent in the saying with what we have been discussing with them for some years now.

I guess I can take one more question.

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Q Thank you. Secretary Shultz's trip later on to Japan, to China, and Korea, will that follow on these discussions that have taken place here for matters that are still pending, or will decisions be reached in his meeting now in Tokyo that relate back to this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly issues that were raised here will be carried further. I would assume a large emphasis of his discussions in Tokyo will be international issues including Asian issues. He certainly will want in those discussions to talk at much greater length than there was time for here about our approach to China, and presumably hear from Japan about their approaches to China. But also, arms control, east-west relations; those will be very prominent topics on his agenda. And we will see after we've done an assessment of this visit whether there are specific pieces out of this visit that we can follow up on further.

The Prime Minister has expressed a willingness to help on a number of specific foreign assistance items and I assume those, we will be pursuing them further in Tokyo.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:30 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 21, 1983

BRIEFING BY
AMBASSADORS NITZE AND ROWNY

The Briefing Room

10:26 A.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Nitze, as you know, have just met with the President. Ambassador Rowny does have to catch a plane, so we're going to ask him to make some statements initially, some comments to you, take your questions. And then we will go to Ambassador Nitze with his remarks and his questions. So, if you'd limit it at first so we could go with Ambassador Rowny and give him an opportunity to get out a little bit sooner, I'd appreciate it.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Ladies and gentleman, I have a few talking points here. Ambassador Nitze and I have just met with the President to discuss the next rounds of our respective negotiations. The President remains convinced, and I certainly agree, that we have a good START position, one which I'm pleased to continue to pursue with the Soviets in Geneva at these negotiations.

As you know, the START proposal is the most bold and imaginative proposal that has been ever proposed in the strategic arms arena -- calls for a full reduction by 50 percent of the deployed ballistic missiles. It's captured the attention of people here and particularly in Europe. I've heard no criticism about this being a good proposal. And it's one we should all pursue.

We've had an active and busy and fruitful period of consultations here in Washington. I expect to return to Geneva with clear instructions which will be aimed at the number one goal, that is to enhance deterrence, to achieve stability in times of crisis and, above all, to reduce the risk of nuclear war. And all these principles, of course, will help us move our negotiations forward.

I'm hopeful also that the Soviet delegation will return to Geneva prepared to join us in moving towards these deep reductions in a number of strategic nuclear weapons. To repeat, as you know, our proposal calls for reducing deployed ballistic missiles by a full one-half and the number of warheads on these missiles by a third and to reduce to equal levels -- And the principle that we have throughout is equality, equality, equality. We don't seek superiority and we can't settle for inferiority.

And, of course, with this has to go hand in hand the verifiability of these proposals at every step of the game. So, therefore, I'm hopeful that the Soviet delegation will come back prepared to continue what has been a rather active and brisk period of negotiations. And I'm particularly interested that they have shown positive leanings towards these confidence-building measures which will reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Their statements that they are also interested in these have encouraged me and I'm going to pursue these with all vigor, parallel with our own START talks. And, if it's possible to get a separate agreement on these, even before we finish START, I think that anything that we do to reduce the risk of nuclear war will be welcomed by us and I have reason to believe the Soviets want these also.

Q General, do you still believe there's a 50-50 chance of winning an agreement this year?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I still remain guardedly optimistic. I like to believe that we can take them at their word. After all, they've said that, given goodwill on our side, there can be an agreement. I know we have goodwill on our side and we're serious. And, therefore, we're certainly going to strive to do our utmost to get an agreement.

Q Mr. Rowny, do you go back to Geneva with anything new in the way of instructions, any new flexibility in your negotiating position? And also could you address the issue whether you see any linkage between Nitze's thoughts on medium-range missiles and that being held hostage in any sense to your thought?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Let me say, first of all, that the President in his last hour or so reiterated the basic principles, and, so, I don't look for any major shifts or anything that's going to develop between

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now and the time we leave. As you know, there will be a meeting next week to get the instructions and final print to dot the i's and cross the t's.

On this business of flexibility, let me tell you that one of the things that the Soviets admire about this President -- and have told me so -- is his constancy and that he doesn't have a proposal and then shift it. And they respect that and they say, "We can do business with a man who knows what he wants and will stay the course." So -- (laughter) --

Q -- their phrase, not yours?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Their phrase. And so look at the fact that they came to the negotiating table in June after we had made a proposal which is much more drastic, much deeper than the Carter proposal. They came to the negotiating table. And they have been responding -- first, when we said, "We'll reduce by 50 percent," they said, "By 25 percent." Of course, they are, again, responding in launchers and not in the ballistic missiles. The way we do, we have a better unit of count. We've said, "But it's the warheads that count." And they said, "We, too, will reduce the number of warheads." Of course, they haven't told us how many. So they see the value -- and, of course, they understand how the public regards this. And so I feel that they know that we have a very good proposal in the START proposal.

Q Could you answer the second part of his question --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Which was?

Q -- dealing with the report that the Soviets were somehow linking the INF talks to the START talks, that they would -- that if we installed any missiles in Europe, they would pull out of the START negotiations?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I have asked my counterpart to take a confidentiality pledge with me, that we will not discuss things that happen at the negotiating table. So I would rather not answer that question head-on because I do think once you start negotiating in the public, you lessen the chances of reaching an agreement --

Q It's not negotiating in public. The Russians are -- I mean there are stories every day this week saying they're going to pull out of START if we deploy the intermediate range missiles.

Q And the State Department addressed that yesterday.

Q So it's no longer in the private realm.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Let me simply say that the two negotiations are part of a seamless web that Paul and I coordinate closely and we see these as one continuum in a way. They're all related, although he has an equal and separate negotiation to mine. But let me go this far. Without reducing -- without getting into the confidentiality of what happened at the negotiating table, the Soviets did publicly say that if any forces were deployed in Europe, that they would have to re-examine their proposal for reductions. This is in the public domain.

Q Do you take that threat seriously, sir?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: It's not a threat. I think it's a statement that they say. Yes, I take everything they say seriously, and they have said on the record, in print, and so I'm not, again, revealing anything that happened across the negotiating table. I want to make that clear.

Q Why do you say it's not a threat?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They have said that if they -- if any systems are deployed in Paul's area -- that is, GLCM's and Pershings -- that they cannot reduce. And you want to characterize it as a threat, that's your character- -- I'm just telling you that's what they said.

Q Did they also say they would not talk anymore, negotiate?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No.

MR. ALLIN: Can we have one more question for Ambassador Rowny? And then we're going to run.

Q Ambassador, if the President -- if that's what the President said, you're going to go ahead and deploy those missiles on schedule. Doesn't that make your task sort of useless?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Put that question to Paul. Those forces are not my --

MR. ALLIN: One more question for Ambassador Rowny. Tom?

Q Mr. Ambassador, I thought he said a little while ago about confidence-building measures --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes.

Q Are we to understand that you are closer to some announcement on the success on that level that may be in connection with the trip of Vice President Bush to Europe?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No, no, I'm not trying to imply that. What I'm saying is that the President proposed certain confidence-building measures. And in the times when Mr. Andropov has put out the carrot -- like his answers to Kingsbury Smith, he said, "And we can move forward in these confidence-building measures." Then when the stick appeared in the Pravda article several days later, which was very critical of us,

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he still was positive about confidence building measures. He's positive both with a carrot and a stick. I have reason to be optimistic, guardedly optimistic, that we can get an agreement in these things because I genuinely think that they want to reduce the risk of nuclear war as much as we do.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you Ambassador Rowny.

Ambassador Nitze?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: As Ambassaor Rowny has indicated, we've just met with the President to discuss the final preparations for the resumption of the arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union.

I would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the United States' commitment to a meaningful agreement to reduce the twin threats of war and intimidation posed by the growing Soviet arsenal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The President has proposed the complete elimination of this dangerous class of weapons on both the U.S. and the Soviet side. This solution which would provide for zero on their side and zero on our side constitutes the most stable, durable, and effective blueprint for peace in Europe, Asia and the world as a whole.

President Reagan has instructed me to be vigorous and probing in my efforts to reach an agreement which meets the security requirements of the United States and of the NATO allies. The United States, together with its allies, has been tireless through diplomacy and concerted action, in seeking a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union. But so long as Soviet proposals continue to mask a desire for a dangerous military advantage, so long as Soviet pledges of peace are accompanied not by cooperation at the negotiating table but by thinly veiled threats against our individual allies, we in the West must adhere to both tracks of our policy: first, to seek fair agreements to reduce the risk of war and, second, to take those steps necessary to maintain the military balance which has kept the peace over 37 years.

I go now to Geneva hopeful that the Soviets will see the folly of seeking to divide and intimidate our alliance and hopeful that an agreement which is fair and effective can be reached. President Reagan has expressed his fullest confidence in me as a negotiator and in our allies as partners. Together we shall meet this challenge. With cooperation from the Soviet Union, we may yet make a major contribution to a lasting peace.

Q Ambassador, can I ask you the question that I asked General Rowny? If the United States plans to go ahead and deploy GLCM's and Pershings, and if the Soviets say they won't talk if you go ahead and do that, doesn't that make this all rather a fruitless exercise?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't think it does. Because, granted, that the Soviet Union long ago -- when I say long ago, six months ago, said that, in the event of practical steps towards deployment becoming evident to the Soviet Union, that they would then reassess their position. And when you asked them what they meant by "reassess their position" they said that might well include calling off our talks, calling off the START talks, taking measures to counteract or every step that we might take so it would be disadvantageous to the NATO allies and to ourselves. This is -- they did say that. But subsequent to that, Mr. Brezhnev made that speech before the

500 generals in Moscow. And in that speech he said that practical steps had already been taken and they haven't called off the talks.

So, I do not believe that it is necessarily an intention of theirs to so do. They do mention these things that they may well do in order to bring pressure on us but it doesn't necessarily mean that they will do it.

Q Mr. Nitze, we've all read a lot in the last few days about this tentative agreement that you and your Soviet counterpart reached in the summer which the Soviets rejected -- which was apparently agreement for an equal number of warheads or -- not equal number of warheads -- equal number of --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Launchers.

Q Why do you think the Soviets -- Moscow said no? What does that tell you about their negotiating determination?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It's hard for me to estimate why the Soviet Union makes decisions. I've regretted very much that they made the decision to radically

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reject the exploratory package which Kvitsinsky and I arrived at. It wasn't an agreement. I made no offer on behalf of the United States. But Mr. Kvitsinsky and I tried to see whether it might be possible to cut through the Gordian knot and to arrive at something which might be worthy of consideration by the two governments.

The U.S. government, I think, did find it worthy of consideration, although they did not agree with all the details. But the Soviet Union did not find it so.

Q You don't see that as necessarily a sign that they still believe that it's, or that they believe very certainly that it's possible to, through the campaign they're waging, make sure that the Europeans never agree to deploy the missiles? In other words, that they can get what they have and we'll wind up with nothing?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think they hope that through propaganda they can make it impossible. I don't think that they can. I don't think they'll succeed in that.

Q Mr. Nitze, are you concerned that the U.S. is losing the public relations war in Europe over these missiles?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm not concerned. I don't think that we are losing the propaganda war in Europe.

Q Why not? Why don't you. I mean, there seems to be a growing peace movement. Gromyko's remarks and Andropov's remarks are getting widespread play in Europe, his criticism of the U.S. position.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You look at the dynamism of the peace movement and the opposition to deployment prior to the President's speech 14 months ago. That was very great then. As a result of the President's speech 14 months ago, that whole trend was checked and changed. Granted, in this last few months, as a result of Mr. Andropov's statement, there's been a renewed forward movement. I think now it will be checked again by the firmness of Mr. Gromyko's position in Bonn indicating absolutely no movement in their position.

Q Have you been told that you can go back and explore other kinds of packages for consideration with your counterparts? Have you been given that authority?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I've been given, not only the authority, but I've been directed to explore whether there's any possibility for a major change in the Soviet position.

Q That includes changes beyond and different from zero-zero?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm authorized to explore.

MR. ALLIN: Two more questions here? Back there. Dean?

Q Mr. Nitze, do you feel that, as you go back to Geneva, you have the necessary flexibility to reach an agreement with the Soviets?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't -- I shouldn't have that. It is only the U.S. government and the Soviet government who are ever going to reach an agreement. I have the necessary authority to explore with my Soviet counterpart what give there is in the Soviet position.

Q As Ambassador Rowny said, this is inextricably wound together. Is this a situation where you're going to succeed and Rowny will succeed or both fail?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Frankly, I think that the time urgency is really on my negotiations. I think it's necessary that we come to a successful conclusion first.

Q What date do your negotitions resume, Mr. Nitze?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: On the 27th of January.

Q And the same with START?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No.

MR. ALLIN: February 2nd.

Q February 2nd?

MR. ALLIN: Martin?

Q Ambassador, are you authorized to offer something less than zero-zero?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm not authorized to offer anything. I'm authorized to explore.

Q Are you --

MR. ALLIN: Helen, excuse me. Let's get some of the people in the back who haven't had a chance. We'll take Bill Ringo and Nick and then we're going to have to call it off.

Q Mr. Ambassador, is there any consideration being given to separate negotiations on curbing cruise missiles? As you know, Mr. Rostow said when they were deployed that the scorpion would be out of the bottle and we're deploying them now.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't remember that remark of Mr. Rostow.

Q At his confirmation hearings he said that.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I see. I wasn't aware of that. But, in any case, the question of cruise missiles is an item which is involved both in the INF negotiations and in the START negotiations because the Soviet side has put forward proposals limiting cruise missiles, submarine-launched cruise missiles, in both negotiations.

MR. ALLIN: Nick Ashford?

Q Mr. Ambassador, do you expect to see any substantive progress before the West German elections in your talks?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I hope for such.

Q You talk about give in the Soviet position. Is there any give in the U.S. position?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: There will be if the Soviets come forward -- Well, wait a minute. Let me change that. I'd rather start from the beginning.

The President's directive to me is to negotiate seriously and he made that clear 14 months ago at the beginning of these negotiations. But, in order to negotiate seriously, it requires give on the Soviet side. And if the Soviet side gives, then I'm sure we will give serious consideration to any serious proposal of theirs.

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Q So we're not absolutely locked in on zero-zero?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I won't answer that question.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:48 A.M. EST

ON THE RECORD

STATE DEPARTMENT

SPECIAL BRIEFING
FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1983, 3:30 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. This is an ON-THE-RECORD session on certification of El Salvador, and the briefers will be Assistant Secretaries Enders and Abrams who will have a few remarks up front, and then be glad to answer your questions.

Tom.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: John, thank you very much. Good afternoon, everybody.

Secretary Shultz, acting on authority delegated to him by the President, has signed a certification permitting El Salvador to continue to be the recipient of United States security assistance, under the provisions of law which require us, every 180 days, to certify that Salvador is making progress under four headings that the Congress and the Administration believe essential to our policy in that country: the concerted effort to comply with internationally-recognized human rights; the achievement of substantial control over all elements of the armed forces; continued progress in economic and political reforms, in particular the land reform; and the holding of free elections.

The conclusion that we have reached and which you will find analyzed in considerable detail in the document that has been given out to you is that, in spite of substantial obstacles that result from the civil strife in the country, that in fact there have been identifiable progress under all of these headings, and in one particular case, there has been major new progress.

With regard to political violence, it has continued to diminish, although at a slower rate than during previous periods; and we think that that is related to the efforts of the Government of El Salvador to create new institutions. A Human Rights Commission has been established and is now active to punish abuses by soldiers, to discipline members of the armed forces accused of abuses, to sensitize members of the armed forces to human rights requirements, the importance of taking prisoners, to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to give human rights instruction to soldiers, and in a number of other ways that you'll find detailed there.

It is a fact that the level of political violence in the country continues to diminish. Clearly not all, or necessarily the majority, of this political violence can be attributed to the government or security forces; but the record since our own involvement in El Salvador is really quite striking and should be put before you.

This is the period just before the final offensive. It's the time at which the American Embassy began to first take statistics drawn from press reports of the number of deaths per month in the country due, presumptively, to political violence.

To say a word about the statistics, other organizations do collect statistics. And particularly after the last certification, they revised their methodology, and the other organizations include in their statistics deaths that are claimed by the insurgents and by the government to have been inflicted on opposing forces, so they are much higher than these figures, but they show the same downward trend also over this period. The figures are non-comparable for that reason, primarily, and for some others.

These (indicating chart) are civilian deaths, as we understand it. We think that the curve is significant. It is a strongly downward curve, and although we don't claim by this means to have documented all deaths due to political violence, most of them are expected to be here, and certainly it is an internally consistent method of doing so.

We believe that part of the reason this curve is so strongly downward is that efforts to control abuses by members of the armed forces have been the subject of increasing attention by the government, in a number of ways I just mentioned.

The reform program, you will recall, last time was a matter of some considerable concern -- and in particular, the "land to the tiller" program, which involves the possibility of sharecroppers and renters obtaining the ownership of the land that they work. You will recall also that earlier this year, when a constituent assembly was elected, that a broad attack occurred on land reform; and for a while, all further progress was stopped.

It has now been resumed very strongly. You will find here (indicating chart) the numbers of applications on that side. We started out here, in terms of beneficiaries, you see, in the March period before the Constituent Assembly came in, at which time we had the attack on land reform, and coming strongly up in each of the categories.

One weak category, which is not here, is the payment of compensation and final titles. There has simply not been enough money to compensate. It continues to be a weakness of the program.

And finally, the democratic process which began with a Constituent Assembly election has continued. There have been efforts to manipulate it for the benefit of individuals or groups; and on the whole, it has survived quite well; and the country is committed to holding Presidential elections, with a new constitution, not later than March of 1984.

We did not find that there had been major reverses under any of these four categories during the period that we examined. However, we did find that there are two important areas of weakness that we would like to single out particularly.

The court system in the country remains nonfunctional. This has been of particular concern to us in the case of American land reform workers that were murdered in El Salvador in 1980. The authors of the crime have been, we believe, very probably identified. But although those people that pulled the trigger are in jail and are going to be brought to trial as a result of a very cooperative attitude on the part of the Government of El Salvador that led the investigation and established a very substantial case against them, those who were responsible for the crime, in the intellectual sense -- two officers of the army and, potentially, one private citizen -- have gone free, and the courts have refused, we believe through intimidation, to indict them. This is, we think, a serious lapse, and it's symptomatic of many of the problems that the legal system has.

I will add, though, while I'm talking about this, that there has been significant progress in bringing the alleged murderers of the four American churchwomen to trial, and that that has proceeded, although slowly, very definitely in the course of the period: that the trial has begun, and a very strong case has been brought against those whom we think are guilty.

Let me sum this up by saying, this is a country which is suffering from very substantial civil strife. The government lost over 1,000 troops, dead in the course of fighting during the year, and many more were wounded. We do not know how many insurgents lost their lives during this period of significant level of strife.

In spite of that, we think that there has been substantial progress in the now roughly a little over two years of our close involvement in the country. More than 20 percent of the arable land of the country has been redistributed, and the process continues. The civilian deaths attributable to political violence have dropped off very sharply, as you saw. And perhaps most important for the future, representative institutions are being created, so a first major step earlier this year in that process continues.

Let me say a word about the process of this certification. As you will see, it's a very detailed document, and it was developed in the Department over the last month-and-a-half by a number of organizations. The Bureau of Human Rights, headed by Assistant Secretary Abrams, had a major part of it, and he'll speak in just a moment about his view of it from that particular concern. Our Embassy collected much of the information. There was then an interagency process headed by the Deputy Secretary that considered the evidence, and finally was presented to Mr. Shultz. After review, he made the decision to certify. This has been a large information-collecting and -balancing effort.

Elliott.

Q Before you go out, you have said you were going to identify two areas of special weakness, and I only caught one. What was the second?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: I'm sorry. I beg your pardon. The other area identified in the report is the punishment of offenses committed by members of the armed forces or related security services. The services have begun on a more systematic basis than before to discipline persons accused of human rights abuses, and some 140 are under detention for various kinds of abuses at the present time. However, we note that, in very few cases are these people being punished by the civilian courts to whom they are being handed over. That is part of the general breakdown of the court system, but is a part of particular concern because although there are inhibitions built in as a result of the disciplining actions -- being locked up or relieved of duty, or transferred -- nonetheless, we think it would be much more effective if there were punishment in a much more systematic way. That is a question for the courts, too, but it's an important one I want to underline.

Thank you.

Elliott.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I just want to say a word about the reform process which Tom Enders mentioned. If you look at the criteria for certification, some of them involve that reform process; others involve violence. Those two realities exist side by side in El Salvador. On the one hand, violence continues -- that directly involving the guerrilla war and that associated with the guerrilla war, by both far-right and far-left against civilians on occasion, although clearly, the overall amount of violence is declining.

Simultaneously, the political and economic reform process is not only continuing, but is gathering strength. The goal of our policy is to strengthen that process so that, ultimately, El Salvador will have a fully democratic political system because that is ultimately the solution to the problem of violence in the country.

We spend a great deal of time trying to assist them in that economic and political reform process, more time really than is, I think, spent on the narrowly-defined military problem.

A very large step forward was taken this year in March, during the election. Progress has continued in the Constituent Assembly. Very soon, a Constitution will be drafted, and next year a President will be popularly elected. It's our sense that if we can help enwrap all of the combatants for power in El Salvador in that democratic process so that the means of fighting for political power becomes exclusively words and votes rather than guns, then of course the problem of violence will have been solved; and that is really the goal of our policy for El Salvador.

MR. HUGHES: We'll take your questions now.

Q Could I try one more? Certainly I, and probably a lot of other people here, Tom, would like to be reminded of the amounts of aid that are currently at stake or currently contemplated.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Let me first say, the certification is attached to providing military assistance. It is not attached to providing economic assistance. It is also attached to providing the services of American training personnel in the country.

The Administration request for this year was for $60 million worth of military assistance. However, in the course of the discussions of the continuing resolution, a ceiling was put on, not specifically on El Salvador, but on most recipients of military assistance from the United States and at the previous fiscal year's level. That ceiling would be at $2[illegible] million, in the case of El Salvador, unless there were re-programming action taken by the Administration and notified to the Congress.

Q Is that contemplated, Tom?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: I can't respond to that question at the moment. There is no decision on that.

Q Mr. Enders, what is your calculation as to what would happen if the military assistance were to cease? What would be the impact upon El Salvador?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We're trying to do two things in El Salvador: We're trying to give it enough military assistance to hold off the insurgents, not to defeat them militarily, but prevent them from prevailing, while we get on with the reforms. As Elliott well pointed out, it is the change in the political institutions, the change in the political habits of that country, that in the end will make the insurgents irrelevant as fighters, and bring about the kind of political solution that occurred in a number of other countries that have had this sort of insurgency in Latin America -- Venezuela, for example. Venezuela never managed to defeat its insurgents -- Cuba-supported, heavily armed from overseas 20 years ago -- in the military sense. It ultimately won by a combination of military action, civic action in the countryside, and above all, an end to repressive institutions and the creation of a democratic system.

That is what we are aiming at, and I think that you could not put an end to the violence -- the fighting between right, left, and center in El Salvador -- by removing your military aid, but you sure could make it clear that they were not going to head on toward that kind of social and political transformation. So I think if we did not certify, and there were not a basis on which to do it, you would find intensified violence -- chaos -- for a long period of time.

Q Could I go back to the aid figures again? I realize economic assistance is not covered by the certification, but how much is that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: $105 million is the figure in our Congressional presentation document.

Q O.K., so then, in terms of aid covered under this certification, it could be as much as $60 million or as little as $25 million? Is that right?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Yes. At the present time, it covers, in fact, the $25 million for this year -- that is in fact what is the part covered for this fiscal year. That's all there is at the moment under the existing Continuing Resolution.

Q I wanted to ask you about the last year's figures. Why don't they include the $55 million after the Illopango raid? I thought last year was $82 million.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: The emergency assistance which could be granted under the law in cases of an unexpected development such as the Illopango raid, and indeed the large buildup in Nicaragua, which was part of the concern at that time, does not count in establishing the line on which you have the Continuing Resolution. In other words, that is omitted, and you look only at the part of assistance that was, in fact, allocated under authorization or appropriation the year before.

Q Mr. Secretary, as a practical matter, even though the law doesn't specify that any more than the $25 million requires the certification, as a practical matter on Capitol Hill, isn't it the case that these arguments that you make in this certification will be applied by Congress to their considerations of all of the aid, economic and military?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: I'm not sure, actually. There has been a feeling that given the suffering that is occurring in El Salvador as a result of the attacks on the economy of the guerrillas --. The guerrilla strategy is to defeat the government, not by defeating its army, but by defeating the economy and the peoples' livelihood; and through the destruction of the electric transmission lines, through dropping bridges, through burning buses, they are causing a very large amount of damage.

Some $16 million, we think, in the course of this certification period was caused in damage by the insurgents' making war on the peoples' livelihood. And I think that there is a feeling in this country, very broadly shared, that we should be responsive to that need of helping them to overcome those losses, and to maintain their level of economic activity. I think that is broadly shared, and it is very, very clear in the law that this is attached only to military assistance.

Q Mr. Enders, one of the charges made by the human rights groups is that there are some 400 deaths a month. They quote the Catholic Church figures on that. But aside from the numbers, the basic charge --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: The numbers, as I say, include the claimed military deaths on both sides.

Q Beyond the numbers, the basic charge they make is -- and I'd like your response -- is that the structure of this repression -- they say the death squads and all of that -- is still in place, that they are still active, they are still operating. And, as you say, the court system is not functioning. What about that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: There was an explosion of violence in the country, left and right, three years ago when the old military government was overthrown in a coups, and a new reforming group came into power.

What happened then was that that new reforming group was challenged from two sides. It was challenged by a left-wing insurgency that feared the reforms and wanted to move immediately to revolution.

It was also challenged by right-wing elements that had been closely associated with the former government and did not accept the change, and that's what we're talking about. When I say "explosion of violence," I think it's probably no exaggeration at all. There were enormous numbers of deaths and a chaotic situation.

Little by little that has gotten under control as a result of the government's activities, and I think that two kinds of activities have helped bring it under control.

One is better discipline over their own forces and more consciousness of the human rights question overall -- repeated emphasis on it -- but the second is clearly also military action. Military action by the government has helped bring order to parts of the country. The insurgency itself has become regionalized in the process.

But I would join the human rights groups in deploring the non-functioning of the judicial system. I think it is a fundamental, major weakness in that country now. And how to get it going again is one of the really important issues in Salvadoran politics at the moment. We can't emphasize enough the importance that we attach to that. I'd like to do that with this certification.

Q Secretary Enders, on page 10 of your report -- the certification report -- you say that when a military is accused, he is discharged from the service by the armed forces. And then page 27 you say that Lieutenant Lopez Sibrian is still on active duty while the case is pending.

Isn't there a discrepancy in this because if the case is pending, how is still he on active duty?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: His case was dismissed by two judges consecutively on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to accuse him. We think that the evidence which was developed by a special three-man commission, appointed by the government and supported by the armed forces, is in fact very serious indeed. It includes, among other things, a very substantial amount of polygraph evidence concerning the guilt of Lieutenant Colonel Sibrian and Lieutenant Colonel Avila Avila.

So, legally I think there's a distinction here, -- a distinction because this man's indictment has in fact not been accepted by two judges supposedly competent to make the decision. But we think that morally there is no question that this man should be brought to trial, and we will continue to press for it. I think it's essential.

Q You were right. The Commission previously — American officials have said that there was some question about the activity of the El Salvador human rights commission, the independent human rights commission, because members of the left were in that commission.

What kind of judgment do you have on Colonel Lopez Nvila in the Commission now?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I think we need to make a distinction, and it's unfortunately a semantic problem that we're all going to be dealing with for awhile.

There has been a group called the CDEHS -- Commission on Human Rights of El Salvador -- which we consider to be very sympathetic and favorable to the left and whose figures we don't consider particularly reliable. That is a private group.

Under the Pact of Apaneca a political commission, a peace commission and a human rights commission were set up. The human rights commission which we refer to in here is that one which has the participation of the church, of the UCS, the Campesino Union, of a number of other forces in society, and has in it Colonel Lopez Nvila, the head of the national police.

So this is as good a time as any to point out that there are now two human rights commissions and that one needs to be very careful in keeping them separated.

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been renewed calls for negotiations by members of of Congress who have recently been down in El Salvador as well as a recent reiteration by a member of the guerrillas who was in Washington, saying that they were prepared to negotiate.

I was wondering, in the context of certification, if you could clarify what your position is at this point on negotiations?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We think the solution to this civil strife must come within representative institutions, and they're on the way to being created.

As they are created, it is very important that an opportunity be held out to the adversaries of the present government to participate in peaceful competition for political power through those institutions, and to do so in ways that would permit them, if they renounce violence themselves, to have protection of their own lives, have access to the media, and an opportunity to campaign in a way which is essential to all democracies.

That is why we attach particular importance to El Salvador, going ahead with its initiative of a peace commission to which will be assigned the question of establishing an amnesty and a means by which people who are ready to enter a peaceful political process can obtain the guarantees that are necessary for that and to become active again on a peaceful basis. That we think is the way to go, that is to say, within a given set of institutions, but opening those up to adversaries.

Q Just to follow that one up for a second. You say that the arrest of the FDR leaders and union leaders in October was a setback in that respect.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Yes, sir.

Q To what extent does it -- well, how important is it that these people be released at this point? Apparently they're being arrested for an alleged crime of subversion or for advocating a dialogue.

How important to your plans in terms of -- what does it say about the government that these people are still in jail?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: I think, Mr. Loeb, the first thing to say is about the people themselves. They are members of an organization which is allied with and supports the guerrilla organization -- the FMLN -- in every respect, including the right of armed insurrection.

The question inevitably will be for people like this, are they prepared to renounce violence or the support of groups that are engaged in violence in order to participate in the political process. They will not be able to have it both ways.

But, that said, we think it was a setback because we would like to see the process going the other way, with these people in fact having an opportunity to say that they are renouncing violence and engaging in the political process, and we should put the emphasis on doing that.

But, remember, that these are people who say they support insurrection, and we do not consider, by the way -- maybe Elliot will comment on this -- we do not necessarily consider this to be a violation of human rights. It was done under a provision of law. The prisoners have not, as far as we know, been mistreated, but we do think it is a setback in a political sense of the kind of process. We would like to see it change.

Do you want to comment on it?

Q They were held incommunicado, however. Isn't that a violation of human rights?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: It was certainly a violation of due process, but we're noting this more out of concern for getting the reconciliation process going than as a violation.

Q Secretary Enders, Colonel Ochoa during his rebellion, in alluding to misuse of some U.S. military aid, said the money he got was used to buy equipment for his men, not clubs for officers.

Are we certain that all the money that we're giving to them is being used correctly, and there is not corruption in the use of some of this U.S. military aid?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We provide goods, not money. Military goods, not money.

Q But on the question of Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa, how do you think the resolution of the problem -- that is, his being given a relatively plum job in this country -- demonstrates the control that the civilian government has over the military?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Manifestly the law here is designed to deal with the problem of human rights absuses that may be caused by members of the security forces, or armed forces, in El Salvador. It is not an effort for us to enforce the command structure in the El Salvador army. That is clearly a separate question. I don't see really in this case that one has anything to do with the other. I mean, nobody is accusing Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa of being a human rights violator. I mean, that was not the issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the number of military trainers, as you call them, in El Salvador right now, and what are the prospects for an increase or a decrease in the present figure?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Have you got that?

STAFF: A limited force of 55.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We have not been over -- I wouldn't say the limit is 55. We have not been over 55. Often we've been under 55. I do not expect any significant increase or decrease at the moment.

We could provide that figure, perhaps, while we finish the briefing. Do you want to get it, Art?

STAFF: The average has been about 40 to 45 in-country.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: Do you want to get the figure, though, right at the moment? Perhaps it would be responsive to the question.

Q It's been reported that for the land reform program to proceed, some additional legislation is going to be required in April, and that the sentiment in the Constituent Assembly doesn't seem to be running in favor of that.

Is that the case, and, if it is, what steps are we planning to take?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: That is getting into the future. The legislation would have to be renewed after, I believe it's March 3, in the Constituent Assembly, and undoubtedly a debate on what that legislation will be will occur; in fact, is already starting.

Q Are you expecting the land reform program to come to a grinding halt at that time or --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We remain vitally interested in the land reform program for two reasons.

One is a question of equity. This was a country in which some three years ago no less than 40% of the land was held by 2% of the farm families, and you've seen that one-half of that has been by now redistributed.

But also we're interested in it for political and security reasons, because it is true that a land-owning peasant is a lot more likely to be willing to defend the current political and social order than one that is landless or a renter or sharecropper at the edge of survival on his land.

MR. HUGHES: Let's have a couple more questions. One over here.

Q Mr. Enders, during this period of certification, was the statements or the whole literature of the opposition taken into consideration?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: The statements or literature?

Q Statements, leaflets, books, every sort of literature coming out of the opposition. Was it taken into consideration?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Yes. Yes. As a matter of fact, if you look at a good deal of the critical literature, you will find that a lot of it is prefaced by an acknowledgement of cooperation from the Department of State, which is fair, because we have tried to help the human rights groups acquire the information they seek.

We also read what they produce very carefully and check into individual allegations as they arise, so we pay very careful attention to it.

Q Secretary Abrams, why can't you keep better track of the, or somehow encourage the army to keep better track of the prisoners that they take?

The report says information on the exact number of prisoners captured in combat is difficult to obtain.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I think you have a combination of two factors. One is that you're talking about a wartime situation.

The other is that you are not talking about a country at a level of technological development where there exists in San Salvador computers that can tell you the whereabouts of people out in the countryside at any given moment.

If a prisoner, for example, is taken by a national guard unit -- a small unit out in the countryside -- most of those units have, for example, no communications capability whatsoever. They're out of contact with anyone, not merely the capital.

So whether that prisoner stays with them or goes to a local jail or is sent to San Salvador is not an easy thing to follow up on, and I think that explains the difficulty that we had and they have in doing it.

Q Do you think that's a very substantial hole in the whole process when they -- with the constant discovering of corpses around the country?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Sure. We think that it is a very real problem. We're very glad to see the overall level of violence down, and also the situation of prisoners improving, and we hope it continues.

Q Secretary Enders, the certification law expires in September, end of September.

Does the Administration support the continued use of this certification law, or would you just as soon see it go away?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: We think that there has to be a mechanism to help us and the Government of El Salvador obtain the goals of our policy which are stated clearly here along with the goal of assuring the security and safety of that country.

Whether this is the right way to do it, with this particular kind of quasi-judicial process and particular periodicity and particular up-or-down, black-or-white, kind of result is something that perhaps is open to question and should be considered.

But this question we're not attempting to address today or at this certification -- the nature of the certification process itself -- but rather to show how we have attempted to use it to obtain the progress that we and the Congress want to see in that country.

Q Ambassador Enders, could I clear up one numerical contradiction, or apparent contradiction.

In his famous speech on October 29, Ambassador Hinton talked of as many as 30,000 Salvadorans being murdered -- not being killed in battle, but murdered.

Your figures there add up to much less than -- on the order somewhere between 15 and 20. How do you explain --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: To go back about here (pointing) is where the violence really started on a very large scale, and that was at the time of the overthrow of the Romero Government by the junta of officers. That was in October of 1979.

So in other words, you're not looking at the entire period, and I think that it's a very impressionistic figure.

Q Because he used the phrase "since 1980."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: That is clearly not supported by either his figures or ours, and it must be -- it's clearly not something he would stand behind.

(An assistant handed a note to Ambassador Enders)

31 U.S. trainers, 6 personnel in the "mil" group are the numbers today.

Q Would you repeat that, please? I'm sorry.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: 31 U.S. trainers and 6 people in the military assistance group.

MR. HUGHES: Last question.

Q Mr. Secretary, other major countries in the region -- Mexico, Venezuela, Panama, and to some lesser extent Colombia -- have expressed favor of negotiations.

In your recent consultations with those countries, did they express any views on U.S. continued military aid and the certification process?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS: You mean El Salvador? I think, as is well known, the Government of Venezuela has been extremely supportive of the Government of El Salvador, and has trained two of its battalions -- two battalions of casadores. Light battalions have been trained by them.

Venezuela continues to have military trainers in country and strongly supports the democratic process there.

The views of Mexico I think are well known. They do not support military assistance for El Salvador, and I don't think that view has changed.

Colombia continues to support it.

MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Tom, Elliot.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:17 p.m.)

UNEDITED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1982, 5:00 P.M.

[1983]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess the way to start is with questions.

Q The President is at the point of a fateful step in U.S.-Israeli relations, cutting off American military aid to force Begin to remove his troops from Lebanon.

A Not that I know of.

Q Is there anything that you do plan to do to persuade the Israelis that now is the time perhaps by way of reducing aid or doing something? They seem to be ignoring everything else we do.

A Phil Habib is due back shortly -- I guess in another hour or so -- so we'll consult with him and hear his first-hand reports of what's going on.

I think we have to remember that the Israelis have said they wish to leave Lebanon and intend to leave Lebanon. There are a variety of issues involved in creating the conditions under which that will take place. Of course, we have been in close touch with Phil over there. Nevertheless, it's always good to get a first-hand report on what he observes, and then we'll have to see what can be done to move this process along. Of course, that encompasses the Syrian and PLO forces as well as the Israeli forces.

Q Are we willing to have the Marines man monitoring posts inside Lebanon?

A We haven't reached any posture of contemplating that.

Q What is behind the incidents that have been taking place between the Marines and Israeli soldiers?

A I'm not sure precisely. It is a fact that there have been some incidents. The Israelis apparently want to penetrate the area that is now controlled by the Lebanese armed forces with the assistance of the Multinational Force. It's agreed that that is the way that would be.

I think we should keep remembering that there is a commission that was set up right from the outset, a military commission, in which the countries who are participating in this -- that is, the French, Italians, ourselves, the Lebanese and the Israelis -- have consultation there. So there is a mechanism there for consulting and working out problems. That exists; there's lot's of discussion, so that is the place to work those out.

Q The reports from Jerusalem indicates that Mr. Habib has failed in his mission so far -- the latest mission. Would you agree with that?

A Certainly, the fact is that the foreign forces are still in Lebanon, and we don't have any plan at hand for seeing how they're going to leave. So that doesn't mean his mission has failed. It means it hasn't succeeded as yet.

There's a big difference between not having succeeded yet and failing.

Q What would you say he has succeeded in doing?

A Probably sharpening up the nature of the issues and the perceptions that the parties have of the various desires that they have. However, it is no secret that we're disappointed; we would wish for a lot more progress than has been made.

In general, that's a statement that has been operative for all too long, and it's a statement about the most recent week or so.

Q In the past, when the question of aid to Israel has come up, you've been just about categorical in saying that's not one of the options we're talking about, I don't think that's the way to go.

From what you're saying now, are you indicating that that policy is going to be under review now, at least?

A No. I didn't say that. I think that the President is committed, as we all are, to supporting things that promote the security of Israel, and that was in the President's Fresh Start proposals September 1st. It's been in all of his earlier statements, and any statements that he has made lately. There isn't any change at all in that and there won't be.

I think that is just about where I would put it. I do continue to believe that the possibility of peace in the Middle East is a very important goal that whenever it can be given more reality will tend to motivate people to further actions in an effort to gain that goal. I think it is the main thing that we have going for us in this effort.

I might take the occasion to say that, for obvious reasons, there's a lot emphasis on the Lebanon problem and all these issues in the Middle East are related to each other. Nevertheless, we have been putting a great deal of effort into the basic peace process, and we shouldn't forget about that.

Q In that connection, one criticism that is heard frequently is that the Israelis have been dragging their feet in Lebanon intentionally while they step up their settlement activity in the West Bank.

What do you have (a) of that criticism, and (b) of that settlement activity this year?

A I have heard that criticism. We have said, the President has said, we've all said that we consider the settlements to be not a constructive contribution to the peace process, so we don't like that.

On the other hand, we continue to work at the peace process, and certainly a front-burner item is to work with King Hussein to create the conditions under which he will want to join the peace process. I think that is a matter of high priority.

Q In the interview in the Monitor this morning with President Mubarak, he said that he understood that the United States had told King Hussein that it would urge Israel, press Israel to put a freeze on the settlements in return for his participation in the peace talks?

A It isn't a question of what-in-return-for-what. The President stated, in his September 1st speech, that he would welcome a freeze on settlements, and we have continued to say that consistently.

Q President Mubarak seemed to be talking about some additional pressure because this was in answer to a question as to whether the United States had put enough pressure on Israel.

A It is certainly the case throughout the Arab world that the continued settlements worry them as they worry us. As they see the issue, the more settlements there are the less there is to negotiate about.

Q Extrapolate there, would you? Do you have any thoughts about when or at what point in the settlement process Israeli withdrawal of those settlements becomes an impractical sort of approach to those negotiations? Don't you reach a point of no return in this process?

A No, I don't. I think that as the President's plan envisaged, assuming there is in the West Bank a different status than now exists, but with arrangements that take account of Israel's security needs, the President's plan envisages that it's perfectly normal to expect the Jews would live on the West Bank but that settlements that happen to exist there, if they choose to live in them, and the area is within the boundaries of some jurisdictions other than Israel proper, then the people who live there come under that other jurisdiction.

Q Would you draw a distinction, sir, between U.S. military assistance where Israel's direct security and economic assistance may be indirectly used to finance the settlements there?

A The two things are obviously related to each other, and we are very conscious of Israel's economic needs. I think that it is a connection that one can make. Money is fungible, and there's no way to get away from that fact.

At this point, nevertheless, our position is that the settlements are undesirable and not constructive in the peace process, and that's where it's put.

Q What is the latest prognostication, sir, about King Hussein coming into the talks? We keep hearing he's close or he's thinking about it; where is he today?

A I hesitate to speak for othr people, particularly kings, and it's better for them to speak for themselves. However, I think on the public record it's clear enough that King Hussein is very interested in peace in the region, and has spoken favorably toward the President's proposals. He is consulting with his counterparts in other Arab governments and with various representatives of the Palestinians, and hoping and working to create conditions that will be conducive to his entering the peace process.

Those aren't the only conditions, but they are conditions and he is working at that. I believe that he is working at it very conscientiously.

Q Can you see that happening before there's some substantial movement of the foreign forces out of Lebanon? Do you think the King could agree to go into the peace process prior to something like that?

A There is no necessary connection. There is kind of a psychological connection among all of these things, without a doubt. But there is no necessary connection between those activities. Clearly, it helps create an atmosphere of a peaceful sense of direction and of movement and capacity to work things out, to have anything worked out; and certainly an agreement under which foreign forces leave Lebanon would be a great contributor.

Q If I could switch subjects. Can you talk to us about what you hope to achieve on your trip to China? Have you been able to focus on that?

A I have been trying to focus on that. On the one hand there are a whole set of issues that pose certain difficulties. There are also some issues that as I dig into them and try to understand them are issues that I think are potentially resolvable.

There are questions of how these two economies -- the U.S. economy and the Chinese economy -- can most helpfully interact, helpfully to each economy. That, I think, can be advanced.

More generally, though, China is a great and large country. I think it is important that the United States have a good working relationship with that country. I think it's fair to say that that situation can stand improvement. So I go there to meet them, to talk with them, to talk to them about our situation, our hopes, and to hear theirs and to see if out of that we can see a process that will build a relationship that is a sound and stable one.

Q Go back to the Middle East for one second. The Israelis have claimed, in response to these incidents with the Marines, that part of their problem is that they believe the PLO fighters and guerrillas are reinfiltrating through the Marine lines in those areas.

Have you seen anything that indicates that the Israelis are right or wrong or is there something you can judge are wrong?

A From what I've seen, our people in the field and on the spot don't believe so. Nevertheless, as I said earlier, there is out there a process of consultation through which people can discuss and give chapter and verse if they have some problem, and it can be looked into. So that process is available and in being, and it's being used.

Q But no sign of --

A I don't have any evidence of it.

Q Could you tell us to what extent the holding off on setting the date for the visit of Prime Minister Begin provides leverage to be used for leverage purposes in the current Lebanese negotiating situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no date has been set. Nevertheless, we certainly do expect that the Prime Minister will come here at some appropriate time. My impression is, from statements that have come from Israel, that the Prime Minister wants to focus his attention on the basic peace process. To that extent, it would be desirable to have clarification in the Lebanon situation so we don't wind up spending all our time on that subject. But those are reports that have come out of Israel.

Q What sense of urgency do you feel on the visit of President Mubarak and 1983 for the negotiations perhaps becoming involved in a Presidential election campaign? Do you feel you must have some type of resolution, some movement before the President's initiative suffers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course, the sooner, the better in getting things into a more operational state, as far as the peace process and these other matters are concerned, including a warming up of the relationship between Egypt and Israel.

People say that when a Presidential campaign starts, it's not possible to do anything in Washington any more. I hear that about all kinds of subjects. If that's the case, it's never possible to do anything because, as far as I can see, there is always a Presidential campaign going on. It guess it gets a little more heated by the time you get to September 1984. Nevertheless, important things have happened in Presidential election years, and I don't see any reason why we shouldn't continue to work at all of these matters and press them in 1983 — hope to get them settled in 1983 — and if not, to continue to press them in 1984. But our objectives should be closer at hand.

Q Sir, do you have any sense of deadline — Early March has been talked about in terms of King Hussein's coming into the process — do you sense a deadline along those lines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't use the word "deadline." I think that the sooner the conditions can be created when he is comfortable coming in, the better. I put emphasis on both those points because the more general support in the Arab community that he carries into whatever he is able to do, the more fruitful potentially, they are in the long run. So I don't regard this period of gestation that has been going on -- that goes through the Fez Summit, the visit of the Arab League Delegation here and elsewhere and all of these consultations -- as blank time at all. They are part of the process of forming a viewpoint.

I think it is the case in most negotiations that I've observed that the biggest part of the time and effort and negotiating activity takes place within each party to the negotiations, whereas of course, everyone focuses on the immediate interaction of. Often, the more difficult things are within each party to struggle, to form their position, and decide on what positions and compromises they are ready to make.

Q If I could take you to another area, it has been now several months since the death of Mr. Brezhnev's of the Soviet Union and Mr. Andropov's coming to power. Do you see any change in the situation there that would be pertinent to the United States? Have you detected anything that bears on our relationship with the Soviet Union in that period? And do you see yourself seeing Mr. Gromyko, or even Mr. Andropov, to probe for some question of further change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to repeat the things that we've said, but perhaps I should; and that is to say that the President's policy has consistently been, and remains, to be realistic about what has taken place, and evaluate things that are said on that basis; to put our confidence in our own strength and will power, and to expect that is what is necessary to defend our interests and to help our Allies defend their interests; and third, to be ready for a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union -- and for that matter, with others -- about troublesome problems around the world, whether they be arms control, or regional issues, human rights issues, economic issues, or whatever.

We have sought to underline that third point, and the President has in various statements that he has made, including a radio address I think about two weeks ago, or something on that order -- recent, anyway.

We have heard noises like that from the Soviet side. We have identified a variety of issues on which it is worthwhile, we think, discussing things with the Soviet

Union. Some are very visible, the most visible right now being the arms control negotiations. But there have been discussions, as you know, between Chet Crocker and his Soviet counterpart about problems in southern Africa; Max Kampelman has talked several times with his counterpart in the Madrid discussions, just to give a couple of examples. So we are probing to see what responses at various levels there may be.

As of now, I don't have anything to report other than the fact that we are probing -- and so are they; but we are also determined, much as we would like to see a more constructive atmosphere, that it won't come at the expense of our realism or our strength. This doesn't mean -- I'm not ruling it out at all. I am, in fact, offering hope that perhaps something more constructive can emerge.

Q I guess what I should have said, to make it more blunt, have you seen anything so far that you think is a change on their side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Regarding exactly that point, there is a perception that Mr. Gromyko had some effect in Europe with his carrot-and-stick approach in arms control negotiations over the last several days, probably at the cost of coherent negotiation and perhaps the cost of inter-Allied relations. First of all, would you comment on that?

Secondly, do you feel any need to try to offset what seemed to be his divisive effort in Western Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Coming at your question from the end, I think it is clear that we have, let's say, the reality track of the negotiations and the positions being put forward, and so on. And we have the public perception and the public-information and disinformation track that is also extremely important, and we have to address ourselves to both of these. And we are doing so with our Allies.

It is hard to see how it is constructive to threaten people and try to make them afraid -- to say to the Japanese, "Remember, those atomic explosions on your soil!" and to make threatening noises at the West Germans should they go ahead with deployment! That kind of fear tactic which has been employed, I think, is not an indication of a desire to have a constructive and peaceful situation. And we should note that.

Similarly, I think the effort that has been made so far is, I think, more appropriately characterized as an effort to disrupt the determination to deploy, as distinct from an effort to advance the negotiations in Geneva. Nevertheless, on the one hand, we intend to continue to work with our Allies and maintain the cohesion that has been there -- and is there today -- in the determination to deploy, if there is no satisfactory agreement. At the same time, in Geneva, Paul Nitze will continue to negotiate in good faith to see what can be brought forth there.

Q On El Salvador, to change places, you've certified them just recently --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- in spite of what seems from the crowd outside to be still sizeable opposition. Do you have any message to them about how far they have to go to "clean up their act" further, or is this acceptable to you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL? The point is that you can identify areas where improvements have been made and are taking place, and so we look for continued improvements. I suppose the most dramatic improvement that you can identify in the last six-month period is the continued reduction of civilian deaths.

There are other aspects of the situation that are disappointing, and I think the inability to prosecute the lieutenant involved in the killings of the labor people, to my mind, is one of the most disappointing. So there are things to be said on both sides of this ledger. But overall, as the certification says -- and as the evidence is in there -- I think substantiates that, taken on the average, the situation has improved; and that is what is called for in the certification.

Q May, I get back to the arms control business? I wonder if you could just give us a feeling for what you intend, yourself, in this area from here on in? And also, do you anticipate now that the next thing that the Soviets will do in Geneva is put on the table there the Andropov proposal that was made public?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to try to anticipate what the Soviets will do. We have to think about our position and develop it, and consider what our responses will be to whatever may be put there. But the place for us to do that is there, and that's the way we --

Our position, as far as my own role is concerned, I consider it to be a subject of great importance -- obviously, it is. And I have been, and expect to continue working at it very hard, and have certain statutory responsibilities as well as the kinds of responsibilities you feel, just as a person in the job, for giving a conscientious and determined effort to it, and give my best advice to the President on how to conduct the negotiations.

Q You asked, I believe, Mr. Genscher to return, to come back here tomorrow. What is your message to him? And are you concerned that the German Government may be waivering in the face of a lot of opposition, particularly from Mr. Vogel and the Social Democrats, to the deployment of the weapons.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they seem like a pretty firm government to me. Mr. Genscher at this point in time has at least two jobs -- two that I focus on: one is the job of Foreign Minister, and the other, in the rotation of the Common Market chairmanship, the Germans are in the Chair, so he has that post as well. It is traditional that whoever is in that post comes over here at about this stage, and makes a visit, and we discuss those relationships.

Obviously, a lot has been happening in Germany. Mr. Gromyko, as somebody here noted a few minutes ago, has been there; and while we have had lots of reports, it's always interesting to hear a direct report from a participant whom you know. So we'll have a chance to discuss all of these issues as well as many others that we are working on with the German Government and our Allies.

(Continued on page C-1)

Q What effect will the Chinese textile problem have on your trip, and will you be trying to make some progress in this area while you're there?

A I'm certainly ready to describe the situation and the reasons for our position, but as in other types of negotiations, the place to do the negotiation is with the people who are designated to do it. I have no intention whatever of turning myself into a textile negotiator.

We are very ably represented, and that person will do the negotiating.

Q Sir, on the Middle East again, you said several times you're disappointed in the process of the negotiations on troop withdrawal from Lebanon.

How do we explain the delays there? Are they good-faith disagreements and misunderstandings, or is there purposeful foot-dragging that is causing the lack of progress?

A I think that there are undoubtedly some genuine differences of opinion about what is a good and proper outcome, and those have to be worked out. Each party to the discussions has to develop an appraisal as to the genuine merit of the other side's position. Sometimes it takes a little time to do that, although in this case we don't think it should take as long as it seems to be taking.

Q I wonder if I could take you back to the question of assistance again.

A The question of what?

Q The question of economic assistance to Israel. Would you consider a reduction of economic assistance contrary to our original statement that you didn't think that questions dealing with aid were productive?

A It's a very difficult question to make a comment on because these levels change each year. You appraise what should be done, and the President makes a proposal. We defend that proposal. As you know, we thought that it was not necessary to increase it over the President's proposal last year, and we said so.

So I find it hard to really make operational contact with that. There isn't any effort being made, if this is your question, to try to make a calculation of how much the settlements cost and then make a deduction of some kind from some number. The trouble wih that approach being that -- what is your base?

Q But you seem to be holding out the idea of reducing their aid as a possibility there.

A I don't know where you -- where did you get that impression?

Q Well, if you're talking about finding a number from which to deduct it, and that being your problem as opposed to the idea of reducing aid being the problem, that seems to be creeping in, or maybe I'm misreading you.

A No. I was just trying to be responsive to the question of how you would do this, and I think it would be a difficult kind of determination to make. I know it's been suggested. I didn't know whether that was what you had in mind.

Q That's what I had in mind.

A Yes. I thought it was. I'm learning.

(Laughter)

Q If I could go back to the INF situation, Mr. Strauss today came out with a statement that sounded similar to the Social Democrats' position, probably for different reasons, but talking about the inoperability of the zero-option plan.

As you become more involved in this whole question now, at what point do you think you have -- the United States has to go beyond the zero-option and indicate a further willingness to negotiate?

A I read Mr. Strauss's statement rather differently, as being quite different from the SPD proposal, as being more by way of saying that we have to be determined to deploy and let's not kid ourselves kind of a statement. That's the way I read that statement.

Q Yes, sir, he did say that, but he also in saying that indicated that he thought the zero-option proposal would not work.

A That was the more colorful aspect of his statement, but I think the operative part of his statement was determination to deploy. At least that's what I took out of it. And that was where, in effect, he was placing his emphasis.

Q On this, it's been suggested on cutting economic aid that might go toward the financing of settlements.

What do you mean when you say "it's been suggested," and is that being considered?

A I've read in the newspapers that people have speculated about it.

Q And is it being considered?

A I haven't been involved in any of those calculations, no. Not that I know of.

That isn't to say that somebody in the government hasn't considered it or done something about it, but it hasn't been something that I have asked to have done or had presented to me.

Q That raises another point, which is one of the situations --

A I don't mean in saying this to imply in any way that the settlements problem isn't a real problem. I think it is -- very. And it's not constructive, and I think a lot of the things going on, on the West Bank, as I understand what is taking place there, are constructive. And I've made comments about that before, and I don't take back a word.

Q Switch questions -- this Administration has been saying that that settlement process is not constructive for some time now. That, I think it's fair to say, has had absolutely no impact whatsoever on --

A I don't think it's had the impact of stimulating settlements. People told me that.

(Laughter)

Q You said it; not me. Especially if that is the case, that would suggest that simply calling the settlements not constructive is not going to be sufficient to stop, much less reverse that process.

Is the Administration then looking for some further leverage, stimulus, to encourage the Begin Government to change its mind about that policy?

A I think the key element here -- and I have felt this way from the beginning of the President's initiative -- is to enlarge the group of people who are sitting around the bargaining table; and once that is a reality, then I think the potential reality of possible peace in that region is much stronger, and at that time you have a changed situation.

Q But you've got a chick and an egg problem. You make that statement, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, King Hussein says that he can't come into the peace process until you stop the settlements.

A We're working on it.

Q Two questions on Hussein. It seems that so many things -- are there any new ideas? New tactics?

A I think that the right tactics are in place and the right strategy is in place, namely, first of all to emphasize the importance of peace; second, to try to do everything we can to get those who must in the end make peace to sit down with each other and start talking about it. And, third, to be forthcoming with ideas about what it seems to us are the areas most likely to be fruitful in such a discussion.

So those things have been put forward. We have been working on them, and it isn't easy to bring these things into being. Nevertheless, I think a considerable amount of progress has been made with opinion in the Arab world particularly, but perhaps elsewhere as well, on the importance of these ideas and on the importance of getting into a peace process with Israel.

So I think there has been headway made. Obviously, we haven't had the breakthroughs that we need, but I don't think there has been a lack of motion. We wish that motion were faster.

Q Are you giving any consideration to taking -- to go to the Middle East yourself?

A That question has been put to me many times, and certainly whenever it seems fruitful and worthwhile to go -- so there's going to be something genuinely accomplished by a trip there -- I'm sure that I will go. And it may be some time soon that those conditions will be met, but that's the test, as far as I'm concerned.

Q You've said earlier that Chet Crocker met with the Soviets on southern Africa. What was that about? Is there some kind of movement particularly?

A No. He's had a couple of discussions with them about their views of that situation and their views of Cuban involvement there.

Q Do you have any indication that Cuban troops might be withdrawing from Angola?

A No. I think I would have to say that those discussions which we promoted, we agreed on with the Soviets, did not yield anything identifiable.

Q On an operational question, you said your expectation is that Mr. Habib -- after you discuss his view and the others here -- he'll be going back to the Middle East? Do you think that's right? The next part of the process?

A I think it's virtually certain. He is here in part to consult and give us his report, but it's also important that Phil be here for President Mubarak's visit because Phil's charter is a broader one than just Lebanon. In fact, we don't want to see him get too enmeshed in the whole Lebanon problem -- that's basically Morrie Draper's responsibility -- so that Phil can give attention to the broader peace process.

And it's in that respect mainly that he's come to be part of the Mubarak visit.

Q When would you expect him to go back? The next (inaudible).

A I would expect so, but I'm not giving any statement about just what his schedule will be.

Q When will you see him?

A I'll see him tomorrow.

Q Prime Minister Nakasone was here last week. I think the Administration was hoping he would pledge more military spending.

It seems that he went overboard, and I wonder if you anticipate any kind of problems on your trip, having to mend fences when you get there, because of his interview with the Post?

A No. I don't think -- he stated his views and related them to Japanese needs as he sees them, and I thought he was a very -- he is a very impressive person, and he was most informative and worthwhile to talk to.

It does seem to me that Japan, with its economic strength and abilities, and its influence around the world, is coming more and more into the center of discussions of how -- a responsibility for how our world operates.

He's a very good person for that, as is his Foreign Minister, Mr. Abe, who I spent a lot of time with.

Q Foreign Minister Ali has been quoted as saying the Egyptians will not talk about the Palestinian autonomy, or will not return to the Palestinian autonomy talks until the Israelis are out of Lebanon.

You said that is going to be the message that Mubarak will bring here.

Have they told you that in advance?

A It has been clear for a long time that the Egyptians are very troubled by events in Lebanon, and you remember this goes back to the Beirut negotiations and where would the PLO go and so forth.

So it's clear that this issue is a bothersome one to them. We know that.

There are many other things to talk about with Egypt -- that's one of them -- and we'll want a full readout on the Lebanon situation. That's one of the things that's important about Phil Habib being here. He can give a very firsthand and fresh account.

But there are a lot of bilateral issues, and there is the peace process more generally, as you suggested, and there are questions of Egypt's relationships with Israel, if we want to get an understanding about it.

Q Thank you.

(The interview concluded at 5:49 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

January 25, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:09 A.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: This will be a background briefing on the visit of President Mubarak. He will be here meeting with the President on Thursday. This is a background briefing attributable to Senior Administration Official. For your information, the background briefer will be [redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say a few words about the schedule. I don't know if we've yet had an opportunity to get anything out because it's changed it a little bit.

The visit will follow the pattern established for official working visits. The Egyptian party will arrive at 4:30 p.m. Wednesday, January 26, and be met by Secretary Shultz at the Reflecting Pool on the Mall. On Thursday, January 27, President Mubarak will meet with Defense Secretary Weinberger at 9:30 a.m. and then will go to the White House at 11:30 a.m. for a meeting and working lunch with the President. After lunch, the President and President Mubarak will have statements for the press.

Following the meeting with the Secretary, the House Foreign Affairs Committee will host a coffee for President Mubarak at 2:00 p.m. in the Rayburn Building. After this session, President Mubarak will meet with Secretary Shultz. That evening, Vice President Bush will meet with President Mubarak and will host a dinner for Mubarak at the Vice President's residence. The next day, Friday, January 28, President Mubarak will meet with the economic group, Secretaries Regan and Baldrige, Ambassador Brock and AID Director McPherson at 10:15 a.m.

Following these meetings, he will meet with Senator Baker at the Capitol and attend a luncheon in his honor with the Senate leadership. At 5:00 p.m. on Friday, Mubarak and his party will depart Washington for New York where he will attend a dinner and give a speech to the Foreign Policy Association. We understand that the next day, Saturday, President Mubarak will meet with U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, attend a reception hosted by Mayor Koch and attend a luncheon in his honor by the U.S.-Egyptian Business Council and the American-Egyptian Chamber of Commerce.

And President Mubarak will depart New York for Canada at approximately 4:00 p.m. Now, you might want to check with the Egyptian Embassy for confirmation of President Mubarak's meetings with non-U.S.G. officials in Washington and New York.

Of the visit itself, as we see it, President Mubarak's visit has six general objectives, to permit the two presidents to renew their personal relationship which is very important to our relations, to review and reiterate the special relationship between Egypt and the U.S. and our common dedication to the pursuit of a just, comprehensive and secure peace for the Middle East, to discuss the peace process and President Reagan's peace initiative,

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to review the situation in Lebanon and our mutual interest in the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the strengthening of the Lebanese central government, to review regional security and political issues and U.S.-Egyptian cooperation in dealing with these issues and to discuss bilateral issues, U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt.

President Mubarak's visit is part of a series of ongoing consultations between the U.S. and Middle Eastern leaders on the President's peace initiative and the situation in Lebanon. We have remained in close touch with President Mubarak and his senior officials. And in recent months the Egyptian foreign and defense ministers have visited the U.S. several times and Presidents Reagan and Mubarak have exchanged messages and, most recently, Ambassador Habib has visited Cairo for discussions with President Mubarak.

The background

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of the visit is an invitation from the President.

This is the second visit in less than a year and we believe that this helps to underline the importance that we accord to Egyptian-U.S. relations.

A hallmark of President Mubarak's leadership has been the continuity of Egyptian policy. Under President Mubarak, Egypt has maintained its commitment to the Camp David Peace Process and its peace treaty with Israel remains firm.

We view a sound Egyptian-U.S. relationship is vital to our efforts to secure a comprehensive peace settlement and we look forward to working with both countries to help them build on our past achievements.

We also view good relations between Egypt and other Arab countries as important for stability in the region and for the fulfillment of Egypt's role in achieving comprehensive peace. The latter would include, of course, a solution of the Palestinian problem. And we expect the focus of our talks to be the President's peace initiative, Lebanon regional security issues, along with bilateral issues related to economic and military assistance.

That's the general framework. I'll take some questions.

Q Why's he coming?

Q What is Egypt's role in the peace process now? Is it your idea that if the talks ever get going with the King and some Palestinian delegation that there will be an Egyptian at the table, too, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, our view of Egypt's role really hasn't changed. Egypt remains one of the vital partners for peace in the Middle East. What has changed has been the mutual recognition that the table must be broadened. In addition to Egypt, you must have other Arab partners and you are aware that we are hopeful that the Jordanians will be able to announce their willingness to negotiate with Palestinians. So the Egyptian role remains vital and we will be discussing the peace process in depth here with the party; but most particularly between President Reagan and President Mubarak.

Q Has he said that he will not take part in any negotiations on the Palestinian question until the Israelis are out of Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the Egyptian position has been that they will not re-engage on the autonomy and transitional talks on the Palestinian issue until there are the other Arabs at the table.

The Lebanese problem is a broader problem with respect to influencing attitudes towards the peace process. For example, when King Hussein was here he underscored his own concern about the Lebanese problem being an impediment to the Arabs coming to the table. And Lebanon, of course, the Egyptians have frankly admitted, has introduced strains into the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. And they have publicly stated that a condition for the return of their Ambassador would be the achievement of an agreed framework for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q What additional weapons do the Egyptians want and is the administration vying to give them additional military aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's an issue of hardware. Our hardware deliveries have gone along quite well. We now have 300 tanks, 20 F-16's, 800 armored personnel carriers, 4 eyehawk batteries, other communications, support equipment already in Israel -- I mean, in Egypt. And I believe we will be discussing the hawkeyes, too, won't we? This is the air surveillance. So it's not a question of additional hardware. That seems to be going along.

Q -- against Libya, or what is the reason behind that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically, the -- I won't go into any great detail, but what we are into is a modernization program with the Egyptians, and recognition that the basically Soviet-equipped Egyptian armed forces -- their equipment has to be updated. You can get all the figures on this. We can give them to you. But, basically, more is coming out of their inventory than we're putting in. And it's legitimate self-defense.

Q Some Israeli leaders, including President Navon when he was here, stressed what he calls a frozen peace between Israel and Egypt. Is the President going to talk to President Mubarak about this issue? And is he going to ask him, for example, to send the Ambassador back to Tel Aviv or to do any other steps that would change this situation of frozen peace?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, we're aware of the concerns that have been expressed by Israeli leaders, publicly as well as privately. And we have -- we're also aware of the views of the Egyptians on the same subject. Our basic posture is that we are in favor of an unfreezing of these relationships as soon as this can be achieved. I like to think both countries share that. We will be discussing Israeli-Egyptian relations in the course of our general discussions of the area and the peace process. But I wouldn't want to signal any particular element of this that we may want to bring to the top of the agenda.

MR. ALLIN: Andrea.

Q In light of that problematical relationship, isn't the Israeli refusal to consider a complete withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, its insistence on being part of that buffer zone and not accepting U.N. troops in the buffer zone, isn't that -- because it's slowing down the process of withdrawal, isn't that just making the situation that much more trouble?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you referring to the Egyptian-Israeli problem or -- I'm sorry. I thought you were --

Q I'm referring to the Lebanese problem and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh.

Q -- its impact on the Egyptian-Israeli problem, this latest Israeli position.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It obviously has an impact. Another good reason for a quick resolution to the Lebanese problem is that it would relieve strains in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship.

Q Can you comment on the latest Israeli position regarding the 28-mile zone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Only that a security zone is part of what the Israelis have insisted upon -- and the security zone itself is really not particularly controversial; it's what goes into it -- and whether or not the Lebanese could support current Israeli positions. These issues are being discussed. Phil Habib is back here. We'll be discussing them. I don't want to turn this briefing into a Lebanon briefing.

Q There are reports circulating in the Arabic press that Egypt is just about on the edge of its wit on the matter of the peace treaty with Israel and it's just a matter of time before Egypt possibly makes a decision to withdraw because of the fact Israel has not given Taba back, is not getting out of Lebanon. And the peace negotiations for the West Bank in the autonomy talks is not moving. What do you comment on this? And what will the administration be doing in order to cool the atmosphere in Egypt, which is really hostile now to a continuation of the peace treaty with Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anonymous Arab press sources that may or may not say something is a very difficult thing to handle. Let me -- (laughter) -- let me put it this way, that

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as far as the United States is concerned, we regret the strains in the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. But we believe that the basic Egyptian-Israeli treaty has stood the test of Lebanon. Now, I do not see any indications on the part of the Egyptian leadership that they are near the edge in whatever was described on that relationship. And I think that questions such as this should be addressed to the Egyptian leaders, themselves. I would be quite surprised if anyone told you.

As far as American policy, we are determined to follow the President's policies in the peace process and in our policy toward Lebanon. As we have already discussed here, success on the Lebanon policy will have a positive impact on Israeli-Egyptian relations. And that is fine. We will be prepared, and the President will be prepared, to discuss in detail a broad range of interests with President Mubarak, which include Lebanon in the peace process but, also, include other regional issues that are very much on the minds of both of those leaders.

Q Can you tell us if the Mubarak visit is going to be followed up by a visit by Prime Minister Begin? And, if so, when?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot go beyond what you already know about the question of the visit of the Prime Minister.

Q At this point, we do not really know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No dates have been set. That is, basically, all I can tell you.

Q What is holding up the date setting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am really not going beyond what you have been told on this.

Q In The Christian Science Monitor, President Mubarak was quoted -- I think I am reporting accurately -- that he will not permit the U.S. to use facilities in Egypt unless an Arab nation asks for it. I mean, apart from Egypt. Also, he said something about no bases would be permitted under any circumstances for U.S. forces, which is an old story. But the facilities angle seems to be something different. Under what circumstance can we justify foreign military aid to Egypt when we have a friend like that in Egypt -- in Cairo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as the Egyptian policy, you did correctly state that it was a no-bases policy. And that dates from President Sadat's time. I told you that earlier -- that President Mubarak was adjuring closely to the basic policies of President Sadat. And that was one of them.

The question of facilities is different. The Egyptians have agreed to the use of American facilities -- or facilities in Egypt -- Egyptian facilities on contingency basis. Ras Banas is one of these facilities. And I believe we have a $91 million appropriation to move ahead, and start to improve it. This will be very important with respect to the future projection of American power in the area. It has always been understood that we would use such Egyptian facilities subject to the approval of the government of Egypt. That is nothing new.

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As far as any other suggestions as to who is saying what or whom, that is out of my province. As far as this government is concerned, we are confident about our security and strategic relationship with Egypt. And we believe that this is a stable relationship, very much in both of our interests. And certainly, American security assistance to Egypt should be seen in that light.

Q The impression I got from the Mubarak interview was not that Egypt may well say no U.S. -- the U.S. cannot use facilities in Egypt at all, but that the U.S. cannot use those facilities in Egypt as a launching pad, a springboard or as a base of operations in another part of the Arab world without the consent of the countries to which those forces might go. This puts, of course, a crimp in the rapid deployment force.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not going to address what President Mubarak was supposed to have said about a third country.

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You can ask President Mubarak, if that is your view.

Q It is in the U.S. interest, is it not, to know where we are going, where we are putting our money.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe we know where we are going. I just said it. You can accept it, or disagree. But do not act as though you did not hear it.

Q What role do you envision for Mubarak in encouraging King Hussein to join the peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Mubarak has been a very active supporter of the President's initiative. He, as you know, has even encouraged the PLO to recognize Israel, I believe, as a means of trying to unstick this process. The Egyptians play an important role with respect to encouraging the Jordanians. But I believe that they recognize that other Arabs are terribly important as well in encouraging King Hussein, and supporting him -- and clearly, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the Gulf.

So the Egyptians and President Mubarak, personally, are being as helpful as I believe they can be.

Q We are all sitting here talking about Mubarak. I mean, the whole peace process has, kind of, ground to a halt over Lebanon. Habib is back here. And, obviously, if that thing does not go anywhere, the King at least indicates he is not going to get into the Reagan peace initiative. What is the state of concern here about these, at least, reports of near incidents between Israelis and Americans in Lebanon and over the virtual breakdown -- if not breakdown, stalling of the whole Lebanese withdrawal process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the question of talking about Mubarak of course, his visit is an integral part of the peace process. So the issues that are before us -- the status of it, where the various potential players are now, how might they be nudged into the right direction, further encouraged to take the decisions that have to be taken -- we will be discussing with President Mubarak. President Reagan will have this very much on his mind.

On the question of Lebanon, its perceptions have linked Lebanon to the broader peace process. We do not believe that the lack of quick progress in Lebanon -- fortunately, has not brought the movement in the peace process to a halt. However, it is clear -- because there is a lot going on. A lot of people are talking to a lot of people, trying to set the terms -- conditions where by the Jordanians and the Palestinians can come in.

However, it is clear that a continued impasse will have an increasingly negative impact on the prospect for actually kicking off a broader peace process. And we will be talking about that, too.

Q On the question of the Lebanese impasse and all these stories about U.S. pressure on Israel -- does the United States now have a policy of slowing down arms or aid to Israel?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This subject was, pretty well, handled yesterday -- on what our policies are. There are no changes in our policies. And I really do not want to go beyond that, because I cannot.

Q Are changes being considered? It was never addressed to the effect of what is being drafted or is not being drafted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would never tell you what is being drafted or what we are thinking of drafting or what we might draft.

Q There have been times when there have been indications from people as to what is being considered -- plenty of times.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not from me.

Q What do you expect to come out of this meeting, besides a better understanding?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, in addition to strains that we have talked about in other relationships, Lebanon has, also, introduced some strains into American-Egyptian relationships for

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the first time. I believe those strains are now gone. The President's peace initiative was very well received by President Mubarak. As I say, they have been in the forefront working with us, trying to encourage others to join. I think this -- in that respect, I would expect this visit to be perceived and to be, in fact, a symbol of the renewal, the reiteration of the strength of the Egyptian-American partnership.

MR. ALLIN: Let's take two more in the back. Phil, and then the gentleman over there.

Q Could I come back to Helen's original question? Yesterday Foreign Minister Ali was quoted as saying that Egypt would not re-enter the autonomy talks until Israel had pulled out of Lebanon or until there was a definite timetable for Israel to pull out of Lebanon. And I gather that that -- and he said that President Mubarak would serve notice of this on the Americans. And I gather they have not told you this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're happy to hear anything they have to say. If Foreign Minister Ali said that publicly, then it's on the public domain. I haven't seen it. I'm not doubting that it's there. But I can't comment on that.

Q Yesterday's FBIS reports, for whatever it's worth.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It may be.

MR. ALLIN: Yes, sir.

Q Is the United States satisfied with the domestic situation in Egypt, that Mubarak is in control, the question of the economy, the continuation of the state of emergency? What's your assessment as far as this is concerned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My assessment is that this is essentially and wholly a domestic issue for the Egyptian government. And as far as we're concerned, we are delighted to have President Mubarak here, whom we consider to be a strong leader in his own country. And we will use this visit to build on a -- on almost a decade of close cooperation.

Q But, as we know, domestic issues usually affect foreign policies and agreements and relationships --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Everywhere in the world.

Q How are you with the time? What's the time element here? There are reports also that you only have -- March 1st that King Hussein will be responding to the request or the maneuvers of the United States to have him back in the peace -- or to have him in the peace process. What's the time element here? Is it working on your side, or against your side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've all read King Hussein's remarks in which he cited March 1st. To get a better feeling as to what he meant, I suggest you ask him.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:38 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

January 25, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

12:35 P.M. EST

MR. GERGEN: I think we're going to have only a limited amount of town, you know. All of you all -- are used to eating and talking at the same time. Why don't we go ahead and get started.

And first of all, let us just -- I want to welcome all of you here from the networks. We certainly appreciate the fact that you could come here today.

It was our thought that since you're going to be spending a good deal of time this evening and in days to come on the State of the Union it might be helpful if you had a chance to talk to people from the administration first hand before we start going down this path.

You know, we have a rule, I guess, and with our Cabinet they can never all be at the -- in the Congress or anyplace else altogether at the same time. I'm a little startled that all of the networks have permitted all of you to come together. I wonder if they -- Soviets really set out to destroy us, what they could do today -- while we went into the men's room.

But in any event, the rules here are this will be on background with the understanding that you could use this starting this evening as of the time the President starts to speak. So it will be embargoed until time of delivery. And you can cite senior White House officials or senior administration officials as you choose.

We are making a transcript of this for you and Karna Small's office is handling that and I understand there will be a transcript available for each bureau chief as of around 5:00 p.m. this afternoon in room 45 over at the EOB, which is the traditional pick-up place.

Q We pick it up over there or do you --

MS. SMALL: If you want to send a messenger, what we'll do is we'll put three in an envelope with the bureau chief's name on it.

Q OEOB, room 45 at 5:00 p.m.

MS. SMALL: Room 45. Hopefully, by 5:00 p.m.

MR. GERGEN: I might point out that this afternoon around 5:00 p.m. we're hoping to get started with a general background briefing for the White House Press Corps at which time we would like to pass out a fact sheet which will accompany the State of the Union message. It will probably come just a little later. So that you might want to pick that up as a part of your package. It's a fairly extensive fact sheet, about 10 or 12 pages.

Now, we're going to be playing musical chairs here a bit today. But I -- and we need to move fairly rapidly.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. What you didn't say today was that you asked me to make some general comments and talk, perhaps, about the political implications of the two years and the state of the Union.

Most of you have reported, and we certainly do not disagree with the conclusion that this third year is a very important year to Ronald Reagan's Presidency. And we are well aware of the polls which show that his political standing is down somewhat.

But we take some solace from the fact that modern presidencies in the post-war period have all followed a pattern of dipping to their lowest point in the third year and then coming back. Now, some come back sufficiently to win reelection and some don't. But this has been the case, this pattern has been the case with Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon and the Carter administration.

I think another point that we would make is that the President spent the first two years laying the foundation here and with economic recovery. And we are very quick to admit that without economic recovery it's going to be extremely difficult; but with economic recovery, we think the President is positioned to bounce back. I think you have only to note, and this didn't particularly relate to the economy, but you have only to note that in June of 1971, Richard Nixon was scoring only about 39 percent against Ed Muskie and yet he came back to win by 61 percent.

The President's personal approval rating, as opposed to his job approval rating, remains remarkably high when you consider the state of the economy and the extended duration of that state. I think people like this President and there's a feeling out there on the part of most Americans that they want him to succeed.

The ABC poll that was released today, we noted with some optimism the point that was made in there that most Americans view this President as a strong leader, able to achieve legislation on the Hill.

But if recovery is the key to his bouncing back politically, I suppose it would be appropriate to address the question of whether or not there will be recovery. And one thing there that we think is interesting is to note that economists are no longer talking about how much worse the recession is going to be, they're now debating, for the most part, how strong or weak the recovery will be.

We think that there is a stimulative monetary policy in force. The same thing is true with respect to fiscal policy when you look at the fact that the tax cut, the 10 percent tax cut, is due to take effect in July and we take some comfort from the fact that the leading indicators have been up for seven out of the last eight months and that we do have a pretty good recovery going in housing, to a lesser extent in autos and then, finally, durable goods orders have been looking better.

Now, the polls that have been made public here in the last couple of days make it clear that at least 50 percent of the people out there think that the country is not better off, or is worse off, than it was two years ago.

On the other hand, there's 46 to 48 percent who think the country is better off or about the same. But if you personalize that question, if you ask -- and we've done this in our polls -- and I think that the CBS poll did the same thing, if you ask the question from the standpoint, "Are you better off or the same?" you get seven out of ten saying that they're either personally better off or about the same. Whereas, you get 52 percent saying the country is worse off.

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And if you look to the future in these polls, as the CBS poll did, and ask the interviewee what he thinks the future holds with respect to '83, in Dick Wirthlin's poll, 70 percent say that the country's going to be better off at the end of '83 than it is today. And the CBS poll -- I think the number is 56.

The only point I'm trying to make by citing those numbers is that I think that those who might tend to write this President off politically now would be making the mistake of underestimating this President that many people had made in the past.

Now, so much for where we are in our view politically. I might make one or two general comments about the state of the Union. And I don't want to invade my colleague's turf. Is my colleage here yet?

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But just generally, the President is going to say, I think, he's going to recognize in this message that the state of the Union is strong but that our economy is troubled. The tone of the message is going to be bipartisan and the President is going to outline a comprehensive budget plan in the State of the Union message. He's going to say that to be effective a comprehensive budget plan has to be bipartisan. It's got to be fair. It's got to be prudent and realistic. And it's got to show deficits trimming downward to no more than 2.5 percent of GNP in 1988.

I think you will see when you see the numbers and when the budget is released that the estimates which we are using this year are not subject to attack from the standpoint that they're too rosy or that there's blue smoke and mirrors in there. We have been very, very cautious in our estimates.

I think the same thing can be said with respect to the savings, that is, the deficit reductions measures which are called for.

Not that they're going to be easy of enactment but that there's not a lot in there like management initiatives and the like which can be collaterally attacked from the standpoint that it's not -- that those are not a real saver.

The The plan will call for some $559 billion of deficit reduction over the five-year period.

Q What was the figure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $559 billion in deficit-reduction measures over a five-year period, from '84 to '88; $140 billion of that will be in the form of a contingent tax increase, which my colleague will explain to you in more detail in just a minute.

The net effect of this budget, or the deficit reduction plan, would be to reduce the deficit from seven percent of GNP in 1983 to 2.5 percent of GNP in 1988. It is a four point plan for economic growth.

Now, I could go a little further, but I don't want to get into my colleage's --

MR. GERGEN: Why don't we open up with him, since you're only going to be here a short time. You all must have some questions now -- pick up from there.

We'll have more details, obviously, on the budget side of this here when --

MS. SMALL: Any specific questions? And then he's going to leave and we're going to turn it over to -- talk about domestic initiatives.

Q Well, the contingency tax increase is obviously a big part of it. And Baker is saying that he doesn't like it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think Senator Baker said following our leadership meeting here that while he might have some reservations about it, he thinks the package should be considered as a package and as a whole and he's certainly willing to consider it. Isn't that what he said when he went outside?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think a lot of people who had heard of this as an abstract proposition, when they saw it as part of the overall, combined, comprehensive plan this morning, have a different view. And there was a lot of changed minds --

Q When he saw it this morning, he changed from his Sunday position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He indicated he could support it because, as he said, the alternatives are a lot worse.

Q Does this mean that deficit reduction begins in 1984?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. This is the '84 budget we're proposing, yes.

Q Fiscal '84.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fiscal '84.

Q What's the contingency tax increase tactic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is it tied to? Why you don't answer that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Getting ahead of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we're getting a little ahead of ourselves. But what we're trying to do here is to have a standby, an insurance policy, if you will, providing that any one of three different things doesn't happen.

Now, first of all, we'd like to close deficits in those out years by having an increase in the economy with spending remaining constant or declining as a percentage of Gross National Product.

If that were to happen, you'd close the deficits automatically because revenues will rise with a rising GNP.

Secondly, the Congress, between now and those out-years, could cut spending even further than we're suggesting or we may suggest in future years. So as a result, if you cut spending more, you'll cut those deficits.

Now, if those don't happen in the out-years, you still have deficits that worry your money markets. So what are you going to do about them?

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We're proposing that Congress enact now a tax that would be the equivalent of one percent of Gross National Product. That would be triggered in in the event that the deficits were more than 2.5 percent of Gross National Product, in order to get them down.

Q In 198- --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In 1986. Fiscal '86, which starts October 1st, '85.

Q Three years.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that would be a temporary tax for three years.

Q How big a tax is that in terms of percentage?

Q Of GNP? Be one percent.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One percent of GNP.

Q -- percentage of an increase. How much --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be in dollar figures then, would be -- We figure at that point we'd have a $4 trillion economy going up toward four trillion, eight-hundred billion. So it's anywhere from $40 billion to $50 billion in round figures of taxes in fiscal '86-'87-'88.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a couple of other conditions to the tax.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the first condition, obviously -- this why I didn't want to get ahead of my colleage -- we are suggesting a freeze on certain entitlements in fiscal '84. If that freeze doesn't take place, we would not want this tax to be enacted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the spending cuts.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the spending cuts that accompany the freeze.

Q -- trigger-trigger you have to have. The freeze is trigger one and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's the whole idea. You're focusing on the tax itself; but any one of four different events could occur that would not have that go into effect.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I think the important thing is we would not even seek its enactment if we didn't get this year, in '83, the spending cuts and the freeze. You see, that's the first thing. So it wouldn't even be in effect in '86 that you can have that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And $420 billion, now, of the deficit reduction is in the form of freezes or spending cuts and the like.

Q Over the period, all the years.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, over the five-year period. The tax represents $140 billion, for a total of $559 billion.

MR. GERGEN: Since my colleage will be here with us. I wanted to take -- than get any more detail here -- I wonder if any of the questions about the President's political standing or the Congressional outlook for -- while my colleage is here.

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Q One thing -- you mentioned a bipartisan appeal in the State of the Union, it would be bipartisan. If you're a Democrat in the House of Representatives, what in this speech, in your judgment, is going to be the most important signal that that's something more than rhetoric?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the tone of it will be an important signal, I think, Dan. But, also, the fact that you have here an approach to this national problem of the deficit that is comprehensive, including all elements of the budget. Nothing is left out. There may be some difference of opinion, and will be, on specifics. But it is a comprehensive approach. And it is a prudent and realistic approach. Nobody will be able to argue with these estimates. Nobody will be able to argue with the savings that are requested, from the standpoint of they're not real savings. Now, you can argue whether you're going to get them. And that's the best way I know to answer your question.

Q But, politically, what is more important to the President as he goes before Congress tonight? The deficits or doing something about unemployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleage just reminded me, Dan, maybe an additional approach would -- you know, the Social Security compromise is an integral part of this budget. And the freeze that's called for in there, or the delay in COLA, will be expanded to extend to the other Social Security-related programs like Veterans benefits, railroad retirement, SSI.

Excuse me, Tom, I didn't --

Q For six months in all --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For six months. There will, likewise, be, and, again, this is ground today we'll cover with you in much more depth, there will, likewise, be a one-year freeze called for on federal civilian and military pay and retirement. One-year freeze, pay and retirement. Six-month freeze on the Social Security-related COLA's.

Q What is your perception of the degree of your political difficulties as it relates to the deficit and as it relates to unemployment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- cover that, too. We'll hit the unemployment issue, too.

Q In the speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the speech, right.

And there will be, and my colleage will expand on this later, there will be some initiatives in there having to do with unemployment. Is that what you're asking or --

Q Yes, that's what I'm --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the view is that without attacking the deficit problem, there is scant hope that the recovery that's poised out there will come. And that's why the President has bitten the bullet here and is going to attack the deficit problem across the board in a realistic manner and hopefully on a bipartisan basis.

Q Just from -- as a political -- would it be a good idea for him to announce his reelection plans pretty quickly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are two sides to that. If you do, then every decision you make people will brand as political because you're running again. If you don't, you run the risk of not being able to be as effective in enforcing your programs and policies. So --

Q But if you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- you know, obviously, we believe that the President is leaning toward running again. We've said as much. Ed's said that. I've said that. We think he's going to run. And the signals have been all in that direction with Paul Laxalt's appointment and that sort of thing.

I think the President, though, feels that you shouldn't get out there and announce too early or then everything you do is suspect on political grounds.

Q When would you anticipate he'd announce?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When? That's -- (laughter).

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You guys who have covered him before know that he has his own sense of when the time is and -- in 1979, it didn't come until the 13th of November, as I remember.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We were asked the other day what would be the latest and I think we said Labor Day or shortly thereafter. But that assumes, of course, that there will not be a serious challenge, which -- in the Republican primary, which is an assumption that we are now making.

Q Is the tone of the speech going to be that the country is facing an emergency? Or is it that we've got a few minor problems in the economy and if everybody pulls together, we can adjust it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's that we have some major problems with the economy and that we, in order to cure them, we're going to need everybody pulling on the same oar.

Q I was thinking of tone. What will be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that the tone is one of emergency. Now, any of my compadres here who might disagree with that in their reading of it, I don't think -- it doesn't reach that, Jim. It does stress the fact that we have a major problem and we need to deal with it on a bipartisan basis.

Q -- I was thinking of the political -- one of the political problems being that people have suggested that he does not understand what's going on in the country. And I was wondering whether this speech was going to be designed to speak to that question, that criticism.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it will largely dispell that notion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it will because the economy is a strange thing. You have some people who are actually better off than they've been for years at the present time and those are people who are primarily dependent on fixed incomes and so who, and because of the decrease in inflation, now have increased purchasing power. We had -- real personal income has gone up for the average person. At the same time, we have people in very tough straits who are unemployed. And the President has concern for this group particularly. And I think that will come out in the course of the speech tonight.

Q Isn't that extremely difficult to sell, though? The idea that people are better off because --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he's not going to talk -- He won't be talking about that --

Q -- just the rate of inflation. I mean, they still stand at the checkout counter and they don't say, "Oh, gee, hamburger's not going up quite as much -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, a majority in your poll said we had not done a good job in controlling inflation.

Q That's right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, that's probably our fault for not selling it --

Q Some said it was worse.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, but the interesting thing, that poll's a little different than most of them I've seen. There is now a majority for the first time starting to realize that inflation is under control, if you look at some other polls. But it's not the kind of thing the average citizen thinks about.

But the main concern right now that most people have, and what makes it a -- as my colleage says -- a major economic problem is the fact that you have too many people unemployed and a number of people worried about losing their job. That's the thing that he'll be addressing specifically tonight.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President went through and worked on this this weekend. And he sent back a message to us: "Look, I want to look reality in the eye on this speech. You know, we know it's trouble out there. We know some people are having a tough time. And I want to say that. And I don't want to get confrontational about the past, either."

He did not want to put in sections about what he inherited and what, you know, where we've been. Not seeking to lay blame anymore. It's not seeking to lay blame in his speech. He saying we've got to work together on these problems in the same way we worked on Social Security, in a bipartisan spirit. That's right up front in the speech. We've now got to work together in a bipartisan way to get these problems solved.

And he also emphasizes the theme that the economy is in transition, that we're going from a -- we're moving into a very different kind of society and we have managed to cure some of the underlying problems, inflation and high interest rates. We've made a lot of progress on those; but we've got some other serious problems in their wake. Mainly, high unemployment and these high deficits. And he does talk about the transition, as well, to hi tech.

In fact, as you know, he's going to Boston tomorrow to visit a retraining center that will be doing some hi tech type things up there.

Q Would you be better off politically, though, if he had something more in there about jobs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He does.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's going to be something --

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has quite a bit about jobs, which I'll talk about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- get a chance --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's got to be something --

Q -- defense spending as well. Is that in there and you just haven't touched on that? Because that appears to be a political concern.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Four elements -- if you could remember what I said, it's a comprehensive approach to the deficit, which means we're going to address all those areas, entitlements, defense spending, the revenue increase and the budget freeze concept. That is, overall spending will be frozen in 1984, in real terms. There will be no increase in real terms in overall spending in 1984.

Q Taken --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Taken as a whole.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Taken as a whole.

Q No, no. The budget taken as a whole.

Q No real freeze, now? No increase in dollars --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- taken as a whole, in real terms.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In real terms.

Q There will be no cuts in some areas --
Q
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which means it will go up at the rate of inflation which we have predicted is 4.5 percent for that year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the budget increase will be about 4.7; so --

Here comes the man with all those answers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've sort of left it at the point that it's a four-point program. Why don't you get into the specifics.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleage may have to go. I'm sorry.

Q Thank you very much. Very good.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as my colleage indicated to you, the budget part of it is only a portion of the total speech.

The speech basically breaks down into about four segments.

First of all is the economy generally and the budget. Secondly are specific things the President is going to do to attack the problem of jobs.

Thirdly, a series of additional domestic matters that deserve attention, specifically, in the areas of education, health, crime and federalism.

And then, fourth, the national security area, international and defense.

Now, the economic area and the budget area my colleagues will be talking with you about.

In the area of jobs, we're looking at it from two standpoints. One is job programs themselves that deal directly with the jobless. And in this regard, we're talking about such things as a specific program to extend unemployment benefits, a specific program to provide job vouchers, in effect, to enable people who have been unemployed for a long period of time to gain employment through voucher system in which the employer would get tax credits for employing those types of people. This is directed particularly at structural unemployment, people who are out of work because the jobs they leaving are drying up for structural reasons, structural change in the economy.

We have other programs for youth employment, specifically to provide for a wage differential for employers who hire youths during the summer.

Q What does that -- Does it mean --

Q Is that a minimum wage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What? Yes. It will be a youth differential, as we think of it.

Q For summertime employment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For summertime only. And the reason for this, we think this is a balance between those who would like to have a permanent youth wage and other -- the unions who are concerned or some who are concerned that this would usurp the jobs of actual workers. We think for temporary work during the summer, this will be an interesting experiment to see how that works.

And we're providing additional funds for job training for displaced workers under the Job Training Act. The Job Training Partnership Act was passed last year.

So, all of these things go towards the whole issue of jobs directly.

Then, in addition to that, we think the other major component has to do with trade because somewhere between one out of every five and one out of every six workers has his job effected by international trade.

MR. GERGEN: Can you hold it for a minute?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hold it? Yes. Sure. I think so. (Laughter).

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THE PRESIDENT: I'm supposed to get out of here in like two and a half minutes and not interrupt any of the other briefings that you've had. I really came in to tell all of you that everything you've heard is off the record. (Laughter.) And I'll sit for just a second since you pulled a chair out.

But I know that you've been getting a quite capable briefing from all those who are on hand as to generally where our minds are going in here. And just wanted to prove I was still alive and on duty. (Laughter.)

Q Do you see this speech as crucial to you in a political way tonight, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Since it's a national institution and an annual institution, I don't believe any administrations in the past have risen or fallen on the State of the Union address. I welcome it as an opportunity to maybe make some things clear and explain some things, what we're trying to do. I must say this, that after all the years in the other industry, I've been surprised that I could still get puckered up going in to appear before an audience that -- there's something about that particular institution over there that you do feel a little uptight when you face them.

Q Mr. President, if you had to appear on telelvision tonight in another role and you had, maybe, 35 seconds to sum up your State of the Union address, what -- (laughter) -- this is a hypothetical -- (laughter.) But what single thing in this State of the Union address -- is there anything that stands out in your mind more than the others that you would concentrate on and make sure you've mentioned in that fleeting 35 seconds?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think I could point to any one. I think the overall tone is the economic situation we're in and what to do about it. But I couldn't -- that's what you usually do, is sum up everything that I'm doing in 35 seconds. (Laughter.)

Q That wasn't bad. Fifteen seconds -- (laughter.)

THE PRESIDENT: But that is the situation, and it's one that, of course, I'm sure we're all involved in and all of -- we're all interested in and wrapped up in, this economic windstorm that has hit us here, and what we can do about it. And I am confident that what we're doing is the way to go about it. You can't be here and look back at the charts of the previous recessions without recognizing that they've all had some characteristics that back on the mash potato circuit years ago I was saying were going to lead to disaster. And that is that each one of them -- inflation went higher and unemployment went higher. And when the recession was supposedly cured, and nothing every got back down to where it had been before, so that it's been a succession of upward steps, each one getting worse than the last. And this one is the last of the string that have taken place since World War II.

But, again, there is something very different about this, which I think reflects our approach to it. That is that inflation has always gone up, and for the first time since the very early depression, we have inflation on a downward path. And I hope it will continue to where it's zero. Because for more than two

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decades I have myself been preaching that you cannot have -- as we were told for so many years and by those in power in Washington, that you could have an on-going inflation that was controllable and that was necessary to sustain prosperity. It had never been that way in our history before. And I kept warning that inflation is like radioactivity. It is cumulative. And one day you wake up and find out that your money is not worth anything. And it gets out of control. And it did. And I hope that we have got it back under control. We have at the present. And I will do everything I can to see that it goes on in the future.

Anything else, even when it was at the modest, little level that they said we could hold, if you added it up each year -- money that you might have in the bank or investments or in insurance was losing X number of pennies of its value. So that, when you finally resorted to that money -- retirement or whatever -- you did not have what you had originally put in there that you thought you were going to have.

I have used an example of my own, a personal example. I once bought a retirement policy when I was in motion pictures, and one that -- when I bought it -- I figured would allow me to continue living as I was living. And when it finally came due, it would not pay the property taxes on my house. That is what consistent, long-term inflation can do.

I did not mean to make an economic lecture here. (Laughter.) Don will correct everything that I have said. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: Thank you very much.

Q Mr. President, do you think what you are going to say tonight is going to be enough?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it will be enough for the fellows on the other side of the aisle. (Laughter.) They will probably think it is too much.

No. I do not think that you can really get in depth. Any one of the subjects that must be included in the State of the Union address would lend itself to a separate address all by itself. You can only point to a direction that you hope we are going -- intend to go, in this kind of an address.

Q Well, Mr. President, there is bound to be disagreement. But we have been given to understand you are really not going to stress the failures of the past or the problems of past administrations. But you are going to look forward, and really call for a bipartisan approach. Is that true?

THE PRESIDENT: I am going to talk about what we all have to do together. And that is the only way we can do it.

Q You are not going to point your finger so much at what happened before.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q Well, what I meant by "enough" was enough to get you out of the political doldrums that you are, allegedly, in -- and enough to get the country out of the recession?

THE PRESIDENT: Hell, I was just hoping that the fellows here with all of you would get you out of those doldrums. And then, the people would get out of those doldrums. (Laughter.)

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There is no point in trying to worry about image or anything in a situation of this kind. You just have to do what you think needs to be done. And, if you are right, that will take care of itself. And, if you are wrong, as Mr. Lincoln said -- "All of the angels in heaven couldn't change that situation."

But I think we are right. I think we are on the right course. And I think really it is the first time since World War II that this government has started down the right road to curing its economic problems. You see, we all forget that the Great Depression was never cured by any of the things that government was doing. It was relieved by World War II. And that is a road I choose not to go down again. But when the War was over, we were still faced with many of the problems that are causing us trouble today. And we kept on taking the same medicine. And it was not doing the job.

Q When you said, Mr. President, that this situation is very different than the recessions of the past, how serious is it? Are we at an emergency point?

THE PRESIDENT: Any time you have got unemployment, you are in an emergency. Certainly, it is an emergency for those people who are without their jobs. And it has to be the uppermost thing in all our minds.

But no, what I meant was the difference is that all the seven recessions prior to this one since World War II, the same remedies were applied. And the same remedies led to increased inflation. When they were supposedly over, due to an artificial stimulant, unemployment was higher than it had been before the recession hit. It never got back down. And about two or three years later, in that range, you had another recession that was worse. And it was, kind of, like taking a fix. And the fix wore off -- because it could not be sustained, because it was artificial.

And what we have done here is, basically, seek to reduce the percentage of the Gross National Product that is being taken by government -- reduce the percentage that was spent by government and that is being taken by government in taxes. And incidentally, the two figures are not the same. They have been diverging for a long time. And we are trying to get back to government in its proper place, and take the restraints off the private sector -- off business and industry -- that have actually held our economy down, and let it do what, for so many years, it did so well for the standard of living and the prosperity of our people.

Now, everybody says I have to get out of here.

THE PRESS: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

END 1:10 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I had mentioned the directed attack on the job problem. And the other part was in trade. And we feel that particularly foreign trade, the enhancement of foreign trade is a particularly important part of jobs and improving the economy for both the agricultural and the industrial -- and the general economy.

In this regard, we are particularly working on things like adequate funding of the Ex-Im Bank, providing the ability for our trade negotiators to improve our situation -- the knocking down of non-tariff barriers in other countries, expanding particularly our trade concerning services and investment and providing markets overseas for high technology, which you will hear a lot about in the course of the year as one of the areas in which the United States will be looking with research and development and training to expand its capabilities.

Another aspect of this that the President will talk about in his speech is in regard to providing facilities for shipping -- which we do not have adequate ports and channels. And this is one of the things in the whole trade area. But trade will be a major theme of the speech.

Now, I am going at these in, kind of, shotgun fashion. The President will be referring to these, as he mentioned. Any one of them, as he said, could take a whole message. And there will be subsequent messages to Congress during the course of the next several weeks, which will elaborate on these various points -- on the trade, on the jobs program and so on.

Then, there is the collection of additional domestic initiatives, which generally improve the quality of life of Americans. One has to do with education, which will get a great deal of attention in the speech -- the establishment of education savings accounts so that lower- and middle-income families will have the opportunity to develop savings accounts to sent their children to college, where the interest will not be taxed and so there will be this incentive to provide for their own children's educations. There will be a reiteration of what the President has already put up on tuition tax credits, and a major thrust made to obtain those in this session. There will be a proposal for block grants to the states, which will increase the number of math and science teachers in secondary schools. This is directly related to improving our competitiveness in the high tech area in the long run. The President will, also, talk about a Constitutional amendment to permit voluntary school prayer, which is an issue he has addressed before.

Then, we will have a series of measures that he will talk about relating to providing for a fairer society. And particularly, these will deal with women's equity issues -- including such things as completing our review of federal laws and changes in federal law that provide any differentiation between men and women in terms of economic equity, improving our assistance to states in enforcing child-support laws, which is becoming increasingly a problem particularly for working women. And we are taking action, through court suits, on equity for women in terms of pension plans.

Then, there will be a mention in the speech of improving the availability of health care through the reduction of health care costs by several things -- giving Medicare beneficiaries the opportunity to go into private plans through a voucher system, prospective payment of hospitals. In other words, now we have a retroactive payment. We would pay at a set-fee schedule that is set prospectively. We would have beneficiary cost-sharing, co-payment to reduce over-utilization.

And we would change the tax treatment of employer-pay health plans so that there would be a limit on the amount of the health plans that would be tax deductible.

Now, all of these are part of an overall program to reduce to cost of health care, which is, right now, increasing three times faster than the normal rate of inflation. The other aspect of this to make health care more readily available is a catastrophic health program for all older citizens, all Medicare recipients. That is, basically, the health program.

We will urge a reform of the criminal justice laws, which will include such things as bail reform -- some of these have been suggested before -- bail reform penalties for crimes, particularly drug trafficking, the forfeiture assets of drug traffickers, improving the sentencing laws generally for federal offenses, assisting states to provide more correctional facilities, changing the insanity defense -- the exclusionary rule and federal intervention in state criminal proceedings, and implementing the recommendations of the Task Force on Crime Victims, which will be reported to the President this week.

Also, in the area of fairness, we will talk specifically about reauthorizing the Civil Rights Commission, which expires in 1983, and strengthening the enforcement of fair-housing laws -- possibly through legislation.

And finally, we will be talking about the new federalism. And the program will be to continue our efforts, which were started in 1981, to have more categorical programs which are administered by the state and local governments to be funded through block grants with simpler administration, less federal requirements and less regulation.

So, in a nutshell, those are the areas in whic we will be concentrating on domestic programs.

Q Can I ask you about the education acts ahead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q I think there would be two levels. One would be mostly for people who are in the middle or upper-middle income categories. It will serve them best. And secondly, will it take away -- and will it not serve private universities most of all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It actually will serve anybody who wants to make use of it. But you are right. It will hit the middle class more, because the lower class has the scholarships and loan programs already available to them. The upper income do not need them. So this will hit at the middle clase. It will benefit all.

Q Has it been means tested?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a limitation on that middle class. I believe it is either $40 thousand or $50 thousand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $40 thousand to $60 thousand, it will pay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $40 thousand to $60 thousand, that is tuition tax credits, I think.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- this one has a phase two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, because you cannot say that anyone who has that $49,999 -- okay. And $50 thousand -- no. That extra dollar cannot be the swing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right. But in any event --

Q There have to be eligibility parameters.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

But it will, also, be useful, because now the tuition and fees at public institutions are getting to be high, also.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Even junior colleges and the like and the community colleges are charging fees now that a lot of people cannot afford.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So this provides a flexible vehicle for people to start early financing their kids education.

Q And what does that mean in terms of revenue lost to the federal government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not great. It is under a billion dollars a year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Over the five-year period, it is about $1.3 billion. But we do not think of that as lost revenue, because it will, also, tend to increase savings.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So we think that this is a valuable addition to what is available now as far as financing education.

Q Only the interest will be, or is a contribution deductible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The interest is tax free.

Q Only the interest.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q On public jobs, you said -- "extend unemployment benefits."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. They are due. The extended federal compensation for unemployment is due to run out in March. We will extend this program.

Q For one year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we are planning for one year. Although, I am not sure. We have not actually got that legislation drafted yet. But I would --

Q It is not over --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The message --

Q For -- purposes, it -- the specific.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right.

Q Then you said that a job voucher for the unemployed to go to a business, and he can get a tax cut for hiring somebody whose benefits had run out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Who has been a long-term unemployed. Right. So instead of getting further unemployment benefits, he would, instead, get a job voucher.

Q His unemployment benefits run out. And his only option then is hope that somebody has got a job that they will accept the voucher, and give him a job? Is that it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q I see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think, actually, the plan we suggested is an optional program where can either take the extended benefits or a job voucher.

Q The assumption behind the voucher system is that there are jobs out there in the private sector, and that all the private sector needs is an incentive to fill them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in every case. But obviously, in a great many cases this incentive needs to be available.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But this is particularly designed for the people in the structurally unemployed category -- people who do not have the skills at this point to take the job in the new, higher tech industry type of thing, but where it would be advantageous for the employer to train somebody if he could do it at a lesser rate.

Q How big a program is that going to be in terms of -- in the perspective of the unemployment problem as we speak, how big a ripple would that voucher system make?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIO OFFICIAL: I think it depends on how many people participate, how many people use it. But the extension of supplemental benefits will cover everybody that is basically eligible now.

Q So there is no cap on it in terms of amounts of millions of dollars that can be spent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no limitation at this point. Although, there is a practical limit on how many people will use the voucher option, as opposed to the extended benefits.

Q And then the thirda thing was a sub-minimum wage for the summer, which you call an interesting experiment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q So those three things are the core of the jobs program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fourth is the special training programs for displaced workers under the Jobs Training Partnership Act, which will be funded at

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somewhere in the neighborhood of $200 million and $300 million. That's additional funding for that.

Q Displaced by foreign competition.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Displace for any, for anything.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's all you want to cut.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, this particular provision is not. This is the authorizations in the law, but this is the first time that provision of the law will have been used.

Q I see.

Q What is the tax impact of the voucher system? How much will the federal government lose in taxes? In other words -- corporations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that depends on what the utilization is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, let me explain that the money will be spent in any case. A worker will take it, either as unemployed insurance or as a voucher, but in any event, the money will be spent. So, it depends upon the rate of unemployment, the number of unemployed workers for an extended period and the like.

Q So, the net effect on the deficit is zero essentially?

Q I wonder if you could, without going into great detail, could you tell us -- You mentioned pre-set fees in terms of hospital costs and co-sharing of the patient and the hospital in order to, I gather, discourage over-utilization. But how does that work?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One of the things that the states have found in experimenting with this is that if you charge a very small co-payment by the user of hospital costs, for example, then they tend to have shorter stays in the hospital and less utilization. It doesn't interfere with necessary medical care, but what it does do is bring down the over-utilization. And so, likewise, co-payment on doctor visits, co-payment on drugs, this sort of thing has been very beneficial when it's been tried by the states who are adapting this throughout the system of Medicare and Medicaid.

Q So, it will mean increased cost, then, to the patient? That is the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not entirely. And I would just add one point. This proposal applies in particular to Medicare. Today, if you have a 120-day illness, an extended, severe illness, you pay half of the cost per day in the hospital, which might $200 or more. If you have a 10-day, routine illness, you don't pay anything, except for the first day.

What we're proposing to do is put a small cost sharing on the front end for the routine illness and eliminate cost sharing entirely after the 60th day, so that the severe, extended and prolonged critical illness doesn't build up $10,000, $20,000 bills.

Q -- catastrophic illness.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the catastrophic illness. Whereas, on the front end, there is a small cost sharing that isn't there now, that that will help to discourage excessive utilization, staying twelve days when it could be done in nine and bring down the overall cost of Medicare.

Q Is that up to the patient or the doctor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Is that up to the patient or the doctor, how soon he gets out of the hospital?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think as long as it's free for ten days, there's no incentive for either the patient or the doctor to consider whether to stay out to reduce it. There's ample evidence, private health insurance, state programs, that if there's an incentive to reduce stays, stays are reduced, costs are saved and patient health care is maintained. There's ample evidence this is the case.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence that a lot of times people do not need to go into the hospital, and they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And they've got to pay higher costs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they don't need to at all, from a medical standpoint, but it's more convenient for them sometimes, and the doctors, to go into the hospital, and that causes overutilization.

Q What's the incentive for the doctors to get rid of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The doctor is going to be guided by the patient's wishes to some extent. I don't know --

I was in the hospital not long ago and it was up to me whether I stayed another day or two. You know, the doctor felt from a medical standpoint at X day it would be all right to go home but maybe I ought to stay another day. These kinds of things.

Q You've got a good job to come back to, though. (Laughter.)

Q If there's no incentive --

Q -- certain legislation as well. (Laughter.)

Q Whatever you want, sir.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So the catastrophic thing has two aspects to this. One is, there's a limit to the medical payments, so nobody is going to be a drain to a great extent. Plus there is this catastrophic feature now, which will be applied to all Medicare patients.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But the point is that the [illegible] them are part of the same package and you have to talk about both. Yes, there is more co-payment nominally for the first days of the hospital period. After 60 days there is no co-payment at all. Whereas today it's 25 percent for 30 days, 50 percent for the next 130 days, and 100 percent thereafter. And what you're doing is loading a huge amount of the cost of health care on a very small number of very sick people in the elderly population, and what we're proposing to do is spread the cost out and provide some incentives in the process,

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for reduced utilization, reducing the excess stays. And you have to look at it together or you'll have a very misleading picture of what it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wonder if we could come back now to a quick review of the budget, overview --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any questions you have for me will be answered by them.

Q I'd like the name of your doctor before you leave. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want me to go on with the budget now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, please. We'll do the budget and then --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the budget message in all its mind-numbing detail is Monday, so we're not going to get into that here tonight. But obviously, economic recovery is at the heart of improving the State of the Union and getting the deficit down, credibly so, especially in the out years, is central to economic recovery.

So what the President will indicate in the address tonight is a little bit about the magnitude of the problem we face and the overall budget strategy he will propose next week for dealing with it.

The magnitude, I think, is fairly well known to all of you. The budget deficit in '83 will be over $200 billion, primarily due to the prolongation of the recession over the latter half of '82 and the continued erosion of revenues.

The problem is that as we look into the out years, and the economy recovering and the unemployment rate coming down, that $200-plus deficit continues to grow up into the $300 billion range by 1988. And the four-point budget strategy that will be proposed tonight is a pretty sweeping and comprehensive effort to bring that back from $200 cap this year, heading down to a small fraction of GNP by '88, rather than allowing it to continue to rise as it would under current law and current policies if we did no more.

Now, the four points that will be outlined tonight are (1) an immediate comprehensive freeze on the budget for FY '84. Now, this is both literal --

Q What are you freezing -- ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go through this. This applies both to the budget outcome for '84 in the sense that the spending level we'll recommend is the same as it was in '83 in constant dollars. So the only increase will be about a little over 4-1/2 for inflation. How do we get there? Constant dollar freeze? Something that has not happened in about 13 or 14 years?

One, is by extending the six-month COLA freeze that the bipartisan commission recommended on Social Security to all of the other related indexed benefit programs in the budget, veterans, SSI, railroad, and so forth.

Secondly, by applying the freeze concept to federal pay, civilian and military, current and retired. There will be no pay increase, no retirement increase for federal employees or former employees in '84.

Third --

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Q This is for one year, now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Third, the freeze principle is applied to the whole gamut of discretionary programs in the aggregate; not every single program, but in the aggregate. We'll request no more funding for health and education and agriculture and programs of that sort than we did last year.

Finally, we'll apply the freeze concept to a variety of other areas that will be spelled out in more detail next week. But for illustration, freezing physician fees under Medicare will be one of the proposals. Freezing price supports in the farm area will be another application of the freeze.

You take all of these different applications that are equitable and requires some sacrifices across the board, add them together, you get a level budget in real terms for '84, so that's point one.

Second point is to follow up that in the out years with continued reforms of the automatic entitlements. And these will focus in the Medicare-Medicaid area, where you still have growth three or four times the inflation rate, in the civil service retirement system which is becoming insolvent over time, as Social Security has already become; and those will be very difficult and controversial changes but the system is too big, too costly, and needs to be pared down.

Additional reforms in the welfare and transfer benefit programs as well.

So that's the second component for the out years, continued reform of these automatic entitlement spending programs.

The third component is a defense adjustment consisting of the measures that have been announced thus far. It amounts to about $55 billion in budget authority over the next five years, and that produces roughly that amount of outlay savings, again over '84 to '88.

Final component, my colleague will talk about in more detail, and that is the deficit insurance policy consisting of a standby revenue mechanism in '86 if the deficit is still about 2-1/2 percent of GNP, and the spending freeze and other control measures have been implemented.

When you add all of these up, it is a package of about $560 billion in deficit reduction over five years, beginning with $44 billion in '84 and then, obviously, the same through all the out-years, they would reduce the deficit path that we're on from about seven percent, added to a section peak today, down to

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two and a half percent or so by the fifth year out in the budget. Now, these deficits remaining will still be large. But clearly, the structural causes are being addressed and the budget hemorrhage is being put on hold with the freeze and we're moving the whole path in a pretty credible way in the right direction. We think that's consistent with economic recovery.

The other point that I would make is that obviously these budget projections for the out years are sensitive to your economic assumptions. We have been criticized in the past for being overly optimistic having maybe inordinate expectations. The numbers that we will put out next week and the kind of overview tonight are based on what you would call very cautious expectations or estimates -- both the recovery and the long-term growth. And they will certainly be in the middle range of where the economists are. In fact, many of the private economists might even be a little higher. That means that we could have an even lower deficit path. We could have even more improvement if the economy responds better than we're projecting on this cautious basis.

So, what you have here is a very large and growing problem -- a sweeping and comprehensive program to deal with it -- some pretty tough measures starting with the freezes this year and a pretty credible path with cautious economic assumptions on which all the projections are based.

Q You mentioned "sacrifices across-the-board", I believe, was the phrase you used. Point to me something and I recognize that you hit only some of the high points. Point to me one thing or two thing that addresses the question of fairness, the question of equity and where the sacrifices have come. You talked about Medicare, pay -- people in military, civilian workers for government and that sort of thing. Somebody who makes in excess of, pick a figure, $150,000 a year and/or depends on income from dividend, that sort of thing, where is their sacrifice?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I was talking in terms of the spending freeze. Those particular people are probably not benefiting from any government program that we haven't cut out thus far and maybe in the past they benefited from Guaranteed Student Loans or something of that sort. They're clearly not getting it now.

But in terms of those who are benefiting from government spending, who are part of the government work force, clearly it is across-the-board. Physicians, there's $150,000 a year physician who won't get an increase in his reimbursement. Hospital administrators are going to be squeezed by the reimursement freeze there. Got some pretty big farmers who walk away with big susidy payments through the escalating target prices. They won't get those increases in the target prices. You've got a lot of fairly well to do federal retirees, many are making $35,000, $40,000 a year plus a private income and so forth off their annuity. They won't get an inflation increase.

They are spread -- the freeze application is spread throughout the budget in terms of people who have some piece of the budget. You can invent a lot of people in the private sector who don't directly benefit from the budget that would be harder to show how they're impacted. But they're not part of the problem.

Q This is a one-year freeze now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q One-year, not just six months?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, for the benefit program, it is six months because we're moving all the COLA's six months to a calendar year basis as in Social Security. For the federal employees who are generally better off than the Social Security recepient or the SSI recepient or the Food Stamp recepient, it is a year because we pay on a calendar or on a fiscal year basis.

Q Will it therefore be difficult for your critics to say the Reagan administration is trying to balance the budget on the backs of -- fill in the blank?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are an awful lot of people who will be squealing about the freeze application to their particular sector of the budget. There will be a lot of blanks to fill in.

Q Well, if you could get the doctors to squeal, you'll be in fine shape. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't worry, we will.

Q They won't --

Q Yes, but that's up ahead, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that's immediately, 1984.

Q I thought the reform of the entitlements was '85.

Q They will pay X dollars for an appendectomy or something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The long-term reform does not include this one-year freeze on physician reimbursement and hospital. That's immediately. The freeze concept applies to the 1984 budget depending on where we catch people in the process. Doctors' fees usually go up in the middle of the year so that would be frozen. Target prices go up at a different time of the year. They'll be frozen when we catch them. The same way with COLA's pay and so forth.

Q As soon as this gets out, they'll raise them immediately. So, they'll be frozen high.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fee schedule is actually in place. So, it will be hard to --

Q Do you think it will be enough?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, the faster we can get it down, the more, the better. But compared to where the budget would head if we did nothing or if we sent up a plan that couldn't rally support -- I believe that we've made a long stride towards controlling the problem.

Q Can you give us any more detail on point three -- what you categorized as defense adjustments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's really budget detail and I'd like to give you everything but we're going to hold that until Monday. It's part of the general procedure here to give you the strategy and the overview but the full detail Monday when the budget comes out.

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Q The other thing is how much of this program depends on the cooperation of Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Almost the entire --

Q -- a good bit of it, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Almost the entire -- bit of the program. I mean, to freeze COLA's, you need laws. To change target prices, you need law changes. To freeze reimbursements, you need congressional approval. All these things require congressionional cooperation and they're going to put the whole system, both legislative and the executive branch, I think to a real test.

If you look at this, it is equitable because it has covered almost every sector of the budget where it can apply. If we start to make exceptions, we're going to have so many people going out under the fence that there will be nothing left of the freeze and the problem of the deficit will continue to grow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, as the President said -- has been said by my colleagues and others, the name of the game here is to get the recovery going and then to keep it going. We have what we think is a sensible program in place. We think that this is the recovery quarter and a lot of signs point that way. Most economists seem to agree with us at this point.

Now, the neat trick is going to be how to keep it going. We're not going to be able to keep it going with these huge deficits. Deficits in the near-by years, '83 and '84, probably don't matter that much. I think that most of the money markets have factored them in. I think they understand what's going on. But were these deficits to continue at seven percent of GNP, as we have and will have this year, obviously, that's going to scare the pants off everybody and, as a result, interest rates are going to go right back up again. And with high interest rates, you're certainly not going to be able to either continue the recovery or to sustain it.

Now, from the point of view of how we intend to do that, you heard what my colleague said about the freeze, keeping the budget down. And things that start this year, that is fiscal '84, continue on and, of course, accelerate -- '85, '86, and '87. If the recovery is stronger and even a one percent increase just for the next six quarters over what we projected, it would actually mean $20 billion a year in less deficits in the out years. That much of a change could take place and certainly that's within the realm of possibility. But as these things occur, if we're not going on the plan that we've outlined here today, what then? What do you do? How do you maintain your credibility with the money markets so that interest rates continue to come down and stay down?

It occurs to us that we have to lay out about three or four conditions and I'm repeating myself here -- something I said earlier in answer to Tom's question. First of all, we say that the proper way to get the deficits down is to have a growing economy and a real growth in GNP, not as much inflationary growth. That, with spending held constant, means that spending is reduced as a percentage of Gross National Product. Currently, at 25 percent, we'd like to see it down to the 22 percent area. At the same time, the revenues under the same scenario would rise to where they would be somewhere in the neighborhood of 20.5 percent, 21 percent of GNP. That means your gap, one percent of GNP, which is less than 50 billion --

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It seems rather cavalier to say that's a near nothing at -- this point but less than one percent of GNP, I think you could declare victory and go home. But how to get there is difficult.

We are going to suggest that if these freezes go into effect, the freezes that my colleague has just talked about and if our spending cuts go into effect, that later this year the Congress enact a stand-by tax to be the equivalent of one percent of Gross National Product. If the deficits in those out-years, the Congress would then look -- and the President would then look at it in the middle of 1985, would say, "Hey look, this isn't working. The deficit is going to be larger. It's going to be three or four percent next year," meaning fiscal '86, then this law would go into effect and the specifics we'll detail in the budget message as to exactly what those taxes would be. But it's in the nature of a surtax and some type of tax on oil -- domestic and foreign.

Now, from that point of view, we have three or four things that have to happen before this would ever go into effect. One, the spending cuts and the freeze this year; two, that the economy doesn't grow as fast as we think it should or could; three, if the Congress would not enact spending cuts that would get these deficits down. Then and only then would this trigger it.

Now, we know that the word "trigger" is an anathema up on the Hill. But our contention is that when faced with this, what are the alternatives? What are the assurances to the marketplace to get interest rates down? You all read at least in part what Paul Volcker had to say on Thursday about this -- the fact that huge deficits make the monetary side of this much more difficult to handle; that you have to get deficits down. What we're trying to say to these money markets are, "Okay, we're serious about this and if all else fails, we have a remedy.

Now, at the same time, one other factor the President will mention. It will only be a sentence or two in tonight's statement -- maybe elaborated on a little bit more in the budget message, and that is that he thinks that it's high time we study whether or not we couldn't have a simpler tax system -- that this is the goal of anybody who's ever filled out an income tax form, that there should be a simpler way to do it. He would like to see this studied to see if it is possible.

Q Flat tax --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's one way of arriving at it -- a broad-based tax with a flat rate; could be a broad-based tax with a gradual rate -- It could be a consumption type tax in which anything that you spent could be taxed on that, not on what you save. That could be flat or it could be -- have different graduations in it.

You have to be careful of a flat tax if you're saying, "We're for a flat tax." Because if you say we're for a flat tax in reference to the question before -- fairness -- flat tax hits the bottom part of the taxable scale a lot harder than it does the upper part. Because if you have, let's say, 20 -- we'll pick a figure -- if you're at an effective 50 percent rate and you're brought down to 20, that's one thing. But if you're at a 12 percent rate and raised up to 20, that's something else again. So, you have to be very careful about saying, "I'm for a flat tax" or "I'm against it " -- of its import --

Q Calling for a study really is sort of a -- is a no-go then, isn't it?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not exactly. You've got to remember that, first of all, this -- the Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee are going to be tied up for quite awhile with, first of all, with the Social Security. That's going to take quite some time. And, secondly, we have all these freezes -- they're in on a lot of this, particularly the health end of it, that come before both of these committees. They'll be in the tuition tax credits. They'll be in quite a few other things so that their plate is going to be very full without getting into these studies. And next year --

Q By relegating it to a study, it means pretty much nothing is going to happen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in '83, I agree --

Q Or '84?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Probably. But on the other hand, this is a complicated subject. We've got two thousand odd pages and there's some of them very odd in the tax --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And just to try to say you're going to simplify that by one statement means a hell of a lot of work.

Q I'm still not clear on where this tax comes from. Did you say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suggested that it will be in the nature without -- again, this is something we want to get into detail with in the budget message rather than here because it will not be in the State of the Union message tonight. But it will be in the nature of a surcharge.

Q Yes.

Q Income tax surcharge?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Something of that nature and a tax on oil.

Q Oh, I see. An income tax surcharge plus some kind of a surcharge on oil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be in the fact sheet.

Q It will be in the fact sheet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it won't be in the State of the Union but it is in the fact sheet you'll

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be getting those two items developed and what that means.

Q And the gross from the tax will equal one percent of the GNP? Is that what you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. and in answer to David's question earlier, remember I said that will be somewhere $40 to $42 billion depending upon what GNP is in '86 going on out to -- Well, by 1988, we're figuring that we'll be fairly close to a five trillion dollar economy.

Q -- the same surtax on everybody's income tax?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Flat, across-the-board.

Q Plus corporations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Plus corporations.

Q May I also ask another question? It seems to me that last year, at this time you were faced with exactly the same problem and you took a different course. What changed between last year and this year to go for this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Last year we decided, you'll recall, that there was the "Gang of 17" and in the machinations of that gang, it became apparent that we were coming fairly close to an agreement that there would be three dollars of cuts for every one dollar of tax increases. And we agreed to go with that. It fell apart. It didn't happen. But we did go for $99 billion of revenue raisers. They weren't all tax increases. Some were better collection methods but it was $99 billion over the three-year period that we went to.

Now, this time we're deep in a recession. We didn't realize back then how badly the recession was going to get. No economists predicted this last year, including our own. So, as a result, we are, at this point, in a recession, just coming out of it. We can see no need for tax increases this year. We have the July 1st tax cut coming and we have indexing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would be worthwhile to point out the total amount of tax reductions when you add up all the tax changes that have been made since Ronald Reagan has been in office -- include this program.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you add up all the -- take the 1981 tax cuts ERTA, as it was called. The 1982 revenue increases, TETRA, the five-cent a gallon tax for gasoline for the road-building program and public transportation plus the Social Security taxes and net those out. Over the period from '82 to '88, corporations and individuals will save about $725 billion in less taxes than the original tax laws would have called for.

Q Then when you throw this in, what does it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Then when you throw this in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you throw this in, you would subtract, if this is triggered, you would

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subtract something in the neighborhood of $140 billion from the 725.

Q What kind of projection are you making for the unemployment rate for the rest of this year --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Coming down from 10.8 toward the 10 area.

Q By the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It will still be around 10, though?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's the best that the economists can do.

Q Yes.

Q And what are you assuming the inflation rate will be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For this year?

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have to waffle here. I don't want to be pedantic, but with having a new CPI starting -- started January 1st and a new CPI has a rent equivalent rather than the old housing one of the CPIW. So, this new one grew at a rate of five percent in 1982 whereas the old one was 3.9.

So, we're thinking that this new one will be between four and a half and five percent.

Q The ten area is pretty fuzzy too, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The what?

Q When you say the ten area, that's pretty fuzzy too, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How can you be precise?

Q Well --

Q -- between eight and twelve. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: - be happy with eight, disappointed at twelve. It's very difficult to predict that with any degree of validity.

Q How's your hard headed constituency on Wall Street going to receive the State of the Union tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If my hard-headed and hard-hearted constituency on Wall Street that thinks that we're going to have 250 to 300 billion dollars in deficits, ought to cheer when they hear it's going to be just north of a hundred -- in the out-years.

Q Will they believe it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, will depend upon how they evaluate whether or not the Congress will enact this. As my colleague said, so much of this depends upon congressional action.

Q -- the figure $100 billion when -- as of when?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just above $100 billion in 1988, coming down from 184 down, if you get all of this.

Q What is your guess on how Congress will deal with it? Are they sufficiently scared to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the Congress at this point recognizes that getting unemployment down and getting the economy going is the chief reason. And I think if they believe that the only way to get interest rates down is to enact this program, to get the federal budget under control, they'll give us most of what we want.

Q You think that the Congress might be tempted to do some tax increases this year that you may not like to have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's entirely probable --

Q And what kind do you think it will --

Q Would that include holding back the 10 percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all I'll say is they will probably take a look at indexing. I doubt if they'd do anything about the July 1st tax cut.

Q Do you think that they would look this quickly at something like a consumer tax?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I doubt it. That would not -- I think that would be counterproductive, to put on taxes just as we're coming out of a recession.

Q I know you want to move on very quickly. You mentioned this is the recovery quarter and the question is how to keep it going. Besides interest rates, which is fairly obvious, can you give me two other indicators that -- as the quarter goes along, that we could look at to say whether they're going to be able to keep it going or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. One of them would be industrial production, and the other, consumer sales, because on those two things the recovery will depend.

Q But as long as the unemployment rate remains at the 10 area, aren't you going to have trouble selling the fact to a lot of people that recovery is really on its way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's like this recession, as somebody was saying. You take a look at financial services; they don't know we've been in a recession. You take a look at high tech; they don't know we've been in a recession. You take the aspects of accountants. I think at this point there are probably more people who are working on tax returns than there are working in the steel mills. That's an odd -- (laughter) -- but it is a fact of life, and they don't --

Q High tech -- high tech, for instance, I quite --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that's the new information economy that were in the transition court that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- said it all after all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But this is a fact that those people don't know there's been a recession.

Q So for 89.2, it's a hell of a place.

Q You watch television, though. You see people standing in line waiting to get free food.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know.

Q But that doesn't do very much for consumer confidence, does it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but you could also take the same pictures of people going to work.

Q Let me ask you about that. The President raised that just a few moments ago and left before -- a chance to discuss it with him. Before us now, how much realistically do you think -- do you think what we put on the air at night is a factor in the shape of the economy and the psychology of the people in this economy? I'd like to hear -- I think we all would -- just a kind of candid, no-holes-barred assessment of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm no psychologist. I know, I think, a little bit about marketing from my previous existence. I would say that it has a great deal to do with mood more than anything else.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If repeatedly people are told the economy is bad, things are going worse, there is, you know, a discouragement among -- this, that and the other thing, people, I think, begin to feel they should feel that way --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that they can't go around being jubilant. But on the other hand, when you take, as we saw here in this city last week, 55,000 people paying -- I don't know -- atleast $20 a ticket to fill up a stadium to watch 49 guys go at each other, you say to yourself, "Where is the recession?," when you see things of that nature.

So I think you have to be careful of the mood that you set. I think you do tend -- because they are better stories, and I

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admit they're better stories, to look at that side of it. Who the hell wants to see on TV somebody that's happy?

Q Do you think that there has been a distortion on the part of the television networks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think it's distortion. I think it's -- you've gone to where the stories are, and that's news.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a great deal of literature, particularly out of the University of Michigan, about the impact of what people see, the signals they get out of Washington or on the television, and its impact on consumer confidence. There's no doubt about that.

Q No, I understand that. But I'm just curious about what your --

Q I mean, isn't that really -- aren't you blaming the messenger for the message, that old --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q You're not.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not blaming the messenger. I'm not, at least. You asked me my opinion, and I say I'm not blaming the messenger. I think that's -- you go where the news is. And I think that's what you think is news. And --

Q -- your definition is slightly different, I guess.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm saying is -- is you're concentrating on the 10.8 percent and not on the 89.2 percent.

Q We've been covering the steel workers and not the accountants.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, exactly. But yet there are more of the accountants who are working and they produce more for the economy than the steel workers. Because you're still looking at the industrial economy as we used to know it in the '60's. And I don't think you've got with it that we're in transition now into the economy of the '90's and the 2000's. And I still think you're looking back at smokestacks. Enough of the sermon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. I wish we had more time for this, but my colleague is here and I -- if it's all right, we'll give him the floor.

Q What do you think about the -- (laughter) --

Q What are you doing --

Q You've got us all here now. What about the 10 area?

Q You want to put us in the 10.8 percent.

Q -- we'll give you one if you want.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you want to start? I have some points that the President will be making tonight in foreign policy and defense, and let me go to the 22-page address -- roughly four pages are devoted to what I believe is called "America in the World." And for starters, should I preview that?

He'll announce a bipartisan policy for national security, the fundamental values that he's stated before: Peace, freedom,

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self-government. And by announce, I don't suggest this is a new initiative. In fact, tonight there will be no announcement of any new initiative, either defense, foreign policy or intelligence -- my areas of responsibility.

Rather, it will be a reassertion, a reaffirmation of the policy that has been created in the first two years, evidenced in some 76, 77 different decision directives, most of them classified, of course, and so the idea being that he has formulated his policies. It's a time for steadiness and implementation of those policies. But he'll emphasize our peace-keeping efforts, both in ending conflicts around the world and arms reduction negotiations.

And then we have about seven areas included in that area. He'll emphasize what joins the United States and the allies is their common dedication to freedom, self-government and the other fundamental values of our society, the initiative to build the structure of democracy worldwide which, as you will recall, he announced in London last June. And he'll reaffirm that he's pursuing that vigorously in different ways, such as the -- what's the firm across -- the Democratic --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- bipartisan study being done by the Republican and Democratic National Committees to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The title of the group, which we're now paring out in our public diplomacy. If you think of it, help me out on that one.

The next point, he'll say that he'll work to restore sustained non-inflationary growth in the world economy. And, of course, this leads to Williamsburg at the end of May, in which the President will play host at the economic summit.

He'll review the gains that have been made in redeeming the neglect of the defense budget for the past decade and he'll develop -- developing a realistic military strategy; as I say, most of which has already been reduced after interdepartmental studies to written directives.

He'll pledge, of course, to continue to work with the Congress on the MX missile, that report due in by February 17th from his commission.

He'll state that in the Middle East -- he'll press our plans for peace in Lebanon, disengagement, withdrawal. Phil Habib, in fact, will be arriving within the hour to brief on the latest steps there.

Q Will he update us on the withdrawal tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At least it's not in the address at the moment.

He, of course, is free to go into any current event and, as you know, sometimes does.

Central America, he'll state that we are in gear on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, moving toward the tax and trade incentive portions of the CBI. And, of course, those passed the House in the last session.

He'll challenge the Soviet Union under its new leadership to show its commitment to peace by action, not just by words.

Finally, he'll reaffirm his dedication to significant reductions in both nuclear and conventional arms, to equal, verifiable lower levels, which you've heard from him many times before; and including, of course, the complete elimination of the intermediate range so-called zero option. And that's it for openers. So if -- and, believe me, that's all within four pages, isn't it?

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Q Are there any new initiatives from your part -- in the area of foreign policy or international security, especially in the area of arms control? Any nuances that the Soviets might pick up on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q By challenging them to actions instead of words, what do you mean there? Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In this hiatus now, in the recess in both Geneva and Vienna for the conventional, we've all heard by front page words from Mr. Andropov, and when we get back to the tables, we'll hope for some progress from the other side, something concrete.

Q Will he continue to characterize the Soviet attitude or demeanor so far as serious, or will it be more of a challenge to come up with something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That will be at a -- I recall that he is characterizing that -- the Soviets as serious. Certainly that's our hope. And there is evidence that they will be serious when we resume the negotiations.

Q I didn't quite understand what you said on the zero option at the end. He's going to stay with that? There's no change whatsoever in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q And if you could just repeat the last business, that there is indication about seriousness at Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I was asked whether tonight he'll refer or characterize the Soviet approach as serious or not.

Q It was my impression that he has done this in the recent past.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Yes.

Q Is the People's Republic of China and/or Japan mentioned by name in these four pages?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I think -- I'm trying to -- back to the trade portion. I don't think Japan is mentioned by name. We're across the hall right now -- the President is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is mentioned in the -- in the sense of working with industrialized democracies on international economic growth.

Q Why are there no new initiatives?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We feel we have begun initiatives in every major region, and the President is more concerned about implementing the ones we've begun rather than -- at least at this juncture -- I'm not suggesting there won't be new initiatives over the coming year -- but none announced tonight. We have the Caribbean initiative, certainly our Central American activity, the Middle East initiative is a very high priority, and we have lots to do on each at the moment without looking for new initiatives as such.

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Q Does that reflect his preoccupation with domestic initiatives?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Certainly this past year, looking at -- as I'm reminded by Mike Deaver each time we seek another hour here or there -- the foreign policy/defense area has received much more of his time than any other area. So I don't think we can state that there is any preoccupation on the domestic side.

Q I'm not sure I understand where the President is finally coming down tonight on the defense spending for the next year and through 1989, in terms of what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know how far you went into this with my colleague --

Q -- $55 billion through --

Q Through the freeze.

Q -- through the freeze.

Q For now.

Q For now.

Q Defense spending will not be frozen; right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q I'm sorry. I missed that. Defense spending will not be --

Q Defense spending will not be frozen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The freeze relates to salaries for the one year after a 30-percent increase in salaries in the military establishment over the last three years.

Q So the basic thing that was announced a few weeks go, the $8 billion or whatever it is, looking at Point 3, remains ntact. There has been no change on that. Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And then what's ppening is my colleague is going to come in with a five-year -- at amounts --

Q But most of the money comes as a result of freezing salaries and through the fuel bit; right? I mean, there are major reductions in hardware?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To decrease inflation -- fuel savings, salaries. That's $55 million, I believe, and et authority forty-seven, and outlay --

Q That's where it comes from, those areas --

Q Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right, yes.

Q What's your expectation that the Democrats on the are going to propose as they bargain through with your proposal ht what they want to achieve in the coming sessions? Would it bs in defense cuts? Is that your highest expectation that s -- they'll put on the tables, the price, to get some of through?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't you help us on that? My colleague works with that end of the NSC and he may be more specific in expectations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've -- I suspect Congress will give the defense proposal a thorough overview, and certainly there are high profile programs which have been questioned in the past and will be questioned again. But the key aspect of the program is that the administration over the past two years has set in motion an initiative to make up for a decade of underfunding in key areas, like readiness and modernization. The President has proposed a multi-year program to redress that, and the key aspect of it is sustained building now. We're on the path. The defense industries have been given an indication that we're serious about this, and efficiencies are worked into the arrangements we've made with the defense industry on this score. And really sustainability and following through is the main emphasis. There's no second-guessing over a defense program at this -- at this point. It's rather clear and forward, and I suspect that's the message we will try to convince Congress, that we need to follow through now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Time for another?

Q Yes, for more than one.

Q Just generally, who are the main writers of the speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has worked on it all week --

Q I mean in addition to him, obviously.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's been a process around here that -- really he sat down with the -- somebody from the speechwriters -- heads up our speechwriting operation, plus a group from the staff, before Christmas. It was December 23rd. And said, "Listen. Here's basically what I want in the speech." And he presented an outline for it. Of course, some of the decisions on the budget side weren't made at that time. But he laid out essentially what he wanted. Then some speech drafts started coming back to him. And he has bounced -- he bounced several back. I guess he went through four -- five like that before he then took it himself. And this weekend he rewrote the speech. And that's -- the long yellow pads were out this weekend.

Q Basically he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So it's -- he completed a draft -- I guess he went through five that he backed up -- bouncing back and wanted to change the materials that he was getting. And then this weekend, as I say, he redrafted the speech himself. So it really is his product, and I think all of you are familiar with the long yellow pads that he turns out his speeches on. And I've said several times, from my background and experience, this man spends more -- takes more care with his words and is more involved in the writing of his major speeches than any President we've had in this office, I would say, since the War -- including the War with the FDR.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the war, but I was in Sacramento. To back up what my colleague is saying -- I hope that for history, and I understand all presidential papers count -- but the many drafts that he does do for his speech, whether in Sacramento, usually on weekends, our speechwriter was Ronald Reagan. And I know there's probably some skepticism on that, as there seems to be on --

Q Not here, no, no.

Q So this is a complete -- he redrafted completely over the weekend sort of the fifth return. Is that --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He worked with the fifth after -- he redrafted a great deal of it. I wouldn't -- you know, there were some ideas, obviously, that he had put into it earlier, some ideas that came up in the staff and so forth that he incorporated. But basically the speech is his. And it's now gone through another cycle. He wanted people around here to take a look at it and have any suggestions -- they went back in last night. He's worked on it -- he put the finishing touches on it last night. And he's doing some more of that today.

Q But it's very much his speech --

Q He's not finished yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you well know, in anything like this -- (laughter) -- as I keep hearing from -- by television land, there are always suggestions that will come in at the last minute from hither and yonder. And that -- the basic speech is finished, but there -- we're down to the finishing touches.

Q He doesn't have an extra paragraph in his pocket that he might decide to pull out at the end of the speech and announce whether he's going to run again or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we'll save that another luncheon.

Q Does it have a slogan or a -- you know, a second beginning or anything like that? Is it characterized that way?

SENIOR ADMINISTATION OFFICIAL: -- effort here to craft another slogan, it would be gone within four days or five days.

Q There are reports that "stay the course" will not be in this -- (laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'll find he's very -- (laughter) -- his principles are still very much --

Q -- has got a good idea, the "second beginning."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Listen. We could all go on a great deal longer, but you've been very kind to stay here and be patient and we thank you for coming. Let's do it again.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:15 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

January 25, 1983

The Briefing Room

5:19 P.M. EST

MR. GERGEN: Good afternoon. This is a background briefing embargoed until the time of delivery of the President's address this evening. Our thought was that since the fact sheets are now being xeroxed it would be better to go and get the briefing started. And then at 6:00 p.m. we will give you the fact sheets as well as the text of the address so that you can run -- Now the process here is that each of these gentlemen will make a statement and then they'll be happy to entertain your questions. [redacted] is going to do some scene setting and present an overview on the economic side. Then, [redacted] is going to talk about the budget, the budget plan. Then, come back to [redacted] A little bit on taxes. And then go on to [redacted] with some other domestic initiatives that are in the State of the Union. And then [redacted] will deal -- with the foreign policy and defense issues.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks.

In the State of the Union message tonight, the President will focus on the transition and renewal of the nation's economy. He'll outline a program for increasing economic growth and reducing deficits. In the section titled, "To An Economic Recovery", the President will emphasize that the economy is undergoing a challenging and often difficult transition. Considerable progress has been made on several of our economic problems, inflation for one, interest rates for the other and together they set the stage for an economic recovery this year.

There are other difficulties, however, that must be addressed in the economy. Unemployment remains far too high. Projected federal budget deficits, which were caused a great deal by the recession, could threaten the prospects for recovery unless strong and remedial action is taken immediately.

The keys to restoring growth and creating more jobs are to lower the prospective deficits substantially, reduce structural unemployment and expand American trade. So, the President will introduce a four-part budget plan to spur economic growth. This budget plan must be bipartisan, fair, prudent and realistic. And in this four-part budget plan, the first part, comprehensive freeze in federal spending, my colleague will discuss in a moment. Structural reform of transfer payments, my colleague will also discuss that. The defense savings, which is the third part of the four-part program, are those recommendations that the Secretary of Defense has already made and which savings he said could be safely achieved. And then, finally, the insurance policy against high deficits in the out year, a standby tax program that I'll discuss with you.

Finally, in the national economics arena -- Oh, by the way, the President will also state that he will oppose efforts to

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undo any third year change in the third year tax cut or indexing. And in the international economics arena, he will call for non-inflationary growth of the world's economy and will discuss how he thinks that can be achieved. And my colleague will discuss that more fully.

So, why don't I turn it over to my colleague?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since the budget message comes on Monday, we will not be putting out the full details at this point in terms of the size of the problem or the overall set of programmatic changes in the budget. But, obviously, if economic recovery is at the heart of improving the state of the union, then getting the budget deficit down is one of the major challenges before Congress and the administration this year.

In the statement tonight, the President will indicate that, due to the recession, there is a very large deficit in 1983, an excess of $200 billion, and that if we do nothing over the next several years, that will continue to grow to $300 billion in the out years. What will be proposed in the budget message in detail, what will be outlined, in terms of a general strategy tonight, is a four-part plan, as my colleague has indicated, to bring that deficit path down from where it is today, slightly above $200 billion, steadily towards a lower and lower share of GNP in the out years.

The heart of it is a comprehensive freeze immediately in 1984 that, when all of the parts are put together, will result in no more spending in the budget total in 1984 than we spend in 1983 on a constant dollar or real dollar basis. Now, the way that we get there is through beginning with the six-month freeze on COLAs that were part of the Social Security package and extending that to all other Cost of Living Adjustments in related programs throughout the budget, Veterans, SSI and so forth, extending the freeze concept to federal pay and retirement so that there would be no pay increase or retirement increase next year, applying the freeze concept to discretionary spending programs in the aggregate so there would be no increase

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in authority over the level adopted by Congress in '83, and then applying the freeze concept to other parts of the budget where it's applicable, such as on farm price support increases, physician reimbursements, and so forth. That's stage 1. It happens immediately, and makes a major difference in turning around the budget.

The second stage to follow is the permanent reform of the automatic entitlements. The details will be coming next week, but it will cover everything from federal civil service to the Medicare and Medicaid medical entitlements, to the whole array of additional automatic spending programs in the budget. That will continue the progress in the out years of reducing the deficit path.

The two additional elements, obviously, are the economies and savings that have been achieved in defense, about $55 billion -- those have been announced -- over the next five years, and the standby tax that will be discussed in detail by my colleague.

Overall, that will reduce the deficit from nearly 7 percent of GNP this year to about 2-1/2 percent of GNP by 1988, and put the budget on a course that's consistent with the economic recovery that is at the center of the State of the Union message.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On taxes, the proposed standby tax program will be limited in size to one percent of gross national product in the years involved. Those will be fiscal 1986, '87, and '88. The standby would last no longer than three years, and begin on October 1, 1985, which is the start of fiscal '86.

The new program would be triggered only if the Congress previously agrees to the other spending restraints, including the budget freeze, which my colleague has just described.

Secondly, that the 1986 federal deficit, fiscal '86, exceeds 2-1/2 percent of gross national product.

And third, the nation on that day has a growing economy and is not still in recession.

Now, all three of these conditions must be met before the program is effective. If effective, the contingency taxes would consist of a surcharge on individuals and corporations that are approximately equivalent to one percent of taxable income; taxable income. And an excise tax on oil, both domestically produced and imported, to raise additional revenues.

Now, the President will state that that is an insurance program to protect against high deficits in future years. And the president will make it clear in his address that he's actively interested also in ways to simplify the federal tax system, and wants that studied further.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the tone of the budget message carries over into the tone of the rest of the program which the President will be presenting tonight. That is, it's bipartisan; we're attacking major problems that our society faces today; it's realistic in that the proposals are doable and we believe that we can get bipartisan support for them; and they require very modest resources. It's fair in that they focus on the poor, the unemployed, victims of discrimination, and lower and middle income families; and finally, that it's comprehensive. In fact, the program initiatives that you'll see tonight are the product of a six-month mid-term review of our policy programs.

I guess the first block of programs deals with reinforcing the economic program. And here the President will be proposing the Employment Act of 1983, which recognizes that the recession we're in today is not typical of past recessions. Instead, historically, perhaps, somebody would be laid off, and then when the recession was over they'd go back to their old job.

But here we see some major structural changes, and thus the program that the President is proposing is responsive to this diagnosis of the problem. For example, we will be extending for another six months federal unemployment compensation. We will also be providing a new innovative program to provide tax credits for those who are long-term unemployed. The idea here is not to subsidize people to sit home and pick up unemployment checks but to subsidize their going out, finding new jobs, being trained -- if you will -- to take on jobs and perhaps careers that they hadn't had before.

It will also call for adequate funding for the Title III of the bill the President labored to get enacted last year, that provides funding for displaced workers programs. It will also call for new flexibility in the state U/I programs to make funds available for relocation and training, and also for a summer youth differential, so that unemployed youth can get the first job, which is critical in their career.

Also, he will again be calling for enactment

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of the enterprise zones, because we feel that they are in some of the hardest hit areas. The enterprise zones can make a real contribution.

The President sees a new trade strategy as an important part of backing up the economic program. And here, I guess, the themes are a fair shake for America's farmers and workers, and free trade. We will be calling for increases in the guaranteed loan levels for the Export-Import Bank. The President will be calling for new negotiating authorities in the Congress. And, also, we will be calling for the Congress to act on a port moderization program that the President has been working on for the past two years with the Congress.

Also, the area of R&D -- here, we will be targeting our federal resources more effectively in the R&D area, and continuing to fund as we have been the great research universities.

Of course, education in the longer run ties into the structural changes that we see in the American economy. Here, the training in science and math to a new level of excellence and quality the teaching of science and math in all of our schools so that children will be trained for the jobs of the future. The President will, also, be calling for an educational savings account. This provides tax incentives for middle and lower-middle income families to save for their children's education. He will, again, be calling for the tuition tax-credit program for options for families so that their children can have a choice in where they go to school. And finally, he will, again, be calling for the school prayer amendment.

Beyond the economic recovery program, there are some essential programmatic reforms. You are already aware of the support the President has given to the Greenspan Commission's call for Social Security solvency. But beyond that, the President this evening will be calling for the containment of health care costs. For example, in 1982, the CPI went up 3.9 percent, while the medical CPI went up over 11 percent. Here, the basic objective is to make sure that health care is an affordable good for all Americans. Here, he will be calling for vouchers so that people in the Medicare program will have a choice. We will be calling for a new program of fixed payments to hospitals to try and contain hospital care costs. In Medicare, we will be calling for cost-sharing in part to help finance a new catastrophic program for all those enrolled in the Medicare program. This catastrophic program would ensure that hospital care costs for the individual do not bankrupt their families. Some two percent of American families had total health care expenditures of over $10 thousand last year.

In the private health care area, he will, also, be calling for a limitation on the tax-exempt benefits. That is the monthly premium which employers pay for health care benefits.

Moving to the area of civil rights -- there, the President will be calling for the elimination of sex discrimination in federal laws, and also in employee pension plans. He will, also, be taking the initiative in calling for a reauthorization of the Civil Rights Commission, and for a strengthening of the enforcement of fair housing laws.

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In the area of crime and drugs -- there, we will, again, be calling for a major reform of the criminal justice system, and then acceleration of the war on organized crime and drug trafficking.

Now, having mentioned this somewhat lengthy list does not encompass all of the program reforms the President will be calling for tonight. Items on the continuing agenda -- because I have not mentioned them here tonight does not mean that they are not still on the agenda and of high priority -- such as the clean air act, enterprise zones and regulatory reform.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

I had assumed you would have the address or at least a summary. I understand that you receive that shortly after we leave here. In any event, I will not repeat it.

Last time I saw tonight's address, it was 22 pages. Only four pages were devoted to my area of responsibility -- defense, foreign policy. And those four pages were at the end of the address. You will find nothing new or novel in those four pages. No changes. No modifications. Do not be deceived by it.

The President determined that, after two years, it is perhaps to reaffirm, reassert, remind some of you of what our policy is, and suggest that it is well in place, a firm policy and a strengthened America on a pretty solid foundation.

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He'll tell you more about it. He will challenge the Soviets tonight to something more than words, whether they be words through Tass or Pravda or mere words on an arms agreement.

The President expects action. He expects it from anyone of several places, whether it be Poland, Afghanistan, Kampuchea. He's not going to be particular or specific tonight.

But going back to the foundation I referred to and the one from which he's working on, the mere four pages tonight. It's been created out of over 100 one-on-one meetings with heads of state or prime ministers, built on some 75, 76 or 77, I don't know which, decision directives in both defense and foreign policy, most of them, of course, classified, creating the policy which we are now implementing and will be over this coming year, built on over 10 major addresses, a significant one being in November of '81 and then again last year in Eureka. And, as I mentioned a moment ago, there'll be no indication of any change from those two announcements, either tonight or tomorrow.

So that's enough on those four pages, ladies and gentlemen. I'll turn it back to my colleague and if you have questions on specifics, I'll attempt to answer them.

MR. GERGEN: It would be helpful if you'd direct your questions, if you could, and -- Let's start. Helen.

Q Are you saying that the deficit will be over $200 bill and that the President will call for a total freeze on spending across the board?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The first part of your question is correct. The deficit, we now estimate for this current year, '83, which is well underway, will be over $200 billion.

The freeze that we're talking about for '84 is designed to bring it down rapidly from the path it would otherwise be on.

Q What will it be in '84?

Q What figure do we use to get the freeze?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The figure for '84 will be somewhere in the range of 188 with the freeze. Without the freeze, it would be in excess of $230 billion.

The freeze, to make clear again, is a -- it results in an aggregate freeze on total spending in '84, relative to the '83 level in constant dollars. But it's achieved by a whole variety of measures built on the freeze concept, COLA freeze, pay freeze, discretionary freeze, freeze of reimbursement to physicians under Medicare, hospitals under the health programs and so forth. And then follows on with the other measures.

Q Aren't those a lot of if's?

Q Total spending, you mean the unified --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those aren't if's. Those are measures proposed in order to bring about an overall standstill in the level of spending in the budget.

Q Then you have to have total cooperation from Congress.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's absolutely right. It is a joint undertaking --

Q How do you know it's joint yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is going to be proposed. It is going to be suggested in a bipartisan spirit. And it builds on, obviously, the freeze notion that was at the core of the bipartisan Social Security solution.

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Q What do you mean "total spending"?

Q -- some elements of it are not exactly a freeze?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I indicated before, the freeze concept is applied, as appropriate, to various parts of the budget. COLA's, which are increases for inflation, can be frozen for a period of six months. In the case of other things, like discretionary programs where you have hundreds of programs, no one would propose to freeze each and every line item in the budget. but for the aggregate of discretionary spending, the level requested --

Q -- discretionary spending. Including defense spending?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Non-defense discretionary spending.

Q Non-defense --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, we've indicated that the defense changes have already been announced.

Q That's not a total freeze, then.

Q -- change the $8 billion --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that you're trying to make an issue where none lies. I said the basic component, the first component is a freeze on a variety of different things in the budget that will be described in the budget on Monday.

When all of these things are done, including the defense change that has been

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announced, it results in an aggregate standstill in the overall budget.

Q In current dollars or constant dollars?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In constant dollars. Constant dollars.

Q In current dollars --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's slightly under five percent, so there is five percent growth in nominal terms, no growth in real terms.

Q -- mean that defense will grow by about 14 percent, but that the aggregate of the non-defense discretionary programs cannot grow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the increase that you're referring to is in budget authority for defense. The budget is growing in nominal terms, obviously; more some places, less others. In the aggregate it does not grow after inflation is discounted for or in real terms.

Q Defense does?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Defense is only going to be cut $8 billion in outlays, whereas the aggregate of non-defense discretionary programs will be frozen except for a 4.7 percent inflation increase. Is that not correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think maybe we've explained that long enough.

Q Can I ask a question of your colleague about the contingency tax package, please?

Q -- question. That's a good question and I'd like to see the answer.

Q I'd like to hear it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try again. There are a lot of different things in the budget. There is pay to military and civilians, there is retirement to former federal workers.

Q Buster, please, can you answer the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You called it a comprehensive freeze. It's not comprehensive, it sounds like it's more like selective, and I should like to know whether it is, and in what way it's selective.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me rephrase it. It is a freeze concept, comprehensively applied to COLAs, to retirement, to pay, aggregate non-defense discretionary spending, to certain entitlements like medical entitlements where you freeze the reimbursement and not the level because more people are using the program, and when you add all of these freeze concepts that are applied as appropriate to different parts of the budget to the defense savings that have already been announced, the sum total of federal spending does not increase in '84 over the '83 level.

Q Which means that the discretionary non-defense programs are frozen. But those --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- They're not cut.

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Q But the defense programs proceed as usual with a large increase over and above inflation, so that it is not a comprehensive but it is a selective freeze on domestic, non-defense programs. Is that not true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll try again. There are a lot of different programs in the budget. Some are entitlements that grow automatically. We freeze them as we can, freeze the indexes, freeze the reimbursements. There are other programs that are appropriated. In the aggregate we ask no more in '84 than we asked in '83. In defense there is an increase. No one has ever tried to deny that or suggest otherwise.

Q The aggregate is the same. Does that mean that the non-defense actually goes down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In real terms that would be the case; yes.

Q Where, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a detail that we'll get to Monday with the budget.

Q There was a reference to an immediate freeze but then you're talking in terms of '84. Are there portions that are going to be frozen immediately, or does all of it take legislation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It all takes legislation, obviously, because the index benefits require legislation, pay requires legislation, a lot of the other changes do. The effective dates occur throughout the calendar year because many of these programs are adjusted at different dates. The angle is that anything that would ordinarily be increased or adjusted in '83, an attempt will be made to freeze that increase. With the exception of defense, and we've made that very clear.

Q -- you have deficit, how much over $200 billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's slightly over $200 billion and we'll be putting the full details of that out Monday.

Q What will be the percentage -- just without going through this whole thing again, while the aggregate budget is increasing just about five percent, which is the inflationary --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q -- how much will the defense budget be increasing in percentage terms, in approximation, in outlays?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that I have that, the outlay figure, right here. In budget authority it's about 14 percent.

Q How much will discretionary non-defense be going down in real terms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you freeze it at the aggregate, in the aggregate at the nominal level, then about five percent.

Q It goes down five percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. Someone is --

Q Well, that was his question. Let's get it straight.

Q Won't it go down more than that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Congress adopted a budget resolution last summer that we supported. It called for a three-year freeze on discretionary spending. That was done in '83 by Congress. In our '84 comprehensive freeze proposal we are continuing what Congress agreed and we agreed to do last year, last summer, for discretionary non-defense spending in '84.

We are building on that by freezing pay, freezing COLAs, freezing other automatic entitlement programs as it is practical to do given the nature of these programs.

Q What will happen to all non-defense spending in '84? I think that's what we're trying to get at.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's the kind of detail in the budget that we'll get into Monday.

Q Well, percentage terms. You've just given us the increase for defense, now where does that --

Q -- 14 percent up, we're trying to get the non-defense down.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was going to ask you to withhold on that until Monday.

Q But it does go down, definitely goes down, in nominal terms?

Q You'd better clear it up because they're misinformed.

Q Give us comparable numbers that we can use. What's comparable to the 14 percent, in terms of non- --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the rest of the budget? Okay, 14 percent is in nominal terms, it's the budget authority requested for defense after the $11.3 billion reduction that you've all heard about and it's been out a while.

The overall budget increase is about 5 percent, slightly under. That includes the larger defense increase, smaller nominal increases elsewhere. It averages 5 percent.

Now if you want to start getting into all the components, how much --

Q No, we don't, we want non-defense. We want a 14-percent comparable figure for non-defense.

A Go down.

Q One more figure will do it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you would ask somebody else a question, in order to put this to rest, I will calculate it right now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let him work on it. Is there another question here?

Q How much do you raise in taxes if you trigger it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which question am I taking first?

Q You're taking this one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q how much do you raise in these taxes if in fact the trigger goes into effect?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One percent of GNP is the limit per year on each of the three years, fiscal '86, '87, '88. We calculate, based upon our economic projections, which are cautious and below the average of most private economists, that the gross national product in fiscal '86 will be something around $4 trillion, 100 billion, rising to about $4 trillion, 800 billion in '88. So you could say that it would be between $40 and $50 billion per year over the three years.

Q And how far will the deficit be down by '88 under your scenario? Again, in dollar terms, how far will the deficit be down in '88 if your entire program is enacted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With the trigger?

Q With the trigger and all these savings.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just above $100 billion in '88.

Q Above $100?

Q Even with the taxes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What did you say the oil fee was? Did you answer that? You said there would be an excise tax on oil, but I didn't hear hear what figure --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will depend upon, obviously, what the surcharge is, how much will have to be made up by the oil tax. Currently, that's in the neighborhood, we're thinking in terms of -- but have sent up no legislation, but are currently thinking in terms of $5 a barrel, domestic and import.

Q Is the President going to suggest any specific study proposals on taxes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will suggest that we study the possibility of simplifying the Tax Code.

Q Do you know how many people --

Q -- get any more specific than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will not get any more specific than that tonight.

Q Sir, if you did not build the trigger tax into the budget, you could not demonstrate that the deficit was going down sufficiently to satisfy Wall Street. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not Wall Street. The question is, if we didn't build the trigger into the budget, are we doing that to satisfy Wall Street?

Q No, that's not the question. The question is, if you didn't build this standby into the budget figures, you would not be demonstrating the deficit coming down. Isn't that true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The deficits will come down in any event, but they will not come down as much as they would if the trigger is enacted. Now, remember what we have said here, that there are many ways to get that deficit down.

The first one, and the one that we hope will happen is to have the economy grow faster than we are projecting at this particular moment. Obviously, if you keep spending level and the economy recovers as a percent of GNP, your deficit goes down.

Q What are your projections? Unemployment, inflation, boxcar loadings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All of those will be in the budget message. I don't have them with me now, and it's on a year by year basis. Yes?

Q Sir, if the balanced budget amendment had passed, you wouldn't have been able to achieve its five-year target. Will the President repeat his pledge to try and get immediate enactment of that amendment, given the fact that he now has a budget that will be able to meet its goal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The statement tonight will not call for the balanced budget amendment,

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but the President will say that that is still his goal, trying to get a balanced budget amendment. We have not crossed that bridge as to whether or not to send up that legislation at this point.

Q Without the trigger, what would your deficit in fiscal '88 be under your program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without the trigger, what would the deficit be? It would be somewhere in the neighborhood of just over $150 billion without the trigger.

Q According to your own projections?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: According to our projections, which are on the cautious or prudent side.

Q Including the freezes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Including the freezes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Including the freezes, obviously.

Q How many people are affected by the COLA freezes? How many beneficiaries --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're trying -- I plead with you again. You're trying to get into details that we will answer all your questions about Monday. We're simply indicating what the overall strategy is tonight in order to deal with the deficit problem that's critical to economic recovery. And I'm not trying to be non-responsive, but simply indicate we're not going to put out all of these kinds of details now.

Q One other --

Q One figure --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q The calculation you just made --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was about 2 percent for non-defense spending.

Q What's 2 percent?

Q Up?

Q That's a nominal term.

Q What was that again, please?

Q Up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Up.

Q Plus 2 percent, that's a nominal term.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q So it's a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hold on, hold on, please.

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Q So we understand the answer, are you --

MR. GERGEN: All right. The question was, what was his calculation?

Q On what?

Q On what?

Q Don't play games --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was raised before: If the overall increase is 5 percent and defense is about 15 percent, what's the rest of the budget, the other two-thirds, 70 percent roughly? It's about in the neighborhood of 2 percent in nominal terms, up.

Q Up.

Q I have a question. If I understand that computation correctly, since you're expecting inflation to be about 5 percent and non-defense spending in nominal terms only growing 2 percent, then we're talking about in real terms a reduction in that area. And my question is: Given the fact that you're calling for a real term reduction in non-defense spending and what will still be a whopping increase in defense spending, what gives either of you gentlemen the slightest idea that this has a chance of being salable to either Congress or the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll answer for the country. I don't know about Congress. As far as being salable, one of the things that everyone is saying we need and need immediately is economic recovery -- economic recovery in order to get jobs for the unemployed, economic recovery in order to have more prosperity in the country. The obvious thing you have to do is to get interest rates down.

With deficits of the $230 billion to $300 billion that my colleague mentioned, we would never be able to get interest rates down. We think that by these budget stringencies, by the program that we have already in place -- that is, the tax cut that is coming on July 1st of '83 and the fiscal stimulus and with steady monetary growth, that combination will enable us to have the recovery that we want -- slow in the first part of the year, increasing in the second half of the year.

Q How low do interest rates have to go to accomplish this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They've already started it. As you notice that in housing, that housing starts are up, housing permits are up about 60 percent. It's starting in automobile sales. With the new rates of interest for purchasing a car, you're getting better car sales. So interest rates have already started down and are showing -- are helping in the start of the recovery.

Q How low do they have to go?

Q On the trigger for the tax, does Congress have to accept every one of the spending reductions that were laid out before it would trigger? I don't understand what that trigger is, that first part of the trigger.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not spelled it out with that great deal of precision. You know, if you get 99 percent, would you not go with this? If you get 71 percent, would you go with it? We haven't spelled out in any of that kind of detail. What we're saying in generalities is that, first, the budget freezes and the budget cuts that my colleague has talked about have to come first. Then we will propose this legislation for the trigger in the out years.

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Q Is the COLA freeze that you're talking about -- does that apply to needs-based programs as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The COLA freeze applies to all entitlement benefit programs that -- especially that are related to Social Security, because they interact.

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And if we have now agreed on a bipartisan basis, at least to propose moving the Social Security date for adjustment from July to January, most of the other dates would be moved equally. That amounts to a six month freeze.

So, yes, it would be applied across the board.

Q The means-tested --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The means-tested programs are entirely indexed. AFDC isn't and it wouldn't and it wouldn't be affected. Food Stamps are and that would be moved six months to keep everything in track. Otherwise, you'll have terrible disruption in programs.

Q But AFDC would be affected by the freeze, would it not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it wouldn't because it's not an indexed benefit program.

Q No, but it would be affected by the comprehensive freeze.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it wouldn't because I said the freeze mechanism applies separately to programs as it best fits without undue disruption or unfair impact on the program. But, nevertheless, as it fits, it's applied to a whole variety of categories in the budget.

MR. GERGEN: We've only got a few more minutes. So are any other questions directed to --

Q On your employment program, did you mention how long you would extend the unemployment benefits and would they be extended for everyone then collecting or just those who may not have benefited from the extended program? In other words, people who just had -- were still on regular, the regular 26-week program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically, we will extend the program with some modifications. The President, however, will send that legislation up as a separate package in the very near future.

Q -- say how many weeks it would be extended?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q How many weeks it would be extended?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Essentially, it wouldn't be a change in the number of weeks extended, but that the program itself would be extended.

Q How many jobs do you estimate that this program would create?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't attempted to make an estimation in terms of the number of new jobs created, as I think that's a --

Q Can you estimate that it would create any jobs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think, however, that trying to get involved in those numbers exercises makes interesting stories, but not very accurate ones.

Q How much does it cost? The whole --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The cost data will come out in the budget on Monday.

Q -- entitlement raises that are tied to the GS salary level, like Black Lung, would they then be frozen throughout the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That being the case and -- that would be true in that instance.

Q There's no plan to ask for an amendment of that law? To change it?

Q -- how much would the freeze save in 1984?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, as my colleague has just indicated, we would insist you wait until Monday for all of those details and far more than you can possibly want or ask for. But we aren't going to go into all that tonight.

Q Would you start releasing these texts and fact sheets so some of us can get out of here?

MR. GERGEN: I just talked to Robin and he's supposed to be -- he's supposed to get here in just about a minute past six. If he is, we're going to stop.

Q Can you tell us, is the President going to propose the voucher system for Title 1 federal aid? Or is that idea not in the --

Q Question?

Q You didn't mention it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is, will the President propose a -- converting Title 1 in the Education Act into a vouchered program. That is not mentioned in the fact sheet or the speech tonight.

Q Well, wait a minute. Does that mean he won't propose it or is it just not mentioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't forecast what the President will or won't do. The subject is the speech tonight and it's not referenced in the speech tonight.

Q Do you need a tax increase to get economic recovery?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, an economic recovery without a tax increase is a plausible scenario. There are many economists that are forecasting such a thing. As a matter of fact, I think that's about -- the average economist is forecasting that.

Q You're not forecasting it. Tax increases are in your budget, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Only to be triggered if the deficits are 2½ percent of gross national product or more in the out years.

Q -- assume that it will be, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q You do not assume in the budget --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the budget, we do not assume that.

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Q   By what year will you have a balanced budget, if your scenario stands up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By what year would we have? Well, we're only required to have a five-year projection. We haven't taken the figures out beyond that. But it will not happen in the five years under our scenario.

Q   Well, that's clear. But there was some talk that you are now shooting for 1990; but if by '88 you're to be well over $100 billion in the red ink still, when do you finally reach --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't taken the figures out. I wouldn't know how to answer your question under our scenario.

Q   With all the red ink, why is the third year of the tax cut a sacred cow? I mean, you've got trigger. You've got all these other things going in, why not take away the third year of the tax cut --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And abort the recovery right in the middle by taking away the money that we hope that consumers and savers will be able to use, one to buy and the other to save. That's an integral part of the recovery system. If -- it's a well-known anecdote that in a -- the start of a recovery period, you don't increase taxes. Instead, you cut them. And that's exactly what we have in place; so why not go with it.

Q   What gives you the idea that all this is politically achieveable in Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I note that the freeze on Social Security benefits for six months, which has been the most sensitive all the way along,

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has been endorsed by the Speaker, by the Chairman of the Rules Committee, by the leader spokesman for the elderly in this country, and has been widely endorsed by the leadership in both parties in Congress. Now, it seems to me, if we can begin with that agreement and that proposal, it ought to be equally possible to put a freeze on federal employees who are better off, obviously -- federal retirees who are far better off than the average Social Security beneficiary, and on down the line.

Q Is there a possibility, do you think that there is a danger that you might damage the chances for the Social Security freeze if you link it as you have been doing with freezes on such things as Food Stamps and other things? Do you not endanger the agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will not speculate on that.

Q You did not mention, I believe, the federalism initiative, which was a year ago at the center of -- (laughter).

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will be talking about the federalism initiative this evening. And in the fact sheet, you will find the federalism initiative. And, in fact, the federalism initiative this year is structured somewhat differenctly than the proposal last year. Most speicifically, as you recall last year, we discussed the concept of a swap involving the Medicaid program. However, in our policy review this year, the President came to the decision that, before proceeding with a swap of responsibilities for the Medicaid program, we needed really to get health care costs under control, and that trying to go through a major swap at this time would be disruptive in the objective of bringing health care costs under control. The federalism proposal you will find this year will not involve the swap of programs and fiscal resources, but, instead, will focus on some new, block grant programs which are detailed in the fact sheet.

Q How much would you pick up if you repealed indexing, rather than run with a stand-by tax? And what is the rationale for the stand-by tax when many of your fellow Republicans on the Hill say that they are against that? They would rather scrap indexing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, the concept of indexing is something that I think that most tax payers would welcome. That is the idea that the federal government will not be allowed to enjoy excesses that would come from inflation only, and that each one of us would go into a different bracket as inflation increased. And we keep getting progressively higher taxes that way. This has been the game that has been played in Washington for the last 15 years. And we are trying to break that game. So what we are trying to do is to preserve the idea of indexing.

Now, what we are saying is that we can fashion taxes that will not interfere with the process of savings and investment. And those are the types of taxes we are trying to trigger if needed in those out years.

Q How about Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague is now here. We are going to wrap.

Q Let us just hear about Israel for a moment. Is the President going to cut off aid to Isreal in any way?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are going to wrap now. And while you are here, I want to remind you that this is an embargoed briefing until time of delivery. And we have got the fact sheets and the speeches here.

Q Why can't you brief us more often?

THE PRESS: Thank you very much.

END 6:04 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BRIEFING BY THE VICE PRESIDENT

ON TRIP TO EUROPE

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

10:03 A.M. EST

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I have a brief statement, and then be glad to respond to questions.

As you know, on Sunday I'll fly to Europe and visit nine cities in seven countries. The main purpose of this trip is to consult with our allies regarding the Geneva talks on intermediate-range nuclear forces. It is not a negotiating mission, but a mission in which I'll hold discussions and consultations with many of the leaders in Western Europe. And during my visit to Geneva I'll be meeting with both the United States and Soviet negotiators involved in the INF and START talks.

More than a decade ago, President Reagan -- more than a year ago, President Reagan initiated the arms control negotiations that are now under way, and our INF proposals are comprehensive. We feel that they are truly significant. They're designed to eliminate an entire category of nuclear weapons -- not to freeze them at high levels, as has often been the case in past agreements.

I'm also going to be -- have with me on this trip, meeting me in Europe because of a schedule problem on this side, Martin Feldstein, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. And his presence will appropriately put some emphasis on the economic side of the equation that's facing our friends in Europe and the United States. We will be prepared to discuss with our allies all the economic issues of common concern, and there are many.

As we embark on the trip, I am -- been studying up on this a lot, and I am very confident of the strength of the Western Alliance. And I'm equally confident of a unified allied commitment to the goal of arms reduction.

Our strength lies in unity and we are unified in what essentially is a strong moral position -- banishing a whole new generation of intermediate nuclear forces from the face of the earth, if you will.

I'm also confident that a meaningful, verifiable arms reduction can be achieved at the negotiating table. I said at the beginning I'm not going there to negotiate. Our negotiator on INF is there. Our START negotiator, General Rowny, will be there. And they are there because our President is serious about results at those arms talks. And I'm not sure our friends in Europe all understand that. I want to make that message just as clear as I can as I make this trip.

With no further ado, I'll be glad to respond to your questions.

Q Mr. Vice President, there's an article in the Times today that quotes State Department officials who aren't named, and one of them -- it says that this trip would be the right time to announce a new approach on European missiles. And this official is quoted as saying, "If Bush is not given something to say beyond reiterating our willingness to be flexible, the trip could turn into a disaster." Now, you've said --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q -- two or three times you're not going to negotiate.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT: That's right.

Q But could you address that? Could you address the question of -- it's pretty well clear now that the President is being flexible -- but are you prepared to reach some new accommodation with the Europeans, particularly the Germans?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Our negotiators are there in --

Q Excuse me. I meant with the Europeans. I do not mean with the Russians.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: The whole purpose of consultation is to listen and to talk within the framework that I've outlined. I just disagree with the nameless, faceless quoted State Department person there. I just don't think that success or failure is going to be determined whether we have a piece of paper in our pocket offering some new deal. That is not what the trip is about, as I've said. So I would respectfully disagree with the conclusion of a person that didn't put his name on his thoughts over there.

But I know how our President feels. We -- and as I listen carefully to what the leaders of the governments with whom I'll be visiting say, I'm confident that we are very, very much in accord with these allies. We do have a moral position, a strong position -- ridding Europe and the world, if you will --

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because we're not going to play it off against Japan and China -- a decade of weapons, a whole new generation, if you will, of these weapons. And that's a good position.

And the Soviets have come back and said something. It was not balanced. It was not equal. As our President said, they met us half way. They said, "Don't you do -- You'll have none, and we'll have half of what we got." That's not balance. That's not equal.

But the place to discuss that is in Geneva. And, in the meantime, I will be listening very attentive, in confidence, because consultations cannot be conducted out in the open in front of the glare of these lights. You cannot get the innermost feelings of people. But I'm going there, the President's appointment, to listen carefully to our allies for suggestions, for ideas, but not to do what they've suggested here.

Yes?

Q Mr. Vice President, you say in your statement that you're confident of the strength of the Alliance. But what about the pressure that's being exerted on the allies, particularly the Germans by their peace movements?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, those pressures are there. And I had an opportunity to visit yesterday, for example, with Mr. Genscher. I would simply refer you, in response to that question, to what Genscher said when he left here. And I think that that is reflective of the German government's position.

Now, I'm not suggesting there's no pressures on them because of their peace movement or anything else, but the idea of removing this generation of weapons really should have the support of the people of Germany. And if I can make no other -- I think there's some misunderstanding on the part of some of the people there as to our commitment to real negotiation. I really believe that. I'm confident they realize that we are determined to stay strong and to help keep the Alliance strong, in concert with our NATO allies, but I'm not sure they see that that other part is quite as serious as we feel it is, that negotiating part, you see. So, I'll try to get that message across.

Q What is your comment on the fact that all parties out of government in West Germany, the Social Democrats, the C.S.U., Franz-Josef Strauss and even the Greens seem to reject the zero option?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: One thing I don't want to do, and it's going to be very difficult -- Two things I don't want to do, one get into a lot of interpretations over statements coming from a wide array of the political spectrum in Germany and, secondly, being a politician myself and having been elected and being somewhat sensitive to things that might appear to be intervention in the elective process of a country, I would want to carefully avoid doing anything to get into that election that's scheduled for March 6. It's not going to be that easy, frankly. But having been in the political wars, I will be very sensitive to that. So, I think it might not be overly helpful, with that in mind, to comment, except to say, as I looked at Mr. Strauss' statement and then read the interpretations of it, which now you can't make a statement without having everybody interpret it, that I'm not so sure that he and his, and Kohl and Genscher and others are going to be very far apart.

I'd like that to sort out a little, however, before commenting on it. Now, you mention opposition. Sure, there's going to be some that are going to have different emphasis, but none, I think, that would want to diminish the Alliance staying together, none that will criticize, not only the moral position but the sound offer that has been made in terms of zero option, zero-zero. I mean, if you could sit and talk to the people, I believe they'd understand that. Now, why give up on something like that? Yet, our negotiator is there, all ears, waiting to hear some reasonable position from which to negotiate.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Vice President, why don't you include the Scandinavian NATO countries in your trip?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Time, I think. They are important. We had the Prime Minister of Denmark here recently. And I think it's really time and it's, as you'll notice in there, it's the basing countries that emerged in the consultations on which I'm about to embark. Yes, sir?

Q A very well known face, not a face-less Department official, Mr. Nitze has said that the United States is not and I quote, "locked into the zero option". Now, what is your assessment? Does the convenience of his ability of a gradual solution lead to a solution perhaps?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think that his -- I hate to use -- The words mean different things to different people. Nitze and the President are as one. They are in totally

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in accord as to what might happen and what should happen. Nitze would agree with what -- everything I've said here about the desirability of the zero option. He would also agree with the President that if there's some worthwhile proposal, something meaningful, something that does reflect balance and equality and fundamental principles that we agree with, that it's worth seriously negotiating. So that would be my reply.

Yes, in the back, sir.

Q -- come to another stop of your itinerary; i.e., the Vatican. There's heightened interest here and elsewhere in the world as to how you assess the so-called "Bulgarian Connection" and the attempt two years ago on the Pope's life. One paper today has it that obviously the U.S. is probably trying to steer away from the Bulgarian Connection, maybe in order not to rattle the East-West relations too much and your relation with the Soviet Union. Could you comment on that particular aspect?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think we're steering one way or another. And I don't think it is our business to do that. This matter is being looked into by competent magistrates in a judicial system for which we have respect. And to prejudge or to jump in there and give opinions to shape public opinion one way or another, in our view, that would not be in keeping with our sense of justice. That matter probably will come up and we'll ask about it. But, like the President, we are not going to get in and prejudge a matter of this sensitivity. And it is being handled in the courts as it should be.

Q -- follow up -- So you would not say that the conclusion that the paper draws is correct when it says that the U.S. government is trying to steer away from --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think our system of justice and, hopefully, fair play in matters of this nature would say that you don't -- nobody is guilty until proved so and there's a presumption that you're entitled to a fair hearing. And for us to stand here from across the ocean and cast judgment on it, in the President's view, would not be fair. And I couldn't agree more. So it's that. And so we're not shaping it one way or another for political currents, if that was what the question is. We're not -- by staying silent, we're not attempting to do that at all. We're attempting to see justice prevail, see the truth out and we believe that the Italian magistrates are very serious in this. Yes, sir.

Q Mr. Vice President, you mentioned a moment ago that you didn't plan to do anything to get into the March 6th elections in Germany.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Does that mean that we can rule out any public statement by the administration between now and March 6th on any proposal other than the zero-zero --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: No, it just means that I'm going to be very sensitive to the political currents and to the election. I'll probably get killed for saying this; but I remember when I was running for Vice President of the United States with the President and a foreign figure, dignitary, got involved, whether willfully or not, in a campaign stop for the opposition party here. And I'll tell you, it put us into orbit in terms of our blood pressure. And I realize the sensitivity, particularly in Germany, the cross currents of public opinion, and also because of the multi-faceted party system there. And all I'm saying is I'm going to endeavor to conduct myself in reply to questions, in terms of fairness of who we see and all of these things in order to stay out of the elections. But it doesn't mean that we will shape whatever it is happens at Geneva, or anywhere else, to try to, you know, to have that reverse twist to it, to try to hold up action or accelerate action on this account. Yes, sir.

Q Wouldn't you like to see the Kohl government win the March 6th elections?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Nice try. We are not going to -- Listen, that's exactly the kind of question I need practice in stonewalling. Next one. (Laughter).

Q What is your position concerning a summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Well, you know, some forget that it was President Reagan who was very open-minded about seeing Mr. Brezhnev at the United Nations. Do you remember last year? That wouldn't have been a summit meeting. But our position is that -- the President's position, which is what matters on this one, is that clearly at some point, you know, a meeting might be in order; but you've got to have it properly prepared for. And if you bill it as a summit, you're going to raise the level of expectations. And if you have a summit, you better know what's coming in and know pretty well what's coming out.

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And that is our view -- thorough preparation so that the meeting would be productive and useful and not followed with a counterproductive lack of activity.

Yes, sir?

Q But couldn't such a summit meeting pave the way for major breakthroughs or breakthroughs in major issues?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think if we became convinced of that, that that would have great influence on the President's thinking.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Vice President, the United States rejected the latest Soviet offer to reduce its medium-range missiles to the levels of missiles held by Britain and France. But hasn't the question of the British and French missiles got to be addressed at some time at either of the Geneva talks because, after all, these missiles are pointing at Russia and the two countries are members of NATO?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: There was a time in agreements where agreements were reached where the British and French missiles -- with the Soviets -- where the British and French missiles were not a part of the equation.

We are focusing here now on INF and we don't feel they are part of the equation. We think you have to compare apples and apples and oranges and oranges and we don't think that mixing that in is contributing to that definition of how we proceed. We don't think it is the role of the United States to -- when we're negotiating with the Soviets' interests to commit somebody else's forces to negotiation. And we agree with what President Mitterrand said loud and clear on that subject and what the British position has been on that subject.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Vice President, will you be carrying any kind of a new message to Europeans? Just from the public statements, the Europeans know what's been said here. There obviously continues to be considerable concern in Europe about whether or not compromise at some point is possible because both sides have rejected opening positions. Will you only be listening or will you be able to tell them in some way and somehow how the United States views a potential solution to this issue?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure I fully -- I think I've addressed myself to that question. So, I would just say that we are not carrying new proposals if that -- I missed the exact wording of what you said -- to the people of Europe whether there were new proposals --

Q I'm saying, would you be able to give them some idea of what the administration negotiating strategy is, for example?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: No, and I think the reason for that is we are serious about consultation. This idea of the cosmetics of consultation is not what drives this administration in working with our allies. And to go there and kind of have public, if I'm getting your question correctly, public postures as to what might or might not be possible in this -- we're not doing that. And we're going to listen, we're going to talk to our allies and then I will come back and keep that very closely held and so that we can talk in frankness and total confidentiality and then come back and report to the President.

Yes, I had identified him and then over here. Yes, sir?

Q Is in your view December '83 the absolute deadline for negotiations?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: There are dates set for deployment and, as Mr. Genscher said, that will go forward in terms of deployment unless there's some agreement that stops it. Yes, that's a set time, an important time, and it is, in our view, that is a fundamental part of the two-track approach.

Yes, sir?

Q I'm not sure I understand what you are going to do because you keep repeating that you have no new proposals to bring to Europe and that you want to discuss. But if you have no new proposals, what are you going to discuss? -- because the zero option has been discussed many times.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We're going to encourage the Soviets to come up with a reasonable proposal because we have tabled a very good proposal. It has a moral base to it. It, for awhile, captured the imagination of the general public. It still has the imagination and support of the leaders of NATO. And it talks about removing an entire generation of new, deadly, intermediate nuclear weapons from Europe. It's a sensible proposal. It's a sound proposal. It's a moral proposal. And we want to hear something that has some soundness, some sensibility, some morality, some balance, some stability, something that will reduce that threat to the lowest possible level. We think we've made that offer and we haven't heard anything in response.

Now, our negotiator is probably -- I don't know whether he's there right this minute, but he's there prepared to discuss, as long as it takes, to hammer out an agreement. And I don't think a lot of the people in Europe know this, and I'm not sure people in Moscow know it. But, if I do nothing else but get that point across, this trip will be worthwhile.

Q Mr. Vice President, if you hear a reasonable proposal for a very low limit that is balanced between Soviet and American forces, but it is other than the zero option, will the administration negotiate on that?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We are there open-minded. As the President said, "Bring on some other proposal and let's discuss it."

Q I have two questions. One, what kind of a job do you think the Soviets have done as far as --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me just correct something before Mr. Smith finishes the last sentence he's writing down there. Without departing from the zero option. The goal is to rid the world, banish this generation, this decade, if you will, of development of intermediate nuclear force.

Q Mr. Vice President, I'm not quite clear. Are you saying anything other than your zero option is totally unacceptable? Are you saying that?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I'm saying let's negotiate. And we've made a sound proposal. We've not heard one in return. Let's negotiate on it. And that's where our allies stand -- firmly behind, but willing to listen.

Q I have two questions. What kind of a job do you think the Soviets have done in influencing European public opinion on this question and, two, did I understand you to say that you'll be meeting with the Soviet negotiators in Geneva?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q What's the purpose of that meeting?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think the chance there would be to at least represent to these individuals who are representing the Soviet Union the kind of conviction that we have in terms of really wanting to achieve and equitable, balanced, stable resolution to this question. And it will be, I think the meetings will be fairly short.

What was the first part of your question ?

Q What kind of a job do you think -- How successful have they been in influencing public opinion in Europe on this question, Western Europe?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I guess I would have to wait until I get there to really find out. I think they had some plusses and they had some minuses. The part that came off as kind of shrill and threatening at the end of the Gromyko visit I think could be counterproductive in Europe if you're listening carefully. The very fact that the Soviets are talking about wanting an arrangement and peace, we welcome that. And so I can't honestly say, assess yet the value of the Gromyko trip or of the Andropov proposals. I think the allies recognize that the proposals are totally unacceptable for the reasons that I keep talking about here in terms of equality and stability and all of this. But the fact that they were made, we ought not to knock that.

You've already -- P.S. All right. Two more after this one.

Q There may be a contradiction in two of your answers. You said that the plan goes through for deploying the missile. You also said our negotiator will stay in Geneva as long as it takes. I don't understand that. If there is serious negotiation still going on in December, will the missile deployment plan be deferred --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: No.

Q -- so long as there is serious negotiation? Or will they be deployed and you will continue to negotiate because there will be less to negotiate about?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: There will not be deferment. I mean, we have certain time frames. NATO has taken a decision in concert with all parties and that is a -- You're talking about the deployment date?

Q Yes.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Well then, he won't sit there as long as it takes because, by January, it will be impossible to eliminate all missiles from Europe. We'll have new missiles in Europe.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We may end up negotiating to get all missiles out of Europe. That's our objective -- new ones that have come in and others. I mean, we are not -- We are very serious about this proposal, you see.

Let's get these two and I guess that does it today.

Q Mr. Vice President, I wonder if I could ask to what extent your arms control policy is hostage to your own party's right wing and how far does Senator Helms' veto extend?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: The answer is none and none.

Next question.

Q The Europeans have ventured on their own a number of times with regards to communicating with the Soviets. We all know about the pipeline and other things. This administration has responded with trade sanctions and some remarkable rhetoric and now options in the arms negotiation that has not won a consensus among the allies. How come this administration or does this administration think that it knows better how to deal with the Soviets than the Europeans?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We have certain responsibilities for dealing with the Soviets. But I don't think we think we know better. I think we think we are acting in concert and I think George Shultz's recent

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trip that eliminated some of the things that, kind of, momentarily divided the Alliance was a very good trip. And I think the idea that we have a proposal that is supported by all the allies -- this zero option proposal ridding Europe and the world of these weapons is a good thing. I mean, I cannot imagine people, if they felt that that could be achieved -- and all it needs is the Soviet acquiescence to achieve it -- that anyone would think that is a bad idea. Nobody thinks it is a bad idea. Our allies are with us on it. Their problem is -- can you actually achieve it. And there, we do have some responsibility with the Soviets, because it is the United States that is doing the negotiating. It is, also, the United States that willingly, we hope in a steadfast fashion, is an integral part of defending ourselves and Europe. With NATO, an attack on one would be an attack on all, for example.

So we do not think that we know best. And that is why I am talking about consultation. But we do have certain principles -- about common defense, about equality, about reduction of weapons, about trade -- certain kinds of trade. And sometimes, there are going to be differences among friends. This Alliance does not march in lock-step. There is room for divergence in free countries -- not so much dissent and disapproval in other countries in Europe. But I do not see many people that feel that -- you know, I will put it this way. I do not see many people going from West to East to seek freedom.. And part of freedom is diversity. And I do not expect any lock-step approval of anything we do. But if there is a question as to our motives, if there is a misunderstanding of this President's commitment to arms reduction or to doing our part to defend these values, then this trip will be worthwhile.

And I just come back to this hypothesis stated out of that story today. I do not think you judge -- you know, these points I have just made I think are important points. And they relate to consultation and reassurance and exchanging of ideas to see that differences do not grow in the Alliance, you see. And I really am looking forward to it. And I think the trip is worthwhile on that count.

And I am going to get killed if I take another question. Is that right, Teeley?

MR. TEELEY: That is correct.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: All right.

Thank you all very, very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:31 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK

January 27, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:46 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: We will go on to the background briefing on the visit of President Reagan and President Mubarak. This is a background briefing. You may attribute the remarks made to a senior administration official. You may use the quotes as you wish but we would prefer that you not use his name.

Q I thought the President only wanted officials to talk on the record to reporters?

MR. ALLIN: Most occasions that's exactly the policy he wants followed.

Q Most occasions it's not.

Q Does Egypt have a corporate income tax and are there plans to abolish -- (laughter) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure it's ever been paid.

Q What? I can't hear very well. I take on the physical ailments of those I cover -- (laughter) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let us run over briefly the format. The two Presidents met in the Oval Office with a group of advisers. This went on for about half an hour. On our side there was the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, Ambassador Habib, and others. On the Egyptian side there was the President, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the Egyptian Ambassador and the Undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry and the head of President Mubarak's office, Osama el-Baz.

The meeting then adjourned to the larger Cabinet Room where both parties were joined by other people. The most notable on the Egyptian side were the three economic ministers who are here and on our side Mr. Meese joined. That went about 25 minutes and then we went off to lunch where, I believe, everyone who was in the larger meeting went into lunch and the lunch went on for about an hour.

Now, the other day I cited to you the -- what we thought would be the framework of the visit. I described them as six general objectives. Let me run over them: To permit President Mubarak and President Reagan to renew their personal relationship, an important factor in our overall relations; to review and to reiterate the special relationship between Egypt and the U.S. and our common dedication to the pursuit of a just, comprehensive and secure peace for the Middle East; to discuss the peace process and President Reagan's peace initiative; to review the situation in Lebanon and our mutual interest in the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, strengthening of the Lebanese central government; to review regional security and political issues and U.S.-Egyptian cooperation in dealing with these issues; and to discuss U.S. economic and military assistance to Egypt.

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You have the departure statement of the two Presidents which, I believe, clearly indicates that the discussions that have taken place so far and those that will take place will fall into the general framework that I outlined. There will be additional meetings with Secretary Shultz this afternoon which will be a follow on the overall discussions. And then, of course, there is the meeting between President Mubarak and Secretaries Regan, Baldrige and AID Director McPherson still to come.

This morning the President met with Secretary of Defense Weinberger. Now, let me take some of your questions.

Q Was there any suggestion on the part of President Mubarak that time is running out and that there is a time limit on the possibility of the peace process working?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. President Mubarak stressed --

Q Could you repeat the question please?

Q We couldn't hear.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did President Mubarak stress his concern about time running out on the peace process and the problems of the stalemate in Lebanon. Is that what --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The whole thing together. And my answer to that was yes. President Mubarak made a major point of emphasizing his concerns over these general issues, citing also the negative impact on our hopes for an early resumption of the peace process of continued impasse in Lebanon.

Q Did he put any limit?

Q Did he put any time frame on it, for example, a year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no time frame discussed. Just -- He did use the phrase "the sooner the better", and he -- I don't want to suggest he thinks a year. I think he -- Clearly, the Egyptians would share our perspective that we're talking in months.

Q That's looking ahead, not to look back. There is a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. Did President Mubarak give President Reagan any indication that that treaty will fall apart, that Egypt -- The word "reneg" comes to mind. I'm trying to think of a less loaded word. That Egypt will pull back on its commitment to have normal relations with Israel if this Lebanon problem isn't solved quickly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two points. Let me answer this in two steps. The first one is President Mubarak's comments on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. He emphasized Egypt's commitment to peace with Israel and to the peace treaty. No question about that. This was a major topic of discussion and his comments were clear, emphatic, no nuances in that respect.

On the question of the impact of Lebanon on the process of normalization, it was made clear in the context of the discussion by the Egyptian President that Lebanon has impacted on this process. He reaffirmed his decision to return the Egyptian Ambassador to Tel Aviv when there is an agreement on a framework for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces. You will recall this is a statement that President Mubarak and his government have made before and publicly.

Q Can I just follow up? Not to put too fine a point on it. Agreement on a framework for the withdrawal or, indeed, when the foreign forces have left Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My understanding was --

Q Will a framework do it, or do they have to get out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My understanding was that it was the agreement itself, with the understanding that the withdrawals would start very quickly.

Q You mean Mid-East foreign forces, don't you, and not all foreign forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not talking about UNIFIL and the MNF.

MR. ALLIN: Can we move back over here?

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Q You're talking about the framework for Israel to withdrawal or all the three forces, the PLO, the Syrian, --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The frame --

Q That may take forever.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- is all foreign forces.

Q All foreign forces.

Q But, to follow on that, in the departure statement the President said only the withdrawal of Israel, in his only reference to that. He only mentioned Israel in talking about the withdrawal of forces.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which President?

Q Mubarak.

Q President Mubarak.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Mubarak. I'm not going to -- The Egyptian position, as I've understood it, and there's nothing in the discussions today to change that, is that the Egyptians support the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q We can follow up on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That includes Syrians and PLO from Lebanon.

Q But he singled out the Israelis. Doesn't that indicate some feeling that the Israelis are the problem, that the rest will fall into place, I think as he said, once the Israelis leave?

SENIOR ADMININSTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, you can ask these questions directly of the Egyptians. My understanding is the Egyptians believe the priority is Israeli agreement in order, then, to get the framework agreed for the others to leave as well. But that's something to check with them.

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MR. ALLIN: Could you hold, please, so we could recognize -- we'll go around the room right here and then to the back. Yes.

Q Another follow-up to that question. What did President Reagan say about this issue of relations between Israel and Egypt? And was there any call by President Reagan to take those relations from this frozen status that they are right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, in the course of the discussion, obviously indicated the desirability of relations between Egypt and Israel being better. He -- I forget which President initiated a discussion of the subject. And there was a discussion of it. And it was in that context that President Mubarak made the statements that I said earlier in answer to Barry's question.

Q Did President Mubarak have any specific ideas for President Reagan, how he might encourage the Israelis to begin to agree to withdrawal and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did President Mubarak have any ideas on how President Mubarak might encourage the Israelis?

Q No, how President Reagan -- or how Ambassador Habib might negotiate --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing specific other than citing the urgency and noting the importance of the American role in this respect.

Q Egyptian government officials specifically said before the Mubarak visit that President Mubarak would ask President Reagan to increase U.S. pressure on Israel for a withdrawal agreement. Did he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was, let me put it this way, the President clearly indicated that it was viewed universally as an American responsibility to ensure that this framework for agreement for the withdrawal of all foreign forces took place. And in that context, he would expect us to have influence on the Israelis in our discussions.

Q Which President was that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Mubarak.

Q What was President Reagan's reply when it was said that time was running out? What -- how did he react to this and did he make any -- any indications as to what time --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no one talked about any deadlines. And I don't want to suggest that President Reagan waited for President Mubarak to say that the Middle East issue was time sensitive. That isn't true. Clearly, President Reagan, on his own, indicated his own impatience and his own recognition that Middle Eastern issues are time sensitive, particularly peace issues. Wars can start any time. And this got you, again, to the discussion about the need for a breakthrough in Lebanon. And the relevance of movement progress on Lebanon towards creating an atmosphere that would induce others to join a broadened peace process.

Q Did he indicate -- Did President Reagan indicate that he was going to do anything to enhance the power of what you'd call the American responsibility to do something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I know what question you're asking. But that wasn't the way the discussion went. The President said that he's -- we are discussing all of these issues now and the questions of how best to make quick progress on Lebanon and all of the issues that I've already mentioned.

Q -- follow up?

Q Has President Mubarak carried any messages from leaders in the Middle East, either from Gemayel, Arafat was mentioned in this context? And just to follow it, President Mubarak spoke of a golden opportunity, referring to King Hussein? Has he carried any new evidence about Hussein's joining the peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to talk about what, you know, what President Mubarak's confidential correspondence is, that he may or may not have told the President about.

Q I mean in the message.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I know what you're asking, Shalom, and I'm not going to answer it because it's, you know, that's his business with his own friends. But clearly, he had -- He clearly stated that the need

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for quick movement in Lebanon and that, particularly on this question of the getting all foreign forcess out, was also a reflection of the position and almost the -- Well, the very urgent desire of President Amin Gemayel and his government as well.

MR. ALLIN: Karen?

Q And Hussein, too?

Q And Hussein as well.

Q And Hussein as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I think before -- In the context of what Shalom asked, I'm not sure that Hussein fits into that. But, certainly, as far as the Jordanians are concerned, this is terribly important.

Q Well, can I ask you whether we have, whether the United States has in any way signalled the Israelis that, unless some agreement is arrived at very soon, that Mr. Begin will not be invited to come in February?

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: The question of a visit by Mr. Begin is agreed to in principle and the dates haven't been set yet. That's all I have to say on that.

Q Well, can you answer my question? Have we signalled that, unless there's an agreement soon on this framework that you've been talking about, that that visit will not take place in mid-February?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the Secretary of State has addressed this and so have many others, and I'll leave it there.

Q I don't know what's been said. Is the answer yes or no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll get you the record, Lesley.

Q Did you all ask Mubarak to do anything and, secondly, when he goes back and, secondly, as a result of this meeting are you any closer to getting on with the President's peace plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did we ask him to do anything? Nothing specific. And that wasn't the context of the discussion. The discussion was really what have we both been doing to try to get this on track. In that context, President Mubarak explained what Egypt was doing and with whom to try to get the Palestinians to agree to a formula that would allow the Jordanians to enter the negotiations. He talked about his contacts with a whole variety of Arab parties.

President Reagan described what we have been doing, talked about, obviously, the visit of King Hussein, the importance of the Saudis, the Fez visit, this kind of thing, but no specific.

Q Let me ask --

Q Excuse me.

MR. ALLIN: Jeff?

Q Mr. Mubarak said outside that he was encouraged by what he had heard from King Hussein, from Palestinian leaders and from other Arabs. I wonder if you could say if he told the President in any detail what he had heard that made him encouraged and, secondly, if you could say, as a result of this, whether you and the administration in general are more encouraged about the prospects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's awfully hard to measure the temperature on this thing. With respect to what Egypt has been doing, the President expressed his appreciation for the, not only the public support of Egypt, President Mubarak personally, for our initiative, but also the private activities that they have been engaged on.

When President Mubarak says he was encouraged, I think it's encouragement based on essentially the same data we have as to evolving attitudes, the forthcoming PNC meeting, that people are thinking seriously about taking some tough decisions there. He did not go into any detail, to the best of my knowledge, as to his discussions with King Hussein or messages, other than that he supports the King's interests and the King's current activities in trying to gain support for a move into the peace process.

Q -- second part of my question about whether all of this brings you any closer to getting on with the President's peace plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRAION OFFICIAL: I think it helps put into higher profile at the highest level here and in

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Egypt the problems that must be overcome in order to move ahead and a need for close consultation as we move ahead. I don't think you can say that this has brought us closer or further except in the sense that I happen to believe that when you have these discussions at the Presidential level, they're always a plus and that you tend to reinforce each other's policies to press ahead and I think that will happen. I know that will happen.

Q Let me follow-up on something --

Q President Mubarak said outside -- may I just -- President Mubarak said outside that he had urged the United States to move further toward supporting the right of the Palestinians to self determination. In the private meetings, did President Reagan in any way suggest that we were considering moving further?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position on this issue is very well known. It's not only the Camp David Accords but the President's initiative which is based on Camp David. We believe that the policies dealing with self determination and everything else in these documents, particularly on the President's initiative, not only adequately deal with the issue of self determination. We're talking about Palestinians, and a lot of them -- elections, governing themselves even in an initial phase. But beyond that, they are eminently practical in that they are realistic and are achievable.

Q So, the answer is no. He did not suggest that we would do anything more than our stated position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean, this is our position. President Mubarak has spoken for himself.

Q Is it Mubarak's position that there can be no major movement on the autonomy question until there's movement on the Lebanon withdrawal issue and is it ours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two issues are not formally linked in any way. And, indeed, we have had a period of impasse on Lebanon and movement on the peace process. At least, I interpret it as movement as to what's happening out in the Arab world -- King Hussein, the visit here, and subsequently. And I think that's clear.

What has also become clear is that, at the present time, the perceptions of Lebanon are beginning to have an adverse impact on the prospects for breakthrough on the peace process. That's what you really mean when you say getting the autonomy talks. And it's -- the problems are very simply put in that respect. You get a new conventional wisdom that circulates out in the Middle East and it sort of goes like this: Why should we take a chance on negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza when there's a North Bank being created? I'm not saying that's the case but you don't need this repeated more than two or three times and pretty soon it's in all the coffee houses and this puts real pressure on governments.

So, from the point of view of perceptions, this -- yes, it's unfortunate, but it happens to be a case.

That doesn't mean there isn't going to continue to be progress. I believe on movement towards broadening the peace process.

Q Did President Mubarak ask President Reagan directly to start a dialogue with the Palestinians? And what was really the atmosphere of these talks concerning the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you should ask those questions to President Mubarak. I'm sorry.

Q -- still somewhat unclear. What was the thrust of Mubarak's presentation on whatever the United States should do vis-a-vis Israel from settlements in Lebanon. You said that he urged the President but was there anything more than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On settlements, they agreed that settlements are a very serious obstacle to peace and this obstacle is going to have to be overcome.

Q -- the United States do. What was the thrust of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that President Mubarak was here to give advice to President Reagan on sensitive issues like that. They discussed the major topics facing them, the prospects for

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progress, the problems that they saw, and there was agreement that more had to be done and we had to move ahead because this is a time-sensitive inter-related set of peace questions.

Q So what did the President respond to President Mubarak? That's what we're trying to get at -- when President Mubarak said that there should be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President -- and I'm not saying that -- you know, don't put this in the context of President Mubarak said, "Gee, we've got problems out there," and President Reagan said, "Gee, really?" They both know the situation --

Q They said that? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President expressed on his own initiative, on his own behalf, not responding, the recognition of the problems, the recognition of the harmfulness of the current impasse in Lebanon, the need to get all foreign forces out as soon as possible, the perceptual link that is harmful between now Lebanon and actually broadening the peace process. There was a discussion, a sharing of assessments, and that's the way it was put.

Q Was anything said about aid cut-off soon, slow-downs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, you don't -- one President doesn't tell another President to do that.

Q President Mubarak said that both Presidents agree that the settlements are a serious obstable to peace and they have to be frozen. The word "serious" -- is this a new terminology which has been added, or was it used before? And the second part of it is: Since the United States and Egypt are equal partners in the peace process, do you believe -- or does the -- President Mubarak feels now that he is going to be treated -- Egypt is going to be treated as an equal partner, the same way Israel is treated in the economic and political and military fields?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm trying to -- on your first question, the answer is no. On the second question, I'm not going to speak for the Egyptians, but it's our -- it's our firm belief, our conviction that the American-Egyptian relationship is very solid, that we would expect this visit to re-enforce that relationship.

The question of the Egyptian-U.S. relationship, I believe, has to be judged on its own merits and not against any other standards. And you judge it on its own merits or against any other standards and it's very healthy and solid.

MR. ALLIN: We'll take three more questions here. Right here, Leo, and --

Q Can you --

MR. ALLIN: -- has had his hand up a long time.

Q You said that everybody went in there and agreed on the problem. Mubarak came out of the meeting and said he was reassured about the U.S.'s willingness to make some progress in Lebanon. What specific things did we say, did the U.S. describe to him, if any, that would give him grounds to be reassured that we can make progress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think that, again, you'll have to ask the Egyptians their own views on this. But, as I understood this, it was a result of the recognition up front that we knew what the problems were and that the President

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was determined to overcome them.

Q And that is all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a difference when you hear this from an Ambassador and when you hear it from the President.

Q Nothing more specific? No indication of what steps we are going to take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He noted that we were discussing all of these issues here now. And we were going to come up with our own policies.

Q Does that mean we have not come up with it yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does not mean anything, except what I have said.

Q Are you saying that there is a policy review to re-examine our, perhaps, financial situation with Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. We have Phil Habib. We have had a policy review going on ever since Phil Habib came back. And that is it.

Q Did President Reagan agree with President Mubarak that, as far as Lebanon is concerned, the prime onus is now on Isreal? Or did President Reagan, as he seemed to suggest in his departure statement, reiterate the view that it is really a concurrent, tripartite responsibility -- Israel, the PLO, and the Syrians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me answer it this way. I think President Reagan is very impatient with the lack of progress so far in the Lebanese situation, and wants to break this loose as soon as possible. In our view, the key to this is the current negotiations between the Israelis and the Lebanese. We believe that, once you get an agreed framework on the withdrawal of Israeli forces and it is clear they are going to withdraw, then you will be able to get the Syrians and the PLO to, also, agree to withdraw in that time frame.

I am not suggesting that there are not other discussions going on between the Lebanese and the Syrians, the Lebanese and the PLO, other Arabs and these people -- because there are. But, clearly, in the President's view, the key is breaking the impasse between Israel and Lebanon at this time.

Q So your answer is yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. My answer is what I said.

Q Are we any closer to getting a resolution of all this now than we were this morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are no further.

Q Are you saying that the President believes that, once the Israelis agree, the Syrians and PLO will agree? Yes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I formulated my remarks extremely carefully. And I am going to leave them there.

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Q I am just asking what you said.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you ask me if I think that is the case, the answer is yes.

Q What arms are we giving to Egypt? Do they want arms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are no new arms coming out of this relationship. On the last time we met here, I noted that a certain number of aircraft, tanks, and other things had already gone into Egypt. There were no hardware issues -- major hardware issues between us.

Q Did you find the Palestinian position disclosed by President Mubarak more encouraging? How do you describe your reaction?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did we find the Palestinian position described by President Mubarak more encouraging; or how would we describe our reaction?

I do not think it is a question of being discouraged or encouraged. It is a question of being perplexed and hopeful that the PLO will be able to make the right, constructive decisions to encourage West-Bankers and Gazans to join the peace negotiations with King Hussein.

May I say one word about economic issues? Someone asked. We are discussing --

Q No. You have to explain "being perplexed."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It seems to us that the issues are so simple. Although, they are complicated. (Laughter.) The choices before them, and before the area, are really quite simple -- will there be movement toward peace; or won't there -- and, if not now, when.

The answers to those questions, in my view, clearly would lead to a constructive and positive response from the PLO.

Q Did the two Presidents meet privately at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They may have talked privately; no structured, private meeting.

On economic issues -- there

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are three economic ministers here. I won't keep you. They're reviewing various aspects of the assistance program and they'll also be discussing certain aspects of Egypt's domestic economic policy, foreign investment, what have you.

We have been discussing in great detail moving along the discussions on a possible American participation in water and sewage projects. And there's a lot of progress on this. We discussed with the Egyptians other areas, for example, the electrical field where our support could be supportive of reforms that they themselves wish to make.

It's this kind of discussion that's going on. We're looking for more flexibility in our programs. There's a limit on this.

Q How about agriculture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Agriculture is one of the target priority areas. These are all areas that the government of Egypt is addressing in a new five-year plan as well. So, these meetings -- I don't want to say beneath the surface, but, certainly, a very important aspect of these meetings in the bilateral relationship has been the advance team of three ministers who are still here and still meeting. And they'll meet with our ministerial team.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:24 P.M. EST

Unedited

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ'S ASIAN TRIP
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983, 2:39 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I've got a statement I'll read, and then I'll be glad to take questions.

As you know, the Secretary will begin his visit to Asia first with a stop in Japan from January 30-February 2. In Tokyo we plan to follow up and expand on the discussions that were held during Prime Minister Nakasone's very successful visit here two weeks ago.

As you know, the Secretary met both the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abe during the visit and looks forward to resuming those contacts as well as to meeting other members of the Japanese Cabinet who did not accompany the Prime Minister here in Washington.

In addition to bilateral matters, such as the various trade problems and developments in our mutual security relationship, the Secretary hopes to discuss in depth with his Japanese hosts the wide range of global and regional issues in which we and the Japanese share basically common interests.

In particular, the Secretary's interested in advancing coordination of U.S. and Japanese positions and approaches on such problems as arms control, the Middle East, East-West economic relations, and assistance to developing countries.

He has welcomed Prime Minister Nakasone's express desire to involve Japan more deeply and directly in meeting the challenges that confront the Western democracies and thereby fulfilling Japan's responsibilities as the world's second most important economic democracy.

From Tokyo the Secretary will travel to China where he will visit from Feburary 2-6. His stay there will provide an important opportunity for him to get acquainted with the leadership of a country which is very important to us and whose friendship we value.

The visit, which is the first in a series of high-level exchanges between the U.S. and China planned for this year, will also give both sides the opportunity to review the relationship in its entirety and to explore ways to expand it.

During the visit the Secretary expects to discuss a broad range of issues. He will exchange views on the world situation with the Chinese leadership and review our respective approaches to global, political and economic problems. He will also review our approaches to major regional issues, including Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the Middle East and southern Africa.

In addition, he plans to discuss the wide variety of bilateral elements in our relationship, focusing primarily on our economic, commercial and scientific and technological ties which have expanded very rapidly in the four short years since normalization.

In the course of his discussions the Secretary will also explain our approaches to those areas where we disagree, with the objective of dispelling misunderstandings and narrowing differences.

His next stop will be in Korea from February 6-8. The U.S.-Korean relationship is in good shape, and there are no outstanding issues which the Secretary will need to resolve during his brief visit. Nonetheless, it will serve several important broad purposes, and perhaps the most important of these will be to reaffirm the U.S. security commitment to Korea.

The military threat from North Korea remains a formidable one, and understandably it is a major preoccupation of the Korean Government. Periodic high-level reaffirmations of our commitments are appropriate and necessary, not only to maintain the relationship of confidence and trust with the Republic of Korea Government, but to give clear signals to North Korea and to its allies.

We are particularly encouraged by recent internal developments in Korea, and the Secretary will say so. The Korean Government knows where he stand on issues of human rights and political liberalization and that we welcome further progress. The Secretary undoubtedly will discuss international issues, including his just-completed visits to Tokyo and Beijing.

Korean diplomacy is becoming more active as Korea's interest in the world expand, and there are a variety of issues on which we consult and attempt to coordinate our positions.

Economic issues will also be on the agenda as Korea is becoming a significant player in the world economic system, and U.S. bilateral trade with Korea exceeded $12 billion last year.

The Secretary's last scheduled stop will be in Hong Kong February 8-9 to attend a meeting of our Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions from the East Asia and Pacific region. He will have an opportunity there to exchange views with all of his ambassadors in that region on global and regional foreign policy issues, and obviously to discuss the results of his trip.

There is one other possibility on the way back there will be a refueling stop in Japan, and we are exploring with Japanese officials the possibility of some brief follow-up discussions during the few hours that the Secretary will be in Japan on that second stop.

I'll be glad to take any questions.

Q You talked about the first of several high-level anticipated meetings this year with the Chinese officials. Could you expand on that? Are you expecting the President to go to China?

A The two events that we know are on the schedule -- of Secretary Baldridge's schedule -- I believe that both of these are in May, in fact -- Secretary Baldridge is scheduled to go for a meeting of a joint committee on commerce and trade, and Presidential Science Adviser Keyworth is to go later and inaugurate a group on science and technology.

In the normal course of events it would be appropriate for Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to visit the U.S. sometime, and we would welcome such a visit as well as other high-level visitors both directions.

Q You say both of those are in May?

A Both Keyworth and Baldridge are in May, yes.

Q What about the Defense Secretary? Is anything in the cards there?

A Nothing specific.

Q When do you expect Zhao Ziyang would be visit to Washington?

A No specific time that I know of.

Q Could you go into a little bit more detail? You said during the trip to -- during the Japan segment of the trip one of the issues to be discussed is East-West economic relations. One assumes this is tied in with the Administration's efforts to get some sort of studies on East-West economic relations done before the world economic summit in Williamsburg. Are the two together, or is this just going to be a general chat?

A I think the whole subject of East-West relations, including economic relations, and it is partly, specifically directed at those studies. We've had talks with the Japanese about their participation in them and directly in some cases and in other cases indirectly, and we want to make sure that their views are fully incoporated, so it's important.

We've had very good cooperation in general with them on these issues over the years, and I think they share our basic concerns.

Q Will the subject of export controls come up with the Chinese? Is that a subject for discussion?

A Do you mean U.S. export controls?

Q U.S. export controls on exports to China?

A Yes. I assume that will be discussed.

Q Can you give us any idea of what we'll be saying to them?

A I think we'll want to emphasize, as we have before, that the United States is interested in expanding its trade and economic relations with China. We're interested in helping China's economic development and modernization. We've made substantial steps toward liberalizing controls with China, particularly over the ten years, but particularly in the last four years since the normalization and most specifically in the last couple of years since the President made a decision on liberalizing restrictions. They remain.

It's a difficult area. There will be a number of specific problems that we'll want to address.

Q Is the Administration considering further liberalization?

A We have no specific steps in mind. We are trying to find ways of achieving the President's objective of improving economic trade and technology relations with China consistent with the general guidelines that he laid down.

Q Just to follow that up, are there any steps to implement some of the decisions that have been made on some of the computers and other high tech stuff, and, secondly, on nuclear technology?

Is that going to be on the agenda for Shultz when he's there?

A They're two very different issues, and on the first, it is not a specific policy decision that's involved. There are a great many of these license applications that come in, a great many that are approved. There are occasionally difficult cases where they're not approved or where it takes some time to come to a decision, but basically we have a very active and growing relationship in that area, and we hope to continue that basic line of policy.

In the case of nuclear technology, we at the moment don't have a basis for peaceful nucler cooperation with China. We would very much like to achieve such a basis. The problem, of course, lies in the fact that China's not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and takes at least a very different view of nuclear export matters than we do. Both as a matter of policy and also as a matter of U.S. law, until some of those problems are clarified, we cannot proceed in the nuclear area.

So I imagine that at least in general terms, that latter subject will be addressed during the Secretary's visit.

Q At the time of Secretary Haig's visit there was an announcement that China was now eligible to purchase items on the munitions list on a case-by-case basis, and there was talk of a delegation coming soon thereafter. The delegation never came. The military delegation got caught up in the Taiwan dispute, obviously. That was resolved last August, but I gather nothing has happened.

Is the subject of military relations in any way going to figure into these talks, or the possibility of some discussions on hardware questions?

A Military relations is very broad. Let me take the hardware question specifically.

We are not pressing China to buy arms. It's not, in our view, appropriate for us to be pushing on this issue. We do have a policy that, as you note, it has been effect now for 18 months, that we will consider Chinese requests as we would not have done before, but on a case-by-case basis. I believe it's been some 12 months now that the regulations have been formally changed to permit approval on a case-by-case basis of such requests.

Q Have you gotten any?

A There have been no -- there have been some requests but there have been no requests for sales of major weapons systems.

There have been also a number of requests for sales presentations which is a much earlier step in the process. I don't know precisely how many of those we've gotten. We've gotten a fair number, and some of them have been approved.

Q Is that presentations of major weapons systems, or --

A I believe it includes some.

Q Could you be more specific?

A I think I can't be more specific because we're getting into commercially proprietary information.

Q But is it more likely to be in the aircraft region of sales?

A I am not going to say anything about specific types because pretty soon you'll have me down to a contractor's brochure prospectus.

Q What about anti-tank weapons?

A Again, if I could start down specific types, I might practically be naming a contractor.

Q Could you give us a better idea of numbers? I mean, you say there --

A Total numbers of such presentations? I think it's on the order of 100 or 200.

Q One or two hundred sales presentations made or --

A Licenses granted for sales presentation. I don't think we know after the license is granted precisely whether the presentation has been made or not.

Q What about the remainder? You said there had been other requests although not for major weapons systems. Can you give us an idea of the numbers there?

A It's fairly small. I really don't know specifically.

Q Do you expect any specific --

A Some of that, by the way, I think is under previous policy if permitting non-lethal transfers. I think the only thing that's even a weapons system is some kind of small arms of some sort.

Q This is all ITAR stuff, right?

A As I say, I think some of it was permitted before the ITAR was revised under the -- because it's non-lethal.

Q Do you expect any further announcements of steps to broaden the relationship such as Secretary Haig took last time when he made this munitions list announcement in Peking?

And how would you characterize the U.S.-Chinese relationship overall at this point?

A I think this visit itself is a major step to broaden the relationship and to put it on a stable and sustainable footing. I answered the second part of the question first, perhaps, that it's been a long time since there's been an exchange at this level, and that in itself is a measure that we have had some difficult times. We had long, difficult discussions about the issue of Taiwan arms that tended to push everything else off the agenda.

The purpose of this visit is to review that full agenda, what's a very rich and broad relationship. There are a great many international issues that we'll want to talk about where we have some common interests and some that are not in common, and where it's important at the least for us to understand how each of us are approaching a number of these issues, where we both have a great deal of influence on events.

And, similarly, in the bilateral area, there's again a very broad relationship that includes trade and technology exchange, exchanges of students and people, which, if you look at it from the long-term perspective, is perhaps the most important of all. So we will have a great deal to talk about there as well.

The basic point is, you said how do we view the relationship -- we view it as one of the very important relationships we have in the world because China is a country that exerts great influence, particularly in the Asian region and a country has has enormous potential, even greater potential for the future.

Q Do you expect that the Chinese will put Taiwan high on their agenda again this time, and, if they do, what will Shultz tell them?

A We've already had some discussion on the agenda, and we've indicated that we've had lengthy and difficult negotiations about the issue of Taiwan sales. We have concluded a communique, and we feel there's a great deal that we have to talk about. We're not going there to have a long negotiation about Taiwan.

I see that subject may come up, but I don't think it's going to dominate our discussions.

Q Will the issues either of textiles -- would that even come up at this level meeting? And, also, what about -- will Shultz probe the Chinese at all for the status of China-Soviet relations and the recent flurry of negotiations they've had, or would that not be discussed?

A On the textile matter, I would imagine the subject will come up, but I would expect it to be in general terms. I don't think the Secretary sees himself as a special trade negotiator. We have a very competent head of our textile negotiating team -- Ambassador Peter Murphy -- have a lot of confidence in him. And, despite the difficulties, it's a difficult negotiation. It involves a lot of strong interests and concerns on both sides.

It's always been a difficult subject with every country. It's been difficult with China before, but we expect in the end we'll achieve agreement. I think when the subject comes up, the Secretary will simply want to indicate his support for achieving an agreed outcome to this.

On the broader question that you raise, I think of course that one of the most important subjects of conversation is in fact our approach to the Soviet Union, how we view our relations with the Soviets, and what objectives we hope to achieve, and how we think those can best be accomplished; and, of course, we would want to hear similarly from the Chinese about their approaches.

Q Do you think the question of the transfer of SS-20s from Europe to Siberia will play in the discussions in Tokyo and in Peking? Their fears and what can be done about it, and our policies about missiles in Europe?

A I think that both of those countries are -- and, indeed, I increasingly sense even many of the smaller Asian countries -- are beginning to realize the stake -- the interests that they have involved in even in what seems to be European arms control.

In fact, having that in mind from the beginning, our approach has been to look at the threat in global terms and to talk about global limits. Certainly we don't see it as any progress in terms of U.S. interests or world peace if the SS-20s are simply moved from west of the Urals to east of the Urals. As a matter of fact, since they can move back equally quickly, it isn't a whole much of a game from even the narrow European point of view. I would expect that whole subject will be discussed in both Tokyo and Beijin.

Q Has the United States, or will the United States soon know on a World Bank loan for the Soviets? I mean, for the Chinese? Are you familiar with that?

A I'm not familiar with a specific loan.

Q That will go through, nonetheless, but that the United States because of interest return on that loan, which we feel should more properly go to a commercial outlet, that we'll vote "no" on that loan.

Do you know anything about that?

A You bring up a case I'm not familiar with. It sounds like some others that I've heard about with Thailand and other places where in fact we are trying to tighten up the general standards for multilateral bank lending, and to not have that lending become a substitute for things that we think are more properly done in commercial channels.

It sounds like that kind of case, but I don't know the specifics on it.

Q The reason I ask that, it really speaks to -- just like on the textile issue -- and while we do have a formidable negotiator and it's a delicate matter, these are the types of things, it seems that the Chinese are looking at in our attitudes towards them on what we think on the oveall sense are very small issues. They see them in a much larger picture, and --

A Also it brings up something that is also fundamental in the relationship, and it's one of the reasons why I think it's a difficult one and why it takes special management, and that is that you have the whole question of economic relations between two extremely different economic systems.

I think, on the one hand, the Chinese are used to things being settled between governments, and once it's settled between governments, that takes care of it. On the other hand, since our approach is exactly the opposite, we have a whole lot of businessmen who are eager to trade with China, we have a lot of technology to offer China that we think would greatly benefit China, and they don't know how to get to first base with a very large Chinese bureacracy.

If we want to promote this sort of progress in the bilateral area that we would like to see, then one of the things we would want to use discussions like this one for is not that we can resolve individual licensing problems but at least to try to understand systems and situations and one another better and perhaps find some solution.

Q It's been reported that Prince Sihanouk has been in Thailand and he's been reported to be in Cambodia at the present time.

Is there any likelihood that Secretary Shultz will see him somewhere along the way?

A I don't know. I just don't know.

Q Do you have any indication that he might be somewhere that Shultz is going to be and that he might -- the two might meet?

A I guess he spends a lot of time in Beijing --

Q Yes.

A -- but I just don't know whether they will meet or not.

Q To follow that up, there's been a Chinese proposal floated to the Soviets on Kampuchea. I'm wondering how the U.S. sees the possibility of a Sihanouk option, if the Vietnamese withdrew and somehow got Sihanouk into a coalition government, would that be acceptable to the United States?

Do we want to coordinate our position more closely with the Chinese on Kampuchea?

A Kampuchea is one of the very important issues where it would be hard to find a more dramatic example, I guess, of where China has a major influence on issues that are of great concern and importance to us and to a number of countries that are -- with whom we are very friendly -- in this case all of the ASEAN countries, and Thailand most specifically concerned.

Certainly if we are talking about a kind of solution that leads to a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, that's precisely the objective that the United States has been pursuing, and we would support any kind of effort that we think can lead to that.

Q Follow-up. What sort of specific agreements between ourselves and the Chinese do you expect to result from this visit?

A As I say, I don't anticipate specific agreements. Even, for example, I think I've already made clear on textiles I don't expect one on something like peaceful nuclear cooperation. I think again it's more a matter of establishing some lines of approach and some high-level guidance to things that would have to be worked out on a more technical level.

The important thing is the opportunity to review a very broad range of issues and to understand on these issues the principles from which we're each operating.

Q What do the Chinese expect? Are they looking for further concessions on Taiwan?

A You'd really have to ask them what they expect. But I think -- I think that they put a great value on this relationship also, and really for both of the two reasons that I cited. They certainly, no matter what takes places in talks between China and the Soviet Union, I think that China's concern about the Soviet Union is going to be an enduring factor in Chinese foreign policy.

Countries that border on the Soviet Union tend to be a good deal more concerned about the Soviets even than we are. I think that will remain, and I think therefore it will remain an important factor in our relations with China. And I think also that precisely because China is so committed now to what they call the "Four Modernizations," what we might call "economic development," I think there is an enormous amount of benefit that they can derive from closer bilateral relations. So I would think they would be interested in that same agenda that I talked about, but you'd have to ask them.

Q Do you anticipate criticism in Pekin and Tokyo of the U.S. policy on missiles in Europe in view of the fact that they may have a kind of an adverse effect on their security interests?

A I would think the zero-zero option is exactly what what they would want to see.

Q Specifically on the course of negotiations in Geneva, do you expect them to support that?

A I think they're pretty comfortable with the way we have been conducting those negotiations. I think I would expect a great deal of support for the way we've been going at it.

I would also expect expressions of concern that if there are going to be changes in position, particularly changes that could affect their interests, that they need to be consulted, and that's a point that I think we need to become increasingly conscious of.

For a long time the arms control business has been run as a kind of branch of European affairs, but it is also increasingly a matter that Asians are thinking about and knowledgeable about. I've been struck in my contacts -- for example, Japanese officials over the last five or six years, there are progressively penetrating questions that I have to answer on this subject.

Q Will the Secretary be seeking affirmation of support in Tokyo and Peking for the U.S. position? Will he be -- explicit affirmation of support?

A The word "seeking" implies that we're looking for something we don't have. I think we have the support. I think we will strengthen the support by the kind of consultations we conduct.

Q If such issues of sovereignty of Taiwan and arms sales to Taiwan are raised, what position you are going to take?

A Basically that we have discussed that issue. We have negotiated it at length. We have a communique on that subject now. We expect to carry out our commitments, expect them to carry out their commitments, and the purpose of this trip is not to try to further refine those very difficult positions that were excruciatingly arrived at.

Q Is there a U.S. policy or view on Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong?

A That's an issue that we want to stay out of the middle of. It's an issue for China and the United Kingdom to settle. We do express clearly to both parties that the United States has very important commercial and human and trade ties with Hong Kong which we would like to see continued, and that we support in a more general way the stability and prosperity of that very unique place.

But the specific way in which that's accomplished is something that I think the British and the Chinese are going to have to sort out.

Q Do you anticipate that North -- South-North Korean relations, including South-North talks, is going to be raised, not only with Seoul leaders but also Chinese and Japanese leaders?

A It will certainly come up in Seoul, and the most important aspect of it remains. No matter how much nibbling progress we can make here or there on the diplomatic front, the most important thing remains the military situation, the military balance, the need to maintain a strong military deterrent in South Korea. And, as I think I said explicitly in my opening remarks, that the reaffirmation of that element of our relationship is maybe the most important single reason for the Secretary's visit to Seoul.

More generally, I think we support South Korean efforts to achieve what goes by the jargon word of "cross-recognition." We support more generally South Korean efforts to expand its diplomatic contacts with a whole host of countries, indeed most importantly with other friendly countries in Asia. So I'm sure that subject will be discussed in some detail.

Q There's no prospect of seeking further new formula of --

A I think we may explore formulas. I don't know that we'll come up with one.

Q In your opening statement on China part, you talk about the despair of misunderstandings between the two sides.

Could you be more specific, in addition to the textile issue? What misunderstanding are you talking about?

A There's been, for example, a lot of Chinese criticism of U.S. policies in the Third World. We, ourselves, think that when you look at the problems of the Third World, that to some extent things like Chinese borrowing from the World Bank or Chinese sale of textiles in the United States is a problem that actually affects Third World interests.

I think we would at least like them to understand our approach to problems in the Third World, such as southern Africa. They may in the end still disagree with us, but at least disagreement from a basis of understanding is I think a good deal more constructive if that's where you turn out than disagreement out of not fully appreciating what it is that we're trying to accompliish, so that would be just one of many important areas.

Q When the President delivered his State of Union message is just about one week before the Secretary takes a trip, but he didn't mention any specificity about East Asia or China.

Do you read any policy significance into it?

A No, I don't. Having labored to get State Department inputs into State of the Union messages in a more general way, it's just that particularly at a time when there is so much concern about domestic problems here, we're lucky that we get any mention of foreign affairs at all.

Q Has the U.S. formulated its position on China's membership in the Asian Development Bank? Is it true the Secretary is in favor of seeking Peking at the expense of Taipei?

A No. We don't have a position on that subject. No, we don't.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:10 p.m.)

Backgrounder UNEDITED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTERVIEW BY
SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
TO
THE EGYPTIAN PRESS
THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983, 6:00 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: First, I would like to say how pleased I am and particularly how pleased the President is to have President Mubarak here with us. He is in the midst of a very important visit to Washington. And, as before, he has made a tremendous impact on the people who he has met and talked with.

I say it's a very important moment because, obviously, beyond the particulars of the relationships between the United States and Egypt, which I think both Presidents would agree are very good and work well, there are issues of great importance that we share a vital interest in, in the Middle East, in Lebanon, in what we call the peace process, the issues of Palestinian rights and Israeli security as well as the basic relationship between Israel and Egypt that are very much in the forefront.

We recognize also that there are all sorts of additional tensions in the area which emerge out of the Iran-Iraq war, and things to think about jointly in various parts of the world.

President Mubarak has brought us very strong and vigorous views, and has contributed to our understanding and I hope that we have added something to it, but it was a very good meeting today with the President. I've had the privilege of two additional sessions with President Mubarak; he's met with the Secretary of Defense. He will meet with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of our AID Program has been present. He's met with members of the Congress. So he has been meeting with key people throughout the United States Government.

I think it has been a very positive and helpful meeting all around, and we are delighted that he is here and impressed with what he's had to say.

With that, I'll stop and have whatever questions you want to ask.

Q Thank you, [redacted] for giving us the chance and we are really deeply grateful for this.

My first question is, the legal advisor of the

State Department, during the Carter Presidency, stated that the settlements are illegal but you are using the words "an obstacle to peace." How would you explain the difference, and what are the basis of this difference?

A I will give you my opinion, and I think it is pretty well in accord with the President's opinion.

One can argue back and forth as lawyers about whether something is legal or not. To us, in a sense, that's not the important question. The important queston is, is it helpful and constructive in what we are trying to achieve in the region.

The President's opinion is, and he has stated it on the record, and I have as well, that this settlement activity that is going on is not a constructive contribution to the peace process. The President has called, in his September 1st speech, for a freeze on settlements, and we have continued to say that we think that such a development would be very helpful and I know that it would be welcomed and regarded as an important thing throughout the world, including the Arab world, so I'll stop at that.

Q How far did the United States complain about the urgency of reaching a settlement within the next three or four years -- three or four months, I'm sorry.

(Laughter)

A When you say three or four years, you have a different definition than I do.

We feel that it is very important to get these essential processes moving, and we have been working very hard in many ways to bring that about. I use the plural "processes," and so I'm thinking about the process of bringing about the leaving from Lebanon of all foreign forces and the emergence of an ability on the part of Lebanon to govern itself and to get on with the process of rebuilding and reconciliation. So that's one element in this picture that we think is very important.

Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper have been there. They are back and forth. The President sees them, talks to them. He has a lot of thoughts in this area, and he's heavily engaged in this process.

It has been going very slowly in our opinion. We wish that it would go more rapidly. But, at any rate, that is one element in the picture.

Another element in the picture is the emergence of another Arab leader, King Hussein, with appropriate Palestinian representation to take part in the peace process along with Egypt, Israel and the United States. We feel that it is important to get this process going. It's our opinion that with all of the important issues that people want to discuss, they often come here -- the Arab leaders do -- and they want to discuss with us various issues about the West Bank, and we say the place for those things to be discussed is at some table that includes all of these parties. Those are the people that can decide something. So we want to get that process going.

I think it is very important that as we are working on these other things the essential ingredient in the peace process that emerge from the Camp David Accords, namely, the relationship between Israel and Egypt, not atrophy. This is something else that we believe needs to have close attention. But it is, I think, worth noting that with all of the strains that come to any Arab nation, in a set of events such as those we saw in Lebanon, the commitment to peace on the part of Egypt didn't waiver. I think that is a very important point.

I would say that if you think I have spoken in terms of urgency, as I hope you have, I have been pounded on all day long by President Mubarak and President Reagan about the importance of this. I agree with it.

The question is not whether we think things are urgently necessary but finding the ways and the means to bring about a prompt set of decisions on the important issues that are at stake. That is easier said than done because whenever you're dealing with issues that are of tremendous importance to people, they don't like to decide when all the decisions represent compromise of one kind or another.

At any rate, I agree with the implication of the question, that there is urgency; time is a factor here, and we need to move rapidly.

Q King Hussein was here a month ago. I think it was declared that he is due to come next month to Washington in order to reach another time. I want to ask, have you reached something concrete with him during his last visit?

A King Hussein was here. Whether he comes back again in a month remains to be seen. But at any rate, we had several days of very intense and worthwhile meetings with King Hussein.

King Hussein, I believe, basically supports the President's initiative. And like President Reagan, like President Mubarak, like, I think, Prime Minister Begin, he wants peace. He is willing to work for it.

The process of constructing the right atmosphere and the right conditions to enter these negotiations is something that we talked with him about in great detail; how to enter, what the conditions should be, what to expect, what will the steadfastness of America -- he's very interest in, of course -- and we discussed all these things a lot. I see and know that he is talking with his peers and advisors, the Palestinian groups and so forth about it.

We hope that before long he will feel that he is in a position to make a positive decision. Of course, that remains for him to decide. Clearly, he's welcome back in Washington at any time, but you don't have to come to Washington to decide things. Lots of times people like to do that. We're glad to have them. We all have to remember that the action is in the Middle East. That's where it is; not here. But we are very interested and we're ready to do whatever we can to move this process along.

Q As you have stated, President Mubarak is in support of the President's initiative; also King Hussein. On the other hand, Begin is categorically against.

How do you see the basis of negotiations with one of the main parties refusing to negotiate?

A Prime Minister Begin is in favor of the Camp David Accords and the Camp David process. We feel that the President's proposals fall squarely within those Accords. So he is certainly willing to come and take part in the process.

I think one should expect in any negotiation that when people start, there are differences of opinion around the table. If there weren't, there wouldn't have to be a negotiation. We don't say that everybody who comes to the table has to have the same opinion. We feel that people should come to the table dedicated to the idea that we're going to find peace, and we'll have to talk and understand each other and develop compromises, and so on.

I see no evidence whatever that Prime Minister Begin isn't ready to come and do that.

Q What kind of conditions are put on the Palestinian delegation within the Jordanian delegation?

A Of course, it's up to King Hussein --

Q Can the PLO nominate the members of its delegation?

A We believe that to have a member of the PLO in the delegation would be what in our country we would call a "non starter." It's just not the case that Israel will sit down, and that's a fact. At the same time, I think there have to be Palestinians in this negotiation because there is going to be, in any negotiation, compromises made; somebody takes a little, gives a little. That's the nature of negotiations.

A great deal of what the negotiation is about are the rights of the Palestinians. The Palestinians are not going to accept a result in which they had no participation. You wouldn't; nobody would. They have to be represented there. Everyone agrees on that, and the Camp David Accords explicity say that.

So that leaves you the question of who are these Palestinians who could be there. As far as we can see, I think there is a presumptive case for people who are on the West Bank or Gaza, but not necessary just that. I think they have to be people who are legitimate in the eyes of the Palestinians as their representatives.

There are quite a number of people who have standing and who aren't the PLO, and who have that status. You can't expect to have Palestinians be regarded as legitimate if they've been picked by the Israelis. You wouldn't accept somebody as your representative that the person you were bargaining with selected. So we have to have people who are legitimate in the eyes of the Palestinians.

That is always a question: How do you select such people? I think one of the geniuses of the Camp David Accords, as I see it anyway, is the provision for a transitional regime with a self-governing authority. And a self-governing authority governs by virtue of the people who are going to be governed, that is, the people on the West Bank and Gaza, who are going to be covered, select them. So that is a process in which you identify people through a legitimizing process.

It seems to me the problem of picking Palestinians, while it has its thorny aspects, is a problem possible of solution.

Q In other words, [redacted] the mayors, to define what you have said now?

A You could interpret it that way. I don't want to try to put something down like that and seem to be too specific because I think this is the sort of thing that King Hussein and his advisors and those who are going to instruct this, they have to decide that.

I just reiterate again, you can't dictate to people who is going to be on their negotiating team and feel that that team will have legitimacy. Maybe you can say, as a party, I won't sit down with somebody; but you can't say who they have to come with.

Q Is it true that the American administration has excluded what you can call the league of villages, this body which the Israeli have done (phonetic) on the West Bank, the league of villages?

A The "village leaguers"?

Q Yes.

A I would only just refer you to what I said earlier: I think they have to be Palestinians, and they have to be individuals who have standing and legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinians whom they are going to represent. That's the characteristic that they have to have.

Q Let me put another question, Mr. Secretary. When are you going to drop your commitment not to open a direct dialogue with the PLO?

A The conditions have been stated and restated very clearly by the President and others, namely that when the PLO, which has in its founding document a commitment to the eradication of the State of Israel, in some manner drops that, or contradicts it, and says that it agrees that Israel is a state with a right to exist and gives that measure of recognition and accepts the idea of Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for peace, when they do that, unequivocally and unambiguously, then the United States will be willing to talk with them.

Q What about if the Palestinians or the PLO do that and there will be no reaction from the Israelis, are you going to take this step?

A We can speak for the United States, and the President has spoken about this. He has said that, and said that flatly. And when various leaders of the Arab world have been here, he has said it to them privately. He has said it to them publicly after their private meeting, and has been asked by them, and he has told them, "You can go back and you can say this." So we have had the same message to everybody; the message has been given in direct, private discussions and in public statements. It's the same comment exactly.

Q Back to King Hussein and selecting the Palestinians, have you heard from him recently that there is any progress on this issue?

A We hear from King Hussein constantly. He, I believe, has a high regard for our Ambassador in Amman; and as others go through, as Phil Habib is circulating around all the time, so in that manner, we are in constant contact with King Hussein. So he gives us his views of what is taking place.

Q Is there any progress?

A I think words like "optimism," "pessimism," "improving," or what, wear a little thin. Certainly, he is very positive and all of that; but at this point, there has to come a time when there is a decision made. I hope that that time is fairly soon, but I can't predict it.

Q [redacted] to what extent you can guarantee the implementation of the ideas in the American initiative? Is it just a proposal, or is there some American guarantee that the principle which is in this initiative can be implemented?

A The guarantee that we can give is that we think these are good ideas, and we will carry them forward into this discussion. Now, other people come to the discussion with different ideas; different ideas were set out at Fez; different ideas have been sponsored by the Israelis; different ideas have been put forward by the Egyptians. So our ideas are not the only ideas. But we will support our ideas, and we will listen to the ideas of others in the negotiation.

We don't go into a negotiation saying, "Our way -- or else!" We have to discuss them, but we will stand by these thoughts of ours.

Q Sorry there is not such kind of commitment. What about the American guarantee to King Hussein which we have been told that it was written, and he has got it in letters?

A Well, King Hussein has wanted to hear from the President that the United States is trully concerned, it will stay involved, and the President is committed to stick with this peace process, through all of its difficulties; and he has that assurance from the President. I think he is convinced that the President means it. I'm certainly convinced that the President means it. So those are some of the basic issues.

We also have discussed with King Hussein a lot about the nature of the peace process and transition arrangements, and he is interested, as President Mubarak is, and as we are, on the question of the pace of negotiations and whether or not we will do everything we can to see them move rapidly -- which we will; we want them to move rapidly. That doesn't mean they will, but we certainly will want to do everything we can to make them move rapidly.

Nobody enjoys being involved in a negotiation that just goes on and on, so we have talked about various ideas about how to make that happen. The question of settlements is on King Hussein's mind, as it is President Mubarak's, and our own. All of these things we talked about with him.

Again, as far as giving guarantees is concerned, it's an interesting word. What the United States can guarantee is what we will support, just as I suppose Egypt can say, "We will guarantee that we'll do certain things" and are willing to. But we can't guarantee what other people will do because they are sovereign countries, and they --

Q The main problem is that the Egyptians will not go to the negotiations before, at least some kind of timetable for the withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon. Up till now, we have set about three times: first, January 1st; second, February 12; and until now the negotiation is very slow. So when can we expect the negotiation on the peace process will come?

A I can't tell you. I don't know. I think it should be soon. I think the Lebanon problems should have been solved a month ago.

Q The President said yesterday that --

A We would like to see them solved, but they aren't solved.

Q But the President said yesterday that he will bring the peace for the Middle East in one year, so is there any forecasting for the timetable -- at least at the beginning?

A I don't want to put down dates because I can't deliver dates. I'm very careful with commitments that I make. I like the word "urgency" that was used here. I don't like the words "three or four years" to define it. (Laughter) I prefer the three or four months.

I think we need to be pushing hard on this because the longer something is stuck, the more difficult it is to unstick it.

Q In other words, there is a definite connection between the Lebanese question, or the Lebanese issue, and the evacuation of the Israeli troops from Lebanon and the peace process?

A The answer to that I think is yes and no. People have it in their minds that these are connected, and there is a certain connection to them; but at the same time, they are independent processes, and they don't need to be tightly inter-dependent. We, at least, have tried to disconnect them to some extent. And one reason why, as we were discussing the question with the President, of the timing of his announcement of his proposal of September 1st, while Lebanon was in still quite a state of turmoil, we felt it was important to put those thoughts there so that people could see that in our eyes, the critical issue is contained in the basic peace process and finding that balance between Israeli security and Palestinian rights and their legitimate -- their ability to live in stability on the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip.

So we put that out, then. Perhaps somebody could have argued: "Well, why don't you wait until everything is all settled and straightened out in Lebanon?" And we said, "No, we're not going to do that because we don't want to make the one contingent on the other."

The fact of the matter is that the lack of a solution to the Palestinian problem is, in many respects, the cause of the difficulties in Lebanon. So if you say, "What comes first?" We say, "Let's make some headway on these Palestinian issues. That's the deeper problem."

Q I have one question:

A So I understand that President Mubarak has said and King Hussein has said and everybody says, "You've got to get Lebanon all straightened out before anything can happen on the peace process."

Well, we say, "It's the other way around, really." But at the same time, there is a connection. The connection, I suppose, is fundamentally to see whether or not the people will really withdraw.

Q A last question -- it will be a long question.

A A long question?

Q Yes.

A You mean, it's got many parts to it. (Laughter) It's going to be more than one question?

Q Yes.

A I can't remember more than one at a time.

Q We have been here since one week, and all the time we are hearing the words "for our background."

A You heard what?

Q "For our background," the information we are going to get from the responsible man is for our background. All right. So I, at least, and some of my friends, now we have this complex BACKGROUND, because we are sure now when we hear the word "BACKGROUND," you are going to give a very diplomatic answer to every question -- and you are the head of the diplomats of the United States. So now we would like to have a real news factor (sic) in what you are going to answer us about what happened during the negotiations with President Mubarak, what the United States is going to do in Lebanon, what the United States is going to do to help our friends in the Arab world. We want news, sir -- and we are going to quote nobody.

(Laughter)

A I can tell you that I have two rules that I try to stick by -- and I got talked out of both of them in this case. One rule is: be on the record; and the other rule is: never have a press conference unless you have some news. (Laughter)

Now, I don't have any particular news.

(Laughter)

My instinct was to say, "They would like to hear some news. They want some news. I don't have any news. I shouldn't have the meeting." And Ambassador Ghorbal came around and everybody came around, and they said, "Well, you should meet with them there. They are a wonderful group of people."

I said, "Well, I don't have any news and I can't speak for President Mubarak. He'll tell you what he thinks."

Q Correct.

A He's very capable of that. So I came here under protest, that I was violating my rules. And now you have shown me that I was right in the first place: I never

(Laughter)

Q You are always right.

Q May I rephrase the question, please? What are the points which you might say the U.S. and Egypt have agreed upon today vis-a-vis the Middle East or bilateral issues?

A A great many things. First of all, in terms of the bilateral relationship, I think that continues to be a strong relationship, and these meetings tend to help keep that going. The final details have been straightened around, and I think in the meeting I just came from with President Mubarak, this was nailed down on a major project in Egypt that has been working for quite a while. Visits like this tend to cause people to bring things to a head and decide, so that got accomplished.

Q What was the major project? The S.......?

A Yes. This is not a news thing. Your government and mine will figure out some proper way that they want to have to announce something like this, and this is not the way to announce it. But I can just tell you that this has been worked on, and I think that, basically, got straightened around.

Beyond these matters that involve the United States and Egypt bilaterally, as I said at the beginning here, we have great interest together in the region and what is going on. And I think in terms of Lebanon, the importance of complete withdrawal, of the Government of Lebanon having the opportunity to reconstruct itself, and the importance of urgency in all of this are things we discussed together and agree on.

By the same token, what I said in the beginning on the peace process and so on, so that this whole range of things we've been talking about here was, basically, in the nature of the discussion. And I think it was quite worthwhile -- to hear some interpretations of others, to find where there were differences and where there were similarities, and to improve the understanding. All of that is very worthwhile to do.

Q We can quote this?

A You mean you want to change the rules?

(Laughter)

Q It's only for this question. It is very similar to the statement of President Reagan after the meeting this morning.

We don't want to change the rules. We want more news! (Laughter)

A I'm not a news-maker. I don't know. Do you want to put the whole thing on the record or --

DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think in the last question I see no problem about putting that ON THE RECORD with the exception of the point that you made about the announcement of the AID project. I think, as you said, the two governments might want to announce that.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They will figure out some way to make an announcement, and I don't want to preempt that.

A O.K.

(The meeting concluded at 6:40 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

January 28, 1983

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
IN A LUNCHEON WITH COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

12:13 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the budget is based on a very -- use whatever adjective you want, we're using such words as "cautious, prudent." Somebody said, "low ball," and we know it's not low ball.

We're trying to make certain that the argument now centers on the budget, not on an economic forecast.

As far as it's concerned, it calls for the calendar year 1983 having a growth rate of 3.1 percent, fourth quarter over fourth quarter. That is probably below the mean of what any group of economists would be doing. Some will be lower than we are. Some will be higher.

We're low initially in the first couple of quarters but by the fourth quarter we see growth rate, real now I'm talking about, at a four percent rate. And we see that four percent rate carrying through the period that we're projecting, which is 1988.

When you get out into those out years of '85, '86, '87 and '88, being four percent real growth, that is a much stronger economy than we've had at any time in our economy since World War II with the exception of the period 1961 to 1966. But that was accompanied by quite a bit of inflation, going from one percent in '61 to six percent at the end of that period. We're not calling for that type of inflation at all. We're calling for inflation to remain in the four to five percent area during this period.

It brings us at the end to a gross national product of $5 trillion by 1988.

As a result of this forecast, of course, as we start out very modestly in our projections, it does not bring the unemployment rate down that quickly. As you know, the rule of thumb is somewhere around 2-2½ percent of GNP to bring down one percent of unemployment.

We're not forecasting that for 1983, but we are forecasting it for the other years. We have single digit unemployment in 1984 and we have it down to full employment by 1988, if you agree with those who say that full employment, now, is somewhere between 6 and 6½ percent unemployment.

As a result of all of this, of course, revenues do not rise as rapidly as they would have with a much stronger forecast or with a much greater inflation forecast. We could have jazzed these numbers up to have indicated that. We decided against that because we tried to be more realistic and in line with what most forecasters are saying they think the outlook is going to be.

Were the economy to grow at a stronger rate, we do say, and will say in the budget document, that if there's a 1.3 percent real growth over and above each year what we have forecast, there would be a balanced budget by 1988. If there's merely a one percent increase over the next eight quarters over what we forecast, the budget deficits in those out years will be $20 billion

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per year less than we're saying. Certainly that is an achievable amount under certain circumstances; but we're not forecasting that.

So it's on that economic assumptions and in that economic mood that we have worked over this budget, which we think is quite realistic. It's not the type of budget that we think is going to be turned off right away by the Congress. Why don't you describe it and then I'll come back for taxes. Unless somebody has questions on the economic forecast before we get into the actual budget itself.

Q What do you base these early projections -- the growth of the economy, 3.1 percent and 4 percent? What factors are you putting into that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what we're saying is that we're coming off a remarkably low year, 1982, a negative year and a real negative quarter of 2½ percent in the calendar quarter of '82.

We see the economy reviving in this quarter. We're thinking it would be plus one for the first calendar quarter of '83 and then gradually going up three percent, I think we have for the third quarter and four percent for the fourth quarter, calendar quarter of '83.

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Q What sectors of the economy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Primarily in the housing and consumer items. Then, somewhat in automobiles, consumer durables, and then finally into the industrial sector. But we don't see a real revival of new plant and equipment until 1984.

Q What interest rates do you see this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Interest rates? We're calling for Treasury bills, which are currently at 8 to average 8 this year. This is based upon the fact that we think they probably will go lower in the first part of the year and then come back again in the latter part of the year, if our forecast holds, because business will be reviving and demand for money will be revived in the third and fourth quarters.

That would also accommodate, by the way, a prime rate in the ten range for this year, or perhaps even more.

Q If we had to tolerate a higher full employment figure than we've been accustomed to in the past, and which I assume is based upon planned obsolescence and transitions from industrial to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And a larger work force.

Q -- and a larger work force, how is that figure going to match up against that of the other industrial countries, those countries that really don't have to modernize plant and so forth? Do you have any notion --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, at full employment or at full blast in their economy, Germany would have to have guest workers. Many other nations have guest workers, as they call them, which means they are importing labor. In Great Britain, six percent, I would think, would be probably more or less in line with what they would think their full employment would be. Japan, that would be a high figure. Japan would, I think two percent would be full employment.

Q Is that a political problem for us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is it a political problem? I don't think so. I think as long as we have in place the jobs training portion, as long as we have unemployment insurance and the like, I think we can tolerate that.

Q On the economic assumptions, what underlying assumption are you making on Fed policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fed policy? Again the magic of no figures. Accommodative.

Q Despite their being accommodative, you'd have interest rates tipping up at the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Because, obviously, the Fed herself would not be feeding money into the economy as it revives. That's when they start -- again, in that overdone phrase, leaning against the wind.

Q What are the implications for long-term rates under that pattern?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Long-term rates to come down, again on Treasuries, somewhere into the nine to ten percent range. A fairly flat curve rather than a steep slope to the U curve.

Q That's by the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I want to catch Mr. Rowan before he runs too far with that. When my colleague said a slight upturn, he was referring to a tenth or so of a percentage point.

Q In the short term rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the short-term rates. In other words, we just see --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not thinking that -- I said that -- yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically, the T-bill mark has been eight percent for several months. We see it bobbling around that for a year and then coming down steadily, so if you want to get some notion that we're predicting an upturn of significance in the interest rate in his budget, don't. Because that's --

Q I wasn't planning to run anywhere.

MS. SMALL: Go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All this budget and the numbers will be out. I don't want to snow you with too many, but to give you a sense of the context and what the major components of the plan are, I think a few will be necessary. So if you can bear with me, let me just give you a little bit on the budget structure and the forecast we face without any policy changes.

The deficit this year we're now forecasting to be about $208 billion, fiscal year '83. That is heavily influenced and heavily induced by the recession and the fact that the economy was down again in the fourth quarter, and basically stems from the fact that revenues now in '83 as we project them will be slightly under $600 billion, or at the same level they were two years ago. So we have just had a standstill on revenue for three fiscal years as the economy has gone through this severe adjustment, inflation has been wrung out, and business activity has declined for about 18 months.

Now, when you have a three-year standstill on revenue and your outlays continue to grow for the defense that we need, for some of the entitlements that we haven't been able to slow down,

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and for interest which has just hemorrhaged because of this temporary period of high interest rates that we went through. We are really out of whack in terms of where we start in 1983 with that $209 billion deficit.

If we changed no policy, entitlements, COLAs, index benefits or anything in the revenue structure, that deficit will continue to rise to about $231 billion by 1984. And as you project out further, it could even reach the $300 billion mark under the existing budget structure with the four percent forecast for real growth over six years -- that we have in the budget.

So, what are we proposing to do about it and why is it there? There are all kinds of arguments that will be made as to whether this was caused by this policy change or that. And that is something that we'll have to contend with on the Hill.

But there is one fact in these very large out-year budget deficit projections that, I think, everybody needs to understand. Compared to what we were forecasting for GNP in early 1981, and I might say that the CBO and DRI and all the others would have been in the same boat precisely and I'll supply you the numbers if anybody's skeptical, but the economy's going to be about $500 billion smaller in nominal GNP by the end of this year than we thought it would be two years ago or CBO or anybody else.

That represents this rapid, enormous squeeze of inflation out of the economy and the cost in lost business activity that we've absorbed during that interim period. And it won't be recovered. We don't want the inflation back, and we can't get the real growth back that rapidly without overheating or reigniting the whole boom-bust cycle again. And that means that over time we're looking at about $150 billion lower revenues a year than we projected just two years ago with the same tax policy because of this rather severe disinflationary correction and adjustment the economy has gone through.

And that's a burden that everybody's going to have to help deal with. The other aspect is that because the interim deficits have been so large, due to this adjustment, and the interest rates were so high temporarily, our debt service costs now are going to be running well in the triple digit range, even with all the policy savings we have in this budget compared to the $50 billion or $60 billion in '81 and the $20 billion or $30 billion range in the late '70's.

So, we've got about $50 billion a year in permanent debt service costs, outlays, built into these out-year budgets now because of the two-year correction, getting this inflation out of economy that we've gone through. And that's a very major factor in creating this path. And it's a new policy problem to resolve.

But what are we proposing to do about it? In the State of the Union, the President announced the basic four points of the budget plan. I think I'll spend just a minute or two elaborating on each. The first is a freeze, and there has been some confusion about that. It is not a freeze in the literal sense that every program, every line item in the budget is frozen, but, rather, it is a concept by which we can hold down various areas with some notion of equitable sacrifice and balance treatment.

So, essentially, what we're proposing is to freeze federal pay and retired pay, both military and civilian, for one year on the grounds with the inflation rate running at four percent. If there's any time, we can forego a cost-of-living increase, it's now.

We're proposing to freeze the COLAs on indexed entitlement benefits, like SSI and veterans and railroad and so forth for six months. We would pick up, then, in terms of display in the budget the six-month freeze on Social Security COLAs that's already been agreed to in the bipartisan package. And, then, on the discretionary appropriated programs, health, welfare, natural resources, water projects and so forth, we have a freeze in the aggregate. You take all the budget authority for these domestic programs who are asking for the same level that Congress voted or appropriated last year, but with some shifts in the internal priorities. We've increased law enforcement. We've decreased mass transit, but in the aggregates, a freeze.

Congress committed to that in the '83 budget resolution, a three-year freeze on discretionary spending, and we're just carrying out that policy. Then, in a few other cases, we have found automatic formulas in the budget that were increasing too fast, both on budgetary grounds and policy grounds, and, so, we have frozen those as well. One example is the target prices in the Farms Commodity Programs. Those would be frozen as part of our pick program with a couple million a year savings in GCC outlays which are hemorrhaging right now, as many of you might know.

We're also proposing, for instance, to freeze physician

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reimbursement and the hospital reimbursement formula under Medicare because that's the only way that you can get at Medicare expenditures -- it's an open-ended reimbursement type entitlement. We think this can be done for one year if we follow up with permanent reforms later.

So, that's basically the freeze package that saves $19 billion in '83 from that base line deficit that I described. And those savings keep growing over time even though it's mainly a one-year freeze because of the big wedge that you've taken out of the base of the budget.

So, over the five years, we would have $164 billion in savings from what would otherwise be these base line deficits without the freeze. The second --

Q -- freeze allowance --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- over the five years. Now, that's the one-year freeze on pay and COLA's and a permanetn steady level on discretionary spending at the 1983 rate.

Then the second big component by way of kind of an organizing concept, we're calling the structural reform, it incorporates the Social Security bipartisan solution. That is nothing new. It's just displayed in the budget. On a unified budget basis, it saves about $80 billion over the fives years -- $12 billion the first year and then slightly higher amounts in the out years.

The second part of this structural reform category is the major initiatives in the health care area covering both the public health benefit programs -- Medicare and Medicaid as well as the private. The basic problem is there are no incentives in the system to control costs because of third party open ended reimbursement. And the more the private health insurance delivery system inflates, the more rapid Medicare and Medicaid go up. And they're now increasing at literally astronomical rates -- three times greater than the rate of inflation at the present time.

So, we're proposing to put a cap at $175 a month on the tax exclusion for employer provided health benefits in order to induce some incentives into the overall private system for cost control and then we would couple that with some changes in Medicare designed to encourage both more efficient consumer or patient and provider behavior. On the provider side, we will be proposing a system of fixed reimbursement per case. And these will be developed -- the so-called "BRG's" based on diagnostic profiles and it basically tells the hospital, if you spend more than average or you keep the patient in the hospital longer than average, it's on your clock, not ours, since we pay a flat rate. To the patient we're saying that for the short stays, the routine hospitalization, there will be a new eight percent co-payment for the first 15 days and a five percent co-payment for days 16-60. But in return, we will eliminate entirely the heavy perverse co-payments that we have in Medicare today on the back end.

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Today's it's free for two to 60 days and then you pay 25 percent for the next thirty and then 50 percent for the next thirty. So, the sicker you are, the longer you are in the hospital, the more catastrophic your illness, the more you pay. So, if you're in six months under Medicare today, the average cost is about $15,000.

We would cap -- eliminate any co-payment after the 60th day and call this the catastrophic feature. That will reduce the cost for the long, extended illness that I just described -- six months to $1500 rather than $15,000. But it will spread the cost of the Medicare system to the front end -- routine, less difficult illnesses and provide an incentive to shorten the length of stay for those who are in for four or eight or 12 days the routine cases. That will save --

Q -- catastrophic plan the President mentioned in his speech --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what he meant, right. And right now you're putting the whole burden of cost on one percent, nothing on 99 percent. This shifts it rationally towards taking the burden off from the people who are dead on their back for a long time or sick on their back for a long time and puts some cost sensitivity into the routine flow of eight million people through the Medicare hospitalization system.

There are some other changes but this gives you a flavor. The overall package saves $58 billion over the five-year period.

The third big piece that will be highly controversial is the major overhaul of the Civil Service retirement system. Now, that is, I think by any standard, the most generous, the richest retirement system that exists, at least to my knowledge. It costs 37 percent of payroll to fund the retirement benefits under this sytem, far higher than any other governmental or private entity. We're proposing over time to phase in reforms to reduce the cost to 22 percent of the payroll and then raise the employee contribution from seven, where it is today to 11.

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So it would be a 50-50 system at a lower cost envelope over time.

To do that, we have to make some changes in the annuity structure, and put a penalty on early retirement between age 55 and 65. You can still retire. But you would have an actuarial reduction just like you would have in Social Security today. That is about a $16 billion savings package over the five years.

Then finally, the other feature -- the third point, obviously, is the defense adjustment that has been announced. That is $47 billion in outlay savings over the five years. And then, the standby revenue feature, which maybe my colleague will want to discuss some more -- that applies only to fiscal years '86 to '88, only if the deficit remains above 2.5 percent of GNP and would have about a $50 billion a year impact if it were triggered.

So this all adds up, then, to a package that starts small, $43 billion in '84, because you are dealing with entitlements. And it takes time to generate the savings. But it grows until you have got $184 billion reduction in the deficit by '88 from this freeze-reform standby package that I have just described, and about $558 billion overall reduction in the deficit over the five years.

There is nothing you will find in this budget that easy. But there is nothing in here, by the same token, that cannot be done in the sense that the money is real. And it can be saved. Or it can be gained if legislatively and politically we can get it done. It would give us a deficit of about 2.5 percent of GNP by 1988, dramatically different from the 7 percent or so deficit that we have today. Still too high. But, obviously, a track that is moving strongly in the right direction. And one that is compatible with pretty strong economic recovery and growth over the period.

If we get better growth, because we have reassured the financial markets that this structural imbalance in the budget is being treated with -- in a credible and realistic way, then those deficit numbers that we are projecting -- as my colleague has indicated -- would be smaller as well. But we are not going to have a chance to see whether that happens unless we get this huge freeze-reform and standby package first, because we will not get the growth without removing this spectre of these huge deficits.

Q You gave us a couple of examples of discretionary programs that would be caught up in the aggregate freeze. Can you give us couple of examples on the other side -- of programs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. That would be cut?

Q That would not be cut. That would go along. In other words, where are the winners?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. There are three categories. One is a targeted set of programs, which would be increased above the appropriated freeze level. Now, the National Science Foundation is one in terms of the technology thrust that we are trying to make. We go to human resources. Head Start is another on the grounds that we, pretty well, concluded that this is one program that works. A third is the law enforcement, anti-drug campaign initiative that Congress approved last fall.

The second category, where they are level -- the best example is handicapped education. Congress appropriated about $1.1 billion for that in '83. We are proposing $1.1 billion in '84.

The third category is a limited number where we have cut below the '83 levels to pay for the selective increases that I mentioned. Postal subsidies are probably the best example of that. They are way too big. They can be cut. But the users of the system ought to pay for it. So we are cutting that by $0.5 billion. Another example would be some of the energy R&D boondoggles that they keep putting in on the Hill from the old energy program. We are cutting that one back rather strongly as well.

But the mainstream part would be in the middle category requesting, pretty much, the same level that Congress appropriated in '83.

Q The same level? Or the same level, plus inflation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It is the same nominal level. So there is, if you assume inflation is five percent, an erosion of real program dollars. But on the other hand, there is opportunity in all of these programs to adjust for small changes of that sort.

Q Federal aid to state and local government stays level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot give you a precise number. It would still come out of the computer. But I would guess, knowing the big programs there and what we are doing, that it is almost level.

Q You said that there would be $47 billion in savings in defense over five years. That is savings from what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From what we had in the February 1982 budget -- last year's budget. That is a five-year budget. And instead of a request, for instance, of $285 in budget authority for '84, we are requesting $273.

Q You still come out with about 30 percent for defense and 70 percent for everything else.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. In outlays, it is about 30-70. That is right.

Q Thirty-seven percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Thirty percent defense, 70 everything else.

Q Thirty and 70. Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What kind of support do you have at least from the Republicans on the Hill? Have you gone through all of that? Or is that just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We are just at the stage now where we are giving briefings. Obviously, we did not want everything to leak out and become part of the public debate before we even formulated our own plan, and came to our own deicisions down here. Some of these things have been tested.

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Others have not. But thus far, there has been a pretty favorable reaction in the sense that it looks realistic. It looks believable. People wish that those deficit numbers were lower. But they realize what you have to do even to get there. And I think we are going to get a pretty good response.

Q Is the process a little slower this year than in previous years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Well, it was delayed. I do not think it was slower. We delieverately started after the elections for reasons that do not need a great deal of elaboration. And because we started a month late, we really had things planned into a much shorter time frame than normal. And we have a three-times-bigger problem than normal. So that did create the appearance of strain and a little bumping and grinding along the way. But I think that we had a pretty orderly process. And we had to face down some pretty tough issues, and make some very difficult decisions.

Q Grassley and Denny Smith and Newt Gingrich and some others were up at the Senate yesterday having a press conference on their freeze proposal. Is there just a solid freeze? And your is a softer, more flexible kind of freeze.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I am not quite sure what they are proposing now. They were -- every month or so. But their idea is to freeze the budget. And I have tried to some of our friends, it is not that easy to freeze last year's numbers in place. You have got to look at the underlying program. And see what you can do with it.

In the case of health care, for instance, you have got more people on Medicare. You cannot freeze the number. You have got to try to freeze some element of the cost. And so I think they tend to produce an exaggerated notion of what is possible even if you apply a stringent freeze. You have to freeze programs in formulas. You cannot freeze numbers, because the numbers are directed by things you have done in the past, or case-load growth and so forth that we are not going to wish away.

Q For months and months, youself and the President, among others, told us that increased taxes made the deficit bigger. Now, in your plan, the part four thing, you have standby taxes to make the deficit smaller. For those of us who are trying to understand which are the good taxes and which are the bad taxes, can you tell us the -- what changed, why you are saying something different?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will give you rather elaborate opening remarks. I am going to talk about the whole tax first. And then, I will get to the contingency tax second. I the '84 fiscal budget, there will be nine separate tax initiatives. Three of these will be new. There will be in the field of education. For one, we will have an education-savings fund in which a parent could set aside a thousand dollars. Any interest or dividends on that would be tax free, would accumulate, and be used for education. That is up to -- it will start phasing out at $40 thousand income, and not advantage beyond $60 thousand of income.

The next one would be credit from new jobs, both to employer -- and there would be voucher system for long-term unemployed to use the voucher for a prospective new employer to hire. We will have three initiatives that we have previously brougt up that have not, as yet, been passed -- but will be reintroduced. One of those will be the enterprise zone system, starting out with 25 of these zones where there will be special tax incentives for employers to hire the unemployed. The second one would be the tuition tax credit, starting off with $100, going to $200 to $300 over the out years, credits against tuition costs in private schools.

And the third will be the Caribbean Basin initiative, where we will have special tax breaks, particularly for tourism, for the countries of the Caribbean Basin.

Now, in addition to those tax initiatives, there will be, of course, three or four separate tax items in the Social Security package. This is part of a compromise that has been worked out and just to recall them to your mind, the first one has to do with the self-employed. I know you'll be happy to hear that. The self-employed will pay at the same rate as the employer-employee, but will get credit, get a deduction for 50 percent of what is paid into the Social Security fund.

The next one is that those who are over 65 who have an income outside of Social Security of $25,000 per family or $20,000 single would pay on the 50 percent of the tax that the employer has paid into the fund.

The other one would be that the dates for the already-enacted increases for employer-employee would be brought forward. And the final one would be the bringing in of the federal -- new federal hires, plus those working for nonprofit organizations, into the Social Security system.

Now, apart from that, the other one and the final one that you want to hear about is the so-called contingency tax. What we will propose on this is first of all, it will not even be sent up to the Congress until such time as there has been some work done, major work done, on these freezes that that my colleague spoke about, and on the budget cuts that we're advocating.

The idea behind this is that the deficits in the out years loom very large, absent some type of policy decision. If all of these things are enacted in the year 1988, the final year that we're projecting, the budget deficit would still be in the neighborhood of $167 billion. It is our feeling that this is much too high for the money markets, that they would want that down, or else we're going to have real rates of interest staying very high over these out years for fear that we'll either monetize that or that in an effort to fund it we'll crowd out all -- private savings.

So the question becomes, how do you fund that size of deficit? You can fund it in either of two ways. You can borrow or you can tax. In this particular case we are proposing that if the budget deficits are larger than 2-1/2 percent of gross national product, starting in fiscal '86 -- that's October 1 of '85 -- that we have a surcharge on taxes. That is, if you paid $200 in tax, five percent surcharge, you'd pay an extra $10. If you are paying $20,000 in taxes you'll pay an extra $1,000, plus an oil tax on a per barrel basis, an excise tax on both imported and domestic oil.

Q A surcharge on the taxes, not on the income?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it will be the equivalent of one percent on taxable income, but a five percent surcharge is probably more equitable, treats everybody equally. If you had a one percent surcharge on taxable income, percentagewise, and only percentagewise, not dollarwise, obviously, it would fall most heavily on the low and middle incomes rather than on the high incomes.

This being the case, it can be argued, why don't you just go out on the bond market and finance that deficit rather than

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tax yourself for it? Here is where perception has become reality. It is perceived that if we do go out and borrow it is worse in those out years, according to the money markets, and therefore we should have a balanced budget through taxation.

The actual truth of the matter is we should correct these deficits from the spending side, not from the financing side. It should be neither by taxing nor borrowing, it should be by failure to spend the money in the first place. And as you have a growing economy, if you keep your spending level, the percentage naturally comes down and as revenues rise you automatically get toward a balanced budget.

We are saying in the trigger, that if the economy is such that it has taken the deficits down below 2-1/2, there is no need for the trigger.

Q Not to beat a horse that may, in fact, have already died, but -- and before I forget my own question -- you've talked about looming deficits before us and you've said very explicitly that the way not to make the deficit smaller was to increase taxes. Now, you have come forth with a proposal which says that if the deficits get at a certain level, you must increases taxes to make them smaller. I fully understand your current proposal. What I don't understand is how it squares with what you, the President, and many other people, and even some columnists and commentators who have quoted the previous positions very vigorously. How do those things square with one another? Do taxes make deficits bigger?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In 1981 we had this opinion. In 1982 as the deficits started to get larger, we got into the recession, as we started from a much lower base, as the economy grows less than we had originally thought, with world-wide recession and the like, it occurs to us that our deficits are much larger than we ever thought they would be. And accordingly, if we can't get them down by either putting a lid on spending or by curtailing spending, then we have to figure out how to finance it. And which way is better? That argument will go on as long as there are tax collectors, as to whether it is better to borrow or to tax. And in this case we're going to do both. We're going to tax a proportion -- remember, I said $157 billion. Well, the tax itself will be $50 billion, so roughly a third will come from taxes and the two-thirds will be financed by borrowing.

Q Just a final comment on this particular point. Early in the administration, that is to say, last year, there of course was no argument within the administration, at least from the President. He said clearly the way to reduce the deficit was to cut spending. And we don't have a -- deficit because we don't tax enough, and indeed, in the State of the Union message last year he said he would not attempt to balance the budget, that is reduce the size of the deficit, on the backs of the taxpayers. Yet that's precisely what you've done, like you say you're ready to do now if the deficits get so high.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not on the backs of the taxpayers. We're trying to -- we're taking one-third of that out year deficit from the taxpayer, and two-thirds by borrowing, so it's not entirely on the backs of the taxpayers.

I agree with you that the proper way is to reduce spending, but again, you have to face reality. We have to make these decisions. If we don't get, and we don't achieve those -- remember last year, we thought we had a deal wherein we were going to have three dollars in cuts for one dollar in revenue increases. Notice I didn't say tax increases, but revenue increases.

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We didn't achieve that, and so we are left with these gaping deficits. You have to somehow or other do it to finance them.

Q How did that turn out, that three-to-one ratio? That was a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it depends upon the way you want to, you know, total up the score. But probably less than one-to-one.

Q Sir, a question about your proposal to grant tax incentives to apply to employers who hire the unemployed. This has been proposed before, you know. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Should I -- I forget the question.

END 12:54 P.M. EST

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PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
EN ROUTE TO TOKYO, JAPAN
JANUARY 30, 1983

QUESTION: Do you expect to be able to get a chance to have much of a discussion with Mr. Nakasone given the situation with the parliament in session right now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: ...how the meeting is scheduled, and I am sure I will, and with Mr. Abe.

QUESTION: Do you anticipate that talking with them would have much if any impact on the decision which I understand is being taken this week on the defense budget?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course he will take the positions that he feels are right for Japan on his defense budget. We will discuss them and I will tell him about developments in the United States. But, of course, he was there himself very recently, and this is kind of an extension of that visit.

QUESTION: What are your principal goals for this visit? What would you like to talk about? What would you like to see accomplished?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in a broad way this is part of our effort to work with our friends in Asia, and on this trip I will be visiting in Japan both on the first and last stop, and China, Korea and Hong Kong. Later on this year, I will go to the ASEAN countries Foreign Ministers meeting as an observer, and I believe also at approximately the same time, we will have a meeting with the Australians and New Zealanders in Washington. So we are very consciously working on our relationships in this part of the world.

It was interesting to me when I first arrived as Secretary of State, we had Lee Kwan Yew there, and subsequently the Heads of State of Indonesia and the Philippines were there, and the foreign ministers of other important countries -- Thailand, Malaysia. So, there is quite a lot of activity in our diplomacy toward Asia.

So in response to your question, in a sense this is the first part of, I would call it, an "Asian Journey." As far as this trip is concerned, obviously our relationships with Japan, China and Korea are of central importance to us. And, broadly speaking, we seek to develop those

For further information contact:

relationships, identify problems and set in motion and consolidate processes and solve problems. There may be some specific things along the way that a contribution can be made to, but I think the objectives are basically broad ones.

QUESTION: Do you expect to see Prince Sihanouk in Peking? Would you see him if he's there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If he is there and if it can be worked out in terms of the scheduling, certainly, but we do not have it on the schedule as of the momnet. It will just have to depend. Obviously, I am going there to visit with officials of the People's Republic of China, and everything about that will take precedence. But if he is there, I would like to see him.

QUESTION: What do you hope to find out from the Chinese on this trip? Are there some misunderstandings that you can clear up on this occasion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are certain obvious problems, and then there are certain areas of tension that do not represent issues of principle but nevertheless are difficult. I would say something like the textile negotiations is a difficulty; it is a sort of typical trade negotiating difficulty, but it does not represent any underlying issue of principle.

The problems involving Taiwan involve basic principles and are somehow more difficult. At the same time, I hope that we can find a way to regard them as being in the background.

Our overall objective is to explore the common interest and common ground, to put problems in perspective of that overall common ground and to emphasize the common ground and see if we can put the U.S.-China relationship on a stable, sound, developing basis.

QUESTION: At this point do you have any indications from the Chinese that suggested they are as eager as we are to restore the tone and the stability of our relationship?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the fact that I am going to China shows that we place great value and importance on our relationship with China. The fact that they have invited me and are ready to recieve me, I think cordially with very serious substantive orientation, suggests that both sides are very serious about the visit. Beyond that we will just have to see how it goes.

QUESTION: Do you expect to learn anything from the Chinese about the talks with the Soviet Union on this journey?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I will be interested in anything they will care to tell me about it and am prepared to share our own views of the evolving Soviet situation with them.

QUESTION: How concerned are you about a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union, or do you think that that is something that is likely to go either not very far or very, very slowly?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I do not know. We will have to see how that goes, and of course, it is primarily for them and the Soviet Union to work out and decide on their relationship. There some elements of, I presume, great concern to China about Soviet behavior, for example in Asia, that are also of great concern to us. If, as a result of their discussions with the Russians, Soviet behavior changes, then I think that is a positive development, but at any rate I will be very interested in anything they have to say about that.

QUESTION: Do you expect to find common ground with the Chinese on our efforts in arms control with the Russians?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no doubt they will be interested in our efforts in arms control and, of course, it is clear that they do not favor an INF result that winds up with a new number of SS-20's moving in toward Asia. We are against that also, and it is very much in our minds as we negotiate in Geneva. So I have no doubt that they will be interested in that subject, and I am prepared to discuss that with them.

QUESTION: Is one of the purposes of your talking with the Chinese officials at this point to give the President an assessment of the new leadership in the foreign policy area? What do you expect to find when you meet the new leaders for the first time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, I will be meeting the Chinese leaders for the first time myself, and I look forward to that, and naturally I will gain some impressions from them. It is one thing to read what people say and analyze what they seem to be doing, and it is another thing to meet people. I do not want to act as though I am overwhelmed by the importance of personal relationships, and yet, they do have a role when you make an assessment of the intent and outlook of people. Of course we have a continuing stream of high level visitors, private visitors as well as public visitors, to China and they tell me what their impressions are, so it is not as though we have no assessments of Chinese leadership. Of course, we do.

QUESTION: Will you be talking to them about a possible trip by the President let's say within a year? Is that on your agenda?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the question of exchanges of visits in general is a subject that undoubtedly will come up, but I am not going to be explicitly discussing a Presidential trip. I think that would be premature.

QUESTION: Do you hope to work out a visit by Premier Zhao to Washington?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he has been invited to Washington, and I am certain to ask about their response, and I hope that he will be visiting Washington.

QUESTION: Secretary Haig...on his trip to China said an arrangement had been made ...that the Chinese would begin to think in terms of some American military equipment and were suppose to send a delegation to take a look at it. They neve did. Would you expect them to put some new life into that particular exercise?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it is a question of seeing what can evolve now, and that is one area where developments might take place. There are a number of others, so it is not as though I am going to say I want to promote this, I want to promote that, I want to promote something else. On the other hand, we have interests, and they do, and if they are mutually accommodative and a visit will help, well certainly, we are prepared to see that kind of exchange develop. When you talk about the evolution and development of a strong and stable and forward moving relationship, it does not in the end come out of discussions in a high level visit only, but also in all follow-on activity that may result from that in a variety of fields. So, certainly, this is a possible area.

QUESTION: Do you include in that the question of technology transfer which also was promised at the time of the Haig visit? I believe some new regulations were drawn up and there has not been complete follow-through.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no doubt that that is an important subject in our eyes, and I am sure that it will be a subject that we will discuss in some detail. As I understand the priorities of China, certainly one that they have emphasized in their public statements, and understandably so, is their desire for modernizing their economy, and high technology is an element of such modernization. I say "an element" because at least in my observation, as an economist and as a private businessman in being involved in lots of projects on countries that are developing, the primary thrust of modernization and development, well certainly, it is not just high technology. There is a lot else, and most major projects do not involve a big element of high technology. There are other elements to that process, and I certainly would want to bring out for whatever interest there may be.

QUESTION: Do you expect the subject of nuclear technology to come up during this visit, either in the context of exchanges between the United States and China, or the question of China's ratification of Non-Proliferation Treaty and their alleged activities in Pakistan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, those are subjects that have gotten a lot of attention and in one way or another, I'm sure they'll be talked about.

QUESTION: What do you have to say to them on the subject?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that, on the one hand, I believe there is a great deal to be gained by the use of nuclear technology, principally in the form of nuclear power. At the same time, it seems to be appropriate for everybody in the world to be concerned about nuclear proliferation in the weapons sense, and it isn't pleasant to contemplate that kind of technology being widely dispersed and the possibility of it falling into cavalier hands, and so aside from any particular thing, it's a subject of general importance. We worry about it obviously. There's an international agency that worries about it, and I think it's a matter for general concern. I'm sure the Chinese are equally concerned.

QUESTION: This is not directly on the subject of this trip, but do you have any reaction to the developments in El Salvador vis-a-vis the U.S. policy toward El Salvador at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, implementing our strategy in El Salvador and Central America is very important to us and to those people there, and it's also difficult. The heart of the strategy is to find conditions for economic development to take place so that the poverty of the region can be alleviated and people can be better off. We know that it's difficult for that to take place when you have guerrilla warfare, insurgencies and a general upheaval that goes with that. So the development of military strength and ability to deal with those insurgencies is important in El Salvador and in the other countries. It's a hard problem. We are dedicated to it and intend to keep helping our friends in El Salvador and other countries in the region. You take two steps forward and one step back and it seems to be that kind of a process. I think in the perspective of a couple of years, we have made great strides. In the perspective of shorter periods, you go back and forth and I think that the problems that we've seen recently in their military organization and governmental problems are genuine difficulties, but I think they will be overcome all right.

QUESTION: -- thing is taking two steps forward and one step back, now is this the one step back?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to characterize any particular individual or development as forward or back by inference, but it's certainly better to be arguing and working on the substance of what you should be doing than preoccupied over the process through which you're going to do it because your eye is not on the main subject. That's the point that I was making.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you sum up at all where we stand on the Middle East after having talked all week --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think in the Middle East in the last couple of months and in the somewhat longer time period, we made a fair amount of headway, most of it not generally visible. At the same time, the visible and important developments that we work for and hope for and expect have not taken place as yet. King Hussein has yet to declare himself, and we want to see that happen. We encourage the process of bring that about in a manner that is King Hussein's stepping forward. But more than that stepping forward with the right kind of support from the Arab community so that the outcome of subsequent negotiations would have a sort of broad support and thereby broaden the acceptance of the peace that we nope for. All of that takes time and I think that considerable strides have been made, but yet we still look for King Hussein to step forward. That hasn't happened yet.

In Lebanon our objectives are clear, and so are the difficulties of attaining them, and at this point there is a pretty wide gap, I would say, between the conditions that Israel feels she needs in order to withdraw and the conditions that Lebanon feels are consistent with the emergence of a new Lebanon and as sovereign and in control of its territories and able to govern itself and develop its relationships in the region. So there are some big gaps there.

The problems of securing the complete withdrawal of the Syrian and PLO forces we have confronted, in a sense to the extent that you can confront them at the moment, that is the Syrians say they will withdraw when the Israelis withdraw. I think we also have good grounds to believe that the PLO will go with the Syrians or will withdraw as the Syrians withdraw.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's for that reason, I guess that it appears as though our efforts are more directed toward the Israeli-Lebanon dimensions than they are the Lebanon-PLO dimension because it takes a plan for Israeli withdrawal to provide the acid test of the Syrian statements. So we are in the midst of the kind of a process, and I wish I could report that there were breakthroughs in the offing. I'm sure there are, but I can't identify them. (Laughter).

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you believe the conditions are such that the Israelis could safely withdraw now? You say they don't seem to believe so at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What I said was that the conditions that they have put forward are quite different from the conditions that the Lebanese seem to be ready to accept, so there is a gap there that has to be worked on by both parties. In the end, of course, people have to be their own judges of what their security demands, but of course, we have our opinions also and we're in with them.

QUESTION: What is your analysis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe there is a genuine convergence of views on finding appropriate security arrangements for southern Lebanon so that you have a real insurance policy that the geographic area doesn't become the base for attacks on Israel. That is accepted as a legitimate objective. So the question is what does it take to do that and how do you do that, and not whether it should be done. My own opinion is that it can be done, and it ought to be possible to do it consistent with appropriate sovereignty for Lebanon. But I am not able just to write out the ticket and hand it to people, and there is a big difference of view about what is necessary. Beyond that are the issues surrounding so-called normalization, and that's a different kind of an issue entirely and was not part of the announced rationale for going into Lebanon in the first place, but nevertheless, is an objective. I would say from the United States point of view that, of course, we believe that the desirable objective is peace among Israel and all of her neighbors.

To that extent, I think the basic peace process involving not only Israel's security but the legitimate concerns and rights of the Palestinians is in the deepest sense at the heart of the security issues because if that can be resolved in a satisfying way, then the tension of the sort of militarily-oriented security arrangements is much less.

So this always takes me in my thinking back to the basic Camp David September 1st President's proposals as really the core of the issues to be resolved.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there was a time when you were saying and when the people in your Department were saying over and over again that withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon could be accomplished very quickly. I take it from our comments today that you would not make that statement today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I would say it could have been accomplished very quickly. It could be accomplished very quickly, but it hasn't been accomplished very quickly because there have developed some very considerable differences of opinion about what is necessary in these areas that I've spoken of.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given that and the fact that you say that the disagreements are very wide, what are the next steps for the U.S.? What do we do tomorrow, next week and the week after?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have to constantly appraise the positions of the parties as we see them and consider them and to try to figure out ways the objectives, legitimate objectives, might be met consistent with the needs of the parties. So in any negotiation you are constantly doing that and that's basically what is going on, and we were interested to listen to President Mubarak talk about the subject. He's very concerned about it, and I must say has in both his public and private statements put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of bringing about resolutions promptly, and I agree that the situation just doesn't remain constant. It's a situation in flux and there is a great premium on trying to get things accomplished in a short space of time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, but how?

SECRETARY: Well, if you have the answer I'd be delighted to know. It's obvious that we're struggling with it and perhaps we're getting somewhere. The fact that people are talking about the problems and working at them, and in the process of doing that assessing what the needs of each other are which always in any negotiations you're constantly appraising and struggling to see if you can find other ways of meeting the needs that are mutually satisfactory. That's the nature of a negotiation.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said some months ago that you didn't feel that your presence was needed there, you personally going to the Middle East. Do you still feel strongly about that today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think there are very able people there working with the parties in these negotiations, and I think we have an extremely strong team working on behalf of the United States and on behalf of getting the issues resolved. With our Ambassadorial group out in the Middle East, it's an extremely high quality group of people; and Maurie Draper is able, knowledgeable; and Phil Habib is also as the overall Mideast negotiator; Dick Fairbanks is involved, and in Washington a strong group, so we have a strong and well-coordinated effort going on.

If a time comes when a trip by me to that region would seem to be helpful, certainly I'm ready to make it.

QUESTION: That time has not come?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm not oriented to trips for the sake of a trip. I have been looking at my schedule and there are plenty of trips, I can tell you.

QUESTION: I take it from what you have said you're not one of those who think the solution is leveling the boom on Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think that forcing people to do things that they believe is against their interest produces lasting solutions to the problems. I don't think it will produce a lasting solution for Israel to force Lebanon to do something that Lebanon feels deeply is not in their interest. By the same token, I think you apply that to any important party in a negotiation, so obviously negotiations are surrounded by an environment of pressures and considerations and arguments, and I don't deem that negotiations are abstracted from that, but just trying to push people around all the time, I don't think, is the way. You might get a solution but it wouldn't necessarily be lasting.

QUESTION: Would some kind of a summit conference with Prime Minister Begin and perhaps with the Lebanese President help at this point if the differences are so wide, so broad?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are all sorts of procedural things that can be tried. I think you have to ask yourself: is there something inherently wrong with the negotiating process that exists where there is an inability to communicate or truly understand or something like that that needs an impulse from a different direction? So far as I can see and has been reported to me, there is a good exchange of views and the forum that exists for the negotiation is a perfectly adequate one, and there is also plenty of ability to communicate at a high level directly and through Phil Habib. So it isn't as though somehow there is a stalling out process because of a lack of communication. I'm not saying that high level meetings aren't sometimes very useful, but I don't see the evidence that that's what is needed now.

QUESTION: The Egyptians, perhaps including Mubarak himself, think that the Israelis are dragging out the negotiations, stalling, trying to carry them into the Presidential election campaign . . .

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I doubt very much that that's the case because I think there are benefits to everybody involved to having a settlement. After all, people are still getting killed over in Lebanon, so if you can save a few lives of your countrymen, that's got to be important, and so on. So you hear that statement made. In fact, I read an interview the other day from Mr. Sharon in which he more or less explicitly said that. I don't think underneath it all that that's true.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Egyptians were also saying and other Arabs have suggested that there is a very narrow window to get this accomplished because there is the fact of creeping annexation or de facto annexation of the West Bank, and at a certain point they really won't be able to negotiate. Do you subscribe to any part of that, and how much of a window do you think there is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, obviously, the more land and resources taken up by settlements, the less room for maneuver, in one sense. I think it's worth pointing out that in the presenting of his proposals, the President was explicit about his view that Jews should have the right to live on the West Bank and in Gaza. At the same time, if there were settlements existing in a geographic area that it was decided should be under some jurisdiction other than Israel's then whoever lived in those settlements would live in the jurisdiction that was there. So in that sense, to some extent it reduces the importance a little but nevertheless I think there is a great deal of power to the argument that the longer time runs and the more extensive the settlements are, the more difficult it is and more futile it seems to the Arabs to conduct a negotiation, partly because of the substance, the so-called facts on the ground that are created, and partly because it appears to them to be a message about what the conceivable outcome of the negotiation might be.

QUESTION: Let me ask a question on Japan real quick. The Alaskan oil business, is that going to come up and the question of the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the value of the yen which some people think is the central issue in the deficit. Will you spend much time on that issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I imagine that the energy subject, I'm sure that will come up, and Alaskan oil is part of that subject. A working group is being established to look at the energy subjects more broadly, including Alaskan oil. Of course, for oil to go from Alaska to Japan there would have to be a cachet or the taking away of the prohibition, and that would clearly involve a lot of legislative strategy and negotiation. The people who are very interested in that development, particularly the Alaskans, many of whom wonder why it should be that oil from 49 states of the Union should be possible to go anywhere the owner of the oil wants to send it,but but the oil produced in the most difficult of circumstances is restricted. But the Alaskans, certainly the Alaskan senators particularly, I know want to see this subject move forward, and so we'll be talking about it certainly.

Your other subject was the value of the dollar and the yen. It's a very important subject, and it's a very difficult subject. It's a difficult subject analytically and then to the extent that you feel any degree of confidence in your analysis, then it's not so easy to know exactly what to do about it. But certainly the problem is there, and to me the problem is well illustrated by the difficulties of Caterpillar tractor. Here you have a company -- marvelous company -- very well managed, good products, extremely experienced in international trade -- can't say this is a company that somehow doesn't know how to operate abroad, it has been more successful than almost any other company in the world. It's a fantastic operation -- and with the surge in the value of the dollar against the yen, last year it practically knocked Caterpillar out of traditional third markets. Now, I suppose you would say: Well, that is somehow a reflection of long-term values, so be it. But in late May, I remember being in Japan discussing this issue with Japanese leaders, and the value was in the neighborhood of 230 yen to the dollar, and most of the people I talked to seemed to think it ought to go to 210-200 or something on that order. Two or three months later, instead of going in that direction it had gone to around 280, and that just made the relative prices of the Japanese and U.S. products totally different. There is nothing you can do about it as an American manufacturer or labor force. But now it's back to 230 again, so that we have this movement that you can only call a blip, but it had very severe consequences. There's something wrong with that. So we can see the problem.

Now, analytically why did that happen? If you understand why it happened, what do you do about it? I'm not settled in my own mind that I do understand how that happened. I have a feeling that the U.S. in its currency is seeing a kind of Switzerland effect where the value of the dollar is being affected very powerfully by financial movements that are very different from what you would expect if you were looking purely at trade matters. Historically, we have always thought of these values as reflecting essentially trade flows, inflation rates and things of that kind. Interest rates have the effect, but I think there is also . . . (inaudible) ... yet this quick movement of a very large magnitude, we've got to figure out a way to get a hand on that, but I don't know what that way is. I have some ideas, but I'm not ready to talk about that.

QUESTION: Former Secretary Kissinger in an article in today's or tomorrow's, whatever date this is now, Washington Post, Sunday anyway, makes some suggestions about your trip to China. He says that he believes that China on this technology front, should be considered in the category of India or Yugoslavia, you know, all these regulations. Did he make that recommendation to you, and what do you think of that idea?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all, in Secretary Kissinger's very interesting, thoughtful article, he says that the Chinese always believe that nothing takes place by accident. That being the case, the Chinese must believe that his article has some official standing, and it doesn't. I don't mean by that to suggest that I'm criticizing his article. I'm just saying that it's his article and it's an interesting article.

QUESTION: Don't you wish . . .

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We'll be discussing the technology transfer issues, and I think that India-Yugoslavia comparison is a handy shorthand that people have. At the same time, I think China is a unique country, and I don't think of China as part of a class of countries, but as a country that is important and needs to be thought of in its own terms and its own right. So I wouldn't say that because we treat Yugoslavia some way, we should treat China the same way, nor vice versa. The China dimension deserves careful and special consideration. Now, having said that, I'm sure we'll try to work out a way of handling technology transfer that expresses the regard in which we hold our relationship with China.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STAT

February 2, 1983
No. 33

PC 15

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
TOKYO, JAPAN, February 1, 1983

MODERATOR: Thank you very much for waiting. We shall start this press conference given by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Dr. George Shultz. As you know, in June of last year when Dr. Shultz succeeded former Secretary of State Haig, the mass media reported this news with the following kind of expression: "At long last, it has been realized."

That is probably because when President Reagan assumed Office two years ago, most of the people expected Dr. George Shultz to become the Secretary of State.

With those opening remarks, I would like to introduce our guest of honor Dr. Shultz, Secretary of State of the United States. Dr. Shultz was born in New York in December, 1920. He majored in Economics at Princeton University, and later received his Ph.D. in Industrial Economics from MIT.

As part of his academic career, he served as the Dean of the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago. As a public official he has served in a series of important cabinet posts under President Nixon such as Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Secretary of the Treasury.

From 1974 on, he was the Vice President of the San Francisco-based Bechtel Company, America's largest construction company. Since 1981, until he became Secretary of State last year, he was the President of Bechtel Company.

Dr. Henry Kissinger in his memoirs wrote: "If I could choose one American to whom I would entrust the nation's fate in a crisis, it would be George Shultz."

As you know, the world at present is beset with a series of very difficult problems. In the economic arena we see mounting economic and trade frictions against the backdrop of the worldwide recession. In other arenas, we see East-West tensions in the area of the deployment of nuclear weapons, and so forth. In view of these worldwide difficulties, we have high expectations and hope that Dr. Shultz will be all the more active in these important areas.

With this, I would like to hand the microphone over to Dr. Shultz.

Before that, however, may I introduce the members seated at the head table. At the extreme right is his excellency, the Ambassador of the United States Mr. Mansfield. Next to Ambassador Mansfield is Mr. John Hughes, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The interpreter is Yonekura. Thank you.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Does anybody have a question? (Laughter.)

MODERATOR: Before receiving any questions, may I ask you for your cooperation in making your questions succinct and brief because we only have very limited time, and Dr. Shultz can only stay until 4:40.

QUESTION: I would like to ask the Secretary for his evaluation of our Prime Minister's recent visit to the United States. How do the leaders and members of the U.S. Government, such as President Reagan himself, yourself Dr. Shultz, and Secretary Weinberger evaluate his visit? We have received various reports from the United States, but, if I may, I would like to hear your evaluation or impression directly.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the United States was a tremendous success. He made a strong impression on the President the members of the Cabinet, the members of Congress, and all who met him as a very well informed, decisive and strong person. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Abe, who also was very impressive during his visit, and we were delighted to see them and look forward to continuing opportunities, such as my visit here now, to continue our discussions and work with them.

QUESTION: I have the following two questions, both concerning defense matters: when we look at the budget message covering fiscal year 1984 and the defense report issued recently, a tremendous amount of funds is allocated to the defense area. Also there is a matter of collective defense with European countries, South Korea and Japan. Against this background, the "Team Spirit" military exercise is starting today. North Korea has reacted to this by calling for a state-of-readiness on the part of all its forces. It is the first time North Korea has called for a state-of-readiness of its forces and is treating the situation as if war is on the brink of breaking out.

Now, Mr. Secretary, what sort of comment would you make to this situation? That is the first point.

The second point concerns the defense of the sea-lanes by Japan. In connection with this ramification of collective defense, we are very much interested and very much concerned with the sea-lanes defense matter. In this connection, to what level and extent do you think Japan's defense capabilities should be enhanced to meet the expectations that Japan faces from other countries? What do you think would be a reasonable level of defense capability on the part of Japan to discharge its responsibility compared to the present level? That is the second question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: With respect to the first question, people throughout the world are interested in peace. The United States and its allies will start no wars. Our efforts to build up our defense forces are efforts to create the capacity to deter aggression. That is our objective. And if our opposition can be convinced of that, perhaps they will even agree with us to reduce the level of armaments. But we know that we must have the strength to defend our interests against aggression and to work with our allies in doing so as well. I think that is the basic point, and it applies whether we are thinking with respect to the Soviet Union, North Korea, what is happening in Cambodia or throughout the world.

With respect to the second question, Japan has set for herself the mission of being responsible for the defense of the air space of Japan and for the seas around Japan. And I think that is a very appropriate mission, given the fact that Japan is obviously a seafaring nation and depends upon air and sea traffic and movement. It is clear that to fulfill responsibilities in connection with that mission, more needs to be done. How much more remains to be seen. But certainly a greater effort is necessary. And no one disputes that. The question is, how rapidly can this mission be taken up. We applaud the determination that Prime Minister Nakasone has been expressing in this regard.

QUESTION: With regard to the possible transfer of SS-20 missiles from the Soviet Union's European territory to the Far East, Japan has expressed apprehensions. I would like to ask whether you or in your talks with the Japanese side jointly, have any plans of involving China in the discussion of what to do concerning such Soviet plans. If they should materialize.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's proposals being negotiated in Geneva are for the complete elimination of intermediate range, nuclear warhead, land-based missiles, as the President put it last night, "from the face of the Earth." That is not only within the range of Europe, but also Japan and China. That is the proposal that the President has put on the table.

I think it should be noted that this involves not only the question of what to do about missiles that might be moved from the range of Europe but also what to do about the missiles already deployed within the range of Japan and China.

QUESTION: Looking at relations between Japan and the U.S. recently, it seems that trade friction has become less important since Prime Minister Nakasone assumed power. Is it correct to say -- I have two questions on this. Is it correct to say that the two countries decided to solve at least part of the trade friction problem through exchange of military technology or through an improvement of Japanese expenditures for defense? The second thing is, what are the trade problems which are still to be discussed and which you have been discussing with Japanese leaders in these days? Thank you.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no trade-off between an exchange of military technology and the solution of so-called "trade frictions" involving access to Japanese markets or other such things. These are independent matters. Of course, we were all pleased, the President was pleased, at the announcements that Prime Minister Nakasone made before he came to the United States for some additional measures, particularly measures dealing with the processes through which goods from another country get into the Japanese market, and for changing those conditions of inspection and registration and so on. And it has been interesting and reassuring to hear also the sense in which the Japanese in charge have a good sense of the fact that it is not enough to set a policy. There has to be a kind of managerial follow-through to transform a policy statement into an operating reality. And there appears to be a firm grasp of that point and, at least expressed to me, a determination to follow through on it. That will, of course, not be the end of all these frictions, but it will be a great help.

I might say beyond the particulars of whatever trade disputes there are between the United States and Japan, we share a tremendous stake in maintaining the general openness of the world trading system. And that openness is under severe attack by forces of protectionism around the world. I think that it well behooves Japan and the United States together, and along with other countries, to, in a sense, take responsibility for keeping this system open and healthy, because we both have so much to gain as do others around the world.

QUESTION: (There have been) numerous published reports on both sides of the Pacific that Ambassador Mansfield is leaving shortly and that the Administration intends to replace... would you care to comment on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think Ambassador Mansfield is one of our most distinguished Americans, and we intend to keep him on the job. (Laughter) He looks great. I would add just a word on that. Japan is one of the world's most important countries. And so, when it comes to selecting a person from the United States to represent us here, we have to find for ourselves a really distinguished American. I believe that we are very fortunate in the United States to have such a person here in the person of Mike Mansfield. It's good for the United States, and I can't help but feel that the Japanese people also appreciate the high quality that this wonderful man brings to his work.

QUESTION: When you talk about the defense of the sea-lanes, the starting point is the Middle East and the ending point is in Japan, from my point of view. The United States guarantees the security of Israel, but the crux of the issue, I think, is Palestine and the Palestinian people. And so without providing a solution to that issue, an overall solution could not be hoped for. I would like to ask when the United States is going to sit at the table with the PLO?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the central issue you correctly state as "finding the conditions in the Middle East that will, at once, satisfy the security needs of Israel and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The President on September 1st proposed a set of ideas which we called a "fresh start" in working on this process. These ideas fall squarely within the framework of the Camp David Accords, which have produced progress with the return of the Sinai and peace between Israel and Egypt. We believe it's essential to pursue this course, and we are trying, and the President is trying everything that he can, to bring about the discussions that will satisfy the conditions I have mentioned.

As far as the PLO is concerned, the President has stated very clearly the conditions under which the United States Government would talk directly with the PLO. Remembering that the PLO is an organization that has in its charter a provision calling for the extinction of the State of Israel, we believe it's appropriate that, before we will hold discussions with the PLO, they simply renounce that and say they recognize Israel's right to exist and the formulas for peace embodied in United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for proceeding in the Middle East. When they do that, the United States Government will be ready to sit down and talk with them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in response to an earlier question you pointed out that the President's proposal in Geneva calls for the elimination of all of the medium-range missiles whereever they may be. The President has also said he would entertain any serious Soviet offer and some months ago the United States negotiator, Mr. Nitze, seriously considered, and talked with his Soviet counterpart about a proposal that would leave at least 90 SS-20s in Asia. Were you able, in your talks here, to tell the Japanese Government that under no circumstances would the United States be willing to make an agreement which leaves medium-range missiles in Asia? And can you so state here today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President has said, first, he favors and has proposed to the Soviet Union that all of these weapons, wherever deployed, be eliminated. That is the United States position.

He has also said we are willing to listen and talk to them about any reasonable proposal. So, if they have a proposal to make as a counter to what the United States has said, let's hear it. We'll examine it. So far we haven't heard any proposal that qualifies under the terms that I just mentioned. The negotiations are resuming in Geneva now, and the place to conduct those negotiations is at Geneva at the bargaining table.

I would like to just take this public occasion to express my appreciation to my hosts here in Japan for the extraordinary warmth and courtesy of the reception that I, my wife and my party have received. Respect for the United States was shown by the fact that we were received by the Emperor, and in our discussions with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister -- my host -- and all the other people, private and public. The treatment that I have received has been cordial and generous, and the approach to our discussions a very serious and informed one. And I appreciate this spirit very much.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for the most straightforward and candid response you have given to all the questions. Although our time was very limited, we are most grateful also for your kindness in sparing time from your very busy schedule. According to our custom, we would like to present you with a memento from our club. Thank you very much, Sir.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 3, 1983
No. 34

PC 16

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
EN FLIGHT TO BEIJING
February 2, 1983

QUESTION: Are you going to speak just in general terms?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think general terms is the appropriate level, and just leave it at that. I am not here selling arms.

QUESTION: Just a follow-up on that quickly. How important is it to the whole US-Chinese relationship in your mind to try to establish some sort of a military sales relationship between the two countries.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the relationship has to be seen as a broad one that in a sense is responsive to the needs that each country has both in bilateral and for international terms. So as time goes along needs rise and fall and we have to be ready to look at them and that doesn't mean that everything anybody wants on either side will necessarily be accommodated. But I think that is the spirit we ought to approach this relationship in.

QUESTION: Are you anticipating any requests to come soon or is there any reason to believe that...

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to try to predict what they may say or want, but I am certainly prepared to respond to anything that they want to bring up in this area. Of course if it came to particulars, that is a matter that is best handled by the various military people.

QUESTION: So you say you are prepared to respond, prepared to give an indication that the U.S. is favorably inclined toward that kind of exchange?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are certainly prepared to discuss what needs they may have within the framework of earlier discussions, which essentially emphasized defensive problems and on which nothing much has happened. So maybe there isn't anything in anybody's mind but if there is why then...

QUESTION: One of the main developments since Secretary Haig was over here in June of 1981 is that the Chinese have now carved out what they have referred to as an independent foreign policy. What is the United States' attitude and what is yours? What are you prepared to tell them about our views of the independent foreign policy that they have carved out for themselves?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I assume any country of the, well probably any country but particularly a country of the size and importance of China or the United States, will have an independent foreign policy in the sense that you have to be guided by the things that you think are in the interests of your country. I think it is quite apparent in the kind of world that we live in that alliances and the indentification of common needs and objectives among countries are an essential part of an effective foreign policy. So to that regard, we have alliances and have identified common interests with a number of countries, and I assume obviously there are some with respect to China. I would expect that we would have some discussion of those things, but that doesn't compromise anyone's independence.

QUESTION: Well, of course, the way the independent foreign policy is actually worked is that they have gone on the attack more against the United States in areas that they don't like -- the Third World, Africa, Middle East and that sort of thing.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In some cases, perhaps in all cases, what those comments reflect are a misunderstanding and to the extent that is so, perhaps my visit can correct some of those misunderstandings, or at least we can talk out what our differences are. You mention the Middle East. I am certainly prepared to talk about our policies, objectives, how we see the Middle East situation and listen to what they have to say. We can discuss that, and I can explain some of our perceptions of what is going on and so on around the world.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you expect to find the same or greater level of anxiety as you found in Japan over the present deployment of SS-20s in Asia and future deployment of them as they relate to INF talks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As in Japan, I am certainly ready to discuss the issues involved in our arms control negotiations. Again, it is not for me to try to predict what they are going to bring up or what their concerns are. But I am ready to talk about our view of the matter and our position and listen to their views and concerns whatever they may be. I can't help but believe that if there are some 99, I understand, SS-20s that have China within their range that that isn't a matter of some concern. But at any rate it is for them to express their concerns.

QUESTION: You haven't any indication going in that they are particularly worried about some kind of a deal whereby another hundred might show up on the eastern side of the Urals?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They have not sent me any telegram saying that, no.

QUESTION: Didn't they put out a statement yesterday saying that there is so much commotion on the issue they don't think there is going to be an agreement anyway? I saw something on the wire about that.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, everyone is free to express their opinion. In the meantime, the missiles are there and whether there is an agreement or not, at present the missiles are there and if there is no agreement, we will have some deployments, and we continue to believe that the best arrangement for everybody concerned, including the Soviet Union, is to eliminate these weapons.

QUESTION: Do you think the fact that the President has now said that Mr. Bush's mission was mainly for propaganda purposes is going to make your discussions on the SS-20s more difficult with China?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you have put that in a provocative way. We are, both the Vice President and I, in separate parts of the world discussing issues of substance and talking with leaders in the various countries being visited and the Vice President is making some public statements and they are substantive and designed to tell everybody as clearly as we can what our positions are and why they are what they are and to express those. If you want to call that propaganda, that is fine, but I think that the public in Europe and everywhere around the world is interested in knowing our viewpoints.

QUESTION: But I mean I didn't call it that. I believe it was the President who said that, if I read the wires correctly.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think my statement still stands. You are trying to inform the public and that is a shorthand way of expressing it, I suppose.

QUESTION: Is that simply a response to the Soviet propaganda offensive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, we have done that right along. The Vice President's trip actually had been planned, thought out quite some time ago. The drama of the trip seemed to be enhanced by its immediate environment.

QUESTION: The Polish Foreign Minister is quoted as --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I think if I may on that, that obviously the President recognized as the timing of the trip was being worked out and so on, that this was an important mission at a time when the whole question of arms reduction negotiations and deployments are being debated in Europe to have a person of the Vice President's stature as a person, as well as his official stature, go over and enter the debate.

QUESTION: The Polish Foreign Minister put out a statement, whose words I don't have, but in effect calls on the United States for improvement in relations with Poland following the changes made in December in martial law and the statement seems to suggest that he would be interested in at least opening some exchange on what needs to be done to restore relations. Do you see any opportunity for that at this time, and have you seen enough happen in Poland to justify a change in US relations with the government there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we have been evaluating along with our allies the developments in Poland and some seem to be a step forward and some seem to be a step backwards, so I think it is rather an ambiguous question whether or not there has been any genuine movement. Lech Walesa is out of jail but yet he is constrained clearly in a great many ways, so that is just an example of something. Obviously we would like to see progress in Poland along the lines of the points we and our allies have made. If there are opportunities for those developments to take place we are all for that. And that would mean that our relationship would be better.

QUESTION: But you haven't seen anything yet, I take it, that would justify a change soon in U.S. attitude toward the Polish Government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, not that I know of, although maybe you have something off the wires that I haven't seen.

QUESTION: No, it was a reference to the Pope's visit that suggested that propaganda...

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what about the North Korean situation? Some people say that they have only done such an alert three times in their history and each time it was involved with the Pueblo or the killing of those two Americans. Anybody worried about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is something to watch. But I don't know of any good reason for it.

QUESTION: Do you think it is provocative on their part?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly it is provocative on their part. It raises the level of tensions but I don't know of any reason to expect some particular explosion there.

QUESTION: Would you tell us something about your own experience with China and Taiwan? I know you have never been to China. You have been to Taiwan on several occasions, I gather, as a businessman. Have you talked to the Chinese? Either in business or in your Treasury job or in some other capacity, what has been your own interaction with China up to now, up till today?

MORE

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have met a number of Chinese officials as they would come through San Francisco when I and I met some during the Nixon Administration when was in office, but never had the opportunity to go to China. I almost went a number of times as a private businessman but the projects we were interested in never seemed to be quite materializing, so in the end I did not go. But there have been quite a number of people, some in the financial field, some in the engineering area that have come through, that I have talked to. Very, very able people.

QUESTION: How many times were you in Taiwan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I do not know exactly I would have to...

QUESTION: Just about? A dozen times, three or four?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, probably four times or so, I am just guessing.

QUESTION: As a businessman?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, all together as a businessman.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you concerned that the Chinese are providing nuclear weapons data to Pakistan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I do not have any comment to make about that matter.

QUESTION: Has any nuclear cooperation been completely ruled out now? It was at one point being investigated and I think Mr. Stoessel at one point talked about their hopes for nuclear cooperation with the Chinese. Is that now completely dead?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there were some discussions basically having to do with nuclear power plants, I believe, and the possible interest of the Chinese in the American (inaudible) and it may very well be that those talks can resume. But we have regulations that our government administers having to do with the conditions under which nuclear technology can be sold abroad. And so if those discussions do re-emerge we will need to sort of focus on the issues brought up by those regulations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you seen the entire text of the Bush speech on the Andropov-Reagan summit? But I was wondering if there is some implication there that the President would meet with Andropov for some element of negotiation or they would simply meet to ratify a deal that was negotiated in Geneva?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The statement in the letter, the open letter, that the President wrote was confined to a particular matter, namely that he would go anywhere to sign an agreement abolishing intermediate range nuclear powered, nuclear warhead, land-based missiles from the face of the earth. That was what he said. So that is a statement of what we would be willing to do on that particular matter. It does not infer or preclude anything else. It was a highly specific proposition.

QUESTION: Is there any justification for the Chinese claim that we have been too slow to supply technology either (inaudible) they say that they get agreements from us or statements from us that the Commerce Department or the Defense Department slows it all down. Have you been able to look into that? Do you think maybe something could be done about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have looked into it. The process of approval is always laborious, I think in any government. There has been, in fact, quite a lot of action, in the sense that a great many requests have been approved. And that number has grown. The level of pending cases has been declining a little bit lately is my information. And there are a number of efforts under way to address, you might say, the efficiency of the process through which requests are made and acted upon, not only with respect to China but other countries as well. It is a difficult matter at best to administer an export control type of program because the more difficult cases almost, by their nature, tend to be...you have to handle them case by case. They tend to be things in relatively new areas so you are constantly looking at the edges of whatever procedures and criteria you have set up.

QUESTION: Are you going to give the Chinese leadership any reassurances that this new process of looking at the efficiency is going to produce a little more for them? Are you going to give them any more reassurances that there might be more in the pipeline coming?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I am a believer that you have to be very careful when you make commitments or assurances or whatever you want to call them. So the one commitment that I want to call attention to is the commitment to keep our commitment, and there have been a great many made as I have studied the history of this relationship. So I think that is about as far as I would want to go. The speed with which a given application to buy something or other can be acted upon I think would take a courageous person to make a flat commitment that I can guarantee you that within "X" number of weeks any application that is made is going to be acted upon. Nobody who has observed the difficulties of these cases would make a statement like that because you cannot keep it. They are difficult problems.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, one thing that hasn't been talked about here. I just wonder how do you see the American strategic relationship with China? Others in the past have talked about how China and Japan and the United States now for the first time have joined strategic outlooks. There has been a kind of chill in the relationship, I guess, as China seems to have altered its posture a bit. I just wonder how you see our strategic relationship now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, this is one of the matters I want to explore in my discussions in China and it kind of brings us back to the first question that was asked. I suppose another way of putting it is that I would like to explore and try to identify the areas where our interests are in parallel. If that adds up to something that you would put the word strategic on, so be it. It may or it may not. But certainly in the broad interplay of power and influence around the world, the influence and impact of China is an important one and we need to understand it and hope that they can be brought to understand ours and, where it is possible to work in a parallel way, I think will benefit from that and so will they. That is the way I would phrase it.

QUESTION: Do you have an overall word to characterize your attitude towards this relationship? Would you use the word realism?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Realism is always a good word. But I think that as I analyse the situation, realism should lead to activities that are worthwhile from the standpoint of both countries. So I think I go well beyond realism to the implication of the fact that there are a lot of parallel interests and realism about them will lead us into some constructive elements in our relationship.

QUESTION: Back to the SS-20 question for a second. The Chinese obviously are not even a U.S. ally, yet they are very much affected by what goes on in Geneva. First of all, have we kept them abreast of what's been going on there? Second of all, are you prepared to give them the same sort of commitment that you gave the Japanese?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am sure that they are generally aware of what is taking place in Geneva. As far as our negotiating stance is concerned the President's proposal is one that would be helpful in Asia without a doubt because it calls for the elimination of the SS-20's that hold eight Asian countries within their range and I think this question of our stance in the negotiation has come up particularly with the Andropov proposal that seemed to envisage moving missiles from the European arena to the Asian arena and that is certainly one of the things that is wrong with that proposal. If it does anything for Europe, it does it at the expense of Asia. Having a global outlook as we do and must, that is one of the reasons why that proposal is unacceptable to us. I think it must be unacceptable to the Europeans as well because among other things missiles that can be moved in one direction can be moved back in the other. If you are really going to get anywhere, you have to destroy the weapons in the first place.

QUESTION: Sir, don't some of the Chinese nuclear weapons qualify as intermediate range in as much as they are pointed at the Soviet Union and that is about as far as they can go? Isn't that some of the reason for the ninety odd SS-20's there? Doesn't that obviously become a factor?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It may be a factor, but nevertheless I think from our standpoint we have to think of Asia as a whole and I think the proposals that the President has made are very constructive ones.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
CHANCELLOR BRUNO KREISKY OF AUSTRIA

February 3, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:19 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Okay. If we could get started, we'll have a background briefing on the meeting of the President with the Chancellor of Austria. Our background briefer, for your information only, is [redacted] You may attribute the briefing to a senior administration official, may use his quotes as you wish, but we'd prefer that in this case you not use his name, attributing it to a senior administration official. Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. What I thought I would do is go through quickly the substance of the discussion. And, then, we can -- I'll take questions as you wish.

The President and the Chancellor met for nearly two hours, which followed a 90-minute meeting between the Chancellor and the Acting Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam, this morning, at breakfast. As the President indicated outside a moment ago, he expressed his wish to the Chancellor to designate Helene von Damm as U.S. Ambassador to Austria. And the Chancellor immediately expressed, on behalf of the Austrian government, his enthusiastic agreement.

In the Oval Office, the principal subject of discussion was the Middle East, a subject I think, as you know, which the Chancellor has been interested in for a considerable time. They agreed that the overriding issue in the Middle East is the requirement for genuine peace, real security and a resolution to the Palestinian problem. The Chancellor stressed his enthusiastic support for the President's initiative and said he would do everything he could to push it forward.

Both were encouraged by King Hussein's support for the President's initiative and hoped that he, too, will decide to join broadened negotiations in the near future. The two leaders also discussed Lebanon in detail and agreed that it was essential that there be an early and total pullout of foreign forces from that country.

They thought together that there's a great risk of fostering permanent instability in Lebanon if the withdrawal of foreign forces is not quickly effected. The President underscores his personal distress at the slow pace of the negotiations thus far, and the Chancellor agreed.

During lunch, there was an extended discussion of the U.S. economy in which Secretaries Regan and Baldrige also participated. The President noted his confidence that U.S. economic recovery has begun. And all agreed that this would be a positive element in the international economic situation. And there was also a discussion at some length on the dangers of protectionism and the requirement to fight protectionist tendencies, which exist in all of the countries of the West.

MORE

I might say that there was a discussion of East-West relations this morning between Acting Secretary Dam and the Chancellor, which went on for about an hour about the new Soviet leadership, arms control, regional issues and what have you. In the meeting with the President, the bulk of the discussion was, in this particular sphere, was about Poland. The President said that we continue to find the Polish situation discouraging and are concerned about the fate of Solidarity members, including the thousands who are still in prison. And the President stressed that what is required in Poland is not repression but reconciliation, and if that occurs, we will do our part in helping Poland overcome its difficulties.

The two leaders agreed that there are no problems in U.S.-Austrian bilateral relations, that our relationship remains close and cooperative. The Chancellor thanked the President for U.S. support of Austria's role as a country of first-asylum for East European refugees. And we indicated, for our part, the appreciation for Austria's taking in and overseeing the resettlement of thousands of Poles who were stranded in Austria when martial law was declared.

With that, I think I'll take your questions. Yes?

MORE

Q What specifically did Chancellor Kreisky promise to do to push the President's peace initiative along?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There weren't any specific promises on his part. He is a man, as you know, who has very many contacts throughout the Middle East and he said he enthusiastically supported the President's initiative and would so indicate that to the leaders of the Middle East with whom he is in frequent contact. Yes.

Q Did the Chancellor elaborate on his talks with PLO chief Yassar Arafat recently in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He mentioned that they had talked and indicated to the President the substance of that conversation. I don't think I want to go into any further details, however, if I may so choose.

Q -- Kreisky has been very close to Arafat, one of the few leaders in Europe who is. Could you tell us did he give the President any indication that Arafat's willing to recognize Israel's right to exist? Or what is the latest on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say that this was discussed in general. And the President indicated our policy, which is that if the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist and the appropriate UN resolutions, then we will have contact with Israel. And there was a general discussion of this. I don't think either one of the two leaders were particularly predictive about whether that would happen and when it would happen.

Q You meant the contact -- you meant with the PLO, did you or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry.

Q You said contact with Israel. I wondered if you meant the U.S. would have contact with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, if our conditions were met, the conditions which have been in place for years, as you know.

Q I think I'm misunderstanding your answer. You said we would have contact with Israel.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. We would have contact with the press -- did I misspeak? We would have contact -- my apology. We would have contact with the PLO if it recognized Israel's right to exist and the appropriate --

Q -- official contact or unofficial?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. No, no, official. Our position has been the same for years and years on this matter. Yes.

Q Is the Chancellor in any way acting as a middleman in conveying the tone or some message between Arafat and the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he is trying to help. And, as I say, it's -- he has very good contacts with many of the leaders of the Middle East and has indicated his desire to push the President's initiative forward.

Q There is no message from the United States government through him to the PLO?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Does the President consider Chancellor Kreisky's close relationship with Arafat as helpful?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Didn't come up.

Q -- Poland, did the Chancellor propose a plan that several nations, like in the case of Yugoslavia, should work together to stabilize, to help financially Poland. Did he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't say anything like that to the President, no. Yes?

Q What was Chancellor Kreisky's position on Poland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what was his position? The two of them agreed that reconciliation was a precondition for stability in Poland. I don't think there was particular disagreement between the two of them on that score. Yes?

Q Was there any encouragement by Chancellor Kreisky for an early meeting Andropov-Reagan? And was Vienna mentioned as a site of such a summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No. Yes?

Q Was there --

Q "No, no," what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were two questions: No mention of a summit. And no mention of Vienna. Sorry.

Q Did the Chancellor mention Europe's concern about the arms race?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did the issue of U.S. concern about Austria having become a channel of sorts for sensitive technology to the communist nations come up at some point today. And, if so, what was said on both sides?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It didn't come up between the President and the Chancellor. However, we have been meeting with the Austrians on the fringes of the Chancellor's visit and there was an understanding between ourselves and the Austrian officials that enhanced efforts needed to be made on both our parts to insure that U.S. technology which is transferred to Austria is not re-exported illegally.

Q Did that understanding emerge or crystalize today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would say in the course of the visit.

Q There were talks yesterday about this as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Any specific undertakings by Austria in this regard?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, now, as I say, it was a general understanding that the two sides would cooperate to try to tighten up the scrutiny, basically, of U.S. technology which is in Austria and to avoid illegal transfer of such technology to third parties.

Q As the Chancellor has these Mid-East contacts, did he convey any message to the President involving many Mid-Eastern leaders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did he bring up any perception that Israeli intransigance in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, with your forebearance, I'm not going to get into the minute details of the discussion, but he gave his view of the various internal dynamics in the countries in question in the Middle East, to the President, including Israel.

Q What science technology --

Q Did he ask the President to exert any influence on Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, he didn't, no.

Q What science technology are we giving to the Austrians, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is an ordinary flow of U.S. technology to many of the countries of western Europe.

Q Which kind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What kind of U.S. technology?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it could be anything from know-how about bottling Pepsi-Cola to microtechnology. It's the ordinary export of U.S. technology to other countries, some of which is sensitive, some of which isn't sensitive, and what our concern is is that none of this technology either in its components or in the know-how associated with it, is transferred to the Soviet Union or to eastern Europe if it has military application.

Yes, miss?

MR. ALLIN: Two more right back here. These two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two more.

Q Can you say if the views --

MR. ALLIN: We might sneak one more in.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry. Could you start again. I'm sorry.

Q The views and the assessment of Chancellor Kreisky and the President about the Arab leaders, are they close? Could you say that they agree, they have the same views?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said neither one of them was -- they were analytical and not predictive.

MORE

Q On the technology issue again, is this now a satisfactory situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Question.

Q Is there any talk at all about a Reagan trip to Austria this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Didn't come up.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:32 p.m.

UNEDITED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1983, 3:30 P.M.

MR. ROMBERG: The briefing this afternoon is ON BACKGROUND. The briefers will have some opening remarks, and then will be happy to take your questions.

FIRST SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think everybody has a set of the tables which show the country programs and the program totals. There are also four sort of illustrative graphs that give you some idea of the distribution of the programs, the FMS, ESF, IMET totals, MAP totals, and also their distribution by region.

The tables which you have are rather complicated and detailed. I'm sure that a lot of you, after you've looked at them, may have questions following this briefing. If you do, don't hesitate to call either me or the Pentagon official.

There are three bills that are in question here. We have a Supplemental Bill for FY-83. We have a separate Lebanon Supplemental, and then we have the FY-84 Security Assistance budget. Let me take up each one in turn.

With respect to the FY-83 Supplemental, we are requesting $987.5 million in additional Security Assistance in this fiscal year. This includes $525 million of off-budget FMS guaranteed loans. These are loans; they are not grants. They are moneys loaned to foreign countries at the rate of interest on which the United States Government borrows funds.

This requirement is based in part and includes the Lebanon Supplemental,this gross number, but $961 million was cut by the Congress from our FY-83 request, and this Supplemental is designed to restore a significat part of that cut. We're doing it because the nature of the cuts imposed by the Congress were really quite severe, and we cannot conduct our foreign national security policy without these resources. Certainly, without the Supplemental, we will do severe damage to a number of important security relationships that we have around the world.

Let me give you an example of the severity of the cut Congress imposed, and the reason why we're going back for a Supplemental is that Congress earmarked a good deal of the '83 moneys to a number of countries above the Administration request levels, but provided no additional funding to cover those earmarks. So that with respect to the FMS guaranteed loans, we only have half of what we requested if we fulfill these earmarks, which we have to do by law; and we only have a quarter of the grant funds that we asked for that are unearmarked -- that is, a quarter of what we asked for.

On the breakdown for the Supplemental is $167 million in grants -- that is grant MAP; $249.5 million in Economic Support Funds, so-called ESF; $1 million in International Military Education and Training -- that, by the way, is for Lebanon; and $525 million in these FMS Guaranteed Loans.

If we don't get the Supplemental, we're going to be in serious trouble with a number of major allies and friendly countries with whom we have strong security relationships, notably, Pakistan, Korea, Thailand, countries all of whom are faced with severe threats from hostile neighbors. We will also have grave problems in countries like Turkey, the countries of the Horn of Africa, and the Caribbean.

Turning now to the Lebanon Supplemental, we're asking for $251 million, of which $150 million will be in Economic Support Funds -- this will be all grant. That, by the way is no-year money; that is, we would ask for it this year, but it would be spent over two years, '83 and '84. $100 million in FMS Guaranteed Loans, and as I mentioned $1 million in IMET, Military Education and Training.

The ESF portion is designed to finance construction and capital equipment to be supplied by U.S. firms, rebuild the infrastructure in and around Beirut -- transportation, basic utilities, water, sewage, that kind of thing. Some will go to agricultural development, training, technical assistance.

The $100 million in FMS Guaranteed Loans is designed to continue a program that we have already begun to rebuild the Lebanese armed forces. That is a three-stage program. We now have completed most of phase one, which is to bring four brigades of the Lebanese armed forces up to 70 percent strength; and February, this month, is our target date to get that equipment in-country, and to begin training the Lebanese brigades on that equipment. The next stage is to reconstitute a fifth brigade, and to bring one of the original four up to the 100 percent strength.

We hope to have that in train and well along by mid-year, that is by June, and have it completed by next February. The reason we need the money now is that if we we are to order the equipment and get it shipped into Lebanon by early summer, we have to pay for it in the immediate future. Of course, the whole rebuilding of the Lebanese armed forces is critical if the Government of Lebanon is to reestablish the Central Government's control over the country, assuming the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.

Finally, on IMET, there is a very high requirement for training for Lebanese military officers and personnel here and also to finance the military mobile training teams that we send to Lebanon to train the Lebanese military in-country on a variety of equipment that we are providing.

The '84 bill, we are requesting $9.2 billion total, which is somewhat above our '83 request by $400 million or thereabouts; and the funds, I think, can best be described as being devoted to five major objectives. Half of the total program is allocated, basically, to the Middle East and to support our Middle East peace effort. That is about half of those funds go to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Sinai MFO.

About 20% of the total supports countries that provide the United States with access and base facilities, specifically Spain, Portugal, the Philippines, Greece and Turkey. Another 20% goes to finance military purchases by countries of particular defense interest to us, for example, Korea, Thailand, Pakistan, and Indonesia, either because their location is critical or because they are faced with severe threats from hostile neighbors, alliance relationships, and the like.

About one-tenth of the program provides economic support where economic instability and political instability could jeopardize U.S. strategic interests. The residual, which is about 1% or thereabouts, goes for the IMET program, which is a very small but extraordinarily important program and one with a very high return, from our point of view, and to small assistance programs primarily in Africa and Latin America. The charts that you have do sort of break down these figures. You can see graphically how the program is broken down.

I think at this point, I'll turn the mike over to the Pentagon official for whatever he would like to say from the Defense Department point of view.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Ladies and Gentlemen: As you no doubt know, the State Department has the lead on developing our Foreign Assistance programs to include our Security Assistance; but in the development of these programs, they work very closely with the Department of Defense, which includes my organization as well as the regions and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The programs and the funding that are reflected here that we feel are urgent in the Supplemental -- and I'm setting aside Lebanon, for a moment -- are those which are continuing programs of countries which we believe are of important interest to the United States, to come up with a series of capabilities within those countries under which we analyze thoroughly and assess judgments on before they are ever submitted and they become part of the package.

Many criteria are used for those to include, of course, the affordability for the country, the sophistication of the materials and weapons systems they would purchase, and perhaps even more importantly, though, what they would contribute to regional stability or internal stability and what certain of them would provide in terms of access to us in case we were called upon in a contingency.

Another important factor is what they could do for themselves without involving the U.S. Forces. I might add that over the last several years, the Security Assistance Program has avoided any direct conflict for the United States, and nations have been able to handle regional problems or their own problems in what we view as an acceptable way.

It is important -- we have certain countries where we have, in Korea, for example, a high state of readiness for the North Koreans, a large amount of equipment, and where we have U.S. forces in sizable numbers, and an urgent need to have a continuing force improvement program within the South Korean forces.

By reductions in programs at this stage or uneven programs, as you might guess if the same thing were to occur in the United States defense forces, we have starts, stops, and faltering; and the countries are simply not able to continue to develop those capabilities which they desparately need.

There are other countries which are important to us, as my colleague said, in the Horn, for various reasons, where there are critical materials at stake and lines of passage and lines of communication. There are those, for example, Turkey, that is in desparate need of modernization, one that throughout the years has found itself in greater and greater obsolescence and one which is in desparate need of modernization. At the levels that we had this past year, they began a modernization program in refurbishing equipment that they have and modernizing the old equipment that they have, in setting up an infrastructure as a very important NATO ally which has tremendous borders and a tremendous range of responsibilities in case of conflict, but more to deter. Turkey is in a position now to where if it does not modernize, it will become weaker and weaker, and in a very important and a key area.

There are other countries that are of a different value to the United States and to the Department of Defense in its overall mission of protecting our interests. We like to believe -- and we do believe -- that the programs that have been developed and the funds that are required, only to continue those programs are important to the interests of the United States.

A couple of other comments: There are countries which because of the economic situation in the United States, that are having difficulties in the world, as you know, or are having difficulties economically. There is a major consideration on our part in recommending credits that might be available to them, which they will eventually have to pay back, and also a concern on our part that those countries should receive increased MAP or grant money and more favorable terms in their pay back.

I will make one other comment, that the moneys that are made available, appropriated, and authorized by Congress for security assistance must be used to purchase euqipment and services from the United States and no other nation. That is not only smart, but it is also mandated by Congress, and followed by us in spirit.

This is not to say that we see the moneys that are appropriated as a money-making thing for the United States. And it is not a reason to have a foreign policy or Foreign Military Sales Program. But it is also not a reason not to have one, because it does not hurt us economically, in our view. There will be varying interpretations on that, but the money does not go to other sources; the procurement must occur here in the United States.

Thank you.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good. I think at this poiint, we will take any questions that you have.

Q Could you save us from some paper work and possibly save us from error by walking us through the largest programs, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, and tell us how they compare with last year's?

A Sure.

Q Just to understand your terminology, "Guaranty" means to guarantee a loan; and "Direct" means a grant?

A It's a forgiven -- We don't have -- Originally, a direct -- Yes.

Q Excuse me, Jim, I just wanted to get that.

A By the way, I had a typo in what I was reading from in the Supplemental. I said the ESF figure was $249.5. It's $294. There has been a transposition of the numbers -- just as a correction.

The way this set of tiny numbers is laid out, each sheet covers a different program. On the top you've got the aggregate figures for the entire program, and you can read across. See the '82, '83, and requested '84 numbers. Page 2 contains the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program. This is the guaranteed credits, the loan program; and it is the largest, single items in the entire Security Assistance Budget.

In the tables that you have, Egypt and Israel are the two largest programs, by far. They take almost half the entire budget. For Egypt, we're requesting $850 million in loans and another $450 in what amounts to a grant. That is, it's a forgiven credit.

For Israel, the number in FY-84 is $1.150 billion and there is $550 million in addition in forgiven credits. That, therefore, gives you for Israel $1.7 billion as a total.

Q Is that what is referred to as $1,000,000,000 in Direct Financing Program on the first page? Is that Egypt/Israel?

A Yes.

Q Is that what it means?

A Yes, that's right.

Q I don't understand on Israel -- it's $1.15 in loans?

A In loans; and an additional $550 million in forgiven loans, for a total of $1.7 billion.

Q Is that on another page, the forgiven loans?

A Yes. I think that's on a separate. It's on page one, and you'll also see it on page three, the very next one, that little short one.

Q O.K. So in other words, how does that compare, total with the current year, in both cases?

A For the current year, Egypt is getting $400 million in forgiven, $900 million in loans. You will see that in the column, "FY-83 Revised Requests."

Q So, in other words, they are level, their totals --

A Yes.

Q -- while Israel goes up.

A No. Israel stays the same, as well.

Q And Turkey?

A Turkey for '84, there is a jump. You'll find that down in sort of the middle of the page. Our program for Turkey in the FMS Program in '83, you'll see, is $355 million in loans; and in FY-84, we're requesting $525. Turkey does get some grant assistance, and you'll find that about four pages further on. And that's $110 million.

Q For '83, right?

A For '83, right. And for '84, $230 is what we are requesting.

Q Just a few questions so I can understand this: The '83 figure we should look for is the Revised Request?

A The Revised Request.

Q That's what we should work for?

A Yes.

Q Now, I don't understand what you just told Jim, that the figure in Israel's case stands the same. In guaranteed loans there is a jump from $950 to $1150 million. Is this right?

A Yes, but Israel, last year -- and you'll find that again if you look back on the forgiven that it got $750 million in forgiven credits. That was a Congressional earmark that I mentioned before. Do you see it?

Q Yes, I do. So you're saying that the totals come out the same --

A Yes, the totals are the same.

Q -- for both Egypt and Israel, '83 and '84?

A Yes.

Q What is the difference between a grant and a forgiven loan?

A It's a word of art. That's the way Congress describes it in the legislation. In other words, we loan them the money, and then we write that part of the loan off.

Q How do these figures play off against what the Hill has been doing? Would you give us the state of play? And I believe it was the Appropriations Committee that was increasing the amount of grant aid to Israel? Where does that stand?

A It's been done. 750 has been earmarked.

Q That is the 750 --

A That's right.

Q Did you say Egypt also stays the same? I couldn't hear you.

A Yes. It's just that the mix within these totals is changed slightly.

Q What is the difference between Foreign Military Sales and between the Military Assistance Program?

A   The Foreign Military Sales Program is basically the loan program, where we extend credits for 12 years -- in a few cases for longer than that. The Military Assistance Program is a grant program. The old Military Assistance Program goes way back to the 1950s.

Q   Last year your request for direct FMAs for Israel and Egypt was, for Israel $500 million and for Egypt, $400 million.

A $400 million, that's right.

Q   And if you look at the figures this year, the total is the same, but you increased for both countries the amount that they get as direct loan.

A   Yes.

Q   What was the reason for this increase?

A   In part, there is, obviously, an economic need for both countries. It reflects also anticipation of a Congressional consensus that the grant component ought to be raised.

Q   Where was it raised? I can't find that.

A   The Congress earmarked for Israel, added 250 over what we had asked for.

Q   So why didn't you go all the way with the Congress, and then give Israel as the Congress did?

A   Because, in the first place, we have a limited resource here. We have other requirements besides just Egypt and Israel who are already getting half the program.

Q   Do you expect that the Congress will try to increase the Israeli share once again?

A   I'm not going predict what the Congress will do in this case.

Q   The increase to Israel, how did that affect the Pakistan program for this --

A It affects it in the sense that the total resources that we have available -- Pakistan is not getting grant money, so that the Congressional earmark for grants for Pakistan, it's a wash. But when we're talking about the total FMS program, we come up short; and unless we get the Supplemental, we will not be able to fund the Pakistan program completely.

Q Unless the Supplemental is enacted by Congress?

A Yes.

Q Do you know how many of the FMS loans have been rescheduled or are in default at this point?

A Let me turn that one over to my colleague. This came up at another session we had this morning with Congressional staffers.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I won't be able to precisely answer the question. I just don't have the data, whoever the questioner was. There has been rescheduling of debts, but not just FMS or Security Assistance debts. It is within the country programs that have been rescheduled. That is to say, Turkey has been rescheduled by the Paris Club, and there have been other countries that have been rescheduled. When that occurs, it affects all elements of their economic programs. It includes Security Assistance.

There is the matter of the Brooke Amendment that, of course, says that when a country defaults or is unable to continue payment or does not, then we discontinue it when that occurs.

There are late payments on occasion by certain countries, but to my knowledge, we only have one right now that falls within the Brooke Amendment.

Q Is that Turkey?

A No, it is not.

Q Can you tell us which country it is?

A Zaire.

STAFFER: No. They just came in. That's right. They just came in yesterday on that.

Q May I ask you, sir, on this economic aid to Israel, I didn't understand one of the replies. This $750 million figure that is listed here for '83, does that include $200 million that Congress suggested be forgiven, or was the government's own request for $750 million forgiven at the outset?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. We did not ask for $750 million. That was a Congressional earmark.

Q You asked for what, $550?

A $500 million. They added $250 million.

Q I see. So, essentially, you're going back to what you asked for last year in terms of forgiven?

A Yes.

(Continued on page 12.)

Q Also on Israel, to get the full flavor of how much U.S. money will flow in that direction, one also has to add the economic support.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q So in other words --

FIRST OFFICIAL: 785 for Israel --

Q Yes. So it would be 1.7 billion plus 785.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's right. 750 for Egypt.

Q Could you also give us some details on the security assistance levels for Central America, especially some details on that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'll tell you, they're in the table. These tend to be fairly small programs. If you look on Page 2, down at the bottom, you'll see the American republics, which include Central America, the Caribbean.

The largest program, I guess, is El Salvador, and -- let's see -- and Panama, but, you know, they're all fairly modest programs, as are all the programs in Latin America. We just don't provide much. The ESF program is much larger.

Q This year they were requesting -- the original request was for $63 million, and then in the continuing resolution there was only $25 million for El Salvador.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Are you asking for any increased amounts for this year or next year for El Salvador?

FIRST OFFICIAL: For El Salvador the big increase is in the ESF program, and, if you'll turn to that page, you'll see that our El Salvador request, both the revised request for the -- in the supplemental is $140 million, and $120 million in the '84 request.

In other words, there's a shift here from military assistance to economic assistance which reflects what we believe to be a shift in the requirements in El Salvador where the economic structure of the country is under attack by the guerrillas -- blowing up generators and pylons and the like -- and it's absolutely essential that this stuff be replaced.

Q (Inaudible) shift from military to economic when your military is virtually doubling?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Pardon? I'm sorry.

Q How do you mean that there is a shift from military to economic when your military is virtually doubling?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It means just that I'm talking in the sense of the kind of -- the requirement within El Salvador, we believe, continues to be very heavily on the economic side. I'm sorry, I didn't --

Q I see you're dropping $20 million in economic and going up $14 million in military, and I don't quite understand your contention that one is shifting in the other direction.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I mean, it's a proportion of what? -- one to five, thereabouts -- that is, the emphasis on it.

Q But your proportion is decreasing, is it not?

FIRST OFFICIAL: But, look, last year -- what was our total? $55 million in '82 for military under -- what was the -- (to staff) Do you remember what the --

THIRD OFFICIAL: 115 --

FIRST OFFICIAL: For El Salvador. We used our so-called 506 emergency draw-down authority on two occasions for El Salvador. As I recall, I think the total was 55.

THIRD OFFICIAL: 63.5 in MAP.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, there you have it. $63 million in grant assistance under our 506 authority, and the FMS financing was 16.5, and this year we're not going after that kind of money for El Salvador. We're only asking, in fact, in the -- for the total -- I should work out the totals and add them all up for you.

Q I have a total, and I'm curious, because it's almost 1-to-1. With MAP and FMS combined for '84 you're requesting $85 million. For ESF you're requesting 120, which is not a 5-to-1 ratio which the Administration has talked about over the last couple of years.

Why this tremendous rise in military?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The military has not risen from '82 through '84. It hasn't.

Q Well, I'm looking at '84, and I'm seeing 120 versus 80, and that's not 5-to-1.

Q Where is he looking?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes, I'm sorry.

Q Well, the 80 I break down -- on FMS guarantee, $30 million for '84, and on the MAP I see $55 million -- sorry, it's not 80, it's 85 --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q So it's certainly not 5-to-1, it's less than 1-to-1½.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes, but I'm sorry, there's one table we don't have, and that's Development Assistance. Do we have anybody from AID here?

(No response)

Q I think that's in the neighborhood of about $40 million, which would still be a 2-to-1, not 5-to-1. Can you explain why that is?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Could you explain why the proportions have changed that radically in the last two years?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're facing in El Salvador, obviously, a really crisis situation on both the military and the economic side. I mean, there's been no growth in the El Salvador economy over the last year -- in fact, there may actually have been a decline -- and we continue to face a very severe military threat.

In other words, we got a major program going -- and I agree with you, I was only operating on the FMS as opposed to ESF and that 1-to-5 ratio -- but the fact is that the needs in El Salvador remain exceedingly high.

Q But is this a testimony to a deteriorating military situation?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. I wouldn't characterize it as that. If we had somebody from ARA here, I would be in a better position to give you the details, but it's certainly serious. But, no, I don't think we can argue that it's deteriorating.

Q I notice that you have $10 million in FMS for Guatemala. Does that include the 6-plus that was announced recently -- $6 million plus -- or is that on top of that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'm not sure about the $6 million plus. This is the program for Guatemala, and it's mostly designed to -- what we had agreed -- maybe what you're talking about is our agreement to sell spare parts for cash.

Q Yeah.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's probably what you're referring to.

Q And why is there no FMS for Honduras?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Because while we've got us some MAP for Honduras -- which I think you'll find over on the next page here -- let me look and see what the numbers are --

Q $40 million.

FIRST OFFICIAL: $40 million. Honduras is not in a position really to carry much of a debt load, and that's the reason for that.

Q I'm curious about the increase to Peru which seems to go up quite markedly. I'm wondering why that is.

FIRST OFFICIAL: This is in the FMS program?

Q FMS, right.

FIRST OFFICIAL: You know, Peru is looking to diversify -- if that's the word -- its military purchases. It's been very heavily dependent on the Soviet Union, and it is in our interests to see that diversification occur. It's a modest program, $30 million. It will buy, you know, a couple of C-130s, something of that sort, and that's basically the reason. Peru is an interesting country, it's an important one, and we'd like to offer them the opportunity to buy American.

Q What is the difference between -- we know what a loan for FMS is, and we know what the forgiven is. What is the difference between the military assistance program and those other two, please?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The military assistance program -- I'm going to leave that one to the second official. Basically, it is a grant program of long-standing that has certain legislative and other legal differences that separate it from the forgiven FMS credit which --

Q That's a grant, huh?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yeah. It is grant. It's a grant program.

Q And how did you handle that question about going on El Salvador from 8 to 55? Was that because you see a crisis in both economic and military?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It continues to -- I mean, El Salvador continues to be in very serious straits.

Q And all the U.S. granted El Salvador last year was $8.5 million?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. Because we had -- we used this so-called emergency draw-down authority, 506.

Q How much was that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: 55.

Q 55 additional million plus the 8?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Is that right?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you explain the increase in aid, the FMS to Jordan?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Can you explain the increase in the FMS requested for Jordan?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Jordan has been -- you know, for years has been buying equipment from the United States. The program, at least to my mind, has always been probably under-funded, given the sort of situation it finds itself in.

It has some very serious modernization requirements coming up, particulary in the air defense area, and Jordan has been a -- what shall I say? -- a very reliable partner in the Middle East, and is in a very uneasy situation and has been, particularly from Syria and so on.

This strikes us as being a reasonable increase in that particular program, given its military requirement.

Q Why there is a decrease in the Fiscal Year '84 on foreign military sales to Lebanon? $15 million.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Because of the supplemental.

Q I don't understand.

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're going in for this $251 million supplemental to Lebanon, which we believe will -- it was a one-shot deal. We're going to re-equip those brigades, retrain them, and hopefully re-establish the Lebanese armed forces --

Q (Inaudible) any more than this, or there will be more progress for the future?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There may be more progress in the future. We're not planning any, but we assume that once we got this re-equipment program finished, that then the Lebanese will pick up the operations and maintenance clause, training clause, and the like.

In other words, it really is a one-shot deal to get that army back on its feet.

Q What about economic aid? There won't be any in '84.

FIRST OFFICIAL: In the supplemental it's "no-year" money. That is, some of it will be spent in '83 and some in '84, and of course there are a lot of other donors that are operating in Lebanon. It's not just the United States.

Q Can I follow up on Jordan, please? Are the numbers that you have -- do they envision a specific arms deal that you expect in the coming year?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. But we have a list of things that we expect them to buy, and it far exceeds $150 million, and that does not include things like advanced aircraft. I mean, it's ammunition, it's trucks, it's --

Q You mentioned anti-aircraft. Does that mean Hawks?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's one possibility, but that isn't in this list. We have no request -- we have no formal request for Hawks -- but I'm saying the things that we expect to come on-stream this year, we've got 300 or 400 -- maybe $300 million worth of things that are really quite ordinary.

SECOND OFFICIAL: May I make a point at this point?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. Go ahead.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I'm concerned that there may be a perception that has grown that the funds that are requested are tied to specific weapons systems for any particular country. That is not the case.

This is an estimate on our part as to the affordability within the overall budget that can be appropriated, either in MAP or credit program, as to their requirements after working with them and understanding their needs.

The funding of these monies in no way commits the United States to sell any particular weapons system. It is based on an estimate of what we understand their needs, and whenever the monies are made available, then the country, probably having some planning -- considerable planning done -- will then come to us for a request.

In Jordan, for example, it is upgrading and modernizing the existing systems that they have, and it does not involve any large procurements of any new sophisticated weapons systems.

In many cases, just as in Turkey, those programs have suffered over the years in obsolescence to meet what they perceive -- and we agree -- is a general threat to them.

Q Is all of this $9.2 billion for Fiscal Year '84 in DOD budget, or is some of it State Department?

SECOND OFFICIAL: All of the security assistance and foreign assistance funds are handled through the State Department. The State Department has a lead on all of this within our government, and also has a lead on not only that in justifying it to Congress, but also has a lead on the allocations of them and also the lead on determining which weapons systems they will receive.

Q So it is part of the State Department budget, not part of the DOD budget? That was my question.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Foreign Affairs budget.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Foreign Affairs budget.

Q Can I inject something here, anticipating a political problem? I've been trying to do the figures in my head, and I got lost, but what is the net effect of the juggling of funds -- Greece vis-a-vis Turkey -- and how much of a political problem are you buying?

I think, as I get it, there's a net increase in -- at least in grant aid to Turkey, and I've already had a couple of phone calls complaing about that.

What is the net effect of that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The Turkey figure is based on what we consider to be a long --

Q The total is 755.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The total is 750.

Q 755.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Yeah. 755. And it's based on our judgment of really long unmet Turkish modernization needs in virtually every aspect of the Turkish military establishment.

The Greek figure, as you'll note, is straight-lined from last year --

Q 280.

FIRST OFFICIAL: -- at 280. We have just started a renegotiation of our defense cooperation agreement -- talks just started, I think, last month -- and we don't know how those negotiations are going to come out.

When we have a better feel for the nature of the agreement that we can reach, why we will have to reconsider, I think, the Greek figure. But, at the moment, we have no reason to raise it.

Q The more money, including the economic assistance, will exceed the $1 billion?

FIRST OFFICIAL: For Turkey?

Q Turkey.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Close to that, yes, I think it is.

Q What about --

FIRST OFFICIAL: 900 and something.

Q What about the tradition of a 7-to-10 ratio?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We don't recognize the 7-to-10 ratio. That's a Congressionally imposed ratio. It's not something that the Administration has ever acquiesced in.

Q Which weapons system are you expecting them to be interested in?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Who?

Q The Turks.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Do you want to take that one? (To Second Official).

SECOND OFFICIAL: The Turks, at the current level, as I indicated to you earlier, are modernizing their tanks, their naval programs, their aircraft programs, in terms of performing better maintenance on them and will buy probably a few helicopters.

The need for the funds across the board in their modernization -- they anticipate that one of their high priorities is what they would consider to be air defense, which would be possibly new fighters, some point air defense, control radars, etc., etc., which would be deployed into the central and to the eastern parts of Turkey, in large measure.

But they have not made a determination as yet as to which type of aircraft they will purchase and how many at this time.

Q On Turkey they have bought the F-4s from Egypt.

SECOND OFFICIAL: No. They have not. They are negotiating with the Egyptians.

Q Would that be included in this money or --

SECOND OFFICIAL: No. In the additional funds above what is now --

Q Yes.

SECOND OFFICIAL: We're asking for in the supplement to go from 400 to 465 to further do what they are doing, and some of that money could possibly be used to purchase those aircraft, depending on how they would readjust their five-year program just as we would.

The increases in the monies are not based on the justification of purchasing of those aircraft specifically.

Q Can I ask you a question on Jordan, please? Jordan goes from 75 to 115. That's 80. That's about more than a 50% jump. $40 million more.

To what degree, if any, has that figure of FMS for Jordan been influenced by the Administration's hopes that Jordan joins the President's peace process?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It's basically detached from that. I mean, the decision on the Jordan figure was developed last summer well before the recent visit of King Hussein. And, as I say, it's based on what we consider to be legitimate military requirements for Jordan.

Q In the economic support funds, what do you mean by "southern Africa regional, $40 million"?

FIRST OFFICIAL: This is a development -- I think it's devoted largely to roads, infrastructure, that kind of thing, and it has to do with our general southern African effort to restore peace and tranquility to that part of the world.

Q But does that mean Namibia or -- which countries does that --

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. It covers three or four. (To staff) Does anybody know offhand which -- I'll have to look that up for you to give you exactly which countries are benefiting.

Q Another question on Jordan, if I may. They received some Soviet arms -- Soviet military assistance this past year, didn't they? And I ask the question in the context to what degree do we feel we're in competition with the Soviets to provide them arms?

FIRST OFFICIAL: What Jordan bought from the Soviets was some air defense equipment. It was basically anti-aircraft guns which -- of a sort that in fact we don't even have. We don't make them. It was a very modest purchase that was a one-time shot, as far as I know, and in that sense we're not in competition. We've been involved in Jordan -- in equipping the Jordan military for years.

Q Is this the highest ever security assistance program that's ever been introduced by the Administration?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Not if you compare it to the late 50s.

Q Late 50s there were more?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. Substantially more. If you look at the dollar value of those programs back in the 50s, it's double this at least, and it was in those days all grant.

Q To follow that last question up -- a more general policy question -- you know that Hill liberals who normally support foreign aid are very touchy about the relative balance between the economic development and security on the other hand.

And, if you look at FY '82 actual and FY '84 request, you see in the security categories rises -- in the case of FMS of about 30% and in the case of MAP about 270%, whereas the ESF is relatively static.

Do you expect that this is going to go down well in Congress, number one? And, number two, what kind of a world does this -- well, not world, that's too silly -- but what does this suggest about the degree to which the Reagan Administration has made the world more secure over the last two years that we have to spend this much more on military assistance?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think the requirement -- first, let me say that the economic aid figures that you have in that table do not include PL-480 and development assistance. You would have to add that on, and that's a substantial amount of money. I don't know offhand what it is, but you're talking billions of dollars.

Second, we deal with the world as we find it, and the fact is that if we've got serious problems -- places like Sudan and Kenya, elsewhere in Africa, primarily sort of Soviet-Libyan activities to overthrow, otherwise destabilize countries -- Pakistan's facing a serious threat from Afghanistan that for national security and political reasons we feel obliged to deal with -- a naked act of aggression that you just can't turn your back on. We have continuing requirement for base rights, and, as I pointed out, almost 20% of the budget is involved in ensuring that we maintain access facilities, bases, and the like in at least five very important countries geographically located.

So I don't think that you can say that the security assistance budget reflects on this or any other administration's ability to deal with the world that it finds. This is one way, and an important way, of ensuring that our security interests are protected.

Q I understand. But after two years of the Reagan Administration, it appears from these figures that the world's actually become a more dangerous place in terms of military threats to U.S. interests. Is that correct?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Look, that's a judgmental thing that we could spend the rest of the afternoon arguing. I don't know whether it's more or less dangerous than it was in 1979 when the Soviets walked into Afghanistan.

Q A follow-up question to that: The MAP program, which was just about moribund in 1981 -- it was down to about $160 million -- and you've got about a 260% rise here --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It is about the highest it's been since '75.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Direct reflection of the economic situation that a number of our allies and other friendly countries find.

Q Is this also a signal to the future? I mean, do you see the MAP grant program increasing in the next few years because of that economic program?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I can't speculate on that, but I can say that when you look at where those MAP programs are devoted, they're the countries that really we cannot in good conscience offer high-interest-rate loans to; that they have serious security problems that need to be met, and the only responsible way to meet them is with grants, because a country like Sudan simply cannot absorb any more credits at whatever the current rate of interest is that the government's paying on money.

MODERATOR: You have two questions in the back, and then why don't we cut it off?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Okay.

Q What is the breakdown in the economic support fund for Israel and Egypt between loans and grants?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think it's all grant for both.

Q And it's also a change from last year -- it was two-thirds and one-third, wasn't it?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. But I think year, '84, I believe it is all grant. Am I right? ESF for Egypt and Israel.

THIRD OFFICIAL: Yes.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. It's all grant this year.

Q And one more thing. You said something before about Zaire. Would you explain why Zaire doesn't get any FMS credit?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Because they can't afford to take on any more credits.

Q Just for clarification, do you have some tables back there with the totals for the countries, with all the addition done? Or could you give me again the totals for --

(Laughter)

Q -- because we're going to have a lot of mistakes here. For Israel, Jordan, Egypt --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Look, I do have something that we probably could duplicate which takes a few of the key ones and puts all of the programs on one thing.

Q Do you have the Middle East on that?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I've got it here. We'll duplicate it up.

Q Are those actual dollars or current dollars?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They're current dollars.

Q They're current. You mean the previous figures are brought up to 1984?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Oh, no, no, no. They are then-year dollars.

Q Okay. I'd like to ask in that case for '83 with the supplemental it comes to $8 billion 775 million, and for the '84 request it's $9 billion 142 million. With inflation is that an increase or a decrease on the 1983 figures?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think a slight increase. I don't know that we've worked it out, but I'm not absolutely certain about that.

Q Okay. Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 3:29 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 7, 1983
No. 39

PC#17

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE INTERNATIONAL CLUB

Beijing, China
February 5, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I came here to contribute what I can to the building of a stable and enduring relationship with China. That was the direction I got from President Reagan and that is what I tried to carry out. I found on arriving that this was also the intent of the Foreign Minister of China as he said privately and in his toast on the opening evening. Within that framework and with those joint objectives, we have explored issues around the world. We found some instances, cases, where we have parallel views and interests and others where our views differ. But in all cases the discussion was penetrating and worthwhile. As we reviewed our bilateral relationship, we realized that much has been accomplished. If you look at the volume of trade, the amount of technology exchange, the number of students and other people moving in both directions, there is a considerable record to look at. On the other hand, there are issues of importance that we must manage with great care. The Taiwan issue was raised a number of times and there was assurance given on each side that the negotiations on that issue, as for example, leading up to the August Communique, and in other statements on that issue that have been part of the written statements that each side have agreed on together, that these have been worked on hard and seriously. And from the standpoint of the United States, I assured my counterparts that we took these undertakings seriously and intend to live by the commitments made in the Communique. I would say that this is a characteristic of ours which cuts across issues, the intention and the determination to live by our commitment. With regard to many other bilateral issues that are sometimes difficult and contentious in themselves, we seek to find that atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence that tends to take a problem and turn it into something that is soluble, as distinct from an atmosphere of distrust which can make the same problem very difficult to resolve because of possible implications of a lack of good faith. But I believe that this objective of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence is a key and certainly is something that I intend and President Reagan intends to work for. I appreciate the warmth and the seriousness with which my hosts have received me here. And I hope that whatever accomplishment may result ultimately from this visit, in the space of just a few short days, of course, will reflect that warmth and the seriousness. I would like to say that, a number of times, when very direct and candid statements were made to me, my hosts said that I should remember that candor was something that could take place among friends. And I would have to say that I received a great deal of friendship during my visit here. Questions?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when you left for Peking you said that you hoped that the Taiwan issue would remain in the background in these discussions. Tonight you told us that it was raised a couple of times. Has that issue remained in the background and perhaps enabled you to move on to the other issues, and perhaps get on the way to solving some? Or is that an obstacle to solving the other problems?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Taiwan issue has been, is, a problem. We discussed it as I said and I think the most important thing that I can say about it is that we have made some commitments with respect to Taiwan and we intend to live by those commitments.

QUESTION: Is the State Department position on the Chinese tennis star Hu Na, who is now seeking political asylum in the United States, that she would face a real threat of persecution if she returned home?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is a case that is handled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice. They are reviewing the case and I don't know what the outcome of that review will be. I do believe that in the process of very large scale cultural exchanges with thousands of people moving back and forth, incidents will arise from time to time, I'm sure. The question always is: Is this a sort of individual incident that has to be given that perspective or not? And here I think is an illustration of the importance of an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence that surrounds the relationship as a whole.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, why is it that the Chinese are still not satisfied on the Taiwan issue? Is it that they do not like the agreement that was signed in August? Can you give us a better understanding of what the problem is now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: One of the rules that I always make with myself is that I don't try to speak for other people. You will have to ask the Chinese that question. From my standpoint I can speak for the United States and as I have said now, this is the third time, that we have made certain commitments, not only in the August Communique, but also in the Shanghai Communique and in the communique on normalization, about what we will do, what we will not do. We will live by those commitments.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you say specifically what it is the United States will do to decrease arms sales to Taiwan as spelled out in the August 17th Communique?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I did not try to renegotiate that Communique with the Chinese and I don't think I want to do it here either. The Communique spells out certain undertakings and we will live by them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you talk about the strategic relationship with China, particularly in relation to China's efforts to normalize relations with the Soviet Union? Do we have what you might call a strategic relationship with the Chinese any more? Or is it just the case where this is another country on which some issues we agree with and some issues we don't?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, China is a country of great importance. President Reagan considers it to be a country that we certainly want to have a strong, stable and enduring relationship with. In my discussions here, and in discussions with others on other occasions, certainly we have talked about our relationships with the Soviet Union, the U.S. relationship, the relationship of China with the Soviet Union. And that is, of course, something that both parties are interested in. There are aspects of Soviet behavior that affect us both and which we have discussed. So, I suppose if you want to call that a strategic relationship you can, but I prefer myself to think of our relationship as being a stable and enduring one based on the direct contact between the United States and China and our interest not only in what the Soviet Union may or may not do but on many other matters of bilateral and international concern.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you seek any explanation from the Chinese on their characterization of the United States as superpower on hegemony along with the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Again, I will let the Chinese speak for themselves. From the standpoint of the United States, we don't think we are remotely comparable to the Soviet Union and we should not be put in the same bag and characterized as the same kind of country for a host of reasons that I need not belabor here.

QUESTION: Why were you so tough on the American businessmen at the luncheon when they asked you to be a little more forceful with the Chinese on their behalf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I wasn't tough. I was just a little annoyed and tired. No big deal.

QUESTION: Did you get the sense from the Chinese that they were on the threshold of an agreement with the Soviets on the Kampuchea issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Again, I think any views of the Chinese about a subject like that, you have to get directly from them. I think it is no secret that both we and the Chinese believe that the Vietnamese should get out of Kampuchea and there should be an opportunity for a democratic Kampuchea to establish itself. And we hope that occurs. If, as a result of discussions between the Chinese and Soviet Union, something like that can come about I think that would be a plus. I don't want to characterize that because I think it would be presumptuous of me. It is up to the Chinese to describe their conversations with the Soviets on that question.

QUESTION: Is there any way you can say what changes have occurred in the U.S.-China relationship as a result of this visit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hope that the result of this visit is some contribution to the development of understanding, of trust, of mutual confidence between us. That is not something that comes out of the visit or what anyone says but emerges as the result of activities that people undertake. To some extent I think it is especially established if you manage to work through successfully something that is difficult, as distinct from things that are relatively easy. And we have had plenty of difficult things to work through. So, my aspiration is to make some contribution to this emerging relationship and I hope that that may have taken place.

QUESTION: May I ask you what is now the policy of the United States regarding the sale of lethal weapons to China? Is China interested in buying such weapons? I am speaking of the initiative Secretary Haig undertook when he was here.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The subject of arms sales didn't arise. And so it was not an issue.

QUESTION: Would you go into more detail on the military discussions that were held this afternoon by the subcommittee --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think there is any special detail to go into. They were on more or less technical matters and undoubtedly were informative but I don't think -- it is fair to say they were not addressed to major military issues.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of speculation that those discussions were a prelude to such things as a visit by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Is there any possibility of that in the next few months?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That remains to be seen. I think from our standpoint, that is certainly a possibility. But it depends upon how much interest there is on each side, in defense visits back and forth. I can't give any definite statement about it.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, what sort of success did you have in cutting through difficulties on the technology transfer issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is one of those issues that is difficult inherently, but on which, as I have dug into it myself, before I came here, and as I've listened to comments made here, it seems to me that is one of those issues where there is a lot of misunderstanding so that a real effort just to clear up the misunderstandings will help. Now there are some inherent difficulties in any technology transfer program, when a country -- and all countries have technology that they don't want to see exported or they want to see it exported only under definite conditions. We have that policy and other countries do. And it is always a somewhat difficult issue not just with respect to China but with other countries as well. But the main point I think out of an examination of the technology transfer subject is that there have been changes over the past two or three years -- the major one following Secretary Haig's visit about a year and a half ago here. And if you look at the statistics on the number of applications made and the number of applications approved, just to take that one measure, there has been a very considerable increase. So as time goes on, and as we work at this together, I think gradually that whole subject will come into proper perspective. Again it is one of those subjects where the interpretation of some problem will vary a lot depending on the sense of mutual trust and confidence between the parties generally, and at the same time handling it successfully will be a way in which that mutual trust will develop. So there is a kind of interactive process going on here.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it possible for you to say if any of the specific problems between the United States and China -- textiles, technology transfer, Taiwan -- are any closer to resolution now than they were before you got here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In the sense that there has been any contribution through these discussions, to understanding and mutual trust and confidence, then I suppose the answer is yes, sort of across the board. All of the subjects were discussed. But I did not come here to be the textile negotiator or the technology negotiator or whatever. I did not aspire to try to settle those issues as such.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have several times referred to the importance of personal contact, back and forth between leaderships. Can you tell us whether it is now clear that the Premier will be coming to the United States within the next several months, and could you tell us what the other trips are now seen as in the offing by high officials of the two Governments?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I talked about the importance of developing mutual trust and confidence, and you interpolated that into meaning personal visits. And I do think personal visits can make a contribution, but even more of a contribution is made by substantive activities that are mutually satisfying, so that if, for example, after our textile people can meet at some point and resolve their differences, that's a real contribution, as distinct from meetings as such. Now I do think that exchanges of people back and forth can be quite helpful. Secretary Baldrige, whose jurisdiction particularly emphasizes matters of trade and technology transfer, will be here in May as part of a regularly scheduled commission meeting. Similarly, the Presidential Science Advisor, Dr. Keyworth, will be here in May. And he, of course, will be able to talk about technological matters and technical matters from the standpoint of their genuine technical content. So, I think those visits -- they are definitely scheduled -- they will take place, and they will be constructive. I hope to meet the Chinese Foreign Minister from time to time; and I hope he will be able to come to the United States before long, so that we can continue to develop our own personal relationship and thereby to be better and better at talking problems out. The Premier has been invited explicitly by the President to visit the United States, and has said that he intends to do so, but pinning down a time for such a visit is something that has to be worked through the diplomatic channels and there isn't any answer as to the precise time and we will just have to wait on that. So there is a flow of people back and forth. I would not be at all surprised to see the volume of it increase.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, were there ever or are there now U.S.-equipped listening posts anywhere in China, or any kind of listening posts with which the United States has been involved?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's the kind of question I don't touch with a ten foot pole.

QUESTION: An easier one. You spent a good long time this morning with Deng Ziaoping. Could you tell us about the conversation and also how you found him personally in the two-three years since he travelled around the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Personally, of course, he is a very dynamic, forceful, interesting individual. I felt privileged to have a chance to spend that much time with him. From the standpoint of the content of our meeting, I would say the point that emerged to me most forcefully was just this one that I have been seeking to emphasize here, namely, the importance for the future of our relationship of the development of mutual trust and confidence.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did the Chinese bring up in discussions with you the subject of joint U.S. military exercises with the South Koreans, and if so what was said?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There was a statment made, not in our major meetings, about it. The response on our part was that this, of course, was a training exercise, planned a long time ago, and about which the North Koreans had been informed well in advance. So there is nothing about it that poses any immediate problem.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the problems of civilian nuclear cooperation with China or ask the Chinese about reports that they are slipping various nuclear materials to other countries?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as cooperation on matters of nuclear power is concerned, that is something that may emerge. There are interests on both sides in that. And we will just have to see if that will develop into something. We, of course, have for a long time been concerned about problems of nuclear proliferation and we continue to have that point of view and I am sure that it is widely shared around the world and here as well. But I don't want to go into that in any detail.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your discussions with the Chinese leaders, did any of them ask you whether President Reagan will run in 1984?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

QUESTION: Did you tell them?

MR. HUGHES, SPOKESMAN: (Laughter) We are about out of time.

End Text.

DEPARTMENT OF STAT

February 8, 1983
No. 42

PC # 18

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
EN ROUTE TO SEOUL, KOREA
FEBRUARY 6, 1983

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I do not have any. You can describe a meeting of top leaders as a summit meeting but I think the fact is that the President has invited the Premier to Washington, suggested some broad possible times, and the Premier has said, and he said it to you people at the press conference with him, that he will be coming. But we have to find the time, so we will start looking for that and that is the fact of the matter.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President has been invited and that is just starting to be under review but I think we have to take these things one at a time.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) What do you hope to accomplish here, what do you have in mind for this Korean visit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The principal objective, of course, is to reaffirm and support our security arrangements with Korea. And also, to pay my respects to the American troops that are stationed here. Beyond that there are points of encouragement towards moves in the direction of liberalization and also some discussion with them about economic development in general. On the whole they have had a fairly successful 1982 economically, particularly compared with other countries, and at the same time, it is always an interesting subject to discuss.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I do not have any specific reaction to that. Certainly, the problem of a reconciliation of the people of the North and South Korea is an important problem and I think the South Koreans have made a number of proposals -- some rather people to people steps and some of a more broad institutional nature -- to see if that cannot be brought about. On the whole, the North Koreans have more or less preemptorially rejected these approaches. So, I think that efforts to try to bring about some sort of better relationship between the peoples of the two Koreas is positive but it would be refreshing if the North Koreans would show a little give in the situation.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is not even in my briefing papers but if it comes up I am certainly glad to discuss it with them. But, fundamentally we have problems in the textile industry in the United States that have led to an effort to bring any increases in import levels in line with increases in the market generally. And that is broadly the stance that that has been taken in all of the negotiations with the Chinese. We have been slightly more forthcoming than with others, but basically everybody has been asked to reduce the rate of increase in their shipments.

QUESTION: Would you address the question of mutual recognition of North and South Korea by the Soviet Union and by the United States? You have any thoughts on that at all? Does it seem like a good idea, a silly idea or ...?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is the sort of thing that might be a symbol of a desire to reconcile these people. They are all Koreans and they have a lot of family ties back and forth so it is something of a strain to have this division. That is one version of so-called cross-recognition and there are a lot of other aspects to it. Sometimes you hear suggestions about recognition, and sometimes it is a matter of trade relationships and things of that kind but what they all add up to is a recognition of the artificially, from the standpoint of families and people of a divided Korea.

QUESTION: How are things going to go or how do you feel things will go now with China? Have we sorted out all the problems of the past few months? What is your own personal feeling about how the talks went and what the future holds?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have identified a lot of problems but also a lot of progress and accomplishment. There are a certain number of meetings that have been identified and potential further developments. And my own opinion is that if we can maintain the sort of spirit of the dialogue of the last four days, then we will gradually make headway in resolving the individual issues. As I commented yesterday at the press conference, if you can get issues into the context of a generally good atmosphere, then you find ways to solve them. You take the same issue and put it into a less happy atmosphere, and they become very difficult to solve. So, I think the general tone of things can have some impact.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Are you telling the Chinese the United States has a commitment to live up to the spirit of, or in terms of, the joint communique, but also other commitments in the world such as the enduring commitment to Taiwan, and it remains a commitment and the U.S. keeps it's commitments. Is that the general tone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's very important that our country keep commitments that are made. In referring to the various communiques that have dealt with the subject of Taiwan, I believe I'm correct in saying that every communique, every formal statement involving China (the People's Republic of China) and the United States have had a reference to Taiwan in one way or another. We do understand these commitments, we intend to live by these commitments. That was the statement that I made.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think there is a satisfactory status quo in terms of our foreign assistance programs that are in effect, and so on. I am sure there is disappointment in Korea, as we feel ourselves, that the foreign military sales levels are below what the President requested. As they have come forward in the continuing resolutions, we have sought to restore the President's levels with a supplemental; and of course, it remains to be seen whether the supplemental will go in the Congress but we will be trying to get those funds restored. But basically I think there is a knowledge of our defense commitments and I'm going there to further demonstrate that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Do you expect to cover any new ground with the South Korean President?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'll be glad to respond to anything he chooses to bring up. And, there are a variety of subjects I think that are interesting subjects to talk about, and I don't know whether you classify them as good, bad or what. But certainly as far as I'm concerned, there is an open agenda.

QUESTION: Obviously the human rights issue is one that always comes up in Korea and recently taking their most noted dissident, I guess, out of jail and throwing him out of the country -- do you think the situation there is improving? If you do, specifically why?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is improving in the sense that there have been specific things, you mentioned the most prominent one. As to why, I suppose, I think it's a move in the right direction and people like to move in right directions. Perhaps it is an expression of confidence on the part of the Government but as for their reason for doing things, I think basically you have to ask them.

QUESTION: Do you plan to encourage them to continue moving and speed up their move in this right direction?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have set out to work at these things through quiet and non-public diplomacy, and so I don't want to violate the spirit of that by having discussion of it.

QUESTION: What can you tell us about your meetings with the Chinese? You have had a lot of negotiations and meetings with people over the years. What was it like? Did you find any surprises there? Could we have your general impressions of the meetings?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, the people are a serious people. Meetings were conducted in a very pleasant way but there was a minimum of the sort of pleasantries that go along with a meeting; and as soon as the photo opportunities were ended, they plunged right into substantive discussions, which I welcomed. I think the people were basically well prepared; they came to talk in a substantive manner. I did feel that on some issues their perception of what the facts are, differed sometimes rather substantially from what my sense of what the facts are on a given case. For example, on the proportion of our market occupied by Chinese textiles. (Inaudible) But I found them to be strong, tough, well-informed people. I want to call to your attention that not everything that we talked about was, so to speak, a negotiation. There was a big sort of informational content to their statements about their views on different parts of the world and situations of different countries, and also in our descriptions of what was taking place. So to some extent, it was information-sharing and analysis-sharing. It was interesting to me in talking with different Foreign Ministers and the people from different countries to get a sense of the degree to which the country has a world view of things as distinct from a preoccupation with what's going on in their own country and immediately around their own country. Certainly it is true that the Chinese have a world view, just as we do. They see things in places that are far removed from China as having an impact that is of some significance to them. They like to talk about Africa, the Middle East and so on, in that context, so that makes it interesting.

QUESTION: Did you get the feeling that they were less concerned about the Soviet threat to themselves than they have been in the past years? Is that a reason why they're now willing to talk more normalization with the Russians?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Again, I think that is the sort of question that you have to ask them about, how much concerned they are. They have made a number of comments, some publicly, during the course of the visit and I just refer you to them. It seems to me, as is true in every country in some way, some more than others, they want to see their country develop and great tensions all around their border are not helpful to them. So they seek to reduce those tensions and I think that's an objective that is understandable.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable concern among some quarters in the United States regarding their shift in attitudes about the Russians and their place in the Third World. Could you tell us anything that would indicate how you came out of these talks and your own view of the significance for the United States of what the Chinese have done within the last year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I felt that their view of the Russians is very realistic. It remains to be seen precisely what the content of the Third World orientation will turn out to be. But the United States, say over the post-World War II decades, has been a champion of economic development of that world. So that has been our stance. Differences of view arise about what the right way to bring about economic development is, they are or may be important issues and they were probably aired more directly at Cancun. But I do think there is an increasing perception around the world that if you want development you need to rely on the enterprise of individual units, you need to give people some stake in what they are doing, that markets do help whether they are organized within a socialistic type of framework or a pure market economy. The market idea is very important. Certainly they use it in China as far as I can see. Also any country, fundamentally, has to rely on itself to provide the real motive power for development. Now that, of course, doesn't mean there isn't a role for aid from outside in technical terms and in straight, foreign investment terms, and in terms of concessional aid of various kinds, there is such a role. But getting the right perspective on these things can be a point of real discussion.

I found one of the most attractive aspects of discussing economic development with the Chinese to be their recognition of these facts and their determination to develop themselves and it was said to me a number of times with the size of China and with the number of people in China, it's quite clear that the basic thrust of the development of China has to come from within.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There have been, for example, some developments in the way agriculture is organized in China, as I understand it, that give family units a capacity to work to a degree for themselves and to benefit from a strong performance themselves, so that what you do is related to what you get out of it. So I think that is an example of the sort of look at the enterprise notion, and the ability to sell into a market is related to that. I don't want to be misunderstood. I'm not saying that the Chinese have promoted a market economy, but they use the market idea and I think if you look around in Socialist economics nowadays you find that there is a considerable amount of experimentation, and always has been for that matter, with the question of how you use the idea of a market, and can you within the framework of state ownership of main resources.

QUESTION: I quess what I was trying to get at was that after hearing them explain their own ideas about their foreign policy especially, is their foreign policy now something the United States tolerates? Is it something we could live with quite comfortably? How is the U.S. going to relate to a China which has really taken a kind of new direction within this last year or so?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The discussions that I had about their foreign policy lead me to believe that there are many areas of great importance where their interests and the way they see the problems are quite parallel to ours. Therefore it's quite worthwhile to be talking with them and I think that can be fruitful. So I came away with a rather good feeling about that. We also discussed a variety of areas where they may have different views and they are critical of the United States sometimes for what we do, sometimes for us not doing enough, or paying enough attention to something. But I found that discussions with them to be informed discussions and substantive discussions and serious discussions, not a sort of debating point type discussion at all. So I found it to be quite worthwhile in relating that to the broader sense of the interaction of their foreign policy and ours to be basically encouraging.

QUESTION: What's your impressions on how they feel about arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It did not play a prominent place in our discussions. They did not ask a lot of questions about it and, on the other hand, when we did discuss it, in a sense the outcome of that discussion was that we offered to have Admiral Howe give a briefing on what we were doing. They seemed to be glad to have that briefing and it was a lengthy and solid discussion and, as Admiral Howe pointed out, they seemed to be very well informed about what is going on, so they follow it.

QUESTION: There were a couple of people from the North American desk at dinner last night between a few of us. On the subject of the SS-20's, one of them said there are a hundred or more there now and a few more don't make any difference to us. Is that a view that you picked up at a higher level (inaudible)?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that kind of comment was not made to me.

QUESTION: In the past, before the Reagan Administration, almost every time we'd go to China there would be criticism the U.S. wasn't tough enough against the Russians or we weren't spending enough on military. In their press they now seemed to be critical of the U.S. for spending too much on the military. I just wondered in your discussions did you get a recent feeling that the Reagan Administration's military program was appreciated.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I felt that it was, and that they welcomed the strength and determination of the United States. I don't hear any criticism whatever along the lines that you suggested in your question.

QUESTION: You got into the question of technology transfer; you talked about that quite a bit. What is it that they are interested in specifically? Did you get a feeling of priority what they want, what they are interested in?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the technology transfer issues have come up in a sense on two levels: One is with respect to some particular piece of equipment or area of knowledge for which an application has been made and about which there is discussion. And so that leads you into such discussion of criteria, and procedures, and speed of consideration, and so on. So that is what you might say is an operational level of discussing the subject. They also laid a lot of emphasis, and in many respects, the heaviest emphasis, on the intent and the atmosphere within which these operational questions were to be discussed. People made the point to me a number of times, on this particular equipment or that particular equipment, so much the way that you view us is more important than the way particular things are handled. It is the overall sense of atmosphere that is being displayed here. So you sort of go back and forth between these two levels. That was the nature of our discussions.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The whole subject is one that is a difficult one, inherently. You have always, particularly these days, a moving target. The sense that technology is changing constantly, particularly in the fields that are of the greatest interest. So you keep having to adapt your criteria and your judgment to this moving target. So I think it will remain a difficult issue but I do think there is a lot of room for clarification so that it can be put into a more satisfactory way. I am not directly answering your COCOM question. Obviously people can make decisions about things like that but that is an issue for the Government to consider.

QUESTION: Thank you sir.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING BY
THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
ON
THE PRESIDENT'S DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

MR. ROMBERG: The briefing this afternoon on the President's Democracy Initiative is ON THE RECORD. Your briefer is Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger, and, obviously, everything he says is for attribution.

I think he has an opening statement and then questions, and also some colleagues are here to work with him. Larry?

UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I would like to discuss for a few minutes with you today the President's Democracy Initiative. There have been a number of press reports on this subject, and they demonstrate that there is at least some confusion about the subject. I'd like to try to clear things up, if I can, today.

As you recall, President Reagan, in his speech to the British Parliament last June, committed the United States to make a far greater effort to support the development of democracy and democratic institutions abroad, and to communicate more effectively the values and ideals which form the foundation of the United States.

He reaffirmed this commitment in his State of the Union address. The Democracy Program we are discussing today is an important step in the implementation of the President's Initiative. It represents what we hope will be a fundamental dimension of our foreign policy for the years to come.

Two weeks ago John Hughes made available a brief summary of the objectives and contents of the Democracy Program. We have made the same paper available to you today.

As this paper points out, this is a long-term effort with a global scope. It is bipartisan, and it relies heavily upon the participation of non-governmental organizations.

This program has been months in the making and will be presented to the Congress in the latter part of February. We are asking for $65 million for Fiscal Year 1984, and we intend to work closely with the Congress and private organizations in both the development and the implementation of the various projects contained in the overall program.

As the handout indicates, the program is directed at such things as leadership training, education, strengthening democratic institutions, improving the communication of ideas and information, and development of personal and institutional ties, or, to be more fashionable, network building.

We cannot yet make available the list of projects since they are still being worked out and have to be discussed with the Congress first. I think, however, they will not shock or surprise you. We will propose strengthening some classic government programs as well as providing additional support for democracy-related projects of non-governmental organizations which have a proven track record or significant potential.

We will have some new ideas and approaches directed at strengthening democracies and democratic institutions.

Let me just briefly give you some examples of the sorts of things we're thinking about:

- Support for the Asia Foundation.

- Support for free labor movements.

- Regional institutes and conferences. For example, the conference we had recently on free elections.

- Visits between the U.S. and other countries -- reciprocal visits.

- Exchanges of publications.

These are the sorts of things we're looking at.

Two weeks ago John Hughes dispelled, I hope, the notion that this $65 million was somehow an effort to promote U.S. arms control and related issues in Western Europe. The point here, ladies and gentlemen, is that there was some confusion, I think, earlier about whether Ambassador Dailey's exercise was to be the recipient of the $65 million; and the point we're trying to make here is, not at all. This is an entirely different exercise and the Dailey exercise is not related to the $65 million we've been talking about.

In fact, not much of this program that I'm talking about today would be directed at Western Europe, and most that is directed at Western Europe would be devoted to a long-term effort to explore shared values among Americans and Europeans, and to engage their partnership in the larger enterprise of building democracy around the world.

Some European nations, as you know, have already been more active than we in this area and provided some of the inspiration for the President's initiative.

I would like now to dispel any notion that this effort somehow involves the Central Intelligence Agency. There is absolutely no CIA connection with this program. Quite aside from other considerations, long ago we recognized that any CIA involvement was unnecessary. Most people in and out of government who have examined this issue over the past few years have correctly concluded that support for democracy and democratic institutions should be open and totally above-board.

The New York Times itself came to this conclusion in an editorial last spring. We also know that as a practical matter CIA involvement would kill such a program. It would provide those who have much to fear from the spread of democracy a pretext to discredit the entire effort.

If I can cover a third source of confusion, we also have for you today a handout explaining the organization of the new government structure for public diplomacy. It covers the broad sweep of activities by U.S. Government agencies in this area and tries to consolidate and rationalize the effort.

For example, I'm told that there were at one time some 35 interagency committees dealing with public diplomacy issues in an uncoordinated fashion. The new arrangement, we hope, will bring order, efficiency and policy direction to the activity. USIA, State and AID have worked closely in this development and will work together in its implementation.

Again, let me make a further clarification. The public diplomacy rubric is a broad one. The Dailey effort with regard to Europe and European security issues can be described as a part of the broad -- as coming under the broad rubric of the public diplomacy effort, as indeed can the democracy initiative.

The two initiatives I've talked about -- the Dailey effort and the Democracy Initiative -- in fact, fall under the broad concept of our public diplomacy approach.

To conclude, the President and his Administration attach great importance to the program. It is one which reflects American ideals, and which we hope will enjoy broad bipartisan support. This is the Democracy Initiative, the $65 million initiative, I'm talking about.

We believe it will produce substantial benefits in the years ahead, but it's just a beginning and much more has to be done, not only by government but we believe by the private sector as well.

The willingness is there. We have been encouraged by the broad support for such a program from people on all points of the political spectrum. It's an idea that many have advocated for years. We have recognized for years the need to provide our friends with economic and military assistance. We need to give more attention now to political, intellectual and social infrastructure necessary to support democratic systems.

This program is, if you will, an accompaniment to our economic and military assistance programs. We would look upon it as a political assistance program aimed at emphasizing the building of democratic institutions abroad. It will all be on the public record, it's all above-board, there is no CIA participation, and we hope devoutly that it will be a bipartisan effort. That certainly is our intention.

I'd be glad to try to answer your questions. I have with me Ambassador Helman and Mr. Scott Thompson from USIA who I'd like to have come up here, as a matter of fact, because I think when it comes to specific questions, they will be able to do you better than I can.

Q Larry, how is this operation going to avoid treading over that fine line of involvement in other countries' internal political affairs?

For example, when you support a labor union or give an opposition party the means for transmiting its message. Is that not a selective involvement in somebody else's affairs?

A You know, again, it's a legitimate question, and part of the answer to it is that we're going to have to obviously, as we deal with these programs, be careful to analyze their impact and their importance with that as a reference point.

But I suppose if you're going to support labor unions, help them -- help labor unions develop in somebody else's country -- yes, there is an argument that could be made that this gets into that area.

On the other hand, it's been our belief all along that these free institutions are worthy of assistance and support; and, in its own way, it's -- you know, we talk about human rights and the condition of people in other countries and how they're treated. This is, after all, much I think within the same context, so it is again a question of placing a judgment on what are the most important values that we're trying to support abroad.

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Q Could I just follow up. The $65 million dollars is a lot of money but it's not an infinite resource. Obviously, you're going to have to make judgments and selections on who you're going to support. What are the criteria are you going to use in choosing who is going to benefit, what parties and sectors of the political structure are going to receive it?

A Again, we're in the midst now of looking at the programs and the budget, and we will have to make our judgments on the basis (1) of what is most likely to have some advantage, some hope of success; what are the most important programs from our point of view.

Scott, you deal with this more than I do. Why don't you get up.

MR. THOMPSON: I had my staff at the Bureau of Programs at USIA working with the bureaus here in the regions and in USIA come up proposals that would be most cost-effective, that would be most worthy of bipartisan support and therefore transcending a particular administration.

I think it's worth emphasizing that most of the programs are of the kind that support countries in their own objectives. For example, the Government of Liberia has a public program for preparing its 1985 elections. They have asked for our assistance in preparing for those elections in 1985. One of the programs herein is such a proposal.

We have gone through iteration after iteration to find the most efficient means of spending this relatively large amount of money.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: Let me add one more point here, too. What we're trying to do here, some of it we hope will be new, some of it will be to expand activities that have been going on for sometime. We have supported through AID, for example, the development of the free trade union movement for some years.

Many of the concepts are, in fact, concepts that we've had for sometime, but we're going to try to expand the activity and do more. Some will be in new areas. I can't at this point give you a set of specifics and I won't be able to until we've submitted the budget to the Congress.

Q You partially answered my question, which basically was going to be how and what you propose to do here is going to be different from what's been done by various agencies in the past.

I guess my follow-up question then would be, is there going to be a central administration here; is it going to be USIA? Who's going to coordinate all this? Somebody has to mind the store.

A The basic concept here is that the money will be appropriated to the U. S. Information Agency. This is for administrative coherence and so forth. The concept, again, thereafter is that some of the monies will then be managed by AID, transferred from USIA to AID, some to the State Department, but with USIA the overall agent, I think is the best way to describe it.

MR. THOMPSON: And a very small staff.

Q I was struck by the absence of the words "civil and human rights" in these two pieces of paper. You mentioned that, but could you develop that theme a little bit more? Where does human rights fit in?

MR. EAGLEBURGER: One, we have a human rights program. But so far as it fits in here, it would seem to me that the whole concept of promotion of democratic institutions is in itself closely allied and related to the whole question of human rights. Obviously, that will be a major element in our approach to the development of democratic institutions. I think it really is subsumed into that broader statement about democracy.

Q Picking up Jim's earlier question, I notice on Page 2 you talk, for example, about strengthening, among other things, parties. How do you handle a situation where in country X, one party might be one that the U.S. favors and one that the U.S. opposes; would this program envisage contributions toward the pro-American party, so to speak?

A Here, again, we're asking iffy questions that are very difficult to deal with in the abstract. But my point here, I think, would be, it is not that we are going to use this approach in a democratic society to support one political party against another. That is not our purpose.

Our purpose is to try to strengthen democratic parties that advocate democracy in those countries where democracy is a sometime thing at best. It will be to try to strengthen the advocates of democracy abroad, not in a democratic society to try to play one off against the other or work with one and not the other.

Again, I emphasize, all of these programs will be public; they will be there to be scrutinized by the Congress and by the press. There's nothing we're trying to do under the table and therefore it would seem to me your question is one that, when you look at the programs and hear our defense of them before the Congress, you'll be able to get some sense of precisely what it is we're trying to do.

Q Does this program do anything to resolve the dispute about the philosophy of the Voice of America which, I gather from the papers, over the past couple of years there's been some feeling that it's been used too much to promote a certain set of political values rather than to be an objective reporter of the truth.

You talk about this being bipartisan. Does it have a back effect on the question of the role of the VOA?

A The answer is, I don't think that the democracy initiative, as such, really will. But if you look at the other paper which describes the public diplomacy layout and the various committees there, you will find that there are at least two committees that deal with the question of our communicating in general and then with regard to the radios. I'm sure this is one of the issues that they will be discussing, as how those radios are best used in the programming and so forth, but I can't guarantee that they're going to solve the dispute that you raise which is, as far as I can recall, has been with us for at least the last twenty years that I've been in the government.

Q Neither of these committees appears to be bipartisan. One is chaired by the Assistant --

A The committees are obviously from within the government. Again, let's make a distinction between the democracy initiative and the $65 million dollars and our desire that that be programs which will receive bipartisan support, and the public diplomacy exercise, which is covered in that second paper we gave you which is, after all, an attempt to establish a government mechanism to be more effective in the whole process of public diplomacy and since it is made up of government bureaucrats, such as myself, obviously it falls within a different category.

It's hard to describe the Government of the United States as bipartisan at any particular time.

Q Might there not be situations where the program could be self-defeating in areas where democracy is an idea and its institutions are shaky at best and we come out and provide support to an institution such as political party, wouldn't that open them up for attack and criticism from their opponents?

A Sure. That's a real possibility. Again, I come back therefore to the question -- the question has to be how wise and sophisticated we are and what it is we try to do. In some cases, in looking at particular possible efforts, we may decide precisely the point you've made. That, in fact, to do anything here would in fact not further the cause of democracy and hopefully we would have enough sense then not to proceed with that.

But, again, my point is, one of the issues that obviously the Congress can debate with us in the process of the appropriation is whether or not Initiative X, which we will be describing to them, makes any sense or not. It will also be open to the press to dispute with us if, in fact, they think it does not make sense.

I can't argue from the general concept which is that we ought to be out doing a great deal more to try to promote democratic institutions abroad to arguing in the abstract this way, that we couldn't make mistakes. Obviously, we could. But I don't think the danger of that sort of problem ought to hold us back from trying to proceed with the general concept, recognizing that you and the Congress will have a chance at us in the process.

Q No need to change the law here; the budgetary authority is the only --

A No.

Q Why was the Secretary of Defense part of the special planning group?

A Obviously, one of the issues that greatly affects our public diplomacy is the whole question of our defense posture, how we are perceived abroad, the Dailey exercise. I want to be careful not to confuse points, but, nevertheless, the Dailey exercise is obviously, in part, occasioned by the fact that we are in the midst right now of a serious discussion with Europeans and, indeed, with the Soviets; and the object of a propaganda campaign on the part of the Soviets with regard to the deployment of the INF.

These are not issues that can be ignored. They are part of the public debate. They are part of the transatlantic debate. It seems therefore, to me, that the Secretary of Defense has a role to play in terms of his advice and his thinking about the future of the defense programs.

Q I think that's where some of the confusion comes in, that although it may not be designed to be an INF promotion program, it could develop into that, could it not?

A Which is --

Q The whole public diplomacy, the whole $65 million dollar program.

A No, no. Believe me. Number 1, we've got an appropriation -- an authorization process to go through with the Congress which is not going to be fast. It's going to take time. We've got an INF issue out there and the Dailey exercise, which we're trying to deal with right now and will be for some months. But you will see, when we submit the budget for the Democracy Initiative, that it really is quite a different question.

By the time we get the monies for this appropriated, in the first place, we will have gone some weeks if not certainly months, I think, down the road. Believe me, they are just two different issues. You will see when we submit the budget that there is a real distinction between them.

Q I understood that they are two different issues, but this is a question almost everybody is going to get when they go back to their office. How much of this money, if any, is going to go to the Dailey effort?

A Zero. Not one penny.

Q How much money will be allocated elsewhere to the Dailey effort?

A So far as I know, none. What Dailey is doing is drawing now on resources of people already available. He is trying to get some cohesion and coherence to our approach, but it is drawing on resources already available. There's nothing new coming into it.

Q When will that $65 million dollar request be put to Congress, Larry?

A It should go in the next week or two. The 23rd, I'm told.

Q One of the issues that affects public diplomacy is obviously the credibility of the media, in this case VOA or RFE. How do you expect this fourth named committee on public affairs which is going to presumably increase the number of major public speeches and so forth carried, which will presumably be propaganda, to accept the news credibility of the VOA?

A To accept the news --

Q Sorry. To affect?

A It's damned if you do, damned if you don't, in a way. When we don't make speeches or don't try to defend or describe U.S. policy, then we are being silent on the major issues of the day.

Obviously, VOA represents the United States. When somebody makes a speech, we are trying to represent the views of the Government of the United States. We're trying to explain those. Obviously, when those are broadcast on VOA, they will be identified as the position of the U.S. Government on subject X, Y or Z.

The question of the credibility of that effort, it seems to me, the best I can say is we'll have to identify what is specifically the view of the Government of the United States, the speech by the Secretary of State on whatever, and the audience will itself then have to make its judgment.

One of the problems I think we have had, and one of the things that I hope the Dailey effort will, in fact, get us to focus more carefully on, is that we have not done an adequate job of describing the President's programs, why they are right and why we believe that they ought to be accepted.

I don't deny at all that part of what we're trying to do is a more effective selling job of what I happen to consider to be a good product to begin with. I can't answer the question of how that will affect the credibility of the VOA. They'll have to describe where the thoughts come from.

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Q So is there a link between the Public Diplomacy Program and the report this morning that former Senator Stone might be selling some of the President's programs in Central America?

A I can't comment on the report about Senator Stone. That is, at this point, something on which I have no information for you, so I don't know whether there is a link or not.

Q Do you have any region of preference to implement this program, for instance, Latin America or Eastern Europe?

A No. And you'll have to wait until you see the budget proposals, but I think what you will see is that in fact there is a broad geographic spread. And one of the points I tried to make in my opening remarks here is that I think you will find that in fact the emphasis on Europe is not as heavy as it is on some of the other areas. East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, I think you will find that they are all covered, in one way or another.

Q You said the democracy campaign was going to be completely above board, but The New York Times reported the other day that Mark Palmer had prepared a document last year which suggested that covert action should be one of the possibilities to be considered. Has covert action, or was it last year considered as a possibility and been firmly rejected? And if so, who is responsible for the rejection?

A There are lots of internal documents within the U.S. Government that look at various and sundry possibilities which, when they are moved to their superiors, the recommendations are not accepted. There is no question that there was a discussion in various documents, because after I read the newspaper article I went back and looked back at some of the old documents. There is no question that this issue was discussed in a number of papers at one point or another.

A firm flat decision was made at senior levels -- without going into the discussion of which people -- but at senior levels, a firm decision was made that there would be no CIA involvement. This was made both with regard to the view of this Department in the inter-agency discussions. A number of other agencies came to the same view; and when it went to an inter-agency discussion, that view was upheld: there will be no CIA involvement.

Q On that point, when you make the transition, are you going to make it clear which programs that you're going to fund publicly, previously were being funded by them under security?

A That makes an assumption that previous programs funded by the Agency will in fact now be transferred over to the public domain, and I don't know whether, in fact, that is what will happen or not. All I can tell you is that any program falling under the democracy initiative will be publicly described and publicly defended; and I can't say that if we picked up something that at one point was funded some other way, we would describe that. Obviously, what was done in another way, under other circumstances is something that we're not necessarily going to be prepared to talk about. All I can assure you is that anything done under this Program will be done in full view of the public, and will be sumbitted to the Congress for approval.

Q Does this mean that when you decide to help a newspaper or a political party, before that, you send something to Congress and Congress will review it and discuss publicly, and everybody who looks at the U.S. budget will know that there so-many thousand dollars are going to this party in Chile or that one in Romania, or --

Is that it?

A The basic answer to that is yes, but at some point you get to a level of detail that I would suppose is not going to be specifically encompassed in the budget.

Number one, we're going to be appropriating money for specific programs; we're going to be asking for money for specific programs. They are going to be described, for example, trying to assist the development of free labor unions in Latin America. Now, I don't know that it will say $4.75 to Mr. X in Colombia; but there will be a description of the program, how it is going to be managed, where the money is going to go, and obviously, the Congress, the GAO, and any other institution will be able to follow through how the money is spent. But I can't say that in the budget submission itself, it will get to that level of detail. I can say that it will be public expenditure of moneys which can be traced through by the appropriate agencies, public or private.

Q Let me ask you -- It's difficult to avoid comparisons with the past. Some years ago, the United States Government gave money to a newspaper in Chile to promote what was thought then a democracy; but we have been living for the last ten years under a dictatorship which was helped by the democratic efforts of the United States Government.

I understand the effort of the United States doing this, but how can you avoid, first, a credibility problem; and second, the involvement either of ideological choices, by this or that U.S. Government, whatever government is in place at a certain moment, to avoid doing this kind of thing which does not promote exactly democracy?

A With regard to the first point, the only answer I can give you is that what we will do is open to public scrutiny. We have to go into the Congress and describe why we want the money and how we intend to use the money. The budget and the way in which we spend that money will be open to all the review procedures, both public and private, that exist for looking at the way money is spent by the bureaucracy.

There is no way we will be able to hide what we do. That, it seems to me, is the best defense I can give you for its being straight and above board and unrelated to whatever may have been done by other agencies under other circumstances in the past.

With regard to the second question, of course judgments made by human beings will have an ideological component. I can't deny that. I can assure you that the Government of the United States under this program will not provide money to support Humanite', in Paris. I can just guarantee that flat out. (Laughter) And obviously, that is a judgment we are making.

Again, the only way I can make the point to you is that, again how that money is spent, recognizing we are all human and we have prejudices, what we will have to face is the fact that it will be open to public scrutiny, and we will have to defend why we did what we did and why we spent the money the way we spent it. Under those circumstances, all I can really say to you is, "Try us and see."

Q In light of the public openness of all this, are you willing to declassify the NSDD that authoritzed this Program, and if not, why not?

A We are not, obviousy, prepared to declassify the NSDD as such; but if you will look at the document which was given to you, entitled, "Public Diplomacy," that is in effect and unclassified precis of the classified NSDD.

Q Larry, when you say you won't give money to the Humanite', that raises the obvious question of Le Monde. (Laughter) Extrapolating from there, is that an area on which you might work, that is to say, a newspaper that has a very limited affection for the United States and one that might in country X, Y, or Z?

A Bernie, I understand the question and the thrust of the question. It's an iffy question. I think the answer in the specific terms in which you give it, is I can conceive of no circumstances whatsoever where we are going to try to provide money to a newspaper in a free society such as France is. That is not our purpose. France is a going, functioning democracy. We may or may not like what any newspaper in Paris says about us, but the democratic institution are alive and healthy in France.

What we are talking about here is "How do you further the process of democracy?," democracy-building the establishment of and the assistance to democratic institutions in countries where democracy is not the normal way of life.

So the thrust is going to be quite different. Again, I come back to saying you'll have a chance to look at the budget, to watch us spend the money, to see how we do it.

Q If a newspaper, or if a particular labor union receives money, will we know that that specific newspaper is to receive help or that particular labor union is to receive help? Will it be that specific?

A Again, I tried to answer that earlier. I can't tell you that when we go in with a budget, it will get to a level of detail that is that finite. I can say that you'll be able to find out how we spend the money. There is no way we can hide the open expenditures of money.

We're talking now about supporting newspapers. There may be a certain professional bias in the approach here this afternoon (laughter). Supporting newspapers is not something I think we're going to be spending a great deal of money or time on. I can't say we won't do it on an occasion. I don't know. But if we do, again, it will be above board. I can't say that if you ask for an appropriation of X millions of dollars, we will then get down to that specific in what we send to the Congress. I can tell you that under the Freedom of Information Act, if nothing else, you can always trace back how it is you've spent that money. We will have an obligation publicly to describe to you how that money was spent.

Q Are you saying the CIA is getting out of the business that you're going into?

A Sir?

Q Is the CIA getting out of the business that you're going into?

(Laughter)

A We're in a different business.

Q The CIA in the past has done things that they call promoting free labor institutions, political parties, media, and so on.

A I cannot speak for the CIA. I can only come back to say, you will know what we're doing. That's all I'm here to try to brief you on and to convince you of, that it will be above board. What other agencies do is not for me to comment on. You will know what we're doing.

Q On that point, Larry, could you respond to this? Last week we asked Prime Minister Fanfani in Italy if the Christian Democrats there were still getting money, as Colby revealed some years ago, "under the table" from the CIA. He wouldn't give us that kind of an assurance.

This raises the point that maybe these outfits could get money from this outfit openly and from them "under the table." Is that possible?

A I doubt it very much.

Q You doubt it.

A Don't let me mislead you. No, it's not possible. I come back to saying we are not going to be spending our money trying to further democracy in countries that have a well and well-established democracy.

Q But Larry, those countries that have well-established dictatorships will not necessarily be happy about your readiness to --

A Happiness, I have learned long since, Bernie, is not necessarily something you find often in foreign policy. They're not going to like some of it.

Q How, in fact, can you even get into a country?

A It's going to depend on the country; it's going to depend on the circumstances of the program. I can't give you a specific at this time except to say, as we develop the programs, you'll have a chance to watch us do it, and you'll have a chance to find out how well we do it.

Q But it would be objective like providing money for democracy in Nicaragua or in Chile.

A It better be. That's our full intention. And that's why I said at the beginning: This must be bi-partisan. What we are trying to establish here is, if you will, a new approach to these sorts of issues which will only last from one administration to the next if it has bi-partisan support. This is not something we're into for the next two or six years. It is something that we want to last over the course of the next 20. And under those circumstances, we're going to have to be very careful to make sure it receives bi-partisan support.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:39 P.M.)

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 9, 1983
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DEPARTURE PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
SEOUL, KOREA
FEBRUARY 8, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan sent me to Korea to reaffirm and strengthen in every way possible the strong relationship we have with Korea and to develop the strength of our alliance and our capacity to deter aggression as it's exhibited here on this Peninsula. I've had the opportunity for many discussions with the Foreign Minister not only in the formal meetings but as we rode around, with the President and with others here -- and beyond that it is inspiring to visit the forces in the DMZ to see the quality of our young Korean and American soldiers, and to see the duties that they are undertaking there on your behalf. So I am grateful for that opportunity and very glad to be here. I express to you, Mr. Minister, my thanks for all of your hospitality as well as your thoughts. If there are any questions, we'll take them, if there aren't, why we'll board our plane.

QUESTION: Our understanding is that you discussed the cross-recognition problem.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What problem?

QUESTION: The cross-recognition of Korean Peninsula. Would you elaborate a little more detail about that now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the question arose and, of course, it's part of the recognition that on this Peninsula there are Korean people and there are families that are located in both North and South. And so efforts have been made, very creative and imaginative efforts, by the Government of South Korea to see if some pattern of reconciliation can evolve, and the cross-recognition proposal is one among many efforts to get at that problem. Unfortunately, these efforts have basically been rejected by North Korea although it may be, as time goes on, that patterns will be found that help to move this situation along. Perhaps you'd like to comment on that, Mr. Foreign Minister.

For further information contact:

FOREIGN MINISTER LEE: Oh, I basically agree with you, Mr. Secretary. We both agreed that this matter of the cross-recognition requires more prudent study so we agree to study continuously until we reach certain advisable conclusions.

QUESTION: Was this question raised during your visit to Peking and if it was raised, what was the reply of the Chinese leaders?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question of cross-recognition did not come up during my visit to Beijing.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I understand that the United States seems to object to South Korean export of arms. Would you please explain Washington's position on this matter?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the United States has a variety of restrictions on itself in connection with the export of arms and so when United States technology is involved in the production of arms by an ally as in the case of South Korea, then basically we think that the restrictions that we apply to ourselves ought to apply to the other countries as well. And, of course, sometimes that leads to some differences of opinion but that's the fundamental point involved.

QUESTION: Could you be more specific on such restrictions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, if there is a country to which we feel it inadvisable to ship arms from the United States, then we would ask our friends who have U.S. technology that we have worked with them on jointly so that they can develop their own capacities, to observe the same restrictions. Otherwise we're not able to enforce on ourselves a policy that we may have.

QUESTION: Mr. Prime Minister, can you tell me what steps --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are very few Prime Ministers in the room. You've just got a promotion. Congratulations.

QUESTION: Tell me what steps your Government is prepared to take to help the Reagan Administration convince the U.S. Congress to boost foreign military assistance to South Korea? What steps your Government would take to convince the U.S. Congress that progress is being made on human rights questions?

FOREIGN MINISTER LEE: I basically think it's not a function of my government to do such things. We try to make them understand the true picture of this Peninsula, understanding that there is still risk of a war in this Peninsula, I think the answer will automatically come out. If there is any way and means to halt our efforts along this line, that is just about the principle I am taking.

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz, if cross-recognition of the two Koreas will take place for the United States and Mainland China and Japan, the United States will sign a peace treaty with North Korea and will withdraw its troops -- U.S. troops -- from South Korean soil?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there is no proposal around that I have heard, other than by the North Koreans, that U.S. troops be withdrawn from South Korea. And there is no intention of doing so. We stand with our friends here in South Korea And, we are here to deter aggression and we'll be here as long as that's needed.

QUESTION: It means that despite cross-recognition the United States never will sign a peace with North Korea?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If North Korea changes its behavior and there is a reconciliation with South Korea and a peaceful situation emerges, of course that's something else again. But anyone who studies the the situation or goes up and visits in the DMZ can see that that's a long way away.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since we've been here in Seoul, there's been a commentary published in Peking about your visit there. Does it surprise you and do you feel that it somehow reopens or changes some of the things that you did there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I've said what I had to say about the visit there. And, I think, it was worthwhile from my standpoint. I learned a lot. I hope that the things that I had to say were helpful in expanding the understanding of the Chinese about the United States and the Reagan Administration. And there were lots of problems there when I arrived and there are still problems there. And that's the situation.

QUESTION: Did you see anything new in that? I mean have you seen it or did you analyze this report?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I saw a report. I don't know whether it's the same one you're talking about, probably is, and I didn't see -- and to some extent people came in with a sense of commotion about it. I read it and I didn't go into orbit about it. (Laughter) After all they weren't businessmen. (Laughter)

QUESTION: When the Chinese leadership asked you to seek the repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act, how did you respond?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land in the United States. We have negotiated several communiques with the Chinese on various occasions, the most recent being last August. And those were very seriously worked on in each case. And it's our intention to live by the commitments in those communiques which we think are perfectly consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

QUESTION: Is that how you explained it to the Chinese leadership or did you say that it's just not going to be possible to do that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is the explanation that I have given you and given the same explanations here, in Beijing, in Washington, in public and in private.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you're nearing the end of this trip to Asia, could you give us an assessment of how you think it's gone, what you've accomplished?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's been a very worthwhile undertaking from my point of ivew. And each of the countries that I've visited on this trip has been very cordial, hospitable. And in every case the discussions that I have had have been very serious and thoughtful, well prepared by them and by us. So, I think it's been quite worthwhile.

QUESTION: I understand that you are going to revisit Tokyo on your way back to the States. Do you have any message to carry from the South Korean leadership to Mr. Nakasone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as I have gone from one country to the next and people have asked me about what has taken place, I've given a report and I have talked to the Foreign Minister about my trip as I came here. And on the way back to Washington, we will stop in Tokyo and I'll have a chance to review with the Japanese there a sort of wind-up of the trip. So I've been reporting in a sense as I have gone along.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, as you know starting to take place Team Spirit '83 so if the Soviets will conduct another large scale military exercises in the Pacific or Chinese, North Korean troops together that the United States considers threaten the peace in the Pacific, in your opinion what the United States will do in case that North Korea and China will conduct another large scale exercise like Team Spirit '83?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, exercises are exercises. We are conducting one ourselves with our friends in South Korea. We have announced it. And it's part of our continual preparation and readiness. And I think the basic thing that the

United States will do and our allies will do is to maintain our strength and try to be sure that those opposing us understand that we do have that strength and determination. And again you can see it expressed very visibly and in very human terms in the faces of the people up manning our posts in the DMZ.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ELLIOTT ABRAMS
AND
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CHARLES FAIRBANKS
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1983, 10:04 A.M.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. ROMBERG: The briefing this morning, as you know, is ON THE RECORD on the Human Rights Report. The briefer is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams. He has some opening remarks and then he will be happy to take your questions.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: This is the second country report on human rights practices that has been compiled fully under the Reagan Administration. It is longer than last year's by roughly 200 pages, and we hope it is more informative as well.

The introduction this year repeats, as I think some of you will have noticed, the central portions of last year's on the philosophical underpinnings of our human rights policy. We reread those sections and found them utterly persuasive and decided to include them again.

What is new in the introduction is the last part of it, which is an effort to describe how we put together the report and the problems that anyone has, and that we had, in putting together such a report -- difficulties in maintaining consistency, difficulties in getting information on certain countries. We wanted to try and give a sense of how we put the report together and what we think the problems with it are.

As to the reports themselves, I think like last year, we have tried to avoid any kind of sensationalism in the tone. We have tried to avoid, to some extent, evaluative adjectives because that's not the purpose of the report. The purpose is to compile facts and report on the facts of the situation to Congress.

I just wanted to make one point about the length of the individual reports. They don't measure anything in particular by the length, the number of pages. To some extent, the length reflects the availability of information; and on some of the worst human rights violators, because they are closed societies, there is very little information

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available. In other cases, the length may reflect, at least in part, the degree of interest in this country, in the country in question; but length, per se, does not reflect the performance of the country in question with respect to human rights.

Another change in the report this year is the inclusion of separate reports on the Baltic States -- Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In previous years, those had been included under the report on the Soviet Union. It was pointed out to us last year that that was an anomaly because the United States, along with a number of its Western allies -- Britain, France, Canada, and Germany -- does not recognize the forceable incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. So why, we were asked, did we not have separate reports on those countries?

We thought that to be a very good question, so this year we do have separate reports. They follow the report on the USSR.

We continue this year with a strong emphasis on political rights and on giving as much information as possible on the question of political rights. First, on participation in governing the country, we have tried to indicate when that participation is real, and when it is not. For example, there is a great difference between membership which can even be imposed in a mass organization organized by, run, and controlled by a government, on the one hand, and real political participation in an open political system in which people do in fact choose the rulers of the country. So we've tried to give some information about what the real form of political participation is.

We have tried to give more information, as we could, about labor unions this year, because it is our sense that trade union movements in a country are both a measure of and a means of political participation by the peoples of various countries. We've tried to show how free the trade union movements are or are not.

We've tried to indicate who actually rules the country in question. For example, we have tried to go beyond saying, "This country is a one-party state." There are some one-party states that have a large bureaucratic party that really does control power. There are other one-party states where, in fact, one man really rules the country entirely on his own. There are others where a small ethnic group or a clique rules the country. We've tried to distinguish those, and give a sense of who is actually in charge: where does power really lie.

We've tried to give more information about elections, going beyond whether elections exist, and saying how free they are. That is, are their multiple candidates so that people actually get a choice? Are the returns fraudulent or are they accurate?

In the case of parliaments or legislative assemblies, we've tried to give an indication of whether they are real. For example, do they ever reject legislation that is put before them? Are all votes unanimous, or are they real, deliberative, and decision-making bodies? We've tried to give more information on the independence of judicial systems and on their ability to check government power.

In the area of free speech, we've given, as has been true in past years, information on how free speech is, and we've tried to cover a somewhat new area this year, namely private speech. That is, it is one thing to discuss the ability of people to discuss political matters in public; it is another, and an interesting question, as to whether they are even free to discuss political matters in private. For example, does the government run such a large network of informers that people will not even feel free to talk about politics in their own homes or in a friend's house. We've tried to give information about that.

Finally, we've tried to give information about the press, as in previous years. As with these other items, we've tried to be more precise about the condition of the press. That is, for example, who owns it? Is it government-owned, or is it not? What is the degree of government control? What is the amount of censorship of the press? We've tried to give a sense of just how free the press is in each of these countries.

I want to introduce Charles Fairbanks who is here with me, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights, and who oversaw the compilation and production of this report. With me, he will make an effort to answer your questions.

MR. ROMBERG: Before we go to question, let me just remind you about the embargo, that the briefing as well as the reports are embargoed until 6 p.m. today.

Q Could you sort of give a general evaluation, compared with last year, on the status of human rights and discuss what you see are the greatest setbacks or the greatest advances in human rights records?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: No, we don't do that, and it's a point, I think, worth making. Two other organizations do global reports, Freedom House and Amnesty International. I don't believe Amnesty tries to make that kind of global assessment; Freedom House, on the other hand, does. Indeed, it does a mathematical assessment. We don't.

These reports, as you know, stem from the Congressional requirement that we report to Congress on the human rights situation in country after country, the initial idea being that this would help Congress in its decisions about economic and military assistance.

As we do the reports, we do them one by one, and no one makes an effort in the course of this process to assess the overall state of freedom in the world, as say, Freedom House does, so that in going through this, we have not tried to do that. It is not an unwillingness to disclose it to you; we don't have in our heads either an overall assessment of whether there was a plus or a minus. I think it's a very difficult thing to do anyway. But this report does not do that.

Q Why is the Soviet Union included in the Communist countries, since obviously, there is no aid?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Initially, when the reports were devised, Congress asked for reports only on countries which receive assistance. The pattern that soon emerged was that we were criticizing only friendly countries and were failing to criticize unfriendly countries because they don't get assistance. Then Congress changed it, and said to do a report on every country, or which is a member of the United Nations, which essentially covers every country in the world. We've got 162 covered this year.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the portion of the report that deals with Israel and the occupied territories, you do make reference to the massacres in Lebanon -- in Shatila and Sabra -- and you point out that there was a Commission of Inquiry empanelled to look into this.

In view of the report that panel has produced, what conclusions do you now draw about the human rights situation as it pertained to that incident?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I guess I would say that question goes beyond the bounds of this briefing. The conclusions that we draw on the basis of that report -- and if there are any, on the basis of the Lebanese report -- will be given later and, of course, in next year's report. But this year's report did not cover that, and I don't want to really go beyond the bounds of what is covered in this report.

Q O.K. May I follow up? There was another mention in there of 5,000 or so detainees -- people who were picked up by the Israelis in Lebanon. What is your view as to the continued detention of these people? Is that a violation of their human rights? What efforts are being undertaken to secure the release of those people who are not, as far as we know, charged with any crime?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: We have made clear on a number of occasions that we're quite concerned about the continued detention of those detainees as well as a number of others. There are, I believe roughly, some 300 Syrian prisoners of war. Our main concern has been to make sure that all detainees, by all parties, are being treated with humaneness and in accordance with the Geneva Accords. All parties have accepted those fundamental humanitarian principles, although the Israelis do not accept that the Geneva Accords actually apply. Our real concern has not so much been with the juridical question as it has been with the question of how the people are actually being treated. Obviously, we have said on a number of occasions that we hoped that as many people as possible can be released as soon as possible, and if anyone is going to be tried, that the trials take place as soon as possible.

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Q I don't understand your answer to the first question. You said that -- you were basically asked, "How do you measure progress?" I mean, surely, this is the point of the report.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: No. Perhaps I misunderstood the question. There is a difference between a report on individual country and a report on the globe.

I have made no effort to assess, nor did Congress ask us to, whether freedom in the world is enlarged or diminished in 1982.

We have many ways of measuring progress in a country. What we do not attempt to do is to line up 162 countries. I don't know how one would do that, really. That is, does one say that, "Well, things are a little bit better in Uruguay but they are worse in Czechoslovakia." How do you measure that? How do you say, "Well, that's an advance or it isn't an advance"?

So we don't make a global assessment. What we do is make a country-by-country assessment.

Q All right. Let's look at it country-by-country in a global aspect. Which seemed to have been the worst? Which seemed to have been -- in your view -- the greatest and the least progress in the world? Taking country by country which were the most glaring examples?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: One can mention a few countries, I guess, in which the situation was worse, in no particular order. I suppose one should mention Iran, where I would say the situation was worse than last year, although, of course, it's starting from what was a very bad situation, so it isn't as if there had been a deterioration from a condition of relative freedom to one of relative unfreedom.

There was a tightening up in a number of countries in the Soviet bloc. You might want to comment on that (to Assistant Secretary Fairbanks). The Czechoslovakia situation was worse. The Soviet Union itself saw a dimunition of the amount of personal -- I hesitate to use the word "freedom" in that context, but "personal autonomy," I suppose.

Lebanon, of course, went through a period of great violence, including thousands of deaths, so that one would have to say, and we do, that the human rights situation there deteriorated.

I'm trying to get the negative ones first.

Q Poland?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Of course, the main problem in Poland had occurred in 1981, not 1982. It was December 1981 when the progress in Poland was halted. The situation in 1982 has deteriorated, but the main change came in 1981, not 1982.

Q Would you mention Nicaragua having deteriorated?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I haven't gotten to Latin America yet. I'm still going around.

If you get to Latin America, Nicaragua, we think -- and this is consistent with virtually all the other human rights organizations reports and press reports -- there has been a continuing diminution of personal freedom.

There have been moves towards democracy in Brazil where the "abretura" continues. In Uruguay, where there were party elections. In El Salvador, where last March there was a constituent assembly election. In the Dominican Republic, where there was another free election.

Do you want to add any countries?

MR. FAIRBANKS: I'll add an evasion which I hope will amount to the basis on which one could give a clearer answer.

The reports, I think, have to stand on their own, and the State Department has never been anxious to draw conclusions because the report itself is our most considered judgment and our most carefully crafted judgment about this situation.

If one looked for places that have gotten worse and those that have gotten better, I think one would have to look to countries where changes in the whole situation have taken place -- that is not merely quantitative changes -- but countries that were attaining a completely different level of human rights observance, and then it turned around.

Poland was a very clear case of that sort where, based on popular participation, a whole range of liberties seemed to be flowering during 1981; and then at the end of 1981 there was a very sudden repression of that going across the board with a whole range of human rights things.

I think those kinds of cases, of which you've named some, are the most significant, and much more significant than things sliding up or down, though that can be very tragic as well.

Q What about countries like South Africa and Pakistan, last year compared to this year?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Do you want to do Pakistan?

MR. FAIRBANKS: In the case of Pakistan, I think ever since the Zia Government took power, one has seen a kind of continuous back and forth movement which follows from the very nature of the regime, I would say; that it is a military regime, but it, in some other respects, is not as harsh in certain areas of human rights as things were before there.

So that one gets a kind of loosening up in which political discussion is permitted, and then one gets the lid put on that, and it has a natural kind of oscillation.

Compared with previous years under Zia, I don't see a very clear movement this year.

Q South Africa.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: South Africa. There have been ups and downs. For example, there have been some deaths in detention. Killing is, after all, the worst form of human rights abuse.

In response, the government has announced and has begun to implement an administered, if not judicial, restraint on treatment of detainees.

There have been a few incidents that give concern about government pressure on the press and on the courts. There have been no major changes in those areas. There's been the introduction of the constitutional reform which we discuss in the country report on South Africa, and, obviously, different parties in South Africa have different views as to whether that is an advance or is not an advance.

The inclusion, in some ways, of the Asian colored communities, but not the black community, in the government.

I would say there has not been any very significant change in the human rights situation in South Africa.

Q Elliott, on South Africa, could I ask a specific question? I'm bemused by a sentence in the opening paragraph which says, "National elections in South Africa are free and fair, but only whites may presently participate."

How can a system of national elections be free and fair when 16.2% of the population are permitted to participate?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: It's very important to distinguish between a country in which 16.2% of the people engage in free elections, and there are scores in which zero percent of the population engage in free elections.

The purpose of the opening paragraph on South Africa was to try to give a sense of the complexity of the human rights and political situation there. It is a country in which, as that paragraph says, there is a very strange mixture.

Those elections in which the white participate in South Africa meet any country's standards of freedom, but the vast majority of South Africans are simply not permitted to particpate in them.

Similarly, they have an independent judicial system in South Africa that is one of the finest in the world, by world standards, yet there are significant, and growing over the years, restraints on what the judges are allowed to even get into.

One of the greatest critics of the government in South Africa is the press. It has one of the most vibrant free presses in the world, yet the government puts very significant limitations on the press, and on occasion attempts to intimidate it.

So what we tried to do is to give a sense of the extraordinary mixture of qualities which the South African human rights situation presents.

It is a very strange one. There are very few countries -- in fact, I cannot offhand think of one -- which has that particular mix of qualities, and that was what we were trying to get at there.

There is a very vibrant political life in South Africa, yet it is one which lives under extraordinary human rights restrictions, and that's what we were trying to convey.

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Q May I raise one other specific? On the part about Israel and the occupied territories, you mention that the settlements adversely affect the livelihoods of the Arabs. Are the settlements, per se, a violation of the Palestinian Arabs' human rights?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: No, we have never said that the settlements, per se, are a violation of human rights. The position of the Administration is that the settlements are a hindrance -- I think we used the word "obstacle" -- an obstacle to movement towards a peaceful settlement of disputes in that area. But we have not said, for example, per se, the purchase of land and its settlement by Israelis would be a human rights violation. I think that would be too categorical.

Q Could we follow up on Israel? Could you please give an overview of Israel, aside from the questions that you've already answered, the overview of the human rights situation in Israel?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: What we try to convey in the report is the distinction -- and this is nothing new; it's really been in for a number of years -- the distinction between the human rights situation in Israel itself and the human rights situation in the West Bank. The difference between a democracy and an area which is under military occupation, military rule.

The West Bank is not a democracy. It is run by the military government, and though there are various ways for the people there to express their views, they do not control the government which rules them.

Turning to Israel for a second. I'll come back to the West Bank. Turning to Israel, Israel, as we say in that report, is a democracy which would be familiar to Americans and meets the usual international and western standards of free elections, free press, freedom of speech, and so forth. Those are limited in virtually every case in the West Bank, although I think it's also fair to say that there are varying degree of harshness of military occupation, and one can point to a number of military governments, including in the Middle East, which are a good deal harsher than the Israeli Government is on the West Bank.

The key, I think, to that portion is the distinction we draw between the full democracy in Israel itself and the lack of full democracy in the West Bank.

Q Another question on Israel?

Q On Afghanistan, just for a second, Mr. Abrams. Besides painting a pretty bleak picture of the human rights situation there, your report seems to draw a political conclusion, unless I'm reading too much into it, and that is that the Soviet Union is in the process of turning, or seems to be in the process of turning Afghanistan into a Soviet province. The introductory paragraph seem to make that clear.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I think that's -- I don't think we do that.

Q Well, Paragraphs 4 and 5 -- 3, 4 and 5.

MR. FAIRBANKS: What page are you reading from?

Q Page 1072. Particularly paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4. Paragraph 4.

ASSISTANCE SECRETARY ABRAMS: No, I think one has to distinguish between Soviet control and turning Afghanistan into a satellite in the familiar pattern of Eastern Europe, and turning it into an actual province. That was certainly not the intention of our statements, nor do we mean to imply that, but rather that the government is fully in the control of the Soviet Union and one cannot in a sense speak an of independent Afghan government at this point.

You want to add to that?

MR. FAIRBANKS: If I might speak to that. If one compares the situation in Afghanistan with the present situation in Eastern Europe, the degree of Soviet control is infinitely greater in Afghanistan because one has in all the important ministries Soviet advisors who we believe, one can't know, pretty well set the policy, and then it's signed off on by the Babrak Karmal regime officials. That's comparable, though more extreme, than the situation that one in Eastern Europe around 1950, during the Stalin period, when there were Soviet advisors who, without going through an ambassador or through, say, the Government of Poland or Czechoslovakia, would directly decide the policies of Czechoslovakia or of Poland.

So Afghanistan is a very extreme case in that way.

Q I have another question on Israel. The inclusion in the section on Israel and the occupied territories of these references to the massacre in Beirut, does that imply that Israel was partly responsible for that and, if not, why was it included in that section rather than the section on Lebanon only?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: We didn't mean to imply anything. We had to figure out where to put the events in Lebanon. One could make a good case for putting them exclusively in the Lebanon report; one could make a good case for putting some reference to them in the Israel report because there was an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Israeli troops were involved in a lot of the events in Lebanon.

We were trying in a sense to do that without implying anything. We thought not to have mentioned Lebanon and the war in Lebanon in the Israel report would have been to leave out an important fact, and that in itself might have been taken as some kind of political judgment on our part. We were trying not to make that kind of judgment.

Q On El Salvador. You say that you really can't fault without question the government or the abuses of its own security forces because the members of the security forces, among other reasons, may be acting on their own "schtick." Isn't that academic to somebody whose been tortured or murdered? And isn't the more important question what the government is doing to try and stop those abuses, and can you talk about that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: There is a crucial distinction if one is attempting to engage the human rights situation in a country, the direction it's going, the possibilities of improvement, between human rights abuses which are ordered by the government as a matter of government policy and those which are committed against government policy or despite government policy. It is important to establish that relationship. That is why we thought that that was an important point to make. That is not the policy of the government.

Q Would not one prove that the atrocities and abuses are against the policy of the government, be it the prosecution of those who commit them, is my point?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: We have said many, many times that one of the things that we would like to see more and more of in El Salvador is the prosecution of security officers and others who commit human rights abuses. We've also said in the certification document about a week ago that one of the gravest human rights problems in El Salvador is the fact that the criminal justice system has essentially collapsed.

Traditionally in El Salvador, what happens to a military officer who is accused of a human rights abuse is that he is dismissed from the armed services and then tried in a civilian court. There aren't really civilian courts trying people, especially military officers now, raising the question of how you maintain discipline.

Our point there was to make it clear that we do not think that every time there is a human rights abuse one can say that this was ordered by the high command or that this is the responsibility of the Salvadoran Government.

One of the things we try to do in these reports was to give a sense of the actual situation in country after country. If you take the recent battle for the town of Berlin in El Salvador, you note that at the beginning, when the guerrillas attacked, there was something like fifty government soldiers there. In many, many towns and smaller ones than Berlin in El Salvador there is a small detachment of national guardsmen. Frequently as small as three or five men under a sub-sergeant, and that detachment has no communications equipment whatsoever with the high command.

It's important, we thought, to know that because it gives you a sense of how difficult it is for the high command to maintain discipline. This is one of the central goals of our attempts to professionalize the armed forces of El Salvador. It's important to distinguish between their failings in achieving that and a policy of human rights abuses.

Q In listening to you this morning, and reading some of these reports, there seems to be a dichotomy on the one hand between the Polands, Nicaraguas and Afghanistans and what you just mentioned, Salvador, Pakistan and South Africa. Is that old dichotomy between authoritarian and totalitarian exist in this report, is that dichotomy valid still?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I don't think you'll find the words in there. You will find them a few times in there. They were irrelevant to the compiling of these reports, and I think that if you look at every report, if you want to make this distinction, on a Communist country and on a non-Communist human rights violator, I don't think that criticism will hold up. We have some extremely tough criticisms of non-Communist countries and of countries which are quite friendly to the United States. These reports were done without reference to the degree of friendliness to the United States, because that is not the issue in these particular reports.

We have always said that the totalitarian/authoritarian distinction was an interesting and valuable one but was of limited utility as a basis for human rights policy. It is of no utility in the compilation of these reports which are not supposed to be judgmental in that way. What they're supposed to be is simply a statement of the factual situation in the country.

The facts can be described, and in some cases I think people will want to use the totalitarian/authoritarian distinction. It's not one that we use, because we were not trying to make that conclusion. We're just trying to present the situation. You can make your own judgment as to whether a country fits under one rubric or the other. But in the compilation of these reports, that did not come up.

Q In terms of other Middle East allies like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, do you see any decline or improvement in their human rights situation over the past year?

MR. FAIRBANKS: Offhand, it doesn't seem to me that there have been major changes during the year 1982 in either of those countries.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: As I recall the reports, I don't recall any major human rights events in either country or a conclusion that there had been any significant changes.

Q The improvements you mentioned in El Salvador, you say that the army started taking prisoners in 1982, but you don't mention how many prisoners they took, how many guerrilla prisoners they took. I would like to know the number.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: I think you can get that out of the certification document. We just can't put in -- I have the number here. In the time we've been doing these reports, the amount of space given to El Salvador has about doubled. The same is true with respect to a number of other friendly countries, such as the Philippines. So we're trying to give more and more information, but you can't possibly give every relevant fact. And in the case of El Salvador, aided by the fact that just a week ago we did a very lenghty report on human rights in El Salvador, so I would refer you to that.

Q You said that you had in some cases had very tough criticism of some friendly governments. Could you give me a couple of examples of the toughest criticism of that sort that you have in the report?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: No. I think I will leave the evaluations of which constitute the toughest criticisms to you.

Q Mr. Secretary, I see that the Romanian education taxes is mentioned. Has the U.S. decided yet how it's going to respond to the imposition of the tax?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: That goes beyond the scope of the briefing, so I think I won't take that right now.

Q In terms of Lebanon, you were saying a moment ago that the ultimate depravation of human rights is to kill somebody. You say that there were thousands of people killed in the Israeli invasion, but you don't fix a number. Obviously, this is a very crucial point and a very controversial one. Why did you not take a stand on how many people were killed in the war in Lebanon?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Because I don't think anybody knows how many people were killed. In any kind of wartime situation, it is extremely difficult to fix the numbers. We have been trying to do this now for two years with respect to El Salvador, and we have come up with figures as to the number of people dead, which we think represent a trend but do not, I don't think anybody believes, represented an actual number. You just can't get that kind of number. You can't get it from the Lebanese if you ask them, you can't get it from the Red Cross if you ask them. There is just no way to get it.

Q On a country-by-country basis, is there a way you can draw a conclusion on which one may be the worst violator of human rights in the entire world?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: We don't do that. We don't try to do that. Reading through the book again last night, I asked myself that question. It's a difficult one to answer. A top-of-the-head answer, it seemed to me that the toughest single report was Vietnam. That is, it looked as if it would be the worst country to live in on the basis of our report. But you may reach a different conclusion if you read from cover-to-cover yourselves as I think unlikely. Why don't we cut it there?

On Romania, I don't know if that question has come up at morning briefings. It probably has.

MR. TAYLOR: Not recently.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ABRAMS: Let me just say a word. It's very clear from the statue that the United States will not, cannot lawfully grant MFN status to a country which imposes an emigration tax that goes beyond the, let's say, pro forma. That is, we're not talking about an airport tax or something like that, but a real emigration tax.

Therefore, there really isn't any decision to make. If an education tax is implemented, an emigration tax is implemented by the Government of Romania, we are bound by law to refuse MFN status in the future. This is not something that's left to the discretion of the Executive Branch.

Thank you.

(Briefing concluded at 10:45 P.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 8, 1983

BRIEFING BY
BY PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
AND TOM DAWSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The Briefing Room

2:14 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Okay. For those of you who are here, I think the rest of the people have probably got the fact sheet and may be working off that as well as the statements by President Reagan and by President Mung'Omba.

We will start with President Mung'Omba who will make a few remarks and then we'll have Tom Dawson, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Developing Countries. And then he will address any questions you might have.

President Mung'Omba.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted to be with you after this very important occasion for Africa and, indeed, for the African Development Bank.

As you know, the bank has been in existence since 1963. It started its operations in 1966. At its inception, it had a capital base of $250 million. In 1982, with various increases, we had reached $2.1 billion.

With the opening up of the bank's capital stock to non-regionals, we have now moved to close to $6.3 million. What does that mean for us? In the past, our activities have been limited by the fact that we didn't have enough resources. And I need not go into the development requirements of our continent. Nearly every inch of that continent needs to be developed. The resources have been the major handicap. And in opening up the bank's captial to non-regionals, we have been merely trying to look for more means of making the African Development Bank more responsive to the problems of the African continent.

This occasion, or this signing ceremony, which has taken place this morning brings in your country, the United States, into the African Development Bank. The United States, as I said in my remarks earlier at the signing ceremony, is not really new to the African Development Bank. Since 1974, when the African Development Fund was created, and since 1976, when the U.S. joined as a state participant in the fund, we have had a lot of assistance, a lot of technical assistance from the United States. We have used that technical assistance in identifying bankable projects for the African Development Fund. And also for the fund, they have sent us expertise from here to come and work with us in Abidjan and I would like to make a further acknowledgment of our gratitude to all this assistance that we have received from your country.

Now, with the coming in of the United States into the bank, we are actually looking for greater participation of your country in the efforts that we have been making on our own. The African countries do welcome this positive step taken by the United States and several other countries. And on behalf of the governing bodies of the African Development Bank, I would like to say positively that I look forward to much closer cooperation and a meaningful participation of these countries in the -- Africa's development.

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I think I should end there. And if there are any questions, I'll be glad to answer some.

MR. ALLIN: Naomi, why don't we have Tom go ahead and then we'll take questions from the two of them. Okay --

MR. DAWSON: I have little to add beyond what's already in the fact sheet. I might stress a point that the United States originally had been invited to join the bank in 1979. And when the new administration came in, the necessary procedures within the bank itself had not been completed. Now that they have been, we have happily decided to go ahead and join. It's an institution that is, I think, unique among the development banks where we actually had our congressional authorization and our first year's appropriation prior to formally being invited to join. And I think that's a -- it's a unique pleasure. And there are very few institutions that I can think of where that is the case. And we will be seeking this year the second installment of $18 million of appropriations and an additional $54 million of callable capital, which will be the second of our five installments that we'll be making in this replenishment of the African Development Bank.

And I'd be happy to answer any questions as well, particularly on the U.S. perspective. Thank you.

MR. ALLIN: Mike, do you have a question?

Q I was wondering what other non-regional countries are members of the bank?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: There are 23 other non-regional countries apart from the United States.

Q What are some of the larger ones?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, the Scandanavian countries, Switzerland, Belguim --

MR. DAWSON: The United Kingdom.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: The United Kingdom. (Laughter). I should have said

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that -- The United Kingdom. Then we have Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Portugal, Spain, the United States. That is 24 -- and Canada, of course.

Q How does what the Bank will do differ from what the World Bank does in Africa to justify creating, essentially, another bureaucracy -- another development bureaucracy?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Essentially, we are going to continue doing the same thing as the World Bank does. We finance projects. But I do not see any contradiction between the work of the World Bank and ourselves. We like to think that the African Development Bank can be used even by the World Bank in the sense that we are on the spot. We are in the situation. And if we can strengthen our management, if we can improve on our expertise, I am sure that the bureaucracy that you are referring to will be non-existent.

Q But do you see what you are doing? Are you going to use different means than the World Bank? Or is this going to be, essentially -- pretty much, the same.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: It is, pretty much, the same. Our efforts are, pretty well, coordinated with the World Bank.

Q But what does U.S. entry mean? Was the United States invited, mostly, because it has the money and can increase its contributions? Is there anything else that will happen as a result?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Yes. There is quite a lot that is going to happen with the United States coming into the African Development Bank. I do not look at this partnership as merely a question of getting money from one country to the African Continent. I think it is going to provide better means of understanding our own problems and the efforts that we are making in Africa in developing ourselves.

MR. DAWSON: If I might add something as well -- the African Development Bank, because of the nature of its founding, had been unique among the regional banks in not allowing non-regional countries to join. And it was the change in that status to, in effect, bring it into conformity with that of the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank --

Q You borrow the money. Is that correct?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Yes. We do borrow money.

Q Do you expect to pay back.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Yes. We --

Q At what interest rate? And how will you get -- with the economic situation so low, how do you expect to raise all the money to pay back within a certain length of time?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: I like to think that we are a bank like any other bank. And the capital markets, the international capital markets are open to us. And we have been trying to borrow. In fact, we have borrowed successfully over a number years on the capital markets.

We have been trying to see if we can get relatively softer money, which would then enable us to on-lend to the African countries.

Q How do you pay back?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: How do we pay back?

Q Yes.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: (Laughter.) We do pay back when the member countries that we have lent to begin to pay us back.

Q What are the average interest rates on loans that you make and loans that you give out?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Our lending rate is now 11 percent.

Q What do vou borrow at, the same thing or less -- I would hope?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: In certain cases, we are borrowing below that rate. In fact, in many cases, the money that we have used to on-lend has been borrowed at less than 11 percent. It is necessary that we do that. Otherwise, there would be no point in it.

Q Oh, of course. You would not make anything. But that would be -- is that, in any sense, subsidized, would you say since high interest rates have been above that in the last two years?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: When the interest rates have been so high, we avoided borrowing.

MR. DAWSON: I might, also, add -- that is a practice quite similar to that of the other development banks who, effectively, are using the guarantees of the individual member countries to allow them to borrow on the capital markets at a rate somewhat above that that the government has to borrow, but below that of which any private borrower would be able to do.

Q What kind of activities do you finance? Do you give special emphasis to certain types of projects?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Yes. We just concluded a five-year program of action in which we have given emphasis to agriculture. Within the sect of agriculture, we are giving greater emphasis to food production. Our feeling is that food availability on our continent is actually on the decline. It's still very scarce. And unless we can step up that, the future of the African economies is very grim. Thirty-six percent of our lending activities in the next five years is going to go into the agricultural sector.

We also finance public utilities, transportation, education, health. What else?

Q Industries.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: Industries and development banks. There are small national development banks which we have been assisting to develop for individual member states.

Q The Soviets have been active in Africa. To what extent do they contribute to your borrowings?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: The Soviets are not active in the African Development Bank. They are not members of the African Development Bank group at all.

Q Will they ask to join?

Q -- invited to join?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: They were asked to join, but they didn't join.

Q How do you perceive your relationship with the United Nations Economic Commission to Africa?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: We work very closely with the E.C.A. in Addis Ababa. We used them for research purposes. And most of the documentation which they have done on various sectors of Africa have been referred to us. And if there are possibilities of funding some of their recommendations, we have been glad to do that.

Q What is your view of President Reagan's position that development in the Third World should be through private enterprise and not through large grants and transfers from the industrial countries to the developing countries?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: That doesn't -- can't answer that.

MR. DAWSON: I think that clearly there is a mix. And the primary responsibility and the primary causes of growth in individual countries are their own economic policies. And, I think, it is certainly the case in Africa with much recent research, for example, the Berg report, indicating that allowing market forces -- for example, allowing farmers to be able to earn market prices for their products is an essential component of getting the growth going.

There is no doubt that concessional assistance, especially to the most needy countries, most of whom are in India, is an essential component of that. But I think it is best used in support of such market oriented policies. And we think the Bank understands that and has been supportive of that.

Q Do you have a problem with defaulting on loans by recipients? And what makes the U.S. contribution to your effort a safe bet in these times when even Mexico is having trouble paying back --

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: We haven't got a bad record of debts by borrowers. There have been some arrears on subscriptions but efforts are being made to see that all the payments are done to the Bank.

I do not think that the U.S. joining the Bank would, therefore, lead to more defaults etcetera. I do not think so. I just hope that the record that we have maintained in the past is going to continue. It's necessary for us to have a clean balance sheet. It's important for our borrowings on the capital markets. And we do insist on that to our borrowers.

MR. DAWSON: I might add one other point with regard to reschedulings and defaults and arrearages in the development banks in general and the African bank in particular, that the loans made are, even in the case of the Mexico which you mentioned earlier, Mexico is keeping current in its payments to the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and, indeed, would be expected to as well if there were countries that were in a default situation.

The international organizations, as it were, are preferred creditors. The threat, as it were, that hangs over individual countries, which has been applied in a number of institutions, is if they are not current on payment, they do not continue to receive loans. And that is a very effective threat.

Q In your remarks, you talked about the ceremony being an explicit recognition of assurance for a long-term commitment by the U.S. Is that commitment beyond the five-year plan that was mentioned earlier?

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: No, I was referring to United States' international commitment to developing nations or to poor nations. That's a long-term thing.

Q Just a technical question. What's the difference between a paid-in fund and a callable capital? And what were your actual budget outlays fee?

MR. DAWSON: I could go on for hours on that.

PRESIDENT MUNG'OMBA: That's right.

MR. DAWSON: The paid-in is best conceived of as a cash payment made to

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the institution. It's made over a number of years, in general. The callable capital is, as it were, a guarantee that should the bank need to call on those subscriptions for the purpose of making payments on its own loans, then that would be necessary.

There has never been in the history of any of the development institutions, some of which are almost 40 years old now, a case where there has been any call on capital, nor do we expect there ever will be. But the nature of the institutions is that their lending volume is limited to the sum of their paid-in capital and their callable capital.

Q Is the paid-in capital then the only thing that shows up in the United States budget?

MR. DAWSON: It is what shows up on budget. But in addition, the Congress and the appropriations committees themselves explicitly approve the amount of callable capital.

Q With so many non-African countries now participating in your organization, do you deplore the fact that it's becoming less and less African?

MR. MUNG'OMBA: No, on the contrary, I welcome that. And I welcome the fact that we have extended this invitation to non-African countries. As I said, the development requirement in our continent have become so large with our economies facing difficulties that it was necessary for us to look for partners in --

Q Sir, the African Development Bank is becoming very much an international organization. How do the IMF and the World Bank take it?

MR. MUNG'OMBA: I think very well.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:30 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 10, 1983
No. 46

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PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
Hong Kong
February 9, 1983

MR. HUGHES, SPOKESMAN: Good afternoon all. We're On-the-Record. I thought just before we started that I might take a moment of the Secretary's time. A number of you on the plane wanted to know about that Radio Beijing interview, and we got a cable today from Beijing saying that the interview with the Secretary was broadcast February 6 -- that was a Sunday on which it was recorded -- at 1400 GMT and nine times, nine times on February 7, that's the following day on their worldwide English service, so that takes care of that little detail.

QUESTION: Was it broadcast internally?

MR. HUGHES: I don't know. This cable doesn't carry any of that. It's pretty good coverage on the overseas service. Mr. Secretary, we're all at your mercy.

QUESTION: Did you have any chance to give any thought to the report from Israel on the court of inquiry and what effect it might have on various negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as the report is concerned it's, of course, an internal matter for Israel. So I don't have any comment on their internal affairs, other than to say that it seems to me another outstanding example of the way a democracy can conduct itself; and to that extent it seems to me that it deserves a definite tip of the hat as a model of how democracy can work. As far as its impact on the various matters being negotiated are concerned, I think all of these questions -- the Lebanon matters, the basic peace process, the Middle East peace process matters, Israeli-Egyptian concerns -- are all matters of great importance. And we intend to keep working away at them and I presume the other people -- parties to those negotiations -- will as well.

QUESTION: Do you think it might delay even more the decisions that need to be made on the withdrawal from Lebanon, just while the internal thing is sorted out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think that necessarily needs to be the case, and people in governments have to work on more than one thing at a time. We all do, and I'm sure the Israelis will.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the issuing of a report is perhaps an example of democracy but if it just stays that way, would you still feel the same way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Do you mean if they just issue a report that's put in a file drawer? Well, they have, I think, first of all, the Government of Israel decided to appoint the Commission. The Commission has conducted a thorough investigation, issued a report, and it's been again an interesting marker on the esteem in which this process and the Commission, is held that there have been no indications on anyone's part that it would be other than a thorough investigation, and that the Commission members would say whatever their conclusions were. And undoubtedly that's what happened now. What will happen next is for Israel to determine, it's an internal matter and we'll just have to see about that.

QUESTION: Let me ask about another matter that doesn't pertain -- well, perhaps partly to this trip. The Department issued the Human Rights Report a day -- on the day or day after you left South Korea. We were told that you told the South Korean Government -- you praised the South Korean Government -- on the progress it has made on human rights questions. Did you let them know that this report was going to be issued which was critical of the Government's -- some of the Government's policies with regard to dissidents -- political dissidents. Did you discuss that question at all with them aside from appreciating the progress that they've made?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As I said on an earlier occasion we are trying to conduct, to the extent that we can, our diplomacy in this regard on a quiet basis and I don't want to undermine that approach by discussing it. The release of that report, I think, basically, that's the report made to Congress and then the release of it is basically a Congressional matter. So we weren't in control of that. I think it is by now a fairly straightforward effort to gather information, publish it and assess it.

QUESTION: Did you during the meeting with Chiefs of Mission here produce any kind of conclusions -- any kind of balance sheet -- of how we are doing in Asia? And did it produce any kind of concern about Soviet activities in Asia -- the Soviet military buildup or naval buildup?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The discussion were wide ranging. I don't want to specify all of the topics. You can pretty well identify them. But to me, it had a very good effect in getting me and others to think about the Asian dimension of our foreign policy. And, of course, as you think about that you can't help but see that we do have and must have a world view, as we think of United States interests around the world. But I found it useful since I look on this trip as, in a sense, part of our efforts in Asia -- this trip now, another to the ASEAN meeting in late June, there will an ANZUA meeting in Washington at about the time -- the Chiefs of Mission meeting was a useful way of trying to draw these threads together. And there are a lot of very impressive people in our Embassies around through this part of the world, and so there was a great deal of discussion (inaudible) varying points of view, so I think all in all it served a useful purpose for me.

QUESTION: Could you describe the Asian dimension a little more? What mutual strategic issues or concerns do you share with China, for example?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, we first of all want to have a strong and enduring relationship with China as such. It's a major country, as we are, and so we need to think of it that way. And here their own modernization program is something of great interest to us. We support what they are trying to do and I think as that succeeds it will be of general benefit to stability in this part of the world -- higher standards of living, the market for our products and so on. Beyond that as you, as we talk about issues around the world, first of all, there are a number that are well known where we have parallel interests, as in Kampuchea and Afghanistan, various dimensions of Soviet behavior. There are other areas where our views differed but it was interesting to me in talking with the Chinese to see that they too have a world view, and they feel comfortable in a sense going around the world and talking about things that are taking place in various countries and seeing the relationship among them. It was interesting to me, just to take another dimension or example, having traveled to Europe in December and then talking with the Vice President about his trip before he left, and exchanging cables to a certain extent about our two trips to see the relationship between them. And you see, for example, a relationship in arms control is discussed and on the one hand, the preoccupation in Europe, of course, with the questions of deployment, zero/zero, what the Soviets do, and in this part of the world the dimensions of our negotiations saying that zero/zero goes across the board, it's a worldwide kind of proposal. And the Russian proposal -- the Andropov proposal -- faltered in Europe because it aspires to continued Soviet monopoly in Europe and in this part of the world it is seen as

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a further destablization here, so those are all reasons why we rejected it in the first place. But again you see the connections and you see the worldwide dimensions in what we are trying to achieve.

QUESTION: Did you get the impression as a result of talking to the Asians that they would be uncomfortable with any compromise that could be reached with the Soviets in which they could keep a certain number of missiles in Asia? The Europeans seem to be interested in some compromise that would reduce the number of the missiles in Europe and allow us to put up some, but that would still leave the Soviets with a rather large force here. Does that put more burden on you to try to get the zero option?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That certainly reinforces the virtues of the zero option. And that point was made to me. At the same time I don't think here they are trying to sort of tell us what we should do. They are very interested in the negotiations and we gave thorough briefings at each stop on what our positions are and I think that was well received.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does that "they" include the Chinese?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

QUESTION: I'm specifically thinking of the (inaudible) in which arms control was listed as one the areas of congruence. Could you expand on precisely what they were talking about? Was it --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the SS-20 matter is sort of in the center of it and symbolizes their interest and their support for the positions we have been taking.

QUESTION: Secretary Haig was out in Asia in June 1981. One of the points he made at that time regarding Vietnam was that the United States would continue every effort to isolate Vietnam under the present circumstances, as long as Vietnam basically was in Cambodia. It's a very controversial position because people think it is better to have contact even if you don't make an arrangement with it.

Have you thought about that question of what United States policy should be towards Vietnam? Do you have any thoughts on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think basically Vietnam has isolated herself by her actions. And Vietnam has become isolated in the United Nations, where there have been very strong votes, and I believe the Kampuchea resolution attracted more votes this year than last year. And Vietnam is isolated economically, and all of this, I think, is unhelpful to Vietnam and their behavior is outside the pale. We oppose what they are doing and I don't think that there is anything to be gained by changing our stance in that regard. I think Secretary Haig was right.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Kampuchea, you said there are parallel interests with China on Kampuchea. It seems that China wants to keep low level guerrilla war going there for quite some time as a drain on Vietnam. Is that a shared objective with the U.S.?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, the shared objective basically is to get Vietnam out of Kampuchea, and to allow there to emerge in Kampuchea a government that is responsive to the will of the people of Kampuchea. And that is a shared objective. The guerrilla warfare is one way of making it cost Vietnam to be there, and it is part of this pressure which, of course, also has its external dimensions as I was talking about in response to the previous question.

QUESTION: So, in the absence of political initiatives we support continued military pressure on Vietnam, is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is correct, but we have been exerting our support basically through the Asian countries as sharing this objective with China, and the Asian countries have basically been taking the lead and we have been supporting them.

QUESTION: There was a report on television last night broadcast from the United States. It said the Administration had decided to make some new aircraft sales to Taiwan. The report may have been garbled -- we heard the F-104 and then it could have been the F-4. Can you tell us anything about this? Is there some new sale planned on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there is nothing new in that. There have been some sales. That is an aircraft that is an old aircraft, that's been in the Taiwan inventory for some time.

QUESTION: 104's, is that what they are talking about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think so, yes, that is what they are referring to and there is nothing about that in any way falls outside of the undertakings that we made in the August Communique.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, one matter we haven't touched on here and maybe came to your mind is economic matters in Asia. As you know, this part of the world handles more U.S. trade than Europe does. Some of the countries you passed through -- Japan, Korea, this place right now -- have been among the more dynamic economies of the present-day world. Do you have any thoughts about the economic trends and the economic circumstances that you found and its meaning for the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think a lot of the future of the world is here in Asia. And I felt that for quite a long time. As a government official before and as a businessman I've made many trips to this part of the world. It has a very able, hard-working people in many, in most of these countries and you certainly can see it here in Hong Kong. So I think that the United States needs to pay a lot of attention to Asia, and the economic dimension, of course, is one of the reasons that brings me here as you suggest. On the one hand, we have the importance of opening up markets here, as in the Japanese case and in the case of other countries, and on the other it is a source of raw materials, it is a source of goods that come into the United States. It is a thriving economic community.

QUESTION: Do you see anything the United States should do or should not do (inaudible) with regard to the economy?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think, of course everybody out here asks you what is happening to the United States economy and will expansion, is it getting underway? So that's topic "A" and I've expressed myself on that subject. I think another subject of terrific importance to everyone here and in the United States is the subject of protection. I think we have to do everything we can in the U.S. to stem the rise of protectionist forces and the people here do, too. They have a terrific stake here in an open trading system. That means, at least in many of the countries, that it's not enough just to express concern about developments in the United States but they need to look in the mirror and ask what their own policies are and whether or not they shouldn't do something about them. We've discussed this a great deal in Japan. We worry about, for instance, local content legislation in the United States. The Administration is firmly opposed to such legislation. And it has been raised with me. But there are countries here, Korea, for example, has now in place a form of local content legislation. So I think we need to mutually examine access to markets and I know the more we are able to say in our Congress that markets are open or being opened, the better chance we are going to have of persuading people that we should exercise great care in this regard in our own domestic legislation. But I think that's an issue of great importance. There's been a good bit of discussion about the debt overhang that many countries have; I think it's worth noting that the picture out here is basically a pretty good one. None of these great problem cases are here; they're in other parts of the world, but nevertheless, it's clearly seen that they can have an effect because just as we had to have a world view in our foreign policy, the economy is basically a world economy system. There's no other way to think about it.

QUESTION: Could you help us clear up some confusion about the Zhao Ziyang visit? You and Zhao, when we were in Beijing, announced that he had accepted the invitation and that there was no date set and I think it fair to say that both sides let it go at that. Thereafter there was an announcement from the White House which, reading the stories about it, went a step further then and suggested that he would come either in June or September and the details had been worked out. There followed that a statement from the Chinese that no, the details hadn't been worked out and that he might come this year or he might not come this year. What are the facts in this case and how did it get out of kilter?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't know how it got out of kilter but the facts are these. I delivered a letter to the Premier from the President reiterating the invitation to come to the United States, and suggesting as an initial possible time either some time in the month of June or some time in the month of September. Those were suggestions. And that was received by the Chinese and it was stated that there was an intention to accept the invitation, and that the Premier would be coming and that the details would be "worked out through diplomatic channels" was the phrase used. And the details, of course, include the time, as well as other matters having to do with the content to be treated during their visits. So diplomatic channels are at work on the subject but there is no further information about when the trip would take place.

QUESTION: Is it certain that there would be a trip in 1983?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no reference that I am aware of to 1983 beyond the references that I just told you about, namely, there was an invitation to come, two suggested time periods and what the possibility in those time periods is to the Premier, I don't know. And if those don't suit, we can look at others and we'll just have to see, as far as the timing is concerned.

QUESTION: What is the status of President Reagan possibly going to China?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he's, that invitation was extended to him through me, and I think earlier, when he and the Premier met in Cancun, if I'm not mistaken. And the President is interested in that possibility. But there is no trip planned that's in the making at this point of time but he's glad to have this invitation.

QUESTION: When all of this was taking place some unnamed White House official was quoted as saying that there was no way the President was going to China.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I was in a meeting of the Cabinet, and I'll say this on the record since what the President said was that he was sort of tired of statements by unnamed White House or Administration sources, and if people had something to say, let them stand up and say it on the record and then we'll know who said what and how official it was. So till you tell me who said that on the record, I don't pay much attention to it. That's courtesy of the President, those are his words, so you see I am on the record.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I think this question was raised very early in the trip, maybe on the plane or on the way over or something, and I just want to see whether anything has changed. On the question of Hong Kong, did you discuss it at all with the Governor or perhaps in the meeting with the Ambassadors or Heads of Mission, the future of Hong Kong or are you still staying out of that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's basically for China and the United Kingdom to work out. And from our standpoint in the United States, we have very considerable interests here in Hong Kong and so we, of course, want to see this question worked out in a manner that will promote the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. But it's basically a question for the Chinese and the U.K. to pursue and I don't want to make any comment about it beyond what I've just said.

QUESTION: Did you discuss that (inaudible)--

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You can't be in Hong Kong and not have people raise this question. But it's not a subject that we really can contribute to particularly, and so we just express our hope that they can work it out in a manner that continues to serve this interesting and rather unique community here.

QUESTION: You expect that to be worked out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would think so. But I don't -- you live here, you have probably a better insight that I. It's a good thing everybody has going here and usually people like to keep a good thing going.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you say what other matters of mutual interest you discussed with the Governor?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: He was interested in knowing what's going to happen in the United States economy. Of course, I know what's going to happen to United States economy, so I was able to answer that question. He was interested in my visit to China, and at the same time, I recognize he's one of the most experienced diplomats in the world when it comes to China, so I was interested in hearing what his views were, so we talked about subjects like that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will you be back in June for the ASEAN Conference?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hope to be; I plan to be. They've invited me and so unless there's something, something comes up to prevent me I'll be there. As I've said, I've been many times to various ASEAN countries and I look forward to it.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 11, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH AND
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The Briefing Room

12:20 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The Vice President and the Secretary will be here shortly. You have the statement, which we would like for you to hold on an embargoed basis until you finish the briefing.

Also, the IMF meeting that was scheduled for 2:30 p.m. has been cancelled due to the weather. And we will let people go.

Unless there is a rising chorus, I see no need for a regular 12:30 p.m. briefing. I have nothing to add to what I had this morning.

Q What about shredding the paper at EPA?

MR. SPEAKES: We shredded that this morning.

So I do not hear a rising chorus. So I think, once this is over -- and we will run a check to see if there is any additional paper, we will put on a lid for the day and let you get home safely.

Q Will they reschedule the IMF --

MR. SPEAKES: I do not know. I will have to check and see.

Q Without objections; so ordered.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. (Laughter.) The "ayes" have it.

* * *

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We'll be delighted to respond to questions. We have had an opportunity, the Secretary of State and -- report on his trip, I on mine, the other part of the world. And we both modestly feel the trips were pretty good. And now, with no further ado, we'd be glad to respond to questions.

Q Mr. Vice President, may I just ask you about the zero-zero option? You say that you brought back to the President the message that our allies would like to see perhaps an interim agreement on the way to a total ban of those weapons. Do I take it from the President's statement today that he is not ruling out the possibility of reaching some interim agreement?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We had an opportunity to brief him and I, as I said in the press conference yesterday in London, I don't think he'd ruled anything in or out. He's just had a chance to digest the views that we gave him in confidence, received in confidence, from the various leaders. So, I just don't know what he's going to do yet. It's too early.

Q -- sir, I asked --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes, I --

Q -- the statement he gave us and I guess what I want to know is, it would be a misinterpretaion then to say that he is insisting on nothing but the zero-zero option?

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THE VICE PRESIDENT: You've heard him say that zero-zero option is our position. You've also heard him say that he would welcome a serious proposal from the Soviet Union to -- and he -- Nitze is over there to negotiate and negotiate seriously and we hope such a proposal will be forthcoming.

Q Do you have any indication there will be? Have there been any new signs of serious negotiations?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I can't say from the 40 minutes I spent with Mr. Kvitsinsky that I got that direct feeling. But it's worth staying in there and trying. We have -- one thing I think we dispelled or hopefully help dispel on this trip was the feeling that we were not interested in serious negotiation. And I made very clear we were. We also happen to have a very strong moral position banning an entire generation of these intermediate-nuclear force weapons from the face of the earth. And I say that because the Secretary reminds us that we are dealing globally on some matters and this is a noble objective. It's an objective that for awhile the Europeans seemed to have lost sight of, not our allies incidentally, not the government leaders, because I found the Alliance very much together on this point.

Q Given our position, even if there is some flexibility in it, and given the Soviet position, as we know it, is it really realistic to think of any arms control this year?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Absolutely.

Q Why?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Because I think that we're there to seriously negotiate and I would think that the Soviet Union would want to help lower the level of terror. What people don't realize is the conviction that our President has about arms reduction. He also is firmly committed to both tracks -- going forward on the agreed dates with deployment but staying there seriously negotiating. And we think the Soviets know they have a monopoly at this moment. And we think that there ought to be some incentive there for them to negotiate because with that -- the status quo monopoly for one side and nothing for the other is unacceptable to the Europeans and certainly unacceptable to the United States.

Q Mr. Vice President, it's been said recently that this administration is losing the propaganda war in Europe to the Russians. What is your assessment? Are we losing that propaganda war?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: No.

Q And why did you say some Europeans seem to have lost sight of our goal?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I think there was some feeling -- when zero option first came out, it captured the imagination of all governments and a lot of the peace movement. Then the Soviet Union, of all people, came forward with kind of a propaganda campaign and I hope that our visit and other things, other statements made by the President in terms of

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various subjects, but his willingness to be serious about arms reduction, are now back in the forefront. And, so, therefore, I think that there is a much better perception of the U.S. seriousness and willingness after this trip. Maybe that's a little bit of an egotistical assessment, but I believe that the press coverage and the summations that I've seen anyway collected from foreign press coverage would bear that out. And that doesn't say we have no problems. There are plenty of problems there.

Q Mr. Vice President, what would constitute a serious offer by Moscow?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I don't know but I think we'd know it when we saw it. Remember what Potter Stuart said about --

Q Pornography?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: -- pornography, I believe it was? We'll know a serious offer when we see it. And we've got a very able negotiator there and we know an unseriousness offer when we see that.

Q Do you think they've been unserious so far?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Absolutely, and so does every single ally that I talked to. Not one felt differently on that point.

Q What about the possibility of an interim agreement along the way before you get to zero-zero?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: What do you mean, do I --

Q The allies -- the question that the allies said that they might take some steps along the way from --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: We've noted Margaret Thatcher's statements, we've noted the statements by Mr. Genscher and others, and it's -- I've brought back to be kept in confidence the innermost feelings of each of these leaders of the governments and, to some degree, the opposition leaders with whom I've met. And that will all be sorted out now by the Secretary of State and the President as we consider the various recommendations, comments, criticisms, suggestions made by these leaders.

Q Mr. Vice President, do you think that the election of --

Q Mr. Vice President, what was --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me -- here, and then come back.

Q What was the purpose of the open letter that you delivered in Bonn from President Reagan when, in fact, the Soviets had already rejected the so-called zero-zero?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: When I got to Europe, and before, I think we all agreed that there was some misperception about the President's willingness to meet with the General Secretary. And I reminded the people in Europe that it was, indeed, President Reagan who had suggested that Brezhnev meet him informally at the United Nations. I reminded them -- and that needed reminding, I found out -- that it was our President who talked a couple of times, at least, about a summit meeting, provided it was well prepared, the hopes of the world not to be elevated only to be dashed by failure to prepare properly. And this, saying I will drop everything, go anywhere, anytime to sign an agreement, put in focus the morality and the correctness of the U.S. position on INF. And I realized that some felt that it was nothing particularly new about it, but Chancellor Kohl thought it was a good idea because what he felt is it showed our President -- and so did -- I believe Mr. Vogel had something favorable to say about it. We made it in Germany, so I cite those two. But as -- along the way, a lot of people felt this demonstrates the President's willingness to reach out, albeit we did define in that letter -- the President did define the terms under which he'd have that meeting.

But you can't look at it all alone. You've got to look at the willingness that has been demonstrated. And why the people of Europe felt that the President was unwilling to meet under any circumstances anyway, I don't know. But I think we -- that letter helped lay that to rest and helped put in focus the position that we strongly adhere to.

Q Could we get the Secretary on the Mid East, do you think?

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's fine.

Q Mr. Secretary --

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Are you through with me? I might --

Q Let us just ask you, if you have to run off so early, a political question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I need to go, too, but, anyway, I was beginning to feel irrelevant, so I'm glad to hear I have a question.

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Q -- if you have to run off so early, a political question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I need to go, too, but, anyway, I was beginning to feel irrelevant, so I'm glad to hear I have a question.

Q Never.

Q Irreverent.

Q Are recent events in Israel going to make a settlement easier in Lebanon for withdrawal of foreign forces?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That remains to be seen what emerges from that, and, of course, we're evaluating what's going on.

Q Do you have any indication that there's movement in the withdrawal talks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

Q Would it be easier if Minister Sharon was no longer a member of the Cabinet?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Just what Minister Sharon's position is going to be is yet to be seen. From our standpoint, when we negotiate with Israel, we negotiate with the government that's there. And whatever government the people of Israel put there, that's the one we'll deal with.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you planning --

Q -- asked you about the Mid East --

Q -- to go there yourself in the very near future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Don't have any precise plan.

Q I meant Far East.

Q You know, when you left -- as you were leaving China, your statement was so upbeat and everything was great and mutual visits and so forth. As soon as you left, the Peking government really started attacking our -- U.S. foreign policy and so forth. How do you reconcile --

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, I do not think there was that much difference between the statements that I made and the statements that they made. I was pretty restrained.

Q But they were not. (Laughter.) I mean, you no sooner left town, sir, than they issued a statement underlining the differences and the problems between the two countries.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are differences and problems. And we are all aware of them, including me. And I can enumerate them as well as anyone else, and did.

Q Mr. Secretary, yesterday Lyndon and Helga LaRouche's "Club of Life" held a demonstration against the IMF Interim Committee meeting here. Now, your Department has issued a statement of support for the Creditors' Cartel established by the Ditchley Group last month. Do you, also, support the expansion --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You are talking a lingo that I do not follow. I am sorry.

Q Have you never heard of the International Monetary Fund or the Ditchley Group?

Q The Ditchley Group. (Laughter.)

Q You do not support the statement that was issued by your Press Office on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that it is time for me to go to lunch.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:29 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

February 16, 1983

The Briefing Room

4:17 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: The briefer this afternoon is [redacted] who will brief you on background as a Senior Administration Official on the official working visit Friday of the Prime Minister of Norway.

We would like to keep this session directed at that visit and the subjects that will be addressed there and we would appreciate your sticking with that understanding, please.

Q Why?

MR. ALLIN: Because that's what the briefing is for.

Q Why can't we ask for his reaction?

MR. ALLIN: Oh, on his confirmation?

Q Yes. Some -- all the good news --

MR. ALLIN: I'm sure he can -- he is free to address that at length if he'd like.

Q How does it feel to be confirmed after two years of waiting?

Q Are you no longer held hostage?

Q Why did it take only two years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, it wasn't two years.

I'll give you a quote, if you'd like, and that is that I'm a happy man. How's that? Let me --

Q You look it.

Q Is that on background, or is this -- (laughter.)

MR. ALLIN: On the record. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the record. Thanks, Mort.

In about 40 minutes the Prime Minister of Norway arrives in Washington for, as Mort Allin said, an official working visit. I don't think I need to say too much about U.S.-Norwegian relations. Sometimes people have said -- and I don't know if this is correct or not, but it gives you some idea of the relationship between the two countries -- that there are more Norwegian Americans than there are Norwegians; that the ties between the two countries are very deep --

Q Why is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is -- Norway not only has a close bilateral relationship with the United States --

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Come on. Let me get this thing over with. (Laughter.) But they are a key NATO ally. They are the country which maintains the so-called northern flank of the alliance. And shortly after Prime Minister Willoch's election victory in October 1981, the President called the Prime Minister. They, I think, are philosophically similar.

For most of Norway's history, they have had a Labor government. And the new government has taken some courageous policies in terms of trying to put a lid on government spending, cut back on the growth of spending there, and to gain greater control over the economy. And from our standpoint, that strategy has been successful.

And one of the things that the Prime Minister will want to discuss with the President, the Vice President and the Secretary of State are the current international economic problems, coping with unemployment which is growing in Norway as well as the United States, as --

Q -- any cutbacks in social programs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- as well as inflation, which is a problem in Norway.

The Prime Minister's own background is that of an economist, and he was formerly the Commerce Minister in Norway, so there will be a heavily economic component.

Energy is another important issue which is certain to come up in the talks. As you know, the Norwegians have a large off-shore oil and natural gas enterprise, and we have had talks about the Norwegians -- about their oil and gas resources and we have talked to them about increasing their production, and they have been willing to do so. And many people have viewed Norway as a potential substitute in Western Europe and elsewhere as a supplier of natural gas, a substitute to the Soviet Union.

The other issue which will clearly come up in the negotiation --

sorry, not the negotiations, in today's -- tomorrow's discussions and Friday's discussions will be INF and security policies. The current government has been very supportive of both the December '79 two-track decision which, as you know, calls for negotiations on limiting intermediate range nuclear forces and in the absence of an agreement at the end of this year, the deployment of those missiles. Despite criticism by the opposition Labor Party in Norway, the current government has firmly supported the December '79 decision and it has also firmly supported the President's proposal for eliminating entirely INF missiles, not only in Europe, but from the face of the earth. And there will clearly be consultations on this -- on the arms control talks in Geneva. Although Norway is not a basing country and has a policy which calls for the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on its own soil in peace time, it strongly supports the NATO deterrent strategy and the deployment by the United States of nuclear weapons to deter a conflict.

Q On somebody else's ground?

Q On somebody else's soil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's about all I really have to say and I'll be happy to answer your questions.

Q Will the main focus of their talks then be arms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the main focus will be security and arms control as well as economics because Willoch is, as I said before, an economist. He is concerned about the international recession and he has his own ideas of how to move toward a period of growth.

Q Did you say that they do now supply the Soviet Union with oil and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they don't supply the Soviet Union --

Q Potentially?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, you misunderstood me. They are a potential supplier or a substitute supplier to other European countries of oil and gas.

Q Which American companies are involved in the oil and gas --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Norway has its own nationalized oil company but that nationalized oil company works with several American and other Western oil companies.

Q Which ones are those?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I can't -- but I think most -- I would say all the major American companies in one way or the other are subcontractors in this very ambitious program.

Q My memory might be at fault and if it is I apologize, wasn't there a controversial parliamentary vote there on payment for the infrastructure. Could you go through that again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have a very good memory. I think two months ago a debate arose in Norway over Norway's payment into the NATO infrastructure funding for the INF deployments if negotiations fail. The opposition party opposed to the deployment of the missiles at the end of the year had a motion which would have stopped Norwegian funding of that NATO common pool and the government continued to support that payment and won that vote by one vote.

Q There's no change in that -- not been reversed or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it has not.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And so it was a courageous stand by the government.

Andrea?

Q Despite supporting the two-track decision, is he also one of the leaders who supports, excuse me, an interim agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I certainly haven't talked to him and the Vice President while he spoke to the NATO Council, as you know, did not visit Norway. So, this will be a good opportunity for the Prime Minister to give his views.

I will say this that we had a meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group in Brussels on Monday where the Norwegian representative was there along with all the others. And that group agreed to a public statement that said that the President's proposal for eliminating an entire class of weapons was the best outcome that could be achieved in Geneva.

Q Was that stressing the outcome as a long-range goal and leaving room for other things --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so. I think it stood for itself.

Q Was the question of an interim agreement taken up then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we're getting off the -- those are confidential meetings.

Q I mean, you can't give half the story.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm just saying that I think we'll be able to hear what the Prime Minister's views are on those negotiations while he's here.

Q How do you think they'll overcome their economic problem? By sending more produce to us here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any effort on their part to send more produce to us.

Q Will they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I imagine through policies designed to encourage growth.

Q Do you have any advice for Ken Adelman?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Come on.

Q Having just gone through a --

Q Yes, let's hear the answer to that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. Any other questions on Norway? All right.

Q Where is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The northern flank of NATO.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:28 P.M. EST

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 18, 1983
No. 51

PC 21

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE
ECONOMIC SUMMIT AT WILLIAMSBURG
February 17, 1983

Mr. Gergen: Good afternoon. Secretary Shultz and Allen Wallis the President's personal representative to the Williamsburg Summit Conference are both here to day to give you an early look at a lot of the thoughts and planning that are going into the Williamsburg Conference which, as you know, is about two, three and a half months away.

This briefing is for the purpose of talking about Williamsburg and not about other subjects so that we would ask that you please direct your questions to that subject. This is on the record.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The message of what we have to say about the summit, in a way, can be illustrated by a description of at least the little bit I have seen of summits in their early stages. Back in early 1975, President Ford got ahold of me -- I was a private citizen -- and told me that some of the leaders of Europe had suggested that there ought to be a meeting of the heads of state of the leading industrial democracies to talk over the problems of the international economy, the things they were doing, their perspectives on them, and ideas that they had for what should be done about them. And he did not know quite what to make of these suggestions, but since it happened that I knew several of the people involved, would I mind going around and talking to them and get a little clearer idea of what was on their minds.

So I did that. And it turned out that what was on peoples' minds and what I reported back to President Ford was that there were problems and, certainly, there are today, and that is it ought to be a useful thing for the heads of these countries to get together and share their ideas, develop whatever common thoughts they could, at least have a discussion such that, as they respectively went about making their own decision about economic policy, they would have in mind the perspectives and the thoughts of the other parties, and that, in order for this to take place, they really had to kind of get together as people and talk and genuinely share ideas, have an interchange.

And that was what, it seemed to me, they really wanted, and as it turned out, President Ford thought that was a good idea. And so the first of these summits, that was held at Rambouillet, emerged.

I have never been to one of them, although I have been involved in helping get several of them going in one way or another. But I understand that the Rambouillet Summit was a relatively informal kind of meeting in a place that was private. A great deal of the time was spent with the heads of state talking with each other. They had other people around -- foreign ministers and treasury secretaries and so forth. But, basically, the emphasis was on an interchange of views among the heads of state.

We find now that the desire of all the heads of state is to have that kind of a meeting in which the maximum amount of time possible is spent with them by themselves, talking with each other, or with others around, but in -- not without an agenda, but without a sort of superstructured kind of agenda that would sort of interrupt the free flow of conversation and exchange among them.

So that idea is dominating the thinking behind how this Williamsburg summit will be organized.

The agenda, of course, is not really discussed much, let alone agreed to. But the approach to doing it is for the various, the respective personal representatives to get direct thoughts from their head of state and to try to develop and agenda based on those thoughts. So, let us say you have an approach to the agenda from top down, as distinct from an approach which has the respective departments and military people working away with each other and deciding what the issues are and trying to frame a tight agenda looking toward a communique that is by and large pre-written and so on.

So that is the approach that is being taken and, obviously, in that kind of approach the emphasis is on the interchange that takes place at the summit, as distinct from some announcement of some sort at the end of it. The event itself and the interchange is what is being pointed at.

So that is by way of introduction. I will be glad to try your questions.

QUESTION: What will be the key subject at the summit and what will the U.S. pursue the most?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course it remains to be seen what the agenda will be. That is what the heads of state, through meetings of their personal representatives, will try to work out. And I am sure as the summit approaches and the shape of various problems emerges more clearly it will get set, both in terms of what subjects and that kind of thing.

QUESTION: Well, do you foresee it to be economic mostly?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is an economic summit traditionally. And it is easy enough to think of subjects. But just how they will be framed and what order they come in and so on has to be worked out.

QUESTION: What do we want to do there? What would we like to see come of it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are -- the President is thinking about it. It is some months away. And he will be taking part through, Allen Wallis, in discussions about it. And I think the right way to go about this is to let that agenda emerge from those discussions.

QUESTION: Is the President likely to have a specific single initiative like Mitterrand did last year on high tech?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It remains to be seen how this agenda will be shaped. I do not think there is any highly specific thing that will likely be pushed, although events will have some impact on that and the thinking has yet to emerge.

QUESTION: How high a priority will the restriction of the study groups that you announced when the administration lifted pipeline sanctions have at this summit? All the study groups on restricting credit and high technology sales to the Russians.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, well, there are five of those efforts underway. And what their status will be at the time of the summit, I do not know. But I believe that they will be at the time of the summit, I do not know. But I believe that they will have taken probably a very considerable shape.

There are actually three meetings at which those subjects might well be talked about. There is the summit meeting in late May in Williamsburg. There will be an OECD -- the ministerial meeting in Paris in the early part of May. And there is a North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in, I think around the 8th or 9th of June, something like that. So that these subjects will be talked about, no doubt, in all three sessions.

Whether there will be something out of the studies that gets a lot of focus remains to be seen. It just depends upon what the state of them is. It may very well be that there is agreement on certain things and people go on about their business and about all that needs to be done is to take note of them. But it just is certainly a possible topic, the general East-West economic subject.

But I am not trying to put that out in front or say this is our subject; but you and I could sit here and we could spin out any number of possible topics. That is one of them.

QUESTION: What is the overall problem in the world today? Is it worldwide recession? I mean, at some times it's been interest rates. At some time it's been growth rates. It all ties together. But then as an economist, what's the overall problem in the world today that the leaders will really want to focus on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I spent a good part of yesterday and the day before discussing that subject in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Particularly the former was directly on economic subjects. And I will refer you to that testimony.

I would like to keep this session restricted to the summit meeting itself. And I recognize that since all I can talk about is --

QUESTION: But you're not telling us anything.

QUESTION: With all good respect, sir, you've said that it's months away and it'll just evolve and you can't say yet and the agenda isn't set and you don't know what will perk up and you don't know this. Can we ask why you came?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is not a bad question. (laughter). I came, I thought, sort of at your request --

QUESTION: To talk about Williamsburg?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- to hear a little about how --

QUESTION: At whose request?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- this is shaping up and thinking -- and the thinking behind it.

QUESTION: How is it shaping up? (Laughter).

QUESTION: Tell us anything about how it's shaping up --

QUESTION: Give us something --

QUESTION: -- other than remains to be seen.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If it shapes up as we want it to, as the President wants it to, and as the other heads of state want it to. And I suppose in a sense you can see this as a contest between the heads of state on the one hand and the bureaucracies of the government and the press on the other hand. We will see which one gets their way.

The heads of state want to have a relatively informal meeting where they can spend a fair amount of time just with themselves or with a very few other people and really talk out some of these important issues and get some idea of what their counterparts think.

That is their idea of how this should work. And as you point out, it always starts out that way, and it winds up very different. This time those of us who are working with our heads of state are determined to see if we cannot help them get their way --

QUESTION: Well, they had plenty --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- and then we will see.

QUESTION: They had plenty -- all eight summits have started with the premise, it's deja vu, but --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And sometimes it has worked. I think it worked in Rambouillet pretty well, as I understand it.

QUESTION: Well, it worked at Versailles. We never found out what was going on. (Laughter).

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That was not because you were not briefed. (Laughter).

QUESTION: That's true.

QUESTION: The Europeans thought they had an agreement at Versailles, but they didn't.

QUESTION: Are all heads of state coming --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think we should call an end to this press conference. It is going to --

QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about Libya, sir? I know --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that is not my subject to talk about right here.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, are all the heads of state coming?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes. (Laughter).

QUESTION: Which heads of state --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, everyone has -- each government has agreed on the time and the locale, and so everyone will show up.

QUESTION: Do you totally rule out a communique at the end?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What will emerge at the end will be up to the heads of state to determine.

QUESTION: I still don't understand why you want to talk --

QUESTION: How about --

QUESTION: --about it now, sir?

QUESTION: --does he know anything about this meeting?

QUESTION: He seconds everything the Secretary says.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Right.

QUESTION: Why was Williamsburg picked?

QUESTION: See you later.

THE PRESS: Thank You.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN MILITARY EXERCISES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

February 17, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:05 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Now, we bring on my colleague who is [redacted] He should be identified here as a senior administration official. And he will answer questions on the Egyptian and Mediterranean exercises. We welcome our colleagues from the State Department and hope they do not learn any bad habits here. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague thought it might be useful if I could come out and respond to any questions you may have concerning U.S. military activities in the Middle East. And I would be glad to do that.

I thought that I would say one or two things. And maybe they are gratuitous. But they are, because I may suffer from having been in the military for 20 years. But I was frankly, honestly surprised at the scale of puzzlement over what is going on.

But in the way of ground rules for this, let me start by saying that I will not comment on intelligence material. We do not discuss intelligence matters. However, I think all of us -- surely, everyone in this room -- are aware of the long history of Libyan efforts to destabilize other governments in the area. These efforts are well known to us and to our friends.

The current deployment of U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft is in the context of combined U.S. and Egyptian air training. These exercises have been conducted in the past -- mostly recently, in December, 1982 as I recall. They will certainly be repeated in the future.

Our fleet units in the Mediterranean are deployed at normal, peacetime readiness levels and dispositions. They are, as always, prepared to conduct or support contingencies as necessary.

In specific reference to the speculation on aircraft carrier movements in the Mediterranean -- the President in his role as Commander-In-Chief does not move each individual ship here or there at any time. This is surely the case today and in the past few days and weeks with the Nimitz. It has not been ordered by the President to any particular location in response to any particular event.

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Now, I will say one more thing and go to your questions. And that is what I mentioned earlier about being, perhaps, overly sensitized to how exercises happen and why they happen. The United States conducts exercises for the purpose of training for improving readiness with our own forces as well as combined forces of other countries.

Now, it, also, does for another reason. Occasionally, the United States will conduct an exercise if there is tension in area in order to relieve that tension, to demonstrate resolve to our friends, and as well to improve the readiness of our own units and their capabilities.

Let me give you a couple of examples. I think many of you here covered, in 1970, the Jordanian situation in August-September as I recall. For those who did not, if you look back, you will find that we had roughly twice the level of Marine forces in the Mediterranean at the time. But if you check, you will find that was indeed coincidental -- that the Marine forces were effecting a relief of one battalion for the other battalion.

I am not trying to blow smoke at you. Surely, if we had not had them there, I expect we would have sent them. But the point is, to draw conclusions that the United States -- by sending those two battalions to the Mediterranean -- was reacting to intelligence in Jordan or anywhere else would simply not be true.

The same thing happened, coincidentally -- to be quite honest, in 1973. You will recall in the October War, if you look back, you will find that we had roughly twice the normal level of Marine forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. And indeed, you will find that that was the consequence of the normal expiration of one battalion's assignment and the next battalion having just come in.

Now again, if they had not been there, we probably would have sent them. But the point is that everytime that there is the deployment of a U.S. unit to a given place on the globe -- to assume that it is associated with a crisis, a reaction to intelligence, an event of some proportion is simply just not right.

Q Well, tell us the case here then.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, the situation with regard to the carrier, for example -- the Nimitz is assigned a broad area of the Mediterranean for operations. And the orders that task it for conducting normal-life operations in that area have not changed. The area in which it operates and it is assigned to do business have not changed -- is conducting those normal operations today.

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Now, let me tell you something else about exercise planning. It is not uncommon to develop either ourselves or in concert with friends an exercise concept. And you develop it and you put it on the shelf and at some point you may conduct it by schedule. At some point you may conduct that operation by consulting and going ahead to conduct it at other than a scheduled time.

The situation with regard to the Nimitz, though, is that for a long time Nimitz and its battle group has been assigned to conduct normal operations in a portion of the Eastern Mediterranean. Those orders have not changed. The Nimitz has not been ordered to any particular location in response to any particular event.

Let me give you another documentation, if you don't choose to believe that. Last weekend at some point the Nimitz filed publicly a notice to airmen and mariners of the intention to conduct flight operations in international waters, international air space, and I ask you, frankly, if the United States were concerned about the possibility of any government taking any particular action, if we would have cast our response or our contingent planning for that publicly? I rather doubt it. And, indeed, that's what we did. The Nimitz was doing that in the context of its standing orders to conduct operations in this area that it's been assigned for some time. It completed it and it moved on still within this broad ocean or broad Mediterranean area.

Let me take your questions now.

Q May I just say --

Q Well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sam?

Q -- the problem with what you have outlined is that responsible individuals in this government have told reporters that, in fact, the Nimitz battle group was ordered to go where it went for a few days and the AWACS were sent to Egypt because of the fear that Qaddafi was massing units on the Sudanese border and was going to attempt to destabilize Sudan. And when you stand up and tell us what you just said, it flies in the face of these other officials and what they've said.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would invite whatever officials that you source to come and say that because it is simply untrue, Sam. And I am referring specifically to the newscast last evening which said, in so many words, that in response to the massing of Libyan forces or something to that effect, that the President had ordered the movement of U.S. units to include the battle group. And that is untrue.

Yes?

Q May I just follow up one and then I'll -- The problem of course continues to be what happened last night. The President stated something which his own officials later said were not the facts. And why did he do that? You have made the case today that he didn't order this carrier to move any place, but they were routinely moved.

Q Didn't know about it --

Q But he either didn't know about it or chose not to state the facts as his own aides later explained them. Why?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me take both points. Those are reasonable questions. First of all, as to whether the President was aware and/or ordered something. The President was aware that the Nimitz was conducting normal fleet operations in its assigned area as I've said earlier. The President doesn't order that movement. The Nimitz has been operating for some time in these same Mediterranean area under the same orders. Now it does that with the authority to conduct operations, exercises, other movements that are approved before it ever leaves the United States. But as you can imagine, you can't on that basis say that on -- when it's leaving port in December that on February whatever it is, 16th, you're going to conduct operations off Libya. It doesn't work that way. So, it has the latitude to operate in that broad Eastern Mediterranean area. The President didn't order it. The President was aware it was conducting normal operations.

John?

Q But he was aware, though, of the press reports and we know that a guidance had been prepared for him in advance of the press conference spelling out the specifics of the situation including the various points that were covered in the initial press reports. I mean this just doesn't --

Q Why did he say that there had been no naval movement? Why didn't he say it's the normal thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, that's the other part of your question and that's a fair point. If you look back, as I recall it, Lou's question, let me look at it -- said, "There's a report tonight that we have sent AWACS to Egypt and that we have sent a carrier nearby and I want to ask you, do you fear that there's going to be a Libyan attack on Egypt or could you explain why we have taken these actions that have apparently been taken?"

The President responded that there hadn't been any naval movement in the context of a Libyan attack on Egypt. And the result awareness was that the Nimitz was conducting normal operations, that it wasn't, surely, directed to do something that was related as Lou stated.

Q I think Lou misspoke on Egypt. But then the next question was about Sudan.

Q The President said, "I'm not aware of any naval movement of any kind."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's

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responding to Lou's question, John. His question --

Q -- next series of questions dealt specifically with Sudan. Lou did talk about Egypt. But I talked about the Sudan. And the President continued to leave the impression that there wasn't anything in the Mediterranean that had anything to do with that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If there's any onus of what the President understood and intended last night, I am responsible for it because in the course of the past week to ten days, whatever has been happening anywhere from Lebanon to other places I have briefed the President on each day. And I can assure you that the President was fully aware that what was taking place was normal operations of Nimitz in the area. Now, that is not a cause for a President to say that there is something unusual going on. And it's in that context that he answered the questions last night.

Q May I follow --

Q What about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen.

Q How about the AWACS? Does that also apply? How long -- when were they sent, how long will they be there, are there Egyptians on these AWACS, and what was the purpose? And are you saying that none of these so-called normal operations had anything to do with the possible crisis in the area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say this. I thought that I said -- if I didn't, I intended to say -- that when we schedule an exercise -- and I refer specifically to the AWACS, and let's talk about that -- that we prepare the concept and the plan and the arrangements and it goes on the shelf and occasionally we come out and we run the exercise. Now, at other than scheduled times we'll consult periodically with friends in the area, whether they're in Asia or anywhere else. And if there is some interest in having an exercise, whether purely for training or for reasons of heightened tension or anything like that, then we'll conduct another exercise. Now --

Q Is that what you did here? You're speaking professorially. Can you be specific about this instance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I will. Now, as we've said -- and I think as the President has said -- Libya has a habit, that is unrelieved for a matter of years, of intimidating its neighbors. This applies to Chad, to Niger, to Tunisia, to Sudan, to Egypt for that matter. Now, it goes in not terribly predictable fashion. Sometimes it's worse and sometimes it's not so intense. At any rate, the United States and the government of Egypt conducting jointly today a AWACS joint exercise. It's happened before, it will happen again.

Now, I'm not going to tell you -- and I don't intend to mislead you -- that this is entirely unrelated to and without interest in whatever Libya may do. I would hope that the American taxpayer expects that we use their money prudently, and these exercises, as I have said, always have the potential for serving a joint benefit. Yes, they improve readiness. Yes, they may deter. But I go back to the premise of the broadcast last night -- and any other premise you want to make -- that is, that it was responsive to the massing of Libyan forces. And that's just not the case.

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CONT

Q Sir, may I ask you a question --

Q -- question of normal operations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Lesley.

Q Under this sort of umbrella term "normal operations," that apparently the Nimitz commanders have some sort of ad hoc responsibility for deciding exactly what they'll do, is part of their instructions from time to time to go into the -- or near the Gulf of Sidra and send planes into the area to sort of warn Libya as it did when the met was shot down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The authorities include the ability to conduct operations in international waters. And for any operations that are conducted in disputed waters, there must be, yes, a clearance and an approval here in town. Now, that just is not the case here.

Q So they didn't go into the Gulf of Sidra or into these disputed waters.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These were not conducted in disputed waters.

Q Well, who --

Q But the aircraft flew over the Gulf of Sidra, did it not, sir?

Q To use your words from before, could I ask you whether the deployment of the AWACS was designed to relieve tension and show resolve? Is that the purpose of their deployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose of the exercise is two-fold. Yes, it is to improve readiness and combine training with our friends in Egypt. If it has the collateral benefit of reducing tension, so much the better. That's it. That's what it's for.

Sorry, Bob. What's --

Q Did, or did not the Egyptian government express concern to the United States government about the situation along the border? I think that's the question that -- it would be

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most helpful if we could get an answer to that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to speak for the Egyptian government. And I can't treat with you exchanges between our government and theirs. I'm sorry.

Yes.

Q Did the aircraft carrier Nimitz enter the Gulf of Sidra, as we were told here last night that it did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think probably it's best if I get out a map for you, frankly. There is no question that these waters in which the Nimitz was operating are disputed. They are not. They are international waters.

Now, the notice that was filed applies, and this goes to Bob's question, that aircraft would conduct operations in the Libyan flight identification region. And they did. And that is not any -- well, any violation of law, surely, involved in that.

Q The ship was outside 3130 or whatever that line is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct, yes.

Q But the aircraft were south of that line in areas Qaddafi contends, at least, although we don't recognize his contingent, are his waters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were conducted inside the Libyan FIR, yes, that's correct.

Q Inside the Libyan FIR means in an -- over -- an air space over water that he contends is his, whether it is or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Did they get specific orders to do that from back here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those are authorities that are approved well in advance; but it wasn't a matter of recent approval.

Q Because you talked earlier about needing special clearance. That was only for the Nimitz, not for the aircraft?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in this instance, that does not require case-by-case approval.

Helen -- or, excuse me, Sarah.

Q Sir, was the President not informed by you people of the danger and of the unrest and disturbance over that way? Or was he, in his reply to questions last night, trying to keep the people from knowing that they -- you know -- what was going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President was fully aware of what was going on and fully in a position to assess any particular risk and I don't think I agree with your assertion that that is the case. I mean, there are operations and exercises going on throughout the world. One can make an assertion that there's a risk in Korea; but --

Q Well, sir, this is such an unusually -- it's a little different from Korea. We're there all the time.

But did you people talk to members of Congress about this saber rattling before you did it? (Laughter).

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I really challenge that, Sarah. For the United States to operate in the Sixth Fleet, something it has done for over 40 years is something that is -- saber rattling is -- I just can't agree with that.

Q Yes, but I'm not talking about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- the operations over the years. I'm talking about this particular operation. Did you talk to members of Congress or consult with them at all before you did this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as a matter of fact, members of the Congress are aware of our routine of this.

Q Which members of Congress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the normal ones. And that's as far as I'm going to go. (Laughter).

I don't mean to be cute about that. It's bipartisan and it is appropriate to the committees who have jurisdictional oversight. And that's --

Yes.

Q Would it be fair to characterize what happened as a happy coincidence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that makes what I've said appear too cute by half and I don't intend that. And, you know, what is -- Let's suppose tomorrow morning, you know, that something happened out there that, for whatever reason, Libya or some other country decided that they were going to take a whack at their neighbor.

Well, it would surely appear that what I've been telling you is entirely smokescreen.

Frankly, would it not have also appeared the same way on October 6th in '73 or in August of '7- -- My point is to you that they're conducting an operation out there. If it reduces tensions, fine. If there is some violence tomorrow, we are ready for it. But it is not a preconceived plot or scheme to perpetrate anything.

Q On the question of whether or not there was naval movement in the area, would it not have been more accurate to say that there was no naval movement other than normal operations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that was surely the President's context of saying what he did.

Q Did you make clear, if so, I missed it, when the AWACS went in there specifically this most recent time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL Did I -- excuse me?

Q Can you tell us when the AWACS aircraft went in currently?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't get into the specific timing of that; but I will tell you that it -- that this operation, which began a few days ago, has a duration that is entirely typical, and in fact almost congruent to the length of previously planned exercises of the same kind.

Q -- the Nimitz movement The Nimitz had been off Lebanon and I'm aware that it has an area of operation which is broad and includes all that part of the Med. But the Nimitz doesn't move from off Lebanon to off the Gulf of Sidra on the whim of its captain. And if the President didn't personally order that ship to move, can you tell us whether Secretary Weinberger, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who ordered the Nimitz, at that particular moment, to cease conducting operations off the coast of Lebanon and begin conducting operations north of that 3130 line in the vicinity of the Gulf of Sidra? Who ordered that and when did it occur?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, the authorities for operations throughout the area of the Eastern Mediterranean is one that is tasked when the ship deploys in the beginning. Now, any changes to that or any modifications to it are within the authority of the Secretary of Defense and his subordinates --

Q We understand whose authority generally it falls within; but I'm asking you a specific question. At some point, some time in the last week or so, the Nimitz traversed the Mediterranean, part of the Mediterranean, and went from waters off Lebanon to waters which a layman would understand to be off Libya. Who made that order and when did it happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President of the United States did not make it. And I --

Q We understand that. Who made it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot account for those within the Pentagon who may have done that.

Q You mean it's just a whim of a guy in the Pentagon waking up in the morning and saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, wait a minute. Let's go back to what the aircraft carrier did. It did not operate in the Gulf of Sidra. It did not operate in disputed territory. It in no way did anything that was contentious.

Q Just to clarify, though, it was operating in exactly the same, you know, waters and its planes were operating in pretty much the same way as they were in '81, when he tried --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, wait a minute. You are absolutely incorrect about that. It was not operating in the same area. The planes were not operating in the same area. It is entirely different.

Yes.

Q Is it pure coincidence that all this happened while President Nimeiri was in Cairo? Did he carry any information and inform President Mubarak who in turn informed the United States that something was happening along the border of Sudan that we don't know about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mention that President Nimeiri was in Cairo. To be quite honest, I'm not aware of that. But I can't --

Q Yes, he just left yesterday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I frankly can't account for exchanges between President Nimeiri and President Mubarak.

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Q Can you tell us why General Vernon Walters is in Khartoum today? There is a report to that effect. And if so, what is he doing there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dick Walters is there in no sense on anything connected to any of your questions today.

Q Can I get --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Yes, go ahead, please.

Q Thank you. To shift the focus, what can you tell us about the Libyan buildup, the size, where it is, how long they've been building up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Frankly, I wish that I could; but I said at the outset I can't discuss intelligence matters here.

Yes. In the back, please.

Q If you hadn't had the coincidence of this training mission, this AWACS training mission scheduled along with the Nimitz changing its position, is the situation such that you would have considered sending -- anyway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's speculative and I don't want to condition the climate by saying something about how we feel from here right now. And I just don't think that's useful.

Q Let me clarify his question. He's made it -- He didn't hear you right. You didn't say the AWACS mission was a regularly scheduled one. You simply said you had a way of exercising that was taken off the shelf in this particular moment. Is that correct? And this wasn't -- They didn't have a long-planned exercise to arrive at -- in Cairo --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I'm -- it's just my Marine Corps mind, I'm not tracking what you're getting at here.

Q You haven't really answered it. All the stories last night on the AWACS said that Egypt asked for the AWACS out there because there was concern about tensions on the Libyan-Sudan border. Some of the stories referred to movements of Libyan planes close to the Sudan. You don't want to get into details; but was this a case where the U.S. government was asked to come in and have an exercise? Or was it just a case of the U.S. idly having nothing to do with its AWACS and sending the four over there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To be honest, I think it's something in the middle. And I'm not trying to be frivolous, Bernie. I think -- we consult with them. We consult with others about how things look to them and to us. And we did. And we've done this in the course of the past two weeks and beyond that, for that matter. We consulted. We mutually agreed that it would be constructive to have an exercise and --

Q When was that decision made?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, latter part of last week.

Q So that was when the decision was made to have the AWACs sent into Egypt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What do you mean by "constructive"? What was the intent behind that decision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I answer that in the context of the earlier answer, and that is that exercises serve two purposes: They help both countries learn to operate together and they improve the readiness of the people involved, and they may have a collateral deterrent benefit.

Q Was the Nimitz aware of the exercises with the AWACs, or was everybody operating on their own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, --

Q I mean, you make it seem as though the Nimitz just suddenly wound up off the coast of Libya without any, you know, authorization from topside.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've really failed to do something here. Let me go back to the beginning. When you're going to send an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean, what authorities does it have? Well, it's assigned an operating area, and in that operating area it's authorized to do certain kinds of maneuvers.

Now, before you ever send it over there, you look at those kinds of maneuvers and you decide is that risky, does it have a political sensitivity to it and so forth.

Now, in the course of its deployment, surely you can change that if you wanted to, and you could say, "Don't do that. Go and do something else someplace else." I'm telling you that the President knew it was on normal operations and he did not alter those operations.

Yes?

Q But aren't you basically confirming the story in your last two or three responses? I mean, just in a somewhat softer tone of voice -- you've talked about, you consulted last week, decided that there was a mutual benefit. You've referred to it having a collateral deterrent benefit. I mean, it has to have a collateral deterrent benefit to something or other. You weren't just reacting to something out of the ectoplasm.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, --

Q Aren't you saying that, essentially, yes, but for whatever reasons, you don't want to make it that hard and fast, an admission of what a number of us were told last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I specifically reject that the circumstances asserted last evening were what prompted this deployment, that there was some kind of massing before the fact of these Libyan forces, as I recall John said.

Q -- really planes, I think, not forces.

Q I don't understand. What are you rejecting?

Q Which deployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said earlier, the statement that was broadcast last evening was that in response to the massing of Libyan forces, as I recall it said Southeast Libya, that the United States has taken fleet movements and certain AWACs movements, and that's just not accurate.

Yes, Lesley?

Q What was the purpose of sending the planes off the Nimitz into the disputed waters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's go back over that again. Maybe I didn't make that clear. First of all, the Libyan FIR is over international waters. And we flew there, and we were operating our ships in international waters.

Q FIR?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Flight Identification Region.

Q Is flying the planes over the areas that he claims to be Libyan part of normal operations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go back. And if I said this wrongly, let me correct it now. This isn't disputed. Now, in the past, we have flown over disputed surface. We didn't on this occasion. The Libyan FIR that we were operating in was over international waters, not disputed by him, nor us, nor anybody else.

Q Well, what's an FIR mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Flight Identification Region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a claimed area.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not a claimed area. When a commercial airliner, when any kind of aircraft is on its way to or from Libya or in transitting and it enters this zone, purely for air traffic control reasons, it identifies itself and so forth. That is a Libyan thing. We have FIRs. Every country has FIRs.

Q Did we identify ourselves?

Q It's not disputed air space, water, territory at all? So, in no way did any American craft, either the Nimitz or any of its planes, go into areas that Qaddafi claims are Libyan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Did we identify ourselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, I said earlier and that's what I hope was clear at the time that we have in the past, we didn't now.

Q Did we identify ourselves?

Q Was there a collateral benefit to the AWACs mission besides training, besides --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you're asking me to say that we are --

Q Was there?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- effecting a negative outcome. I, you know, just wait and --

Q Well, you said there were two reasons to send -- There are generally two purposes or two outcomes when sending a training mission of this kind -- one was for training, one was for cooperation with another government over that kind of an operation, and there were also sometimes, may be collateral benefits in an operation of this kind. Were there, are there collateral benefits in this operation of the joint U.S. and Egypt AWACs mission?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suppose you implied, have we prevented something from happening. How am I suppose to answer that?

Q I'm asking you a question. I'm not implying anything. Was -- In the opinion of the United States government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, I take collateral benefit to mean that the benefit was we prevented something bad from happening. Now --

Q Those are your words, not mine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they're your words. Did it have a value? Well, I don't know if it did or not.

Q Can you tell us what specific part of Egypt or North Africa the AWACS are operating in in this exercise?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Where is the Nimitz now and how long will the AWACS exercise continue if its still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Nimitz, as you know, if you ask the Pentagon, they don't discuss precisely where a ship is. But I don't mean to lead you away from something ominous here. I mean, the Nimitz is operating in its normal operating area. It has not been directed to go to a precise location. The President doesn't get into that.

Q But you --

Q Did our aircraft identify themselves in the flight identification region and were they challenged?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know. In an undisputed area, I could speculate for you but you'll have to check with the Pentagon on that.

Marvin?

Q Do you have information of unusual political instability in the Sudan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Do you have any information about -- when is the scheduled visit of President Nimeiri to Washington?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Nimeiri was here --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was here recently --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- not long ago for medical reasons but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- for medical reasons.

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Q Are you expecting him to come back here to -- further medical check-ups?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know. I'll be glad to check and find out.

Q You referred a couple of times to the sentence that, "These operations were not ordered in response to any specific event." I'd like to break that into two things. One, is that they were not ordered in response but, two, to a specific event. Is there a specific event going on to which these operations were not ordered to respond? (Laughter.) Is there an event going on? (Laughter.) Let's break them down. He said the operations were not in response to a specific event. Is there a specific event which you're denying that these are a response to? (Laughter.)

Q That was terrible. But I understand it. (Laughter.)

Q Per the '73 situation, you were lucky then.

Q That's right.

Q You just happened to have those people in that area, I think he's asking -- Are you just lucky to have some --

Q Was there an event -- but this operation was not in response to that event?

Q Right.

Q I think that's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, I think I'm finally getting it.

Q Or was there an event that led the United States and Egypt to conclude there might be a collateral event -- collateral benefit?

Q Right, were there troops massing, in other words? (Laughter.)

Q Are you concerned about things going on in --

Q Let's stick to the original question, if you would, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I understand what you mean and the fact is that the United States and this administration, in particular, has always had a concern about Libya's rather adventurous and unpredictable policies. The -- gosh, I'm trying to think of a time when there wasn't some kind of worrisome indicator. And I can't think of one, frankly. (Laughter.)

Q But the answer is there was a worrisome indicator --

Q Under the fascists.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But there are always worrisome indicators coming out. I mean, anybody can pick up a paper everyday and find something that is --

Q You're saying there's no particular crisis? Is there any crisis atmosphere at the Pentagon, here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying that on this particular occasion, the reading of the leaves, and the mutually agreed judgment of our leadership and those of our friends in the Middle East was that -- let's conduct an exercise.

Now, I don't mean to underscore that that is somehow a recognition of an extremely heightened danger. But it was, purely, manifestly, an expression that we believe there's value in demonstrating our readiness.

Q Can I just follow --

Q Why?

Q When you decided, when you mutually decided it would be constructive to have exercises, were the Libyan troops then massing at that time on the Sudan border?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's close enough to intelligence. I'm sorry, I can't do that. Yes, in the back please?

Q To put it in simpler terms, weren't we simply trying to send a message to Libya --

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Libya -- we don't want to see them move into the Sudan? Isn't that what we're really saying here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You tie this to Sudan -- frankly, Libya has intimidated and made frequent threats to everybody from Tunisia to others, and so I wouldn't limit it.

Yes, Chris.

Q But you --

Q Let me ask you this series of questions. One, did the President -- you say he did not order the Nimitz to move. Did the President specifically order the AWACS into Egypt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, in the context that certain authorities are standing and certain authorities require approval, yes, the AWACS deployment required an approval and the President approved that.

Q All right. And may I follow up? On the Nimitz, you've mentioned that the AWACS -- the decision to move the men was made late last week. When was the decision to move the Nimitz into the Libyan area made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly can't give you a time. I want to explain that -- as I guess I said earlier, that the Nimitz conducted its movements and finished those and left and that the timing of the AWACS thing involves the presence today and tomorrow and the next day or so of the AWACS over there, and as a consequence there isn't the exercise linkage of those two events.

Q Can you give me any time frame as to when the decision was made for the Nimitz to move away from the coast of Lebanon into the area around the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we really don't get into --

Q Was it a matter of weeks, days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really don't want to get into when the military move was --

Q Let me ask you one of my other questions, because -- the one thing about the Nimitz explanation that to me, anyway, doesn't scan. It was my understanding that the Nimitz was off the coast of Lebanon to provide support for the Marines in Lebanon. So why would it have moved off the coast as part of its normal operations when those Marines are still there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Nimitz does do that. We've had one or two carriers in the Mediterranean for years and years. At the moment there is one over there, and one carrier can't do everything all the time. The forces in Lebanon have not always had carriers off shore there. There have been several times in the past when there haven't been any carriers there, so this was not extraordinary, unusual.

Yes.

Q You mentioned you had 20 years in the military. You also said that this was an exercise like many exercises that are planned well in advance, put on the shelf, and then -- run at a scheduled time or in response to something. When was the last time that any exercise such as this -- a joint exercise with another nation has been run at such short notice?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The short answer is that we've done it recently, and I will get you an answer on it.

But I have a conscious recollection of it.

Q -- generally, joint exercises between the United States and another nation usually are planned well in advance and are not done within just a matter of a few days. He also said it would have -- it would terminate as these things usually terminate. Some of these things, I believe, have an indefinite termination date. Does this one have an indefinite termination date?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it doesn't.

Q Does it have a definite termination date?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it does.

Q What will govern the termination date?

Q Will you tell us what it is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What will govern the termination date? Whether the Egyptian Air Force is ready, or the crisis is over?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you set a termination date, when you start the exercise, you've clearly ruled out that there is going to be some -- that your criteria include those kinds of factors. Now, you know I'm not going to stand here and tell you that if something violent happens over there we're going to end the exercise and say, "Tough luck, guys. We're going home." No. I mean --

MR. SPEAKES: Okay.

Q What surprised you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take Helen and Lloyd and then close it down.

Q You say that things are always worrisome where the Libyans are concerned. But aren't they more worrisome and more tense in recent days, at least?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess a little, yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Helen, and then Lesley.

Q Why were you surprised that everyone was aroused by this -- these exercises and the fact that there would be a linkage between the movement of the Nimitz and the sending of AWACS, that it suddenly loomed as a big picture? Why should that surprise you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess having been on a lot of exercises -- let me say that I was on a ship boring holes in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964, so these things -- it seems to me what we have military forces for, we send them here and there to be ready in there -- if there is a situation that requires our help with an ally, and as a consequence, what we have been doing to assure training readiness, to assure that we and our allies can operate together and, by the way, to make clear to any antagonist that we are ready, is a normal function of forces. And that's what they're employed for.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Let's go to Lesley and then --

Q -- one last question?

MR. SPEAKES: -- three hands are up. We'll take three. Make them short.

Q On whose initiative did the AWACS go to Egypt? Was it on the initiative of the United States getting in touch with Egypt and saying, "Hey, let's run this exercise"? Or was it, on the other hand, on the initiative of, say, Egypt going to the United States and saying, "Let's run this exercise"? Because somebody had to have the idea and somebody had to initiate it. So the question is who.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've talked to -- we have been in touch through our embassy there and through our military in the normal exchanges of intelligence. And this happens on a day-by-day basis. We could go back and find the precise date, but those talks were in progress last week as the week before that, for that matter. And a point was reached -- and I honestly cannot define for you when it was -- when both sides agreed. Now, I don't know whether our guys or their guys or who it was that suggested it, but it was a joint decision. It wasn't something that either side forced down the throats of the other. It was common judgment that it serves our interest now to go out and train together.

MR. SPEAKES: Did Deborah have a question? Lesley?

Q Is there anything -- yesterday while this story was beginning to bubble up, there was some talk that the White House was feverishly trying to keep it out of the press. What is so damaging now that the public is made aware of a joint exercise with Egypt or that the Nimitz moved around Libya? What was your problem with having the story come out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It gets into a matter of the principle of sources and methods and intelligence and so forth. And that's as far as I can go. I'm sorry.

Yes?

Q The President approves the AWACS, and you briefed the President. It would seem to me that the President would want to know who initiated these discussions, the U.S. or Egypt. And you mean to say you don't know who did this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't say that. I said that we and the Egyptians and the Sudanese, for that matter, frequently consult each other on a daily basis. Our ambassador and his counterparts in the foreign ministries exchange information on how we view the situation in the area. Now, this -- I'm sorry. This is normal practice, and it has been going on in the past few weeks and I would guess in the course of the past ten days or so that they began to say: What about an exercise and what do you think about it? Well, we can or we cannot be ready and we can or we cannot have the forces available and this sort of thing. And they reached a common agreement that, yes, let's do it, both sides are ready, and we are in a position.

Now, I -- that's as good an answer as I can give you. I'm sorry.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:50 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER WILLOCH
OF NORWAY

February 18, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:35 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Now that we have all the agenda-setters here in the room, we will begin this briefing.

This will be on background, attributable to a senior administration official. We would appreciate it if you would just attribute my colleague's remarks to a senior administration official.

Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have just seen the press statements by the President and the Norwegian Prime Minister. He, as you know, has been here on an official working visit. This afternoon, he will complete his visit with discussions with Secretary Shultz. But I think we can give you a rundown now of the issues that came up and the results of the meetings.

As the Prime Minister indicated, I think the key issue -- or the issue at the top of the agenda -- was the arms control and disarmament question. And I think the Prime Minister's statement spoke for itself, which I think reflected the Norwegian government's strong support, continuing support for the December 1979, two-track decision.

That decision, I will remind you once again, was that the United States would negotiate with the Soviet Union on this class of weapons. And failing in an agreement, NATO would proceed with the deployment of 572 systems beginning at the end of 1983.

Now, discussing the 1979 decision, I think there are several specific points that are worth noting. Both sides agreed that the Andropov proposal -- that is, his proposal that calls for almost 500 Soviet warheads targeted against Europe and zero for the United States -- was an unacceptable and an unreasonable proposal. And there was good discussion of why British and French systems should not be taken into account in those negotiations. Both sides agreed that British and French systems do not play the role that American systems play in Europe. And that is operating as a deterrent to Soviet attack, that the British and French system cannot substitute for the American nuclear umbrella. And I think there was common agreement that equality, as the President said in his State of the Union address -- "Equality between U.S. and Soviet forces in arms control is a precondition for an agreement."

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There was an agreement, beyond that, that the United States should continue to pursue its goal of eliminating an entire category of weapons in the Geneva negotiations, the so-called "zero option."

There were some other security- and arms control-related discussions -- a proposal made recently by the so-called "Palme Commission," calling for a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe, a small corridor where battlefield nuclear weapons would be banned, was discussed. And both the Norwegian Prime Minister and the President agreed that this was not a stabilizing arms control measure, that it would result in a reduction to deterrence in Europe, and felt that the focus in our arms-control efforts should be on the Geneva negotiations and our efforts to eliminate an entire category of systems.

Finally, I think I can say that the President told the Norwegian Prime Minister that the United States is indeed sincerely committed to reaching an agreement in Geneva, sincerely committed to banning an entire category of systems so that the United States could forego, altogether, the deployment of any new systems in Europe beginning at the end of 1983.

In think the second issue on the agenda was economics, and the strategy that both countries are pursuing with other Western countries to bring about a recovery and an expansion of the international economic order. I think, as those of you who were here for the little briefing that I gave prior to the visit, I pointed out that Prime Minister Willoch is a trained economist and -- before being a Prime Minister -- was a Commerce Secretary. So there was a good deal of discussion on ways in which to bring about sustained growth and

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limiting inflation. There was also agreement that both sides had to work hard to limit the forces of protectionism. And the Norwegian Prime Minister was very pleased to hear the President reiterate his position, his opposition to protectionist pressures here in the United States.

Thirdly, energy was an important issue that was discussed. The Prime Minister told the President that the Norwegians remain committed to developing their energy resources -- in part to reduce potential European dependence on Soviet energy supplies. The Prime Minister pointed out that Norway faced some short-term difficulties in rapidly developing their energy resources in Northern Norway and off-shore resources there -- that this was a terrific technical challenge but went on to say that in the 1990's that this looked like a very important source of energy for Western Europe. There was --

Q Is that oil in Northern Norway or other fuels?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, this is natural gas and oil. But when I say this -- we're talking about the Norwegian Sea, its off-shore we're talking about.

Q -- oil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oil and natural gas. And I think it's fair to say that the U.S. officials, including the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of Defense, who sat in today in the meetings prior to lunch and at lunch, were pleased to listen to the Norwegian government's commitments to move ahead in the exploitation of its energy resources.

I'll just finish up by saying that there was a good discussion about U.S. policy in Latin America, and Central America which in response to a question by the Norwegian Prime Minister, the President and the Secretary of State had an opportunity to explain our policy there, to explain that we have a balanced, integrated approach to the problems of the region -- focusing both on the military side as well as the political and the economic. And I think there was general agreement that there was a tendency to misunderstand or that Europeans have misunderstood the fact that we do have a balanced policy towards the region. It does not focus merely on the military dimension.

Q Did the President use that phrase, "The Europeans have misunderstood"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think this was more a kind of perception that both sides just simply share. But there was no charges there. There was just a general feeling that more needed to be done to explain our position and our actions in Central and Latin America.

Q The Prime Minister made it clear that he does not want the United States to insist on the zero option as the only agreement possible. In fact, he said, as you recall, that he wants the United States and the Soviet Union to make all possible efforts to get agreement as close to this optimum as possible. You would help us if you could tell us what the President's response was when they discussed the possibility of an interim agreement.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's response was we continue to seek the elimination of an entire category of weapons. But he went on to say, as he said publicly, and the Vice President said when he was in Europe, that we do not take a take-it-or-leave-it approach to the negotiations. And he continued by saying that Ambassador Nitze in Geneva has been instructed to consider to explore any serious Soviet proposal. And as I said earlier, I think both sides agreed that the current Soviet proposal on the negotiating table, one that would provide for a Soviet monopoly in INF systems, was not a serious proposal but that Ambassador Nitze was ready to work with the Soviets, to discuss a Soviet proposal that would meet what the President has outlined as his criteria for effective arms control.

Q May I just follow that up? Did the Prime Minister ask the President why the United States does not now offer a new proposal or did the President volunteer information as to why the United States --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, he did. He said that he felt that it was important -- the President felt that it was important to achieve the optimum outcome in these negotiations and to demostrate that we were serious in the negotiations about eliminating an entire class of weapons.

Q That's the reason why he would not now change his proposal or submit a new one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. He

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said that we wanted to make the Soviets understand that we thought that the so-called zero outcome, or zero option, was a realistic goal in the negotiations.

Q So you give no indication at all of the President making a new proposal on arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I simply stand where I have, that we continue to seek the elimination of these weapons, but that Paul Nitze is not in chains. He has been instructed to explore any serious Soviet proposals that the other side is ready to make.

Q I think the question is, did the Prime Minister indicate to the President that he would like another movement on the U.S.' part?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't, I think that it's fair to say that the Prime Minister continued to state that we should attempt to achieve the best possible agreement, including zero.

Q But also, excluding zero? Either way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that concrete negotiating options were offered up to the President like that. What the Norwegian Prime Minister was interested in hearing, and I think he did hear it, that we are sincerely committed to getting an agreement in Geneva.

Q Why didn't he know that, and also, if you do agree with our interpretation of his remarks, that he would accept less -- I'm speaking of the Prime Minister -- less than a zero?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not too sure I would agree with that interpretation.

Q Why?

Q -- as close as possible to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is your interpretation. It's certainly not mine.

Q What does "as close as possible" mean?

Q You don't quarrel with that interpretation, do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. You should ask the Norwegian Prime Minister.

Q You're telling us what went on, from both sides. You are speaking for both.

Q You don't quarrel with our interpretation, do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I just don't want to comment on his interpretation.

Q Did he indicate in the meetings that he would be willing to accept less?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think the issue came up like that, Chris, it really didn't. I mean, there was no discussion, gee, would you take this or that? I think it was more a general discussion of asking the President what our negotiating strategy was and the President explaining that we think that zero is a realistic alternative, that we want to continue to try to achieve it, and at the same time if the Soviets have a good idea, a reasonable proposal, we're willing to explore it.

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Q Did he discuss at all the possibility or the desirability for an interim agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't remember the term "interim agreement" coming up.

Q How about the concept?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that there was, there was no discussion. I'll just simply repeat what I said. There was no discussion of concrete negotiating alternatives other than eliminating weapons.

Q We're not asking you that, we know that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you're not going to get any more out of me on this subject than you've gotten.

Q You've confirmed now. You state --

Q We don't want you to distort what the --

Q Could you tell us if the President or the Prime Minister, either one, mentioned the March 6 elections, and what strategies might change that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was -- no, I want to make this point very strongly. There was absolutely no discussion about how our negotiating posture and what we say about it would affect the March 6 elections.

What there was a discussion about was a simple discussion of what might happen on March 6, and President in fact asked the Norwegian Prime Minister -- I remember him saying, you know, you're closer to this situation than we are, what's your judgment?

But there was no discussion of how our policy should in any way be hinged to that election date.

Q What was the Prime Minister's judgment?

Q -- afterwards -- ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no -- all there was, a simple political discussion as though we were talking about who's going to win the next mayoralty in Cincinnati.

Q What did the Prime Minister say? What was his judgment? Did he have none?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that really is privileged information.

Q Why did the President ask him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because it's obvious that people in the West are interested in that election. It's an important election.

Q Did the Prime Minister think that the zero-zero option was reasonable? Was he discussing that in the sense of what was reasonable, what possibly could be attained?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he was interested. I don't think he specifically had a view on whether it was reasonable or not. He was interested in hearing what the President felt, because it is a U.S. negotiating position, and he did hear from the President that we thought it was reasonable both in terms of a concept as well as an achievable goal in Geneva.

Q He didn't comment specifically on whether he thought it was reasonable?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he was more interested in hearing what the President had to say.

Q You said the President described the zero option plan as a realistic goal. Did the Prime Minister --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's the same question. He simply --

Q -- didn't words.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I -- You're a semanticist. I don't think -- the Norwegian Prime Minister was mainly interested, as far as I could tell in sort of listening to what the President thought about the chances for an agreement in Geneva.

Q -- an agreement, does Norway have to deploy Pershings on their soil?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did the President ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are not a deployment country.

Q Did the President ask the Prime Minister about the West German election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I can't remember precisely how it came up. But I do remember the President simply saying, "Gee, what -- " you know, "your closer to it. What do you think might happen?"

Q Well, what did he say?

Q Did he give him an answer, even if you don't say what it is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's just inappropriate for me to do that.

Q Did he shrug his shoulders, say, "Beats me"? (Laughter).

Q You said that what the Prime Minister wanted to hear was that we are serious about what's going on in Geneva. Is there anything that has happened in American politics or anything that has happened over here that -- any reason that there was any doubt in the Prime Minister's mind in the first place that we're serious about negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, what has happened is there is an international propaganda campaign, a peace offensive, which anyone who reads the European press or listens to what the Soviets say is very clear. They are trying to argue that somehow we are unreasonable. We are intransigent in these negotiations.

Q What I was asking is was the Prime Minister doubtful that we are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No.

Q Well, why did he need to be reassured if he didn't have any doubt in the first place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think he necessarily did have to be reassured; but I think the President did want to make it very clear, just as the Vice President, in his visit, to be able to say that we are sincerely committed to achieving an equitable outcome in Geneva.

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Q But the Prime Minister didn't bring up anything about the propaganda campaign that the Soviets --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was some discussion, and I think that's an interesting point. I think both the President and the Prime Minister in their meetings and over lunch talked about Soviet propaganda and the need to do a more effective job in countering it and getting our case out to the public.

Q So many of those countries have signed treaties with the Soviets.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So have we. (Laughter).

Q So have we.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay.

Q No, I've got --

Q I don't quite understand your answer. Does that mean that the Prime Minister believed that we were not doing an effective job of getting our case out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was more a discussion, I think, by two Western politicians of some of the problems in countering Soviet propaganda.

For instance, the idea I talked before about the British and French forces and the Soviet Andropov proposal and the need to do a more effective job explaining why a Soviet monopoly is not an acceptable arms control outcome. It was more a recognition that they both share, as Western leaders, who have to constantly sustain support of their publics, unlike the Soviets, of having to deal with that problem.

Q On another subject, are there any -- was there any discussion in energy, of the Norwegian cut in the price of oil today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, Secretary Regan did report to the Norwegian Prime Minister that there had been, I think, what is it? a three-dollar cut in the price. But there was no real discussion.

Q The Prime Minister didn't know that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know if he did or he didn't.

Okay?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:54 P.M. EST

SPECIAL BRIEFING BY M. PETER McPHERSON, ADMINISTRATOR, AID

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 1983, 3:05 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: This is an on-the-record briefing by AID Director McPherson. It is on the subject of Commission on Foreign Security and Economic Assistance that the Secretary announced this morning.

Peter, all yours.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon. I am Peter McPherson, Administrator of AID.

Secretary Shultz before the Senate Budget Committee today announced the creation of a Commission on Foreign Security and Economic Assistance. This Commission will be chaired by former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci. Incidentally, we've got a handout in a moment which will give these names for you and more detailed background.

The Co-Chairmen of the Commission will be Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, and Larry Silberman, Executive Vice President of Crocker National Bank and former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Deputy Attorney General, etc., and Clifton Wharton, Chancellor of the State University of New York System and Chairman of the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development, a leading developmentalist, economic international development type here in the country.

The Commission has been formed to review the goals and objectives of the U.S. foreign assistance program. We expect the Commission to review all present foreign assistance programs, security and economic, both bilateral and multilateral, and to make recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State, and Congress. We expect to utilize funds raised from private sources, as well as funds that the Government will contribute. The Commission will operate outside the State Department itself. The foreign assistance programs have long been an integral part of our foreign assistance policy and we are confident that a Commission of very distinguished Americans, the others to be announced shortly, will help us to adjust and improve these programs to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world.

On behalf of the Secretary, I've begun to organize the Commission, a duty the Commission itself will shortly take over, and will continue to serve as the Secretary's liaison to the Commission.

I might add that the Commission first came up as the Secretary and myself and others during the lame duck session consulted with Congress about foreign aid. It came up in several meetings with Congressmen as their idea actually, so after thinking about it and fairly extensively consulting with Congress in the last few weeks the Secretary feels it is a very excellent idea and is going to go forward with it.

I would welcome any questions you might have.

Q How many members will the Commission have when it's full?

A The exact number is not yet determined. It will have in excess of fifteen members.

Q Give us an example of how they'll go about examining whether foreign assistance is best served in the American interest, say, in any given country. What will they do? Will they go there? Will they audit the program? How is it done?

A We don't expect that the Commission will travel abroad, but rather will have people to come in to brief them or hold in the nature of hearings from a wide range of individuals who have opinions and who have direct experience in this. There is, of course, an enormous amount of experience and opinion within this town and otherwise that the Commission would easily be able to draw from.

Q How do they decide whether $18 million here and $29 million there is best spent and best serves American interests? Just from interviewing people?

A Well, the traditional approach in the past has been that foreign assistance served America's interests in several ways. One, that it served the interests of America because the development in growth -- speaking of economic assistance for the moment -- of foreign countries was in fact good for America, furnished markets and economically good.

The second reason has historically been for humanitarian purposes, drought and so on. A third reason, and very important one, is it served national security interests. Our program has tended to be targeted to various areas of the world that were of great interest in foreign policy context to America. The security, the military, the foreign military sales, of course, have been primarily looking at U.S. foreign policy interests and security of the countries that were our allies and friends. Those premises, it seems to me, need to be reviewed in the context of the budget austerity days that we have before us, and I think the Commission itself will need to draft some more detail as to how it will proceed, and it seems to me inappropriate for us to try to ahead of time determine in great detail what it ought to do exactly, but it's our expectation that they will take the premises of the program as now set forward, set forth, in the budgets and other presentations of the Administration and look at those. They will talk extensively with Congress.

In some ways there have been, of course, a lot of commissions in the past, but this one in some ways we invision to be different, and we expect to have Congress and members of Congress deeply involved in the Commission as members or in some capacity, at least some unofficial capacity, and we look upon this group of really very distinguished Americans to deal a lot with Congress and Congress to express their views.

We've got to have leadership of this country take a serious and careful look at foreign aid rather than just sort of talking back and forth about it, serious people should take a look, in our judgment.

Q Can I ask sort of a devil's advocate question? If you're going to have them dealing a lot with Congress, what's going to prevent people from drawing the conclusion that this is nothing more than a PR effort to convince Congress by co-opting some critical members of it or supportive members of it, that you immerse them in all the detail of this stuff and then they come out supporting the foreign aid program?

A Well, I think the involvement with Congress that we anticipate having will be such that there will be a variety of views to start off with on foreign aid, and I wouldn't expect that such a variety of views would be able to be co-opted as you said. I think there needs to be an honest exchange and a careful analysis of where we are on foreign aid. Historically it has been thought to be a pretty important program and it had certain premises, those that I laid out a moment ago, and it's time, in our judgment, to review it, and to review it not just as the Administration within itself thinking it through but to review it by senior outside people and review it with Congress, have a serious discussion on the matter.

Q You seem to be indicating that this Commission will have a mandate to make changes.

A Well, the Commission will have a mandate to make recommendations it thinks to be appropriate. We are not telling the Commission ahead of time just what they should do.

Q When are they going to report, in time for the upcoming bills' passage?

A We expect a tentative report or an initial draft tentative report by July 1.

Q Can you say where we are? Could you give me the context for that? Some of the questions you are going to be looking at. There must be a number of things you have in mind, the balance between security and economic development and that sort of thing.

A That's one of the ways foreign aid is traditionally viewed, and that may be appropriate. On the other hand, you perhaps should look at more basic questions as to what functions foreign aid plays, what the needs are, and build from that kind of basis as opposed to starting right off and looking at the balance between military and economic.

Q When you say "where we are" that has no picture in my mind. I mean is it useful or not useful? What are the basic questions you are trying to answer?

A You have before you a world economic situation. You've got a world political situation, country by country, continent by continent. We've had now a lot of years experience with foreign assistance. It seems to us it's appropriate now, and there has been a lot of discussion about foreign aid when it's up before Congress, it's appropriate now to sit back and thoughtfully say, "Let's look at the world as it is, the situation, political and economic and military abroad, and let's look at our resources and let's see where we want to go. If I were to define in great detail what this Commission should do I think that would be somewhat limiting, and I don't want to do that.

Q Would you expect that they might take a look at allocations of our foreign assistance program to the Middle East, for example, as compared to the rest of the world and say, "This is out of whack; this doesn't make any sence"?

A I really don't want to prejudge but clearly overall allocations are clearly going to be something the Commission would have to look at.

Q Is there going to be an agenda?

A A note about what I say on allocations. I don't want to comment specifically on the Middle East, but I just want to say the broad allocations obviously are part of the way a foreign assistance program works.

Q Are they going to have any sort of an agenda or a framework from which to begin?

A We are preparing a series of questions and working papers,but we expect that they themselves, using such papers and questions, will then as a Commission -- the Commission will have staff and will be housed outside the Department and AID -- will then want to use such papers to draft their own questions, their own agendas, etc.. It's very important, and in some ways it would be nice to have a complete scenario. On the other hand, that would be limiting, so we've been careful not to do that, and I think you understand why we don't want to sort of pre-direct the activities of the Commission in such a manner that it will not perform its function effectively.

Q Is there some fundamental I haven't quite grasped for this yet? Because foreign economic aid and military aid is basically a product of U.S. foreign policy across the world, and it is a very large part of that entire policy. Is the Commission going to, of necessity, deal with general foreign policy problems? I mean are we saying the State Department is going to be dumping foreign policy onto this Commission?

A I wouldn't say that. I didn't think the Secretary had that in mind. On the other hand, he clearly sees foreign aid as an integral part of U.S. foreign policy, and accordingly this Commission's recommendations will be part of that context.

Q To follow up an earlier question, if I may. Would it be unduly cynical to say that one of its tasks is to figure out how the heck to get a foreign aid bill through Congress?

A Well, it seems to me, to us, the Secretary, that there has not been a consensus of levels of foreign aid and how the foreign aid program should function for a few years and that such a general belief on how to operate would be very helpful for this country and for its foreign policy.

Q When is the last time a full foreign aid bill was passed by the Congress?

A A year ago. As with some part of the Government last year, it was funded this year by a continuing resolution for '83. For '82 a bill passed.

Q Will you get into bilateral aid, multilateral aid, FAO, and --

A We're looking primarily on the economic side, the bilateral program, the so-called development assistance, the ESF, the PL-480, the bilateral programs that the U.S. directly administers. We are looking at the multilateral programs, which are the banks. I mean the World ~~Bank~~, the American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank. That on the economic side. And on the military side we are looking at the foreign military sales, MAP, and so forth, the so-called military assistance basically.

Q How much will you concentrate on the IMF?

A The IMF program will not be a point of concentration. On the IMF there have been, as you know, extensive discussions internationally in recent weeks. There is before Congress a program. It is the belief of the Administration that our role and our contribution to the IMF is clear and is before Congress and the public at this time.

Probably shouldn't take more than a couple more questions.

Q Yes. In that connection, you said a minute ago you didn't want to define the role of the Commission, but now you're saying the Administration doesn't want the Commission to focus on the IMF, and in connection with that I sort of ask another question, which is that since the Secretary announced this Commission I assume it's safe to assume that he supports its work, not necessarily its conclusions, he'll wait until he sees that. Does that mean that he'll also wait until this Commission draws its conclusions as to how much he should support the current foreign aid request? Are you going to put all this on hold until this Commission comes out.

A We're proceeding. Congress is proceeding with hearings. The Secretary testified this morning on the foreign aid bill, among other matters, before the Senate Budget Committee, and we expect to continue. Congress hopes to move along through the committee process in the next very few weeks the various appropriation requests of this Administration.

Q Do you expect it next year, I mean not this year in other words?

A I would surely think that by next year there would be some impact, and I envision the discussions through this year will be of interest to members of Congress too. But the point I would like to respond on especially, and I think the point you are making, is we do not think of this Commission as intervening and stopping the appropriations in process while the Commission goes forward. The Commission, yes, is looking at things as they are right now, but the Commission is also going to be looking at matters over the next few years.

Q You're not suggesting that its findings are in any way binding in the end at all, are you?

A No.

Q What if the Congressmen come back and in the course of this appropriation process they're going to say, "Now, wait a minute Mr. Secretary, you just proposed an overall review of this program, why shouldn't we wait and see how it comes out? They will take any opportunity they can to get of passing it. You know that.

A Let me answer this question and leave you, because I think we've covered it quite well. We have had extensive consultations with the appropriate committees on Congress on this Commission, and I think everyone up there understands, both from our point of view and from the point of view of expeditiously handling what they've got before them, that no way does anyone want to wait for several months before this Commission completes its task. That's going forward. I need to look forward and prepare, as a matter of fact, my hearing before the House Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow morning, and I can tell you that Chairman Zablocki isn't waiting for anything as he proceeds to mark up and prepares to ask me all kinds of good questions tomorrow morning.

Q How much of a budget will the Commission have?

A We think the Commission needs to more carefully define its agenda before an appropriate budget can be drafted.

Thank you gentlemen, and ladies.

(The briefing was concluded at 3:25 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
STEPHEN W. BOSWORTH, CHAIRMAN
FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1984, 4:15 P.M.

[983]

MR. BOSWORTH: I'd be happy to take any questions anyone might have.

Q On the record?

A On the record.

Q What about El Salvador? (Laughter.)

A Don't anticipate it. (Laughter.) On the subject of the Policy Planning Council and staff.

Q Steve, could you explain the mechanics a little more about how the -- the Secretary said that there will continue to be permanent people. I mean are you still going to have a staff as has existed in the past?

A Yes, very much so. We're fortunate, I think, in having a very highly qualified staff in place that is composed of people from outside the Government, people from inside the Government; and that staff will remain in place and will work with the Council members.

Q So what's different then? I mean tell me what's different about this change?

A I think there are a couple of things that are different in a sense. I don't want to try to exaggerate the differences because, as the Secretary indicated, this is a function which has been performed in the Department over the last 35 years. But I think there are a couple of things that are different.

First of all, I think the Secretary himself is very directly and acutely interested in the function of the Policy Planning Council and staff. As he indicated just a few moments ago, he is concerned about the need not to allow the Department as a whole, and himself in particular, to become totally a captive of day-to-day events. So he very much wants this function performed, and performed in a vigorous fashion.

The second difference, I think, is that of structure. In contrast to the approach of the past several years in which the structure of policy planning has been rather traditionally hierarchical with a Director and several Deputy Directors. It's our belief that by creating this Council, which will operate in a collegial and basically very coequal fashion, that we are able to attract a very high quality of individual by giving them the prospect of direct participation in this exercise of frequent and direct contact with the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary and the other principals.

So I think those are two differences. I would not want to exaggerate them. The function remains basically as it has been for the last several years.

Q Can you give us some idea of the type of projects or thoughts that you're working on?

A I think the Secretary gave a pretty good breakdown. There are issues of current policy where because we do not have discrete regional or functional responsibilities we will be expected by him to provide an integrating function and to provide a cross-cut of issues -- for example, economic issues which have political implications. One can enumerate such things as the debt crisis, the question of what's going to happen in the world oil market, etc.

Those are primarily economic issues, but they are economic issues of very profound political implications for our foreign policy. That is one set of issues. That is sort of a policy function, if you will.

The planning function is the other side of the coin, and that is an effort to look ahead to anticipate problems and issues that are coming at us to begin developing contingency planning for dealing with those issues, to develop alternative analyses.

It is not what one might possibly consider a Think Tank operation in that we are not looking 10-20 years ahead. I think the majority of our forward planning is six to 24 months ahead, but we are also trying to be attuned to sort of see changed developments in the world that will inevitably impact on U.S. foreign policy.

I think we should be conscious of the fact that there is a lot of work being done on foreign policy issues in a forward-planning sort of context outside the Government. And one of the things we intend to do very vigorously is establish lines of communication and contact with the various private foundations, universities, and individuals who are doing that sort of work.

Q It's unclear to me, and maybe I'm just naive, it's unclear to me if these council members will consider this as a full-time occupation or if they'll be coming in on visitation duty from time to time?

A It will not be visitation duty. It's a full-time job.

Q Would you expect to expand the number of council members?

A It's somewhat accordian-like. I think that five, in my view at the moment, is kind of the optimum, but there is no fixed tenure. People will be here for a fixed period of time but not everybody for the same amount of time.

As the Secretary indicated, Bob Osgood is not going to be coming on until the summer when he finishes his academic commitments, so we'll be operating with four for the next few months; then he'll make it five. Conceivably, we could go to six at some point or we may drop back to four for a few months if someone leaves while we're getting someone else.

Q Will it have any kind of a monitoring function? Suppose an Assistant Secretary wants to send off memos someplace or other, does it have to go through the Council?

A No. I don't want to spend all of my time clearing everyone else's memoranda, but I do expect, and the Secretary expects that we will be informed and know about what's going on in the bureau but we are not a traffic cop.

If we have views on an issue which are not consistent with or the same as the views of a regional bureau or a functional bureau, we will express those views. But we are not a traffic cop.

Q At what level will these people be paid and treated in terms of access and so on?

A In terms of their level of pay, I think given the rather compressed nature of the Federal salary schedule, it will be at or near the top.

In terms of access, as the Secretary has made clear, he expects to meet with them directly, and I suppose one could consider that sort of the rough equivalent of an Assistant Secretary level, but I'm not going to spend a lot of time trying to negotiate a contract as to what our level or status is.

Q Will they meet once a month, once a week, once a day?

A I think that will vary. If my own experience over the last seven weeks that I've been in this job is any indication, I think we could expect that one or more of us will meet with the Secretary a couple of times during the day, sometimes more than that, on individual issues.

I would hope that we would also, as a group, meet with the Secretary periodically but I'm not at this point in a position to say how frequently that will be.

Q Each of the four members has his own regional study background -- the Soviet Union, Europe, Latin America or Mideast -- but is there any special reason why the Asian specialist is not included?

A No. In fact, I would submit that it basically has been included. I think that both Bob Osgood and Peter Rodman have done an extensive amount of writing on Asian studies, Asian developments.

We did not try to go out and recruit a Western European specialist, a Middle East specialist. What we really tried to do is find four highly qualified generalists, each of whom has some specific areas of expertise, of concentration. But I think that basically everyone here is a generalist.

Q What issues have you dealt with over the past seven weeks?

A The same issues the Secretary's been dealing with over the past seven weeks. Also looking at some aspects of the international economy. We've been operating at a rather stripped-down staff over the last seven weeks. As me that question eight weeks from now.

Q Did you get involved in the Libyan thing on a day-to-day or do you get involved in broader issues?

A We get involved in both narrow and broad issues. I don't want to get into the specifics of what we've been working on, but narrow and broad issues.

Q Let's take one a little further away. Maybe it'll be more helpful. If the Council had been in existence last summer, would it be involved in the pipeline dispute? Is that the kind of cross-cutting issue that --

A I would think so.

Q What kind of relationship will you have with the White House?

A We work for the Secretary. Our relationship is to him.

Q The Council members won't talk to NSC?

A No. We talk to the NSC. We'll continue to talk to them; have a very good relationship with the White House.

Q Thank you.

(The on the record briefing concluded at 4:23.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 28, 1983
PR No. 64

PRESS CONFERENCE
WITH
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE
SHERATON BAL HARBOUR
BAL HARBOUR, FLORIDA
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1983, 11:45 P.M.
[a.m.]

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Good morning. Any questions?

QUESTION: Mr. Kirkland, yesterday, indicated that he feels there's little chance the Reagan Administration will turn away as much the way labor would like to see them turn away. In fact --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Turn what?

QUESTION: The expression that Mr. Kirkland used concerning the Reagan Administration was "There's no education the second kick of a mule." Did you offer any indication that Mr. Kirkland perceives reception of the Reagan Administration that the mule might be able to budge?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We had a wide-ranging discussion across many topics. It was a very constructive atmosphere; didn't agree about everything but I thought it was a very good meeting. I don't have any comment on the detail of it, but as far as I was concerned the meeting that I had was constructive in tone throughout.

QUESTION: Could you summarize the general nature, subject matter of your remarks, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The sessions are off the record with the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and I would just respect that tradition of theirs. I'll be glad to answer any questions you want to ask me about what I think about something or other.

The nature of the discussion with them is traditionally off the record and I'll just leave it that way.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, the Canadian Government is saying that the barring in this country of three films without a disclaimer by the United States, that they are either political propaganda or that they are not wanted in this country. Is the throwback of the McCarthy era an abridgment of freedom of speech?

For further information contact:

How would you explain that to the Canadians as the Secretary of State?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have just barely caught up with the fact that those films have been barred, and I think I'll just reserve comment until I'm able to dig into it a little bit more.

QUESTION: Do you feel any possibility that because of the principles involved that the Administration may have to reverse this or back down on it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to make any kind of definitive comment until I've had a chance to get into it a little bit. Obviously, we must stand always for the principles of freedom of expression. But where that leads you in this particular case, I'm not ready to say.

QUESTION: Did you get the impression you were invited here as a surrogate Secretary of Labor?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, following up that question, as a former Secretary of Labor who enjoyed very warm relations with the labor movement, do you have any guidance that you could offer to Secretary Donovan, or to us, as to how the labor movement changed this arms-length relationship? It's really quite unparalleled, isn't it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think Secretary Donovan has been around here and invited to talk with various groups, and has done so. I understand the discussions have been constructive. It seems to me that's the way to handle it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a lot of these labor people are skeptical this recovery will continue. What's your view?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My opinion is that we are now seeing the start of a recovery. If we manage things right, I think it can continue and expand and develop into a genuinely strong recovery. I believe that will happen.

When I say "if we manage things right," I'm very conscious of the fact that our economy, big and important as it is -- 25 percent of world GNP -- nevertheless, it is very much a part of the world economy.

The expansion here helps everybody else but what happens elsewhere will also affect us. So we have to manage it and think about it in that manner.

I might say that I think one of the positive developments taking place in the world economy is the obvious tendency now for the price of oil to fall. I think that is a positive development. I recognize there are many problems that will be created by that but we shouldn't let the problems and the need to cope with them blind us to the importance of this development, and its basically positive impact on prospects for the recovery.

My old friend over here, I have to recognize. Jack.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you tried to advise the Secretary of Labor on how to behave more adequately?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think he's doing fine. I don't have to advise him.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on that economics question, what about the outlook on unemployment? There seems to be a feeling that things may improve but unemployment won't diminish very much very soon.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Decline in unemployment tends to lag in upturn historically. That's just a statistical fact. On the other hand, I think as recovery takes place, employment opportunities will be created. That's in some ways a definition of a "recovery." I think we can see that.

What tends to happen is that the labor force, of course, keeps expanding and you have to have a recovery that is faster than the expansion of the labor force in order to really cut into unemployment. I think it's important to have a strong and steady kind of expansion and in the end that will have its impact on unemployment.

Of course, the big thing is to have an impact on employment so that the number of jobs expands and the number of the job opportunities expands.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you probably know there's a lot of opposition in Canada to the testing of the cruise missile over northern Alberta, and I wonder how important -- how critical is testing in Canada of the cruise missile to the U.S. Defense Secretary, and if the Operative Agreement is not signed, what affect will it have?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's important to test weapons so that you know about their behavior. So this arrangement is a matter of great significance, and the Canadian Government has made an agreement with us and we expect that will carry forward.

I think there's one thing that we must keep in our minds here in this country and throughout the free world. There tends to be a preoccupation with weapons and, of course, we must have a capacity to defend ourselves. That's why we are talking about these weapons. But the real thing for us to concentrate on is not the weapons but the values that are involved, the values we share. What we're trying to do and what our Allies are trying to do is to defend those values. In order to do that, obviously, we have to have a deterrent capability, and that's what this is all about. It's about our values and the defense of them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, speaking of weapons, has the inability to get Mr. Adelman through the Senate Committee up there, is this creating a problem for you? Can we have your comments on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Obviously, we want our nominee to be confirmed because you always do, on the one hand, and, more to the point, because Ken Adelman is a darn good guy and he'll do a good job. He can't perform in the job until he's confirmed, so the more delay there is in his confirmation, the more difficulty it causes us in pursuing the President's program of reduction in these armaments.

However, that having been said, the President's program is on tract. We are working on it. The capacity of the staff of the Arms Reduction and Control Agency, that staff is fully engaged. So we continue on. But we would be benefited by having Ken Adelman confirmed.

QUESTION: Are you personally going to pick up any of the slack at this time while you're waiting for the Senate vote?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am working on this and other matters all out. Ken Dam, my Deputy Secretary, is paying special attention to working with the ACDA staff. There is an Acting Director there. Administratively, we're fully engaged. But, certainly, we'll be better off when Ken Adelman is confirmed, as we expect him to be.

QUESTION: On what basis do you make that statement, sir? I hear a lot of confidence in Washington that the Senate will approve him; on what basis do you think that will happen?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: On the basis of general sentiments that you hear, on the basis of the merits of the man and the need to pursue vigorously the program of arms reduction that the President has put in place, and so we need to get the President's team in there and working. I think those arguments will become more and more obvious as we go along.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, yesterday, Defense Secretary Weinberger said that El Salvador does need more aid, more military aid on the part of the United States. The Defense Secretary also implied that perhaps we should expand the Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon.

Does this indicate that Americans must accept, as a fact life, active U.S. military involvement for the Reagan Administration, or for the United States to have their way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You have two different things there entirely. One is support for the Government of El Salvador in its effort to have the strength to counter the insurgency in El Salvador, remembering that that insurgency is armed and supported by outside forces -- by the Soviet Union through Cuba and Nicaragua to them -- and we need to support that democratically based government.

By helping them in their military efforts and supporting them with armaments, that's one thing. That is not the use of U.S. troops. That's the use of U.S. support.

In Lebanon, we're there in a peacekeeping role; not in a hostile environment, but in a peacekeeping role. What expansions there may be in the Multinational Force and what involvement it may have in the arrangements for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon and the provision of security, attention to the security of interests of Israel in southern Lebanon, remains to be seen.

The President has taken the position that we should be open-minded about that and work with Israel and Lebanon to see what makes sense; and if there is a U.S. role, we should be ready to consider it, but there won't be any commitment to U.S. forces without that being carefully considered and there be consultation with the Congress about it.

QUESTION: There's a lot of feeling around here that an economic game plan that calls for the unemployment rate to remain as high as ten percent for another year or year and a half is not really a recovery. I know that the President and Mr. Donovan here both have said that workers and union members will come back to the Republican Party when the recovery is underway.

If unemployment is ten percent at the time of the 1984 elections, what kind of blue collar vote and labor vote do you expect you can get?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's sort out of my jurisdiction. I don't know about that. I do say this. That there is no game plan for unemployment staying high. There is a game plan, or an effort to have policies that will lead the United States' economy to expand and to have that expansion take place with inflation staying under control, and to have that expansion take place with a greater rate of savings and investment so that we are able to modernize the plants and equipment that we have and give to the American worker the kind of top-notch tools that he and she need to do their job. That is the kind of expansion we want and it will have rising employment, and I hope we'll see unemployment fall.

It is so that the people who project things as economists are not always right. For example, nobody expected that the rate of inflation could possibly fall as fast as it's fallen in the past year and a half. But that is a real triumph, and it exceeded peoples' expectations.

Everybody keeps saying that unemployment will be slow to decline, as you all have here. I would say that the unemployment statistics that were last recorded showed a decline that surprised everybody. I don't say we'll continually be surprised; I just say that when people project how things are going to be two and three years from now, they don't necessarily know what they're talking about.

If we have a strong expansion going with jobs increasing, I think that's the main thing. What the political fallout from that is, I leave to the politicians to figure out.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said over the weekend that one fine day King Hussein would join the peace process. You were very optimistic that the Palestinian National Council did not give him a mandate. In fact, the Palestinians have said that the President's plan was not a sound basis for any progress.

Where does your optimism come from? Can you explain it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Palestinian Council and the statements that come out of meetings like that, you can find all kinds of statements and meanings that attribute it. Our sense of optimism comes from the attitudes that we feel in King Hussein. I think he genuinely wants to be part of the peace procress under the right conditions, and I think it must be quite obvious to people throughout the Middle East, including Palestinians most particularly, that they have a tremendous amount to gain from the establishment of a peaceful situation in the Middle East and with Israel. Those are the kinds of things that lead us to think that this will get going.

QUESTION: In March?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to lay down a time or anything of that kind.

QUESTION: You mentioned tools for labor to help in recovery. One of the things they are pushing for are tighter trade restrictions, domestic content laws; what is your answer to them on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the answer, in a sense, has to come back to expansion. If we have expanding job opportunities in this country and around the world, that puts all of the tensions surrounding trade in a different light. But when we have unemployment that is high and rising, that creates great tensions everywhere, not just here.

My point in this is, if we can create a situation where our economy expands, where, with the help of falling oil prices, we see a greater expansion than is otherwise anticipated in Japan and Western Europe, you get that expansion. That begins to feed expansion in the Third World which has been extremely important for jobs in this country. Then, we want to keep trade relations as open as possible so that the interactive effect of these expansions can take place and be mutually stimulative to everybody. Then, we'll all benefit. That is the kind of reasoning, at least, that I have on this subject.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on protectionism, isn't the Secretary of Labor or the U.S. Trade Ambassador strengthened by the threat or the reality of domestic content legislation, in GATT talks or in straight bilaterals? Aren't you strenghtened when you go forth from a meeting like this knowing what labor senses and what it wants?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Underlying the problem, however, is the fact that domestic content legislation embedded into our law, if that were to happen, would be bad for the United States. It would be bad for the American consumer. We have to keep remembering that, and don't forget about the consumer. There are a lot of them out there. We have to keep remembering those things.

Threats and consequences always play a part in any bargaining process, but we don't use as threats things that we wouldn't like to see come to pass. We have to be a little careful about that.

QUESTION: Could you clarify the President's calls for something in the nature of a Palestinian homeland; explain how, if at all, this differs from previous policy on the matter?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think it needs any particular clarification. The President spoke, and I think his meaning is perfectly apparent. I never try to clarify Presidents; they speak for themselves.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, recently, four high-ranking officials of the Cuban Government were indicted for alleged complicity with drug smugglers using their island as a refueling point. Could you comment on that, and do you have any assurances that that is no longer taking place now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't be sure, obviously, but it's something that we don't want and our policies are against it, our efforts are against it. There are efforts to interdict the flow of drugs into this country; they are very strong. They also have programs to try to stop the production of drugs at their source with various countries going forward. All of that effort is a very strong one.

We've had, in recent months, some rather spectacular seizures of drugs right here in this area. So we're not always successful but we're successful quite often. We keep working at it. It's very important.

QUESTION: As a former Labor Secretary, do you agree with the plan, the proposal to drop the minimum wage for people 22 and under during a five-month period? Obviously, Mr. Kirkland and the Federation do not agree.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've always felt that a youth minimum differential would be constructive, particularly in view of the fact that unemployment among youth, particularly black youth, is historically very high, much higher than other demographic groups.

I think there's no question about the fact that if this were to happen, it would help employment opportunities for the young people and I think that would be a constructive thing to do. I've advocated that a long time. In fact, I remember the first Executive Committee Meeting of the AFL-CIO -- and I see Jack smiling over there -- that I came to in 1969. I had made a comment before coming here advocating this on a TV quiz show, so that was the first question I got in the Council Meeting. The issue is still around. I haven't changed my opinion, and I guess my friends in the labor movement haven't changed theirs either.

Thank you.

(The press conference concluded at 12:10 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL BRIEFING

by

RICHARD R. BURT

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MARCH 8, 1983, 10:30 A.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I think it is best that I just begin answering your questions. I don't think I need to make a statement.

MR. STEINER: I just wanted to say that now that you have been confirmed, we hope to meet more with the European press, Western Europe, the NATO countries, and we hope to have a lot of small group meetings like this. This is one of the first, really, to meet with you people.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: It might be useful just for the first question you ask if you introduce yourself and tell us whom you represent.

Who wants to break the ice?

MR. BRYNE: I am Arvid Bryne, from Dagbladet, in Oslo.

I would like to have you outline the situation now in the IMF talks, after the German elections, maybe.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Well, the German elections have no direct relationship to the IMF talks. The negotiations were underway prior to the election and are underway now in Geneva.

As I said in a press conference in Brussels last month, we are somewhat disappointed with the status that the negotiations have reached. We do not believe that the Soviet Union has put on the table a reasonable or an acceptable proposal. They apparently believe that they can derail the NATO December '79 decision and thus not have to pay anything for stopping American deployments.

As the President said very clearly in a speech to the American Legion, we believe there are certain principles or criteria that have to be followed in the negotiations. One of those key principles is equality in US. and Soviet rights and limits in the agreement.

That is certainly what our proposal calls for in insisting on zero for both sides. The Soviet proposal does not call for zero for both sides. It calls for zero for the United States and a massive SS-20 capability for them.

While we are disappointed with the Soviet position in the negotiations, we are certainly not giving up. We are continuing to pursue our goal, which is to eliminate an entire category of systems, at the same time our representative has been instructed by the President to listen to other proposals, and we hope that they will be reasonable proposals and meet the criteria that the President laid out.

On the German elections specifically, the most important point is that the campaign and the elections themselves demonstrated the basic political stability of the Federal Republic of Germany, and we think that the message -- one of the messages of the election -- is that Germany, like other allied countries,-- remains solidly behind the December '79 decision.

From that standpoint, I think the statements by other officials calling the results -- encouraging are correct.

I just add that I would not personally view the election as a watershed, because I believe that the United States can work closely with any major German political party.

All the major political parties made it clear that they fundamentally supported the Atlantic Alliance.

MR. HELLBERG: Lars Hellberg, Aftenposten, Norway.

You said on the Hill, yesterday I think, that an analytical debate is underway in the intelligence community both on the scope and the nature of the Soviet military expansion. Would you add to that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I wouldn't want to go too far beyond what I said. I think that there is no debate over the question that the Soviet Union is maintaining an impressive military buildup. There has been for some time a technical debate over how to cost or to understand or to quantify — maybe that is the word — the Soviet buildup in Western terms.

They have a different economy and it is important that we revise and reanalyze our techniques for estimating the Soviet buildup periodically.

What does seem to be occurring, according to some experts, is that the Soviet Union is preparing for a new round of military improvements, investing more in research and development than has been the case in the past. This may — may — and I want to emphasize "may" — may mean that they are allocating defense-spending rubles somewhat differently. Again I want to emphasize that "may" — what that may mean is that the constant increases that we saw during the seventies in their procurement of existing systems could level off — not decline, but level off — so that they could spend more money on research and development of new weapons.

QUESTION: Still they would have to be produced at some point.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Well, at that time, then obviously, they would spend less on research and development and more on procurement, and this is a fairly normal phenomenon.

QUESTION: Any idea what these new weapons would be?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: They are actively developing and testing a new generation of cruise missile, as one example, as well as at least four new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a new intercontinental bomber known as the Blackjack.

MR. HOJEBERG: Thomas Hojeberg, Scandinavian News Agency.

What about the discussion about an interim solution concerning the debate?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: What do you mean, "What about the discussion?"

MR. HOJEBERG: Well, you say they call on Europe. How seriously do you take that debate? Are you seriously considering maybe going into a discussion with the Russians about an interim solution?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Obviously if we were, I wouldn't tell you, because we have to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union, and the way to engage in negotiations with the Soviets is to not reveal to your own public what is in store in the negotiations.

What I can say is that Vice President Bush consulted very closely with several key heads of government during his visit to Europe. He reported to the President the results of those discussions. He will continue to consult this month. There is a meeting with the NATO Special Consultative Group in the middle of March.

We are familiar with the ideas contained in the interim solution proposal, and we are constantly reviewing ideas like this, and other ideas. But our position in the negotiations and in public remains the same, and that is, we believe verystrongly that we should continue to seek the total elimination of land-based intermediate range nuclear missiles.

QUESTION: Have we set a date for Vice President Bush's next tour of Europe?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I am not even aware that there is such a tour planned.

QUESTION: When N@rwegian Prime Minister Willoch was here, it was said that the Vice President should come to Norway, but a date was not set.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I know that there have been some press reports and some discussions come out of that, but I think it is premature now to talk about a visit, to talk about concrete dates for a Vice Presidential visit.

QUESTION: It was given before the visit in November.

MR. ALBRECTSEN: I am Bent Albrectsen, Berlingske Tidende.

Are you able to now, after time has passed since the Andropov access to power — do you have an estimate of trends in the Soviet Union after that change?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Well, I discussed some of these questions yesterday — and, Steve, you might give them a copy of my statement.

MR. ALBRECTSEN: That would be very nice.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I talked a little bit about what we know about Andropov and his role.

Generally speaking, I think the emphasis in Soviet policy seems to be continuity. We have not seen any major changes of the sort that some people hypothesized. There have been suggestions that the new Soviet leader might be more radical; there might be major changes in the Soviet economy; there might be major shifts in foreign policy; and so far we haven't seen those changes.

What you see at home in the Soviet Union is a stepped up anti-corruption drive, campaign, designed to improve efficiency and productivity, which are some standard techniques used by the Soviet leaders in the past. No signs of basic economic reform. On the foreign policy, I think you see a more active effort to implement the status quo. We see a continuation of the talks with Peking; some diplomatic activism in South Asia; and a stepped-up peace offensive, propaganda offensive, in Western Europe. But, again, no fundamental changes.

As a result, we do not base our policy towards the Soviet Union on a single individual. And our policy also represents continuity. We are publicly saying, and in private telling the Soviets that we are prepared for better relations; but that better relations have to objectively flow from changes in behavior; that there are aspects of Soviet behavior that are mainly responsible for the decline in U.S.-Soviet relations; and that we have to address these problems, particularly the problems of the Soviet military buildup; the Soviet propensity to use force in places like Afghanistan, and the Soviet human rights record; before there can be a real improvement in the relationship.

This is the position that we weretaking together with the allies at the Madrid CSCE conference, and we are pleased by the strong unity of the allied Commission in Europe.

MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Niels Christiansen, Jyllands Posten, Denmark.

Do you have any comments on the reported Soviet suggestion or proposal to include the Baltic in a Northern European nuclear-free zone?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: We are extremely skeptical about the nuclear-free zone concept, as you know. Nuclear-free zones under some circumstances might make some sense. For example, we have supported in principle a nuclear-free zone for Latin America. The problem, of course, is that in the Nordic area, you have a superpower adjacent which has thousands of nuclear weapons on its soil, which would not be in any way limited or affected or influenced, really, by a Nordic nuclear-free zone, including the Baltic.

The basic flaw with a nuclear-free zone is that it would prevent the West from deterring the use of Soviet nuclear weapons against the Nordic area, while doing nothing to curb the Soviet nuclear buildup which threatens the Nordic area.

It is a form of unilateral disarmament by another name. And the question, of course, that is raised by the inclusion of the Baltic is the problem of verification.

We have recently seen reports of Soviet submarine activities in the Baltic, the possibility that those submarines are equipped with nuclear weapons, and I think recent developments with submarines in that area, and the difficulties in tracking those submarines, and I think these are very important examples of the verification problems, the monitoring problems, that one would encounter in making the Baltic nuclear free.

QUESTION: Could you say a little more about the Soviet activity in the Baltic?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I seem to remember a certain submarine --

QUESTION: Oh, you are thinking about -- all right. So there is nothing new that they haven't sort of reinforced, as far as you know, the nuclear capacity and put in even more nuclear submarines there?

The answer is no?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I don't want to give you an anwer because I just haven't looked at the situation. They have plenty of capability in the Baltic, and over recent years they have enhanced that capability, as you know, because as they have deployed more modern, longer range submarines in the North Atlantic, they have moved their older nuclear submarines down into the Baltic.

QUESTION: You mentioned the various kinds of weapons that the Soviets seem to be working on with R and D. Is there any sign that any of these have already breached or will breach the treaties or the understandings that are in force between the United States and the Soviet Union?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: We watch the situation very closely, and from time-to-time, some of these developments do raise questions which we then raise with the Soviets. I don't want to go beyond that.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you how the Administration's problem with Ken Adelman is influencing Poland, and ask if they are influencing the discussions, the talks going on?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: None. A very simple answer -- none.

QUESTION: That means you don't need him. (Laughter.)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Is that a question or a statement? (Laughter.)

MR. STEINER: Any other questions?

QUESTION: Deputy Secretary Dam is going to go to Europe soon. What is going to be the main topics? What is going to be his mission there?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I think that one of the things he is apparently -- you know, he is of Danish ancestry, and so I think he will be interested in part in his visit to Denmark in visiting his roots.

QUESTION: When is he leaving, by the way?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I can't remember. It is the end of this month.

QUESTION: I was just thinking, is it possible to set up a talk with him before he leaves?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I think that something like that is -- Steve is working on something like that.

MR. STEINER: We are trying to get something.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I think his main two foci will be security and disarmament issues, on the one hand, and economic problems and prospects on the other.

I know that in both Oslo and Copenhagen, he will want to talk about the Reagan Administration's support for arms control; he will want to explain our approach to arms control; the fact that this Administration, for the first time, is calling for real reductions in nuclear capability, not simply codifying the buildup on both sides. He will want to emphasize the continuing commitment of the Reagan Administration to a strategy of deterrence. He will want to explode the myth that somehow this Administration has a nuclear war-fighting strategy.--that is a myth.--but that we continue to base our policy on deterrence. And on the economic round, I think he will want to talk. On the one hand, he will want to report on economic developments in the United States, particularly the various signs that indicate that an economic recovery is underway here; and I know that he will want to explain President Reagan's commitment to defining protectionism in international trade.

QUESTION: Do you feel that there has been any kind of changes over the last couple of years with regard to the U.S. relations with the Nordic countries?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: That is an interesting question; and it is something that is hard for me to answer right off the top of my head. I would want to think a little about it.

I don't see, though, any significant changes in our relationship. For just one example, we recently had, as you know, the visit of the Norwegian Prime Minister, which was an immensely successful visit. I know that everyone, including the President, who saw him was very impressed with his grasp.

Sometimes there is a tendency in Washington to believe that the Nordic countries tend to have a parochial outlook on various issues. I can tell you quite honestly that the Norwegian Prime Minister demonstrated exactly the opposite. He was concerned about a wide range of issues and we had very good talks. And to the extent that that visit was an example of sort of a U.S./Nordic dialogue, I think that we are in very good shape.

QUESTION: Yes, but they keep popping up these disputes, for example, between the Labor Party in Norway and in the U.S., and with the Danish Social Democrats.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Let's don't be naive about these questions. I am constantly amazed — and some of you may know, I was a former journalist myself, and I know what makes good copy. There is an inevitable tendency for the press to focus on differences and disputes, and that is healthy. That is one thing that forces politicians and government officials to focus on these problems.

What is really very healthy within the Alliance — and I would argue in its relationship with the United States and the Nordic region — is how truly pluralistic and democratic our relationships are. The fact that we can air our differences and our views openly; that we don't suppress or repress; NATO, for example, is not the Warsaw Pact. When there are NATO meetings, the differences become apparent very quickly.

There is a constant belief that I think is sometimes unconsciously fostered by the press, that differences and disagreements show that the Alliance, or that the Western World, is somehow in disarray.

I believe just the opposite. None of us believe in our own domestic politics that debate shows that we are in disarray. We all support the democratic process. We want to see spirited debate within our parliaments. We expect to see the parties clash.

The same is true for the Alliance. Now, the Alliance wouldn't be the Alliance, the West would not be the West, if we didn't have these kinds of disagreements and disputes, and we weren't able to work these problems out.

I could take you through -- though it would be very boring for you -- thirty years' experience of disagreement and debate within the Alliance. Going back to the 1950's, you remember the Year of Europe; 1973 and the problems caused by the '73 Middle East War; the dispute over the pipeline of this Administration; the dispute in the Carter Administration over Iran and the Iranian sanctions; and you can go back into the 1960's with several examples.

The fact is that the Alliance always survives because of its problem-solving ability.

So I think what is necessary is to take a kind of sophisticated approach to these issues. The time to get worried about the state of the Alliance and the state of the Western World is when the debates disappear.

QUESTION: Is there any new assessment on Poland? Is something happening, are they moving, or is it largely a static thing?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I think we are fairly depressed about the situation in Poland. You will recall that the EC, as well as NATO, supported three conditions for change in Poland shortly after the imposition of martial law. None of those conditions has really been met.

There are still large numbers of detainees in Poland. While martial law has been technically lifted, the State continues to enjoy through emergency measures a great deal of authority. Solidarity has been suppressed, and the government's efforts to establish factory unions is certainly not the kind of labor movement, free labor movement, that the people in the West hope would come about in Poland.

The situation can't be called static, because there are continuing efforts by the authorities to crack down on dissidents. There are continuing signs of dissidence. There are some important, potentially important, developments on the horizon, including the continuing possibility of a visit by the Pope.

We believe that it is important, under these circumstances, that the West make its views very clear to the Polish authorities that we are not going to forget Poland, and that the pressures that we have applied should continue in place.

QUESTION: If we can go back to the IMF, are you still convinced that it is possible to get some agreement with the Russians based on the zero option?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Yes. Just to emphasize my point, — I make two points about why I think it is possible. First of all, when the negotiations started at tne end of November 1981, the Soviet Union took the position that there was already a balance in Europe. In other words, that they did not need to reduce a single SS-20 missile.

What is interesting about the Andropov proposal of last December is that they now admit that a balance does not exist, and that they would be prepared to reduce some SS-20's.

Now, that is not to argue or to suggest that the Andropov proposal is acceptable. It is not. But what is important about it is that they have at least recognized that Western public opinion will not accept this fallacious argument that there is a balance.

In fact, let me ask a question. How could there be a balance when the negotiations started at the end of

1981, and then continue to argue there is a balance, while they were excluding negotiations, and while the negotiations have been underway, they have been deploying a new SS-20 every week.

So, our position of calling for the total elimination of these weapons has at least moved the Soviets to recognizing that they must consider reductions, and that is an important first step.

Now, as the year goes by, and the Alliance demonstrates that it is solidly behind the December '79 decision, and that in the absence of an acceptable agreement deployments will begin at the end of 1983, we believe that the Soviets will become more serious.

One more question.

QUESTION: Excuse me, sir. You said there were two reasons.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Well, the first was the fact that they have recognized, that they have accepted the need for reductions. The second is the point about timing, that as deployments --.

QUESTION: All right.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: -- that as the prospect of deployment becomes more imminent, we believe that the

Soviets will have to be more serious.

Until now, as I said earlier, they have been trying to get something for nothing, and trying to derail American deployments without have to reduce a single system on their side.

MR. STEINER: One last question.

QUESTION: Are you going with Dam?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: No. My principal deputy, Robert Blackwill, will go.

QUESTION: And you yourself have no plans at the present to go to Europe?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: I will chair a meeting of the Special Consultative Group on INF in Brussels in March.

MR. STEINER: Thank you, Mr. Burt.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Thank you. Good to see you.

QUESTION: Thank you, very much, sir.

[The briefing concluded at 11:05 a.m.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING ON
LAND REFORM IN EL SALVADOR

BY
PETER McPHERSON
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1983, 2:35 P.M.

MR. McPHERSON: Good afternoon. We have recently seen very positive developments in El Salvador. For example, the acceleration of the date for the general elections and the extension by the Constituent Assembly of El Salvador of the provisions of Phase III, so-called land-of [to]-the-tiller of the Agrarian Reform Act, extension until the end of 1983.

These events coincide with the completion of an outside evaluation of the El Salvador Agrarian Reform Program, an outside evaluation undertaken or paid for by AID. The report was undertaken by Checchi and Company, a well-known firm with extensive experience with the Agrarian Reform Program of El Salvador.

The report is very positive on the state of the Agrarian Reform Program, and I believe the American people should be aware of these developments. I should like to take this opportunity to facilitate that process.

With me today is Peter Askin, who was the Mission Director in El Salvador -- Deputy and then Mission Director -- from October 1977 until last July.

The authors of the study, a team of independent and experienced consultants assembled by Checchi and Company, arrived in El Salvador with the impression from U.S. newspaper accounts that the conversative coalition that won the March 1982 election had attempted to, in effect, annul the reforms.

El Salvador has a long history of attempting land reform, and many observers, I suppose, including the consultants, would not have been surprised to have found that, in fact, this attempt also had ended unsuccessfully. However, the members of the Study Team found "somewhat to their surprise" that the reforms, despite an on-going civil war, were still very much alive, and that significant further progress had been made during the June to December '82 period. The authors spent two months in El Salvador, at the end of 1982, conducting the study which included extensive field work.

I simply would like to highlight some of the more important aspects of the reform and the features of the report.

The authors first found that the Agrarian Reform Program was working successfully.

Next, that agriculture production, in the reformed sector, after an initial period of decline, had regained pre-reform average production levels. This is an especially unusual thing to happen in land reform undertakings. Generally, there has been a prolonged period where production has declined and stayed low. But in this case, as I said, after some decline it has now come back up to pre-reform average production levels.

As illustrated by the chart that I have here, we see that there has been a dramatic increase in applications over the last six months. This follows a period of uncertainty immediately after the March elections.

(Indicating) This basically is the uncertain period -- this part isn't to scale but this is -- the uncertain period, that six months, and then a very substantial jump-up, beginning at about October '82 to the end of February where we went from about 30,000 to almost 48,000 people that had applied for the program.

The land reform that we're focusing on is two phases, the so-called Third Phase, which is the land-of-the-tiller. This program benefits thousands of small farmers who were formerly renters and sharecroppers and have little chance of owning their own piece of land. Phase III, that which is reflected here in the chart, permits renters and sharecroppers to apply for title on land they had tilled under those tenure arrangements as of March 6, 1980, up to a maximum of 17.3 acres. In other words, if you were farming on land, you could apply to become the owner up to 7.3* acres.

The other phase which is involved here and has been implemented, is the so-called Phase I which is large holdings. Individuals that were living and working on those farms became, in effect, the owners by way of cooperative arrangements.

We have a handout which you'll be getting which will lay out the rest of my statement. I think, perhaps the easiest way rather than going over it is to have you ask questions.

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*Number should be 17.3 acres.

You have in your possession the Checchi Report. The handout is composed of two things. One, my longer statement which I haven't read in full; and (2) several excerpts from that Checchi Report of three or four pages that lays out, I think, the most pertinent findings.

The important point here is that after an initial start, beginning in March of '80, the period right after the election, particularly for several months, there really wasn't much going on. Indeed, some of the people had been thrown off the land that they applied to own.

Beginning about October '82, the army took a very active role and began to put people back on the land that they had been thrown out of and you see a very dramatic jump of applicants for ownership.

This 48,000 farmers covers a total projected of about 300,000 people. It is indeed a substantial increase in activity, and I think this is the development, which, in all the other activities involved in this country, has largely gone unnoticed by the American public.

I welcome your questions.

Q What is the difference between an application and the actual possession of the land?

A These people, when they apply, are ordinarily in possession of the land. The land-of-the-tiller, by definition, is people who have been renting it, were renting it as of the date when the law was passed in 1980, and generally have continued on in possession, so to speak, of the land as renters.

So when they apply, they're already physially there, usually. What happens then is an issuance of a temporary provisional title and then in due course a permanent, a certification of ownership. In connection with all that, these tillers promise to pay for this land over a period of years and the government issues to the owners bonds that they in turn will see that they're paid.

Compensation has been one of the issues. There are numerous recommendations which the Checchi Report makes concerning compensation in other matters, recommendations which we think, in many cases, look very interesting and in some cases already we have been pursuing.

Q You paint such a glowing picture of it. I wonder, are there any problems with this, and particularly the issuing of permanent titles. I hear that's been lagging behind.

A There are a number of problems. You'll find when you look at that Checchi Report, there are a whole series of recommendations. Each would suggest something that, of course, should be done. You mentioned permanent titles. There have been many fewer permanent titles issued than there have been provisional titles.

I think the material we passed out has a listing of various figures, including permanent provisional titles.

As a tax lawyer, and sometimes working with property law in this country, I can tell you what an excruciating process -- I bet everyone here has bought a house at one time or the other -- working out title to real estate is. That is a long and involved process that the El Salvadoran Government continues to work hard at, and we're interested in facilitating in a variety of ways.

Q What is that figure, please, on permanent titles that have been issued?

A Let me get that figure for you. As of the end of last month, 1,410 permanent titles; there have been provisional titles as of last month, 35,823.

Q As I understand it, the Phase III has been extended until the end of the year?

A That's correct.

--MORE--

Q What are your projections for that, and what happens after that? Does it stop?

A It has been extended, of course, a couple of times now. I think we just have to -- and the El Salvadorans will have to -- look at what happens then.

One of the reasons there was such a big jump from October to the end of February was that the military government, particularly the last quarter of last year, went out in mobile units and, in effect, informed people about the rights that they had and pushed the system along.

I suppose that if in fact the figures were to continue, it would be feasible to cover much of the country that might be open to this by the end of '83.

Part of the problem in implementing land reform has been to implement it in areas where there has been substantial conflict. In fact, in the eastern part of the country it has been implemented much less than in other parts of the country. It's just very hard to do it, very hard to get people in and to make the whole system work.

I think the El Salvadorans -- in answer to your question -- are simply going to have to look at where this is at the end of '83.

Q Generally, how do the guerrillas respond to land reform?

A I think land reform is a serious threat to the guerrillas. Land reform says to the guerrillas that this El Salvadoran Government is serious about helping the people, including the little people.

When you find an army which has been so interested in this kind of reform, in helping people who live on the land actually own that land, it responds to much of the rhetoric that the Communists -- the guerrillas -- have used. It's a very positive development.

Over the years I've been quite interested in the land reform of various countries in the world. You've got history going back in this hemisphere, of course; Mexico had a massive land reform after their civil war. Bolivia, Peru, and so on.

Land reform is never an easy thing. There are inevitably major problems with it. There have been numbers of difficulties with the El Salvadoran land reform, but it appears to be going fairly well.

There are some advantages. First of all, of course, the world has learned from some of the previous land reforms. Our key has been -- let me just contrast it with many land reforms in this hemisphere historically.

Usually they didn't provide a lot of credit, a lot of agricultural extension -- seed and fertilizer -- in other words, backup help for the farmer who was getting this new title or new provisional title.

In El Salvador, through the foreign aid program, we've done a lot of work of exactly that kind. In this case also there was certainly a benefit that the title -- that the land was going in many cases to the people that actually lived on it, so there wasn't actually a tumultous shift around.

I think it is because of those two factors -- our extending credit, seed, and that kind of thing, plus who was getting the land -- that you found that agricultural production didn't have the dramatic dive that you had in many countries -- in Bolivia in looking way back, and Peru, and so forth.

Q Mr. McPherson, the report says that the entire process of land reform would be aided greatly if the level of violence dropped and world prices for coffee, cotton and sugar rise.

I would be interested in knowing what percentage of aiding greatly depends on things over which the Salvadorans have no control such as the low price of sugar and coffee.

In other words, basically doesn't this report say the land reform program has a long way to go and a lot of that depends on things outside Salvador's control?

A We think that this progress is pretty substantial progress. We think that when you increase titles, we increase people who are applying for land by almost 70 percent.* In the period from October '82 to March '83 -- to February '83 -- you're talking about a lot of progress.

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*actual number is 56%

There's no question that if the violence were to stop, particularly that there would be another -- if the violence were to stop, the farmer -- land reform, the things that the guerrillas are saying they want -- at least some of the things they're saying they want, would happen.

It's also true that agriculture generally in El Salvador would benefit if coffee prices and sugar prices in the world market were up. I can't quantify just how much, but I'm saying two things: One, things would be better if the violence were to be reduced; but, two, clearly, very substantial progress "to the surprise of us" -- to quote the report -- has been made.

Q This may be in the green book, but could you give us a sense of proportion as to what has happened in Salvador? Has most of the land that is subject to land reform been broken up or a small portion of it? Where do we stand in that?

A That's a very fair question. We think that -- you notice that there are 48,000 applicants or families that have applied. We think that there is in excess -- around or somewhat in excess of of 100,000 that may be eligible.

The figures are somewhat hard to come by, frankly, but there may be in excess of 100,000.

Q Additional or --

A No. In total. That figure is a little bit skewed back and forth, but in a range of 100,00 or a bit in excess. That figure represents about 300,000 people, so you're talking about perhaps in excess of an additional 300,000 people, or a bit more than that, that could be possible beneficiaries. That's for Land-of-the-Tiller, not --

Q That represents 100,000 people? 48,000 applicants represents 100,000 people?

A No. It represents 300,000 people. In other words, we estimate about 6 people per family.

That's talking about the Land-of-the-Tiller program. In addition, Phase I, there are some 314 cooperatives -- Peter, do you have the number of people we're talking about there?

MR. ASKIN: We're talking roughly about in excess of 200,000.

MR. McPHERSON: In excess of 200,000 people have benefited from Phase I. Phase I — to say it's fully implemented is probably not quite the way the people and the cooperatives are set up. There is not more land to be put into Phase I.

Q To what degree is this public report of progress at this time prompted by the Administration's push to get the $60 million in military aid?

A We had asked for the report several weeks ago -- months ago, actually -- because people who went down to El Salvador arrived two months before the end of last year, completed the work, and it was just delivered the end of last week.

Q So it's just a coincidence?

A We work on land reform in El Salvador day after day, and a report of this size is pretty hard to have delivered on Day X. Moreover, of course, you never know what a report is going to say, I might point out.

Q I don't think you quite understood the question that I asked. I was trying to ask what the total land available for land reform is, and how much of it has been broken up for small farmers?

Are there still large landholders in the country, and how many?

A The large landholders have almost entirely been moved into Phase I, and those are the 312 cooperatives.

The Land-of-the-Tiller is another program that essentially people were qualified to participate in if they lived and worked on land as renters. This program covers -- and we have come perhaps nearly half way to having that program implemented.

Q Is the average application about 20 acres,did you suggest before?

A No. It is less than that. Indeed, you cannot as a Tiller, under the Phase III program, have more than 17.3 acres.

Q So that's about it.

A Yes. But you're essentially a pretty small farmer.

Q I'm not quite sure I understand the motive here. I just want to try to understand it.

A It's a pretty involved program, frankly, this whole thing.

Q In what you said a minute ago, you said — you kept insisting on the point about if the guerrillas stopped fighting, this land reform program would progress faster and better and so on.

Does the Administration believe that if Congress, for example, approved a cut-off of military aid so that there would be no more fighting — there would be no arms in El Salvador — it would be great because land reform could take place or does the Administration believe that sending more bullets to El Salvador would assist the land reform program?

A I think our clear position is that if we were to cut off military aid to El Salvador, one group of fighters would have a lot of arms and so forth, and it doesn't look to us like that would help the land reform program at all.

It's pretty clear that the guerrillas see the land reform program as a threat. It's something that they have never wanted to succeed, and the El Salvadoran Government, proceeding as they have with this, plus their initiative as well to move up the date of election, it seems to me are very positive steps.

I've taken an awful lot of your time. Why don't I have one more question here and then I'll quit.

Q Which one of the recommendations is AID going to support of the report's recommendations?

Q There are many, many recommendations there — a total of, I think, 14 primary recommendations. Some of them we expect to, but we're looking at them all. I think one of them, for example, was this report is brand new but it came out just before the El Salvadoran Government had extended the date of land reform, which it did on March 3. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:00 p.m.)

Unedited

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE USA

BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1983, 3:35 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am most pleased to inform you that today President Reagan issued a statement of oceans policy and established by Presidential proclamation an exclusive economic zone.

This proclamation of an exclusive economic zone, or an EEZ as it is sometimes referred to, confirms United States sovereign rights and control over the living and non-living natural resources of the seabed, subsoil, and super-adjacent waters beyond the territorial sea, but within 200 nautical miles of our coast.

The EEZ applies to waters adjacent to the United States, to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and United States overseas possessions and territories.

The EEZ is widely regarded as a lawful claim of jurisdiction under international law. Over 50 nations already claim some form of EEZ, and it is included in the recently completed Law of the Sea convention.

The President's proclamation clearly establishes United States jurisdiction and control over seabed mineral resources off the coast but within 200 nautical miles.

The President's proclamation does not materially affect our existing jurisdiction over fisheries resources.

In establishing an EEZ, the United States has limited its claim of jurisdiction to resource-related rights. Within our EEZ, all nations will continue to enjoy non-resource related freedom of the high seas, such as navigation and overflight.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would be happy to take your questions.

Q How does this relate to the Law of the Sea treaty. Is this in place of our signing it?

A As you know, the President decided in July of 1982 not to sign the Law of the Sea treaty, and at that time we undertook a very extensive review of the next step as far as oceans policy were concerned.

Our objection to the Law of the Sea treaty turned around the deep seabed mining portions of the text, not the non-deep seabed mining -- not the non-deep seabed portions of the text.

Consequently, we view this step of the declaration of an economic zone following this review to be a positive, next step in terms of the development of our oceans policy. We feel that it is completely in accord with international law as that international law is embodied in those portions of the LOS convention that covered this area. So we think that this is the appropriate way to move at this time, and that is the relationship to the LOS treaty.

Q Is this consistent with the Law of the Sea?

A Yes. I believe I just answered that. It is consistent with international law as that international law is reflected in the EEZ portions of the Law of the Sea treaty.

It does not stem from the Law of the Sea treaty, but those provisions are consistent with international law.

Q Just out of curiositiy, because I know very little about this -- the fact that we're claiming a 200-mile zone around the possessions, such as the Marianas, would the Law of the Sea agreement also envision such a right?

A The Law of the Sea would envision a right after, of course, it comes into force -- it is not in force, as you know, at the present time. It may be many years, if it comes into force at all -- but it would provide for the establishment by signatories to the agreement based upon international law of such zones.

The zones that can be established -- again, I come back to the fact -- are clearly a right under international law as it has developed. That is reflected in the treaty so that it would be permissible under the treaty.

But if the treaty were in force, and if the United States were a party to the treaty, we would have the same sort of a situation as far as the economic zone is concerned.

As you can see, it's the portions that are outlined here in the blue.

Q That applies to possessions like the Marianas and Puerto Rico as well?

A It applies to the Northern Marianas. The Northern Marians, the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, of course, is in a developing state, but under the covenant and the U.N. trusteeship agreement, it would be applied -- we will apply it to the Northern Marianas, as well as Guam, to Wake, to Midway, to the Hawaiian chain, to Johnston atoll, and to the other possessions within the Pacific area, as well, of course, to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the continental United States and Alaska.

Q But that would be consistent with Law of the Sea as well.

A That would be consistent with the provisions of the treaty. That's correct.

Q Could the signatories to the Law of the Sea treaty take similar action in respect to their 200-mile limits at the present time?

A Oh, yes, indeed. That obviously follows from the answer that I just gave. They could indeed do so. Indeed, 56 countries have already established economic zones. These economic zones are, however, varying in nature.

It will be our position that we would be prepared to recognize the establishment of economic zones by other countries even before the treaty comes into force.

If those economic zones are consistent with international law as reflected in the treaty, and if the countries establishing those zones -- the coastal states establishing those zones -- would recognize the rights of other countries in their zones and they would not be inconsistent with international law. So that, yes, other countries can establish these zones, many have, and that would be our position as far as recognition of those zones is concerned.

Q Establishing these zones, of course, you're not ruling out exploration anywhere else in international waters, are you? This is an exclusive zone.

A No. It is the position of the United States that beyond the 200-mile economic zone that seabed mining -- which I believe you're referring to here -- is a high-seas freedom to be pursued as a high-seas right, which basically means that a country would have the right to pursue that as long as it does not interfere with the sovereignty of any other country.

But that is beyond the zone that you're talking about there. It is not within the zone. Resource-related matters within the zone are entirely under the jurisdiction of the coastal state, in this case the United States.

Q Do you have a rough area for those zones claimed in the Pacific territories there?

A Yes. I can give you a rough idea. In the statement you will note that it says "in excess of 2,000,000 square nautical miles."

Indeed, the 2,000,000 square nautical miles applies to the zone around the continental United States, but would exclude the Hawaiian Islands and the Pacific area.

If you total up the entire amount, it would be somewhere around 4,000,000 square nautical miles, probably a little over that.

Q Why 200 miles? Is that a traditional, economic zone? Why not 300, why not 1,000?

A This is the zone that has really been developed through international law and is reflected in the portions of the Law of the Sea treaty that applies to it, so that you will find there that it is 200 miles.

As you know, the United States already has a 200-mile fishery zone, but the EEZ is something that has come to rest after 200 miles as far as the developing international law of this subject is concerned -- as I say, as it has been reflected in the treaty text.

Q You say here where there's a conflict in zone between a couple of nations, it will be settled in accordance with equitable principles.

What are the equitable principles?

A The equitable principles would be equity under the particular circumstances, and that may encompass various considerations. It might encompass in some case, medium lines, it might encompass variation from medium lines in other circumstances.

We don't think that all situations are subject to the same sort of resolution, but the resolution between exclusive economic zones should be on the basis of equitable principles.

Q It will basically be worked out between the two countries involved?

A That's correct.

Q Could you expand on any impact the proclamation might have in two areas: On the U.S. tuna industry and in marine scientific research?

A Yes. I'd be happy to. There is a specific exclusion from the zone for tuna. As you know, since the passage of the Magnuson Act in 1976, the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, there has been an exclusion for highly migratory species of tuna.

We do not recognize the jurisdiction of any other coastal state, and we do not assert jurisdiction in the United States beyond 12 nautical miles over tuna.

This particular exclusion is also made from the assertion of fisheries jurisdiction within the economic zone. So the economic zone then will specifically exclude tuna.

As far as the marine scientific research is concerned, although the provisions of the Law of the Sea treaty applicable in this area would give us the right to assert jurisdiction over foreign flag vessels doing marine scientific research in the U.S. exclusive economic zone, we have determined that we will not assert that jurisdiction. That the matter of freedom of marine scientific research is an important one to this country and to its scientific community, and we will not assert that.

However, we will recognize the assertion of such authority by other states having economic zones as long as that assertion is consonant with international law and it is asserted in a reasonable way.

Further, we will assist U.S. scientists in achieving the necessary authorization in those cases to undertake this research. But the United States has determined that, although it would have the right to do so, it will not assert this right over marine scientific research in its zone.

Q In just one other area: Would this have any impact at all in the negotiations in the International Whaling Commission -- on the moratorium?

A No. This will not have any impact on the IWC at all. We will continue as far as the situation on marine mammals is concerned, and particularly on the IWC to recognize the IWC protection of whales.

As you know, at the present time we defer on marine mammals to the appropriate international agreements in that connection, and we will continue to do that, although we clearly have the authority under the economic zone to control those, but we will handle it in that way.

Q A simple-minded question, but if this is consistent with the Law of the Sea, why didn't we simply sign the Law of the Sea?

A I think I answered that question just a few moments ago, when I said that the reason that we did not sign the Law of the Sea treaty was because the President's concerns and objectives that he stated in January of 1982 simply were not met.

Those related to deep seabed mining. They did not relate to the other portions of the Law of the Sea text which is involved here.

The basic reason, then, for our non-signing of the Law of the Sea revolves around the deep sea mining aspects. I think that you and probably others are fairly well aware we've made our position quite clear on the reason for non-signing because we did not achieve the changes that we felt were necessary to have a regime for deep seabed mining; that when deep seabed mining becomes economically feasible and appropriate, we would be in a position to appropriately mine under American flag and under the circumstances that we felt would be necessary for mining and necessary for protection of our economic interest and, indeed, our strategic interests. It has nothing to do with this part of the treaty.

Q Would this proclamation -- when does it go into effect? Immediately?

A Immediately. It went into effect -- it will go in effect today. Yes.

Q Within the federal bureaucracy there are several agencies and departments which have jurisdiction over various areas that this proclamation affects. Have you decided to name one agency the lead agency for the 200-mile zone or have you decided on a coordinating body, for example?

A We have made no decisions in that connection yet. The proclamation and the accompanying statement really are as far as matters go at this point. Obviously, I think it can be assume that certain implementing legislation will be necessary to carry out the provisions of the proclamation. That, of course, is something that has not yet been fully addressed as yet either.

Q You make this sound like a fairly routine exercise to assert claim to these areas which makes me wonder why it hasn't been done previously?

A After we made the decision on non-signing in July, we undertook a very, very thorough review and study of what the appropriate next steps in our ocean policy development should be.

After that rather complete review and after a complete agreement amongst the relevant departments and agencies and a unanimous recommendation of the Cabinet on this matter to the President, it was deemed that this was the appropriate next step to take.

We think that, of course, it clearly signals that the United States will comport itself with international law in this area as that has been reflected in the LOS treaty text. We believe that it will be essentially a model for other countries that will establish such zones, and there will probably be a number of countries that will do this before the Law of the Sea treaty comes into effect. As I say, if it does come into effect.

The more that we can have consistent zones -- zones that are essentially consistent with the provisions of the text reflecting international law, the better off we will be. So that we felt that it was a very appropriate step in the development of our national oceans policy in the wake of our decision on the non-signing of the LOS treaty.

Q Are there likely to be significant objections from other countries?

A We consulted very, very broadly in that connection with other countries. I would have to say that there was a somewhat variable response in that connection, although overall the response has been quite moderate.

Those countries that oppose the decision of the United States not to sign the LOS treaty could be in general characterized perhaps as being the most concerned about our declaration here.

There are some countries also that have some question with regard to our position on the tuna exclusion. However, I would remind you that our position on tuna -- has been our position since 1976 -- would continue to be our position even on the hypothetical assumption that the United States were a party to the LOS treaty and the LOS treaty were in force. We would still take the exception on that.

So there's basically no difference on that. However, I think that there is very little question that the countries, both our allies and friends and those that are perhaps not in that category but are concerned with the Law of the Sea, will certainly recognize the United States exclusive economic zone.

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Q Are there any areas like the Caribbean or up around Alaska where our 200-miles bump into somebody else 200 miles?

A Yes. You do have areas in the Caribbean. Obviously, you have areas where these would touch, but that would not provide any problem. We would not obviously assert out to the full 200 miles if you had a situation where it would abut against another country's exclusive economic zone.

Q How about Alaska?

A You're talking about this area right here with the Soviet Union?

Q Yes.

A This is a line of demarcation that was established back in 1967. There is some dispute over this particular part of the area and you see this little white area within the blue, that is being addressed at this present time, but, again, there is not going to be any assertion of our exclusive economic zone that would prejudice the outcome of those discussions with the Soviets.

Q I don't see it mentioned specifically, but this would also include oil and gas?

A The zone will include all living and non-living resources out to 200 nautical miles beyond the territorial sea of the United States, it will remain at three miles.

It would also cover the water column above, in terms of OTEC, that is, Ocean, Thermal Gradiance, Wind, Wave, Energy, when that becomes feasible. So that certainly it would cover oil and gas or any other non-living resource within that area.

Under the situation that exists at the present time, the United States has jurisdiction to all of the shelf, the natural prolongation of the land mass even that goes beyond 200 miles which traces back to the Truman proclamation in 1945 and the subsequent development of that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 1953. That is essentially incorporated within the EEZ proclamation out to the 200 miles.

The only real change, if you're really looking for the specific change is that where the continental shelf terminates before you get out to the 200-mile limit and you have a portion of deep sea bed, this would assert the sovereign rights and control over the resources of that portion of the seabed that does not exist now.

In addition to that, as far as fisheries resources are concerned, under the Magnuson Conservation and Management Act of 1976, there is only management of these resources and, of course, as I have said, we are now asserting sovereign rights over those fisheries resources. This, we feel, will be an improved position for the United States in various negotiations that we might be having on fisheries matters with other countries.

Q In practical terms, what does this mean for foreign fishing rights within U.S. waters, and will the EEZ actually supercede certain aspects of the FCMA?

A It essentially means virtually no difference as far as the fishing situation is concerned -- foreign fishing within U.S. waters, allocation of excess stocks and what not. We do that under the Magnuson Act at the present time. That is going to remain essentially the same as it is now.

I just gave the only real variation as far as the fishery situation was concerned.

I'll take one more question.

Q I'm a little confused about the relationship of the EEZ to the Law of the Sea Treaty because you've said that it parallels in large measure the treaty, and yet you've said --

A May I correct your --

Q The EEZ provisions.

A No. I said that it is consonant with international law and that international law, the balance, is reflected in the EEZ portion of the LOS text. That's quite different that saying that the LOS text is the basis of the assertion of an EEZ. That is not the case. So that is an important distinction and I've tried to make that quite clear.

Q I note that there are differences. For example, you note that the territorial sea remains at three miles and the treaty says it's twelve. The treaty system involves a 12-mile territorial sea with notions of transit passage through international straits, et cetera. It sounds like the EEZ proclamation is an effort by the United States not to assure anything off its coast, because, as you said, the U.S. has most of it already. And on the polymetallic sulphides, the U.S. has in fact cut the funding for such a program in the U.S. Government for FY-84. So it's not a coastal justification. Rather, the U.S. is trying to create a model in customary international law and yet you've said there are 56 states with economic zones of varying claims. And if there is not clear trend in customary international law, why do you say -- how do we obtain the consistency with which you're aiming if the U.S. zone is really just another zone among 57.

A That's not correct. There is, I think, a clear development within international law that would militate for a zone which is consonant with the provisions of the EEZ in this connection.

The fact that other states have asserted zones that are not consistent with this, of course, we believe is not desirable. Indeed, our position on the recognition of the establishment of other zones by other coastal states would be that they should be consistent with international law, as reflected in the treaty, and they should allow for the rights of other nations within those zones. Indeed, they should not assert rights for jurisdiction beyond what has really been elaborated in the EEZ text of the LOS Treaty which is the way these things have developed.

We believe that consistency in the establishment of EEZ's is to be very strongly desired, and that the movement in this direction, we hope, will be helpful in that connection.

Thank you very much.

(The briefing was concluded at 4:02 P.M.)

RUSH THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

March 10, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:18 A.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: We better get started here because one of the briefers is -- had hoped to get an 11:00 a.m. shuttle for a speech. It's going to be a little difficult. So -- First of all, the material in this briefing will be on background, attributable to senior administration officials. Secondly, the material in this briefing will be embargoed until the time of the President's speech which is expected to be around noon. So, it may be incorporated in the stories on the speech that are to be moved at around noon. Thirdly, we hope to have a fact sheet in about a half an hour that will give you a breakdown on the numbers comparing them for the last two years and looking ahead to 1984 on both economic and military aid.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. You have in the speech a figure is -- restatement by the President of the strategic importance to us of Central America and the dangers and cost to us should Salvador not survive in its struggle against the guerillas.

The President goes on to outline his strategy in dealing with the problems that we face in Central America emphasizing that we are approaching this by supporting democracy in El Salvador and in other countries of the region. He gives his assessment of the situation and I call particular attention to it. He says, "How bad is the military situation?" It is not good in his judgment. The insurgents have sporadically had the initiative since October. And, on the other hand, they have not been able to make permanent gains. They do not control territory permanently and the President, subsequently, makes quite clear that he believes that with the additional comprehensive package we've proposed that our friends in El Salvador can regain the initiative.

He makes very clear that he is not going to Americanize the war either by sending American combat troops or by sending American combat advisers. He addresses the question of the number of trainers that we will have in the area, pointing out that we will need substantially larger amounts of training. We would prefer to do all of the incremental training out of country -- in the United States or in other countries of the area. However, that is much more expensive than doing it in El Salvador itself and the ultimate decision on how many training personnel there will be in El Salvador is a function of what resources ultimately become available as a result of the congressional process.

He states here his position on negotiations. He is for negotiations among the countries of the area in order to deal with such threats as the large number of foreign military advisers in Nicaragua, in order to deal with the flow of military equipment across borders, which is a major problem from Nicaragua to El Salvador, in order to establish democratic regimes in all the countries of the area.

He notes that a regional peace initiative with the three Central American countries -- Honduras, Costa Rica, and El

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Salvador at the head of it, is emerging. We've been very closely in touch with the sponsors of that and he wishes it well.

He also notes that we support negotiations within countries -- negotiations in order to maximize the participation in free and non-violent elections. The concept here is that there should be negotiations in El Salvador and in Nicaragua; for example, in order to make sure that all parts of the population, all opposition groups, have an opportunity to participate in the electoral process.

He, however, makes quite clear, again, his opposition to power sharing negotiations and gives a specific example of what happened

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in Laos, when an attempt was made at an arranged coalition government through negotiations, resulted in an early Communist takeover.

He presents a comprehensive economic and military assistance package. The economic part of it, designed to provide the kind of additional drive in a number of countries, in El Salvador, a coordinated counter-insurgency civic action program in the key provinces of Usulutan and San Vicente, and Costa Rica, a support for their northern provinces' projects, which are designed to prevent the Nicaraguans from pressuring that area and Honduras support for agriculture. These are all proposals designed to get on with the fundamental business of the President's policy, which is strengthening our friends in their ability to resist the pressures they're under.

He also proposes a substantial, additional military program along with this, with a heavy emphasis on training. The economic program is a total of $168 million. The military program is a total of $130 million. And I'll be glad to address afterwards the division of these sums in terms of the way they would be presented to the Congress.

The President reaffirms his support for democratic reforms and the land reform. And I should point out to you that there's been a lot of action on both fronts in El Salvador in the last couple of weeks. You've heard President Magana call for early elections. They'll be in December, open to all. You've heard of the formation of a peace commission with two independents and a Roman Catholic bishop in order to promote the participation of adversaries in those elections, facilitate it.

You've heard of the Pope's endorsement of that call. On the land reform side, the reform legislation was renewed for another ten months until the end of the year. I think it's not well known here, but it should be, that the land reform is going at a higher rate than it ever has. The first two months of this year showed much higher totals of applications in the start of the process than have ever been noted before. And at this rate, within ten months the land reform can be completed.

The President renews his commitment to ending human rights abuses, noting that the creation of democratic institutions is essential in order to do so. And in general, he reaffirms his emphasis on the search for a political rather than a military solution to the problem in El Salvador, coming down very vigorously throughout the speech on the creation of democratic institutions, control of abuses, reforms and negotiations.

And I'll stop there and let you ask questions about this.

Q Okay. You seem to be rather vague on the number of military advisers the United States will send. Are we going to go above 55?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, that will depend on the resources available.

Q What does that mean? If Congress gives you more money to send advisers, will they send them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what it means is that -- Let me restate this, if I could. It costs perhaps ten times as much to train a given military unit of El Salvador in the United States than it does in El Salvador. It costs somewhat more to train it in other countries of the area. If we receive the full amount of our request, we propose to do all or most of the additional training required out of country. If we receive less, we will decide to do more training in country and we will have more trainers than we now have.

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Q Can you tell us what governments of what countries allow the United States now to train Salvadoran troops within their borders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been, notably, training in Panama and Usarka.? And that is an important option to us.

Q Are there others?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We are looking at others. But I would prefer, at this point, not to --

Q Is Costa Rica involved in it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that is very unlikely.

Q To follow up on this question, I am a little confused. Are you telling Congress that, if you do not get the money, we are going to commit more U.S. trainers to El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am saying that, indeed -- if we have low funding levels, we think the training is the key to this problem. If we have low funding levels, we will do more training in El Salvador.

Q How many more trainers are we envisioning here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no estimate available.

Q Is it open-ended?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think you would be wrong to read it that way. We are dealing with very fine trade-offs and very small numbers. We have been dealing, as you know, with a self-imposed ceiling of 55 -- not a big number. And the actual average has been less than that during the last year.

So the numbers, I think, you should not characterize as open-ended.

Q Are you saying that, if you get the full $110 million, you will not need to go above the level of 55?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am saying that, if we get our full request, we will prefer and would do most of the, or all of the additional training out of country.

Q -- you need not go above 55.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The exact number -- I do not want to get caught on the exact number there, because I do not think you can envision all those circumstances. But, in essence, that you be the result.

Q On the economic side, did you give a breakdown -- you mentioned a total of $168 million. How much is going to which countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I would be glad to do that. We will give it to you in the fact sheet. But let me just run through some of the numbers.

The total increase in economic assistance that we are talking about is $168 million for four countries: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. If that is agreed by the Congress, it would bring our Fiscal Year '83 totals to $472 million for economic assistance for those four countries. And the breakdown of the increase would be: El Salvador, $67 million; Costa Rica, $60 million; Honduras, $34 million; Belize, a little short of $7 million.

Q Would you repeat that, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will give you, I think it was mentioned to you, a fact sheet. So you will have these numbers in all their extraordinary detail here. But it is $60 million for Costa Rica, $67 million for El Salvador, $34 million for Honduras, and a little short of $7 million for Belize.

Q The military aid figures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon. Those are the --

Q The military aid.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right the military -- those were economic figures. The military assistance figures are as follows. We propose to go for $60 million dollars of reprogramming of military assistance. That is to say we would be taking military assistance that has now been authorized under the continuing resolution from other countries and devote it to El Salvador.

Some of that is consumables, which may be required in the near future. There is a major element of training in that. And my colleague can respond on details of that. That is the first part of the military assistance proposal.

The second part of the military assistance proposal is to take reorganize the supplemental that we have up before the Congress and take $50 million of that, which has not been approved by the Congress, and devote it to El Salvador. That is to say that other countries would be diminished by $50 million. And El Salvador's total in the supplemental would be increased by $50 million.

These changes, up to this point, do not increase the President's budget request to the Congress. They reorganize it.

Q There is no drawdown?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No drawdown, no emergency drawdown.

Finally, the President would submit an additional $20 million request to the Congress primarily for Honduras, but also for Costa Rica and Panama.

Now, in Congressional terms --

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Let me go back over it.

In Congressional terms, this would be the play. The first $60 million reprogramming would be submitted to the appropriations committees. There's a regular procedure for doing this, and it's done quite frequently.

Secondly, the supplemental request, which is going to be debated by the Congress in any case, will give the Congress an opportunity to have an up-or-down vote on the program for Central America. This enhancement package would be subject to a vote by the Congress, as indeed would be $20 million actual supplemental that is added on to it.

Q On this --

Q And if your eyes don't glaze over at that, then you can take anything.

Q What is your latest assessment on how many days ammunition they have left? Ah -- passing that one on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, on the ammunition. It's unfortunate that this figure of 30 days, 60 days, 90 days has been picked up and thrown around as freely as it has been.

Q Why is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because on the amount of ammunition left for the forces that are in Salvador, it all depends, as all of you well know, on the usage. And if they have more combat, which they did have in January, early part of this year, they're going to use more ammunition. If they have lows like they have had, they don't use that much ammunition.

Right now they're going to have another problem because it looks like the fighting in Morazan is picking up again. So the ammunition requirements -- let me just give you some thumb --

Stay away from that 30 days. Nobody can, nobody -- because people force witnesses and everybody else to come up with a figure. I mean, you know, it's unrealistic to look at it that way.

Q Why do you go before Congress and say it if you think -- why didn't you tell Congress it was --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did say that, and that was not picked up.

Q You did not tell Congress.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, Let me just give you something else on the requirements. In other words, which -- we have to look at it from a different angle on the ammunition requirements.

The amount that was programmed -- now, this was in, towards the first, or the latter part of fiscal year '82. That means August, September of '82. The amount programmed was considered sufficient to provide modest, a national reserve of about 3.5 million rounds and a basic load for each of the weapons, which is 210 rounds per weapon.

Now, the problem that developed was that the requirements were planned around the assumption that funding resources would be available in fiscal year 1983 in the sum of $60 million. That's what we requested. Unfortunately, being forced to operate under the continuing resolution caused a drastic program cutback across the board, and the reductions in ammunition orders were especially severe.

So, we find that in the last week we were forced to fly five C-130 special air mission flights to Salvador to deliver two million rounds of small weapons ammunition. So you can, from that, gives you a little bit of an idea as to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've got to move off rather quickly. Perhaps --

Q What countries lose military aid in order to give more military aid to El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to address that in the reprogramming requests we send up to the Congress, but not today. They will be going up very soon and available to you.

Q On the negotiations question, on page four of the speech, the way the President defines what he wants these regional negotiations to consider, it seems to limit them, and it seems not to provide the kind of political flexibility that some of these countries have been talking about. Is this a statement of what the United States hopes for, has told these countries these regional negotiations should be limited to?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not a limitative statement. We hope that these issues are addressed, they are critical; that is to say, the democratic transformation of all the countries, the question of how you could get all of those foreign military and security advisors out of Nicaragua and other countries as well -- and there are 2,000 Cubans there, as you know -- as well as a support for insurgencies across borders. So these are -- but they are not intended to be limitative. It's intended to be an expression of hope that they will be addressed.

Q But what is the U.S. attitude if these countries, as they have suggested that they may do, want to discuss or arrange a discussion between the guerrilla forces and the Salvadoran government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a question that the Salvadoran government obviously would address in that. What the --

Q -- the U.S. attitude?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What the U.S. attitude is is that we can support negotiations, can and do support negotiations within each of these countries, participations in elections. And that's very firmly and clearly stated here.

Q Does that represent a change in your policy from the previous statements by the administration on negotiations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's an important clarification of the administration policy.

Q If you get the money that's requested here, what will the result be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The result will be, we believe that the Salvadoran army will be able to take the initiative and it will be able to provide the military shield behind which the political and economic reform process can go on towards the creation of a broadly supported government in that country.

Q And if you don't get the money?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If we do not have funding levels, obviously a very difficult situation would develop in that country.

Q On negotiations again, internal negotiations, I know you want them to lead toward elections. But are there any preconditions such as laying down arms that you would like to see imposed on such negotiations, or are they unnecessary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that these questions have to be addressed by the Salvadorans. Their peace commission is the vehicle which has been created by them in order to do that. And we are indicating here our very strong support for that activity by the peace commission.

Q Will there be any change --

Q If the Salvadorans --

Q -- in the role of the U.S. people -- trainers there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q None at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. They are not -- the President states that very clearly. They are not to be military advisors to go into combat with Salvadoran units.

Q What about the idea of sending them off to brigade headquarters and that whole --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President doesn't address that. That is an idea that we have considered and do consider, but we have not got a decision on that. Obviously, the degree to which you do training at brigade headquarters is again a function of resource levels and the overall pattern of training. No decision on that.

Q What they're doing here, it seems to me, is taking the lid off the number of trainers unless you get the full amount of money that you want, and then we have a tentative promise that it doesn't go above 55. Is that incorrect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not doing that. We are saying that a lot of training has to be done and where we do it depends on what the money situation is. But --

Q Well, so you may take the lid off the number of trainers if you don't get the money you want.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will -- if we do not have substantial funding for this and cannot do it out of country, we will indeed do it in country.

Q Is there a new lid? I mean, are we talking about a new figure? You say it's not open-ended. Are we talking about 60, are we talking about 100, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the notion of open-ended suggests that under any of these circumstances, you could have very large numbers. And the answer is clearly you can't have under any of these circumstances very large numbers. In other words, we're not -- it's not open-ended. That's --

Q What do you consider not a large number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you a definition of that because I think the thrust here is very clear -- a preference, a very strong preference for minimizing the number of trainers in country.

Q How open-ended is the military aid? If they can't do it for -- with $110 million, would we pour more money in or will we say at some point that we can't do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President -- the comprehensive program the President thinks will get the job done. He notes that we've trained one in ten of the Salvador soldiers. This is going to significantly increase that number, and we have throughout observed the good performance of American-trained units down there, both large ones and small ones. We expect a good return from this. By the way, the insurgents themselves have often commented on that.

Q Well, if you get this money, you don't expect that you'll have to come back in another six months and say, "Well, we need a little more, because this isn't quite enough"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the package the President thinks will do the job.

Q What if the Soviet Bloc countries continue supplying increased amounts of arms and ammunition to the other side? Where does the escalation stop?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, if there's an escalation on the other side, we'll have a new situation and we will have to reconsider that. I'm not ruling that out.

Q What percentage of the Salvadoran military requires training? And how long does it take to train a Salvadoran soldier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It depends on what you're training them for. With battalion training is six weeks, basically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it ran three, almost three months.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Three months. All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That -- when we brought them, the battalion to -- train.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've got to run, if I could. I would just like to say that the -- what the President is saying here, one is you're not going to militarize the -- the approach down there. He is not going to Americanize it. He is going to provide a shield behind which a political and economic solution can emerge.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:44 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER LUBBER OF THE NETHERLANDS
BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 1983, 4:12 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As you know, we are welcoming the Dutch Prime Minister as well as the Dutch Foreign Minister for a visit that begins Monday evening when they arrive in Washington. The invitation for this visit was extended, I believe, during Vice President Bush's visit to The Netherlands in January.

I don't think I need to spend much time on the various issues that will come up during the visit. Obviously, East-West relations and the Geneva negotiations, both START and INF, will be central topics.

On INF, we will continue the very close consultations that have been underway in recent weeks and months on our negotiations in Geneva, as well as the implementation of the December '79 decision.

I might just say in passing, we are pleased with the fact that our NATO allies continue to support our negotiating position in Geneva and continue to support the December '79 decision as a whole. This visit will be in part an effort to exchange views and to demonstrate alliance solidarity on this issue.

On other questions, we will want to talk about, obviously, other regional problems, such as the Middle East, Central America. We will want to talk about U.S.-European issues, economic problems and economic prospects, which, as you know, in our case we are pretty optimistic. I know that both the Dutch Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister wil want to hear about various signs that demonstrate that a U.S.-Economic recovery is underway and what implications that might have for prospects in Europe.

There are some issues on the U.S.-European community agenda. That is, combating protectionism and avoiding a new dispute over agriculture which will probably come up.

I don't think I need to say too much about the U.S.-Dutch relationship. The Netherlands are one of our oldest friends. I think that The Netherlands was the first country that actually recognized the United States, so it's a very old relationship. It's a deep relationship.

Vice President Bush got along very well with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister during his visit, so this is a good opportunity to sustain our relationship with the new government in The Netherlands.

I'll just stop there and be happy to answer any questions.

Q Can you tell us what was going on? Why was it necessary for the Dutch Foreign Ministry to say that they have no beef with Bill Dyess?

A I can't comment on why it was necessary for any foreign government official to make any statement. There have been reports in the Dutch press which you're familiar with, but I can't speculate on why the Dutch Government made those statements.

Bill Dyess is our Ambassador there. During his tenure in The Netherlands he has done a good job and relations between the United States and The Netherlands have been very good.

Q And he will be going back to his post after this?

A Following this visit?

Q Yes.

A My understanding is he will.

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Q How many cruise missiles are they suppose to receive in the Netherlands?

A I'm not sure. Is that classified?

STAFF: No.

A It's 48.

Q When would deployment be completed?

A Not all five basing countries under the December '79 decision are meant to begin their deployments at the end of the year. The Netherlands are not among the countries under the original December '79 decision that were to begin at the end of the year.

Q Who are they.

A The total deployment begins -- the first deployment, as you know, begins at the end of '83 and is completed, I believe, in 1987 or '88. The countries that are scheduled to begin at the end of the year, roughly speaking, are Germany Britain and Italy.

Q Do you know when the Netherlands is supposed to begin?

A I can't recall.

Q Do you expect a commitment from Prime Minister Lubbers?

A A commitment? What kind of commitment?

Q Of deployment.

A We're not in the business of expecting anything. Our position has been clear all along. We would like the Dutch Government, in the absence of an arms control agreement, to begin deployment. There's no secret about that. I don't need to talk about our expectations.

Q Isn't the Dutch Government committed to go back to its parliament once before the deployment actually begins?

A I'm not really sure. I know they do want to consult closely with their parliament on the INF question, in general, and I know that they're in the process of putting together a defense White Paper which, I think, will be -- what? Ready next fall, Peter? -- which will address the INF issue, but that shouldn't be viewed as necessarily a deadline for them to take a decision one way or the other.

Q Do you expect that the Prime Minister and Secretary Shultz or President Reagan will will discuss the situation in Suriname?

A I think that it's reasonable to expect that it will come up. It is an issue of concern to us. It has been a issue of concern in the Hague.

Q You say they are supporting the President's proposal in Geneva on INF; did you say that before?

A The NATO Governments, including the Hague, have supported the proposal for eliminating an entire class of weapons.

Q You think that the absence of an interim proposal that the united front of NATO nations will hold very long?

A I think that we have demonstrated unity from December 12, 1979 onward, and I have no reason to expect that unity or that siutation will change. I think the Alliance is united now and will continue to be united on this question.

I think all of the Allied governments were pleased by the President's American Legion speech where he emphasized, as did Vice President Bush, that we do not have a take-it-or-leave-it-proposal, and made it clear that Paul Nitze has been instructed to consider any other proposals that meet the criteria laid out in that speech: Of U.S. Soviet equality, no inclusion of British and French systems, no additional threats to Asian friends and allies, and verifiability.

I think that that has met any possible concerns about our sincere desire to seek an equitable outcome.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:22 P.M.)

RUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

March 15, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:40 P.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: We'll now have the briefing by [redacted] rules for this briefing: On background, attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I don't think this should necessarily go on too long. I thought the statements by both the President and the Prime Minister were pretty clear and concise discussions of what the two discussed this morning. I'll just summarize the central questions.

As the statements, I think, demonstrated, INF was a major discussion -- point of discussion. There was general agreement on the need to continue both tracks of the December '79 decision, a recognition that preparations for deployment were critical to the success of the negotiating effort in Geneva, that those preparations provided the incentives necessary to achieve a negotiated outcome in Geneva.

The President listened to the Prime Minister's ideas about the INF issue generally and our negotiating approach in Geneva. There was substantial agreement on the central need to achieve Soviet reductions and to not permit any monopoly to emerge -- a monopoly in INF capabilities to emerge from the negotiations.

The second issue was relations between the United States and the European Community with a lot of discussion on the question of trade and agriculture. Both sides recognize the need to avoid tension or any kind of trade war in this area and the need to find a pragmatic solution to disagreements between the United States and the E.C. on agriculture. They recognized that discussions are now under way in this area, and they both promised to do what they could to reach a solution to this area, which potentially could raise concerns in other areas of U.S.-European relations.

There was discussion of energy questions, the implications of the current price of oil. As you may know, there is a lot of interest in Dutch energy, specifically natural gas and natural gas deliveries. We are interested, of course, in finding alternatives to Soviet natural gas in the European energy market. And there was discussion of Dutch plans in this area, as well as plans of other countries such as Norway.

Fourthly, discussion on the international economic picture and, specifically, the economic scene here where the President was able to report to the Prime Minister on the encouraging signs of economic recovery here, its possible implications for the economic picture in Europe.

At lunch, Treasury Secretary Regan was able to report on the international debt situation, which the Prime Minister was interested in hearing about. And there was the discussion of the various issues that are likely to come up at Williamsburg.

Lastly, there was discussion of the situation in El Salvador and Central America. The President spent time explaining the United States' commitment to democratic forms of government in

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Central America and specifically El Salvador, arguing that our approach is not a military approach but one that recognizes the social and economic problems of the region. The Dutch Prime Minister in his remarks said that there were some differences in our approach to the region, but those differences were far fewer and less important than had been the case earlier on. And I think that they had a useful exchange on that subject.

I'll be happy to take any of your questions. Yes.

Q Any talk of an interim deal on INF, any suggestions from the Dutch?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was an exchange of various ideas, an exchange that has been going on for some time. You will recall the Vice President saw the Dutch Prime Minister in Europe last month, and this was another opportunity to hear their views. But I don't want to go into specific details because it doesn't -- It essentially corrupts the consultative process to talk about these things in public.

Q Can I follow that? In light of recent statements by Kohl and Colombo, would it be fair to characterize the spirit of what the Dutch Prime Minister was discussing with the President as being in the same vein?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not make that generalization.

Q How would you characterize it? Just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't. I wouldn't. But, if you are trying to suggest that the Europeans have a united front on the interim solution and they're all saying the same thing, I would not do that.

Yes?

Q In his departure statement, the Prime Minister said something about compromise. Could you tell us how that came up in the talks between the Prime Minister --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did not -- That's interesting. I did not hear that word, and I don't remember that word coming up in the discussion.

Q It was -- When he talked about economics and the need for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, that's right.

Q -- a compromise in trade.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't quite -- That's right. I was thinking in INF. And I think he was referring there to specifically these trade problems we have with the European community and the problem of agriculture and the need to find a compromise in that area. And that was, I think, recognized by both sides in today's talks.

Thank you.

Q No, I wanted to ask a question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead. Thanks for helping me out.

Q One of the press people from the -- You're welcome.

One of the press people from the Netherlands said that the Prime Minister had been quoted, when he talked with foreign journalists, as saying that they would do everything possible to make sure the Geneva talks were successful, but if they ended -- I believe the word used was unhappily -- there are still ways that deployment of the 48 Cruise missiles that the Netherlands are supposed to get might not take place. What does he mean by that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I really don't know.

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Q Do you know that he made that statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if he did make that statement. I haven't seen it.

Yes?

Q The Dutch Foreign Minister was quoted in reports over the weekend as speaking favorably about an interim solution. Was what the Prime Minister said today consistent with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't seen those remarks and so -- And I think it would be a mistake -- The Dutch Foreign Minister speaks for himself and, since I haven't seen those remarks, I just think it would be a mistake to say that that was what,necessarily,the Prime Minister said.

Yes?

Q The Prime Minister said something about the importance and adequate contribution of the Dutch to NATO. I understand there has been, the Americans disagree on that -- on adequate. Is that true or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you can answer that question in two ways. I mean, we don't think anyone's contribution, in general, is adequate, including our own. We think that it's important to do more. We have not, as an Alliance, kept pace with the Soviet military buildup. And we've publicly said that we think that everyone needs to do more.

On the question of the specific Dutch contribution, that they have done a good job. They have, under difficult economic circumstances, increased their defense spending. They have very large armed forces. They have an active Navy, Air Force and Army that's bigger than most people recognize. They're proud of their contribution, and they play an important role in maintaining the military balance, both in the Netherlands in the role they play in naval tasks, as well the forces that they have earmarked for defending the central front in Germany.

Q But it's never adequate.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so. As long as the Soviet Union continues to increase its forces as they do, we have to do more.

Q Did the Dutch Prime Minister report on the coming anti-nuclear demonstrations in Holland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He discussed the domestic political situation in Holland and the concerns and special problems they have there. And I think it was useful for us to hear those comments.

Q Just useful?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it's important for our own planning to understand the domestic political context of some of these decisions.

Q Was there any comment from Mr. Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- No, not really. He just wanted -- I think he was interested in hearing what the domestic situation was.

Q Did the Prime Minister, as Foreign Minister Colombo said he did last week, suggest to the President that what is needed is some kind of new proposal from the United States in Geneva to break a deadlock in the talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to --

Q I'm not talking an interim agreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You want me to put -- You're trying to put some words in my mouth and I'm not --

Q No, I'm not. I'm asking you what he told the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to go any further than I have, to simply say that they exchanged ideas on the negotiations in Geneva.

Q Well, can we read from your saying that they exchanged ideas that they did talk

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about possible proposals, other than the zero option for the proposal now on the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here, I'm going to have to reiterate what Larry Speakes said this morning. We have exchanged ideas on these negotiations since they began. We have formal mechanisms for doing this. During these visits, such as these, we exchanged ideas and I think we will continue to do so.

These are a unique set of negotiations. I do not believe that the United States has ever consulted as fully and as continuously as we have in these INF talks.

While only the United States is represented at that negotiating table, we have gone into those negotiations with an alliance position and we have never taken a position in those negotiations without discussing it beforehand with the allies. And so this is just a continuation of that consultative process.

Q Did you get the impression that if negotiations fail, the Netherlands would, indeed, take the full 48 missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you know, the Dutch government has not taken a position on their own question of deployment. They have not said they would not deploy. And that, I think, is -- their position hasn't changed as a result of this visit.

We hope -- our position is clear, we hope, that they will exercise their responsibilities under the December '79 decision.

Q Are they keeping it deliberately vague at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think they're keeping it deliberately vague. I don't want to speak for why they have or haven't taken a position.

Q Did the Prime Minister discuss the domestic political situation in the Netherlands to underscore the importance of reaching some kind of agreement before December?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think that's fair. I don't think that's what he did. I think he was more interested in explaining -- you know, there have been a number of recent events. There have been some -- and not just because of INF -- there have -- it's a relatively new government. There have been elections in Germany. The Prime Minister is a Christian Democrat. The Christian Democrats, one in Germany. And I think it was an opportunity for the Prime Minister just to bring the President up to date on the political scene --

Q Was that brought up in the context of the discussion on INF, though?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can't -- I really can't recall because these kind of issues flow into one another.

Q Did he indicate to the President how possible Parliamentary votes would turn out if this -- brought on the floor, Parliament floor.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was not discussion of that in that kind of detail. I do understand, and this was not discussed in their discussions today. But I do understand today there was a Parliamentary vote in the Hague on the question of INF infrastructure funding, which won substantially; but -- which was

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won substantially by the government. And this is the allotment that all the NATO countries pay in to central NATO funds to pay for the preparations and deployment if the negotiations don't succeed.

Yes.

Q The President has characterized in the press, publicly, through Larry Speakes, how he feels about the nuclear freeze movement in this country and how a vote in the Congress would not change the way he is going forward.

When the Prime Minister spoke to the President, did he characterize how he felt about the nuclear freeze, anti-nuclear movement in his country at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, not really.

Yes.

Q But there still is no clear understanding whether or not the Dutch will, in fact, deploy the missiles on schedule. That is still an open question as far as this administration is concerned.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's not sort of reading the tea leaves. The Dutch government has simply not taken a position. They have not publicly -- they have not taken a decision on the question of deploying in the absence of negotiations. They continue to support the Alliance decision, the December '79 decision. And as I, I think, underlined in my remarks, they continue to believe, and I think the Prime Minister was very clear on this in his statement, that the preparations for deployment are necessary to create the maximum conditions for agreement in Geneva.

Q When are they supposed to deploy the cruise missiles? '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I'm not sure if that is classified or not, Bernie. So I'm not going to answer that. But they are not scheduled -- I think it's fair to say they are not scheduled to deploy at the end of the year, as are some other countries.

Q Why did the President raise the El Salvador issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he wanted to raise it for a number of reasons. One, there was a specific -- it has been a specific concern of the Dutch for some time. There were some journalists, if you'll recall, that were

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killed, and this has been a domestic issue in the Netherlands. It's been a political question in the Netherlands. And more broadly, though, I think that we think we have a very good case for our policy in Central America. We think that -- that to some extent that case has been distorted in Western Europe for any number of reasons. And it was a good opportunity for the President to set the record straight.

Q Do you need support of Western Europe here? Does it really matter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but it -- it's not a question if it matters or not. They're our close allies. We have central -- we have shared values with them. They're important countries. And we want them to understand why we are doing things.

Q Is there any kind of trade-off here, though, a certain -- making them aware, "Look, we've got our own problems in our own area here. We're preoccupied with the nuclear matters in Europe, but we've got our own problems." Was there a sort of suggestion that we need some mutual understanding here, anything along that line?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. You'd have to clarify that "trade-off" for me --

MR. ROUSSEL: Make this the last question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's beyond me.

Q Secretary Weinberger said several times that an interim agreement is not objectionable if there is a means of getting the Soviets back to the table to conclude it. What do you need, what kind of assurances would you need to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that question. You'll have to ask Secretary Weinberger.

Q Well, you're dealing in the same area --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but I just can't -- I can't answer that question.

My last question.

Q In which case would you like the Dutch to increase the gas production, natural gas production? You have talked about natural gas. A second -- as a replacement for a second gas pipeline to the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that wasn't -- you're being much too specific and I -- it is clear that we think that Dutch gas is important, and we're interested in -- we were interested in hearing from the Dutch what their plans were in terms of natural gas. But there was no kind of specific agreement sought after.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:58 P.M. EST

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1983, 4:09 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: We are on BACKGROUND. This is attributable to a senior State Department official.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Let's go back a few days to the origin of the visits. I think this is important, to put back into perspective when, in California -- I think it was about over a week ago -- the suggestion was made from the Israelis that their Foreign Minister might visit. We had an immediate positive reaction, and then thought it would be a good idea to invite the Lebanese to come. They obviously thought it was a good idea, and both parties came to Washington.

For those of you who are interested in these things, I asked that we put together a piece of paper that says Shamir and Salim meetings in Washington, which talks about delegations and one-on-one.

If you think anyone would be interested in this, you might want to run it off, so I can skip that O.K.?

Q Please.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The visit to Washington of the two Foreign Ministers has provided and is providing us an opportunity to review the status of the troop withdrawal negotiations and to hear their concerns and ideas, as well as express our own views, in the context of the need for rapid progress.

I should note that there have been discussions on other items apart from Lebanon, although Lebanon is the main focus. And in this respect, the President stressed, in his discussions with the Foreign Minister, his determination to press ahead with the peace initiative he launched on September 1 in the context of our policy and this Administration's own recommitment to the search for peace in the Middle East.

The President met with Foreign Minister Shamir Monday afternoon, and he will be seeing Foreign Minister Salim tomorrow morning. I don't think right now we can give you the exact time, but tomorrow morning, I would say somewhere between 10:00 and 12:00 o'clock.

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His meeting with the Israeli and Lebanese Foreign Ministers is a clear indication of the importance he attaches to successful and rapid completion of the negotiations.

In addition to his personal participation, he, obviously, has been following these discussions closely.

We had not anticipated a dramatic breakthrough as a result of these talks, and there is no breakthrough; but we do believe progress is being made. And as demonstrated by the public statements of the Lebanese and Israeli Foreign Ministers, they have participated in the discussions in a constructive manner and a very positive spirit.

Our concern with respect to achieving a stable Lebanon and assuring the security of Israel's northern border remain unchanged. Questions as to how best to accomplish our objectives have been central to our discussions. We have been injecting our ideas all along, and will continue to do so as necessary.

I foresee a return trip to the area by Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper and his team in the near future -- don't pin me down to days -- in order to help the parties quickly arrive at an agreement.

I would like to note the recent public statements reflecting Syrian and PLO intentions to withdraw from Lebanon if Israel does. We welcome this public reiteration of their positions as confirmation of our strategy for working for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Let me reiterate for you briefly our policy objectives which were first outlined last fall by the President. They are the guiding principles in the negotiations that Ambassadors Habib and Draper have been conducting these past months, and they are central to the discussions we are holding with the two delegations here:

One, the withdrawal of all foreign forces -- Israeli, Syrian, PLO, Iranian, you name them. All armed elements remaining in Lebanon must be subject to the control of the Central Government, and this includes the militia forces in the south.

Second, arrangements to secure the security of Israel's northern border; third, the restoration and reenforcement of a stable Central Government in Lebanon, the extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory, and the unity of that territory.

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Then, of course, subsumed under all of these are arrangements to assure the security of all of the residents of Lebanon, including the Palestinians.

While many issues have been dealt with and agreement has been reached in the course of the negotiations, we are now at the point of addressing the remaining core issues. It is essential that momentum is not lost in the timetable for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon be worked out as soon as possible.

I have mentioned the President's personal involvement and his commitment through his meetings with the Foreign Ministers. In addition, Secretary Shultz has been conferring with and briefing the President throughout the visit of these two Foreign Ministers.

Once an agreement has been reached for the withdrawal of all foreign troops, it will be clearer to what extent an international presence is needed to assist the Lebanese armed forces. I should say it would be clearer as to the nature of the international assistance, because I think it's clear that there will be a need for some time.

We continue to see an important role for the 6,000 UNIFIL troops currently in Lebanon. There is also a need for the Multinational Force. The objectives of this force would be to facilitate the withdrawal process and to assist the Lebanese Central Government in reestablishing its control throughout Lebanon. These details will be worked out.

The security of Israel's northern border is a hallmark of U.S. policy. The U.S. will do all it can to assure that an agreement is reached which will preclude a return to a situation in which hostile acts can be perpetrated on Israel across its northern border from Lebanon.

Israel has pressed its case for full normalization of relations with Lebanon. This is the second part of the discussion, the first part being the security issue. That is a worthy goal, and one we readily share.

We will continue to strive to see full peace, security, and normal relations between Israel and each of her neighbors, as we seek to resolve the Palistinian problem. This is the basic message in the proposals outlined in the President's initiative on September 1.

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At present, progress towards this goal, full normalization and full peace with Lebanon, must be conditioned by Lebanese judgments of what is possible, consistent with Lebanese needs for internal stability and political consensus, as well as the essential relations with the other Arab countries. A stable, secure, and free Lebanon would be an historic achievement for the area, for Lebanon, for Israel, and for the world. A Lebanon beset by strife, living under occupation and instability serves the interests of none of us.

Let me answer some questions.

Q Since it's clear you didn't write that statement in the time since Shamir left the building -- he said, when he left, that some new ideas have emerged — are these new ideas those that would define the nature of joint Lebanese-Israeli patrols in southern Lebanon to take care of the security problem?

A Let me address the statement first: In a visit like this, you do a "rolling" statement, so this wasn't canned ten days ago, I can assure you.

We have been discussing essentially the security issues and also the mutual relations issues. The question of which security arrangements in the south can be agreed upon, how they will operate, and how the results will be verified, in a manner consistent with Israel's security needs and Lebanon's sovereignty needs, that's what we're talking about.

The words "joint patrols," I think you'd have to put that aside. What that implies, to the extent which you are talking about, is a residual Israeli military presence. And I think the Lebanese have made clear that that's impossible for them to accept, so --

Q ::::::::: can you define for us a little better --

Q Wait a minute. Let him finish.

Q I thought he had.

A So, we're trying to find solutions that are consistent with what are both the Lebanese requirements and Israeli real security concerns. And in that respect, let me cite the statement of the Lebanese Foreign Minister. He made very clear that we were addressing real Israeli concerns, real Israeli concerns.

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Q Can you do a little better on translating the principle of Israeli security and Lebanese sovereignty into something that we can grab hold of?

A No. I really can't, because that's going to get -- I can't discuss the substance of what we've been talking about in detail. I just can't. Others may outside; I can't.

Q Can you just --

A But I'm not going to because we're talking to the Israelis. We're also talking to the Lebanese. There are no final proposals or anything. We're in a very delicate stage of discussing these issues. You have to find a balance. These are very difficult decisions for both sides.

I don't want to make their task at home any more difficult.

Q Can I follow up two questions. Did you say that the joint patrols with residual Israeli --

A Residual Israeli presence. If you're asking me questions, will there be a residual Israeli military presence in the south, the Lebanese have made very clear that that they can't accept.

Q Okay. But are you saying that joint patrols is also unacceptable?

A Yes. I would think in the context of residual -- this would fall under one of those residuals.

Q Even if they cross over for just those patrols and go back?

A Are you talking about the issues that the -- I think the Lebanese have addressed that one. That's not the --

Q (Multitude of questions at same time)

A Now, look, I'm not getting into the details. I'll take some other questions, but if you want to follow up and parse that one, I won't give you any answers. Okay? So don't --

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Q Do you agree with the Lebanese Foreign Minister when he said that the Lebanese armed forces are capable of controlling and patrolling south Lebanon, which --

A Let me put it this way: We have confidence that the Lebanese are preparing themselves seriously to assume their security responsibilities for their country. It's not a game for anyone. It's not a con job that anyone is trying to put over on any side. Those persons who would seek to do harm to Israel, the Lebanese would see as their enemies, too. They're people coming in with guns to kill other people.

The Lebanese ability -- I speak personally -- I'm confident that they're going to be able to work out with their armed forces what they need to do their security job, and not only in the south.

This is tough, this is difficult, but we believe they can do it. As you know, we've been working with them for some time.

Q How long will it take?

A It depends on what you're talking about. And what are you talking about? Are you talking about a mobile combat armored division? You're talking about small groups of motivated people who are well-trained to carry out interdiction patrolling and other functions, and we believe the Lebanese have the motivation to do it and the will. Okay. That should answer that question.

Q You said before that the idea of joint patrols has to be put aside, if I heard you correctly. Any way of joint patrols to be used out --

A Let's forget about joint patrols, please. We're talking about -- the Lebanese have said what they cannot accept. Again, these are not games there. They can't accept having foreign armies running around Lebanon, and that doesn't mean that they are not terribly concerned about the security of all of Lebanon and the southern Lebanon part, and the need also to assure that Israel's security needs are met.

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Q In the President's speech to the American Legion, he talked about the U.S. would guarantee Israel's security in return for a complete withdrawal.

That concept has never been fully parsed except in terms of the U.S. participation in a multinational force.

You said earlier that the full role, I guess, and size of that force would be determined in connection with the actual terms of the withdrawal.

But, I mean, that's been the main idea talked about. I know your problem, but --

A No, I know. You understand my problem. I'm not going to try to define away what a President said or add to it.

Let me explain that in these negotiations the role of the United States in the security field goes beyond the American presence as symbolized by the MNF, although that's important. We have ongoing security assistance proposals. Some of you are aware of a supplemental we've asked for.

There is an ongoing training role. Some of this can be accelerated; some of it can be expanded. In addition, we are participating in the negotiations, an important element of which is the security zone of south Lebanon.

I would expect that whatever the ongoing mechanisms that come out of these negotiations, that we will continue to be participating in them.

This makes quite a broad package of how the United States can participate in assuring the security of Israel's northern frontier, which, quite frankly, is not inconsistent at all with helping the Lebanese rebuild themselves and assuring the security of Lebanon.

Q But last night Foreign Minister Shamir said he did not think that a U.S. role would be helpful. In fact, he said, quote, "We opposed it."

A I don't know what U.S. role you're talking about, but I don't believe that's an accurate description

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of Foreign Minister Shamir or his government's view of the AMerican participation in these negotiations or in the kind of an ongoing role that I described earlier.

Q But more to the point what he was saying to some of us last night was that he didn't think a multinational -- it was appropriate for a multinational force to protect the area north of the Israeli border.

And you're telling us that the Lebanese don't think it's appropriate for there to be joint military patrols, and I'm not sure where that leaves us for southern Lebanon.

A It leaves you with Lebanese forces that are trained and capable of doing the job. Why should that surprise you? Most countries have armies who patrol their --

Q We understand from Mr. Shamir that he's bringing some new ideas to the Israeli Cabinet because he has a mandate to accept them here.

As to the status of those ideas, are those acceptable right now to the Lebanese, or you still have to explore it with the Lebanese?

A I really can't get into that. We've been talking about ideas. We're going to continue to talk about ideas. It really would be harmful if I were to start to address these things, and I can't do it, and I won't play games.

Q Is there room for U.S. military personnel in this security zone in southern Lebanon?

A This gets you into whether -- you mean is there a specific role for an American MNF? Is that what we're talking about?

Q No. When you were talking before in answer to Gwertzman's question, you ticked off a couple of things under the category of guarantees.

A Yes. Because you're talking about -- when I mentioned "mechanisms," not all of these things have been worked out. But the kinds of things they're

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thinking about -- and I think a lot of it's in the public domain -- a joint military commission, a joint military committee. I'm assuming we will have American military personnel who will play a continuing role in that context, as well as in the training and the military assistance role.

Q But this is different from, for example, U.S. Marines there for some kind of role?

A Yes, sir.

Q This is more of a supervisory thing, sending them in there?

A In the follow-on implementation -- assurances that the agreements will be implemented, this kind of thing. But don't pin me down, because I can't answer. I'm not that close to --

Q Could I follow up on this? Secretary Weinberger said a couple of weeks ago on TV interviews that one of the ideas is that U.S. personnel would train the Lebanese forces in south Lebanon. That would be the way that the American presence would be in south Lebanon and not in the multinational force.

Is that one of the ideas that is discussed?

A I can't really confirm or deny. I don't want to talk about it. I realize someone will write a headline we're going to put trainers in the south, but that hasn't been -- you know.

Q The military personnel you're talking about -- this American military personnel who will play a continuing role in the context of, say, joint military commissions or committees -- this is not MNF Americans?

A No, no. For example, today we have some American military who are out with Morrie Draper who are participating in the negotiations. Obviously --

Q Would you define that as an executive role, as part of a commission or a committee?

A It's a diplomatic role.

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Q Is it like the observers you have in --

A No, no. These are people who are participating on the team. We've always had them.

Q Is the bottom line of this that the Lebanese will be able to tell their people that there will be no Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon?

A Yes. That's the position of the Government of Lebanon.

Q It's also the position of the U.S., isn't it?

A We don't see how you can really come to an agreement that will provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces unless there is an absence of foreign forces.

You know, it's -- and I think --

Q But you could perceive -- let me just follow this -- you can conceive of Israeli military personnel of working in some supervisory cooperative manner with the Lebanese?

A No. I don't see how you parse withdrawal of foreign forces. I mean, either the soldiers are there or they aren't there.

But there will be discussions. There will be mechanisms that will be worked out in joint committees, joint commissions --

(Continued on next page)

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Q Joint Israeli/Lebanese commissions?

A And I think American participation. They're discussing these issues. There has to be some framework for verifying that the agreements are implemented. Everyone recognizes that there is a special nature of the south with respect to Lebanese and Israeli security.

There will be a continuing, on-going mechanism but not in the context of the idea of being in southern Lebanon.

Q Could the U.S. also serve as an intelligence-gathering function as we have in past agreements in the Middle East, either working off observations posts --

A I don't think that's being contemplated.

Q Or reconnaissance.

A I know what you're talking about, and we're still doing some of it in the Sinai. That's not being contemplated.

Q You've addressed what the Lebanese cannot accept. Can you address --

A When I said is it's not being contemplated. I don't want to rule things out that the President hasn't looked at, and the Secretary hasn't even seen. And if someone were to say that's a sign of sine qua non, that's something else. There's a lot of fluidity in this.

Q You've suggested some role of American military men in southern Lebanon. Are you now excluding a role in a multinational force, extended multinational force, per se?

A I'm not excluding anything, and I'm really not including anything. Jim mentioned that Foreign Minister Shamir, presumably yesterday, when someone asked him a question, said he didn't like the idea of MNF.

Q He was opposed to it.

A That he's opposed to it.

Q He said today that he does not believe that Lebanon will be ready to take on that security role for three to four years and in the iterim Israeli troops should be there in some way to do the job. Does that address accurately Israel's point of view at this point? You've said -- BEST COPY AVAILABLE

A I'm not going to comment on that.

Q You say that the Lebanese cannot accept. What is it facing that realization that -- what is Israel's point then?

A That's what we've been spending the last five days discussing. I'm really not going to tell you where we came out because we're still going.

Q On the second problem, which is the nature of relations between Israel and Lebanon -- not the security arrangements but the other issue -- have you made any progress on this?

A There's a lot of discussion that's been going in the committees that Ambassador Draper has been chairing. I'm not aware of any secrets out there in the Middle East. I read the Israeli and Lebanese press reviews everyday. If you don't, I suggest you should.

They've been having lots of talks. There are the problems; again, the constraints on the Lebanese, apart from the internal consensus issues.

There is the fact of life that Lebanon is dependant on the Arab world either through remittances of about $3 billion dollars a year from people working primarily in the Gulf, or someone cited a figure of, what, 90 percent of Lebanon's exports go to the Arab world.

One very militant right-wing Christian reminded me a couple months ago that of those Lebanese working in the Gulf, 200,000 of them are Christians, as he was explaining the limits on Lebanon; formal cooperation and normalization with Israel.

We are trying to work within these problems, too, to come up with something that both sides can live with.

Q This joint military commission or committee, whatever you choose to call it, this is new; this is not something that is on the ground now?

A No. They've been discussing these. So much has already been discussed in these public negotiations out there.

Q Who's on this joint committee?

A Is this a clear committee you're envisioning?

A There are discussions going on on normalization and on security, and on the security side there have been discussions about setting up in order to monitor or the implementation of the agreements certain mechanisms. One or more of them are in the military field.

These people would talk, they would review the situation. The Americans will be participating in this. It was in that sense that I was talking.

Q In other words, when you said "joint military commission or joint committee," it wasn't clear whether you were talking about American/Lebanese, Israeli/Lebanese or all three.

A I don't know. Whatever mechanisms that finally come out and whatever they call them — and understand all of this is still being discussed — we're going to be a part of it. How we're a part of it, we'll be full partners wherever you call us.

Q If you go back ten days ago, the Israelis seem to be insisting that they had to have some kind of permanent military presence in southern Lebanon. As a result of the discussions here in the last few days, do you perceive any relaxation in that Israeli position?

A You're going to have to ask the Israelis to comment on that.

Q We asked Shamir about that yesterday, and he seemed to — he used the characterization that the Israelis would be happy with some form of -- his word was "cooperation" — some kind of cooperative setup between Israel and Lebanon, the details on the ground of which would have to be negotiated in the Middle East.

That seemed to be backing off an insistence that there had to be a permanent Israeli military presence. Do you perceive that as a change in the Israeli position?

A I don't even want to comment on it.

Q Is there a separate American/Israeli agreement being worked out, like in past agreements?

A You're thinking of an MOU. Not in a formal sense. We're having good discussions.

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Q In other words, is there a sort of understanding that if this Lebanese troop withdrawal issue can be settled that some of these other American/Israeli issues can be settled at the same time?

A First, we are not working on a formal Memorandum of Understanding. I think for those of you who follow the theology of these things -- I'm not going to say something like this won't eventuate maybe with the Lebanese, as well. But we're not. I'm not looking for one. The answer to your question is no.

Secondly, we did discuss other issues, but it was just in the context of discussions; the bilateral --

Q What is your timetable, from now, from hereon in? You expect some kind of --

A The Foreign Minister of Israel is soon to get on an airplane to go to New York, and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon will probably be in Washington through Thursday night. As far as timetable, we've still discussions here.

I can't answer exactly when do I think Phil is leaving?

Q No, that's not what I'm talking about. In the larger context, are you hopeful that with the progress you made here, you can get an agreement within the next few weeks, few days, few months?

A Every time I say something like this, you remind me later that I misled you. You don't quite say I lied. I think it's moved us closer, yes. You know our view, the sooner the better, but these are serious issues. We've engaged on a different level on these issues.

Q Does this tie into King Hussein's coming into the talks in any direct way? Do you report on the substance of these negotiations or these talks here today?

A We are in the process of having the discussions, but we do keep people informed. I think it's been clear that if we can achieve an agreement on Lebanon which provides for the full withdrawal of of foreign forces and the reconstruction of Lebanon, that's going to have a very positive impact generally on the environment out there.

No one has to explain to me that it's negative.

Q When you say we're going to be part of this process you're talking about, are you envisioning an increase, modest or large, in American military strength in Lebanon?

A At this point I'm not envisioning anything. I don't exclude because the President himself, back some months, did not exclude any increase in our component of the MNF in cooperation with other donors. But before you can talk about that, you really have to see what is the agreement that's come out; where would such a force, if it had to be increased, best be put and maybe it wouldn't have tc be increased at all, depending on how the deal is cut.

Q You were asked before whether the Secretary and you maybe thinking about going out to the Middle East, and you might not have heard the question. It came from two colleagues on either side of you.

A And it was, is the Secretary thinking about going to the Middle East?

Q Yes, sir.

A I think he wants to go to the Middle East, but he still believes that it should be at a time when a trip would be most useful. You can pin me down on that, and I can't give you the answer. But he's not interested in a fact-finding mission.

Q You said the Lebanese would find it impossible to accept a residual Israeli military presence. There's been some consideration to a civilian residual Israeli presence on a temporary, occasional basis.

A I think the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the Lebanese intend to handle the job themselves. I wouldn't want to suggest that people are going to jump in and out of uniform or something and it's going to make the thing work out.

Thank you.

(Background briefing concluded at 4:45 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

RUSH

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT
AND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM
OF LEBANON

March 16, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:16 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. The President has concluded his meeting with the Foreign Minister of Lebanon. And a senior administration official is here to brief you on that meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Most of you were not in the State Department briefing yesterday, I think.

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Then I will not go into as much detail as I did there on a preliminary statement, but let us go back a little bit into the origins of these meetings.

It was about 10 days ago that we were informed, while we were in California, that the Government of Israel thought a visit by the Foreign Minister would be a good idea. The reponse went back, of course, positively. And at the same time, we suggested that the Foreign Minister of Lebanon come for talks in the same time frame. And that was received positively.

Q Who suggested that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did. And that was received positively.

And they both came with rather complete delegations. Now, somewhere in the State Department Press Room is a complete listing of all of the meetings that have taken place: those that were one-on-one, those that were delegation meetings. So anyone interested could get it from them.

Now, before they came, we said there would be no breakthroughs. We expected none. There were not. We believe there was progress. The two parties came. And they engaged in the talks in a constructive and positive spirit. And I think you can see that from the public statements of the two Foreign Ministers.

In addition to the formal Lebanese delegation, the acknowledged Leader of the Sunni Muslim community in Lebanon, former Prime Minister Saeb Salam, came with a message from President Gemayel for President Reagan.

Now, where do we go from here? We will have another meeting with the Lebanese in the State Department today.

Q Is that with the Secretary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will not be with the Secretary. It will be with Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper leading our side.

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The Israeli delegation left yesterday, as you know. The Lebanese will probably stay over -- at least some of them -- until Friday morning or Thursday night. I would expect Ambassadors Habib and Draper to leave on the weekend and to show up in the area -- I can't tell you whether it's Jerusalem or Beirut -- by Sunday.

Now, the President has been personally involved throughout this period of both preparations for and meeting with the delegates. The Secretary of State has been conferring with him and briefing him over the period of time that they have been here, and we have been discussing. And, as you know, the President has met personally with the foreign ministers and the leaders of the two delegations. Actually, the President met with the full Israeli delegation. Today he and the Vice President met with Prime Minister Saeb Salam and Foreign Minister Salem.

Q Salem --

Q Salem as in cigarettes?

Q -- like Massachusetts?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Like Salem, not to be confused with Salam.

Q Not Salem. That's interesting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Salem. Salem.

Q There were two separate meetings, weren't there? One with the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One with the President followed by a meeting --

Q How long was that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About half an hour -- followed by a meeting of about half an hour with the Vice President.

Now, go ahead.

Q Both Salem and Salam were in both meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, yes.

Q Thank you.

Q -- message that -- communicated to the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me go on. The meeting with the President lasted about half an hour. And there was a very good and pointed exchange of views.

Q Pointed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By that I mean -- I don't mean that, but precise exchange of views. By this, you know, the President has been involved in Lebanon and I think he's probably the first President since Eisenhower who had a Lebanon policy. If you go back to what I used to tell you in early '81, Ronald Reagan has had a Lebanon policy -- a policy focused on Lebanon.

Q Invasion by the Israelis?

Q What was his Lebanese policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since well before the invasion by the Israelis --

Q Was the invasion part of the policy? (Laughter.) He laughed. (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Laughter.) The --

Q Maintain some credibility here. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had -- this administration has had a policy, a discreet policy on Lebanon. When -- in a different manner --

Q We don't know what it was.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're damn right, we had a good policy on Lebanon. It was right at the beginning, we were trying to stop the fighting, and then we were trying to work with the Lebanese to make sure that the country was strengthened, not weakened as a result of the pending Lebanese elections. Phil Habib was out there. He got a ceasefire. We had a Lebanese policy.

Events have forced changes in the policy, obviously. But we had a policy that did -- that was not the same as previous administrations that said Lebanon has to wait. Now, you can criticize us for not having done everything that maybe some of you think we should have done, but we had a policy and we still have a policy.

I said all of that to explain why, when the President meets with foreign leaders on this subject, you address the substance immediately.

Now, the former Prime Minister brought a letter from President Gemayel. I haven't read the letter. I assume that the substance of the letter is similar to the comments that were made by Mr. Saeb Salam, in which he expressed a great appreciation for the role of the United States and the President personally over the months in our policies designed to make Lebanon whole again.

The President reiterated our commitment to our policy on Lebanon, starting with the withdrawal of all foreign forces, which is the key. In this respect, the Lebanese side concurred 100 percent that all foreign forces meant all foreign forces, including the Syrians and the PLO.

There were also discussions of the substance of the issues that we have been discussing over these past few days, which were essentially the questions of security arrangements in the South, security for Northern Israel, and the means of arriving at these agreements consistent with Lebanon's requirements, which are Lebanon's sovereignty.

There was no argument and there has been none over the issue of whether or not there should be security or whether these security arrangements should be good --

Q -- should be good?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and effective. That's not the issue. The issue is how. The Lebanese well understand that security for Northern Israel and arrangements in the southern zone will also enhance Lebanese security. It's where the Lebanese happen to live. And they're very interested in that.

Now, the Lebanese also made clear their determination and their requirement to handle their own security affairs.

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and, in general terms, made clear their willingness to go in these agreements, both in mutual relations and on security, to the limits that are required for Lebanese survival.

Now, there was also a discussion --

Q What does that mean?

Q What does that mean?

Q We don't understand that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. It means that there are limits beyond which the Lebanese cannot go with respect to mutual relations -- not that they don't want good relations -- but formal, mutual relations, and on issues of security, for example, a residual Israeli military presence. That they cannot do those things and maintain the internal consensus that they need for their own stability and their essential relations with the Arab world.

Q But could Israeli troops --

Q Well, are you saying they cannot formalize a peace with Israel because the other Arab nations would not tolerate it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this point, that's not what we're discussing.

Q Isn't it trade --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are discussing trade issues and the trade issues are thorny. They're difficult. I think something like 90 percent of Lebanon's trade is with the Arab world and -- Three billion dollars' worth of remittances come into Lebanon each year, primarily from the Gulf. And I recall a couple of months ago a very close associate of Bashir Gemayel, a Lebanese, -- I would describe him as a militant Christian, a leader -- expressed to me -- He said, "You have to remember that 200,000 of those Lebanese who live in the Gulf are Christians." So try to understand why we have certain problems here.

Now, there was also discussions about the peace process, the broader peace process. The Lebanese from the beginning -- and I'll take you back to when President Gemayel visited here -- the Lebanese were as interested in the President's peace initiative for the broader area, as they were in the issues of Lebanon because they well understand that Lebanon's problems will not totally be regularized until you have a broader peace, and that there is some provision made for the Palestinians.

They stressed that, at the present time, there is a widespread, generally positive atmosphere in the Arab world with respect to the need for moving ahead on peace, peace with Israel. They believe strongly that success in resolving the Lebanese problems and coming to successful conclusions on these negotiations will also be a great stimulus towards accelerating movement towards peace, broader peace.

They expressed great appreciation, therefore, not only for the President's policies on Lebanon, but also for his September 1 peace initiative.

Now, much of this was repeated in the Vice President's meetings with the Lebanese. And I'll end on a note -- When the

Lebanese were telling the President how important it was that the United States and he personally continued to be firm in the pursuit of the objectives of our Lebanese policy. The President assured them that he had no reverse gear on this policy.

Lesley?

Q What is discussed -- What did the Lebanese say, what do we feel is going to happen if there is an agreement by the Israelis to withdraw in terms of the Lebanese and the Palestinians --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Syrians and the Palestinians.

Q Syrians. Syrians, right. Sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Lebanese are convinced that the Syrians and the Palestinians will indeed withdraw when the Israelis withdraw, that there must be this agreement in the first instance, however, with Israel.

Let me just say that there is widespread cynicism throughout the Arab world that the Israelis have any intention of withdrawing. Those of you who talked, who visited out there before the April 25th withdrawal from the Sinai know that the odds they were offering were astronomical that the Israelis would never leave. So this is terribly important that you have it.

Q Does the U.S. government support that opinion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say two other things. Let me say two other things.on this point. That in the discussions in, recent discussions in New Delhi between the President of Lebanon and the Syrian President and the head of the PLO, Mr. Arafat, privately the, we have been informed, that these two parties reaffirmed their intention to withdraw and almost simultaneously the Voice of Palestine, which is the official PLO radio, carried this, as did the Syrian Information Minister make a public statement. These things are not coincidences.

So, yes, we do share that belief.

Q Share what belief?

Q That they will withdraw.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That the PLO and the Syrians will indeed withdraw --

Q You're not saying you share the cynicism in the Arab world that the Israelis --

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no, no, no. I was explaining.

Q Does the U.S. Government agree that they will withdraw if the Israelis withdraw?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the answer is yes. But I wanted to give you that explanation.

Q You say there has been no breakthrough but that there has been progress. Where do you see any progress at all on the crucial issue of maintaining the security of the northern border of Israel? That is one of the key issues.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is one of the key issues. I am not going to get into the details of those discussions. And that is what they are right now. They are very delicate. Foreign Minister Shamir is probably getting off an airplane in Israel. We are meeting again with the Lebanese. I am just not going into the details.

Q But is the U.S. offer as described in The Washington Post this morning accurate, about we will send more Marines in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not sure I read that.

Q Help me friends. It says that there is going to be -- we will send more --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sure it must be written somewhere, Lesley.

Q -- more U.S. Marines in.

Q One of the recurring points of discussion is, reportedly, the possibility of sending more Marines as part of a multinational force to Southern Lebanon to take part in the security arrangements.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, some months ago, the President indicated a willingness to consider this, in principle to consider it along with our other partners in the MNF should the circumstances be such as to require this. We are not going to know whether there will be an expanded role for the MNF until we know what the overall shape of the final security arrangements are. We just do not know. And there were no discussions -- the Lebanese did not come in here and say --

Q Didn't Shultz make a new proposal to the Israelis that involved the U.S. sending not part of the Multinational Force, but a whole, sort of, separate group of Marines in, three new ideas that Shultz proposed that Shamir, kind of, liked?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I do not want to mislead you. We had lots of ideas that we talked about. Let me try to clarify what I think is one of the issues that is related, also, to what Sam asked.

There is the issue of how do you reassure the Palestinians on their security as you look to the future. Now, it is a psychological issue right now, because clearly those eight-to-ten thousand Palestinian fighters up in the North and around the camps in Tripoli have no capacity for coming down to Beirut or to Sidon and Tyre and protecting people.

And in that context, there has been discussion about the possibility of a role for UNIFIL having a -- to be located near these camps in the south.

But not to have the security responsibility. The soverign responsibility would be Lebanese. But we're talking now about a symbolic reassurance. That kind of talk has been going on -- and not only in the south, elsewhere.

Q Does this administration believe that if Israel withdraws that the Lebanese Army is capable of maintaining the peace and security in South Lebanon and the rest of the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q We do believe that?

Q Right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have to look at the threat.

Q By themselves without any other outside forces?

Q By themselves?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I would think so.

Q Do the Israelis believe that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what we're talking about. We're not faulting the Israelis for having security concerns. And let me remind you that the Foreign Minister of Lebanon at least twice has said, "We are here discussing our concerns and fears and the Israelis are here discussing their concerns and fears." No one is trying to short change the fact that people have real concerns.

This gets you into a threat analysis. And there can be differences about a threat analysis. And you can argue about what is there now, what might be there in five years, what might be there in 10 years. But as far as what is there now and what is likely to be there in -- I don't know what time frame you want to choose. Whatever else you want to say or you can argue about the Israeli invasion, one thing you can say categorically is it eliminated that threat in its major elements.

Now, you're not talking about training the Lebanese Army -- you know, a Panzer Corps. You're talking about motivated, trained, sufficiently armed small units who can interdict and patrol and who want to do it.

Q An unfortuate description, Panzer Corps.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But we have our people on the staff --

Q -- already had the Panzer Corps to begin with.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- who are there believe that the Lebanese are thoroughly capable of doing it.

Now, we are working with them. We're training them. We have our money -- our assistance going in. We have a supplemental on the Hill, as you know, for more military assistance.

Q Do Draper and Habib --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And our soldiers who work with them believe clearly that, yes, they can do the job. Given the threat.

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Q Do Draper and Habib have any new orders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wrap it up. No, they -- it's not new orders. Draper and Habib have been here participating in this. I think what they have is now a changed situation. You know, they're going to move back into a negotiating environment that has been altered as a -- I think positively altered as a result of the meetings here.

Q Since there are -- at least discussions of the possibility of U.S. forces being involved in some multinational effort keeping there possibly into Southern Lebanon,

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doesn't that give you additional concern in light of the hand grenade incident today where five Marines were wounded. The longer we're there, doesn't that increase the possibility of some international incident that draws us in more fully?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the beginning of the deployment of the Marines, no one excluded the possibility of unfortunate isolated hostile incidents. That's obviously what you have -- not only against the Marines but you had a hand grenade thrown against the Italians.

I should say, in that respect, that Prime Minister Saeb Salam brought the regrets of the President of Lebanon and the entire Lebanese nation on this issue while expressing great appreciation for the courage and valor of the Marines.

Q Well, what if it's a larger incident?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What do you call a larger indicent -- bigger bomb?

Q Death.

Q Bigger bomb, more people killed. Doesn't that generate some feeling here we have to do something? And doesn't that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do what?

Q Take our troops and go in in a sweep and wind up in some kind of military action with somebody?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't expect there to be much of this. If you can get the foreign forces out -- you can pretty well document that most of the trouble that's been happening in the south area and also whatever is being reinfiltrated back into Beirut, and some people have gotten back and the Lebanese know it, and they've picked up a lot of them, are coming from those forces that are behind the Syrian lines. Those forces will leave, whether they're Iranians -- and, you know, got about a thousand -- there's Iranian crazies out there still, or PLO, they're going to go. That's another damn good reason for getting rid of them all.

Q What about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to tell you there aren't going to be additional incidents. We hope there won't be. But so far we've had -- and there are those who want to screw things up, who don't want these negotiations to succeed, who don't want Lebanon to be whole again. There might be some nutty Lebanese Communists involved in this but chances are there's someone else.

Q You spoke earlier --

Q Like who? Who do you think might be involved in this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's hard to say. You could --

Q Did Salam bring any information about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he couldn't bring anything.

Q You spoke earlier --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I tell you, there are a bunch of -- I told you there are all of these Iranians who are over there, too.

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Q You haven't told us what --

Q You spoke earlier of progress in the negotiations, a changed situation. Does the U.S. now have reason to believe that Israel will soften its position on the residual force in Southern Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't really want to address the Israeli position. Foreign Minister Shamir has already talked to that. He's back reporting to his Cabinet. Please, understand.

Q You just talked about -- you're saying Habib and Draper are going into a changed negotiating environment. What has the change been? You haven't really told us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know I haven't.

Q Well, give us a break.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, we've had five days of talks.

Q Well, you have five days to brief us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have floated some ideas. These are ideas that we believe,

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both sides have evidenced serious interest in.

Q What happens to Major Haddad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Major Haddad is a problem. The Lebanese just frankly say, "Major Haddad is a Lebanese, whom we will deal with in a honorable way. But he cannot be in charge of the South."

Q But Israel is backing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're hoping that this is an issue that can be worked out.

Q What did you say in a secret meeting with Hussein in London?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was so secret about it? We had lunch for three hours in the Grand Dining Room of the Plaza -- the Ritz Hotel.

Q Nobody knew you. (Laughter.)

Q Who came?

MR. ALLIN: Take two more questions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They knew him.

Q Are you suggesting that it might have been one of the Iranians from -- from the valley that threw the grenade --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't know who it might be, but if you want to know who might do things like that, I just note that there are these --

Q But they're 60 or 70 miles away up in the valley.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, people can infiltrate in, or maybe there are a couple of nuts around. You know, nuts are everywhere. (Laughter.)

Q Not here. (Laughter.)

Q Can you explain what the President meant when he said, "I have no reason to -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What does that mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very simple.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Forward, all the way, persevere.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's it.

Q Forward with what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With our policy.

Q I thought you were going to be informative today.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With our overall policy.

Q You told me you were going to be informative.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am, I am.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:45 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
EL SALVADOR

FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1983, 11:00 A.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning, all. Yesterday, you requested a session with [redacted] We have produced him. This is a session ON BACKGROUND, so the speaker may not be quoted by name. You may attribute this to a senior State Department official.

Q May I ask why it's ON BACKGROUND. I mean, we have [redacted] on television now, and it seems to me he is not going to say anything startling or anything beyond which he said on television, so I was just wondering why --

A Well, you never know.

Q Can I back that?

A You may back it, but we're not going to change the rules. I understand your --

Q Include me in that.

A O.K. I note as well.

Q Would you give us a good reason why?

A I think it's a collective decision. [redacted] There are certain sensitivities about his role and what he might say; and I think the collective wisdom is that he prefers to be ON BACKGROUND today, so he is going to be ON BACKGROUND. We can either proceed on that basis, or we can call it off.

Q Just put on the record again the recollection of Secretary Shultz' comments before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, --

A I understand.

Q -- that if somebody in this Administration has something to say, he should get up and say it.

A I understand. I understand your point.

Q Just for the record.

A I understand your point. But there are going to be circumstances where, if we seek to respond positively to requests you make, we're going to have to have some rules which we either all agree to or we don't do it. So, is everybody happy? I guess I shouldn't pose it that way. Does everybody accept that we are now ON BACKGROUND?

O.K.

I have to leave in about 15 minutes. I understand [redacted] can stay until 11:30.

[redacted] I hope I haven't soured the atmosphere for you?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As I understood it, they wanted me to come in here ON BACKGROUND. That is what I was asked to do, and here I am. I have no statement. I'm here to talk to you -- dialogue or negotiate with you. What would you like? But not about power-sharing.

Q I do have one question, if I may: Is there going to be a reassessment of the package toward El Salvador, the $110 million because of recent perceptions that the human rights violations continue? Will there be cuts or --

A I wouldn't think there would be any reassessment from the Administration side -- certainly not from my side. We will continue to push hard on all of the human rights cases. We, unfortunately, get new ones. We'll push on those, too. But there is improvement and they have been coming fewer and farther between. I think the reassessment is being made in the Congress of the United States.

Q Could I just pick up on that? I'm quoting from a Times story today: "The Administration is considering a reduction in the $110 million package." Is that true?

A Well, they haven't told me.

Q You have been doing some consultations on the Hill since you've been here.

A That's right.

Q What is your sense of the attitude up there? By next week, it will all be clear; but at this point, what is your prediction about the way things are going to pan out?

A I think there is a lot of concern. I think almost everywhere I've gone -- you know, I haven't really been around as much as sometimes. These are concerned, responsible representatives of the people. They seem to me to find the arguments convincing, most of them. They want to help.

They have a problem, too. American public opinion has not yet moved as far as it should move -- and I think eventually will move -- in understanding what El Salvador is all about. I don't know how many of them have told me, "Yes, [redacted] but there is not much constituency support." But I haven't met anybody up there who wants to see the comandantes -- and the Salvadoran comandantes will make the Sandinista comandantes look like Boy Scouts -- I haven't seen anybody up who wants them to take over. That would be a far worse result than anything you've had up to now.

Q What makes you think that they would make the Sandinista comandantes look like Boy Scouts?

A You ought to take a look at who they are and what they've done and where they came from. They had on Radio Venceremus the other day that they were inaugurating the second of March Memorial Offensive. I had never heard the date of the second of March, so I read and looked into that. The second of March was 1972, before the elections of '72, and what happened on that day? They killed their first two National Guardsmen and captured two rifles. They shot them down as they were standing, presumably, at peace with the world outside of a hospital.

That's the kind of thing that they --

Two or three of the comandantes left the Community Party of El Salvador in the early 70s because they didn't agree with the Communist Party official strategy at that point of participation in the political process. Two days after the October golpe, which threw the Dictator Romero out in '60 or so with the senior officers of the Salvadoran armed forces, the man who was heading the junta was a man by the name of Guillermo Ungo. You know, he's the "front man" for them that runs around the world now. He was in charge of the junta. There were communist ministers in the government, and Cayetano Carpio said, "It ain't good enough. Power to the People."

"Power to the People" is a Lenonist phrase which means "those of us who are really worth it, run the place." It happens that "Power to the people" is the same chant,"Poder popular" that was used when the Sandinista comandantes interrupted his holiness, the Pope, eight, nine, or ten times in Managua. Now, if it wasn't good enough for Cayetano Carpio to have Ungo heading the junta and communist ministers in the government, and if he said, "The struggle has to go on," I think it gives you some idea of what the real leaders of the guerrilla are about.

You can fill trunks with the statements that they made in the late seventies of what their objectives are. And when they kidnapped people -- and they raised $40-$50 million by kidnapping -- and a lot of people for whom ransom was paid, they got back alongside the road, including a distinguished Foreign Minister of El Salvador, who was killed for no good reason at all except his name happened to be one of the important families. That's the kind of people they are.

I think, eventually, the American public will recognize this, because it's the truth.

Q Over the last few days, there has been a gathering move among several people, particularly in the Senate, to get behind a resolution -- there are several people like Senators Kassebaum, Hatfield, and Inouye who have already put forward proposal which, in broad outline, are essentially the same. Basically, what they would do would be to grant some form of aid, but to put limits on the amount, to put limits on the number of advisers, and also to condition the continuation, say, towards no pre-conditions, no strings efforts by the Government of El Salvador to try to engage in negotiations.

Is this acceptable to the Administration, something like this?

A I'm not an Administration spokesman. I'm an [redacted]

Q Give us your viewpoint as [redacted]

A Some of this -- You know, are we serious about maintaining and helping defend a country that after 50 years of military dictatorship is trying to convert itself into a democracy? We had stunning elections this time last year. That Assembly is just about finished with a Constitution. We're going to have new elections later this year. There will be a directly-elected President of El Salvador. We have an Assembly that just recently, twelve days ago, by a 36 to 24 vote, extended land reform to the end of the year.

Is the object of the exercise to help this process? You know, the society is tortured; it's sick in many ways. It needs a little bit of understanding and a little bit of assistance. Now, are we going to put in what is necessary so they can defend the democratic process, so the reforms can go forward, or are we going to so work it out that we handcuff ourselves?

I don't know. There may be good reasons for a new understanding with the Congress. If we could reach, in my view, an understanding that this was a bi-partisan problem, with (that) the fundamental interests of the United States in our commitment to freedom, our national security interests, our economic interests in the sense that if we do not hold and maintain some degree of stability and security in Central America, we are going to have floods of Central Americans in the United States. Now, that's an economic interest.

It seems to me we've got to make up our minds: It's my personal view that if we can reach an understanding with the

Congress and have a bi-partisan policy, we're not going to have a Marxist dictatorship in El Salvador. We're going to continue to press them like mad to improve what is wrong with their society, but we're going to help where help is needed. If that can be reached, and the condition is some number different than the President's number, I personally, would say that it is worth it, to have the American people and the American Congress with the Administration. But some of the proposals I've heard about, it seems to me are designed to give us the worst of both worlds. We won't have what we need to keep the Salvadorans engaged with real hopes of peace this year, or a political process working; we'll have just enough to go on. That's a question.

But I repeat, I cannot speak for the Administration -- the President. Congress and the Administration will give the American Embassy in El Salvador instructions and resources that are available, and we'll do the best we can, working in support of the Salvadorans to put them to good use.

Q :::::::: two questions in the same area, the military: Number one, how badly off, re-supply-wise, is the Salvadoran army, and could you give us some examples? Number two, could you assess the military situation there?

A All right. Those of you I've talked to before -- and there's a number in this room -- know that my basic view has been for a long that you cannot be expected to control successfully this kind of a war with a 6-to-1 or a 7-to-1 numerical majority, particularly when you recognize that maybe one part of that is well-trained, well-equipped troops, so it's almost 1-to-1 in active combatant forces, that you need more people, and you need them better trained and better equipped. You need mor mobility to support them; you need more medical facilities to support them.

One of the shocking things about that war is the ratio of killed to wounded. In the last 18 months or so, there have been about 2,000 killed in action, and about 4,000 wounded in action. That's the real war -- it's well over, close to 15 percent of the army's strength. But that 2-to-1 ratio, I mean, just shouldn't be.

In the heavy fighting in October through February, there were rapid draw downs of some kinds of munitions. There were selective ammunition shortages on the horizon. It's not everything, but it's perfectly clear that the money that was available had been fully committed, and there wasn't enough there to get through this fiscal year. So it's not an immediate, critical problem, that the whole thing is going to fall apart today. There were some immediate shortages, and some things have been done to fill those shortages.

Now, "How is the war going?" I guess that's the second question. This is slow, tough business, and it's going to continue to be very slow, tough business as long as the other fellows are getting critically-needed items from outside. The air infiltration this year has been considerably above anything we'd seen before.

On the good side, there is some good news. The efforts to slow down, control sea-borne infiltration have made progress. It still comes in by sea, but much less. This period last year, before the elections, it was pouring in over the beaches. Two years ago, it was coming in by the truckloads from Honduras. Now, it's filtering in, in small vehicles, a few things at a time; and it's being brought over the mountains, on those trails on pack animals, but it's less than it was two years ago from Honduras.

They are getting critically-needed items weekly, if not daily, from Nicaragua. They come into Nicaragua from Cuba, Algeria, from Libya, from Vietnam. I haven't seen anything recently, but at one point from Ethiopia; and it's pretty hard to stop this situation where you don't have the majority, the ratio of forces that you need -- based on historical experience and conventional wisdom, at least -- and the other guy is still getting resupply of critically-needed items.

That's true. We've been capturing a lot of stuff recently, too -- and that's a change in the war -- and there have been some tactical adjustments to try and deal with it. You can't defend every little outlying village with a half dozen national guardsmen. If the guerrillas move, they come, they will take that town, and then they'll take the weapons. The Salvadoran Army does not have enough people, well enough trained to do everything.

Q Could you elaborate on --

A I think you've had -- Other people have really --

Q Well, it's just about the, following up on your question, about Algeria. Has this been stated before by the United States, that Algeria has been supplying --

A Did I put my foot in it? That's why we're ON BACKGROUND. There have been armed shipments from Algeria to Nicaragua. It's true. Maybe I shouldn't have said it.

Forgive me, [redacted]

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

SECOND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were Soviet-manufactured arms.

Q What impact will the delay in the nuns' case have on Congress and on the aid package?

A Well, it sure, in hell, doesn't help; and it doesn't help my state of mind. I mean, it's maddening business, absolutely. The degree of frustration dealing with a judicial system unlike anything that any of us ever heard of or ever imagined.

There is maybe one, little optimistic, positive note -- we try to look for the silver lining, I guess -- there have been questions under their rules of evidence as to whether, you know, technical evidence could even be introduced that has anything to do with the decision-making process of the Salvadoran criminal justice system. So to the extent that there have been questions raised about the microbus -- I gather that the reports about the ballistic evidence were not right, that it's not in the paper, at least on quick reading -- that is evidence that they are going to take some of the technical evidence. The really positive thing about it is that the court, the appeals judge, seems to have picked around the edges. He's got some procedural points; he's raised a question which I suppose is right judicially, but sort of strikes you as absurd -- at least me: he wants to know why they weren't charged with robbery as well as with murder. He views that as a deficiency in the charge.

But he does say -- and this is good news -- that their right to be charged with murder and the trial should go forward as soon as these technical inconsistencies have been adequately dealt with.

Q How do you intend to tell, to pressure the Salvadorans now on this case? What would be your strategy?

A My strategy is the same as it's been for 18 months or two years when I first got down there: "Come on, fellows; come on. You've got to do better; you've got to do better."

But there is a difficulty: I do not believe it is appropriate -- and I've been criticized for this, and perhaps correctly -- for a foreign power to intervene directly in the judicial process. I'd like to think you had an independent judiciary. I've been damned critical of the way it functions. So we make our points normally through the Attorney General, the representative of the Executive, or indirectly in press statements.

I went to Zacotecoluca recently, and I had a meeting with the judge, but I did not discuss the details of this case because I did not think it was appropriate for a foreign ambassador. Can you imagine what would happen if we had a criminal case here, and the Ambassador of El Salvador or the Ambassador of France went directly to the presiding judge? I think the principle of trying to support, develop, and make the judiciary work puts some limits on what I will do.

As I say, some people think I am overly cautious.

Q You earlier said, in a fairly cogent comment there, at one point you said, "All they need is a little bit of help."

Could you give us some idea of how much "a little bit of help" is? You're talking to Congress, now.

A I can't put numbers. I think you've heard me say, it may be a little bit for a long time. We want to get the policy right. We want to understand what is at stake. I think part of it is to recognize the difficulties in this very different society, with a very different history, a cultural institutional overlay that is wearing away, and have some patience. Get it right and stay with it!

The resources -- in all, I suppose as [redacted] I'll never get enough resources. I'm particularly bothered about not having what we need to keep the military effort going, to say nothing of stepping it up so it's more effective on the offense. I'm worried about the economy, which is an absolute disaster. But I think it costs less -- in fact, I'm sure of it in my own mind -- to do what is required in El Salvador now than it would cost if we don't stay with it now.

Q Does the army need more aircraft and helicopters?

A I think so, a modest additional number. This is one area where there is a sort of comparative advantage.

Q How many more?

A I don't want to put numbers on it. I think there are some indications in the Congressional presention material. It's not very many. In the first instance, they've lost two helicopters, two Huey's -- two of the twenty -- and they certainly need replacing. They could use a little bit more. It's not a massive infusion. There's no way -- I mean, Congress could pass $500 million tomorrow, and say, "We want to put a lot of stuff in there." There are no trained officers, non-coms, maintenance teams to handle them. We have an absorptive capability problem. You know, they can take some more. And if there were more Americans to do helicopter maintenance, those that were there would fly a little better than they're flying now, although I must say, they are doing remarkably well -- the Salvadorans in that field.

Q You haven't talked at all about the political situation.

A I haven't been asked about it.

Q Well, here it comes.

A Good.

Q There has been a lot of talk about the future of the Defense Minister; there has been a mutiny by one of the, by most accounts, most able field commanders in that army. Regardless of how much training or equipment we put in there, is this army politically capable? Does it have the leadership and the political solidarity to do the job, or is it so mixed up with right-wing elements in the society that it's going to do a job that we don't particularly want it to do?

A I won't deny that there are problems there, like everywhere else. I think the message from the Ochoa rebellion was, the army themselves were very, very disturbed; they understand there is an enemy, and this is self-defeating; and I think that is why they rallied around the President, who has the title of

Commander-in-Chief, or something or other, General Commander of the Armed Forces, constitutionally, and it's the only time he has actually exercised it. I mean, he intervened; settled that.

An interesting phenomenon -- none of you would find it out of the ordinary, but it's the first time I've been down there when the President went on television when he didn't have the military right beside him. He announced the settlement of the Ochoa business.

There are divisions within the army. There is lots of pressure for General Garcia's departure. I think the President, with constitutional processes, informed the military commission to look into it. He's got the officers that are pro-Garcia and anti-Garcia, and they're all going to work it out. My guess is that in a Salvadoran way, this will work out, and that they will pull themselves together. And I hope that if there is new leadership that it will go after the main thing.

I don't know how you keep political parties from mucking around with armies. And of course, you have an army that for 50 years was sort of running the place. It's not always easy to get their minds on the war and away from the political issues. But here is a place there has been very marked progress, and this is a place where General Garcia made a contribution, getting the army out of the process, pulling them back to defend the electoral process, and not to rig it. That, by Latin American standards, was a sea change.

Q Can we ask again about the arms flows. If the air route is so heavily used these days, and if the interdiction of arms coming in is such a high priority to us and the Salvadorans, why isn't there more physical evidence? Why don't we have more planes down if, in fact, that is a route being so heavily used?

A Why don't we bring them down? What with?

Q That's the question I'm asking you: If it is so heavily used and if interdiction is such a high priority, there doesn't seem to be much physical evidence that -- It leads you to believe that either (a) the interdiction effort doesn't work at all or (b) there is not that much coming in by air.

A I think there is a missing element here. We have provided patrol boats; put radars on them to go up and down the coast. We have taught about how you inspect things and stop the smuggling of arms in trucks and automobiles. The Hondurans have put people out in Honduras to try and slow down. They've been successful on land. But there really isn't much of a capability for air interdiction.

What are you supposed to do? They don't have any radar, as they remind me every day: "Why won't the United States give us radar?" It's a political issue in El Salvador. They don't have it. They don't have very good communications if they had the radar through the airfields. If they get to the airfields, the aircraft don't have any air-intercept radar? Have you ever priced a modern fighter for an intercept mission, with the electronics that it's supposed to take? One of those would take two or three times the currently available military assistance for the Republic of El Salvador.

So they say, "Well, we've got our radars, [redacted] The compesinos see them, and they tell us about them. And we have some independent confirmation." I don't think every flight reported is an Nicaraguan arms-smuggling, but I think there is a good deal of it.

You know, somebody said, "Well, you ought to put in a radar down there, and have Americans man it, because there is also a maintenance thing. I mean, they have trouble keeping the radios working; how are they going to keep radar working? Where are the technicians going to come from. We can't put Americans in on a radar site. We have a ceiling on American military. So everywhere you look, we seem to have boxed ourselves in.

Now we're taking air interdiction seriously. And they have been doing some interesting things. We've taught them a little bit about night flying, and now they fly a few patrols. I'm probably getting into an area I shouldn't be talking about. But they've been flying that.

It's like looking for a needle in a haystack: there are a couple hundred small fields where these things come in. There are three areas where we've identified where they come regularly, and there are a few other places they come from time to time. What I'm praying for is that one of them will break its landing gear or something or other, and then we'll have the evidence to convince the skeptics.

Q Sir, would you give us an idea of what the Peace Commission is doing? What is it accomplishing? Do you see --

A It has just been formed.

Q -- any movement on the guerrilla forces, moderate or whatever, to talk?

A I'm always an optimist. I've been wrong before. I ran into real trouble by being optimistic last year when the FMLN looked like it was about to do something sensible, and make a serious proposal. Then they came out with that propaganda stunt in Mexico -- a dialogue without pre-conditions, which is the biggest single condition you can have. So that means you can talk about anything: making Cayetano Carpio the Minister of Interior, for example, not precluded under their formulation.

The Peace Commission itself has just been formed. They had a long, difficult time in the Salvadoran political process reaching agreement on the terms of reference; but what it is supposed to od is be a channel of contact. It is supposed to rework the amnesty provisions; it is supposed to play a major role in providing guarantees to anybody who wants to participate in the democratic process. It is supposed to be a way to talk about that.

It has a bishop. He is one of the bishops who delivered Mr. Ungo's October proposal to the President in great secrecy, heard the President say, "Let me think about this. I will get back to you. Keep it secret so we can deal with it sensibly," and then ten days later, they had a television spectacular in Mexico City, which convinced me that maybe I'd been wrong in thinking that maybe they were getting to be serious. It almost meant that the bishop couldn't be on the Peace Commission, because the right-wing guys that don't like dialogue, or negotiation, or this stuff, said, "He's purely pro-guerrilla. He delivered Ungo's proposal." It took some political persuasion by the President and others to end up with church representation on the Peace Commission, but that is the guarantee that it is serious.

It has a leading political figure and it has a former foreign minister. You know, we're going to encourage them to interpret their mandate in the broadest sense possible.

There will be other people who will discouraging them, and we'll see what happens.

OFFICIAL: Time for one more question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me take two more. One and one.

Q If the stakes here are what we say they are --. the Panama Canal, the cost of this thing rising, why are we tip-toeing around with 55 advisers, we won't give them radar, we won't do this, and we won't do that. If the stakes are the way you guys describe them, it doesn't seem that this Administration's response to this great threat that you guys described is adequate to meet it.

A Well, there is this domestic political problem. I think the President has spoken up, and very eloquently given his view of this. I think others --

Defining the problem -- you can do it in a negative sense. It's certainly perfectly clear what we don't want to have happen. Putting it in the positive sense, which is more important, the political solution and trying to get this economy and this judicial system that make this society work, that takes longer and is harder.

But if the American people are going to be bound by the Vietnam syndrome for the rest of history, if they are going to look back instead of looking forward, as the Secretary said the other day -- When I talk to Congressmen, and they say to me, "It's a convincing case. We'd like to help, but I'm worried about my constituents."

The American people have got to understand this.

I have a naieve notion. We started out in Vietnam with about 90 percent support, and ended up with less than 9, I guess. I think the facts, the situation, the realities, the differences in Central America suggest that if we stay with it and explain it honestly, I don't suppose we'll end up with 90 percent support, but I think we can persuade the American people that this is another place for patience and perseverance.

One more question.

Q Isn't part of the problem that the reason for the Vietnam analogy, the numbers change -- you know, the President says one week that $60 million is needed; then the next week $110 million is needed. There seems to be little explanation of why you go from one to another.

How do you say that we absolutely have to have this amount of money between now and September, and what happens if Congress cuts it to say $30 million or $40 million, which is what seems likely?

A Well, I wasn't here and not fully acquainted with the processes of policy formation about numbers. I think there is something you should bear in mind. The President came to being very explicit on this: We have various constraints. This ceiling of 55 -- remarkable, I'm told -- is exactly the ceiling that was on the American trainers or advisers in Vietnam after the Peace Treaty. It was 55 when Vietnam fell.

How in the hell we ended up with exactly -- if it's true -- the same number? It just boggles the mind. But if you, for Vietnam reasons or domestic political reasons or for other reasons, good ones or bad ones, cannot do much about increased training in a country, then you need more money, because it costs a hell of a lot more to train a battalion in Fort Bragg than it does to train a battalion in Ahuachpan. It costs more to train at the military training facilities in Panama. There are some advantages in out-country training. You can get their undivided attention. They are not pulled out to go and deal with the latest guerrilla attack.

I think that probably -- it would be my guess; I don't know; it's purely a guess -- in looking at the elements of the problem, and as I say there is language in the President's speech that says, "Give me more money and we'll have fewer trainers in-country."

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:40 A.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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PRESS BRIEFING
BY
MR. EDWIN MEESE, III,
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT;
MR. JOHN WALKER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY;
MR. CARLETON TURNER,
WHITE HOUSE DIRECTOR OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY;
AND MR. JEFFREY HARRIS,
DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON THE NATIONAL NARCOTIC
BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM

The Briefing Room

3:51 P.M. EST

MR. ROUSSEL: All right, if we could get going here. The ground rules for this, it will be on the record, for sound and camera. We have Ed Meese, Counsellor to the President -- who will be briefing also with us are John Walker, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations; Carleton Turner, Director of Drug Abuse -- Office of Drug Abuse; and Jeffrey Harris, Deputy Associate Attorney General.

Mr. Meese?

MR. MEESE: Good afternoon. We're here to brief on the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System. As you know, for about 15 months now the various agencies of the federal government that are involved in narcotics control have been working in South Florida successfully in an integrated and coordinated program to investigate and prosecute narcotic cases but also to interdict the flow of narcotics into the country through that area of the nation.

We feel that we have learned a great deal from this experiment. It has been successful in reducing the amount of narcotics coming into that area. It has provided benefits to law enforcement in terms of decreasing the incidents of crimes related to narcotics. And, as a result, the President has taken a series of actions. One was last October in which he directed the establishment of a series of narcotics and organized crime task forces throughout the country. This was -- has been implemented and we have 12 of these regional task forces that are primarily involved in the investigation and prosecution of organized crime with heavy emphasis on drug trafficking.

Yesterday he met with key members of the Cabinet and directed that the next step be taken and that is to establish an interdiction system that would take the lessons learned in South Florida and expand the interdiction concept to all the borders of the country. In order to do that, he has established an executive board that is composed of the key Cabinet members involved in this activity which will meet periodically to establish the policy and to make sure that the system works. It will be led by the Vice President who will have the overall responsibility for coordinating and overseeing this interdiction effort.

The chart here shows this executive board. It will be chaired by the Vice President. It will include the Secretary of State because a great deal of effort is being put into the international aspects of narcotic control; the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation and myself as Counsellor to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, and Carleton Turner, the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office.

It's anticipated that this group will meet as often as necessary but probably around -- about quarterly in order to establish the policy for the overall program and to monitor the results.

To develop the plan, the implementing plan for this effort, a coordinating board has been established with the heads of the various agencies that are actually involved in this effort. It will be chaired by the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Dan Murphy, Admiral Dan Murphy, and will include the agencies that are listed here. John Walker, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement, Rudy Giuliani, the Associate Attorney General will both be working on this coordinating board and they will be assisted by the Commissioner of Customs, the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Commandant of the Coast Guard, Secretary of the Navy, Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, Deputy Director of the CIA, the Deputy Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Director of the FBI, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Secretaries of the Air Force and Army, the Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotic Affairs and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. In other words, you've got here represented in this group all of the agencies that have resources or have an operational responsibility for narcotics interdiction.

The concept is that the -- what has worked well in South Florida will be now expanded. The plans will be worked out so I'm just giving you a hypothetical implementation

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of this program. But we know that it will, in all probability, include somewhere around four regional groups that will take in the various areas of the United States. And there will be an intelligence group that will provide intelligence and an intelligence coordination center, which we have already existing at El Paso, which will be expanded and upgraded to provide an intelligence system to support not only the interdiction effort, but also the investigation and prosecution efforts of the task forces.

There will be close liaison between the interdiction effort and the investigation and prosecution task forces -- the organized crime tax forces -- so that they will be working well with each other. This is a part of our total, national program that has been used successfully and we hope will continue to be even more successful in the primary, federal responsibility in the field of law enforcement, which is preventing and controlling drug abuse.

It is a part of a national program that includes, beside the enforcement activities that I have mentioned -- the task forces and the interdiction effort -- it, also, includes: prevention, education, treatment, research, and includes the health aspects -- all of which is coordinated through the White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy.

So this is, in effect, an overall program. Today, we are dealing primarily with the enforcement aspects of drug abuse control. But equally important, we feel, are the efforts that are going on as far as the prevention, treatment, and education.

So with that as the start, we will open up to questions.

Andrea:

Q Mr. Meese, can you tell us something more about the interdiction, about what kind of activities might be carried out outside the borders, what kind of military involvement, CIA involvement?

MR. MEESE: Okay. The activities outside the borders -- obviously, one of the things is the State Department and the Department of Justice working with other countries to eradicate narcotics at the source, and to prevent the export of narcotics from those nations. Other activities on the borders, of course, would involve using resources from the military as well as the law enforcement agencies in order to stop -- to track, stop planes and ships, boats that might be bringing narcotics into this country, to arrest the people who are involved, to confiscate the contraband narcotics, and then to proceed with the forfeiture of the boats and planes that are involved in this traffic.

Q Do you need more money for this? And does this, also, involve any kind of a crop subsidy or other type of external program such as we had in Turkey?

MR. MEESE: I will let Carleton answer that part of it. Then, I will come back to the money.

MR. TURNER: The State Department -- Don DeCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State, has a budget for that. And there are monies budgeted in the INS budget that take care of any programs. It would be a joint program -- no pun intended there -- (laughter) -- between our government --

Q I would never have thought of that, Carleton.

MR. TURNER: -- and other governments.

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MR. MEESE: Yes. As far as monies in the budget, we have something in the neighborhood of around $150 million in the '83 budget, and I believe over $200 million, approximately, in the '84 budget for increased law enforcement assistance in the organized crime and narcotics field, some of which will be utilized for the interdiction effort.

We will, also, be using -- there will be use of military resources such as radar assistance, such as aerial surveillance, and in some cases Navy ships with Coast Guard crews aboard in this effort.

Q Mr. Meese?

MR. MEESE: Yes?

Q This $150 million sounds like the same $150 million that was talked about for the original 12 task forces. Are you saying that that money will be stretched all the way?

MR. MEESE: No. Some of that is being used for -- for example, the Customs' air resources, things like that.

Q Aside from refereeing turf battles, what will this new, super task force do that the other 12 cannot do? And doesn't the creation of these new layers of bureaucracy really argue for the creation of a central, federal anti-drug office such as the President vetoed in the last session of Congress?

MR. MEESE: First of all, the President did not veto a central narcotics office. What the President vetoed was a jerry-built system that was the very antithesis of what we are talking about here.

Here, we are using the President's authority, exercised through the Vice President, to coordinate existing governmental agencies, and not develop any new bureaucracy. The drug czar would have created a whole new office, would have put a lower-level staff member from the White House in charge of Cabinet Officers, and would have created a walking disaster in which history tells us has never worked where things comparable to that have been tried before in the government.

Q But given

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that the 12 task forces which span the entire country are responsible for investigation of cases and prosecution of cases. The interdiction effort is essentially a border patrol effort designed to provide surveillance, interdiction, and apprehension of the people that are involved in the narcotic traffic. And it is a border activity as opposed to the task forces, which are generally working within the United States.

I guess the best analogy is the difference between a patrol force in a police department, which is on the street, watching, monitoring what goes on, making arrests, and a detective force which is investigating cases and taking cases to prosecution.

Q Can you tell me the estimate of the total amount of money involved annually in the drug traffic coming in, and whether it's being cut by the South Florida task force?

MR. WALKER: I'm sorry, could I have the question once more?

Q I'd like to know the dollar value of your estimates of all the narcotics traffic coming in here annually --

MR. WALKER: If you're talking about the street value, retail street value, we're, estimates range from $70 to $80 billion a year.

Q Now, hasn't the Florida task force cut down that to some degree?

MR. WALKER: I think that you have to view the success of the South Florida task force as having a success generally, but a success primarily in the South Florida region. We have seen evidence of traffickers coming around South Florida now and penetrating our borders in different parts of the country. Hence, the reason for this new program.

Q Is that the real reason? We have to --

MR. MEESE: That's one of the reasons. That's one of the reasons, but it's really to take a successful program and expand it nationwide. But part of the reason is that if you just left the program in South Florida, then you would have the penetrations elsewhere. The whole --

Q And that is happening, is it not?

MR. MEESE: To some extent we see indications. You know, measuring narcotics trafficking is not an exact science. They don't usually respond too well to public opinion polls, and so therefore you have to make inferences from the data that we get.

We do know that the amount of narcotic trafficking in South Florida appears to be less. We know that the crimes incident to narcotics trafficking seem to be decreasing to some extent. But it's not a laboratory situation; you can't be exact.

We also know that we have had increases in the amount of boat and plane traffic in other areas up farther north, in other areas of the southwest, and this leads us to the inference that they are trying elsewhere. So, that's one of the reasons, in addition to what, the idea of expanding nationwide.

Q Could you compare the effort that you're going to put forth in these four areas that you're talking about with what you were doing in South Florida? Is it going to be as intense and as expensive?

MR. MEESE: Well, I don't think you can compare it precisely. You are going to have, you're going to have attention to all of the borders but you may concentrate at a particular time when the threat is there in a particular location or in a particular area. You will have mobile forces that you can use to allocate to the specific threats wherever they may be. So, it will be a moving type of operation. It will probably not be as intensive in any one spot on a prolonged basis as it was in South Florida, but overall it will be more intensive, if you take a whole area, than anything that we have at the present time.

Q How many jobs will be allocated?

Q Mr. Meese -- resources devoted to this?

MR. MEESE: Beg pardon?

Q Will there be additional resources or are you talking about organizing the resources already available?

MR. MEESE: We think we're doing both. There are more resources, were contemplated, with the additional budget allocations that were made.

Q -- of that will be available for interdiction?

MR. WALKER: Let me give an example. As far as the Customs Service is concerned, we have a request in to DOD right now for six P-30 Ryan aircraft, eight tracker-interceptor aircraft, the C-12 variety, and four Blackhawk helicopters. And we are expecting a favorable response from that. We have an indication on that.

Now, we have monies in our budget for --

Q These military planes would be available to the Customs Service?

MR. WALKER: Military planes will be made available to Customs; yes.

MR. MEESE: This is under the provisions of the law passed in late 1981 that allowed military equipment to be utilized by other law enforcement agencies.

Q Is that only a part of the additional resources that we're talking about here overall? Are there other aircraft or seacraft?

MR. MEESE: There will be other aircraft that are being used that will be allocated to this that are not being used at the present time. There will also be military aircraft. We have used military radar planes, military surveillance planes. So there will be a variety of resources that will be used in this effort.

I can't tell you the exact amount because one -- this has just been directed by the President yesterday

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and the actual implementation plan will be developed by the Coordinating Board.

Our effort is to utilize existing resources and other available resources in the best way possible. If, at the end of that time, when we've got everything being used to the maximum and still additional resources are necessary, then the President will consider that as a part of the budget process.

Q Are you going to submit, Mr. Meese, for a supplemental?

MR. MEESE: It won't be necessary at the present time. It may be necessary later.

Q But are you --

MR. MEESE: I don't anticipate it during fiscal year 1983.

Q But maybe next year.

MR. MEESE: But -- if that becomes necessary. But I think just using the existing and available resources better will go a long ways.

Q We've been hearing, though, for a long time that there aren't enough resources to do what has to be done now. The 12 new task forces were going to be hard pressed to make it on that $150 million just based on what they were supposed to do.

It's real hard to figure out how that same $150 million is going to fund this whole new border effort. Maybe you can explain a little bit about how the money is going to be divided between the old --

MR. MEESE: No.

Q -- task forces.

MR. MEESE: No. I don't --

Q The old-new task forces.

MR. MEESE: No. The -- What you're talking about is a part of the same overall plan. Some monies in the budget that was allocated were specifically for an interdiction effort which is now going forward.

What we're trying to do is take resources, as I say, existing and available resources, including military resources and others, and utilizing them on an entire national basis as far as the border is concerned. We don't know -- I don't think anybody could tell you precisely ultimately how much in the way of resources is necessary. We do know that the resources we have available now can be used better. We do know that things such as radar surveillance, such as aerial surveillance by the military, such as the use of Navy ships that are in training activities with Coast Guard crews aboard can be utilized to a greater extent than we have. And that's what we're going to do.

Q Who will have the authority to decide what the priorities are the for the military when it comes to drugs versus other things, and also for some of these other things? Who will be making those decisions?

MR. MEESE: Well, obviously, the Secretary of Defense has that responsibility. But he will be working with these other agencies under the direction of the Vice President in order to make those resources available.

One of the tasks of the coordinating board is to make resource recommendations to the President through the Vice President from this executive board so that we will have whatever resources are available and whatever additional resources might be needed.

Yes.

Q Perhaps I missed it. What is going to be done specifically in the way of getting at the source of the drugs, crop eradication and things like that?

MR. MEESE: In addition to the interdiction effort, which is really what we're talking about today, there is an on-going effort, which has been -- is light years beyond anything tried before by the government, in the State Department to work with the countries -- the source countries in the eradication of the crops, the law enforcement efforts in those countries against production facilities, laboratories and that sort of thing and efforts by the law enforcement and customs agencies of those countries to help prevent the export.

Q Can you tell us which countries primarily?

Q Are there funds allocated for that?

MR. MEESE: Yes, there are funds in the State Department budget for that, as a regular thing.

Q What are we talking about?

MR. TURNER: You'd have to see Don for the exact figures. I can make that available. But the budget covers proposed programs underway and the possibility of contingency money for other programs. There is money there.

Q Which countries in particular? Turkey, Bolovia or what?

MR. TURNER: Well, you have a program in Turkey. That's one of the successes. Mexico is another success. But right now you'd have to say Colombia would be your target country because you're getting three drugs from Colombia. You're getting marijuana, cocaine and qualudes. You also have Bolivia, a source of cocaine; Peru, a source of cocaine. Some programs are under way in Bolovia, some in Peru, not as much as we would like; but that's contingent upon cooperation between our government and their governments.

Q Any other country that's really problems and -- Southeast Asia --

MR. MEESE: Southeast Asia. And we've had some good successes over there, since the Attorney General's visit particularly.

Q What kind of goals are you setting for this system in terms of a percentage reduction and --

MR. MEESE: We're not setting any goals at this time. I think the first thing we want to do is get the plan set up and measure what can happen. Obviously, your ultimate goal is to try to stop the importation of narcotics in any way. That is not going to be reached. As a matter of fact, I think it's worthwhile to caution that what we're doing today is making a major step; but it's a step that's going to take a long time to implement and it's going to take a long time to see the results. But what we are beginning is a new, major step that, in terms of resources, in terms of organization, in terms of allocation of assets and in terms of overall concept, is something that's never been done before.

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Q Only four of the twelve regional task forces have been set up so far, according to General Smith before the Congress this morning. If that's the case, and he doesn't expect that all twelve would be up to speed until this summer, when do you expect that this will be on-line and ready to go?

MR. MEESE: I can't tell you for sure. Actually, there are more task forces than that.

MR. HARRIS: All the task forces are going. We expect that they will all be going at 100 percent by the summer. They're -- each one now is operating somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 percent to 33 percent of full strength. But they all have started and by summer they will all have a resources board.

MR. MEESE: But as far as this, the implementation plan is -- will start

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being developed within the next week or ten days, and I can't tell you for sure how long it will take to get this implemented. We're going to do this in a very careful manner to make sure that it is being done successfully.

But in order to see concrete results, I think this is going to take a while, a number of months. It was a long time -- it was several months before you saw any results from the South Florida Task Force. These are not things where you have a panacea or things where you have immediate results overnight. But it is a matter of getting organized, getting your assets marshaled, getting the additional resources that we need and moving in a way, as I say, which hasn't been done before.

Q Mr. Meese, just to clarify, what we're talking about here is coordination systems, no new money and no new manpower?

MR. MEESE: Yes, there is new money. There is new money and there is new manpower.

Q How much new money is there going to be just for these interdiction operations?

MR. MEESE: I can't tell you the exact amount at this state because we don't know until we see the implementation plan. There is money in the budget now, for example, to fuel a fleet of approximately a dozen aircraft -- additional aircraft that aren't there now.

MR. WALKER: Right.

MR. TURNER: It's 18 -- over $18 million in the customs budget.

MR. WALKER: We've got -- in the customs budget, we've got $18.3 million, just for --

MR. MEESE: This is for maintenance operating costs.

MR. WALKER: -- just for increasing in air interdiction.

MR. MEESE: We have something in the neighbor- --

Q Is that the total figure for how much new money is earmarked for interdiction?

MR. MEESE: No, because you can't put it in terms of money. We will be taking military resources that are not being used now in this effort that will be used, and I can't tell you how much those resources are worth.

Q Well, what kind of a budget do you have --

MR. MEESE: What?

Q I mean, you're saying, well, you can't put --

MR. MEESE: You're taking -- no, you're taking the departmental budgets. All these departments have budgets.

Q Yes, but what kind of a budget do you have for this --

MR. MEESE: You don't have a separate budget for this.

MR. WALKER: It's not a separate law enforcement agency.

Q So if it's not a separate agency --

Q Well, where's the money coming from --

MR. MEESE: What?

Q If it's not a separate agency, you can't really put your finger on how much it's going to cost you, then.

MR. MEESE: Well, that's right. I mean you can eventually, but you do it in a post-audit type of thing. You can tell in the course of a year because you know how many flying hours you've had for military aircraft, you'll know how -- you'll have how many hours and miles or knots of steaming and so on --

Q So essentially you don't how much it's going to cost.

MR. MEESE: We can't tell for sure.

Q During this long orientation period, do you expect to take this -- the interdiction --

MR. MEESE: We don't expect a long orientation period. We'd have a long -- a planning and implementation period.

Q Well, during the period -- the long period you suggested earlier we'll have to wait before we know the results of this effort, do you expect that the administration will continue with its objection to the creation of a centralized anti-drug office?

MR. MEESE: Nobody has proposed a centralized anti-drug office, but if you talk about the drug czar-Mickey Mouse system that was in that bill, yes.

Q Ed?

MR. MEESE: Yes.

Q Why is the President giving a speech tonight?

MR. MEESE: Well --

Q -- serious question.

MR. MEESE: -- he was afraid there might not be enough news tomorrow. No --

Q -- seriously.

MR. MEESE: No. I think when --

Q Will there be after the speech?

MR. MEESE: I think when you -- (laughter) -- I think when --

Q Serious question.

MR. MEESE: I think when you hear the speech, you will understand why he gave it.

Q Well, what is the thinking --

Q Mr. Meese, could I ask you --

MR. MEESE: I, however, am limiting my remarks only to the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System.

Q Mr. Meese, I'd like to ask you a question about your home territory. I noticed you have California divided there. Is this going to have San Diego down on one area and --

MR. MEESE: These borders are not exact. This is just a prototype drawing of how the regions might show up. That will be up to the implementation plan. But it would appear logical -- it would appear logical that the Southeast -- Southwest Interdiction Program would operate primarily along the southern border and a certain distance up into California and it would --

Q -- like San Diego or something?

MR. MEESE: Yes. It would depend on where the maximum range of planes would probably be and where they'd be landing. It could go farther north, it could go -- I could see them stopping somewhere over in here. The exact boundaries have not yet been determined.

Yes, Bob.

Q Do you perceive -- if this organization doesn't have a separate budget, then does it not have any staff of its own?

MR. MEESE: The staff comes from the existing agencies. We are not creating a new organizational entity. We are creating a coordinating mechanism to better utilize the resources of the existing agencies that are involved in the drug control program.

Yes.

Q How many miles of border are we talking about? Does anybody know --

MR. MEESE: How many?

MR. TURNER: About 96,000.

MR. MEESE: Ninety-six --

MR. TURNER: Roughly 96,000 miles of border around the U.S., but we're not looking at every inch.

MR. MEESE: Ninety-six hundred --

MR. TURNER: Ninety-six thousand.

MR. HARRIS: -- 3,000 miles in the State of Maine alone --

Q Ninety-six thousand miles of borders --

MR. WALKER: If you count all the little bays and inlets.

MR. MEESE: Oh, I see. Okay.

Q Coastline, border --

Q What about the coastline?

MR. MEESE: My friends tell me here it's 96,000, if you -- as the crow would fly if it was going along the edge of the ocean.

MR. TURNER: Every bayou.

Q That's a --

MR. MEESE: I didn't know that either.

Q What are the major points of entry for drugs in the southwestern California region?

MR. MEESE: Well, in the southwest -- John, do you want to handle that?

MR. WALKER: Yes. We have a lot coming in through the Gulf, through the Houston area, and through New Orleans.

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And primarily that's the route that we see being utilized right now. We don't seem to have that many overflights over Mexico at the present time. But that could change.

MR. TURNER: I think --

Q What about San Diego and --

Q Yes, what about California?

MR. MEESE: You have some activity coming into Southern California but not an awful lot of flights.

MR. WALKER: In terms of flights -- fairly limited there.

MR. TURNER: I think you should remember one thing that after the South Florida they were busted up. They had a centralized organization and they're spreading out. So, there's not any one point that has been pinpointed as like a South Florida. And I think what he's -- Mr. Meese has said and the President says, we're not going to let that happen again.

Q Doesn't that make it harder for you to catch these people?

MR. WALKER: Noboby said it was easy. (Laughter.)

MR. MEESE: And the other thing is we don't make the rules for them.

Q Do you expect there will be a tightening up of the relatively easy access that exists on our Canadian and Mexican borders, speaking mainly of --

MR. MEESE: I would say that, again, at this point we have no indication that there will be any major changes in that. This is one of the things that I think will be viewed by the implementation plan. But as far as changes in the process at the border, none is contemplated at the present time.

Q Ed, you mentioned the change at -- expansion of the El Paso Intelligence Center.

MR. MEESE: Right.

Q How many people --

MR. MEESE: Upgrading.

Q -- how much of an upgrade, how much money -- don't know?

MR. MEESE: We don't know because that's one of the things that they'll be coming up with here in the implementing plan. But I think one of the things is, in terms of upgrading, we're looking at improved communications equipment which is already in the budget. We're looking at improved computerization, for example. One of the things we're seeking is to get real time information back and forth between the El Paso Intelligence Center and both the task forces internally and the border interdiction program.

Q The second question. How about just intelligence gathering in general?

MR. MEESE: Right.

Q Do you expect an increase or a heightened effort to gather intelligence outside the United States?

MR. MEESE: We would hope so, yes.

Q What would that entail? Would that entail more American funded or American agents trained going into various countries --

MR. MEESE: I think one of the things you don't do is talk about your intelligence methods. But I can say that the fact that you have now task forces over and above the ordinary narcotic activities of U.S. attorneys and FBI and DEA -- the task forces are in addition to what was going on before. They are generating more leads. The interdiction effort, as it goes around the country, will generate more leads. This will provide better leads for those agents, CIA agents, DEA agents and others, who are working in foreign countries to improve their intelligence gathering capability.

Q The reason I ask that --

MR. MEESE: Yes.

Q -- was in the past, DEA and before it was DEA, its other -- the other names it carried -- and all of that. There was substantial and serious criticism of the conduct of various American training programs for the agents, conduct of the agents in various countries, the way they questioned prospective witnesses -- all very serious allegations back in the '60's. The question is how will this be applied in --

MR. MEESE: You haven't had problems, to my knowledge, since January of 1981. We have the same agents, same intelligence people out there now and I would see no difference in terms of the ethical quality of their work. But I think in the operational quality of their work, the more leads they have the better job they can do.

Q On the military side, can you elaborate a little bit more about how those missions will be done -- whether it will be standard missions that are say flown and an extra person put on just to worry about drugs? I mean, how is that going to work? There has been a lot of complaints from Justice that they haven't been getting all they could from the military.

MR. MEESE: Really? I haven't heard those complaints.

Q I have.

MR. MEESE: Well --

Q -- the Justice Department.

MR. MEESE: I see. I think what you have, what we plan is that there will be missions, both training missions which have training value and special missions that will be run by the military primarily in surveillance and in radar activities, this sort of thing. A lot of the kinds of things that we're talking about here -- the surveillance observation and monitoring of aircraft, for example, has to go on anyway through both FAA and the military. But what we have is, through coordinated communication systems, a better ability to relay this information to track these planes by the DEA people and Customs people.

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MR. WALKER: The military is being very helpful in the -- right now in the area of interdiction by providing navy vessels which can tow the smuggler vessels, by providing the ability to refuel Customs vessels and Coast Guard vessels, by having arrest teams actually on the navy vessels so they can do actual interdiction. All of these things are going on at the present time and we'll continue using that.

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Q Will this task force address the profit motive, make the importation of drugs so expensive that it will reduce the incentive?

MR. MEESE: The interdiction effort will, to some extent, because every time you make it harder for them to fly in successfully you're making the cost higher. Every time you interdict a ship and capture the contraband, capture the people, and also go for forfeiture of the ship, as you would with the forfeiture of the planes when they land, all of these things increase the cost. But primarily the real increase in cost is primarily going to be the work of these task forces, because in addition to the prosecutions they're tracking the money.

We have Internal Revenue Criminal Division people, Customs people, in a very big program in which they are going after the funds to provide for forfeiture, court-ordered forfeiture of the proceeds of the illegal narcotic traffic.

MR. WALKER: We'll be devoting 420 personnel for that effort alone.

Q What about sentencing? Is there going to be any attempt made to increase the penalties?

MR. MEESE: Yes, as a matter of fact we have a bill before Congress at the present time, the one that the President sent up last week.

Q Isn't this interdiction effort, Mr. Meese, mainly aimed at marijuana and cocaine, the so-called middle class recreational drugs, as opposed to heroin, which mainly affects lower-income people?

MR. MEESE: No. No; as a matter of fact, I would say heroin is one of the principal targets.

Q Most of or much of that originates in the Golden Croissant, they say, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran. In only one of those countries, I gather, we have much influence. How do you expect that this new agency, this new task force, will make much of a dent in the export from that area of heroin to this country?

MR. MEESE: Well, one of the things we've done as far export in the country we do have some influence in and we've made some major strides. But we're worried, in the interdiction effort we're worried about the importation, and one of the things you do is that you, the efforts will be directed against the ships, the planes, whatever else is bringing the stuff in.

We'll take one more back here, now.

Q You spoke earlier of diversion and, in fact, that's become an increasing problem also along the eastern seaboard. What effect did that, the increasing diversion problem have on your thinking in coming up with this interdiction system?

MR. MEESE: That was one of the reasons why it was done.

Q Was it one of the more important reasons or a minor reason?

MR. MEESE: I would say it was a reason. I wouldn't try to quantify it. But it was one of the reasons, obviously. Okay. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:22 p.m., EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADDRESS

March 23, 1983

The Briefing Room

6:01 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought, if I could, I would start with two or three minutes of overview of the President's remarks for this evening, and then take your questions. My colleagues, senior administration officials, will respond as well.

As you can see -- and I will not be redundant -- the President's remarks are oriented toward justification of his defense proposals, an elaboration of his perception of the problems we must contend with, and his response -- his solution for dealing with the security problems in the years ahead.

He focuses upon not just the numbers, the trends, but as well, the political implications of this enormous accretion of Soviet power, and then addresses how we must respond.

The President, then, turns his attention -- in the latter part of the speech -- to strategic deterrence. As you know, for many years, over a generation, the United States has based its security against strategic attack upon a concept of deterrence focused on offense. That is, the promise that we could retaliate if anyone chose to commit aggression against us. This threat of retaliation, this deployment of offensive forces, and this offensive basis for deterrence implies the need, over time, to sustain ready, modern, strategic offensive forces.

Since coming into office, the President has increasingly pondered the implications, long-term, of continued. sustained commitment to ready, modern offensive forces, and generally to the questions raised by basing your security on threatening others. So, in short, this concept of threatening and the requirement to sustain offensive forces has led him to conclude that there must be a better way.

That is to say, should we not investigate the promise of new technologies in the defensive area which hold promise for contributing to stable deterrence through defense as opposed to offense -- defense which does not threaten the territory of other countries, defense which defends ourselves?

Now, the President is fully conscious that this is not a simple proposition, nor is it by any means a near-term proposition. First of all, he is very much aware that defensive systems, if paired with offensive systems concurrently, are not stabilizing at all; in fact, the contrary -- permitting an offensive policy or first-strike, if you will. And this is in no sense his intention. His commitment is to a long-term program of research and development to see if technologies at or soon after the turn

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of the century could enable us to place greater reliance upon defense and, through providing incentives for arms control, lead to a significant, serious reduction in strategic, ballistic missile forces.

Now, he is fully conscious of the fact that you could not, under any circumstances, contemplate defense from the perspective of Allied security. That is to say, Europe relies upon our strategic offensive forces today for their security. Their vital interests and ours are one. These are inextricably linked. Our commitment to them is firm, and will endure. And he has so reaffirmed to his counterparts.

Indeed, what he would contemplate is that any benefits which materialize from this R&D program, surely, would be shared so that the strategic interests of Europe would be secured through these same benefits.

He is, as well, very much aware that questions can be raised about the ABM Treaty. What are you doing? Do you have any altered intention or policy vis a vis the ABM Treaty? Absolutely not. United States policy toward the ABM, which we respect is in no sense changed by this R&D program.

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In short -- and I'll conclude -- the President in this portion of his speech is directing, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty, and recognizing the need for very close consultations with our allies -- directing an intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program in defensive systems and in eliminating the threat which is posed by strategic ballistic missiles.

We'll take your questions now. Yes, sir.

Q Would you define some of the new technologies you're talking about in broad terms, at least?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'll turn it over to my colleague here. There are a number of those -- I could discuss them, but he can do it better.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that in one word, but let me say this. We have carefully avoided trying to explicitly endorse a single potential technology, because we do not feel -- the President does not feel that the available data and information is in hand. But certainly it would encompass the full complement of lasers, of microwave devices, of particle beams and projectile beams.

We believe that the state of technology and all the supporting technologies from electronics to aiming and tracking systems to materials to guidance to data processors to communications has advanced so rapidly in the last ten years that it is possible now to define and begin an aggressive R&D program with a high probability of success toward the end of this century.

Q To what degree is this call based on the concern that the Soviets are well ahead of us in this kind of research?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I do not think that the lead -- purported lead that the Soviet Union has claimed to have is an overwhelming one. They have a larger effort. The United States has a substantial effort also. Neither one of us possesses today the technology to meet the requirements of the goal that the President has, I think, clearly stated in his speech.

Q Is space basing contemplated as one of the things to be explored or even the main avenue for the basing of these things?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Space basing is an option. So is -- so, of course, is using earth basing. I emphasize the lack of specificity is because we wish the American scientific community and our entire broad technological expertise to apply itself to this problem and help us, let us say, develop the strategic vision that the nation needs.

Q Just to follow up, are you -- is one of the elements that has led your thinking this way this High Frontier type proposal of a group of satellites surrounding the planet which could take this kind of role?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is certainly not dependent upon the particular proposal embraced in the High Frontier Report, by any means.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the other hand, I would say there is one thing in common, and that is the High Frontier Report began with the objective of using American superiority in technology and in our industrial base to gain an adequate military capability and adequate defense capability. That is the common

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element. The particular 400 Satellite System that was embraced in the High Frontier Report is a concept to look at but not the basis for the President's objectives.

Q Sir, you say that the U.S. already has a substantial effort under way on this. Give us a sense of how big that effort is and how big it's being made further by the President's decision tonight? Any numbers would be welcomed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's program in the Department of Defense embracing ballistic missile defense and generic research in the kind of technologies that we are discussing here is today on the order of $1 billion. It is premature for me to in any way attempt --

Q -- $1 billion over what period of time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One billion dollars per year today is the present spending rate of that entire program, from ballistic missile defense through generic technologies.

Q By the DOD?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By the Department of Defense. It would be -- I must emphasize it would be premature for us to identify or to scope the full nature of this program. We are calling upon the community of scientists, the available expertise in the nation to help us identify this.

Q But is the President going to put more money in the budget to get this done, and when and how much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When the program -- Research and Development Program is identified, to the best of our ability in the next few months, a clear-cut decision will be made by the President and with the advice and involvement of the Congress, of course.

Q Can you explain why this does not violate the ABM Treaty? And if not literally, then in spirit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in neither does it. The ABM Treaty envisioned research and development efforts and, indeed, the Soviet Union has had a quite intense R&D program that is fully authorized within the ABM Treaty.

Q -- the Soviet program?

Q What are the limitations of the treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a dollar figure for you, Steve.

Q Roughly --

Q Is it equivalent to ours?

Q Is it roughly equivalent?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'll take the question and I'll get it --

Yes.

Q What are the limitations of the ABM Treaty? What can't we do?

Q Yes, in terms of space technology, for instance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the authority for research and development is rather broad. The ABM Treat deals, as you know, with the number sites, which is, first, two, now, one and, indeed, we don't have any authorized on both sides. Originally, National Capital Command Authority plus one site. And we have chosen not to deploy.

Yes, Saul.

Q Yes, you said that this would provide incentives on arms control. Does that mean that it's on -- that this whole R&D program, as well as theirs, is on the table in strategic negotiation sessions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll take it in two parts.

First, let me stress that the motive, again, and this is clear from the fact that we are telling you what is launched today is a search for a plan; but the motive that has led the President to this point is his commitment to provide hope that there is an alternative to the inexorable requirement for building, deploying modern ready nuclear offensive forces.

Now, it is that which has led him to draw attention to -- away from offense and into defense. Focusing that attention will take some time and it will surely take decades to reach fruition. But it's the hope element which we're talking about.

Now, on your second -- on your real question, because that is the motive and because this is a long-term thing, this has no immediate effect upon START or INF or other arms control talks. Clearly we anticipate that an important benefit, once this research brings material results, would be a dramatic incentive for the Soviet Union to agree to radical reductions in offensive ballistic missiles.

Q But it can also have that other problem and that is that both of us at the same time achieve or are about to achieve an ABM capability, at the same time our arsenals are stuffed with offensive weapons, that means a race for a first strike by the nature of what you, yourself, said. Aren't we in danger of doing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think if one were to envision -- call it perfect competition and freedom of choice on both sides, that you can envision us, for example, proceeding through development and into deployment as you suggest. But stop and think about it, once the United States program goes on for years and years and years and you near a point of saying it does or does not have some promise, you cannot go to a system of deployment nor would we, as a value judgment, without Congressional and executive, as well as, inter-allied and U.S.-Soviet consultations and negotiations about the implications of this.

Now, I underscore that very strongly. In no sense do we envision an accelerated effort to develop an ABM system. That's not the point here. It is not the objective.

Lou?

Q You have -- two questions. Is this specific enough that you envision that you're going to come back here within this fiscal year and ask for some more money from Congress for R&D. Or aren't we even that close to it -- I mean after these scientists get together?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think it prudent to expect within this fiscal year the plan to be directed and the effort to be under way. The results in terms of recommendations, I think, unlikely during this fiscal year -- next fiscal year --

Q The second question is that following on what Saul asked, even if your intention is exactly as you've stated it, you're talking about something that is going to be, as you say, decades away. Why couldn't, in a different circumstance, different -- obviously different President, different Congress, different relationships in the world -- this be precisely what you don't want it to be, an encouragement for a first strike? If you have in fact a really good defensive system and we still have a very strong offensive arsenal, why in another context couldn't this be an incentive for a first strike for us or for the -- or the Soviets, regardless of what you intend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, because as both a legislative and a practical and an appropriation matter, you simply could not do that nor would we propose it.

Q -- clarify it. Are you contemplating eliminating our offensive nuclear arsenal before you would actually deploy this new defensive technology -- rather than have an overlap here --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. You wouldn't leave yourself entirely defenseless in a transition period. It is phased. My colleague has suggested an obvious point and that is that this would be in a transition time -- assuming that there ever were any deployment, and that's not clear -- necessarily phased with clear negotiations in progress, so that that is an agreed proposition.

Q -- would have both offensive and defensive weapons in being and in deployment at the same time, which gets you into the first --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You would not because of the effectiveness of this approach of the defense systems is for the long term.

What the President is trying to do is open the door to the next century so we can get away from these hair-triggered missile systems. And you would phase this in. It would be combined with negotiations on defensive and offensive systems. And an overarching strategic arms agreement could be the ultimate goal, so that both sides could get rid of these arsenals of missile forces that threaten their societies and have more stable defensive forces against some residual ballistic missile force.

Also, remember now, as we try to reduce strategic missiles in SALT and START, we recognize that if we'd press the reductions further -- we have only the rather ambitious reductions proposed in START, as you know -- but if you pressed further, some people began to raise questions whether the deterrence will become unstable. This is because in the present dispensation we depend on the threat of the offensive missiles. So at some point, the present approach gets in the way with arms reductions, more radical arms reductions. And the President wants to open the door to a new approach where we can eventually get rid of these missiles.

Q What mechanism are you going to use for mobilizing the American scientific community and -- I'm not sure that I can see how you can come up with a decision on the direction to take over the next few months, considering the magnitude of the problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, the specific mechanism that we take I think will depend upon all the various agencies involved getting together under a coordinating mechanism that the President is in the process of defining. I do not think that is a difficult feat. I believe the American scientific community is ready and prepared and willing, as they have in the past.

The second part of your question --

Q You indicated you expect a decision on the direction you want to go --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Months.

Q -- within a matter of months.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. The generic technologies that underlie this are by no means mature. But they are reasonably far along in the pass of development. I mean, we have had lasers for decades today. We know quite a bit about large lasers. The same thing is true of accelerator technology, whatever. There is enough there to make a judgment.

What has been lacking, I think, has been sufficient attention to trying to -- toward trying to solve the task, the strategic vision, if you wish, that the President has described in his speech.

Q Well, do you see that taking place with the formation or reformation of a panel like the ICBM Panel that was in effect during the late '50's, the early '60's, the panel of experts or what?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is more than -- a bit speculative right now because we are still in the process of discussing this. But let me just say this, I think the decision ultimately will certainly involve representation from all the agencies in the government associated with defense, as well as those associated with science and technology. We will do our very best to get leading members, the strongest expertise we can, from the scientific and engineering and industrial community to help us in the participation.

Q Is there an assumption here that at some point there's going to be some kind of large infusion of money? I mean, you've given us nothing about direction, structure, funding.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The best thing I can say is to give you the calibration that I gave you before. Today, we spend a billion dollars in R&D across the full spectrum of what we call "sight defense" to protect a small zone out through generic technologies. Until we can identify how many technologies are worth pursuing towards the system development, I don't think I could make an intelligent estimate.

Q -- politically at sort of providing some light at the end of the tunnel on the nuclear -- the current kind of nuclear arms race we have and sort of trying to satisfy some of the feeling that has built the nuclear freeze movement that -- you know, it's 20 years away and we don't have the technology yet but we're going to try for it and maybe one day we can all live in a land without offensive weapons. I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could say from the --

Q -- does that buy you some time politically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I may answer this, I think from the very early months that I came here, I saw the President's very deep concern and very deep commitment to some day ending the degree of reliance we have today upon a policy of assured destruction, retaliation for deterrence.

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I think this speech represents the President's strategic vision toward that end.

Q Does the President envision, can you tell us --

Q Can you relate this --

Q Fusion Magazine published a study that indicated that exactly the new technology that they were investing in would have the sort of spinoffs for the civilian economy that would pay for themselves many times over, much the same way the NASA program did. I'm wondering if you've looked at this and the sort of marginal -- it might be to the American people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly. And I think there's a lot of truth to that. We've seen it throughout the history of modern technology. I think there will be large spinoffs. I would not attempt to speculate as to whether it is a compensating spinoff.

Q Is there any particular appeal that's being made to the American scientists who've been brought to dinner in the White House tonight, for instance, and is there any promise that the President envisions bringing them together under government sponsorship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The commitment is mentioned in the speech. The President certainly will call upon the scientific community, and these are leading members of the scientific community, to help us in this endeavor.

Q To what degree is this decision an outgrowth of your feeling that with the MX panel's research that our land-based forces are going to be increasingly vulnerable to a first strike and that this -- system is really the only way to prevent that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that point, that observation is in large measure what prompted the Joint Chiefs to discuss this overall issue with the President, the fact that we must be willing to look forward more than just another decade. I think that is a consideration.

But I emphasize, on the part the President, the objective is a long-standing one that has no overlap, particularly with the MX Commission or any immediate decision on the table for the President now.

Q This is a decision that is totally independent of the MX panel and will have no effect on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The decision is completely independent of the MX panel, and as to the other question, I can only speak from my own experience, in the first few months that I was here, in 1981, I had a quite profound discussion with the President on the exact objective that is expressed in this speech.

Q You said the Joint Chiefs.

Q When did the Chiefs raise it with him? When did the Chiefs raise it with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The month of February.

Q -- the President make a statement --

Q On -- there is only a vague mention of a further speech in a week's time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right. There will be another time to speak on that subject, on arms control.

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Q Will that be on interim arms -- ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could we call on some of these people back here, please? Yes, in the middle.

Q To what extent was the President, have the President's views been influenced by his meeting with Edward Teller on this subject last fall?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has met periodically with Edward; he's met with a number of other people. And this is not a disproportionate laddering. I wouldn't make it high on the scale.

Q How is this system different from the BMD proposal that's in the original Air Force MX plan, Dense-pack plan? That calls for BMD by 1992, as I recall.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, BMD and this technology goes back 25 years. There have been various proposals. What we're saying, the President is saying tonight is, we are going to develop a plan for a program based upon those new technologies today that offer greatest promise.

Q -- going to start the -- program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Will you explain the Cuban intelligence station that the President mentioned, how long it's been built, it's been functioning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q How old are the -- photos --

Q Is this going to help the President to sell his defense budget to Congress, this new proposal? I mean, how does it encourage, it being part of the same speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a responsibility to provide information with regard to the problems we have to deal with, the Soviet trends, capabilities, so forth. And that's what the President is doing to facilitate judgment by both the American people and, of course, the Congress.

Q Can we expect to see the President offer limited reductions next week at Geneva, as opposed to complete elimination on both sides under the zero option?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't speculate on what he'll say next week.

Q You talked about having some degree of success by the turn of the century. Can you say what kind of capability you expect to have developed at that point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, this is not something you can prejudge. As my colleague said, there are a dozen promising technologies. The pace of their maturing is something you can't --

Q Can we talk to some of the scientists who are in the White House to see what they think of these new technologies?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

END 5:28 p.m., EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADDRESS

March 24, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

10:05 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, Karna. Karna assures me that in the room are 26 of the world's foremost writers in the area of defense. And she further assures me that you all refused to accompany the senior official in Portugal and Spain -- (Laughter) -- to be here for last night's address.

But, seriously, last night's major address by the President was the first in a probable series of three addresses. The next will be 31 -- I guess it's next Thursday, isn't it Karna -- Los Angeles World Affairs Council and primarily in the area of arms reduction, arms control and a probable address the following week on his MX decision and related matters.

But I assume you have all read or heard the address last night, which was basically the Soviet threat, defense of the defense budget, and finally the presentation of a new initiative of a deep hope, a deep commitment on the part of the President to announce something that he's felt very strongly about, certainly since I came over to this position a year ago, and that is, how do we get off this trail, this interminable route of build up of nuclear offensive weapons. And the genesis, if we may, of last night's announcement, I think, arouse or would lay in a meeting, a rather routine, cyclical meeting that the President has with his chiefs and chiefs of staff several weeks ago.

It was not really an agenda item. These meetings are loosely structured, giving the chiefs led by General Vessey, the ability to exercise their direct responsibility to the President as counsellors on defense matters. And this idea arose. It's not a new idea. Those of you who've had far more experience and background in the area of defense than I know that this is not a totally new concept. It goes back 10 to 20 years. In fact, I think my colleague is here with us today to handle the technical side of defense. Two other colleagues can answer questions, maybe in the historic perspective.

But the President showed immediate interest in the concept when it arose at the table. I might say Secretary Weinberger was there and was aware that it would be presented in routine presentations. The President interest increased. And, so, the concept has developed, as I say, over the last several weeks.

And in his mind, he's been briefed on an ongoing basis, obviously on a rather close-hold basis, because you have not written in the interim. But that's it for openers. I might add that he's reviewing and will be for the next 24 hours a standard, written decision directive which will call for next steps on inter-agency basis. He'll probably sign that

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in his morning 9;30 a.m. briefing tomorrow. I would like to avoid classifying that. That's our policy in classification -- as many NSC decisional directives by the President as we can will continue to be nonclassified and, as this develops, we may be able to hand you that tomorrow.

But, again, while the emphasis is obviously on the new or what might be considered to some the novel, we would hope that it not detract from the first part of the address, namely the Soviet threat and what the President feels, in his basic duty to the American people to be, their security and freedom, that we continue to support, to declare, particularly to the American people, the Soviet threat on the one hand, what the President feels he must do about it on the other. And, apparently, that message didn't get through to the House in the past week. Perhaps the speech could have been given a week earlier and had a little more effect on what now appears to be a three percent budget out of the house, a three percent increase -- something between three and four. I don't think they're all that certain what it represents mathematically up there even yet.

But, with that, we could open to my colleagues on the more technical side.

Q Before we get to the technical stuff about the new initiative, I wonder if I could ask you about the, one question about the first part of the speech you just referred to? And that is, the President certainly made it clear he feels terribly strongly about the need for his defense program to be put into place, continue to be put in place. Yet, he never, to my knowledge, has threatened to veto legislation which would provide insufficient funds for defense, in his view. Can you tell us, since we're on background here, is the President prepared to veto that kind of a bill?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I learned with then Governor Reagan in '67-'68, working with a state legislature not unlike the House at the moment, he avoids threatening vetos until a matter arrives on the desk. But -- So he has not indicated what --

Q But what --

Q Any guidance about whether that would be likely?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not going to project that.

Q Putting it another way then, what will he settle for if he can't get his 10 percent real increase?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That we're going to have to watch as it unfolds.

One other, before we get to --

Q Are you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Are you going up with a second proposal later on this year, with a money bill for this BMD proposal? Are you going to come up with a supplemental for the BMD or are you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our view at the moment is it's not going to require a supplemental this year. We'll be able to operate out of existing assets.

Q How expensive do you think this is going to be? Do you have any idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't seen any figures. I've heard some. That, of course, will no doubt be called for in the directive that goes out tomorrow.

Q When you say, "out of existing assets," are you talking about the fiscal '83 budget? You mean you wouldn't put any money in for fiscal '83, which is really next year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is my understanding, yes.

Q No money in '84 either?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's open.

Q Additional money.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Well, that would require a supplemental, then, wouldn't it? Or an add-on of some kind.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That will be, no doubt, a very early issue out of this directive.

Q Could you just expand this for a minute, if you could, on the way this thing evolved with the JCS. How did the issue come up? What was it that -- How did they express it? How did they put their concerns?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFCIAL: I'd rather leave it just in the brevity that I've given it on --

Q Can you tell us which member of the Joint Chiefs are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say that the Chiefs are in total community on this issue -- from the community of the Chiefs.

Yes.

Q Were there any prominent scientists at MIT or Cal Tech or what not who were contacted and were brought into this process, in developing this proposal -- Do they endorse this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: During the course of preparing the President's

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involved with that on our White House Science Council examination of new military technologies for the last year and last night about a dozen leading scientists in the United States met with the President before and after the speech.

Q Could we get a list of those folks --

MR. SPEAKES: We put it out last night. It's available in the press office.

Q What is the mechanism for mobilizing the scientific community into this R&D effort? I don't understand that at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mechanism -- first of all, if you notice in the President's speech last night, he called upon the entire scientific community to help us in this whole endeavor. But, specifically, the decision directive that my colleague spoke of just a moment ago will begin the process by initiating an interagency effort and I think implicit in that is bringing into the process of defining the R&D program as well as carrying it out the broadest possible scientific expertise -- academic, federal laboratories and government scientific capability that we have. This is a tough job and it's going to take the entire capability that we have.

Q -- federal grants to colleges and universities towards this program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it means altering them in any way. The basic research that we have today will certainly continue because that's the, if you wish, the salt source of tomorrow's talent. But most certainly, I am certain that the various government agencies that will be involved in this will be providing funds to academic institutions, to federal laboratories and whatever to do the generic research that will be associated with this.

Q Will this effort -- to you or the Pentagon or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly not me. I am an adviser to the President, not a process --

Q Well, I mean, who is going to coordinate and pull this all together? Is it Defense or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Department of Defense and other agencies such as the Department of Energy that maintain large commitments to advanced military R&D will be involved. I think, ultimately, the Department of Defense will be the primary leadership.

Q If you're talking about a massive new national effort here, as the President was last night, and you just said it will involve grants to scientists to get the right kind of research done, how can it now involve a large additional amount of money in the budget for the current year, let's say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's put it in perspective because it's absolutely impossible for us to give you a dollar figure when the President just said we need to step out and define the optimum R&D program to achieve this goal many years from now. But put it in perspective. Today we are spending about a billion dollars in the Department of Defense across the entire complement of ballistic -- anti-ballistic missile technologies and the advanced technologies, the generic technologies

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that will be required for tomorrow's systems. That encompasses a very, very broad program and a rather massive R&D effort. And, I think, when we look at this, we've got to look at that as a baseline. You're not going to multiply that by a factor of five because you don't really know enough --

Q It wasn't clear from what you said last night on that one billion dollars whether you're encompassing just BMD technology or beam and laser technology which goes beyond BMD --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That includes the Army ballistic missile development program. The advanced technology development in DARPA and the various service directed energy programs.

(?) Defense Advanced research pro[illegible] agency.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The less traditional parts are about a quarter of a billion and the more traditional, and I'm not using the word "conventional" because of conventional nuclear confusion. The more traditional approaches are about three-quarter of that billion. The less traditional, more advanced approach is one-quarter.

Q What I'm trying to get at is whether the one billion focuses on BMD because there is other aspects of beam technology too that are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is encompassed in that billion dollar is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- laser technology, microwave technology, particle beam technology and projectile technology -- traditional BMD missiles.

Q The breakdown you just gave, was it the projectile tends to take up three-quarters of a billion and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's -- the more advanced ideas are only a fraction, like a quarter of that billion.

Q And that quarter of a billion --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The others are --

Q -- the laser, the beam --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The generic -- let me clarify a bit, if I may. The generic is a quarter of a billion. About half a billion is the traditional BMD that is being carried out by the army.

Q Is there any area where this will -- that you try to concentrate on? In other words, are they going to concentrate on the BMD thing, or like, for example, the experimentation that's going on in Huntsville right now? Or are they going to concentrate on directed energy weapons? It seems to be very vague. Or are you going to take it in all and put the money in everything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me be specific. Let's use the jargon of the past. This is not site defense or terminal defense that the President is describing. It

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is the broad goal of being able to have a comprehensive ballistic missile defense capability as a first, big step towards to reduced reliance upon a sure destruction. And that means bold, new technologies.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me add -- It's essentially -- (inaudible) -- impression of prioritizing. First, prioritizing within advance concepts that will be worked out. And that's why the thing will grow gradually. As my colleague indicated, 403 existing funds will cover this period of working more prioritizing. Second, prioritizing overall. And that's where the President's decision comes in, opening up the door to what was -- could be doctrinal opposition, reluctance to really explore more vigorously this whole avenue of strategic stability --

Q You couldn't then say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- putting in greater emphasis, then, will over the years induce the Defense Department, the Department of Energy to allocate the resources, once meritorious priorities have been identified.

Q You couldn't then say it was a crash program or you couldn't say it was a Manhattan Project or the war-on-cancer type of thing. But I'd like to ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- talk Manhattan, if you wish.

Q -- was the purpose of the President's speech last night to sell the F-184 defense budget or to lay the groundwork for a new, and as yet undefined, program whose costs are unknown. And, in retrospect, do you believe that including the latter may have dissipated any impact of the former?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, in the first part of it, the short answer is yes. The President, in a traditional format, stated the problem, what we're up -- (inaudible) -- and his solution, how to cope. The second one -- I disagree with your characterization of it, that is a crash program, a massive program. I think that to talk in programmatic terms really misses at least the President's motive in what he said last night.

The President wanted to get the attention of several constituencies, the American people, the Congress and so forth, on a very important public policy issue. Now, clearly, today, when one looks at any given newspaper, you're going to find some expression of interest or concern in nuclear policy every day.

Now, it probably, the President felt strongly, would have been the wrong way to lead to announce throwing a pot full of money in a new direction before you had established the understanding of what you're trying to do here. Now, what is it he's trying to do? On that score, it's the President's very strong belief that continued, exclusive reliance upon threatening people, upon offense for deterrence is simply, over time, an unacceptable exclusive basis for deterrence, that people's perceptions of an apparent, interminable preoccupation with building offense isn't sufficient leadership, that you've got to provide some hope -- this is what my colleague underscored -- hope that there can be something which doesn't threaten other countries, doesn't threaten their territory, but, indeed, promises to defend us.

So, it was this getting of attention, engendering of a debate, posing of an alternative to offense alone. Now, the President didn't do that waking up one morning and deciding it was a good idea. As my colleagues mentioned, it goes back to his earliest days.

It predates the President's election. The chiefs meeting with him six weeks ago was a trigger, but it was a trigger that hit upon very mature thinking in the President's mind on this, mature also in the sense that he's very conscious of the problems here. I mean, any time a country relies for a generation on a doctrine for deterrence, you establish commitments. And you make commitments based upon that doctrine. The commitments endure. So, you've got to be concerned about that. The Europeans rely upon American strategic offensive power. Therefore, it's very clear that those commitments which endure

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must be underwritten as you go with this research effort. And the President is absolutely firmly committed, and has corresponded with his counterparts overseas on this score underlining our commitment.

Q I question whether there is anything really new in substance in the President's approach, because all of us -- and some here know much better than I -- are aware, as Judge Clark referred, of the past research and the past extensive work over a long period of time looking toward the space-based lasers and other forms of so-called "futuristic," ballistic missile defense. It is not an idea that just spawned itself. There was a considerable amount of money spent on it, and effort. I do not see, really -- in a substantive fashion, where this takes us beyond where we probably would have gone anyway. Most of the people I have talked to projected that this would become a realistic operational system -- this type of thing -- about the end of this century. So where does this take us beyond where we have been before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a matter of emphasis.

Q Just calling attention to it?

Q But there is no money in it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prioritizing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have fiscal years ahead of us, 16 fiscal years ahead of us in this century.

Q But we will be moving in this direction.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, I would say that your portrayal of what is going to happen in the next few years is an accurate one. But I would ask you -- and I think this is really the point: Does anybody expect that this enertial investment -- year by year by year -- could ever materialize into anything without being elevated to a conscious, public-policy debate on the issue? Of course not.

And it was to engender -- not to dictate, not to impose, not to arbitrarily decide -- but to invite consideration before we go ahead with this program, before we reach the point where these technologies mature.

Q Spread through the length of this, there have been, in the last year, reports by -- and others that there has been some demonstration project. Can you give us some technical details about what is going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me answer a little bit of the last in this question. First, there has been no single, specific breakthrough that prompted this initiative by the President. On the other hand, let us look at the last five years. There have been remarkable advances in a number of the underlying technologies, the most obvious one of which is microprocessor technology. There have been major advances in segmented optics, major advances in aiming and tracking systems that have begun to make this look much more feasible.

But let me back up a second. I beg to differ on one point. We do not have a program and we never have had a program that had any prognosis for success toward this goal in the Year 2000. Last year, the House proposed action that would, essentially, have seriously and significantly altered the generic program in the Department of Defence over a spirit of frustration that we were not getting ahead. The fact of the matter is, we have not had a clearly stated goal for our programs, which is what the President provided last night. We have not had the total scientific expertise of the nation, by any small means, committed to this endeavor.

And it is a question of elevating it, just as my colleague said. The President is setting out his goals very clearly. And he is asking us all, and the scientific community, to try to devise a program by which we will get there. But we are not going forward.

Q So this is more like Jack Kennedy's saying, "We are going to the moon by '70." Is that right? You are going to have this system by 2000.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President did not say that we would have it by the Year 2000. He said we must have it, because of its importance. He, also, said it is not a short-term task. It is a much longer-term task than the Apollo Program was.

Q You, yourself, said last night "by or around the turn of the century." So it seemed to me that that is what you are projecting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not right. He said that they could not mature before then, so as to setting that as a milestone.

Q I still do not understand, in terms of the difference between the plans that you are now asking to be developed versus the plans that now exist.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to be specific. If you set your goal, as the President did last night, clearly and crystally, then you are going to try to lay out an R&D path that will do both the following. It will attempt to identify the most promising basic technologies whether they be lasers, microwaves, particle beams, whatever. Then, in turn, you will try to lay out a generic program that will develop guidance system definition, whatever optics are required, studying whether you can propagate a laser beam through the atmosphere, that kind of generic technology.

We do not have that type of an encompassing R&D program to get an objective. We have some random --

Q Then, you are, sort of, pursuing a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me give you a Pentagon view on this. As they put the budget together --

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each year. You know, there are many promising proposals which, as you well know, have to be pushed over the edge and cannot be funded because there's only that much room. And as things get moved over the edge, it's a question of priority. And this is really something we -- the nation will do, or is it contrary to our strategic doctrine and therefore, while it looks quite interesting, we really don't have money for it this year, and then you go through that again next year, or only have half the money needed to move it ahead.

Now, with this focus that the President provided, the priority is higher so that we'll move into the budget rather than just falling over the edge.

Q Without in any way questioning all that you've said about the President's deep-seated feeling there must be a better way to defend the country and so forth, isn't this also in a sense or -- a way to have an answer to the kind of yearnings of the people who are backing the nuclear freeze that there might be some way to get away from nuclear weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that's too narrow, frankly. I think, first of all, as a comment on the freeze in particular -- I won't go through my litany -- but the President on that score feels like he is going beyond a freeze. And he has already in his reductions proposals a better answer than the freeze provides. But there are at least two sources of this -- of the timing and substance of this idea. And that is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their presentation, are very clear that when you look out a couple of decades from now, the realities of what is feasible in terms of the Triad become problematical. It isn't that we can't solve the problems, but it is to say that you want to be sure that you have investigated every complement that will enable you to cope with the worsening demands of preserving these systems. And that leads you, naturally, into defensive systems. That -- to take your point, however, it is a requirement of leadership that you look at the -- your concept for security over time and how the other side is maturing in its force posture. And necessarily you must evaluate how that changing balance is viewed by your own body politic and others.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there's a second important part in your question, to which I think we all would emphatically say the answer is yes. It is a response not to the politics of the freeze movement or -- but to the yearning that all people with common sense have to be -- which the President emphatically shares with all of us who have common sense -- to make an effort to free us of this present human condition of having the overhand of large missile arsenals that could destroy our society, the Soviet society in -- with time scales measured in 30 minutes and that that condition is not something that can be -- should be tolerated and that a major effort ought to be made to find a path out of it. And I think in that sense the President was very much responsive to what people feel because --

Q -- psychology --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- he shares, obviously, that view.

Q To make this all come about, history has shown us that you have to centralize your efforts, like in Project Apollo. What are we doing to make certain that this is going to be centralized rather than a bunch of disjointed studies and disjointed services and agencies and what have you working at several different directions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely, that's at the heart of how you assure that you meet your milestones and succeed, ultimately. The President's directive is in two phases, and the first phase is to ask the Secretary of Defense, working with others here in the Executive Branch, to define a plan. Now, that plan definition will, indeed, involve through contracts and consultant work the advice of outsiders. Now, that is laying out the spectrum together with the evaluation of their promise, risks, costs, so forth. At that point you reach a decision point. The President reviews that; then, with the advice of the Secretary as well as the other members of the NSC, make choices which are both resource allocation choices that are keyed to milestones over time.

That, then, cranks in to the budget process, and you are in Phase II.

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Now, Phase II is not simply a kind of an implementation, per se. It is continuing to evaluate the several things you have chosen, priorities, and it is subject to change as certain things you hoped for don't prove and others come on strain. But that's --

Q How far away -- excuse me.

Q In what sense --

Q Let me follow up. Please let me follow up. How far away is Phase II -- find us getting into a budget process, identifying an office, someone to run the program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They anticipate that Phase I would require through the balance of this fiscal year.

Q I was going to ask: Where do you feel that you come into constraints in the ABM Treaty, which does have constraints on development -- not on research but on development -- in space, in mobile systems, things of that nature? It does specifically talk about that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you have to explore when you get there and address that when something concrete arises in terms of testing or development.

Q But how far away do you feel you might be before you come up upon those constraints on development -- not on deployment but on development -- that are in the --

Q What about the budget implications for the out years?

Q Wait, let him answer the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You said it's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You almost said 10 years, didn't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly it's a period of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- ballpark?

SENIOR ADMIN~~ISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- guess.~~

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can't tell specifically, but we can certainly say that it's of the order of five, ten years. And in that sense I think we can certainly say that we have ample time to consider steps to take at that time, ample time to discuss it with the Soviets.

Q Sir, can I --

Q Hill testimony --

Q Could I just clarify one point here? If we're prioritizing, presumably we're doing more than we would have done otherwise. So that means we're going to spend more than we otherwise would have spent. But what is the actual extent of this additional commitment in dollar terms that you project over this year and next year and the next five years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- what the purpose of the Phase I effort is. You are --

Q You don't know at this point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Much like the President explained how the budget is made in his speech, you don't start with a figure and then fill it in from below. You look at what the concrete requirements are that are justified, and then you add it

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up and see whether that can fit into the budget.

Q Well, everybody says this could be incredibly expensive, that it would just pale in terms of expenditures beside the Manhattan Project --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whatever NASA does tends to be expensive. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me add something before -- I think it's -- we've got to understand that the program we have today is subcritical in the sense of meeting an objective on a given time scale. And what we're talking about is trying to drive the program to a critical level. And the reason that I offered you the billion-dollar reference point before is to say this billion dollars is a subcritical program. And now we are taking the steps to find out exactly where the priorities are and what the optimum program should be.

Q May I ask you a question that I hope has a short answer? What is the scientific basis for your conviction that you can erect a defense system that cannot be overwhelmed by an offense? First of all, you are suggesting something unique in history.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, that somewhat overstates the precise objective that the President made. The President's point is not that he is confident today that we can erect an impenetrable barrier to ballistic missiles. His point is that we must try to rely less exclusively on offensive systems. That's it. The -- go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Secondly, a meaningful -- not necessarily watertight -- defense is not unique in history, as you, of course, know of many historic examples of defense -- defensive systems working. And within the --

Q Did you ever hear of a war being won by defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The objective is not the war being won. The objective is to free, to some extent, our society of this threat; to reduce the threat, at least; to reduce the danger to the American people in the long term, for the next century.

Q Hill testimony has always --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the allies, of course, too.

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Q Hill testimony has always indicated that the Soviet Union is spending more on BMD and HEO projects than we are. Do you agree with that proposition? It's really a three-part question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You do agree that they are spending more.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You do also agree -- I figure that such a system would have terrific balance of power impact. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the issue of assuring

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that the maintenance of stable deterrence is what must govern any implementation or adaptation of these technologies and ultimate systems into our defense.

Now, that's another way of saying that if and when these technologies prove out, before deployment you have got to stop and look at the several policy approaches to going ahead or not going ahead -- arms control and so forth.

Q If we agree that the military utility of such a system is terrific, then why don't we just re-bill the whole exercise as the militarization of space, keeping pace with what we agree is Soviet superiority in a field that's very important to us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, you couldn't make that value judgment that that is a possible accomplishment, that today you could simply say we will have this by 1990 and do it with any confidence that you could get there.

Q What I'm saying, we're impelled, at least in part, by the fear that the Soviet Union will get there first -- let's draw our own conclusions after that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I offer you one perspective. I don't think the Soviet Union's program, a careful analysis of the Soviet Union's program, to the best of our abilities, would indicate that the Soviet Union is likely to get there in the near future either. What the President is really trying to do here is to lead us more toward a reliance upon defense. I think it is not impossible that the Soviet Union would also choose to pursue the same emphasis. But we are not looking for a magic bullet, a silver bullet. This will be a very tough job. I do not think the United States nor the Soviet Union is going to reach into a hat and pull out a destabilizing solution suddenly.

We're talking about a long-term of technology development. I think it is very likely that both we and the Soviet Union, considering the state of technology transfers, if you wish, today, would develop whatever capability was deemed effective in the same general period of time.

Q But our Air Force officials have said several times in interviews that the Soviets could have a working laser weapon, they deem it a crude one, but a working laser weapon of some kind, by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anti-satellite, very simple mission --

Q -- a weapon, introduction of the laser as a weapon by around 1990.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anti-satellite -- the President is not discussing anti-satellite technology. The anti-satellite mission is something we have -- both nations have known how to do for many, many years.

Q Will this project have anything to do with defense against cruise missiles -- is that a big -- on this whole --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the speech the reference is to ballistic, strategic ballistic missiles.

Q If we're talking about shooting down missiles in the boost phase, as I presume we are, and this relates to a question asked by someone earlier, are we not talking about space-based weaponry and would this not be a breach of an international treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It depends what it is. The treaty against putting the weapons in orbit were -- weapons of mass destruction is a valid treaty to which we are party. Putting other systems, not weapons of mass destruction, would not be affected by that treaty.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The likelihood of it -- implying that there would be nuclear weapons in space is so low as to be negligible. I think large numbers of -- large fraction of members of the scientific community have been looking for some time in great detail at directed energy systems based on the ground using nothing in space more than a directable mirror, for example.

The concept of putting nuclear weapons in space is only marginally consistent in any stretch of the imagination with what we are discussing here.

MS. SMALL: We're going to have to wind this up. Are there any last thoughts that you want to leave with this group and then we're going to adjourn.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just come back to, again, the President's motive in this was basically a motive of offering hope.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- a note of history. Some of you will recall that we had discussions in the late '60's with the Soviets where they were quite upset that we seemed to put so much emphasis on stopping defensive systems instead of stopping offensive systems. So we should not foreclose the possiblity that within the next decades, through our arms control negotiations, we can develop a larger convergance and a strategic philosophy which would help force the Soviets and us to reduce the offensive systems and get the more stable arrangement.

MS. SMALL: Anything else you want to say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me make one comment. The question came up before about inflexible -- the inflexibility of defense. I think you do have to realize that that's part of the challenge. We are -- Maginot Line concept, if you wish, just demonstrates that defensive systems have traditionally been lethargic and offensive systems have traditionally been aggressive.

Necessarily, we are forced to find a system that has expanded flexibility that could readily defeat an extrapolation of a generation or two or three or four in Soviet technology.

It is a broad goal. It must be a flexibile defense. And I agree, that is one of the most difficult aspects of the system.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, one of the most important points that I think was made here and maybe we understated, my colleague just said it again, and that is that a terribly important part of the President's thinking is this -- is that if we do succeed, even partially, the value in an arms control context and in a rather novel arms control context are enormous -- that is for a more comprehensive approach affecting offensive and strategic systems.

Thank you.

END 10:47 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DEFENSE
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

March 24, 1983

The Briefing Room

12:45 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I could answer any question, I'd be happy to do so.

Q What does the directive say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The directive is not yet final and until the President signs it, of course, we won't know specifically and so I think I'll just have to leave it at that for the moment.

Q In general.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In general terms, it will direct what he said he was directing in the speech last night.

Q Direct who?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be directing the Executive Branch of the government to take those actions that are necessary.

Q I'm glad this is all on background. (Laughter).

Q What can we expect to happen here when there's apparently no money allocated beyond what's already in the budget for research and development? How is what he's asking for different than what's going on anyway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're going to define a very specific plan and that will include the technical and schedule factors and related to that the cost factors. We don't know -- have the precise work-out on that yet; but chances are it will first show up in the budget in a realistic way in the FY '85 budget.

Q How much would you be asking for? Any idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not yet.

Q But I mean, if there's a billion there now, would that be doubled, tripled? I mean, give us some ballpark --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The real answer is, we don't know the real ballpark. I can scope it broadly. I don't mean to -- it'll sound perhaps trivial and if you excuse me; but it will certainly be a measurable increase over what we spend today on these matters. My guess is that in terms of the defense budget overall, however, it will not make a substantial change in that budget. But I must say that we really don't know with precision yet. We hope to know soon.

Q All that money would be for what could be called "pure research," "applied research," what --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Research and development.

Q Can I ask why did the President decide to do this now? Why not last week, last month, next year? What's so important about doing it today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak precisely for the President. Let me give my impressions. Of course, one thing is clear. The President is genuinely -- seriously interested in reducing the risk of nuclear war. It's a matter that's been on his mind since he's been in the administration. He's pushing arms control. And I'm sure you're well aware of the arms control proposals we have.

He has been receiving advice from his various National Security Advisors, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have indicated to him that the -- we have to start looking to the future, the longer-term future to somehow or other get out of this mold where our populations are hostage to nuclear terror, the nuclear environment --

Q When did those advisors make that point? Last week? Last --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there have been advisors who, in one way or another, have been -- or individuals who have been making points for a period of time. But I would say that it's -- it came to a head in February.

Q In what way? I mean, why? Was there a meeting? Was there -- What came to a head? Was there a report? Was there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were various meetings, including a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q As a result of the MX --

Q With new data?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q As a reuslt of the MX Commission --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not related to the MX Commission at all.

Q Well, we were told last night by Mr. McFarlane that there was a relationship to failure to find some kind of a basing mode.

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Q -- the Joint Chiefs, he said --

Q The Joint Chiefs came in and said, "We've got to take a look at these -- the technological systems now that we've had this problem --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but we must understand that what we're talking about in terms of the technological systems, we're really talking about the longer-term future, a couple of decades, turn of the century and the MX is in a near-term environment framework relative to that.

Q But trying to set the context, to follow up on David's question --

Q From your point of view, are we talking about laser beams here or are these satellites? What are the systems?

Q We just want to clarify what Mr. McFarlane said last night about whatever relationship this may have to the scientific problems related to MX basing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I personally don't see

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any relationship between what we are going to attempt to do here and the MX Commission.

Q No. I mean, the decision to initiate this now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I, personally, do not see any relationship. We are looking to the long-term future, trying to make some major change, get away from over-reliance on offensive weapons with the terrors associated with it, and try to have defensive systems which reduce the risk of war.

Q As I understand it, the ABM Treaty not only bars deployment of defensive systems, but also some types of development of those systems -- "development" being a really vague word used to even include testing and that sort of thing, which I think does come under the prohibition of the ABM Treaty.

What steps are you going to take to assure the Soviets, as we were told last night, that whatever this administration does will not, in fact, abrogate the ABM Treaty?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our program will, as the President has stated, be consistent with the obligations of the ABM Treaty. That is a Presidential statement. And, in addition, of course we are in consultations with our allies and, obviously, with the Congress. And, obviously, we will be with the Soviets.

So whatever we do in this R&D effort will be consistent with the terms of the AMB Treaty. If these technologies downstream -- again, I have to emphasize this is longer-term, not near-term -- if these technologies look like they could bear fruit in terms of providing effective defense, then what we would hope is that there would be incentive for us and the Soviets to sit down and talk about a very broad arms control regime.

Q If I could follow that up? Could you be a little more specific and, also, address the question of whether of not you are, in fact, bumping up against some the limits imposed by the ABM Treaty in proceeding with development which might entail testing and that sort of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, this will all be defined in the program plan. Again, I will emphasize that the President has stated what we do will be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

Q Sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am?

Q In light of the importance of this and in light of the problem that the press seem to have this morning actually understanding the significance and explaining it to the population, is the President going to do anything to lead the nation to understand a little bit more fully what the importance of all of this is? I mean, the sort of thing that JFK did on the space program and so forth. Is he planning to go to the nation again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The question had to do with is the President going to do more help clarify -- or are we going to do more.

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Of course, I think the President's speech was extremely important. He kicked it off personally with his own, personal speech. So it is straight from the President. And we will, of course, as time and events unfold, continue to tell you what we are going to do.

Q Was there any thought given to the coupling of his speech in terms of concentrating only on the Soviet threat, and having a separate speech on this new proposal? Some of the Congressional hawks this morning on the Hill are quite disappointed. They feel that the new proposal really overshadowed what they wanted the President to do, which was to graphically demonstrate the scope of the Soviet threat.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot answer that with confidence, because it was the President's decision on the speech. But from my working standpoint, that aspect was always planned to be incorporated in the speech. For the time, the President has made his decision on that particular aspect.

Q Defense Department officials have said, over the past couple of years, that these weapons are "turn-of-the-century" ideas -- around the Year 2000. And they envision massive expenditures to develop them. Now, you are talking about something that you say will not be a significant part of the Defense budget. That seems awfully inconsistent.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am talking -- in terms of the near-term, our R&D program which the President has directed -- I am not saying it is insignificant. I do not want to mislead you in that respect. I was just simply trying to scope it, because I do not have the numbers. It would certainly be substantial relative to the effort we have now. And how much of a change or perturbation in the Defense budget, I do not know.

Now, so we are really talking in terms of the near-term budgets.

Q Is this in fact a turn-of-the-century --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Definitely. We are talking about decades, not months or weeks.

Yes, sir?

Q As you know, one of your colleagues -- your former colleagues, for more than five years, has been

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screaming for the government to put up the kind of money he says the Soviets have put up in particle beam weapons research. Assuming you're talking about particle beam weapons and/or lasers, is there any reason to believe that any of that technology would be any use against cruise missiles or subrocks fired from submarines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to answer that simply by saying our program as identified by the President is focused on ballistic missiles, which are the most destabilizing in hair-trigger type forces.

Q In other words, no protection against cruise missiles, subrocks, SS-20's programs that fire --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a slightly different question. If I interpreted your first question correctly, is that technology applicable to those systems -- in defeating those systems, or are we focusing on developing means to defeat the systems? So -- but the answer is we are focusing on ballistic missile defense.

Q Which means that this, at least in the way you're currently thinking it through, is no defense against cruise missiles, SS-20's fired to be not so orbital but lower to the ground, and subrocks and other weapons like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, we're looking at ballistic missiles.

Q How much is this thing going to cost by the time it is all over with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't know.

Q What are the Soviets spending now? How far ahead are they if they are already into this kind of research?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to how much they're spending. We do know they've had a massive investment program and research and development program on strategic defense for many, many years.

Q Are they doing the same kind of thing -- are they in danger of bumping up against the limits of the ABM Treaty?

Q You're a fine one to talk. (Laughter.)

Q What was the question?

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question had to do with -- are the dangers -- are the Soviets in danger of bumping up against the limits of the ABM Treaty? I can interpret it that many ways. (Laughter.)

Q Do you see how hard it is to work around here? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I think, if you'll permit me, I'll just finesse it by not saying anything on that.

Q No, no. You addressed the question that the U.S. has no intention of violating an ABM Treaty. The President made that point last night. And we were told last night that the Soviets are already into some kind of this research and your colleague said that he would try to get a figure on the Soviet -- are they doing something now -- are they doing now what President Reagan wants the U.S. to start doing?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have a large across-the-board technology effort on strategic defense.

Q In 1981 General Daniel Graham said that this High Frontier's program could be done in five to six years instead of 15 years if we could eliminate the red tape. What do you think?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't agree with that. It would take much longer. And it's not red tape; it's a matter of technology and systems design and development and so forth.

Q What do you say to those -- some people, including Sam Nunn and others, who are pretty expert on the defense issues, who believe that this is destabilizing, that, in fact, we will go through a period where both sides have offensive and defensive weapons and that it, in fact, encourages first-strike capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't agree with it.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we're looking at a phased approach, again assuming the technologies come to that kind of fruition. We're looking at a phased approach wherein we can start increasing emphasis on defense and decreasing reliance on strategic offensive missiles or any kinds of offensive -- strategic offensive nuclear missiles. And that certainly -- by decreasing the reliance on the strategic offensive missiles certainly moves away from a first strike; in other words, it's in that direction, and --

Q Which --

Q More.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More.

Q I was going to ask -- no, what I wanted to ask is, can you conceive of either super power ever relying completely on a defensive system, an untested defensive system, and giving up all offensive weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's -- if you'll permit me, in a sense that's a hypothetical question and I would -- having been in the R&D business, I would prefer not to try to answer. All I know is there are a lot of knowns and there are a lot of unknowns, and only time will tell how this turns out.

Q Could you tell us what the differences between defensive and offensive weapons are in this case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. An offensive weapon, which is a retalitatory weapon, would be such as our intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine-launched missiles. The idea behind deterrence is that we could have force sufficient to survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate against the Soviets and thus, if we had that kind of a force, we hope to deter the

Soviets from striking in the first place. The cost then would be higher than the gains.

Q Would you say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The defensive system is one that could destroy an incoming missile.

Q Would you say that it would be correct to assume that the Defense Department and you have no idea at the moment what exact form these weapons will take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not crazy about the absolute no idea, but let's say that it is truly premature to start talking about system and force configurations, just far too early.

Q But what system --

Q -- weapons, that they were talking about last night, which your colleague was talking about, laser beams, et cetera. What's the difference between an offensive laser beam in space and a defensive laser beam in space?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, in terms of a defensive sytem, we would be talking about a system that could intercept and destroy a missile which was targeted against us or our allies, as it was implying.

Q Could it also not be used as an offensive weapon to destroy anything on the ground?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It seems highly unlikely to me. In other words, a missile flying exo-atmospheric is, relatively speaking, compared to, say, a bunker on the ground, is a vulnerable target, a soft target.

Q Could it not also be used offensively to shoot down satellites?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of could, the answer is yes -- could. In other words, there's a physical possibility; but not as an attack against armed targets.

MR. SPEAKES: He's going to be here a while. Let's go one at a time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You have the atmosphere and you have hardening and so forth, so on.

MR. SPEAKES: Go Timberg and then Weisman.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q Elaborating on my colleague's question, when he talked about cruise missiles and you said you're not focusing on that, does that mean that even if this plan comes to fruition that cruise missiles can still make their way to the United States below this curtain? And what are we doing about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the present time, our defense against any kind of attacking vehicle is at best minimal. We have very, very little defense against weapons of any kind that would be earmarked to attack the United States.

Q Okay. But if you can shoot down the ballistic missiles when they still have the cruise missiles, then what have you accomplished?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, we would be looking eventually to an entire arms control regime, but again the initial focus must be, and is, on those systems which pose the greatest danger of mankind in terms of triggering nuclear wars. And that's where our challenge is at the moment and that's where we're focusing.

Q Just following --

Q -- President Reagan asked for a postponement the week before last of the Senate Budget Committee's consideration of the budget. He said that -- in his letter to Senator Baker, that the reason -- or a main reason for that was because of some decisions that he had to make and, perhaps, announce on defense issues that would affect the budget. I assume this was one of them. The question is: Is this the only one, or do you have some more that he will be announcing that will affect the budget -- the defense budget for the next year or the next couple of years? Is this what he was talking about in that letter?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of defense, my -- I know of nothing else specifically in terms of defense.

Q So the natural follow-up to that is: If the impact on the budget is so minimal, as you say, what was the rationale for saying that that was the reason to hold up the whole consideration of the defense budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not ready to acknowledge that the impact on the budget is minimal.

Q I thought that's what you already had acknowledged.

Q You said for '84.

Q He said at fiscal '85 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, excuse me. I'm sorry. I misinterpreted your question. I thought you meant in terms of Congressional deliberations.

Q Yes, well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the '84 budget. My apologies --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q No, you said in the '85 budget.

Q You said --

Q You said there was a measurable increase over the one billion probably but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. No, maybe I misunderstood. What I'm --

Q -- in terms of the whole budget, it would be minimal.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought the gentleman was asking in terms -- so I may have misinterpreted the question. I thought what -- my answers to your earlier questions stand. I thought what you were asking was, was this intended to sort of have an impact on the Congress in terms of how they deal with the FY '84 budget.

Q Yes, I may not have been clear. What I'm asking is: The President made a big deal of asking the Senate to postpone its consideration of the budget because he had some decisions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The FY '84 budget.

Q The FY '84 budget. Now here we have the decision, but you're telling us it has no real impact on the '84 budget. So why did he want -- why did he say that he wanted a postponement in order to make this decision or announcement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think there's a technical connection in the sense of -- this decision obviously does not relate to the '84 budget figures. But I think the President's message last night was

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the imperative of strengthening our defenses and, also -- with respect to this specific initiative -- to give some vision, to break through the morass of the kind of situation we all have to live under today, to show some vision of hope for the future, some way we can again reduce the risk of nuclear war in addition to arms control. We are still pursuing arms control.

Q Following on the earlier question that this system is being focused at ballistic missiles and leaves us still vulnerable to cruise missiles even after you complete it, won't that just have the effect of shifting the offensive arms race rather than eliminating it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, one has to recognize that the ballistic missiles are truly the most threatening, because they are very fast-flying systems. I think -- 20 minutes, so forth, so on.

Whereas, aerodynamic systems are measured in hours, many hours. And there is a big differences in terms. However, there will be, undoubtedly, a broad scheme that takes this into account. And it will include, hopefully, an arms control regime that brings it all down.

Q You said that you disagreed with part of a colleagues analysis through the High Frontier Program.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The time frame.

Q Yes, sir.

Now, what is your overall evaluation of that. Are you opposed to most of it, or a part of it, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My personal view is that many of his points are good. But some of his points, I did not agree with. And certain things, I thought could stand improvement. Nevertheless, it is --

Q Overall, you say it is a good idea.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

I am saying what I am saying: some good, some areas of improvement. And I want to emphasize, again, that the President's program is not pinpointed to any particular system. It is across-the-board and would look for the optimum approach to this.

Q You said a moment ago, "Our defense against any kind of attacking vehicle is, at best, minimal." The kind of vehicle you were speaking about specifically is cruise missiles and/or -- what else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Aeroplanes and missiles. Ballistic missiles, aircraft, and cruise missiles.

Q We only have a minimal defense against incoming aircraft now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q Being used --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that is -- I am talking about actually knocking down attacking aircraft. All the -- are gone. Our air defense force is very, very small. We are trying to improve our air defense force, the President is. But we do not have a major air defense force.

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Q I, also, want to pursue one clarification on the High Frontier point. And then, I had another question, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q The most recent proposals that High Frontier has put out that I have seen really have nothing to do with laser, particle beams -- weapons and so forth. It really is just off-the-shelf technologies. So it really does not have any relationship to what the President proposed as far as I can see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I will repeat, as far as our analysis is concerned, the kinds of technologies that have to be brought to bear is measured in years, many years, not months and weeks.

Q That being the case, the other question that I had is, the same technologies that we would have to invest in, in terms of research to achieve this kind of defensive capability, are the same technologies we ought to be investing in to achieve things like fusion power, is that not the case? Is that being taken into account here, that this is going to actually have an effect on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There can be some relationship within the scientific community. But, again, this program is focused on defense against ballistic missiles.

Q Just to clarify, if we came up with a system that was effective against ballistic missiles, is there any reason why it could not be used against the cruise missile?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know you will not like the answer. But the real answer is: it all depends. That is the real answer.

Q On what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is the real answer.

Q On what does it depend?

Q Whether it works or not.

Q On what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whether it works -- (laughter) -- what it works against.

No. This is really what it is. Whether it works; what it works against. For example, just to give you a notional idea, is it exo-atmospheric or indo-atmospheric? In other words, if it is a system that can operate effectively only against matters which are in space where there is no atmosphere, that is one matter. If it is a system that can operate against systems both in space or within the atmosphere, that is a different matter. And that is the real world. That is not cop-out.

Q What has happened in the last year or two that would call for a reversal of the policy of the last several Presidents of depending on mutual deterrence?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1980 Elections.

THE PRESS: Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They elected a man with some leadership and vision.

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Q Sir, when does the ABM Treaty expire?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We just completed an ABM Treaty review. We review it every five years, I believe it is. And I think it is an indefinite treaty. I believe there is a review every five years.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:10 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary Draft

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADDRESS

March 24, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

2:08 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, Karna. Thank you for joining us today. I'll open and then we have two technicians here -- my colleague, who's been closely involved in the address and initiative announced last night.

But let me say, as Karna just suggested -- little of the background, the President's thinking, concern -- I think really last night's address, which I'm sure you're acquainted with, was prompted by two concerns on the part of the President. One, he's felt for some time that the major and extent of the Soviet threat has simply not gotten through to the American people and, I think, obviously, not gotten through to some members of the Congress, that there's been too much of overreaction and almost -- some call it knee-jerk reaction -- to the arithmetic involved in the defense budget, that it's hard to justify any set of figures until the threat, and, therefore, the need, is explained.

And, as you've heard the President, and before that, Governor Reagan state, "Give the American people the facts and they're going to do the correct thing." And that was his idea last night for the first, shall we say, two-thirds of the address. Not much time in which to do that. But there are many facts and figures we would like to have put in, drawn in part from Cap's recent volume -- I hope you've seen -- The Soviet Threat.

And he, I might add, was editing, particularly that part of the draft, up to an hour before delivery. Apparently there were advance copies in places because I understand some reporters relied on other drafts, on material that simply was not in the final. But the last third was prompted again by the President's concern, going back months, if not years, to the interminable build up of offensive nuclear arms, without much apparent hope of ending or diverting that particular race.

Some weeks ago at a routine meeting here in the White House with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the give-and-take that these meetings have taken on, very productive meetings. And Chiefs come in and in their independent duty of direct counsel as military advisers to the President, the thought of, and not necessaril a new one, spread -- My colleague will explain. But going back, some arenas here, ten years, the thought of going from the spear to the shield idea was brought up, surfaced by the Chiefs jointly in unity.

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The President's interest rose immediately. He asked for further information and, in the intervening weeks, on a rather close-holed basis,this theory was further developed. Obviously close-holed because none of you wrote about it, but -- Sometimes our system does work. (Laughter.) And, in full knowledge of some of the shortcomings or what would certainly be reported as shortcomings, he asked that we go forward in preparation of last night's announcement. The shortcomings, of course, being does this violate existing treaties, particularly in the ABM area; would this not call forth the allegation that we are abandoning our Allies toward creating a fortress America; other things that I think we've all heard in the hours since his announcement last night.

But even in the recognition of those allegations, he wanted to go forward in the hope that we can truly show an end to the offensive ballistic race.

With that introduction, I'd like to turn it back to you for questions you may have for either Jay or Fred.

Q Well, I have kind of a far out question, but, in terms of ending the race and not being destabilizing and dealing with all those arguments that you have heard already, I'm sure, in previous briefings and you heard last night, let's assume you have some big breakthrough, some kind of timetable of your own choosing, would you be willing to share that technology with the rest of the world, including the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We certainly want to include the Allies, as the President made clear in his speech, in these developments and work with them to maintain the reality of our commitment, of our nuclear umbrella. And, if there is going to be the possibility for a change to a more stable relationship where the offensive missile arsenals are less prominent because of defenses, we would want the Allies included.

Would we want to share it with the Russians? We'd have to see the reasons why. Under extraordinary circumstances of a great deal of progress in opening up and reduction in secrecy and verification, at the kind of an end phase of a major arms control development in the next century, it's possible. For the more near term foreseeable future, we are in a competitive relationship and the Soviets are doing well enough getting their hands on our technology and scientific developments without us voluntarily sharing it.

Q Well, I meant in the sense that, you know, the idea being that, if you achieve the breakthrough and have the capability that you want to have, then the argument goes it's not stabilizing, it's destabilizing because you can destroy all their incoming missiles which, theoretically, would leave them open to a strike which they could not counter.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, the Soviets have, if you're talking about ballistic missiles, the Soviets have other deterrent forces, aerodynamic aircraft or they're building cruise missiles.

Second, we could, if there was such a technological breakthrough that you postulated, we would probably want to pause. Congress would be involved, and the deployment, the full deployment might take a long time. And, meanwhile, we might develop, would hopefully develop jointly with the Soviets a schedule for progress in reducing the offensive missile forces, so that neither ours nor theirs are threatening to the other side.

Q Do you know for a fact who leads in this outer space competition in laser beams, et cetera? And, if not, could you give us a judgment on who may lead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: There are some areas where one side leads, and some where the other. Maybe -- Do you want to address this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's fair to say that the Soviet effort is somewhat larger than our own. There are some areas where they are ahead, and some where we are ahead. But their effort is definitely somewhat larger. I think the point to emphasize, though, is the fact that neither one of us

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are anywhere near achieving the objectives that the President has stated in his talk last night.

Q Why is the Soviet effort larger? Why has it been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's larger investments. You might ask why is their investment in strategic forces three times as large as ours? Why is their investment in conventional forces 70 percent larger than ours? These are the points the President made in his overall speech yesterday.

Q Then you've been denied --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You remember the table he had on how many tanks they build, how many we build. You can ask a question why --

Q I just meant it as outer space.

Have you been denied requests for outer space research?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have to allocate our resources overall, and we have a ceiling on the defense budget, so it's a question of priorities. We cannot argue that we made a top priority of additional money for outer space because we had other priorities. You saw the tables on tanks, missiles and so on that the President showed last night.

Precisely what the President's instruction to us now does is encourage or guide us to establish a higher priority for efforts in this area.

Q The question I would have is: If you're not allowing any more new money for this specific project, in either this budget or next year's budget, and you do have money in the budget this year -- a billion dollars overall -- to study this technology, what difference is there now than there was before the President made his speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's take several things. One of the reasons why we have been emphasizing so much the nature -- the requirement to define an R&D program is -- basically is that the nation's effort right now is what I would call a subcritical effort. We are pursuing some promising technologies that would ultimately be required to meet this goal. But we do not have a national program to meet this goal. We feel that it is necessary to draw upon broad expertise, inside and outside the government, to try to lay out a plan, a program that will get there as rapidly as possible.

And, first of all, first in our minds is to get this prior to development of the fiscal '85 budget because that's crisp implementation. How we get between here and the beginning of the fiscal '85 budget will depend very heavily upon what that plan looks like. There are resources already within the Department of Defense in generic research that underlies this, and we have flexibility between now and the beginning of '85.

Q If the critical thing for you at this point is to get this defense budget through Congress, and there's some doubt in both Houses whether you can get it through, why have this big initiative occupying everyone's attention over what is acknowledged to be a future project? What was the tactic?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, some felt that what we call the last one third of last night's address might detract. The President answered that thought or contention with the answer that he felt that the two approaches, somewhat independent for the moment; additionally, that just as the new approach offered the idea of hope to him, it would, likewise, do so to the American people; and, shall we say, end up actually complimenting the argument for his proposed budget; and that we were looking for new alternatives to old theories, as they say, the spear and shield idea and -- but, while early on we felt that, as I say, the one would detract from the other, on balance, he felt it wouldn't, and I don't think it will.

Q Could I ask you to develop a little bit more the genesis of the idea in the President's address and specifically what it has in common with the High Frontier proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What it has in common with the High Frontier proposal, the High Frontier proposal, which is, as I understand it -- and my colleague may wish to speak to this -- a project somewhat outside of the Pentagon, would be only one aspect of the totality. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. Yes, I would say that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a very narrow approach.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- neither the High Frontier nor any other particular specific proposal in any way influenced the President's objectives. I think

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the President's objectives were really establishing the long-term goal of reducing our reliance upon assured destruction.

Now, to be specific, the High Frontier Report refers to a system of approximately 400 satellites that would use, essentially, infrared-seeking missiles to hit incoming ICBMs. It is an approach to the problem.

The President has not been led to this statement and initiative last night by any particular technological approach. The thing that is common is that the very spirit that led people to initiate the High Frontier Report -- the desire eventually or hold out as a goal the eventual withdrawal from mutual assured destruction -- was the same goal.

Q Has the President spoken to General Graham about this as part of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Has the President spoken to General Graham specifically?

No. Other people here have, including myself, very much. And others have talked to General Graham specifically.

Q So he has been involved in the development of this idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did not say that at all. You might say that General Graham, a year ago or so, came and discussed with me in detail the elements of the proposal. There are literally dozens, if not hundreds, of different schemes that people have developed using lasers, projectiles, microwaves, particle beams.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might put it more generally that there were a number of ideas that, in a sense, were lying fallow rather than being tested out, prioritized. And that is precisely what we now have to do -- to start prioritizing, which one of these particular things to pursue in Defense and the Department of Energy.

They were lying fallow because of doctrinal blinders that prevented particularly the government and to some extent the scientists from pursuing this further -- the belief that it was bad to examine the defense against ballistic missiles.

And what the President has opened up here is a vision that this could lead to a better world.

Q I wanted to ask if there is any particular technological development. We heard a couple of weeks ago about the Soviet capability to destroy an American satellite from the ground, maybe with a charged particle beam -- whether it is charged particle, or laser, or anti-satellite technology, anything that has, sort of, been something of a breakthrough which would indicate that this idea had a little more plausibility than it had, I guess, in the first two years of the Reagan administration.

Q An hour before the President went on last night, an unnamed Member of the Congress phoned the White House stating that he had understood that that had, in fact, occurred, and that was what prompted the address last night.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is a categorical no. I do not think any major breakthrough has occurred in the United States or, to the best of our knowledge, in the Soviet Union that particularly prompts this thrust.

But what has happened, and in the last two years, but I would particularly focus attention on the last five years, is what has happened in the whole family of the critical technologies -- and let me just list a few. In data processing, micro-electronics, micro-processors, computers, in aiming and tracking systems, in large optics -- large-scale segmented optics, in our knowledge of visible-wavelength lasers -- across this and many more areas of technology, the speed of evolution has been enormous in the last five years, enormous even looking back on the last 30 years of technological evolution.

And I think the time has come when it most certainly looks reasonable to begin a project whose difficulty is perhaps equivalent to the development of controlled fusion.

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Q Whom are we going to protect this country against with this effort? In other words, we heard about intercontinental ballistic missiles. But are you, also, talking about intercontinental bombers? Are you talking about submarines off the coast? Are you talking about cruise missiles aboard Russian trawlers? What would this program protect this country against? And would there be perfect protection against a nuclear attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The program we are proposing to pursue here is an anti-ballistic missile system. No question. I think, as this first bold step, we should distinguish that very much from the President's general guidance which is to reduce -- our objective goal, hope is to reduce our reliance upon the threat of assured destruction.

But the most serious threat today and the most destabilizing threat unquestionably is the ballistic missile. And that is what we are very much trying to address.

Q Land or sea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Land or sea. Right. And INF as well as ICBMs.

And you asked specifically whether it will have linkage, essentially. Our objective, of course, is to design and develop as flexible

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every conceivable advance we can imagine in ICBM development, in penetration aids, decoys, reduced observability, everything else. Our objective is to design an area defense system that is highly flexible.

Q You made a reference to one aspect of the Frontier, High Frontier proposal, although not all of it. The first phase of it, the more immediate proposal they make is to deploy some 400 satellites, each with a certain number of rockets. But that is only what they call their early stage. They go on then to explore lasers, x-rays, particle, and so on. What do you consider to be some of the more promising routes to take in developing this system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To answer most simplistically, I would say certainly I think the very rapid advances that have occurred in shortwave length lasers are very interesting. But do not deemphasize the very importance of what I was trying to answer in Pat Buchanan's question, the importance of aiming and tracking systems, the importance of improving our infrared detection schemes to distinguish between decoys and real vehicles, for example. These and data processing, these are really underlying critical technologies.

Q I'm still looking for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're looking for me to draw a picture of what it's going to look like.

Q Well, about the picture, I don't expect a picture at this stage. What I'm looking for is to bring this a little bit from the vagueness of something out there in space and all to something that a scientist would talk about is where we see our brightest future is in lasers, or we see our brightest future in terms of particle physics or we see -- I mean, what are the promising --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I try to answer by offering an analogy?

Q Sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In 1951 the nation decided to embark upon a program to develop controlled fusion so we would have cheap, secure, reliable electricity for eons to come from seawater. We had no idea how we were going to obtain that objective. We began by studying all different types of plasma devices. We supported plasma physics throughout America's universities and several laboratories. And we are doing it in the year 1983, 32 years later. I think the difference between that and this is the sense that here there is a far greater urgency. And I wish -- I think we intend to try to design the optimum R&D program and compress it so that it will be available in the --

Q -- the Manhattan Project --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without launching a crash program, now. This is not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The same answer to that question of the Manhattan Project, in one sense, that it is a program such as that but we do not have the kind of urgency we had at a time when we feared that the Germans would get a nuclear weapon before we did.

Q Can I ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's no flavor or intention of a crash program. Fiscal '83 is not going to change the funding. Fiscal '84, we'll look at that. Fiscal '85, well, surely it will -- some of it should begin to show.

But the time horizon is, as the President said, toward the end of this century.

Q Well, is it -- you're not going to increase the '84 budget because you don't know where to put the money or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We might -- we're not yet decide -- it's not clear yet.

Q And, secondly, is there a Defense Department program now that's designed to study all these new technologies and determine whether it is even feasible to proceed with them into 1988, with a 1988 cutoff?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is an active, imaginative, and aggressive program in the Department of Defense to pursue certain technologies. There is not a broad-based program to address this objective by exploring all -- either all alternatives nor all the generic research that would be required to achieve his goal. Yes, we are studying certain types of lasers. We are studying certain types of directed energy concepts. But it is -- that's what I meant --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pieces.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- before when I referred to -- as being subcritical. It is pieces, as my colleague just said. Yes, but it is not a program, and that's the best analogy, was the Manhattan Project. During the Manhattan Project, people went out and measured nuclear cross-sections at the same time they were trying to learn how to separate uranium 235. It was a very broad program. It spread across the country, actually.

Q How do you proceed from here to design this thing? What does this speech set in motion exactly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A directive which we are producing now on an interagency basis, following the President's mandate of last night -- has been working on it, again, in pieces, for the past couple of weeks, but tomorrow if he is satisfied with the proposed decision directive, standard NSC directive, he'll sign it and it'll pass the -- several issues you've suggested here this past hour.

Q He'll sign this directive tomorrow?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Yes. In all probability. That's the schedule.

Q -- is that one of the NS DD's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: GD's, right.

Q A numbered one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Number 80 whatever.

Q Well, can you, just for the -- Does it matter? Can you tell us a number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I may be able to tomorrow. And it may be a non-classified document. That's my hope. Working group on that right now.

Q Has Edward Teller played much of a role in this? Has he had much input? He's been, certainly, speaking publicly in favor of such an approach.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will say personally I have spent an enormous amount of time with Edward Teller on this, as he is a member of our White House Science Council. But let me emphasize, there was no particular technical concept that influenced the President in any way. The President -- if this is a proper thing to say -- was not bureaucratic in his approach to this. The President has a goal and the President drew upon all of his advisors in how best to assess and implement this. But the President was not in any way influenced by bomb-pumped X-ray lasers nor satellites carrying sidewinders nor anything else. The President has a global objective and is trying to provide strategic vision.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He has conferred with Dr. Teller. Dr. Teller was here two months ago. In fact, he was here last night.

Q Teller was saying, you know, that, in fact, there were some advances in the last year or two. He couldn't discuss them because they were classified, that there are some novel schemes being worked up at government laboratories. And I was just wondering if you could give us any sense of just -- of what those refer to.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They refer to the general concept of using the very high energy density of a nuclear weapon to result in directed energy, to be very general about it. And that has been in the press in the past.

On the other hand, I must emphasize there has been no particular technical breakthrough that drove the President to this particular initiative.

Q If you look just for a second on the other side of the mirror, from the Soviet Union's perspective, if the Soviet Union were making a public announcement that they were looking at and forming a program, R&D program, to develop an anti-missile system, would we not think that the Soviet Union was escalating the arms race?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It depends how it is couched. Here it is very clearly couched with the objective of de-escalating the arms race of the competition -- it's not really a two-sided race -- and getting away from the Soviet racing in an offensive missilery. And we will then cut back our offensive missilery or stop adding new ones as we can have the defense-dominant situation.

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Also, recall that the Soviet Union in the late '60's very much favored letting defensive systems go ahead and rather curbing offensive systems. At that time, we talked them out of it because we thought that was wrong.

Q In the real world, though, if the Soviet Union today made an announcement that it was stepping up its defensive systems, would we not have some serious doubt about their want and need for a -- arms reduction? Would we think that it was -- wouldn't we take that to mean that we'd be escalating the arms race? I mean, don't you think they're going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they would -- you know, we would see it in a larger mosaic where we see that they are building so much more. They're spending three times as much as we do in investing in strategic nuclear forces now. They are in that very high plateau, as well as in all the other systems, as the President showed last night.

So additional initiatives there, plus the secrecy that prevails in the Soviet Union, you know, would make us concerned, as we have been concerned about other Soviet programs. And very -- usually there's a good reason. The Soviet Union can observe much more detail, much more openess the thinking that goes on, the funding that takes place, the constraints we impose on ourselves. So this situation is not symmetric.

Q I'd like to get a little time perspective here. If I hear you correctly, you're talking about drawing together some kind of a plan for an organized research and development effort. The plan, if drawn up effectively, might lead to budget requests in FY '84-'85. The R&D would then go on for X number of years, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 years. And you're talking about weapons that we may not see for 10-15-20 years. Is that right? I mean, a lot of us need some kind of a time perspective. We realize you're talking about something vague and projected. This is the nature of science and technology. But we're laymen in this field. And if you're thinking in terms of those blocks of years, it would really be useful if you'd just lay a little bit of that out in more concrete terms. I mean, I've used my terms. I don't want my terms. I want yours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But the President said clearly last night that this was a next century military --

Q But there's a lot between what you may do in FY '84 and the next century. And we're asking you to -- fill in some of the gaps.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I may interject, the reason why it's been couched exactly the way it is is the fact that we all believe, the President believes that we must draw upon all the wisdom and

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expertise of the nation to devise a path that will be most effective. This is a very difficult challenge, comparable to fusion. And we -- The President was calling upon the community of scientists to contribute to this. Necessarily it will take some serious thinking. We will be -- The administration and the Congress will be highly responsive to what will be needed to implement that plan as quickly as possible.

We are very resistent to saying that we will put X dollars as a supplemental in the '84 budget or Y dollars in the '85 budget because we are right now trying to seek the greatest and brightest expertise to make exactly those decisions. We know the goal. We -- I think we have a sense of the urgency, as a very real Presidential commitment. And that is what it is all about.

We do not know the details. We cannot tell you how big the object will be.

Q -- it's a little hard to put together, the 21st century and urgency. I have a problem with that. And I -- That may be the very nature of scientific research but, again, I renew my plea to get some notion between urgency and the 21st century, which sketches out what you all would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- let me give you a perspective here on offensive missiles. Work began, in some senses, in World War II. German scientists came to this country closing the traditions on German developments to our development. And they proceeded on a slow pace initially, then accelerated, particularly accelerated after Sputnik -- ten years, twelve years later with certain difficulties and failures of the Atlas and Titan programs leading to the MX -- to the Minuteman and so on.

What you're looking there is 20, maybe 30 years of work on offensive missilery. And people are still perfecting them. And we're going on to the MX. And, so, it's gone to so many systems. And that path has been open for 30 years.

The path to working on defenses against offensive missiles has been rather closed by the doctrine, by the belief it was a wrong way to go. And the President now has opened the door again to say we really should, for the next century, not be stuck on just continuously improving offensive missiles, but we should get back to see whether we cannot develop defensive systems against missiles.

So, to have this kind of scheme that seems to be surprisingly long to you is really not so extraordinary, looking back in history -- how the other systems came along, with which we are now saddled.

What the President wants to happen is that his successor in the 21st century should not be similarly -- be saddled as he now is with only offensive missile forces.

Q Why, though, was there such a leap from here to the 21st century? Why wasn't there that interim step, which is technology that has progressed since 1972, the LOAT System, Low Altitude Intermediate System. I mean, there is an anti-ballistic missile defense system that is short of Buck Rogers. I mean, they already talk about this being 50 percent effective against incoming Soviet missiles. Why was that not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- there's one perfect difference. There are two approaches to the ballistic missile defense problem. One is if you have a site such as a Minuteman field or a closely spaced basing field, that's called terminal defense. And, basically, that's something that really people have known how to do for a long time. Certainly, back in the '60's we were on the verge

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of deployment -- at the end of the 60's. Now, we are talking about something else, protecting a nation.

And, certainly, the concept of LOATS, as the lower level element, that's the Low Altitude Defense System, is one approach that uses nuclear weapons. We wish to take a look at the full spectrum today. LOATS is one of the least sophisticated of those opportunities.

Q It would be wrong to assume that the intermediate steps are excluded?

Q Yes, you're not ruling out LOATS,

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and specifically you're not ruling it out as part of an MX defense system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, this has nothing to do with an MX defense system. And I will not say we are ruling it out.

Q -- land-based missiles.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not a very attractive option.

Q But it is still a possibility.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You should note here, as just stated, the broad objective is not just the defense of land-based missiles.

Q No. The broad objective --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because the defense of land-based missiles is really locked into the doctrine that offensive forces are the right way to go, even to protect by all means. But defensive -- something that degrades the capability, the destructive potential of the missile arsenals -- is the wrong way to go.

Breaking away from that is what the President has addressed.

Q Is it fair to say that this concerted effort might produce technological applications that could be deployed in advance of the next century or perhaps considerably in advance of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It certainly is possible, most certainly. I think we have tried to quantify how large we consider the problem, and how many steps will have to be taken, and how many accomplishments will have to occur. And in light of our experience of doing complex -- the nation's and the world's experience in doing complex development projects, that is I think why we estimated this degree of complexity.

Could I just say one last thing about -- it certainly has been our objective to emphasize non-nuclear means.

Q I want to ask you a question about this destabilization business and the premise that underlies it. I, personally, slept better in the late '50s and early '60s when things were destabilized. But the Republican Party platform which Ronald Reagan ran on as a candidate and supported as President called for military superiority over the Soviets, because the American people demanded it -- is the way the platform put it.

In fact, every Republican Party platform since 1960 with the exception of one Presidential year has used the word "superiority." Does this administration buy the idea that the peace of the world, beyond some point, becomes endangered when the United States gets too strong in some area, that the peace of the world is equally endangered regardless of whether or not it is the Soviets or the Americans that get too strong in a certain area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. This administration does not buy the idea. But we are, also, able to point out that, given the disparity in spending particularly on strategic forces -- 3-to-1 in the Soviets' favor, we are not moving toward superiority.

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It follows by arithmetic. And, therefore, those who accuse us or those who wanted us to move to superiority ought to be informed that this simply is not happening.

Q Because you have abandoned the goal, or because it is simply --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not within the budget. It is not achievable within the budgets that we have within the strategic field. In other areas, in the naval -- maritime area, we stated the goal and are pursuing the goal of maintaining superiority.

Q At what point was it decided to formally abandon the platform position then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Platform positions are more visionary and are larger goals. And when you get chopped into the budgetary process with a Congress that may be partly controlled by the other Party, then you may not be able to implement your platform entirely. That is one reason. There may be other reason, too.

Q Can I just ask this? Since you are not going to ask for any money in the '83 budget -- possibly but not for sure in the '84 budget and then more likely in the '85 budget, what do you need from Congress to help you along this way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me phrase it this way. We will ask for the resources at the earliest opportunity when we can spend them intelligently. Some of that may be through simply redirecting existing funds. Some of it may be through programming. Some of it may be through a supplemental. And one thing we know with reasonable confidence is that it will certainly be in time for preparation of the '85 budget.

Q You do not need an authorization. You are just talking about money. You do not need any Congressional backing in principle. You are talking about when you need money --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a one-billion-dollar-a-year program for ballistic missile defense across the spectrum of system development today in the army to advance technologies to a generic base already underway in the Department of Defense.

Q So you do not consider this a change in direction that would require you to go to Congress for a green light on other than specific increments of money.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think the thing that is different is this does not require the support of Congress. The thing that is so different is the fact that the President is saying to the American people that here is a pass toward greater stability in the future and one that I believe we should pursue. And that path represents reducing our reliance upon assured destruction.

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Q In coming to that conclusion, you said before that one of the reported shortcomings would be treaty violations. Could you address that for a couple of minutes as to how --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That what?

Q That treaty violations would be reported --

Q ABM treaties.

Q -- shortcoming of -- offering the plan -- the ABM treaty. Can you address that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure if I quite get your question -- that at this time the program envisaged does not come in conflict with the ABM treaty since the ABM treaty, anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 permits research and it would be -- proposing as a research program.

There can be a stage further down in time, in a number of years hence when testing other activities prohibited by the treaty would be appropriate. Long before that time we expect to have discussed this roadmap with the Soviet Union to see whether together we can move toward a larger strategic arms control framework which would permit us jointly to move away from the reliance on offensive missile arsenals.

Q On that same point, the actual treaty language says that each party undertakes not to develop tests or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, base-to-base, or mobile land based. Well, the word "develop" it seems to come in conflict with the President's remarks last night which was that he wanted research and development of these systems. How do you handle that one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you get to a development stage as defined in the treaty, then you have to address that and perhaps renegotiate the treaty or see what you do about it. But at this stage, you're not confronting opportunities for such a development phase. Obviously as you go to a complete system there will be development of testing phase further down the road.

Q My question is that given the fact that this is somewhat vague and very far in the future and also the potential, as one of the other questioners mentioned, that, for example, if the Russians look at this and may take it the wrong way, why is this all being done in public? Why don't we just develop this thing quietly for awhile until we see what we've got? And was that seriously considered as --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I have a feeling that the people around the table here know the answer. To invigorate research in a broader way in the government, particularly in an area where for doctrinal reasons the path may have been blocked for a decade or more. It would be very difficult at peacetime -- not in wartime like the Manhattan Project. It would be very difficult in peacetime not to do that in public and also it would kind of convey something sneaky. There's nothing to be shy about here or concealed. On the contrary, I think we can take a rather -- we can take a very positive view of this, as the President obviously made this clear last night.

Q I wanted to change the subject briefly. The President mentioned last night that 10,000 foot long runway in Grenada -- two question. First, what do we think is the purpose of this and secondly, what Soviet aircraft require a runway two miles long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: An illustration of the potential purpose was given by one of the Grenadan officials, I think a year ago. He said, Esprechio (phonetic) was his name, that -- one way could serve strategic purposes for the Soviet Union. And of course indirectly or directly -- indirectly through Cuba or directly Soviet support made this airfield possible.

What aircraft would require such a runway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- larger

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The majority of modern military aircraft require a runway longer than 8,000 feet.

Q Aeroflot? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q No, I mean, I'm talking about -- not the MIG-23s that are in Cuba, or MIG-25s but does the -- I mean does the Backfire Bomber require that or do the fighter planes need a -- can they use a smaller runway than that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact of the matter is, Pat, I think this answers your question is that a 10,000 foot runway is not needed for commercial applications. It is required for military aircraft -- either fighters or bombers. I don't think the Backfire Bomber actually takes as much runway as a fighter does.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- good question.

Q What is the difference in the President showing pictures of Grenada and Cuba? I don't mean this in an offensive way, but what's the difference in the Soviet Union saying, "Well, here's Diego Garcia and here's the Gulf of Oman, here's Oman, here's where we're building this runway and here's for our Rapid Deployment Force." I mean it seems that there's a symmetry here of perspectives.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the difference is in the trend, the historic trend. In Southwest Asia, in the Gulf, there was the British base of Aden, now South Yemen, and the British have always been in Diego Garcia, directly or indirectly. There were U.S. bases and Whelis (phonetic) Air Force in Libya. So, we had a military presence to -- commensurate with our interests and commitments in the area.

The Soviets have not, in the past, had such a military presence in the Caribbean and in Central America. It is that shift that is of concern to us.

Q But isn't it consistent with their -- just as it is with ours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it is not consistent. They are not importing the energy from the Caribbean area as we are from the Gulf. They don't have, therefore, this kind of legitimate interest that we have.

Q I would like to get back just for a quick second to the speech last night. One thing that it seemed to do

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that wasn't related to the 21st century necessarily was that it did represent a fundamental shift or a fundamental change that, acknowledgement, if you will, and you said it here, about reducing our reliance on assured destruction, I mean if anything that speech said last night, I think, and I'd like to get your reaction to it, that

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this administration is saying once and for all that this notion of MAD, of mutual assured destruction, is simply not the basis for U.S. strategic policy under the Ronald Reagan administration, that there is a significant change in U.S. policy. Now, is that the case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's be very careful here. The narrow sense of mutual assured destruction, some people have an image of it that both we and the Soviet Union should simply threaten to attack cities and have no other capability. That was never U.S. policy. And that was made clear in the Annual Report of Secretary Weinberger, in the Appendix, A, I believe. If you go through the posture statements of McNamara, Brown, all the previous Defense Secretaries, you'll all find they envisage, ask for flexibility, ability to target military targets.

So the discussion here is slightly different from that debate. The discussion here is more that we have -- emphasized continuing improvements in offensive missiles and shyed away from working on systems that could defend against these offensive missile arsenals.

Q But it's more than just -- I mean, we're talking about more than weapons systems here. We're talking about doctrine and strategies.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exactly.

Q And this does represent a departure from the last 20 years in U.S. strategic policy. Correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It opens the door to approaches which have been abandoned in the mid-1960's, namely that a secure nuclear deterrent force and secure peacekeeping arrangements in the nuclear world ought to exclude defensive measures. That branch was taken in the late 1960's, early '70's. And what the President's initiative does is it says, "Let's look at the other branch again, that defensive measures, particularly in the ballistic missile areas, can and will contribute to the goal of preventing nuclear war and of assuring our security.

Q But the President clearly said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So you're right. It is a departure, but not all the way back to Day 1 in the nuclear age.

Q -- twenty years --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- it is a lofty objective to seek a means for defense where assured destruction is not the dominant theme.

Yes.

Q Can I ask a question about the first two-thirds of speech? Is there any indication that, from the Senate, particularly, since the speech took place after the House had already voted -- or, you know, on the same day -- that this is going to have any impact in getting you more money than the people in the Senate have talked about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, clearly, the purpose of the speech, particularly, the first -- what is it? Nine-tenths or four-fifths was to convey to the American public the seriousness of the Soviet military buildup, the disparities that have resulted from that buildup and that would get worse if we trimmed back our effort. So, clearly, it goes without saying, he was communicating with the American people the importance of our defense effort.

Q Has our intelligence turned up any evidence that the Soviets are embarked upon this same kind of physical research? Particle physics, laser physics?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we had a question on that earlier. They have been working in these areas, yes.

Q The President talked a great deal about the growth; but does he -- of the Soviet threat. Does he, do you all see the Soviet threat vis-a-vis our arsenal as being about the same, worse or less severe than two years ago?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the immediate period, the mid-'80's, late '80's, it's on a way of getting less severe because the improvements in readiness and sustainability and personnel, manpower that have been instituted and that have been detailed to some extent in the President's speech make our forces more capable.

But looking beyond that at the 1990's, the disparity in what we call "military investment," buying systems, buying research and development, are still very, very troubling. It is for that reason that we cannot simply cut back, as some people are suggesting on the Hill, on these new systems, on what is called "modernization" in the Pentagon.

Q Do we take into account at the moment whatever we perceive to be the debates that are going on within the new Soviet leadership over their priorities and their investment? What is our assessment of what has been going on over the past several months, some of which has gotten into unclassified public material?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we do take -- or try to do take it into account. We try to sift out deliberate disinformation from facts, a difficult job. We, of course, constantly watch their defense effort, their continuing stream of new systems that come down the pike, new missiles, new aircraft and so on. By and large, that what we call this long-term Soviet buildup has been going on and hasn't really changed substantially in the last few years --

Q Regardless of the changes in our policy from one administration to another, is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not seen a significant change in the last few years either up or down. Some people have been arguing, you may recall, that because President Reagan decided we really have to make a larger defense effort that the Soviets would simply follow and do even more and negate everything that we do or that we add on our side.

If there was any change at all, it may have been a very slight decrease in the rate of growth of what they're doing. Now, what they're doing is at the higher level already.

Q -- two or three percent growth instead of three or four percent --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right. And that may actually have begun in the late '70's. But that is on a much higher level than ours.

END 3:01 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY KENNETH D. KAUNDA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA
TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 1983

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Let me tell you a little bit about this visit and its genesis. It's part of the continuum of consultations that we've had with the Zambians over the years. Kenneth Kaunda is no stranger to Washington. I think it's his fourth trip here.

This is an official working visit. The emphasis will be on substance. He will arrive this afternoon from Paris. He has been in Paris, he's been in London, he's been in Cyprus. He will go on from here to Cape Verde, and then to Algiers.

He will arrive here this afternoon. He meets with the President tomorrow, meets with the Secretary tomorrow. The Vice President will give him a dinner the next day. He will meet with other high-level Administration officials, with Congressmen, with officials of the international financial institutions before departing I think early on Saturday morning.

Kenneth Kaunda is the first southern African leader, or Front-Line States leader, to visit the United States in this Administration. He is one of Africa's senior statesmen. His views on southern African issues are respected and sought by this Government, and that's the reason why he's coming.

This is not going to be a negotiating session on southern African issues. It is going to be an exchange of views, a consultation, and part of a series of consultations that began when Vice President Bush went to Lusaka last November. We're looking forward to having him here, and the community here will spend a lot of time listening to his views.

I think that is all I want to say at the outset. I think economic issues will come into the discussion as well, but the focus will probably be on the southern African issues.

Let me throw the session open and bring my colleague up here to provide some broader context of his own.

SECOND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might just add that, as my colleague has said, President Kaunda has been the leader of his country since its independence. Some would say since before its independence. He's a major figure in the non-aligned movement, obviously, as well. He has many things he'll want to talk about that go beyond immediate issues in his own neighborhood, I'm sure of that.

Everyone who's followed African events closely over the years is well aware that he's been a central player in the search for a negotiated peaceful change in southern Africa for decades, a major player in the Rhodesian conflict era, a major victim of that war, as a matter of fact -- Zambia -- and has an important interest as well in another neighbor, namely, Namibia.

He is a leader who has in the past taken important stands for peace, even when it meant that he was out front of some of his friends. He is a man of, obviously, considerable experience. We intend to profit from hearing his views directly. And he is in every sense a major figure among the Front-Line leaders, although he is not the Chairman of the Front-Line, a title that is reserved for the President of Tanzania.

He lives very close by to many of the more important conflicts in southern Africa; therefore, he's intimately involved in all these questions.

I think I'll just stop there, and then my colleague and I will be happy to take any questions there might be.

Q Is there any special urgency about this visit or is it just one of those things that turns up on the diplomatic calendar?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No. I wouldn't say there's any special urgency about it. There's been preparation for some time on it. The invitation for it I believe -- correct me if I'm wrong -- was actually transmitted during the Vice President's visit, is that correct?

FIRST OFFICIAL: In November, yes.

Q President Kaunda had at one point in the not-so-distant past fairly close relations with Nkomo, and I'm wondering, do we have any sense of where he stands in this Zimbabwean feud between Nkomo and Mugabe?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't want to speak for him. I can relay to you what has come out in the press in Zambia. I think that President Kaunda made a statement saying that he was not going to raise this issue in London, and that Mugabe was the man in power in Zimbabwe and he was going to follow his advice and his lead, but that he was going to stay away from this one during his trip -- during his visit to London.

Q Since we're on background, could one of you tell us what President Kaunda's position is on the question of Cuban troops in Angola?

FIRST OFFICIAL: He has made no secret of his sense that the linkage, as it's put by the Front-Line States, between these two issues is extraneous to the Namibian independence process. That is the standard Front-Line States' position and he adheres to that.

Q What effect will his visit have -- what bearing on the Namibia talks? Will you be covering that entire ground with him, or is he bringing some proposal on this issue?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We, of course, don't at this point know what ideas he may be bringing, but he'll certainly be presenting his view of the current situation in the negotiations, and he may have some ideas as to how things could be expedited further. We, for our part, will want to bring him as fully up to date as we can as to how we see the state of play in the negotiations and seek to elicit any suggestions he might have for carrying the ball further down the field. Quite obviously, we are not arranging a meeting between heads of state in order to resolve theological questions about the status of linkage. Both President Kaunda and our Government, I think, want to see Namibia independent, and that common interest should provide an ample basis for a useful discussion. I can't predict beyond that what the outcome would be. As I've said, though, we attach significant importance to his views and believe that he has excellent lines out to a great number of the parties, or the key parties, in the region. Obviously, that includes Angola, it includes South Africa, it includes SWAPO, it includes Cape Verde which has been the host to a number of the South African-Angolan direct contacts, and so on.

Q What's your view of the current status of negotiations?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We consider that there is an ongoing, positive evolution in these negotiations. We don't have any major announcements or updates to offer today, but despite the sort of stiff, formal exchanges of position, of declaration, of condemnation, of resolution, and what have you at various forums internationally that you're well aware of, whether it's in the context of Front-Line meetings or in the context of demand summit in New Delhi or wherever the next venue will be, there's a series going on. There's one in Lisbon this week. There'll be one in Paris later. There'll be one in New York, no doubt, after that. Despite all that, there is indeed an evolution under way. It is not one that is publicly visible for which we can all be thankful, and as long as that remains the case, obviously, we'll be giving it all of our best efforts.

Q What's the motivating force for that optimism? Economic problems?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, no. I wouldn't say economic problems. I would say ongoing, direct and indirect, and other kinds of contacts between the key parties concerned. The point is that all these contacts are being kept in a very discreet channel with the result that there is not a visible series of events that people can point to and say, ah ha, this is progress. Because people are, obviously, negotiating, and they're negotiating discreetly, and they're not advertising their latest shift of position and their latest reformulation of position.

Q Would you say that Namibian independence is a lot closer now than it was in January of '81?

SECOND OFFICIAL: As I have said before, I would say that, yes.

Q Two years ago the President charged that the Embassy was plotting a coup against him, and two of our first secretaries were named as CIA spies.

What effect has that had on relations with Zambia?

FIRST OFFICIAL: When I arrived in Zambia in August and presented my credentials, the President made a big point of saying that the past was the past and that we were opening a new page in our relationship, and that has been in fact the case. I have had nothing but the most positive kind of relationship with the Zambian Government at all levels, and we've had a stream of important Americans, both public and private, to Zambia since September, including the Vice President, Henry Kissinger, Kathryn Graham, Nancy Kassebaum, and the relationship has been, I think, a very positive one.

Q I know you don't want to speak for the Soviet Union, but how would you describe the relationship between the Soviet Union and Zambia? Military installations, say, aid, whatever.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think you answered my question for me. I really don't want to characterize that.

Q As an observer on the scene can you speak on background as to how close it is, what level of cooperation they maintain?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Zambia is a non-aligned country. It has a Soviet Embassy there which has got regular contact with their government. I mean, I really don't want to go much beyond that.

Q Is there any U.S. aid to Zambia?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. We have been providing over the last several years an average of about $30 million a year. In some years it's been higher; in some years it's been lower.

This year it will be about that, focused on agriculture. The Zambian Government is trying to develop their agricultural sector, and the United States is working with them to support that emphasis. Our aid takes the form of PL-480 food assistance, commodity import assistance -- primarily fertilizer -- and technical aid in the form of advisers who are stationed in Zambia to provide help on planning, research, marketing, that kind of thing. This year the figure will be about $30 million, and the mix will be about half PL-480, about half commodity import, something like that.

The figures over the last six or seven years come to an aggregate of about $200 million since the middle 70's.

In addition, we are providing another $13 million for a road-building and a road-repairing project between Kafue and Chirundu. Let me translate that for you. It's actually the main road between Lusaka and Harare. It's a regional project funded under SADEC auspices, and it's not part of our bilateral program with Zambia, but it does impact directly on the economy there.

Q No military aid?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No military aid.

Q What's the Chinese aid at the moment?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't have figures in my head. They've provided, of course, a lot of assistance over the past. The Tazara Railway is one of them. There's a textile plant in Kabwe. There are a number of roads that they've built as well, but I don't have an annual figure.

Q Is it decreasing, increasing?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think it's decreased since the great big investments, the great big infrastructure investments, that were involved with the railway.

Q Does U.S. aid match that, balance it?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. It's not designed to either. I mean, the bulk of Chinese aid came during the middle 60's. It was for a quite different purpose, and ours is designed to -- as I say, to focus on the emphasis that they've put on developing their agricultural sector. It's a specifically focused program which is not in place to react to other people's programs.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 10:25 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

March 30, 1983

The Briefing Room

9:07 A.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: This is a background briefing, and they should be identified as Senior Administration Officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. I thought we'd start off with just one or two words of background on the President's decision which will be announced today concerning intermediate nuclear force talks in Geneva and then respond to your questions; my colleagues taking questions in their respective areas.

As you know, since the mid-1970's the Soviet Union has been deploying in Europe intermediate nuclear forces -- long-range intermediate nuclear forces, principally the SS-20. The Alliance -- NATO -- began consideration of how to respond to these deployments and to the serious imbalance that existed in the '70's, mid-'70's, and was worsening. And in '77 a proposal was made that there be a corresponding deployment to redress that imbalance by NATO. This was discussed in the course of over two years' time, and in December of 1979 the decision was taken by the NATO Alliance to undertake two measures: First of all, to deploy on the NATO side 572 missiles, comprising 108 Pershing II missiles, 464 ground-launched cruise missiles; and, concurrently, to seek negotiations with the Soviet Union with a limitation of INF forces.

At that time, December of 1979, the Soviet Union had approximately 800 warheads; the NATO Alliance had zero corresponding systems, zero corresponding warheads. At that time as well, that condition was characterized by President Brezhnev: "A balance now exists."

To make a long story short, today that condition is roughly 1300 to zero. Over a year ago Brezhnev committed to a moratorium on the deployment of these forces; a freeze, if you will. And instead of a freeze, these missiles have continued to be deployed throughout the Soviet Union to the point that today over 350 systems missiles exist; in addition, to -- approximately 200 older single warhead systems.

The United States, in close coordination with the NATO Alliance, proposed

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negotiations as a consequence of the NATO two-track decision in November of 1981. And, as you know, the President's proposal, coordinated with the Alliance, was for the complete elimination of long-range, land-based intermediate-nuclear force missiles.

Those negotiations have been under way for over a year's time. The Soviet Union has made no serious response to the U.S. proposal. The Soviet Union has taken a position, a position which calls for them having more warheads as a final outcome than they had at the beginning of the negotiation.

In short, it is not a serious proposal. It's a proposal which calls for zero corresponding systems on the Alliance side; in short, a monopoly for the Soviet Union.

The United States has coordinated its views of the Soviet position from the beginning. It has had a very active consultative process in NATO capitals -- in Brussels, bilaterally, here in the United States. At the beginning of this year, given Soviet intransigence, unwillingness to negotiate seriously, the President undertook an intense round of consultations with our allies and this will be addressed by my colleagues in a moment as to the mechanics of that consultative process. It involved travel by the Vice President and very close and very intense round of talks bilaterally and in the special consultative group, high-level group, the nuclear planning group. And this has led to the forging of a proposal which the President will announce today.

The President's firm commitment to getting results from this negotiation has led him in consultation with his counterparts in the Alliance to propose that while we will maintain the zero-zero outcome as our objective in these negotiations, that the Alliance could propose as an interim step on the way to this final zero outcome an interim position which provides for an equal number of long-range INF missiles on -- or warheads on launchers if the Soviet Union could agree as well to reduce their warheads to an equal level on a global basis.

We'll take your questions now.

Q Are you suggesting any numbers --

Q -- you just said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the back, please?

Q -- an equal number of missiles or an equal number of warheads on launchers? Could you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Warheads.

Q An equal number of warheads on launchers. Is there any specific number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Warheads on missiles on launchers and there is no specific number.

Angela -- Andrea?

Q There have been reports of 100 and 300 warheads -- 100 missiles, 300 warheads. Are those about the level that you would envision this would reach?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no number envisioned at this time.

Q There is no number even envisioned in any kinds of discussions, less formal discussions in Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The proposal is, as I've stated it, that the United States would agree to an equal number of warheads on missiles on launchers.

Q In other words --

Q There is a --

SENIOR ADMINISTARTION OFFICIAL: Sam.

Q There is a report --

Q -- finish --

Q Had you finished? I didn't want to cut you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, go ahead.

Q There is a report -- had you finished? I didn't want to cut you off.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, go ahead.

Q He says he's finished. There is a report that this proposal is being put forward today with the intention of actually citing numbers, suggesting numbers in two or three months. Is there any plan for the United States somewhere down the line to actually propose numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a negotiation. Surely, the United States would anticipate the negotiation of an equal outcome and that obviously must involve numbers. And we go into a negotiation in good faith looking for that equal outcome.

Q You're not saying to the Soviets they must be the ones to first propose the numbers then or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't prejudged

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where it comes from, no.

Q -- the question. Sir, please, we can't understand your answer when we don't hear the question you're saying no to. So would you please repeat the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sam asked whether or not there is a precise number and from which side it had to come. Did it necessarily have to come from the United States or from the Soviet Union. My response was that surely there would be, ultimately, a number, that we enter that negotiation without prejudging that it had to come from the Soviet Union.

Yes.

Q -- whatever that number might be, would the U.S. position be that we would want both Pershings and cruises in -- a mix of them on our sites?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's correct.

Q President Reagan said that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. The question was did we envision that the outcome would have to include both GLCMs and Pershing-2s, and the answer is yes.

Q During the campaign President Reagan criticized President Carter for conducting public negotiations, and isn't he doing the same thing in this case? And does that mean that this is really a public relations ploy and not really serious negotiation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me ask my colleague to expand on that. In short, the President put forth certain principles in his American Legion speech. Going back before that, when he first entered these negotiations, he stated that he would enter them in good faith, negotiate any serious proposal.

Now, what he is saying today is surely in keeping with and not a departure from the principles that he put forth in February. Do you want to expand on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say one thing, that before this, I might note that there is a little bit, there is a major difference on how we've handled the coming forth of this initiative, and how the Soviets, for instance, handled their initiative last December, where General Secretary Andropov came forward with a speech before we had heard anything about a proposal, and we had to wait, in fact, over a month before we saw that proposal at the negotiating table.

First of all, Secretary Shultz has discussed this approach already with the Soviet Ambassador here in Washington, and as I think you all know, Paul Nitze in Geneva laid this proposal out to his Soviet counterpart. So the Soviets have heard about this proposal. We have asked them not to, in any preemptive way, to come forward and disagree with it until they have had a chance to seriously consider it and before the negotiators have a chance to sit down and discuss it.

Q Could I ask you this? Even if this proposal were to be embraced by the Soviet Union and some unspecified number were hit as a number that they would build down to and the number that the U.S. would build up to, would that delay deployment of missiles starting in December?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is, does this proposal in any way, or would agreement on this proposal in any way affect the deployment date for the beginning of these systems at the end of 1983? And the answer is, definitely not. That without an agreement we will begin deployment at the end of 1983. And if there is an agreement, remembering that we still would like to eliminate entirely these systems, but if we were to reach an agreement on equal levels of warheads, we would still begin deployment at the end of 1983. The deployment date is unchanged.

We believe that it is only the deployment date and the beginning of deployment that gives the Soviet Union any incentives whatsoever to negotiate seriously in Geneva.

Q What are the provisions for inspection, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That one after this one. Thank you.

Q What is the incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously on this proposal if they know we're going to deploy anyway, since that's the objective that they have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a big difference between 572 and a lower number, and we would like to move to a lower number.

Q Must the Soviets agree to the zero option absolutely as an eventual objective, for us to go ahead with this interim proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are, the President remains committed to the zero-zero final outcome. We propose this interim position on the way to that outcome without precondition.

Q Sir, you talk about the specific number coming out of the negotiations. Do you anticipate the U.S. unilaterally before the next round starts coming up with a specific number proposal, or do you think that will only come during the process of a negotiation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a matter for negotiation. The question was, would we anticipate a number being proposed between now and the recommencement of the talks, or would that be a matter for negotiation? And it is a matter for negotiations. Yes?

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Q What are the current numbers for trying to get to even, the current numbers that you would rather see come to even? You propose that they be even. What are the current numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now, the systems we are talking about are LRINF missiles. Now, that is SS-20s, Fours, and Fives on their side with an aggregate of about 1300 warheads. On our side, there are zero corresponding systems.

Q You are not counting the 462 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, our own deployment involves P-2s and GLCMs. And so the balance between the aggregate P-2s and GLCMs versus the Soviet force being at equality is what we are seeking, equality in warheads on missiles on launchers.

Q To follow that up, how many warheads would there be on those that we are planning to deploy, totally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All our systems are one-warhead systems. It would be 572 at the max.

Q Could you answer my question, sir?

Q Could you amplify on that "on a global basis?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: "On a global basis" means that the equal limits on both sides would apply throughout the world. That is, as the President mentioned in his earlier statement, that we are not in this negotiation to provide for one part of the world's balance and allow the Soviet Union to move these missiles to another part of the world -- to export the problem to Asia. And these are, after all, mobile systems as well.

Yes?

Q We would count three Pershings or three GLCMs for one SS-20?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is the number of warheads, yes. That is right.

Q Would this scaled-down figure still involve deployment in all five European countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It would.

Q What was the question?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. The question is: Would this lower level involve deployments in all of the five basing countries? And we envision that it would.

Yes?

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Q And, also, do you want to keep the same sort of ratio of Pershings to GLCMs, about a 4-to-1 ratio?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that is something that must be a matter for negotiation. We do anticipate that the deployments must remain in a militarily viable condition. I will call on my colleague to go into that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, depending on the number, we would want to make adjustments so that we had a militarily effective distribution. And it is impossible to say, now, what that might look like.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. We are going to have to go with two more questions, because these people have got to be somewhere in about three minutes.

So has the back been neglected?

Q Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's get a couple in the back.

Q Is there anything the Soviet Union can do now, in the context of this proposal or anything else that you envision, to stop U.S. deployment of Pershing IIs in December 1983, anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. They could agree to the proposal that was initially put forward and to which the President remains committed, which is the total elimination of all of these systems.

Q In other words, to avoid deployment, the only way to do it is to agree to zero-zero?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And I might point out that a statement to that effect was made by the Defense Ministers of all the NATO countries in Portugal about 10 days ago.

Q Are you still trying to not count the British and French missiles?

MR. SPEAKES: The last question, right there. That is it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are not counting the British and French missiles for the simple reason that those systems are, for the most part, submarine-launched, ballistic missiles. They are not land-based, INF systems. They do not provide the same kind of role as American systems in providing a nuclear guarantee or nuclear umbrella for our allies. They have no place in these negotiations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of the 162 to which the Russians refer, only 18 are land-based missiles. The remainder are sea-launched missiles that are identical to the sea-launched missiles in the inventories of the United States and the Soviet Union, which are counted in an entirely different negotiation in SALT or START. So they are seeking to count them twice.

Q But don't they, in fact, pose a threat to the Soviets?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. And they could possibly be addressed in some other kind of negotiation, but not in these INF systems. The point is that, if you even add the British and French submarine-launched, ballistic missile forces to the American submarine-launched, ballistic missile forces, the Soviet Union still has a larger inventory of submarine-launched, ballistic missiles than Britain, France, and the United States combined.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. That is it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 9:28 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT KENNETH KAUNDA OF ZAMBIA

March 30, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:43 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a background briefing on the visit of President Kaunda with President Reagan. This is a background briefing, attributed to Senior Administration Officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. President Reagan and President Kaunda just finished two hours of very intense, very substantive consultation.

The format for the meeting went something like this. They met in the Oval Office to begin with, and then moved into a larger meeting with advisers, in the Cabinet Room. And after further discussion they then went to lunch.

I can say that throughout the entire process the substantive exchange never stopped. The statements that both of them have made, I think, speak for themselves. There were a wide range of topics that were discussed, from southern African issues to the Middle East, Korea, arms control, East-West relations; you name it, they discussed it.

The meetings were attended by a broad spectrum of officials from both governments, covering the economy as well as the political scene as well.

I have been involved in relations between these two countries for only about six months, but during that period we have had continuous consultations, continuous exchanges between the two Presidents by mail. We have had a visit by the Vice President and other distinguished American citizens.

This meeting was really the high point, so far, in what I would call a continuum of consultation, and this series of consultations will continue. Both men agreed to keep in constant touch as we work our way toward a solution of the really pressing issues in southern Africa.

I think that the Zambian side as well as the American side were very well satisfied with the exchange.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were satisfied because there was a very strong effort on both sides to listen, to understand, and to try and devise common approaches to the problems that face them.

Q And did they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q On Namibia? Did they agree to separate the Angolan-Cuban issue from the Namibian independence issue?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to go into the specifics of what was actually said. All I can say is that both sides understand each other's positions very, very clearly, and share very much the same objectives.

Q How about the meetings?

Q Well, but that's exactly where they were before they started.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's where they are now.

Q So they have made no progress?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These negotiations -- these talks were not negotiations. These were consultations.

Q But there was advance indication that Dr. Kaunda would be asking the United States to put more pressure on South Africa, for instance. Did he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's fair to say that Dr. Kaunda, President Kaunda spoke from the heart about the importance of getting an early settlement of the Namibia problem, an early return to greater stability in southern Africa as a whole, to get some momentum behind the hope that we all have for peaceful change in that part of the world. And it was a very heartfelt statement.

We also, on our side, the President, the Secretary, spoke from the heart. We have committed ourselves to seeing this process through. We remain convinced that it can be done. We exchanged notes on how we see the current state of play and how the process could be advanced more rapidly. Neither of us have any interest in delay.

Q You said that you want to get some, he's asked for more, some momentum behind the movement for peaceful change. Are you dead in the water?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we don't consider that to be an accurate description of the situation at all.

Q Exactly how close are you, now, at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have, as we have made clear in the past, resolved virtually all of the Namibia-related questions associated with 435. We have a continuing exchange going on bilaterally with Angolan officials. It is a privileged diplomatic exchange. We are here today to discuss the detail of it. It is an ongoing exchange which we believe has good prospects for a further, positive evolution.

Obviously, in discussions with officials of Zambia, Zambia is an important neighbor of Angola, important neighbor of Namibia, so the Zambians were anxious to hear our view of that exchange as well as the exchanges going on between Angola and South Africa directly.

Q Is the temper in the neighborhood there, however, one of impatience over these talks, if you're talking about more momentum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there are, there's a wide degree of consensus that everyone is getting impatient. That's not an issue which would divide us from our friends along the front-line states, including the Zambians.

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Q What is dividing you? What is dividing, what's the difference in the point of view between the President and Kuanda on this?

Q It's Angola, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we would need to go into discussions of other governments' positions. The Zambian Government has made very clear, just now -- President Kaunda made clear what it is that he would like to see, and indicated that the Zambians and the U.S. share the view that we'd like to get an early independence agreement for Namibia.

Q What's dividing them? What's the question? What is the main difference in the approach?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, at this point I think we should be quite clear that the negotiation hinges on issues that are between a few key parties, South Africa, Angola, ourselves, SWAPO, to some extent.

Zambia has encouraged this process from the sidelines. It is not directly a party in the immediate U.S.-Angolan bilateral discussions. So we exchange ideas on how to move the process forward. I don't think there's a need to discuss divisive issues.

Q Would you follow up your answer to Jim, please? You said, we've solved virtually all of the Namibian-related questions. Which ones have you not solved? Where are we now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only remaining issues that are associated with 435 concern the final composition details of the UN force that would be in Namibia during the transition, and the precise nature of the electoral system that would be used during the transition.

Q On the issue of South Africa, the President, President Kaunda said before he left, he was reported to have said, in UPI, that the countries of the West are sitting on a volcano. As far as South Africa was concerned, that it was going to erupt within, he predicted, four years. And the racial eruption would make the French Revolution look like, I think he said, a Sunday teaparty for children.

Does the United States share that view of South Africa and the racial tensions being about to erupt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think we would let the Zambian leaders, their statements, stand and speak for themselves. He has spoken from the heart on many occasions about his view of the situations, both in South Africa and in southern Africa.

Q Do we, what view does the United States have of the racial tensions? Do we think that they are going to erupt in South Africa? Do we think that more pressure is needed on the government in Pretoria to lessen its apartheid law?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we think that the situation in that respect is very clear. There obviously are dynamics at work which are readily apparent to the leaders of South Africa itself -- themselves. And it is, in part, for that reason -- internal dynamics in South Africa. It is, in part, for that reason, that that government is seeking to find a way forward away from the blind alley that it has been in in the past.

Q But do we think -- do we think that we should be putting more pressure on the South African government for change? Is that our position, that the United States should exert more pressure on them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's our view that the situation contains within itself both the problems and the pressures and the solutions. The role of outside -- the role of outsiders, such as ourselves, is to encourage the right kind of process, and we are doing that in every way we know how, both by what we say and by what we do.

Q What are we -- I'm sorry to keep at you on this, but what are we saying and what are we doing? Are we continuing our quiet diplomacy with South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We most certainly are, both on regional issues and on direct bilateral issues and the situation as we see it inside that country. At the same time we are investing in what we believe in. We are backing, as far as we know how, the process of constructive change away from the apartheid system.

Q It's fair to assume, isn't it, that President Kaunda doesn't think you're doing enough? I mean, this speaking from the heart was -- he really was saying that the U.S. should put more pressure on, wasn't he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I can take an overview of this broad question -- because it's very difficult to disentangle South Africa, Southern African, the whole region, and Namibia and Angola are all part of that. It is the view of the Zambian leadership, as has been repeatedly stated, that the West has a vital role to play in advancing the peace process, in turning the corner away from heightened violence and in leading to a more just and stable region.

I'm not putting words in anyone's mouths when I say that. This is the standard, long-standing Zambian position -- that the West has an historic responsibility that it must play. It is our view that we are playing precisely that role, a serious engaged balanced diplomacy in the region.

That is what President Reagan is committed to, and that's what we've already begun.

Q Did President Kaunda bring any specific suggestions as to how we might proceed from here on out or for any changes in the U.S. approach?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, this was not a negotiating session. Both had presented their own set of broad views on the subject.

Q Well, did those broad views include suggestions?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There weren't any specific -- well, you know, now go to so-and-so and say such-and-such. There wasn't anything of that kind, no.

MR. ALLIN: Okay. We'll take two more questions. Connie, Jim.

Q One more follow-up -- one more follow-up again in your -- regarding your statements about the U.S. role in the area. Have the events in Zimbabwe changed America's tactics regarding South Africa or changed America's philosophy in any way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't say so. Maybe you want to elaborate your question, but from what you've asked, I don't quite see the point.

Q Is the United States surprised at all at what happened in Zimbabwe and do you seen handwriting on the wall for South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our interest in Zimbabwe, as in other countries in the region, is to promote both development and stability there. And to the extent that that is -- suffers a temporary setback, we are naturally concerned. It doesn't mean we're going to wash our hands and walk away.

Q Was that discussed this morning, the Zimbabwe situation? Did President Kaunda and President Reagan discuss this problem in Zimbabwe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no.

Q It hasn't changed our philosophy or our tactics regarding South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Regarding South Africa? I'm not sure I quite understand the implication of the question.

Q Well, are we still pressing for majority rule in South Africa after what's gone on in Zimbabwe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe in every part of the world that government should be based on the consent of the governed, and in that sense we don't tailor that policy country by country.

Q What can Zambia contribute to resolving the Angola question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's fair to say that we -- both sides exchange -- and these exchanges will be continuing this afternoon, by the way -- analyses of the state of play in the negotiation. We both put ideas forward. I'm not going to be revealing diplomatic exchanges here as to how that process could be moved more rapidly.

Obviously, President Kaunda, who has been on the scene in -- among the front-line states longer than any other leader of the front-line states, with the exception of President Nyerere of Tanzania, is a seasoned statesman who has been through many of these things before.

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To the extent that he is assured that we are going to stay the course, it enables him to carry that message, it enables him to carry that message to his colleagues.

It is in part a question of keeping channels open, of keeping communications going at a time when most of the focus is amongst relatively few parties, and others are watching with interest, with concern, and with impatience.

Q For the uninitiated, can you tell us whatever about Resolution, I think it was 345?

Q 435?

Q I had it written down somewhere.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: UN Resolution 435 and all its annexes is an appropriate subject for a two-semester graduate course. It was passed in 1978. It provides the framework for a transition plan leading to Namibia's independence, with all kinds of detailed provisions concerning conduct of elections, transitional UN force, and so forth.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Resolution itself is rather short, but it refers to a plan, however, which is attached to it, and the plan is rather long.

THE PRESS: Thank you. Stay the course.

END 2:01 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON ARMS CONTROL

March 31, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

10:00 A.M. EST

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought I would make a few opening comments and then we can just have the questions we wish. I have been trying to think to myself what is this really all about. And obviously it is about reductions in nuclear arms, particularly a particular class of armaments in Europe that are highly destabilizing and therefore especially dangerous. And clearly we have been in the position, the President has, of wanting to see that whole class of weapons eliminated globally. We continue to think that is the best solution.

We recognize that this is a negotiation and the Soviet Union has rejected that. And so the President has made another proposal. The new proposal you will have so I won't repeat it other than to say that it is a further effort to negotiate something that still aspires, although it isn't a condition, to get to elimination of these weapons but is willing to take as an interim step some finite number somewhere between zero and 572 warheads on both sides, and according to specified criteria that has been set out.

So partly this is about that. But I think that in the full perspective of things we tend to mislead ourselves if we concentrate overly on the weapons aspect of this problem. And it is a fact that we have had an extensive,rich consultative process with our allies on the, on the original 1979 Dual Track Decision, in the first place, then on the elimination option, in the second place, and now on the President's most recent proposal.

And we have had really sort of an alliance view throughout. It is very unified and strong and determined. So I think that raises a question of how is it possible to get so many countries that are geographically spread around and who have varying interests on many things to be so unified on something of this kind. And I think you have to come back to the values that these countries share in a determination to be able to defend those values against a very clear threat to them.

And it is really that that underlies the unity that we have and the fact that we are undertaking both to confront the Soviet Union with the strength implied by the First Track and the Dual Track Decision, but at the same time hold out to everyone the prospect of a reduction, or in our basic proposal, elimination of these very destabilizing weapons.

So the perspective that I want to lend is the strength of the alliance and the reason for that, namely our jointly held values as really the underlying source of strength. And I don't say that in any way to neglect the importance of the particulars of the arms reduction negotiation and the weapons systems and all that.

Period.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I thought, I didn't want to interrupt.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So, do you have any questions before I leave?

Q: Sir? From Moscow recently we have heard from Andropov and we have had some journalists reporting on the temper of the talk over there. And the general feeling seems to be that the Russians have had it up to here, if you will, with dealing with the Reagan Administration. Is that, do you find that is their reading?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There have been some very sharp statements made, and I think it is fair to characterize the U.S-Soviet relationship as, as not a particularly good one right now. It is tense. At the same time, I think it is important to point out that we have discussions going on with the Soviet Union in two fora in Geneva that include both the INF and the START talks also kind of adjoining each one of those talks about confidence-building measures.

There is a continuing discussion in Vienna and NBFR talks. We are engaged with them across a range of Helsinki Final Act and disarmament issues in Madrid. And we have quite a number of other settings in which there are from time to time meetings, for example, meetings that I have with Dobrynin, Ambassador Dobrynin.

So there is dialogue. And it is our feeling that the important element here is to see and to probe and to find out whether there are areas of importance where substantive agreements can be made. That is, tone reflects substance, not the other way around. And there are a great many substantive matters where we are in deep disagreement with the Soviet Union, and that is the essence of it.

So we need to work at the substance. And if it turns out that the substance can be improved, then I think the tone of the relationship will improve.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there is some very sharp differences in statements with the President made over a period of some weeks, very, very harsh denunciation of the Soviet Union and what everyone seems to feel is a very constructive proposal at this time. Why is there such a great variance between the President's rhetoric on some of these very, these occasions when he speaks so sharply and so strongly of the Soviet Union, the focus of all evil, and then made movement toward this kind of substantive thing? Because the first statements almost indicate that it wouldn't matter what negotiation we had, we wouldn't trust them to carry it out. And it would be almost impossible to negotiate.

Is there a plan here? Is it by accident? Why are these, these enormous differences in tone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that if we didn't feel that there was a reasonable possibility of arriving at significant agreements in these discussions we wouldn't be having them. So the fact that they are going on, at least from our standpoint, shows that we think there is a chance that things can improve and that the improvement can be genuine in the sense that it can be built on substance.

Now, the range of issues that one can discuss is quite broad. And, of course, on many of them, particularly when you are talking about something like arms control, I think that it is not so much a matter of trust as it is verifiability, that you are going to aspire to an agreement that is inherently capable of being carried out because you can know on both sides, they as well as ourselves, that it actually is being carried out.

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So the key here is the subject of verifiability.

Q: Do you get any indication from the Soviets at all of a shift in their position on verifiability? Are they moving toward a more acceptable position as far as we are concerned? Is there any shift in that whole area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, our negotiations are ongoing in various areas, and I think that the notion that an agreement ought to be verifiable is an accepted notion. The question of what it takes to satisfy yourself on that is where all of the argument comes.

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For example, the President feels that the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty is capable of considerable improvements in the area of verifiability, and the Soviets feel -- have told us that they do not agree with that. The Soviets have a difference of opinion there. It is not over whether verifiability is a proper concept -- it is over the implementation of the concept.

Q Sir, given that you have said that the tone for that meeting reflects substantive disagreements between us and the Soviet Union, wherein lies the possibility for an improvement or a chance of an agreement on improvement of the relationship? Why do you think there might be such a thing and do you think there is any prospect of a summit meeting before the end of the first term in this administration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you have to review all of the issues and then aprise them one by one and see what the prospects might be piece by piece, so if you say "any agreement" that can cover a broad range. The focus of attention right now is on the major arms reduction negotiations and particularly today the INF negotiations. But there are a lot of other things.

The President has said, and as far as I can read it Mr. Andropov has also said that in principle they are prepared to have a summit meeting but only on the basis of the prospect that something really significant could be achieved in the meeting. So the idea of a simple get-acquainted meeting doesn't seem to be in the cards.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have expressed the wonder -- the pleasurable wonder that at the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I didn't express any wonderment. I insist that it is remarkable and that it is important and then I tried to give -- I tried not to have wonderment but rather to give you an answer, namely our shared values.

Q Isn't it true though, sir, that President Reagan would have stayed on his original zero-zero option had it not been for pressure from our allies in Europe?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President has said -- and this has been an Alliance proposition all along as I understand it. I am relatively new to it but the 1979 decision -- the original proposal -- has been an Alliance proposition all along and it has been discussed continously about what position we should take and what our negotiating strategy should be, and so on. And there have been lots of discussions within the U.S. government as well as within the European governments and among us. And I think it was a shared view that the timing is right now to make this change in our position. So I don't think it is a question of pressure this way or that way. It is a question of a continous process of consultation and I think there emerged a very broad consensus in our government and in the governments abroad that this was the time to make a change, as the President has done.

Q You didn't find, sir, a reluctance in the Pentagon to make this change?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. We had lots of discussions of this over quite a -- practically ever since I got here -- I was reminded this morning nine months ago. Somebody implied that it ought to be time for me to produce something. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't there perhaps a considerable danger that offering the interim proposal at this point shortly after the hurdle of the West German elections will suggest or be interpreted

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as meaning that the administration was not terribly intent on zero-zero option to begin with, that once the political hurdle had been cleared we throw out a more specific bargaining position and that this might tend to undercut the substance of zero-zero?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think there is really any legitimate question about what the President feels and for that matter what our allies feel is the best outcome. It is the elimination of these weapons. We think so, we continue to think so, and I think that that position has a kind of broad appeal to mankind in a sense. It is supported by the Japanese. The Chinese think that it is the right proposal, and so on. There is a world-wide acceptance of that. I think there is also a recognition of the reality that we are trying to bring about arms reduction and that in the process of conducting this negotiation we need to try out other options, and so we have.

I think it is worth pointing out that the way the President has constructed this proposal, he did not substitute some number for zero. He rather said in effect that there are a variety of numbers that are conceivable and we are saying to the Soviet Union that we are willing to seek an interim number. And if they would accept this concept maybe there are some numbers that they think are better than other numbers. Obviously you cannot just pick any number for a whole bunch of reasons. But I think it is an effort to put this forward in a manner that is -- maximizes the potential for negotiation and for some reality of the prospect of getting some place as much as -- We cannot do it, of course. It takes two sides to make an agreement.

Q Does this put the onus on the Soviet Union now to come up with a number -- an acceptable number -- and is it, in terms of the public relations battle of this, is the ball now to be perceived in the Soviet court?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the ball has always been in the Soviet court because we have tabled a complete and very good proposal in what has been called the zero option, and I guess you could say that they have made a response but the response is so far out of the ball park that I don't think anyone really took it that seriously. But at any rate, certainly this is another effort to put forward something as they have said very clearly that they do not accept the idea that they will have none of these weapons.

So this is another way of trying to get at it consistent with the principles that have been implicit in the President's position and the Alliance position all along and has been enunciated most recently in his American Legion speech and again by Paul Nitze in Geneva.

Q You are asking in effect -- you are saying to the Soviets in effect, what number will you take? Is that the way that you read it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It leaves it open to the negotiators to say, well, you think this number, we might think that number, but if we can get the thing into that ballpark then it seems to me that that is a big advance. I don't know whether the Soviets will respond that way, but at any rate I think that our position is a good one. It has a good ultimate objective and it is a negotiating position and it has strong Alliance support.

Q Mr. Secretary, we are truly trying to maximize the prospects of coming up with an agreement. Isn't there-- will there be some way to take account of the fact that the British and the French are modernizing their strategic nuclear forces in a significant way and either in this negotiation or in START might we accommodate that fact somehow? Because it doesn't seem to me from the Soviet perspective a priori crazy to insist that these forces be factored in this tabulation of forces.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: You used -- I will just focus on the current -- the negotiations we are talking about. You used a good word, "strategic," and these are intermediate-range missiles that we are talking about. We are talking about land-based missiles, and we are talking about the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I don't think that it is reasonable to consider -- we should not consider a proposition broadly that equality consists of adding up the armed forces of every country in the world and then saying that the Soviet Union has to have the same as everybody else combined. I think this problem that we have has to be put in terms of the U.S. and the Soviet Union and equality and capacity to deter on our part based on that notion. As you know, the overwhelming number of UK and French systems are submarine-based so that they are not land-based systems -- I believe only a very small number of the French systems are land-based. So strategic land-based -- those are national systems. They are not NATO systems. So I don't think that they should be counted, let alone taken into account in this negotiation.

I need to extract myself here and let you get --

Q I wondered if the United States would feel that the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles that the Soviet Union has, if they eliminated those would this be a realistic approach to the thing? Because the Soviets have never given an indication in their history of eliminating a new weapons system.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You must be kidding.

Q Well, no I am not.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You must be kidding.

Q The Soviet Union has never eliminated an operating weapons system. They have only gotten rid of the old obsolete systems, and they haven't given any indication in these negotiations, I am sure, that they wish to dismantle any of the SS-20's.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we cannot appraise proposals according to what the Soviet Union would like. We have to appraise proposals according to what would be sensible and reasonable from the standpoint of our allies and which one would think would be reasonable for them. If they feel, as it has been said so often, that they are threatened, then why isn't it reasonable to say let's just eliminate all of these weapons and then they don't threaten anybody.

Q I wasn't talking about what was reasonable --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that there are all sorts of responses to these things, but to think that we could accept -- the number of SS-20 warheads now deployed, I think, well exceeds 1,000 and not have anything to confront that and to be used as a component of our deterrence would be absolutely ridiculous.

I will leave you in the hands of my better peers.

END 10:30 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Los Angeles, California)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

March 31, 1983

The Westwood Room
The Centruy Plaza Hotel
Los Angeles, California

9:12 A.M. EST [PST?]

MR. SPEAKES: -- anything you got.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Very good. You'll hear from the Reagan administration.

MR. SPEAKES: Anybody got anything --

Q Yes. Is there anything new in the speech other than -- any new proposals per se?

Q Are they any proposals --

Q ...Am I right saying there are no new proposals? That's a correct characterization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There's a report on the fact that we will be doing something in the non-proliferation area --

Q -- can't hear you.

Q -- say again.

Q What?

Q Will you speak up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the question was whether there are any new proposals. There's a reference to the fact that the President in the non-proliferation area will be doing more in terms of getting together with heads of state on this issue to strengthen safeguards. But that is not a new proposal as such. It's a new vehicle for moving in that area.

Q Also, the President says that he's going to have more to say on accusing the Soviets of violating one of our treaties. Can you tell us about that? Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It says that he may have more to say on that issue.

Q What does he have in mind when he says we have serious grounds for questioning their compliance? What precisely does he have in mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The administration has previously discussed those serious concerns in the area of chemical warfare where there are clear violations and has

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expressed serious concerns in the areas of nuclear testing and in the area of SALT. And we have many letters that have come -- questions to the Senate -- from the Congress to the President where he has been asked to address these issues and he will be responding to those concerns some way in the future.

Q He will?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He would need to answer their letters -- find a way of communicating his concerns, his own concerns on the findings. These are even -- being studied very, very intensively at this point.

Q Where does it say he might have something more to say? Why doesn't he say he will have something more to say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that specifically. I don't know.

Q Is there a speech that is being considered or something as formal as that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q Why the big attack on the nuclear freeze movement at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The focus of the speech is on the agenda of arms control issues, some of which will be badly undercut by the proposals for a freeze, instead of for reductions. He says that would pull the rug out from under our negotiators at this point just to talk about a freeze rather than reductions in effect.

And it would prevent the modernization in the absence of reductions on the Soviet side.

Q The administration continues to have serious concerns about the use of chemical warfare despite the Australian test results that suggested that maybe the toxins aren't as prevalent as once believed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think anybody who has talked to refugees in Eastern Thailand that have come out of Cambodia and Laos and has talked to the Afghans that have escaped would find their testimony very convincing about what has happened. And in addition, our laboratories, as well as those of other nations, have indicated that there is really a lot of ground for concern on this issue.

Q What would you describe as the basic purpose of this speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is to put into a broad context not only the decisions on the new INF initiative, which were announced yesterday, but also once again to lay before the public and the world the extraordinary agenda of negotiations and proposals that this administration has undertaken in the area of arms control, that reflects the President's personal seriousness and that of his entire administration in this area.

Q What is he doing differently than the previous administration? What's extraordinary about the agenda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I may say something personal, I joined the government in the Kennedy administration and worked in the White House in the Johnson, Nixon and Ford administrations, and I've not seen anything like this broad a range of proposals. For example, the 50 percent cut in ballistic missiles -- strategic zero option for INF, etcetera --

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Q Weren't there proposals on the tables in previous administrations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, in previous administrations, for example, with the SALT agreements, you capped, you provided ceilings, which in most cases codified enormous buildups. In the case of SALT II, it would have permitted and did permit the near doubling of the Soviet Mirv missile force, for example. Salt I permitted enormous buildups.

Q So, you're talking about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact of the reductions and the fact that we are engaged now in strategic, intermediate and conventional force negotiations. We have begun the effort at the Committee on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive chemical weapons ban. We have laid before the Soviets and the world a proposal in the area of confidence-building --

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And there are other efforts underway, as in the non-proliferation area.

Q Do you think that today's address -- the President has this extraordinary agenda on seeking arms control. Does he undercut that at all, himself, by using such harsh rhetoric in talking about the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that he has assessed the Soviet reluctance to engage in discussions on reductions and on effective verification in a very clear way. In the reductions area, however, the Soviets have undertaken the proposal in the area of START, which does suggest that they are understanding the importance of moving to real reductions rather than staying at high ceilings.

But they have not been specific, in general, on system limitation. And they are always very unspecific on verification procedures.

Q But I mean, by referring to the Soviet Union as an evil empire and the focus of evil in the world and all that -- does that make it harder to negotiate with them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They use extremely harsh rhetoric about us regularly. I do not think the President has used unusually harsh rhetoric about the Soviets. The particular phrase you take, maybe he should have cited Alexander Solzhenitsyn's language, which is to the effect of its being a focus of evil.

Q What would it take to get him upset. When Andropov calls him a liar and a lunatic, he says that is nothing new and, kind of, ordinary. What does it take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot speak for the President on that. I do know that he would like the focus to be on these specific proposals that he has made, which are technically very detailed as well as in the broad outlines which we have made public, and which we are currently negotiating.

Q While we are on this subject, how can we compromise with evil? I mean, how can we ever make a deal with an evil empire?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is easy to make a deal at equal levels when you have the systems identified and the verification procedures established if the parties find it in their mutual self-interest. And in this area of military escalation or building of continuing increases of arsenals, it makes sense to try for that.

But maybe Mr. Speakes would like to speak for the President more on the psychology. (Laughter.)

Q Can you explain what this man has in mind?

MR. SPEAKES: We shall make evil good, Sam. It is the Old Testement.

Q He says, "My views about the Soviet Union are well known. Although, sometimes I don't recognize them when they're played back to me." I would be glad to compile a group of videotapes of his views and play them back to him, and see if he recognizes himself.

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MR. SPEAKES: Well, the evil shall be good and walk among you.

Q Can we get some more specific --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think in the specific -- if I recall the specific context of the speech on evil, it was -- the proceeding sections dealt with human rights issues, anti-semitism, and so on. And there is a very clear pattern of Soviet violations in that area it seems.

Q But this administration has played down human rights; unlike the Carter administration, this one seems to think that real politics is the way to get along in the world. You, yourself, have just said to make a deal if it is to our mutual interest.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that there is -- I work arms control. And I find in all of the arms control speeches and in the other speeches that I have read of the President's, the continuing reference to the importance of both peace and freedom. And the two are linked for him. And I believe that the arms control aspect has a genuine element of preserving both peace and freedom.

MR. SPEAKES: Let's get Deborah.

Q On the question of chemical weapons, how does the U.S. decision on binary -- proceeding with binary chemical development square with this concern about the Soviets using them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It is a good question. In effect, we have proposed in that area, of course, the equivalent of a zero option. That is, we are actively urging accelerated negotiations on a total ban on chemical weapons.

Vice President Bush carried that message, personally, from the President to the Committee on Disarmament in the first week of February in Geneva of this year.

Our negotiators there believe, as do many in the Congress and those in the administration, that one of the chief incentives for the Soviets to negotiate on anything is the proof that there is a funded program in the United States on the similar kind of systems. And it may be an incentive for them to negotiate, indeed. I happen to believe it is if they believe that, in the absence of eliminating such systems, we would be prepared to develop a deterrent. Right now, we have no effective deterrent in that area. We have an aging, old deterrent.

Q But the U.S. has described the use of these chemical weapons as a violation of international law. How does the development of such a weapon not put the U.S. in violation of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The use is proscribed And we would like to ban. And we have proposed a ban not only on its use, but on the production of such systems.

However, you cannot deter something that, unilaterally, has turned out differently in the arms control area

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if you do not have some system of your own that is of roughly equal type. We are proposing a total ban. We would be delighted with a zero option in this field.

Q -- saying two wrongs make a right here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm saying that the --

Q Are you saying that if they have them that we've got to have them and even if binary weapons are against international law, if they've got them we've got to have them too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm sorry. They are not -- the use of the weapons is against international law. What we are trying to achieve is a ban on its production as well.

Q Bascially you seem to be extending what appears to be the administration's negotiating posture of developing a weapon, or threatening to develop a weapon, in the hopes it will give you leverage to negotiate further so that if negotiations fail, you'll have a weapon on the table.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not extending that. That is a rationale that has been used in all of the areas.

Q Didn't you just say that if we don't have a deterrent it's very unlikely that the Russians will consider any reason to negotiate on chemicals or strategic weapons or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying that that is the insight, if you will, that our negotiator in this case, Lou Fields, Ambassador Fields -- the Committee on Disarmament and the arms control community in the administration believe correct -- that it does turn out unfortunately that the Soviets seem little impressed by unilateral restraint. We are trying to negotiate a ban.

MR. SPEAKES: We had a hanging question about Soviet response to yesterday's speech and earlier speeches. There's been no specific -- no official response. There's been commentary on Moscow radio and television. Our position on it -- we hope the Soviets are giving the President's interim proposal made at Geneva serious consideration and we hope that they are studying it with -- and giving it a comprehensive study. And perhaps that explains the reason that there has not been official instant reaction.

Q Larry, is the administration, considering that Andropov called the President insane and various other things very recently, is the administration encouraged by the absence of rhetoric from the Soviet Union? Is that --

MR. SPEAKES: I don't think we can make a judgment, Lou, specifically because there's been some commentary but we just can't make a judgment. It's our sincere hope that they are giving it serious study.

Q Didn't we ask them to withhold comment until they had done so?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes, and we hope they do so. Okay.

Q I have a question. I've got a technical question on START. Where are the negotiations now? Are they in recess and when are they coming back? And also

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beyond that, it seems like we've kind of put those into a second priority now. Are they -- is there any plan to elevate their importance vis-a-vis INF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The talks went into recess this week and will resume at -- probably six to eight weeks from now in normal cycle. They have not in any way been downgraded. We have the proposals on the table. We are very hard at work in some confidence-building measures areas and we have discussed some very detailed aspects of the broader outlines that we've made public. But we, as you know, do not discuss, because of the confidentiality, the specifics of the negotiation at any one time.

Q We're discussing the INF negotiations pretty frequently now but we haven't done anything about START. Is the President thinking about a new proposal for START? Is he going to be doing any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we've proposed a -- ceilings of 850 ballistic missiles, which is a 50 percent cut below our current levels; 5,000 warheads on those ballistic missiles, which is also a significant cut; no more than half the missiles to be land-based and so on.

Q That's the old proposal. That hasn't gotten anywhere. Is there any demonstration of flexibility on the President's part --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are certainly discussing these with the Soviets and listening for various counterproposals.

Q Is there any prognosis at all for success in those confidence-building measures? They've been announced several times by the administration -- notification or are you getting nowhere on them too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviet public references to those have generally been fairly friendly so we do have some hopes that something can be achieved in that area.

Q Are the Pershing missiles -- can they be programmed with two -- with more than one nuclear warhead? Can there be more than one nuclear warhead on a Pershing II missile?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are being produced with one warhead and that is the intention to deploy them. I do not know and I would think that it would take, personally, this is a guess, it would take major configurations. It's something -- not something I can --

Q But all of our warheads, all of our missiles that are going to be deployed are all single warheads.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes, absolutely.

Q I have one final question. Last -- around the first of the year -- last fall, we were being told by the President and others that the Soviets were negotiating seriously and that we are optimistic. Now, all of a sudden, they haven't produced a serious proposal. What's happened to change our view on the status of what they're doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, there is a difference, if I may, a semantic difference between -- and a substantive difference between negotiating seriously and a serious proposal. We are still negotiating seriously. We're still waiting for a serious proposal.

Q How can you negotiate seriously on something --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we have elaborated each other's views of the specifics of the proposals that we have made and we've gained substantial understanding in that. We have not made any kind of a breakthrough, if that's what you're asking, in an agreement.

Q How long does it take to elaborate views, assuming that you were given to believe a few months ago that there was serious negotiation in progress, meaning that every so often something would happen, other than just a restatement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and always accompanied by the hope that we would find a, if you will, a forward leaning spirit on the part of the Soviets to get those reductions that we want, massive reductions, verifiable reductions. We have not seen that spirit at this point.

Q So we're not as optimistic as we were a few months ago, in other words --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President and certainly his negotiators have always believed that, (a) their proposals were right and very, very forward leaning; and (b) that they deserved and were getting serious attention from not only our side but also from the Soviets.

Q Yes, but what about his question? Are we less optimistic than we were?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you that because I'm not sure how you're interpreting this optimism.

Q Wasn't there some talk about some kind of an agreement out of START by the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was talk about an agreement within about a year by the Ambassador, by Ambassador Rowny -- I think he said, 50/50, within a year. I don't think he said -- I'm sure he didn't say by the end of the year.

Q Well, what about 50/50 within the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to speculate on that.

Q Is that still the general assessment over there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to speculate on that.

Q Well, if there's no -- if we're just sitting there with a proposal that they're basically just sort of understanding, they're not coming back with a counter -- it is still 50/50?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have come back with a counter involving reductions of substantial number. But the systems to be limited and the verification procedures and the specifics are, in our opinion, unsatisfactory at this point.

Q So is it 50/50 or is it something less than that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to speculate on that.

END 9:33 P.M. EST [PST?]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Briefing by
AID Administrator Peter McPherson
On
Columbian Earthquake
Friday, April 1, 1983, 3:04 P.M.

MR. McPHERSON: Good morning. Mr. Ambassador, would you join me please.

Yesterday, as I think all of you know, at 8:13 Eastern Standard Time an earthquake registering 5.5 on the Richter Scale shook the town of Popayan, Columbia, with a population of about 250,000. There have been reports of about 300 deaths and 1500 people injured. There are confirmed 200 dead.

Communications to the area have been interrupted. The Government of Columbia has requested the U.S. assist in this matter and we are responding.

The Agency of International Development is in the process of airlifting 1000 tents, plastic sheeting for shelter, medical supplies and flood lights by a U.S. aircraft to the area.

This morning, at 8:30, the first relief aircraft arrived. That aircraft was a U.S. Government C-130. It landed at Cali, a town of about 90 miles from the city affected.

This plane later took off and was able to land in that city where it discharged its cargo. A chartered commercial 707 landed at 10:30 and discharged its cargo in Cali where it will be transported to the site by Columbian aircraft. Another flight is scheduled from the AID stockpile in Panama and will land in Cali this afternoon.

We expect that the full amount of assistance that has been requested, and apparently is in need, will be in-country, in fact, on site by this afternoon or evening.

The U.S. Ambassador to Columbia is currently making an aerial assessment of the area, the surrounding area affected, and we expect to respond to a request for additional assistance if that is necessary.

The damage appears to be greater than originally estimated. The town was crowded for religious observations, observing the Holy Week. As a matter of fact, one of the major sites of death was a cathedral collapsing killing an estimated 60 worshippers. Thirty bodies, in fact, have been recovered.

The value of U.S. assistance which has been or will be delivered by this evening is about $700,000 in value, and we expect quite possibly that can increase.

As the President's special representative for International Disaster Assistance, I would like to extend to the people of Columbia our deepest sympathies for what we know to be a really terrible situation and extend our sympathies to the people who have suffered.

I would also like to thank the U.S. military personnel who worked througthout the night in getting the material ready for the planes and loading them. We responded with those peoples' help just very rapidly, as I said a moment ago, being able to have all the supplies that appeared to be needed at this moment on site within about 36 hours of the time that this disaster occurred.

I have with me here Ambassador Gomez, the Ambassador from Columbia to the United States, and I think he would like to make a comment or two.

AMBASSADOR GOMEZ HURTADO: Thank you for this opportunity to express our grateful cognizance of the help that was given by the American Government to the Colombian authorities. We have received aid that was mentioned a few minutes ago in a demonstration of efficiency and good will. The Colombians are very grateful for that help.

Popayan means a lot for our country. It is one of the ancient cities. It is full of history. Most of our Presidents were born in that city, and they contributed to the fight for independence and then to build up our democratic political system.

What happened in Popayan is very meaningful for Colombia. All of our people are very sorry about what happened, and we consider that the economic future of that city is in danger because it was one of our architectural shrines. We had maintained that city as a model, as a museum, as a demonstration of the Spanish civilization from the time of the colony, and we have preserved it with a national effort to maintain the general lines and the art of that time -- the Baroque style especially -- and that city used to live mainly of the tourists.

Having lost most of its monuments and churches, and of course the pieces of art that we have in those churches, we know from now that the future, the commercial future of this part of our country, will be endangered.

Our Red Cross organization has been able to give aid and to bring food to the people, but the problem we have is that they don't have shelters. They don't have homes any more. It has been several tremors before the earthquake, so the people don't dare to return to the ruins. That's why the help of those 1,000 tents is psychologically very important.

We are very grateful also with the actual Ambassador of the United States in Colombia -- Mr. Boyatt -- who immediately flew to Cali, a near city, and was waiting there for the aid that was flown by air from Panama and actually may be already in Popayan, and helping our authorities to give that aid, to distribute that aid to the people.

Most of the dead and injured belonged to the lower classes. That happens -- I don't know why -- in every tragedy, so we will have a lot of problems to rebuild the city, which is an economic and social interest. We will have the problem to rebuild that city because we fill find other priorities. As people are poor we will need to feed them first, to provide them some houses, and only afterwards maybe we can succeed in making the reconstruction of the city which has, as I told you, an economic interest.

We are so very grateful to President Reagan who sent to our President, Mr. Betancur, a very warm message of sympathy. Thank you.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Are there any questions?

Q Where did the planes fly from?

MR. McPHERSON: Panama. They flew from Panama and the supplies are located there, stored there, at Panama and flew in to Cali which is, as I indicated, about 90 miles from the site.

Q Could you read off that list of items sent? 1,000 tents?

MR. McPHERSON: 1,000 tents, plastic sheeting which can be used for shelter -- you spread it out and use it for shelter -- medical supplies, and what we are calling floodlights. Electricity is out, and in order to continue on with searching for the bodies and this kind of thing, they need some electricity.

One of the other problems that they have, incidentally, is while they have water, there is some serious problem of water that can people can drink. What happened, of course, is that sewer lines and water lines run side by side, and so when you get an earthquake, they often both crack and you get an intermixing with all kinds of problems that occur.

We think that we may well have a problem there that we will be wanting to respond to shortly.

Q Is there anything that is needed which the United States is unable to provide in terms of emergency assistance?

MR. McPHERSON: We're in a pretty good position from Panama to respond and respond quickly, as we've done here. Apparently UNICEF has put in a modest amount of assistance.

There's some reports -- and we don't have it confirmed -- that Venezuela may be sending in some assistance. The Colombian Government, of course, has been doing a magnificent job responding to the needs of their people We have, as the Ambassador indicated and I've talked about today, I think done a very good job at the President's direction of responding quickly, really very rapidly, to this emergency situation.

Q How many people do you have reports are homeless?

MR. McPHERSON: There are clearly thousands.

Q So are 1,000 tents going to be enough, or more sent in?

MR. McPHERSON: Those tents will hold about six people per tent -- or more, I suppose -- but that's what they're constructed for. We think that for right now this will probably be okay. In these kinds of situations what you find is that people will move in with friends or relatives. There's an immediate community response to the extent that structures remain standing. There is some fear of people moving into structures, as the Ambassador indicated, because the tremors haven't entirely stopped.

There was another tremor this morning, by the way. I think at 6:30 this morning. This is a community going way back to 1730 there was an earthquake where there was vast destruction. I think in 1942 there was --

AMBASSADOR GOMEZ HURTADO: 1842.

MR. McPHERSON: But there's been a series --

AMBASSADOR GOMEZ HURTADO: Yes. A series.

Q How much of the city is still standing? Buildings, this kind of thing?

MR. McPHERSON: I don't think we've got a firm report. I suppose when we get with this aerial report that the Ambassador is taking at this time we may have a better feel.

Q Did the U.S. volunteer this, or did Colombia ask?

MR. McPHERSON: The Colombians have asked, and we were in a position to respond immediately. There's a formal procedure for doing this. The Colombians ask, the U.S. Ambassador finds there to be a disaster, and it sets off a response such as we have taken.

Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 3:17 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON GROMYKO PRESS CONFERENCE
SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 1983, 11:07 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning. The statement is ON THE RECORD. It is a Department of State statement that you have. I hope you've had time to read it; it was put out here a few minutes ago.

Briefing material is attributable to senior officials.

Obviously, you have seen what is here in terms of the statement. I think these officials may want to talk about it a little bit. And, in fact, why don't I, instead of going on, say that that statement is ON THE RECORD from the Department. The President, of course, has also spoken ON THE RECORD previously; and I think the speakers have an opening remark and then we'll take questions.

Q Before we begin, I don't usually make a point of this sort of thing, but I wonder (inaudible) should not be ON THE RECORD.

MODERATOR: As I say, the statement is an official statement. It is ON THE RECORD. The President's statement is ON THE RECORD. And this is going to be ON BACKGROUND. But I take your point.

Q The statmeent is anonymous, by the way.

MODERATOR: This statement is an official statement issued by the Department of State. You're going to waste your own time in terms of some people having deadlines in Europe they've got to make.

Q But it's a matter of some importance. If the Soviet Foreign Minister is ON THE RECORD, there's no reason why these official who go on television, make speeches around the country, can't be ON THE RECORD answering these questions. There's no sensitivity involved in this.

MODERATOR: I take your point. The briefing will be ON BACKGROUND.

Q Can we attach your name to the statement?

MODERATOR: It's a Department of State statement, issued by the Department.

Q No -- did the Secretary participate in its composition?

MODERATOR: This is a Department of State statement. We do that frequently.

Q I know, but when you speak for the Department of State you still have a name. You are [redacted]

MODERATOR: Do you want to say that I made available to you an official statement? Is that all right with you?

Q It would make a difference to us if Secretary Shultz prepared the statement --

MODERATOR: All right.

Q -- or if the 12th Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary to the Deputy Assistant who prepared it.

MODERATOR: No. This is an official statement. If you want to say that I issued the statement on behalf of the Department, you can do that. I'm not going to go into the drafting process.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL. The answer to your question is yes. The Secretary of State is aware of the statement and he, of course, did participate. All right?

Q Thank you. I appreciate it.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I just have a few brief remarks to make and then (the other officials) will be happy to answer your questions.

The statement does speak for itself, so I'm not going to try to summarize it. I will point out to you though that it addresses both the specific points that the Soviet Foreign Minister raised about the INF negotiations and our position in those negotiations as well as make some broader points about U.S.-Soviet relations.

I wanted to just make a few specific points about the Foreign Minister's statements concerning the INF negotiations.

The Soviet Foreign Minister had three principal arguments about the interim proposal.

The first was the familiar concern about the British and French forces.

The second was the absence of aircraft limitations in the interim proposal.

And the third concerned the Soviet position on forces deployed in the Asian portions of the Soviet Union.

In each one of these three objections, we believe we have a strong case for the approach we have chosen, and I thought I might make that case.

First of all, on the question of aircraft, the Soviet Union has wanted to include aircraft in overall reductions. We have never ruled out altogether INF agreements limiting aircraft. In fact, we have called our negotiating approach a phased approach. We have wanted to concentrate in the first stage of these negotiations on the most destabilizing weapon systems and where the greatest disparity in forces exist -- which is, clearly, the land-based long-range intermediate forces where the Soviet Union, as the statement makes clear, has some 1300 warheads and the United States has zero.

However, if you look at the overall balance in nuclear-capable aircraft, you arrive at some very interesting conclusions; and that is that the Soviet Union has a substantial advantage, together with its allies, in nuclear-capable aircraft able to deliver nuclear weapons against targets in Europe in contrast to the United States and all of its allies.

Last year NATO examined this problem and put together what it called a force-comparison study, which showed that the Soviet Union, together with its allies, had some 2500 nuclear-capable aircraft that could be used today against targets in Europe, while the equivalent figure for the NATO Alliance was some some 450 aircraft.*

So it is difficult to take the Soviet charge seriously on aircraft because of the substantial advantage they enjoy. Nearly five- --or more than five -- to-one advantage is in this category of systems.

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* NOTE: The correct figure for NATO Alliance nuclear-capable aircraft if 800. The 450 figure refers to U.S. only nuclear-capable aircraft.

Secondly, in the British and French forces area, we have said all along that these forces, which are almost entirely sea-based ballistic-missile forces, do not have the same role or function as the U.S. and Soviet forces. It should not be included in these negotiations. However, again, looking at the numbers, it's important to make a point -- which is if you take existing levels of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are some 950 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and you look at existing levels of U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- which I think are, roughly, 550 -- and you add the British and French submarine missiles -- what, 144? -- most of those are 162 --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: 162.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- to minus 18, you find thta the Soviet Union still has a substantial advantage over the United States, Britain and France in the category of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Of course, submarine-launched ballistic missiles -- the ones that are deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union -- are limited in the strategic arms category and are under discussion right now in thbe START negotiation.

Finally, on the Asian systems, the Soviet Union, of course, wouldlike us to ignore the substantial SS-20 forces they deploy in Asia. There are a couple of points worth making here.

First, a good fraction of those Asian forces can reach targets in Europe where they are now deployed because of the range of the SS-20s.

Secondly, those forces, because the SS-20 is a mobile and transportable missile, can easily be moved from East to West. In fact, a number of the Soviet SS-20 bases have been constructed in areas close to rail links and other transportation centers and our studies indicate these these missiles can be moved very quickly from one portion of the Soviet Union to another. So we obviously have to take into account these forces.

And, finally, we have to take into account the threat that these systems pose to our Asian friends and allies. We simply cannot ignore those threats. And this is why we have been willing to limit worldwide our deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces. While our existing plans call for only deploying these systems in Europe, we would be willing to reduce and eliminate altogether these forces anywhere in the world; and all we are asking the Soviet Union to do is take the same step.

And I think all three of us would be happy to answer these questions, but I think we need to get to the guts of the Gromyko argument; and when we get to the guts of that argument, we find that it doesn't stand up -- that there is no reason why the Soviet Union should not either agree on our bold version of arms control eliminating these systems -- and if they're unwilling, as they have been, then agree to take a step in that direction to agree to equal levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads.

Q Despite the substantial disagreement, can you take an overall view of this agreement? Is there a basis for negotiations now? In other words, as important as the details may be to you, aren't you arguing details with the Soviets now and isn't the net result that you've made mutual progress toward arms control -- or is that not so?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think that when you call these "details," they are --

Q Important.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL -- they are important details. Nevertheless, I think there is, and the President has come forward, with a proposal that does provide a basis for progress and negotiation in Geneva.

Q And Gromyko didn't kill it today?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think, as we point out in the statement, we found it somewhat restrained.

Q Isn't it true that the last time that Gromyko responded directly to an American proposal was in March of '77?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'm not too sure if that is true. I know I have asked some of our Soviet historians. That was a famous presentation he made. But he gives press conferences and responds to disarmament and other issues every year in New York --

Q I know in New York.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- at the General Assembly.

Q But in terms of a U.S. proposal and and an immediate direct response by Gromyko, isn't this comparable to 1977?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it is comparable. Whether this is the first time since '77 he's done that, I just can't say.

Q (Inaudible) your statement said that Gromyko has rejected this proposal as well. I mean, is it assumed here that it is rejected or not rejected?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The statement says it was rejected. What I said in my statement is that the President's proposal does provide the basis for a negotiation.

Q Well, "rejected" is a special word in diplomatic language. I mean he may have rebuffed it. "Rejected" is really to say no way. Do you take that as saying no way?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Again, I think the statement speaks for itself.

Q The statement uses the word "unacceptable" at several key points.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think Mr. Gromyko used the word "unacceptable."

Q Yes, that's what I mean.

Q What we are trying to find out is are we still engaged in a process of negotiation with the Soviets based on the proposal that the President has made most recently or are we checking that out somehow?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The negotiation -- let me just -- Paul Nitze, at the end of the last round, laid out the ideas that the President publicly discussed. We are not now in formal negotiations with the Soviets. That formal negotiation will resume on May 17. What we are saying is that we think this proposal provides the basis for negotiation and we hope that the Soviet Union does as well. And we hope that when we return to the negotiating table on May 17 some progress will result on the basis of the President's proposal. And in the statement, I think, as you can see, we call on the Soviet Union to seriously examine this proposal and not to reject it out of hand.

Q Thank you.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'll just add there's a history here of things being rejected at one moment and ultimately accepted. The Soviets rejected the concept of negotiation about these forces until the December 1979 decision, after which they agreed to negotiate. What they regard as unacceptable today they may not regard as unacceptable tomorrow and they have every reason to be concerned about conveying the impression, which Gromyko's remarks have begun to do, that they are unwilling to enter into any agreement that would be based on equality of the relevant forces, which are the warheads on long-range missiles.

Q Directly after the President's speech, you gentlemen held a briefing at the White House, at which it was said that there might be another American proposal of specific numbers if indeed the Soviets turn this one down.

I presume that we are not in a position now where the United States is preparing that and the initial position has been rejected, killed -- or whatever word you want. There's still some life in it, right?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We certainly do believe there's life in it, and this is why we have called on the Soviets to examine this carefully; and we're not going to negotiate in public. We want to hear what the Soviets have to say when we return to Geneva to the negotiating table.

Q Isn't this about what you expected?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I don't want to comment because I think there was more than simply this possibility. I think my own view is the Soviets could have come out with a much stronger and tougher line than they did, but that's my own personal view.

Q In one of the briefings this week it was said that the Soviets were asked not to reject the proposal out of hand and to think about it seriously and come back to the table. Had you specifically wanted them not to issue this kind of statement?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't say that. I think that we expected some type of statement from them.

Q Could you address Gromyko's allegation that Japan and the waters surrounding Japan are stuffed full of nuclear weapons and the Island of Okinawa is an enormous nuclear weapons base. South Korea is a complex of nuclear-weapons bases, the Indian Ocean -- blah, blah, blah -- Diego Garcia stuffed full of nuclear weapons, the Persian Gulf stuffed full of nuclear weapons?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think those allegations are somewhat ridiculous. It is very clear -- and my colleagues may want to comment on this -- it is very clear that over the last ten years the Soviet Union has engaged in a massive military buildup in the Far East and they have deployed nuclear-capable aircraft to the area. They have deployed their SS-20 missiles -- which can reach targets in Japan, South Korea and elsewhere in Asia -- and we have not engaged in any kind of major military buildup in Asia. Our desire there has been to maintain and preserve the balance.

Q But could you take it step by step?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. I'm not going to comment on the whole question. We never do on the question of nuclear-weapons deployment. You know that.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: What he seems to be referring to is the fact that we have nuclear-aircraft carriers that move throughout the oceans of the world. They sometimes have on board small numbers of nuclear weapons, and I suppose he counts them every time they move from one ocean to another.

The fact is in the Pacific the Soviets have an overwhelming advantage in nuclear weapons and have had for some time, and that is an advantage that has been increasing. We have deployed no new weapons in the Pacific.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: If you're going to compare forces -- I mean what he's talking about are basically tactical aircraft that are deployed on aircraft carriers or in Japan or with U.S. air force units in Korea, which are of course in no way comparable to missiles, strategic weapons with thousands-of-miles range that can strike and destroy whole cities.

Q So what you're rejecting then is the word "base," when he says there are bases -- "base" meaning --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. We're just saying they're not comparable. You're talking about some tactical aircraft that have the ability to deliver nuclear weapons and you're trying to compare them with awesome strategic-capability systems like the SS-20s.

Q Their major growth has been just in the SS-20s --

FIRST OFFICIAL: No.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: As my colleague said, it's been across the board. But I did want to underline that when you talk about what we are focusing on in INF -- which are these intermediate long-range missiles of the SS-20 type -- they have deployed 324 warheads or 108 systems to Asia already, and there may be more on the way. We don't have any comparable system in Asia at all. So for them to raise this issue is really almost incomprehensible.

I think they are referring, as my colleague said, to a few ships. they have lots of ships of their own that we believe carry nuclear weapons.

Q On that figure, you know, I've seen 90 to a hundred. You're saying 108 now.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What is the current rate of new SS-20s -- about one a week? about one a month of them going to Asia? 351 was the last one. Where are we today?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Roughly, we will stay and have stayed with this rough estimate that they deploy one new SS-20 a week; and they allocate, I think, one out of three or one out of four SS-20s to Asia.

Q So they're building up the Asian forces as well as the European forces?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes, they are.

Q O.K.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Clearly, but it's a little misleading to say one a week or whatever. They came at different times. That kind of figure is more from looking at the overall number and saying it would be an average of one a week.

Q All right.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We have seen recent deployments in Asia, and it continues to build up in Asia. There's a lot of emphasis on Asia.

Q You are also concerned about mobility. Is there any evidence that SS-20s are shifted at all from either side of the ocean urals?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: They don't need to shift them now, because they have deployments in the eastern and western parts of the Soviet Union --

Q Yes, I know.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- but what there is evidence of, in exercises and the way they produce the weapons and they transport them, is that it's an easily transportable system and they have the capability to transport it over a great distance.

Q A small point on the SS-20s in Asia. I'm curious that many of those can reach targets in Alaska, since he flatly says that none of them can reach American targets.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: O.K. Let me give you my best estimate, and again our expert -- maybe my colleague -- may want to comment on this specifically.

And, again, his point about mobility or your point about mobility -- they are mobile. They can shift them very quickly. If they did ship them, without question, they could; where they are deployed right now, it depends on which range estimate you buy, and there's been a difference of a small number of about 500 kilometers in terms of estimating in various range estimates.

If you take one estimate of it, they can, clearly. If you take another estimate, they can, barely. But, you know, this is a very small part of Alaska right now in the current deployments.

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Q What are the parameters? What are the range parameters you are talking about?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let's see -- I don't think these are classified numbers: 4,400 to 5,000 kilometers in range -- much longer, by the way, than the Pershing II or the GLCM that we're talking about; and those ranges are 1800 kilometers and 2400 kilometers. Theirs is almost double the range.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: One thing you should bear in mind with the SS-20 is that while we worry about the threat that it poses to our allies in Europe, where it is deployed it has the capacity to cover the entire Middle East, large portions of northern Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and all of China.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: And the United States.

Q What is the rate of dismantlement of the 4s and 5s -- are the Russians doing much along those lines? And secondly, what about the Chinese missiles? The Soviets have raised this as an argument, that the Chinese have IRBM-type missiles. How do you answer that, that they would need some in Asia to counter Chinese weapons?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I can answer that; my colleague might want to do the -4s and -5s dismantlement.

The Soviet Union has substantial nuclear capabilities to use against countries in Asia, including China, without the deployment of the SS-20s, and no one would try to suggest that there is anything approaching a regional nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and China. But we make the point in the statement that we cannot accept the principle that we have to enter into arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that provide an outcome that gives the Soviet Union equality with all of its potential adversaries combined, because what that means is that the United States enters an agreement in which it accepts inferiority with the Soviet Union.

I think the President has been very clear -- and the Alliance has been very clear -- that the only basis that we're prepared to negotiate with the Soviet Union is on the basis of equality.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Do you want me to just add, on the -4s and -5s, those numbers do change. Right now they are in the 240-250 range, closer probably to 240. They have decreased a little bit as these SS-20s have built up in large measure.

With regard to China, they have a very small, strategic missile program; the Soviets have a huge one.

Q They have decreased from what, over how long a period? It's just never been made clear.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think their figure was, roughly, 600 four, or maybe 5 years ago, so they are gradually reducing that force. They have said that they were retiring that force, come what may. We should not view this as any kind of concession. After all, we're talking about missiles that are well over 20 years old.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's worth putting a couple of these numbers into perspective. Since the late 1960s, the United States has been reducing the number of its deployed nuclear weapons to the point where we now have deployed today the lowest number of nuclear weapons we've had deployed at any time in the last twenty years, and some 8,000 fewer nuclear weapons than we had in the mid-to-late 1960s.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has been steadily adding nuclear weapons over the whole of this period. If you look just at Europe, the United States, in December 1979, unilaterally removed 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. And we are pledged under the terms of the December 1979 agreement to remove an additional 464 nuclear warheads from Europe as the ground-launch Cruise missiles are deployed. So we will have actually reduced the total number of weapons deployed in Europe, even if we were to carry out the full planned deployment by over 1,000 weapons.

The Soviets have been adding weapons at the rates that we've been discussing, both in Europe and the Far East. In addition to the longer-ranged weapons that we've been talking about, they have been making significant additions across the spectrum of shorter-ranged systems, and they continue to do that.

Q Even though you're not talking numbers at this point, in our proposal is the Cruise-Pershing mix negotiable?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: What is negotiable are reductions in both the ground-launch Cruise missile numbers and the Pershing II numbers, that we have said this week that we would deploy, if we deployed a reduced number, a mix of both Pershing II and Cruise missiles. In other words, we're not talking about dropping the Pershing II.

Q Why? What is the reason?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Because we think there are sound military reasons for maintaining a ballistic missile and cruise missile mix.

Q What is the military reason for the mix?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Because there are different defenses against the two types of systems. They have different capabilities, and in the analysis that was done by the NATO military authorities during 1978-1979, it was agreed that a mix was more militarily appropriate.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Could I just add on one point there, too? As you compare these systems, in which the Soviets, as you know, have over 1,050 warheads right now, SS-20 warheads, all of those warheads or missiles in their 351 systems move at the same speed as the Pershings. We've often heard people talking about the short flight time of the Pershing compared to the Cruise. All on the Soviet side are the same flight time as the Pershing.

Q I got a heated phone call one day from someone in Alabama claiming to be an expert who took vigorous exception to the notion that the Pershings can reach the Soviet territory in six minutes -- you've seen 5 to 8, 6. He says it's much slower than that.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's roughly 15 minutes, which is, by the way, the same flight time as some Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles against targets in the United States.

Q I've never seen a published account of those. I keep seeing 5 to 8, or 6. That's flat wrong, right?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That is flat wrong.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: It matters where it is. Some people are talking about how much warning time they might have. There are a lot of variables involved.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: One question we need to ask ourselves is why is it somehow unacceptable to threaten the Soviet Union from Europe with a ballistic missile, but it is perfectly all right for the Soviet Union to threaten our allies with an even more destructive ballistic missile?

Q While we've got you, I'd like to ask you about the demonstrations in Europe this weekend -- what effect you think they might have on the Soviet statement here and what effect you think they might have on our negotiating position in Geneva.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I would only on your first question say that I think it would be a mistake for the Soviet Union to view those activities as somehow representing a lack of commitment or will on the part of the Alliance to go forward with the December '79 decision. I think the response of the European governments to the President's proposal demonstrates that there is very strong support for continuing preparations for deployment in order to achieve an arms control outcome, that the Alliance has remained united behind this issue since the December '79 decision was taken, and it is as united as ever right now.

In terms of our negotiating position, we recognize the concerns of Europeans, and Americans for that matter, for reducing the risks of nuclear war. What is clear is that you will not reduce the risk of nuclear war if we do not either get an acceptable arms control outcome or are unable to deploy, and the Soviet Union is left with a total monopoly in these weapons. Unilateral disarmament is certainly not a solution to this problem.

Specifically on this question, from my special perspective -- someone who worries about Europe -- that is one of the major problems with the freeze, that what the freeze would do would be to lock in the United States and its allies into a massive inferiority in the area of INF systems. It would preserve the Soviet 1300-to-zero advantage.

Q I haven't been to all the briefings this week, but the question has come up in my office which goes something like this: If there is no agreement, the U.S. would be deploying over several years 572 new warheads; the Soviet Union has some 1300, plus or minus, some over this period. The interim proposal calls for both sides to end up with equality of warheads. So in other words, the U.S. is asking the Soviet Union to give up in the negotiations something the U.S. is not willing to do on the ground -- that is, we're not willing to deploy the number that would bring us to equality with the Soviet Union warheads, but yet asking them to come down to equality on their own.

The question just is this: Is this a logical proposal?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it's completely logical. And you might look at our position in the Vienna negotiations on conventional force levels.

I think the important point is that the United States and its allies cannot formally agree to codify or institutionalize inferiority. In December '79, we took a specific decision, and that decision was to deploy 572 systems. We are not at this stage going to revise that decision because our concentration is, at this stage, to implement that decision. That is what we intend to do.

But we are not prepared to codify Soviet superiority, or to institutionalize it, within an agreement. The purpose of these systems, of 572 systems, is to establish, in the face of the Soviet SS-20 buildup, a clear link between the defense and security of Europe and the defense and security of the United States. We believe that the December '79 decision, which includes the 572 systems, will do that.

Q Have we settled on the number of 572 with the Allies, because their traditional deployment in Europe, the Soviets, was around 600 warheads? How have we arrived at that number?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. There were a number of factors that led to the 572, everything from looking at overall military requirements, targets, the countries involved. For instance, the Pershing II numbers, part of that 572 -- 108 -- each one of the Pershings will replace a shorter-ranged Pershing, and that figure was already set, of 108. So I think there were a number of factors, and no one was predominant.

MODERATOR: Let's take one more.

Q You, obviously, can't answer this in detail, but to pick up on your point that we cannot afford to codify Soviet superiority, they are still deploying. At what point do you have to reevaluate your own strategic position in that regard, because obviously, if they deploy 500 SS-20s, 572 GLCMS and Pershing IIs don't really have very much to do with the strategic balance.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: My colleague may want to add a point to this because he is the fellow who is responsible for working with the Allies in looking at NATO requirements in the future; and that's a future-oriented question.

Our problem right now is to implement the decision we have already taken, and that is the focus of our effort. It would be counter-productive, in my view, to begin raising questions about that decision. Our purpose now is, in the absence of an agreement, in the absence of eliminating these systems altogether, or in the absence of achieving an agreement on the basis of the President's interim proposal, is to deploy all 572 systems.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let me just add one point, which is that the numbers the Soviets have already deployed make no military sense to us. The number greatly exceeds any reasonable scenario for the employment of those weapons. There are so many more weapons than there are targets that one wonders why the Soviets go on deploying them, unless it is to create a political effect. But we can't justify even their current number.

While they could, of course, go on building to the sorts of numbers you suggest, it seems to us a terribly ill-conceived deployment plan and a wasteful one.

(The briefing concluded at 12:43 P.M.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT OSVALDO HURTADO LARREA
OF ECUADOR

April 8, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:14 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: Okay. I apologize for the delay. The briefing will be ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a senior administration official. This briefing is on the visit of President Reagan and President Hurtado. And it will deal, exclusively, with that meeting. So other questions on other subjects that you may feel our briefer has some insight into can be addressed at some other point. This briefing is on the meeting that was held today and on U.S.-Ecuadoran relations.

Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, Mort.

The discussions that the two Presidents had -- and that George Shultz and Don Regan and other administration officials had with President Hurtado -- covered the following points.

First, support for democracy -- this is an elected, democratic, constitutional government in Ecuador, coming in after a period of military rule. It is headed toward presidential and parliamentary elections next year, with the first round in January of 1984. It has been a very difficult transition. The President expressed his strong support for democracy in this country and, indeed, for the spreading trend toward democratic institutions througnout the Hemisphere. And President Hurtado, in addition to reiterating his strong belief in democracy in the Hemisphere, thanked the President for the support that we have given.

The second topic that was treated in several conversations is the economic one. As you heard President Hurtado point out, Latin America is in a serious debt crisis. And most of the countries on the continent are facing deep recessions with an uncertain future. The President, President Hurtado, described what Ecuador had done to deal with this issue. It has, on the one hand, asked for the rescheduling of a portion -- $1.3 billion -- of its $6 billion foreign debt. That is under discussion with New York and other bankers. And the discussions are proceeding quite positively. They will be taken up again this week. And the expectation is that they will be successful.

On the other hand, though, the government of Ecuador has taken a series of very difficult stabilization measures, have caused a good deal of popular reaction. It has acted with courage and some considerable firmness and with success -- such things as sharp devaluations of the currency, removal of subsidies on petroleum and other products, sharp cuts in state programs in a number of areas, and a compression of the budget deficit. All of this latter has been taken in conjunction with a negotiation with the IMF, which has progressed quite well.

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The United States, on its side, has -- in addition to its, roughly, $10 million program of economic assistance for this country -- provided this year -- and we are just about to announce the second part of this -- $81 million worth of CCC agricultural credits.

Now, in discussions on the economic side, both the Ecuadorans and our officials agreed that not only do individual countries have to put their houses in order, but there has to be some general expansion in the international system. It is one thing if only a few countries have to cut back. But if every country has to cut back, this becomes inconsistent. And an environment is created in which the effects tend to reinforce each other and make matters worse for individual countries.

The President, Mr. Regan, Mr. Shultz pointed out to the developing expansion in the U.S. economy, said that it is not a question of having a single locomotive for the Western World, but of a large number of countries

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moving together and all, would affect each other and pointed to the Williamsburg Summit as the next occasion on which to discuss a common strategy in depth.

We also covered -- third subject -- a number of hemispheric questions; in particular, the question of how to develop diplomacy moving towards peaceful solutions in Central America. It was pointed out in the course of these discussions that a proposal had emerged in Central America, led by Honduras but responding to an initiative by a number of regional powers, such as Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia, to have an all Latin regional meeting on peace in Central America. Have been a lot of consultation with the United States, and we had agreed that we should not take a direct part in this in order to maximize the possibility that Nicaragua would join it.

However, at the present moment, Nicaragua appears to be resisting this meeting with other Central American countries. The debate is occurring in the OAS over what is the right forum of such a meeting. The United States representatives expressed support for this five-plus-five initiative, five Central American countries, five other Latin American witnesses, as they are called. And there was a larger discussion about the role of peaceful discussions in the hemisphere, including the experience the United States has had in attempting to negotiate with Cuba, and attitudes that the Cuban government adopts towards its neighbors.

Our relations with Ecuador are very good; a very cordial exchange, mutually supportive exchange. The President of Ecuador thanked us for the support that we had given during recent severe flooding in his country, particularly in the coastal town of Guayaquil.

Okay. That, I think, summarizes about where we were. Yes, sir.

Q As you know, the President of Ecuador and his Foreign Minister have made statements in the last six weeks in which both have declared their view that in order for there to be peace in Central America, all foreign interventionists should leave the region. How does the United States view that suggestion since we, of course, have uniformed military advisers in El Salvador -- trainers, pardon me -- and we have covert activities going on which the administration says is within -- are within the law. So how do those things fit within President Hurtado and his Foreign Minister's view that all interventionists in the region should leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you may recall that a number of democratic countries, including this one, got together in October in San Jose and tried to outline an end game, if you will, for Central America, sort of what we were aiming at. And one of the things that we were -- we said must happen, all of us -- the United States has affirmed that in a number of ways since that time, including by President Reagan repeatedly during his trip to Latin America and Central America in December -- one of the things that we suggested was that there should be mutual, reciprocal, verified accords on removal of all foreign advisers, limitation of the import of heavy offensive weapons, an end to insurgencies run from one country on another on the same mutual and verifiable basis, and a number of other points. But all of those points were included in that statement of policy and supported subsequently by the President.

We don't have to have a lot of foreign military trainers in El Salvador or elsewhere. We have a few. We don't have nearly as many, of course, as the Cubans have in Nicaragua.

Q That wasn't my question, sir. President Hurtado and his Foreign Minister have both said all foreign military interventionists in the region should be withdrawn. What is our government's view of that call --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our government's view of that is that, and I'm giving you the specifics, because we've already supported and indeed proposed the specifics that on the same reciprocal and verified basis that we should remove the trainers, part of the intervention, if you will. I think that's what is meant by that word and the heavy offensive weapons and so forth. That is all on a basis of reciprocity and verification. That is an American proposal and that of other democracies in the area.

Q May I follow up, sir. Did he raise this issue in the talks today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Has it been raised at the embassy level or at the level of foreign minister talking to foreign minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On an economic question with Ecuador, he said while he was in New York that he was interested in a debt solution that would involve debtor countries paying on their ability to pay perhaps with respect to their foreign exchange earnings rather than fixed interest rates and over and over again rescheduling. Did he bring this up in the meeting today and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir.

Q Didn't come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir. He, indeed, spoke of the relatively good job he thought Ecuador was doing in reaching agreement with its creditors and the successful handling of its debt. He pointed out that this is a very major issue. You heard him speak out in front of the White House. It's a very major issue for a lot of countries that we all must be concerned with, but he did not propose such a solution.

Q And anything about a collection of countries similarly situated with respect to that -- getting together and devising some overall debt relief?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Didn't even bring it up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q In the five plus five plan, did he voice support for it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He voiced support for solutions that would get the maximum amount of agreement. He said that Ecuador is not proposing its own plan, does not plan to put forward specific ideas but is vitally interested in peace in Central America and would support and join other proposals.

Q But he did not specifically support five plus five?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not specifically support five plus five although he did express interest in it.

Q Did he ask the President -- President Reagan for any information on what exactly the United States is doing in Nicaragua? And was any explanation offered?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the subject did not come up as I think I just mentioned.

Q Sir, on the economic front, you say that he had not asked for any economic aid, he have no discussed the Nicaraguan issue, and he have no expressed himself on the five and five proposal. What is the substance of the visit then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was mainly on the three points that I mentioned before which resulted in some very far-ranging conversations on this. We said on our side that we thought that, indeed, they had done extremely well with their stabilization program and that we were telling our banks that we thought it was a serious and constructive program that is worthy of support.

I don't think that either the President of Ecuador or our President thought of this as a meeting in which -- to request economic assistance. We had, as I mentioned, just granted a substantial amount in the CCC credits.

Q Sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, that -- excuse me, you're first.

Q I just wanted to ask you about the CCC credits. You say we've already granted them or we are about to make the announcement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The second tranche of them is about to be announced. The total will be $81 million.

Q And forgive my ignorance, but what does CCC credits mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They mean short-term credits for the purchase of agricultural goods, generally three years in length. It would be particularly helpful at this time of a payments crunch in Ecuador.

Q How much of it's already been made public then?

Q Is that for all --

Q How much of the $81 million has already been announced?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How much are the -- have we got an expert here on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know, sir.

Q This is for Ecuador to buy American agricultural products?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I don't know how it's broken down into the two tranches, I'm sorry.

Q And this is all $81 million -- all the credits are for Ecuador and not for --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ecuador.

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Q -- agriculture -- beets, corn --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you that either. I'm sorry.

You're going to have to provide specialized -- take numbers and provide specialized information, please.

MR. ALLIN: You ought to give Jeff Biggs a call at the Department, 632-4726. I'm sure he will be glad to provide that. Right, Jeff?

Q What's the number again?

MR. ALLIN: Jeff?

Q Yes.

Q In his speech before the OAS yesterday, President Hurtado said, and I quote, "The violence that has left a trail of blood in Central America has historical causes that are linked to oppression, social injustice, and economic problems." In his departure declaration, President Reagan thanked President Hurtado for sharing with him the benefit of his perceptive views. Was that perceptive view shared with President Reagan and did he try to stress that the President should take that into his analysis of what's been going on in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he did not make that point. However, many administration spokesmen have, as you know, said that there are two things going on in Central America. One is the legacy of past injustices, and the other is outside interference.

Q Just a clarification on the five-plus-five.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Is the five-plus-five identical -- is the Honduran resolution at the OAS identical to the five-plus-five, or is there a difference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it simply says -- calls on all countries to meet under this formula in order to discuss the resolution of their problems, all countries in Central America.

Q Under five-plus-five -- I thought it didn't --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It has the five, and it is less certain about how many others should come in, but it suggests other Latin American countries coming in and being witnesses without --

Q And would we oppose -- if Cuba were invited as a Latin American country, would we oppose that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It refers to members of the OAS, I believe. We would not support that, no.

Q At any time during the meeting, was the issue of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And -- excuse me -- I think I should say that no one is proposing it.

Q All right.

Q Sorry. At any time during the meeting, was the issue of tuna-fishing raised by either side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it was in a congratulatory tone because this is a very difficult issue -- an issue brought about, on the one hand, by seizures, by Ecuador of U.S. tuna-fishing boats and, on the other hand, by the imposition of a U.S. embargo on tuna and tuna products, has been satisfactorily

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resolved. It was a month ago.

MR. ALLIN: Last question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You may have heard President Reagan referring to this in his remarks.

MR. ALLIN: Al?

Q Yes. The question is: Did the President of Ecuador urge President Reagan to seek a peaceful solution to problems in Central America? Did he use those words?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It was the American side that raised the ideas that we have and see -- possibilities we see for peaceful solutions. And it was President Hurtado who commented and reacted on some of his quite general ideas without putting forward specific ones.

Q So he didn't have to bring up Central America, then, on his own? It was the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did.

Q He didn't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did.

Q What about the CBI?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not bring it up. Ecuador is not a beneficiary.

Q It was not discussed in the context of the hemisphere?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:32 P.M. EST

RUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 11, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
ON THE
MX COMMISSION REPORT

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

12:12 P.M. EST

MR. HETU: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Assembled is the President's Commission on Strategic Forces and a number of our senior counsellors. Let me introduce General Brent Scowcroft, the Chairman of the Commission, who will have a brief statement and, then, take questions and answers.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Herb. I think, since you really have not had a chance to go over our report, that it would be useful for me to take five minutes or so to outline some of its major elements as background for your questions.

It is a closely reasoned report, I hope. And, therefore, I would urge that you read it carefully. I will not pretend to cover all of it, but simply touch some of the highlights.

The Report begins by outlining the central dilemma for us -- of coping with Soviet expansionism, while avoiding the devastation of a nuclear war. It, then, goes on to discuss the nature and the requirements of deterrence and the manner in which arms control can make a contribution to that deterrence. It points out that the Soviets place great emphasis on their military forces, at least as a backdrop for their political designs.

For example, Soviet investment in ICBM forces underscores the importance, in their eyes, of the role that those forces play for them. Thus, since the deployment of the last U.S. ICBM -- the Minuteman III -- the Soviets have deployed the SS-17, the 18, and the 19 -- over 600 missiles of MX size or larger. And they are, now, in the process of testing two new ones.

Since the fundamental purpose of U.S. strategic forces is deterrence, it is vital for us to understand the importance of military power in the Soviet scheme of things. To maintain and enhance deterrence, the United States has been modernizing its strategic forces. The Report discusses that modernization with emphasis, of course, on ICBM forces -- which is at the heart of our current, national problems on strategic force modernization.

Our analysis has convinced us that this issue has come, in part, to be miscast. And our Report recommends what we feel is a major, new departure. We are proposing new directions both in ICBM forces and in arms control. That new departure, fundamentally, is to integrate strategic force programs with arms control, and to move both in the direction of stability.

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We would accomplish this through a three-part program. The first part would be the immediate deployment of something like a hundred MX missiles for a number reasons, among which are the following.

First and certainly not least, to demonstrate U.S. national will and cohesion -- we have now had four Presidents who have said that the MX is important, if not essential, to our national security. Failure to carry through with this program would hardly demonstrate to the Soviets that we have the will, which is an essential element of deterrence.

Next, in order to reduce the substantial imbalance in the capability of U.S., ICBM forces compared to those of the Soviet Union -- the Soviets can, with their ICBM forces, put our forces and other critical targets at risk in a way that the United States cannot begin to match. This is an important element of instability.

But, very importantly, the MX is essential to induce the Soviets toward negotiation, especially negotiations on an arms control framework which would permit us, and encourage them, to move in the direction of greater stability.

For the longer run, the Commission proposes engineering design of a small, single-warhead missile -- looking toward possible deployment in the early 1990s. We suggest a single-warhead missile in order to reduce the value of the target, making it unremunerative to attack and, thus, enhancing the stability of the force -- and small in order to open up, to a maximum extent, the opportunities for survivable basing, almost certainly including mobile.

In order to provide the environment which will support the deployment of a small missile, a new departure in arms control is needed. Counting by launchers has, perversely, led us to the present structure of very high valued targets, large missiles with a number of warheads.

We must, therefore, turn to counting our forces on both sides by warheads, and not by launchers. After moving to count warheads, it would be, then, useful to cap or reduce the numbers sharply in order that a deployment of great numbers of small missiles would not be necessary.

This, in turn, gets us back to the MX, which is essential to induce the Soviets to negotiate away what is currently a favorable strategic position for them in ICBM forces, hopefully, to encourage them to move in the same strategic direction by making clear that their huge missiles in silos are a wasting asset.

For this, we believe that MX deployed in Minuteman silos is an adequate response at reasonable cost. It is true that, whatever the current survivability of Minuteman silos, they are becoming more vulnerable. We do propose a vigorous R&D program on silo hardening and, of course, would take advantage of any developments which result from that research and development, either with the MX or, conceivably, with the small missile.

The fundamental requirement for survivability of our ICBM force is as a hedge against a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare, putting our submarine-launched, ballistic missiles at risk. We do not see that on the horizon at the present time. And we are proposing the small missile in the longer run to enhance survivability of the ICBM force.

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For the present, we believe that vulnerability is not so dominant a part of the overall problem as to require other, immediate steps. We believe that the Soviets must have some uncertainties about their operational capabilities, notwithstanding whatever their test accuracies indicate to them. But especially, we feel that there still is an important synergistic survivability between the ICBM forces and the bomber forces in that it is difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviets to attack both of them simultaneously.

That, in brief, is the outline of our recommendations. Few, if any, will consider our recommendations an optimal solution. If such were available, this Commission probably would not have been convened. We have tried to construct an approach which is different in kind, however, which promises a major, new departure for the the United States in the direction of enhanced stability for our strategic forces and, hopefully, an approach which will permit a consensus to develop, allowing us to put the devisiveness of the past -- both in arms control and in our strategic forces -- behind us and allow us to move forward with a more common perspective in our efforts to preserve both peace and liberty.

And now, we are prepared to take your questions.

Q General, once before Congress turned down the concept of hardened silos for the MX. What has changed in your judgment? Has the political climate changed, or the technology?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Sam, that is not precisely correct. What Congress did is turn down an interim deployment of MX in Minuteman silos, proposed by the administration while they were deciding whether they wanted to put it

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in aircraft, deep underground, or go to ballistic missile defense. And the Congress said, "No. Come back and tell us where you want to put it permanently, not on an interim basis." We are recommending a permanent deployment for the MX.

Q So you don't think there would be an objection from the standpoint of the technology of the hardened silo?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: What I'm saying is I think their objection at the time did not relate to what it is we're proposing.

Q This, you say, is permanent, General? Do you mean permanent, or just until the development of the smaller single warhead missiles?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I would think permanent exactly. When one would phase it out, I think it would still be very useful. After that time, it would depend extensively on developments with the Soviet Union.

MR. CUTLER: Bill, if we were successful in developing the single warhead missile and in negotiating an arms control treaty, in which both sides relied primarily on single warhead missiles for their ICBM force, then one of our objectives would be to reduce the number of multi-warhead missiles on both sides, including the MX's on our side and the SS-19's and 18's on their side.

Q General, moving from the -- counting launchers to counting warheads, what would that do, in your opinion, to the problem of verifiability?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't think it necessarily -- and some of the other commissioners might want to comment -- I don't think it necessarily makes that kind of verification more difficult. We have fairly -- we have adequate rules now which allow us to determine the number of warheads on missiles. If we'd kept the same counting rules about testing, it seems to me that that would not be an insurmountable problem.

DR. BROWN: I think that's right. It's a matter of how you do the arithemetic. The present agreements limit the number of launchers, they limit the number of warheads per launcher, and you get the number of warheads by multiplying. If you limit the number of warheads and let the number of launchers be loose, you can still -- you're still going to have to get the number of warheads by multiplying the number of launchers and missiles you see by the number of warheads per missile. It's a different way of going at it so as not to put pressure on to reduce the number of launchers and thereby make the forces more vulnerable because they're more warheads to attack a limited number of aim points.

Q What about refiring capabilities?

DR. BROWN: Well, that is going to have to be taken care of no matter how you do it.

Q General, you said in your report that the Soviets are developing two new ICBM's. Is this, in your opinion and the panel's opinion, a violation of SALT II?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, yes, we use that as a shorthand. That -- I don't think we want to get into that. It's an extremely complicated -- extremely complicated matter. In fact, they have had two tests of something, one of which they have declared as their new missile and --

Q Will not our announcement of two ICBM's, the MX, and a new smaller ICBM, announce to them that it'll be all right for them to go ahead with two new ICBM's also?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think not at all.

Lloyd, you might --

DR. BROWN: It certainly shouldn't because we're talking about a flight test with a small missile that would not begin until probably 1988 or '89. To equate that with a flight test that takes place this year, I think in a treaty that -- whose original term was to run until 1985, it seems to me is a strange application.

MR. CUTLER: The SALT II Treaty prohibits the extended testing of more than one new missile, ICBM. The SALT II Treaty runs out in 1985. It expressly provided that by the end of 1984, had it been ratified, there would have been a new negotiation for an extension of that treaty with lower limits and also more improved limits. It would have been quite logical to expect that in any extension going beyond 1985 both sides would have agreed that each could deploy in that period -- test and deploy a second new missile, especially one as stabilizing as a single warhead missile.

Q General, are you not saying both in the report and in your summary that the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles, which Mr. Brown and Mr. Reagan and others told us was a fact as early as 1980, in fact does not really exist for all practical purposes and probably won't in the immediate future?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think we're saying that. I think what we're saying is that the program, which we propose, fundamentally, deploying the MX early for purposes which only it can serve, and relying on the longer period for the survivability which the small missle provides, is adequate to deal with the problem.

DR. BROWN: The equation of vulnerability of land-based ICBM's with the vulnerability of our strategic forces is, I think, the mistake that's implicit in your question. The land-based ICBM's will be vulnerable. In combination with our other forces, they will provide a stong deterrent.

Q Why won't the Minuteman be vulnerable in the same silos --

DR. BROWN: It is.

Q I don't mean the Minuteman, I mean the MX.

DR. BROWN: It is. The difficulty for someone who has tried to attack a diversified force, in order to escape retaliation, is that destroying one component of that force successfully, providing that the others are designed to be complimentary to it, will not protect him from retaliation.

MR. CUTLER: And Sam, for every missile that survives, that missle will have ten warheads instead of three, so you will have triple the size of your surviving force.

Q General, when Sam asked earlier about the Congressional objections, the first time around, on hardened silos, the objections were not just that it was a temporary interim plan, the objections were also to the question of the vulnerability of the silos and the hardening technology. Has something changed since then regarding the technology of what you're proposing to be done to the Minuteman silos?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't say anything is fundamentally changed although there are some very interesting new developments in silo hardening which could hold out substantial promise. We are not basing our recommendations on a research and development breakthrough of any kind.

Q So you would proceed with the basing mode even if the technology on the hardening does not work out?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q Well, how do you answer the question of vulnerability though? That was the main Congressional objection.

DR. SCHLESINGER: I think that it is important to avoid exaggeration on the vulnerability question. The effect of deterrence is to achieve an impact on the minds of a would-be attacker.

There is a substantial difference that General Scowcroft has referred to between accuracies achieved in a test range and those accuracies that would be required in an operational attack against the U.S. complex. The Soviets can never have a high degree of confidence that those accuracies would be achieved in a massive strike which has never before been tested.

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MR. CUTLER: I'd like to add just one other point on the vulnerability question, and that is that this report proposes a new and better answer to the vulnerability problem.

The vulnerability problem of the ICBM forces essentially is the multi-warhead missile. If both sides have an equal number of ten warhead missiles, then one side can use ten percent of its force to knock out all the missiles on the other side. Or, if it uses two warheads per missile, twenty percent of its force to knock out all the missiles on the other side.

We're proposing moving toward a system of single warhead missiles, where essentially you would have to use all of your missiles to knock out all of the missiles on the other side. And that's the central stabilizing proposal of this response.

Q I would like your response to the argument that is made that deploying an MX counter-silo missile in a non-survivable basing mode might be destabilizing development. General Kelly Burke used to argue that unless the MX is made survivable, that would put us in a use-it-or-lose-it situation. Both sides would move their finger closer to the trigger and that would be destabilizing. The MX is a counterforce weapon. What's your response?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't know -- Jim, why don't you comment on that.

MR. WOOLSEY: Let Jim --

DR. SCHLESINGER: You wanted that --

MR. WOOLSEY: Go ahead. Go ahead.

DR. SCHLESINGER: All yours.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Trying to share the wealth here. (Laughter).

MR. WOOLSEY: Let me call your attention to the discussion at the bottom of page seven and the top of page eight in the report, because the thrust of the recommendations with respect ot what has been termed the window of vulnerability in the late 1980's, the U.S. ICBM force, I think, can only really be understood in that context.

It is, essentially, that the problem of the vulnerability of the

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ICBM force, when viewed in isolation, is an important problem. It needs to be fixed; but it is a problem that we have some time to fix and we should do it right and that the best way to do that is, essentially, to try to evolve ourself and to encourage the Soviets to move toward a force of single -- small single warhead ICBM's over time.

With respect to the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force in the relative near future, such as in the late 1980's, the interaction between the bomber force survivability and the ICBM survivability described in those paragraphs I mentioned to you is of great importance and, therefore, I suppose you might say that the Commission believes the vulnerability problem is important, needs to be dealt with, but that it's a long-term problem, not a short-term problem, as far as the U.S. ICBM's seen alone is concerned.

Q Then what was this entire 1980 Presidential campaign defense debate about, Dr. Brown? I mean, we have all of you luminaries here seeming to say that we should never have worried about this window of vulnerability, which you announced in a speech and President Reagan campaigned on.

DR. BROWN: If one wants to go back to the 1980 campaign, perhaps some of you who were involved in reporting it will remember what was said by one side was that there was a critical window of vulnerability and that it needed to be removed right away. And what the other side was saying is, "This vulnerability is a problem. We are going to have to take care of it." And the timing and the overall nature of the problem was not that immediate and that critical.

I will point out to you that there were other ideas proposed for solving the vulnerability problem. Some of us may think that those were even better ideas. But you have to start from where you are now. And from where you are now, this strikes at least this particular advisor as being a sensible solution to the problem.

Q General Haig, where are we now? What's your view on this window of vulnerability?

GENERAL HAIG: Well, there are two undercurrents of confusion on the so-called "window of vulnerability." And I'll overcome my present nostalgia for -- (laughter) -- to try to put it in focus.

You know, there's a window of vulnerability -- and I think the original debate was focused on the aggregate capability of the two sides to deal a destructive blow in an instantaneous, hard-target kill capacity and that the gross figures between the Soviet Union and the United States were falling into considerable disarray. They had the large, heavy ballistic, instantaneously launchable systems. And that is a window of vulnerability in terms of net assets. And it runs up against deterrence because if that imbalance becomes overwhelming, and it's in the process of doing so, then deterrence is undercut and there's an incentive for the other side to contemplate first strike. Very destabilizing.

Then, we have a second range of window of vulnerability discussions which are focusing, more importantly, on the vulnerability of our systems to a Soviet strike. And that's the vulnerability of the fixed silo. And it's awfully important you don't get them confused in analyzing this problem.

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Therefore, I think one can say, yes, of course, there's a window of vulnerability. It was a valid concern by serious people. And as Harold said, some viewed it as a more urgent problem than others.

And then there's this second range of window of vulnerability which involves the vulnerability of a fixed silo. And here, we feel that we are going to deal with this by going to this light missile, which has other assets as well, which can be deployed in mobile configuration.

But in the meantime, we've got to deal with that other window of vulnerability as well.

Q General, if the vulnerability problem is not that immediate, it can be taken care of on a longer-term basis as the Commission now seems to state, why not skip the MX and go immediate to the small missiles, the small, mobile -- I gather it would be a mobile, single-warhead missile. Is that correct?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I've tried to deal with that in my opening comments. Basically, we think it's very difficult to get there from here for a couple of reasons. First of all, we don't have a small missile. It will take time to develop, especially basing options. If one looked right now in deploying a small missile, we might have many of the same basing problems that the MX has faced over the past year. There are some interesting, promising developments, hard mobile launchers, for example, which would permit a useful mobile deployment. They're not here yet. It takes time.

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Furthermore, we think it's essential to work on a negotiating environment to at least change the counting rules so that the small, single warhead missile is not counted as one along with an SS-18 replacement with ten warheads. Therefore, we think it's essential, and for the other reasons --

DR. BROWN: Let me follow up on that. I think that Mr. Scowcroft's given the right reasons, that we do need to show the Soviets that their large missiles may not be completely invulnerable in the future either. We need to put some kind of leverage on them, to push them towards smaller, single-warhead missiles.

But to go back to your specific question -- why can't we just wait -- I'd recalled to you that we said in the 1970's, early 70's, that we would modernize with a new missile in the late 70's. In the mid-70's, we said we'd do that in the early 80's. In the late 70's, we said we would do it in the mid-1980's. Your question suggest that what we should now do in the early 80's is say that we'll do so in the early 90's. And given the record, I just don't think that's believable.

Q General, what are you hearing from Congress about the prospects that they will approve this plan when they have rejected all of the others up to this point?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to forecast. We have consulted widely on the Hill, both in the House and the Senate, both to exchange ideas, get their views and what we have we feel has a reasonable, has the best chance to be successful and to be able to develop the kind of consensus essential, if we're to move forward. But I --

Q Is that a consensus from the Pentagon?

MR. WOOLSEY: Brent, could I -- Excuse me. Could I just, on the previous question, particularly call your attention to pages 16 through 18 of the report, which is, I think, the best we can do in trying to answer your question.

Q Do you have a consensus from the Pentagon? Did you work on them as well as Congress?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'll let the Pentagon speak for itself.

Q You did not -- Can I then --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: This was an independent commission. We heard from officials in the Pentagon, from the Air Force, from all relevant military agencies, but we operated independently and came to our conclusions independently.

Q Do you have a fear that certain high officials at the Pentagon are going to come and try to disagree with your panel and undercut your findings?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We believe our conclusions are inherently persuasive. (Laughter.)

Q Do I understand that there's a major overhaul here in the U.S. approach to the START talks, at least in counting? Is it your understanding the President is accepting that part of the report as well as the MX basing?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We are -- made our report to the President. And he, in turn, when he has reviewed it with his National Security Council, will announce his decision.

Q General Scowcroft, a number of people at the table there are responsible for developing the MIRV. As a matter of fact, I don't think, except for the absence of Mr. Kissinger, you could get a better panel than this one of the people who are responsible for it. I'd like to hear a little discussion about why it took so long for you people to learn the dangers of the MIRV. And what led to the big turnaround?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: You say -- Harold, go ahead.

DR. BROWN: You'll notice that submarine-launched ballistic missiles are still going to be MIRVed under this recommendation, and there's good reason for having multiple warheads. If one is concerned about ballistic defenses as a possible destabilizing factor, and if you worry about MIRVS as a destabilizing factor, I assume that you would worry somewhat about anti-ballistic missile deployments, too, then multiple warheads are an important way to assure that retaliation will succeed and that, therefore, deterrence will hold. As a side effect, a very important one, MIRVS created the situation where land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles seen only by themselves, if that's all there was on two sides, would be subject to a severe destabilization.

Overall, I guess I still

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believe that mobile warheads, particularly on SLBM's, are important to have.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think in addition, Jim, that besides we have not yet developed an ABM treaty. There was some doubt about whether or not it would be accepted. And MIRVs were a hedge against that. They were also a way, in terms of SALT I and arms control, of demonstrating that the United States was still ahead or equivalent to the Soviet Union.

Q If the Soviets don't agree that this --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, just a second. Let me reinforce what Brent has said. In the first place, the MIRVing was developed by Secretary McNamara in the '60's as a way of going through a Soviet defense without developing a counterforce capability on the part of the United States. That motivation disappeared, to a large degree in 1972. Since 1972 the United States government has been worried about the long-run implications of both sides MIRVing with large throwweight missiles. The MX was originally put forward partly as a bargaining chip to induce the Soviets not to MIRV their force and we were prepared to dispose of the MX. In 1974 the President raised in Moscow the question with the Soviets -- at Yalta, raised the question with the Soviet Union whether or not we could have a mutual limitation on MIRV throwweight.

So I think that the presupposition behind the question is not entirely accurate historically.

Q General, are you flatly accusing the Soviets of violating the unratified SALT Treaty in this report --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.

Q -- with the development of two missiles?

Q General, is the D-5 adaptable for the single warhead land-based missile?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No.

Q Where is the Vice Chairman of this commission -- Mr. Reed?

Q He's away. He's been called --

Q Is there a reason why he's not here?

Q He's playing the market this morning.

Q Seriously, General Scowcroft.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I believe he announced that on the termination of this Commission in the making of its report that he was finished with his federal service, and that's finished.

Q But the Commission Report -- the Commission is just reporting now. We all --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, no. The Commission reported to the President at 11:30 this morning.

Q Was he there?

MR. CUTLER: He was there.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, he was there.

Q But he just chose not to --

Q If the Soviets won't go along with the idea of reducing the number of their MIRV force and they continue to go in that direction strategically, does the smaller missile still make sense to the United States?

DR. BROWN: It still makes sense. It will have a more difficult time competing, but it still makes sense.

Q Well, can you explain why?

DR. BROWN: Because it will diversify the force further and force the Soviets into an even more complicated planning function. If they have to take out -- if they have to plan to be able to destroy a series of hardened mobile missiles, if those can be developed, then that further complicates their planning. They need different warhead yields, different --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: It may prevent us from going as far as we would like toward a single warhead missile because without --

DR. BROWN: -- single warheads --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: -- the Soviets moving in that direction you have to deploy very large numbers in order to maintain a balance. That would be one of the chief --

Q General, is there any reason --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: One more question, ladies and gentlemen. Last one.

Q -- in your opening statement, you said around 100 or about 100? Is there any possibility that would be increased?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, that's our recommendation.

One more.

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Q Doesn't this contradict what Secretary Weinberger and Mr. Keyworth were saying? They said that superhardening had been achieved when they were arguing for dense pack and here on page 19 it says precisely the opposite.

DR. BROWN: Quote what it says so that we'll see.

Q What?

DR. BROWN: Quote what it says.

MR. SCHLESINGER: It does not say the opposite.

Q It says the effectiveness of the CSB deployment preserving the survivability of an ICBM force over the long run would depend significantly upon advances in hardening silos. The effectiveness of this is yet to be demonstrated and the cost --

DR. BROWN: That's right.

Q -- is, as yet, uncertain.

MR. LAIRD: That's right.

MR. SCHLESINGER: There are many promising developments in the hardening area, but it has not, as yet, been demonstrated.

Q Yes, but that was not what Secretary Weinberger and Dr. Keyworth told us.

MR. LAIRD: That's what this commission report says. (Laughter.)

MR. DEUTCH: I would like to -- if I might -- I would like to make one remark about what, for me, and I believe many members of this Commission the bottom line is. And the bottom line is that one is being presented with three inseparable pieces: a new approach to arms control moving towards mutual stability, MX and Minuteman silos, and the development of a new small single warhead, ICBM. And it is the combination of those three steps that should be given consideration by you and by the American people rather than any one of them individually. It is an inseparable approach to the future which I support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Any other comments?

Q -- to follow up, would you be against proceeding with the MX? Would you be against proceeding with the MX, Mr. Deutch, if the research --

MR. DEUTCH: I personally would be against proceeding with any single element of the package. It is all three together that I believe are essential.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much.

MR. HETU: Thank you. Copies -- transcripts will be available at about 4:00 p.m. this afternoon in the press office.

Q -- this is a unanimous report?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: It was a unanimous report, yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:46 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND SULTAN QABOOS OF OMAN

April 12, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:54 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me start with a little bit of background. This is the first visit by the Sultan in eight years. He was here in 1975. We have had 150 years of political relations, as the Sultan mentioned in his remarks. And we opened our embassy in Muscat on July 4, 1972.

The visit symbolizes the importance the U.S. administration attaches to both U.S.-Omani bilateral relations and to the important constructive role played by Oman under Sultan Qaboos in the Gulf and in Mideast regional affairs.

We had four general objectives: To permit the Sultan and the President to know each other; to form personal relationships; to strengthen and broaden the already close relations between Oman and the United States; to review regional security and political issues and U.S.-Omani cooperation in dealing with these issues; to discuss the peace process, President Reagan's peace initiative and other regional issues.

The first meeting took place from 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m., approximately, in the Oval Office. Present on our side were the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Judge Clark and Ambassador John Countryman. On the Omani side, there was the Sultan and the Foreign Minister. I will have to get you other names from the White House, if you're interested.

This meeting of approximately half hour, apart from get-together discussions, touched on a variety of issues. But at the beginning of the broader meeting, which started at approximately 11:00 a.m., the President introduced the broader meeting by briefly reviewing the discussions in the previous meeting where there was a very heavy focus on the peace process.

In the discussions, there was a brief review of bilateral issues, in which we have no problems. It was more a quick review of elements of this relationship. There was a discussion of the peace process. The discussion involved the issue of how the recent position of the PLO leaders, as communicated to King Hussein, serves the Palestinian cause in general and the rights of the approximately 1½ million Palestinian

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people under occupation in particular. Both sides acknowledge that there were problems at the present time as we look to the future of the peace process, but they also agreed on the need to persevere in the search for peace and stability in the area.

As you know, the Sultan and Oman have been strong supporters of the Camp David Accords, and Oman is a strong supporter of the President's September 1 initiative.

On Lebanon, the Sultan emphasized the need for an early solution there to allow Lebanon to be free of all foreign forces, give it the chance it deserves to develop itself. In the context of his remarks he noted the dangers to the Lebanese consensus of continued foreign occupation.

There was also a thorough discussion of the Iran-Iraq war, of the dangers of the continuation of this war which was generally recognized to be useless and purposeless bloodshed at this point, the need for meaningful initiative to try to bring the hostilities to an end.

Apart from the basic issues of security and stability for the area, there was also discussion of the very great ecological danger of the current oil spill which is a by-product of this war.

There was some discussion on the Omani side on the meetings taking place in a regional, marine ecological body, to which all of the Gulf countries and Iran belong, in the hope that this forum could lead to agreements which could allow the oil spill to be taken care of.

Why don't I take some questions. As you know, I gather its running on the wires, the Secretary of State will have a press conference this afternoon. Many questions that are on your mind that are not in the Omani-U.S. context, I will not address. The Secretary will address them later.

Q Did the Sultan urge direct talks between the United States and the PLO?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can ask him. That was not the context of the discussion. The context of the discussion was the need to persevere in the search for peace and, as I said earlier, there was discussion of the issue of how the current attitudes of the PLO leadership could contribute to this search for peace, and most particularly, to fulfill the rights of their own people.

Q Did the Sultan recommend any concrete steps in light of recent developments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't say that he recommended anything in particular except the need to persevere, keep at it.

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Q Was there any feeling by the Sultan that there was a chance of changing the PLO attitude?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was discussed more in the nature of the attitudes of Palestinians more broadly.

Q When you said that there was a broad discussion about the effect of the current attitude on the Palestinians, what was the conclusion? What is the effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, you know, there was a recognition on both sides that, clearly, the current situation can't possibly serve the Palestinian movement and cause

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and let me leave it at that. You're going to have plenty of opportunity later this afternoon to explore in detail with Secretary Shultz the status of the peace process and things. I'd prefer to leave it to him.

Q Regarding the Iraq-Iran war, did the Sultan bring any new initiatives or new ideas that can be formulated and what you call meaningful initiatives --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Sultan, as you know, is a very realistic, and I'd say practical, as well as wise person. He knows you can't just wave magic wands at problems and the problems go away or you find the solutions.

He did not attempt to bring any magic solutions. He did discuss the dangers of the continuation of the war for everyone in the area and expressed the hope that in the near future attitudes would have moderated to the point where there can be some meaningful initiatives to bring the war to an end.

There was a brief discussion of the various initiatives that had been in play, why they did not achieve any success.

Q Did the President ask the Sultan to do anything to help save the peace initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That wasn't the context of the discussion. The Sultan expressed his continuing strong support for the President's peace initiative. And they discussed ways and means of proceeding constructively into the future.

Q Let me try one other.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to comment on --

Q Let me try -- Did the Sultan express himself on whether he thinks some element of PLO leadership might still give Hussein the go-ahead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that was the context of the discussion, focusing on that.

Q Despite what they discussed, is there a role that the United States feels the Sultan can play in getting -- in your plan? Is there, despite what they discussed, is there a role the United States feels the Sultan can play in getting the peace talk back on track or the negotiations back on track?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that the Sultan's support is extremely important in itself. And I think that he personally, and Oman's influence within the GCC is important, has grown over the last period of time. We think that's the most important role that the Omanis can play at this time is to continue to indicate their support. And --

Q -- have any discussion at all of U.S. forces in the Gulf region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in the sense of U.S. forces in the Gulf region. As you know, we have a very close, cooperative relationship with Oman in the security field. They have made available to us certain facilities to be used in emergencies. Those bilateral issues were described or discussed very satisfactorily during a visit that Admiral Howe, the Director

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in Political Military Affairs in State, and General Secord of ISA made out to Oman a couple of months ago. So, there was no issue with respect to that but a general review of our cooperation is probably the best way to discuss it.

Q On the influence of Oman in the GCC, are you expecting the Sultan to persuade or did he ask him to persuade the Gulf states to support the Reagan initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The Sultan supports the Reagan initiative. He's made no secret of it. Everyone knows this. And, as I said earlier, we believe that his continued support for the initiative is very important. And we have no doubt that --

Q My question is with the influence in the GCC.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me put it this way. Nothing would please us more than if the entire GCC endorsed the Sultan's support of

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the President's initiative. But those are issues for them to work out.

Q Did the Sultan bring any message from other leaders of the Arab world? Or did the President give him a message to take back to his fellow leaders concerning the peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Sultan did not bring messages from others. He came here in his own right. Obviously, in any discussion between a Gulf leader and the President of the United States when this leader addresses an issue of regional concern -- be it the Lebanese problem or the peace process or the Iran-Iraq War, he speaks with some confidence in representing the views of others. I would say in that sense, he very clearly expressed at times that he was expressing opinions which others shared with him, but no real message.

To the extent that the President gave the Sultan a message, it was that we are -- whether he shares it or not is up to him -- but clearly that we are committed to our relationship of bilateral cooperation with Oman, that the Gulf remains an extremely important area, a priority American interest, a vital American interest that we intend to promote, and that the President remains committed to the search for peace and his own plan, and that we remain determined to achieve a settlement on Lebanon.

Q What did he have to say about the Iran-Iraq War and the supplying of arms to Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The supplying of arms to Iran in general? Have you got anything particular in mind?

Q Just general supply of arms.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not so much, I guess --

Q Wherever they are coming from.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. They would like to see the War end. But I do not want to put words in the Sultan's mouth. The focus was --

Q Was there any discussion of an Arab summit, and in what context?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think so. I am not aware of any great enthusiasm anywhere for an Arab summit.

Q Is there a possible role for Egypt in the Mid-East peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Egypt?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. Egypt is one of the partners in the Camp David Accords. Oman -- along with the Sudan and, I believe, Somalia -- never broke with Egypt. And they have been outspoken supporters of Egypt's adherence to the Camp David Accords, the treaty with Israel, et cetera.

Q But they have not taken an active role.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Egyptians have not taken an active role in the sense of sitting down again at the table on the autonomy talks. This is a whole other issue. The Egyptians have been out in front in supporting the President's peace initiative and encouraging King Hussein to join the negotiations.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:12 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 106
April 12, 1983

PC# 22

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
TUESDAY, APRIL, 12, 1983

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APRIL 12, 1983
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 1983, 3:30 P.M.

JIM ANDERSON, UPI: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. In the Middle East, where does the United States go from here and, specifically, are you personally prepared to play a more direct role in the wider peace process?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The United States has been playing a very strong and direct role. The President's initiative of September 1 was and remains an historic opportunity for peace in the region. Those proposals remain on the table. Of course, we will continue to support them. They deserve support, and they'll get it not only from us but from others in the area.

QUESTION: Will you be doing anything to engender such support, personally?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the main point is that the proposals are responsive to the needs of the region. There is no question about the fact that the events of last weekend were a disappointment and are a disappointment, particularly so since it seemed that King Hussein had managed, after a great deal of work and effort and patience on his part, to create conditions under which he could enter the peace process. Then word was received out of the meeting of the PLO in Kuwait that conditions were put forward that were unacceptable to King Hussein.

We agree with King Hussein in rejecting those proposals. At the same time, everybody has to take a look at the situation and say, what is the alternative. Almost as if by punctuation, we had the murder of a moderate Palestinian in Portugal over the weekend. What is the message? That was a murder of a Palestinian, apparently by Palestinians, but it certainly doesn't do anything for the Palestinian people.

I think if there is genuine concern about the legitimate aspirations of these people, then there ought to be some thought given to their needs. This is what the President's plan does.

I might point out that directly in the Camp David Accords, it speaks of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and calls upon King Hussein and representatives of the

Palestinians to come and talk with Israel about peace. This is the right course of action; it remains the right course of action.

The approach of violence, which seems to have been the approach for many years now and which has had the effect of devastating Lebanon and causing untold losses of lives and injuries, that's bankrupt.

I think it's about time everyone took stock and said that the road to peace, and road to well-being for human beings is the road of negotiation. The prospect for negotiation is best through the use of the President's proposals which fall squarely within the framework of Resolution 242 and the Camp David Accords.

QUESTION: Is it realistic to expect that King Hussein could enter peace talks without PLO approval, and are we encouraging them to do that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: King Hussein has to take his own counsel, and I think that it is most beneficial when King Hussein enters the peace process, if he does, that he do so with support from his brothers in the Arab world because that will have the effect of making any settlement that might be reached much more meaningful. Of course, I think we also have to remember that when you're talking about the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the people who live there predominately, they're Palestinians. So you're negotiating for Palestinians.

I think it's the case in any kind of a negotiation, people are not going to accept something that they don't have a part in so they want to be represented. So I'm sure that in any such negotiation King Hussein will want company.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you not, in fact, now appealing to more moderate Palestinians to come forward and join King Hussein and enter the negotiations despite what any radical element within the PLO may feel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've always tried to appeal to the good sense of moderates, and continue to do that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Phil Habib is now sitting in on the tripartite talks. Will you now consider another move, namely, a trip to the Middle East yourself to get things moving?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any current plan to go to the Middle East. Certainly, whenever the President decides that it might be useful, I'm ready to go, but there's no current plan to go there.

QUESTION: After reading the statement of King Hussein, what other information do you have that would contradict the very final statement that Jordan will not join the peace process by consent or renew it with any other party?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any additional information, and I'm not asserting here that King Hussein is about to join the peace process or anything of that kind. I didn't make that comment. In response to a question about would he come in by himself, I tried to make clear that it seemed to me he would want to be accompanied by Palestinians if he were to decide to do that at some point.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, has the PLO done itself damage by its negative response?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I certainly think so.

QUESTION: How so?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It has clearly been the party that has, at least temporarily, frustrated what is a most promising opportunity for peace with justice and security in the Middle East. It seems to me it must become more and more apparent that such a frustration, accompanied as it was by this violent act, all too typical, does not provide any answer for the aspirations of the human beings called Palestinians who are living there and trying to make their way in the world.

QUESTION: A number of Arabs, including some moderate ones have claimed, in the wake of the King's decision, that the United States had shown no ability to influence the Israelis, either in Lebanon or on the question of settlements in the occupied terrorities.

Do you think it would be fruitful now to increase American pressure on Israel on either of those front?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I think that, as from the beginning, the key to peace is that itself. That is the incentive that has to drive people.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, in getting a settlement in Lebanon, I think that a great deal of headway has been made. For there to be a genuine settlement, it has to be something that the Israelis and the Lebanese feel are in their interests, and the questions are difficult ones.

We are all impatient. I know some of my colleagues in Israel that I've talked to are impatient. Everybody would like to get this negotiation completed. On the other hand, you're talking about matters of great importance and difficulty, so you want to get them right.

I think the pressure of the desire to work something out is very important there, and I don't think the way to go about is with additional arm-twisting of one kind or another.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is a school of thought that says that a lot of the moderate Arab states, in a diplomatic sense anyway, are being held hostage by radical elements in the PLO, and that even the United States in its efforts is, to an extent, also hostage to these same radical elements.

Is there, in your current calculations, some way of getting out of this presumed "trap?"

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is a "trap" -- if it is a "trap" -- that was created by the decision of the Arab League to place on the PLO the mantle of negotiator for the Palestinian people. It's that decision basically, that King Hussein refers to when he looks for support in his efforts to enter the peace process.

That stands there. On the other hand, I wonder if it isn't going to become apparent to people that when you seem to give such power to a radical group, you've made a mistake. At any rate, from our standpoint, we will continue to advocate the peace process; we will continue to stress the importance of the security needs of Israel; we will continue to stress the fact that if there is to be peace, it must be achieved by members of the Arab community with representation for Palestinians sitting down with Israel, with Egypt, and with ourselves in the peace process, and working it out. We will continue to emphasize that for this to be successful, it has to meet the legitimate needs of the Palestinian people.

I think that's good, high ground to stand on. That's where we're going to stand, and we're going to invite others to come and join us there.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is that the same thing as urging moderate Arabs, then, to look back once again to the Rabat decision of '74, urge them to reconsider the validity of that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they'll have to compose themselves and see how they want to proceed. It's up to them to decide how they wish to do that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I could take you to a different part of the world, you and other people in the Administration have said to the Congress and publicly that the Administration is not violating the Boland Amendment, which says that the United States Government cannot aid forces in Nicaragua for the purpose of bringing down that government.

Some senior people in Congress have raised questions about that -- even disputed it. Today, Congressman Barnes, the head of the Latin Subcommittee in the House, has introduced a measure to forbid any U.S. aid to any irregular force anywhere near Nicaragua having anything to do with Nicaragua.

In view of the Congressional concerns about what is going on and what it is going to lead to, what is your attitude toward tightening the Boland Amendment to take out any legal ambiguity or proceeding to a flat ban such as that which has been introduced by Congressman Barnes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as I know, there is no violation of the Boland Amendment. I want to expand, however, and say, as people look at what is happening in Nicaragua, and ask themselves why, it shouldn't be difficult to figure out the answers. After all, here is a regime that came in, the Sandinistas. And what did they say? They said, "We don't believe in this dictatorship we just overthrew. We're going to have a free kind of system here. We're going to have elections. Everything is going to be great."

And what have they done? They have completely gone back on the promise of elections. They have very badly suppressed freedom of the press. They have done a terrible job on the Miskito Indians, for example. They have been very hard on the Church, as illustrated. As an illustration -- there are lots of other things -- but the illustration is the way in which they greeted the Pope on his recent visit. So if you look for explanations for why it is that the Nicaraguans are having internal trouble, you don't have to look very far. I think it's important to recognize these underlying facts.

QUESTION: What about the question of whether you would support, or what your attitude is regarding the endeavor by many in Congress to either tighten up on this language so that no support can be given to irregular forces, or to ban it completely?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The moves being made that seem to be designed to prevent us from continuing to support our friends in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America, in their effort to provide a military security shield so that they can go forward with the process of democracy, so that they can go forward with the process of economic development, so that they can go forward with the development of the human rights efforts in those countries, I think is the undermining of our ability to provide that shield and is a bad mistake.

It is bad not only in the region; it's bad for our country, because here we're talking about our own neighborhood. We see that in Cuba there is a Communist-controlled country. The same thing is emerging rapidly in Nicaragua. And if that becomes the case in Central America, it is not only bad for the people in Central America -- My gosh, if you care anything about human rights, I think you have to consider what is being done in that regard if you turn this over to the Communists. However we also have to think about own security, because here we're talking about our neighborhood. So I believe that the Congress should do the reprogramming that we have asked for and support the continuity of effort that is necessary in El Salvador and elsewhere.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Kirkpatrick made some comments in New York today that suggested the United States has a moral obligation to support groups like those in Nicaragua which are trying to overthrow the government. Is that this Administration's policy?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, when we see forces of democracy, forces that are opposed to something that takes on the aspect of tyranny, it's easy enough for us to figure out which side we're on. But our own immediate problem with Nicaragua is the undoubted use of Nicaragua as a base from which arms flow, largely through Cuba, to Nicaragua, and then to El Salvador. It's the "export of revolution without frontiers," I think is their phrase, to their neighbors that is the heart of the difficulty and which we are trying to cope with.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in spite of the validity of all that you've said about the situation in Central America, the United States is still signatory, and indeed was one of the founders of the OAS and wrote a good deal of the Charter.

What about Article 18 which specifically prohibits any intervention in a sovereign state?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are talking about states that are very anxious to have us there. We're talking about helping. Here is Costa Rica that has no army; here is Honduras, struggling to make its democracy work; here is El Salvador, certainly with a pretty tough history and with lots of problems -- no doubt about it -- but, nevertheless, making some progress, and we're trying to be helpful. I think that is perfectly well in accord with the OAS Charter.

I also think it's well in accord with the OAS Charter to be opposing the export of revolution and the export of arms across national boundaries for the sake of encouraging the kind of disruption that we see in El Salvador. After all, look what these people have done to the chance of the people in El Salvador to make a decent living. They've blown up 55 bridges; they have blown up power plants; they have disrupted the economic infrastructure. I suppose it's no wonder that they are reluctant to come into the democratic process. That would be a terrific platform to run on.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, again shifting to another part of the world, is the United States taking adequate steps, in your estimation, to counter Soviet moves in the southern Pacific and in southern Africa?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In the southern Pacific and southern Africa?

QUESTION: Among the ANZUS partners where there is a large Soviet build-up and also in southern Africa?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as southern Africa is concerned, I think the answer is yes, but I'll elaborate on it a little bit.

As far as southern Africa is concerned, we and others have been working long and hard to bring about an independent Namibia, and we find that in order to do that -- it is obviously not an integrated part of the negotiation -- but in order to bring it off, we have to see some sort of program for the withdrawal of foreign forces, Cuban forces in this case, from the area so that South Africa will have confidence that it is not being surrounded or having on its borders the Soviet proxy forces.

We have been working hard on that. We have been making some progress, but, like most of these things, it's a slow, hard go. But I think basically what we're doing is right, and I hope that in the end it works out.

As far as the southern Pacific area and ANZUS is concerned, we have very strong relationships with Australia and New Zealand and the countries in that part of the world, and, yes, I think that we're working adequately there. I might say I've been in touch a couple of times with the new Prime Minister of Australia who happens to have been a friend of mine from some years back. I believe that the strength of that relationship is going to continue.

QUESTION: Do we detect a growing Soviet buildup there, though, in the waters in the southern Pacific?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I don't think so.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I take you back to the Middle East, please? You say that the President's proposals are on the table. Can you in any way be forthcoming --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They're on top of the hill. That's where they are. On the high ground. They're on the high ground.

QUESTION: Can you in any way be forthcoming in a specific way as to what is being done to pump some life into the President's plan? For example, any thought of an invitation to Hussein to Washington? A resumption of Camp David type of get-together?

And, finally, when you talked earlier about the Rabat decision to empower the PLO to be the sole mandate for the Palestinians as being a mistake, is there in that a suggestion that you think it would further the cause of peace if that power were stripped from the PLO?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think what is needed is for it to be exercised constructively. There's a saying around here, "Use it or lose it." I think that if people have the ability to do something or other, then they ought to measure up to those responsibilities, and they aren't doing so. That's the main point.

As far as actions are concerned, it's always fun to travel. Maybe not so much fun as to have conferences. But it isn't necessarily so that action of that kind necessarily brings progress; sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't. I don't think that we ought to equate constructive efforts with visible moves of some kind. In fact, it may be that the best thing we can do right now is to keep quiet for awhile.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence the PLO is considering military action?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are elements of the PLO that claim credit, if that's the right word for it, for the murder of the Palestinian in Portugal. So whether what has been decided is a decision to go the route of violence rather than the route of peace and negotiation, I don't know. But if that is the decision, I think it is a bad decision, a bankrupt decision, a return to something that has only led to tragedy.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you describe for us the position of Saudi Arabia at this time? The Spokesman said yesterday that King Fahd was willing to cooperate in furthering the ends of the Reagan proposal.

Do the Saudi Arabians support the Reagan proposal now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Saudi Arabians have been in touch with us closely throughout this whole process and have been basically supportive. As the President said when he spoke on the subject on Sunday, the Saudi Arabians were as emphatic to him in their rejection of these changes as King Hussein was and as we felt ourselves.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you consider any steps necessary to improve our relationship with China?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are, of course, working at that. It takes two to have a good relationship. We have a lot of inherent problems, but we have many objectives in common, many ways in which we can help each other. In my trip there and in our subsequent contacts, we've sought to emphasize these and will continue to do so. I recognize fully that there are difficulties that arise out of the fact that we continue to have a relationship with Taiwan and, for that matter, that we have a judicial system that works in a certain way when people come here. It works, it produces outcomes that sometimes other countries don't like, and they get aggravated. But at the same time, I think we have to be true to our own ideas and laws.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President said today that the Palestinian leadership should take bold and courageous action to try to get this plan moving again.

All signs from the Middle East, not only now but in recent years, have been that with the exception of Sadat, nobody is going to take any bold and courageous action for the Palestinians on the West Bank.

If nothing happens, what will happen?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They have not had a happy lot, the Palestinians on the West Bank. There are many who profess to feel deeply about that fact and want to see that lot improved, and there are ways to do it. I think the principal operative way that is available is through the President's plan -- which I've said is perfectly consistent with 242 and the Camp David Accords. There it is. It's a method through which the lot of the Palestinians can be improved. If you're interested in that, then there's a way. We think that perhaps people will in the end come around to that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the event that the United States has to proceed with the deployment of Pershing II missiles beginning at the end of this year, how concerned are you at possible Soviet countermoves with might involve deployment of SS-20s, either somewhere in the Caribbean or in the eastern Siberian region which would put the western United States in the range of the SS-20?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, the United States is in the range of lethal Soviet ICBMs right now. So far as we can see, as we trace Soviet activity in deployment of the SS-20s, they are proceeding fairly aggressively with a deployment schedule that seem to be totally independent of what anybody else does.

I think it well behooves ourselves and our allies to implement the two-track decision of 1979, namely, to pursue aggressively negotiations, which we're doing and which the President has done with some new proposals most recently, on the one hand, and at the same time continue in our determination to deploy if it turns out that we're unable to reach any agreement. That's where we have been standing, and that's where we do stand now. I believe from everything that I have heard and seen, and people I have met with, that our allies and their leaders are as determined as we are to see this thing through.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you seem to be aiming appeals at two groups in the Arab world. First, to the moderates in the PLO camp to reconsider the action of last weekend, and, if that fails, to the moderates in the Arab world itself as opposed to the PLO to reconsider and perhaps modify the Rabat formula.

How much hope do you have that either appeal will be effective?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I like the word hope, but, in a sense, I think it's overworked. We're determined to stick with this, and I know when the President talked with us about his September 1 initiative before he made his proposals, and as we were discussing them and developing them he said to us, and we all agreed, that there was no point in making proposals of this kind if all you were expecting was some immediate reaction and a settlement. These problems have been around a long time.

It was quite clear to the President at the time that it was important to make fundamental proposals that were of such a nature that you really could and would stick to them and stick with them and exercise determination and exercise patience, and recognize that in the end, what's the alternative? What's the alternative to peace? What's the alternative to security? What's the alternative to addressing the legitimate rights and needs of the Palestinian people?

I don't think the alternatives are attractive at all, but the attraction of peace is very powerful, and that's where President Reagan stands now, and that's where he's going to continue.

QUESTION: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(The press conference concluded at 4:04 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

RUSH

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
CHANCELLOR KOHL

April 14, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:05 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This will be a two-part briefing, as Mort indicated.

This is a special visit in some respects. It is not only a bilateral visit from the German Chancellor with the normal issues on that agenda, obviously, the security questions, arms control, INF, we'll feature on those; but he is coming as the representative of the European community and he -- as the Presidency, which Germany now holds, of the European community. And we are obviously looking forward, in that capacity, to having a discussion that will have a bearing on the Williamsburg Summit, which is the reason that Allen Wallis is here.

On the bilateral relationship and the security relationship, it's clear that this is an important visit for us. The Chancellor has won, recently won an important election. And it is, I think, timely that he sit down with the President and address some of the critical issues that we face.

Probably the most important right now, of course, is continuing to implement the NATO two-track decision. Our position on that decision is very clear. We are continuing with our allies to go forward with preparations for the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles. But we are also working very hard to achieve an arms control outcome that would make it possible for us to revise that decision and, if possible to forego the deployment of missiles. Those negotiations begin on May 17, when Paul Nitze returns to Geneva. Our German friends have told us that the Chancellor will want to discuss the status of those negotiations prior to the beginning of those negotiations. The German government has praised President Reagan's recent initiative on proposing an interim agreement which would call for equal levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads on INF missiles. So we expect there to be a substantial amount of agreement on negotiating questions and security issues.

Beyond that, and while Allen will get into these issues, we are also working, as you know, very closely with our allies on the question of coordinating approaches to East-West trade. We would like to come up with a common approach to issues like energy and technology transfer and financial flows from West to East. And that will be a subject on the agenda.

And I just might mention a third subject, which does not get a great deal of attention here in Washington but gets a good deal of attention in Western Europe, and that is the status of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the so-called CSCE talks, which are underway now in Madrid, where 35 nations, the European, East and West Europeans, the Canadians and the United States are discussing the -- a follow-up agreement to the Helsinki -- 1975 Helsinki Final Act. And both the Chancellor and the German Foreign Minister indicated that they will want to discuss those topics.

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I'll stop there and take any questions you might have.

Q Are you saying that the Germans fully endorse our negotiating position on the intermediate-range missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Totally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They fully and totally endorse that position.

Q What about technology transfer, you know, regarding -- gas pipeline and this kind of thing? What is the response, the general response to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think we are making good progress in our discussions in COCOM

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on the question of technology transfer. There are some obvious differences and this is a question that raises economic questions and export possibilities for countries but we are confident that we can work these problems out.

Q If the two countries so fully and totally agree on the need for,on the arms control issue, then why did you say that that's the most important reason why he's coming over here to talk to us? Why does he need to talk to the President before the negotiations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because ever since and even before the December '79 decision was taken, the way in which we have been able to -- I think -- bring the Soviets to the negotiating table and to put pressure on the Soviets to meet our legitimate security concerns is through alliance cohesion. And the only way you achieve alliance cohesion is to constantly keep in touch with one another. Since the President's interim proposal, the Soviets have come forward. They have rejected that proposal. Foreign Minister Gromyko has given an extended press conference as you all know. And it's important that the two heads of government address those issues,talk about them, stay on the same wave length so they understand our point of view and we understand theirs.

Q Is the United States satisifed that Chancellor Kohl can handle his own domestic political opposition to the missile deployment and if not, is that -- something he's going to try to reassure us of?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He does not have to reassure us on his capacity to govern the Federal Republic of Germany. I mean,what we have seen so far speaks for itself. But to answer to your question, yes. We are satisfied he can handle any problems that might emerge.

Q Well isn't the question a little broader than that? I mean, they both have domestic political problems like from the nuclear freeze movement. Do you think they will talk about these mutual problems and perhaps devise some sort of strategy to try to overcome them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're looking for a lead.

Q No -- might answer the question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, of course, it's obvious these two men are politicians. They will talk about domestic political questions, and I think it's obvious that they will want to address these. What they both clearly share is a dedication to making progress in the Geneva negotiations. There is simply no doubt about that. And it's important, I think, that that has a domestic factor to it. But what they are really interested in doing is trying to somehow be able to forego missile deployment in Europe, and the only way to forego missile deployment is to make progress in the Geneva talks.

Q Wouldn't the passage of a nuclear freeze resolution by the House be damaging to that effort, both here and in Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We believe it would.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well for one thing, Chris, a nuclear freeze would leave the Soviet Union with a complete monopoly in this category of INF missiles. It would leave the Soviet Union with 1,300 warheads that it could use against our NATO allies, and would leave the United States with zero. So,I think this is the most significant example of how a freeze would undercut our efforts to negotiate real reductions. It would be very difficult if a freeze were to be instituted. I'm not talking about a freeze resolution passed but if a freeze were to actually be instituted the Soviet Union would have absolutely no incentives whatsoever to negotiate in Geneva. They wouldn't --

Q Sir, then, why do you think the Congress of the United States is tending to vote for the freeze? Do you think people don't understand the situation or you think they don't believe you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've got me. But Chancellor Kohl and other European leaders would certainly be concerned if our negotiating leverage in Geneva were undercut.

Q Well, doesn't the President veto that bill?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm not going to discuss that.

Q Couldn't he veto it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to discuss that.

Steve?

Q The President is due next week to give his thoughts about the MX Commission which has now called for a drastic revision in the view of some, of a strategic approach, of an arms control approach for the United States. Is the President going to be briefing the Chancellor on his views about what the MX Commission calls for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will be briefing the Chancellor on these issues. But -- And I'm going to get off the stage here and let Allen Wallis take over, but I just want to differ with this view of how the MX Commission Report calls for such a drastic review of our strategic approach or arms control approach. In fact, there was a New York Times article that somehow suggested that, because of this Commission Report, the focus in terms of our arms control approach was going to be warheads. That has been the basic focus of our START approach since we came forward.

MR. ALLIN: Let us just take one more.

Q Are there any terms that would make the administration ready to support the final document in Madrid, as far as it is being proposed by the neutral and non-aligned states? I am thinking of another -- better performance of the Soviet Union in terms of human rights, the Scharansky case or anything else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a very good question. First of all, we are dissatisfied with that document as it now exists.

Q You are satisfied?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dissatisified.

We think it has to be stronger on several important human rights areas. But we, also, believe that improved Soviet performance on human rights would improve the atmosphere for negotiating a concluding document in Madrid.

Q Let me ask a question. You said earlier that the only way to forego deployment is to make progress in negotiations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The only way to forego deployment is actually to agree to eliminate these weapons altogether.

Q You used the word "progress."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I am sorry. I am glad you corrected me.

Q The only way to forego deployment is to agree to eliminate them completely?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right.

Q Well, haven't we asked that we have a reduction as a start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has come forward with an interim proposal, which could lead to reductions at equal levels. But that would not lead to our foregoing deployment. It was cause us to revise, downward, our deployment plans.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:16 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 14, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
W. ALLEN WALLIS,
UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
ON THE 1983 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

The Briefing Room

10:17 A.M. EST

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: As was explained, I am the President's Personal Representative for this summit. There is a Personal Representative for each of the eight leaders who will be there.

This is the ninth of the summits, of the meetings of the heads of the seven largest industrial democracies, plus the President of the Council of Europe. It will be held at Willliamsburg, the 28th through the 30th of May.

The summits, over the years, have become larger and larger, and more and more complicated and grandiose and spectacular events. We are making a major effort to revise the format this time, at least as far as the actual leaders are concerned. We cannot control how many press come and how big a number of people there is around Williamsburg. But in the actual meetings, we will be able to arrange that this time so that it is clearly a meeting of the heads of governments and not simply a convention to which they came as has been the appearance that I, as an outsider, got in the past sometimes -- of these meetings.

Also, this time, we are having the agenda prepared, as we put it, from the top, down. In the past, the agenda have grown out of the bureaucracies of these countries, and eventually have been fed up to the leaders for their approval or review at the end.

This time, we started by the President's writing to each of the other leaders and asking them if, before the first Sherpa meeting, they would call -- and, incidentally, the Personal Representatives are called "Sherpas." I should have mentioned that -- (laughter) -- since they, presumably, guide the leaders to the top, to the summit. (Laughter.)

Before the first meeting of Sherpas, each of the leaders called his Sherpa in and told him what topics he would like to have on the agenda, and gave him some idea of what views he had on those topics and, in particular, what he would like to hear about the views of other people on those very same topics, so that it is literally

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being formed from the top down. And, correspondingly, we will not have a prenegotiated communique. I hasten to add: Of course, there will be news there. There will be a statement at the end of the summit telling what they actually talked about and what they said about it and what conclusions they reached and what actions they're setting in motion, if they are setting any actions into motion. But since we -- since it's really to report what they actually say, we can't write it now. We're going to have to wait until the actual meeting of the leaders to write it. In the past, I am told that by this time they'd be on the second draft of the communique, even before they actually met. So those are real differences.

Now, these -- finally, I should say that Williamsburg is well-suited to this kind of a summit. It's an informal place, it's a beautiful place, and it's soaked in American history. But, nevertheless -- I'm sure you've all been there -- it's not grandiose or pretentious; it's informal, will lend itself to this kind of a summit. Somebody -- the heads of government will each have one of those old colonial -- restored colonial houses that they'll be in, and if they want to, they can talk to each other over the back fence, which led somebody to say this will get known as the "back fence summit." But I'm not sure how much of that they'll actually do, but it will be a possibility. And they'll be able to walk to the meetings and walk together if they want to or if they want to go out for a stroll, they'll be able to do that. There'll be definite arrangements for that kind of informality.

And, finally, much more time will be devoted to the heads alone. Something like half of the total time -- the thing isn't well -- completely structured yet, so I can't make a firm statement -- but as it looks like it's shaping up, about half the total time will be with the heads alone and no one else present.

Q God help us. (Laughter.)

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: They will not be totally in the hands of their ministers and their staffs and so on.

One final remark I might make about this informality: The President, of course, is very -- this is his style and the way he'd like to have it but he's not imposing this. After the last summit, all of the leaders, literally every one of them -- and I believe President Mitterrand was the first to come out publicly with it -- said that they really thought the summits ought to be restructured in this direction. So this nas been a unanimous desire of all of them, and it's very much President Reagan's feeling that it should be that way.

Q You mean they didn't like Versailles?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I didn't hear that they didn't like Versailles.

Q Well, you've been critical of the other summits. Was Versailles the worst? (Laughter.)

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I'll go on with some other things about -- I wasn't at Versailles and I don't know anything about it, but I'll --

Q Were you at any previous summits?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I'll go on to some other things about this summit, and then we'll take questions at the proper time. Maybe I should say proper question, too -- (laughter) -- about what are the --

Q -- you're saying they're grandiose and they're just sort of out of control, and I was just wondering --

UNDERSECRETAEY WALLIS: They've grown gradually over the years to be more and more that way, and everybody felt that way.

With regard -- the question that you're presumably most interested in is what they'll talk about. Now, we expect the agenda to be much less rigidly structured, also. Instead of having a point-by-point agenda, there will be general topics that will be interwoven in the discussions. Because when you get the heads of governments together, they are the people that can take a broad overview, and it's not sensible for them to get together and negotiate a financial arrangement or negotiate a trade arrangement or something of that sort. It's much better for them to take a broad view of the interrelations of trade and finance and their relations to other things and to the economies of their countries and to the basic problems that are facing the world's economy today. So the agenda, while I'm not saying they're going to go in there without any kind of structure to it at all, obviously, it will -- and we're working -- the Sherpas are meeting from the various countries, are all meeting to try to work out what the topics will be and what kinds of things are likely to be covered. But it will not be one of these point-by-point-by-point things where, if you're talking about protection and somebody mentions a trade issue -- I mean, a finance issue or international debt issue, he won't be told, well, that's out of order now, but that comes five points down the agenda. They'd simply talk about it, because they are interrelated and that's the thing we want to capitalize at this summit -- is having the heads, who have to cover all of these different areas.

As to the topics that will be discussed,

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you could judge what they'll be, yourselves, from reading the papers. They'll discuss the principle economic issues in the world today and, of course, foremost is the level of economic activity -- the problem of restoring the expansion, the rate of growth in the world economy and, in particular, having that spread to employment.

There are also major problems of international debt, as you're all aware. There are problems of protectionism, rising protectionism in the world. Those will surely be discussed. There are these economic problems of East-West relations that my colleague touched on, which again, will be discussed. And I won't try to enumerate those. As I say, I think you just read the papers which, probably some of you do, and you can get a feel for what are the issues of the day. And those will -- I think you can count on all of those being discussed at one point or another.

So, let me stop there for questions. I see a hand up here.

Q It seems to me that in previous announcements there was some talk that there would be no communique at all and no statement afterwards. But now you're saying that there will be no pre-negotiated communique but, of course, there will be a statement of agreement afterwards. It sounds like there is this sort of creeping back toward --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: No, let me -- what happened there when we said no communique, communique to people in the diplomatic business means one of these things that's carefully labored over and written ahead of time and we said there wouldn't be one of those. But we found people who were interpretting it to mean there wasn't going to be any disclosure after the meeting of what had been talked about -- that there wouldn't be any communication. Of course, that's not the case at all. There will be briefings at appropriate times and during the session and there will be a statement at the end. Now, whether it will be a written statement or an oral statement, I can't say, because that will be up to the heads at the time.

Q Do you mind if I follow it up?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: No.

Q Those of us who have covered a couple of these summits, I think, have the impression that it was not the existence of a communique that created the problems but rather the desire of certain countries and in the case of East-West issues, the United States, that wanted the summit to -- leaders to agree to certain things. It wasn't the fact of the communique but it was the fact of countries wanting everybody to agree with them on certain points. So, given the disagreement, is it the -- that continues to exist and that my colleague referred to on some of these issues, to smooth things along, will it be the U.S.' position this time that it might not be so desirable to push for agreement and try and wrap things up in some kind of fashion at the end?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I'm tempted to ask you to repeat the question but -- (laughter) --

Q Oh, go ahead. Take a shot at it. (Laughter.)

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I'm not quite sure where to start on that one. But I think it is --

Q Just say, yes. (Laughter.)

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I think it is true that with pre-negotiated language, having watched some of these negotiations now and, as a matter of fact, you see this out -- outside the government, too, and people negotiating things. But there's

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often an attempt to find language that everybody can agree to and the reason they could agree to it is because it means different things to different people. That's why they agree to the language. That kind of agreement isn't really very valuable for this kind of a situation. There are times when that is extremely important. But for this sort of situation where these leaders are getting together in order to better understand one another and their respective economies and what the impact of their policies is on other countries and indicate to other countries what kind of policies would be beneficial or hurtful to their countries, for that kind of a summit, that sort of pre-negotiated language is not appropriate. And the situations that require that kind of pre-negotiated language usually need to be dealt with by ministers at considerable length and care.

So, I think that there is a chance by this device that we will not have -- the problems, as I understand it, from Versailles arose afterwards over the interpretation of the language.

Q Sir, I was just trying to ask in a delicate way, it's obvious that a lot of people feel that the problem with the summit last year was because Ronald Reagan was trying to ram through an agreement on certain kind of East-West things. And that was the source of the confusion and disagreement and misinterpretation. People thought -- and so the question is not -- the question is is he going to be stubborn again this year -- (laughter) -- and try and get an agreement on some things that other people will resist.

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I won't try to go back over the Versailles Summit except to say that I think people of principle are always called stubborn if they adhere to their principles if you don't happen to accept them. And I don't think that the troubles at Versailles resulted from anything -- I hadn't heard that charge, as a matter of fact.

Q Do you want to argue with that, Henry?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Henry?

MR. NAU: If I might just add something, Steve. I think it's incorrect to say that the President rammed through some language at Versailles. Indeed --

Q He tried to.

MR. NAU: The language that actually emerged in the communique was the version of some language proposed by Thatcher and modified by some other participants. So, I think --

Q -- everybody interpretted it differently, right, Henry, and so --

MR. NAU: No, there's no question about that. After the summit there was a question of differences in intepretation which is inevitable to some extent. Now, I think at this summit the objective is to try not to box them, to try to prepare the summit and the issues in such a way that the heads themselves are going to have some flexibility with those issues rather than to have --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Let's not try to re-hash the Versailles Summit because all I really came here was to try to tell you something about what to expect of this one.

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Q -- if --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Yes. And then I'll take you next because I know you've been trying to --

Q If you are going to have a meeting of the heads of state --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: We are.

Q -- and nobody else there, he's going to be the spokesman for that meeting and how are we ever going to find out what really went on? Or is each man going to come out and do his own leaking? (Laughter).

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: The chairman will make a statement at the end of that session and inform the ministers that are present what's happened at that session. And then there'll be a statement at the end of the day.

MR. ALLIN: You'll be kept fully informed, as always, Sarah.

Q And the chairman is the President in this case?

Q -- peculiar in this hodgepodge of agenda that you're really not having a formal agenda. Isn't that meeting getting absolutely nowhere?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Well, your views are interesting -- (laughter) -- but let me take this question here.

Q In the economic field, do you expect any major East-West controversy this time around?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I don't expect major controversy. I think this kind of a meeting is an opportunity to work toward closer agreement. And I think in many ways there is -- Well, in fact, as far as I've been able to detect in the eight or nine months or however many years it is I've been here, on fundamentals, there seems to be very close agreement. And so the problem is to explore how do these appearances of squabbles occur and how can we prevent those. And I --

What are the topics that would be involved in East-West disputes?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: In East-West? One of the issues is East-West. The degree to which -- a matter of debate, and even within our government, is the extent to which trade with the Eastern bloc conveys a significant strategic advantage to them and what kinds of trade. And what kinds of trade are not significant from that point of view.

There are also disagreements about the extent to which governments ought to intervene in foreign exchange markets, in order to bring about stability. There are disagreements about how to resist protectionism. So far there isn't any disagreement about whether we ought to resist it. But there are different -- I say "disagreements," they're simply differing approaches, differing views. And I think when the heads get together and can override the views of the specialists who negotiate these things normally, that we have a good chance of coming to a constructive agreement and, not only that, to some follow-up action that will execute what's agreed to.

Q It was already evident from what happened last year and what's been said this year, by the Germans particularly, that the question of East-West trade is one that they would like to mute. That's what things foundered on last year immediately following the Summit. What reason is there to believe that the leaders themselves can put together any kind of agreement on this when disagreement's already substantial?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: I think there is good reason to hope and expect that. Since the beginning of this year there have been a series of quite intensive studies going on related to this issue. There has been a study of the energy security issue, in -- really not just in Europe, the whole world -- going on in the IEA, the International Energy Agency and in the OECD, both. There are studies going on of -- and probably going to be agreements about credits with respect to, not just the Eastern countries but to all

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industrial countries. There are studies about what kinds of advantage can be obtained by state trading companies dealing with competitive companies. You always hear the statement made, well, they can play one off against the other, and so they extract practically all the benefit that normally would be divided between the two participants. There are studies in OECD of the extent to which that may be a hazard and if it's a hazard, is it actually true, does it really happen. So there are a number of these studies going on, and they will be reporting to various agencies. There are some going on in COCOM about specific military equipment and also about other high technology that may have strategic implications and watching newly emerging technology.

There will be a number of meetings -- other meetings that can consider these things. There will be a high-level COCOM meeting at the end of April and there's an OECD ministerial meeting in May. Right after the summit there's a NATO -- a ministerial meeting. Incidentally, there are also some studies going on in NATO. So there is a lot of serious work going on, and in the course of this, people are really pinning down where their disagreements are and a lot of this has the result of guiding people who do want to control their trade with the East with -- insofar as it's a strategic danger. So I think there's a lot of reason to think that on those issues there will be much better agreement this time.

I might mention also that on the foreign exchange issue at Versailles -- which, incidentally, most of the people in the government don't regard as total a waste as the press all does -- but Versailles it was agreed, because of the disagreements about exchange intervention in efforts to stabilize foreign exchange rates, somebody said why don't we peek at the facts. Let's ask each country here to make a survey of what has happened in the past when it has intervened in foreign exchange markets. And so each of these -- they got together and agreed on methodology and each of the countries has made a detailed study of that. And that will be available, be published prior to the summit, indicating circumstances under which intervention seems to have some value and the circumstances in which it doesn't.

All of that points the way toward much better agreement. I'd be surprised if we have major disagreements on those issues.

MR. ALLIN: Take two more questions --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: The man on the second row has been trying to get a question.

Q When you sat down with the President, what did he say he specifically wanted to see on the agenda for discussion?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Essentially the items that I mentioned. I mean, the questions of --

MR. ALLIN: Okay, in the back, yes.

Q -- reports in the press that the United States wants something like half the time at the summit to be taken up with discussions of East-West trade.

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: Yes, I know. There never was any basis for that whatsoever. I can tell you -- what's that?

Q -- any intentions on --

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: No, nobody is going to spend half -- nobody is going to spend half the time on any one topic, especially that one. Yes.

Q Could you tell us how much this is going to cost and about how many people there are now preparing for it?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: No, but that leads me to add -- one bit of information, I guess, was not disclosed to you. The Sherpa --

the planning motion -- we have a Sherpa team, of which I'm the chairman. Henry Nau is a member, Beryl Sprinkel in the Treasury is a member. And what leads into your question, Mike McManus of the White House staff is a member. And Mike has complete charge of all of the logistics side of this. And if he knows, you'll have -- if -- you know, you'll have to ask him. I haven't asked him yet.

Q Will the issue of nuclear arms in Europe come up at all on this, or do you expect that to be put off until the NATO meeting in June?

UNDERSECRETARY WALLIS: This is an economic summit. But as I understand it, frequently at meals they set that aside to discuss political questions. So quite -- we haven't had any discussion yet of what they'll do on that. We will have before -- just shortly before the summit, we'll ask the political directors of the various countries to think about what they might want to talk about. And I haven't any idea what it will be.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:40 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
FOLLOWING THE VISIT OF
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

April 15, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:43 P.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: We'd like to get started, if we could. This is a background briefing on the visit of President Reagan and Chancellor Kohl. This is a background briefing, attributable to senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will try to give you an overview of the meetings. As Mort stated, we have my colleague here who, if you've got some questions on Williamsburg, he can deal with far better than I can. I might make -- begin, though, by making a remark about the atmosphere surrounding the meeting. This was, I believe, the second time since Helmut Kohl has been Chancellor that he has met with the President. And as with the first meeting, what was remarkable about the meetings was the atmosphere. I think you could tell from the remarks that the two heads of government just gave that the chemistry in the relationship between the two is very, very good. They -- even though they don't speak the same language, they communicate as well as two heads of government can. I think that they share a similar kind of philosophical perspective. They're interested not just in the technical details of economic and security questions but approach issues from a standpoint of values which is particularly apparent with the German Chancellor.

He is an optimist and he has been an optimist throughout his political career. He is very optimistic about the kinds of problems that the Federal Republic of Germany faces in what will be a very difficult year. He told the President of the United States that Germany continues to abide by and forcefully supports the December '79 decision. He urged the President to make a strong effort in the Geneva negotiations to reach an agreement but he very strongly stated that in the absence of an agreement that would eliminate entirely INF missiles that the missiles scheduled for deployment at the end of the year would be deployed. He told this to the President today at lunch. He told it to the Vice President today at breakfast and he informed the Secretary of State of the German support for the INF decision last night.

So, that was the clear signal that we got. He was optimistic about the ability of his government to continue to support the December '79 decision. He was optimistic about the economic prospects in Germany which, while lagging somewhat behind the United States recovery, are becoming apparent with a low inflation rate, the first signs that unemployment is going down. In response, the President and the Secretary of State were able to give the German Chancellor, I think, a good description of the recovery under way here. And I think there was an agreement that with these positive signs that the Williamsburg Summit should be a success based on the success of the economic policies that are now being carried out not only in the United States and the Federal Republic, but in other industrialized countries.

The German Chancellor stressed the theme of allied unity, obviously interested in shoring up and strengthening support for the December '79 decision. He was extremely complimentary on the question of allied consultations and praised the way in which the President and this administration had consulted prior to the recent announcement of our interim proposal on INF missiles. The President in response was able to pledge that the United States would continue to consult closely and beyond simple consultations pledged that the United States would make its greatest efforts to reach an agreement in Geneva not only in the INF negotiations, but in START.

I might just simply add that, on the INF issue, the Chancellor made a very strong statement on no change in the timetable for missile deployment. He argued that this was a means by which the Soviets would be brought to negotiate seriously in Geneva. And he, also, made a strong statement on not eliminating or dropping the Pershing II missile from the scheduled deployment, arguing again that that weapon system and the possibility of deployment of that weapon system was necessary to create incentives for serious Soviet negotiating.

I probably should not give you a quote from the Chancellor. But I will -- on the INF issue. This was: he said that -- "If there is no agreement in Geneva, we will do what we promised to do." As the Chancellor indicated in his remarks following the lunch, there was a discussion of the Madrid Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe as the 35-nation, follow-up conference to Helsinki and the Conference of the mid-1970s. There was an agreement there that we should, together, work to achieve a final document in the Madrid Conference that would lead to convening a conference on European disarmament. But that would be linked to making real progress in the area of human rights. So there was agreement on what we call a "balanced approach" to the Madrid talks. There has been progress, both on the disarmament front and on human rights.

Would you like to say something on Williamsburg?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is not a lot to say about Williamsburg beyond what the President and the Chancellor said in their general remarks. But I can add a few, more specific comments.

The first thing is that they both agreed quite enthusiastically that they want this summit to be informal and relatively unstructured, and with a lot of time for private discussion among the leaders. Both of them emphasized that strongly. They, then, had some discussion of topics that might come up. It was stated very strongly by the Chancellor that this summit could be and will be a success. And both of them expressed that conviction. The Chancellor put it that it can be -- this is not a direct quote, because I do not write that fast. But I took down the substance of what he said -- that it can be both realistic and honestly optimistic, that we can present an optimistic picture to the world and that we can present a united front.

At the same time, he emphasized that, because we do have agreement on fundamentals, we are in a position to discuss those points of disagreement between us -- things like the agricultural problems between us and Western Europe, differences in view on East-West economic relations. Any other points of difference could be discussed effectively because of the agreement on fundamentals and objectives.

I came away -- having some interest in seeing the summit come off successfully, I came away extremely encouraged, because we had here two of the most important of the leaders who will be at that summit who not only showed that they are informed about the issues already and that they are dedicated to

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handling them properly, but the thing that really encouraged me the most was that there was, so obviously, an excellent chemistry between those two as individuals. And for the kind of summit we are running -- hoping to run -- informal, personal association, that is a critical factor.

That is really all I have to add. And that was not much either.

Q Did the Germans urge that the whole East-West trade issue not become a big topic at Williamsburg? And what was the U.S. reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not say that they "urged." Both the President

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and the Chancellor mentioned -- and I would be hard-pressed to remember which brought it up first -- that the studies that are in progress, to the extent that those are coming along in the respective organizations where they are being carried out -- the extent that those are wrapped up there, it won't be necessary to spend a lot of time on them at Williamsburg. And I don't know whether you remember -- it doesn't matter which one brought it up first because they both had this idea in mind, that -- how much we have to -- they have to discuss at Williamsburg depends on how much progress is made before that and what state the studies are in.

Q Will any of those studies be finished?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of them I'm sure will be. None are finished yet, and until they are actually wrapped up and in an envelope, it's unsafe to make categorical assertions. But I'm quite confident -- 99 percent sure -- that some of them will be, and I'm equally sure that some of them won't be.

Q When Kohl spoke he said, "It is our belief we have not heard the last word yet from the Soviet Union." Does that "we" refer to both Kohl and Reagan, and what is the basis for optimism there'll be some change in the Soviet's position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think he was speaking for the President, but I think that it's fair to say that reflects the views of this administration; in other words, we were not completely surprised by the Soviet response. And while the Soviets have said they will not accept the interim proposal, they have never said they will not negotiate about it. We have laid out a framework for a negotiation. As you know, we haven't come forward with any specific numbers precisely to give Ambassador Nitze the flexibility there to sit down with the Soviets and explore a possible outcome. So we remain optimistic that when Ambassador Nitze returns to Geneva on May 17 that there will be serious negotiations on the President's interim proposal.

Q Are there any signals Moscow that they're working on some sort of paper to offer at the talks, or is this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are no signals from Moscow about what they are necessarily going to come up with in May. We assume that they will continue to promote their approach, but we are confident that the President's proposal will be the basis for negotiations when the round resumes.

Q You said -- the President said that he called on the Soviets to respond seriously to our proposal. You're interpreting that response they'd given us a not-serious response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'll just simply repeat what I said, and that is: While they have rejected the specifics of the proposal, they have not indicated that they're unprepared to negotiate over it. And that's really what we want.

Q You did mention as areas of disagreement East-West economic relations. I was wondering if in the conversations today either side reflected the thought that those disagreements might be so intense as to disrupt the happy calm in the other areas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'd say just the opposite. The feeling was that there are differences of interpretation and emphasis and slant there, but there was no idea that that's a major -- that that's going to be a major tug of war or a major stumbling block.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just also amplify what my colleague said, because -- and I think he'll agree with me. Obviously, there have been disagreements within the Alliance on East-West economic issues. There were no disagreements on East-West economic issues in these talks today. They did not go into great detail on the studies or the issues, but if you look at the Chancellor's statement as well as the President's statement, both endorse the need for a common approach to East-West economic relations.

Q -- using the linkage between the progress in human rights records, on the one hand, and the European disarmament conference, as you mentioned it right now -- does it mean only if more progress is made, the administration would then support the arms -- disarmament conference --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have always supported -- not always, but we supported -- we began supporting, I think, sometime last year the concept of a CDE, a European disarmament conference. The linkage, though, exists by virtue of the fact that a European disarmament conference is being discussed in the context of the Madrid talks, which has a very important human rights element. And what we have always said -- and what the Allies have always agreed with -- is that we want a balanced outcome there. As you're aware, the Alliance has had a united position in the Madrid talks from the beginning. For example, last year in the aftermath of Poland those talks were suspended for obvious reasons. We returned to the talks last fall. The neutral and non-aligned countries came up with some proposals for ending that conference with a final document. The Allies agreed that there should be some amendments to that final document to strengthen its human rights provisions, and that remains the Alliance position.

So there's no -- this is not a new position on the part of the United States, and it is completely consistent with the Alliance approach.

Q Can you go back to INF for a moment?

MR. ALLIN: Could we get some of the people in the back, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What's that about the President meeting with Andropov? There was -- Kohl mentioned that they both still agree that continuing contacts are important --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, as a statement made in Bonn prior to the meeting today, the Chancellor did inform the President that he was considering a visit to Moscow sometime this year. He said the principle reason for going to Moscow some time this year would be to tell the Soviet Union that the Federal Republic of Germany would remain an integral part of the West.

He then asked the President what the President's views were on a summit meeting with Andropov and the President reiterated our view on that, that we are open to a constructive summit meeting with the Soviet Union. We continue to believe that that meeting should be carefully prepared, that we do not believe that a meeting -- a quick, get-to-know-one-another type of summit is in our interests at this time because it would raise expectations. We would like to achieve concrete results from a summit.

Q Did you indicate to the German legation in any way that by the time the Geneva talks resume you will have a sort of fresh-start proposal to give some sort of numbers concreteness to the general interim idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was some discussion recognizing that we had to flush out the proposal somewhat and we have a mechanism, a special consultative group to do so. It is meeting later next week. And so there was a recognition that the consultations on our proposal would proceed as we move toward Geneva.

But it was agreed that at this stage we wanted to give Ambassador Nitze flexibility that he could explore with the Soviet Union alternative levels that might be acceptable to both sides.

Q If I may just follow it up, you will not be having a specific numbers proposal by the time he returns to Geneva --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just think we -- we're in the process of consulting on this subject right now.

Q There are reports in the Financial Times and elsewhere that the famous Brazilian bridge loan package is now falling apart or being renegotiated and so on. In light of that and other sorts of developments, is there any feeling now in the administration that Williamsburg will have to discuss an approach to the international financial crisis that goes somewhat beyond what you've called "ad hocery"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first, you asserted some facts, which I'm not either confirming or denying or otherwise discussing, since they're not really relevant to what I'm here talking about today.

When I was here talking about what the Summit would cover, I mentioned the international debt situation as something they almost surely would discuss and the interrelation between problems of debt and problems of trade and so on.

Q You give us a quote from the Chancellor on his commitment. Can you give us a quote from the President, if he offered one that you overheard, on the negotiations? Did he utter a commitment directly to the Chancellor? You paraphrased. Can you give us a direct quote --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a direct quote and I can't even give you a paraphrase. But I can tell you that the President did give the Chancellor a very strong commitment on his desire to seriously negotiate an acceptable outcome at Geneva. There should be no doubt about that.

Q Is it correct that the Sherpas are meeting this weekend in Williamsburg and what are they negotiating this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is correct, they are meeting. And they will be talking about the plans for the Summit Meeting. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not surprising.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:12 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 19, 1983
No. 111

PC#23

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE HONORABLE DONALD REGAN
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
ENROUTE TO MEXICO CITY
April 17, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We plan to discuss the relationships between Mexico and the United States and to review, under the umbrella of a long-standing binational commission, a variety of issues that come along; to renew our sense of ability to deal with these issues. It's a kind of a problem solving type of mission. It is a new Government here under President de la Madrid and this will be the first high level visit with them. We've been seeking to arrange this for some time and this was the first time when we were able to find a mutually convenient date for it.

QUESTION: Is there anything, sir, about Central America that you're going to ask or want to discuss with the Mexicans in terms of their role in any kind of negotiation or resolution to that whole problem?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Developments in Central America are clearly of great concern to us and to the Government of Mexico, understandably in both cases, and I think it's going to be important for us both to exchange ideas and information and to see what patterns of collaboration, if any, we can work out in helping the people there to deal with those problems. Neither of us want to see warfare there; both of us want to see stability in that region. And so I'm sure it's going to be a matter that both parties will want to talk about.

QUESTION: The U.S. and Mexico are on a collision on Central America. They recognize Nicaragua and Cuba; they are for negotiations; you oppose them. We have the feeling that the two countries are talking past each other.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're going to talk to each other, that's the point and we'll see what information we may be able to provide mutually and whether or not there are things we can do.

QUESTION: Should we, Mr. Secretary, on this trip be looking for anything, that is to say by way of some new initiative that may emerge to -- that would pursue a solution in El Salvador, Central America -- or is that too ambitious out of this trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't know of any new initiative that might be talked about, but we're certainly going to discuss these issues and if we can find something that we think could be useful we'll certainly be ready to pursue it.

QUESTION: You said the other day there's a fair distance between the point of view of Mexico and the point of view of Washington?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was just described, fairly.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you saw Don's story in the Post today about the U.S. proposed reactions under discussion, including direct use of U.S. air and naval power, etc., U.S. considering contemplating various strong military political measures,in response to potential escalation of military activity in Central America by Cuba and the Soviet Union. Can you tell us about what, in fact, the Administration is contemplating, or do you see any such move by the Soviets?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Administration is not contemplating any Americanization of the conflict in Central America. We observe and have said on a number of occasions, obviously a large flow of armaments from the Soviet Union to Cuba, from Cuba to Nicaragua and on into the adjacent countries and into El Salvador. We see Cuban advisers in large numbers in Nicaragua and we see a stridency in rhetoric that is very Soviet-oriented in its tone, and so it seems clear that there is a growing Soviet-Cuban influence in Nicaragua. I don't know whether that was what was being referred to in the story or not. I just glanced at it here.

QUESTION: What it talks about is that the Administration is contemplating proposed reactions, those under discussion include direct use of U.S. air and naval power, dispatching U.S. Air Force jets to the area to offset Soviet-made jets, etc?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know -- well, I'm not going to comment on a news story when I don't know what it's sources are, not me.

QUESTION: Forgetting his sources, is the story accurate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it has been said that AWACS are in use in the region as a matter of intelligence gathering.

QUESTION: You're not going to take this question, is that it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I said there is no plan, that I know of, to Americanize that war and the things that are described there are by way of Americanizing the war.

QUESTION: Are you planning on going to the Middle East soon? This week -- Thursday?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any current plan to go to the Middle East. I'm not saying that I won't. I will go when there is something constructive to be accomplished.

QUESTION: Are you going to name some sort of senior adviser to try to accelerate the possibility of finding some solution for El Salvador?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that formulation of a high-level person that might be useful to the Government of El Salvador is certainly under consideration. I think to be useful, the Government of El Salvador has to think so -- not just the Government of the United States.

QUESTION: Do you have any person in mind?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I think that if someone is named it might be somebody from the United States, but not necessarily.

QUESTION: Sir, what do we want from the Mexican Government in terms of Central America? I mean for the past few years basically we haven't been happy with Mexico because of its position on Nicaragua. At this point, what do you want?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to sort of pre-stage what I intend to say to them before we get there and talk about it. So, I think I'll just leave it at that.

QUESTION: How serious is their economic crisis?

SECRETARY REGAN: Mexico is trying to work its way out of its economic difficulties. They have a sensible plan; they are trying to bring their inflation under control; they're trying to provide more jobs: they're trying to cut down on their money supply; they have been helped in their balance of payments by IMF loans, VIS loans, loans from the United States Government of a temporary nature, plus, of course, loans from commercial banks. All of these should take up the slack as far as their balance of payments problems are concerned.

QUESTION: Does their situation look a lot better now than it did say last August?

SECRETARY REGAN: A great deal better as a result of the measures that the de la Madrid Government has taken in order to get sustained economic growth for Mexico.

QUESTION: Do you think they will need further commercial bank loans this year?

SECRETARY REGAN: At the present time, it does not look that way but that's not to say that the situation might change depending upon what happens in the world's economy or prices of oil or other things of that nature.

QUESTION: Hasn't the falling oil prices knocked the stuffing out of their foreign exchange?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, falling oil prices are not helpful, obviously, to their foreign exchange. It's a question of how much oil can they sell and at what price. However, were interest rates to decline, that would more than offset the fall in the oil prices.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. prepared, if necessary, to help Mexico now?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, that's one of the things that we will be discussing with Mexico. At the current time no additional help is needed.

QUESTION: Interest rates falling where?

SECRETARY REGAN: Interest rates falling world-wide. Their loans are at floating rates. Either based upon the London and the interbank rate, LIBOR, or based upon the American Prime and usually these two go fairly well together in parallel.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will there be any effort on the part of the U.S. to use the economic leverage given Mexico's debt position, etc. to get them to mute some of their differences with the U.S. on policies toward Central America?

SECRETARY REGAN: I don't think that those two necessarily tie in one to the other. I think Mexico is our third largest trading partner and it's up to us to try to help Mexico and its economy for our own selfish good. The big switch that was made in '82, wherein they, instead of we having a surplus with them, we ended up with a deficit in trade, a swing of some $8 billion as a result of their having to cut back in their economy. So it's in our interest to try to help them get their economy started.

QUESTION: Are you ruling out any use of economic leverage?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, we don't use economic leverage in that sense of the term, no.

QUESTION: What are you using? What sense of the term are you using?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, we don't use economic leverage from that point of view. We try to help our trading partners.

QUESTION: From our point of view, what do we want from Mexico in terms of their economic situation and in terms of the whole situation there?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, if Mexico gets back into a growth situation, where they can once again start importing more than they were, we in the United States will get a good share of that business.

QUESTION: But is there anything that we want in terms of their policies at this point -- their economic policies?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, we think that the program that the Mexicans have worked out with the IMF is a very sensible program. It's a tough one and we hope they'll be able to carry it out.

QUESTION: How do you explain the fact that we have three Cabinet members on this trip? Isn't it pretty unusual, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: This is an unusual relationship. Mexico is our neighbor. Mexico is our third largest trading partner. There are 200 million legal border crossings per year. We live in the same area -- the area has a lot of turmoil in it. When we review all of the issues, they fall across a wide spectrum. So, I think it's important to us and the fact that there are three Cabinet officers going is an indication of our view that it is important.

QUESTION: Do you think there's going to be any change of point of view on Central America? The U.S. has its position -- no negotiations, no shooting their way in, etc., no recognition, the indictment of Nicaragua. We know what the Mexican position is. Do you think that as a result of this trip there will be any shifts in positions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We'll have to see, but we'll certainly spend time talking about the issues. We'll explain our view and listen to theirs and see if there are any areas where we might collaborate effectively.

QUESTION: Is the appointment of a high-level intermediary a pre-condition for approval of the $60 million aid request by the House sub-committee?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There has been discussion about that and Congressman Long has been putting this idea forward for quite some time and we've been thinking about it and talking to him about it and trying to on the one hand get clarity on what he has in mind and, on the other hand consider ourselves -- what, if anything, might be useful.

QUESTION: Wouldn't a foreign mediator make a lot more sense than an American mediator?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think when it comes to mediators an awful lot depends upon the person as distinct from where that person might come. Well, if there is somebody, it might very well be a U.S. person, a Foreign Service top person or maybe somebody not of the Government; or it might be somebody from outside the United States. But I think the key thing is that the person be well-versed in the area and have the stature and kind of sense or savvy that would make that person effective.

QUESTION: I can't imagine who in the United States would have credibility within the guerrilla movement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The point is to help the Government of El Salvador define conditions under which people could come into the electoral process that are genuinely credible conditions. And I think that's quite a possible thing to do. Now whether the guerrillas will come into the democratic process or not is certainly an open question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if this high senior level negotiator were named, would the United States -- would you shift the U.S. position in any way against shooting their way into power or stay within the same ground rules?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no shift -- no contemplated shift and you asked about this and we've talked about it as though it's sort of an imminent possibility and I wouldn't want to turn it into your lead or anything like that. It's something that Congressman Long has been talking about and he has some leverage and there's also -- there's merit to the idea but it has to be considered and there's some downsides, too, if it isn't done right.

QUESTION: The Post made it their lead this morning -- that's why we're talking about it.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Some news day! (Laughter) Thank you very much.

QUESTION: Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 20, 1983
No. 122

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
SECRETARY OF STATE,
THE HONORABLE DONALD REGAN,
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
AND
THE HONORABLE BERNARDO SEPULVEDA,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF MEXICO
UPON DEPARTURE
Mexico City, Mexico
April 19, 1983

AMBASSADOR GAVIN: Ladies and gentlemen, we have just celebrated a significant event in Mexico -- the visit of three Secretaries in the Cabinet of President Reagan, and at this time, if I may, I will present to you the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. George Shultz, and the Secretary of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Mexico, Lic. Bernardo Sepulveda, who will take your questions.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First, I'd like simply to express my appreciation for the cordial welcome and the gracious treatment that we have all received here in Mexico, and also to say that I have certainly benefitted, as have my colleagues, from the constructive discussions that we've had here over the last couple of days. I'll be glad to take your questions.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Communique simply says precisely what it says. We agree that it's important to avoid escalation of the armed conflict and that we seek peace; we seek economic development, in the region. As far as the meeting to take place in Panama is concerned, I have, as we pulled up here, again wished the Secretary the best of good fortune in those meetings. We hope that they're successful.

QUESTION: I have a question for Secretary Shultz and then one for Secretary Regan. Did you deal with the question of illegal immigrants to the United States and undocumented workers in the United States, and how is this problem going to be solved? Is there going to be a quota system for Mexican workers in the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We did, as we said in the Communique, discuss the general question of immigration and I think the most important development in the legal sense in the United States is the prospect of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, that is well known here and in the United States. I would say beyond that, however, that the really important thing to focus on is the importance of economic growth throughout our region. We talked about that in talking about the U.S. economy. We've talked about the Mexican economy. We've talked about Central America, but it is prosperity at home that is essentially the answer to this question.

QUESTION: What shape will American financial support for Mexico take, and will there be additional American investments in this country?

SECRETARY REGAN: We had a very interesting discussion with Secretary Silva Herzog and Secretary Hernandez regarding the Mexican economy and what they forecast for it over the next several months. At the current moment, Mexico is doing it on its own, there is no need for further financial aid. If conditions were to change, obviously, we plan to be in touch with each-other constantly, so at the moment there is no additional financial assistance.

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz, have you reassured the Mexican officials that the money that's supposed to be used to interdict arms in Central America won't be used to wage war against the government that they support in Nicaragua?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have discussed the situation in Central America at great length and the Secretary has described his efforts to me -- very constructive efforts -- and the point of view of Mexico. We also discussed these matters with President de la Madrid, and in turn, I've explained our analysis of the situation and the things that we're trying to do to help bring about security for the region, particularly in El Salvador, where there is a guerrilla challenge to a democratic government, and our own efforts to promote, I think, the essential ideas of preventing the flow of arms, in the case that we worry about, from Nicaragua, Cuba and Nicaragua to El Salvador, and to seek means for national pluralism throughout the region, so that we can see economic development take place.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you had six Cabinet members meeting here, three from Mexico and three from the United States, and you discussed a number of problems from the point of view of the interests of the two nations. My question is the following: Were there any points in which the different focus of each Government might bring about a disagreement between them or did you have a general area of disagreement in the positions adopted by the two governments surrounding all of the items that you discussed?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would say that we had a uniformly good atmosphere -- a problem-solving atmosphere -- in the sense that whatever we took up, I think it was genuinely felt on both sides, the object was to make progress in solving the problem. Now, in some cases, there were things that had been so constructed before we got here, like the tourism agreement, that we could sign it, so that represented an agreement. In other cases, we agreed to start up again some talks that had been suspended, as in the discussion that Secretary Baldridge had on the issue of subsidies. There were others in which we exchanged ideas and in which a proposal was tabled on one side or the other. On the question of tuna, for example, we both see that these are fish that migrate around and so they haven't heard about national boundaries, so it's a problem to know how to deal with that, and the Mexican Government put forward a new proposal, which we'll be examining. We didn't agree on everything, but we were able to look at every issue, including very sensitive ones, such as the Central American issues, all in, I think, a very constructive spirit. I might ask my counterpart if he would like to comment on that.

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SECRETARY SEPULVEDA: Thank you very much. I share a great deal of the viewpoints expressed by Secretary Shultz and that these conversations have been extremely fruitful and extremely cordial and productive. We've held them in an atmosphere of frankness and cordiality and we have been able to present our different points of view on these various matters within this framework of cordiality and frankness. As you know, this is the first occasion during the Administration of President de la Madrid that the Binational Commission has met. We've met -- Secretary Silva Herzog and Secretary Hernandez -- with our American counterparts and worked constructively over the past two days in analyzing the various problems that were presented to us. Some of the results have already been mentioned by Secretary Shultz, but I'd like to mention a couple of others that I think we have made progress on. For example, the matter of environmental quality along the border between the two nations, we have made progress in discussing this situation. I think this is a situation that affects both Mexicans and Americans and we have made progress that we'll be able to settle and improve the quality of the environment along the border between our two countries.

Another item that I consider of importance is a matter of cultural exchanges, and that we hope that we will both be able to receive and to send cultural presentations frome one country to another and vice versa. And I think as far as legal matters are concerned, I think we have established the groundwork for cooperation whenever that is necessary and indispensable, and that we will get good results in the legal field in the future. As far as Central America is concerned, of course, we have what, in the contents of the Communique, reflects the results of our conversations. But I think there is another point that I think is very important for us, and that is that we feel that we're seeking medium term solutions to the problems of Central America. But we have to undertake the task of working on the beginnings of those medium term solutions on the basis of urgency and working with all the parties concerned. And, of course, we are interested in establishing peaceful conditions throughout the area that would permit the building of friendly relations between the various countries in the Central America region. And, of course, we have to generate peaceful machinery in Central America and that cannot be done on a short-term basis. But as we establish and build upon what we are doing and establish a better climate, then our task will become even easier. And I think we have established the need, as I said, of achieving medium term results in this area by means of prompt action in the field of economic development and in the establishment of economic conditions that will affect the prosperity of all the countries of the Central American area. I took advantage of the occasion to brief Secretary Shultz on my visit to the five countries of Central America, and I think that there has been a useful exchange of views as far as Central America is concerned between our two delegations that is of a great usefulness for the situation.

We hope to be able to promote dialogue and negotiations starting with our trip tomorrow to Panama and our meeting there.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Contadora initiative has certain points in it that directly affect the United States. My question is: Does the United States Government object to these provisions or is it willing to cooperate with this group?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as I understand it the Contadora Four have managed to organize a meeting in Panama and to my way of thinking the key in this meeting is the fact that all five Central American countries will be there, which to my mind is a recognition of the basic fact that the issues are fundamentally regional. Now, having said that, of course, there are all sorts of questions that have to be worked out by the parties and I know the Secretary and his counterparts will be trying to do that. And, as I said earlier, we wish them well in their effort, because we, as they, want to see peace; we want to see democracy; we want to see economic development in those regions and we feel that we got a lot and I hope gave something in the exchange of views on this, not only with the Secretary, but with President de la Madrid, whom we were privileged to spend a considerable time. Thanks very much for your cordial treatment here in Mexico.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 27, 1983
No. 128

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ,
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE MALCOLM BALDRIDGE,
AND THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DONALD REGAN
EN ROUTE FROM MEXICO CITY, MEXICO
April 19, 1983

For further information contact:

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QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have to speak from our position, but I think the most encouraging thing about the meeting that's coming up is the fact that all the countries of Central America have accepted to come, which more or less automatically defines it as a regional conference. We believe that the problem is essentially a regional one, so the fact that they're all there seems like a good thing to us. The Mexicans have helped to arrange that although their own view has tended to be that the problems are essentially bilateral rather than regional. That's of course, one of the things we discussed at quite some length; what are the arguments, pro and con on that.

QUESTION: Secretary Baldridge, we hear in Mexico that yours was a command performance. They insisted that you be there. Can you tell us what you did that made it worth their while?

SECRETARY BALDRIDGE: It's just my natural charming self. (Laughter) They're making a major policy change from an inward investment policy of a domestic economy to an outward-looking economic policy and are tending more toward strengthening their exports, which you need to do in order to pay back their external debt.

The subsidies problem between us is a serious one. We agreed to resume discussions on that on this stop and we talked over the (inaudible). The Mexicans also made a new proposal in the fishing talks -- the fisheries problem that has been a source of some contention over the last several years. (inaudible) We want to help them where we can on their ability to get and retain foreign investment and also some of their own domestic capital. In reference to the past year or so, I think they are trying to change and work out their policies.

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz, there is no more key issue for the United States in terms of Central America than the fact that Cuba and Nicaragua are supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas. Is there any acknowledgement on the part of the Mexican Government that Cuba and Nicaragua are doing what the United States says they're doing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think anyone questions that.

QUESTION: When you raised this with them as a major concern of the United States, what was their response?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I described the situation as we see it, and that's part of how we see it. Nobody took issue with that description.

QUESTION: Is it your impression that the Mexicans, in view of their influence with both Cuba and Nicaragua, are attempting to do anything to moderate their behavior?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Secretary Sepulveda described to me the discussions that he and the other foreign ministers in the Contadora four had with the various governments when they made their tour around the five governments. He apparently took the lead among the four in their discussions in Managua. What he told me that he said about the things that have to be resolved gave me some encouragement that he does see it that way, because certainly one of the things that he considers important is the cessation of the shipment of arms from one country to another. That's really what's taking place from Cuba to Nicaragua to El Salvador.

QUESTION: Sir, is there any change on the possibility of your going to the Middle East since the bombing in Beirut?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That question will be -- well, the bombing, of course, is something that we are all distressed about, deeply, and undoubtedly we will discuss it when I get back. Just what the situation in Lebanon is as of tommorrow, we'll see. Phil (Habib) has been having continuing meetings. I've been reading his cables constantly. I don't have any doubt that it's a good idea for me to go to the Middle East as soon as it seems as though it's going to be worthwhile and helpful to everyone out there. We'll just have to see and make an assessment of whether that's the case.

QUESTION: Is this something you're going to decide upon this week, whether or not to go out there, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a matter that been under continuing review for quite a while. The President will decide and maybe this week, and maybe not. I don't have the answer to that.

QUESTION: Do you think it would be a good idea to communicate the U.S. position toward Beirut and the situation there, the peace initiative, and so one at this time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There's a lot to be said for going and in particular, if that can be helpful in bringing about a settlement of the Lebanese problems. There's also a lot to be said against it. In particular, we have some very capable negotiators out there who know the situation well. We're in constant touch with them, have a lot of communication with the Lebanese and with the Israelis, including telephone calls.

So, it's not as though there's no contact or nothing going on. We have had the view all the way through, including when the Israelis and the Lebanese came to the United States three or four weeks ago, whenever that was, that it's very important to support our negotiators and not to undercut them in any way. So, this is a matter that we'll be consulting with Phil on. His inputs and others will help make that decision.

I would say there are a number of things to be discussed. There is the Lebanon problem; there are the relationships between the United States and Israel; there's the Egyptian-Israeli situation; and then there's the overall peace process, as well as other matters of interest to the Middle East. Whether there's anything we can help with in the Iran-Iraq situation, particularly the oil spill which is getting to be a very bad situation in the Gulf -- a real pollutant -- I don't know.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what's going to happen? Are you going to have meetings with your people tomorrow to talk about the Middle East, or are you going to talk to the President about it, or, how is this decision going to be made?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm going to talk to the President about it, but me let me give you my schedule tomorrow:

Beginning at ten o'clock, I testify for several hours on the MX before the Senate. Beginning at four o'clock, I testify before the House Committee on Nicaragua. Thursday morning, I testify before a Senate Budget Committee, so the Congress has me pretty well occupied. But I expect to see the President and report to him on the trip to Mexico. In particular, I have some messages from President de la Madrid for him. I might say the Mexicans were quite sympathetic and strong in their concern for our people in Beirut, and shocked by the action and both Secretary Sepulveda and President de la Madrid gave letters on that subject.

I don't know when I'll get through testifying. That's up to the Senate. You sit there. They all walk in and out and you sit there and answer questions.

But sometime between when I get through on that and when I pick up testifying again, I'll try to see the President. And I think sometime Thursday afternoon, I'll have some free time from the Congress and be able to consider this issue.

QUESTION: Why are you testifying on MX?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: At the request of members of the Committee as transmitted by Senator Tower, there is a feeling that there's some foreign policy implications to the MX deployment.

QUESTION: Sir, in terms of Central America and with your discussions, what were the positive results of the trip, and to your mind, disappointments of the trip in terms of Salvador, Nicaragua and the Mexican position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: From the standpoint of benefits, without being able to put specific points in front of you, I think I have a clearer idea of what the Mexicans are trying to do, of what their attitudes are, how they see the problem, their analysis of it; they have a better idea of ours. I hope that we are able to make our points clear to them. We got a sense of their positions, right up to President de la Madrid. We spent quite a bit of time talking about that with him. So, I think that understanding of the perceptions that people have and what they think should be done about it is important. I suppose the sense in which this is regional as distinct from bilateral, is a matter that makes quite a bit of difference in how you go about it. There's also some importance to the extent to which you conceive of action on it being a series of discreet steps that stretch out over a period of time, as distinct from a set of things that you try to get put in place. I suppose, in a way, that's a dimension of the multilateral regional versus bilateral point, but it's nevertheless something that we discussed quite a bit.

At one point, it was said by a top Mexican that our objectives are peace, development and democracy. And we officially think they have to be attained in that order. Well, in a sense, those are our objectives, too, but we see them as quite interdependent. And, in fact, it's the lack of a pluralistic, representative government in Nicaragua that has tended to destabilize the region to a considerable extent.

But at any rate, in discussing issues of that kind back and forth, I hope that we each have improved our understanding of the situation.

QUESTION: Did they suggest to you that through our policies, the United States is radicalizing the Nicaraguan revolution?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That was never said to me. I know I read that written all the time, but they never made that statement.

QUESTION: Maybe they were being diplomatic?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I must have spent three hours sitting, just the two of us, with Secretary Sepulveda talking about this issue. There was no particular reason why he should pull his punches.

QUESTION: Did you have any disappointments on the trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I think that overall, the discussions went quite well. The object of trying to create an atmosphere within which we could talk about problems in a constructive and forthcoming way and get something done on them, in that sense, I think that trip went quite well. Not only the discussuions I had, but the discussions Mac and Don had were quite fruitful. We got much better aquainted with our opposite members. All that is to the good.

But as far as the Central American side is concerned, of course we're quite aware of the fact, although it wasn't arranged at the time this visit was arranged, that tonight the Foreign Secretary in Mexico is off to Panama, and so I think the opportunity to talk to him extensively before that was important for us.

QUESTION: Do you feel the same about the visit of the President of Brazil to Mexico? I mean, was it important for you to talk to the Mexicans before the Brazilians did, or what could they pass on?

SECRETARY REGAN: I think that part of that conversation will involve the economies of both of the countries, and seeing as to whether or not they can increase trade between those two nations. Also, to see how they can be helpful to each other in the situations they find themselves in now, regarding both of them as large detonations struggling to get the necessary foreign exchange to pay for their principle and interest.

QUESTION: You said earlier you don't think there's any chance of a debtor cartel?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, I don't. I don't believe there's anything sinister in their meaning as regards a debtor cartel or anything of that nature.

QUESTION: The Mexicans gave you an optimistic progress report on their ability to make the IMF goals and so forth. Did their progress report dovetail with the independent State Department and other economic analysis that we have?

SECRETARY REGAN: I would say that ours was a little less on the bullish side than theirs.

We thought they were doing very well, not to say that we didn't think they would make it, or anything of that nature. But some of their forecasts -- they themselves admit -- are more targets than actual performance that may be met during the course of the year.

QUESTION: Did you discuss contingency plans as to where the money is going to come from this summer, if they need more money as they apparently will need?

SECRETARY REGAN: There was no need to do that, in as much as none of us could quite accurately forecast what the need might be and what circumstances would require that. Obviously, you could play the game "what if". What if oil prices fall? What if interest rates fall? You could go through the whole litany of "what ifs". But all we said was we would watch the situation carefully, stay in touch with each other, and if the situation starts to worsen, then we'll get down to brass tacks.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It seems to me that an awful lot rides on the quality and strength of an economic recovery around the world. That will make a big difference to everyone in their ability to work out of these debt problems. It's not a magic wand, but it will change the atmosphere a lot. You consider that the U.S. economy, which is almost a quarter of the world economy, has been basically flat for three years or so --just hasn't had any growth. If that starts growing, it automatically changes the atmosphere considerably, and if that is accompanied by a better performance on the part of Germany and Japan, well there you are up over 40% of the world economy. So it can make quite a difference.

SECRETARY BALDRIDGE: There's clearly a great deal of economic interdependence between Mexico and the U.S. - I don't think it's widely realized that our exports to Mexico in 1981 were $18 billion; in 1982 they were $12 billion -- a $6 billion drop. And 25,000 jobs, a billion dollars in exports. That's 150,000 American jobs that we lost as a result of that drop in exports. So, it's quite clearly in our own self-interest to help any way we can. (Inaudibles)

QUESTION: How exactly can we help? What could we say that we would be willing to do, or what steps would we take specifically to bring this about?

SECRETARY BALDRIDGE: Maybe the best thing we can do to help is to get the U.S. economy growing again as we think it is. It looks like that is on track. That's the number one thing we can do for Mexico. We can help them, as the Secretary of the Treasury has pointed out, tide them over their debt problems in the interim. We can also help them in their desire to attract new foreign investment. We can't do it for them, but if they are adopting the policy that we think they will be, we can certainly aid (inaudible). I think there are other things --the nuts and bolts -- the Fisheries Agreement is finally coming to some conclusion on a substantive agreement. Whether it's in their favor or not, it's the fact that it's amicably settled -- GSPs and so forth, they are all part of a mosaic that helps give confidence to foreign investors, and also some of the Mexican money that is left -- capital that is left.

SECRETARY REGAN: I'd add to what Secretay Baldridge has said. One of the subjects we did discuss was financing trade. They are going to have trouble financing trade. We discussed EXIM, CCC, other types of help that they may need in order to purchase goods and services from us.

QUESTION: Do we give them any certainty that there will be new EXIM -

SECRETARY REGAN: We said we'd be more than willinng to discuss it. But we did discuss the various aspects of it -- how to go about doing this, what areas, that type of thing.

QUESTION: Is there anything new on immigration, the whole issue of Mexican people coming into the U.S. which is apparently increasing as their economy is weakened?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The fact that it's a major issue on both sides of the border, and I think that the fact of the matter is that in the U.S. there is rising concern that we don't control our borders. It isn't an anti-immigration sentiment so much as a lack of control over who is coming in and how. So I would expect that something like the SimpsonMazzoli Bill is liable to pass. That has some significant implications for Mexico, so they're very interested in it. Immigration has been a kind of a traditional safety valve for them. So, they're very concerned about it.

QUESTION: Thank you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE
PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING
THE MX MISSILE

April 19, 1983

The Briefing Room

9:17 A.M. EST

MR. ALLIN: This is a BACKGROUND BRIEFING on the President's recommendations regarding the MX, based on the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations.

I would appreciate it if you would attribute the briefing to senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It might be most useful if you would just take a minute to read the President's statement. And then my colleague and I will try to answer any questions.

Q This seems to be nothing but a total endorsement of the Commission's Report. Is that correct, basically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has accepted the Commission's recommendation with respect to deployment of the Peacekeeper missiles and development work on a new small missile. He, enthusiastically, has adopted the Commission's recommendations.

Q Is there anything that the Commission recommended that he does not endorse?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are a number of points of narrative made in the Commission's Report that do not necessarily require any action. I think he has taken the actions dealing with the deployment of these systems.

I suppose I should add that I suspect the President is gratified that the Commission has broadly endorsed his strategic modernization program, which is in the narrative rather than in the recommendations on the Peacekeeper. But in its analysis, it comes to the same conclusions to which the President came in initiating this strategic modernization.

Q I thought they said there was no window of vulnerability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The phrase, "window of vulnerability," was never as precise or informative as is necessary to gain a grasp of these issues. There are vulnerabilities in all parts of our strategic force, and indeed in all parts of the Soviet strategic force.

The critical question is whether -- recognizing that the vulnerabilities are partial or, to turn it around, the potential survivability of each part of our force is partial -- whether, in combination, the force as a whole is adequately survivable to assure that we have a deterrent.

And one of the points that is stressed at some length in the Commission Report is the synergistic effect of different elements of the Triad. That is, the fact that we have submarines and bombers and land-based missiles, each of which would be attacked by different forces under distinct circumstances.

It means that, when you put it all together, there is an adequate level of survivability, provided we do certain things. And one of those certain things at this juncture is the deployment of the MX as recommended in existing Minuteman silos, because without it --

Q Is that not the same thing as saying that the window of vulnerability as advertised by the President during his campaign did not exist in the panel's view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I do not think one can say that there is no vulnerability. It is widely recognized --

Q That is not the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is widely recognized in the Commission Report that there is a significant vulnerability. And if you read the section of the Report that deals with the land-based ICBMs, the Commission accepts the judgment of the preceding administration that most, if not all, of the ICBM force is vulnerable to attack.

Q This stuff does make a great deal of the synergistic effect of the remaining three legs of the Triad. So, QED, where is the window of vulnerability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to define the window of vulnerability?

Q No. I would like the -- to define the window of vulnerability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of the window of vulnerability, I think you really have to look at two levels. First, thinking in totality -- of the total strategic forces, there is the concept of the window of vulnerability. And one really must examine two things: not only our capability, but also the projected capability of the Soviets -- in trying to arrive at an overall view of the window of vulnerability. Is it getting wider, et cetera, et cetera?

Needless to say, it lacks preciseness. And you have to really leave it up to those individuals who address this on a day-to-day basis to come up with a judgment.

Now, let us step down to a second level. And we will talk about the vulnerability of the land-based ICBM. And I do not think that there is a great deal of disagreement when you look at, exactly, the capability that is attributed to the Soviets now in terms of the increased exposure of our land-based system.

So in terms of the synergism, this is the whole idea of the Triad -- is that while looking over some period of time, one particular leg might be more vulnerable than the other two legs. And this is the synergism that you really want to aspire to.

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MR. ALLIN: Could I interrupt just a minute. Two things: number one, the crews that need to go over to the East Wing should go now; and number two, we would appreciate if this material was, also, embargoed -- along with the speech -- until 10:00 a.m.

Okay.

Q In terms of what the President has endorsed and not endorsed in the Commission Report, what we can assume -- I mean, the President's statement is much briefer than the Report. We need to know what we can incorporate, be reference, as administration policy.

You said, some points of narrative were not necessarily adopted by the administration. And then, you talked about the recommendations. But there were a couple of recommendations the Commission made that are not -- I do not see in this statement. One is that we change the START proposal, though it is already heavily oriented toward the counting warheads -- a point the Commission Report, sort of, does not acknowledge. But we, at least, change it to remove the launcher-sub limit. Does the administration accept that change in its START proposal. Will it carry that forward?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You might not all have heard the question. The question was: Will the administration change, consistent with the recommendation of the Commission Report, its START policy? And the questioner observes that it is already a part of the administration's START policy, that an emphasis is placed on the counting of warheads and, indeed, on throwweight.

The Commission raises questions about counting launchers. And this is an aspect of the Commission Report that needs to be studied very carefully. And we are in the process of doing that.

Q So you have not necessarily accepted that recommendation. You are studying it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are looking at that recommendation. But I think it is important to point out that our START policy is already oriented toward numbers of warheads and throwweight, and launcher limits of some sort would be necessary as counting rules, even in a situation in which they were not themselves the unit of the count. But that is an issue that is under study. It's a very complex one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to add one comment to that, that you must really view the Commission -- the Commission's recommendations in the context of the entire package. And their comments concerning arms control is highly contingent upon that total package moving forward. And that --

Q I understand, but the administration has embraced the heart of their package, and so I'm just wondering about a couple of things that, as you say, flow into the context of that. And the second one, if I could have an answer, is this. The Commission also strongly recommended the idea of studying a small ballistic missile submarine. It was a study they were recommending, not a production course. I see nothing about that. Is the administration going to study a different SSBM?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let's -- from an historical viewpoint, you will find that through the years a number of different-sized subs with different capabilities, different loadings, have been examined off and on. I would subspect that, again, out of this Commission's report that this recommendation certainly has been noted.

Q I know it's been noted. What I'm asking -- has the administration embraced it, or not? Is the administration going forward to study, as the Commission recommended, a small SSBM?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No decision has been made on how to proceed with the small --

Q Could you assess for us the likelihood that Congress will go along with the President's endorsement here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, we're hopeful the Congress will and it was a major part of the Commission's deliberations to meet, as they did on a number of occasions, with members of the Congress. The recommendation made by the Commission has been endorsed by every recent -- perhaps it's every living Secretary of Defense, by the recent Secretaries of State, by -- from both parties. It's a very broad spectrum of opinion reflected on the Commission and the counselors to the Commission. If the -- it is hard to believe that the Congress would be unresponsive to the degree of consensus that has been developed both by the Commission and now endorsed by the President.

Q Senator Mark Andrews, Republican of North Dakota, who describes himself as being hawkish on defense, says because you are no longer dealing with a really hardened, so-called invulnerable launch site, that you're talking about a first-strike weapon only. How do you respond to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we disagree with that. As I said at the outset, there are vulnerabilities associated with all parts of the Triad. The question is one of degree. There are vulnerabilities with respect to the submarine force. It's difficult to communicate with submarines. Some of them are in port at any given time and are vulnerable. Nobody would argue that that's a first-strike force.

Whether a system is a first-strike system or not does not turn on the question of whether it is vulnerable or the degree to which it is vulnerable. There are no invulnerable systems. The days in which we were able to deploy a system and remain confident that for 10 or 20 years it would be invulnerable are long past. The balancing out of technology has relegated that to an anachronism. And the Commission recognizes that.

Q Isn't it true, though, that the largest Soviet land-based missiles are, in effect, invulnerable unless you get an MX? Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The largest -- indeed, the Soviet ICBM force is not vulnerable to attack by the United States by virtue of our modest offensive capability and their extreme hardening.

Q Is that the reason you want the MX, so it will have a hard-target kill -- capability?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Commission says -- and this is a conclusion that we endorse -- that without the MX, a number of things -- a number of consequences flow from the failure to proceed with this. One is it would be extraordinarily difficult to succeed in the arms control area. Secondly, an imbalance would be permitted to exist, in which the Soviets would have the capability, as they now do, to destroy and attack an entire element of our Triad. And we would have no comparable capability.

Q Could you explain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And that is a matter of considerable concern to us. Our ICBM force -- our existing ICBM force is aging and is going to need to be replaced. Part of it, indeed, is now being dismantled due to old age, the Titans. And there are various other reasons the Commission adduces for wanting a launcher of the approximate size and characteristics of the MX, not least of all a hedge against a breakout or Soviet ABM capabilities. So for all of those reasons we

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think it's important to maintaining the strategic balance and moving forward on arms control.

Q I want to clarify the point brought up by Walt over there a moment ago. The President, then, has not endorsed the entire commission report? And can you be more specific what he has endorsed in that report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, I want to be careful here because it would be wrong to go out and write a story that says that there are parts of the commission report the President hasn't -- does not -- does not --

Q He hasn't?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wait a minute. I just want to put it in context. The question is does the President agree with every word in the report. I can't answer that. I just don't know whether he agrees with every word in the report. He has endorsed the recommendations of the report.

Q Has he endorsed all of the recommendations?

Q Some of the recommendations.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The recommendations that deal with those action items like whether and how to deploy the Peacekeeper missile, whether to proceed with the development of the new small missile. Those recommendations he's endorsed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Let --

Q When the report was presented, though, gentlemen, we were told by the commission members that unless all aspects of the report were accepted by both the President and Congress that none of them could succeed on their own, not the MX, not the arms control initiative --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to put the acceptance in proper perspective. Again, I'll have to go back to -- let's view the recommendations as a package. And if you really look at the totality of the report, you're really talking about nearly a true decade track. Okay?

Now, an essential part of this report is the sort of progress that will be made in terms of arms control. Okay?

So, you know, yes, he has endorsed the commission's report; but he certainly cannot implement this, the recommendations in a vaccum. The arms control I mentioned plays a critical part in terms of exactly what's going to be done in the long term in terms of the MX missile. Will the small missile actually be deployed? Will the Soviets reciprocate in moving away from launcher limits if that desire is made? Will they actually agree to bring down their MIRV missiles? In other words, I'm trying to tell you that, you know, the report must be viewed in the context of not something here or now. It's something that is going to unfold over a number of years.

Q -- recommended some things for here and now to get it started and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what --

Q Does he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you promote me to general, please? Thank you. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I really understand this question. But let me try it one more time. The report makes a number of recommendations. The President has accepted those recommendations. Now, with respect to one arms control question, let me say first he accepts the thrust of the commission's report with respect to arms control and has recognized the relationship between our arms control policy and the prospects for success and, moving ahead on the -- in adopting the recommendations with respect to deployments. And the Commission and the President see eye-to-eye on that.

There is a specific point made about an aspect of our START policy. And that is under study and review.

MR. ALLIN: Let's take two more questions here because people have got to get going. In the back --

Q Would you -- Just a few minutes ago, you were addressing the question of what is and what is not a full-strike weapon. Would you explain to me why this MX missile as it is planned to be deployed does not constitute a full-strike weapon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there is no agreed-upon definition of what constitutes a first-strike weapon. And, indeed, one cannot look at an individual weapon and in any meaningful sense talk about it as a first-strike weapon because what is involved is the totality of the forces on both sides. And the deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles, consistent with the recommendation the President has accepted, would not endow the United States with the capability to destroy a significant element of the Soviet strategic force.

Unhappily, the Soviets now have that capability with respect to a significant element of the American strategic force. And that is why we remain concerned about the nature and direction of the Soviet strategic program and believe that analysis demonstrates that even with the full deployment of 100, we would not have a first-strike capability.

MR. ALLIN: Okay. Just a minute. Mike we'll take you and then way back, Dean, Jerry, Mike. Okay? And that'll be it. We've got to get -- Close it off --

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Q Could you explain the significance of this 45-day time clock that starts with Congress today? I don't understand the importance of it. Why, if Congress votes it down, why couldn't you just resubmit it or is there some funding that if you don't get within 45 days you jeopardize? What is the 45-day thing mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From a programmatic viewpoint, as you very well know, just looking global across the whole spectrum of strategic forces modernization, it's necessary, in order to move forward -- and I'm talking about essentially we have a program in which there's a -- cost of $5 billion -- and just in the interest of moving forward the program and not to end up cancelling contracts or what have you is -- we need a near-term decision.

Likewise, not slipping the initial operational capability, it requires a prompt decision.

Q So, if the decision is no, then you've got your decision and you don't resubmit it? Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's something that would be addressed at that time. Right now, everyone feels some -- is hopeful at least that the recommendation will be approved.

Q On the second page, the second recommendation urges development and production of the Peacekeeper in deploying 100 of them in the existing Minuteman silos near Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Why is -- that sounds so much like dense pack to me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It should not sound like dense pack. As you very well know, the Minuteman silos are separated, each by a distance of three to five miles. So, it's certainly not a dense pack, which is 1800 to 2200 feet.

Q -- Wyoming --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Say what? Oh, okay. All right. I missed the --

Q Does the administration have its own cost-estimate for MX as well as the Midgetman?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Could you repeat --

Q Does the administration have its own cost-estimate for the MX program as well as the Midgetman?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Midgetman -- it's a very early stage to be talking confidently about costs. But we have no disagreement with the Commission's judgment. We think this program, in fact, now will save some money. I --

Q Do you agree with their -- I think they said $14 billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we do. Could I just return to this window of vulnerability question? The window of vulnerability is not simply a physical, a technical question. It's a question of whether, in the judgment in Moscow and here and around the world, there exist circumstances in which the United States might be vulnerable to attack. And that judgment rests not only on such technical considerations as whether the Soviets have the requisite number of warheads with yields and accuracies sufficient to destroy Minuteman missiles in their silos. They have that.

The Commission recognizes that they have it. The previous administration recognized that they would acquire that capability about now. There's no dispute about that. But whether the United States is vulnerable depends on our ability to respond in its totality. And it depends on a political dimension that mustn't be ignored. And if this country now, after it has been proposed by successive administrations in one form or another, and endorsed by this Commission, which really gathers together representatives of all those preceding administrations, were to fail to deploy the only new ICBM the United States has had in close to 15 years, if, indeed, we were not able to make what is obviously a controversial decision, the political impact of that has to make the window of vulnerability a far more formidable and far more important factor in our security.

And, so, the window of vulnerability is not simply a technical matter. It's a question, too, of the political climate. And we would only do great harm to the stability of that political climate by failing to make this decision.

Q Are you saying that people who would oppose it would be un-American?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, of course, I'm not saying that.

Q General Scowcroft said yesterday that the MX in combination with the D-5 could be viewed as a first-strike capability. Could you comment on that?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we certainly don't view it in that light.

MR. ALLIN: Jerry?

Q Is there any language in this, in the report at all that the Administration takes exception to, that you can specifically say, that you take exception to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Which is why I wanted to put in perspective the statement that we have endorsed, the President has endorsed the recommendations of the report. There is no language to which exception has been taken.

Q Is that five billion dollars --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a great deal of discussion of uncertainties and potential future developments that do not add up to recommendations. And how some of that will be dealt with in the future remains to be seen.

Q Is that five billion dollar figure, the one you gave us, the cost Congress would have to approve for the '84 Budget to get this thing going --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, that's --

Q Is there no cost in the '84 Budget --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- no, that's a sunk investment I'm talking about.

Q -- that's what you've spent so far --

Q Is there any cost in the '84 Budget --

Q That's five billion.

Q -- or approximately how much are you asking for in the '84 Budget to get this thing rolling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would have to -- I don't have the number, it's about one, point -- I could look in the Commission's reports.

Q It's under two billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think it is. Let me look -- let me look at the number.

Q -- five billion is what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, let me look at the --

Q Five billion so far?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me look at the precise number.

Q Where is that five billion so far, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's sunk costs.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Research and Development.

Q Research and Development --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, research and development.

Q We've already done that already?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Thank you.

Q It's gone?

Q But what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The actual profile of the investment is in the report, and we stand behind these numbers.

Q -- page? --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's on page twenty-two of the report.

Q The other fourteen billion is on top of the five is that right, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q The other fourteen billion's on top of the five?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct, we have a sunk cost of about $5 billion dollars.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 9:43 A.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF EC PRESIDENT, GASTON THORN
WASHINGTON, D. C.
THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1983, 2:00 P.M.

MODERATOR: As previously announced this is a background briefing on the visit of EC President, Gaston Thorn.

It is my understand the Senior Department Official will make a brief statement on the visit, and then you will be free to ask questions.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: All right. I'll just try to summarize what has happened during the visit. President Thorn, accompanied by their Ambassador, Sir Roy Denman, and their Economics Minister, Jean Durieux -- Is that his exact title?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Chef de Cabinet.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I see. That's different -- chief of staff, so to speak. They met the President at 11 o'clock at the White House and had a meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room, at which Deputy Secretary Dam and I were there from the State Department; the Vice President was there; Judge Clark was there, and Secretary Regan was there. I didn't make a list of those, so I can't guarantee that that's all.

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: That was all.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That was all? Thanks. I would say it was quite a constructive conversation centering mostly around plans for the Summit, which was the occasion of President Thorn's coming. He will be one of the eight participants in the Summit. However, naturally, some of the Summit topics are related to other things, and occasionally there was the mention of some other subjects besides those that will come up at the Summit.

Both Presidents agreed that they were optimistic about the Summit being constructive and coming to useful conclusions. One of the bases for optimism is a feeling that the economies of the Western world and the industrial nations are either beginning to recover or are on the verge of doing so. Our President, of course, pointed out that recovery seems pretty definitely to be established and growing here. President Thorn said it isn't actually underway in Europe, but that everybody thinks it is just about to be, and that there is a definite spirit of optimism in Europe.

President Thorn also reported that he senses a greater degree of unity among the countries that will be at the Summit than at any time in the last ten years. I wasn' sure whether that last ten years meant that it was greater before that or that he wasn't there to observe it.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: He was there to observe it, and he felt it was greater than before.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Good. Being an ex--statistician, I would have a tendency to quibble on things like that and wonder what ambiguities there could be in them.

I jotted down notes while I was there knowing that I was supposed to come and report to you. The emphasis was that both people felt that the Heads of Governments should focus on the big issues, not specific issues. There was some mention, for example, if you would guess and you would anticipate, of the present issues between the United States and the EC over agriculture. Both felt those extremely urgent and important and needed to be dealt with -- and are being dealt with -- reasonably optimistically; but they felt it wasn't really the kind of thing suitable for the Heads of State at a meeting like the Williamsburg Summit will be. I think both sides felt that, and that is what had been felt by other people working on the Summit.

There is an interest in the level of interest rates in the United States -- both parties think they are too high, and hope to see them come down. There was some discussion of the needs of the developing countries, both those that are taken care of by the IMF and some of the poorest oines that are more dependent on outright aid.

President Thorn expressed some interest in some kind of a new monetary system, but he said he didn't mean a new Bretton Woods; he really didn't say what he did mean, but just that he had an interest in a new monetary system. Maybe later, Ambassador Vest will be able to elaborate on that. You might have other sources than what he said there.

There was some discussion of East-West relations and the work that is in-progress and a general feeling on both sides that that work is coming along satisfactorily and will probably be taken care of in the various agencies dealing with it -- the International Energy Agency, the OECD, NATO, and COCOM, in which case it probably wouldn't take up a lot of time at the Summit. It remains to be seen how those will in fact shape up.

The European Community expressed some concern about the Export Administration Act and the Administration's position on that. They have serious questions over what they call extra-territoriality and we call conflicts of jurisdiction. They also commented on the proposed ban on imports from companies that violate COCOM restrictions. They emphasized support for the world trading system and emphasized that we ought to examine the links between finance and trade.

That exhausts the notes I took at the meeting with the President. We then had a lunch -- the Secretary of State had a lunch for the group from the EC, and we discussed essentially the same questions. I think no additional questions were discussed there, but some of them were discussed in greater depth and at greater length. I have nothing to add, really, from the lunch, which again was constructive -- two groups that are working toward similar objectives and starting with similar assumptions. There may be questions about that which will remind me of something that did happen different at the lucnh.

I'll stop there.

I'll ask my colleague if he wishes to amplify that at all. I see you took some notes, too.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I took notes, too, as of habit, and I would say you covered all the points quite precisely.

I would say from the point of view of President Thorn of the European Commission, this association of the European Commission with the succession of Summit has been a very important activity. The European Commission, by treaty, gives the Commission authority to move in the world of trade, energy, export credits, and so on. So as an institution just getting underway, in some ways, in the strange world of growth(?), it does have some responsibility in its own right, which makes it possible for it to play a role in the Summit and to be helpful. Certainly, it has been helpful for President Thorn to have come over here and to have talked with the President.

Q You said that President Thorn expressed some concern over the new proposals for the Export Administration Act. Were there any suggestions that the Administration might want to rethink some of its proposals?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, we didn'' discuss that at any length at all. We already knew that they had concerns about that because they had communicated them to us previously, so he simply reminded us that they had those concerns. And I would say that we didn' have any more than simply an enumeration of the fact that that was a concern.

Q Sir, could you elaborate on the words of President Thorn on the needs of developing countries or the developing world?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Incidentally, when I used the word "needs," I didn't to imply that either President Thorn or President Reagan used that word. I could have said "interest of."

Both of the Presidents -- and I can't really sharply distinguish between which one said which because they were saying essentially the same thing. Both said that we, in the interest of the world economy, need to see that the economic condition of the LDCs improves. Both of them agreed that that is also in the interest of the industrial economies.

As to the needs -- I probably did use that word now; it just shows you you should watch your words even more carefully in a meeting this. I did not intend to quote them, attribute that word; and I kind of doubt that anybody used the word "needs" in any context in the entire meeting, but --

Q On the import controls, the EC has made its views known on extra-territoriality in the form of a diplomatic note, but I don't think that the EC has said anything on the import controls because the proposals just came out from the Administration on April 4th. I wonder, could you just outline what these ECs concerns on the import controls?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. They really just mentioned that, that they are concerned about it -- did not elaborate. I think you would have to ask them about questions like that. I've told you now everything they said this morning.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I have to assess that it was a very brief exchange. There have been so many stories already about how much the Europeans are concerned about this Act. The Wall Street Journal has made a nice week of it. They only referred to it in passing, as if to say, "I just want to point to this: you are well aware of our position. We are concerned. We hope we can find a way to defuse that different spot between us." They didn't really go into details at all.

Q Did President Thorn point out any other aspects of the Export Administration Act that were not previously addressed in the diplomatic note?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No.

Q In the lunch with Secretary Shultz, did the Secretary go into any detail in describing the U.S. concerns on agriculture to the EC? And did President Thorn give any indication to the U.S. of the ECs position on it?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We did discuss agriculture more than just mention it, the way we did the Export Administration Act. As to exactly who said what -- that is, you asked did the Secretary express any views -- he indicated the importance that we attach to that. Others of us there indicated the urgency of coming to some conclusion on it. It's been dragging on and in-process since December.

There is currently a meeting of the -- What is it called, the Commission?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: It's the Council of Agriculture Ministers of the 10 countries.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That is in progress. And he indicated they will be considering what prices to set, but they haven't settled that yet. That will be later this week, presumably. We consider that a very critical issue, whether their prices are way above world prices, which then stimulates extensive production, and so on.

So there was no negotiation going on in these sessions at all. We did make it clear that not only we, but the United States Congress attaches a great deal of importance to that question, and they seem to be acutely aware of that. We made sure they were.

Q I wondered if the Second Senior Official could go into any detail as to what President Thorn meant by his comments on the new monetary system.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: In all fairness to a group like this, no. I would be misleading you if I would try, because I don't think I've ever heard him define it. They are pointing to a direction in which they would like to see action, picking up on things that they have heard Secretary of the Treasury Regan say at one time or another. But they have never defined the shape that direction would take.

Q What direction --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: They certainly didn't this morning.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: They certainly did not. They are looking for that combination of activities which would inhibit the excessive swings, and they have not said, at any time that I can recall, what shape it should take.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Like the rest of us, I guess they'd like to see exchange rates stable.

Q I wanted to ask about comment on East-West. You said that President Thorn had said things were coming along satisfactorily and might be handled pretty much within the agencies. Chancellor Kohl said roughly the same thing. Does the U.S. agree with that assessment?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes. As a matter of fact in this meeting, President Reagan said it first, as he opened the meeting with a brief statement, and included that in his statement; then Thorn said the same thing later on.

And you're right: Chancellor Kohl did say that. That is the way it looks at the present time.

Q So President Reagan agreed with that assessment, that this would not be a major --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, not that it won't, but it wouldn't have to be if the subjects are disposed of satisfactorily in the other organizations. That remains to be seen; but we're saying it looks as if they will be satisfactory at that point.

Let's see: You wanted to follow up.

Q On the exchange rate, yes. We had the same debate exactly a year ago. I wonder of the American readiness to intervene in the exchange market more than it was last year, or is it going to a decline?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, we're not. What happened last year -- and I wasn't here -- if you can rely on the newspapers --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We can.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: To some extent, I do. (Laughter) I'm just kidding about that. I hear it from inside. I know from the fact we're working on it.

Last year they decided that since there is this theological debate, why don't we peak at the facts. So they agreed that each country would make a study of those instances in which there had been intervention in its currency. I've forgotten how far back they carried it; it probably depended some on how far back there had been some systematic records and consistency in institutional arrangements. But they agreed on a common methodology, and then each country made its own study. They got a pack of studies about 1-1/2 feet high. They have formulated a rather brief summary of what these studies show. That will be published by the end of the month. That was to throw light on this issue of intervention. Until that is published, it is hard to make any general statements about it. But at the present time, our position is unchanged.

Q Yes.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I guess you know what our position is: our position is the same as the one that President Mitterrand stated in his national television speech about two weeks ago. I should have brought it so I could quote it precisely. The content was that if two countries have differing inflation rates, there is no way that their exchange rate can be kept constant. He said, "I have to tell you that, in all candor," or something like that -- he emphasized it.

That has been our position for a long time, and still is.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: In all fairness, if I may just say, in Europe, you will find a very high degree of pressure from country to country on those governments, pushing for a greater degree of activity in intervention on the part of the United States.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We're keenly aware of that.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: And that is what is pushing these various ministries to look for more action from the United States. And it is in terms of intervention they are thinking, and they consider we're big enough to do it.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The only thing we've said is something to smooth out temporary turbulence in the market. The usual example that is given is that the day the President was shot, the Treasury did intervene to stabilize markets, although the evidence is that it didn't make any difference: the market was going to be stable anyhow.

Q I wonder if the Second Senior Official could bring us up to date a little bit more other than the fact that the Council of Agriculture will attend this meeting. On the question of agricultural subsidies, did they get anywhere in this intervening three months of talks?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: On the question of prices, not --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: On the general subject of agriculture.

Q Yes. Agricultural subsidies.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Prices, not subsidies, though they're related.

Q Prices.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: The discussion we've had for three months has been on all of our differences on agriculture. It involves every factor that could contribute to what we consider distortions in the international market.

Progress, but very slow progress. You have to cut away an awful morass of protection on each side of your position.

I think they have come to clear identification of particular areas that they are willing to consider on both sides, and we're now waiting to see what they come back with. It's been a long, slow process.

Q Weren't they supposed to have some sort of report by the end of March?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: That was what Ministers hoped for. We're having another meeting late this month. However, it's not the first governmental or intergovernmental activity that managed to last a little longer than it was originally scheduled for.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Late this month or early next month. you remember they just told us they had to delay a couple of days.

MODERATOR: Let's take two more.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I see one back there and one over here. Let's take three because there is one I haven't taken at all.

Q Is it fair to say that the thrust of the U.S. position on this agriculture question is that we attach urgency to settling it very soon? I mean, when you say "soon," do you mean before the Summit?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We can't, realistically, expect it to be settled before the 28th of May, but we do attach great urgency to that.

I suppose you all realize what the situation is. We don't like it, but we're not complaining now about their barriers to our imports of agricultural products or our exports to them. In fact, they are one of the biggest purchasers of our agricultural exports.

Our big complaint is, in third countries, for example in Saudi Arabia, our chicken producers have been wiped out of the market almost completely and abruptly by heavy exports to Saudi Arabia, and to the Middle East generally, of heavily-subsidized chickens. Incidentally, chickens aren't just from the EC either.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Brazilian chickens are the best! (Laughter)

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The best or the worst, depending on what -- They won the last bid, so now the EC is mad at them, too; but we're mad at both of them because we don't subsidize those things. That puts our chicken farmers, who are generally the most efficient in the world -- that is, they actually can produce chickens at a lower cost, so it's in the interest of the world economy to get their chickens from here -- pushes them out of the business. They have established business with lots of capital invested; people are working there. They can't just pick up and move in a day, a week, or a year.

It's an extremely serious matter so it is urgent. If you have any doubts about it, go down to Arkansas or Georgia, or places where they raise chickens, or even just go over to the Hill and talk to some of the Congressmen from there. It is a very urgent matter.

I just happened to pick chickens because the chicken producers were the last people in talking to me about this, but there are quite a number of other cases of that sort.

On the other hand, they are our largest customer or our second-largest customer for agricultural products.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Our largest, $8 billion a year.

Q Which countries?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The EC, the European Community, generally.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Particularly heavy in soybeans and corn gluten feed.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Yes.

We haven't been sitting by idly, doing nothing. Even when we met them in December and decided to have these talks, the Secretary of Agriculture stated then, clearly and unambiguously, that we were not going to withhold any action until these talks came to a conclusion.

About a month later, we sold a million tons of flour to Egypt at a highly-subsidized price, partly as an effort to get their attention and to indicate that we really were serious.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: It did!

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: It certainly did. After that, the talks became very much more intensive and business-like. But we've also had a number of export sales with subsidized credit -- quite a few of those. So we're not just sitting idly by, and we won't.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Could I say one thing? It's only fair, though, to keep in mind -- and I'm not trying to play the devil's advocate on the other side of the coin. If this is an extraordinarily difficult social and political, as well as economic, problem in our country, it is equally so in every one of their countries. So the margins of maneuver are small in trying to get to the bottom of the problem.

You use the question, "When are we going to settle this problem?" This, like a lot of other problems, is an area in which we are less likely to so-called "settle" the problem than find areas of accommodation we can both live with. I know that sounds like fancy, gray language. But that's the real world.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We may ameliorate it --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: You may ameliorate the problem, but you don't solve the problem -- certainly not in the short term. And it is just as well to keep it in mind.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: We have become completely convinced that the people we work with are working in good faith --

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: -- and they attach as much urgency to the problem as we do. That is one of the reasons we've continued the negotiations longer than we anticipated when we started.

Q Could I have a follow-up on the agricultural phase?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: All right.

Q The meeting next week is going to be held at a much lower level than the former one. What does that mean?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Not much.

Q Does that mean that they will get down to details, otherwise there is no hope whatsoever?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say it's being handled at a much lower level. The meetings have been held primarily at the level of Deputy Cabinet Minister and Office Director. the ones that have been held this year. As far as I know, the next one that will be held, whenever it is held, will be held with someone who is there at a Deputy Cabinet Minister level and the same Office Directors who have the greatest technical knowledge that have participated in the past. It is not a particular derogation at all.

Your question surprised me because there hasn't been any decision to do that, although it is true that I'm not going to be there, and I have been at the past ones: I suppose the Assistant Secretary will. But that is because of other things connected with the Summit and the OECD Ministerial and a whole lot of other things. So I was really surprised at any suggestion that we're downgrading, because we're not.

Q But Mr. Havercamp is not coming, but why? The last time he was --

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Mr. Havercamp only came the last time. Mr. Havercamp did not participate in the January talks.

OFFICIAL: Or the February.

Q I would like to ask only the Third Senior Official, please, would the question of East-West trade relations and political relations be envisioned as a big issue or not?

THIRD SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. As I think, the First Senior Official explained, we hope very much there will be sufficient progress between now and then so that it will not be a big issue.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: If it's settled elsewhere, it won't be an issue there of any consequence.

If it's settled elsewhere first, it won't be a big issue at Williamsburg.

Q If not -- ?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Then, they will have to discuss it, if they haven't been able to come to any decision.

Q I would like to know if Secretary of Agriculture Block lobbied to get the agricultural issues on the table in Williamsburg? Is he a disappointed man today?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Not that I know of. He certainly didn't lobby with me. (Laughter) I guess that's whom he would lobby with, if he were. No. I think this is an issue between us and the EC, and that's only two of the eight parties that will be present at Williamsburg.

You see, for this kind of issue, curious to me anyhow as a new arrival in the government, places like England, France, Germany, and Italy that I used to think were important countries, they are not in on this kind of negotiation. The EC handles trade negotiations for all of them. It's a bilateral issue between us and the EC.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: But there is one point, and that is the EC representative discussing agricultural matters keeps watching over his shoulder blades to see what those countries are doing.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: That's certainly well within the EC -- they control it. But not on external relations.

O.K. Thanks very much.

(The briefing concluded at 2:35 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 22, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM E. BROCK, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
RICHARD E. LYNG, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,
AND
MARK PALMER, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The Briefing Room

4:35 P.M. EST

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Do you want to go straight to questions? Okay. Or do you have the statement?

I think the statement is self-explanatory. The President has announced that we have offered to renegotiate a new long-term agreement with the Soviet Union in an effort to reaffirm our reliability as a grain supplier. It's very simple, straightforward. We have not received a response.

Q I don't think that mike is on.

Q Ambassador Brock, in your --

Q We can't hear --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I probably am speaking a little low at the end of the day. I'm sorry. I apologize.

Q In your suggestions, in your proposals to renegotiate, are you making any specific proposals for changes in the present agreement?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, we haven't determined any suggested changes even among ourselves. We simply have offered to begin negotiations.

Q Is it correct to assume there were preliminary talks so that you have solid Soviet interest already expressed in this?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We have not received a response. The Soviets were advised of our willingness, I think, on the 7th of April. Is that right, Mark?

MR. PALMER: Yes.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: But we would assume that they would have an interest. We've had no talks.

Q What are you suggesting as the minimum Soviet purchase in the new long-term grain agreement?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We have made no decisions on any levels at all. We simply are expressing a willingness to talk.

Q Is it fair that you're going -- would like to increase it from the levels of the existing agreement?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think we would be prepared to consider that, but I think it would depend in part upon our analysis of their needs and their own, as well as the agreements that they have with other countries and what fit we might have within that context.

MORE

Q If I'm correct, the negotiations for this long-term agreement were freezed after martial law was imposed on Poland -- in Poland. Is this decision linked to the situation in Poland?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Do you want to respond to that, Mark?

MR. PALMER: No, it's not linked to the situation in Poland. We continue to be deeply concerned about developments in Poland. There is a review under way within the U.S. government about the situation in Poland. We expect to complete that review fairly soon and to consult with our allies. But our concern --

Q But, Mr. Palmer --

MR. PALMER: -- about the situation there remains -- we believe that the sanction -- this sanction has made its political point but that it no longer makes sense to continue it because a number of grain suppliers, beside the United States, are prepared to go ahead with long-term commitments and agreements to the Soviet Union in the grains field.

Q The President has said repeatedly --

Q But it does amount to lifting the sanctions, doesn't it? It does amount to lifting the sanctions.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: This was simply -- we simply suspended any further negotiations, but we -- I don't think you could categorize this as a sanction, in the category that certain other actions were.

Q Has there been any change in Soviet conduct that would make this -- make us enter into these negotiations?

MR. PALMER: No, there hasn't been. This is not related to Soviet political conduct. We remain deeply concerned about their conduct in various parts of the world. It is simply a decision to establish our credentials as a reliable supplier of grain.

Q Why shouldn't it be connected to Soviet conduct?

MR. PALMER: It is a step being taken in the context of grain trade, not a political step in the context of our relations with the Soviets.

Q -- the original step was political. The original step to suspend negotiations and not to discuss a long-term agreement was political. Why doesn't this have a political component? You can't say that it's not a political action, because they were connected from the start. Isn't that right?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: This suspension was taken as a -- one of a whole series of steps that were taken at that particular time. But we have consistently in this administration drawn, I think, a pretty clear distinction

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between normal commerical trade and other actions that do have political or sanction connotations. We simply are not -- have no intention of engaging in economic warfare with the Soviet Union.

And I think that would be the implication if you said no grain trade, which is generally commercially available. Other countries are signing these agreements, and under the circumstances, it makes sense for us to be available.

Q -- this likely to be seen in Moscow -- isn't this likely to be seen by Moscow as an indication that the Reagan administration, despite its rhetoric, is no longer interested in linkage between Soviet behavior in the world and the commerical relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think we have made throughout the two years of this President a very clear distinction between normal commercial relations on products that are generally available and other steps in the area of strategic materials and the like.

Q Like the pipeline?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, of course. Because, naturally, there is a clear distinction between the two.

Q What caused you to, at this time, decide to renegotiate on a long-term basis since the contract goes through -- what -- September of '83?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The contract goes to September the 30th, and if history is any teacher, these negotiations are not done in a matter of a day or a week. It takes some time for both sides to prepare their positions. And we do need some time, unless we get under the time pressure of the last week or so, which is a very difficult negotiating position.

But I think fundamentally the decision was made because we have been trying for some time to be sure that we establish this country as a reliable supplier. We damaged that reputation substantially when the former administration imposed an embargo. This administration has imposed no firm embargoes, has no intention of doing so, but we wanted to make the record clear about our reliability as a supplier.

Q Mr. Ambassador, would you follow the Carter precedent that, should there be an embargo at some point in the future, that grain, which is covered under the agreement, would not be included in that embargo?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think the way the President phrased it as early as '79 or '80 was that we, under his administration, would not single out any one group to bear the brunt of foreign policy.

Q That's not my question. My question is when President Carter imposed the grain embargo, he did not include in that embargo grain contracts which were covered by the long-term grain agreement. My question to you is would that principle continue to exist in any future long-term grain agreement with the Soviets?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think so. That's a principle that several administrations have adherred to. We do. And to add some strength to that, we have the change in the law. The Durenberger amendment was passed with contracts -- last fall.

Q Mr. Reagan said he wasn't going to renegotiate

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a long-term grain agreement with the Soviets. He said he wasn't going to do it until there was some fundamental changes in Poland, which included the end of martial law, releasing political prisoners and, I think, recognition of Solidarity. Have you -- How did you convince him that he ought to do this since those rather fundamental changes haven't been made yet?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think I should let --

Q You did convince him to change his mind, didn't you?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think Dave Lyng might want to talk about how he was convinced. I think the Department's been very active.

Q Could you answer one question, please, about the cost? The cost, how much was the cost?

Q Wait --

Q There's something on the floor, please.

MR. LYNG: We've continued to ship grain to the Soviets. We haven't shipped as much this year as we'd like to ship. They have purchased just the minimum in the one-year extension. And from an agricultural standpoint, we have lamented seeing this moving to the Argentines, to the Canadians, to a number of others.

And we think that by having a long-term agreement, we can regain at least a portion of that volume that we had before. The issue of continuing the grain shipments has not been a problem with this administration.

Q No, the question was negotiating a new, long-term agreement until there were fundamental changes in Poland. The President said there would be no new, long-term agreement until there were fundamental changes in Poland, which haven't occurred. How did you convince him to change his mind?

MR. LYNG: The importance of this to the nation and the statement says it, the President's statement. It

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is consistent with United States agriculture export policy. And it reflects our commitment to reestablish the U.S. as a reliable supplier.

Q That still does not address the question.

Poland was a central issue. Nothing has changed in Poland. Why the flip-flop?

MR. PALMER: I think there is no question in the minds of either Moscow or Warsaw how seriously we view the situation in Poland. We are quite convinced that they will not take this as a step that indicates any lessening of our concern. The sanctions that we still have in effect are powerful. They are continuing to have an important influence on developments. And so we do not, in any way, feel that this will be misread by the countries in the East or by our allies.

Q Then why make this thing in the first place if you do not intend to stand by it?

MR. PALMER: It was an important political signal. And it had an effect as a political signal.

Q You mean now, or before?

Q You said, it was an important political signal originally. And our changing our mind will not be misread by Moscow. Why is it not an important political signal when we, now, agree to negotiate on a long-term basis?

MR. LYNG: We simply felt that it had its impact. And in the last few months -- year, there have been a number of other countries that continue to provide these materials on a commercial basis, some slightly below normal commercial. And it simply had no validity as a tool in that exercise anymore. There are other sanctions that do have validity. But this one does not. So why not change that?

Q It seems that what you are saying is that the dollar is, ultimately, more important than our political concerns, that we were losing our markets. But now --

MR. LYNG: If I accepted your statement there, then the implications would be that we would want to begin to engage in, what some would call, economic warfare.

We have not suggested that at any point in time. The suspension of talks was part of a long list of efforts. We felt that it made its point. And its usefulness is, now, over.

Q Ambassador Brock, what about the quantities in the current agreement? Would you like to see increased quantities over the six-to-eight million tons that are now in the agreement?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think that depends entirely on the flavor of the negotiations and whether or not a different level would be in their interest as well as ours. That is part of the negotiating process. And I think we, clearly, would like to sell more. But whether we change the levels in the formal agreement or not, we have made no decision in that regard.

You had a question there. Yes, ma'am.

Q Yes. I wanted to ask about how much money would be involved? And, I think, the statement was drawn about Argentina and Canada. All those countries are selling grain to the Soviets. Does that mean that we will miss the bus?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: It could.

Q Or have we missed it?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think it is fair to state -- Dick can speak more eloquently than I. But if I recall when President Carter imposed the embargo about four years ago now, we had 70 percent of the Russian market, and have fallen -- as a consequence of that embargo -- to something like 20 percent. And, yes, we have taken a pretty tough lick. And we would like to get some of that back.

Q -- money, millions? Approximately.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Billions.

Q Billions of dollars to the economy.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

Q What kind of pressure have you received from the American farm community to reinstitute these negotiations?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: They have expressed a considerable interest. (Laughter.)

Q Who will represent the United States at the negotiations? And when and where will they be?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We have not made a decision as to who, individually, would represent. I have the responsibility, legally, to either do so or designate the person. But we have not made that decision.

Q Is the Agriculture Department sending a team to Moscow pretty soon to start looking into this -- in the next three or four weeks?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: They have consultations.

MR. LYNG: We did, in March.

Q That was the normal consultation?

MR. LYNG: The normal consultations in March. We did; yes.

Q Let me ask you one other question. How much grain do we sell in Poland?

MR. LYNG: Yes. We are selling no grain to Poland that I know of. There may be a very small amount of commercial transactions. Most of the business we did with Poland was with government credit guarantees. And we are not guaranteeing any Polish credit now.

Q Those sanctions are still in effect.

MR. LYNG: No. This is not sanctions. It is a question of no credit.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:51 P.M. EST

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ENROUTE TO CAIRO
April 24, 1983

QUESTION: Do you have any idea what you hope to accomplish in the troop withdrawal talks in Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hope that we can first arrive at an agreement between Israel and Lebanon that will provide for the withdrawal of the Israel forces from Lebanon, and obviously then we have to go on and work out with the Syrians and Lebanon and with the PLO their withdrawal consistent with the Israeli withdrawal schedule.

QUESTION: Are you optimistic in getting such an agreement with the Israelis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that it is a very do-able thing. Basically, that's because it seems to me it's very much in both the Israelis and the Lebanese interest and anyway, as a negotiator and mediator, you have to be optimistic, you have to think it will succeed, otherwise you won't get anywhere.

QUESTION: What are the major obstacles now as you are going out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are, of course, the two tracks in the sense of the negotiations -- they have to do on the one hand with security arrangements and on the other with the movement of goods and people and other aspects of the relationship between Lebanon and Israel. There has been a tremendous amount of accomplishment, at least as I see it, by Phil and Morrie in working with these and with the Israelis. But there are still difficult issues in each of those areas and so I'll try to identify them as clearly as I can and work with the parties to help in any way I can to get them resolved.

QUESTION: Have you been told, Mr. Secretary, that your presence on the scene will in fact produce a deal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, but I think that we all feel -- Phil does and the President does--that it's time for me to come out and give Phil a hand. I don't have any assurance from anybody that by coming out there will be an agreement. There are some tough issues.

QUESTION: Why this week, instead of two weeks ago?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are matters of judgment about that. I have been having it in my mind for quite some time and we have wanted to give all of the leeway possible for the parties themselves and working with Phil and Morrie to go as far as they possibly can. And I think the announcement of a Secretarial trip tends to put things on ice to a certain extent, awaiting your arrival, so we held off on it until now. And I think it is just our judgment that the issues have got to a point where the injection of a new face of something of that kind would be helpful. So here I go.

QUESTION: Are you prepared to stay, Mr. Secretary, until there is an agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I'm prepared to work at it as long as it seems there is a chance to accomplish something.

QUESTION: Including --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And I hope that there can be some accomplishment fairly reasonably soon.

QUESTION: Are you aiming primarily for an agreement in principle or are you going to try to work out an actual timetable, take it down to more fine points --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We'll go as far as we can go. I think that the creation of a timetable is something that follows, really, agreement on the conditions that will obtain once withdrawal has taken place. And that's a matter that we'll just have to see how that best emerges in the situation. Obviously that will be connected with what Syria will do.

QUESTION: Did you just talk by telephone before this trip with any of your counterparts in Israel or Egypt or Jordan before deciding on this particular timing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I've had lots of discussions with everybody in the region and our Ambassadors have, and Phil has, so we've had a great deal of feedback. I'm not, however, responding to a demand from my counterparts that I come out, although I think it is far to say they welcome the visit.

QUESTION: How concerned are you that even if you do get an arrangement with the Israelis that you will end up with nothing from the Syrians -- that they will no longer be willing to leave?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, anything is possible, but they have said that they will withdraw as the Israelis withdraw, as the Government of Lebanon requested them to withdraw. The Arab/ Fez statement set that out as an Arab understanding, all of those things were confirmed when the Lebanese met with them in New Delhi at the time of the non-aligned summit and so all those statements are there. But we have to have an Israeli agreement to call their card and I hope that we'll have it.

QUESTION: Would you be prepared to engage in a kind of shuttle diplomacy between Lebanon and Israel, if that's what it takes to get that deal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, sure. We are prepared to do whatever is necessary by way of movement back and forth.

QUESTION: And then if you have the deal, you would be prepared to fly to Damascus to see if it would work with President Assad?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Just how the movement around will go will depend on our feel of the situation and what we think the right tactic is. So, I don't want to try to predict that I'm going to go here, there, back and forth and so on. I'm going to decide as I go what the best next step is.

QUESTION: We haven't considered breaking away, for example, from the Lebanon situation to go to Jordan to try and revive the peace process as well, or do you want to do one after another in seriatim, rather than both together?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the peace process is very much on our minds and on the President's mind; however, we put, the President puts the priority on this trip on trying to work out a withdrawal plan from Lebanon. That's our priority and we will work at the peace process as well, and if in the course of my stay in the area, it's possible to meet with King Hussein and King Fahd, we want to do that.

QUESTION: Why would it not be possible?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no reason not to do it; both have let me know that I'm welcome and they would like to see me. I think they both feel that it is quite proper to place the emphasis on getting the Lebanon situation squared away if we can. And a trip to either of those capitals is something that I hope to work in, but I have to put the priority where the President has put it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, suppose you succeed and the Israelis and the Syrians do withdraw, what sort of force has to go in there to maintain the integrity of the Lebanese state in that situation? Do you have to beef up the Multinational Force, put in more Americans? How do you deal with that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all, a great effort has been made over the past months to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces and to the greatest degree possible, and ultimately totally, of course. It is up to the Lebanese to maintain law and order in their country. Just what help in any interim period will be needed from the Multinational Force or UNIFIL is something that will be part of the discussion and what the disposition of those forces would be. But General Cooley has told me when he was back the time the Lebanese and Israeli teams were in Washington and then since then we have continued to track it, that he believes that there has been a great deal of progress with the Lebanese armed forces. A big training effort has been going on and the state of that will have to be assessed and see what additional help may be needed.

QUESTION: How would you describe the state of Israeli-American relations? Clearly the Israeli security concerns are at the bottom of this. Can you give any more assurances or anything to the Israelis, you think, to make it easier for them to strike a deal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Israelis always take the position, and I think properly, that they have to be basically responsible for their own security. And you have to respect that. We are part of this negotiating process; we want to see it succeed and we certainly are prepared to stay with it--after an agreement and a leaving of the forces from Lebanon takes place--to be helpful. But just what role the United States might play is going to be part of this discussion.

QUESTION: Can you talk about the Haddad issue a little bit? Is he an insurmountable obstacle in the sense that Israelis are not going to yield from their demands that he remain in charge of security in southern Lebanon? And if they do insist on that, is there any way a deal can be cut?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If you say it is an insurmountable obstacle, we might as well turn around and go back, but it is certainly a major issue and just how it can be resolved, I don't know. But obviously, it's one of the things that has to be worked at if we are going to get a resolution of the issue.

QUESTION: Are you going out with any ideas of your own to try to resolve that problem?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have ideas but my first idea is to listen to people and hear what their ideas are and what the reasons are for the positions they take and sometimes, if you understand the reasons clearly, you can find other ways to serve those reasons. But at any rate, that's the way I will approach it.

QUESTION: So you are not taking any specific plan or anything like that? You'll listen first and then if you can make suggestions later, do that.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not coming here with a preconceived American plan to try to sell the people. I'm coming here, having followed these negotiations very closely, discussed them a lot with Phil and Morrie as they have been back, discussed them with the Lebanese and the Israelis directly as they have been in the United States. So I start with a lot of knowledge; but still, being there and listening to people tell you their point of view and what their problems are and what they are seeking. is I think an indispensable step in anything like this. Anything that really sticks and really works, has to emerge out of the feelings and the desires of the parties. I think that is always the case in any bargaining situation.

QUESTION: How is it that you don't already know these things after all of the myriad contacts which have been going on for the past two years?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a question of knowing alright, but hearing people talk about it again; and I suppose there is always a difference between what you know and what you realize as things get driven home to you. I told that little story on knowing and realize once and I won't repeat it. But I think there is a nice distinction between those two notions of understanding and no doubt being there, listening to people in their home environment and hearing them in a setting where there are a number around who talk, argue with each other, it helps to really get an appreciation of their views.

QUESTION: In that sense then, is this trip overdue? Should it have been made earlier?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, if I had thought so, I would have made it earlier and one can argue it. We argued it back and forth several times and felt that there was headway being made and the process ought to continue as it was and headway did continue being made. But it has been our judgment and Phil's judgment that now is the time to do it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how important is resolving the Lebanon issue in your mind to the possibility of the broader Middle East peace plan having any hopes? (sic)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's important but these two things are not directly connected with each other. They are connected in people's minds to a certain degree, but they are separate issues. I think each, to the extent that headway is made on either of them, tends to reinforce the other and so it would be helpful. But the two processes are independent.

QUESTION: Are you hearing any ideas on this trip about how to resuscitate the Reagan plan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know that resuscitation is the word to use; if you think of a person who needs resuscitation, it's a pretty bleak picture. I think that the fundamentals of the ideas are valid, necessary, basically welcome to people and that remains so and so we have to just keep working at it. But I just remind you all that there was in the United States a very broad support for the President's initiative, that has been true around the world and there have been major changes in attitudes of key arab countries; and of course, while it was rejected by the Prime Minister in Israel, all in all a lot of the ideas are very valid and I think interesting to people there, so that remains so.

QUESTION: Can you talk about your Egypt visit -- the two days or so in Cairo -- what is the purpose of the stop in Cairo?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, Egypt is one of the Camp David partners so we thought that's a good place to start. Second, we have an important bilateral relationship with Egypt and so I'll have some discussions about that. Third, the Egyptians are close observers of this scene and they have thought a lot about the Lebanon situation and so I'll invite their views. So for these reasons, it seemed worthwhile to start in Cairo, but in addition I wanted to have a meeting of our Ambassadors in the region. You probably all know them; they are a very talented group of people. They seldom get together as individuals, and while I know them all and I've met with them all, I've never sat with them as a group and discussed -- interacted. So I think that's going to be quite worthwhile and I expect to spend a fair amount of time at it, as well as taking time specifically on the tactics of our negotiations approach with those that I am going to be working with directly. So (a) it gives us a chance to talk with the Egyptians directly and (b) it's a good setting for this Ambassadorial meeting that I expect to learn a lot from.

QUESTION: Can you give us some sense of a calendar, Mr. Secretary, that is to say, what do you see in terms of days at the outset Cairo, Israel, Lebanon and whether we, in fact, will be going to the OECD meetings in Paris on this trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I expect that we will get to Cairo, I think, in the early afternoon on Monday Cairo time, and expect to have meetings there that I described through Tuesday evening and probably go to Israel Wednesday morning. Then we will just have to go on from there and see how quickly it goes. Certainly, I want to go to Beirut very quickly, partly to talk to the Lebanese but also to visit the people in our Embassy and give my support and reassurances to them. They have been through a lot and they are all heroes out there from the descriptions that I've had and they deserve our support and they are going to get it.

But as far as how long this is going to take, which is your question on OECD, I don't know and we will just have to see how it goes.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about the articles that have been rather critical of you and the Administration for essentially not accomplishing anything? Does it annoy you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, nobody likes criticism but I guess it comes with the territory. I have to do my best and do what I think is right and then everyone can make their judgments. Everyone is entitled to their point of view, even me.

QUESTION: Do you think you have had a chance to do your best or do you think people have taken advantage, the time, the transition sort of presented you with a sort of fait accompli in certain areas? I'm thinking mostly of arms control.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think I've had great cooperation and a wonderful reception in the Administration and in the Congress. I've been treated very well, as a person; and, insofar subject of arms control is concerned, I've been getting into that more and more and I think I don't have any trouble getting my views to the President and getting a good hearing and I think with some effect. So obviously there are a lot of positions that have been taken and on the whole I think very good positions.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am surprised. I'm not complaining, I don't -- but I'm surprised about the comments that I'm invisible because there are some weeks when I feel all that's happened to me all week long is I've been sitting in front of Congressional committees answering questions and it's a highly visible kind of activity.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I think they want to give you a little dinner.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll have to have John -- we should tabulate the number of meetings and what not that we have had -- I've never done that.

QUESTION: I do --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You do? Well, I'd be interested to see how that looks.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in connection with the President's Middle East plan, some of us have the feeling that your strategy now is not for you to become personally involved in sort of an on-the-spot salesmanship role but rather for the Arab world to decide on its own that it wants to come in. Could you sort that out, please?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President feels, and I certainly agree with him, that there is a very good set of proposals on the table, both in a kind of immediate sense, like you take a photograph of them, and also in a kind of historical sense in that there has been an evolution on things that in its tortuous way nevertheless spells quite a lot of progress. So all of that is there and it is our feeling that it deserves careful analysis by everybody -- Arabs, Israelis -- and that as they do that, I think they will come to recognize that it is a very good approach. Now obviously, there is a first step of an Arab leader, presumably King Hussein, coming to the peace table and sitting down and starting to talk and until you start talking, you can't arrive at any kind of an agreement. Now what positions people take when they talk is up to them. We've tried to say what positions we'll take. They'll take, I'm sure, widely divergent positions as will the Israelis. But that's the way you begin. And the first thing is to get people to sit down and talk and what that stands for is a really vital affirmation of what everybody now says -- mainly that it is time to come to grips with what is necessary to get a more general peace in the Middle East, or at least this aspect of the problems of the Middle East.

QUESTION: But will you personally engage in salesmanship of the President's plan with King Hussein or are you going to stay this side concentrating on troop withdrawal from Lebanon and let the Arab world reach its own consensus which is what you've been suggesting in recent interviews?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know that we have that much more to say. We've described -- we've responded to questions and I hope we have also convinced people that there are certain positions the President is going to take and he isn't going to change them and that it is up to people to decide to go ahead into the negotiations. But we will sit and talk and do that a great deal -- to the extent that it is helpful.

QUESTION: What makes you think the decision they take isn't their decision - in other words, that there is room for reassessment of the decision they have made?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, it's just as I read the cable traffic around, there seems to be a lot of that kind of head scratching feeling that says maybe we are letting a pretty good train go out of the station, and we don't know when the next one is going to come along.

QUESTION: Can you tell us one thing, Mr. Secretary, about your remarks to The Washington Post that if Hussein accepts that you are not asking him to actually sit down at the table to negotiate until the Administration succeeds in getting a freeze on settlements on the West Bank. Could you give that sequentially?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Sure. First of all, the President in his September 1 speech called for a freeze on settlements. And we have continued to emphasize the desirability of that and I think we all know the rationale for that in terms of changing the factual situation that you are negotiating about. So, there is that. Now, that is clearly of great concern to anybody that would come to the negotiating table understandably. And the President has repeatedly assured everybody that he has taken that position and he is going to continue to take that position. And various interlocutors constantly say are you going to stay with your positions? And the President says, yes, I'm going to stay with my position. Now, in our discussions with King Hussein, we tried to make a distinction between a statement that he might make explicitly saying"I am ready to sit down with Israel and negotiate about peace"or however it would be phrased. And the actual day when you sit there and put your feet under the table and start talking. And I think in terms of discussions with the Israelis about a phrase of however the settlements issue should be treated that you are in a lot stronger position if it is clear that the key Arab leader has committed himself to sit down and talk. I think it changes the situation so we tried to make that distinction with King Hussein and I think that he could see that there was at that point.

QUESTION: But would you not expect King Hussein to actually join the negotiations until a freeze is in place?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What the President told King Hussein was that he wouldn't press him to actually sit down to negotiate until a freeze, When you look at that in detail, there are a gigantic number of things that a freeze could mean, so it's a concept that sounds simple but it has a lot of ambiguity to it. But at any rate, we would certainly work on it very hard.

QUESTION: What weapons do you think you have in your arsenal going into this that you are willing to tell us about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am the Secretary of State. I don't have weapons and I don't have an arsenal. I just have words and whatever persuasive powers I can bring to the situation. Thank you very much.

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E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT'S
- - DISCUSSION WITH TURKISH JOURNALISTS, ANKARA,
- - APRIL 25, 1983

BEGIN TEXT.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: LET ME BEGIN BY TELLING YOU WHY I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SAY SOMETHING ON-THE-RECORD. IN WASHINGTON, OF COURSE, OUR EMBASSIES REPORT BACK TO US WHAT IS HAPPENING IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES AND NORMALLY WE GET REPORTS OF WHAT THE PRESS IS WRITING.
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COURSE, HAVE NOT REALLY REFLECTED THE REAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO SECURING A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE FOR TURKEY IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE. I KNOW, THERE HAVE BEEN STORIES SUGGESTING THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SOMEHOW SHIFTED ITS POSITION ON THE 7 TO 10 RATIO. THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER STORIES THAT HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT BEEN FULLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING A FULL INCREASE, THAT IS THE 755 MILLION DOLLARS WITHIN THE FISCAL YEAR 1984 BUDGET. THERE WERE EVEN SUGGESTIONS, I THINK, THAT THERE WERE OFFICIALS ABSENT AT IMPORTANT CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS WHERE A GOOD CASE COULD HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THESE INCREASES. WHAT I WANT TO TELL YOU HERE AND NOW IS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION IS FULLY COMMITTED TO MAKING THE BEST POSSIBLE ARGUMENT WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS FOR SECURING THE FULL FISCAL YEAR 1984 SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST THAT WE CAME FORWARD WITH. I JUST WANT TO REMIND YOU THAT THE INCREASE SOUGHT IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 FOR TURKEY IS THE SINGLE LARGEST INCREASE OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, AND I THINK THAT THIS IS A FAIR REFLECTION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION'S PRIORITIES AND COMMITMENTS TO HELPING THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT STRENGTHEN IT'S OWN STRATEGIC POSITION IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. FRANKLY, I DON'T THINK THAT DESCRIPTIONS AND ARTICLES HAVE ACCURATELY DESCRIBED THE TIME AND EFFORT THAT AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN TO FULFILL COMMITMENTS WE HAVE MADE TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. I THINK THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT AND I THINK THAT THE TURKISH PEOPLE NEED TO ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: THERE IS A GENERAL IDEA THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS

USED TURKEY FOR BLACKMAILING GREECE. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO CONVINCE US THAT THIS IS WRONG?

A: I THINK A CHARGE LIKE THAT IS TOTALLY PREPOSTEROUS. WE DON'T USE TURKEY TO BLACKMAIL GREECE AND WE DON'T USE GREECE TO BLACKMAIL TURKEY. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUESTED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 DID NOT COME OUT OF THIN AIR. IT REFLECTS CONSULTATIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD UNDERWAY WITH THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT FOR OVER TWO YEARS. IT REFLECTS A CAREFUL PLANNING PROCESS AND IT REFLECTS THE FACT THAT WE

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BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY SHARE VERY IMPORTANT MUTUAL INTERESTS AND WE ARE MAKING THE CASE FOR A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN AID FOR TURKEY ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE: THE NEED THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ON TURKEY GEOPOLITICAL POSITION, AND THE FACT THAT WE AND THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD. THAT'S THE REAL EXPLANATION. IT'S A COMPLEX EXPLANATION. IT'S NOT THE EASY EXPLANATION. IT'S BEEN VERY EASY TO MAKE THESE ARGUMENTS, BUT IT'S NOT THE TRUTH.

Q: WHICH WERE THE TRUTHS THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS USED TO LOBBY AT THE CONGRESS FOR TURKEY?

A: THERE IS NOT ONE SHRED OF TRUTH IN THAT CHARGE. THE STORY IS A SEQUEL OF A SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING WHICH HAD BEEN CALLED TO DISCUSS AID REQUESTS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES. THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN A DISCUSSION FOR AID FOR TURKEY. THERE HAD BEEN AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THAT SUBCOMMITTEE AND THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE TURKISH AID REQUESTED WAS NOT GOING TO COME UP AND WAS NOT GOING TO BE A SUBJECT. AND WHEN CONGRESSMAN [illegible] RAISED THE QUESTION OF TURKISH AID THAT WAS AGAINST THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, AND AGAINST THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. WE WILL MAKE SURE THAT EVERY TIME THAT WE ARE AWARE THAT

TURKISH AID IS GOING TO BE DISCUSSED IN CONGRESS WE WILL HAVE PEOPLE THERE WHO CAN DEFEND THAT REQUEST. NOW, I HAVE A NUMBER OF RESPONSIBILITIES IN MY OWN PERSONAL JOB: I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE, I HAVE TO DEAL WITH EASTERN EUROPE, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, I HAVE SPENT SEVERAL HOURS EVERY DAY PERSONALLY, AND WITH TRIPS TO CAPITOL HILL MEETING WITH SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN. MY COLLEAGUES IN THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT HAVE ALSO DONE THE SAME AND WE HAVE A TEAM OF PEOPLE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION FROM SEVERAL AGENCIES WHO ARE WORKING EVERY DAY WITH A LEGISLATIVE PLAN TO SECURE OUR FISCAL YEAR 1984 REQUEST.

Q: DO YOU MEAN TO SAY THAT WHEN THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AID OF 110 MILLION DOLLARS TO TURKEY WAS BROUGHT UP IT WAS NOT DONE BY THE COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN BUT IT WAS DONE BY

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MR. SOLARZ?

A: IT WAS DONE BY MR. SOLARZ AND THERE WAS NO PRIOR WARNING WHATSOEVER THAT HE WAS GOING TO RAISE IT. IT CAUGHT US TOTALLY BY SURPRISE.

Q: CAN YOU GO INTO DETAILS OF THAT?

A: I HAVE GONE INTO THE DETAILS. HE MADE AN INDEPENDENT DECISION ON HIS OWN TO RAISE THAT ISSUE. NOW, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO HAVE PEOPLE EVERYWHERE AND EVERY TIME. BUT, WHEN WE KNOW THAT THE TURKISH AID IS GOING TO CONTESTED AND GOING TO BE DISCUSSED, I CAN GUARANTEE YOU THAT WE WILL HAVE THE PEOPLE THERE TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE CASE. IF YOU DON'T BELIEVE ME, I'LL BE VERY HAPPY TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE COPIES OF THE TESTIMONY THAT I HAVE PERSONALLY GIVEN, THE TESTIMONIES THAT OTHER SENIOR

OFFICIALS HAVE GIVEN, AND MY APPOINTMENTS THAT I'VE HAD WITH SEVERAL SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN DISCUSSING THIS PROBLEM WITH THEM.

Q: I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THEM VERY MUCH. HOW SUCCESSFUL, MR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DO YOU CONSIDER YOURSELF AND THE ADMINISTRATION IN THESE EFFORTS OF CONVINCING THE CONGRESSMEN AND THE SENATORS?

A: I THINK THAT WE WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

Q: YOU WILL?

A: I THINK THAT WE HAVE MADE EXCELLENT HEADWAY. I THINK THAT YOU HAVE TO VIEW SOME OF THESE ISSUES IN SOME PERSPECTIVE. I THINK IT'S AN IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS TO VIEW THESE ISSUES IN PERSPECTIVE. IT WAS LESS THAN 10 YEARS AGO THAT WE HAD A TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN WHICH THERE WAS AN ARMS EMBARGO MANDATED BY THE CONGRESS ON ALL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY AND NOW I'M TALKING ABOUT A SITUATION IN WHICH THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS PROPOSING THE SINGLE LARGEST INCREASE TO ANY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD AND IT WANTS TO ALLOT THAT MONEY FOR TURKEY. I CONSIDER THAT A FAIRLY DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENT AND I BELIEVE WE ARE MAKING HEADWAY IN

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CONVINCING THE CONGRESS OF THE NEED TO PROVIDE TURKEY WITH THE HELP IT NEEDS TO PROTECT IT'S OWN VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST.

Q: WHAT MADE THIS BIG CHANGE?

A: I THINK THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS. I THINK THERE IS NEW RESPECT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WORK THAT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS DONE TO IMPROVE THE TURKISH ECONOMY. IT'S COMMITMENT TO STRENGTHENING TURKEY'S DEFENSES AND ITS COMMITMENT TO RESTORE CIVILIAN GOVERN-

MENT. THAT'S ONE FACTOR. ANOTHER FACTOR IS THAT TURKEY GEOGRAPHICALLY IS SITUATED IN A CENTRAL STRATEGIC LOCATION AND [illegible] STRONG TURKEY IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTEREST OF THE WEST. I DON'T WANT TO BRAG TOO MUCH, BUT I THINK THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS MORE POWER TO CONVINCE [illegible] NUMBER OF PEOPLE ON THE HILL THAT STRONG U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS ARE VERY MUCH IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD YOU. THERE WILL [illegible] DIFFICULTIES AND ONE THING THAT THE PRESS MUST UNDERSTAND IS THAT WE HAVE A VERY COMPLEX PROCESS OF [illegible] AND APPROVING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES WHICH HAS [illegible] ONE COMPLEX ALMOST EVERY YEAR AND WE WILL HAVE TO [illegible] THIS EFFORT THROUGH THE SPRING AND INTO THE [illegible] WE ARE COMMITTED TO DOING THAT. WE HAVEN'T COMPLETELY SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING EVERYONE OF THE [illegible] OF OUR REQUEST BUT WE ARE COMMITTED TO DO SO. RONALD REAGAN DOESN'T MAKE DECISION THAT HE DOESN'T STAND BY. THAT'S NOT THE CHARACTER OF THE MAN. HE STANDS BY HIS SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST TO CONGRESS FOR TURKEY.

Q: WHAT HAVE YOU OBSERVED ON THE TURKISH SIDE OF YOUR MEETINGS HERE IN ANKARA?

A: I THINK MY MEETINGS CONFIRM MUCH OF WHAT I ALREADY KNEW. I WAS LUCKY TO MEET A GROUP OF EXTREMELY EXPERIENCED AND WISE MEN WHO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING OF TURKEY'S SECURITY INTEREST, WHO ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO THE NATO ALLIANCE, WHO ARE STRONGLY COMMITTED TO STRENGTHENING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF TURKEY, AND THAT'S NOT JUST ITS MILITARY STRENGTH AND ITS CONOMY, AND ARE COMMITTED TO STABILITY AND PEACEFUL CHANGE IN TURKEY. I

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COME AWAY WITH A SENSE OF VERY REAL OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-TURKISH RELATIONS. I BELIEVE THAT U.S.

TURKISH RELATIONS NOW ARE BETTER THAN THEY HAVE BEEN IN A GENERATION, AND I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SAY IN PART IT'S BECAUSE OF THAT MAN SITTING BEHIND YOU, AMBASSADOR STRAUSZ-HUPE.

Q: CAN WE GET YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE 7 TO 10 RATIO?

A: IT'S VERY SIMPLE. OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED. WE DON'T ACCEPT OR ENDORSE THE CONCEPT OF 7 TO 10 RATIO. WE DON'T ACCEPT OR ENDORSE ANY ARTIFICIAL RATIOS FOR MAKING A SECURITY ASSISTANCE DECISION. WE THINK THOSE DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE ON THEIR OWN MERITS.

Q: BUT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S REQUEST TO INCREASE THE AID, THE MILITARY AID TO GREECE, IS FITTING THE 7 TO 10 RATIO. HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT?

A: I DON'T THINK IN FACT IT IS.

Q: WHY NOT?

A: IT REALLY DOES NOT FIT THE 7 TO 10 RATIO.

Q: IT'S 500 MILLION DOLLARS THIS ONE AND THE OTHER ONE IS 755 MILLION DOLLARS...

A: OUR REQUEST IS 755 MILLION, AND IN OUR REQUEST FOR GREECE IS 280 MILLION. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO ADD AN ADDITIONAL AMOUNT FOR GREECE UP TO 500 MILLION DOLLARS. IF AND WHEN WE SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING A SUCCESSFUL BASE AGREEMENT. OUR DESIRE IS NOT TO BASE A SECURITY ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR TURKEY ON WHAT GREECE ACHIEVES OR VICE-A-VERSA. OUR DESIRE IS TO ACCOMPLISH A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE THIS YEAR IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY. THAT IS OUR PRIMARY GOAL.

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Q: DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CYPRUS ISSUE CAN BE SOLVED BY INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS? WHAT WILL BE YOUR STAND IN UNITED NATIONS?

A: WE HOPE THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WILL RESULT IN PROGRESS ON CYPRUS. WE SEE THE INTERCOMMUNAL PROCESS AS THE BEST FRAMEWORK FOR MAKING PROGRESS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. I CAN'T ANTICIPATE WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WILL BE AT THE U.N., BECAUSE IT'S TOO EARLY TO SPECULATE. BUT WE BELIEVE AND SUPPORT THE PROCESS OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE OPPOSED TO "INTERNATIONALIZING" THE CPRUS PROBLEM.

Q: HOW DO YOU ANSWER THE CONGRESSIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE'S ATTITUDE? THEY ARE TRYING TO LINK AID TO TURKEY TO THE SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE TURKISH TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND.

A: WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY SUCH LINKAGE. THAT'S OUR POSITION.

Q: AS THE ADMINISTRATION...

A: AS AN ADMINISTRATION. I CAN ONLY REPRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION. I WOULD NEVER TAKE ON MY PART TO SPEAK FOR THE CONGRESS. THERE ARE FEW PEOPLE THAT BRAVE.

Q: HAVE YOU ALREADY BEGUN TO MODERNIZE THE JOINT BASES IN TURKEY? THE AIRPORTS?

A: WELL, I WILL JUST SIMPLY SAY THAT THESE ARE TURKISH BASES AND IT'S REALLY APPROPRIATE ONLY FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO COMMENT ON THOSE BASES.

Q: THERE IS A DEBATE ON BUYING SOME AIRPLANES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND IT COSTS NEARLY 5 BILLION DOLLARS AND SO TURKEY EXPECTS SOME CREDIT FACILITIES FROM THE UNITED STATES. WHAT IS YOUR POINT OF VIEW ABOUT THIS?

A: OUR DESIRE IS TO ASSIST IF WE CAN IN MODERNIZING THE TURKISH AIR FORCE. WE HOPE WE CAN ASSIST. WE THINK IT'S

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A LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENT.

Q: MR. BURT, IS IT RIGHT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS ALREADY ASKED TURKEY TO COOPERATE IN SAUDI ARABIA IN PRODUCING JET FIGHTERS IN TURKEY?

A: THE UNITED STATES WAS ASKED?

Q: SO FAR AS THE AIRCRAFT DEAL CERTAIN AMOUNT, OR A CERTAIN PART OF IT?

A: NO, IT IS NOT RIGHT.

Q: MR. ASSISTANT SECRETARY, ACCORDING TO SOME CALCULATIONS, AMERICAN, AND I THINK OFFICIAL, TURKISH ARMED FORCES NEED 10 BILLION DOLLARS OVER 13 YEARS TO UPGRADE THE MATERIAL CAPIBILITY OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO MINIMUM NATO STANDARDS?

A: ARE YOU ASKING ME IF THAT IS CORRECT? I HAVEN'T SEEN THOSE STATISTICS. I THINK THAT THE TURKISH MILITARY DOES HAVE VERY SIGNIFICANT REQUIREMENTS, AND I THINK IT WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE PROGRAM TO MEET THOSE REQUIREMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO ASSIST TO THE BEST OF ITS ABILITY.

Q: UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER, WHAT IS YOUR ESTIMATE? I MEAN, WILL THAT MONEY BE ABLE TO BE RAISED?

A: AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE FOR TURKEY, AND WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE IT.

Q: WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF THE CLAUSE, IF IT STICKS TO THE AID WHICH TIES THE AID TO WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM CYPRUS? WHAT ARE THE CHANCES OF THIS CLAUSE TURNING INTO A NEW EMBARGO?

A: I AM NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ON WHAT THE CONGRESS MIGHT DO, BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL FIRMLY, I WANT TO UNDERLINE 'FIRMLY', RESIST ANY MOVE OF THAT SORT.

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Q: HAVE YOU GOT ANY SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO GENERAL EVREN?

A: NO. MY MAIN PURPOSE FOR BEING HERE WAS TO ACHIEVE SOME FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION HERE. YOU HAVE AN EXCELLENT AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WITH WHOM I HAVE ESTABLISHED VERY CLOSE PERSONAL TIES. I TALK TO HIM ALMOST EVERY DAY. BUT, THERE IS NOTHING LIKE COMING HERE LISTENING TURKISH OFFICIALS FIRST-HAND AND IT WILL HELP ME IN A VARIETY OF WAYS TO MY JOB MORE EFFECTIVELY WHEN I RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

Q: ARE YOU TAKING ANY MESSAGES FROM HERE TO GREECE OR CYPRUS?

A: NO. I AM NOT A MESSAGE CARRIER.

Q: MAY I ASK WHY YOU OPPOSED TO 7 TO 10 RATIO?

A: WELL, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FOR ONE THING, IT'S A RATIO OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE, NOT OF WHAT IS SPENT BY THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR SECURITY. AS YOU KNOW, GREECE IS IN A BETTER POSITION TO PURCHASE MILITARY EQUIPMENT COMMERCIALLY THAN TURKEY IS. BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, WHAT WE BASE OUR DECISIONS ON ARE THE REQUIREMENTS AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES AS SIGNED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. NO TWO COUNTRIES HAVE THE SAME REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THOSE REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES CHANGE OVER TIME IN VIEW OF THE THREAT AND ANY KIND OF ARTIFICIAL RATIO, WHATEVER THAT RATIO IS, IS NOT A LOGICAL WAY TO DECIDE WHAT THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE NEEDS OF ANY ONE COUNTRY ARE. WE ARE OPPOSED TO ARTIFICIAL RATIOS IN PRINCIPAL, NOT SIMPLY BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, BUT, AROUND THE WORLD, BECAUSE WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT, PARTICULARLY IN A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF FACES SERIOUS BUDGETARY PRESSURES, IT MAKES SENSE TO BASE DECISIONS ON A RATIO.

Q: WHAT ARE YOU PLANNING TO DO TO BREAKDOWN THIS RATIO IF THE ADMINISTRATION IS SO MUCH AGAINST THIS RATIO?

A: WHAT WE ARE PLANNING TO DO IS TO WORK AS VIGOROUSLY

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AS WE POSSIBLY CAN TO ACHIEVE THE REQUEST THAT WE HAVE SENT TO THE HILL FOR TURKEY, AND ALSO TO WORK AND HOPEFULLY ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT WITH ATHENS. WE ARE CARRYING OUT THAT PROGRAM INDEPENDENTLY. THERE IS NO RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO AND THERE SHOULDN'T BE.

Q: BUT, THE EXTRA AID FOR GREECE IS COMPLETELY CONDITIONAL ON A SUCCESSFUL BASES AGREEMENT...

A: THAT'S EXACTLY RIGHT.

Q: WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S NOTION ON A BALANCE OF

POWER IN THE AEGEAN BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE?

A: I THINK THE BEST WAY TO ANSWER THAT IS THAT FOR ME IT IS STRANGE TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF A BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY, BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.. SO, IT IS AN ARTIFICIAL CONCEPT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS TO THINK ABOUT THE BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. THAT'S WHERE THE ALLIANCE FACES A THREAT AND WE FORGET THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SYSTEMATIC, UNPROVOKED MILITARY BUILD-UP BY THE SOVIET UNION THAT THREATENS EVERY COUNTRY IN THE ALLIANCE. ONE OF THE MOST FORMIDABLE ASPECTS OF THAT MILITARY BUILD-UP ARE SS-20 MISSILES WHICH CAN STRIKE TURKEY IN 15 MINUTES DEPLOYED EAST OF THE URALS. THIS IS A SERIOUS THREAT AND ONLY THE ALLIANCE WORKING TOGETHER CAN SOLVE IT. WE HOPE TO SOLVE IT THROUGH A SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION IN GENEVA, BUT IF WE DON'T SOLVE IT, WE WILL BEGIN DEPLOYMENT AT THE END OF THE YEAR OF U.S. MISSILES. SO THAT WESTERN SECURITY CAN BE PROTECTED AGAINST THIS UNPROVCKED MILITARY BUILD-UP.

Q: CONCERNING THE SS-20S BEHIND THE URALS DIRECTED TOWARDS TURKEY, COULD STATIONING COUNTER-MISSILES IN TURKEY BE ONE OF THE WAYS OF COUNTERING THAT THREAT?

A: WE HAVE NO PLANS WHATSOEVER TO DEPLOY CRUISE MISSILES OR PERSHING-II MISSILES IN TURKEY. THE ALLIANCE TOOK A DECISION IN DECEMBER 1979 AND FIVE COUNTRIES WERE ASSIGNED THE ROLE OF DEPLOYING THESE MISSILES AND TURKEY IS NOT ONE OF THEM.

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Q: WHAT IS THE RATIO OF TURKEY DRAWING MORE DANGER BECAUSE OF MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES THE TEN AIRFIELDS TO BE MODERNIZED IN TURKEY, ESPECIALLY THE ONES IN EASTERN ANATOLIA?

BURT: I QUESTION THE BASIC ASSUMPTION OF YOUR QUESTION THAT SOMEHOW U.S.-TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION INCREASES DANGER TO TURKEY. I THINK, U.S.-TURKISH SECURITY COOPERATION LESSENS THE DANGER. I THINK THAT IS WHY TURKEY IS A MEMBER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE. THERE IS MORE SECURITY AND COOPERATION THAN BY A COUNTRY STANDING ALONE. SO, I REJECT THE PREMISE. WE DON'T ASK FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR TURKEY TO ACHIEVE OUR DEMANDS. WE SEE SECURITY BENEFITS IN A STRONG, STABLE, SECURE TURKEY IN AND OF ITSELF. IT'S NOT FOR US TO DEFINE TURKEY'S SECURITY ROLE. THAT'S UP TO TURKEY. THAT'S UP TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND ITS LEADERSHIP.

QUESTION: AT WHAT STAGE ARE THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GREECE OVER THE BASES AGREEMENTS?

BURT: WELL, THEY ARE CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS. SO, I CAN'T GO INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL. BUT, THERE ARE IMPORTANT ISSUES STILL TO BE RESOLVED. WE HOPE WE WILL ACHIEVE AN AGREEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES. WE THINK IT'S IN THE INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE TO ACHIEVE SUCH AN AGREEMENT. BUT, WE STILL HAVE SOME ISSUES THAT ARE UNDER DISCUSSION.

QUESTION: HAS THE U.S. CONSENTED TO THE CLOSURE OF THE BASE NEAR ATHENS?

BURT: THERE YOU ARE ASKING A QUESTION THAT I PREFER NOT TO ANSWER, SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY CAN MAKE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS MORE DIFFICULT.

QUESTION: HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING NEW IN YOUR CONTACTS IN ANKARA THIS TIME?

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BURT: WELL, I THINK FOR ONE THING I LEARNED THAT THE TURKISH PUBLIC DOES NOT UNDERSTAND HOW COMMITTED THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS TO WORKING FOR AN INCREASE IN THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE BUDGET. I AM GLAD THAT I CAN TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN OUR COMMITMENT ON THIS QUESTION, WHAT.AN IMPORTANT PRIORITY IT IS.

QUESTION: YOU MEAN THE OFFICIALS YOU EXPLAINED...

BURT: I DIDN'T MEAN TO EXPLAIN TO YOUR OFFICIALS...BUT, JUST LISTENING TO YOUR QUESTIONS, I OBVIOUSLY NEEDED TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU.

QUESTION: IN CASE OF FAILURE ON THE BASES AGREEMENT WITH GREECE ARE YOU SUGGESTING THERE WILL BE A DEMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO PUT SOME MORE JOINT BASES INTO TURKEY?

BURT: THAT'S A VERY GOOD QUESTION BUT I LEARNED LONG AGO NEVER TO ANSWER A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. AS I SAID BEFORE, WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS.

Z OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE, PAPANDREOU ASKED A GUARANTEE FROM THE UNITED STATES AGAINST TURKEY. BUT, AFTER HE UNDERSTOOD THAT HE WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO GET A GUARANTEE AS A LETTER OR ANYTHING HE SAID, STRENGTHENING GREECE IN MILITARY WAYS WOULD BE A GUARANTEE FOR GREECE AGAINST TURKEY. SO, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS STRENGTHENED GREECE. DOES IT MEAN A GUARANTEE TO GREECE.

BURT: OF COURSE, IT DOES NOT. WE DO NOT GUARANTEE ONE

ALLY AGAINST ANOTHER. A VERY SIMPLE POSITION. ALLIES DO NOT NEED GUARANTEES.

QUESTION: IF THIS 7 TO 10 RATIO HOLDS, LET US ASSUME TURKEY DECIDES THAT IT WILL LIMIT HER RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE COMMON DEFENSE AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON DEFENSE WITH THE SAME RATIO. WOULD IT BE A VERY BIG SURPRISE IN WASHINGTON?

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BURT: WELL, AGAIN, YOU ARE ASKING ME A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION. I THINK WE WOULD REGRET ANY SUCH DECISION BY TURKEY, BUT THAT DECISION IS TURKEY'S TO MAKE.

QUESTION: DID YOU HAVE A FEELING THAT MIGHT HAPPEN WHILE SPEAKING WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS?

BURT: ABSOLUTELY NOT. NO ONE MADE ANY SUCH SUGGESTION. I FOUND FULL TURKISH SUPPORT FOR FULFILLING TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE ALLIANCE COMPLETELY.

QUESTION: HOW WAS THE GENERAL FEELING OF THE...

BURT: LET ME SAY SOMETHING. TURKEY IS A VERY GOOD AND LOYAL ALLY. MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT. A VERY GOOD AND LOYAL ALLY. AND IT ALWAYS HAS BEEN A GOOD AND LOYAL ALLY WE UNDERSTAND THAT.

QUESTION: IS THERE AN AWARENESS OF THIS IN CONGRESS?

BURT: I THINK THE CONGRESS IS BECOMING AWARE OF IT. WE ARE HELPING CONGRESS TO BECOME AWARE OF IT.

QUESTION: I HEARD THAT THE DEFENSE MINISTER ASKED YOU WHEN YOU MENTIONED THAT IN YOUR TALK THIS MORNING, HE ASKED WHY YOU KEPT REPEATING THIS STATEMENT THAT TURKEY IS A GOOD ALLY?

BURT: THAT'S A VERY INACCURATE THING. WHAT THE TURKISH DEFENSE MINISTER SAID, AND I MADE THE STATEMENT THAT TURKEY WAS A GOOD AND A LOYAL ALLY AND HAD ALWAYS BEEN A GOOD AND LOYAL ALLY. HE SAID, "REMEMBER THAT" TO THE JOURNALISTS. HE SAID THAT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER. HE WASN'T TALKING ABOUT WHAT I SAID. HE WAS REMINDING THE PRESS. YOU KNOW, YOU PEOPLE ALL HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY AND YOU SHOULD TAKE THAT RESPONSIBILITY VERY SERIOUSLY. I AM A FORMER JOURNALIST, AND NOW AN OFFICIAL. AND STANDING BACK, I THINK, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU RECOGNIZE THAT PEOPLE READ WHAT YOU SAY. THEY TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. YOU INFORM THEM. SO, ACCURACY AND PERSPECTIVE, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE IS VERY IMPORTANT

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QUESTION: I THINK THAT THE TURKISH PRESS SO FAR HAS BEEN [illegible] ALL THE COMPLEXITIES AND ALL THE CONFLICTS OF THE CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS THAT HAVE BEEN COMING UP BY EUROPE AND BY THE UNITED STATES. SO FAR, FOR THE LAST 30 YEARS, VIS-A-VIS THE POSITION OF TURKEY IN THE WORLD AND IN NATO AND IN THE SECURITY OF THE FREE WORLD VERY STABLE. NOW, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO PUT PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENTS TO THE TURKISH PUBLIC WHEN YOU SEE SOMETHING SO [illegible] TOTALLY WRONG AND THE LAST 30 YEARS THESE CONTRADICTIONS HAVE COME UP VERY VERY POINTEDLY. SO, THE TURKISH PRESS HAS PLAYED A VERY POSITIVE ROLE...

STATE: LISTEN, IF YOU THINK I'M CRITICIZING THE TURKISH PRESS YOU ARE WRONG. WHAT I'M SAYING SIMPLY IS THAT THERE ARE, AS YOU SAY, COMPLEX ISSUES. THERE IS VERY LITTLE THAT IS MORE COMPLEX, FRANKLY, THAN THE WORKINGS OF WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONGRESS WHICH MOST AMERICANS

DON'T UNDERSTAND, LET ALONE PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT, WHAT SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS HAS ATTEMPTED TO STRENGTHEN AND IMPROVE THE TIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

QUESTION: I THINK, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ALSO TRIED THAT YEAR AGAIN. THEY LIFTED THE EMBARGO FINALLY. BUT, THEY WAITED FOR TURKISH WITHDRAWALS FROM CYPRUS AND IT WAS SOME INTERMITTENTLY UNTIL SOMEHOW, SOMEWHERE THEY HAD TO STOP. SO, NOW WHEN THERE ARE NEW SUGGESTIONS COMING FROM THE CONGRESS, YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THE TURKISH SENSIBILITIES OVER THAT.

STATE: WE DO UNDERSTAND. THAT'S ONE REASON WHY I AM HERE. THIS IS ONE REASON WHY WE WORK SO HARD, AND I SPEND SO MUCH TIME AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ADMINISTRATION SPEND SO MUCH TIME. WE ARE ACTUALLY TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THAT RELATIONSHIP AND TO WORK ON THE CONGRESS, AND TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS WHICH CAN BE MADE, WHY IT'S IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO HAVE A HEALTHY ROBUST RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY. YOU DON'T HAVE TO CONVINCE ME OF THAT.

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QUESTION: DOES THE U.S. HAVE ANY SCHEME OR WHATEVER TO BRING TURKEY AND GREECE TOGETHER?

[illegible]: I THINK IT WOULD BE PRESUMPTUOUS OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUGGEST THAT THEY CAN SOLVE A VERY COMPLEX, COMPLICATED PROBLEM. WE WANT TO SEE A BETTER RELATIONSHIP EMERGE. BUT, THAT IS REALLY IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS UP TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ANKARA AND ATHENS.

QUESTION: DOES THE ADMINISTRATION PLAN TO PROPOSE A PROPOSAL FOR CYPRUS?

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

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[illegible]: THERE IS NO AMERICAN INITIATIVE WAITING IN THE WINGS. WE THINK, I THINK I TOLD YOUR COLLEAGUE TO YOUR RIGHT, THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE. WE HOPE THAT THE TALKS CONTINUE AND THAT SOME PROGRESS WILL BE MADE. BERG UNQUOTE DAM

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release April 25, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY MALCOLM BALDRIGE,
MR. BOB LIGHTHIZER,
AND MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD
ON TRADE REORGANIZATION

The Briefing Room

1:37 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: We have with us Secretary Baldrige and Bob Lighthizer, Dennis Whitfield of the U.S. Trade Representatives' Office who will brief us on the administration's viewpoint on trade reorganization.

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Thank you, Larry.

Good afternoon. The President has decided to support a major reorganization of international trade responsibilities within the Executive Branch. The administration is ready to work with the Congress as expeditiously as possible to create a unified, Cabinet-level department. And this new department should combine the major trade functions in the Executive Branch, primarily the office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce, and should include certain trade related business and economic functions presently within the Department of Commerce.

The reorganization would consolidate the primary responsibilities of these agencies including their policy-making, their negotiation-implementation, regulatory and promotional functions into the new entity. A new Cabinet-level Secretary would, in effect, be the present day USTR combined with certain trade and industry functions of the Secretary of Commerce.

At present, trade responsibilities are scattered over several major Cabinet-level agencies. Because responsibility is diffused, the decision-making process is at times difficult. Trade policy formulation, negotiation regulation and promotion are closely intertwined. They cannot efficiently or effectively be artificially separated into separate and different Cabinet-level organizations. We need the institutional strength that comes from combining authority for policy coordination and negotiations with real organization power and resources. Our other major functions in government -- foreign affairs, defense matters, financial matters, and others, have strong Cabinet departments responsible for both developing policy and carrying it through to completion. So should trade.

The importance of trade to the welfare of our nation is increasing dramatically. Total trade in goods and services now stands at over 22 percent of GNP. Trade generates jobs. Every one billion dollars worth of trade produces approximately 25,000 jobs. And in the period 1977 to 1980, four out of every five new jobs in manufacturing were export-related. The rapid growth of trade in our domestic economy means that trade cannot be relegated to a second-tier position.

Senator Roth and others have introduced S.121 which would create a new Cabinet-level Department of Trade. We support the purposes of this bill and, in general, its major proposals. We wish to begin immediately intensive discussions with the Congress on all aspects of this issue. We need a stronger, more consolidated voice for free trade. There's growing protectionist sentiment, both at home and abroad. Most U.S. businesses stand behind free trade. We have gained more by relying on free trade principles than

MORE

any other country and we stand to lose the most if the world slipped back into protectionism.

If we are to meet the challenges of foreign competition and maintain and enhance the multilateral framework for trade, we must take the institutional steps that will be be necessary to meet those challenges by consolidating trade responsibilities in one Cabinet department.

The administration is asking the Congress to help us develop a detailed proposal and to pass the required legislation as quickly as possible. That's the end of my statement. Bob Lighthizer, the Deputy USTR, is here in Bill Brock's absence. He's in Europe. And he and I will be glad to answer any questions that you might have.

Q Would there be a net increase of one Cabinet department or would you do away with the Commerce Department and scatter its agencies around?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I can't comment on the timing of this but the President's intention is to end up with one Cabinet department less, not add one so that this new department eventually would be the department that combines both of those resources.

MR. LIGHTHIZER: Mr. Secretary, I should just say that was really a joint statement of Ambassador Brock and the Secretary.

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes, that's --

Q Why don't you just take all the trade inthe Commerce Department and let it go at that?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: We want to really take the business- and trade-related functions of the Commerce Department that are very specific to business and trade and put them into this new department -- they are, by and large, the implementing functions for our policy -- and combine them with the USTR that has the responsibility of actually developing the policy. So we would have the development of the policy and the carrying out of that policy in the same department.

Q What would be left?

Q What would happen to the remaining Commerce functions?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: We have not made those decisions yet. We will after the --

Q You mean, this --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No.

We will after the consultations with the Congress.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you -- as Commerce Secretary -- or Ambassador Brock, then, head this department?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: The new Secretary would be, in effect, the USTR and the Secretary of the new Cabinet position. Whom that would be, we do not know yet.

Q Mr. Secretary, realistically, aren't we talking about -- at least for awhile -- two new Cabinet posts; you will keep Commerce and have this new department, also? So wouldn't it actually increase the number of Cabinet level departments, at least for awhile?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I do not know the exact timing. We do not know yet, until we finish our dicussions with the Congress. But the intent would be to end up with one department and one Cabinet Officer less.

Q What happens to EX-IM Bank?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: That is one of the functions that will be under discussion with the Congress. We are not prepared to --

Q Mr. Secretary, what happens to ongoing negotiations during the interim, while you are discussing this with the Congress -- ongoing negotiations with other countries, number one? And, number two, what happens to the proposals that were made about a year ago for Commerce to absorb most of the Energy Department?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Let me take those one at a time. Clyde, you are always asking two questions at once.

The first -- there is no question that the responsibility for trade negotiations, development of policy is with the USTR. That would continue until there was any change in the law.

Your second question, would you mind repeating?

Q What happens to the reorganization that was announced a year ago with respect to the Energy Department being absorbed -- most of the Energy Department being absorbed by Commerce? Where does that stand now?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: We still have that bill on the Hill. This effort has entirely to do with trade reorganization. And I would have to defer any questions on Energy to the Secretary of Energy. He is responsible for that.

Q Mr. Secretary, what about the large block of trade involving agriculture? Would you take that over? Or would that remain with the Agriculture Department?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Again, that is one of the areas that we will be consulting on. But there has been no decision or consideration of that yet.

Q If I could follow up -- if that stays away from this new Department of Trade, won't that leave a very large gap in the ability of that Department to, both, negotiate and to carry out policy?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I would not comment on that one way or the other. Today, that is still under consideration. And I cannot help you.

Q What is the reasonable assumption about what would happen to the rest of the functions of the present Commerce Department if this were to go into effect?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I do not want to make any reasonable assumptions. We have not --

Q Unreasonable? (Laughter.)

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: (Laughter.) Or unreasonable ones. These issues, really, are going to be worked out in consultation with the Congress. We want a bill that accomplishes what we want on the putting together of, both, the policy-making function on trade and the carry out of those policies. That is the most important principle that we want to build on.

Now, after that, we want to get the sense of the Congress and work with them on it.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you explain why Guy Fiske withdrew from overseeing the sale of the weather satellites?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, this conference is on this trade reorganization bill. And I have nothing more to add to what I have already said about the event.

Q Well, can you say, for the record, whether or not you feel that there was a conflict of interest there?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I have said before, there was a possibility of an appearance of a conflict of interest. Therefore, he excused himself. And as far as I am concerned, that is the end of the matter.

Q He did not excuse himself for eight months after the issue first came up with Comsat?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, this conference is on trade.

Yes?

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Q What are your personal plans? Are you planning to stay on in government? Further plans, or not?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, I don't have any other job now and -- (Laughter.) I have, in the past been able to earn a living outside the U.S. government, and I suppose I might be able to again, but I don't have any real plans. I'd like to stay with this President. I'm a great supporter of his, and believe in his policies.

Q Is that on the record?

Q Mr. Secretary, would you like to head this new department? Are you --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I have no comment on that. I'll do whatever the President wants.

Q Does that mean you and Bill Brock would be fighting it out to see who would --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No --

Q -- stay in the Cabinet?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: We haven't fought yet, and I don't imagine we will in the future. He and I are great respecters of each other and we've worked very well together, and I admire him tremendously.

Q You seem to have --

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the recommendation, how would you assess this administration's current policies in regard to foreign trade?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: How would I assess their current policies? Well, that's a pretty broad question for this kind of a press conference.

I think that we're united on, in trying to keep protectionism down to the lowest possible level. We are united in trying to increase U.S. exports abroad. We're united in the fact that we have to do as much as we can to get jobs that come from those exports. The 11 percent drop in U.S. exports since the end of 1979 has cost the U.S. one million jobs. So all of our efforts ought to be toward trying to regain that. Trade means jobs, and that's why it's so important.

Q So the foreign --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q -- trade policy up until now has been what, a failure?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No, nobody's said that or even intimated it. I think that whatever you call our present trade policy, it could be strengthened by the consolidation of both the policy-making function and the authority to carry out that policy into one department. So whatever our policy is, it's going to be stronger and better served by having one department.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes?

Q -- I'm still not clear on one of your answers. In your discussion within the administration about this reorganization, has the President expressed an intention or is their an understanding among you about which individual would head this new department should it come into being before the end of, of this administration?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No, we've just left the President, Deputy USTR Lighthizer and myself. There has been no conversation at all about who would head the new department, what would happen as far as the personnel are concerned. But the President has decided to back the general purposes of the Roth bill on trade reorganization. There are details yet to be worked out, and some important details, as the questions have indicated.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Do you expect this reorganization -- are you optimistic that it will be in place before the end of this term?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I am. I am optimistic we can get this passed this year.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Why --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: There's somebody in the back of the room I haven't --

Q Mr. Secretary, on this legislation that's going forward, this is going to create the new Department of Trade. Will it also, at the same time, abolish the Department of Commerce, or will they move on separate tracks?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No, I think in the original legislation, I do not think there will be an actual abolishment of the Department of Commerce. We will have to work that out in another way. But, the intention is to work that out, so that we don't have two departments.

Q So, initially then you would --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes?

Q -- create the new department, and then there would be separate legislation to abolish the Department of Commerce?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I am not enough of a legislative expert to know, but that's probably a good guess about the way the course would run.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes?

Q -- understanding that you want to consult with Congress and the decisions haven't been made, what is your current thinking on what would happen, for example, to NOAA?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Again, I have no thoughts on it that I would make public now because that's going to be the subject of consultation. That, and all the other departments in the Commerce Department.

MR. SPEAKES: Andrea, and one in the back.

Q Mr. Secretary, why are you optimistic about this being accomplished before the end of this term when the Energy Department's reorganization and the abolishing of the Department of Education have not proceeded at all? What makes you think this will be any different?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I think those are two completely separate and different cases. I think number one, that trade is on the front burner in everybody's mind today. The number of jobs that we could gain or lose by the proper conduct of our policy and the follow-through on it affects those jobs. And everybody, everybody, is interested in what happens to trade.

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Now, if Congress can be convinced that this is a stronger, more effective department combined than it is separately -- and I happen to think they can -- then I'd be optimistic about this passing. And I think it rests on one very common sense viewpoint. No where else in the U.S. government or most foreign governments that I'm aware of do you have the policy recommendation, the policy development in one department and the carrying out of that policy in another department. They're together. The Defense -- That's true in Defense, State, Treasury, Agriculture. Why should it be different in trade? I think that kind of common sense reasoning will prevail in the Congress.

Q Is the timing of --

MR. SPEAKES: Last question.

Q -- this announcement geared to the Economic Summit? Is this meant to be a message of some sort to our allies?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No, sir. I don't think that's relevant. This is a -- The Economic Summit comes once a year. This would be for as long as the Congress wanted it to stay this way.

MR. SPEAKES: Helen, and then --

Q You seem to be pretty cavalier about what happens to the other important functions of your department. You say you haven't even thought about it, you don't know where they'd go, you'll have to discuss it. Isn't that rather strange?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Helen, I don't think the use of the word "cavalier" is exactly correct in this context --

Q You escaped from every question revolving --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: -- and I did not say I didn't know or I hadn't thought about it. What I said very carefully -- we thought about it a lot -- was that some of these issues are complex. They have to be discussed in great detail with the Congress to see what kind of a bill we can all get through because trade, don't forget, is Congress' responsibility. And I would not want to be cavalier the other way in just trying to hand them something engraved on stone and say, "Take it or leave it." That's not the way we should work on this. We should work with them, not in a cavalier attitude.

MR. SPEAKES: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:50 P.M. EDT

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

April 26, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:34 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: Okay. We'll start on this briefing because the congressmen are not out yet and if we wait it will be another fifteen minutes I'm afraid.

This will be a briefing on the visit on Thursday of Prime Minister Trudeau with President Reagan. This briefing is on background and should be attributed to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought I might just say a few words to give a framework for the visit. The meeting between the President and Prime Minister will be their eight, including encounters at international meetings such as the Ottawa Summit, the NATO Summit, Versailles Summit.

The Prime Minister will be arriving tomorrow around noon. His program will center, of course, on the meeting with the President on Thursday in the Oval Office, followed by a working lunch. Tomorrow afternoon at 4:00 p.m. he will also be meeting with the Vice President. Ambassador Gottlieb will be hosting two social events: a luncheon I believe on Wednesday with Canadian businessmen, and then a dinner that night at his residence. And that is the program, as we understand it.

The basic reason for the Prime Minister's visit is to consult on the Williamsburg Summit. In this sense, the visit is similar to the one which Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher paid on the fourteenth and fifteenth of April.

Bilateral issues will also figure, we assume, in the discussions, although the fact that Secretary Haig and Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister MacEachen had a meeting on the tenth and eleventh of April here where they went over the -- I'm sorry, Shultz. I beg your pardon.

Q Is he back again? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he may be, I'm not sure, but not as Secretary -- Secretary Shultz -- you got me there.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister MacEachen had a meeting here on the tenth and eleventh of April where they reviewed the bilateral agenda. So I doubt that bilateral questions will play an overly large role in the discussions, either with the President or the Vice President.

The Vice President, as you know, was in Ottawa on, I guess, the seventeenth, was it, of March -- fifteenth? -- thirteenth. Okay, thirteenth of March. So, our consultations with Canada have been very,

very intensive in the last, last couple of months. And I think as the Secretary and Foreign Minister MacEachen made clear when they completed their meetings here on the eleventh, we feel that the bilateral relationship, whereas it will never be without problems, without issues, is in a relatively good state at this point.

Let me take your questions.

Q Could you put some kind of a timeframe about where -- recognizing what you've just said -- can you put some kind of a timeframe on the cruise missile -- was anything discussed --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was discussed between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister MacEachen. We assume that it will come up tomorrow, or rather, on Thursday. We do intend, in the near future I would say, to present a proposal to the government of Canada regarding testing of the ALCMS system along with several other systems under the memorandum of intent which was signed between Secretary, Deputy Secretary Damm and Ambassador Gottlieb in the beginning of February.

I can't tell you exactly when the request will be submitted. This is something which the Department of Defense does through its channels, but I expect it will be submitted fairly shortly.

Q Do you expect the two leaders to have a discussion about it during the meeting Thursday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would expect the subject to come up. I don't feel that it's one which would occupy a great deal of time. The Prime Minister has said that when the request is submitted it will be considered by the government of Canada. I think that's quite reasonsble, understandable.

Q There are still recurring problems with the Europeans, and the question at Williamsburg may come -- obviously is going to come up -- between relations on technological transfers East-West. Where does Canada fit into this? What will we expect of them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Canada has been very actively involved in all of the discussions on East-West economic relations going back to the fall of last

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year. The Canadians are participating, of course, in the discussions in NATO, in the International Energy Agency, in the OECD, and in COCOM.

These discussions or these studies, which were begun last fall are making progress, each according to its own time schedule. It is difficult to generalize, to say exactly where we are across the board in all of these studies. Some are more advanced than others. There will be, for example, a COCOM high-level meeting on Thursday and Friday of this week, which we feel is an important occasion, the second high-level meeting -- the first having taken place in January of 1982 as a result of the agreement reached at the Ottawa Summit.

But with Canada as with the Western Europeans and with the Japanese, we feel we have made good progress in arriving at a general understanding of the basic principles for East-West relations. Considerable work remains to be done. But we were satisfied, I think, with the progress made thus far.

Yes?

Q Let me get back to the cruise missile question. Are you confident that this will work out, eventually I mean? There may be demands on the Canadian side. But are you confident that this will work out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a decision which the government of Canada will have to make. But, yes, I am confident that it will work out. The Prime Minister indicated in public during the Vice President's visit, as we understood it -- his remarks, as we interpreted his remarks, that he thought that this was a reasonable request for the United States to make.

So I am confident that this will be resolved, yes.

Q I would like to get back to the Summit for a minute. It is not clear from your East-West answer whether East-West economic relations are to be a major topic during this bilateral meeting this week. Can you tell me if it is? And can you tell us what Summit-related issues have to be discussed before the Summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Summit preparations are underway now. There was a meeting on the -- I cannot think when the last Sherpa meeting was held in Williamsburg. Very recently.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ten days ago.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ten days ago.

Allen Wallis and his colleagues met with representatives of the other Summit participants, including Canada. So this process is going on, we feel, quite well.

The President and Prime Minister will want to review the status of preparations for the Summit. And in this context, obviously, there will be some discussion of East-West economic relations. But as we have made clear, this is not the centerpiece of the Summit. Rather, the centerpiece of the Summit would be questions of how the Western countries can improve -- better economic cooperation, coordination of their

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policies, enhanced chances for non-inflationary growth in all the economies involved and, thereby, contribute to general improvement in the international economic situation. This will be the principal focus of the Summit.

Economic questions or questions involving economic relations with the Soviet Union will undoubtedly be discussed. But since there is good progress being made in the studies, there seems to be no reason to make this the center of discussions in Williamsburg or, for that matter, on Thursday with Prime Minister Trudeau.

Q By "studies," are you referring to some mechanism by which the Allied nations could all agree on dealing with the Soviet Union? And where is that right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not see this as an exercise in which we seek agreement on a mechanism by which all will follow the same basic policy or will meet to coordinate policies. Rather, we see an effort underway in a variety of organizations -- in COCOM, in the IEA, in the OECD, and in NATO -- to agree on certain basic principles which would be implemented in those organizations.

Obviously, each country would make independent decisions on questions involving trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries or against the backdrop or on the basis of certain generally accepted principles. This is what we are talking about.

Q Is that material for discussion at the summit level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a subject which, I think, the leaders at the Summit would want to take very positive note of, that considerable progress has been made in the

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various efforts that are underway; but I wouldn't consider it, again, to be likely to be a center of the discussion at Williamsburg.

Q Can you give us any idea of the type of progress being made in these other organizations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think -- just take them one at a time. In COCOM, the high level meeting which will be held, as I say, on Thursday and Friday has resulted, we think, in -- or will take note of considerable progress made in updating and modernizing, if you will, the COCOM list. Also, will take note of proposals to make the organization itself somewhat more efficient, somewhat more effective. In the IEA, we're talking about energy security and I think there's a good element of agreement there on the need to enhance energy security of all of the participating countries.

In the OECD, the question focuses on two aspects, one on the question of export credits. There will be a meeting this week of the export credit consensus arrangement, also -- it's being held in Paris -- to discuss an extension and modification of the consensus regulations for the period after the 1st of May of this year.

The OECD is also discussing overall questions of economic relations with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union.

So in all of these fora, the studies which were begun at the beginning of this year are moving along rather well, we feel.

And we have some important meetings coming up. As I said, we have the high level COCOM meeting Thursday and Friday. We have an OECD Ministerial on the 9th and 10th of May. Secretary Shultz, Secretary Reagan, Secretary -- I think, USTR Brock and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors will be there on the U.S. side. That's on the 9th and 10th of May. Then we have the Summit at the end of the month, 28th through the 30th. And then we have the NATO Ministerial in Paris on the 9th and 10th. So these are sort of milestones along the way in each case.

Q Let me get back to these discussions this week. There are topics that are going to come up at the Summit, I mean, within the framework of generally everybody reaching economic growth together. And I'm just wondering if you can lay out for us some of the specific topics. I mean, are they going to talk about interest rates? Are they going to talk about currency exchange rates? Are they going to talk about East-West some? You say, I mean, Trudeau and the President -- I mean, you started out saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all of these subjects will obviously be discussed. I don't think the Summit is seen as a place for decisions to be taken on any of them. The idea, the objective --

Q I don't mean the Summit. I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, tomorrow. I see.

Q Yes. Yes, I mean, the President and Mr. Trudeau --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, as was the case of the meeting between the President and Chancellor Kohl is taking place against the backdrop of the preparations for the Summit. And I think what the leaders are doing in each case is taking sort of a snapshot of where they are on the preparations, what remains to be done, where should we be concentrating between now and the 28th of May to ensure a successful meeting.

So, in this case, I think they'll review the results of the last Sherpa meeting and look ahead to the next one, which will be held in the middle of May and see what else needs to be done to have a successful meeting.

Q Doesn't it seem unusual for two chiefs-of-state to get together and to just sort of chat about the -- I mean, I'm not trying to be combative; but --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On a nice day like this, you shouldn't be combative.

Q Well, I'm not trying to be; but it does seem unusual for two chiefs-of-state to sit down and just chat about the Sherpa meetings, which are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, no, that's not what they're chatting about. They're chatting about what we consider to be -- and I think the Prime Minister probably agrees -- is an extremely important event coming up at the end of May. It just happens that there is a process underway for planning -- for preparing for that meeting which is known as the "Sherpa process." All they can do is review what their associates, their personal representatives have done and get an idea of what needs to be done between now and the end of May to ensure a successful meeting. I don't find it unusual at all that they would want to meet.

Q Last Friday, Prime Minister Trudeau was very critical of U.S. policy in Central America and he accused the United States of intervening in other countries' affairs in Central America. Is that subject likely to come up in this meeting? And do you have any particular response to that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would take some issue with the way you characterized the Prime Minister's remarks in his Iowa press conference. He had some things to say about Central America. I don't think he accused the United States of intervening in Central America. I think he said that Canada was opposed to intervention.

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The two are not necessarily the same, certainly not in our view and I doubt in the view -- that's true in the view of the Prime Minister either.

Canada has interest in Central America. Canada has assistance programs in many Central American and Caribbean programs -- or in Central American and Caribbean countries. We are working together with Canada and other interested countries to promote economic progress, social reform, and stability in Central America. We feel we have a common interest here, so, sure, I think we will discuss the subject with the Prime Minister. But I don't see this as one where we're at loggerheads or in a confrontation. I think our perspectives differ somewhat, but I think there are a lot of shared interests in terms of U.S./Canadian interests in that area.

Yes.

Q After the MacEachen visit, Ambassador Gottleib met with a group of us over at the Press Club for breakfast, and we asked how acid rain was progressing. And he said with, you know, all diplomacy that under the Reagan Administration, that the whole process is going backwards because this -- the EPA under this administration has actually relaxed the rules for the emissions of sulphur dioxide. And he was quite upset, to say the least, about the way things were going. Do you expect this will come up with Mr. Trudeau? And, I mean, is there anything new that this administration can offer to them in terms of some affirmative action on this issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to take issue with Allen Gottleib, but I would have to say that my perception of where we are in the transboundary air pollution or acid rain discussion with Canada is somewhat different than the one he presented to you at the National Press Club. It's true that the negotiations are still under way. It's true that despite the fact that we began the negotiations in June of 1981, we've yet to reach an agreement. But the fact that in two years we've not been able to reach an agreement on this very difficult and complicated issue does not, in my view, mean that we've failed or that the Reagan Administration is moving backwards in this area. I would remind you that it took us three years to reach agreement on the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972, and I think the subject matter covered was a lot easier and the issues were a lot clearer than the issues involved in the acid rain discussions. So we've made some progress in -- certainly in identifying the issues. The work groups have completed their work. Peer review panels are examining the work group reports in both the United States and Canada.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister MacEachen agreed that when this process -- that is to say, the peer review process is completed -- the two peer review chairmen should get together, compare notes, and probably arrange to participate in the next meeting between the two Ministers when that occurs, presumably sometime this fall in Ottawa, although no date has yet been set.

We also have a new Administrator-designate at the Environmental Protection Agency, Mr. Ruckelshaus. It was understood or agreed -- and the Secretary has talked to Mr. Ruckelshaus on this -- that he and his opposite number, Mr. -- or Environmental Minister Roberts would get together fairly shortly after Mr. Ruckelshaus's confirmation and after he's been able to familiarize himself with the state of play on this issue. So I think it's -- I know it's a disappointment to our friends in Canada that we haven't been able to reach an agreement so far, but I would simply say that it's a complicated issue. The President told the Prime Minister when he was in Ottawa in March of 1981 that the negotiations would be lengthy. The President has proven prophetic in this sense, though we have been negotiating now for almost two years. I would expect that the negotiations will go on a bit longer. Exactly how much longer, I don't know.

Now, as far as the relaxation of standards, it's true that some of the state implementation programs have been relaxed somewhat by the Environmental Protection Agency. However, actual emissions have continued to decline.

Q That's because of the recession.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it may be because of the recession. It could also be because of the fact that the United States has now installed 89 -- or 96 -- I can never remember the exact number -- scrubbers on power plants, largely in the Middle West. It could also be because some new atomic power stations have been introduced in the Middle West region, thus

MORE

enabling the power companies to reduce somewhat on the coal-fired power plants. It could be for any number of things. The fact of the matter is that sulfur dioxide emissions in the West -- Eastern part of the United States, the area we're talking about, have continued to decline despite the fact that some of these state implementation plans have been relaxed somewhat by the EPA.

So, it's not a black and white, open and shut case. I think progress has continued to be made and it's awfully difficult, if you really look at the facts, to make the Reagan administration look like anti-environment, pro-acid rain, frankly.

MR. ALLIN: We're just going to be able to take one more question because the President's remarks are going to be piped in here. Who hasn't asked a question yet? Peter?

Q Is there any trade that the Canadians engage in with the Eastern bloc that the United States wishes that they not be taking place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any specific trade arrangements between Canada and -- Not that I'm aware of. We are aware, of course, that Canada is a major competitor of the United States for grain sales in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. But as long as these are unsubsidized commercially-based sales, we have no basis for complaint about Canadian sales.

We simply feel that Canada, as all the other allied countries, should view trade with the Soviet Union as we do, against the backdrop of our overall basic security interests, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. As long as that happens, we have no basis for complaint. And I'm unaware of any specific cases involving Canada which we would take issue with.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you. If there are a couple of you that didn't get to ask questions and want to come up and informally ask my colleague on background before he goes, why don't you come on up.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:56 P.M. EDT

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 28, 1983
No. 132

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
EN ROUTE FROM CAIRO
TO JERUSALEM
April 27, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you've seen Mubarak. On the way out you talked about this as being very do-able -- Lebanon. After seeing Mubarak, do you feel that this is even more so the case?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he certainly believes so, and I think when something is seen as very important by people on a widespread basis and when it's apparent that both the Israelis and Lebanese want to find an agreement -- apparent on the basis of the fact that an awful lot has been achieved -- then I think you have a basis for feeling it's do-able. So I continue to feel that way.

QUESTION: Can you give us a rundown of what you think the chief obstacles are now, what you'll try to achieve in the next couple of days?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to sort of go through obstacles. I have an idea of what the chief ones are in my own mind, but it's important for me to get some idea of what other people think the obstacles are and how they see them. I'd rather just sort of leave it for my discussions to frame that in my mind. But there are, of course, problems remaining quite clearly, and I'll have to get at them.

QUESTION: Why are you not seeing the Prime Minister until so late in the day?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think this is the way they have scheduled it, and I think that it's the way things go in Washington as well. Somebody comes on an important mission and we generally talk to them in the State Department and other places and then they'll go over to the White House. I think it's a fairly normal way to do things. But I do look forward to seeing the Prime Minister in the large meeting late today, and also I hope to see him tomorrow morning in a smaller meeting.

QUESTION: What is it that you will be able to do? In other words, will you bring some flexibility or some possibility of offering something that for example, Phil Habib or Morrie Draper could not do. What is it that your presence will make possible that was not possible before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I really don't know. I hope it turns out to be helpful -- helpful to the parties themselves, of course that's the main thing, and to Phil and Morrie in their efforts. They have been doing a terrific job, and they have all sort of ideas. I'll just try to work along with them.

QUESTION: General Sharon yesterday talked about a "special status" for southern Lebanon. Is it conceivable that you could get over the Haddad problem by somehow working out some kind of an understanding between the Israeli and Lebanese that would allow Israel to go back into southern Lebanon if there were a direct threat to their security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the key here is the removal of all foreign forces. That's what you have to achieve. And any arrangement that falls short of that is not going to be the basis for Syrian troops withdrawing, is not going to be compatible with the sovereignty of Lebanon. So that has to be the objective.

QUESTION: So a "special status" would be ruled out for southern Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to make a comment on some words that somebody has said. I don't know what they imply, but it sounds like they imply some continuing presence of Israel in Lebanon, and I think that for there to be sovereignty for Lebanon, all foreign forces have to be removed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you go beyond some of the generalities and be a bit specific with us about what you're going to ask the Israelis to do under the two headings of the Lebanon troop withdrawal and under the larger and broader peace process?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As I said I don't want to get pinned down into specific things because they're the grist of the negotiation, and I want to see how the negotiation goes. I don't think it's particularly good for me to be identifying this, that or the other as key elements in the picture at this point.

QUESTION: To get into the recent history of this thing, you spent a lot of time about six weeks ago with Mr. Shamir and with the Lebanese. Have the negotiating details changed in any significant thing? Aren't you really going to be talking about the same things that you were six weeks ago and thought you were reaching agreement on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Some of the same things, but of course in a broad sense, you talk about the same things. But then in a tactical sense, as you get down into the operational details of an agreement, they evolve. In the end, it's these details that have to get pinned down. So at one level of generality I think the answer to your question is yes; at another it tends to focus in more and more on particular things that people are trying to work out.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the flight over you were saying you wanted to learn some things here; you wanted to understand what people in the region feel about the situation. You have now had a chance to talk to your Ambassadors. Have they changed your views about anything? Do you see new problems that you didn't see before or new solutions that you didn't see before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to make a comment about the meeting with the Ambassadors because we've tried to make these private meetings, and I think it's important to keep that sense of it. I think, whether you are talking to our Ambassadors or anybody else, the importance of peace in the Middle East comes through and the difficulty of achieving it in a very broad sense is very apparent, and the importance of keeping at it. I think that everyone regards getting the Lebanon situation squared away as a matter of tremendous importance. It will have its reflection on other areas, but it stands on its own feet as a matter of great importance. But at any rate, I think the priority of working on Lebanon on this trip is one that everyone agrees on.

QUESTION: Is there any indication yet as to whether you would be welcome or not in Syria at some point in these negotiations? Have you made up your mind yet when or if you will go there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would like to go to Syria; and assuming that there are important things to go about, as I believe there will be, I hope that I will be welcomed there, and I expect that I will. As I've met with the Syrian Foreign Minister a number of times, he's repeatedly invited me to come to Syria, so I don't expect that he would have any other opinion.

QUESTION: I infer from that that you wouldn't go there until you either had an agreement between Israel and Lebanon or almost had one. Is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have a whole flow of negotiating matters to consider, and just when I will decide it's important to go-- but I don't want to say in advance.

QUESTION The Israelis have been saying that you'll go to Beirut twice: tomorrow and then again on Saturday. Is that the plan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that's probably. Certainly my plan is to go to Beirut tomorrow; and then what develops beyond that and where it's most useful to be and who I should be talking to when, is something that I'll have to feel my way on. I think you have to have an idea in your mind of what you're doing, but also not let that idea get you so pinned down that you don't have that flexibility of mind and movement to do other things.

QUESTION: You're going to see Mr. Begin this evening and again tomorrow morning before going to Beirut. Is it your assumption that you'll be carrying from Begin some concessions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I certainly wouldn't --

QUESTION: Do you understand what I mean?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I expect by the time I go to Beirut, I will have a very clear idea of the things that Israel considers important and where the critical elements of the negotiation are as they see it.

QUESTION: When you said a moment ago that you'd like to go to Syria assuming that there are important things to discuss and that you expect that there would be, does that suggest that you feel, if I may just push it a bit, that on the basis of what your Ambassadors have told you, that you have a feeling now that we are close to an agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't like to play around with words, but if you say that here is a starting point and here is the ending point, and let's say that you've got an agreement and you make a list of issues or something like that and then you say, well, where are you on this list. Well, I'd say that we're here somewhere. A lot has been accomplished. And so you say, well, then you've got an agreement. In one sense yes; on the other hand, you won't have an agreement until you have an agreement. So the remaining issues are difficult ones. So I don't quite know how you measure closeness is my point. But I think there is a very good chance of getting an agreement with the right effort on everyone's part, and certainly I'm going to do everything I can to help the parties come to an agreement. It's not our agreement or my agreement; it's their agreement, remember, and they have to feel that it is good for both of them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you discuss the Haddad phenomenon? What is it that makes it so difficult to resolve? Is it his militia or is it him personally that is at stake here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe it's both, but I don't want to make a long description of that. I assume that I'll be hearing about that, and I'll listen.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when you just put your hands out there, what did your right hand stand for, an agreemnt or an actual withdrawal? And if for an agreement, how far beyond that is the actual withdrawal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I was talking about an agreement between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of Israel, and that's the first thing that we're concentrating on. But obviously the withdrawal of all foreign forces is something that needs Syrian agreement and the agreement of the other forces in the area -- PLO forces and Iranian forces and any others that may be there.

QUESTION: Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

April 27, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

5:00 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hello. Kind of you to come. The President has chosen the extraordinary step of addressing a Joint Session of Congress this evening on the situation in Central America because he believes that the challenge that we face there requires a national consensus and a very strong bipartisan support.

The President is choosing an address to a Joint Session and to the country at large because he believes that the facts concerning the circumstances in Central America are not widely understood among the American people. He wishes to explain and make clear that a determined campaign inspired by and supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba -- a campaign of subversion in Central America is very well advanced. It has not reached a crisis proportion and it is still within our ability to contain and ultimately reverse current trends. But because it will take substantial effort, effort which must be sustained over time, the President wishes the people and the Congress to be thoroughly well informed and to seek their support.

The President will take the approach of, first of all explaining just why Americans should care about what happens in Central America. He will define our interests -- interests in terms of trade, petroleum, strategic locations, the Canal obviously. He will point to and describe in some detail how these interests are threatened, the level of Soviet effort in terms of advisors, hardware, other forms of assistance. And he will then define his solution to the problem.

The President does not believe and tonight will say that the solution to the problems in Central America cannot be a military solution. As a long-term proposition, ultimately we must provide for stable economic growth and development as well as progress toward pluralism, reform of institutions, improved protection of human freedoms. But that in order for this longer termed process to prosper and succeed, there must be a fundamental level of security behind which it can take place. And that security does not now exist.

The President will go into some detail in comparing and contrasting the situations in Salvador and Nicaragua. Finally the President will state his policy succinctly as embodied in four goals: political, economic, security, and with regard to regional cooperation. And he will also provide certain assurances to the Congress and to the people as to limits or guidelines he will follow in pursuing these objectives and policies.

And I would like now to turn to my colleague who will be more precise on what I have said, particularly with regard to our policies, the four points, the assurances, anything else you'd like to say.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might add to the general description that the President also in contrasting the development in Salvador and in Nicaragua, the latter case you have a broad coalition moving towards monopolization of power, militarization, and

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substantial foreign military presence and in the case of El Salvador a situation of substantial conflict, human rights abuses moving in the opposite direction towards the development of democratic institutions, the overcoming of human rights abuses, and substantial reform.

He does include a statement of policy on Nicaragua. He says that we do not seek to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. We do seek to, in accordance with U.S. and international law, to diminish or prevent the flow of arms to insurgents in neighboring countries. He adds that we cannot and should not protect the government of Nicaragua from the anger of its own people. But we could and should, through diplomacy, offer an alternative and he pledges himself to actions to prevent -- to protect all countries in Central America from war.

The four points that my colleague mentioned are: first, the establishment of democratic institutions, social reforms, land reform, and human rights improvements -- as being the essence of the first point that he seeks.

To back that up, economic assistance to overcome the costs of the turbulence and the recession, but the Caribbean Basin Initiative to open up hope for the future.

Military assistance, as my colleague indicated, as a shield to allow these economic and political changes to take hold and work.

And then finally, the diplomatic track. Negotiations among countries on such things as the level of foreign military advisors and trainers, import of offensive weapons, support for insurgency on neighboring countries, access of opposition parties to democratic elections on the one hand, and, on the other, negotiations within countries on how to hold fair, safe and open elections -- elections open to all parties. He points out that the terms of participation in elections should be, indeed, negotiable in each case.

The President, in his assurances, states that he will support any reciprocal and verified agreement that the Central American countries can reach on the elimination of foreign military advisors, import of offensive weapons, renunciation of support for insurgency on neighboring countries, and he indicates also his intention to support the access of opposition parties in all countries in the area to the democratic process in those countries.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just have one item to add to the description of the speech and the description of the President's motivation for making the speech, and that is that this is an effort, in the Congress, to the Congress, to attain a bipartisan approach.

Bipartisanship is mentioned and is described and is built into these remarks. And this is an effort, not just with words, but with policy, to address and draw as close as possible to the Congressional intentions that have been so frequently expressed in the form of conditions, certifications, speechs, and the like. This is a strong effort to do that.

And I think its an effort to share the responsibility, as opposing -- as opposed to shifting the responsibility -- to share it with the Congress. And in a non-partisan way.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have only two more points to make. At the conclusion of his speech the President announces his intention to name, nominate for the advice and consent of the Senate an ambassador-at-large to Central America. His or her duties will include the joint responsibilities for lending U.S. support to regional efforts to bring peace to the area, and secondly, to work closely with the Congress, to be attentive to their interests and to assure the closest possible coordination of U.S. policy for the region.

Finally, the President will say precisely what he wants the Congress to do and he will call for prompt action in four areas: Specifically, in the spending reprogramming requests for 1983; for action on the 1983 supplemental, economic and security assistance funds for Central America; for action on the 1984 authorization bill and appropriations for economic and security assistance in the same area; and, finally, for bipartisan support such as was offered last year for the prompt enactment of the Caribbean Basin Initiative trade and tax measures. He will acknowledge, with appreciation, the introduction of this measure in the House today.

The sum total of the administration's request for aid collectively in the entire region in 1984 is $600 million. The President notes that this sum is really very, very modest considering the stakes at issue. Indeed, $600 million is less than 10 percent of what Americans spend on video games.

Q What was that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, coin-operated video games. (laughter)

Q Is that Central America and the Caribbean, or just Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- Central America. The statistics are also available to you here on the collective investment of the Soviet Union in the Caribbean and Central America and Cuba and so forth over the years, which far outdistance our own, of course. We'll take your questions now.

Q Are those figures -- include any additional aid beyond what was announced in the President's speech in March?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Everything has been announced. The reprogramming, the 1983 supplemental, the 1984 bill and the 1984 supplemental.

Q This is all -- but that's the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. The '83 second supplemental.

Q That doesn't total $600 million, I don't think. How does that break down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1984 bill does. Why don't you give them the breakdown?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The 1983 totals are four seventy-two for economic assistance for the countries involved, and one hundred and eighty-three on the military side. So we're a little --

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Q That's the '83 supplemental?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's all 1983. All 1983.

Q When you spoke of negotiating the terms of taking part in elections, is this a change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q From the way you've described it, it could be or couldn't be a change in your existing policy.

SENIOR ADMISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's intended as a very clear and firm statement of -- restatement of what the President said on March 10th, which was that he is in favor of negotiations for elections. He is not in favor of negotiations for power sharing.

Since that time, Secretary Shultz has described this in some detail in testimony on the Hill and we, of course, have been in dialogue with the Salvadorians on this subject. And they have some ideas and proposals.

Q What's the status of the CBI bill right at the moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's had hearings in the Senate Finance Committee and today was introduced by Chairman Rostenkowski in the House.

Q What about the special envoy? Will you be naming Mr. Stone? Tonight will the President announce -- and if not, when?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will not announce his choice for this special envoy and, as I say, the text simply says that he or she will have duties that I've outlined.

Q Is there a problem that you can tell us about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President won't make any --

Q Yes, but why isn't he going to name him since it has been pretty well spread around that he's been asked?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It hasn't been spread around by us.

Q Not by you, no. Come on -- speak up.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, thank you. (Laughter.)

Q Is there a problem? I mean, is it that you will not be named? Can you say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not in a position to answer your question.

Q Wink twice if you're going to be -- (laughter.)

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Q Why isn't the President addressing the troop level of American advisers there and the point that had been brought up, or indicated earlier, that more American trainers may be necessary if he doesn't get the full Congressional approval. Is that in the speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President does address the numbers involved really on both sides. Specifically, he cites the levels of Soviet advisers regionally, Cuban advisers in Nicaragua, and, by juxtaposition, points out the

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the imbalance here. We're talking on the order of 2,000 Cuban advisors in military context. Substantially more than that when you aggregate other advisors on a regional level of approximately 2,000 Soviet advisors in the entire hemisphere.

Q Is the President asking for any modification or waiver in restrictions like the Bolling amendment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, in fact, the President is very explicit in saying that our purpose is not to overthrow the government of El Salvador and we are and will comply with the law in Nicaragua.

Q Can you talk about what you hope to get if Congress would give you all the money? In other words, you've got two major things that I see that you're trying to get. One, trying to resolve the situation with the rebels in El Salvador. And, two, trying to work out some sort of non-aggression situation with the Sandinistas.

Could you talk about if you get this money, what does it do toward getting the rebels into the elections, which they don't seem to want to join for a lot of reasons. And, two, where does it get you with regard to getting the Sandinistas to stop helping the rebels?

Is this just -- You talked about the fact that there is -- the security situation that you need for development in El Salvador does not exist now. Is this just kind of a stop gap to get you -- to keep you on the road toward those goals? Or will you actually achieve something toward those two major goals if you get the full amount?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two key variables to look at in the military assistance situation for El Salvador. One is the level of training. That is to say, the amount of simple training that can be done over and above the level of consumables and weapons requirements. And second is the reliability, durability, expectations of the aid.

So far, we've been living just sort of from hand to mouth from -- every six months. And we've never been able to create a firm environment in which the Salvadorans could develop their military force.

So we -- at current levels, even with the Doc Long add-on, which puts us at about $55 million -- or, correct me, $56 million for this year, we will not be able to do significant training. And, therefore, you are not able to get out ahead of the insurgent problem to get the initiative against the insurgent.

Equally, unless we have some expectation that support will be continued at some minimum level that includes training by the U.S. Congress, there will be uncertainty as to how these funds are used and it will be difficult for the Salvadorans to gain the initiative.

Note that I put it at again, "the initiative." The President is calling for a political not a military solution. Once the insurgents can be convinced that they have no long-term prospect of winning, the likelihood of their lending themselves to a political solution will be much greater.

Once the Sandinistas come to the conclusion that they're going to be opposed by a large number of their own citizens for a long period of time unless they admit them into the electoral process and withdraw from their support in other countries, then perhaps the conditions for a stable Central America will have been created.

Q What is the military situation now? Are we losing the war?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Answered no. The -- But the insurgents have had the initiative on and off since October. They have not been able to convert it into major gains of territory or developing a recruiting base. But they have been able to knock off relatively large numbers of small outposts. And they have extended the area of operations that they have.

We think that during this period, in effect, the -- although the government army has made gains. Those gains have been less than that of the insurgent. So --

Q Well, why do they seem to be losing the war if they've extended the area of operations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, except that it does not lead to -- you cannot extrapolate that out indefinite -- If, in fact, the current trends were to continue indefinitely, you would end with a loss so that you're looking at current trends which are unfavorable, although not sharply so. And the question is how do you take action early enough to reverse them?

Q And did the turnaround begin in October?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The insurgent offensive at that time, when combined with leadership uncertainties in El Salvador itself, resulted in an ineffective response and these gains were made. The leadership situation has now clarified in the military side in El Salvador. And if training is made available, we expect that there will be an improvement in the course of this year.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me enlarge on that just a moment. The President feels very strongly that the short answer is, no, we are not losing there.

But it is equally clear to him that we have had a difficult problem in getting the level of assistance that we need. Now, as my colleague has pointed out, if we're going to be able to sustain a policy over time, recognizing that economic development doesn't take place overnight, it's going to take a sustained commitment. About seventy-seven cents of every dollar we send down there goes to economic programs as opposed to security programs. But it's going to take this small level of security assistance to make possible any hope of progress on the economic side.

The point is, however, that given these problems -- and they have been very evident in all of your reporting -- it's apparent that the stakes simply are not understood -- the importance, why we should care. And it's that central purpose, to explain just what our interests are, what the costs of failure would be to the American people -- because over time you will never sustain any policy in the Congress that doesn't command broad public support. And that's the objective.

Q Is it fair to say, from what you're saying, that the objective here of the administration is not to achieve a victory over the insurgents but rather to prevent a victory by them and achieve a stalemate for a period of time during which it is hoped that the insurgents will realize that they have to do something else? And if that's the strategy, when do we think -- how long might there be a stalemate where we keep pouring in aid to hold off a victory? And what might then happen to encourage them even more to participate in a political reconciliation, other than just holding them off militarily?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- (laughter) -- not any of that.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What it is, is that the President is seeking a level of assistance by which both the society, the economy, and the armed forces of Salvador can regain and take the initiative. And although an anti-guerrilla situation is not eliminated or even reduced down to minimal conditions overnight, it is the regaining of the initiative and momentum that will induce the guerrillas to at least consider the possibility of participating in the political process instead of trying to take the situation there by force.

So we're not looking for a stalemate, we're not looking for a long, drawn-out deadlock. We are looking to raise the level of assistance sufficiently so that our friends there can take and hold the initiative.

Q Sir, you just said that we're not looking for a long deadlock and your colleague says we are looking for a sustained commitment.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me explain, then.

Q How many years and how much money are we talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me explain, as I think I did in my answer. When you take the initiative, you don't necessarily win an anti-guerrilla conflict overnight. It takes a sustained effort. In the country of Malaya it took some years. In the country of Colombia, where the M-19's have been operating for years, they've been reduced to manageable proportions over time. It didn't happen overnight. But the government forces in Malaya, the government forces in Colombia, took and had the initiative. They had a sufficient level of commitment and support and they had a sufficient momentum so that over time, with a sustained effort,

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those insurgencies were reduced down to what most people would call irrelevancies, even though even today they still exist.

Q How many years will it take in El Salvador, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It won't be over in one year, but it all depends on how much we help, how effectively we can train, and how effectively the Salvadorans themselves can respond. But it won't be endless.

Q Could you elaborate a little on this thought that the United States will support any agreement that was reached that would bar the weapons and trainers of both sides from these countries? Would you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Daniel, I think that makes a major point in this speech. Although in the San Jose principles -- the United States joined in that previously -- but it's made here specifically in connection with the four points and with the fourth point. What it means is that if we can attain -- not we -- if the Latin governments and countries in groups that are discussing possible initiatives can attain a reciprocal, verifiable

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commitment among those countries that now receive foreign military assistance to either cap it or end it or reduce it, then we will join in that effort. And that is the specific idea. If you can get the thing --

Q And as to that, will it be the task of the U.S. Ambassador-At-Large to try to achieve such an understanding? Will it further it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If the U.S. Ambassador -- San Jose's principles did not involve the Sandinistas.

Q It invited them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. They did. And it was an invitation to them.

Q But the final document did not take into account any Sandinista cooperation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They did not come.

Q They rejected it. So how can you, then, take the San Jose principles and say that this is the basis on which we are going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, look. The mere fact that they reject it does not mean they are not the right basis for a solution in the area. They are the right basis for a solution in the area.

The Sandinistas said, "We weren't at San Jose. So we're not bound by these principles that -- we don't have to address them." And the answer of the Central American countries to that was, "Okay. Then, let's have a meeting of Central American countries in which we develop these principles on the basis of our own grouping."

The Sandinistas are now saying no. They do not want to do that. They want to meet bilaterally with the Hondurans or with the United States. So they are bobbing and weaving on this. But the point is to get them together ultimately in a regional grouping.

And what the President is saying is that he wants to support that process. And he wants to encourage them to reach agreements among themselves to deal with their own problems, which will have these effects. Dealing with the foreign military advisors is the most striking and immediate one -- get them all out of the area.

Q Will the Ambassador-At-Large speak with the Sandinista government and try to encourage them into a regional cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just how he does that with any individual government, nobody has attempted to determine in advance. But the purpose is to promote that kind of agreement for all the Central American countries. That includes Nicaragua.

Q The Vietnam analogy -- it, sort of, runs in a kind of a reflexive sort of aspect of public reaction to this thing from the beginning. Does the President confront that directly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The word "Vietnam" does not appear in the speech, if that is the question. The assertion of an analogy as you portray it, I think, is treated in the speech in terms that there is --

Q There is one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- one negation -- if I could just answer --

Q I am sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in which the President lays to rest the question of the memory of Vietnam by stating, categorically, that there is no thought of sending American combat troops to Central American, that they are not needed and that they have not been asked for.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The point is that the President goes into the uniqueness of this situation by laying out what our interests are, which are very clearly understandable in the Western Hemisphere, affecting our own economy, involving our own vital sea-lanes -- situations which have not applied elsewhere: Vietnam, if you will.

Q Given the steadily eroding support for the President's requests -- specifically, dollar amounts of military aid and the votes of restrictions on U.S. activity in the region, what difference will this speech make? What is the expectation, politically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is the central reason for the speech. Now, that is the self-evident truth. We are having a tough time getting Congression support for what we are trying to do.

The President's judgment is that that is because they do not understand the importance of it, nor precisely what it is we are trying to do, and that the American people as well have not been adequately informed on this issue. The two earlier public addresses on this subject were not carried by television. And in short, this is basically a very conscious stepping up to what the President believes is an extremely important public policy issue, which the American people and the Congress should decide based on the fullest possible information.

And that is why he is making this speech tonight. And, implicitly, he obviously does believe that with the facts on what our interests are, on the severity of the problems, and on what it takes to deal with them, they will make the right choice.

Q Is there any reference to Cuba and possible action against them in view of their continued role in support of the rebels?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are countless references to Cuba. You may be sure.

Q How about possible action against them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q What is the "or else?" I mean, what if Congress -- and the country -- does not rally around him in support?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President makes pretty clear, after going into precisely what the government of El Salvador is trying to do and the efforts they are making, that we cannot turn our back on it.

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We cannot turn our back on democracy in Costa Rica, nor in Honduras -- in short, intends to stay the course.

Q You said that one of the purposes in trying to obtain the bipartisan approach is to draw closer to what Congress has wanted. What specifically in this speech fits that definition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The diplomatic initiatives and descriptions and assurances in the fourth point is directly the kinds of things called for by numerous Senators and Congressmen -- the description of the economic efforts, the agricultural efforts and the social efforts that have the support of the administration there and which we want to intensify.

The description of military support, not as an end in itself but as a shield for reform, for movement towards democracy, for movement towards opportunity for people, these are things that the Congress has wanted the administration to do and say more of and they are going to get that tonight. Now, if they won't take yes for an answer, then we'll have to see what the answer really is. But there's not just an appeal for bipartisanship here, there's considerable substance of bipartisanship here.

Q Is there a categoric assurance that the United States under no conditions will send combat troops in this area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'll have to hear the actual statement made because I wouldn't want to hypothecate or hypothesize what might happen.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President states very firmly that there is no need for them, for American troops there. And they're not asking for them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- not needed, not wanted?

Q Does the President either explicity or implicitly reassure Congress that the 55 man limit will remain in effect or is there still some question as to whether it might be necessary to increase the number of advisors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He doesn't address that.

Q On the Boland Amendment, let me ask about the Boland Amendment, there was some talk on the Hill that Boland wanted to change that limit, that there would no longer be any covert operations, everything would be overt operations. What does the administration feel about that possible change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If there was speculation about it, I think that today you could discount that. As far as I know, that concept, and I had heard that, isn't being seriously considered any longer there.

Q Would you talk about the special envoy a little bit and discuss the extent to which the Salvadorans are upset about that whole concept? It makes them obviously a little uneasy.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not an envoy for El Salvador in the sense that you may have seen some press reports and there's been some speculation in El Salvador itself. This is not an envoy, for example, to independently work between several groups in El Salvador. It is a person to support the efforts of El Salvador and the other governments of the region to advance towards peace. And the operative phrase there is "support the governments."

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Q The great unknown in all this, and you say, American troops will not be involved. There's absolutely no intention of such. If the Nicaraguans accept MIGS from Cuba and -- or large numbers of combat troops from Fidel Castro, this administration has already said privately and you have said in Senate hearings that you have warned the Cubans and the Soviets about that. So, obviously, there is some discussion and that's what people are worried about, the escalation, thereof. And the speech doesn't answer that. People are concerned about what's down the road. How do you answer that? How do you assure the American people that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can put together a huge catalogue of "what ifs" and the President does not attempt to deal with all the "what ifs".

Q But you've addressed that in the Senate.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exactly, is that -- what the President says there's no thought of and he's addressing the issue that the United States' active policy would want to put in American troops into, say, El Salvador. And he's saying there's no thought of it, no need of it, and no desire for it by the locals. He's not trying to eliminate all contingencies and the contingencies that have been discussed remain.

Q Has the President had any assurances of bipartisanship going into this speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would like to answer that. I think that the administration is very appreciative of the bipartisan efforts led in the recent days by Chairman Long. Several weeks ago it did not appear that his subcommittee was in a position to vote in favor of any re-programming at all. He took the trouble to go down there. He made personal efforts to set reasonable, attainable and worthwhile conditions, to show some movement with the progress that he attained and that we attained, with the help of President Magana and the government down there, he felt assured enough to come back and with democratic votes, not just his own, reprogrammed $30 million for military assistance.

Q Why did they pick a joint session against the advice of some of the Republican leaders?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know about such advice.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nor do I.

Q Does the President start out in his speech that there's the long-term effort of two, three, four, five, six, seven years down the -- Does he make clear the length and the duration of the American involvement in terms of aid, advisors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm glad you bring it up again, Rick. It's been asked two or three times here, and that's a very key point.

Earlier, I said that if you're going to have any promise of economic develop -- I think everybody would accept that that doesn't happen in two years or three years and so forth. And, so, yes, with respect to the economic development of the area, it's going to take a long time.

I couldn't give you a number of years. Separately, what it takes to stem and end the military threat to this development process may take very little time or it, too, could conceivably take a long time. The point is that today the ability of the President of the United States to explain to the people the issue, the stakes, the nature of the problem and the nature of the solution, and, then, command broad support for it, and to demonstrate to people in the area that the United States is committed to this process carries as much a message to the left there as to anybody else.

And the very demonstration of that commitment and will could make this a much shorter process than I think is implied by your questioning here. Now, I can't say it's going to be over tomorrow afternoon. I don't intend that.

The point is if the government of El Salvador and the other governments in the area have a clear demonstration that the President is committed and enjoys a broad base of support in his commitment, that can have an enormous effect in turning the tide.

Q -- do you believe, then, to follow up on what your colleague said that this money would be sufficient to regain the initiative? Can you -- I think those were his -- That was his term. Is that something that the administration believes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that if we get the funds we've asked for right now, to include the reprogramming, the two glove supplementals, the '83 and the '84 bill, that, yes, we can have a very solid program in '84 and '83.

Q You will regain the military initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're talking about going from a level of roughly $80 million last year to $136 million this year, if our requests are agreed to, back down to $85 million next year. I'm talking about security assistance. And that kind of surge will give you the enhancement,

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we think, that will gain the initiative.

Q Is there going to be any sort of political effort beyond what the President says? I mean, is there any, like -- or something of this sort, sending out across the country, any sort of effort beyond tonight's speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gosh, I'm afraid to know what you might say if I said yes. (Laughter.)

Q No, I'm serious. In other words, a lot of people have complained within your own -- within the State Department and other places that there isn't enough visibility of the administration out among -- in these various areas, supporting kind of -- that you're talking about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I don't mean to be frivolous. Yes, the administration spokesmen, as often and as frequently as we can, are going to be promoting the President's policies in the days ahead very vigorously. Yes.

Q Okay. That's what I wanted. That's all.

Q Is it true that you're saying that the President can categorically state there's no intention to send combat troops now, that there's just no way he can make that assurance for the future?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the present set of circumstances, the President says that they are not needed. He points out that they haven't been asked for and so forth. Now, I think that's -- I don't intend to be cute by that. If there -- something profound in the context of rebus sic stantibus, then we'd have to take another look at the situation, but --

Q Since the purpose, as you said, of appointing a special envoy is in part to try and figure out ways and promote a process whereby the opposition in El Salvador can participate in the electoral process or will participate in the electoral process, will the envoy be empowered to talk to anyone in the opposition in regard to El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague didn't say that. He said that the envoy's purpose is for mostly regional, that is to foster among the governments of the area the reaching of an accord among themselves that provides for exclusion of outside advisors, lateral movement of subversive weapons, people, and so forth. Now, it is, too, as well to help where we're asked for in facilitating the fullest possible participation of everyone in elections. But this is not an intrusive role to which the United States is called. And we don't see it that way.

Q Does that mean that --

Q Is that no?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q Well, could we have the answer to the follow-up question?

Q Is that a no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that he's not supposed to --

Q To talk to the opposition in El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, his mandate as to who he talks to isn't defined. He has a mission and he's to do his best to carry out that mission.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or she.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, maybe I could help on this. The Salvador government has asked that all opposition parties, as well as parties that are in the government, participate in election. And it tends to seek means by which they can all be brought in. It will be contacting and reaching out to the -- obviously, to the degree that we can be helpful in that process at their request and in support of them, that is what we will be doing, one of the things we'll be doing in El Salvador.

That does not necessarily -- it does not mean, however, that we are acting independently in trying to reach opposition groups.

MS. SMALL: We're going to have to wind this up. Is there one final comment that any of you want to make?

Q Yes, one question then.

The continuing flow of arms into Nicaragua from Cuba, from the Soviet Union, from Libya, the apparent apprehension of a boat in Costa Rica, I understand, with a large body of arms just today all dramatizes the fact that the flow continues. And as long as it continues it would seem to be very difficult to stabilize the situation in Salvador. What steps to prevent that continuous influx are being considered? Or are there any being considered?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are obviously very interested in preventing arms from reaching the area. We make clear that strong sentiment through our diplomacy, both to the Soviet Union and, as already reported long ago, to Cuba. With our friends in the area, we try to do what we can to identify and prevent these kinds of shipments from taking place.

On that, the President does note in this speech tonight that the Brazilian success last week in detaining the Libyan aircraft might well not have been possible had the Grenadan airport been finished and we would never have known about it.

END 5:50 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

April 27, 1983

The Briefing Room

6:00 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: May I have your attention, please? This is a background briefing attributable to senior administration officials. It is embargoed at the same time as the speech -- until 8:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time.

Again I want to say, this is a background briefing to be attributed to senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hello. I will be brief, and take your questions in about five minutes together with my colleague.

The President has decided to request the extraordinary measure of a joint session of Congress to address the Congress and the American people tonight on an issue that is of extreme importance to this country and its relationship to Central America and to our national security.

He believes that the challenge is so important that it requires the development of a very broad, national consensus and strong bipartisan support for the support of U.S. policy. He will go into the nature of the challenge as he sees it. And that is that there is, today, a Soviet and Cuban inspired and supported campaign of subversion in Central America that is very well advanced.

The President will take the format, in his remarks tonight, of explaining just what U.S. interests are or, in other words, why we should care. What is it about the area that affects our interests -- security interests? In this context, he will talk about the level of trade, the level of petroleum that passes through this area -- almost half the trade, half of our petroleum requirements.

He will talk about the geo-strategic locations in the area -- the canal and so forth. He will talk about the level of Soviet advisors and Cuban advisors, which out number the American advisory program by many, many, many fold.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fifty to one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fifty to one, my colleague tells me.

He will, basically, explain the character of the problem as it exists and the conditions within these countries. That is that conditions of recession in terms of trade on primary products have led to very high unemployment, high inflation, which makes attractive an appealingly simple concept of Marxism. And this has been very much exploited by the Soviet Union and Cuba and which has fostered and supported

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insurgencies which are far along in El Salvador.

In the nature of the solution to the problem, the President will make very clear that the solution is not and cannot be a military one, that the long-term solution must be built upon the economic development of the area and a long process of establishing sustainable growth in these countries, that in a political context the long-term future must rely in greater progress toward pluralism, toward reform of institutions, establishment of democratic institutions, and greater protection for human freedoms in these countries.

But in order for this long-term political and economic program to have any hope of succeeding, there must be a fundamental level of security behind which this development process can take place. The President's sense of priorities is already expressed in the amount of investment that is going into these relative categories today -- roughly three to one in favor of economic assistance versus security assistance. But there must be this security assistance.

The President will lay out his four policy pillars, if you will: our political objectives, our economic objectives and policies, our security objectives and policies and, finally, our objectives for regional cooperation and our support for regional solutions to regional problems.

He will, also, provide certain assurances as to the U.S.

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conduct in seeking these objectives and limits which we impose on ourselves. He will stress that the United States has not sent troops and there is no need for U.S. troops in the area, nor have any been requested.

He will make a very strong call for bipartisanship. He will make clear he views this as a shared responsibility and one which we must all shoulder.

I'll call in just a moment on my colleague for a little more precise definition of the four posts and the four assurances. I wanted to say, fundamentally, that it's very clear to the President -- and this goes to his motives for the speech -- that we have had problems in getting the levels of assistance -- economic as well as security -- that are needed to sustain U.S. policy in the area. He believes that the reason we've had problems is because there is not an adequate understanding of the problem, nor an adequate understanding of how we're trying to solve it, either in the Congress or in the country at large.

On the other two occasions when the President has spoken publicly about this issue, it hasn't reached a television audience, it hasn't been carried. And so today he hopes to reach the people of the United States as well as the Congress because he is — accepts that there is no promise of long-term success in sustaining this policy unless it is widely understood by Americans. But he believes that if he identifies what our interests are, why we should care, how they are threatened, and what we intend to do about it, that we can reverse current trends before a crisis point is reached.

The close of the speech -- the President will also announce that he intends to nominate an ambassador at large to the Central American region. He goes on to say that he or she will have as his or her duties: Lending U.S. support to regional efforts by the governments of the area to find solutions to their problems and to bring peace to the area; and separately, but related, to work closely with the U.S. Congress to be attentive to their interests and concerns and to assure the closest possible coordination of U.S. policy in the area with them.

Anything to add?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can be very brief. Thank you.

I think the essence of the strategy is in the four points with our values, support for democracy, political change, and for human rights at the very start. The President does contrast the evolution in Nicaragua and the evolution in El Salvador, in the one case, from a very broad consensus type movement in Nicaragua towards a monopoly of power, militarization, and foreign intervention; and in the other case, an opposite movement from a situation of serious human rights violations towards the construction of democratic institutions, a limiting of human rights abuses, and very substantial land reform.

The second principle is, of course, economic support -- both economic assistance in the near term and the Caribbean Basin Initiative to give hope for the future.

The third point is military assistance as a shield. The President very clearly states that this limited program is designed to give the -- our friends the opportunity to hold off and, indeed, take the initiative against the insurgents, pending the rest of his strategy taking hold.

And, finally, on the diplomatic front, the President does state very clearly that he will support any agreement -- he uses the word "any agreements" -- reached among the Central American countries to remove all foreign military advisers and trainers, to limit the import of offensive weapons, to permit access to opposition groups to democratic processes in elections in each country; and, finally, on a basis of verification and reciprocity, to end the support for insurgencies from one country to another.

He states his Nicaragua policy very clearly. He says that the United States does not

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seek to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. It does seek to -- in accord with the United States and international law -- to see that flows of armaments to neighboring countries are limited and eliminated.

He indicates that the United States cannot and should not protect the Nicaraguan government against its own people. But we should offer a diplomatic alternative and that is what is contained in the four assurances that he very strongly proposes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a word or two: in numerous places in the speech and in the substance of the President's speech, the theme of bipartisanship is very evident.

It isn't only that the President is asking for bipartisan team-work and support, it is also that he is formulating the administration's Central American policies in four points plus four assurances, of which three of the four are clearly the kinds of things that have specifically and generally been asked and requested by both sides of the isle by the Congress.

And I think that the administration is grateful to see and appreciative in seeing the emergence of some substantial bipartisanship particularly in the last week in the situation in which Chairman Long and his Subcommittee of Appropriations in the House has approved, with a bipartisan vote, the reprogramming of $30 million of the military assistance requested by the administration, with the suggestion that more can be forthcoming with more progress.

Let me make one final point, and that was that the President ends by seeking four specific things from the Congress, and he asks for the prompt action of the Congress on reprogramming 1983 funds for both economic and security assistance; prompt action on the 1983 supplemental; prompt action on the 1984 bill; and finally, immediate action to move the CBI tax and trade legislation to the floor.

He notes, with his appreciation, the introduction today in the House of Representatives by Chairman Rostenkowski, of the CBI legislation. As a footnote, he mentions -- in terms of overall levels -- that in 1984 our aggregate request is for about $600 million to the whole area. That's about 10 percent of what American's will spend this year on coin-operated video games.

Your questions please.

Q Are you the new envoy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been no decision made on the envoy.

Q Is he an administration official or not?

MR. ALLIN: Yes. He's been working in an advisory role with the Secretary and the President for several months in the area.

Q Why is there no decision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ask the President. He hasn't decided it yet.

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Q You don't have an expert guess -- will you send a message to him? (Laughter.)

Q Is it true that there has been opposition from within the State Department to having a non-diplomatic -- who is not someone from the diplomatic community to take that post?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gosh, if that were so, the Secretary's in trouble.

(Laughter.)

Q -- in this case --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't mean to be frivolous, I'm sorry. No, I don't know that.

Q Is the administration concerned that Senator Stone was a lobbyist for Guatemala in 1981 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've heard no such reference to anything like that.

Q Are you aware that he was a lobbyist for Guatemala?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not. I have to be clear. I'm not involved in the clearance process, but I must say again, there's been no decision here.

Q -- would you consider --

Q What would you anticipate --

Q When would you anticipate this decision's going to be made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Soon.

Q Is he --

Q What are the plans like --

Q -- this evening --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Not this evening. It will not be made, in my judgement, for another day or so.

Q Is he among those under consideration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are -- Yes.

Q -- still under consideration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you tell us who else is under consideration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is there anyone else under consideration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q How many?

MR. ALLIN: Miguel, help us out here. Go ahead. (Laughter.)

Q -- I wonder -- (laughter) -- if you believe that the -- (inaudible) -- the government going to recommend in El Salvador aren't enough to counteract the outcome of what is going to happen there?

I say that because I have some experience in this kind of business. In 1968, there was in my country, Cuba, a situation like that. And I told my President Battista that we are going not to be six months. He told me, "Miguel, we are going to fight with the last bullet." We try to wait by fascists, by -- (inaudible) -- who save their country against this fascist -- (inaudible). And in January the 9th -- the 1st -- we have to leave the country.

I have been seeing the same characteristics over there. And I think that we have to take action and to imprison the military power of these people or the contrary, we are going to have another Cuba, another Nicaragua, etc.

I think that the --

MR. ALLIN: Miguel, did you ask a question? Because we only have so much time.

Q Yes.

Q It was your idea, Mort.

MR. ALLIN: -- por favor.

Q You called on him.

MR. ALLIN: He had his hand up, folks.

Q -- actions. And with the program that have been designed, do you believe that the country is going to be saved for democracy and not for the -- enemy? That my question.

Q Is Miguel under consideration? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are two parts, I think, to the answer.

First of all, we have had problems, as I've said, in getting approval for the amounts we've requested. Now, the short answer is if we get the full amounts that we have requested, we believe that two things will happen. First of all, in real terms the economic assistance that's provided is a very strong infusion that we believe is the limit of what can be absorbed this year and usefully employed on the security side. Yes, we believe that if we get the funds we've asked that that is for this year a sufficient amount to stem the tide and begin to enable the government to take the initiative and not just in the security side but in economic recovery as well.

Now, the second, if you will, or stronger message or signal to be sent here is if we can get agreement for this it will be a very strong demonstration that the President and the country and the Congress intend to provide the necessary support and it can have an important rallying effect on the government and on the people down there.

Q Tell us some more about the conciliatory parts of this. Is this new -- this? Is it an outbranch in terms of the verifiable having all sides come in and talk? Is there something new in that, the political end?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, that's another reason why the speech is important. And that is that very few people, I think very few journalists are aware of the long history of serious efforts and diplomacy to engage all of the governments down there to include Nicaragua. And the fact sheet has a long history of U.S. efforts to try to engage them already. My colleague will cover this more in just a moment. It does express our very strong support in this speech for regional efforts to solve the problems there. The principles are consistent with and reenforcing of the San Jose principles that we do support and the efforts that we commit ourselves to seek arrangements for excluding heavy weapons from the area, advisors from the area and to prevent the free flow of weapons between countries, we have said before. But I don't think many people know that.

In the back.

Q You say the U.S. would support any agreement and you emphasize any agreement that would result in the withdrawal of foreign troops from the area. What if that agreement also involved power sharing, say, on the part of the leftists in El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, nobody has ever said the leftists in El Salvador have to withdraw from the area. There are two different issues here.

Q We won't agree to their sharing in power if it's not the result of an election.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, maybe I'm misunderstanding; but the points concerning the exclusion of weapons, exclusion of advisors and limiting of exporting revolution, if you will, doesn't tie itself or isn't tied to the Salvadoran rebels, except to the extent that they enjoy this external support.

With regard to their participation in the electoral process in Salvador, yes, he also says that he supports that. And negotiations to facilitate that participation.

But, again, he reaffirms we do not support negotiations for power sharing.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And he would like to see the same happen in Nicaragua.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exactly.

Q What I'm saying is, isn't it conceivable that the parties down there, the nations in the region, would negotiate an agreement for withdrawal of foreign troops that might also, as a price for this, give power to the guerillas in El Salvador? I mean, do you exclude that as a possibility?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't see that the Salvadoran government is likely to do that.

Q Since the President's speech makes a point on the Nicaraguan issue of emphasizing that the U.S. is acting within the law, will the President accept the moves in the Boland committee to limit to 45 days any additional covert activity and to set up an overt fund of money for interdiction -- weapons interdiction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As an opinion, I'd only say that I think some of those accounts about what is being considered are, first of all, speculative and, in at least one case to my knowledge, erroneous. I apologize. I guess I'd have to say that with regard to whatever else they might consider, we'll wait until we see it. But the President does make clear we are not violating the law and we will not.

Q Of the $600 million you mentioned proposed for '84 for the area, how much of it -- do you have a breakout for El Salvador and Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Have you got the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nicaragua does not figure on it. (Laughter.) El Salvador is $190 million.

Q How much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One hundred ninety million economics, $85 million military.

Q Nicaragua has none?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Has zero.

Q Who gets the other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala.

Q The other question I had was how much time is this administration allowing for this process to work? A year, two years? I mean, what kind of time frame are you talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think economic development in countries like Central America or others for that matter takes a long time. I wouldn't put a number of years on it but it will surely take more than two or three for the economic development. How long it takes to stem and eliminate the insurgent problem isn't predictable right now. It could take very little time. It could take a longer time. It's a function of, in large measure, how much the people and the government believe that the United States is committed to them. Beyond that is, importantly, a function of how well they perform.

In recent days we think, frankly, with a number of changes that have been made -- new assignments and so forth that there is every promise that with this level of aid they could take the initiative. And if it's clear to the guerillas that the United States intends to support over time the government of El Salvador, it could be over sooner than otherwise one would expect.

Q If not, then what?

Q For those of us who have not had a chance to read this as closely as we would like so far and who don't follow this as closely as we should, is there any new diplomatic initiative or any new offer of any new bipartisan move contained in his speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's a very strong theme of interest in bipartisanship and an effort to develop it and a very clear acknowledgement that this policy cannot be sustained without a bipartisan base of support and a repetitive emphasis on bipartisanship.

Q What about the other part? Any new diplomatic offer? Is there any such --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a very strong affirmation of our support for diplomatic initiatives, both regionally and by countries in the area -- the Conta Dora by the reinforcement for the San Jose principles and so forth. The naming of an Ambassador-At-Large to be undertaken in the next few days, I think, signals a clear and emphatic interest.

Q The President said he thought that Nicaragua is having second thoughts about any introduction of any kind of nuclear offer from the Soviets. Have we been in contact with Nicaragua and warned them about anything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think today -- the answer is no -- but it was reported today here and has been corroborated that the foreign office there has said that they would not accept Soviet missiles and would not become a missile base.

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Q Has there been any change in U.S. support for the idea that, before negotiations in El Salvador, the guerillas should lay down their arms -- that first they lay down their arms, and then the negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not said that. We said -- and the President says in his speech here -- that the terms for participation in the election are negotiable. We have, also, said -- "You are not going to shoot your way into them."

Q In the Mid-East, we are trying to get King Hussein to come forth and, sort of, get negotiations started. Are you trying to do something similar in Central America? Is there an emphasis here on trying to get our allies in Central America to do more of the negotiating?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a very strong emphasis on regional efforts and the requirement that solutions be regional solutions. We are not focusing on a given country, if that is your point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The other point is that it is not, sort of, we that are somehow manipulating them or getting them out to do this. They are taking their own problems in their own hands and have called this current diplomatic effort. The President is saying he supports it.

Q I have got two questions. Number one, did the Nicaraguan decision not to be a Soviet missile base result from any U.S. pressure at all? And, number two, as long as you are breaking down the El Salvador portion of that $600 million, how about the other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer to the first question is no.

And what I reported to your colleague's question was a New York Times report today. But it was not a consequence of diplomacy with Nicaragua.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want the figures?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is '84, right?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: $105 million in economic for Costa Rica, $80 million for Honduras, $4 million for Belize; and in the case of military assistance, $37 million for Honduras, and $3 million for Costa Rica.

Q One question -- is there any new programming or any new supplemental being proposed here at all --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- besides the $110 million?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It is the one that was proposed on March 10th by the President.

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Q You and the President both used the expression "he or she," referring to the Special Envoy. Is there really a woman under consideration?

I would like an answer. I mean, do you mean it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Always.

Q Your colleague said, nothing is really new, substantively, other than an agreement to appoint a special Ambassador. And all of these points have been made to Congressman, by administration officials, and to the public: Why do you think this appearance tonight is going to make any difference in terms of the public or Congressional sentiment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, it is the first time when the President will have reached the American people on national television on this issue. Now, I would think that there are those present who would think that very important in shaping American opinion.

Q So you are calling a joint session of Congress so you can get on television and communicate? (Laughter.) I am sorry. I do not mean to be spurious.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You got it. (Laughter.)

Mr. Gergen will be glad to deal with that. (Laughter.)

Q No wait --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I will be glad to answer that.

The President is going to the joint session of Congress because the Congress has opposed the full levels that he has asked for. There is, clearly, significant opposition to what he proposes to do. He believes that because the Congress does not understand the interests, the treats to the interests, and how you go about countering that. And there is no better way to go to the Congress and say that than to go and do it.

Q Do you think the President's message did not get through before because the message was flawed or because it was not carried on television?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the message was very solid. I do not think the interests have appreciably changed. There has been some change to the level of support and that kind of thing. But I think that the message did not carry, for whatever reason, to the average American and to the Congress.

Q Why is there such a quick reference only to the Libyan planes in Brazil? And why isn't there a reference to the fact that there is an evidence of what you are trying to prove? That is, of this campaign of subversion. There is no evidence -- no reference to that fact, that the Libyans are trying to take arms to the region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well,

the reference there, if you haven't read it, is that had the Grenadan airstrip been completed, that shipment might have taken place and we might never have known about it.

With regard to, I think, your larger question -- and that is what are we trying to do about that -- I think the President has said before, and says again, that our opposition, very strong and firm view of this introduction of weapons, particularly heavy weapons in this area, have been made known to the Soviet Union and to Cuba in the past and remain very much an emphatic part of our policy and our diplomacy today.

Q Why isn't that referred to in the speech, the fact that these planes were carrying arms to El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He does talk about that.

Q But not the planes part.

Q I don't think it's --

Q Can you be more specific on the role of the special envoy? Will he be based in here or in San Salvador? And will his role be more directed -- his or her role be more directed toward negotiations within El Salvador, or regional negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Regional. The -- of his location -- he will, of course, be officed in the State Department, and his job is, as I said, both to travel and to be attentive and lend support to regional efforts toward solutions to these varied problems the President cites; and, secondly, here to deal with the Congress as he or she may see fit to do.

Q -- the El Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce was pretty critical to day of reports that a special envoy was being named, likening it to an act of an approval. I was wondering if you have anything specific to respond to that. And I was wondering generally if you'd like to respond to that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The envoy that is envisaged is an envoy to act in support of the governments of the area -- El Salvador in particular, of course. And El Salvador is going to hold an election. It is reaching out to all opposition groups to participate in that election. It will need assistance from the international community in preparing the election. The role of the special envoy in that case will be in support of and on the request of actions taken by El Salvador; not in an effort to impose from outside arbitrary or unwanted actions from the United States -- in support of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But because of this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a second.

Q From what the President -- on the question of the troops, from what the President says in his speech and from what you gentlemen have said here tonight, I don't hear any commitment by this administration not to send troops to Central America. Why is there no commitment?

Q Question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is that with all of the references to troops, there is no commitment never or not to send troops.

Q I think there is. I think there is a --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is that your question?

Q Yes, that's the question.

Q There is something.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the President says there is no thought of --

Q Page 6.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- sending troops.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President has said many, many times -- I'm not trying to blow smoke at you -- that there is no need for troops, that they have not been asked for.

Q But you're not ruling it out at some point in the future, are you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the current circumstances and the foreseeable circumstances, the President cannot anticipate sending U.S. troops to this area. Now, I'm not trying to be cute. You know, if tomorrow there were 20 divisions of new outsiders, that would be rebus sic stantibus. But it's not that situation.

Q It seems that this special envoy is something of a strange -- Number one, he only operates, as I understand it, in El Salvador at the request of the Salvadoran government. My first question is: Is that true? In addition, it appears that he is going to be lobbying Congress, based at the State Department, and negotiating elections with -- supposedly with insurgents, a task that nobody has accomplished, and yet -- obvious reason to think that's going to be accomplished. Isn't that a lot of water for that -- him or her to carry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you've expanded a little bit on what I said. First of all --

Q Your colleague was the one that said -- answered the question about the Salvadoran government. Is that true? He would not operate unless the Salvadoran government requested him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, he is in support of the Salvadoran government.

Q At their request?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, in support of their elections, would be at their request, too.

Q But only at their request.

Q But only at their request. Is that --

Q Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are not trying to impose from outside on any of those countries arbitrary --

Q So if the Salvadoran government does not request him, he is not in a position to operate in that way. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is in regard to the internal negotiations problem. I'll try to make a distinction -- perhaps, I should have made it clearer -- between the regional problems which involve, for example,

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import of offensive weapons and military advisors and trainers on the one hand, and negotiations within countries on the other. In the latter regard it is in support of and on request and acting on behalf of, and not attempting to exercise an independent outside judgment.

Q -- initiated by Congressman Long and the key thing he wanted that envoy to do was to be involved in the negotiating process within El Salvador.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I correct that -- is that if you look at the letter that was discussed between Congressman Long and the State Department, Secretary Shultz, you'll find that -- a very clear statement about power sharing and support of free and open elections, which all can participate in.

Q Has El Salvador requested a special envoy yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This whole special envoy has just come up now.

Q I'd like to ask the senior official in the dark suit if it's true that Senator Stone was a registered foreign agent for Guatemala and then to comment on what effect that might have on his credibility as a negotiator with leftists?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: During 1981, Senator Stone was a registered attorney for Guatemala with two missions, one of which was to seek to work towards a treaty with Belize. And the second of which was to seek to work for an upgrading of their own human rights sufficient to obtain a restoration of the relationship with the United States. We came close in both regards, at least in terms of agreements, but we didn't get there in either. And I resigned.

Q Can't you comment on the second part of my question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No private organizations in Guatemala -- I know the rumor. There is no -- I never represented any private organizations there.

Yes. Go ahead.

Q -- curious about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Go ahead.

Q -- credibility -- What do you think --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Senator Stone has high credibility. I've been told that by --

Q Is that on background?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's very much on background.

Q This morning's Post carried an ad by the Nicaraguan Embassy, which at least report, probably more, probably contradicts many of the statements you just made here. I'd like to ask you, if I could, one, they say that they have tried repeatedly to engage this government from President Reagan on down in diplomatic discussions and have repeatedly been rebuffed. And number two, they challenge this government to produce graphic evidence of this alleged flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and say such evidence is not produceable because it doesn't exist. What do you say to those two allegations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I say this -- that there have been three separate efforts at negotiation that have been proposed to the Nicaraguans, one of which in August '81 I was involved in which we proposed a nonaggression agreement with them in return for their getting out of El Salvador which they turned down flatly, was put --done in writing, the second of which was the group of democratic countries meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, in October of 1981. They produced the principles that the President is now reaffirming very vigorously and making his own.

Personally, those were offered to the Nicaraguans as a basis for negotiation. They rejected them. And, finally, there is an effort now underway, led by Honduras, to have a regional meeting of all the Central American countries to address those questions. The Hondurans said that since they didn't respond to the Costa Rica initiative because we were involved, "Don't participate this time, and let's see whether we get to the bargaining table." They still don't want to come.

Answer to the second question is that there is a mass of evidence which we have provided to our two intelligence oversight committees which describes the command-in-control apparatus, the flow of logistics and training from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

And I should add to you that since the Nicaraguans challenged us last July, we offered to help them find a headquarters. They said, "We don't know where the headquarters is of the insurgents outside Managua." We said, "We'll help you. We'll give you technical assistance." They never took it up -- All we need a little direction-finding.

Q I wanted to ask him whether the suicide of Salvador -- Butterfield, if that has been analyzed by the State Department in terms of what it might mean vis-a-vis a negotiating position of the FDL or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The largest and most intransigent faction has lost its two, top leaders. We don't know what the role of the other groups was in that. But it looks very much like an outburst of gang warfare.

And there may be some instability among them as they struggle for power. I think it's very hard to see exactly which way that this -- go. I would only point out to you, though, with reference to the last question that it is suggestive that all of this happened in Managua.

MR. ALLIN: Thank you. We'll have to conclude on that funereal note for the guerrillas and thank you. (Laughter.)

END 6:43 P.M. EDT

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 2, 1983
No. 134

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM JERUSALEM TO BEIRUT
April 28, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They're keeping you busy, I understand.

QUESTION: How did you find Begin?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Very constructive and thoughtful. We had a fine meeting both yesterday and then a so-called private meeting this morning.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We reviewed all the Lebanon issues and went through them, and he gave me his views and interpretations and then we discussed a whole range of other issues of interest to Israel and the United States. We also agreed that since I'll be around in the Middle East for a while, that we would schedule a series of meetings, that is between he and I, so that we'll have a chance to talk through a good range of issues over a period of time and come back to them and kind of dig into them a little more deeply than you can possibly do in a single meeting or even a couple of meetings.

QUESTION: Beyond Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Beyond Lebanon, yes.

QUESTION: What does it mean when you say that you'll be around the Middle East for a while?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You're all trying to find out when this is all going to be over. Well, obviously, if we're able to get an agreement, or if an agreement emerges between Lebanon and Israel, that's not going to happen overnight, and there are lots of other things to do as well. So I will be in the area for a while. So there'll be opportunities as that takes place to meet, and we agreed that we would do so.

QUESTION: A while is a couple of weeks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we'll have to see.

QUESTION: We had a briefing this morning from the Israelis in which the gentleman implied that the major issue on Lebanon is the Haddad problem and the kind of complex issues around the joint supervisory teams. Is that what Begin told you also? And then can you discuss your own sense from him about whether or how the Syrians fit into this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: At this point what I'm doing is gathering information and views and reasons for views and so on, and I'm going to do that again with the Lebanese Government, so I don't want to say what my views are or be quoting other people. I think the Israelis have given you their views directly; you don't have to hear them from me. So I'll just leave it at that. As far as the Syrians are concerned, they have said on a great many occasions to me and to the Lebanese that they are prepared to withdraw as the Israelis withdraw, as we noted in one of our other discussions that is with you. They have changed their line somewhat recently, but, at any rate, we still expect that if we can get an agreement with Lebanon and Israel that we will go on to our next steps and they have said that they'll withdraw. So we'll expect they will.

QUESTION: As a factual matter, a senior State Department official said last night at a backgrounder, that we don't have information that matches the assertions about the new Soviet presence in Syria -- flying the helicopters, manning the Sam-5s. Are you checking into that? Was that a major issue last night?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's not an issue. They presented us with their intelligence, and we have our own intelligence, and we've discussed that with them. And some of the things that they have said are parallel to our intelligence - quite a bit. The basic fact is, without arguing particular points, that there has been a very considerable increase in Soviet weaponry and Soviet personnel in Syria.

QUESTION: Was that a complicating factor at all in the Lebanon negotiations? Some of the Israelis last night at dinner were telling us they were afraid that this was intended to frighten the Lebanese Government and it might harden their negotiating position -- they might feel intimidated by this larger Syrian presence and Soviet involvement. Does it complicate your task in getting a withdrawal agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can tell you more about Lebanese attitudes after I've met with them, but I think basically the Lebanese-Israeli discussions involve them and their security concerns, their relationships and while President Gemayel's recent statement got a lot of publicity in one way in Israel, it also was a statement, I thought, about his attitude toward Lebanon with respect to any other country -- that he intended to be independent, and intended to run his country as he saw it, and everybody should take note of that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do we take it from the way you're going about this stage of the negotiations, essentially drawing out each of the parties for their arguments and such, that even though you've had a couple of meetings now with the Israeli Prime Minister, you wouldn't talk in terms of a narrowing of the gap on these remaining issues at this point? That remains for the next stage after you've talked to both parties?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's a good rule, when you're talking about a negotiation, that you really haven't gotten the issues framed until you've talked to both sides, and then you have a better idea. So I approach these discussions with the notion that I'm going to reserve judgment on just how wide the differences are, and how difficult they are, until I've heard from both about what they regard the issues to be. And as I said a moment ago, how the reason about the issues, what's the resason why something is so difficult. And sometimes if you look at the understructure of an issue as described by people, you have an idea of what the real root of the problem is, at least that's the way I've always approached these things.

QUESTION: Does that mean that your actual negotiation will be starting on Friday having had these preliminary explorations in the two capitals?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that we all have to remind ourselves that negotiations have been going on for four months, and a lot of ground has been covered, a lot has been known, and to a certain extent there are no new issues and there are no new arguments. The question of really understanding them deeply and seeing where the rate of emphasis is. So in a sense I'm starting, but that's not quite the right word. It's been ongoing. But in terms of arguing points with the parties, I suppose that is more likely to start tomorrow.

QUESTION: On Friday, in other words, you will start to make your own contributions as to how to deal with the gaps having heard from both sides?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll conduct a set of meetings that are in a sense more energetic from my side of it. I've been listening and asking questions.

QUESTION: Is there anything in the presentation of the Israelis that you didn't know before? You mentioned on the way over that there was a difference between what you know and what you realize, and now that you're on the ground, are there things that strike you as new that you didn't realize before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It isn't that there's any issue that is new in the sense that I didn't hear about it in Washington, or read about it in the endless books that we have, but I think it is good to get a feel for it as people now see it, and it's given me a better appreciation of the nuances of concern -- where the weight is, and I'm beginning to get a sense of that, where the weight of concern is.

QUESTION: Based on your conversations so far, could you assess for us the degree to which you think the Israelis are anxious to leave Lebanon, and whether you think they're willing to make any compromises to get out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have had the opinion all along that the Israelis want to leave Lebanon. They don't want to be in Lebanon. And one of the first meetings that I had on the subject was with Foreign Minister Shamir in Washington and he was very strong on that point. And I think that the evidence from the fact that there's been a tremendous amount of progress sort of buttresses that, and everything that I have seen in Israel supports that idea that they want to get out. They want to get out on the basis of an agreement and arrangements that they think will provide the things that they want, and that's quite understandable. But the desire to conclude an agreement and leave I think is quite clear.

QUESTION: Are they each willing to compromise on the key issues?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's important to anyone in a negotiation that the final result be consistent with the general goals they've sought. So it's a question of finding ways to achieve those goals that are mutually satisfactory. So if the question is whether you're going to compromise something which you regard as essential, well, no, people don't make those kinds of compromises; but if you say, can we find our way to a manner of doing something that satisfies both, well , that kind of compromise, I think, is the sort of things we're looking for.

QUESTION: Do you think you might have to go to Syria before the Israelis and the Lebanese reach an agreement? In other words, try to see if they will accept the terms that the Israelis and the Lebanese are looking for?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, right now, of course, I'm trying to come to grips with Lebanon-Israeli issue, and the question of going to Damascus is something that I'll come to in my own mind, and I would expect to go there assuming that I'm welcome there, and we will have passed that question. But I don't want to say anything about the timing because that will have to evolve out of the situation.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you will have a series of discussions with Prime Minister Begin during the time you're out here. Do both of you, do you think, see this as an opportunity to sort of chart the whole future to repair the tension in the relationship and chart a new future for Israeli-American relations encompassing the President's peace plan and other issues?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm sure that both Israel and the United States, both the Prime Minister and the President, want to have a strong collaborative relationship, and wanting it is important, but wanting it is not enough; there has to be the structure of specific things that we work on that give rise in a sense to and support that kind of relationship. And there are all sorts of interactions between Israel and the United States. Right now we're focusing on the Israel-Lebanon negotiations and our involvement and interest in that. There are a whole set of issues having to do with the peace process that are familiar to you. There are bilateral issues involving financial flows and weapons procurement and so on and there are interests that we have outside the region. So, there are a great many things that we'll talk about and I hope that we'll be able to go through this full agenda.

QUESTION: Was it something that Begin proposed that you have a series of meetings or was it something that you suggested?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was something that I suggested and he was very pleased to -- he said he was very pleased to do it.

QUESTION: Did you indicate the frequency with which you hoped to have these meetings? Daily or --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I just said that I expected that I would be in the region for a while and that as we started this meeting, it was my hope that we might have a series of them rather than think in terms of meeting where you go through fifty topics and tick them off -- have a more leisurely kind of discussion, and that we'd have to schedule them as we can. Because the priority here is trying to work on the Lebanon situation and he was very agreeable to that approach.

QUESTION: Have the Israelis proposed having a Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. in connection with the Lebanese-Israeli agreement? Are you talking in those terms?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are a lot of things that are in the air on this and proposals like that, I think, are common in these types of negotiations, so I think I'll just leave it at that.

QUESTION: What is it that has produced the need for you and the Prime Minister of Israel to have a complete review of all of your interests?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's fair to say that particularly since the -- all of the events connected with hostilities in Lebanon have taken place that there has been a considerable strain in the relationship, so that gives rise to a need to review it and to examine it and try to see that everything goes as well as it possibly can. But then I would say that it seems like the natural thing that I do wherever I go that I would review the bilateral as well as other aspects of relationships between the United States and the country that I'm visiting. In the case of Israel, the relationship of the United States to Israel has been so close over such a period of time that I think it is especially important to do so here.

QUESTION: How are you reporting back to the President and how often?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As often as there is something ... to report but at least once a day.

QUESTION: Do you phone him directly?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's easier to put things in cables and they get them set out clearly and it comes to him, but also if the occasion arises when I think a phone call is useful, I'll certainly -- I know that he'd be very glad to receive it.

QUESTION: Do you tell him more than you tell us?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I tell you everything there is.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is the Soviet build-up as such in Syria that you are totally concerned about it? More than replacement of what -- because I think that some Israelis were saying it was quite alarming (inaudible) --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a matter of genuine concern to us as it is to the Israelis. I don't want to blow it up into -- beyond that, but it is a major build-up and a major problem, no doubt about it.

QUESTION: What about the state of Begin's health and his spirit? We've heard all kinds of things suggesting that since the death of his wife, he hasn't been the same person. What can you tell us about that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I met him for the first time yesterday and I spent a lot of time with him this morning -- an hour and a half, I guess or something like that, and he's a very vigorous interlocutor, I can tell you that.

QUESTION: This review that you're talking about -- one shouldn't construe that this is some sort of complete review of American-Israeli relations such that the relationship could be downgraded in some way, I mean you know, as in the Kissinger review of relationship.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, no, no, that's the wrong slant entirely.

QUESTION: Thank you.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 2, 1983
No. 139

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM
April 28, 1983

QUESTION: Can you give us your assessment of the talks with Mr. Gemayel and how long you met with him?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Sure. Well, why don't I give you sort of a run-down chronologically of the day. You know pretty much, I think. First we went to the site of our destroyed Embassy. We saw that. We kind of got a feeling for how that seems to have taken place. As people now know, they think it was a pick-up truck although they're not absolutely sure, and that it was driven, suddenly turned into the driveway the wrong way, so to speak. That is, generally you'd come around like this, and it came in this way, and it was just driven into the window and exploded, bang, with the driver. So it was a kamikaze-type operation. And, well, you can see for yourselves, the destruction was very wide and not only was part of the building that you could see literally stripped away, but the parts on the side that were a fair distance from the immediate blast were gutted more or less. So, anyway, I viewed that, then went over and met with our employees of the Embassy who were at a nearby site, and just expressed my appreciation for what they've done, and their courage and helpfulness. A great many -- most of them there -- are Lebanese and as we know most of the people who were killed are Lebanese -- one lady there who works for the Embassy whose husband has still not been dug out, so all of these things can't help but affect you. They're so tragic. But anyway they have really pitched in both in terms of helping to dig out and helping to get our Embassy back in business again promptly, but also, I think, just generally supporting each other. So I spent time just shaking hands and talking with them. I should just say that at first as you probably noticed, I had a little meeting with the three Ambassadors of the three countries who are in the Multinational Force. You probably know that the French were there and the French Commander, as soon as Colonel Mead came, said to him: "My forces are at your command." He turned the French forces over instantly to our Marine Commander in an immediate action that if we ever had any

For further [illegible]

doubt that we have a Multinational Force in a very true sense, you can see it there. And considering how the French always are very concerned about their national identity and sovereignty, so I thought that was a wonderful thing for them to do.

And the British have turned over a floor of their Embassy to us as we're trying to find space and so on. So there's been a very strong response and cooperative response from everybody. So then we went on up to the Presidential Palace. I had a fairly lengthy private meeting with President Gemayel, just the two of us for a while. I didn't put my clock on it, I can't tell you exactly how long it was, but about half, three-quarters of an hour, and then we had a session that was similar to the session that I had in Israel, where we asked that they -- well, President Gemayel presented an overall statement and then we asked them to highlight the issues for us. Then we asked questions in an effort to be sure that we understood the issues thoroughly. We had a kind of a working lunch -- a very pleasant lunch -- and then we went back again to the exploration of the issues, and at the end of that, I had another private meeting with President Gemayel. There we were joined by Phil Habib and Elie Salem, the Foreign Minister. That is sort of the structure of it and while the discussion in the large group was entirely on the Israeli-Lebanon agreement and related matters, the discussion with President Gemayel was in part on our bilateral relationships and the Embassy situation and so on. So that is kind of a description of it.

QUESTION: We got the impression from hearing both sides today, we got briefed by the Israelis in the morning and the Lebanese in the afternoon that they were talking somewhat at cross purposes, that they don't understand what the other intends to do. Do you have the sense that they're both on the same wavelength and did you clarify things for them today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They certainly are talking about broadly the same issues. I didn't really try to argue or discuss a lot, I tried to understand today as I did yesterday in Israel and my objective was to be sure that I had understood and people knew that I had heard them out. And whatever points there are or aspects there are to their position, they're known to us and not only me -- but Phil and Morrie Draper and Nick Veliotes and Charlie Hill and Gene Cooley and our whole team. I missed some people, but you know who they are.

QUESTION: Can you begin to see where some narrowing can take place as a result of your two conversations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can see some areas, I think, where it's possible to think of ways of formulating things that would perhaps satisfy both parties, but then there are other issues where there are just differences, and they're going to be difficult to work with, but again, as I said this morning, I'm very impressed with how much has already been accomplished, and just have a sense that we have a very good chance of making it. But I can't tell you how on some of these issues because --

QUESTION: On the security issues, can you see any way that an international force or Multinational Force, somehow involving the Americans in some form or another, could bridge the gap on the security issue between what the Israelis insist on and the Lebanese insist on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, anything is a conceivable thing, but that has not been an approach that would seem to be congenial to the Israelis.

QUESTION: Does that mean the use of Americans?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's what your question was, I think.

QUESTION: Well, if they accepted the international force in the Sinai disengagement -- the Golan disengagement and the Sinai pull-out -- why couldn't they accept it in principle in something which they say involves somewhere between 40 and 100 troops of their own?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to get in a position here of arguing the thing one way or another, but I think there is probably a difference in that the reason for the security concerns in southern Lebanon is that that has been a base from which northern Israel has been attacked, and so to the extent that you believe, as they do, that there is a potential for infiltration, and then PLO terrorist groups once again shelling or attacking or in one manner or another using that area, you want to see an intelligence capability and you want to see a capability to follow-up on whatever might be found out, and take the terrorists out of there.

So, the Multinational force, as presently conceived of, is not a military, internal security group that has a combat assignment, but in southern Lebanon, I think, there is a potential combat assignment in a sense. That is, right now, there is no large force, but if there is a small group or something, the idea is you've got to go and take them out of there. So that's a different kind of role, that's the only point I'm making. I'm not saying it's inappropriate, but it's different from the examples you gave.

QUESTION: Is this the sort of thing that you would be bring up when you begin the bargaining tomorrow, and Saturday and subsequently?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As you have noted, I'm making a conscientious effort not to get into a discussion here of the issues and how I think they should be approached and so on. I'm trying to reserve judgment, and I'll make my moves at the bargaining table, so to speak.

QUESTION: What did you and Prime Minister Begin talk about this morning?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We talked about Lebanon and we also talked about U.S.-Israeli bilateral issues, and other issues around the world in which the United States and Israel both have a wide-ranging discussion. And as I told you this morning, we identified it at the beginning as something that would be a continuing set of discussions, and I don't know how many times we'll be able to meet, but I think, from my standpoint, the more we're able to really dig in and talk about these things thoroughly the better.

QUESTION: Can I just follow up on this statement to clarify an impression you may be leaving with me, will one of the dimensions of your approach to find bridging solutions between the two positions involve an increase of American troops in Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any comment to make on that really, particularly insofar as southern Lebanon is concerned. We have taken the view that is if some increase in the Multinational Force is appropriate: it's open for consideration. We're not foreclosing that, if that would turn out to be useful and obviously, I think, the question is open as is the deployment of the Multinational Force. But in saying that I don't want to leave any impression at all that I'm getting ready to propose American troops in a combat role in southern Lebanon and I'm not contemplating that.

QUESTION: I was asking a question of broader international context. Is there not some possibility of international formula to bridge this apparent contradiction between the two positions -- the Israeli and the Lebanese -- against security on the one hand and sovereignty on the other?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: But you see it isn't that broad. As you discuss an issue like security/sovereignty obviously you try to get the ways in which you are going to get at that by various measures, and there have been a lot talked about, a lot already agreed on that dileneate ways of getting at it. And then the question is whether or not these ways are satisfactory, whether the Israelis feel that the provisions for security are really going to work, and when proposals are made they have to be tested against the criterion of full withdrawal and sovereignty. So you get down -- so you move from these general principles which everyone agrees on that there must be security and there must be sovereignty. You get everyone to sign on that immediately, but then how do you make that operational? And that gets you right down into the detail of particular issues, adn that's where the cutting and fitting has to take place.

QUESTION: You've met with both sides now, sir. Can you indicate to us whether you think it's going to be harder or easier to accomplish this than you expected when you set out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought it was going to be difficult when I started out, although I thought it was going to be do-able, and I still think that it's do-able, and I'm even more convinced that it's tough.

QUESTION: Do you think we're going down the ladder?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, no, I think it's been very positive. The good thing about it is that the spirit is terrific. Both Heads of State have assured me that they want an agreement, and they want full withdrawal and they want a peaceful, stable, secure prosperous Lebanon, and secure borders and all that. And everybody keeps tell each other, telling that I think the figure was used today, that over 100,000 Lebanese have been killed in the last three, four, five years as a result of all that has happened. So obviously, most of those who were killed were killed before the Israeli war in Lebanon. And so this is a matter of long standing, and the Lebanese keep saying, if you think the Israelis are concerned about having the PLO come back here and raise Cain, think of how we must feel about it in the light of all of these things. So all of this genuine desire to get an agreement, the confluence of interest in this matter and the general spirit of people as I've talked to them give me the confidence that we'll get there. But if you ask me about quite a few specific issues, do I see how we can work our way through them? I don't see how we can work our way through them, but I think we can. I don't know how but I think we can.

QUESTION: Are you going to go back and forth for the next few days, or do you have some other approach that you plan to use?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What I think is going to happen is I'll spend a lot of time tomorrow with the Israelis in various groupings through the morning. I think we have a lunch scheduled with the opposition party leaders and then on Saturday, probably come back to Lebanon and meet with President Gemayel and his advisers and then we'll see where we go from there.

QUESTION: Will you see Begin tomorrow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes.

QUESTION: On the American troops, Casper Weinberger said a couple of weeks ago, that an increase of perhaps as many as two divisions -- about 800 to 1,000 men -- was possible. Are you thinking of anything beyond that or is that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What the President has told me and that's what I'm operating on, is that he's very anxious to see this work out, and he wants to be helpful, and as we work at this, if it seems that some increase in the Multinational Force will be helpful, we'll consider it. Obviously we have to consult with the Congress before any change is made, and it's also a question of the disposition. Right now there's a certain deployment and I feel certain that however this works out, there'll be some rearrangements of that deployment because we can already identify various potential missions that are not missions of operating under hostile conditions, but nevertheless will be offering reassurance and so on that you can see. So, I'm going to work at this but I don't want to get pinned down to brigades or numbers or anything. I am only going from a general principle from the President and when I see where we're going, I'll get in touch with him or I'll keep in touch with him and he'll make his decision.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK

April 28, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

12:32 P.M. EDT

MS. SMALL: Welcome, everyone. Let me just say welcome to everyone. I've seen many of you here before. We're happy that we could arrange this gathering for Ambassador Kirkpatrick, particularly. Dave Gergen will be joining us in a few minutes. And we might say that we are making a transcript of the exchange, which probably won't be available until late tomorrow morning, by noon, because we have Trudeau here, we have departure statements, and briefings and other things that are also going to have to be typed. It's a little hard for the stenos to get it all out. But by noon tomorrow, there will be a transcript in Room 45 for you all if you want to send a messenger. And this would be on the record. Everything today is on the record.

We can go ahead and start our salad. The main course will be up in a few minutes. And if the Ambassador would like to -- Ambassador Kirkpatrick, if you wanted to open up with some remarks yourself, we'll just then go to questions and make it sort of a working lunch, however you would like to proceed with your remarks.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: What can I say? As I think most of you here know, we think Central America is very important for the United States and for our future as well as, even more than, our present and for a lot of different reasons which the President laid out last night and which a good many people in and out of our government have laid out many times, as -- all of you know that and all of you know what the President said last night.

I might comment briefly on what I thought about some things that Chris Dodd said last night. (Laughter.) This might be the -- you probably now want to think of that, too. I would -- but I guess there are a few simple observations I would like to make. The one is the extent to which the terms of the debate have changed in the last year.

A year ago, a significant number of persons engaged in public debate on this issue doubted -- continued to doubt on the record that the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the Soviet bloc, in fact, had and were interested in having and had developed an -- a significant presence in this hemisphere. There was a lot of pooh-poohing about the suggestions of the development of Soviet power in the hemisphere and the efforts to develop bloc power in the hemisphere; and, specifically, the Soviet interest in Nicaragua, Central America, et cetera.

Even six months ago, significant numbers of people engaged in this public debate were still doubting on the record the presence of a significant flow of arms into Central America, specifically Nicaragua, and the other countries of Central America through Cuba. And as recently as three months ago, I think there was a lot of doubt about whether the struggle in El Salvador was a truly indigenous affair or whether there were -- whether there was a kind of a regional agenda, whether other countries in the region -- like Honduras and Costa Rica were or were likely to be involved.

These are interlocking questions, because, obviously, if there was a significant arms flow from the Soviet bloc through

Cuba into Nicaragua and from there to Salvador through Honduras, then Honduras was involved significantly by way of the continuing flow of arms through Honduras. And whether or not there were safe houses discovered in Honduras and whether or not there were some kinds of threats going on to Costa Rica, those questions today, I think, are no longer considered as very lightly opened questions by most of the people participating in this public debate today.

As recently as six months ago, certainly, almost nobody was talking about the establishment of a Marxist state in El Salvador as a likely possibility. Now, that's changed. You know, even Dodd begins last night by saying we will oppose the establishment of a Marxist state in Central America. Steve Solars (phonetic) and his MacNeil-Lehrer show with me last night, and Congressman Long began by saying the same thing, basically. Of course, we oppose the establishment of a communist state in El Salvador.

Six months ago -- even three months ago -- nobody even raised that possibility -- virtually outside the circle of those of us who have been long concerned about the question. Nobody was talking about the possibility of establishment of Soviet bases. Last night Dodd began by saying that we will oppose the establishment of a Marxist state in Central America, would oppose the establishment of Soviet bases. We will not tolerate -- that's the strongest language I think anybody has used yet that I have heard -- the introduction of offensive Soviet missiles or Soviet missiles with an aggressive -- aggressive capacity or offensive capacity into the -- Central America.

He said we will oppose these by war if necessary. That is very interesting. That's the kind of -- if I may say so -- purple prose that nobody in this administration uses in talking about these issues. That's just kind of interesting, I think; worth noting.

Q Who was that?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, Dodd -- Dodd did that. I was -- I hope I got my notes right. I haven't seen a text, a written text of the speech, but I took notes on it as he was speaking and I think that's what he said all right. Professors, like journalists, are practiced in taking notes -- (laughter) -- but they should know that -- better, I think, at taking notes than at a lot of things.

The interesting thing that I thought about his discussion was -- which I thought paralleled in certain ways Steve Solars' (phonetic) discussion on the Lehrer show where I had been with him -- was that he -- what he didn't do was deny that these were legitimate concerns or that -- realistic concerns, but he moved on to say the administration misunderstands the basis of the conflict. He said we know as little now about Central America as we knew about Indochina in the '60's. He then went on to say the people of Central America are appallingly poor and that there are appalling disparities in wealth in Central America; that Central America is wracked with poverty. I would just like to say I wholly agree that the people of Central America are appallingly poor and that there are appalling disparities of wealth and that the people of Central America are wracked with poverty and that there is, in fact, hunger -- real hunger and a great deal more malnutrition that is hunger-derived, in a sense, in the sense that there's no alternative to the -- no practical alternative to the malnutrition for a great many rural Central Americans.

It seems to me, therefore, if the question is not whether anybody opposes a Marxist state -- there's also no question about whether the people in Central America are appallingly poor and whether there is hunger and whether they are wracked with poverty.

He even went on to say, instead of trying to do something about this, they -- that is, we, the administration, try endless military aid, endless military training. I would like to say there that when he talked about our trying endless military training, reminded me of some hecklers I encountered at Berkeley and then at Minnesota. I think it's the same group actually, because they were saying the same things. And one thing they kept saying is: 30,000 dead. U.S. out of Salvador, 30,000 dead, as well as those -- we've had an average of about 37 trainers in El Salvador through this period, you know, as though they were somehow responsible for the 30,000 dead. I thought about that 37 trainers or 55, which is our sort of top figure, and

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I felt that same quality of statistical surrealism was involved here. If -- Anybody who can think of that meager US training presence as endless training for El Salvador has got a notion of what's endless that I don't understand.

He said that -- What gets really interesting, though, in these causal arguments, if Central American were not wracked with poverty, hunger, injustice there would be no revolution. And here we really get to the question that I think is the most important question that remains between the Administration -- between those people that are concerned about doing something about Central America and the people who oppose any kind of program that's been so far offered in any way.

And I'd rather put it that way than in terms of administration/non-administration. The question is what it is that causes what it is we are concerned about. Now, we can say that we are and should be concerned about wracking poverty and hunger in Central America.

We should have always been concerned about it. We should be concerned and I think we are in some sense concerned about wracking poverty in Bangladesh and in Burundi, where I was this summer -- I found what may be the most wracking poverty I have ever seen -- or Ruanda. That's one kind of question.

Now, whether that wracking poverty and hunger is the cause of the strategic, of the revolution, as Chris Dodd called it, in Central America is quite a different question. I think this is very important and very basic. It's quite clear that if poverty and hunger caused Marxist revolutions then there would be Marxist revolutions in all the countries where there is wracking poverty and hunger.

And, presumably, we would see a correlation between the levels of poverty and hunger, on the one hand, and levels of revolutionary activity, on the other. But, of course, no such correlation exists and, I mean, it's not so. The poorest, the very poorest countries in the world are, in the great course, peoples of the world in the poorest countries are not, in fact, in making revolutions of any kind, least of all Marxist-Leninist revolutions.

Central America --You know, Great Britain said all this. I don't know why one has to keep going over it, in fact. But it's not the poorest countries who foment Marxist revolutions and -- it's the poorest people who do. Usually it's countries who have been poorer than they are, and that certainly fits the Central American model, by the way, and who had already improved the living standard quite a bit.

And in Central America what causes our particular problem is the fact that there is a -- what differentiates it from our humanitarian concerns in Asia or in Africa or in the Middle East , differentiates our appeal for aid in Central America from our humanitarian aid to the UN, and through the USAID, and so forth, is a strategic problem.

And that strategic problem is caused by the introduction of a lot of weapons and a fairly high level of trained guerrillas, who were trained in Cuba and Nicaragua and other places into the region, and who are making war on those societies. There is no sense in which this government opposes change in Central America, or seeks to maintain a status quo. You know, that is an impossibly silly argument. All you have to do is look at the historical record over the last decade to see that we have, in fact, done the opposite to maintain our status quo. We have, in fact, promoted

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change. That was true in the previous administration; it is true in this administration. It's not change we're talking about, it's a particular -- it's not even violent change we're talking about. It's a particular kind of violent change, caused by a particular kind of people trained and armed and equipped and linked to our adversaries in the world.

That's really -- that's the point I want to make. I would like to say about -- and the only reason I am laboring it is because people keep talking about it, you know, all the time. You know, the other things I would like to say about -- it's obvious that his figures were wrong. He talked about the -- he said this administration, that we had provided $700 million in economic and military assistance to El Salvador since his administration came to power, and that's just not true.

We have provided a -- We requested $720 million, and we have provided about $461 million.

Q Since Reagan took office?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Since Reagan -- right. Those are Reagan's figures.

Q Four fifty-one, did you say?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: The Reagan administration -- I just got all these figures. They are very complex, as real figures usually are.

Q Does that break it out for --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: In military assistance. Since the Reagan administration has requested since its arrival in office for a fiscal '81, '82 and '83, $525 million in economic assistance.

Q Five twenty-five?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Plus $195 for FY '84, but that's not -- that's requested. Congress has provided $461.5 million so far in economic assistance for El Salvador. The military assistance, the administration has requested for FY '81, '82, '83 and '84, $340 million. But Congress has approved so far only $143 million. So if we look at the grand totals approved to date requested by this administration, '81 through '84, the grand total is $600 million, not as Chris Dodd said, a billion through '84. It's not a terribly important point, but it's a kind of important point. You know, it's like a 40 percent error.

Just one other point. On negotiations, you know, he talked about the dogs of war being loose in Central America, and when the cheering has stopped and there's going to be a regional conflict. And I would just like -- And how the government ought to use its power and influence to bring about a negotiated end to the hostilities.

And I would just like to say that that's exactly what we try to do all the time. And if -- And what I think is very badly needed and, hopefully, will be forthcoming is that if anybody has some good ideas, practical, constructive ideas about how to leash those dogs of war in Central America and Nicaragua, for example, and El Salvador, Honduras, they should give us some concrete suggestions. And they would find us interested, you know -- attentive, really.

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Q Would you address the Rabinowitz-Scala-Plaza (ph) thing, Mrs. Kirkpatrick? Particularly, the emphasis they put out on the Contadora process?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I would just say that things keep changing. Among the things that keep changing is the Contadora process. The association of those countries -- Venezuela and Colombia and Panama and Mexico -- is obviously one that is ongoing, and they change

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their minds, too. As I'm sure you know, the foreign ministers of those countries have been meeting intermittently -- it sometimes seems almost continuously -- and with the foreign ministers of the core countries of Central America, the Central American five. For weeks now,almost,they've been meeting and they've been communicating, talking to each other and trying to put together some kind of solutions for the region. And those have taken various forms. And most of those forms, by the way, have been thoroughly welcomed by the administration.

We are entirely willing and ready to stand aside for any kind of regional negotiations which meet the -- satisfactory and it's a -- which can be organized among the countries of the region by the Contadora group in conjunction with the countries of Central America.

Q Ambassador, if the problem is the introduction of arms and money and so forth by the Soviet Union and its surrogates, why could that not be cut off by making it unpleasant for the Soviet Union in places where they are more vulnerable such as Afghanistan and Angola and Ethiopia?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I'm sorry. Would you say that again?

Q If the problem of the Soviets -- is just the Soviets introducing -- Why can they not be gotten to agree to stop it by making it unpleasant for them in areas that are much more vital to them than El Salvador is, such as Afghanistan, by supporting the -- and so forth?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Are you suggesting we go to the source? (Laughter.)

Q Yes, exactly, precisely. I don't see any point in letting the enemy choose the ground upon which you fight because that's very unpalatable ground down there.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: First of all, I think that not all the -- I don't want to either seem or sound indifferent to the suffering of the Afghan people, which is very, very large and, indeed, tragic. But I would say that not all areas of the world have the kind of direct strategic relevance to the United States that Central America and the Caribbean do. And I think that we don't have an abstract interest in controlling the Soviet flow of arms in the world. We have a very specific need to prevent the establishment of bases for the projection of Soviet power in places that are vitally important to us. And Central America and the Caribbean are such places. And I think, therefore, we cannot try to deal with those problems in other places. I think that's the answer --

Q Did you see more of a stress on the political solution versus a military solution in the President's address last night?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think if we want a political solution in either El Salvador or Nicaragua or any place in Central America, we have to provide military assistance. If we don't provide military assistance, there will be a military solution in El Salvador very quickly and it will be an imposed peace based on essentially the surrender of the people of El Salvador to the guerrillas. I just don't find that military/political solution language very meaningful, frankly, because there's only one group that has imposed a military struggle on El Salvador and those are the guerrillas. And there's only one other country that continually tries to persuade the guerrillas to stop fighting and accept some other kind of -- settle their differences in some other kind of way.

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I think we have been trying to promote, we, the United States, have been trying to promote political settlement in Nicaragua for a long time. We did -- the Carter administration tried that, the Reagan administration's tried it. I don't think we have ever tried to promote military settlement any place. There is somebody who's trying to promote a military solution. They're the people who come in with arms and try to conquer the place.

Q Ambassador, a lot of people are puzzeled by the difference in the strength that exists between the guerrillas and the government forces in El Salvador. It's generally reported to be about 30,000 on the government side and somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 on the guerrilla side. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't think anybody knows exactly how many guerrillas there are.

Q Well, a rough --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: The figures that I usually hear are six to eight thousand guerrillas.

Q All right, six to eight thousand --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Five, six, eight -- I don't know exactly.

Q How many thousand on the government side?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Again, it depends on whether you're talking about army or militia.

Q Well, police, army, whatever -- the government --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, it matters as the Nicaraguans are always pointing out. Some -- maybe let's say 20,000 in the army and plus some assorted police and National Guards and --

Q They certainly have a substantial majority just, you know, as far as the

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numbers. Why are they not more successful and -- Well, how do you explain this discrepancy if there are less guerrillas -- Why don't the government people prevail? How do you read that?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think it's -- That's like saying how can so few criminals tie up so many cops?

Q I don't think that's really comparable, though.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: And I -- Well, I think it's entirely comparable.

Q I would add that --

Q But isn't there a concept about guerrilla warfare, as well as ~~a~~ ten to one --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, there is. And it isn't exactly -- I think it is comparable. And the reason I think it's comparable is that the guerrillas are the attackers and they can choose where they want to attack, when they want to attack, how they want to attack. And they can benefit by surprise. And let me say in Salvador they do and they benefit by surprise because they have such top flight, sophisticated communications equipment for directing the attacks. And they can supply -- And the government forces are trying to defend the whole country. And guerrillas can decide to attack here and if the government doesn't know in advance, then they get there after the attack. And then they can decide to attack there. It's a relatively small country and they've got fairly high mobility.

Q Well, let me ask you, it's been suggested that one of the reasons might be that there isn't a sufficient amount of dedication or zeal or commitment on the part of the government, that there is not the willingness on the government's side to, in effect, give up their lives for what they believe in that you have on the guerrilla's side. How do you evaluate that factor?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think there's been probably more government soldiers killed in the last two years than there have guerrillas. So -- if I may say so.

I believe -- By the way, reliable figures on this are very hard to come by in fact, about who was killed and how many and who killed whom, in places like El Salvador, not just El Salvador.

But the fact is that it's very hard to fight a guerrilla war. I mean, everybody knows that.

El Salvador is a miserable, poor -- let's use Chris Dodd's language, you know, appallingly poor, small, parochial little country, which, like other countries in the region, has a tradition of what's known as "a barracks army," which is to say the armies aren't very much accustomed to fighting wars. They're accustomed to being -- maintaining internal order and a variety of other things. And they are not trained to counteract guerrilla tactics.

Now, you introduce --

Q We've tried to train them and --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, but it's --

Q -- it hasn't been successful.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, we haven't tried very hard. And, by the way, we, you know, we still aren't because we haven't had the money. You can't take fifty-five trainers into even a little bitty country like El Salvador and get very far in a year and a half or so, two years, in training people. You can't train very many.

There is a big difference, as everybody has commented on, between the military performance of those brigades who have been trained by Americans and those who haven't. That's because they've learned something about how to respond.

I think -- See, I don't think this is any mystery. The guerrilla tactics and guerrilla war are a very different kind of operation.

In addition, by the way, the guerrillas enjoy sanctuary, ready sanctuary in Nicaragua. They even have, as I understand it from some Costa Rican friends, they have enjoyed, maybe they don't now, rest and recreation facilities in Costa Rica, just over the Nicaraguan border.

Q You know that?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I said that I am told by -- I have been informed by some Costa Rican friends that this is the case. It may be that those have been shut down. Efforts were made to shut them down. I do know that for a period that was the case. And we all know that there are rest and recreation facilities inside Nicaragua, which the Salvadoran guerrillas regularly repair to. So they've got a sanctuary and that makes it easier, too. And they've got high mobility. And they're well trained. They're better trained for fighting a guerrilla war than the government troops in El Salvador are trained for countering guerrilla war, which is a --

Q Let's turn to the success of our policy. Do you feel that, if we gave them what you would regard or the experts regarded as adequate arms, adequate military training, that that would make the difference, that they would immediately prevail? Or -- not immediately -- that they would be able then to prevail over the guerrillas? I mean, do you think their dedication, their commitment and all the rest of it is there?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Oh, yes, absolutely. Absolutely. Absolutely. I think there is simply no question about that. I think that the notion that the people of El Salvador are indifferent to the idea of guerrilla triumph in El Salvador is a terribly mistaken canard. You know, I mean, it's -- that's just really wrong. The people of El Salvador care a lot about this. And among the people who care are the soldiers. They don't necessarily know what to do about it, but they care a lot. That's -- The only way they've really had to prove it was in that election, as a matter of fact, where they did prove it.

They're not at all indifferent about whether they're governed by Sandinistas and neither, let me say, are the people of Costa Rica or the people of Honduras. Probably, neither are the people of Nicaragua.

Q Could I follow that up, Jeane, with two questions?

If the President got what he asked for last night, would there be any major changes in our approach to the region?

And, secondly, have we, on any levels, talked to the Soviets directly about this? And, if so, what have been the responses?

First, would there be any difference in our policy if the President gets what he wants? I sense differences in his last points. But --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: If we -- if Congress provided all the assistance --

Q Yes.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: -- which the President has asked for, then I think we would be able to undertake even more effective measures, for example, in the training field.

Q Can't hear you.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: In training, for example. We would be able to continue training at a somewhat higher level and that would help a lot.

We have -- It took us a while to put in place our own capacities for surveillance, you know, aerial and that sort of thing. So we're in a position to make more effective use of resources today than -- we, the U.S. government -- than we were a year ago, or even six months ago. I think that -- you know, I think that represents our best estimate of it. That's --

Now, on the Soviets --

Q Could I just follow that? What about pressures on the Salvadorans to clean up their own situation? Are we willing to do that after this?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Oh, listen, we do it, you know, to a very, very, very great degree, of course.

I just wish, in fact, that you, for example -- (laughter) -- would -- would, really, would take a good hard look at the record of U.S. pressures on the government of El Salvador over the last three years down to this week, let's say. There, I mean, I think that it is no exaggeration to say that the U.S. government has put a very great deal of pressure on the government of El Salvador to meet our standards in judicial, moral and political domains and that they have moved far in that regard. Far.

I think we put, really, really maximum pressure. And, I may say, I think I know quite a bit about this --

Q How do you say they've moved farther? Fifteen-thousand, as Long pointed out to you last night, over 15,000 instances of unresolved crime.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: That isn't -- Of course, that isn't --

Q And not a single conviction.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Yes. That isn't, you know -- That isn't what he said. People are always using those figures and sometimes they use 15,000 and sometimes 20,000 and sometimes 30,000 civilian deaths, you know, attributed to the government and unresolved. What that means is that there have been that many people killed in the ongoing conflict, that many civilians killed in the ongoing guerrilla war and in El Salvador. You know -- And that nobody knows who's killed those people. A very great many of those people have been killed by guerrillas and a good many others of those people have been killed by their being caught in crossfire. And virtually all of them have been killed as a direct consequence of the existence of a guerrilla war in El Salvador.

Q Where is the evidence --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, stop the war and you'll end the killing. That's --

Q Do you dispute the statement --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I understand that there were 45 unexplained deaths in El Salvador before the onset of guerrilla war in the fall of 1979 and the year before that.

Q Where's the improvement?

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AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: The improvement is in judicial process. The improvement is in the establishment of democratic processes, democratic elections, constitutional processes for law-making in El Salvador, land reform.

Q Do you --

Q There is a --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Mort.

Q Do you dispute the --

Q Don't forget my Soviet question.

Q Let me just follow this --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know -- Listen, the only thing I know about your Soviet question -- And I suppose -- I know what I know. I only know what I know. The only thing I know about that was what was basically leaked from the Haig period about the conversations which he had with Gromyko about Central -- in which Central America figured. But that's -- you know, you have as much access to those newspapers as I do.

Q Enders has said that they warned them on the introduction of aircraft into Central America.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think that was in that Haig conversation, Smith, actually, presumably, in the Haig-Gromyko conversations.

Q Two things. First, the -- in describing civilian casualties in El Salvador it's -- the figure is often -- thirty-some-thousand have died, the overwhelming number killed by government security forces.

Now, first question is do you dispute that --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I'd just say nobody knows.

Q But, presumably, when we put human rights pressure on the government, we must tell them something like, "You keep doing this and you are going to alienate your own population, including Mr. D'Aubisson, Major D'Aubisson."

Now, what is it that we get back? I mean, these are high ranking politicians, some of them, with a stake in the country, presumably, and do they just dismiss that theory or what?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Mort, I don't think that -- I think that the thousands of people who are killed in El Salvador are killed in the process of fighting a war in El Salvador. That's -- I think there are a few cases of clearcut murder by security forces. The nuns were such a case. The murder of Mike Hammer and Pearlman and Rudolfo Biero were such a case.

There are then -- And there are others. There are some cases which are known -- well, in which there's powerful evidence to suggest, let's put it that way, as well as we can know anything, were killed, were victims, civilian victims of security forces in El Salvador.

And then there are a very great many dead Salvadorans who have been civilians, that is neither people whom we knew to be guerrillas, nor people whom we knew to be in the army

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but were found dead in streets and nobody knows who's killed them and they are casualties of war, literally. And what we say continuously to the government of El Salvador -- all parts of the government of El Salvador, and the security forces in El Salvador -- is that from their point of view and our point of view, it is absolutely essential that they must fight the guerrillas who are after all trying to kill Salvadorans in ways that don't kill innocent civilians and other persons and that they may not. And if they have other scores to settle, I mean they must not do it. And we also insist that there must be judicial processes which put an end to private violence on the government side.

The question is really private violence. And we tell them all the time that this is terrible -- a mistake for them, and simply intolerable to us.

Q Let me follow that up. Do you think there is any possibility that that kind of message can get through sufficiently to encourage Rubin Zamora, for example, to actually come back in the country -- that we could guarantee his safety so that he could come back and make these elections cricket?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I believe we can guarantee Rubin Zamora's safety. I just really don't doubt that. I do not doubt that we can guarantee Rubin Zamora's safety. If we can guarantee his safety furthermore as a campaigner, and that we can guarantee and devise with the government of El Salvador, and get their cooperation by the way, ways to protect their supporters -- Kaunga or, you know, anybody else who is willing to enter an electoral process.

Q But, Howard, if we could do that, that would be a really new thing because we haven't been able to do that. How could we do it? They were all wiped out when they came in in 1980.

Q They were all what?

Q The ones who came into the elections were all wiped out.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know who you're thinking --

Q Oh, the whole, the whole Directorate of the region --

Q The FDR leaders who were killed in November --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Right. Right, right. But that means they weren't killed coming into elections.

Q They were, actually.

Q And if we can guarantee it, that's something new --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think we can. I think we can.

Q Would the government agree to it now?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think they will, yes. I think they will. I think that will be negotiated out -- and I don't want to anticipate the outcome of negotiations, but I would like -- which will be undertaken by a negotiator -- but I personally do not doubt, one, that we can do it, and that we can negotiate such an agreement and that we can deliver on security.

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I don't know whether we can do it with 55 Americans, but I don't doubt that we can do it if we decide to do it. And I think we've decided to do it.

Q You mentioned the magic word which is Haig. There was a big story in The New York Post yesterday about what they called the secret guerrilla war in the White House -- Team A, Team B, who the hawks are, and who the doves are --

Q -- talk to Winnick --

Q Well, that's my question -- in early Haig there was an effort, apparently at the State Department, that this should be a front burner issue, El Salvador. Allegedly, the White House staff -- we were told Jim Baker was going to be here, this was a question for him. Then allegedly the White House staff said "No, that's not who we're going to go with, we're going to go with" -- Is one to assume that the President's speech to the Congress yesterday means that this issue is resolved for now, for the rest of this term of this President -- that this is going to be so-called front burner -- that he will make his case to the American people regularly and methodically, and be prepared to do political --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Ben, I think one can assume that this administration is at all authoritative levels persuaded that this is an issue of capital importance -- it's an issue of great importance -- of very great importance, but it will stay on the front burner in this administration until the problems have been resolved in Central America.

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That's the reason of course, that -- The President thinks that it's got to be on the front burners of the Congress and for the American people. And I guess everybody in this administration now is persuaded that objectively that -- as Marxists might say -- that the objective situation has this issue high on the agenda of priorities --

Q Including all the people who were cited in the Post yesterday as saying they're still against it?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Yes, I --

Q You saw that story?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I saw that story.

MR. GERGEN: Can I comment on that as a member of so-called Team B? The Latham story in The New York Post yesterday which -- what I and several others regard as a rather scurrilous piece. The fact is that Baker and others around here enthusiastically endorse the idea of the President going to the Hill to give that speech. They are strong supporters of the policy.

And there has been unity in this building and in this administration to the President taking this issue on.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Then, the reason -- But the point is that the reason that there's a consensus is because nobody thinks there's any choice, which is exactly the President's message to the Congress and people, that there really isn't any choice. I mean, it's just objectively so important to the United States today that it's got to be faced.

Q When do you think the country will come to the same conclusion?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know. But I believe that the dialogue, trialogue, the discussion on this and all other issues of public policy is not just one that's determined by any president or administration. It's one that's determined by the whole, as it were, political class, by the administration, by the Congress, by the media confronting issues.

I think that's going to be as much decided by our communicators.

Q But why do you think you have so much difficulty in arousing the country to the dangers to the south as the administration sees them? I judge you would grant that you do have difficulty.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't think we have difficulty. No, I don't think the country is very aware of it, but I don't think the problem is we arousing the country. Why isn't there broader understanding of this issue in the country generally, I think, is the question.

And I think the reason for that is that we are accustomed to taking for granted security in our hemisphere. Our whole national experience has led us to be sort of a -- certainly in the modern period -- to be safe and secure in our hemisphere.

We are not accustomed even to giving any thought, to speak of, to those small countries of Central America. We have -- The really interesting thing, I think, about the post-World War II period is the lesser interest in Latin America generally in the United States -- interesting to think about the fact that the

Rio Pact was the first of the series of alliances negotiated and signed by Harry Truman in the postwar period when he decided and the Congress decided we had to have a series of alliances.

Before NATO was ever negotiated came the Rio Pact and the Rio Treaty. And there used to be a good deal more attention paid to hemispheric affairs politics in the United States than has been the case in the last few decades.

I think part of the problem is just that, a sort of slide from the forefront of American attention of hemispheric affairs. Generally, Central American countries, as people keep saying, "Those are little countries."

We're not accustomed to thinking geo-politically. We're accustomed to thinking in terms of big countries, big armies, big bank balances and credits and problems and such.

Q May I --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Wait a minute now.

Q I'm --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Little female chauvinism --

Q Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Phil Houston hasn't had an opportunity.

Q As you, I think, correctly pointed out, there's an emerging consensus about El Salvador, even here in Washington, even if no one else wants to admit it. But where I think that we're going in exactly the opposite direction is on Nicaragua.

And last night, the President really gave only a little bit of rhetoric to the question of Nicaragua. And I wondered if you could talk a little bit about how to develop consensus about Nicaragua or what the prospects are.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I think that, first of all, the first challenge, the first prerequisite -- the first requisite of good public policy in a democracy is, I think, a reasonably and well-informed citizenry and Congress. And I think the first pass before not us, the administration, but the American people, the Congress, is to become informed, as

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it were, about the government of Nicaragua. Who is it, what is it, what are its policies? What does it intend? How does it treat its own people? How does it treat its neighbors? How does it respond in international negotiations?

That's the first task, I think. And, again, I think that there's a big problem. Nobody, none of us is accustomed to thinking about Nicaragua as a very interesting place. I think it is also kind of cultural snobbery almost, by the way, that's involved in attitudes towards Central America. Who cares about Nicaragua, El Salvador --

Q We had the Marines in Nicaragua on a number of occasions and --

Q But isn't Nicaragua the issue now? We --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: "We" didn't. You know, our grandfathers did, but "we" surely didn't.

Q I'm not talking about "we". I'm talking about the United States.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: We haven't thought about Nicaragua in a long while. It's like saying, "we" had slaves. "We" didn't.

Q But isn't Nicaragua -- I mean underlying --

(Laughter)

Q --underlying Dodd's remarks, is it really Nicaragua behind it? I mean Dodd is talking about one issue or responding, but really what the issue now is is Nicaragua, and the covert operations.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, let me ask a question: whose issue?

Q Well, but isn't that the origin of more of the opposition in Congress to the -- I mean the --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, it surely, presumably, wouldn't be the origin of opposition in Congress to military economic assistance for El Salvador. That would be very odd.

Q Okay.

Q Mrs. Kirkpatrick, I think one of the reasons or some people believe that one of the reasons why there might not be much support in the country is that the Reagan Administration doesn't appear to have made up its mind if it wants to fight or feed the Russians. And I wonder if you could explain the rationale behind the decision just a week before the President going on television to announce the offer of a long-term grain agreement to the Russians.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, I think I will just pass, and toss that question to my friend, Ben Wattenberg.

(Laughter)

Q What, in your assessment, are the chances of the Soviet missiles being reintroduced into that part of the world? I mean let's extirpate this clear down to the end. Supposing El Salvador

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goes to pot; supposing we get in terrible political problems in trying to place the missiles in Europe. How much of a chance is there of the Soviets attempting some major effort? Maybe not missiles, but maybe something related in Nicaragua, in that part of the world?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: You know, Soviet military power in this hemisphere is the most ignored, important politico-military question that I know about. The -- I find it extraordinary that our media pay as little -- and our Congress -- pay as little attention to Soviet capacities for -- and not only capacity, but actuality for over-flight and electronic surveillance of the United States as we do. You know, planes periodically slip through our radar and end up taking pictures in Vermont or someplace and people sort of shrug.

There was a lot of attention paid at a certain point in the Ford-Kissinger foreign policy period about the development of an agreement not to develop nuclear servicing, submarine servicing capacities in Cienfuegos, and that was hailed as a great victory when the agreement was won. And then those capacities to service nuclear submarines were developed at Cienfuegos, and nobody really much noticed them. We know, you know, the Soviet nuclear missile-bearing submarines that roam around off our shores.

And Soviet aerial recognizance over-fly us. And all the important portions of the Southeastern Caribbean and the northern rim of Latin America -- Venezuela, for example. You're going to get the -- People that study these are always drawing circles

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about overflight capacities and the circles are very interesting. They change a lot when you move them from Cuba to Grenada, for example.

The Soviets -- what do we know? We know that Brezhnev, himself, mentioned the possibility, if you will, or the potential, necessity of stationing nuclear missiles in this hemisphere. We know that Vladimir Zagladeen, who is described as the Deputy Minister of the -- Foreign Minister -- I don't really know much about Vladimir Zagladeen, let me say, is -- a week ago reiterated the what, assertion that in case of the stationing of Pershings in Europe, the Soviet Union would need to find places to station nuclear missiles in the Western Hemisphere -- as he put it, an equal time and distance from American cities and he then said something of five to seven minutes.

We know that plans have been undertaken for the construction of a deep water port in Grenada at which is on the Atlantic Coast, which is on one of that -- exactly that sea lane through which virtually all the oil tankers passes between Grenada and the Venezuelan Coast. It's a very narrow strip. We know that there's discussion between the Soviets and the Nicaraguans about the construction of a canal -- a canal, an alternative to the Panama Canal. We know that there is discussion, what the Nicaraguans have said, Ortega himself, one of the Ortegas said that they were involved now in the construction of a platform which will -- which Soviet ships can be repaired and serviced.

So, we know about the airstrip is capable of handling high performance jets in Grenada that's being developed. We know a great deal about the development of air strips, again, capable of handling high performance jets; bombers as well as others in Nicaragua under way now. We know about the stationing of the MIG-23s in Cuba which we know that with just a couple of hours of alteration of some of the mechanisms, they can be transformed into MIG 27s which are capable of launching offensive nuclear weapons. I mean, we know all of those things.

I see little reason to suppose that they would not, in fact, act on Zagladeen's and Brezhnev's warning to undertake the stationing of nuclear missiles in this hemisphere. Everything we know about their behavior suggests that this is, in fact, what they are doing, that they are moving as rapidly as possible to the development of major facilities for the projection of Soviet military power, not just in the hemisphere but right around the American rim in the hemisphere. One of the, by the way, striking things about this is the speed with which they build and, for example, Nicaragua, between the time they undertake the development of new air strips, for example, on that Nicaraguan-Atlantic Coast where the mosquitoes used to be and the speed with which they developed this.

Q "Missiles" becomes the code word. I mean, the bombers and that we've lived with now for a couple of decades.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, I don't think we've lived with those bombers for a couple of decades.

Q The surveillance on the East Coast and the submarine base and we've debated --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: But not the MIG-23s.

Q Yes, perhaps not. But I don't know, but I would suspect though that missiles, that changes the dialogue in such a dramatic way. You feel really there is that chance?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't feel anything about this. I only know what they have said. They are the ones who have introduced this possibility into the discussion. Brezhnev introduced the -- you know, this idea into the discussion. I don't have any independent opinion about it.

Q Did he --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: -- being reiterated --

Q --in your discussion of it must take -- must encompass that. I mean your diplomacy, your work must encompass the possibility.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: My work, no. I mean I just know what I read.

Q Your work is dealing with the allies in part. Why is --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I mean that quite seriously. I mean I don't have any special responsibility or competence in relationship to weapons or missile installations anyplace in the world. I do try to follow their press and strategic writing with regard to this hemisphere. It's harder to do from the UN than it used to be from Georgetown, if I may say so.

Q Why have -- or are you trying to deal with the allies on this and to get them on board? For example, West Germany and France, by my recollection, is contributing about $50 million each to the Sandinistas. And how about Spain? Can't we get Spain on board and be a little -- what we did for them in getting them into NATO and the Common Market and staying out of the Gibraltar issue, and also in staying out of the enclaves in Morocco issue.

Could some leverage be exerted on the allies to get behind us in Mexico, too? Why can't we squeeze Mexico?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Ask somebody else.

(Laughter)

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: With the European allies, I would say we do quite a lot of talking to them in capitals and in Washington, you know, about these problems. And I think that the German government, the Federal Republic has said that there would be -- they are no longer extending assistance to the government of Nicaragua. Almost all, by the way, of the assistance to Nicaragua, economic assitance to Nicaragua has come from the west.

Our best estimates are there has been some -- about $2 billion in economic aid that the government of Nicaragua has received since July, 1979, when they came into power. They have about $1.7 -- let's say $1.4, it's either $1.4 or $1.6 has come from western sources, and the remainder from Eastern bloc sources. I think actually -- Actually, I think it's $1.6 has come from western sources, and $.4 from Eastern bloc sources. The French government is a very special -- you know, they have some special perceptions about Central America, which I think one has to go back to Chateaubriand to fully understand, in fact, in "The Noble Savage" and the dream of revolution and the state of nature.

You know Rousseau. In Rousseau's discourse on inequality, when he wanted to picture the ideal state of nature, he put it in the Caribbean, he would say that. And I'm not just kidding when I say I think this is an important kind of foundation for some of the dimensions of French perception of that policy today. We keep talking to them a lot about it. And I think that they have come to understand at least better some of the dimensions of strategic importance to us.

Q Just to follow that through. The French takes -- Mitterand takes an admirable position vis a vis the Soviets, and he lobbied hard for the installation, indeed, of the cruises and Pershings, and he had his own strong military defense against the Soviets. So he is aware of the Soviet threat. Can't you just close the circle with him and say that we're very aware of that threat right here in the hemisphere and move them around?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: We just do a lot of discussing with the French government about this question; that's really all I can say.

Q Steve Solars says that when he and Jim Leach were down in Nicaragua that what --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Excuse me, could I get a cup of tea? Is there anybody around?

Q In fact, one of the Ortegas said that they were perfectly willing to have negotiations, direct negotiations with the United States, and he says that Ambassador Quainton (ph) said that this was a very significant departure.

And he came up here and he said that he reported to the State Department, Solars says,

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and nothing happened.

Now, the Democrats claim over and over again that when Enders went down in August of '81 that there was a kind of a take-it-or-leave it attitude. And the whole impression that gets created is that we have really not done all we could to negotiate out this problem, that we have opted for the covert route instead of trying as hard as we can to get this situation settled diplomatically. What do you say to that?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I just say it's, you know, it's just not so. That's all.

We have tried repeatedly by all kinds of means to persuade the government of Nicaragua to, at a minimum, at a minimum, live at peace with it's neighbors. To -- Mort, the best, maybe, example is the San Jose Communique, are the San Jose principles, which we reiterate all the time, which look toward the end to the importation of arms and an end to the export of arms across borders with mutual, you know, mutual respect for each other's national independence and territorial sovereignty and verified respect for the borders of all countries by all countries.

The Nicaraguans have been very interested in having a border agreement which would protect them against any crossing of anybody into Nicaragua while leaving them perfectly free to violate, ignore the borders of Honduras and Salvador and Costa Rica during this same period.

Nicaragua has denied Costa Rica the use of the San Juan River, for example. By the way, that's where they're talking, making motions about a canal. Costa Rica has treaty rights to the navigation of the San Juan River and they have had free use of it for a century and they've been denied it. There have been a lot of violations of the Costa Rican border by Nicaragua, a lot of violations of the Honduran border by the Nicaraguans -- continual just penetration, perforation of the Honduran border by Nicaraguans infiltrating arms and guerrillas into Salvador.

And what they have wanted to talk about was never the -- never included their respect for the borders of other countries. It always consisted of other countries' respect for the sanctity of their borders only. That's a very special kind of a topic.

If you just look at -- They have been offered again and again an end to the -- all importations of arms into the area with international verification of that, an end to the importation and use of all foreign advisors in the area with international verification of that, respect, mutual respect for the borders of all countries with international verification of that.

They've also been -- There are -- all kinds of proposals have been made for internal reconcilation in all countries and, of course, for democratic elections and democratic freedoms in all countries. Again, with international verifications and guarantees. And they simply turned them down.

Q Well, let me just -- Solars' point was that maybe all of this is propaganda, you know, that these offers get made for the purpose of not being accepted, but, nonetheless, the impression gets created that we have not done our level best to try to settle the situation.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I know. That's, you know, that -- I'm afraid that the impression gets created above all by them, though. I was saying to Joel coming down, I have the feeling that if we were living today at World War II and we heard, you know a

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Roosevelt or, let's say, Churchill, "We will fight them in the streets and on the beaches," the announcer would say -- CBS would say, "And now, for another view of this question" -- (laughter) -- "we will bring you from Berlin -- " This is -- "

Q   But isn't the question in Nicaragua really one of whether or not the Sandinistas are willing to talk to their own -- I mean, I agree with you that there's nothing new in Ortega saying that he's willing to talk to the United States. But why can't the United States put a condition on that that they talk to their own opposition, which is really what the internal dispute is about, isn't it?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: All I can do there is assure you that we have said privately and publicly in many arenas, on many occasions, that we wholly support -- and the President said it last night -- the negotiated settlements that provide for all the good things that I just described, you know, the respect for each other's borders and the --

Q   No, but I'm talking about --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: -- and internal reconciliation --

Q   Okay.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Internal reconciliation -- I mean, we -- you know, that's a -- as you know, that's one of the basic principles. The San Jose communique is internal reconciliation.

Q   Mrs. Kirkpatrick --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: -- a respect for opposition, the negotiated settlements.

The Nicaraguan government is really very interesting to observe. When -- the last time that they came to the U.N. -- well, not the last time that they -- a year ago -- they've been there twice since -- but in March a year ago -- I guess it was the first time they came to the U.N. -- coincided with the trip of Enders and a very serious American approach to them. Conversations -- this was the period, the Haig-Enders-Kasten -- et cetera, conversations in Mexico, and the proposals and negotiations with Nicaragua. And they, interestingly enough, chose that moment to come to the United Nations to level all sorts of extraordinary and untrue charges against us. And they, as they say, heightened the rhetoric and inflamed the disagreements at exactly that moment. Just that pattern has occurred three times with them.

Q   Do you think the --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I wouldn't want to say about the Nicaraguan government what D'Escoto said last night about the President, namely that they simply lied. Because I don't think that's quite the appropriate language which heads of governments and members of administrations talk about each other. But the truth is they do lie -- (laughter) -- and they lie fairly regularly about what they have done and what they are doing. And D'Escoto lied in that interview when he talked about the absence of the 2,000 military advisers that probably is -- as a matter of fact, he's probably right. That's not quite an accurate estimate; that's an underestimation of the number of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua today.

Q   Mrs. Kirkpatrick, I'd like to ask you a couple of questions. When you passed, as you did, on the timing of the Soviet grain offer, is it because you don't know the rationale, or because you do and disagreed with it? You don't duck many questions.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Sometimes -- Ben Wattenburg (phonetic) can handle the questions better. (Laughter.)

Q   It's a fair question.

Q   And you don't duck many questions. Why are you ducking this one?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I haven't -- because I wasn't involved in that discussion at all, but -- and I'm not actually just ducking that question. But I have had the experience of being President of the Security Counsel for the last month. I've been in New York virtually the whole time.

I don't regularly attend any of the Economic Cabinet Counsel meetings anyway, because I don't have the time to be away from New York. And I missed all the discussions, in fact. So I could not tell you what the thinking was of the Cabinet Councils and the members of the administration who made that decision when they made it, truly.

Q In early March Mr. Enders was on the McNeill-Lehrer Report, and he said that the US goal in El Salvador was not to win the war, it was not to destroy the guerrillas, it was to give them just just enough aid to hold the line. What's wrong with trying to defeat the guerrillas, if as you said earlier, they are the source of all the havoc that's being caused in that country?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Mr. Lofton, I have said -- I noticed reading the speeches of the guerrillas, they always end their speeches saying, "Revolution or death, we will win."

Q They don't say "Hold the line"?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Pardon me?

Q They don't say, "Hold the line"?

(Laughter)

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: They don't say, "Hold the line". They don't say, "Hang on until we get --", you know, "We'll provide the shield until the next season's crops come in." They --

Q What is wrong with victory as a policy?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, I think, actually, that there is a distortion of Tom Enders' statement. I think what he says is that we will hold the line until democratic institutions have a chance to work their magic and everybody is brought into the democratic process. That's really what he is saying.

Q Which is victory.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: If I may say so. I mean victory is an El Salvador free of war and making it, you know, decisions democratically and respecting constitutional processes; that is victory.

Q Do you think the President --

MS. SMALL: We do have to wind up here, we will just have maybe one last question.

Q Do you think the President cleared the legal hurdles last night in the matter of aid to the Contras? He said that we are not trying to overthrow any government, but you have

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Boland Amendment, and we know that the Contras are, indeed, fighting with the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government, and we are aiding the Contras.

So does he clear the hurdle?

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I don't know. I mean I think he just meant what he said. You know, he meant very clearly that this Administration is not, as some people have suggested, breaking the law in any sense.

Q Are those really just words? Because the Contras are --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: No, those are not words.

Q Well, the Contras are of set purpose to try to overthrow the government, and we are aiding the Contras.

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: Well, actually -- I don't even -- words are what we communicate with, and then they are the only -- I think that the -- I don't know the Contras that well, frankly. The Contras that I know have, as a goal, the establishment of democratic institutions in Nicaragua.

And what they would like to do is, in fact, have a negotiated political settlement in which there was internal reconciliation and then there were elections in which the Nicaraguan people could choose their government. I think that is the goal of the Contras.

The goal of the United States in Nicaragua, the minimum goal of the United States in Nicaragua at this point is, I think, to persuade the government of Nicaragua to stop actively trying to destroy their neighbors. And the maximum goal of the United States in Nicaragua is, I suppose, to encourage the Nicaraguan government to keep the promises it made the OAS in relationship to the establishment of democracy.

I don't think any of that involves any contradiction of any law.

Q If you accept that as the goal of the Contras, that's true, I guess you can. You can ascribe that as --

AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK: I do, I do, I mean it quite seriously, when I say that is my understanding of their goals, truly.

MS. SMALL: Okay, we're going to have to wind up. I want to thank you, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, for coming down here and being with us. Thank you all for coming. We will try to have a transcript, as I say, by noon tomorrow.

END

1:55 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU

April 28, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:46 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: This is a background briefing on the meeting between the Prime Minister of Canada and the President. Please attribute the remarks to senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague, of course, will be taking the questions on the Summit which was, of course, a major subject of discussion between the President and the Prime Minister. I would be pleased to answer questions on the other subjects discussed which, as the Prime Minister and the President indicated, included matters involving the East-West arms control negotiations. Perhaps since they, themselves, in their closing statements gave a pretty full report on the subjects discussed, why don't we just start now with your questions on subjects other than Williamsburg please?

Q Did they discuss cruise missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically. The Prime Minister, as he stated, when he left the Oval Office or left the meeting with the President expressed support for the President's position on the negotiations under way in Geneva and indicated that he saw the President's position, the President's proposals as being fully consistent with and supportive of the NATO two-track decision which, as he stated a few moments ago, he fully supported. But there was no specific discussion of cruise-missile testing.

Q How about acid rain?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject did not come up between the President and the Prime Minister while I was present. Did it come up -- did not come up while I was present.

Q Both countries are now in sync on the issue then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the point to keep in mind here is that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister MacEachen met on the 10th and 11th of April and had a very extensive discussion of the acid rain issue which, as I recall, accounted for probably 50 percent of the time of the actual -- of the formal meeting. And they have worked out an approach over the coming months to the U.S.-Canadian discussions on the acid rain issue which involve, among other things, a meeting between Administrator-Designate Ruckelshaus and Environment Minister Roberts of Canada as soon as Mr. Ruckelshaus is confirmed and read into the subject.

Q What bilateral issues?

Q Did they have any discussion on Central America especially in the context of Mr. Reagan's address last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there was discussion of the situation in Central America and the Prime Minister indicated without going into great detail that he was generally supportive of the position which the President took last night in his speech.

Q Did he express any concern regarding the Caribbean Initiative where they now receive money for military aid? And I think the Prime Minister did not agree with that in the past.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussion did not get into the question of the various types of aid which might be provided. So, I can't respond to that point.

Q What bilateral issues did they discuss?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It wasn't really a discussion of bilateral issues so much as it was a recognition that the bilateral relationship is developing satisfactorily and under good control by the Secretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Q Did they discuss their mutual interest in Robert Service and his poetry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid not. I don't -- no.

Q That's all they had to talk about the last time in Ottawa. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They had a very full review of a number of issues but that was not one of the subjects discussed.

Yes?

Q Even though the subject of cruise missile testing didn't come up, is there any problem with when America does -- when the United States does submit its request to test cruise missiles in Alberta? Is there any problem with that request going forward and Canada saying, "Yes, you can"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That obviously is a question which should better be directed to the Prime Minister or to a representative of the government of Canada but it certainly is our understanding that the request, when it is submitted, will be reviewed in a positive and forthcoming way. The Prime Minister did indicate, as you heard a few moments ago, that he fully supports the position which the President has taken in the negotiations with the Soviet Union. So, we are generally positive, optimistic that when our request is submitted, it will be dealt with favorably. But, again, as I say this is a request, rather a decision which the government of Canada will have to make. Okay --

Q -- question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm sorry. One more there?

Q What did they disagree on? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm hard-pressed to say. I don't want to give the impression that there were no points of difference or nuances in the way that the two leaders approach the issues but there were no points of difference which come to mind. I think it was a very amicable and friendly meeting -- the eighth of the two leaders since President Reagan took office.

Q Did the Prime Minister have any suggestions on an approach to Nicaragua and El Salvador?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specific in suggestions. He, as I say, indicated during the discussion of the President's speech and the general situation in Central America that he

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appreciated the reasons behind the policy which the President was following and generally supported it.

Q Did he not express any reservations about the Latin American policy. He generally is supportive, but did he not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were no specific reservations expressed. The Prime Minister noted that his own general approach to other countries was that if they wished to adopt a certain form of government that that was their business. But when they chose to export that form of government by violent means, that was indeed quite a different business. And the President fully agreed with that. And that discussion took place within the context of their general review of the situation in Central America.

Yes.

Q Does the President discuss at all his intention to nominate a special envoy and what role that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That subject did not come up either in general terms or in terms of a personality.

Q -- East-West trade, Export Administration Act? --

MR. ALLIN: Why don't we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I think we'd better break and let my colleage talk about it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The discussions on the Summit showed both the President and Prime Minister to be in general agreement -- or specific agreement also -- both in the general style that's planned for the way the Summit will run and also for the subject matters that should be discussed and even in general on what their attitudes on the subjects that would come up.

The Prime Minister emphasized very strongly the importance he attaches to an informal, nonstructured, noncommunique -- that is, no advanced negotiated communique -- kind of Summit in which the heads of government come together and talk, as he put it, rather than try to see that what they say conforms to what their subordinates have previously said they would say.

And as you know from previous reports, the President feels very strongly on that, and that is the way the Summit is being planned.

With regard to subject matter, the Prime Minister said that at every Summit people start out saying,"This will be the most difficult Summit ever -- be harder than the previous ones," he suggested that in point of fact this one won't be. This one will be a much easier Summit than some, because in large part of what he described as the remarkable turnaround in the U.S. economy.

However, we pointed out then later that, of course the turnaround in the Canadian economy is comparable, so the two together do give a very good basis, or as the Prime Minister put it, instead of having to focus quite so exclusively on contemporary, on present problems, they will be able to focus on the future to consider how deep and how lasting the recovery will be.

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And then they had a good deal of discussion, including the Secretary of the Treasury, on the subject of the interest rates, why they are as high as they are and whether they can be expected to come down, and since the Secretary said they can, they then went into the reasons why could they, why are they high, and why could they expect to come down. And presumably that will be discussed more fully at the Summit.

And they had a good deal of discussion of the problem of -- the debts of the LDC's and how they can pay that off, what a lowering -- how much a lowering of interest rates would contribute, how much an expansion of trade opportunities for them in the developed countries could contribute, possibilities of handling that problem satisfactorily.

There was a good deal of discussion between them also of the importance at the Summit of taking steps to fight the rise of protectionism and even to roll back some of what has happened. I guess that covers everything on which I made note.

MR ALLIN: There was a question over here before on the East-West Trade -- the Export Administration --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. What was the question about East-West trade?

Q Did the subject come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it did not come up in these meetings.

Q -- the Export Administration Act, did it come up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That did not come up either in these meetings.

Q I just wanted to clarify --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That doesn't mean it won't come up at the Summit, but it did not come in any meetings between the President and the Prime Minister.

Yes.

Q I wanted to ask -- who did you say made the observation that it would be -- that this could be an easier Summit -- was it the President or the Prime Minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister started by saying that people always say every Summit is going to be the hardest one, the most difficult one ever. He thought this one might not be as difficult as some of the earlier ones because of the remarkable recovery in the American economy. And we added, well in the Canadian economy too. Right back of you is another question.

Q Could you be more specific about their mentioning rolling back what has happened in the protectionist area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I really can't because they weren't. They simply referred to that as one of the topics. See they are not trying to carry on the Williamsburg discussion here so much as talking about what should be talked about there.

Q Did the Prime Minister suggest in any way that there could be no communique at Williamsburg? Is that what you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He stuck to what we said all along. That there will be no pre-negotiated communique but there will of course be communication and there will be some kind of a statement at the end, which those of us working on preparing the Summit

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are assuming will actually be in writing.

Yes?

Q You talked about the benefits of not having a pre-negotiated communique. What do you think some of the risks are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of the reasons for not having it?

Q Some of the risks going into --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, the risks. I suppose the risks are that the discussion will be so diffused and dispersed that it'll be extremely hard to write a good account of what they talked about.

What we're aiming at in this summit is to have an unstructured discussion where the inter-relations among subjects are emphasized. And that, obviously, will make it hard to write up.

Also, it's not expected that this summit will lead to definite agreement. So, we will now do this, that or the other. It might lead to things as the last summit did, to undertake studies or to put people to work on problems, but not to negotiate an international understanding. And, so, I think the difficulty is that it'll be hard to -- it may be hard to put real -- The more successful the summit is in its goals, the harder it'll be to pin down something that doesn't lead everybody to say, "Well, he didn't do anything."

Yes?

Q You said that East-West trade problems were not discussed in the meeting. Does that mean that the U.S. has agreed not to give any enforcement to the subject during the Summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they just didn't discuss it.

Yes?

Q You mentioned the remarkable economy -- recovery in the U.S. economy and also in Canada. The two countries have had very different approaches. Did Trudeau or the President suggest which methods seem to be producing best or were they just simply the Canadian responding to the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There wasn't any discussion of what had accounted for on either side. The Prime Minister did give the President a great deal of credit for the recovery that's come about here and congratulated him on his perseverance and steadiness.

Yes?

Q The French government is showing some reluctance recently about participating in the various meetings, one set in Paris with finance ministers and one here this week, which, I think, they've been or out of and are back into, allegedly because of concern about U.S. trade policy. Is there any concern that this might poison the atmosphere of the Summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There wasn't any discussion of the French or that question.

Q No in general towards the Summit. Do you -- any concerns?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm reporting today on what happened between the Prime Minister and the President.

Q -- on the Summit --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Only as they relate to what happened in the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President.

Q Is there any discussion at all about what political topics may come up at the Summit -- any hot spots?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we didn't have any discussion of that. And, of course, that will be prepared by different people than are preparing the economic Summit. It is an economic summit, and the people preparing it are concentrating on those issues. But there will be a meeting of political officers to consider what they might talk about privately at lunch or dinner or something, which I'm told is when they talk about political questions.

Q Did they discuss at all interest rates in the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: They only discussed the question of why are interest rates as high as they are in the U.S. and what are the reasons why they can be expected to come down.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:00 P.M. EDT

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 3, 1983
No. 142

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM JERUSALEM TO BEIRUT
April 30, 1983

QUESTION: Just in the most general of ways, where do we stand? What are you hoping to do today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, on where do we stand: Of course, we had a further discussion with the Israelis yesterday and we once again went through the full range of issues so that both parties agree on what the issues are. They weigh them somewhat differently. And the discussion was a lot more operational -- a lot more nuts and bolts yesterday, both in the meeting, really the meeting the Prime Minister was in and then the subsequent one where it was just a continuous meeting for all interests and purposes. He had some other things he had to do. That was the only reason he dropped out.

In the meeting today, we all undoubtedly want to talk about the issues as issues with President Gemayel and his team, but we'll also be wanting to pushing into operational details. I think we're well beyond now the point where general principles are useful to talk about, and we need to be much more into exactly how something would work if you're going to do this or that or the other thing. So, the discussions will be much more concrete. And, of course, depending upon the Lebanese view of matters, we'll want to be as detailed as we possibly can be about what their position is in an operational sense. So that's what we'll be doing today. And I believe the meetings will be at the Presidential Palace, and we'll just be sticking at them. I think John probably will be trying to give you a briefing on what's happening, but we'll just be going at it continuously as I see it.

QUESTION: One of the major sticking points on the security issue has been a role for Major Haddad. A couple of weeks ago, the Lebanese offered the concept for, as I understand it, a compromise where he would get not the Commandership of the territorial brigade but Deputy Commandership or something like that for a finite period, thereafter to get some sort of appropriate job outside of the region. Does that seem to be what's shaping up as the kind of compromise that is envisioned?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you've described what the Lebanese proposed. The Israelis don't seem to have changed their view about a command responsibility -- that is the two jobs that they've talked about, Commander of the Brigade or Commander of the Zone. But we will continue to push on that subject. That's clearly a matter of great importance to both parties. I don't want to make any comment about where I think that will go. You have described what was put on the table, and the Israelis have set out what they believe and we're working on it.

QUESTION: At what point in the process do you envision talking to the Syrians about what it is you've done? When you get close to a deal between Lebanon and Israel or after it's concluded or how do you keep the Syrians from saying, well, you did to me what they did at Camp David to Jordan? You present me with something I have nothing to say about, I don't want to participate.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, I have talked on various occasions to the Syrian Foreign Minister and there have been conversations between the Lebanese officials and the Syrians at various times. We will have to make a judgment about when is the appropriate time to go to Syria for a concrete kind of approach to an agreement. We have had our Ambassador Paganelli go to the Foreign Ministry to see if we're welcome to come there and we have received the answer back that we are. And there are possible dates, but what the right date will be, I don't know. Assuming that we do make genuine progress, and that's an assumption because the issues are far from resolved to see how you might resolve them, but assuming that we do make some genuine progress in the next few days, certainly we'll want to go to Damascus.

QUESTION (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That depends, but we have been in touch with them and they have invited me to come so --

QUESTION: Just a couple of days ago, the Israelis said they would never give back the Golan Heights. Does that create any problems? Does that give Syria an incentive to shoot this whole thing down because they won't get anything out of it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that the Israeli position on the Golan Heights has been clear for some time, and so has the Syrian, and for that matter the U.S. position hasn't changed in a long while. So all of that is there; there's nothing new about it.

QUESTION: Yesterday, we were told by a senior Israeli official that the U.S. role in the negotiations had been less than positive, because he contended we had given the misimpression to the Lebanese that their security can be protected without working out the kind of security agreement that Israel demands. Has this been raised with you in terms of a complaint about the American role?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've heard complaints about the American role, but on the whole, I think, the atmosphere in Israel as in Lebanon has been focused on the present and the future and trying to work out the appropriate arrangements for it. I don't want to argue the past; I don't accept the criticism that you referred to as being valid.

QUESTION: Do you see in a general sense this negotiation coming down to a final tradeoff of the Israelis moving off Haddad, perhaps as Deputy Commander or some other leadership role, in return for a more forthcoming attitude by the Lebanese on trade or on some aspect of their mutual relationship?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am probably annoying all of you by not being willing to get into those issues and where the tradeoffs are as I see them because I think that's for us to be thinking about and using and not be broadcasting around.

QUESTION: Do you get the sense that the Israelis are willing to discuss the Haddad question, that that is a negotiable issue as far as they are concerned?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've been discussing it and their position hasn't changed that I can see beyond the two propositions that they've put forward and put them forward publicly as well as in the negotiating situation. Whether in the end there'll be anything else that we can do remains to be seen.

QUESTION: You're scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Begin tomorrow. Can you tell us what your plans are for Monday and beyond?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I wish I knew exactly, but my plans are to keep working at it. I'm planning to have, at his invitation, just a family dinner with Moshe Arens and his wife this evening. And I have scheduled a brief meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir scheduled for early tomorrow morning, prior to the Cabinet meeting, not a negotiating session or anything, but just to give him a quick update. And then I have a meeting scheduled with the Prime Minister in the afternoon. That's another private meeting similar to the one that I had the other day. But it would range across all issues. That's what the schedule now shows. But as I've said from the beginning, a schedule is something that has to give way always to whatever we think is worth doing to try to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

QUESTION: So beyond Sunday, you have your schedule as it is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I really don't know. My talks are not fixed. Certainly we will try to get as far as we can with the Lebanese in operational terms in our meetings that are coming up. So then we'll want to come back to the Israelis in similar detail, as soon as it's possible to do so. As you know they have a Cabinet meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning -- a regular Cabinet meeting -- so that's a block of time that's in there.

We also have the question that you raised of: When do we go to Damascus? And, of course, that as I said depends on where we think we are in the negotiations and what the time availabilities that they have are. So I -- these things are juggling around and I don't know exactly when I'm going to do what.

QUESTION: The regular negotiating session is scheduled to resume on Monday with Ambassador Draper. Now is it conceivable to try to clarify your role versus the role of Ambassadors Draper and Habib, that you could go on and, for example, talk to the Syrians or the Saudis or others and leave the dotting of the i's and the crossing of the t's to the regular negotiating teams. Does there come a point where we no longer need the participation of the Secretary of State in these operational details?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It will make me feel very good if you have the opinion that we can get to the point where all that's necessary is to dot a few i's and cross a few t's. I don't feel that we're there yet. But certainly the direct talks between the Israelis and the Lebanese that Ambassador Draper is helping with, that's the forum ultimately where whatever is done would be done, and that's appropriate. But what that schedule will be in the light of what we're doing on these trips has to relate itself the one to the other, because there are key people involved in negotiations who are also involved in any meeting that I might have to say with the Israelis, like with David Kimche, for instance. So, you can't be at two places at once.

QUESTION: The Israelis were saying yesterday that they have injected several new ideas. They don't want to use the word "concessions" -- on a military issue, one that they would not any more insist that Haddad have the key role in his batallion or his brigade, whatever; the other that they are prepared to lower some level of their military presence. Are you bringing with you anything such as that that could be described as a concession? Is that where you are attacking the problem first?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a fascinating negotiation. I'm sure that maybe you'll write some reflective pieces on it that I'll be interested to read, but you have a meeting and certain things transpire in the meeting. Then you read about the meeting as various people describe it. I suppose it's the old elephant story, but different people have different perceptions. You had one briefing that you described as by some unidentified briefer who put forward a much different line of thinking about what was going on and the briefing that you referred to and I'm sitting there in the meeting and I'm reading about all these things. Everybody is giving his views, publicly and privately, and we have to sort of find our way through this, while to a certain extent, keeping our own counsel about just where we think the issues are going.

I know that if you don't feel that I'm unresponsive, you probably ought to, at least on this kind of thing, and the reason is that I think that the less able I am and my team are to be effective in the negotiations, and at the same time, it's one of those negotiations where the public statement about what is going on is an integral part of the negotiation. I recognize that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you discuss the Soviet involvement in the negotiations in the sense that the Israelis keep -- you say in the public diplomacy aspect -- keep hammering away at the Soviet involvement in Syria and they are telling us that you also agree that this is a very serious matter and is a kind of an implication that now there is a new Israeli-American consensus on how to act in -- we haven't really heard much from you about this really.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, just descriptively, the level of Soviet involvement in Syria has incrased substantially above what it was, say a year ago, in terms of the sophistication of the weaponry and the number of personnel involved. That's sort of a fact. And then there are all sorts of combinations or permutations to that fact and implications of that fact. As far as these negotiations are concerned, in the first instance, they involve Lebanon and Israel and arrangements between those two countries and at the same time, obviously, whatever discussions there are basically involving Lebanon and Syria about the Syrian withdrawal. And at least, as far as I am concerned, Syria is a sovereign country and they have expressed themselves on the subject as has the PLO to the Lebanese -- we've had that reported to us -- and there isn't any Soviet involvement in any direct way in these talks. That isn't to say that they don't have some materiel and some personnel in Syria. Obviously they do. But as far as these talks are concerned, they are involving Israel and Lebanon -- in the one instance, Syria and Lebanon in another, and Lebanon and the PLO and so forth.

QUESTION: Have the Syrians in the last several weeks indicated they could not accept the way the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations seem to be going, at least the content of them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They've made statements about the conditions under which they would withdraw. They have also, I gather, complained to people that they're not as well-informed as they'd like to be. So we presume they are getting better informed. The basic condition laid down by everybody has been complete withdrawal of all foreign forces, so I think in terms of a fundamental given here is that in the Israeli-Lebanon agreement, there are provisions for a complete withdrawal. And that's the fundamental thing that Syria has put forward. And so they probably are rejecting to some extent statements that you read about in any morning's paper that suggest something other than complete withdrawal. But as far as we're concerned, complete withdrawal is the underlying premise.

QUESTION: It sometimes seems when we are listening to the Israelis the last day or so that they have rediscovered the strategic consensus and are trying to sell it back to us. How much does it cost?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the strategic considerations involving the Soviet Union in this part of the world are always important matters. I tried to describe the Soviet situation as best I could in response to Bernie's question, and I don't, in terms of how much does it cost, I don't have any --

QUESTION: What I was thinking about is: Do you anticipate some new attempt to revive the Memorandum of Understanding or some new U.S.-Israeli document, call it what you will?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: One of the things that I'm doing, as we've talked about before, is talking to the Israelis, with Prime Minister Begin, in particular, about the U.S-Israeli relationship in a very general sort of way. First, as when I go to any other country, I talk about that subject, although in the case of Israel, the relationship has been so close and strong and integral that it has a special meaning.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think there are lots of reasons that are connected in part with their situation in Lebanon, in part with, no doubt, the desirability in the Arab world of having the Israeli forces withdraw from Lebanon. They know perfectly well that if the Syrian forces don't withdraw, the Israeli forces won't withdraw, and I think they can perhaps reflect back on some of the things that happened a decade or so ago or more, and the Israelis are still occupying the West Bank; and so if they wind up as the responsible party for Israeli occupation of Lebanon, I don't think that's a good mark for them, in a direct way or in the Arab world generally. And I think you have to remember that's where their attachment is -- to the Arab world.

QUESTION: Thanks very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STAT

May 4, 1983
No. 144

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM
May 1, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of what we have now found out about the attack on the residence with Katyusha rockets, do you have any other feelings than you have communicated earlier? Do you think there was an attack on you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any way of knowing that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You could hear lots of rounds going off last night beginning in the early part of the evening, and so --

QUESTION: But the Marine Lieutenant said he was sure that they were aimed at the Embassy residence.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I heard that.

QUESTION: Is that going to cause you to reconsider your mission in any way or are you worried that it might become too dangerous?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

QUESTION: Do you have any sense that anyone is trying to intimidate you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not intimidated, whatever they are trying to do.

QUESTION: Going to the substance of it, can you give us any kind of assessment, any kind of feel for where we are now on the negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to seem to be dodging questions but in a way I am, in the sense that I, if I were sitting down with the President and describing the negotiations, I would go through all of the issues, say what I thought were basically settled and what was open and what the possible trade-offs are and so on, and I just feel as though I can't do that, and therefore it's hard for me to really give you the kind of substantive statement that I know you would like, but what I can say are the general things which are accurate and important -- namely that, the work on the agreement has been very intensive and hard work, and people have really gone at it well-informed. I have been impressed that the effort is genuinely serious in the sense of people struggling with some concept or element of the agreement in the spirit of people who intend to carry it out if they agree to it. In a sense, difficulty of something is a good sign because it shows that people take whatever they are arguing about very seriously. If you are ever in a negotiation, and people start conceding things that are important very easily. You say, "Oh, oh, something is wrong here." Well, in that sense, I think that the spirit and effort is very good, and we have gone through the draft agreement as I said this morning -- I think some of you were there, maybe all of you -- from stem to stern, and talked about it conceptually, talked about word by word.

And we've also explored some of the aspects of the agreement in terms of exactly how it is they understand this would really work in practice and detail, which is not part of the agreement, but an effort to get a sense of the meaning from the inside out. And so I would say that they have been very good sessions.

QUESTION: Why is that not better done with the two sides themselves sitting down at a table saying, "Do you understand that word, 'withdrawal,' to mean that?" And then communicating directly rather than through you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course it has been going on directly between the two sides with Morrie Draper present and others from the U.S. side, and a tremendous amount of progress has been made as a result of that. So what we have is a good structure and a lot of agreements to start with and they will get back to that. But I suppose the answer to your question is that the issues that remain are issues on which the principles have to weigh in very heavily and the negotiations as they're structured have key people involved in them, but they don't have the Presidents and the Prime Ministers and so on level involved in them. So in the nature of things, we're able to engage with those people and perhaps that's whatever service I may be able to render you, that's about it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, let me take you back to the rocket attack. I think that you can probably assume that the Israelis will mention this to you as an example of the fact that the Lebanese are really not even in control of security in their own capital. Does it give you any pause for thought that maybe there is a serious problem there than they can't handle in the south?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you have to remember that their capital is literally surrounded by foreign forces. It's a country that is occupied by foreign forces, not of just one country, not even of just two, but of lots of elements of combat, so I don't think that's any fair test of what they'll be able to do when all of the foreign forces leave. There wasn't any firing, for instance, over in West Beirut.

QUESTION: I was just wondering, you've done a lot of labor negotiations, how is this different from a labor negotiation, or is it very similar?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's similar. I suppose you'd have to say the stakes are higher. You have life and death on the table, so that makes a difference. But the effort to understand the genuine points that people have and why they have those points, and how you can find mutually agreeable ways to resolve them, is a fairly common thing, whether you're in labor negotiations, or a business deal, or this kind of negotiations, or any other kind of a negotiation, that's the way things tend to work. But the fact that the stakes are so high does give a different feel to it.

QUESTION: Are you going back today to Israel, and go through the document the way you did in Lebanon, word by word, phrase by phrase, and if so how could you possibly get through this whole thing in time to go to Paris?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Are you worried about Paris? Well, what the approach of our meeting will be, of course, will depend on what they want to do and what we want to do. I think that in the end you do have to take it and go through it. It's a very painstaking, lengthy, tough process, and nevertheless at some point that kind of thing has to be done. The schedule that's been suggested, I think we told you that I had an appointment with the Prime Minister at four. He has requested to have that meeting later because he, as I understand it, is attending a funeral, and so the proposal we had sent down from Israel was that we have the meeting with the negotiating group at four, and then when the Prime Minister is free, I would have a meeting with him. So that it's turned around a little bit, but I just pass that along for whatever it may lead to.

QUESTION: It was suggested by the Lebanese that this is the critical phase now, this next phase where you're talking to the Israelis, and after you've gone through the same process with them, the United States -- you, personally -- will be able to come back with specific problems, ways of dealing with those problems, language. Would you address that issue? Is that correct? Is that a good perception -- an accurate perception?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: All the way through, in the discussions that Phil has been having and Morrie has been having, bridging ideas have been offered. And the document that we are sort of working off of is full of bridging ideas that have been offered by us or have been offered by others, one of the parties. So there is nothing new about the process of trying to find ways to bridge across. And that will continue.

QUESTION: How critically important is this next phase?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are down to the really strong strokes; there's no doubt about it. And we now have, I think, a very good and carefully thought out idea of what the position of the Government of Lebanon is. We know what they are willing to do. And so we'll try to find out the same thing from the Israelis, by the same process.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Syria, you said you were planning to go there on Monday but the schedule has slipped.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't know when I would go, but there were various possibilities. There is no possibility of my going Monday, obviously.

QUESTION: Had there not been a possibility at one point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they came back and said, yes, we'll receive you and here are the times that are available and Monday was one of the times. We've had to say that we can't make it by that time.

QUESTION: Have you sensed the same concern among the Lebanese over the Soviet build-up in Syria as you sensed that the Israelis have given you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Israelis gave us a very extensive briefing on what their observations are, what they think is there, and their own analysis of it and their evaluation of it. The Lebanese are certainly aware that the Soviets are in Syria, but they didn't offer and we didn't have that kind of extensive discussion.

QUESTION: What happened last night with those two Katyusha rockets is undoubtedly going to be taken with some concern in the United States. If they presumably have not missed by less than a hundred yards, they would have hit some part of the building, and the explosion would have been fairly large, according to what the Marines told us. Given the concern that the story is undoubtedly going to cause in the United States, have you thought about taking any extra kind of security precautions or doing anything differently than you are doing? It is a serious issue when two Katyusha rockets miss by you. The Marines certainly seemed very concerned about it.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I wouldn't play it up excessively. There is a lot of attention paid to the security aspects of things; and I feel very comfortable about it.

QUESTION: But you haven't thought about possibly shifting the site of the meeting or not staying overnight when you go back?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly not. It's been there -- the Presidential Palace has been there. They are well-known landmarks. There's been a major war on for all this time and it's still there.

QUESTION: Would you not expect the Israelis to take this attack, to repeat an earlier question, as evidence that they have to provide for their own security, because you have all the Multinational Forces that exist in Lebanon -- you have Marines all over the place -- still an attack like that can happen? I think you can be sure that they'll say, you see, we need our own forces to protect our own borders. What do you say in response to that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think anybody knows who fired off those rounds, but the fact is, as I said earlier, Lebanon is a country occupied by foreign forces and until the foreign forces get out, it's not possible for the Government of Lebanon to really take control because the foreign forces are in control of the areas where they are.

QUESTION: You would not expect this to delay or impede your negotiations as far as the Israelis to dig in their heels even further on the security demands?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Israelis are very concerned about the security issues. That's the big, main point in the whole negotiation so they don't need to have their concerns hyped up. They are very much aware of the security problems, and the negotiations are addressing them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you decided at what point you have to make a decision; it's about Paris, obviously, in part. But could you conceivably go to Paris and come back or stay here and let somebody else go to Paris?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm planning to go to the Paris meeting. It's an important meeting. Among other things, it will be a place where I can meet the Foreign Ministers of the countries that are in the Multinational Force with us, and we're trying to get that set up. But we're going along all right and I'm just no -- other than being pretty firm in my decision to go to Paris -- I think we have the time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I'm still not clear on the procedure now upcoming. You will be going over the agreement again and the annex much as you did in Lebanon, but will you be using the text that you now have after going over it with the Lebanese, or will you be using a text that emerged from all the meetings from last December, and then use that as a basis for future comparison?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not sure I follow you.

QUESTION: You had a text that you took to Lebanon and you went over it clause by clause. Now you are going to do the same thing with the Israelis. My question is: Are you going to use the text which you are bring back from Lebanon as a starting point or a text similar to that which you took to Lebanon two days ago?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's sort of a tactical thing we'll have to -- we've been thinking about. But, actually, obviously, the Israelis will want to know what was the Lebanese position on a lot of these key things, and we'll tell them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I have two questions --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In the sense that it's just the question of what is the easiest document for people to work from.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as I said earlier, we've been -- there's been lots of bridging stuff in the documents, not only things that we've offered but somebody on the Israeli side or the Lebanese side comes up with an idea and it is a pretty good interplay that way.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I don't understand your answer to Barrie's question about security. You replied in your response about the fact that there were all these foreign troops and MNF in Beirut.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it's not the MNF that is the problem. It's the fact that you have foreign forces in Lebanon. They are not in Beirut.

QUESTION: Yes, but what has that to do with the firing of two rockets? Obviously, the foreign forces -- the MNF -- were not behind those triggers?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The MNF was not behind those triggers --

QUESTION: Obviously, we know that. But I don't understand your answer frankly.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Inaudible)

QUESTION: You mean the Syrians, the PLO, and the Israelis, is that what you mean?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know who fired the rockets, but I'm just saying in response to the question about Lebanese ability to control its territory, that it's hard to test that until the territory is vacated by the foreign forces and I did find out that West Beirut seems to be pretty quiet now.

QUESTION: Don't you think they have more security now in Beirut because foreign forces are there? The MNF and the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The MNF is a different proposition.

QUESTION: Let me take you another way if I may. To what degree will the bridging involve and the introduction of American troops to provide that bridging between the Israelis and the Lebanese on security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We're not envisaging any of that kind of bridging -- the use of American troops -- as a way of compromising issues in the south of Lebanon.

QUESTION: Sir, (inaudible) the privilege of a provocative question because a lot people in the United States will wonder. Do you consider that what happened early this morning was an assassination attempt?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 5, 1983
No. 154

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM JERUSALEM TO BEIRUT
May 3, 1983

QUESTION: How are you doing now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, I think we are in a -- we've moved through a great deal of material. We have still some major problems left but we made lots of headway over the last two or three days. So what will happen at the next stop remains to be seen but I think I think I now have a good idea of what Israel will agree to, and so we will be working back and forth between that and the Lebanese position and I think that we can see pretty good opportunities.

QUESTION: Could you indicate to us your travel plans now as far as Damascus, Riyadh, Amman and Cairo and when you might leave the area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have anything more to say on that than before.

QUESTION: Do you still hope to go to Jordan and Saudi Arabia?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I do, but first I have to get a little bit more closure on this situation before I go.

QUESTION: Can you now predict when you might have an agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, you are never in that position until you have got one.

QUESTION: Are you still prepared to come back here after Paris if that is necessary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My plan is to go back after the Paris meetings.

QUESTION: To go back to the States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's the plan.

QUESTION: Should we assume that you basically now have a document that the Israelis find acceptable, and if the Lebanese also find it acceptable then you are finished except for telling the Syrians what it is and that you don't intend to shuttle between Damascus and Beirut?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are major issues to be confronted still and a lot of them have to do less with the language of what an agreement says and more with being sure there is a genuine meeting of the minds on what this really means and what you are going to do, assuming this is agreed to, and we want to do as good a job as possible on that because you have to be thinking if this agreement is reached, then it has to be carried out and you want to be sure people are as close to the same wavelength on that as possible. You can't predict everything, though. There has to be a certain spirit of administration, but within certain frameworks you do have to nail down the way different parts of the system would literally, actually work. So that's where we are.

QUESTION: One of the ideas that's been floating regarding Major Haddad is that the southern region would be divided into two separate regions -- a southern, southern region and a northern one -- that he would be the Commander of the southern one and then there would be an overall command. Is that fairly close to the way that thing might be resolved?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to comment on the Major Haddad issue. That's a very important part of the whole process and we're talking about it in various ways. So I'm just not going to comment on it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we've heard a suggestion that you have a sense that either you could get it done very quickly in the next few days, like before the weekend, or else that it's going to probably take about another month of work. Is that anywhere near a ballpark figure?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My sense of it is that things are coming to a point where closure on this is possible and if it turns out that it doesn't happen then it will take quite a while to bring it back up to where it is again, because things change when you don't find an agreement -- people's positions shift around.

QUESTION: Just to follow up that point. Are you now aiming for an initial document of which the text is set or -- you've used the word "closure" and I'm not sure where you're trying to get a detailed agreement in principle of all the questions -- but with the language still open to negotiations by members of the teams?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have a document and specific language -- suggested language -- and so on, so by the time we get through we won't have just a set of agreed principles. We'll have things that are agreed to as they are written and that is one aspect of the problem. But another aspect is, what I was mentioning, that people agree to do certain things and you set that out, and you describe it and so on, but then you have to be sure that the implications of that are seen and there's some foresight about what it really implies and people are accepting it and prepared to carry through. So that means you have to have some pretty careful exploration of how these matters will work. So there is an agreement, as such, that represents pieces of paper with words on them, and then there's really the understanding of -- in operational terms -- of just what it means.

QUESTION: There would be continuing negotiation after you're finished. It doesn't just all stop after you've got what you want?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's like any other agreement that people can make. You make the agreement, but the agreement covers things that are prospective, and so that means you have to have an administrative set-up to deal with the unforeseen things and what is that set-up and how will it work and so on. So that'a a dimension that goes beyond just what you write down in an agreement, that's if you're trying to get an agreement that will really be effective, which both parties are. You can see that people are really serious about these issues because they argue about them, and they really do probe into these areas. It's a good sign, not a bad sign, but it just means it takes a long time.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what areas are -- in what areas the two parties are still most far apart?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As before, I think I'd rather just stay away from that and try to manage as best as we can without it.

QUESTION: Is security a part of the free movement of people and trade?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: All the parts of the agreement are important, but certainly the security aspects from both the Lebanese and the Israeli standpoint are kind of absolute, necessary conditions. I suppose if you use mathematical formulation, a necessary and sufficient condition -- they're necessary, they may not be sufficient, but without strong security arrangements you don't have an agreement. The Lebanese are at least as concerned that the ability to have stability and security in their country be maintained as the Israelis are. There's no difference of opinion about the desirability of that.

QUESTION: Do you find yourself in the position, as a labor negotiator, trying to split the difference between the two sides, or you're trying to sell some Lebanese positions to the Israelis, some Israeli positions to the Lebanese?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, it's a little bit of everything I suppose, as you get down to issues, but sometimes they're sort of, I don't know how to characterize them, relatively small issues that lend themselves to -- sort of, well, a little bit of this and a little bit of that. But on things that are of real importance, that technique doesn't work. You have to get something that is satisfactory to both sides. So it isn't -- of course, on an all across the board you do -- so I don't think your "splitting the difference" approach really satisfies people very well.

QUESTION: In the past couple of days we have had some briefings with the Israeli military intelligence, and they say that the evidence they have tends to lead them in the direction of believing -- without any direct evidence -- but leads them in the direction of believing that the Syrians may have played a role or "sponsored" was the word used, in the explosion of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Can we infer from the fact that you are going to Damascus, that you do not agree with that conclusion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm going to Damascus because the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon involves Syrian forces, and I want to talk with them about that. That has nothing to do with any information having to do with our Embassy. I don't have any comment to make on that. It's just another subject.

QUESTION: One, will you try to get some kind of written affirmation of the Syrian desire or intention to withdraw their forces; and two, are you going to discuss -- I remember during the Kissinger days, there was a time when about one hundred, two hundred million dollars in economic aid was offered to the Syrians, I'm not sure if Congress ever approved this -- will you make any effort to discuss bilateral issues in an effort to try to woo the Syrians away from the Russians a little bit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the issue of Syrian withdrawal is basically something for the Lebanese to work out with the Syrians and we will support them and help them as best as we can. The Syrians have taken a position over a period of time that they are there as a result of the mandate from the Arab League and more or less at the invitation of the Lebanese. And so, I think the Fez declaration dealt reasonably with the Arab League mandate, and the Lebanese are wanting them to leave and have said so. So that's basically the framework that has to be dealt with.

QUESTION: What about the AID question on American aid to Syria? Will that (inaudible) try to improve the relationship (inaudible)?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are always interested in improving our relationships with countries in this part of the world, including Syria. We have a relationship. I've met with the Foreign Mini- several times. We have an Ambassador there; they have an Ambassador in Washington. And we work at that, but that's something we always do wherever we go.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that today for the first time you feel in a realistic way that you have the makings of a deal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have always felt that it's a do-able proposition, and I continue to feel that way, maybe a little more definitely as I have gone along. But I don't like to keep repeating myself, but you don't have a deal until you have a deal.

QUESTION: Is "do-able" (inaudible) --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have to get there; we're not there yet.

QUESTION: But do you feel now that it's do-able this week?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm sure that's what we are going to try to do. In fact, we are trying to accomplish it as fast as we can.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions: Number one, up until now you have been saying that you're prepared -- you left open the possibility that you might come back after Paris. Earlier, while we were sitting here you said your plan is to go back to Washington, is that cancelling out the possibility of returning here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it doesn't represent any change of mind or anything. I just haven't thought about that too much. The plan all the time has been to go back after the Paris meeting, and I haven't confronted any possibility of changing it.

QUESTION: So you are now going to Damascus flat out, that still depends on how the talks go, doesn't it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It depends on how the talks go and it depends on the Syrian agreement to receive me. Although they have agreed to receive me in principle, we haven't established the time.

QUESTION: Is it your assumption that if you get a deal between Israel and Lebanon that the Syrians will fall into place, that their strategic interests are such -- in addition to what you have already said about Fez and the Arab League and the Lebanese invitation -- that their strategic interests would, in fact, have them fall into place?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We think they must have an interest in withdrawal of Israeli as well as their own forces, and I would hope an interest in a secure and peaceful and prosperous Lebanon. So, we'll make the best of assumptions and go at it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two questions. One, have you begun discussing with the Israelis a side Memorandum in which you might reaffirm some usual U.S.-Israeli understandings? And, secondly, again, Mr. Begin seems to be very, very pleased with the talks yesterday, at least with his description of the atmosphere. Are there any thoughts you might like to add just on how Mr. Begin is negotiating?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Both parties obviously see the United States' presence in these negotiations and I think have welcomed it and find it constructive and, one of the formulas that is often resorted to, is to seek side letters of assurances from the United States to Lebanon or to Israel on various things that they regard as especially important, and which somehow don't seem like the things you can put in an agreement. So I imagine there may be some sort of letter or side letter or letter of assurance or whatever it would be called. But that hasn't been worked out; it's been talked about some, particularly during the course of discussions occasionally it is said, well, why don't -- maybe the United States could write a letter that states their opinion or gives assurance of something or other. So we have been compiling a list of these things.

On the second question, I have had several meetings with Prime Minister Begin. They have all been good meetings, thoughtful discussions, and as you all know he is a very courteous and gentlemanly person and the general atmosphere of the discussions has been good and substantive, but in every respect conducted in a warm and pleasant manner. And I think probably he was just reflecting that as I was, and his statement was a very generous statement on his part and I appreciated it.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there have been a number of things happening that you probably are keeping track of, and we keep that very much in our minds. And of course, when I go to Amman and Riyadh, I will be talking about that as well.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STAT

No. 158
May 9, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE P. SHULTZ
AND
THE HONORABLE FOREIGN MINISTER ELIE SALEM OF LEBANON
AT
THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, MAY 4, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have been meeting for many hours today, and into the evening yesterday, with representatives of the Government of Lebanon -- with President Gemayel, with the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Minister and their colleagues. As a result of our discussions, we now have a explicit and clear idea of the position of the Government of Lebanon, our plan is now to return to Israel and we will present this material to the Government of Israel and have their reaction. So, that's where we are and that's our program.

QUESTION: Is this the final plan that you will present to the Government of Israel or will you have to come back here again after you've gone to Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Government of Lebanon has really extended itself in these discussions and we have all worked at it very hard. The Prime Minister has been with us throughout and we have now a solid position of theirs so we'll present that and we'll see where we go from there. It is very desirable to come to a conclusion as rapidly as we can.

QUESTION: Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that that conclusion -- that is to say, that you can, in fact, achieve a complete withdrawal agreement by this weekend?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it remains to be seen, and we'll have to have the reaction of the Government of Israel. They'll have to look at the material and then give us their view about it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you expect the Lebanese and the Israelis to sign some sort of agreement before you leave, even if the Syrians haven't yet agreed to it? Or do you just have an agreement and then you will leave and someone else will do the selling job with the Syrians?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Again, it depends on the reaction of the Government of Israel to the material that we will be bringing as to how rapidly we can move. I am scheduled and plan, in any case, to go to Damascus on Saturday. President Assad has indicated that he will receive me on Saturday, so if we have a meeting of minds between Lebanon and Israel by that time, that would be very positive.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in saying that the Lebanese Government has extended itself, are you not saying now that the ball is very much in Israel's court to accept or reject what you've negotiated here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm not putting pressure on anybody. They have their own pressures to consider and their own objectives. The Government of Lebanon and the Prime Minister and his colleagues have worked at this very hard and thoughtfully, and I mainly wanted to pay a compliment to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and President Gemayel for the constructive and hard-working effort that they have put in.

QUESTION: Mr. Foreign Minister, is it necessary for the Lebanese to go to the Arab world and particularly to Syria, before you can accept final agreement on this document?

FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM: I think I'd better say a few words and then the Prime Minister will, of course, speak in Arabic in his statement. I just want to thank Secretary Shultz for his very intensive efforts with us and with Israel, in an attempt to reach an agreement. We do not have an agreement. We have given Mr. Shultz a clear statement on all the points raised in the proposed agreement. He knows exactly where we stand. This is not the first time Lebanon does this. Lebanon did that at least three times before. There were conflicts of views, fears and differences that have not led in the past to correspondence of ideas and, therefore, the attainment of an agreement. Lebanon appreciates deeply the efforts of Secretary Shultz because Lebanon wants to free itself and the American initiative is the only concrete mechanism we see ahead of us to liberate Lebanon from occupation and indeed to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of this country. What we are doing, therefore, we do with pride, and openly, and with hope that this will lead to an agreement. We have not in any way compromised the basic principles that we have set from the very beginning to govern our relations with Israel in the context of this agreement. The principles that were enuciated before remain. Our efforts with the Arab countries are continuous. We have been, for the past three months, talking to the Arab countries; we are talking to them today; we talked to them yesterday; we will be talking to them tomorrow. Therefore, we will not be doing anything we were not doing before with the Arab countries. Again, we go to the Arab countries not to seek their approval, because we are a sovereign state, like all Arab states -- they determine their affairs in light of their own interests. We go to the Arab countries to coordinate with them, to keep them informed on the positions that we are taking, and to take their advice because in many matters they are concerned. Lebanon is an integral part of the Arab world.

In no way do we want to violate or compromise any basic arrangement that we have with the Arab countries. And, therefore, we have to be always in line with them and in full cooperation.

QUESTION: Mr. Minister, is an agreement still possible this week?

QUESTION: A signed agreement?

FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM: Yesterday you asked me, and I told you Mr. Shultz is an American and by nature an optimist, that I am from Lebanon and by nature a realist. I will leave it at that.

QUESTION: Yesterday you said that you couldn't see this happening in the next few days. Although you wouldn't rule out miracles, you said it couldn't be done by a magic wand. Has there been some miraculous thing done on the part of the Secretary?

FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM: We have seen that he certainly is a very persuasive individual. Behind his gentle manner and method, he's a very tough fellow and I think if any agreement can be had, it is through the efforts of Secretary Shultz. Whether the ideas that Lebanon is proposing will be acceptable to Israel -- now that's an open question. I would say if these ideas are acceptable, then we are on the way to an agreement.

QUESTION: Sir, are you confident that if Israel will accept (Inaudible) that Syria will be prepared to withdraw its troops from Lebanon?

FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM: We in Lebanon are confident that what is in the higher interests of Lebanon will be supported by Syria.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 5, 1983
No. 155

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM
May 4, 1983

QUESTION: Have we come any closer?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, sure, we have a clear and very forthcoming position from the Government of Lebanon, as we have said, so now we'll see what Israel has to say to that.

QUESTION: Prime Minister Wazzan's remarks prepared for us -- one of the things he said was that this was Lebanon's last position. Was that actually the case or is he just negotiating -- using us?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I won't comment about that. I will give the Israelis my opinion.

QUESTION: Is it your assumption that if you do get an agreement from the Israelis to what you have from the Lebanese that there will actually be some kind of initialing or signing or you'll have to get an understanding from the Syrians before there is ever any signatures?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: This is something between Israel and Lebanon. Now, obviously, the Israelis are not going to withdraw if there is no indication of Syrian withdrawal and PLO withdrawal. But it's separate -- a related but separate -- matter basically between the Governments of Syria and Lebanon and the PLO. And then there are other things that Israel insists on: return of prisoners and bodies, so there is that. This is a negotiation between Israel and Lebanon and what the Syrian position is, is a separate thing. As far as the actual signing is concerned, if there is such a thing, there have been negotiations going on between negotiating groups as you know, so if an agreement emerges out of this -- that both parties agree to -- I would presume, if that's the opinion of both parties, they would have a meeting of that negotiating group and that's the group that will finally negotiate whatever they decide on.

QUESTION: Do you expect to have some definitive word late tonight on the Israeli position?

For further information contact:

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any to predict. We are asking for appointments, and we are prepared to work at it all night, if need be. But it's a very important, comprehensive agreement and so it takes a lot of going over.

QUESTION: Do you think you'll have to go back to Lebanon again? Do you have any way of knowing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no way of knowing.

QUESTION: The Lebanese keep saying that they don't discuss Major Haddad at all. How do you get around that? Some sub-groups are talking about him?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have a way of getting at that.

QUESTION: Are you going to Saudi Arabia after or before you go to Damascus? Can you give us something on your tentative travel schedule?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If it works out and it's a big "IF" and the real thing to concentrate on is Israel and Lebanon, but if it words out reasonably well, then I would ask to be received in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. And since the Damascus visit is Saturday, I'll try to do it before that. But it may not be possible to work that in, but I'd like to do it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we don't want to use up your voice any more. Just one final question. Are you getting tired? Are you physically fatigued now with this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not particularly. I just have a little cough. I cough and cough and it's debilitating.

QUESTION: Are you going to Beirut tomorrow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that is not my intention.

QUESTION: Will you stay in Israel tomorrow and to Beirut again, or never to Beirut again?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I wouldn't say never.

QUESTION: Thank you.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING BY
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, JR.,
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE,
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
[illegible] ON
VISAS & TECHNOLOGY
THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Thank you very much, and my statement will be brief.

I've been asked here to announce the new visa policy to address the problem of illegal foreign access to controlled strategic technology.

As you know, this Administration has been very concerned with the ways in which Western high technology has been used to accelerate the military buildup in the Warsaw Pact forces, and especially those of the Soviet Union.

The acquisition of sensitive technology, which is both overt and covert, costs us dearly. It allows the Warsaw Pact to save hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development costs. It allows them to save years in developmental lead time in weapon systems and defense industrial production. It allows them to modernize quickly critical sectors of their military industries while diminishing engineering risks by adopting proven designs and equipment, designs proven in the West.

It allows them to achieve greater weapons performance than would be the case if they relied solely

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on their own technology. It allows them to develop rapid countermeasures against Western weapons systems.

In short, the process is crucial to eroding the qualitative edge the West has used to offset the quantitative superiority of Warsaw Pact Forces, and it costs us billions of dollars in increased defense expenditure to overcome the capability of our own technologies when they are held in unfriendly hands.

This Administration has set out to rectify the situation. Thus far, we have raised the priority of this issue so that it now receives the attention of the most senior officials in the government.

We have doubled the number of our personnel working on the problem. We have quintupled our resources devoted to export control enforcement. We have sought to strengthen the multilateral system of strategic export controls. We have maintained high technology sanctions on the Soviet Union and cut back on Soviet exchange programs. We have enhanced our analytical capabilities, including our attempt to define more carefully which technologies are critical for military purposes.

For more than two years, we have been actively seeking out the weaknesses and loopholes in our own system and trying to plug them as fast as we can.

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An additional area when action can be taken is to give greater attention to the potential for illegal acquisition of U.S. controlled technology by foreign visitors.

Over the last year, the senior interagency group on the transfer of strategic technology, which I chair, has examined this problem. We have found that there is cause for concern. People are coming to the United States to acquire controlled technology by any means possible. Some of this occurs through industrial or military espionage, some through carelessly handled commercial visits or poor control of sensitive information, some through research exchanges and some through elaborate diversionary schemes to get items out of the U.S. by disguising their destination and end-use.

Some of it involves people entering the United States to acquire strategic technology contrary to our laws and national security interests.

This Administration is determined that the illegal acquisition of U.S.-controlled technology must be impeded by all legal means. The visa process is one of those means.

Accordingly, the State and Justice Departments have been directed to apply the appropriate provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny or restrict

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visas where there is reason to believe that an alien is seeking to come to the United States to acquire controlled strategic technology illegally. This policy is now in effect, and we are taking necessary steps to implement it.

The purpose of this new policy is to further protect U.S. strategic technology so that it does not contribute to the buildup of military power among potential adversaries of the United States. This policy will not be allowed to interfere with the interests of U.S. persons and aliens when their dealings are legitimate and properly involve U.S. technology.

Thank you very much, and I would be glad to answer any questions you might have.

Q What kind of people are we talking about? Is it Western European or Eastern European?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: It's primarily Warsaw Pact nationals, but the Act in question applies to all nationalities.

Q What kinds of tests or what judgment do you apply in determining if the person seeking this technology --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: It would be based on information that we collect by a variety of means as to

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whether or not the individual might be seeking illegal access to controlled technology.

Q Could you give us an example, please, of a case, purely theoretical case; describe a businessman or something? What would you give you reason to believe that such a person would be coming here to acquire illegally such type knowledge?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: For example, you can have an individual who comes to the United States for purposes of industrial research; that is, he seeks to learn about some industrial product but he may have been previously identified by intelligence sources, for example, to be involved in espionage in some way. So we would have good reason to believe, based on his prior behavior, that the individual might be more likely to engage in espionage than the stated purpose of his visit.

Under those circumstances, we might deny the individual a visa or control the circumstances under which he had access to the United States.

Q What kind of control? I mean, you would say where he could go in the U.S.?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That would be one

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of the ways of limiting his access, yes.

Q Have nationals from any of our Western allies been denied visas because of this problem?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Not known to me, no.

Q But do you expect to scrutnize them carefully as well as those from the Warsaw Pact?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: There are some cases that we've seen where nationals of non-Warsaw Pact countries have acted as conduits for illegal transfer of equipment to the Soviet Union; and under circumstances where we have so identified such an individual, we would seek to deny or restrict his access to this policy.

Q Which countries? Can you identify the countries?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: We don't have any specific countries in mind to discuss.

Q Doesn't U.S. law now give the Justice Department -- have visa restrictions on anyone we want to restrict visas?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Yes. The legal authority is there. It's a question of the policy on precisely how it's implemented. We do not need new statutory authority for this policy.

Q Do you have any estimates about how many visas are likely to be denied or restricted under this policy that would have been granted?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: No, we don't have any estimate at this point. Part of the expectation is that by having this kind of policy in place, one might deter some of the less adventurous spirits in this line of work.

We have seen an upsurge in recent years of efforts to acquire this technology illegally where the purpose of travel has be disguised. We think that probably there will be some cases.

Q Can you put some flesh on that and give us a specific instance, a case that might be known that you can give us as an example?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: An example of --

Q Of this kind of industrial espionage.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: I don't want to quote specific cases unless we have -- we can't deal with specific cases that we have denied. Through our own national means, we have found a considerable amount of activity where the purpose of the individuals coming to the United States has been concealed and that his actual purpose has been espionage or otherwise violating U.S. laws dealing with controlled technology.

Q What secrets have been stolen to your knowledge, or what trade secrets have been taken by others?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: The range is very substantial. It includes not only secrets that are classified, but also industrial know-how, technology, equipment that is on our existing munitions control list or our arms export control list, or nuclear export list that denied for export without suitable licensing.

Q Exactly, what kind of equipment or technology are you talking about?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: It can cover a range from explicit military equipment, electronic test equipment, certain kinds of industrial processes, technical know-how or the equipment itself to perform the industrial process.

The technology controls that we have cover an important range of modern industrial technology that is suitable for military purposes.

Q You said you found a considerable amount of activity in this regard. What is a "considerable amount of activity?"

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UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Efforts by individuals of foreign nationality to acquire U.S. technology that is controlled.

Q Can you put a number on it? Anything tangible? Just saying a "considerable amount" -- to me maybe ten would be, to you a hundred would be?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Unfortunately, it's in the realm of -- in the intelligence business, I'm not at liberty to discuss significant numbers. The point is, the numbers are significant enough to be having an important impact on the military power of the Soviet Union, and that is why we regard it as justified to take this measure.

Q Does this apply to all foreign nationals including diplomats?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: The diplomats, in the United States, are under a different set of circumstances. They don't have visas --

Q This is just private foreign nationals?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: This would be for foreign nationals who do not have diplomatic status.

Q How would it affect the average person seeking a U.S. visa, either visitors or residents and

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so on? What difference would it make to them, or will it only be somebody who's under suspicion already?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHENIDER: It would not affect the ordinary visitor at all. It would only have an affect on people who are generally known to be in the business of illegal technology acquisition.

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Q Isn't that already illegal? And don't you keep illegals out anyway?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: As I say, we have the statutory authority. The problem has been that we have not had a rigorous policy of denying visas where the individual who is seeking a visa has as its purpose the legal acquisition of controlled technology.

Q How has that been a problem? You mean many of these people have slipped through even though the controls exist because certain officials have doubted whether they should pinch them or not?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: No, we have just not -- It hasn't been a criteria for controlling the issuance of visas, and so we are making it explicitly a criteria by this policy.

Q What are the gradations? You mentioned keeping people out of the country: just denying them a visa, limiting areas of the country they could go to. Are there any other gradations?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Basically, you've touched on the two basic ideas. One is denying them access altogether; another is controlling the terms of access that they have so that if they come to visit a factory in New York, they don't spend the next two weeks wandering around factories all over the United States.

Q It's exceedingly vague. Can't you give any examples of exactly what people have done -- what people you're speaking of and what they have done that causes you this great concern?

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UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: There is no dearth of examples. The nature of the problem has been that the techniques by which we learned that these violations have taken place is in the domaine of the intelligence services, and generally, they are rather tight-fisted about being explicit.

Q You don't have to tell us how you learned it, just an incident.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: How we learned that --

Q We won't ask you how you learned about the incident, if you could just tell us about the incident.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Yes, well often knowing about the incident will compromise how we know about it.

Q Can you give us one that doesn't fall into that category of "often" -- I mean one that doesn't reveal --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: I can't think of one at this point that I could lay out. Perhaps we can see if some can be declassified so we can use them.

Q Can you name systems in Warsaw Pact nations that have been improved through this type of --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Yes. Tactical aircraft, fire control systems, air defense, nuclear weapon design, ballistic missile guidance.

Q Would you say there has been gross negligence until now?

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UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: "Negligence" might be too strong a term. I think the problem has been one of sensitivity. Within the U.S. Government we have had only a dim understanding of how extensive this activity has been. It was only during the late 1970s that we began to become aware of how extensive a problem this was and how rigorous and well-organized was particularly the Soviet effort to acquire this technology. So over the course of the past 2 or 3 years, the ability of the U.S. Government to understand the scope of this problem and try and identify how it was being done so that we could feed that knowledge back into a system of identifying some ideas as to how we could control it has taken quite a long while.

In a certain sense this seems like a fairly mundane change since no legislative change is required. On the other hand, because of the vast traffic in the United States in terms of foreign visitors, any little change to visa policy requires a substantial, well-organized effort to make it effective and make sure that it doesn't interfere with legitimate entry into the United States.

Q How will this effort be applied?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Perhaps I can ask the representative from Consular Affairs to describe the mechanics of it.

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VOICE: Can you identify yourself?

MR. CAULFIELD: Yes, John Caulfield.

Right now, most applicants from communist countries who apply for visas have their applications, not the physical applications but the details from them, sent to the Department of State for an advisory opinion. At that time, any information that the Department of State had available concerning the applicant, including concerning possible intention to acquire controlled technology illegally, would be made available to the Consular Officer at the Embassy or Consulate overseas; and he would take that information into consideration in making his decision.

Q What would be a profile, a typical profile that would really set the bells ringing when he walks into a Consular Office and applies for a visa?

MR. CAULFIELD: It would not be at the Consular Office. The Consular Officer would not be the person to necessarily identify this potential activity. But as I said, in all cases, or most cases of applicants from Communist countries, the visa application would be referred to the Department of State for an advisory opinion.

If information was available which indicated this person's intention in coming to the United States was to seek

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controlled technology illegally, then the Department of State would make that information available to our Consular Officer who would use that information in making his decision.

Q That isn't done now?

MR. CAULFIELD: I think the Under Secretary had addressed that in his remarks.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: As I said earlier, we have not had a policy in place that would control the issuance of visas on the basis of individuals' seeking to acquire controlled technology. In a certain sense it sounds strange that this hasn't been implemented to date, but as I mentioned earlier, the fact that we're doing it now is the culmination of an increasing preponderance of evidence that this is a problem of very substantial concern to our security.

Q Is there such a thing as a restricted visa, like "not good for California" or something? How do you deal with that?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: The law permits us to restrict the scope of a visa if we so choose. We have circumstances in people who have diplomatic access to the United States, for example, in Washington, who have their travel restricted

It is an enforcement problem, but in terms of policy, it doesn't represent anything that is startling.

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Q You and your colleague keep referring to Warsaw Pact countries, "Communist countries," Mr. Caulfield kept saying.

Will this policy be applied to every person who is suspected of trying to steel sensitive technology? Will it be applied to industrial theft as well as military issues? Will it, for example, be applied to Japanese visitors?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: It would only apply to foreign nationals who are attempting to acquire controlled technology which is defined in several -- actually four -- different areas. One is the technology that is on the Commodity Control List under the Export Administration Act; the second is the Munitions List under the Arms Export Control Act; the third is the technology regulations under the Atomic Energy Act; and the fourth is technology controlled under the National Security Classification System. So it would not deal with foreign visitors whose interest in acquiring technology did not fall under those areas.

Q So it won't deal with industrial -- private industry?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right, provided it's not in these controlled areas. That's right.

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Q Would it apply to Japanese visitors who are trying illegally to obtain technology for their home industries?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: If the technology that they're seeking to acquire is in these four categories. The Immigration Act applies to all nationalities and does not distinguish between, say, the Warsaw Pact countries and allied countries or neutral countries or any other particular classification, but simply refers to the -- it refers to all nationalities.

Q I'm just trying to get a grasp on the numbers we're talking about. Are we talking about hundred, several hundreds, thousands, who may be stopped from coming into this country? Certainly the Department has had some sort of guesstimate on the type of people who may be involved.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: It's hard to forecast what the numbers would be in the future given that those who are --

Q Visas that might be denied.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Yes. -- for the simple reason that, knowing that we have a policy to this effect and would be investigating visa applications for this purpose, that many who would otherwise try it --because in the past, because we had no controls of this kind, would be deterred from doing it.

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Q If it were in place last year at this time, how many people -- I mean, how many people came into this country in the last year? I'm just trying to get an idea.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: I can only say it would be a very considerable number because we have not done it, but I can't give you an overt answer because of the fact that it's in the domain of our intelligence services and we're just not able to comment on that publicly.

Q How many people came through last year under those circumstances that were detected and prosecuted?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Because we didn't have a policy last year of denying visas for these purposes, we did not prosecute people for anything that was related to a --

Q No one came through the United States last year that tried to acquire this technology?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Sure, they did, but we didn't have a policy in place of denying them a visa for correcting this sort of technology.

Q How many people came to the United States, tried to acquire this technology, were detected and prosecuted, regardless of your visa policy? I mean, if it was on the list, it was on the list, wasn't it?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: We, of course, had prosecutions dealing with violations of our export laws.

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You may have heard last year the Customs Service had a fairly substantial effort at a few airports just seeking to detect or find technology or equipment that was being exported illegally, and they found a fairly substantial amount of illegal diversions. These cases are now being pursued. I don't know if the Justice Department might want to make any additional comments on that.

MR. SCHROEDER: No.

Q Why don't we have the Justice Department tell us what penalties are available if a person is found to be conducting this kind of business after having entered the country. What action, beyond deportation, can take place?

MR. SCHROEDER: Under the Export Administration Act there are both civil and criminal penalties for the illegal export of technology that is controlled -- that is, it requires some sort of license for export.

I'm not personally familiar with exactly what those criminal penalties are, but I would assume that that could involve both fines and/or imprisonment.

Q Mr. Schneider, this applies to all foreign nationals regardless of whether they're Communist-country applicants or not.

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right.

Q Because you were mentioning the Communist

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countries earlier --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right. That's an example of how we would deal with it.

Q Yes. So it's regardless of the origin of the applicant?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right.

Q You say that a large number of people come in now in the status that you've -- in that group that you are now trying to land on --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right.

Q -- and if they pinch things and leave -- could you explain, take us through step by step, and explain the process whereby people who are known either by the Embassies out there or somewhere in the State Department or somewhere in the Justice Department to have been involved in industrial espionage of controlled items are let into the country. A number of us, I think, are scratching our heads at that. How does the seive work?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: I can give you an example. An individual in a foreign country sets up an export company that is intended to divert technology acquired from the United States to a Warsaw Pact destination. He comes into the United States posing as a European or a Japanese or whatever businessman, and says he wants to buy one of these widgets which can be legally exported to

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the Federal Republic of Germany, but not to the Soviet Union. He gets the widget and moves the widget to the Soviet Union through his company.

Q My question is, who under the current non-rules, or whatever you want, who in the United States and where in the United States do we know that that guy is a bad guy, and how does the process occur whereby that information is not given to the Consular Office or to the customs people or the border police or whatever?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: We know about these illegal activities in part through our intelligence services. The difficulty is that we have not had a policy in place heretofore that would have provided a coupling from what we know about these folks who have engaged in this kind of activity back to the Consular Officer who would have denied the fellow a visa who was involved in this kind of shopping expedition.

Q As it currently exists, if I'm a Consular Office in, say, Warsaw and a Soviet citizen walks up to me and says that he wants a visa for the United States because he's on business and he's a businessman, is that in any way routinely put through back here to the State Department, or does he use his own judgment?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Why don't you take care of it?

MR. CAULFIELD: Yes, it would be. Most citizens of Communist countries automatically have their visa applications referred back to the Department of State for an advisory opinion regardless of where they apply.

Q To which bureau? To yours?

MR. CAULFIELD: To the Department of State.

Q To the Department of State.

MR. CAULFIELD: Any information that we would have concerning potential ineligibility would be made available to the Consular Officer at the place where the person actually applied.

Q Where is the missing link, because the Assistant Secretary just said that there are people in this building who know who the bad guys are, and you say there are other people in this building who regularly get an inflow of the names of guys, and somewhere there's a missing link? Where does it occur?

MR. CAULFIELD: Right now the policy is to make information concerning a person's possible involvement in gaining access to controlled technology illegally available to the Consular Officer so that having that information he can make his decision on the visa.

Q But does this person have to have a prior record before you have him on the list?

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UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: Not necessarily. There are plenty of cases of multiple offenders, but there would be cases where we would find that an individual has received an assignment from a Soviet-bloc intelligence service to collect U.S. technology by posing as a foreign business traveler, and he may not have been in that business before. If we are able to develop information that this kind of thing exists, then we would use that information in this case.

Q What, actually, is the difference between the new policy and the old policy?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: The new policy is that we overtly make attempts to legally acquire U.S. controlled technology a basis for denial of visas.

Q How? How do you overtly do this?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: The process was explained earlier. When the visa application is made, we marry that visa application with information that we have collected from other sources to make a judgment as to whether or not the particular individual might be on an expedition to illegally acquire controlled technology. If that is the case, we will deny or restrict the visa.

Q If I understand you, then, what you are saying is although you may have had the information in the past, you simply haven't acted on it, although you might

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have reason to suspect that a fellow --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right. It's been, I would say, imperfectly acted upon in some cases, especially from the Soviet bloc where we identify an individual as a foreign intelligence officer. For example, it's not too hard to give him a problem in acquiring a visa. But the problem is sufficiently widespread in a sense that dummy companies have been set up by the Warsaw Pact companies to acquire technology, for example, that we need a more systematic and thorough going policy to do it, and that's what this initiative is intended to do.

Q Can I just follow that? So in previous cases when you have had applications and you say, "Oh, this guy's a problem, but we don't have any criteria for denying his visa" --

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: That's right. This is the last question. I'm sorry, I've got to --

Q Have we asked the allies -- the NATO allies specifically, to implement the same kind of policy?

UNDER SECRETARY SCHNEIDER: We have discussed it, and they are working on the same kind of initiatives.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:31 p.m.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 9, 1983
No. 163

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM JERUSALEM TO AMMAN
May 6, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, obviously that was a pushover, what are you going to do for an encore?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have, I think, to look to the efforts made by the Israeli negotiators, by the Prime Minister, by Minister Shamir, by Moshe Arens which have been very constructive and earnest all the way through here. And I can say the same for President Gemayel and Elie Salem, Prime Minister Wazzan and their colleagues. There has been throughout the discussions that I have been involved in a very clear effort on everyone's part to find answers and solve problems. So when you have that kind of atmosphere, you always have grounds for thinking you can achieve something. I think it is a significant step that we have an agreement between Israel and Lebanon that will provide for complete, full withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon -- complete withdrawal, and at the same time gives the attention that must be given to the security needs of Israel. Now, obviously we have to go on to the question of Syrian withdrawal and PLO withdrawal. We fully understand that the Syrians consider themselves to be in Lebanon on a different basis from Israel. So we will approach this as a separate topic but obviously for Israeli withdrawal to occur, there has to be evidence of what Syria will do. We are going to Jordan to talk with King Hussein about the developments with Lebanon and also in the peace process more generally and then, as you know, we are going to Damascus and then Riyadh or Jidda, depending on where King Fahd is. Then we are going to swing back through Jerusalem and pull in Paris late some night. We will get to Paris.

QUESTION: How soon do you hope an actual withdrawal could occur in Lebanon? The agreement provides, what eight to twelve weeks, I understand?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that is the time span that it will take depending somewhat on the circumstances, weather conditions and all of that. That's the length of time that would take from the time you start until the time you finish.

For further information contact:

QUESTION: What was the most difficult issue that you dealt with out here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it is hard to classify them. In some ways everything is difficult. I think what's difficult is to get the whole package together and everybody on board at once on everything. That's where the difficulty lies. I wouldn't single out any one.

QUESTION: Sir, what actually is going to trigger withdrawal? Is it something in the agreement that says once the Syrians agree to withdrawal then the Israelis will start to pull out? Is there a trigger mechanism of some sort?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is a problem that we will have to approach and we will. But I'd rather not get into that. I'd rather wait until I talk with the Syrians.

QUESTION: What clarifications did the Israelis want?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe that the nature of the clarifications as we had them explained to us briefly will not pose any real problems. I think they can all be taken care of. I say that on the basis of a very brief conversation. The Prime Minister called me to tell me of the Cabinet's decision. I think it is notable that it was a large majority. Then he asked that Moshe Arens come over which he did and we talked for a while. I called the President and spoke to him and gave him the news and Moshe Arens also spoke to him. I assume he will probably be making some calls himself. While in the process of that conversation we had some idea about the nature of the clarifications. On the basis of that, I think we are all in good shape.

QUESTION (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Wait until you actually get down to it to see.

QUESTION: What American guarantees are involved in all of this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: American guarantees? Well, we have a letter of assurances that we have given the Israelis and also one to the Lebanese that says a variety of things about our support for the agreement and our readiness to work to see that it is implemented and so on, things like that.

QUESTION: How much money is involved?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there is an awful lot of money saved if there can be some peace in the area. There is no money. We did not pay anything to get this agreement, if that's what you mean.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) or weapons or anything like that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, we have committed ourselves and we have stated to the Lebanese that we intend to help them in every way we can, including financially, subject to Congressional approval, of course, in the reconstruction of their country. First they have to get the foreign forces out then the money will start coming.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what about Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have a fairly substantial flow of funds going to Israel and we will continue to support that flow of funds.

QUESTION: Does this improve the chances, now that you have an agreement between Lebanon and Israel, that Jordan might be persuaded and others might be persuaded to support Jordan in entering the broader peace process?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it helps, no doubt about it.

QUESTION: Can you elucidate a little bit more than that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: King Hussein has emphasized a number of times and so have many others that if they had evidence of the willingness of Israel to withdraw from Lebanon that would have an impact on their thinking. So, now we have a clear unequivocal declaration on the part of Israel that there are conditions under which it will withdraw completely and these conditions are acceptable to the Government of Lebanon. So I think that's a very big thing.

QUESTION: When and how will the agreement be signed?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am not sure exactly the answer to that but presumably it will be signed in the meeting of the negotiating teams that have been negotiating and when everything is set up properly there will be another meeting of that negotiating group and there are a number of things to be covered and discussed that are set out. That's when presumably the agreement will be signed.

QUESTION: Will the text be made public?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That I am not sure of. It belongs to the parties, Israel and Lebanon. I understand that a few reporters have got major pieces of it -- some of the more enterprising members.

QUESTION: What is your pitch going to be with King Hussein, Mr. Secretary, on all of this? That is, both on the agreement and to the degree that you think it will encourage him to join the President's peace process.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Obviously, with King Hussein, I am going to give him a full briefing on our discussions between Israel and Lebanon, how they went and what was agreed on and answer his questions. I am sure that will be one point of great interest to King Hussein. Then, I would like to get his direct observations and ideas and thoughts on the peace process more generally. I will contribute a few of my own but there will be sharing of ideas. I have, of course, been in touch with him regularly but I haven't talked to him directly since last December when he was in Washington.

QUESTION: Will you try to urge him to enter the peace process without the backing of the PLO?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to go into detailed questions of what I might or might not want to talk to King Hussein about. These are the general areas we will cover and we will see how the conversation moves. We will just sort of talk along about what seems reasonable to talk about.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will Israel now be entitled to get those F-16's approved for contracts that have been held up or will you still have to wait until their troops have pulled out of Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am not going to scoop the President but I don't see any reason why -- I'll just stop there. I don't want to scoop the President. I will not make any comments.

QUESTION: Will the President make the announcement? Will the President make the annoucement that your trip was a success?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Inaudible) I am sure the President will make a comment on it. It's a very good thing and he has been working on this personally for ever since I have been on the job.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Prime Minister is always welcome. I am sure that the President will hope to have a chance to talk with him sometime before long. I had hoped to have time for a number of discussions with the Prime Minister about the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The Lebanon events sort of overtook our time on that so we didn't get into it in as much detail as is desirable. But I am sure that we will be working to have this relationship be on a very strong, warm track.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I feel sort of like the first question over here. What are we going to do next? We have a lot of work ahead of us.

QUESTION: Do you feel better than Major Haddad does? (Laughter)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Don't worry about him. He'll do all right.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) Mr. Secretary, you ducked a question on what would trigger withdrawal but earlier --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I always duck questions directly.

QUESTION: You had said that until the Syrians withdraw the Israelis will not withdraw. There has been no change on that, is that correct, sir?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The position that we have always taken is that there has to be, without there being a direct agreement between them, somehow the notion of simultaneous withdrawal. That allows for lots of combinations and permutations about what precise withdrawal schedules look like.

QUESTION: But you would not expect an Israeli withdrawal unless, however you worked it out, there would be a simultaneous Syrian withdrawal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think there is no way that the Israelis could be expected to withdraw under those circumstances.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 166
May 10, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
ENROUTE TO DAMASCUS, SYRIA
MAY 7, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us where we are on Reagan's peace plan and did this issue come up with King Hussein?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, we have discussed it in quite some length. He described his negotiations with the PLO in detail. We recognize that it is a frustrating moment, but nevertheless he expressed his continuing determination to pursue it and I know the President feels that way too. We've talked about a few things that we might do to move things along, so we're formulating matters and we have also agreed to be in close touch with King Hussein on the matter.

QUESTION: Can you elaborate on some of the things you might do?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I really don't want to, but we do have some ideas.

QUESTION: What is the prospect, or did he give you any idea of whether there would be a new set of negotiations with the PLO, or is he currently having discussions with the PLO that might give him a mandate to move forward?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are all kinds of discussions going on as people try to reassemble themselves after the breakdown of the negotiations that almost succeeded. I think the King hopes that perhaps the PLO will find it possible to accept conditions that allow him to go to the bargaining table. In the meantime there are a variety of other things we're doing that will support that.

QUESTION: On the visit to Damascus, do you expect a meaningful answer from Assad on whether he will go along, or would you expect to pay more attention to his actions rahter than his words?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have had several talks myself with the Foreign Minister, and President Assad has been quoted to me by the Lebanese, and the Syrians have always said they will withdraw as the Israelis withdraw. So that's my starting point, and I don't know where we'll go from there.

QUESTION: My question is, what will you be watching, their words or their actions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think they both are important. Obviously in the end it is what they do that counts.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did the King elaborate any more on the kind of conditionality he sees between the Lebanon withdrawal and going forward with the peace process? In other words, would everyone have to be physically out of Lebanon before he would consider going forward, at whatever level with the PLO or without them or talk with them again?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What he told me was that he considered this a significant step, this agreement. Obviously, it becomes much more significant if there is actual withdrawal. That's what we're really after. But the fact that Israel has agreed to withdraw is an important fact. The fact that that happened through negotiations shows that the negotiating process can produce a result.

QUESTION: And he accepted that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: He certainly agreed with that. Although he's very much like you all are: That's fine now. What's next? That's everybody's point of view, including mine.

QUESTION: Do you have any real fear that Lebanon could just fall apart once the Syrians and the Israelis leave? We've seen a week now of shelling between internal Lebanese factions that are not related to the invading forces. How great is your concern that that fighting will get even worse once the foreign troops will pull out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I wouldn't be so sure that those shellings are not related to the occupying forces.

QUESTION: Do you blame the Syrians, including the Druzes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't go any further than that because I don't have the hard evidence, but we have a lot of evidence.

QUESTION: Do you think once the foreign troops pull out, Lebanon will live in peace and tranquility?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Nobody lives in peace and tranquility, but it can be a lot more peaceful and a lot more tranquil than it is now.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what sort of advice do you believe the Soviets are giving the Syrians in connection with the withdrawal process and the agreement.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any basis for doing more than just speculate about that so I don't think I want to comment on that. I did notice that the TASS article on the Lebanon-Israeli agreement denounced the agreement. I don't know whether you saw that. I just read a little clip in the newspaper.

So that suggests the Soviet attitude.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, getting back to Hussein and the peace process, is it your view that the only way he might come into the process is with at least the tacit support of the PLO and not through some other device as having a vote or plebiscite in his own country and having indigenous Palestinians support that vote?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that's a problem for the King to work through and I don't want to make any direct comment on it. But there are a lot of different things that can be done and that we've discussed that may turn out to be fruitful and helpful, and I just don't want to go into them.

QUESTION: Was there discussion between you and the King yesterday on some of these alternatives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We didn't discuss that. We discussed attitudes of West Bank Palestinians. We discussed his view of the Palestinian diaspora and what their problems are and so on. Also, I think the King feels as I do that someone has to think about the Palestinians as individual people and be ready to do something that will be helpful to them in their lives as they lead them.

QUESTION: To come back to our qeustion that was raised yesterday, it still is not clear how the withdrawal from Lebanon will begin, what will trigger it? Do you intend to raise that question with President Assad in this meeting this afternoon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, of course, that's what I want to talk about -- Syrian withdrawal and just how that will (Inaudible) itself. Where we will be able to go on the subject I don't know yet, that's what I'm going to Damascus to find out. But he maintains the postiion and I don't argue with him about it that Syria is there on a different basis than Israel is there, so you don't link them.

On the other hand, the Israelis are not going to withdraw leaving the Syrians there and vice versa. So somehow, there has to be a schedule put together, independently, that is known by both parties. Before you can even start on that you have to get some sort of agreement in principle, then you can start working out details; there is no point in working on the details until you get the principle settled.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is this going to require us to follow this up since the two parties won't talk to each other directly, some American shuttling back and forth between the Syrians and the Israelis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that it's primarily a matter between Lebanon and Syria and between Lebanon and the PLO and we will support Lebanon in its efforts. But it is first and foremost something for Lebanon to work out and I believe that Syria, as I understand it, feels that way about it too, that they want to deal with Lebanon but they also are ready to discuss it with us as well.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some people have speculated, including Gideon Rafale, a former senior diplomat in Israel, in the Jerusalem Post yesterday, that it is very important really to bring Syria and the Soviet Union more into the negotiations, sort of like Cy Vance I guess tried in 1977. Do you see any value in that at all?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't have the impression it worked very well in 1977.

QUESTION: Cy, in his latest book, claims it was working well but then Sadat undercut it by going directly to Israel.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The way I heard the story it was somewhat different.

QUESTION: Putting that aside, the fact is you still have a Soviet and Syrian role out here. The argument is simply that do you gain more by ignoring them or by trying to work with them constructively?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we keep them briefed on what's going on as we see it. Their role has been to supply weapons and to make provocative statements.

QUESTION: Did you ever talk to Cy about this because he feels very strongly that the biggest mistake they made in 1977 was dropping that Geneva approach.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I haven't discussed it with Cy directly buy my impression is maybe you could say it was a stroke of genis because it alarmed Sadat so much, as many tell it, that he decided to take matters in his own hands.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 167
May 10, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE P. SHULTZ
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT ASSAD OF SYRIA
AND
THE HONORABLE FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM OF SYRIA
DAMASCUS, MAY 7, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First, the schedule, which was that we met with the Foreign Minister and his party-- first a little group, then a larger group, for a couple of hours or so. We discussed mainly the Lebanon negotiations, but also such matters as the Iran-Iraq war and tensions in the Middle East in general. We then had a working lunch with the Foreign Minister and, following a slight break, about four hours of discussion with President Assad, which again covered a wide range of things but I would say at least half of it on the Lebanon situation. In the interest of time, I'll just comment on the latter, since that is the thing we have been working on. Of course, the Syrians will speak for themselves about it, but I think it is fair to say that they are hardly enthusiastic about the agreement that Lebanon and Israel have worked out. Now, procedurally, as I understand it, what has to happen is that Lebanon -- which brought a copy of a draft agreement as of, I think late Tuesday, here and discussed it with them -- will, after Lebanon acts on the agreement, show them -- although that's up to Lebanon -- the actual agreement as it has been finally shaped up. Then, Lebanon will have the negotiation with the Syrians about Syrian withdrawal and with the PLO about PLO withdrawal. My guess is that these will be very difficult negotiations, but this is okay. At least from my experience in the Middle East, nothing happens easily, so no one expected that this one would be. On the other hand, at least in my judgment, there are great incentives built into this situation for people in the end to go along with it, but that's only my judgment. At any rate, no doubt the Lebanese and the Syrians will be discussing this matter, and we have said that we are ready to help as we can. President Assad gave me his assurance that I, or the appropriate U.S. representative, will always be welcome here to do that. So that's where it stands.

QUESTION: Are you saying that you may come back here to do the same sort of thing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no direct plan to do that, although I, Phil or somebody -- of course, the Ambassador is here, and we will be keeping in touch with them as our Ambassadors do. In other words, the door is open for further discussions with us, as well as with the Lebanese.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) possibility, Mr. Secretary, that if there should be progress in that negotiation and you were required in the final stages to try to close the deal, you would be willing to do that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think it is that kind of a proposition, and I don't mean by my comment to imply that I'm ready to come back.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you're saying that you've had a tough round and they didn't like the agreement. You are saying the Lebanese are going to have tough discussions with them. What is the time frame looking down the road, then, of any foreign troops getting out of Lebanon? It is not going to be quick.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in the first place there is built into the Israeli-Lebanese agreement a withdrawal period of eight to twelve weeks. The start of any withdrawal period awaits assurances all around on what everyone is going to do. I can't make a prediction on how long that will take, but it will take a little while.

QUESTION: In the interest of time, can you just summarize very quickly just what the Syrian objections are?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd rather let the Syrians do that. You can imagine them pretty well and they have expressed them publicly quite a bit.

QUESTION: But did they make clear that in principle they are for the troop withdrawal still?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It depends on the level of principle -- at a certain level of principle, yes.

QUESTION: Were you surprised at the intensity of their objections, Mr. Secretary? Did it run deeper than you thought it would?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we had a pretty good idea what their views are, and I would say that we weren't surprised.

QUESTION: Is it the remaining or the residual Israeli presence that they object to or , on a more philosophical level, the whole idea that Israel makes political gains from military aggression?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: How much they learned from our discussion as compared with what they knew before we talked, I'm not sure, but I think we have started all this with the proposition that what this agreement yields is complete Israeli withdrawal. And from the Arab standpoint, obtaining complete Israeli withdrawal is a very important matter.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you just make clear if they rejected the withdrawal based on the agreement that has worked out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't want to say anything that -- as a clarification, I don't want to imply that I know that the Lebanese will bring that agreement here and deliver it. I'm sure they will come and want to discuss it, but of course, that is up to them. It is their agreement, so I don't want to say anything that seems to lock them into that.

QUESTION: You think the door is open or this amounts to a rejection?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the door is not slammed.

QUESTION: Thank you.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 17, 1983
No. 179 PC#24

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE OECD MEETING
Paris, France
May 10, 1983

QUESTION: What is your comment on the departure today of the Soviet diplomats from Lebanon and how dangerous do you think the situation is since last week?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The departure of the Soviet group from Lebanon has been described by them as something that happens annually at the end of the school year. I have no way to debate that, but it does happen regularly. As far as we are concerned the situation in Lebanon is that there is an agreement between Israel and Lebanon calling for, among other things, withdrawal by Israel. We look now to withdrawal by Syria and the PLO so that Lebanon can get itself free of all foreign forces, and we continue to work for that objective. I might say that I had a meeting this afternoon with the Foreign Minister of Iraq who has publicly supported, he has told me, the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces. The Egyptians have also called for that, the Jordanians have also called for that and I understand the Saudi Arabians have also called for that. So there is a certain rate of Arab opinion developing so that withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon is what is called for. There will be Israeli withdrawal so that Lebanon as a country can be sovereign and peaceful and prosperous. That is the objective the U.S. is working for.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I address this question to you and Regan jointly. Can you tell us what you gentlemen think you have accomplished here at the OECD meeting in the last two days, and whether or not President Mitterand's statement last night in any way clouds the prospects of success for the Williamsburg Summit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Mitterrand's statement was an eloquent statement of his view, it was a special bonus for us in attending this session and I do not see that it in any way clouds, it helps to put forward ideas for the Williamsburg Summit. I had the privilege of a meeting of an hour and a half this morning; it was very fruitful and worthwhile. In a general way I think that we feel that we have come here, we have joined with our friends in the OECD countries and we have found a great sense of common purpose and unity and recognition that we do have serious problems and we also see the prospect of some answers. Particulary everyone has pointed to the prospect of economic growth, everyone has noticed that there has been substantial headway, more in some countries than in others, but as a general proposition, substantial headway. I think that we can look to the future with much more confidence. I say that as a result of the communique as such, but even more by virtue ot the discussions that we have had and getting a sense and a feeling of the outlook that people have.

QUESTION: (Hobart Rowen -- Washington Post) What specific things have come from the meeting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are a great many specific things in the communique that will be undertaken. I think however that the main point is the sense of communication and interaction and the sense of common purpose. I feel that if you contrast the statements here that came out of the GATT Ministerial of November, for example -- I did not happen to attend that meeting, but I have heard a great deal about it -- I think the atmosphere was much stronger and healthier on the subject of open trade here than it was there. So we have made some headway and some progress.

QUESTION: (Bernard Kalb -- NBC) What kind of example do you think the Soviets are giving the Syrians in connection with the troop withdrawal agreement, and do you foresee a possibility of the Syrians triggering some kind of (inaudible) to sabotage the agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I do not have any idea of what advice the Soviets are giving the Syrians: I am not privy to that. However, I have seen the article in TASS attacking the Israeli/Lebanon agreement, so they have made their view of the matter clear. I would only say this: that Lebanon is a country that has suffered like no other country has in recent years. If you took the casualties in Lebanon and scaled them according to the size of the U.S. population, you would be talking in U.S. terms about casualties about in the order of ten million. Imagine what our country would be like if we had that level of casualties. Now, we have an agreement between Israel and Lebanon for withdrawal and for Lebanon to have a chance. We are calling upon Syria and PLO to withdraw so that Lebanon can have a chance. I should think all countries by this time would look at it that way and say to themselves that it is about time that we took a constructive attitude and got on the side of peace and a chance for people to construct their lives. I would call upon the Soviet Union to take another look and to get on the side of peace in Lebanon.

QUESTION: Can you please tell us about your talks this morning over breakfast with Mr. Hayden on Southeast Asia?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: This was a first meeting between Mr. Hayden and myself -- he having just taken office some four or five weeks ago -- and so we reviewed various issues common to the region and as it happened his Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, is a friend of mine from years past, so we exchanged greetings back and forth on that regard. It was a general meeting, getting acquainted and hearing his views of what some of the prominent issues are. Mr. Hawke will be visiting in Washington in mid-June and Mr. Hayden will be in Washington in early July for the Anzus Meeting, so we will have a lot of contacts with the new Australian Government coming up.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on the OECD agenda I have one question: one of the sore points on the European agenda is of course how does the American administration evaluate the agreements in the East/West trade area? We got the signals that basically the East/West issues are on the back-burner in Williamsburg. In light of the communique and your statements there are a lot of points where you could evaluate this aspect differently, that in Williamsburg you might have still some conflicting areas.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am sorry to say that even the press cannot stir up a fight in this area. There do not seem to be any sore points that I can find. We have discussed a wide range of issues from the market orientation of trade and financial arrangements. We have discussed energy matters, We have discussed security matters in another forum -- not in the OECD forum of course, that is entirely different. As a general proposition what seems to me to have happened in this field is that there has been a great deal of discussion among those concerned and we have argued and struggled to make our views clear to each other and gradually over a period of time a consensus of views has emerged. That is beginning to take shape and it is not that controversial at this point. Everybody, certainly we are pleased with the way this is coming along.

QUESTION: What was the result of your meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We discussed really three things. First, that the Iraq/American relationship -- we have a relationship -- could be stronger. We discussed the Iran/Iraq war and our desire to see it end, and some possible ways of going about that. Also we discussed the Lebanon situation and I reported the views of the Minister on that. I might say that I would not have reported somebody else's views here like that except that I asked him if I could say that he favored Syrian withdrawal, and he says that he said it publicly so there is no reason why you cannot say that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you planned to go back to Damascus?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My plan is to go back to Washington tomorrow morning and I do not have any immediate plan to go back to Damascus. I might point out that Ambassador Habib remains in the area and is well known in Damascus and knows the area well and may very well travel there on behalf of the U.S.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We know that the Syrians object to the Israeli/Lebanon greement, that is not really the point. The point is: will they withdraw? It has been said by many that they will withdraw when the Government of Lebanon asks them. I have a pretty good idea that they will get asked.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you any indication of whether the clarifications sought by Israel have been acceptable to the Lebanese?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My understanding is that, as is usual in agreements of this kind there is a lot of effort to dot the I's and cross the T's and it is a bit of a struggle; but there is no special problem that should impede us connected with it.

QUESTION: Are you disappointed that the Lebanese Assembly has not acted yet in any way to formally approve the agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Lebanese Assembly will act, I am sure, as soon as things are ready for them. I think that they are working at that very hard.

QUESTION: I have a question for Secretary Regan: Do you think that President Mitterrand's suggestions on a reform of the EMS are: a)A good thing, b) feasible?

SECRETARY REGAN: There is no doubt that at some point and time the nations in the world will discuss in more detail monetary problems and the currency fluctuations that have characterized the world's currencies over the last three or four years. I do not think the time is quite ripe for that at the present moment. I think Mr. Mitterrand also indicated that there needs to be a lot more planning, a lot more discussion, a lot more consideration before any type of real conference would be called on this. I also point to the study that was released on April 29 concerning monetary policy and convergence of currencies and the statement that was jointly issued at that time by the G-7 nations of which both France and the U.S. subscribed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think that President Reagan will pursue his Middle East plan, and what guarantee is the U.S. likely to give to Jordan in the future to participate in negotiations, and what do you think about what happened yesterday in Amman?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: President Reagan will pursue his plan for peace. President Reagan is dedicated to doing everything he can to help bring peace to the Middle East and to other troubled areas of the world -- so you can be sure that he will pursue that. I think that the prospect of peace must be a major incentive to people in any region. To pursue, the U.S. does not have to persuade people, it is obvious that it is in their interest, so I would expect that people would pitch in and pursue it. As far as the two explosions in Jordan are concerned, I guess that is what you are referring to, I do not have very much information about it, other than they occurred. So I will not comment about it.

QUESTION: How is your visit coordinated with that of Mr. Weinberger? Do you know if the Secretary of Defense is seeing Mr. Tariq Aziz?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The visit, was, I think, fortuitous, in the sense that it is an extra chance to talk with people in the region by a high official of the government, but it was not planned that way particularly. These meetings take place from time to time and Secretary Weinberger is here on that kind of a visit. As far as I know, he has no plan to see the Iraqi Foreign Minister.

QUESTION: Wh y do you think the Soviet Union should pay any attention to what you are saying about Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can speak for the U.S. as a country dedicated to peace, and I call upon the Soviet Union and other countries to show equal dedication. I thought myself that it was a great thing to see the Lebanese, with all of the difficulties they have, struggling to find an agreement with Israel and by the same token, the Israelis negotiating in a troubled situation to bring about withdrawal and to try to establish a modicum of peace on their northern border. People are trying, trying to construct a peaceful world. Everyone has signed statements saying that is what they are for; let them come through and join in the peace process. I do not think that words will necessarily do it, but there is no need to despair, we might as well try.

QUESTION: What do you mean by "join in the process?"

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Join others in calling on the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon.

QUESTION: Can I just ask Mr. Secretary Shultz one thing on the Williamsburg Summit in light of the last two days at the OECD. Earlier this year you said that you would hope for a rather informal or unstructured Summit. Do you think that anything can be accomplished in terms of solving, or even moving towards solving, these complex and interrelated issues at a summit that is as informal as you have foreseen?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President and other heads of state do feel that the most will be accomplished at the Summit if it is informal, conversational, with, certainly, an orderly process of working through various subjects, and this will provide them with an opportunity with a genuine exchange of views on a lot of these subjects. I do not think that you expect that heads of state are going to come at this issue with a sense of a solution in some kind of definitive one per one sense. What heads of state can contribute, it seems to me, is a sense of the relationship among these issues and a greater understanding of how they effect the various countries involved, so that as they proceed with their own policies they do so with a great sense of how the interations are likely to be around the world. It is those kinds of things that you tend to get out of a Summit. Furthermore on matters such as the prospects for economic growth without inflation, I think those will be very well served if the protectionist pressures can be kept in a balance, perhaps rolled back a little bit, and here getting a feel for mutual determination to do so is often very helpful as you go your own processes in your own country. So these are all aspects of what may come up at the Summit, but I do not think that people go there expecting to find five answers to four questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think that the Saudis are still going to exert pressures upon the Syrians with their petro-dollars?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I did not say that they were, so the word "still" is not an operative one, and I do not have any comment to make about whatever the nature of the discussion between the Saudis and the Syrians may be, other than to note that the Saudi Foreign Minister at the airport did make a comment about the importance of Syrian withdrawal.

QUESTION: Do you have any confidence that any initiative toward Vietnam can settle the problems of Kampuchea and Laos?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think in that situation we have one where a Soviet-sponsored country with some 180,000 troops or more has invaded Kampuchea, has moved into Laos, is causing trouble on the Thai border, and what we and others have called for is for them to withdraw to their own country. In that regard we are supporting the effort of the ASEAN countries and also the People's Republic of China which has the same viewpoint. Whether the Australian Foreign Minister will be able to accomplish something in that regard, I do not know. I wish him well, but our policy is very clear.

QUESTION: Are you willing to meet with the Soviets and discuss with them on the question of their getting on the side of peace?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We meet with the Soviets, I do, and others do from time to time. We are always interested in peace; it has many dimensions. Somebody brought up Kampuchea, we have been talking about the Middle East, we have very constructive efforts going in Southern Africa, we have lots of problems in Central America; there are many places where we can be more constructive. Let alone in the field of arms control. Where the President has put forward sweeping proposals for reductions in nuclear armaments and in conventional arms, the MBFR talks are going on in Vienna, there are talks going on in Madrid -- there are a great many forums where various dimensions of what it takes to build peace are under discussion.

QUESTION: Should they be brought into closer consultations, particularly on the Middle East?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The point I made in the Middle East was in response to questions and in response to an article in TASS, more or less officially attacking the agreement reached between Israel and Lebanon: how you can attack that agreement and feel that you are for peace in Lebanon, I do not know. It is an agreement to start the process for removal of foreign forces, so I do not think it takes a conference, it takes them to urge the Syrians to withdraw, as the Israelis have agreed to withdraw.

QUESTION: Do you, after these two days of talks here, feel that the U.S. has more responsibility for protecting the fragile world recovery, and in particular are you more interested in world growth as a way of helping the developing countries, who have in many cases, borrowed very heavily from the American banking system?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The U.S. has been, remains and continues to be very much interested in world economic growth, non-inflationary, healthy growth. It is good for us, it is good for our friends and allies, it is good for the developing countries as well as our industrial neighbors so we have been in favor of that, we continue to be. All of those sentiments were reinforced at the meetings here and there is a continued thrust in that direction. We are glad to be aboard, if anything, leading the charge.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 11, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
GEORGE SHULTZ,
SECRETARY OF STATE

The Briefing Room

4:45 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: The Secretary has just finished his meeting with the President, following his 17 days in the Middle East and in Paris. And he will report to you on his meeting with the President, as well as his travels.

He will have a brief opening statement and, then, be followed with about 10 minutes of questions, after which we would like to conclude.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was a pleasure to report to the President in person, as well as -- during this trip -- by cable and by telephone. Somehow, that is a little better kind of communication, when you can look somebody in the eye and talk it over.

But at any rate, during the course of the travels in the Middle East -- I, of course, started out with good instructions from the President. And we were able to maintain a constant communication. I reported to him on the situation in Lebanon right now as I left it. And that is that the agreement between Israel and Lebanon is gradually settling down. I think just about all the i's have been dotted now and the t's crossed. And we expect to see that take final shape and be ratified.

Of course, once that is firm and in hand, then the next question is -- and it is a question that is being worked on -- is Syrian and PLO withdrawal. And I have no doubt that the Lebanese will call, formally, for that. And while I fully recognize -- having been there -- that there are problems and difficulties, nevertheless it is clear that there is a weight of opinion building up in the Arab world that this is the opportunity to bring about Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, along with all foreign forces, and support for that.

So I feel confident that, in the end, that will happen. And Lebanon will have a chance to, again, be a sovereign country and to be able to decide for itself how it wants to live and have a chance to be peaceful and prosperous.

Q Mr. Secretary, why are you confident?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Let me just --

Q Oh, were you finished?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I am not quite finished.

I do want to say that I attended the OECD meeting, along with several other Cabinet Officers. And, there, I think we found a very good reception to the developing economic recovery in the United States. Everyone recognizes how important that is. There was, I think, a good recognition of the

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importance of combating protectionism, so that the recovery in various countries can interact and we can get the most possible mileage out of it.

There was general agreement on the East-West economic relationship areas, something that had been discussed a great deal over the months. And that seemed to emerge in pretty good shape and without too much controversy. So, on the whole, the OECD meeting went well. And I had the privilege of a good visit with President Mitterrand about his perceptions of what is going on around the world and, also, looking toward the Williamsburg summit.

So I would be glad to have your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, why are you confident? Why do you think there is a chance of the Syrians' not vetoing this? Are they saying anything to you that gives you any hope that they might go along?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they have been very critical of the agreement. I think that we have to divide our thinking, because you can have reservations or you can disagree with the agreement as such -- the Israeli-Lebanon agreement. But that is not really the question that we are asking them. We are asking them to withdraw. And they have said, over quite a period of time, that they are ready to withdraw when the Lebanese ask them to withdraw.

So these are not unrelated subjects. But they do have some difference between them. And they haven't said they won't withdraw.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you starting to feel that they are under some pressure from the Soviets not to withdraw?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: What pressure they are under from the Soviets, I do not know. I do know that the Soviets, in a TASS article, attacked the agreement. But what the nature of discussion between the Soviets and Syria is, I do not know.

I do

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have the impression from the history of Syria and also from direct discussions with the Foreign Minister and President Assad that these are two very independent people, and I doubt that anybody is telling them what to do. I think they'll probably decide for themselves.

Q Why are the Russians withdrawing their dependents from Beirut?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you have to ask them a question like that, but I think every year Russian dependents leave where ever they are and go home during the summer months whenever the school is over. That's what they have said they are doing. It is, perhaps, slightly early but not that much.

Q You think it's a benign thing and it doesn't indicate either pressure from the Soviets or the possibility of a war between Israel and Syria?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any reason to think otherwise. That's the explanation they've given, and so we just accept it.

Q Mr. Secretary, on what grounds do you make secret agreements with the Israelis and Lebanese, that we will be committed to, and you refuse to give us the details of?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't know where you have all of that.

Q Are there some secret accords in this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there are various side letters, things that are not a formal part of the agreement, and both parties felt that it was an operational matter or detail, or something of that kind, and fitted better as a side part of the agreement, or as something that would be said in the joint liaison committee once it gets operating, or something of that kind.

I'll give an illustration. The agreement is between Israel and Lebanon. The Syrians feel, and the Lebanese feel, that the question of Syrian withdrawal is an unrelated matter. The Syrians make a big point of the fact that their forces are in Lebanon on a different basis than the Israeli forces. So, there's nothing in the agreement about Syrian withdrawal. On the other hand, the Israelis make it very clear, as you would expect, that they won't withdraw except that there is simultaneous withdrawal by the PLO and the Syrians.

So you can't have it as part of the agreement, for good reasons. It therefore has become part of a side letter which the Israelis wrote to us and which we acknowledged. It's not a secret. But it's not part of the agreement --

Q Then there are no secrets?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- and that's just a way in which the --

Q You have made no secret commitments that the American people are not informed, or know about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There, I don't say that there aren't -- that things haven't been said that are part of the record -- there's not going to be publication of every word that's been said, but --

Q I don't mean said, I mean commitments.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- there are no commitments made on behalf of the United States that commit the United States to something or other that's a secret.

Q Mr. Secretary, what about the reports we're hearing that Syrian and PLO troops going back into Lebanon -- this comes at a, at the time when your agreement is reached -- it looks almost like a response to it. Is it? And is it happening?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have heard reports, as you have, that some PLO have re-entered Lebanon. I would say, first of all, that that's a violation of the agreement under which they evacuated Beirut. And I think we ought to take note of that fact. And now, second, of course it's an unwelcome development. We want them to be moving out, not moving in. Nevertheless, we will continue to pursue our agenda which is to first get this agreement nailed down finally, and then to proceed to work on the Syrian and PLO evacuation of Lebanon.

Q Mr. Secretary, how long do you feel --

Q Mr. Secretary, have you and the President discussed at this point the F-16 sale and what the status of that will be now that your trip is complete and the agreement has been agreed to?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we talked about it a little bit, but I don't have anything to add on that. That's a subject that the President has under review and he'll decide what he's going to do in good time.

Q Will you be --

Q Will you have to go back to Damascus to iron some of these things out once the draft agreement is spelled out for itself, would you have to --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm planning to stay home for awhile. I like it here. (Laughter.)

Q What is the next step then for you?

Q Williamsburg.

Q What is --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Phil Habib is there. Phil Habib is our, one of our most experienced Americans at these negotiations. He's well-known to the Syrians. They like him. They respect him. And you could just see that when you're there with Phil. So, the United States has been, and will be, very well represented by Phil.

Q How else do you appeal to the Syrians, to join in? What appeals can be made to them to join in?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all the Lebanese will make a statement to them, I'm sure. And they'll have discussions with them. There are certain legitimate questions that the Syrians will raise that will have to be addressed. For example, the security zone that's set out between -- in Southern Lebanon abuts the Syrian border, so I think it's a legitimate question: How are you going to handle that? So there are a variety of things of that kind that they'll, no doubt, talk about.

Other Arab countries are weighing in on the subject, so I'm sure that they'll be heard from. We are perfectly ready to talk with the Syrians about the situation, and I think we also go on -- to a degree, on the basis that everyone has spoken of the desirability of Lebanon having a chance to be sovereign. Certainly, Syria has spoken about Lebanese sovereignty all the time, so let the foreign forces get out and let's see what the Lebanese can do.

Q Even still, Mr. Secretary, you appear to be hanging your hat solely on the -- for your optimism solely on the basis of the fact that the Syrians in the past have said they would withdraw. Do you have anything more solid to go on?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have only to go on the views of others. And while the discussions that I had in Syria were certainly not encouraging at all as far as their attitude toward the agreement is concerned, they didn't refuse to withdraw or anything of that kind. But we have to take these things one at a time, and I think that the first thing is to get the agreement between Lebanon and Israel nailed down and to have the broad spectrum of the various confessional groups in Lebanon have a chance to express themselves through the parliamentary process in Lebanon. Once other governments are able to see that here is an agreement that the government of Lebanon has worked out, that the government of Lebanon wants to sign, and that the government of Lebanon's parliamentary process has endorsed, then it's a little hard to second-guess them. So I think that's the position that they want to get in.

Q Mr. Secretary, how long can Israel wait for a Syrian withdrawal without trying to place some pressure of its own?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there will be a period here -- and, no doubt, a certain amount of discomfort -- but there -- it is something that we'll work along at and that can't go on forever, as your question implies. But I don't want to put down some length of time as a marker either. These are very difficult, tough issues, and the way to get at them is just to get at them and work at them.

Q The opposition is already talking about a deadline of June 6, the anniversary of the invasion.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're not talking about any such time period as that. I'm not saying that's too soon or that it's too far off. Just not going to get penned down by some sort of an artificial date. Our object is to achieve this result, and we're going to work at it and we're going to do it.

Q Mr. Secretary, the government of Israel has announced that it will have nine new settlements in occupied territories. Do you see any connection between that announcement and your activities in the area? And do you find it helpful at this time?

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MR. SPEAKES: Last question --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I have -- I would make the same comment on that that I've made on settlement activity, generally: That insofar as our efforts on the basic peace process are concerned, the President has said -- going back to his September 1st speech -- and we have continued to say that we don't think that new settlement activities is a constructive contribution to that end.

Now, I think it's also the case that our arguments with the Israelis will be a lot more meaningful if there is some evidence that we have an additional Arab leader coming to the bargaining table to speak on behalf of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza and elsewhere. And as yet we haven't had that situation.

Q Well, why don't you speak to them? Why does someone have to speak on behalf of them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The West Bankers and the Gazans, of course, have been speaking and talking and people are getting around with them. Nevertheless, there has been for quite some time a mandate, as you know, given by the Arab League to the PLO to speak on behalf of the Palestinians and that mandate continues to hold.

Q You would suggest that that be withdrawn. Do you still want that to be withdrawn, Mr. Secretary?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:00 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER GEORGE PRICE OF BELIZE

May 12, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:01 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: This is a background briefing, attributable to a senior administration official. For your information, the background briefer is [redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, Mort.

Prime Minister Price is making his first visit here as Prime Minister of an independent country. He's been here a number of times as head of a self-governing colony. It became independent a year and a half ago.

It's a parliamentary democracy, one with a tropical economy but one that has a kind of potential for development that the Caribbean Basin Initiative is aimed at.

He came up here to talk about Central America and our bilateral relations. We covered the question of the dispute between Guatemala and Belize. As you know, or may know, Guatemala claims a substantial portion of Belizian territory, and efforts have been made to bargain this issue out -- very intensive efforts with our support.

There is no solution in sight at this moment and the -- However, the United States will continue its efforts to see whether it can't encourage a direct negotiation between these two countries. Recent attempts have been made at that and failed.

Prime Minister Price expressed his interest in the British government retaining its garrison in Belize until the dispute with Guatemala had been settled. And we told him that we are encouraging Britain to do so.

The President and the Prime Minister talked in some detail about the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the President noting that the Senate Finance Committee is marking it up this morning and expressed confidence that that would be a positive markup and, indeed, confidence that the legislation would be passed.

Prime Minister Price reiterated how important it would be for a country like Belize that wants to develop agricultural and industrial exports and attract investment. Prime Minister Price talked about the President's speech before the joint session of Congress. He told him he thought it was very well presented and effectively presented and noted that the President had said that three-quarters of the assistance that we are giving to the area is economic and underscored his appreciation for that, thinking that that

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is the proper emphasis to address the underlying social and economic problems.

We talked also about drugs, with Prime Minister Price pledging to continue the efforts of Belize at drug eradication, of a joint spraying program with Mexico and at interdiction of drug trafficking through Belize. They've been quite effective in doing that.

Finally, there was an exchange on the situation in Central America as a whole, with the President and the Prime Minister expressing the hope that the efforts at a regional solution, which are now underway, can make progress.

Let me stop there. Those are the issues that --

Questions?

Q Anything with respect to Belize possibly being the place where Fort Gulick might go after the Panamanians -- Anything about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It was not --

Q What is the United States providing in the way of money or other sort of assistance for this anti-marijuana program?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you the exact dollar figure out of my head, but we have provided both Mexico -- Mexico, large sums of money in support of it and Belize, rather small -- So, I think $20,000 or $30,000. But I have to get you the figure for that.

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Q What does Belize stand to gain if the CBI should attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Several things. One, duty-free access for products that they now manufacture or produce and sell, like sugar and citrus. And the Prime Minister mentioned both of these as products that would become more competitive on which they would have a substantially larger return with duty-free access.

But Mr. Price is here in part also to promote investment in New York and in Houston and in a couple of other places, and he will be trying to track people down to invest for duty-free entry of manufacturers to our market. Belize has substantial surplus labor, has a good education system, and he thinks a lot of labor can be employed down there rather than come up here.

He noted to us that 25,000 Belizians out of a total population of 140,000 that are in Belize are in the United States, and suggested that it was in everybody's interest to have them employed down in Belize.

Q In the discussion of Central America, did Mr. Price offer any opinions, or the President any observations about the issues involving our activities relating to Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President mentioned it briefly. There was quite a long discussion on Nicaragua. Mr. Price offered the view that it was not well known in his country, the efforts that the United States had made to reach a negotiated solution with Nicaragua, and he was very glad to hear about them and urged us to make them better known. But also urged us to continue them.

The President said that he was in very vigorous support of the regional effort which is now being made.

Q Did Mr. Price express any views that he said were held in the region about our reported covert activities --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is Belize having some trouble with Guatemala? How stable is Belize?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the territory of Belize until recently, until this government,was claimed in its entirety by Guatemala, and has been since Guatemala became independent in 1821. Recently, the Guatemalan government has limited its claim to a portion of the territory, southern portion of the territory of Belize. But it is still very substantial, and one that the Belize government is not prepared to consider.

So there is a potential there for friction or worse, and a great deal of effort has been expended on trying to find a solution to it. As I mentioned earlier, we haven't found it yet.

Q Do you support either side's claim?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we don't support the claims, but we have done a great deal of mediation in the past of this.

Q Who occupies the ground that is in contention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Belize.

Q Did you say that there had not been any direct negotiations between those two countries yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been discussions

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with this present Guatemalan government, and with the last government there were intensive negotiations between Britain and just before Belize became independent and Guatemala that almost succeeded; came very close.

MR. ALLIN: We are getting ready for this photo-op with Ambassador Nitze. Why don't we take two more questions here?

Q I was puzzled by the size of the amount of money on this marijuana thing, and yet the President mentioned it. Is Belize, in fact, a major supplier of illegal marijuana to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but the concern is, of course, that it could become one. And it is a country that has participated in the irradication program, I would say.

Q Jerry, what is the approximate size of the British air and ground garrison now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About 3000.

Q Squadron and Harriers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Four Harriers; four Harriers.

Q Did they ask you at all about the possibility of either military aid or sales to Guatemala, saying that that's something they would not like particularly at this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that was not raised. We do provide modest military assistance to Belize, and the President and Secretary of State did comment favorably on Belize's decision not to have relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:10 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 12, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

1:48 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: Ambassador Nitze will make a couple of remarks to you and, then, be available for questions for about 10 minutes.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: We return, this Saturday, to begin the next round of the negotiations on May 17th in Geneva. And before I left, the President gave me 50 minutes of his time -- just now -- to go over the situation. And I was, again, deeply impressed with the firm support that he gives to the efforts we are making to achieve meaningful limitations and reductions in the field of nuclear weapons. And I feel that I have all the flexibility that I need, at this stage, to pursue these negotiations actively and toward a meaningful result.

Q Ambassador, what can you tell us about the instructions he gave? And has there been any discussion at all about specific numbers of warheads as a possible proposal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: There has been lots of discussion. But, as you know, the President's proposal is one which says that we are prepared to consider any level that the Soviets might be interested in. And that is one of the things that I will be discussing with my Soviet counterpart, to see whether or not we can find a level which they take seriously and we can negotiate with them on.

Q Mr. Ambassador, were your instructions changed at all by this meeting with the President?

Q Or are they unchanged?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: My instructions -- this was a general discussion. And it was not a discussion about the specific wording of instructions.

Q What is your estimate as to whether an agreement is possible within the next several months, and whether the Soviets really are going to be able to deal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think we have a lot of hard work before us -- before we can actually get to a specific agreement.

Q But what is your estimate, if you would answer my question?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I cannot make an estimate.

Would like me to make an estimate in percentage chances? I cannot do that.

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Q However you choose to, sir.

Q Do you think there is any possibility that the U.S. missiles will not be deployed, at least a few of them? Or do you still think that some will be deployed and that the Russians will not really get down to hard bargaining until that happens?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Certainly, what we are trying to do is to achieve an agreement as quickly as we can. And we, certainly, would like to achieve an agreement prior to the initial deployment of the weapons in Europe. But if that is not possible, then it may be necessary to deploy the weapons.

Q Is there any chance that there will not be a deployment?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think there is a chance.

Q You think -- could you repeat that?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think there is a chance, yes.

Q That there could be an agreement before deployment.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I do, indeed.

Q What do you think of the Andropov proposal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: What the Andropov proposal basically was, was saying that the Russians would be prepared to consider limitations on warheads as well as limitations on the number of systems on launchers. And that has really been inherent in the Soviet position for a long period of time.

Q What about the British and French missiles? Is there any give on our side on including them?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No. There is no give on our side in including them. We see no justification for subtracting from the U.S. ceilings the numbers of British and French nuclear systems as defined by the Soviets. And that -- all the reasons for our position were well spelling out, I think, in that article by Larry Eagleburger, which appeared recently in The Washington Post.

Q Mr. Nitze, why did the President say last week that -- if the objections to the British and French aspect of the Andropov proposal are still valid -- why did the President say that he was encouraged, that he would give the new offer serious consideration when your remarks and remarks by Weinberger indicate you are going to reject the proposal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No. I think what the President had in mind was that both the U.S. START position and the U.S. INF position contemplate putting the control on the number of warheads as being the most important limitation. That is certainly true of the INF interim proposal. It was, also, inherent in the zero-zero proposal.

In the zero-zero proposal, it did not stand out, because we were proposing the abolition of all systems entirely: the launchers, the missiles, and the warheads, and the base facilities, and the final assembly facilities, et cetera, et cetera.

So if you are banning the entire system, you do not emphasize one part as opposed to another part. In the President's interim proposal, he discussed equal levels on

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warheads on both sides. So he was emphasizing the warheads.

Similarly, in the START position, the principle element of the U.S. position is the reduction to 5,000 missile warheads on both sides.

Now, granted that there are other provisions. But the principle one in the START position has been the reduction in the number of warheads on both sides. So I think to have Mr. Andropov say that they were prepared to consider warheads as being a more valid measure of capability than just launchers was a step bringing somewhat closer together the basic analytical framework in which one negotiates.

Q Where is your -- What is your --

Q Yes, but, Mr. Nitze --

Q -- justification for optimism --

Q -- you haven't -- Excuse me --

Q -- if you're going to reject the British and the English missile --

Q You'll have to ask --

Q Well, she always insists on a followup.

Q -- proposal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: People can change their minds.

Q Mr. Nitze, you haven't replied to my basic question.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Yes?

Q Which is that the British and French missiles are still the major stumbling block. Correct?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, but you -- you ended up by saying, "How could the President express a degree of encouragement by virtue of what Mr. Andropov said?" The main thing that he said related to his willingness to consider warheads as being a more valid measure of capability than any other measure.

Now, I repeat, I think that was properly viewed as being -- as an encouraging development. It doesn't cover everything. It certainly doesn't cover a lot of other things, including compensation for the British and French.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the President and -- the U.S. is looking to possible violations of the SALT terms with these test firings of Soviet missiles. I understand that that's SALT and we're talking INF here. But does the possible violation of accords by the Soviet Union in this other area, does that in some sense hurt the atmosphere for your negotiations?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It doesn't help.

Q If the President embraces the build-down concept --

Q Mr. Ambassador, if there is very little new in the business of counting warheads -- it was inherent in both our positions and we have always been for counting warheads -- can you tell me why the Congress should consider it, therefore, new that the President is now about to count warheads? I mean, this business of trying to get some support for MX? If it's not -- If counting warheads has always been inherent and always part of this, then what's new about it on either side?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Well, I can't expand upon what I said earlier. I said, the fact that Mr. Andropov has publicly come out and made this statement does narrow the theoretical difference between the way in which both sides look at the problem.

Q Mr. Ambassador, the reportage on your walk in the woods concentrated on cruise missiles. Is there any possibility of an agreement that would eliminate Pershing II but keep cruise missiles?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That is -- The President's proposal talks about limitation to equal levels on the number of warheads on both sides. And it says that the -- other parts of the U.S. proposal remain unchanged from what they were under the zero-zero proposal. And, therefore, it does not contemplate a differentiation between Pershing II's and ground-launch cruise missiles.

Q If Congress rejects the MX missile, would that have any impact upon your negotiations?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think it would but not directly. You know, everything has some impact on other things.

Q What kind of impact would it have?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It would -- Well, it would suggest greater importance to the -- a greater division between the executive branch and the legislative branch than would be supportive of the most effective negotiations with --

Q -- tell us what number you're going to Geneva with this week, on the number of Soviet SS-20's that have been deployed? Are you still using 351?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: The number that have been deployed? Yes, I think that is the latest figure that has been used, yes.

Q There were reports of an increase in the numbers of SS-20's. How do you interpret the Soviet buildup in advance of -- the resumption of talks.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Well, they have been continuing to add to their deployments in the Far East.

Q Well, how does that effect your negotiations?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: It is not a good thing from the standpoint of -- I don't quite understand the purport of your question.

Q The point is, what with the Soviets building or adding to the SS-20's at this time, does that give you any insight into Mr. Andropov's real bargaining position?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, I think it is quite clear that the Soviet deployments of SS-20's have been continuing on a steady state for the last seven years. There hasn't been any interruption. There's nothing new about the rate of their deployment.

Q Mr. Nitze, are you going with a new proposal to Geneva? Or is there anything new to our position? And, also, what do you think of the Scowcroft Commission report?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: With respect to whether there is anything new, the President's interim proposal was brand new. And that I presented on the last day of the last round of our negotiations. So during this round I will have an opportunity to spell that out in all its amplification and its implications for the draft treaty text, etcetera, etcetera, so that I will really be dealing with a new proposal.

Q -- pick numbers?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: As I said earlier, I will explore with the Soviets whether or not there are specific numbers which they would be prepared to negotiate seriously on.

Q Can you tell us that -- if the President embraces the warhead build-down concept, would that apply to INF as well as to START?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: As I understand it there are complexities in that which haven't -- or at least when I last heard about it hadn't been fully worked out, so I'd prefer not to comment on that.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:03 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON THE MX MISSILE

May 12, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

4:27 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, first, I apologize. I'm sorry. It's been a busy day, but it has been for you, too.

Q Did they vote yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

I've looked forward to this. I wouldn't always open that way, but it seems to me that events here in Washington and elsewhere have given a lot of us around here a sense that things are beginning to happen. These have included events relative to arms control, to the Middle East, to Central America, to economic matters leading up to the Summit, and with some promise vis-a-vis countries in Asia.

I'd be glad to respond to questions on each of those areas. I would like to say just one brief point on arms control, and that is that the President felt increasingly, going back to late last year, that we were on the threshold of real opportunity for progress in arms control.

That was as much a product of the incentives that were being established, authorizations at the time, as it was to certain realities and understandings that were emerging in Geneva as to priorities and so forth. And believed and tasked us to infuse the community with a little greater sense of analytical intensity.

The acatalyst in this process was a proposal that came forward early in the year, in January, and an article on the op-ed page of a well-known newpaper by Senator Bill Cohen for an approach called a guaranteed build-down. The President called Bill that same day and told him that he thought this was a very constructive concept to the extent that it integrated the realities of the need for modernization, as well as the imperative of reductions, and that he wanted to work with him in the ensuing weeks to see if it conceptually could be applied in a way which would preserve stability and lead to real progress in reductions, and directed me and others in the community to open a dialogue with Cohen and others who expressed an interest soon thereafter -- Senator Nunn, notably.

In the course of the past five months, there've been an active exchange between those Senators and others with me and with the Department of Defense representatives, Ron Lehman and others that have talked about how it could be applied in a way that would be both stable, enhance stability.

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We identified what were for us some problems with it, that is its susceptibility if applied rigidly and without discrimination as to take into account modernization programs on both sides and priorities on both sides, in terms of arms control, and specifically that if, as conceived, a two-for-one approach were taken across the board in all systems that, because of the unique features of each system and because of asymmetries, frankly, that exist between our force and the Soviet Union that it could be a problem if applied in that fashion.

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Senator Cohen understood that.

Q Could you just explain what asymmetry is, just exactly what do you mean by asymmetry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- there's asymmetry in age, there's asymmetry in defensive systems. For example, the Soviet Union has quite a substantial air defense system. We do not. We have to contend with that. They do not. That's an asymmetry.

There are asymmetries in age. Our force is basically an old force. Theirs is a relatively new force, on average by about 10 years newer. And so you have to look at modernization programs over time and new systems coming online in the Soviet Union and so forth.

Senator Cohen and others were very receptive to this dialogue, and the long and the short of it is that it has led in recent days to what I believe is a meeting of the minds; that is that if one applies this concept flexibly in its formulation and in its implementation, that it can be a constructive means to achieving what we're all after and that is reductions; that we can envision, that if formulated flexibly and implemented flexibly, that it can lead not only to results in Geneva but to a broader consensus here and in the Congress and in the country at large on how we do it. And the President has pledged to work very carefully and closely with interested Senators and others in the House to translate the concept into an application with our own ideas into finally an integrated approach in Geneva. So, again, it is a measure of cooperation and important in two respects: For its substantive merit and, secondly, for the broadening of bipartisan support that it represents.

I'm getting too verbose. I could go on to other areas, from the Middle East --

Q Before you do --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- to economics.

Q -- could you be a little bit less abstract in explaining how this would apply or modify the existing U.S. proposals? -- because the language that you cite about how it would have to be implemented flexibly and conceived of flexibly and formulated flexibly makes it sound like what you might be doing is just taking the existing U.S. proposal for reductions and calling that a build-down. After all, we already have a proposal that seeks to reduce the number of warheads that each side has drastically by whatever it is -- one third. And it't just not clear in my mind what -- how our proposal would change. What are some ways it would change under -- other than just saying, "Well, that's a build-down. Let's call it a build-down"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I believe, first of all, there is further work to be done. The milestone that is reached today doesn't represent the definition of a precise START position that says in each system X will be reduced in exchange for Y modernization, no. We are in the process of integrating now the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, which, as you know, point to the need for improving stability by concentrating through modernization on less high-value targets and more distribution of the deterrent over a number of targets. That together with the build-down concept is being integrated.

Q Can you say that again, just express that thought again, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're in the process of integrating the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations into the START position. As you know, this calls for the focusing upon warheads as a unit of account and upon focusing in the modernization program upon the need to move over time away from MIRV systems,

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which are very high-value targets and into a more stable relationship brought on by increasing the target base with single-warhead, small ICBMs reducing, thereby, the warhead-target ratio.

Doing that, which involves among other things reconsidering the launcher limit, is underway together with analytical efforts to apply the build-down concept to the phased approach, which is already underway in Geneva.

Now, I do not want to blow smoke at you. This is going to take some time. But it is an effort to which the President is committed jointly, and from which I expect to see results soon.

Q As I understood the build-down, the concept was to build-down in terms of launchers, correct? I mean, that was the original proposal on the Hill, no?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was with warheads.

Q It was with warheads.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were some uncertainties as to whether you are talking about big warheads, little warheads, all warheads or, in some cases, platforms, launchers. But we are talking about warheads. And one other point I did not mention earlier was that we will see in the letter today -- we have seen -- that a point of impetus is that variable ratios, as opposed to a fixed two-for-one, are going to be necessary to encourage the Soviets toward a less stabilizing -- or a more stabilizing outcome. And that is an important milestone.

Q That is what my question is about. When you say "variable ratios," does this mean that, in some cases, we are going to be asking the Soviets to take out more missiles, to destroy more missiles than we are willing to destory in order to get to where we think the situation would be stable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, we ought to focus on warheads as opposed to missiles.

Q I meant to say -- I am assuming that you are talking about warheads. Could you answer the question with "warheads" substituted for "missiles."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

The precise ratio for reductions in every category is still to be defined. Putatively or implicitly, a variable ratio means that, at a given point in time and in a given system -- both variables, to preserve stability, at a given moment you might have a ratio of 1.1, 1.7, 2.6. But the point is that -- the objective is, throughout the reductions process, not to have a destabilizing rate of reduction so as to create an imbalance at that point.

Q But at any given point, might the Soviets have a different ratio than the U.S. has on a given system?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sometimes, it might be more severe for us. Sometimes, it might be more severe for them. But the point is, all the time, there would be a stable balance during reductions.

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Q Would this be a different ratio for each different type?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could be.

Q There is no even approximate scale on which that would be worked out as of now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not as of now.

Q Does this letter and proposal allow the United States, as you all conceive it right now, to build up in the meantime? Doesn't this leave you that opportunity to continue? I mean, you talk about modernizing. And you talk about maintaining a balance during the reduction process. Aren't you saying that the United States could continue its buildup to match them while this so-called "build-down" --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. And I take that very seriously. The implication being that this is a cover for us to really build, instead of reduce. And I would rebut that on two counts.

First of all, the realities of our program forces, as appropriated by the Congress and so forth and as subject to appropriations in the out years -- is conceived originally and is maintained today in a very finite limit which does not envision going beyond existing levels of forces. Look at the Trident Program. Look at the ICBM Program.

Q But it does allow you to buildup to those limits, obviously.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think that is a reasonable assertion to

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the extent that, if there is a limit, which in real terms, the United States is not now proposing to reach and has no reasonable prospect of reaching given Congressional constraints --

Q But, but, let me take that a different way though --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the programs we've already presented on the Hill.

Q It's widely perceived that you're sending, then including this in the letter in order to get a favorable MX vote. So there is the inherent contradiction that you're agreeing to a device to build-down and destabilize -- and, to, to -- more stable, while at the, while you're doing it in order to get the most destabilizing, largest buildup missile system ever devised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, that's just not accurate, Saul, you know that. The MX is neither the largest nor the most destabilizing --

Q Saul --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- anywhere.

Q Aren't ten warheads per missile -- is not --

Q How many are on the 18 right now and have been for five years?

Q I won't argue with you about the number --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me bronze that, right now. (Laughter.)

Q The fact is, the fact is you're going for something called building-down in order to get something that will build up our forces and build up a missile. Are you prepared, for example, after installing the 100 MX's to build-down and destroy 2,000 warheads, if it's two-for-one, is the ratio?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to be frivolous.

Q That's alright.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, whenever the MX is deployed, and it's in 1986, we'll have well before that, in fact this year, the precise translation of the ratio for not only that, but for other systems. But, if we even never had this, the purpose of the MX was never to enable us to exceed a limit or go beyond where we are today. We're going for 5,000 balistic missile warheads. And, whatever the outcome on MX, that's the outcome we want. And 2,500 at most would be at the amount deployed on land.

Q Nevertheless, the MX and the Scowcroft Commission has suggested that the kind of missile the MX is, and others have suggested, that the kind of missile the MX is, is destabilizing. It is a very tempting target --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, just a minute --

Q -- it is a sitting duck --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that's not right either. The Scowcroft Commission said that the MX is an important contribution to deterrence today.

Q You're not -- you're suggesting that there's no contradiction, then, between going for a build-down scheme in order to get Congress to approve a build up scheme, such as MX. That's my point.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no.

Q I have two questions --

Q Are you, are you -- and I don't mean this frivolously either -- are you endorsing the build-down concept? Is the President endorsing that or not, first of all. And, secondly, do you expect that whatever the concept is that you'd work with, that it will be reflected when you return to the START talks on June 8?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first point, the administration is endorsing a build-down concept today. A concept that is mutually derived from an iterative process which will involve variable ratios over time, flexibly applied. I give you all the other hookers I've already thrown at you, but I don't think they are hookers. We don't intend them as caveats to evade the issue.

The build-down is a valid, useful, constructive proposal. Applied flexibly, we believe it can really help us get results.

Q Then what about the -- you will propose this before you go back, or when you go back in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I honestly think that it's going to take us beyond June 8 to get it integrated into the detail that will be necessary, and frankly, I think that a concept such as this, plus -- and let me underscore -- other separate, but related proposals of the Scowcroft Commission will give us an integrated proposal but it is not exclusively build-down. It is, as well, accommodating the Scowcroft recommendations for the Midgetman. And it will take more time than just June 8. There will be new proposals on June 8.

Q How long --

Q But not with the buildup?

Q A variable ratio -- being flexibly applied, sounds awfully much like something that's so flexible and so variable that, in fact, it won't really make a big difference in your proposal. I mean, you've been talking about de-productions, you've also been talking about modernization all along, can you explain just, again, how the build-down is going to affect your proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I could repeat what I've said, but I don't want to evade the issue. I think the best answer must come when it is integrated, and applied, and I can't

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give you that today. But it is not something that is an expedient by any means. It is something that is endorsed, truly. And I think to be fair to the Senators, they surely would not cop out to some expedient to get the MX. Bill Cohen is perfectly serious about de-productions.

Q Was this negotiated with Senator Cohen? Has he agreed to the language in here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: -- yes, a -- very close work with Senator Cohen, yes. I'd suggest you go and talk to him --

Q Did you say it will be integrated in the June 8th proposal as well as the Scowcroft Commission? That something along these lines will be integrated into the June 8th proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This and the Scowcroft recommendations are now being integrated. I am confident that we will have new material on the June 8th position.

I cannot promise you that the detailed build-down over time propositions will be in it. And I don't think that would be --

Q When do you think that this will be integrated and you or -- some official will be able to say this is the proposal with all of the details? How long is that going to take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. It isn't something -- and I can only give you my word on this -- where we're filling a square on the Hill and saying, "Put that off until next year." Absolutely not. The President is telling me, "Get hot on it." And he's telling Bill Cohen and Sam Nunn and Chuck Percy as well as the rest, "I am committed to working closely with you."

Now --

Q I'm not accusing you of that. I'm just trying to get some sense so it isn't quite so much in the clouds as how long you think this is going to take. Six months? Three? You know, I mean, it just -- it's very hard to know because it's being presented in such a generalized way.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't know. I guess I would only have to say that the President, both on this concept and on the Scowcroft Commission and from his general confidence that I referred to earlier, is very deeply and personally concerned that we must move aggressively in Geneva to promote the earliest possible reduction of arms. I mean, this is not a back burner issue.

Q Just to repeat the, I guess, analytical point that is implied by a lot of these questions, the administration has already embraced reducing the number of warheads. It has already embraced modernizing its forces, which imply, replacing existing ones with new ones.

So as a concept, you know, the existing proposals imply taking what you have, replacing it with something new and reducing all at the same time. So that, to me, implies that there was some kind of build-down implicit in the administration's proposals already. And I don't see what the milestone is today since what you're saying is you're taking this term and saying that it is applied very flexibly, basically to the positions that the administration already has.

Now, I'm not trying to be argumentative. I just don't see it that way.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, you're not. I -- It's a fair point.

Let me make another point. I think it underlies everything that's going on here. You know, if you're really serious about getting results, you're not going to say on background or otherwise that we believe our concept should be -- that on ICBM's we will trade one single warhead system for one MIRVed system or any other varient. My point being that if you want to get really down to it and not preempt the Soviet Union and not have a propaganda battle between here and Moscow, you'e going to get serious in Geneva. And that means that you're not going to foreclose and disclose publicly the precision of your position because it requires a preemptory rejoinder. We're not about that.

Q Well, do you have a position that you're not disclosing or is it what you said before, that you haven't worked it out yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We already have some changes. We will have others.

Q That are like that? One number specifically

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related to another number for a specific system.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. I said earlier we will have changes that derive both from the Scowcroft Commission and from our concepts or our analysis of build-down. We don't yet have those. We do have some ideas. They have to be further defined, and that's what I mean.

Q Can I just --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's make this the last one because some people are getting --

Q I just wanted to clarify the variable ratios thing.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Him and Bob.

Q Are you saying that, for instance, at one point because of their advantage over us on land-based missiles that they have a certain ratio they'd have to give up and we'd have a different ratio, but that, for instance, in sub-based missiles we might have a different ratio than they did because of our advantage; that each different system will have a different ratio and our ratio will be different from the Soviets', conceivably?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Different, but both requiring as a criterion matched equality and stability during reductions. But not --

Q In overall numbers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And in capability, too.

MR. SPEAKES: Timberg is the last question.

Q But requiring -- matched what, sir? I'm sorry. I missed out -- different but requiring --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Balanced --

Q Equality and stability.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- equality and stability.

Q Can you tell us, number one, what chance do you think this proposal has when it's presented with precision to the Soviet Union? And, number two, could you tell us exactly what this milestone is that we've passed today? You can take the first one, you know, second.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that it's promise is a function, in part, of the incentives in real terms in systems modernization that are authorized. And that is separate from the substance of your position. I think that the substance of it is important because that, it shows the United States is flexible, is proposing new ideas, is soliciting responses. The second part of your question on a milestone is that I think the administration has demonstrated to the Congress that it wants to reach out, to listen to what they have to say, promote bipartisanship, and Senator Nunn has been extraordinarily helpful in this. And I guess -- this is terribly self-serving -- but I -- this ought not be a milestone, but I -- let me tell you. We have had 17 iterations of language, of ideas, of fundamental points of view between ourselves, the White House, the Congress, State, Defense and the other players on substance. And in attitudinal change and in working together, I have never seen the National Security community work like it has with others in the White House here as well as the Congress and

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this administration. Now, that's totally self-serving, but it is --

Q Seventeen in the last -- how long?

Q -- letter --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not just the letter. Yes, it's the letter; yes, it's the substance of what we're talking about

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within the executive branch and State and Defense, and, yes, it's working with the Hill.

Q You mean, seventeen in the last -- weeks? Seventeen in the last what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Five months.

Q What were you -- You were -- Is that hyperbole or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was hyperbolic when I referred to the long term and the short term. We've had a good dialogue with the Hill for five months, especially, and in the four days, we've had a very intense intra-executive branch process, intra-White House process involving everybody from communicators to Jim Baker. And it's been a damned good process.

Q Can I just say, what did you say before about the 850 launchers? What is the status of that in the proposal? Is that being reviewed or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President looked at up -- all the ups and downs sides of it, the possibilities of keeping it as is and what that implied for the number of Midgetmen you could take, increasing it, doing away with it entirely. The President pointed out, frankly, some of the down sides of entirely doing away with it. And he is pondering it. He's asked us to come back to him tomorrow or the next day with a precise proposal. And I expect he will reach a decision, probably not, however, until we've also given further work to the build-down so that he can look again at the NSC level, at this mix, before Ed Rowny goes back to Geneva on June 7.

Q Are you going to have something by then about the 850 to present in June?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

Q You mentioned matched equality and stability, and then you threw in capability. Was that -- Is that a third or is that just a different definition of equality?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's an adjunct of stability really because stability's a function both of capability --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:57 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 24, 1983
No. 190

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT

The White House
May 20, 1983

QUESTION: What do you expect to accomplish at Williamsburg and how?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think there are many important things to get to happen in the world, and which by and large will happen if the right policies are followed by individual countries. And I hope that Williamsburg can make a contribution to that.

Of course, the main thing is economic growth in the world economy. That's the name of the game in my opinion. Well, that depends on the U.S., in considerable part, Germany, Japan, U.K., others, developing countries. So from the standpoint of the U.S. economy, I think you could only describe our fiscal and monetary policy right now as very expansionary, very strongly pushing that.

So, I think we're doing what we should be doing. Other countries we'll learn about as we go, but I think Japan and Germany are looking pretty good right now, and perhaps the same for the U.K.

I think that it's impressive when you look at where growth has come in the last eight or ten years in the world, to see how much has been contributed by the so-called Third World or developing countries. And we need to rearrange our thinking in this country and perhaps elsewhere away from the notion that somehow those are poor economies and we should help them. I'm not saying that they aren't poor and that they shouldn't be helped, but rather, we have to get our thinking geared more to the notion that they are economies that have a big capacity for growth, and when they grow that is fundamentally good for us. And so we have a stake in them and there are certain things that follow from that, I think, in terms of our own policies, and we need to be willing to step up to those things and encourage our friends at the Summit to do likewise.

I think the issue of trade and protectionism is very important, and it's extremely serious. It's important because if there is expansion in these different economies, it's the fact of trade among them that allows a kind of mutually stimulative effect to take place, so that everything can go forward together around in the world economy.

I say it is a very serious problem only in part because of particular moves individual countries are making in the protectionist field. I think that's the least of the problem at the moment. And, in fact, in the case of Japan, things have gotten better, not worse. In the case of some other countries, including ourselves, I think we've made some courageous decisions. But we've had a little slippage here and there. I think the big threat is, in a sense, an intellectual one.

There is an effort now under way emerging since the effort to make protection -- make it legitimate and fashionable even, to talk about running a protectionist economy, that somehow it's our duty. And I think it is linked to a considerable extent, in this country, anyway, to so-called industrial policy. And that looms as a big sort of intellectual debate. But I put great store on the question of what is, in a sense, legitimate. And once an idea like the value of open trading to us takes hold and people accept that as right, well, it has big consequences. Because when moves away from it are made they get criticized and that upholds a standard to which you repair all time. If the standard is disturbed and some other standard is created, you don't have it to repair to, and you will I think, degenerate badly.

So I think it's very important and worthwhile, not empty at all, that in forums like this the affirmation of the importance of open trade is made. The reason why I thought the OECD ministerial meeting was quite positive, because there was a distinct shift in tone there from the GATT ministerial on this critical issue that involves, in a sense, the intellectual standing of the idea of open trade.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that truly open trade and truly open investment is compatible with preserving current American wage standards and living standards? Or will there be major dislocations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it's perfectly compatible. There's no problem about it. An open trading system, even if we were insular and were just talking about this huge U.S. economy, an open, free market means that you're going to have structural adjustments going on all the time, and the minute you start blocking those adjustments your economy starts to become much less efficient, and much less capable of producing advances in standards of living. And when you have open trade on a broader scale, well, there are going to be structural adjustments, all right, but our capacity to produce value here is not diminished by that at all.

QUESTION: Sir, on the exchange rates question, I get very confused talking to officials in the new administration about just what is the optimum position, or what is the optimum hope down there at Williamsburg on looking at a study of -- some kind of of a Bretton Wood study for -- on the exchange rate question, or is this just a game? Are you really not interested in examining that question? Could you just tell us what the delegation is going to attempt to accomplish, the President is going to attempt to accomplish?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can tell you how it looks to me. And here I'll speak in general terms, and I'll relate it to the Williamsburg discussion, but that's really sort of an event that comes along, but the major issue are there.

I think it is a fact that almost anyone would recognize that a par value system couldn't have handled the tumultuous economic changes that have taken place in the world economy over the last ten years or so. In fact, I think the effort to maintain the par value system in the Smithsonian Agreement turned out to be very counter-productive for the world economy and fundamentally the upheavals in the world economy destroyed it. So, it isn't as though there has been an alternative to a floating rate system during these past years.

I say it did a lot, the Smithsonian did a lot of damage because it set up rates that became more and more out of kilter with the market, and that called for a tremendous amount of intervention, as people tried to defend those par values; huge amounts. And the result of that, how do you intervene?

Well, you have to get up money to go and intervene, so you create it, and in the process world liquidity was increased greatly, or the world money supply was increased greatly, and what we got out of that was an inflation that we're just now, I think, somehow getting out of our system.

So an effort to maintain a par value system in a time of tumultuous economic change won't work; it will be counteproductive.

Now, there are proposals in effect to go back to a par value system, to try to reconstruct on a world scale a monetary system based on the concept of par values.

I think it is not likely to work right now, but I do think we are moving into a period where it will be possible to try some new ideas, or refresh some old ones, and where the chances of greater stability are much greater.

I think everyone recognizes that it's desirable to have more stability than we've had. The only question is, How do you get it? Now I said I think we have a better chance, because I see right now the US, the UK, West Germany and Japan all having relatively low rates of inflation, I think pretty good prospects of keeping it that way, more or less, and with expansions in varying degrees taking shape with an opportunity on a broader scale for mutually stimulative development to take place.

Well, that's a description of something that has more coherence to it than we've seen in the past, and more stability to it than we've seen in the past. And that may produce more stability in exchange markets, because exchange markets are really sort of thermometers registering what's going on, rather than the actual heat itself. Now it may be -- may or may not be of any use if more stability emerges to throw some sort of a blanket over it in terms of a different system. And I think there is a kind of issue about par value systems.

If you say -- where one might say when they are desperately needed they won't work, and when they were worked, they aren't needed. That is, we could say if we can get conditions of nice stability, where rates are relatively moving narrowly and so on, then we could make a par value system work. But maybe thats not when you need it. The only argument you could make for it, I think, is if you had stability and you put something like that into effect, maybe it would help you a little bit in maintaining the stability.

Anyway, I think these are ideas that we're perfectly willing to talk about, and others are. They don't depend upon the outcome of some study. They are in the realm of ideas that people who are experienced can reflect on. And there are all sorts of ways to skin this cat, if you want to do something at all different from what's going on right now.

QUESTION: Do you see a study of --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't --

QUESTION: -- some kind coming out of the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm sure that there will be a discussion of the question of monetary arrangements, should be. And how that goes and how its continuation after an event at Williamsburg is carried on is the question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us the same kind of overview on the East-West trade issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: On the East-West trade issue, I think what has happened is that out of all the discussion that's gone on and the differing points of view that have been expressed, and the information that has been generated and people have been exposed to, that the subject has become less controversial, in the sense that it has emerged that the idea of having some sort of policy about East-West economic relationships has become accepted, that that's -- we should have something like that.

So, we proceed with that kind of a study in the NATO setting on an overall basis, and then various elements of it are being reflected in what's going on in the COCOM discussions and in the Energy Study that the IEA and OECD were involved in here recently and the information collection and analysis function that the OECD has undertaken, and in the efforts to come to grips with the issue of the market orientation of these relationships.

Now all of those are rather broad statements, I recognize, except for, perhaps, the COCOM statement, which to the extent that COCOM operates, it's very explicit and it identifies particular things and does something about them, perhaps is "the" most significant single thing.

But I think that it is significant that there has been an evolution of people's thinking, to the point where the subject is much less controversial, and where the legitimacy -- to go back to this earlier idea -- of having a point of view on this subject is accepted, that we should. And then we can argue about precisely where you'd come down on it, and, no doubt, will to some extent. But I think the sort of big threshold point has passed, and that's fundamentally a very good thing for us.

And if you think about it in the sweep of things, it's a tremendous new thing to think that NATO can conceive -- can be a place where there is an economic strategy going with the military strategy.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you expect --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't mean by this to wipe off the map a lot of differences of opinion about lots of things, plenty of room for scrapping about stuff. But, nevertheless, in a broad sense, I think that something important has happened here.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how are you going to handle Mr. Mitterrand's complaints about our deficits?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our deficits are not so much this year or next year but the out-years, and our deficits are too big, so we agree. And the question is, how do you do something about them? And the administration is working at that, made proposals about it, will continue to do so. But it's a hard problem, and we're not satisfied with our performance in that regard. I think it is increasingly difficult to argue, however, that you cannot have at the same time large deficits, falling inflation, falling interest rates and economic growth, because look at our economy right now.

So the idea that big deficits are cataclysmic at least at a moment like the one we're in is -- you can't make that case on the basis of the immediate evidence, although I think -- I think the large deficits can be cataclysmic in these out-years, the difference being that in the out-years, presumably, we'll be at a high employment level, whereas now we're not.

And, therefore, the deficits, the stimulation of the deficits is tolerable, and the competition in the market of the government borrowing is handleable, under the circumstances. So you have to differentiate the circumstances.

QUESTION: On your trade proposal, aren't you asking the Europeans, who have very high structural unemployment, to accept more domestic unemployment, if they go along with your plan for broadening trade, dropping trade barriers, particularly with the LDC's? And how are they supposed to react, given the problems we've had with the Caribbean Basin Plan in this country? Is that a model for them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I hope it can be a model. We have made a considerable amount of progress on the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and it's -- everything comes slow and hard, but it did pass the House in the last Congress. It has gotten very good consideration on the Senate Finance Committee, and I think that the chances are very good that the CBI is going to become law and be good. It isn't our proposal for trade, necessarily; it is everybody's proposal for trade. Certainly, the Japanese are very much oriented to open trade now. The Germans are. And I might say when Chancellor Kohl was over here the last time I didn't get a chance to sit in on the meeting of the -- the day meeting when he was here, but I met with him in the evening over dinner. And the question of Japanese competition came up, and he has a different point of view toward that than you hear in a lot of places. He says, "You know, we Germans are pretty smart, too. And we'll compete. We're not afraid of Japanese competition. We welcome it, and we're rolling up our sleeves and we're going to have a more investment-oriented policy and watch out for the German economy. We're going to be very competitive in these fields. Don't sell us short." I considered that to be refreshing and a healthy attitude. And I think we need more of that attitude here. And the fact of the matter is we can do it too. We're a very competitive outfit.

Here you do have something that ratchets back into the exchange rate question that Roy was asking. I think from our standpoint our problem in the exchange rate goes something like this: The dollar is very strong and justifiably so on the basis of financial flows. It's not correct, as people sometimes say, when thinking about our Japanese competition, that the dollar is overvalued. It isn't. There's no evidence that it's being manipulated or anyone has even the capacity to manipulate it over a long period of time. And flows of money are too huge for anybody to be able to do that.

However, the dollar, much more than has been true in the past, is very strongly affected by financial flows as distinct from the flows of money that come out of trade movements. And, therefore, from the standpoint of trade as such, the dollar is way overvalued. Or maybe that's not even -- I don't want to use that word, but we're -- the values are much different than if you had no financial flows and the dollar was just reflecting the trade patterns. So that's put us at a big disadvantage in our exports in the Third markets. And it puts us in a position where we'll have a lot more imports than we otherwise would. And I think that's very unhealthy for us. It is the kind of thing that puts a lot of pressure on the protection issue, on the one hand. Has nothing to do with quotas or tariffs or any of the sort of structural trade problems that people talk about all the time. It's strictly exchange rates, and the exchange rate differentials make huge differences. They are much more important than anything else.

QUESTION: Is there any way to --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So I think that is a very large problem, and I frankly would have to tell you I don't know what the answer to that problem is. I do feel that we haven't set the problem right in our minds. At least, I don't think so, and I thank I have got it straight in my mind now what the problem is, and I always feel that's the first step in getting somewhere -- is to get your problem identified clearly, and then you -- people start working away at it and maybe we'll find ourselves some kind of an answer. I don't -- I'm not -- I don't know what the answer is at this point.

QUESTION: Dual exchange rates?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I wouldn't sort of jump to that conclusion, but -- because I don't know how you're -- I don't know how to manage that is something as big and complicated as we are.

QUESTION: Controls on capital flows?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, have controls on capital flows; I've been there. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in response to Hank Trewhitt's question --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In fact, I think if I have a claim to my last tour in government, is getting rid of the controls on capital flows.

QUESTION: I just want to get it on the record --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's one achievement that I feel proud of.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, your response to the question about East-West trade seemed to be framed in the international context. I wonder if you would specifically address it to the domestic context. Is this administration united in a consensus that it is okay just to have an accord that East-West trade is an important subject on which there should be a policy? Or aren't there some fairly important people around this building and the Commerce Department who think that they want to take a position that's a great deal more explicit than that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't mean by my comments to say that there aren't explicit operational dimensions to all of these things. But just in the broad sweep of things, there has been a big shift. I was speaking internationally, as you point out. And then I think there is a large degree of congruence of thinking that the developments in COCOM are very positive. And to me the real guts of this East-West economic issue is the technology transfer issue, and getting some control over it. From an international standpoint, it's the COCOM mechanism that is the place where you would see that take place. From the standpoint of our own, I don't know if you were speaking of our own domestic policies. Is that what you were getting at?

QUESTION: Well, to put it very, very bluntly, I was thinking about the --

SECRETARY SHULTZ : Or were you speaking of the discussion within our own government?

QUESTION: Yes, discussions by people in the Commerce Department, but, particularly, by people in this building, with quite a lot of importance who have kicked up rows over East -- on the subject of East-West trade, and whose views seem to be much more intense than to be satisfied with the notion that we are agreed that we should have an agreement.

I am thinking of the President, in fact.

SECRETARY SHULTZ; We're agreed on a lot more than that we should have an agreement, but I just was trying to respond in a general way. But I think the substance of things that has been taking place, like COCOM, the Energy Study, the general look at things, continued recognition, as in the OECD communique of the key market considerations, as the key in the trading process -- all of these things are pluses. And the point is, it wasn't we against them, so to speak. It was more a general consensus that emerged. And I think the President's quite happy with it, frankly, what I hear.

QUESTION: A related question. Mr. Secretary, I must spent two or three days with several Europeans who were most concerned, volatilely concerned, I would say, about the question of the Export Administration Act and territoriality, which is a very sensitive kind of thing. How do you plan to cope with that? Is that -- I believe a Congressional committee said "No" a couple of days ago, or I may be wrong about that. But, in any case, it's out there. And I'd like to just ask you to deal with it.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Export Administration Act renewal or amendments or whatever are being actively considered by the Congress. The Administration made proposals, and we are in the midst of that debate here. The views of our European -- our OECD partners -- are well known. They don't like extra-territoriality, as they call it. I have learned from my legal friends that that's not the word to use. The right word is "conflict of jurisdictions". It's less loaded. "Extra-territoriality" assumes a result, and "conflict of jurisdictions" doesn't.

So I think there are all sorts of legitimate questions about it. For instance, if you license something under the condition that any restrictions that would be placed on that license within the United States also apply to the licensee abroad, well, is that extraterritoriality or is that illegitimate or isn't that a perfectly respectable way to proceed? And then there are all sorts of things like that that you can discuss.

But it's a -- we're debating it. And, on the whole, our OECD partners agree with the business community here, that we have been too restrictive, or our laws give too much power to interrupt the flow of trade.

So we know that, and we are having that debate, and we will probably hear something about it in Williamsburg and probably argue a little.

QUESTION: It was reported in Japan that a deal is cooking in which all the major countries would agree at the Summit, or before the Summit or shortly afterward to reduce their discount rates simultaneously in an effort to reduce world interest rates. Is that the deal that's cooking?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not that I know of. And I don't think that at least from the standpoint of the United States we have the capability to agree on something like that and execute it.

QUESTION: What does it show?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It shows that our rates have come down like this and their rates have gone more or less up.

QUESTION: How about real rates?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in terms of real rates, on the -- in the short-term area I would say they are slightly high now, not tremendously. Probably the real rate of interest now in the three-month arena is what? Four percent?

QUESTION: Something like it.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Something like that. Now, if you move out five years or ten years, that's generally where people are talking about the high real rates of interest. I think intellectually it's a question whether people are figuring that right. That is, presumably, the real rate of interest derives from looking at the nominal rate and comparing it with the rate of inflation. Make your subtraction and you get the real rate of interest.

Now if you are talking about ten-year money, say, then what is the rate of inflation if you should apply to whatever the nominal rate is now? What is it, about 11 percent, some like that? It has been coming down. Well, that's really the issue. And people have felt that long-term inflation would be low in the United States, and, therefore, they have been willing to project that out ten years. And we've had very low long-term rates of interest.

Well, there's been quite a long period in which people have been badly burned. And so the market is still skeptical that inflation will really stay as low as it is right now. To put it another way, you have to compare the long-term rate with what expectations of inflation are. And I suppose in a kind of peculiar economists way, you would say that the fact that long-term interest rates still hang fairly high is evidence on the assumption that real rates of interest are in the three to four-percent band, that the market expects inflation to rise.

Now what has been happening is -- a way of interpreting this is that what's been happening is that the market has gradually been becoming more and more convinced that long-term inflation really is under better and better control. And that's the explanation for why long-term interest rates have been declining. But they haven't come back down into the single-digit area very much, so we still have a ways to go in convincing the market that the low rates of inflation are here to stay. And I suppose that's the significance of something that one of you started off with, namely, those big deficits in the out-years.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, two things that haven't been touched on at all. Could you say a word about global debt and what you think might happen at Williamsburg? And, two, do you exepct that arms control, and, particularly, Euro-missiles, will be coming up? And, if so, what result would you anticipate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, on the debt, it's a problem on everybody's mind. And it, I think, is one of the subjects that needs to be addressed. My opinion is that Jacques de Larosiere and his colleagues at the IMF and Tom Karstens at the Bank, working with Don Regan and Paul Volcker and Tim McNamara over at the Treasury and others and their counterparts around have done a fantastic job. They have done it pretty quietly and very effectively. And some potentially nasty problems have not gotten away from us. And a very good piece of work has been done.

And I think we need this IMF quota increase. And we need the additions to the general arrangements to borrow that the Treasury has been asking for and the President has been asking for and the counterparts in other countries so that there's maneuvering room here. And that the problems ahead of us will be -- are handleable. That doesn't mean they aren't difficult.

So, I think it's a good subject to discuss. It's not only a question, of course, of whether you are able to provide the money to bridge over and not have defaults and so forth; it's also a question of how to do that. And I think everybody's thinking needs to continually be refreshed on that subject because the broader the problem is, the more, it seems to me, you have to look at any individual case you're dealing with in terms of what it means if it is applied generally because if you get too widespread an austerity program, you produce the opposite of what you really need -- namely, economic expansion.

It's the expansion that will allow you basically to work out of the debt problems. But you need a dose of austerity, all right, in many cases. So, it's a nice balance to strike and it needs to be re-examined continually and restruck as you see the conditions changing and emerging.

And, so, it's a real difficult kind of an issue. I would point out one other thing -- namely, that the debt problems are not global or worldwide. I think you used that phrase. I don't think that's right.

I think they are located in a few places. And the fact is that if you look at the developing-country world, there are a lot of very healthy places that have been damned well managed. Look at Asia. Very impressive. So --

Ms. SMALL: Could we just have one more --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- they get spotlighted in one place or another.

QUESTION: How about the second part of --

QUESTION: -- the second part of the question was arms control and other political issues that you expect to have discussed at the Summit -- the Middle East, El Salvador perhaps but arms control is the first.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The INF issues are up front on everybody's agenda in Europe, so I think it's very likely that they'll come in for some discussion. There is a very high level of consultation that goes on continuously. And it's been striking to me in coming into the government to see how much exchange of ideas and information and consultation there is in this whole process.

And I think it's worked well and people like it and they feel consulted and so that process undoubtedly will manifest itself in the Williamsburg setting. I think there are also other aspects of arms control that people want to keep posted about, even though they don't have the same kind of immediate, collaborative effort that the INF does. That is, they're all interested in the START negotiations, no doubt interested in the -- to the extent people have read about it -- the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, the implications of that for arms control matters. MBFR continues in its back-burner way to be of interest to people.

They're interested in the confidence-building measures of various kinds that have been proposed, one way or another. So, I would -- and the CSCE seems to be kind of coming to a head right now. And it has its relationship, broadly speaking, to arms control -- at least, the CDE proposed there. So I'm sure the issues will get discussed and should be. I would hope they would be.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could I just add one more question --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I might say they tend not to be -- the Williamsburg -- or these summits are presumedly economic summits, so the formal sessions are predominantly economic issues, but there's lots of sidebar conversation and opportunities for exchange, and so there will be exchanges on other issues.

QUESTION: On that INF question, sir, is there a problem developing of any magnitude with the Japanese reaction to the Soviet decision not to dismantle but to actually remove large numbers of SS-20's, if we ever make an agreement with them -- that would be then accessible to Japanese territory? Is that a current problem? Are you --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's an observation of something that the Japanese view and we view as highly undesirable. And we have -- of course, the zero-zero proposal was essentially a global type proposal. And the Japanese like that a lot. So do the Chinese. And as we have moved to this interim position that we now have on INF, we have accompanied any potential numerical illustration of our approach with a set of principles that include the notion that we think globally about this issue.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

MS. SMALL: One final question.

QUESTION: On the Middle East could we just -- after -- you've been back now almost two weeks --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I still have my Beirut bark, however. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: I wonder if you still think that the Syrians have not slammed the door, as you mentioned in Damascus, after all this pyrotechnics and muscle flexing they've done since you've returned.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think so.

QUESTION: On that same point, is there a danger of an Israeli preempted strike against the Soviet-manned missle bases in Syria? Have you done anything to talk them out of considering such a strike?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the presence of the Soviet missiles and personnel manning them in Syria and the aggressive Syrian statements and behavior -- particularly, you have to remember that in the Bekaa you have a Syrian presence, apparently occasionally the Russian troops are there - at least during the day. You have a PLO presence, you have other groups in there who are -- how well controlled they are has to be a question. So you have, a dangerously -- or a potential for real problems. And we're aware of that, the Israelis are aware of that. We have discussed it with the Soviets. And I think there is a general view, at least expressed, as I've heard it expressed in the discussions that I've had, that nobody wants to see a war break out. And there is an exercise of general restraint taking place. I hope that turns out to be the case.

QUESTION: Including on the part of the Soviets, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I say everybody recognizes the potential danger of the situation and seems to rhetorically, in terms of conversation, say that they don't intend to start anything.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL PRESS BRIEFING

(CORRECTED COPY)

FRIDAY, MAY 20, 1983, 10:02 A.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. TAYLOR: As most of you have been informed, this briefing by Ambassador Dougan will be ON THE RECORD and will focus on the scope, responsibilities, and activities of the newly created position of Coordinator for International Communication and Information Policy, which Mrs. Dougan will fill.

Mrs. Dougan this morning will make a few brief remarks, and then she'll be glad to answer any of your questions.

Ambassador Dougan?

AMBASSADOR DOUGAN: Thank you. This is a very informal briefing; and I think many of you already know quite a bit about the area and the office, but I would like to briefly recap for you.

As many of you know, this is a new responsibility that was created under the Reagan Administration to literally do what the job description says -- "Coordinate international communication and information policy for the U.S. Government." I am obviously very honored and pleased that President Reagan and Secretary Shultz have asked me to take on this responsibility.

The area is* increasingly complex in what it involves. particularly with the ~~[illegible]~~ MESHING of computers and traditional telecommunications, you have a very expanded set of issues that need to interrelate and to be coordinated from a policy perspective.

In terms of the responsibilities of the office, I have been informally on board for a number of weeks now and have already undertaken a number of activities and have been very, very appreciative of the strong support I've gotten from the Department and from the various other Federal agencies.

I have already chaired bilateral negotiations with the United Kingdom, which is the first comprehensive bilateral discussions we've had in the area of telecommunications. It's one of the first things I did coming into this position.

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I've also had in-depth discussions with the Canadians in preparation for the upcoming High Frequency Conference.

I recently got back from Geneva. In fact, I've had to postpone my own swearing-in twice now because of the workload. In Geneva I attended the Administrative Council meeting of the ITU -- ~~which is~~ the International Telecommunication Union. While there, among other things, I helped to organize a pre-Council meeting of 11 Western countries in preparation for the Council, which I hope will be a percursor of things to come. We want to get like-minded countries together prior to major conferences and major meetings involving international telecommunications.

Within the U.S. Government, I have started to review organizational recommendations in terms of how we in the Executive Branch deal with these issues. As you probably know, there are 14 Federal agencies having some responsibilities in this area.

I don't foresee turning the world upside down in a moment of time. The process will continue and must necessarily depend on various segments of the U.S. Government for their expertise to support a focal point. It is truly, a coordinating focal point so that we can, in fact, have more concisely articulated and identified issues, and more coherent policy positions.

Does anyone have any particular questions? That's sort of an overview and if you have questions that you'd like to ask I'd be happy to answer them.

Q Yes. This work you did in Geneva, you say, at the Admin Council -- can you give me something more on that, on the organizational meeting of the 11 Western countries? What is that about?

A It was a meeting that we had prior to the commencement of the Administrative Council to begin to identify issues of particular interest and commonality between the major Western countries who are members of the Administrative Council, and I look to processes like that --both bilateral and multilateral forums--to be able to literally coalesce like-minded interests in international forums.

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Q This sounds like some of the things that we discuss in connection with the problems the U.S. has been having in connection with the ITU. Ambassador Gardner was talking about alternatives to it, not necessarily issues -- a separate organization entirely from the ITU but one that is an organization that can be set up to prepare the U.S. position for like-minded countries, to use your phrase, in preparation for these international conferences.

Does this mean -- are we looking for any particular conference with the D-11. This organizational thing that was set up or they were working on -- is this looking to the meeting this summer in Geneva or the HF Conference or anything in particular?

A That particular meeting was directed specifically to the Administrative Council meeting in Geneva. But, as you know, in testifying on the Hill I have already done that quite a bit in terms of our relationships to international organizations and the whole range of organizational issues related to international telecommunications; and we look to forums prior to every major conference, whether they're multilateral or bilateral, as part of our preparatory process and to really have a more sophisticated approach to these things.

Q For those of us who are here, so to speak, who wandered in off the street almost, explain to me what the area is. What is it you are doing? I don't quite understand it.

A I'm guilty of having in my vision caught people in the room who are most directly involved in this and the trade press knows quite a bit about this issue, so I'm perhaps remiss in not covering a little more of the basics.

The international communication and information policy arena involves literally everything involved in telecommunications, which immediately comes to focus. But I also am very, very involved in trans-border data flow issues, free flow of information -- the whole synapse between information and how you get it.

If you look at the fact that you need to look at the traditional telecommunication carriers, whether it's picking up your telephone -- that's one form of telecommunications -- or turning on your television set, to print media and other forms of communications, but also how you control and

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design and organize that. For example, one of the many upcoming conferences I'm going to be concerned with is the Direct Broadcast Satellite Conference coming up next month; and former Commissioner Abbott Washburn will be chairing that upcoming ~~High Frequency~~ Conference.

There are a series of international conferences related to spectrum allocation, geostationary orbit spacing -- how we plan the airwaves, and how we use them. There are also a lot of defense and security, trade and economic issues in this process.

And so in trying to formulate and articulate U.S. policy, we need to look at all these things -- technology transfer, international standards, copyrights, patents. Do you just think you have the kitchen sink? (Laughter.)

Q And up to now there's not been one coordinating office on this?

A No. When the Office of Telecommunications Policy was disbanded under the Carter Administration, we had what was called Executive Order 12046, which in large measure tried to replace the Office of Telecommunication Policy by placing responsibilities in various segments of the Executive Branch of Government; but one of the things that was missing was a coordinated focal point. ~~for~~

I said the other day at a meeting when someone asked what was the area like, and I said it was a little bit like trying to hug Jello. It moves so quickly and it's a little bit sticky and it changes its color and consistency with very little attention. It's an area that is quite complex, and I have no illusions that I'm going to make the issues become any less complex but, hopefully, this will provide a useful focal point for dealing with them in a more sophisticated way.

I would also say the private sector has a particularly unique role to play in international telecommunications because the United States is the only country that maintains its leadership basically within the private sector -- we do not have, for example, a PTT in the United States -- so that private industry is so often dealing with government counterparts abroad as opposed to a private industry counterpart. So the relationship and the coordination between government and the private sector is increasingly important because of that.

(cont'd on pg. B-1.)

Q How does one coordinate the activities of the international telecommunications areas of departments if they don't want to be coordinated? I am thinking of -- you have some very large departments that you are dealing with, besides State. I mean, Defense, Commerce. Is there any authority you have over them in this area, or are you simply depending on their good will? I am thinking of Defense, particularly.

A We have a senior inter-agency group on International Communication and Information Policy which the Department of State chairs. And the reason I am organizationally housed in the Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance is that he has traditionally chaired this body, and it does, in fact, represent a formalized focal point for the fourteen federal agencies that are involved in this.

So, we have that mechanism already in place to deal with this. It doesn't mean that various agencies aren't going to have individual views and perspectives, but part of the process is to take, whether it is a defense concern weighing in against an economic or trade issue, or even a technological issue from NASA's perspective, and putting those together.

USIA is also, of course, a member of this senior inter-agency group.

Q When was the last meeting of that group held?

A We have had a series of on-going meetings in relation to a particular up-coming concern of international satellite systems. As you probably know, there is an application for the Orion satellite before the FCC. So I have held a series of SIG briefings related to that in preparation for determining U.S. positions, and the last one was about a week ago.

Q Yes, but I am talking about a meeting that Schneider himself has chaired.

A The last meeting, I guess, was about three weeks ago, and he chaired half of it and then I ended up chairing the other half.

Q Is that on Orion, as well?

A Yes.

Q When do you think you are going to have your answer to the FCC on that?

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A As you probably know, it is not a single issue. It is a cat's cradle of many issues put together. So there will be a series of responses related to both the temporal and the longer range policy concerns.

Q A series of reports to the Commission?

A There will be a series of actions and ~~their~~ responses on the part of the Executive.

Q When will they start flowing?

A They have been, already.

Q They have?

Q Can you tell us more about what they say?

A Some of it is -- there are some things pending right now, and I think because there is a pending application before the Commission, I don't want to prejudice that outside the process.

Q How about talking a little bit about some of the issues that are involved, then? Could you do that?

A Some of the issues in the Orion application?

Q Yes. I mean, this government stands for deregulation and for competition in this field.

A We have two very significant policy concerns. One is a longstanding commitment to INTELSAT, which is, as you know, an international global satellite system, and we also have a commitment to as much competition and free market environment as possible.

This application, however, does not -- I mean, it is a mistake to try and pit those two issues in a black and white fashion directly against one another, because the Orion application is premised on the fact that it does not have to coordinate with INTELSAT, so that one could -- and I would have to say naively -- separate them. I don't think, from a U.S. policy standpoint, not the FCC process, but from the U.S. Executive Branch policy standpoint, that it would be wrong for us to separate them, because the Orion application was not an accident waiting to happen but an event waiting to happen, because there have been significant changes in what, in fact, is a domestic service or a regional service. And what does the market place want, how can it be served? INTELSAT and COMSAT are not the same animals they were when they were created a decade ago.

So those are all factors that, I think, need to be reviewed from a U.S. policy standpoint.

Q You said they are not the same.

A Our process is not strictly geared to a response to the Federal Communications Commission.

Q I'm sorry, what was that?

A It is not solely directed towards the Federal Communications Commission.

Q I'm sorry, what is the point?

A Our process is looking at overall policy issues related to this, of which the Orion issue sort of brought it into focus.

Q Do you agree with those who say that if the Orion application is approved, then this will be just one of many that will come along, American and non-American, which is apparently in the minds of some people the real threat to the INTELSAT system?

A I think we have to equate the economics into it -- one can't answer that without having an assessment of: is there in fact a market out there for the Orion service that cannot be met economically or to the marketplace's satisfaction through INTELSAT. That will be, I think, the major determinant.

Q Did you say COMSAT and INTELSAT organizations changed?

A Well, COMSAT has changed as an entity. They are allowed to be involved in competitive activities now that they were not previously. There are regional satellite systems that were not envisioned when INTELSAT was first created. There are domestic satellite systems. For example, the French "monitoring" service, also happens to maintain a province in the St. Lawrence seaway. So its domestic service extends into North America.

Thus,you have some blurrings of lines of what have traditional outlined services or service areas.

Q For those of us who are not experts, what is the Orion? What does it propose to do? When would it become operational?

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A The Orion application is currently pending before the Federal Communications Commission to provide a private international satellite service. In other words, Orion can be likened to something like a condominium in the sky. Under that premise, the applicants do not feel that they need to coordinate through the 14-D mechanism of INTELSAT, the INTELSAT agreement which states that they must, one, coordinate with INTELSAT, and there must be a determination if there is undue economic harm to INTELSAT.

Q When would this go into operation, if the application were to be approved?

A I don't think they have -- they don't even have a satellite launch commitment yet, do they?

Q On the space shuttle they had something. They have some kind of a slot on the space shuttle signed up for in '86, or something like.

A '86 sounds about right.

Q Who is behind it?

A A consortium of U.S. business interests. Bill Daniels is one. It is a consortium of U.S. business interests.

Q Is there anything else?

A Yes. I would like to.

Q You are not in a hurry, are you?

A. Well, I have got to get to a meeting, as a matter of fact, but I can answer one more.

Q Well, I have got two. Could I ask you to say where you and the State Department stand on American membership, U.S. membership, in ITU, and what kind of an attitude you have towards the talk or threat of withdrawal from ITU?

A As you probably know, I have testified before Congress on behalf of the Administration on this, and our commitment is to be involved in whatever forums most appropriately and effectively serve U.S. interests, and we believe that the focus in terms of the ITU is to concentrate on getting it back on track, in its more technical base, and away from the political emphasis that has evolved in the last couple of years. That is how we are approaching it.

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Q Was that part of what you were trying to achieve in the pre-Council meeting that you are talking about?

A To some extent.

Q Could I ask one more question? What is your attitude towards S-999's provisions for a special representative for telecommunications policy, and how would that relate to your authority and responsibility?

A As you know, S-999 is sort of a bifurcated proposal that has ambassadorial positions within the Department of State and also directly within the White House.

The State Department's view is that ~~this~~ it is unnecessary to have this duplicative approach.

Q Unnecessary?

A To have this duplicative approach.

Q So, in effect, the Department opposes those provisions in S-999.

Q Is there a White House position on that?

A You can read testimony on that. That has already been submitted by the Department of Defense.

Q By whom?

A By the Department of Defense.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 10:23 a.m.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI
OF ITALY

May 25, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:04 A.M. EDT

MR. FRANKLIN: This is a background briefing on the visit, tomorrow, of Prime Minister Fanfani of Italy. As usual, the briefers will be referred to as senior administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Prime Minister Fanfani's visit is one of a series of bilateral visits and meetings that have been set up in preparation for the Williamsburg summit. Most of the other leaders have, also, come in the last several weeks. A couple of them will have bilateral meetings down at Williamsburg toward the end of the session there.

I can briefly run through the program and, then, talk a bit about the substance. He is going to be arriving this afternoon at 4:30 p.m. There will be the arrival ceremony at the Monument at 5:00 p.m. The Italian Ambassador will be hosting a dinner in honor of the Vice President this evening. Tomorrow morning, the Prime Minister meets with Secretary Shultz at 9:00 a.m., with the President at 11:30 a.m. There is a lunch at 12:15 p.m. at the White House, which is expected to break up about 1:30 p.m. at which point there would probably be departure statements. And, then, the Prime Minister would leave.

He is going to Chicago tomorrow evening, where he is getting an honorary degree at Loyola University, and will be returning to Washington the following day and, then, going down to Williamsburg on Saturday.

I think that U.S.-Italian relations, of course, have been close and, pretty much, tension free throughout the post-war era. But they have taken on a greater importance, I think, for the United States in the last several years, because there has been a development of Italian foreign policy and a maturation of that policy, which has made Italy more relevant and more important to issues of concern to us.

The Italians were among the first to join the multilateral force in the Sinai. And this was, indeed, their first instance in which they sent troops abroad, other than in the U.N. context, since the second World War. They were, also, the first to volunteer to join the multilateral force in Lebanon. And they were, also, the first European country to make a commitment to deploy American cruise missiles. And their willingness to do so was very instrumental in securing the Alliance decision in December of 1979 on that subject.

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So the Italian policy has matured in some important ways. And they have become an extremely supportive ally of the United States.

The issues which the President and the Prime Minister will discuss would, I suspect, largely focus on the Williamsburg summit. And my colleague can answer any questions about that aspect of the meetings that I cannot. I would suspect that they will, also, discuss the Middle East. The Italians, as I have noted, are playing an important role there, and one that we certainly want to encourage. And I would guess that they will, also, discuss the intermediate nuclear force issues: both the status of the negotiations, the prospects for the negotiations, and the ongoing process of deployment, which is due to begin toward the end of this year in Italy, in the U.K., and in Germany with deployment following in the succeeding years in Belgium and the Netherlands.

Q Does Mr. Fanfani speak English?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not well. I suspect he will speak in Italian.

Q Are the Italians as unhappy as some of our allies over U.S. economic program -- the deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that they --

Q Are they as outspoken?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're not traditionally as outspoken as the French, who tend to be more outspoken than most on this. I would guess that their views would not be significantly different from those of the other allies on these kinds of issues. The Italians have some of the same problems the French do. They have a very high inflation rate, as well as a high unemployment rate. So they're certainly concerned about economic affairs.

Q The recovery

hasn't started there at all, has it? I mean, that's one of the few -- the countries where there's been no turnover -- Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's right.

Q And there's no antipathy to the missiles in Italy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, I think that -- It's a controversial subject in all of the countries of Europe and particularly in the countries where they are to be based. And I think it would be wrong to say that there's no controversy in Italy. I think the controversy hasn't been as vocal or as vigorous in Italy as in most of the other deployment countries. But it's not without controversy there and the government is not without a certain degree of courage in moving forward and having made the decision initially and moving forward now.

I think that for a variety of reasons, including the political constellation there, it hasn't emerged, for instance, as a major election issue. And our expectation is that following the election, a coalition government will be formed which will adopt foreign and defense policies not significantly different from its predecessors.

Q When is the election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 26th of June.

Q And what's Fanfani's status? He's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's a caretaker Prime Minister. He was the Prime Minister and has stayed on in a caretaker status with his government, pending the election.

Q You said you didn't think the Italians views on economic issues were significantly different from the other allies, but which allies? Since the French seem to have one view; some of our other allies have different views. Would they be lumped together with the French and have they expressed any position --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess on a spectrum, they would be closer to the French than most of the others because of their high inflation rate, which tends to -- Most of the other allies have begun to bring down inflation and their priorities are somewhat different.

Q Do we have any feel for how they feel about President Mitterrand's suggestion of a New Breton Woods Conference and whether they might support --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they would be --

Q -- him at the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, all Mitterrand said was that he thought this was something that should be discussed at the summit. He didn't express any expectation that the summit would decide to do it.

Q No, but he said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the Italians would be happy to discuss it. And I think that given the fact that their problems are more similar to the French than the Germans, say, on the spectrum they would be closer to the French. Although, I don't think there would be an exact coincidence of views.

Q Can you explain why --

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Q -- specific indication that they would support the idea of fixed exchange rates, return to fixed exchange rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know if they would express it quite so starkly; but I think that they, precisely because they have the same economic problems, would be more favorable to a more active interventionist policy than some of the other allies.

Q I'm just not up on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But probably less vigorous in pushing the view than, say, the French.

Q Why is he a caretaker? Was there a vote of no confidence or has he just decided he doesn't want to be a part in the elections?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the -- It --

Q Can you explain what happened with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Well, he is a caretaker Prime Minister. I should hasten to add that he is one of the most powerful figures in the Christian Democratic Party which will certainly emerge from the election as the largest party. So, although he's a caretaker figure in that sense, he's going to be one of the major leaders in Italy, as he has been for the last 30 years --

Q How old is he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the future.

He's in his 80's. Do you know the exact age? Is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's late 70's.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Late 70's?

He was, interestingly, the -- He was the Italian Prime Minister when Eisenhower took office, as I recall.

Q Do the Italians desire that the United States take action to buy lira in order to change the relationship of the dollar to the lira, lowering the dollar?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me get to that because I didn't answer the question here about how the government fell.

The Socialists pulled out of the government. So it's a four-party coalition. The Socialists, who represent about nine percent of the vote at the last election, pulled out of the government and the basic issue was economic policy, whether to have -- go to a greater degree of austerity in their economic policy, which the Christian Democrats were trying to make government policy. The Socialists opposed it and they pulled out.

There are very complex political reasons. The Socialists, obviously, hope that an election at this time would somewhat improve their prospects. A marginally larger vote next time would make it more likely that they could assume the prime minister -- the role of prime minister, at least at some period during the next term of the Parliament.

But, as I said, I think our expectation is that the coalition governments that succeed after the election won't be very different in composition than the ones that have preceeded it. And the Christian Democrats are going to, certainly, be the

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largest party. Although, they may share power in terms of some other party having the Prime Minister. It's not impossible.

I guess -- The answer is that they -- that they probably would be quite pleased if something like that occurred. But I don't think they're going to press very strongly for it, would be my guess.

Q -- unilateral --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so.

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But, as I said, they have a high inflation rate which puts a lot of pressure on the lire and, like the French, they would obviously like assistance in maintaing the exchange rate stability which their domestic economic situation makes difficult.

Q What's their stand on the Export Administration Act? They suffered under the last imposition of sanctions. Is that something that they're liable to raise at Williamsburg?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible. I would guess that they'd have pretty much the same views as all of as every other country in the world, basically, that's affected by this. But, on the other hand, I don't think they have high expectations that they're going to change American policy in the area. But, obviously, they did -- They were one of the people who were impacted by the pipeline sanctions and the possibility that U.S. steps of this sort could occur in the future would be a matter of some concern.

Q You indicated that Mr. Fanfani was Prime Minister first under the, at the time of President Eisenhower. Now, the government of Italy, of course, has flipped and flopped quite a bit over the years. How many times has he been Prime Minister?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could make up a number. Something like five, I think, but I'm not sure that's accurate. We could check and get you a number.

Q What's the record? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's an interesting question because, while the government of Italy has this reputation for changing rapidly and frequently, in fact, there's a remarkable stability in the government. The same faces appear -- Columbo has been the Foreign Minister in the last several governments. And so you do have -- In a sense, you don't get the dramatic shifts that you've had in the American government, in the French government, and in the German government in the last several years. You get a very steady continuity precisely because of the multiparty system which forces coalition government.

Q What is that inflation rate that you're mentioned as being high? Do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fiftenn percent, I think.

Q And what's unemployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's -- I wrote it down before I left. Let me see. I think unemployment's fifteen and inflation is eighteen. Yes, that's what I have -- 15 percent unemployment, 18 percent inflation.

Q Do you know how many people are unemployed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't. I'm sorry.

Q Can you tell us a little bit about why you think the Italians decided to be players in the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that there are a variety of reasons. One is that the Italians want to be taken seriously. They don't want to be considered one of the smaller, less important allies. And I think they recognize that if they want to be taken seriously as a major European country and a major ally that they have to behave seriously. And so this is, in effect, putting their chips on the table, getting into the game.

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Secondly, you've had an interesting coaltion -- I mean, an interesting political dynamics among the parties there in which the Socialists and the Christian Democrats are sort of competing with each other as to who can be the more responsible, who can be the more active in foreign policy terms, who can be more pro-Western. And this competition, from our standpoint, is fairly healthy. The Communists are the only real opposition in the country and even they are forced, are continually trying to demonstrate that they're not just tools of Moscow and so, although they tend not to support things like INF or the Middle East, they tend to mute their criticism to some degree. So for a variety of political reasons you've got that.

Finally, I think that there's just a generational change. In the immediate post-war era, the results of having lived under Fascism discredited an activist foreign policy, and anybody who talked about a Mediterranean role for Italy was accused of being from another era. I think that now you've had a generational change, Italy does perceive that it has a role in the Mediterranean, that it is a major Mediterranean power and it's more willing to play that role now.

Q If this is to be a first-name basis summit what will President Reagan call Prime Minister Fanfani? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Amitori, I suppose.

Q Is it possible that during the bilaterals tomorrow -- just forget about Williamsburg -- that they will discuss the assassination attempt on the Pope?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible that Fanfani would --

Q Is that on the agenda?

SENIOR ADMININSTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so, but it's certainly possible it would come up. There isn't a formal agenda. I mean, both sides have briefed their principals on the issues that are likely to come up. It's possible that Fanfani would sort of bring the President up to date on where it stands. Our own view is that we have confidence in the Italian government and in the independent judiciary which is conducting the investigation and which is still underway.

Q When will it end?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question. I don't think that anybody can set a terminal date on it. I think they'll go on as long as they think that there's evidence that they can gather which they haven't yet gathered. I would expect that it could extend -- Whatever happens with the individual Bulgarian that they're now holding, I would expect the investigation will probably go on for some time.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:18 A.M. EDT

READ OUT BY
STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN JOHN HUGHES
ON THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS IN NEW YORK
WITH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS
May 26, 1983

JOHN HUGHES: I'd like to run through this is in chronological order. The Secretary began his sessions here this afternoon with a session with the Foreign Minister of Zaire, Mr. Kamanda. That meeting lasted from 4:30-5:05. The participants on the U.S. side were the Secretary of State, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and Assistant Secretaries Crocker and Hughes. The Secretary complimented the Zairian Foreign Minister on the progressive steps his country had taken in connection with amnesty in the past few days, announcing amnesty for all political prisoners and saw this within the framework of other positive developments in Zaire. There was then talk of U.S.-Zaire relations which both sides agreed were very good. There was some discussion of world affairs; that was followed by a discussion about U.S. aid to Zaire. The Secretary indicated that the Administation would continue pushing for the amount of aid it considered appropriate to Zaire and would work in Congress to achieve those totals. They then got into discussion about Namibia and some discussion of the upcoming resolution on Namibia in the U.N. Security Council. The Secretary indicated that the United States was determined to work for an independent Namibia in terms of U.N. Resolution 435.

After that, the Secretary met with SWAPO leader Nujoma. That lasted from 5:10-5:40. The U.S. participants again were the Secretary of State, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and Assistant Secretaries Crocker and Hughes. There was extensive discussion during that meeting on the future of Namibia. The Secretary once again underlined U.S. commitment to an independent Namibia and asked Mr. Nujoma to talk a little about the kind of independent Namibia he foresaw. Mr. Nujoma responded and gave remarks along those lines as had been requested. The Secretary again stressed that the United States wants to see the emergence of an independent Namibia and was committed to working towards that end.

The third meeting in the hotel was with the Front Line States plus Nigeria. That meeting lasted from 6:00 until 7:10. On the U.S. side, the participants were the Secretary of State and Assistant Secretaries Crocker and Hughes. The Front Line States, represented by their Foreign Ministers and their Permanent Representatives, were Tanzania, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, plus Nigeria. Again, there was general discussion about the issue of Namibia and once again, the United States reiterated its commitment to an independent Namibia. The Secretary said the United States felt a great deal of progress had already been made in this connection and that the remaining issues really were resolvable given the proper environment. He pointed out that as a matter of fact, as an observation, there was a connection between the sovereignty and security in the region. The facts were and are that there are foreign forces in Angola and there are non-Namibian forces in Namibia. There is violence in the area about which the United States is concerned. The Secretary again said that it was his feeling that the nub of the problem on Namibia was soluble if the surrounding environment in the region was made secure and the United States had an acute interest in working to help create the conditions -- create the environment -- which would enable countries in the region to be sovereign and secure and to undertake sturdy economic development. He said the United States was committed to dampening the cycle of violence in southern Africa and creating the climate of confidence which would permit the sovereignty, the security and the economic development which I already mentioned.

QUESTION: Mr. Hughes, what sort of changes, if any, have there been that might have been indicated to the Foreign Ministers in terms of the U.S. position on -- the linkage issues?

MR. HUGHES: Well, the United States really wasn't discussing linkage. It was discussing security in the entire area, and that was the point that the Secretary was trying to make. He was not talking about Angolan troops alone. He was talking about all foreign forces in Angola, and he was talking about, obviously South African forces in Namibia, making the point that to get to the sovereignty, the security and the opportunity then to further economic development, clearly those forces of all characters have to eventually be withdrawn.

QUESTION: Was there any discussion of the future role of the Contact Group?

MR. HUGHES: No.

QUESTION: It wasn't brought up?

MR. HUGHES: No.

QUESTION: Was there any response to Mr. Nujoma's view of the kind of independence that he wants?

MR. HUGHES: The Secretary listened to what Mr. Nujoma said; they both agreed -- they obviously share the principles of democracy and liberty and economic development. They agreed on those principles as a good foundation for nation-building.

QUESTION: Was there any discussion of the resolution? And particularly, the proposed deadline --

MR. HUGHES: No, only in the -- you mean in the Security Council?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. HUGHES: Only in general terms during the Zairian Foreign Minister's session with the Secretary -- only in general terms -- and the point there was that there was agreement on the need to achieve the broadest consensus for that resolution.

QUESTION: Was there discussion of sanctions?

MR. HUGHES: No.

QUESTION: Yes, how was the atmosphere? Was there collusion talk?

MR. HUGHES: The atmosphere was very cordial in all three meetings.

QUESTION: Would the U.S. be in favor then of having the Secretary-General initiate negotiations for a peace talk?

MR. HUGHES: It didn't come up and I'm just giving you a read-out on what happened at these meetings this afternoon.

QUESTION: Was there any talk of travel by the Secretary perhaps to the region?

MR. HUGHES: There was some discussion of it by one participant, and I think the Secretary's point on that was that the time was probably not right for his involvement at this stage.

QUESTION: Anything more specific about the climate of confidence that the U.S. was trying to build?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I think a non-violent climate is what the United States is --

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

MR. HUGHES: Well, the United States is proposing through diplomacy and energy and commitment to work with others that have a similar commitment to produce that climate.

QUESTION: Did Angola talk about its relations with South Africa? And its diplomatic meetings with South Africa?

MR. HUGHES: No, but I should really draw the line here and say that I would be happy to talk about what the Secretary of State spoke about but I really cannot and must not speak for the other participants.

QUESTION: In the discussions today, was there any kind of line drawn between the kind of discussions that were had today and the kinds of speeches that have been delivered in the Security Council?

MR. HUGHES: No.

QUESTION: Mr. Hughes, when you talk about the broadest consensus, is a broad consensus possible when the resolution doesn't contain a deadline?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I think we'll have to see how -- there was really not detailed discussion about the resolution -- what they were talking about was the ultimate goal of an independent Namibia. There was not much discussion specifically on the resolution.

QUESTION: Did the Secretary say flatly or even not flatly there could be no independence while Cuban troops remained in Angola?

MR. HUGHES: No, he did not make such a statement.

QUESTION: John, you say it wasn't linkage. But what does talk about an environment in which there are foreign forces that have to be withdrawn mean exactly?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I think it means that various parties are not going to take actions while various other parties are in the area. I think that's the -- and that probably goes for both sides and you have to work out an agreement for withdrawal.

QUESTION: Is it correct then to say that he was trying to make the point that he sees not much chance or little hope for movement as long as the situation persists?

MR. HUGHES: No, I wouldn't say that he was saying that there was not much hope for movement. What he was saying was that there has been considerable progress on the Namibian issue, but you do face certain realities about the overall Soviet and Cuban military presence in the region, and you have to face up to such realities.

QUESTION: Isn't all this linkage by another name then?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I can only tell you how the discussion went this afternoon, George, and it was discussion of the need for broad security in the area which will permit sovereignty and in turn economic development.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) discussion between Angola and South Africa mentioned?

MR. HUGHES: I don't recall them being mentioned, no.

QUESTION: Was there an indication as to the future course of the Contact Group?

MR. HUGHES: No, there was not.

QUESTION: Is there any significance in the fact that the Contact Group wasn't mentioned?

MR. HUGHES: I don't think so. This was a discussion -- in the first two meetings obviously there were parties who were participating and in the third meeting there was a discussion between the Front Line States and the Secretary of State in which each side offered their views of the situation, of the progress that had been made, and the distance that needs to be --

QUESTION: Did they express their dissatisfication in any way with the slowness -- the slow pace -- of what they might regard --

MR. HUGHES: I think both sides felt that there had been ups and downs in the progress of these negotiations.

QUESTION: In the course of two hours of discussion, were there any new ideas?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I don't know that if you mean new ideas, did the parties agree to leave the room and call a new series of meetings or draft a new resolution --

QUESTION: No, no, propose a new thought to get out of this impasse?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I think the thought was commitment and the airing of views and the bringing, I think, closer together of both sides in terms of understanding what has been achieved and what needs to be achieved.

QUESTION: Will the Secretary report on this meeting to his colleagues in Williamsburg this weekend?

MR. HUGHES: I don't know whether it will come up at Williamsburg. It's conceivable; I don't know.

QUESTION: Would it be fair to characterize this as the beginning of a personal effort on the part of the Secretary of State to try to resolve that impasse?

MR. HUGHES: Well, the Secretary's been involved and the President's been involved, and the Secretary made that point in the meetings because the United States does have a commitment to the independence of Namibia, but it certainly is the first time the Secretary has seen Mr. Nujoma, for example, though I think Mr. Nujoma has seen a previous Secretary of State. But they had not met. I suppose that was a first. And certainly these meetings, I think, this afternoon demonstrate the United States' concern and commitment and specifically the Secretary's, yes.

QUESTION: Did they run on longer than expected?

MR. HUGHES: No, I think they -- the meetings -- were more or less on schedule. They may have slipped a little in starting on time, but I think they ran more or less on time.

QUESTION: Mr. Hughes, would you say -- is it accurate to say that there has been no movement on the issue of foreign troops since it's such a bitter issue with the Front Line States and it seems that the Secretary of State is maintaining the U.S. position on that?

MR. HUGHES: I think that if you are asking have troops left, the answer is no.

QUESTION: No, I mean attitude?

MR. HUGHES: If you mean is there a diplomatic discussion going on about those troop removals? The answer is yes, very much so.

QUESTION: Have the Front Line States, though, seemed to relax their position on the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola? They say that's totally irrelevant.

MR. HUGHES: Well, I don't think I should speak for them. I think they can speak for themselves.

QUESTION: Has the United States relaxed its position on that?

MR. HUGHES: It's not a question -- the United States doesn't have a position, the United States has an observation. There are certain realities in play here and one of the realities is the presence of Soviet-Cuban military power in Angola and that's one of the realities observed by the South Africans, so it's not really the United States who is saying you have a situation; you have a reality and somebody has to work at that.

QUESTION: Are more of these meetings expected in the future?

MR. HUGHES: It's possible, but nothing was scheduled as a result of this afternoon.

QUESTION: Did the Secretary succeed in getting any more enthusiasm for Mr. Crocker's proposals (inaudible)?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I don't really know what you mean by Mr. Crocker's proposals.

QUESTION: The plan (inaudible) for the electoral processes.

MR. HUGHES: There was no detailed discussion of that. The point was made by a number of people that two of the main issues on Namibia seem to be the U.N. force and the electoral mechanism. As far as the United States was concerned, the position we took is that we understand those problems but we felt that those problems were soluble if you could create the right environment and the right sense of security in the region.

QUESTION: And this environment was the focus of the whole meeting? I won't say linkage, but the environment was the question on which most of the discussion centered?

MR. HUGHES: Well, I would say in the last of the three meetings, it took up a fair amount of time, yes.

QUESTION: John, there's been an awful lot of public criticism from black African countries about the American position on the Cubans in Angola, was there any criticism directed at the Secretary during these private discussions?

MR. HUGHES: It wasn't really that kind of a session. It was -- all of the Front Line Representatives spoke, the Secretary spoke, and it was really an exchange of views about the pace of negotiations and where they were and what is needed to bring things to a successful conclusion.

QUESTION: Was there any indication that the U.S. was expected to put more pressure on South Africa?

MR. HUGHES: Well, the United States isn't in the business of putting pressure on either side. The United States is in the business of trying to use its good offices to increase commitment on both sides to break through this impasse.

QUESTION: When the talks were over, how did the Secretary feel about them? Was he pleased or was he frustrated, was he --

MR. HUGHES: I think that he felt that all three meetings were very worthwhile and constructive.

QUESTION: Thank you. Thanks very much.

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ' NORTH-SOUTH SPEECH
BEFORE
FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1983, 12:00 P.M.

MR. REAP: Good afternoon. Today's briefer, for your information and not for publication, is [redacted] He will brief on the Secretary's speech in New York.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: You all have the text, I hope, of the significant statement that the Secretary is making at the Foreign Policy Association in New York this afternoon. But just to give you a bit of the background and some of the highlights, I think he had very much in mind, in this statement, the upcoming conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development beginning the end of the first week in June in Belgrade, which is perhaps at the international level, the most significant step in the moving North-South dialogue for a period of a couple of years.

With that in mind, he wanted to make a fairly full statement of the Administration's ppolicy on relations with the developing countries. He has spent quite a bit of time himself on this statement and, given his own background in the world of economics and his own experience in developing countries, he has put quite a bit of his own stamp on this.

I think the major points that he wanted to highlight are that the developing countries are now-a-days a very major factor in world growth and stability, and that the U.S. has a very significant stake, therefore, in their progress.

He has some interesting statistics in there on just how important the relationship between the United States and the developing countries is for our own growth and economic welfare and, I think, some interesting personal philosophy on the subject of political stability in developing countries. He sees it as not only an important part of our foreign policy, but in looking over the long term, a part of our foreign policy that will continue to grow and increase in importance. I think it is for that reason that he wanted to make the statement before a U.S. audience and do it in a fairly comprehensive and positive way.

He personally expresses a good deal of optimism for political and economic development in the south, despite the continuing news of the day dominated by real problems of debt and political instability, in particular in developing countries. He sees the priority very much as one of resuming

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significant growth in developing countries, and that is indeed the importance, for developing countries, of the Williamsburg Summit this weekend and the main contribution that that event can make to the developing countries of the South.

He is very strong on trying to articulate the political framework for North-South relations which in his mind is very much one dominated by the framework of mutual responsibilities and mutual gains from cooperation over a very broad range of activities, and he tries in there pretty much to cover the gamut of North-South collaboration in many fields, finance, trade, investment, and the debt problem.

The United States has committed significant efforts and resources to promoting economic and political progress in the developing countries, and that continues to engage some of the President's effort and the Secretary's. He cites in there a significant development last night in terms of the House of Representatives' the Administration's full request toward meeting our commitment to the World Bank's International Development Association.

He places perhaps greatest emphasis on the trade area as what really determines the future growth and fate of developing countries, and is calling there for a major effort in terms of a new round of multi-lateral trade negotiations with very special emphasis on expanding trade opportunities for developing countries. He sees a lot in this for developing countries on both sides of the transaction, that expanding their exports over the rest of the decade is quite important to world growth; and in a structural sense, he sees developing countries opening their own markets as contributing a great deal to efficient use of the precious investment resources in their own economies, and as he likes to do, points out that those developing countries that have grown most rapidly in recent years have, in fact, been those that are most open to international trade and investment.

The debt problem, in a fairly balanced way, he cites as one that can be stabilized by the adjustments that are now in train, but its ultimate resolution, in fact, depends on growth in developing countries' trade with the rest of the world over the remaining years of the 80s; and it is, in part, with that in mind that he puts such particular emphasis on trade liberalization as an important piece in a stable and growing world in a North-South dimension in coming years.

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Looking to something that President Mitterrand said a couple of weeks ago regarding a crisis in economic development in Africa, he cites Africa as, in effect, a disturbing exception on the scene in terms of fairly encouraging progress in developing countries, and in effect says that Mitterrand is right when he refers to the risk that Africa might become the "Lost Continent" of development, and that the deep stagnation of agricultural development, in particular, that has hit much of Africa, threatens both tragedy in human terms, where you have got a prolonged period of declining per capita consumption of food, for example, and a prolonged period of political turmoil unless these trends can be reversed. He calls for new approaches by the Africans themselves to increasing productivity, and he has got some specific suggestions there and new approaches on the part of aid donors to effectively support that kind of reform.

I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Is he calling for a renegotiated GATT? Is that what this amounts to?

A No.

Q That skates over it rather quickly, suggesting that there be still lower tariffs, but he's not very specific in what he wants.

A He's calling for a major negotiation in the GATT. What he's saying, in effect, is that the world of trade liberalization has, to some extent, by-passed North-South trade, that developing countries themselves maintain high and significant trade barriers which in some ways distort their own pattern of development, and they should be brought into a framework of fairly ambitious liberalization of trade.

On the other side of it, when you look at the very significant increases in exports that they need to fuel their growth over the coming years, that there ought to be another look, maybe a significant one, at what can be done to increasing their market of access in the North.

So I think he is saying that the traditional approach of GATT of tarrif-cutting rounds has accomplished a great deal -- about what it can in terms of trade among the industrial countries -- but there remains a great deal to be done in terms of North-South trade, and that that's perhaps where the big need is in this next draft.

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Q Why do you suppose he hasn't mentioned at all exchange rates?

A Well, he could have. He has fairly clear views on that subject -- and we talked about this quite specifically. I think his reasoning was that exchange rate stability is primarily a topic of hot discussion and of interest among the industrial countries, and as such, is an item that puts the focus on Williamsburg; and therefore, this time around, he wanted to concentrate on those issues that he sees as the major ones in terms of North-South relations.

Q It seems to ignore the effect that this has, the fluctuations in the exchange rates, has on the developing countries.

A It, obviously, has an effect on them. And if you look back, for example, to the remarks that the Secretary himself made at the monetary conference which Jack Kemp sponsored about 10 days ago, you'll find a pretty clear statement of his views on that subject, that indeed greater stability in exchange rates is important and that the approach to that comes through the closer convergence of underlying economic policies, particularly among industrial countries since that is what determines exchange relationships, and that perhaps there is a role there for greater consultation among industrial countries on the impact of their economic policies on exchange rates, among other economic manifestations. He looks to that as being the approach to achieve that, which he definitely sees as an important objective.

The developing countries have sort of "before" floating rates and "after" floating rates (which) had, in effect, an exchange rate regime of their own, which has always put more emphasis on the frequent movement of exchange rates, and that has sort of continued and continues today. So I think the kind of fundamental discussion of whether the regime of the future and the role for more stable rates is one in which it it's the impact of the industrial countries' actions on developing countries that is important. I don't think they contemplate changes in the way they have and continue to handle their own exchange rate regimes.

I think that's the reason. He just didn't want to get off on, while an important subject, one that's not central to the subject that he in effect is trying to focus some additional American attention on here.

Q Another point: On the question of austerity which he mentioned a couple of times --

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A Right.

Q -- was this an implied criticism of the IMF which imposes austerity conditions, or could you expand on that aspect?

A No, I don't think it's a criticism of the IMF. What he feels quite strongly about is that one has to not mix means and objective here, that, as he said at that monetary conference, "There is no particular nobility in more austerity than is absolutely necessary to reach the long-term objective, which is revived growth." And I think that's the point he wants to make, that the short-term function of austerity in developing countries has to be kept in perspective. It's purpose is to reestablish their creditworthiness, and therefore, their ability to attract additional capital that they need to fuel their own growth. The amount of austerity that accomplishes that objective is the right one; a harsher hairshirt is, in effect, not functional.

I think he has had some concern, as well, that there are obviously limits. Developing countries are societies in transition; they've got political stresses of their own. He has said many times before that one has to keep in mind the limits of the pace of adjustment and austerity that can be attained there.

But, no, he's not trying to criticize the IMF.

(Continued on page 6.)

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Q Could you say something about the timing of this? It strikes me as a major subject but coming on the eve of Williamsburg, it just doesn't seem to add up. Why do this now, right on the very eve of the meeting down there?

A All the participants at Williamsburg have suggested that the impact of the industrial countries on the development countries, and North-South issues, are a part of the agenda. That is accepted, that that is a significant factor in the discussion at Williamsburg.

I think the timing is related in that the Secretary, I think, has felt that the Administration needs a full and comprehensive statement on this aspect of our foreign policy and economic policy, and felt there is a need for doing that more fully than has been up to now. This is a good time to do that, in part, because it's part of the backdrop of Williamsburg.

Q Had he intended to go to Belgrade and deliver a speech like this?

A He would have liked to and thought about that, but it turned out to be impossible.

Q Is that the origin of this speech?

A He has always intended to do this to an American audience before the UNCTAD Conference, but looking to the UNCTAD Conference.

He had hoped he could go to Belgrade himself but that turns out to be impossible because the U.S. opportunity to make that statement at that conference, it conflicts with his prior commitment to be in Paris for the NATO Ministerial. Thus, he's going to have to delegate that responsibility.

Q Who is going from the U.S.?

A It's not yet decided. It should be very shortly.

Q When he says "mutual exchange of concessions on the trade front," can we talk a little about what that means?

For example, on the United States part, would it mean something like the generalized system of press preferences, duty-free treatment to all of the development countries, in a more across-the-board, systematic fashion, or would it be more in terms of specific barriers that we have, let's say, on textiles or something, that we would give that up? And on the LDC side, what would we want them to give up, or would we be talking about just the really outright quotas or would we be talking about subsidies, and would it be for just the more advanced developing countries?

A Several questions there. First of all, what he's talking about goes beyond and is more ambitious than the system of generalized preferences.

Stepping apart from that, he says that we have to renew our system of generalized preferences, and that's one thing. Beyond that, there's a more ambitious task of trade liberalization. That, as he describes it, would not necessarily be subject to the same sort of limitations and rules that are in the generalize preference system. One of the reasons that it would not be is that, in effect, it would be a negotiation in which the developing countries make some concessions themselves. It is a two-way negotiation, in that sense.

It would not be just the highly industrialized developing countries. As we see it, it would be a process that would be open to any and all developing countries that wanted to participate in such a process in the GATT.

Q How much of this is directed to Congress?

A I think the main picture he's trying to present is one of coherence, that there is an Administration approach from beginning to end, with a now, and a medium-term and a long-term.

As to what are the fundamentals of the process of political and economic development in the South, and what is the most constructive role for the U.S. towards that, I think that message of coherence, he thinks, always helps when you're going to the Congress to talk about this or that element of it. That's a fundamental need he's trying to fulfill in an A to Z statement on this relationship.

He refers, I think, specifically to the Congress in regard to the IDA request, in terms of being significantly heartened by the action on the House floor last night in approving the Administration's full request for the current fiscal year towards meeting the U.S. commitment to IDA which the President himself made a strong personal commitment, too, at the time of Cancun, as he invested a good deal of effort in the dialogue with the Congress there.

I think the Secretary considers that a very significant and heartening development in the House last night. Obviously, the Congress would be involved in providing the authority for any new trade negotiation. That would be some time off; you're probably talking about a preparatory process of -- if you look at the history, you're talk about a preparatory process of probably at least two years before you get an agreed framework among participating parties, and everybody is in a position of a sort of "go" for a negotiating authority to their respected parliaments.

Q Some of the developing countries seem to have a preference for using UNCTAD for any kind of trade discussions rather than the GATT.

Is this in any way a bid, if there's going to be these kind of negotiations, let's put it in the GATT as opposed to UNCTAD?

A Yes. That's clearly his position, that this negotiation should be in the GATT, and that's what will get it done fastest and most effectively.

Q I was at a World Bank conference where there was a lot of criticism of the U.S. for not meeting its full IDA commitment. What's the situation in the Senate? Does this mean last night that we now are assured that it will be met for the next year?

A No. There's still a House-Senate conference to take place.

Q What's the situation there? Are you fairly confident that they will come out of that with a close-to-the-full Administration request?

A I think we're quite encouraged by the House action.

The House approved the full amount requested by the Administration which would, in this fiscal year, and there's another Administration request for the following fiscal year, if that were met in full, as the House has approved the current fiscal year, that would meet the full U.S. commitment to the current IDA replenishment.

The Senate bill is different, and therefore ultimate success depends on the House Senate conference. I think they're quite hopefull, but the final reviews aren't in there.

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Q The three policy papers that were released by UNCTAD last February -- the one on money and finance, the one on trade and structural adjustment, commodies -- it seems that you've addressed the issues that UNCTAD brought forth in the money and finance paper, and the trade and structural adjustment paper. But, again, back to commodities, is the United States going to take a position on the early ratification of the common funds for commodity stablization at UNCTAD, and what's the U.S. position on the Nairobi integrated program for commodities?

A The Administration doesn't have a request in the Congress for U.S. participation in the common fund, and I don't think it's imminent that there would be such a request. If other countries want to go ahead, they can. That's the U.S. position there, that's it's not possible for the U.S. to contemplate early participation in such a fund.

On the integrated program, the integrated program is a long-term plan for commodity negotiations. The U.S. position is that sometimes commodity agreements can be useful. And when we see it that way, the U.S. participates in negotiations; and, in fact, participates in some active commodity agreements, as we do in the coffee agreement and as we're participating in new negotiations for a possible sugar agreement.

But that's a cautious case-by-case position, and you'll find the Secretary's view in here that, by and large, commodity agreements, if you look at the whole sweep, haven't been all that successful in meeting their objective of stablizing commodity prices. They don't quite seem able to do that. And, therefore, he puts more emphasis, as far as the development implications of that is concerned, on mechanisms for providing off-setting compensatory financing to developing countries to cushion the effect of fluctuating commodity prices which have been the course of commodity price history for a long time in the past and probably will be in the future, despite the efforts of commodity agreements. So it's a cautious position.

Q Can I ask a follow-up to that? The Third World Countries have also asked for compensatory financing without conditionality.

Is there any position on that at this point?

A Not at this point. That discussion is going to take place in the International Monetary Fund.

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It's scheduled to start towards the end of June.

I think in that discussion, that's one question, whether there should be stronger conditions attached to this kind of financing or not.

Q In terms of the crises in Africa, would it be correct to infer that the Secretary seems to be laying the burden of the problems there, to some extent at least, on the tendency toward one-party socialist states, like Tanzania, rather than any responsibility that the North may bear for the crises there?

Q He puts strong emphasis on a crises in agricultural development. You've got in Africa some of the fastest growing population rates in the world -- around four percent a year.

In food production, in some countries, declining, and on the whole continent going up by a little less than one percent a year.

Obviously, a continent that poor can't go on that way and feed its people by ever increasing expensive imports of food. That's in economic and social sense the heart of the problem.

He cites what he sees as a list of economic policy problems -- some of them structural, some of them policy problems -- that at least significantly aggravate that crises in Africa; not giving the farmer full market prices for what he produces, and therefore it's not as attractive for them to produce than they otherwise would. Having, for example, controlled prices that, in effect, subsidize the urban consumer on the back of the small private farmer. That's a significant failing that he cites.

Exchange rates, fixed at levels that make it unprofitable to export. Agricultural commodities that many African countries have in great quantity over many years. And government intervention create an artifical priority for investment in industrial sectors to the disadvantage of the natural market strength of agricultural development; the same thing is done in credit.

He mentions all of those briefly. Those are failings that socialist governments can make and other kind of governments can make as well, but he sees them very much as the heart of the problem, and had some concern that the kind of -- uncoordinated way that many donors in many ways are now providing aid to Africa is not significantly helping

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them address these problems. He's, in effect, calling for some real attention there to the policy framework in which African food production and agricultural development can get back on the course of which it's obviously capable.

The African themselves -- many African leaders have said a lot of things. They indicate that they recognize this and they kind of see it that way. I think it's, in part, because of that that the Secretary sees this as a kind of environment where something can perhaps really be done, both in terms of more effective coordination and more effective use of aid that's provided and of the African themselves coming together to try to make the right kind of agricultural policies politically respectable and doable in an African context.

Q Thank you.

(Briefing concluded at 12:32 P.M.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER FANFANI OF ITALY

May 26, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:42 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: This will be a background briefing on the visit of Prime Minister Fanfani. I would request this interview be on background attributed to a Senior Administration Official.

Q Is he really going to say anything that requires this to be on background, I mean, what, what's --

MR. ALLIN: Just standard operating procedure, Sarah.

Q Did you come to say anything?

Q Shall we say we won't accept it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know me, Sam, I never do. All right, this was a --

Q Are you willing to say you don't --

MR. ALLIN: What do you want me to do --

Q I want to know why you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You want to know why I'm doing this on background? Because I think I've done it before on background and I take my orders from Mort Allin.

Q -- as a long-time journalist, don't you think it ought to be on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I used to get my best stories on background, Sam.

Q But your own paper, the one you were associated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Listen, I'm in a -- do you want this briefing or don't you? I mean, I've got a problem here --

Q Now that you ask -- no, we always are happy for the information.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Ask Mort afterwards, all right. Let me just give you this on background.

Q Giving up?

Q Gonna walk out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meeting was really, I think, best described as a, both a bilateral meeting where the President and Italian Prime Minister had an opportunity to talk about

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a number of bilateral questions of interest between the United States and Italy and broader international issues, as well as a preview of the Williamsburg Summit this weekend. We've said it many times, I've briefed it many times, but it's still worth saying that, in the last two years, I think it's true that U.S.-Italian relations have grown closer together than at any time in post-war history. The Italian government and this Italian Prime Minister particularly, has been highly supportive of several key U.S. and NATO foreign policy initiatives.

A premier example is the fact that the government has supported the NATO December 1979 decision, is making preparations right now in Sicily to begin cruise missile deployment in early 1984, absent an agreement in Geneva. As you can tell from the Prime Minister's concluding statements, he strongly supports our efforts in Geneva to achieve an agreement, but there is very little doubt -- and he strongly told the President that there should be no doubt -- that in the absence of an agreement that the Italians will begin deployment along with the British and the Germans.

There is alot of discussion about the Mediterranean area. Italy has recently taken on an expanded role in the Mediterranean as a special vocation, as a NATO country. And, there was a discussion of Lebanon. Not only, of course, are the Italians participating in the multinational force along with the British and the French and, of course, the American marines, but more recently, they have been diplomatically very active in the Middle East in trying to bring about a withdrawal of all foreign forces in the Middle East. They have talked to a number of Arab countries including Syria. And, there was an agreement that we needed to continue our efforts to produce an agreement that would result in a withdrawal of all foreign forces.

There was some discussion of Libya. The Italians have close ties -- economic ties -- with Libya. They have a large work force in Libya, and, at the same though, they are concerned, as we are, about Libyan foreign policy behavior -- and most recently exhibited in Central America, and there was a good discussion with both the President and with the Secretary of State about the situation in Libya.

As you know, there is an Italian election approaching on June 26. The President asked the Prime Minister to describe the issues, and what the political situation looks like, and Mr. Fanfani who, as he said, has been a senior leader in Italy since the Eisenhower administration, pointed out that, even though there are a number of changes in government in Italy, that there is a great deal of continuity in Italian political personalities and Italian policy.

And, on the question of Williamsburg, they agreed that

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this summit would be a different kind of summit than last year's meeting, that the heads of government would have a lot of time and opportunity to address different issues. They recognize that on the political side of the Williamsburg agenda, that the arms control and INF issue would be the most topical one for the heads of government to address.

And, then, on the economic side, the question of expanding and sustaining the recovery would be a key theme that would be addressed.

And, I think, with that I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q They've had unilateral talks with the Syrians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have been in diplomatic contact, as I said, with a number of Arab countries including Syria.

Q Well, is the general --

Q Did they talk about it?

Q Go ahead.

Q Did they talk about what they had said to the Syrians and what they got back from them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have -- There was a discussion of their communications. And they recognize, like we recognize, that it is a difficult problem.

Q This general discussion of Libya, was there any specific focus and did Italy -- did Fanfani rather suggest that he was unhappy with Qaddafi and was going to take some measures, some sanctions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think there was, as I think I said, Sam, a concern -- both sides in the talks. Both the Italian Prime Minister and the President registered their concerns about Libyan behavior.

Q Did the Prime Minister raise any concerns about interest rates and budget deficits in the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not really. There was a recognition that those issues would come up at Williamsburg, but I would not say that there was any strong concern registered, just more of a tour de raison of the various aspects of the current economic environment that would be addressed at Williamsburg.

Q Did the subject of President Mitterrand's call for a new Bretton Woods Conference come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it didn't, although President -- sorry -- Prime Minister Fanfani was in Paris this week, as you probably know. He did have talks with President Mitterrand. And there was some discussion about what they addressed and how that might be a factor in the summit. But there was, on the specific question of Bretton Woods, I didn't hear it come up.

Q Well, again, you said, going back to Sam's question, they registered concern about Libya but there was no discussion of possible need to attempt to influence Libyan behavior?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that -- I mean that almost goes without saying. I mean, everyone would like to influence Libyan behavior.

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Q Who raised the subject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the subject was first raised by the Secretary of State. They had a separate meeting this morning before the meeting in the Oval Office.

Q Can you tell us how he raised it, other than say they're concerned? Did he ask for Italian help in any respect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It's just a good opportunity, Sam, to -- We know that the Italians have a lot of knowledge about Libya. They're in touch with Libya. And, as an ally and a close partner, we're interested in their views, how they view events.

Q Back on Syria, did Fanfani offer any encouragement for American hopes that the Syrians have not really closed the door on withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- And the way you phrase your question, it's hard to give you a precise answer. I think there was very much -- If you're asking me, did Prime Minister Fanfani say, "Listen, we've talked to the Syrians and they say there's no chance. So, forget it." The answer is no.

I think there was a recognition that the way that the way that the course we're pursuing in Lebanon is the right course, that we have to continue to work for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and that Syria is a key factor and that it will be difficult. But there was no discussion about changing our overall plan or our current course.

Q Was there any discussion about the investigation into the assassination attempt on the Pope?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None whatsoever.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q Not at the ministerial either --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. You mean it was Secretary Shultz?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:51 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

ON

PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S VISIT

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1983, 2:40 P.M.

MODERATOR: As we had previously announced, this is a briefing ON BACKGROUND on the visit of Prime Minister Nakasone to the United States.

For your guidance purposes only, our briefer this afternoon is .....

SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let me just start with a short statement and then I'll take questions.

This visit will be what is termed an official working visit. Both the President and the Prime Minister thought it would be helpful to have such a meeting before the Williamsburg Summit to exchange views on matters of mutual interest and to build on the warm relationship between them that they established during the Prime Minister's first visit to Washington in January.

The Prime Minister will arrive by plane at Andrews Air Force Base this evening and will be officially greeted by the Acting Secretary at the Reflecting Pool at around 8:30 this evening. The Prime Minister's visit will include a meeting, followed by a working lunch with the President and

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certain U.S. Cabinet members on Friday, the 27th.

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe will have a bilateral meeting Friday afternoon.

Those are the official Executive Branch appointments.

On Friday evening, the Prime Minister will also deliver the commencement address at the commencement ceremony at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; and I understand, subject to confirmation, he's going to be giving that speech in English, which will be something of a first for a Japanese Prime Minister in the United States.

The Prime Minister will travel to Williamsburg on Saturday, May 28th, for the Economic Summit and will also attend a Japan Society dinner in New York City on May 31st.

He returns to Japan on the 1st of June.

The Prime Minister and the President have both placed a great deal of emphasis on the importance of strengthening U.S.-Japan relations and the Prime Minister's visit underscores the full scope and closeness of our relationship.

We have been observing with great interest and appreciation the energetic manner in which the Prime Minister and his government have been carrying out responsibilities of their offices. Since his last visit to Washington, the Prime Minister has achieved very significant accomplishments in the

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trade area. In April he secured Diet approval of additional tariff cuts on some 25 items, as well as approval of tariff reductions and accelerated tariff cuts on some 300 other items which the Government of Japan had previously been seeking.

This month he won the approval of both houses of the Diet for omnibus legislation, providing 17 laws governing standards and certification requirements.

I might note at this point that those are the important area that we refer to as non-tariff barriers, where other factors than tariffs become barriers to entry of foreign goods; and we believe that significant progress is being made in reducing those non-tariff barriers.

These requirements could potentially cover six billion dollars of U.S. products that could be sold to Japan, and the changes should significantly enhance access to the Japanese market once they are implemented.

In other areas the U.S. and Japan held initial meetings of bilateral working groups on energy matters and a bilateral working group on industrial policy. Work in both of these areas is off to a good start.

We held additional meetings on high technology, and Japan took very helpful steps on auto and steel exports to the U.S., as well as on machine tools.

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In the international area, the two Foreign Ministers -- Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe -- held discussions during the OECD meeting in Paris on foreign assistance matters. We are both looking for ways in which we can reinforce and complement our respective foreign assistance efforts.

Prime Minister Nakasone just completed a visit to the five ASEAN countries, which was a highly successful visit, during which he clearly strengthened Japan's economic and political relations with the countries of Southeast Asia. He announced increased economic assistance and trade benefits to those nations during the course of his visit.

Japan has also joined with us in international economic assistance and debt-relief measures related to the debt burdens of several developing countries -- including Mexico, Brazil, and Yugoslavia.

In the defense area, the Prime Minister secured Diet approval in March of the '83 budget, which provides for a six-and-a-half percent increase in defense spending and an 8.9 percent increase in foreign assistance in a budget which is otherwise flat or declining.

What all this adds up to, in our view, is substantial progress in the international economic area and on defense.

The Prime Minister's efforts have further strengthened the relationship between our two countries and our efforts to

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work in partnership in resolving bilateral issues in meeting the global challenges that we both face and in seeking to maintain a strong international trade and financial system.

This is not to say that we don't have very important problems to discuss. We will be doing so. The recent market opening measures that I mentioned are just a step in a process of market opening by Japan.

We will continue to seek further steps by Japan with a goal that U.S. goods, services and investments should enjoy access to Japan's market comparable to that enjoyed by Japanese products and investment in the United States.

I think both of us -- both countries and both Heads of State -- are very much aware that protectionist sentiment is continuing to grow in the United States and that further steps by Japan to open up its markets are needed.

We want to build on the momentum and the excellent relations that the two leaders have established in seeking to find mutually acceptable solutions to these matters.

Finally, there will be considerable discussion, I'm sure, of the broad international economic and political issues which the two leaders will be taking up at Williamsburg. The Summit takes place at a time when economic recovery has begun in both of our countries and in a number of other Summit participants'. Our respective domestric policies, we believe, have set in place favorable conditions for sustained non-inflationary growth.

As the two largest economies of the Free World, we and Japan have a special responsibility to cooperate to see that confidence in this recovery deepens and spreads to other countries.

We have been very impressed with the cooperative approach that Japan has taken during these past few months and are certain that we will continue to work together at Williamsburg and beyond.

I'd be happy to take any questions.

Q Will there be an attempt to kind of downplay the defense issue on this trip, and that six-and-a-half percent increase that you cited -- what is the real increase? Is that the real increase after inflation, or is that --

A It's a little complicated. That is a nominal increase, from which you'd have to remove inflation. But, on the other hand, I believe they have capped the pay in the military services so that actual inflation in military spending in Japan would be less than normal inflation. So I am --

Q You don't know what the real increase is?

A The real increase is somewhat less than six percent. But since their inflation is low and since you have to add that other factor in, I would imagine you probably would

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be talking about a real increase in the neighborhood of five percent.

Do you have anything more precise about it?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: No.

Q There are reports that Prime Minister Nakasone is intending to raise at Williamsburg the idea of the Global Infrastructure Fund that was developed by Mitsubishi Research Corporation. We know there are a number of people in the White House who find that idea very attractive, and probably the President would even though it's not the sort of thing that might appeal to Secretary Shultz. I'm wondering if you can still give us some sense of what you think the response of the President might be.

A I really don't know. We'd have to see if he brings it up.

Q What specific areas, apart from the 25 separate areas that they've already reduced -- what specific areas would you like to see the Japanese reduce or eliminate tariffs in?

A I think our principal focus right now is not on tariffs; it's on non-tariff barriers — in the first place, to really try to make sure that the kind of simplification of standards we're talking about actually results in improved market access.

The whole standards business, I think you all can

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recognize, is in its nature a complex one. It involves things like, in the pharmaceutical area, deciding that a drug is safe to sell and whether you will rely on tests that are conducted in another country. So it can't by its nature be simple, and it's something that's going to take working over time.

We think that is as important as the tariff area, probably more so.

The area of industrial policy, as I mentioned, is another one. I think we'd have to say we're in an exploratory stage of trying -- both of us -- to understand a little better what industrial policy is, what industrial policies each of us practice, and what industrial policies could be considered unfair or market-restricting.

A couple of other areas that are important in the trade area, beyond tariffs, are the question of quotas -- particularly on agricultural products -- and the question of procurement by NTT of U.S. telecommunications equipment. I think something like about one percent of NTT procurement currently comes from the United States; and we sell only about 80 million dollars a year to Japan, where we purchase about 800 million dollars of telecommunications equipment.

Our feeling is that doesn't really reflect the relative competitiveness of our industry. We have had some very

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productive talks with NTT about ways to make the procurement process more open to U.S. manufacturers.

So those are some areas that we're really concentrating on.

Obviously, we would like to see further tariff reductions. I can't tell you specifics. And I would have to say frankly that's not the main focus of our attention right now.

Q Well, prior to the time that Mr. Nakasone came here in January, there was a sense of a sort of building crisis in relationship between the United States and Japan. His trip was widely believed to have cleared the air somewhat and provided at least a breathing spell for something else to happen.

Now it's four months later. You say you generally approve of what he's done. But how would you characterize at this point the relationship between the two countries? Has the sense of crisis been dissipated, or where do we stand in our relationship overall with Japan?

A Since the "crisis" is your word, not mine -- I mean I think, and I think I said it before, that I think this relationship is a remarkable one in its quality; and, particularly, when you think of the history that we've been through and the kind of evolution the relationship has managed over a long period of time, it is very important, I think, to

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both countries. And it's one that I think has very, very solid foundations.

Obviously, we have problems -- particularly in the trade area. And I don't think those problems have gone away. I think we have made some real progress in dealing with them. The kinds of measures that I've described are essential ingredients of that, and it's really in the nature of these trade issues that you don't solve that kind of problem overnight. And even when you agree that you have a problem -- and I think, for example, I don't think the Japanese Government would disagree with us that, in principle at least, in quotas on agricultural products or restraint of trade, just as matter of fact we have some restraints of our own -- but when whole industries have grown up ground certain measures, you can't simply change those overnight.

So it is a process. And I think what we find very encouraging -- I would say in the last six months, particularly with this new government--is a very serious attitude toward working persistently at these problems because they're going to be with us for quite some time.

Q Let me put it in a different way. In the months since Mr. Nakasone was here in January, has the action of the Japanese Government met the expectations on the U.S. side?

A I think it has, yes. And I think there are things,

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too, that they've done -- really, on their own initiative -- that weren't a matter of our expectations but, clearly, from which we benefit -- such as the improvement of relations between Japan and Korea, or the strengthening of relations between Japan and the ASEAN countries that I think resulted from the Prime Minister's visit there. I wouldn't say we had expectations in those regards. We're clearly the beneficiary of them.

Q Do you look upon Japan as a spokesman for Asian interests or not to that degree?

A I've learned it's very dangerous to let any one country speak for other countries. (Laughter.)

I think there's no doubt at the Summit, where Japan is the one Asian participant, I would be unsurprised to find the Prime Minister from time to time reminding the other participants of Asian concerns where they neglect them. But I've noted -- particularly in Asia, where the diversity is so remarkable -- I think the best thing that we can do is to hear directly from each country how they view their interests.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you know whether the Prime Minister will be meeting with any other Cabinet-level people like Ambassador Brock?

A I don't believe so. Do we have any?

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SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We don't have a schedule.

A We don't have a schedule.

Q Just Shultz and Reagan?

A Shultz and Reagan, yes. There might be some meeting. Secretary Reagan of course will be down at Williamsburg, but their schedule is pretty well blocked out already.

Q Are you expecting the President and the Prime Minister to discuss the yen/dollar problem and, specifically, to talk about a plan to have a fund for intervention that would have Japanese yen, U.S. dollars and German Deutschmarks?

A The whole question of monetary intervention is something that will undoubtedly be discussed extensively at Williamsburg. I don't know to what extent it will be in their bilateral meeting, and I don't want to trespass on the terrain of and my Treasury colleagues too closely.

I think that kind of specific fund is not something that we think would be appropriate. We are prepared to consider intervention in the case of specific market disorders, and we'd certainly look at appropriate measures in that context; but I think we would see it as much more a matter of maintaining close consultation and being able to act when we conclude with another government or several other governments that such a disorderly situation exists. That the basic approach

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to stabilizing exchange rates -- which we agree is a problem -- has got to be one of stabilizing price growth within our own economies and that getting on the path of non-inflationary growth is really the best fundamental solution.

Q But do you see any attempt to have some bilateral kind of mechanism, even consultations between Japan and the United States on this, since the yen/dollar has gotten the most attention?

A The yen/dollar has gotten the most attention, but the fact is that one couldn't well complain about a weak mark or a weak franc or a weak pound. And, in fact, it's the dollar that is strong, not the yen that is weak; and there's no question that that causes problems. It causes problems for exporters. And I think we understand the basic causes of that -- high interest rates, a certain amount of safe-haven effect for the United States.

Those basic causes are not something that's going to be overcome by intervention but I think will be overcome by the recovery that is under way.

Q What do you think will come out of the Energy Working Group in terms of the U.S. being ready to sell either Alaskan oil or Alaskan gas?

A That is something that we're still studying, and we're talking extensively with people in the Congress about

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Congressional attitudes. It's beyond our current effort to get the short supply limitations lifted.

I'm not too sure what specifically might come. It's really too early to say.

Q What are we going to talk to the Japanese about as far as defense is concerned? Are we going to express our concern over the SS-20s in the Far East or is this about the limit of what we're going to say publicly?

A I didn't answer the first part of your question before?

Are we going to downplay the issue?

Q Yes.

A No, we're not going to downplay the issue. We had pretty extensive discussions of both defense issues and arms control issues --

Q Right.

A -- in January, and then again when Secretary Shultz was in Tokyo in February.

There have been developments in the arms control area since that time, and there will be discussions of arms control issues at Williamsburg. So I would imagine that that subject would get some further treatment. And I'm sure, given the sort of basic nature of the concern on defense, that that issue will be discussed -- although I wouldn't think probably

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in the detail that it was last time.

Q You're referring to SS-20s when you say "arms control"?

A Principally the SS-20, although --

Q I mean as far as they're concerned, anyway.

A That's the issue that has excited the most attention everywhere -- and, clearly, in Japan -- but I think the Japanese, as well as the rest of the world, recognize that the effort in the START talks to get major reductions of strategic forces is as fundamental. In fact, if one looked at it just in terms of magnitude of nuclear weapons under negotiation, that's the really big negotiation. It's the SS-20 issue that is the focus of immediate attention right now.

Q I have a few questions on this background information book on the Williamsburg Summit which was delivered to the press at the press conference made by Secretary Shultz and Sec. Regan.

This book has parts of selected economic data, particularly on Japanese data. I heard that the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Okawara, formally protested about this part of the Japan issue and asked why that information book contained that Japanese part. Do you confirm that, and could you explain what kind of discussion was being held between the United States Government and Japan Embassy?

And the second question: Is it proper that this

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information book has a particular part ON a particular country -- Japan?

A There is a lot of information in that book. In fact, the particular pages that you're referring to I think we first became aware of last night. They were handed out after Secretary Shultz' BACKGROUNDER, but I'm sure he was not aware they were there.

It's certainly not our intention in the Summit discussions at all to single out particular countries, and we frankly regret the inclusion of those materials.

Q Did the Japanese Ambassador protest?

A We've had discussions about it. We've made clear to the Japanese that we regret the inclusion of those materials in the book.

Q Who was the author of those?

A I'm not sure who actually wrote those.

Q I mean what agency, what building in town, put them out?

A I don't know.

Q Are the books going to be distributed to reporters and others in Williamsburg?

A I don't know about that. I think probably further distribution will not include those charts -- not because we're not willing to discuss the facts in them but because we think that's not in the spirit of what we're trying to do in Williamsburg.

Q Do you mean that you're excluding those particular pages when you decide to distribute further?

A I think in further distribution, that's right.

Q In other words, you accept the protest of the Japanese Government?

A It's not a matter -- as I said, that material went in there, it's not in the spirit of the discussions we have in mind at Williamsburg, and we are not looking at Williamsburg to single out Japan or any other country for trade practices.

Q Did you get any other complaints from other countries?

A You'd have to ask my colleague in the European Bureau; I don't know. I didn't.

Q Did you express the State Department's regret to the Ambassador?

A We discussed this and we made it clear that this was not a policy-level decision by our government.

Q Is the information incorrect or just improper?

A I don't want to call more attention to the information by getting into a lot of detail. There are two

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things about it that are clear to me, and I can't say I've studied it with enough care to know whether the facts there are correct or not.

One is, as I said: It is not the spirit of Williamsburg to start putting particular countries on trial.

But, secondly, with respect to the facts that I saw in there, there was an exclusive focus on the balance of trade in manufactures. And everyone who knows the first thing about the subject knows that, for example, Japan runs a severely adverse balance of trade in raw materials and in agriculture and, in fact, is our largest agricultural market for that reason and that singling out a particular measure is not the way one approaches the trade problem and the problem of protectionism is not something that is limited to Japan,by any means.

Q I saw not long ago a report, according to which the surplus of Japan with the U.S. would be around 50 billion dollars in 1983?

A No. I think you were seeing a total of two-way trade --

Q Oh.

A -- on which the surplus is about 18 billion.

Q Last year. It was 18 billion last year in 1982.

A That's right.

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Q Yes.

A Are you seeing a 50 billion projection for 1983?

Q Yes. Does it make sense to you?

A It's -- I mean the total trade balance is in the neighborhood of 50 billion, and I'd be surprised if --

Q Yes, O.K.

A -- it could reach that magnitude. There might be some increase, but I don't think it will be at that level.

Q Shultz and Abe are having a meeting tomorrow. Do you have any specific agenda that will be coming out?

A I really don't know specifically. Of course they met, I guess it was only two weeks ago, for some very long bilateral discussions in Paris and in ministerials.

My guess would be they would most of all want to talk about any things to do with Williamsburg and ministerial meetings that they will both be participating in there.

Q Further discussions on foreign assistance?

A That I think they've covered pretty well for the time being.

There's a lot to talk about at these meetings and one has to be pretty targeted.

Q The topic of the Korean situation is included in that discussion?

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A I don't know that they'll get to that. I don't know.

Q Just on this inadvertent inclusion of certain charts and material, is there anything in there that is not factually correct -- it's just a matter of delicacy rather than any facts that might be --

A It's not just delicacy. It's also a matter of balance. I mean nobody looked at --

Q Or balance --yes. But I mean is there anything in those pages incorrect or unfactual?

A I can't say whether it's correct or incorrect, but it was clearly inappropriate in that collection of materials.

Q Can you tell us where the study of Japan's activity in the sea lanes stands?

A I wish I could give you a more precise answer. I believe that that is fairly actively going on in essentially military-Self Defense Force channels.

Q In other words, it's started, but it's not completed yet?

A That's right.

Is that correct?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: That's right.

A I guess I have a voice for one more question.

Q On the China problem, in view of the fact that

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Secretary Baldridge visited there recently and had an extensive talk, would you expect that there would be a new dimension of the China problem to be discussed between either Shultz and Abe or President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone?

A It has nothing particularly to do with Secretary Baldridge's visit; but, clearly, the subject of U.S. relations with China and Japanese relations with China is something that's of great interest to both of us, and we both recognize the great importance that China plays in the region and in the world. And I think we both agree that good relations between each of our countries and China is in the interests of the other countries.

So I would not be surprised to see some fairly extensive discussion of that subject.

Q O.K., thank you.

A Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Williamsburg, Virginia)

For Immediate Release May 27, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE, GEORGE P. SHULTZ
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE
ENROUTE TO WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd like to make a comment about a change the President will announce to the State Department. I know we are all aware of how important our relationships with all South American and Latin American countries are. And, particularly, just now, the spotlight is on Central America.

Over the past years and months, the President has developed a strong and increasingly effective set of programs to address Central American problems. These policies have emphasized the importance of economic development where the flows of funds are quite large now. They have emphasized the importance of freedom and democracy. They have emphasized the importance of the creation of a shield. And this is particularly important in El Salvador. A military shield that will avoid, as much as possible, disruption of economic development.

Q (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Where was I before you interrupted me? -- beyond which, the economic development and democracy and freedom can take place. And so, this has given emphasis to the development of the military capability of each of the countries that we are supporting.

And, finally, the policies have emphasized the importance of negotiations within El Salvador -- negotiations to bring about a true and widespread democratic process in the coming election,

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and negotiations to achieve a regional solution to the conflict in Central America.

Now, in all this, Tom Enders, Assistant Secretary of State and a man of vast experience in diplomatic matters has played a very strong and important role. And I want to take the occasion to pay a tribute to the fine work that Tom Enders has done. When you look at the rotation of things in the Department, you see they do make changes in Assistant Secretaryships. And people move on to Ambassadorial posts. And Ambassador Enders will move to a major diplomatic post. And the announcement of what that is will be made shortly, as soon as we have all of the details ironed out.

To replace him, Tony Motley, and those of you who traveled to Brazil with the President will remember is our Ambassador in Brazil, will come to Washington and take up the position of Assistant Secretary of State for South American Affairs.

Q Is that Tony M-o-t-l-e-y?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. His right name is Langhorn Motley. But everybody calls him Tony. And I do not know how you get Tony out of Langhorn. But, anyway, that is what I call him. So that is what --

MR. GERGEN: M-o-t-l-e-y.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Motley.

I think all of us who have had the chance to work with him in his post as Ambassador recognize that he has got a real flare for Latin American affairs. He was born and brought up in Brazil. He has been all through the area. And I am sure that he will do a fine job, as Tom Enders has.

Q Why are you choosing to put Mr. Enders out of his job?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: He's done a great job, and I think that we do shift people from time to time. It's a normal course of events. And this seems to be a good moment to make a change.

Q You see him taking a post in Central America?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it won't be in Central America. It'll be a major diplomatic post. And we know what it is. But it's not proper to announce it until all the aspects of it have worked out.

Q Are there any other changes contemplated?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any changes that will be made will be announced when we're prepared to do so, and the only reason for this rather hurry-up announcement is that it seems to have leaked out, that Enders is going to be moved to another post. And Tony Motley is coming up, so we thought we might as well make it official rather than unofficial.

Q -- disagreements between Mr. Enders and Jeane Kirkpatrick play a role in this change?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, the policies that the President has evolved here have obviously my full support and Tom Enders' full support. He was very important in the development of them, and the same with Tony Motley. I guess you have other things to do.

Q No --

Q No.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: She seems -- (inaudible.)

Q Well, can you tell us a little more about what's coming up in Honduras, Mr. Secretary and the latest story about a significant increase in U.S. military trainers operating in Honduras, training Salvadoran troops? Can you give us any detail on that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's only a -- I think it's a fairly straightforward proposition. I think the Congress has been quite concerned that the number of trainers in El Salvador, where there is very active fighting, be held to a small number. And the number 55 somehow has emerged into the situation. And, so, we want to conduct training. Everybody supports the idea of training for the Salvadoran armed forces.

And the most cost-effective and easiest way to do it, when not in El Salvador, is in a neighboring country. And, so, that's why we are moving this to Honduras.

Q Will there be 100 or more new trainers down there? A report in The Times said this morning, talking about 100 or more. Is that fairly accurate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to duplicate our problems on the number 55 by getting into another numbers game. I would just say that we believe -- "we," meaning the Salvadorans, the Hondurans, ourselves -- think that it's important to undertake this training. The performance of the U.S.-trained Salvadoran troops has been very good, and also their conduct with respect to civilian populations has been good. So the training seems to pay off. And this, from a cost-effective standpoint, is the quickest and simplest way to do it.

Q When will -- going back to Tom Enders, when will this take place, this shift? Very soon, the next couple of days or --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're announcing the shift. We've been talking about it and announcing the shift perhaps a little prematurely because of the leaks. But we have to go through this process of all the clearances that go between the announcement of an intention to nominate and an actual nomination and then the congressional process of confirmation and so on. So I can't tell you when this will actually take place, but it's something that will start emerging.

Q -- a job until his replacement is confirmed or --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he will gradually phase out and into his next post. And Motley will come up, and in the meantime, of course, there are quite a number of people in the department who have been working on this. And we'll man the post all right. In the meantime, Enders remains the Assistant Secretary and is heavily committed to what we're doing and will continue to do the excellent job that he's done.

Q -- he'll continue working there until Motley is confirmed? Is that what you --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, for the time being. They both are -- will be nominated for a post -- important post. They'll both be in the process of confirmation, and so we will have a -- we will have a strong method of seeing to it that that job is taken care of.

Q Let me clarify one important -- let me clarify one important point, sir. Did I understand you correctly to say that the training operation in Honduras now will replace the training operation in Salvador, or supplement it? In other words, are the trainers going to come out of El Salvador altogether?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, the idea is that people feel more comfortable with a limit on the number of trainers in El Salvador.

Q So you're going to keep this low limit --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: So --

Q -- in El Salvador and supplement it in Honduras?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There no doubt will be some in El Salvador,

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but we think that a major effort is called for here and the most sensible place to have it seems to be Honduras.

Q Thank you, sir.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pretty straightforward operation.

Q Are you sending new military trainers into Honduras?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes. That was announced, I think, yesterday that there would be a --

Q -- yesterday -- (inaudible) -- Times. It ran on the front page this morning; but --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's why announcement -- (inaudible). (Laughter.)

Q Same thing.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the reason for that is, and it's awfully hard to manage these things; but, basically, something being undertaken by the Hondurans, obviously with the Salvadorans; and so it was proper for them to essentially announce it. And at the same time, obviously we're involved; so we confirm that that -- And I think that was confirmed in the State Department.

Q It's our trainers who are doing the training.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our trainers.

Q Why --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And our money. It's their war, their people and it's Honduran territory; so it's a combination.

MR. GERGEN: There's a question --

Q (Inaudible) -- will stay in El Salvador, though, you're saying. You're not talking --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There will be trainers stay in El Salvador. But, as I said, I don't want to continue the numbers game, except that we won't exceed the 55 that's been there.

Q -- don't want to say how many are currently there; but you won't drop the number that are there in order to increase the number in Honduras?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The number in El Salvador will continue to be less than 55. And the needs to train people will be met by the development of a training capacity with trainers assigned in Honduras.

Q And they will be training both Hondurans and Salvadorans?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The program is mainly directed at the training of Salvadoran troops.

Q -- worry about trouble with Congress on this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't -- They have been concerned about the number of trainers in El Salvador and so we accept that concern and are doing it next door. There's been, of course, there has been training in the United States and that's always possible but it is a lot more expensive. So, you also have to be thinking about the dollar and the cost. This is a much more cost-effective way to do it.

Q Have people on the Hill and the Foreign Relations Committee, etc. been brought in on this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, people know about it and they've been consulted and so on.

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I don't say that it's been -- I mean, I'm not trying to say that everybody has endorsed this idea. But the process of consultation has taken place.

Q But they don't have to give their approval -- Congress?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, this is a use of funds that are available for training and it meets the desire not to have a build-up of military trainers in El Salvador.

Q The funds -- these particular funds being used are not the President's personal funds but rather funds from Congress --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They are funds that have been appropriated and --

MR. GERGEN: Right.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- designated for training for the Salvadoran troops.

MR. GERGEN: One last item, there was a question raised in that -- it arose here earlier about a change in U.S. policy toward combat troops that you all were asking about --

Q (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there's no change in policy and the reason for my preamble to the personnel statements was to emphasize, (A): the importance of this area and, (B): the fact that we have a strong set of policies. Those policies remain in place and have, obviously, the full support of everybody working with them, including Tony Motley, with whom I have talked about them in detail.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
STATE DEPARTMENT

on
CENTRAL AMERICA

FRIDAY, MAY 27, 1983, 12:30 P.M.

MR. TAYLOR: As was previously announced, this will be a background briefing on Central America.

As you are already aware, the document given to you earlier this morning is embargoed until the conclusion of this briefing. I understand our briefers will have a brief introductory statement, and then they will be happy to take your questions.

Q As we were two years ago, are we going to be supplied with additional documentation?

MR. TAYLOR: I understand there will be some additional glossy photographs.

Q Photographs, no documents?

MR. TAYLOR: No other documentation that I'm aware of.

Q Thank you.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. As you all know, there has been a lot of public discussion and debate about the Administration's policy in Central America. The President has announced the elements of our policy most recently in his address to the Joint Session of Congress last month. As you know,

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we are trying to pursue a rather complex, multi-faceted approach to the problems in the region of Central America. We are trying to promote and to sustain democratic institutions and reforms and human rights. We are trying to provide assistance in economic development and we are trying to encourage negotiations toward political settlement through regional discussions and through the democratic electoral process within the countries in the region.

These efforts are hampered by the support that the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and terrorists within Central America are receiving. A significant development recently with respect to this external support was the issuance on May 13th of a report by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives. Copies of that report are available in the press room.

Most of the discussion about that report was focused on the different approaches for how the problem should be dealt with -- what kind of legislation, if any should evolve. On the other hand, there has not been significant attention to the findings of fact contained in this report which are conclusions and judgments reached by critics of the Administration's policy as well as proponents of that policy.

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I'd like to quote just briefly from the Committee Report. It says: "A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other Communist countries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assistance of the Sandinistas. The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of which are located in Managua itself for communications, command and control, and for the logistics to conduct their financial, material, and propaganda activities. The Sandista leadership sanctions and directly facilitates all of the above functions. Nicaragua provides a range of other support activities including secure transit of insurgents to and from Cuba and assistance to the insurgents in planning their activities in El Salvador." That all appears on page 6 of the Committee report, which is the part that was prepared by the Democratic majority of the Committee, and the Republican views that are later in the report concur in those conclusions.

We can't make public all of the intelligence data that has been provided to these Committees of Congress that have lead the Committee to reach the conclusions I have just quoted. We have to protect sources and methods; we have to maintain our capability to gain intelligence on a continuing basis. However, we have been able to pull together in one place a compendium, which

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has been made available to you, of background materials that support the conclusions and illustrate the ways in which external support has been given to insurgents and to terrorists in El Salvador, in Honduras, and in Costa Rica, which we think will be of use to you and to the public in understanding the facts that underly the Administration's policy and the difficulties that we face in seeking a solution to the problems of Central America.

We also have this afternoon some additional updating materials about recent events with respect to arms movement to and through Nicaragua which the Defense Department briefer can elucidate on.

Would you like to do that at this time?

SECOND OFFICIAL: As the briefer just mentioned to you, we also want to share with you some declassified information on the latest developments of Cuban and Nicaraguan and Soviet activities in Central America, first on the increase in shipments of military equipment and arms to Nicaragua and secondly, some information from recent defectors on plans for terrorist activities in Honduras and Costa Rica. We have, and will pass out to you, some smaller photographs so that you can take them with you. These are the two photos that the President used yesterday on the four Soviet merchant ships carrying military equipment and other supplies for the Sandinista Government that are in today presently in the Port of Corinto, 70 miles northwest of Managua on the Pacific Coast.

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This is an unusually high number of Soviet ships to be at the port at any one time. In the past, all heavy equipment deliveries made by the USSR to the Government of Nicaragua has come by sea. Past deliveries included MI-8, HIP, and MI Hoplight helicopters, T-54 and T-55 tanks, and 152-millimeter antiaircraft guns. The present shipments, although not confirmed, may include trucks, trailers, armored vehicles, jeeps and probably additional MI-8 helicopters, but that is not confirmed. The equipment that is being carried on these ships is not confirmed.

There are also certain indicators that the additional shipments may be coming into the Port of El Bluff on the Caribbean side, but there are no details available on that at the present time.

Concerning the terrorist plans and activities, a captured member of a Honduran terrorist group provided the Honduran Security service recently with the following information on terrorist activities in Honduras. Some of this information is old, but it is new certainly to the Hondurans as to what was taking place and to us. At a meeting of the FPR, which is the Fronte Populaire Revolutionario, the Popular Revolutionary Front -- of Honduras, now -- at a meeting in Havana, January of 1983, a Cuban official who was introduced as the Number Two Man to ? Dinero in the Americas Department of the Communist Party of Cuba, described the insurgency situation in Guatemala as "bad" --

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bad from their point of view, while he felt that Honduras was rapidly reaching the stage when the employment of guerrilla warfare would be viable due to the deteriorating economic and political situation. The economic situation is bad. The political situation isn't too bad in Guatemala today, but this is what they were talking about.

It was interesting also that attending this meeting was a representative of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the FSLN. It was also interesting to hear them state that the Cubans still consider El Salvador and Guatemala as the crucial areas in the current struggle to liberate Central America.

For this group, Cuba has already trained 20 of their members. They have not returned as far as the Hondurans, as we know, into Honduras as yet. But they also agreed in October of 1982 to train another group of 16 out of this small(about 160-180 man)group in Honduras at the present time. It is interesting what they are training them in. Nine of this group of the sixteen are to be trained in tradecraft.

Q Tradecraft?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Tradecraft, just in insurgency and how to work in the -- how to mount different operations, insurgent type of activities.

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Q That's called tradecraft?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Tradecraft, guerrilla tradecraft.

Q Arts and crafts.

SECOND OFFICIAL: How to pursue their trade.

So nine of them -- two in the manufacture and preparation of false documentation; one in communications; two in the design and construction of Vietnamese-style underground hiding places; and two in demolitions.

This group they agreed to take in October. The group departed Honduras for Cuba in November of 1982, and are scheduled, according to this fellow they captured, to return to Honduras in July of 1983.

I'm going into a little detail on this because you can see from the information obtained from this source how all of them are involved, in one way or another, in supporting each other. The Sandinistas are also supporting the FPR in Honduras. They are providing weapons and equipment for 75 men. They have also agreed and are providing money and false documentation, safe haven, and propaganda support through their Radio Sandino and the Nicaraguan News Agency.

The Salvadoran groups, or at least one of them, are also supporting the FPR -- this is the PRP in Salvador. They have supplied the Honduran group with arms and explosives which were, unfortunate for them, but fortunate for the Honduran Government, subsequently discovered by the Honduran Security Services.

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Q Which group was that in El Salvador?

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's the PRP.

Q How does that spell out?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Group Popular de Pueblo.

VOICE ON SIDELINE: The ERP, the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo.

The other interesting item is that the FRP -- now we're getting back to the Honduran group -- has had a representation office in Mexico City since 1981. I was looking here to see if I could give you the name of the office there. No, I didn't bring it with me. Yes, I do have it. It's called the COAPHO, which is the Comiti te Apoyo al Pueblo Hondureno -- the Committee for the Support of the People of Honduras.

Thank you very much.

(Continued on page 9.)

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FIRST OFFICER: If you have any questions.

Q The number of the -- the estimated number, did you say 160 to 180?

SECOND OFFICER: Between 160 and 180 is the estimated number of this group. Those are estimates. They really don't know. I think they're just now starting to discover --

Q But, from the defector, that's what we got?

A That's what --

Q Could you tell us a little bit more about the defector? What were the circumstances under which he defected; why do you believe they will --

A This fellow was a member of the group that was captured. The defector -- and maybe I better go into the defector part of it, because the defector is the who has given us information on what they're planning in Costa Rica.

They're planning additional terrorism, and also one of their biggest objectives, and their primary objectives that the Sandinistas are working on, is the penetration of the Costa Rican Government using the democratic parties but also in supplying materiel, weapons, to groups, terrorist groups that they're trying to organize in Costa Rica. That's the information that came from the defector.

The other information on the Hondurans came from a member of the group that was captured by the services, the Honduran services.

Q Do the Costa Rican terrorist groups have names, as yet, or initials?

A No.

Q So they don't exist at this point; is that correct?

A No, they're just groups that they're working with, extreme leftist groups.

FIRST OFFICIAL: There is terrorism in Costa Rica.

Q Where was the latest incident?

A There are incidents that have occurred.

Q What was the latest?

A In this we refer to the bombing of the -- what was it? The airline office in July '82 as one event that was clearly tied into Nicaraguan-linked terrorism. I don't think there is anything in the background document more recent.

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SECOND OFFICER: There is nothing more recent than that except for the efforts to reorganize.

Q Do we have any question about how his testimony or defection was arranged? In other words, the Honduran military has been accused of torture, especially of security forces; and, of course, Castieo, the Deputy Commander in El Salvador, who was taken by the FMLN, has said many, many things about U.S. and Salvadoran plans in the region and they're all subject to some question because they don't know whether they're being given under duress.

We had an individual up here last year named Tardencilla from Nicaragua who made a number of allegations, apparently on the record, and then retracted all of them.

So how is it that we can gain some notion of the credibility of this testimony? Do we have corroborating evidence of all of the things to which he testified?

A You never get corroborating, really information on everything that you get from a defector or from a fellow who is captured and then decides to talk.

There is sufficient information that the information that is presently being received certainly falls in with other information available to us and available to the Honduran and Salvadorans; but to the Hondurans in this particular case.

Q Not to the Costa Ricans necessarily?

A The Costa Ricans -- they've had some information. They know of all the information that's taken place in the place. In other words, they're the ones who have the present defector.

Q But you said, according to this defector, the primary objective was the penetration of the Costa Rican Government using demoractic parties and the weapons, a supply of weapons to presently non-existent or non-formed --

A Not names.

Q Do we have corroborating evidence that this is going on beyond the date of July 1982, when the last terrorist incident was alleged to have occurred?

A We have had information that the communist party in Costa Rica has decided, and decided about two years ago, to go and move into the Lucha Armada Phase of operations; the arms struggle.

Q But they haven't made such an announcement; right?

A That's right.

Q I may have just missed some of this because I

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was confused among the letters, and so on.

Could you review, so that I understand clearly, the 160 to 180 men --

A That's an estimate.

Q Are they Sandinistas or Hondurans?

A Of the Honduran group.

Q They are Hondurans who are in where?

A In Honduras or training in Cuba right now. We know, according to the source that they have right now, that at least 36 of them are in Cuba right now training.

Q So 36 of the 160 to 180 are believed to be in Cuba training. Of those 36 -- are the 9 that you specified what they're training in? In Cuba or they in Honduras learning from the other 160?

A The 9 are part of the group of 16.

Q Who are --

A Who are Hondurans training in Cuba.

Q Are they part of the 36 training who are training in Cuba?

A Yes, of the total 36. Because the first group was 20 -- there are two groups. One group of 20, one group of 16. The group of 20 has already been trained. We didn't have or we don't have any information on what they were trained in.

The group of 16 that is presently there training, that's the breakdown that I gave you.

Q There are a total of 160 or 180 Hondurans either in Honduras or Cuba. Of those --

A That are supposedly members of this group.

Q Of that large number, 36 are in Cuba. Of those 36 you know that 16 are being trained in Cuba and 9 of those 16 are being trained in these specific --

A In those specific trades.

Q I want to ask about the plans for a training base in Honduras for Salvadorans, if you could give us some details on that?

FIRST OFFICER: A training base is the first part of the question I would like to address.

There is a Honduran facility which is being activated by the Hondurans as a regional military training center. It is a Honduran training facility. It is not a base, and it is especially not a U.S. base.

An early use of this facility will be for the training of Salvadoran units. The United States will send a mobile training team to Honduras to carry out that

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unit training. But over the longer term, this is and will remain a Honduran facility and the training will be done there of Hondurans and perhaps members of the armed forces of other countries invited by Honduras to train there. That is a matter for Honduras and its neighbors.

Q As I understand it, they will be initially -- this mobile training team will be handling one immediate reaction battalion of approximately a thousand men, and then then, I guess, Cazadores -- four Cazadores --

A Yes.

SECOND OFFICER: Within a 6-month period.

Q The Cazadores are 350 men.

FIRST OFFICER: That's right.

Q There's four of them. How many American military trainers will be required in six months to do that job?

A Probably about 100.

SECOND OFFICER: Trainers and support men.

FIRST OFFICER: For the whole training team.

Q Who is going to pay for this Honduran base to be carved out of the jungle?

A There is some security assistance money in this. The costs are relatively minimal because it is a pretty austere facility, with tents rather than aparment

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buildings, and that sort of thing.

There will be some costs, of course, to the Salvadoran program to the extent that Salvadorans are trained there; and there will be costs to the Honduran program to the extent of an infrastructure buildup, but I don't know if we've gotten into that yet.

Q You mean, you haven't figured out how much it's going to cost?

A Right now, I'll say we're talking a couple hundred thousand dollars for a rather austere tent city. It is possible that the Hondurans will want to make some improvements and build some permanent structures there over time, but I don't think that that is very far advanced yet.

Q When will it begin, the training?

A It could begin in June or July.

Q But it's definitely on?

SECOND OFFICER: The Hondurans made the announcement last night.

Q Did the Honduran Congress pass on this issue, as one senior Administration official said would be necessary?

FIRST OFFICER: Don't know what their internal procedures are.

Q Who made the decision? When was the decision actually made and who made it?

A The Honduran Government announced it last night.

Q Was it related to a visit by General Alvarez here last week?

SECOND OFFICER: No. This has been in the mill for a long time.

Q No, but in terms of a final decision as an agreement?

A The agreement is already being negotiated.

Q One senior Administration official told the foreign press over at the Foreign Press Center less than a month ago that this would have to be ratified by the Honduran Congress.

FIRST OFFICER: I just don't know what their internal procedures are.

Q So it may not?

SECOND OFFICER: If it's strictly a Honduran base, it doesn't. That's the thing.

FIRST OFFICER: It's their announcement as their government, and whatever their procedures are, I just don't know.

Q You said last week that the agreement was already

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being negotiated. An agreement between whom?

A I think this was the terms of reference for how the facility would be used and whether it would be made available between us.

Q What parties are negotiating?

A There's no agreement in any formal sense. The Administrative arrangements had to be made for how the Salvadorans would come in and how long they would be there and go out and what facilities would be available.

Q Are you saying negotiations between the Salvadorans and the Hondurans?

A And the U.S.

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Q How does this differ from the School of the Americas' setup where we have an agreement with Panama?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The School of the Americas is quite -- and you can tell more about that.

SECOND OFFICIAL: The School of the Americas until 1984 -- that's a U.S. facility.

Q Right.

SECOND OFFICIAL: And this is not a U.S. facility.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Totally different.

Q You mentioned -- how does this affect -- two questions. Number one, how does this affect the 55 who are now in -- 55 military advisers, military trainers, now in El Salvador. Will that number change at all?

FIRST OFFICIAL: This is an alternative -- to answer your questions one at a time because after you've asked your second question I will have forgotten your first because of my own deficiencies -- but this is an alternative to increasing the number of U.S. personnel in El Salvador, and it is an alternative to the very high cost that would be involved in trying to do unit training in the United States. It costs several times as much just to bring a battalion up here and train them.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Let me add one additional on the training part of it. One additional part -- on the training in the United States -- we will be training at Fort Benning

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525 officer cadets.

FIRST OFFICIAL: They came in yesterday.

SECOND OFFICIAL: And the first group came in yesterday. So that's a part of the training in the United States. It's much cheaper to do the unit training some place else.

Q Then you expect to keep the 55 still in El Salvador as well as the 100 or so in --

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'm not sure -- are you asking are we putting in more or putting in less?

Q No. I want to know if you're going to keep the 55 in El Salvador.

FIRST OFFICIAL: There's a continuing need to have training done in-country too.

Q You're not putting in more in El Salvador?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No.

Q Just to give us an idea, how many Salvadorans do you expect to train over the next year or six months, or whatever time frame you want to choose?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Over the next six months this proposition is 2400 at the regional training center, the four Cazadores battalions and the one quick-reaction battalion, and then the 525 officer candidates. There are programs of individual instruction at the School of the Americas and elsewhere. I don't know what the total would

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be, but those would be the main --

Q 2500 are at the camp or that's --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Not at one time, but that would be the total over a 6-month period --

SECOND OFFICIAL: At Honduras --

FIRST OFFICIAL: -- by the time you were through training one quick-reaction battalion and four Cazadores battalions, you would have trained about 2400 people.

Q There, not here?

FIRST OFFICIAL: In units, in Honduras.

SECOND OFFICIAL: There.

Q Can you tell us how this squares with the repeated instructions from Congress that they want you to train these people in the United States?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There's two themes there. Actually, I guess there are three. There are those who say that we should do it in El Salvador, but for those who are concerned about El Salvador, in some cases say it should be done out of country, and we should not increase the American presence in Salvador. Also, there are some who would prefer that we do more of the training in the United States.

There is a practical constraint within available funding about training large units in the United States as opposed to courses of individual instruction such as are given to officer candidates. We think this is cost effective,

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and it is responsive to the concerns that have been expressed in the Congress.

Q All right. So the letter that the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee -- the Foreign Relations Committee sent to Secretary of State Shultz on the 24th of July which says specifically any training outside El Salvador must be done in the United States, the Department is repudiating --

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're not repudiating. We discussed this with the leadership of the Commitee. We've informed them that we're going forward with this. We haven't had any -- I don't know that it is a major issue. I don't think that it is.

I think that we have tried and are trying to do training in the United States in the case of individual instruction. I think that the practical limitations in terms of the costs especially for training an entire unit is something that will be understandable to the Congress.

Q I understand the cost in the first six months of the regional military training facility in Honduras to put through 2,400 men will be $7 million.

How does that square with what -- how does that compare to what that same number would be in the United States?

FIRST OFFICIAL: What is it? Three or four times? In excess of $20 million?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Again, it depends. The ratios are hard -- it depends on what you throw into the base, the ratios.

Q If it's cost effective, you must have figured it out.

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's right. And it costs roughly about two times more to train in the United States.

Q Is that what it cost to train the one? About $21 million?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, no. It was around -- it costs around $5 million for the cadets. In other words, the 525 cadets will cost five and a half million to train at Benning.

The battalion -- when we trained the battalion at Bragg the last time, the figures, as I recall, were about five, five and a half or five -- between five and six million. So, see, we're training that many more.

Q Could the first official give some clarification on your analysis of the nature of the political forces involved in the Sandinist and the Castro regime? In your White Paper you seem to paint a picture of some kind of Marxist-Leninist hard core which dupes other democratic forces into supporting it.

Specificially, do you include the Society of Jesus amongst the Marxist-Leninist hard core or amongst the democractic dupes?

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FIRST OFFICIAL: Neither.

Q I would agree with you on that. Are you saying that --

FIRST OFFICIAL: What is your question?

Q My question is where do they fit into the picture? I don't think that any Marxist-Leninist can dupe the Society of Jesus --

FIRST OFFICIAL: I've spent too many years in their schools to believe that.

Q So the question is what role do they play, or are we dealing with a strictly Marxist-Soviet-directed --

FIRST OFFICIAL: The point --

Q -- here, or are we dealing with --

FIRST OFFICIAL: The point of this is that we drew a parallel. I'm not going to say anything critical about the Society of Jesus, but let me say what we have done here.

We have tried to illustrate in this background paper the parallelism between the tactics that were used by Castro in Cuba in which it began as, "well, we'll have a coalition, but the people with the guns were the hard-line Communists and the democratic allies were in the publicly visible but less powerful positions and were, over time, eased or forced out. It is not necessarily

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limited to fooling people. It's not that the Communists are so smart and everybody else is so dumb; it is that this is a tactical way in which those who wish to obtain power and who have no regard for democratic means have attained power in Cuba. I could turn around your question, perhaps, and ask you if you're denying that Cuba is a Communist state today, having followed this tactic, and we point out that within Nicaragua we are seeing the same kinds of tactics. Interestingly enough, we are also seeing Cubans who use those tactics themselves, and we think that there is a certain logic that flows from that parallelism about what is happening in Nicaragua.

MODERATOR: I think we have about time for two more questions.

Q I'll be very brief. This map that has already made an appearance -- I think it was in *Time* magazine, and Mrs. Kirkpatrick quoted largely from the *Time* article in which it appeared before the Security Council -- and I want to know if the *Time* magazine account of arms supplies is something that the Administration can generally endorse? That's one.

And then, two: How effective have our arms interdiction efforts been to interdict this flow over the last two years?

And, finally, are we, in terms of arms supplies

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and backing of rebel groups, is the United States doing anything comparable to what is being done here or outlined here?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Now you've asked three questions, and I've forgotten the first one.

Q It was about the map and whether --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Our view on this is summarized in our background paper. I don't really want to characterize the Time magazine story as being something we endorse from the first capital letter to the last period. I'm not sufficiently familiar with it to say that, yes, that is absolutely the Administration position or it differs in this way or that way. But we've tried to outline in this background paper what we think.

Q Okay. And you won't address the other two questions?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I've forgotten them, but I really -- in fairness we ought to let somebody else ask a question.

Q I just want to know how effective you judge the arms interdiction --

FIRST OFFICIAL: It's very difficult, because what we're dealing with here are clandestine arms shipments through a variety of means. We've got some photographs of the trucks in here with the panels and the secret hiding places. You've got rough jungle terrain that is available to go through the

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sparsely inhabited. You've got a lot of sky up there and small dirt landing strips, and you've got boats that can go out into the water, and they don't announce the delivery schedules. It's not anything that is done in an overt way, and that makes interception of this traffic a difficult proposition. There have been some successes, and there have been a lot of arms that have gotten through.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Let me just say the most successful part of the interdiction probably has been the overland through Honduras in the past two years, and that's where most of the evidence that we've been able to show has come from.

MODERATOR: One more question right here.

Q I'd like to ask you why you're doing the briefing and why Mr. Enders isn't, and where he is if he's not in town?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't have his schedule with me. I'm his deputy, and I'm here to do the briefing.

Q Could I ask a substantive question, please? Could you tell us something about the level of Cuban and Bloc personnel in Nicaragua now, and approximately how many of them you estimate to be military --

FIRST OFFICIAL: This, I think, really has to be the last one. I think we are estimating about 8,000 Cubans within Nicaragua right now, and in the neighborhood of 1500

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to 2,000 of those would be security personnel. I don't have total numbers on Soviet-bloc people. I know that there are a number of technicians and engineers and so on working on -- I guess we have some people working on the airports and things like that -- but on the security side I think the latest estimate I've seen is about 50 Soviets and comparable or smaller numbers of East Germans and some Bulgarians.

Q Has that increased significantly in the last couple of months, particularly since Matagalpa in March?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. I think not.

Q Any PLO?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There are a few PLO and a couple of Libyans, I guess.

SECOND OFFICIAL: About 50 in the PLO and Libyans.

Q Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 1:13 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF

PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE OF JAPAN

May 27, 1983

The Briefing Room

[pm]

1:54 A.M. EDT

MR. BARNES: This afternoon's briefing is on background attributable to a Senior Administration Official. For your information only, the briefer is [redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is going to be short, because I've got to catch a plane and I think a number of you want to catch the President. They had a very productive, very warm meeting. The first part of it was a long tete-a-tete with just the two, the Prime Minister and the President, and a couple of close aides on either side, and that, in fact, went straight into the lunch meeting, so --

Q Who were the aides?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure exactly who. And then we had a luncheon discussion, which was interrupted briefly by a birthday cake and a birthday song for the Prime Minister, and continued the discussions over lunch.

I think the one general comment I'd make is there's clearly a very warm relationship between the two leaders and very warm relations between the Japanese ministers and the President's Cabinet officers. And we view that as a very important element in building a strong bilateral relationship that's very important to us, and we also see that as a very good sign for the success of the Williamsburg summit.

The major topic of discussion at lunch was the Williamsburg summit; that is, I think you heard from the President and the Prime Minister they discussed a very wide range of other topics during their private meeting. I'd be glad to take any questions that I can handle.

Q Did the President apologize for the flap over the inclusion of a statement in the briefing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that is a minor matter which I talked about yesterday, and there's really not much more to be said about it.

Q Did the President apologize today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure it didn't come up today.

Q Did the situation about trade and Japanese automobiles come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mostly I'm going to have to talk about what I heard over lunch. Trade matters were discussed over the lunch, not a particular focus on automobiles. There were other

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subjects that Secretary Baldrige and Trade Representative Brock were focusing on more.

Q Any unhappiness on the part of the Japanese with domestic content legislation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That subject wasn't mentioned specifically, but the general subject of protectionism and concerns on both sides about protectionism and what it could do to cripple the recovery that we believe is underway, mentioned on both sides, and the domestic content legislation is clearly an example of protectionist measures that we think would damage our own economic interests in the long run as well as Japan's.

Q How did the Prime Minister respond to that? How did he react to the subject of protectionism? I assume we brought it up.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I said, both sides expressed concern about protectionism and expressed commitment to taking measures to try to counter it. In the case of Japan and this Prime Minister, there've been a great many measures already taken to reduce tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers, negotiations on import quotas, actions to try to open up procurement by the national telephone-telecommunications monopoly, so there are a number of measures there of a market-opening character that were mentioned.

Q What were the measures that Mr. Baldrige, Mr. Brock, or others brought up as specifics with regard to trade? What things did they talk about with the Japanese --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I just ran through the quick list. I mean, the specifics that we are talking most about right now are non-tariff barriers, where the Japanese have taken a number of significant actions. It's important to follow through and make sure the implementation of those actions is meaningful. The procurement by NTT was a subject that was discussed. The general subject of industrial policy was discussed; I think there's agreement on both sides that we need to understand a little bit better what we mean by those terms, by that term. And there are certainly some things in the area that are called industrial policy that we both think are desirable, and other things that might be considered barriers to free trade that we would like to remove.

Q Were global issues discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The general East-West economic situation, the general question of world economic recovery. The Prime Minister was particularly forceful about the importance of the actions and subjects that will be discussed at Williamsburg to the developing countries and the fact that the developing countries have been hurt even harder by the global recession than the industrialized countries, and I think there's a general agreement that we want to work within the existing institutions, the IMF, the World Bank, and others, to address those concerns.

Q To what extent was defense, or military questions, discussed, and can you tell us whether the United States asked anything further of the Prime Minister in that regard?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really can't say. It wasn't discussed in the lunch. As I said in the backgrounder yesterday, we discussed the subject extensively in the Prime Minister's visit here in January and then when Secretary Shultz was there in February, and a number of measures, including the budget increase that just passed the Japanese Diet. I assume it may well have been touched upon during the private meeting, but I don't think -- we weren't there pressing for new things. We feel we have a considerable amount of progress underway at the moment.

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Q Was there a suggestion by the Prime Minister that Mr. Reagan should meet for a summit talk with Mr. Andropov?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The general desirability of doing that, if the conditions are right, was mentioned over lunch, and it may have been discussed in more detail in private.

Q Mentioned by whom?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both sides.

Q Who initiated the discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: During the luncheon conversation I think the Prime Minister may have been the one who mentioned it first.

Q Was the defense interest issue raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q The defense interest, agricultural --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I heard, no.

Q How about the defense program with Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I just answered that question.

MS. WINNICK: Anyone that wants to go out for the departure should come with me right now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have time for about two more, I think.

Q The Prime Minister mentioned the situation in the Middle East and Asia was discussed as well. Could you be more specific about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't, because I assume that was done in the private meeting. I know we have heard at the Secretary's level and at lower levels about Japanese concerns about the Iran-Iraq war and its potential consequences, but I don't know what was specifically discussed with the President.

Q Any discussion on the China program, China regime?

SENIOR ADTMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, that may have been in the private meeting. It was mentioned between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister in their meeting earlier this morning.

One last one?

Q Can you elaborate at all on the East-West discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They mostly talked about the studies that are being conducted in the IEA and the OECD, and the general desirability of a unified Western approach to the subject of East-West trade, and agreed on the importance of maintaining that approach in the Williamsburg discussions.

Q The Far East was also discussed then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have been, in the private meeting. It was with the Foreign Minister this morning.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:01 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Williamsburg, Virginia)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE AND PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER OF GREAT BRITAIN

May 28, 1983

Room 105
William and Mary Hall
The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia

7:23 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention, please. We have with us [redacted] This briefing is on background. That means that the briefers will be identified as senior administration officials. It is -- no pictures of any type. There will be no pictures -- still or television. There will be no audio nor any television broadcast.

The questions -- they'll each have a brief statement and the questions should be confined to the two bilaterals -- one with President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher -- on background, senior administration officials, about 15 minutes of questions. Please raise your hand because we do have an extremely large crowd.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll make a brief statement and then my colleague and I will take questions and just to report on the general topics discussed in the two -- the meeting between the President and President Mitterrand and the meeting between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan.

First of all, on the meeting with President Mitterrand, they discussed the INF negotiations. They reaffirmed to each other the importance of strength of purpose, not only in the negotiations themselves but in attitudes toward deployment and general attitudes. Mr. Mitterrand expressed his determination to bring down French inflation and bring up their rate of growth. He's concerned about the world economy and liquidity implications of the U.S. deficit. They discussed that a little. The President expressed his view of the importance of economic expansion and President Mitterrand agreed. And they both agreed on the importance of the economic development in the Third World. I would say, to a certain extent, as in the case of the meeting with Mrs. Thatcher as described to me, I was not there -- so I'll brief you on a meeting I didn't attend. But I got a rundown on it from the President. But in both cases, I'm sure there's a personal chemistry and a personal interaction and the fact of the matter is the President gets along very well with both of these leaders and that always helps.

In the case of the meeting with Mrs. Thatcher, she expressed some concerns about the Export Administration Act that's just making its way through our Congress. They shared the view that it's important for there to be economic expansion and that it take place in a non-inflationary way so that we don't return to the problems of the past. And no doubt it would be helpful if there is a kind of convergence or economies moving together so they can interact and stimulate each other.

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Insofar as the arms control and related issues are concerned, I gather from the President, they both expressed their determination, on the one hand, to be strong, on the other hand, to be reasonable.

Questions?

Q Can you expand a little bit on what President Mitterrand said about the out-year deficit and why he was concerned about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did you hear the question? Can I expand -- did everyone hear the question?

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I expand on President Mitterrand's comments about the out-year deficit and why he's concerned about it.

First of all, he didn't -- as I understood it, particularly distinguish between out-year deficits and other deficits. It just had to do with the notion that a deficit is a call on world liquidity and liquidity is important to growth and, therefore, -- at least this was my understanding of the line of reasoning taken. And, of course, the President's view is, and which he expressed, that right now what's important is economic expansion. And the most meaningful way in which our deficits in these current years are going to be cured is through economic expansion so that our GNP grows and, therefore, some of the things that money is being spent on, it won't have to be spent on and the rates of revenue from given tax rates will increase. So, they had that exchange.

Helen?

Q I take it that each of these world leaders seems to be reaffirming that the President should go ahead with the deployment of the missiles even though now the Soviets are threatening to put the SS-20s in Eastern Europe, launch on warning and so forth. None of this apparently makes any difference.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I sense, in the discussions I've had with each of the foreign ministers, both here and earlier, of course, and in the President's meetings with Prime Minister Nakasone and Mr. Fanfani here recently and these two today, a very general sense of determination -- as I tried to put it, on the meeting with Mrs. Thatcher, to be strong and to be reasonable and that we have to maintain that posture.

Q A statement has made clear to us how the administration feels about the latest Soviet statement. But can you tell us with some particularity how the British and the French feel about it because, after all, it's their independent forces that are at issue right now. Why --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as their forces are

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concerned, they have said, and said, and said that they should not be counted in the INF negotiations, and that is an affirmed, allied position, and it remains the same as it has been. There's no sense of shift in that at all.

Q Do you sense that the Soviets are attempting to divide the allies, and if that's the intention, as you perceive it, is it not working? Is that what you're saying?

[redacted] The effort to divide the allies is not working. The effort to threaten the allies tends to backfire. And so, I think that if the Soviet Union wants to avoid those deployments in Europe, it's very simple. They can agree to eliminate their deployments. And I think everyone agrees that the elimination of this class of weapons is the best answer. And that not being agreed to by the Soviet Union, that an interim solution, along the lines that's been proposed in which Ambassador Nitze is talking about in Geneva, is the right solution.

You know, there's been a tremendous amount of consultation with our partners on this, and all steps taken are agreed, so it's no surprise that people should come here with exactly the same attitudes that have been developed out of this consultation.

Q [redacted] from either President Mitterrand or Prime Minister Thatcher, any question about the current American tension at the INF negotiations? Any change of attitude on either of them about your negotiating posture?

[redacted] No. I think, as I said, our posture is something that's been developed out of really very extensive consultation, and when the President made his statement it was applauded, and I think there is a continued adherence to the particulars and the continued efforts at negotiation.

Q [redacted] do you or the President agree with President Mitterrand that there have been misconceptions created by the American press about the French position on monetary matters?

[redacted] Well, I'm not going to comment on what the press says and all of that. That's -- I'm not going -- I've long since learned never to fight with the press. But, if he wants to do it, that's up to him. (Laughter.)

Q [redacted] from the descriptions we've had so far, there has been no sense of confrontation. Everybody is -- seems to be in general agreement -- certainly on the objective. Is that not another way of saying that some of the real differences that do exist between various countries have not been broached?

[redacted] There are going to be many hours of intensive discussion and sharing of views, ideas, differences, agreements or whatever. So far as I can see, people are approaching this meeting in just that spirit. People haven't come here to fight, they've come here to share ideas and try to develop a greater sense of momentum in solving the problems of the free world. And there is a considerable momentum, and so we will be trying to find our way towards strengthening that, developing that. And if there are differences, that's all right, they'll be reported. But there's no sense -- nobody seems to have come here to pick a fight at all. Quite the contrary.

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Q [redacted] was there any elaboration in the meeting on the -- I think Jerry asked -- whether the French President said something about the misunderstanding on his position on the franc and the dollar. Could you elaborate on what he said?

[redacted] I think insofar as his comments on press statements and so forth, it's better for you to have anything on that from Minister Cheysson, or -- I mean, that's strictly their view, and I don't want to comment on it.

Q But, did he give the President a view different than one we've been reading about?

[redacted] I don't want to get in between President Mitterrand and the press. That's nowhere for me to be. I'm not going to get there. Let's go on to something else. How about a question for [redacted]

Q [redacted] what do you understand is the French position -- (Laughter.)

[redacted] I don't understand -- the question. (Laughter.)

Is

Q Sir -- [redacted] there any chance that

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President Reagan would go along with a tax increase if it all could be earmarked to lower the deficit, thereby lowering the interest rates, the value of the dollar and making it easier for U.S. exporters to export our products overseas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What years are you talking about?

Q As soon as possible, sir.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is is there any chance that President Reagan would go along with a tax increase strictly to bring down the deficit in order to get interest rates down in order to encourage trade and to be done as soon as possible.

The President has said he wants no tax increases in 1983 nor in 1984 and would veto any. So the answer to your question is not for 1983 nor for '84.

Q Just very directly, what did Mitterrand tell Mr. Reagan about the question of a monetary conflict?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, I'm a little hesitant to try to interpret somebody else. But my interpretation of the remarks is to say that President Mitterrand feels that it's time to start a process of fundamental thinking about the broad nature of the international financial system. And so when he speaks about Bretton Woods, he's not saying we should try to duplicate Bretton Woods in any formal sense; but rather that we should duplicate this act of imagination in looking at the problems that we have and stretching our minds and seeing what better can be done.

Q Did he say that any conference could not produce results overnight, that it would take a long preparation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't remember him saying that in so many words, no.

Q On IMF, can --

Q -- how did President Reagan respond?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you started, so you finish.

Q Well, let him follow up and then I'll take the next one.

Q I'd like to know how President Reagan responded to that observation, that statement by President Mitterrand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President's view is --

Q What did he say, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How did the President respond to that observation?

The President's view is that the thing that we can do and that others can do that will have more impact than any other single thing is to have strong, non-inflationary growth in our economy. And when you have that, a lot of these problems that we're talking about will fall away. And no doubt this is a subject that will get discussed at this summit and we'll want to talk about the links between non-inflationary growth and debt problems, non-inflationary growth and trade relations and so on around the horn.

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Q I might ask, if the Soviets were to proceed with this threatened deployment in the Warsaw Pact countries, would it be necessary to counter that with more Pershings and cruises?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's hard to see how the Soviets -- they seem to be deploying continuously. And so a statement that they're going to deploy more doesn't -- you wonder what that means because they seem to be deploying SS-20's as fast as they can.

Q Did President Reagan reject outright intervention in currency exchange?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President has never rejected outright intervention in exchange markets. There has been for a long time in the United States a policy of readiness to intervene when such intervention will help contain disorderly markets. And that's been a policy in place. It's still in place and there is periodic intervention from time to time, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Did Central America come into the discussion, and in that connection, has the administration new intentions of sending advisors to Guatamala?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So far as I know, because I wasn't at the session with Mrs. Thatcher, but the President didn't report anything about Central America and it didn't come up in the meeting with President Mitterrand.

Q Well, the tricky part of my question, of course, is to ask you, indeed, if we have intentions of sending advisors to Guatamala.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q What about the Middle East? Did that come up and what is your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q What about the Middle East? Did that come up and what is your assessment -- is there

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a danger of war breaking out again in the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject of the Middle East did not come up, I do not think, in either meeting. I am sure it is going to come up during the course of the weekend. As far as the situation in the Middle East, as we have commented a number of times, the presence of this additional Soviet weaponry -- Soviet manning that weaponry, the aggressive behavior of the Syrians, their association with PLO guerrilla forces, with Iranian terrorist groups that are there -- all provides a situation that is dangerous.

And we are watching it, the Israelis of course are watching it carefully. And I would say the Israelis have been very restrained in their reaction to it. But we are all watching it very carefully. And, of course, we do not want to see a war break out. What we want to see is all foreign forces leave Lebanon, disengage, and provide the basis for a more peaceful situation.

I am told there is one more question to come.

Q The Israelis are building up, too. Isn't that part of the threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israelis are having to look to their own deployments and their own strength. But the Israelis, on the whole, I think have been restrained in the face of really quite a large Syrian buildup. The number of troops in Lebanon on the part of Syria far exceed those of Israel at this point. And their statements have been restrained as well.

I guess that's it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 7:38 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STAT

June 9, 1983
No. 204

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
Williamsburg, Virginia
May 29, 1983

LARRY SPEAKES: The Secretary of State now will brief on the statement that he delivered upstairs. The Secretary will confine his questions to security issues. And he will be here about 15 minutes.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Questions?

QUESTION: What is new in this statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, this is a very strong statement put out by a group that has not made a statement on security before, as such. And I think it is worth noting that it includes some who are members of NATO. It includes Japan that is not in NATO, and has not been part of this same process. And it includes France who is a member of the Alliance, but not of the NATO command structure.

So there is diversity here. I think there is a mixture here of security concerns and a general expression of outlook that is, to our way of thinking, a very strong and positive and important statement right at this time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the statement seems to be a combination and summation of the various positions stated by this Government and NATO in the past couple of years. Why, then, did it take much of the day to hammer this out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was something that the Heads decided they wanted to do last night. The Heads spent the morning talking about economic matters, not about this. At the end of the morning, they looked at some material that had been prepared by the Foreign Ministers. And they are not lackeys, the Foreign Ministers, it turns out. So they had some of their own ideas and a lot of suggestions for things that, I think, in the end have strengthened this text. And so, then they went on to the discussion of economic matters and, then, came back and added this on as new material was available.

So it was, in a sense, interspersed in the economic discussion. But the basic groundwork for the statement and the decision to make it was made at their dinner last evening.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, specifically, was the question about the inclusion of British and French systems a matter of contention today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there was discussion about that. But there is no contention whatever about what was said here. This is agreed by everybody. There was some -- as I remember -- there was some question about exactly where in the statement that should fit. And I think it fit in very well.

QUESTION: Is that all? Is that the only point of contention? Or was it the fact that the Canadians might have said that they should be included?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. The Canadians did not say that. But anyway, the Canadians will brief on their own. They did question the location of the statement and, finally, it was a Canadian suggestion -- as I recall -- that the text that you see here be located where it is.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, why did the Heads of State feel it was so essential to do it at this time? Is this in response to the threats by the Soviets to install the new missiles if we do not cancel the Pershings?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I imagine that that must have been on their minds -- that the Soviet Union made a very threatening statement across the bow of this meeting. The Heads considered it to be important to show the strength and unity of the West. And so they have gone ahead with this.

But I think, aside from that, the statement is a strong one and stands on its feet as a very important comment to the Soviet Union not only about the strength and the resolve of the West, but also the willingness of the West to engage in meaningful negotiations for reductions of armaments as it says in here with a principle of equality and on a verifiable basis.

QUESTION: But if by stating so clearly that these French and British systems have no place in the INF talks, are you implying that they may have a place in the START talks? Is that one of the implications one can draw from this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. No, it is not any implication at all. It is put in the context of the INF talks. And the reason it comes in that way is that the Soviets have made the suggestion that they be counted. That is what precipitates the issue in this particular way.

QUESTION: Is it fair to suggest, as was suggested this afternoon, that there was some trade-off on economic matters for support on this statement on security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Absolutely no sense of any such thing at all. Just totally out of the ballpark.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there any suggestion from the other delegations that the United States is not pursuing the arms control negotiations with sufficient impetus or urgency?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think -- quite to the contrary, there is a very good sense of the negotiating process and the process of consultation has referred it to in here, I think, in the next to last paragraph, "continue to carry out thorough and intensive consultations." I think people feel that that has gone very well and the -- are very supportive of the manner in which these negotiations are being conducted.

QUESTION: Just to follow up, there was some suggestion from other delegations that the President last night at dinner made a very strong statement that was too strong for the taste of some of the other Heads. Can you respond to that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know where that might have come from. I think the discussion was conducted with everybody having their say. And I know at the end of the meeting which -- I can't remember just exactly when it ended but the foreign ministers were having coffee in a room upstairs in the Plantation and the President came up to our room as the other Heads were leaving and gave us a brief rundown and told us that the decision had been made that there should be a statement. And they looked to us to develop it. Then he handed me a sheaf of notes -- about eight pages of notes that he had taken, of what everybody said -- not what he said, but what everybody else said. And it was on the basis of those notes that we constructed a statement about what happened in a meeting that we didn't attend.

But at any rate, then the result of that effort went back to the Heads in mid-morning and they adjusted it some more and so on. That was the process.

QUESTION: What didn't they like about that earlier draft -- the draft that you brought back this morning?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, I don't know whether you've ever been in one of these things that -- the early draft is never accepted. (Laughter.) It's like when you inspect your platoon in the Marine Corps and you look at the rifles, you always find some dirty rifles. That's absolutely routine -- (laughter) -- got to be changed around. But I want to say this, though, in all seriousness. This is a very important statement. It was taken with great seriousness by the Heads of State. They looked at it carefully. They wanted it to say precisely what they wanted. So they immersed themselves in it when it came to them. I think this is not, in any sense, a draft prepared by some other people which they okayed. Quite to the contrary, it emerged out of what they said last night as best as we could reconstruct that from the President's notes and his roughly half hour briefing of me about it, and then their own work on it at various times during the day. So, that was sort of the process involved.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you saying there was no advanced American language on this subject?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Absolutely none. None.

QUESTION: You said this was meant as a strong message to the Soviet Union. Isn't it also meant as a (inaudible)

QUESTION: Louder, please.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was about the message to the Soviet Union, isn't it also a message to Western Europe? It is a message to the people of the world, including the people of the Soviet Union, of what the leaders of these seven countries stand for in this field. And in that sense, the statement speaks for itself and it has the flow of freedom and justice and strength and interest in arms reduction, and at the end, an attitude toward the importance of finding peace in the world.

So, I think it is a very strong and balance statement and it's designed, obviously, for the people all over the world and also as a statement to the Soviet Union of our resolve and our reasonableness.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what has changed from the original draft you started the meeting with -- between that and this statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It isn't really relevant and it is not a question of what was changed, it's a question of what was agreed to. This is what people agreed to. It is always the case. It will be the case tomorrow when some people get together tonight and start to develop a joint statement, that people will look at that and they'll subtract and they'll edit and so -- and that's a normal process that goes on as it did in this case.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, was there any suggestion made at any time by any of the Foreign Ministers or by any of the people involved in this that the President had emphasized the question of deployment too much instead of emphasizing the necessity for an interim agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: This is not the President's statement. This is a statement by these seven Heads of State.

QUESTION: I understand that, sir, but I --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: And the -- it emerged out of their discussion. And it was discussed in that context. It was not a question of the President emphasizing this, that or the other thing. It was discussed and everybody had their oar in, believe me.

QUESTION: Was there any -- what I was trying to find out, was whether or not any of them felt that the President in any of his statements -- he's made a number of statements on this issue. He had an interview with European journalist the other day -- had emphasized the question of deployment excessively rather than the question of a necessity for an interim agreement.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't hear any discussion of anyone's prior statements. The discussion was about this statement and what we should say, and it was worked on very hard, very thoughtfully and conscientiously, and what means something is what people agreed on. And you have that text, I assume.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what do you hope results from issuing of this statement? What do you hope the response of the world, of the Soviet Union will be to it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We want the world to see what we stand for and what we are prepared to do. The fact that, to some extent, you seem to greet this as old stuff, perhaps, is reassuring. I'm glad to hear that you recognize how important it is that we are strong. I'm glad to hear that you see that we truly are in favor of arms reduction. I'm glad to hear that people think that it's clear what will happen on deployments if we don't have an outcome -- a good outcome in this negotiation. And I'm glad to hear that people sense the truth and validity and strength of purpose in this last statement. We commit ourselves to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of a war. We have a vision of a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind, and we are determined to pursue that vision. I think you have to say these things and keep saying them because they're true and they reflect the spirit and the thinking and the gut-feeling of these leaders. And it's very important that people see that.

And it's also important that the Soviet Union, in contemplating its posture in negotiations, recognize that if it wants to come to the table in a reasonable way and seek arms reductions, we're there, and we're ready to work on it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is there any new strategic information or analysis that led the Heads of State to want to make this statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is, of course, a lot of thinking that is embodied, among other things, in the Scowcroft Commission Report, but that wasn't what precipitated this statement. And I don't think that it is in any sense reflected in here. It isn't that specific an arms control type statement.

QUESTION: I mean, I didn't ask about the Scowcroft Commission.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did the changes -- can you answer this? Did the changes that you made to the original draft say more about arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not particularly. I think it's slightly shorter than what we started out with and it's, more or less, in the same vein and --

QUESTION: But did it add more -- did it add more language about arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I recognize you like a story about an argument -- (laughter) -- but you're not going to get it out of me, because the important thing is what people did agree on. And I think also it's important to recognize that the people who did the agreeing really worked at it and they care about it and they put themselves into it and they argued about it and when they finally got through, they had something that they basically wrote and subscribed to.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Where is Secretary Regan? (Laughter.) I'm the only guy in the place that didn't get any lunch because I was trying to redraft this stuff. I need a cracker or something.

QUESTION: -- paragraph 5, where you say, "Should this occur the negotiations will determine the level of deployment." Is there any suggestion there that if serious negotiations are going on the deployments themselves could be postponed until early next year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Absolutely nothing like that can be inferred from this at all. It says we wish that we could have an agreement on -- a balanced INF agreement. That's always been the key in the INF approach. And it simply goes on to say that if there is agreement, then that agreement will determine the level of deployment, whatever it is. If there isn't agreement, as it says, it's well known that we will proceed, the countries involved will proceed with the planned deployments. That is, those that have been set out in the plan and that's -- that starts at the end of 1983. So it's very clear and crisp on that subject.

QUESTION: Was there -- reluctance, sir, to go along with something that gives preeminence to the neclear missile issue over economics?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There was no discussion of that kind of thing, no interplay, in a sense, between the effort on this and the effort on the economic subject, except that, I think, our meeting wound up ending an hour-and-a-half or so later than it was supposed to end and that is because -- had a lot of people who felt they had things to say and they were talking about economic things. And it kept going. And I kept saying, "Gee, the press is waiting over there for this statement." And people kept talking about economic things. And I was trying to root for you. But I didn't make it.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 29, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
DONALD REGAN

Room 105
William and Mary Hall
The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia

7:28 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY REGAN: It's from deployment to unemployment that we now switch. (Laughter.)

Now, a quick statement as to what's been going on in the economic area of an economic summit. The finance ministers met last night as a group for dinner, met again all morning, met through luncheon and, then, joined the heads and the foreign ministers for the plenary session this afternoon.

Obviously, there are many topics that were discussed in the finance ministers' meetings, more in depth and detail than occurred during the plenary session this afternoon. Reason -- obviously, as Secretary Shultz has just told you, the INF statement was also a subject for this afternoon.

Now, obviously, the main question on everybody's mind is, how is the economy or economies of the industrialized nations going? Generally, upbeat. It was reported by most of the countries that their economies had made the turn.

The United States, of course, seems to be leading the way. UK is in good shape. Germany is showing signs of recovery. Canada is coming along. Japan is doing reasonably well. France admits that it's having difficulties but says that its program will work. And Italy says that -- obviously, they can't talk too much about economic matters as it's a caretaker government, as to what will happen as far as an economic program in the future. But, nonetheless, they report that there is a willingness on the part of most of the parties in Italy to get on a deflationary path.

So, I'd say all in all it, as we suspected it would be, turned out that most people were reasonably confident that the recovery was underway. The key question that was asked of each participant was, is this a recovery that's sustainable? And if sustainable, how?

And there the subject naturally turned toward interest rates, and in this connection, of course, the deficits in many countries, particularly that of the United States and its effect upon interest rates. We explained our point of view, what we were doing about deficits and, more importantly, what we were doing about interest rates.

And there were many questions asked and quite a bit of discussion of that particular topic. We moved into the field of unemployment because this is one of the main problems facing all of the nations, the 32 million to 35 million unemployed in the industrialized countries.

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We, then, discussed the plight of the less developed countries in the North-South area as far as what we in the North could do to be more responsive to the needs of the South.

And from there, this took us into international trade and a lot of the international trade issues. Let's see. What else did we cover?

There wasn't that much time. I suspect it'll be covered more tomorrow -- the plight of the debtor countries and the large international debt.

So, why don't I pause here and see your questions? Andrea?

Q Mr. Secretary, we heard that there was quite a lot of strong statements from some of the other heads to the President today on the subject of the big deficits -- from the French, the Italians and, in fact, also the Germans. Can you speak to that?

SECRETARY REGAN: I wouldn't say there were strong statements in the sense that they were provocative.

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, the question. The questioner said that she had heard that there were strong statements by the heads of certain of the delegations, particularly the French, the Italians and, indeed, several of the others to the President about our high rates of interest.

My answer is, I would not characterize --

Q -- our deficits, sir.

SECRETARY REGAN: Deficits, excuse me. Deficits. My answer is is that they weren't strong statements in that sense. For example, one of those nations that you mentioned said that they had no right to intervene in the United States' solution to its problems. What they were asking was, could the United States get their interest rates down? How we did it they would leave to us as a sovereign government, whether we cut spending, raised taxes or whatever way we did it.

So, therefore, I would say that while they were all naturally interested and concerned, I wouldn't say they were strong statements.

Bart?

Q Mr. Secretary, what did you tell them on behalf of the United States by way of assurance that we're going to lower our deficits and our interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, as far as the question, What did I tell them, by way of assurances, about what we're going to do about our interest rates, or our deficits and their effect on our interest rates. The answer to that is: that we explained the situation between the administration and the Congress on the deficits, what the picture is -- the current picture -- what the picture will be in 1984, on changes that could occur in the picture if the economic script changes one way or another; in other words, if we recover more rapidly in a better real growth rate than in our projections, what it does; or, if it turns out that we're not that good -- what would happen there.

We also then explained that there is very little linkage between deficits and interest rates; that the evidence simply isn't there. Sometimes there is a linkage, sometimes there isn't. And we've examined that in detail, twenty years of history of these summit nations we've gone through to see what the linkage is.

Q Mr. Secretary, the reports we get suggest that the general thrust of what you were told was that there is a greater sense of urgency in Europe than they find here about getting deficits down. That they say if they don't get the deficits down quickly, they face a rising unemployment problem. Did you -- is that a correct impression?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question was: The Europeans have a greater sense of urgency about getting interest rates down than we seem to, because high interest rates mean high unemployment to them. I think we're every bit as concerned about our 11 million unemployed as they are about their 2 or 3 million unemployed per country.

I think that we're very sensitive to what's going on as far as getting our economy recovering. We don't necessarily have to have in this first year interest rates coming down in order to have the recovery. Witness the fact that with these same rates of interest for the past 6 months approximately, we have had two quarters of recovery. We have -- explaining this to them. Sure, they're anxious to get interest rates down. They point out that they have to buy, in dollars, most of their imports. This is the reserve currency of the world. It's a safe-haven currency. When times are bad, people naturally turn to dollars; when things are good, they also want dollars. And, accordingly, they want to know what we can do to solve that conundrum for them.

Go ahead.

Q Mr. Secretary, how would you describe the mood of the meeting -- the tone of it -- compared with the last two years.

SECRETARY REGAN: About the same. (Laughter.) As far as economic affairs are concerned, I would say that they are more upbeat as far as the recovery is concerned, they're not as worried as they were, let's say, at Versailles. But, there is no rancor or bitterness or anything else. Remember, there was none at Versailles. It was only later that some might have occured. But during the meetings, no. So, I would characterize it as generally, interest, friendly, first-name basis, that type of thing.

Follow-up here.

Q Does the President seem to enjoy his role as sort of the moderator or note-taker, or --

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SECRETARY REGAN: The question: "Does the President seem to be enjoying his role as the moderator and the like?" I would say, yes. He's handling it quite well. He has -- keeping his notes, doing a great job on it. He's doing a yeoman's job of trying, as anyone would, I think he's had practice with the press -- when more than one person wants to talk at one time, selecting which one would do it; and, in general, he seems to -- well, I left him half-hour ago, he was rather buoyant about what had happened and the fact that they were able to solve the INF question and he hopes that the statement that's now being written will turn out equally well.

Helen, you had a question back there, or a comment?

Q Are you talking -- in this, all this atmospheric -- this happened in the leadership meeting, right?

SECRETARY REGAN: That's what I'm talking about. In the leadership meeting that I was in, from 2:00 p.m. until approximately 6:30 p.m.

Q No arguments, no harsh discussions?

SECRETARY REGAN: Discussions, not arguments, no. Not arguments, discussions.

Q What do you call a dis -- I mean, anything heated in the way of exchanges, or --

SECRETARY REGAN: No. No voices raised. As you could expect from people who are used to parliamentary debate, there were good exchanges between them.

Q Are you predicting now there will be a statement tomorrow showing the same unity as there is on arms control?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes. I would predict that. The Sherpas are now writing the statement. It's supposed to be shown in a draft form, later tonight, to the heads; brought back tomorrow, and gone over in tomorrow's session for release

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tomorrow afternoon, as you know.

Let's go back over here.

Q I wonder if you could tell us if the French proposal concerning a monetary conference was raised, what they said, and what the U.S. said?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question: Did the French raise the question of a monetary conference and the like.

Among the rules that we have agreed to do is not to characterize each other, or what each other has said.

Let me put it this way. The subject of monetary conferences was discussed by many delegations. Most think that there is not sufficient preparation for one. It would be premature. It would get up false hopes. It should not be had. One nation said that they did not mean they wanted a Bretton Woods conference. (Laughter.) Who could that be? But what they wanted was the spirit of Bretton Woods. That spirit, characterized by that nation, as being a spirit of a group of builders, of people who came together to capture an idea to rescue the world that had been in recession for over a decade and needed a way out for trade, and needed an international monetary system in order to get trade started again, because trade during the '30s had languished. And in that same spirit, couldn't we get started now thinking about the problem of what do we do with the world's monetary system in order to encourage world trade so that, through world trade, economies can grow -- not only economies of industrialized nations, but the developed countries and the less developed countries, particularly in the flavor of North-South. So it did come up in that respect.

Down here.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned international trade. Can you tell us what was said about protectionism and surpluses? Was anything resolved?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question is on international trade, the question of deficits and surpluses, was anything resolved.

Answer: There was discussion, but not much discussion in that area. I suspect more of that will come up tomorrow. Nothing was resolved.

Steve?

Q Mr. Secretary, what agreement was reached on terms of monetary stability? So everybody discussed it and so on and so forth. What kind of an agreement are we going to have?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question is, since everybody discussed monetary stability, what sort of an agreement did you come to on monetary stability.

I would say -- I am not sure the exact words that will be concocted tonight to describe that by the Sherpas. But I would characterize it as saying they called for more discussions of this among the Finance Ministers to try to resolve the subject, that the Finance Ministers meet often but probably should meet more often, that they should concentrate on this subject, that not enough work has been done in this area. I think that is probably what the heads will tell us to do.

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Of course, obviously -- I am not trying to describe it to you here -- there was a lot more discussion of that at the Finance Ministers level. And there will probably be more this evening at dinner. We will know more about each other's thinking on this subject. But this is not what the heads were telling us. And I am trying to stick to that.

Let's go over here.

Harry?

Q Did any of the heads, or of the Ministers, raise the issue of extraterritoriality as embodied in the Export Administration Act?

SECRETARY REGAN: Question: did any of the Heads of State bring up the question of extraterritoriality as embodied in the Export Administration Act.

The answer is yes; at least two that I know of expressed concern about this Export Administration Act and what its affect will be on companies that are domiciled in their country. Explanation: our bill, as suggested by the administration, is that this should refer to American products that are being manufactured by American companies overseas, or branches of American companies overseas, and that for domestic, national defense concerns we have a right to demand of our American firms that they not sell products that we have put on a ban list.

Q To follow, sir, does that include non-American firms manufacturing the same technology under U.S. license?

SECRETARY REGAN: We did not get into that -- about non-American firms manufacturing under U.S. licenses. We did explain the Bumpers Bill -- the House bill on this. We explained, also, the Garn Bill. And that is even tougher than the administration bill. And the discussion dropped there. There were no conclusions that came from it.

Back there.

Q You said that you pointed out to the other Ministers that there

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was no close connection between deficits and interest rates. You also said earlier on that you explained what the administration was going to do about interest rates. Can you explain to us what you are going to do about interest rates if it's not just cutting deficits?

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: Since I explained to the ministers that there's little connection that we can see between deficits and interest rates, yet we did say that we were going to do something to cut interest rates, what are we going to do in addition to cutting the budget in order to get interest rates down? The answer lies in monetary policy. You have to remember that over the last three weeks, our monetary policy, particularly M 1, has gone up rather sharply. What is it? Close to $17 billion over the three-week period. As a result, interest rates are up a half a point in that same three-week period, indicating quite clearly that the more money you try to pump into the system, the higher your interest rates are going to be, not lower.

So we told them that we could not engage in quick fixes in the United States by putting money into the economy. If we put money into the economy, we would certainly drive interest rates up, which is exactly the opposite of what they want. But as far as what we're trying to do, we are trying for a slow, steady growth in that money supply. I keep hearing myself saying that over and over again.

Go ahead. This has to be the last one, according to Dave.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that long term you're going to hold off on any monetary conference. What about short term the possibility of temporary intervention in the currency markets?

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: Since we're going to hold off long term on any international monetary conference, short term are we going to intervene more? Only if the occasion arises that calls for intervention in the short run.

Q Under what circumstances?

SECRETARY REGAN: Under what circumstances? Disorderly markets.

Thank you very much.

END 7:46 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Williamsburg, Virginia)

For Immediate Release May 30, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The White House Press Filing Center
William and Mary Hall

3:34 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Get to sit down today. That's pretty good.

Well, we're going to have shift work today. And I'll answer questions for a while and Secretary Regan will. I think that you might save your real tough economic questions for him and I'll provide what atmosphere I can.

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, Tass has answered the statement that was issued yesterday saying that this whole conference obliterates detente in full. Do you have a response to their response?

Q Question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: "I was informed that Tass had a statement today," I hadn't seen it, saying that the statement issued yesterday "obliterates detente in full." I'm quoting you. I don't know whether -- I assume I'm quoting Tass. Trust you. (Laughter.)

Well, this is just a piece of information that you've given me and I haven't had a chance to really look at it and see what else they may have said or anything of that kind.

But I would say that in the statement there is strength, there is purposefulness, there is unity, there is a sense of cohesion. And there also is expressed in several places in the statement a complete willingness to sit down and try to negotiate outstanding problems with the Soviet Union.

Now, we don't consider it a negotiation if they say the way, for instance, in INF is for them to have a monopoly of intermediate-range missiles. That doesn't look like a sensible outcome for us. So we say that. But that's only being reasonable and strong and sensible.

Q To follow up. Where do you think -- What is the state of detente in your opinion right now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's a word that has a great many meanings. I would say that the United States and the Alliance is strong, the United States and the Alliance is realistic about what is taking place around the world in many dimensions, the Western relationship with the Soviet Union and the United States. And the Alliance has expressed on many occasions a readiness to sit down and talk about outstanding problems in a spirit of trying to solve them. So I don't know what you call that. I'd call it a pretty sensible stance for us, frankly.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President has said again that he thinks the Russians won't negotiate on TNF until they're convinced that we are going to move forward in absolute agreement with the placement of missiles. And so he said that we are going to move forward.

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My question really is what's your hunch? Do you think the Russians at some point before next December will become convinced that we're serious and serious to negotiate or will it take an actual installation of cruise and even Pershing missiles to convince them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the thing that we and our Allies have control over is what we do and what stance we have. So what the statement basically says is that -- I hate to keep repeating myself -- that we're strong and we're determined and absent an agreement, there'll be deployment. And if there is an agreement at some level other than zero, then the -- whatever the agreement says will determine the level of deployment. I don't know that I'm quoting it exactly accurately; but that's the basic notion.

Now, that's what we have. And we can say this is going to be our pattern of behavior and put that forward and also say we're realy to negotiate.

Now, the question of whether there is an agreement or not will depend on how they react to the situation and that remains to be seen.

Q And you haven't an inkling as to whether they're going to become convinced before December or have to actually see those missiles go in place?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you always -- in any negotiation, you scratch your head and you look at your opposite side and you speculate about

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their situation. And, of course, we do that. And I think it only stands to reason that if they think they can get their objective without giving up anything themselves, well, they'll be delighted. But they should be convinced by now that they can't do that because there is a determined alliance here.

Now, how far along toward deployment dates we have to get or whether we have to actually deploy, I don't know what it takes to convince them of that fact. But by this time, I should think they'd be convinced because there's a very determined attitude.

Q Mr. Secretary, can we have an update on the U.S. position so far as continuing the negotiations even while the deployment proceeds? In other words, absent an agreement in December, when we are due to begin deploying cruises in Britain and in West Germany, is the United States prepared to keep talking? In other words, inferentially is there a deadline of any sort, a cut-off? Are they prepared to keep talking and even talk past where the ceiling might be and have to scale down?

And, secondly, we --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Why don't you let me answer that question.

Q All right.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll forget these questions. I'm sort of tired. If I don't take them -- You can have the next one.

I think the Vice President said during his trip to Europe some months ago, four or five months ago, that we would negotiate to get the numbers reduced as far as possible. What has been proposed now and is being put forward in Geneva by Ambassador Nitze is an interim agreement, that idea. We continue to think that the best answer is zero, and after, if deployments take place, after they've taken place, we're quite prepared to continue to negotiate and to try to attain zero if we can.

So, the negotiating end of things remains something we're continually interested in.

Q Secondly, we --

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q It's a brief question. Brief -- Secondly, we've accused the Soviets of not really having a moratorium on SS-20's, as they've claimed they've had. What is our latest count? At what rate are they deploying SS-20's -- at the same clip they were before they went into their alleged moratorium?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have a number right on the top of my mind or a rate of change or something like that, but I know that -- I pick up intelligence reports fairly frequently that identify more SS-20 deployments in one place or another. So, it's a continuing process.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the subject of East-West trade, could you characterize how satisfied are you with the language of this communique? Do you think that anything was achieved here that had not been stated previously at Versailles and other --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The language in the communique basically refers to things that have been worked out or processes that are underway. And it -- I forget the language -- it notes them with approval or something like that on the one hand and calls for a continuing effort on the other.

So, we regard this process of identifying the security aspects of East-West trade and doing something about them as a continuing process. And there have been good, strong meetings having to do with COCOM. There, I think, has been a very clear identification of the undesirability of over-dependence in the field of energy on the East and the importance of developing Western sources of energy.

There has been a good base started under the OECD auspices of gathering information on trade and financial flows, as was called for in the Versailles summit,and the beginnings of analysis of that that I think is a very constructive -- In the OECD ministerial meeting, the statement was made and agreed to by all that the trade outside the strictly security area ought to take place on the basis of market considerations and that there shouldn't be preferential treatment.

And, in addition to that, the study going on in NATO seems to be

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moving well. We will discuss that the week after next. So I cannot say that that is something that has been discussed like these others at the Ministerial level.

But on the whole, I think there has been a lot of activity. And the important thing is that, out of all the discussion and lots of disagreements and arguments to be sure -- but out of all that a kind of generality of view has emerged -- and we discussed this in the plenary sessions -- of the importance of this area and the general line of effort that we should be making and are making. So I think it is a very good thing that has emerged. And everybody is, basically, on board.

Q Mr. Secretary, a couple of days ago, you mentioned to us the dangerous situation in the Middle East, especially the aggressive behavior of the Syrians. Both on that front and on the other dangers which the world is facing right now, whether they be East-West or the Middle East and Central America, what can you report that was done here that might have contributed to some amelioration of the troubles of this world?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think a great deal. First of all, in the security area, I think emphasizing all of the points that I have talked about already -- I will not repeat them -- sends out a very powerful and strong message: strength, determination, willingness to negotiate, and so forth.

And the last paragraph -- I wish I had it here; I would read it again to you -- it is a very strong statement. Anyway, I think that is very important. And it sets that dimension out strongly.

Now, the communique today -- or the agreement today that was read by the President on behalf of all the heads addresses itself to economic issues. And it identifies the importance of recovery. It takes note of problems, does not duck them. I think that reflects the realism of the discussion that was held. It was a considerable discussion that Secretary Regan had lots to say in on debt problems and what we are doing and what the additional things are that can be done. The problems of the developing world were talked about, and the importance of the connection between the industrial countries and the developing world is addressed in the communique. And all this set in the values that we stand for, I think presents a picture of a group of countries that are deeply concerned, capable, have resources, will use them, know how to use them, determined. I think it is a very strong message, both to ourselves and our own people and the people around the world about the kind of leadership that the world is going to get from the countries represented here.

And I might say, also, the countries who are associated with them, because the EC was represented in the form of Gaston Thorn. So actually there are countries indirectly represented beyond those that were literally sitting there.

Last question.

Q The European Community recently announced an increase in the agriculture-export subsidies. And Sir Roy Denman has said that those are non-negotiable areas. Does Item 3 here indicate a change in position by the EC to negotiate those export subsidies and a pledge of the United States to hold back on protectionist moves?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The particular negotiations about agricultural trade going on with the EC are ongoing negotiations. They were only referred to very tangientially.

There was no attempt to take up that negotiation here. I think that would have been totally inappropriate. That is in the hands of people doing the negotiating. And I think it is a critical and important negotiation. And as for any immediate wrinkle in it, I cannot say that I have been looking into this in the last few days. So I do not have any comment on anything that may have happened very recently. But it is an important negotiation. And my involvement with it really was last December trying to get this round started. And I think there have been some good results already. Although, as a negotiation, it is very much in process. So probably, that is the place to leave it.

Thank you.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Could you finish on Don's question, please -- on the Middle East, sir? Don asked --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: His question was a very broad one. But on the tensions in Syria as such, I would say from our intelligence reports, the level of tension seems to have subsided a little bit. At least, that is the indication from the activity that we are tracking.

Q Was there any consensus on the Middle East?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:51 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Williamsburg, Virginia)

For Immediate Release May 30, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY DONALD REGAN

The White House Press Briefing Room
The College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia

3:52 P.M. EDT

SECRETARY REGAN: I don't think I really need an opening statement. You've heard the President's statement. The significance, I think, of this is that the leaders of the world have agreed on an economic policy designed to complete recovery for the rest of the world. I think that they have laid down specifics for us as finance ministers in order to carry this out. As you know, there was an annex attached called Strengthening Economic Cooperation for Growth and Stability. That's the entire theme of what the financial and economic types will be working on between now and the next summit and we have been given specific instructions to try to halt protectionism, to be particularly alert to the debt burdens of the developing nations, to start a process to see whether in due course we should have a high-level international monetary conference, to keep open markets, and to conserve energy, to encourage the development of technology and the like. And if those things are done, the opinion of the leaders is that we probably -- by the time of the next conference, we'll be well on our way to a complete recovery worldwide.

Why don't I take questions.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q You just said that discussions were being conducted to see if we should have a high-level monetary conference. Is that a contradiction to point five? I read that as saying there will be a high-level international monetary --

SECRETARY REGAN: If you read what it says and let me put my emphasis -- they've invited the Ministers of Finance, in consultation with the managing director of the IMF, Jacques Laroussier, to define the conditions for improving the international monetary system -- that stands by itself -- and to consider the part which might in due course be played in this process by a high-level international monetary conference. That's no different from what I just said.

Q Is the United States opposed to the calling of a high-level monetary conference?

SECRETARY REGAN: No, we're going to consider whether in due course what part that would be played in that process.

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Q Mr. Secretary, the French say this is a clear mandate to hold such a conference at sometime in the future. Is that a correct interpretation of that?

Q Question?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question is, "The French say -- " and I don't know who the French are in this respect, which one of them is saying this, but I would say that what we are -- that the French say that this is a clear mandate to hold a conference in the future. I would say, I'd stick on this, that we're going to consider what part might be played in due course by a high-level international monetary conference.

Q The French are all saying that the statement about the finance ministers meeting two or three times a year for multi-lateral surveillance with the Director-General of the IMF, the managing director of the IMF, represents some new implementation that goes somewhat beyond Versailles because they will be empowered to make recommendations regarding intervention in the monetary markets to the various nations. Is that in fact novel?

SECRETARY REGAN: I would say that what the Heads of State were saying to the finance ministers is that you should meet more often, that you should make certain that all nations are on a course, in their economic policies, that make their economies converge which means that if someone is out of step, you say it. I think that that process started at Versailles. It will now be strengthened and improved. We had two meetings last year. We probably will have a few more this year.

Yes? One over here and then I'll come back.

Q I have two questions. One, in these meetings of finance ministers with the manager director, would there be some ministers from developing countries invited?

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SECRETARY REGAN: No. The question is: "In this meeting with the managers, Managing Director of the IMF, would there be people, or representatives or developing countries?" No. If you look at the annex to the Versailles Summit statement or communique, there it said with emphasis on the nations whose currencies make up the SDR. That is, the so-called G-5 nations: Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, the United States. That is the G-5 group; those are the currencies that make up the SDR.

Yes? Right here.

Q Mr. Secretary, the French Finance Minister said last night that there was a common front against the United States on the subject of interest rates. Is that the case?

SECRETARY REGAN: Well, again, that may have come through in the translation. There was -- I wouldn't say a "front" against us -- because I asked him about that. That's why I inquired. I said "What is this common front?" He said, "There's no front against you, it's a common question that is asked constantly of the United States, 'When are you going to get your interest rates down?'"

So there was no confrontation. It was not a "front" in that sense of the word.

Q Well, does any of them accept your argument against linking deficits and high interest rates?

SECRETARY REGAN: They were skeptical, but they offered no proof to dissuade me. (Laughter.)

Q Do you have any proof? -- to persuade them?

SECRETARY REGAN: Pardon?

Q Do you have any proof to persuade them?

SECRETARY REGAN: We think so, and I'm going to furnish it to them.

Back over here.

Q Mr. Secretary, how does it come to pass that the only method mentioned in the communique for reducing budget deficits is to limit the growth of expenditures?

SECRETARY REGAN: That's the proper way to do it. That's why it's mentioned in here.

Q Nobody mentioned raising taxes as another method?

SECRETARY REGAN: You must remember, they have economically trained people, they recognize the proper way to get budget deficits down is to cut expenditures.

Q Did anyone suggest raising taxes?

SECRETARY REGAN: I beg your pardon?

Q Did anyone suggest raising revenue?

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SECRETARY REGAN: Not to me they didn't suggest raising revenue.

Q To the President, did they?

SECRETARY REGAN: Not to the President, they didn't suggest raising revenue.

Q Was there a great deal of discussion on unemployment? And how to reduce it?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes there was. There was quite a bit of discussion about unemployment as being the number one burden of most of the nations. And --

Q Have a crack at him. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY REGAN: (Laughter.) No. How to go about it -- one of the things that, particularly in the Finance Minister's sessions that we discussed, was the fact of the rigidity of the Western European economies -- the large smoke-stacked companies, their concentration that way -- that these do not provide new jobs. As you know, in the United States, over -- well, close to 70 percent of our new jobs -- come from firms with less than 100 employees. And most of these are not in the area of -- oh, let's say steel making, or things of that nature. It's more light industry, service industry, things of that nature.

They also recognized that this is true in Japan, and they're going to have to try to figure out in Western Europe, in order to cut down their unemployment, how they can go about creating new companies in order to get more of their workers employed by these companies.

Back there.

Q You and the other Finance Ministers had prepared two drafts of this exchange rate provision. Now, can you tell us a little bit about how the second one was -- how the heads chose the second one? Was it just by --

SECRETARY REGAN: I'm not sure I follow. Which, which paragraph, or which statement are you referring to?

Q Paragraph five on --

SECRETARY REGAN: Paragraph five?

Q -- on exchange rates.

SECRETARY REGAN: This is a common technique in drafting communiques, when those who are the drafters and who are not the final decision-makers, come to a point of disagreement; and, they spend enough time on it to recognize that there are different versions and neither side is going to be able to give in order to be able to coalesce them. So, the natural thing to do is to send both of them up for decision by the senior people who are, would be accepting the statement -- in this case the heads of the nations.

And it was debated around the table as to which version was preferable. Wait a minute, there's a question over here. Go ahead.

Q Well, who took what position?

Q On the debt situation of the LDC's, this document seems to deal with this problem on a medium-term basis. But, when those countries are trying to pay their bills tomorrow, would the governments involved in the conference here -- would be they, they have a disposition to help those countries financially with official loans to those countries to try to get them -- to have them waiting for this decision that could come in the near future?

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SECRETARY REGAN: The question is about the debt of the less developed countries, the statement being made that -- the statement of the heads from Williamsburg here seems to be more of a medium-term solution. What about the short-range solution? How are they going to pay their bills? The answer to that is that there is a certain amount of official development assistance through IDA, through the World Bank, and through the IMF programs that is available in the short term. These are liquidity problems. And these loans are and have been made available. There are over 35 programs now under way in the IMF. IDA is distributing about $3 billion or $4 billion a year in concessional loans. So that's the short-term solution. What we're trying for here is more of a medium-term solution. How do they get out of this precarious situation they're in, wherein they have incurred large debts in relation to their foreign exchange earnings. How do we increase the foreign exchange earnings? The obvious answer is for them to export more into the industrialized countries.

Q But I mean the governments, I mean through the central banks. Like are they --

SECRETARY REGAN: The central banks -- the question also is -- he means through the central banks. Central banks are not set up to make loans to individual countries. That is not their function.

Yes. You have -- go ahead, you.

Q Mr. Secretary, getting back to the question of the International Monetary Conference in Paragraph 5, the -- I understand the version that was not put in the text made no specific reference to a monetary conference. Was the inclusion of that phrase a concession to French sensitivities?

SECRETARY REGAN: No. The French said that it would be better to put it in from that point of view. The subject was debated as to whether or not that phraseology might suggest more than was intended. But after listening to the French description that this did not -- was not an intention of that, it was agreed that that reference to it could be made.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: Actually, it was Chancellor Kohl that suggested the compromise.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q Over here. (Laughter.) You mentioned yesterday that there was a $17 billion growth in the money supply over the past three weeks.

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q Does that mean in your mind that that conforms -- that American monetary policy conforms with this objective, namely, as stated in this communique, discipline, non-inflationary growth, and monetary aggregates?

SECRETARY REGAN: The question is, I mentioned yesterday

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there was a $17 billion increase in the M 1 in the United States in the last three weeks. Does that square with the discipline, non-inflationary monetary growth called for in this statement?

I would say that we all recognize that M 1 has been loose, but it's -- and above its target, but for many technical reasons. And the intention is to get it back there. M 2, which is used by most nations of the world to measure their money supply, in the United States M 2 is below its target range, so definitely it's in a non-inflationary way.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY REGAN: I can take one more. Then I have to go to a bilateral.

Q Can I follow up on this?

SECRETARY REGAN: Go ahead, you, right here.

Q Mr. Secretary, in Paragraph 9 in today's statement, it is said that East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests. Security interests defined by whom?

SECRETARY REGAN: By the Western nations here at the summit.

Q Yes, but the Europeans and the --

Q Question.

SECRETARY REGAN: Oh, the question? The question is in Paragraph 9, East-West economic relationships should be compatible with our security's interests. And the question was, whose definition of security's interests? Our own definition of what we think our security interest is. What else?

Q Western Europeans, or in -- the Americans?

SECRETARY REGAN: Both. All seven summit nations.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY REGAN: Yes.

Q If I could follow that up, does that mean that the problems that the United States and Europe have had over East-West trade are going to disappear?

SECRETARY REGAN: I would say -- I'm not sure that problems ever disappear -- but I would certainly say that the problems have been lessened by the actions that have been taken recently and certainly since the Versailles Summit between Versailles and Williamsburg. That was noted this morning, how much smoother those relationships are as far as the West is concerned.

Q Did this summit lessen the concerns that the delegations have brought and mentioned -- Mrs. Thatcher and the -- there were a couple of mentions yesterday in the sessions over the Export Administration Act. Have these discussions lessened --

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SECRETARY REGAN: Well, that has nothing to do with -- The Export Administration Act has little to do with that Paragraph 9. That's an entirely different interpretation.

They are concerned about the Export Administration Act; but since it hasn't passed the Congress yet, they merely wanted to register those concerns so that their feelings might be considered by us in our considerations.

I'm sorry. I have to go to another meeting.

Q Has your policy on intervention changed? It says "helpful," "when helpful." Dces that still mean disorderly markets or not?

SECRETARY REGAN: We will be acting in accordance with this statement. (Laughter.)

END 4:08 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release June 1, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
MR. EDWIN MEESE, III,
COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT;
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,
MALCOLM BALDRIGE;
U.S. SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROCK;
AND SENATOR WILLIAM ROTH

The Briefing Room

10:20 A.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We have with us Ed Meese, Ambassador Brock, Secretary Baldrige, Senator Roth, who will discuss the details of the creation of the new Department of International Trade and Industry. The ground rules are this is on the record for sound and camera. Ed Meese will read a statement from the President to begin the briefing and that statement will be available at the conclusion of the briefing. You've also been given a fact sheet and the joint statement. And also there will be a press release from Senator Roth which will be available in the press room at the conclusion of the briefing. We'll begin with Mr. Meese.

MR. MEESE: Thank you, Pete. I'm glad to see that all you refugees from Williamsburg have made it back and are all rested. This has been the result of several weeks of work and I will read the statement from the President.

"In recent years, international trade has become increasingly central to the American economy. Today one out of every eight American manufacturing jobs is related to exports. Every billion dollars in export supports some 25,000 jobs. The President is proud of the team that has been brought to Washington to work on trade issues. We have come to believe, through our experience, that the executive branch can and should be better organized to tackle the issues on this front and in the future.

"Today I am pleased to announce plans that would place responsibility for both trade policy-making and implementation in a single department. This new department can not only provide a leaner, more efficient and better coordinated approach to international trade but can also help us in achieving many key objectives.

"These are, first of all, a healthy and open system of international trade, the expansion of United States exports, the reduction of overseas barriers so that American firms can compete more effectively abroad, the encouragement of the private sector to seek out more opportunities overseas, and of great importance, ensuring that America speaks with a single unified voice in trade and industrial matters. I urge the Congress to enact this plan into law as swiftly as possible."

I'll turn it over to Senator Roth and then after he's through we'll all be prepared to answer your questions.

SENATOR ROTH: Thank you, Ed.

I'm very pleased to be here today with my good friend, Ambassador Brock, Mac Baldrige, as well as Ed Meese. I think a Department of International Trade and Industry is an

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idea whose time has come. It's important that we organize today for the problems of tomorrow. If we don't act now, the problem is we'll have to react later. But I'm pleased that we've been able to reach agreement on what I call a lean and mean Department of International Trade and Industry. I believe it's a proposal that will develop, coalesce bipartisan support in the Congress as well as in the private sector.

As I say, it's important to organize now for the '80's and 90's. Make no mistake: Trade is the engine of future growth. Today trade of goods and services makes up 22 percent -- 22 percent of our gross national product. For every single billion dollars of increased exports, we create something like 25,000 jobs. Between 1977 and 1980, four out of every five new jobs were export-oriented. A strong organization is the key to strong policy. We've had a two-headed monster and we're trying to create a single voice for trade. In my opinion, we have a Model-T apparatus --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: One-headed monster.

Q One-headed monster. (Laughter.)

SENATOR ROTH: Now, we'll have a one-headed monster. (Laughter.)

Q -- probably his speechwriter. (Laughter.)

SENATOR ROTH: But anyway -- I see my old speechwriter over there. (Laughter.)

But anyway, what we are creating is a lean, mean trade department. We want the necessary institutional underpinning for detailed analysis, product by product, country by country. We want to anticipate both opportunities and problems rather than react.

So, I'm pleased to be here today because I think America wants jobs and trade means jobs.

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MR. MEESE: Mac, would you like to say something?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: No, I think we just answer questions.

Q Nobody starts. (Laughter.)

MR. ROUSSEL: That's not what he said.

Q No, I was thinking, do you like to hear from --

Q -- who's going to be the Secretary?

MR. MEESE: Would you like to hear from the two heads? (Laughter.)

Q Who's going to be in charge? I mean --

Q Who's going to take the ball?

Q Who's going to be in charge, and what happens to the other one?

Q Are you guys going to just fight it out?

Q Are you going to flip a coin or --

MR. MEESE: As you know, we never talk about personnel matters until we're ready to make an announcement. (Laughter.)

Q All the experts say Baldrige wins -- your baby. You went into the Oval Office one day, blind-sided him, said, "Here. Sign here."

Q And the other goes to the Civil Rights Commission. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Let me tell you, Sam, that's --

MR. MEESE: Only because the EPA's taken, Bruce.

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Sam, that's not true. The President's had this idea for a long, long time. This is not something brand new, number one. Number two, there hasn't been any discussion about who's going to head up the new department. May be either one of us or may be neither of us. That just hasn't been decided yet.

Q How about a calf-roping contest to see who wins?

Q Excuse me, what are the options for --

MR. MEESE: Any serious questions?

Q What are the options for placement of the Census Bureau? Is Labor the likely department that it would go into or --

MR. MEESE: That's being worked out. We haven't decided. There are a number of options under consideration. But that was one that has not been resolved, and that's why we have not specified that in the fact sheet. Actually, as you know, the Bureau of the Census really works for so many departments, and we're trying to figure out what is the best organizational placement.

Q How can you have -- consider trade all connected in one department when one of the largest areas of trade -- agricultural trade -- is out by itself?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, that's a real specialty. It's worked well. We didn't see any reason as long as it's working well to include that in the new department. What we're trying to do is get the making of general trade policy and the implementation of that policy in one department. And I think if you look back in history, there have been several steps in trade consolidation in the U.S. government over the last few years. It was a major step toward consolidation when some of the Treasury functions and some of the State Department functions were transferred to Commerce a few years back.

This is another step. There'll probably be other steps in the future, but this is the way we've decided for the time being.

Q Is this going to go the way of --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: -- if I can just add one thought to that, you'll notice in the fact sheet that the statement that this will include or -- I've forgotten precisely the words -- but, in fact, it said that the new department -- be structured around the functions of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

We have now the authority to do in USTR the agricultural negotiations and to coordinate trade policy, which includes agriculture. So, I don't think there's any proposed diminishment of that function at all in this. It does include all trade policy.

You're probably, I guess, referring to the fact that the FAS is not proposed to shift out of Agriculture, but that's a different issue. That's a matter of the field service itself but not the policy function or the negotiations. They will stay with the new department.

Q Ed, is this going to go --

Q -- State Department? Will you be --

MR. MEESE: Frank, then Andrea.

Q -- or how will this work?

MR. MEESE: Frank?

Q How will this work with regard to the State Department? State handles your foreign policy, of course. Will this Trade Department be in any conflict there? Will you coordinate or what will happen there?

MR. MEESE: No, it's basically -- will continue. As you know, some years ago, the trade negotiation function, which had been exercised at least in part by State was taken and put into the U.S. Trade Representative. And, so, this is taking what is established organizational policy and putting it together with those functions primarily in Commerce.

Let me go back on the Agriculture. There are always going to be specialty departments that have their specilized role that doesn't conflict, as Bill says. For example, in Energy -- Department of Energy will still retain certain functions of an international nature. But the overall, general trade policy and implementation will be in this department.

Q Is this going to have as much success on the Hill as reorganizing Energy and getting rid of Eduction?

MR. MEESE: We hope it will have considerably faster progress than has been indicated up until now in the other two departments, which still remain priorities of the administration.

Q -- a question for Mr. Brock. The summit declaration from Williamsburg called for a new GATT round. How soon do you think that that could be accomplished?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We suggested in Geneva last November -- I did -- that we start consideration then of

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at least a North-South round. And we have a work program in the GATT on agriculture, on safer services, safeguards, a number of other areas. Most of those have a deadline of about two years. We expect to complete most of those work efforts at the end of '84. So there's no reason we couldn't begin serious talks shortly thereafter, '85, maybe '86; but not much later than that.

Q Then it could actually get underway?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, I'm not sure that I would suggest you actually would be formally meeting in the negotiations. Because if you remember, it took us, what? About five or six years to go from the ministerial in '73 until we got into the actual Tokyo round talks. But there was a lot of preliminary conversation that was preparatory to that that led to those talks' success. So I think you could begin that preparatory work certainly no later than '85 and not too long after that, a year or two, maybe three at the most, you could have, I think, constructive negotiations. It depends on the attitude of others. We're ready to go now, most countries are not. So we have to understand that and take that into account.

Q And you're not just talking about a North-South round?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, no. I think we'd be talking about more than that. That was one of our proposals. That's why I mentioned it. But we, frankly, would like to have negotiations to create some rules in the area of services trade. We have proposed a lot of work in high technology, particularly in agriculture and on things like the safeguards close, some of which can be handled within the existing GATT structure; but others would require negotiations and services probably would, agriculture probably would, North-South would, I think, clearly.

Q Will the present Commerce Department be eliminated and, if so, when?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes, what we want to do here is end up in this process with one less Cabinet officer and one less Cabinet department; so that by taking some of the functions of the Commerce Department and the USTR, putting them together in this new department, there would be no Commerce Department left. And the USTR would be in the new department. And the rest of the present Commerce Department would be spun off to other areas.

Q Will this be all part of one piece of legislation, the demise of Commerce?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I believe it would. It would, wouldn't it, Senator?

SENATOR ROTH: Well, we haven't made any final decision. It could be combined into one bill or we could keep it separate, but they'll be on the same track.

Q Senator, would you tell us on that legislative point, where is the bill now and what are the prospects of getting Democratic support for it?

SENATOR ROTH: Well, the original bill that I introduced, of course, is in Government Affairs, of which I am Chairman. There has been a great deal of interest in a trade department, as you know, on both sides of the political aisle.

I think what we've come up with will provide the vehicle for our coalescing of support, bipartisan support. It's my hope that we can act in the Senate prior to our August recess and for the Congress to complete action this year.

Q Where does it stand in the House? Are you getting support from the Speaker or is that -- somebody negotiating for that?

SENATOR ROTH: Well, we're just beginning, or the -- on that side. We've been in discussion with government operations, which, of course, has jurisdiction, like government affairs has jurisdiction in the Senate. So we would hope that they would begin hearings in the near future. But that's, of course, up to their leadership.

Q You want the kind of bipartisan support you got, then, on -- for example, Social Security?

SENATOR ROTH: Yes -- I think -- We're very hopeful that we will get bipartisan support. For example, in the Senate we've had people like Moynihan introduce a bill, a number of others have co-sponsored my legislation, including Heinz.

Q Ambassador Brock, there have been some reports that your department was unhappy with the idea of a Department of Trade. Is that true?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We had expressed a modest amount of concern early on with the proposal which was made by some, not by those here present to simply merge USTR into the Commerce Department. That is not what is being proposed today. I think what we have suggested is a very different department, a very new department that, if you'll read the fact sheet carefully, does have -- maintained all of the functions of the U.S. Trade Representative. And I think that can work.

Q So you're satisified with what's coming out --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, of course.

Q Will STR keep a separate identity within this larger structure or will it pretty much be broken up along functional --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think -- It's my view, and I believe it's Mac's as well,

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that the new Secretary would be the U.S. Trade Representative, would be the nation's principal spokesman on trade and the principal negotiator on trade as the U.S.T.R. is today.

Q What about the people underneath you, the 150 or whatever?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: They are in the Office of the Secretary, as we have described on the chart which we handed out. It is a clear policy arm of the Secretary in the Secretary's Office.

Q So it would be a distinct view that --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, focused around the Secretary herself. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Meese said this is presently envisioned. Is this going to mean that bureaucracy will grow or get smaller? And related to that, will -- lose their jobs as a result?

MR. MEESE: Well, we anticipate that the bureaucracy will get smaller, that people doing similar functions at both U.S.T.R. and Commerce will be merged. And this will be -- and as far as anybody losing their job, but we have enough attrition in the government to accommodate this, I would think, in the course of implementation.

The main thing is that from the standpoint of both foreign countries as well as our own business community and exporting community, this gives them a clear-cut single place to which they relate and which will be able to carry out the President's policies on trade. I think it's important to note that most other countries have a similar arrangement and that's why we feel this will be a much better and more effective way of dealing with foreign governments.

Q Can you give us an example of why this present situation doesn't work and cases where trade deals have fallen through because of having the functions separate?

MR. MEESE: Well, I would refer to Mack on this. I don't know whether we can give you specific examples, but we have had a number of comments from people who are in the day-to-day business that they're uncertain as to where to go or they are -- or much of the time they feel they have to go both places. But, Mac, why don't you comment specifically --

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: I guess it takes too much time to be as efficient as the taxpayers deserve, number one. And, number two, there are inevitable gray areas in -- when you have the policymaking in one department and the carrying out of the policy in the others. It's too easy to fault the other department. If the accountability is in the same place, then that helps greatly in the management.

I might add that every other Cabinet department in the United States government is organized that way now. Trade is the only Cabinet area function that doesn't have policymaking and policy implementation in the same department.

And another point. Every one of our industrialized trading partners and competitors, with a possible exception of Canada, also has policymaking for trade and policy implementation in the same department, even including the Peoples Republic of China where I've just come back from and I -- they asked me there about this plan. And they said, "Oh, we've done that some years ago." And they've had 4,000 years of bureaucratic experience to back that up.

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Q Secretary Baldrige, let me ask you --

Q Mr. Secretary, were --

Q Go ahead.

Q -- foreign governments and foreign traders coming to you and telling you as well that they didn't know whom they should be dealing with?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: They're too sophisticated for that, but let's say -- and I'm sure Bill would agree with me on this, because we talked about it -- a foreign government typically now will go and call on both the U.S.T.R. and the Secretary of Commerce. And our own industrial associations and individual companies will do the same thing. And if they find one of us, let's say, a bit more sympathetic toward the cause, then they'll bring in all their guns and try and do business at that agency. Meese, Bill and I have to do so much coordination. I don't know what his estimate is, but my estimate is it takes up about 10, 15 percent of our time just to do simple coordinating things so we don't get blind-sided along the way. And that is not an efficient way to do business. And it's not the way any other Cabinet department does business.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you agree with those who believe the real GNP rate for the second quarter will be 5 or 6 percent?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Yes, sir.

Q Why?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, because I think it's going to happen, Sam. The first quarter we still had -- you know, when we kept -- the GNP went up 2.5 --

Q Five.

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: -- percent, we were still having inventory draw-downs of some size. And that has a depressing effect on the GNP, but it also makes a springboard for the later quarters. And I think we'll have over 5 percent this quarter and probably the next quarter, too. So we ought to hit our estimate for the year of 4.7 percent fourth quarter at fourth quarter.

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Q Could it go higher? I mean, six, and even seven percent?

SECRETARY BALDRIGE: Well, if you had to put a bet down, you'd probably bet it could go a little higher. I feel very good about our overall estimate, because I think it was realistic, conservative, and it's in the same line as most of the outside economists.

Q Ed, do you think that Chancellor Kohl will be able to bring back some Soviet willingness to meet in a summit?

MR. MEESE: I think it's important to note that Chancellor Kohl is going over there for his own visit. He is not going over as our emissary. And, what he will do is, I'm sure, come out of that with some further ideas from his face-to-face meeting with Mr. Andropov. But, he is not going over there as an emissary or as someone who is trying to arrange a summit on our behalf. The decisions as to when, and if, a summit is appropriate will be made by the President on the basis of our own contacts with the Soviet Union.

Q Do you get the sense that Chancellor Kohl feels that we should be a little bit more willing to move into a summit, and not demand so much assurances of the come-out?

MR. MEESE: I think that he feels that a summit would be desirable, but he is -- in the meetings that we had with him there -- was very understanding, and agreed -- and agreed with the President's assessment that you don't just have a summit for the sake of having an occasion and that there should be some constructive outcome that would develop from that summit and not just be a perfunctory meeting.

Q I judge that you're not quarreling with the idea that Chancellor Kohl may develop some ideas which you'll be interested in hearing. You're only quarelling with the description of him as taking a message or being an emissary for the United States?

MR. MEESE: That's correct. If he comes back with any interesting information, we'll be glad to hear it.

MR. ROUSSEL: Let's take Bob Ellison then make that the last one.

MR. MEESE: Yes. Let me also, just go back though, I think Mac would agree in your assessment of the first quarter GNP, that one of the very productive signs was the fact that the private sector portion of the GNP actually increased more than the 2.5. I think it was in excess of 5 percent growth in the private sector, and that a part of that was the decrease in governmental purchases during that period of time, both of which bode well for the future. So, I think a 5.2 increase in the private sector component of the GNP was a very favorable sign which lends credence to what the Secretary has said about the future.

Q You've given us a lot of information about the relationship between jobs and trade. Do you have information as to how much in trade we're losing as a result of our current procedures, or, how much in trade will be gained under this Department of Trade, or how many jobs will be added as a result of this reorganization?

MR. MEESE: I'll ask the two experts here, but, let me just say preliminarily that trade is sufficiently complex that you cannot say a single governmental reorganization is going to make a change in either the amount of trade or the number of jobs.

The purpose of the governmental reorganization is to be able to facilitate the private sector trade to its fullest. And that, in the long run, is what's going to produce the jobs and produce the increased trade.

What we don't want to do, however, is to have a government organizational situation that is cumbersome, or that fails to get the utmost out of what the government can do as far as supporting trade.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I guess that's about it.

MR. ROUSSEL: Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:46 A.M. EDT

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE IVORY COAST

June 6, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:05 A.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: On the meeting that the President and the President of the Ivory Coast will have tomorrow, we have two senior administration officials.

There will be some opening remarks. And then they will be open for your questions.

This will be a background briefing attributable to administration officials.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

Q Does it have to be background?

Q Are you going to tell us any secrets?

Q What is wrong with on the record?

MR. ALLIN: This is the way we always do these briefings before and after meetings.

Q So what?

MR. ALLIN: And we would like to continue it.

Q There is nothing wrong with changing.

MR. ALLIN: We will talk about it later.

Q I thought the President did not want any backgrounders anymore.

MR. ALLIN: Go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Laughter.) I will do the best I can for you.

The man whom President Reagan will welcome to the White House tomorrow is one of the outstanding, moderate statesmen of Africa. A planter and a former doctor, he is very close to the land and to the people. And his principal concern today is development -- economic development -- involving all the people, and economic development as a prerequisite to withstanding or resisting tensions and any subversive actions that might take place in his country.

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President Felix Houphouet-Boigny has led -- in fact, managed -- Ivory Coast since its independence from France in 1960. But for at least 16 years before that, he was politically active. In about 1945, he was elected Deputy to the French Constituent Assembly. And during a couple of years of the succeeding 14 years, he was actually a Minister in the French government.

Ivory Coast, under his leadership, is one of the true success stories of Africa. It is considered to have the best distribution of wealth in sub-Saharan Africa.

Now, President Houphouet has done all of this on the basis of agricultural development and education. And even back in the mid-40s when he was becoming politically active, these were his two principal concerns. They are today his two principal concerns, inspite of the fact that some petroleum has been discovered and is being produced in Ivory Coast.

Today, this country is the world's largest producer of cocoa, and the world's third largest producer of coffee. President Houphouet is firmly attached to free enterprise. He not only practices it, he preaches it. And his government has, perhaps, one of the most open investment codes of any Third World country.

The attachment to France is very strong, with reason. He and French President Mitterrand served together in the government back in the 40s and early 50s. So they are long-standing friends. France has served Ivory Coast in providing technical assistance, actual budgetary support whenever it was needed -- and that has been very seldom in the case of this country -- as well as advisors to the government and teachers.

President Houphouet has seen the advantage of maintaining close ties to France. And he has always said that he will continue to do so as long as he feels Ivory Coast has need of that expertise. So there is tremendous loyalty between the two countries. France is still the strongest trading partner and, by far, the largest aid donor. The United States is, now, in second place in trade for both exports and imports.

I might just mention a few things about the domestic, political situation. Two years ago, President Houphouet introduced what he likes to call "democratization."

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This was in the year of national elections meaning election of the President, elections for the new deputies in the National Assembly and also municipal elections.

For the first time in the country's history, two years ago, the President and his government decided to permit any candidate who wanted to run for office to do so. Before that time, the party, the single political party in the country, had always blessed a slate of candidates and the electorate simply voted on the one man for the one job. This time, in 1981, about 650 individuals stood for 146 Assembly seats and about 80 percent of the deputies were turned out of office. This is quite remarkable. And Houphouet has had some cause for concern. This had never happened before and there were a number of disappointed candidates. So, there has been a long process of what he calls reconciliation -- reconciliation of all the candidates. But he works very carefully, as is his style, with all parties in any kind of dispute, toward a peaceful and harmonious resolution. So, many of these feuds often based upon family rivalries have been settled and he's in the process of settling others.

On the plane of foreign relations, Ivory Coast is outspokenly anti-communist, principally because he doesn't like others to export their revolution. He broke relations with the Soviet Union in 1969 and has not re-established them. He just established relations with Beijing in March of this year.

U.S.-Ivorian relations have been, and still are, very close and friendly. Ivory Coast looks to this administration to pose a real block to further Soviet expansion in Africa, either directly or through its surrogates, Libya and Cuba. We have no bilateral aid program in Ivory Coast nor do we have a Peace Corps program. The aid program was terminated some years ago. They do benefit from certain regional African programs that we have going. There are many and varied cultural exchanges between the two countries. Ivory Coast is sending under government scholarship more and more of its young people to take graduate degrees in those fields where they know we are superior -- agronomy, engineering, business administration and so forth.

Our private sector, American private sector, is growing. Esso and Phillips Petroleum are the two operating companies or the lead companies in oil consortia, petroleum consortia, now producing oil. And we have very good bank exposure. There are six of the big American banks there and a number of other commercial activities.

In short, we would like for this visit to result in several things. We see it as an opportunity to recognize the outstanding moderate leadership of President Houphouet-Boigny over the years to acknowledge his influence with other African leaders, to acknowledge the values which we share. It's an opportunity to reaffirm our government's encouragement to the American private sector, both commercial, business, and academic,

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to intensify their own activities in Ivory Coast. The country is tailor made for private sector activity.

We hope, also, that President Houphouet-Boigny will return to his country with an enhanced or a stronger stance on particular international issues which are of concern to both of us. Ivory Coast positions in the United Nations are generally moderate and generally coincide with our own.

Finally, we hopw that in our discussion at several levels with the Ivoirians here, during the visit, that President Houphouet-Boigny and his government, his ministers, will return with a better understanding of the U.S. government's point of view on commodity pricing, which really is the only issue between our two governments. Ivory Coast feels, in effect, that the Western countries, particularly the world's largest consumer of cocoa and coffee, the United States, should make more of an effort to help arrange commodity pricing which will provide remunerative prices to the Africans. And we, on the other hand, have never felt and do not feel today that government intervention in the fixing of prices is a good thing. This is the subject of long discussion between us and it will continue during this visit, I imagine.

I think I'd like to ask -- Excuse me.

Q Are you ready for questions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wanted to give my colleague an opportunity to say anything that might come to mind, and then we'd both be happy to take your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd only add that we see the visit as an opportunity, not only to show our interest and appreciation for the cooperation which we have had from President Houphouet-Boigny and his government through the years, but also to underline the importance that this administration places on the Francophone African states. Houphouet is the doyen of the Francophone African leaders. They are in the main moderates. They have been supportive of the United States, not only during the current administration, but in the past. And we've orchestrated a series of gestures to try to convey to them our appreciation for their support and to encourage it in the future.

Q Franco what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Francophone -- French speaking states of West Africa -- excuse me -- West and Central Africa.

Q What is the rationalization for his spending so many millions or billions of francs to build a new capital in his home village?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say that at the time he spent most of the money that he has spend on Yamoussoukro, there was no thought, at least in Abidjan as a whole, of making Yamoussoukro the political capital. This suggestion emerged only this year and was quickly implemented through a National Assembly decision or vote. Houphouet is, as I mentioned earlier, is a planter and he was a wealthy man before he ever became President of his country. I can't say how much of the money came out of the government coffers and how much might have been his own, but he does have extensive holdings.

Q Well, he's turning a village into a capital city. What is the cost of --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At least the village is there. In some countries there isn't even a village, I guess, when the new capital is --

Q Well, Washington started out as a village, too, but what is the cost of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, the cost is billions more than they have today. This decision has been taken. In practice, it is already a political capital. The economic capital will remain in Abidjan, which means the business community will stay there. And, presumably, for a while the hub of the communications and transportation arrangements will be in Abidjan. But he is already receiving African heads of state in Yamoussoukro and holding party meetings. It's only another step or two before the National Assembly might meet there. Perhaps he will begin calling ambassadors there.

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But as far as increasing the infrastructure, which is already in place, the government is not in a position, a financial position, to accomplish that at this time. It will be several years, we expect, before that can --

Q Has he ever faced opposition? Has he ever permitted opposition or -- is he a dictator? He's been in power since '60. I mean, has he ever had an opposition that he permitted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say that there have been early incidents of opposition. There were -- There was evidence of coup plotting in 1963. Another coup plot was uncovered in 1973. These were young junior officers. He has just released the central coup plotter from the 1973 coup.

There is a lot of dissatisfaction in the country because of unemployment. This country is going through financial difficulties, like many others in the world. So the jobs are not available. The cost of living continues to rise.

Q But he's never permitted an opposition candidate to run against him in an election, has he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I mentioned, he has never -- the party has never permitted candidates which it had not blessed first to run. It's only been since 1981 that this is possible. And in his large national council meetings where he presents his point of view and takes questions and takes statements from spokesmen for the various socio-professional groups making up the party, criticism does emerge.

Criticism, for example, of the educational system. Their system has favored the liberal arts, the humanities and has prepared a lot of Ivorians to become doctors and lawyers for whom there simply are not enough jobs. He is revamping his educational system and bringing in foreign teachers of math and science to overcome what he sees as a real block for a lot of the people.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I make a point, please --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Surely.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a country with a multitude of ethnic groups and apprehension that if there were to be party politics it would divide on ethnic lines and that there would be violence between the ethnic groups. Within the single party, there's a considerable amount of democracy. The Ivory Coast is not a police state by anyone's stretch of the imagination. And all observers concede that if there were to be an election that Houphouet would be the winner hands down.

Q Then why doesn't he submit to it?

Q But the answer is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because they don't other than one --

Q -- no, there has never been an opposition party, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- party and the party only proposes one candidate for the presidency. But there are contested elections both for party and for government office at lower levels.

Q Do you mean tribal as opposed to ethnic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Same thing.

Q I see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In Africa we call it "tribes." In Europe, we call it "ethnic groups." It's the same thing.

Q But nobody has ever opposed this guy for President, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right, yes.

Q I was wondering, are you concerned about future stability in the Ivory Coast considering the recent wave of teachers' strikes as well as the fact that Houphouet-Boigny is now pretty old and there's no method of choosing a successor?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a method of choosing a successor. A week or so after his election in '81, re-election in '81, there was a constitutional amendment passed establishing the position of vice presidency. This position is, as yet, unfilled. And, frankly, it does cause concern among Ivorians about the future when Houphouet has passed from the scene.

Q How old is he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will be 78 in October.

Q You mentioned earlier that we wanted the Ivory Coast to take a stronger stand in some international affairs. Could you be a lot more specific as to what you meant?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- What I meant to say, if I didn't, was that we wanted a reinforced, moderate stance on international issues. For example, Ivory Coast has always resisted efforts in the United Nations and its specialized agencies to strip Israel of its credientials. And they have been very supportive of the United States on the Puerto Rico question.

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Q -- South Africa?

Q What's their position on Namibia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, I believe this gentleman --

Q What's their position on Namibia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They, like all other Africans I know anything about, are keen to have Namibian independence take place as soon as possible.

Q But they don't believe in linkage, do they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they don't believe in linkage. They do understand, we believe, what it is that we're trying to do. But there is a sense of frustration among the Africans that Namibian independence is approaching slowly.

Q They approve our close tie --

Q What is their relationship with South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I beg your pardon?

Q What is their relationship with South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They don't maintain diplomatic ties with --

Q But don't airplanes from South Africa land there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have no passenger rides. It's a bunkering --

Q -- re-fuel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Ivorians are somewhat unusual in that they have -- the President, himself, has espoused the need for dialogue among groups that don't agree with each other and he feels that that includes the South Africans. And they approve of the process in which we are engaged, seeking to achieve Namibian independence, via dialogue with all of the parties, including the South Africans.

Q Will the President be able to report any progress on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No dramatic breakthrough, no.

Q So, they're not going to get anything on commodities pricing because of a divergence of philosophy? Or is there something being worked out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure that both our President and our Secretary of State will express understanding for their position and concern. The commodity pricing issue goes -- transcends our bilateral relationship, of course. It involves other governments and other -- and international lending institutions.

Q Do they feel they're not getting enough money for their cocoa and coffee?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. That's right. They would like to have a higher, what they call "intervention price" at -- which means the price which would -- if the cocoa price fell to a certain level, that is, the lower intervention price, would trigger their buffer stock mechanism. But since we decided not to join the cocoa agreement, the price of cocoa has fallen, I don't know, what is it now? it's up around -- it's climbing back up gradually. But it dropped well below 50 or 60 cents below the agreed lower intervention price, which bears out our argument.

Yes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICAL: Their basic point is that they would like to see more stability in the commodity price market so that they're not subject to the vicissitudes of prices which might go -- sink to one-third of their value one year, climb up to three times that value the next year. It's awfully hard to do economic planning on that sort of economic basis.

Q Were you offered any gestures in that area during this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm really not at liberty to say.

Q Was this trip arranged before the start of the -- or before the OAU Summit was agreed upon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes, yes, it was.

Q You said that the Ivory Coast has the best wealth distribution system in the Sub-Sahara if Africa. Could you give us an idea of how wealth is distributed there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it wasn't the system I was talking about as much as the distribution itself. You will find all over Ivory Coast, which is certainly not one of Africa's largest countries -- nevertheless, you will find all over that country a road network, a paved road network. And there's an electricity grid which covers the country. This is not to say that every village has a paved street and a telephone system. But the country is blanketed with those two systems. That's just one indication of the economic trickle-down, if you will, of the economic benefits. He has also -- the President has also provided economic opportunity in the north, which is the more deprived part of the section, through the establishment of cotton and sugar industries.

Yes?

Q What about personal income?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Personal incomes. The per capita income keeps dropping now. It was up around $1200 per capita a couple of years ago. It's probably down around $1,000 per capita now which is, in Africa, very high, as you know.

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Q Will this be the first meeting between the two Presidents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct, yes. This is President Houphouet's third state visit. He was here, once, on a private visit. This is three state visits in a period of 21 years.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were due to have met at Cancun. But Houphouet-Boigny felt ill and was not able to attend the meeting.

Q You said that they are frustrated at the slowness with which Namibian independence is arriving. What is their view of constructive engagement in general and our policy toward South Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Houphouet, throughout his history as a politician, has always espoused dialogue, the need for contact and peaceful settlement of disputes. This is what, in effect, contructive engagement means. It means you are engaging in dialogue, in conversation.

Q But he does not feel that we ought to be putting more pressure on South Africa --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would like to leave that for him to say.

Q You had mentioned earlier an "orchestrated series of events to show our appreciation." What were you talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Visits back and forth and the Ministerial trade mission, which went out to Africa in the early months of the Reagan administration, the Vice President's trip, the invitation to several other Francophone Heads-of-State to come to Washington, Ahidjo -- Secretary Mobutu -- recent ship visits that we had along the West African coast, the visit of Carl Vincent to -- within the last couple of months, much more intense consultation on the diplomatic level -- sharing of information about what is going on in Africa and elsewhere, a concerting of our diplomacy to a much more intense degree than has ever been the case in the past.

Q How does that show our appreciation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It shows that we are interested in them, that we value their views and that we can work together rather than we attempting to go our way independently as a superpower.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:32 P.M. EDT

Unedited

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON

SECRETARY SHULTZ' TRIP TO NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING
PARIS, JUNE 7-10,1983

MONDAY, JUNE 6, 1983, 3:00 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. As we had previously announced, this is a background briefing on the Secretary's forthcoming trip to the NATO Ministerial Meeting. For your guidance only, and not for attribution, our briefer this afternoon is [redacted]

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I will make a few brief, overall remarks and take any questions you might have. I guess the significance of this trip is that it fits into a series of meetings that we have been having with other western and allied countries on economic, security and political issues that, from our standpoint, have been extremely successful.

I will just remind you that last month there was a meeting of the IEA, the International Energy Agency board of governors, which among other things, looked at the problem of energy dependence on other countries, followed immediately by an OECD Ministerial meeting which five, I think, Cabinet-rank Americans attended, which again we thought was very successful both from the standpoint of economic policy and international economic recovery as well as the subject of East-West economic relations. Of course, we have recently had the Williamsburg Summit, which again we were very satisfied with, both from the standpoint of the economic outcome and in particular the statement on security and arms control question. This is, I think, the sort of last step of the series of meetings.

The overall topic of interest, of course, will be the issue of the INF negotiations and arms control, more broadly. We will expect, at the Paris meetings, to achieve a reaffirmation of the December '79 decision. This in some respects is the last NATO Ministerial really before the end of the year. There will be another Ministerial, of course, in December, but that meeting would coincide, if we don't achieve an arms control outcome, with missile deployment so this will be, in a way, a good opportunity for the Ministers to address the negotiations and the missile deployment question in a thoughtful way, looking toward the end of the year.

There will be a meeting of the Special Consultative Group, which is the NATO consultative group on the INF negotiations, where the Allies will receive a report on the state of play of the Geneva negotiations in the current round. The Ministers will then receive a report which they can use for their own discussion in Paris.

The subject of East-West economics will be another topic which will arise flowing out of the studies that were commissioned at the end of last year. NATO has been looking at the security aspect of East-West economic relations, and a report has been drafted in NATO and that report will be discussed at the Ministerial. We are very satisfied with the report and the work that has been underway on the security aspects of East-West economics.

In addition to those two major themes, the Secretary of State will be having a number of bilateral meetings, taking the opportunity of being in Paris with a number of Foreign Ministers from Allied countries to discuss bilateral questions of concern on the margins of that meeting.

I will be happy to take your questions.

Q [redacted] in view of the attitude taken by the Canadians during the negotiations for the statement at Williamsburg on security and arms control, would you anticipate in any way some difficulty raised by them or another member about NATO's position, or about the American position in the negotiations on the English and French nuclear systems?

A No., I don't. The Canadians made it very clear that the positions they took during the Williamsburg meetings were not positions based on the substance of the negotiating process. In other words, they were not changing their viewpoint on the inclusion of the British and French systems. It was more, as I think they have said, a presentational question of whether or not the Williamsburg statement needed to have a reference to the British and French. But no, we don't expect any problem whatsoever on that question.

The only potential question is the question that arose during the Defense Ministers Meeting last week, and that has to do with the potential problem that the Danish Government may have based on the recent vote in the Parliament in Denmark.

Q You mentioned the report drafted on East-West trade.

A It was the security aspects of East-West economic relations.

Q Will that issue finally be resolved at this meeting?

A What do you mean "that issue?" We have supported a continuing effort to examine different aspects of East-West economic relations. We don't see the problem being, you say an issue being resolved. We think it is a long-term question; it requires a good deal of study; it requires a certain consensus building and discussion within the Alliance. We think we have made good progress in the last six months, and we plan to continue. So this is just one point along a continuous dialogue which we will have.

What we want to do is highlight the importance of the East-West economic question on the NATO agenda. A year ago you couldn't get Ministers to really sit down and discuss these issues. Now they are discussing those issues. They have drawn certain conclusions at the IEA and OECD, and now in NATO.

Q Is the report going to be made public ever?

A I just don't know. That's a good question. I know that it will be alluded to, I'm quite certain, in the communique. Whether the report itself is classified or not, I just don't know.

Q Do you expect more questions about the European communique voicing concern about the two-way street on defense production, contracts, and so on?

A I don't, because it is a Foreign Ministers Meeting, and that is normally an issue that is discussed by the Defense Ministers. I wouldn't rule out the possibility, but it is not the kind of subject that the Foreign Ministers get into too much detail about.

Q Can I get back to the NATO report on East-West economics a minute? After Versailles, we asked in here what had happened, and we were talking about, "Well, what was going to happen was, there was going to be a series of reports in IEA and OECD -- they were going to do these reports."

It was asked in here whether these were really going to be reports that would enable the Alliance to reach a common position, or were these just "puffy" pieces to sort of diffuse the subject? The answer was that no, these were going to be reports, and that the Alliance was moving towards a common position.

Well, here we are a year or so later, and you are now --

A You've got your time frame a little confused. Those reports were not agreed to after Versailles. The reports were agreed to in November and December of last year.

(Continued on page 7.)

Q Okay.

A Let me just first of all say that changing policy within the Alliance is not an easy task in the short term. You look at the efforts we've made, say, since Afghanistan on the whole question of what we call "out of area." That's been something that we've discussed with the allies now for two or three years. We've made some progress. Increasingly the Europeans informally are deploying their forces outside of the formal NATO boundaries. We have French and British forces, for instance, in the Indian Ocean.

It's something that cannot be changed overnight, and I think the same is true in the East-West economic area.

For example, we do have now an increased commitment on the part of the allies to strengthen COCOM, which is the mechanism for controlling technology transfer. They're willing to actually strengthen the institution and give it greater resources so it can do a better job. They have been willing to revise the list -- the so-called COCOM list. They have been willing to put new technologies on that list that have not been on that list before.

There is a new recognition, a public recognition, that it's dangerous to become too dependent on one source for energy. So I'm not disappointed. Anybody who expects after 30 years of neglect of this subject -- the economic dimension and security dimensions of East-West economics -- for there to be a major turn-around in six months is naive. We're satisfied what's important now is that these governments are engaged in a good-faith exercise, that they're willing to state their case.

Furthermore, I'd like to be able to stand up here and say the U.S. Government is 100 percent right on all of these issues, but they have their views, and what is necessary is a good dialogue with them because in some cases they have a point of view that needs to be taken into account.

Q When you say they've agreed on strengthening COCOM, have we and them reached agreement on specifics such as increased funding or instantaneous translation services and the run-through --

A At the last -- we'll have to get you the details, but there was a meeting on COCOM at the end of April --

Q Yeah.

A -- which, my understanding, did conclude with an agreement to enhance the effectiveness of the organization. I would imagine that would include funding. Among other things, we are expanding COCOM.

Q Will you get into the specifics of the U.S. negotiating posture at Geneva?

A Yes. We will.

Q How about START?

A START -- I'm certain we will be prepared to discuss START, but in terms of any Presidential decision would depend on the timing, obviously, for the President and whether or not there will be anything to report.

Q And, also, will there be any thought that NATO might send a message with Chancellor Kohl when he goes to Moscow?

A I haven't heard of any suggestion like that.

Q Isn't there going to be the President's decision by Wednesday of this week with the restarting of START?

A I know that is what people -- and that's a proposed kind of idea -- but I just wouldn't want to speculate on precisely when the President will have a decision, when he will be prepared to announce it.

Q It's possible that the talks could begin on Wednesday without a new American position having been agreed to?

A I just wouldn't want to say. I just don't know.

Q I wonder if I could ask you something on the INF, leading up to Williamsburg, and because you mentioned it yourself in connection with this NATO meeting. When was the decision made to go to that statement at Williamsburg, and what were the antecedents of Williamsburg?

A I don't want to go into too many details.

Q Try a couple.

A The decision was made on Saturday night, after the first dinner that the President had with his colleagues.

Q Hadn't you explored that earlier?

A We had explored -- we had raised the possibility of such a statement, but it was clear that it would be up to the heads themselves, and it would have to be their joint decision. The President, based on his conversations at that dinner, determined that it was worthwhile to try to put such a statement together.

Q Can you tell us when you began to explore that subject?

A What?

Q The subject we're talking about. The INF.

A Do you mean when --

Q When did you begin to explore this with the allies?

A -- within the U.S. Government?

Q No. With the allies.

A I think we raised it as a possibility with the allies in early May.

Q When you were in Europe?

A I don't want to go much further than that.

Q On specifics of INF, is the question of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe one of the specifics that's being considered?

A Absolutely not, except by the Swedish Prime Minister.

Q I thought the Germans had raised this, too.

A Absolutely not.

Q I'd be curious to know the value -- what's the need or the value in having a NATO Foreign Minister's statement follow -- on INF deployment following the Williamsburg statement?

A Because the Williamsburg statement was a fairly unique statement with a unique cast, with diverse countries represented, but the December '79 decision is a NATO -- formal NATO decision taken by the members of the integrated military command structure. Formal reaffirmation of that decision can only be taken by NATO.

Furthermore, two of the direct participants in any missile deployment, should negotiations not succeed -- Belgium and The Netherlands were not even represented at Williamsburg -- and what we seek in a NATO communique is a reaffirmation of that December '79 decision as well as a reaffirmation and an endorsement of our specific negotiating position in Geneva which is an alliance-wide negotiating position.

Q In connection with that, how do you expect to incorporate the Danish problem? I mean, how would you deal with it?

A It's much too soon to say. We're not there, we don't know what the Danes are going to say, what they are prepared to do.

Q Do you expect that Belguim and The Netherlands will go along affirmatively with this reaffirmation?

A We expect, as they have before, that they will support the December '79 decision. That's distinct from their own specific deployment plans, and they have not yet as of yet made a deployment decision.

We hope that when the time comes, they'll make an affirmative one. But neither Belguim nor The Netherlands are scheduled in any event to begin missile deployment in 1983. It's only Germany, Italy and Britain which, under the December '79 decision, were going to begin at the end of '83.

(Continued on next page)

Q What actual impact is the Danish decision? They were not taking any of the missiles but they were giving some money for the site preparation?

A All the members of the integrated military command structure pay something known as NATO infrastructure funds which is a pool of money which projects like the INF program are funded from. But I can be very categorical that the program will go ahead with or without Danish infrastructure funding.

Q Can you tell us what, if any,progress has been in Geneva since the talks resumed on INF?

A No, I can't, because we haven't even had the opportunity to formally report to the Allies, and obviously they should be and we should discuss with them first before we talk to the press.

Q Could you give us a flavor of what you expect vis-a-vis Poland at this meeting?

A I imagine the question of Poland will be discussed.

As you know, or most of you who have been on these trips know, that a good part of the meetings are taken up in something called "super restricted sessions" in which only the Foreign Ministers and the permanent representatives are in attendance. So it's a device designed really to provide a really informal, early candid exchange of views. I would imagine in those sessions people will want to talk about Poland, changes or the lack of changes there, the Pope's visit, debt rescheduling, et cetera.

Q Do you expect to discuss the Export Administration Act?

A I seriously doubt,since it's not a security or NATO problem, that it will come up.

Q Would you mind outlining briefly the schedule of sessions; how much of them will be super secret and how many of them will be --

A The meeting itself lasts for about a day and a half, and normally the first morning session is super restricted. Sometimes that spills over into the afternoon. The second day sessions are usually a little bit larger and that's usually devoted to discussions of the communique.

Q Are any of these open to the press?

A None.

Q Will you be producing anything in the way of -- you'll be producing a communique.

A We'll be producing a communique.

Q Are there any particularly significant bilaterals with the French or the British vis-a-vis the Middle East or --

A The Secretary of State is seeing President Mitterrand. I imagine they will get into any number of discussions on the Middle East and international economics as well as security questions.

I think that there will be a strong interest on the part of most of the people the Secretary of State will see about the Middle East.

Q Can you tell us who else he will be meeting with?

A I can't right off the top of my head. It's seven or eight European Foreign Ministers.

Q Did you say earlier -- I came in late. Are you going to make public the NATO study on East-West trade?

A No, I doubt it. I think we will discuss it in the communique. I don't know if it's classified or not. I'm not aware of any plans to do that.

Q Can you give us any idea of what is to follow that NATO study on East-West trade?

A There will be follow-up work. It'll have to be in NATO, but I don't want to prejudge. One of the things the Ministers will have to determine is precisely what they want to do.

Q Do you have any idea how much longer the work on East-West trade is to continue?

A I think that it will become a subject, as I said before, that we will want to continue to address. I don't think that the idea is that we will terminate. I think we've all recognized now that it is a legitimate issue for the Alliance to examine; just as I was saying that just as in the out-of-area issues, the problems in the Third World and how they influence and affect the Alliance.

I think we'll want to continue to address this problem.

Q Do you believe that an INF agreement before December is possible, likely?

A You can't put words in my mouth, but I think it's possible.

Q You think it is still possible?

A Yes.

Q There was some talk in the building that the government in Warsaw might ease up a little bit in conjunction with the Pope's visit.

Do you have any inklings in this regard, and what do you expect the talk to be at the meeting?

A You're really asking me to speculate, and I prefer not to do that. We hope that the government in Warsaw eases up. Period.

Q What is the common NATO position on the Polish situation?

A The common NATO position on the Polish situation is what it has been since early 1982, which is that we have three conditions. We hope those three conditions will be met. We've applied sanctions.

To remind you what those three conditions are, they are a dialogue between the government and free trade unions, release of detainees, and the lifting of martial law. And by that, lifting of martial is not just in name but in fact.

Q How do you think the Polish Government has done on those three?

A Obviously, they have not met all of those three conditions.

Q Can I ask just one more on the economics question. You went into some detail on the COCOM -- the changes that have been agreed to on COCOM. Can you point to any specific improvements in the East-West trade areas such as financing?

A Yes. The Soviet Union has been placed in a so-called Category 1 by the OECD nations, which means that the interest rates are at the highest level with those countries.

We have also, for the first time, agreed on the establishment of a monitoring mechanism which was lacking and is a central clearing house at the OECD which keeps track of East-West financial flows.

Q Is the United States still going to get the Allies to agree to put energy equipment on the COCOM list?

A We are having discussions on what is know as other high technology other than military in COCOM in July.

Q Does that mean yes? How they going?

A We're beginning those discussions in July, and we're pleased that the Allies were agreed to do that under the COCOM framework.

Q You did have a meeting on the subject a couple months ago, didn't you?

A No. That was only on the question of

military technologies and updating that list and improving it. Now, we're going to be looking at other high technologies.

Q So the subject of energy technologies did not come up there; is that what you're saying?

A Not that I'm aware. It came up, and there was an agreement that we would discuss it at a meeting in July.

Q Do you foresee or prepare any possible merging of IFM and START, because as it is being advocated more and more by several people?

A No, not at this time.

(Briefing concluded at 3:30 P.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY OF THE IVORY COAST

June 7, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:33 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: We're going to begin this briefing on the visit of the President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, and President Reagan.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a few words of context. I think it's important to underline that we're talking in the context of this visit of a leader who has been at the helm of his nation since its independence in 1960. His political career goes way back before that. He served in six successive French governments in the Fourth Republic. He helped to form and to shape the decolonization laws that led to the independence of French-speaking Africa. And he's been a major figure on the African stage, really, ever since his country's founding, having played also a central role in the diplomacy leading up to the formation of the Organization of African Unity in 1963.

And it is not just purely coincidental that there was a good deal of discussion, of course, in these meetings today about Africa's situation, about the situation of the OAU and the influences which are making it difficult for the OAU to function as most Africans would like it to.

This is a man who has a vision for his continent, a vision for his country. And, for obvious reasons, that kind of longevity and that kind of a track record are in themselves of great importance to us. So we feel it is fully appropriate that we have -- really turn out the red carpet for this visit.

We have excellent relations with the Ivory Coast and the discussions which have just taken place and will continue were in every sense constructive and positive.

They had a chance to talk about most of the obvious issues that you can imagine. I will ask my colleague to give a bit more flavor for the exchanges between the two leaders.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. It's nice to be here again today.

We got off to an excellent start this morning. I think the good Lord blessed us with the weather and that set the scene for really a fine meeting between these two leaders.

You were probably present when each of them made his remarks on the lawn. And the spirit of shared values, shared concerns carried over into the Oval Office.

The basis of Houphouet's concern as regards prosperity, or lack of it, security, or lack of it, goes to development. Development is the heart of his concern. He starts and ends with development. This gets us into several areas. And these subjects did arise, how the West can do more to assist the developing countries. And may I make a special point here, often we seen in Abidjan, and this has occurred here, too, that when President Houphouet-Boigny expresses his concerns about security and development and prosperity for the people, he is talking about Ivory Coast; but he is talking

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also about Africa. His concern is that of a man who feels, as my colleage suggests, that he has made, and continues to make, a contribution to Africa.

The development problem is the foremost because he sees in development the only means of resisting or opposing subversive influences which he perceives in that continent today. He has grave concern about Libya and what Libya is doing in nearby areas.

He shares our President's concern about the economic crisis in Africa and there was some discussion about another of the causes of such crisis, namely the commodity pricing arrangements, the need that African producers of certain commodities, export commodities, have for longer-term stability in the pricing.

I think, perhaps, if you have some questions it might -- we might best proceed to those.

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Q Was the President able in any way to offer President Houphouet any hope with regard to stability in commodity prices or did he basically tell him that we support the relying on what the marketplace --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the President understands where President Houphouet is coming from because, as you know, we have similar problems in this country with farmers and particular commodities which require our attention.

Q I got the impression yesterday when a senior administration official was briefing us on this subject, that, in fact, the Ivorians would like to see more government intervention, specifically, United States intervening with the people who are buying the commodities to stabilize the prices and that was something that the U.S. was not going to support.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Ivorians at every conference on cocoa and coffee make this point, that they feel all of the Western consuming nations ought to make some arrangement that would assist with remunerative prices. This is a point they make all the time and --

Q In the meeting, how did President Reagan address that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: I'd not rather not go into the details of -- I tell you, I will make a suggestion, though, if you're going to breakfast at the Press Club on Thursday, you might want to explore this area further with President Houphouet-Boigny.

Q Is there any likelihood of any change in U.S. opposition to some intervention on pricing or did -- the Ivory Coast say, "We've got this problem", and President Reagan said, "We understand your problem, but we're not going to do anything"? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is there any prospect of change?

Q -- prospect of any change?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Through the years, our position has been very clear, that we believe that free-market forces bring about a more economic, a more rational arrangement on commodity transactions.

Q Can you tell me what did President Houphouet mean in his opening remarks when he referred to "problems that could not be resolved without effective and forceful steps by the U.S."? What problems did he raise during this meeting that required forceful and effective steps by the U.S. government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The, as I think I also mentioned yesterday, the -- One of the principal concerns of the Ivorian President and certainly of his neighbors would be the influence of Libya as a surrogate for the Soviet Union. He --

Q Well, what kind of response did he ask for?

Q What did he think -- the United States could do about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He made the specific point that one does not achieve peaceful solutions through force. And, again, this goes to his basic philosophy of arriving at peaceful solutions to problems.

Q But he was discussing forceful and effective U.S. steps. Again, what did he have in mind for the United States to do with respect to Libya, especially if force is not the way to take a forceful and effective step?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really would prefer not to go into any more detail on this private conversation.

Q Well, I don't know what the point of the background briefing is, but what -- And when he said that in his opening remarks, and was he specifically addressing himself at that time to security concerns?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The context should be --

Q From what you could tell from the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- as clear to you as it was to us. I don't think we were aware in the beginning of what he was going to say. The context --

Q Okay, let's try --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Houphouet-Boigny looks to the United States as -- He shares our values first, as he pointed out and as our own President pointed out this morning. He considers us the strongest nation on earth, one with a responsibility which, I think, we, too, feel, that we have obligations not only to our own people, to the Americans, but to other nations in the world. He simply sees us as the strongest nation which is the only nation that could do anything to achieve some of these solutions. He doesn't necessarily specify how we are to do that.

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Q Did he talk, at all, about Namibia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. That is, of course, one of the subjects that would come up in any discussions that Ivorians would have.

Q Could you tell us a little bit about what he said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I simply would prefer not to go into detail.

Q Well, could you just give us, kind of, a generalization as to where the emphasis was during this freewheeling discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say that, throughout the conversation on that subject, a broad understanding between us emerged.

Q Back on the commodity issues, did President Houphouet make any specific requests in that area? And did the U.S. offer any gestures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you are again asking for details that I am not --

Q Will we find out --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do have differing points of view on commodities. President Houphouet brought his Minister of Agriculture with him. And I am certain that there will be discussions between him and other senior officials in this government on that subject.

Q In relation to the question of Namibia, did it come up in the meeting? Or can you give us any idea of the general Ivorian feeling about the role being played by the United States and whether there is more we should do, or there are things we are doing that are not satifactory?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The general tenor of that conversation was one of an assessment of why we are in this situation not only in Namibia, but in other parts of Africa, and a consensus on the desirability to make further progress.

Perhaps my colleague has something he would like add to any one of these points.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was just reminded as my colleague was taking up your last question of a point that the President of the Ivory Coast did make, which is that many African leaders, I think, have had the feeling that historically we, the U.S., have not done all we could to exert our influence in Africa. And many have wished that we would.

And, I think, the concept of "better late than never" was, kind of, the thrust of his presentation in several of the meetings that have already taken place. We are doing, precisely, that. We are doing more than we ever have. And we are more actively engaged than we ever have been, whether it is on the issues of seeking to bolster regional security where it is threatened farther north by Libya or whether it is in southern Africa.

Far be it from us to put words in the mouths of any foreign Head-of-State. That is not our function on a background briefing or any other kind of briefing. So the snickers aside, you would not expect us to go beyond what has been said. The President can speak for himself at the Press Club.

But there is a broad, comprehension of views. We must be engaged in southern Africa. That was the thrust of what he said. We must be engaged in dealing with the destabilization that comes from Tripoli. We must be helpful. "We wish you would do more." That was the nature of the discussion. And we made clear we are doing a good deal already.

Q Again, was this economic, a combination of forces, a specific request on what could be done to ward off this subversive element that he sees?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the first point of departure is to make sure we know what the problem is and what the source of the problem is. Let us be clear what kind of world we are talking about.

When two Heads-of-State get together as they do, always, infrequently -- after all, the last time Houphouet was here was 10 years ago -- a lot of the time is going to be taken establishing first principles. What kind of world are we living in? What are the threats to our stability and our prosperity? What are the bases for finding peace?

But having said that, sure there was discussion about the different dimensions of it, with the overwhelming concentration on the preconditions for development. There has to be some assurance of survival of peace, of security before you can even make investments, after all.

But I think it is, also clear -- as the Ambassadors indicated -- that there is a lot of concern about economics as well.

Q What was the Ivorian leader's assessment of the OAU summit going on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, events are moving rather rapidly. And I do not think any of us can really track it from this distance. It was supposed to have opened, I believe, yesterday and did not. People were thinking it might formally open today and, as far as we know, has not -- but could any minute. It is

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like that, isn't it, unless something has changed?

Q From a pragmatic point of view, what do you mean by peace -- all these countries in Europe are all doing the same thing we are, trying to invest, trying to help the economy. Which countries are involved and what did they add -- do they want arms? I'm not quite sure what they want.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, some countries that feel themselves directly threatened, of course, do. A country such as Sudan, for example, which has been repeatedly and directly threatened by both conventional and non-conventional violence from Libya, yes, would be looking for arms. Ivory Coast I don't think feels that it is directly threatened so much, but the whole region is threatened by a pattern of destabilization. That's what -- so there it's more a question of a lead, a Western lead, a U.S. lead in finding ways to address this problem in cooperation with African leaders.

Q You said that the President expressed the feeling of many African leaders that the U.S. has not done as much as we could to exert influence on the continent. Could you be at all more specific as to -- exert influence in what way or on what issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I think it's a question of several issues -- the search for ways to bring about peaceful settlements of disputes. There is, of course, an OAU mechanism for that, but sometimes a helpful hand from outside can make a big difference. There is the question specifically of Southern African disputes, including anti-colonial ones as formally in Rhodesia, now in Zimbabwe and now in Namibia, bringing influence to bear to try and promote peaceful change inside South Africa.

And then there is, of course, the question of economic influence to make markets more broadly available, to bring about more foreign investment, all those good things.

MR. ALLIN: Okay, Jim, one more. Yes.

Q A couple of questions. Did President Reagan offer any assurances that the United States would become more involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to go beyond what the Ambassador has said in terms of what assurances were offered. We are involved. We are deeply involved. This administration's policy in Africa is a highly involved one by relative standards: at the very highest level engaged in this effort to get a settlement in Namibia; involved as well, as you well know, in efforts to make clear that certain kinds of behavior by the Libyans are simply not to be countenanced by the international community, us included; involved, despite very severe budgetary circumstances, in doing our best in terms of assistance programs. So I mean, I don't think any brand new commitments were made in the context of one-morning sessions, but a lot of mutual understanding established.

Q It almost takes on -- it almost sounds like President Houphouet came here to issue a warning to offer his own African domino theory.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't go beyond what I've said. He will have ample opportunity to address these points at the Press Club, which is Thursday morning -- is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m.

Q Thursday morning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m.

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Q Tune in.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't call it an African domino theory, no. That would be putting words that I didn't hear in his mouth.

Thanks.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:53 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STAT

June 14, 1983
No. 212

PC#25

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
Paris, France
June 8, 1983

QUESTION: Could you say what the importance of this NATO meeting is and what we can expect from it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think this is one of a series of very important meetings starting with the OECD meeting in Paris, a month or so ago, the Williamsburg Summit, the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting last week and now this meeting, which I think significantly takes place in Paris. And to me these meetings on the one hand bring together a varying but nevertheless consistent group of countries, the industrial democracies of the world, in various settings and we see these meetings taking place against the background, on the one hand, of problems and challenges to the industrial democracies and I think, at the same time, the basis for increasing confidence is that we are meeting these problems and challenges successfully. In the OECD meeting and at Williamsburg, of course, there was a concentration on economic issues and I think we now see the beginnings of recovery in the free world economy, with much lower inflation than we've had at the start of past recoveries and good prospects for keeping inflation under control. I think that's a very good situation and at the same time, I think there has been and I felt this at the first NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting that I went to last October and then in December in Brussels and at successive meetings, a real sense of unity and cohesion and determination to identify and defend our values and to see the relationship of that goal to the kinds of things that are being done in NATO. In particular right now, of course, the focus is on both tracks of the dual track 1979 NATO decision. I think we are moving into the time of 1983 when, on the one hand, negotiations are going on intensively in Geneva, and at the same time, I think, it must be clear to everybody that the decision made to deploy, unless there is a negotiating outcome, is a very firm decision. So I think all of these things are coming together in this set of meetings. This is the fourth one in the series and I think it's a meeting of extraordinary importance as we try to bring these things together.

To my way of thinking, it all should give us renewed confidence as a free people in free countries, recognizing with candor the problems that we have and struggling with them and gradually finding solutions or ways of coping with a greater and greater success with these problems.

QUESTION: Isn't there some danger that with all these meetings you may run out of things to say with each other?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, this is a time, I think, when it's very important to stay glued together. We've had an intensive process of consultation. I've focused on these four meetings. There are innumerable other contacts both by cable and letter and by individuals traveling around, Europeans and Japanese and Americans, people from Washington and various capitals, and I think that the intense and continuing consultative patterns that have been established are good and it may be that we don't have something brand new and fresh to say, but at the same time, it's important to keep reaffirming the track we're on and as even the weeks and months go by there are developments that need to be assessed and we'll do it.

QUESTION: You said that this meeting "significantly" takes place in Paris. Could you go into that significance, of the French invitation and of Paris as a place for the meeting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that you have identified properly why I made that comment and I think it simply signifies the cohesion of Europe with the United States in the sense that NATO and the North Atlantic Alliance having recognized the distinctiveness of each country and the distinctiveness of France and I might say the United States. I think one of the magic qualities of our cohesion these days is the fact that every country is insistently sovereign and independent, but nevertheless, on that basis, people are talking together, working together and within that framework, cooperating effectively. So I think it's that balance of insistent sovereignty with a sense of cohesion and collaboration that perhaps especially underlines the importance of this setting and the ability to do that.

QUESTION: Re Nicaragua: Why was the decision made to respond to the expulsion of three American diplomats so severely? If that leads to a break in diplomatic relations, would you consider that a negative consequence?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't have any thought of breaking diplomatic relations. Senator Stone has Nicaragua on his itinerary. We expect to see that continue, that's our intent as we seek a regional solution to the problem of Central America, a peaceful solution, a solution that will yield economic development and progress toward democratic institutions in the area; that is our objective, an objective that can hardly be served when you have the kind of military buildup that's been taking place. Now as far as the actions taken are concerned, there was no justification whatever to the expulsion of the three American diplomats and under the circumstances it seems to us that it was important to express our reaction to that and we did nothing at all about people in the Embassy in Washington but simply, basically closed the Consulates scattered around the country.

QUESTION: You said it is the U.S. intent for Ambassador Stone to be in Nicaragua on Friday. Do you expect him to be received officially?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We expect he will be. The point is that we seek a regional peaceful solution to the problem, and the President has named an outstanding American, with great talent and knowledge of the area and he is going around now basically in a listening pattern and trying to help people compose the differences that are there and I think that is unambiguously a good thing, and I should hope that Nicaragua responds to it and expect that they will.

QUESTION: Back to Europe: How would you assess the state of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON countries after the change of leadership in the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hesitate because I much prefer to talk about the United States and the Alliance and what we are doing and then look for outcomes that may be different from the past based on things -- on behavior and changes that take place that you can identify in terms of some sort of substantive result. As of now, we don't see any substantive result. On the other hand, as you point out, there is new leadership and that always, I think, tends to make you, and should reinvigorate your efforts to probe and test and to see if a different pattern can be brought out. It remains to be seen. But as in the case of my response to questions about Nicaragua, the position of the United States, and I'm sure the position of our Allies, is that we are determined, we are going to be strong, we are going to defend our values and at the same time, we are always ready to work for constructive solutions to problems if those can be obtained, and they are substantive and reasonable and not just rhetorical. So I think we just have to wait and see in answer to your question, but be ready to work with the other side as the substantive opportunities arise.

QUESTION: Would you comment on our policies with respect to Greece and Turkey? Will we get Greece to agree to the 7/10 ratio on arms sales? Will we get Greece to sign a base agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, as far as Greece and Turkey are concerned, they both are our Allies. They both are friends. We want to keep it that way and we like our friends to be friends and that isn't always the case, but anything that can happen and encourages that trend, we are for it. As far as the base negotiations are concerned, they are on-going and at an intense stage right now and we want to see a constructive outcome to them. I think I'll just leave it at that rather than to comment on what's going on in a particular negotiation. In terms of U.S. support levels, we have proposals to the Congress and there is gradually action taking place in terms of the 83 Supplemental and the 84 Authorization and Appropriation Bills that are working their way along. I don't think that we want to find ourselves pinned down to some sort of formula approach to any of these things and really can't do it even if you want to, given the nature of the authorization and appropriation process. But certainly we want to deal with each country in an equitable and helpful way.

QUESTION: Will East-West trade be a major part of the NATO agenda?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It will certainly be part of the agenda. It's an important subject. Last December, when this group met, there was a great deal of sentiment for having a broad study, kind of an umbrella study of East-West economic relations, take place within the NATO framework and as I went around Europe and discussed that, it seemed to jell. It was the position favored by President Mitterrand as well, I discovered when I came to Paris and so the Economic Committee of NATO undertook a study. We think it is a good study and I'm sure that study will be discussed, as it should be, and no doubt not only in this NATO meeting but as a continuing matter as we find ourselves more and more with a broad sense of generality of views on the importance of at least certain aspects of East-West economic relations. So I expect that will be an important topic of discussion.

QUESTION: Could you bring us up to date on the Middle East, particularly General Walters' visit last week?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are seeking to explain and to develop support from the idea of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and General Walters made a trip around in that regard, and I'm not going to comment on particulars of what he said or somebody said to him in the places he visited, but he certainly got a cordial reception as he always does and people listened and I think it was an effective thing to do. The Lebanese have been putting on a strenuous effort to go round the various capitals, particularly Arab capitals, but also others, including Europe, and particularly the countries of all of us who are contributing to the Multinational Force, and similarly wanting to develop support for a withdrawal of all foreign forces. Of course, right now what that means is Syrian and PLO forces since the Israelis have agreed to withdraw. We are supporting that idea and I think it's very important to bring that about. Now, beyond the problems in Lebanon, are the basic difficulties of the peace process itself and I think it is apparent to everyone, certainly it is apparent to the Lebanese, that it is critical for them in the long run to find some kind of solution to the problems of the Palestinians and a way of serving the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people. The President's September 1st fresh START proposals addressed themselves to that objective; those remain important proposals. I found in my trip to the Middle East they are very much alive in the minds of the leaders that I spoke to, and I think it is clear also that the key is finding some way to have legitimized, from many points of view, Palestinian participation in talks with Israel about that and related Israeli security issues. We continue to pursue that and at least in my own thinking, I think it leads you inevitably to scratch your head in the light of all of the developments around, to scratch your head more and more about the human beings called Palestinians, and ask yourself what is being done and what can be done to make life better for them, and perhaps, in a way this is the sort of thing that will improve that process.

QUESTION: There are reports this morning that the PLO was planning to bring its troops back into the Bekaa from Tunisia, Yemen and elsewhere. Can you comment on those reports?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to comment on any particular report but any development that puts more foreign forces into Lebanon than were there at the time of cessation of the main hostilities is an unwelcome development. We are trying to move in the other direction, and it only adds to the tensions in the area and those tensions always have the potential of leading to an outbreak of major hostilities and we don't want to see that. I don't think the Syrians want to see that, from all I know; I'm sure the Israelis don't want to see that, and we don't want to see that. So I think it's very undesirable to have additional forces going into the Bekaa.

QUESTION The Administration supported the idea of a Bulgarian-Soviet plot. Now that position has changed. Why?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I really don't have any comment on it, but you go ahead and ask your question. This is a matter that is under investigation by the authorities of Italy and we support their investigation and await its outcome.

QUESTION: Do you see a role for Spain as a mediator in Central America?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Spanish, of course, have a very special relationship to Latin America, particularly the Spanish-speaking countries, but to all countries in Latin America, and constructive efforts by anyone are always welcome. There are lots of mediators around now and I think, I'm sure that -- I won't try to speak for somebody else -- we welcome the efforts of the Contadora Four who are working with the situation and I believe that the efforts that Senator Stone is making on behalf of the President are also seen as constructive in the region. And somehow I think it is worthwhile to help the Front Line of this mediation effort to work and probably Mr. Gonzales has that in mind. I'm sure he'll have constructive things to contribute on this score. I had the privilege of a discussion with him last December and we touched on this matter but he was just new in office and didn't develop his thoughts too extensively. He'll be in Washington shortly and we'll have a chance to review it with him then.

QUESTION: Back to Europe: Britain and France don't want to be included in the INF talks. What is the position of the Administration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, our feeling, and the feeling of Britain France and all our Allies, is that these are National Forces and they don't have a role in the Geneva talks, so they are not there. That was stated once more in the Williamsburg Security and Peace Statement.

QUESTION: You talked about waiting to see if the Soviets will be conciliatory. Do you think there is any chance of movement before a high level meeting -- you and Gromyko or Andropov and the President?

Well, on certain things, it depends on the subject and certainly it's reasonable to expect that the capable negotiators that both sides have in these various negotiations will be able to make progress if the National Governments involved want to see that happen. Our National Governemnt, in the United States, and I think those of our Allies, wants to see it happen. So there is no reason why competent negotiators can't get somewhere. I hope, for example, that a strong and significant conclusion can be brought out of the CSCE meetings in Madrid from the standpoint of the Western side of it we have unity there and purpose there, and we have outstanding representation in the various delegations and from the standpoint of the U.S., Max Kampelman, is doing a terrific job. So there is no reason why you couldn't have an outcome there.

QUESTION: The President is supposed to announce new START proposals today. Could you give us a preview? Can you envisage START and INF being grouped into one negotiation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think they are separate and what we have said is that we are prepared to keep negotiating and working for the ultimate goal of the elimination of all of these weapons and for as low a level as possible of equal and verifiable deployments. If the elimination goal is not reached right away, and in the event of the start of deployment, at least from our standpoint, we are prepared to continue the negotiations and I don't see there is any implication there of merging the negotiations. I think we probably would just keep it the way its going now.

QUESTION: Do you see an evolution in the relationship between the Alliance and Japan on the basis of the Williamsburg Declaration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think that anybody is trying to work toward a formal Alliance. There is a relationship between major industrial democracies and there is a common concern, born out of security interests on the one hand and economic linkages on the other. That was well illustrated by both statements that came out of Williamsburg. I think that the way in which that is working now is perfectly satisfactory. There is a lot of interaction between ourselves and the Japanese -- diplomatic work -- and of cou[illegible]rect relationship on security concerns and between Japan and Europe as well.

QUESTION: The paragraph in the statement on security re "indivisibility." What was that addressing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it was a broad statement of conception and at the same time was an affirmation of the position that has been taken by ourselves as a Spokesman for everyone in the INF negotiations that among the principles that have been put forward there, by Ambassador Nitze and the President, stated as guiding principles, one is a global approach.

QUESTION: An apparent contradiction: If there is not INF agreement and deployment goes ahead, you accept inequality. But in the negotiations you seek equality.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, what has happened since the decision was taken to proceed with a double track decision, is that the Soviet Union has continued a relentless and extensive deployment process. So, I think that from our standpoint, the thing for us to do is to proceed with planned deployments if the negotiations don't indicate some other outcome and then we'll have to appraise the situation as we go along. But, of course, what we want to see happen is that as the Soviet Union deepens its appreciation of the resolve and the cohesion and the unity of the Alliance, it will decide that it's better to have a negotiated outcome, either before or after deployment starts. So the principle of equality obtained, we don't have it now; that's the reason deployments are so needed, the Soviet Union has a monopoly of these weapons and seeks to maintain it and we don't accept that.

QUESTION: Are we willing to accept inequality at higher levels?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't appreciate inequality at any level and we want to see levels kept down and so we think the right way to approach things right now is to proceed with the deployments that are planned unless negotiations yield a result for some other pattern of deployment. We believe that the best pattern and the best level of equality is at zero, we continue to believe that and we'll continue working for it. It leaves you right where you were when you started the question. (Laughter)

QUESTION: There seems to be a widespread feeling in Europe that it isn't fair for the U.S. to seek equal levels with the Soviet Union when the Soviets have to face French, British and Chinese weapons as well. Is the U.S. prepared to take this into account?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it is a commentary on people's mentality that there emerges into thinking that the Soviet Union has to be more heavily armed than all the rest of the world combined. I think that's not an accpetable way to think about it and from our standpoint, we take the position and we'll maintain the position that in this strategic area we have to think about the Soviet systems and the systems of the United States and seek a balanced outcome -- an equal outcome to the relationship between those forces.

QUESTION: What happens if the Allies don't show cohesion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They are showing cohesion and have demonstrated that time and again. It is interesting, as you review the history of the Alliance that periodically it rises to a crescendo but it is always there -- a sense of a lack of cohesion and so on -- and yet here we are, what is it, 35 years later. And I think that the statements and the actions, and the ability to adapt to the evolution of circumstances remains strong. It seems to me the basic reason must be that the values that unite us are preeminent, and in the end are the things which tie you together and will continue to do so.

QUESTION: With President Mitterrand having signed the Williamsburg agreement and with the NATO meeting being held in Paris, do you see a chance in the French attitude toward the Alliance from that of the previous Government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I see the French Government as being very strong-minded, independent, conscious of its sovereignty and fundamentally very supportive of the security concerns of the Alliance. And that has been evident to me in every meeting that I have held with President Mitterrand. It was evident in Williamsburg and it is evident in the behavior of what the French are doing. So I think I'll just leave it at that.

QUESTION: Is the U.S. talking to the British and French to get bargaining chips in the INF talks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. These are independent forces and we've gone through that argument again and again.

QUESTION: Is there any merit to this, in asking them in some way to join with the U.S.?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, they are not part of it. They are not to be counted in these negotiations. They are not part of it; they don't want to be part of it, and that's where the situation rests.

QUESTION: Does the Soviet Union possess strategic superiority in the world?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think the question that was raised was different. It was: Should the Soviet -- if I can rephrase the question, you were saying, isn't it legitimate that the Soviet Union should be superior to any given country and think of itself as equal to all the rest of the world combined, and I say no, that's not a legitimate point of view at all. We don't accept that at all.

QUESTION: Is it your impression that they have superiority? Would you trade U.S. armaments for theirs?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think when you ask thatkind of question, you have to put it in its broadest context and armaments are one think and what stands behind the armaments has to go with it and I wouldn't trade our situation for theirs, even remotely, because a free system, I think, will yield the best results as we go along and also ultimately in terms of human values and also in terms of our determination and ability to defend ourselves. You have to think of this as one big pot in a way and I don't have any doubt whatever of the superiority of the Western values and abilities. Now insofar as particular elements of armaments are concerned there is no doubt about the fact that in some very important areas there is a clear margin of Soviet superiority and the one that has been focused on in the NATO dual track decision is the Soviet monopoly of these highly destructive intermediate range nuclear missiles and if you...and there are various ways of establishing or counting elements of that picture, but there are important overall elements, throw-weight perhaps being the one that is most prominent, where there is a huge Soviet advantage; that isn't true across the board, I fully recognize that. But there are some very important elements of Soviet superiority which we seek to remedy. But, take overall, our system, their system, our military forces, their military forces and the impact of free people -- I don't have any doubts about which side I want to be on.

QUESTION: What is your assessment of Soviet policy in the Middle East today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't like to make comments about their intentions and what they are trying to do and all that because we can all speculate about it, and unless you have a seat around the table in the Kremlin you don't know for sure. So all I can say about it is that they have installed powerful and more far-reaching weapons in Syria than were there before number one; number two, their own forces are manning those weapons; number three, in terms of their public statements they have denounced and opposed the agreement between Lebanon and Israel for the security of the Southern part of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and I don't consider any one of those three things to be constructive contributions toward stability and peace in the Middle East.

QUESTION: Why are you meeting here with Giscard? Do you plan to meet with other opposition leaders?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is not so much a question of opposition leaders. Valery Giscard D'Estaing is a friend of mine f many years standing. I have gone to see him when I've come to Paris, when he's been in town, many times; we have visited together elsewhere; he is just a very good friend and a person that I enjoy talking to.

QUESTION: What is the significance of the Soviet proposal for a nuclear free zone in Western Europe?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's always interesting when the suggestion is made that other perople be nuclear free, but not themselves, and I can't help but wonder what that suggests about their attitude toward Soviet submarines in the waters of other countries. Is this a mea culpa, or what is it? I don't see it as a particularly forthcoming, in other words, proposition.

QUESTION: The feeling here is that President Mitterrand got trapped into signing the Williamsburg Declaration and that the U.S. is pushing the socialist government into a corner. What about this, given the presence of communists in the French Government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would have to say that I admire the positions that President Mitterrand has taken on this general field and point out to you that there may be communists in the French Government but there are some communists from the Soviet Union that used to reside in France who aren't here any more; and that's a decision the French Government made, and I applaud the decision, purely the French Government's decision. I'm sure that whatever President Mitterrand does he will do as a sovereign and independent Head of State. That's always been the case and that is, I may say, always the case with France. But as far as all of your questions on the internal political arrangements in France are concerned I pass on that, that's France's internal affair.

QUESTION: On East-West trade, one has the impression that the Export Administration Act is unraveling and that there was a lot of pressure on the U.S. in Williamsburg. What is the Administration seeking on restricting trade with the East? What do you expect from Congress on this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as the legislation is concerned, and the legislative situation, there are different versions and neither is precisely what the administration proposed and that's fairly typical of the way legislation takes place in the U.S.; everybody doesn't agree, as you know. There is a struggle about that and our friends and allies have made it clear, long before Williamsburg, but at Williamsburg, that there are aspects of the Administration's position along the lines that you mentioned, that they don't like. So we know that. I might say that my lawyers have taught me not to say "extraterritoriality" any more; that's in part because it is replaced as the current jaw-breaker. But we refer to it as conflict of jurisdiction and I think that point can be brought out very clearly if you take a hypothetical case. The U.S. firm that has developed a process of some kind and licenses that process to a firm in antoher country on the written and clear understanding that if U.S. exports control policy is applied to that category of technology then those controls will carry over to the other country. Now some people say that's bad, that's extraterritorial reach. The other side of the argument is that there is nothing wrong with it, that's what has been laid out in the contract, it was an understanding undertaken, clearly, and at best it is a conflict of jurisdiction as to who is going to have something to say about that. So I think there is a legitimate sort of legal and conceptual issue here that is a pretty deep and difficult issue. We have embarked on some extensive discussions of this issue in which I've asked Ken Dam, who doubles as a lawyer, and a very good one, the Deputy Secretary of State to participate; he's been working with the Deputy Attorney General, Ed Schmultz and we have been conferring with the Canadians and with the British and others, and they've delved into this issue at some depth and length conceptually and in terms of statute, so that's that kind of a question...in terms of what do we seek in this area, it is, I think, broadly two things: these things have been reflected in the discussions we have had and I think broadly speaking there is a general view that there has been a lot of technology transfer to the Soviet Union in one way or another over the past years and that has helped them militarily considerably, and that is not a smart thing for us to do, and we should get control of it, and we are trying hard to get control of it. I think there is a general view that that is the thing to do. Beyond that we don't see any reason why, given the fact that the mass of armaments that we have undertaken are provoked bythe development in armaments on the Soviet side, why it makes any sense for us to, as a group of nations, to have trade with them on other than a market basis. So these are basically the things that we seek; it's not a trade war, it is that kind of control. Now as far as legislation is concerned in the United States, for the government to exercise control on exports of any kind, there has to be a statutory basis for it; otherwise a firm is free to make sales as it chooses and therefore we seek statutory authority to do that.

QUESTION: Can you tell us something about interest rates and the prices of the dollar?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Something about the interest rates and the price of the dollar. The interest rates are higher than the President wants. We would like to see them lower, nominal interest rates and real interest rates; and the price of the dollar is basically governed by market forces and at least as I see it there are, broadly speaking, three elements to that market: one is what is happening in the field of trade, which taken by itself would suggest a lower value for the dollar; another is developments in the field of capital flows, partly flows that are oriented to interest rates, but also to a major extent in my opinion flows that are oriented to a kind of safe haven objective and it is the size of the capital flows that has produced the strong dollar and from the standpoint of the U.S. exporting community, they don't like it. To some extent they scratch their heads at the ways which the Europeans and others are complaining about it because if the dollar were to be a lot lower in value I think American goods would be a lot more competitive, particularly in thrid markets. So...that's kind of roundabout but I think the value of the dollar represents the market's evaluation of it and broadly speaking is reflecting, as it must, the flows of money which are made up of these different components. As far as interest rates are concerned I think it is fair to say that broadly, as we are successful in reducing the rate of inflation in the U.S. and as the conviction grows that the rate of inflation will stay more or less under control, then I think we'll see interest rates continue their decline. The decline has been quite dramatic over the last two years. Of the years of the Reagan Administration, in short term rates it has been significant but not as dramatic in long term rates. That is I think when the President took office, the short term rates were about 20 percent and now, in three-month Treasuries, 8 ½ or something like that, so that's a big drop. The long term rates have not come down as much. I think it isn't quite right to say that means that the long term real rate of interest is high in the U.S. It is more correct to say that the level of the long term interest rates represents a market hesitation to judge inflation as being under control, let's say five years or ten years from now. The fact that the long term interest rates have been coming down represents an emergence of more and more credibility. The inflation may be under control but people in the markets have been burned so much over the last ten or fifteen years that there is a lot of skepticism there. That is one of the reasons that the President is as determined as he is to do something about not so much the near term deficits in our budget, but the out year deficits in our budgets.

QUESTION: Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT REGARDING ARMS NEGOTIATIONS

June 8, 1983

The Briefing Room

9:50 A.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: We're going to have to end this briefing promptly at 10:15 a.m.; so we're going to start right now, even though some people are still back there.

Q When do we get paper?

MR. ALLIN: The statement by the President will probably not be ready until after the briefing and may not be ready until just about the time he's going to deliver it.

Q What about the fact sheet?

MR. ALLIN: No fact sheet.

This is a background briefing. It is embargoed until 11:00 a.m., embargoed for wire transmission and for any other use until 11:00 a.m. at the time of the President's statement.

The remarks should be attributed to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning.

I'll be very brief and take your questions.

Q Louder, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Late last year, the President provided to Judge Clark and others here in the White House his thoughts on what it would take to put us in position to get results in Geneva. Specifically, he said that we needed to have a very solid political foundation in terms of solidarity within the Western Alliance, with Japan behind what we were trying to do in Geneva.

He also thought that as part of that process that we had to demonstrate that we could solve problems economically and otherwise, that improves, basically, the followership that we could hope for in getting results in arms control.

And in that context, he talked about the several studies that were being launched at that time in the wake of Versailles on credits, on technology transfer, on East-West trade generally and so forth and the separate political effect they could have in building this allied solidarity. And he said we have to give this particular emphasis for what it will give us ultimately in arms control.

At any rate, the final element that he thought we needed, in addition to the military foundation that is authorizing B-1, Trident, MX was a bipartisan consensus in this country and particularly in the Congress. And toward that end he directed the Judge and others, the Secretary of State and Defense, to be more active in reaching out to listen to what people on the Hill

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had to say about arms control with two purposes in mind. Basically, of course, to build this bipartisan concensus; but on the one hand, perhaps to get some ideas that were constructive and reflective of Congressional sentiment.

At any rate, this process has gone on since the first of the year and dialogue with Senators of arms control interest and influence on the Hill: Bill Cohen, Sam Nunn, Scoop Jackson, Tower; counterparts in the House: Al Gore, Norm Dicks, Joel Pritchard, Tom Foley, Sam Stratton; people on both sides of the aisle: Jack Edwards, Bill Dickinson and over time has led to analysis of their ideas in the administration here.

But perhaps the most important single element in building this bipartisan consensus was the appointment of the Scowcroft Commission. This was ostensibly done to examine alternative basing modes for the MX. You recall, however, that it's mandate from the Congress, actually, included the full spectrum of strategic forces from Trident, accelerating it, to alternative basing schemes for MX, to air defense, a lot of other things.

The results of all of this have been reflected in the Scowcroft Commission Report, relating both to MX, to arms control, to deterrence, to the development of a new, small single-warhead missle.

The President received the report, endorsed it, as you know, and since that time has had his administration looking into how it should be incorporated into the START position.

That's involved two NSC meetings and other briefings of the President, meetings with Congressmen

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over the past six weeks and culminated yesterday in an NSC meeting -- Secretary of State, Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Vice President, others who discussed the specific recommendations on what should be changed. The President's guidance at the beginning of this analysis, when he got the Scowcroft Commission report and provided the word to the community, was look at their recommendations and propose changes to meet three basic criteria -- what is militarily sensible in terms of deterrence, what is stable in terms of foreclosing incentives for first strikes and, finally, take into account Soviet perceptions of stability, of deterrence, of their own force structure and their modernization programs. In short, let's go into it with something that is realistic, has some prospect of making progress and getting an agreement, not just through our own lenses of what makes things stable, but through Soviet perceptions as we have learned them over the past three rounds.

Yesterday's agenda focused on basically three items. We talked about, first of all, the warhead limit that we have heretofore espoused of 5,000 in ballistic missile warheads. All agreed that it was sensible to maintain that, that it did reduce the things which actually blow up and kill people, that it did get at throwweight and that an equal outcome at 5,000 ballistic missile warheads was a sensible proposal.

The second item on the agenda was the deployed missile limit, which heretofore has been at 850 for ballistic missiles on both sides. Considered that, considered the Scowcroft recommendations that would be reconsidered in light of our common interest in moving towards small, single-warhead missiles.

The discussion was not contentious. It turned on, whether you need to, some said that you could, if you wished, go ahead and deploy 300 or so small, single-warhead missiles within the 850 limit.

Others said that whether you keep it at 850 or go higher or entirely do away with it, there is some value in keeping a ballistic missile limit for a couple of reasons. On the one hand, this is a unit of account, launchers, ballistic missiles, more properly, that the Soviets have adhered and espoused for a long time. It is something they are comfortable with, that they prefer, indeed. As a consequence, if you do away with it entirely, are you not taking a position which is not negotiable with the Russians ?

Others, in the military, particularly, said apart from that, having a ballistic missile ceiling is a sensible thing to do because, in the near term, the Soviet Union is far better disposed to deploy a small single-warhead missile, fixed or mobile, than we are. And, as a consequence, their breakout capability is better than ours. So it's good to have a ballistic missile limit.

The ability suddenly to expand beyond the limits of an agreement or treaty , by having a ready, hot production line ready to go. The emphasis throughout from the President, in several interventions in this meeting, however, was on flexibility. What we are trying to do, again, was reduce weapons, have a more stable balance, and do it in a way which was negotiable, in short.

Looking at that, the President's judgment was that we should, in the interest of making the Scowcroft proposals -- or being responsive to them, relax the 850 limit. Now, as you know, up until now, the Soviet Union has proposed a limit of about 1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. That's bombers and missiles both. Within that, if you were to strip out 350 bombers, we're talking about ballistic missile limits on their side of on the order of 1450. Ours had been 850. I'm not going to say what our new target is. It is reasonable to assume it is in that spectrum.

Q Which spectrum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Between 850 to 1450.

Q Half way in the middle?

Q How about twelve?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Let me make another point. And I apologize for verbosity, but the point is that we're not going to get into the specific details of this position, not now or tomorrow or ever.

Q Oh. Ever?

Q Ever?

Q You're never going to tell us?

Q Well, all right.

Q Even if you get an agreement, you won't tell us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When we get an agreement we'll tell you. Right.

Q Can you tell us anything about the report about 1200 coming from State?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is there a specific number?

Q Can you guide us?

Q Or are we just saying that -- or is there a range?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying that we're moving away from a 50 with flexibility to negotiate a higher ballistic missile limit and with flexibility. And I do want to emphasize that. It would be somewhat misleading to give you a precise figure were it to imply that it is that figure and that figure alone that the United States will accept, because that is not the case.

Q But there is some figure the United States is proposing. That's different from what we'll ultimately accept.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I say it's --

Q And you're not going to tell us -- the way you told us last time, it was 850. You've changed your policy and now you won't tell us what it is in our new proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's exactly right.

Q Why have you changed your policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we believe that the opportunity now has improved for progress if both sides deal privately in good faith in Geneva and not in the headlines of the newspapers.

Q But what we're asking is will a specific figure be placed on the table secretly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The instructions to Ambassador Rowny will provide authority to negotiate flexibly a limit. And that is as far as I'm prepared to go.

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Q But -- the fourteen, we're asking --

Q You won't say then whether there is a flat figure that he's going to come forward with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I won't.

Q Are we still --

Q Would that then -- then we can assume he will.

Q There isn't a number, or there is one and you won't tell us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I won't go beyond what I've said --

Q Are you in effect asking the Soviets to come up with some suggestions of a figure and that's why you want to be flexible, rather than locked into 1200 or thirteen or something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, you can be confident that we will have numbers and they will have numbers. I'm saying that our numbers are not --

Q In other words they've got 1800 --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- rigid, fixed, and inflexible.

Q -- you're asking them to come down somewhere and you'll see what they'll do? Is that the idea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a negotiation, yes.

Q Does this flexibility apply to the question of whether U.S. bomber forces should be counted, or is that still something that we think should not be in there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As we have already, we remain willing today to arrive at an equal bomber -- heavy-bomber figure.

Q But a separate figure that is not mixed in with the missile figure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not trying to be cute. We haven't mixed them before.

Q Well, maybe I don't understand the talks. Please correct me. I thought that we were insisting that our bombers not be counted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we've always been willing to --

Q In the 850 figure, that's including bombers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it has been separate, but we've always had a bomber limit that we've been willing to agree to.

Q Tell me what it was. I don't know it. Or was it made public?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, at this point, our bomber ceiling has not changed.

Q Is there still a land-based sub-limit on the 5000 figure?

Q What was the question?

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Q Is the 5000 -- is there still a sub-limit on the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, half of those on land-based ICBMs.

Q What about the sub-limits in our missile figure --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not quite finished. Could I take just one more moment and take your questions?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last item on the agenda yesterday was discussion of how you get at throwweight. There are -- and I won't bore you here -- two basic approaches here. You can deal with this indirectly; that is, you can propose, as we have, that they have X number of heavy missiles, X number of medium missiles, and so forth, and that that outcome, as a practical matter, gives you a certain effect on throwweight. Another approach to it is to say -- why just not set an arbitrary figure of X million kilograms of throwweight? Now, again, going back to the President's emphasis that what we want to do is to not take a position that is so inflexible that the Russians reject it out of hand and, given our experience in the three rounds to date, that the Soviets have said, "We don't like you all designing our force structure and saying how many 18's, how many 19's." But wanting and believing that that is a sensible thing to do, the President's tentative thinking was that -- can we not be flexible, can we not say that we are prepared to go in either direction in which they are most comfortable.

Now, as a practical matter, that comes down to saying that the indirect limits which we believe would lead to the most stable force

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will continue to be pursued. That is, limitations, subordinate subceilings on heavy missiles. Those collateral constraints will endure. However, we are flexible on this issue, and are prepared to deal directly with destructive capability if the Soviet Union prefers.

Q By directly, you mean overall?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As an aggregate, absolute throwweight figure, if they prefer that.

Q Including bombers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ballistic missile throwweight is what we've been dealing with here. The final thing that was on the agenda yesterday was a discussion of the build-down and the work that's been done thus far in the administration, at the President's direction, to rigorously and thoroughly analyze how it might be applied to the START position.

This work goes back quite some time when the President called Bill Cohen, after his op-ed piece back in January as I recall, and since that time the work's gone on in State and Defense and it has reached a point of some maturity. It has defined six or seven parameters that must be integrated to apply the concept, and raised a number of problems that must be overcome. Further work has got to be done in which specific excursions, if you will, are analyzed; that is, analyze a two-for-one on ICBMs, analyze a one-for-one on SLBMs, and several combinations of how things might be applied, looking at these six or seven variables.

How long? Over what period of time would you do this -- which is related to the rate at which you would do it -- how does it affect our modernization program on each leg of the triad, and theirs? What about the verification issues involved? How can you make sure that improvements in a warhead are not a means of circumventing what is really a new warhead, and so forth?

But this work is important work. The President insisted yesterday that it be tackled very seriously, and that as soon as possible we get back to them at the NSC level with specific recommendations on how the build-down might be applied.

That's all I have. Andrea?

Q Upon build-down -- aren't you really saying that what was proposed on the Hill, even though it helped you get the MX, is really too simplistic ? And that once the NSC started looking at it, you realized that it cannot be factored into the START proposal very easily?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. When you start looking at this -- and I encourage you to look at it, as we are -- you do find out that there are problems; that those problems accrue just from the fact that our force is older than their force is, we have a greater need to modernize, but it's not at all to say you can't do it.

Indeed, there is some promise that in certain specific areas it could be applied. How to do it -- how to achieve its integration into START.

Let me pose a couple of questions for you. Would you want, for example, to take build-down and set it into its own category, and say that we and they should adopt it only with regard to modernization and forget START -- well, not forget it, but negotiate that separately -- well, would that be a sensible thing to do?

Again, given the --

Q -- to modernization --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q I thought that the concept of build-down only applied to what I think of as modernization; that is, as you put a new warhead in place, you remove two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, do you do it exclusive of what you are doing in START. In other words, do you say,

Q -- separate negotiation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right, or must you not make it compatible with START? And you quickly determine that you really have to --

Q How can you not make it compatible with START? There can't be a two-track negotiation on the same subject, can there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that is actually what its authors propose, though. And, I encourage you to talk to Senator Cohen, that this is really something that you really ought to do separately, quite apart from START. We don't think you can do that.

Q How long before you think you have something you're comfortable with on this? What's the timetable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you that. I pledge to you it is being seriously looked at. I would guess that it will be done in the course, surely of the summer -- a month, six weeks.

Saul?

Q What about --

Q I've got two questions --

Q -- the Scowcroft --

Q If we go directly to throwweight, if we decide to go directly to -- to negotiating throwweight, are we committed to equal parity in throwweight -- first question -- is that what we want? Or are we willing to negotiate, within going to throwweight, some kind of difference between them and us on the throwweight?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Equality has always been a fundamental requirement of our position.

Q Well then, if we negotiate directly on throwweight, we want equality. Is that -- and it is fundamental and non-negotiable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not put it in those terms. But equality has always been a foremost goal of our position.

Q If I may just follow up? And along with that, we are still asking the Soviets to get rid of 3,400 land-based warheads of their --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is not right.

Q Is it not? If they have 5,900 and we are trying to get them down to 2,500, that strikes me as 3,400.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I thought you were talking about the aggregate. Go ahead. I am sorry.

Q And within that 3,400, we still have the collateral restraints which are unchanged from our first proposal. In other words, what we are giving them a choice of is either equality in throwweight if they want to negotiate that, or staying with the same proposal we now have on the table on land-based ICBMs and their big ones. Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I think you are neglecting that the Soviets have, right now, modernization programs underway and at least two new missiles being tested. You are, also, I think not cranking in that the increase in the ballistic missile ceiling will lead to their re-thinking their future force posture in those terms, as apart from 850 up to a higher ceiling.

Now, what does that mean? Well, it means that they will have to re-think what size warheads they put on those missiles and how many of them that they do. And that will lead to a different force structure, a basic Soviet force structure if they agree to this.

So the outcome may or may not be punitive, if you will, which is your implication. But this is a flexible proposal. And it is one that is very negotiable.

Q The Scowcroft Commission: what is going to -- are you going to extend its life?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am glad you asked. I am sorry. That was the other issue that was --

Q Question, please?

Q Scowcroft.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was: what is to become of the Scowcroft Commission.

The President had asked before -- I think, three weeks ago -- General Scowcroft, personally, to continue to serve and to ask his view as to whether others would be so willing to serve, too. And the President, today, will announce his

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intention to extend the Scowcroft Commission into next year, specifically into January of next year. The President was quoted -- I do not know how -- accurately yesterday. He had hoped that he could extend it forever. But there are problems of competing demands on the members -- that between now and then, the President will, also, examine alternative approaches to achieving the fundamentally same purpose. That is the assurance of a bipartisan body devoted to providing influence on arms control policy.

Q Should it not have a broader base? Instead of just having former Defense -- should there not be some American citizens on that -- (laughter) -- I am sorry -- civilians who are non-governmental who might participate as an advisory group?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that is a good point.

Q I mean, this is simply an extension of military minds.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the composition, I would not argue, was something self-serving. The Congress people who came yesterday and others were very strong in urging that the Scowcroft Commission, as presently constituted, continue.

But, as I have said, the President will consider what other format might be reasonable and, in extending Scowcroft, will urge that he continue to draw on outside counsellors and advisors from the country at large.

Q What about Tom Reed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Back in April when the Commission reported, Tom withdrew from further work at that point.

Q He is not going to be Vice Chairman, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q When you raised the number to whatever it is that you will not tell us, did you, also, raise the sub-limit in heavy missiles in that number, in other words, from 110 to some new number?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no change in that.

Q May I ask a follow up question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q This proposal, at least as you are describing it, seems to be aimed at impressing everyone with flexibility. Is it, now, your assumption that there is a serious prospect of an agreement here before the election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One has a tought time. And --

Q I could not hear the beginning of your --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is it our position that there is a good chance of getting an agreement, Karen said, before the election.

Whether or not agreement is possible depends on both sides. I would be pedantic about it -- if, or to the extent that success is measured in terms of the President's commitment, his flexibility, the incentives we have, the solidarity of the Alliance; yes, the prospect is better today than it has been in the past.

Q Have you sounded out the Russians at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Someone in the back?

Q Is the structure of the negotiations still the same in your mind -- in other words, two phases, first ICBM's and SLBM's and then followed by bombers and cruise missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only thing I would say today is that the United States has always said in the past that we believe stability is best served by getting at the most destabilizing systems first. But I'm saying today that everything is on the table, that we are prepared to negotiate everything.

Now, in the back?

Q How many missiles and how many warheads do we have now and how many do the Soviets have right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The figures are classified. The ones that have been published in Time and Newsweek are not far off. In ballistic missile warheads, these have portrayed a balance on the order of mid-7,000 -- 7400, 7500. That has worsened a bit in favor of the Soviets since that table was published.

In the back?

Q Is there any new approach -- cruise missiles, the new ones --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Short answer is no. Further consideration is being given to that, however, in the next coming weeks.

Yes, Bob?

Q Is there any change in the possibility of combining INF and START?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Do you see any connection between the new position being announced today and the possibility of a summit meeting between the President and Andropov?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is Andropov going to live? I mean, how ill is he? (Laughter.) That's a serious question.

Q Yes, what do you have about him, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no reason to --

Q Doesn't it --

Q No reason to what, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAI To -- I won't speculate on it.

Yes?

Q May I just follow that up?

Q -- before --

Q Go ahead.

Q -- everything is on the table, does that specifically include throwweight equality?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's what I intended earlier. How you get at it is a matter on which we are flexible.

Yes?

Q If I understand you correctly, the only modification in the U.S. policy now -- START is being willing to negotiate the number of missile launchers. Is that the major change, flexibility and the willingness to negotiate the number of -- the ceiling on the missile launchers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is that. It is not launchers. It's deployed ballistic missiles. It's different from launchers; the emphasis, too, on flexibility reducing destructive capibility, or throwweight, if you will. This new introduction of authority for being responsive to whichever, indirect or direct, approaches the Soviet Union might prefer is an element of change.

Yes, in the middle?

Q Maybe I'm merely getting you to say it for the third time, but to follow up Joe's question, do you mean to say that equality in throwweight is no longer the absolute non-negotiable end product of these negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't intend to say that. I said, if I recall, that equality has always been and remains a fundamental U.S. objective here.

Q -- equality is not on the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize. I've got this leadership meeting here.

Q Is all this new to the Soviets; I mean, except for what they've read in the papers? Or has it been presented yet? Had they been sounded out beforehand?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be presented by Ambassador Rowny.

MR. ALLIN: The statement will be ready here on the stage in just a moment. It is embargoed for wire transmission and any other use until 11:00 a.m.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:19 A.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL NEWS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1983, 10:04 A.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUSH: Good morning. As we previously announced, this is a briefing in conjunction with the release of the Department study, "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace."

Available in the Press office, for those of you who have not previously obtained them, are copies of the study and an accompanying document.

Contrary to what we earlier announced, this briefing will be on the record, and our briefers this morning will be Mr. Mark Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs; Mr. Robert Dean, Deputy Director in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; and Stanley Riveles, who is with the Strategic Programs Bureau of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

I have been asked to remind you, too, that Mr. Palmer, this afternoon at 2 p.m., will be giving a briefing at the Foreign Press Center.

Mr. Dean.

MR. DEAN: Thank you.

Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It gives us a great sense of satisfaction to outnumber you on one occasion this way, and we thank you for coming.

As you are all aware, there is considerable public debate over security and arms control issues both here and in Europe. The character of that debate, its tenor, is really unprecedented on both sides of the Atlantic.

On the whole, as we have said before, we consider the debate to be a constructive one. After all, in democracies, it is an informed public which ultimately must support the defense and arms control policies of the government which represents it.

At the same time, the debate has been beset, again on both sides of the Atlantic, by misunderstanding, confusion, and excessive emotion.

The issuance of the publication, which I think all of you have received, "Security and Arms Control: The Search For a More Stable Peace", is the Administration's contribution to the debate. In it, we seek to clarify and explain the issues which are at the focus of public debate and disagreement, to set forth their complexities in particular.

For example, the strategic nuclear balance is considered by many solely in terms of numbers. The report offers a discussion of the strategic nuclear balance in terms of the qualitative characteristics of the weapons systems of both offensive and defensive forces.

The theme of the booklet as set forth in Secretary Shultz's note on the frontispiece, is "Defense and Dialogue", and Mr. Palmer will have a few words to say about that.

We trace the history of arms control. We point to the continuity in American arms control efforts since the end of World War II. We also point to the departures which this Administration has taken to approach arms control, in our view, in a sounder and a more coherent fashion.

Finally, the status of the negotiations, not only the START negotiations and the INF negotiation, but some of our other arms control initiatives, including MBFR, is discussed, and the central issues in each negotiation are laid out for you.

We hope that the booklet does have a constructive effect on the public debate and we hope it channels the public debate, obviously, to some extent, and we look forward to participating in the debate on this basis in the coming weeks.

I think I would like to turn this over now to Mr. Palmer, and then we will answer some of your questions.

MR. PALMER: Having been the victim of briefings, I won't go on at any length, but let me just stress that from the point of view of U.S./Soviet political relations, which I work on, we think that this report is an important contribution to the dialogue that we have launched with the Soviets. We will be providing copies of it to the Soviets. They, of course, have provided the American people with large amounts of literature about their views on arms control and defense.

Secretary Shultz said yesterday in Paris that we are in a new period of probing and testing the Soviet Union, and arms control, of course, has been, and remains, a critical part of that probing and testing.

We think that the preconditions for success in arms control are increasing. We, of course, have made the kinds of corrections in the trends in defense spending which were required to get Soviet attention and Soviet respect to our positions to give them incentives for forward movement in arms control, and if, with the Congress, we can sustain those increases in defense spending and be as creative and flexible as the President was yesterday in presenting our new approach on START, it is my view as a specialist on the Soviet Union that we may well see over the next twelve months some significant results in the arms control process.

With that, we would be happy to take your questions.

Q I think that we are all interested in that comment that you made that the balance is seen by many only in numbers, and we are talking in this book about quality. Put some meat on that, would you please? Just tell us where you find the misunderstandings among the public.

MR. DEAN: Let me cite the freeze as an example. Proponents of the freeze ignore, for example, the problem that our offensive forces face in Soviet defensive forces. The Soviets have a very thick air defense net. We have no comparable capability. It makes very little sense, in our view, to simply freeze offensive forces and let defensive forces run free, whether it is air defense, whether it is ASW capabilities, or what have you. So that is one area in particular where it is not just a question of numbers.

People, as a second illustration, like to compare the simple number of warheads, or the simple number of launchers. The fact is that it is the capability of those launchers, the capability of the warheads that sit atop them to carry out certain military missions, which have a decisive effect on the strategic balance.

The issue that has been driving the debate among the specialists in this area, in this country, over the last ten years has been precisely the Soviet SS-19 and SS-18 missiles, which have a capability to eliminate, in our estimate, upwards of 95 percent of our land-based force in a pre-emptive first strike.

We don't have the same capability, because of warhead accuracy, because of the numbers, and because of other capabilities of the missile.

So, it is issues like this that we hope to present in a more refined way as a contribution to the discussion.

Q How do -- I'm sorry, I haven't read this yet -- but how does yesterday's announcement on the changed U.S. posture affect this study? Is this taken into account here?

MR. DEAN: It is not taken into account specifically. There is no discussion of the major modification in here that the President has made in our START position. That said we are awaiting the Soviet response. We feel we have taken a major step forward and made a major move to bring movement to the negotiations, and we feel that the next move is up to the Soviet Union.

There is nothing, I should point out, inconsistent in the presentation of this booklet with what the President said. On the contrary.

Q When you talk about significant progress being possible in the next six months in arms control, are you thinking specifically of INF or START also?

MR. DEAN: That was Mr. Palmer's remark, and he may care to address it, as well.

We are hopeful that the President's emphasis both on the number of deployed missiles and our willingness to look again at that issue with the Soviets, and perhaps even more importantly his directive to Ambassador Rowny to approach the negotiations with all flexibility, will help us break the logjam at those negotiations. We are waiting now for a Soviet sign for some Soviet response, and we think if we get it, there is a good prospect for movement in the next six months.

Q But that is START. What about INF? Are you expecting progress on both within six months?

MR. DEAN: I think the two are -- politically, in any case -- the two are tied together. That is not to say that movement has to be in tandem, necessarily, because the issues are different. But, as you recall, we made a major move in this round of the INF negotiations, and in effect what we have said to the Soviets is that you pick the number of equal Soviet and U.S. warheads on intermediate range nuclear missiles.

Again, we considered that a demonstration of our flexibility. We would hope that the Soviets would read it as such and respond accordingly.

Mark, do you have something to add to that?

MR. PALMER: I tried to be careful about the time-frame. I think I said the next twelve months -- not to say that progress in the next six months isn't hoped for, and that we aren't striving for it. We are. However, as the President has noted, the closer we get to deployment of the INF systems, the greater the Soviet incentive becomes to really be serious in the talks themselves. So that while we are working hard both in START and in INF for early progress, my general view is that it is over the next twelve months that we may see some significant movement.

Q Excuse me, maybe I cannot see -- I cannot escape the comparison between this study and what is coming out from the Committee for Foreign Relations in the Senate as a tougher report on the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. And I see that they do not see things eye-to-eye, especially with relation to the assessment of the Soviet position during the negotiations.

Do you have any comment on that?

MR. DEAN: I can't really comment on the report because I haven't read it and studied it. If you would care to be more specific, though, I will try to give you an initial reaction.

Q This draws my attention, really, at the last page of the report, where there has been genuine success, the record suggests that this has resulted from Western patience, their resistance and unity, which puts the whole burden of success to the Western side in the negotiations which contains or includes two parts.

What I see in the other staff report of the Committee is that they at least perceive the Soviet side as really willing to come to agreement with the Western World in arms control.

MR. DEAN: I hope they are right. I think a careful -- and it takes two to make a deal, and I think a careful analysis of our position in both negotiations would show that in successive rounds, we have made departures from our position, gestures to the Soviet Union in both negotiations, once again designed to bring some movement to the talks.

The Soviets have not made any commensurate movement since they introduced their first position in either talk.

So, as I say, from our point of view, the burden is certainly on them.

I think to cite some examples for you, in the INF case I think the famed "Walk in the Woods" is an example of something of a major departure on our part that was carefully considered back here, modified slightly, and taken back to the Soviets, and the Soviets turned their backs on us.

I think the President's interim proposal, again, which is essentially a gesture of flexibility to the Soviets, an indication that we want to begin serious bargaining with them, and I think has been read by everybody diplomatically as such, is further evidence of our wanting to be in a serious bargaining situation with them.

They have played those negotiations politically from the outset. Their efforts still remain, in our view, to derail these deployments, to discredit the NATO position in the eyes of Western publics, and to muster through such appeals opposition in Western Europe to the deployments in the hopes of preventing them.

In the START negotiations during the last round, we introduced two new positions on cruise missiles and on bombers. We hope for a Soviet response. They didn't -- they were not forthcoming, so we have but to conclude that they take, for the time being, a political view of those negotiations as well.

I wonder if either of my two colleagues would like to comment on that? Stan?

MR. RIVELES: I can only reinforce what Mr. Dean said. The Soviet Union in the INF negotiations has directed their proposals toward preventing the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Europe without undertaking any reciprocal commitment on the restriction of their own systems.

All of the proposals from the beginning of the negotiations in November of 1981 have contained four central elements which have been consistent throughout; and that is, no U.S. deployments in Europe; a free hand for the Soviet Union to deploy as many long range INF missile systems in the Far East; major reductions in aircraft; and the requirement to count British and French systems toward any aggregate ceiling.

Those essential elements have been incorporated into every Soviet proposal regardless of its appearance in the form in which it has been presented, and these are the crucial areas in which it seems to us that the Soviet Union is treating the negotiations as a political instrument to achieve their own goals.

MR. DEAN: The principle of the quality is terribly important in all our arms control negotiations with the Soviets. It is a principle that underlies our positions in both of these negotiations.

I would remind you that in both the SALT I and SALT II negotiations, the Soviets were initially hard over on the inclusion of the British and French systems, but eventually acknowledged the principle of U.S. and Soviet equality.

There is no Administration, I don't think personally, that can ever concede a change in that principle. That is all we are asking for.

Q Is your feeling that there could be progress within the next twelve months then based on your assessment of the Soviet side as being, as taking a political view of these talks; that you think that as we get near deployment that is what will lever some progress, or do you have other reasons to believe that?

MR. RIVELES: I think there would be a number of factors or levers, as you put it. One very important one is the bipartisan appeal of -- or I should say the bipartisan approach which now sustains our position, particularly in the START negotiations, as a result of the Scowcroft Commission and that decision.

The Soviets have to perceive this alteration in our position as a genuinely national move. So they cannot rely upon political divisions to elicit unwarranted or untoward concessions from us at the negotiations.

Secondly, the bipartisanship which has characterized the debate on the decisions over the MX missile, and the strategic modernization program as a whole, I think are bound to serve us well at the negotiations.

Q But those are still political points on our side.

MR. RIVELES: That is right.

Q So, politics against politics, and you think --

MR. RIVELES: That is not to say that -- I mean, both sides, of course, have political arrows in their quivers. One has to. These are the facts of life, and I think that is especially true for the American side, where the debate is much more open, and we are subject to the vicissitudes or changes in public attitudes, more so than the Soviets. So these are central for us.

My point earlier was that the Soviets -- that basically in the INF case, what you see is what you get. The Soviets tell us at the table what they say in public. Their tone is polemical and their objective is apparently thus far not to achieve genuine military balance, which we would think would be in the interests of both sides, but to play to the gallery and to achieve prevention of these deployments.

Q I have sort of a technical question, if I may?

MR. DEAN: Please.

Q I just want to know why this report comes from the Bureau of Public Affairs instead of ACDA.

MR. DEAN: This report was contributed to by every national security agency in the government, including and importantly the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It was reviewed by every agency. It is essentially an inter-agency document. The fact that it came out through State Public Affairs is really irrelevant. In some respects, I would hazard the guess that State Public Affairs has a wider distribution or an easier distribution mechanism. It has no signficance, though.

MR. RIVELES: Bob, could I add to that that ACDA had a major input into this document, but I think the title of the document indicates why in our view it is primarily a State authorship and that is it is security and arms control.

Our Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, is a specialized institution that deals with the exclusively arms control questions, whereas this document, if you read it -- and I would certainly enjoin you all to read it, those of you who have not read it yet -- that it is a broader brush approach to the relationship of arms control in particular to our broader national strategy, and of course the State Department is in charge of foreign policy and not only arms control.

Q Thank you.

MR. DEAN: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 10:24 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

DRAFT

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

June 9, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

11:18 A.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This is on background. You know my colleague, I believe -- is the senior administration official to be quoted here. We will have a transcript made of this and it will be available in your name in Room 45 in the old EOB, probably about 6:00 p.m. today, just for you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll take just 5 or 10 minutes for some rhetoric from me and then I'll welcome your questions. Late last year, the President, at a morning meeting that he has each morning with Judge Clark and others, expressed his sense of what seemed within the realm of the possible in the national security spectrum of opportunities, and in addressing arms control specifically, said that he believed that there would be, beginning in 1983, an opportunity for making real progress toward arms reductions with the Russians, but that for there to be -- for us to capitalize on it, we needed to have several conditions created.

The first one he talked about was political support, political support in the context of allied backing and cohesion in a unified Western position, and he was very conscious of the fact that that was going to be difficult to achieve for reasons that were not of his making. I think all of us are very conscious of the fact that there has been for all of the time since World War II basic disagreements between how we and the people of Western Europe view the Soviet Union, the extent to which each of us believe that it constitutes a menace to our interests, disagreements over what Soviet purposes are and, as a consequence, how we should conduct ourselves in East-West relations.

For all of that period, up until about the mid-seventies, these disagreements, while not moot by any means, could be ignored, because the United States disposed of quite a significant military advantage in strategic power and so even when we would raise these disagreements and try to parse them within the alliance, we were never able to push them to a point of unanimity, and never had that much political will.

Some of you recall the long, extended effort in the late mid-sixties to create a NATO strategy, and that was one dimension of this disagreement, but an important reflection of it, and it took us several years to arrive at a NATO strategy, MC-14.3, which everyone acknowledged at the time and since papered over fundamental disagreements and it could, because even then we disposed of quite a substantial nuclear advantage.

It wasn't until the late seventies that people began to kind of embarrass the alliance by pointing out that that advantage no longer existed and that we had to come to terms with the problem, the implicit threat to which this vulnerability exposed us.

But back to the point, the President realized that to build that solidarity you were going to have to deal with this larger problem. Now, last summer in Versailles there was a manifestation of this disagreement, and it happened to come up over East-West trade, although there were more profound reasons for it, and in the wake of Versailles we had an argument, a public argument, and it led to an agreement to, some say, submerge, others say deal with the disagreement in several studies that have played out since last fall in COCOM, in IEA, on energy dependence, on credits, and OECD, and in NATO on East-West economic relations generally, and these things have bubbled along, but I think that it is important to stop and think about what was achieved.

I don't think anybody here would say the millenium has dawned and that everybody in Western Europe now agrees with President Reagan on how we should do business with the Russians; that's not my point. But I do assert that there is the beginning of wisdom represented in what is going on in these several studies, that there is the beginning of awareness that economic relations must be conducted with a sense of the security implications in them, and that the way in which this was done represented a measure of leadership that has been acknowledged in the eyes of Western European political leaders.

There wasn't any lengthy discussion of these several studies at Williamsburg. That fact, and the fact that what was discussed at Williamsburg was done in a way which acknowledged a renewed American leadership, I think, is testimony to the fact that there is respect growing in the West that the United States is once more able to play a positive role in international affairs and that the President is leading.

The underpinnings of leadership and of solidarity are many, and you all know them better than I. Basically, it's the ability to solve problems, and I think in the past two years there has been an acceptance among European political leaders that the President is solving problems here at home, that he's trying to solve problems internationally, whether one talks about the Falklands, the Middle East, or Southern Africa, and there is less of a tendency, a tendency you saw in the late seventies, for European leaders to go off to Moscow without consulting with us, for European leaders to dream up their own solutions to Middle East problems without much regard for American views on this issue, which I think, perhaps by negativism, but in reality reflects a reemergence of their willingness to accept United States leadership.

Well, there are other underpinnings that the President mentioned for any hope of making progress in arms control. Most importantl you've got to have some leverage, something to trade, something to deal with, and you've got to have a strong deterrent. The President was saying this at a time when the Congress had approved or authorized the B-1, the ATB, D-5 missile, and where the remaining modernization issue was the MX, and that had to be done as well.

But if that could be achieved, the only other thing the President thought or said at the time that we needed was strong bipartisan support here in the Congress and in the country at large with which to go to Geneva and, in his judgment, make real progress, in short, allied political solidarity, a position of obvious strength as perceived from Moscow, military strength, and bipartisanship in the country at large.

Toward that latter chink or element of the foundation, he directed that the Judge and I, Secretary of State and Defense, and others make a very positive effort to go and listen to what the Congress had to say about arms control, and to take what they had to say into account in forging the positions in START, INF, and otherwise, and that's what we've been doing with centers of influence and interest from Scoop Jackson to John Tower to Cohen, Nunn, Dicks, Gore, Aspin, Pritchard, Fazio, Stratton, Bill Dickinson, and others from across the spectrum, and perhaps the most important, I guess, catalyst for this process was the Scowcroft Commission.

The President appointed the Commission to ostensibly look at alternative basing modes for MX; all of you know the history of this discourse with the Congress.

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Its report, which integrated basing modes with the larger issue of deterrence and of arms control, was endorsed by the President in April, and the work since then has been devoted to how you integrate it into the START position.

That played out in the course of a couple of NSC meetings and periodic briefings, meetings with the President and his advisers, and a lot of meetings with the Congress, bipartisan gatherings of various people, in the past six weeks. The views of the Congress, in terms of Scowcroft Commission, small missiles, stability and how you get it, were cast in letters that they wrote here last month, and which the President answered. Their interest seemed to be for, mostly toward stability and how you get it, looking to the promise of the small single warhead missiles as holding out a good prospect for improving it in terms of the land-based leg, into whether or not there is not a need for, for a vehicle, need for a vehicle through which bipartisan influence on arms control policy can be expressed and in some isolated cases specific approaches, such as the build-down approach, that ought to be considered.

All these things have been put into the interagency process and worked for the last six weeks. At the NSC meeting two days ago the President considered basically three major items and two or three minor items on the agenda there.

The first one was, what should we do in terms of the Scowcroft recommendations on the warhead limit which has heretofore been a part of our START position? And everyone agreed -- it was not contentious -- that this was a central element of our proposal; central in the sense that it did reduce the things that blow up and destroy things, warheads; that it did get at throwweight, destructive capability; and it was a relevant unit of account that ought to be preserved as a unit of account. And it has been, and it is, as originally proposed: 5,000 ballistic missile warheads remains the position of this Government.

The next agenda item that was considered was the deployed missile limit, which we've had up until now, of 850. The Scowcroft Commission treated history, history in the sense that the trend toward MIRVing in the past more than a decade, the trend toward deploying higher value targets, more warheads on single missiles, particularly the resultant imbalance in land-based prompt hard-target kill systems that it has produced has led to an unstable situation and that this could be best relieved if we were to move away from that and toward a balance that basically involved fewer, a lower ratio of warheads to targets.

You can achieve this with the numerator or the denominator. That is, you can lower the number of warheads, you can increase the number of targets, or aim-points you have to shoot at, as through deploying single-warhead missiles, for example.

The Soviet Union hasn't much liked that proposal that we limit ballistic missiles to 850, and has said so. However, apart from that, which is not the foremost consideration, the decision to go toward a more stable balance through introducing a single warhead missile raises the questions of how many do you want, and that how many SLBMs do you want, and what does that add up to, and is 850 a sensible number or not?

Many said that you could deploy as many small missiles as you would probably need to deploy and still fit it into the 850 limit. Others said that it isn't clear that that is true; you may want more than 300-or-so small single-warhead missiles, and therefore you ought to either raise that limit or to do away with it entirely.

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The military, correctly in my judgment, pointed out that there is great vantage, or value, in having a deployed missile limit because the Soviets are in a much better position, should they so choose, with their new missile programs that are already being tested, to move out quickly in great numbers with a small missile, than we are, and therefore a limit would be in our interest.

Some of those same people pointed out that we must say that historically the Soviet Union has preferred ballistic missile limits as a unit of account, and that if we were to do away with it entirely that this might be an element that was non-negotiable from their point of view.

Well, as you know, the Soviets have thus far proposed a limit of about 1,800 total strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and if you strip out airplanes that corresponds to about 1,450 ballistic missiles. We have proposed 850.

The President decided that we would be flexible in negotiating a number somewhere in between there.

The last item on the agenda was, how to deal with throwweight. It's not that the earlier items didn't; they do, both warheads and ballistic missile limits have an effect on throwweight. But, basically, it was a discussion of which of two alternative approaches to dealing with throwweight seems best, or has the greatest promise of getting results in the wake of three rounds of negotiating in START so far. That is, having gone the indirect route so far, that is, by saying that the Soviet Union ought to have x number of SS-18s and x number of SS-19s, that the resultant reduction in missiles and warheads on them gives you an effect on throwweight indirectly.

The alternative approach is to say, forget about what the character of their forces, how many 18s and 19s, and simply set a number. And they can build whatever they might choose within that number, a number of millions of kilograms of throwweight.

The results of the first three rounds of START have made it, or included, that very emphatic Soviet position that they don't much care for our telling them, you can have so many 18s and 19s, and structuring their force according to our criteria.

That is no reason for rejecting it. However, there is a case to be made for melding these two approaches and saying that if you look carefully at what gives you stability in terms of Soviet missile force, as measured through our lenses, how many 18s and 19s and the resultant warheads and throwweight, versus our own modernization program, would establish a stable balance, and then tot up what that gives you in terms of throwweight; and to say to the Soviets, we're willing, we prefer that you build a force that looks like this, but whatever kind of force you want to build, it should not be any more than X destructive capability as measured in millions of kilograms of throwweight. And you can go either way, but you cannot exceed the limits that we propose in either category, although within aggregate numbers those subceilings are negotiable.

Well, there are other issues which were discussed. One of them was what to do about the Scowcroft Commission, and the President had met with General Scowcroft and the others several times. There is a problem in their own availability, and that's understandable. The President was pleased for them to continue to serve and has agreed to extend it through the first of next year, and we will see whether at that time it is possible to extend them beyond that; that is, if they are willing to serve. And if not, what other mechanism is sensible at the time?

I'm sorry I've taken so long, but I'll take your questions now.

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Q There are no numbers as yet, the number of limits that you're putting on individual missiles at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, and I suppose that sounds like some kind of sophistry, and it isn't intended that way. The President, in more broadly speaking about East-West relations, has lectured us a few times about getting results, and in his judgment what it takes to get results and what represents serious, good-faith bargaining and what doesn't, and he has said to the extent you put out everything that you're willing to agree to in the newspaper, that that's not good faith negotiations and so he's not going to do that.

Q You said in the discussion of throwweight ceilings -- I mean with warhead ceilings -- there was a consensus that the 5,000 should be preserved, saved -- from the 2500?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Was there any discussion of raising or dropping the 2,500 at the NSC meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was, and part of it internal within the Executive Branch and part of it spurred by Congressional interest in it. And on the one hand you can say that putting a lower number on warheads, on ICBM warheads, lowers the numerator of the warhead-target ratio and, therefore, is an introduction of stability. You can also say that it penalizes the Soviet Union, who has most of its force deployed on land. You can also point out that that has been a manifest point of Soviet criticism in terms of nonnegotiability, if you will.

But the President came down on the side of what is more stable in terms of military outcomes and that is going to be preserved.

Q What would you say to what could be perceived here as a softening in the U.S. position from adamancy to, your word here, "flexibility," from what at least used to be a very strong position, it seemed, on arms reduction as opposed to what now seems to be an embracing of the concept of arms control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you have probably said it better than I could, Bud. I think that --

Q Well, I not only said it, but I am trying to get an explanation if that is indeed true.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it is. The President has set some objectives. We're trying to achieve reductions in warheads and we're trying to achieve a reduction in destructive capability and potential. Now, there are a lot of ways of doing that. And as long as we can get an outcome which does that -- and the President set some fairly specific criteria of measuring that -- then we're willing to listen to any of several ways of doing it. So it is an element of flexibility that --

Q But why is my question. Maybe you've already told us why, but it didn't quite come through to me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'd better talk to the President about it. I don't mean to be frivolous about that. When he gave us these marching orders last year, it was very clear. I think implicit was that he had thought about the agenda he came in with, and after two years had winnowed away some of the 15 or 20 goals we were going to achieve, and realized that only two or three were going to make, and this is one of them.

Q On the throwweight limits, originally, as I understand it, the proposal was that there would be equal throwweights. Now, is that still the position, or is there a number? You said X million kilograms. Do we have a now fixed number which each side should have, and is it also a second-stage process on the road to reductions, or is it

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part of a whole package in the beginning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the requirement for equality has always been a foremost objective since the beginning. Now, how you achieve it and when you achieve it is negotiable, but we have not gone away from the requirement for ultimate equality, and that's as far as I want to go.

Q Just to follow up on Mort's question, has the two-phase concept that the President unveiled at Eureka, in effect, been replaced by a single phase within which the Soviets have a choice? Either they can accommodate their concerns on throwweight by agreeing to a throwweight limit, a direct limit, or they can accept the collateral restraints on their big missiles, but within the context of a single phase.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't intend this as ambiguously as it sounds. The President remains convinced that we should devote our attention first to those most destabilizing systems, ballistic missiles, and we are going to try very hard to get that agreement first. Everything is on the table right now, and I include by that bombers and cruise missiles, all strategic systems, so we are prepared to discuss anything in that spectrum.

Q Let me ask you, you say everything's on the table.

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When we negotiate at Geneva this time, and let us suppose the Russians raise the question of the MX, have we a position on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the START position was originally crafted with, in anticipation of the MX deployment, and so that has been taken into account. That's reflected --

Q That's part of our force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q And we come at it from that with the Russians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Could you characterize your view or the President's view of the state of the Soviet mind at this point, the receptivity to all of this? I mean, how you communicate or what kind of an idea do you get?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the -- we haven't had a Soviet response; that isn't your point. I don't know. You know better than I do, you, the factors that go into the Soviet calculus of whether to engage seriously in this thing or not. They have to do with internal Kremlin politics and with the military parameters of it, the extent to which they believe the Western Alliance is behind this thing or remains divisive and susceptible to exploitation of that divisiveness.

I suppose I would say that I am more optimistic on all of those counts that progress is possible than I've ever been in the past, but we have no specific Soviet signal or indication to justify that.

Q What is your optimism based on? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All these things I've mentioned. I think that when the political leadership there looks at the reality of all three legs of the triad being authorized, hopefully; when it looks at the, in the wake of Williamsburg, the measure of political solidarity that is here; when it looks at -- and I would frankly minimize this element -- the value of, I would say, in internal political terms, of some kind of agreement, there may be some attractiveness to making progress. But I don't put much --

Q You mean, to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Finally, however, when the military in the Soviet Union looks at what things are going to be like in the late 1990s if these programs go unconstrained, there is a powerful incentive for them to get serious about this. Joe?

Q You mentioned you set a lot of store on allied solidarity and you mentioned allied leaders going off to Moscow. The next one that goes is Kohl in July, and some of the Germans have led us to believe that the United States has changed its position somewhat on INF, that we are no longer asking for, I think the technical term is "global equality," and that we are prepared to accept regional equality instead. Is that true? Did the President say that to Kohl before Kohl left Williamsburg?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two points. Earlier, when I referred to people running off to Moscow without coordinating with us, I was referring to the late 1970s, and not to the last 2-1/2 years. In fact, the discussion of travels of each of the leaders was, has been a matter that has been a subject of coordination.

But more to your point, the short answer is, no. Global limits is our position, and that remains our position, and there is no agreement to alter that.

Q Global equality? That is, they, the Russians will have to dismantle?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Yes.

Q Is it your thought that the START talks are not affected in some way by the INF talks and the more immediate turbulence that one can see in that INF framework --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're right, I think. They are surely related, and the political atmospherics tied to one affect the possibilities for progress on the other, and I think, there -- I will assert; you will have to judge -- that in the INF context the President's position of really ultimate flexibility, saying

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to the Russians, if you don't like zero and if you don't like 572, you pick a number. But equality is a reasonable principle on which to base an outcome.

Q Overall equality including the missiles of Western Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Now, if you intend by that, Martin, the British and French systems, I -- no. Those are strategic systems. Those are taken up in START. But in INF systems, yes -- equality. *(See note on Page 10.)

Q Is it conceivable to you that progress in START, whatever that might mean, can be made even in conditions of non-agreement at INF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they can. The foremost I reason I think they can is because the military implications of not constraining U.S. forces are very severe for the Soviets in the out-years. And that's a very powerful incentive. I think they would like very much to constrain those systems.

Q -- the inter-continental systems, you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q How do you mean that? I mean, what is this fear that you think they have in the 1890's? What does it derive from?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When you look at the past --

Q The 1990's -- (laughter) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the Soviets have always had this awareness, I think, that technologically the United States can do better than they can in military hardware and otherwise; that for a lot of reasons we just didn't apply that technological capability to military systems in the 1970's and they stole a march on us in that period. And they have maximized that window of opportunity. I don't want to use cliches but that -- it was a window of opportunity, so to speak, in which we were relatively quiescent in our modernization -- no submarine for 15 years, no bomber for 20, no missile for 17. And the giant has awakened. I guess I'm using a lot of stupid sayings, but that -- And they can see that if that technological capability, through cruise missiles, through the D-5 missile, through MX, in terms of guidance, accuracy, is applied that they're going to be outclassed again. And they are not right now. And they are in a good bargaining position, but so are we.

Our programs, it is true, are only authorized, but that, historically, has been the biggest hurdle. That was the hurdle which, when we overcame it on the ABM Treaty got them to the table seriously. We hope to replicate that.

Q Following up on Steve's point, in the next six or eight months, it is probable that the Russians are going to impose as much pressure as they can intimidation on the Western Europeans to block INF deployment. Is it really feasible in that kind of climate that they would find it in their interests to make progress, create a somewhat more euphoric atmosphere in START? It'd seem to me they'd want to scare the hell out of the Europeans on all fronts over the next six or eight months.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can argue that better than I can. I can see that the Soviet Union might, through some real concession or apparent concession in START, could demonstrate

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*(See note on Page 10.)

the image of this peaceful intent and that there would be this wave of hopeful sentiment come out of Europe that says, "Gosh, if they're making these right noises on START, maybe there's hope on INF. So, maybe you ought to delay the deployments over there." So, it cuts both ways.

Q Really, I mean, can I marry Hugh's question with Steve's question? Do you really think that the way that something that is going to happen maybe in 1990 is sufficiently attractive for them to abandon a very good line they've got going for the next six months? Does that really -- is that your Kremlinology?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is that plus it clearly turns, importantly, on their perceptions of President Reagan's political position in 1984. But, yes, I wouldn't walk away from it. I do think there's a powerful incentive that is there in military terms.

Q How do you read the December climate in Europe when the time comes to place those missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's just so much that can happen between now and then. But I am more optimistic than I was six months ago mostly because there -- the -- an effect, a side effect which nobody has reported upon and, of these studies, has been a conscious awareness of facts by political leaders in places of government that hadn't really gotten into these issues for a long time, that there's a problem here and a kind of a greater concern about the Soviet Union than there was before. Now, that doesn't translate it yet to the people of Europe.

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*Clarification: The briefer was not stating that the British and French systems would be a part of the Geneva START negotiations. He was emphasizing that those systems are strategic, not intermediate-range forces and thus differ not only in role but in type and characteristics from those being negotiated in the Geneva INF talks. Although historically the Soviet Union has sought negotiating leverage by introducing British and French systems into both strategic and INF negotiations, it has been for many years and continues to be the U.S. position that it's neither proper nor necessary for bilateral U.S./U.S.S.R. negotiations to involve these or other third country forces. (See Page 9.)

But I think you -- the big events such as Kohl's election and Prime Minister Thatcner's election today are perhaps more expressive of where the center of opinion is in Europe. And when you put it together with their confidence that we are negotiating in good faith, all this blather on my part to the point there is just a gut feeling that -- what Europeans tell me when they come here, what I read in the newspapers out of Europe every day is that, sure, there's opposition, but there is an emerging awareness of the problem, of the legitimacy of worrying about it, and a willingness to stand up and deploy. And now that's going to be severely challenged in the summer and in the fall, but if NATO -- and we are not without our instruments to influence that and actions that we can take that will have a neutralizing effect on Soviet propaganda. And there are a number of arrows in our quiver to deal with this.

Q The fact that we have moderated our position, wouldn't that encourage the Soviets to perhaps think we might moderate it further?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, sure. But I think we are somewhat in a different position now in terms of at least we're no longer moderating it under a -- with an inexorable intra-ally pressure to moderate it further. Now, there will be some, surely, but I think that we've begun to see the allies turn around and say, "We've been doing all the conceding," and in the coming coming months, that there'll be a very grudging willingness to do any more than that.

Q What do you mean when you say that the Soviet position will turn on Reagan's political position in '84?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't say it will turn on. It will be influenced importantly by whether or not they think they could get a better deal by waiting it out.

Q So if Reagan decides not to run, what would that mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's inconclusive. My point was if he were perceived to be unlikely to run and win, then there would be an incentive for delay. But I just don't think that's the case.

Q What's happened to that Soviet threat to put missiles in Eastern Europe? Has that been resolved, and Weinberger's answer on that? Where do you stand on all that now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have said that. Ustinov and others have said that if deployment goes ahead on our side, they would have to take counter measures and at various times they have said, to compensate implicitly within the theater and other times saying --

Q Well, are there missiles there, as Weinberger indicated, when he was over -- in Eastern Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, yes.

Q May I go back a step, please? What's the priority? START, or INF? Or is that a reasonable question? Is there some requirement at some point to fold them into each other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the President believes that he has very solid positions in both and is interested in both in getting results. As a practical matter, it seems less likely, just looking at the Soviet history of what moves them to deal seriously and what doesn't, that they will deal seriously on INF until they recognize that the prospect of deployment is quite high. And that probably means the next few months that they're going to stonewall over there. That's not to say that we're not --

Q Stonewall START?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, stonewall in INF, because they just don't believe we're going to be able to bring that leverage of deployments to bear. But we're as committed to both as we can be.

Q Now, you don't accept a possibility that some choice is involved later on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- between asking them to do one thing first or one thing more than the other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Isn't there some excessive optimism involved in the hope that when the Soviets see INF -- our INF deployment proceeding, our Pershing II deployment proceeding, that that will then persuade them or force them to go to -- to negotiations? Isn't it conceivable that they would react to that simply by increasing the number of their SS-20 deployments, which is very easy for them to do, and preserve the margin of superiority up the line?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that that fundamental strategy is going to be debated between now and December very -- very carefully. I think up until now, in the wake of their experience of the past two years, an experience of success in being able to manage Poland and still keep East-West credits coming and things like that, would encourage them

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to conclude that the Europeans really are in a state of decline and that they will not be able to come together with this solidarity essential to accepting deployments and to really turning around in terms of East-West --

Q I'm saying let's say they accept the deployments. The Europeans accept the deployments. The Russians react not by coming to negotiations, but by simply deploying more SS-20's.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, they will either do that or they will conclude an agreement based upon their perceptions of which long-term strategy better serves their interests. That is, to the extent that deployments on their part, increased deployments, would rally European solidarity more and perhaps be affected in greater restraints on East-West trade, that it would be a dumb thing to do. What I'm saying is that I think there may well be an evolution in Soviet thinking as to what is achievable in terms of their relationship to Western Europe going on now. I don't know how it's going to turn out, but I'm more optimistic than I was.

Q Could you conceive of their going so far toward our point of view, toward an agreement with us at START, that they could argue the deployment, the INF deployment, should be included in a negotiation, or that anything that they could propose could ever induce us to stop that deployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they could propose doing away with what justifies it, the SS-20's, and I don't think they're likely to do that. I only say that because Soviet military people have always been very reluctant to destroy anything that's new -- or old, for that matter.

Q To what extent does your proposal force the Soviet Union to restructure its strategic forces less than it did before it was revised? Bear in mind you're keeping the 2,500 warhead limit on land-based missiles, I believe.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One thing that I think people are forgetting is that the Soviets have two new missiles being tested right now. Now, what do they intend for those? How many do they want to deploy, how many warheads are going to be on them? One is a small solid, single warhead, the other is a medium MIRV. How many do they want of each? Is there some logic, in presuming that they want to keep all the 18's they have, the 19's they have, and if so, which models?

Our presumption of punitive results from our position, really, your presumption of punitive results, is based upon a kind of an inertial view of Soviet force structure, and the force structure is clearly not inertial, it is changing very quickly. And I think we're going to see more changes to it soon.

Q More effective -- they will be more effective --

Q That's a really key question, because that's the question that fills out the rhetoric.

Q Just to plug some numbers into it, in addition to the 2,500 number, there's the 210 number and the 110 number, the collateral restraints on heavies and mediums, which are still part of the American proposal, is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q So, I guess just I would add, with an asterik, those numbers to Charlie's question.

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Q And is the answer that the only real change is in future missiles that they might deploy, that otherwise you're exactly where you were before?

Q And the new medium that they're testing presumably would fit under the collateral constraint on medium ICBM's.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, maybe I didn't stress enough that in saying that we're willing to go indirect or direct. If the Soviets should choose to live within an aggregate throwweight limit and an equal

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outcome and to propose to structure their force within it that provided for substantially more numbers of the SSX-24 and the PL-5 that inherently must require, within a ballistic missile limit, fewer numbers of 18s and 19s, then that is surely negotiable. In short, maybe I haven't made it clear enough that this is surely negotiable.

Yes, we believe that the best outcome in terms of their force structure is X limits on 18s and 19s. But we are very conscious that they've got these new systems coming on. We want to put a cap on it, however, and say that the aggregate can't go beyond certain numbers.

Q But you are still trying to force them to sea, aren't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that's a more stable outcome. We think that --

Q Yes, but I mean it's what they say they're not going to do. I'm trying to figure out what is the basis for your optimism that you have a proposal that will sell now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, now, do you think that their having 956 SLBMs and an aggressive MIRV program for them forecloses going to sea? I don't think that quite tracks. I'm not trying to be cute, Charley, but I think that --

Q I think that your original START proposal, I mean, I think the whole world thinks your original START proposal worked to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union from the point of view of land-based missiles. All I'm asking now is, how you've changed that, if you've changed that? That's -- I'm not arguing any pros or cons on anything.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that you really are giving too little notice to the new systems the Soviets are bringing on line, and to how they probably plan to change their force structure even if there hadn't been any START dialogue, and what that implies for the 18 and 19 force, which is ten years old, after all, going on.

I don't want to mislead you. I don't see the Soviet Union completely forswearing the land-based ICBMs by any means, nor that they even go to less than half of their force in that area. But I think a lesser force than they have now is not out of the question, and that's what we're after.

Q Could I ask you just one other question here on the matter of throwweight? When you speak of an aggregate number in throwweight, are you willing to include the warheads in that negotiation, or is your position on 5,000 warheads firm and fixed? I mean, I see you get a throwweight directly by putting an aggregate limit that would force down the throwweight of a bunch of missiles, but would it force down the number of warheads?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, surely 5,000 translates in the current force structure to some throwweight that is lower than what they have. We believe, in terms of the target base and ours and theirs, and the requirements of ballistic missile systems, that 5,000 is a reasonable number. Whenever you say that it's firm and inflexible, that means that it can never change. We never say never, but 5,000 to us is a stable, sensible aggregate.

Q Did I understand you to say that you're going to try to persuade them, among other things, not to go forward with the development of these two missiles that they're now testing?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I didn't say that. It's not that wouldn't be desirable; it would. But I'm not, I don't have high hopes for that.

I think that it is sensible to provide caps on those and limitations to them, both in the size of the RVs they put on them and in the aggregate throwweight you put on them and how many RVs you put on them. I think all those things ought to be limited.

Q Would we at any point raise the possibility when we, you know, when we propose things to them, that there be a cap on both sides if both sides stop development of new missiles? Is that part of our negotiating --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think this is something that we ought to talk about. The proposition that a freeze is a sensible thing to do -- what you've said is not that simple. But you're saying, on ballistic missile systems? Yes, a freeze. And you have to think about, what is that, what imbalance does that preserve? If we both freeze now, what does that leave you with, in terms of what we have and what they have?

And I think most objective observers would say it leaves us at a position of terrible disadvantage, to freeze now.

Q So we wouldn't propose it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Another reason is that they have proposed it and that they have not done it. When last year Brezhnev said that they would observe a moratorium, effective immediately on SS-20 deployments, they just didn't do that. They kept right on doing it, and still saying that

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they had a moratorium, which recently they have said they are not going to observe.

Q Can you just comment on the build-down concept? Has this Administration seriously explored the implications, and does it propose to introduce it as a negotiating position in Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The short answer is that we have scrubbed it in the interdepartmental group on START, and it has been rigorous and thorough and it is not finished. And what it has produced is that you have to -- there're about seven factors you have to take into account in trying to structure a build-down formula that preserve stability and it's fairly complicated. Let me give you one or two of the problems.

Would you want, for example, to take the concept and apply it to modernization programs on both sides, quite apart from START or arms control? Would you want to say that go ahead with what you're doing in Geneva, but both sides adopt a formula for build-down on any modernization they do, whatever the outcome in Geneva, and you find that that creates a lot of problems. Just when you look at the age of the two forces you quickly arrive at the fact that ours are more than 15 years old and theirs are less than five years old, so we have to modernize when things begin to break and fall apart, and there's an unstable situation there.

So, what does that do? Well, I don't mean to be pedantic, but it leads you toward saying you've got to have it within the context of your arms control talks. If your objective in arms control talks is to get down to 5,000 warheads, let's say, all right, then you have to decide within what period of time do you want to get down to that number. If you want to get down in five years, your build-down ratios would have to be higher than they would if you want to get down in eight years.

Whether it is five or eight depends upon your modernization program and theirs. How do you verify the build-down? That is, one new warhead deployed, you pull out two. Well, what is a new warhead? When our ability up until now to detect changes in Soviet warheads other than explosive construction has been pretty good, but on explosive construction you can get changes which give you materially different performance, and we would never know. So, there're problems in that, what's a new warhead, what isn't?

At any rate, the point of this is that these seven factors have led to some tentative conclusions as to what you would want to have in your build-down concept and things you should not, and the next step is to -- and the President's directing today further analysis on seven or so excursions; that is, look at the application of X ratio to SLBM's and ICBM's, look at wide ratios for all nuclear systems. And this is going to be wrung out. And the President has insisted in his meetings with everybody around the table that this is going to be thorough and complete, and to report back to him here in about a month's time and to discuss it with the people on the Hill that have an interest in it.

Q How soon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would guess about a month's time, but it's gone forward with commitment.

MR. SIMS: Could we maybe take one more and then let everybody go to lunch?

Q There've been a lot of objections, especially from the Air Force, to Midgetman. I mean, I know you're committed to going ahead with it, but suppose some of these objections prove valid, I mean the cost involved, the personnel, and all that stuff. Do you have any alternatives or are you discussing the possibility of going to sea as an alternative with the people who want Midgetman?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're going to do Midgetman. You're going to pay for it. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:15 P.M. EDT

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
FLYING BETWEEN PARIS AND SHANNON AIRPORT
FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you give us some further idea about what the back and forth about the East-West trade clause in the communique -- which we still have not read but have heard dictated?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not sure -- I dictated and interpolated a little bit as I went along. We'll try to get you the text. Although I guess the official text they will have to produce there.

One of the things that takes up a lot of time, and we should be tuned in to it, but its very difficult to do it, is the French sensitivity about what they are involved in and what they are not involved in. There is a big point, of course, that they are not involved in the Unified Command of NATO, and therefore, there are certain decisions that they don't take part in, while they are involved in the Alliance. So, you are constantly in this process of saying the Alliance thinks such and such, and then the French saying, "Well, we agree with that, no problem. But that is something that the Unified Command did, so we can't touch." And then you struggle around with language to not weaken the point, but at the same time to protect the precision of the French view. The same thing carries over in this East-West economic area. So, there are certain words that they are very sensitive to and ways of phrasing things.

Take the subject of energy. I suppose because of the background of the pipeline dispute and the orientation to alternative supplies of gas, there is a tendency to think in those terms. So, the words gas in some fashion or another will call into a draft. The French will immediately complain that they have big nuclear program, and how can you say that gas is the only althernative. It is ridiculous. Nuclear power is a strong alternative, and so on. And they are right.

So it is always something that seems to take a lot of discussion, and I think to some extent it is aggravating, and to some extent we should learn and know about these points that they make. But I don't think that the economic part of the communique didn't in the end take a lot of time in the discussion itself. There were some bracketed items and some alternative approaches. As far as we were concerned either of the approaches would have been fine. And so in the end that didn't turn out to be a big problem.

The length of time that was taken was more related to the first problem that I mentioned, in getting phraseology that had to be very careful. The allies concerned agree that we had very good questions and that sort of thing. What has turned out on all of these issues is good -- strong, straight forward -- but it seems to take a while to get there.

QUESTION: Sir, how would you characterize the results of this meeting from the U.S. point of view?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think we have had a series of meetings, as I've said, and the OECD meeting got this process off to a very good start. The Williamsburg Summit, I think was outstanding. And from all I can judge, the NATO Defense Ministers meeting was very strong and this one was. We have been saying to ourselves for a long time, I know when I came back from Europe in December 1979, or December whenever it was 1982 .

QUESTION: Seems like such a long time.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It seems like it, yes. I felt very strongly, and said that 1983 is a real big year. And from an economic standpoint, arms control standpoint, deployment standpoint, a lot of things, so we really have to concentrate and be sure things go well.

And I think they are. I think we have demonstrated time and again the strength of the Alliance. The whole thing, of course, is helped a lot in the sense that expansion is taking place in the economy. So I think a long way round about answering your question is it was a good meeting and part of a pattern. No, it was right on the line. I suppose if anything coming over here, as I think I mentioned, we had to be careful having had these three meetings, that you don't sort of have a sense of anti-climax. I think somebody here asked about that or maybe it was in that session in Paris, and that is a problem. But I think it carried itself on through, it was very good.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, one of the major issues that has been the highlight of this meeting is the INF question. Can you give us your assessment now of the prospects for agreement? I know you have said it is up to the Russians. But is an agreement possible this year? And if one isn't reached when do those deployments start? Can you give us a little more specificity there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as the deployments are concerned, there is a schedule and a plan. And it involves obviously preparatory work which is going on as you get sights ready and all of that. And then a schedule of deployment, I can't call off the precise dates, come toward the end of the year. But that's all scheduled and there has been a very clear determination all along that we are going to hold to that schedule. So there is no ambiguity about that whatever.

Of course an arms control agreement is possible, whether it is likely or will happen, I think depends primarily on whether the Soviet Union wants to come and talk about in terms of, at least our standpoint, are reasonable.

QUESTION: To what extent do you think the reservations that the Greeks and the Danes expressed again at this meeting, does that in effect take a bit of the glow off the meeting, or does it in a way tarnish the work that has been done?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Greeks have a habit of reserving on things and that has become sort of a standard thing. So, it is something that always happens and it is kind of interesting that Haralambopoulos, who I don't know whether you know him or interviewed him or anything. He's quite a delightful person. He's fun. And he has lots to say and he always makes these speeches about -- well here is this paragraph and I'm reserving it because I don't agree with all the essentials points but there is this or there is that and so on and I think by this time people have accommodated themselves to it and can go along.

The Danish reservation is a problem and that vote is a problem. At the same time the Danish government itself does not share the view expressed in that vote. And they've been very clear about that. I hope that as time goes on the Danish situation will mend itself. But certainly that is not something that we are looking for.

QUESTION: There seems to be a very conscious effort to put the onous on the Soviet Union on arms control. In your statements in the report that was issued in the SCG statement and so forth, I wonder do you think that you are having any success in getting that message across to the West European public and to the American public that indeed the Russians are to blame for the fact that there hasn't been any agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that we need to keep saying what it is true. I don't now how to come up with a measure of what you say or your question, but I suppose the best measures are elections. And the candidates that stood up to these issues very strongly won decisively. So I think that is probably the best answer you can get of where the political thrust is.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what sort of feeling do you get from the other ministers about whether the President and Andropov should have a summit conference? Is their a feeling that that ought to happen? Can you talk about that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I've talked about that with many in bilateral sessions and it had some mention in the general discussion but not a lot. I think that people would like to see a summit meeting if there were something worthwhile that could come out of it. There are a few who think it would be nice to have a meeting. But not too many. I think that on the whole there is a desire to have it contain some real substance. If that can happen, then they would like to see it. Of course, that is precisely the President's view, as well.

QUESTION: What do you think the chances are of having one where there would be some substance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are this whole range of issues in arms control and some in regional issues and the human rights areas that we've talked about such as in being discussed in Madrid and elsewhere. There are a variety of bilateral issues, but it depends on how these things go along, and there are lots of fora where we are talking with them, so it isn't as though there aren't places where substance could be developed.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It isn't there, but that doesn't say it couldn't get there.

QUESTION: Are you aware of any intelligence reports indicating that there is a significant increase in the number of Soviet combat troops in Cuba? If so, what do you make of it? Would you tie it to INF in any way or more to the situation generally in Central America?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I'm not aware of any increase in Soviet forces in Cuba but beyond that, I don't want to comment on intelligence reports.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us your reading of what is going on in the Middle East with Qadhafi flying to Riyadh? What does that signal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, Abdullah went to Libya to confer, and I think there's a lot of talking around. We have been trying to make the point of conducting a pretty active diplomatic effort ourselves. This is the opportunity to bring about withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and all it takes are for Syria and the PLO to withdraw, so I'm sure that and the Syrian/Lebanon relationship and so on is heavily into those discussions. I don't know precisely what they are saying to each other. We do get some good indications as meetings of that kind conclude and our Ambassadors are given read-outs on the meetings. It is another marker of why it is important to have good strong Ambassadors in those regions and we are fortunate that we do have them. They get it, and we will hear. We have a constant stream of information, but I don't know about that particular one as yet.

QUESTION: The info you're getting from your Ambassadors, is it encouraging or is it still sort of a stalemate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I can't say that there are indications of something about to break, but I do hear more and more, how to put it, background noise or whatever that has to do with problems that Syria sees which are essentially descriptions of problems that are resolvable problems through a negotiation, basically by Lebanon and Syria, and perhaps others. That doesn't mean that there's been a break in the logjam, however.

QUESTION: I hesitate to ask a Central America question again because you'll think it's all I care about, but we've already talked about the Middle East. What have you heard, what can you tell us about Stone's visit? Did he get to meet with any Nicaraguan officials today? It's only midday? Did you get any indications that they are going to deal with the U.S. Government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I haven't had a chance to read my cable traffic and so on today, I'm sorry to say, but, so I don't know the answer to your question.

QUESTION: We're back to the Middle East again --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Inaudible) whether there's anything in there or not.

VOICES: (Inaudible)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, apparently --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It turns out he's a very good reporter -- he has very informative cables every day that come in.

QUESTION: Do you have anything to tell us in that regard as to what form of a discussion he's had so far in the (inaudible) countries, so I guess there wouldn't be much news --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it is fair to say his mission is extremely well received.

QUESTION: If the reports we saw are correct, the Syrians have now come out again and said while they won't receive Phil Habib, you're still welcome there anytime. Do you take that as a hint that they are trying to get you to come out there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I've had a number of discussions with Khaddam and found them worthwhile. They have suggested, and we have reciprocally suggested, that it would be good to have the relationship between Syria and the United States be a stronger, so to that extent, it's a continuity of comment. Whether there is anything related to the Lebanon issues remains to be seen, and I expect to spend a fair amount of time this morning on this subject. Elie Salem is in Washington and Phil will be there and some of our other people and I'm going to weigh in on that, so at this point, I'll reserve judgment, but I'm glad to know I'm welcome.

QUESTION: The Ambassadors' review is still continuing -- the review in Washington is still continuing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are some there. I think it was overly described as though it was a review. It wasn't as though we called people back to have a review. Several were, it happened, back for one reason or another and so it seemed like a sensible thing to get them together and have some further talk. Not all are back and if we were going a full-scale review, we'd have called everybody back which we didn't do.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you look on your calendar, you'll be going to Asia, of course, in a couple of weeks, is it more likely in July you'll end up in the Middle East or is it possible you'll be seeing Gromyko? What would be the factors in either case?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't have any trips planned in between the end of the Asian meeting and the trip to the NATO Ministerials in December. But I think that doesn't mean I'll be at home all that time. I was hoping to have a week off in August sometime, so that's where the situation stands at the moment, so I don't have any comment on that.

QUESTION: Back on Central America, you have talked about your hopes for a regional solution, but it seems to me the trend over the past few months despite the formation of the Contadora Group has been toward increasing tensions and more bloodshed and more polarization in the region, do you share that perception and do you see any way out of it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't think I have anything to add to what I've said; that is, it seems to me the right answer in Central America is to have movements in the direction of democratic institutions in the countries, in El Salvador, bringing a broader and broader base of people into the democratic process, on the one hand, and an agreement on a regional solution by which we mean certain, specific things, which you're quite familiar with, that would allow people to get at the essential tasks of economic development and developing more of a tradition of democratic pluralism in their method of government. For that to happen, I think, it's just like any other pattern of negotiation in a tense situation, there's a combination of a need for strength, on the one hand, and a willingness to negotiate when you have it on the other. And we're working both those avenues and it's a tough, difficult situation without a doubt.

QUESTION: Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
THE VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER ROBERT HAWKE
OF AUSTRALIA

June 10, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:34 A.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: We have a background briefing on the visit of the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Hawke, with the President on Monday. We would appreciate it if you would attribute it to a senior administration official. Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have a short, prepared statement and then I'll be glad to take questions.

Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia is making an official working visit to Washington June 11-15 at the invitation of the President. During his stay here he will see the President, the Vice-President, and also Secretaries Shultz, Weinberger, and Regan. He will also meet with Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board, and with Chairman Feldstein of the Council of Economic Advisers.

We are extremely pleased that Prime Minister Hawke has been able to make this trip. It provides an opportunity for us to meet him, and for the President and Prime Minister to establish a personal relationship.

Prime Minister Hawke has a long-standing relationship, a cordial one, with Secretary Shultz, and this visit gives them a chance to renew that relationship.

The relationship between our two countries is a solid one. It is based on a long tradition of friendship as well as many interests in common and a similar perception of world events. It also is based on alliance in peace and in war. And, I might note -- it's not in my statement here -- but, it's based, perhaps, most of all, on shared democratic values.

Australians and Americans fought side-by-side in the major conflicts of this century. It is, nevertheless, far too easy at times to take friends for granted. And that is an error that we do not intend to make. This visit thus provides another opportunity to affirm to the Australians that we value the role that they play in regional and international affairs, and that their counsel and support on major issues is important to us.

Fortunately there are no major bilateral problems between our two nations. We sometimes differ over approaches to common problems or objectives, but, as befits relations between close friends and long-standing allies, these questions are dealt with ammicably and constructively.

During the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, we will be discussing a wide range of topics of common interest between Australian and U.S. officials. The talks will certainly touch on

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ANZUS, an alliance that is key to our security interests in Asia, in the Pacific, and in the Indian ocean. Conversations will also cover the Middle East, East-West relations I'm sure will be discussed, as well as U.S. relations with China and Australian relations with China.

The subject of Indochina, and specifically the problem of Kampuchea, and the ASEAN approach to that problem will undoubtedly be a major subject of conversation. We also anticipate that arms control and the Williamsburg Summit will be discussed.

There will, of course, also be extensive discussion of economic matters and, I think, as is inevitable particularly in the present difficult economic circumstances that the world, as a whole, is facing.

With that, I'd be glad to take questions.

Q What's the Australian approach in Kampuchea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q What is the Australian approach to Kampuchea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's one of the purposes of this visit is to discuss with the new government how they see that problem. I think from the contacts that we've had so far, and the contacts between the Australian government and the ASEAN countries, I think -- at least, we have seen so far a fairly substantial convergence of views between the new Australian government and the views of the ASEAN countries, which is the policy that we support.

Q What about the question of possible restoration of Australian aid to Vietnam?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That might come up. I think it's a point that the ASEAN countries have made clear -- and we have supported them in this view -- it would not be a constructive step. It would, unfortunately I think, lead Vietnam to believe that a military solution to the problem of Kampuchea in the end could succeed, rather than having to face the need for a political solution.

Q Could you be more particular about the advice that you'll be giving Mr. Hawke, because he said he's coming here to consult before making up his mind exactly what to do on that? Is there more you're going to be saying to him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure that he's going to come here and then make a final decision. We, in fact, have other consultations. We've been in close touch with him already. I myself had some consultations when I was in Australia. Secretary Shultz has already met once with Foreign Minister Hayden in Paris. We have some very important consultations in Bangkok at which Foreign Minister Hayden will be representing Australia, where we will be discussing this subject with the ASEAN countries who, it's important to keep emphasizing, are the key players in this, and the ones whose interest are most directly at stake.

And again, Foreign Minister Hayden will be here in July for the ANZUS Ministerial and I imagine the subject will be discussed then. It is not something, I think, that lends itself to, it's not something you make a decision and then the problem goes away. It's one where ongoing consultations are called for.

I think that -- I hope I made clear in my answer to the earlier question, our view on the specific issue of aid to Vietnam, is that aid to Vietnam would be very unhelpful at this time.

Q What is really being considered by Australia? What kind of aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They haven't mentioned specific things to us so I don't know.

Q Has Vietnam asked for help? What is the question? We're uninformed about the issue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the general -- obviously, I think, Vietnam would like to get aid, indeed, aid in substantial amounts from western countries. And I think, prior to their invasion of Kampuchea, in fact, that kind of assistance was very clearly in prospect and under discussion.

The point of the ASEAN strategy is to make clear to Vietnam that it cannot have its cake and eat it as well, that it's got to choose between constructive relations with the ASEAN countries and with the countries of the west, or continuing its occupation of Kampuchea in violation of international law.

Q Are we talking about economic aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's, I understand, the proposal that's been in the Australian Labor Party platform, but there are many things that have happened since that time, I think, including not only the Vietnamese attacks recently on Thailand and on the refugee camps on the border, which I think affected how people view the situation, but also very extensive discussions during Foreign Minister Hayden's visit to the ASEAN capitals earlier this year.

Q Again for the less informed, what is the Australian government's apparent posture on aid to Vietnam? You mentioned it was in their party platform. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to speak for them. They really have to speak for themselves. I think they have taken a very cautious and careful approach. I think they have been very attentive to the views of the ASEAN countries and to the concerns raised by the ASEAN countries, and I think that the general feeling that that party platform statement represents is a feeling that somehow, a sense that overtures to Vietnam are in order, that the object is not the isolation of Vietnam but, I would hope, I think, that one of the results of the consultation would be already to have made clear that none of us, and certainly not the ASEAN countries, certainly not the United States, are interested in the isolation of Vietnam as our objective.

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What we are interested in, in fact, is to bring Vietnam into a constructive relationship with the other countries of the region. But that can only be premised on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and the establishment of an independent non-aligned regime.

Q What has Prime Minister Hawke said recently in regard to that pledge in his party platform? Has he said he intends to, you know, act on that, or it's under consideration, or -- ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, you should go to them for what they specifically said, but their general posture in the last few months has been one of studying the issue and consulting very closely before taking any specific actions.

Q Excuse me if you've covered this. You know, there are various reports that this government in Australia would like a greater American involvement in the Pacific region and also greater Australian involvement or control or oversight over the American bases or posts, communications facilities in Australia. Do you have any comments on those two aspects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't had any specific proposals. I don't know if there might be some mention during these discussions.

Q Do you think that, are we likely as a result of this meeting and ANZUS to become more involved in the Pacific, send more ships -- whatever -- troops?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, I think that the basic U.S. posture in that region is a strong one and a very good one, and I think that we have, we and Australia have a common interest in maintaining that, just as I think the joint facilities in Australia very clearly serve our common interests and I think both governments share an interest in maintaining that.

Q What are the economic problems between us?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Partly -- they're not simply problems between us. It's, in considerable measure, problems that we face together -- problems of protectionism. We're both badly hurt by some of the protectionist agricultural policies of other countries. I think we both stand to lose very badly if protectionist sentiments around the world, including in the United States, get out of control. We are both very much affected by the way that the present world recession has impacted on the growth prospects of developing countries. And in the case of countries in Southeast Asia, that can -- if it ends up affecting their internal stability, that can directly affect Australia's interests as well as our own.

So, to a considerable measure, what we would be talking about is a common problem, that is, a world problem in talking about ways of working together to address that as we did, for example, at the GATT ministerial in December.

There are problems between us, as well. I'm not trying to slide over that fact. I mean, I think the Australians will no doubt object to some of our own measures such as beef quotas and no doubt object to some of the ways that we have been trying to combat the agricultural protectionism of other countries by providing blended credits for our own agricultural exports. And that, in some cases, has hurt Australian markets.

Q How big is Australia's balance of trade problem? Do they have a large balance of trade problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I don't have the specific statistics. Do you have it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The balance is in our favor if you're referring to the United States.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I couldn't give you specific figures. It's in the order of several billion dollars though.

Q But is there a balance of trade problem that the Australians have right now? I mean, worldwide is that one of their economic concerns?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have one at the moment because of a drought and the drop off in wheat sales and so on. Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, obviously, they had a major devaluation recently, I guess in the first two weeks of the new government, and that was a response to the general imbalance in their trade.

Q -- what your position is on the suggestion from some sections of the Labor Party that to answer some of the queries about the U.S. bases and perhaps some concern that the Australian government isn't totally aware of the information passing through the U.S. bases in Australia, that the Australian government -- station someone at the Pentagon so they can monitor the information going through these bases. What's your reaction to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we'd want to hear the specific proposals from the Australian government before deciding our position or what we would say in public comment about it. I think that, as I said earlier, I think one of the things that has emerged clearly in discussions we've had with Australian government officials since the new government has come in, when it's

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been possible, to brief them in great detail about how these facilities, and they're joint facilities, work. I think they have come to share our appreciation that the facilities are, indeed, joint ones and do indeed jointly serve our common interests.

I think within that framework any specific problems can almost surely be worked out.

Q The Australian government and the New Zealand government are involved in a dispute with the French over nuclear testing in the South Pacific. The Australian government, as I understand it, is proposing some sort of nuclear freeze zone in the South Pacific. What attitude would the U.S. government take to that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been some general talk about, by the Australian government, about the outlines of what they might propose in the way of a nuclear freeze zone. But they haven't formally given us any specific details. And until we saw the specific details, it would be very hard for us to take a position.

Q -- likely to see that in this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a possibility.

Q Have we ever supported it, except, in I guess Latin America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco which is -- provides a nuclear freeze zone in Latin America. We've made it clear on a number of occasions that there are certain conditions that would absolutely have to be satisfied for us to participate in any such scheme.

Q That's where we do our testing, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q We do a lot of our own testing there, don't we?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we do not. We do not do any testing or dumping of waste in the Pacific.

Q You did.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A long time ago. We stopped a long time ago. In fact, we're party to a treaty that prohibits atmospheric testing and our underground testing is done in U.S. territory. So, that's not a -- specifically a problem for us. The things that --

Q How much time does Reagan spend with him on Monday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think about three hours. [illegible] you have the exact total?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think about two hours.

Q Meeting and a lunch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A meeting and a lunch.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A meeting and a lunch.

Q On the conditions, those would continue to include port visits, wouldn't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's one of the most important conditions on any such scheme, is that it not interfere with the free transit of naval vessels.

Q Is the U.S. putting any pressure on France to stop these tests?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I won't discuss what we say to the French on this subject through diplomatic channels.

Q I tried. (Laughter.)

Q Has there been any protest there on this nuclear freeze in Australia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the focus in Australia has primarily been on the subject of the South Pacific and the issue such as French testing in nuclear freeze in Australia. I think there is a growing concern in Australia, as there seems to be around the world, about the problem of nuclear weapons. And I think there's a very strong interest in the whole question of East-West relations and specifically arms control. And I think -- I'm quite certain that the subject of our approach to arms control negotiations would be something the President would want to explain in considerable detail to the Prime Minister, and I think the Australians, judging from talks I had when I was there, are very interested in how we're going about it and what we hope to gain from it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:53 A.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER ROBERT HAWKE
OF AUSTRALIA

June 13, 1983

The Briefing Room

12:37 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: Mr. Wallace says it's time for us to begin. This will be a background briefing on the meeting between the President and Prime Minister Hawke of Australia. We would request that the remarks be attributed to a senior administration official on background.

Q Still a senior administration --

MR. ALLIN: Still senior.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Haven't been demoted yet. I got promoted last Friday. So, I'll hang onto it.

I take it a number of you are trying to get across the river as am I, so this will be relatively short. I think the basic comment to make is that this was a very warm meeting. I think it was, insofar as you can judge these as an outside observer sitting and listening to two men discuss it, but also judging from the remarks that were made on departure, I think the President and the Prime Minister had a very --

Q -- hit it off.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- hit it off, to use those words, that's not bad -- I'll take that -- and that the personal relationship is a good one, and that in many ways that has been, I think, the single most important purpose of this visit. There are a great many specific issues that were discussed between the two men today and that will be discussed in more detail with various Cabinet Secretaries that the Prime Minister will be meeting with later today and the rest of the week. But I think the most important thing, certainly from our point of view, was establishing a good personal relationship between the two leaders and I think that has happened. It's -- in many ways, as we've said, the relationship is such a strong one that we think even where there are differences there's the strongest possible basis for working those out and that having that kind of good personal chemistry between the two men certainly assures that.

I would be glad to take questions.

Q What were the basic differences?

Q What issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, I'd say that it was not a meeting in which specific disagreements were aired at all. On a whole range of international, regional, bilateral issues, I think we have a very substantial degree of common interests and seeing problems in similar

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perspectives and even subjects such as, for example, issues over agricultural sales where, obviously, there are differences between us, even those were discussed within a framework of a much larger general agreement between our two countries on the desirability of reducing that kind of protectionist activity in the agricultural area and in other areas.

Q What was the course of the economic discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It covered the questions of international trade, questions of -- they discussed the Williamsburg summit and the flavor of the discussions there, the prospects for U.S. recovery and how that would affect Australia; considerable discussion of the recent labor-management meeting among the labor-management leaders in Australia and the Prime Minister's summit; and, in fact, quite a bit of discussion about labor-management relations. I suppose it's significant -- this is the first President we've had whose -- was once a president of a union and retains a lot of interest in union matters. The Prime Minister, of course, had just come from the International Labor Organization meeting in Geneva and there was quite a bit of interest in the problems that he had addressed there.

Q What about the U.S. deficit? Was that discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In -- not specifically, no.

Q Did Vietnam come up?

Q Aid to Vietnam?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was discussed within the framework of a broader discussion about Kampuchea.

Q What were the details?

Q Who said what?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can be specific about the kind of general position that we stated. As a general practice, I don't want to go describing what other governments have said to us, that's up to them. But we reaffirmed our continuing support for the ASEAN countries in their approach to this issue and made it clear, as we have on a number of occasions, that we consider support for the ASEAN countries to really be the key to finding a political settlement to that issue.

Q Any indication of whether the President supported the Prime Minister's initiatives in Vietnam, in sending the Foreign Minister to Hanoi?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister presented his views on that subject. I think it was an opportunity to -- on both sides to get a better understanding, not to come to a specific agreement on a specific approach.

Q Were you able to come to -- give Mr. Hawke any specific undertaking that there would be no more blended credits sign-offs into markets where Australia --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It certainly wasn't done today.

Q Was the President able to give the Australian Prime Minister any indication of the durability of American recovery, economic recovery?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President and Secretary Regan who was there expressed their views about that and our belief that we have a strong recovery under way and one that's going to benefit not only the United States but the international economy as a whole.

Q Did Mr. Hawke share that view?

Q What was discussed about ANZUS?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to ask Mr. Hawke whether he shares that view.

On ANZUS, a fairly wide-ranging discussion, including some very interesting points made about the fact that it was a labor government originally that brought Australia into the ANZUS Treaty and, indeed, in the presentation as put to us, it first began the understanding in Australia that the U.S.-Australian relationship is in many ways the foundation of Australian foreign policy. I think it was a very strong and broad commitment to the maintenance of the ANZUS alliance and to the fact that it serves our mutual interests.

Q What did they discuss on the bases?

Q Were any possible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you're talking about the joint facilities, I'm not going to get into specifics about the --

Q Were they raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In a general way.

Q Did the President ask -- I mean, did the President express any concern about these bases, about the Prime Minister's view of these bases and what was going on with the bases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These aren't bases. These are joint facilities that, in fact, serve both of our interests, Australia's as well as the United States. And --

Q Did the Prime Minister express his concern about information at these bases and the maintenance of the bases by both --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We didn't get into those specifics today. There may be other occasions on this visit to do that.

Q Were possible changes or an updating of the ANZUS Treaty discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in those terms, no.

Q Any decision --

Q What about the proposition for a review of -- ANZUS --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That might be something that we'd discuss with the Secretary of State or with the Secretary of Defense this afternoon.

Q But was it raised today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically with the President.

Q Anything discussed on a nuclear freeze zone in the Pacific?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Australia's interest in that subject was mentioned, yes.

Q Did the Prime Minister repeat his offer or, first of all, repeat his -- what he sees as need for the United States to do something to improve relations with China and his offer to act as some kind of go-between, mediator or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The whole subject of U.S.-China relations was discussed in considerable detail and --

Q Well, is that -- is that a "yes" to those two questions or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to give me --

Q Yes. Did he again stress to the President the need for something to be done to improve U.S.-Chinese relations? And did he again make some kind of offer to act as a mediator or go-between to facilitate that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. In both cases, you're asking me what the Australians said. I am not trying to be evasive, but I want them to say whatever they want to say about what they thought the President --

Q What did the President say in response to whatever question the Prime Minister put to him -- (laughter) --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, that I'm much more comfortable saying, that we affirmed the importance that we attach to strong U.S.-Chinese relations. The President explained, and Secretary Shultz also in some detail, the kinds of efforts that we have made to improve those relations. We certainly appreciate the efforts the Australian government has made in this to communicate views to us, as transmitted by the Chinese.

Q Does the administration see some kind of role for the Australian government in a process of improvement in relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is certainly helpful when you have friends who wish you well and wish your relationship well to be able to exchange views, to give you advice, to carry messages from time to time. I think for the most part, the management of U.S.-China relations is a U.S. responsibility. We're not -- we're dealing directly with the Chinese and that is the main channel, but it's certainly helpful to have a friend like

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Australia who is friendly to improvement in U.S.-China relations.

Q What did the President say about --

Q Was the subject of East Timor brought up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was discussed, yes.

Q What was said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The -- again, I don't want to -- most of the discussion was from the Australian side, and I don't want to characterize their views. I think I'd just leave it there.

Q What did the President say? Or what did the U.S. side say at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position on the subject is, in fact, well known to the Australian government. We weren't in the position specifically today of telling

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Australia how to conduct its relations with Indonesia. We mostly listened on that one.

Q Was the question of Australia possibly stationing a liaison officer in the United States specifically to look at policy about bases raised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That might be later on, it was not raised specifically with the President. Let me -- you realize, I trust everyone here may, or may not -- the Prime Minister's about to go to an extensive meeting with the Secretary of Defense, he'll be having a substantial meeting tomorrow and a lunch with Secretary Shultz; he'll be meeting with Secretary Regan; and in all of these discussions, a great many more specific details will be raised, in fact, a number of times during the meeting today, that was -- general comments were followed by the suggestion that specifics would be gone into elsewhere.

Q What did the President say about sales of high technology to China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our general interest -- well, the fact that we have taken substantial steps already in the first two years of this administration to liberalize that trade with China, and the fact that we are looking for further ways to make progress in that area is a point that was underscored by our side.

Q Was there any discussion on Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that did not specifically come up.

Q Arms control? Particularly a comprehensive defense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not so much on that, much more on the subjects of the INF discussions and the START discussions, and what the prospects for progress in those areas might be, and the related -- closely related subject -- of East-West relations, on developments inside the Soviet Union and what prospect both of us saw for some Soviet flexibility in the negotiations.

Q Did the President in any way lobby the Prime Minister to support his tougher line in the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't -- I think they share -- from what I heard -- a reasonably common view about both the problem posed by the Soviet Union and also about the importance of serious arms controls measures. In fact, the President did lobby very strongly about the seriousness with which we are approaching the arms control negotiations, and the distinction between his, the President's skepticism about phony arms control, as he feels some of the things we tried to do in the past were, and his very strong belief in the importance of serious progress in the START negotiations and the INF negotiations.

Q Did they talk about the Faulklands at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that didn't come up.

Q How about the giving of arms, or of loaning -- making loans, because Regan was there and Weinberger will be involved? Will be there any loans made to Australia? Or will there be any arms, extra arms, given?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, those subjects weren't raised. No.

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MR. ALLIN: One more question.

Q Did they talk about any movies? The "War Games" thing, for example? (Laughter.) Did the President -- I'm serious -- I mean, maybe they -- that movie seems to have impressed him, did that come up in the conversation at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well actually, they talked about the very high quality of the Australian film industry -- from a professional as well as film-buff --

Q Did they spend some time on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, it was the last subject discussed at lunch, but in fact, I must say, it -- there's no question the quality of those movies has impressed the President, and he's something of an expert in this area.

Q Did he say any specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: "Breaker Morant" was mentioned specifically. (Laughter.)

Q What?

Q Which film?

Q Which did he mention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: "Breaker Morant."

Q Did he mention any American movies specifically? (Laughter.)

MR. ALLIN: There will not be a 9:15 a.m. briefing tomorrow morning.

Q Awwwwww ...

MR. ALLIN: Sorry.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 1:50 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT ALVARO ALFREDO MAGANA BORJO
OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR

June 16, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:35 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: The background briefing on the visit of President Magana will be conducted by [redacted] The briefing should be attributed to a senior administration official on background. Also, I would like to take this opportunity to introduce -- because I know a number of you have talked to him on the telephone at one time or another but -- Jeff Biggs, who is the Public Affairs Adviser for ARA at State, is here. He's the one whose number we often throw loosely around when we don't know what to say about Central America. So, Jeff is here also.

Jim?

Q Where is he?

Q Where is he?

MR. ALLIN: He's right here.

Q -- stand up. (Applause.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. President Reagan and President Magana last met in -- and, I think, met for the only time -- in December of last year in Costa Rica. This meeting that begins today, this visit by President Magana that begins today originated in an invitation that was extended at that time.

It is not something that was just scheduled recently. This comes at an interesting time, of course, when there are changes occurring in the personnel responsible for Central America policy in our own government and when the events in El Salvador are in a state of evolution. So, there will be plenty to talk about.

The news in part is that there is a process going on in El Salvador towards the evolution of a democratic system. President Magana is an economist, a lawyer and a professor who became the Provisional President after the election of the Constituent Assembly in March of last year.

Under his leadership, the government of El Salvador has developed a pact, Pact of Apaneca, which is subscribed to by most of the political parties which contemplates a program of peace, support for human rights, internal reconciliation. And a lot has been done on this in recent months.

President Magana announced that the Presidential elections would be held this year, back in March. The Human Rights Commission was formed at the end of December and has now begun to function, investigating cases of human rights abuse allegations and is embarked upon an educational program, both with the military and civilian sectors of the Salvadoran population.

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A Peace Commission has been appointed and has extended an invitation to the left to enter into a dialogue with them about participation in the democratic process in elections in El Salvador.

The military has embarked on an important campaign in the east and central districts of San Vicente and Usulutan to provide security for that region and conditions under which a major reconstruction program can be begun so that the productive lands that are in those regions, that have been used for the production of export crops, that can help restore the flagging economy, can be resumed and so that those areas can participate more fully in the land-reform program. The land-reform program itself has been proceeding. And in the last few months, several thousand new beneficiaries have been added to the rolls under the Land-to-the-Tiller Program.

One other feature of recent developments that I should note is that the Constituent Assembly has been able to function as a legislative body -- to debate, to form coalitions, to decide by vote on policies to be followed by the government of El Salvador. And, I would say, that the two most important examples of that are the extension of the land reform program that was enacted in early March whereby the Land-to-the-Tiller Program that would have expired on March 3rd was extended through the end of this year. And, as I say, in the few months of the extension there have been several thousand additional beneficiaries added.

Secondly, the Constituent Assembly has adopted an amnesty law

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in which persons who have been in opposition to the government are given an opportunity to return to Salvadoran society and those who wish to leave El Salvador are given an opportunity to do so in safety and their departure is facilitated by an amnesty board.

To date, the numbers change every day, and the last number I had, I think, was 68 people who had come in who were not in detention and benefitted from the amnesty and about 500 political prisoners of a total -- of about 800 who were in detention have now been released in the few weeks that the amnesty law has been in effect.

I won't go on. And we'll stop here and take questions.

Q Is it certain that there will be presidential elections this year? As you know, there have been several reports suggesting that the government there wanted to delay it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that there has been discussion there as to whether it would be possible to get everything organized in time to have the elections. President Magana has recently reaffirmed the intention that Presidential elections will be held this year. We support that and we believe that the elections will be held. I --

Q But what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- add one point on that. I think that a part of the difficulty is that there is a new constitution being drafted which has to be passed by the Constituent Assembly and the elections are to take place under that new constitution. And the new constitution has not been adopted yet but that is expected soon.

Q President Magana has said that he was going to be pressing President Reagan for unrestricted aid and more aid in the fight against the leftist guerrillas. What can the President -- President Reagan reply to that since it's not the administration, but the Hill, that is putting restrictions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of any communication about a request for unrestricted aid.

Q He said so in an interview yesterday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President's program has been presented to the Congress. We are seeking funds as set out in the President's budget, not unrestricted. We have no intention, as you know, of sending combat personnel. We are remaining within the limited number of U.S. personnel in El Salvador and, as I say, I'm just unaware of anything about unrestricted --

Q What do you hope to get out of the trip --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q What do you hope to get out of this trip by Mr. Magana?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that for President Magana to visit the United States he will gain a better first-hand understanding. He has been in the United States before but I don't think he's been here since he has been in office as the provisional President of El Salvador. But I think he --

Q -- understanding of what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I was about to say. I think he will get a better understanding of the attitudes and concerns that are here because he will be meeting with the President and senior officials in the administration. He will be meeting with Members of Congress. And I think that that is very useful for him. I think that the exchange of views at senior levels between two governments who are so closely allied in an effort where we have common national interests in preserving and encouraging the development of democratic government within El Salvador and avoiding having El Salvador become a Marxist state in Central America. It just seems to me that there are obviously a number of areas of common interests there that's helpful to have discussed at the most senior levels.

Let me go back --

Q Is it true that we, more or less, put this guy in there? Wasn't D'Aubisson going to take over and was it true

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Hinton and Enders, that we more or less engineered this guy as President? I mean, maybe that's a little that true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I think that there was a rather complicated process that followed the election which was only for constituent assembly and that the provisional president was then chosen by the constituent assembly and he was not chosen as the candidate of any one party. I believe that the Armed Forces also had an interest in the candidate for provisional president. But he represents, I think, a consensus choice, and I think that that is evidenced by, first of all, this Pact of Apaneca, which is the basic charter of government that all but one of the major parties subscribe to; and, secondly, that he has been able to lead El Salvador in ways that have found the necessary consensus for the achievements like the Peace Commission, which has made this invitation to the Left and has formed the Human Rights Commission which is engaged in its activities and has extended the Land Reform program and other governmental actions that required this consensus of political groupings within the country.

Let me go to the back here so that we don't --

Q What is the status of the meeting -- the potential meeting between Senator Stone and leftist guerrillas from El Salvador? Where is the administration on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, Ambassador Stone has just returned from his trip to the countries in Central America and the Contadora countries -- Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Mexico. He is reporting to the Secretary of State and to the President, and then we will have to see what next steps will be. His mission is not to be a negotiator but to be a facilitator of the search for peace that is being undertaken by the nations themselves in the region and within the nations of the region. I can't comment on what the next steps will be. That's a matter of policy to be resolved.

Q Does the administration think it would facilitate the process down there for him to meet with the guerrillas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking me what will the policy decision be as to the next steps following Senator Stone's original mission which was an information-gathering mission, on which he is just now reporting to the Secretary of State and the President.

Q When can we expect --

Q One of the things he didn't mention in the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Early next week --

Q -- list of topics to be discussed was the question of the judicial system which the administration has in the past said was one of its major concerns with El Salvador. Can you tell us what progress you'll be able to tell Congress about -- or he'll be able to tell Congress about on the judicial front?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, for one thing, I believe that the government of El Salvador is completing a review of its emergency law, the Decree 507 which has been in effect for a couple of years and under which the political prisoners who are now being amnestied were detained -- or at least most of them. Some of them were in detention prior to that.

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The revision of the constitution, I have been told by senior Salvadoran officials during a recent visit, will contain new provisions that will enhance the independence of the judiciary. And in this regard, it will provide, we believe -- and we have not seen a text. This is based on discussions with Salvadoran officials -- but we expect the new constitution to provide for greater tenure for judges and greater independence in establishing the budget for the judiciary, which under present law has been subject to the Salvadoran equivalent of the Office of Management and Budget so that the judiciary -- the judicial branch will decide what, how much of a budget it needs and then they're subjected to a budget review which might cut them.

Q How about the trial, specifically, of the church women and the labor leaders? Any progress to be reported on the prosecution of those cases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, those cases are still in the courts. I think we've reported just recently on the status of them. I am unaware of any very recent development in any of those cases that will be --

Q What is the status of them, those two cases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With respect to labor leaders, the case has been affirmed that there is a basis for prosecution in the case of the gunmen, those who pulled the trigger who have confessed. And that case will go forward to trial but a date has not been set.

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There were two other individuals who were not directly involved but were thought to be behind this and their cases went to an appeals court that said there was not sufficient evidence to proceed with them. The Attorney General of El Salvador has appealed to the Supreme Court. And that's where that one stands.

In the case of the four church women, the appeals court returned the case to the investigative stage before the court of first instance on an issue relating to ownership of the motor vehicle that was stolen as a part of the overall crime, which is a subsidiary element; but it had to be established who owned the bus. That process is now being completed and it will go back to the trial stage, we think in the next month or two.

Q Are we satisfied with what they're doing or do we feel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I sure wish that these cases would move faster.

Q Are they stalling? Just stalling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think it is stalling. There are problems, and we've discussed these with the government of El Salvador, in the resources, training, capabilities of the judicial system to work in the present environment. It is a very difficult thing to try to -- to engage in what is a war, really, that you have this conflict going on within the country. You have great divisions and you're trying at the same time to build democratic structures. And I think it's a real tribute to those people like President Magana who are trying to do that that they've accomplished what they have.

There is work going on on reforming and improving the administration of justice, improving the independence and the ability to function of the judicial system. And I really can't go into detail on it.

Q How much control does he have over the army and the death squads?

Q The Treasury agents, they're murderers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is another issue.

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was does the provisional President have control over all the elements of the security forces? If I can characterize it that way. (Laughter.) You're asking about death squads. Well, you're talking about criminals. Obviously, no government official -- any responsible position is --

Q -- call them government death squads.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think you're -- when you're talking about death squads, you're talking about outlaws, you're talking about criminals, you're talking about law violators. And I don't think that --

Q Sanctioned by the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so.

Q No?

Q Who's killing all those people down there?

Q And why?

Q The guerrillas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, there aren't as many people being killed. And I think that just ought to be said.

Q Two thousand, 2,500 in the last year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The numbers have --

Q -- Deane Hinton, I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I'm just making a point that the numbers have gone down over the past year, really over the past two years, from '81 it's gone down.

Secondly, that there is a problem that is related in part to the administration of justice and the difficulties of getting anybody prosecuted in the courts. And there is a problem of divisiveness. There is a problem of democratic traditions not being deeply rooted. And you have political violence from the left and from the right from death squads.

Q Will the President -- Will President Reagan make some of these points, that he wants faster justice on the prosecution of those two cases, that he wants better control over some of these --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to get into a point-by-point agenda; but these -- the situation in El Salvador with respect to the reforms. And, as a part of the reforms, the reforms effecting the judicial process are certainly an obvious topic for discussion.

Q Is he prepared to recertify?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not a decision -- That's a decision that has to be made, really, by the -- I guess, by the -- delegated to the Secretary of State to be made in July. And I can't say that we have all of the facts that we'll have to have to look at and the Secretary of State will have to decide that in July.

Let me go back -- Here.

Q I think what we're trying to get at is is what does the administration want to talk to Magana about? What does it want to tell him he has to do to continue to get aid, to continue to get military aid that he's not doing now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not -- You know, as I say, I'm not going to get into the details of the agenda. Certainly, our policy --

Q Why --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, then, you know, we could have the meeting right here.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Because it would not be an effective way to conduct foreign

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relations with another sovereign state to have the full array of everything put out here before the two Heads of State have an opportunity to sit down and talk to each other. Let us let them talk to each other.

But certainly our policy is to support democracy, to support the economic and political and social reforms that President Magana is trying to institute in El Salvador. And our interest in those reforms I am sure will be a subject of discussion with the President, with members of the executive branch and Members of the Congress.

Q Rubin Zamorov, the Spokesman for the FMLM, (?) held a press conference earlier today and was asked the same question you were, which is what is the status of the talks between the left and the senior administration. He says that they had sent forward a letter to the Reagan administration after Stone was named, and that they have gotten no response so far, that they are waiting for a response. Does the Reagan administration intend to reply to that letter, which has been confirmed by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think that that is a subject --

Q -- after this round of talks between Stone and Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think I can go beyond what I said before, that Ambassador Stone is reporting to the Secretary of State and to the President on what was a fact-finding and an orientation and a familiarization mission for him in which he heard the views of all of the governments concerned. And there will have to be decisions made as to the next steps to be taken in the pursuit of his mission. Those decisions have not yet been made. And so I cannot answer your question.

I can express just s touch of concern that the FMLM has gone public in this way.

Q Why?

Q Yes.

Q They have not gotten an answer?

Q What is the problem -- that they say they want a meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it makes one just a bit concerned about the seriousness of purpose.

Q Because it is public it is not serious?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I question whether the publicity that they have attached to this offer is the objective of making the offer or not. It just makes me just a little bit concerned.

Q Is that the attitude of our administration, that because it is public it is propaganda and not the real thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. That is not dismissal or anything like that. All I am saying is that I am concerned that it has been the subject of such publicity rather than something that would be put forward to the Peace Commission of El Salvador in response to their invitation.

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Q They want to talk to us.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well --

Q Could you bring us up to date on the aid requests for El Salvador and how they are doing on the Hill?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The authorization bill has been reported out of committee in both the House and the Senate. The economic assistance levels I believe are at or close to the administration's request. The military assistance levels are below the administration's request by about $10 million in the Senate and by about $20 million in the House.

Q What are the numbers?

Q Can you tell us the numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that there is a --

Q What year? Are we talking about '83?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Eighty-four.

The House put a limit of $65 million on military assistance to El Salvador. And the Senate put on a limit of $76 million. And the administration requested $86 million.

Q And the economic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The economic assistance I think was at the levels we requested which -- and I am trying to think, is it $105 million on the -- I have some figures with me if you want to get that afterward. But I do not have them right in front of me, because you get into about four different categories with PL-40 development assistance, economic support fund.

Q At the noon briefing at the State Department, it was confirmed that the elections are going to be delayed until next March. You did not mean to say that -- you are not still sticking on this thing of Magana's answer a couple of weeks ago, are you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not think that there was an announcement of a delay in the elections until March.

Q What is it?

Q You do not think it is here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was not said there. I think you misunderstood.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think there must have been some confusion.

Q And he said that one of the reasons, too, that President Magana is coming here is for him to explain to Congress the different situation in El Salvador and, also, ask for the full funding in military aid or what is remaining.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think that would be a fair characterization. As I say, this is a visit that stems from an invitation extended last December. It's not something that was scheduled to coincide with -- where we happen to be right now in a legislative process that has its own calendar quite apart from this visit. But, certainly, he will be meeting with members of Congress, and they'll have an opportunity to ask him question and tell him what they think.

And he'll have an opportunity to ask them questions and tell them what he thinks.

Q You said the body count was coming down. Can you tell us what the precise numbers are at this point from '81 to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that we are well under -- And I hate to regard this political situation in El Salvador as a statistical game, but I think we are down somewhere between 170, 180, 185, in that range, and that we were -- a month -- and that we were well above a couple of years ago.

Q A hundred seventy to eighty-five what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deaths.

Q Civilian deaths?

Q Of what? I mean, what could characterize what kind --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Deaths attributable to political violence of the left or the right.

Q -- not civil --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not talking about military casualties.

Q Okay.

Q And what was it before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Can you give us any --

Q It's noncombatants --

Q What was that?

Q Noncombatant civilians.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't --

Q The high was 800.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm embarrassed that I looked at the certification report just before I came here, and I don't remember the number. But it's in the certification report.

Q Mr. Secretary, you alluded to the new Vietnam-style pacification program --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did not allude to a Vietnam-style pacification program. You alluded to that, I believe.

Q Yes, okay. Would you characterize how it's going? Do you see light at the end of the tunnel there or -- I mean, how's it going?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to suggest an analogy --

Q Oh, no.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No? Okay. The --

Q Mr. Secretary, would it be fair to say --

Q Well, what does he see --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wait a minute. The initial reports are that the government forces have not met substantial resistance and that the guerrillas seem not to have desired to confront them at this stage. It's only been on for a few days, as you know.

And the tough part will come in the effort to rebuild this area and make it a productive part of the country as it was once again. This is the area that I said -- where you grew the cotton and the coffee and the sugar that provided the exports and contributed so much of El Salvador's foreign exchange. And these fields are unplanted right now, and they need to be.

And getting people to move in there in an environment where they can be secure will really be the tough part of it -- not this initial military sweep which is necessary but only the first step.

Let me go back to somebody else in the back.

Q Could we return to Helen's question about the terrorists from the left and the right? What is the government -- our government -- doing to try and reduce terrorism from the right and, you know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a problem really that has to be dealt with by the Salvadorans. We cannot go in there and be the police force or be the army. They have to deal with that one themselves.

I think that we've made clear to them how important it is to the American people and to the American government that they do their utmost to improve the security situation in that country. If we say we're for democracy and human rights, one of the most fundamental right is the right to life, and it's very hard for democratic institutions to function and operate in an environment where you have this risk of political death from extremists of the left or the right.

Q -- brain death --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q -- not just political death? You're talking about brain death, to physical death -- threat of political death?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Threat of political violence exercised by killers, if you will, of the left or the right. I'm talking about physical death, yes.

Q How would you describe the importance of this visit? I mean, is it simply a get-acquainted visit or is there more to it that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I can rate it on a scale. I think, as I said, that with El Salvador and the United States so closely involved in cooperative efforts with respect to our assistance programs there, with respect to their efforts to

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achieve a democratic system and a fair society, restore their economy with our national security interests in the region. There is such a close community of interest that it is always important to have the heads of state meet and discuss the array of issues of mutual concern. I don't think I can go beyond that and say it's very important or a little bit important or put a number on it.

Q Try it this way. What does he have to promise to keep the money coming?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there is an answer to that one.

Q We're all barking up the wrong tree, aren't we? I mean, the purpose of this visit is not to express concern to Magana about what's happening in El Salvador. I gather the purpose is for Magana to be presented to Congress and, I guess, the American public to try to make the case for combatting Marxist-Leninism in that country.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think you can put one single label on it and say this is -- we're going to show off Magana to Congress. I don't think you can say we're going to call him up here and lecture him. I don't think those are fair characterizations and there's no single purpose here. There is a whole array of issues to be discussed. It is useful to have them discussed at the highest levels of government on both sides. Such a discussion has not occurred since last December and it was scheduled last December that it would occur again in June and now it is occurring.

Q Which Cabinet members will be included in the discussions? Which ones will be included?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know that the Secretary of State will be. That's --

Q In reference to Sam's question, you said you can't put a label on it either/or. But both of the things that you've just said are certainly encompassed in the visit, are they not -- i.e., you're going to show him off on one hand --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're not showing him off.

Q Well, I mean, those are your words.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is here. He is scheduling meetings with Members of Congress.

Q Yes, but those were your words in terms of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was characterizing his question. I wasn't characterizing what we're --

Q But on the other hand, there will be some -- if it's too strong, but some lecturing of Magana to say -- this is what we need -- will there not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will certainly be discussion of the problems that are of concern to us, to the Congress, and to the American public.

Q Can we talk about the elections for a moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

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Q Are you suggesting with this constitutional reform that has to take place that that might not take place in time for the elections to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. I was saying that I think that because the constitution has not been promulgated, has not been adopted that that has contributed to discussion that we have all heard about whether the elections might be postponed. However, I think that the constitution will be adopted very soon and that the elections will be held this year as President Magana announced on about the 10th of March.

Q Can I just follow that up? Have you been reassured recently that those elections will be held --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that will be a subject that will be discussed again. But we have had a very recent statement from President Magana that the elections will be held this year.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Magana said on Sunday that they expected them to be held --

Q If President Magana should ask for more economic or military aid from us, what's the answer there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I didn't --

Q -- military aid --

Q If Magana asks for more economic and/or military --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to anticipate that he will make such a request and I really don't have an answer. As I said, the President has a budget and he's put the budget to the Congress and that's the position that we have at the moment.

Q You're not planning any step up in either economic or military --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't say beyond what the President has in his budget. That is the administration's position.

Q But you're leaving open the possibility for more military aid this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Leaving open the -- I am unaware of any further requests from the administration in addition to the amounts that have already been proposed.

Q Does Magana reflect the kind of leader we want to see in El Salvador? Is he the type of guy we want?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that --

Q Say "no". (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he's done an incredible job in a very difficult situation.

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Q Could I --

Q Get him, Naomi.

Q Naomi, get Mort.

Q Sic him.

Q You said earlier --

Q You have a right, Naomi, to ask a question.

Q You said earlier that it would be useful for him to go before Congress and hear the message that they have to give him, it'd be a useful -- and there's a good purpose for coming. What message do you think they're going to give him? I mean, isn't it something to the effect of "Clean up your act if you want more -- "

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want me to say what the Congress --

Q I'm calling the death squad to town, Naomi.

Q You're in touch with Congress. You know what he's going to hear.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, sure, and so are you. I think that President Magana will have meetings with Congress and, as I said, that he will give them his impressions and ask them questions and they will give him their impressions and ask him questions. And I don't want to characterize who -- which member will say what and --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:11 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE MEETING BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND
PRESIDENT ALVARO ALFREDO MAGANA BORJA
OF THE REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR

June 17, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:45 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: This will be a background briefing attributable to a senior administration official.

Q Come on, Helen.

Q Why?

Q Thank you.

Q Who is Ronald R. Reagan?

Q W.

Q No, no, "R."

Q Read your statement.

Q This statement says, "R."

Q Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess I should begin by acknowledging that there is a typographical error in the heading of that.

Q Was it our doing, or their doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know who typed it. But I do not think we did. (Laughter.)

Q Oh, I see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is President Magana's statement. Let me give you a little bit of the discussion this morning. The two Presidents met from about 11:20 a.m. until about 1:30 p.m. This covered a brief meeting in the Oval Office and, then, a larger meeting with more staff present in the Cabinet Room and a working lunch. Let me try to cover it by topic.

President Magana described the situation in El Salvador as one offering hope for achieving peace and completing a democratization of Salvadoran society. He reported that the draft constitution has now been completed and will go to the constituent assembly, a point that is reflected, also, in his prepared statement.

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He affirmed his support for a presidential election this year, as he had announced on March 10 with the support of the political parties at the time of the Pope's visit to Central America. President Reagan affirmed U.S. support for early elections.

They discussed the efforts that El Salvador has made to attract broad participation in the elections, including the amnesty law and the repeated invitations by the Peace Commission to enter into a dialogue with the left. President Magana pointed out, however, that negotiations to divide political power at the table rather than through an electoral process would conflict with El Salvador's commitments to democracy. And he was reassured that this was a position with which the United States government agrees.

The discussion included the functioning of the judicial system and the cases involving murders of American citizens in El Salvador. On two cases in particular, President Magana reported that the remaining formalities at the investigative stage in the church women's case should be completed in the next two weeks, and that the case should go to jury in six to eight weeks. In the case involving labor leaders, as you know, the appeal remains with the Supreme Court. And we were assured that the government is pursuing that appeal with full vigor.

There was discussion of the land reform program, which was described with reference to phase one as really concentrating, now, on making the cooperatives function more efficiently and economically. The phase three program is being pursued through an accelerated effort to motivate and promote the opportunities provided by the extension of the land reform for

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additional renters of land to apply to become the owners of that land. And, of course, several thousand new applications have been filed through the promotional program of the last few months and that has just been renewed with a new program to promote the land reform.

There was discussion of the importance of the present campaign in San Vicente and Usulutan Provinces. The latest report, according to President Magana, is that San Vicente is now militarily secure and that reconstruction and resettlement efforts can commence. He emphasized that success here in returning to normal activities in this important agricultural area will help to restore the confidence of the people and add to the productive base of the country and provide needed employment.

With regard to human rights, there was discussion of --

Q You skipped one province, I think.

Q Usulutan.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion of the campaign going on in these two, this is beginning with San Vicente and moves on to Usulutan. It really began only a few days ago and what has been accomplished thus far has been accomplished in San Vicente.

The discussion of human rights centered on the progress that has been made and the agreement that there is work that must still be done. The observation was made, President Magana pointed out that El Salvador needed to move simultaneously on many fronts-- economically, militarily, politically, and socially and that this was necessary and that his government was committed to do this.

The Minister of Defense, in particular on the military situation, reported that the army was committed through improved morale and through an increased training program, increasingly to the defense and protection of the people. He described the code of conduct on human rights that had been adopted and was being applied now in a written code for the first time in the El Salvadoran armed forces and this was being incorporated in the training and educational efforts being made by the armed forces through the command level down through the enlisted personnel. He stressed the support of the armed forces to carry out their responsibilities for the democratization of El Salvador.

Finally, on the regional scene, there was discussion of the Contadora process, primarily by Foreign Minister Chavez Mena, who described the meetings that have been held to date. El Salvador is determined to participate actively in this regional initiative for peace in Central America and to work closely with the other democracies -- Honduras and Costa Rica and with Guatemala in assuring that the efforts for peace will address the real problems in the region and the need for mutuality with regard to arms flow and foreign advisers and pluralistic societies among all of the countries of the region and this is not to get off that track into one of trying to solve the problems of Nicaragua without addressing the regional problems and the problems that Nicaragua causes in the region.

That really sums it up on the topic.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me make a point about the speech. The text that President Magana delivered out there was delivered as the copy that you have. However, he went through page two on the second paragraph and then he resumed on page five, the third paragraph to the end. But the entire text stands. There's no change in it. He just abbreviated it a bit because of the weather.

Q Heat.

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Q How firm a commitment did he make to having elections by the end of the year? Up on the Hill, he was talking about the fact that it wasn't really his decision -- it was the Assembly's, first of all. And, secondly, did he make any requests either for more aid or for aid with fewer restrictions on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no specific request -- if I can take these in reverse order -- no specific request with the aid. There were expressions of appreciation for aid that has been provided and acknowledgement of the importance of that aid to El Salvador.

Q How about restrictions on the aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That simply was not a subject of discussion. There was -- Your other question was on --

Q On the election and how firm his commitment was.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the election, that he indicated his support for the early elections, and we reaffirmed that we thought that was important, too. And he did acknowledge that this is a matter on which the Constituent Assembly must make a determination as they promulgate the new election law.

Q When you say early elections, was he talking in terms of this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This year, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, what was said, if anything, between the two Presidents about the death squads and what evaluation, if any, did the President of El Salvador give to Mr. Reagan about who is winning the war in El Salvador right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was nothing that was really characterized as who is winning the war. There was a description of the military situation. And it was pointed out that two years ago it had been suggested by some in Washington that the government of El Salvador had only 30 days and the situation was perilous and that that proved to be an inaccurate prediction and that the military situation is an improving one today, and particularly with this initiative that has begun in San Vicente.

The subject of human rights was discussed at length and -- I don't think I should get into specifics of --

Q How about the specifics of the words "death squads" or "paramilitary units"? Were those words used by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion of the need for support for human rights within the armed forces and by the members of the armed forces and acknowledgement by the El Salvadoran participants and their assurance that this would be -- that the armed forces would improve on the human rights front.

Q Did the President bring up that need for human rights -- support for human rights -- by the armed forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did our President? Yes.

Q Can I follow on that? Was Vides Casanova, the Defense Minister, asked why he reshuffled the command structure in the way that he did last month that brought Caranza who's known to be a leader of death squads to the head of the Treasury force? Was that brought up? Was Caranza brought up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We did not discuss specific personnel changes. And I don't know that I would accept

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your characterization of Colonel Caranza.

Q Did President Reagan apply any pressure, moral or material, to get the El Salvadorans to improve the human rights climate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I can go beyond saying that there was discussion of human rights, there was understanding by the Salvadorans of the importance of human rights here in the United States and in their own efforts in their own society, that --

Q That doesn't address the question. I mean, are we pressuring them to improve the human rights situation or are we not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there is anything that I would characterize as pressure that is really called for. I think what we have here is a government that is trying to work on human rights. It knows that the human rights situation is one of deep concern in the United States. And it is working within that context to try to improve the situation.

Q Did the President directly request more aid, more dollar amount or a different type of aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there were no new aid requests.

Q In terms of -- It sounds like the President of Salvador does not want the U.S. to negotiate with the rebel leaders.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I should think that no government would want another government to negotiate with rebels in the country concerned.

Q Did he specifically ask that the U.S. turn down their bid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that was not specifically addressed. As I say, we supported the efforts by the Peace Commission to invite the left to come and have a dialogue with the Peace Commission that has been designated by the government of El Salvador for that purpose.

Q I know, but they've made a bid to talk to us. Was there any request that we not do so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was not specifically discussed in this morning's meetings, no.

Q Was it indirectly discussed, as far as you're concerned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Well, you indicated --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, indirectly only in the sense that we, both sides agreed on the importance of the effort being made by the government of El Salvador, through the Peace Commission, to try to provide for the broadest participation in a democratic process to fully implement the amnesty law, to pursue the efforts to engage the left in a dialogue on conditions that will permit their participation in the democratic process, and both sides agreed that there should not be negotiations to divide up political power on the basis of talks around the table, rather than through a democratic process.

Now, I suppose the indirectly rules out a U.S. sitting down with the guerrillas, as well, to divide up power behind the backs of the Salvadoran people. If we don't want the government of El Salvador to do that, and they don't want to do it, I suppose they don't want us to do it either and that we don't want to do that.

Q So we're turning them down --

Q Do you interpret that then that the door is closed on a Stone meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- in their request to meet with Stone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't say that. I said that the subject was addressed indirectly to the extent that there is a common position by the two governments that there should be an effort to engage, by the government of El Salvador, to engage the left in a dialogue through the Peace Commission about participation in the democratic process. There was also explicit agreement that a negotiation over power sharing outside the democratic process was something that the government of El Salvador did not want, something that the United States government did not want and was not pushing them to do. I think it is implicit in that that neither side would want the United States government to engage the guerrillas in a negotiation about power sharing.

Q What about dialogue other than power sharing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was not addressed.

Q Where does Ambassador Stone and the possibility of his meeting with the Nicaraguans fit into that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can say on that --

Q I'm sorry -- with the Salvadorans.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can say on that -- Ambassador Stone, by the way, did participate in the meetings today and he is reporting to the Secretary of State and the President on his mission. And decisions will have to be made on next steps and I don't really want to get into will the next step be to answer the letter, will the next step not be to answer the --

Q But you're not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's nothing decided and so I can't really address what the next steps will be.

Q What you just said, though, was not foreclosing the possibility of Stone meeting with the Salvadorans?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since no decisions have been made, I really can't -- you could come up with other examples of things that I could not foreclose, but that's among them.

Q Well, what we're trying to get at is that --

Q The point is that --

Q -- we've been told that the request is being studied. Is it still being studied or was it foreclosed today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be decisions made until after he has met with the President, on that or any other steps regarding Ambassador Stone or other aspects of the peace process.

Q When does he meet with the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Monday morning.

Q Did the administration tell Mr. Magana that it would or would not meet with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not hearing you.

Q Did the administration tell Mr. Magana that he would or, that Stone would or would not meet with the Salvadoran insurgents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's been answered.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Three times, Ben. The decision has not been made.

Q But did they tell Magana anything?

Q Can you go into a little bit of detail about how this encouragement of dialogue between the government and the leftists through the Peace Commission would take place? For example, I mean, is there going to be a referee? I mean, who's going to guarantee, for example, if you were a leftist, their security in even engaging in a dialogue, for example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say this: I can confirm that some thought has been given to that process by the Salvadoran government and by the Peace Commission. I really think that I cannot say, "Well, here's the way they would do it. Here's the secret way they would do it to protect everybody's security." The question is a valid one. The issue is there. The issue has been recognized and addressed, but I cannot really go into details as you ask.

Q On the question of the dialogue with the Peace Commission, when you speak of the left, exactly whom do you mean? And also can you say exactly who the Peace Commission represents? Does it represent political parties, does it represent the provisional president, or is it supposed to be a mediator? What is its role?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the Peace Commission is a non-governmental entity that has been designated by the government of El Salvador to carry out this role. Its authorization, I believe, specifically comes from the Political Commission, which is sort of a Cabinet plus political party leaders. The mandate of the Peace Commission I don't think should be an impediment. I think they clearly enough have the authority to engage in the dialogue.

Q -- reach agreements on behalf of the government of El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that that's a process that hasn't begun and we hope would begin and see where it goes.

Q Can you say that it -- when you speak of the left, are you speaking specifically of the FDR FMLM?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The invitation that has been extended by the Peace Commission was a general one to all who are in opposition, but specifically included the FDR FMLM. I believe so.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: FDR.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: FDR.

Q Well, was that an attempt then to split the two fronts or -- in your opinion, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know what it was. I think it was an acknowledgement that the FDR has purported to speak for those in opposition in the past and it wanted to make clear that they were not excluded from the invitation, but the invitation was a general one.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's take a couple of more questions here. Joe, Bob, Pat.

Q What has changed because of today's meetings? And how has it changed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't say anything dramatic has changed as a result of the meeting. The meeting is one that has been scheduled for some time. It was really an opportunity for the leaders of the two governments to review the situation. The progress that has been made in the evolution of democracy in El Salvador and the problems that remain and the steps that need to be taken. Yes.

Q In his departure statement, President Magana expressed concern about a "weak, vacillating commitment by the United States," and he hoped it did not end up that way. Did President Reagan give him any reassurance on that point, that he can count on continued firm support from this country?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did indicate that we -- certainly he firmly supported the efforts of the government of El Salvador, yes.

Q But did he address himself to the problems on the Hill, for instance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No speculation about that, no. I don't mean I'm not speculating. I mean the President did not speculate.

Q You said yesterday when you were doing this --

Q Two questions: Number one, did President Magana mention anything about needing more U.S. troops in El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Number two -- go ahead. Do you want to --

Q Yes. You said yesterday that you were bringing him up here to show him some things. And he did see at the Hill this morning that there is no opportunity for any expanded aid. Right?

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I was not in those meetings this morning on the Hill.

Q A few months ago the President was very alarmed by the conditions down there. Did he say anything today that would indicate that he feels conditions generally have improved down there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Really nothing of a comparative nature was said. I think there is recognition that there is a very serious situation. I think that, based on the reports that were made by the Salvadoran participants, President Magana and his colleagues, and the -- my impressions of how they were received, I would say that it was somewhat a more optimistic situation but still a very serious one.

Q You said that the military situation has improved somewhat.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think with the initiation of this campaign in San Vicente, which has -- in which the miliary has demonstrated an initiative and a willingness to go out and --

Q But they haven't engaged --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- stay in the field and pursue the objective over a period now of -- what is it? A couple of weeks since this began?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A week.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About one week since it has begun.

There's less, I think, of a sense of it being a 9 to 5 war and of not following up. Now, we still have to see how this goes on. I thought it was a little over a week. But it's just one week.

Q They haven't engaged the rebels yet, have they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have not been any major engagements in this. And the rebels have abandoned the area. But one of the real tests of this will be to see if the military will stick with the objectives of securing and keeping secure and restoring the productivity of this region and not be discouraged or distracted by diversions from the guerrillas. We don't know that yet. It's off to a good start.

Q One clarification, please. My colleague asked before about a certain colonel and he characterized him as being a known death squad leader. You said that you differed with that characterization. Can you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said I did not accept it.

Q Okay. Can you tell us, please, whether or not there are any reputed death squad leaders in command positions in the Salvadoran army as of this date?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't.

Q You cannot?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q Shouldn't we know, considering the money we're putting in there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm just unaware of anybody in a command position in the Salvadoran armed forces whom I would have any reason to believe is the leader of a death squad.

Q Can you reassure us and rule it out then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm saying, based on what I know.

Q Yes, but Lopez Sibrian has been named by the United States government as somebody who was involved in the killing of agrarian reform workers. And he is in a command position --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is he?

Q Yes. Well, he orders troops around. He's not a colonel; but he orders many troops around in Morozan Province.

You don't -- You're saying he's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the record, he is a lieutenant. And he's Chalatenango Province.

Q Well, does he command --

Q He what?

Q He's in a different province.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, I don't want to quibble here. I think the question was about the leadership of the armed forces and a colonel. And I was answering a command position in that context. Lieutenant Lopez Sibrian is somebody whom we hope will be brought to justice in the near future. And I'm not going to stand here and say he's guilty or innocent. But from what I do know, I think there's reason to believe that he should be brought to trial and that a court should determine that.

Q There have been reports that the U.S. has trained about 7,000 Salvadoran troops; but there's a tremendous attrition rate, like about maybe 3,000 of those left and that the Salvadoran government supposedly was trying to do something to keep people from getting out. Did the President raise that issue with President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, this was discussed, and the Salvadoran army has just recently initiated a substantial reenlistment bonus for these U.S.-trained battalions. So we don't know how that will work. It's a two-year enlistment period and, after two years of war, will somebody want to reenlist for a bonus? Some will and some won't.

Q Do you know how much that is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is somewhere between $100 and $200 a month. And I don't know if it's $120 -- $120 a month as a reenlistment bonus, so that, in effect, it's a pay increase after you've served your first two years, I think it's just about a doubling of the enlisted man's pay in the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

Q Why doesn't he mobilize the country--

Q -- from $60 a month to $120 a month? Is that --

Q -- if he's at war?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that there is a -- Let me finish -- come back -- I'm sorry, I didn't hear.

Q In other words, what's the salary during the first hitch?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's a $60 a month salary --

Q And if you reenlist --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and if you reenlist, it will go to $120.

And you're saying why not a general mobilization? I think they've not seen the need for a shortage of troops in the Salvadoran army. One of the sad facts of the years of conflict destruction of the economy in El Salvador is that there are great many unemployed and joining the army is an opportunity for lot of people in that country.

Q Are there no prisons? Are there no work houses? (Laughter.)

Q But if you're at war, if you're in an all-out war, why don't you mobilize the country?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a matter of degree of mobilization. There are some things that are done that are in a mobilizing spirit, such as the committee on the economy that involves the private sector and the government in trying to restore some sense of business confidence and investment within El Salvador.

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Q -- reaffirming support for early elections. Was President Magana able to offer assurances there would be early elections?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did say that this is something that has to be decided by the Constituent Assembly.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:15 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ
OF SPAIN

June 17, 1983

The Briefing Room

4:02 P.M. EDT

MR. FRANKLIN: This is a background briefing on the visit of Prime Minister Gonzalez. The rules are the briefer will be referred to as a senior administration official.

Q [redacted]

MR. FRANKLIN: He's --

Q -- on background?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- means you've really got some good stuff.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Got your pencils out?

Q Is Spain a big country? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can always tell when you're talking to the White House press corps.

Let me give you a little idea of the schedule. He arrives at Andrews on June 20, which is Monday, at 3:30 p.m. Is it Monday or Sunday? What's June 20?

Q Monday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Monday, okay. And he has meetings and lunch with the President on June 21st between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. and he has a meeting immediately after that with the Secretary of State. He is going to appear June 22nd at the National Press Club. He's going to the OAS and then he will visit the Senate and the House and he leaves for New York City at late afternoon, June 22nd and will spend June 23rd in New York. The Spanish Foreign Minister, Fernando Moran, is accompanying him as well as the Minister of Finance, Miguel Boyer.

Just a couple of overall themes. We have a very strong bilateral relationship with Spain and we have had one throughout the post-war period, have worked very closely with the Spanish government. One of the things that I think is really, though, remarkable about the U.S.-Spanish relationship is we have sustained that relationship through the period of transition from the Franco period to democracy. And the recent election in Spain, recent meaning late last year, in which the Socialist government scored impressive gains and has one of the largest working majorities in any government in any country in Europe, has not changed that picture. We continue to have a good relationship with the Socialist government.

Secretary of State Shultz visited Spain last December and had a two-hour meeting with Felipe Gonzalez where they discussed a range of issues and I know that the Secretary of State found the Prime Minister or actually his official title in Spain is President,

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but found the Prime Minister/President very articulate, very pragmatic, strongly dedicated to Spain playing a larger role in international affairs. He's very interested in Spain's integration into the European community, both in the specific sense -- he would like to gain membership in the EC for Spain -- but in the broader sense too. He, as you know, during the Franco period, Spain was relatively isolated from European developments. Gonzalez wants to move Spain more broadly into European politics. Under the last government, Spain became the 16th member of NATO. The current Spanish government has taken the position that Spain will remain a member of NATO while a review is undertaken of the question of whether Spain should remain a member. The Gonzalez government has said that they will not take a decision on that subject this year, 1983. They haven't said when their review will be complete. They have said that there will be a referendum which will be held on the subject at some point and they haven't said when that referendum will be held.

Our view of that subject is that it is entirely up to the Spanish to determine whether they should remain a member of the alliarce although our preference, of course, is that they remain a

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member of the alliance. Regardless of what the Spanish ultimately decide about NATO membership, there will be a strong bilateral U.S.-Spanish security relationship, by virtue of the fact that the U.S.-Spanish base agreement, which was signed under the last Spanic government, was ratified by the Spanish parliament under the Gonzalez government, and it was ratified by one of the most lopsided votest that has been taken in the Spanish Cortez in many years, which we think is a pretty strong signal of the support of the Spanish government for a strong security relationship with the United States.

On the security question, you might also be interested in the fact that, during a visit to Bonn recently, Prime Minister Gonzalez supported the December '79 decision on INF deployment, although Spain was not a member of the alliance when that decision was taken. And, as some of you probably know, the Spanish have recently made a decision, as well, to purchase F-18 aircraft to replace their inventory of older American aircraft.

Other subjects beyond security issues and the Spanish role in Europe and within NATO that are likely to come up in the visit -- clearly, Central America. The Prime Minister recently visited Latin America and Central America. And we will be very interested in hearing his views on that subject. It's clear that we don't view the issues there entirely the same, although it's our view that the points of agreement outnumber the points of disagreement on Central America.

And I think that's about it unless there are any questions.

Q Is the question of Gibralter likely to come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would expect that it would be raised. We don't have a direct role in that issue. That's a problem or a bilateral problem between Spain and Britain, but we would be certainly interested in hearing the Spanish point of view on that subject.

Q Well, I don't understand, because of my own ignorance, why did they have this review to pull out of NATO? Did Gonzalez run against it? Just for my own interest only.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Socialist Party during the campaign was opposed to NATO membership. And since Gonzalez' election, rather than pull Spain out of NATO since Spain entered NATO under the last government, he has said that there should be a review and a referendum. But he has not announced when that review will be completed or when that referendum would be held. He has said that 1983 is a critical year for the alliance because of the missile deployment question and has said, for that reason, that he did not want to make a decision of hold the referendum during 1983.

Q What countries did he visit in Latin America? Did he go to El Salvador or where did he go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have that here and I can't answer that. We can certainly get it for you.

Q What does he think we're doing wrong there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to speak for him.

Q Well, what are the differences that you cited earlier?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that he has -- again, I really don't want to speak for him and, in fact, there are some interviews that appeared in both Time and Newsweek this week where he speaks for himself.

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Q Could you be more specific on what our, your disagreement with Gonzalez on the Central American threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not even -- I think that -- I wouldn't want to try to define those differences because, as I said before, I think that the areas of agreement outnumber the areas of difference.

Q Well, you said --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I'll be candid with you. It's silly for me to try to stand up here and tell you what the areas of difference are because I may be wrong. And we should wait and see what happens during the talks.

Q How about the areas of agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think --

Q Can you tell us with what you're in agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it's useful. I don't think it's useful to do that.

Q Is it possible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It makes it just -- we want this to be a successful visit and it just doesn't --

Q Yes, I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're all intelligent people and you can read what he has said and you can read what we've said and you can make up your own minds.

Q Let me try this one. This man is generally recognized as more or less ex officio, the Socialist International as its specialist and spokesman on Latin American and Central American affairs. He has

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spoken critically of U.S. policy in the past in a friendly manner, but still critically particularly in regard to the subject of negotiations, things like that. Do you believe this subject is likely to come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said before, I think we will certainly be interested in hearing his views on Central America. And I know the President will want to describe our policy there. Whether this will result in major differences or not remains to be seen. But we tend to doubt it.

Q Will they talk about the question of the bases, the American bases?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We do not have to.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That question is resolved.

Q Has he sought any particular role for himself in Central American problems? And is that one of the reasons for his visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not to my knowledge. He has not. I mean, there is an obvious traditional role for Spain in Latin America. They happen to speak the same language. And so Spain does have a role in Latin America. And we welcome that role. We would like to strengthen Spain's international role generally.

Q Did you say whether or not he would meet with Stone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know. He may. I am not sure. We should try to find out.

Q What is the role of Mr. Enders in this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not aware of one. Tom Enders has not been confirmed as Ambassador to Madrid.

Q Were the bases agreements resolved according to the way Todman had had it all figured out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And that is what they finally accepted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. That is right.

Q Will there be a dinner for him, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q I came in late. What kind of economic issues --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are no really serious bilateral economic problems. Probably, the key economic issue for the Spanish is the question of their accession to the European Community. And we are not, of course, directly involved in that question.

Q What is the shape of their economy now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they have some fairly serious economic problems. They have a high unemployment rate. But the new government has carried out, we think, a fairly successful program in trying to bring down unemployment and bring down inflation.

Q Did they respond in any way to Williamsburg, to the statements that came out of the summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to my knowledge.

Q Is the President alarmed in any way that NATO may lose Spain as a member?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He is not alarmed by that. As we have said, this is a decision that the Spanish should take. Our preference, though, is clear. Spain has joined the Alliance. And we would hope that it would remain a member of the Alliance. But regardless of whether Spain stays in the Alliance or not, we are confident that we will maintain a very strong bilateral security relationship.

Q Do you have any sense of how such a referendum will go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I do not.

Q What, from our point of view, do we want this visit to accomplish?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think really two things are key: one, that we demonstrate that under very different political circumstances, remembering that Spain for so long was ruled by Franco, that the U.S.-Spanish relationship is very durable, that we can get along very well with a young, democratically-elected, Socialist leader; two, we would like this visit to be -- this may be the wrong word but -- almost a celebration of the fact that Spain has become a fully participating, democratic country. And that is a very important accomplishment and one that we fully support.

Q Do they have anything to say about the INF --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I mentioned that the Prime Minister during the visit to Bonn expressed support for the December '79 INF decision.

Q Do you think that Felipe Gonzalez will reiterate this support here in Washington publicly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just do not know. I have not discussed it with any Spanish officials.

Q And what is the reason the Reagan administration has to say to the citizens of -- that the Reagan administration won't change these negative views or position in Latin America to a positive one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All we want to do is listen. Spain has a great deal of expertise and experience in Latin America, Central America. And we want

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to the Prime Minister's views.

Q The conference -- The Madrid Conference on Security in Europe, will that be discussed? I think the Spanish have just -- came out with a compromise initiative.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that there's a good chance that it will come up.

Q Would the U.S. administration hope that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think -- We haven't even seen the details of that possible initiative. So I think we -- I couldn't say at this stage.

Q Will they speak about the Middle East at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Possibly.

Q Possibly.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:18 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ OF SPAIN

June 21, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:58 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLIN: This will be a background briefing on the visit between President Reagan and President Gonzalez. For your information only, the background briefer will be [redacted] You may quote him directly, but we'd appreciate it if you would attribute the remarks to a senior American official. Okay?

[redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. What I'll try to do is go down the issues as they arose in the meeting. I think, as you could tell from the statements that you've just heard or will receive, that it was a very warm meeting and very substantive as well.

There was a lot of discussion. The President had a lot to say, as did the Spanish President. One issue that was discussed was Spain's role within the Western security system. The Spanish President described Spain's current status within the Alliance, which is that they are a member of NATO, that they have currently frozen their further integration into the military structure of NATO while they undertake a review.

Some of you who were in this room before recall -- in the last briefing I gave before the visit -- Spain joined the Alliance under the last government. And the current government has that position under review. But as you could tell from the statement that the President made -- the Spanish President made at his departure, Spain, he said, is committed to remaining a Western country, Western aligned and has a security role.

The President's -- the American President's position was that we understand the Spanish position on NATO, that it is their decision to take, but that our preference, of course, is that they remain a member of the Alliance.

There was an extended discussion -- let me on one other Alliance-related question -- the President -- the United States' President did congratulate the Spanish President for the remarks he made recently in Bonn concerning Spanish support for the December '79 decision.

There was quite a lengthy discussion about Latin America and Central America, where, as you know, President Gonzalez is quite an expert, having spent a good deal of time in his capacity as a leader of the Socialist International touring Latin America.

He recently went to Latin America as did the Spanish king. The President talked about our goals in Latin America, stressing our historic ties to Latin American countries. He mentioned three principal goals as peace, democracy and justice, that these are values that the United States wants to promote.

The Spanish President said he had no disagreement with these goals. And there was, I think, no fundamental disagreement in the discussion about Latin America and Central America. President Reagan described in some detail the Caribbean Basin Initiative, talked about the economic and social problems in Central America, talked about his recent events in El Salvador -- by recent events, over the last 18 months, the election there -- the status of the land-reform program, and, then, talked about our disappointment over the failed revolution in Nicaragua.

President Gonzalez, then, spent some time talking about the Spanish democratic experience and the transition to democracy in the post-Franco period.

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Then there was some discussion of the U.S.-Spanish bilateral relationship with both sides welcoming the successful ratification of the U.S.-Spanish base agreement; discussion of bilateral economic problems where the Spanish Finance Minister talked about concerns about protectionism. And the President, Secretary Regan, and Secretary Shultz all very firmly said that this administration would fight protectionism and then there was some discussion about the U.S. recovery and what that might mean for European economic recovery and Spanish recovery. Then the Spanish President and Foreign Minister were able to talk about the Spanish goal of joining the European Community and reported in some detail to President Reagan the discussions last weekend in Stuttgart on the question of EC, European Community, accession. The Spanish President underlined the political and economic importance that Spain attaches to this.

The discussion then moved to security topics again and the President and the Secretary of State welcomed the recent initiative by the Spanish government to break the deadlock at the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. And the President and the Secretary of State said they hoped that this would break the deadlock and that the Soviets might find it acceptable as a basis for concluding that conference.

There was then a discussion of Lebanon and the Middle East where the President and Secretary of State were able to describe strategy for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon; some discussion of the broader Middle East peace process and then finally the Spanish President asked for U.S. support in developing a system which pipeline -- or energy from North Africa could transit Spain to Western Europe. The President enthusiastically supported this and told the Spanish President that we, the United States, would be willing to fund a study looking at the feasibility of building such a pipeline.

Q Is it gas over there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q One question is did the Spanish Prime Minister at any point in the discussions with President Reagan raise the issue that the U.S. should settle conflicts in Central America by negotiating directly with Cuba or Nicaragua or the Salvadoran rebels?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that that's just too specific. I think that President Gonzalez emphasized his desire for peaceful resolution of disputes and emphasized the need for peaceful resolution.

Q Was that gas or oil from Algeria -- pipeline?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gas. Gas.

Q -- following that up. Did he emphasize his support for the Contadora process or did he stress that there should be broader talks beyond just the electoral process in El Salvador? I mean, what was the focus?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think there was a -- I don't think he specifically suggested to us exactly how to resolve the problem in Central America.

Q Was there any implied criticism of us for emphasizing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that --

Q Did he perceive us to be emphasizing a military solution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not that I could detect.

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Q What about the Contadora proposal? Didn't that come up --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was -- I think both sides referred to the proposal as -- and I think both sides said that they would like to see a regional solution along those lines, that it was, generally speaking, we support it. But there was no specific discussion of the nuts and bolts of the proposal.

Let me say, there was a lot of time spent with both sides talking about, I think, the historical and the social and economic backdrop to the current problems.

Q You said before that there was no disagreement in what they said about Central America. And yet President Gonzalez has been quoted as saying that he thinks American policy has not been positive. That leads me to believe that they must have hardly said a word about the subject.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They spent a good deal of time talking about it.

Q And they agreed on everything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I saw no disagreement.

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Q And they agreed on everything?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I saw no disagreement.

Q He didn't bring up his criticism in person with President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said was that we detected no disagreement and there was no discussion of military solutions or not. There was an emphasis, as I said before, the President of Spain on the desirability of a peaceful resolution.

Q Was there any mention of the Gibraltar negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom or any petition of support for Spain in these negotiations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I'm aware of.

Q You said a minute ago that there was no disagreement on Spain's part over the goals -- no fundamental disagreement with these goals. Was there any fundamental disagreement over the methods to reach those goals, or was there any discussion of the methods to reach those goals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There wasn't a great deal of specific discussion of day-to-day diplomacy. As I said before, I think the focus was really on the broader problems and the nature of the problems. And there was complete agreement, I think, that there are deep-seated economic problems, social problems and there are outside efforts to intervene. And there was no disagreement, I think, on the overall analysis of the situation.

Q Did the President specifically lay out before Mr. Gonzalez his thoughts of the Nicaraguan-Cuban-Soviet buildup and role in El Salvador?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He talked about -- I think he talked about in detail the efforts of the El Salvadoran government to establish democracy. He went into great detail about the elections in El Salvador, the efforts that the current government is undertaking in the area of land reform, the release of political prisoners. He also spent a good deal of time talking about the abortive revolution in Nicaragua. And that was -- that took a good deal of time.

Q Did the President suggest a greater willingness now, a greater flexibility in terms of opening talks with the left in El Salvador, opening a dialogue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no suggestion of that.

Q Did the President speak in the context, in the terms that he used last night, most recently, about the Cuban-Marxist-Soviet axis and the threat to this region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't specifically use that phrase.

Q When the two of them were discussing the problems of the area, you said that they agreed on economic, social and military intervention, basic problems, but which of those did the President consider most important, President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't -- this is just one, this is one conversation. And I think you take it out of context for our overall policy. But I would say that the bulk of the time was discussing the inherent problems in the region, the political, social and economic problems. But the President didn't pull any punches. He made it very clear that, in order to address those problems, and that we were the first administration in many years that was trying to address those problems, that we had to take into account the security side.

But it was quite interesting because he did start out -- and I think he tried to explain his philosophy in dealing with the Western hemisphere -- and argued that there had been earlier administrations, said that there had been earlier administrations with an alliance for progress and good neighbor policy that had raised expectations that had never really come through and that he was determined to reverse this and to deal seriously with those problems and that our broad policy was doing that. And I think that President Gonzalez was quite interested in kind of getting a tour de horizon of our overall approach in Central America and Latin America.

Q You said President Reagan expressed disappointment over what you called the failed revolution in Nicaragua. Did President Gonzalez express a viewpoint on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He pointed out that he, in Spain, he had had to deal with the Communist challenge, that there is, after all, a Communist party in Spain. And he talked about the problems

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of Marxist-Leninists in Central America.

Q Any use to -- regime at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really, no.

Q Did he make that observation in the context of the Nicaragua discussion, or in the context of the development of democracy in Spain?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In Nicaragua. He pointed out -- he pointed out -- he said, he even told the President, that he was talking about the development of democracy in Spain as something to take into account in thinking about Central America.

Q Did he offer any type of mediation or good offices to the U.S. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. But, both Presidents agreed that they needed to collaborate and coordinate. He -- as President Gonzalez pointed out in his departing statement -- they speak the same language and have very close historical and cultural ties with 300 million people in the Western hemisphere. And that kind of coordination and discussions, of which this was an important start, I think is something that we both value.

Q Did he give any specifics about where he's going to take his own personal diplomacy in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did President Gonzalez say that he thought the only way to reach a peaceful solution would be to remove foreign troops from the region -- on both sides?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I didn't hear him say that.

Q Did he say that the U.S. should undertake discussions with other countries in the region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He -- again, I don't think there was any real detailed discussion on the day-to-day diplomacy. I think what was an effort to do was to try to initiate a broad dialogue on the problems in the region, and to try to emphasize those areas of commonality where we can work together.

Q Was there any discussion of using other Central American nations as mediators?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

MR. ALLIN: Why don't we try about two more here. Bob. Mike.

Q Concern --

Q What was there --

Q Concern the referendum about the NATO in Spain -- anything new from the point of view of the President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's entirely an internal Spanish affair.

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Q Speaking for yourself --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Completely up to the Spanish government and the Spanish people.

Q President Gonzalez spoke about a tentative date for referendum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Not that I'm aware of.

MR. ALLIN: Bob?

Q What was there about Spain's development that President Gonzalez wanted President Reagan to take into account in dealing with Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think only that, number one, that the Spanish President understands the challenge posed by Communists because he's had to work with Communists in his own country; and number two, that a process of democratization in Latin America is possible. The Spanish are very proud -- and very justifiably so -- in the progress that has been made in establishing a strong democracy in Spain. And this is one of those points where I think there was very strong agreement between the two Presidents: that the establishment and support for a process of democratization in Latin America is something that we can agree on, that we want to see.

Q Did President Gonzalez give any assessment of how this review of Spain's NATO rule is going, or when there might be a referendum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That was the same question somebody else asked.

MR. ALLIN: Okay. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:16 P.M. EDT

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ' TRIP TO THE FAR EAST
BEGINNING JUNE 23, 1983
BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
JUNE 22, 1983, 10:05 A.M.

- - - - -

MODERATOR: Good morning. As we previously announced, this briefing is on the Secretary's upcoming trip to East Asia. The briefing is ON BACKGROUND, for your information only. Both of your briefers have some initial comments for you, and I suggest that you hold your questions until both have finished their remarks.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The key point in the Secretary's visit to Asia is going to be his attendance at the post-Ministerial Meetings in Bangkok with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers. Before that, he is going to have a short stop in the Philippines for meetings with President Marcos and Prime Minister Virata, and he will have bilateral discussions with the Thai government in Bangkok before leaving Ban~~k~~gkok next Wednesday.

The Post-Ministerial session is a tradition that began in 1979 growing out of the dialogues that the ASEAN countries had established with major industrialized countries -- the United States, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and the EC. It consists of meetings, the first of which is a meeting between the five Foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries and the six Foreign Ministers representing the dialogue partners. Then, it is followed by individual dialogues between the five Foreign Ministers and each of the dialogue partners separately.

During the course of the two days of meetings ~~also~~ the Secretary will be having bilaterals with each of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and, in fact, also with each of his dialogue partners, so it will be a busy session of meetings.

The post-Ministerial will focus on Kampuchea with the ASEANS trying out and perhaps discussing with us the ways in which we can continue to pursue the strategy that they have very successfully put together for trying to achieve a political settlement in Kampuchea.

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The United States fully supports the position of ASEAN on Kampuchea. We believe that ASEAN's approach to the problem, based on the ~~form~~ formula of the International Conference on Kampuchea has the best chance of attaining a settlement that meets the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, including Vietnam. The creation of a truly neutral independent Kampuchea holds the future to peace and stability in Indo-China. We will be emphasizing in Bangkok our strong supporting role, and we will be listening carefully to what the ASEANs have to tell us.

We are, likewise, concerned with the security of Thailand, a long-time friend and ally of the United States. This concern is shared by Thailand's ASEAN partners. The Secretary's presence in Bangkok will affirm further our longstanding interest in Thailand's security and prosperity as well as that of its ASEAN partners.

Another issue that will be on the agenda will be the question of refugees. It will figure, I think, both in the formal sessions and the bilateral meetings with the ASEAN governments. With the cooperation of countries-of-first-asylum and countries of ultimate resettlement, the community of concerned nations has thus far dealt effectively and in an humane manner with the enormous problem posed by the movement of Indo-Chinese refugees. The United States itself has taken more than half a million refugees for resettlement. The ASEAN countries have accepted an enormous burden as countries-of-first-asylum, and one of our purposes will be to assure them that, in fact, ultimate resettlement in other countries is assured.

We share with the ASEAN countries a fundamental interest in a stable and open international political system, and there will be a good deal of discussion about global political issues. I think there will be a great deal of interest in hearing from the Secretary on the U.S. approach to East-West relations and on arms control negotiations and our hopes for the success of those negotiations.

They are also very interested in our security presence in the Pacific, which they and we see as providing an essential underpinning for regional stability and security.

The growing role of the ASEAN nations internationally has ~~grown~~ led to a heightened interest and involvement on their part in the state of the world economy, and that will be a subject of considerable discussion in Bangkok. The ASEAN nations represent an impressive success story of development and of ~~in the~~ substantial sustained rates of growth over very long periods of time, though those growth rates have fallen from the previous high levels of the 1970s due to the current world economic problems. We expect there will be keen interest in United States views on the prospects of recovery and in hearing from the Secretary and from Under Secretary Wallis on the results of the recent Economic Summit at Williamsburg, and particularly about its implications for the developing countries.

We will be discussing in economic areas some specific points such as the renewal of the GSP, which is a subject that those countries have great interest in, and in general issues of market access in the United States for ASEAN manufacturers. We share with them a concern about the specter of growing protectionism, and we will be discussing that in Bangkok.

We will also cover United States policies toward aid in the international financial institutions, and the Secretary and the President are firmly committed to assisting the developing countries to meet their economic goals, and we will be reaffirming this in our dialogue with the ASEAN countries.

In sum, what we expect is a friendly, informal atmosphere with an open and productive dialogue on a very broad range of major political and economic issues. The ASEAN countries individually and ASEAN as an organization are really both impressi successive stories, particularly compared to what one might have expected to have happened in the region ten years ago in the wake of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. What has happened, in fact, is cause for considerable hope and satisfaction. The countries are dealing with their own problems in their own ways very effectively They have formed an effective partnership in addressing difficult international issues, particularly the problem of Kampuchea; and they have shown themselves as a group able to conduct mature and productive dialogues with the advanced industrial countries, including ourselves.

This has personally been an outstanding tradition and one that Secretary Shultz very much looks forward to continuing. This will be his first time there as United States Secretary of State.

My colleague will continue.

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The visit by Secretary Shultz to India and Pakistan should be seen as the fulfillment of the long-delayed plans of the Secretary of State of the United States to visit this very important area and to have on-the-ground discussions with the leadership of these two countries. Some of you were in Brussels in December of 1981 when we had a lot of snow and the Polish crisis, and the plane did not go to South Asia. I mention that because it is important to understand that this is not something that is coming up two-and-a-half years into the Administration. It was on our plate early on. Everyone understands why the visit didn't take place at that time.

Now it comes against the backdrop of the Administration's success in its attempts to strengthen a relationship with Pakistan, to improve relations with India, and as we see the last few years, also against a backdrop of improved relations between India and Pakistan, and good movement throughout South Asia with respect to the countries relating to each other and trying to solve their problems.

We have received here a variety of South Asian leaders. Obviously, the most important have been the Prime Minister of India in mid-July 1982, I believe it was, and the President of Pakistan in December. We have just had meetings between the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Doha of Bangladesh. and we have had visits and high-level contacts through the two-and-a-half years with other senior leaders of other countries, Sri Lanka, Nepal.

You have seen the schedule. The Secretary will be spending roughly two days in each country. In India we see this as a natural follow-on to the successful visit of Mrs. Ghandi. The Secretary will be meeting with a wide range of Indians. He will also be chairing the Joint Commission with his colleague, Foreign Minister Rao. Of course, we are interested in improving our bilateral relations and also in taking the opportunity for wide-ranging discussions on regional and other issues. Mrs. Ghandi is the president of the Non-Aligned Movement -- this is important. We will be discussing issues as diverse and as important as peace in the Middle East and economic recovery.

The Pakistan visit as well will be a continuation of the important dialogues we have had with senior leaders of the Government of Pakistan. I've already mentioned the very successful visit of President Zia here in December of '82. We have also had high-level discussions most recently in May -- the visit of Foreign Minister Yaqub Kahn, when he came to discuss Afghanistan in the context of the Geneva talks. We will be discussing bilatera issues in Pakistan as well as regional issues of mutual concern. The Secretary will also chair the inaugural session of the U.S.-Pakista Joint Commission with his colleague, Foreign Minister Uaqib.

I think that is all I have to say. Would you come up

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Q Are you going to talk to the Philippines about the human rights situation? How about that as a starter?

This has been a kind of a basic primer you've given us. Maybe we can talk about some of the issues; maybe about Afghanistan; how close are we to a settlement?

Let's ask you about the human rights situation in the Philippines. Is it something that is quiescent as far as we're concerned, or is the U.S. Government going to try to make some headway now that the bases are all sewed up.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That is a subject that we have discussed with the Philippine Government regularly. It obviously has got to be a matter of concern to us. We're concerned not only about the fact of human rights violations themselves where those take place, but also — because ~~our belief~~ that in the end, countries are strongest when they're based on represent~~ed~~ative institutions, and that the long run of the future of the Philippines, in which we have a very large stake, is going to be furthered by the growth of free and democratic institutions.

Therefore, we have on a number of occasions, including, for example, when We ~~Form~~ was closed, some months ago, — One of the opposition papers, expressed our concerns to President Marcos, and I'm sure, as on previous occasions, that will be a subject the Secretary will touch on. I think of particular interest to us is that we look to the parliamentary elections that are scheduled to be held next year as representing an important opportunity to move forward and to really begin the rebuilding and restrengthening of democratic institutions and traditions in the Philippines. I'm sure that will be pointed out during the discussions in Manila.

We Forum

Q Do the Philippines figure at all in Project Democracy?

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A I don't know the specifics, but certainly a very important part of what we have seen with Project Democracy -- the activities ~~on~~ the Asia Foundation has conducted in it, we would hope under strengthened funding, it will be able to conduct on a larger scale which it does with a number of Asian countries, including the Philippines, where we have programs for bringing Philippine leaders of all groupings to the United States, ~~of~~ programs for studies of ways to strengthen the role of law in society, and so forth.

In effect, the answer is yes. I don't know the particulars.

Q It was stated that before the Secretary visits India, the percent of Tarapur spare parts will be settled. Could you bring us up to date on this?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We're well aware of the issue of the Tarapur spare parts, and I can assure you we're working on this subject.

Q When will you release it?

A Quite frankly, any decisions that we have to relate, we will tell the appropriate government. You'll understand. I know you won't understand, but nevertheless.

Q What is the standing of the nuclear fuel for Tarapur via the French?

A I think that's taken care of.

Q It is now?

A This is not an issue. They were talking about a spare parts problem.

Q The deal with the French has now ultimately been consummated?

A Yes, and that is not a problem as far as the continunity of fuel for the reactors.

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Q To follow this up, this means that there will not be an arms sale?

A I really can't go beyond what I told you.

Q In Bangkok, in the ~~first~~ post-ministerial, are you expecting this nation of the Australian Foreign Minister ~~to direct,~~ acting in some sort of liaison role, with the Vietnamese, which I gather was discussed with Prime Minister Hawke when he was here, to get much airing?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Foreign Minister ~~Aiden~~ Hayden is scheduled to go from Bangkok to Hanoi. So I would imagine there would be a great deal of interest in what kinds of views he might convey when he's in Hanoi.

I think it's one of the points that we have emphasized repeatedly in our discussions with the Australians, and I think both the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Hawke, when he was here, have indicated agreement with — that it's very important that what we do, ~~in~~ the United States and Australia, should be in support of the ASEAN countries and with their concurrence.

The key to success in this whole effort is to recognize that it is the ASEAN countries that have the most direct stake in it. It is by supporting those countries that we have the best chance of achieving a political settlement.

I think, for that reason, I would assume that both from the Australian side and from the ASEAN side they'll be a great deal of interest in making sure that there is a very clear understanding by the Australians of the ASEAN position and what they would hope to achieve.

Q Following up on that question, when Mr. Hawke was here he spoke of Australia's offer to mediate. What is the U.S. position on Australia serving as a mediator between ASEAN and Hanoi on the Kampuchea issue?

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A. I hope he didn't use the word "mediate." I don't like the word "mediate" because that implies a role for Australia in between ASEAN and Viet Nam, whereas I think the role that we see as one that could be useful is ~~the~~ as a country that clearly supports ASEAN, clearly supports ASEAN's objectives, which Hawke made very clear they see as their role.

From that position, which is not that of a middle man, but rather of one of the ~~countries~~ countries strongly supporting ASEAN, being able to possibly play a useful role as a channel of communication.

Q Can you tell us something about why the Secretary is going to Peshawar and the Afghanistan connection?

SECOND OFFICIAL: The Secretary is going to be in Pakistan, and it would be unusual if he, of all the visitors to hit Pakistan, didn't visit the site where there are 3 million refugees from Afghanistan. As you know, we have made significant contributions to the care of these refugees over the last three years -- about $94 million. Obviously, he would wish to go there and visit this area, to see it on the ground, to see it himself. It's a very important component of the Afghan equation.

You have roughly four and a half million refugees, most of them in Pakistan, the rest in Iran. That's one-third of the population of that country. When you think of a future settlement in Afghanistan, you also must think very much about the future of these people. You also must think very much about the future of these people. There is a current humanitarian issue.

(Continued on next page)

Q: Can you give us an update on where the negotiations stand at the moment? How close is an agreement?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think this is the third Geneva negotiating session. It started in June of '82, the second in early '83, and the third one is now, and this is in Geneva.

I mentioned earlier that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan had come to talk to us about these negotiations. He also had visited before coming here, China, France, the United Kingdom, and he visited the Soviet Union before going to Geneva. So the Pakistani Foreign Minister consulted with the five permanent members of the Security Council.

These negotiations are being carried out under the auspices of the United Nations -- Under Secretary Cordovas -- who is holding so-called indirect talks in Geneva; indirect because the Pakistanis will not recognize the Soviet Puppet regime, and although the Soviets are not officially represented, they've always got someone sitting out in the hall who seems to make most of the decisions for the Babrak Karmal types that are around there.

As far as where they are going, no one is sure. We support the concept of a negotiated settlement. We support the U.N. effort. We hope it succeeds. As we understand the position of the Pakistanis -- and they have made this clear not only to us but to all of those who support the U.N. resolution and the Islamic Conference resolutions -- the Pakistani position is based on the four key elements of those resolutions: Withdrawal of Soviet forces, return of the refugees with dignity, honor and security, the right of the Afghans to choose their own form of government -- who's going to represent them in Kabul -- and the recreation -- I emphasize recreation -- of an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan.

The Soviets, of course, focus on the issue of so-called external interference. You know the theology and mythology. The Soviets were called in, according to the Soviets, because there was this great uprising, and the government said, "Please come and save us," so they did with 105,000 troops, helicopter gunships, napalm, all those wonderful things you used to see on American television, but you don't see it there.

The Pakistanis have engaged on the other side of the equation the issues that have been discussed so far, and that has been on the need for a time certain for a Soviet withdrawal. Those are the issues that have been discussed to date. There are these other two issues that are very important, which are of primordial importance, that I mentioned. They'll also be introduced into this, certainly by the Pakistanis, at an appropriate time.

We have been asked -- I understand it's at Russian insistence -- that we play some sort of a guarantor's role, and we have made it clear that we're willing to look at anything, but we're not going to agree to guarantee anything we don't know what's in it.

So that's where it stands. We don't know what the prospects for success will be. We hope they show progress.

Q These four elements you talk about -- those are the four what? Ideal goals --

SECOND OFFICIAL: Those are the four elements in the U.N. Resolution and in the resolutions that have been repeatedly supported by the Islamic countries.

Q But the discussion now --

SECOND OFFICIAL: Which represents the Islamic world.

Q But isn't it correct that the real negotiations now, the discussions now, fall somewhat short of those ideal goals?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Yes. I mentioned that.

Q Yes. And I was wondering --

SECOND OFFICIAL: There were two they were focusing on.

Q Right. Would the United States support a settlement that doesn't reach the level of those goals, but at least I suppose your main concern is getting the Soviet troops out. But I mean, will the -- in other words, I'm asking you, in an direct way, how far the United States will go to help the Afghan refugees come back to their country and choose their own form of government? Or will it be enough that you get somewhat close to that goal and get the Soviet troops out, leaving a pro-Soviet government?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We have our own policy on this, and a very important element of our policy is the association of the Afghan people with their form of government, and an independent, non-aligned government. I think that answers your question. I really can't speculate.

Q Can you give us an update on U.S. military aid to the Afghans?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Do you want to give me another question?

Q On her return from the European tour, Indira Gandhi has once again reacted sharply to Ambassador Barnes' remark, equating the Khalistan movement with the Puerto Rican struggel for freedom.

She has also accused --

SECOND OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I don't even know what you're talking about.

Q The Khalistan movement --

SECOND OFFICIAL: Is that in the Punjab?

Q Yes.

SECOND OFFICIAL: And Harry Barnes said what?

Q He had equated the Khalistan movement with the Puerto Rican struggle for freedom.

SECOND OFFICIAL: He had said that?

Q Yes.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Or someone said he said it? I'm very suspicious of these reports.

Q Well, she has once again accused the U.S. of being the base --

SECOND OFFICIAL: I have no comment on anything like that. I'm sorry.

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Q Can I ask the first official on --

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think it's well understood, and should be well understood, that we don't intervene in the internal affairs of the Government of India or India. That's a matter of record.

Q So would you say that he didn't make such a remark?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I'm not even going to address it beyond where I went. I've lived too long.

Q Last week in Paris India displayed less (inaudible) assistance than it has given last year. In fact, there was a decline of 3% in real terms. This is in sharp contrast to the treatment given to Pakistan, which has offered more this year than it has given last year. On both occasions the American attitude reportedly was highly influential in bringing about those results.

Do you think this background would help India reconciling itself during these talks the Secretary will be having in New Delhi which (inaudible) perceives to be American policies towards India's economic development needs and problems?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I can't comment on the question because I don't have the background facts. But let me say that I think any objective look at the record over the last 20 years will clearly indicate that the United States has been extremely helpful in bilateral assistance to India and others in that area, as well as basically responsible for the fact that there are multilateral lending institutions which exist to which we contribute heavily, to which India and other countries benefit.

I'm not going to argue whether there's a two percent increase or a one percent decrease. I think against a historical record as clear as this one, it shouldn't be viewed as any significant issue or problem.

Q Air Chief Marshal Sitthi said at the weekend that he would have no objection to a four-party solution there -- that is to say, the Sihanouk coalition and the Heng Samrin Government --

(The second official departed the briefing room)

Q The briefing is over? He's left.

Q No, no. That eliminates questions about drugs and Pakistan, I guess.

MODERATOR: He has another appointment.

Q Oh, sure. We'll ask the first official about that.

Q I was saying, Air Chief Marshal Sitthi said he would support a four-party solution at the weekend, and Doha, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, said yesterday that he thought that was the general view in Asia.

What is the United States' view on this as a compromise?

A I'm sorry. We haven't had that specifically proposed to us. It's presumably something that I guess he will bring up to us when we're in Bangkok.

Q You don't have a view on it?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Not specifically.

Q On the question of refugees, you said that you talked to Thailand and other countries as being countries of first asylum, does that imply that you expect to get all these refugees into countries which can absorb them permanently?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's the objective. That's right. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 10:35 a.m.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 221
June 22, 1983

PC #26

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
LOY HENDERSON CONFERENCE ROOM
JUNE 22, 1983

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No. 221
June 22, 1983

PC#26

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
LOY HENDERSON CONFERENCE ROOM
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1983, 3:05 P.M.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any questions?

GREG NOKES (AP): Yes, Mr. Secretary. Are U.S. efforts to obtain a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon at an impasse? If not, what is our next step, and do you or Ambassador Habib or Deputy Secretary Dam plan to meet with Syrian officials in the near future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have been meeting with the Israelis and with the Lebanese. We have been consulting with the Saudi Arabians and other friends in the region. We have had contact with the Syrians.

We continue to be fully engaged in this very important issue. I recall to you the President's objectives of the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, of the emergence of Lebanon as a sovereign country able to rule itself and develop, and to provide measures that ensure the security of Israel's northern frontier. We continue to work for those objectives.

Ambassadors Habib and Draper will be returning to the area probably the day after tomorrow, and we will continue to be fully engaged and work on it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what if the Israelis redeploy their forces to the south? Would that be a setback in terms of a total withdrawal of all foreign forces, and is there any deadline inherent in that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are no particular deadlines although obviously the sooner a withdrawal process can start, the better. I'm speaking of a full withdrawal process. That is what we want. I say the sooner the better because it's a very tense area. When you have tension, I think the sooner you relieve it the more you reduce the risks.

One would hope that if there is any move in the direction of withdrawal it would be part of an overall program. In any case, whatever happens I'm sure there will be intensive discussion between the parties most directly concerned.

QUESTION: But if there were a partial redeployment of the Israelis, would that be a setback in terms of the full withdrawal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That depends upon the conditions under which it takes place. I think there is, of course, inherently a sense that when one of the foreign forces there withdraws, that is part of the terrority of Lebanon that they can take control over.

Nevertheless, I think we have to come back and judge anything that happens according to these major objectives, not only of the President but of the others that we have been working with in the area.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the situation in Lebanon itself, with the Syrians apparently trying to take control of the PLO in the Bekaa Valley and with the Syrians also attempting to set up local autonomous rule in parts of the Bekaa Valley, doesn't lend itself to much optimism in terms of a Syrian withdrawal at any time soon.

Is there any reason to believe -- do you have any reason to believe that ultimately the United States may be successful in getting the Syrians to withdraw?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We certainly are going to continue to work on that problem. As you point out, I think quite correctly, there are obvious indications that the problems are real. Nevertheless, I think there is great importance throughout the world, and the Arab world, on the emergence of Lebanon again as a country that is free of foreign forces, and great support for that idea. I think and hope in the end we'll have success, and the Lebanese will succeed.

QUESTION: A debate is raging in the press about the central message that you meant to convey in your statement on Soviet-American relations to the Foreign Relations Committee last week. Would you care to join and maybe settle that debate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've been asked that question a lot. I have, after trying a variety of answers, settled on this one. My advice is: read the statement and draw your own conclusions. Don't depend on somebody else.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you give us any details on the deaths of the two American journalists today in Central America, and have you determined as yet where the fire came from that hit their car?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I understand that the fire came from Nicaragua, and it hit their car. They were in a zone which was known to be a dangerous zone and they had been warned, as I understand it, before they went there. But the fire did come from Nicaragua, and I want to take the occasion to express my sorrow and my condolences to their families.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to give you another chance on Dan Shorr's question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought that might come back. There is a fundamental point when people complain about news stories of one kind or another, that they should read something and then figure it out for themselves and not depend on the opinion of someone else.

QUESTION: In the carpentry of that particular speech, clearly, there must have been an emphasis in your mind of some sort of signal you wanted to get to the Kremlin, and we have in fact had mixed interpretations.

We would like a little background guidance from you.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think there are two signals, if you want to use that terminology: strength and diplomacy.

We want to make it clear that we are determined to be strong, to be able to defend our interests. We have strong allies. We're working effectively with them; there is cohesion, and we are determined. At the same time, we and our allies both would prefer a more constructive dialogue and set of arrangements with the Soviet Union than we now have.

In the statement I say that we are prepared to engage in that kind of discussion. I think it's a question of both sides of the coin. They're both there.

QUESTION: If I may follow up, sir. Since you made that statement, and given the statements made by Foreign Minister Gromyko, do you sense in what the Soviets have been saying any indication of a Soviet response to the diplomatic side of your two-signal approach?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You can take a statement like the full text which I read of Mr. Gromyko's speech a few days ago and, for the most part, it is, I would say, a very tough and categorical kind of speech and set of statements. However, it is interlarded with comments about the desire for -- I think his term was, at least, as translated -- smoother relations, and so you find that intermixture.

I think it's fair to say that this sort of a combination of strength and diplomacy has been present in statements made by a variety of people, including General Secretary, or now President Andropov and President Reagan. The question is, will there be a development in terms of substance?

There are a wide variety of places in which discussions are going on between ourselves and the Soviet Union and our allies in the Soviet Union.

There are many fora where substantive issues can be explored. And in those fora, we are prepared with reasonable positions and a spirit of give-and-take. So we'll see whether or not we have a kind of response that can allow the diplomatic side of this to develop.

-- MORE --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you decided yet whether or not the United States will engage in a direct dialogue with representatives of the left in El Salvador, and whether that dialogue will be conducted with Ambassador Stone here, there, under what conditions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The basic dialogue that has been put forward has been put forward by the Peace Commission in El Salvador which has stated its willingness to discuss with the left conditions under which they might enter the electoral process.

I think that is the right body to conduct those discussions, and the right way for it to go. If we can facilitate that, and I think if that is to happen, it would undoubtedly be through Ambassador (Senator) Stone's efforts. If we can facilitate that, we're glad to do so, but fundamentally I think the responsibility rests with the people of El Salvador, and they have designated the Peace Commission as the body to engage in that discussion.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some confusion about the meaning of the terms under which the MX missile might be abandoned.

Is this meant as a serious negotiating offer, or is it meant to simply convey the idea that it would be very, very difficult to talk us out of the MX?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think this blow-up today about that subject is puzzling because I don't think that there's anything particularly new to be said on the subject.

Let me just review where we are. The first point to remember is that the Peacekeeper, or MX, as it is deployed, will be a very important modernization of the land-based leg of our triad deterrent force. That's the fundamental reason why the President is recommending it, the Scowcroft Commission recommended it, and why it's being funded and put there.

At the same time, we are in the process of a wide-ranging discussion with the Soviet Union aiming at reductions in strategic arms. That's including the whole variety of arms that fall under that category. So all of these things are under discussion.

But I don't think there is anything particular to recommend, picking out a particular element in that bargaining and trying to place it against some other element in that bargaining. If we are able to reach a result, which I hope very much that we are, there will be a package of things that will be worked out between the parties, and that's always the way it is in any complicated bargain, not an equation of any one thing.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on that point a number of people in Congress have said that they believe the MX was essentially put forth as a bargaining chip. But General Scowcroft himself has said that is not the case, that there are no conditions under which it would not be deployed.

Was it meant to be a bargaining chip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think I've just answered that question, but I'll try it again. The reason for the proposed deployment and eventually the deployment of the MX or Peacekeeper Missile is that it constitutes a key ingredient in the land-based leg of the triad of deterrent forces. That is the basic sum and substance of it.

We are engaged in a bargaining process, and the bargaining process is about strategic forces. The MX or Peacekeeper is part of those strategic forces, so it's something that has to be taken account of in those discussions. It's basically as simple as that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I can come back to the dialogue with the Soviet Union, could you give us some of the flavor of the talks? I don't mean -- what I mean is aside from the arms control forums, which we all know about. Now, you've been, I gather, talking to Ambassador Dobrynin, and presumably Ambassador Hartman had some talks in Moscow.

Are these more in the way of each side reading its own brief, or are there actually any proposals put on the table, or is it a kind of a sterile discussion? We don't get any sense of any give and take here.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't point to results that show that somehow we're making genuine progress from the variety of talks we're involved in, and I think by and large you know them well. There are the INF talks in Geneva, there are the START talks in Geneva, there are the chemical warfare talks in Geneva, there are the MBFR talks in Vienna, there are Max Kampelman's discussions in Madrid, there are the ambassadorial discussions that you mentioned, there are a wide variety of international agencies in which both countries are represented and which our representatives sometimes get together in the venue of those talks. So there are a wide variety of things, and there are some areas where there has been some progress made.

Of course, we have positions that we express, and they do too. At the same time there are occasions -- and I've been involved in some myself -- in which there is a kind of a personal give and take to it. But, barring substantive results that we can point to that are significant, I don't think that you can say the process is leading us somewhere.

In other words, I say you really have to judge it by results. There's a lot of input, there's a lot of activity, but we have to keep looking at the substance and asking ourselves in those terms whether or not we're getting anywhere, and so far we aren't.

But we will keep at it, and I hope that we will get somewhere.

QUESTION: Can I ask you a question I've asked you sometimes in the past. Do you see any value in a meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to try to get to some of these issues at a higher level in advance of when you'd see him normally at the U.N.?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: If it turns out, if there is a judgment that it is desirable to do that -- when Foreign Minister Gromyko and I came to the end of our meeting in New York, we agreed that if it appeared to be desirable to us, we would arrange a meeting. So far it hasn't seemed worthwhile, but that doesn't mean that it couldn't be arranged. But as of now there is no plan for such a meeting.

There's nothing to bar it, however, and the possibility of it is always present, of course.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, (inaudible) that a meeting will or might take place in Damascus between you and President Assad at the end of your upcoming trip to the region since you said that you are in contact with the Syrians and consultations with (inaudible)?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We're in contact in the sense that we have exchanged cables. Our Ambassador has met with them. They have said they are ready for and want to see a dialogue with us. We feel the same way about it, and we hope that such will be arranged. But I don't have any plan or any schedule to stop in the Middle East on my way back from Pakistan.

QUESTION: Sir, in your talks and discussions with the Saudi Arabians and their intercession, have you felt that the Syrians perhaps would be more amenable to a withdrawal from Lebanon now since they are involved -- since the Saudis may be nvolved in some of those talks?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Since the what? I couldn't hear.

QUESTION: The Saudi Arabians -- since you are in consultation with them, and since they have been interceding in some of those talks, have you sensed that perhaps the Syrians would be more amenable to a withdrawal from Lebanon now from your discussions with the Saudis?

Also, sir, you mentioned that Ambassador Habib will be going out to the region. Is he welcome in Damascus? Will he be stopping over in Damascus?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First we observe, I think, a very constructive effort on the part of Saudi Arabia, and what precisely will come out of that remains to be seen. Other countries also have expressed themselves and are being helpful. Beyond that, I don't have any comment to make on the Saudi effort.

As far as Ambassador Habib in Damascus is concerned, they have stated that they don't want to receive him there, so he won't go, and we will find other people who we hope will be acceptable to them and be able to carry on a discussion with them.

-- MORE --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border where some of our colleagues were killed yesterday. That area has been heating up in recent months with military action around that border.

Recently, General Alverez, who is the head of the Honduran military, was in Washington, and he said he would like assurance from the United States that if there were a major attack by Nicaragua into Honduras, the United States would come to the aid of Honduras.

Can you tell us what is the United States attitude about that, and how likely do you think such a thing might be?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We consider the situation in Central America to be of great importance to the people there and to ourselves. And because of that, we are extending great efforts there. I think the very large-scale shipment of arms into Nicaragua from the Soviet Union, sometimes directly and through Cuba, is not appreciated by us. It's a very unfriendly thing to do. So we would take a major outbreak of war there very seriously. Beyond that, I don't want to make a comment.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you have the impression yet that the Soviets want to negotiate a way to get their troops out of Afghanistan? And what would you hope to accomplish on that front and on the Cambodian problem during your trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The United Nations has been conducting for some time now negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan matter. Just how much progress they've made is a little difficult to interpret. The Pakistanis have been involved, and of course, taking a part there. I've had the opportunity to discuss that with Foreign Minister Yaqub Kahn, and I look forward to talking with him again. But I don't really have anything to point to that says that genuine progress has been made. There is a large contingent -- over 100,000, we understand -- of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

For there to be a genuine resolution of that problem, which we very much favor, it would have to include the removal of those troops; it would have to include the emergence of a non-aligned government of Afghanistan; it would have to provide for the creation of a government that is responsive to the people of Afghanistan, and in some way the refugees would have to come back with honor and without prejudice.

So those are the things, I think, that are pretty well agreed that we need to work for. And there is a lot of effort going on, but it's hard to identify progress.

So far as Kampuchea is concerned, we have been supporting the efforts of the ASEAN countries. I will be very interested to be talking with them in a few days in Bangkok. Again I think what we would like to see -- the ASEAN countries would like to see, the Chinese would like to see -- is the removal of the Vietnam forces, Soviet proxy forces, from Kampuchea, and a chance for that country to revive itself.

There are a lot of interim things being talked about. Of course, the Thais are very close to that situation, so their views have to get some special weight. That is, again, something that I'll be discussing.

QUESTION: Also, on that general region, does your trip to Asia signal an increased American commitment to the Pacific and Asian region, both in terms of defense and trade?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is a fact that our trade with the nations of Asia has been increasing rapidly over quite a period of time. And if you look at the patterns of economic development, population, and so forth, I don't see how you can expect anything else but a continuation of that trend into the future. So it's a very important area for us from the standpoint of the economics of it, and of course, it has great strategic and security importance as well. So when we say we should be global in our outlook, it certainly means that we should be paying attention to developments in Asia, and I have been very conscious of that personally, both before being in this job and since being in the job.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what do you make of the current struggle within the PLO? How do you interpret the Syrian involvement in that? And if Yasser Arafat were to be overthrown, would that necessarily be a bad thing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't have a lot of contacts with the PLO, so our intelligence is all second-hand and third-hand. I shouldn't say we don't have a lot: we don't have any direct contacts with the PLO. That always leaves you a little less well informed than you might otherwise be.

But there is, clearly, a struggle going on, and it has probably some elements of policy. There may be some elements of the results of indecisiveness involved and control over funds and bureaucracy -- I don't know. The basic issue, I think, is how can it be brought about that more attention is paid to the problems of the human beings called Palestinians, who live there, and whose lot is a poor one and whose prospects, not just taking it from year to year, but almost from generation to generation, are not that great.

It seems to me that we do have to pay attention, not just us but the PLO and everybody, to the legitimate rights and aspirations of these human beings, and see if we can't do better by them. I think it must be so that one of the reasons why there has been such difficulty with conflict in the Middle East is the fact that we, as an international group of countries, have not been able to come to "grips" satisfactorily with the human condition of the Palestinian people, and we really have to bear down on it. It's a very difficult problem, I know. That's the reason it hasn't been solved. But I think that is at the heart of the matter more than sort of internal PLO politics.

QUESTION: But would Arafat's coming or going bode ill or well for your ultimate objectives, do you think?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's a question of the degree of unity in the PLO and the extent to which there are factions and what orientation of the PLO might have, and whether or not, in the end, whatever happens might make it more possible for King Hussein to have a non-PLO, legitimate Palestinian delegation that was endorsed with him in entering the peace process. That's what we have been trying to achieve.

The extent to which Syria comes to dominate the organization, which may be happening -- you read that a lot -- I think makes it questionable, whether or not these developments would ease that problem. So we have to look elsewhere for our method; or perhaps in our discussions with the Syrians we might find some answers.

MR. HUGHES: The last question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: "The last question," the boss says. You pick the last questioner.

MR. HUGHES: What about Mr. Schorr?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: O.K.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you know of any material of American origin or American license being used by one side or the other in the war between Iraq and Iran? And if that were to happen, what would be your attitude towards it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have had an attitude of neutrality in that war, and we haven't made sales directly ourselves. We have also prevented sales of American-licensed or American parts flowing through in somebody else's equipment.

In saying that I don't say that nothing could possibly have slipped through our efforts -- and maybe you have an example in your mind or something. But that has been our policy, and we have tried to follow through on it and with a considerable amount of argument with some of the countries that have wanted to make those sales.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(The press conference concluded at 3:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR OFFICIAL ON SPEECH
BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1983, 3:40 P.M.

Q Is there any shift of nuance or flavor or policy in what linkage the Administration is drawing between the Cuban troops and the Namibians, a withdrawal from Namibia by South Africa?

SENIOR OFFICIAL: No shift.

Q You don't then mean to de-emphasize your position that there should be a parallel withdrawal of the Cubans, or at least a commitment to draw the Cubans from Angola as the South Africans make their commitment to withdraw from Namibia?

A No, there's no change in the basic situation. Obviously, the negotiation has moved along since the last time we had a major speech. This is the highest level speech on this subject during the course of this Administration, and the most pulling together of all the threads of our policy in southern Africa, but there is no change on that issue.

Q The South Africans say that they

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can't leave Namibia until the Cubans leave Angola and the Angolans say the Cubans can't go because they have an insurrection in the south of the country which the South Africans and I believe the Israelis are supporting with arms and which we're giving moral support to since we've had their leader here and given him an honored reception.

Isn't this a sort of Catch-22 permanent situation? Aren't we partly responsible for the non-resolution of the problem?

A If this problem is resolved, as we hope it will be, it'll be largely because of efforts; not that we are the obstacle to the effort.

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Q What is our attitude, then, to the UNITA insurrection, which is the reason for the Cubans?

A Our position is that the initiative that we have taken there provides the basis for the independence for Namibia, and, if that is successful, will lay the basis for a return to peace and an end to the civil conflict, in fact, in Angola.

It is not a Catch-22, but the situation that exists between the parties inside Angola is not part of this negotiation. That's a matter for Angolans to resolve.

Q But what is the United States' attitude to UNITA, then?

A As we have said before, UNITA is a credible nationalist force, an important element of the Angolan political equation. But the way in which various Angolan parties achieve internal peace is their affair, and it is an internal Angolan matter.

Q You say negotiations are moving along regarding the Cuban issue. Are we getting any closer? Can you point to any particular progress that we're going to resolve that in our favor soon?

A We believe that there is a positive evolution in this negotiation, but we're not here today, and this speech is not pegged upon any dramatic, new announcement

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that we're in a position to make. But we believe that in the wake of the visit here in April of a senior Angolan team, that there has been further evolution, we remain in contact, and when we have announcements to make, we will.

The speech is designed to put that initiative, and other things we're doing in southern Africa, in a broader context to pull together all the elements of our southern African strategy that have been developed and put in place over the past two and a half years, and to make clear how the pieces fit together with each other; and to indicate that constructive engagement is a regional approach to all the countries of the area, and not just something defined in terms of Namibia, for example.

Q Why was the decision made at this time to deliver this speech to, as you say, pull together all the threads?

A In part because we have over the past two and a half years set some things in place, both as concerns our policy towards South Africa, our support for constructive change in South Africa, our effort to get dialogue going between South Africa and a number of its neighbors, our efforts to communicate at the highest level with a number of leaders of the area at the head-of-state level.

We have also moved the 435 process on Namibia to the point where it is ready to be implemented, provided we

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can get the basis for a political decision to go forward with it. So the time is right.

In addition, we have the perception, from time to time, that there are those who misconstrue some of what we're doing in the area. We felt the time had come for a major statement of the coherence of our approach to the region as a whole.

Q Is it fair to say, then, that you feel that your policy is now in place in southern Africa after two years of implementing it?

A Yes, indeed, we would.

Q What are the prospects for getting an agreement this year?

A I'm not going to give you percentages. We obviously think this is a going negotiation; that it has a good chance of success, but, beyond that, I don't think we want to try and put bets on the table.

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Q In the speech, you link the Namibian situation with the President: "The President is committed to Namibia's independence." Is there any special significance in linking that with the President?

A I think, as the opening paragraph of the speech made clear, this is a region, Southern Africa, which is of growing importance to Western and to U.S. interests. The President has himself been involved from the early days of that negotiation in laying the basis for the policy. It is, obviously, in our interest as we seek to become something we have not always been -- a credible actor vis-a-vis all the key parties in the region, to make sure the President stands behind this efort, that he is interested in this effort, and that he considers this an important initiative.

Q A point of background information in relation to the passage on the issue of disinvestment in South Africa, isn't there legislation in Congress -- I think a bill from Solarz -- that deals with this issue? What does that bill call for and what is the Administration's position on it?

A There are various amendments under consideration in the Congress, on the House side, that involve such issues as the import of Krugerrands from South Africa, the issue of making the voluntary Sullivan Code of Fair Employment Practices

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C-2 mandatory under law, the issue of bank lending, the issue of IMF lending, and so forth, to South Africa. Our position in public testimony is very clear on those.

The issue of disinvestment, as such, is not currently the subject of legislation, as far as I am aware although it is being looked at, obviously, in a number of state legislatures and city councils. The Administration's position is that such initiatives run directly contrary to the spirit of what we are seeking to achieve, that such initiatives as I have referred to, if they have any impact at all, would be to underscore an attitude of mind in this country which thinks that the way you influence advance is to condemn, or to wash your hands, or to disengage or to dissociate.

What we're trying to do is to convey an opposite approach aimed at indeed achieving constructive change in South Africa and regional peace in southern Africa by rolling up our sleeves and getting involved rather than by pulling back and trying to adopt a posture of simple dissociation.

Q If I could just refer to the speech again, You say, "The point where the transition to independence in Namibia can begin .. if the key parties are prepared to take the necessary political decisions."

Could you expand on those political decisions? Would they relate to the withdrawal of the Cubans and a somewhat simultaneous withdrawal of the South Africans

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A They relate to the issue that we are seeking to negotiate to a success with the Angolans in these separate bilateral discussions we've been having with them. And of course, they relate to the issue of implementing 435, and that requires that all the parties be prepared to go forward with 435, including, of course, South Africa.

Those are the key parties, obviously, in this, but there are many other parties as well -- many other parties.

Q When are you going to name an Ambassador to Mozambique?

A As soon as agreement is received from the Government of Mozambique for the individual whose name has been sent to Mozambique, which we anticipate will be momentary.

Q Thank you.

(At 3:51 the briefing was concluded.)

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ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR RICHARD T. KENNEDY
ON
NON-PROLIFERATION MEETINGS WITH U.S.S.R.
FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1983, 11:00 A.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good morning. In response to your interest, Ambassador-at-Large Richard Kennedy is here to answer questions on the record for you. He does have a pressing schedule, so we'll probably have to limit this to about 15-20 minutes. Ambassador Kennedy.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Good morning. Let me just introduce this little short session with a couple of general comments. First, as I think you know, these meetings with the Soviets on the general issue of non-proliferation came about as a result of some conversations between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in New York in connection with the General Assembly meeting last year.

Following that meeting and their discussions where they concluded that such discussions on the non-proliferation issue might be of some mutual interest and benefit, the Soviets suggested to us that an initial meeting might occur in the relatively near future. We suggested then perhaps December -- early December -- and as a result there was a meeting here in Washington. A delegation from the Soviet Union headed at that time by Dr. Morosov of the State Committee on Nuclear Energy came to Washington. Morosov is also the Soviet Governor at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the same position in that agency that I occupy.

Those discussions were, I think, at the time properly characterized as business-like and effective. They were frank exchanges and useful in clarifying the views that each of us held on a whole variety of subjects that surround the question of proliferation.

At that meeting it was agreed that a subsequent meeting would probably be in order to explore further some of the issues which were discovered and discussed at that first discussion. Again, they invited us, then, to come, and we took the opportunity afforded by the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to go on from that meeting

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in Vienna to Moscow with a delegation from the United States. It was that meeting that we just conducted.

The meetings, again, were conducted in an atmosphere of frankness. We were candid. We do have some differences of view, but they are in this area largely matters of detail rather than of important substance. There is a general view on both sides that we share the same common objective as to proliferation. There are some questions which we continue to explore as to means that might best be applied.

I would also add -- and I think the Embassy in Moscow commented to this effect -- that this meeting was conducted with an aura of cordiality. They were extremely -- what shall I say? -- extremely cordial to us and made every effort to make the discussions successful ones.

With that, I'm at your disposal.

Q I don't have a clear understanding of the scope of these talks. Are you discussing global non-proliferation or only those issues where the Soviet Union and the United States are directly involved?

A We're talking about the entire global scope of the non-proliferation question. Obviously, that includes the full range of issues that one would incorporate within the subject. It includes such issues as the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply, the discussions on international plutonium storage. For example, these discussions going on in the context of the activities of the Vienna agency, but nonetheless of direct import and importance to both of us. We exchange views on such matters.

For example, we talked at some length about the President's views which he had expressed only recently on the subject of comprehensive safeguards as a condition of supply. That's the kind of range that we're talking about.

I would add, there are no inhibitions on either side as to raising subjects of this kind.

Q Did either side point to possible countries that might be trying to develop nuclear weapons, or much concern about this question?

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A I wouldn't put it quite -- they pointed to countries which might be attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Obviously, there are a number of countries which are -- I suppose we might characterize as -- in the sensitive category.

We and they, I think, share the views as to which countries they may be and as to the nature of the problems that each presents. Manifestly, they put the question more seriously in respect to countries, I think, where they believe our interest lies and where our influence may lie, but then that's not surprising. So do we in respect to countries where we think their influence may be somewhat greater than ours.

The objective in each case is very clearly to be sure that we understand and share our appreciations of the situation and have some indication of what steps each of us might be able to take to dissuade countries from proceeding in this way.

Q What would these talks lead to that would not be achievable at Vienna?

A Would not be achievable --

Q Through the IAEA.

A I think the talks go beyond the scope of the normal range of business that occurs in the IAEA. It's to be recalled that last year we, the United States, explained rather clearly to all of our colleagues, associates, at the IAEA, that we believed that introduction of what we referred to as extraneous political issues in the IAEA, diverting it as an institution from its principal and primary missions of technical assistance, safeguards and safety, was unwise.

Manifestly, when one gets into the broader questions of non-proliferation, one is ranging well beyond the scopes that we're talking about there. So the discussions that we're having with the Soviets range rather more broadly than one would expect them to range in the IAEA itself.

Let me add in that connection, for a number of years, in connection with board meetings -- the board meets three times a year -- in connection with those meetings

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there has been in nearly each board meeting case a short meeting with the Soviet delegation to the board to exchange views on the general agenda which is going to be before the board. Those discussions have been, for the most part, scoped narrowly focused on the agenda before the Board of Governors. I would add, not to concert views, but simply to be sure that people understand the views that each of us is going to take. We do that with a number of other countries as well.

This is simply a consultation mechanism to facilitate the actions of the board itself. In answer directly to your question, these discussions range well beyond the scope of the things that would normally be taken up in the IAEA context.

Q Ambassador Kennedy, could you characterize the talks that were here last December and the ones you have just concluded in Moscow in terms of are these more technical or more politically oriented?

A About half and half. There are technical discussions. Let me explain how the talks in both cases have procedurally gone forward, and this was arrived at in joint understanding because it just seemed to facilitate the exercise and it helps to explain the answer to your question.

The talks proceed with a full day of plenary discussions. That is, principally discussion focused between I, as Chairman of our delegation, and the Chairman of the Soviet delegation. As I said, in the first discussion that was Mr. Morosov; in the second it was chaired by his senior, Mr. Petrosyants who is the Chairman of the State Committee on Nuclear Energy, and a very substantial member of the heirarchy.

Those discussions were essentially between us with some commentary on the part of members of our delegation on particular broad questions, but focused essentially on the broad issues, exploring each other's policy framework and intentions.

Then the second day the meeting breaks up into working groups which are focused on much more specific and more technical questions. Questions such as the application of safeguards, specific means of export control, the particular questions associated with how one

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might conduct an international plutonium storage regime, these kinds of questions, dealt with in very specific terms.

The working groups then prepare reports which they bring before the plenary which meets again on the third day, and then we go back to a more general discussion with a much broader scope relating the results of these working group discussions to those broader questions and asking what steps they suggest to both of us might be taken and how we might proceed with other countries. Then finally, as in this case, an agreement that we might well pursue these discussions further with some specific questions that we want to address in more detail again at a subsequent meeting, and we did agree in principle that there should be a third meeting. It's tentatively viewed that that would occur this fall here in Washington.

Q What would be the ultimate goal? An annex to the current NPT Treaty, or a new treaty, or a bilateral agreement, or what?

A The goal is, I think, a very simple one. It is to be sure that there is a full understanding between us as to what our respective intentions are and what objectives we share. I would add that in this field, as to the proliferation question, our objectives are very much the same. And then to find what concrete steps might be taken in respect to the whole question of the broad non-proliferation regime.

You noted the question of the review conference, the Treaty. The Treaty is up for review, as it is on a five-year basis. It's planned that a review will occur in 1985. That was the subject of considerable discussion between us to see how we might each in his own way advance the effort to have an organized and sensible meeting on the review conference.

Q Is it your idea, then, that in the review period of 1985. presuming that you and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on certain specific steps that might be taken, is it your intention then that those steps be raised in the review and possibly applied into a revision of the Treaty?

A No. I would not say that. I would say that the kinds of steps that we're talking about -- that we would be talking about -- are steps that can be taken

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without necessarily revising the Treaty at all -- steps that can be taken within the context of the Treaty as it now exists, within the context of the IAEA regime, and within the context of all of the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral arrangements that exist.

Q Ambassador Kennedy, what specific concrete steps would the United States like to see come out of these meetings, and realistically what specific concrete steps do you expect the Soviet Union to agree to?

A I don't think I'd want to hazard what steps we'd expect them to agree to. What I would do is say that we clearly, as I indicated earlier, have a strong mutuality of interest in this field, in this area, and that in fact, for example, as we discussed the question of comprehensive safeguards, the President's proposal in this regard, it was clear that they share the sentiments that underlie our initiative in this regard, and that they are in a position to advance that initiative in the event that they choose to do so, and if we find a framework in which that's possible. That's the sort of thing we're trying to discuss.

I would point to the review conference. Here is a question where there are two broad track that have to be concerned about. One is the procedural one, and that's not a minor issue, for if the conference is not properly organized to get off in the right way, it can turn into a less successful -- let me put it that way -- a less successful enterprise than one would like to see it.

We have agreed upon initial steps. They, we and the British are the depositary parties for the Treaty. It's necessary that we get that process under way. These talks help to get that under way, the process of getting the review conference organized.

That was a concrete result of these particular discussions.

As I said, the discussions on the Committee on Assurances of Supply -- which are discussions which go on in Vienna in the IAEA context -- here we explore ways in which each of us could contribute to making that effort a more successful one. That, by the way, is obviously related to the review conference, for it deals with principles based on which supply would occur. It would be in our view,

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and I think in the Soviet's -- although I shouldn't speak for them -- in our view certainly it would be in everyone's interest if those principles could be resolved in many ways in that Committee on Assurances of Supply -- CAS -- before the review conference.

These are the kinds of things which we -- and let me add that, obviously, there are all kinds of very specific things in the safeguards area -- how one administers a safeguard regime -- and those things are discussed on a technical level and agreements are reached as to how we can proceed, and what we can then do in respect to strengthening the IAEA system.

Those are examples. I would add one more as an example. We have for a considerable time been giving thought to the implications of new suppliers entering the marketplace in this field, and what that means for the worldwide nonproliferation regime that's been put in place over many years, the questions arising out of the London Group and the Zanger Committee and so on. What effect will the emergence of new potential suppliers coming into the marketplace have on that regime? That's something that the Soviets did find intriguing and interesting. They are now taking a much harder look at that question, I think, than had been the case before. It's a matter in which we are now exchanging thoughts on the implications and what countries might do to deal with that sort of question.

MR. CARLSON: We might have time for just one more.

Q One factual question which I'm still trying to put into perspective. Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union, supply how much of the world's nuclear fuel? In other words, are they the principal suppliers? We and they?

A They are a very important supplier, and so are we. I can't give you a number. I can find one for you quickly. I don't, on the top of my head -- I can't tell you what the specific numbers would be, but both we and they are major suppliers, obviously.

Q Principal suppliers?

A I would say principal.

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Q When you talk about new suppliers, are you talking about China supplying Pakistan? I mean, I'm trying --

A We're talking about people like China. It is obvious that at some point Brazil and Argentina may well become suppliers. They have material, they have facilities for processing it, and manufacturing it into fuel. They can manufacture componentry that are associated with systems.

It's obvious, I think, that there are other countries in the same way. The South Africans could well become suppliers.

Q Is there much fear that there will be an immiment explosion by some country? I mean, is there any concern about any imminent person joining the nuclear explosion category?

A No.

MR. CARLSON: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR KENNEDY: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:21 a.m.)

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SOVIET DELEGATION

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 28, 1983
No. 240

PC #27

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH EAST ASIAN NATIONS
POST MINISTERIAL MEETING

Bangkok, Thailand
June 28, 1983

The ASEAN dialogue partners have just concluded their meetings this afternoon. Their Excellencies, the Ministers of ASEAN and the dialogue partners, are very happy to give a press conference here. Please state your name and organization when you pose a question.

QUESTION: Could I ask both Mr. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State, and Mr. Hayden, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of their hopes for the outcome of the visit of the Australian Minister to Hanoi?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The views of the United States are that we support the approach of the ASEAN countries to the problem of dealing with the Kampuchean issue and all the related matters. So, when it comes to any approach to Hanoi, we believe that it ought to be coordinated and be seen as useful by the ASEAN countries. And it is our understanding that they feel Mr. Hayden's visit could be useful, but I think it is up to them to say. That is the approach of the United States.

MR. HAYDEN: As I understood the response yesterday afternoon from the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, they, as Mr. George Shultz pointed out, saw that the visit could be useful and they supported it and Mr. George Shultz made it clear later that if they supported it then the United States was prepared to endorse it.

QUESTION: I have a question for Secretary Shultz. Mr. Secretary, what evidence does the United States have, and how firm is it, that the Vietnamese are withholding the remains of Americans killed in Indochina, or missing in Indochina? Why would the Vietnamese be doing it and why are you making a point of it at this meeting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We make a point of our concern to know what has happened to the missing in action and to have returned to us the remains of those killed in action because we care so much about the men in our armed forces who have fallen and about their families. So, I took the occasion here to ask for help from the countries in this region and they all were considerate enough to say that they would give it to the extent they possibly could. According to our information, we still have missing, I think, 2,494 and we have intelligence that suggests that the remains of quite a sizable number are in hand but have not been turned over to us. So we wish as a matter of deep concern to the families involved and out of respect for the deceased that those remains be returned to us. We have sought help and it has been offered.

QUESTION: And the third point was what would the motivation of the Vietnamese be for what I understand you called cruel behavior?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no reason to speculate about their motives. I don't have anything to add on that.

QUESTION: I would like to address this question to Professor Mochtar as a spokesman of ASEAN on Mr. Hayden's visit. What is ASEAN's view on Mr. Hayden's visit to Hanoi?

PROFESSOR MOCHTAR: As long Mr. Hayden's visit is in a framework of seeking a solution along the lines of how ASEAN sees the Kampuchean problem should be solved, we think it might be useful and he is welcome to tell us what he has learned in Hanoi. In fact, we welcome this from anybody who has relations with Hanoi.

QUESTION: I would like to ask a similar question to Mr. Maceachen of Canada. In view of the fact that Canada has been praised for not doing the same thing ....

MR. Maceachen: Well, I want to continue to be praised. And I find Professor Mochtar's answer very acceptable for Canada. If the Australian Minister can play an effective and useful role, certainly we would welcome that.

QUESTION: I propose my question to Minister Abe. Could you please elaborate about the implementation of Prime Minister Nakasone's proposal regarding the ASEAN and Japanese meeting of the Ministers for Science and Technology, and second, about the act of the Japanese Government regarding the discriminatory tariffs against ASEAN products?

MINISTER ABE: I'd like to answer your questions. First, when Prime Minister Nakasone made his visit to the ASEAN countries, he proposed to the leaders that they hold a Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology. As a followup to this proposal of Prime Minister Nakasone, I have suggested in this morning's session with the ASEAN Ministers that we will be dispatching, this coming August, a survey team which will discuss the issue further with the peoples concerned in the ASEAN countries. And, if possible, by the end of this year we wish to hold a Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology. If no particular ASEAN nation would like to host this conference, we will be happy to hold it in Japan. But, in any case, the issue would be up for further consideration among the peoples concerned. Second, on the issue of customs, I wish first of all to point out that Japan will expand by 50 percent, the import ceilings of the generalized systems of preferences concerning industrial and mining products and that, in December of this year when the tariff council will be held, the items of interest to ASEAN will be considered there and I would hope that favorable results could be achieved in the council through deliberations on the ASEAN items.

QUESTION: I would like to address my question to Secretary Shultz. Since the United States did not sign the Treaty of the Law of the Sea, could you tell us what is the motive of that, and are you willing to participate in the future in signing the Treaty of the Law of the Sea?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The reason we have not signed the Law of the Sea Treaty is that we believe the provisions for a mining convention are seriously flawed and will not lead to the development of the seabed resources but quite the reverse. The reason, basically, why they are flawed is that they say to private enterprise, which might want to develop the technology and ability to do that, that this enterprise must, in effect turn over its expertise to an international authority and then, with whatever it is able to earn in the use of its technology, finance that international technology to compete with it. It doesn't seem to us that that is likely to strike any enterprise as a very good deal and therefore it is not likely to result in what can be a very useful exploitation of the seabed resources. And so we felt that it is a seriously flawed element of the treaty and therefore we have not signed. Other elements of the treaty which have been worked on a long time, I know, are broadly satisfactory to the United States and we intend to live by them.

QUESTION: I would like to address my question to Secretary Shultz. In your statement, you mentioned your support, moral, political and diplomatic support, for Prince Sihanouk and for Son Sann and then you also added that you will not have any dealings with the Khmer Rouge. I don't hold any brief for the Khmer Rouge. In fact, I am against them, but is there any purpose in your emphasis on this question at this time, and I would like to know whether ASEAN Ministers explained to you why ASEAN supports the Khmer Rouge as part of Democratic Kampuchean Coalition?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The reason why we don't support the Khmer Rouge is because of their very cruel behavior when they were in charge. We support the Sihanouk and Son Sann approach to government because we think they represent the prospect of a return to a sovereign and democratic Kampuchea and are joined in an effort to bring about the removal of the forces of Vietnam from Kampuchea according to the principles and programs set by the ASEAN countries.

MINISTER DHANABALAN: Excuse me, can I make a correction? There was an assumption in your question that ASEAN supports the Khmer Rouge. I must make a correction. We do not support the Khmer Rouge. We recognize the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. We support the Son Sann and Sihanouk factions and we are supporting the coalition government in order to enable the KPNLF and Prince Sihanouk's groups to grow. So the assumption in your question is quite wrong.

QUESTION: I would like to address my question to the Japanese Foreign Minister. This is regarding the Japanese plan to repatriate Kampuchean refugees from Thailand back to Cambodia. I believe no one present on the panel here today recognizes the Phnom Penh regime or has had contact with it. But I would like to find out what kind of message should be directed at the Phonm Pehn government in order to bring this repatriation about. And can the Minister explain what means are being considered at the moment -- the physical mechanisms -- to get these refugees back?

MINISTER ABE: In Thailand alone, there are currently approximately 160,000 refugees who are still here. The issue was discussed at the dialogue that we held with the ASEAN partners and this is rooted in the proposal that we presented last year. In last year's meeting, we presented a proposal to establish a voluntary return center for the refugees in the western part of Cambodia and we said that we will provide enough funds to implement such a center. Of course, I must point out that all the management and implementing measures will be taken by an appropriate international agency. Ever since last year, this idea has not progressed. But, in view of the fact that there are many refugees who wish to return on a voluntary basis under the condition that the implementation will be undertaken by an international agency, we proposed that we will be ready to provide enough funds and assistance in order to implement such an idea.

QUESTION: My question is for the U.S. Secretary of State. Sir, I would like to ask you to expand on your remarks concerning a growing Soviet threat to the region specifically focused on Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. Ever since I have been out here, U.S. policymakers have spoken of a growing Soviet threat to

The region based on Soviet activities there. But we get very few specifics, so if you could expand on what the Soviets are doing.......

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think we have to start with their support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. That is point one. Point two is the use of those bases. And point three, so far as we can see, is the gradual shift to using the bases as home ports or basing areas, particularly for submarines so that they are able to project their sea power into this region. Those are examples of the growth of Soviet influence.

QUESTION: But U.S. policy makers said almost precisely the same thing three years ago. Is there any indication now that the Soviets are setting up permanent facilities in Vietnam as opposed to temporary facilities, or only using Vietnamese facilities?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, those bases are there, and ports are there, and they regard them as places to station themselves -- I don't know whether the word permanent is the right word. I hope it isn't. But certainly it is an effort to use those facilities for the purpose of projecting Soviet power into this area. That is the statement that was made.

QUESTION: I have two questions. The first one I would like to address to Secretary of State Shultz. It is in follow up to my friend's question on the MIA Question. Recently, a few months ago, some of the American team used Thai soil to rescue American MIA's in LAOS. But they were not very successful. -- To mention, Mr. James Bo Gritz's team. Such action has surely soured neighborly relations between Thailand and Laos. Has Washington introduced any measures to prevent such teams from using Thai soil for such action? If not, what is the American policy with regard to the MIA's in Laos when the civilian operations would resuce them? My second question I would like to address to Mr. Hayden about Cambodia. There is so much speculation, and I hope that your trip to Hanoi tomorrow would not be a failure, but in order to pursue the solution for the Cambodian question, I think I am on the side of Australia in bridging the gap between the two countries. My question is: do you have any other options in mind, -- let's say, for example, an Australian proposal for a comprehensive political settlement by bridging the so-called modalities and substance between the two groupings, or, for example, in a large international conference, to accommodate the two parties for a peaceful settlement? Thank you.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As to your first question, I am not sure that I understood it clearly, but to the extent that I did, it involves how to approach this issue. And, of course, any means that can be effective we are for. And there have been private efforts organized. There is a joint center that works on it, but principally we believe that work through official channels is probably the most effective method in the long run. It is a problem sometimes that people wanting to be helpful, may push into something and raise hopes and they are dashed, and so on. But, clearly, we are anxious to have any method used that will help return the remains of the deceased and provide information for us and for the families involved, on those who are missing.

MR. HAYDEN: If I could answer the second question -- we have certain principles we have declared. They are fairly common with those declared by other interested parties; withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and self-determination within Kampuchea; the neutralization, independence, and non-alignment of Kampuchea; normalization of relationships within the region; and, respect and preservation of the territorial sovereignty of countries of the region. They seem to be fairly common principles and, as we understand it, recently have been expressed by a Vietnamese spokesperson. I guess the task I see ahead of me is trying to sort out to what extent there is some sort of common understanding as to the interpretation of those declarations. In spite of the commonality of interests, there hasn't been much success in getting people together. Having said all that, we approach the task before us with a great deal of caution and respect for its daunting quality. As I've said many times before, on the balance of probabilities, we shouldn't expect to achieve much success. For all that, we are prepared to go ahead and enter into some sort of discussion. The task we embark upon is nothing more than that.

QUESTION: This is for Mr. Shultz. Your last answer just raised my question into a two-parter. You say that any means that would be effective we are for. Are you saying, then, that if you were convinced that a private mission to look for MIA's would be effective, you would not be against it or you would not try to stop it? And the second part of my question has to do with the Kampuchean coalition, and if I understand U.S. policy correctly, the U.S. is willing to give political and moral support to the coalition but not military aid. Could you be specific as to why military aid to the coalition would not be productive, or rather, why it would be counterproductive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: On the first question, I think the key word is "if it has a good chance of being effective." On the second question, we feel that we can support them, of course, as we do through our security relationship with the Thais. But, insofar as other support is concerned, we think that non-military support is the kind of thing that we should do in support of the ASEAN effort here.

QUESTION: My question is directed to Mr. Mochtar. Discussions have taken place on the future of the New

Zealand force in Singapore and Australian Air Force units in Malaysia. Do the Five see the maintenance of these forces in place as a significant factor in the maintenance of a united stand against Hanoi on the question of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea?

FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR OF NEW ZEALAND: I think in ASEAN, there is a healthy principle which we keep. We make a distinction between bilateral relations of the individual countries on which we don't comment because that is their own business and ASEAN matters. I don't see the relation between the forces you mention and the ASEAN position on Kampuchea,

QUESTION: My question is addressed to the Thai Foreign Minister in his role as Chairman. I would like to know whether the ASEAN Ministers have any reservations about Mr. Hayden's forthcoming visit to Vietnam, and whether the ASEAN Ministers see Mr. Hayden as performing any role on their behalf. If I may, I'd also like to ask Mr. Shultz whether he has raised the question of the American MIA's with Mr. Hayden with a view to perhaps Mr. Hayden raising it with the authorities in Hanoi?

MR. SIDDHI: Well, I think that Mr. Hayden had a dialogue with us, among ASEAN. Yesterday, we explained our position very clearly. I think that Mr. Hayden understands very well. So, as this is an international problem, we have no reservations concerning Mr. Hayden's trip to Hanoi. We also told Mr. Hayden the progress that we have made thus far. If he can probe further and get more information for us, it would be very useful to our search for peace and a political solution for Kampuchea. I would say that Mr. Hayden has a role to play and we have no reservations about his trip at all.

QUESTION: For Secretary of State Shultz and Mr. Genscher. Secretary Shultz, could you summarize the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles targeted on Western Europe and Asia? Do you see any movement in those negotiations? Have you received a responsible answer from the Soviet Union? I have a follow-up for Mr. Genscher.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The United States has made proposals in Geneva for reductions in the deployment of the SS-20's and offered first that those weapons should just be eliminated -- both the weapons that are planned to be deployed by the United States and the comparable Soviet weapons. Just eliminate them from the face of the earth — that was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. So we have now proposed that they agree to a global limit, that there be some number of warheads that each side would accept as a limit, and we have not specified a number because we felt that there was more room for give-and-take if we said just some equal, verifiable level. So we have proposals on the bargaining table that are reasonable, that have been worked out with our Allies, including with Mr. Genscher and his Government, and that are global. At this point, I can't tell you, I am sorry to say, that there has been any reasonable response, but we are there at the negotiating table and so is the Soviet Union and if there can be a negotiated outcome, we obviously would regard that as constructive.

MR. GENSCHER: We have always felt that the Soviet Union will be ready for serious negotiations only if it is firmly convinced that the intended deployment in Western Europe will take place if no results have been achieved at the negotiating table. This will be one of the important points to be discussed during the forthcoming visit to Moscow which will take place next week. We should leave no doubt about the fact that, unless concrete negotiating results are achieved, deployment of United States' Intermediate Range nuclear missiles in Western Europe will take place. Western Europe means the Federal Republic, Italy, and the United Kingdom as this was decided by NATO in December, 1979.

QUESTION: May I address a question to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers? ASEAN is very successful in staging one conference after another. You had the meeting with the EEC in April and now you have the post Ministerial Conference with the Dialogue Countries, but my impression is that more and more time is dedicated to the Kampuchean conflict and I wonder whether you have chosen the right dialogue countries. Therefore, I would like to ask you what was the criteria to choose dialogue countries? And, secondly, wouldn't it have been better to choose other dialogue countires, for instance, Vietnam or China or Moscow?

MINISTER DHANABALAN: Can I answer the question? It is quite wrong to say that we have spent all our time talking about Kampuchea. We had two sessions with the dialogue countries. One was what we call the five plus six; that is all of us together. We spent the whole of yesterday morning and then we met with each of the dialogue partners. In the meeting of the five plus six, I would say we probably spent about 25-30% of the time talking about Kampuchea. In the five plus one, almost the entire time was devoted to economic and other issues and not Kampuchea. So your question is not even based on the right reading of what went on here.

QUESTION: What impact, in fact, are the discussions on the common issues going to have on the current UNCTAD meeting? Is there going to be a softening of the stand? Because of the discussions, are these a part of the negotiating tactics which they normally (inaudible)? At first, they start with the (inaudible) and then later on (Inaudible) they modify their postures. Would the United States, for instance, ratify the Common Fund as a result of the discussion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: From the standpoint of the United States, we consider the development of the developing world to be of critical importance to us -- our trading relationship, our strategic relationships with Third World countries are of great significance, and therefore, we have devoted a great deal of thought and attention to this issue. We have expressed ourselves in a constructive spirit and we have gone to the UNCTAD meeting in that same manner. We feel that the general tenor of the discussions at UNCTAD, and at other places, is becoming more and more realistic and concerned with the operational aspects of development. There are a vast number of points on which people now agree, in particular, the importance of trade and investment, as well as aid, to the development process. The industrial countries must be willing to take the products of the developing world if they are to get anywhere. Just to give a number, I believe that the earning which flows to the ASEAN countries from trade exceed those from aid, including from multilateral lending institutions, by a factor of thirty, so you can see the relative importance of trade.

As far as the Common Fund is concerned, our view is that the problem of very volatile commodity prices has classically been a genuine problem for both the producing and consuming countries. But we do not feel that the way to get at that problem is to try to have a broad scheme of price controls. Although there is a buffer in those in terms of working through the mechanism of commodity agreements, the Common Fund involves raising money in order to implement what would be purchasing policies by commodity agreements to maintain certain price levels. We think that, in the end, it wouldn't work. It would bankrupt the Fund. We believe that a better approach to this problem is to look at it from the standpoint of the income flows to countries that are especially affected by the commodity price issue, and in that regard, the IMF compensatory financing approach appeals to us more. So, we haven't found the Common Fund approach one that we think is workable. It is not a question of ideology. It is a question of workability, and, of course, we are ready to look with people at the practical aspects of the Common Fund and other means, but at this point we are not convinced that it will really serve the purpose for which it was intended.

QUESTION: I would like to direct a question to the Indonesian Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister Abe has been saying that Japan intends to increase aid to Laos, and in your speech in today's Japan-ASEAN meeting, ASEAN accepts the continuation of Japanese aid to Laos but you said that ASEAN does not feel that such aid should be increased. Does this statement represent the views of all ASEAN nations, and if so -- this question might be directed to Mr. Abe -- if so, what is Japan going to do? Is Japan going to keep on with its original plan?

MR. MOCHTAR: I think our position has been made clear in the statement this morning. I think the thrust of the statement is that any aid to Laos should not end up giving assistance to the occupation of Kampuchea. That is the gist of it. And, as for the other part of the question, maybe Mr. Abe can answer.

MINISTER ABE: Concerning this Kampuchean question, Japan strongly supports ASEAN's position and, until the Vietnamese forces are withdrawn from Kampuchea, Japan will continue to freeze aid to Vietnam. Laos, however, is not Vietnam, and Laos has not invaded Kampuchea. Of course, Laos may be influenced by the

Vietnamese, but Laos is an LDC, a less-developed country. We have been providing Laos with humanitarian aid even though that aid has been scaled down since the occurrence of the Kampuchean problem. But, in view of this interdependent relationship we have with Laos and from the standpoint of providing humanitarian assistance to Laos, this aid to Laos will continue. But I wish to make one thing clear -- that this aid will not in any way serve to strengthen the Vietnamese at all. This will be strictly used for the improvement of the people's welfare in Laos. Even if the aid to Laos were to be increased, I do not believe that it will contradict in any way ASEAN's position. Of course, we don't envisage any drastic increase of our humanitarian aid to Laos, but when necessity arises, it may be increased by some small scale.

MODERATOR: Since Their Excellencies will have to attend a function in a very short period of time and there are still three more questions waiting to be posed, could you please be short and concise?

QUESTION: Mr. Genscher, what is your assessment of the political impact of this dialogue which has taken place here on the general East-West relationship?

MR. GENSCHER: It has always been the policy of the countries of the European Community not to transfer the West-East conflict to other regions of the world. And so I think it is clear that this political dialogue which has taken place between the member countires of ASEAN and the member countries of the European Community -- the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Japan and Australia -- may make an essential contribution towards the policy of greater stability, both politically and economically, in the world. And, seen against this background, this present dialogue could very well have a stabilizing effect on East-West relations. For this purpose, however, it would be necessary for both sides -- not only the Western countries but the Soviet Union and its allies, as well -- to pursue a policy characterized by moderation all over the world. In other words, by non-interference in the affairs of other countries and by the consistent application of the principle of the non-use of force. In practical terms, this means the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, according to reports in today's newspapers, you inferred at yesterday's meeting that Australia's initiatives on Kampuchea were stupid. Did you use that word, and, if so, in what context?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I used the word but not in any respect with regard to Australia. I used the word in characterizing a process. We were discussing negotiations and I said it seems to me that sometimes we get involved in a process where we say that we want to be reasonable and we do want to be reasonable and we make a proposal and the other side says no. And so people say, "Be reasonable. Make another proposal." So we make another proposal. And the other side says no. So we move, and so they say, "well, you've got to be reasonable. Make another proposal." And I say, in that process, we are being reasonable. We are being stupid. And the point is that when we are engaged in the process of bargaining, we should be bargaining with our opposite number at the bargaining table and not with ourselves. That was the origin of the remark "stupid" and it wasn't applied to anybody. I don't know how the press possibly cooked up that characterization.

QUESTION: My first question is directed to Mr. Hayden. What will Australia's position be at the United Nations with regard to Democratic Kampuchea? My second question is towards the Japanese Minister who just said that Japan

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will make sure that its humanitarian aid to Laos will strictly be used for humanitarian purposes. Has Japan worked out some sort of mechanism to make sure that this aid will only be for humanitarian purposes?

MR. HAYDEN: For Australia's part. We will make a determination on our attitude about that matter at the United Nations when it is closer to being discussed at the United Nations. At this point we recognize no government in Kampuchea and we recognize one of the elements of the so-called democratic coalition government as it presents itself.

MINISTER ABE: Under the Japanese Economic Cooperation scheme, we only provide economic cooperation after thorough and intensive consultation with the recipient government as to the usage of the cooperation which will be extended. This will be done in a very close, detailed manner. Japan has diplomatic relations with Laos and our aid to Laos had been only that humanitarian aid that I mentioned. We will continue to make sure that under this Japanese system of making closely, detailed studies of how the aid will be used. We will continue to implement the aid directly linked to those humanitarian needs.

MODERATOR: The press conference is adjourned.

QUESTION: I have one last question. The question is to Secretary Shultz. You said earlier that the United States Government might be prepared to help private groups try to recover the remains of American servicemen in Vietnam if those efforts appear to have a reasonable chance of success. Can you tell us (1) How that determination will be made; (2) whether we are currently providing aid to any such group; and (3) if Bo Gritz came up with a plan that seemed reasonable, would we support it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I appreciate your giving me an opportunity to clarify my answer and I think I can concisely do so by saying in response to your third question that the answer is very unlikely, but these things would have to be looked upon case by case.

QUESTION: Thank you very much

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 274
July 6, 1983

PC #28

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE
Bangkok, Thailand
June 29, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would like to say, first of all, how much I and my wife and all the people traveling with me have appreciated the extraordinary hospitality accorded to us here, how much we have appreciated the opportunity to meet with the Thai Government, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and others, and also with their colleagues in the ASEAN group. And, finally, I would like to express my sense of privilege at the opportunity to be received later this morning by his majesty the King. If there are any questions, I'll try my hand at them.

QUESTION: Can you tell us what you hope to accomplish in India and looking ahead one more stop, the Geneva negotiations and Afghanistan have not really come up with much. What is the outlook for an Afghanistan solution?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, in India, as with other countries where we visit, we seek to improve and deepen our understanding and quality of our relationships. Beyond that, since India is a country in the forefront of dealing with the problems of economic development -- problems which are of great significance in the world -- I look forward to discussing these issues with Mrs. Ghandi and her colleagues and to learning from them and to exchanging views on these issues. So, there will be a variety of bilateral problems and things to talk about, but also some matters of general interest to us and to the Indians as well.

For further information contact

In Pakistan, we have similar bilateral problems of interest and, at the same time, a host of issues affecting Afghanistan will, I am sure, be discussed, I look forward to hearing and having from the Pakistanis their insight into the negotiations that have been going on about Afghanistan. Your appraisal may be the right one. I want to listen to the Pakistanis and have their view, as the United States Government would like to see a satisfactory solution to that problem and the definition of "satisfactory" is, by this time, quite well known so I won't review it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you had any reaction from the Thai Government or others about your endorsement yesterday of border-crossing forays if they would be effective in returning American bodies?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I am having difficulty with that. I certainly didn't mean to endorse border-crossing forays at all, and I think such forays are counterproductive and serve neither the deep and emotional interests of our country nor the families involved in finding out about missing in action and having their remains returned. So, I didn't mean at all to endorse those forays, and I don't. Of course, the legitimate efforts of the families involved and their organizations are efforts that we have great sympathy for and try to be helpful to.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you comment on Vietnam's recent statement that Kampuchea is a matter between Vietnam and China and ASEAN has no role to play, and also comment on the just-concluded ASEAN meeting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the just-concluded ASEAN meeting has been a very constructive one. I thought the communique they issued was a very interesting, thoughtful and helpful communique, and the meetings with the dialogue partners, both the five-plus-six and then the five-plus-one meeting that I attended. Of course, I can't speak about the others; I didn't attend them. But the whole thing seemed to be constructive. I might say that both dinners were extraordinary and the one last night was capped by one of the most humorous toasts I have heard in a long while. I think the Thai Foreign Minister is a rival to Bob Hope. So, that added a little special spice to the occasion. As far as the statement that the Kampuchea problem is really a China problem, I certainly don't see it that way and neither do the ASEAN countries. I think the statements that have been made recently by the Chinese bear out their interest in an independent Kampuchea with a Government that springs from the desires of the people of that country and not an effort to dominate that country.

QUESTION: Going back to the question on your visit to India, the arms aid to Pakistan by the United States is an issue affecting India's relations. Are you likely to carry any assurances to India on this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I know that the Indians register on that. We believe that it is important for us to support many countries around the world, including Pakistan, and we don't regard our support for Pakistan as in any sense directed against India. Quite the contrary. I think that the destabilization in the region symbolized by the Afghan problem is something that everyone should be concerned about.

QUESTION: One of the subjects, I guess, you will be discussing with Mrs. Ghandi is the question of supplying components for the nuclear reactor at Tarapur. Can you tell us whether the United States has found a third country that is willing to provide those components, and if not, what you plan to tell Mrs. Ghandi?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that I will save what I plan to tell Mrs. Ghandi for Mrs. Ghandi, and we'll take up that issue. I am sure it will be brought up and I think it is more appropriate for me to report to you on what happens in that conversation rather than prospectively.

QUESTION: Here's one you may be able to answer. I recall when we were in Manila you were asked about the proposal by the Thai Foreign Minister which was endorsed by the ASEAN in its communique for a 30-kilometer pullback by the Vietnamese in return for some political gesture. If I remember correctly, you said you wanted to discuss it first with the ASEAN people before taking a position. Do you now have a position on that, and if so what is it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The ASEAN countries have endorsed that approach and we think that it may be helpful and so we favor it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the stories yesterday about the MIA's raised once again also the question of the possibility that there may be live POW's in Southeast Asia. What is the Reagan Administration's position on that? Do you believe that there might still be some alive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are not in a position to rule it out but we don't have evidence that there are some alive.

QUESTION: There was a report out of Hanoi on AFP this morning talking about the Vietnamese being ready to reactivate a nuclear test reactor that was built by the Americans back in the late 1960's or early'70's. Is there any fear on your part or have you heard expressed by any of your ASEAN colleagues that this facility might be used to make nuclear weapons?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hadn't heard about that, so you are bringing this to my attention. Certainly the use of any facility like that directed toward nuclear weapons we would obviously oppose. I don't think it would be a good thing at all.

QUESTION: What is the view of the United States on the announcement by Vietnam several weeks back about the withdrawal of troops from Kampuchea, and what kind of information might you have on how many troops may have been withdrawn?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the question is whether or not there is a withdrawal taking place or a troop rotation taking place, and from what we can see it is probably the latter. So it doesn't have the implications that a genuine withdrawal might have.

QUESTION: You now say that you do not endorse cross-border forays. Yesterday when you were asked about James Bo Gritz's raid into Laos and what you thought of his using Thai territory to stage such a raid, you replied that you support any method which has a good chance of being effective. Can you clarify what you really mean?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I tried to clarify that this morning and I don't think I spoke very clearly about it yesterday. So let me stand on the answer I gave at the beginning of the conference which is basically that we believe these cross-border forays -- that type of thing --tend to do more harm than good and we oppose it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been some furor in India over the past several days because of remarks allegedly made by Ambassador Barnes. Are you concerned that this might distort the real purpose of your trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the purpose of my trip is one to help build our relationship with India and that is the way I am approaching it, and I have no reason to believe that the Indians will be receiving me in any other spirit.

QUESTION: I would like to ask you a more general question. You said last night for moral reasons you could not support the Khmer Rouge. Now, I think in international politics one should not mix up moral issues because the fact is that power politics don't mix with morals. Therefore, I would like to ask you how much U.S. foreign policy is still based on moral issues because I don't have to tell you that moral terms can change within ten years. So, my question is: How relevant are your moral issues nowadays, or how much this is just an excuse for not getting involved anymore in an area where you have had a bad experience?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't give you a percentage but I can say that I believe there is, has been and no doubt will be a continuing element of American foreign policy that derives from our own sense of the importance of freedom and democratic ways of government generally -- freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press and openness in society. We believe that this has been very good for us. We observe that democratic countries are not the countries that have been responsible for aggression around the world, and so we think that this is the kind of atmosphere that will allow people to flourish.

Therefore, I think that a sort of pure and simple balance-of-power approach to foreign policy, just coldly like that, is unlikely from the United States. There will be this continuing strain of what might very well go under the general word of morality or however you want to label it. So I think that will be a permanent part of our thinking. Many say that it shouldn't be there, but I think you will find that for the United States it will be there. It obviously poses all sorts of problems of degree, and we all know that we all start with our imperfections. Nobody is perfect. No country is perfect, and so in applying this standard you always have an imperfect measuring stick, but nevertheless I think there is this underlying sense of moral purpose in American policy. And I personally believe in it and hope that it stays that way. Thank you.

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: SECSTATE PRESS BRIEFING

THIS IS A TRANSCRIPT OF AN ON-THE-RECORD PRESS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ ON THE AIRCRAFT BETWEEN BANGKOK AND NEW DELHI ON JUNE 29, 1983.

BEGIN TEXT:

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Q: TELL US ABOUT THE VISIT TO THE TAJ.

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SHULTZ: WELL, I HAVE SOMETHING TO ANTICIPATE. I'M CERTAINLY LOOKING FORWARD TO IT MYSELF. HEARD ABOUT IT. SAW A RATHER LOVELY LITTLE FILM ABOUT IT. .. IS MADE BY, I THINK, GOODYEAR, BUT THE INDIANS MENTIONED IT TO ME WHEN MRS. GANDHI WAS HERE AND I GOT HOLD OF IT, LOOKED AT IT, AND I WAS GLAD THAT IT WAS ABLE TO FALL INTO THE SCHEDULE WITHOUT DISRUPTING THINGS AT ALL. I THINK ITS A GOOD IDEA WHEN YOU VISIT A COUNTRY TO SEE SOME OF THE SPLENDID THINGS THAT ARE PART OF THAT COUNTRY'S HISTORY. SO I THINK THAT'S AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR WANTING TO SEE IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE SOME INDICATION THAT INDIA IS PREPARING FOR ANOTHER NUCLEAR TEST?

SHULTZ: NO, WE DON'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR INDICATION OF THAT.

Q. THERE WAS A REPORT BEFORE WE LEFT WASHINGTON, WHICH YOU PROBABLY SAW, REGARDING THE SPARE PARTS, SAYING THAT ONE REASON THE ADMINISTRATION WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO GO TO CONGRESS WITH A WAIVER WAS THAT THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS OF CONSTRUCTION GOING ON IN THE DESERT THAT SUGGESTED A FORTHCOMING NUCLEAR TEST.

SHULTZ: WELL, THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECIAL THING ABOUT THAT. THE TARAPUR ISSUE, AS I SAID IN THE RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTION IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER TODAY, I AM SURE IS SOMETHING THAT WILL COME UP AND WE WILL HAVE INFORMATION FROM MRS. GANDHI WHEN WE GET THERE.

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Q. I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP ON THE TARAPUR QUESTION, SIR. HAVE ANY THIRD COUNTRIES COME FORWARD TO PROVIDE THESE SPARE PARTS?

SHULTZ: WELL, THERE ARE VARIOUS POSSIBILITIES AND I THINK IT IS MAINLY A QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PARTS ARE GENUINELY AVAILABLE FROM VARIOUS THIRD COUNTRIES. BY GENUINELY AVAILABLE I MEAN WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTICULAR PART THAT IS TECHNICALLY GOING TO BE ABLE TO DO THE JOB

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CAN BE PRODUCED AND GOTTEN THERE IN GOOD TIME.

Q. I WONDER IF WE COULD JUST GO TO ANOTHER REGION REAL QUICK, MR. SECRETARY. HABIB AND DRAPER HAVE BEEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR SEVERAL DAYS NOW AND THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF MOVEMENT ON THE GROUND, SOME STARTLING DEVELOPMENTS, ARAFAT IS SUDDENLY PERSONA NON GRATA, THE REPORTS OUT OF ISRAEL THAT THE ISRAELIS FEEL THAT ALL IS NOT LOST, THAT THE SOVIETS, FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, MAY FAVOR A WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE U.S. IS STILL PRESSING AHEAD WITH THAT OBJECTIVE TO REMOVE ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

SHULTZ: I THINK YOU HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT OUR OBJECTIVES ARE THREE-FOLD, NOT JUST ONE: NUMBER ONE, ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT; NUMBER TWO, THE ABILITY FOR LEBANON TO EMERGE AND BE SOVEREIGN AND DEVELOP WITHIN ITS OWN TERRITORY; AND NUMBER THREE, THAT THE WHOLE PROCESS HAVE BUILT INTO IT ARRANGEMENTS THAT ASSURE THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER, AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE ISRAELI-LEBANON TREATY -- THE ISRAELI-LEBANON AGREEMENT.

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Q. DOES THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PLO -- CAN WE SAY YET WHETHER OR NOT IT IS HELPFUL OR HARMFUL TO THIS WHOLE PROCESS THAT THE U.S. IS TRYING TO DO (INAUDIBLE) THE SITUATION AND GET THE WITHDRAWAL AND REBUILD LEBANON? ARE WE GETTING ANY SIGNALS FROM SYRIA ABOUT WHY IT IS DOING THIS?

SHULTZ: WELL, YOU CAN SORT OF LOOK AT IT AND REASON ABOUT IT IN VARIOUS WAYS. WE JUST HAVE TO SEE HOW IT WORKS OUT. BUT FROM THE PURE AND SIMPLE STANDPOINT OF

PLO WITHDRAWAL, IF SYRIA WITHDRAWS -- IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A QUESTION THAT PEOPLE HAVE RAISED, THE GREATER SYRIA'S

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ROLE IN PLO AFFAIRS THE MORE LIKELY IT WOULD BE THAT IF SYRIA DECIDES TO WITHDRAW THE PLO WOULD WIND UP WITHDRAWING. NOW I THINK IT IS ALSO QUITE CLEAR THAT THE MOVEMENT OF MATERIEL OF VARIOUS KINDS TO THE PLO UNITS IN LEBANON IS OBVIOUSLY DEPENDENT ON SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THAT MOVEMENT TAKE PLACE. I THINK THAT FROM THAT STANDPOINT THE SITUATION IS, IN A SENSE, UNCHANGED EXCEPT THE DEGREE OF APPARENT SYRIAN GREATER STRENGTH OR INFLUENCE WITH THE PLO. SO I DON'T KNOW. I WOULD SAY THAT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IT DOESN'T HAVE ANY PARTICULAR THING TO WORRY US. ITS IMPLICATIONS, I WOULD THINK, ARE MORE BROADLY INTO THE PEACE PROCESS AND WE HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT IN CONNECTION WITH OUR BASIC PROBLEM OF HOW DO YOU CONSTRUCT A PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WITH KING HUSSEIN WHERE THAT DELEGATION IS, ON THE ONE HAND, LEGITIMATE, AND ON THE OTHER, HAS THE IMPLICIT ARAB BACKING. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN IT SEEMED THAT ARAFAT HAD BEEN READY TO MAKE SOME SORT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN WHEREBY JUST THE KIND OF DELEGATION WE WANTED TO SEE COULD BE PUT TOGETHER AND THEN THAT DEAL FELL APART, AS WE ALL KNOW. IT DOESN'T LOOK AS IF ARAFAT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DELIVER ON THAT KIND OF A DEAL NOW. SO I DON'T KNOW QUITE WHERE THAT LEAVES YOU TURNING. EXCEPT TO COME BACK AGAIN TO THE QUESTION THAT I HAVE MENTIONED BEFORE: NAMELY, WHAT HAPPENS TO THE HUMAN BEINGS CALLED PALESTINIANS IN ALL THIS AND WHO IS REALLY REPRESENTING THEM? I THINK KING HUSSEIN, IN A PRETTY INTERESTING STATEMENT THE OTHER DAY, IN EFFECT PUT THIS QUESTION. SO THERE IS AN EVOLUTION OF THINKING ABOUT THAT SUBJECT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, ON THE MOVEMENT OF SYRIA TO VETO YOUR ARRANGEMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN -- OR RATHER ISRAELI -- FORCES, REGARDING THE MOVE AGAINST MR. ARAFAT *TO DISRUPT HIS CONTROL OF THE PLO, WHAT, SIR, DO YOU SEE* AS THE ULTIMATE ROLE OR DIRECTION OR CONTROL OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THIS ENTIRE AFFAIR? THE AGREEMENT AND THE DISRUPTION AND THE ULTIMATE ANTITHESIS OF U.S. POLICY?

SHULTZ: I AM HESITANT TO COMMENT ON THAT QUESTION

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BECAUSE, IN A SENSE, IT IS A FACTUAL QUESTION. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THESE DEVELOPMENTS? I DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT, I DON'T HAVE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SAID TO WHOM AND SO ON. SO I THINK I WILL PASS ON THAT ONE.

Q. ARE YOU GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE THAT THEY MAY BENEFIT FROM THIS DISRUPTION OR DESTABABILITY (SIC) IN THE EFFORTS YOU HAVE MADE TO ACHIEVE A WITHDRAWAL AND THE DISRUPTION IN SO-CALLED MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE PLO?

SHULTZ: WELL, FROM THE BEGINNING ONCE THE THROUGH TASS STATED THEIR VIEW THAT THEY DIDN'T LIKE THAT AGREEMENT, THEY MADE THAT VERY CLEAR RIGHT FROM DAY

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ONE. THERE HASN'T BEEN ANY SHIFT IN THAT. PRECISELY WHAT THEY MAY HAVE DONE ABOUT THAT POINT OF VIEW IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS I DON'T KNOW, OR WITH THE PLO, BUT THEY DID MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, MRS. GANDHI HAS CALLED FOR A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES. WHAT KIND OF A POSITION WILL YOU BE, OR WHAT IS YOUR POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND GENERALLY ON
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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEVELOPED WORLD AND THE UNDEVELOPED WORLD, THAT MRS. GANDHI TAKES SUCH INTEREST

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IN -- THE STATE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT.

SHULTZ: WELL, ONE OF THE REASON I AM SO GLAD TO GOING TO INDIA AND TO HAVE A CHANCE TO VISIT WITH MRS. GANDHI IS THAT I THINK THAT THE IDEA OF AN ENRICHED DIALOGUE ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES, OR TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, AN ENRICHED DIALOGUE OR DISCUSSION, CONVERSATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENT AND THE ERLD ECONOMY INCLUDING INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES AND LESS-ADVANCED COUNTRIES IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE AND INDIA HAS HAD A LOT OF EXPERIENCE WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ON A LARGE SCALE, SO THAT IS SOMETHING TO TALK ABOUT. AND BEYOND THAT INDIA HAS THOUGHT A LOT ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD AND HAS THE ROLE AS A LEADER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. AND SO ALL OF THIS I THINK MAKES IT -- DISCUSSIONS IN INDIA -- VERY POTENTIALLY WORTHWHILE AND I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO IT. I THINK IT'S AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT TO TALK ABOUT.

Q. IT SEEMS THAT THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS BOTH IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN ARE SORT OF WILD CARDS IN THE SUB-CONTINENT. CAN YOU TELL US HOW SERIOUSLY WE VIEW INDIA'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES? HOW BIG AN OBSTACLE THAT IS TO IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA, AND SECONDLY, HOW BIG AN OBSTACLE OR HOW CONCERNED WE ARE ABOUT PAKISTAN'S POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

SHULTZ: I THINK WE HAVE TO START WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IN OUR VIEW, IS A VERY UNDESIRABLE THING. SO WE HAVE HAD FOR A LONG TIME

AN ACTIVE PROGRAM TO COMBAT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE FACT THAT INDIA HAS SET OFF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION REPRESENTS A PROBLEM [illegible] SOME OF THE [illegible] REACTOR IS SUBJECT TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION, [illegible] SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF THEIR NUCLEAR PROGRAM [illegible] AND WE CONSIDER THAT TO BE A PROBLEM [illegible] FOR QUITE SOME TIME. [illegible]

IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN, [illegible] COUNTRY, WE WOULD BE [illegible] NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. [illegible]

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THEY -- PRESIDENT ZIA HAS SAID THAT THEY AREN'T DEVELOPING, DOING ANYTHING TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON. AT ANY RATE OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S A VERY UNDESIRABLE THING TO HAVE HAPPEN.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT ROLE DO YOU SEE THE INDIANS HAVING IN THE AFGHANISTAN DISCUSSION PROCESS AND DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS, THAT A DEAL MIGHT BE CUT THAT WOULD LET THE RUSSIANS OFF THE HOOK TOO EASILY?

SHULTZ: WELL AGAIN I'M LOOKING FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THE AFGHANISTAN ISSUES WITH THE INDIANS AND SORT OF SEEING FOR MYSELF IN ADDITION TO READING ABOUT WHAT THEIR VIEWS ARE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN. AS FAR AS THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN ARE CONCERNED, WELL OBVIOUSLY WE DON'T WANT TO -- THERE IS A PROGRAM, A SET OF OBJECTIVES THAT HAVE BEEN PRETTY WELL AGREED TO AND I KNOW FROM MY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN ON THE ONE HAND, YAQUB KHAN ON THE OTHER, THAT THESE OBJECTIVES ARE FAIRLY WELL LAID OUT AND THAT IF A

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NEGOTIATION CAN SUCCEED IN BRINGING ABOUT WHAT'S CALLED FOR BY THEM THEN I THINK IT'S A VERY GOOD THING. IF A NEGOTIATION BRINGS OUT SOMETHING THAT IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE, THEN WE'D HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT IT. BUT I DON'T HAVE ANY SENSE THAT THE PEOPLE NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS ARE BACKING OFF FROM THE OBJECTIVES THAT THEY'VE SET FOR THEMSELVES. AGAIN, I LOOK FORWARD PARTICULARLY TO TALKING WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND YAQUB KHAN ABOUT THE SUBJECT.

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Q. HAVE YOU HAD A CHANCE TO ANALYZE THE RESULTS OF THE MOST RECENT WARSAW PACT MEETING AND THE ARMS CONTROL

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PROPOSALS THAT THEY HAVE ALLEGEDLY SET FORTH IN INF?

SHULTZ: I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO STUDY THAT. I KNOW THEY'VE ISSUED THEIR STATEMENT AND QUITE A FEW HOURS AGO WE'VE GOTTEN IT, AND HAVE HAD A SORT OF A BRIEF REACTION WHICH IS THAT IT DOESN'T SEEM TO CONTAIN NEW THINGS, BUT RATHER THAN MAKE A QUICK REACTION WHY DON'T WE WAIT UNTIL WE'VE HAD A CHANCE TO EXAMINE IT CAREFULLY.

Q. ARE WE MAKING ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS YOUR STOPPING OVER IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE WAY HOME FROM HERE? AND IF YOU DID WHAT WOULD YOU EXPECT TO ACCOMPLISH?

SHULTZ: THERE ISN'T ANY CHANGE IN THE TRIP PLAN THAT WE HAD SET OUT TO BEGIN WITH, NAMELY, TO GO FROM ISLAMABAD BASICALLY TO LONDON AND THEN BACK. OBVIOUSLY I'M IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH PHIL AS HE'S CONDUCTING HIS TALKS AND SO WE'LL JUST HAVE TO SEE ABOUT THAT BUT THERE'S NO CHANGE IN OUR PLAN AT THIS POINT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY: WHAT IS THE U.S. POSITION ON POSSIBLE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS FROM LEBANON AND IF THAT WERE TO OCCUR WOULD THE U.S. INCREASE ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE MULTINATIONAL PEACE KEEPING FORCE?

SHULTZ: I THINK THAT YOU HAVE TO JUDGE ANY PARTICULAR THING THAT HAPPENS ACCORDING TO THE BROAD OBJECTIVES THAT WE HAVE -- AND WE TALKED ABOUT THESE THREE OBJECTIVES -- AND THEN YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURELF DOES PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL CONTRIBUTE TO THEM. OBVIOUSLY, IF IT'S PART OF A PROGRAM THAT'S DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT

FULL WITHDRAWAL IT'S A GOOD THING. TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ISN'T, THAT IT MIGHT WORK IN THE OTHER WAY, THEN IT PRESENTS SOME PROBLEMS. SO THAT MEANS THAT THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSING WHAT IT IS THE ISRAELIS MAY HAVE IN MIND AND WHAT IS THE SETTING IN WHICH THAT FITS IS

IMPORTANT. THAT'S ONE OF THE THINGS THAT PHIL'S BEEN DOING AND OF COURSE WE DID THAT DURING VISITS IN WASHINGTON. DAVID KIMCHE WAS THERE, ELI SALIM WAS THERE, WADI HADAD WAS THERE AND THIS WHOLE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL, HOW TO BRING IT ABOUT AND TO HAVE IT

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TAKE PLACE IS SORT OF TOPIC NUMBER ONE. AMONG THE THINGS THAT DESERVE ATTENTION, AND YOU SUGGESTED IT IN YOUR QUESTION, IS IF ONE OF THE OCCUPYING FORCES WITHDRAWS WE WANT TO HAVE THAT HAPPEN IN A WAY THAT BRINGS ABOUT LEBANESE CONTROL OF THAT TERRITORY, NOT THE OTHER OCCUPYING FORCE. SO THAT'S ANOTHER REASON FOR THE DISCUSSION NOW. AND THERE ARE MANY SUGGESTIONS THAT PEOPLE MAKE ABOUT WHAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE OUGHT TO DO BUT WE LOOK ON THAT VERY, VERY CAREFULLY BECAUSE THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, I THINK WE SHOULD KEEP REMINDING OURSELVES, WAS INTRODUCED INTO A SITUATION WHERE ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED AGREED IT SHOULD COME. ESSENTIALLY IT WAS INTRODUCED INTO A NON-HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SO THAT'S ONE THING. TO INTRODUCE THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTO AN ARGUABLY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT IS A DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF WHAT THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE SHOULD DO. AND BEFORE YOU DO THAT YOU HAVE TO THINK VERY CAREFULLY ABOUT IT AND CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS CAREFULLY ABOUT IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY: JUST BEFORE IN YOUR NEWS CONFERENCE

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SECTO

STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS. DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN. USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON, P/RM, P/P, P/PFF, P/FW, P/FN, P/PFO MC KAY/CARL, B/BF, B/BXN, NEA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD, USIA ADVISER, MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

YOU SPOKE OF HAVING PROBLEMS -- THERE ARE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA. COULD YOU GIVE US A FEW EXAMPLES OF PROBLEMS?
SHULTZ: WELL, NO I'M NOT SEEKING TO EMPHASIZE PROBLEMS. I'M SEEKING TO GO THERE AND SOLVE WHAT BILATERAL PROBLEMS WE MAY HAVE OR TRY TO GET THEM ON THE ROAD TO SOLUTION AND CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF BUILDING OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA WHICH WAS SUCH A MARKED RESULT OF MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT IN THE UNITED STATES. SO I THINK THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP WITH
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ANYONE OR ANY COUNTRY IS ALWAYS ONE WHERE YOU SAY, WELL WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS, AND WHAT CAN WE DO ABOUT THEM

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THAT MEETS OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES AND TRY TO GET THEM PUT ASIDE AND CONCENTRATE ON POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS. SO THAT'S SORT OF THE ORIENTATION PLUS THE DISCUSSION OF THESE BROADER ISSUES THAT CONCERN US BILATERALLY -- ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT -- AND MUCH MORE BROADLY.

Q. I'M NOT REALLY TOTALLY UP TO SPEED ON INDIA, BUT YOU TALKED ABOUT IMPROVING INDIA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION. DIDN'T THE UNITED STATES OPPOSE A BANK LOAN TO INDIA OR AM I MISTAKEN -- AN INTERNATIONAL BANK LOAN? ISN'T THAT A PROBLEM? AND HOW DO YOU TALK ABOUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WHEN INDIA, THE WORLD'S LARGEST DEMOCRACY, IS DESPERATE FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND THE UNITED STATES APPARENTLY IS A LITTLE CHARY OF SUPPORTING THAT.

SHULTZ: THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPORTED VERY LARGE FLOWS OF WORLD BANK LENDING TO INDIA OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED ABOUT INDIAN BORROWING AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. I THINK PERHAPS THAT'S THE ISSUE YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT. AND THAT'S SOMETHING THAT WE DISCUSSED WITH THE INDIANS WHEN MRS. GANDHI VISITED, WE'VE DISCUSSED IN THE INTERIM, I EXPECT IT WILL ARISE AGAIN AND I'M PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT IT.

TO PUT THE PROBLEM IN A BROAD WAY, CHINA HAS COME INTO THE WORLD BANK AND HAS EXPRESSED ITS DESIRE TO BE IN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. CHINA IS A POTENTIALLY BIG BORROWER. INDIA HAS BEEN A VERY LARGE BORROWER FROM THE WORLD BANK AND THE AMOUNT OF RESOURCES TO BORROW FROM HASN'T INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY AND THEREFORE YOU HAVE A

PROBLEM AND THE INDIANS RECOGNIZE IT, I THINK THEY ARE SPOTLIGHTING THAT FOR GENERAL ISSUE AND ITS A QUESTION HOW TO GET AT IT.

I THINK THAT THE ISSUE POINTS UP THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC SAVINGS IN ANY COUNTRY THAT SEEKS DEVELOPMENT AND ITS QUITE NOTABLE THAT IN THE CASE OF INDIA SOMETHING LIKE 90 PC OF THE INVESTMENT THAT'S TAKEN PLACE THERE -- AND ITS BEEN VERY VERY LARGE -- HAS COME OUT OF DOMESTICALLY GENERATED SAVINGS. ITS A TERRIFIC RECORD AND THE SAVINGS RATE IS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THE SAVINGS RATE IN THE UNITED STATES.

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SIMILARLY, WHEN I WAS IN CHINA AND WE DISCUSSED THIS, THE CHINESE HAVE THE VIEW THAT THEIR ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF THE MULTILATERAL LENDING INSTITUTION SHOULD BE AT LEAST THE SAME AS INDIA'S BUT THE CHINESE ARE VERY REALISTIC -- AFTERALL, THEY SAY, WE HAVE A BILLION PEOPLE AND WE HAVE LARGE NEEDS AND SO REALISM SAYS THAT WE FUNDAMENTALLY HAVE TO GENERATE RESOURCES OURSELVES OUT OF OUR OWN SAVINGS AND I THINK THAT'S CORRECT. THAT POINT IS AN IMPORTANT ONE. MRS. GHANDI, INCIDENTALLY, RECOGNIZED THAT POINT IN HER ADDRESS TO THE UNCTAD MEETING.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, EARLIER YOU SAID YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE SOMETHING ON THE TARAPUR QUESTION . YOU SAID WE'RE GOING TO HAVE INFORMATION FROM MRS. GANDHI WHEN WE GET THERE. THAT OF COURSE TRIGGERS IN OUR MINDS THAT THERE IS GOING TO BE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF THE COMPONENTS FOR TARAPUR. IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING?

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SHULTZ: NO, I'M JUST SAYING THAT I RECOGNIZE THAT IT'S AN ISSUE AND I'M PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT IT.

QUESTION: WELL, LET ME SHARPEN IT THEN. WILL YOU IN FACT MAKE THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE U. S. WILL GIVE THE COMPONENTS FOR TARAPUR?

SHULTZ: I'LL JUST STAY WHERE I AM: THAT I RECOGNIZE THAT IT'S AN ISSUE. WE'VE DISCUSSED IT IN THE U. S.
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GOVERNMENT AND I'M READY TO TALK ABOUT IT WITH MRS. GANDHI OR, MORE LIKELY, WITH OTHERS IN HER GOVERNMENT.

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Q. WHAT ABOUT THE REPORTS ABOUT THE 900 MILLION DOLLARS IN POSSIBLE U. S. ARMS SALES TO THE INDIANS?

SHULTZ: 900 MILLION DOLLARS?

Q. YES.
SHULTZ: THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF ARMS SALES BUT NOT ON THAT SCALE. I DON'T KNOW OF ANY PROPOSAL OF THAT MAGNITUDE.

Q. YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT U. S. ARMS SALES TO MRS. GANDHI?

SHULTZ: THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF THAT AND I THINK THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PROPOSALS MADE BY A U. S. COMPANY AND THAT'S AMONG THE MANY SUBJECTS WE MIGHT DISCUSS.

Q. WOULD THE UNITED STATES LIKE TO SEE INDIA BUY U. S. ARMS?

SHULTZ: YES

WE HAVE A NEWS ITEM FOR YOU. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF CHINA, MR. WOO WILL BE VISITING THE UNITED STATES IN EARLY OCTOBER. THIS IS THE RESULT OF AN INVITATION THAT I ISSUED TO HIM WHEN I WAS IN CHINA AND WHICH HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE. WE'VE HAD SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION AND HE WILL BE VISITING US IN WASHINGTON, AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN THE UNITED STATES, EARLY IN OCTOBER. THE DATES HAVEN'T BEEN PINNED DOWN FULLY AS

YET. THERE WILL BE THAT VISIT COMING ALONG.

Q. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD CONCEIVABLY GO TO CHINA THEREAFTER, LIKE ON THE NOVEMBER TRIP?

SHULTZ: NO. I THINK THE NOVEMBER TRIP IS PRETTY WELL SET IN ITS BASIC ITINERARY AND, AS I THINK IT SAID IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE DATES OF WHEN HE IS GOING TO VISIT, WHERE AND HOW THE TRAVEL PROCESS MIGHT GO, IS BEING WORKED OUT BUT THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE TRIP ARE NOT (INDISTINCT).

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Q. DOES THAT MEAN CHINA IS IN THE CARDS FOR THE PRESIDENT SOMETIME, BUT NOT TOO LONG THEREAFTER? SAY WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS?

SHULTZ: IT ISN'T. THE FACT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS COMING DOESN'T MEAN ALL SORTS OF OTHER THINGS OTHER THAN WE HAD LOTS OF VERY WORTHWHILE DISCUSSIONS IN BEIJING, SO I'LL WELCOME HIS BEING IN THE UNITED STATES. I THINK IT'S JUST A FURTHER ELEMENT IN THIS PROCESS OF HIGH OFFICIAL VISITS. I BELIEVE THE EMERGENCE OF A STABLE U. S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP, THAT'S CERTAINLY OUR OBJECTIVE.

Q. IS THIS SOMEWHAT OF AN EXTENSION OF HIS PERIODIC VISITS TO THE UNGA?

SHULTZ: WELL, HE'LL BE AT THE UN SESSION AND AS A MATTER OF FACT THAT'S WHAT WE TALKED ABOUT WHEN I WAS IN CHINA -- WHY DOESN'T HE ADD A U. S. VISIT AND SAVE

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HIMSELF A TRIP. SO THAT SEEMS TO BE THE WAY IT'S WORKING OUT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, DOES THIS SHOW THAT THINGS ARE WARMING UP WITH CHINA AFTER THAT COLD SPELL OR BAD PATCH THAT WE SEEMED TO HAVE?

SHULTZ: WELL, I THINK IT'S A GOOD THING THAT HE'S COMING AND I WELCOME IT AND WE'LL HAVE A GREAT VARIETY OF THINGS TO TALK ABOUT. AND I THINK THERE IS A PROCESS
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UNDERWAY OF LOOKING AT PROBLEMS AND DOING SOMETHING ABOUT IT. THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF

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CHINA TO THE UNITED STATES WHO CAME -- LITERALLY CAME HERE AFTER MY VISIT TO CHINA -- BUT WHO HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AND WHO TOOK PART IN ALL THE MEETINGS I HAD IN CHINA -- I THINK HE'S DONE A VERY EFFECTIVE JOB IN WASHINGTON AND THAT'S BEEN HELPFUL. HE'S A TOP PERSON.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WE ALL REMEMBER THAT THE VISIT THAT WAS ANTICIPATED WAS THAT OF THE PREMIER WHO, IT WAS SAID, WOULD COME SOMETIME THIS YEAR. DOES THIS SUGGEST THAT HE WILL NOT COME THIS YEAR? THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS COMING, AND WHY THE FOREIGN MINISTER RATHER THAN THE PREMIER?

SHULTZ: WELL, THE PREMIER HAS BEEN INVITED AND HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE AND THE QUESTION OF WHEN HE WILL COME HAS YET TO BE DETERMINED. I DON'T THINK THE VISIT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER IS IN ANY SENSE A SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT OR ANYTHING OF THAT KIND. THE VISIT OF THE PREMIER REMAINS IN EXACTLY THE SITUATION IT WAS AND WE ARE DISCUSSING POSSIBLE DATES.

THANK YOU.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: JOINT INDO-US PRESS BRIEFING

FOLLOWING IS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF A JOINT PRESS BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUGHES AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN MANI SHANKAR AIYAR. BRIEFING WAS HELD IN NEW DELHI AT 1730 LOCAL TIME, JUNE 30.

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BEGIN TEXT: WE'RE WELCOMING TO THIS JOINT BRIEFING

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TODAY MR. JOHN HUGHES WHO IS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. MR. HUGHES IS REALLY NO STRANGER, EITHER TO YOUR PROFESSION OR TO THIS COUNTRY. HE STARTED HIS CAREER AS A NEWSPAPERMAN, HE WAS CORRESPONDENT FOR THE "CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR" IN ASIA, BASED IN HONG KONG FROM 1964 TO 1970 AND AFTER THAT HE WAS EDITOR OF THE "CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR," FROM WHERE HE WENT ON TO BECOME THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY AND THEN DIRECTOR OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA, AND IS NOW THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS. HE IS, THEREFORE, A FAR MORE DISTINGUISHED PERSON THAN I AM, BUT WE ARE DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU HERE, SIR, AND IT IS MY EARNEST HOPE THAT MOST OF YOUR QUESTIONS WILL BE DIRECTED TO HIM RATHER THAN TO ME.

HUGHES: I THINK IT'S ALL GONE VERY WELL UP TO NOW AND WE SHOULD LEAVE....

M.S. AIYAR: THIS MORNING SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ RETURNED FROM AGRA, AND SOON AFTER HIS RETURN FROM AGRA, ACCOMPANIED BY MRS. SHULTZ, HE CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA, GIANI ZAIL SINGH. AFTER THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, MR. NARASIMHA RAO. THEY WERE TOGETHER FOR ABOUT AN HOUR TETE-A-TETE, AND THEN THEY JOINED THEIR AIDES, BECAUSE THE AIDES IN THE MEANWHILE WERE SITTING IN THE COMMITTEE ROOM OF THE MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DRINKING COFFEE. THE TWO MINISTERS JOINED THEIR AIDES AND THAT'S WHEN WE HAD PLENARY TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO DELEGATIONS. THOSE PLENARY TALKS

LASTED FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, FROM QUARTER PAST TWELVE TO QUARTER PAST ONE.

AT THOSE TALKS THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS FIRST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN HIM AND MR. SHULTZ WOULD BE POSITIVE. MR. SHULTZ, IN HIS REPLY, EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION OF THE SPIRIT IN WHICH HE HAD BEEN RECEIVED AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF PRESIDENT REAGAN. HE COMMENDED THE SPIRIT, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE

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PREPARATIONS THAT HAD BEEN MADE FOR HIS VISIT AS WELL AS IN TERMS OF THE WELCOME HE HAD RECEIVED HERE IN INDIA.

HE DESCRIBED AS AN EXTRAORDINARY EXPERIENCE THE OPPORTUNITY THAT HAD BEEN AFFORDED HIM TO SEE THE TAJ MAHAL, WHICH HE SAID WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THE MAGNIFICENCE THAT INDIA CAN PRODUCE. MR. SHULTZ THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SPIRIT THAT HE HAD SENSED WAS THE SPIRIT WHICH HE AND HIS DELEGATION HAD BROUGHT TO INDIA. HE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES REGARDS ITS RELATIONS WITH INDIA AS A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. HE SAID THAT IT WAS A POWERFUL POINT THAT INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTED THE TWO LARGEST DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD. HE SAID THAT A STRONG, UNIFIED, DEMOCRATIC INDIA WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, THAT THIS WAS GOOD FOR INDIA, GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES AND GOOD FOR THE WORLD. HE SUMMED UP THE UNITED STATES' OBJECTIVES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH INDIA AS ONE OF WORKING TOWARDS A WARM, COOPERATIVE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIP.

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THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MINISTERS CONTINUED OVER A WORKING LUNCH. THEY WERE THEN TOGETHER FOR THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION MINUTES. SECRETARY SHULTZ THEN WENT TO SEE THE PRIME MINISTER AT 4:00 P.M. THEY WERE TOGETHER FOR AN HOUR AND A QUARTER AND AT 5:15 P.M. WERE JOINED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDIA AND HIS AIDES ON THE ONE HAND AND BY SECRETARY SHULTZ'S AIDES ON THE OTHER. THAT MEETING IS STILL CONTINUING.

SO, IN EFFECT, THE TWO SIDES HAVE BEEN TALKING TOGETHER ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE ABOUT 10:30 THIS MORNING. I DON'T KNOW HOW LONG THE TALKS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WILL CONTINUE, BUT THEN THEY'LL BE ONCE AGAIN RESUMED WHEN THEY MEET OVER DINNER. AND THUS, THE TWO MINISTERS ARE HAVING AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH EACH OTHER ALL MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THIS INTENSIVE SCHEDULE OF TALKS HAS ENABLED THEM TO COVER A VERY WIDE GROUND.
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AMONG THE SUBJECTS THAT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED, SOME

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TOUCHED UPON, SOME DEALT WITH IN GREATER DETAIL, ARE BILATERAL INDO-U.S. RELATIONS, THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF WHICH HAVE BEEN TOCHED UPON IN THE REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION. SINCE YOU HAVE IT BEFORE YOU, IT'S ALREADY BEEN CIRCULATED, THE TWO SPEECHES MADE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF INDIA AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ. (THE UNITED STATES SIDE IS TAKING CARE OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S SPEECH SO YOU'LL GET THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE EVENING. WE EXPECT TO GET IT OUT TO YOU SOMETIME, SOMETIME JUST NOW. MR. PISTOR HAS BEEN INVOLVED WITH ALL OF US SO PERHAPS IT'S NOT KNOWN IMMEDIATELY, BUT I'LL TRY AND LET YOU KNOW BEFORE WE FINISH HERE.)
WE CAN SHARE WITH YOU FURTHER DETAILS TO THE EXTENT THAT THERE IS AN INTEREST IN THE PRESS FOR THESE DETAILS ABOUT WHAT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED IN THE JOINT COMMISSION IN REGARD TO BILATERAL INDIA-U.S. RELATIONS.

DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALSO TAKEN PLACE ON MATTERS THAT HAVE NOT PERHAPS BEEN STRICTLY DEALT WITH WITHIN THE JOINT COMMISSION RELATING TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, BOTH IN THE ECONOMIC AND IN OTHER SPHERES. THEN THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL ECONOMIC INTEREST, WHICH ARE BEING DEALT WITH IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS. AND FINALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSIONS ON PARTICULAR INTERNAIONAL MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES. IN THE LATTER CATEGORY, I MIGHT PERHAPS VERY BRIEFLY MENTION TO YOU, THE INCLUDE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST TSIA, THE QUESION OF AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND IN THAT CONTEXT THE QUESTION OF ARMS REDUCTION, CENTRAL AMERICA AND OTHER MATTERS.

WE MIGHT PERHAPS BE IN A POSITION TO SHARE A FEW MORE THE MOMENT I WOULD LIKE TO REST MY OPENING STATEMENT THERE, BUT BEFORE WE INVITE QUESTIONS FROM ALL OF YOU, THERE'S A RATHER IMPORTANT STATEMENT WHICH MR. JOHN , HUGHES HAS TO MAKE AND PERHAPS HE COULD MAKE THAT FIRST AND THEN WE'LL ENTERTAIN QUESTIONS. MR. HUGHES.

HUGHES: WELL, THANK YOU MANI. I THINK FIRST OF ALL I WOULD LIKE TO SAY ON A PERSONAL LEVEL, HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE MR. AIYAR'S KIND WORDS AT THE BEGINNING OF

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THE SESSION, AND AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL, I'D JUST LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION TO THE INDIAN SPOKESMAN FOR SUGGESTING THIS JOINT BRIEFING WITH THE AMERICAN SPOKESMAN.

YOU'VE HAD A RUNDOWN FROM MR. ARVIND DEO AND I'M NOT SURE I CAN ADD TOO MUCH TO THAT. AS YOU KNOW, THE SECRETARY WAS AT AGRA LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING AND, I THINK WAS REALLY VERY MUCH IMPRESSED BY THE TAJ. HE'S TALKED ABOUT IT QUITE A BIT TODAY TO HIS INDIAN COLLEAGUES -- HE SAW IT IN THE MOONLIGHT LAST NIGHT, HE SAW IT AT DAWN THIS MORNING AND OBVIOUSLY IT MADE A BIG IMPRESSION ON HIM.

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HE CALLED ON PRESIDENT SINGH THIS MORNING; THAT WAS LARGELY A COURTESY CALL, BUT I UNDERSTAND THAT BOTH OF THEM EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE STRONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES IS IMPORTANT FOR BOTH SIDES.

AS MR. AIYAR HAS SAID, HE THEN WENT INTO A ONE-ON-ONE SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, AT WHICH THEY DISCUSSED THE AGENDA FOR THE SECRETARY'S STAY HERE AND ALSO ON A NUMBER OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. AT 12:15 THEY WENT INTO THE LARGER MEETING. AGAIN THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIA WHICH AS MR. AIYAR SAID WE REPRESENT BETWEEN US THE TWO LARGEST DEMOCRACIES. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THE IMPORTANT WORK OF OUR JOINT COMMISSION IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE, COMMERCE, CULTURE AND THEN A FAIRLY EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON U.S. - U.S.S.R.
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RELATIONS. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED OUR POSTURE TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION. HE OUTLINED THE BASIC PREMISES OF

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THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION POLICY, NAMELY FIRST BE STRONG IN TERMS OF MILITARY STRENGTH, IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND INDEED, HE MENTIONED TODAY, SPIRITUAL STRENGTH, A KIND OF SELF-CONFIDENCE TO BE REALISTIC, BE REALISTIC IN APPRAISING THE SOVIETS, BE REALISTIC IN APPRAISING OURSELVES AND THREE, BE REASONABLE IN WORKING WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE TENSIONS. THERE WAS AN OUTLINE OF THE TALKS WE ARE HAVING WITH THE SOVIETS IN VARIOUS FORA, AND HOW THOSE TALKS ARE GOING. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSITION IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AND THEN, AS MR. AIYAR SAID, SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA.

AND AT THE END OF THAT MORNING SESSION, THE UNITED STATES RELEASED -- OR IS RELEASING I SHOULD SAY, NOW -- A STATEMENT THAT EMERGED FROM THOSE MEETINGS. THE STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE UNITED STATES' SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE INDIAN MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TODAY DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF SAFET-RELATED SPARE PARTS FOR TARAPUR. BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA ARE CONCERNED FOR THE OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF THE REACTORS AND FOR THE HEALTH OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE PLANT AND FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE COMMUNITY IN WHICH THEY OPERATE.

INSOFAR AS THE NEED FOR REPLACEMENT PARTS TO ENSURE THESE OBJECTIVES IS CONCERNED, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY ACTIONS TO SUPPLY THOSE PARTS WHICH ARE NOT AVAILABLE FROM ELSEWHERE. THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA SHARES THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES THAT THIS PROBLEM CAN BE SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. THAT'S THE END OF THAT STATEMENT.

AFTER THAT THE SECRETARY HAD LUNCH WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER MR. RAO, WITH THE FINANCE MINISTER MR. MUKHERJEE, MR. JHA, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMS COMMISSION, MR. ALEXANDER, THE PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, AMBASSADR NARAYANAN, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY MR. RASGOTRA AND MR. CHANDARI, THE SECRETARY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND DR. SETHNA, THE

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CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. AFTER THAT HE WENT TO THE MEETING OF THE INDO-U.S. JOINT COMMISSION AND, AS MR. AIYER HAS SAID, YOU EITHER HAVE OR SHORTLY WILL HAVE THE STATEMENTS MADE THERE. HE THEN WENT INTO HIS ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. THAT WAS A MEETING WITH NO NOTE-TAKERS AND NO ASSISTANTS, NO AIDES. THAT LASTED FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES, IT'S JUST BEEN EXPANDED.

HE IS DUE TO HAVE A SECOND MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER THIS AFTERNOON ALTHOUGH I'M NOT QUITE SURE HOW THAT WILL FARE GIVEN THE WAY THE SCHEDULE IS SLIPPING. THE CONCENTRATION IN THAT MEETING WAS EXPECTED TO BE THE MIDDLE EAST. AS I SAY I'M NOT QUITE SURE WHETHER THAT MEETING WILL BE FOLDED INTO THE MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

ANOTHER EVENT HAS BEEN ADDED TO TOMORROW'S SCHEDULE. HE WILL HAVE TEA WITH PRIME MINISTER GANDHI AT 6:30 *TOMORROW. IN TERMS OF HIS SCHEDULE HE IS GOING TO A*

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DINNER TONIGHT HOSTED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER. IN TERMS OF TOMORROW, IN THE MORNING HE WILL LAY A WREATH AT THE RAJGHAT MEMORIAL, HE WILL VISIT THE VICE PRESIDENT, HE WILL HAVE LUNCH WITH A NUMBER OF PROMINENT ECONOMISTS, HE WILL HAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE AT 3 O'CLOCK IN THE AFTERNOON, THAT'S IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE ROOM AT THE MAURYA SHERATON HOTEL, AND IN THE EVENING HE WILL HAVE A DINNER, HE WILL BE A GUEST AT A DINNER HOSTED BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO INDIA AND MRS. BARNES. I THINK THAT'S ABOUT ALL WE HAVE FOR YOU AND SO I WILL RETURN THE MICROPHONE TO MR. AIYAR. END PART ONE. MORE TO COME. SHULTZ

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SECTO

STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS, DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN, USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON, P/RM, P/P, P/PFF, P/FW, P/FN, P/PFO MC KAY/CARL, B/BF, B/BXN, NEA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD, USIA ADVISER, MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: JOINT INDO-U.S. PRESS BRIEFING

FOLLOWING IS THE SECOND PART OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF A JOINT PRESS BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUGHES AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN MANI SHANKAR AIYAR. BRIEFING WAS HELD IN NEW DELHI AT 1730 LOCAL TIME, JUNE 30.

BEGIN TEXT (PART TWO): Q: MR. HUGHES, IS YOUR STATEMENT, OR MR. SHULTZ'S STATEMENT ABOUT REACTOR PARTS MEAN THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND SOME CONVENIENTLY AND MUTUALLY AGREEABLE THIRD COUNTRY WILL SUPPLY THE PARTS, OR DOES IT MEAN THAT THE SECRETARY HAS DECIDED, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED TO NOT TAKE THE ADVICE OF A NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC SENATORS WHO SAY IT VIOLATES THE LAW, OR IS THE ADMINISTRATION WILLING TO DO IT, AND SEE THE SUPPLY OF PARTS CHALLENGED IN CONGRESS? WHAT ABOUT THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION? OR HAS THE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM BEEN SUBORDINATED NOW TO A SAFETY PROBLEM OR WHAT? WHAT IS THE THINKING?

HUGHES: WELL, THE UNITED STATES' POLICY ON THE OVERALL QUESTION OF NONPROLIFERATION IS QUITE CLEAR, THERE REMAINS NO CHANGE IN THAT, BUT INSOFAR AS THESE PARTICULAR PARTS ARE CONCERNED THE PRESIDENT, THE ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE DECIDED TO TAKE THIS ACTION. THE ACTION IS QUITE CLEAR. INDIA WILL LOOK FOR THE APPROPRIATE PARTS THAT IT NEEDS ELSEWHERE. IF THOSE PARTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE, THOSE PARTS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE IN THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE UNITED STATES, AND CANNOT BE ACQUIRED ELSEWHERE, THE PRESIDENT INTENDS TO TAKE THE ACTION THAT WOULD MAKE THOSE PARTS AVAILABLE TO INDIA.

Q: WHAT DETERMINES IF THEY ARE NOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE. IS IT TIME, IS THERE A DEADLINE WHEN THOSE ARE OR NOT AVAILABLE?

HUGHES: I DON'T KNOW IF THERE'S A DEADLINE ON DETERMINING WHEN THOSE PARTS ARE AVAILABLE. THERE HAS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, ALREADY BEEN CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA AND INDEED A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES. IT'S NOT AS THOUGH THIS RESEARCH INTO THE AVAILABILITY OF PARTS IS STARTING FROM SCRATCH NOW, THAT RESEARCH, AS I UNDERSTAND, HAS BEEN GOING ON. I CAN'T GIVE YOU A TIMETABLE ON WHEN.

Q: WOULD YOU SAY NOW THOSE SPARE PARTS ARE AVAILABLE

FROM A THIRD COUNTRY?

HUGHES: I DON'T KNOW. I THINK THAT THAT EXAMINATION WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE. AS I SAY IT HAS BEEN GOING ON AND I ASSUME WILL CONTINUE TO GO ON. THE ANSWER -- IF YOU ARE SAYING DO WE YET KNOW WHETHER SPECIFIC PARTS WILL BE SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES -- I THINK THE ANSWER TO THAT IS NO. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT ALL THE PARTS MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS SAYING IS IF THOSE PARTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE, THE PRESIDENT WILL TAKE THE ACTION WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE.

Q: WHAT IN THE U.S. SPOKESMAN'S VIEW IS GOING TO BE THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION OF SPARE PARTS TO REPAIRING INDO-U.S. RELATIONS -- THAT WAS THE QUESTION.

HUGHES: WELL, I THINK NEITHER MR. AIYAR NOR MYSELF CAN GIVE YOU ANY DETAILS OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY BECAUSE IT'S STILL GOING ON. THAT'S THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION.

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INSOFAR AS OVERALL U.S.-INDO RELATIONS ARE CONCERNED, I THINK WE WILL SEE AS THIS VISIT MOVES ALONG. WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH OUR UPS AND DOWNS IN THIS RELATIONSHIP. I THINK THE RELATIONSHIP WAS IMPROVED BY MRS. GANDHI'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES ABOUT A YEAR AGO, AND I SEE ALL KINDS OF STORIES IN THE NEWSPAPERS SUGGESTING THAT IT WILL BE, THE RELATIONSHIP WILL BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT HERE.

THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN VARIOUS AREAS, THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY MANY COMMON BONDS BETWEEN US. WE DO HAVE THIS GREAT DEMOCRATIC HERITAGE AND I THINK THAT COUNTS FOR A GREAT DEAL. THERE'S A GREAT FLOW BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES. I UNDERSTAND THERE ARE SOMEWHERE AROUND 400,000 OR 500,000 INDIANS NOW RESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES, AND I THINK THE UNITED STATES SENDS ABOUT 90,000 TOURISTS A YEAR TO INDIA. I THINK THAT ABOUT 70,000 INDIANS WENT TO THE UNITED STATES ON TEMPORARY VISAS LAST YEAR. SO

THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF REASONS WHY THAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE STRONG.

RANJAN GUPTA: YES. I'D LIKE TO ASK THE AMERICAN SPOKESMAN. YOU MENTIONED ABOUT LOOKING FOR SPARE PARTS ELSEWHERE. HAS THE UNITED STATES TOLD INDIA WHERE IT CAN FIND THESE SPARE PARTS AND DOES IT CAUSE ANY CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES THAT SOME OF THE COUNTRIES MENTIONED HAVEPLANTS WHICH HAVE CLOSED DOWN AND THEREFORE SPARE PARTS AVAILABLE MAY BE OBSOLETE, AND HENCE THE DANGER TO RADIATION WOULD CONTINUE.

HUGHES: I REALLY CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION BECAUSE YOU GO BEYOND MY OWN KNOWLEDGE. AS I SAY, I KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN CONSULTATION. I KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN AND, I'M SURE, WILL CONTINUE TO BE HELPFUL IN POINTING TO OTHER SOURCES, BUT JUST WHAT COUNTRIES ARE INVOLVED AND SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE SPARES AVAILABLE, I'M AFRAID I THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION OF SPARE PARTS TO REPAIRING INDO-U.S. RELATIONS -- THAT WAS THE QUESTION.

HUGHES: WELL, I THINK NEITHER MR. AIYAR NOR MYSELF CAN GIVE YOU ANY DETAILS OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE SECRETARY BECAUSE IT'S STILL GOING ON. THAT'S THE SIMPLE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION.

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THE QUALITY OF THE SPARES AVAILABLE, I'M AFRAID I CANNOT ANSWER BECAUSE I DO NOT KNOW.

L.K. SHARMA: WHAT PRECISELY IS THE U.S. ROLE IN FACILITATING THIS DELIVERY FROM THE THIRD COUNTRIES? IS IT JUST A HELPFUL SUGGESTION OR WOULD YOU GO BEYOND THAT? AND NUMBER TWO, IF CONGRESS DOES NOT APPROVE OF THE U.S. ITSELF SUPPLYING THE SPARE PARTS WHAT DOES THE ADMINISTRATION INTEND TO DO?

HUGHES: WELL, ON THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, I THINK IT'S BASICALLY CONSULTATION, I THINK, THE UNITED STATES MAKING AVAILABLE ITS EXPERTISE ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF THE PARTS. OBVIOUSLY INDIA HAS EXPERTISE AS WELL, AND, I THINK, IT'S PROBABLY AN EXCHANGE OF IDEAS. AS TO THE SECOND PART OF YOUR QUESTION, I DON'T THINK I'M GOING TO GO BEYOND OUR

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STATEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS FIRM IN HIS DECISION TO MOVE FORWARD IN THIS WAY, BUT I'M NOT GOING TO SPECIFY HOW, WHAT HIS STRATEGY WILL BE AND HOW HE WILL APPROACH THE QUESTION IN TERMS OF CONGRESS.

BILL CLAIBORNE: WERE THERE ANY DISCUSSIONS ABOUT CONCESSIONAL FUNDING FROM INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AGENCIES, SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK?

HUGHES: THERE WAS SOME GENERAL DISCUSSION AT LUNCH, AND IT'S CONCEIVABLE THAT THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SOME DISCUSSION IN SOME OF THE OTHER MEETINGS, BUT THERE CERTAINLY WAS SOME GENERAL ECONOMIC DISCUSSION AT LUNCH.

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Q: CAN YOU CHARACTERIZE A LITTLE BIT MORE?

HUGHES: WELL, I THINK IT BASICALLY WAS AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IT WAS A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

AIYAR: CAN I JUST ADD TO THAT. MR. NARASIMHA, OUR SECRETARY ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WAS PRESENT AT THE LUNCHEON MEETING, SO WAS MR. L.K. JHA, AND THAT CONSTITUTES A FAIRLY FORMIDABLE ECONOMIC TEAM ON THE INDIAN SIDE. IT WAS EXPLAINED TO US AT THE PLENARY TALKS THAT ECONOMIC EXPERTS AS SUCH WERE NOT PRESENT IN MR. SHULTZ'S DELEGATION. THEREFORE THE PURPOSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS WAS NOT ONE THAT WAS DESIGNED TO ARRIVE AT AGREEMENTS HERE AND NOW SO MUCH AS TO CLARIFY TO THE UNITED STATES INDIA'S CONCERNS, AND ON THE INDIAN SIDE TO TRY TO UNDERSTAND

WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS IN RESPECT OF THESE ISSUES. THE TWO MAJOR ISSUES BEFORE US ARE IN REGARD TO THE IBRD. THERE IS THE FULFILLMENT OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN REGARD TO IDA-VI AND SUBSEQUENT TO THAT WHAT POSITION THE UNITED STATES WILL TAKE ON IDA-VII, AND IN THIS GENERAL CONTEXT THE QUESTION OF THE INDIAN SHARE OF IDA FUNDS.

AND THERE'S ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED STATES' ATTITUDE TO AN INDIAN REQUEST FOR BORROWING TWO BILLION DOLLARS FROM THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK IN TRANCHES OF 500 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR OVER FOUR YEARS FROM THE GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE THAT IS TAKING EFFECT IN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

ALSO OF COURSE WITHIN THIS, APART FROM THE TWO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, THERE ARE PROPOSALS REGARDING MONETARY REFORM. THE REFERENCE IS TO THE CALL GIVEN BY THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES AT THE LAST SUMMIT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MONEY AND FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT, AS WELL AS THE DISCUSSIONS IN THIS REGARD THAT TOOK PLACE AT THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT. SO THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT DO REFLECT UPON THE BILATERAL INDO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP IN REGARD TO DISCUSSIONS TAKING PLACE IN MULTILATERAL FORUMS. AND THERE IS ALSO THE BILATERAL INDO-U.S. RELATIONSHIP. SO THESE QUESTIONS WERE DISCUSSED IN THE LIGHT OF ATTEMPTING TO EXPLAIN INDIAN CONCERNS TO THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA ATTEMPTING TO UNDERSTAND THE UNITED STATES' POSITION ON THESE ISSUES.

Q: DID SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPOND TO MRS. GANDHI'S

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APPEAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE? DID SHE GET ANY SATISFACTORY ANSWER?

AIYAR: I CAN'T ANSWER THAT BECAUSE THE TALKS ARE STILL GOING ON. YOU KNOW THERE ARE TALKS STILL GOING ON BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ. SO I CAN'T TELL YOU WHAT'S HAPPENING THERE. WHAT I CAN SAY IS THAT IN THE TALKS THAT TOOK PLACE EARLIER IN THE DAY, WE HAVE HAD AN ASSESSMENT FROM SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ OF THE MAJOR MATTERS THAT CAME UP AT THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR MONEY AND DEVELOPMENT, WHICH WAS AN ISSUE THAT WAS RAISED AT THAT SUMMIT. END PART TWO. MORE TO COME. SHULTZ

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SECTO

STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS, DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN, USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON, P/RM, P/P, P/PFF, P/FW, P/FN, P/PFO MC KAY/CARL, B/BF, B/BXN, NEA CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD, USIA ADVISER, MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: JOINT INDO-U.S. PRESS BRIEFING

FOLLOWING IS THE THIRD PART OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF A JOINT PRESS BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUGHES AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN MANI SHANKAR AIYAR. BRIEFING WAS HELD IN NEW DELHI AT 1730 LOCAL TIME, JUNE 30.

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BEGIN TEXT (PART THREE):

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Q: WHAT WAS THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REACTION TO INDIA'S DEMAND FOR (REST OF THE QUESTION INAUDIBLE).

AIYAR: HE EXPLAINED HIS POSITION. AS I SAID, IF THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE HAD BEEN TO CLINCH TH ISSUE NOW WE'D HAVE PUSHED IT FURTHER, BUT WHAT WE WERE ATTEMPTING TO DO HERE WAS TO CLARIFY EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS.
Q: I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW FROM THE AMERICAN SPOKESMAN WHAT EXACTLY IS THE POSITION OF THE INDO-U.S. AGREEMENT OF 1963? IS THERE ANY OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUPPLY THE SPARE PARTS. NUMBER TWO, IN CASE THE UNITED STATES AGREES TO SUPPLY THESE SPARE PARTS, WHAT IS THE CONDITION ON THE SUPPLY OF NON-AVAILABLE SPARE PARTS.

HUGHES: YOU'VE CAST YOUR QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAS AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPLY THESE SPARE PARTS. WITHOUT SEEKING TO DUCK THAT QUESTION, I DON'T KNOW ABOUT THE LEGALITY, THE FACT IS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS FIRM IN HIS DECISION THAT HE IS GOING TO MOVE FORWARD, THAT THIS IS WHAT HE WANTS TO DO. HAVING CONSIDERED IT, HE THINKS THIS IS RIGHT AND THIS IS WHAT HE IS GOING TO DO. INSOFAR AS THE OTHER COUNTRIES, YES, THERE CERTAINLY IS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT INDIA WILL LOOK FOR THESE SPARE PARTS ELSEWHERE. THAT IS QUITE CLEAR, AND AS I SAID, IT MAY WELL BE THAT ALL OF THE PARTS ARE AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE. IF THAT IS THE CASE THEN THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT SUPPLY ANY. SHOULD THOSE PARTS NOT BE AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE, AND THEY ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT HAS

MADE CLEAR THAT HE INTENDS TO TAKE THE KINDS OF ACTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE. THE STATEMENT STANDS BY ITSELF, THERE WERE NO OTHER OBLIGATIONS OR PROMISES OR CONCESSIONS OR AGREEMENTS. IT'S A STATEMENT THAT STANDS BY ITSELF.

Q: SECOND PART OF THE QUESTION WAS ON THE QUESTION OF SPENT FUELS.

HUGHES: YES, I'M AFRAID I SIMPLY CANNOT ANSWER THAT

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QUESTION BECAUSE I'M NOT SUFFICIENTLY INFORMED ON THE ANSWER.

JOHN DAYAL: COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER THE ISSUE OF PAKISTAN WAS DISCUSSED IN TALKS TODAY MORNING AND IN THE AFTERNOON? THE INDIAN STAND ON THE ARMING OF PAKISTAN IS WELL KNOWN AND I PRESUME THAT THE SAME STANCE WAS MAINTAINED AT THE TALKS TODAY.

HUGHES: WELL, I DON'T EVER WANT TO SPEAK FOR ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AND THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT. I DON'T RECALL A SPECIFIC EXCHANGE ON THAT POINT, BUT THE UNITED STATES' POSITION IS QUITE CLEAR. WE EXPECT AND HOPE THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN, AND WE WILL DETERMINE OUR POLICIES TOWARDS BOTH COUNTRIES AND THAT INVOLVES DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS ON THE BASIS OF EACH COUNTRY'S NEEDS.

Q: INDIA MAINTAINS THIS ARMING OF PAKISTAN IS NOT DIRECTED TOWARDS LARGE COUNTRIES LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, BUT COULD BE TURNED AGAINST IT (INDIA).

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HUGHES: YES, I DID NOT HEAR ANY DISCUSSION TODAY CONCERNING UITED STATES' MILITARY AID PROGRAM, OR SUCH AS IT MIGHT BE, TO PAKISTAN.

Q: JOHN, IF IT'S STILL NECESSARY THAT THESE NUCLEAR, THESE SPARE PARTS BE OBTAINED FOR THIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, WHY WON'T THE UNITED STATES SUPPLY THEM UP FRONT? AND, DID THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT PROVIDE ANY SORT OF REASSURANCES THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE CAN TAKE BACK TO WASHINGTON TO CALL OFF SOME OF THE OPPOSITION IN CONGRESS?

HUGHES: WELL, THE SECOND PART OF THE QUESTION FIRST. AS I SAID EARLIER THE STATEMENT STANDS BY ITSELF AND I THINK IT'S QUITE EXPLICIT ON WHAT TRANSPIRED. INSOFAR AS THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION IS CONCERNED, THERE ARE SOME LEGAL RESTRAINTS UPON THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH NONPROLIFERATION, AND I THINK THAT THAT
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EXPLAINS WHY WE ARE SUGGESTING THAT THOSE PARTS COME FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FIRST, IF THAT IS POSSIBLE.

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Q: WELL, IF THERE ARE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS HOW CAN WE ASSURE INDIA THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY THESE PARTS?

HUGHES: WELL, WHAT WE'RE ASSURING INDIA IS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS GOING TO TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION. THE ACTION THAT HE WILL TAKE INSOFAR AS CONGRESS IS CONCERNED REMAINS FOR HIM TO ANNOUNCE.

Q: WHAT CONCERNS DOES YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE ABOUT THE VAST BUILDUP OF ARMS, AMERICAN ARMS TO PAKISTAN AND THE LONG-TERM SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN?

AIYAR: INSOFAR AS ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN IS CONCERNED, WHAT THE MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TOLD HIS U.S. COUNTERPART IS A REITERATION OF POSITIONS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED IN THE PAST. INSOFAR AS THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN IS CONCERNED, THE POSITION AGAIN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS BEEN REITERATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AND I WOULD DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH OF THE NONALIGNED DECLARATION ON THE QUESTION OF AFGHANISTAN AT THE LAST SUMMIT.

Q: THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION ABOUT....

AIYAR: NO, THE POSITIONS WERE AGAIN EXPLAINED, THEY WERE TOUCHED UPON, THIS IS ONE OF MANY ISSUES THAT WERE TALKED OF. IT WAS NOT A MAJOR FOCUS OF ATTENTION, BUT IT WAS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS THAT WAS TOUCHED UPON IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSION. SO WHAT WAS STATED TO THE UNITED STATES' SECRETARY OF STATE WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE

POSITIONS WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN ON BOTH THESE QUESTIONS IN THE PAST.

Q: YOU SAID HE SPOKE OF TWO THINGS.

AIYAR: THE SECOND THING WAS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN.

Q: WAS AFGHANISTAN A FOCUS OF DISCUSSION?

AIYAR: NO, IT WASN'T A FOCUS OF DISCUSSION. IT WAS ONE OF THE SUBJECTS THAT WAS DISCUSSED.

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Q: YOU MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS DISCUSSION ON INDIA'S NONALIGNED PROPOSAL FOR THIS CONFERENCE ON MONEY, INTERNATIONAL MONEY AND FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT. I'D LIKE TO KNOW WHAT THE U.S. POSITION ON THAT CONFERENCE IS AND ALSO WHAT THE POSITION IS ON THE INDIAN PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT LEVEL TYPE MEETING AT THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMING UP?

HUGHES: I DO NOT RECALL ANY DISCUSSION WHICH MIGHT, I SUPPOSE LUNCH WOULD HAVE BEEN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR IT, BUT I DO NOT RECALL ANY DISCUSSION SPECIFICALLY ON THE MONETARY CONFERENCE THAT YOU MENTION. INSOFAR AS THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE IS CONCERNED, I THINK THE UNITED STATES' POSITION WOULD BE THAT IT IS FOR THE KIND OF ACTIVITY THAT PRODUCES STABILITY AND PEACE BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT PROPOSALS FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE AND THINK THROUGH THE PROCESS UNDER WHICH SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE ORGANIZED TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD OFFER THE KIND OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT WOULD FULFILL THIS GOAL.

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Q: ARE THERE ANY HEALTH PROBLEMS WITH THE EMPLOYEES AND RESIDENTS...?

HUGHES: NO, NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. I SHOULD LET COLLEAGUES SPEAK ON THIS. I DON'T WANT TO MISLEAD YOU INTO THINKING THAT THERE IS SOME PROBLEM HERE. I AM TALKING ABOUT FUTURE PROSPECTS. OBVIOUSLY, IF YOU ARE NOT ABLE TO RUN THIS KIND OF INSTITUTION EFFECTIVELY, IT COULD SOMETIME IN THE FUTURE BE DANGEROUS. I THINK THAT'S THE POINT I'M TRYING TO MAKE.

I CANNOT ANSWER THE LAST PART OF THE QUESTION AND I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT SPECIFIC DANGERS, I JUST REITERATE WHAT I SAID. IF YOU DON'T, EVEN A NEWSPAPER PLANT, IF YOU DON'T RUN IT EFFICIENTLY AND YOU DON'T PUT THE SPARE PARTS IN IT, IT CAN GET OUT OF HAND AND BECOME DANGEROUS TO THEPEOPLE WHO RUN IT.

Q: (INAUDIBLE).
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HUGHES: THIS IS A QUESTION ABOUT CENTRAL AMERICA, WHAT

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WAS THE BASIS FOR THE DISCUSSION OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND WHO BROUGHT IT UP. THE SECRETARY OF STATE BROUGHT IT UP, SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE AMERICAN POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WHICH HE DID. AGAIN I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK FOR INDIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BUT I THINK I COULD SAY THAT IT WAS A WORTHWHILE DISCUSSION, AND THE CLARIFICATION WHICH THE SECRETARY OFFERED CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES' CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY WAS VERY WELL RECEIVED AND APPRECIATED.

I'M SUGGESTING THAT THERE MAY WELL BE IMPRESSIONS ABROAD OF U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA WHICH ARE MISLEADING AND INCORRECT. I'M SUGGESTING THAT THE SSECRETARY WAS INTERESTED IN CORRECTING ANY SUCH MISIMPRESSIONS, AND THAT HE DID SO.

AIYAR: WELL, THEONLY BLANK THAT I COULD FILL IN IS THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER, IN A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THIS, AFTER THE EXPOSE WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAD GIVEN, REFERRED TO THE NONALIGNED POSITION ON CENTRAL AMERICA AS SET OUT IN THE NAM DECLARATION.

THE QUESTION ASKED WAS, WHAT IS THE INDIAN REACTION TO THE STATEMENT AND I STARTED SAYING AND AM NOW GOING TO SAY IT, THAT WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.
Q: IS IT THE INDIAN IMPRESSION THAT INDIA IS READY TO HAVE AN OPEN-ENDED ARRANGEMENT ON THE SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS? OR IS THERE A TIMETABLE THAT YOU CAN TELL US?

AIYAR: WE DON'T ENTERTAIN YOUR APPREHENSIONS. WE

EXPECT THAT AS SOON AS THE MODALITIES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED WE WILL BE GETTING THE SPARE PARTS REQUIRED FROM SOURCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND *TO THE EXTENT THAT IT TURNS OUT THAT SOME SPARE PARTS* ARE NOT AVAILABLE EXCEPT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WE ARE PERSUADED THAT THE ACTIONS REFERRED TO IN THE STATEMENT READ BY MR. HUGHES WILL BE UNDERTAKEN WITH A DUE SENSE OF URGENCY.

Q: ON THE QUESTION OF PAKISTAN EXPLODING A NUCLEAR DEVICE, HAS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TAKEN NOTE OF IT

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AND WHAT IS THE IMPRESSION OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ABOUT THAT DEVICE AND WHETHER IT WILL NOW SOUR PAKISTAN-U.S. RELATIONS?

HUGHES: I'M FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF THIS TODAY BUT THE FACT IS THE UNITED STATES HAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF SUCH AN EXPLOSION.

END OF PART THREE. SHULTZ

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SECTO

STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS, DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN, USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON, P/RM, P/P, P/PFF, P/FW, P/FN, P/PFO MC KAY/CARL, B/BF, B/BXN, NEA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD, USIA ADVISER, MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: JOINT INDO-U.S. PRESS BRIEFING

FOLLOWING IS THE FOURTH AND FINAL PART OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF A JOINT PRESS BRIEFING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY HUGHES AND INDIAN MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN MANI SHANKAR AIYAR. BRIEFING WAS HELD IN NEW DELHI AT 1730 LOCAL TIME, JUNE 30.

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BEGIN TEXT (FINAL PART):

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AIYAR: I COULD GO ON ABOUT TWO HOURS ON THE GREAT ADVANCES THAT HAVE BEEN MADE IN EACH OF THESE SUBCOMMISSIONS. I AM PREPARED TO SWEAR YOU THAT, BUT I THINK BOTH MR. HUGHES AND I WOULD TOTALLY DISAGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT EITHER THE PROGRESS HAS BEEN NEGLIGIBLE OR THAT IT HAS BEEN DEADLY DULL. IN FACT IN EVERY ONE OF THE AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN TREATED BY THE SUBCOMMISSIONS OF THE JOINT COMMISSION, SIGNIFICIANT PROGRESS IS INCREASING, WHAT SECRETARY SHULTZ DESCRIBED TODAY, AS THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE TWO DEMOCRACIES HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT AND YOU HAVE ONLY TO GO THROUGH THE DETAILS TO FIND THAT, WHETHER IT IS IN REGARD TO TRADE, WHETHER IT IS IN REGARD TO THESE IMPORTANT SEMINARS THAT ARE TO BE HELD ON THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT IN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE NEHRU STUDIES PROGRAM, THE TRADE MISSIONS THAT ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN, THE PROPOSED TAX TREATY, THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON SCIENCE. THERE'S A WHOLE HOST OF SUBJECTS WHICH ARE OF GREAT RELEVANCE TO THE ORDINARY PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND INDIA, WHERE THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION IS OF SIGNIFICIANCE, AND IT'S REALLY THE MEANS THAT WE HAVE TO BUILD UPON THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO GREAT DEMOCRACIES.

Q: WERE THERE ANY NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES?

AIYAR: I THINK THE PURPOSE OF THE EXERCISE WAS NOT THE NARROWING OF THE DIFFERENCES AS AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE. IT WAS MORE A QUESTION OF ATTEMPTING TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHERS POSITIONS, AND IN THAT PROCESS

WHAT WAS DISCUSSED ON AFGHANISTAN, AS I SAID IT WASN'T A MAJOR FOCUS OF ATTENTION, SO THERE WERE REFERENCES MADE TO THE SUBJECT. AND IN REGARD TO THE ADB, THE POSITION IS AS I SAID EARLIER, THAT WE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OUR NEED TO SECURE THIS PARTICULAR LOAN. THE UNITED STATES' SECRETARY OF STATE WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ECONOMIC EXPERTS SO HE BROADLY STATED THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES. AND IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS OF THE RATIONALE FOR US TO BORROW FROM THE ADB

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WILL BE CARRIED BY MR. SHULTZ BACK TO WASHINGTON. AND HOPEFULLY, THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL, AS A RESULT, BE FAVORABLE TO THIS INDIAN REQUEST.

Q: HOW SOON DO YOU EXPECT TO RECEIVE SPARE PARTS FOR TARAPUR AND SECONDLY, COULD YOU ALSO BE PRECISE ABOUT HOW LONG THE REACTOR - THE TWO REACTORS CAN CONTINUE TO OPERATE BEFORE YOU RUN INTO SERIOUS SAFETY HAZARDS?

AIYAR: THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION IS VERY SOON.

Q: WHAT IS VERY SOON?
AIYAR: VERY SOON REALLY JUST MEANS VERY SOON. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEM HAS NOW BEEN RESOLVED. THERE ARE COMMERCIAL MODALITIES THAT HAVE TO BE COMPLETED. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO TELL YOU HOW LONG IT TAKES TO COMPLETE A COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATION, OPEN A LETTER OF CREDIT, GET THE STUFF SHIPPED OUT OR SENT OUT BY AIR. THIS WOULD ALSO OF COURSE VARY FROM ONE SPARE PART TO ANOTHER. SO IT WOULD NOT BE FAIR ON YOUR PART TO ASK ME TO SPECIFY VERY SOON IN TERMS OF DAYS OR WEEKS OR

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MONTHS. BUT WHAT WE DO EXPECT IS THAT NOW THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED, AND SINCE THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE AWARENESS IN INDIA OF WHAT OUR SPARE PART REQUIREMENTS ARE, INSOFAR AS WE ARE GOING TO PROCURE THEM FROM ELSEWHERE IT SHOULD TAKE PLACE VERY SOON. I CAN SEE NO GREAT DIFFICULTY NOW.

INSOFAR AS WE ARE NOT ABLE TO LOCATE A SPARE PART ELSEWHERE AND HAVE TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO PROCURE IT, HOW SOON IT COMES WOULD DEPEND UPON HOW QUICKLY THESE ACTIONS REFERRED TO IN MR. HUGHES' STATEMENT ARE TAKEN, AND WE DON'T ANTICIPATE ANY PROBLEMS IN THAT REGARD. SO WE THINK THAT WE WILL GET IT VERY SOON. I AGREE IT'S A VAGUE WORD IN TERMS OF DAYS OR MONTHS BUT IN TERMS OF A CONCEPT OF WHETHER IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME, TAKE A LONG TIME, TAKE A VERY, VERY LONG TIME, COME VERY SOON, I THINK IN RELATIVE TERMS IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT THESE TO COME VERY SOON. NOW, OF COURSE, THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN

RESOLVED, YOUR SECOND QUESTION, ABOUT HOW LONG IT WOULD BE BEFORE HEALTH HAZARDS BECAME APPARENT, SORT OF

RECEDES INTO THE REALM OF HYPOTHESIS. I DON'T THINK WE ARE GOING TO FACE THAT PROBLEM NOW BECAUSE WE ARE GOING *TO GET THE SPARE PARTS THAT WILL PREVENT HAZARDS FROM* OCCURRING IN THAT AREA.

Q: DOES AMERICA HAVE FRANCE IN MIND AS AN ALTERNATE SOURCE?

HUGHES: I JUST HONESTLY CANNOT ANSWER THE QUESTION BECAUSE I HAVEN'T BEEN INVOLVED WITH THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE BY EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES. I AM AFRAID I JUST CAN'T ANSWER YOUR QUESTION. I DON'T KNOW WHERE THE SEARCH HAS BEEN CONDUCTED.
Q: (INAUDIBLE).

AIYAR: THE QUESTION THAT WAS ASKED BY MR. L.P. SHRIVASTAV, IS CAN I NOT NAME THE COUNTRIES FROM WHICH THESE SPARE PARTS SUPPLIES WILL BE MADE. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO NAME THEM STRAIGHTAWAY BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY NOW THAT THE SOLUTION HAS BEEN FOUND, SEARCHES WHICH HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE IN OUR OWN MINDS WOULD GET TRANSLATED INTO THE MARKETPLACE. I DON'T KNOW WHICH ARE ALL THE SPARES THAT ARE REQUIRED. OBVIOUSLY THE BULK OF THE SUPPLIES WILL COME FROM WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BECAUSE THEY ARE THE ONES WHO ARE ADVANCED IN THIS PARTICULAR KIND OF TECHNOLOGY, AND WHICH ONES THEY ARE, AND WHETHER THEY WILL BE ONLY CONFINED TO WEST EUROPE, I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO TELL YOU JUST NOW. BUT WE'LL SEE AS GO ALONG.

Q: A NUMBER OF DAYS AGO, INDIAN OFFICIAL SOURCES CHARACTERIZED INDO-U.S. RELATIONS AS VERY GOOD, BUT THEY COULD BE BETTER. AFTER TODAY'S DISCUSSION HOW HAS THAT CHANGED AND WHAT FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THAT CHANGE?

AIYAR: THEY ARE GOOD, VERY GOOD, AND ARE BETTER.

Q: FOR WHAT REASON?

AIYAR: FOR THE REASON THAT IT IS AN IMPORTANT VISIT. WE'VE HAD AN EXTENSIVE TOUR-DE-HORIZONTE WITH THE

SECRETARY OF STATE, THAT'S CONTINUING. IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BE CONTINUED AS WE GO ALONG.

Q: IN ADDITION TO THIS MINOR QUESTION OF SPARES, IN THE OVERALL INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP, WAS THE ISSUE OF REPROCESSING ALSO BROUGHT UP BY THE INDIAN SIDE OR WILL IT TAKE ANOTHER U.S. PRESIDENTIAL VISIT HERE TO RESOLVE THAT MAJOR ISSUE?

HUGHES: IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY MEETING AT WHICH I WAS PRESENT. BUT OBVIOUSLY THERE WERE OTHER MEETINGS.

Q: (INAUDIBLE, ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS)

HUGHES: I DON'T SPEAK FOR THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT.
AIYAR: INSOFAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED WE LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST TO WHAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD TO TELL US ON THE SUBJECT, AND WE DID EXPLAIN THAT AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, AS WE HAVE PUT OUT IN SOME DETAIL IN THE

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NON-ALIGNED DECLARATION, WE ARE HOPING THAT WE'LL HAVE AN ARMS FREEZE, FOLLOWED BY ARMS REDUCTIONS, WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THE DETAILS OF THIS HAVE BEEN SPELLED OUT IN THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT DECLARATION.

Q: (INAUDIBLE, ABOUT TARAPUR).

AIYAR: YOU KNOW WE'VE BEEN ASKING FOR SPARES UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE 1963 TARAPUR AGREEMENT AND THAT PROBLEM HAS NOW BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. HAD IT NOT BEEN RESOLVED, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A HEALTH HAZARD. BUT NOW THAT IT HAS BEEN RESOLVED AND WE EXPECT TO GET THE REQUIRED SPARE PARTS VERY SOON, I THINK IT WILL BE REASONABLE TO SAY THERE WILL BE NO HEALTH HAZARD. AND INSOFAR AS THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE EXPLAINED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE REASONS FOR WHICH WE HAVEN'T SIGNED THE AGREEMENT -- SORRY, SIGNED THE
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TREATY. THERE WAS NO OCCASION ON THIS VISIT TO REITERATE THOSE REASONS. WE WERE CONCERNED MORE WITH

THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF SPARE PARTS FOR TARAPUR AND THAT PROBLEM HAS BEEN RESOLVED IN TERMS OF THE STATEMENT READ OUT TO YOU BY MR. HUGHES.

Q: (INAUDIBLE, ON TRADE AND U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON INDIAN EXPORTS).

AIYAR: AS FAR AS EXPANDING TRADE BETWEEN INDIA AND U.S.A. IS CONCERNED, OBVIOUSLY IT WILL NOT TAKE PLACE ON THE SAME PATTERN AS WITH COUNTRIES WITH WHOM WE HAD TRADE PLANS. SO THE IDEA OF GIVING SPECIFIC TARGETS IS NOT AS GERMANE TO THIS EXERCISE AS IT MIGHT BE IN OUR TRADE RELATIONS WITH SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. THERE HAS IN FACT BEEN SOME EXPANSION IN OUR MUTUAL TRADE IN RECENT YEARS. FOR THE LAST FULL YEAR, THAT IS 1982, INDIA'S EXPORT TO THE U.S. AMOUNTED TO ABOUT 1,400 MILLION DOLLARS AND OUR IMPORTS FROM THEM AMOUNTED TO JUST UNDER 1,600 MILLION DOLLARS. SO WHILE THE TRADE IS NOT EXACTLY IN BALANCE, THE TRADE DEFICIT IS OF THE ORDER OF 178 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE TOTAL TURNOVER WHICH IS IN EXCESS OF 3,000 MILLION DOLLARS.
THERE'S BEEN A TRADE MISSION THAT'S COME IN FROM THE UNITED STATES HERE, THE OPIC TEAM. WE ARE HOPING TO SEND OUT A TRADE MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME TRADE PROBLEMS RELATING TO PROTECTIONISM WHICH HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY OR FULLY RESOLVED. FOR EXAMPLE, IN REGARD TO TEXTILE PRODUCTS WE HAVE, AS THE RESULT OF THE MOST RECENT AGREEMENT, SUCCEEDED IN INCREASING ACCESS BY APPROXIMATELY 70 CRORE (ONE CRORE EQUALS 10 MILLION RUPEES) ANNUALLY ALTHOUGH IN A SENSE THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTIONISM IN THE TEXTILE SECTOR

REMAINS. WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL SCHEME OF PREFERENCES PROVIDES ONE MECHANISM FOR IMPROVING THE TRADE BALANCE IN INCREASING INDIA'S EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND WHAT WE ARE SEEKING FROM THE U.S.A. IS STABLE, DUTY-FREE TREATMENT, WITHOUT ABRUPT EXCLUSIONS BASED ON AUTOMATIC TRIGGERS OR ARBITRARY SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA.

THERE HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS ABOUT THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY. WE HAVE SOLVED THEM IN REGARD TO FOOTWARE AND FOR TWO TYPES OF FASTNERS. AND SOME PROBLEMS THAT

REMAIN IN REGARD TO CASTINGS AND SOME OTHER TYPES OF FASTNERS WE HOPE WILL BE RESOLVED AS WE GO ALONG. BUT THESE ARE MATTERS OF DETAIL WHICH WERE OF COURSE NOT GONE INTO DURING THE COURSE OF THIS VISIT, BUT SINCE YOU RAISED THE QUESTION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SUBCOMMISSION ON TRADE, THAT SUBCOMMISSION DOES LOOK INTO SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS, BUT THERE ARE ALSO DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS THROUGH WHICH WE ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THESE PROBLEMS AS THEY COME ALONG.

Q. (INAUDIBLE).

AIYAR: WE HAD THE OPIC MISSION HERE -- THIS WAS A LITTLE EARLIER THIS YEAR -- THAT'S THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTORS (SIC) CORPORATION.

Q. (INAUDIBLE, ABOUT SAFETY HAZARDS AT TARAPUR).

HUGHES: I'D LIKE TO HELP YOU WITH A CLEARER ANSWER TO YOUR CLEAR QUESTION, BUT I'M NOT AN EXPERT. I HAVE

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OT BEEN SUGGESTING THAT THERE IS IMMINENT DANGER. I HAVE SIMPLY BEEN MAKING THE POINT THAT IF YOU DON'T DO THE KIND OF THINGS THAT YOU PRUDENTLY HAVE TO DO IN ANY KIND OF A PLANT, AND ESPECIALLY A NUCLEAR PLANT, YOU COME TO A POINT WHERE IT MAY BECOME UNSAFE, BUT I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT IT IS GOING TO HAPPEN ON THE 13TH DAY OF THE THIRD MONTH AND YEAR....

Q. (INAUDIBLE).

HUGHES: NO, IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF DISCUSSION ABOUT DANGER, ITS JUST REALLY RESPONDING TO WHAT IS AN OBVIOUS, ULTIMATE PROBLEM.

AIYAR: WE'LL TAKE ONE LAST ONE FROM GEORGE.

Q. WAS THERE ANY RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES ON LAUNCHING THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS?

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HUGHES: NOT THAT I HEARD.

AIYAR: THERE WAS DISCUSSION AT LUNCH, BUT IT WAS A

STATEMENT OF EACH OTHERS' POSITION REALLY AND AN EVALUATION OF THE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT BY SECRETARY SHULTZ. THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. ANYONE REQUIRING ADDITIONAL COPIES OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S STATEMENT WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN THEM FROM THE RECEPTION AREA OF USIS.

HUGHES: THANK YOU SO MUCH.

END TEXT. SHULTZ

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 12, 1983
No. 279

PC #29

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
New Delhi, India
July 1, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all I would like to express my appreciation to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, for the great cordiality and the interesting and worthwhile time that I have had here during my visit. One of the outstanding characteristics of the visit, not only with the Government people that I talked with, but those in private pursuits, I found on reflection is the fact that, almost in every meeting, what I found myself engaged in is a genuine conversation. And reflecting on it, I have noticed that in many international meetings, basically, you say what you think and they say what they think and you kind of go by each other. But here it's been rather different. There has been a definite effort to engage with each other in a very constructive spirit and that has been not only worthwhile but it is fun, it is engaging, and I have appreciated it. Any questions?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there's a report out of Washington this morning on how Mr. Habib last week presented a proposal or requested the Israelis to consider the possibility of setting a firm date for withdrawal in order to put pressure on the Syrians to do the same, and that this proposal has been approved by the President after you requested that approval. Can you comment on that report and then tell us a little about the proposal and what the reaction has been from the Israelis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Ambassador Habib has been back in the area talking with people in different countries and what the content of his discussions are, of course, we are reading about. I don't think it is a good idea to comment on the content of the negotiation as it is unfolding, but I did see that account and it doesn't really conform to what I have noted. But I am not going to comment on the details of how Ambassador Habib is going about his efforts to attain the full objectives that the President has set forward and which I think have been generally agreed to as the right objectives, namely: number one, the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; number two, the chance for the emergence of a sovereign Lebanon able to take care of its own affairs and develop its prosperity; and number three, attention to the security needs of Israel along its northern border, recognizing that southern Lebanon has been an area from which Israel has been attacked. So, those have been the three objectives that we have had; they continue to be the President's objectives. I believe they are shared by others that we have been working with in the area and those objectives are the guide of our diplomatic effort.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in order to achieve those objectives, does it make sense for Israel to declare that it is prepared to withdraw totally and thereby have another initiative, another possible way, to break down Syrian intransigence? In other words, I am asking you the same question in a way that possibly you could feel comfortable replying to?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have just said ditto on the answer I just gave.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you have any knowledge that India is preparing to detonate another nuclear device and what will be the President's strategy on granting the sale of the reactor components if India is unable to find them elsewhere?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no information whatever along those lines and from all that I can see there is no such intention.

QUESTION: The next part of the question, sir. How will the President defend his decision to grant the waiver or the sale of component parts if India is unable to locate them elsewhere?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, if there is a sale, the President will defend the importance of doing that on the grounds of the importance of having nuclear power stations operate in a manner that takes due consideration of the safety and health of the operators of the plant and the people in the community. Just as we said in our statement, I think these are good strong grounds.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, have you asked the Government of India for any commitments whatsoever as a condition for the supply of spare parts?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, there hasn't been any conditioning. It has been clear for a long time that the U.S. has some very definite objectives in the area of non-proliferation. Those remain and they are well-known.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there is a report in a German newspaper today that India has agreed to buy 5 billion dollars worth of arms from the Soviet Union. Are you aware of such a transaction, and if so, what would be the U.S. reaction if that were true?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am not aware of that transaction and I don't want to comment on hypothetical questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to try the Middle East for a second, given the job that Habib and Draper and company are doing now in the Middle East, can you say at this point whether you expect to include the Middle East in this current trip or can you now categorically rule it out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I only can say to you that the plan of the trip, which is to go from here to Pakistan and from Pakistan to London and back to Washington, remains intact.

QUESTION: How far has your visit removed all the irritants from Indo-U.S. relations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I came here to discuss not only bilateral relationships but also the many matters on which India and the United States share common concern about a wide variety of problems around the world. We have had very good talks, as I mentioned in my opening statement. They have been general conversations. I have learned and benefited from them and I hope the same can be said for the other side of it. If that kind of thing and the addressing of the various problems that we have talked about helps, then naturally, that's what we are interested in.

I am sure that there are always irritants and problems of various kinds and that's a characteristic situation. The question is whether we can get them on the table and talk about them and work them out. I think the answer to it is yes. I would say that we proceed on the basis that here we have the world's two largest democracies and just as I think India has a stake in a free, democratic, expanding United States, so we have a stake in having India be a free, expanding democratic country. And to the extent that our relationship is mutually supportive of that regard, I think, that is a very good thing.

QUESTION: There is another report from Washington which suggests that following a series of meetings which you have had with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin you appear to be leaning in the direction of a summit meeting between the President and Mr. Andropov. Could you give us any indication at all as to what your thinking is at this time on that subject?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is not so important what my thinking is, but what the President's thinking is and, so far as I know, it remains what he has said and what we have discussed: namely, that as a matter of principle he thinks that such a meeting could be constructive only if it is a well-prepared meeting from which there is a reasonable chance of significant results. That has been his position for as long as I have been talking to him about it and that remains his position.

I think people don't quite recognize how many places there are -- places in which the United States and the Soviet Union are discussing one thing or another. There are arms control START talks in Geneva, there are INF talks in Geneva, there are talks about chemical and biological weapons in Geneva, there are conventional force talks in Vienna. There's some talk on non-proliferation matters going on alternately in Washington and Moscow. There are talks going on in Madrid. There are many international bodies where both countries are represented; our Ambassador in Moscow talks to people in the Soviet Government there. And I have had a series of meetings, as was reported, with Ambassador Dobrynin.

Our stance on the United States side is that we, first of all, have to be realistic about what's going on; second of all, we have to be strong enough to defend our interests and help our Allies defend theirs, and strength is clearly far more than just military strength -- all of that is important -- it includes economic strength and the kind of confidence in our own positions which we have; and then third, a willingness to sit down and genuinely negotiate, and here we feel that we have important and reasonable positions in all of these discussion fora. We are also there in a spirit of give and take and the question of whether or not these talks are going to get anywhere is basically a question of whether or not the Soviet Union wants to be also reasonable and approach them in a spirit of give and take. It remains to be seen.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Afghanistan is one of the issues in your talks here and also in Islamabad. You have recently written a letter to Mr. Gromyko dealing with Afghanistan. Did you get any answer and what was the purpose of this letter?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There has been an exchange of letters. The purpose was to assure the Soviet Union, as we have assured others who are involved in this negotiation -- the Secretary General of the UN, the Pakistanis and others -- that we wish to see it settled and we would like to see it settled according to the guidelines that have been laid out in the UN. Just how much progress there has been, I think, is something of a question and I look forward to my discussions in Pakistan where I will get another reading on that subject.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss with Mrs. Gandhi or anyone else the reported explosion of a nuclear bomb in Pakistan? And is it possible for such an explosion to have taken place without the United States knowing about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have very sensitive instruments that have been successful in detecting nuclear explosions and so far as our readings are concerned we have no evidence of such an explosion.

QUESTION: May I know whether the question of reprocessing of spent fuel by India has been discussed at the talks? And if so, do you agree with the Indian position that India has a right to reprocess its spent fuel, howsoever it likes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think that difference of opinion remains as it was.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the discussion with Mrs. Gandhi was there a discussion of the Indian proposal, adopted by the Non-Aligned Summit, for an international conference on money and finance? Specifically, have you been able to reconcile the differences on the question of whether the integrity of the IMF can be challenged in any such negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, I don't think it is appropriate for me to engage in a discussion about what the Prime Minister and I discussed, but let me just comment on your question, leaving aside the question of discussions with the Prime Minister. That issue has, of course, been around and people are interested in it. We believe that the integrity of the IMF is of great importance, particularly right now, but at any time, as the world economy faces a variety of financial difficulties -- balance of payments problems of different countries. The IMF has been playing, will play, a central role in that. So anything that would disrupt the IMF, I think, is not helpful in this regard. To the contrary, it's important to maintain the integrity and to bring about the support for the pledges to the quota increases that have been agreed on. Of course, we are working on that very hard and trying to persuade the United States Congress to go along with the quota increases, in which the United States will put up 8.4 billion dollars and other countries will put up their proportionate share.

Insofar as a review of the monetary system is concerned, that was discussed a great deal at Williamsburg, among other places, and the approach taken is to study the situation carefully and to include in that study the possible usefulness of a larger conference. It may very well be that such a conference would turn out to be useful, but at least our approach is to study the issues carefully so that if you have a large conference you know what it is that you are trying to get out of it and there can be some substantive results,

CONT

as distinct from a variety of decisions that don't really make contact with each other.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you in your discussions here touch on the matter of the extensive U.S. military sales to India, and is there a prospect that somewhere down the calendar there will, in fact, be sales of military hardware to India?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was discussed and whether there will be actual sales is an open question. Certainly the United States is prepared to make such sales and, from the standpoint of India, of course, they will speak for themselves. But the question was discussed and to the extent that there have been any misunderstandings about the conditions under which the U.S. makes sales, I have tried to clear those up.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said you expected the Soviet Union to be reasonable in arms talks. Now, a couple of days ago the leaders of the East European socialist countries proposed to put a ban on nuclear arsenals. This suggestion coincides with one of the non-aligned countries of which India is the chairman. Do you think these proposals are reasonable?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have to see proposals and study them in detail. Proposals for a freeze, for an extreme change in the situation, generally speaking, don't go anywhere, but we study all proposals carefully and we study any proposal that comes from the Soviet Union very seriously. We hope that in the end it will appear to the Soviet Union that it is in their interest to engage with us in a program to reduce, not just limit, to reduce the level of armaments of all kinds.

QUESTION: Was there an Indian proposal about arms purchases from the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no special proposal. There was a possible sale and in the course of the exploration of that -- in the end it did not take place -- a number of questions were raised that have general policy implications. So since there was at least the potential for misunderstanding, in the discussion of this question we tried to clear it up and I think basically have made some headway in that regard. But there is no outstanding proposal that I know of.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, today is the day that China becomes eligible for World Bank concessional assistance and it seems that any borrowings by China will come at the expense of India. I wonder whether you could give the U.S. position on that in view of its influential role in the World Bank, what the U.S. position will be on how much India should get and compare it to China?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have to look at proposals to borrow for a particular project case-by-case. I think the fact of the matter is that there have been loans to China, it won't be a new thing. At the same time, there is no doubt about that fact, particularly with China as a member of the multilateral lending institutions, particularly the World Bank. But even without China there, there is, so to speak, more need for concessional funds, more demand for them than there are funds, so it is a problem. I think it is something that we, both the donor and the recipient countries, have to think through and work on and it is going to be a tough problem.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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SECTO

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP [redacted] OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: [redacted] *BACKGROUND BRIEFING*

FOLLOWING IS THE BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR SENIOR INDIAN EDITORS HELD BY [redacted] AT ROOSEVELT HOUSE, NEW DELHI, JULY 1, 1983.

BEGIN TEXT: JOHN HUGHES: WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ON
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BACKGROUND RULES THIS MORNING. YOU ARE WELCOME TO USE

THE INFORMATION, BUT WE WILL APPRECIATE YOUR NOT ATTRIBUTING IT TO THE [redacted] BY OFFICE OR NAME. IF YOU WISH TO USE IT THEN ATTRIBUTE IT TO A SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIAL, AND THAT WOULD BE FINE. [redacted] THIS IS THE CREME DE LA CREME OF INDIAN JOURNALISM.

[redacted] HOW ABOUT ME, CAN I USE THE INFORMATION? (LAUGHTER) I THINK THIS OUGHT TO BE A TWO-WAY STREET HERE. I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, BUT I WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS AS WELL.

Q: WE WOULD FIRST LIKE AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW THE TALKS HAVE GONE. WE ARE GLAD TO HEAR ABOUT THE TARAPUR SETTLEMENT, BUT DOES THAT END THE MATTER OR IS THERE ANY MORE TO BE TIED UP, AND DID YOU GO INTO THE REPROCESSING QUESTION TOO?

[redacted] NO, THE DISCUSSION THAT WE HAD HAD TO DO WITH THE TARAPUR SPARE PARTS AND I THINK THE STATEMENT MADE YESTERDAY IS A CLEAR ONE. I DON'T KNOW THAT I NEED TO AMPLIFY IT AT ALL. BUT AT ANY RATE I THINK THAT THE CONCERN THAT WE ALL HAVE -- THAT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OPERATE SAFELY -- IS THE MOTIVATION FOR THE UNITED STATES -- THE PRESIDENT -- BEING WILLING TO TAKE THIS STEP. IT IS A STEP HE TAKES WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COST AT HOME, AND YOU PROBABLY NOTICED THAT TWO OF HIS POTENTIAL OPPONENTS (ASSUMING HE RUNS) HAVE BEEN ATTACKING HIM, EVEN PRIOR TO HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE THE STEPS NECESSARY TO HAVE THE PARTS COME HERE. SO, HE WILL PAY SOME PRICE; ON THE OTHER

HAND I THINK HE WILL BE ABLE TO DEFEND THE ACTION VERY WELL, AND AT ANY RATE HE IS WILLING TO DO IT.

Q: DOES THIS COVER ONLY JUST SAFETY-RELATED SPARE PARTS OR OTHER PARTS ALSO?

[redacted] WELL, IT'S...I THINK THE BACKGROUND IS TO DO WITH THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE REACTOR. NOW, SAFETY-RELATED IN THAT SENSE IS A VERY BROAD TERM, IT'S WHAT IT TAKES FOR THE REACTOR TO OPERATE.

Q: IS THERE A DISTINCTION?

[redacted] I DON'T REALLY THINK SO, BUT I THINK IT IS FACTUALLY CORRECT AND POLITICALLY HELPFUL FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SAY THAT WHAT HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT HERE IS SAFETY AND HEALTH.

Q: [redacted] IS IT BY DESIGN OR AN ACCIDENT THAT THESE THINGS GET ANNOUNCED AT HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AFTER THEY'VE BUILT UP TENSION AND MISUNDERSTANDING? (INAUDIBLE)

[redacted] WELL, THINGS TEND TO GET DECIDED IN MOST SOCIETIES WHEN THEY'VE BEEN BROUGHT TO A HEAD SOMEHOW. I THINK THAT'S THE WAY LIFE IS TO A CERTAIN EXTENT AND, AT LEAST AS I OBSERVE TRIPS AND EVENTS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER, IT MAY BE THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT THING CONNECTED WITH THEM IS THE PREPARATION FOR THEM.

Q: [redacted] CAN YOU TELL US THE SCOPE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS OR IS IT REALLY ON SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES OR IS THERE REALLY A SCHEME ON A DISCUSSION OF INDO-U.S.

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RELATIONS?

[redacted] NO, NO, I THINK THAT THE PROBLEM HAS ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE TARAPUR PLANT AND IT MAY BE THAT ALL OF THE SPARES WILL BE AVAILABLE ELSEWHERE. IT IS UNDOUBTEDLY HELPFUL TO INDIA THAT THE PEOPLE WHO MAKE THE -- WHO ARE POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS HAVE TO CONDUCT THEMSELVES THROUGH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE U.S. SUPPLIES ARE SORT OF A BACKUP YOU MIGHT SAY. BUT AT ANY RATE IT
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GIVES THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT THE KNOWLEDGE THAT IN THE END THEY WILL BE ABLE TO FIND THESE PARTS TO MAINTAIN

THE PLANT'S SAFE OPERATION. AND THAT'S THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF IT.

Q: THIS EXERCISE WE HAVE GONE THROUGH ALREADY. THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED 30 OR 40 PARTS THAT ARE REQUIRED...

[redacted] YES.

Q: ...AND THEY'VE FOUND THAT THREE OR FOUR OF THEM ARE CRITICAL ITEMS WHICH CANNOT BE HAD ANYWHERE ELSE EXCEPT THE UNITED STATES, THEY'RE THE GENERIC TYPE FROM THE GENERAL ELECTRIC OR WESTINGHOUSE WHO HAVE BUILT THE PLANT. NOW, THIS EXERCISE HAS BEEN COMPLETED ALREADY. HAVE YOU REACHED THE STAGE WHERE YOU SAY THESE THREE OR FOUR PARTS WILL BE GIVEN BY PRESIDENTIAL ACTION OR STILL WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING FOR THEM ELSEWHERE?

[redacted] WELL, I THINK THAT THE PROCESS OF SEARCHING FOR SOURCES OTHER THAN THE UNITED STATES IS ONE THAT WE DON'T CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE ISN'T ANY AMBIGUITY OR EQUIVOCATION IN THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION. WE'LL HAVE TO CARRY THE DECISION AND WE HAVE HAD, ACTUALLY SINCE I LEFT WASHINGTON, A SUPREME COURT DECISION THAT POSSIBLY BEARS ON THIS PROCEDURALLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES -- THE SUPREME COURT DECISION, AS YOU UNDOUBTEDLY KNOW, HAVING TO DO WITH THE SO-CALLED LEGISLATIVE VETO -- AND AS IT WAS BEFORE THAT DECISION -- THE PRESIDENT'S WAIVER COULD HAVE BEEN DENIED IF BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS VOTED TO DENY IT, SO HE WOULD HAVE TO FIGHT IT OUT IN THE

CONGRESS. THE COURT DECISION MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE LEGISLATIVE VETO TECHNIQUE IS NO LONGER CONSTITUTIONAL, SO PRESUMABLY THAT DOESN'T APPLY. PRECISELY HOW THE CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN IT WILL GO UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS THEREFORE SORT OF AN OPEN QUESTION. WE DON'T KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT AT THIS POINT. BUT YOU CAN BE SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OPPONENTS WILL RAISE A HULLABALOO ABOUT IT AND HE WILL HAVE, IT WILL BE IN A POLITICAL ARENA. AND HERE OF COURSE WE'RE REFLECTING THE CONCERN THAT EVERYONE HAS, INCLUDING YOUR GOVERNMENT, I'M SURE, ABOUT THE VERY UNDESIRABLE

POSSIBILITIES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE WORLD AND SO ON.

Q: [redacted] DON'T THESE OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE TO GET U.S. SANCTION BEFORE RELEASING THE SPARES?

[redacted] NO, THEY DON'T.

Q: SO THE DECISION IS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT HAVE ANY OBJECTION IF INDIA OBTAINS THESE PARTS FROM ELSEWHERE.

[redacted] THAT'S CORRECT, BUT I THINK THE HARD KERNEL OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IS THAT IF THEY AREN'T OBTAINABLE ELSEWHERE, AND IT MAY BE THAT THAT HAS BASICALLY BEEN DETERMINED, BUT WE'LL HAVE TO ASSURE OURSELVES OF THAT, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE A SOURCE OF THE SPARE PARTS.

Q: I WAS ASKING WHETHER THERE IS A BROADER DISCUSSION OR NOT ON INDO-U.S. RELATIONS APART FROM TARAPUR.

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[redacted] OH YES. I THOUGHT YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT NUCLEAR MATTERS.

Q: NO, NO.
[redacted] YES, WE HAD. I DISCUSSED, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS IN OUR MEETINGS TALKED ABOUT THE INDIA-U.S. RELATIONSHIP, OUR ASPIRATIONS FOR IT AND THE SUBSTANTIVE UNDERPINNING OF IT AS WELL AS YOU MIGHT SAY ITS TONAL QUALITIES AND
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ATTITUDES TOWARD IT. AND I THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WAS OUTSTANDING IN

ITS IMPACT ON U.S. ATTITUDES, AND THIS IS PART OF A PROCESS OF CONTINUING TO BUILD THAT RELATIONSHIP IN TERMS OF ITS BILATERAL NATURE AND IN TERMS OF THE MUTUAL INTEREST THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE IN A WIDE VARIETY OF WORLDWIDE ISSUES. SO, WE HAD A GOOD BIT OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT. AND I BELIEVE MYSELF -- I KNOW THE PRESIDENT SHARES THIS VIEW -- THAT A UNIFIED AND STRONG AND DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC, FREE INDIA IS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP CAN HELP IN THAT REGARD THAT'S IMPORTANT TO US.

Q: [redacted] YOU KNOW THAT CERTAIN ISSUES HAVE COME UP IN THE RELATION TO THE BROADER INDO-U.S. RELATIONS ON ACCOUNT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TO THE CURRENT REPLENISHMENT OF FUNDS FOR IDA, YOUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS IMF FUNDS AVAILABLE TO COUNTRIES. AND THEN THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE LOAN THAT INDIA IS SEEKING AND U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD THAT. BECAUSE IN THE INDIAN SCHEME, AS I SEE IT, THE AID PROSPECT FIGURED VERY PROMINENTLY. AND GENERALLY THE U.S. ATTITUDE IS SEEN TO BE LESS THAN HELPFUL. DID THIS ISSUE COME UP OR WILL IT COME UP IN THE DISCUSSIONS HERE OR NOT?

[redacted] WE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT GENERALLY, AND INDIA'S INTEREST IN THE MULTILATERAL LENDING INSTITUTIONS AND ACCESS TO LOANS AND SO FORTH IN PARTICULAR. AND LET ME EXPRESS, IF I CAN, THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THIS SUBJECT, AND I MIGHT SAY AS A BACKGROUND MATTER, I DID ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN A GENERAL WAY IN A SPEECH IN NEW YORK

ABOUT A MONTH AGO AND IF YOU'RE INTERESTED I'M SURE WE CAN FIND A COPY FOR YOU.

BUT AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION IT'S CLEAR, I THINK, TO EVERYONE THAT WE HAVE A WORLD ECONOMY, WE'RE ALL INVOLVED IN IT, WE ALL STAND TO GAIN OR LOSE DEPENDING UPON HOW HEALTHY IT IS AND HOW WELL IT OPERATES. SO THAT INCLUDES THE SO-CALLED THIRD WORLD AS WELL AS THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES, AND WHEN YOU ADDRESS YOURSELF TO THE HEALTH OF THIS SYSTEM YOU HAVE TO ADDRESS YOURSELF TO THE WHOLE.

SO THAT'S ONE POINT THAT CONDITIONS THE U.S. ATTITUDE AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT PEOPLE'S THINKING IN THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR THAT MATTER ELSEWHERE, HAS BEEN MOVING AWAY FROM THE NOTION THAT CONCESSIONAL AID OF ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IS A FORM OF GIFT-GIVING -- AND I'M NOT HERE SPEAKING AGAINST GIFT-GIVING, BUT I THINK THAT HAS BEEN A KIND OF CONCEPTION THAT THE RICH NATIONS OWED IT TO THE POOR NATIONS TO GIVE THEM RESOURCES. I THINK THAT IDEA IS BEGINNING TO FADE OUT OF THE PICTURE INSOFAR AS THIS PROBLEM IS CONCERNED, AND TO BE SUPPLANTED BY A DIFFERENT IDEA, THAT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO DO THINGS THAT ENABLE THOSE WHO WILL DO WHAT IT TAKES TO DEVELOP, TO SEE THEIR ECONOMIES BE HEALTHY AND EXPAND.

AND THEREFORE WE FIND OURSELVES WITH ANOTHER ZERO-SUM GAME IN THE SENSE OF WHAT I GIVE TO YOU, I DON'T HAVE

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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
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STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS, DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN, USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON, P/RM, P/P, P/PFF, P/FW, P/FN, P/PFO MC KAY/CARL, B/BF, B/BXN, NEA, CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD, USIA ADVISER, MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

ANY MORE; BUT A PLUS-SUM SITUATION WHERE ACTIONS TAKEN THAT HELP EVERYBODY BE HEALTHY ARE MUTUALLY SELF-SUPPORTING. AND I THINK THIS IS A MUCH BETTER, MORE SOLID WAY OF THINKING ABOUT IT AND ONE THAT HAS A LONG-TERM IMPLICATION TO IT, THAT IS, A HEALTHIER ONE THAN THE RICH TO POOR GIFT-TYPE OF THINKING.

OBVIOUSLY THE COMPONENTS OF THIS PROCESS OF ATTENDANCE *TO EACH OTHER'S HEALTH HAS A TRADE DIMENSION, AN*
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INVESTMENT DIMENSION, AN AID DIMENSION, AND SO ON; ALL THESE THINGS ARE PART OF A PROCESS, AT LEAST AS I SEE

IT, AND I'VE TRIED TO SPELL THIS OUT SOMEWHAT IN THAT SPEECH.

INSOFAR AS INDIA IS CONCERNED, I THINK THE DEVELOPMENT PICTURE IS QUITE AN IMPRESSIVE ONE AND WE CAN SEE A PROGRESSION. IF YOU TAKE IDA, OTHER CONCESSIONAL LENDING AND COMMERCIAL LENDING AND THINK OF THESE AS INCREMENTS IN THE TOTAL LENDING MIX, AND THEN LOOK AT IT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, WHAT YOU SEE IS THAT INITIALLY HIGHLY CONCESSIONAL SOFT LOANS FROM IDA MADE UP THE BULK OF THE *TOTAL. AND AS TIME HAS GONE ON, THAT HAS CHANGED AND* ALL THREE ELEMENTS ARE IN THE PICTURE AND THE COMPONENT OF IDA HAS DECLINED ALTHOUGH IT'S STILL VERY IMPORTANT. AND I WOULD EXPECT THAT PROCESS TO CONTINUE AND BY NOW, AND I CALLED ATTENTION TO THIS IN THE NEW YORK SPEECH, INDIA GENERATES 9U PERCENT OF THE FUNDS USED FOR INVESTMENT IN INDIA FROM DOMESTIC SAVINGS, AND REALLY THAT'S THE KIND OF THING THAT'S NECESSARY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Q: BUT YOU WOULDN'T BLAME OUR GOVERNMENT FROM SEEKING THE LOWEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

[redacted] OF COURSE NOT, EVERY BORROWER DOES THAT, AND THE QUESTION IS THAT, I THINK, WE HAVE TO ASK OURSELVES, THINKING ABOUT THIS IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL ECONOMIC SYSTEM, IS THIS: INVESTMENT IS ABSOLUTELY DEPENDENT ON SAVINGS, BY DEFINITION, AS WE ALL KNOW. IF YOU CONSUME EVERYTHING THAT YOU PRODUCE, THERE ARE NO RESOURCES LEFT OVER TO INVEST, SO YOU HAVE TO HAVE SAVING IN THE WORLD IN ORDER FOR THERE TO BE INVESTMENT IN THE WORLD. AND

YOU CAN AT LEAST CONCEPTUALLY THINK OF SOMETHING THAT YOU MIGHT CALL A WORLD SAVINGS, AND CONCESSIONAL AID OF ONE FORM OR ANOTHER TAKES OUT OF WORLD SAVINGS BY A POLITICAL ACT AND ALLOCATES THOSE RESOURCES TO SOME FORM OF INVESTMENT SOMEWHERE. SO IT ISN'T AS THOUGH CONCESSIONAL LENDING IS A SORT OF A FREE GOOD, IT IS PART OF THE FLOW OF WORLD SAVINGS AND YOU HAVE TO THINK ABOUT ITS IMPACT ON WORLD SAVINGS AND THE ALLOCATIVE PROCESS HERE.

Q: [redacted] AS WE SEE IT IN INDIA, WE SEE THIS

SITUATION AS BEING ASYMMETRICAL. YOU CALL IT THE WORLD ECONOMY BUT THE WORLD ECONOMY IS NOT IN BALANCE AND THAT'S WHY WE CALL IT THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AND USUALLY IN MANY WAYS THE NORTH MEANS YOUR COUNTRY BECAUSE EVERY COUNTRY'S ECONOMY IS IN A LARGE MEASURE DEPENDENT ON THE HEALTH OF YOUR ECONOMY. SO IN A SENSE IT IS THIS UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIP TO START WITH, WHICH CREATES PROBLEMS. THAT APART, WE ALSO SEE A SHIFT, A MAJOR SHIFT IN AMERICAN POLICY OVER THE YEARS. EARLIER, AMERICA WAS THE LEADER IN ORGANIZING ASSISTANCE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AMERICA HAS LONG ABDICATED THAT ROLE. IN FACT WE FIND THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDES MORE HELPFUL THAN THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE FOR AID, WHATEVER THE REASONS. THEN, WE ALSO FIND THAT AMERICAN AID ITSELF HAS BECOME MORE POLITICALLY DIRECTED THAN BEFORE AS MOST OF AMERICA'S AID NOW GOES TO A COUPLE OF COUNTRIES, EGYPT, ISRAEL. I THINK THESE TWO COUNTRIES ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE.

[redacted] IT'S LARGE BUT IT'S MORE LIKE, I THINK, 45 PERCENT OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

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Q: WELL, THEN PERHAPS IF WE ADD A FEW MORE COUNTRIES IT MAY ADD UP TO MAKE IT 80 PERCENT. GENERALLY WE GET A KIND OF IMPRESSION OF AMERICA, STILL THE LEADING-MOST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, BUT NOT REALLY ALL THAT INTERESTED AS IT USED TO BE IN ITS MORE LIBERAL DAYS. THAT IS HOW A LOT OF PEOPLE IN INDIA, IF I MAY SAY SO, SEE AMERICAN POLICY, AND EVEN THOSE WHO ARE REALLY FOR VERY STRONG INDO-U.S. RELATIONS. I'VE COME UP AGAINST THIS FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS REALLY NOT ALL THAT INTERESTED
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AS IT USED TO BE. THAT IS THE KIND OF -- I DON'T KNOW IF THESE BRIEF DISCUSSIONS, LIKE THE ONE WE ARE HAVING

NOW, ARE THE APPROPRIATE PLATFORM FOR DISCUSSING BILATERAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE MORE THAN BILATERAL ASSISTANCE IS INVOLVED. BUT THESE ARE THE KIND OF PERCEPTIONS SOME OF US HAVE HERE.

[redacted] YES, WELL, I'M AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THAT IS THE VIEW OF PEOPLE AND THAT GETS WRITTEN A LOT. IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS. THE FACTS, LET ME GIVE YOU A FEW FACTS: THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS BY A LARGE MEASURE THE LARGEST SINGLE DONOR COUNTRY, IN GENERAL, FOR CONCESSIONAL AID OF VARIOUS KINDS. THERE'S NO OTHER COUNTRY CLOSE TO IT. THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS THE LARGEST DONOR COUNTRY IN THE SENSE OF CONCESSIONAL AID TO INDIA. IF YOU ADD UP OUR COMPONENT OF THE WORLD BANK, THE ASIAN BANK, BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AND SO ON, YOU ADD ALL THESE THINGS UP TOGETHER AND THEN COMPARE THEM WITH WHOEVER ELSE YOU WANT TO NAME.

THE UNITED STATES, MORE IMPORTANTLY, PROVIDES THE LARGEST MARKET FOR GOODS FROM THE THIRD WORLD. ROUGHLY HALF THE MANUFACTURED GOODS IN THE THIRD WORLD FIND THEIR WAY INTO THE UNITED STATES MARKET. I BELIEVE, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER ANY OF YOU COVERED THE GATT MINISTERIAL IN NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS VERY CLEAR, AND I'M NOT TRYING TO SLAM ANYBODY ELSE, BUT IT WAS VERY CLEAR THAT THE SENTIMENT FOR PROTECTION, WHICH IS STRONG IN THE WORLD IN ALL COUNTRIES, IS STRONGEST IN EUROPE, AND REALLY THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES HAVE A MUCH BIGGER STAKE IN THE OPENNESS OF MARKET THAN IN ANY OTHER SINGLE THING.

IN 1980 THE FLOW OF EARNINGS FROM TRADE EXCEEDED THE

FLOW OF FUNDS FROM AID BY 17 TIMES. SO TRADE IS A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT COMPONENT -- AND I SEE IT IN OUR OWN COUNTRY THAT THERE IS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T WANT TO SEE TRADE TAKE PLACE TO SUBSTITUTE AID FOR IT, AND IT'S A VERY BAD TRADEOFF. I'VE HAD THIS BATTLE WITH OUR OWN LABOR UNIONS, OVER WHAT WE CALL A CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE, WHICH WE ARE TRYING TO HELP THESE TINY ECONOMIES IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN OF CENTRAL AMERICA BY REALLY OPENING THE U.S. MARKET TOTALLY WITH NO RESTRICTIONS WHATEVER. AND THE LABOR UNIONS TAKE THE VIEW THAT THAT'S NOT A GOOD IDEA. ON THE OTHER HAND,

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THEY'RE WILLING TO SUPPORT GIGANTIC SUMS OF MONEY, AND OUR VIEW IS THAT IT'S MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE THE MARKET OPPORTUNITIES.

AT ANY RATE, THE UNITED STATES, WITH ALL OF OUR PROBLEMS WITH PROTECTION, IS, I THINK I CAN FAIRLY SAY, BY FAR THE MOST OPEN INDUSTRIAL MARKET IN THE WORLD TO THE PRODUCTS OF THE THIRD WORLD. SO, IN ALL OF THESE RESPECTS I THINK THE REALITY IS -- IN TERMS OF THE AMOUNTS OF MONEY AND SO ON -- THAT THE UNITED STATES IS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. AND WE THINK THIS IS GOOD FOR US. NOW INSOFAR AS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS CONCERNED, WE MENTIONED IDA -- AND THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I'VE BEEN AROUND THE HORN ON A LOT BECAUSE I WAS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AT ONE TIME, AND FOUGHT FOR THE IDA TRANCHES THEN AND THE OTHER CAPITAL APPRECIATIONS TO THE VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT BANKS. BUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION INHERITED FROM ITS PREDECESSOR AN IDA COMMITMENT WHICH ITS PREDECESSOR WAS UNABLE TO SELL TO A DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS. NOW, PRESIDENT

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REAGAN TOOK THIS COMMITMENT AND ADOPTED IT AND WE THINK WE ARE VERY CLOSE NOW TO GETTING IT THROUGH THE CONGRESS. WE'VE WORKED VERY HARD ON IT AND WE HAVE A '83 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION IN WHICH THERE IS AN INCREMENT, AND IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL WE'LL COMPLETE THE IDA-VI PLEDGE IN THE '84 APPROPRIATION PROCESS. AND THIS HAS BEEN A MAJOR EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT, AND HE'S HAD TO TURN AROUND HIS OWN PARTY AND SUPPORT SOMETHING THAT HIS PREDECESSOR LAID DOWN.
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AND BEYOND THAT, THE AMOUNT OF ECONOMIC CONCESSIONAL AID OF VARIOUS KINDS UNDER THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS

INCREASED EACH YEAR, ITS TOTAL HAS BEEN GOING UP. SO I RECOGNIZE THE IMPRESSION THAT PEOPLE HAVE BUT I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACTS, AS TO THE REALITY. NOW, I THINK THE IMPRESSION COMES ABOUT SOMETIMES BECAUSE THE U.S. HAS HISTORICALLY, AND TODAY THE PRESIDENT VERY MUCH TAKES THE VIEW THAT WE SHOULD SAY WHAT WE REALLY THINK AND THAT WE SHOULD BE CANDID ENOUGH IF WE THINK THAT SOME NICE IDEA THAT EVERYBODY SORT OF LIKES IS REALLY WHAT WE CALL 'PIE IN THE SKY' AND WE OUGHT TO SAY SO, OTHERWISE WE'RE NOT BEING HONEST WITH PEOPLE.

I REMEMBER WHEN I WAS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ON THIS, THERE'S A SO-CALLED LINK AND THAT ISSUE IS STILL AROUND IN WHICH IT IS PROPOSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF SDRS BE LINKED TO AID. I'M SURE YOU'RE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THIS ISSUE. WE ALWAYS OPPOSED THAT IN THE UNITED STATES ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD UNDERMINE THE CONFIDENCE IN THE SDR, THAT IT WOULD QUICKLY BE SEEN BY LEGISLATURES AS A BYPASSING OF THEM, AND THEY WOULD WIND UP MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE, AND WE WOULD HAVE IN THE PROCESS DONE MORE HARM THAN GOOD. AND WE GOT UP AND SAID THAT. IT MADE US VERY UNPOPULAR, EVERYBODY RAILED AGAINST US. I HAD INNUMERABLE FINANCE MINISTERS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COME AROUND AND SAY TO ME, WE'RE GOING TO MAKE A SPEECH AGAINST YOU, AND I'M SORRY THAT I HAVE TO, BUT PLEASE DON'T CHANGE YOUR MIND. AND I HAD A VERY DISTINGUISHED FINANCE MINISTER, WHOM I WON'T NAME, FROM A COUNTRY THAT PORTRAYS ITSELF AS BEING ALL FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, COME AROUND AND SAY TO ME, [redacted] YOU SAY THAT YOU'RE OPPOSED TO THE LINK, BUT ARE YOU REALLY, ARE YOU REALLY GOING TO STICK TO IT? I SAID, OH YES, THAT'S WHAT I

THINK AND ARTHUR BURNS IS SITTING HERE, HE'S THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FED, THAT'S WHAT HE THINKS, LISTEN TO HIM, HE'S VERY WORKED UP ABOUT IT. THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO BE FIRM ON THIS. AND HE SAID, WELL I'M JUST DELIGHTED TO HEAR IT, IT GIVES ME A CHANCE TO DEMAGOGUE ON THIS ISSUE. AND THERE'S AN AWFUL LOT OF THAT. BUT I THINK THAT IT'S IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES, AS THE COUNTRY THAT IN A SENSE PEOPLE LOOK TO TO BE HONEST ABOUT THESE THINGS, TO ARGUE THESE POINTS DIRECTLY, AND FOR THAT REASON I THINK IT OFTEN COMES THROUGH THAT WE ARE THE BAD GUYS, BUT THE REALITY, I THINK, IS QUITE THE

REVERSE.

Q: AS A COROLLARY TO WHAT YOU SAID, NOW, THE THIRD WORLD IS INTERESTED VERY MUCH IN THE U.S. ECONOMIC RECOVERY. IT WOULD HELP THEM.... WHAT IS THE CORRECT POSITION ABOUT IT? WE KEEP READING CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS.

[redacted] WELL, I DON'T WANT TO POSE AS AN ECONOMIC FORECASTER, BUT I WILL MAKE ONE ANYWAY. WE HAD A GROWTH RATE, REAL GROWTH RATE OF ABOUT TWO AND A HALF PERCENT IN THE FIRST QUARTER, COMING OFF OF A DOWN QUARTER. WE HAVE THE PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES FOR THE SECOND QUARTER AND THEY ARE A REAL INCREASE OF 6.6 PERCENT. THE PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES ALWAYS GET REVISED AND WE REALLY CAN'T TELL, BUT LET'S SAY ITS IN THE BALLPARK OF 6 PERCENT. ALL OF THE INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS IS TURNING INTO A SUSTAINABLE RECOVERY.

WHEN AN ECONOMY THE SIZE OF THE U.S. ECONOMY -- IT'S OVER 3 TRILLION DOLLARS -- MOVES AT AN ANNUAL RATE OF 6 PERCENT, THAT'S A HUGE MOVEMENT. AND SO I THINK THAT WE

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DO SEE THIS REAL RECOVERY UNDER WAY. THERE WILL BE A STRONG EFFORT TO MANAGE IT SO THAT IT IS A NON-INFLATIONARY RECOVERY; SOME THINK THAT IT'S GOING TOO FAST, IN OTHER WORDS. BUT AT ANY RATE, I THINK THAT YOU'LL SEE STRENGTH. AND IT IS ALSO THE CASE THAT THE STRONG DOLLAR, WHICH IS MUCH STRONGER THAN IT WOULD BE ON STRICTLY TRADE MEASURES -- IT'S STRONG IN CONSIDERABLE PART BECAUSE OF THE FLOW OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO THE UNITED STATES AS A KIND OF SAFE HAVEN
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ECONOMY -- SO THE DOLLAR IS VERY STRONG, AND WHAT THAT MEANS IS THAT WE WILL SHIP A LOT OF OUR INHERITED

EXPANSION ABROAD. WE'RE GOING TO HAVE A VERY LARGE TRADE DEFICIT THIS YEAR AND I NOTICE THE FIGURES FOR MAY HAVE JUST COME OUT AND IT IS A RECORD MONTHLY NUMBER.

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OUR TRADING PARTNERS WHO ARE LOOKING FOR THEIR OWN EXPANSION TO BE EXPORT-LED, IT'S VERY GOOD NEWS THAT THE DOLLAR IS SO STRONG. AND PRESIDENT MITTERAND IS ALWAYS COMPLAINING ABOUT THIS. I HAD A LONG SESSION WITH HIM A FEW WEEKS AGO AND I ASKED HIM, WHY ARE YOU ALWAYS COMPLAINING ABOUT THE STRONG DOLLAR? IT'S WORKING TO YOUR ADVANTAGE. AND HE SMILED AND HE SAID, YES, I'VE SEEN A FEW DEALS THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN HERE RECENTLY IN THIRD MARKETS THAT WE PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE GOTTEN OTHERWISE. SO I THINK IF THE DOLLAR STARTS TO WEAKEN WE'RE GOING TO HEAR A LOT OF COMPLAINTS, JUST AS WE HAVE HAD A LOT OF COMPLAINTS WHEN IT WAS STRONG. BUT I THINK THE U.S. ECONOMY IS MOVING AND IT'S GOING TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE, BUT IT'S ALSO TRUE THAT IF WE CAN KEEP TRADE OPEN THAT THERE'S GOING TO BE A MUTUALLY STIMULATING EFFECT HERE AND THE U.S. ECONOMY IS GOING TO BENEFIT BY STRENGTH IN VARIOUS OTHER ECONOMIES SUCH AS INDIA'S.

Q: THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IS STILL VERY HIGH IN THE U.S., 12 MILLION UNEMPLOYED. HOW ARE YOU GOING TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM?

[redacted] NO, YOU'RE OFF BY AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE, BUT IT IS VERY HIGH, IT'S IN THE VICINITY OF 10 PERCENT IN A LABOR FORCE OF A 100 MILLION, SO IT'S AROUND 10 MILLION. IT'S A HIGH NUMBER. IT HAS COME DOWN SOME AND

WITH EXPANSION IT WILL COME DOWN, BUT NOT AS RAPIDLY AS WE WOULD LIKE. ONE OF THE THINGS THAT TENDS TO HAPPEN IN THE UNITED STATES, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS HAPPENS IN THE INDIAN ECONOMY OR NOT, BUT WHEN OUR ECONOMY STARTS TO EXPAND IT TENDS TO DRAW PEOPLE INTO THE LABOR FORCE, AND SINCE UNEMPLOYMENT IS THE RESIDUAL BETWEEN PEOPLE WHO WANT TO WORK, WHO ARE IN THE LABOR FORCE -- UNDER OUR DEFINITION -- AND THOSE WHO ARE EMPLOYED, WHEN THERE IS A BIG SURGE INTO THE LABOR FORCE, IT'S VERY DIFFICULT FOR UNEMPLOYMENT TO GO DOWN EVEN THOUGH EMPLOYMENT IS GOING UP.

SO, I THINK THAT AS YOU OBSERVE THE U.S. ECONOMY AND YOU'RE TRYING TO UNDERSTAND IT AS AN ANALYST AND WRITER, YOU OUGHT TO SEARCH THROUGH THE REPORTS AND FIND OUT WHAT'S HAPPENING TO EMPLOYMENT, AND YOU'LL SEE JUMPS IN A GIVEN MONTH OVER MONTH OF A QUARTER OF A MILLION, EVEN HALF A MILLION SOMETIMES. ONCE THE U.S. ECONOMY STARTS *TO ROLL IT GENERATES JOBS AT AN ASTONISHING RATE, BUT* THE EMPLOYMENT RATE WILL STAY HIGH BECAUSE PEOPLE WILL BE COMING INTO THE LABOR FORCE AT A GREAT RATE. ALSO, WE HAVE A STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT GOING ON IN OUR STEEL, AUTOMOBILE AND SOME OTHER OF THE HEAVY INDUSTRIES THA ARE HAVING LOWER VOLUMES AND IMPORTANT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE GOING ON, SO THEIR EMPLOYMENT WILL BE LESS AND THERE WILL BE SOME HARD-TO-PLACE UNEMPLOYED IN THE AUTO AND STEEL AND OTHER SUCH CENTERS, AND THAT'S A MAJOR PROBLEM FOR US.

Q: [redacted] YOU HAVE MET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ABOUT A DOZEN TIMES, DOES IT MEAN THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MR. ANDROPOV IS ON? DOES

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IT MEAN A THAW IN THE COLD WAR WILL SET IN AFTER POLAND AND AFGHANISTAN?

[redacted] I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT MEANS. I KNOW THAT THERE ARE A WIDE VARIETY OF SETTINGS IN WHICH U.S. REPRESENTATIVES MEET WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES. IN OUR START TALKS, OUR INF TALKS, IN THE MBFR TALKS, IN THE GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON CHEMICAL WARFARE, IN MADRID, IN SOME OF OUR DISCUSSIONS OF NONPROLIFERATION, OUR
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AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, THEIR AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WITH ME, AND IN OTHER PLACES, SO THERE ARE A GREAT

VARIETY OF SETTINGS IN WHICH WE ARE TALKING. THE IDEA THAT WE HAVE NO DIALOGUE, IN OTHER WORDS, IS INCORRECT. THERE IS A DIALOGUE.

THE DIALOGUE HAS NOT BEEN, IN THE PAST YEARS -- BASICALLY I THINK SINCE THE AFGHANISTAN INVASION BY THE SOVIET UNION -- HAS NOT BEEN A PARTICULARLY FRUITFUL ONE IN THE SENSE OF MOVING FORWARD IN ANY WAY, AND HISTORICALLY IT IS THE CASE THAT MOVEMENTS TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. HAVE BEEN DERAILED BY -- WHAT AT LEAST IN OUR EYES, IN THE EYES OF OUR ALLIES -- BY AGGRESSIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN SOME REGIONAL AREA, LIKE THEIR INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN OR SOME OTHER SUCH THING. SO THESE BILATERAL, THESE REGIONAL TYPE ISSUES HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT STUMBLING BLOCKS.

BUT AT ANY RATE THERE ARE DISCUSSIONS GOING ON. THERE'S A BROAD AGENDA, WHICH AT LEAST IN OUR EYES INCLUDES HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, WHICH WE PLACE AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL, REGIONAL ISSUES, ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, AND BILATERAL ISSUES OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND I SET OUT EARLIER THIS YEAR TO MEET FAIRLY FREQUENTLY AND JUST GO THROUGH THESE ISSUES, AND WE'VE DONE IT. WE TALKED RECENTLY, WE HAD A REFLECTIVE SESSION. I SAID, I USED TO BE A PROFESSOR, SO WHAT GRADE, MR. AMBASSADOR, DO YOU THINK WE OUGHT TO GIVE OURSELVES? WE'VE BEEN AT THIS. AND WE AGREED THAT THE BEST WE COULD GRADE OURSELVES WAS C-PLUS, MAYBE WE SHOULD HAVE A LITTLE LOWER GRADE IN THE SENSE OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

NEVERTHELESS I CAN SAY TO YOU THAT FROM THE UNITED STATES' STANDPOINT WE THINK THERE ARE A LOT OF VERY REASONABLE POSITIONS ON THE TABLE. THERE IS IN OUR NEGOTIATORS A SENSE OF GIVE AND TAKE, THEY'RE READY FOR IT. AND SO, IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE SITUATION COULD MOVE FORWARD, BUT IT REALLY DEPENDS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE OTHER SIDE IS FORTHCOMING. AND AS OF NOW, WE DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO TRY.

BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT, I GUESS WE NOW CALL

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HIM, ANDROPOV, RATHER THAN SECRETARY GENERAL, HAVE SAID THAT IN PRINCIPLE THEY FAVOR A SUMMIT IF IT IS WELL-PREPARED AND HAS SOME REASONABLE CHANCE FOR SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. SO, IN THAT SENSE BOTH POSITIONS ARE SIMILAR. FROM OUR STANDPOINT WE HAVE THE VIEW THAT IF YOU HAVE A SUMMIT THAT ISN'T PREPARED AND DOESN'T PRODUCE ANYTHING IT MAY VERY WELL DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD BECAUSE THE VERY ANNOUNCEMENT OF IT WILL MAKE PEOPLE FEEL THAT SOMETHING VERY POSITIVE IS ALMOST SURELY GOING TO HAPPEN, AND THEN IF IT DOESN'T HAPPEN THEIR HOPES WILL BE DASHED AND YOU WILL BE WORSE OFF THAN WHEN YOU STARTED. AND THAT'S THE REASON WHY I THINK THERE IS THIS SENSE, AT LEAST ON OUR SIDE OF IT, THAT WE WANT TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING IF IT CAN GET SOMEWHERE, AND IF IT CAN'T GET ANYWHERE IT MIGHT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

Q: DID AFGHANISTAN COME UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, AND WHERE WILL YOU PLACE IT, C-PLUS OR C-MINUS, AND DID YOU COMPARE IT WITH THEIR POSITION IN GENEVA?

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SECTO

STATE FOR PA AND PA PRESS. DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. CLARK AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. ALLIN. USIA FOR P ASSOC. DIR. THOMPSON. P/RM. P/P. P/PFF. P/FW. P/FN. P/PFO MC KAY/CARL. B/BF. B/BXN. NEA. CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD. USIA ADVISER. MCDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BRIAN BELL

[redacted] WELL. WE AREN'T A PARTY TO THOSE DISCUSSIONS ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REPORTS FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S NEGOTIATOR, AND THE PAKISTANIS OF COURSE ARE INVOLVED AND WE HEAR FROM THEM, THEIR VIEW. WE FAVOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE AFGHAN SITUATION. IT'S A LITTLE HARD TO READ BUT OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE LATEST ROUND OF TALKS IN GENEVA HAVE NOT GOTTEN VERY FAR, BUT WE'LL HAVE MORE INFORMATION ON THAT. AT ANY RATE OUR VIEW IS THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING FOR THE WORLD TO GET THAT
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PROBLEM BEHIND US. WHAT IT TAKES, WE THINK, FOR THE PROBLEM TO BE GOTTEN BEHIND US IS, 1) AN AGREEMENT OF

THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEY WILL TAKE THEIR ARMED FORCES OUT OF THAT COUNTRY, 2) THAT THERE BE, A GOVERNMENT EMERGE IN AFGHANISTAN THAT IS A REFLECTION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY. AS FAR AS WE'RE CONCERNED WE WOULD EXPECT IT TO BE NONALIGNED, WE RECOGNIZE THAT REALITY. WE THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE REFUGEES, OF WHOM THERE ARE A GREAT MANY, BE ABLE TO RETURN WITH HONOR AND WITH SAFETY. SO THESE ARE THE TYPES OF THINGS THAT WE THINK CONSTITUTE A PROPER SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND SO FAR AS WE KNOW THERE ISN'T A LOT OF MOTION BUT MAYBE THERE IS MORE *INFORMATION THAT I HAVEN'T RUN ACROSS YET.*

Q: ONE LAST QUESTION. WHAT IS YOUR OVERALL VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN WEST ASIA?

[redacted] THAT'S A HARD QUESTION TO ANSWER IN A BRIEF MOMENT BECAUSE THERE IS SO MUCH TO IT. WE HAVE BEEN STRIVING VERY HARD ON TWO FRONTS, NUMBER ONE, WHAT WE CALL THE BASIC PEACE PROCESS, INVOLVING THE ISSUES OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND ASPIRATIONS AND SATISFYING THEM, WHILE ALSO DEALING ADEQUATELY WITH THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL, AND THIS INVOLVES YOU IN THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP AND THOSE ISSUES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND ON THE OTHER, THE OBJECTIVES WE THINK ARE THE RIGHT ONES IN LEBANON, WHICH AGAIN ARE THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, THE EMERGENCE OF LEBANON AS A COUNTRY ABLE TO BE SOVEREIGN AND RULE ITSELF. AND NUMBER THREE, REASONABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL'S NORTHERN FRONTIER, RECOGNIZING THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON HAS BEEN A PLACE FROM WHICH ISRAEL HAS HAD ATTACKS.
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SO, THOSE HAVE BEEN OUR OBJECTIVES. WE HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH EVERYBODY INVOLVED, ALTHOUGH ONLY INDIRECTLY WITH THE PLO -- WE DON'T HAVE ANY DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THEM. WE HAD BEEN TOLD DIRECTLY BY THE SYRIANS AND THE SYRIANS HAD TOLD THE LEBANESE AND OTHERS, INCLUDING HERE IN NEW DELHI AT THE TIME OF THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, THAT THEY WOULD WITHDRAW AS ISRAEL WITHDREW. AND OUR ARAB FRIENDS, AND I PERSONALLY HAVE A GREAT MANY, LEANED ON US VERY HARD AND SAID YOU MUST PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW. AND WE

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WORKED VERY HARD ON THAT, AND I PERSONALLY SPENT A LOT OF TIME ON IT WITH NICK VELIOTES, PHIL HABIB AND OTHERS, AND WE FINALLY DID GET AN AGREEMENT, HAVE AN AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDES FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AND I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW, IF WE CAN FIND AN AGREEMENT FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. AND NO DOUBT THE PLO WILL LEAVE, AS SYRIA DOES. I THINK THAT'S FAIRLY CERTAIN.

BUT RIGHT NOW, HOW TO CONVINCE SYRIA THAT IT SHOULD GET OUT OF LEBANON IS VERY DIFFICULT AND WE'RE WORKING AT THAT. OUR AMBASSADOR HABIB IS IN THE AREA, HAS BEEN FROM LAST WEEK AGAIN, AND SO YOU HAVE THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ISSUE.

AS FAR AS THE PEACE PROCESS IS CONCERNED, KING HUSSEIN IS READY TO SIT DOWN AND TRY TO WORK SOMETHING OUT WITH ISRAEL. AND I THINK THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM, THAT HE PUT FORWARD ON SEPTEMBER 1, LAST YEAR, RETAINS A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE AREA.

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SECTO

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KING HUSSEIN IS A SUPPORTER OF IT, AND KING FAHD IN THE LAST TIME I MET WITH HIM WAS VERY INTERESTED TO KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD STICK WITH IT AND RETAIN HIS PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE. BUT IN ORDER FOR THAT TO COME ABOUT KING HUSSEIN HAS TO HAVE A LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN DELEGATION WITH HIM, AND IT CAN'T BE PEOPLE FROM THE PLO. WE THOUGHT -- WE HAVE BEEN WORKING AT THAT OVER A LONG PERIOD -- AND WE THOUGHT, HOWEVER LONG AGO IT WAS, A COUPLE OF MONTHS, I GUESS, THAT WE FINALLY
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GOT IT AND THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT IT SEEMED BETWEEN ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN TO PROVIDE JUST THAT. BUT THEN

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ARAFAT WENT BACK TO HIS COUNCIL AND HE WAS NOT ABLE TO SELL IT OR AT ANY RATE IT FELL APART. AND SO NOW WE ARE TRYING TO RECONSTRUCT THINGS AGAIN TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE PROCESS.

IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO GET SOME FORWARD MOTION BECAUSE, AS IN EVERY NEGOTIATION -- WE HAVE ALL SEEN THIS, AND I KNOW YOU ALL HAVE -- YOU MOVE THINGS UP TO A CERTAIN POINT AND YOU GET THEM WHERE THEY ARE SOMEWHERE NEAR COMING TO FRUITION, AND THEN IF THEY DON'T COME TO FRUITION, AND NOTHING CAN GET SETTLED, THERE TENDS TO BE RECESSION, AND YOU HAVE A HARD TIME BUILDING BACK UP TO WHERE YOU WERE AGAIN.

SO, MAINTAINING SOME SENSE OF MOTION HERE IS IMPORTANT TO US AND IT'S ALSO VERY DIFFICULT. SO, THAT HAS LED US TO BE THINKING A LOT ABOUT WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE PLO. IS THE PLO BECOMING ESSENTIALLY A MOVEMENT DOMINATED BY SYRIA, OR IS IT BECOMING MORE RADICAL, HAS IT DISCARDED THE PEACE OPTION, SO-CALLED, AND RETURNED TO ESSENTIALLY A TERRORIST TACTIC? IT'S HARD TO READ AND WE ARE TRYING TO PUZZLE IT THROUGH.

IN THE MEANTIME, WE SAY TO OURSELVES MORE AND MORE IN ALL OF THIS MANEUVERING AROUND THAT THE PLO IS DOING, SYRIA'S DOING, ISRAEL'S DOING, AND OTHER PEOPLE ARE DOING. WHO IS THINKING ABOUT THESE HUMAN BEINGS THAT ARE CALLED PALESTINIANS? OUR CONCLUSION IS -- NOBODY. AT LEAST IT'S HARD TO SEE THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THESE HUMAN BEINGS ARE A PRIMARY MATTER ON ANYBODY'S MIND. AND THESE PEOPLE ARE IN VERY DESPERATE SHAPE, IN MY

OPINION. THEY ARE ACTIVISTS IN LEBANON, AND THE LEBANESE DO NOT LIKE THEM THERE. THE EXISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON HAS TORN THAT COUNTRY TO PIECES FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS. THEIR EXISTENCE ON THE WEST BANK, AND THE CONDITIONS THERE ARE NOT GOOD. AND WORST OF ALL THEY DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO ASPIRE TO. THERE IS NO WAY FOR THEM TO SAY THAT IF WE WORK HARD AND SEND OUR CHILDREN TO THE UNIVERSITY, THE NEXT GENERATION CAN HAVE SOMETHING AND SO ON, THE WAY YOU CAN HEAR PEOPLE IN OTHER SETTINGS, CAN THEY? THEY ARE, I THINK, DESERVING OF SOME ATTENTION, AND WE ARE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW

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WE MIGHT BE HELPFUL, RECOGNIZING IT IS VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT. AND SO I AM NOT PAINTING TO YOU A PICTURE OF A MAN WHO'S GOT THE ANSWERS, BUT IT'S A TOUGH, TOUGH SET OF PROBLEMS. WE ARE WORKING ON IT HARD AND WITH, I THINK, AN EFFORT TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE.

Q: HOW ARE THE TALKS GOING?

A: FINE. I HAD A GOOD SESSION WITH MRS. GANDHI AS WELL AS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. WE COVERED THE SAME KIND OF TOPICS YOU ASKED ABOUT AND I AM AFRAID THAT WE WOUND UP TAKING MORE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TIME THAN SHE PLANNED OR AT LEAST WAS LISTED ON THE SCHEDULE, BUT WE SEEMED TO HAVE (INDISTINCT) SHE'S GRACIOUS ENOUGH TO INVITE ME BACK FOR TEA THIS EVENING. I THINK IT'S BEEN VERY WELL WORTHWHILE.

Q: WHAT DO YOU EXPECT FROM INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS?
A: WE EXPECT TO HAVE, WANT TO HAVE, A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AND THE ABILITY TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF INTEREST TO BOTH THE COUNTRIES, WHETHER THEY ARE

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ACTION PA-02

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SECTO

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BILATERAL MATTERS OR MULTILATERAL MATTERS, SO THAT IF WE DISAGREE IT WON'T BE BECAUSE OF INCORRECT UNDERSTANDING AND WHERE WE CAN AGREE, WE BOTH BENEFIT FROM THAT. I'VE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE WORK OF THE JOINT COMMISSION AND THE VARIOUS SUBCOMMISSIONS -- THAT'S BEEN SORT OF A QUIET EFFORT, A NO-BIG-DEAL THING, BUT A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE BEEN WORKING AWAY IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER, AND SO WE WANT TO KEEP THAT GOING. I THINK IT'S A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL THING. AS I SAID IN THE BEGINNING, THE

EXISTENCE IN THIS REGION OF SUCH A LARGE, FREE, DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY HAVING A HEALTHY ECONOMY IS A VERY

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IMPORTANT, STABILIZING FACTOR HERE. WE WELCOME IT AND SUPPORT IT. WE THINK IT'S A GOOD THING FOR THE UNITED STATES. END TEXT. SHULTZ

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP [redacted] OPRC, IN
SUBJECT: CORRECTION IN TEXT OF [redacted] PRESS CONFERENCE

SEVERAL LINES WERE INADVERTENTLY DROPPED FROM THE TEXT OF [redacted] JULY 1 NEW DELHI PRESS CONFERENCE. THE FOLLOWING ANSWER AND SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION SHOULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE [redacted] ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION ON PAGE THREE OF REFTEL CONCERNING U.S.
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NUCLEAR DEVICE.

BEGIN SUBSTITUTE TEXT. [redacted] I HAVE NO INFORMATION WHATEVER ALONG THOSE LINES AND FROM ALL THAT I CAN SEE THERE IS NO SUCH INTENTION.

Q: THE NEXT PART OF THE QUESTION, SIR. HOW WILL THE PRESIDENT DEFEND HIS DECISION TO GRANT THE WAIVER OR THE SALE OF COMPONENT PARTS IF INDIA IS UNABLE TO LOCATE THEM ELSEWHERE?

[redacted] WELL, IF THERE IS A SALE THE PRESIDENT WILL DEFEND THE IMPORTANCE OF DOING THAT ON THE GROUNDS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS OPERATE IN A MANNER THAT TAKES DUE CONSIDERATION OF THE SAFETY AND HEALTH OF THE OPERATORS OF THE PLANT AND THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY. JUST AS WE SAID IN OUR STATEMENT, I THINK THOSE ARE GOOD STRONG GROUNDS. END SUBSTITUTE TEXT. PISTOR

NOTE BY OC/T: OMISSION OF REFTEL NUMBER. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 8, 1983
No. 272

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON HIS MIDDLE EAST VISIT
Islamabad, Pakistan
July 3, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: At the President's direction, I will be stopping in the Middle East on my way back to Washington rather than simply flying over it. I expect to have conversations at this point with the Heads of State of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it has been said many times since you were last in the Middle East that you would probably only go back if there were some expectation that your presence there was going to make a difference, particularly in some kind of negotiations to withdraw from Lebanon. Is that the criterion for this particular stop?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, I want to be in a position to give the President a firsthand account of the current situation in the Middle East and the views from the different countries. I think it's best to do that on the basis of a personal visit. In the process, if things can be moved along toward attainment of the objectives that we and others have set, then obviously I want to do that.

QUESTION: But you won't have any sense right now that the Syrians are ready to get on board?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I will, of course, be very interested to talk with the Syrians, and it remains to be seen what I will find. Obviously, they have made a great variety of statements that we all know about, but I want to hear firsthand from them what their views are and some of the reasons behind them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in a more specific way, will you be discussing with Israel its desire to achieve a partial withdrawal? Then will you attempt to use this partial withdrawal to get the Syrians to do likewise?

For further information contact:

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The implication of your question is that there will be some sort of shuttle back and forth. I'm not planning to do that. I'll discuss whatever anybody wants to bring up. Let me remind you that the President's objectives, and those of the Lebanese, the Israelis, and we would hope the Syrians and everyone else are, first of all, the leaving of Lebanon by all foreign forces completely. Second, the emergence of a sovereign Lebanon able to govern itself and blossom once again. And third, arrangements that ensure the security of Israel's northern border.

QUESTION: Again, to achieve that, Mr. Secretary, will one way be to ask Israel to set a firm withdrawal date for all of its foreign forces, along with a Syrian-PLO withdrawal, so that at least you have a date to work with and to offer the Syrians?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Just what will be discussed, of course, is a question of what people want to bring up with me. Our objectives are stated -- that's the key, that's the criterion by which we judge whatever it is that anyone may propose. I look forward to intensive discussion in each capital of these objectives and how to obtain them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you taking anything to any of these leaders in the Middle East -- anything in the way of a proposal to any of them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our objective remains the same, and we want to discuss with them how to get there, and what the current situation is, and how it may have changed. I might say also that the peace process and its importance remains very much alive. As we move along, the consideration of how to so combine the needs for security of Israel with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people remains a key objective for us.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder whether you would address a question that one of our colleagues put to you earlier today, whether your sudden decision to visit the Middle East represents an act of desperation to salvage the troop withdrawal plan that you negotiated on the last visit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It seems like a sudden decision because the President decided last night about it. Of course, we've been thinking about it for quite some time. Phil Habib, Morrie Draper and Dick Fairbanks have been in the area. As is always the case, the announcement of a visit by me tends to have an impact on what they can or cannot accomplish, so it's better not to insert an announcement too early. So, it isn't as though this is a sudden move. Certainly we want to review the bidding. It is important to try to bring about a withdrawal, and at this point, we don't have a reading on the Syrian situation. We very much want to get one.

QUESTION: But to characterize your trip as an act of desperation would prompt what sort of answer from you?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, hardly. Do I look desperate?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Syria rejected the arrangement for Lebanon and Israel, and did not receive Mr. Habib. Have you detected any possible change in their position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We haven't had any discussion about that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since your last trip out there, in your view has there been any change that is in a forward direction? Has Mr. Habib or any others been able to produce any movement in the situation which you now can capitalize on in another trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The situation is always an evolving situation. The conversations in the area that Ambassador Habib and others have had, I think, have been helpful to us, but as I said at the beginning I want to get a firsthand reading myself. The President wants me to get that so that I can report to him on just what the situation is.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have ruled out shuttle diplomacy, but shuttle diplomacy usually means frequent trips back and forth. Is it possible that this trip will not be a once-around and indeed you will have to carry from one party to another, and back again points of view?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am not expecting that that will emerge. Among other reasons, there is a great deal to do in Washington, and I need to get back. As you probably realize, I've been away for a while. So I need to get back.

QUESTION: Do you see any possibility of a breakthrough on this trip or any trip abroad on Lebanon, sir?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It would be a great blessing, and I'd certainly be delighted but I don't see any real prospect of it. Certainly, that's our objective, and should things so come forward that that was closer to possible we would be delighted.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you going to Saudi Arabia to ask the Saudis to try and persuade Syria to make some troop withdrawals or go along with the Israeli-Lebanon agreement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'll be seeking the views of King Fahd and his advisers on the removal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and also on the peace process more generally. I'll want to know what his views are and consult with him about next steps. That's the purpose of the Saudi Arabian visit.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did President Zia or Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan plan any role in setting up your visit to Damascus?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think so. If they did, I don't know of it. I have discussed the Middle East situation with the Foreign Minister and no doubt in the dinner this evening, President Zia and I will talk about it. But I don't know of any direct role that they may have played. They are very interested and they are very helpful and thoughtful people.

QUESTION: What would happen if Syria does not pull out? What would that mean in the Middle East?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are assuming on the basis of Syrian statements, that in one way or another way they intend to leave Lebanon. That's one thing they have always said and they've never contradicted that. Another question is, what are the circumstances under which they would leave Lebanon? They never said that they wouldn't leave.

QUESTION: Thank you very much.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 8, 1983
No. 302

PC #32

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
Islamabad, Pakistan
July 4, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would first like to express my appreciation to President Zia, to Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan, and to the people of Islamabad and the people of Pakistan generally for the hospitality with which I have been received, by the very thoughtful and enlightening conversations and the seriousness of purpose by which this visit has been treated. It has been a very fine experience for me, and I have benefitted greatly from it. I feel that the relationships between the United States and Pakistan, important as they are, have been advanced through our discussions of a great many bilateral matters. First of all, those covered by our Joint Commission effort, where there are a number of things already in motion and others that will be developed by the Commission activities. Second, by our discussion of various important bilateral matters. Particularly, it was interesting to me that on three different occasions we were able to discuss the narcotics problem, and I am greatly heartened by the reports that I was given on that. Finally, it has been a distinct privilege for me and my party to have this visit, marked as it has been by the chance to talk with the Afghan refugees and all the events surrounding that yesterday, to have this visit capped by a most hospitable and warm dinner last night with President Zia and a wide ranging conversation with him and his colleagues. So again I express my appreciation for not only the hospitality but also the content that has come with it during this visit. Now I will be glad to have questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as a result of your discussions with the Foreign Minister and President Zia, has there been any fine tuning of the United States-Pakistan position on Afghanistan, any change regarding what Pakistan will convey in the Geneva discussions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have shared views and, of course, I have been very interested in the Foreign Minister's report and analysis, and President Zia's, and we have, I think, become very well informed through an intense briefing at the staff level. Our objectives, I think, which we share completely, remain unchanged, and I would say in my analysis that the report that I've had that there isn't a sense of enough progress to make it worthwhile continuing the dialogue, but notso much as to make you think we're anywhere near the end of it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to divert your attention toward the interview of the Russian Ambassador in Pakistan who said that "Mr. Shultz is bringing the Soviet danger in his briefcase during his visit to Pakistan."

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I guess the origin of that question has never visited where we visited yesterday. It is not me that brings the Russian threat, it is the Russians who have brought it themselves with their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. We could see the human tragic fallout from that in the refugees, and particularly, I think the women and the children, the widows. So the Russian threat is there, has come forward as a result of Soviet aggressive behavior, nothing whatever to do with the United States. At the same time we join with Pakistan and others in deploring this action and in expressing our support for the Afgan freedom fighters.

QUESTION: Your Excellency, according to Pakistani papers, President Zia has talked to American Journalists last night that Israel had planned to attack Pakistan's vital installations. What would be the American reaction in this regard?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I didn't hear any such statement from President Zia, so the entire question is hypothetical, and I am not going to react to it.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Syrians have made clear their opposition to that agreement, so that has been stated and stated publicly on the record, so there that is. As I said yesterday, the purpose of the [illegible] is to gather information, to have firsthand basis for talking with the President when I return about the situation, the ideas that people have, and if in the process, the movement in the peace process, in the effort to remove all foreign forces totally from Lebanon, and see Lebanon emerge as a sovereign country in charge of its own frontiers, and with security for the northern border of Israel, those are our objectives, and if we can do something in serving them during the trip, certainly we are going to try.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary of State, while one can appreciate America's concern for strategic and security needs, what is the Reagan Administration's concern for the violation of human rights and the absence of social justice to the peoples of Asia?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the people of the United States, the President, are concerned about human rights problems everywhere in the world, including in the United States. It is a subject that is built into the character of the American people, and so we are always alert to problems and we try in as constructive a way as we can to help in doing something about them.

QUESTION: Your Excellency, this is Mir Abdul Aziz of UPP. I think that your government is aware of the burning issue of the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir which has been disturbing the relations between India and Pakistan for the last 35 years. In the recent elections in Indian-held Kashmir, not only Mrs. Indira Gandhi's party but all other Indian parties have been rejected by the muslims of Kashmir which proves that the issue of Kashmir is very much there and can prove at any time a danger. The point is what steps the American Government is going to take to solve the issue of Kashmir which is very much there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am not going to comment on questions of that kind, beyond saying this, that I found in India and I found in Pakistan a desire to improve the relationship between India and Pakistan. From the standpoint of the United States, a country that values its relationship with both countries, we certainly applaud that effort, we hope that it will, over a period of time, be eminently successful.

QUESTION: What makes you pessimistic about the outcome of your visit to the Middle East right now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't say I was pessimistic. I just described what I was going to do and the objective that I have. I think that given the fact that obviously there are acute problems in the Middle East and have been for a considerable period of time, it made sense as we thought about it and were in touch with our diplomats in the area to pay a visit on my way back to Washington rather than just fly over those problems, and that's what we are doing.

QUESTION: After the inaugural session of the Pak-US Joint Commission, the economic relations between the two countries will take a new turn. What do you say? And when do you think the next meeting of the Joint Commission will be held?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the work of the Joint Commission, I am sure, will follow the suggestions made by Minister Yaqub Khan at the meeting, namely that we will establish three subcommissions. These subcommissions will get into the operational detail, and they have produced something substantive for us to look at in the Joint Commission as a whole, then we will meet about that. We've had our overall meeting and we have put this process in motion. I think, as I remember your statement, you hope and I concur that we ought to have these subcommissions going before the end of the year. Again I call your attention to the fact that in each of the important areas involved there is already a lot of activity, so it isn't as though you have a standing start and you have to generate things. There is motion there. We think it can be accelerated, expanded, and qualitatively improved by the work of the subcommissions and the Joint Commission.

QUESTION: The 3.2 billion (dollar) deal between Pakistan and the United States is an important part of the economic assistance, but the recent congressional debates and the cuts authorized to foreign assistance have been a cause of concern here. Have you given any assurances to the Pakistani side regarding the American commitment for foreign assistance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have discussed this issue, and of course it is important to the President to get his program through the Congress. The issues involved, as we have discussed them here with President Zia, the Foreign Minister, are basically twofold. On one hand, there is the level and flow of assistance in terms of its magnitude and composition; and on the other hand, there is the question of the ability to plan for that continuing flow. Both problems are present. It is a problem that derives from our budget process in the United States, and we have done a variety of things about it including in particular the appointment of a commission headed by an eminent American, Frank Carlucci, who with a variety of others, and congressional involvement, are focusing on this issue. But I think that we are going to (inaudible) our effort and the picture looks good, but we do have always conflicts in the Congressional authorization and appropriation process, and that is the Congress constitution (inaudible) appropriate funds, and we work with them and trust that they will see matters our way.

QUESTION: Excellency, you have visited India. What is their perception with regard to the Afghanistan (inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to speak for another country. I think it is unwise for me to characterize their position on an issue and I would leave it to them to.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was about the spares for Tarapur. The issue that was posed was the question of spares for the Tarapur plant, and the President's pledge was that if they were unavailable from some other country, an effort will be made to find out the answer to that fact. Then the United States would be ready to supply the necessary parts. It is not a large volume -- particular things that are related to safety and health in the operation of that power reactor. I think the concerns for safety and health in the operation of nuclear power plants here-the dominant consideration. The decision stands on its own as an effort to serve those safety and health objectives.

QUESTION: You had an exchange of letters with Foreign Minister Gromyko on Afghanistan, and now you have had talks with Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan. In two or three months'time the UN Envoy will get in touch with the Soviet Union in Moscow on the subject of guarantees and other questions related to the Afghanistan issue. Do you think these UN talks will go on for years as other talks have gone on for five or six years? What is your assessment? How soon can this question be solved?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think it is a mistake to try and put some sort of deadline down on talks of that kind. At the same time, obviously nobody concerned wants to have talks that just drag on endlessly and pointlessly and the possibility of not coming out with something constructive. The expert on that subject is sitting on my right, but I have already characterized what my understanding of the situation is, and I don't want to repeat it.

QUESTION: Your excellency, don't you feel that the Russian attitude toward Pakistan has become stiffer day by day? In this background, can we trust you regarding our security?

ANSWER: Well, what the Russian attitude is toward Pakistan is a question I think the Foreign Minister should address himself to. As far as the United States is concerned, we have a close relationship with Pakistan. We have a security relationship with Pakistan, and we share concerns about Soviet behavior, particularly as it is exhibited in Afghanistan. We are supporting each other in the effort to deter Soviet agression there, and I might say we have the same attitude as a worldwide proposition.

QUESTION: You know that the day Mr. Secretary landed here, there was an incident in the Parachinar area. A plane flew into it, into Parachinar, and indulged in bombing. And it was a coincidence that when Mr. Brzezinski came here, on the eve of that visit also, there was a similar incident. Do you have any reading into it, or do you think it is just a stray incident?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't have any basis for knowing of any particular connection.

QUESTION: How do you find the long-term prospects of a strong and enduring relationship with Pakistan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think the prospects for the relationship of the United States and Pakistan in the long-term are excellent, and the reason is that we are building this relationship on a solid foundation of bilateral interests that we have with each other. And then we are moving from that to interests we have in common about various problems around the world. But the foundation is the direct relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and as that grows it tends to be self-reinforcing. We are looking at it just as you implied in your question -- as a long-term proposition and not as some sort of a quick relationship.

QUESTION: How do you view your meeting with Zia Ul Haq?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was an excellent meeting from my standpoint. First of all, the President organized it as a small group of people, so we were able to sit around for the entire time and have intense conversation. We covered a wide range of subjects, and I found it a very worthwhile conversation. I might say, having met with President Zia before -- this is my first time in Pakistan and over an extended period of time, that he comes across as a man of great ability and with a very wide range of knowlege and insights, and so I benefitted greatly from the conversation.

QUESTION: Does the American Government have interest in the restoration of elected democracy in Pakistan? Was this the subject of discussion with President Zia and what is the American reaction to such proposals as he might have been making?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, we are always interested in movements in the direction of democracy. It is my understanding that there will be a statement about this subject. I don't know what the contents of it will be, but there will be a statement about this subject in the middle of August. We look forward to that with keen anticipation.

QUESTION: What are you going to do in the event of a Russian attack on Pakistan? Or any attack by Afghan surrogates on Pakistan? What will you do?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to answer hypothetical questions. I described the strength and work of the relationship between the United States and Pakistan, and beyond that, hypothetical questions will have to go to the side.

QUESTION: Sir, there have been reports that there has been a new agreement between the USSR and India for provision of five billion dollars of arms. That would further increase Pakistan's fear and insecurity. How do you look at this situation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Various people have asked about that, but I haven't seen any substantiation of that report.

QUESTION: Why is the U.S. still opposing the peaceful nuclear program of Pakistan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The United States Government is not opposing the development of nuclear power for peaceful uses in Pakistan. It was notable to me that President Zia went out of his way to assure me that that, and only that, was the objective of the Government of Pakistan. We discussed this last night.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

July 13, 1983
No. 280

PC. #30

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
UPON DEPARTURE
Jidda, Saudi Arabia
July 5, 1983

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what you have accomplished in your discussions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all I'd like to express my appreciation to His Highness, His Majesty, for receiving me and my party and for the very worthwhile and constructive discussions we had last night. From my standpoint, in addition to the various things we discussed, analyses of the situation and expectations, it was most gratifying to see with King Fahd that we continue to share the objectives of the removal of all foreign forces in Lebanon; of the desire to see Lebanon emerge as a country sovereign and able to rule within its borders. While we recognize the importance of security arrangements that seek that Lebanon not be a base from which hostile actions might occur to any of its neighbors --to Syria or Israel-- in addition, we see that we continue to share the objectives of seeking an active peace process that among other things, addresses itself to legitimate rights and concerns of the Palestinian people. So, I think the reaffirmation of the importance of these objectives and our discussions of analyses of the situation and things to do about it were most worthwhile from my standpoint and again I am very grateful to you, Your Highness, and to His Majesty for the time, and particularly at this season of the year for your willingness to break off from other things and meet with us.

PRINCE SAUD: We are very pleased, Mr. Secretary, to receive you here and on my part we affirm we also share the hope that Lebanon will achieve its independence and towards this end Saudi Arabia has cooperated in the past, and will cooperate in the future. In the discussions, also, we were very pleased to hear from the Secretary that the United States continues to pursue discussions towards this objective, independence for Lebanon and also accommodating the overall Middle East problem, the rights of all the Palestinian people. We had had fruitful discussions with the Secretary and we hope that in this tour in which he will visit other countries that from the discussions will emerge all sorts of steps that will move the peace process forward,

For further information contact:

and an important and significant result will be withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and for Lebanon to achieve and maintain its security in full dignity and independence. We are pleased to receive you in this month of Ramadan and any other month.

QUESTION: Mr. Minister, you talk about the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Does Saudi Arabia, also as the United States does, want to see the withdrawal of Syrian forces as well from Lebanon?

PRINCE SAUD: Sir, we don't equate the two forces. As I said, the Israelis are occupying forces. We want to see their withdrawal and we want also to see Lebanon be able to maintain its security through its armed forces and internal security forces and therefore no need .....

QUESTION: Does that extend to forces from any other Arab country? Is the Golan Heights issue being linked to the Lebanon situation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Golan Heights didn't come up in the discussion at all.

QUESTION: Were there any contributions, any ideas that emerged in your conversations last night, that could promote the process of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon? That you could take to President Assad for example?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to discuss the details of matters of approach we are going to use, but I consider that the discussion was a very fruitful one and is going to be helpful to me as I approach these meetings, and as I am sure our friends from Saudi Arabia will approach their own contacts with the countries.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, has this trip changed in character from an information gathering trip to a negotiating trip? It sounds like you were making more headway than simply gathering information.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that my objective was to gather information to help move the process along as I can, and be in a position to give President Reagan a firsthand account of the views of His Majesty and the other leaders of the region, when I return.

QUESTION: But has it become more than that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think I have said what I have to say.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 5, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR WILLIAM BROCK
ON SPECIALTY TRADE

Winder Building
Washington, D.C.

2:00 P.M. EDT

MR. DEMAREST: Ambassador Brock will have some opening remarks to make. We'll have copies of those remarks available in just a few minutes and then we'll take your questions.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I am pleased to announce that President Reagan decided today to grant four years of import relief to the specialty steel industry in the form of digressive tariffs for stainless steel sheet and strip and plate and quotas based on the U.S.I.T.C. recommended minimum import tonnages with a three percent annual growth factor for stainless steel bar, rod and alloy tool steel.

This import relief program under Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is an important part of the President's comprehensive program to address both the serious injury found in the 201 investigation as well as the serious distortions in the world steel trading environment in which our industry must compete.

Trade problems in the specialty steel area have been widespread. These difficulties stem from persistent excess productive capacity, some of it uneconomic and supported by subsidies as well as trade restrictive and distortive practices used by many of our trading partners to respond to protect their industries and stimulate exports. In requesting the 201 investigation, the President noted these distortive practices and expressed his concern that a partial remedy against unfair imports could be rendered meaningless by a substitution of new foreign suppliers for those whose shipments were effected by unfair trade law findings.

On the fifth of May then, the United States ITC or International Trade Commission sent its recommendations to the President following the completion of the 201 investigation. The ITC found that imports from all sources had caused serious injury to our domestic specialty steel producers. Increased imports during a period of reduced demand resulted in severe losses last year which threaten this industry's ability to make the necessary investments to remain competitive in this technologically advanced field. The relief that the President is imposing today is designed to remedy this serious injury. The President's decision to impose relief under Section 201 is part of his comprehensive approach to trade problems in specialty steel. This program has, as its objective, the reversal of global trends towards excess capacity, greater subsidization, and protected home markets in order to bring to an end the -- an end, excuse me, bring an end to constant trade disputes in this sector.

This is the very essence of the commitment made by the President and the other heads of state at the Williamsburg Summit, that we would make every effort, working together, to achieve a free and open trading system.

I think that will conclude the formal statement. I would be delighted to respond to your questions.

MORE

Q What happens to the European companies which are punished already by counterveiling duties issued, I believe, the end of May? Are they exempted from these measures?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, in the case of the tariffs on the flat roll products, for example, the tariff would be additional to any finding of a counterveiling duty. And if the country or company wanted to petition for a change in that formulation, they would have to do so to the ITC on the basis of the original finding in the context of the new tariff.

Q Mr. Ambassador, at the time the President referred this case, last November, to the International Trade Commission for an advisory ruling, he also asked your office to undertake discussions with other countries on the type of trade distorting practices you talked about. He now again talks about entering into negotiations, but my question is, have you held some of these discussions and with whom and what was the outcome of that?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, we have. I think the delay of any action, frankly, was caused by the desire of people to wait and see what the finding of the ITC might be and then the final decision of the President. Now that we have taken an action that is not only consistent with U.S. law but with the GATT, we should have an opportunity to hopefully address some of the trade barriers in other countries, some of the trade distorting practices.

You've got to understand -- I think one of the problems we have, particularly in the steel area -- there's virtually no free trade in the world -- in world steel. Most of the countries engage in some distorted practice, some unfair practice -- subsidies in one case, government intervention through tariff or non-tariff barriers in other cases, but an enormous amount of cartelization and government intervention. Under those circumstances, your basic goal has to be to increase our leverage to reduce those unfair practices.

I think we have chosen a method that gives us the greatest opportunity to do that. And that's precisely why this route was picked.

Q Mr. Ambassador, some of the steel executives have openly opposed tariffs, saying that they feel that no matter what level of tariff you put on specialty steel coming into this country, foreign countries that are targeting the specialty steel industry can cut the prices below that and so that the tariffs would be ineffective. Could you comment on that? And does this decision today give your office any leverage to deal with that kind of a practice if, in fact, you find that it's occurring?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, I think -- you know, that's a fair comment on their part and one that we've very much tried to take into account. And that's why we drew the distinction between the flat-rolled products and the rod, bar, and tool categories; because the ITC, in its finding, said that these first two categories, where we put the tariffs on, they're -- frankly, they're low tariffs and they phase down to zero very quickly. But even there they did find that those categories were the most price sensitive and, therefore, that the tariff could have an effect of relieving the injury caused.

On the larger percentage of imports, where the percentage was a higher share of the U.S. market, on the other three categories, we felt that the quotas were the only way to achieve two objectives. One is to remedy the injury that had been caused, and, secondly, to demonstrate our concern with the unfair trade practices of a number of other countries, which we hope will be reduced over the next two months of negotiations.

Q Mr. Ambassador, we've been on this route before with specialty steel, with quotas. The President -- imposed quotas, and they were lifted after the three-year period.

What makes you think that the results this time, the four-year experiment, will be more effective than they were for the three-year experiment?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I don't think you can say that the earlier relief was not effective. If you'll look at the record, we did make a great deal of concentrated investment in the flat-rolled area. We have, I think, as competitive an industry as there is in the world. And that's why this case is so incredible. We don't need any protection at all in a free market, in an open trading system. Our companies can compete. The frustration is that they haven't been given the opportunity to do so by the pressures of so many governments.

Now, in the areas --

Q -- a couple of years later --

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, no. Let me be precise. The relief that was given before did offer an opportunity for investment. That opportunity was taken. The companies have modernized, and therefore we limited the relief to a very low tariff in that particular category. If the four years that we have granted are used in a similarly effective fashion, as we have been told it would be in these other three categories of rod, bar, and tool, then I think we've solved the problem.

Q Well, permanently -- a need to come back in 1988 with another three- or four-year quota?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I think hopefully we have used a sufficient two-by-four this time to indicate that we just can't continue to tolerate a world system that is totally trade distortive, where governments intervene at will without any consideration of international rule. If we can stop that kind of practice, we can get to a true open competitive system. That's what we committed to do, by the way, in Williamsburg.

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And that's why this is an important step for this government to take.

Q -- what about -- is there enough produced in the United States or insufficiently produced in the United States? Have provisions been made as in the prior case?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes. We accepted, completely, the ITC's advice on razor blade steel and products of that sort. All of the products that they recommended be exempted are exempted by the President's order.

Q Thank you very much.

Q Mr. Ambassador, why four years, that particular time period? I see you recommended three. The industry wanted five. (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR BROCK: We found what we hope was a happy medium. (Laughter.) We honestly felt that the industry made a good case for a longer period in reducing the quantitative restrictions asked. We thought it was fair to give them a bit more time. And this way, it is a less protectionist or restrictive step and, yet, one which does give them the opportunity for adjustment, to address the previous question I got, so that, hopefully, we can stop these interventions once and for all.

Q Mr. Ambassador, how did the limits -- the market shares compare to the industry recommendation -- are they higher ceilings, lower ceilings?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: It's different. I'm not sure that you could make a complete statement across the board. In the case of the three quota categories, we granted a three percent annual growth rate because that was about twice the normal growth rate over the historic -- the period of the last decade or so. And we thought that would be adequate to allow competition to work effectively.

I just don't know how -- frankly, we've never tested the concept of market shares in the GATT. So we don't know how the ruling might come down anyway. But I'm not sure we're willing to say somebody has a fair share of the U.S. market -- whether they engage in fair practices or not. The question is: are they competing fairly or not. If they're competing fairly, they ought to have full and free access to this market, period. If they're not, then I think we have to take more specific remedies, which is precisely what we've chosen to do.

But we can't say that we're going to guarantee a market share of the U.S. economy whether or not the practices are fair. That doesn't make sense to me.

Q Mr. Ambassador, is it your understanding that Congress has a review authority over this decision of the President. Or did that expire with the recent Supreme Court case along with legislative vetoes?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, it's my judgment that the Congress has review authority over everything that is done in the trade area. I have a joint responsibility to the President and to the Congress. They have a Constitutional right to that jurisdiction as far as I'm concerned.

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Whether they can engage in some veto of this action remains to be seen after the Supreme Court decision. But we will submit it to them and consider, very carefully, their reaction.

Q Mr. Brock, I was interested in your use of -- I think the words that you chose specifically, "to use this remedy," to, sort of, signal the U.S. resolve to, overall -- in many cases, do away with subsidies and the EEC practices. I'm wondering if you would comment? You just concluded some agriculture talks, the first round in the series in that, in which there was no movement to roll back or dismantle, even to really study those subsidies by the EEC. You now have this steel decision coming out, which is again pushing a year or two forward and saying, "address it on the other side." Is the timing of this crucial? Is it your sense that it's the time for this administration to, once again, put this before Europe and say, "we're not falling back on these demands?"

AMBASSADOR BROCK: First of all, I don't want to single out Europe as being engaged in unfair practices either in steel or in agriculture. We have mentioned a few other countries in this breath -- Japan and others -- with regard to agriculture. But the timing is consequential.

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I think it's obvious that the United States feels very strongly about the need to open up the world's trading system and to expand world markets.

It's obvious that that sentiment is not shared by all of our trading partners. And there are going to be other occasions in the future when we have to take perhaps more direct action, as we have in this case.

Q Did you discuss this -- I'm sure that you informed your trading partners that this decision was coming down. Did they at that time in any way indicate that they would go immediately into negotiations with you?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No, we did not try to spell out the detail to that degree, in all honesty. And they will have plenty of time now to look at it and to see if OMAs would be a preferable route for them. It is entirely up to them. We do not intend to impose that judgment on any individual country. We do say that there trade practices are a matter of concern to us and would be in any such conversation.

But the decision is entirely theirs. And I don't know what the several countries may do. You may -- I'm sure you do not know that most of the countries that have communicated with us, except perhaps for one, had requested that we impose quotas across board. I'm not sure that anybody is going be totally satisfied with the mix that we have adopted. But we chose it very carefully because of the President's commitment at Williamsburg, because of the commitments that we made for this government at the OECD meeting in Paris and the commitments we made last November in Geneva to try to open up this system.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I'm having a little trouble understanding how -- if the specialty steel industry is the most -- in the world -- why they have to make progress, as this press release says, towards adjustment. What can they do if their competitors -- or the cause of the problem is the pervasive unfair trading practice of the other countries?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The degree of competitive circumstance varies by product category. In all honesty, the primary competitive strength is in the flat-rolled area and the sheet plate/strip groups. And they have the investment there and are, in my judgment, competitive and could compete freely and fairly in a world market that was open.

The unfair trade practices of others have made investment in the last few years -- two or three years particularly -- almost impossible so they have not been able to carry that investment program forward in the three remaining categories of rod, bar and tool. Now, the fact that the trade is unfair has a legal connotation, but it also has an economic effect -- that it keeps us from making the investments that allow us to remain the most competitive industry in the world.

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And this remedy gives us time to take account of the injury that has occurred because of those practices.

Q Mr. Brock, can you give us the tonnages on those three products --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes, we should have for you a release that has --

Q It showed the year one which I assume is the year forward, not the --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I'm sorry.

MR. DEMAREST: What year are you asking for?

Q What were the tonnages prior to the limits that would go on to year one --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Oh, the tonnages of -- for 1982?

Q Yes, of --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Do you have that?

MS. CURTISS: Yes -- Yes, we can get it for you. Takes a few minutes to find out -- anyone who wants to hear about it -- glad to find out for them.

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Can we get him that detail when this is over with? Because I'm going to run out of time very shortly; but -- there's one or two --

MR. DEMAREST: You have time for about one or two more questions.

Q -- this report that the President was given six options. Which -- is this one of those six options?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

Q Which one was it? (Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR BROCK: The one that he chose. I think it was the third; but I'm not sure.

Q Whose recommendations?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Mine.

Q Your office?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes.

Q How much time did the President spend on this decision?

AMBASSADOR BROCK. A good deal. We all did. It was a very complicated and difficult decision because this is simply not a straightforward issue in the mix of the problem that we've had in -- as it's developed over the last 10 years.

And I shouldn't have said he had six options. I don't remember whether it was precisely six or not. I think it was a little less than that, as a matter of fact. Either four or five.

But that says that everybody that wanted to suggest something suggested it and it was considered an option. I don't know that I could take all of those as the clear choice kind of things.

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Q Mr. Ambassador, were you pretty much in agreement that something should be done at the -- should follow the ITC's recommendations?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes. I think you have to enforce the U.S. trade laws. If you don't do that, you are going to make the problem worse; but you have to do so in a way that opens up the system. And I think that's where we were wrestling the issue to the ground among these several options: What would have the greatest impact, not just in terms of providing a remedy for the injury, but of doing something more fundamental to open up the system over the longer term. And that's where I think the President's decision was remarkably good.

Q Mr. Brock, Lloyd McBride has just said at the National Press Club that any tariffs would be totally inefficient and that they wouldn't work and that the tariffs would -- to the extent that tariffs had been substituted for quotas, they would be totally against the steelworkers' union. How do you react to that?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, I have an enormous respect for him. He's a very talented and a very able and a good man. I think that I would like to react to it after he's had time to look at this decision, study it very carefully and see how it works and then I'll react to whatever he says at that time.

Q Mr. Ambassador, not all of our trading partners, I think, will go along with the comment that this remedy follows the declaration of the leaders of Williamsburg. And many of them have commented that this administration is more free trade in its rhetoric than its practices, going to the motorcycle case and others. How do you react to that?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, I just happen to disagree. I think the administration has shown an enormous amount of courage in trying to move, not just our whole country, but the world system towards a more open process. Had we not exercised that leadership of the last two years, it is my judgment that the world would be a far more dangerous and more protectionist place than it is today. We're not perfect; we're not without sin. We've never said that we were. But our goal is abundantly clear. And that is to keep moving in the direction of openess and of greater trade. And I think this comports with that.

Q How much -- I don't understand exactly how this opens up the system -- could you run through that scenario again?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: It seems to me that the one way to be very sure that we walk away from that commitment is to not enforce U.S. trade laws and to not enforce our international obligations. If we simply go through the exercise of analyzing a problem, finding that there are unfair trading practices -- as we have done in case after case after case in this category -- finding serious injury, and taking no action at all, that you are inviting an explosion in this country and particularly in the Congress that would be reminiscent of Smoot-Hawley and worse.

And it seems to me that the first and most important step you have to take in moving towards a better trade in the environment is to enforce your laws adequately and effectively; but to be very precise in the way that you do it. Your objective has to be to open up the system. And if, in fact, we -- in our discussions with other countries -- if they see fit to choose to talk about OMAs, as opposed to being part of a overall quota, if we focus on those unfair trade practices in which they engage, and do, in fact, get results that reduce those practices, we have moved the system ahead.

Q Mr. Brock, should we expect to see, or not to see, moves similar to this involving quotas and tariffs in other areas, say over the next year and a quarter or so?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: I don't know of any immediate industries that would be subject to a similar type of approach. It's possible; but nothing occurs to me as to being in the near-term offing.

Q Would the administration welcome and be willing to consider quotas in other fields?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No. I don't think we would, in all honesty. When you've got a clear case of subsidy, government intervention -- there are countries on this list that will be affected that sell us product, and we're not allowed to sell one single pound of our product in those countries. Now, that simply doesn't work, and it isn't going to work anymore. We just can't continue to let that situation obtain. So, that's a different situation when you say "Let's just have quotas, per se," that implies whether the trade is fair or unfair in category after category, and I don't believe this President would support anything of that sort. I certainly would not.

Q How will you handle those cases -- you're talking about OMAs and things of that nature --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: If cases are requested just to provide protection -- for protectionism's sake -- we, in my judgment, will reject those requests.

Q Isn't it right that they, in that same speech, at the press club was complaining about the proposed deal between U.S. Steel and a British steel corporation -- I'm sure you're more familiar with it than I am. The idea behind it is that they're going to come in, I guess, and take over a large amount of the steel production in Philadelphia -- how do you react to something like that?

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AMBASSADOR BROCK: With a good deal of concern. But, I think that it's a little bit hazardous yet to start commenting on it without looking at it in terms of the anti-trust implications -- and that's not really my purview. But I would expect that the administration would look at that sort of activity, as we would any other, to be sure that it is, in fact, improving and not regressing the system.

Q Mr. Brock, one more question --

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Yes?

Q Are you saying that you're opening up the system by enforcing the laws to avert Congressional protectionist action?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: No. I'm saying that I hope the effect of these actions will not simply be to put a low tariff on that's phased out over four years, or a -- reasonably high quotas in terms of market penetration in the other categories. I hope that the effect of this step will be to do more than remedy the injury that has occurred because of the unfair practices, I hope the effect of it would be to get rid of the practices that caused the problem -- on the part of other governments.

Q And how do you see that then occurring?

AMBASSADOR BROCK: Well, that's really what the country-by-country negotiations process will be all about. If, in fact, countries want to negotiate, embarking on agreements with us under this rubric, we will do so. But, we will be discussing something more than just the quotas.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:26 PM EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

July 11, 1983 - 4:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. We're on background. The information is attributable to a senior American official. [redacted]

[redacted]

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you. I wasn't present at Hans-Dietrich Genscher's press readout, but I've gotten some reports. Based on those reports, I think his statement would go pretty much for us as well.

I think that we were very pleased by the opportunity to be debriefed on Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow. We had very good sessions both here in the State Department, I think. We had a lengthy meeting this morning with Secretary Shultz, then a lunch, and after lunch, went over to the White House where the Foreign Minister met with the President and a smaller meeting in the situation room with Judge Clark.

I guess the first point we'd make is that this is just another example of the very close consultation underway on security and East-West issues that we carry out with the Alliance -- and specifically, in this case with the Federal

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Republic of Germany.

We were very pleased by the very precise and clear position that Chancellor Kohl took in Moscow, his emphasis on Germany's role within the Alliance, his position as a leading member of the EC and its alliance with the United States. We support the overall concept elaborated by the Chancellor in Bonn, the East-West relations, that is firmness on the one hand and a readiness for dialogue on the other.

We, of course, fully support the message on INF delivered by the Chancellor, that is that we will continue to seek an agreement in Geneva, that there is no doubt in the determination of the Alliance as a whole, or in Washington or in Bonn, that in the absence of an agreement that the deployments will begin on schedule.

In addition to the INF message, we were told today by the Foreign Minister about the Chancellor's discussion of humanitarian issues during his visit to Moscow, human rights cases, as well as his discussion of the Madrid conference, where we share with Bonn the desire for a speedy conclusion of the Madrid talks.

The Foreign Minister did tell us that the United States came under heavy criticism during the visit to Moscow on its negotiating posture in Geneva, but that the Chancellor rejected this criticism saying that that criticism was tantamount to

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criticism of Bonn, because our negotiating positions had been worked out in such close consultation. These were not U.S. negotiating positions, in other words; they were Alliance negotiating positions.

We also share with the Chancellor the desirability of contacts with the Soviet Union, and we share the view that a summit could be productive, if it is carefully prepared and has a good possibility of producing concrete results.

I will be happy to take any questions you might have.

(Continued on page 4.)

Q As he left the White House, Mr. Genscher said that it was his expectation that the Soviets are going to drop their suggestion for including the British and French arsenals in the negotiations.

A As I say, I wasn't there. I'm not sure that is an accurate depiction of his view. What he told us was that the Chancellor took a very strong position in Moscow in opposition to the inclusion of the British and French systems. The Foreign Minister himself noted that in a previous visit to Moscow in 1980, presumably I guess with former Chancellor Schmidt, that in the discussion of INF and INF negotiations that the Soviets had not raised the British and French forces problem. But I'll let the Foreign Minister speak for himself. I'll have to check my notes.

Q The exact quote was that it was his hope and expectation that the Soviets would drop that demand.

A Well, it's certainly our hope that they will drop that demand.

Q What about the other part, the expectation?

A I just couldn't say. That's asking us and it's asking me to speculate.

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Q But is that what he told you, though?

A No, I just told you what he told me. That he took a very strong position, that the Chancellor took a strong position in Moscow against their inclusion.

Q In relation to the Madrid Conference, when you say you both share the desire for a speedy conclusion, what is the likelihood of the U.S. accepting the compromise tabled by the Swiss delegation last Friday for overcoming this question of how the follow-up conference on human contacts will be handled?

A As you may know, Max Kampelman, our Ambassador to the CSCE Conference is back in Washington for consultations and we are reviewing -- as you know, earlier we supported the Spanish Initiative for a compromised settlement. We endorse that.

We hope that we can reach a decision that will make it possible for us to reach a speedy conclusion. But since Max Kampelman has just returned, we're still consulting, and no decision has been taken.

Q What do the West Germans tell you confidentially or otherwise is the real situation of Andropov's health?

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A What we heard today was that he is a man, despite possible physical problems, is intellectually very keen and in control of the subject matter.

Q So a meeting with Andropov would be productive if you had it sometime soon, or what do you think?

A I just wouldn't know. But he does seem, again, to be able to master the subject matter.

Q Why is Kampelman delaying his departure going back to Madrid?

A He is not delaying his departure.

Q We were told today that he was leaving tonight and then there was a later announcement that he's leaving tomorrow.

A That may be a personal matter.

Q Will he meet with the President?

A I don't know.

Q Could I pin you down a little more on exactly on what you told Chancellor Kohl about the idea of high-level meetings. Both here and at the White House that's the one thing that came through was that high-level meetings are desirable and that goes for U.S.-Soviet high-level meetings, and I assume that's a

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sentiment he must have expressed directly to you and to the President.

Can you give us a clear idea of exactly what the U.S. side said?

A We have had high-level meetings. As you know, the Secretary of State has met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. As you also know, the Secretary of State has regular meetings here in Washington with the Soviet Ambassador. In Moscow, our Ambassador also holds meetings with various officials. We're not opposed to high-level meetings, in principle.

Although no decision has been made, but as you know in the U.N. General Assembly the Secretary of State normally meets with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Our position on a summit, though, is the same one we have had for sometime, and that is, we do not want to have a merely atmospheric summit, one that raises expections that doesn't produce real results. So that requires some dialogue and it requires some imagination. We want to carefully prepare such a meeting so that it will produce something of note.

Q On this point, could you characterize the

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way in which Genscher talked about it? Was he strongly in favor of this high-level meeting?

A We had heard before that there is clearly a desire in Bonn for a U.S.-Soviet dialogue. At the same time, both today, the Foreign Minister as well as the Chancellor, and I can recall at Williamsburg, agreed enthusiastically with our view that such a meeting has to be carefully prepared. I do believe that the German Foreign Minister made reference to that fact today outside the West Wing.

Q Did Genscher give you an idea whether he or Kohh or both thought such a meeting as a summit would be productive in their view, from what they got from Andropov?

A That's a difficult question to answer because it gets into this question of careful preparations and the dialogue we have underway. They would support a well prepared summit. I think that's what they've said.

Q No, but that it would be from what they saw the Russians, that the Russians were really willing to talk.

A Again, this is just reporting what they told us, and I think they've said it publicly, that their

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position seems to be similar to ours. They also talk about the need for a summit and the need for careful preparations.

Q There was a story out of Bonn on Friday saying that Genscher was going to report to the White House that Andropov indicated the Soviets would like to resume the INF talks a week earlier as a show of their interest in the negotiations.

Did he in fact report that, and is there any problem with that?

A We heard nothing about that today.

Q You haven't heard it from any source?

A No.

Q Did Mr. Genscher talk in any detail about his impression of Andropov's hopes and aspirations for Soviet-American relations?

A It would be fair to say that he mentioned the extent to which the Soviets did discuss the United States, and seemed to focus on the United States as a primary foreign policy concern, which is consistent with our discussions with the Soviets and other reports that we've had.

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Q There have been reports, I believe, on Friday, apropos of your comment saying that the deployment will begin on schedule, that the deployment could not physically begin on schedule for a technical reason.

A That was another mistaken report. That story is totally wrong; that we will be ready to deploy the Pershing II on schedule, i.e., by the end of the year.

Q Will they be operational before March?

A It will have its IOC, initial operating capability, by the end of the year.

Q Also on the Pershing deployment, the Soviets, through their assets in Germany, the United States and elsewhere, such as the Green Party, the peace movement and so, are publicly engaged in an all-out campaign of destablization of the Kohl Government and of the Reagan Administer through the Briefing Gate scandal run by the Harriman wing of the democratic party.

Did this question come up, to your knowledge, either in the Kohl-Andropov meetings or was it something raised by the Administration with Genscher here?

A No.

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Q If the Madrid Conference is concluded --

Q Just to make sure I'm absolutely clear, no aspect of the Soviet operations to destablize Germany or the United States was brought up at all?

A No. The fact that the Soviet Union would like to play on domestic opinion, particularly in the FRG, is something we well understand. It's a problem that we're confident that the Kohl Government can cope with.

(Continued on next page)

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Q If, in fact, there is agreement after concluding the Madrid Conference soon, is there any problem in Secretary Shultz going to that meeting?

A No decision has been taken because we don't have an agreement yet on a concluding document. There has been a suggestion that the concluding ceremony where such a document could be initialed would be attended by Foreign Ministers, but that is all at this stage tentative.

These are only suggestions short of an agreement.

Q When might the decision on Madrid come?

A I can't say.

Q Would the United States require progress, or the promise of progress, I should say, on both INF and START for a Geneva conference? I mean, for a conference with the Soviets.

A You mean a summit.

Q A summit. Yes.

A I don't think we go so far as to specify precisely what kind of progress is necessary. We say that we want careful preparation, and we want the good possibility of progress in such a meeting. So I don't think it would be wise for me to specify exactly where progress would have to occur. But, obviously, progress in either of those two negotiations would improve the atmosphere for such a meeting.

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Q Speaking broadly -- I mean, when Kohl went to Moscow, there was this expectation that perhaps his visit would be the occasion for the Soviets to offer either a new position or at least suggestions of a new position in the INF talks, and all public appearances are that that didn't happen.

Have you heard anything privately to indicate that they got hints of a new position or suggestions of a forthcoming new position or anything along those lines?

A Obviously, I can't go into all the details, but what I can tell you is that we're not aware of a brand new Soviet negotiating position. Their position thus remains what it has been, which is that the bottom line they want to maintain a complete monopoly in INF capabilities, and that they're not willing to think of any negotiating outcome that provides for the deployment of one single U.S. system which remains an unacceptable outcome for us.

Let me just make one other point which really isn't related to your question, but it's a point that needs to be made to gain some perspective on this.

I think that what we've seen in the last week is a pretty remarkable demonstration of alliance cohesion, and I remember very well sitting down where you people were three years ago when Helmut Schmidt went off to Moscow in the middle of the summer following the December '79 decision, and there was a good deal of suspicion, skepticism and concern here in Washington about what was going to take place in the Schmidt-Brezhnev meetings. There was concern about the extent to which Bonn and Washington were on the same wavelength, worries about the degree to which they shared, they had the same understanding, about what the December '79 decision meant, and the difference is very striking where this Administration has had complete confidence in the Chancellor's visit to Moscow. We're extremely pleased by the results of that, the firmness that he demonstrated there, as well as the openness for dialogue, and I think that that element -- the U.S.-German element of the Kohl visit to Moscow -- is a very important one.

Q When the Chancellor left -- when the Vice Chancellor left the White House this afternoon, he was asked the question, "Short of a miracle, what ways are there to avoid the deployment of the missiles?" And his only response was, "If the Soviet Union accepts the double zero option."

Is that the only way that deployment can be avoided?

A That's by definition the only way, because --

Q No other agreement is possible other than the Soviets --

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A No, no. There are a lot of agreements that are possible, such as the interim proposal, but that would entail some U.S. deployment. The only way -- if we're going to stick to our principles, which are ones of U.S.-Soviet equality -- the only way you avoid U.S. deployment is if you get zero deployments on the Soviet side.

Q Are you saying the U.S. has better relations with the Kohl Government than it did with the Schmidt Government?

A I wouldn't want to get into those kinds of comparisons. I just want to demonstrate the success, I think, over the last 12 months of our consultative approach with Bonn. If you look at the NATO Ministerial meetings, if you look at the Williamsburg Summit, you look at the visits here by Chancellor Kohl, the visits to Bonn by the Vice President, you see, I think, an intimacy and a contact in that relationship that is unprecedented, and we think it's very helpful and it's very healthy.

Q Does this mean that you did not talk about areas where Washington and Bonn may not see eye-to-eye? That is, in terms of the apparent disagreement between Western European Governments and Washington on the new U.S. import restrictions?

A It did come up.

Q In what way?

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A It was just mentioned.

Q There was no exchange?

A Not really. It's understood to be a source of irritation, but, obviously, the over-arching issue during today's talks was security, INF, arms control, and U.S.-Soviet-East-East -- that whole jumble of problems.

Q This will come up in another forum?

A I think there are fora for this to come up.

Q You mentioned that he emphasized how the Soviets laid all the blame on us for the delays, the deadlocks, in these conferences. Could you elaborate? Are they blaming us for every delay? Do they indicate any kind of flexibility whatever?

A That's a difficult question to answer. I don't know whether they did or they didn't. What we came away with the impression is that they got a good dose of the Soviet party line, which you can read in the Soviet papers every day.

Q Evidently he stood his ground, though, and said this is an attack on West Germany as well as the United States.

A That's right.

Q Was there any indication that the Soviets showed any renewed interests in that so-called "walk in the woods formula" that Nitze and his opposite number worked out?

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A No. I don't think so.

Q There was a report in the newspaper here about the time of the talks that --

Q Those two Congressmen. I mean, one of the Congressmen who came back.

A Those Congressmen, according to the newspaper stories, didn't even agree with themselves.

Q Do you expect the INF talks to adjourn the current session on, I think, Thursday as they're scheduled, or go on for a couple of extra ones this time?

A My understanding is that they're going to recess on schedule.

Q You weren't aware of Bernie Gwertzman's question about the reports that the --

A Yes. I read it on the front page of The Washington Post last week.

Q But you knew nothing about those extra session?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:26 p.m.)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
TALKS WITH CHINESE ON NUCLEAR MATTERS
BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARMENT OFFICIAL

FRIDAY, JULY 15, 1983, 1:31 P. M.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. As has been noted, we have had several days of talks. These talks resulted from an invitation extended to the PRC by Secretary Shultz when he was there last February.

This in turn followed some talks that had previously occurred in Bejing in September of 1981. A team from the United States, headed by Assistant Secretary James Malone, was in Bejing at that time.

In those first talks some suggestions of language and ideas for the possibility of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were discussed with the Chinese. They indicated an interest in considering these further, and it was on that basis that Secretary Shultz in February, as I suggested, extended an invitation to the PRC to send a delegation here when they were ready, at their convenience, to discuss those ideas further.

Clearly, the entire question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and the PRC is complicated, but, by the same token, there are precedents for such cooperation in the nature of agreements for

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cooperation. These agreements for cooperation are required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as you know.

The Chinese delegation is here on a rather extended visit. The discussions which we had earlier in the week were just the beginning of a fairly extensive visit. Today they're having some talks with the Department of Energy which is describing for them in somewhat greater detail than has been done up to now the programs of nuclear energy which the United States engages in, in particular its civil power programs.

It will also be meeting with the people from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission this afternoon. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission already has agreements for cooperative work with the PRC, particularly by way of exchanges of information on safety matters.

The delegation then will be visiting a number of facilities around the country. They will be visiting the facilities at Idaho Falls where there are some engineering laboratories of the Department of Energy and also a large facility which is used for nuclear safety testing work.

They are going to Florida and South Carolina. They'll be visiting commercial nuclear power plants in North Carolina. They'll be going to Pittsburgh. I gather that Westinghouse has invited them to visit some of their activities.

They'll be at the Hanford Laboratories in the

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State of Washington -- in Richland, Washington -- to look at some waste disposal projects which are going on there.

They will then go to San Francisco where they will be meeting with other industry representatives from the United States.

So it's a fairly extensive visit. Manifestly, this is representative of the Chinese interest in developing their own nuclear power program, a program which we gather they have just about firmed up in at least its general cope and direction.

I would say that you should be aware that they're not only talking with us; obviously, they're talking with other countries as well. They're looking for a wide range of technical assistance and advice, and it's with that view that they have come. It was in that spirit, indeed, that we carried on these discussions.

Let me say that both sides would characterize these discussions -- and I'm sure these words will come as no great surprise to you -- as frank.-- they were. They were thorough discussions, they were friendly, and I would say very friendly. We got along well and exchanged a lot of views with candor, and we made progress.

When I say "progress," I am speaking about the general prospects. First, we were trying to be sure that we had a better appreciation of each other's programs, what

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it was each was trying to achieve in the nuclear energy field -- that is, the peaceful nuclear energy field.

I think we achieved a much better understanding, certainly on our part of their program and intentions; they, in turn, of ours. And that's going to be reinforced, as I said, through these visit they're making now.

As to the question of cooperation, we looked at the requirements which would have to be taken into account in developing some sort of an agreement for cooperation which would be the basis for any participation by the United States in a program of Chinese nuclear power development. The Chinese have indicated they are interested in discussing that with the United States' vendors.

So we did discuss what the general content of such an agreement might be. We looked at illustrative language, and discussed this in some detail to be sure that there was a full understanding of what this entailed. As I suggested to you, we made substantial progress, and they will be taking back to China with them some suggestions which we discussed, some of which we agreed upon, some of which they have further need to examine and think about.

We will be giving them further suggestions over time, and it was agreed that we should probably get together again, hopfully in the relatively near future, to see if we can further this proc-ss and actually reach some conclusion.

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Why don't I leave it there and answer your questions?

Q The Chinese, when they arrived, put out a statement back in Peking, saying that they were coming with a draft agreement, leading to the supposition that there was going to be some sort of initialing on conclusion at the end of these talks. Was it expected that there was to be a conclusion?

A Certainly not on our part, nor do I think that was necessarily the case on their part. The draft agreement to which they referred -- I can't speculate -- it may well have been something in the nature of some thoughts they had developed, resulting from their previous discussions when Mr. Malone, as I said, in September of 1981.

Q Is there any movement that you can detect in the Chinese reluctance to sign agreements not to transfer this technology to third parties as the U.S. would like?

A I don't want to characterize that. Let me say that we did discuss those questions very thoroughly. I would point to the evidence, I think, that appeared in the Post this morning to the effect that the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been invited to Bejing for talks with the PRC, as some suggestion that at least they're thinking very hard about what is

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involved in international nuclear commerce and what all other supplier states see as important in such commerce.

Q Would you say that when you were discussing earlier -- you said you called them suggestions, we made some suggestions -- were those the areas in which you made suggestions of language that they might consider adopting outside of the whole idea of signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

A We examined in considerable detail the full range of our own views as to how nuclear commerce is affected internationally; and, secondly, the general aspects of international safeguards, the relationship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, our own requirements of law so that there would be an understanding on their part of what those requirements would be.

They, in turn, expressed their own views in a policy sense -- a broad policy sense -- on these general matters, and I think they understand what our meeds might be were there to be an agreement for cooperation.

I would also say that they had notified us of their intention to invite the Director General to Beijing. We believe if that signifies -- and I do not want to imply that it does -- if that signifies an intention on their part to move further into actual association with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we obviously would consider that a positive step.

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Q Can I follow up with one more, please? With regard to the similar discussions the U.S. has with the Soviet Union, would you see these talks as a source of chafing between China and the Soviet Union, or would you see this as an area where the three powers -- one of the rare areas where the three powers actually are in agreement?

A I think we're probably a little too early to say that. There is, clearly, as you know, a substantial community of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union in respect to the question of non-proliferation.

I would say to you that in discussing these matters with the People's Republic team that was here -- delegation that was here -- it also is clear that they have a highly responsible view of this problem, and I think their views are emerging, are developing, as they begin to think about moving into the international arena.

Q What agreements would the Chinese have to sign before there could be any formal nuclear cooperation agreement?

A An agreement for cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act. I think the number of the paragraph is 123.

Q Just that one condition?

A Yes, essentially. That's correct. It's a kind of an umbrella agreement. It outlines a number of conditions and considerations that have to be met.

Q Could you list some of the basic areas that are concerned, that fall under this agreement, that have to be included in any cooperation agreement?

A Yes. I think to be sure I don't miss some, why don't I just give them to you on a little piece of paper?

Q In other words, there is no intention by the Administration to waive that law or anything like that?

A No. We've not considered the necessity of waiving.

Q So you have a piece of paper that we could get?

A Sure. Be glad to provide it.

Q In other words, they cannot purchase, say, a Westinghouse reactor without having signed this cooperation agreement?

A Having entered into an agreement for cooperation, that's correct.

Q And that basically would rule out -- if they signed that agreement, as I understand it, they could not then use -- transfer nuclear materials that could be used for explosive devices to third countries.

A That's correct. The agreement, among other things, would include provisions concerning the retransfer of U.S. provided material or sale of that material elsewhere, and, indeed, it would preclude the use of that material for --

Q Would the inspection provision require they open their nuclear weapon plants?

A First, the inspection provisions pertain specifically to non-nuclear weapons states. China is a nuclear weapons state. So that is a consideration which obviously would go into discussion of whatever provision might be arranged in that regard.

Q In effect, then, you would be thinking then in terms of a waiver on that provision?

A No. There's no need for a waiver. That provision pertains to a non-nuclear weapons state, and China is a nuclear weapons state. So the provision theoretically would not apply to China.

Q China has not signed the NPT, though, have they?

A No, they have not.

Q Is that a requirement?

Q Have we made representations that they should?

A We make representations to all parties at all times that all parties should, because we believe it ought to be universally adhered to.

Q Including India?

A Oh, yes, indeed. I would add, ON DEEP BACKGROUND, not with much success.

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Q The question I was coming to was that you indicated a sort of philosophical decision by the Chinese on this question. The reason I ask, if you could be helpful on this -- it was fairly widely reported at the end of last year that one of the problems holding up any cooperation agreement was that the Americans had indications that the Chinese were supplying Pakistan with material for their work on an operation which could lead to a nuclear explosive device, and that this was a bothersome question. As well as there were reports, which I think the Chinese denied, that they were supplying South Africa.

But do the Chinese agree on the general philosophical approach that efforts should be made to limit the spread of nuclear weapons without necessarily agreeing to the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

A Yes.

Q Is that a new --

A That is a general view. I think it's perfectly fair to characterize -- I think they have publicly themselves -- that they consider, as do the Indians, the Argentinians, others -- they consider the NPT to be a discriminatory instrument, and thus one to which they would not adhere.

Nonetheless, as I suggested to you, they have indicated that that aside, they do not -- I think their words, the words they have said, is they would not encourage or --

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see if I can find the specific words which they've said at some point. They've made public statements that they do not advocate nor encourage nuclear proliferation.

I would say to you that they have also indicated to us -- and I would prefer that you not quote this, but I will say what they said -- I would prefer it simply not be quoted -- that they believe that their concern over the question of nuclear proliferation is no less serious than that of the United States.

Q Is this a new -- did they tell you this when Mr. Malone was there last year, or is this relatively a new decision?

A I don't think the question was pursued quite so far when Mr. Malone was there. I can't answer the question. I really don't know whether what you're seeing here is a kind of maturation of thinking, but my impression is they have been thinking about this and about their own activity as they develop a relationship with other countries in a major supply way -- which, of course, a major nuclear program might entail for at least some time as they develop their own capabilities. But initially, certainly, if you're talking about buying some reactors, you're involving yourself in a very heavy way with other countries, and I'm sure that that has caused them, helped them, think the problem through a little bit and see what that means as they relate to all other countries.

Also, it is true that they recognize themselves as a potential supplier of nuclear materials and equipment at some point. You know, they have a very, very large background in the field. Up to now now in civil works, but now they're going into the civil program apparently in a big way, and they have a lot of people and a lot of capability and at some point see themselves as a potential supplier.

They already supply uranium. They could be a supplier of a great many other things in time, and so they have to think about what that means and how they relate to the rest of the international community. I think they're responsibly thinking ahead in that regard.

Q Can you elaborate on the uses that they hope to put peaceful use of nuclear power to?

A I think it's been widely reported that they plan a fairly substantial program of nuclear power development, electricity generation. I can't tell your precisely at what point in their planning and decision-making process they are at this point, but they seem to have gone far enough now that they are actively seeking to find advice, assistance and participation.

Q Would they expect in that line anything unusual or out of the ordinary in terms of training,

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inspection and maintenance by the vendor, or would we?

A Unusual or out of the ordinary. I don't know what that means. I think whenever you go into a major nuclear power plant program, you've got a lot of training and educational work, both in the operational and maintenance field. Manifestly, if you're starting to build a new plant, you've got to have a lot of people trained in the technology that's involved, and that goes all the way down the line into the second-tier suppliers who are supplying componentry. To that extent, sure, I think they're going to want assistance in this regard for some time to come. I don't know. That's up to them.

Q It would be a long-term resident program, more or less, wouldn't it?

A Conceivably.

Q On the signing or the lack of signing, as you understand it, did this delegation have the authority to sign any agreement?

A My impression is they did not, and I say that because -- and I again would prefer that this be not quoted, but only for your own personal background -- I would hope not to read it -- but they did indicate that at one point as we were looking at various language formulations, that some of these looked fine to them but that obviously they had no

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lawyer with them, and therefore whatever they looked at would have to go back and be examined carefully by their experts and lawyers. So my impression is, no, they hadn't.

They were interested in reaching, I think, increased understanding and making progress. It's a long process, going through one of these things, and I would for your guidance recall that in other situations we have taken a very long time indeed to finally arrive at agreements. That's only because these are very complicated questions.

Q Would an agreement on nuclear cooperation require the signing of these nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? Is that a condition?

A No. It would not.

Q Does the United States believe that because of these talks the future prospects for the signing of a cooperation agreement has been enhanced?

A My view is, yes, that that is the view of the United States' side.

Q You said you expected to continue talks in the near future. You're talking in terms of weeks or after the -- after Mr. Blix have been to Peking?

A I think the paper suggested mid-August, so I would doubt that we would be meeting with the Chinese in that time frame. I simply can't help you there. I don't

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know how long it's going to be. As I said, our own view is that we should keep the momentum up. They think the same, and it's only a question of how soon.

Q A couple of questions. Did they indicate that they were interested in purchasing the reactor from Westinghouse which has been offered to them?

A No.

Q Because I see they've signed letters of intention with the French, and they've talked with the British. I don't know how broad a market there is there. Is this beyond this Guangdong project?

A I think they're thinking well down the road beyond the two-unit plant that they're talking about in the Guangdong area. Indeed, they are. They discussed other things with us of ideas that they have in mind, so I think they're thinking well down the road some years. But it's also true that there is not only the specific reactor project, but there are all kinds of ancillary activities that surround that in terms of engineering work, advice, counsel, support by way of assemblies, major componentry of such systems. These are, as you know, very, very big, very complex, systems, and there are all kinds of things that surround them. So all those things are involved, too, and I couldn't possibly get into how they do that or what their decision-making process is.

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But to your specific question -- did they say they wanted to buy a Westinghouse reactor -- no, and we didn't ask them.

Let me add one more point to that. They did, I think, very clearly indicate, however, their interest in participation in their work on the part of U.S. vendors who they recognize as having great experience and competence.

Q First of all, just quickly, how long is there visit in the U.S.? And, secondly, do they have any civil uses of nuclear power now in China?

A The length of the visit: They arrived on this past Sunday. Let me see if I have the specific date when they depart. Their current plan is to leave for Beijing from San Francisco on July 23.

Q Do they have any civil uses now?

A If they do -- and I think the answer is at this point no -- they're working on -- and let me just check this -- they're working on a very small plant, in a sense a kind of prototype machine of relatively small capacity, and that they're working on themselves. But, so far as I know, there is no power-producing machine in operation at this point.

Q When the drawn-up agreement was presented to them, is this during these talks or well before that?

A There had been an initial draft provided to them, suggested to them, in 1981, during the visit of Mr. Malone. When they came this time, they had had the opportunity, obviously, to have reviewed that very carefully. As I mentioned earlier, it may have been their thoughts about that to which that other piece that was written in Beijing referred to. I don't know. But, in any event, when they came, taking account of the comments and discussions that had occurred in 1981, we had prepared another general draft. When I say "general draft," the purpose here was to get clear a content and not try to arrive at specific language. That's for the lawyers and all the fellows who put the commas in to come to later.

Q Does an agreement on nuclear cooperation require that China would accept the restrictions of the International Atomic Energy Agency? [illegible]

[illegible] A No. [illegible]

Q I'm trying to pin down what the barriers are as far as the United States is concerned.

A Barriers?

Q What is it that China has to do other than sign the agreement? I guess we need the terms of the cooperation agreement which --

A There are a series of things which are required by law to be a part of that agreement, and that's what I

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was going to give you a copy of instead of trying to just remember them all off the top of my head. Okay?

Q Yes.

A But, no, they do not have to become a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As I indicated, however, were they to do so following their discussions with Hans Blix, needless to say, we would find that to be a positive act, something that would be positive for the international community as a whole, and we would look forward to. They understand, I think -- will certainly understand better after their conversations with Mr. Blix, the statute. We discussed the AIEA in a general sense. They knew that I had some connection with the organization, and they raised questions informally with me. We discussed the AIEA. We made clear to them how strongly we feel about that institution, how important we consider it in the international framework, and I think they see it much that way themselves.

Q In an agreement, say with France or Germany or Britain, on nuclear programs -- the Chinese -- would they be confronted by the requirement to agree to these various things that you were going to get for us?

A Not necessarily.

Q So there would be clear sailing?

A No, no. I wouldn't put it that way. Not clear sailing. No. In the first place, these other countries are all in adherence to the statute of the AIEA. They all follow generally the same rules of the trade, the supplier's guidelines. No. There may be some differences, but, by and large, they would be quite similar.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:02 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
UNDER SECRETARY ALLEN WALLIS
AND
DEPUTY MINISTER MORIYUKI MOTONO
U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC SUBCABINET CONSULTATIONS
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 1983, 2:35 P.M.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: We have just completed two days of in-depth discussions of our overall and our bilateral economic relationships. The United States-Japan Economic Subcabinet Consultations are held twice a year and they provide an important opportunity for a wide-ranging discussion of both bilateral and global economic issues.

I chaired the U.S. delegation. The Japanese delegation was lead by Moriyuki Motono, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is here on my left and will be available to answer questions.

As always, the discussions were conducted in an open and friendly manner, as is appropriate for the close relationship between our two countries.

We reviewed the results of and the follow-up to the Williamsburg Summit, and we surveyed the international economic situation, focusing on world economic recovery, the energy outlook and international trade and financial issues, including development assistance to and debt problems of developing countries. Each of us provided a briefing on our own domestic economic policies and outlook. We agreed that closer cooperation between the world's first and second largest free-market economies, building on the achievements of the Williamsburg Summit, will make a major contribution to strengthening the international economic system and will aid in resolving outstanding global economic problems.

With respect to bilateral economic relations, we agreed that the overall state of our relations remains generally healthy. I would also note that the fifth session of the U.S.-Japan Trade Subcommittee was held immediately before the Subcommittee Consultations, and there was a very useful and candid exchange of views in that meeting.

Both sides recognized the increasing interdependence of our economies and the productive partnership we share in trade and investment activities. At the same time, there is a clear recognition on both sides of the importance of resolving outstanding issues as quickly as

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possible. This is vital because of the influence that the United States and Japan have on the world economy as a whole and because of the impact that trade frictions have on one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world.

The U.S. expressed to the Japanese our appreciation for a number of significant market-opening measures that the Japanese Government has taken in the past several months. The Japanese side expressed their concern regarding some of the recent trade-restrictive measures taken by the U.S. while at the same time stating their appreciation for the determination of the U.S. Administration to pursue open market policies.

We reviewed the series of bilateral talks on industry-related measures and their impact on trade, and on high technology and energy. We agreed to explore these areas further in a manner to enhance positive bilateral cooperation. We confirmed the need to maintain cooperation on various global issues, including policies on East-West economic relations, development assistance and debt accumulation problems.

The President's trip to Japan in November underscores the vital importance of the ties beween the United States and Japan. Building on the basic strength of our relationship, we are determined to work closely together to ensure the success of the visit and to further solidify our partnership.

It was agreed to hold the next Subcabinet Consultations in Japan in about six months.

That concludes the statement I have, and I'll be available, as is my friend Mr. Motono, to see what we can do with your questions.

Q Can you make the statement available, please?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: No. We are not going to distribute the statement other than my reading it.

Q Mr. Secretary, aside from agreeing that Japan and the United States should resolve as soon as possible outstanding issues, did the United States and Japan reach any agreement to resolve any of the outstanding issues? Specifically, beef and citrus problems that the U.S. and Japan have, automobile imports.

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UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Of course, those specific problems are generally handled on an individual basis through USTR. We're aware of those problems, and we had some discussion of the mechanisms and the machinery that will be used to pursue them. But we did not resolve those problems or attempt to resolve problems in these meetings. The effort is to see that steps are being taken. Particuarly the Trade Consultation Committee is the place that would consider issues like that. Probably not those particular two because they're already in the hands of USTR, and being worked on.

Q Did the U.S. side ask the Japanese members to consider extending the voluntary agreement restricting auto imports, and, if so, how did the Japanese reply?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: No, we did not bring that up.

Q You didn't discuss it at all?

UNDER SECRETRY WALLIS: I don't recall our discussing it. Did that come up at all in these meetings? Obviously, the U.S. Government and the Japanese Government have had discussions on that issue but not in these particular meetings.

Q Can we ask the Minister to comment on that, please?

Mr. Minister, would you comment on whether Japan is prepared to extend the agreement to restrict the sale of Japanese automobiles in the U.S.?

MINISTER MOTONO: I think you are hoping that I would say that we have accepted.

Q I'm trying to find out if there was anything discussed at the meetings.

MINISTER MOTONO: No. It is a matter at this stage that we cannot comment. The time has not come for commenting on the matter.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: There's been some misunderstanding in this country about that issue. When I was in Tokyo ten days ago I learned that what Minister Motono said was -- he was asked a question in private meeting in his office as to whether the agreement terminates at a certain date -- I think it's next March -- and he confirmed that it does, which is correct. That is the way the agreement stands. That was all that happened. The people who were there then went out and interpreted that to mean "and it

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won't be extended." Whereas, all he had said was it terminates at that date. Of course, as I say, it does. That has led to a good deal of misunderstanding.

Q Mr. Minister, has the Government of Japan made any decision yet on whether or not the agreement would be extended?

MINISTER MOTONO: There is no decision made as yet.

Q Would the Minister please comment on the expressions of concern he made about U.S. policy that was mentioned in Mr. Wallis' statement?

MINISTER MOTONO: We have gathered in Williamsburg to see what could be done to upkeep the open-trade system to roll back protectionism, and as the recovery comes back, to be able to dismantle all those protectionist measures.

We have seen some concern; certain actions taken by the United States Government in a restrictive sense. But we have also expressed our appreciation for such action taken, like in the Houdaille case where the American Administration has very strongly upheld the principle of open and free trade.

Q Was there concern over Harley-Davidson?

MINISTER MOTONO: Yes.

Q What about steel?

MINISTER MOTONO: Steel (inaudible). It seems to be the two outstanding actions.

Q What do you think, Mr. Minister, about the American interest in holding IDA 7 to around $9 billion, or a U.S. contribution of $750 million a year? Does that strike you as a sensible, workable figure for the talks that will be held in Tokyo next week on IDA 7?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: I'm not sure that is an announced government policy. If it is, it's news to me.

We have a question over here.

Q There's been a lot of unhappiness by U.S. companies and U.S. Administration officials with the NTT Procurement Agreement. One thing that companies have been suggesting is having some kind of goal for how much would be purchased by NTT.

Was there any discussion of this, and what would be the position of the U.S. and the Japanese Government on setting goals for how much to purchase?

MINISTER MOTONO: As far as I can answer you about this, I suppose we are both respecting the rules of a free-market economy, whatever products are competitive and purchased.

There is no impediment for purchase of such equipment by NTT so far as it meets the conditions of competitiveness. The idea of introducing a target seems, to me, something which is quite against this idea. It should be open-ended, if the product is competitive.

I know in the past, treatment of NTT, which has doubled their procurement last year over the preceding year, we are seeing substantial progress. Of course, it's not like --you cannot sell in Japan like some European countries would go to Africa and sell equipment to a country where there is no system. We have an established system of communication.

The product or equipment should meet the requirement of the system. So there are certain limitations. American companies have been fully briefed on what the system is. NTT has taken the trouble of sending people, responsible people -- technicians -- to explain to American companies what are their needs.

I hope that on the basis of this knowledge, and the will to invest in such areas where they think they can sell their product, some substantial purchase will be made in the future. I don't agree with any targets for purchase.

Q Mr. Wallis, could you comment on that?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: I don't have anything to add to that. That, again, is a topic that's been discussed in a good deal of detail between the STR people and the appropriate the Japanese officials.

Q What is the U.S. Government's position on setting targets?

MINISTER MOTONO: That would be contrary to our general policies, too. What we're concerned about is having openness to the market; that our products should have just much access as anybody else's products anywhere in the world, as is the case with comparable Japanese products who may want to sell to AT&T or somebody or other, and they do.

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Let me ask the Press Officer, in regards to that very first question that was asked, am I right in thinking a transcript is made available?

STAFF: Yes.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: So then the answer about, is there a copy of this statement, no, but there will be.

Q Mr. Wallis, was there any discussion of the yen dollar relationship in your meetings, and, if so, could I have both of our comments on what was said?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: There was certainly discussion of that in terms of it being one of the concerns of both governments. Again, that came up more in an inventory of issues that need to be dealt with in some fashion. And, there, I don't believe any positive proposals have been made, except that both governments are aware of it and are concerned in the same way.

As you know, the Japanese have attempted to raise the yen by intervening and buying lots of them, but it hasn't had a lot of impact. Our other studies of intervention in foreign exchange markets indicate they usually don't have any effect, except to lose a lot of money for the intervenor.

Do you want to comment on that, Yuki?

MINISTER MOTONO: Yes. If this question of intervention is considered, some intervention could be possible if the amount of money involved would be smaller. When we consider that the nature of the flow of resources nowadays, especially since Japan has completely liberalized its foreign exchange control at the end of 1980, we have seen an enormous outflow of long-term capital.

During last year, there has been an outflow of $27.5 billion; an inflow of $12.5 billion. Net deficit of $15 billion. What can you do with such an enormous amount of money, even if you try to have the wish of intervening, to affect the trend. It would be impossible.

Of course, I think common intervention in some cases, as it was noted in the Ministers of Finance Meeting at the end of April -- April 29, to be more precise -- have agreed that in some cases intervention is useful. But that

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would be limited, to my view, to stem the erratic fluxuation, but not to change the trends.

Fortunately, the outflow of our long-term capital, which I said the net was $15 billion last year, shows a little lessening trend this year. I think for the first four months it averaged about $5 billion. I would like to be precise on it, but I'm not quite sure. But compared to the average of about $8 billion, regarding the corresponding month of last year.

So we hope that this trend may influence the nature. I must point out that this outflow of resources, of national resources from Japan, is the result of our openness our system of free flow of resources, and the money goes where the yield is high. In other words, to international markets where the interest rates are high.

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Q Mr. Minister, you mentioned earlier that your government is pleased with some of the steps the Reagan Administration has taken and particularly its public statements on the question of protectionist legislation and so on. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of concern in this country among the people -- and to some extent in Congress, as well -- which is expressed publicly and in very plain language as basically, the Japanese market taking jobs away from American employees.

How do you deal in these talks with U.S. officials on that kind of issue? Do you discuss it at all, or do you simply accept the U.S. Government's statements that it wants to squelch efforts of protectionism, or do you have a plan or anything that you can say to people who have these concerns, about what efforts, if any, Japan is making to prevent that from being the case?

MINISTER MOTONO: I think in the talks among professionals, we are, you know, mature enough to know the political constraints, the trend of public opinion, and the pressure, so we try to know -- mutually encourage -- because we have also a public opinion in Japan. For instance, when we are asked to take some visible and dramatic steps, for instance, to open the market, we are all agreed that we should do more to open the market. But some visible and dramatic steps can be tragic in Japan, politically speaking.

So I think we had a very frank exchange of views on that, and perhaps I could say that we are mutually encouraged to take whatever positive action we could take to protect the common goal of an open free trade, because the two countries' future depend so much more (inaudible). We are the two countries which have the dynamism of protecting, preserving the free and open trade system.

MISS STOCKMAN: One more question, gentlemen.

UNDER-SECRETARY WALLIS: Let's take two because they were simultaneous.

Q Can either of you gentlemen comment in more detail on the discussions of the debt situation? Is there recognition that the bridge-loan agreements reached earlier this year have now collapsed, and that some further measures are necessary?

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MINISTER MOTONO: Would you like me to reply?

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Surely, if you would like.

MINISTER MOTONO: It's not a very easy task to answer it. I think we have exchanged views and have both agreed on the importance of the program. We are both aware that great effort should be done in the future to meet the situation, but there was no feeling of alarm, undue -- excessive alarm, about that situation.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: Let me add that we did explicitly express our appreciation for the role the Japanese Government in helping with these problems, particularly the Latin American ones -- Mexico, to start with -- which are ones that bear heavily on us.

There was one other simultaneous question here, so --

Q I would like to ask each of you, given autos, steel and agricultural goods, are you optimistic that trade tensions between the two countries could ease over the next six months?

MINISTER MOTONO: That is also a very difficult question. To tell you very frankly, I think it is a definite course that Japan has taken to open further its markets, with due consideration for balance, for the political stability. I think that is also very important because of the alliance we have with the United States, and we are certainly an element of stability for world peace.

At the same time, if you just look at the trend of trade, it is with rather mixed feelings that I am looking at the American recovery, which is very strong. To me -- perhaps I'm too optimistic -- but I think it is very steady, and all signs show that it is a real recovery. As much as the American economy recovers, it is natural that consumers have more confidence in the future and would spend more. Also, enterprises which invest in new fields -- now, there is a shift from certain old-line area to more high technological and service communication areas.

All those new investments would entail a strong demand on the part of American enterprises. Under the present conditions, we do have competitive goods. Japan is a market where there is completely free competition, and our manufacturers vie with each other to provide the consumers with exactly the product which they want.

The United States, which has the consumers' demand after inflation repealed means that the disposal income is reduced. That means that the shape of demand takes more the nature of a kind of middle-class demand, if I may get perhaps into too much detail. That demand is certainly to pull goods from Japan -- not only from Japan, but from abroad.

At the same time, the fear about inflation may give an effect on American interest rates to be on the higher side for a while, so the effect on the dollar/yen rate also is obvious. We would be squeezed in a situation where, although we open up our markets further, the imbalance itself is not going to show such a physical difference or improvement. We would like to have it reduced, but what can you do? That's a puzzle.

UNDER SECRETARY WALLIS: You asked us both to comment. I'll comment very briefly. You asked about optimistic. I'd say, well, I'm certainly hopeful. When you say six months, I don't know whether I can attach the word "optimistic" to that; but if you double that period, I'd say I am optimistic, largely for reasons associated with the economic recovery that Mr. Motono emphasized. But if you look at the political pressures in the United States, of course, protectionism is a battle between one group in the United States against other groups in the United States. It's not a battle of the U.S. against Japan and vice versa; it's the producers versus the consumers of autombiles in this country. We wouldn't have this problem if the consumers weren't showing a preference for Japanese cars.

The workers have a preference, presumably, for working in the automobile industry; and at present, if you can't buy a Japanese car, you can get one that some people think is better anyway -- at any rate, it is comparable and doesn't cost a whole lot more, and the consumer isn't going to have any enormous pressure. But the worker, at present, if he loses his job in the auto factory, cannot walk across the street and get as good a one or a better one, so his pressure is going to be very great.

I think as recovery proceeds, one of the things that is happening is that our auto industry is more and more producing cars that the consumers do like equally well in part. Also it is making jobs availble, and if they can't work in that industry, they can work in another one, which is just not true now. When it is true, the protectionist pressures will not be nearly as great, and then the consumer pressures will begin to bear more relevance to the termination of actual policy.

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So, yes, I am optimistic, though hardly over a six-month period, but over a twelve-month period. But even on a six-month period, I at least have some hope that there will be some progress.

Thanks very much.

(The briefing concluded at 3:06 p.m.)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
INITIALING OF DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH GREECE
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 1983, 4:32 P. M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Before I talk about Greece, I thought I would hit another subject which is timely, and that is we have reached an agreement on a concluding document -- an agreement in principle on a concluding document in Madrid. There are still some technical questions to work out and some last-minute problems that have been raised by the Maltese Government, but on the critical, central questions -- that is, those dealing with East-West issues -- agreement just a few minutes ago, as I said, was reached in Madrid.

Our Ambassador, Max Kampelman, is making a statement in Madrid on that agreement. It is quite a lengthy statement. I have a copy here. We are making just now copies of that statement in the Press Office. We'll endeavor to get them to you as soon as possible.

I will make, though, just a few general points about that agreement. To begin with, we think it is an important agreement. It represents real --

Q Can you make these on the record?

A No. I think Max Kampelman's statement will speak for itself. But it does represent a real and significant improvement over the Helsinki Final Act. As you know, we've been negotiating on this concluding document for over two years.

The words in the agreement are very important, because they enable us to judge and evaluate Soviet and Eastern European performance in the human rights area. Without those words, that process would be more difficult. They exist as criteria for judging Eastern behavior in the human rights area. For that reason we think it is a substantial accomplishment that we have achieved this agreement.

That said, deeds are much more important than words, and this Administration will continue to press for improvements in Soviet and Eastern European human rights behavior. Thus, while we are satisfied with this document, this in no way will represent any diminution on our part of our interest in obtaining better human rights performance, and this will continue to be a priority issue on the Reagan Administration agenda. We see this outcome in Madrid -- which, as I said before, does represent a significant improvement, a real improvement, over what we obtained in Helsinki -- as one step towards improved Soviet and Eastern European performance in the area of human rights.

When I am through talking about Greece, I'll be happy to answer any questions that you might have on Madrid.

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Let me just move to the Greek base negotiation -- very short statement -- and again answer your questions.

The Governments of the United States and Greece announced today the initialing in Athens of a defense and economic cooperation agreement. The agreement will be signed at a later date at the convenience of both governments.

The negotiations, begun in October in Athens, were conducted by Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew and Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Kapsis.

We believe they have negotiated an agreement which benefits both the United States and Greece as well as the NATO alliance in which we are partners and reaffirms the importance the United States attaches to its traditional relationship with Greece.

Questions?

Q Papandreou has been saying that after five years, bye-bye to the bases, and the U.S. has only 17 months in which to dismantle them.

Are you saying that very specifically, that at the end of the five-years period the bases disappear?

A This agreement is no different in terms of its duration and termination than agreements we have signed with other countries. We have agreements with other countries, as we do now with Greece, that provide for a certain period, and at the end of the period if either party wants to take the initiative and terminate that agreement, they are free to do so. So there's nothing unusual in that. It's the same with other agreements we have with other countries.

Q So you're suggesting that in terms of language, it's not a terminating agreement?

A We have had a security relationship with Greece that goes back -- an agreement that goes back to 1953, and we are going to continue it under this agreement.

Q How do you explain the way Papandreou has been advertising this, and the emphasis on the termination after five years?

A I won't explain it. I think he can explain it. But under the terms of this agreement it's quite clear that the U.S. will continue its security relationship with Greece under the duration of the agreement.

Q Is there anything in this agreement that is different from the last one in connection with termination?

A It is, because the last one was signed in a different era, Bernie. It was one that, as you know, was signed in the early 50s and was going to continue at the convenience of both parties. In recent years I think there has been a different pattern of agreements. They have had a definite duration -- normally five years like this one -- and at the end of the period both sides can decide whether they want to continue it.

Q Could you give us one example of other countries with whom we have these sort of five-year agreements?

A Spain, Turkey, Philippines.

Q Wasn't there a draft agreement in the late 70s that never got signed?

A That's right. This is the third try really. We have made two other efforts.

Q Were those earlier draft agreements five-year agreements?

A Yes.

Q So this is not an innovation in this one?

A No.

Q Did the U.S. seek to resist this termination?

A No.

Q Are you saying that this agreement is in fact an agreement to continue the present arrangements? It's simply an extention of what we've got --

A No. It's a new agreement. You can sit down with the old agreement and new agreement, and kind of compare and contrast. Obviously, as I said before, this is not the early 1950s, but what my point is, it is an agreement that is similar in form and I think in character to other agreements we have signed with other allied governments.

Q It doesn't carry a connotation of termination, it carries a connotation of just extinction.

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A I will let the agreement speak for itself. We have signed an agreement which, over the next five years, is going to provide for defense and security cooperation with Greece.

Q Then you have no doubt at this point that in three or four years from now we'll be sitting down to renegotiate?

A I wouldn't want to say.

Q Is there any connection with this, as has been said in Athens --

A Obviously, it's not wise for me to try to speculate on what the picture will look like in three, four or five years.

Q Are there to be an exchange of letters committing this Administration to a 10 to 7 ratio? Turkey, Greece --

A We do not accept the 10 to 7 ratio.

Q So there is no such commitment.

A It's a mechanistic approach to security assistance, and that's been our position.

Q Could you explain the mysterious 17 months rather than 18 for instance or 24?

A No. I think it's, again, very similar to arrangements we have in other agreements. I don't think it's --

Q 17 months?

A The way it works, I think it's 12 months plus 5. I think you get a year. * (See below.)

Q Why?

A I think it's just a matter of convention, really. I followed the negotiations very closely, and I can't explain it. I don't think it was ever a major issue.

Q On the assumption that the agreement after that five-year period is not renewed, is indeed 17 months sufficient time for the United States Government to make alternative arrangements?

A No. That is not the assumption it's based on. I mean, I think it's a little bit bizarre, actually. You're asking me questions about what the world's going to look like in five years from now and what we might do, when the issue before we had an agreement was what the immediate future was.

We're very pleased that we've been able to sign an agreement that is going to extend the U.S.-Greek security relationship for at least five years, and we're quite happy with this and we assume the Greek Government is as well.

Q But, presumably somewhere along the way between now and the expiring of that five-year period, the United States Government -- the Administration, whatever it is at that time -- will have to ask itself the question whether it is likely that that agreement will be renewed

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Clarification: The agreement provides that either party must give written notification to terminate the agreement which would then take effect five months after that notification. The U.S. would have 17 months after termination of the agreement for withdrawal.

and take action accordingly. I mean, 17 months is not going to be a sufficient time in order to restructure the United States' strategic installations in that area. Right?

A No. I think that's not true. We've been negotiating so far. We could have failed to get an agreement. At any time the United States can lose its access to various base facilities around the world. It's even been known to happen.

Q Would you be allowed to function during that 17-month period, or must the functioning terminate at the end of the five years?

A No. We could function.

Q What precisely must either country do to terminate the agreement?

A We have to take a positive decision and inform one another of that desire.

Q In what time frame?

A I can't remember. I think there are notifications that can be made before the five-year period, and there are notifications that can be made after.

Q There's no specific provision for renegotiating or at some point reviewing?

A I think it's obviously implicit that at that period they can go ahead and renegotiate if they so desire.

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Q But such agreements are not written implicitly. Is there anything in the language that says there will be a review at such and such a time, or that negotiations would be started --

A No. We don't have those kinds of language in other agreements. Take a look at any of the agreements we've negotiated recently. We recently concluded an agreement with Spain.

(Continued on following page)

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Q While the agreement text, we know, is not yet released, there are reports from Athens, despite what you said about the 7-10, where apparently reporters are being given to understand there that the agreement includes a generally worded American commitment to maintaining the balance of military power between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean region.

A There is language in the Agreement which makes reference to existing U.S. law. I think it's the Security Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which includes, among others -- this is the law, not the Agreement; the law of the land -- includes balance as one of the criteria, which the United States should follow in making security assistance decision. And there is reference to that law, which is not unusual; but there is no reference to any 7-10 ratio.

Q If the $500 million figure accurate that has been bandied about?

A We have made a request, as you know, for the next fiscal year, if we were able to achieve a successful base agreement that met our requirements up to $500 million. So in that sense, that is accurate.

Q What is the figure for Turkey?

A The figure for Turkey is -- Our request is -- What is it?

STAFF: $755 million.

A Yes, $755 million. That's our request.

Q Where does the figure 710 come from?

A It's an invention not of the U.S. Government.

Q Was this $500 million figure raised from an earlier Reagan Administration figure or what?

A What we requested was $280 million, but we came forward --

Q For FY-84, right?

A -- we came forward with 220 additional, contingent on achieving a satisfactory base agreement.

Q We haven't seen the Agreement, as John points out, but does it specifically say that if one side challenges, there is in fact this timetable for dismantling in 17 months?

A No, I don't think that's a -

Q Where is the 17 coming from that we're talking about?

A That is not the right way to look at it. They are in the Agreement; there is language for, at the end of the five-year period for both sides to notify one another of their intention of extending the Agreement, renegotiating the Agreement or leaving the Agreement. And that period altogether would cover some 17 months.

Q I'm sorry. What would cover the 17 months?

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You mean this notifying each other, there is a period of 17 months? Is that what you're saying?

A Yes.

Q At the end?

A Is that correct? How would we want to say that precisely?

Q Is the 17 part of the five years?

A No, no.

STAFF: It's a shirt-tail right.

A It's normal language that we have in other agreements which provides both sides some time at the end of the five-year period to determine where they want to go.

Q And there is a 17-month spread to either terminate or to reach another Agreement, is that the idea?

A It could be used -- If one party decided that they wanted to terminate the Agreement, they could notify the other at the end of that five-year period; and at the end of that 17-month period, you could terminate.

Q Right. And if you agreed to negotiate, you would use that same timeframe to work out another Agreement or whatever time is required?

A Presumably, you could extend it, or whatever.

Q Can we go over to Madrid now?

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A Just a second.

(To staff) Do you have something you want to add to this?

STAFF: I think that once either side gives a notification, then there is a 17-month grace period for us to take whatever measures remove our facilities and our people.

Q This is not what Papandreou put in his statement. I mean there is conflict here.

A Well, what is the conflict?

Q The conflict is, Mr. Papandreou said in his statement quite plainly that at the end of the five-year period of the Agreement, when the Agreement terminates and the bases will have to be removed, the United States then has 17 months in which to wind up the operation of the bases. That's rather different. I mean, the 17 months in Mr. Papandreou's terms is a period during which the United States winds up the operations. You're suggesting it is a period during people make up their minds what they are going to do.

A Both sides, both parties are going to have views on this matter at the end of the five years.

Q Has Papendreou --

A It's the Greek Government. I mean, this is a sovereign country. We have signed an agreement that is going to last for five years. If the Greek Government, at the end of that five-year period, wants to take that decision, it is free to do so.

Q Papandreou has not told the United States now that this is it: you have five years and then it closes down? He hasn't served that notice in advance?

A We have not -- No, the Agreement isn't even in effect yet.

Q No. In the negotiation, has he said to the United States, "You have five years, and then you clear out in 17 months?" Has that been told to --

A What happens is that five months after we are notified that the government wishes to terminate the Agreement, a termination would take effect -- the Agreement would be terminated. Then, we would have 12 months to vacate.

Q Could you please answer my question? In putting this initially in this package now, has Papandreou told the United States, "I'm signing for five years, and at the end of it, I'm telling you now, I want you out?"

A Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q Couldn't you do better by way of a reply? I mean, is that a no?

A But people have been saying publicly the way he has been characterizing the Agreement. I mean, I find it a little bit bizarre -- I have to tell you I find it a little bit strange that you are asking me about terminating an agreement, you know, the day that I'm announcing that we've achieved an agreement.

Q Can we put it this way? I know you won't answer it, but let me try to put it this way: There has been a lot of reporting and speculation for a long time that Papandreou is in effect playing a two-edged game, while on the one hand, trying to keep these bases there, while at the same time satisfying his domestic constituency that opposes the continuation of these bases by using rhetoric that implies that he is going to terminate their thing there?

May we ask you as a senior U.S. official if you have any indication that the statements made in Athens today are for domestic political consumption?

A The way I answer that is that we are pleased we have an agreement with Greece, (Laughter) which was what this negotiation was all about, after all!

Q Could I ask you about the economic aid part of it, or the economic cooperation, beyond the, up to $500 million? Is there some provision for military co-production agreements?

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A There will be discussions of that subject.

Q But nothing settled yet?

A No. We would hope to enhance U.S.-Greek military cooperation.

STAFF: One more.

Q Is there anything you could tell us about the sudden snag that occurred a month ago and how it was resolved?

A No, I wouldn't want to go into too much detail on the negotiations.

Q Was it very fundamental?

A No, I don't really think so.

Q Let me ask one question: The previous agreement was equally for five years?

A No.

Q That was the '53 all the way through?

A Yes. That's right.

Q But the draft Agreements in the late 70's would have been for five years?

A Yes. I mean, all the agreements that we have negotiated, the draft agreements with the Greeks, the negotiations, the agreements we have with other countries in this period are five-year agreements.

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Q I was leading to the question of what was the change in the military foreign sales aid package in the past five-year package? Compared to this $500 million this time, what was the previous --

A This represents a fairly substantial increase. I've got two more minutes.

Q Can we ask a quick one on Madrid?

A Yes.

Q Have you reached any decisions about any kind of initialling act, including possibly a visit --

A No. That's under discussion.

Q No timing, then?

A No, no timing.

Q When will you?

A It has to be worked out amongst 35 different Foreign Ministers.

Q Will it be before the beginning of September?

A There is no way of knowing that.

Q Is the U.S. Secretary of State willing to go?

A If the other governments think it is desirable, then he would be willing to go.

Q Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 4:55 p.m.)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
ANZUS COUNCIL MEETING
BY
TWO SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
MONDAY, JULY 18, 1983, 5:30 P. M.

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're ON BACKGROUND attributable to senior American officials. Let me give you a rundown.

The Secretary had dinner last night with the New Zealand Foreign Minister. They began their formal sessions this morning at 9:00 o'clock, the Foreign Ministers of New Zealand, Australia, and the Secretary of State represented the United States.

Secretary Weinberger was there for about 45 minutes this morning, and then had to leave.

The Australian Minister of Defense was there. There was no New Zealand Minister of Defense there, so I take back my apology of the other day to New Zealand. We didn't get it wrong.

SECOND OFFICIAL: It was the Secretary of Defense.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The Secretary of Defense.

SECOND OFFICIAL: He's the number two.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The atmosphere is really very good. They were very quickly on a first-name basis. Of course, the Secretary of State had met both of his counterparts several times before, but they were very quickly on a George and Bill and Warren basis.

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The breakdown of the air conditioning, I think, contributed to the informality. Everybody shed their coats. Some people loosened their ties. That was a good, informal session.

The Secretary is, in about 25 minutes, playing host in this building at a reception for his counterparts, and then we'll be their host at a dinner at Blair House tonight.

They began at 9:00. They went til about 10:20, basically with a review of the ANZUS Treaty. The Australian Government is new and had suggested this. There hadn't been such a review in 31 years.

The Australian delegation made it very clear that their commitment to ANZUS was total -- they offered their full support to it -- but thought that there would be merit in reviewing it to strengthen it and to determine its relevance.

They had a good look at the treaty. There was a thorough discussion of it, and there was ultimately solidarity of viewpoints that the ANZUS Treaty is a vital and relevant document.

They also felt that the spirit of ANZUS guides the bilateral relations between the various countries. I'm not going to get into any more detail than this. My colleague here wants to do that because there will be a communique tomorrow which will touch on those points.

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They then broke for coffee and, given the character of the visiting delegations, tea. They went back at 10:40 and took part in a global overview which primarily centered on economics with a special emphasis on economic development, international aid, which lasted until 11:40. Then from 11:40 until 12:00 noon, with the Secretary of State leading -- the Secretary of State led that previous session, too, on the economy -- they discussed defense with particular emphasis on U.S. strength, and then a review of Soviet intercontinental missile strength, particularly as it affects Asia.

They broke for lunch, went back at 2:30. The discussion then was led by the New Zealand Foreign Minister, mainly on ASEAN, with some particular emphasis on Soviet influence in the area, obviously Vietnam and Kampuchea.

Then Foreign Minister Hayden of Australia talked a bit about Australia's view of Asia and gave an account of his visit to Hanoi and Laos, and also of his talks with the Vietnamese authorities on six Australian MIAs, and also made reference to the fact that he raised the question of U.S. MIAs.

That session ended about 3:20, and they then talked about Pacific Islands from about 3:20 to 4:00 o'clock, discussing political and economic future of those assorted territories.

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They broke for tea from 4:00 to 4:20, and they then went back, with the Secretary leading a discussion on Northeast Asia with emphasis on Japan, China and Korea, until just a little after 5:00 when they broke.

They will go back into session tomorrow morning. I think the Australian Foreign Minister will be the host at a luncheon tomorrow. Then they'll have an afternoon session, wrap up the communique, and hold a press conference.

My distinguished colleague, the podium is all yours if you wish to add anything to all that.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I don't think I have anything to add to that. I'd be glad to try to take questions.

Q Could we have a little more on what the Australian Foreign Minister may have said about his visit to Hanoi and Laos?

SECOND OFFICIAL: There's not a great deal more to add to that. I don't think he came back with a feeling that there was about to be a break in the Vietnamese approach to the Cambodian problem. I think he felt that it was useful to have gone and talked to them.

(Continued on next page)

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Q On Australia and New Zealand both, did the subject of notification by the United States of ships and vessels carrying nuclear weapons come up?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, not specifically. There was a discussion of a nuclear-free zone proposal which the Australians have crafted to try to avoid that problem for us.

Q Some of the New Zealanders suggest that there have been people within the Parliament, or even within the Government, who would like the United States to notify about ships or vessels carrying nuclear weapons. It didn't come up?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, and I think -- No, it didn't.

Q How is the danger of the Soviet threat in the ANZUS region perceived?

SECOND OFFICIAL: There was some discussion about the possible vulnerabilities of the small Pacific island countries because, essentially, of their economic weakness. The importance of addressing those economic weakness is because over the long run, they could leave some opening for the Russians. But I think the general framework of the discussion was to recognize that the threat that we all face from the Soviets is primarily outside of that region. I mean, it's not a direct military threat within the ANZUS region itself -- at the moment, it's not our principal concern.

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FIRST OFFICIAL: There was some reference to the use of Camranh Bay and Soviet activity in Vietnam.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. There was specific reference -- You said in the South Pacific region?

Q I was thinking primarily of ANZUS, but let's extend that beyond the ANZUS region.

SECOND OFFICIAL. There was discussion about Vietnam; there was discussion about the Soviet buildup in the Pacific. There was, as John said, more broadly discussion about the Soviet buildup, which indeed threatens all of us.

Q Did the Australians bring up their idea that the geographic limits of ANZUS should be more specifically, explicitly defined?

SECOND OFFICIAL: That issue was specifically discussed, but not in the form of the Australians' saying that we should do that. I mean we talked about the dilemmas of doing that, the arguments both pro and con; but I think there was a general agreement that in fact, more often than not, efforts to be specific in that way are actually openings for creating problems, and that while it is useful to have some understanding among ourselves of what the nature of the imprecision is, that a certain amount of imprecision and ambiguity is actually useful.

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Beyond that, the Australians did say specifically that they felt it was important outside of the ANZUS area, — while we share substantial common interests and common concern about democratic values -- and indeed as a result of this, which I think they referred to as "the spirit of ANZUS," we have, generally, a common global approach -- that it is important not to say that our actions outside the ANZUS Treaty area are based on the Treaty itself, although they may be shaped by the spirit of the Treaty.

Q Did the Australians say, in terms of defense, that they were intending to narrow their scope or the portion of the Indian Ocean which they were committed to defend?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No, they didn't.

Q They did not?

A No.

Q Would you go back to the question of notification? I'm not clear on what our attitude is towards notifying Australia or New Zealand that our ships are carrying nuclear weapons?

SECOND OFFICIAL: As far as I know, we don't.

FIRST OFFICIAL: We neither confirm nor deny.

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's a public position. I believe, as far as I know, with respect to any communication

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between governments, we don't notify. But I don't know that for sure.

Q Is there any consideration of changing this policy?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Not at the moment, no.

Q Did the Australian or New Zealand Foreign Ministers put forth any new ideas on economic development and international assistance?

SECOND OFFICIAL: No specific ideas. I think there was a significant part of the discussion about the global situation focused on the important of development. The Secretary made the point that development is much more than just a matter of official development assistance. In fact, if you look at the Southeast ASian countries, who are the most immediate neighbors of Australia, I think some 94 percent of their development resources come from domestic sources. And of the portion that comes externally, a larger portion is provided by private investment than by official development. So there was some discussion about that general question of perspective, kind of general agreement on the importance of development, and then in the discussion later about the Pacific islands, again some specific discussion about the problem there -- the special problem of the character of those countries, many of whom have serious problems in developing economic self-sufficiency.

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Q Were any suggestions put forward on a monetary or trade conference or any type of new multi-lateral solution?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Not today, no. There is more room on the agenda tomorrow if you're talking about, for example, New Zealand's concern about the international monetary system. The way the agenda has been structured, I guess it might come up again tomorrow; it did not today.

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Q Was there any discussion today, including Japan, in the defense arrangements of ANZUS, or is that likely to come up tomorrow?

A There wasn't today, and I don't expect it to come up. There was discussion about Japan and Japan's defense efforts which are within the framework of the one treaty, the security treaty that Japan has and that is with us. I think it's fair to say a general understanding of the benefits to the whole region of an improved Japanese self-defense capability, while everyone recognizes, as the Japanese themselves recognize, that neither Japan nor Japan's neighbors are interested in seeing a Japanese role that extends beyond Japan's self defense.

Q In light of some impressions left by the Australian election campagine, did the Australians specifically, explicitly re-commit their government to the treaty and to the arrangements which have been made subsequently with the United States on the B-52's and the rest? In other words, are things going to remain as they were before the Labor Party took over?

A They very, very definitely, very clearly reaffirm their commitment to the treaty. Insofar as we

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talked about specific, existing arrangements, I would say the general thrust of the discussion was to continue arrangements as they are although these are bilateral arrangements between us and the details of them are more appropriately discussed when the Australian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister meet in bilateral meetings later in the week.

Q In addition to the B-52's, would that include the intelligence bases?

A They're not bases; they're facilities. The joint facilities certainly will continue. There may be some discussions about specific details. I think actually fairly small ones. There specifically is the question of public disclosure the Australians have raised, but we will discuss that with them bilaterally.

Q In review of the ANZUS treaty today, were there any problems raised, any questions or areas where, say, Australia or New Zealand felt that there had to be renegotiations?

A No. I think we're all quite happy with the treaty. I think that the general form of the treaty it was pointed out by one of the other participating governments -- I believe it was New Zealand -- is probably part of the reason that it has had the long life that

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it's had; in fact the document is too specific, has problems because it constantly needs renegotiation. I think within that framework, a comment was made that the imprecision is good as long as it is accompanied by very extensive dialogue about the specific issues and specific concerns. Indeed, that is why we have these very extensive consultative mechanisms within the Alliance and why we have these annual ministeral meetings.

Q When the Australian Foreign Minister was talking about his trip to Hanoi, did he urge the United States to change its policies so that Vietnam was not so isolated? Did he urge a dialogue, in other words?

A Let me say, first of all, it's not our policy. It's the policies of the ASEAN countries. The guiding principle and the one that has guided our discussions today also is that it's the ASEAN countries who have the direct security interest at stake in this issue that has shown, really, impressive leadership on the issue and whose lead we want to follow and whose interest we want to support.

So the question is, in a way, whether they should change their policies. I think the feeling was that while we're still discouraged at the pace of progress, we believe that the approach the ASEAN countries have taken is the

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right one; that they have demonstrated the right mixture of resolve and at the same time willingness to find a political settlement, and that the real thing that's needed is a change of position by Vietnam.

Q There's been some discussion in the press about the Laos pursuing a policy somewhat more independent of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Was there any discussion today about pursuing that with the Laotions?

A Yes. The Secretary specifically indicated our interest in exploring an improvement of relations with Laos in which we think the most important concrete action the Laotions might take on their side would be toward a resolution of the MIA issue.

That expression of our interest was in fact made in the context of the Australian Foreign Minister indicating that they would be very happy to convey our concerns about that issue to both Hanoi and Vientiane.

Q We still diplomatic relations with Laos; right?

A Yes, we do.

Q No Ambassador?

A Not an Ambassador.

Q Do you have an Ambassador?

A We do not. We have diplomatic relations

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but conducted by a Charge'.

Q Have the Laotions expressed interest, as is my impression, in improving ties with, say, the West?

A Specifically,indicated interest in improving relations with the United States, as we have indicated interest in improving relations with Laos.

We really still need to see -- we've seen some encouraging steps. We've indicated what we really need to see is some concerted pattern of progress on the MIA issue.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I have a feeling we have satiated you with information.

Q What is the focus of the talks tomorrow?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We'll be doing a wrap-up of arms control and global issues. If there are any remaining differences on the communique, we'll be discussing them tomorrow.

(Briefing concluded at 5:50 P.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
THE EMIR OF BAHRAIN

July 19, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:35 A.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We're going to have to get going because my colleague's got another meeting he's got to be in in a few minutes. We will now have a briefing by my colleague on the President's meeting with the Emir. This is attributable to senior administration official on background.

Q Begin. Tell us about Begin.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Welcome to the afficionados of American-Bahraini relations.

Begin's already been announced. I really have nothing to add to it. So, it would be hopeless to ask me a question because I won't answer it. So, let's go on.

Q We tried.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am going to give you a briefing on background of the meeting in the -- on Bahrain, the Emir. I've only got about 10 minutes. Let me do my best and get out.

Q Do you think it will take that long?

Q Regurgitate it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just let me tell you the Emir was in the room with the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Health and one of his senior court advisers. On our side, there was the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense, Bill Clark, and Ambassador Sutherland.

The subjects that were discussed -- a bit first on the bilateral relationship. There was really just a discussion of some of the issues, some of the topics and a reaffirmation of our interest -- mutual interest in close cooperative relations. Most of the time was spent on regional issues, Middle East peace -- focus on the Palestinian problem, a discussion of the Reagan initiative; Lebanon, agreement on the need to get all external forces out, a need to break the current impasse; Iran-Iraq war, they discussed the urgency and agreed on the urgency of finding a solution; Soviet issues, the problems of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the pressures this puts on the Gulf; the problems of instability in the general area redounding to the benefit of the Soviets. Our visitors were quite concerned about the threats this posed to the conservative monarchies of the Gulf.

The President asked the Secretary to discuss his current visit to the area and there was a focus on Syria, Syrian attitudes, on Lebanon. Now, a large part of the discussion was on Lebanon, in part because of the merits of the case, in part because of the topicality. President Gemayel is arriving.

Then in the context of discussing the Iran-Iraq war, there was a considerable discussion -- the President and the Vice President and the Emir on the problems of trying to find a way to isolate the oil spill, to cap the wells, to avoid further harm

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to the marine ecology. We discussed the things we have been trying to do individually and to some extent together, noting that the American experts are in place just waiting to be given the green light from a security point of view in order to end that threat to the ecology of the area.

Now, that was the general discussion. Let me answer a couple of questions.

Q Did the President convey to him the cancellation of the visit of Prime Minister Begin --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- what effect this may have on the Middle East peace prospect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not at all.

Q It did not come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the subject didn't come up.

Q Can you give us your analysis of what impact it does have? I mean, you did have the Emir here today --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- and Gemayel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really -- this just happened and I'm not going to engage in any off-the-cuff speculative analysis. It wouldn't be doing you a service either.

Q Any approach made regarding a -- base?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q -- a rapid deployment base for the Gulf? Any approach made by the U.S. to the visitors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q On the subject of the Palestinian peace plans, is the Emir a backer of the President's September 1st --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think he's --

Q When he was talking about secure national boundaries, it sounded like he was going beyond that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Emir is a backer of anything that will bring peace to the area. Basically, the Bahrainis see their interest served by peace. They would like --

Q Would you characterize it -- would he insist on a Palestinian homeland? Did he? Would he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You can -- however you define that.

Q He said within secure boundaries. It sounds like --

Q -- national boundaries -- kind of like a state.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You ask him what he meant. Ask the Bahrainis. This was not --

Q He's not here.

Q Now, we're just trying to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, but this was not further elaborated beyond what he said publicly.

Q We're just trying to translate what he said publicly. As you, yourself, said it depends on how you define "boundaries".

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q We're wondering how he defines "boundaries" and I'm sure the United States and Bahrain have been discussing this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you want to get a view as to what the official Bahraini position is on that subject, ask the foreign minister. I mean, we didn't go into it.

Q Did the President ask what he meant?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we didn't go into that. There was just a general agreement

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on the need to unblock the peace process and also a general agreement on the fact that Lebanon, the current impasse in Lebanon, really was a practical -- obstacle to unlocking the solution of the Palestinian problem.

Q Did he offer the President any suggestions about how to change Assad's position or change the Syrian approach?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The emphasis of the Bahrainis was on getting foreign forces out. Now --

Q Well, in that context --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- which is -- I think it's fair to say that in their view if the focus were to be put exclusively on getting foreign forces out and talking about security issues, it would make it a lot easier.

Q Well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, we explained the background of the agreement and what the various elements of the agreement were intended to accomplish. And they just frankly said they thought that the non-security elements of the agreement were a problem.

Q -- non-security elements being a problem for Assad, but did they offer any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Being a problem for the -- for the rest of the Arabs as well. That was what they claimed. We explained why the agreement had the key element, from the Arab point of view, of assuring Israeli withdrawal, and we thought that this was something that was important to the Arabs and they said, yes, it is, all withdrawal is important. I don't want to give you the idea that the Bahrainis were supporting a Syrian occupation of Lebanon, because they're not. But there were no magic solutions that came out of the meeting.

Q -- discussions of the West Bank?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just in the general context of the need to unblock the road to -- a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, in that context.

Q What role, if any, can Bahrain really play in the peace process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bahrain will play a role in the context of the Gulf Cooperative Council. They well recognize the limits on Bahrain's influence but they are a conservative, a moderate country who obviously recognize that continued turmoil and threats to the peace are against their interest. And to that extent, they can be constructive exercising their influence through a mechanism that exists. They don't pretend to be independent actors.

One more. I've got to run.

Q Would he -- he call for the withdrawal of the Syrian as well as Israeli forces from Lebanon? Did he support that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, sure. The question is how do you get it -- how do you get it?

Q Were we surprised by Begin's call today, or had we had some advance warning --

Q -- that Larry was going to take that question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:45 A.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE
PRESIDENT'S BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

July 19, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:14 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: We have with us two gentlemen. They will speak as senior administration officials and should be identified as such.

We are passing out the executive order signed by the President that creates the Commission and sets up its structure. We anticipate, at 5:00 p.m., having the names of the Commission members. And the reason they are not available now is that we're doing Congressional notification on these members. And we will have them available to you once that's completed.

So gentlemen --

Q Yeah, we'll embargo it.

MR. SPEAKES: I know you will.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To answer your first question, yes, I do know Henry Kissinger.

Q That disqualifies you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we'd like to do is just give you a few words and, then, take some of your questions. Basically, we anticipate that soon there will be a meeting between the President and Henry Kissinger and that, starting early next week, Dr. Kissinger will be starting his initial round of briefings with the excutive branch.

The main thrust of the Commission, as you know, is long-range in nature. It's going to look at the fundamental economic, social, other aspects that it sees with regard to the U.S. interest in Central America. There will be a two-tiered group. It will be explained to you -- it will be clearer to you at 5:00 p.m. when they announce the names to you. There will be members of the Commission and, then, there will be senior counselors who will advise the Commission.

At this stage, I think I'd like to ask my colleague to give you a little bit of the feel of some of the things that we see as the underlying structure that will be used by the Commission when they start to look at the problems and come up with the solutions. My colleague is intimately familiar with the Central American problem.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon.

There's been a great deal of focus over recent months on the political and military situation in Central America. (Laughter.) There's been less focus on the economic aspect of the problem there. In fact, the economic solution certainly needs to be undertaken over the long term in order to have real peace and stability in that region of the world.

Central American countries -- all of them -- are suffering probably the most serious economic crisis that they've suffered since the 1930s. All of them have balance of payments problems. Most have borrowed heavily since the 1979 oil price increases. And now most are facing the possibility of debt rescheduling -- very serious debt problems.

They all experienced sharp decreases in production leading to large-scale unemployment. The causes of these economic problems -- at least the immeditate causes -- are: one, the political instability in the region and, two, the world recession. The world recession has meant that the region's primary export crops, which are coffee, sugar and bananas, have had less demand or lower prices on the world markets -- as well as the demand for the manufactured goods of this region has been substantially reduced. The net impact in the immediate term has been this great financial hardship that I just outlined.

Notwithstanding the political instability in the region at this time and the economic -- the world recession, the facts are that there are long-term, structural problems that will need to be addressed that this administration has been very aware of, but that this commission will be taking a very close look at. These long-term, structural difficulties include: one, a lack of employment

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and economic opportunity. I mentioned a moment ago the sugar, bananas and coffee as crops that produce a large share of the exports receipts. This concentration on one or two crops in each country has built into those economies a substantial or structural disequilibrium.

Secondly, or, b, the population growth rate in the region has been in excess of three percent. That's a very large population growth rate that produces a lot of young people year after year on the job market that currently just can't find or can't -- all of them can't find employment.

Also, there's industrial structural difficulties that simply don't encourage growth. Other factors, all of these, leading to unemployment and really lack of economic growth and opportunity.

A second structural difficulty is that a large portion of the population in several of these countries, indeed, in all of the countries to a degree are still living in great poverty, really many of those people unaffected by the economic growth that has occurred in recent years and other sectors of those economies. The average income in the region, per capita income, is $980. Now, that's the average. So, what that means because, of course, many people make much more than that, is that a lot of people have an income of substantially less than that per year.

In addition, there's a lack of basic health care for many of these poor people. Over one-third of the people in the region are illiterate with all the problems that come from illiteracy in terms of job productivity and so forth.

Another major structural difficulty is that public and private institutions, in many cases, are very weak or just not functioning at all or very well. Institutions include the political, in some cases, judicial, economic, educational systems and so forth.

These and other strucutral difficulties need to be dealt with long-term for the economic situation and, indeed, the political situation to work itself through. The region does start, however, with some advantages that need to be built upon.

First, most of the countries in the region have democratically elected governments. Indeed, most of them, in recent times, have had elections. I think that that's something the American people just don't focus on because of history and other factors.

Two, it appears that we may have a Caribbean Basin Initiative adopted reasonably soon. I think there's a conference on the Hill this very day to reconcile House and Senate versions of the CBI. That would be a substantial economic step which can be built upon in working through the structural difficulties that I was talking about.

A third advantage that the country -- that the region has is that these are hard working people -- people that are reasonably productive. There are other advantages but these need to be taken into consideration.

The U.S. government has for some time -- had a foreign aid program in the region. In 1983, we will be giving some $639 million in economic assistance -- that's three times, incidentally, three times, in excess of three times the amount of military assistance that will be going to the region. That includes a balance of payments, support immediate difficulties, but longer term aid in terms of some of the structural difficulties, health, and agriculture and so on.

In summation here, there are structural difficulties which the commission will want to look at. There are some advantages that the region has that the commission will want to look at, how they can build on those. The U.S. government is already deeply involved in working at these but we're assured that there are additional suggestions and opportunities that need to be expanded upon.

We welcome your questions.

Q How can the appointment of someone as controversial as Henry Kissinger help reach the kind of political consensus for the President's policies, controversial policies --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think you get to a stature of Dr. Kissinger, as the Secretary of State, with all that he brought in that job without having some detractors. It's rather interesting to note that the detractors come from both the right and the left.

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Q That's precisely why it seems like a politically stupid thing to do.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I wouldn't share your assessment. (Laughter.)

Q Come on, Andrea. What do you have in mind? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that it's obvious that when Dr. Kissinger's name was put forward that those that evaluated it and the President who made the decision was aware of precisely some of the reactions that it would get. But in spite of the reactions that it might come from -- might come from the right, might come from the left, the fact of the matter is that Dr. Kissinger is a person of stature and respect and has a strategic outlook and that's precisely what's needed in the job.

Q Some of the -- go ahead.

Q How does the commission -- this is a bipartisan commission like others, but this has -- deals with external affairs. How does the commission deal with the fact that the military situation is changing in Central America even as the commission is going about its work and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Even as we speak.

Q Well, yes, as we're here. How does that play into the commission's considerations? And what does the commission do about dealing with the situation in Nicaragua where there's fighting going on, and in El Salvador, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think what you have is, to a certain degree, as you have pointed out, there is an element of a moving target. But you have to remember that the commission -- if you look at the commission's date, it comes up with a report on December 1st, which it makes to the President and to the Congress. Both the Executive Branch and the Congress evaluate it. The commission's report, I'm sure, is going to be put into a time frame a little further on, and it's going to look to some of the underlying aspects. In other words, it's looking long-range and it's not getting involved in a day-to-day operation. That's the significant difference.

Q But is it looking long-range -- if I can follow up, is it looking long-range at the military situation in Nicaragua as well as these economic factors, which have just been outlined to us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think what you have is -- it has an ability, if it so chooses, to look at all the elements, including security, et cetera, which is in its mandates. How they choose to shape it is something for the commission to look --

Q If the commission comes up with a viewpoint that's different from what the administration has or a proposal -- a set of proposals which would redirect the administration's approach in Central America, will the administration go along with that? Would the administration be willing to change its policies if Dr. Kissinger comes up with a different set of policies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking a theoretical question that I don't -- I don't think I can really -- if I can just follow it up, don't think I can really answer. I think the President's intent in putting together a commission -- as you will see the other members are of a significant stature also -- the President obviously understands when you put a commission together of that shape, they're going to arrive at their own conclusions. They have a mandate to look at it within the system, and so that's the way it will be.

Q So if some people are already saying this commission is stacked, that --

Q -- the commission be going down to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I can only hear one at a time.

Q Well, some people already say this commission is stacked, judging from the names in the newspaper -- and we don't have the official names yet --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- these are all people, apparently, who are hardliners, who take the President's view of the seriousness of the communist aggression, as he's outlined it, in Central America. And is it reasonable to believe that they will simply subscribe to his policy with some fine-tuning modifications?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the commission's work will stand on (a) the membership, (b) on their product. I think it's unfortunate if anybody prejudges a deal before it even gets off the ground.

Q Will Kissinger and the commission be going down to the area as soon -- after they finish the original round of briefings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's up to the commission and what Dr. Kissinger want to do. In other words, they have the support of the Executive Branch to go after their mission. And how they go about it is their call. We're there to help them.

Q Do you -- the answer to the question before, when you were asked about whether they would be assessing the military situation as well as the economic situation, did I hear you correctly to say "no"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I said was -- you heard me correctly to say, no, no, not just the military. What you heard me say was, if you look at the mandate, it talks about security, economic, and all of the aspects. So I think they'll be looking at all of the aspects.

Q Well, can you just amplify a little bit about what the nature of their examination of the military situation will be? If they aren't looking at day-to-day operations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q But, for example, will they make a judgment or does the President want them to make a judgment about the extent of the necessary military commitment that might be required over the long term, over the next five years in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the time frame --

Q Does he want a finding on that from this commission?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The time frame which they pick is up to the commission, as to the time, whether it's five, ten, or fifteen. They have a right to look at security.

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Now, if they decide that within their report they want to come up with legislative packages and authorization bills, that's up for the Commission to decide.

Q Does the President want them to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President appointed this Commission to go ahead and look at it. He's giving them a fairly large mandate and how they go about it is something for the Commission to say.

Q Can I follow that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q If the Commission is going to be so long-term, which is what one gets from listening to your colleague's briefing, the issues that you talked about them dealing with, it's not going to -- or how is it going to have any effect on what's really controversial, the covert aid program or the covert -- overt-covert program or the military assistance program, period, which are things that people are arguing about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any time that you establish a commission that it has to come together and it has to evaluate the problem and then make their report, you're going to have a lag in time. We all knew that. That's why this Commission was established, to look at things long range.

Meanwhile, the President's policy in Central America continues.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the point --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- two different things. Two different -- We're talking about two different elements.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the point is in part --

Q -- between them. I mean, there is a real-life sitation going on now and there is, you know, all kinds of schemes you can come up with, Alliance for Progress things. How do you meld the long-term, you know, ideas --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'll know them at the time in which they come into effect. I mean, from a practical point of view, you know better than I do, that if you come out with a Commission report on December 1st, you're more than likely looking at [illegible] at the earliest, and I don't want to prejudge when the Commission wants to see its stuff to come into effect, unless you're talking about an urgent, urgent supplemental, you're looking at an FY '85 program. But, I mean, that's up to them. And there is going to be that period of time and the two are delineated.

Yes, sir.

Q Just to clear it up. They will have the mandate to go into the covert action programs, see whether they're working or whether they should work or whether they should be continued or discontinued?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What they have the mandate --

Q They will have the mandate to look into the military aid program to see whether military aid, to the extent we're giving it, is an --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have a mandate, among other things, economic, to look into the security aspect of it.

Q Does that -- what you're saying the same as what I'm saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not -- I just told you what I'm saying. They look into the security aspect of it.

Q What do you mean by the security aspect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, security covers all the ranges of national security --

Q Including covert?

Q But will they have the opportunity and the ability to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The security covers all of the ranges.

That's up for the Commission to decide, what aspects they're going to get into or not.

Q But you said earlier that they have a bandaid to look in certain -- "within the system" is the way you put it. Does that mean that the parameters have already been established by what we're already doing there and they can't get much outside of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't mean to give that characterization at all. And if I did, I'm sorry.

Q Well, let me pursue that. Can they -- will they have a mandate to look into the covert military operation and come up with a judgment as to whether it's worthwhile or counter-productive?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me see if I can answer this question that you both put one more time. They have the mandate to look into the security aspect and all of that which comes under it. And I'm not going to get more specific on that aspect.

Q All of that which comes under what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the national security aspect of it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have an obligation -- I mean, they have a right to get into that aspect --

Q That really isn't responsive.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm trying to be as responsive as I can on that subject. You've got some standard answers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, read your Executive Order, Section --

Q Well, we haven't had a chance, sir. You've just passed it out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Take a moment and read it, there --

Q And we're talking about a Commission whose membership we haven't been privileged to know yet.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wait a minute.

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Q It says --

Q We'd like --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm doing the best I can --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I interject here, please?

Q Yes.

Q We'd like to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It says, "To the internal and external threads of security and all that encompasses," I might add. So you draw your own conclusions from that. You're not going to smoke him into talking about covert activities. We don't talk about them.

Q Can I --

Q You folks called this briefing and some of us are really trying to figure out just what this Commission is going to do. Could you try to answer the earlier question that Steve asked? Do you anticipate that the Commission is going to come up with some proprosal for long-term military aid or what level is necessary to maintain the security? I mean, is this what you -- what you think the Commission would do? It's hard to -- otherwise, to pin this down, what you're talking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- I think that they would look at all aspects of it, including the security and the economic. And I'm not going to try to prejudge, nor have I personally, in my own mind, prejudged where they're going to go and where their emphasis is going to be.

Q But that would mean that there would -- you would think that they would have some proposal at the end of their term for what they thought was necessary in long-term military and economic aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they would have, I would think, in their report, would not only be an analysis of what they conceive to be the problem but how they would propose to see the solutions to it. So, in that case, I think we're on the same wavelength.

Q Is the administration in any way bound by what the Commission does?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so.

Q Given the orientation of what we know of the Commission make-up at this point, do you honestly believe it's realistic to think that the Commission could disagree with the basic thrust of the administration's policies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's always entirely possible when you have a commission of this caliber that they can agree or disagree. I think they're going to be guided by their own thoughts --

Q There's one criticism with respect to Mr. Kissinger that seems to be shared by people in Latin America according to press comment this morning, which is that Henry Kissinger when he was Secretary of State didn't really distinguish himself as a democrat abroad. And a principle aim of the administration's policy has been to -- is for the promotion of democracy in Central America. Now, given the fact that Kissinger's involvement in certain covert activities designed to disrupt the election in Chile and subsequently remove the democratic elected government in that country, how will you assure the critics that, in fact, there -- be no contradiction between his purposes and what the Reagan administration support of democracy is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not addressing myself as some of you earlier -- to get into the thrust of your question, I just came from a lunch with some 20 Latin American ambassadors and I would say that the general impression was that they were pleased with the idea of Henry Kissinger as the head of this commission.

Q Can we quote you on that at least since you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know --

MR. SPEAKES: -- on background.

Q Well, that's a dangerous statement you just --

Q -- report that --

Q Some anonymous --

Q Can we report that Mr. Motley had lunch with these ambassadors and --

Q Yes, sure.

MR. SPEAKES: Sure. Go ahead. On the record and off the record --

Q On the record, what he said?

MR. SPEAKES: Yes. Sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- we're off.

Q Could you repeat that again?

MR. SPEAKES: Now we're on background.

Q -- repeat --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's get the ground rules straight here.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. The statement that Ambassador -- the Secretary Motley was at a lunch and got good reaction from Latin ambassadors is on the record, attributed to him. Now, we're back on background.

Q Did you say -- all of them, all 20?

Q Could you address the democratic --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just sort them out. I heard no disparaging remarks. I heard several good ones. Okay?

I didn't sit there and take roll. They were buying. (Laughter.)

Hey, I took a pay cut to come here, second hit. I don't offer to buy lunch unless I'm forced to.

Q Is that on the record? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anytime.

Q It is a matter of record in Congress that -- in testimony that's been approved by Congress that Secretary Kissinger did take place in certain covert activities with respect to the democratically elected government of Chile. Can you address the question of how that squares with U.S. policy in Central America --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- not address the question of whether he did or didn't get into -- What I'm telling you is he's a former a Secretary of State. It's obvious that a person of that stature is going to have critics. I find rather interesting it comes from both the right and the left --

Q Ronald Reagan was his critic until recently.

Q Thank you.

Q Why did we say thank you now?

Q -- look around you.

Q Go ahead.

MR. SPEAKES: -- want to get these --

Q -- answer the question.

MR. SPEAKES: Get these two questions.

Q The President said in Florida yesterday that more Cuban soldiers and Soviet supplies --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Can you say that --

Q -- have arrived in Nicaragua.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry.

Q This is according to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand. But --

Q And after that, he said this cannot be allowed to continue. I want to find out what is the administration doing to make sure that this is not allowed to continue. Do you have any kind of military and naval action planned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Are you ruling it out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can go back to the President's April 27th program with regards to the four parts of his policy. And I think that if you have any questions about exercises or anything else I would ask you to go to the Department of Defense on that --

Q -- the President never says -- he never says never. I --

Q Although there are several people on Capitol Hill, including the Speaker of the House, who question the entire justification for military assistance in Central America, it does not appear from the names that have surfaced so far that there is anyone on the Commission who has a record of questioning the usefulness of military assistance in Central America. I'm wondering if you could say flatly whether or not the administration made any conscious effort to keep people off the Commission who have a record of questioning military assistance as a tool for American policy in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In my dealings with regards to the establishment of this Commission,

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I know of no incidence of what you are saying. I think that the intent, as I understand it, of the President was to appoint a commission of representative respected Americans to take a fresh look at what has become a national issue. And I -- the people, themselves, and the report will stand on --

Q If that's so, I mean, the polls seem to show that -- representative American, there are a hell of a lot of representative Americans who disagree with the adminisration's policy. So, how could this be a representative commission if there's no one on there who seems to disagree on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can digress into polls. In another life, I used to spend lots of other people's monies on polls and we could go on all day about it who -- demographic, how the question was. I mean, I can't answer that.

Q The question is still worth an answer. How come there are -- nobody on the commission apparently --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We --

Q -- who disagrees with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I tell you, I would suggest that maybe you might want to ask that question at five o'clock.

Q Let's have the members. I mean, we want to make this a fruitful briefing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wish I could. I want to be responsive to you.

Q We need to know who the members are to really ask that question, I agree.

Q Will you come back at 5:00 p.m.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not -- That's right.

Q Will somebody be available at 5:00 p.m.?

Q Does President Reagan believe that there was no attempt by the U.S. government under Secretary of State Kissinger to undermine and eventually helped foment the fall of the Allende regime or is the assumption in this administration that that was the appropriate thing for the U.S. government to have done?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that that issue has entered into it at all. What the Secretary -- the President has done --

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- is appointed Dr. Kissinger.

Q Why would that issue not have entered into it since this is one of the --

Q -- background certainly comes into play --

Q -- background --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it goes back to this, that you're getting critiques -- as I said earlier, you're getting -- Dr. Kissinger is getting hit from both ends of the spectrum. You're asking him from one end of the spectrum --

Q Yes, sir.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are equal other questions on the other.

Q Okay. How about detente? Ronald Reagan --

Q Excuse me, but presumably what this commission will be coming up with will be attempting to help a region where governments who are not made up of U.S. members of Congress will have to also work with whatever we recommend. And that, I think, would mean that you would hope to have the confidence of the people in that region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only tell you the reaction one more time that I got at lunch with some 20 ambassadors today with regards to how Dr. Kissinger will be perceived by Latins.

Q Was Kissinger chosen for his consensus-building --

Q Does the administration feel that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One at a time. I'm sorry.

Q Was Kissinger chosen for his consensus-building possibilities here, or to send a signal to Latin America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think what -- as you know, in any choice that goes on in selections, there's a variety of factors that go into it and qualifications that are examined. I don't think you can point to any one thing as the final decision --

Q Has the Counsel's office --

Q Does the administration feel that the very fact of establishing the commission provides a new argument for Congress not to tie the President's hands in Central America, at least until the commission report is issued?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think that the administration's position with regards to hand-tying or not hand-tying is affected by this -- by the formation of this commission.

Q You're not going to use that as an argument?

Q Has the Counsel's office cleared him of potential conflicts of interest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand that that process is under way now.

Q Well, what's the salary for this job?

Q -- the process is under way, if the process is simply under way, how do you know that he can accept this appointment without a possibility of conflict? Why was it -- why didn't it precede the announcement?

MR. SPEAKES: We've got an ongoing conflict check on all the members.

Q What's the salary?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- announced --

MR. SPEAKES: If any of them are not able to serve, they won't serve. It's happened previously in commissions. And if they're not able to serve -- but we don't anticipate any problems. We'll look and see.

Q It happened with Harold Brown, Larry, on the MX Commission --

MR. SPEAKES: I just said that.

Q -- but it was -- but you never announced Harold Brown, formally, is my remembrance of it. The word got out -- I mean, you've announced -- or the President announced Kissinger, so the presumption would be that it would -- I would think the presumption would be -- correct me if I'm wrong -- that he had passed at least the conflict check of the Counsel's office; otherwise, the President wouldn't have announced him. Is that wrong?

MR. SPEAKES: Secretary Kissinger is presently serving on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, so he's passed a conflict for that. It will be reviewed in the light of -- current employment.

Q Is it the same -- same standard?

MR. SPEAKES: It will be reviewed in the current light of the current situation, and we'll see. But we don't anticipate any problems.

Q Are there any --

Q Is he going to have an office around here, or do you just reach Kissinger in New York?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to set up -- we are -- I talked with Dr. Kissinger this morning as we worked out some of the details. We're going to set up an office for him at the State Department, initially, and then see where --

Q Oh, that's good. Shultz will love that. (Laughter.)

Q -- where is Shultz going to go? (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Listen. You guys haven't got half the one-liners that we've thought of after --

Q Do you know if it's at the State Department?

Q Tell us a few.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Do you know if it's at the State Department?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We're going to temporarily set them up there and see where he wants the Commission. Obviously, he needs help -- (laughter) -- he needs a conference room if they're going to get together.

Q Wants it in bed. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're there to facilitate the Commission. If he wants to stay in the State Department, we'll do it.

Q I want to get back to what I think is the central question. The people who question -- there are a number up on the Hill who question whether or not military aid is of any use. You said you don't know of any effort to keep those people off the Commission. Do you know of any member of the Commission who has questioned the usefulness of military aid in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I can't answer your question.

Q Are there any limitations on the capabilities that the Commission will have in terms of who they talk to? Will they be able to go to Havana and Moscow and so on to investigate -- (laughter) -- these questions as Dr. Kissinger is wont?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Obviously the intent of the President in appointing this commission is so they could proceed in whatever manner they want.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

END 3:47 P.M. EDT

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 291 PC# 31
July 19, 1983

PRESS CONFERENCE
ON
32nd MEETING OF THE ANZUS COUNCIL

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM HAYDEN
FOREIGN MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA
THE HONORABLE WARREN COOPER
FOREIGN MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND
TUESDAY, JULY 19, 1983, 5:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This is an ON THE RECORD press conference. It is confined to ANZUS-related issues.

The Ministers participating, from your left to your right, are the Australian Defense Minister, Mr. Scholes; the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Hayden; the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz; and the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Mr. Cooper. I think the Secretary of State may have a few remarks up front, and then I will select the questioners. I would appreciate when you ask your question, if you will state your name and your news organization*, and the Minister to whom you are going to address your question.

Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would like to express my gratitude to our friends from Australia and New Zealand who have come here and labored with us for two days. We covered a wide range of subjects, as the communique shows, and from our standpoint we consider it to have been a very worthwhile discussion.

I would like to take the opportunity, as well, to thank Mr. Hayden who, when he visited Hanoi recently, took the occasion to raise with them the questions of our POW's and MIA's there. You have undertaken it when the Vietnamese visit you in Australia, you will continue to follow up on that subject and we appreciate that very much.

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* Court Reporters were unable to obtain the names and organizations of the questioners, and, therefore, they do not appear on the transcript.

For further information contact:

MR. HUGHES: If neither of the other two Ministers have any remarks, then we'll take some questions.

QUESTION: To Mr. Hayden. Mr. Minister, when you came in on an ON THE RECORD conference you said that there were two different interpretations of ANZUS in Australia, one that commited us to global responsibilities, the other one that committed the U.S. to the regional defense of Australia.

I understood one of your intentions here was to clarify this issue. I assume that items 3, 4 and 5 of the Communique addressed that. They don't seem to say anything, and I wonder, has the issue clarified in your mind as to the nature of the Treaty? As a result of this meeting, has anything at all altered as to our understanding of the Treaty, or the American understanding of it?

FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN: I don't think you should discriminate against this particular communique. It's been drafted according to the great traditions of these sorts of communiques. But if I could go beyond that and say, for my part a number of matters have been clarified. For instance, it was implicitly stated at one point in the discussions, in the course of this morning's session by Admiral Crewe, that each nation should contribute according to its abilities and in its area of greatest concern.

For me, that means very simply that we have explicitly declared that for Australia our role should be seen as one of regional concern. This is fairly consistent with the view I've expressed over a very long time, both when I was spokesman on defense matters for the Labor Party in the National Parliament and subsequently when I was leader of the opposition for the Labor Party.

And so the difficulties that we've had with the contradictory purposes being presented to our defense planning, that sometimes it was presumed we had a global role to fulfill somehow as an appendix associated with a superpower, and at other times we had a regional role, has been clarified, and I accept that clarification. For my part it will allow much more explicit and precise formulation of our defense thinking. It's the sort of defense structures that we establish for our defense forces.

QUESTION: I would also like to address Mr. Hayden. Does this mean, Mr. Hayden, that you don't think that ANZUS involves us in any global responsibility?

MR. HAYDEN: ANZUS doesn't by the terms in which it's drafted. ANZUS refers to attacks on the metropolitan territory, the signatory members to territories they may administer, and refers to the area of the Pacific. It doesn't refer to international obligations. Yesterday, Mr. Shultz made this clear where he said that there would be circumstances where, if ANZUS doesn't commit Australia to U.S. diplomacy, for instance in the Middle East or Central America, we may or may not agree.

If we do agree, it would be on the basis of other principles, although the spirit of ANZUS guides many things which we do even though ANZUS doesn't cover it.

So there is a multinational observer force in the Sinai which was committed by the previous government not under obligations arising from ANZUS but because of certain common views, I believe, they shared with the American Administration. That's one illustration of the way in which decisions can be made which have an implication well beyond the obligations which are covered by ANZUS.

QUESTION: I would like to follow that and ask all three Ministers what are the geographic limits to the ANZUS obligations and Alliance possibilities. For example, would it include the Persian Gulf?

FOREIGN MINISTER COOPER: We have reviewed ANZUS. It's been going for 32 years successfully. The document comes out in my opinion strengthened. We have not given precision to the geographic areas. There is no manner in which we have looked at the latitude or the longitude. We have looked at the Pacific.

Obviously, the strongest points are in the Pacific. There is still the importance of the Indian Ocean. There's a relevance, of course, to the Americans and Australians in the Indian Ocean. There is relevance to New Zealand. There is less relevance to New Zealand in regard to, say, Central America. But if there was an attack on New Zealand on Australia, and really if we're looking at to where the attack might come from, we would probably say sometime in the future from the Soviet Union, we would believe that ANZUS covered the Pacific area. But we are very, very interested in the work that's done by the United States and other countries in bringing about peace in other areas.

We have been through the global responsibilities of the Western Alliance countries in trying to create a bit of peace. But there is no doubt that ANZUS represents the Pacific, but no definition is given to the geographic area. That's probably one of the main reasons that its survived intact so strongly as a treaty between the two antipodean countries and the United States.

QUESTION: I would like my question to Mr. Cooper. Sir, it would seem from the wording of this communique that there is a more realistic understanding of the expression and intent of Article 4 which carries the American commitment as opposed to the comfortable myths of the past.

Would New Zealand, sir, have any reservations on this, perhaps, new understanding?

FOREIGN MINISTER COOPER: We don't really see a new understanding. As I have said, we believe that ANZUS have come through a review, which has been overdue, intact and, frankly, we look very close to end those. There's a lot of discussion about that particular article and it still commends each of the countries to looking at the problems that maybe if there is some invasion or some military offensive against each other.

There is the clear responsibility to be involved in a treaty where freedoms are at stake. There will be different readings of that particular clause and it will be probably from the news media. The three countries, however, feel that ANZUS has served us and will continue to serve us very well.

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QUESTION: Sir, could I ask Mr. Hayden's response to that same question as perhaps a more realistic assessment to the wording and the intent of Article 4?

FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN: I think you ought to look at Articles 3, 4, and 5, but the obligations under ANZUS are fairly clear: In the event of threat or attack a response is required, and that response has to be provided according to constitutional processes of the respective partners. However, it would not be accurate to presume that the response guaranteed the automatic provision of military forces support. It may, but it would depend on the circumstances of the attack, and how each party weighed that up and concluded what was its proper response according to its constitutional processes.

It may be in certain circumstances that diplomatic responses or political/economic sanctions, or perhaps the supply of equipment, are judged to be the appropriate response. It is also presumed, underpinning the Treaty, is the expectation that each country will have provided a prudent level of self-defense capability commensurate with the resources which it has available. I think that eminently reasonable. In fact, when I read the principles which were enunciated in 1969 by former President Nixon of this country, at Guam, and last year a statement -- I think at Maryland by Judge William Clark -- which seems to be a restatement of those principles, I think they are eminently sensible and that they are in accord with the general principles which are explicit and implicit under the ANZUS arrangements. In short, I think all countries which are signatories to this Treaty have an obligation in the first place to make sure that they've taken prudent measures to develop their own force structures, and that those prudent measures are commensurate with what they could reasonably have provided in relation to the resources which they have available.

QUESTION: I'd like to address this to Secretary Shultz. Paragraph 25 refers to praise from your colleagues for negotiations you're trying to bring out aimed at achieving a peaceful settlement of the situation in Lebanon and the wider Middle East dispute.

Would you please explain what you expect to achieve from the visit of President Gemayel, and what effect the absence of Prime Minister Begin may have on the continuation of this negotiating process referred to in the ANZUS communique?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I knew we'd stick to ANZUS all the way (Laughter) and I give you credit for doing it in an artful manner. (Laughter)

FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN: I think you'll lose many to me because you bet it happen. (Laughter)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We, of course, will be conferring very closely with President Gemayel. The objectives that his government has and the United States Government has are identical in wanting to see all foreign forces leave Lebanon, in wanting to see the emergence of a sovereign Lebanon able to carry on its work and prosper, and be sovereign over all its territory, and to see that there are appropriate security arrangements so that Lebanon doesn't become a place from which attacks can be launched on any neighbor of Lebanon. So those objectives are there, and operationally, we've made some headway in attaining them. We still have a way to go, particularly in bringing about Syrian agreement to withdraw. This subject, among others relevant to the Middle East, will be discussed very strongly.

As far as Mr. Begin's visit is concerned, of course, we're disappointed that he isn't able to come. He has told the President that there are personal reasons that make it impossible for him to come. At the same time, of course, our relationship with Israel is close and continuing, and there is a very strong dialogue between the United States and Israel. We will, of course, be working with the Israelis on these same points.

MR. HUGHES: More ANZUS-related questions?

Yes, Connie.

QUESTION: Thank you. For Foreign Minister Cooper. Mr. Foreign Minister, did you get any indication that the United States will help New Zealand and Australia purchase military equipment to make those countries more effective ANZUS partners? And did you get any indication that President Reagan might visit New Zealand and Australia in November?

FOREIGN MINISTER COOPER: On the first question with regard to the purchase of military equipment, we were talking about ANZUS in regard to the general principles and any other discussions which take place in regard to the bilateral relationship. It's not easy for a country such as New Zealand, of a small size and an agricultural-producing country, to find the capital to buy expensive military equipment, and I'm sure that the United States Secretary of State is aware of that, as is the Defense Secretary.

On the second one, of course, we would like to see President Reagan visit New Zealand. I'm sure the Australians would, too. He is busy, and I know that he is taking a five-nation tour of the Southeast Asian area. Whether he can extend that or not, I don't know, but he is very welcome to visit our country at any time he can fit it into his very busy work in the United States and externally.

QUESTION: Does Secretary Shultz have anything to add on those points?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz, if I could take you back and follow up on Mr. Anderson's question a few minutes ago, could you, sir, comment on the United States view of the limits of the regional aspects of the ANZUS alliance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the hard kernel, in a sense, of the ANZUS alliance is the undertaking to respond in the event of an attack on any of the countries involved. So that's the sort of direct central point. In our discussion we referred to that. Then there was also the phrase, "the spirit of ANZUS," and I take it to mean that these are three countries that, broadly speaking, have the same values and want to defend them, see that they prosper around the world, and so we are interested in what goes on anywhere, as the discussion that we had here shows.

As events unfold, it may turn out that two or three of us are involved in some part of the world, but the direct obligations of ANZUS are very particular, and the effect of ANZUS is to draw us together, to have us not only in a yearly consultative mode such as we've had here for the last couple of days, but that we see each other at other international meetings. There is a great deal of consultation back and forth through our ambassadors, and so it is a vehicle for sharing ideas and seeing how we can best defend the values that we all have in common.

QUESTION: My question is to Mr. Shultz. Was the question of U.S. facilities, communications facilities, in Australia raised at any point in the meeting over the last few days? And what is your view of the proposition from Australia that the United States should make a specific statement of the functions of the three communication stations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The subject was discussed, but not extensively. The Australian delegation will be here further, and we considered that that was an appropriate subject for bilateral discussions, in particular, although in the agreements the ANZUS relationship is referred to as a sort of umbrella, so there will be further discussions.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, a supplementary question, if I may? Do you have any objection to Australians, coming to a sign of apprecation of those facilities, as most Americans have access to understand?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't follow your question.

QUESTION: It seems to be quite common knowledge in the United States of the role and function of those bases in general terms, and the specifics of that have not been spelled out for Australian consumption.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not everything that's written about is correct. Not everything that's written about and that is correct is necessarily commented on officially here. I will simply say that there will be some bilateral discussions of these matters, and we'll see what happens in that event.

QUESTION: I'd like to direct my question to both Mr. Shultz and Mr. Hayden, if I could.

There will be those in Australia who'd be astounded to find that the discussion about the security of our region didn't include specific discussion of the U.S. bases in Australia, which many Australians regard as the greatest of threat to our security.

Could you comment on that suggestion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the record should show that these matters were discussed, but that they also are reserved for more intensive discussion on a bilateral basis, so it isn't as though they're being ignored as your question implies.

FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN: I don't think many thoughtful Australians would be shocked, but there was some discussion on the matter, as Mr. Shultz pointed out, and as he also pointed out the discussion hasn't concluded. That will be followed up in bilateral discussions with appropriate people over the next couple of days.

I've already made the point here -- but I've made it many times publicly over the past few years -- that there are clear risks in having those facilities in Australia, but they're risks which we're prepared to accept as a government so that we can contribute towards a role of deterrence and arms verification, and so that we have some moral standing in the position we intend to take more actively in the United Nations and other international fora in support of arms control, arms reduction, and in that respect we've already appointed an Ambassador for Disarmament so we can take this more active role.

But if I can conclude quickly -- anticipating the question that might come from some sources, having had it put to us before -- there's no contradiction in those two purposes. We're not proposing unilateral disarmament of any particular country, and certainly not of the United States. That would be a nonsense proposition.

We should be prepared to defend our interests. There's nothing consistent, at the same time, to wish for and work for a more homogenous world, and that's what we'll be aiming at.

QUESTION: Mr. Hayden, I think it was yesterday you said that your purpose here -- what I'm aiming at is to establish what our responsibilities are, what our safeguards are, under ANZUS.

Can you point to me in section 2, 3, 4 or 5 anything which in any way enlarges anyone's knowledge on what those safeguards and responsibilities are?

FOREIGN MINISTER HAYDEN: I think I've done that fairly effectively in answer to either the first, second or third question, which had been mentioned, when I spoke about the obligation for responses to be forthcoming in the event of threat or armed attack, but that didn't necessarily involve an automatic provision of military forces in support of a country subjected to threat or attack. But there were a range of responses available and which response was appropriate would be judged by the other signatory countries.

Secondly, in relation to the geographic region, it's a matter which we explored and certainly we agree it's not a limitless commitment for the signatory parties. On the other hand, there are benefits in not being specific, and that's something we acknowledged before we arrived here. If we are specific, then it encourages people to perhaps be adventurous in areas outside of the specific definition of responsibility that we put down in a geographic basis.

The other matter is, of course, that I've clarified with absolute conviction for myself -- I believe my colleage, Defense Minister Scholes -- that the role we can most certainly pursue is that of a regional role, that we get rid of the confusion and contradictions which were constantly arising for Australia, where, on the one hand, there would be an effort to fulfill a global role which always seemed to me to be a rather extravagant purpose, given the small size of Australia -- population-wise -- and the small aggregate resources we have compared to, say, large or superpowers. We have a high per capita income, but we're talking aggregate sense, what we can afford.

Secondly, to clear up the tendency in the past of some conservative sources in Australia to encourage Australians to believe that ANZUS covered every conceivable association with the United States and every conceivable action that we might take. What's been made clear is that ANZUS has clear limitations and that there may be things we do outside of those limitations or obligations. We may well do them because of the spirit that encouraged the formulation of ANZUS and its sustenance, but we don't do it because of ANZUS; we do it more because of deeper-seated commitments that led to the formulation of ANZUS.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, this review of ANZUS which you have had this week happened at the suggestion of the Hawke Labor Government.

Can you tell me when this was first raised? When the Hawke government asked for a review, whether there was any initial apprehension on the part of the Reagan Administration about what that review might actually mean?

And can you also tell me whether you feel there's any advantage from America's point of view in the sorts of discussions you've had about the regional, global, (inaudible) or the geographical limits? Is there any advantage for Washington in the types of talks you've had?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't recall precisely when it was raised, probably through staff and ambassadorial levels. I think Mr. Hayden and I talked about it a little bit when we met in Paris in May, and we discussed it with Prime Minister Hawke when he was here, so I can't pin down precisely when this idea emerged.

But I think it's an excellent idea, and it was most worthwhile to go through the discussion that we did and to arrive at where we are. I think it's been a good exercise.

QUESTION: Could I ask Mr. Shultz one last question, please?

MR. HUGHES: If it's ANZUS related. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Do you agree, Mr. Shultz, that Australia has the right to be consulted on the use of Australian facilities at Northwest Cape in any act which will -- in any firing order, for example, or in anything which could involve Australia in hostile acts?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: All the things connected with that facility -- and I listened to your question and it was very all encompassing -- will be discussed bilaterally, and we will rest on that point.

MR. HUGHES: That concludes our press conference. Thank you very much.

(The press conference concluded at 5:35 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL
OF LEBANON

July 20, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:35 P.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This is on background.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know that President Gemayel arrived yesterday with the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Minister, and with the National Security Advisor, Wadi'a Haddad. I should say that the Foreign Minister has been here for some days because of the UNIFIL extension in New York. So actually, he was here greeting the President at the airport.

The Secretary met the President, and had a brief discussion with him yesterday with the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister. Tomorrow, President Gemayel and his collegues will be coming to the State Department for an 11:00 a.m. meeting with Secretary Shultz, followed by a working lunch. The Vice President gives a dinner tomorrow night. Friday, the President of Lebanon meets with President Reagan at about 11:30 a.m. and, then, there will be a working lunch after that. That evening, there'll be a reception and dinner hosted by the Lebanese Ambassador and, on Saturday, there'll be additional meetings with the Secretary and the President in some form to be worked out to mutual agreement.

The most important framework for the visit, which comes at a most important and delicate time in the situation in Lebanon, is the fact that we are committed to the President's basic policy on Lebanon which comprises the full withdrawal of all external forces, support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon and the increasing control of the central government over its territory, and security for Israel's northern border.

This is President Gemayel's second visit in nine months. It will give the two Presidents the first opportunity that they've had in this time to directly confer. Although, as you know, the Secretary has been out in that area a couple of times. And Phil Habib has been in and out as well. So there has been communication.

Now, in the past months, there have been important developments in Lebanon -- positive developments. In the context of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, the Israelis pledged their total withdrawal. The government of Lebanon and the Lebanese people in the areas that they control have made a good start in trying to rebuild their country. And the Lebanese armed forces have been strengthened, retrained, expanded, and have expanded their control of Lebanese territory.

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Now, that, obviously, is not a statement of everything that has to be done. This is a beginning. The government has got to continue to show progress toward the achievement of the goals that I mentioned earlier, which are not really our goals. They're the goals of the government and people of Lebanon that we support. And this will be the basic thrust of the discussions that will be taking place over three days.

So, with that, let me take some of your questions.

Q Well, what is there to talk about, since the Syrians won't leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have a policy toward Lebanon, which I described for you,

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and there's plenty to talk about within that context. One of the things to be discussed is, of course, the current Syrian attitude and the current prospects for achieving Syrian withdrawal.

Q What are the current prospects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what we're going to be discussing.

Q What are the current prospects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to be -- trying to -- we'll be discussing these things. Obviously, the Syrians -- let's understand the context. The Syrians have said that they would not withdrawal in the context of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement despite the fact they are not mentioned in the agreement and despite the fact that the agreement assures a withdrawal of Israel totally from the territory of this Arab country. Obviously, we regret this. Secretary of State Shultz has thorough and detailed first-hand knowledge of the Syrian position on the subject.

Q I have three questions -- two questions.

Q President Gemayel --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have an agreement. It's a good agreement, but a good question is whither goest the agreement under these circumstances and we're going to be discussing that as well.

Q President Gemayel --

Q I have two questions.

Q -- said that the Israeli re-deployment is tantamount to partition. He said that today at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Do you agree with that? He said it's de facto partition.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to address what the President did or did not say, that I wasn't there and heard, not that I don't trust you.

Q Does this administration agree that the partial withdrawal --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This administration believes that any actions that are taken by any party in Lebanon should contribute to the goals I outlined earlier and the essential element of these goals is the total withdrawal of all external forces.

Q Does the Israeli action contribute to the essential goals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would hope so.

Q Do you think it does?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to go beyond that because these are some of the things we're going to be discussing with the President.

Q The Lebanese said before President Gemayel arrived that of two things they desperately wanted from this particular visit, one of them was a block to any partial Israeli withdrawal or re-deployment and obviously haven't gotten it. Wouldn't you call this a -- at the very least, a partially failed visit already?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not at all. In the first place, I'm not familiar with what you claim the Lebanese said was one of their sine qua nons. They are very concerned. We are concerned. The Israelis have recently reiterated publicly and privately their opposition to partitioning Lebanon. We hope the Syrians feel the same way and we're going to be working with the Lebanese to make sure that doesn't happen.

Q Is there any way --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Helen.

Q I have two questions. One we were told repeatedly today that the Israelis gave us no details. The New York Times had a story -- well, they buried in a story that the Israelis had, indeed, presented their plan of operation to the Pentagon.

Second question is, are we sounding out Britain, France, Belgium, etcetera, to join in the multi-national force right now and does that mean that we have accepted the Israeli plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're reading from something.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me tell you that the French and the British, as well as the Italians, are already in the multi-national force, so I don't quite understand what the thrust of it is.

Q Okay, then how about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We had previously talked to the Belguims as well as others. But that was --

Q Are we not seeking to expand --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- previous. Nothing has moved on that for some time.

The question do we accept, do we not accept, it's not our -- if there is a re-deployment, it's not an American re-deployment. Just let me say that, and I want to emphasize, because I think this is the basic concern of the government of Lebanon, as well, is that nothing be done that contributes -- that anything that is done contribute to the goal of total withdrawal of all foreign forces rather than detract from it.

Q Do we have a plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Plan for what?

Q Whatever, however far they want to pull back and what they plan to do and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israelis have talked to us, sort of talked at us about this for some time --

Q Talked at you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- and everything rather informal. So, as usual, in something like this, everyone is

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right and everyone's wrong when they say that, yes, you were told the details and all of that. That is --

Q But you don't feel we have the plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is partially correct.

Q We don't have the --

Q Do you have any idea how imminent the Israeli Cabinet decision today to accept the general staff recommendation -- how imminent that re-deployment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Again, we'll have to wait to see. We'll want more information from the Israelis. My understanding at this moment is that no specific date was set. And this and modalities are open for discussion.

And, clearly, the Israelis would like to discuss this with the Lebanese.

Q Well, let me follow that up. Is one of the subjects you will be discussing with Gemayel how to fill, how to help fill the vacuum or the void left, particularly in the Shuf area, by the withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll be discussing a lot of aspects about that situation, including, I think, the key question is the prospects for reconciliation amongst the factions so that, if something like this happens, the government of Lebanon can respond successfully in extending its control.

Q You talk about prospects and reconciliation. There's more violence today in Lebanon than for sometime.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not all sure that it comes from the fact --

Q What are you going to do to fill the void if a void is created?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If a void is created, that's not necessarily -- I told you one of the things you'd try to do is create an environment where the government of Lebanon, if you will, can negotiate its way in. I would not -- I'd dismiss a lot of the rhetoric, and I would not conclude that the government of Lebanon will be unable to do this. I think they will be able to do this. But these are questions that we're going to be discussing. I'm not going to be able to give you the kinds of answers that I know you think you deserve.

Q The Syrians made it quite clear, as you said to Shultz, that they were not prepared to leave. The Israelis have said that they are prepared to stay in their new re-deployed position for years. What new ideas, if any, does the administration have for changing that stalemate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First, the Syrians never said they would not withdraw. That's just about the only thing they -- They didn't say that.

Now, the problem is under what conditions will they withdraw. And the Israelis have never told us that they're going to dig in and stay for years.

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Q They've told everybody else.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They haven't told us. Again, I don't pay much attention to what I read in the press on those things.

Q Do you expect --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry.

Q Wait. Do you have --

Q -- officials on the record have stated that any Israeli --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Who?

Q Lebanese officials on the record have said any Israeli withdrawal -- partial withdrawal -- would be considered in violation of the Lebanese-Israeli treaty.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Where do you stand on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the government of Lebanon can speak for itself. I'm not going to address this issue.

Q But you are a party to the agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're witnesses to a very good agreement.

Q Are you going to --

Q -- violation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me ask --

Q What do you think about the timing of the Israeli decision today while Gemayel is here, and how is it going to effect the talks here? Another question: after the decision of Mr. Begin not to come next week, do you expect any other official to be here for discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Take your last point first. We have no information that any other official is planning to come, but Israeli officials are welcome in Washington. On the question of the timing, Rafi, I can't comment on that. You probably know more about it than I do.

But, certainly, it ensures that the subject is going to be discussed -- (laughter) -- if there was ever any doubt.

Q Will you be advocating to the Lebanese that the Lebanese government start a public campaign to encourage Syria to withdraw?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into what it is we're going to say to the Lebanese or not say. I just won't address it.

Q Aside from the question of whether you will say it to the Lebanese, does the U.S. government think that Lebanon ought to go public against Syria and -- in order to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we think we'll say to the Lebanese -- I'm sorry. I can't get into that, Don.

Q If you -- Going back to Joanna's question of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q -- the brunt of her question. How does the -- What is the progress of U.S. thinking, either by itself or in collaboration with the Lebanese, toward making some due efforts to break the deadlock? The Foreign Minister and, I gather, some of the others have talked about their great sense of urgency in not letting this matter sit for weeks. How are you coming on working out some next pitch in the area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you always put up with such

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dramatic entrances and exits. Things work better over at State.

Look, there's no question that the Lebanese are correctly worried about the passage of time with no momentum. I don't want to suggest this is a cosmetic issue. It is not a cosmetic issue. It is a substantive issue. But perceptions are reality as well. And they fear that unless there is re-created this sense of momentum towards achieving the goal of Lebanon for Lebanon, that the national consensus will fray and they're worried about it now. You can talk to them; they've already told you, I'm sure. And this is going to be -- yes, this is, I believe, a key element of their sense of urgency, which we all have to respect. They live there, it's their country, it's their future. And it will be in an urgent environment context that we'd meet with them. And we're glad we have not only the three days before us, but that we've had time to talk to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon and others in the days in the past as we get ready.

Q What have you told the Israelis privately?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me try to --

Q But to follow that up, Don's question was what can the U.S. do about that. We understand the situation is desperate, that they feel we have a moral obligation to help them out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I won't describe it as desperate. That's your word.

Q All right, but Don's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's serious.

Q -- what could we do about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're going to do our best to work with them to try to restore this momentum, and we're going to talk to them about this.

Q Have you talked to the Israelis?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're -- I'm sorry. Let me get --

Q The area which would be affected by the Israeli pullback would be the Shuf. The inhabitants of that area are the Druze of Lebanon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q A representative of the Druze society, which is a religion block, had been invited here and didn't come a couple of weeks ago, a few weeks ago. Are you intending to bring him to Washington or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me clarify this. He was planning to come, and obviously if he were to come, we would be happy to talk to him.

Q Are you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mean, we weren't inviting. Let --

Q What would you do to help what you call reconciliation among factions which will enable the Lebanese government to be successful and moving in the areas where the Israelis are going to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, quite frankly, the way that we can be most helpful to the Lebanese is if we can work with them to restore this sense of momentum. And then it allows the government of Lebanon to work in a more promising environment to get the other -- to get the factions to call truces, at least, and take a chance on another way. Another way would be to stop shooting each other and put some faith in their own army and their own security forces. This is with us right now.

Q But these people have plainly said that they're not ready to accept the army to move in and they actually -- they and the Shiite in Lebanon have issued a statement in Damascus over the last weekend saying, "We're not ready to permit the Lebanese army to move in the Shuf area before we reach a political agreement with the government."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Is the -- what are you doing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I've heard. In the first place, I don't pay too much attention to what is issued in Damascus, no matter who issues it, as expressing Lebanese opinion. These declarations issued there have a habit of changing when people move around. The fact that the government of Lebanon will need to work out agreements with the factions in the Shuf is not a surprise to anyone. Whether any one side is going to be able to insist on its maximalist demands in an argument like that is -- it's hard for me to conceive that. They're very few of us in this room who know what we're talking about, so I won't keep pushing it. I don't think the detail is here. But, yes, it's got to be done.

My view is it's essentially a Lebanese issue. Lebanese reconciliation is essentially a Lebanese issue. I don't see how anyone else can impose it on people who don't want it. I think they want it.

Q Do you know --

Q Eight years have passed because we in Lebanon couldn't have --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there were some other reasons. It wasn't just the people were mad at each other. I would hate to live in a situation like the Lebanese have lived

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in the last eight years.

Q You are ruling out, then, any possibility of the multinational force moving into the Shuf.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't rule in and rule out anything. But in the first instance, the problem of the Shuf is a problem of agreements amongst Lebanese. And until or unless something like that is achieved, I would think talk about the MNF becomes irrelevant.

Q Do you know yet if Frangia has talked --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Frangia? We are talking -- let me -- I don't want to be asked questions: do we talk to him, her, or anyone else. We talk to many factions in Lebanon. There're some people you can't get to. But when you can, you talk to them. Our Ambassador, and it's been Habib, Draper, our DCM, our people who wonder through Beirut -- and they talk to them. They have one message: support the government; that's your hope for the future. That includes Frangia.

Q Are Habib and Draper going back?

Q What's your major concern now? Is it the factions who are fighting among each other inside Lebanon, or the Israeli decision today about the possible re-deployment and it might be followed by complete withdrawal or partial withdrawal up to the Auwali River? Is this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'll tell you what the key problem is: the Syrian refusal to contemplate withdrawing in the context of an Israeli guaranteed withdrawal. That's what's caused the problem. These other things, I think, are symptoms of this problem. Now, we're going to have to work around that. But that's an issue you ought to keep your eye on. Let's understand that there was a formula that the government of Lebanon accepted and the Parliament supported, which was to turn Lebanon back to Lebanon. Syria turned it down. Now, that's a fact. And we're going to work --

Q Is anything happening on that score?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're prepared to meet with the Syrians. So far, to the best of my knowledge, they have not taken any actions to make such a meeting worthwhile.

Let me take a couple of more and, then, go.

Q The Habib-Draper thing, can you answer that? Are they going back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Habib-Draper: no final decisions have been made on the staffing of this issue.

Q Please, I would like to follow my question. Besides being opposed to the action which was done by the Israeli Parliament today -- or the Israeli Cabinet, and you want the complete withdrawal and independence of Lebanon, et cetera, et cetera, the whole thing, what are you ready to do in case that the Israelis will cross the Auwali River and create a fait accompli and, then, they will present you with this package of a new situation and the new borders in the area?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll be discussing this with the President of Lebanon in the next few days, and with the government of Israel.

Q And you have not discussed it at all?

Q There seems to be a tendency among Lebanese officials that's become clear over the last couple of days on the question of de-linking the question of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement to the withdrawal. Do you support the Lebanese government's interpretation of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Laughter.) I'm not sure that's the Lebanese government's interpretation. We'll find out.

Q Well, what they are saying is that the lesser accord reached between the United States and Israel does not really concern them since it does not mention them. And, therefore --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes. It's an agreement caught between two side letters: the Israelis side letter, which says they won't withdraw until the Syrians withdraw; and the Lebanese side letter that says, unless Israel withdraws according to the schedule in the agreement, the Lebanese reserve the right to suspend or declare the agreement null and void. That's a problem with that agreement.

Q So you are totally in a catch-22 situation as far as the U.S. government is concerned?

Q How about the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We're not in a catch-22 situation. You asked, what do we think about the Lebanese government's attitudes. We'll be discussing those with the government of Lebanon. I'm not going to discuss it here.

Q I wanted to know has there been any contact with the Israeli government since they announced this Cabinet decision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, sure.

Q Any protest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Discussion.

Q How? With whom?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Diplomatic channels. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:59 P.M. EDT

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
CERTIFICATION TO EL SALVADOR
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1983, 5:49 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. We're going to be ON BACKGROUND this session. That means you may attribute the information to Senior Administration Officials. The backgrounder is embargoed until 6:30 p.m. The documents which you've been given -- the two letters, the certification and the report on the situation in El Salvador -- are also all strictly embargoed until 6:30 p.m. Glad we were able to produce this backgrounder and the documents for you this afternoon, which at one time we thought might be in some jeopardy.

Q For the record, one official has never been shy about speaking on the record. Why can't we make this on the record?

MR. HUGHES: We will pursue this maybe at another time, but the ground rules are BACKGROUND, and that's the way it's going to be.

FIRST OFFICIAL: As the documents that have been made available to you indicate, the Secretary of State has determined that the criteria in Section 728 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act are met. That is, that the Government of El Salvador is making concerted and significant efforts to comply with human rights, is achieving substantial control over the armed forces, is making continued progress in implementing reforms, is committed to free elections, and has demonstrated good-faith efforts to begin discussion with the opposition; and, since the third certification, has made good-faith efforts to investigate the murders of U.S. citizens and bring to justice those who are responsible.

The report -- the blue-covered document -- describes in some detail our assessment of the situation in El Salvador over the past six months. There have been a number of positive developments, in particular the process of democratization is going forward, the Constituent Assembly is functioning as an effective legislative body for debate, and for civilized consideration of very controversial political issues, such as the extension of the land reform and the amnesty -- two issues which were resolved in favor of an extension of the land reform and the granting of an amnesty for political prisoners and for guerrillas and their supporters.

The Peace Commission was inaugurated early this year and has initiated an effort to engage the left in dialogue and was engaged in the formulation of the amnesty law which has resulted in the release of over 500 political prisoners and the granting of amnesty to over 200 guerrillas and guerrilla supporters.

The economic and political reforms seem to be on track. There are very positive statistics with regard to the land reform program, in particular, with substantial increase in all of the indicators of progress, the number of claims, the number of titles issued.

The elections have been scheduled for later this year.

The cases of the U.S. citizens, which was added by law just last week to the certification requirement, but which has been addressed in previous reports, are progressing, albeit more slowly than we would like to see.

As the Secretary has pointed out in his transmittal letter, the fact that he has found the Government of El Salvador to be meeting these statutory standards, this is not to say that he is satisfied with the progress that has been made. Indeed, the transmittal letter, I believe, conveys accurately a sense of disappointment that more has not been done. In particular, there continue to be substantial numbers of killings of civilian non-combatants by extremists of the left and the right. There has not been substantial progress in the internal discipline of the armed forces in the sense of having a system that brings to justice those who are guilty of human rights abuses.

The discipline within the armed forces is an issue of particular concern. Here we see that as the training program goes forward under the U. S. training where there is substantial human rights content to the training courses -- both for officers and for the unit training -- as the Government of El Salvador has issued comprehensive instructions on human rights and the law of war, treatment of civilians -- as the government troops acquire experience in civic action programs, as in the combined national campaign plan, that we are seeing a greater awareness, a greater sympathy, for human rights concerns. But we are not seeing the other side of it, which is the subjecting of those who abuse human rights to an effective system of discipline. That is a matter that will require continued and intensified efforts by the Government of El Salvador.

In this regard, the Government has initiated a program of judicial reform to address the inadequacies of the courts in seeking to deal with not just political crimes, not just abuses by the security forces, but to deal with the maintenance of administration of justice in general. This program has the endorsement of President Magana. It is really just beginning, but offers promise that there will be increased capacity on the part of the Salvadoran Government to deal more effectively with this serious shortcoming.

I know that there has been very little time to review the documents, but rather than go on with this narration, let me stop here and open the floor for questions.

Q Could you help us out with the continued assistance? In other words, this certification clears the way for a continuation. If you can give us the numbers as they stand now, please, in terms of aid.

FIRST OFFICIAL: What is affected -- but what would be affected by the failure of certification would be only the military assistance and training, and the continued assignment of U.S. military personnel in security assistance functions. Basically, we're talking about the trainers and the MO Group.

Q What are the numbers on that military aid?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The Administration's are -- you know, we have the $26 million in the Continuing Resolution. We have $30 million that was approved in the reprogramming. We have a request for a Supplemental Appropriation, which has not yet been acted on, for another $50 million, and there's another $30 million in reprogramming that has not been acted on. What does that total up to? 136, I believe.

Q The 56 has been passed, and that, had there not been certification, would have come to an end.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Except that that is virtually exhausted because the armed forces have been more active. They have been out in the field in recent weeks in San Vincente and Usulaton in particular, but also in other parts of the country.

There are still deliveries being made, and under the law on certification, the deliveries would also have to stop. I can't give you a specific indication of where the pipeline is on this $56 million.

Q Advisers -- how many are there now?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're within the 55. Again, that varies from day to day.

Q They would have to leave tomorrow, presumably, if you would decertify.

FIRST OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q So what is the number of advisers?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It's within the 55, but it varies, depending on whether you have -- if you have a 4-man team that is there and they come out and you can put in a 3-man team, and it might be 52 or 53.

Q This does not include it, even though it might go for military forces?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. It does not go for military forces.

Q Well, to replace money which is spent for military purposes.

FIRST OFFICIAL: It is used for budget support, but it is not used for any military purpose. But, anyway, it does not cover this.

Q What about the medical units?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Wait a minute. Excuse me. What is that?

Q The medical trainers or whatever you're calling them -- the military personnel who are in El Salvador with the medical program.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The military personnel are there under security assistance funding, so they would be affected also.

Q How many of them are there?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I believe it is less than 25. It's 20-something.

Q What about --

FIRST OFFICIAL: Let me get around.

Q Is this the last certification under the law that was passed in 1980 or 1981?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Under the 1981 statute, this is the last certification called for. The statute calls for certification every 180 days during the Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983.

Q So what is the status now? Didn't the Senate pass some sort of a Resolution or legislation that would require the President -- to extend certification for another year or --

FIRST OFFICIAL: The House Foreign Affairs Committee has reported an authorization bill containing a provision that would be a substitute for certification with periodic progress reports on the plans of the Government of El Salvador.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a bill containing a similar provision but not requiring reports on as many issues, and also containing a renewal, in effect, of the present certification requirement. Neither bill has come to the floor.

Q What is the percentage difference in the number of non-combatant civilian deaths and the number of disappearances between this period that you're reporting on now and the previous 6-month period?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The overall numbers -- and I don't have a calculator or a mental capacity to calculate it -- but it is 160-something per month on deaths according to press reports, which is the base used by the Embassy, during the preceding six months. That is up to 170-something in this reporting period, looked at over an average.

If you look in the report at Page 9, there is a chart, and, as you can see, it varies from month to month. There was a substantial decline in early 1982, and it has remained somewhere between 100 and 250 ever since, and it has gone up and down. I think, in fact, the chart shows that as of right now the number last month was lower than the month of the last certification, but the overall 6-month period, the number has slightly increased.

Q I don't understand the methodology, why you haven't broken it down into 6-month periods? That is, Appendix A.3. But would you say that --

FIRST OFFICIAL: There is that Appendix that gives you the breakdown of comparative methods used by the private human rights organizations and the Archdiocese.

Q Yes. But why haven't you broken it down into semi-annual periods, which is the reporting period and which is the system that you've used in the past to demonstrate progress?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We did in the report use a monthly average during this 6-month period and compared that monthly average to the preceding 6-month period. That information is in the report.

Q So the situation, then, has deteriorated with respect to non-combatant deaths?

FIRST OFFICIAL: There has been a slight increase in the number of non-combatant deaths, which is a serious problem.

Q But it is not enough of a serious problem to make you conclude that you cannot certify to an improvement in containing violence and human rights.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The standard is whether --

Q Is that correct?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. You're asking whether it is sufficient to conclude something that is not the standard in the law. The standard in the law is whether the Government of El Salvador is making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights, and is achieving substantial control over its armed forces.

The report recounts, and I have briefly touched on some of the things that the Government of El Salvador is doing in this regard; and the things that they are doing are certainly important steps and worthwhile steps, but the combination of things that they are doing and the combination of things that they are not doing have not brought this number down.

Q So that there has been some progress from your point of view in both these areas, even though the numbers have gone up slightly?

SECOND OFFICIAL: It's worth adding, I think, something for a second. The chart really shows there is a spurt of violence in January and Feburary. If you look at that chart, the two months with the lowest totals of all of those recorded are March and June of 1983. Those months show less violence and fewer deaths than any others for which we have an estimate here, by our count.

Q Could I ask you, how does the Secretary reach this conclusion? Is there a recommendation that is put forward to him? I ask that against a context, so I'll give you all the questions at one time.

Were there any recommendations to the Secretary that he do not approve certification?

SECOND OFFICIAL: I suppose we probably shouldn't answer that --

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. I think that --

SECOND OFFICIAL: -- on the grounds that the recommendations that people in the building make to him are not matters of public record, just as memos are classified. I mean, the advice -- if we were to give you that, it would be impossible for people to give their honest views to the Secretary.

FIRST OFFICIAL: The Secretary was certainly given this report. I know that he studied the report, and this represents his decision. This is not something where he got a recommendation and acted on it; this is one that he personally studied very carefully and deliberated over and decided.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think it's worth adding, it was not an automatic certification. It was a product of, as my colleague says, careful --

Q There was no recommendation, as such, by specialists?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We're just not going to answer your question.

Q Can I just ask, in view of what one official just said -- last time in Congress when there were hearings on this, you said that the certification for the previous period was a "close call."

Given the rise in the number of civilian deaths, and presumably a marginal rise in the number of disappearances, how do you characterize it at this time?

FIRST OFFICIAL: What was the second part of your --

Q Given, as I understand it, as a marginal -- generally people agree there's been a marginal rise in the number of disappearances.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think it's about the same.

Q I understand a marginal rise or the same. But, regardless, last time it was a close call. This time what is it?

SECOND OFFICIAL: If I remember right, and I may not, that was in response to a question from Congressman (?) a year ago.

Q Last time --

SECOND OFFICIAL: That's not my memory.

Q Well, if it was close --

SECOND OFFICIAL: In any event, I think the general attitude that we have -- I can only speak for myself -- but I can say that I certainly agree completely with the position -- sentiment expressed in the Secretary's letter of transmittal, which I think makes clear his own dissatisfaction. He speaks of key areas where progress has been disturbingly slow, and a record which falls short of the kind of progress he'd like to see, and I think that is certainly the view of the Administration.

Q Would it be fair to say that the certification, given that language and having read this letter -- would it be fair to say that the Secretary of State is certifying reluctantly?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No.

Q Why not?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think that he has decided that the criteria of the law are met, and therefore he has certified. He has also said and noted in the transmittal that the Salvdoran Government is engaged in a process of seeking to establish a true democracy that will be a lasting safeguard for human rights, and that this effort deserves our support.

I don't think it's fair to say that he certified reluctantly. I think the only thing you can say is that he did not certify with any sense of satisfaction that the Salvadoran Government had taken all the steps to deal with the issues of certification that we would like to see them take.

Q But my question goes to the whole bulk of the letter which is filled, virtually from its first part, with reservations. "We certify, but," and then he lists all the "buts."

SECOND OFFICIAL: The problem is that certification, of course, is not a report. It just calls for an up or down judgment, and a judgment was made. It is subject, I think, to misinterpretation as a sort of general stamp of approval that everything going on in El Salvador is just fine, and that we are quite happy with the progress that's been made.

One of the purposes of the letter is to indicate that that would be a misreading of the act of certification.

Q So that according to this, you pointed out the Salvador Government has met the criteria that has been introduced. Therefore, we could foresee a situation, for example, where they could make progress toward human rights and substantial control over the army, and there could be a tripling of civilian murders and a tripling of disappearances. I mean, that's also within the realm of possibility.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't know that it's really fair to offer up that kind of a hypothetical. He really have to deal with the facts as he finds them. I should think that if you had a tripling, it would really call into question whether these concerted efforts were being made or not, and you'd really have to look at the facts. You can't deal with it in hypotheticals.

Q But isn't it looking at the facts that you find that there is an increase in deaths and killings and disappearances, and in spite of that you say there is an effort by them to resolve the problem?

FIRST OFFICIAL: He is finding that the Government of El Salvador is doing a number of things that constitute a concerted and significant effort. They have formed a human rights commission. The human rights commission is active in seeking to provide educational programs in order to sensitize the members of the security forces, to raise the public consciousness.

You hear a lot of talk about human rights in El Salvador. It is a matter of public concern. The reputation of the country is something that you hear people talking about.

There is an effort within the armed forces to provide a greater sense of professionalism. They are operating under a lot of handicaps in terms of a long tradition in which respect for human rights was not a promiment feature of the society.

They are operating with a judicial system that has not been able to deal with the additional burdens imposed upon it in a time of this guerrilla conflict.

You're dealing with an armed forces that has seen a lot of disruption, because you had a change of Defense Minister. You had this rebellion back in January, and the Defense Minister at the time remained on, but his authority was a matter of some uncertainty. The present Defense Minister came on only in April.

One of the first things he did was issue a comprehensive human rights instruction to the armed forces and go out and visit the district commanders and tell them this is the instruction that you are to follow.

What we're finding here -- what the Secretary has determined -- is that the statutory criteria are met. I don't think it's fair to look at this only in terms of the statistics, and you have to look at it in terms of this is a law that was written about El Salvador and not Utopia.

The effort is being made. The results are, in some areas, disappointing, and acutely disappointing, and require further efforts, more intense efforts, by the Government of El Salvador, and we think requires our support and assistance for those efforts which are being made.

Q The only two statistics, really, that are specific would have to deal with non-combatant deaths and the disappearances. Is that right?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Their statistics on land reform that I referred to. There are samples of the convictions of individual members of the armed forces in one province. There's no centralized statistics, and we did a sampling in which we found a number of convictions -- the number of convictions compared to number of those disciplined.

SECOND OFFICIAL: I think it's worth adding that we've said with each of the last three certifications, and say again, that with respect to civilian deaths, nobody's statistics are reliable. We certainly don't believe that because we have the number 126 for June, that means that in fact 126 people and no more were -- civilians were killed in El Salvador.

I don't think that anybody has a means of determining what thatr number is, so one has to use a good deal of caution.

Q Why, then, did you dispute the reports of the other commissions, the Archbishop Commission on Justice and Peace, and the three other commissions in Appendix 3? Why do you choose, for example, in the American media, not all murders are reported, by any means?

SECOND OFFICIAL: We refute them because we don't think that they are reliable, and they are presented sometimes with fewer caveats than we think are justifiable. The methodology that they use is not, I think, reliable. I also think the methodology we use is not reliable.

But what they do show you, I think, is two things, all of these statistics: One, they show trends, and there's general agreement on the trend downwards in violence. Another thing is they show you that the carnage continues and that the rate of killing is extremely high.

Q On something that has come up in the past, which is the question of torture. About a year ago there was a large article about torture that was allegedly administered at the headquarters of the National Police whose commander is a member of the human rights commission.

You didn't really -- no one in this building really wanted to comment on that except to condemn the torture. But since then, as you note on Page 10, a Dr. Angel Ibarra, a Lutheran relief person, was arrested, and he was tortured also in a National Police headquarters.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Does it say "headquarters"?

CONT

Q I'm sorry.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't think it says that.

Q Pardon me. He was arrested by National Police and, according to his testimony, was taken to a safe house where the National Police were operating, and tortured there.

FIRST OFFICIAL: There have been a number of reports like that. This is not a unique report.

Q My question then is if the head of the National Police, Lopez Nuillo, is an active participant in the human rights commission, has he ordered or has he seen that those who tortured Dr. Ibarra have been disciplined?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I think that Lopen Nuillo is one of those who is trying to bring about a greater professionalism in the security forces. The incidents of torture, I think, continue. Certainly, the allegations do, and I've talked to a number of prisoners who have made similar allegations that they were taken somewhere before they were taken into the police station, and that they were tortured.

I don't think that those acts, to the extent that they do occur, are with the knowledge, consent or authority of Colonel Lopez Nuillo, and I think that he is trying and has achieved some improvement in the operation of the National Police.

Maybe it's a point that is small progress by our standards, but it's significant that a lot of the people who wind up in the jail are people who were arrested by the National Police. I think that that is an organization that is probably improving.

Q When do you expect that?

Q You haven't exactly said --

FIRST OFFICIAL: I'm sorry -- let me get --

Q This man has the competence to discipline somebody in his force because he's the commander of it. Has he disciplined anybody for that incident of torture?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't have any details on that right now.

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Q Could you look into that question?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Could you tell us about the $80 million? When might action be taken on that? I ask that in the context that since this would clear the way for the distribution of that $80 million, when might that request be acted on by Congress? That 50 and the 30?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The $50 in the Supplemental -- I think the Supplemental is in Conference right now.

Q It was acted on today. $25 million was approved.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Okay. You're more up to date than I am.

Q They split the difference, the House and Senate. $25 million. Do you have any comment on that?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Half as good as it should be.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. (Laughter)

Q Is that the Congress has approved, or a Conference Committee is recommending?

Q Conference Committee.

Q Recommending $25 million.

Q Yes.

FIRST OFFICIAL: If there's anybody in the back here who hasn't had a chance to --

MR. HUGHES: Let's take two more questions.

Q Are there any other countries in Central America which have comparable amounts of killings and disappearances? To put this in some sort of perspective, are things worse kin El Salvador than they are in Nicaragua or Guatemala or Costa Rica in terms of people dying -- noncombatants dying and being disappeareds?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I could only give you an impressionistic answer on that. My impression is that it is worse in El Salvador. I do not have any numbers to compare that for you. Do you have any?

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SECOND OFFICIAL: No. I mean, there had been very high levels of violence in Guatemala, especially under the old regime, the Lucas Garcia regime. I don't know what the numbers are right now.

Q How about Nicaragua?

SECOND OFFICIAL: The number of killings are well below anything like the numbers in El Salvador.

Q The question of the $25 million that the Conference Committee approved -- since that's so much below what you asked for -- what effect, from you perspective, will this have on the ability of the armed forces of El Salvador to function, assuming this is approved by the full Congress?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It's a subject on which there are variables. One of the variables is the degree to which the government forces are out in the field, and one of the disappointments about that $25 million level is that the forces are out in the field providing the protection, engaged in the civic action programs in San Vincente to restore the countryside to peaceful and productive use by the civilian population.

In the process, one of the encouraging things on the human rights front is that the government forces are engaged in this pacification, civic action, kind of activity that brings them into contact with the civilian population and I thin gives them a real improved sensitivity and appreciation for the kind of cooperation that there ought to be between the military and civilian sectors.

So I think that it obviously has to retard the professionalism that you might attain through enhanced training, and it obviously reduces the capacity of the armed forces to remain out of the barracks and in the field, protecting the nation. I think it's what my colleague said, it's just half what it ought to be.

Q But what is it going to mean? Literally will they have to stop the pacification program in San Vincente and Ululaton?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. This is going to require some analysis, and it's something I was not really aware that the action had been taken today, and I can't make up the impact for you.

Q The Fiscal Year is almost over. Someone must be kind of conscious of this problem.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. But it's something that will require some analysis.

MR. HUGHES: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 6:21 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BROADCASTING-SATELLITE CONFERENCE
THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1983, 11:00 A.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good morning. This is an on-the-record briefing on the subject of the Regional Administrative Radio Conference on direct broadcast satellites which was just concluded in Geneva.

Let me introduce the coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan, and she will in turn introduce the head of the delegation and other technical experts that are here.

AMBASSADOR DOUGAN: Thank you. I look around the room and a number of you are already quite familiar with this issue, but for those of you who are from the general press, we are going to be talking this morning about the Regional Administrative Radio Conference that was just completed last Sunday. The Final Acts were signed. It is referred to technically as the Broadcast Satellite Service Conference, but we know it in the United States as the Direct Broadcast Satellite issue.

In terms of my opening comments and remarks, I think this is an instance where we have had over the

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last few years a number of conferences with a lot of political and other concerns, particularly focusing on the ITU. In this instance, I think the five-week conference generally ended up with the United States being able to meet its needs, a conference with a plan that the signatories can live with. A great deal of hard work went into the conference. As you probably know, the economic and technological aspects of the planning for this conference will very much chart the future of direct broadcast satellite.

I think we should be particularly proud of our delegation, headed by Ambassador Washburn. He has some of the key delegates here with him this morning.

The hard work that began a long time ago involved years of preparation work. You see things that happened just in the final weeks and months. These conferences start way ahead of time. And the Federal Communications Commission, the Interregional Advisory Council, NTI, Department of State, the whole interagency process has been brought to bear to make this conference work.

There were a number of political issues which did arise, and Ambassador Washburn will talk a little bit about some of these things.

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When you talk about a subject such as satellites and direct broadcast satellites, the concerns of Eminent Domain, spillover, cultural sovereignty, these are all things that end up being part of the process. But I think one of the positive aspects is although there was considerable discussion and focus on the Falkland Islands and a number of other areas, when you were talking about who would have the right to and how much would be available to direct broadcast satellite requirements for various countries, that it was an environment that was basically handable, and that these political activities and concerns were finally put into the perspective of the overall conference and they were able to come with the plan.

I would say that our colleagues from the delegation are still suffering a little bit from jet lag but they have put in five very intense weeks. But, as I said, they have put in a lot and effort prior to that, and I would like to particularly extend to the Department and the U.S. Government, thanks to them, members of the delegation. The private sector also were particularly key participants and contributors to this as well as my having mentioned earlier the work of the Federal Communications Commission.

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I would say another thing, and that is, we are particularly fortunate to have Abbott Washburn as our head of delegation.

Ambassador Washburn, as many of you know, was there at the birthing of Intelsat, so he has been able to see and participate and, indeed, be a statesman in this process for many years. I would like now to extend my thanks to him and to the delegation, to our home team, to my own staff, and to all those who helped make this a process and a conference which have results that are positive.

Thank you.

Ambassador Washburn.

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Thank you, Diana. This service is a totally new service. It's not like a lot of other conferences where you're jiggering services that have already been in existence for a great many years. This one you had to start out from scratch, agreeing on the parameters, scores of parameters, and service areas, channels of orbital slots, and it's a fiercely technical conference.

When we were working on the preparations, I didn't see how we could possibly do it all in five weeks because it is so technical.

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We had 25 of the 33 countries of North, Central and South America. 33 countries belong to ITU, the International Telecommunications Union, from the Western Hemisphere; we had 25 of them there. And naturally all of the big ones.

Fortunately, the politics was confined just really, essentially to one issue which was the Falklands. The U.K. and Argentina both put in requirements to serve the Falklands. You can imagine what happened. This took up hours and hours of time in the plenary meetings.

We can give you a blow-by-blow on that if you're interested. The other political issue was the claim of Columbia and Ecuador that they have sovereign right to to the space above their countries up to the satellites. As you know, the geostationary satellites are all located on the equator, and they have claimed, for a number of years, that any satellites located over their countries, the owners of those should get their permission.

We and the U.K. and other countries have steadfastely resisted that on the basis -- I think it was in 1967 the United Nations passed a resolution which said that space is the common heritage of mankind; it doesn't belong to any one country.

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That didn't take up much time. That was really just a boilerplate statement. They put it in their reservations at the end of the Final Acts. We and some other countries, the U.K., France and others, put in a counter-reservation against that. So that didn't make up any time. What took up time was the Argentine-U.K. debate.

As Diana said, we feel very happy with what we came back with. Our objectives were two-fold. One, to bring back a plan that would accommodate the requirements of the applicants that the FCC has approved to mount direct satellite broadcasting systems. There are eight of them that have been approved by the FCC, subject to the outcome of the RARC, and then there are three more that are pending in the wings which the FCC will probably approve.

We wanted to get orbital positions and channels to take care of those applicants plus plenty more for future applicants. That was one objective, and it was met, amply met.

The other objective was to have the procedures for implementing and regulating this new broadcasting satellite service, flexible enough so that our system operators can take advantage of the very rapidly, moving

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technology in this field so that systems of different characteristics can be mounted, and so that there can be modifications to the plan in terms of service areas and the like without having to go back to another conference like the one we've just been through. I can say that that objective was also meet.

With me is Leslie Taylor, my legal assistant who worked on this procedural side; next to here is Ed Jacobs who is from the Office of Science and Technology, International Section of the FCC who has followed this for the past, I guess, three and a half years or more; is that right?

MR. JACOBS: Every since '77.

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Well, this particular conference. And Bruce Franca was a computer wizard who worked out this plan, long with other experts from Canada and from the United States, and to a certain extent from Mexico.

The problem was to get all of these requirements of all of these countries into one plan. There were over 2000 channels that were requested by these countries, and to get them all in without interference. This was done because of some very clever planners and some extraordinarily

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versatile computers.

We had our terminals over there in the conference center and at the U.S. Mission. The computer itself was here in Washington. The Canadians had a similar setup.

The IFRB, the International Frequency Radio Board of the ITU, also had computer resources. Somehow they managed to fit it all in.

Next to Bruce is Bill Hassinger of the Mass Media Bureau at the FCC who is also an engineer and who worked particularly on the planning committee of the conference.

I think that we are prepared to answer any questions that you may have. To be a little bit more specific, we asked for eight orbital positions or slots. We got eight orbital positions. We had to make some adjustments. Everybody made some compromises. We didn't get the eight ideal positions that we asked for. Nobody got eveything, the ideal things they asked for.

We had to put one of those satellites quite far off to the east at 61.5 degrees where its eclipise time is pretty poor. Anybody using that satellite would

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find that his television programs would go dark at about 9:30 and stayed dark -- how long? -- depending on the time. This is in the equinoxes in the spring and fall. I think a couple of hours would be the worst.

Obviously, that is not a desirable satellite to use because it comes right in prime time. So we regard that as a spare. By the time it comes to be used, technology will very likely have figured out how to handle that. The problem is the batteries weight too much, and these DBS satellites are bigger than the fix satellite service that you all know so well. They're bigger and heavier and they don't permit batteries to be attached to them to take care of the solar eclipses. Actually, the earth gets in the way of the sun at this particular time so that the satellite solar cells can't function, and that's why they black out.

One should remember that these services aren't going to be mounting until 1986, at the earliest. Most of them will come later, I think. Certainly, the other countries. So the technology is probably going to find a way to overcome that.

But then going west, we have five very excellent

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positions exactly in the areas where we wanted them to be. On the west coast, to the west -- the furtherst west -- we had to move them further west than we wanted. One at 175 degrees and one at 166, so that they cover only the Pacific time zone. Whereas, we had planned that they would cover the Pacific and Mountain time zone. That is a compromise we made.

Also, you have a certain, less desirable elevation angles at those points.

We did not win the ballgame, as you know, on the power-flux density. This is the power that is on the ground. We were pushing hard for the higher power minus 105 dBW per square meter which our technical people and industry people say is required for the advanced television of the future; the higher resolution, high-definition television, the MAC multiplexed, analogue system which produces so much better color.

We tried our best to persuade the other countries that they should opt for this future technology. We thought we persuaded them but when the vote came, it was 12 to 9 against us, and the lower-power of minus 107 was

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adopted for the planning purposes.

We took a reservation on this at the end of the conference so that our operators can go ahead at minus 105. Mexico also took a reservation on this low-power figure of minus 107 dBW per square meter. Venezuela did also.

I personally think that when a lot of these smaller countries come to mount their own systems some years from now they will be pleased that we did this because it means that our operators can go ahead and actually have experience with this system of higher power -- systems of higher power -- and the other countries coming along later will benefit from this. So we took a reservation on that.

We also took a reservation on polarization. We got part of what we wanted in polarization. We wanted circular polarization. We also wanted each assignment, channel assignment to be able to be indirect or direct in its polarization.

There simply wasn't time in the conference and there wasn't adequate computer software ability in the computer resource at the IFRB to run this through for polarization either way, direct or indirect. It really was a deficiency in software that kep us from getting

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what we wanted on that polarization question. We took a reservation on that also.

Those were the only reservations that we took, on the power and on the polarization. We did file a counter-reservation to Ecuador and Columbia's claim to -- the sovereign claim to the space above their countries. We took that counter-reservation with a number of other countries.

I believe that is all I need to say. If you want to ask questions, the technical team is here.

Q One thing that I only heard sketchy details about was the problems that the Russians might have with our Alaskan beam. Could you elaborate on that, what their reservation was and how we are going to deal with that?

A I think I'll let Bill Hassinger address that.

MR. HASSINGER: It was not the case that the Russians took a reservation on it. It's a matter that -- there's a possibility that the beam we use to serve Alaska might cause -- and I emphasize the word "might" -- cause some interference to some Russian systems in the far eastern part of their country.

There's been some difference of opinion on the criteria to be used in predicting whether the interference

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will occur.

The conference, at least initially, wanted to proceed on the basis of laying down some strict rules and criteria for this, and we convinced them that since it only affects the United States and Russia, at least in this one part of the world, that we thought it best could be handled by direct contact between the two countries.

Our position, or at least that of the delegation, was that we feel it would be more productive for the United States to contact the Soviet Union to see what can be done about coordinating usage in that part of the world to prevent interference. It may require a little give-and-take on both parties, if we can work it out.

Q Each slot gives us, what, 32 channels?

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Yes.

Q you referred to the far eastern slot that we ended up with as a spare. In terms of the eight CP's that have already been granted for DBS service, how many slots would they use to accommodate the eight that already have permits? Would they use the seven remainder or would they use fewer than that, or where is the room for additional systems?

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: As I said, we came home with eight slots, 32 channels per slot. That's a total of 256 channels.

The advisory committee of private industry and government that worked two years getting ready for this conference, in their report predicted that we would need a range of channels between 68 and 215 by the end of the century. You can see how difficult it was for them to try to predict the requirement for DBS channels when their range went all the way from 68 to 215. But we've come home from Geneva with 256, and it's no where near the end of the century yet.

The applicants that we have now really got their choice. If I were one of them, I'd pick one of those five ideal slots. Each one of the applicants is going to have to change its applications, amend its application now in terms of what happened at the RARC.

Q You would anticipate, though, how many satellites, for example, per position?

A How many satellites per position?

Q Per slot?

A What -- about six?

MR. HASSINGER: It's more than that.

MS. TAYLOR: You can put several in one slot.

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Bruce Franca.

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MR. FRANCA: It really depends upon the type of satellite employed. I think the applicants represent a fairly wide range of implementation schemes. For example, we've got graphic scanning; is talking about, really, a two-channel type of system where DBSC, I think, at one time was talking about something like 14 channels.

The average tends to be about 3 to 6 channels per satellite, so you can figure out how many equals 32 channels.

Q Will other companies who want to put up DBS satellites beyond these eight that you've approved be able to do so, and how many?

A Yes. I think if you look at the eight orbital positions, we have four western positions. That is, there are four positions that will serve either the Pacific time zone -- the western ones basically serve the Pacific time zone. The next two satellites, then, serve a combination of the Pacific time zone plus the Mountain time zone. The four eastern satellites would serve the eastern half of the United States.

Basically, the system operators have all talked about basically from one satellite to four satellites serving the entire United States, and all of those can be

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accommodated in the plan that was developed.

Q To what extent do the existence of the interim DBS services alter the discussion?

A We basically always assume that the interim systems had to be accommodated within the framework of the plan that was developed at the conference. I think that was successfully done in this plan.

Q Can I ask you about the political dimension of all of this. Acknowledging all the hard work and diligence and skill that was brought to bear in this particular conference, this is one of a series, is it not, of satellite planning conferences? My recollection from the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference was that the United States found it objectionable to have to engage in these rigorous apriori planning exercises at all.

Is there a possibility that the results of the recently concluded RARC will merely encourage other countries to seek further stratification or detailed planning in other satellite services in the immediate future? And given that possibility, do the results of this conference tend to give the State Department confidence that the United States can continue to work within the ITU umbrella in the planning of its satellite services?

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AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: I think that the result here shows that we can work within that framework and come out with a flexible, workable result. It certainly is far more flexible and less rigid than what came out of the '77 conference where they produced plans for Region 1 and Region 3, which are very apriori and tight. The result is that nobody in Europe or the Far East has put up a commercial system.

I would think this conference, perhaps, would have the opposite result than what the fear you raise.

AMBASSADOR DOUGAN: I would like to add a point on that. I think just even the issue of the Falklands, which was obviously a major political focus, did not debilitate or poetentially debilitate this conference the way the issue of the certification of the Israelis at the Nairobi Conference did.

You're correct in the fact that these conferences do build upon one another and relate very strongly to one another. We are already looking forward and working on the High Frequency Conference coming up next January and the Space WARC coming up in 1985. But I think our general reaction to this conference, in terms of how

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politics have been able to be put in better perspective and that the conference was able to move forward and have a reasonable plan, is a very, very positive thing. That doesn't mean that international telecommunication environments are not going to continue to be sort of political Petri dishes, and the bacteria is almost self-generating in these atmospheres when you have high economic and political stakes that are being brought into these arenas. But I would say by and large our sense of this conference and the outcome and the working of them, and these people who spent five weeks and are still on speaking terms with a lot of people, that we are very encouraged.

Q Before you step down, Ambassador Dougan, one follow-up. This was the first conference at which a new coordination process was brought to bear between the so-called home team and the so-called away team.

Could you comment on how well that works, and what you've learned from this run at this type of coordination for the future?

A I think, one, we learned a lot. One of the intriguing aspects of this particular conference was the

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introduction of electronic mail and the use of the computer in this process. As you may know, I have, since I came on board, starting with the mobile WARC, and with this conference, sort of formalized a home-team approach where we can provide some on-going continuity for each of the upcoming conferences and have strong interagency participation in the process to provide the kind of backup and support and expertise that needs to be brought into the process to help our delegation.

As I say, we learned quite a bit, and we're already working on applying this to the High Frequency Conference. Jerry Burner from my staff, who is going to be one of the ones working very directly on the High Frequency Conference, was directly involved in the home team in part to help build on that for the future, so we've had a very good process.

Q Can I ask a question on the one that you lost: the power question. As I understand it, the fact that the United States took a reservation to that provision of the Treaty, it means, Number 1, CBS could go ahead with development of high-definition television, but in so doing they would have to -- the burden would be on them

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to make sure that the higher power would not interfere with anybody else in any other country. The question is, can they do that?

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Yes. It has to be done in a bilateral discussion in our case with Canada and Mexico. Of course, we don't know what Mexico's power figures are going to be. They took a reservation but they left out the minus 105. They just said they disagreed with minus 107. So maybe we don't need to coordinate with them, but we will certainly need to coordinate with Canada because they've announced that they're going to, on their interim systems, their initial systems, going to be at a low power, possibily as low as minus 109 or minus 110. We have already had some discussions with them in Geneva. We'll have some more with them probably late next month.

Q Mr. Ambassador, in terms of when the plan kicks in, though, in order to coordinate some of these differences, if the occasion should arise that you couldn't agree, that one country submitted that it was affected, that it couldn't come to some kind of terms of what would be an acceptable level of interference, does the IFRB step in as an arbitor and tell us what to do or tell them what

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an acceptable level would be.

A That's in Leslie's legal area, and I'll let her answer that.

MS. TAYLOR: First of all, as a practical matter, I think we've made a lot of efforts in communications areas to get along well with our neighbors. There are some notable exceptions to our getting along, but we've generally have gotten along very well with Canada, and we expect to be able to work something out.

As a practical matter, when U.S. systems are implemented, the first systems are not going to be at minus 105. They'll be at somewhat lower powers. That's probably not an issue for sometime to come.

Later, when they go to higher powers, technological means will be available to lessen or reduce the power level at the edge of coverage which would be along the Canadian border. In that way, if the power at the border is at an appropriate level, then there's no problem there as well.

It's really hard to envision that we would get into any sort of a battle before the IFRB. I really can't see that happening.

The plan is implemented in terms of interference relationships between Administrations. The plan, which I think some of you reporters have copies of, is a computer printout with a lot of number and the last column of the numbers is what we call the protection margin. It's the protection margin that is looked at in terms of analyzing whether there's some change to the detriment of one country by a change in what another country is doing. That is what would be analyzed.

If there would be some sort of plan modification on the part of the U.S. But implementing it at minus 105 would not be a plan modification for the U.S. I frankly don't think it's going to be an implementation problem for any of our providers.

Q Just technically speaking, though, does the plan provide for the -- doesn't the plan provide for the IFRB to be an arbitor if something like that should happen? Let's say not the U.S. and Canada; some other two countries who can't --

A The radio regulations spell out --

MR. HASSINGER: They're not arbitors.

MS. TAYLOR: They're not arbitors. That's not their role. The radio regulation just simply describes the role of the International Frequency Registration Board.

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They're really a ministerial body. They carry out the instructions of the ITU and of the Radio Conferences.

Q If the two countries can't agree, they have to live with the interference then?

A I really -

Q If two countries can't agree, then they just have to live with the interference?

A If the U.S. implements a system and Canada doesn't have a system in place, you have interference into an imaginary system or a theoretical system. Then, it's not a real problem.

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: The IFRB doesn't have any enforcement. The ITU doesn't have any enforcement. If everybody violated the radio regulations, you would have chaos. Even in times of war people live up to the radio regulations of the ITU.

Q Leslie mentioned, at least in initially, you didn't see the American systems coming in at the higher of 105. If some of these companies are going to realize their plan to put down a signal that's strong enough that you can use a dish as small as two foot in diameter, what power have they got to have? Does 107 do it so that with

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these interim systems we're okay?

A   107 requires a bigger dish, but I think this is a technical question where Ed Jacobs should answer.

MR. JACOBS: Could you repeat the question?

Q   I'm sorry to backup on a technical point, but I want to make sure I'm clear on this. What do our American companies that have received these permits feel like they've got to have in terms of power on the ground to use these very small 2 or 2-1/2 foot antennas that they're talking about? Do they feel like they've got to have the 105 to do that, or are we going to at least start out with something of lower power?

A   I think to implement those kind of very small antennas, the 2 foot type of antennas, then, generally in that case we are talking of a need for the minus 105 power. At least at the edge of coverage, at the edge areas, in the areas that are more central to where the satellite antenna is beaming a signal. In the center of the beam, where the signal is a little more powerful, then they can possibly use those size antennas there. But if you want to use those smaller antennas at the edges of the coverage area, then you're going to need the higher power that we've

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suggested in the plan.

Q My final point, Ambassador, if I'm following this right, is that you had to take that reservation on the power or else our companies would not have been able even to contemplate using the smaller size antenna?

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: Unless they started out at three-quarters of a meter size. Would that work, at three-quarters of a meter?

MR. FRANCA: First of all, I think there's two different answers to your question. One is based on interference performance of the antenna, and the other is basically the signal performance of the antennas.

One of the problems with using a smaller dish is that the interference, or the discrimination of the dish becomes a lot -- it's basically a broader beam and so there is not as much discrimination available.

So from an interference point of view, you may run into a little bit of a problem with the smaller dish.

From a signal point of view, again, you have to define what type of quality do you want when you're using a two-foot type antenna. I think generally there's other improvements that can come about that minus 105 is or is not a value that's absolutely needed.

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Another thing that has to be taken into account is the propagation models used in the analysis of the plan. What that allows the U.S. to do, where we have large variations in rain within the United States, for example, the actual fear of weather performance of our systems, we'll be putting down numbers -- we're permitted even using a value such as minus 107 in clear air, our power flux-density will be on the order of minus 107 as permitted under the plan.

You may degrade the signal performance so that service is provided, instead of 99 percent of the worst month, it would be provided, say, 98 percent of the worst month at minus 107. You have a lot of trade-offs involved even under the minus 107.

You arrive at the conclusion that even at minus 107 that small dishes are precluded or that high-definition type systems are automatically precluded.

Q I'm a guy who is a subscriber to a dBS system that has to go up under the comparatively low power, and I'm sitting in my house up around the Canadian border somewhere and the thing is fully operational and I have a two foot antenna and I'm sitting there and I'm operating at

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a lower power, am I going to notice the difference in picture quality?

A Maybe one percent of the year.

Q What was the total number of slots allocated?

A Of the entire region?

Q Yes.

A I haven't the slighest idea.

MR. HASSINGER: 48 orbital locations.

Q So the United States got 8 out of 48?

MR. FRANCA: 8 out of 48.

Q Was that the largest for any country?

A Yes.

Q Do you know what the next largest was?

A 6 for Canada, 5 for Brazil.

Q You say the advisory committee suggested that there be a range of need of slots of 68 to 215 by the end of the century. We went in asking and got 256 today. Isn't that subjecting the United States to the accusation of being greedy?

AMBASSADOR WASHBURN: We didn't have any criticism in the conference of anybody's requirements. I think each administration there was concerned about getting what it thought it needed. Once we got a plan which did that, after

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a lot of compromising, people left the conference happy. I didn't hear any imperialism statements from other countries.

Q Can I ask a question related to the consumers of America. It's a two-part question.

Part one is, what direct result will this conference have on consumers in terms of when they can reasonably expect to have access to this service, if any? The second part of the question is, to what extent will the results of this conference make it possibile for people living in the U.S. to view signals transmitted on other countries' satellites?

A Other countries' satellites?

Q For example, does the result of this conference mean that in the future people living in the United States can expect to watch programs on Cuban satellites, Mexican satellites and Canadian satellites with comparative ease and freedom, or will it have no impact on that?

A We try to minimize spillover to the maximum extent through technical means, and Leslie mentioned that; shape beams, technology that's coming

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to fulfillment.

The programs that will be one these systems are domestic programs so that I don't see why U.S. citizens would be very much interested in what dBS programs were beamed from Cuba to their own people. There will be spillover in Florida by Cuban programs. They'll be spillover in Cuba by U.S. programs. But that phenomena will be confined as much as possible by the technology.

I suppose some of these programs will be encoded. The short answer is that this programming is from each country to its own citizens. It's not an international service.

We try to minimize its internationalism to the greatest extent. It's interesting that there was very little discussion of spillover in Geneva except in these technical terms.

I've got a graphic here of the U.S. satellite positions, the Canadian satellite positions and the Mexican satellite positions. I don't know how are here, if it's ten or eleven. If anybody wants those, the reservations are over there and the counter-reservations.

Q In terms of Jonathan's question on when

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consumers can expect to see this, you don't see anything changing the 1986 timeframe?

A No. I think the initial systems may come sooner, but true dBS won't be until '86 or later.

AMBASSADOR DOUGAN: I would like to thank you all very much. This is an important area for U.S. concerns, and we appreciate your attention.

(Briefing concluded at 11:50 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 21, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE ON INF NEGOTIATIONS

2:11 P.M. EDT

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Good afternoon. I've just had the opportunity once again to consult with the President and Judge Clark on the negotiations in Geneva, on the reduction and limitation of intermediate-range nuclear forces. During the last round that began in the middle of May and recessed a week ago, the U.S. delegation presented and explained in detail the text of a treaty which would implement the interim proposal which the President, after extensive consultation with our NATO allies, had authorized us to put forward.

That text called for equal number of warheads on the INF missiles of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union. We attempted to elicit from the Soviet delegation an indication of the level they would be interested in. They would not do so. In an effort to move the negotiations forward, we told them we would consider any level between zero and 572 and specifically proposed a level of 50 each on each side, a level of 100, 150 and so on up to 450.

The Soviet side continued to insist on their one-sided proposal, that they be permitted a continuing and large deployment of the SS-20's in Europe and that the U.S. not be permitted to deploy any comparable systems in Europe.

They also insisted on no limitations whatever on their forces in the eastern portion of the USSR and on a significant reduction in the U.S. duel-capable air support of NATO's conventional defenses.

The negotiations in Geneva have been intense and strenuous, with movement on a number of issues but as yet not by the Soviet side on the most important issues. The President today repeated to me his deep desire for a constructive outcome if that is at all possible prior to the first U.S. deployments scheduled for later this year.

The President is impressed as am I by the steadfast support of our allies, both in Europe and in Asia. With that support and the support of the American people, I believe that the Soviet Union may yet see the wisdom of reaching a fair agreement and the folly of continuing to maintain a rigid and uncompromising attitude.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you sound pretty bleak. What is it that gives you any hope that before December, before the start of the deployment, there could be an agreement?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm not that bleak. Temperamentally, I'm an optimist. And this last round has been, as I said, a strenuous and difficult round, but I think we have made some progress. But it is my hope and belief that the Soviets will in this last round give real consideration to --

Q Where does the -- excuse me -- where does the progress come from? I mean, where do you see it?

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: We have changed our position radically. The President's interim proposal was a substantial change from the zero-zero proposal which we had had on the table prior to that time. In fact, one time it was referred to by the other side as "the boulder standing in the river of progess." So, we've done something on our side.

We've done other things on our side. I don't want to get into the details of the negotiation. But they also, with respect to the details, have made some movement.

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What I've said is, with respect to the central problems, there I'm hopeful that they will, in the next round -- they didn't in this last round, make significant movement.

Q Why do you think they'll make significant movement in the next round? I mean, you say we've made movement but it takes two to have an agreement.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I couldn't agree with you more. It takes two and that's what I'm hopeful -- it will be two.

Q But why? What gives you reason to think they will move in the next round?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Because I -- we are scheduled to deploy at the end of the year, as I've said in my statement.

Q When is the next round scheduled to begin, sir?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: September 6th.

Q So, you're saying that as deployment gets closer there is more likelihood that they'll move?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That's exactly what I'm saying.

Q Would the President at all consider delaying by a month, by three months, by six months any of the deployment if you have reason to believe that would help the Soviets move?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I doubt that it would.

Q I know that but --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't like to get into a hypothetical question of that kind.

Yes?

Q Mr. Ambasador, the President was in here this morning saying -- talking particularly about the MX missile and talking about funds for it and to going -- Congress at this point and saying that passage of it, approval of it would give you greater leverage in your talks. How would it do that?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Certainly if the MX had been voted down I think that would have been -- not a good thing from the standpoint of my talks.

Q Why? But specifically he was talking about passage for this thing and saying that, in a positive sense, saying that passage would give you greater leverage. I'm wondering how it would do that?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think it would give us greater leverage, yes.

Q Yes, sir, but how?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You understand the facts. As you know, my negotiations don't deal with systems such as the MX which is an even larger missile than its counterpart, the SS-18. Nevertheless, I believe that the Congress, by supporting the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission sends an important signal of unity of purpose. My position is, of course, strengthened if the Soviets are convinced that America and its allies mean business. Only if they are thus convinced will they be prepared to participate in arms reductions of a lasting and positive nature.

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Q Well read. (Laughter.)

Q -- be prepared to go beyond your guidance?

Q Mr. Ambassador, is it true that you and Ambassador Rowny don't speak to each other?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That's totally untrue.

Q Do you shout at each other?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, Ambassador Rowny is a long time friend and associate of mine and we see each other regularly. And it's also totally untrue that we only communicate through aides.

Q Are you saying then there's no disarray -- (laughter) -- in the U.S. negotiating teams?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That's exactly what I'm saying. There's certainly no disarray between the two of us.

Q Where do you think these reports come from or why?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You might know more than I about that.

Q Have you found any problem in getting your instructions or in communicating with the policy makers here? The President has recently assembled a new task force and some people have suggested that that's because there has been confusion in the ranks here in terms of dealing with the negotiators abroad.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Frankly, I greatly welcome the President's decision to create this new task force. I think this will enable the President to have prompter recommendations as to what should be done in the two negotiations and I welcome that in particular with respect to our negotiations.

Q Are you saying that in the past the recommendations have not been prompt enough? Have there been delays overseas because of difficulty in getting clear instructions?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, what I really had in mind was that in the past we've had more time. Now, with this being the final round before deployment there,it seemed to me that a different kind of a process of decision could be helpful.

Q Mr. Ambassador, as far as -- just a question on timing. You said that they resume in September, the talks resume in September. Is there any chance that they could resume early?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: They originally had been scheduled to resume on September 15th and we did accelerate it by nine days.

Q Do you think that there's any chance that you could begin even earlier than that because of the need to get something done before deployment?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, we've discussed that at length with the Soviet delegation and the final decision was September 6th.

Q Mr. Ambassador, there's been a lot of -- Is there anything you want to say? (Laughter.)

Q This just in.

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AMBASSADOR NITZE: I'm reminded that I said that the MX was larger than the 18. I didn't mean that.

Q There's been a lot of talk recently about a different mood in the Soviet camp, that what happened in Madrid --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I did mean the SS-18 is much larger than the MX. I didn't mean that the --

Q There's been a lot of talk that there's a new mood in the Soviet camp with the agreement in Madrid, and the releasing of the Pentecostals and all of that. Do you sense any difference in mood in the Soviet camp, any greater -- I know what you've already said in terms of the specifics of the negotiations -- but an indication of a softening line on their part, a possibility of greater accommodation?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I can't say that I've sensed it yet. I am hopeful that I will find it when we resume in September.

Q Will you take a new proposal back to the table when you go back in September?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't know.

Q When do you know that?

Q Well, are you -- were you given any instructions by the President that would make it possible to go back with a new proposal?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: You know, if you look back on the record of these negotiations, we've never gotten instructions until the last few days before we return. And I don't anticipate it this time either.

Q -- one last question?

Q Will you go out of business in December if you don't have an accord? (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:22 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release July 22, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ROBERT C. McFARLANE,
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The Briefing Room

1:35 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: The briefers today are Bud McFarlane and Assistant Secretary Veliotes. Bud will have an opening statement which is on the record and available for radio and television coverage. And after that, we will kill the lights and they will go on -- background briefing to report on the meeting in detail.

Q Why is that necessary? We'd like to ask him two or three questions before you kill the lights.

MR. SPEAKES: You -- try that, if you'd like.

Q All right.

Q Is there any possibility of talking to Habib, or not?

MR. SPEAKES: I think Phil has already left.

MR. McFARLANE: Hello.

Q Hello.

Q Good-bye.

MR. McFARLANE: I thought I'd just say one or two things at the outset and then take one or two questions. Nick Veliotes is here, too, and together we'll provide a read-out of the meetings with President Gemayel today and take your questions. I think Larry has provided the ground rules.

At the outset, I'd just like to say that it is with a deep sense of conviction, commitment, hope that I undertake this assignment. The overriding character of this issue is its human anguish which each day worsens. The scale of tragedy in the Middle East seems to deepen and elude our best efforts to bring it to a close. It is also clear, however, that the President has surveyed the global agenda of opportunities and has concluded firmly that it is incumbent upon the United States to do everything possible that we can to bring peace to this troubled area, first in Lebanon, and then to move forward in a broader peace process.

As an instrument of that very deep personal conviction, I am both humbled and share his sense of commitment. After putting together our team and consulting further here in Washington, I anticipate going to the area promptly, doing what we can to relieve the long history of suffering and tragedy in Lebanon.

I'll take your questions now.

Q Are the Syrians --

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Q   Mr. McFarlane, do you have --

MR. McFARLANE: Sam?

Q   Sir, do you have any assurances, either direct or indirect, from Syria that you will be welcomed there and can do work in all of the countries, including Syria?

MR. McFARLANE: Well, the short answer to your question is that -- no. At the same time, we have no reason to doubt the commitment of all countries in the area to seeing Lebanon enabled to restore its sovereignty and it's toward that end that we go in good will and anticipate the same reciprocal good will from each country in the area.

Q   Well, if I could try it the other way around. Then I take it that there have been no signals saying that you would not be welcomed?

MR. McFARLANE: No, that's correct.

Q   Bud, what makes you think you can do any better than Phil Habib to get this process going again?

MR. McFARLANE: Well, I surely wouldn't say that there is, from any intrinsic quality of my own that transcends that of Phil. Phil is a giant, and if it were possible, Phil would be on the job today. He has other obligations, and I will pick up where he left off. We enter it with a renewed determination and if we do not succeed, it surely won't be for lack of will.

Q   Let me ask --

MR. McFARLANE: Bill?

Q   -- frame this in another way, Bud. What reason do you see for the kind of optimism that the President has continued to express for a Middle East settlement? What makes that any more than empty words at this point after the failures of an entire year?

MR. McFARLANE: Well, first of all, I think that the promise that gave us a renewed sense of optimism a year ago remains basically in place. And I honestly believe that. I think the unfortunate but undeniable effects of the most recent war have been to call into question in each of the principle parties just what their strategy is and whether it is a viable course. For the Palestinians it has called into question the viability of violence as a means of establishing their own identity. For others, their strategies which have endured for 35 years, I think, seriously are under review.

Now, it's true we would have preferred that we might have been able to make more progress than we have. But it's not to deny the real accomplishments of the past eight months. We think these can be expanded -- it's toward that end that I'm going out.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END   1:40 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE
VISIT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL OF LEBANON

July 22, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:41 P.M. EDT

Q Will you be going to the area before receiving a signal from Syria -- a positive signal?

MR. SPEAKES: One second, please. We're going to conclude the on the record portion and go to background. So, lights, please.

Now, he has a question pending up here. Once again, this is on background, senior American officials and they'll stay and answer your questions.

Q Can we just get on the record whether Morris Draper is going to continue --

Q Will you be going to the area --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?

Q Will he be going to the area before a signal -- a positive signal from Syria?

Q Question?

Q What is the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is will I be going to the area before receiving some positive confirmation of my reception in Syria.

The urgency of the situation in Lebanon, I think, requires that we return at the earliest possible moment. And I intend to do that. I think the turnover of my responsibilities here will require a matter of days but not weeks and that it should be possible to leave within a week to no more than 10 days time.

Q Will you be going back to the area with new ideas as a result of today's sessions at the White House?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The visit was very worthwhile in that sense to allow a thorough examination on both sides of what might be possible. There have been some changes in emphasis. I don't want to raise your expectations that there is a new fundamental direction of strategy. There is not.

I think trying harder including a certain measure of flexibility and calling, once more, upon the parties there for reciprocal flexibility is, in its essence, how we intend to proceed.

Q Does that mean you will be putting more emphasis on national reconciliation rather than anything else in --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll put emphasis on all of these things.

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The question was would we put greater emphasis on national reconcilation. We'll put emphasis on that as we have in the past but, foremostly, upon our leading goals of the withdrawal of all foreign forces so that the Lebanese government can get on with this reconciliation process.

Yes?

Q Do you know what your first stop is or your initial itinerary and also who will be taking over your duties here when --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first question, I have nothing for you right now. I would expect to define that in the course of talks with George Shultz and others in the next few days.

With regard to responsibilities here, I'll continue to serve as the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs and changes in that status are -- have not changed as of this moment.

Q So, what about -- what about --

Q You are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, go ahead. Follow up?

Q What about your work? I mean, what you're now doing, who will do it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think all of you would agree I'm far from being indispensable. There are a lot of folks here that do things as well or better than I and that all the way up until now have been doing them. So, there will be no lapse in continuity on other accounts.

Q But no one has been designated to do your work?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Bob?

Q Was your appointment floated past the Syrians before it was made? Did they sign off on it in advance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was the President's decision.

Q No, I understand it's the President's decision, sir. But before the President announced it to us today, was it, in fact, passed by the Syrians to determine what kind of reception -- if you would, in fact, get a favorable reception?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q No?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Here on the side?

Q What countries are you going to visit in the area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't expect to depart from the pattern established by Phil. I think all of those

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parties have a role to play, and the same countries would be dealt with from now on.

Q Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Surely we expect to visit Syria

Q -- from your answer to my colleague's question on national reconciliation that you favor -- national reconciliation second and favor first, and only after you finish with the withdrawal, with total withdrawal of forces from Lebanon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't tend that. All of these goals must go forward concurrently. The reconciliation is enhanced by having foreign forces out of the country, and so we will be doing what we can toward that end, but it's not to say we are ignoring the other. The reconciliation is for mostly something that is internal, for the Lebanese parties and for the Lebanese government. We can help in that by getting the foreign forces out. But it's not a matter of priorities for us.

Q Now with facing the partial withdrawal of the Israelis from the Shuf area and the foreign forces leaving, would you be tackling the conciliation between the Druzes and the Shuf area and the government whom they've announced that they are not ready to allow the army to move in that area unless they reach a political agreement with the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, the division of labor here is natural. That is, the United States can more properly, together with our MNF partners, help in the diplomacy leading to the withdrawal of foreign forces. The reconciliation of the confessional groups in Lebanon must ultimately be a matter for the government of Lebanon to lead in. To the extent that we can help, surely we are willing to do so. But this is fundamentally a Lebanese -- a matter in which the Lebanese must assert their own leadership.

Q -- can you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The front row, I'll get you next.

Q In your opening statements, where you talked about moving on at some point to the broader peace process, can you say at what stage now or how soon you could move to that broader peace process, and what format it might take?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the question was earlier reference to moving on to the broader peace process would be implicit in what we are doing in Lebanon. And the question was, How soon and in what way would that broader issue be addressed. The resolution of the Lebanese issue, and the way in which it is resolved -- that is, the post-withdrawal climate of relationships between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and the other parties -- of course will be an important factor in establishing the climate for peace progress. Now that's a diffuse statement, and it can only be diffuse at this point. The President believes that we must have a resolution of the Lebanon issue before we can anticipate that there will be strategic gains, if you will.

But it's not to say that we are ignoring it. We are very, very conscious of the broader, longer-term interests of each of these parties in the Lebanon dispute, and will be mindful of those as we are reaching a solution in Lebanon. So you can't separate them; they are inextricably linked. Our foremost preoccupation now will be upon withdrawal, re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty, security on Lebanon's borders with each of its neighbors. Certainly, with Israel.

Q Mr. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, I promised in the back.

Q The President said this afternoon that he and President Gemayel discussed the next steps, and decided on the next steps. Are these next steps anything new or different than what we have seen in the past year?

Q What are those next steps?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the next steps that he referred to, basically, are: trying harder, new faces -- this is not to say that there is a fundamental change in concept or in strategy -- and intensified dialogue on cooperation, both economic and security-wise. And I think -- well, that's all. I'm not standing here saying that there is a new watershed event happening today; there's not.

There is a renewed commitment, dedication; that's it.

Q Are you saying that's all --

Q Do you mean --

Q --you can tell us about or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- here first? I'm sorry, how about the back, please.

Q Did Gemayel ask for expansion of the Multi-National Force? Particularly, the American component?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q And if he did, where does the administration stand on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't.

Q Mr. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q In light of some news reports in the newspapers here in Washington, that the redeployment from the Shuf Mountains might continue on in the next two to three months to reach the Auwali River. Do you have any assurances from the Israelis that they are not going to do that step, or is it that they will be doing it and after that they will present it to you as a fait accompli? Will you have any assurances from the Israelis that they will not continue after the Auwali River and they will create the -- partition of Lebanon a fait accompli?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not sought assurances in any context. The clear relationship between any withdrawal and the prospects of total withdrawal by all parties is manifest. We have exchanged some ideas on how stability can be preserved in any possible withdrawal, by any party. We'll be thinking further on those ideas and discussing them when I go back to the area, but there is no precondition --

Q Could you be more specific on those ideas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- set with any party thus far.

Q The time element is not in anybody's favor by the Israelis doing this step, and Mr. Begin has not come in, and the whole new realities in the area, so how are you going to tackle this situation now? If they will continue seeping into the South, and getting to the Auwali River -- nonstop?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I guess I don't share your pessimism. I think if one always looks at the worst side in the Middle East, we'd never have gotten involved in the first place. Things can always get worse. The President's dedicated to the proposition that they've got to get better, and the United States is not going to quit until they do.

Q As a result of today's talks, have the Lebanese in any way changed their position on the question of unilateral withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't discuss the content of the talks here. The President and President Gemayel are both very imminently conversant with the risks at play right now in any kind of move which is not thoroughly coordinated. And we'll be moving in that direction in the next -- days --

Q -- the names -- the people you'll be working with -- what will be the status of Morey Draper and Dick Fairbanks back here, and also -- I'll hit the question because it's going to be speculated on -- the fact that you're the chief negotiator now, and you're coming out of the White House, in effect, will be read as a kind of Presidential impatience with the State Department's handling of this. Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not right.

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The first part of your question -- Bernie asked: "What is going to be the role of others who have already been involved -- Dick Fairbanks, Morey Draper and so-forth, and, is it intended, or do you expect it might be read as, White House dismay with the way the State Department's handled it up until now -- that there's somebody in the White House going out."

On the first question, I'm going to be talking with Phil today and tomorrow to get his ideas, frankly, on how we can best bring all the talents that's been applying for so many years to this issue, into the continuing talks in the weeks ahead. The President's very emphatic in saying to draw upon that talent. I've known Dick Fairbanks for twelve years, going back to work here in the White House, and I have asked the President for his confirmation that Dick and I can continue to work together. The President didn't need to be asked. He was very emphatically insistent on Dick playing a role. I'm going to be talking to the others that have been involved. There's an enormous amount of talent and, I think, substantial accomplishment already. All we're doing now is, unfortunately, losing Phil, and sending in a second-stringer. But, I'm going to do what I can.

Q I'd like to --

Q How about the State Department question?

Q -- follow up on Bernie's --

Q I didn't hear the question about Draper.

Q -- which might go to the real heart of the -- what might be going on in the administration here. Dr. Kissinger was named to a Latin American post last week. Your career has been intimately involved with him, your wife is employed by Dr. Kissinger. At the end of this -- maybe I'm wrong on this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gee, I didn't know that. (Laughter.)

Q -- on Bernie's question --

Q In any case --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q -- your career has been intimately tied with him. At the end of this process, will there be anyone involved in foreign policy in the administration who isn't directly run by Dr. Kissinger?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize. The bottom line -- what was it?

Q At the end of this process, will there be anyone involved in foreign policy in this administration who isn't directly run by Dr. Kissinger.

Q Awwww. (Laughter.)

Q Say "No."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: "No." (Laughter.)

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No. But, seriously -- good gosh, you know, to say that I've been involved with Dr. Kissinger is something I don't deny or run away from. I've been involved with John Tower. Does that make me a screaming liberal? (Laughter.) I don't think so. You know, I mean -- (laughter) --

Q You didn't answer the Morris Draper part of the question. And, also, are there any new people he's going to bring with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there will be new people. And I'm going to talk to Morey. I'm going to talk to him to glean everything that I can from his wisdom. Morey, too, has -- with Phil -- brought us to where we are. And they have an enormous record of accomplishment out there. I haven't made any decisions because ultimately I want to talk to the President after getting, from Morey and Phil and Nick and others, their sense of what composition and strategy makes most sense right now.

Don?

Q You spoke of flexibility in moving to the next step. As you know, the big loggerhead now is that Syria will not withdraw in parallel to an Israeli agreement which they reject. How do you think of the flexibility in connection with the agreement that already exists? Are you going to try to go beyond it to ask Syria and Israel, perhaps, to do something which goes beyond the agreement which they have signed? Do you plan to go back into the agreement? How do you see the process from here in attaining what is a necessary breakthrough in the situation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, Don, it would be out of place for me to stand here and to say that the disagreements which separate the parties right now are susceptible to a magic formula that we've cooked up in the last few days. We have some ideas. We've reconsidered some of our earlier positions. We've tried to reach some harmonization of our assessment of the problems with the government of Lebanon. This has led us to a few ideas that deserve greater emphasis here, less there, that we're going to go out and try to promote. But I don't want to deal with those publicly until we've had a chance to discuss them with the government of Israel and the other parties to the disagreement.

Q When we were briefed two days ago by your colleague and in talking to other administration officials, this meeting between the President and President Gemayel was supposedly hoping to impart some new momentum to the peace process and the withdrawal process. Has anything happened here today, besides your appointment, that might be read as imparting new momentum to what's happened?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's not the kind of thing that I can discuss in a precise, detailed fashion. But, yes, I personally feel -- and I think the Secretary of State and the President feel from what they've said to me -- that this visit has been enormously valuable in reaching a very strong consensus between ourselves and the government of Lebanon on what it is going to take to achieve a withdrawal of foreign forces. That's not to say it's going to work necessarily.

But we and they are of a common mind of what the strategy must be. It's just a matter of trying to make it work now.

Q Is this something new, something that has not been tried before?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there have been differing emphases as to what ought to be tackled first and second, and what the prospects were for dealing with what they viewed as the foremost issue versus what we did. And now, that doesn't exist. We have a very solid consensus. And we shall see whether it's that common view, as it now translates through our diplomacy, that will have a differing outcome. I can't guarantee that.

Q Was there any discussion, today, about increasing the size of the MNF? Did Gemayel ask for an increase?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was asked. And to the second question: negative.

Q You mentioned something about flexibility on our part, the parts of the countries out there in the Middle East. Does that mean that the Israeli-Lebanese agreement that was signed in May -- May 17th, I believe -- will be abrogated in any way or modified?

Q Question, please?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was: given my reference to flexibility, is there an implication

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that the existing Israeli-Lebanese agreement would be abrogated or altered? No, I don't intend that. The flexibility I mentioned is that we are open to new ideas, that we are willing to listen to ideas from each of the parties. The accomplishment -- and the Israeli-Lebanese agreement is an accomplishment -- stands on its own. We're going to move from there to see what else we can accomplish somewhere else.

Q About the two side -- are you trying to link them?

[redacted] Just let me address a question I think Bernie asked that [redacted] did not address for good reasons. George Shultz was a fervent advocate of Bud McFarlane replacing Phil Habib. As Assistant Secretary in the Department, I shared that feeling. And as a representative of the Career Foreign Service, I can just say we're all delighted Bud is coming back where we think he really belongs.

Q Can you read out the meeting --

Q Yes, what about the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want anything else --

Q Yes.

Q More, more.

Q -- a read-out on the meeting.

Q Yes, we still don't have a read-out on the meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you do, basically.

Q Well, put it in English.

Q Can you be on the record with that last quote of yours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, as far as I'm concerned. It's up to you.

Q Were you on the record?

MR. SPEAKES: On the record.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- have the lights on, Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q But everything is still --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since I'm absolutely sure it's true, Bernie.

Q This is on the record, Larry?

MR. SPEAKES: No, no. The --

Q Make the whole thing on the record?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: George Shultz can speak for himself, but I just thought that I'd --

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MR. SPEAKES: The on-the-record thing was the Shultz quote. We're ON BACKGROUND now --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just -- let me put this whole thing in context. You know we had a lot of meetings. We had meetings with Shultz yesterday, and we had meetings -- staff meetings with Gemayel's colleagues for several hours after that. Discussions continued last night at the Vice President's meeting or dinner and meeting. Now we've had the meetings in the White House. The President has made his announcement on Bud McFarlane. We will continue to be meeting with the Lebanese until President Gemayel leaves tomorrow, and there will be a meeting sometime during the day tomorrow with the Secretary of State.

The discussions -- we talked about a lot of different, discrete issues, but they were all in the context of the support of the goals of the government of Lebanon. They're their goals; we support them -- sovereignty, unity, and the integrity of Lebanon. And in this context, a heavy emphasis was placed on the need to achieve as soon as possible the total withdrawal of all external forces. This ran through all the meetings.

Also was how can we more effectively support the Lebanese in various specific ways, in the discussions in the Pentagon with Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey. They reviewed the security situation and our own assistance programs, how can we help them more to accelerate the good progress in the Lebanese security forces.

In the meeting with Mr. McPherson, the AID administrator, the Lebanese explored a number of aspects of economic relations and economic assistance. Also, in the context of how can we strengthen the Lebanese economy, the government of Lebanon.

Now, the Israeli-proposed re-deployment was discussed in the context of the achievement of the total withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Broader regional issues were discussed, of course -- My colleague already talked about this -- and the relationship of Lebanon to the broader peace process.

Q Thank you.

Q Were there any discussions of new aid, new loans to Lebanon, any commitments --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was a discussion of the Lebanese economy --

Q -- any commitments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no commitments. Just a general discussion of what their needs were. As you know, the World Bank is leading an effort to mobilize donors for the real big bucks. And a lot of this is related to the security situation, the investment environment. As momentum is restored, as the government of Lebanon is able to assure the security of more of its territory, then I think the economic side will also come along a pace.

Q Were there any new security commitments? And what was the discussion about the MNF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was a discussion about the MNF because it exists. Obviously, it's an important factor of the Lebanese situation

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where it is. The question has been asked three times now in one way or another and the answer is still "no" on that so let's -- I'd just as soon drop it.

Yes, Bernie?

Q The Lebanese, while they're here, have been urging publicly at least that the U.S. be more active and among the things they've urged, that the U.S. as a super power talk to the Soviet Union as a super power and get much more involved with the Syrians. Is there any inclination in this administration to bring the Russians in to a more prominent role in the diplomacy here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We keep looking for a constructive Soviet role -- I'll confine myself to the Middle East -- I have yet to find it. We did discuss these issues. We explained that we are in contact with the Soviets. We do discuss these matters. We believe, however, that the best bet for peace in Lebanon and reconstruction and independence as well as moving forward in the broader peace process is along the lines of President Reagan's policies.

Q Nick are you offering any more concessions to the Syrians to induce them to withdraw, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Concessions isn't the word. Bud McFarlane -- Bud --

Q Benefits.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not benefits. You would think that the peace and security and stability of an Arab neighbor would strike a few bells in Damascus -- positive bells.

I think you have to look at the appointment of Bud McFarlane as a recognition of a reality, apart from Bud's merits -- I can't think of a better man to take this on at this time. But clearly certain attitudes were responsible, at least in part, for Phil not being here.

Q Syrian attitude? Why don't you say it? Syrian attitude?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course.

Q Have you had any direct or indirect signals from the Syrians, though, that Mr. McFarlane or any other change of faces would open the door?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're asking will the government of Syria accept an emissary from the United States in order to maintain the dialogue. The anwer is yes. We have every reason to expect this. Someone asked a truly crazy question about clearing appointments earlier. Not really, it's pretty far out.

Q You do that with Ambassadors all the time.

Q I want to clarify. You left the impression in your last answer that Phil would still be the negotiator if the Syrians had agreed to receive him.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't -- this was a factor in the change. Someone asked what are we doing to keep the dialogue going with Syria. We've had George Shultz there twice. We've invited their foreign minister here once. We're willing to talk to them and we now have a new team

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led by Bud McFarlane that will be in the area soon and we fully expect that this team will be received by the Syrians and everyone else involved. We have no reason to believe to the contrary. I don't want to belabor this.

Q -- going cap in hand to the Syrians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nonsense.

Q What do you mean nonsense?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're trying to create the circumstances whereby Lebanon can be reconstructed and saved and also open the door for an environment -- a moving ahead on the peace process. This has resulted in a lot of things including the appointment of Bud McFarlane. That's not cap in hand. That's trying to move a process forward because we've got responsibilities for it.

Q You said earlier that the Israeli proposed re-deployment was discussed in the context of the total withdrawal of all foreign forces as I remember it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Has the United States -- to your knowledge -- has Lebanon made a judgment yet as to whether this proposed re-deployment is acceptable as a part of the total withdrawal? That's your criteria that you've set out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not relevant at this time because the way it has been described has been a re-deployment to somewhere and the government of Lebanon would have trouble accepting or endorsing anything short of a timetable for the total withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Now, if the Israelis or the Syrians or anyone else leave any part of Lebanon -- we all have to expect the government of Lebanon would do its best

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to be responsible for the law and order in that vacated area. I think that's common sense.

Q What do you mean when you say it was discussed in the context of? I don't understand -- Are you accepting it as part of or are you saying it's not part of or are you making no judgment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any such readjustments should be in the context of promoting the total withdrawal of all foreign forces. Now, a lot of these things are going to be discussed. And I'm not going to get into the details of --

Q [illegible] --

Q -- I was asking, you know -- Lebanese government --

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Last question. Right here -- got it.

Q Thanks, Larry.

Q Okay. (Laughter.)

Q The Lebanese government, you said, is ready to move into any area that any one of the three forces is ready to move out of. You know, and definitely you know, that the area we're talking about, the bottom line, is the Shuf area. If the Israelis move from the Shuf area without securing an agreement, without an agreement being reached between the Lebanese and the Druze, between the Lebanese government and the Druze, we're going to have an outbreak of war again. Did you discuss this with Gemayel? Did you discuss steps of how to find --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We discussed all of these issues. Everyone understand the realities of the problems. We talked about ways to solve the problems. I have no doubt that the President of Lebanon is going to do his best, but there has to be some reciprocation on the assumption that there are those immediately involved who have an interest in recreating Lebanon.

We are hopeful that this can be done. Now, I should say, but in this context there was great concern expressed during the discussions about the shelling in Beirut. My own personal view, being around this place for awhile, is that we're getting some -- the usual so-called negative signals. But when they start to kill women and children, they take on a rather bloodthirsty cast.

The shelling of Beirut by anyone, after the horrors of the past, should and must be widely and openly condemned by any government which has a pretense to being called civilized.

Q Who's doing the shelling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I also remind you this is an Arab city, which should have special meaning for our Arab friends.

Q Who is doing the shelling?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Who is doing the shelling? Everyone can guess. Clearly, they're coming from areas under occupation. The people who want to give the so-called signals are hardly friends of Lebanon or its reconstruction.

Q There are two areas of occupation that you're talking about -- the Shuf and the Metn. One is occupied by Israel,

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one occupied by Syria. Would you be kind enough to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those people -- the occupiers have clear responsibility under international law for doing their best to stop it if it happens. And provoking it is literally unacceptable.

Let me leave you on that, and you can use your own judgment.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:14 P.M. EDT

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PRESS CONFERENCE
DR. HENRY KISSINGER
CHAIRMAN, BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
MONDAY, JULY 25, 1983, 2:02 P. M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We are ON THE RECORD. Dr. Kissinger is the Chairman of the President's Central American Commission. He will have some opening remarks and then take your questions.

Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: I just have a few very brief comments about the purposes and nature of the Commission. The purpose of the Commission is to make recommendations to the President and the Administration about long-range and middle-range objectives in Central America.

The objectives are to include the political, economic, social, and security goals. The Commission will not deal with current operational issues. We have not been consulted, nor should we have been, about current operations.

After the Commission has concluded its report, it will cease to function. I have no intention, indeed no time, to involve myself in the operational questions that may flow from the Commission report, presuming that the Administration accepts the recommendation.

So you should look at this as a way to achieve, or to contribute to hopefully a bipartisan consensus on one of the more searing problems that is before our nation, and to do it in a manner that permits us to look beyond the immediate crises into the goals that we're seeking to achieve.

We will not duplicate or get into areas that are covered, for example, by Amassador Stone. Ours will be a different perspective.

Now I'll be glad to answer your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, some have been curious as to why you accepted such a position.

DR. KISSINGER: So has Nancy. (Laughter) I accepted that position after -- with considerable reluctance after turning it down several times when the President called me and said he had no second choice. It is my view that when you have been Secretary of State and the President asks you, you don't have the right to refuse.

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Secondly, I believe it is a vital, national issue that should be put into a larger framework and on a bipartisan basis.

Q Dr. Kissinger, as a vital national issue, do you also feel that it has a potential to become another Vietnam for the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: A great deal depends on how one views what Vietnam was. I think it is imperative that we avoid the bitter debates that characterized the Vietnam period, and also that we avoid the same kind of uncertainty about objectives and about what was attainable that characterized so much of the period.

I think that the Commission will try to make its contribution to avoiding another Vietnam kind of crisis.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how do you see this problem that you're confronting? Could you just give us the benefit of your thinking of the parameters of all this? How serious is the problem of Central America?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, you should all understand, this will be a report of a Commission. I'm Chairman, but as far as its report is concerned, only one of its members. Therefore, my personal views about this or that aspect are really secondary at this point.

But to answer your specific question, I think it is obviously a serious problem that is attracting more and more public attention, and more and more the attention of the President. The reason for the Commission, as I have been given to understand, is to avoid having the debate on a succession of tactical issues on how to handle this or that particular crisis as it emerges, but perhaps to put forward a more comprehensive view of where we might go over a five-year period and how to get there.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say that your Commission is not going to be concerned with the short-range, but with the middle- and the long-range.

DR. KISSINGER: That's right.

Q But isn't it conceivable that what's going on, at least in the security area now in El Salvador and Nicaragua, will have a lot of impact on what you're going to recommend? And how do you deal with the short-term crises if you're not going to be involved in that directly?

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DR. KISSINGER: There's nothing we can do as a Commission about the immediate military situation or about the immediate Congressional situation for that matter. I believe that it is the responsibility of the Administration to defend its programs before the Congress and to conduct the day-to-day foreign policy.

It would be a confusion of the purposes of this Commission if we got ourselves involved in that, obviously, since we'll be going on while the Commission meets, and that will have to be taken into account.

But if we get ourselves involved in trying to influence the day-to-day decisions, we'll be spending all our time going to meetings of interdepartmental committees, which it is our purpose to transcend.

Incidentally, I wanted to make one other point which I discussed with the President and the Secretary of State this morning. I don't believe that we will be able to meet a reporting deadline of December 1. I believe February 1 is a more realistic deadline. I say this only so that if December 1 comes along and we haven't issued a report, then you will not think that there is violent disagreement in the Commission.

Q Could I follow up and ask you, sir, whether your working premise is that when the Commission comes in with that report on say February 1, that the El Salvador Government and the Government of Nicaragua will be in power? Is that your premise?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that's our premise, but if it isn't, we'll have to think of another. If either of them isn't, we'll have to make another five-year projection. (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect to travel to the region, and, if so, would the whole Commission go? Would you just go? How extensively would your -- how would your travels interrelate with those of Ambassador Stone and others who are involved?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, that decision will have to be made after the first meeting of the Commission which will be in the week of August 9 -- it's about two weeks -- but two weeks from now.

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From my conversation with several of the Commission members, all of whom I'm calling this week, I have the impression that a visit to the area will be necessary, probably of the entire Commission at one point.

I haven't decided yet whether I might take a quick separate one simply to inform the key countries, or the countries involved, of what we are planning to do and how we're planning to do it and to get their suggestions of how we might proceed.

But under no circumstances will the Commission engage in any negotiations or in any of the immediate efforts at direct conciliation which is what I understand Ambassador Stone's objective is.

Q Dr. Kissinger, following up on that, would you expect that you could carry out your mandate without meeting with such people as the Sandinistas, the leftists in El Salvador, or do you indeed expect to meet with them?

DR. KISSINGER: I would think that we will visit the area, a visit to Nicaragua is highly probably, if we are welcome. As to other groups, we will follow the recommendations of the Commission on that subject, and we're certainly free as far as the government is concerned. We have been given no limitations as to with whom we can meet.

I can tell you that, as far as the domestic -- the internal American situation is concerned, we will give every significant group of every point of view within the United States an opportunity to be heard before the Commission, and we will leave it up to the Commission to decide what groups to meet when we go to Central America.

Q Dr. Kissinger, your appointment has already raised a lot of comment and controversy. What, personally, I guess, do you say to that, and do you have any particular plans for trying to convince Congress or the right-wing that you're going to be able to be a compromiser and not a further divider on this issue?

DR. KISSINGER: If I understand some of the right-wing objections, they're not worried that I may not be a compromiser. I think the opposite seems to be their view, insofar as I understand it.

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I will be going on the Hill tomorrow to meet with the Majority Leader, the Minority Leader, the Speaker, Mr. Michael, and several members of the Commission that have been appointed. I'll be talking to the other members of the Commission or the other councilors of the Commission that have been appointed by the Congress.

I will make no special effort to talk to the more obstreperous of the critics to show my good faith. My record is whatever it is, and they have a crack at the report when it appears.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, when the idea for this Commission first came up, four Members of the Congress talked about it being a bipartisan study group. What they meant by "bipartisan" was not simply filled with Democrats and Republicans, but bipartisan in terms of its approach to the problem. Some of the critics have already said that by the composition of the Commission, you're not getting a bipartisan group; you're getting a single point-of-view group.

What do you feel can be, ultimately, the contribution that you can make?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, you're going to get many criticisms. As far as the composition of the group is concerned, I took the view that while I might have some strong objections to some people and express them, the composition of it I left to the White House in consultation with the Congressional leadership, particularly with the sponsors of the resolution. It is my understanding that the composition of the group is broadly acceptable to the sponsors of the original resolution.

I do not even know some of the members of the group. In fact, many of the members of the group I have not met. Talking to them on the telephone, I do not have the impression that this is a single-issue group. One always has to attempt to strike a balance between an attainable consensus and representing every last point of view.

I think it is a broadly-based group. I think Bob Strauss and Lane Kirkland are certainly not admirers of every aspect of this Administration, if I have understood their statements correctly.

Q I understand that. What I am trying to get at is, can you envisage that the end result of this Commission will be a report sharply critical, or even substantively critical, of the basic line of the Administration's policy in Central America?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, while my relationship with the Administration has not been intimate, I have been generally supportive of the Administration's foreign policy, and it would be ridiculous to pretend anything else, as far as I'm concerned.

On the other hand, Bob Strauss has been anything but broadly supportive of the Administration's domestic or foreign policy. So I think it is quite possible that a report will come out that differs with aspects of the

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Administration's foreign policy. We all have to engage in this effort with an open mind and with a willingness to adjust whatever preconceptions we may have to the briefings and to the facts to which we will be exposed.

We certainly have been given no restrictions in either the previous conversations or in the conversations I had with the President, the Secretary of State, and the Vice-President this morning. Certainly, nobody put any restrictions on the kind of recommendations that can be made, nor would that be practically feasible.

Q May I follow up on that? To what extent do you regard it as your mandate to test some of the basic assumptions of the Administration's policy? Have you been encouraged to do that by the President or the National Security Adviser or the Secretary of State? And will you have the resources to do that -- for instance, your own staff?

DR. KISSINGER: The President, the Secretary of State, and the Security Adviser have given us the charter to come up with long-range objectives wherever they may lead. They did not specifically say, "Test our assumptions," and you have to remember now that I am now speaking as an individual, and that these ideas will have to be discussed by the Commission when it meets. But my view would be that we should certainly put forward some kind of a concept of how the United States should deal with smaller countries in the developing world, especially in this hemisphere, hopefully some statement of the factual situation as we see it, and then some goals and maybe some programs.

Whether we can achieve such an ambitious objective in the limited time available, I don't know, but it will certainly be not through lack of effort. In talking to Commission members, I'm impressed, indeed moved, by the way they are clearing their calendars to spend a really great amount of their time on this effort.

MR. HUGHES: I think we've got time for a couple more questions. Shall we take Mr. Dunsmore and then AP?

Q Dr. Kissinger, this morning some of us were speculating on what the reaction of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would have been if the White House had called and said, "By the way, George Shultz is going to take over the Central America policy for the next five years?"

Our consensus was that the seventh floor would perhaps be somewhere in orbit at this point.

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DR. KISSINGER: First of all, you're wrong about this. The seventh floor tended to be in orbit anyway, with my boiling point!

First of all, I did not consider this until the Secretary of State talked to me twice, and the second time at great length on this Sunday. I made it clear to the Security Adviser that this would have to have the enthusiastic support of the Secretary of State, who is, after all, an old friend of mine and a man I admire greatly.

Secondly, having been Secretary of State, however assertively I might have exercised that office, nobody who has been in that office can have any question that the foreign policy of the United States should be conducted under the guidance of the President by the Secretary of State, and nobody would do anything to derrogate from that role.

Third, I am not taking over Central American policy. I am heading a Commission which will make specific recommendations. I will not be involved in the operations during the meeting of that Commission, and I will withdraw as soon as the Commission is completed.

Fourth, Secretary Shultz was asked by me, on a number of occasions, to undertake less public missions, specifically to prepare the Rambouillett Economic Summit and then again the Puerto Rican Economic Summit. President Ford and I benefited enormously from Secretary Shultz's contribution. But of all the problems Secretary Shultz may have in this city, I am determined not to be one of them. I am an admirer and a friend.

MR. HUGHES: Last question from AP.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the United States is already heavily involved in Central America in a military way, both in El Salvador and through a covert operation in Nicaragua. From all indications, we're becoming much more heavily involved with each passing day. You say your Commission report might not come out till February 1. Is it possible we could become so heavily involved in this period that were you to recommend that we become less involved, it would be difficult to get out? And would you counsel the Administration to go slow on its involvement until your report is completed?

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DR. KISSINGER: I really hope not to get involved in the current decisions of the Administration while the Commission is meeting. Just the preliminary briefings I've had this morning have given me some sense of the huge scope of the task that we have undertaken.

My impression is that nothing irreversible is likely before the Commission report, but this is my impression from reading the newspapers and from just general conversations. The magnitude of what we're doing may increase with the nature of the assessment of the threat, but I do not believe, nor do I have the impression, that the Secretary of State and the President believe that events between now and February 1 will make our report irrelevant.

Q Thank you.

A Nice to see you again.

(The press conference concluded at 2:30 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS AND
FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR

July 28, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:11 P.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: Let's get going. This briefing is on background. This briefing is attributable to senior administration official. It is on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me make a few comments and then take your questions. First, let's run over the schedule a little bit just so you get a feel for the 15 or so hours of discussions that we had in the State Department and a couple of hours over in Defense.

There were three meetings on Tuesday, July 26th, in the afternoon and there were -- meeting in Defense the next morning, a meeting in State, a follow-up meeting in State with the two Ministers. And then for the next six or seven hours we just talked -- and had lunch and talked.

This morning we had additional meetings and, of course, these three days were capped by the President's meeting with the two Ministers. In that meeting were the Secretaries of State and Defense, Mr. McFarlane, Dick Fairbanks, Bill Clark, on our side and the Israeli -- Ambassador Lewis -- stand-up, Ambassador Lewis, and yours truly.

So, since Prime Minister Begin was unable to visit Washington and in light of the visit here last week of President Gemayel, we believed it was particularly important to invite Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Arens to come here for high-level discussions on the current situation in Lebanon and other matters of mutual interest. It was also important to hold thorough consultations with the Israelis before Bud McFarlane and his team depart for the region.

I've described to you the types of discussions we have had. They were intensive. They included all aspects of the current situation in Lebanon including Israeli plans for redeployment or partial withdrawal. As you know, this is a decision that has been taken by Israel and we are all determined to ensure that it contributes to our shared goals for Lebanon.

Throughout our discussions with both the Israelis and the Lebanese before them, the President emphasized our unequivocal commitment to the basic goals for Lebanon: Full withdrawal of all foreign forces; a strong central Lebanese government, fully sovereign throughout its territory, supported by a national consensus; and adequate security arrangements for Israel's northern border.

The Israelis assured us that they adhere fully to these goals and they certainly have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon. Secretary Shultz addressed this on the record for you. They have stated clearly and unequivocally their position that the projected redeployment in Israeli forces is in no way intended to contribute to the psychology of or the fact of divisions in Lebanon. It is rather the first stage in a full withdrawal envisaged by the Israeli-Lebanese agreement and is consistent with that agreement. I think it's very important that I emphasize to you, as the Secretary did, and as the Israeli Ministers did, this Israeli interpretation of where their redeployment fits into the overall goals for Lebanon.

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I realize we can't control wildcard speculation but I hope you will give this a prominent place in your reporting. All of this is designed, in the Israeli view, to allow the government of Lebanon to regain sovereign authority over an additional significant portion of Lebanese territory.

Now, the next step will be the trip to the area by McFarlane and

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Fairbanks to give renewed impetus to achieving the goals we share for Lebanon. Now, the President, also, renewed the U.S. commitment to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area based on Security Council Resolution 242, the Camp David Accords, and that he remains committed to his September 1 peace initiative.

The President, also, reiterated to the Ministers the U.S. view that additional settlements are a serious problem with respect to future progress on the peace process. And we, also, discussed other issues of mutual concern, bilateral issues relating to the U.S. continuing commitment to Israel's security and well-being.

Let me take some questions. Let me go back first.

Q Before we get into the whole Lebanon question, was the Habib project brought up at this meeting at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in the context of the meeting with the President. The President was fully informed. And the Israeli side was fully informed that he was fully informed of previous discussions on this subject.

Q It wasn't brought up before the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. And these subjects were held -- the detailed discussions on this matter were held at the Pentagon at the meeting chaired, on our side, by Secretary Weinberger on Wednesday.

Q Did you ask for, and did you get, any commitment or timetable on the next phase of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did we ask or we get --

Q Did we ask or did you get.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- or did we get from the Israelis a -- what?

Q Either a commitment or a timetable on the next phase of their withdrawal from Lebanon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which next phase? I'm sorry.

Q Oh.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Are you talking about re-deployment?

Q Yes, re-deployment of their troops.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And subsequent stages, is that what you're talking about?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, okay.

Q Leading to a total withdrawal.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

And if you'll shut-up, I'll finish my comments.

Look. This subject was discussed: how can we best put the Israeli re-deployment in the context that will best contribute to our shared goals that I've described to you. I'll go over them again if you'd like to hear them.

Q No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right.

Now, we discussed lots of ideas with them. We will continue to discuss these ideas as we go out. I will not go into the details of these discussions, because that's where we are -- in the discussion stage.

But let me explain again that it wasn't a -- we were not convincing the Israelis that their re-deployment had to be put into a broader context. I mean, they knew that. They want to be as helpful as they can within the context of the decision that's already been taken to re-deploy.

Q But, then, the answer to the question is no.

Q The short answer is no, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if you -- there is no short answer to that question. I'm sorry.

Q -- you've got a timetable -- for God's sake.

Q You said, the first step is to order full withdrawal. And that goes with the agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q You said, this is a first step. And the goal is to order full withdrawal. And that goes with the agreement. Does that mean that Israel does not stipulate its full withdrawal on the scene and presume withdrawal, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was describing to you the position that the Israelis have as we understand their position as described to us.

Now, what was your second question?

Q It was only one question. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, what did I -- I don't understand. (Laughter.)

Q When you said it's one step to order full withdrawal -- the first step toward full withdrawal. And that goes with the agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. This is the way we understand the Israeli position. There is full withdrawal of Israeli forces stipulated in the agreement.

Q Well, where does it stipulate in partial -- the deployment in the agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agreement does not stipulate how such withdrawals will be taken up.

Q Could you answer the question about the timetable?

Q So the withdrawal means --

Q Could you clarify that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are different ways to -- no. I cannot answer, specifically, the questions you're asking, because we are in the process of a diplomatic series of contacts that Ambassador McFarlane will carry out when he leaves. And I'm not going to address the details of what he's going to talk about when he gets to the various capitals. Please understand this.

Q Can you say whether or not there was discussion about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But we understand the concept that you are discussing. We understand it.

Q Can you say whether there was discussion about the security interests in terms of the multi-national force in some way filling the vacuum and helping the Lebanese Army to secure that area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in any great detail. It was an understanding that --

Q -- their role for the force --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We didn't go beyond where we were with the Lebanese on that, quite frankly, which was --

Q Can you clarify where you are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Basically our position on this is that the President is prepared to consider requests with respect to a role for the MNF on the understanding -- let's talk about the Shuf -- on the understanding that there are agreements arrived at which between the government and the factions which would ensure, to the extent possible, that the MNF would not be -- that no elements of the MNF would be inserted into what would be a hostile environment.

Q There would have to be an agreement, let's say, in the Shuf between Druze groups and the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There would have to be an agreement that they wanted the LAF to come in. They were prepared not to fight it. Once you have those agreements, then the role of the MNF, if there is a role, we'll consider this seriously.

Q Will McFarlane get involved in trying to negotiate those agreements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think Bud McFarlane will be involved in all aspects of this.

Q He might talk to Junblat or some of the other --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He'll talk to everyone but let's --

Q -- question on this -- did you understand from the Israelis that they are in the mood or are they planning rather to pull from the Shuf area within this redeployment, before this -- such an agreement is secured between the Lebanese government and the -- certain factions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israelis well understand that if the Lebanese government is going to successfully extend the control of its territory, and this is a significant portion of its territory, successfully extend its control, there will have to be such an agreement. I can't tell you the direct answer to your question. I think what the -- the best I can do is that the Israelis would like to see such an agreement expedited.

Q What kind of an agreement?

Q Are they ready to help in implementing it and -- reaching it and getting the two factions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Every indication that we had on this subject in the course of these 15 hours of talks is, yes.

Q So, they will mediate between the two?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've asked those questions before and I want to -- in our view, the government of Lebanon has a very important and leading role to play in achieving these agreements. Others can help. And anyone who can help, including the Israelis, will be prepared to help. But no one can substitute for the government of Lebanon and we talked about this with Gemayel.

Q Can you help a little bit in what it means in the context of the agreement -- the partial withdrawal? As I understand it, the agreement between Israel, Lebanon is not yet in effect. When it does go into effect, it provides for a total withdrawal over an eight to twelve week period, if I understand correctly. Is the agreement going to go into effect and if not what does it mean, a partial withdrawal, in the context of the agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The phraseology that I used was our understanding of the Israeli position as to where this redeployment fits into the agreement. Now, that is their view whether the agreement is implemented in the near future or not.

Now, let me get back to this. I think that's the Israeli way of saying we've got a good agreement and it should be implemented as soon as possible. I think George Shultz also addressed this issue on the record for you and I won't repeat it.

Now, obviously, we've got a problem. The agreement envisage -- not the agreement -- the agreement stipulated Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis have made clear, however, and made clear at the time of the agreement that their guarantee of withdrawal was related -- total withdrawal according to the

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timetable in the agreement was related directly to a Syrian and PLO willingness to withdraw simultaneously. So we obviously, at this point, are not talking about the -- fulfilling those provisions of the agreement as stipulated, now. However, the goals of our two governments, which include what the -- in the agreement, remain the same. We're coming back to how do you handle re-deployment, which is a decision the Israelis have made, and from the Israeli perspective, this is the first stage of the full withdrawal envisaged by the Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

Q So this was your own idea. Now it's not related to the application of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement; right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The re-deployment decision has been made in Israel. So when you talk about what are we doing, we're dealing with an issue that has really been decided. What has not been decided yet totally have been the modalities of this move, how it relates, how it will be described, how it will be, in fact, implemented in the context of the broader objectives for Lebanon.

Q Going back to the question --

Q Can I please ask a question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q When do you -- when does this withdrawal start and -- or this pull-back -- excuse me -- or re-deployment or whatever the "in" phrase is? And then, secondly, does Bud have -- does Mr. McFarlane have anything new that he's carrying out there or is he simply going to focus on Lebanon, per se, or on the broader peace issue or why are we all talking about settlements again being an obstacle to peace?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me stop -- first let me start on Lebanon. When the re-deployment takes place, I don't know. Clearly, the Israelis would like to have it -- I'm giving you an interpretation. The Israelis would like to have it take place as soon as possible, in the near future. But they would also like to have it take place in a manner that will, in the first instance, enhance the prospects of the Lebanese government successfully extending its control over this territory. We all agree that this -- and so does the government of Lebanon -- this is very important. And beyond that, whatever is done, not contribute to the partition psychology that is rampant. So I can't answer the question directly because I don't have the answer.

On what will Mr. McFarlane carry out with him, we have ideas. And these are ideas that are thoroughly consistent with our policies. We discussed some of these with the Lebanese when they were here and repeated these discussions with the Israelis --

Q -- ideas about getting the Syrians out or about the broader peace --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your ideas that have to do with implementing our policy on Lebanon across the board, including the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Now, the third part of your question is what's this talk about the peace process? A portion of the Secretary's discussions with the Israelis was devoted to various elements of the peace process; the problems of where we are, how do you -- how is there -- any ideas for getting additional movement or new movement. There was discussion on the problems of the Palestinians under occupation. There were the problems of settlements on this. We discussed these issues frankly. And we also discussed the problems of security for the Palestinians in South Lebanon. This is a very important issue. All of these issues were discussed. And I suppose the significance, Karen, is that as far as the United States government is concerned, we continue to recognize the essentiality of a viable peace process for our interests in the Middle East as well as for other reasons and that

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we are not prepared to accept that there is nothing that cannot be done positively about that nor that there -- people thinking constructively together can't improve the lot of the Palestinians, either in South Lebanon or under occupation.

Q On the beginning of the withdrawal, you said you didn't know any date. Is it because the Israelis have not made up their minds and it's an open proposition or have they made up their minds and for some reason you don't know when it's going to happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't really go beyond what I said.

Q The President in his press conference said he hoped to see Israel keep their promise that when others withdrew then they will withdraw? Did you raise that question with the Israelis on whether they are willing to withdraw unilaterally to make that possible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in those terms. Not in those terms.

Q You're not suggesting that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Q You're not suggesting that anything serious might be done in the autonomy talks regarding the future of the Palestinians on the West Bank until Lebanon is stabilized --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That may turn out to be the case but we think it's important for all the obvious reasons to engage the players where we can and see if there's anything that can be done.

Q But Mr. McFarlane --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me go --

Q Two questions about Syria. First of all, is it clear to you that Mr. McFarlane will be able to visit Syria in his current trip to the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And the other question is are there any thoughts about disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces in the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are there any what?

Q Thoughts.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thoughts about disengagement?

Q Thoughts about disengagement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talked about a lot of things. I don't want to --

MR. SIMS: May we have one or two more --

Q Is there any understanding that this redeployment will not involve permanent fortifications or any sort of digging in or that kind of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's certainly -- it's very clear that everything the Israelis told us, they have no intention to dig in on the Auwali line and that's not their aim. Their aim is to leave Lebanon and to leave Lebanon in a context that will support their goals, their policy goals which we agree with, and also provide for the security of Israel's

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northern frontier. So, I've got one --

Q -- any assurances from the Israeli party that they will stop the settlements, postpone some settlements, do something about the settlements --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q You did not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We discussed this with them but we did not get that from them.

Q And something else because you mentioned the psychology of partition, it just happen that the President of Lebanon was the first one to mention that the Israeli redeployment is tantamount to -- de facto partition. Are you saying that he's also involved in this psychology of partition?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that having spent some time in the Middle East, I think these things have a habit of growing like wild fire. The President of Lebanon, as I understood what he said publicly, and I certainly talked enough to him privately, understands the inevitability of a redeployment. Since it's going to happen -- he would prefer it not happen -- but it's going to happen. Since it's going to happen, he shares with us and with the Israelis that this be done in a manner that contributes to the ability of the government of Lebanon to extend its control and contributes rather detracts from the overall policy goals.

Q Are you confident this can happen then?

MR. SPEAKES: Last question. Sims says he's already answered three --

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: Am I confident what can happen?

Q -- that this redeployment could be done in a way that will contribute to the stability of the Gemayel government in the situation in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Thank you. Before you leave, please, we will have a briefing after the Cabinet meeting today. It will be available for radio and television coverage. It will include two Cabinet members. I cannot give you any more details at this time.

Q Subject matter?

Q Approximate time?

MR. SPEAKES: Can't give you subject right now.

Q What time?

MR. SPEAKES: I'd say around 3:00 p.m. Cannot give you the subject now.

Q Which two Cabinet members? Which two?

MR. SPEAKES: If I told you that, you'd know.

Q -- on the subject?

MR. SPEAKES: Pardon? I really can't say at the moment.

Q Is it on the Cabinet subject?

Q Foreign policy or domestic?

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Q Resignations?

MR. SPEAKES: More or less.

Q More or less what?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:33 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
CHESTER A. CROCKER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
PETER McPHERSON, DIRECTOR OF AID
PRINCETON LYMAN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ON
ETHIOPIA, FY-1983 U.S. GOVERNMENT DROUGHT, RELIEF
AND FOOD ASSISTANCE
FRIDAY, JULY 29, 1983, 4:05 P.M.

MR. McPHERSON: Thank you, Nice to see all of you again.

The policy of this Administration, and indeed of the United States Government, for many, many years, has been to respond to disasters without regard to the politics of the government of the country involved.

I think it's very clear that a hungry child knows no politics, and so such a humanitarian response to the people as opposed to the government is exactly the right policy.

The situation in Ethiopia is one that has concerned us for some time. There is a very large area of the country which has been drought-striken for sometime now. The numbers of the people affected are unclear.

UNDRO, when it issued its appeal a couple months ago, it's initial appeal, concrete appeal for relief, talked in terms of three million people in the area that was affected by drought and some one million which were in danger. There has been, of course, quite a lot of discussion about those figures and the facts are that nobody really knows exactly how many people are in Ethiopia let alone how many people are in danger.

In any case, it's clear that there's a very serious drought in the area, a life-threatening drought, and one that obviously must be dealt with. Rains have come to some parts of the area, and there is at least some growth, we know, but in any case there's going to be a lack of food at least for the rest of this year and probably on into 1984.

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What has the U.S. response been to this? So far in Fiscal '83, we have responded with some $6.7 million dollars of food. $4 million of this was in direct response to the drought. This food has been food that the United States could uniquely supply, so-called fortified, enriched foods, particularly soy-fortified sorghum grits and corn-soy milk.

What is involved here is that when a person is under nutritioned, has serious nutritional or health problems as a result of lack of food, that this enriched food can fairly quickly, much more quickly than other sorts of food, bring that person back to a more healthy state. Other donors have not had this sort of food available in their usual donor program, so it seemed especially appropriate for the United States Government to supply this.

We have supplied what the needs, as defined by a couple different groups, for this kind of food and that has been basically the $4 million that we have given for a total amount of food so far in '83 of $6.7 million.

In addition, there has been some feeding of refugees that have fled Ethiopia into Sudan, on the Sudan side of the border. Additional food which we have provided, which we've announced, is a continuation of a feeding program going on into 1984 of $3 million more. This is a mother/child feeding program which we have had there for a few years.

Mother Theresa, for example, has a mother/child feeding program in the capital, and is part of that $3 million. There had been consideration of whether that on-going feeding program, at least all of it, would be continued at the levels that it has been but it was clear to us, upon carefully reviewing this whole matter, that the drought was so severe in affecting virtually all parts of the society and country in one fashion or the other that we should continue to do so.

A major issue in Ethiopia, in connection with the drought, has been transportation of the food. It is agreed by almost all parties at this time that there is enough food within the borders of Ethiopia to deal with this problem.

Much of the food, however, is in the ports of Ethiopia -- here, here; there along the Red Sea. (Indicating on map) They've had difficulty getting the food out of the

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ports. At this time, for example, a major bridge that needs to be crossed to take food into the country is now destroyed, as well as there have been some operational problems.

There haven't been allocated, or aren't enough trucks to bring the food in, for example. Let me get back to that in a moment. So there's been a request to the world by UNDRO once more to supply some of this transportation need.

I announced a couple days ago that we would be providing some $700,000, most of it for transportation and management of our transportation, and that we are working with the Catholic Relief Service to manage this component. Much of our transportation money will, in fact, go to transport our food.

There was a debate, a discussion really, to the donor community as to how that transportation money should be provided. There was some possibility that we might actually provide trucks. Trucks are physically difficult to immediatley move in. They can't just sort of drop from the sky, at least not easily. We have had some people over there looking at this very carefully and felt that there were trucks around to rent. What we are going to have Catholic Relief Service do is have cash available to, in effect, rent vehicles on the spot.

The transportation thing is complicated, frankly, by coordination within the country and by, it would appear, the Ehiopian Government not allocating vehicles to this whole need that they could. I mentioned a moment ago the clogging of the ports.

There was a huge shipment in of cement which seemed to be given priority to truck into the country over having trucks being used to transport some of this food. We think, in short;- and I believe in all candidness, that much of the donor community feels that the Ethiopian Government could do a good deal better in allocating the vehicles that it has at its disposal for this transportation.

I might note that while the West has done a substantial amount -- for example, the West has, in total, supplied some $3-1/2 million for transportation, about half a million of that being the U.S. We don't know of transportation that the Russians have supplied. Frankly, it's pretty clear that the Soviets could be doing a great deal more than what they are.

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Q What was the Western total?

A $3-1/2 million. It could be doing a great deal more than they are, and we urge that both the Soviets come up to their responsibilities in this area as well as the Ethiopians in doing a better job of allocating the resources that they have available to them.

This gets to my last point, and really the principal announcement of a new effort, of an additional effort that we're putting into this. Our assessment is that what needs to take place to move this thing along, to get this job done, is stronger coordination on the ground.

We've gone through, of course, a number of disasters over the years and have a pretty good experience as to what it takes to make these things work. One of the clear lessons is that you need someone on the ground who really coordinates, who coordinates the various donors' imputs and who can give regular and clear information as to what is needed where.

UNDRO, historically, has not been an operational agency. Their function has been to define need and lay out the need to the world and ask the world to come in and do it. For the first time ever, very recently, UNDRO took the responsibility in Chad to coordinate the donors' responses to the drought and the war situation there, and did a very, very good job.

This afternoon, accordingly, I've sent to Geneva, where UNDRO is located, a telegram asking them to take the lead of not only setting out to the world what the general problem is but to actually have people on the ground to coordinate this. That telegram to UNDRO, as well as the same telegram informing our fellow donors, will be available today.

That is the general situation. I think it might be of interest to you as well that there is a very severe drought in several parts of southern Africa. It goes across here (indicating) from Mozambique up into Tanzania, across into Angola surely, and several places down here. Zimbabwe, as an example, which has traditionally been a major exporter to the region of corn, is not in a position to export this year because of the problem and, indeed, has got some severe drought problems in areas of its own.

Because of that, a few weeks ago -- perhaps many of you know -- a few weeks ago we have allocated some $25 million as a reserve to respond to that drought, and this fiscal year, to date, we have actually apportioned some $9 million. That being another example of our policy -- the long-term U.S. policy that I mentioned a moment ago -- of the U.S. responding to need without regard to our relationship to countries. $9 million, for example, went to Mozambique in the last fiscal year. In fact, that was over and above that $25 million, a part of it.

We have a number of problems; Africa has a number of problems, and we continue to track those needs and respond carefully to them as best we can.

We have a responsibility, obviously, to be certain that the food we deliver to the country, or goods we provide, actually are used by the people who need them. These are fairly tumultuous situations, and often it's hard to be certain that the food actually gets to the needy person. So sometimes it takes a little work in advance before we appropriate or allocate the monies.

Those are my reasonably brief additional statements here. My colleague, Chet Crocker, and I will be happy to answer whatever questions you may have.

Q On that last point, have you asked UNDRO to be at both points; that is, the port and the distribution point to supervise the distribution to the people who need it?

A It's my judgment that UNDRO will have to be both at ports as well as in the distribution.

Q What kind of manpower are you talking about there?

A I don't know. I'm sure it will be more than a person or so. It's a fairly major effort. Some of you will recall the effort that was undertaken at Somalia recently, a few years ago, where, in the end, the international community, in effect -- I guess it was the UNHCR -- put CARE on contract to coordinate all that. It was when CARE came on board, to really coordinate it -- in that case, it was at our urging as well. As I think many of you recall, when CARE came on board to coordinate that, that really began to come together. That was a refugee situation as well as drought.

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Q You got a letter this week -- today, I guess -- from this outfit called BVed for the World --

A Yes.

Q -- that suggests that the most efficient way to deal with the transportation problem would be for the United Staes to give the money to UNDRO, which would then buy presumably European trucks.

A They're a good organization, but I don't think they understand UNDRO. UNDRO is not an operational agency per se to try to give money to aid. They'd say, "Well, we don't do that."

If UNDRO is willing to take an operational responsibility on the ground the way Catholic Relief Services is on th ground -- it was Catholic Relief Services that was given this contract -- then the role, the relationship we have with UNDRO, would change. Indeed, part of what I'm really saying to UNDRO is: "We need you on the ground as a respected international agency to work with the Catholic Relief Services; with the Swedes who are providing some Volvos, trucks and other things. We need you to help them pull this all together for us."

Q And on the last point that you made -- making sure that the food reaches some person of need, and specifically starts with children -

A Yes.

Q -- how do you deal with the problem in a country at war? Most likely, the last person to starve will be the soldier.

A There's no question that that historically is true -- that soldiers usually eat, and even with other people may be in very bad condition. We have to be certain, as best we can, with the food that we provide, that there is not a diversion of our food.

We have a pretty good record of preventing that, but it's only because we are elaborately careful. There's no substitute to having people on the ground watching and caring for it.

Our long relationship with the Catholic Relief Services and their ability to handle this kind of thing is why we've gone to them. But it's also why we've to sort through this whole problem for a little while.

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Some of you may remember a few months ago there was a story, first in the European press and then our press, that some of the food that were being then provided by European donors had been diverted to the Ethiopian military. And apparently in the end that story was inaccurate, but it appears to be. We don't have a full backup on that, but the facts are that it's the kind of thing that we continually have to worry about and to question if it's appropriate.

Q Tht sounded as though you were saying that Catholic Relief Services also had to make sure where it goes. I thought they were just doing the transportation, and I thought you had asked UNDRO to take this distribution responsibility -- or are you having them both do it?

A Catholic Relief Services are the people that we are looking to, in large part on the ground, to make sure that our food gets to the right place. But our food is only a portion of the whole. The Europeans have provided a substantial amount of the food, and somebody needs to coordinate all that.

What we need from UNDRO -- I, perhaps some of you will recall, was responsible for the U.S. coordination of the Lebanese relief and reconstruction. And the months immediately following the invasion were really very difficult because there wasn't anybody to pull that all together.

In the end, I suppose, we, being by far the largest donor, did a good share of that; and we proceeded to keep very close ties with everyone else.

That situation, as difficult as it was, was much easier than this because it's a pretty small country, the communications were pretty good, you've got a long coastline and lots of things.

But Ethiopia is a very diffirent problem. It's mountainous. It's a big, difficult country to work in. We need to have some international organization that other donors -- all donors -- will respect and they can work closer with the Ethiopian Government.

Q In that kind of terrain, is the thought of aircraft just out of the question? Are they too extravagantly expensive? And here I'm talking heavy-duty helicopters, not fixed-wing.

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A Our first food drop was flying in from Cairo down into the capital of Ethiopia some food. It was felt there was an emergency need, and we did that. So the aircraft was used there.

It may be that some aircraft will be necessary; but, frankly, our view is that trucks are probably the fastest, as well as the cheapest, way to take care of this under the circumstances.

Q Politically, are they also the calmest? You brought helicopters in there. Does that speak of a military implication?

A One of the problems with bringing -- you'll notice that we're talking about renting trucks, not buying trucks. Bringing in the aircraft or bringing in trucks, it seems to me, substantially increased the possibilities of diversion.

Q Mr. Hackett from Catholic Relief Services --

A Yes.

Q -- who just came back from Ethiopia, was saying this afternoon that he's very worried that seed -- as you said, the rainy seasons are beginning in a lot of these provinces; and he's very worried that the seed isn't going to get to these people and the whole thing is going to repeat itself again next year -- that they won't be able to grow any crops and we'll be in this thing next year. Is AID doing anything to try to --

A We're concerned about that. We've provided a hundred thousand dollars worth of seed to be distributed through this Catholic Relief Services as well.

It's an old problem that you have in these situations, and one can certainly sympathize. If your child is starving today, you feed the seed that you were going to plant next year because by then the child would be dead unless you take care of it.

We have the same problem, incidentally, in the Andes, in Peru and Bolivia. Actually, it's a size greater than Texas. In Bolivia we've got this tremendous drought and the Indians have eaten a good share of next year's seed.

And, yes -- the answer is: Yes, we have provided some hundred thousand dollars and we're watching that situation closely.

Q On the point you made that politics can enter this thing, somebody today -- I'd have to go through my notes and find out who it was -- but somebody said that our effort in Somalia was much larger than our effort in Ethiopia is today; is it?

A I don't have the total figure for the Somalia program; but over a period of the drought and refugee situation, it was certainly much larger than we've given to date. We were a very primary donor to Somalia. I would suspect that we were, by far, the largest one in Somalia. We think that that was for the whole period.

We're, of course, continuing to watch the Ethiopian matter and will be responding with the other donors.

This activity. like all these activities, should be a coordinated effort of the world community.

Q And your point is that that is not a political difference. It's simply that we were the major donor there. A and B, it was over a longer period of time.

A Yes. It certainly wasn't a political difference.

Q Does asking UNDRO to take over coordination in Ethiopia mean that the United States will be prepared to give more money, particularly for the transportation purposes? Will CRS complain, for example, that they were denied $40,000 that they asked AID for? Would that situation --

A What are you reading from?

Q I'm just quoting what they said.

A CRS -- I gather you mean for the truck.

Q That's right.

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A We work closely with CRS, and my understanding was that they felt very comfortable providing a $40,000 truck when we provided some $700,000 otherwise.

But the basic question I think you are asking is: What if UNDRO goes in and takes a leadership role? What will be our additional response?

To be honest, I' m not sure what the needs will be and what our response will be in the months ahead, except to say that we'll be responding to need as best we can.

But one of those concerns will be whether or not the food that we give will reach the people that are hungry. And UNDRO or someone -- but UNDRO would appear to be the best, taking a strong lead in this coordination -- will be a significant assurance to us that in fact the food is delivered where it's suposed to be delivered. And so, clearly, it would facilitate whatever contributions we make.

Q Why was the Administration's PL 480 request for Ethiopia dropped and then reinstated?

A The question is that why was the 1984 Ethiopia ongoing feeding program not included as a projection until -- and then we announced that we were going to have a 1984 program?

It wasn't formally -- it wasn't dropped; it just wasn't included. And I make that distinction because we have felt for some time that the Ethiopian Government should be doing a great deal more for its people. There is some concern for a long time that there were a lot of military expenditures where there were a lot of very hungry people.

And based upon that, we have in fact tried to signal the Ethiopian Government that we think they need to do more.

That signal was very appropriate when we made it, which was almost a year ago. We've been saying in that signal and many other ways it's time for the Ethiopian Government to do more.

The reason for the reinstatement of this program or the indication that we're going to continue with the program in '84 was, frankly, it's clear to me that the drought was affecting almost everything in Ethiopia and that we were going to be hurting very hungry people if we didn't continue with that program.

It's one of those problems that you get when you take a position that the hungry child knows no politics that it's hard to signal as strongly as you'd like to that the government of that child should do more. And so we're caught in that quandry and we are proceeding to have a need for a program.

Q A detail on the telegram you are sending.

A Yes.

Q Is that --

A We'll provide that to you.

Do you have that cable?

VOICE: Yes.

Q Is it within the powers of the Director General of UNDRO, wherever he is, to do it, or does it have to go back to New York to the General Assembly or the Security Counsel or whatever?

A I see no reason why it should have to go back to New York and through some sort of General Assembly. As you know, the politics of the UN are elaborate. It would surely be my hope that there is not several weeks of trying to figure out how to do something like this.

Q And he doesn't have to check with the other donors or --

A I can't, really -- I don't want to try to respond as to what has to be done. But I think they ought to be able to move fairly rapidly, and this will be the urging of the whole U.S. Government that they move rapidly.

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It really is one of the things that the world community must move toward, which is to figure out how to have an on-the-ground automatic response to disasters and coordination. For years we -- the U.S. Government -- provided an overwhelming amount of the response. But as the Europeans have grown and prospered, it's become a multi-donor thing. I'm thinking 50 years ago it was a different situation. And we just are not the group to coordinate everybody else; it's not appropriate, for a a variety of reasons.

Bu there hasn't grown up an automatic coordinating response, and UNDRO is designed to at least begin to look at that kind of function.

So we think it's very appropriate that that be handled. UNDP has a person on the spot, and then UNDP may well be the appropriate person -- or appropriate organization.

But UNDRO looks like the best right now, particularly after a successful venture in Chad.

I won't burden you with any more, unless you -- yes, sir.

Q You said in your statement that the Soviets should be doing more. What are they not doing or what should they be doing?

A We think they probably could provide a good deal of transportation, for example. There is a substantial Soviet and Ethiopian relationship that would no doubt facilitate their help if they were to act promptly. The Soviets around the world -- and there's no real change -- around the world, basically their calling card has been guns and military power. And they have taken the line that they didn't really have much responsibility for these things, that the "decadent West" had to take care of these problems.

I think the world is getting really kind f fed up with that kind of response and feels that it's time the Soviets do their share.

Q Thank you.

Q This seven hundred thousand is in addition to this money that's listed here, is it not -- or is it part of it?

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A We had better take a look at that list to be sure. Ray, do you know what was --

VOICE: I believe it's on this list.

Q It's included in these figures. O.K., thanks.

Oh, yes; I see it.

A Thank you.

Q You talk about the need for a new vehicle, a new coordinating agency, or do you see --

A No.

Q -- UNDRO modifying its activities?

A UNDRO, in effect, modified its activities in Chad. I'm against the organization in principle.

Q I am too.

Q It's a good thing you said it. (Laughter.)

A Thank you. I appreciate your time, everybody.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON VISIT OF
MOBUTU SESE SEKO
PRESIDENT OF ZAIRE

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1983

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: President Reagan has invited President Mobutu on an official working visit to Washington to discuss both bilateral relations and regional developments in Africa of mutual interest to both countries.

As you know, the U.S. has long enjoyed close and mutually beneficial relationships with Zaire. All U.S. Administrations since that of President Eisenhower have shared an interest in Zaire's independence, territorial integrity, security and economic development.

The Reagan Administration is committed to a strengthening of U.S.-Zairian relations in all possible ways. Zaire, by virtue of its size, its location, its population and its resources, plays under President Mobutu's leadership an important role in African affairs.

The U.S. shares many mutual interests with Zaire in Africa. We have, for example, welcomed Zaire's courageous role in dispatching troops to Chad in support of the Habre Government which has been recognized as legitimate by the OAU Governments, and which is now under attack by Libyan-supported rebels.

Zaire, like many developing countries, has suffered the economic consequences in recent years of higher prices for its import requirements and lower prices for its exports. It also suffers from the standard problems of under-development and adequate human, financial and infrastructure resources.

However, we welcome the steps which the Government of Zaire under President Mobutu's leadership has taken over the past year to deal with its economic problems. Budgetary controls, efforts at improved public administration, liberalization of the economy, and an intensive dialogue with the IMF on a stabilization program are all encouraging developments.

We hope the Government of Zaire and the International Monetary Fund will reach early agreement which will lay the basis for consideration of debt rescheduling by official and private creditors, and open the way for renewed economic growth.

Zaire is a complex country with some 250 different ethnic and linquistic groups. President Mobutu has played a central role since Zaire's independence in forging national unity and overcoming centrifugal forces based on tribalism.

President Mobutu has recently declared a political amnesty for opponents both within and outside Zaire. This step toward political reconciliation is one which Zaire's friends, including the United States, have welcomed.

During his visit, President Mobutu will meet with the President, the Vice President with whom he just had lunch, the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, the Administrator of AID, and Members of both Houses of Congress.

He will depart Washington the morning of August 6 to spend a few days in New York meeting American business leaders before returning to Zaire next week.

Questions?

Q A very basic one. Why is Chad so important to the United States?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I will defer Chad oriented questions to my colleague, if I may.

Q Perhaps you would quantify the extent of help that Zaire is giving Chad and what Mobutu wants.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Zaire dispatched some -- we think it's approximately 1500-1600 Zairian troops now in Chad, six aircraft, three reconnaissance aircraft, and three Mirage's. The troops have been deployed around Ndjamena which has in turn freed Habre's forces to go north where the rebels have been attacking.

Q As far as you know, there are no Zairian forces, then, in the north? There all in the capital.

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. Not that I'm aware of. They've not been deployed outside of Ndjamena.

Q What about the aircraft?

Q Are the pilots for those planes Zairian?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Where are the aircraft?

FIRST OFFICIAL: What are they?

Q Where are they?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They are based in Ndjamena and, as far as I understand, have flown some reconnaissance.

Q There is a report out of Chad today saying that the Zairians are expected to send another 1800 or so troops.

FIRST OFFICIAL: I have no information on that. We've not been informed of any request or of any plan by the Zairians to do so.

Q To what extent is the problem in Chad one for discussion during this current visit?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Certainly that will be one of the themes of discussion. It's a subject in which we both have a mutual interest. Both the Zairian Government and our own are concerned about the efforts by Libya to support a rebellion against a legitimate government in Chad, so it will be a subject of discussion.

Q And do we want the Zairian Government to take additional steps?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We have not asked them to do so. We have welcomed the steps that they have taken and the support they have given Habre, but we have not asked them to take any initiatives.

Q Do you plan to ask them before he leaves?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I am not aware of any plans to ask him to do anything additional.

Q Are there additional things they could do?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I suppose theoretically that someone has mentioned that they might send more troops, but I think there are logistical supply support limits, logical limits, on what Zaire could do. There are also considerations of their own security and the number of troops that they would send outside the country at this time. We have nothing in mind to ask them to do additionally.

Q Will the help that Zaire is giving Chad reflect favorably upon our consideration of its debt rescheduling?

FIRST OFFICIAL: I don't think that there is a direct linkage, nor have the Zairians asked us to make one. Our consideration on debt rescheduling relates to our appreciation and our understanding of the kinds of economic reform measures that President Mobutu has taken in the past year.

In his dialogue with the IMF, he has agreed to certain budgetary limitations which he has followed now. We are in the seventh month of an austerity program. He has stayed well within the budgetary limits suggested by the IMF and agreed to by the Government of Zaire. They have had discussions on exchange rate reforms and so on. These are the criterion by which we will measure whether we should enter into a debt rescheduling program.

It is our assumption that if they reach an agreement -- and there are signs that an early agreement may be reached with the IMF -- then the creditor countries on the basis of economic performance criteria would be prepared to consider a debt rescheduling.

Q What kind of money are we talking about?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The external debt is approximately $5 billion. How much would be up for rescheduling is a subject which still has to be addressed in the context of their projections of balance of payments problems. It's much, much less than $5 billion in terms of rescheduling.

Q How much is the U.S. owed?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Debt to the U.S. -- about $800 million, I think. I'm just giving you that off the top of my head. Someone can check that figure if you need it precisely.

Q Does the $5 billion figure include short-term debts owed to private creditors?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It includes both private creditors and public debt. Essential creditors. But the bulk of it is to other governments and international institutions.

Q Did the U.S. have any role in getting the Zairian troops to Chad, either in terms of paying for it or providing the transport?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. Not in either of those categories. As you know, the $10 million in assistance that has been provided to Chad, some portion of that has been used to assist the Zairian forces in Chad with certain kinds of minimal equipment -- some jeeps, some communications equipment, some boots, rifle belts, things of that nature -- some equipment which they were lacking.

But we have not attempted to provide arms for them, and under the terms of our legislation the funds could not be used to pay for expenditures and transport.

Q Who will be using these antiaircraft missiles and Red Eyes?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Those would be Chadian forces. As I said, the Zairians are not deployed in the north.

Q How about additional military aid to Zaire? What are they asking for and what are we prepared to give?

FIRST OFFICIAL: They have no specific request. The Administration has for the last couple of years asked the Congress to approve additional security assistance, funds for Zaire, not related in any way to the Chad situation. But just looking at their own security problems and the very extensive borders that they have, it has been the judgment of this Administration that we should provide more support than we now do.

Unfortunately, we haven't gotten Congressional approval for higher levels of security assistance.

Q What are the levels?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Levels have been running in recent years about $10 million in FMS credits, about $10 million in development assistance, and about $10 million in PL-480 assistance. In addition to that we have a Peace Corps program there with about 240 volunteers, and some small Title II, PL-480, program.

Q How much of the debt that Zaire owed to the United States is owed to the Export-Import Bank for the Shaba-Kinshasa electrical transmission line?

A The Inga-Shaba line?

Q Yes.

A I can't give you that breakdown, but we could find it for you and give it to you later.

Q Also, in the meeting with the Ex-Im Bank official yesterday, was that a major subject of discussion?

A I'm not aware that the President met with Ex-Im Bank yesterday. He met with officials from the World Bank yesterday.

Q All right. Well, he was also supposed to meet yesterday, in the early evening, with an official from the Ex-Im Bank. At least --

A I have no information on that meeting.

Q To what extent are allegations of corruption or actual corruption in Zaire a complicating factor to all of these economic questions you've discussed?

A Let me just say a word about this. President Mobutu last December, when he launched his economic reform program, also called attention to problems of corruption in the Government of Zaire. Following that, a number of government officials were placed under arrest -- I think about 115. Some were brought to trial and have been convicted. A number of Cabinet ministers and governors were relieved of their office.

The total impact of that, I think, has been to substantially reduce the amount of corruption that is occurring, and a kind of serious effort is underway to improve financial management in the government and the public administration.

The perception in the United States and the charges that have been made by people such as Nguza, in Brussels, opponents of the Mobutu regime, have clearly had an impact in the Congress. There has been a great deal of criticism in the consideration of foreign assistance bills for Zaire -- foreign assistance proposals for Zaire. One of the elements that is consistently raised in Congressional hearings is the issue of corruption.

Q On the external debt -- I was looking at the AID presentation to Congress -- the external debt was listed as, I think, 78 percent of their GNP. Just for comparison, I looked to Ghana, for example, which is 6 percent of the GNP. Is that, as I deduce it to be, extraordinarily high?

A Can an economist on staff help me on that? 78 percent of GNP sounds terribly high to me.

We'll have to get you those figures.

Q I've got the figures in the AID presentation to Congress.

A Yes, but it's 78 percent of the GNP?

Q 78 or 76 percent.

A It's obviously high.

Q Is that a world record?

A Not that I know of. But the thing about Zaire is there is a resource base to handle a debt level, and they reached this debt level at a time when copper prices were up close to $2.00 a pound; they then fell to $.60 a pound. Obviously, debts contracted at one level of earnings don't seem to make the same kind of sense when the earning level has fallen by a third.

So it's a debt level about which, it seems to me, no one can be complacent, but it isn't an appropriate subject for any kind of moralizing, really. They got into a debt when the prospects of repayment seemed viable. It's a situation we've seen in a good many other places in the Third World in the last couple of years.

Q Will the Reagan Administration make additional requests for ESF for Zaire if the country meets its economic performance requirements for the IMF, or for that matter, even if it doesn't, are there additional requests to Congress for ESF?

A In the FY-83 Budget, the Administration requested a certain amount of money in ESP. It was not premised on an agreement with the IMF. There was considerable sentiment in the Congress that, should there be agreement with the IMF, then perhaps ESF would be in order. But our premise in our request to Congress for assistance to Zaire is that there is a clear need now for security assistance, that we have been able to use our assistance carefully and well in Zaire, and that the levels are just far too low for a country of that size and of the importance of Zaire. So the requests stand on their own.

Obviously, the more the economic performance in Zaire improves, and if they come into compliance with an IMF stabilization program, the chances of getting Congressional approval for increased assistance would perhaps be enhanced.

Q Do you know whether Zaire is working with any African neighbors to help Chad?

A I know only that they have had very close consultations with a number of other African governments, but I'm not aware of any specific steps of the same kind that Zaire has taken -- that have been taken by the Zairian Government; but the process of consultation goes on and is more or less continuous.

Q Do I understand you right that only Zaire has sent forces into help?

A That's correct.

Q Has Zaire received any military help, monetary or otherwise, from Israel?

A The Israelis have a training program in Zaire. They have trained the Presidential Security Brigade. As a result of the visit by then Defense Minister Sharon, they came to agreements on additional training and additional sales of equipment to Zaire. The Israelis have undertaken to train the so-called Kamanyola Division, which is down in the Shaba area and badly in need of some work.

Q In relation to the Chad business, the Israelis are not involved?

A Not involved that I'm aware of.

Q Was there any discussion here of Angola with the --

A There has been simply one round of substantive discussions that Mr. Crocker had with the President this morning. There was a working lunch with the Vice-President

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today. There will be meetings with the Secretary of State and the President tomorrow, and I would expect that South Africa would be a topic of discussion at that time.

Q What kind of support are we wanting from Mr. Mobutu on that?

A I think we both share an interest in stability in southern Africa, and I think it is on that theme that we would have discussions with the Zairian delegation -- that we share a common interest.

Q What were the discussions between Mr. Crocker and President Mobutu this morning? (given in French)

A He wanted to know what subjects were discussed between Mr. Crocker and President Mobutu this morning.

I think I can say that they had a preliminary review of a range of bilateral issues and a preliminary discussion on regional issues including Chad.

Q Can we ask the Second Senior Official about Chad generally now? Is that possible?

(Second Senior Official assumes the podium.)

Q Why is Chad important to us? Why are we sending money in? Why are we so interested in having Zairians send troops? What is there about the battle in Chad that is important?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think it's important to restate what has been said, that the Zairians are not in Chad because we asked them to go. The leadership of Zaire is a very decisive leadership. It took this decision on its own merits because of its reading of the situation and of Zaire's national interests.

But to answer the question directed toward us, we feel very strongly that there is a continent-wide pattern of Libyan destabilization, Libyan terrorist activities, Libyan aggression. The First Senior Official has mentioned what is taking place in Chad now, which consists of an elaborate campaign of financial, logistic, and other kinds of Libyan support for rebels who, in fact, have been created by Libya; in addition, direct Libyan combat aggression against Chadian territory.

In that context, we view the situation as being a broader regional one. Chad happens to be the place where this pattern of Libyan behavior is most visible and most prominent. But it is, by no means, the only example of such Libyan behavior.

If that kind of activity passes without response by, first and foremost, those most directly concerned by it, namely African states, without response by the internaional community more generally, it will feed upon itself, and it will pose a threat to the stability and security of a rather large number of additional states. One could just look at the map and see Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, and the list goes on. So in other words, we define our interest in the situation as being of a regional character.

We wish to make it clear that this is, first and foremost, an African question to which already Africans have responded.

Q You say the Zairians are not there because we asked them, but did we ask them?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: No.

Q You talk in terms of the Africans having responded. Unless I misunderstood what the First Official was saying, it was only Zaire that has responded.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I was referring, Martin, to the broader pattern of Libyan activity Africa-wide, to which there is not any question a significant degree of African concern, which has only heightened in recent years. I think the response to that is amply evident.

Q Is Chad getting foreign assistance, or do you think a lot more will be necessary?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We deal with these situations one step at a time. We have had a significant program of civilian assistance for Chad which has faced problems of food, availability, and so on for its civilian population. More recently, we have earmarked funds for Chadian forces and Zairian forces in Chad.

What the prospects are is very difficult to predict right now. We are in the middle of a small-scale, but very important, conflict.

Q Do you have accurate, up-to-date information as to what is going on on the ground?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: Pretty regular information, yes. Libyan air attacks continue, for example, as was said, I think, in the noon briefing today. Libyan air attacks are a regular feature for the past 3-4 days. There is continuing Libyan support for further cross-border activity in the direction north/south, bringing both "rebels" and Libyan elements themselves, and substantial amounts of Libyan hardware into Chad.

Q How many Libyan bases are involved in land activity as distinct from air raids? You have identified Libyan regular forces inside Chad as distinct from the "rebels"?

A Well, we wouldn't go beyond what has been said and publicly announced by the Chadian Government itself, which yesterday, I believe, pointed to the existence of a number of captured Libyans from their recent retaking of the city of Faya Largeau.

It is, yes, indeed, our impression that there are Libyans on the ground in Chad. There are Libyans serving with Goukoni's forces -- this is the rebel leader we're referring to. There are, of course, Libyans as well in the Libyan-occupied strip in northern Chad, which is Chadian territory occupied by Libya for the past decade.

Q Can you clarify a report that President Habre may be dead?

A We have no evidence to support that claim, which came from Libya.

Q Do you have any evidence to support the contrary, that he is alive and well?

A We believe that there has been no change in his status.

(Laughter)

Q With the increase in Libyan involvement in this situation, do you expect a parallel increase in the Zairian involvement in the conflicts? And in this case, do you foresee any increase in the assistance to Zaire to meet that challenge?

A As was said in response, I believe, to an earlier question, we are not aware of any immediate plan on Zaire's behalf to move additional support to Chad. So your question is hopothetical. If Zaire were to move additional forces to Chad or were to seek to do so, we would look at that proposition when it came up.

Q Could there be a role for forces from outside of Africa in Chad to bolster the Habre forces, say French forces, for instance?

A I think that question is best posed to the French. There is already a substantially greater French effort than our own. We are in close consultation with the French, and will cooperate with them as appropriate.

Q Would you like the French to be doing more, particularly in terms of air support, for the Chad Government?

A As I say --

Q Is the United States pressing the French to do more?

A We consult regularly with them, and we cooperate with them, as we do with the government in N'Djamena. I wouldn't go beyond that.

Q Have you asked other African nations to send in troops or any other kind of help, to Chad?

A We are not seeking -- It is not our job, in effect, to take the lead in this sense. The Chadian Government has launched various appeals. We have made our views known. But we are not pressing friends in Africa to become involved. We're trying to, if anything, limit outside involvement in this conflict in the most blatent form, which is, of course, Libyan aggression.

Q How many Libyans are there on the ground?

A I don't have a number for you -- I wish I did -- but I don't have an exact number. We do believe they are involved in several capacities -- in logistics, in armor, in communications, and of course, their pilots and their aircraft. There are Libyan units based in northern Chad. That portion of it called the Aouzou Strip, on a regular basis. There are also Libyans serving with the Goukoni forces further south beyond the Aouzou Strip.

Q Are you talking about countries' forces far beyond the --

A I don't have a map on them.

Q You have one behind you, but it's not delineated.

A (Laughter) The Libyans are going this way (indicating). (Laughter)

Q Are you talking about Libyans in the hundreds or thousands?

A I think we would want to check that and try and get you -- I'll take the question, which I suspect might come up again.

Q Also, do you have any information that the Libyans are preparing a grand assault?

A Well, the assaults that have already taken place have been, until fairly recently, primarily on the ground. They have been combined operations and involve Libyans and the Goukoni forces. At the present time, we do see evidence of continuing planning and activity that involve logistics, concentrating -- units and columns being formed and so forth on a regular basis, so --

Q Inside Libya or Chad is that?

A Both.

Q Both sides of the border?

Q Are there any plans to deploy AWACS in the region, to determine precisely what is going on there? Also, what about moving the "Eisenhower" into the Gulf of Sidra?

A I think those questions, as you know, should best be posted in the Defense Department, and have, I think, already been answered over there. I don't have anything additional on that.

Q Recently, Colonel Qadhafi met with King Hassan in Morocco, and there were conciliatory statements after that. What is your reading of that meeting? There has been speculation that some kind of deal may have been struck. What was your reading of that meeting?

A It comes against a background of efforts by Colonel Qadhafi to perhaps break out of his own isolation, self-created, in both the Arab world and the African world. In that sense, I presume it represents an effort to do better with at least some of his neighbors. I don't think we have any conclusive evidence of results from that at this point, from that meeting.

Q What is your impression of who is winning and who is losing right now?

A Going back a bit, there was a period some weeks back in which the forces of President Habre were driven out of a series of northern strong points to the north of Faya Largeau where the current conflict is taking place. Then, President Habre lost Faya Largeau. On the basis of that, there were immediate follow-up actions attempted by the rebel elements in the eastern part of Chad, centering around the town of Abeche.

Those eastern points have all been retaken by government forces and in a very dramatic action in the course of the last week. Faya Largeau has been retaken on the ground, and the forces of Goukoni handed a substantial setback on the ground, after which we are seeing these raids from the Libyan Air Force directly.

Q But are the Habre forces pressing on north of Faya Largeau? Are they able to get up any momentum right now?

A There are some follow-up operations, but the principal point of contest that we are focused on is in Faya Largeau itself.

Q So they haven't really moved beyond that area?

A There have been some follow-up operations, yes, in the immediate vicinity; but I wouldn't describe them as being far away from Faya Largeau.

Q Is it to the point that the rebels had to have an increased amount of Libyan support if they are to sustain any kind of potential as a real threat to the Habre forces?

A I would not characterize it that way. Of course, it all depends on your view of the have-to-have -- have to have for what? The Government of Habre, as First Senior Official indicated, is recognized virtually universally in Africa and the international community as the legitimate government of Chad.

Q Have you any more news on the phosphorous bombs at all? There have been reports today that the Libyan Air Force has been dropping phosphorous bombs and shrapnel bombs on Faya Largeau?

A We have heard reports of cluster bombs, fragment bombs, napon, and so forth. Beyond that, I don't have anything new.

Q As a public service announcement, could you say that definitely Americans won't be sent to train the Chadians in using Red Eye missiles?

A We only have people arriving in N'Djamena to off-load and to provide immediate instruction in the capital. There is no plan to put anyone elsewhere, and the people that we do send in on these flights tend to come out very shortly thereafter. That is the way we intend to --

Q When you say "immediate instruction," what does that mean, like about 15 minutes or -- ?

A No. Instruction for qualified people on the kind of equipment we're talking about is not a long-term proposition. People have been going in, staying overnight or a couple of days, and coming back out again.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:40 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release August 5, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR ROWNY
ON THE START TALKS

The Briefing Room

10:00 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Ambassador Rowny has just completed a meeting of about 20 minutes with the President to report on his talks that have been taking place over the past several weeks. He has an opening statement which he will read. And we are now passing out copies for you.

Q Can we have a copy?

MR. SPEAKES: If we can get by the photographers we will.

Q Good morning.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Good morning. Are you ready?

Q Yes.

Q Have we got an arms package?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I've just finished reporting to the President, having arrived in Washington yesterday afternoon, on round four of START, which ended on Tuesday. I also met this week with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels to give them a status report on the round.

I reported to the President that this has been our most significant round to date. Our talks have been intensive, serious, and businesslike. I remain hopeful that we will reach agreement on substantially reducing strategic offensive arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

As you know, the President sent me back in June with his personal instructions to show maximum flexibility and explore every possible avenue for agreement. In our formal sessions and in many long and private sessions, Ambassador Karpov and I discussed various ways to narrow our differences.

On July 8th, the United States delegation tabled a complete treaty text which embody the many changes we had previously made and the increased flexibility the President had announced in June. We met the two main complaints the Soviets had previously raised: One, that we were prescribing how the Soviets must restructure their forces; and, two, that we were not being comprehensive, that is, not including from the outset all our strategic forces.

Reducing the warheads of each side by about a third to 5,000 remains the central element of our position. We are also determined to reduce, over time, the three to one Soviet advantage in nuclear destructive capability and potential. Our goals are two-fold -- deep reductions and a more stable strategic relationship.

Without violating the agreement to keep details of our issues confidential, I can report to you that I told the President that the Soviets also showed some flexibility and forward movement. The President appeared pleased that his flexible approach is being carried out in serious and businesslike negotiations.

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In preparations for the next round, I will be meeting with senior officials and the National Security Council and will consult with the Congress. That completes my --

Q Where did they show flexibility?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They showed some flexibility in some non-central issues, as I declare it. And I, again, to keep the confidentiality of what we have done, and not reveal the details of -- I can report to you that after they heard that we were showing flexibility that they said that they, too, could show some flexibility in several important but not we call the central issues.

Q Where's the forward movement?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: By the fact that they did show that flexibility, the fact that we have laid out our position and have shown that we are meeting their concerns. In other words, we've laid the framework now for moving along.

Q Bob, we can continue on this, can we not? Lights?

MR. SIMS: No, this was -- the opening statement is on the record, camera and a couple of questions and the rest --

Q Why?

Q Why? We haven't had a couple of questions yet. We want to ask questions.

Q That wasn't the ground rules for this.

MR. SIMS: Will you take a couple more on camera?

Q What's wrong --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Fine. It's all right with me.

Q Sure.

Q We need a negotiator, Bob.

Q Lights back on?

Q Lights.

Q So the flexibility and the forward movement comes from showing some flexibility --

Q Wait one second. Can we have our lights on?

Q -- in non-central issues?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes, the flexibility comes from our showing flexibility in the way to get to our goals. Our goals remain the same to reduce these asymmetries and to have deep reductions and we have laid that out. And the Soviets recognize that and the Soviets showed

MORE

some flexibility in several areas by some forward movement on things which were concerns of ours. They're not of the same spirit as ours -- they're a different genre, but they -- they are important.

Q So what is the next round? Is there a way to further narrow the differences, or --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes. We're going to further narrow the differences, I think. We're talking about these, but, you know, these things are always difficult to predict. The question is: what is the Soviet's agenda, what's on their priority list? And, in my view, our negotiation is not their priority attention. It's Nitze's. Paul's negotiation. Because they keep bringing it up in my negotiation. They say, "Look, if you deploy GLCMs and Pershings in Europe, we can't come down to 1,800." And I say, "Well, why don't you take that up with Nitze and Kvitsinsky. That's their area." They say -- "Well, we want you to know it." And I say, "Well, that's not in our area."

Q General, are you still sticking by your assessment that there's a 50-50 chance of bridging an agreement by the end of the year?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Oh, I've come off the 50-50, because I made enemies on both sides. The pessimists thought I was too optimistic, and the optimists thought I was too pessimistic -- I've now shifted to being more -- to being hopeful, rather than a, than the 50-50. I can't put a number on it.

Q What's the timetable as you see it now?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, the timetable is -- you know, it's really up to the Soviets how fast they want to move. We're -- we've moved out in front with laying out our position. The Soviets have said, you know, "We recognize," -- apparently recognize, on their side, that launchers alone is not a significant measure of capability. So they've said, "We, too, will limit the total number of weapons." And I say, "All right, what's that number?" And they say, "Well, we won't tell you."

Well after a year, you see, we don't know really what their position is.

Q Well, do you have a number?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes. Five thousand.

Q And they don't agree with --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They know.

Q Why won't they tell you?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well (laughter) -- this is, you'll have to ask them.

Q -- a bargaining tool?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Partly that, I think, and partly a fact that I think that they are very much opposed to reducing these ICBMs and other ballistic missiles beyond the post -- particularly ICBMs. They want to keep these large destabilizing systems. We want them to reduce those systems. And we want them to reduce, say, by a third, on both sides to these lower numbers. They haven't shown much interest in doing that.

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Q Do you believe you'll have difficulty getting any progress on yours until there's some kind of resolution with Mr. Nitze's negotiations, and will the December deployment of some of -- of the American missiles over there have a direct impact on your negotiations?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, you can only speculate on an answer like that. If, what the Soviets are telling me, by bringing up the other negotiation, in my arena, is that they have their priority effort on that one. Then, yes, we can't make any real movement until they see how that one's going to go. On the other hand, there are many things that -- this is a complex agreement -- and there are many things we can work on and do work on, so it's not as though we were standing still or not making any progress; the point is: can you expect a breakthrough? And in my opinion, you cannot, until either Paul and his counterpart have an agreement, or until the missiles begin to be deployed. Other -- because I don't think that they'll focus on these negotiations until --

Q What about the idea of merging the two, which is -- merging the two sets of negotiations, which has come up several times. If the Russians are that fixated on the other set, aren't you sort of wasting your time?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. We don't think we're wasting our time. Paul and I talk about this frequently. We did before we went to the last round, and we still coordinate closely on this, and he and I agree -- and it's a U.S. policy -- that it is not in our interest or in our allied interest to merge these negotiations. It's premature to talk about that. We want an agreement in this INF arena. We want -- if we fail to get an agreement -- and these talks are merged at some further point, we want to see the U.S. missiles deployed on the soil. We don't want to leave problems hanging over to further complicate an already difficult negotiation in our arena.

Q General, are you confident that you'll have an agreement as long as we go ahead with the production and deployment of the MX missile?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Would you repeat the question?

Q Is it possible to get an

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agreement on intercontinental missiles as long as we go ahead with production and deployment of the MX missile?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes. (Laughter.) I thought you were going to ask the reverse.

We need to modernize our forces. And we are modernizing our forces with our present programs, which are going along. The MX is a necessary part of the modernization of our land-based leg of our triad. It's a measured response. And a hundred MX don't begin to compare to the 600-odd weapons which they already have, which are equal or superior to the MX. So if we don't modernize the MX, my leverage is cut way down. The odds of trying to get an agreement are so much greater.

So I can't guarantee you an agreement if we have the MX. I can guarantee you that the odds are very great that I cannot get an agreement if we don't have the MX.

Q Do the Russians view it that way?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think so.

Q What about these "shouting matches" stories, and your not talking to Nitze?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: It's news to me.

Q You're not talking to Nitze. You never tell him what you're doing and vice versa.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I think you ought to ask Paul about that, because Paul has dismissed it as well as I. It came as news to us. And, also, reports when they hit, the delegation over there -- that there was some kind of shouting matches between us -- said, "this is news to us here in the delegation;" and "why don't they ask some of us on the delegation." So I don't know where this comes from.

Q You said it was not in the U.S. interest to merge the talks. Could you elaborate on that a little bit?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, I don't know how long to make this.

Go back to Rome. And at the Rome conference in 1979, the NATO Allies asked the United States to deploy some systems, because the Soviets were building up this new, huge system: the SS-20. And we acceded that on a two-track approach: one, that we would negotiate and make preparations to deploy. We set up a separate arena for these systems, which are not strategic systems, to be put into our agenda -- or arena, because they are not this intercontinental capability type. This negotiation is going on. This negotiation should run its course. Hopefully, there should be an agreement.

And Paul has shown some flexibility saying: look, if the Soviets don't buy the zero-zero, he's ready to talk about other numbers. That negotiation, hopefully, should be completed so that the Soviet threat to Europe is knocked down. Now, if it's not, then at that time there should not be a condition where the problems are inherited by combined negotiation -- of still have the SS-20s uncountered, or without anything being built against them.

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So you don't solve anything by merging it. You create a problem, make the other negotiation more difficult. So the object should be to complete this negotiation -- hopefully, successfully. Then, think about -- if you're going to think about any possible merger.

Q Did you get new orders from the President today?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. I didn't. No, not today. This was a preliminary report. We only had a short time. I got from him, again, this feeling that he wants me to show the maximum flexibility that I possibly can, without giving in on our objectives, that he is dedicated. He is serious about the arms control. He wants me to talk to the Judge later this afternoon, which I'll do, and to Secretary Shultz. I've already talked to Adelman. And so I'll be following up on this. And you remember, between the last two rounds, we met five times. So I'm looking forward to meeting with the NSC and others more frequently.

Q Well, when's the next round?

Q -- are saying that they're going to reassess their position in START if we go ahead with the deployment of the medium-range missiles. And if they are, does their new flexibility seem to you in any way kind of a pressure on us to delay deployment?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Let me answer. I heard one question: when do we resume. We've agreed to resume on October the 4th. We have this two-month cycle in session, and two months in Capitals.

The question of what the Soviets are up to -- you can only speculate, and I can only speculate on. The fact that the Soviets have been bringing up in my negotiation the other systems, to me, is significant. They wouldn't be bringing this up if they weren't paying a lot of attention to it. So they are trying to prevent the deployment of GLCM's and Pershing II's in Europe. There's kind of a timetable and an urgency to that because our deployments will begin in December. There's not a similar timetable in our arena and so, by combination of factors, they are putting more attention to the other negotiation and are telling me that they cannot reduce with this 1,800 number if there are deployments in Europe. And I say, "Look, these are two separate, different negotiations." They say, "Oh, but to us there is a relationship."

MR. SPEAKES: This has to be the last question right here.

Q There were reports a month ago that the Soviets had detailed a proposal with sublimits in each category. Can you confirm that even if you don't give the levels?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes, without giving details, I can tell you that they did detail some sublimits pretty much on the pattern of SALT II, but this, when you analyze this, it does not cause a reduction in their ballistic missile warheads or their ballistic missile potential. As a matter of fact, it could go up. That's about as far as I can go and still stay within the confidentiality of the agreement because this is public knowledge.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:17 A.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1983, 11:02 A. M.

MODERATOR: Good morning. This is a background briefing by senior State Department officials on the visit of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Just a couple of words of introduction. This is a visit that we attach a lot of importance to. President Diouf of Senegal is a leading African statesman, one of the leading voices of Francophone Africa. In his short incumbency, he has already established that fact.

Senegal is a country which we have had for many years excellent relations with, and those relations have, if anything, deepened and broadened in the past few years.

Senegal's voice has been heard well beyond the confines of Senegal on a whole variety of issues involving the importance of human rights, the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes in the Middle East, in Africa, in West Africa, in Central Africa, and elsewhere.

As many of you will be aware, Senegal has played a role in inter-African peacekeeping efforts on a number of occasions, so for some time there has been this record of constructive involvement and positive involvement in an African context, as well as beyond.

We have, as I indicated, sought to broaden and deepen the dialogue with the Government there in recent years. Our levels of assistance support for Senegal are among the highest in Francophone Africa. The country faces many, many problems, about which my colleague will provide more detail, but at the same time it has a quality of leadership and of institutions which equip it better than many countries in the developing world to deal with.

My colleague is no stranger to many of you here, so I won't provide the detailed background on him, but he has been our Ambassador in Senegal for several years now, and I will let him take over from here.

Thanks.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think there is only one person now in the room who will know what I mean when I say it is great to be back among the magnolias again, having been in this room off and on -- two people -- for a couple of years in the early seventies.

I might say a couple of things about Senegal and then answer your questions.

Analogies are sometimes useful and the analogy I find useful in describing Senegal is to compare it to Costa Rica. It is, in many ways, the Costa Rica of West Africa, at least, perhaps of Africa as a whole, in the sense that it is a functioning democracy in which the law rules and in which human rights are absolutely protected at home, and a country which has done a great deal in various international fora to advance the cause of human rights in the international system.

It is a quiet, undemonstrative country, which tends to its business in a constructive way. The guiding principle of its foreign policy is what it calls dialogue, that is, the search for reasonable solutions to difficult problems.

It has since independence in 1960 been headed by two men; one very well known on the international scene, Leopold ? Sidar Senghor, who left office on January 1, 1981, and subsequently Abdou Diouf, who replaced him and then was re-elected in his own right in February of this year -- two men who have sought consciously to project Senegal's basic resource, which is human, across the African continent and, more broadly, into the international system.

They are superb diplomats. They are very gifted problem-solvers. They are very moderate and tolerant people among themselves and with foreigners -- myself included. They have suffered some serious economic problems, partly man-made, partly nature-made. They have had drought or near drought conditions in ten of the twenty-three years since independence, and that has had a profound effect on their ability to create the kind of agricultural surplus which historically underlies development in this world.

Abdou Diouf has taken some rather serious steps to redress the economic situation since taking office. He has reduced and eliminated subsidies on most of the basic food commodities in the country -- a risky political business in Africa, for those of you who follow Africa -- and he is beginning to get his budget deficits under control -- not a problem unknown in this country with all of the political difficulties that attend that kind of effort.

He was invited by President Reagan, as my colleage has said, for two reasons, I think -- one in recognition of Senegal's very constructive role in this world. We don't agree on every issue. They have much stronger views about the rights of the Palestinians, for example, and express them much more forcefully than we do.

They bring a different point of view to bear on the North-South dialogue than Washington does. Nonetheless, it has been a very effective open political dialogue between the two administrations, both of which took power in the same month of 1981.

The second reason is that President Diouf is an extraordinarily intelligent, clear-spoken individual with rather wise perspectivies for a man of 47. He is worth listening to, has been my experience. It has also been the experience a number of senior American visitors to Dakar since I have been there. Vice President and Mrs. Bush, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, AID Administrator MacPherson, Chet Crocker has been there several times, and others.

This is, in a sense, a continuation, indeed a kind of culmination of an active political dialogue which we have carried on with the Senegalese in recent years.

One fact, our AID program in Senegal this year is $38 million. It will probably rise in the coming year. It has virtually doubled under the Reagan Administration, and is now the largest American AID program in French-speaking Africa.

I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Q I understand in January an agreement was signed with Senegal for the use of the Dakar airport as an abort landing site for the Space Shuttle. Is there any agreement between the United States and Senegal which would allow for the landing or use of the Dakar facilities for the Rapid Deployment Force?

A No. It has never been discussed with Senegal. The airlift which has resupplied the Chad in the last few weeks was staged through Dakar airport with Senegal's agreement.

Q What would we like Senegal to do in relation to Chad?

A Well, essentially what they are doing, which is --

I had better, if I may, go on DEEP BACKGROUND on this one.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Q Will Chad be an important item in the talks?

A I think, in the circumstances, it will be hard to avoid. How important it will be, I think, is a function of the agendas which the two Presidents bring to the talks. I think the question of Senegal's economy will be an important agenda item. Given Diouf's role in inter-African politics over the last year and a half, I suspect that the leadership of this government would like to have some of his perspectives on trends and prospects in Africa as a whole. He makes a lot of sense when he talks.

There may be some discussion of the Western Sahara; probably the North-South dialogue. I would imagine that, given where they come from, in terms of their own economy and their perspectives on the North-South dialogue as a whole, there will probably be some discussions of the problems of international liquidity.

Q Excuse me, you were on deep background only on that part about Chad.

A Only on that part about Chad.

Q You are now on background.

A Yes.

Q Sir, when you said DEEP BACKGROUND, what attribution is that?

A "It is understood that."

Q "It is understood."

Q Getting back to Chad for just a second, what position has the Senegalese President taken on the U.S. role so far in Chad -- the provision of the aid that the U.S. has provided, and the steps it has taken, part-way steps it has taken, on the AWACS. Specify your ground rules before, if you don't mind.

A Yes. BACKGROUND. One of the nice things about doing business in Senegal is that the government of that country doesn't feel compelled to rush out and make statements every day. In fact, they rarely make public statements. There is no work for a spokesman in Dakar. They express themselves -- they tend to express themselves privately, and I can assure you that they have not discouraged the American assistance effort to Chad in the last several weeks.

Indeed, like I think most Francophone Africans and some Anglophones, as well, they have found it a source of gratification that the United States was willing to play a more active and effective role in relation to a problem that preoccupies them all a great deal, and that is Mr. Qadhafi and his ultimate designs, whatever they may prove to be in black Africa. He is regarded unambiguously as a threat.

Q Would they prefer to see more U.S. involvement?

A Well, you have to define the terms of that involvement, I suspect. It is a little hard to answer in the abstract.

They would not like Mr. Qadhafi to own Chad, nor would anybody else in the neighborhood.

Q Can we infer from your previous comments, sir, that however they feel, that the balance, our intended balance, is correct in hoping that France will take the lead instead of the United States taking the lead in Chad.

A I think that they would regard the French, for a variety of historical reasons and experiences, as the logical Western power to take the lead in Chad. We have the same view in this government.

Q Are they in a position to do anything more than just encourage the French strongly, or, if asked, could they provide military support for Hissein Habre's government? Could they and would they?

A It is a hard question to answer, because they don't have the financial means to project their forces that far successfully and maintain them for very long. So, in a sense that the question would have to be put to Paris --

Q Well, neither does Zaire.

A No, but that is a question that would have to be put to Paris, and it is a function, among other things, I suspect, of France's willingness to pay a bill. It is not a question we have discussed with the Senegalese.

Q Is that likely to come up?

A I have no idea.

Q What would the Senegalese see as the proper role for the French as taking the lead as the proper Western power. Would they like to see French aircraft in there?

A I ought not to speculate on what they would like to see, in part because I wouldn't want to cut across any lines they may have going with the French at this point. They would like to see Qadhafi stopped.

Q Are they making much headway in encouraging the Mitterrand Government to be a bit more forceful?

A You have read the press tickers more recently than I. I don't know what the state of play is this morning.

Q You read the cable traffic overnight.

A No, in fact, I didn't. Fortunately, it is another Ambassador's problem, and I have been much more focused on the nuts and bolts of trying to work out a successful visit here.

Q Sir, in the absence of French actions soon, are the Senegalese being asked to urge other African nations to do as Zaire has done in sending some sort of help?

A Not directly, to this point.

Q Sir, do the Senegalese eventually expect France to act, and to act before the situation in Chad becomes irretrievable?

A Expect is a word of art. I rather imagine they hope that France will take some action if that is what the situation will require.

Q Does Senegal have diplomatic relations with Libya?

A No. They were broken in 1980.

Q Over what?

A Over a strong Senegalese sense that the Libyans were engaged in activities in Dakar and The Gambia, which is an enclave country within Senegal, which were incompatible with diplomatic status.

Q Have the Senegalese accepted the Sankara Government in Upper Volta? Have they given any diplomatic recognition?

A I don't know. I left Senegal on Friday. I don't know.

Q One other question on a slightly different subject. What is Senegal's external debt, right now, to the best of your recollection, and do you know if they are going to be meeting with officials of the IMF while in Washington?

A The debt is running about $1.3 billion. It has been rescheduled in each of the last two years, and there will probably be meetings of the Paris Club and maybe the London Club again this fall.

Q What about the IMF?

A I know they are meeting with the World Bank at the meetings they have set up. I frankly don't know, as of this point, whether they have an appointment with the Fund. They are in the course of negotiations with the Fund to create and '83-'84 standby agreement.

Q What is the Senegalese position on the Western Sahara?

A They would like it solved in terms which are tolerably acceptable to all parties. No such problem is ever solved to everyone's entire satisfaction, and the Senegalese are realists in such matters.

It was, in fact, the Senegalese who worked out the resolution in Addis Ababa at the OAU summit in June, which the Chiefs of State passed, and as part of which the Polisario agreed to absent itself from that meeting.

The resolution provides for a referendum to be held by December and implementation of the outcome in the ensuing months.

Q Sir, what is the status of the talks for confederation between Senegal and The Gambia?

A It perks along. It was two years ago this month that President Jawara of The Gambia, following the aborted coup, proposed a confederation, in consultation with the Senegalese, and over the two years they have signed a variety of protocols designed to harmonize various governmental systems -- transportation, information, communications, security. They have created a confederal cabinet which meets twice a year, and a confederal assembly which has now met once, and they are now at the point at which they will have to begin talking about the tough issues in confederation, which are monetary. They have a British-based system on the one hand and a French-based system on the other -- customs, harmonization, and the like.

They are not rushing. They have very much in mind that it took The Cameroon the better part of ten years to work out a functioning confederation, then federation, and they are moving rather delicately but purposefully ahead.

Q In connection with your comment earlier about the difference of views between the US. and Senegal on the Palestinians, is Senegal playing any kind of a role in the U.S.-Middle East peace efforts either in Lebanon or in the broader view?

A No.

Q No role at all.

A No. Under Senghor, they offered several times to facilitate contacts with the Palestinians. It was not an offer that previous administrations took up with enthusiasm, but they are not involved. They do have a battalion as part of UNIFIL in Lebanon and have had since the beginning.

In fact, they have a very professional army. It is almost certainly the most professional army in black Africa. Very high quality, and they have used it for a variety of peacekeeping purposes -- Sinai, first; then Lebanon; Shaba twice; and most recently the Chad. They acquit themselves well.

Q How strong is it? Can you put a number on it?

A On the army?

Q Yes, the army strength.

A On the order of 8,000 men.

Q In Chad?

A No, no.

Q What is in Chad?

A Nothing is in Chad at the moment. They were in Chad from January of '82 to June of '82 when the OAU peacekeeping force was withdrawn. All their forces are within their own frontiers at the moment, except for the battalion in Lebanon.

Q 8,000.

A Yes.

Q Sir, you said that they supported the right of the Palestinians. How do they support the right of the Palestinians? They have once played an important role in bringing about some kind of an attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

A Well, I think that they think that no long-term solution in the Middle East is possible that does not take account of the fact that Palestinians constitute a people and will require a home. That is their basic position in public and in private. In that respect, their emphasis is somewhat different from the emphasis of American policy and diplomacy.

Q The economic measures that President Diouf has undertaken, has that caused any civil problems in Dakar or in the area since the most recent election?

A No. The last round of austerity measures is now about a year and a half old. They raised the price of rice, for example, from 80 francs a kilo -- 80 CFA francs a kilo -- to 105, and did it so skillfully that there was no problem of social unrest.

They will face the prospect of taking additional austerity measures in the next coming while. When, I am not quite certain, but they will not be easy.

Q Are they undergoing an adjustment program?

A Yes. They are negotiating an adjustment program.

with the IMF. They had a program in '81 - '82 that was very successful. The Fund considered it its model African program that year. They had a subsequent program for '82 - '83 which came a cropper on two points -- one was a basic miscalculation, I think, largely on the Fund's part of international peanut prices and therefore revenues, which left a substantial hole in their budget. Therefore they didn't meet their performance criteria and an inability to get a handle on the public payroll in the period leading up to an election.

It is not unlike some problems we have known in Washington from time to time.

Q So there hasn't been any sort of civil unrest.

A No. It is a very peaceful country.

Q Was the Fund program actually cut off, or did they cut off a tranche, or what happened?

A In '83?

Q In '83.

A In '82 - '83, the program was suspended in about April, I guess. They had made an initial drawing of about 10 percent of their rights, but no subsequent drawings.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you, very much.

(The briefing concluded at 11:27 a.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
FOLLOWING THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT DIOUF
OF SENEGAL

August 10, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:28 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: We'll start with the briefing. It is ON BACKGROUND and any use of these statements should be attributed to Senior American Officials. And we have with us [redacted] It's all yours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: I think I'll start with a few general comments about the meeting that just took place. This was an official working visit. As President Diouf said a few moments ago, it is his first official visit to this country. I believe it may be his first overseas visit since he was elected for the first time to the post of President earlier this year. So the meeting offered an opportunity for both Presidents to exchange views on a number of obvious topics. I will mention them in a minute.

I would point out that there is a certain interesting coincidence in the fact that both men assumed office in January of 1981. Both men feel that they inherited something of a difficult and increasingly difficult economic situation. And both leaders have felt it necessary to address the kinds of difficult measures that must be taken to get on top of that economic situation.

The relationship between the U.S. and Senegal has been excellent for many years. It is -- I would think it's accurate to say -- a relationship which has been getting progressively deeper and more substantive in recent years. And we believe that is all to the good.

I won't rehash what the two Presidents said in their public comments on the lawn, but I do believe that those remarks do accurately qualify and characterize the kind of relationship that this is. There are many shared values here. There is a long history here. There are common principles. There is both public and diplomatic adherence to the same objectives and a good deal of mutual cooperation that goes back for some time.

The kinds of topics discussed obviously included the question of developments in Africa. We, the two sides, discussed in some detail the challenge that Qaddafi of Libya poses to Africa, including in the Chadian context, although not limited thereto.

They discussed a good deal the question of the interrelationship between security, on the one hand, and economic development on the other, the two objectives which the Senegalese President argued are those of Africa. And on the U.S. side, there was full agreement that, indeed, those are the two objectives that we should be working together on to try an strengthen both security and development and that the two depend upon each other. In that general sense, there was an absolute identity of views.

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There was also considerable discussion and our President asked the Senegalese President for an analysis of the internal economic situation in Senegal. And President Diouf explained at length the difficulties facing the Senegalese economy and the nature of the most extremely difficult decisions that he is in the middle of now, he and his collegues, in terms of helping Senegal address that economic agenda. It involves a whole series of things, including budget planning, including subsidies internally in the economy, including agreement with the IMF and so forth.

As I mentioned, there was discussion, as well, of the Chadian situation, of the OAU in the wake of the recent summit meeting in June in Addis Ababa, the 19th Summit, at which President Diouf played a very central role. And, in addition, the question of developments in Southern Africa and our common desire for movement towards Namibia's independence as soon as possible.

I think that briefly summarizes the kind of discussion this was, and I'll be happy to take questions.

Q What is the situation,as far as the two Presidents now understand it, regarding Faya Largeau and whether the Libyans have taken that oasis?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I can go much beyond what has been said already today in very recent hours at two briefings, one here and one at the State Department. So, I think I will stand on that. The situation is not fully clear.

Q President Reagan said they had agreed, the two leaders had agreed to disagree on certain subjects. What were those subjects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not going to go into the substance of disagreements or agreements. I think it is best to direct questions specifically as to our position and address yourself to the Senegalese as to their position.

I would stress that in discussions which have just taken place, there was very wide agreement on a great many subjects.

Q The President said they agreed to disagree. You are not going to tell us what he was talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe it would be appropriate for us to be trying to pinpoint points of disagreement in a private diplomatic discussion between two heads of state.

Q Did they agree on the Namibian approach?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is definite agreement on the desirability of bringing peace to southern Africa, bringing Namibia to its independence.

The Senegalese government has repeatedly stood loud and tall on the importance of the contact group's effort on Namibia. We have had many indications of that, both recently and in the more distant past. Senegal believes the contract groups should stick with it.

Q Was the subject of French participation in the situation in Chad mentioned in the conversation between the President---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, we have taken the position and continue to that this is a situation in Chad in which we are working closely with others who share the same view of the situation and that includes key friends in Africa. It includes the French. I think the Senegalese see it very much the same way.

Naturally, in that context, sure, we discussed what the French can do, what the French are doing, as well as discussing what others can do.

Q What are the general areas of this agreement?

Q If the situation and the difficulty Qaddafi poses and the situation in Chad was discussed in some detail, why was there no reference or even allusion to that in the departure statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are dealing here with a very fast moving situation with conflicting reports coming in from many different sources and it is simply not appropriate in the context of a head of state level discussion to be having press communiques about the latest battle reports that might get conflicted or changed in two hours' time.

Q Well, last week, the departure statements on the South Lawn, there was specific reference to armed aggression by Libya by both leaders. Today, there was scarcely a mention of the problems in Africa right now posed by Libyan aggression or Libyan-backed aggression. Why was there no even general reference to that if both countries are so concerned at this point and if it was such a dominant topic overshadowing this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't say it was a dominant topic. It was certainly discussed and discussed in some depth and there is no doubt in our view that the Senegalese government shares the view of the situation that we have.

Q Do they not want us to mention it publicly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Perhaps one might assume that people recognize that this is the case. As you know, when the Zairian head of state was here last week, Zaire has, at this point, 2,000 troops in Chad. The relationship to the Chadian question is much more direct geographically and in terms of the more in-depth involvement of the Zairians.

Q Senegal has been a location for trans-shipments. They are centrally involved in our supply effort.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, indeed, and the Senegalese have very close defense relations, as you know, with the French as well and the Senegalese government shares our view of the situation.

Q Did the President ask President Diouf to use his office to persuade the French to bring in air power?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not going to comment on the in-depth exchanges on this in a diplomatic exchange, no.

Q Was there discussion at the lunch on the continued use of Dakar as a contingency landing site for the shuttle and is that use possibly affected by the stresses in the area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say its use is affected by it. Reference was made to the fact of our cooperation with Senegal in that area, yes.

Q Was there any discussion of the Middle East, specifically of Palestinian proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not on that subject.

Q What about the Middle East in general?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Only in the most general terms. The bulk of the discussion had to do with economics, the economics of Senegal and the situation facing Africa.

Q What is the difficult economic situation that you referred to, facing Senegal at the moment and imminent decisions, difficult decisions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It refers to a situation of enormous budget problems, budget deficit, balance of payment problems and Senegal's own dialogue which is nearly complete in terms of reaching a stand-by agreement with the IMF.

Q Does President Reagan think it would be helpful if the OAU made some kind of diplomatic effort regarding the Chadian situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are not a member of the OAU. So, it is not up to us to really say, but obviously the OAU's stance remains to be shaped. At this point, the OAU's position on the Chadian question is somewhat undefined, apart from the very basic point that the OAU charter, in all its provisions, is being violated as we sit here.

Q So, was that appeal made in this meeting to President Diouf to somehow move the OAU into some kind of direct action on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were discussions about different diplomatic possibilities. Beyond that, I don't think it's appropriate to go.

Yes?

Q Did he offer an analysis of what we might expect from the OAU and did he say anything about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion of the diplomacy in the OAU context, the different voices that one might hear. There was discussion,as well,of possibly impending action in New York at the UN Security Council.

Q Can you shed any light --

Q Give us something.

Q -- on what the analysis of possible action or the line-up within the OAU is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We certainly can, yes. And this view would, of course, be shared by Senegal as well. The delegation of President Habre was seated without contest as the representative, legitimate government of Chad as recently as mid-June 1983 at the Addis Ababa Summit, the 19th Summit. So, that is the view of Africa as expressed at that summit. Now, it would appear that a tiny minority of African governments, including that, of course, of Libya, does not recognize legitimacy of the Habre government, has said so publicly. There are not many others who share that view.

Q What was his analysis of what we could expect to happen, what might happen in the coming weeks and months as far as the OA -- as far as any OAU action or expression of opinion about the situation in Chad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Diouf did not make, did not offer a prediction on that. He simply made reference to various exchanges that are taking place on the subject. I think it's still a bit early.

Q Does he think that the UN would be a better forum right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact is that several parties have brought the issue to the UN and I think it's to be expected that would be the case in a situation like this. And one can expect, I think, to hear the view of Senegal expressed up there.

Q Do you want that to happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're certainly prepared to participate in that sort of debate and exchange in New York. Yes, indeed.

Q What's the American view, though, of the likelihood that, at least in the short term, these diplomatic efforts will bear fruit -- the UN, the OAU?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is perhaps traditionally in our system a tendency to make a disconnect between events on the ground and diplomatic events. They are always very closely aligned with each other in reality, and they will be in this case, too, I expect. Certainly one should exhaust diplomatic possibilities, but we also have a war going on.

Q What would happen to Senegal if Chad falls to Libya or Libyan-backed forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to put words in the mouths of our guests. It really is unfair to them, but as I recall the conversations that I've been party to in the past 24 hours with our visitors, there's been repeated reference to the phrase "precedents".

Q Precedents?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This kind of situation, if it is successful, if Qaddafi's successful, creates precedents and those precedents affect the calculations of all in the area.

Q Did that take place in these discussions here, that kind of conversation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes, indeed.

Yes, in the back?

Q I would ask two questions on behalf of the radio and television of Senegal. They would like to know what conclusion was drawn after the discussion on the economic matters between the President and Mr. Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was noted, for example, that we have in recent years significantly expanded our level of economic cooperation and assistance with Senegal in times of budget austerity here. It is also noted that Senegal constitutes, I believe, the largest recipient of economic assistance in francophone Africa. Which is an indication, if you will, on our part, of the high regard that we have for the institutions, the values and the leadership of Senegal.

It was also noted that there could be some very difficult months ahead in Senegal, economically. And we intend to keep closely informed of the situation as it does develop, and to consult closely with the leadership of Senegal, and we will be doing what we can in that context.

Q Does President Reagan plan a visit pretty soon in Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no announcements to make in that regard today.

Q Can you tell us whether there was any views expressed by the President of Senegal that perhaps his diplomatic efforts, pressure on the French in any way, would change in intensity or quality or direction before and after this visit, in relation to Chad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to comment on that, no. The views of the key leaders of Africa, and there's no question that this is one of those leaders, have already been made known both to us and to other African countries who are concerned, and to Paris. I don't think there is a need as a result of today's discussions to change the signals in that regard, and I have no announcement to make about a change of signals coming from Senegal.

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Q You were asked about what would be the impact if, indeed, the Libyan forces could take over the entire country. What if Faya Largeau falls and Habre's crack troops that are there and have been pinned down for a couple of weeks now are out of commission, how serious is that if Faya Largeau is indeed over-run by those who are fighting now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, apart from referring you to the earlier guidance, the only thing I would add is this: That there are two aspects to the answer to that question.

One is that it is an important northern oasis, very important in the Chadian context. It is, however, not the only town in Chad. It is some distance from there to other major centers and therefore it is not automatically clear what that would mean.

Therefore, the second part of the answer has to be what took place in terms of Habre's forces there. That we don't frankly have a clear picture of at this point.

Q Whether they survive or are quickly rounded up---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the situation in which the change of hands, if it has taken place and we don't know that, the situation in which it took place.

Q Is Senegal a member of the Security Council?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

END 1:56 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO MEXICO

August 10, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:06 P.M. EDT

Q Larry, before you start, do you know anything about the reported kidnapping in Lebanon?

MR. SPEAKES: No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Anything about Faya Largeau?

MR. SPEAKES: Nothing other than what we had at noon.

What about Mexico? Want to know about Mexico?

The briefing is on background, attributed to the senior American official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. What I would like to do is spend a few minutes with you on some items that may be of interest and then take your questions.

President Reagan, as you know, is going to be meeting with President de la Madrid on Sunday, August 14, in La Paz, Mexico. That is in the Baja. The President will be accompanied by Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Gavin, Judge Clark, other high officials and I will be going along on the trip also.

Meetings between the Presidents of the United States and Mexico have gone on on a continual basis, I am told, since the beginning of the century. As you know, President Reagan met with President-elect de la Madrid in San Diego on October 8 of '82.

Since then, there have been quite a few high level meetings. As you know, Secretary Shultz, Regan and Baldrige were there in April this year and their finance and commerce ministers, Herzog and Hernandez, have visted here.

The object of the President's visit is to continue the high level dialogue on the bilateral and world affairs that he began last year with President de la Madrid. There is obviously a two-fold purpose.

One is to expand the cooperation between the two countries and at the same time narrowing and resolving the differences that exist between neighbors.

As you are well aware, our relationship with Mexico, for a variety of reasons including the long border, is a very complex one that covers all kinds of aspects. Generally speaking, I think we can characterize the relationship as good and the purpose the two Presidents are after is to make it better.

On the economic and financial scene, I think you are well aware that Mexico is experiencing a very severe economic challenge or crisis and we were able to act with them last year to help them hurdle the initial steps of this thing. In a package we helped develop with them, we made an advance payment, you may recall, of one billion dollars for oil that they will then put into the petroleum reserve. We granted CCC credits, that is commodity credit guarantees, of $1.7 billion and, in cooperation with other central banks. we were able to arrange a

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$1.85 billion dollar short-term loan to Mexico. We have also helped in swap arrangements with Mexico to meet its short-term commitments and, of course, we have encouraged the private banks who hold a larger share of their $80 billion dollar debt to renegotiate the loans that they have.

Q Was that $80 billion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly $80 billion. It is a moving target, but that is the figure. President de la Madrid has instituted several major programs to deal with this economic crisis. They have agreed to reduce their public sector deficit which is always a problem, especially a problem in lesser developing countries from 16 percent to eight and a half percent in '83 and with further reductions in '84 and '85.

Q What was that second phase? Sixteen through---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From 16 to eight and a half percent of GNP during '83 with further reductions anticipated in '84 and '85. The Mexican government, as you know, has taken on a more realistic exchange rate, has drastically reduced imports which, of course, affects us adversely because they are our third largest trading partner and we are their largest trading partner.

Also, the IMF in May reported that Mexico was in compliance with their targets and that was good news not only for the Mexicans, but for us and everybody else that has an interest in their financial health.

These developments over the past year, the austerity measures necessary to be taken in Mexico, the reduction of imports, the changes in currency rates have sent shock waves through the United States and especially those communities that deal along the border. I think what it did was really bring home to us exactly not only the complexity, but the intensity of the intertwining of the two economies backwards and forwards, not only imports from Mexico, but obviously our rather large exports to Mexico.

The meeting,we expect the Presidents to talk about looking into the future, how do they see their relationship developing over the years to come?

They will obviously review the economic situation in both countries. As you well know from previous briefings, economic recovery in the United States is considered to be one of the engines of recovery for the rest of the world and, obviously, how our economy does affects the Mexicans. How their economy does obviously affects many U.S. businesses that do business in Mexico, either in Mexico or that export goods to Mexico.

They would like to, I'm sure, concentrate, and we will, on trade and financial matters. They want to maintain their markets in the U.S. and, at the same time, they're having to do some belt tightening which leads to imports, so we get into the age-old problem of fiscal responsibility, which means sometimes a reduction in imports and, by the same token, a necessity to generate hard, foreign currency that comes about by exports. So it's the old balance between the two, and I'm sure that it's something that they want to discuss.

On specifics, obviously border matters, not only in economic and trade, are of interest to the two countries. There is in this country a concern and one that the Mexicans are addressing, and we will be discussing it with them, on environmental matters -- mainly at this point air pollution, as opposed to water pollution, and also, of course, sewage spills that affect people on both sides of the border.

Central America, of course, I think will be a subject to be discussed. As you know, the President has publicly on several occasions supported the Contadora process of which we consider Mexico to be a leader. And I'm sure that that subject will come up for discussion. We've had good discussions with the Mexicans on this subject. Secretary Shultz had a long discussion with them in April. Dick Stone has been there a couple of times since then, and I think they'll pick up where, the Presidents will pick up where those talks let off.

The program calls for the President to arrive in La Paz from El Paso shortly after 9:00 a.m. next Sunday. The President then goes to the government palace, their statehouse, and following an arrival ceremony, there will be discussions between the Presidents and their advisors. They anticipate that these discussions will take little more than two hours. There will be one-on-one followed by a couple of expanded meetings as they go.

Following that, the Presidents go to a nearby legislative assembly building. I'm told that's the only place in which they can accommodate the size of the press envisioning traveling with it. And they will make individual statements to the press. A joint statement will be released at that time. And then the Secretary of State and Foreign Secretary Sepulveda will remain behind to take questions.

There will be a luncheon following that at which both Presidents are expected to make more than a toast, but about a 15-minute speech each. The speeches I think you can expect to be focused on the nature of our bilateral relations in the years ahead. The President then leaves directly for the airport.

I'm told that, following your questions here, that you will be passed out a booklet of this nature that I don't think covers what I have covered, but you're more familiar with these, those of you that travel. It's got a map to show you where it is, among other things -- some background information and material.

At this stage, I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you envision that the joint statement is going to have any material in it relating to Central America, or will that be just on trade and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would envision that the joint statement will focus on the bilateral aspects.

Q Can we have it now? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If it's been written I haven't seen it.

Q Well, how about immigration? Is that not a subject, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think it's a subject that it's possible the Mexicans may raise. As you may know, there is not a totally clear understanding of what Simpson-Mazzoli attempts to do in Mexico and I'm sure that if the subject is raised, the President will continue the talks that we have had at lesser lower levels with the Mexican Government, trying to explain to them exactly what is in Simpson-Mazzoli and that we think, in the long run, it's in their best interests.

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Q Are we going to offer them new financial aid in any rm at this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that that s a subject for discussion at that time. Obviously, there is on-going iscussions about all kinds of things including commercial credit to upplement our export of grain and the rest of it, but I don't think that s a subject on the agenda.

Q Will they agree to take a lot more food free from the nited States than they are taking now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In my discussions with he Mexicans, I don't think the subject of free food has come up. It is ot something that is high on their agenda. Obviously, they do import and ay for with credit facilities other grains and the rest of it, but, in iscussions I have had with the Mexican officials on this subject, the subject of free food has never come up.

Q You mean, the commodities that they are sending to the now, they are agreeing to pay for them on credit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, what I attempted to--- in the past, we facilitated through the commercial credit facility their buying $1.7 million dollars worth of our farm goods. What we do is extend loans for that aspect. They repay the loans. It is the same thing we do all over the world.

Q You mean all of this food that Block is now sending them is going on credit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Simple commercial credit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, it is like we do with most other countries in the world. We sell it. We facilitate a loan to pay for it; they pay us back.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a guaranteed loan.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a guarantee loan. Your government steps in in a guarantee position.

Q Will that be stepped up in quantities?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that question. I don't know.

Q They seem to be importing so much from Japan. The Japanese build their elevators, et cetera. They are cutting back from United States imports. Will that be brought up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think it would. I can't give you a profile of what the cut-down on their imports are, but I would think that it is probably across-the-board, if it follows most other patterns of imports.

Q I hope this is not a dumb question. Why La Paz?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a good question.

Q Thank you, sir. What is the answer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The best answer I can give you is this: When I got here three weeks ago, they had already decided on La Paz. So, I didn't have to agonize over where to go.

Q Was there not a problem early on in trying to find a place that was mutually acceptable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct and I think that obviously is mutually acceptable.

Q That was before the VFW speech.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You guys are way over my head. I don't understand the intricacies of these things.

Q Why La Paz?

Q Can we coach you on it?

(Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You heard the groundrules.

Q I have another dumb question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't stand many more of those dumb questions.

Q No, seriously, give us some details on the pollution problems.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. There are two aspects. One is an environmental aspect and the other is a sewerage aspect. The sewerage aspect is that some of the sewerage that flows in the rivers and also then off of the west coast goes out into the ocean, but it doesn't go out in the ocean far enough and it creates a problem. It is a delicate subject.

Certainly, one questions whether it should be discussed at Presidential levels. Nevertheless, there is a problem with it. What we are attempting to do is as follows: Work with the Mexicans to figure out exactly what is needed to solve the problem.

Now, there is no mystery of how you solve the problem of raw sewerage. It is a question of the proper design and/or monies behind it and we are urging them to take care of the problem which is creating a problem for us. It ends up being our problem. So, we are motivated to urge them to solve their problem.

Q Where does it begin? In Mexico?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot of it begins in Mexico, yes.

Q And what about pollution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You guys are cracking me up. Be serious, will you? The pollution problem is an air pollution problem to a certain degree and that is it has to do with air emissions in Mexico that, due to wind currents, can cause the air emissions to come across to the United States.

Q Does the smog of Los Angeles drift down there and do the same thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You are way over my head on atmospherics, but I will try to get you some more information on it.

Q How would you characterize U.S.-Mexican relations now in terms of what's going on in Central America? In the past, there has been some friction. Mexico has long supported negotiations. They've been critical of Reagan administration policies in Central America. Where are we now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that where we are is that we appear to be narrowing our differences on it. I think the fact that the President publicly support the process of the Contadora has helped in their efforts. I think the fact that we agree with them, it has to be a regional problem -- Once we both agreed on that, that was the process that they're following, then, is more in tandem with that which we believe.

And I would say that the differences are narrowing on it. Obviously, the Contadora group must act as it sees fit. It is an independent effort that, we feel, has a good chance for success.

Q Have they expressed themselves on the question of the exercises that we're conducting in the Caribbean -- in Honduras and also off the coast of Nicaragua?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not seen anything in public. They have -- We have discussed the subject with them through normal diplomatic channels.

Q Are they concerned about it? Have they expressed reservations about our policy in any way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'll have to ask the Mexican government what their position was on that. I think it's difficult for me to characterize that for them.

Yes?

Q You said earlier that Central America was a subject to be discussed. You also said there was going to be no reference in the communique.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't say that. I said I thought that the -- I'm sorry -- I thought what I said was the communique would focus on the bilaterals.

Q Well, let me ask you, "a subject to be discussed" is really a subject number one in this country. It may be a subject number one in much of Mexico and Central America. So, isn't it a bit bigger than just "a subject"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think so. It is a subject, obviously, that is of great importance here, and it's probably one -- I don't read the Mexican press -- but probably one that has quite a bit of import there. But you have to remember that between two Presidents that have a responsibility for a bilateral relationship, especially in a time when they're facing an economic challenge, you just can't dominate with one subject.

There are many areas of economic and trade aspects that are important to Mexico, short range and long range, in which you take the opportunity of the Presidents together to talk about. I didn't mean to say it was a by the way, but --

Q But is it the case that because Mexico has such deep economic problems that for the time being they're just as happy to put the focus on the economic problems and on bilateral relations rather than on the major regional issue?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have never known the Mexicans, as well as others, to be shy to discuss the subject.

Q A number of U.S. statements on the subject of Central America tend to at times -- I don't want to understate this -- will see the Sandinistas as a threat to other democratic governments in the region should El Salvador fall. Do the Mexicans see the Sandinistas as a threat to their democratic government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you'll have to ask the Mexicans that question.

Q Sir --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- on immigration, if they pass the bill as amended in the House and to provide for so many temporaries to come to work on our farms and ranches, does Mexico mind if we bring in about half of their unemployed? That's what some of the observers think will be the result with the passing of that amendment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You've got me at a disadvantage. I don't know what the size of their unemployment is. And half of them, I would say, that that's a rather dramatic number.

Q Well --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- but does Mexico mind if large, large numbers of their unemployed come in here to work temporarily and maybe just happen to stay?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I don't want to try to speak for the Mexican government, but I think it's -- part of the conventional wisdom that Mexico has always viewed the ability of Mexicans to go over the border in the United States as a kind of a safety valve for their unemployment. And I see no reason why they've changed.

Yes, sir?

Q In discussing Central America, can we expect that President Reagan will be put emphasis on his concern about the refugee aspect of the -- the "feed people" fear that he's pointed to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that it would be fair to characterize that he would put emphasis on any one aspect of it other than discuss all of the elements.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Could you be more specific on the trade matters that you think the Mexicans are going to emphasize?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. We've had ongoing talks with them now through a commission that was established in '81. There's also the bi-national commission but the areas obviously to come up for discussion will be the prospective treatment by the United States Congress of the graduated system of preferences, which many of you know expires in January of 1985. That is something that is of great interest to the Mexicans.

An area that is of great interest to us is the matter of subsidies on Mexican exports to the United States and the possibility that they provide an injury to U.S. companies. The fact that Mexico does not belong to the GATT is probably a subject that we'll discuss, because we feel that the GATT is a built-in mechanism to address these questions of subsidies, and so on.

Is that specific enough for you?

Q Is there going to be discussion on tuna?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Is there going to be discussion on the tuna problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible that it might come up.

Q Are they going to discuss sewage? (Laughter.)

Q Is that part of the sewage? (Laughter.)

Q What's the problem?

Q It's knocking off all the fish. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One at a time, please. I'm just a country boy. The problem--I think that the tuna is long on its way towards being resolved, but I don't think it is totally put to bed.

Q What about shrimp?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible that shrimp may come up too. (Laughter.)

Hold the phone, please.

Q There have been some suggestions in the Mexican press, out of some Mexican political -- that the United States have been providing certain amount of aid in support of the PAN party in Mexico.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What party?

Q The PAN, the national action party.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I am hard of hearing, it is too many years in a jet airplane.

Q Do you expect that to be discussed, will you expect to give any assurances to the Mexican government that the United States does not support the separatist movement in Sonora led by the PAN, for instance, and so on.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that your statement is correct. It is not the mission of the United States government to do that.

Q Where have the differences narrowed with Mexico on the Central American issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think where they have narrowed is that it seems there is more support now, even with the recognition on the part of Nicaragua, that there has to be a regional approach to it. I think we were pleased to see in the Cancun declaration the metion of democratization--although it wasn't one of the ten points, it was certainly discussed in the preamble--tnat we think is a very healthy step forward.

Q The President continues to believe that the OAS is a better forum, and his support of Contadora has been very late and very lukewarm.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't characterize it that way.

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Q I would.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. (Laughter.)

Q Is there going to be any more movement in narrowing these differences in this summit on Sunday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is there going to be any more movement --?

Q Toward narrowing these differences--do you see movement, or expect any movement, Sunday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that that is certainly something that we'd look forward too. As to whether there is progress on it or not, I wouldn't want to predict. But, I think certainly that is the object of the exercise.

Yes, sir?

Q Yes, another dumb question. Is there anything that Reagan particularly wants to discuss at this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the subjects that I have told you about; the economic and trade--

Q What's he putting on--

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Those I think that you can characterize as of importance to us.

Q Will they bring up the water?

Q Is there any message that United States would like Mexico to carry to those with whom it has communication in Latin American--in Central America?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think outside of the process that Mexico is one of four Contadora countries, and any message would be to Mexico and the other Contadora countries, which also Ambassador Stone and through all the diplomatic channels, but there is no message for Mexico to be a conduit to.

Q Will there be any water--discussions of water rights--and salinity of the water because the Mexicans are all upset about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if that's going to come up or not. It's not on our agenda. Yes, sir?

Q Where-- This will probably retire as the dumb question. What is your reason for having this meeting at this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said earlier, there is a history of frequent meetings between the Presidents of the United States and the President of Mexico going back to the beginning of the century. They had met earlier when President de la Madrid was President-elect and the timing seemed to be right for them to meet again.

Q Well, who initiated this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that question. I'll try to get you an answer for it.

Q Is the President going to release the White House Border Working Group Report at El Paso and will he have anything in there good enough to discuss with the President of Mexico?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to your first question. I'll try to get it for you.

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Q Are they going to be discussing the possibility of increased sales of Mexican oil and gas to the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the possibility of any increase in oil to the United States is an agenda item that could come up from either side.

Q Excuse me, Miss Thomas' question about whether Contadora or the OAS is a better forum is a valid one. The President has said many times that he thought the OAS was a better forum. So, how would you describe his support for the Contadora process which is ad hoc at best. Go to it, boys, and give it your best shot.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is a valid question. I would agree. I think there are two elements that you have to keep in mind. The people that stepped forward was the Contadora group. I don't see the OAS beating down the doors trying to get into the act. I think that is a practical reality of life.

As the Contadora seems to have the ability to talk with not only the core four, but with Nicaragua and are moving forward and so therefore I think that they are a very valid vehicle to try to achieve a peaceful solution and I think the President looks at it that way.

Q The OAS could be reconvened in five minutes. There is an open foreign minister---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand that, but I am saying that I don't see any enthusiasm on the part of the OAS to address the subject.

Q Why don't we move? We are in it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we are, but it takes seventeen votes. It is no use dragging somebody reluctantly into a negotiating process if they don't want to come in when you already have a group out there working on the subject.

Q Are you saying the OAS is reluctant to come into the picture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What I am saying is I see an absence of signs of them beating down the doors to get into the process.

Q Why does the President think it is a better forum?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the President's public statements speak for himself. In the last two or three speeches which he has made, he has applauded the Contadora and supported the Contadora effort. I think the President's statements stand on their own.

Q What kind of progress are you looking for on the Central American question? Are you seeking any movement at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think that what you see in all of these negotiation processes is a step at a time and, aside from the Contadora aspect, as you know, Dick Stone's visit I think resulted in some positive steps. Hopefully, the meeting between the government of El Salvador and the guerrillas would be another logical step that everybody is looking for. So, on all the variety of fronts, I think that would be a logical step to look for soon.

Q What are they going to do about strengthening the drive against narcotics?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the program with regards to Mexico and narcotics has been very successful. I am trying to quote off the top of my head from a briefing the Attorney General gave the President the other day, but there has been a dramatic decrease in both coke and marijuana from Mexico into the United States, but I don't have the specific figures. I think for narcotics the program in Mexico is working

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very well.

Q Did we understand you to say that you expect very soon for a meeting between---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am hopeful that soon there will be a meeting between the two. I am not being coy with you. I don't know of a date that it is set or anything of that nature.

Q You are hopeful that there will be a meeting soon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think that is a logical and fruitful step in this peaceful process.

Q Between the government and the Salvadorian guerrillas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:35 P.M. EDT

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 31, 1983 PC# 33
No. 326

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 31, 1983, 2:05 P.M.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I want to begin this press conference by talking first about the situation in Lebanon, a land that has known too much bloodshed and violence for too long.

As we all know, there has been widespread fighting recently throughout Beirut and its suburbs. At present, we're advised by the Lebanese central authorities that effective measures are being taken to restore order. We all pray that they will be successful.

An historic problem in Lebanon has been to find a formula for reconciling the various communal and confessional groups. President Gemayel has been working hard to do just that throughout his tenure in office. Today, with his Council of Ministers, he issued a call for key Lebanese leaders to join in a dialogue aimed at constituting a new national approach to reconciliation and unity.

The Government of the United States firmly supports this effort, consistent as it is with President Reagan's firm policy of support for an independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces with appropriate security arrangements for Israel's northern border. We intend to help President Gemayel in his new initiative in every way possible, through our own efforts and through cooperation with our partners in the Multinational Force -- France, Italy and Great Britain.

-- We call upon the international community in general, and in particular on Syria, which has the largest army in Lebanon, to respect and support this process.

-- We will continue to provide training and support for the Lebanese armed forces.

-- We will continue our active diplomatic engagement through Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks as we did earlier through Ambassadors Habib and Draper.

-- And we will continue to maintain our support for the Multinational Force and for the United States Marine comcomponent of that force. Let no one doubt that if attacked, the Marines will take care of themselves with vigor.

Our goals have been clearly stated on many occasions. We will continue to work energetically to achieve those goals.

The recent outbreak of fighting in recent days in Lebanon has been tragic. It must be brought to an end. That will not be easy. We must recognize that fact, but we must also recognize the importance to the world as a whole of a secure and peaceful Lebanon. Determination, patience and strength of will are required in the weeks and months ahead.

The problems of Lebanon, important in their own right, are at the same time a part of the greater question of peace for all the Middle East. President Reagan addressed himself to that broader issue a year ago on September 1.

The principle behind the President's initiative -- balancing the key requirements of security for Israel and the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people -- is as valid today and in the future as it was a year ago.

The President's initiative was and remains a major and creative contribution to the peace process and a workable basis for negotiation. Any party who truly seeks a just, secure and comprehensive solution to the conflict must turn in the direction of the President's initiative, based as it is on the Camp David Accords and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Any serious effort at negotiations in the days ahead must return to these fundamentals.

The United States has worked tirelessly for peace in the Middle East for many, many years. President Reagan had no illusions a year ago, nor have we any now. The job is long and difficult, and requires patience and determination.

The United States is involved in Lebanon because our effort is indispensible to freedom, peace, justice and stability. We are involved in the wider problem of the Middle East for the same reasons. We intend to continue our efforts with patience and with vigor.

Now, if there are any questions?

JIM ANDERSON: Mr. Secretary, in light of the concerted fighting that has taken place in the last twenty-four hours or so, will the Administration go to Congress, to report to Congress on the new combat situation there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President, of course, notified Congress as a matter of common sense and as a matter of conformity with the War Powers Act when the Multinational Force, when the Marines were introduced, I guess about eleven months ago. The Congress has been periodically kept up-to-date through testimony and other means in the meantime. Most recently yesterday the President, again, posted Congress formally on the situation there. We will continue to consult with the

Congress and keep them abreast of the situation, both in terms of formal statements and the innumerable telephone conversations that have been held.

QUESTION: Will that be within the framework of the War Powers Act or simply because you are seeking political support?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, that is within the framework of the War Powers Act when forces are sent equipped for combat. It is required to have a report, and the President has so reported.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, pledging support for Lebanon's -- for the Gemayel Government's attempt to restore independence to Lebanon, are we considering increasing the size of the Marine contribution and its role?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have no plan under consideration at the moment to change the size, the role, or the mission of the Multinational Force or the Marine component of it. We have said on a number of occasions that when the process of withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon really gets underway, questions can be raised about what changes in the role the Multinational Force might undertake, but we don't have that process underway right now, as we all know.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what do you say to those people, mostly from the Hill, who claim that it is time for the War Powers Act to be invoked because the Marines are, in fact, involved in a combat zone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The War Powers Act is being complied with, and the President has reported under the War Powers Act formally, both, as I said, at the time of the original introduction of the Marines and as recently as yesterday with a formal statement to the Speaker and the President pro tem of the Senate.

QUESTION: Do you believe that the Marines are now involved in a combat situation or a combat area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is always a question about the situation that you go into when you're equipped for combat. When they went in in the first place, of course, Lebanon had the violence of the murder of Bashir Gemayle, as you remember. The Multinational Force was reintroduced and it helped to bring about stability. It was a situation in which there was a fair amount of violence.

We have been there for some 11 months, and with the exception of the tragic deaths that we are particularly aware of right now, the Marine force has made a very constructive contribution, and is very much welcomed, I can tell you, by the people in Lebanon and in that vicinity.

In the last three or four days, there has been a renewed outbreak of violence, and it's kind of generalized. All of the Multinational Force areas have been hit, but so have practically all other areas. The question now is whether the efforts being made to control and end that violence will succeed. As I said in my statement, the authorities of the central Government of Lebanon are working at that, and they are confident that their forces are positioned properly. Our advice and our own independent observation are that they are moving in the right direction.

So assuming this subsides, then I think we're back in the situation we were in before. But we are watching it every day, and I will go from this press conference to a meeting with the Vice President and others as we daily look at the situation and appraise it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you plan to play any personal role in mediation over Lebanon, and in particular, might you extend your trip to Spain to include the Middle East, or might you later this fall, have parties come here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I feel as though I'm heavily involved because it seems to me that life is consumed by telephone calls, cables, and what-not. We're working very closely with Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks. I had a lengthy conversation with them today. They are very competent people, they are doing an outstanding job, and they are handling the situation well. So I have no plan to extend the Madrid trip in any way.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, coming back to the War Powers Act, several members of Congress have said that because of the hostilities there, the Administration, or the President, should invoke that other part of the Act, which you did not mention, Section 4(a)(1) which talks about "imminent hostilities." But as I understand it, those people as well as Dr. Kissinger, who has said this on television, feel that Congress now should be asked to vote for any prolonged stay of the Marines in Lebanon.

Do you have any feelings either on why the Administration has chosen not to invoke that first part of Section 4? And secondly, what about just the idea of asking Congress to endorse the stay of the Marines?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As I said, the President has reported properly under the War Powers Act. We think the situation remains one essentially of "equipped for combat." Obviously, there is a lot of violence in the vicinity. We hope, and we have some basis for that hope, that the violence will subside. So the provision under which the President has notified the Congress remains the appropriate and valid one.

As I said, we review this all the time, and we'll watch the situation very carefully.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since American Marines are fighting and dying in a combat situation, why not call it what it is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm quite ready to call it what it is, and have in my statement there. They are involved in a situation where there is violence. It is a generalized pattern of violence. They are defending themselves, as they must and should. We are reporting to the Congress, as we should, as I said, as a matter of common sense as well as a matter of law, and we are doing so.

QUESTION: To follow, sir, is it your belief that the Marines have not been specifically targeted?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are conflicting statements. You get an intercept here or there about somebody saying to shoot at the Marines, and you also get many intercepts that say, "Oh, the Marines are there. Don't shoot at the Marines."

I believe that there is no concerted effort to single out the Marines and target them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have made much of the President's notification when the Marines were first sent there, but at the time he said, and I quote, "There was no intention or expectation that United States forces would become involved in hostilities."

Now, the situation is completely changed. Don't you feel obligated to Congress, in light of the changed situation, to now present the thing in a more candid way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have presented the thing, to use your word, in a very "candid" way. There is no dearth of publicity about precisely what is going on. The President continues to report as we think is appropriate. It is candid, it is in accordance with the law, and it's in accordance with what common sense tells you you do in a democracy; that is to consult with the Congress and make your views known to the American people generally, and that is precisely what the President is doing. There is no information that isn't available as a general proposition.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since there seems to be this repeated call that the President report to the Congress, and since there are --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: He is reporting to the Congress. That's the thing that I keep trying to get across here.

QUESTION: I think that there is a general feeling that no one would recommend that the Marines come home, that what the President would get would be a vote of confidence.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I feel myself that people do have confidence in our efforts and support our efforts in the Middle East very broadly. They are efforts very much on the high ground. We are there to help in the effort for peace, national reconciliation, and sovereignty of Lebanon. I don't have any doubt about that.

The President is reporting as appropriate under the law, and all of the facts are available. I'm sure that we will hear from people about their views, and we do all the time.

QUESTION: If the President were more forthcoming and cooperative at this point, it seems (inaudible)--

SECRETARY SHULTZ: He is forthcoming. There is no more forthcoming you can be, or cooperative you can be.

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QUESTION: It was predicted, however, by Senator Mathias this morning that he is generating a confrontation with the Congress because of this.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm sure everyone worries about this -- and certainly I do as Secretary of State and, for that matter, as a Marine -- whenever our forces are involved in a situation where there is violence and where there is danger. Of course, we've had casualties, so we're all worried about that. Senator Mathias is, I'm sure. The President's very worried about it.

The facts are all there for everybody to see, and we're working at this together. We're trying to explain what our policies are, what is being done, and some measure of success that is taking place right now, at least in the sense that there is an effort that has some possibility of prevailing, of containing this violence, and a renewed attempt at national reconciliation in Lebanon. I hope that that comes off.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you sufficiently satisfied with the progress that the Lebanese army has made under the American trainers there, that they can bring order to Beirut without increased danger to the Marines in the months to come?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They have made great progress in our judgment. I have to rely, of course, on the judgment of military people, such as General Cooley, who has been over there and very active -- that's his judgment -- and from what we can see in the way they are handling themselves in the current, very difficult situation, where you have to remember they're dealing for the most part with people of their own population. It's a very difficult thing for any armed force to do. But our observation is that they're doing it well and in a sophisticated manner.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does Syria bear any responsibility today for the political instability or in the physical violence going on in Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The political instability, I feel, would be much less and much easier to cope with if all foreign forces would withdraw from Lebanon. Israel has agreed to withdraw from Lebanon. I believe Syria should withdraw from Lebanon, as should the PLO, and give the Lebanese a chance to cope with their problems in their own way themselves.

They have plenty of problems. To a certain extent you can say you don't need anybody to stir them up, because they're there. But I think it would be a major contribution if that very large Syrian army were to get out of Lebanon.

QUESTION: What about Syrian involvement in the fighting, sir? The second part of the question. Is there any evidence of Syrian involvement in the current fighting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are varying reports on that. I don't want to try to make a definitive comment because I find the evidence something that is not absolutely clear cut. It is certainly the case that some firing has come from Syrian-controlled areas, and of course it is their responsibility as an occupying force to contain that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you have noted, it is a year since President Reagan began his Operation Fresh Start for the Middle East. Some people think that is dead, others would say at least it's on the shelf, and I think it's obvious that you started out trying to negotiate peace in the Middle East, and you're now negotiating a few hilltops just outside of Beirut.

To what do you attribute the failure of the Reagan plan thus far?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't consider it to be a failure, but certainly we don't have peace in the Middle East either. That's for sure. It's a long, tough struggle, as successive Presidents and Secretaries of State, let alone heads of state of countries in the area, can testify.

It did seem as though last April we were very close to having a kind of Palestinian participation with King Hussein that would have reinvigorated the negotiating process. That failed at the last minute, but perhaps we can bring that back. At any rate, I think the propositions involved -- 242, 338, the Camp David Accords and the President's initiative -- are very much on people's minds.

If you think about it at all, where else are you going to go, but to the ideas involved that are contained in those documents?

QUESTION: Is there anything you would do differently in terms of getting more directly involved, having a special negotiator pressing harder?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We had special negotiator, of course, and we worked at it very hard. We had numerous meetings here.

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We had our negotiator, Phil Habib, there. Always you can look back and scratch your head about whether your timing could have been different, but I think on the whole our effort was a pretty good one. Others may have a different judgment, and I know that they feel free to say so.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think the resignation of Prime Minister Begin will slow down or will it speed up a broader peace process, and how long do you want Israel to delay its partial redeployment from the Shuf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any statement about the extent of delay of Israel's redeployment will have to come from Israel. I don't want to make any comment on that. The President did ask them to delay, and they did, so we're glad about that fact. It does give a little more time for this process that I spoke about to take place.

Prime Minister Begin, in my own dealings with him, was a person of clearly strong mind and vigorous. He was a very gentlemanly and courteous person to deal with, and I wish him well. We will deal with the new Government of Israel when it appears.

MR. HUGHES: Last question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what role would you expect the United States to play in an effort to bring about political reconciliation in Lebanon? Would you see any special effort beyond what's already been made public by Mr. McFarlane?

What can we do to try to settle things down politically, aside from sort of a verbal reinforcement of Mr. Gemayel's statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I tried to spell out in my statement a number of things, including the diplomatic effort that we are undertaking, along with others, to rally the international community to support this effort.

Beyond that, I think all of the different things that I listed, plus some that I didn't, namely, the potential economic support from Lebanon, must play a part.

In the end it's my belief that something like national reconciliation in a country is fundamentally something that the government of that country has to be primarily responsible for. We can help them and we will. But it has to be their primary responsibility, and I think it's quite striking that President Gemayel has stepped up to that responsibility very strongly in his statement made today.

The boss says I have to leave.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 1, 1983
No. 327

PRESS BRIEFING
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
DOWNING OF KOREAN COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, 10:45 A.M.

For further information contact:

PR #327

PRESS BRIEFING
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
DOWNING OF KOREAN COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, 10:45 A.M.

MR. JOHN HUGHES: Good morning. The Secretary of State will have a statement on the shooting down of a Korean airliner and will take one or two questions before he has to leave. Assistant Secretary Burt and I will be back here at the mid-day briefing and will offer you any further information we have.

The Secretary of State.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: At 1400 hours Greenwich Mean Time yesterday, a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 enroute from New York to Seoul, Korea, departed Anchorage, Alaska. 269 passengers and crew were on board, including Congressman Lawrence P. MacDonald.

At approximately 1600 hours Greenwich Mean Time, the aircraft came to the attention of Soviet radar. It was tracked constantly by the Soviets from that time.

The aircraft strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula and over the Sea of Okhotsk, and over the Sakhalin Islands. The Soviets tracked the commercial airliner for some two and one-half hours.

A Soviet pilot reported visual contact with the aircraft at 1812 hours. The Soviet plane was, we know, in constant contact with its ground control.

At 1821 hours the Korean aircraft was reported by the Soviet pilot at 10,000 meters. At 1826 hours the Soviet pilot reported that he fired a missile and the target was destroyed.

At 1830 hours the Korean aircraft was reported by radar at 5,000 meters. At 1838 hours the Korean plane disappeared from the radar screen.

We know that at least eight Soviet fighters reacted at one time or another to the airliner. The pilot who shot the aircraft down reported after the attack that he had in fact fired a missile, that he had destroyed the target, and that he was breaking away.

About an hour later Soviet controllers ordered a number of their search aircraft to conduct search and rescue activity in the vicinity of the last position of the Korean airliner reflected by Soviet tracking. One of these aircraft reported finding kerosene on the surface of the seas in that area.

During Wednesday night, United States State Department officials, particularly Assistant Secretary Burt, were in contact with Soviet officials, seeking information concerning the airliner's fate. The Soviets offered no information.

As soon as U.S. sources had confirmed the shooting down of the aircraft, the U.S. on its own behalf and on behalf of the Republic of Korea, called in the Soviet Charge' d'Affaires in Washington this morning to express our grave concern over the shooting down of an unarmed civilian plane carrying passengers of a number of nationalities. We also urgently demanded an explanation from the Soviet Union.

The United States reacts with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling act.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will this make any difference in the way the United States deals with the Soviet Union? For example, your meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I certainly will want to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko and hear what he has to say about this. Of course, we expect to hear from the Soviet Union long before that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, was the United States in touch with Moscow at all on the Hot Line or any Presidential contact in this case?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. This information that we have has come into our hands after the shooting down of this plane.

QUESTION: Have you spoken to the President about this matter, and what does he say?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I haven't spoken to the President as yet --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, was there any warning given by the Soviets?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- but I should say the President is fully informed, and I've talked with the West Coast, and the President knows all about this and has been kept fully informed. I haven't personally spoken to him.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, did the Soviet Union give any warning to this aircraft and request it to land or try to force it down before it shot it down?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have no evidence of that. There was apparently no ability to communicate between the two aircraft; but as the statement says, the Soviet plane that shot the commercial airliner down moved itself into position where it had visual contact with the aircraft, so that with the eye you could inspect the aircraft and see what it was you were looking at.

QUESTION: Do we know whether the Soviets sought to force the KAL plane down without using missiles?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have no information about that. And as I said, as far as we can see there was no communication between the two aircraft except that they did track this aircraft for two and a half hours; at least eight fighters at one time or another were around in the vicinity, and the aircraft that shot the plane down was close enough for visual inspection of the aircraft.

QUESTION: Were they aware, sir, of any particular kind of Soviet military exercises or maneuvers or super-sophisticated radar that might have been in the area and that they had warned everybody to stay away from it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

QUESTION: Is there any explanation that you could offer for this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have no explanation to offer. We can see no explanation whatever for shooting down an unarmed commerical airliner, no matter whether it's in your airspace or not.

QUESTION: Are you suggesting that the decision to shoot this plane down was made at a fairly high level since they were tracking it a long time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm relating the facts as we have them at this point, and I can't go beyond the facts that I have here. I'm not going to speculate about it. I'm trying to put forward the facts as we know them and to tell you the United States Government's attitude and my own attitude toward the shooting down of an unarmed commercial airliner.

QUESTION: My question was going to be, sir, if you had any sense as to whether there could be any political motivation for this beyond what you know already?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't imagine any political motivation for shooting down an unarmed airliner.

(The press briefing concluded at 10:48 A.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL PRESS BRIEFING
ON THE
SHOOTING DOWN OF A KOREAN AIRLINER
BY THE SOVIET UNION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, 5:10 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Sorry about being late. I have a statement on the Soviet response to our demand earlier today for an explanation of the shooting down of the Korean aircraft.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has sent a message to Secretary Shultz in reply to our demand of earlier today for an explanation of the shooting down of a Korean Airlines 747 by Soviet aircraft. The message, which was delivered by the Soviet Embassy here to the Department of State, is an almost verbatim repetition of the TASS item issued from Moscow today.

That TASS message reads as follows: "An unidentified plane entered the air space of the Soviet Union over the Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the Pacific Ocean, and then for the second time violated the airspace of the U.S.S.R. over Sakhalin Island on the night from August 31 to September 1. The plane did not have navigation lights, did not respond to queries, and did not enter into contact with the dispatcher service."

I continue quoting from the TASS item from Moscow this morning. "Fighters of the Soviet Antiaircraft Defense, which were sent aloft toward the intruder plane, tried to give it assistance in directing it to the nearest airfield, but the intruder plane did not react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan."

That's the end of the quote of the TASS story from Moscow this morning which was included almost verbatim in the Soviet response to our demand.

In addition, Mr. Gromyko's message includes a statement that in connection with the U.S. request, the Soviets have taken measures to search for the aircraft and indicates that as a result of the search signs of a possible crash have been found in the area of Morenon Island. This is not in the note, but the fact of the matter is that Morenon Island is in the Sea of Japan inside of Soviet territorial waters.

The search, according to the Soviet message, continues in the area.

The Soviet Charge' has been informed that the United States Government finds this reply totally inadequate, and the United States reiterates its demand for a satisfactory explanation.

That's all I have for you.

Q Does the Gromyko message or did the Charge' somehow intimate that the Soviets had in fact shot the plane down? The TASS story makes no mention of that.

A That's correct.

Q So they simply do not explain how it is that the plane went down?

A That is correct. And that is why we consider this "explanation" totally unsatisfactory.

Q Anything, John, in connection with the search, about survivors?

A No. We have no knowledge of any survivors, and they make no mention of survivors.

Q Apparently Larry Speakes said that the Korean pilot radioed his position after he was hit. Do you have any indication of that, and does that indicate that in fact he was near this island in the Sea of Japan?

A No. I don't. I'm not contradicting Larry Speakes, but I don't have anything on that.

Q There were indications earlier that the plane may have had radio trouble shortly after it left Alaska. There are some garbled communications with another Korean plane. Do you know anything about that?

A No. Don't have anything beyond what --

Q What's next here? We've got an inadequate reply. We say we want more. Do we expect the Soviets to tell us some more, and what happens if they don't?

A I think these words speak for themselves. We're demanding a satisfactory explanation, we are considering our options, and I think you should keep in touch with the White House.

Q John, any reconsideration of Madrid?

A No.

Q Do you know whether any of the options that have been recommended by --

A No. Don't think I'll get into the options. As I say, I think you should remain in touch with the Western White House.

Q -- some of the options recommended by members of Congress, such as stopping Soviet planes flying in here, stop the grain deal, etc., etc. Has the Administration given any consideration to those possibilities?

A I think a variety of options -- I'm not getting into them or confirming what they're discussing -- have been under consideration today and undoubtedly the President would make his decision on any options that he wishes to adopt.

Q Do you think it's a matter for the United Nations?

A Why don't we wait and see, Jim. There certainly are international implications to this.

Q What would you be waiting to see before you consider United Nations --

A Why don't you keep in touch with the Western White House. I think that any announcements might come out of there.

Q The Japanese have revealed that there was in fact an order in their chronology of events, that the Soviets did order from the ground, Soviet Command, that the pilot fire.

Can you confirm this here?

A I think I would reiterate what Assistant Secretary Burt said earlier, and I think he has not personally seen a line which says, "Fire your missile." But I think it is quite clear from the transcript that the attack was being coordinated over a period of time, and while there may not be a line in there which says, "Proceed with the attack," the pilot was making clear what actions he was taking, and at no time was there a command not to attack. So I think one has to assume --

Q The Japanese have that line, I believe.

A They may have. I'm being as helpful as I can in telling you what we have.

Q In one version put out by the Japanese of the transcript they talk about three missiles. As far as you are --

A Not aware of that.

Q Only one.

A As far as we're aware.

Q Does the United States dispute the Soviet comment in its response that the plane had no lights and made no radio contact -- no navigation lights? Does the U.S. dispute that at all? And what implications, if any, do those observations have vis-a-vis the plane's going off course in the first place, its remaining off course for two and a half hours, and its failure to respond to efforts to warn it?

A We weren't there, so it's hard to give you a view of whether those navigation lights were working or not, but we have no indication they were not.

Q You have no indication that --

A And indeed the transcript does talk of the aircraft -- talks of a Soviet pilot making mention of the navigation lights of the plane.

Q When we talked about options, I want to be clear that your answer to my question was not a generalized answer, that, yes, we consider options, thank you very much. I was asking specifically about the grain deal, I was asking specifically about Kennedy's recommendation that flights be cut off.

A There are a lot of people out there today, Marvin, offering various ideas and various options. They're coming from airline pilots and Congressmen and so forth and so on, and obviously all options, I think, that are suggested would be given attention.

That doesn't mean to say that those options are necessarily under consideration having been initiated in the State Department.

Q Are U.S. allies involved in this discussion of options? Are we --

A I think I'm going to stand where I am and not go any further on that.

Q Are you expecting any response from -- I don't mean response -- are you expecting any action from the United States within the next 24 hours related to the shooting down of this plane?

A I think that you will see further activity on this front. Yes.

Q Do you have a number of American casualties yet?

A No. I do not. I'm afraid that's all I've got for you. Thank you.

Q Is that it for today, John?

A That's it.

(The briefing concluded at 5:18 P. M.)

DRAFT 9/3/8

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
ON
SECRETARY SHULTZ'S TRIP TO MADRID

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1983, 11:14 A. M.

MR. HUGHES: Nice to see you all on a holiday Saturday morning. This is ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a Senior State Department Official.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This is not meant to be a briefing on the airliner business, although the airliner business will have an impact on the Madrid Conference. But it's really meant to be an overview of the Madrid meeting which will take place next week, to give you some idea of how we're approaching that and what some of the events will be and some of the issues are.

First, just a little bit of background. We have been negotiating for two and a half years in Madrid with 34 other nations, the nations that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation that signed the Helsinki Final Act. This is a follow-on meeting which, as I said, started two and a half years ago and has been working on what we are calling a concluding document which is meant to extend and improve on the Helsinki Final Act.

As you know, nearly all of the issues have been resolved in negotiations by our chief negotiator, Max Kampelman. We think that the agreement which would be initialed by the Foreign Ministers next week represents a substantial improvement over the Helsinki Final Act.

In particular, as you know, we have placed special emphasis on human rights. I won't go into a great deal of detail here, but we can explain for those of you who are interested how we have improved in the text of this concluding document in several areas over the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

That said, we recognize that this is a piece of paper, and that, as we have always said, in relations with the Soviet Union what is important are deeds, not just words; and a principal reason for continuing and conducting these negotiations, for concluding the negotiations, and having the Secretary of State participate in the concluding ceremony has been that we think it's important to hold the Soviet Union and its allies accountable for the agreements and for the commitments they make.

We think that, like the Helsinki Final Act, the results of the Madrid Conference provide a standard or a yardstick, if you will, for human rights performance that allows us to hold or to measure Soviet performance by that standard.

I don't have to tell you that we think that the Soviet performance in the human rights area has been miserable. In fact, it has worsened over the last year, and we will make that very clear and the Secretary of State will make that very clear in his public remarks as well as in his various meetings at the Madrid Conference, including most particularly his meeting with Gromyko.

So, in sum, we think this is a useful agreement. We think the conference will be useful. But this should not be viewed, and we do not view the conference, as a major breakthrough in East-West relations.

Let me say a few words about the conference itself. The conference will begin on Wednesday morning in Madrid. The Spanish Government as host has a schedule which calls for Foreign Ministers of all the 35 nations attending to make brief statements.

There is a protocol to the order in which those statements are made, and according to that protocol the Secretary of State will make his remarks on the third day, on the concluding day, of the session. I think that is September 9.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko is scheduled to make his statement on the 7th. In addition to the statements, there will be ample time and opportunity for meeting, and we expect the Secretary of State informally to have contact with a number of different Foreign Ministers on the margins of the meeting to discuss various issues.

It goes without saying that the Korean Airliner incident will be an issue very much on our mind, and we assume on the minds of allied Foreign Ministers, neutral Foreign Ministers, and others.

We have scheduled some meetings. The Secretary of State plans to meet with the NATO Foreign Ministers as well as meet collectively with the neutral and nonaligned ministers. He has bilateral meetings scheduled with Foreign Minister Genscher, with the new Italian Foreign Minister Andreatti, and he will be having meetings with leaders of the host government, Spain, the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Spanish President, and he will be meeting with King Juan Carlos.

Just a last word on the meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko which will take place on September 8. The airliner incident has had an impact on our planning and preparations for this meeting. The decision was taken by the Secretary of State in consultation with the President. It was discussed at the White House last night that the meeting should go ahead, but the agenda and the duration of the meeting will be influenced by the episode.

The Secretary of State has said publicly that he intends to ask the Soviet Foreign Minister for an explanation of this incident and to insist that the Soviet Union come clean with the facts.

So in addition to this question, or this issue on the agenda, there will be a few other problems that will be discussed. We like to maintain the confidentiality of these discussions, so I will not go into details about what other issues are on the agenda.

With that, I will take your questions.

Q Can you give us a better feel for what happened to the Maltese business? Does this meeting get rid of everybody's obligations under CSCE for this phase, and, if so, how do you justify that in legal terms? And, finally, why is everybody so eager to do this now if that isn't going to work, when the Secretary is going to have a chance to see everybody in New York two or three weeks later?

A First of all, I can't be too explicit about the Maltese question. We hope, Hank, that that problem will be resolved, and we are working in Madrid and in other capitals to resolve that problem.

Obviously, it's not principally a U.S. problem. It's a problem that involves all the participants in the conference, and we are working with the other participants to resolve the problem.

But it's too soon or too early for me now to talk in detail about the legalities of how this question will be worked out, but we hope that it will be worked out.

On the question of the meeting itself, I think that in part a number of Foreign Ministers who are very busy men agreed earlier on to conclude the conference in early September. Decision were taken and schedules were drawn up, and I think it's just simply convenient for them. Despite the fact that there are some loose ends right now, it's convenient for them to attend the meeting at this time.

While you're right, there can be meetings, all kinds of bilateral meetings, at the General Assembly, it isn't clear really that there would be the opportunity for any of the Foreign Ministers to meet with as many Foreign Ministers as quickly and as efficiently as you can at the Madrid meeting. So the Secretary of State, for instance, it's not clear that he would have the opportunity to see that whole constellation of people as he will in Madrid.

Q I wonder if you could elaborate on your remarks that the jet episode will change the duration and agenda of the meeting with Gromyko? Is it going to be a shorter meeting with a shorter agenda, a longer meeting with a --

A The former. It will be a shorter meeting with a shorter agenda.

Q Does that mean explicitly that you originally planned to talk about things of a more cooperative nature? Now you're not? Is that --

A I think it's clear, Bernie, that the meeting -- that the airliner episode has cast a shadow over our dialogue with the Soviets. Beyond that, I'm simply not going to go into details about what was planned and what wasn't planned.

Q You don't mean that the Secretary will raise the airliner, and if Gromyko says, "I've got nothing more to say about it," that that will be the end of the meeting?

A You're asking me to speculate on it.

Q No. I mean, I'm not asking you to speculate. When you make reference to the duration of the meeting --

A I answered the question. It will be a shorter agenda, logcially a shorter meeting.

Q Just for the record, could you tell what the rationale is for going ahead with the meeting rather than postponing it as a gesture of U.S. abhorence of the Soviet attack on the airliner?

A We have said that we have a feeling of revulsion about the Soviet action, but we have also said that the best way to communicate that feeling of revulsion is to explain our views firsthand at a senior level to the Soviet leadership, and the meeting with Gromyko will give the Secretary of State an opportunity to do just that.

Q Is there any indication that the Soviets might back out of the meeting, seeing how its nature has changed?

A I'm not aware of any gesture or any indication.

Q Can you tell us if any other decisions of that kind were taken last night?

A No.

Q No, you can't tell me, or no, there weren't any taken?

A No, I can't tell you.

Q But this was a particular decision that was made to go ahead with it, and it was focused on in the discussions?

A It was discussed last night, but I think, as you know, prior to that discussion the Secretary of State had expressed his views and had been in touch with the President on this.

Q Did any of the allies want to call the meeting off?

A I'm not aware of any effort by allied governments to call off the meeting.

Q Larry Speakes said last night that the agenda is going to include other Soviet violations on the international scene. What will the agenda include?

A I said that I did not want to go into detail about this meeting, so I think we'll just let Larry Speakes' words stand.

Q Can you at least say whether arms control is or is not on the agenda?

A I don't want to go beyond what I said.

Q When you talk about agendas, you don't mean that this is a mutually agreed agenda?

A No. It is not, and that's a good point. We have points we want to make to the Soviet Union, and we asume that Foreign Minister Gromyko will have points he wants to make to us. It could very well be very different.

Q There has been speculation for a long time about talking about a summit between Reagan and Andropov. Will that definitely not be mentioned? Will it probably be mentioned, but you're not preparing for a summit, or how does -- what is the status of that?

A Your question assumes that a summit was imminent and we are actively working on it, and we have been meeting with the Soviet Union, having a bilateral dialogue with the Soviets, and our position on a summit has been and continues to be that we want a carefully prepared summit that will produce concrete results.

Q It wouldn't even be a likely topic this soon?

A I'm not going to comment on it, but I wouldn't push you in that direction.

Q Is it possible, since you're ON BACKGROUND, to give us a little bit of the framework of U.S.-Soviet relations as he meets Gromyko?

A I think that I would make a contrast -- and I don't mean this to be an invidious comparison -- but you will recall after the invasion of Afghanistan there were some statements by senior U.S. officials at the time that people were somewhat shockd and bewildered and surprised by that Soviet action which I think expressed the perspective that the previous Administration had a policy in place for the Soviet Union that was somehow inconsistent or had not taken in account the possibility of this kind of Soviet behavior.

I think that offers a contrast with the current Administration. We have a policy framework in place which recognizes the Soviet propensity to use military force, and we have recognized from the outset that this was a brutal regime. We have recognized from the outset that the Soviet Union relies on military force for intimidation and to achieve other objectives.

So this episode has not led to a fundamenal reappraisal of our policy towards the Soviets. Rather, it has tended to confirm our existing policy which was, as you know, based on the need for strength vis-a-vis the Soviets -- military strength, economic strength, and a recognition of the important values that we have that we do not share with the Soviets, and a recognition of realism that the Soviet Union does act in ways that challenge our interests; that they have violated agreements like the Helsinki Final Act and like the biological and toxin weapons convention.

The President has been criticized for calling the Soviet Union liars, saying that they were evil. But, again, I would only say that I think we believe that this recent episode has confirmed that our fundamental policy approach is correct, and that fundamental policy approach will thus be sustained.

Q What do you think of the chances that the Soviets will in any way come clean before this meeting, and, assuming they do, will that change things significantly at this point?

A You're asking me to speculate. I would only say that we would hope -- I don't know what the chances are, but we would hope that the Soviets would come clean as soon as possible.

Q You left out one aspect of our policy. Are we still interested in agreements of mutual benefit?

A We are interested in continuing to talk to the Soviet Union to make it very clear what our concerns are. We are interested in arms control agreements that protect our national security and enhanced stability. I might point out that there is a tremendous contrast between the rhetoric of the Soviet Union depicting itself as a peace-loving country and the events of this week.

There is no such contrast in the policy and actions of the Reagan Administration. We are a peace-loving country, and we will seek agreements that make peace more likely.

Q Would one of the things we'd be discussing with the NATO and other allies in Madrid be a possibility of airline sanctions, or would we do that before that?

A I think that we are consulting with our allies continuously on this subject -- when you say "this subject," I mean on the airliner episode. I don't want to get into specific details about what we're saying.

Q Larry Speakes strongly hinted that some kind of sanctions and air travel against the Soviets would be one of the actions. Can you give us a little more about that?

A No. We're getting off the Madrid meeting, and if you're pretty much satiated on the question of Madrid --

Q If the meeting went on, when would -- between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko, what issues do you expect him to raise regarding the situation with Lebanon?

A You should ask the Soviet Union about what Mr. Gromyko may raise.

Q No. Mr. Shultz, I mean.

A I don't want to get into what we might or might not have to say to the Soviets.

Q Do you come to this reunion by Foreign Ministers as a kind of pressure on Malta to accept the Final Acts of the conference?

A No. We just hope, as I said before, that the conference will be concluded at the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

MR. HUGHES: Mr. Nokes wants to ask the last question.

Q I didn't know it was the last. Thank you. The Madrid agreement is going to provide for certain follow-up meetings in various places at various times. Are we committed to going ahead with those follow-up meetings?

A We are, because those meetings are very much in our in interest. Most of those meetings concern human rights, and thus they provide vehicles for the United States and its allies to use to hold the Soviet Union accountable for its miserable performance in the human rights area.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:26 p.m.)

NATO/USSR

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 3, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE

September 3, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:31 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: As you know, Ambassador Nitze has just finished a meeting with the President and will report to you on that meeting. He has a statement which he will read. You have copies of it. He will take just a few questions after that and I will then be available under normal briefing rules when he finishes to answer any questions to see what you might have on your mind. So, Ambassador Nitze.

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I've just been to see the President about the next round of the INF negotiations, which begin in Geneva on September 6.

We are all deeply concerned about irresponsible Soviet action which led to the death of 269 persons including over 50 Americans aboard the Korean Air jet liner. We must nevertheless continue our efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict through negotiated, fair and verifiable agreements.

I return to Geneva prepared to pursue constructive approaches to the issues which divide us. The President has assured me of his personal and strong support as we enter this crucial round of talks. We have no illusion that the going will be easy. We expect the Soviets to stress apparent movement in the public press, as they have already done. But we will be looking for substantive movement at the negotiating table, where it counts. If the Soviets are prepared to address the basic issues squarely and seriously, I have the flexibility for real progress.

Remember that the United States first proposed complete elimination of the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to lower dramatically nuclear tensions. When the Soviets made clear their refusal seriously to address this, we offered a flexible approach to an interim solution at lower, equal levels. Again, they repeated their previous arguments in favor of a position that would essentially perpetuate the current imbalance in INF missiles.

The time is at hand for the Soviets to move with us promptly to achieve an agreement restoring stability and nuclear balance in the INF realm.

We will continue the process of the closest consultation with our NATO allies. I leave tomorrow to consult with Chancellor Kohl in Bonn on Monday and will then continue to Geneva later in the day.

MORE

Q Isn't this incident, Mr. Ambassador, and the U. S. reaction to it bound to slow down the progress of negotiations in the arms talks?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: It certainly isn't going to help progress, but we still hope that we can maintain progress and arrive at a useful and worthwhile and verifiable agreement.

Q Are you going back with more flexibility than you had and with any new proposals based on the Scowcroft Commission recommendations or anyone else?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: No, I think it's inappropriate for me to go into details of my negotiating position. In the past, I have never done that. You remember, we agreed to keep confidential the details --

Q Why can't you say whether you are going to make some more concessions?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I don't propose to say that.

Q Mr. Ambassador, Yuri Andropov's statement about the destruction of those SS-20s that might be removed, has that changed anything in your view?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I think it was about six months ago that General Sherpov (sp?), one of their principal commentators, said they would be prepared to, I think, as I remember, he said they would be prepared to destroy a dozen, a little bit over a dozen SS-20s and that is essentially what Andropov is saying in his recent statement.

I think the important point here is that the number they have assured us, they suggested that they might reduce is really significantly less than the difference between their current deployments and the 162 that they said they reduced, too. But the more important factor is that they have not suggested that they would give up production of SS-20s. It really is a meaningless thing to destroy a few old ones and continue to build new ones.

Q Mr. Ambassador, might it not be, and that is following up on your earlier statement, might it not be that the world outrage at the Korean Airlines incident and the public relations of all of this might induce the Soviets to be a bit more forthcoming than they might otherwise be?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I hope that would be the case, but I wouldn't guarantee it.

MORE

Q Doesn't it put some pressures on the Soviets?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I hope that they will look at it that way.

Q Mr. Ambassador, in the past, weren't the Soviets hoping that the peace movement of Western Europe would, in effect, cause the government there not to deploy these U. S. missiles and now that the Soviets are looking so bad, has the situation changed some and may the Soviets now have to be more serious about negotiations?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: Well, it will take greater cooperation on their side in order to get a deal, and I hope we will find that greater cooperation. Thank you very much.

Q Are you going to bring up the plane subject with the Soviets in Geneva?

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I will mention it.

Q Mr. Nitze, one question on flexibility, please. You say, "I have the flexibility for real progress." Have you been given additional flexibility over and above --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: I earlier said I wouldn't answer that.

Q I'm not talking about --

AMBASSADOR NITZE: That's it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

END (1:37 P.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION

September 5, 1983

The Briefing Room

5:50 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: We are now passing out, or will shortly, a fact sheet. That is the extent of the paper that we have at the moment. That and this background briefing is embargoed for wire transmission until the briefing is completed and for release until 8:00 p.m.; repeating, embargoed for wire transmission until the briefing is over or release at 8:00 p.m. Anybody have any trouble with that? Everybody accept?

We anticipate having the speech and an English translation of the tape excerpts that the President will use about 7:30. Both those items will be for immediate wire transmission but embargoed until 8:00 p.m. We have with us [redacted] They will be identified as Senior Administration Officials. And with that, I will turn it over to them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With Larry demoting me before I get started, God knows what it is going to be like when I am through.

I am at somewhat of a disadvantage here tonight, ladies and gentlemen, because the President is still working on the speech which is very much his own and I therefore cannot be totally precise on everything that may be in it.

Having said that, it is clear that the President really wishes in this speech to do three general things: First of all is to stress once again on his own behalf and on behalf of the American people our horror at the act of the shooting down of KAL 007; secondly, to continue the process of laying out the facts as we obtain them before the nation and the world, a process that was begun by Secretary Shultz last Thursday in his statements; and thirdly, to describe in a general way the actions the U.S. intends to take in response to the KAL shoot down.

It is important to remember that what we are dealing with is a Soviet act that has horrified public opinion. It is the U.S.S.R. against the world. Our objective is to act with the international community both broadly and in the civil aviation context in specific terms to accomplish several things.

MORE

First of all, to demand the facts and an admission from the Soviet Union that the plane was shot down by the Soviet Union; secondly, to obtain appropriate recompense for those injured by that act; and thirdly, to assure that acts of this sort do not happen again.

Our objectives will not be served if the shoot down of KAL 007 can be portrayed as simply a part of the East-West struggle. That is not what it is. It's another demonstration of the character and nature of the Soviet Union: its values, its priorities, its decision-making process. The act is hideous, of course, but so is Afghanistan and Poland and yellow rain. A realistic assessment of the Soviets must recognize that the shoot down of KAL 007 is not out of keeping with past Soviet performance.

The way to change Soviet behavior is through economic, military and Alliance strength -- objectives which the President has been pursuing from the moment he was inaugurated as President of the United States.

At the same time -- and the President will make this clear tonight, the United States must continue its efforts to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union where it is in our interests. It is for that reason that he has already announced that Paul Nitze will return to Geneva to continue the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe. It is for that reason that we will continue the START negotiations, because our objective is to seek reductions in nuclear arms of both categories. It is, in short, in our interests.

The President will make clear that he has instructed Secretary Shultz to go to Madrid to meet with Mr. Gromyko in order to emphasize to the Soviet Foreign Minister our great concern about the shoot down of KAL 007. That will be the principal focus of the discussion that Secretary Shultz has with Mr. Gromyko. We consider it particularly appropriate since the Madrid meeting is, after all, dedicated to the question of human rights, and travel without fear to person or property is certainly a human right. In short, the shoot down does not change our estimate or approach to the Soviet Union. Rather, it confirms it. It was a terrible act, but one which must be dealt with in a way that increases the chance that it won't happen again.

So to summarize, we will deal with this issue on two levels: with a response to the specific act itself and the fact sheet you have been handed largely details the direction in which the President is moving in that regard.

MORE

And in the broader sense we will reaffirm the approach of this Administration to dealing with the Soviet Union; that is, an approach combined of realism, strength, and dialogue.

As Larry Speakes indicated at the beginning -- and I want to highlight this -- the President in his speech tonight will include a part of the tape we have of the conversation of the Soviet pilots. He will also announce that at the Security Council tomorrow Ambassador Kirkpatrick will play the entire tape that we have in our possession. And I should indicate that we will at the same time or as we play that tape make available a transcript of the tape also tomorrow.

Q Will that be in the Security Council?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be in the Security Council.

Q Afternoon, morning, do you think?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not sure yet. The last I heard there was still conversation going on. I am sorry I can't tell you yet. It will go in the morning or afternoon.

Q Is it the same eight-minute tape that was played for the Congressional leaders yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not sure exactly how much was played for the Congressional leaders. We will play the entire tape which I -- don't hold me to this -- but it runs about 20 minutes. Let me deal with one other issue before we open this to questions.

I have been told by Larry Speakes and others that there are a host of questions relating to the RC-135 question. And I want to deal with that for a moment. I think you will be handed a piece of paper which will contain everything I am about to say. I want to emphasize that that is all I have to say on this subject today. A U. S. RC-135 aircraft was in the vicinity of the Korean airliner on August 31,, when the airliner was initially detected by Soviet radar. Both aircraft were then in international air space and the U. S. aircraft never entered Soviet air space. The U. S. routinely conducts unarmed RC-135 flights in international air space of the Kamchatka Peninsula to monitor by national technical means Soviet compliance with the SALT Treaty. The Soviets conduct similar monitoring activities near U. S. missile testing sites. The Soviets are aware of our flights and track them routinely. They know that our aircraft do not enter their air space. The Korean aircraft's inadvertent entry into Soviet territory should have been an early and strong indication to the Soviets that the flight was not a U. S. reconnaissance aircraft.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: The Soviets traced the Korean aircraft and the U.S. aircraft separately and knew there were two aircraft in the area. So we do not believe this was a case of mistaken identity. The closest point of approach of the two aircraft was approximately 75 nautical miles while the U.S. aircraft was in its mission orbit. Later, the U.S. aircraft crossed the path taken by the Korean airliner, but by then the airliner was 300 miles away. Still later, as the Korean airliner strayed off course, and overflew the Kamchatka Peninsula, it was initially identified by the Soviets as an RC-135 and then as an unidentified aircraft. Approximately two and a half hours after the Soviet and Korean aircraft were near each other in international space, the Soviets shot down the Korean airliner as it was exiting or had exited their territory west of Sakhalin Island, some 1,000 miles from the operating area of the U.S. aircraft.

During the two and one-half hours of Soviet surveillance of the Korean aircraft, the Soviets had radar images, both ground and air, of the Korean 747. The two aircraft are distinctly different in shape and size. Their fighter aircraft also had visual contact with the Korean aircraft. The Su-15 and the MIG-23 aircraft pilots' voices are on the tape obtained by the U.S. and played for the Congressional leadership never referred to the Korean aircraft as an RC-135, only as "the target."

They made no serious effort to identify the aircraft or to warn it. They did not appear to care what it was. Instead, they were intent on killing it. If the Soviets made a mistake in identification, which stretches the imagination, they have not said so to date. In fact, they have not to date admitted shooting down the Korean commercial aircraft with 269 people aboard. We continue to ask the Soviets for their full accounting of this incident. The presence of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a routine monitoring mission to assure Soviet compliance with treaty obligations some 1,000 miles and two and a half hours flight time from the scene of the shoot down in no way excuses or explains this act which speaks for itself. In fact, the RC-135 in question at the time that KAL flight 007 was shot down had been on ground at its home base in Alaska for more than one hour.

Now, that is the end of the statement which I think is being handed out to you. I do want to add one other fact because I am told that it has been a question.

MORE

Our aircraft, that is the RC-135, was not monitoring commercial aircraft, and did not know that the Korean aircraft was, of course, in jeopardy. I have with me Ambassador Matlock, who is on the NSC staff. As I indicated to you, I really cannot go any further on the question of the RC-135, but between us, we would be glad to try to answer any questions you may have on the speech.

Q You say that this action is characteristic of the Soviets. Have any missiles ever been fired at any American aircraft in a similar situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any missiles ever fired at an American aircraft in a similar situation? I don't know the facts on that.

Do you know whether they have ever fired at us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. We would have to check.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will have to check it and get back to you. We'll get that for you.

Q Can you tell us by which process the President will make the tape -- how will the translation be made?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL How will it be played? The President -- the tape will be played, I think, in two excerpts, about two transmissions, about three transmissions, and then the President will paraphrase.

MORE

Q We will hear the Russian pilot in question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You will hear the pilot of both Russian aircraft talking and about I think a total of six transmissions or seven.

Q Will we have an exact translation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will put out an exact translation of the speech. The President will paraphrase.

Q Can I ask one ground rules question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q The section on the RC-135, are you embargoing that as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Same embargo.

Q Are you sure the meeting in Madrid is still on? Have the Soviets told you that it is still going to happen?

Q Where is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The statement is going to be handed out I think. Right. Wait a minute. I have a question to answer over here. As far as Madrid is concerned at this point, it is our understanding that Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz will be meeting in Madrid. We have no word from the Soviets that he does not intend to meet or that he will not be in Madrid. So we are operating on the assumption based on our earlier conversations with the Soviets that the meeting will go forward.

Q Were those conversations before this incident?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL, They were, yes.

Q There has been no contact regarding this meeting since then?

SENIOR ADMMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That is not correct. There has been some contact with the Soviets with regard to the meeting since the KAL shoot down. And we have indicated to Mr. Gromyko that Mr. Shultz has a particular subject he will want to discuss in great detail.

Q You said you won't discuss the reconnaissance flight. However, you say that beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was shot down deliberately. Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you like to try to attempt Soviet --

Q Because it's very bad, it's the evil focus or whatever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that we can answer the question why. You will have to ask the Soviets why. In fact, that is one of the things --

Q They are giving different answers why.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is very clear they are giving answers which are not in accord with the truth. In fact, they have not admitted that they shot it down.

MORE

Q Can you prove why?

Q Or why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the fact is that shoot down occurred and which we can prove.

Q To follow up on Helen's question, since you are saying that you are so positive that a mistake wasn't what happened, what is your analysis of -- in your briefing us here -- what is your analysis of why the Soviets acted in this particular way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we know is that the Soviet fighters were sent up and given orders to shoot down what certainly should have been readily apparent was a commercial airliner. I mean these are the facts of the matter.

Q What conceivable reason, diplomatic, defense, would the Soviets have for doing this? I mean I am sure you and the State Department and other places have talked about this. What is your analysis as the reasons or the motivations that the Soviets would engage in this act deliberately?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIA: I know of no conceivable reasons. I would point out, though, that it is not the first time they have done it. You will recall the incident in 1978 when also shots were fired at a civilian airliner. That time the airliner also was brought down but fortunately with very little loss of life, two people.

MORE

Q That was a thousand miles inside the Soviet territory, if I remember.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was before it came down. The point is, though, that this was also a case where Soviet fighters were ordered to fire at what was very clearly a civilian airliner. And what I find particularly shocking is that whatever the reasons for it, obviously no appropriate corrective steps were taken since then to prevent the recurrence. And this time, of course, the tragedy is much greater.

Q But you never tried to find out why? I mean there have been other airliners going through there. Has there never been another mistake of a plane going off course?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been, I'm sure, other incidents of planes going off course. Let me try to give you the only answer, if I can expand a little bit on what the Senior Administration Official has said, that we can give you. We know certain things as facts. We know, for example, that the Soviet aircraft that shot the plane down came within 2 kilometers, about one mile, of that aircraft. We know that the Soviet pilot indicated that the navigation lights of the aircraft were on. We have reason to believe, or clear reason to believe, that he was up close to the aircraft; we know for a fact 2 kilometers, on the basis of what he said. Those are the facts we know. Now we can sit here and speculate with you all night on why they shot the plane down, and we would be more than happy at some other time to spend a good bit of time speculating on it. You have to understand we are trying now to deal with facts as against speculation. The facts of the matter we know, the rest is speculation.

Q What makes you so certain, beyond this surmise? that it could not have been a mistake?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I tried to indicate in the statement I gave you on the RC-135 is if you analyze the facts, and with that aircraft on the ground an hour before the plane was shot down, you have to come to certain conclusions. But again, all I am saying is with regard to the RC-135, or the motivation of shooting down the KAL airliner, we are giving you the facts as we know them. The analysis of why it happened would have to be, and I am sure you understand this, speculation.

Q But is there any central fact that you are not telling us that leads you to conclude that it was not a mistake, a case of mistaken identity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have given you all the facts that we know with regard to that question. Obviously when it gets into the question of intelligence operations, there are some things we obviously cannot talk about. But with regard to this issue and this question, we have given you the facts as we know them.

Q Is there more tape you haven't given us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Is the question in fact that you are coming to a conclusion, the President is coming to the conclusion that they had positive, or you have positive irrefutable proof that they knew it was a civilian plane when they pulled the trigger?

MORE

Apparently you do not. You are surmising. Now that's what we're talking about here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't put words in my mouth, my friend. I'm giving you, and we have given you, the facts. The conclusions you have to draw on your own. I am saying it's very difficult in our judgment on the basis of those facts to come to any other conclusion. But if you want to argue the conclusion, that's fine, as long as you deal with the facts.

Q What are the negotiations you are suspending?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact sheet there -- well, it's done in a general way. But to be a bit more specific, let me be a little more specific there. For example, as I think you will know, we were in the process of discussions with the Soviets which would return us tonegotiations on opening a Kiev Council. We were in discussions with the Soviets on resuming negotiations on a cultural agreement. Those two will be suspended. I think there is in the fact sheet a specific reference to the transporation agreement.

Q What is that?

Q What is the transportation agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's an agreement -- you probably can explain this in more detail than I -- there's an agreement between the Soviets and the U.S. on transportation. I'll now let the brains explain it further.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was an agreement that was signed in the mid-seventies -- frankly, I don't remember precisely what the year of original signing was -- which recently expired. And the question was, should it be renewed.

Q What is the practical effect of not renewing? What does it do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agreement itself again covers several areas of transportation, including civil aviation, civil aviation cooperation. These are cooperative research and other cooperative efforts. As a matter of fact, since the invasion of Afghanistan, activity under the agreement was reduced and one of the new areas we had some projects going under is civil aviation. I think this was one. Given that fact, it's particularly inappropriate at this time to renew until we can receive assurances that the Soviets are no longer threatening the safety of civil aviation.

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Q Can you be more specific in saying what the agreements are? After all, it is not very persuasive that these acts are significant if you can't say specifically what they are.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have told you what the transporation agreement is. It is on the public record.

Q I am afraid I still don't understand what it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is an agreement, I think the full title, Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on Cooperation in the Field of Transportation.

Q What kinds of cooperation? What is the practical effect?

Q Suppose there was somebody who knew nothing about it, like a passenger?

Q Like us.

Q What would you tell that person is the practical effect of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The practical effect is that the overall agreement which provided a framework for specific cooperative efforts is not being renewed.

Q Oh, that explains it all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we can take a question and find out specifically where the activity was in the past year.

Q Yes, find out.

Q As you recall, we haven't seen the rhetoric yet, but after the invasion of Afghanistan and again after martial law in Poland, the United States Government took various kinds of sanctions. In both those cases, the sanctions that were taken, which they didn't exactly change the world, but they seemed to have much stronger measures than are included in these things tonight. How do you analyze the situation in which rhetoric of the Administration has been strong but the measures that actually set forth do not seem to be those that would seem to have a great deal of weight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It took 20 mintues into the briefing before Oberdorfer got to me. The answer to the question I think, Don, is fairly simply. As I tried to indicate, we are dealing with this issue at two levels. With regard to the first level on the question you really have in mind, one of our major objectives is in fact to proceed in the civil aviation community, international civil aviation community, through, for example, and I think it is mentioned in your fact sheet, the ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization, both in terms of condemnatory steps against the Soviet Union and in terms of trying to find ways in which we can as an international community develop ways in which this will not happen again, and in a third phase -- and I am not going to go into detail on this and I will try to explain why in a second. A third aspect of that is to see what can be developed in the way of international reaction to the Soviet Union. You will note, for example, as a step taken independently by Canada today, they announced that they still suspend Aeroflot flights to Montreal and to Canada for 60 days.

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That is an example of the sort of effort that we are going to want to pursue internationally. Now I am not going to go into detail on that basis on issues that have to be negotiated out, dealt with with allies and other members of the ICAO, for example. We are beginning negotiations and discussions with them on that subject. We will have a better sense of how much we will be able to achieve after we have pursued that process further. With regard to the general thrust of your question, however, I have got to say to you that it is our view that the proper way to proceed is with specific actions relating to civil aviation in every way that we can and in the broader sense that the way you change Soviet behavior is by dealing with issues such as the defense budget, such as the way in which we deal with arms control negotiations with the Soviets, how we are able to strengthen the economy and so forth and that those are the ways over the long term in which we will change general Soviet --

Q In other words, do what you are doing anyway basically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In other words, do what we are announcing you do that we are doing today.

Q Could I ask you a couple of questions? First of all, since the thing that really upset the Soviets more than anything that Reagan did since coming to office and more than the MX, more than the Euro missiles which was announced, change in direction for defense policy last March 23rd. Are you planning to reemphasize that? Are you going to bring that up again as the President did for a couple of weeks after that speech to demonstrate what our position actually is on attempting to prevent nuclear war in respect for life and so forth. They are so obvious.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since I tried to indicate in the beginning in our view this shoot down reconfirms the approach this Administration has been taking to defense issues for example and I think it is fairly clear that we will continue to stand by the positions the President has taken thereon. I am not arguing that we are going to try to take unfair or make a specific example of this event but we are going to be making the point I have made here today which is that this demonstrates Soviet behavior and in terms of an understanding of the Soviets, things like a strengthened defense posture are important to us.

Mr. O'Leary?

Q Is Canada the only country that has done anything in conjunction with us up until now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jerry, it is not a question of in conjunction with us. We don't have any Aeroflot flights into the U.S.. Those were suspended as a policy sanction I believe or was it Afghanistan? Poland. But anyway, Canada has acted and as far as I know at this point, Jerry, that is the only country that has taken specific action about this as far as I know.

Q How many years of increases in the defense budget do you anticipate before Soviet behavior begins to change?

Q Bravo.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't any answer to that question.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Somebody behind you? Yes.

Q You mentioned this transportation agreement which no one seems to know too much about, that it just expired but you were not going to renew it. What it says on the fact sheet was in fact it was renewed for 18 months in June of this year and now you are cancelling the renewal. Which is correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me tell you the specific situation and if the fact sheet says 18 months it is, I think, wrong.

Q They also say --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agreement expired I think at the end of August. We will get you the exact facts. We were in discussions with the Soviets about a renewal of that agreement. We had sent a diplomatic note in fact to the Soviet Union saying we were prepared to extend the agreement for six months while we discussed renewing it for a greater length of time. We have now withdrawn that note which informed the Soviet Union that we were prepared to extend it for the six months while we discussed a further or a renegotiation or a pursuit of the agreement so that we have withdrawn the note to the Soviets which would have extended it for six months. It is now, therefore, expired.

Yes, sir?

Q What is your view of the Carter Administration sanctions that they took after Afghanistan, boycott of the Olympics and the grain embargo? Was it your view that, the Administration's view, that this does more harm than good and is that why you are not pursuing this kind of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the view of this Administration with regard to the grain embargo is clear. It was clear when the President was campaigning for office. In addition as you know we now have legislation which makes a grain embargo even more difficult to impose.

With regard to the Olympic sanctions I won't argue at all that those actions were important and should have been taken -- for example, the Olympic sanctions. But I am simply saying that with regard to this specific case and without trying to get into an argument about whether Poland deserves more sanctions or less than this event, it is our judgment that the best way to proceed in response to this act is to deal with it particularly in the area of civil aviation, at the same time, by the way and they are in the fact sheet, but pursuing claims on the part of those who have been injured or killed, the families of those who were killed but to pursue it in the civil aviation area while recognizing that with regard to the general question of dealing with the Soviet Union the way you deal with them is in the broader aspects that I have tried to identify.

Yes, sir?

Q Is it also true --

Q Could you tell us the three negotiations that you have suspended or cancelled, are those the only ones that you mentioned or are there more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are those three, yes.

Q Could your statement be taken to mean that no further bilateral actions stemming directly from this are contemplated by the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. You can't take it at that. You can simply take it as a statement that as of this time right now these are the steps that the President wishes to take. All I am saying then is I can't predict what further actions he may decide in the next weeks to take.

I am trying to get somebody. Yes.

Q Will there be a signing of a final document in Madrid despite the refusal of Malta to join the European countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That will be determined when they get to Madrid; precisely how they will proceed. There have been a number of proposals, one of which would have the 34 who have agreed to the document in fact proceed with the document leaving open Malta's accession to it. I don't know what will finally be decided at Malta; I mean at Madrid.

Q Releasing the tapes is going to raise the question again why if it was possible to monitor the conversation between the pilots and the ground station it wasn't possible to get in touch with the KAL flight and warn them it was in danger or some communication of that nature. The Russians in a very backhanded way have already been saying that. If you had been able to listen in on their conversations, why couldn't you at the same time technically be in touch with the KAL?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would far rather those questions be answered at the Defense Department or someplace where you have experts. Let me simply say one relevant fact is that we have never claimed, in fact I will state to you right now, this was not real time information. This was obtained over a period of time. It was not, to begin with, our information in the first place.

Q The Japanese could not have reacted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So I can't speak for that except again it wasn't real time.

Q Can I ask a question about reparations? Have the Soviets ever paid reparations in any case where they have caused casualties as in the '78 and is there any reason that we think that they would pay any reparations for an act they don't even acknowledge having committed as you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the best of our knowledge they have not paid reparations in any similar case. I don't think they did, I know they didn't in the earlier Korean case.

Q They demanded payments in the case of the other planes?

Q Let him answer.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '78 I am talking about. But to answer your question whether they had paid it in the past, may be relevant to an estimate of whether they will pay this time or not but that does not mean that we should not pursue it with every means we have available and we intend --

MORE

Q What are the means?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to go into those in detail yet, because obviously we are going to be talking to other allies and friends who also had people who were lost, but we will pursue it.

Q Do we have any reason to think that the Soviets can be pressured to pay any reparations in this case?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The first thing we have to do is to make them understand that they have got to admit that they did it. I cannot give you an answer. I would have to say to you that I think I am not at this stage particularly hopeful that they will quickly agree to reparations.

Q Is the Secretary of State going to talk about this at the Madrid Conference? Have his remarks been changed as a result of this incident?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Do you expect the conference itself to become -- that others will also talk about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q This will be the main topic of the conference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't say it will be -- by any means be the only topic that the others will mention, but I am confident that it will be a major topic at the conference.

Q The major part of Shultz' presentation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely right.

Q The only part of Shultz' agenda, or any other topics?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The way I tried to phrase that, it will be the principal focus of his conversation with Mr. Gromyko. I don't want to go beyond that.

Q Given the confusion by the RC-135 plane, is there any effort by the Administration to fly our planes at a different schedule than the Koreans now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a question I cannot answer.

Q Has any step, secondly, and from your statement you have said that you wanted this seen as an East-West issue, but as a shoot down of this plane?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said was it would not be correct, it would not be useful to us, or to the process of pursuing this issue, if it became nothing more than, or simply an issue of East-West relations.

Q Was it because of that that the Administration did not say earlier that there was a spy plane in the vicinity of the Korean airliner, and do you think you have hurt yourself by not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think there are two answers to that question which relate to each other: The first of which is, as I tried to indicate in the facts we laid out today, when you have a plane on the ground an hour before the KAL airliner is shot down, when there are the major distance differences even during most of the flight, it was not, we thought at the time, a relevant issue. That is point 1. Point 2 -- and this is less the answer, but it is important, I think. I come back again to saying we were not dealing with a real time situation. This has been a case of trying to put things together, to make the picture fit and to understand it. It was not, for example, that in the briefing of the Congressional Leadership yesterday we tried to hide the fact of the RC-135. We did not, as this process began, believe there was any relevance to the relationship between the two, and as we began to put things together, it begins to fit, but only in the most extreme way.

Q Are you ruling out any possibility that the computer tape was sabotaged?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't understand what you mean. The KAL?

Q The tape provided the plan, TASS is accusing us of having sabotaged it. That raises a rather interesting question as to whether --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: KAL computer tape?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't have speculated on that.

Q She has been trying to be recognized.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am prepared to end with one more over here, if you will.

Q Can you tell us --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I may regret this.

Q Does the United States know or have evidence to suggest who in the Soviet Union approved this shoot down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q No idea whatsoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

MORE

Q Can we just try one more on this Kiev Council; just what it is? Is this a council --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Factual.

Q You are not going to open; is that what it is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Got it. We were in the process of negotiating for the opening of a consulate, a U. S. Consulate in Kiev, and a Soviet Consulate in New York prior to the Afghan invasion. At the time of the Afghan invasion. President Carter stopped those negotiations. Earlier this year we began again with the Soviets discussions of opening a U. S. Consulate in Kiev, and a Soviet Consulate in New York. We have now suspended those discussions.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (6:30 P.M. EDT)

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WHITE HOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
NSC FOR BOB SIMS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS AN ON-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY SHULTZ ABOARD HIS AIRCRAFT BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MADRID:

--

Q. MR. SECRETARY, I WONDER IF YOU CAN TELL US WHETHER AGENDA FOR THE GROMYKO MEETING WILL STILL INCLUDE [illegible] NEGOTIATIONS AND WHAT YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT [illegible] AND WHETHER THE QUESTION OF THE APPARENT SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF SALT AND ABM WILL COME UP?

A. MY AGENDA FOR THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WILL BE STRICTLY HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER.

Q. GROMYKO, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS FREE TO RAISE SUBJECTS ON HIS OWN. DO YOU EXPECT HE WILL RAISE ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS CONTROL? AND WILL YOU BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS RAISING THEM?

A. OBVIOUSLY, HE CAN RAISE WHATEVER HE WANTS TO RAISE, BUT AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED, THE ONLY SUBJECTS THAT I INTEND TO ADDRESS AT ALL IN THIS SESSION ARE HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS, AND IN PARTICULAR, THE KOREAN AIRLINER.

--

Q. DO WE HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE INCIDENT, AND DO WE KNOW ANYTHING, FOR INSTANCE, ABOUT THE PILOT... THE SOVIET PILOT? WAS HE AN EXPERIENCED PILOT? IN TERMS OF PILOT ERROR... WHAT MORE DO YOU KNOW?...

A. I DON'T NOTICE THAT IT'S PILOT ERROR THAT I KNOW OF, AND THE TAPES THAT WE HAVE CONSTITUTE OUR KNOWLEDGE BASICALLY OF WHAT TOOK PLACE, AND THEY SHOW A QUITE CLOSE INTERCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN THE PILOT AND HIS GROUND CONTROL. WE DON'T HAVE THE MESSAGES FROM THE GROUND CONTROL AND THE PILOT, SO WE CAN'T SAY WHAT WAS CONTAINED IN THOSE MESSAGES. BUT I THINK YOU CAN PRETTY WELL INFER FROM THEM WHAT THE PILOT HAD TO SAY.

[illegible] ON'T HEAR THE EARLIER QUESTIONS, BUT HAS GROMYKO [illegible]ED THAT HE WILL MEET WITH YOU?

A. THE MEETING HAS BEEN SCHEDULED, AND WE HAVE CONFIRMED TO MR. GROMYKO THAT THE LUNCH THAT WE HAD PLANNED IS NO

LONGER ON THE SCHEDULE AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. AND WE HAVE SET THE TIME FOR THE MEETING, AND THAT'S WHAT I KNOW ABOUT IT.

--

Q. BY GIVING THE AIRLINER INCIDENT PRECEDENCE, (ILLEGIBLE) FIND ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THAT YOU WON'T GET AROUND TO ANYTHING THAT SET THE TONE FOR THE WHOLE CONVERSATION HERE, AND WON'T THAT MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A SENSIBLE CONVERSATION ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE?

A. WELL, AS FAR AS I'M CONCERNED, THE EXCLUSIVE SUBJECTS OF CONVERSATION HERE ARE THE HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS, AND THE SHOOT-DOWN OF THE AIRLINER IS A GIGANTIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION. BUT, IN A DEEP SENSE, THAT'S WHAT THE MADRID MEETINGS HAVE BEEN ALL ABOUT -- HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS. AND WHILE WE HAVE WORKED HARD TO GET GOOD LANGUAGE IN THIS DOCUMENT, WE ARE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT, AND IN MY STATEMENT I INTEND TO BRING OUT THAT, OF COURSE, WORDS ARE IMPORTANT, BUT MUCH MORE IMPORTANT ARE DEEDS. AND HERE WE HAVE A DEED -- AN ACTION -- THAT IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF ANY KIND OF STANDARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT CAN BE IMAGINED.

--

Q. WHY DO YOU THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO HAVE THIS MEETING? WHAT CAN YOU POSSIBLY SAY TO HIM THAT YOU HAVEN'T ALREADY SAID AT THE MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO? WHAT CAN YOU POSSIBLY SAY TO HIM THAT HASN'T ALREADY BEEN SAID IN VERY STRONG LANGUAGE SEVERAL TIMES OVER THIS PAST WEEK?

A. I CONSIDER IT AN OPPORTUNITY TO CONFRONT DIRECTLY A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO -- THE PERSON WHO MUST HAVE BEEN INVOLVED HEAVILY IN THE DECISION ABOUT ALL OF THIS. PARTICULARLY, WE KNOW THE POLITBURO MUST BE THE SOURCE OF THEIR DECISION ABOUT HOW TO REACT TO THIS, SO I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT TO PUT IT TO THEIR HIGH AUTHORITIES DIRECTLY. WHAT IS THEIR EXPLANATION? WHY DON'T THEY TELL THE TRUTH?

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TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

Q. MR. SECRETARY, TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT, TWO MORE MARINES WERE KILLED TODAY IN BEIRUT. HAS THE ADMINISTRATION MADE ANY FURTHER DECISIONS ABOUT FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF MORE MARINES IN BEIRUT? OR A DECISION (ILLEGIBLE) OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MNF REGARDING A (ILLEGIBLE)?

ANY DECISIONS THAT ARE MADE WITH THE MNF -- WE WILL OF COURSE, WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS. THERE IS NO TO INCREASE OR DECREASE THE MARINE FORCE IN BEIRUT BUT, OF COURSE, THE SITUATION IS ONE IN WHICH THERE IS A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF VIOLENCE TAKING PLACE AND, TRAGICALLY, SOME OF OUR MARINES HAVE BEEN KILLED. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN SOME WOUNDED, BUT THAT'S A MATTER WHICH WE HAVE TO MONITOR AND BE CONCERNED ABOUT, AS I'M SURE THE OTHER MNF COUNTRIES ARE SIMILARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR NATIONALS. OF COURSE, WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED THAT WE CONTRIBUTE WHAT WE CAN TO THE BASIC MISSION IN THE DEPLOYMENT IN THE GFIRST PLACE.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT HOW THE DECISION WAS MADE TO INVOKE THE SANCTIONS THAT YOU DID, AND HOW THE DECISION WAS MADE TO COME TO MADRID, AND AT ANY TIME, DID YOU CONSIDER NOT COMING TO MADRID? AND AT ANY TIME, DID YOU CONSIDER STRONGER SANCTIONS THAN WERE TAKEN?

A. AS FAR AS COMING TO MADRID IS CONCERNED, THAT DECISION ORIGINALLY HAD TO DO WITH THE CSCE MEETING, AND THERE WAS A GENERAL ASSUMPTION LAST -- TIME GOES BY, DON'T HOLD ME TO THE DATES -- LAST JULY, WHEN AN AGREEMENT WAS BEING REACHED ON THE BASIS OF THE SPANISH COMPROMISE PROPOSAL INVOLVING THE SOVIET UNION AND OURSELVES AND OUR PARTNERS ON WHAT THIS DOCUMENT OUGHT TO SAY. AT THAT TIME, WE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE UNDOUBTEDLY A CONSENSUS DOCUMENT AND THE SPANISH, AS PART OF THEIR PROPOSAL, PROPOSED THAT FOREIGN MINISTERS COME AND JOIN IN THE SIGNING OF THAT DOCUMENT. AS IT HAS TURNED OUT, FIRST OF TA HAS BEEN IN DISAGREEMENT WITH WHAT IS WRITTEN S TO ADD SOMETHING, AND THAT HAS CONSTITUTED A WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WORKING AT. SO THE ANSWER TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION IS THE DECISION TO HAVE A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND TO GO TO MADRID WAS BASICALLY MADE SOME TIME AGO. WHEN THE MALTESE QUESTION AROSE, AND IT AT LEAST IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE WON'T BE THE KIND OF DOCUMENT THAT WE WISH TO SEE, WE CONSIDERED HOW TO HANDLE IT AND DECIDED AS WE DISCUSSED IT OURSELVES AND WITH AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN AND WITH THE PRESIDENT, THAT THE BEST THING TO DO WAS TO GO AHEAD TO MADRID. THE SPANISH ISSUED AN INVITATION THAT WAS THEIR INVITATION TO FOREIGN MINISTERS -- AS DISTINCT FROM AN INVITATION TO GO TO THAT CONFERENCE AS SUCH -- SO I THINK THAT WAS A WAY OF PROCEEDING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND, AT THE SAME TIME, PRESERVING THE NOTIONS ABOUT THE CSCE DOCUMENT THAT WE HAD IN MIND ALL ALONG. OF COURSE, THERE ARE CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS GOING ON AS FAR AS THE MALTESE ARE CONCERNED, AND IT'S CONCEIVABLE THAT THERE WILL BE AN AGREED DOCUMENT BY THE TIME WE GET THERE, BUT I DON'T WANT TO SAY THERE WILL. IT'S JUST THAT THAT'S BEING LOOKED AT ALL THE TIME. NOW, GIVEN THE KOREAN AIRLINER SHOT-DOWN, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN VERY FIRM, THAT, BY ALL MEANS, WE SHOULD CONTINUE ON AND THAT I SHOULD GO TO MADRID. THIS IS A MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION, AND WE WANT TO TAKE THE OCCASION TO TALK TO ALL OF THE COUNTRIES THERE. IT'S BEEN A WORLDWIDE RESPONSE AND WE WANT TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF A HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING. SO, IN THAT SENSE, IT HAS AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY AND A FORUM FOR THE KIND OF DISCUSSION THAT WE THINK IS QUITE APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

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Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE SPOKEN IN THE PAST -- YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED IN THE PAST ABOUT WHETHER THIS MEETING COULD BE USED IN ANY WAY FOR THE PREPARATION FOR A POSSIBLE SUMMIT. YOU SAID THAT A SUMMIT WOULD HAVE TO BE WELL PREPARED FOR AND THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SOME PROSPECTS FOR CONCRETE RESULTS. GIVEN THE KAL SHOOT-DOWN NOW, WOULD YOU SAY THAT ANY PROSPECTS OF A SUMMIT EVEN REMOTELY BEING DISCUSSED AT A MEETING LIKE THIS ARE OUT? AND ARE YOU LIMITING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ONLY AT THIS MEETING OR ARE YOU LIMITING THE SUBJECTS OF THE UN MEETINGS AND SALT AS WELL UNLESS YOU GET A SATISFACTORY ANSWER?

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8401
THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 SECTO 9006

STATE FOR S/S-CHARLES HILL AND PA-ALAN ROMBERG
WHITE HOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
NSC FOR BOB SIMS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

A. I CERTAINLY DON'T INTEND TO BRING UP ANY SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS. WHETHER MR. GROMYKO BRINGS THEM UP, OF COURSE, IS UP TO HIM. IF HE DOES, I DON'T INTEND TO DISCUSS THEM. I INTEND TO DISCUSS IN MY MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO EXCLUSIVELY HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS AND, PARTICULARLY ... KOREAN SHOOT-DOWN. BUT, OF COURSE, THERE ARE OTHER ...TS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOVIET BEHAVIOR AND THEIR ...ENT OF DISSIDENTS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION THAT I INTEND TO DISCUSS.
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Q. IF HE BRINGS UP THE SUBJECT OF A POSSIBLE SUMMIT, YOU WON'T DISCUSS IT?

A. I'M GOING TO CONFINE MY DISCUSSION TO THE THINGS THAT I HAVE TALKED ABOUT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT HAPPENS IF GROMYKO SITS DOWN AND SAYS I DON'T WANT TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER? WOULD IT BE AN UNUSUALLY SHORT MEETING?

A. IF HE COMES TO THE MEETING, HE WILL HEAR ME DISCUSS IT. IF HE DOESN'T CHOOSE TO ADD ANY RESPONSE, OF COURSE, THAT'S UP TO HIM. BUT I INTEND TO GIVE THE SUBJECT A FULL AIRING.

Q. COULD YOU ALSO BE MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT THE OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS?

A. I THINK THEY ARE VERY WELL KNOWN. THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE THAT WE CARE VERY DEEPLY ABOUT. THERE ARE GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWRY. THERE ARE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THERE ARE A GREAT VARIETY OF MATTERS THAT I ALWAYS BRING UP IN MY MEETINGS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND I INTEND TO DO SO IN THIS MEETING.

'M NOT SURE I UNDERSTOOD ONE OF YOUR ANSWERS BEFORE ... TALKED ABOUT CONFRONTING A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO ... OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD A PART OF THE DECISION -- YOU ARE NOT ACCUSING THE POLITBURO AT THIS POINT OF SHOOTING DOWN THE AIRPLANE, ARE YOU?
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A. NO, I'M NOT. I HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE DECISION WAS MADE TO SHOOT THIS PLANE DOWN.

Q. I'M JUST TALKING ABOUT WHO HAD A PART IN THE DECISION AFTER THE PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN -- PEOPLE WHO HAD A PART IN THE RESPONSE. . .

A. HE CLEARLY HAD A PART IN THE RESPONSE. TO SOME DEGREE, HE HAD A PART PRESUMABLY IN SETTING THE PROCEDURES FOR BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WHEN AN UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT ENTERS THEIR AIRSPACE, SO THESE ARE SUBJECTS THAT, IN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER, I BELIEVE, AND THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES, WE SHOULD PUT TO THEIR HIGH AUTHORITY.

- (INTERRUPTING A QUESTIONER) I DON'T THINK WE HAVE NEARLY ENOUGH INFORMATION ON THEIR COMMAND STRUCTURE OF DEALING WITH THESE THINGS. IT'S JUST THAT I CAN'T GIVE YOU ANY DEFINITIVE ANSWER ON THAT WITHOUT INFORMATION.
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Q. CAN YOU EVALUATE YOUR OWN SENSE OF WHAT THE IMPACT OF THIS HAS BEEN ON US/SOVIET RELATIONS? THIS MEETING WAS ORIGINALLY INTENDED, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, TO PAVE THE WAY FOR YOUR GROMYKO MEETINGS AT THE UN AND TO TALK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL, ETC., SO CAN YOU TALK ABOUT ... WAS THERE ANY LIKELY PROGRESS ON INF THAT NOW ISN'T GOING TO MATERIALIZE -- WHAT IS THE REAL IMPACT OF THIS INCIDENT ON AMERICAN/SOVIET RELATIONS?

A. WELL, IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS HAD A VERY REALISTIC VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SOCIETY AND WHILE THIS TRAGEDY IS SHOCKING, IT IS NO DOUBT IN KEEPING WITH HIS VIEW OF HOW THIS SOCIETY BEHAVES. SINCE THAT IS THE CASE, THE POLICIES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING ARE UNALTERED AND THOSE

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8402
THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 SECTO 9006

STATE FOR S/S-CHARLES HILL AND PA-ALAN ROMBERG
WHITE HOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
NSC FOR BOB SIMS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

POLICIES ARE THAT WE MUST BE REALISTIC ABOUT THE NATURE OF THAT SOCIETY AND WHAT THEY ARE DOING AND BE READY TO DESCRIBE IT WITH ACCURACY AND CANDOR. WE MUST BE STRONG SO THAT WE HAVE A CAPACITY TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT IT'S POSSIBLE TO HAVE AGREEMENTS IN A FIELD LIKE ARMS CONTROL THAT CAN SERVE [illegible] INTERESTS IN MAKING THE WORLD A LITTLE MORE STABLE. [illegible] LONG AS THESE AGREEMENTS CAN BE VERIFIABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, WE ARE WILLING TO TALK TO THEM ABOUT THEM. AND THAT'S WHY THE PRESIDENT HAS CONTINUED TO SEND PAUL NITZE BACK TO GENEVA AS THE MOST RECENT EXPRESSION OF THAT. BUT, CERTAINLY, IN A TRAGEDY LIKE THIS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING IT, IT'S A GREAT SETBACK TO ANYONE'S CAPACITY TO TALK TO THEM ABOUT THE NORMAL RANGE OF MATTERS THAT YOU DISCUSS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES.

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Q. DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY, IN ANSWER TO JOHN THAT YOU WILL NOT DISCUSS, EVEN IF GROMYKO WANTS TO, WHAT IT IS YOU ARE GOING TO SAY TO EACH OTHER IN SEPTEMBER?

A. AT THE MEETING THAT IS SCHEDULED ON THURSDAY WITH GROMYKO, MY AGENDA IS EXCLUSIVELY A HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA, AND I HAVE DESCRIBED IT NOW AND I WON'T DESCRIBE IT AGAIN.

Q. ARE YOU STILL PLANNING TO SEE HIM IN NEW YORK AS PLANNED BEFOREHAND?

A. THE FOCUS HERE IS ON THIS MEETING, AND WE'LL HAVE TO SEE WHAT COMES OUT OF THIS MEETING -- IF THERE IS ANYTHING SATISFACTORY THAT COMES OUT OF IT. BUT WE ARE NOT GOING TO LOOK BEYOND THAT.

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Q. THEN YOU ARE SAYING THAT IF THERE IS NO RESOLUTION OF THIS AIRLINER EPISODE, IT'S POSSIBLE YOU WON'T HAVE [illegible] OTHER MEETINGS IN NEW YORK?

[illegible]'S CERTAINLY POSSIBLE.

Q. I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THIS FITS IN WITH EITHER YOUR PHILOSOPHY OR THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY UP TO THIS

POINT. YOU HAVE EMPHASIZED THE (ILLEGIBLE) THINGS OF BEING STRONG AND TALKING. THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION STILL HAVE CENTRAL AMERICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN, AND EAST ASIA, NUCLEAR ARMS -- A LIST AS LONG AS YOUR ARM. I GUESS WE WERE PREPARED FOR YOU SAYING, FROM WHAT HAD BEEN SAID, YOU WANTED TO TALK FIRST ABOUT THIS, BUT NOT TO SAY YOU WOULDN'T TALK ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE. AND I DON'T QUITE SEE HOW THAT FITS IN WITH THE (ILLEGIBLE) YOU HAVE EXPRESSED UP TO NOW. WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO GO BEYOND JUST MAKING THE FIRST ITEM TO SAY THAT'S ALL WE'LL TALK ABOUT?

A. THIS MEETING IN MADRID HAS ITS WHOLE CENTER OF GRAVITY ON THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THAT'S WHAT THIS IS ALL ABOUT. AND THAT'S WHAT DESERVES THE EMPHASIS, AND, OF COURSE, THE SHOOT-DOWN IS SUCH A GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS THAT I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE IT AND TO CALL FOR AN ACCOUNTING. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH A SOCIETY LIKE THE SOVIET UNION IS THAT THERE IS NO SENSE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN SUCH A SOCIETY. THEY CAN DO THINGS, AND NO ONE CAN QUESTION THEM IN THERE. THERE IS NO PRESS LIKE THIS. THERE IS NO CONGRESS. THERE IS NO CAPACITY TO CALL FOR AN ACCOUNTABILITY. HERE, THEY HAVE MADE THESE LIES ABOUT WHAT TOOK PLACE, YET THERE IS NO ACCOUNTABILITY EXCEPT FROM THE OUTSIDE WORLD. AND, SO, I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT FOR THEIR HIGHEST OFFICIALS TO BE HELD TO ACCOUNT. NOW, (ILLEGIBLE) THEY WILL NOT RESPOND IN ANY WAY BUT AT LEAST WE SHOULD PUT FORWARD THAT MINIMAL LEVEL OF CIVILIZED BEHAVIOR THAT YOU ARE ACCOUNTABLE AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE THINGS YOU DO.

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Q. WHAT DO YOU DO IF HE SAYS TO YOU, "MR. SECRETARY, WE HAVE COME UP WITH A NEW PROPOSAL FOR INF TALKS AND I'D LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THAT?" WHAT DO YOU SAY?

A. I'D TELL HIM THAT MR. NITZE IS THERE IN GENEVA AND THAT IS THE FORUM IN WHICH WE ARE NEGOTIATING THE INF

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MADRID
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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 SECTO 9006

STATE FOR S/S-CHARLES HILL AND PA-ALAN ROMBERG
WHITE HOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
NSC FOR BOB SIMS

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: PRESS CONFERENCE

MATTERS AND, IF THEY HAVE A NEW PROPOSAL, THERE IS A VERY COMPETENT NEGOTIATOR SITTING THERE READY TO HEAR IT.

Q., (ILLEGIBLE) SOVIETS THAT YOU WANT TO LIMIT THE TALKS TO THIS ONE TOPIC?

THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT DID A VERY GOOD JOB OF LAYING IN HIS SPEECH LAST NIGHT.

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Q. (ILLEGIBLE) DIPLOMATIC MESSAGE - [illegible] EGIBLE) TO TELL THEM THAT'S THE WAY IT'S GOING TO [illegible].

A. THESE MEETINGS NORMALLY -- PEOPLE DON'T TRANSMIT AGENDAS -- WE GO AND SPEAK BACK AND FORTH. AT LEAST THAT'S BEEN THE WAY IT'S BEEN IN OTHER MEETINGS I'VE CONDUCTED. AND SO, I'M SURE THAT HE IS WELL AWARE OF WHAT OUR AGENDA IS. IF HE ISN'T, [illegible] IF ANY OF YOU PEOPLE WRITE THIS UP, WHY HE'LL UNDOUBTEDLY READ ABOUT IT.

Q. MR: SECRETARY, DO YOU TALK FIRST ON THURSDAY? THAT IS TO SAY, WHO IS THE NOMINAL HOST?

A. (COULD NOT HEAR)

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Q. (UNINTELLIGIBLE)

A. WE ARE WORKING WITH OUR FRIENDS AND COUNTRIES ALL AROUND THE WORLD; THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT SENSE OF OUTRAGE AT WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND WE ARE TAKING THE VIEW THAT THE BEST WAY TO GO ABOUT THIS IS TO TALK WITH PEOPLE AND TO MEET WITH PEOPLE AND TRY TO FIND A SET OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS THAT FIT WHAT IS TRULY AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME. IT ISN'T AS THOUGH THIS IS -- THIS IS NOT EVEN REMOTELY A US/USSR EXCLUSIVELY KIND OF AN ISSUE. WE HAD CITIZENS ON THAT PLANE. SO DID 13 COUNTRIES. SO IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL MATTER, AND TO EXPLORE THIS, AND WE ARE, VERY ENERGETICALLY. WE HAD A NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, INCLUDING YESTERDAY, AND WE HOPE TO TALK WITH OTHERS AT LENGTH IN THIS SESSION HERE. AND THAT'S THE WAY WE'RE DOING IT. AND WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SAY,

EXACTLY, REMAINS TO BE SEEN. I WAS GLAD TO SEE CANADA MAKE THE STATEMENT THAT IT DID YESTERDAY, SO WE'LL JUST HAVE TO SEE.

Q. (ILLEGIBLE)

A. (INDISTINGUISHABLE) ... THE IDEA FOR THIS MADRID MEETING AT ONE TIME WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A KIND OF WORKING LUNCH AND GO ON THROUGH A MEETING -- THAT KIND OF A FORMAT. AND WE THOUGHT THAT WAS AN INAPPROPRIATE FORMAT.

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Q. WHERE WILL THE MEETING BE?

A. I THINK IT TAKES PLACE IN OUR AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

Q. HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE YOU TO SAY YOUR PIECE IF GROMYKO DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY?

A. WELL, I DON'T WANT TO DESCRIBE THE INTERNALS OF THIS, AND JUST HOW IT WILL GO. SHULTZ

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ACTION PA-02

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 SECTO 9026

DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS: PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: *BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted], SEPTEMBER 8, 1983*

BEGIN TEXT:

HUGHES: MAY I HAVE A LITTLE ORDER HERE PLEASE. O.K. WE ARE GOING TO DO THE SESSION ON BACKGROUND RULES. MOST OF YOU UNDERSTAND WHAT THAT IS. BUT LET ME MAKE IT CLEAR AGAIN THAT YOU MAY USE THE INFORMATION AND YOU MAY USE THE QUOTATION BUT YOU MAY NOT ATTRIBUTE THAT INFORMATION TO ANY SOURCE OTHER THAN SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS. FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION THE BRIEFERS ARE [redacted], THE THREE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO
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STRESS ONCE AGAIN THAT THIS IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO SENIOR

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AMERICAN OFFICIALS. [redacted]

[redacted] THANK YOU JOHN. I AM NOT GOING TO MAKE A LENGTHY STATEMENT. I WILL MAKE A FEW POINTS ABOUT THE MEETING. AS YOU KNOW EVEN IN THESE VERY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE A PRACTICE OF NOT COMMENTING ON OUR CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

Q: CAN YOU SPEAK LOUDER?

[redacted] AS YOU KNOW, WE DO NOT COMMENT ON OUR CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGES, BUT I WILL MAKE A FEW BRIEF POINTS. AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE STATED, THE MEETING WAS FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE TOTALLY UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WERE COMPLETELY INSENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS FELT AROUND THE WORLD CREATED BY THE KOREAN AIRLINE MASSACRE. THE SECRETARY OF STATE TREATED THE KOREAN MASSACRE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM AND ADDRESSED IT IN THAT CONTEXT. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE, BUT WAS MADE TO DISCUSS IT AT THE MEETING. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER HAD A DIFFERENT AGENDA, WANTED TO DISCUSS ARMS CONTROL. HE MADE A LENGTHY AND SOMEWHAT STALE PRESENTATION ON SOVIET SUPPORT FOR ARMS CONTROL WHICH INCLUDED NOTHING NEW IN THE WAY OF NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS AND HIS PRESENTATION ON ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS, MAINLY INF, DID NOT APPEAR TO DEMONSTRATE MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN TERMS OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WHILE OUR CONCERN AT THE MEETING WAS TO FOCUS ON THE KOREAN MASSACRE AS A HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM, THE SECRETARY DID DESCRIBE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STRONG COMMITMENT ON ARMS CONTROL. HIS INITIATIVES IN

DIFFERENT FORA INCLUDING STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, THE MUTUAL BALANCE FORCE REDUCTION TALKS IN VIENNA, THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT ALL INF MISSILES BE ELIMINATED AND A COMPLETE BAN IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AREA. BUT AS I SAID, THE FOCUS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESENTATION WAS THE KOREAN AIRLINE EPISODE WHERE HE STATED I THINK, THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S CASE VERY FORCEFULLY, ASKING THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY FOR AN EXPLANATION BUT FOR STEPS TO INSURE THAT THIS EPISODE

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WOULD NEVER TAKE PLACE AGAIN.

-- AS IN HIS PUBLIC PRESENTATION YESTERDAY, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO SOUGHT TO SHIFT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS TO THE UNITED STATES. IT BECAME CLEAR IN THE MEETING THAT FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT WAS NOT GOING TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE SUGGESTED THAT THE MEETING COME TO AN END. WHICH IT DID.

-- I WILL BE HAPPY TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q: IN WHAT RESPECT WAS IT WORSE TODAY THAN...
[redacted] I WOULD ONLY SAY THAT IN TERMS OF SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENTATION THE LINE WAS VERY SIMILAR TO YESTERDAY'S . IN TERMS OF STYLE, THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PRESENTATION WAS MORE AGGRESSIVE.

Q: SIR, YOU SAID THAT... (INAUDIBLE) AND THE STATEMENT IN FRONT OF US SAYS THAT THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE MATTER. DOES THIS IMPLY THEN THAT THE MEETING IN NEW YORK BETWEEN THE TWO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD ALSO NOT TAKE PLACE?
[redacted] THAT IS A SUBJECT WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT AT THIS TIME.

Q: CAN YOU DESCRIBE -- DID SHULTZ TALK FIRST OR DID

GROMYKO TALK FIRST AND HOW LONG DID IT TAKE SHULTZ TO LAY OUT HIS VIEWS, OR HIS PIECE?

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ACTION PA-02

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN MADRID
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3446
INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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SECTO

DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS; PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted]

[redacted] KAREN, I DON'T REALLY WANT TO GO INTO THAT KIND OF DETAIL. I THINK THAT THEY BOTH HAD A CHANCE TO GO BACK AND FORTH. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION EARLY ON IN THE MEETING ABOUT THE AGENDA ALONG THE LINES I SUGGESTED. THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT EARLY ON IN THE MEETING WANT TO ADDRESS THE AIRLINER INCIDENT AT ALL.

Q: CAN YOU THEN ON A DIFFERENT LEVEL, CAN YOU TALK ABOUT WHETHER ALL OF THIS IS REALLY A LOT OF SOUND AND FURY AND NOTHING IS GOING TO COME OF IT, SINCE YOU DON'T SEEM TO BE GETTING A LOT OF RUSH TO COOPERATE ON ANY KINDS OF ACTIONS?

[redacted] WELL, FIRST OF ALL THAT'S NOT CORRECT. AND THE

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PURPOSE OF THIS PRESS CONFERENCE IS NOT TO TALK ABOUT THOSE ACTIONS. BUT THAT IS INCORRECT. SECOND OF ALL, IT IS NOT ALL SOUND AND FURY. JUST BASED ON THE SPEECHES THAT YOU'VE UNDOUBTEDLY LISTENED TO HERE AT THIS CONFERENCE. FROM THE FAIR SAMPLE OF WORLD OPINION, IT IS CLEAR THAT PEOPLE ARE VERY UPSET ABOUT THE MASSACRE. AND AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO MAKES CLEAR, THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE MATTER. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO PUSH THIS QUESTION, TO DEMAND AN EXPLANATION, AND TO DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE STEPS TO INSURE THAT WE DON'T SEE THIS HAPPEN AGAIN.

Q: I THINK YOU HAVE TO GIVE US A LITTLE BIT MORE OF HOW IT WENT SINCE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE SUBSTANCE. YOU SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT GROMYKO PERHAPS HAD SPOKEN FIRST ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. THE SECRETARY MADE SOME COMMENT ON ARMS CONTROL, WHICH IS A QUESTION HE HAD SAID EARLIER HE WOULD NOT TALK ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE. AND SECONDLY HE SEEMED TO TALK ABOUT THE PLANE INCIDENT AND GROMYKO THEN APPARENTLY STARTED GIVING AN EXPLANATION AND THE IMPRESSION YOU GAVE WAS THAT THE SECRETARY THEN CUT HIM OFF IN THE MIDDLE.

[redacted]: WELL, BERNIE YOU'RE TRYING TO PUT A LOT OF WORDS INTO MY MOUTH MAINLY DESIGNED TO GIVE YOU MORE INFORMATION. WE NORMALLY, IN THESE CASES, AND I'VE BRIEFED ON OTHER GROMYKO MEETINGS, I THINK WE'VE GONE INTO AS MUCH DETAIL TODAY AS WE HAVE IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION EARLY ON IN THE MEETING ABOUT THE AGENDA. THERE WAS A FAIRLY LENGTHY AND TYPICAL SOVIET STATEMENT

ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. THE SECRETARY OF STATE DEFENDED THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON ARMS CONTROL, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS THE UNITED STATES THAT HAS COME FORWARD WITH INNOVATIVE AND IMAGINATIVE APPROACHES. BUT THAT CONVERSATION ONLY TOOK PLACE AFTER THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER HAD AGREED THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE AIRLINER EPISODE. IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE AIRLINER EPISODE, IT BECAME CLEAR THAT MR. GROMYKO'S LINE WAS THE SAME AS THE ONE HE PRESENTED IN PUBLIC YESTERDAY. THAT IS, THAT THIS WAS A U.S. RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH IS TOTALLY PREPOSTEROUS AND UNACCEPTABLE. THE SOVIET UNION IN TODAY'S MEETING WAS INSENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS FELT AROUND THE WORLD BY

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THIS HEINOUS ACT.
HUGHES: HERE, THERE IS ONE OVER HERE. HERE WE GO.
NOPE. HERE, HERE.
Q: [redacted], WOULD YOU CARE TO PASS A JUDGMENT ON THE REACTION IN THIS CONFERENCE TO THE GROMYKO STATEMENT YESTERDAY MEANING, THE SPEECHES TODAY, THE MENTION OR LACK OF MENTION. FOR INSTANCE, THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE RUMANIANS DID NOT MENTION IT, OTHERS DID.

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SECTO

DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS: PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted]

[redacted] WELL, OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THE COUNTRIES, THE VAST MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT THIS CONFERENCE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED.

Q: [redacted] WHY DID IT TAKE TWO HOURS? WERE SPEAKERS USING INTERPRETATION OR WAS GROMYKO LISTENING TO SHULTZ AND THEN (INAUDIBLE.)

[redacted] GROMYKO WAS SPEAKING IN RUSSIAN AND THAT WAS BEING INTERPRETED. AND AS YOUR QUESTION IMPLIES, THAT TENDS TO DRAG THE MEETING OUT SOMEWHAT.

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Q: BUT HE DIDN'T ASK FOR ANY INTERPRETATION OF SHULTZ?
[redacted] NO.

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HUGHES: ONE BACK HERE.

Q: YESTERDAY FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO SAID AT THE CONFERENCE THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE KOREAN JET WAS ACTUALLY DOING SOME FORM OF SPY WORK. DID HE REPEAT CLEARLY THESE THINGS TO THE SECRETARY?

[redacted]: I SAID EARLIER THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESENTATION CLOSELY PARALLELED WHAT WAS SAID YESTERDAY IN PUBLIC.

HUGHES: MR. OSMOND.

Q. CAN WE SAY THAT THE BULK OF THE CONVERSATION THIS AFTERNOON DEALT WITH THE AIRLINER?

[redacted]: I WOULD SAY THAT IT WAS A GOOD PORTION OF TODAY'S SUBJECT. I WOULDN'T WANT TO GET INTO FRACTIONS WHETHER IT WAS 60 PERECENT, 40 PERCENT, I DON'T THINK THAT IS A VERY SENSIBLE WAY TO DESCRIBE IT.
Q: ON THE AGENDA, THE DISCUSSION ON ARMS CONTROL THERE SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A BIT OF CHANGE IN THE POSITION DESCRIBED TO SOME OF US ON THE PLANE. THEN SHULTZ SAID HE WOULDN'T TALK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL IF GROMYKO RAISED IT. I'M JUST WONDERING IF HE HAD TO DECIDE TO HAVE SOME DISCUSSION OF THIS BEFORE HE COULD GET GROMYKO TO COME TO THE MEETING.
BURT: YOU DIDN'T LISTEN CLOSELY ENOUGH TO WHAT I HAD SAID. THERE WAS NO NEGOTIATION ABOUT ARMS CONTROL GOING ON IN THIS MEETING. WHAT WE HEARD WAS A STALE REITERATION
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OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL WITH VERY LITTLE NEW IN SUBSTANCE. AND ALL THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE DID IN A VERY FORCEFUL WAY WAS TO DEFEND THE PRESIDENT'S RECORD IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL.
HUGHES: ONE IN THE BACK IN THE AISLE THERE.

Q. HOW LONG....
HUGHES: NO, THE GENTLEMEN NEXT TO YOU. GO AHEAD.

Q: (INAUDIBLE). WHAT DO YOU THINK THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE INTEREST TO SHOOT THE PLANE?

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HUGHES: (TO [redacted]) WHAT WAS THE RUSSIAN MOTIVATION?

[redacted]: WELL, I THINK THE SOVIETS EXPLAINED THAT PRETTY CLEARLY. THEY CONSIDER THEIR TERRITORY TO BE SACRED AND THAT ANYTHING THAT SEEMS TO OVERFLY IT RUNS THE VERY SERIOUS RISK OF BEING SHOT DOWN. IN OTHER WORDS THEIR TERRITORY RATHER THAN HUMAN LIFE IS SACRED.

HUGHES: THIS GENTLEMEN HERE IN FRONT OF US.
Q: YOU SAID THAT MR. SHULTZ CALLED THE MEETING TO AN END. WAS THERE AT ANY POINT THE INDICATION THAT MR. GROMYKO WAS ABOUT TO WALK OUT OR TO LEAVE.

[redacted]: I DON'T WANT TO DISCUSS THAT.

HUGHES: MR. OBERDORFER
Q. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK TWO SORT OF UNRELATED QUESTIONS. WHILE WE WERE IN THERE, WE WERE LISTENING TO THE NEWS BROADCAST WHICH SAID THATTHEU.S. FLEET HAD STARTED SHELLING IN LEBANON. DID THIS MATTER COME UP IN ANY WAY IN TODAY'S MEETING? AND SECONDLY, WHAT HAPPENS NOW, DID THE TWO MEN SAY TO EACH OTHER WE WILL TALK ABOUT THIS AGAIN IN NEW YORK? DID THEY EXPRESS TO EACH OTHER ANY KIND OF FUTURE CONTACTS ON THIS SUBJECT OR ON

ANY OTHER SUBJECT?

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8448
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SECTO

DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS; PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted]

[redacted]: THE ANSWER TO BOTH OF THOSE QUESTIONS IS NO.

HUGHES: MR. BEGLEITER.

Q: DID SECRETARY SHULTZ USE THE WORD MASSACRE? OR IS THAT YOUR WORD USING THE WORD MASSACRE?

[redacted]: WELL HE HAS CERTAINLY USED THAT WORD PUBLICLY AND I CAN'T RECALL THAT OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD WHETHER HE DID OR HE DIDN'T.

Q. DID HE USE IT IN THE MEETING?
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[redacted]: I JUST CAN'T SAY.

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Q: DID THE SECRETARY BRING UP OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS, THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS, IMMIGRATION MATTERS.

[redacted]: I THINK BECAUSE HE TREATED THIS ISSUE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONTEXT THAT YOU CAN ASSUME THAT HE DID.

HUGHES: JOHN.

Q. AS YOU KNOW, ON FRIDAY THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THERE MIGHT NOT BE A MEETING AT THE UN WITH MR. GROMYKO IF THE ANSWERS HERE STILL WERE NOT SATISFACTORY. DOES HE PLAN TO MEET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AT THE UN OR NOT?

[redacted]: THIS IS JUST A QUESTION AS I SAID BEFORE WE ARE NOT ADDRESSING RIGHT NOW.

HUGHES: OVER HERE.

Q: HOW FAR DO YOU THINK THAT THIS MEETING WITH GROMYKO WILL CHANGE THE CONTENT, THE SUBJECT OF SHULTZ'S SPEECH TOMORROW AT THE CONFERENCE?

[redacted]: THAT'S... I THINK THE MEETING HAS JUST TAKEN PLACE.... IT IS SOMETHING WE'LL CONSIDER PRIOR TO THE SPEECH.

HUGHES: MR. SHEIFFER.

Q: [redacted] HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS NOW?
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[redacted]: WELL, I DON'T REALLY WANT TO SAY TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT SIMPLY BECAUSE THAT AGAIN WE HAVE TO THINK ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS MEETING AND ASSESS IT. WE'VE SAID BEFORE THAT THE MASSACRE HAS HAD AN ADVERSE IMPACT. THAT'S AN OBVIOUS POINT TO MAKE. I THINK A MORE IMPORTANT POINT TO MAKE THOUGH IS THAT THIS EPISODE OF THE MASSACRE ITSELF IS NOT A U.S. SOVIET PROBLEM. A MORE APPROPRIATE QUESTION TO ASK IS WHAT DOES THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT MEAN FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD? IT'S

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STANDING WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

Q: SIR, THERE WAS A REPORT THAT FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING BETWEEN MR. GROMYKO AND MR. FERNANDO MORAN, THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT MR. GROMYKO TOLD MR. MORAN OR SUGGESTED THAT THE DECISION TO SHOOT DOWN THE SOUTH KOREAN PLANE WAS TAKEN AT A LOCAL LEVEL. HAS ANY OF THIS SURFACED DURING TODAY'S MEETING WITH MR. GROMYKO AND MR. SHULTZ OR HAS THERE BEEN ANY NEWS OF THIS VERSION?

[redacted]: WELL, I'M NOT GOING TO COMMENT ON A NEWS REPORT ABOUT ANOTHER MEETING. I JUST WILL SAY THAT WE FOUND THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS INSENSITIVE TO THE DESIRES OF THE WORLD TO FIND OUT THE TRUE EXPLANATION AND SOUGHT INSTEAD TO CLAIM AS HE DID YESTERDAY THAT THIS WAS A U.S. RESPONSIBILITY.

HUGHES: GO AHEAD, NO, NO, RIGHT NEXT TO YOU. NO, THE GENTLEMAN THERE. GO AHEAD.

Q. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT SAYS THAT THE U.S. WILL PRESS HARD ALONG WITH OTHERS THROUGHOUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR JUSTICE. NOW THAT YOU'VE

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8449
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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 SECTO 9026

SECTO

DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS; PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted]

HAD THE CHANCE TO TALK TO OTHER PEOPLE HERE, WHAT FORMS OF PRESSURE TO YOU EXPECT TO TAKE?

HUGHES: WELL, WE HAVE PURPOSELY NOT TALKED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THESE THINGS BECAUSE WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OUR FRIENDS ABOUT VARIOUS STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN. AND I DON'T THINK IT'S VERY USEFUL NOW TO SAY MUCH IN PUBLIC ABOUT HIS ALTHOUGH I CAN REITERATE THE KINDS OF THINGS THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SAID IN HIS SPEECH EARLIER THIS WEEK

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Q: DO YOU THINK ANYTHING WILL ACTUALLY DEVELOP AT ALL?

[redacted]: I DON'T WANT TO MAKE A PREDICTION ON A QUESTION

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LIKE THAT.

Q: I JUST WANTED TO ASK ABOUT THIS QUESTION ABOUT WHERE THE DECISION TO SHOOT DOWN THE AIRLINER HAD BEEN TAKEN. DID YOU ACTUALLY POSE THAT QUESTION?

[redacted]: THERE WERE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS POSED TO GROMYKO AND NONE OF THE ANSWERS TO THE EXTENT THERE WERE ANSWERS WERE SATISFACTORY.

Q: ARE YOU NOT WORRIED THAT BY PUSHING THIS ONTO THE SCHEDULE YOU MAY UNDERMINE OR ENDANGER THE SPIRIT OF MADRID?
[redacted]: WELL, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT AS THE SECRETARY OF STATE POINTED OUT THAT THE SPIRIT OF MADRID IS ALL ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WHAT BETTER EXAMPLE OF STEPS THAT ENDANGER THE SPIRIT OF MADRID THAT A COUNTRY THAT NOT ONLY DOWNS A DEFENSELESS AIRLINER BUT THEN REFUSES TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT ACT AND AS SUCH TELLS THE WORLD THAT IT IS PREPARED TO DO THE SAME THING AGAIN.

Q: (GARBLED)
[redacted]: WE ARE GOING AROUND IN CIRCLES. I ANSWERED THAT QUESTION EARLIER.
HUGHES: WE WILL TAKE A COUPLE MORE QUESTIONS. WE HAVE HERE IN THE AISLE.

Q: WERE THE ONLY SUBJECTS OF CONVERSATION THE AIRLINER, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES?

[redacted]: I THINK THAT'S ACCURATE.

HUGHES: KAREN.
Q. CAN I TRY ONCE MORE? I DIDN'T MEAN TO. IF I OFFENDED YOU IN ASKING MY EARLIER QUESTIONS, IT'S JUST THAT DAY AFTER DAY HERE WE KEEP ...GROMYKO ESCALATES AND SHULTZ RESPONDS AND THERE IS AT LEAST IN MY IMPRESSION LISTENING TO THIS A MUCH HIGHER LEVEL OF, YOU KNOW, A HIGHER PITCH TO THIS WHOLE THING AND SHULTZ WAS OBVIOUSLY VERY EMOTIONAL WHEN WE SPOKE THERE TODAY. HOW CAN ALL OF THAT NOT HAVE SOME EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. AND WHAT EFFECT DOES IT HAVE?

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BECAUSE YOU ALL HAVE BEEN SAYING IT DOESN'T AFFECT THE CHANCES OF INF OR ANY OF THE SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8450
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SECTO
DEPT. FOR PA AND PA/PRESS; PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR
-- MR. CLARK AND MR. SPEAKES
USIA FOR P DIRECTOR THOMPSON, P/PPO, B/VOA, EU

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP CSCE (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO PRESS BY [redacted]

[redacted] WELL THE PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN A VERY IMPORTANT DECISION WHICH IS, THAT IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES, IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE WORLD TO SEEK MEANINGFUL AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. THAT SAID, THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH CUTS TO THE CORE OF BASIC CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND I THINK YOU ARE CORRECT. THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE PRESIDENT FEEL VERY STRONGLY ABOUT THIS QUESTION.

HUGHES: WE WILL TAKE ONE MORE HERE.
Q. YOU MADE ANDRE GROMYKO TALK ABOUT SOMETHING HE DOESN'T WANT TO TALK ABOUT. YOU USED THE WORD "MADE" -- THE SECRETARY MADE HIM DISCUSS THE AIRLINER. WHAT
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IN FACT DID MR. GROMYKO PROCEED WITH?

[redacted] HE TALKED ABOUT THE AIRLINER. THAT'S ALL I WANT

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TO SAY.

HUGHES: UNLESS EITHER [redacted]

[redacted]: GEORGE SHULTZ IS A PRETTY PERSUASIVE GUY.

HUGHES: O.K. THANK YOU GENTLEMEN.
END OF TEXT. SHULTZ

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1983, 5:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I have two statements which will be ON THE RECORD. We will then go ON BACKGROUND and answer your questions. I will introduce them after we have gone ON BACKGROUND. First a statement with regard to closure of Aeroflot offices in the United States.

As directed by the President, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger informed Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin today that the Soviet airline Aeroflot must close its offices in the United States by September 15 and that airline officials must depart this country by September 15. This is in response to the brutal and unprovoked Soviet shooting down of an unarmed Korean civilian airliner and the resulting loss of 269 lives.

In response to the brutal and unprovoked Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007 on September 1, 1983, the President has requested the Civil Aeronautics Board to take strong action against the Soviet airline Aeroflot. In a letter sent this morning to CAB Chairman Dan McKinnon, the President asked the Board to take the following action, effective September 12, 1983:

(1) to suspend the right of Aeroflot to sell tickets in the United States;

(2) to prohibit U.S. airlines from selling tickets in the United States for transportation on Aeroflot:

(3) to preclude U.S. airlines from carrying traffic to, from or within the U.S. where an Aeroflot flight is on the ticket;

(4) to direct U.S. airlines to suspend any interline service arrangements with Aeroflot; and

(5) to prohibit U.S. airlines from accepting any tickets issued by Aeroflot for air travel to, from or within the United States.

The President has also reaffirmed the suspension of Aeroflot flights to and from this country which has been

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in effect since January 5, 1982. The impending Board decision would prevent Aeroflot from marketing any of its services through U.S. carriers or their American agents.

The President requests all United States airlines and travel agents to comply with the letter and spirit of these actions.

The duration of these measures in the civil aviation area will be for a period of time, in part dependent upon the extent to which the USSR demonstrates its willingness to honor essential standards of civil aviation, makes a full account of its shoot down of the airline, and issues an apology as well as compensation to aggrieved parties.

The United States will continue to work with the members of the international community in their efforts to promote air safety and to deter such Soviet actions from happening again.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
U.S. SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST SOVIET AIRLINE AEROFLOT
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1983, 5:25 P. M.

MODERATOR: Let us go ON BACKGROUND, please, and kill the cameras and kill the lights.

Q Can we have copies?

MODERATOR: We can make copies available later. I don't happen to have them right at this moment.

Q Can we have a filing break on the ON THE RECORD statement?

MODERATOR: Yes. I think you can do that. Frankly, I would prefer that you get any questions you might -- clarifications you can -- go ahead, you can file. Go ahead. Filing break.

We're now ON BACKGROUND. Let me turn this over to three experts. They may all be referred to as Senior Administration Officials or Senior Department Officials or Senior CAB Official, as you wish, but that is the attribution.

Why don't you come on up and they'll take your questions, as appropriate, if you would just be patient so they can come to the mike. Let me also say that the subjects of the questions should be limited exclusively to these actions taken today and not sort of broader questions.

Q Has this been announced at the White House?

MODERATOR: The White House has also made the statements available. Yes.

Q If a passenger with a foreign ticket turns up a -- but it's got a partial Aeroflot stub on it -- comes up, what then happens? Is he then transferred to a European carrier, or is he asked to buy another ticket? Doesn't this mean that the U.S. airliners are going to lose money in the process?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The first thing that I should stress is that the order that the Board has been requested to issue would not apply to foreign air carriers other than Aeroflot.

Q But if I have a Lufthansa ticket, but I'm flying Pan Am, I have to go to a Pan Am desk to fly, but it's also got an Aeroflot stub, that ticket will not be affected?

FIRST OFFICIAL: If you bought a Lufthansa ticket -- let's suppose that you flew from Munich to New York on Lufthansa on a ticket issued by Lufthansa that had on it a flight segment, New York to Chicago, on Pan American. Under the order the Board issues today, Pan American would not be permitted to honor that ticket.

The passenger could under those circumstances take that ticket to Lufthansa for a refund and could purchase a separate ticket.

MODERATOR: Okay. Next? (No response) We've stunned you with our brilliance.

SECOND OFFICIAL: Let me add one I think very, very general explanation here. The action which has been taken is directed against Aeroflot. It is not addressed to other foreign airlines.

It only applies where you have conduct that is not wholly outside of the United States. In other words, we are attempting very hard in this case not to have any so-called extraterritorial application of U.S. law or U.S. regulation.

That is a purpose here to achieve, in effect, parallel action from other nations around the world. In effect, we are addressing only those instances in which there is a contact with the United States.

Again, it does not address foreign carriers other than Aeroflot, either inside or outside of the United States. It does address, in effect, conduct which is not wholly outside of the United States.

Q Could you tell us something about the expected impact of your decisions today?

MODERATOR: On whom?

Q On the Soviet Union. On Aeroflot in its capacity to fly, its economic movement, its sales --

THIRD OFFICIAL: Aeroflot maintains in the United States two full-time offices: One in New York, one in Washington. Both will be shut down. The personnel who staff those offices will be required to leave one week from today.

The number of personnel involved is about three full-time permanent Aeroflot officials plus a number of other Soviets who work at Aeroflot, who are spouses or dependents of Soviet Embassy people or people here with other Soviet organizations.

The total number of Soviets who will leave as a result of the shutdown and the order to depart will probably -- I'm not exactly sure of the detail -- but probably will be a little under 20.

Q As far as movement of the planes, how much are they going to lose in revenues as a result of this?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Let me take a shot at that. We have made some effort to try to identify the impact, and I must say that that it is quite difficult to come up with the precise estimate. But we do believe that the order, when implemented, will have a significant effect on Aeroflot revenue.

You must appreciate that the United States is the largest generator of air traffic in international air traffic in the world, and we believe that the effect of the Board's actions as requested by the President will be to divert significant traffic and thus hard currency revenues away from Aeroflot.

Aeroflot has always been a rather minor factor in the U.S. market, but the U.S. market and the travelers that it generates have been a more important source of revenue to Aeroflot. So we think the action will have economic impact.

Q Can you give us some idea of those revenues that were being earned by Aeroflot in the United States?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We are still trying to get a good fix on that. I would prefer not to do it at this point because my staff tells me that the numbers are too loose to be quoted.

Q Can we make the request that that question be taken and come back with an answer, please?

MODERATOR: We'll try, but it's very difficult at a briefing like this to take a question and come back in any timely way, but --

Q In some time.

MODERATOR: At some point we'll try and do that.

Q Does anybody have a feel for what contract holdings Aeroflot may have in this country such as maintenance, terminal space and that sort of thing that they may be giving up and will result in lost revenue to the municipalities?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Aeroflot has not served this country since January of 1982 when, as a result of the troubles in Poland, Aeroflot's right to fly to this country was suspended. Therefore, they have effectively not been serving this country in approximately a year and a half, so I think that they have --

Q (Inaudible)

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes. You may recall, they only served two points, in any event, New York and Washington.

Q But could they sell tickets even if they couldn't fly?

MODERATOR: Previously.

FIRST OFFICIAL: Aeroflot had authority which expired in January of 1982 to sell tickets in the United States. There was some question as to whether Aeroflot might in fact have had authority to continue to sell tickets for transportation from Montreal to Moscow or to points in Russia.

In order to make sure that there was no doubt, the Board will, I am sure, clarify that and make it clear that they have no authority to sell anything in the United States.

Q Two question, please. The first is, is this likely to divert business curently held by American airlines -- U.S. airlines to foreign flag carriers?

And the second is, was there consultation with allies? And the obvious followup to that is, do you expect parallel actions by allies?

THIRD OFFICIAL: We have been in consultation with not just the allies but also neutral and non-aligned countries around the world over the last week, and we have told them in these consultations that we were planning to take certain steps which would not have extraterritorial application to affect the operations of Aeroflot, the lingering relationship and operation here, and so on. So I don't think that these measures will come as a surprise to the allies.

As to the effect on American carriers, can you take that one?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We don't expect this to have a significant effect on American carrier revenues or costs. Again, we have made a quick attempt to ascertain what the present level of doing business between the U.S. and the Soviet carrier is, and as nearly as we've been able to tell it appears to be a roughly even exchange of revenues from transportation provided over the lines of U.S. carriers and Aeroflot.

We think that the effect of our actions -- the actions the President has requested -- will be to divert those revenues that they current get in conjunction with American airlines away from Aeroflot.

Q What was Dobrynin's reaction to all of this, and did he say anything markedly different from the kind of presentation that Gromyko made to Shultz in Madrid?

THIRD OFFICIAL: First of all, we're not going to get into aspects other than the specific Aeroflot operations today. As to his reaction, I don't think it's appropriate to go into how he reacted to a private diplomatic exchange, but the note was presented to him and he accepted it.

-- MORE --

Q Do we have any idea how many U.S. air travellers went to Moscow or the Soviet Union last year? Can you tell by the visas or the tickets? Do you have any idea at all?

FIRST OFFICIAL: To the best of my recollection -- and I would like to get back on this one, the numbers slipping my mind -- I believe the number of travellers out of Montreal, in total, which included U.S. and Canadian citizens, was on the order of 20,000 last year.

But, if you would like, I will get back and get Alan the best numbers we have. I don't recall at this point.

Q With only three full time employees at these two offices, it suggests to me that Aeroflot wasn't doing any business in this country anyhow.

Do you have any figures on how many tickets are written on a monthly or an annual basis?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That is private commercial information. Aeroflot is not a party to any joint arrangements, clearing-house arrangements, where we might be able to get that information. So, we have a very hard time getting a fix on that.

Q Three employees -- does that not suggest that their operation is minimal, at most?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Well, their operation -- it is hard to dispute they are not flying. Their operation is minimal. It is hard to imagine a more minimal operation. But I think that the important thing to remember here is that no airline, even the largest U.S. airline, sells the majority of its tickets by itself. The vast majority of tickets that are sold in this country are sold by travel agents or by other U.S. airlines. And both travel agents and other U.S. airlines, as a result of the actions requested by the President will be precluded from selling transportation on Aeroflot.

Now, we point out that Aeroflot, although it no longer flies from the United States to Moscow, flies to many points in Europe, and Asia to Moscow. And in the past, travellers from the United States, ticketed by U.S. travel agents and U.S. airlines, have, in fact, used Aeroflot services. So, don't look at just the three, think about the 18,000 travel agents in this country and the 20 or 25 airlines who are selling tickets.

Q It sounds from the way you have described it, in fact, from what you have just said, that who this is really going to hurt is the U.S. travel industry, and I am not trying to sound like the Chamber of Commerce on this. But suppose I wanted to fly from Irkutsk to Kiev, I think that my only choice is Aeroflot. If I can't buy a ticket here, I buy a ticket through the travel agent down the street to Montreal, and when I get to Montreal, I still buy the same ticket.

I mean, I am not sure from what you say how much U.S. -- Americans -- who buy Aeroflot tickets, to whatever extent the Aeroflot tickets they buy are for internal travel within the Soviet Union, certainly aren't going to hurt Aeroflot because they aren't going to lose the business. It is just going to require me to go to Montreal to buy the ticket.

FIRST OFFICIAL: First of all, we wouldn't want to prejudge what the Canadians going to do, and perhaps the Canadians will consider some of the steps, in which case you would have to go a lot farther than Montreal to buy a ticket.

The second thing, though, is that I think it is important to remember that the percentage of its revenues that Aeroflot derives from U.S. travellers, who are ticketed by U.S. travel agents and airlines, we believe is significant. It is much more significant than the percentage of service that Aeroflot can provide to the U.S. traveller. U.S. travellers, we think, will not be severely or seriously inconvenienced by what we are doing, but we believe the proportional impact on Aeroflot will be much greater.

Q Let me put it, just to put a point on the question, what I mean to say, of the Aeroflot services that Americans buy, how much of that service, if you can tell us, is service which they will be able to get elsewhere, or as opposed to service which they can only get from Aeroflot, and they will therefore have to find a way to obtain?

FIRST OFFICIAL: That in part depends, in large part depends upon what other countries decide to do in response to our initiatives and approaches.

MODERATOR: I remind you, too, we had a travel advisory today, and I refer you back to that.

Q I understand the Soviets have been permitted to fly, to land Aeroflot in Washington, and I suppose New York, to supply their Embassy here and the UN Mission in New York. Is that correct, and will they be allowed to continue doing that?

THIRD OFFICIAL: From time-to-time, the Soviets have made special flights into this country for cargo or to bring distinguished visitors, just as we have done the same thing into the Soviet Union. We have that under review.

Q I am a little mixed up about one thing. Suppose I go over to the Air France ticket office here and ask them to book me from Paris -- let's assume Aeroflot is flying from Paris -- from Paris to Moscow on Aeroflot. Can they do it under this -- ?

FIRST OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q This applies only to U.S. travel agents and U.S. airlines?

SECOND OFFICIAL: Let me again emphasize what the entire purpose here is. One, it is to take a strong United States action against Aeroflot. It is also not to impose upon other countries, or to profess to impose upon them, what we are doing for ourselves.

What we are trying to do is to encourage the rest of the world to adopt similar and parallel actions. If they do so, we will have effectively, around the world, stung a very strong blow against Aeroflot.

But we recognize it is going to take united action for this to be effective around the world. But as far as the United States goes, we have taken actions involving U.S. carriers and also other conduct that is either to, from, or within the United States.

It does require a United States contact, in effect.

The purpose is to encourage others to do the same.

Q Have you spoken with any representatives of the travel industry about the impact of this?

FIRST OFFICIAL: We have a bit of a legal problem here, because the Board has now been requested by the President to issue an order that will accomplish, to do the things that Alan laid out in his initial presentation.

The Board will, I believe, very shortly, issue an order that may go out tonight, or at the latest tomorrow morning, which will give the affected parties 48 hours to comment -- a little longer than 48 hours, until noon Monday -- to comment on the proposed effect of the order.

As a result, through what may seem arcane legal procedures, we will be in a position of being precluded from speaking with parties that might be affected without violating conflict of interest regulations.

Q Do you anticipate any kind of loud outcry? Have you analyzed this enough so that you don't expect travel agents, 18,000 of them, to be highly annoyed?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The CAB has had a lot of experience with travel agents, not all of it favorable, but I really believe on this one that we can expect very strong support from the travel industry, and I don't expect any outcry other than one saying it is the right thing to do.

MODERATOR: We'll take two more questions and then close it down.

Q I am confused about the CAB order. Would that be effective immediately, or would it be effective at noon Monday, or when would it be effective?

FIRST OFFICIAL: The order will be effective when the Board issues the final order. I would anticipate now that that order will be effective on Monday, probably, I would say, by close of business on Monday.

Q Subject to comment in the meantime.

FIRST OFFICIAL: It will be subject to comment by interested people.

Q Is it accurate to call it an order or as a proposed order, or what?

FIRST OFFICIAL: It can either be called a tentative order or a show-cause order.

Q Did I understand you correctly to say that last year there were 20,000 U.S. citizens flying to the Soviet Union through Montreal?

FIRST OFFICIAL: No. I said I believe the total number of passengers flying on Aeroflot services from Montreal to Moscow was 20,000. The U.S. passengers on that would have been a smaller amount. I will have to get back to you with the best numbers we have. That is just a recollection, top of the head.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thank you all.

(The briefing concluded at 5:40 p.m.)

ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON THE PLANE
FROM MADRID TO THE U.S.
September 9, 1983

QUESTION: I'm going to change the subject again and ask you about Lebanon.

QUESTION: We don't have a subject yet.

QUESTION: It apparently is not getting any better. Is the Administration going to have to make a decision - 1. about the Marines and 2. about a longer range consideration of what we can do to bring the Lebanese Government in control of the country and prevent this deterioration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as the Marines are concerned, they are there and they will carry out their mission and they will defend themselves vigorously, as we've already said. And I think there has been some active defense. I met yesterday with each of the Ministers of the Multinational Force, but then we had meeting of the four of us together to discuss Lebanon and I think I can fairly say that all the countries concerned are, of course, very well informed about what's going on and the problems are obvious -- the importance of returning stability there. Of course, that's primarily the job of the Government of Lebanon -- is of critical importance and the role of the MNF in supporting that, I think, is an essential one. There is a general agreement that the performance of the Lebanese Armed Force in their stabilization of Beirut -- I've lost track of the time when they went in there -- about five days ago or so, was really quite remarkable and I was struck by the fact that the French who are severe judges on the one hand and are deployed in that area had that comment and I think that their performance has basically exceeded people's expectations, not only in terms of its military skill, but also its sophistication as a military force in handling things, so that's a very positive thing, but clearly there are great problems particularly in the struggle over the alleged Shouf areas. I think that's where it's concentrated.

QUESTION: Will it be necessary for a new American diplomatic initiative? Will this be --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's been a continuous initiative and over quite a long period of time -- first with Phil and Morrie. The domino theory works, huh? And then with Bud McFarlane and Dick Fairbanks. Bud was back very briefly for some general sessions, but certainly very active and have had a lot of help, I think probably more help in an active way from the Saudis than on many occasions and the Jordanians have been a part of the picture, recently the Egyptians and others.

QUESTION: Could you give an instance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to give any particular instance or describe their activities beyond saying that they clearly see the importance of the issues. They've been supporting the Government of Lebanon and working very actively to stabilize the situation.

QUESTION: I have a follow-up question on the talks on the Korean plane incident. The package that was put together last night and approved, I gather in a tentative way. Is that the extent of the Allied response or do we anticipate doing something more in addition to that? And a second part to that, do you expect to meet Gromyko in New York in late September?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all, insofar as actions are concerned. We have taken some ourselves as the United States but basically we have been trying to approach this as it is -- a world issue -- and to talk to others and consult with them and do that on the basis that one characteristic of something effective is something that has widespread support and you may do something that looks dramatic but it doesn't have support and it isn't as effective as something that is perhaps less dramatic but more widely supported. I think that it may turn out that this meeting scheduled for September 15 of the International ICAO may turn out to be quite an important place for strong discussion of the rules of the airways. The French proposals for things that are planned to be tabled there in which the people in the meeting we had all basically supported, I think, could amount to something worthwhile. The general support for what have become known as the Korean demands is important, of course, the demand for access to the site becomes less significant as time passes but the other demands stand and whether the Soviets respond to them or not, it's, I think, a matter of importance that they have widespread support. The extent to which there will be agreement to break for some period of time as a kind of political demonstration the air traffic to and from countries to the Soviet Union, that's still -- many countries want to do that, a few have reservations or feel that in one way or another, their legal restrictions make it difficult for them. But there is a remarkable and uniformed strength or feeling in it, it goes right over into the Neutral Non-Aligned group that I had breakfast with and I think it's important to see that and have that come forward. At any rate, we're very much in the midst of the effort to work with people around the world on this.

QUESTION: Will there be other things in addition to this package, though, that's what I was wondering? Or is this pretty much the extent of the Allied response?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, what the content of that package has to evolve and I don't think anybody can feel that they have really thought through in any precise way what the International Conference ought to be taking up and precisely what you should table. The French have these four items; there may be others and what kind of changes would really make some difference when you try retrospectively to look at what happened and say if these regulations had been in effect, would it have changed things at all?--It takes time to think that through and I think we've made a start, I'm sure that other things will come along and there'll be some second thoughts about some of the things that are put forward but that's in the natural evolution.

QUESTION: How about the meeting with Gromyko?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I had a very --

QUESTION: No, I'm sorry -- the one in New York in late September. You said the decision would depend on the results of the one in Madrid.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I will have to report to the President about the meeting and we'll talk around about that with people in Washington and the President will decide what our position will be on that and so, I just pass on that question.

QUESTION: Have you found out what they said at the Moscow news conference? Do you have comment on it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I haven't found out all about it. It is being carried by Cable News live and so in our Op Center, it's being monitored. I heard a report that after two hours, there wasn't anything that has been brought forward that hasn't been stated before.

QUESTION: However, there was some news about our plane --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hesitate to comment because I'm getting this third hand and you know, they are listening to it and they talk to somebody who gives us a phone report but any report -- I'll put it this way -- any report that our RC 135 was out of international waters is not correct. That plane flew a pattern that is a well established part of the national technical means of monitoring tests or when we think there are tests that flies that pattern and as has been stated, the plane was not out of the international waters ever and it was on the ground for over an hour when the shoot-down took place, but the word that I heard was it's getting boring after two hours and the main piece of evidence seemed to be that the plane was way off course and we know that.

QUESTION: Were you aware of any attempt or any move by other East European countries to distance themselves from the Russians on this issue? It seemed like there were varying degrees of lip service paid in the speeches and I was wondering whether that trend was seen in the halls of the Conference?

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: Do you mean in the informal discussions?

QUESTION: In the informal discussions, were (inaudible) -- did the incident divide the East to some extent?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I can only report on things that were said to me, sort of the flavor of things that I heard and what others have told me so that's not very authoritative really. It's just catch as catch can. I suppose, well, I would say that basically people had no doubt that we were right that the Soviet Union had shot the plane down and that it was a terrible thing to have done and, of course, for a long while, not having acknowledged that. When the Soviet Union did acknowledge that in its roundabout way or with its peculiar phraseology of it, I'll put it that way, that tended to confirm the fact that we were being accurate. I suppose there is a tendancy in those countries, some of them anyway given their orientation, to think that there's going to be something brought out to support the allegations the Soviet Union is making and beginning this morning, there seemed to be a considerable build-up to this press conference because it includes some people who thought to be quite authoritative people and from what I know of it so far, it doesn't seem to have produced anything that would match the pre-publicity but I say that hesitatingly because I haven't heard it myself or seen any report. I'm told that in the Department they are trying to sort of abstract out the essence of any allegation that's been made and then set the facts out along side of it as we know it and get up a sheet like that and if they have it before we have landed and they've sent it to us here, we'll pass it around.

QUESTION: Will you respond to any of that at Andrews, if it is significant?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the people who are monitoring it and analyzing it and so on are in Washington and they are more able to do that then I am so that is probably where the response ought to be.

QUESTION: What did you really expect to come from your meeting with Gromyko? And were you disappointed in any way? Was it realistic to expect him to recant his sins, or whatever?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe it was important. The President believes it was important to say what we thought and to state our information and our indignation and the things that we felt should be done, directly to a very high official of the Soviet Union when we had that opportunity and we had it. So we did it. And as I said in my statement afterwards he was totally really unresponsive to the problem, but I still think it was important to do that. Of course in the protocol of these meetings the guest is entitled to speak first. And so he spoke about arms control and so on, peace. And I felt that I didn't want to leave him or anyone in the position of saying that we weren't interested, or unwilling, to talk about that subject. So I made some comment about it. But then from our standpoint we focused the meetings as we intended on the human rights subject. Now, the idea of saying that human rights are not important, what's important is nuclear armaments: I think at least my reaction to that is to say, that's what's important are human beings and what happens to them.

That's really the number one issue and it is because of concern about that that people are so concerned about nuclear weapons. It isn't the nuclear weapons as such its because of their implications for human life and the same is true of the Korean Airline catastrophy and massacre. It is all of the implications that go with that and that of course has a very special dimension to it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, don't you have to weight at this point in your own mind and in the Administration's mind the relative value in the long term of pursuing the sanctions or the political statements on the Korean plane incident versus what happens 60 or 90 days from now when the political actions or the demonstrable actions get phased out and you then have to sit down again with Gromyko or Nitze has to sit down with his counterpart? Can you give me sort of a feel at this point for the relative value of that now? The Administration has made its stand -- taken its stand -- the allies are going along on the sanctions. What's important now? Are you looking ahead to that point in 90 days, lets say?...

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would put it differently. It isn't as though the Administration is taking a stand and the allies are going along. That is not the way we are doing this or thinking about it. We have had our thoughts about this. There have been just spontaneous reactions all over the world to it. You don't have to go argue with people about it. Of course, the pilots' associations have been the most active. Canada reacted just spontaneously and so on. So what we are trying to do is find a reasonable common denominator of a package of things people can group themselves around. Some will want to do more, some less, some about what that package is. But I think the concept that evolved is a pretty good one at least in my opinion, namely to put a great deal of attention on what can be done to insure that this doesn't happen again and the ICAO is the right forum for that. And then the concept of this break in air traffic to the Soviet Union is to provide a kind of political statement to that meeting that will give some reinforcement to the feelings that people have in the meeting. And so we will have to see what people will be able to think of and what can be agreed upon. And whether the Soviet Union will agree upon anything really meaningful. The French proposal basically prohibiting a military attack on a civilian plane under any circumstances would seem to go at odds with their law and at odds with the kind of statement that the Soviet Union made at the conference. Now I don't know whether they will have some second thoughts or not. If that comes forward and has wide support and they don't accept it -- I don't know quite where that will lead but it does seem to me that that approach has a great deal of merit. It isn't an on again, off again type approach.

QUESTION: What happens beyond (inaudible). Maybe you will or maybe you won't meet with Gromyko in New York, but at some point you are going to expect the Soviets to sit down in Geneva and bargain again or continue to bargain or something.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as we are concerned in Geneva, very deliberately, right in the midst of all of this. And our own shock and everybody else's, the President very visibly dispatched Paul Nitze back to Geneva to continue on with these discussions. And Ed Rowny will return to the START talks. And Mort Abromowitz to the MBFR and so on. So we will be there and we will be continuing to take reasonable positions. We will be prepared to engage in give and take and we will be seriously pursuing these negotiations. That doesn't mean they will result in anything because it has to be a two way street for it to resolve anything. But we will be there.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the West German Foreign Minister has been saying that Gromyko has indicated to him and others what he thinks may be a break in the Soviet position on INF. In particular he says Gromyko is looking at British and French forces and saying, well, they have two faces. They have a strategic face and they have a European face. And Genscher is presenting this as a possible way for the Soviets to get off the British and the French forces. Have you heard it? What do you think of it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we would will to hear it if it comes forward, is in Geneva. And the implication of what you say if I'm following it is that they are getting ready to withdraw their demand that British and French systems be counted. I would have to tell you that I heard no suggestion of that from Gromyko in what he told me. But at any rate if they are inclined toward a position of that kind there is a place to express it.

QUESTION: Did you hear any suggestion of that from the Europeans -- the western Europeans, the Germans, the French?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, obviously, people talk about all these things all the time, but I think that the place to have that registered as far as the INF talks are concerned is in Geneva. And as I say, I didn't see the sense of a shift on that at all.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how long do you think it will take before you're really ready to begin a normal dialogue with the Russians again? In your speech you challenged them to a dialogue but the reality is at this time except for arms control, you are really not in a position to do much talking, it looks like.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As the President formulated his policies on this, and I might say, just his sort of immediate instinctive reaction, was that the basic tenets of our policy are not rearranged by this tragedy because the behavior of the Soviet Union as terrible as it is here is not different from that that lay behind our assumptions about them. And so I think the basic tenets of being realistic with the bark off basically of being strong and of being ready to engage in constructive dialogue -- and make agreements where the agreement is solid and to our advantage and in terms of arms control verifiable and so on. That has been our policy. That remains our policy.

Now, the fact of the matter is that the Soviet reaction to this catastrophe almost does as much to compound the problem as the catostrophe itself, so we'll just to have to see whether they can bring themselves to anything approaching an honest dialogue about these subjects but anyway our policy is steady and in place.

QUESTION: You may have been asked a version of this. I didn't hear all the questions and answers but two questions. 1. Would you have been happier if the Europeans had consented to a longer than two week period of sanctions against Aeroflot, against air traffic regulations with the Soviets? And 2. Did you find any of the Europeans implying they would have been more convinced of your sincerity on the sanctions if you were not at the same time fulfilling a Soviet need by selling them grain?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That observation was never made and I think to the contrary, the reaction I felt was that the President's reaction to sort of stay on course while at the same time being very clear and unequivocal about this Soviet action was greeted with a great sense of respect so I didn't get that sense. Maybe you have picked that up. I'm sure that people mutter about these things but basically the idea that trade in non-strategic, non-military goods ought to go forward and the concept that we struggle with last year and through the first part of this year to get all of that moving, I think, once again is kind of vindicated as the right concept to approach this thing, but of course, this tragedy points up the whole civil aviation area in particular and that's where everybody's focus instinctively went as ours did.

QUESTION: Now, the first part of the question. Would you have been happier with a longer than a two week period?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, our original idea was a 60-90 day period of moratorium on landing flights of Aeroflot. That was one of our thoughts. I think the European idea really that it was, I don't know where, maybe it was Genscher but he seemed to take a quite strong lead in the European group, that it ought to be conceived of as a kind of political demonstration in support of the Montreal meeting, I think, was a good concept. I was struck by, I think it was the Norwegian Foreign Minister who said that the concept of this action shouldn't be a concept of punishment because there is no punishment that fits this crime. It has to be a concept that has some driving force toward bringing about some constructive action. I think it was the U.K. in the discussions that I had, that said a action on Aeroflot landing rights is not the right approach. It's better to put a prohibition on two-way traffic and prohibit the flights of national airlines as well as Aeroflot, in other words an effort to isolate the air traffic. That was, I thought, on the whole a good thought. So there was a kind of an evolution of things and I don't consider the evolution is over. My own guess is that an action that was taken yesterday by the U.S. may turn out, I'm not sure about this, to be of some significance: namely, if you cut an airline out of this international computer information network, that's a very valuable thing to any international network that enables you to go to Chicago and get a ticket on Aeroflot from Paris to Moscow. To be part of that is quite significant. It may turn out to be. But that's something that's just emerging and we didn't really understand that too well or push it.

QUESTION: Most of those airlines have 50-50 deals with Aeroflot. They share the revenue no matter who flies on which airlines, so even if they flew all on the national airlines, Aeroflot would get half of the (inaudible).

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: We'll have to see, as I say, I'm on pushing into this but I think, my instinct is that in this day and age of computer information networks, not being in one is a problem.

QUESTION: Rich said at the backgrounder yesterday that Gromyko didn't want to talk about the incident at all but that you made him do it. I was wonderfing how you accomplished that and I just wondered, could you give us some feeling about what was his reaction in the meeting? Did he complain a lot about talking about it, didn't want to talk, or just sort of what was the feeling between the two of you there, and why did you finally decide to break off the talks?

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: Well, it went on as long as there was any point in it going on. I think that by concentrating on the subject of human rights and the airline connection with that--but I didn't confine myself to that by any means, I never do. I always talk about the various human rights issues in any meeting with the high-level Soviets. This is a matter of personal policy and the President's direction. So by the time that I got through talking about that, no doubt he felt he had to give their line and their response, which he did.

QUESTION: I mean, what actually took place when you brought up the airliner? Did he say I don't want to talk about that and you said, yes, you do, or just what was the byplay?

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: I can't give you all a byplay but it was a very tough meeting, to put it mildly.

QUESTION: Well, I mean, did he shout? Did you shout?

QUESTION: It was reported outside -- the noise.

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: What? You mean you could hear us? (sic) No.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It was a very strong meeting and I don't believe in sitting around and taking a lot of you know what from anybody, so I didn't.

QUESTION: How do you know he didn't want to talk about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he made a lot of statements along those lines.

QUESTION: I'd like to go back to Lebanon.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Because I think I want to be fair and proper about any reporting of something. He didn't say he would refuse to talk about it. I guess basically what it boiled down to -- he basically said he's not going to initiate any discussion of it, but if I talk about it, then obviously he responded, so I think I'll just let it go at that.

QUESTION: On Lebanon, first, after the Israeli invasion we had a U.S. mediator there. Then we had as a result of the mediation, 1200 Marines there. Then we had as a result of the Marines getting in difficulty, 2000 more Marines and a naval task force off shore. Now, we've had firing from the naval force in order to protect the men who are now on the ground. It seems like step by step, the United States is becoming militarily involved in the Middle East in a way in which we never have in recent years anyway. How do you look at this train of circumstances and what do you see as the way in which the flow can be turned in the other direction? How long and how deeply are we prepared to become involved in the situation which obtains in that country?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are there in all of the roles that you identified in an effort to be helpful and at the invitation of the Government of Lebanon now with our armed force. Their role is a role of stabilization and peacekeeping. As we've stated, we'll defend ourselves -- the Marines will defend themselves and we'll support those Marines. And the other MNF forces feel the same way. Our concept is and the way the mission is stated is it's up the Lebanese armed forces to take control of the situation as I believe they have in greater Beirut and our presence and the presence of our partners can help them do that in a whole variety of ways. It probably boils down to helping them that those who think they may get somewhere by roughing us up are experiencing the fact that we will defend ourselves and we're capable of doing that and so are the French and so are the others. Now, having said all that obviously the situation in Lebanon is in very considerable turmoil and while we've had some successes in our diplomacy and in our effort, we're very far from where we would like to be. So it's a tough row to hoe and not only there but in the Middle East diplomacy generally, but the United States has been at it a long time and we'll continue to work at it. There are one or two promising developments that I don't even entertain in the back of my mind but still there are some things that are on the plus side but at the same time you can't help but concentrate on the situation at hand and many of the developments in the Shouf and the Aleyh regions are -- they're hard for us to do anything about but they are very hard to contemplate, too, that these groups that get isolated and are subject to widespread killings and there have been several incidents of that and more are threatened. That's very difficult but I think that's fundamentally up to the Government of Lebanon to come to grips with their own internal situation and to the extent that we can help them do that and help them get stability where they can attain it and help to get others to stop stirring it up, well, that's all the good and I think worthwhile and I think it's something we should measure up to.

QUESTION: On that point, there was a radio report that the Government of Lebanon has asked all of the forces -- the Multinational group -- or is asking -- maybe it's in the process -- to go into the Shouf and help them. Is that correct? And what is our attitude? Would the United States be disposed to do that -- send men into that area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There've been requests in one way or another for that kind of help or for the MNF undertaking missions different from the mission that they went in with in the first place. And, under the present circumstances, there isn't any disposition to change our mission. It is clear that the Lebanese Armed Force -- General Tanoose -- feels that for an armed force to go into the Shouf or the Aleyh area, it is important first to have a deal cut under which the people who are struggling with each other agree to some ceasefire conditions and boundary conditions and so on, then maybe there's a role for somebody. But that has not been achieved. But we hope that will be achieved and people are trying to achieve it and that's what Gemayel is trying to do in this effort to broaden the base of his Government.

QUESTION: I wonder if you could help us with some kind of analysis as to the true long-term or at least midium-term impacts of the Korean incident. On the one hand, it certainly seems that there has been a propoganda --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I keep telling myself. Don't call it a Korean incident. Incident is not the word for this -- a catastrophe, a tragedy.

QUESTION: Alright, a catostrophe-tragedy. On the one hand, it does, however, seem to have had from the Administration's point of view some positive implications. It is a certainly an opportunity for a propoganda victory. Certainly, it seems take some pressure off the Administration. It seems as though you'll get some benefits on things like the MX vote in Congress. On the other hand, there's no question it's been a setback in terms of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, so how do you ultimately weigh it? What's the bottom line on it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think from -- I'm not going to try to answer that question because I don't know how this will all spin out but from the standpoint of our activities, what we have sought to do and what the President has directed is first of all, get the facts out as soon as we have them and as soon as we have them in a way that makes us feel confident that we know what we're talking about and we've done that. And then express ourselves about the implications of these facts as part of the world assessment and to work with our Allies on all aspects of this tragedy including what can be done to avoid it in the future. Now, there are all kinds of implications, I'm sure, but we aren't trying in any way to manage it for this, that or the other purpose other than to do the things that I've described to you. I do think that it tends to reinforce the way in which the President has looked at this whole problem and to reinforce the basic elements and the importance of our strength and so on, but at any rate, I think the important thing is to handle this tragedy in terms of getting the facts out, assessing the facts and handling it that way.

QUESTION: You said you are prepared to conduct the dialogues -- a dialogue with the Soviets even now but what if you don't obtain any kind of satisfaction on a reasonable explanation from the Soviets? Is this not going to keep the dialogue at a low level for some time to come?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the answer is really the same across the board on all of these issues. We're there, we're reasonable, we have strong positions, we're ready for genuine discussions, but for that to take place, there has to be somebody on the other side who has that same viewpoint and who is forthcoming and honest about it and will confront honest questions with reasonably honest answers, so we'll just stay in that posture and if we don't find anybody on the other side in that posture, well, that's too bad. But we're going to be there and the same is true in these various meetings, such as the CDE meeting, and the preparatory and so on and all the other far along things. They won't fail because the U.S. is unwilling to be there and to work at it in an honest but also a realistic way.

QUESTION: Can you explain -- I'm going to ask you a question that my editors keep asking me -- under what scenario do you ever see the Marines getting out of Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The obvious and the -- it may be sometimes shocking developments bring about a reaction but I'm not saying that will happen. There've been so many shocking developments that you wonder what it must take but I think we'll just to have to see about that. I don't have a timescale to put on this.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
VISIT OF ROBERT MUGABE
PRIME MINISTER OF ZIMBABWE
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983, 2:07 P. M.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. This is a BACKGROUND briefing on the official working visit to Washington of Robert Mugabe, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. The briefing can be attributed to Senior State Department Officials.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I only heard a brief time ago that I was to do this, so I don't have a whole lot prepared. I thought I'd first mention who's in the party and something about what they are doing here, and something about what they've already done in Atlanta.

The principal visitor, of course, is Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe. This is his first visit to Washington under the Reagan Administration. He was here in the fall of 1980 towards the end of the Carter Administration. His visit at that time was primarily to preside over the entry of Zimbabwe into the United Nations. He came down here for a one-day working visit. This is a two and a half day official working visit which began this morning and which ends at noon on Wednesday when he flies off to Detroit for the better part of a day, and then goes on to Canada for another official working visit starting Thursday morning.

He has with him his wife, Mrs. Zali Mugabe, who is not only the wife of a Prime Minister but is a person of importance in her own right. She's Deputy Secretary for Women's Affairs of the Zimbabwe African National Union, the ruling party in the government, and interests herself a great deal in women's affairs of all kinds, particularly helping ex-combatants from wartime rehabilitate themselves, obtain training, education and so forth.

The Foreign Minister, Dr. Witness Mangwende, is with the party, as well as Dr. Bernard Chidzero. Dr. Chidzero is Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. He has with him his wife, Mrs. Michelline Chidzero. She is of Canadian origin, and I think that accounts for her presence since there's an official visit to Canada coming up.

The third minister in the party is Dr. Fred Shava, who is Minister of Manpower, Planning & Development.

There's one Deputy Minister, also Dr. Naomi Nhiwatiwa -- Mrs. Nhiwatiwa. She is Deputy Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications.

The rest of the party are at the level of officials such as the Chief of Protocol and so forth.

You might note from these titles that all of them except the Prime Minister carry the honorific of doctor. These are legitimate doctorates; they're not acquired, and they're not self-bestowed. All of these people have Ph.D's from Oxford, London School of Economics, University of London, and McGill University. It tells you something about the calibre of talent in the Zimbabwean Cabinet.

As far as the program is concerned, I'll go back to Atlanta in a minute. Let's focus on the Washington portion. They arrived this morning at 9:30. There was a welcoming ceremony by the Secretary of State at the Washington Monument grounds, and then they went to the Madison Hotel where they're staying. They had a meeting that lasted about an hour and twenty minutes -- that is, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and the Zimbabwean Ambassador with Dr. Crocker who's over here, Assistant Secretary for Africa -- and they are right now probably finishing up a luncheon at the Madison hosted by Mrs. Kathleen Graham of The Washington Post, which I believe is Zimbabweans and Washington Post people, although I'm not sure. I haven't seen the guest list.

This afternoon there's a meeting with the Secretary -- Secretary Shultz -- at 3:30, which will be followed by a meeting organized by Mrs. Helen Kitchen who directs the African Studies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown. This will be primarily for an audience of businessmen.

This evening the Zimbabwean Ambassador in Washington is hosting a private dinner. It's an in-house affair, just the Mission staff and visitors.

Tomorrow morning -- although it's not on this program -- I believe they're having a meeting or meetings with the Congressional black caucus and Transafrica.

The main event of the day, of course, is a meeting with the President in the Oval Office which will be at 11:30 followed by a working lunch hosted by the President.

There will be departure statements by the President and Prime Minister Mugabe at approximately 1:30 p.m. at the Diplomatic entrance of the White House.

In the late afternoon the party will visit the Embassy of Zimbabwe to meet the staff, and at 5:00 p.m. the Prime Minister will meet with the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Peter McPherson.

The dinner that evening again will be private and primarily with businessmen. At 8:00 o'clock -- correct me if I'm wrong -- there will be a taping of an interview for the McNeil-Lehrer Report which will be broadcast Wednesday evening.

On Wednesday morning there will be a breakfast on the Hill hosted by the House Foreign Affairs Committee which will also be attended by a selected group of Senators. We were unable to fit a separate meeting with Senators into the program, so they're meeting together.

At 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday morning there's a press conference at the Madison Hotel in the Prime Minister's suite for invited members of the press.

At 11:00 there will be a farewell call by the Under Secretary, Mr. Eagleburger, and Dr. Crocker prior to a noon departure.

I should also probably mention that Mrs. Reagan is hosting a tea for Mrs. Mugabe at the White House at 11:00 o'clock. Mrs. Mugabe is pursuing a number of her other interests separately. She has a separate program, including visits to the Museum of African Art, Children's Hospital, and some other things that she's expressed an interest in seeing.

As I said, the group goes on to Detroit, leaving here at noon, arriving there about 1:30, and they will have a program arranged by Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit. I don't have the program here, so I don't know exactly what they'll be doing there.

In Atlanta, they were hosted by Mayor Andrew Young, which seemed quite appropriate since Mayor Young in his previous incarnation as U.S. Ambassador at the United Nations in the Carter Administration, played a key role in the Anglo-American proposals period of the effort to find a solution to the Rhodesian problem, and they became friends through contacts in that period.

The program there consisted of, first of all, on Saturday there was a civic reception followed by a dinner, at which both Mayor Young and Prime Minister Mugabe gave speeches.

On Sunday there was a brunch hosted by a law firm, one of the larger Atlanta law firms that is interested in encouraging trade and investment exchanges between that part of the United States and Zimbabwe. A large number of businessmen were there as well as lawyers.

In the afternoon there were separate ceremonies at Spellman College which is a college for women, at which an honorary degree or award was given to Mrs. Mugabe, and then at Morehouse College, which is for men, both of those being branches of the University of Atlanta, an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws was conferred on Prime Minister Mugabe, and he gave a speech, as did the Mayor and the President of the College.

He explained to us this morning -- I was not aware of this -- that he had been invited as far back as 1979 to receive an honorary degree by Morehouse, but he was unable to make the visit there until this occasion. I think on the earlier occasion Joshua Nkoma did go and get an honorary degree. In other words, it was to be for both of them. At that point they were co-heads of the Patriotic Front -- so-called.

The ceremonies at Morehouse were followed by a wreath-laying at the tomb of Martin Luther King, Jr. and a visit to the Martin Luther King Center. In the evening there was a private dinner just for the Prime Minister and the Mayor and their wives. Then they got to the second act of Sophisticated Ladies, which was being shown at the Fox Theater in Atlanta. Some of the rest of us got to see both acts. That was the Atlanta program in outline.

Q Can you take questions?

A Certainly.

Q Can you tell us what you expect to achieve from this visit?

A This visit arises from a specific invitation issued by Vice President Bush when he visited Harare in November of last year. The invitation came from the President, obviously. It was delivered by Vice President Bush. The Prime Minister accepted, and this is the mutually convenient time that was arranged.

Zimbabwe is for us a very key country in Africa, particularly in southern Africa. We've invested as a government through three Administrations now a great deal of effort, diplomatic capital, political capital, in first of all trying to find a solution to the longstanding problem of Rhodesia resulting from UDI which was declared in 1965, and after internationall recognized independence was successfully achieved in seeing that the experiment of Zimbabwe succeeds. Because if it doesn't succeed, there will be adverse repercussions throughout southern Africa, both for the United States and for the countries of the region, and perhaps all the countries in Africa.

When you have a developing relationship of that significance with a country, a new country, it obviously makes sense to have personal contact between the leaders. This will be the first such personal contact between our President and the head of government of Zimbabwe. I should say parenthically that this is one of the unusual countries in Africa where the Prime Minister is the head of government. They do have a president who's chief of state, but he's ceremonial primarily and doesn't have political power or function, so these are the two leaders of their countries.

They obviously hope to have an exchange of views on a variety of subjects. The Prime Minister has told us, and we happen to agree with it, that there are no major or even particularly minor bilateral issues. That is, strictly U.S.-Zimbabwean.

We do have our differences on other issues -- that is, regional ones involving southern Africa -- international issues. And doubtless they will come up for discussion in these various meetings.

He has described our relations as being excellent, very good, various phrases, but I think we agree with that characterization, and we hope through this visit to further cement those relations.

We're investing a great deal in Zimbabwe in the form of aid.

(Continued on page 10)

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Q How much is that?

A The AID program now is running at the rate of $75 million a year, give or take a few million. The total, since independence, is $223.1 million U.S. delivered.

Q $223?

A $223.1 million.

Q Could I ask, first, a two-part question? You said that there will be a press conference for invited reporters. Why are certain reporters being excluded?

A I think I will have to ask our desk officer to help me with that. I think that was a Zimbabwean request; I think they wanted to have a meeting of the Prime Minister with certain people. The basis of their choice I do not know. They arranged that.

Q You mean the Zimbabwe people are saying that they are calling a press conference, but they are going to exclude part of the press; is that correct?

A It says "press conference" here, that's right, with international/Washington, D. C. press corps in the Presidential Suite at the Madison Hotel. You can interpret that as an exclusion to those who are not going to be there, or you could interpret it as an invitation to those who will be there. I suppose you could do it either way.

Q Those of us who have not been part of the Zimbabwe-approved press, if we go --

Will they exclude you if you go?

Q Yes. I would like to know, will we be thrown out because we are not government-approved, or what?

A I don't know whether you'll be thrown out, but I presume you will not be admitted if you don't have an invitation.

Q I see.

Q How does this gibe with the overall assessment, your assessment, of U.S.-Zimbabwean relations where, I guess, we're trying to promote democracy in Central Africa? Is this the way we expect a newly-emerging democracy to behave? I wish you would tie in that answer with the treatment being accorded to the white minority group, Ian Smith and others.

A That's a very complex question. Are you talking about the press conference now?

Q The press conference. It seems to me, since we regard the First Amendment as kind of fundamental to all political rights, and here in our own country we see it being encroached upon -- I think that was the thrust of my colleague's question -- now is this simply an external manifestation of what is happening internally to people like Ian Smith?

A No, I don't think so. Prime Minister Mugabe makes himself available to the press frequently. He doesn't exclude people. Anybody who is accredited in Harare can go to the airport when he arrives, issues a statement, and answers questions. He gives a great many interviews to people of all points of view. I don't think their intention was to be exclusionary in this case; it may be a matter of numbers as to how many can fit into the suite.

I don't know why the Zimbabwe Embassy arranged it that way. If I had been the Zimbabwe Ambassador here and was asked to give advice to the Prime Minister as to how to handle his media relations, I probably would have said, "Why don't you have the press conference and invite everybody?" But that isn't my job. Let somebody else have the say.

Q Could you tell me, is the continued detention of some of the Air Force officers, has it been an element in the conversation that Dr. Crocker held; will it be an element in future conversations?

A It has been and it will be -- it has been in the past, both in Horare and here. It's bound to come up in his talks during this visit. I think, if you want me to comment on that --

Q Yes.

A -- as you probably know, two of the people have been released; it's probable that a third will be released, although these things are never certain until they take place. It was a question of determining what his actual citizenship was.

b-4 There is a fourth man or a seventh man who has not figured in some of the press reporting, named Lewis Walker, who was detained but never charged, never tried, never accused. He was held as a sort of material witness while the trial went on. I understand he will be released the the operation of a review tribunal.

That will leave three in detention. The reason they are still in detention is that the Government of Zimbabwe still has some concern that two of them-- perhaps all three -- did actually have an involvement in the sabotage in the Air Force in which they lost half their planes. They consider that if that is the case, people of that character do pose a threat to the security of the state, because they could engage in a similar operation again, particularly in view of the fact that a great many of their former colleagues in the Rhodesian Air Force emigrated to South Africa, and from that position have the possibility of mounting similar operations in the future. So it is a security question from their point of view. It has nothing to do with the trial.

I might comment that from my own point of view, there are at least two kinds of miscarriage of justice. There is the kind where a guilty person is acquitted; there is the kind where an innocent person is convicted -- both are equally bad. In this instance, the decision of the court was respected by the government. They were acquitted -- all of them -- the reason being that their confessions were inadmissible because of the manner in which they had been obtained and confirmed. Secondly, the state presented no case other than that provided by the convictions, and therefore, the case collapsed; and they were, therefore, all acquitted. That does not necessarily mean that they were all innocent of any involvement in the problem being dealt with, which was the sabotage of half of the Air Force.

The Emergency Powers legislation, under which they are detained, permits the detention of people considered by the government to be a threat to the security of the state. The fact that you were convicted or found innocent does not necessarily determine your status as a risk to the security of the state.

Q Do I detect a note of sympathy in your -- You used the word "innocent," which strikes me as a legal word, a word which is determined by a court. In fact, they are innocent in the sense that they have not been convicted of anything, the same way you and I are innocent. So since they are, to use your term "innocent," since they haven't been convicted, does the United States accept the Zimbabwe argument?

A It's not for us to accept or not accept. I think "innocent" has at least two meanings. What would you say about a murderer whom the courts failed to convict because of something like, let's say, the *Miranda* rule. Is he innocent?

Q Legally speaking, yes.

A He is legally innocent. Is he innocent of committing the murder?

Q Not guilty, legally.

A He's not guilty, right.

Q Then, he isn't a murderer, is he?

A He wasn't found to be a murderer, but he committed murder.

Q His guilt is not proven.

Q You don't know that he committed murder and so forth --

Q The murders in the south, are you planning to raise that situation?

A The which?

Q I can't pronounce it: Matabeleland.

A Matabeleland. Yes. We've raised Matabeleland on a number of occasions, both here and in Harare. It's a very complex situation. There are dissidents operating in that territory who have been committing murders, robberies, rapes of all sorts of people, white farmers, people in busses, school teachers -- pretty indiscriminate.

The government was unable to cope with that through ordinary police measures, and therefore, turned to the army. Unfortunately, the army, in the process of trying to deal with the dissidents, did things that were equally bad against innocent people, considerable numbers of them. I think this was a failure of command and control, if you will; I don't think the soldiers who were sent in there were told what they were supposed to be doing. They were told, "We're here to crack down on the dissidents," but nobody told them how you go about that, how you tell a dissident from a non-dissident, and how you treat people in general in that sort of disorderly and chaotic situation.

When it was brought to their attention, or when they became aware of how much the Fifth Brigade was misbehaving, they were called out of the area, and they have not returned. They have turned to other units to try to deal with that problem.

The dissident problem is somewhat les serious than it was, but it continues. A good many people have fled over the border into Batswana, including some of the dissidents. Some have been killed; some have been captured; some are still at large.

Our view is that there is not a terribly large number of them, I would say a few hundred, maximum. I think most of the very serious crimes were committed by a very few, small bands of 10 to 15 people. So it is not an insurmountable problem. If you could get your hands on, let's say, the 60 people who have been causing all of that trouble, you're on top of the problem.

They have made major strides, but it is still a problem; and I wouldn't be at all surprised to pick up the paper tomorrow and see that some white farmer has been murdered again.

Q So you have any statistics on how many were killed?

A Statistics are very hard to come by in that sort of situation. I think people who use any figure above 1,000 are exaggerating. In terms of world mayhem, that's serious, but it's not the most serious problem that is going on in the world.

Q Sir, does the State Department have any evidence that Mr. Mugabe has ever apologized or paid reparations to the 48 civilians murdered when his Patriotic Front shot a missile into an unarmed, passenger, Viscount plane of Air Rhodesia just five years ago, and then riflemen from b-9 the Patriotic Front -- there were 18 survivors, and they shot down 10 of them. You recall this, don't you?

Did he ever apologize for it?

A I recall the incident very well. To my knowledge, he has not apologized for it, and I don't see any particular reason why he should since that act was committed by Joshua Nkomo's forces.

Q About the Patriotic Front, you said they were co-leaders. You just said that.

A Yes. And anyone who has studied the history of the Rhodesian Civil War knows that it was fought by two guerrilla armies completely separately, with no, practically no contact, much less command and control, between the commanders of the two forces.

I think when Joshua Nkomo comes over here, if he does, that would be a very appropriate question to address to him.

Q He is, as I understand it, a member of the Rhodesian Senate, is he not?

A Joshua?

Q He is part of the government. He came back after fleeing for his life.

A He is a Member of Parliament; he's not in the government.

Q Let me ask you this:

Did Nokomo and the Patriotic Front --

In other words, what you're saying is that Mugabe never did apologize because it was his unit, too? He never has? Five years have gone by and he has never apologized.

Q I don't agree that it was his unit.

Q Well, it was his Patriotic Front; you said it was. Now, the question is- did they claim, like the Soviets, that this was a spy plane?

A No. Certainly, not. That was an act of terrorism against innocent civilians.

(Continued on page 20.)

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Q Secretary Shultz -- one follow-up -- Secretary Shultz spoke of his revulsion at the Korean airlines massacre. Why had Secretary Shultz, to your knowledge, or Secretary Crocker, have no such revulsion at the Rhodesian airlines massacre?

A I suspect that both Secretary Shultz and Dr. Crocker, and I would include myself, were revolted by that act.

Q Oh, great. I'm delighted. [redacted] You were revolted. You'll mention this with Mr. Mugabe?

A Mr. Mugabe had nothing to do with it.

Q He had nothing to do with it? Okay.

A Do I have to say that five times, or will four suffice?

Q I'm not convinced. He's never apologized --

A Obviously you're not.

Q -- his group did it.

A His group did not do it.

Q I have a similar question. This morning, the Department of State gave out with a list, at the Press Conference at noon, of plane episodes where they were shot

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down and reparations were paid. Bulgaria was one, Yugoslavia was one, Peoples Republic of China. But the Mugabe, or the Zimbabwe shoot-down was not listed among them. Was that at the specific request of the people organizing this visit, that it might distrub the visit?

A I don't understand what you're talking about.

Q Why was, among the shoot-downs, this not included on the list that was made public?

A Where there were no reparations paid?

Q The shoot-downs where reparations either were or weren't paid? I mean, is it for political sensitivity during the time of his visit?

A I have no idea. I doubt that seriously. What you're talking about is an incident that occurred in a guerrilla war. You're not talking about a government, a government that shot down a civilian airliner. You're talking about a guerrilla movement.

Q You're talking about conflict then, and that's different.

A I'm talking about conflict, and I suspect that those people were doing something that had not been approved at a higher authority, but I don't know that

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and I can't prove it so I'm not going to offer that as a defense. But it's something different for the forces of a government to engage in that sort of an act and for guerrillas to do that.

Q Is the focus of this visit primarily matters of economics or is the intent to talk about the problems of southern Africa? What is the basic issue that we want to discuss with Mugabe?

A I think they're more political than economic. We don't have any particular problems with the policies or performance of the Zimbabwe Government since independence in the area of economics. In fact, it's been an extraordinarily good performance, particularly in view of the world recession and two years in a row of very severe drought in Zimbabwe and throughout southern Africa.

They had a very high growth rate the first year after independence; about 14 percent, 12 percent the next year, 2 percent last year. This year probably zero. But with so many countries on the minus side of the line, zero is pretty good in these circumstances. We expect they'll pull out of it and do much better next year. I don't think that they'll be anything on the agenda. Certainly nothing

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critical about their performance in the economical area. The fact is they've taken a great many courageous decisions that are politically unpopular. They've just eliminated most subsidies on basic food commodities, raised the price of the basic staple food which is maze meal by 43 percent, milk by 50 percent, bread by 25 percent, beef by 25 percent and so forth. You can imagine these are not terribly popular but they're extremely important steps recommended by the IMF, agreed to by the Government of Zimbabwe.

At the same time they have held wages down. The last wage increase was January of last year of '82.

To compensate for these increases in basic food prices, they offered an additional five dollars a month to all people earning less than $300.00 a month in the fields of agriculture, domestic services and mining, because those three sectors are suffering. People in other sectors get an additional $10.00 a month. That's not much of a wage increase, so I would say that they're policies have been moderate, sensible, logical, rational and very good.

Q Could you tell me what the regional and international issues are that he will raise with the President where he thinks the United States is not pursuing a policy that he would endorse? Would you be more specific about southern Africa?

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A South Africa, they feel quite threatened by. It's a much larger, richer, more powerful militarily, economically, every other way, neighbor which dominates the region. And not only sits astride but furnishes their access to the sea. Zimbabwe is a land-locked country and suffers all the vulnerabilities of land-locked countries.

They obviously don't like the system of apartheid. They abhor it. They won't approve of it. They'll use practically any occasion available to denounce it. That doesn't endear them to the the south African government.

They feel that the south African government does not want them to succeed; will in fact enourage tendencies towards failure. They accuse them of engaging in destablization of their neighbors. All of this is well known.

Where we come into it is that they think we have a great deal of influence with South Africa. My own view is that they exaggerate the degree of our influence. I don't think any government has that much influence on any other government no matter what their overall relationship, even in an alliance. They would like us to use our so-called influence to put a lot of pressure on South Africa to treat them better, to be kind to them, in effect, rather than

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hostile.

On Namibia, I think our differing approaches are quite well known. We'll discuss them no doubt. They don't like the so-called linkage. They've said that on fifty or a hundred occasions. They seem to think that the Cuban troop problem in Angola, while there may be some merit to our view, that there shouldn't be foreign forces on the African continent for whatever reason. They somehow seem to think that could be solved separately from the Namibia question or the whole security of southern Africa questions; that these two issues should be separated and dealth with separately. They disagree with us on that. On the other hand, they encourage us to continue our efforts and continue our negotiations. They hope we'll succeed.

If we're successful, I think they may even grudgingly conceed that we have the right approach, if successful. If we're not successful, I suppose they'll blame us. That's what diplomacy is all about.

Q Are there any senior white officials as part of this delegation? That is, Zimbabweans who are white?

A I believe not. Am I right? I don't think there is a single white official.

Q How does this jive with an abhorrence of

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apartheid if they have themselves brought along here a racially segregated delegation, and if the entire itinerary ticks off Martin Luther King's grave and the Martin Luther King, Jr. organization in Atlanta; it includes the black caucus in Congress, and then they go off to Detroit, and I think I can predict in advance what they'll do in Detroit?

Isn't this really an apartheid visit, a design calculated to whip up feelings, emotional feelings of black against white, and is it in the interest of U.S. diplomacy to encourage this kind of thing?

A I have at least three answers to that. First of all, the population of Zimbabwe is approximately two percent white these days, so I would agree with you that the whites are two percent under-represented on this delegation. But since they're not a hundred people or even fifty people, I don't know how you can get two percent white representation.

As far as the Cabinet is concerned, there is one white minister, Chris Anderson, whose responsibility and title is Minister of State and whose responsibilities are for the civil service. I don't think the civil service is going to figure prominently in the discussions in

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Washington, so I don't see any reason why he should have been included.

The Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce is also white. He might have been a candidate for inclusion since we do talk about trade and commerce. However, he was just over here a month and a half ago. He had his own visit, spent a lot of time here, so that would be a kind of wasted space on the delegation.

I don't think this is a visit by the Zimbabweans to promote a kind of reverse apartheid.

What would you say if they included one white? Would you call that tokenism?

Q [redacted], before we adjourn, I would like to ask this question. Both the Roman Catholic Social Justic Commission, I believe is the name of it, as well as --

A The Commission for Justice and Peace.

Q They have protested twice now, and the Catholic bishop has spoken out. Bishop Muzorewa has stated the conditions now in parts of Zimbabwe are worse than under the Ian Smith regime, and a religious news service reported recently a mob stoned Bishop Muzorewa and

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his congregation when they were dedicating a chuch near Harare. They noted that the mob was led by a motorcycle with Zimbabwe Government plates.

Did you protest that at the time, [redacted]?

A The attack on Bishop Muzorewa's meeting? No, I did not protest it.

Q You knew about it, though?

A I certainly knew about it. It was written up in the newspaper.

Q It didn't make the Washington Post or the New York Times, to my knowledge.

A It made the Herald in Harare, and that's why I knew about it, because I didn't attend the service.

Q Why didn't you protest it?

A Because I don't think it was a government-sanctioned action. I think it was some over-zealous ZANU youth who were in a competitive, political situation in that particular neighborhood, and they sometimes get out of line as do youth wings of other parties.

Q Were they arrested and imprisoned?

A Not so far as I know. The only statement I've heard from the government on that was the Minister of Home Affairs saying he was investigating. He said that

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in response to a parlimentary question. Not by Bishop Muzorewa but on his behalf.

As far as security in parts of the country being worse than they were under the Ian Smith regime, that's possible maybe in three percent of the country but in ninety-seven percent it's much, much better.

Q What I wanted to ask is this. In your standard, you say that you didn't protest this because it was over-zealous youth.

A If I'm suppose to protest every act of violence that goes on in the country I'm serving in, I would have time for nothing else. What concerns me --

Q It's a human rights policy, [redacted]?

A Governments are suppose to uphold human rights. That doesn't mean every individual who lives in a country upholds human rights.

If an individual gets out of line and throws a rock through a church, I don't think it's up to the American Ambassador to involve himself in that.

Q It's a mob that attacks a Bishop who's the first Prime Minister.

Q How do you spell ZANU, [redacted]?

A ZANU. Zed is Zimbabwean for Z.

Q Thank you very much.

(Briefing concluded at 2:45 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MUGABE

September 13, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:45 P.M.

MR. SPEAKES: The President has completed his meeting, luncheon and departure statements with Prime Minister Mugabe and to report on the meeting we have [redacted]

The briefing is on background, and the briefers should be identified as Senior Administration Officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the departure statements of the President and the Prime Minister covered a good deal of what we might be covering if we made statements here. So basically we are here to answer questions, if you have any.

I would say, first of all, that the meeting in the Oval Office and the luncheon which Dr. Crocker characterized afterwards as a real working luncheon was all substantive talk. There was no small talk that I noticed. So it provided a very long period for an exchange of views.

From our point of view, I suppose the major objective of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington was achieved. This provided an opportunity for an exchange of views at the highest levels of the two governments on a whole host of the topics starting with bilateral relations. As you know, we have a very substantial aid program to Zimbabwe. The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude for that aid.

There was talk about Southern Africa, specifically about Namibia and the related question of Angola; the Cuban troop issue; South African-Zimbabwe relations and the South African position in the region of Southern Africa; Chad was discussed; the Middle East; Central America; the Korean aircraft; North-South issues and the role of the international financial institutions; a few more detailed questions such as the sugar quota; desire for more trade.

And at the end, the Prime Minister volunteered some assurances that despite what he considers some negative reporting

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by the media about the trend of events in Zimbabwe, that there has been no change in their devotion to certain fundamental principles, such as national unity, reconciliation, non-racialism, non-tribalism, protection of minorities, rule of law, constitutionalism, democracy and so forth.

And I think those assurances, those renewed assurances were very well received. Let's go to questions if there are any.

Q Did the subject of abstention at the UN come up and, if so, what is our position to Zimbabwe on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was raised. It wouldn't be a surprise to tell you that we were very disappointed by that abstention. The Prime Minister was asked the rationale for it. His answer was that Zimbabwe feels that it doesn't just represent itself on the Security Council, but that it represents the other states of its region.

First of all, Southern Africa, to a lesser extent Africa as a whole, and in some cases the non-aligned grouping as a whole and that they had, therefore, consulted with the other governments that they feel they are representing by occupying that seat, as the Prime Minister put it, temporarily. And the seven governments they consulted were unanimous in the view that they should abstain and, therefore, they abstained.

Q Who asked him for the rationale?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The American side.

Q I know. Specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I want to get into that.

Q Was it the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get into that.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because you might ask that about every single question that comes up, and I don't chose to answer that. I think it was a general discussion on our side. Obviously the two principals did most of the talking but not exclusively. Others joined in on various topics, as you would expect.

Q Was our side angry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't say that. I would say they were inquisitive, wondering what the rationale could be for an abstention on an issue that is quite clear cut to us. The Prime Minister did characterize it as a horrible tragedy.

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Q What were the seven countries that he consulted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He didn't name them. I presume they are their neighbors in Southern Africa.

Q So he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a presumption.

Q He wasn't speaking for all non-alligned countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, sir. I said that he said the Foreign Minister had consulted seven other governments.

Q Sir, was our disappointment -- you said we were very disappointed. The $75 million, are we going to show our disappointment by reducing the amount of taxpayers' money sent to this government or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that question.

Q You can't. Could I follow up with one other? Since the President, with the State Department's composed speech, said to Prime Minister Mugabe, "Both our countries came into being through revolution," I was wondering if you or the other Senior Administration Official could tell us, does the Reagan Administration believe that General Washington and the Continental Army did anything compared to murdering missionaries or shooting down unarmed airliners? I mean comparable, I said. You got the word. Think about it. It could have been sinking ships, okay? Could I get an answer to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are you trying to tell me that there were no atrocities committed in the American Revolution?

Q None that I know of where missionaries were murdered or that they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you have been reading biased and prejudiced history texts then.

Q You mean do compare? Well, that's good; I'm interested.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't make the comparison.

Q You were able to find some?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think there probably were some.

Q Could we ask some other questions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

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Q Is it the U.S. view that South Africa continues to destabilize that region of the world as Prime Minister Mugabe said? Does the U.S. share his view that South Africa "continues to destabilize" that region?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I better toss that to the other Senior Administration Official since it's beyond Zimbabwe and involves the region.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our view on the question of violence in Southern Africa has been made clear on numerous occasions. We deplore it from whichever quarter. We have said so at every level of the U.S. Government. We believe that respect for boundaries, respect for sovereignty cannot be a matter on which there are double standards. And so we deplore violence whether it's by South Africa across boundaries or against South Africa across boundaries.

We have also, on numerous occasions, and on many fronts, worked, usually quietly, to try and bring parties away from that course of action towards direct discussion of the issues in the hopes that through that process, there will be possibilities for coexistence in this very tense, tense region. That has involved, in the past, the question of Zimbabwe's relationship with South Africa, but also Mozambique's and Lesotho's and other countrys in the area.

Q Does Zimbabwe link Cuban withdrawal from Angola to the Namibia situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position of the Government of Zimbabwe was stated by the Prime Minister in his departure statement.

Q He mentioned linkage, but he didn't say where it was.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. He meant to make clear the longstanding position of their government, which is that they don't accept linkage of these two issues. They recognize that we in the Contact Group are working for something which they would also like to see, which is an internationally-recognized independence for Namibia. But there is a difference, as he said, about modalities for getting there, and there is an urgent request, once again, that we separate these two issues.

Q Will we? Are we rigid? How rigid are we?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position on the matter remains that we are not trying to sell linkage as a juridical doctrine to anybody, and we don't either get our jollies or get our disappointments by any kind of a Gallup Poll on the linkage issue. What we're trying to do is to solve a practical problem, and we are, in fact, doing it in a manner which is parallel but separate. Our dialogue with the Angolans about the Cuban issue, which has been going on for some months now, is conducted separately. It involves us and the Angolan Government bilaterally. It does not involve the front line states of the

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Contact Group, so in that sense, we are dealing with it separately. But we do feel there must be an agreement on the Cuban withdrawal question, which is, in general, parallel with the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435 on Namibia.

Q To follow up on that, are the Angolans coming closer toward asking the Cubans to leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't comment beyond what we've already said on the record on that issue. We are in continuous contact with them. The Angolan Government, in our view, wishes those contacts to continue; would like to see a settlement and is grappeling with some very difficult choices and issues as concerns the Cuban question. Yes?

Q Was the question of access by Western reporters to Zimbawbe raised at the meeting? There have been some complaints that they're having a lot of problems.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It did not come up in any of the discussions thus far. It has come up in Harare, but that specific subject did not come up in the course of this visit, at least not yet.

Q Did the question of human rights come up from our side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My recollection is that the Prime Minister volunteered a statement on that subject himself, which was to renew the assurances that they are devoted to respect for human rights, et cetera, which I mentioned in my opening remarks.

Q Did that include the airmen who were aquitted and then taken right to jail? Did the President ask about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister volunteered some information on that subject --

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- also as he has in previous meetings.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that the people had been aquitted; that they were redetained under a law which exists in Zimbabwe which permits detention of people considered to be threats to the security of the state. Two of the officers were deemed subsequently not to pose such a threat; have been released. A third is probably going to be released on the same basis. The delay in his case was owing to some doubt about his true nationality, which has now been established as being Irish.

The other three, he said, will remain in detention for some time. He didn't specify how long, but the presumption is that their cases are continuing to be reviewed.

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Q Do we approve of this? Did the President say anything about hoping that since they have been aquitted by a judge, a black judge, that they would be released in the name of human rights which our country seems to -- or do we just say: Well, that's fine. We'll send you $75 million more even though you keep these people in jail after they have been found innocent. What was the President's reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President didn't say either of those things.

Q Oh, he just kept silent.

Q What did President Reagan say in response to Prime Minister Mugabe's concerns about South Africa as a destabilizing force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the position expressed by the President and our side was that we are, indeed, deeply committed to seeing peace and economic development in this important region and that furthermore, we are giving, as a matter of very high priority, our energies to the search for a settlement of the Namibia problem in conjunction with the Cuban issue in Angola.

It is our view -- and this was stated -- that this is perhaps the most important outstanding regional question in Southern Africa.

Q Could you give us the names of the man who is going to be released and the other three who will be held in detention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The two who have already been released and have left Zimbabwe are Slouter and Pile. They're the two most senior officers. The third man, the Irishman, is named Brisko.

Q And are the names of the other three known?

Q It is Prime Minister Mugabe's belief that if the United States was to deal more firmly with South Africa with threats, South Africa would not be as intransigent as it is. What is the U. S. position on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Prime Minister did express that view and has in several meetings. I suppose our feeling is that we're going about it in the right way through diplomatic channels and are trying to achieve the results that we want to achieve.

The Prime Minister, I must say, stressed political and diplomatic pressure. On several occasions he has said -- and I think you reiterated this -- that he wasn't calling for economic sanctions or anything of that sort.

Q Can I get back to the abstention at the U.N.? After we expressed our disappointment and the Prime Minister explained his position, did we have a redirect or an answer to that such as either further disappointment or some kind

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of threat to foreign aid, or what was our response to his [illegible] explanation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't hear anything of that character, no.

Q Did it drop as just a one -- two answers -- one question, one answer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Nodded affirmatively)

Q Is our disappointment allayed by this explanation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't believe it is.

Q How will you manifest --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only speak for myself. I don't think we have established a U.S. Government policy position on that issue, which happened only yesterday. I'm certainly personally disappointed. I'm sure the other Senior Administration Official is, but I don't know that we've had a conference on it to decide a policy.

Q Was there any discussion of an upcoming -- of Mugabe's upcoming visit to the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not mentioned. It's been in the planning for some time. There was some doubt that it might come this fall, but the last information I had was that they haven't determined a date yet. But it is in the offing somewhere. He has been invited and has accepted in the past, but they haven't picked a date yet.

Q I am going to paraphrase the Prime Minister. At one point he said something to the effect that: We're a young nation, and we make mistakes, but we have the best of intentions. What was he talking about? Did he have any mistakes in mind?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I suppose he did, but he didn't enumerate them. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any idea what he might be talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I have my ideas about what mistakes he made, but I can't tell you what his idea of the mistakes he's made is.

Q They're close?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Are we satisfied --

Q Can we go back to the plane here for just a second? You mean we expressed our disappointment. They say: Well, we did it because the seven other states we feel we represent asked us to abstain, and then the subject was dropped? That was it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think in this sort of discussion at a working luncheon what happens is that you go on to another topic. Somebody else raises something else, or the Prime Minister goes on and says: Now, it occurs to me that on Namibia -- and so forth, and you get off on another tangent. This isn't such a structured discussion that you can say: Well, let's have seven and a half minutes on the Korean plane.

Q At any point in the luncheon or the meetings or whatever, was there further discussion on either just the plane downing itself or on the U.N. vote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No.

Q That was it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was it. Yes, sir. Back there.

Q Was there any reaction from the delegation when the Prime Minister raised the issue of media coverage of events in Zimbabwe by the Western press?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At one point the Prime Minister mentioned that he'd been watching the news on TV, and this had to do with the Middle East, and I hope I'm not speaking out of line by saying that the President warned him to be careful about watching the TV news. (Laughter)

Q Sam Donaldson of ABC and other correspondents remembered that Mr. Mugabe, when he was here in 1980 described President Carter as the great cock of the United States. Did he say anything comparable about President Reagan, or does he feel that he is less exalted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not say anything comparable about President Reagan -- (Laughter)

Q In what respect?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's have two more back in the back and then --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- for which I was grateful. (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Please.

Q Does the U.S. look at South Africa as a buffer community in Southern Africa?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have to toss that to the man who runs all of Africa. I just deal with Zimbabwe. I look at South Africa from Zimbabwe. He has to look at it from Washington.

Q Do you run all of Africa? (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the State Department sense.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't look at any one country, any one group of countries as a buffer in the sense of having taken an alliance standpoint in a global contest. We do believe that what will help to stem opportunities for the Soviets and their friends is progress towards peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes, and we have a record second to none in the pursuit of such solutions, as the Prime Minister himself made reference to in his departure statements.

Q Where does the relationship between the U.S. and South Africa lie at the moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's hard to characterize it in one sentence. I would describe it as a relationship which, on our side, we wish to be constructive, we wish to support what we believe in, we wish to acquire a degree of credibility which enables us to be persuasive. That is an approach we've taken toward South Africa. It's not exclusive towards South Africa. We could not be doing what we're doing in the region without doing it with everybody. We have our doors open with everybody.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, Mike, Steve, did you have something?

Q Yes. What is our position on Zimbabwe's progress in regards to human rights, and particularly, in the case of these six airmen? Do we feel they have acted appropriately? Are we troubled by their detention after aquittal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I would say that we were troubled by their redetention after aquittal. It's a rather delicate matter to talk to other governments about matters affecting their internal security. Those, I suppose, are the most sensitive issues that any government faces, particularly a Third World Government, and one which, in this case, is now only three and a half years away from a very bitter and bloody civil war which was very destructive. They have continuing security problems.

It would not be right for us to tell them that they don't. How they deal with them is really their responsibility. We have our views, we might do things differently ourselves, but they do face certain dangers regionallyand internally. There is conflict within the country. Somebody blew up half their air force. That's

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of concern to them. I wouldn't feel right about going to them and saying: Well, you should ignore that and just let it pass.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steve, last question.

Q Was there no particular response on the American side to the Prime Minister's explanation of the situation with the airmen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall a response in any of the discussions today -- do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- on that subject. No, I don't.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(2:07 PM EDT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 14, 1983

BRIEFING BY ELIZABETH DOLE, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION AND J. LYNN HELMS, FAA ADMINISTRATOR ON THE DELEGATION TO THE ICAO

The Briefing Room

10:43 AM EDT

MR. SPEAKES: With us today we have Secretary Dole, Department of Transportation, and J. Lynn Helms, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and Donald R. Segner, Associate Administrator for Policy in International Aviation of the FAA. The latter two will participate in the U.S. delegation to the conference in Montreal. Secretary Dole has a statement to begin with and then Administrator Helms will have a brief statement and answer some questions.

Let me point out to you that this matter and this meeting in Montreal is a civil aviation matter and that the Administrator will be prepared to discuss only in the area of civil aviation and not in the area of any military intelligence operations.

SECRETARY DOLE: Thank you, Larry.

Good morning. Thirteen days have passed since the Soviet Union wantonly shot a Korean 747 from the skies, thirteen days in which the world has risen up to voice its anger and its disgust at what President Reagan has called a crime against humanity, thirteen days in which all of us concerned for the future of international aviation and flight have questioned how such acts can be stopped forever, thirteen days in which our initial shock may have subsided but not our sense of outrage. Indeed, all members of the civilized world stand together in condemning this act for which there is no justification, legal or moral.

Our first inclination surely is to punish the offender. As the President has said, it would be easy, and it is easy, to think in terms of vengeance. Instead, the better course and the one we are pursuing is to impress upon the Soviets the enormity of their action and persuade them to respond satisfactorily to our collective concern for aviation safety.

In cables which I have sent to the Ministers for Civil Aviation of non-Soviet bloc countries around the world and in followup telephone conversations last week, I urged a united and firm response from the entire international community to the unwarranted Soviet assault on a civilian aircraft.

We have, as you know, reaffirmed the order which in January 1982 denied Aeroflot entry rights to the United States. We have also closed remaining Aeroflot offices in this country and invoked orders suspending interline ticketing with Aeroflot. The immediate action by the Government of Canada to suspend Aeroflot services in Canada is in our view an appropriate action. We are gratified that other countries are following their example.

We also commend the members of the International Airline Pilots Associations for organizing and carrying out a boycott of flights to Moscow.

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The Soviets also have been notified that our bilateral agreement for cooperation in the field of transportation will not be renewed, and we are working with the thirteen countries who had citizens aboard the Korean jet in an effort to obtain just compensation for the families of those killed.

But beyond these steps, we must concentrate our best efforts on repairing the fabric of international air commerce so severely shredded by the Soviets.

The United States Government must, and will, be involved. But the work of assuring safe passage for civilian aircraft under rules that all nations will accept and honor can only be achieved through the determined efforts of the international civil aviation community.

To further that objective, we are here to meet with the President this morning, and I have asked FAA Administrator Lynn Helms to head up the delegation representing the United States at the emergency session of the ICAO Council in Montreal tomorrow. The delegation's mission will be to register the outrage of the American people over the Soviet action, to call for ICAO to review the facts surrounding this tragedy, and for ICAO to condemn those responsible. We are urging the international aviation community to take steps to ensure that nothing like this can ever happen again.

I hope that the meeting will be the focal point and the effective catalyst for demonstrating the strength of our concern and our common concern. The aviation community must be prepared to call to account any nation engaged in international air commerce which deliberately and callously violates the safety of air transportation. No issue to come before ICAO is of greater urgency or importance.

I will now turn this briefing over to Administrator Helms who has a statement. He is going to be heading the delegation and he will be happy to answer your questions this morning. Thank you.

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: This special session of the Council was called at the request of the Government of Korea. We fully support that request. We believe that this incident is a civil aviation matter and it is an internatioal civil aviation safety matter. We intend to take a very firm position that there must be an international inquiry, an investigation, to determine all the facts and what happened.

Secondly, we intend to take a strong position that all of the ICAO rules, procedures and annexes should be reviewed in parallel to take every step possible to ensure that such an event does not happen again.

In the time remaining, I'll try to treat your questions.

Q What happened to the radio communications on the Korean airplane? What happened? Why were they so far off course? Do you have any idea? Have you investigated?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: You raise two questions. The one on communications --

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Q Both of them then.

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: -- we are satisfied we had very effective communications from our Anchorage Control Center through the point of what we call Nippi, N-i-p-p-i, which is a geographic point in the Pacific Ocean where we turn control over to Tokyo Control. So we had effective communications.

Q How about Tokyo?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Tokyo acknowledged that they had control. Once we turn it over to them, then of course it is up to them to handle control. Incidentally, we could monitor, however, on the same frequency certain of their conversations also.

Q Did they have communications all the way through until the incident?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Yes. There was positive radio communications with the KAL pilot throughout.

Q How about the next one? What happened to the plane? Why was it so off course?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: That's the reason we want an international inquiry. There are many theories, and we really don't know with certainty.

Q Mr. Helms, if you could monitor the communications, some of those communications, have those been made public, the communications monitored by the U.S. between the Japanese controllers and the Korean pilot?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: I have to say yes and no. Yes to the extent that we have them recorded. Ordinarily once we turn over control to Japan, we no longer record those. We only record those, ordinarily some 15,000 tapes a day, where we are in control. After that, our controller may be listening, but they would not be recorded.

Q Did you say you did have them recorded?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: No, we do not have. Once we turn them over at Nippi, we do not record the conversations then between an aircraft and another air traffic control center of another nation. So we don't record those. The Japanese, I am sure, have them, though. They can give them to you.

Q What were the conversations which you just mentioned which you said you had? I thought I understood you to say you had some of them, despite the fact you turned over control to the Japanese.

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ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Yes. We recorded some of the conversations. Recorded, excuse me. I must make a distinction. When I say record, I mean our controllers heard it. We didn't put it on tape. We stop our tape recorders once we turn them over at this intersection point at Nippi. But you are on the same frequency as NHF. Our controllers heard Tokyo center and KAL talking and some of the transmissions. They were routine reports of being on position. Everything we have seen indicates the pilot thought he was exactly on course.

Q Mr. Helms, can you be a little more specific about some of the things you might try to do to prevent this kind of thing from happening again? You talk about reviewing the ICAO procedures.

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: The Annex 2 to the ICAO procedures and policies was specifically designed with the thought in mind that such an event might happen somewhere in the world. It set out procedures of what member nations should undertake to do and should implement. We'll take another look at that, I am sure, to see if we can do it.

Also, when R-20 -- it's Romeo 20 in aviation language -- was established, which is the northernmost track across the Pacific, this was done by ICAO and all member nations that were affected, including Russia. Russia was offered the opportunity to participate in air traffic control, and I specifically mean in this case air traffic control, just like our centers do and the Japanese centers do. They declined to participate. Now perhaps they'll change their position and now elect to participate. But we are going to review them all and see whatever we can do to come up with additional steps.

Q Do you believe, given what the Soviets have said in the last couple days they want to protect their borders and they are going to continue to protect their borders and if they had to do it all over again they would do exactly the same thing, do you really think there is anything you can do to prevent this kind of accident from happening again if a civilian airliner strays into Soviet airspace, given their frame of mind?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: I don't know, but I have the obligation to at least try. And we intend to take a very firm position in the ICAO Council that all the nations in the world suffer from this. We must attempt to get better control.

Q What is the outlook for this conference? Are there real questions that we will be able to get support to go along with our goals?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: The information that has come to me from my counterparts around the world indicates an extreme interest in this matter and in this Council. My view is that there will be a resolution that comes out of the Council meeting, and that resolution will call for an international inquiry. It will probably have other items, but I wouldn't want to predict to you the total content of it. I believe that will come out of it, however.

Q How many countries are here and how would you characterize them? Are they all free world, non-communist countries?

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ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: The Council is made up of 33 nations in what we call Category 1, 2 and 3. Category 1 has 11 nations, Category 2 has 11, and Category 3 has 11. The reason those categories are established is the larger industrial nations that have a large aviation fleet are in one and then it works down in descending order. They are elected freely from the total of some 50 nations that are members of the ICAO assembly. That ensures them that Third World nations and all of them are equally represented.

Q Will Russia be there?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Yes, I am quite confident they will.

Q How will they get there?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: They have a permanent delegation, a representative at ICAO. I would suspect that he might receive some support.

Q Mr. Helms, what is the requirement? Is it a two-thirds requirement to get an investigation, a simple majority?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: In the case of the Council, it can be a simple majority.

Q How many of the members of the Council would you characterize as likely to support the Russian position?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: I wouldn't want to hypothesize on that. My judgment would be perhaps 25 or 30 of the nations will in fact be there and be represented. But I don't think I would want to characterize which ones may support it and which ones will go against it. It is a civil aviation safety matter, and there is a very, very strong feeling about this around the world. I have had many communications on this.

Q Have you heard from any countries who say they are not coming or will not come?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: No, I have received no information that any of the 33 have said they will not attend.

Q Do you have support in these messages you have been getting from nations that are often aligned with the Communists in other world matters?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Yes. I think I would have to say that that has happened in a number of cases, and some of the events that have been reported around the world tend to substantiate that. I don't think I would want to go in detail and distinguish it because remember, this is an international event. The proper purview of that is the State Department. I am only interested in the civil aviation safety part.

Q What is the nature of possible reprimands that would follow an inquiry?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: That is a hypothesis which I just couldn't say. And I am sure before it was implemented it would go from the technical work, which is ICAO, over into the UN, which is the proper role for that to be implemented.

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Q Does the Soviet Union participate in air traffic control systems anywhere?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Only in one. That is the four-power agreement for the Berlin corridor. Other than that, they do not participate in any joint efforts. Once a nation such as Sweden hands off air traffic to the Russians, then they pick it up. We have no joint arrangements that they participate in.

Q Could you give us the range of possible things that they could do to chastise a country that had violated its rules and regulations?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: There are a number of things that could be done, but I don't think it would be proper for me to try to usurp the decision of the ICAO Council. That is something that that Council should do. Before the U.S. took a posture, that's a proper role for the State Department to finally rule on. But there are a number of things that could be done.

Q Has the Council ever dispelled or disciplined a member before?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: Action has been taken in its history, and some of the discussion that is now going on, and suggestions that have been made to me, would indicate that some people feel some action should be taken. But I don't feel free to discuss those.

Q Without taking a position, can you give us some indication of what the options are that are available to this Council?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: No, you're -- well, the first thing is the Secretary General of ICAO can direct that an international investigation be conducted. He can select the nations and the representatives from those nations to do it. Under the ICAO rules, the nation in which an accident or incident happens has the right to initiate that event, that investigation. However, the operator, the air carrier, also has a right to be a participant, which says then that Russia and Korea, by the very nature of it, would be involved.

The Secretary General of ICAO, or the President, President Lumbare, could in fact go ahead and designate two, three, four, five others and by this designate an international inquiry. I would think that the Russians would not dare refuse to participate. That would be an open acknowledgement to the world of civil aviation that they have no interest in civil aviation safety. And I can't imagine that they would turn that down. I can imagine it would be a severe negative decision on their part.

One more.

Q Would we be willing to participate in this international inquiry? Will we turn over all the information we have, including intelligence secrets and so forth?

ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: It is a civil aviation matter.

Q I know.

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ADMINISTRATOR HELMS: All of the data which comes to us in civil aviation we will gladly work with them on. A decision as to whether other information would be turned over would have to be made by the National Security Adviser or Secretary of State. I just couldn't make that decision.

I am sorry, but I must go. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (10:58 A.M. EDT)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

ON THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT EANES OF PORTUGAL
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1983, 2:00 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: This is a BACKGROUND briefing on the visit of the President of Portugal Eanes. The ground rule are that it is a Senior State Department Official. For your information and not for publication, it's [redacted]. I think he is going to start off with a brief description of the visit, and then take your questions.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you. I've also got with me [redacted] who may help on some of the questions.

The visit of President Eanes we regard as an important one, with a particular symbolism for our relationship with Portugal, who is an old and very close ally of the United States, with whom we have had excellent relationships for over three decades.

Let me run briefly through the high points of the schedule, just to give you a sense of what he is going to be doing here, tell you a little about him and his position, and then take any questions you may have.

He has arrived today at Andrews. He has a meeting at 2:45 today with Secretary of State Shultz. Tomorrow, he will be meeting with the President in the morning at the White House, and be having lunch here at the State Department hosted by Secretary of State Shultz. Tomorrow afternoon, he will be up on Capitol Hill meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. Tomorrow evening, there will be a state dinner at the White House hosted by the President.

On Friday, he is going to be meeting and having lunch with Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The Portuguese President will himself be giving a reception Friday evening. From Saturday till next Tuesday, he's in New York where he will be meeting various representatives of the American business community and also of the Portuguese-American community.

Eanes is the President of Portugal. The Portuguese have a system under which they have both a President and a Prime Minister. The President is thus the Chief of State. His duties are more than ceremonial. He can do things like veto legislation, select the Prime Minister; dissolve the parliament; and he has played a very important role both in the creation and in the evolution of the Portuguese democratic system and structure.

He has been the President of the country since 1976. He played a very important role immediately preceding that in fending off what appeared to be quite a likelihood of a communist counter-coup. In 1975 it was a period of considerable turbulence in Portugal, growing from the revolution which overthrew the authoritarian regime and which led, eventulaly, to the creation of a stable democratic structure which exists now.

He has been the President since that period, as I've mentioned, during which there have been a number of governments, and he has played an important stabilizing role in the evolution of the political structure in Portugal which exists today. He was a career military man and he remains the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

That's pretty much the background I have on the visit. Our relations with Portugal and the sorts of issues which will be discussed are similar to those which we have with most other NATO countries -- issues of European security and arms control; but in addition, Portugal, like France, retains important ties in Africa with former colonial areas. In the case of Portugal, principally Angola and Mozambique.

We have found that Portugal has been a valuable interlocutor for us and a source of valuable advice on affairs in Africa, and we have worked closely with them. I would anticipate that that would be among the issues which would be discussed during this visit.

I will be glad to take any questions.

Q Is there one particular, new initiative to be discussed on Angola?

A No.

Q I mean, that is static, you don't see any movement on that -- negotiation?

A I guess I'm the wrong person to ask. I am unaware of any particular new initiative. I think that the situation in both Angola and Mozambique will be discussed. They do have access to information and people in those countries, have been a source of advice, and also they have assisted us. I would anticipate they would be the sorts of things we would be talking about, how we see the situation developing, where they can help, and they'll be giving us advice.

I, at least, am unaware of any sort of specific initiative which we'll be asking them to push.

Q What is the overall political situation in Portugal now?

A The Portuguese face a very difficult economic situation. I think at the moment, the political situation is very stable. The government has a popular vote of approximately two-thirds -- that is over 70 percent of the seats -- in the Parliament. They've got a strong Prime Minister, the head of the Socialist Party, Mario Suarez, who has allied his party, the largest, with the second-largest party.

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The issues they face are difficult. They've got a large and still-mounting foreign debt, and the difficulties of unemployment and inflation that occur in other countries have been intensified in theirs, so they have adopted a series of tough austerity measures. But the questions are those that always exist in these kinds of circumstances, "Will they be able to make them stick?" and "Will they be adequate?"

Q What is that debt now, please?

A [illegible] what is the Portuguese debt?

SECOND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The debt service ratio is about 35 percent.

FIRST SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What is the total sum, about $10 million, or something?

SECOND SENIOR DEARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes.

FIRST SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Or $10 billion? I've got it in here somewhere.

Oh, no, I don't. It's quite large.

Q $10 billion, is it?

A I think it's -- I'm not sure. I can have someone get you the exact sum. It's something in the area of $10 billion, but whether its -- Let me check and get back to you on it. I didn't bring the figure with me.

Q Is there a particular reason for the visit right now?

A Not at this specific time. It's been scheduled for some time. I think, in fact, it was scheduled earlier and then had to be moved for reasons having to do, I think, with the schedule of elections in the country. I can't recall, exactly, but there is no specific reason why he should come this month as opposed to two months.

Q But what is the reason for the visit at all, though?

A This is the first state visit by a Portuguese President since that country's -- Essentially, it is the first state visit by a Portuguese President. And given the closeness of our relationship, it's well due.

Q Is there any consultations with this government on its decision on Aeroflot?

A No. They've agreed to adopt the four measures which we and a number of other countries have put into effect, including the boycott on overflights and flights to and from the Soviet Union. I think we're gratified that they were able to do so.

SECOND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Portugal has adopted a 30-day boycott.

Q Is President Eanes going to discuss about the American base in Lajes?

A I doubt that will come up in detail. We are negotiating with the Government of Portugal to renew the base agreement which has expired, and I would anticipate those negotiations would be mentioned in passing, but I doubt they would get into detail on either side.

Q Are there any particular sticky points of that agreement?

A Not at the moment. I mean there will be the usual questions of AID levels and access rights, but I don't [aid] anticipate any particular ones being discussed at this time. And I don't anticipate any real substantive hold-ups in the negotiation.

Q What is the AID level requested for FY-84? [aid]

A Is that figure out yet (to staff)?

SECOND SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: '84? It's $40 million in economic support; $60 million in military grant assistance; and $45 million in military sales credits.

Q How does that compare to FY-83?

A It's up significantly. '83, as I recall, went down significantly from previous years.

Q '82 was --

A '82 was the bottom of the trough, and it's been going up since then.

Q What is of the most concern of the Government of Portugal in its relations with the United States?

A I think it is a relationship without major sources of friction on either side. I think foreign assistance levels, because Portugal is the poorest country in NATO, I guess, with the exception of Turkey, and thus the poorest country in Western Europe, with no exception, are very important to the country. But I don't anticipate that the [aid] visit would turn into a negotiation on AID levels, but that is an important element of our relationship. It really is a relationship without significant sources of friction.

I recognize that means that it is a relationship without significant sources of news, but --

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:15 p.m.)

* * *

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON STATE VISIT OF PORTUGUESE EANES

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, 1:50 P.M.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I'm sorry to keep you waiting. The Presidents leave at the time they decide to leave. This is ON BACKGROUND, attributable to a senior American official. After [redacted] has finished this particular readout, we'll take about five- or ten-minute break, and then he'll come back and do the KAL one.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I missed dessert for this briefing. I will just try to briefly run down the issues that were discussed by the two Presidents today.

First of all, the atmosphere was very warm by virtue of the fact that year in and year out, the United States-Portuguese relationship is a very cooperative one. The Portuguese, as they have demonstrated most recently, I think, with the suspension of Aeroflot flights for 30 days, have been for 40 years probably one of the most loyal allies that the United States has had. Some of you know the background of this including the 1973 Middle East war, and the crucial role that their bases in the Azores played in that effort. The base issue -- the question of Portuguese bases -- was discussed, and both sides stressed the importance of moving ahead with the negotiations which have begun, and both sides desire to wrap up an agreement as quickly as possible.

Our negotiator for those talks is our Ambassador in Lisbon, Allan Holmes, and he, of course, is back with the Portuguese President. Some of the details and some of the questions in those negotiations have been discussed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister as well as Mr. Holmes.

Looking at broader forms of political cooperation, there was some discussion of NATO issues, INF and Geneva talks. The Portuguese President praised the decision by President Reagan to continue the Geneva negotiations, and strongly supported the December 1979 decision.

I mentioned the other forms of political cooperation, the question of the Korean airliner, probably the most important. There was some discussion on the impact on European public opinion of the episode, with both Presidents agreeing that it would likely reduce the appeal of the neutralist or the pacificist sentiment in Europe. The Portuguese, as I said, have taken a stronger position on the airliner than many of our other allies, suspending flights by Aeroflot to Lisbon for thirty days. That is a fairly important rout for the Soviets because they fly into Lisbon and then fly on to Havana.

There was a lot of discussion on economic problems. As you may know, Portugal has been negotiating with the IMF, and as part of that negotiation has announced some sweeping austerity measures. The Portuguese decision to adopt those measures was praised by the President and the Secretary of the Treasury in the meetings this morning. President Reagan was able to brief President Eanes on the implications for the world economy of the United States recovery.

There was some discussion of the domestic political scene in Portugal. The Portuguese, as you know, have made major progress in building a stable democracy. At the same time, there is still a large non-democratic Communist Party; but President Eanes expressed confidence that the new government in Portugal would be able to deal with any extra-political and extra-consitutional threats.

Then, finally -- and I don't mean to say finally because it is the least important, because it's very important -- there has been a good deal of discussion on southern Africa.

Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker recently visited Portugal where he met with President Eanes and others, and discussions this morning were a good follow-up to those. The Portuguese, needless to say, have a great deal of experience in Angola, Mozambique and other parts of southern Africa, and desire to play a larger role in that region, and the United States strongly supports that.

In his discussions on how the United States and Portugal could cooperate in working on Southern African problems, including a Namibian settlement and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

My final point concerns the fact that traveling with the Portuguese President and the Foreign Minister was the Regional President of the Azores. Most Portuguese-Americans -- and I think there are, roughly, 1,000,000 in the United States -- come from the Azores. The United States has a special relationship with the Azores which was pointed out in very strong terms by the Regional Azorean President, and he had the opportunity to talk about the special problems of the Azores with the President.

I'll be happy to answer any of your questions.

Q Did the President ask for any more U.S. aid? He seemed to make a mention of that during his remarks.

A They are, obviously, interested in U.S. security assistance. They have important military modernization needs. Our security assistance funding for Portugal has increased in recent years, and we intend to increase that amount in the years ahead. The President was able to tell the Portuguese President that that is our intention.

This is, obviously, a question that will be related, not formally but indirectly related, to the the base negotiations.

Q Are we discussing with them the idea of a new U.S. military base in Portugal?

A No. The base where we are, for the most part, interested is in Lajes, in the Azores.

Q Are there any hangups on that base negotiation? How soon do you expect that to be --

A I wouldn't want to speculate, but we are interested in achieving an agreement, as are the Portuguese, as quickly as possible.

Q When does the current agreement expire?

A It expiered earlier this year, but as with other agreements, there is a grace period, which I think lasts for one year for the two sides.

Q But there are no special issues in this?

A I don't think there are any particularly special issues. As you know, we have been negotiating with other countries -- recently Spain -- and we've completed an agreement there; with the Greeks; and outside of Europe, the Philippines. I would say that, roughly, the issues are the same.

Q It's tied to more, to a substantial increase in aid?

A I wouldn't say that. I wouldn't necessarily say that.

Q How is it tied to any increase in economic assistance?

A Well, we do not tie any of our base agreements formally to increases in aid, but obviously, the Portuguese do have economic problems, and they have military modernization needs; and we want to be as helpful as we can.

Q How should we refer to you in this briefing, as a senior State Department official, or what?

A Senior State Department official or senior American official.

Q O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 2:15 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
OVERVIEW ON IMPACT OF MEASURES
ON SOVIET AVIATION
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, 2:15 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This is an overview, and I would be willing to go into as much detail as you would like to go as far as I can go on the impact of the various decisions taken by governments on Soviet aviation, both the operations of Aeroflot and the flights of non-Soviet airlines into the Soviet Union.

As you know, with the ICAO Meeting getting underway in Montreal, many countries have announced decisions for differing periods of time to suspend their aviation operations. We thought it might be useful to try to pull it together for you, and give you some sense of what the overall impact has been.

Let me just go over a few general points, and then I'll be happy to talk about specific decisions taken by governments.

The NATO countries, with the exception of France, Greece and Turkey, Japan and Switzerland, all of which are observing the two-week boycott of air service to the Soviet Union, account for over 50 percent of world civil aviation traffic.

The first point you would make is that the countries that have gone along with the suspension, or a boycott, are the principal carriers.

If you add Australia and New Zealand, which do not have flight to the Soviet Union but are taking other actions against Aeroflot, for example, cancelling interline ticketing -- I can explain that if any of you are interested -- if they're added in, you get another percentage which brings the figure almost up to 60 percent.

Q Of the world's carriers?

A Of the world's carriers.

Q That's not of the world carriers. It's of civil aviation traffic; right? Sixty percent?

A That's right. It's called World Civil Aviation Traffic. Not the world carriers because there are a lot of one-airliner airlines.

Q That's exclusive of Aeroflot, non-Aeroflot?

A That's not Aeroflot. That's right. The percentage of flights by non-communist countries to the Soviet Union affected by the suspension of national service is roughly 50 percent.

A total of 80 scheduled flights to the Soviet

Union by non-communist country airlines will be cancelled out of a total of 156 in the two-week period. Here, I have to make an important point.

Q Eighty a day, you mean?

A No. Eighty total. Out of a total of 80 --

Q Over the next two weeks?

A Two weeks. The number is likely to be far higher if we see pilots in countries that have not gone along with the suspension; simply to declare that they will not fly. It is a little too early to tell. We should know in the next day or so.

A total of about 30 percent of Aeroflot flights to the non-communist world will be affected by the two-week suspension. Many of the remaining Aeroflot flights are with smaller aircraft to Third World countries.

Q Would you do that again?

A A total of about 30 percent of Aeroflot flights to the non-communist world will be affected by the two-week suspension. Many of the remaining flights are with smaller aircraft to Third World countries, whereas most of the flights that will be cancelled will be to major destinations in which larger aircraft would have been used.

Let me make an important point here. If Aeroflot flights to France, Finland and Sweden were suspended, the overall percent of Aeroflot flights would then rise to over 50 percent. The reason this is an important point is that today the Soviets were unable to fly into Paris, despite the fact that the French have not suspended flights, because both the Federal Republic and Switzerland has banned overlights by Aeroflot, the Soviets can't get in.

A very similar situation exists at Shannon Airport in Ireland where, because the British have banned overlights, the Soviets cannot get in without flying over a thousand miles out of their way.

Q I thought Ireland was going along with the suspension.

A Ireland is going along with a partial suspension.

Q That overlight question, how would that --

A Let me give you what Ireland's situation is. Ireland has suspended only Aeroflot rights to pick up and discharge passengers to and from Moscow. In other words, if a flight is going from Moscow to Shannon to let -- and people are going to get off, those flights have been suspended. The flights that the Soviets fly through Shannon, which are refueling stops, usually with Soviets and Cubans on board to go to Havana, have not been suspended. But the effect, we believe now, is that they probably will be because they can't overfly British air space.

Q What is the two-week period you mentioned? When does it start and when does it stop?

A The two-week period has, for most countries, begun today. It was made to conincide with the beginning of the International Civil Aviation Organization Council Meeting which is getting underway in Montreal.

Let me just say a word about that. At that meeting the Council will be discussing a resolution today which we hope will strongly deplore the Soviet action and call for a variety of actions to insure that it does not happen again. At the present time, our delegation at that meeting, led by the FAA Administration -- FAA Administrator. Len Helms is negotiating with other delegations to get a tough resolution.

I've been discussing this in terms of a two-week boycott. As I mentioned earlier, talking about Portugal, that was a 30-day suspension. The Canadians have called for a 60-day suspension. And some countries, while proposing a two-week boycott, have left open the possibility of a renewal.

Just one other point, in terms of the duration of this. As you know, many of these governments have taken this decision along with private decisions by pilots. And in almost every case, the pilots have called for suspensions of 60 days. So we could very well see these two-week actions prolonged into much longer suspensions by virtue of the decisions taken by pilots.

I do have information on the specific situation in many of these countries. I'll try to help you if you've got any questions.

Q On one of the figures you just used, you said if France, Finland and Sweden suspended Aeroflot flights, the figure would rise from 30 percent to 50 percent of Aeroflot flights to non-communist countries.

A That's right.

Q Do you have a figure that just deals with France and does not include Finland and Sweden, or do you have something to say about Finland and Sweden that would -- there's no way to use that 50 percent figure in referencing the Paris situation?

A I see your problem.

Q Can you isolate France for us, and tell us what the figure would be if you add France and, let's say, Ireland?

A I know what you're trying to get at, which is the percentage and I don't think I can get it for you now. We'll try to get it to you.

Q France is a fairly major point, isn't it, for Aeroflot?

A I don't know how major it is, but I think it is an important one. I wouldn't necessarily call it the most important.

Q Do you have a number of flights perhaps in France?

A No.

Q Have any governments taken additional political actions comparable to those of the United States in suspending the consulate agreement and the negotiations regarding the cultural exchanges, and so forth?

A I don't have a comprehensive list of those, but by and large the answer is yes. For example, some of you may have been aware that there has been a senior delegation of Dutch parliamentarians in Washington this week with the leaders of the four major parties. They have cancelled. They were planning to go to Bonn, Washington and Moscow to discuss arms control. They have cancelled out of their Moscow visit.

I think it's fair to say that a number of symbolic gestures -- cancelling meetings and cutting back on exchanges -- have been taken.

Q In that connection, has the Secretary decided whether he will see Gromyko at the U.N.?

A No.

Q That still is open?

A It's something we're still looking at.

Q How would you characterize this as to the degree of sucess or in relation to what you had hoped to do?

A I think that we're gratified with this. We think this is fairly successful. We don't think that this is going to destroy Aeroflot as an airline. That was not the purpose of these steps. We have never called them sanctions.

What we wanted to do is provide a strong political signal to coincide with the meeting of the ICAO in Montreal to demonstrate the depth of concern that the non-Soviet or non-communist civil aviation community felt about this episode, and we think we've done that.

(continued on next page)

Q There was a lot of talk on the Hill yesterday about trade sactions. Is there any consideration being given right now within the Administration?

A I'm not sure. What do you mean by "trade sanctions"? Do you mean a grain embargo?

Q Or a call for --

A I think we have a number of trade sanctions in place agains the Soviet Union, by far more than I would say any other country in the world, and those sanctions were put into place because of Afghanistan and Poland; and there is a strong desire by the President to strengthen particularly our transfer of high technology to the Soviet Union.

This is an ongoing effort, and, if anything, this episode has given that effort new impulse.

Q But it hasn't changed the -- for example, are you taking any different attitude in COCOM, for example, because of this?

A Yes. That's exactly what I'm saying. I think this is going to intensify our efforts, give it new energy to strengthen the COCOM system.

Q When you originally decided to take civil aviation measures, was it just that Aeroflot will be banned, or were the commercial airliners also to be included? Because it seems if you have, for instance, a ban on Aeroflot that only lasts two weeks, the commercial ban lasts longer, Aeroflot is going to pick up the traffic and the hard currency that would have gone on those flights. Have you made an effort to --

A I know. I don't think that's necessarily correct.

Q If Aeroflot can't -- I mean, if, say, an airliner isn't flying out of -- Lufthansa is not flying out of Germany or their pilots won't fly for a month, but Aeroflot can't fly out of their for only two weeks, it's then going to pick up everybody who would have gone on Lufthansa.

A It's not clear that Aeroflot will only be affected by two weeks.

Q Well, that's the question I wanted to ask.

A There are other organizations and ground controllers, people who service aircraft, who are also taking actions, so it remains to be seen if Aeroflot will be grounded for only two weeks.

Q But have you tried? Because it could have happened that Aeroflot in fact would pick up passengers that could not go on commercial flights. Are you trying to make sure that doesn't happen?

A I'm not too sure that's true. I mean, we'd have to think about that. I'm not sure that passengers who, if they couldn't fly Lufthansa, would immediately jump on Aeroflot. Speaking personally, I sure wouldn't. I don't know if you've ever flown Aeroflot.

Q Have we managed to deliver our request for compensation to the Soviets, and how was that done?

A Have we delivered our request?

Q Yes. Managed to get the Soviets to take it?

A No, we haven't, but we are going to continue our efforts.

Q How?

A We will be in touch with the Soviets.

Q Is there anything being contemplated in connection with shipping comparable to what you've done with airlines?

A We have looked at the maritime area. We have not taken any decisions yet.

Q Is there anything being contemplated in this?

A I would just simply say that we have been looking at the maritime area, and we have not taken any decisions as of yet.

Q Were you about to get to a list of pilot unions and things like that which --

A I could just run down -- I don't know how interested you are in this. If you've got any -- I think it would be pretty boring if I went through sort of country by country.

Q Do you have a fact sheet or could a fact sheet be put together?

A I think we could probably do that. I don't think anything on what I've got here would be -- it's just that we'd want to make sure it was up to date. That's the problem. It's a kind of moving situation.

Q You indicated that at the Montreal meeting we're looking at "a variety of measures." Can you outline what some of those are?

A We would like, for example, to see if the Soviets could not be more cooperative on providing radar and other forms of information to the other countries so that in the event that an aircraft strayed off course, we would be in a position to alert them.

At present, as you may know, we have about a 900-mile blind spot between Alaska and Japan where we aren't able to carry out continuous radar coverage, but the Soviets are, so their cooperation in providing that information would be useful.

Other measures include working out better communications links between the airliners and military aircraft, specifically Soviet aircraft. Another thing that could be managed would be communications between air traffic controllers, ground controllers. The most important, though, is a proposal to ban, prohibit altogether, the use of military force against civilian airliners.

Q There was a report that Judge Clark had suggested that we could anticipate that the Soviets would try to fabricate some kind of evidence to prove our involvement in espionage.

Was that just kind of an off-the-wall statement, or do we have some kind of reason to believe that something is underway?

A I haven't seen anything that tells me that something is underway. I think it was just a suspicious concern about the fact that the Soviets had charged that this was a spy mission.

I think it's natural to be suspicious of what they might do to make that claim.

Q Any reports on this apparent salvage operation that they're engaged in?

A There is Soviet activity in this area which is north of Monterone Island, and the Soviets have various types of equipment which could be associated with a salvage effort. We can't confirm that they have found the aircraft or are bringing it up.

Q Has the debris that has washed up in Japan supplied any clues?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q On a somewhat related subject, do you have anything to tell us about the expulsion of two American diplomats from Kabul?

A No, I don't. I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you think the Augustenbergs were roughed up and given orders to leave as a Soviet reaction to what we're doing on Aeroflot and so on, and will we retaliate for what has happened to the Augustenbergs?

A I don't want to speculate on why the Soviets engaged in that kind of activity. It is completely unacceptable from our standpoint, given the fact that these people were U.S. diplomats performing their duty.

The Soviets have been alerted to our very serious concerns about how they behaved in this episode.

Q But are we going to do anything more than alert them?

A I don't want to go beyond that.

Q At this point, or is there --

A I just don't want to say any more.

Q One other question about the airplane: Is there any theory, or do you have any information as to why the airliner was relaying its radio message through the other airliner at some points during the flight? Would that suggest that their radio was -- there was something wrong with it?

A I just wouldn't know.

Q In terms of political signals that you're sending, you're seen on the one hand to be trying to discourage contacts with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Larry Speakes leaves open the possibility of a summit this morning. You are not yet sure whether the Secretary will see Gromyko. There are actions that the United States can take to make certain political points in that connection, if that is the purpose.

What is the aim? In fact, to discourage political contact? If that is the purpose, why don't you just not see Gromyko?

A I don't think our aim has been to discourage political contact.

Q What is the aim, then?

A Our aim is to make it very clear to the Soviet Union that this kind of behavior is not acceptable to the international community, that they have violated some very important provisions concerning international civil aviation, and that in one way or another they not only have to apologize and make good for what they have done, they have to help us help the rest of the international community engage in a cooperative effort to insure that it doesn't happen again. You do that through a variety of different ways.

Q But you were pleased, for example, that the Dutch Parliamentarians had cancelled their visit to Moscow.

A I'm not arguing whether I was pleased or not. I think it was more a reflection of a political sense of outrage which is felt in the various capitals. I wasn't arguing that they were carrying out U.S. policy.

Q I never said that was the point.

A No.

Q In Montreal we're goin to ask the Soviets to be more cooperative to civilian aircraft. Have they ever cooperated?

A We're goin to ask them to be more cooperative.

Q I mean --

A This international organization, of which the Soviet Union is a member, is going to take some decisions about international rules and regulations.

Q My question is, have the Soviets ever provided, for example, ground radars for that stretch of --

A For that stretch? I think the answer is probably no.

Q Why can't the flights get into Paris? They can't overfly West Germany? Didn't you say that their flights cannot get into Paris?

A That's right. They cannot overfly West Germany and Switzerland.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 2:36 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1983, 11:04 A.M.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MR. CARLSON: This is a BACKGROUND briefing on the Special Report No. 110, "Soviet Active Measures," which is being released at the end of this briefing. I think you may have copies that were made available earlier this morning.

It is a BACKGROUND briefing. The briefer is a senior State Department official and not for publication.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Today, we have released State Department Special Report 110, which is the third in a series of reports on Soviet Active Measures. The earlier ones came out, number 101, last June, June a year ago, and the original one -- I think it was number 81 -- about two years ago.

These normally, often-clandestine Soviet activities, "Active Measures," are designed to influence, to affect political attitudes and public opinion in the non-Communist world. We use the term "active measures"

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because we didn't find anything that quite corresponded to this in English, and this is simply a direct translation of the Russian term -- the term that they use.

They involve a variety of techniques and vehicles, of front groups, such as the World Peace Council, and local communist parties; are efforts to influence the media -- media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries; similarly to influence individual attitudes with forgeries, the spreading of rumors, agents of influence.

The key player is the KGB, and indeed it has an active measure service in its headquarters in Moscow, but it also involves the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party which controls foreign front groups and sometimes also the international Information Department, which controls the media.

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In looking back and sort of turning around in the Western camp, probably the closest thing to it is psychological warfare as used by the Allies in World War II, in trying to understand what this is all about. You look at some of the examples in the report and it gives you an idea of the sweep, of the range. In the case of Nigeria, you have the United States Ambassador charged with trying to assassinate the leading Presidental candidate, Chief Awolowo. That appeared in a major newspaper in Ibadan run by a newspaper closely affiliated with his party, backed up by a document supposedly sent -- an internal document in the Embassy -- lending credence to that.

Then in Europe, the Novosti correspondent in Bern is expelled for improper activites involvement in the Swiss peace movement. In India, you have released in the left-wing Indian press an expose -- actually it was not just about India -- "Operation Balkanization -- American Designs on India." This was supposedly a speech given by Jean Kirkpatrick here in Washington on U.S. policy towards the Third World. The headline, because it was released in India, focuses on that paragraph -- total fabrication.

Finally, one other example, the fake telegrams that appeared in the magazine in Rome about six weeks ago relating to

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assassination of the Pope and alleging that the United States was trying to orchestrate the press play on this to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, and trying to lend credence to this through these fake documents.

Looking back over the year, assessing this, we've come to the conclusion that there is greater intensity, and also that the targeting is somewhat bolder than it was the year before. Admittedly, what you see here is more than the tip of the iceberg; it's not the whole iceberg. It is what can be publicly sourced, what is available, what has surfaced; but it doesn't involve things for which we know we have only intelligence information on.

The main regional themes parallel Soviet policy, as you expect they would. In the case of Europe, the number one target is the deployment of the missiles, the peace movement; secondarily, trying to pin the blame for events in Poland on the United States. There is a faked NSC document that was published in Spain which supposedly, Mr. Brzezinski wrote, and then there was a very complicated one relating to the Dozier kidnapping and the cousin of a man named Scricciolo who was caught in a fake letter from Irving Brown trying to tie CIA, Poland, Scricciolo, and so forth.

Then, you have a couple relating to NATO generally, including one of these repeaters, the Holocaust document, which popped up just last week or the week before in Copenhagen, which isn't in the report.

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In the case of Africa, there are really two main themes in Africa, that the U.S. is interfering in the internal affairs of the African countries -- I mentioned the Nigerian one. There was another one in Ghana where you have a senior figure in the Ghana Government standing up before a group like this and saying, "I have the proof: There was a West German Embassy document that the U.S. Ambassador was trying to oust the Government of Ghana. This appeared in the government newspaper and, naturally, did not help relations between the United States and Ghana.

The other theme in Africa has been to suggest very close collaboration between the United States and South Africa; there have been a number of fake documents that have appeared in regard to that that are mentioned in the report. This is a continuation, of course, of things one noted last year.

Central America: Front groups seem to be the main vehicle. There the target, obviously, is to assist the Sandinista cause, the Salvadoran rebel cause, and hurt the policies of the United States.

In the Middle East, radio seemed to be a particular vehicle, and there, as you would expect, the United States is painted as not the friend of the Arabs. South Asia I mentioned: the most striking one had to do with the "Balkanization of India" and that touches a very tender chord in South Asia, going back to the whole trauma that surrounds partition, and it is a theme that

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has been repeated over the years so people knew what they were talking about when they used the word "Balkanization." It goes back to the 1940s.

In the Far East, two comments, one what you might call almost a defensive move on the Soviet part. Stung by the bad publicity about yellow rain, they have launched a counter effort to suggest that the United States is involved in chemical warfare. This is not only in the Far East, but also picks up in Cuba where a resurgence of dengue fever, probably brought back by Cuban soldiers from Angola, has been attributed to U.S. chemical biological warfare effort.

Then, finally, in Japan, as you may know, a Soviet KGB officer defected a couple of years ago. His revelations, which were released by the House Intelligence Committee during the year, laid out fairly clearly the nature of Soviet active measures in Japan. He was particularly apt in describing this because this was what he was involved with. It also has been helpful in shedding light on activities that might take place elsewhere.

In assessing all of this, we think it's important neither to overstate nor understate the impact. We do feel it needs to be realistically recognized that the Soviets, as a standard tool in the way they conduct their business, carry out these deception activities on a large scale. Their impact is such

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that neither, on the one hand, is the Republic in danger, but on the other hand, they are not de minimis. They have an impact; they seem to have more of an impact on the Third World. And once a story is out -- and this is one of the difficult things when you are dealing with them -- it's awfully hard to counter. You know, once you get this thing on the front page of the newspaper, you can deny it, but you never really quite catch up with it. So it has a difficult impact.

Really, what you've got is sort of a classic dilemma of free and open societies. They can roam around and try to take advantage of our openness -- and of course, there is no reciprocity; you're not going to find an active measure appearing in Pravda.

Also in dealing with this, it is important to recognize that while these activities are being carried out largely by the KGB, largely by intelligence officers, the purpose of the activity is not intelligence. The purpose of the activities is essentially political effort to influence political attitudes and public opinion; and it needs to be addressed in this same vein, and we feel most effectively addressed by making available to publics information as it becomes available to us.

In that way, the publics around the world know what is going on; the media knows what is going on, and as people are more aware, they are less likely to be taken in.

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In fact, frankly, it's not just a problem for the United States; it's a problem for all people who favor free societies. Our feeling is that lots of sunshine and lots of information is the best response.

I'll be happy to take any questions you have.

Q Have you and your associates come across any evidence that American or other Western correspondents are being bought and paid for by the KGB or their associates?

A The Soviets would certainly try.

Q My question was, do you have any evidence that any reporters have been put "on the pad," "on the take," by the KGB?

A Yes. In the case of Western Europe, in the case of publicly-available information, there was a case a couple of years ago where a French journalist had been on the payroll -- I think the chap's name was Pathe' -- for twenty-odd years, putting out a newsletter. Then, in 1981, there was a Danish free-lancer named Petersen who was arrested and charged with working for the Soviets. His main task was to work in terms of, you know, trying to help the Danish peace movement along.

Q What about in this country?

A In the United States?

Q Yes.

A Not that I recall.

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Q How do you explain that?

A Excuse me?

Q How do you explain that? Is it because you don't know or because it is not happening?

A I think what the Soviets find is that the U.S. -- As mentioned earlier, the impact of these tends to be somewhat greater in the Third World where their folks, let's say, need money more or where the free press is less well articulated.

Q What about African an Asia? You've given us two cases.

A Well, if you read through the cases, you'll see there are a lot of instances. What seems to happen in terms of how do you get a story in the newspaper, you are either able to get in through having bought a journalist -- and clearly, there are instances where journalists are bought -- or it is slipped in inadvertently. We don't always know how it's slipped in.

Q Has this government ever tried to confront the Soviets directly about it?

A We have made our views known to them, yes.

Q And what is the response?

A They listen.

(Smiles)

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Q It says here in this document, in a speech by Eagleburger, "While recognizing that 'Active Measures' are but one aspect . . . . ,common-sense requires that we counter these intrusions not only through effective counterintelligence. . . . ." and so forth. This raises the question, "To what degree is the United States, if at all, involved in any comparable 'Active Measures?'"

A First of all, apart from the propriety or the wisdom of doing that, if we did, Jack Anderson and Seymour Hirsch would have a field day. Can you imagine secrets of activities of this sort being kept secret in this town?

Q Are you suggesting that Semour Hirsch hasn't had a field day?

A Well, so would the Soviets have a field day.

Q Is the answer "No?"

A The best answer is, we cound't get away with it if we wanted to; and if we tried it, we would be crucified.

Q But is the answer "No?"

A Excuse me.

Q Is the answer no, that we don't do it?

A This sort of activity -- right, no.

Q We don't do this.

Q If sunshine and lots of information is the best response, how come this briefing is ON BACKGROUND, then?

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A Well, sunshine and lots of information doesn't come from having my name; it comes from the State Department report which is put out there, plus other reports.

Q Could you also talk about the incident in Copenhagen of two weeks ago that you say wasn't in the report?

A Yes, sur. You may recall that one of the repeaters in the "active measures" field is a Soviet effort called the Holocaust Papers -- this goes back to the 1960s when there was an American spy named Johnson who was working in NATO Headquarters and who provided a great deal of information on NATO targeting. By 1969, this was packaged as a document called "The Holocaust Papers." The message was: "Europe, if it comes to nuclear war, you're the first target, and the Americans will get you!"

In 1979, when the Peace Movement started up and the whole question of the INF began, this resurfaced; it resurfaced in London, and in various forms, it has popped up in, I think it was, fifteen or twenty times. What happened in Copenhagen a week ago was that there was a NATO maneuver -- I have it here; I'll give you the specifics -- a NATO maneuver called, I think it's "Amber Light." Anyway, there was a NATO maneuver taking place, and several hundred people in towns in Copenhagen and in Sealand, particularly older people, received copies of a document that stated that because of these maneuvers, "You need to pack up your bags, evacuate your homes, and so forth." This led to panicked phone calls in Copenhagen and elsewhere. The headline story in the Danish morning paper Politiken said, "Pack your bags before maneuvers tear against you." And the Berlingske Tidende, this is September 8th, "The terror against the elderly before the NATO maneuvers." Anyway, a series of panicked phone calls, "What does this mean? What is this all about?" The document was supposedly signed by a Danish general, General Jorgensen. The whole thing turned out to be a phony, a fake; and indeed, on tracing it and examining the text of it and pulling out this Holocaust document, we found that it was one of the items in the Holocaust document that talks about the evacuation of populations in the event of nuclear war.

This is the item in NATO. This sort of, if you will, and I'd put it on the low range of the scale, the sort of minor "dirty tricks" scale, as opposed to something like the Ghana business or the "Who Shot the Pope" question, which is at the high end of the scale, or effort to suggest that Tom Pickering ordered the assassination of a leading Presidential candidate in Nigeria.

Q Have you been able to convince Flight Lieutenant Rawlings that we were not up to that?

A Yes. What happened following onto that is that the United States protested; there was a sharp downturn in

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relations, and the Government of Ghana eventually accepted that this was a West German Embassy report, in fact, that this was a fabrication. The West Germans immediately stated it was a fake document. We, of course, so stated as well, but it took some doing. In a sense, the damage is done -- in terms of damage.

Q Since the Korean plane incident, have the Soviets done anything along these lines? I know what they've said publicly, but this report refers to clandestine activities. Are you aware of anything they've done over the past two-and-a-half weeks?

A We're anticipating, on the basis of history, that something might well pop up, sort of "confirmatory evidence" to suggest that the Korean airline was on a spy mission, or in some other way to provide corroboration for the Soviet lie line, or the Soviet propaganda line. We're watching.

The sort of thing you might anticipate would be some document that surfaced in the Sea of Japan, flight plans or what-have-you, to link the plane; a fake audio tape -- there was, if you recall, the Reagan-Thatcher audio tape of a couple of months ago -- something that would lend further credence or credibility to the Soviet line, or -- and this would, I think, would be very difficult to fake back -- a black box, or something. So we're watching!

You can't turn this stuff on and off that quickly, but it would certainly not be surprising for the Soviets to try something like this.

Q Considering the number of anti-American groups around the world, do you trace back each of these episodes to the KGB or their sister services? Are you sure that all these are KGB operations as opposed to other groups which don't like this country?

A Well, you don't know for sure unless you get the man who did it, that it is the KGB. What is so useful about something, when you get somebody like Levchenko -- he actually did these things -- who can actually sit down and explain to you how they're done, what's the methodology. So what we do in each case is that we look at an instance -- we don't leap out and leap into print right away -- and run through a series of internal tests; and if at the end of it we conclude that it is not some crack-pot group (you know, Lyndon LaRouche or what-have-you, or some high school kid) (Laughter) you look at it and ask, "Is the thing real?" Sometimes somebody comes in and says, "Heh, we've got a forgery," and then we check, and sure enough, the Defense Department put out such a document.

(Laughter)

So you first check. Then, you look for the formatting. The Soviets are very good at collecting documents, and we know this from defectors, from intelligence sources, and what-have-you for duplicating publications, documents, and so forth. High

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School kids and crack-pot groups can't always do that. Then, you look for the substance of the document: is it a sophisticated job? The Rome one, for example, was quite sophisticated on that. They had to know in that all the people, the sequence of events on publicity in the Italian media, who spoke up in which Italian newspaper.

Maybe I should back up and explain what this was. This (Chart) is an attempt to say that the United States orchestrated the arrest of Antonov and the bad publicity the Soviets have achieved as a result of the assassination of the Pope. Well, internally, what they've done is to turn it all around, and say, "We think ..." -- these were two telegrams that surfaced about seven weeks ago, but they are supposedly dated back to 1982. They said, "First, we can get together with our Italian friends and we think we can 'finger' a Bulgarian, and then the people will think we can deal with them." Then, they mentioned the newspapers that later wrote about this or the people who spoke publicly about it, and said, "We think if we get together with them, they will be helpful." Then, there is a second telegram which says, "Yes, it was a great success." So, high school kids, again, can't internally do something like that.

When you look at the material, it sort of hits you. We've had a couple that don't just ring like the Soviets.

Then, you finally say, "Whose purpose is being served by all of this?" And if it all adds up to something that would seem to help the Soviets, and if all these other things are there -- Sometimes, the other things that you look for are mistakes. Sometimes, they are a give-away. Well, you need the mistakes to prove to the journalists that the document is indeed a fake if it's very well done -- and some of them, indeed, are very well done. The Rome one contained a couple of mistakes in there, in the formatting.

Then, finally -- let me just finish with the thing -- you sometimes have linguistic mistakes. The document would tend to give away the likely authorship. The document in Nigeria talks, this internal U.S. Embassy document, about the importance of keeping the Department informed about this "wet" affair. That doesn't mean anything, so people laugh. (Laughter) What does that mean in English? They are English words. But what it means in the Soviet intelligence lexicon is assassination. So somebody just slipped up. They're not ten-foot tall in this.

Q You talked earlier about the greater intensity in targeting is bolder now than what you've seen before.

A Sure.

Q Is it the U.S. view that Andropov himself has to give the O.K. for any of these operations, or is this sort of "kid stuff," way below him?

A Depending on the seriousness -- We don't know. What happens is in the Soviet Government, depending on how serious it is, it goes up the line. One would expect that something involving the President or an assassination or what-have-you would go fairly high up the system, Central Committee, or what-have-you. One doesn't know how far up the line it goes.

Q You referred to a bogus tape of a conversation between Reagan and Thatcher.

A Right.

Q Could you explain?

A That's back in here in dealing with the Falklands Campaign. That surfaced in the Netherlands about six weeks before the British elections. It was an audio tape which was supposedly a phone conversation between President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher. In it, the President is highly critical of Mrs. Thatcher, and she is saying, "We really have to hit the Argentinians," and the President is chiding her, blaming her also for the sinking of the Sheffield. Then, it goes on a little bit to talk about the missiles in Europe.

Q How good an impersonation was it?

A It was real voices.

Q How were they? How close were they?

A The quality was like -- Did you hear the 8 o'clock

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CBS News this morning? The pilot of the Korean Airlines was speaking. It was about like that. You have to sit down, and if I were to play it here, nobody would understand a word. But if you get -- and we did -- the transcript and you listen to it six times, then you can pick it out.

What we found out in this case was that the Reagan words -- the voices are authentic; we established that. We also established that no such conversation took place. Two, the voices are authentic. Three, that President Reagan's comments were taken from a speech given November 22, 1982, which was telecast or broadcast to Europe, and the words and phrases are taken from that. We're not sure where Mrs. Thatcher's were taken from.

To further complicate the thing, there was an alleged transcript. The thing was sent the way a lot of these things are sent: under cover of an anonymous letter. It was in Dutch, and there was a Dutch transcript. When we compared the Dutch transcript of the tape with what was actually said, they didn't correspond. But it is so hard for somebody to pick it out, I think that the person who put it together would figure that nobody would really go to the trouble to try to really pull it apart.

Q May I ask another question?

A Sure.

Q Several Americans participated in that World Peace Assembly Meeting, in Prague, several prominent Americans are also scheduled to participate in the U.S. Peace Council Meeting in this country in a few weeks. Does the State Department attempt on its own, or through the FBI, to warn these people what they are dealing with, and to beware of it? Or do you depend on the U.S. media to get this message out?

A Well, this is a free country, and people can do what they want to. We do put out information. There have been a couple of reports on the World Peace Council, and we did a report on the Prague Peace Assembly. We rely on information, really, to get to people, basically.

(The briefing concluded at 11:38 A.M.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release September 20, 1983

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We see this as an historic example --

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We see this as an historic example of bipartisanship on an extremely difficult issue that had major constitutional overtones. We started on this negotiation Monday a week ago. We worked through the weekend and we believe that the legislative and executive branches rose above politics to reach an accommodation.

Okay?

Q No bad feelings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. Absolutely not.

Q As the President says in his remarks there that he had some strong reservations. What was he referring to then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President was making the point which was made to the Congress throughout our discussions that there are constitutional questions involved here which the President will address in his signing statement.

Q When is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that would be after the Joint Resolution passed both Houses of the Congress.

Q What are the consequences --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the form that it is now in.

Q When do you expect that to happen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Congress, the leadership tells us that this is going to be put in both houses on an expedited process. It is going to be moving I think, I believe, but this is a matter for the Congress, I think it is going to be moving contemporaneously in both houses.

Q Tip seems to indicate that this afternoon that he was going to wait for it to move in the Senate first?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIL: Yes. I had just gotten a call that indicates that that possibly is not the case. I started to say probably. We don't think that will be the case. Senator Baker has already introduced a resolution since we left the White House and Charman Zablocki will be introducing the resolution this afternoon.

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Q Do the constitutional problems arise from the Supreme Court case and the legislative veto? Is that the constitutional --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That was a separate constitutional question that has already --

Q Which involved all the time maintained not being addressed in any of these discussions. Right? Or any of these discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That constitutional problem is behind us. The Supreme Court has already ruled that the veto protection provisions of 5(c) of the War Powers Act are unconstitutional. There are other constitutional questions involving the question of separation of powers. The war powers, the power to conduct war and that sort of thing that will have to be addressed.

Q Will the Administration challenge that once the resolution is enacted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As I indicated, the President would speak to those constitutional -- he would assert his constitutional reservations in his signing statement. In other words, the inherent constitutional powers of the Commander in Chief, make reference to that somehow in his signing statement. You know, we haven't written the signing statement, needless to say.

Q You won't seek Supreme Court review of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If once this resolution passes, Mike, and once it is signed by the President, it would be my off-the-top-of-my-head view that you would not have a case or controversy within the meaning of the law so that you could go to the court. You need an active case or controversy. Now if we have not been able to resolve this, then you could have had the possibility I suppose of a constitutional challenge.

Q Aren't you saying, but haven't you by signing -- aren't you in effect waiving or acknowledging the power of the War Powers Act and the fact that they can, that you have to notify them under 4(a)(1)? Aren't you agreeing to all of that when you signed this statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q They are asserting that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We made it very clear, Chris, during the negotiations that we would sign the resolution if it passed in the form in which it was negotiated but would reserve in our signing statement on these constitutional questions. So that there would not be any acknowledgement prejudicial to the prerogatives of the Executive Branch.

Q Do you reserve your position --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the signing statement, reserve in the signing statement so that would be no prejudice, no prejudice to the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Branch. There are other -- there will be a question, for instance, this resolution recited that hostilities began on the 29th of August, that Section 4(a)(1) was triggered, the Congress will make certain findings with which we will be inclined to disagree in the signing statement.

Q Do you disagree with the fact that it was triggered on August 29th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q I don't understand. How can you sign something and make it law and then say you don't believe it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is simply a recitation, Chris, in the resolution if you look at it. Congress simply recites that they find that this was the fact.

Q In other words, they find it, but you don't agree necessarily.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct. Quite frequently the President will sign legislation with which he would disagree; some aspects of which he disagrees with.

Q What do you get out of this? It looks to me as though they got what they wanted.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think we got something very substantial and what we got was the Congress, the Legislative Branch acting in support of the President's policy in Lebanon. I mean what the President says in his statement here, "Support of our presence and policies in Lebanon."

Q Last week there were senior officials saying that this 18-month clock might allow the Syrians to just hold off until they continue the hostilities. Has the opinion changed? Is that changed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that the -- I am not sure that I am familiar with what you, you said Administration officials said this.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think we would acknowledge that that would be the effect of this. What we think the effect of this will be, Wayne, is that those people over there who are opposed to a strong central government in Lebanon or the withdrawal of all foreign forces will see this as unified action by the Legislative and Executive Branches in support of our peace-keeping role.

Q Do you think --the question you are saying this is not what Larry or Senior Administration Officials were saying last Friday might be seen as aid and comfort to the enemy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q That is what you are saying?

Q This is a sticking point really. It is strictly a question of the time element.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You had a number of areas that were very difficult. The first area was whether or not the President should submit a report under 4(A)1 as at one point Senator Byrd said he wanted the President to do. That was resolved in a manner consistent with the Executive Branch's position. You had the question of exactly what the mission statement should be and you will see that in Section 3 of this resolution. I think that was resolved on a basis that was satisfactory to both Executive and Legislative Branches. It doesn't expand on the mission but at the same time it gives the Executive Branch the authority to protect, to do whatever is required to protect our Marines while they are there. You then had the question of duration, and there were suggestions from time to time that something shorter than eighteen months should be the duration. The resolution has eighteen months and the leadership in the Congress eventually said eighteen months is okay and then you had the matter of termination.

Q Did you try, you couldn't keep from having any time, any particular date in there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That was an approach that we advanced early on during the negotiations but it became clear that we were not going to be able to get the majority of the leadership to support that kind of an open-ended resolution, Mike.

Q Let me ask you about this: The mission, you say it doesn't expand the mission. Some people would say that what you have agreed to here really restricts the mission to staying in the MNF, in the Beirut area and to do anything beyond that, to go in the mountains or something would really be a violation of what you have agreed to. Do you buy that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't speak to that because I am not familiar -- let me just say that the mission statement says, "The mission shall be what is set forth in an exchange of letters between the two governments and such protective measures as may be necessary to ensure the safety of the MNF." Now I can't tell you whether that original exchange of letters permits them to go in the mountains or not. That is something that I think the military commanders and others would be more adept at speaking to.

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Q Does the "protect Marines" clause give you the latitude to do whatever you feel is necessary? Do you now feel your hands are not tied in whatever the MNF wants to do, needs to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think anybody would ever quarrel with giving the President whatever authority he needed to protect the Marines. I mean that is really not an issue.

Q I know but there is a question about allowing them to shoot the Lebanese, to protect the Lebanese Army because that indirectly protects the Marines. That is an issue.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To answer your question, we think this gives us the authority ---

Q To do what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That we need to protect the Marines without getting into hypothetical situations. It doesn't mean that you can do this or that or the other.

Q What about the United Nations clause? Is that something you put forward, they put forward? Do you feel comfortable with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was in an early draft. I can't really tell you which. You know, most of this quite frankly was developed by discussions up on the Hill. In other words, I would steer you away from thinking that this was a draft that we took up there and negotiated. That really was not the case. The original drafting was done by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This resolution is closer to the original Zablocki than to anything else.

Q But if I can follow up on what Juan was asking, is there some implication there that somewhere down the line you might replace the MNF with a United Nations peace-keeping force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that has been a policy for a long time,hasn't it? I mean the suggestion that we would like to see all foreign forces out of Lebanon.

Q No one has actually talked about replacing the MNF with the U. N. force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I really can't tell you specifically where that provision came from. I think it came from the original draft of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q But the idea of a one-year limit before you begin seeking those kind of arrangements seem new to me. Is it new to you? Is it agreeable to you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What do you mean by one year limit?

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Q After one year start talking to the United Nations, no later than one year after the ceasefire?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. What is that? That is a statement of Congressional policy. It just simply says that it is the sense of the Congress that you shall do and then report to the Congress. The Congress would like the Executive Branch to explore the possibility of a U. N. presence. That is all that means.

Q I mean are they saying to you that we ought to get out of there and get a U. N. force in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what they are saying is you ought to at least explore the possibility of a U. N. force at some point, some point in time coming in there.

Q That is not binding on the Administration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is binding if once the President signs that, it is required that we at least explore that as the resolution states. But it is not binding that we after one year replace the MNF with a U. N. force. That's certainly not ---

Q So generally to wrap things up, are you satisfied with this whole resolution and with the War Powers Act as it stands or would you like to see the courts or the Congress to reshape that resolution?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I said earlier that we have serious questions about the War Powers Act, and as the President said in his statement he thinks this resolution is one that if it is enacted in its present form that he will sign.

Q You do not have any resolution at all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would rather leave it that we have got some problem with the Act. We have some problems with this resolution which the President has indicated he will speak to at his signing statement and we made that very clear to them at each stage of these negotiations.

Q Who won?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The country won.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE U. N.

The Briefing Room

September 23, 1983

10:38 AM EDT

MR. JANKA: Good morning.

We are handing out now a schedule, summary schedule, for the trip to the U.N. You'll have that in a minute. I would like to introduce to you this morning [redacted] to talk with you and answer your questions about the President's trip to the U. N.

This will be on background attributed to Senior Administration Officials. Larry?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know, and as the schedule you will get indicates, the President is going to New York on the 25th and he will deliver a speech on the 26th to the U. N. General Assembly. In addition, he will want to consult with Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, and he will meet some of the world leaders who are there, and I will go into that in just a minute.

Every President since Truman has spoken to the UNGA. President Reagan spoke to the Special Session on Disarmament on June 17, 1982. The reason he is going this year is essentially that there are a number of major international issues that are very much on the front burner, including the KAL shoot down, Central American issue, Middle East, relations with the Soviet Union and arms control, all of which he thinks need to be discussed with the General Assembly and our views put forward and also with some of the world leaders. I can't give you much on the speech itself, first of all, because it is still being written; secondly, because my boss, George Shultz, will be background briefing on that on Monday.

Let me simply say that at this point that while there are all of these issues facing us, that the President's speech which will try to deal with them will do so in a manner in which there are some proposals for positive change. I think it is fair to say that it will particularly emphasize the importance of proceeding, moving ahead on arms control.

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The President will be the first speaker at the General Assembly and we are hopeful that that speech will help to set the tone for the General Assembly sessions themselves. There will be some 14 heads of state or government and some 50 foreign ministers present in New York at the time the President gives his speech. He will, I understand, give a reception for heads of government, chiefs of state, foreign ministers, on Sunday night.

He will meet with the Secretary General of the U. N., where he will reaffirm strong U. S. support for the United Nations. I emphasize that fact. He will, however, at the same time say that the United States feels strongly that we have got resist to ~~access~~ politization -- I can't even say it -- politicization -- I hope he can -- (Laughter) of the U. N. specialized agencies, and he will indicate the U. S. Government's unwillingness to accept without strong response the growing tendencies in the U. N. toward a double standard.

He will stress that we want to make the U. N. a more effective organization, that we want to hold down budget growth while improving the efficiency. He will probably also make it clear, however, to the Secretary General that he stands by his budget requests for the United Nations as submitted to the Congress and that he feels it is a reasonable request to the U. S. Congress, and that this Administration can take substantial pride in the fact that we have worked over the last two years to hold down real budget growth within the U. N. For example, real budget growth for the U. N. in the years '83-'84 -- I'm sorry, '84-'85 as against '83-'84 will be .7 percent; seven-tenths of one percent as contrasted with '82-'83.

Q One more time, please?

Q That is the real growth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Real budget growth for the U. N.

Q How much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the years '84-'85 will be seven-tenths of one percent as contrasted with '82-'83.

Q Last night Congress voted against it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand that.

Q As contrasted with what for '82?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With the U. N. budget for '83-'84.

Q '82-'83?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '82-'83.

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Q Do you know what the budget growth was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The biennial budget for '84-'85 is .7 percent more in real terms than the biennial budget for '82-'83.

Q What was the increase in '82-'83? Do you know that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '80-'81 to '82-'83?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not sure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will find that out for you. A substantial reduction in the real budget growth rate is my point.

Q Sir, what is that in real dollars, real money?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will have to get you the figures. All I have is the percentage figures.

Q You don't know how much we give now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President will also --

Q Will he veto it, sir?

Q Will it be in the speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me finish. That question I don't know the answer to.

Q I see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me finish this and I can get, as I suspected you would want to, to the United Nationsl budget. (Laughter) In the meeting with the Secretary General, he will also reaffirm our support for the Secretary General's efforts in the Afghan negotiations, where we strongly support his efforts and the efforts of Mr. Cordovez to arrive at a negotiated settlement for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and he will also indicate our support for the Secertary General's efforts in Namibia and in Cyprus. He will meet, the President will meet as well with Price Sihanouk and Son Sann. He will emphasize to them that the U. S. Government backs strongly the ASEAN strategy to obtain a comprehensive political settlement in Kampuchea, and his meeting with Price Sihanouk and Son Sann will be a demonstration of this government's support for their efforts in fact to arrive at a reasonable settlement in Kampuchea.

The meeting will reflect our view that the non-Communist elements of the coalition led by Price Sihanouk and Son Sann offer a credible alternative to the puppet regime now imposed on Kampuchea.

Q Is that one meeting or two meetings?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One, as I understand it. He will meet as well with Samuel Doe of Liberia. Mr. Doe has been particularly supportive of U. S. efforts in areas such as the Chad, and with regard to Israel, and we will want to make it clear to him that we appreciate those efforts. The meeting will also reaffirm our support for Liberia's return to constitutional government and the President will also indicate that we are ready to help as we can in Liberia's economic development. The President will meet with Jorge Illueca, who is the President of the 38th General Assembly. He is from Panama. It is essentially a courtesy call. He will meet as well with King Hassan II of Morocco. I think you all know that we regard our relations with Morocco as particularly important and the President will want to spend a good bit of time talking with the King about Lebanon -- in specific terms, the Middle East; more generally the Western Sahara -- and bilateral issues again including economic relationships.

Finally, the President will also meet with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. As you know, India is now the chairman of the nonaligned movement and the President will want to spend a good bit of time talking with her about nonalignment and its role in the world and her views of world events and to indicate to her in advance of the summit that Mrs. Gandhi has called in New York our interest in a close relationship with the nonaligned movement. The President won't be able to attend the summit sessions himself but he intends to use the meeting with Mrs. Gandhi to try to indicate to her our views on many of the issues that will be discussed at that summit. We will also want to discuss bilateral problems and issues with Mrs. Gandhi in the aftermath of her visit here last year and indicate again our desire to continue what we think has been a rather substantial improvement in that bilateral relationship since her visi.t

I will now be glad to try to answer your questions. Yes, sir.

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Q Will you be more explicit about the double standard that you said the President is going to tell Perez de Cuellar that we are no longer willing to accept?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is our general view -- well, let me give you an example if I may of the -- I am not now speaking for the President -- but as an example of the double standard that I think we in this Administration tend to find disturbing. The Security Council was, in the last analysis, unable to arrive at a resolution dealing with the events that the Chad and Libyan intervention in that country despite the fact that, in our view, the evidence of intervention is clear and we think that the condemnation, therefore, naturally should have flowed therefrom. With regard to the Korean airliner shoot down, we were more successful and, in fact, the Soviets were forced to veto that resolution, but even there there were some countries which felt it necessary to abstain from the vote, and I must say it is an abstention that we did not understand. And our view is that there tends to be these days within the United Nations a willingness to accept conduct on the part of other countries or at least not to react strongly against it and at the same time, then, react strongly when actions are taken by some Western countries that do not meet with full approbation by the U. N. Yes, sir.

Q If I could follow that up, why then, to make another part of your statement clearer, is not an action like the Senate action on the funding a tangible and concrete signal of that displeasure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think Ambassador Kirkpatrick made the point well yesterday; that the issue in terms of the double standard is the governments conduct themselves in the U. N. in ways that we think are, to put it mildly, unwise. That is not to say that we do not believe that the organization as such serves a useful purpose and should continue, and that is not just pointing to the specialized agencies that do substantial good work but in addition the importance of maintaining a United Nations which permits members to debate with one another and to air issues. We are not saying that the U. N. as an institutional or and organization does not serve a purpose. We are saying, however, that we are substantially unhappy with the way in which a number of countries express their views within the United Nations and we intend to react when they do so. We are not saying that they don't have a right to do it. We also are saying that we think it is unwise to cut the U. N.'s budget.

Q Is there any way in which this Administration thinks that displeasure can be shown other than the President's stating it? I mean if you have ruled out the budget cutting, is there any specific or concrete action you could contemplate taking?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the answer to that is that the way in which we think it best to deal with this issue is to be very precise about our feeling and our reaction that we do not, again to state it specifically, we do not agree with the proposed budget cut. We do, however -- and this is related to questions of efficiency and expenditures of money -- we do believe that it is important for the U. N. to take major efforts to cut its budget growth which we think has been too fast and too much and that there are inefficiencies within the U. N. that can very well be dealt with by holding down budget growth.

Q In broad terms, can you give us an idea on the speech as to whether we are going to hear strong language, anti-Soviet language or whether that is going to be qualified somewhat and is the emphasis going to be more on arms control in terms of the Soviet-U. S. relationship rather than KAL?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am reluctant to try at this point to answer that question very specifically. I think there is no question because the speech is still in the works, but I think there is no question the President is going to make it clear our view of the state of our relationships with the Soviets and their conduct, including the Korean Airline's tragedy. I think it is also clear, however, that the President will in the speech be making suggestions on a range of issues for positive steps to try to improve the international atmosphere and I think it is safe to say that a subject -- well, a major portion of the speech will deal with arms control, which we believe and the President believes certainly to be one of the areas that is most in need of serious attention. Yes, ma'am?

Q Sir, I don't see any place on here where the President is going to be greeted by or confer with our Ambassador there.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think she will, I don't know how she is going to greet him, but she will be present with the meeting with Perez de Cuellar and my assumption is that Ambassador Kirkpatrick will accompany the President throughout the whole visit up there. I have to assume that they will probably get together at some point when he first arrives. Yes, sir?

Q [redacted], do you believe that if the budget cuts in the Senate voted last night were to stand that it would over the long run damage U. S. interests and give the Soviets a propoganda edge?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it would damage U. S. interests. Whether it gives the Soviets a propoganda edge or not I don't know, the point being that we believe that the maintenance of a strong U. S. role within the United Nations is important to U. S. interests; and that the U. N. can serve useful purposes in maintaining the peace. Again, that is not to say that we don't have substantial disagreement with the way in which some members of the U. N. of late have been conducting themselves. Yes, sir?

Q [redacted], how do your remarks just now about our support of the U. N. square with Mr. Lichenstein's remark the other day and particularly with the President's virtual endorsement of what Mr. Lichenstein said? It seems to me we are hearing two voices out of this.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that is right at all. And I devoutly hope I am in sync with my President, but I really don't think that is the case at all.

What Ambassador Lichenstein was saying -- what the President said in support of that statement was not that the United States ought to get out of the U.N., or that the U.N. ought to get out of the United States, but rather, as the Ambassador made clear, if there are some countries in the U.N. who are dissatisfied with the way in which we carry out our obligations as hosts, they have a perfect right to move or move the U.N. if they can get sufficient other countries to agree with them, and we are not going to stand in the way of that. We feel we have met our obligations as hosts to the United Nations. We will continue to meet those obligations and those who complain about the way we carry it out can look for other alternatives if they wish. And, I don't think that that is in anyway in contradiction to our and my saying that we believe the United States or the United Nations serves a useful purpose for the United States.

Q If that is the statement of policy, Larry, why did both the State Department and the White House say it was not policy, that Lichenstein was just speaking for himself immediately after he said it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have just told you what I thought the statement of policy was, that the United States continues to believe it is useful to maintain itself in the United Nations and the United Nations in the United States. What Ambassador Lichenstein said, he said as a personal statement, but I and the President have no trouble with the point he made which is if you don't like the way we are managing the process of being hosts here, you can find some other solution.

Q Let me ask it this way. In 1945 we campaigned rather strongly to make sure that the United Nations would be in the United States. Would we do so again if there was a movement to get the U.N. out of the United States? Apparently you are saying now, and the President has said, and Lichenstein has said, that we wouldn't stand in the way if that is what they wanted to do. Would we not fight such a move?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is clear if the majority of the United Nations wanted to move it somewhere else, we would not stand in the way.

Q That is right. Would you fight the majority in doing it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My answer to that would be, we have to face the circumstance at the time. I don't know whether we would fight it or not. Our view is that it is useful for it to continue in New York. It is useful for the U.S. to be a member of the United Nations. And since it is a wholly hypothetical question of what we would do if a number of people tried to get it out of the United States, I can't answer the question.

Q Who are some of the countries in the U.N. that we are substantially unhappy with, as you say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would rather not go into too much detail, although I can point out to you, as I said, that our lack of enthusiasm for the abstention at the time of the Korean shoot-down ought to give you some hint.

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Q Why?

Q Why is that "the double standard" which you mentioned, to use a quote?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can give you some personal attempts at an answer to that, but I don't know that they are necessarily terribly helpful. It is my personal view that there are a number or reasons for the double standard, one of which is that it is fairly clear to me that the way in which the Soviet Union conducts its foreign policy tends to freighten a good many other countries far more than the way in which we conduct our foreign policy, and I think we are doing ours the right way, but I think there is no question that a number of countries particularly amongst the developing world see the dangers of irritating the Soviet Union as leading to consequences that they would find unpleasant substantially more often thatn would be the case if they upset the United States. Yes, ma'am.

Q That's right. What exactly has the United States done, I mean the U. N. done for the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are getting way off the President's visit. But you know, the basic point again is that it is our view that the United Nations does serve a worthwhile purpose because it permits countries to come together to debate. The United Nations has in fact put forces into a number of trouble spots around the world that have in fact helped to maintain the peace.

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The United Nations is, for example, useful on the surprise issue, UNIFIL has made a difference in the past in Lebanon, the United Nations has served the purposes of peace on a number of occasions. That is not to say we are by any means wholly satisfied with his conduct?

Mr. Gwertzman?

Q [redacted], your criticism of the double standard seems more aimed not so much at the UN as against the non-aligned block whose members generally vote the way you are criticising.

My only question is, why doesn't the President make his views about this double standard known, not so much to the Secretary General of the U.N., but to Mrs. Gandhi.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you can assume that -- well, you know, I don't think the President is going to ask Mrs. Gandhi to carry his water with a number of other States. I think you can assume that on occasion we will make it clear to those governments concerned that we are not enamored of their conduct.

Please, and I know I knew when I got here that the questions were going to focus on budget and so forth. Please understand that the President's trip to New York and the purpose of that trip is not by any means primarily to go up there and spend his time telling people about our unhappiness with double standards or the budget and so forth. He is going there to make a speech about major international issues and to try to put before the American people and the U.N. our view and some suggestions on how those issues ought to be dealt with.

I can't deny to you that the subject of the U.S. role within the U.N. and views of the U.N. is enevitably going to be a subject discussed up there, given the public discussion on that subject of the last week or so.

Yes?

Q Specifically, what arms control issues is he going to take up in his UNGA speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I don't want to get too specific until I have had a chance to look at a later draft of the speech. But by and large, I think it would be obvious. One is the strategic arms talks and another is clearly the intermediate range nuclear force discussions in Geneva.

Q Is that on background?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you want me to go beyond that, you are going to have to wait a few days and listen to George Shultz on the subject.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Can you tell us how the U.S. contribution to the U.N. has increased over the period that you cited?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I will ask [redacted] -- there have been substantial increases in the U.N. budget, both the general budget and in the specialized agencies and by the way, one of the areas where we are working the hardest is

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n holding down budget, real budget growth in the specialized agencies, where our general policy in all of them has been to argue strenously for zero growth, zero growth in the specialized agencies.

We have not always succeeded in holding to that but we have, I think, held it down in a number of them, and if you are going to push me on the specifics and budget figures, I am going to have trouble here but we will be glad to try to get that all together for you.

[redacted], do you have anything you want to add?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. I might say the U.N. budget has grown three-fold over the past ten years.

Q You don't know what our contribution is?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 25 percent.

Q It has grown 25 percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q I know it is 25 percent. Would you tell us how our contribution to the U.N. has grown or not grown over the past few years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It has grown in the same proportion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If the budget has grown three-fold in the last ten years, the U.S. contribution has grown three-fold in the last ten years.

Q That is not my question.

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Q Ours has grown .7 percent?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q If the budget, if the 25 percent grows, if it is always 25 percent, and the U. N. budget grows a tenth of a percent, that our contribution grows seven-tenths of a percent; is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Is that threefold in real terms?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What is it in real terms?

Q Sir, what does that mean in money? You must know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I am sorry. I will be glad to get it for you.

Q Why not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because I don't know, because I don't know, but we will be glad to get you the figures.

Q Does the President regret the fact that the Soviet Delegation will not be led by either foreign minister or head of government? Does he feel that will hinder his message on arms control getting through?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't talked to the President about it but I would imagine his view of that is it is up to the Soviet Union to decide who they send. That is their business, not ours.

Q The Soviet Union will not be represented at this reception then, is that correct, because Gromyko is not going to be there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I frankly don't know the answer to that. Have they been invited?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The invitation is to the head of state, head of government and the foreign minister. None of those are there --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They will not be present.

Q Does the President feel neutral about that or do you think that the U. S. regrets that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the view of those with whom I have spoken on the subject which, as I indicated, don't include the President is we feel neutral on the subject. It is not a matter of great concern to us one way or the other.

Q Has the Soviet ever contributed to the U. N.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q It is not a matter of concern to you whether the Soviets are headed by a top ranking official or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is their choice to make.

Q They don't bother --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is their choice to make.

Q Is the Administration sad with Mrs. Gandhi's response to the Korean airliner shoot down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that, I guess the best way to answer that question is to say that there are a number of countries that we would have wished were a bit more vociferous in their condemnation of that act and I wouldn't want to be any more specific than that.

Q On the arms control part of the speech, without giving us any details, do you want to say for the Secretary, will the President tell us a little bit more about the new instructions to Mr. Nitze?

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIAL: I would not be surprised.

Q Given the U. S. behavior on the Gromyko airplane episode, and Mr. Lichenstein's comments and the President's comments and the Senate vote and perhaps even your comments today about the displeasure of the way the votes have gone for the U. S. recently, is there, frankly, some need felt by the Administration for the President to reassure the U. N. of the U. S. support?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In light of the comments over the last several weeks, and particularly the Senate vote, I guess I would say that it is probably, you know, I must say we haven't thought about it in the terms in which you have asked, but I have to say I think it is going to be important to make it clear that the U. S. continues to support the United Nations and continues, and this Administration continues to believe in the budget it submitted to the Congress with regard to contributions to the U. N. Yes, I think that is probably a fair statement.

Q Is the U. S. concerned overall -- what you seem to be saying earlier. Is the U. S. concerned about the influence of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries that are now exercising ih the U. N.? Is that a major concern now?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that it is a major concern. Obviously, it is a concern when in our view there is a tendency to apply a double standard. That has got to be a concern to us and because it is of concern to us we are talking about it publicly and we will be talking about it in New York. But, again, within the context of understanding we are talking as Ambassador Kirkpatrick said about the conduct of states within the U.N., not in terms of the U. N. as an organization having a double standard.

John Walcott?

Q Just to be a little more precise --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is what I was afraid of.

Q Is our support for the U. N. budget and our contribution, say, also extending to all the specialized agencies.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Specifically UNESCO?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, except as you know we are now in the process of reexamination of our role within UNESCO and I can't say what when that reexamination is completed will be our findings.

But What I am saying is our support for the U. N. system includes also support for the specialized agencies but with the qualification that we are going to look at the budgets of each of the specialized agencies, and make our decisions on how much if at all they ought to grow on the basis of what they do and how efficient we think they are and with the qualification that we are now looking at UNESCO as a specific institution and our judgements of our place in it.

Yes, Ma'am.

Q Will the speech include anything new on START?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this point, I wnat to hold that for the Secretary. The answer is I don't know yet exactly what it is going to say on START.

Q On Cambodia ---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q There is a wildly held belief in New York that all these comments about the U. N. and the flap about Lichtenstein and the Senate vote have in fact hurt American interests particularly in letting the President speak about U. S.-Soviet relations and focusing world wide attention on Soviet behavior. Is what you are doing here this morning an attempt to really clear out the underbrush and get the focus back on Soviet behavior and KAL?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not what I am doing here this morning. You know, I did not come here surprised with the fact that I have talked about the U. S. in the U. N. more than I intended because that is what the questions have been about. But the purpose and that is why I said it earlier -- the purpose of the President going to New York is not primarily or even secondarily to try to reassure people about the U. S. and the U. N. It is to go there to speak about a range of international issues that are damned important and that need to be dealt with. Now I cannot say having said all of that that the issue won't come up. I am sure it will. And I have indicated to you that I think the President will himself raise it in his conversations with the Secretary General.

Yes, sir?

Q The double standard as you have mentioned it is not something new.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. It is not. Somebody mentioned the last several years and I should have said it is not a new phenomenon.

Q Is there a point in time where this double standard has increased or have you all just drawn the line with the KAL shoot down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think our judgment is that while it is a long-standing problem, it has gotten worse in the last,certainly in the last decade, and probably in the last few years. And I am not saying we have drawn a line but we are making it clear that we don't look with particular favor on the way in which things have gone. I think it is also fair to say that what has brought this to a head in terms of public discussion of late was the decision by Mr. Gromyko not to come to New York because he didn't want to get clobbered the way he had in Madrid and his use of the issue of where he would land and what he would come in on as an excuse for not coming here. But I think that has drawn attention to the subject and I think, therefore, it is natural that the conversation, the discussions are going to center on this isuse now.

It is what led to the Soviets saying what they said which led Ambassador Lichtenstein saying what he said. But I think a triggering event has been this question of Gromyko coming to the U. N.

MR. JANKA: Let's take one more question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One more question.

Yes, sir?

Q Is the President going to make clear in some of these meetings in the U. N. that the U. S. will [support] higher foreign aid to support the U. N.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not so far as I am aware, no.

Q Or to their votes in the U. N.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not so far as I am aware. No.

Q There seems to be many threats here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 11:15 A.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND

The Briefing Room

September 23, 1983

3:10 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: Thank you all for coming back this afternoon. It is my pleasure to introduce [redacted]. [redacted] is prepared to talk to you about the visit of President Koivosto and all the arrangements surrounding his visit and the substance of the talks.

With him is [redacted]

[redacted] Let me say -- I am sorry -- this will be on background attributed to administration officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. I thought I would walk you quickly through the schedule, make a couple of remarks about the substance of the visit and then go right to any questions.

President Koivisto will arrive tomorrow evening, Saturday evening, at Andrews, 7:00 p.m.; move into town, shall be lodged at the Watergate Hotel. He has a luncheon by the Finnish Ambassador Sunday noon, Sunday night dinner given by the Vice President in honor of the Finnish President; Monday morning, wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington National Cemetary, at 9:00 A.M.; at 10:00 A.M., Ken Dam, who will be Acting Secretary of State that day because Secretary Shultz will be in New York with the President, will call on President Koivisto at the Watergate.

Later that morning, President Koivisto will meet with the Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige; afternoon meeting with Martin Feldstein call on Secretary Elizabeth Dole; call on Secretary Regan; Tuesday, the Finnish President will have breakfast with the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Hill and will meet President Reagan at 11:30,working luncheon to follow.

President Koivisto will leave Washington Tuesday evening for New York. A few words about President Koivisto. He has been in office 18 months. You will recall that President Kekkonen had been President of Finland for about 20 years. Koivisto is the first Social Democratic President of Finland. He is a former Prime Minister and a former Finance Minister. President Koivisto visited the Soviet Union earlier this year. The visit to the United States reflects Finland's interest in maintaining its links with the West. We are conscious, as everyone has to be, of Finland's geographic position which is a fact of life and something that we recognize and understand.

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Under a 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union, Finland must adhere to neutrality but it does maintain active trade, commercial and cultural relations with us and with all of the countries of Western Europe.

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You will recall that Vice President Bush visited Helsinki in early July. In terms of the discussions here, we will be having a general review of U. S.-Finish relations. We'll be explaining to them in some detail our arms control positions. They are not party, of course, to any of the nuclear weapons negotiations. They are active in the CSCE Conference and will be participating in the conference on disarmament in Europe which starts in Stockholm next January. We'll be also noting with appreciation Finland's role in contributing troops under United Nations' auspices to UNIFIL in Lebanon.

That is all I have. So, I would be glad to try to answer any questions.

Q How did Finland react to the Korean airliner?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Finish Government made no official statement. The Finish pilots' union voted to suspend flights to Moscow for 60 days. Note: Moscow only, not all flights to the Soviet Union. They have continued to serve Leningrad.

Q You are saying they are sending troops now to Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, ma'am. They have had troops in Lebanon for a number of years as part of the United Nations detachment there.

Q What will be the key subject of discussion with Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think probably an exposition of our arms control views.

Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Finland is very interested in arms control. They, being right next to the Soviet Union, are concerned about East-West stability and the state of relations and they play an active role in international organizations in trying to promote arms control measures. So, they have a very active, vigorous interest in it. We will be trying to explain to them our objectives and what we think should be moving forward and we will be listening to their views.

Q Are we trading very much with Finland now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not. About three percent of Finish export trade is with the United States. Their principal trading partner is the Soviet Union. That accounts for about 25 percent of Finish foreign trade. The rest of it goes to Germany, other Scandinavian countries. But U.S.-Finish trade, although it is small, has been growing.

Q Is this a nation where the nuclear freeze movement has any political power to speak of? Is it strong in Finland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There has been not a great deal of popular movement in Finland concerning nuclear weapons or nuclear freezes.

Q Would you say the Finish people, with the concentration on arms control which you stressed in a number of instances here, is this a country where the people are particularly concerned about nuclear war anymore than any other Scandinavian nation or any other Western European nation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I can draw a conclusion that they are more concerned or less concerned. I think it is a concern and it is a subject the Finish Government follows. But there has not been, to my knowledge, any big popular movements in Finland.

Q Does its importance in the agenda of this visit reflect then the fact that we don't have a lot of other things to talk about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have many strains with the Finns. We understand their position and the facts of life that govern their conduct. We are interested in trading relationships, even though they are small and we will touch those bases.

We have one recent military equipment sale to Finland which was announced last March to sell the Finns improved tow missiles. Those are anti-tank missiles. So we have had an occasional military sales relationship with Finland.

Q Where would she use these? She wouldn't use them against the Soviets in her treaty, would she?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One assumes that if it came to that, the treaty wouldn't be operative anymore. But I don't think that is the present day particular threat.

Q Is that a fortified border, the Soviet Finnish border?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Finns are in a position to defend themselves, you know. They do keep an Armed Force and having had a troubled history with their neighbor, they are conscious about it.

Now, I think it would be silly to try to pretend that a small country like Finland by itself would be able to do much with its huge neighbor. But they do have a proficient army.

Q Do they get technology from us?

Q How does your policy toward Finland fit in with the philosophy expressed by Vice President Bush in Vienna making the distinction between those countries in the Russian shadow that we would tend to be more receptive to those who were able to establish a more independent posture, but we would not be very receptive to those who simply follow the Moscow line? Did you make a separate distinction on Finland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very much so. I mean Finland has been since the end of World War II an independent country. It is not a Communist country. There is an active Communist party and political movement in the country. But they have no portfolios in the current coalition government.

In the elections that are held intermittently the Communist vote totals have been declining. In last March's election, they reached a ten-year low of getting 14 percent of votes cast. So Finland is in no sense an occupied country or a country that falls into a Warsaw Pact country, a country that falls in the category of the Eastern European countries of the sort that were addressed by the Vice President.

Q Are we trying to sort of romance them? I mean, is this the idea, they are showing some independence in terms of the declining influence of the Communist party there? Are we trying to just sort of encourage this trend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think this is a regular visit between friendly countries.

Q Sir, you must be more familiar than I am about the fact that this is the only country that paid their debt to us after, was it World War I?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a good point to make.

Q How in the world did that little country do it when all those other countries didn't and is it true that if we were today to be able to collect from these other countries that we would be able to wipe out our deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am afraid it wouldn't be correct that we would be able to wipe out our deficit.

Q Do we send them any technology, scientific technology?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry. I am getting it from both sides.

Q But I am finishing my question. How were they able to do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How were the Finns able to do it?

Q A little country and little produce.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess they made the tough financial decisions that were required. It happened quite awhile ago. But they did, indeed, repay their debt. I am actually not familiar with the mechanics of how they did it. But it is a fact that they did.

Yes, ma'am. This lady here.

MORE

Q I have two questions. Do we send them any scientific technology?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The kind of technology that is involved in exports of machinery, some computer sales, certainly the technology that is involved in those tow missiles that we are selling to them which were announced last March. It is not advanced technology of state of the art.

Q They will turn it over to the Soviets, won't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily. Tow missiles have been used a lot of places already where the technology -- tow missiles have been used in the Middle East. Presumably some weapons have been captured in the Middle East. So we do not believe that the sale of the tow missiles to Finland leads to a threat to the disclosure of that technology.

Q The second question I have: Would you characterize Finland as being in a status like Austria, neutral?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are both neutral, sure.

Q I mean that type of thing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Will President Reagan be interested in the views of the Finish President on the Soviet Union and what is happening today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would certainly imagine, because the Finish President visited the Soviet Union in June and met with Andropov. So, I am sure that there will be an interest in his reactions or his description, whatever light he can shed on his impression of his time in Moscow.

Q How would you describe U.S.-Finish relations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good. It is a modest relationship. They are somewhat distant geographically. Trade is not massive. It is a small country with only five million people. But by and large the relations are quite good. We accept as a fact of live their geographic position. We appreciate the fact that they are a non-communist democratic country. We understand why they maintain their position of neutrality. But by and large the relationship is very good.

Q Sir, they used to excel in children's health. Do we get any of that technolgy from them?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL:Not to my knowledge. That doesn't mean that we don't, but I am just not aware of it.

Q You mentioned earlier that there were some strains but not many strains.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I said there are not strains. I am not aware of strains in the U.S.-Finish relationship.

Q You mentioned -- where is the President going after? Does he just go to New York and go back to Finland? What is the rest of the trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He goes to New York and then he is making a tour around the United States. I don't have the details on his further stops but I am sure we can get them from the Finish Embassy and make the available.

Q Are you satisfied with the answer the Finns made to the Korean airliner incident or did you expect them to do something more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, given this position, we weren't surprised by the fact that they did not make an official statement. We certainly noted the action of the Finnish pilots in suspending flights to Moscow for 60 days and clearly that is in line with the kind of thing that we were happy to see happening in a number of other countries.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(3:22 P.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The Jade Room
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

September 25, 1983

5:19 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention, please. This is on the record but not for cameras. Do we need the lights?

Q No.

MR. SPEAKES: Kill the lights.

Q Larry, can we have pictures to begin with?

MR. SPEAKES: I think not. This is Secretary of State on the record but not for cameras.

Let me give you a brief bit of information about tomorrow. The speech will be available in the press center here at 7:30 a.m. It will be embargoed for wire transmission until 9:00. It will be for release at 10:30. There will be no overnight excerpts released from the speech. The Secretary will be here at 8:15 to brief on background on the speech. At that time we will have a fact sheet for distribution.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You may very well be especially interested in developments in Lebanon. But first let me tell you a bit about the President's schedule and the things he's been doing here in New York since he arrived. He had a luncheon with the Secretary General of the United Nations, during which time they covered a full range of issues having to do with the U.N. The President expressed his support for the work of the United Nations and during the course of that meeting, the President had placed a telephone call to President Gemayel to express his congratulations on the cease-fire and both he and the Secretary General talked to President Gemayel at that time.

Later in the afternoon, the President met with Prince Sihanouk and with Premier Son Sann of the Kampuchea, and they discussed the situation there and, of course, the President expressed his continuing support for their efforts.

Later in the afternoon, the President met the Head of State of Liberia. This is a state that has recently recognized Israel and has taken very strong stands at the United Nations on a number of issues, including the Korean Airline tragedy. And so they discussed those matters and also the moves toward democratization and the economic program being undertaken in Liberia.

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So those were the items on the President's diplomatic schedule.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, we have been keeping track, of course, continuously and through the morning, and I can report to you -- you probably already know -- that about an hour ago in Damascus, the Foreign Minister of Syria Khaddam and Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia announced a cease-fire. In doing so, they called for restraint on the part of all parties as they undertake a process of national reconciliation. I think the call for restraint and reconciliation hits exactly the right note. President Gemayel will be making an announcement in Beirut, or may be in the process of making one now, and in that, as I understand it, he will be describing some of the elements of the cease-fire in slightly more detail.

Our understanding is that the cease-fire is to be effective at 6:00 a.m. in the morning Beirut time, which is midnight here.

I want to say on my own behalf and on behalf of the President that we congratulate the parties to this cease-fire. We recognize its importance and we recognize the importance of seeing that it is a first step in an important process and the President's objectives and those of President Gemayel remain unchanged as wanting to see the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and the emergence of a strong central government of Lebanon based, of course, on national reconciliation, and we also have the objective of appropriate security arrangements on Lebanon's south border.

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If there are any questions, I would be glad to try to answer them.

Q Did you ask for a bolstering of the U. N. supervisory force to supervise the cease-fire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe when the greater detail is given it will show a request for neutral observers to come into play. And it has not been decided who those neutral observers will be. However, I can say that there are trained U. N. observers in the Beirut area and that the Secretary General from all of our conversations has a constructive attitude toward their use. Whether they will in fact be used remains to be seen. But the agreement does provide and wants to see some neutral observers in the area where fighting has been taking place.

Q Will there be any change in the U. S. role?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. The U. S. Marine mission remains important and remains unchanged. And I think, however, they will be a little more comfortable in carrying that mission out because they will be subject to the cross-fire that they have been in. We will continue, of course, with our diplomatic efforts to be helpful to all the parties.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you have any idea when the reconciliation process will begin, the efforts to launch this national dialogue that the Lebanese talked about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am certain that they want to get it under way as rapidly as they can. No doubt the first step is to get the cease-fire into place and that means working from the top to the people in the localities and going on I am sure as rapidly as they can. But I can't give you any precise time. That is, I suppose, more appropriate for the people on the spot to answer.

Q What was the key to achieving the cease-fire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ. Well, there were all sorts of issues being discussed and gradually narrowed down to the point of agreement that was reached today. But I suppose the key must have been the sense that people in the community had that further bloodshed and fighting was not going to be productive and that time for national reconciliation had really come and the groundwork for it was well in place. But I think that is a question that undoubtedly President Gemayel and others will discuss.

Q Mr. Secretary, why do you think the Syrians changed their view on this? We have had some pretty tough language from the Syrians in the past few weeks. Why did the Syrians agree to the cease-fire now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't answer that question with any --- I can't look into the Syrian mind. The fact of the matter is that they have agreed and of course they have been very active in the negotiations. They have made a great many proposals during the course of the negotiations and finally today there has been agreement on a set of conditions for a cease fire that we hope will lead to a constructive result.

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Q If there should be any violation of the cease-fire what is the standing policy regarding an American response? Is it the same policy in terms of defense and retaliation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as our so-called rules of engagement are concerned they don't change. But I think that again I will call your attention to the words used in Damascus and I am sure they will be used in Beirut -- that "all parties should exercise restraint" and we should look for a period of national reconciliation.

Q Do you believe when you talk about the people had had enough bloodshed -- any reason to believe that this cease-fire can be successful or more successful than attempts in the past?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't make a confident prediction in the sense of being able to see into the future. But there has been a great deal of turmoil, people have suffered greatly, both in terms of people killed and people wounded and opportunities foregone. And the urge for peace and reconciliation and getting on with the task of economic construction is very great in Lebanon. And I can testify to that myself very personally from many contacts I have had with the Lebanese people. So that urge must be there and presumably will sustain efforts at a cease-fire.

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Q Does this mean that Syria will withdraw, or when?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is nothing in the cease-fire -- I will just let President Gemayel announce the details of the cease-fire, but I will imagine that he will have some comments to make about the importance of Lebanon's sovereignty and integrity.

Q Mr. Secretary, will this be a cease-fire in place? Are you at all concerned in the next six hours or so the contending forces will be jockeying for positions in a last minute conflict?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I hope that people will concentrate on making preparations for the cease-fire, and it won't become a vehicle for escalated fighting. The reason for having a time lag, obviously, is not to give people one last moment of fighting but rather to provide enough time so that the agreement can be transmitted down and the assurances can be given to people on the ground that this is something that has been agreed all around and in good faith with the expectation that it will be accepted, but as to the details, President Gemayel will be announcing them, and I think you will see in the details of that some aspects of your question.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the assurances that the Druze will abide by the cease-fire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, their views have been represented in all these negotiations. So the process of having a cease-fire is a process in which they participated and have at their top leadership agreed.

Q Mr. Secretary, a minute ago you said the mission of the Marines would not change under this cease-fire. Do you anticipate that the positions they hold would change if the cease-fire takes effect, and if it continues in effect for a while, would it be time to talk about bringing them home?

MR. SPEAKES: This is the last question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is no plan currently to change the mission or the places where the Marines are stationed, and I think the best place to leave it is right there. Their mission is there. They will stay there and they will be helpful in this process of bringing about a sense of stability and reconciliation in Lebanon and bringing Lebanon back to the prosperous and flourishing state that it once held. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (5:32 P.M. EDT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

The Jade Room
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

September 26, 1983

8:11 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: I don't think we need the lights this morning. Let me have your attention, please. We would like the lights to go down. Thank you.

We have [redacted] here to brief as a Senior Administration Official. He will provide a brief update on the situation in the Middle East and then lead into the President's speech this morning before the U.N. General Assembly.

In addition, following his briefing, [redacted] will be here in the briefing room to answer your questions on an informal basis also on background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President is here to address the General Assembly to express once again his own and the country's commitment to peace. This is the commitment that is not simply a wish or a hope, but something that guides our policies and which is exemplified in things that are discussed in his address.

It's a commitment to the basic idea of nonalignment which in a sense is diversity and the capacity of people to follow their own lines of thinking and not be dominated in the world by East-West problems.

It's a commitment to reduction in arms and elimination of categories of arms where it is possible and the determination to pursue the negotiations for arms reductions in all of the forums where they are being discussed and to do so vigorously, reasonable positions in the spirit of give and take, and it's a commitment to work on issues that you see around the world causing so much trouble. We have been focusing recently on Lebanon but we see these issues in virtually every part of the world. We see them in Central America, we see them in Southern Africa, we see them in Kampuchea, we see them in Afghanistan. So there are many trouble spots and the United States, with its commitment to peace, is always attempting in every way we can to be part of the solution and not part of the problem.

So, once again, the President has come to the United Nations, to the world community, supporting Mrs. Gandhi's effort to discuss these issues to, again, state his commitment to peace.

If there are any questions, I will deal with them. Way in the back.

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Q Under the revised articles proposal, it is correct, is it not, that the United States would continue to insist on an equal number of missiles in Europe and the right to deploy in Asia but in fact would not deploy in Asia, is that what you are saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position of the United States in the U.N. talks has always been for a global limit, not a European limit, a global limit. That position hasn't changed. What the United States has said to the Soviets in Geneva is that we're prepared to consider deploying less than that global total in Europe, but the idea of a global limit is maintained.

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Q How does that square, [redacted] then with previous American concerns that Soviets could simply dismantle their SS-20s and move them from Europe to Asia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether you have heard that question or not. Do you have a way of — how does that square with the problem that has been pointed out by the United States that you can just move these missiles from one theater to another theater.

Well, it squares perfectly and that is the reason for having a global limit because you then have some understood total and then where that total would be deployed is a second question, and the President has addressed that in saying that we are willing to consider less than that global total deployed in Europe. Obviously, the Soviets, at least at present, have SS-20s deployed in non-European theaters presently.

Q [redacted] what is new about the second proposal on page 3 of the President's speech in which it says, "The U. S. will consider mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles." Is that new?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is new. The Soviets have, in the course of the discussions in Geneva, said that they believe that the questions of aircraft should be considered and brought into the discussion and potentially into an agreement. And so, basically, what Ambassador Nitze is authorized to do is to say we are prepared to discuss that subject, and, basically, since you wanted to discuss it, what do you have in mind? And, so, the subject is on the table, you might say, whereas it hasn't been on the table before.

Q [redacted] do the Soviets have any aircraft that we consider INF? And second and apart, is this the first time we have offered to reduce the Pershing IIs?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was, do the Soviets have any aircraft that could be considered INF aircraft. Well, presumably they think so and certainly, yes.

On the question of the Pershing II's, what we have talked about so far is, first of all, elimination of the intermediate range missiles entirely and as that position was rejected by the Soviet Union we moved to the idea of an interim solution which we could be at varying levels anywhere between zero and 572 warheads.

Now, obviously, there could be a lot of different numbers in between there. And Ambassador Nitze has tried out a lot numbers in his discussions. The additional point being put forward now is that within any total number the mix would be an appropriate mix but the concept would include the possibility of coming down from 572 not only in the ground launch cruise missiles but also in the Pershing. So some appropriate mix would be developed.

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Q In that context, [redacted] was there any idea of not deploying any Pershings? Is that on the table?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, absolutely not.

Q And is there any change in the deployment schedule?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No change in the deployment schedule, and certainly, if you look at the proportion of the planned NATO deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles, then you can get some notion of what was considered appropriate at the level of 572 and how that would work out at lesser number remains to be seen. But there would also be Pershings in that mix.

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But are you saying the ratio would remain the same ---

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm not saying the ratio remains exactly the same. I guess there would be some sense of proportionality to it, but the decision on this is best handled at the negotiating table.

Q It used to be said that the more you negotiated in public the less likely it was to getting an agreement. These negotiations have been probably most publicly discussed and I guess the least achieved. I just wonder, do you think these proposals which are going to be made public make it any easier or more difficult?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could you hear the question? It was essentially about does public disclosure of positions impede any negotiations. I think basically the answer is yes. I just give you that as an opinion, negotiator. The problem of controlling information, however, is tremendous, and so I think we have tried to conduct our internal discussions in the United States government as carefully as we can. It is a negotiation being undertaken by the United States as part of an alliance. So we've had broad consultations not only within the alliance but also with our friends in Asia, and then presented the proposals privately in Geneva, but with all of the speculation about them and leaks, many of which give incorrect information and, therefore, mislead the public, we felt it was necessary to state these publicly and the President decided to do so in his speech. If it were possible to conduct negotiations very, very privately, that would probably be advantageous, but it simply doesn't seem to be possible.

Q Do you have anything more than what we have on the record from the Soviets that is an rejection of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am going back to the point we just discussed, I think I will leave that question alone.

Q In the speech the tone is quite different from that which has been made -- the tone of the speech is quite different from most of the speeches in the last several weeks since the shooting down of the Korean airliner. Does that suggest the desire on the part of the President or the government to put that matter behind and turn to a new state of Soviet-American relations? Or what does it suggest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Korean airliner tragedy you cannot put behind you particularly since we have so many unanswered questions about it from the Soviet Union. So it's there. The need to construct things that will prevent such tragedies in the future is there and I think that it has to be kept in front of us, particularly in the light of the statement made by the foreign minister in Madrid that if circumstances arose that were similar, they'd shoot it down again. So I think that we need something more satisfactory than that. However, the President has from the beginning taken the view that we have had an analysis of the Soviet situation. That hasn't been changed by this. We had a set of policies that have been based on it, that emphasize the importance of the strength of the United States and its allies and their determination and we've also had a policy of being ready to solve problems if we can. And so right from the beginning, the President has determined to keep

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arms control negotiations going and Ambassador Nitze is in Geneva, Ambassador Rowny will return, Ambassador Abramowitz is going back to Vienna, and so on. So we're not putting that tragedy behind us and shouldn't, but we also will carry on these important discussions.

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Q [redacted] is it possible under this new concept of global limits that we might match the Soviet forces in Europe and chose not to match their forces in Asia although having the option to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think all I can say on this is that we continue to emphasize the importance of global limits and we have put forward the idea that within that concept we are willing to consider deploying less than our global total in Europe. That is all. There is no further statement on that.

Q Are you talking about global equality?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Global equal limits, absolutely.

Q Parity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. Global limits for us and for the Soviet Union at an equal level. That is one of the guiding principles that was set forth by the President, by Ambassador Nitze last — I forget just when — last spring sometime.

Q [redacted], there is no statement here about the United States being willing to change its position on the British and French missiles. Does the Administration feel that they can't strike a deal with the Russians if there is no conclusion of the British and French missiles and any such deal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We feel that our position and our allies share this view and all of these proposals have been developed in close concert with our allies — we feel that our position is a reasonable one and is a basis for settling this matter if the Soviet Union is ready to settle it. The question of British and French systems has been discussed ad infinitum and we have given the reasons for our position on that and the allies firmly support that position.

Q [redacted], are the British and French included in the global limit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We are talking about in this negotiation U. S. and Soviet systems; land-based systems. And we are talking about global limits on what within the category of intermediate range nuclear weapons the global limit that would be assigned on the one hand to the Soviet Union; on the other hand to the United States. That is the scope of the negotiation. However, since the negotiations arise essentially from a decision made in the NATO Alliance responding to the build-up of intermediate range missiles by the Soviet Union, which has continued relentlessly responding to that decision it has been essentially a negotiation conducted by the United States but with close consultation with our allies.

And, so, there has naturally been some focus on Europe but the concept has always been one of global limits involving U. S. and the Soviet Union.

Q [redacted], given the schedule of

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deployment and given the pace in Geneva, is there any way you think the U. S. can avoid the beginning of deployment in a couple of months or is that going to happen even if that is unavoidable?

MR. SPEAKES: This is the last question, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The deployment schedule was set back when the decision was originally made. It has not been changed. It remains in effect and that deployment will take place barring an agreement that changes it. Now, that is what we are negotiating about, to see if such an agreement can be reached. And we will continue to negotiate about that and continue to be ready for give and take on this whole subject, not only through the balance of this year, but after deployments take place. If there is no agreement, they will and after they take place we are prepared to continue discussions. And if an agreement is reached that would imply dismantling something that has already been deployed, but we are willing to do that.

The point is, however, that this is as it has been referred to many times, dual-track decision that was made. One track is that you deploy what you feel you need to defend yourself adequately and the other track is that you negotiate about it and if you can bring about a more satisfactory result through negotiations, that is what you are striving for. But you must in order to have that negotiation be a real one carry through on your determination to deploy and there is absolutely no wavering in that in our alliance.

THE PRESS: Thank you. (END 8:35 A.M EDT)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY SHULTZ

The Jade Room
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

September 26, 1983

8:36A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Do you want to give a brief readout on Lebanon? We can put this on the record, if you would like.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is a whole new press conference.

Q Good morning. (Laughter)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The cease-fire that we found being announced yesterday has taken effect and so things are settling down and hope that they stay that way, and in the mean time, preparations are being made not only for meetings to implement the cease-fire carefully,but also to start the process of discussions of national reconciliation. So that process is getting started, and I think that's about what there is to report.

Q What is the Marine mode going to be in the cease-fire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the Marines are there. Their mission is the same as it was. Insofar as the cease-fire is concerned, we can expect that they won't be fired upon.

Q No, but are they there also to monitor the cease-fire?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, they are not to monitor the cease-fire. There will be, as it's called for in the agreement, neutral observers to monitor the cease-fire. Just who those observers will be hasn't been determined, but I think it is important to take note of the fact that there are trained United Nations observers in Beirut and additional ones nearby. So it seems at least to us logical to make use of them, but that hasn't been decided.

Q In this process of national reconciliation or this dialogue, do the Syrians participate just as observers or are they active. participants?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The agreement request that, I think it says fraternal brothers in Syria and Saudi Arabia be invited to observe these discussions.

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Q So they wouldn't have a veto?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I would think the concept is they are there and their good offices are there. The Saudi Arabians have been very constructive in putting all this together, and so they stay involved and we hope be helpful.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the Russians figure in the cease-fire in anyway?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not in any direct way that I know of.

Q Any indirect way?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not that I know of.

Q Does the whole question of national reconciliation imply power sharing, a new realignment of the power blocs in Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in Lebanon, of course, any government is based upon representation of the diversity that is Lebanon, and the elected Parliament represents that, the arrangements whereby you have different factions in the Presidency and the Prime Ministership and so on. That's the traditional Lebanon politics, and it's that kind of skillful politics that it takes to achieve a balance and to achieve stability in Lebanon and that's what's being striven for and has been from the beginning.

So this is a further evolution into a sort of wider political structure for the Government of Lebanon.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you know whether part of the agreement, Mr. Secretary, either stated or unstated that the Lebanese Army cannot be used either internally or against another Arab state during the course of negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Lebanese Army has never been constructed with any intent whatever to use in an agressive way against any other Arab state or any state. Its mission has been to help bring about stability within Lebanon. This is a legitimate mission for them and so far as I know has not been altered.

MR. SPEAKES: As I said earlier, that's on the record. Assistant Secretary Burt is now at your disposal in the briefing room. He will be on background in his informal discussions with you on the speech.

END (8:41 A.M. EDT)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S UNGA SPEECH
AT
THE UNITED NATIONS
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1983, 11:40 A. M.

MODERATOR: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. It gives me a great deal of pleasure to introduce to you A Senior Administration Official who comes to you with very timely remarks on the President's speech this morning. It will be ON BACKGROUND. He will open with a few remarks and then recognize questions.

Q Excuse me, do you want to spell out what "ON BACKGROUND" means for the foreign journalists?

MODERATOR: It means that you may say that this is the remarks by a high government official and not give his name.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know how many of you may or may not have had an opportunity to hear briefings earlier this morning. I don't want to reiterate a lot of material that you have already heard; just simply say that the President in his speech across the street a few minutes ago outlined three very important initiatives that we are taking in the Geneva INF negotiations. All three of these initiatives are in response to stated Soviet concerns, both publicly and privately in the negotiations. They reflect a sincere desire on the part of the Reagan Administration as well as our allies to move forward in the negotiations to achieve an agreement, if possible — and I stress "if possible" because in order to achieve an agreement, flexibility is required by both sides.

Just very briefly a little background on each of the three proposals.

First of all, the President has said that we are willing for the first time to entertain limits on aircraft as well as missiles in the INF negotiations.

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already, looking at the press reaction to this step, I don't think people understand its significance. The Soviet Union for over ten years has been asking that the United States limit, or agree to limit, aircraft deployed in Europe that could potentially deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet territory.

Q Excuse me. Could you speak louder, please?

A In the negotiations -- in the SALT negotiations during the 1970s, the United States resisted any effort to limit the so-called forward-base systems -- these aircraft -- and it is an important step that the United States for the first time is willing to limit aircraft that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

Since the INF negotiations got underway at the end of 1981, the Soviets have pressed the U.S. negotiators to limit aircraft as well as missiles, so it was an important step toward the Soviet position to be willing to discuss aircraft as well as missiles.

Secondly, as you know, the Soviet Union has spoken a good deal in public about its concerns about the Pershing II missile. It is worried that the relatively short flight time of the Pershing missile -- some 15 minutes -- was somehow a destabilizing factor, or could be a destabilizing factor, if and when that missile was deployed.

Of course, the Soviet argument has ignored the fact that the flight time of the Soviet SS-20 missile, which is already deployed and exists in hundreds, has a similar flight time as the Pershing II missile.

But the President today in the second initiative he has taken has said that the United States is willing as part of an overall agreement covering both Pershing missiles and cruise missiles to reduce the numbers of Pershing IIs. We're willing to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union on specific numbers, and current deployment numbers call for 108 -- that's 108 Pershing IIs -- so we would be willing to substantially come down from that number if we could achieve an overall agreement providing for equality in numbers of warheads.

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Finally, the President has taken an important step in saying that if the two sides could agree on equal numbers of worldwide deployments — that is, equal global ceilings — that the United States would not have to deploy all of the forces permitted by that agreement in Europe. That is, we could deploy a number fewer than the agreed-upon global ceiling in Europe.

This is a step designed to emphasize to the Soviet Union that European deployments do not offset Soviet global deployments. We believe that all three of these steps taken now — the new negotiating round just getting underway earlier this month, and in the face of virtually no Soviet flexibility in the negotiations — does demonstrate the President's good faith in these negotiations and good faith in the NATO alliance, particularly in the aftermath of the strong feelings here and in Europe about the Korean airliner tragedy.

With that, I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can the President's use of the word "lawlessness" this morning be understood to be a long-range advocacy that the U.N. be made able to enforce law? And, if so, does this mean abandoning de facto agreement with the Soviet policy of downgrading U.N. charter review?

A I think you're reaching there. I think you're reaching in your explanation of what the President was tryingto say. I don't think he was making a comment on necessarily changing the U.N. Charter or the relationship between U.N. obligations and the sovereign rights of governments. I think what he was referring to was more a spiritual reawakening really of some of the basic values that led to the creation of the United Nations in the first place.

He was asking, I think, both people and governments to step back from the current problems and recognize the — as I said before, the spirit behind the United Nations and what it represents in an effort to seek constructive solutions to international problems without resort to force.

Q The second part of the question: The fact that it is the same as the Soviet policy in standing against U.N. Charter review?

A I'm not conversant on what Soviet policy is toward U.N. review. Sorry.

Q In your advance discussion of this — if you had any — with the Soviets, is there any indication that they would be likely to move in any one of these points?

A As you know, in public the Soviets have been critical of these moves, but we are not paying attention to Soviet public statements. They have been discussed privately with the Soviets, and we are hopeful that these gestures, these intiatives — they're more than gestures — these initiatives will stimulate progress in the negotiations.

I don't want to describe what the Soviet reaction has been in private, because they are confidential negotiations, but we are hopeful that these will lead the Soviets to negotiate more seriously in Geneva rather than seek to dismantle the NATO consensus behind deployment and negotiation in public debate in Western Europe.

Q I have two questions: The first is with regard to the inclusion of aircraft for the first time, does thatinclude both local and regional use of aircraft, deployment of aircraft? The answer to that is yes?

A No.

Q I'll give my second question then. The second question is with regard to the famous Nitze-Kvitsinsky discussion in the woods. At that time it seems that Pershing IIs were omitted from the '75 — I think the government thought inadvisably. That's not on the agenda. Are we insisting upon some Pershing IIs in the combination deal that is supposed to be effective? Is that right?

A Let me answer both questions. First of all, we have said that we are willing to limit aircraft in principle. We haven't made a decision yet on whether those should be global or regional limits. That's a subject for negotiations. There are pros and cons to both approaches, but we are taking a very open-minded attitude towards this question in an effort to see what the Soviets would like to do; and we will, by necessity, if we make progress on this issue, then have to decide later on.

On your second question, you're absolutely right that this proposal, while demonstrating a willingness

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to reduce numbers of Pershing IIs, does not foresee the elimination of the Pershing IIs altogether. Of course, if the Soviets were to come forward and agree with the President's call for eliminating these weapons altogether — both the Pershings and the cruise missile — then we would eliminate, obviously, the Pershings.

But we believe very strongly that as long as there will be some deployment under agreement, under the interim proposal, above zero, that we should deploy the so-called mix of weapons. One reason that we believe in this is that of course the Soviet Union now has a ballistic missile threat directed against our allies in Europe; and if we agreed now to drop the Pershing II altogether, we would be giving the Soviet Union a monopoly in ballistic missile capability against our allies, and we don't believe that's a wise step to take.

We are prepared, though, to reduce to fairly — to reduce substantially numbers of cruise missiles and Pershings to a point where it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to argue that the Pershings represented some significantly dangerous or qualitatively different threat.

Q There was no offer contained in the speech today to meet with Mr. Andropov. I wonder if you would at this point consider that idea of a summit to be a dead letter?

A I don't think we would ever consider any possible summit meeting — any exchange or dialogue with the Soviets — to be a dead letter. But we have laid out for some time our requirements for a summit, our conditions for a summit. We don't want a cosmetic summit meeting, an atmospheric summit meeting; we want a summit meeting that has the real possibilities of moving the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward, that has the real prospects of producing concrete results, and we're certainly not at that stage now.

I think it's obvious that the Korean airliner episode has cast a shadow over the relationship, so our position on a summit remains what it has been — it really depends on the progress we can make with the Soviets on a range of issues, certainly arms control being a very important aspect of the relationship.

Q The President said in his speech this morning he would, of course, retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere. What does that mean?

A That simply means that if we were to agree with the Soviet Union on an equal level of systems deployed worldwide, and we would agree also that we would deploy some number fewer, the United States would have the right to deploy additional missiles elsewhere. We have no plans to do so at present and no agreements with governments outside of Europe to do so, or plans to deploy these weapons in the United States; but we would have that right, and we could in theory implement that right if we so chose.

Q This would also include Asian countries? For example, Japan?

A In theory it could include any country, but we have no plans now to deploy any INF missiles in Asia, and we certainly would not do so without a decision taken first of all by the President, and then after consultations with countries in question.

(Continued on page 7)

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Q If the United States no longer is insisting on theater parity in Europe --

A That is incorrect. That is not our position. We are saying that we would deploy fewer missiles in Europe than the Soviet Union deploys globally. We never said that we're not insisting on theater parity.

Q But if you have a global parity, and you agree that these numbers can be shifted between theaters, isn't that what you're saying?

A No. We are not saying that we have the same number of systems in Europe than the Soviet Union would have in the western Soviet Union. We're just saying we would have fewer numbers than the Soviet Union than the Soviets had in the western as well as the eastern parts of the Soviet Union. Do you understand that point?

Q No, I don't.

A If the Soviet Union -- let me just illustrate it for you. It's purely illustrative, and I want to make this point so you don't think I am talkingabout a specific proposal.

Suppose, for example, that the United States and the Soviet Union agree on an overall number of warheads, three hundred to each side, under such an arrangement -- again, there's no decision on any fraction -- perhaps, the United States could deploy, say, two hundred of those warheads in Europe. That would not mean that we have given up theater parity because the Soviet Union, with its three hundred warheads, presumably wouldn't deploy all of its three hundred warheads directed against Europe. They have other military contingencies, and they would have to decide just how they would allocate their force. We're certainly not giving up the idea of regional parity.

Q Theoretically, they could deploy 275 to four 250?

A That is something we have to negotiate. Our position does not rule out, once we get into scussions with the Soviets, formal regional substance. at is a possibility, that we might agree with the viets at some point that there would be a European -ceiling or an Asian sub-ceiling. That's a subject negotiation.

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Q What I'm trying to get at is, does this not open the way of dealing with Russian objections about the British and French missiles without actually counting those missiles?

A We do not, and are unwilling to take into account the British and French forces.

Q Why is that?

A We have said that several times. This is a bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiation, and the Soviet Union has only dragged the British and French systems into these negotiations as an excuse to not permit the United States to deploy one single system in Europe.

Q You have indicated earlier that there is a difference between Soviet public and private reaction to the American proposals. If, tomorrow, the Soviet speech is as negative as all the indications are concerning these proposals sought today by the President, should we then dismiss that speech as not important or not necessarily relevant to the negotiations?

A Let me say two things here. First of all, I didn't say there's a difference between Soviet public — the public line and the private line. I just simply said that all you have heard is the public line. So I don't want to give you the impression that the Soviets are saying something else in private. I'm just not going to comment on what they're saying in private. And as for dismissingwhat the Soviets say, that's your decision; that's your judgment. It's not for me to tell you how to respond or react to Soviet statements.

Q Taking your analogy of 300 missiles — 200 posted in the European theater — where would the rest of the 100 be kept? Would it be kept in the U.S. in some storage?

A That is an issue —

Q And how do you still insist we are still insisting on parity?

A Again, we haven't said anything about theater parity. What we are insisting on is global parity. The United States has never insisted on regional military parity. We don't have, for instance, in Europe a conventional balance of forces, unfortunately. We would like to improve

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our conventional capability, but we have never said that we are going to defend with American forces against a Soviet attack in Europe or Asia simply with the forces that we have in Europe or Asia. In fact, the fundamental concept of NATO strategy has been that we deter an attack in Europe or Asia with our forces deployed in the United States as well as those deployed in Europe or Asia.

NATO strategy links the defense of Europe to the central strategic balance, the so-called American strategic umbrella.

On the question of where we might deploy additional forces, these are questions that we haven't even addressed. What we are insisting on at this stage is the right to parity.

Q Will there be new talks between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Shultz in the near future?

A I simply can't say.

Q No initiative?

A I can't give you an answer. Unfortunately, the Soviet Foreign Minister chose not to come to New York, using the spurious argument that we could not protect his security. We have protected the Soviet Foreign Minister for seventeen years and we are confident we could do it this time.

Q A couple of weeks ago there was a Soviet proposal to deploy even all SS-20's that are stationed right now over there when the Americans are stationing their missiles.

What is the attitude of the American Government about this proposal?

A I don't think that Mr. Andropov said that the Soviet Union is willing to deploy all of its missiles.

Q I didn't say that.

A I thought you did. He said that the Soviet Union was willing to liquidate — not destroy — liquidate some of its missiles. We have had difficulty in Geneva clarifying precisely what the Soviets mean by "liquidate."

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We can't determine whether they're referring to launchers. That is, the vehicles that carry the SS-20's or the missiles themselves. And, furthermore, it appears that the Soviet Union wants to reserve the right to continue production of missiles, which is a little bit troublesome when the Soviet position is based on a regional approach; they only want to limit weapons deployed in the western Soviet Union.

If you can continue to produce these weapons, and presumably deploy them in large numbers in the east, they can be easily moved back in the range of western Europe, but we willing to keep talking.

Q May I have the second question in view the question that arose?

A Sure.

Q And that is with regard to the French and British missiles. We have proposed the inclusion in the INF discussion. Does that include, however, their possible inclusion in the START negotiations as part of a strategic weapons system?

A It does exclude that. These systems simply have no place in a bilateral negotiation between the two superpowers.

I think one fact that needs to be brought out, which has not been brought out, that while the Soviet Union has talked about the existence of 162 British and French missiles, what the Soviet Union hasn't talked about is the existence of several thousand weapons that it possesses that could be used to attack Britain and France which are not now limited by arms control.

For example, there are submarine launch ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union deploys in the Baltic which are not now limited under SALT which can be used to threaten Britain and France. There are short-ranged Soviet missile systems, such as the FROG and SKUD, the SS-21's, the SS-22's, which could be used against Britain and France which are not limited. And there are several thousand bombers, medium-range bombers and tactical aircraft which have a nuclear capability.

If you look at the overall regional nuclear balance that exists in Europe today, it's hard to escape the conclusion that the Soviets have a 4 to 1, or a 5 to 1 advantage in overall nuclear capability. And even if

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you include the British and French forces in that overall balance, the Soviets are still far ahead.

Q The President is very critical of the Soviets for violating existing agreements in his speech this morning.

Two questions. First of all, why do you think the Senate would be receptive to any agreement you might negotiate?

Second, do you have any confidence that your verification procedures are any better than (inaudible).

A You don't establish verification procedures independently. You spend a lot of money on so-called national technical means of verification, satellites and other things, so that we can verify these agreements. But you've got to get the other side to cooperate with you, and this is what we are doing and would do in any new agreement.

Some of the agreements that the Soviets have violated -- for example, the 1972 Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons -- didn't even have a provision for verification in it. Sweden and some other countries are now calling for a convention of the countries that signed that agreement so we can get some verification provision inserted into that agreement so that violations can be monitored and detected.

We have a very high standard of verification. We are negotiating both in Geneva, the INF talks, as well as in the START negotiations, for a high standard of agreement. So if and when we go to the Congress -- the Senate -- with a treaty, we can convince those members of the Senate that this agreement is verifiable.

But you're right in highlighting this issue. The President highlighted it in his speech. We must have a verifiable agreement. And I think this is something that not only the U.S. Senate but the public opinion generally understands is necessary for progress in arms control. These ambiguities, these other steps, these problems that are now emerging in terms of Soviet compliance in the nuclear area -- the President mentioned new missile testing where we are not able to obtain the information that we need to determine whether a missile is a new missile, and the deployment of radar potentially having an ABM capability -- these are of some concern

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to us and we are talking to the Soviets about these problems.

Q On the point that missiles, as you have said, can be moved back into position as soon as relations heat up, how can we or anyone, any nation justify a global policy that envisions no long-range plan to create an enforceable law to eliminate all weapons?

A We are working very hard to eliminate all weapons. As I think the President pointed out, the initiative for eliminating an entire category of weapons -- these INF missiles -- was a fairly radical departure in arms control, and we have a comprehensive policy.

I think our view is that you work with what you've got, and the way right now to accomplish that objective is through negotiations between the United States Government and the Soviet Government.

Thank you.

(Briefing concluded at 12:05 P.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ

The Jade Room
Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

September 26, 1983

2:33 P.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: If we could get going, please, because the Secretary has got to leave here in just a few minutes.

Q We've been waiting for you, Pete.

MR. ROUSSEL: All right. This briefing will be on the record. No camera; no sound, the Secretary will give us a readout on the lunch with King Hassan and the meeting with Indira Gandhi.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Since the President returned from the U.N. after giving his address, he had a working lunch with King Hassan --

Q Can't hear.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I was saying, since the President returned from giving his address to the U.N., he's had a working lunch with King Hassan and then a meeting with Mrs. Gandhi. In both cases, of course, people are very much interested in developments in Lebanon, the prospects there. So that was discussed. The Korean airliner tragedy was discussed. The general situation in the Middle East, of course, is something, especially in the case of King Hassan, he has many ideas about. So a considerable amount of time was spent on that subject and Mrs. Gandhi talked some about her plans for the meeting of the nonaligned movement, the people who are coming here, the heads of state, beginning tomorrow and over the next couple of days. That is generally the nature of the discussion.

Q What can you tell us about the military and diplomatic situation in Lebanon right now, and did you get any commitments on this trip from the U.N. that they would put their observers in to monitor the cease-fire?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Insofar as the observers are concerned, I am aware of some discussions going on in the area and I know that the Secretary General has been quite active on the suggestion. Precisely where that stands right now I don't know, although he was working on it actually as we were leaving him. But I can't tell you precisely.

As far as the situation on the ground is concerned, it's our understanding that the cease-fire seems to be holding and so the process of getting these meetings organized, so on, is taking place.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you had any report on the debris that was handed over on the airliner today to the Japanese? Can you add any information?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We had a report on it. Apparently the turnover went smoothly and carefully, carefully in the sense that they had labeled everything and our people looked at it and tried to catalogue it carefully.

Q Question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question was, have we had any report on the debris turned over by the Soviet Union to our party, and I was saying that we have had a preliminary report that mainly said that the procedure for turning it over was a careful procedure, quite straightforward and we, of course, have to examine carefully precisely all of the items, but there didn't seem to be anything that leapt out at you about them immediately, but we haven't had a chance to really examine them carefully. There were no bodies or anything like that.

Q Any identification of persons aboard the airliner?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm not sure about that. As I say, what we have or what I have seen so far is just to report that the process went smoothly and in an orderly way and that there was nothing that immediately leapt out at you that was surprising. We will have more detail as time goes on.

Yes.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, in Reagan's proposal this morning, in the first part, is there anything in that that addresses the Soviet concerns that British and French missiles be counted on the allied side?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The position of the allies and the President's position is that there is no rationale for counting them in the INF talks, and that remains the position that we have.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q By suggesting that you might not match warhead for warhead in Europe, is that sort of a back-door way to get around it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it isn't because the position remains that we are interested in global limits, global limits with the U. S. and the USSR having a right to the same numbers of intermediate range weapons, and the fact that we would deploy less than our total in the global number in Europe is, I suppose, as much of anything, a reflection of the fact that in fact the Soviet Union has deployed in Europe and non-European theaters.

Q Mr. Secretary, do we have any reason to think that the Soviets will treat this proposal, this package of proposals differently than they've treated our other INF proposals?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, only the idea that they say they are interested in a negotiation, they say they're interested in a reasonable settlement and we believe that our positions have been and are reasonable and the suggestions that are made show the opportunities for give and take on areas where they have raised questions. So we are a very responsive partner in the negotiations.

Now, as far as their willingness to make an agreement, I can't say. So far they haven't seemed to be interested beyond the rhetoric of it.

Q Mr. Secretary, a little while ago the President was unable to confirm whether or not Ambassador Nitze has made this proposal to the Soviets. Can you, and has there been any response?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Ambassador Nitze made the proposal to the Soviet Union, as a private negotiator would, prior to the public statement that the President made today. There hasn't been, I don't think, any official response beyond the kind of response that someone in those circumstances makes as a matter of initial reaction.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, in the President's speech last year to the U.N., there were some pretty tough rhetoric in the speech, references to Soviet-sponsored guerillas, ruthless oppression, communist atrocities. There wasn't any of that in the speech today. Why has the President changed his tone?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President hasn't changed in his view of matters at all and his policy remains one of great realism about the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet Union, about the importance, for example, in any agreement that's reached to have built into it some method of verification so that you know what is taking place, and he gave some examples of why you have to have something of that kind. And the President continues to feel that the essence of the problem is to be strong and, at the same time, the President has from the beginning and remains committed to having discussions and trying to pursue them so that if there are reasonable negotiated outcomes possible, we will have done everything we can to find them. But they have to be reasonable. That's been the President's position and that remains the President's position.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the President and Mrs. Ghandi discuss any of the points that he made this morning in his speech about the nonaligned nations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think so. I can't say that for sure because they met by themselves for a while, and I came right on down here after that so I didn't get a chance to ask what they may have discussed in the private meeting, but in the larger meeting that I attended, that subject didn't come up, but it was not that long a meeting.

MR. ROUSSEL: This will be the last question.

Q As a followup to that, may I ask if there is a change in the U. S. policy towards nonalignment, are you suggesting that the nonaligned -- the U. S. is a natural ally of the nonaligned?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we think the principles, as the President said in his speech, that underly nonalignment are ones that are very congenial, as far as we're concerned, and they don't involve the formation of blocs that take positions with respect to East versus West, but rather go to certain principles. And if you look to some of the founding documents of the nonaligned movement and if you look at the countries that were the founders and think of what those countries have stood for, I think it carries that very same message. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (2:43 P.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE [koi]
VISIT OF PRESIDENT KIOVISTO
OF FINLAND

September 27, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:20 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: I have here [redacted] to give you a readout on the President's meeting with President Kiovisto of Finland. [redacted] will be on background, attributed to Administration Official. [redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, Les.

The two Presidents spent 45 minutes in the Oval Office with staff members, and then had a working lunch. As the President remarked in his departure remarks, there are no bilateral problems between the United States and Finland. So this visit was an opportunity to exchange views, rather than to try to solve problems.

There was a discussion of East-West relations. President Kiovisto has visited the USSR five times, including twice since Andropov took over the Soviet leadership. And the two Presidents exchanged views on East-West relations.

There was discussion of the downing of the Korean airliner and its impact on overall East-West relations.

President Reagan acknowledged the understanding of the United States for Finnish neutrality. The two Presidents discussed arms control in some detail. President Kiovisto congratulated President Reagan for the United Nations speech yesterday. The two Presidents talked about the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Geneva. President Reagan outlined our interest in confidence-building measures between the United States and the Soviet Union which could ensure better communication in times of crisis.

The two Presidents discussed the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, which will open officially in Stockholm in January, but for which the Finns will host the preparatory conference, which begins one month from now in Helsinki.

President Kiovisto outlined Finnish views on a nuclear free zone for the Nordic area. The two Presidents discussed Lebanon, with President Reagan expressing appreciation for the valuable Finnish contribution to the UNIFIL forces in Lebanon.

MORE

President Kiovisto congratulated President Reagan for the United States' role in helping to bring about a cease-fire in Lebanon.

During the luncheon, President Reagan outlined American views on the situation in Central America, the local situation in Nicaragua and El Salvador, and our hopes that the Contadora process and Senator Stone's mission can bring some peace to the region.

The two Presidents also discussed trade between the two countries. Secretary Baldrige, who was present at the luncheon, pointed out that the trading relationship is sound. There are no problems. And of particular interest in a time of increasing international competition, Finland is one of those countries that does not subsidize exports, which means that we have no particular bilateral problems on the matter of export subsidies for Finnish products sold in this country.

That's all I have. I would be happy to try to field questions.

Q When you say that President Kiovisto congratulated President Reagan on his speech to the U.N. was that kind of a general statement, or was he expressing support for the President's position on arms control and his assertion it's time for the Soviet Union to walk through this open door?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was a general congratulation, a general expression that the speech had made a valuable contribution to the dialogue, and a comprehension of the American desire for progress in the arms control area. But it was not a Finnish enforcement of the United States' position. Indeed, we would not have expected such.

Q Can President Kiovisto, in this Administration's view, be used as a conduit to Andropov?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question didn't come up. We have plenty of means for talking with the Soviets and do talk to them regularly in Moscow and here in Washington, and indeed in the negotiations which are underway. But the question of using someone for a conduit did not arise.

Q When you said that they discussed the Korean airline incident, did the Finnish President express his horror or revulsion? Could you tell us more about what was said there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't go into much more detail. Obviously the concern for the incident was shared.

Q That's it?

Q Did President Reagan express disappointment, he was sorry Finland didn't react more strongly on the incident?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I think, as I sketched in the background here last Friday, Washington recognizes the facts of life and Finland's geographic location and Finland's history. And we respect their neutrality and we understand the basis for their positions.

Q Who was present on the American side at the luncheon discussions?

MORE

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the American side, let me think. Secretary Baldrige -- excuse me, Vice President Bush, who should have come before, Secretary Baldrige, Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, Mr. Ed Meese, Judge Clark, Ambassador Kenneth Nyborg --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keith.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Keith Nyborg, excuse me, the American Ambassador from Finland, who is present with us, Jack Matlock, Senior staff member of the National Security Council, and myself.

Q Can you tell me when the President leaves the United States, does he go back to Finland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will leave the United States a week from today, from Los Angeles. He is heading for New York tonight and then going on to Houston, Los Angeles -- any other stops? That's it.

Q When President Kiovisto mentioned the idea about the nuclear-free zone, what was the Americans' response to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Kiovisto sketched the general concept and did not seek specific American reaction or support. He explained Finland's views and the fact that Finland has been discussing the concept with its Nordic neighbors and the fact that those members of the Nordic zone who also happen to be NATO members are not in a position or have not yet expressed support for the nuclear-free zone concept. So basically it was an exposition and explanation, rather than a search for support.

Q The Soviets have also discussed a nuclear-free zone, I believe in that same area. Was the President speaking in support of that, President Kiovisto?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He didn't mention the Soviet proposal at all and certainly our understanding was that he was explaining Finnish ideas and certainly not Soviet ideas.

MR. JANKA: Thank you very much.

END (1:30 p.m. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

September 28, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:33 P.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We have [redacted], who will brief us on the Thatcher visit. This will be on background, attributed to Senior Administration Official.

Q Why?

MR. ROUSSEL: That's the way it is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very briefly I will run through the schedule and then make a couple of points, and then take questions.

The Prime Minister arrives this afternoon at 4:25 at Andrews. She will be heloed into the Monument grounds, greeted by Acting Secretary of State Ken Dam. She has a private dinner this evening.

Tomorrow morning she has a breakfast meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; calls on Paul Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan. She will then come to the White House for a meeting, followed by luncheon with the President from 11:30 until 1:30. She and the President will make statements at the Diplomatic Entrance on departure. At 3:00 p.m., she will give a general press conference at the British Embassy. After that conference, she will meet with the Vice President, and in the evening, at 8:00 p.m., she will attend a dinner at the British Embassy, where she will receive the Winston Churchill Award and deliver a speech. She will depart at 8:00 a.m. Friday morning for New York.

Q Is President Reagan going to that dinner at the British Embassy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the meeting, we expect that the President and the Prime Minister, who know one another well, will have an extensive exchange on topics including the INF Arms Control negotiations, that is Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces in Europe; Central America; East-West relations in general; the Middle East, including Lebanon, where we are appreciative of the British role in the multinational force. They will also discuss a range of economic issues.

I would be happy to try to take your questions.

MORE

Q What are they going to talk about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arms control, East-West --

Q Are there any pressing issues between us where we differ on these issues that you have listed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, we see eye to eye with the British Government. And the British Government has acknowledged that position. On the Middle East, in Lebanon, the two countries have been cooperating very closely. On East-West issues, the aftermath of the Korean airliner shoot-down, there has been strong cooperation. The British have been very active, particularly at the Madrid Foreign Ministerial meeting, following the shoot-down, in discussing and talking with allies and friends about the airline boycott to the Soviet Union. The differences that exist lie in the economic areas.

Q Taxation of corporations, state taxation of corporations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Unitary taxation or state taxation of multinational corporations has been an issue on which we've had differences. The President has decided to establish a high-level working group of representatives from Federal and state governments, and the U. S. business community to explore the states' use of unitary taxes. They will give a full and complete hearing to all sides of the issue and will consider the views of our trading partners who were seriously concerned about the issue.

Q We already know their views. They are against it. I mean we already know what their views are. So is the President going to change his view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's up to the President.

Q What about the whole area of taxation? Mrs. Thatcher said last Sunday, she pointed out very pointedly that in Britain, once they realized they weren't going to get less spending, they made up the difference by raising taxes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the UK.

Q In the UK.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Really, she believes there is linkage between big deficits and high interest rates, and that high interest rates are affecting her economy. What can the President say to her about the economic situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President, I am sure, will outline for her the recovery that's under way in the U. S. and the expectation that that is going to have a beneficial effect and will, we hope, bring down interest rates here further.

Q Not in the short term, though. She is concerned, as are the other allies, about the short term.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indeed, she and the other allies are. I wouldn't expect anything dramatic to come out of this meeting. This is a chance for friends to get together to talk about problems like that, and to have an intimate exchange of views. But I would not expect something to flow from the meeting in terms of the decision on that. Yes?

Q For those of us who came in late, on the taxing of multinational corporations, the United States view is that Great Britain taxes, for instance, U. S. corporations in the UK too highly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. The issue is taxation of multinational corporations by states of the United States on their global earnings. A number of states do this. There has been a Supreme Court case about the rights of individual states of the United States to tax multinationals. And the United Kingdom and other countries which have an interest in this have expressed views to this government which clearly state that they don't like individual states of the United States taxing multinationals on their global earnings.

Q What is the U. S. Federal position on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President has appointed, as I ran through, a Commission --

Q Does that mean until the Commission reports, we won't have a position on it?

Q He has a position on it.

Q In court cases he has.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the court has adjudicated the matter, and the court has decided the matter. What this Commission is going to do is look at ways in which we might deal with this, to listen to the views of the states which have a clear concern for their revenue base, look at the views of the corporations that are involved, and look at the views of friendly governments who have positions that find this practice damaging.

Q But didn't the Federal Government join those court cases on the side of the states? Am I wrong?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the most recent business, we did not.

Q But prior to that? I mean we are on record, the Federal Government is on record in support of the state's rights on that, are they not? Is this President not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know the answer. Let me see if I can find out something on that.

Q You didn't file anything on the last case.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. We did not take a position on the last one.

Q But it sort of bolstered the state case.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One can draw that conclusion.

MORE

Q In any case, the state's right had been upheld by the Supreme Court?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q When was this Commission formed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was announced a week ago.

Q When is it going to report?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know.

Q Can you say anything more about what you expect the discussion on the INF talks to be? Is there a question of a new position being presented?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President outlined the new U. S. positions on Monday in his United Nations speech. Before announcing those positions, the President had consulted with the British Government, as he had with other concerned governments. I think it's natural to assume that the President and the Prime Minister are going to talk about the negotiations, what might be the prospects in the next months as we reach the deployment date, which is due in December, and what possibilities exist for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement that would obviate the need to begin the new deployments in Europe.

Q Did you say "obviate the need to begin the new deployments"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. If we can get an agreement with the Soviets along the President's initial position of zero-zero, then there is a total obviation of the need, elimination of the need to deploy.

Q Now, failing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Failing that, we are prepared for an interim agreement at levels somewhere between zero and 572.

Q What is the situation on the American Ambassador there? Have we announced a successor yet?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Ambassador Price was announced last Tuesday, a week ago.

Q Charles Price.

Q What about Central America? There had been times when Mrs. Thatcher was not terribly happy with what we were doing in Central America.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I agree with the premise of your question. Mrs. Thatcher has publicly stated very strong support for what we have been doing in Central America. And I would imagine the two of them are going to discuss that.

Q And was there an allied interest? There was a report last Saturday, I believe, that the Western allies were pressuring us to pressure Gemayel to be more conciliatory in reconciliation with some of the Muslim groups.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I saw some of the press reports. Obviously the cease-fire which followed those reports, without commenting on the validity of those reports, has created a new set of facts in Beirut.

Q What about the process of reconciliation and negotiation with the various factions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Discussions are continuing on it.

Q Are we satisfied with Gemayel's willingness to be inclusive?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I am sure we are.

Q Is Mrs. Thatcher, to your knowledge?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To my knowledge, yes.

Q Would you expect any kind of a decision on Lebanon coming out of this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't anticipate one, no.

Q She has stressed that it all has to be peacekeeping. If it changes in any way, the forces should consider withdrawing. Is there a difference between her and the President on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall her statement to that effect, but clearly the object of all the MNF countries is to try to provide the conditions which will bring back a stable government in Lebanon.

Q Will the President be able to assure her that the shelling does not mean if the cease-fire falls apart, there will be a more agressive military role in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's a hypothetical question into which I do not want to wander.

Q But that's what the problem will be. If the cease-fire doesn't hold, that's what the peacekeeping force's concern will be, and other allies will be concerned about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The clear intention of everybody involved now is to try to ensure that the cease-fire will hold.

Q At whose initiative was this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't honestly know the answer to that, but the President and Prime Minister have met frequently, as you know, since President Reagan came into office. And honestly I can't recall which side proposed it. But it's part of a very regular series of meetings.

Q Do these two allies have any significant differences with regards to energy policy, specifically petroleum? Do we have any lingering problems along those lines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None that are on the front or middle burner. That's not to say there may not be some at all. But nothing that I think would come up in these points of discussions.

Q Is President Reagan likely to suggest the benefits of a settlement between the British and the Argentines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. Our position, as stated by the President previously, is that we hope that there can be negotiations for a mutually acceptable agreement between Argentina and the U.K., both of which are friends of ours, if those negotiations can be on a mutually acceptable basis to those two countries. So I don't think we will have any new initiative on that question.

Q What about Namibia or South Africa or any of those issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could well come up. There is no set agenda. But again, we've been working closely with the U.K., and the contact group has been encouraged by the recent visit of the Secretary General to South Africa and to Namibia. And we and the other involved countries have had discussions with the Secretary General the last few days in New York. But there is no difference between the U.K. and the U.S. position on that.

Q How about the Persian Gulf, the fighting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Iran-Iraq war is a matter of concern. I don't know whether the two, President and Prime Minister, will get to that or not.

Q Also new threats by Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, a matter of concern. But I don't know specifically whether they will get to that.

Q What is your view on the emergence of Syria in Lebanon? Do you view it as a stabilizing factor in the Lebanese --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that is off the subject of a pre-brief on Prime Minister Thatcher's visit.

Q Have the British said where the economic summit will be? Does she host it next year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: She hosts it next year. I don't know whether they have announced the site.

MORE

Q Is it Scotland?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether they have announced it, so I am not sure.

Q Any discussion planned on Third World debt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry?

Q Any discussion planned on the problem of Third World debt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I mentioned, there isn't a set agenda. That could well come up. It's a popular subject in town this week with the Fund and World Bank meetings.

Q Is Northern Ireland on the agenda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There isn't an agenda.

Q You mentioned economic matters. Are there any other economic matters; for example, the steel question? Are there any outstanding disagreements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Steel could come up. That is, the Specialty Steel Decision has been a matter of concern in Europe. If it does, the President will explain his reasons for taking the decision that he did and the way the American Embassy was affected by what had transpired in the last three years and the fact that we have talks under way with the European countries that are affected on how to resolve this situation.

Q Are there any special --

MR. SIMS: I think we've had the last question.

Thank you.

END

(2:53 PM EDT)

Chairman
Dr Henry A. Kissinger

Commission Members
Mr Nicholas F. Brady
Mayor Henry G. Cisneros
Gov William P. Clements Jr
Dr Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro
Mr Wilson S. Johnson
Mr ane Kirkland
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PRESS BRIEFING BY:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman
National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America

10:00 a.m., Thursday, September 29
State Department
Washington, D.C.

2201 C STREET NW. ROOM 1004 WASHINGTON D.C. 20520 TEL. (202) 632-7804

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY

HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1983, 10:00 A.M.

DR. KISSINGER: Hello, ladies and gentlemen.

This isn't going to be a very extended press conference. I just wanted to tell you about the Central American trip the Commission is taking. We are leaving on October 9; we'll be back at midnight on October 15. We're going to start in Panama, go to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and conclude in Nicaragua.

We have talked to all of the ambassadors of the countries concerned, and agreed with them, more or less, on our program and the people we are going to see. Obviously, in a week -- in a day in each country -- we will not become fully expert on every country. We may manage it in one or two of them. (Laughter) But let me tell you how we propose to do this: There were all kinds of sensible plans that I had discussed with you, one of them put forward by Mayor Cisneros, which was that we should split into subgroups, and that there would be only one group that visited all countries, and the others would be visited by subgroups. It was a great theory which foundered on the desire of everybody to go everywhere. On the fact that, retiring as I am, I did not simply want to make assignments of people to countries. So that once everybody expressed a desire to go everywhere, we met their needs.

We are going to organize it as follows: We are reducing protocol functions to a minimum. In fact, of the programs I've seen, there aren't any. We will begin in each country with a session with a governmental briefing by high officials, senior ministers. We will meet with the Head of Government within that context, or separate from it as a group. Then, for the rest of the day, we will break up into smaller groups meeting with counterparts, or meeting with people on special subjects -- economic and social development, political development, security issues and diplomatic issues.

In addition, to the greatest extent possible we will see opposition leaders within the democratic context; we will not see resistance leaders of the guerrillas groups in Salvador while on this trip. We will also see members of the Church hierarchy in each country, and again, wherever possible, private sector groups from the business community and labor. The AFL/CIO has been extremely helpful to us in that connection, as has the American society with respect to the private sector.

As you may know -- or as you will know, anyway -- most of the Commission is going to Miami on Sunday to meet with Latin American labor leaders that are there as guests of the AFL/CIO, and also to meet for lunch with the President of Costa Rica, who is also there as a guest of the AFL/CIO.

I see Herb Hetu, who handles our press relations, is unhappy because he has a release that is going to go out at 4 o'clock this afternoon, which tells you the same thing in more coherent language.

That's all that I have on my mind, and I'll be glad to answer any questions on that subject.

Q You say you will be meeting with the leadership in Nicaragua?

A Yes.

Q When you meet with the leaders, you say, with opposition groups in the democratic context, will you meet with the leaders of the guerrillas in Nicaragua?

A No.

Q Will you meet with the guerrillas on some other trip, because you said "on this trip?"

A I don't exclude that we -- The Commission really hasn't taken a position on that, but we are meeting with Ambassador Stone this Friday, and we will be getting his recommendations on that subject.

I don't exclude that we will get the point of view of the resistance people in some context.

One thing I want to make clear: I keep reading in the newspapers that I'm going to engage in some super-duper negotiation on my own or on behalf of the government. I will not be engaged in the negotiations on Central America. This Commission will write a report. When this report is written, I will withdraw from those activities.

Q Dr. Kissinger, Congressman Henry Gonzalez has called for an investigation of conflict of interest in your role on this Commission because, amongst other things, your fellow Commission counselor and your business partner, William D. Rogers, was an agent of the Sandinista government through 1981, involved in negotiating arms deals for them.

A I don't believe that's true.

Q Well, it happens to be true, and you can look at the Department of Justice papers --

A Who are you?

Q My name is Stan Ezrol. I'm a correspondent for the Executive Intelligence Review.

A But I don't answer questions of the Executive Intelligence Review.

Q The question is, you've just exposed yourself as a hypocrite and liar by sending out --

A (Tumult) audience saying, "Oh, oh, oh."

(Microphones off.)

Q -- it's on the public record.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any possible --

Q Will you engage in further negotiations on arms transfers with the Sandinista government while you're down there?

A You are not accredited to me. You may be accredited to the State Department, but I'll take questions --

If any serious journalist wants to ask the same question, I'll be glad to answer it. I don't take questions from the Executive Intelligence Review.

Q Dr. Kissinger, before you said that you don't exclude the possibility of talking to -- Oh, you said that you were not going to engage in any negotiating aspect during the Central American trip. You're telling us that now, but --

A That's correct.

Q -- if somebody brings it up with you -- Let's say, the Sandinista leaders say, "We want to use you as a back channel, or as a channel," what will you tell them?

A   Obviously, the security and diplomatic aspects of the issue are before the Commission. If the Sandinistas, or any other government, puts to us their ideas of how the issue can be resolved, I will certainly make sure that these ideas get to the appropriate levels of our government.

What I'm saying is, I am not, myself, going to engage in negotiations; and in acting on this, I will certainly feel obliged to report anything that is of use to those who are responsible for negotiations, to the government and I will do that responsibly.

Q   With whom will you be meeting in Managua? Which members of the Directorate or the government have said they would meet with your Commission?

A   I have met with the Nicaraguan Ambassador on several occasions since I took over chairmanship of this Commission. The last time was, I believe, on Monday of this week. He tells me that we will be meeting with the top leadership, both in a larger group and in a smaller group. He has not identified the names of these people, but I'm sure we will have that; and we will then tell the press with whom we have met. There will be no secret meetings.

Q   When you're in Honduras, will you be talking to members of the Contras with the FDN?

A   That is not the present plan, and I don't believe we will. If it should happen, it would be laid on after today. But it is not our plan. We are not dealing -- certainly not on this trip, with the covert side of this, in any regular way except to take note of it and to discuss its relevance. But we don't have to know the operation of details for that.

Q   In Nicaragua, will your agenda include the Sandinistas seeking arms around the world, as they are known to be? Will that be on the agenda there?

A   At this point, the Commission is going to be meeting the rest of this week, and we will be meeting again next week. We have a list of precise questions, but certainly, within the Contadora process, the issue of arms supply into Central America is one of the key topics, and that is a topic that will be discussed in assessing the diplomatic possibilities with all of the countries concerned, and not just with Nicaragua.

Q Is there any possibility that your itinerary as planned now might be expanded to include Cuba or Castro?

A No, absolutely not. Our itinerary that you have is the final itinerary. There will be no departure from it except through an emergency on this trip, and except for the emergencies it's not an escape hatch. There will be no departure from it.

We are planning later in November and in December to visit in smaller groups the Contadora countries; and we plan to visit Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. A number of Commission members and I had lunch yesterday with the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. Another group of Commission members and I are going to meet with the President of Colombia next week, and we have been in close touch with the Mexican Government through their Ambassador and through our Ambassador.

Those are the only other trips that are planned. There are no trips to Cuba planned, and I can't really foresee that this could possibly happen.

Q Do you feel, Dr. Kissinger, that the Commission loses valuable input by not speaking to Fidel Castro or Raoul or someone within the Cuban Government?

A The Cubans certainly are free to submit whatever their views are on a settlement or on any other relevant topic to us and we would take it very seriously, but I don't think for us to meet with Castro is a political action. It's a policy action; it's not a fact-finding action. I mean there's no sense for a group of Americans who have no authority to respond to see Castro just to hear what he has to say. He can send us a message and we would read it seriously.

Q Yet you haven't excluding seeking, say, Eden Pastore or one of the guerrilla leaders, counter-revolutionary leaders, in Honduras. You haven't excluded that.

A Almost certainly not on this trip.

Q Not on this trip, but you haven't excluded it.

A But we haven't excluded either at some point hearing from representatives of the insurgents in Salvador either. But that's a different matter from a formal meeting or an informal meeting with Castro.

Q You're not planning to see the insurgents in El Salvador on this trip?

A No, absolutely not. There will be nothing secret going on on this trip. You will know or we will publish the schedules, the important ones, as soon as they are set. There's an advance team down there now, and there will be no meetings that are not announced.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how useful is a trip like this when 20 or 30 people sit together in a great group and listen to a chief of state? What do you think you are going to get out of it that you don't already know?

A That's a very good question. It's one that we have asked ourselves.

I think what you get out of it is a flavor for the country, a judgment of the personalities, an opportunity to ask questions that have been bothering us and to judge the response, and in the working groups perhaps to enable people to go into more detail on specific questions.

What we have told all the governments with which we have been in touch and will again tell them when we are there is that they are free and welcome and invited to send people for longer meetings with the Commission. And we were back and forth within the Commission on your very question and we finally concluded that with all its shortcomings a brief trip at least would expose us to the atmosphere, to the mood, to the type of people that one is dealing with and give us a chance if we work hard, if we work 12-15 hours a day, of collecting at least a fair amount of information.

There's no doubt though that we will not be complete experts on the countries when we are finished.

Q The inevitable question, Dr. Kissinger: Since you will probably be going on a 747, will you be taking press?

A No, we are going on a DC-9; and it seems to me that the Department is of the view that every last seat must be filled. So there's no danger that anybody will be comfortable (laughter), and we wouldn't dare to take the press on a trip in which they would not be treated to the luxury to which they have been accustomed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, violating, God knows, how many ground rules, but because you are such a national resource on foreign policy --

A I hope you won't quote that. (Laughter.)

Q Could I ask whether you've had time to --

A Or do I have to repeat it so that you (laughter) --

Q Could I ask whether you have had time to look at the Andropov speech and what your impression is of it?

A I'll answer that, and that's the only question on that subject or on any other non-Central American subject I could answer.

I must say before the airplane shootdown I thought we were on a road that would inevitably lead to an easing of the atmosphere to significant agreement, probably in the INF field, and maybe an agreement in principle on START; and I thought there would be a blip when the deployment in Germany started. But that is where I thought we were heading. And the logic of events would still seem to indicate that this is in the interest of both countries, but I am afraid that largely the Soviets conduct since the airplane shootdown has shown such rigidities and such suspicions that I'm beginning to wonder whether we may not get into a prolonged period of cooling relations that it may be harder to break out of than I had originally thought.

Q Do you relate it almost solely to the shootdown of the plane and the Soviet handling of that or do you think --

A I think the Soviet handling of the shootdown exposed rigidities in their system and it showed a predominance of the military that is quite unusual. It has never happened before that Soviet Chiefs of Staff were on international television. And whatever one thought of party, control of the governmental machinery, at least they had a historical perspective and didn't need to settle every issue in any given time period. The military may have a more rigid view.

And then in a post-succession and pre-succession situation, which seems to me to be the case in the Soviet Union -- given the age of the incumbent General-Secretary and the age of the Politburo -- the maneuvering may be so intense that nobody can make the slight adjustments, or adjustments, that are inseparable from a negotiating process.

But I better stop before I get disavowed by everybody in this building. So let's go back to Central America.

Q Back on Central America, do you see a consensus emerging after the first two months of the Commission being in operation, nothwithstanding the divergent views on the Commission?

A As I said to some of you, when I took this assignment I thought it was a suicide mission and I thought the odds of coming to a significant agreement were very low. But I also thought that that was no reason, having had the position I had, to turn it down.

I don't know what conclusions we're going to come to because we haven't reached the point yet of report-writing; but judging the mood of the Commission, I am really very impressed by the genuinely nonpartisan way in which it has been approached and the gravity with which people consider the problem. And I'm optimistic that on major areas we will achieve -- I think unanimity is really less important than bipartisanship. So I believe that we will have a consensus on major areas of the problem.

Diplomatic options, for example, is an area on which we haven't even had testimony yet, so I can't judge what conclusions will emerge on this. But I'm now more optimistic than I was that we can write a thoughtful report that makes some contribution to our thinking.

Q Dr. Kissinger, many of the people emerging from discussions with you have said that they recommended a massive program of aid development and so on. Is it fair to assume that your recommendations will call for such a program?

A We will certainly deal with the economic, social and political development of the area. And one of the interesting aspects that has emerged is that it is an area where relatively small amounts over an extended period of time could make a substantial difference. It is not like the huge debt-crisis countries.

The next problem is it isn't simply an issue of throwing money at the problem. I think everybody agrees that simply adding resources is not even helpful for the economic development alone, but everybody seems to agree that political changes are important.

So the question before us is whether we can come up with ideas that define what we would consider a humane and democratic evolution and how we can relate the aid programs to that process; but I think it is safe to assume that we will make recommendations in the field of sustained economic development, to social development and political development. And, for example, today, we'll spend the better part of the day -- and certainly all of the afternoon -- on the human rights issues.

Q Mr. Secretary, being that you're not going to Cuba, how have you decided to assess Cuba? Are you going to try to take a fresh look at it or call on experts and that sort of thing, or are you going to rely on past experience?

A No. I think there's no way of analyzing our diplomatic options, which is certainly one of our assignments, without talking about it at several levels -- within Salvador, relations to Nicaragua, in relation to Cuba and in relation to the Soviet Union, and the relationship of all of these to each other. Those are the levels that have to be considered.

We will certainly have testimony before the Commission about Cuba and not simply rely on the written record.

Q Thank you.

(At 10:20 a.m., the briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

September 29, 1983

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT MOHAMMED HOSNI MUBARAK OF EGYPT

The Briefing Room

11:08 AM EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We have [redacted] with us who will brief on the visit tomorrow of Mubarak. This will be on background, attributable to Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will make a few comments about the visit of President Mubarak and then take questions.

This is President Mubarak's second visit this year and the third since he assumed office. We believe that these visits are a mark of our special relationship with Egypt.

President Mubarak will be in Washington from the evening of September 29 until the evening of October 3. The principal purpose of President Mubarak's visit to the U.S. was to participate in the United Nations General Assembly. I believe he addressed the Assembly yesterday.

President Reagan invited him to Washington to renew their continuing dialogue on regional and bilateral issues.

In addition to his meeting and lunch with the President, President Mubarak will meet with the Vice President, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Acting Secretary of State, the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce, the U.S. Special Trade Representative, the Administrator of AID, and the House and Senate leadership. Secretary Shultz met with President Mubarak in New York yesterday.

The principal regional issues for discussion will be Lebanon and the Middle East peace process. The U.S. and Egypt share views on what is needed to resolve the problems in Lebanon, beyond the cease-fire: Political reconciliation, support for the central government, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

We would expect the President to express his appreciation to President Mubarak for Egypt's support of Ambassador McFarlane's efforts in Lebanon. The Egyptians have been quite visible in envoys who are being sent back and forth as well as their public statements. And they will exchange views on the situation there as we look to the future.

On the peace process, the Egyptians support Camp David, of course, which they are one of the originators, and the President's initiative of September 1. They will undoubtedly discuss these issues: The need to look beyond the current Lebanese problems to the broader problems of peace and stability in the area and discuss the Palestinian problem in that context. Obviously, the President will

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note the importance of Egyptian-Israeli relations in the peace process and will undoubtedly indicate our continuing desire and willingness to help each state take steps to improve that relationship.

Bilateral issues will also be discussed, as well as other regional issues. I am sure we'll discuss the Iran-Iraq war, problems of North Africa. Bilateral issues we will discuss are aid programs and military cooperation.

Let me leave it at that and take your questions.

Q Are there concerns by the U.S. Government about Egypt's purchase of weaponry from the Soviet bloc countries; Romania, for example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not concerns. These are decisions to be made by sovereign countries. Egypt has made clear that it looks to the United States as the primary supplier for replacing those, not one for one, but replacing the obsolescent Soviet equipment in its inventory and modernizing its armed forces.

Q The U.S. Government has no problems with sales?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not really a U.S. Government issue. If the Egyptians are interested in purchasing arms from a country, I suppose they will.

Q Yes, but if we are giving them a great many credits and aid, et cetera, and they are using that particular financing to buy weapons from East Bloc countries --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL~~S~~: Well, they are not doing that. All of our financing really is tied to U.S. procurement. We have I think a five-year program we have agreed to with the Egyptians. We are not now and do not expect in the future to be the exclusive source of arms, although the Egyptians have made clear they would like us to be their primary source of arms. I believe they also have some purchases from France and other places.

Q You said they will be discussing the Iran-Iraq war. I am wondering if you can tell us how seriously we are taking the threat from Iran to close down the Persian Gulf if, in fact, Iraq gets those jets from the French and whether Mubarak is going to help us out in that, and just your general assessment of the situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This was addressed, I believe, yesterday, over in the State Department, and I will comment on this in the context of the visit. We have made clear publicly, most recently yesterday, our support for the freedom of passage of nonbeligerent vessels in the Gulf and into the Straits of Hormuz. Anything that threatens that situation obviously we would be opposed to, as well as the Japanese, the Western Europeans, and of course the Gulf countries themselves. We will be discussing these issues with President Mubarak. The Egyptians share our concern that the war not go on interminably because of the dangers of escalation and the unpredictability.

Q Have we transmitted this view to Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I refer you to my hearings of about a year and a half ago before two House committees. That was all on this.

Q Anything more recent than that?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, of course.

Q You have transmitted your views to Iran?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Helen, yesterday we addressed this, publicly.

Q In a State Department briefing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. But beyond that, the Secretary has made public statements. If you are interested on the background on public statements, we can get them through the State Department Press Office. There are no secrets as to our views on it.

Q Is the Administration at this point eager to push Mubarak toward restoring better relations towards Israel, such as sending back the ambassador and that sort of thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I said in my opening remarks, as the good fathers of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, we believe we have a special and continuing responsibility for seeing to it that the relationship between these two good friends of the United States is as good as possible. With respect to the Egyptian ambassador, our view on that is simple: The sooner he goes back, the better. Again, our view here is well known.

As far as the question of relations, I don't want to get into picking sides on this because both sides can make a very effective case on blaming the other side for problems. However, I don't think that we should lose sight of the essential fact. The Israeli-Egyptian Treaty is in place and being respected. The Sinai Peacekeeping Force is operating effectively. There have been nickel and dime types of complaints from both sides. And the Treaty withstood a significant strain. We have been into this before over events in Lebanon. So I just ask that everyone keep in perspective the fact that we have a treaty. It is a treaty which continues to form the basis of this country's peace and security policies in that area. And it is one on which we are seeking to build.

Q Since it is a principal subject of the discussions tomorrow, perhaps you could tell us what is the current U.S. position on peacekeeping, cease-fire observers in Lebanon? Secretary Shultz was pushing the idea of U.N. observers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I am not going to get into this because Dick Fairbanks is addressing all of this later on in the State Department, I understand, and here.

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is 4:15 here today.

Q Thanks for telling us.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So let's leave this.

Q He is going to brief us on that?

MR. ROUSSEL: Well, that is a thing for columnists.

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Q What about the rest of us?

MR. ROUSSEL: It's not for here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: 2:30 at the State Department.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a 2:30 at State.

Q Does the Middle East peace plan and the fate of the Palestinians rest on peace at some point in the future, in Lebanon, or is the qeustion of the settlements on the West Bank and so forth just all being put on the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be a lot of issues that are interrelated. The Lebanese situation, obviously, has consumed a lot of time and energy because of the potential of the problems of Lebanon not only consuming Lebanon but perhaps its neighbors as well. I don't see where you need have a total new look in Lebanon to be able to move on otherwise in the peace process. But the fact of the matter is that when so many of the key governments concerned are spending all of their time and energy with respect to the Middle East, focusing in on putting fires out in Lebanon, such things as the broader questions of peace and stability, the peace process, are put on the back burner. That is a practical issue.

Q Since the Camp David process seems to be for all intents and purposes dead — as long as we are on background -- will the President be proposing any concrete ideas to revive it or does he expect any from President Mubarak?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, dead, I won't agree with that. Certainly at rest, yes. (Laughter)

Q Permanently?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, permanently is a long time. Before you form any judgments on this, spend a little time in background on the last 30 years. The Presidents will be discussing the current situation. They will be discussing what are the options available, try to encourage Palestinians as well as Jordanians to engage in negotiations with Israel in the near future.

Now we have a lot of problems. I don't want to raise any expectations. That is not the point. But the people immediately concerned out in that area are not happy that the peace process is on the back burner. This is their future, their lives.

Q How do you know they are not happy with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talked to them, Helen.

Q Which ones?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All of them.

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Q You are saying the Palestinians aren't happy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying lots -- the people out there are not happy with the status of things. The Palestinians aren't happy. The Jordanians aren't happy.

Q Did you talk to the Palestinians? Are you saying that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure.

Q The PLO as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. (Laughter)

Q Do you expect the two Presidents to talk about any further American weapons going to Egypt or new bases we might get over there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't have bases.

Q Their bases. We don't have our name on them, though.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they are not bases at all. What we have is the Egyptians, through our strategic relationship, shared goals, allowing us to use their facilities on a case-by-case basis under the terms of the agreements which were entered into with President Sudat and reiterated by the Mubarak government. That includes such things as Ras Banas. They will probably talk about that. The Egyptians and we are in the process of a joint funding of a modest facility on the Red Sea which would, if it goes through -- and we hope it does, because it's important to CENTCOM, and, we think, to the credibility of the American deterrent in that area, whereby we would jointly finance construction of some facilities.

Q Do you think we need any more facilities than we already have, or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we need anything else in Egypt. We have, as you know, a number of agreements with countries in the area where we have access on an emergency basis.

Q Do you like your new job?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll let you know when I get there. I'm anticipating that.

Q When do you leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About a month, month and a half.

Q Is there any reason to believe greater progress might be made with the new Israeli government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Greater progress towards peace, the peace process?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we will have to wait and see until that government gets into office.

Q Do you anticipate that will be a subject of discussion with Mubarak?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they are going to talk about all kinds of things. They are not strangers. I'm sure they'll talk about this. How about one more question?

Q Could you talk more about North Africa? In the practical sense, what can the two Presidents discuss with respect to Libya and the current situation in Chad, and what can they do about it, and where do they fit into all this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Egypt fits into the Libyan equation because it's there, and its relationship with the Sudan. And I'm sure you are aware that the Egyptians have cooperated with us in a couple of important exercises that were relevant to the situation in Chad. So there are things to talk about.

Q Thank you.

Q Specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to tell you specifically what they are going to talk about because that's what the two Presidents are going to talk about.

END (11:26 A.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

The Briefing Room

September 29, 1983

1:58 P.M. EDT

MR. SIMS: This briefing is on background, attributable to a Senior Administration Official, who is [redacted].

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can be pretty brief because I thought that the President and the Prime Minister in their statements just outside went through the agenda that they covered this morning.

Just a few words, before I get to that, about the other people Mrs. Thatcher has seen this morning so you can put that in context. She was on Capitol Hill with the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning; met with Paul Volcker and with Secretary Regan, where she obviously addressed economic issues in the main. And then in a private meeting with the President, the two touched on the subjects that were mentioned: East-West relations, policy towards the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the airliner incident, where there was agreement in both British and American policy that had been in place prior to the airline incident. That is a fairly firm policy, one that emphasized the maintenance of a military balance, and alliance cohesion was in a sense vindicated by the airliner incident. As the Prime Minister pointed out, following the airliner incident, we have a willingness to continue to negotiate, but at the same time maintenance of Western strength. There was a discussion of the arms control negotiations. As I said, they both agreed on the need to continue the negotiations. And on a specific negotiating point, there was some discussion of the inclusion of British and French forces in the Geneva negotiations, the INF talks, or the START negotiations. She made a very forceful case against the inclusion of those forces, one key argument being that if British and French forces were included in any U. S.-Soviet agreement, that the result would be less than equality or parity for the United States. She argued this would not be in the interest of the West as a whole.

This is an argument that, as you know, we strongly agree with. And as Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Minister, stated publicly at the United Nations General Assembly yesterday, and Mrs. Thatcher made the point today, the British have not said that they will never include their nuclear forces in arms control negotiations. But Mrs. Thatcher made the point that British forces make up about two-and-a-half percent of existing Soviet nuclear capability and that following a U.S.-Soviet strategic arms agreement, which those forces were significantly reduced, that the British would take a look at the option for addressing their forces in an arms control format.

There was extensive discussion of the Middle East, first on Lebanon, where there was agreement on the need for the four multinational force countries -- the United States, Britain, France, and Italy -- to stick together, maintain their presence in Lebanon,

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both militarily and politically, stabilize the situation there. And their conversation broadened to discuss the broader Middle East peace process, both agreeing that the situation in Lebanon can be stabilized, that we need to begin working on the peace process.

There was discussion both, as I pointed out, earlier this morning with Volcker and Secretary Regan, as well as at lunch, on the world economy, the international debt problem, interest rates, the U. S. recovery. And I would just say in passing that the Secretary of State and the British Foreign Minister were also able to meet this morning and addressed another list of problems, including Central America, Mrs. Thatcher pointed out Belize, Southern Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique. And the problem of Polish debt rescheduling.

I would be happy to answer your questions.

Q What about this arms to Argentina? Are we selling Argentina military supplies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not.

Q What was that reference to in her address out here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: She has said publicly, the British have said that they do not want Western countries to sell arms to Argentina.

Q Did she have a point in raising it here, in telling us she had made her views known about arms to Argentina?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What are you asking me? Did she say it publicly? She obviously did.

Q In her departure statement, she made a point of saying she had made her views known here, in this visit, I suppose, since that is what she was reporting on, about arms to Argentina. I was wondering why, if, as you say, we are not selling --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I answered that question. The British government does not want Western countries to sell arms to Argentina.

Q Are we considering it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are no imminent plans to sell arms to Argentina.

Q Who raised the point about including the British and French missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one made the point about including them. The point was made about excluding them, and I believe it was Mrs. Thatcher.

Q Is our country not reading the Andropov statement as a rejection of the President's proposal? I mean we seem to say we are at the table, we want them to talk seriously. Maybe I will put it as a more open question. How are we reading that statement in terms of the President's arms control proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the statement speaks for itself. We are not going to take this as the final word. It's obviously in the Soviet propaganda interests to publicly turn down these --

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Q He didn't mean it as a final statement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- these statements. I don't know what he meant, but we are in Geneva. We are negotiating seriously. These are serious negotiating initiatives. And we hope the Soviets treat them with the seriousness they deserve.

Q It's in their propaganda interests to what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To publicly belittle these initiatives.

Q But do we have an indication from the talks that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't want to discuss the negotiations. They are confidential.

Q Earlier today we were asking about what the Vice President said. Larry came up with the statement that he talked about we've taken note of statements by the British and French Governments, as well as the Japanese Government, indicating at some future time, et cetera, et cetera. Where are these statements? He mentioned one yesterday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a speech by the President of France yesterday at the U.N. General Assembly. There was also a speech by the British Foreign Minister that I just alluded to at the General Assembly. And I think that --

Q So these statements happened yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. But these are not new positions.

Q They are not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. They go back as far as, I think, three, four, five months ago, where at least the British were saying that if the United States and the Soviet Union could make significant progress in reducing their strategic arsenals, that they would be prepared to consider proper venue for discussions on their forces.

Q So, in other words, we would have to strike a deal with the Soviets first on our own forces before they would consider including --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, some of these questions are better directed towards the British. You are asking me to describe British policy. But Mrs. Thatcher pointed out that two-and-a-half percent -- of the Soviet total, the British total only accounts for about two-and-a-half percent, that it's a very small force, and that it is not in Great Britain's national security interest to enter into those negotiations until the forces of the Soviet Union were substantially reduced. It just wouldn't be fair.

Q But we would go along with that British position, is that right?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not believe that British forces should be included in either the INF or START negotiations.

Q Was there any mention by Mrs. Thatcher as to what steps the President should take to reduce the U.S. interest rates which she says affect negatively on the world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. She wasn't offering us specific economic advice. She made clear, like many Europeans have made clear, that they're concerned over high interest rates.

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Q Did the President give her any assurances these interest rates were going to come down this year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was discussion by the President as well as the Secretary of the Treasury on the economic plans of the Administration and the expectation that they will come down.

Q Did Secretary Regan again express to her his opinion that there is no demonstrable one-on-one relationship between high budget deficits and the rising interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was discussion of interest rates and deficits. I wouldn't put it exactly the way you put it.

Q How would you put it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to put it any more specifically than how I put it.

Q In view of the Andropov statement and the hard rhetoric we have expressed over the past few weeks toward the Soviets, realistically is there a climate in which we can go ahead and make progress in arms controls?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If we can't make progress in arms control, it should be clear it's the fault of the Soviet Union. They're the ones that are taking a very negative tack. They're the ones that are publicly rejecting substantive initiatives on the part of the United States. We're the ones in the aftermath of the airliner episode that are keeping those negotiations open and we're coming forward with new ideas. Now we hope there will be progress.

Q Do you think the level of rhetoric will begin to tone down a little bit, at least on our side, now that the Korean airliner thing is the way of the wind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have to tell you I have been up in New York all week at the General Assembly and listened to a lot of response from other countries to the President's speech at the General Assembly, and you talk about the level of rhetoric, most people were struck by the moderate tone of the President's remarks. So I don't accept the assumption upon which your question is based.

Q Did the Vice President's speech of yesterday come up in the context of the British and French forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I am aware of. One more.

Q On Belize, did the President request that British forces remain in Belize?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject of Belize came up. We have said publicly we hope that British presence remains as long as possible. I just really don't want to go beyond that. That's the last question. Thank you.

END

(2:09 PM EDT)

Medulla

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1983, 2:32 P.M.

MODERATOR: Good afternoon. This is a BACKGROUND briefing on Lebanon. For your information and not for publication, the briefer is . . ., who can be referred to as a Senior Administration Official; and I think he may have a couple of comments for you and then take your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRTION OFFICIAL: I thought I would dispense with any opening comments. I just wanted to make clear that, obviously, I have just come back from Beirut and I know a little bit more, hopefully, about what was going on out there than back here; so I am not an expert on the dynamics of the War Powers Compromise, et cetera, but I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Without some kind of neutral cease-fire observer corps going in, what is the fate of the cease-fire?

A Th fate of the cease-fire is that it is still holding pretty well. I just talked to Ambassador McFarlane an hour or so ago. We are still working urgently on getting the neutral observers called for in the agreement to go in as the first stage of the cease-fire. But the thing that makes the cease-fire hold, first and foremost, is the will of the parties, and so far it appears to be the will of all concerned to try to make this work.

Q Then how important is the deployment of the neutral force, the cease-fire observers?

A Obviously, the agreement itself contemplates the deployment of cease-fire observers. We would like to get them in there with all possible and, as I said before, we are continuing to work on that as an urgent matter.

Q Well, if the Syrians have turned aside the UN Observer Force, what are the possible alternatives, based on the dynamics of the negotiations leading to a cease-fire?

A I don't think we accept that the Syrians have necessarily turned off all UN activities as the cease-fire observers at this stage. As I understand it, both our MNF partners and the Secretary of State and Ambassador Murphy and I will be talking to the Foreign Minister of Syria tomorrow; and we are all trying to reach a situation where we can get an agreed group of responsible cease-fire observers. Whether those are UN or something else, time will tell.

Q But that's the question. What are the alternatives, if they're not the UN?

A There are alternatives. I'd rather not speculate about them, even on BACKGROUND, because until it goes in I don't want to prejudice any ideas we might have.

Q But there are other alternatives?

A There are other alternatives, certainly.

Q Do you accept that the mutual observers might be pulled out of UNIFIL in the south but they will be placed under their country titles rather than under the UN umbrella title?

A That sounds like the same question I said I really didn't want to answer. There are alternatives to UN observers, but I'm not going to speculate with particularity.

Q You were out there. With this static that's coming from Iran, is that a serious thing in sort of, you know, stirring up the Shiites there or is it something that's just mischievous? Was it a problem or was it just an irritant?

A As that gewntleman can testify -- he's sitting in the back row over there; he was there was -- from the time certainly when the airport closed in Beirut -- which is now four or five weeks ago, I guess -- we were not very good lightning posts for what was happening in the rest of the world, even the rest of the Middle East, because we weren't getting outside newspapers and we were doing lots of meetings and writing cvables and things like that. So I don't have a very good feeling for what Iran has been saying and the status of the Iran-Iraq war, et cetera. As far as what we felt on the ground in Beirut -- not very much having to do directly with Iran.

Q Could you discuss the importance of the MNF staying there -- I mean what role they should play? The Syrians and the Soviets seem to be making a major effor to at least persuade people that the MNF should leave promptly.

A Obviously, we are not trying to keep the MNF there as a device. The multinational forces are there at the request of the legitimate Government of Lebanon and their role, at least with regard to the United States, is defined in the exchange of letters between our Ambassador to Lebanon and the Foreign Minister of Lebanon in September of

1982; and we are not going to be ordered out by Syrians, but we are certainly not going to stay any longer than our presence is desired by the legitimate Government of Lebanon itself.

Q Well, how long do you think that would be?

A I don't know. The Congressional action now taking place will set some kind of an initial time period. It is not an absolute time period. But I think that there is agreement in the United States as between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch that the job which we are doing over there is not finished, that we have made I think a crucially important first step in achieving the cease-fire, that we are still dedicated to the policy propositions we have laid out for Lebanon, and that the multinational force has an important stabilizing role -- at least, so the government there believes -- and we will keep them there so long as that is necessary and is desired by the Government and is the decision of the President.

Q Do you have a feeling that the cease-fire was achieved because of the Aemrican military involvement? Do you think it was necessary to bring about the cease-fire? And I'm just trying to see if in the future there was a need? It would be relevant -- what you tell us now.

A The only American military involvement during the fighting in Lebanon was in defense of U.S. personnel, and so I don't think that the Aemrican firepower was the reason we had a cease-fire. But I do believe that the multinational force presence, and in particular the resolve demonstrated by the United States, was important in indicating to everyone that the credibility of the continued support of the multinational force partners in particular and the Western World in general for an independent, sovereign Lebanon was an important signal to be sent.

The cease-fire, in my judgment, woudl never come into effect until all of the parties decided it was in their interest. And I think that while some might have considered that gains on the ground were possible, there came a time when they had to trade off any possible gains on the ground for what their losses were, for the fact that the troops who had been involved in the fighting were retired, and for the possibility that the goals in the futue could be achieved as well -- if not better -- through political mechanisms. And I think the altter point is really key to understanding what is happening out there.

What I find the most encouraging sign to be is that the various parties to the dispute, both within Lebanon and without, appear to have decided that political and diplomatic methods are now to be preferred; and that is something that we strongly encourage.

Q If that's really the case, do you think that the serious goal is in fact to topple Gemayel and to really alter the shape of the Lebanese Government in a significant way? So aren't we then being a party to allowing him to gain that at the bargaining table instead of on the ground?

A I don't know what uyltimate Syrian goals are. I know what the parties tell us in th course of negotriations, and I think all parties have made it clear that they accept the legitimacy of President Gemayel -- and not as an individual; as the one who has emerged from the constitutional process of Lebanon -- that that is a legitimate government, it is a legitimate process, and that is respected by all parties. And, obviously, we strongly support that as well.

As the Lebanese move forward in political dialogue, whatever emerges -- that is, in accordance with the desires of the people of Lebanon -- and this within their legitimate system of laws and constitutional authority -- is something that we will respect.

Q Fritz Mondale said recently, and even today, that he thinks that Syria will withdraw from Lebanon if Israel withdrew and after Lebanon gets its reconciliation together. Do you agree with that analysis, and is the focus now going to be on the Israeli withdrawal and the national reconciliation of Lebanon? Do you have --

A I think the focus, once we get the pieces of the cease-fire firmly put in place, will clearly and properly be on the removal of all foreign forces. And I might say that you could turn the proposition that you have quoted of Fritz Mondale's on its head and say that I'm sure that Israel would withdraw if Syria and the PLO withdrew.

Q Let me just back-track. Prior to the outbreak of fighting in late August, the effort was to try to get the Syrians to agree to some formula for getting out, so that the Israelis would withdraw, also. And that, of course, was put aside as you tried to stop the fighting, but the Syrians up to that point had made it very clear in very strong terms that they would not agree to anything so long as the Israeli-Lebanese agreement was still viable.

Is there any thought of rewriting that, or going back on that agreement?

A We have an agreement, the May 17th agreement, by which Israel is pledged to leave all of Lebanon within an eight- to twelve-week period, and I think that is an important achievement, and I think that one of the officials of the Lebanese Government kind of put his finger on it when he said that in the political reconciliation meetings in intra-Lebanese fora, the question would be presented to critics from outside the government; that when you attack that agreement, you have to have something positive to put in its place; and if you don't like that agreement, how are you, Mr. Critic, going to achieve the removal of foreign forces. And that is the question. The question is, how to achieve it.

We have means of one party's having agreed to removed itself entirely from Lebanon, and I think that is something to build from, not to throw out. But the goal is what we are after.

Q If I could come back to the question of the neutral observers, do you foresee any possible role for an American role in that structure?

A Let's be clear. Under the agreement, there are three points in the agreement. The first point is a cease-fire on all axes and throughout Lebanon, and that is the one which calls for neutral observers to police the lines of fire.

In addition, point two of the agreement, which talks of convening of parties to the dispute in the mountain areas -- which has already met, now, of course -- that is, the government, the army, the Amal, the Lebanese forces, and the National Salvation Front -- that group is to address the question of -- I'm sorry, the Druze, not the National Salavation Front -- that party is to address security arrangements for the Shuf, which also might involve some kind of international presence.

So, I tend to hear some kind of loose talk eliding those two. I presume you are talking solely of the first kind.

Q Yes.

A Again, the question of whether Americans forces, per se, would be involved in that role. Now, if we do use United Nations Treaty observers, there are Americans in that delegation, and if that were the method chosen for cease-fire observers, then there would be Americans, but they would not be there as Americans wearing American uniforms.

Q Just normally, actually, officials also mentioned the term "entirely", "Israeli forces entirely to be moved out of Lebanon."

Can you refresh my mind as to where really is it mentioned that Israeli forces would entirely leave Lebanon? I understand that the Syrian objection is precisely because the agreement does not call for the entire removal, or the entire Israeli forces from South Lebanon, from Lebanon.

A I spent, I guess, twenty hours with Foreign Minister Khaddam and various of his cohorts in the Government of Syria, discussing the legal interstices of the May 17th agreement, and at the end of the day, I think it is clear to anyone who objectively reads the May 17th agreement, that it does call for the removal of all Israeli forces. There are no residual Israeli forces called for under that agreement, and the only Israelis who would be on the ground at all in an interim role after the full withdrawal of Israeli forces would be a few members of the Israeli Defense Force armed with side weapons under the command of Lebanese officers to assure that the security arrangements were in fact in place, and there would be no more than a couple dozen at any time.

That is certainly not an Israeli force, and in my view is not a residual presence.

Q Once you get the neutral observer issue established, could you go over, just briefly, what other steps would then follow leading to a national reconciliation in the new government and an open withdrawal of foreign forces?

A The cease-fire agreement, as approved by all the parties, as I said, has three basic elements, and the first is the institution of a cease-fire throughout the country, and there is the question of what observers are brought in to do that. Then the non-combatants would be allowed to move through-out the country freely to return to their homes, and relief operations would continue unimpeded.

The second point in the agreement is, as I mentioned, the convening of the military committee to discuss security arrangements in the mountain areas.

The third major point in the agreement is the calling together of a national political dialogue among the national salvation front, the Amal, the Lebanese forces, certain identified elder statesmen, if you will, of Lebanon, and chaired by the President of Lebanon, who would bring with him a delegation from the Government. That would address the broader questions of the political future of Lebanon. They would be joined by representatives of Syria and Saudi Arabia in that conclave.

So, you have the near-term cease-fire, you have nearer-term -- middle-term, if you will -- military arrangements for the area where most of the fighting raged, and then you have a broad political dialogue to hopefully set the course for the country in the future.

Now, I wouldn't think that the question of focussing on removal of foreign forces must await the conclusion of all of those three efforts that have been begun by the cease-fire agreement, and I would hope that we can consider the question of removal of foreign forces concurrently with maybe points two and three of that agreement.

Q There is one point which is not clear to us here. Probably you can enlighten us on it.

The question of national dialogue, will it be carried out separately by calling all the partners to negotiate either in or out of Lebanon with inviting Syria and Saudi Arabia as observers? Or can it be as some in the Lebanese Government are interpreting it? They can form a national coalition government of all the various partners and the effective leaders of these partners, and discuss the national reconciliation within the scope, the framework, of the Lebanese Government, that way circumventing Syrian presence.

Now, your interpretation of it, would that be acceptable to the U.S. first, and, second, wouldn't that create another Syrian veto again, their being kept out?

A The cease-fire agreement, announced by the President of Lebanon, says specifically that the President of the Republic calls an urgent and comprehensive meeting to begin the national dialogue immediately. The meeting brings together -- and it lists those people. Then it says, "The President is pleased to welcome the attendance of a delegate from paternal Saudi Arabia and from paternal Syria.

Q Is there an agreement where they are going to meet?

A The question of the place of meeting for this group is still an open question which is being addressed by the parties. But to answer your question, this is an agreement to which the President of Lebanon has put him stamp, and I would think that the question of the formation of a new government of Lebanon may be considered in the context of this meeting, it may be considered separately, but I don't think it would be simply a substitute for this agreement. I would think that they would have to go forward with at least a meeting or two to have this political dialogue to which they have agreed.

Now, on the broader question, it has been made clear to us by the government of Lebanon that President Gemayel is very serious about reaching out as broadly as possible, both to energize a real searching debate among the Lebanese body politic about how the future is to be structured, power-shring, et cetera, looking broadly at how that is going to be done, as well as to reach out and broaden his cabinet and his government to be as reflective as possible of views across political and confessional lines within the country.

(MORE)

Q Mr. Ambassador, how far do you think Gemayel s willing to go? And assuming that he is very conciilatory, what is your estimate of how far his father and other members of the Phalange side are willing to let him go?

A I think the President is very much an independent actor. I don't think that he is a creature of his own background. I don't think that he views his role as President of Lebanon simply as a representative of the Phalange. I think he has a very broad view of how Lebanon must function in the future as the complex state it is. I think he is very realistic about it, and I think that that is one reason why he has received support from across communal lines, because they see him as a man who is seeking a broad vision for the future of his country.

And United States support, as we have made it clear, is not for just a Christian government or a Maronite government or a Phalange government; it is for a government truly representative of all of Lebanon.

Q Mr. Ambassador, how come we are faced now with a problem of who the neutral observers might be? ldn't that have been part of the negotiatins? It seems rising that having achieved the ceasefire, it would have been an element that would have beden under discussion. For there to be a sudden problem now is something of a puzzle. I wonder if you can deal with that, please?

A Well, the most important thing that we were dealing with was that there were many people dying; there was a very dangerous situation; it was very difficult to live in Beirut, as I can attest, for those many weeks; and the primary desire was to get the fighting stopped and to get political conversations going. And the question of who those neutral observers would be was something that arose late in the game as a potential stumbling block. And rather than wait two or three days or a week or some indefinite period to wrestle that question to the ground prior to achieving a ceasefire, we thought that it was certainly much better to go ahead and get the killing stopped; and to talk about that and other remaining open issues in a period when at least the guns were no longer firing and people weren't falling over with mortal wounds.

Q To just follow up, during that time when the issue came up and the focus was on getting the killing stopped, as you cay, what were the Syrians defining or offering as their definition of what a neutral observer r t be? Had they, in those private talks, already ruled o the UN?

A I don't recall the exact sequence. Things were fairly hectic there towards the end, as you can imagine. I think the first that I heard a problem with the UN was cast by the Syrians in terms of not wanting to have a permanent UN partition of the country ala Cyprus or something like that. And in their mind the UN had the connotation of permanence.

Now, we of course have no problems with that because the last thing that we would want, in terms of policy, is the partition of Lebanon because we are for, as you konw, the territorial integrity and sovereignity throughout the territory. And so we have been trying to work with the Syrians and work with others who are also in touch with the Syrians to indicate that there is no question in our mind as to permanence.

And then we have had the question of certain elements of the UN forces not being neutral: either, broadly construed, the Gang of Four in the multinational force, or Americans and French because of military or air bombardments during the fighting, etc. And we don't agree and will not ever accept the position that the UN force or our or the French or the Italian or anybody else's contribution to it would not be neutral because, obviously, the position that we have been taking in Lebanon we do not believe to be partisan.

Q Mr. Ambassador, reading the testimony made by the officials of this Administration --

A Reading the what? I am sorry.

Q Reading the testimony --

A The testimony?

Q -- the testimony in front of the different committees of the Congress during the last seven or ten days gives the impression that Egypt and Jordan played a part in the developments in Lebanon which may be equal to the part played by the Saudis. Do you have any comment on that?

A Well, you have me at a disadvantage because I haven't been in town over the last seven to ten days and I haven't gone back and read the testimony of various Administration officials. But I will say that during the course of the last two and one-half months when Ambassador McFarlane and I hae been jetting around the Middle East, we have certainly been both to Egypt and to Jordan, and I think it is clearly true that both officials of the Egyptian government -- I believe it is true, I should say -- that officials of the Egyptian Government and officials of the Ishmaelite Kingdom of Jordan have been in touch with the Syrians; and, from what they have told us, I would think that those moves by those two governments would have been helpful in reenforcing the kinds of positions that we were taking, the Saudis were taking, and others who wanted to see an end to the fighting and a beginning of a political dialogue instead.

So, certainly we were not trying to be exclusive, and we encouraged everyone to do what they could to bring the same message to bear on all the partites.

Q Is there any idea that they participate -- I mean Egypt and Jordan -- in sort of a peace-keeping force in Lebanon, a Middle East peace-keeping force in Lebanon?

A I have not heard serious consideration of that. There have been a couple of casual comments but nothing that anyone has focused on with great specificity.

Q -- under Point Two?

A It is not anything that is even mentioned in the agreement itself as the final draft emerged. In earlier drafts of the agreement there was specific mention of some kind of an international presence, but now it is left to the discussions among those Lebanese parties. Whatever those parties deem to be necessary and appropriate, they would then have to come or the Government would have to come and say that this group has decided that it wants international help from X, Y, or Z.

Q In these recent discussions that you had with the Syrians did the future of the Golan Heights come up?

A As I recall, the only time it came up was in an initial conversation when we stated the overview of the United States position in the Middle East. We have never had, to my knowledge, a detailed and specific conversation with the Syrians on this subject during this mission.

MODERATOR: I think we will probably have time for about two more.

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MODERATOR: I think we will probably have time for about two more.

Q Mr. Ambassador, what about the Palestinian fighters who have been up in the Shuf fighting? People here made a great deal aout them being up there fighting as proxies for the Syrians. They are obviously not participants in any of this political settlement. What happens to them? Who polices them? Who controls them? And how aware are you that they will just be tempted to wreck the whole thing?

A Well, as far as who polices and controls them, in the near term the ceasefire observers would hopefully report any ceasefire violations by anyone, whether they are one of the named parties in the agreement or anyone else who is out there stirring up trouble.

The policing function, I think it is fairly clear that the PLO can act only with the acquiescence of those from whose territory they operate, whether it is the sovereign territory of Syria or the parts of Lebanon under Syrian occupation. And I think that the potential for them causing trouble or causing the ceasefire to break down would not be a testimony to the independence of their character and abilities, but rather the fact that someone else would have had to at least given the green light in order for them to perform that role.

Q You are counting on Syria to make sure that the Palestinians do not misbehave?

A I think I will just leave it there.

MODERATOR: Thank you.

A We have one gentleman back here, and to be fair --

Q What do you think the chances are of the various private militas -- the Lebanese forces, the Amal, and Morbatone (?) and Druze being disarmed?

A Well, I think the first order of business, as far as disarming the militas, wil be under this Group No. 2 of the agreement that we mentioned in the mountain aras, and that specifially is certain elements of Amal and the PSP Druze militia and the Lebanese forces Christian militia. And from there, the disarming of the rest is obviously a high item on the agenda of the Government of Lebanon, but I would think that would be part of the overall political reconciliation of the country.

Thank you.

Excuse me. One more.

Q Has there been any communiction, direct or indirect, by our government with the Soviets in terms of the Lebanese situation and the ceasefire?

(Briefing concluded at 3:02 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON LEBANON

The Roosevelt Room

September 29, 1983

4:18 P.M. EDT

MS. SMALL: I just wanted to thank you all for coming. I want to thank you all for coming. I want to apologize for earlier having to change the time, but this happens to us a lot. We have to sort of go with the flow of people's schedules. Anyway, this will be a session on background with comments attributed to an Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the State Department I was a High Administration official. At the White House, I am a Low Administration Official.

MS. SMALL: High Administration Official, okay.

[redacted], why don't you fill us in for a few minutes, give us some comments, and we will open it up to questions. As you can see, we are making a transcript, but since it's late in the day, I think it would be most convenient for the stenos to type that up later on tonight and we'll have it for you the first thing in the morning in Room 45, with a list, if you all want to pick it up.

It's all yours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. We have with us today -- I am [redacted], not Bud McFarlane, for those of you who are severely disappointed. Bud, of course, is still in Beirut. We also have with us [redacted], both of whom were part of our mission at various times, although not at the most exciting times.

I have just come from doing a similar session with the State Department Press Corps, and I found it more efficient, rather than to make some long or even short opening remarks, to just respond to your questions. I will add, since I have only been back from Lebanon for about 40 hours, I am not very up-to-date on the domestic political side of things. I noticed what the vote was. But I would be in a better position to address the questions about what is happening there. With that, I will turn it over to you.

Q Was the offer of the Lebanese Cabinet to resign part of the cease-fire deal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was not. Although I notice that everyone took that in the way in which Ambassador McFarlane has assured me it was intended, and that was a gesture of the bona fides of President Gemayel to show that he is

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really concerned and honestly seeking a wider, broader-based, stronger government. And so I think it's a constructive move if taken in that context. But it was not part of either the language of the agreement itself or any side understanding.

Q What have we promised the Syrians in the way of their role in Lebanon, and the role of our attitude towards other subjects of interest, like the role on the Palestinian question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had general conversations during the course of our travels out there over the last couple of months with the Syrians in which we laid out the bases of American policy in the Middle East; publicly, most specifically, the President's September 1 statement of last year.

With regard to Lebanon itself, we have only said that we recognize the historic and practical reality that they have legitimate interests in what goes on in Lebanon. And we have made no private understandings, agreements, nods, winks or shakes of the head to them in addition to that.

Q What do we mean by their legitimate interests in Lebanon? What are those?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have not defined them further than that phrase, rather Delphic though it may be.

Q Do we have in mind a confessional reapportionment that would seem workable, or does anybody?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We are certainly not -- having spent now two months in Lebanon, I am fully apprised of the fact that I am about as far away from an expert on the interstices of Lebanon policy as exists. In addition, I don't know anyone in our government who would claim to be an authority on that subject because it clearly is one of the most complex of any country I have seen. Therefore, we don't see our role as telling the Lebanese, or making deals with non-Lebanese or whatever, as to a particular confessional balance in their Cabinet. And I would expect that the power sharing that they work their way through to be one of the major topics of conversation at this political conciliation enclave that was created under the terms of the agreement.

Q Were there agreement and were there reapportionment that was satisfactory to all the players, all the Lebanese, would Assad then cooperate with us, with them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the fact that all parties agreed to move from the battlefield to the realm of political conversation and negotiation speaks better for Syrian intentions and the intentions of all parties than anything else. And so I cannot tell you what is going on inside the mind of President Assad, but I think we are all encouraged by the fact that the cease-fire both went into effect and has been holding reasonably well, even though we don't yet have the cease-fire observers on the scene.

Q How important is the neutral observer to the continuing process and what is the most promising thing you can say about the makeup of that force?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ideal circumstance would have been to have the neutral observers, as it's put in our agreement, come into the confrontation lines contemporaneous with the start of the cease-fire. Obviously that wasn't possible. But it was our judgment that rather than trying to dot all the i's and cross all of the t's in those long, endless -- seemingly endless, from our point of view -- negotiations leading up to the cease-fire, that once we got the agreement on the cease-fire, we'd better go ahead and take it and stop the shooting, and knowing there were quite a few loose ends still to be tied up. The identity of the cease-fire observers is one of those loose ends.

Now, the fact that the cease-fire has now held for three days without them does indicate that it's the intention of the parties as the most important, not 50, or 100, or 200, or whatever number of fellows actually standing there. That is not to say we don't want them to come; we do.

Second, let me address kind of a sub-point I think in your question. There are two kinds of potential international roles we are talking about in Lebanon under the terms of this agreement.

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One is on the first point in the agreement, that is, the cease-fire along all axes throughout the country itself, those cease-fire observers. The other is under Point 2 of the agreement, which talks about the committee that will be formed, to talk about stability and security in the mountain areas where the fighting took place and the outlying Shouf districts. In an initial draft of the potential agreement, that made explicit reference in Point 2 to the international forces accompanying Lebanese forces in that area.

The final draft doesn't refer to it, but the committee, which is now meeting -- that security committee is meeting in Shuwelfat, which is a Beirut suburb -- may well come up with something that contemplates other international forces. But I think we ought to be clear that those are not the cease-fire observers talked about in Point 1.

Q What is the most promising element that is developed in the discussion about how that group in Point 1 might be made up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the fact that we are still talking about it is the most encouraging. I mean our multinational force partners, I am advised, have been talking to the Foreign Minister of Syria. The Secretary of State, Ambassador Murphy and I will be meeting with Minister Khadbam tomorrow. Prince Bandar, I think, is probably going to go up tonight or tomorrow. So everyone is still talking about the best kinds of ways we can work that out.

In addition, we spoke with Bud McFarlane on the phone. He is talking to Gemayel. Everyone is coming up with various ways of handling it. We still think the easiest, simplest, cleanest, neatest way to do it would be the United Nations Treaty observers who are there, they're trained and know how to do that kind of job.

Q Is there any alternative to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are potential alternatives, yes.

Q Which are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would rather not go into them right now.

Q You refer to them as loose ends?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the loose ends -- we have some bigger loose ends than that in my view. Sure, that is a loose end. But as I said, the fact the cease-fire is holding is testimony to the fact that it's not a big loose end. We also have a loose end of where the first meeting of the Political Accommodation Committee is going to be held. We have the loose end of the actual details of what the security agreement in the Shouf is going to look like. So these things are not self-defining. But it did provide a framework for everyone to agree to stop shooting and start talking. That is the basic success I think was achieved.

Q What are some of the other possibilities besides a U.N. --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let the record show we have driven Mr. Evans from the room.

Q I'm coming back. (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q What are some of the other possibilities besides a U.N. observer team?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I recognize we are on background, but I don't think it would be helpful to speculate about it because those would involve discussions of particular countries or ad hoc arrangements which we are not even in the process of talking to the countries about. So I just would rather not speculate about it.

Q Did you put the question of the U.N. force to Assad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did we?

Q Yes. Did anybody?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe that it arose in conversations between Ambassador McFarlane and Khadbam, is my recollection, prior to the agreement on the cease-fire. And I think that is the only explicit conversation we have had about it.

Q What was their reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I recall, their reaction was that in their mind the institution of U.N. observers into a circumstance like this tended to lead to a permanent situation of partition, or quasi-permanent one, a la Cypress, and since Syria was not in favor of partition, they didn't want the U.N. Now that to me sounds like a rationalization because the historic facts don't bear that out. But as I recall, that was their major rational.

Q What is their angle, do you suspect, Khadbam or Assad?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we could speculate about it. My speculation would be that they would probably prefer non-American, French, Italian and British inviduals involved in this because of our involvement in the MNF. That might be one of their motivations. That is pure speculation. They didn't say it that way. But I don't know that is the case.

Q Damascus isn't proposing to do the job?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, no. Oh, no. They are talking about other neutral acceptable possibilities, other countries, which would be recognized neutral, not under the U.N. umbrella, although there was even some speculation earlier that a U.N. force, if the participants were drawn from neutral "countries", might also be successful. But as I say, those are very tentative things. We haven't had any real negotiation about that.

Q How big a force are we talking about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one has ever put quite a definitive number on it. It's not that large a confrontation line that they have to police. We are not talking about running around through the whole Shouf. I think the U.N. itself was thinking in terms of something like between 50 and 150.

Q How many?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Between 50 and 150, the U.N. was thinking of. Whether that is the right number, I can't tell you. But certainly it would be no more than a couple hundred people, I wouldn't think.

Q And the second phase would involve whom?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The second phase doesn't necessarily involve any international presence. But if these four parties that are being brought together in the second phase of the agreement were to make the recommendation that they would like, and the government of Lebanon would then request, some international presence, they might request anything. They might request UNIFIL to move up in the South. They might request individual countries ad hoc to come in. They might request the multinational force. We just don't know what is going to arise out of those conversations that are going forward now.

Q But the multilateral force will stay as a multilateral force while this whole process is underway?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry, I missed the first half.

Q The multilateral force --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Multinational force.

Q The multinational force will stay on its present basis all through this process?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The multinational force will stay as long as we agree to keep our troops there, and we have just been through the Congressional exercise, and as long as the Governmnet of Lebanon maintains its request. We are there at the request of the Government of Lebanon, not by our own unilateral judgment. For example, when the Government of Lebanon went to the United Nations about ten days ago and asked for removal of all foreign forces, they were careful to say all foreign forces not invited by the Government of Lebanon; because this is a force that as of right now they want there to help their peace and stability in the Beirut area.

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Q Dick, was there any discussion or even commitment to any change in the power structure of the Government as a condition of the cease-fire? In other words, was there any assurance given in order to get the cease-fire through the Moslem elements, that there would be definitely a change to their advantage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there wasn't. But to be fair, the present government, as all Lebanese governments, have had Moslem ministers in it. The Prime Minister, of course, was a Sunni. There is another Sunni in the Cabinet. There was a Druze in the Cabinet, although he resigned at Jumblatt's request. The confessional element has always been there.

I now think everyone expects that as a result of the political conversations that will begin as a result of this agreement that there will be changes and a broader Cabinet brought in. But there is no specific agreement to that.

Q I hate to keep pushing on this, but it is crucial Do we have any desires as to what emerges, the structure or shape of what emerges? Is it possible, for example, that the Presidency would go to someone other than a Maronite?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's certainly possible. I would think that would be a very unlikely result. I have never heard any of the basic players challenge the legitimacy of Amin Gemayel, himself, recently, let alone the question of whether the chief of state should be a Maronite. So I would think the whole Lebanese political equation is open for discussion. But I would personally be very surprised to see a change from the Maronite presidency.

Q When you say that Syria has a legitimate interest there, and when you say they are not interesetd in the partition, that leads to the conclusion that they are interested in some sort of a proxy government.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, one man's proxy government is another man's friendly government.

Q Pardon me?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One man's proxy government is another man's friendly government. And I suppose where you draw the line in there as to who is friendly with whom, certainly Lebanon is a relatively small state in terms of population. Ninety-five percent of its border is with Syria and five percent of its border is with Israel, and it does not have any borders with anybody else. So as a matter of both historical reality and of pragmatic reality, I think that any government of Lebanon is going to have to have a balancing act between looking south, looking east, and looking out across the water. I think that that range of forces, together with the complex internal situation, will determine where they go in the future.

Q You said you never heard any of the major players question the legitimacy of Gemayel's Presidency.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Recently.

Q What does "recently" mean, and does that include our side, and did you ever hear Assad assert legitimacy for Gemayel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I never heard Assad assert legitimacy, but I did early in my discussions with Khadbam hear him say that we are not questioning the legitimacy of the present government. Now, for a while there, in the early stages of the war, the Syrian media was starting to make attacks on the legitimacy of the government itself. But, again, toward the end, those statements, both public and private, dropped off. And I think they were reminded of the fact that when Amin Gemayel became President, that the Syrians and the Palestinians, for that matter, in addition to the Lebanese elements, all said: This is a reasonable choice because he has always professed the vision of a broadly-united Lebanon. And that, I think, is important in recognizing our support for what he is trying to do.

We are not, as the United States Government, supporting Amin Gemayel as an individual. We are not supporting him as a Christian, a Maronite, or a Phalangist. But he has indicated by his rhetoric, and by his actions, a sensitivity to the reality of Lebanon, that it's going to take a broad outreach and a broadly-representative government and one that captures the Shia and the Sunni and the Druze, and all the Christian elements, and tries to bring them together. That, I believe, is what he is about, and that is what we support as a matter of policy.

Q [redacted], in the view of this government, do the Israelis have an interest, legitimate or otherwise, in the continuance of the Gemayel Government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do they have an interest?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How do you mean that?

Q They put Gemayel's brother into the Presidency originally and he was assassinated, as you remember, and Amin was substitutec They were in occupation of much of the country. In that sense, do they have a legitimate continuing interest in the form of that government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that Israel certainly has a legitimate interest, which we have recognized publicly in our policy, as to the security of their northern border, and certainly I think any Lebanese government would be on shakier ground if they were hostile and antagonistic either toward Israel or toward Syria because those are the only two neighbors.

Q Is the Israeli interest being reflected in our -- are we a representative of that interest in these discussions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. As a matter of fact --

Q Whose?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that there are forces within the Lebanese body politic who have interests or who have ties with Israel, which are stronger than their ties with Syria, and vice versa. You look down the list of the people who are to attend the political reconciliation meeting, it is certainly clear, to take an individual, Kamil Shamoune I would think would feel much closer to Israel than he would to Syria. I would suppose exactly the opposite would be true of Suleiman Franjieh. Those are both Christians. So it is not something that is confessional. It is something that is kind of personal and political.

Q Let me ask you a sort of a general question, I guess, bothering a lot of people. As I recollect it, the resolution passed by the House and the Senate says that it is an essential interest of American policy to maintain the unity of Lebanon. But this agreement looks like an agreement for a cease-fire whereby the Syrians can slowly pick to pieces the present Government of Lebanon. Don't you sense any tension at all between the agreement you just made and the agreement that the Senate and House have just supported? Aren't they really wildly at odds?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would certainly hope not.

Q What is the line of continuous logic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. The policy we have for Lebanon is not that Lebanon must be an ally of the United States. We are for an independent Lebanon, one that is sovereign over all its territory, and one that has achieved the removal of all foreign forces, which is the other half of the coin of sovereignty. The strength of Lebanon to us is that it is the only Parliamentary democracy that is really a functioning parlimentary democracy in the Arab world. And we would hope that as a result of the cease-fire and the political accommodation discussions, they then would be in a position to move on to new elections, to revitalize their legitimacy, their democratic base, because obviously they haven't been able to have an election for some ten years now because of their civil war and then the occupation of foreign forces. So our position is that whatever the Lebanese body politics in a democratic way produce, that that is fine with us. We aren't interfering with the domestic concerns of Lebanon.

We are just trying to make sure others don't as well and that Lebanon has a chance to be Lebanon, because its traditional political system and its function as an economic and a societal, in some ways, bridge between the Arab world and the West we feel is a very healthy and important one and one that is very important to our interests. In addition, the conflict in Lebanon, starting really from when the Palestinians came in after they left Jordan, has made it a kind of microcosm of the Palestinian problem. And a solution in Lebanon in many ways now lies athwart our attempts to address the Palestinian questions in all its dimensions, as it says in the Camp David Accords.

We would like to solve that problem both intrinsically for its own merits and also to give us momentum to readdress the broader question in terms of the President's September 1 initiative.

Q Another question. In your mind, is it possible for Gemayel to assert his government's authority against the Phalangist militia? If that is not done, doesn't that in effect mean you are not going to really move towards the very objectives you defined? In other words, he has to come to that confrontation and he has to be able to see it through, if what you are talking about is to come about. Is that not true?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's a very central question. And I think it's broader than just the Lebanese forces or Phalange militia. I think it goes to all the militia in the country.

Q But it's against the Phalange militia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, because it's there, I understand. But if you look at what has happened there over the last five months, you really have the development of a Lebanese Army, Lebanese Armed Forces, which is unique in the modern history of Lebanon. It is an effective, multiconfessional fighting force. It is quite reflective of the complexities of Lebanese society itself. It is about 60 percent Moslim and 40 percent Christian. It is about 40 percent Shia. It has Druze officers trickled around through it. It has Shia, it's got Sunni, it's got Maronites, Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox, and all of those things. It is a very confessionally balanced army. It held under some very difficult street fighting conditions in downtown Beirut prior to the Israeli withdrawal from the Shouf.

It held together under very fierce battlefield conditions, heavy artillery, et cetera, in these battles around the perimeter of the next couple of weeks of fighting. It is one of the institutions on which the government, whatever government, is going to have to build itself. Now the intention of the government is, after they have the political process going their way and as they start getting the removal of foreign forces, to disarm all of the militias: The Druzes militias, the Sunni, the Shia, and the Christian, and yes, President Gemayel is acutely aware of the situation of the Christian militias. I believe he has already had conversations about the importance of the Christians, having that militia cease to be, and having only military control with the government forces. And I think the Christians recognize that. And it's kind of a question of well, you disarm first; no, you disarm first. The only way it's going to work is if they probably do it all together.

Q But that was never true before '73 -- excuse me, before '75.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: '75.

Q It would be wonderful, of course, if it would happen. But is that remotely realistic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is. I think it is remotely realistic, and better than remotely, because in our conversations with Lebanese from across the spectrum, whether you talk to the Jumblatts and the Nabih Berris, or whether you talk to Fhadi Fremm and Pierre Gemayel, or whether you talk to the Sahba Salams and the kind of establisment Moslims have in Beirut, everybody has a feeling within the Lebanese body politic that this may well be the last chance for an integral Lebanon to seize the moment and pull itself together. If they miss this moment, they may well fractionalize, departition, and the chance for a national consensus would be lost.

And I think that that is very much on the minds of the political leaders, left to right wing on the spectrum, and across their religious divisions.

Q People don't behave that way, though, especially if it's the last chance. There is too much to gamble to give up your arms. But in any case --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are not going to give up their arms first. I am not suggesting that. That would be the end of the process if the political process works. It is not going to be the beginning of it.

Q One week ago, or about, when the President gave his interview in Newsweek, one got the impression that the way the President saw this problem was that the Syrians backed by the Soviets were trying to drive the multinational force out and topple the Gemayel government and essentially take over the country. Now, in one week, that intention of Syria has not vanished, has it? Do you think it has been thwarted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it has been largely thwarted because they found that as a function of the resolve of the Western partners in the multinational force in general, and of the United States in particular, that furthter advances in a military way were going to be quite costly, and I think that the Druze themselves, who were certainly not doing all the fighting but were doing a significant part of the dying up there in the Shouf, felt that they had accomplished everything that they needed to accomplish. And I think that the solidity shown and the way in which the Lebanese Armed Forces hung together surprised a lot of people. So I think a combination of all of those things changed the calculus as to what was and ought to be achievable militarily and what might be achievable politically.

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Now, someone keeps pointing out that we have sold out the future to a Syrian-dominated government. And there is certainly a chance that the political conversations, which hopefully will get under way shortly, might result in a political mix in the country which is highly favorable to Syria and perhaps very unfavorable to us, or very unfavorable to the Israelis, or something we don't like at all. But that is certainly the chance you take. And I think our belief is if we can get a functioning democracy in Lebanon, we can live with whatever that result is.

Q When all of these parties make their calculations, they presumably make them looking over their own shoulders and looking at what kind of power relationships in the region will prevail after this thing is all over. If the Syrians were there in force with 40,000 troops, is that not likely to be the reality when it's all over with, and do they know that we'll be there? You know, do we know that there will be anybody to resist the Syrians?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the action of the Congress sends an important signal. And I think an 18-month extension and not an absolute limit, I think the way that this thing is worked out, indicates that the type of American resolve that Bud McFarlane has been talking about in his conversations with the Syrians, and I have, that we have talked about with the folks in Lebanon, with the Saudis, et cetera, that we are not going to have the attention span of a butterfly, as one Syrian once put it, and that we have an intention to see this thing through in such a way that the governmental institutions and the constitutional system of Lebanon is preserved. I think that is an important part of the mix. So I think that you have a commitment on behalf of the Lebanese government, a commitment on behalf of a large spectrum, if not the entire spectrum, of the Lebanese body politic, and I think that is going to be a sufficient counterweight to anyone else's desires.

Now, that may mean that I am a fuzzy-headed optimist, but having just been pounded by artillery for a couple of weeks, I don't feel totally, strangely, optimistic. I think it is possible. There are no guarantees. I can't tell you things are going to be sunny a month from now for sure.

Q We will see.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we will certainly see. The facts will tell. But I cannot see a better way of moving forward than trying the political conversations and seeing where they lead.

Q Back to Tom Drackey's question. He keeps talking about withdrawal of forces. His question presupposed the possibility that the forces are not going to be withdrawn. From that I ask this question: Is it realistic to think there will be any withdrawal of forces until the Israeli-Lebanese agreement is ratified in some way; that is, of Syrian forces? Is that realistic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know what is realistic yet. What we went out there to start to address, when we went out in the end of July, was the removal of foreign forces. Now we got a little sidetracked on something called having a little internal shooting. But we were just starting to really get our

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teeth into that issue. And certainly the Syrian position has been very clear and very unyielding on that question. But we were having conversations with them about it.

I think there are ways of coming up with an accommodation which could be suitable to Israel, to Syria, and to the PLO so they all remove themselves.

Q Give us a little bit of a look at a possible idea there,[redacted], because this is all background.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know how I hate to do this.

Q Try.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, all right. Let's just speculate. This is pure speculation. You've got these three sets of forces, each one is saying, "We'll get out if the other folks get out first, and they don't get anything good out of it." That's basically the gridlock at the moment. But one of those forces, for example, has a quite different calculus from two of the others, and that's the PLO. The PLO has problems with the Syrians. The PLO's eyes are not really on Lebanon per se; it's down there on the south. They have got their own set of dynamics operating.

Now, just think of how this gridlock would change if next week Yassar Arafat said, "Well, being in Tripoli, Lebanon, isn't very close to being in our heartland. We might as well get out of here and set up some bases someplace else and continue the struggle in a different way." And if they got up and left, that would be a very different circumstance for the Israelis, because after all, the Israelis didn't go into Lebanon saying: We are going to drive the Syrians out of Lebanon. They went into Lebanon saying: We are going to make our northern border safe, Operation Peace for Galilee, and knock the PLO. If the PLO left, then the Israeli situation would be different. That is one speculation. Now there are a lot of other things that one can think of which would change this mix. The present mix looks like gridlock, but then the present mix looked like gridlock on the cease-fire two weeks before it happened.

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Q You are saying the Syrians, yes, could be pulled into a withdrawal agreement with the existing Israel-Lebanese agreement intact?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it is possible to conceive of such a result.

Q You can conceive of that, especially if you conceive of the Palestinians deciding they are not close enough to where they wish to be and then finding another place. I must be very dense on this, but where in the hell could they possibly go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Brooklyn. (Laughter)

Q Okay, that one I buy. (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are possibilities along that. And there have been some conversations among the Arabs about that specifically. You could have asked the same question a little over a year ago when the question was they've got to get out of Beirut and where are they going to go. Everybody said, geeze, where are they going to go? They went out of Beirut and they went to places.

Q Back to Amman. No, that's not right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there are places.

Q If the cease-fire breaks down, what would be the military situation? And did the Syrians drop into the cease-fire to bring back the munitions and guns and everything or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Syrians have lots and lots of weapons available in very close order to Safar and the close-in fighting areas. They also have lots of fresh troops they could bring in with a variety of covering uniforms.

So a pause in the fighting, while it would certainly permit Syrians and their surrogates to resupply, I think would probably be more beneficial to the troops of the government of Lebanon because here they were in their tiny little enclave with the airport closed and getting pounded every day, as well as the civilians and a few American diplomatic personnel also getting pounded. So I think that from just a balance of forces situation that the cease-fire would probably be of more benefit to the Lebanese government.

Q Is it your thought that the U. S. diplomats, including yourself, will have to be closely engaged in the reconciliation search for as long as it takes, indefinitely?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would hope not. The reconciliation, as I say, the internal Lebanese reconciliation, is not something in which we are directly involved. There is no American delegate in this strange group. It is a purely intra-Arab matter. There are all the factions within Lebanon, or many of the factions, I should say, within Lebanon. There is a representative from fraternal Saudi Arabia and fraternal Syria, as it says in the agreement. There are no Americans there. So we are not going to be playing directly in that game.

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Q Will we not be playing indirectly? We have been a principle supporting supplier, have we not, of the Lebanese government, the Lebanese Army?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are right now, without question. And certainly we will be in there, in the area, and be dealing with this problem. We will not be dealing directly with the reconciliation problem. If some government comes out of all of this which is unacceptable to us, then presumably we will no longer be a major supplier or trainer of the Lebanese Army or have large economic programs or what have you. But as long as it is something from within the constitutional system of Lebanon, as I say, we are not going to challenge its legitimacy.

Q Could you imagine a situation where the Lebanese government might want to test the level of support it is getting from us or a situation where the other parties to the Lebanese government would expect us, call upon us to allow it not to stand in the way of the agreement and supporting Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can think of a lot of hypothetical circumstances that are going to put us into some tough decisions. But I don't think it is useful to come down with any definitive answers on all of the things that might happen in the future.

Q But I am trying to see the conditions under which we would not be a major part of that negotiation.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't see any circumstance where we will be a major part of the negotiation. I mean we are not going to sit there and have a secret note passed to us by the government of Lebanon: Do you agree Citizen X can be Prime Minister; or do you agree we can balance the Telecommunications Ministry with the Ministry of Posts this way? I mean that is not our concern.

MS. SMALL: Just one more question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If I can just add, though, you have answered your own question. We don't have an interest in putting ourselves in the position within these negotiations where we can be played off one part against the other. If there is one thing that endures in Lebanon, it is a characteristic tendency to try and do that with outsiders. That is why what we have tried to do is create a context where they could talk and reconcile the differences without being able to exploit outsiders in the way that you have described.

MS. SMALL: One last question.

Q What kind of odds would you give all this working?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a good speculation, but I would say that the achievement of a cease-fire was very encouraging to me because it, as I think I began by saying, could only come about if the various forces believe that political and diplomatic conversations were better than trying to alter factions on the ground through military means. So I think that is a very promising sign. I think we are very encouraged by that.

Now whether the chances of political reconciliation working are 10 percent or 90 percent, I cannot tell you. But as long as the Lebanese are given the opportunity for self-determination, that is what we will be continuing trying to do, while we assist them. There is one thing that we can hold up to the Lebanese, that they must come to grips with their problems themselves. They must come to grips with their political differences, their religious differences, and that is a difficult set of jobs for them to do. Where we come in, where our multinational force partners come in, where the Saudis come in, is attempting to help them get the removal of foreign forces. And that is where we will be putting the majority of our efforts.

MS. SMALL: Thank you, [redacted]. Thank you all very much for coming.

END (5:00 P.M. EDT)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
WEST GERMAN PRESIDENT CARSTENS

The Briefing Room

September 30, 1983

10:03 AM EDT

MR. SIMS: This briefing, for all three of you, will be on background attributable to a Senior Administration Official. For your information only, he is [redacted]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just run briefly through the schedule and then take your questions.

The President arrives, President Carstens arrives on Monday afternoon. The main day in Washington will be Tuesday. He'll be meeting with the President in the morning after arrival ceremonies here. He will have a state dinner that night. The next day, he will have activities, largely on the Hill, where he will address a Joint Session of Congress, return dinner in honor of the Vice President on Wednesday night, departure for Philadelphia on Thursday morning, ceremonies in Philadelphia, including a major dinner that night hosted by President Carstens. Friday, he departs on a trip around the United States ending in New York, I think, on the 14th, when he'll depart for Germany. On the way, I think he'll be in Houston, Seattle, New Haven, Connecticut, where he attended Yale University in the late '40s. He will return to his alma mater.

Foreign Minister Genscher will accompany the President for the Washington part of the trip. The Foreign Minister will depart back to Germany on Thursday. For the rest of his trip in the United states, State Secretary Von Staden, former Ambassador here, will accompany the President, but this will be largely ceremonial.

So let me take your questions, if you have any.

Q What is he going to talk about, missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President, the Federal President is not constitutionally involved in day-to-day management of foreign policy questions, but the fact that the Foreign Minister -- Foreign Minister Genscher's also Vice Chancellor will accompany him and will participate in the Oval Office meeting with the President means that a full range of U.S.-German questions, not bilateral questions, but largely multilateral questions, will be discussed, and I'm sure that the INF question will be high on the agenda.

Other issues, I think, would be the general East-West environment following the KAL incident in light of President Andropov's statement earlier this week; outlook for the situation in the Middle East where the Germans, of course, are very interested, although they're not directly involved in the MNF, subjects such as that.

Q Well, how do things stand now with Germany, with deployment coming up in December and no sign of any change in that timetable?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Federal Government has made clear that it intends to go ahead with both tracks of the 1979 decision, that is to say, support of the negotiations in Geneva, but if no agreement is reached which would obviate the need for deployment, to proceed with deployment. So both tracks are under way as far as the Germans are concerned. The Federal Government welcomed the announcement that the President made in his Monday speech to the U.N. General Assembly, that is to say, the new proposals which the -- modified proposals which the United States is advancing in Geneva. They share our hope that an agreement will be reached, but are clearly determined to proceed with the deployment track if that proves necessary.

Now, there will obviously be demonstrations in the Federal Republic. There have already been demonstrations. But I think the government is clearly determined to proceed despite these demonstrations. There were perhaps less significant demonstrations at the end of August and beginning of September than some had expected, but it's a little difficult to foresee how many people will demonstrate in October. The major week of demonstrations, as I recall, is to be during the week, if I'm not mistaken, of the 22nd through 29th of October.

Q Has the KAL incident undercut the demonstrations? Is that what you're referring to, the demonstrations in late August and early September ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure whether the KAL incident had any immediate impact on the demonstrations at the end of September -- or rather end of August, beginning of September. Could have been. In any event, these demonstrations did turn out to be somewhat less significant than people had expected. I think to the extent that people in Western Europe, as here, have perhaps a clearer picture of what the Soviet Union's international conditions means, or approach to international relations is as a result of the KAL incident, it would make the demonstrations perhaps somewhat less significant, less people would -- would reduce the incentive to demonstrate against INF deployment.

Q So the size of these demonstrations was not as large?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Didn't seem to be, no.

Q Why in October?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm really not a hundred percent sure why that date was picked. I think --

Q Oktoberfest?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Oktoberfest happens to be at the end of September, so that's past and gone by the time the demonstrations come. I'm not really sure why that particular date was picked for the peak of the demonstrations. There will be demonstrations at various times, though, between now and, say, the middle of November, end of November.

Q What responsibilities does President Carstens actually have in the Federal Republic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the Federal President occupies in a way sort of a moral position in a way, the symbol of the German State, Chief of German Nations, Chief of State. He is not empowered constitutionally to be directly involved in day-to-day operations of the government. But the President, as you may know, was a career Foreign Service Officer, German Foreign Service Officer, for probably I would say almost 20 years, rose to the top of the German Foreign Service, was State Secretary in the Foreign Office for several years. That is the highest career job in the German Foreign Service. Retired from the Foreign Service in the early Seventies and ran for Parliament and shortly thereafter was elected Federal President, replacing Walter Scheel in 1976.

Q This is a largely ceremonial post?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is largely a ceremonial post, but there are some official acts that he has to take involving formation of the government, so forth, calling on Kohl, for example, receives the call to form a government from his President.

Q How old is he?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Gee, I don't know. I'd say in his middle sixties, just as a guess. He was a young man.

Q What was he in Nazi Germany?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was a member of the German Army, as many people were during the war. Helmut Schmidt, for example.

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Q He speaks English, I assume?

MR. SPEAKES: Oh, he does indeed. He had the opportunity to go to a leading American university, perfect his English. He speaks perfect English.

Q Is he from the same party as Kohl?

MR. SPEAKES: Christian Democratic Union, yes.

Q Any significant differences to be discussed between the two countries?

MR. SPEAKES: The United States and Germany?

Q Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: No, but I think it is a good time to have the Foreign Minister and the President here. Foreign Minister Genscher was in New York for the U.N. General Assembly, saw the Secretary for dinner on Wednesday night, is now in Central America, in San Jose, Costa Rica, as a matter of fact, for a meeting with German diplomats from that area and a review of the situation in Central and South America. I think that might be one of the subjects which certainly the Secretary will want to talk to Foreign Minister Genscher about, European attitudes towards Central America. Yes.

Q Is it possible that part of what we're doing in this session of talks, and some of the others is basically doing some encouraging of the German Government to stay steadfast on the tracks that you've already talked about?

MR. SPEAKES: Well, I wouldn't want to link this particular visit which was set up last year when the President was in Germany in June, and is coming at this time in connection with the 300th Anniversary ceremonies, I wouldn't want to link that directly to any problems in the relationship. Obviously, when Senior American and German Officials meet at this particular time, the INF issue will be one of the major subjects discussed. But this Administration is very confident in the determination of Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister's government, to proceed with both tracks of the dual-track decision. But given the ongoing negotiating situation, it is important for the two governments to stay in touch at a high level, and that's what we're doing at this time. So it's a timely visit in that sense.

Q What sort of feedback are you getting from the German government about the impact of the Administration's efforts to promote President Reagan's arms control ideals? Is it having any impact over there?

MR. SPEAKES: Well, I think we've had quite an impact in Germany. The President's speech was given extremely positive play in the German press, and I think the German people, German press, German government, welcomed the promises that were contained therein. I think there is a perception in Germany today that the United States is negotiating seriously in Geneva, both with INF negotiations and in START. The Federal Government supports this. Now, this is not to say that the President's position has a hundred percent support in Germany, but support does seem to be very widespread throughout the country in both political parties. So I think we have succeeded in that sense in making clear that the President is committed to find solutions in the arms control negotiations.

MR. SIMS: Any more questions?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT MUBARAK

The Briefing Room

September 30, 1983

1:35 P.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We will have [redacted] here who will give us a readout on the Mubarak meeting. This is on background, attributable to Senior Administration Officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's talk a little bit about the logistics. The first meeting took place in the Oval Office. The President, Vice President, Acting Secretary of State, Ambassador Atherton, Judge Clark, the Vice President, and myself on the U. S. side; on the Egyptian side there was President Mubarak, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hassan Ali; Ambassador Gorbo, and Ambassador Amre Musa.

After about half an hour, we went into the Cabinet Room, where the Egyptian side was joined by Minister of Finance Hamid; Minister of Economy Asid, and Minister of Cooperation Shindi. On the U. S. side, we were joined by Secretary Regan, Secretary Thayer, AID Administer McPherson.

Q Is that everybody?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Is that everyone who was there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: John Howell.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right, Admiral Howell, Director of Political Military Affairs. Following that, that group went to lunch.

Q What did they eat?

Q What did they have?

Q Soup?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yesterday, when we met, I outlined how we saw the visit and the subjects that we expected to be discussed.

Q Was there any news?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The visit followed that pattern, and I think the statements of the two Presidents, which most of you heard, clearly indicated that. Now, let me stop there, and you said --

Q Was there any news?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know I don't make news.

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Q Well, was anyting new said that we would be interested in that you want to tell us? (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you've heard the President.

Q Yes, I did, that's why I asked you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And now you can ask me questions about what they said.

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Q Listening to what the President said, I didn't hear anything about relations between Egypt and Israel and sending Ambassadors, and things like that. Was that discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. The whole question of relations, good relations between Egypt and Israel was discussed, of course.

Q And what happened?

Q Were there any assurances from the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- well, general assurances, except that obviously the Egyptians are interested in good relations, too. They gave us no new assurances on such things as the Ambassador going back, but the President emphasized --

Q Which President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- President Mubarak emphasized Egypt's commitment to the Egyptian-Iraeli Treaty as well as the Camp David Accords.

Q Would you be willing to dissect that problem a little further?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really. (Laughter)

Q [redacted], in terms of the Palestinian question, Mubarak clearly said that the time has come to resurrect the peace initiative?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Well, don't forget that Camp David has two parts, and when the Egyptians and we and the Israelis agreed, it was well understood that the second part of Camp David was as important as the first part of Camp David, and that dealt with the Palestinian problem.

Q Didn't you just say the other day that the Camp David Accords --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I didn't.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was asked if the Reagan Initiative -- someone here said the Reagan Initiative was dead, and I said no, it wasn't true.

Q You said, "It rests".

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said it was at rest, and someone said, "Permanently?" And I said, something like "Nonsense."

Q No, you said, "That's a long time."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: However -- did I say, "That's a long time?"

Q "Long time."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, the problem is

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that as long as you have a Palestinian problem, no matter if you define it in -- let's say in small terms -- although God knows that's big enough -- as the Occupied Territories, and 1.5 million people living under Israeli guns, you are not going to have a chance for stability and peace in the area. That is the essential fact.

President Carter, through his efforts, was responsible primarily for the Camp David Accords. President Reagan, in the first part of this Administration, worked hard to finalize the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty. The September 1 Initiative, 1982, was designed to reinvigorate the Palestinian part of Camp David.

Now, the issues are there; both Presidents agreed on the urgency of these issues for the reasons I described.

Q But is there anything that we are going to do or can do now? Aren't we in a situation where there is virtually nothing we can do until we get some Jordanian participation, and there is no prospect of that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The need for Jordanian and Palestinian participation is obviously there. I am not going to predict that as a result of these meetings we are closer to the goal because that isn't -- well, would not be true.

Q Are we going to do anything differently as a result of Mubarak raising the issue with President Reagan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Differently, no; continue to focus on the problem, yes.

Q In the broadest, general --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And also in the narrowest sense.

Q Did Mr. Mubarak have any suggestions on what to do about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just the need not to -- I mean, while recognizing the importance of Lebanon, which no one is disputing, the need to find ways and means of focusing attention back on the Palestinian problem.

Q Was the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No miracle new solutions, no.

Q I assume there was some discussion of the Syrian role in Lebanon. Is there a new U. S. thrust toward the Syrians that President Reagan --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, that news story, if you read the first headline, it said, "New U. S. Policy." If you read the second headline on page 22, it said, "It is said there is a new U. S. policy", and then you read the sources. I'm not really sure that story is worthy of comment.

Q It's the same kind of source that we're getting here with Senior Administration Officials. Are you saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go read it again and see the sources. I'll go no further than that.

Q Was the question of cross-finance being discussed and the Middle Eastern economic operation between the two countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, we discussed the -- the two Presidents discussed these issues; Secretary Shultz discussed these issues the day before yesterday with President Mubarak; Secretary Thayer discussed the issues with the President.

This afternoon we are going to have a meeting with, I think, Secretary Regan, Secretary -- is it Baldrige?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think so, and Brock, the Ambassador.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And Ambbassador Brock and AID Administrator McPherson, discussing various aspects of this issue, of course.

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Q On that point, did Mr. Mubarak request additional aid from the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: President Mubarak highlighted the debt burden, particularly due to the high interest rates from the foreign military sales issue.

We recognize this as a problem. Let me say we recognize it as a global problem. Obviously, you have to question how much assistance you are giving someone, whether it's Egypt or any other country, at 16 percent interest. This is a problem, and these are usually developing countries that we're talking about.

Q What about my question? Did he request additional aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He highlighted the problem, asked the President to be as forthcoming as possible in helping Egypt meet this real live problem.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I -- please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I add, I think, a point to clarify Don's question. The discussion was much more in terms of aid than in increased levels.

Q It was the terms of aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of the terms.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The terms of aid.

Q Can we give him a break on interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And interest rates in particular, rather than terms of raising the levels.

Q Is that in the mix? Is there a possibility of lowering the interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot of these issues are now being discussed in the Administration, and as I say, it's not just an Egypt-specific problem, it's a global problem.

Q Is it possible foreign military sales contracts could be written with a break on interest rates? I mean, is that even an option?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This gets you into direct credits and commercial guaranteed credits. We work today on the basis of commercial guaranteed credits, and it's -- you can't change the interest rate on those. You can, with great difficulty, change some of the repayment periods.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question here for the future is how do we come up with a new mix to make our military assistance effective, make it assistance?

Yes, sir.

Q What was the reaction of the President to President Mubarak's appeal to Iran to stop the war and calm down and sit. He made a statement when he came out.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The U.S., well, the President's attitude is the attitude that this Administration has had since the war -- since it came in, and that is, the war should stop. It's in no one's interest. Certainly, we support any effort to bring this senseless war to an end at this point.

Q Anything new on Chad in terms of support for --

SENOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Who hasn't -- I better get --.

Q On the bilateral -- on the Israeli-Egyptian relations, you said there were no assurances on the sending of an ambassador. Were there any other assurances, any other new assurances having to do with that relationship from the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said that President Mubarak emphasized that Israel is committed to the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty.

Q Israel or Egypt is committed?

Q Egypt.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That Egypt is committed to this treaty. This is a pillar of Egyptian policy.

Q Were there any -- I guess I should have asked were there any specific assurances either requested or discussed in the nature of the ambassadorial question, or were they assurances of a generalized sort?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they were general. They were general, but let me clarify: The United States, as I mentioned yesterday, has a continuing special responsibility. This is our belief, our policy, doing our best to improve relations between these two countries. We periodically, in the past, in part through the good offices of Ambassador Atherton, have brokered steps to try to improve this or that area of relations, and we will continue to do this.

So it's not a question of just periodically talking to the Israelis or the Egyptians, and saying: Don't you all agree you should have better relations? We try to go to the problems, talk it over with them, and see how can we try to get them on, both sides, to make those gestures that would help unfreeze the situation.

Q On the foreign troops withdrawal from Lebanon, what can you tell us about the talks on that subject, and have they figured out any ways or means to get them out?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no new ways or means to get them out. This is something that Ambassador McFarlane is spending full time on. But the fact that the withdrawal of foreign forces and Lebanese sovereignty and a hope for Lebanon in the future all are wrapped up together is not a new idea.

Q What is it, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What?

Q What does that tell me?

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIA: Well, I don't know what you want me to tell you, Sam .

Q Is that all they said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they didn't spend all their time talking about the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. They spent a lot of time talking about Lebanon: the need to help the Lebanese reestablish their sovereignty, the need to help the Lebanese work together to take a chance on living with one another. That's a very important element here.

Q Can you be a bit more specific? What has been the Egyptian role in Lebanon? Appreciation has been expressed and all that, but it's being referred to very vaguely. Can you be more specific in terms of the assistance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not really. I mean, you can ask the Egyptians to give you details of their own diplomacy. They have sent envoys to Lebanon. This has been in the public domain. They have been publicly very supportive of our policies. They have been active in trying to encourage domestic reconciliation in Lebanon.

Beyond that, I think you ought to ask the Egyptians for details on what they're doing.

Q Did President Mubarak recognize the efforts of Syria as helpful to achieve the cease-fire in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just say that in my view, President Mubarak has a very good understanding of Syria and Syrian policy.

Q Oh, thanks.

Q In his departure remarks, President Mubarak said that the key to a breakthrough is a complete withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces. Do we quarrel with that answer?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you want to, you could say with other foreign forces and Israeli.

Q But he said Israeli and other foreign forces. I mean could we --

SENIOR ADMINISTRAITON OFFICIAL: The Egyptians, I think you should ask the Egyptians their views on this. No, we don't quarrel with a phrase like that. That's a statement of Egyptian policy.

We would have put it slightly differently, but they support the same --

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Q How would we have put it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Slightly differently. Read the --

Q Well, how?

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIAL: Never mind.

Q Never mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position is very similar: we call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Okay?

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Q Have you been discussing the question of having better relations between Egypt and other Arab countries as well as between --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For sure.

Q -- Israel and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, of course. There were discussions on this point. We --

Q Daily?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- in the course of the discussions, I think it was clear that we support better relations between Egypt and other Arab countries. Where we can be helpful, we will continue to try to be helpful.

Q Excuse me.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am.

Q Was there any attempt by either President to assess the chances that the Jordanians or the Palestinians could be brought into the peace process so long as Israel remains in Lebanon, and if not, could you do it for us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not really, and I couldn't do it for you. Let me say that there is a recognition that there is need for some progress on Lebanon, before we can turn our attention, with the full focus that it deserves on the other issue.

Q Recognition by whom, by us or by them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By us and the Egyptians.

Q That's not what he was saying.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But she asked a specific question.

Q But I'm asking -- you meant in your answer --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: I know, but I am answering her question, please. Please, let me try to. I am sorry I can't give you what you needed for a lead, but the --

Q A lead? (Laughter)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The problem is --

Q We're talking about a footnote here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But let me please answer the question. I mean, there is a little bit of respect you owe someone else in the audience.

The problem was recognized. As I said the other day, it's a practical issue. When everyone's energies are devoted to trying to stop the tinderbox in Lebanon from going off, you just don't have much left for addressing these other issues in the same kind of concentrated manner. But I think the point here -- and I don't want to put words in President Mubarak's mouth; you can ask the Egyptians. I think he's recognizing this, but he's saying:

Look, it may take quite a while for Lebanon to sort itself out. Once we get Lebanon on the right track -- and we hope and pray to God that we're on that way -- we should then move on to the other issues, as well.

Q Can I follow up on this lead? Is the President's view that national reconciliation in Lebanon is possible with the Syrian involvement and influence on the parties --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which President?

Q The U.S. President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not a briefing on Lebanon, but just let me say --

Q Well, anyplace then.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say that I understand that Lebanon is very much on your mind, Saman.

Q Very much on everybody's mind.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But let me just say that the President, of course, believes and U.S. policy is dedicated to the proposition that Lebanon can be made whole again, including all of the players who are there, including the Syrians.

We are not saying that --

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Q What?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, he was trying, I believe, to get me to comment on whether or not we thought any progress could be made on Lebanon as long as Syria was a factor, I thought.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which is a very difficult question to answer.

Q Indeed.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We assume -- Syria is a factor in Lebanon, and as far as my experience has demonstrated, has always been a factor in Lebanon. So a Syrian role in Lebanon is not new. Taking this into consideration, yes, we do believe that we can make progress.

Q So actually, what you are saying, you would support the continuous flow to Syria and Lebanon, then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all. I'm just saying that -- I'm talking about a fact. Lebanon, Syria has had a role in Lebanon, has always had a role in Lebanon. It's not a question of whether I support it or not. The sun comes up tomorrow whether I support it or not.

Q Can I follow up on her question? I'm just unclear as to whether it's your impression that Mubarak was saying to the United States: We know you're focused on Lebanon, but it's time to get back to this other issue, or is he saying: We know you have to remain focused on Lebanon until it's on the right track, but you have to get back to the Palestinian question? I mean, was there any rebuke implied?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no rebuke implied.

Don't forget, President Mubarak, you have got to get back to first principles on these things. Egypt was one of three signatories of Camp David. Egypt, while recognizing the importance of of Lebanon, is committed to implementing all of Camp David, and that has a focus on the Palestinian issue. There was no disagreement between us.

The Egyptian President did not argue that we were giving too much time to Lebanon or not enough to others. He was just exchanging views and giving us his own judgments that we had to keep a focus on the Palestinian problem because of its centrality in the broader peace and security issues in the area. There was no argument on this.

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Q Well, do we think that's possible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes, but how can you do it, and how fast can you move, and then you get back to the question one of you asked: in essence, how fast can you get the Palestinians and the Jordanians to join, and I can't give you answers to that, but you should be always conscious of the need for that, and we are, and you should not forget this problem, and we haven't, and you should be working on it, and we have been, not always in ways that are obvious to everyone.

Q Does President Mubarak's insistence that our position that the Palestinian problem be addressed based on the September 1, '81 initiative mean that the procedures that were established before '82 are now, in fact, obsolete?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what you're addressing is the specific format of the autonomy talks. Now, let's understand that those autonomy talks -- and I don't want to take you through old history, but again, you have to understand this. The original proposal was that Jordanians and Palestinians come into the autonomy talks. When we could not get Jordanians and Palestinians, the Egyptians said we would attempt, I believe, to speak for them, negotiate on their behalf. That tripartite, American-Israeli-Egyptian negotiation, is what he was referring to.

Indeed, there's no quarrel with that, at least not in this country. We realize that if you're going to have a meaningful negotiation, you have to have the Palestinians involved. That's the key issue, how do you do it.

Q Yesterday there was an article by William Saffire. Does it in any way reflect the thinking of the Administration? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How can you ask a question like that?

Q Was that discussed between the two Presidents? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course not.

Q Was it discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of course not. Why should it be discussed?

MR. FITZWATER: No more questions, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why should something like that be discussed?

Yes?

Q Did President Reagan put any thoughts on how to reactivate his initiative in proper time? How would he sell it to the Israelis, for instance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, this is really the question that I have been asked here, and we didn't get into details on how best to move ahead to get it going. We did not get into that kind of detail. We will have -- no, the two Presidents did not.

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Q Was the possibility of an Egyptian participation in supervising the cease-fire in Lebanon brought out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was not.

Q Was the question --

MR. FITZWATER: Thank you very much.

Q Wait a second.

Q Come on, let's --

Q Please?

MR. FITZWATER: No, let's cut it off.

Q No, I'm sorry, there are a couple more questions.

SENIOR ADMINSITRATION OFFICIAL: All right, let's take a couple more if it's all right.

MR. FITZWATER: All right. All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You choose them.

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MR. FITZWATER: Steve?

Q May I ask one more time about Syria, because it's not clear to how much the question of Syria came up in the talks today. Was there any discussion of any concerns by anyone about the influence of Syria in the Government of National Reconciliation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were discussions about Syria. I am not going to get into characterizing those discussions. Bud McFarlane is involved in a very delicate negotiation, and no useful purpose would be served by my getting into this.

Q Was the question of Egypt willing to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union raised in the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No. I am trying to remember if anyone volunteered. No, we didn't talk, get into that at all, no.

Q Back on Syria and this morning's story, is it the Administration's position that the policy enunciated in that story is basically correct, it's just an old policy, not a new policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The policy enunciated in that story is an American policy --

Q The Syrian's influence —

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: — sourced to Fardi Phram, Kamile Shamoan and Pierre Gemayel? Come on. That's not serious.

Q Well, answer the question. Is it the policy, the source?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The policy is what? What question are you asking?

Q I'm asking to what degree do we think the Syrians should have influence on the Lebanese Government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not an issue. The issue is the -- and this was pressed by Saman. This is -- Syrian influence in Lebanon is a fact of life; it has been. As far as I'm concerned, it's going to continue to be.

I'm not going to sit here and try to quantify how much influence foreign countries should have in Lebanon. I'm just recognizing that.

The theme in that story is basically nonsense, which anyone who read it should know. On that happy theme, I'll leave you.

END

(2:20 PM EDT)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, 2:02 P.M.

MODERATOR: This is a background briefing on the visit of President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde. It is ON BACKGROUND and the briefer can be referred to as a senior State Department official.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Chet Crocker is travelling abroad -- left for Nigeria for the inauguration of President Shagari, and instead I am coming to you today to talk about the visit of the Cape Verdian President, Aristides Pereira. Pereira is in the United States on a private visit, a private visit that is taking him to New York where he spoke to the General Assembly, as the President of the Sahelian Group, CILSS, and then on up to New England where there is, as all of you know, a large American community of Cape Verdian origin, practically 300-325,000 people of Cape Verdian origin, who live principally in the States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. The President is up there with his American community, with the political leaderships in those states and in the key cities that he will be visiting.

He comes to Washington on Monday, and will be meeting, of course, with Chet Crocker and the team from the African Bureau, as well as with Mr. Dam, who will be the Acting Secretary at that point.

He will be seeing the President on Tuesday, and will have a lunch given in his honor by Vice President Bush on the 5th. He will fill out much of the balance of the week in calls on the Hill.

Now, it might seem strange for a country of relatively small size, really a very long ways away, to be receiving as much attention as we are giving, and giving in a very conscious manner, to Cape Verde.

There are a number of reasons for this. There is the obvious reason that he is the President of a country with an American community, derived community, a community that goes back in this nation's history a long time.

I think I was reminded several days ago that there are Cape Verdian names on the regimental roles of Massachusetts during the Revolutionary War, and a lively and active trade and life that has gone on between those States and the Islands all through the

19th century, and the period of great immigration to this country during a drought rather similar to the one that has affected the Islands in the last twenty years.

That is a good community. It is a strong active community. It is active in all fields in the New England area -- universities, business, work going way back to the times in the cranberry bogs -- they are a wonderful group of people.

They have, as a result, established in and of themselves, and reminded all of us that this is one of the points we all came from, and reminding ourselves of those ties, and recognizing this productive and good community is one of the purposes that underlines the way we are receiving the President.

Second, he is the President of the CILSS Group, and for a number of years, the United States has made an important contribution to the development of the Sahel region, in our attempts, along with other donors, working with the nations of drought-stricken West Africa, to try to overcome this perennial problem, which has so disastrously affected and continues to affect the prospects of that portion of Africa, West Africa, Sahelian Africa.

This side of the operation that the Cape Verdian President is the President of, CILSS, is the actual group of the nations of the area themselves; how they get together; how they coordinate their activities with donors; how they coordinate their own projects, because much of the work in the Sahel has been across national borders; developments of such institutions as the Senegal River Basin, which very definitely cuts across borders; and how you keep everybody moving with common thoughts, common policies and common themes.

This has been, as I say, in terms of humanitarian interests on the part of the United States AID interest, and also the stability of West Africa, a key feature of how we have worked and dealt in that part of the world, and the Cape Verdian President is its spokesman, and we look forward to having time to hear how he sees that effort which faces new difficulties with fresh droughts of enormous magnitude, in Mauritania and elsewhere, and how he sees all of this evolving, and the role he sees for donors, and how we are all going to be working together as we deal with what, frankly, is a perennial problem.

Third, we are looking forward to the President in a very political dimension. I don't have to take your minds back too many years to the end of the Portuguese colonial empire, the fragmentation of that empire, the coming independence of its various bits and pieces, the radicalization of that process, in which a great many, and nearly all the former Portuguese colonies became independent under very extreme circumstances, and politically aligned in a manner that makes the United States uncomfortable, and they all occupy in some manner important strategic points along the edge of the African continent.

It has been a very active part of our diplomacy over the last several years to try to rebuild bridges and ties, and try to find ways to bring the Lusophone Africans back out of the binding engagements they entered into with the Soviet Union and the East Bloc in the years immediately following their independences.

Now, Aristides Pereira and his country opened the way in an important manner, first with Portugal, with Western Europe, with us, in doing something, I think, by classic vocation Cape Verdians are good at, building bridges. They are a nation that has sailed all over the world, and is present in Western Europe in expatriate communities, present in Angola in a large expatriate community, present in this country, as I mentioned earlier.

This is a statesman, Aristides Pereira, who is known and respected deeply all through Lusophone Africa, and a leader in an important degree in the way Lusophone Africa looks at the rest of the world. The Portuguese have looked at him that way; we regard him with the same esteem, and attach a similar importance to him.

His visit will therefore fall into the context of this broader political dimension, and specifically in the dimension of specific developments inside Lusophone Africa. In fact, since the President has returned recently from an extended visit to Angola and to Mozambique, his visit will afford us an opportunity to get his observations and reflections on what is going on in those two areas, and what the prospects for American diplomacy and the activities that we have had underway now since the beginning of the Administration to seek an end, to seek a settlement for Namibia, and seek an understanding in those terms with Angola.

So, it is a pretty extensive agenda for a private visit, but this is a special man and we are giving him special importance. He is a friend of the United States, and we are welcoming him on that basis, and look forward to his visit, and look forward to the outcome, look forward to the discussions we are going to have with him.

I would be happy to take any questions you have.

Q Weren't the Cape Verdians instrumental in promoting a dialogue between Angola and South Africa?

A That is absolutely right.

Q What has happened since then?

A They have been builders for peace in a number of different ways. They were the ones who took the lead and some risk in a diplomatic sense in asking South Africa to send a team to Cape Verde on two occasions, Angolans, as well, and there were bilateral discussions between the two sides, which we encouraged, and which Pereira took the risk of pulling off.

It is hardly a popular thing in Africa these days to be a host to South Africans, but I think it indicates the direction of Cape Verdian thinking.

Specifically with respect to those two rounds of talks, they were a good occasion for both sides to put on the table directly, face-to-face, those issues that divide South Africa and Angola, and Angolan/South Africa, and see if any measure of agreement in ground could be reached. They were also an occasion to talk about the war that puts both countries at bayonet's point, end-to-end.

I cannot pretend that they produced any breakthrough. They did not. But the existence of that forum, the existence of a venue in which South Africa and Cape Verde and Angola can sit down together and talk and negotiate is absolutely essential, either as a general proposition in reducing tensions between both sides, or if we are successful in advancing the peace process forward, a time in which it will inevitably come in which the two sides have to sit down and work out the details of whatever would result in the form of a cease-fire or other arrangements that would have to surround it.

So, it is not only the past but the future promise of that venue that is important to us.

Q What is the relationship now with Portugal and the former colonies? How do they get along?

A Well, it varies a bit. It has improved radically over the last three or four years. It is, in my judgment, no longer a party issue in Portual, by any means. I think the major parties, both conservative and the present government, as examples, and the President, are all unified on, and that is that Portugal has a special vocation with its former colonies, and it is out to rebuild that vocation, and they are responding -- responding in varying ways.

The Cape Verdians were the first to really normalize and advance their relations. The Cape Verdians are the ones who hosted the first Lusophone African summit. They came first, but they were quickly followed by Guinea-Bissau, where Portugal now has excellent and strong relations. Mozambique was the next major breakthrough, and the pattern of development of relations in Portugal and Mozambique has been rapid, important, deep. Eanes took a personal role in making that happen. He has been strongly backed by the past government and by the present government.

There is a real Portuguese commitment to playing a role in Mozambique. In Angola, it has been slower. Angola has -- though Eanes has visited Angola, Angola, torn as it is by civil war and all of the other pressures it is under, is slower to make those decisions. But there is a degree of cordiality between the Angolans and the Portuguese that certainly didn't typify the scene the day the Portuguese pulled the flag down and got on the boat, and the majority of their citizens left with them.

Q How does that rate by the historical reference? How many Cape Verdians are there?

A How many on the Islands?

Q Yes.

A Bob Booth, have you got that population note? I think it is about three or four hundred thousand.

Q So, the expatriates outnumber them.

A There are a great many more Cape Verdians living an expatriate life in Portugal, Western Europe, this country, and in continental Africa, than there are on the Islands. It is classic story. I mean, if any of you who turn back and can find the history, it is really extraordinary reading. Tales of the Irish famine practically Xeroxed in those years, in the middle part of the last century, when the Islands experienced a similar twenty-year drought, twenty years without rain.

Q Does Cape Verde allow any kind of military presence, any basing, any calls at all by any nation?

A Cape Verde occupies, obviously, some very interesting some air real estate. It is a civil air transit point, you know, an air transit point. It is transited by all sorts of people, and the Cape Verdians are very shrewd and maintain an open door. Cubans transit, Angolans transit, South Africans transit, the Vice President of the United States transits, Pan American transits, you name it. They maintain very much an open-door policy, but they maintain an open-door policy that is with a security feature in mind. They are not out promoting trouble around the world, and there are certains kinds of flights they don't like to have.

Q So there is not much possibility of Cape Verde granting U.S. military access to the Islands.

A We are not seeking that. We are not seeking any sort of basing facility. Whether incidentally, American planes have stopped there, it is not a common pattern.

Q Do the Cape Verdian expatriates maintain a link with the homeland? Is there a strong connection between expatriate communities?

A Yes. In varying degrees there are a number of active community organizations throughout New England. There are several over-all groups that bring them together.

If anything in the last decade, I would guess, and I don't want to be unfair to them and how they have worked, but I think there has been a stronger and stronger sense of community endeavor, and there are several superb historical pamphlets they have put out, some of the groups.

They have brought over -- and it was really a very touching moment -- Cape Verde gave to the United States a year ago a marvelous old Massachusetts whaling brig called the Amnestina, and sailed it under sail, canvas sail, all the way from Cape Verde to this country, where it was given as a gift to the United States, and where it is now being rehabilitated in the form of sort of a floating nautical research station and museum in the Great Banks, and it is back to where it started just about a hundred years ago. It is also open for contributions.

Any other questions?

Q Just one, sir. Remember about six months ago when the Libyan planes carrying arms went to Brazil. It was thought that they had to land somewhere, maybe Mauritania, maybe Cape Verde. Did they land in Cape Verde then?

A I think the pattern of Libyan planes has not included a stop in Cape Verde, and I meant that in context of answering a question you just asked.

Q What is their chief product of export? Pardon my ignorance.

A Immigrant remittances. (Laughter)

Q How much are we donating to CILSS and to Cape Verde in bilaterals?

A I don't have the CILSS figure, the Sahel program figures here with me. We can get them to you separately. Our aid to Cape Verde varies a tiny bit. Let take a look at the actual figures -- about just over $5 million, nearly $6 million a year. A mixture of food assistance, development assistance, and a very, very small IMET program.

Q (Inaudible)

A Yes. That includes direct and the Sahel contribution. But the over-all Sahel figures, I don't have.

Q Is "CILSS" an acronym for something?

A Do you want all of it?

Q No.

A It is an acronym, and it is a French acronym for the cooperating states of the Sahel.

Q Any further questions? Good.

VOICE: The meeting with the President is Monday. You said Tuesday.

A Oh, sorry, I got that wrong, it is Monday, 11:30.

(The briefing concluded at 2:20 p.m.0

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9-30

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
BILATERAL MEETINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, 4:20 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will make a quick statement, but let's mainly have questions.

Most of my time today has been with foreign ministers from various Middle Eastern countries; with France and also with India. Much of our discussion focused on Middle East issues.

Two things come forward in my mind as a result of these discussions. First of all, as far as the United States is concerned, and I believe others share this view, the key points in Lebanon continue to be; Number 1, supporting the emergence of a strong central government and thereby supporting the efforts of President Gemayel to broaden the base of his government and to do everything in his power to bring about national reconciliation so that we have stability and capability to govern that country.

Second, to find a way to the removal of all foreign forces -- Syrian, PLO, Israeli, other foreign forces. And, third, to have that take place in a manner consistent with security on Israel's northern border.

The second thing that has struck me in my conversations is the great extent to which people have on their minds and brought up strongly with me, is the fundamental importance of the basic peace process in the Middle East; and any number have urged on me the importance of maintaining our commitment and effort on behalf of the President's basic Middle East initiative of a little over a year ago.

So I think that while we are properly, of course, especially concerned about events in Lebanon, because of the continued, or the violence that has gone on there prior to the ceasefire, it is evident to everyone that it is extremely important to maintain our attention as we try to do on the basic peace process, and the President's initiative is broadly recognized as a centrally important element there.

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Q In his speech the other day to the General Assembly, the Syrian Foreign Minister was quite hostile to the United States and made numerous mentions about the U.S. being a symbol of colonialism.

Do you now feel, after having met with him, that they are going to cooperate in your efforts in Lebanon and in the Middle East, in general?

A They have been very difficult for us to get along with. We have had lots of contact with them. We've had many points of differences, and we'll just have to see. They state their view and we state ours, and we work at it. But there's no question about the fact that their views differ from ours in many important respects. Nevertheless, we have a good pattern of communication. And as far as my meeting today was concerned, as prior meetings with the Syrian Foreign Minister, they were, on a personal level, friendly and informative and exchanged views on a variety of subjects.

Q Do those differences mean that there will not be a U.N. peacekeeping force in effect because the Syrians will be able to exercise a veto over it?

A On the question of observers, who will be the neutral observers called for in the ceasefire agreement, the Syrians have a point of view that they have stated, and it was stated to me in my meeting.

I must say that practically everybody else that I met with feels that the logical and obvious source of these observers is the U.N., and that is our view. We discussed this and we didn't come to any agreement about it.

Q So is it dead now or are you --

A I think something isn't dead just because one country doesn't agree with it. Lots of others do. It means we'll work on it.

Q Are the Russians still opposed to the use of U.N. observers there, too?

A I don't have any up-to-date information on that.

Q If the Syrians maintain their opposition -- the United Nations ceasefire observers -- is it practical to consider putting them in without their signing off on it?

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A We will want to have U.N. observers go there at the request of the parties, and they are represented, I think it's fair to say, in the Security Committee. So there will have to be a request to come. I'm sure the U.N. is not going to respond unless there is a request of some kind, so it has to come from somewhere.

Q Could you comment on today's Washington Post article out of Beirut which the sum-up suggests that the U.S. is taking a different policy in Lebanon; that it is basically cutting Gemayel off at the knees and viewing Syria as a -- making concessions to Syria in order to wean Syria away from -- I don't want to take your time by summing up. Are you familiar with the article?

A I can't see any basis whatever for any idea that we are doing anything but supporting President Gemayel as vigorously as we possibily can. We have been doing that and trying to help him bring stability, first, to the Beirut area; trying to help him in the processes now engaged in, and national reconciliation. I think it's very important that he be able to pull this off, and we are supporting him.

Q I would like to follow up on my previous question, if I may. So long as the Syrians say no, is there any way to deploy any ceasefire observers in the numbers that are necessary to nail down the ceasefire?

A It's very difficult to deploy observers if those to whom the observers are going to refer don't ask for them. We'll have to see what comes forward from that Security Committee. You can't just force people into a situation.

Q Have we asked the Soviets to intervene in our behalf? That is, on behalf of the view that the United Nations ceasefire should be deployed with the Syrians?

A This subject has been discussed with the Soviets, and I know that the Lebanese Foreign Minister, I'm sure, did so after he left me. He told me he was going to but I haven't had a chance to hear from him. I'm involved in this back-to-back meetings all day long, and I'm probably not as well informed as you are at this point.

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Q The Lebanese Foreign Minister said there was an alternate possibility being considered. Did you discuss any of them today with the Syrians?

A I have found people wanting to focus on the U.N. observers and the logic of it and the ease of it. I haven't found anybody other than the Syrians who seem to think there's any good reason not to use them.

Q Who do the Syrians want as representatives?

A There's no point in my requoting what the Syrians have said. You've all heard what they have said.

Q What they've been saying today over at the U.N. is that the Government of Lebanon, by having agreed to the ceasefire agreement, has in effect ceased to be the Government of Lebanon because it says in the ceasefire agreement that it, the Government of Lebanon, is only a party to the conflict and that until the government itself is somehow reconstituted or broadened, it doesn't have the power or authority to ask for any U.N. force or any kind of force.

A As far as we're concerned, there is a government of Lebanon. It's a legitimate government, and we support it.

Q Does the United States Government concede that Syria has special interests in Lebanon, has some security interests that it has to be concerned with, and in a sense we believe that we should have some kind of say in the kind of government which ultimately is formed there?

A I think it's quite obvious that Syria, as a neighbor of Lebanon, and as a country through which a great volume of trade that Lebanon carries on with not only Syria but with other Arab countries that trade flows through Syria, that there's going to be a strong relationship between Syria and Lebanon. I think that's just a matter of observation and a matter of history that there has been a long-time relationship there.

However, it is our belief, and for that matter I've heard President Assad say and Foreign Minister Khaddam say, that a government of Lebanon able to be sovereign and have jurisdiction over all its territory is their objective. I think that is where the matter stands.

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Q I would be interested in knowing what is the next step in the process of coming up with an observer team. Obviously, there's a time element here. It can't drag out indefinitely. Are you planning further meetings with the Khaddams; is there going to be another meeting with the MNF forces; what's going to happen?

A People are discussing this in Lebanon, on the one hand, and there are a variety of discussions going on here at the U.N. The Secretary General's office and his aides have been working on it. So we're feeding into that process.

You have processes in Lebanon, you have them here in New York, and you have the U.N., as a body, seeking to work this out. I think it's a fair statement that if requested the U.N. is quite ready to put its organization into place there.

Q Do you have any sense it's going to be resolved soon?

A I hope it's going to be resolved soon, but I don't have any way of telling you exactly when.

(Continued on next page)

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Q Ambassador Salem said he thought it might be resolved, that he hoped that it would be resolved this weekend. Do you share that hope?

A Yes. I'm not big on -- as you all know that have traveled around with me, on being optimistic, pessimistic, hopeful, not hopeful, and all of that. I think the facts are that there's a difference of opinion about how this observer force should be constructed, and Syria has an opinion that they have stated. Others have a different opinion.

Most people that I've talked to have the opinion that the U.N. is the logical force to put in there; and, that being the case, I think we will continue to work at it and try to bring that about.

Q You are hopeful about something this weekend? The question was, are you hopeful --

A Sure. I hope for all kinds of things. (Laughter) I'm not knocking hope. (Laughter)

Q Foreign Minister Khaddam in his speech made another polemic about the multinational force pulling out of Lebanon forthwith, and you answered it sort of in the Cable News interview last week. At the briefing after the cease-fire, you ducked the question.

But can you give us some feeling on the purpose of a multinational force now in Lebanon, where you see it going, doing anything different, or -- I don't mean expanding the force. I'm not talking beyond 18 months. I'm just saying in this next months is it contingent, for instance, on some agreement on troop withdrawal of the foreign forces?

A The Cable News interview was, in my view, misinterpreted somewhat on this question, and my intent was to say and is now to say that the basic mission of the multinational force remains what it has been from the beginning. In that interview a lot of effort was made to tie in some sort of time limit or something like that to it. You recall that when the multinational force first went into Beirut, we went there, and after a fairly short time we left. Then we went back in again.

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From that very moment, we took the position -- and this I might say we took after very considerable consultations with our partners in other countries -- that it is a mistake for us right from the beginning to say that force is there for such and such an amount of time, because that tends to become a factor in people's calculations in and of itself.

So we have declined to give some time, right from the beginning. There's no change in that. So what is the mission? The mission is the multinational force is there at the request of the Government of Lebanon, and its mission is to help provide stability by its presence in the greater Beirut area, and by that means to help the government get control.

I think it has on the whole made a very constructive contribution, and it continues to have that same mission. There hasn't been any change in the mission or in the numbers. The only thing that has happened that, of course, we all deplore and see is that there has been quite a lot of fighting, and the multinational force has been caught in that cross-fire and has defended itself. It has taken some casualties, and naturally that's a fact that we have to deal with.

Q The reason I ask is there is a prevailing opinion in the Post story, which you have knocked down, included in there that the Administration is now looking for almost any way to get the troops out of there in a kind of face-saving way, the cease-fire will last a month or so, and we'll get out.

In your interview you were asked that question and you sort of -- you indicated that it should be there as long as -- until there was stability. Then you said among the factors, instability is when a country is occupied -- 75 percent of its territory -- that isn't stability.

There was a suggestion that we should stay in there until it is really in control of the country, i.e., an agreement on troop withdrawal. Those are two very contradictory --

A The first thing I would say is that we're not there looking for a way not to be there. We're there for a purpose, and we think the purpose is being served. The President has gone to great lengths recently to persuade people and to get an affirmative vote from

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Congress in support of us being there, which has been done.

As far as trying to identify in some precise way what it is that would lead us to be ready to leave, I've consistently resisted getting pinned down on that for the reasons that I gave and which go back right to the very beginning that we're trying to avoid getting in the position where the presence of the multinational force and various things start getting manipulated against each other.

Q If the Soviets and the Syrians persist in their opposition to the deployment of neutral observers, will they then have to bear the responsibility if the cease-fire breaks down and fighting resumes?

A We hope the cease-fire doesn't break down, and we'll work hard to see that it doesn't. I think it isn't only the question of whether observers are there, but also progress being made in the Security Committee, the emergence of meetings at national reconciliation and so on that will help create the atmosphere. In fact, that is much more fundamental than the presence or absence of observers, but observers can play a part in giving people a reassurance that the things that they thought were going to happen are actually being observed and will happen. So we work on the observer side and also on these other matters.

Q I would like to change the subject just a tad. You have seen the French Foreign Minister, you've seen the Iraqi, and I guess we've all heard what the Iranians had to say.

How concerned are you that there may be some new explosion in the Gulf which would threaten the Western oil supplies, and did you make any progress with either the French or the Iraqi in heading off what a lot of people consider a very destabilizing development in that war: The shipment of Super-Entendard fighters to Iraq?

A First of all, I share the general view that the Iraq-Iran war is, first of all, a great tragedy for the two countries, with huge casualty rates, great cost in every dimension, and that it's very desirable to bring it to an end.

It's desirable for the reasons involving those two countries, and it's also desirable because a possible extension of it so that it affects other countries is --

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and third countries, particularly those i
those who rely on the supplies coming fro
that's obviously a very undesirable devel

Has any progress been made in t
that war to a conclusion? Not that I kn
there are some interesting developments
nibbling around the edges of and which w
to support.

Our influence with Iran is ne
we have more contact with Iraq. So try
constructive things is very important f
I can't say we have made --

Q The other part of the q
our influence with France and whether
progress in -- or have tried (a) -- (b
in talking them out of supplying Exoc
delivery vehicles for them to the Iraq

A The French, I'm sure,
question in its own terms, and they'l
they think is in their best interests
interests of the Iran-Iraq situation
community, and I'm not going to comme

Q On that question, thi
the previous one, is on the record a
Gulf and its oil supply is of vital

A Yes.

Q Does that remain the

A Yes.

Q In other words, if
by the Iranian Foreign Minister to
Hormuz is put into effect, what th
of action?

A That remains to be
to comment on what we do in any c
say that it is a matter of vital
States. I might say that the bus
do "A," we'll do "B," and therefo
happening. If you start giving
mail, "A" is going to be replace
infinity. I think you have to
different way.

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Q How about Andropov's speech? Can you comment a little bit on -- give us your interpretation on the Andropov speech?

A I didn't know he made a speech.

Q Or his statement.

A He made a statement -- issued a statement. It was, again, a very disappointing statement, because it continued the pattern -- extraordinary pattern of totally misleading information about the Korean airline catastrophe.

On the subject of arms control, which is of vital interest to us and our friends, he had nothing very positive to say about the efforts that we've made to engage in a positive give-and-take on the subject of INF negotiations.

We, however, will look to hearing from the Soviets at the bargaining table, and we'll be there. We have reasonable positions. They're coordinated with our allies. We are there in a spirit of give-and-take, and we want to see an agreement worked out if one can be worked out.

But I think another of the points that has emerged from the discussions I've had here with my colleagues from European countries is the very strong sense of determination that if the reasonable proposals that we've made aren't accepted, there will be deployment.

Q Going back to an earlier question --

Q Can we come back to the Gulf --

A I'm still in the midst of my run-around schedule, I'm afraid, and so I'm going to have to go along.

Q Can you tell us something about your discussions with Mr. Tariq Aziz, whether there's any role for the U.S. to play in helping to bring about peace in the Gulf war?

A If there is, we're certainly willing to do it, and there may be one or two things we can do, but they're not very dramatic. But, at any rate, that's an

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objective that we want to --

Q Can't you say what he asked you to do, asked the United States to do?

A The United States is often flattered, in a sense, by people who somehow think if we put our mind to something, we can do almost anything. Would that it were true.

I think they wish that we would do something, and we're willing to if we can think of constructive things to do. There may be one or two, and if they will work, we'll do them.

Q Any suggestion Gromyko might be coming next week?

A I have no information on that.

(The briefing concluded at 4:50 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT CARSTENS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF WEST GERMANY

October 4, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:36 A.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: Yes, if we could get going because we've got things to do. This is on background, attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, I will be brief and then be happy to take your questions. I think the first thing I would say is that, as I think you know, this visit is not an ordinary state visit but is part of a fairly extensive trip that President Carstens is making to the United States as part of the Tricentennial celebration which has been going on this year celebrating 300 years of relations between Germany and the United States. So, after this visit in Washington the President will be going to other cities. I think the highlight will be a celebration in Philadelphia because the first German settlers 300 years ago settled in Pennsylvania. And there are a number of other events going on. There is a political --

Q What day is --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What day do they go to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thursday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is, I think, a broader political message here which is that probably no two countries in the last 30 years have had closer ties than the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. And this is a recognition in part of the 300 years of cultural legacy of the German input in the United States but also the last 30 years the major American influence in the Federal Republic. And you heard a little of that in President Carstens address talking about the Marshall plan, CARE packages and the like. And this has obvious political symbolism in a very critical year when the alliance is being tested and when the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic is being tested mainly by, as you know, efforts by the Soviet Union to unravel the December '79 decision on seeking an arms control agreement and, if we fail at that, the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles at the end of the year. And I think that's a good introduction for talking a little bit about the meeting that was just held in the Cabinet Room between the two Presidents.

President Carstens said that he was particularly appreciative and that he could speak on behalf of all parties in Germany about the importance of the U.S.-German relationship, of the importance of the presence of U.S. forces in Europe and the important -- in particular, the important security relationship between the two countries and the strong support within the Federal Republic for continuing membership in NATO.

He then went on and talked about the INF issue and said there were three things that he wanted to thank the President for on behalf of the government. The first were the series of proposals that the United States has made in the Geneva talks -- most recently is the proposals that were contained in the President's speech at the United Nations. Secondly, the decision by the President

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to keep the negotiations in Geneva under way and to, in fact, intensify our efforts to seek agreement there despite the Korean airliner tragedy. And, thirdly, the consultations that have taken place between the United States and the other allied countries including Germany on developing our negotiating position and the negotiations themselves. And he mentioned the fact that Paul Nitze, our negotiator in Geneva has paid several high level visits to Bonn to discuss this with Chancellor Kohl and others.

He then went on to say that the NATO decision of December '79 would be carried out by the German government. There was some discussion of the domestic debate within Germany with the President asking questions and others and President Carstens describing the domestic situation and discussion of U.S.-Soviet relations and East-West relations in the aftermath of the airliner. And, finally, Hans Dietrich Genscher, who is the German Vice Chancellor, the leader of the Free Democratic Party and the German Foreign Minister, who was also present at the meeting, had just returned from the meeting that he had held in Central America with German ambassadors. And he reported on his visit there. And the gist of what he said was the German policy would be to do more to cooperate with the United States and Central America. Particularly he said the German government was particuarly impressed with what the United States was doing in the economic area, strongly supported the Contadora effort and wanted to consult closely with the United States on future policy in Central America.

I would be happy to take your questions. Yes?

Q Was the West German delegation apprised of the START proposals that President Reagan will be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the President did in discussion of East-West relations, U.S.-Soviet relations describe what decisions he'd taken there and was talking about his meeting later today with Ambassador Rowny where he will presumably say something about those new proposals.

Q Did theydiscuss --

Q And was there reaction from the West German delegation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were very supportive. They are, as you know, they strongly support arms control and are appreciative of the efforts the President is making in both START and INF.

Q On INF, did they discuss what might happen or what ought to happen in the negotiations if there's no agreement by December?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we're both --

Q -- apart from deployment, I mean, on the negotiating track.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, because there was complete agreement that, for our part, the negotiations would continue and should continue.

Q Was there any discussion at all of the new detailed Soviet rejection of the President's INF position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What is the feeling within this administration about the -- we hear some talk that some aides feel that perhaps the President went too far on the rhetoric and has somehow damaged relations with the Soviets to the point that they're not willing to talk anymore.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have yet to meet an aide, so-called "aide" who has expressed that view. These are phantom aides as far as I'm concerned.

Q You don't think that the rhetoric may have been --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't, no. No, I don't feel sorry for the Soviets. They can dish it out. They ought to be able to take it.

Q You said both Presidents discussed the level of opposition in West Germany to December deployment. What was President Carstens' evaluation of how deep the oppostion runs and what was President Reagan's response?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He pointed out that there are groups in Germany opposed -- the peace movement, the Greens, but he said that he was confident that the government could go ahead.

Q What about President Reagan? Did he make any observations on this issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he was really being briefed by the President on the German domestic situation.

Q Was there any sense that these demonstrations might be less virulent this fall because of recent events? Any assessment by the Germans that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have heard such an assessment. That assessment, though, wasn't really made today. It was really more of a discussion of what the climate is and really a kind of optimistic assessment of the ability of the German government to follow through on its commitment.

Q Was there any discussion of German reunification, specifically, the not so veiled threats by the Soviets that by standing with the West the Germans are losing their chance to get East Germany reunited with West Germany?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no discussion --

Q Carstens didn't express any -- you know, "We're taking this risk, we're doing this for a greater good."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no discussion. But I would just note, and I want to emphasize this wasn't discussed at the meeting, but that there were recent announcements made by the East German government which are fairly positive both on lowering the currency requirements for younger people who are visiting East Germany and also a decision to apparently remove these automatic weapons that are stationed at the wall. So --

Q What was the climate described as domestically? You said that the Germans described the climate --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I went through that. I said --

Q Optimistic? Was that the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said that the government and Carstens -- and the President was optimistic that the government could follow through, that he mentioned that there were groups opposed to this deployment but that he was confident that they would be able to follow through.

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Q Does that mean by controlling demonstrations or the fact that there may not be any demonstrations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think everyone assumes there will be some demonstrations.

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Q You said that President Carstens in the meeting reiterated the German government intent to go ahead with deployment. I notice in his public remarks he did not mention deployment. Is there any disappointment that he did not say that publicly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I would have to look at his public remarks, but he was just very clear on this. And when we say go ahead with deployment, we're talking about in the absence of an agreement.

Q Well, all right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But, no, there's absolutely no disappointment.

Q When you said Carstens said he could speak for all parties, did you mean the political parties such as the Greens and the other peace movements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He said that he was -- could speak on the question of NATO solidarity, that all, I imagine, the political parties represented in the Bundestag.

Q Was there any feeling expressed by either president one way or the other on whether there was going to be an agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think both sides hoped that there would be an agreement, but at the same time there was a recognition that as long as the Soviets felt that they could achieve their objectives without having to pay a price, in other words, stop the deployment without having to reduce their forces, that they might have fewer incentives to do so, that there was a recognition that the Soviets have surprised us in the past and could surprise us again and could finally get serious at the negotiating table prior to deployment. So, in other words, I think that no one has given up on the possibility of achieving an outcome, an agreement prior to deployment.

Q Can I follow that up? Do either or both of the presidents feel that the recent U.S. proposals on nuclear arms last weekend -- the one that's coming up today -- will substantially improve the prospects for an agreement with the Soviet Union?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You just can't -- I don't think they -- I think they both recognize and, generally speaking, I think we recognize that you can't talk about improving the prospects for an agreement unilaterally. It's up to the other side. And it's not clear to us that the Soviets are interested in achieving an agreement. They have taken a very intransigent position in the INF negotiations. They continue to insist that they be the only power in the negotiations that be allowed to deploy these weapons. Their approach in the negotiations is that they refuse to envisage any agreement that provides or permits the deployment of a single U.S. system.

Q What relationship do you see between the two talks? I mean, do you think that any progress in START depends on an agreement in INF or do you think they'd proceed on their own?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't think there's any mechanical relationship. Clearly perhaps progress in one would improve the climate for progress in the other.

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But we don't have -- see any mechanical or formal linkage between the two. We'd like to make progress in both.

Q Was there any discussion of the large U.S. budget deficits and the high interest rates that result thereof?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None.

Q In view of the Soviets entrenched position, did either Carstens or Genscher suggest that perhaps another modification in the West's INF proposal might be made before December?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was a discussion of continuing consultations. But there was no discussion of any new proposals.

Q Did the French and British forces come up in the discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:50 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL ON THE START PROPOSALS

October 4,1983

The Briefing Room

1:37 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: Will you sit down, please. We are very limited on time. If you will sit down, we can pass these things out a lot faster, please. What we're handing out is the fact sheet on the President's statement this afternoon and the personnel announcement for James Woolsey. The statement, the President's statement, the advance text is being run off right now and we'll have it before the end of this briefing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When President Reagan took office, he directed that there be an interagency study of our national security and foreign policies and a central part of that was a study of how arms control and defense programs should work together to provide for enhanced security for the United States.

His first major announcement in that area was not only the strategic force modernization program in October of '81, but also his 1981 speech in which he laid out four major areas of interest. We know these as INF, START, conventional arms control, and confidence-building measures. And over the last two years,you have seen that plan in SALT play out. In June of last year the President announced his new START proposal. The focus of that proposal was on trying to provide stability at reduced levels.

As you will remember, the initial proposal provided for phased reductions, in which there were two phases. The first phase focused primarily on the fast-flying systems, ballistic missiles; a second phase that would focus on less threatening, less destabilizing systems. During the course of the last year it has become readily apparent to everyone that if there's going to be success in the negotiations, two things were going to have to happen.

One is that there is going to have to be a modernization program that would provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate, and the second was that there would have to be a unity within the Western democracies and bipartisan support within the United States. A manifestation of our efforts to achieve both support for the strategic programs and the bipartisan support for arms control was seen in the Scowcroft Commission report, and you will remember in June the President announced some new initiatives which were to be implemented in round four of the negotiations.

Most people are not aware that, in fact, a great deal happened during round four on the part of the United States. We did more then simply relax our requirement for a limit of 850 ballistic missiles; we removed the dividing line between the two phases,putting everything on the table. We agreed to limitations -- we agreed to discuss limitations on bombers and air-launched cruise missiles at below SALT II levels. We proposed some other limitations designed to enhance stability.

That was a part of our effort, building upon the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. As you all are well aware, at the same time we were working closely with the Congress on other aspects of arms control, including the concept of a build-down in which you would, for each new weapon introduced into the force, you would reduce a larger number of warheads. And what the President will do today is announce his initiatives for the next round of START and included in that will be proposals for mutual, guaranteed build-down.

The fact sheet that you've been given sort of summarizes

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those issues, so what I'd like to do is -- let's see, just take questions.

Q The 5 percent build-down is in what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ballistic missile warheads.

Q It's in warheads, it's measured in warheads?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Is it measured in throwweight, too? How does it bear on throwweight?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we have said is this: we are putting forth a proposal that provides for a build-down in ballistic missile warheads and we are prepared to propose a concurrent build-down in bombers. We understand that we seek limitations in the destructive capability and potential of ballistic missiles and that the price for getting that will be limitations on areas in which we have advantage which is primarily in the bomber area. And the instructions that the delegation will take back provide for a more explicit reference to those trade-offs.

Q So -- wait a minute. So, it's an indirect goal and not the direct -- It's an indirect objective, not the direct objective the Pentagon wanted. Is that correct? Throwweight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. You mean on the throwweight question?

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no.

Q -- Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we have said to the Soviet Union already is that we are prepared to approach the question of destructive capability and potential by a variety of means. And what we have said to them is that we are prepared to go with the -- what we will call the indirect approach, which is various subceilings and sublimits, which was part of our Phase I Proposal. But we have also said to them we're prepared to discuss the direct limits, sort of aggregate approaches.

In our interest, of course, is getting those limits on ballistic missiles.

Q But in this respect the overture from last time has been modified to say that you're also willing to approach the issue of throwweight indirectly by saying -- applying it to cutbacks in bombers -- cutbacks in missiles. Is that the trade-off provision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If the Soviet Union has a proposal, we're prepared to explore proposals in which limitations on missiles are balanced by limitations on bombers. And there are many approaches to this. Some are direct. Some are indirect. Some are hybrids. And we're not prepared to say right now exactly what it would be. We need to talk to the Soviet Union a bit about some of these concepts.

Some of these concepts that we're talking about are new to the Soviet Union, and it's going to take some explaining so that they will understand some of the approaches that are possible. Some of their approaches are more traditional, and they won't take much --

Q Wouldn't most of this build-down take place anyway, though, under the current U.S. proposals? In other words, isn't a lot of this inherent in the second version of the START proposals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Because of the way this is proposed, we're not talking simply about reaching a reduced limit by X date, but we are talking about guaranteed percentages occurring and with incentives to move in stabilizing directions. There is a price if you want to go in destabilizing directions and that is you have to reduce much more quickly.

Q Precisely how does linking it to modernization work so that the Soviets don't have to scrap a lot of their heavy missiles? Give us a formula.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me give you an example. This is an illustrative example. You might say that in the course of modernization that for every land-based missile warhead you deploy you might have to take out, for an average new one, you would have to take out two old ones. But for, say, each submarine-based missile, for each two that you deploy, you would have to take out three old ones -- that is to say, a one and a half for one ratio.

Q I notice you have a five percent build-down for missiles but no percentage build-down for bombers. Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union --

Q -- percentage -- If it's five percent on ICBMs, on land-based ICBMs, obviously that means more to the -- more of a build-down to the Soviets than it would be to us. How do you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are not putting forth unfair or inequitable proposals, but -- we have said is our primary interest, the centerpiece of our strategic arms proposal remains a desire to get ballistic missile warheads down to five thousand.

Q Okay. But in getting down there to five thousand, are we prepared to go five percent or some kind of percentage on bombers that will equal out with the percentage that they would have to go on ballistic missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is something we can discuss with the Soviet Union --

Q Why didn't you include a percentage in bombers where we had the advantage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because have a negotiation going on.

Q In effect, are you saying to the Soviets, "What percentage reduction in bombers would you need to get to where we need to be on the missiles?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a possible formulation. I don't think that's exactly how it would take place in the negotiations.

Q How much throwweight would equal -- how much Soviet throwweight would equal one American bomber's?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't put forth that formulation to them. But clearly we're prepared to discuss a wide variety of trade-offs. And if they have some numbers involved, we're prepared to listen to their numbers. We might even at some point propose some numbers of our own.

Q -- you have some numbers in mind, but you're not telling us at this stage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't even told the Soviet Union.

Q Well, that's --

Q Are we? Are we initially going to have some numbers on the table in Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In time, we will propose some numbers on a -- in a variety of areas. Some will be initially.

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Q How does the position on the cruise differ from where the talks were left when they last recessed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we had indicated to the Soviet Union was that we were prepared to address their concerns in the ALCM areas in exchange for their addressing some concerns of ours. What we have proposed thus far is a -- limits on bombers below SALT II levels and limits on ALCM loading below SALT II levels. Now, the Soviet Union has come back and said that, well, if you multiply the two together, you come back with this very, verv high number. But I would remind you, by that logic under

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SALT II, if you have multiplied the numbers together you could have something like 37,000 ALCMs, but nobody ever contemplated 37,000 ALCMs. What we are prepared to do is to discuss with the Soviet Union limitations that would bring the -- bring some reassurance to them that we don't have outrageous plans for ALCMs.

But, frankly, they know we don't have outrageous plans for ALCMs.

Q Are your ALCMs figured into the bomber weight level? Is that part of the same formula?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are prepared to discuss with the Soviet Union limitations on bombers in exchange for getting limitationson ballistic missiles. The exact formulation of how those limits would take place, we have put forth some proposals and we are prepared to discuss some alternative proposals with them. And some of them might involve such calculations.

Q What is the purpose of the working group breaking it out, this issue of -- START, and do you expect it to accelerate progress and whom do you expect to head it? Can you talk about that in some detail?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The concept of a working group is not new to the negotiations. We have several working groups in INF. We have proposed a confidence-building measures working group in START, but thus far the Soviet Union has not been willing to establish that particular working group. There is a great deal of work that has to be done in any treaty.

Contrary to what some people have said, no treaty is simple. They are all complex; they all involve a great deal of technical and lawyer expertise -- legal expertise. The advantage of having a working group is that you can keep the big discussions on the big issues on track, but as you see problems that you can address you can work them in the working group. So the working group won't be the only place we discuss build-down, but it will be where we try to accelerate our understanding and our work on these proposals.

Q Well, are you aiming at some sort of interim agreement, like the Vladivostok Accord, through this mechanism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bob, it's a little premature to anticipate such things when they haven't been forthcoming on any of the major issues of concern to the West.

Q But on build-down, is build-down separate from the rest -- the body of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is an integral part of the START approach.

Q Well, no, but picking up on Bob's question, for the sake of an interim agreement, for the sake of some success -- and, by the way, all treaties don't take all these months to negotiate; they didn't take that long in the sixties. So assuming that something is attainable --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of them should have.

Q What do you mean, the testing of the atmosphere? You question that?

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Q It took ten days.

Q The question is --

Q What's the question?

Q The question is assuming that you are interested --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arms control is getting more and more complex, and I think everyone understands that.

Q Assuming that both -- if both sides, indeed, can agree on anything important, is it possible that something like a build-down will be separated out as an interim agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we have to talk to the Soviet Union about how it is we are going to reach an agreement on basic principles which divide us and basic trade-offs which have to be made. And it's just premature to talk about such things.

Q Getting a little bit off the subject of numbers, I haven't had a chance to read the President's remarks -- nobody has -- but I noticed that the President has --

Q I have.

Q I have.

Q -- noted, it says in the fact sheet, that the Soviet Union has not responded. He announced that the U.S. will continue to press for progress. The President directed that in Round 5 the U.S. delegation seek a more positive response to the additional flexibility demonstrated by the U.S. What does that mean? Seek a more -- it seems to me that that might be a sort of implied hint there that if we don't seek a more positive response and if we can't make progress then maybe that's the end of it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. The President, I think, has demonstrated his commitment, and the spirit of the way in which he is approaching the negotiations, when people ask whether or not he would cancel the talks in the context of the Korean airliner incident. And, clearly, he made his decision and he made it clear to the world. We are pressing to get an agreement. He is committed to that.

Q You keep talking about limitations on bombers in exchange for limitations on missiles. What does that -- how about the submarine, the third -- submarine-based missiles? Does that -- are you assuming that there is equality there, or that there is no necessity to make a deal on that part of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, clearly, that's an area in which they have certain quantitative advantages, we have certain quantitative and qualitative advantages, and both sides have development programs. And, clearly, any agreement would imply either we do slightly better or slightly worse than the situation might otherwise be.

Q What?

Q Do you think the President is betting on --

Q So what if --

Q -- the missile build-down on --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Say that again?

Q Is that included in the missile build-down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes; oh, yes.

Q Submarines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Submarine -- the warheads; yes.

Q Would the United States give up the entire Minuteman force to get 100 MX missiles under this proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so.

Q What, then, is the alternative if you should get a two-for-one build-down?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Charlie, the point is that, clearly, if and when we get a negotiated set of rules which apply both -- equally to the Soviet Union and the United States, both the United States and the Soviet Union will have to make some decisions about how they are going to structure their forces for the future under those rules.

We're not saying that the shoe won't pinch on our feet, too; it will.

Q Are you saying -- may I follow up on that? How integral to this proposal is the Midgetman concept? I mean if you're going to build down, I think the implication of the question is that you become more vulnerable with the MX. So how essential is it to proceed with Midgetman?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Part of our initiative, and a major part of what we are trying to do, is to encourage an environment in which both sides provide -- deploy increasingly survivable systems, to encourage deployment such as the small missile, or deployments in more survivable modes. And so we are trying not to discourage survivable deployments. We are trying to encourage them. And at the same time, we are trying to discourage the deployment of large numbers of systems which tend to cause concern about the stability of the balance.

Q Can I clarify that? In other words, when you said just now and I think also a moment ago that we're trying to move to more stabilizing and survivable systems, isn't that what you mean, that you're trying to move to a one-warhead missile concept for the United States' part?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, clearly, deployment --

Q Isn't that translated into what normal people can understand? Isn't that what you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would invite you to go back and take a look at the Scowcroft Commission report, which shows the integral relationship between small missiles, other missiles and arms control. And to point out that --

Q Well, not to -- your invitation. Can you just --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is clear to us, we are committed to the development of a small missile, because we can anticipate that a small missile would provide opportunities for an enhanced stability and increased survivability in our forestructure. And we also believe that in the forestructures that we see in the near term, it is essential that we have a system like the MX, to guarantee that we will have an overall enhanced deterrent.

But the mix can change, under the circumstances, and arms control can influence that.

Q Following on Charlie's question, doesn't this necessarily mean that we're going to have fewer than 100 MXs? And, secondly, doesn't this require deeper cuts on either side than either side is willing to tolerate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're clearly willing to tolerate the cuts. We're the ones that are proposing the significant reductions. But you raised a good question, which is in the last round it has become increasingly less certain that the Soviet Union itself is interested in significant reductions, if any reductions at all.

And that's one of the things that we clearly are trying to achieve.

Q How about the first part of that question, though, about the fewer than 100 MXs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right now, our program is 100 MXs. And whether or not arms control will change that remains to be seen, but let's see what we negotiate.

Q Could you explain the relationship between the three provisions under the build-down proposal? Does it mean, for example, that if you are able to negotiate a five percent mandatory build-down per year, that the modernization thing doesn't have to be -- that you don't have to get involved in that? You just go for a five percent build-down each year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Mike, what you would do is apply each rule to the force for the year. And whichever rule produced the greatest reduction, that would be the rule that applied. So, clearly, if the relationship was such that both sides did not modernize much, then you would -- the driving factor would be the guaranteed annual percentage of whatever is negotiated. If one side or the other or both decides to modernize at a particularly rapid rate, then it's the modernization rules that would drive. And, of course, those are subject to negotiations.

Q What if you have one side modernize a lot and the other doesn't? Which would apply, or would both apply?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the side that modernizes a lot would be driven by the modernization rule. The side that is not modernizing would be driven by the guaranteed annual percentage, which would guarantee that there would, in fact, be annual reductions. This is designed, by the way, Mike, to encourage stability during the reductions process, to make sure that you don't get one side simply freezing and achieving the military advantages of a freeze.

Q How many years of a treaty would you foresee? At five percent, what are we talking about, a three-year treaty? Five-year treaty? Ten-year?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it depends, again, on what the force levels are when you begin, what the floor is. In our case we're talking about 5000 for now. And the question is, whatever percentage rate you negotiate, that would determine the duration.

Q Can you assess --

Q I don't understand that.

Q -- that last question. Would the build-down ideally only take place until you got down to the 5000-warhead limit? Is that where it would --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're having trouble getting the Soviet Union to agree to any reductions. And so if we can get them to 5000, it's a good start.

Q That would be the floor under the build-down? Is that the way it's envisioned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you assess, please, what it does to the pace of negotiations to introduce so many new concepts into them at this late stage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's one of the reasons why we want the working group, is we've got a lot of issues that we've had some good progress in terms of presenting our basic views; we have not had good progress in terms of getting them to address our concerns, and we have these other approaches which are designed to try to see if we can reduce some differences and a working group, we think, would help us address some of these issues.

Q Doesn't it impede negotiations when one side keeps coming in with a new concept every new round?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that people oversimplify that. The truth of the matter is that we've been dealing with the Soviet Union for a long, long time and they are far more sophisticated in negotiations today than they were, say, in 1969 and 1970. We've got a lot of definitions worked out, a lot of concepts. They read our literature, they watch our debates, they read what you write. But it will take some time to go through some of this, but I don't think that is a major obstacle.

MR. JANKA: Thank you. Just a reminder. This is on background.

END 1:58 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SPANISH-AMERICAN COUNCIL MEETING
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1983, 4:35 P.M.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just want to give you an idea of what had happened today at this meeting between the Secretary of State and the Spanish Foreign Minister.

I brought with me [redacted] If there's any questions I can't answer, maybe they probably can.

Let me say that this was the first meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council under the Treaty of Friendship, Defense and Cooperation, which is the successor agreement to previous agreements that we've had with Spain. And it is also the first meeting of this Council since Spain joined NATO and thus became an ally of the United States.

Let me first give you some of the details on this schedule and what happened, and then we can talk a bit about what happened at the meeting itself.

The Secretary was tied up, giving a luncheon for President Carstens, the President of Germany, and so Deputy Secretary Dam hosted a lunch for the Spanish Foreign Minister. Following that luncheon the Secretary and the Spanish Foreign Minister met privately for forty-five minutes, following which the U.S.-Spanish Council met with a broader participation. That lasted from approximately 3:00 to 4:00 following which there were cocktails and a bit of entertainment.

The Spanish Foreign Minister left for the airport. He's going back to Spain this evening.

At the same time as the Deputy Secretary was giving lunch for the Spanish Foreign Minister, the chariman of the various committees that report to this Council were giving similar get-togethers for their Spanish colleagues. For instance, our Assistant Secretary for OES, Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs, was meeting with his colleague, and our Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was meeting with his colleague from the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

Both formal meetings of those committees either took place today or had taken place earlier. Most of those individuals thus met separately in addition to their participation in the Council Meeting.

The Secretary noted in his welcoming remarks that this was indeed a historic occasion but it was far from his first opportunity to meet with his colleague from the Government of Spain. I think it's fair to say, and it's my own judgment, that the relations, the intensity of the relations with Spain have been as intense as with any ally over the past year.

The Secretary has visited Madrid twice. The Spanish Foreign Minister has visited Washington twice, the first time with the Prime Minister a couple of months ago. There have also been other bilateral meetings at other venues between them, including at the last NATO meeting in Brussels.

There have a series of meetings, and the relationship between Foreign Minister Moran and Shultz has grown -- both of them took office at nearly the same time, and both of them have thus participated in the development of the new relationship with Spain which grows out of Spain's membership in NATO and the Spanish and U.S. conclusion of the Defense Agreement and its ratification which, again, took place under their terms of office.

In the meeting, he noted this historical context in which it was taking place. He then listed some of the areas where we see significant cooperation taking place in the context and under the aegis of the U.S.-Spanish Council. This includes, for instance, defense/industrial cooperation. That is, cooperation in the procurement, production of U.S.-related items. The U.S.-Spanish Agreement and, in particular, Spanish membership in NATO allows Spain a number of rights and privileges in terms of access to the U.S. market here. It allows us to waive the buy-American provisions which would otherwise apply. It allows us to waive some of the costs, such as the cost of research and development of weapon systems which we would have to apply if we were selling it to a non-ally.

There is a special committee under the Council set up to enhance cooperation between the U.S. and Spain in this area.

The Secretary noted that under the agreement we have been able to expand resources in the area of culture, education, science and technology exchanges between our countries. That we were also working to insure that there was full offset for major Spanish purchases of U.S. weapon systems, such as the F-18; that we were continuing to provide assistance to the Spanish air defense system -- Combat Grande -- which is a long-term project; that we were providing additional assistance to the port facilities at Rota, and that we hope to see the provisions of the agreement which provide for the possibility of enhanced military cooperation in new areas to be explored fully in the coming months and years.

Finally, the Secretary noted that there were continuing problems in our economic relationship. These derived, on the one hand, from the unfavorable balance of trade between Spain and the United States; that is, unfavorable to trade. There's approximately a 4 to 1 balance in the U.S. favor, not including investment and tourism which tends to change the balance somewhat less favorably for Spain, and also in the area of fisheries, and that we recognize that these are difficulties which we and the Spanish Government have to continue to work on. Although in both cases the legislation and other things inhibit the ability of the administrations on either side to influence the situation to some degree.

The Spanish Foreign Minister made a statement which I think it's fair to say paralleled the Secretary's in many ways. They noted the same areas of cooperation, the same general satisfaction and the same difficulties on which continued work was necessary.

The meeting then heard the reports, a summary of the reports of the six committees which had met earlier: The Science and Technology Committee -- the Environment and Science Committee; the Economic Committee; the Educational/Cultural Committee; the Defense Industrial Committee; Joint Military Committee; and the Political/Military -- Administrative Committee, following which there was an agreement to approve the reports, to approve the press statement which I think all of you have gotten, and the meeting concluded.

I will be delighted to take any questions.

Q The 4 to 1 trade inbalance, could you flush that out with figures?

A I can't. Do you have some of the figures?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The Secretary mentioned in a -- no, not on that.

Page 4 of this document could not be found.

Q Does the Spanish Government agree that the main problem is their unfamiliarity with American markets or do they tend to blame protectionist legislation?

A I don't know. It is not for me to speak for the Spanish Government. I think that insofar as they are talking to us, obviously, they are interested in what we can do. But I don't think they would suggest that the four-to-one imbalance results from U.S. protectionism.

They might well believe that the balance could be improved somewhat as a result of changes.

Q What does it mean to fully offset the Spanish purchases of U.S. weapons systems?

A It means that the U.S., particularly the firms involved in the sale, should try to find Spanish products in the same area, generally, to buy. For instance, I can't remember who makes the F-18 -- General Dynamics?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: McDonnell-Douglas.

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: McDonnell-Douglas. There are many things that in aerospacial -- you know, Spain has a fairly active aerospacial industry, as well, and McDonnell-Douglas, in entering into that agreement, would commit itself to buy a certain amount of Spanish products. There are areas in which the U.S. Government can facilitate this, as well.

Q Has McDonnell-Douglas, for instance?

A I don't know. Where does that happen?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: There are a number of areas where McDonnell-Douglas has made private arrangements with Spanish procurement agencies and companies to facilitate offset agreements, and this goes all the way from technological offsets, such as arrangements for coproduction to less technological areas like arranging to facilitate the sale of Spanish shoes in the United States and enhance tourism, and so forth.

But, again, these are private arrangements between the company, McDonnell-Douglas, the contractor, and the Spanish agencies. These are being finalized right now.

Q Would it ever work out to fully offset those purchases?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That is hard to say. I don't know. I know the Spanish will attempt to make sure that it does. But how the negotiations will go with McDonnell-Douglas, it is hard to say, right now.

Q What was the magnitude of that plane deal, the F-18?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It is $2.7 billion.

Q How many planes?

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It would be 72 planes, with an option to buy 12 more.

Q Can you say anything about our industrial cooperation in defense industries?

FIRST DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think this is an area where there are possibilities that the treaty opens up. I think that Spain, for instance, is interested in selling some aircraft, and there are other potentials, but I can't get too much more specific.

The legislation allows us to give Spain access to the market and to waive legislation -- the "Buy America" legislation -- which makes it more difficult for foreign contractors to bid for U.S. products, but it still requires that the Spanish enter the normal bidding process with both American and other allied firms.

That is, as you know, an intensely complex process which requires, among other things, a good understanding of the Pentagon procurement system. One of the things that we can do under the Spanish Council system is to provide both the Spanish Government and Spanish firms with a fuller understanding of how that process works, where the decisions are made, when they are made, what kind of input one can have into the system.

I think that is something that is just getting started, to a large degree.

Q So, in other words, the United States Government is not compelled to buy a single dollar of anything Spanish, necessarily.

A That is right. There is no indication that we have committed ourselves, nor have we been asked to commit ourselves in that regard. What we have been asked to do is to give them an opportunity to compete and to try to make an effort to insure that they are not disadvantaged in that competition through, among other things, lack of familiarity with it.

Q Were all of these issues reviewed at the working level over the past two days? What you are discussing now, does that fit into what has happened over the past two days?

A Yes.

Q At the working level?

A At the Assistant Secretary level and below. That obviously has been discussed continuously in Madrid and here with the Embassy, but there was discussion at the Assistant Secretary level, and that was more briefly discussed by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister.

Q When did the talks start?

A I think they arrived here on Saturday, and have been here since.

Q You emphasized earlier that this was a first meeting since the entry of Spain in NATO. Have Secretary Shultz and Minister Moran talked about NATO and the future of Spain in NATO or out of NATO?

A The Secretary made clear in the earlier meeting he had, the bilateral meeting, in his office before the Spanish Council meeting that we continue to hope that Spain will maintain its membership in NATO, and that we believe that this serves Spanish interests in a number of ways, including some of the specific ways I mentioned, but also in the broader contribution to Western security and stability and democracy, and that we continue to attach importance to that, and believe it was in Spanish national interest, as well.

Q Has the Spanish Minister related this question to the entrance of, or any kind of U.S. influence on the entrance of Spain in the European Community?

A Not on this occasion, but I think it is fair to say that the Spanish have made clear that in previous meetings -- I don't believe it was expressed this time, I could be wrong -- that progress on that issue would be helpful.

I don't think that we regard the two as directly and obviously linked. We do regard them as connected in the sense that democratization of Spain, the creation of a stable, functioning democratic system has obviously opened the way for Spain to participate more fully and more effectively in all of the Western institutions, and the EC and NATO are two of the most important Western institutions, and just as we support their participation in NATO, we support their full participation in the EC, and think that is a perfectly logical and reasonable development.

Q Some days ago, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was here and now the Foreign Minister of Spain, have they talked today something about Gibraltar, and the problem with the Spanish/British relations on the subject?

A I don't believe that that arose. We have made clear both to Spain and to Britain whenever the subject has arose that we regard this as an issue between two close friends, and we very much encourage both sides to work actively toward a resolution of the differences.

Q Continued Spanish participation in NATO, is that continued on a referendum?

A I think the plan of the Spanish Government is to hold a referendum on the issue of Spain's role in Western defenses and participation in NATO sometime, the time not yet specified.

Q Did the subject of United States policy in Latin America come up?

A There was a good deal of discussion of that, including a good deal of discussion at lunch, with Secretary Dam and Ambassador Enders, who, as you know, is presently the Ambassador to Spain, the former Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs.

I think the discussion was largely an intellectual exchange about the difficulties, economic difficulties, facing Latin America; problems of political stability in these societies, in which a very great coincidence of analysis and views emerged.

Q Did they say anything specifically about the presence or the alleged presence of Spanish terrorists in Central America -- Costa Rica or Nicaragua?

A No.

Q Any discussion of the possibility of a more active Spanish role in Central American diplomacy?

A Not per se. We welcome a Spanish role in Central America, Latin America. We think they can play an important influence. Certainly wouldn't discourage it, but there wasn't any sort of operational consideration of initiatives, or that sort of thing.

Q When Mr. Enders was Assistant Secretary, he went to Madrid to discuss this possibility, I think back in February. I just wondered whether he has pursued it at all since he became Ambassador.

A I think we have continued to pursue it in the sense that we and the Spanish have had fairly extensive exchanges about the situation. I think both of us support the concept that initiatives are going to have to arise out of the region, and that those should be supported by external countries.

Mr. Enders did not propose at that time, nor have we proposed since, a specific Spanish role, a mediating role, nor have the Spanish suggested it.

Q The Spanish Foreign Minister expressed this morning earlier, prior to the reunion, some wish to get some information, first-hand information, about the situation in Lebanon, and the U.S. position in Lebanon, and all that. Did he get that?

A Yes, there was a discussion of Lebanon.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:57 p.m.)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
ON
VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER WU XUEQIAN
MONDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1983, 11:00 A. M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'm introducing the confusion. I felt I couldn't start a breifing this morning without making some mention of the real tragedy in Rangoon, and the shock and sorrow that we feel about it which is, I think, even deeper than perhaps reflected in the kind of statements that we make in public which perhaps never quite do justice to the personal side of it.

Any death is saddening and particularly any act of terrorism, both in the case of the Korean Foreign Minister who was well known to many of us here in the State Department, including the Secretary, as a man of extraordinary intelligence, integrity and personal charm. He was a real leader in his country. As a native of North Korea he was a man who had spent much of his career looking for ways to improve the atmosphere between north and south.

It was my personal privilege to know him, and I couldn't begin this statement, frankly, without saying that I mourn his loss.

A number of the other people who were killed were also really remarkable men, and this is a real blow to us as well as to the South Korean Government. That was the point I would like to say at the beginning.

Q Can that be on the record?

A I'd just as soon that be ON BACKGROUND. I think I'm speaking really --

Q That's ludicrous. It's a personal tragedy to you and it's ON BACKGROUND.

A As you know, the Chinese Foreign Minister arrived today from Montreal. His name, by the way, is Wu Xueqian, if I have the pronounciation correct, to begin a five-day visit to this country.

His trip here reciprocates the Secretary's visit to Beijing last February, and is in response to an invitation extended to him at that time by the Secretary.

Wu and his party, totaling seven in all, will arrive from Canada where he's been on an official visit for the past few days via a brief stopover in Boston.

Our Ambassador in China and several other State officials will meet him in Boston and escort him on a flight to National that arrives at 1:50.

There will be no formal welcoming ceremony at the airport. I think you've all seen a copy of the Foreign Minister's schedule, so I won't repeat the details here. There are no formal events slated for today.

Q I haven't seen the schedule.

A You haven't seen the schedule? Can we get a copy of the schedule for them?

STAFF: We will get something.

A I could run through some of the highlights, if you want, then here. There are no formal events slated for today. Secretary and Mrs. Shultz will be hosting a small private dinner at their home this evening.

We see the principal purpose and merit of this trip as the opportunity it affords to maintain the momentum in our relationship with China, a momentum that I think began to be restored during the Secretary's discussions in Beijing last February and which has picked up over the spring and summer.

Among the events that have led to that, the major one, perhaps, was the President's decision to liberalize export controls on transfer of high technology items to China, an action which was perceived by the Chinese and correctly, I think, as evidence of the President's commitment to regard China as a friendly non-allied nation.

Among other events, I would cite the recent visit by Defense Secretary Weinberger to China which represented an important first step toward restoring a strategic component to the U.S.-China bilateral relationship.

Although the Wu visit follows closely on the heels of the Weinberger trip and is in no sense to be regarded as a follow-on visit, obviously, the agenda for talks between a U.S. Defense Secretary and his Chinese counterpart will differ markedly from that of a Secretary of State and a Foreign Minister.

During their three sessions of formal meetings on the 11th and 12th and in their wrap-up session on the 13th, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Wu will address a range of global, regional and bilateral issues of mutual interest.

The issues that were discussed during Weinberger's visit to Beijing and specifically a question of possible sale of arms to China I think will more likely be addressed in detail when Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping comes here some months from now to continue his talks with the Defense Secretary.

We look at the Wu visit as a part of normal high-level consultations between the two countries. That such consultations are mutually beneficial was affirmed by the U.S. and China in the 1972 Shanghai Communique and again last year in the August 17 Joint Communique.

That view is not simply diplomatic rhetoric. We consider that regular consultations are necessary to deepen our understanding of each other, to cooperate effectively with each other where we have parallel interests, to address such differences as we have in private and in a businesslike way, and to build a mutual trust which we both see as a prerequisite for understanding and cooperation.

We are pleased that our relations with China are back on track, and the two exchanges at the Secretary-Foreign Minsiter level -- in fact, three exchanges -- were possible in the same year.

We also look forward very much to the exchange of visits at even higher level when Premier Zhao comes here in January and President Reagan goes to China in April. But we are not looking for dramatic breakthroughs or major developments during Wu's visit here.

We think that simply the conducting of exchanges at this high level and the opportunity to exchange views in this way is of enormous value and is a sign of a normal and progressing relationship between our two countries. We've had a series of visits during this year, starting with the Secretary's visit to Beijing in February.

I've already mentioned, of course, Secretary Weinberger's visit. Presidential Science Adviser Keyworth was there in April, and Commerce Secretary Baldridge was there in May.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Bingqian has been here recently, and we have agreed on the visits by Premier Zhao in January and President Reagan in April. In sum, what we see as a process of businesslike talks on the principal issues which confront and concern us.

The Foreign Minister is scheduled to make a number of calls on other Cabinet Secretaries and on the President. He leaves Washington Thursday afternoon for a private two-day visit to Chicago. His principal host there will be the Chicago Council for Foreign Relations and the Mid-America Club.

Chicago was selected because it will be the site of a future Chinese Consulate-General under terms of a previous agreement with us. It calls for establishment of an American Consulate-General in Chengdu. Details of his schedule in Chicago apparently, I'm told, are available to you. If that's not the case, we'll get them made available.

Now I'm prepared to take any questions on the trip.

Q Did Shultz see Wu in New York too?

A No, he didn't.

Q On the list of appointments he sees the Science Adviser on Thursday I guess it is -- Wednesday or Thursday. Do you know that he's not coming with a shopping list?

A Do you mean a shopping list of --

Q High tech or military stuff.

A We have gotten various lists of items, including most recently when Weinberger was there. Those are things that we will be looking at. It's possible that he will raise additional ones. I just don't know.

Q Those are high technology items.

A In the case of the Weinberger visit, it was both -- we make this distinction -- it's important under our export regulations -- that dual-use technology which is adminstered under the Export Administration Act and military weapons which are administered under the Munitions Control Act and the procedures for approval of those two different kinds of sales are different under our system.

When Weinberger was there, he got some items that were dual-use technology intended by the Chinese for civilian purposes and some other items that were clearly munitions list items and intended by them for military purposes.

Q Could you tell us in more specific terms about how U.S.-Chinese strategic cooperation is proceeding with specific reference to places like Afghanistan and Cambodia?

A I think perhaps the best description of it is that we have, I think, common interests in political settlements of both of those conflicts, political settlements that rest in the first instance on withdrawal of Soviet forces and Vietnamese forces.

In the case of Kampuchea, at least, beyond just the withdrawal of Vietnames forces, there are a number of specific elements of a political settlement that had been outlined in the 1981 International Conference on Kampuchea that was held under U.N. auspices which in fact was a case of cooperation between the ASEAN country, ourselves and China to define some of the elements of the settlement.

I would say we have these common interests in the outcome. We have been following parallel but not identical policies. Visits of this kind are a useful opportunity to discuss things that we are doing, things that we might be doing, and to find ways in which we might perhaps more effectively cooperate.

Q Will this visit be used also as an opportunity to talk about the civil nuclear agreement, or is that not likely to come up in this one?

A It might come up. Ambassador Kennedy was in Beijing I think just about three weeks ago, just the week before Weinberger arrived, and held a round of what I think were quite productive talks, although there are some difficult issues outstanding between us, and we're still some ways away, I think, from a successful conclusion.

Whether those negotiations might be assisted in some measure by discussion of specific items between the Foreign Ministers, I'm not -- I'd be speculating. It's possible. It will take more detailed talks at the technical level before we wrap it up, though, but it's possible that some discussion between Shultz would be useful.

Q How about the issue of transfer -- third-party transfer -- as opposed to a technical issue. Will that be dealt with in this meeting?

A You're bringing up, really, a separate thing that's not connected to the --

Q That was one of the key items in the civil nuclear talks also.

A No. A key item in the civil nuclear talks is the question of Chinese assistance to third countries in building nucler weapons. That is to be distinguished from the question of transfer to third countries of U.S. technology which is a question that we have been addressing with them in the context of our general liberalization of civilian high technology to China.

I don't believe in the case of peaceful nuclear cooperation that we have any real issue about the transfer of our things to third countries. It's rather the broader category of Chinese assistance to third countries.

In the case of liberalized export controls, however, we have been discussing with the Chinese the need for certain assurances on the transfer of advanced U.S. technology to third countries, and that's a subject that might be pursued some also when the Foreign Minister is here.

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Q Maybe I didn't follow the stories from Weinberger's trip closely enough. I had the impression from press acounts of Weinberger's visit the the Chinese were not interested in military equipment, as such. But you're suggesting that they've actually given us a list of military equipment they would like to buy from us.

A They've given us a list of military equipment that they would like to know whether we would approve the sale of. They haven't said they want to buy it; that seems like quibbling.

They want to know what we will approve before they will indicate what they want to buy.

Q Didn't we in the last days of the Carter Administration give them such a list of things like Hercules transport, and that sort of thing?

A I'll have to check the record to be sure. I believe there was such an exchange, and then there was a subsequent exchange in 1981, following Haig's visit to China, when they gave us a list of items they were interested in. We gave them some preliminary indications of what we thought we might be able to go forward on, and then that exercise came to a complete halt because during the controversy over the Taiwan arms sales they indicated they didn't want to pursue this dicussion with us at all.

When we were in Beijing, we picked it up from that point at which point the Chinese noted that that list was somewhat out of date. I'll stop there.

Q So the ball is back now in our court, then? In other words, to look at the list that they've given us?

A In part, yes. In part, we're really grappling with a problem that comes partly out of just the newness of this whole process for both sides.

The Chinese really want treatment that is, in fact, different from what any other country that purchases military items from us receives. That is, our normal procedure is to wait until there's essentially a negotiated contract expressing a specific intent to buy something and then decide on a case-by-case basis whether the license will be approved.

What the Chinese are looking for is some indications of what things we will approve before they get into that kind of negotiation and that kind of request. I think in the long run -- and this may be quite a long run -- but if we got into a more normal relationship with them in this area, then we would expect it be treated much like any other country; that is to say, a case-by-case approval after a clear interest has been expressed.

Since it is a very new area for both of us, since the Chinese have some understandable sensitivities about asking for a whole range of things and then being turned down, we are trying to find some ways of giving positive guidance that would indicate the areas where we are prepared to go ahead. I think we've indicated a number of ways on a number of occasions the areas we think are more promising, particularly, to begin with, are the areas of anti-armor and anti-aircraft systems.

Your question was, whose court is the ball in. Partly, with this specific list, you could say the ball is in our court but partly we are trying to say, look this business of going at things by lists is not the way to do it. What we need to do is to have some understanding of what functions, what missions we might work together in helping your perform, and if we had an idea of those missions, then, we can give you a list of things that you may not even know about, for example, that are approvable and would be useful.

We're trying to get away from the list procedure. At the same time we would like to be responsive.

Q Is there any chance that the details of the China technology, export policy, will be announced during Wu's visit?

A There, the ball is very much in the Chinese court. As I say, we have really the one piece that is left to complete before we can issue the guidelines, these assurances on third-country tansfer. We've made some proposals to the Chinese; in fact, after some discussion, made some counter-proposals. So it's very much a matter of when they give back to us. It's possible they'll do it during the Wu visit, although this is a subject that is being handled more or less by their equivalent of the Commerce Department. And we've been handling through diplomatic channels in Beijing.

The answer is, I wouldn't expect it to be settled during his visit but it might --

Q What I think you're saying is it might be settled during the Wu visit but the the action is more likely to be happening elsewhere anyway?

A That's right.

Q In the areas of mutual interest to be discussed, do you have subjects on ways to lessen the tension in the Korean Peninsula?

A Clearly, the question of reducing tension in the Korean Peninsula is something that is of great importance, I think, to both China and the Untied States. I think there have been a number of positive indications from the Chinese side, although, unfortunately, their vote in the Security Council was not one of them. But there have been a number of positive indications on the Chinese side of a desire to at least more forward in a constructive way.

I would say the handling of the hijacking and their handling of some lower-level contacts with the South Koreans have been positive signs. So, clearly, we there is a common interest and there seems to be, at least, a positive atmosphere from the Chinese side. So we would certainly interested in anything they have to say.

We have to underscore that any discussion on this issue has got to proceed first and foremost from a very close consultation between us and the South Korean Government. So the most I think we would be doing would be listening to see if the Chinese have new ideas in this area, but we would be listening with great interest.

Q How did they vote on the various airline resolutions in the U.N.?

A They abstained.

Q On the ICAO as well?

A On both the ICAO and the Security Council resolution.

Q This is sort of off the wall. Is the Hu Na a dead issue at this point, or is that still a chafing thing on relations between the U.S. and China?

A I think it's an issue of the past.

Q Didn't they cut back cultural ties in the wake of that, and how do those ties stand now?

A They suspended certain activities during this calendar year. I think the assumption has been made that those will continue at the beginning of the year.

Is that correct?

STAFF: Yes. In fact, when Foreign Minister Wu gave his press conference just before leaving Peking, he said he said that renewal of cultural contacts was one of the subjects he wanted to pick up.

Q I'm sorry, we didn't hear that.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: One of his statements he made before he left Bejing was that renewal of cultural contacts with the United States was one of the subjects he wanted to pick up. That's official cultural contacts. The unofficial ones, which, in fact, I think are the great bulk, have proceed on.

Obviously that is an important area, the whole question of contact between us of students in this country, of Americans going to China, I think has been one of the great positive gains from this relationship. And, clearly, we would like to find ways to continue it and even expand it where appropriate.

Q Would you expect that this visit in the field of military technology sales, and so on, is going to -- there was a correlated question about whether there would be an announcement now. Is there more likely to be announcement during the Zhao visit? In other words, is this more of a setup for that January thing -- to give you two or three months to do that?

A Let me go over it again. There is some confusion, and I don't blame the press at all. It's a confusing subject.

There are three different areas that are under discussion. There is peaceful nuclear cooperation, which is the subject of the Kennedy talks which involves an agreement under which we could, for example, sell peaceful nuclear reactors to China. Those negotiations are largely governed by the requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which requires certain assurances be given to us before any peaceful U. S. technology can be sold to a foreign country.

The second category is essentially other civilian technology that comes under the restrictions of the Export Administration Act -- advance technology that particularly, I guess, is there because it's technology that has potential military as well as civilian applications. This includes things like high-speed computers, microelectronics manufacturing capabilities; and, in fact, about literally thousands of different products.

That was the subject of the President's decision back in May to reclassify China as a friendly non-allied country for the purposes of the Export Administration Act controls, and that was the object of an exercise that we conducted here in Washington over the last four months to develop new guidelines in this area that would provide for a substantially liberalized flow of that dual-use technology to China.

The publication of those guidelines is what is waiting on the third country assurances from the Chinese.

The third area -- military sales -- which includes some weapon systems and some technology that is exclusively a military application is the subject that was -- the discussion of which was resumed during Weinberger's visit to Bejing and where I wouldn't expect any major moves in the near future. I expect it will be discussed next at a high level when Defense Minister Zhang comes to Washington. We don't have a specific time for that visit, but I expect it probably would be after Premier Zhao comes here.

Q May I ask on another subject?

A I think not. The ground rule is we stick to this one. Frankly, that's what I came prepared for.

(Background briefing concluded at 11:30 a.m.)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL
ON
VISIT OF FOREIGN MINISTER WU XUEOIAN
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1983, 5:10 P.M.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I don't have any formal statement but just a few remarks.

I think this was a very good visit. The talks were friendly, frank and constructive. They were also very lengthy. The number of topics that were covered of global issues, regional issues, bilateral issues is kind of a testimony to the breadth of the relationship. The fact is that they had extended their schedule six hours of meetings to about eight, and then had a wrap-session this afternoon and gone into a little business as well; it went over half an hour. It was a lengthy and extensive discussion; very useful ones.

Q You mean those with Shultz were eight hours?

A With Shultz alone, yes. He also had nearly an hour with the President. He met with Secretary Regan, Secretary Baldrige, Science Advisor Keyworth.

Have I missed any other Cabinet officiers? I think that's the list. Excuse me, and Deputy Secretary Thayer. Weinberger was off in Korea. I think he chatted briefly with Weinberger just before Weinberger. He chatted at the dinner.

I think these talks were very constructive. They helped to lay the groundwork for what we hope will be very useful exchange of high-level visits when Premier Zhao comes here in January and when the President goes to China in April.

There were no breakthroughs, as I indicated in my original backgrounder. We didn't expect any. I think our relationship is on the kind of basis now where we have a lot in common, a lot to talk about, that we can usefully learn from one another, and quite a few problems as well that take time and have to be worked on. I think there was a general agreement that we had made considerable progress in the relationship since the two Ministers met in Beijing in February, and that we look forward to continuing that progress over the coming months and through the two very important visits that we have scheduled for next year.

I guess I'll stop there and be glad to take your questions.

Q Did he come with a list of categories of arms that China would like to buy?

A No, he did not come with any additional lists. There was discussion of lists that we have gotten previously and agreement on both sides that we would like to move ahead and get them some answers about those issues, but also tha we would like, at least in our view, that we would like to get that whole discussion ouside of the framework of a specific shopping list and into a better understanding of what areas they can use our help in and How we can then best provide that.

Q Did he made any assurances about China's third country sales of U.S. technology?

A The general rule, in case you don't know, is that I don't like to characterize what the other said. That's up to them to do. The subject was discussed. Our strong concern to have that kind of assurance before we put the new tech transfer policy in place was made clear again. I think there was some progress registered during the discussions here but we'll still have to work on the issue through diplomatic channels, probably in Beijing.

As I indicated on their side, this is principally a matter of concern to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and the details have got to be worked out with them.

Q Was there any discussion of the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and China might do in view of the fact it does have a good relationship with North Korea?

A I guess what I can say is that there was fairly discussion of that subject. We registered strongly our concern about the Rangoon bombing, about the fact that South Korea seems to be the object of this kind of terrorism and, thus, then only underscores the importance of efforts to find ways to reduce tensions. That, I think, is a long-term interest that we and China both share although we may go at it in different ways.

Q Was there any new idea from the Chinese Foreign Minister about the ways to reduce tension on South Korea -- I mean, the Koean Peninsula?

A I don't want to characterize specifically what they said.

Q Why did you cancel the press conference in Chicago?

A We didn't cancel it. Apparently, the Chinese side cancelled it. I think mostly sheer exhaustion, frankly. The Minister really has been overworked. Apparently he met with fifty Foreign Ministers when he was at the U.N. General Assembly, I think, in a space of a week which is mind-boggling to me. We certainly put him through a very, very tough schedule here. I think, frankly, he wants to take the time off in Chicago.

Q What aspect of the Taiwan question was discussed, or aspects?

A It was discussed in terms of its affect on our relationship, discussed in terms of -- at least they talked to us some about their attitude, about their 9-point proposal. Our position has been, and we have simply reiterated it, that there are differences between us. We know there are differences between us on this issue. We are trying to approaches those differences by adhering faithfully to the communiques that we have signed. Regarding the issue of Taiwan is something that the Chinese on both Taiwan and the Mainland have got to resolve between themselves.

Our interest is, and hope, that resolution will take place peacefully.

Q Excuse me, if I may follow on that. Some of the reports I read of interviews with Minister Wu, he has said that he did not think we were adhering faithfully to the communiques. Did he bring that up?

A We think we are adhering to it. There are obviously some differences of view about it, but, frankly, over time, I think we will probably accept -- I mean, our point has been rather than quibbling about specific interpretations, look at our actions over time; and over time you'll see a trend, as the communiques suggests, that there should be.

Q I gather from what you're saying that he said he still doesn't think we're adhering to it.

A I don't think he put it in quite those terms. You would have to ask him how he put it. I don't want to characterize it. I'll just tell our position is that rather than getting into disputations about specific commas and specific words in the communique, we know there are some differences about how it's looked it. We, for example, have recognized that if one is to look at quanities in terms of dollar figures, then you've got to take account of the fact that dollars inflate. But the main point is that over time they can expect to see a trend. And our basic message is, we take the commitment seriously; the President takes the commitment seriously, and we intend to live by it.

Q On Monday, you said there are three different areas in which there will be discussions regarding the transfer of different kinds of things. The first one was on peaceful nuclear cooperation. Can you kind of just go through these three areas as to where we stand on the basis of these discussions.

A Okay. I'm not sure I can be all that helpful, but I'll try.

As it turned out, all three of those were discussed. I was more trying to indicate the difference because each one is fairly complicated and each one we have specific restrictions imposed on us by law and the restrictions are different. It really is hard to keep it straight. I noticed many press stories written by very good journalists that don't get it straight.

I think the Chinese have -- one of the reasons we have these very long discussions is that it takes a lot of time to explain it. And, to be honest with you, sometimes I'm not sure I have it straight.

Let me start with what I think is really the most important, and that is dual-use technology; the technology that is licensed under the Export Administration Act, which has been the subject of major attention by us, ever since Secretary Shultz' visit to Beijing in February. In fact, I can almost say that the most important thing we learned in that visit was the depth of Chinese concern on that issue and some of the specific points on which they were concerned. That was discussed, I believe it's fair say, largely in terms of both sides recognizing -- although you would have to ask them to speak for themselves -- I think there's a recognition on both sides of the significance of the President's decision to reclassify China in Category V, as it's called, under the Export Regulations, and of our subsequently developed guidelines that would provide for a substantial liberalization of controls on exports to China.

There was specific discussion, as I've already mentioned, of our need for assurances against the unauthorized re-transfer of our technology to third countries. That was not concluded, but I think we made some progress.

The second area, the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation, was discussed at some length. The Chinese did announce to us -- and this is a matter of public record now -- I believe that they, as of yesterday it is, joined the IAEA which is a very significant step in bringing China in as a responsible player in international, peaceful nuclear programs.

It is well know that China has some serious reservations about the Non-proliferation Treaty and certain other aspects that flow from it, just as I believe the French do and for similar reasons.

We explained to them the requirements that we have under our law for certain kinds of assurances if we are to trade in peaceful nuclear technology with countries; for certain kinds of assurances both about how our specific technology will be used and also about how the country receiving it will behave in its general dealings with other countries. This is a very tough issue.

Ambassador Kennedy had a round of talks in Beijing that were useful. I think the discussions here this week, I hope, have moved us forward some, but we're still some distance from concluding an agreement there.

The agreement is important both because of what it would represent in terms of China's effective participation in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons; and also because it would open the way to what I think could be very mutually beneficial trade in advanced nuclear reactors, and so forth, that we can sell them.

The third area is the area of military technology. It was discussed briefly with the Secretary. The point there simply being to register the importance of the discussions that Secretary Weinberger and members of his party held while he was in Beijing, and then it was discussed in considerably more detail when Deputy Secretary of Defense Thayer and Assistant Secretary Armitage called on the Minister yesterday.

Frankly, I thought we had covered the subject in such detail when Weinberger was there that now it was a matter of get back to the staff work and figure out our own positions a little better. But, actually, I think the discussion we had yesterday gave us a clearer picture of a couple of points that the Chinese were stressing, and I think they have gotten a clearer picture on our side.

For example, in the case of things they've asked for, it's mostly a matter now of our going back and doing our staff work, making our policy decisions and deciding what kinds of things we can move ahead on.

--MORE--

Q Are they closer to accepting our notion of how this ought to be done as opposed to their notion, or is that still a standoff?

A Maybe I wasn't sufficiently clear in my first backgrounder. There are these two notions, but I think we're going to have to proceed with them both in parallel.

There's a sort of matter of confidence-building and some development of understanding that we can make the process work. I think, frankly, in the end if we can show that our way works, which I believe we can, then I think they'll be comfortable with it.

In the meantime, when they ask us about some specific items, I think they're entitled to an answer. As we said, it isn't necessarily going to be a positive answer, but they should get either a "yes" or a "no" or a "not for now."

Q Back on the first point of dual-use technology, are you any closer now to the publication of the new guidlines, the liberalized guidelines, than you were before this visit, or do you still expect that to take place much later?

A It's dangerous to set deadlines for yourself. I think we're closer, and I don't think it need be much later, but --

Q Vis-a-vis the Premier's visit: Before, after, during?

A I would hope before. As I understand the problem, that they have got to go back and go a little work of their own. As they presented it to us, it would seem like something that we could solve faster than that.

Q What about time-frame for any possible military sales? Would that also --

A I think that's further off. I think it's possible that we might make some progress sooner, but I think we certainly are thinking of a return visit by the Defense Minister some time next year as being a logical point by which we'd want to be sure we had made progress.

Q After Zhao but before the President's visit?

A That isn't scheduled yet, but I would assume it's most likely to be after Zhao, and it could well be before the President goes to China. But we've just barely begun to talk about dates.

Q Did the subject of SS-20s come up, and, if so, which side raised it and what was said?

A Yes. It came up. It was discussed. I just don't want to start characterizing their views of it. I'm not sure which one of us raised it first, frankly.

We talked about it in terms of general concern about Soviet military activities and in relations to the ongoing arms control efforts, and it was in a sense also -- there was a more general discussion of arms control surrounding the proposal that the Foreign Minister made at the United Nations which I guess some of you know is a sort of three-part thing suggesting that the U.S. and the Soviet Union should, (1) stop further production and deployment, (2) reduce by half what they have, and then (3) China and other smaller nuclear powers should join in a kind of multilateral discussion.

The Secretary explained, I think rather clearly, our concerns on the one hand that a simple freeze when the Soviet Union has some very important areas of unlateral advantage, specifically including the SS-20, is simply not acceptable to us; and, secondly, that we believe certain kinds of modernization should proceed because they're actually stabilizing rather than destabilizing.

But that the general spirit of a substantial reduction in nuclear weapons is exactly what we're trying to accomplish, both in the INF talks and in START.

Q By saying that the SS-20s was discussed, is it fair to assume that that means that both sides have something to say in response to the other, that there was an actual discussion rather than a statement by one side and silence?

A There was an exchange. Yes.

Q What is the specific time for the Chinese Premier's visit to the United States?

A We talked about it. I think we made some progress on it, but that one isn't quite wrapped up yet.

Q Did Mr. Wu raise the issues of Taiwan relations, and how much time did you spend on the Taiwan-related issues?

A I can't measure exact time. Again, you'd have to ask him what he specifically raised. It's a serious issue, and it has got, I think, a serious amount of discussion, but it by no means was the dominant topic. Even in our bilateral sessions, we had many other subjects that we talked about.

Q Did Mr. Wu express any desire that the U.S. supply military aid to Prince Sihanouk and Son Sen?

A Again, that's a position -- I think it's fairly well known the Chinese have generally urged all countries, including the Unite States, to do more -- or to do whatever they can to support the various resistance factions in Kampuchea.

We have our own constraints, of which of course the most important one and that we have stressed very clearly to them as well and during these discussions is that whatever we do, we will have nothing to do with the Khmer Rouge.

But there was a fairly lengthy discussion on the subject of Kampuchea -- I think a very useful one -- and while our policies are not exactly the same, I think we generally have a common purpose, and that common purpose is to see Vietnamese withdrawal and the free election of an independent Kampuchean Government under U.N.-supervised elections.

Q Did Minister Wu announce to the U.S. that formal official cultural exchanges will resume after the first of the year, or is that still an unresolved --

A It didn't come quite in the form of an announcement, but the Secretary and the Minister agreed that we should resume those exchanges and their Ministry of Culture and our Embassy in Beijing, representing the USIS, will be in contact to develop a program.

Q First of the year? As of what date?

A Next year.

Q Did the Chinese talk about their --

A Excuse me. For next year. I assume they'll be in contact much sooner than that.

Q Did the Chinese talk about their ongoing negotiations with the Soviets and indicate to what degree they thought their might be a relaxation or the degree to which the Soviets might meet some of those three and a half, four points that the Chinese are setting forth? And to what degree did we explore the possibility of a Sino-Soviet reconciliation?

A Really, again, have to be very careful about characterizing what they have said, but we had a rather rich exchange on the subject of discussions with the Soviets. I don't think it's going too far to say that I think there's a fairly healthy skepticism on both sides about Soviet intentions, and at least about the seriousness with which Soviets have so far been negotiating.

Q Soviet intentions with respect to --

A I guess I mean it both with respect to the negotiations that they're conducting and also Soviet intentions in any strategic sense as reflected in what they've done in Afghanistan, what they're doing in Southeast Asia.

As far as we're concerned, although we recognize there are many problems in Central America the Soviets have nothing to do with, that we believe that's another important reflection of the Soviet strategy.

Q Underscoring of a shared wariness of the Soviets as a military threat. Is that what it comes to?

A I think that was the general tone one could gather from a lot of it. Yes.

Q Could I follow on that one? Whether the Secretary expressed any concern that the Chinese alter their public statements on the nature of the Soviet threat to reflect more accurately the hard-line views that they express privately?

A We have indicated and did indicate now that we think that what is said in public is important. We think it's particularly important not to say things that seem to confuse the United States and the Soviet Union; that our policies and our purposes are very, very different.

It's also clear that China puts a very high premium on both the fact and the appearance of independence in its foreign policy, and that's something that affects what they say.

Q On my question again, if I may ask you: Was there any indication that the Chinese in any way expect some sort of progress toward a breakthrough in these Sino-Soviet --

A You better ask them that. I can't say.

Q What is your understanding of how those talks are going?

A My understanding of how those talks are going is that the Chinese are serious, and I'm not saying this is what they told us. My understanding, both from what we've heard today and more generally, the Chinese are serious when they talk about these three obstacles sometimes -- I guess you know, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and the border which is sometimes broken out into Mongolia and occasionally even the SS-20 is suggested as a separate obstacle.

It's a measure of just how serious they are about the negotiations, I think, that they view those obstacles as major ones, and so far I don't see any sign that the Soviets are budging. Therefore, I've got to conclude that while there may be a certain amount of cosmetic improvement, we've noted some increase in trade from the -- it's still at extremely low levels.

But I think unless there's a really major change in Soviet policy, I don't think there's going to be a major change in Sino-Soviet relations.

Q Did the normalization of China's relations with India appear in the talks? And, if so, was there an exchange of views on American and Chinese perceptions in this area?

And the second question would be, was there any discussion of U.S.-Chinese cooperation on development issues with reference particularly to the multilateral development institutions?

A The answer to the first question is no, that subject was not discussed. There was some discussion of development issues and also a broader discussion of the state of the international economy and its effects on developing countries.

I think we explained our view. In response to some comments and a bit of criticism from the Chinese, we explained our view that we think in fact we are making good progress on economic recovery and that that is taking a form which is in fact providing a major benefit to the developing world.

I guess I have time for one more.

Q Did the U.S. side bring up with the Chinese their abstention in the United Nations with regard to the Korean airliner matter?

A We have brought it up with them so many times. I'm not sure we brought it up during this visit, though.

Q Secondly, you may be aware that there have been reports that the United States Government is considering a very large cut in aid to Zimbabwe because of their abstention.

Is there any plan within the U.S. Government to take any reprisals against the People's Republic of China because of their abstention?

A We looked at our aid program to China after the U.N. vote, but we found that there wasn't any, so --

Q There are lots of other business we have with China besides aid. Are we going to do anything against them because of this?

A Other than expressing our concern about it, in the end I'm not sure there's a lot that we can do, but we did express our concern very strongly.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 5:37 p.m.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 22, 1983
No. 401

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE HONORABLE ALLAN J. MACEACHEN,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF CANADA
HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA
OCTOBER 17, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'd like to express my appreciation to Allan MacEachen and his colleagues and to the people of Halifax for the very good setting, the good conversation that we've had. We've had a very worthwhile meeting from my standpoint and so I'm glad to have had the opportunity once again to have the meeting. I'm glad that Bill Ruckelshaus was able to join me and help in signing the agreement on phosphorous, and also to help in explaining about acid rain.

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Well, I certainly share Mr. Shultz's appreciation of the meeting. I think it was an extremely good meeting. I appreciate his presence in Canada for another meeting particularly in Halifax. Also the presence of Mr. Ruckelshaus because it illustrates the importance which both governments attach to environmental questions and the necessity of making progress as we are both determined to do in the future. We had a pretty thorough canvas of bilateral questions and that has been the practice at our regular meeting and I think I can say that the question of bilateral issues has never been addressed more intensively in the past and we have certainly appreciated that development. On multilateral questions East-West relations, alliance questions were part of our discussions and certainly as I stated in my address last evening Canada stands with the United States and its other allies in support of the two-track NATO decision and the implications of that decision as may be demonstrated in the deployment of missiles in Europe in the absence of satisfactory agreement. We have demonstrated our solidarity with the alliance with our association with the United States in our commitment to test the cruise missile. Those decisions are still very important parts of Canadian foreign policy and I believe that constituted a very important common cornerstone of our discussions.

QUESTION: Secretary Shultz, did you have communication with Foreign Minister Genscher; if so could you share with us some of the background he gave you on his meeting with Mr. Gromyko?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've a cable from Foreign Minister Genscher which I received just a few minutes ago here, and basically it said that immediately as he has returned to Bonn he has asked our Ambassador Arthur Burns to see him, and I believe by this time that conversation has been completed so we'll be having a cable from Dr. Burns shortly and in the meantime he's sending two people who were present throughout the meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to Washington and they're leaving tomorrow morning and we will be meeting with them on Wednesday. So we'll be having a full readout, but as to the content I haven't received the material yet.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, may I ask whether you discussed with Mr. MacEachen the emphasis of the Canadian Government and that Mr. MacEachen has laid recently on the need to reduce the high level of rhetoric between the superpowers as a means of reducing tensions. If so, what response did you receive?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We discussed, of course, so called East-West issues at great length and I think very fully and I think we both expressed the importance of observing the situation accurately and describing it accurately - fully - of determination to maintain our strength and purposefulness. Mr. MacEachen has already mentioned the dual track decision and the determination to follow through on that and at the same time to maintain our posture of being ready for strong discussions and reasonable positions and positions of give and take in the various fora where we are meeting with the Soviet Union so I think we agree on the importance of all of those matters and I might say that I admire very much the strong statements and, for that matter, leadership that came from the Canadian side in the Korean airliner catastrophe. The Canadian position was immediate and strong and well out in front of many other countries.

QUESTION: Mr. Shultz, on the recent casualties of the marines in Lebanon: Will they be left there to take casualties or withdrawn?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Any casualties, of course, are matters of great concern and concern on the part of the President and all of us. The marines are there to serve a purpose. They're there along with the representatives of other countries in the multinational force of Italy, France and the United Kingdom and we are determined to see that purpose through and that's why they're there. As far as defending themselves is concerned, they will defend themselves.

QUESTION: You spoke of friendship between the two countries and the usefulness of these meetings to solve bilateral issues. One issue that is of great importance to a Nova Scotian is the boundary issue and the fishing rights on Georges Banks. Do you believe that we'll have to go all the way to the Hague before we get a solution to that problem?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, if it takes that then we'll do that, but we'll do it in a good spirit, in a sense of presenting our respective sides and in the sense of being prepared to accept whatever the verdict is. So, I think that's a good way to approach that. The subject of disputes over fishing matters is something I find as a Foreign Minister exists with many countries and fish seem to be the source of great tensions somehow or other. But we want to resolve these issues and I think in the case of West Coast salmon, to take another example, we did manage to keep things under control during the current fishing season and we both have agreed to instruct our negotiators to do everything they can to bring about a positive result of that particular negotiation.

QUESTION: Did you discuss that particular issue,Mr. MacEachen,or will you in future meetings?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Well the question of the boundary is now by agreement with both countires before the courts and ....

QUESTION: You don't forecast an out-of-court settlement?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: No because we did our best to reach a conclusion. Our best efforts didn't achieve that, and we have put the matter before the International Court. We are preparing,each of us,a case and it will be determined by the courts. That is our decision and that was not part of our discussion because that is in a sense an issue that has been dealt with in the past in that way. We did talk about, as the Secretary has stated, about not only Pacific salmon, but also the impact of possible investigations on the Canadian fishery by United States authority. We don't have at the moment in a sense major immediate live issues except on the necessity of concluding a treaty with respect to the Pacific salmon.

QUESTION: Are you more or less optimistic as a result of the Genscher-Gromyko meeting?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well as I've said I have no information directly from Mr. Genscher about the content of his discussions so I don't have a basis for answering your question.

QUESTION: The press said Mr. Gromyko indicated an agreement was still possible.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I'm glad to hear it.

QUESTION: Mr. MacEachen, in all the briefings we've had it has been suggested that in no way are you carrying a message from the Middle East on behalf of Mr. Shultz. Nevertheless you have spent several hours discussing the Middle East and I was wondering what sort of message on your own behalf you would be carrying to the Middle East and inasmuch as you are going to visit Damascus, Cairo, and Amman, what effect you think you can have on the current situation?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Well first, it is true that we did spend some time on the Middle East. I'm leaving for that part of the world tonight. I wanted to get the benefit of Mr. Shultz's experience in that area. Indeed, we did discuss that matter but I am not carrying any specific messages to the Middle East. My purpose is to conduct bilateral visits in five countries and to assess the situation. I have no plan to bring about peace there. I have expressed our support not only in our discussions this morning but earlier for the Reagan peace plan which offers the best promise for progress. I realize that the situation is very difficult and that no one, certainly not myself, sees light that would assure a settlement, but I certainly would encourage and did encourage Mr. Shultz to continue those efforts with the prospect that at some point there will be a breakthrough. I think we have to continue those efforts, but as far as Canada is concerned we do not seek a special role in that process.

QUESTION: What is Canada's position on the mercenary externally supported attacks on Nicaragua? Do you think Canada can do anything in this situation and did you discuss the matter with Secretary Shultz?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: We have as a matter of policy indicated our support for the Contadora Group. Recently in New York, I expressesd our political support for that effort and expressed an interest in contributing to that process if in our judgment we could make a contribution. I believe it is a step ahead that the twenty-one points of the Contadora ministers have now been agreed and it remains to see how they can be implemented through a political process. I also mentioned the speech that the President of the United States made to Congress in April on Central America and that his suggestion with respect to a possible military verified withdrawal of all forces from that area was a constructive one and that it should receive international support and that if the Contadora Group could accelerate a process leading in that direction then it would be very constructive in the Canadian point of view.

QUESTION: Does Canada have a position on the attacks on Nicaragua?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: I don't. I have not discussed specifically the attacks on Nicaragua. I have already discussed on an earlier occasion with Mr. Shultz our view as to how the military -- in our view how the solution to the situation in Central America does not rest in military roots. That is a Canadian point of view that we have discussed in the past and to which I refer today.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) (Relating to off shore gas production in Nova Scotia).

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Oh, I didn't press, not yet. That may come in the future.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thanks for the tip. (Laughter)

QUESTION: For the past couple of days you have spoken of the good relationship between Canada and the United States, there are at the moment a number of outstanding issues particularly in the area of trade for instance natural gas exports, specialty steel, etc. Can you tell use what progress you have made in these areas?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Well on natural gas we did discuss that. I think that is a situation that is moving, that there is a more accommodating atmosphere on that area in our meeting today. That we have attempted to make our gas export policy more market-sensitive, without speaking for Mr. Shultz, I think that has been noted by him. On specialty steel, of course, we have brought to the attention of the American authorities the impact of the application of Article Nineteen on Canadian sales and we are presently working as to -- Mr. Regan is working with Mr. Brock on possible solutions. I don't know if they will take place, but certainly it is an area where discussions and possible actions can take place.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd like to add a point. The trading relationship between the United States and Canada is the largest country-to-country trading relationship in the world. And I think you can make two inferences from that fact. Number one, we must be doing something right. Number two, there will always be problems and so these problems come and go and we try to work them out. I think when we talked the last time we talked a lot about trucking and lumber. We didn't talk about those anymore because those problems have been dealt with. I think that the proposal, the paper put forward by Mr. Regan on behalf of the Canadian Government on trade is a very interesting one and he proposed that we go about the continued opening of trade and I believe that something like 80 per cent of the trade takes place without any tariffs, quotas or anything, but continued opening on the basis of a sectoral approach and we think that offers some interesting possibilities so I would expect to see that pursued and specialty steel and petrochemicals I think were two areas that were put forward by Canada as subjects for discussions.

QUESTION: Mr. MacEachen, could we have your opinion on acid rain? Do you feel that there's been a set back or has the negotiations or talks on this slowed somewhat?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: No. I don't the talks have slowed. While yesterday we weren't able to conclude to the point where we could decide to have bilateral discussions looking to a bilateral agreement I think that the presence of Mr. Ruckelshaus and Mr. Shultz indicates the importance that the United States Government attaches to this question and I have to say that we would be much better pleased if Mr. Ruckelshaus has been able to disclose a final decision of the Administration that we could support. Nevertheless, we have made some progress in terms of acknowledging together that there is a real problem. The United States Administration is deeply concerned and that what is in issue now is what abatement programs might be put in place. I'm aware since we began our discussions between Mr. Shultz and myself, we have made progress, but we haven't yet reached the goals certainly that Canada wishes.

QUESTION: Mr. MacEachen, the four points raised by Mr. Ruckelshaus as where will the money come from, who's going to pay, how are we going to administer the rules and what kind of rules will we have. Do you have any opinion on how Canada views these four points?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: No, I don't have an opinion on these four points because they are issues that are the responsibility of the United States Administration. Mr. Ruckelshaus has made clear the situation that he has to deal with and I think that is the responsibility and not for me to make comments on, how each of them should be addressed.

QUESTION: Do you think it is feasible to try to bring about yet another withdrawal on the part of Israel in Lebanon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I think in Lebanon right now, of course, the effort is to see that the ceasefire does hold, that observers can be put in place, that the national reconciliation and broadening base of government discussions go forward and I believe that if those things can take place successfully then we have the basis for working on the wirthdrawal of foreign forces and of course that subject will be kept up front and precisely how that ought to be managed and who should do what is a matter for negotiation.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well countervailing duty and dumping cases can be brought by United States citizens, and it is up to them to decide if they want to bring a case in, and if they do then that will be taken up by the organization within the Commerce Department, and that's the process and I'll just stand on that process.

QUESTION: (inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you understand that a case under the countervailing duty law is not an action of the United States Government. It is an action that is open to anyone in the United States, a competent party that feels in some way aggrieved under our law, so the decision whether or not a case is going to be brought is up to individuals. Then the governmental authority examines the case and decides what to do about it and I might say the Canadian or whatever government or party is involved has ample opportunity to provide information.

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: May I make a comment? You mention the restructuring, I don't think that the issue may arise, soley in the interest of Senator Cohen, has anything to do with restructuring program in the Nova Scotia-New-Foundland fisheries.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd better be careful or it will be a closed case.

QUESTION: Mr. MacEachen, you mentioned earlier that Canada has an interest in contributing to the process in Central America. Did you make any commitment on what might contribute there? Was there any response by Mr. Shultz in terms of an interest in the Canadian contribution?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: No, I have made no commitments. We haven't had any request, even from the Contadora Group and if the request for assistance or a contribution were made we would obviously consider it. Without knowing much more about the circumstances that might prevail, it wouldn't be possible to give any commitment in advance.

QUESTION: Mr. MacEachen, a moment ago Mr. Shultz suggested that one of the problems in the Middle East was the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. You are going to be going to Damascus and I believe Syria was mentioned as a specific example. Could you enlarge a little bit about exactly what it is that you will be talking about in Damascus and how the Canadian position is either similar to or closely allied to that of the American position and what sort of effect or effort you will be able to bring in Damascus to restore some sort of order. What are you going to be saying in Damascus?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: The first point is that this is the first time that a Canadian minister has ever visited Damascus in an official capacity, has ever had a dialogue with the Government of Syria. And I think that's a very important objective in itself for Canada now to engage in a discussion, to understand more of what Syria wants to do, why it is pursuing certain courses, that is a very important object in itself that I intend to pursue, but beyond that I do not intend to present a proposal or to attempt to interject Canada into a situation for which we do not have an obvious role.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask the Minister why you think you do not have an obvious role when this is a situation that has been going on for years and Canada has a well formulated foreign policy and at least you can explain to them what the Canadian position is or attempt to do something. Is this surely just a fact finding mission after decades of knowledge between the two countries. Can you not -- are you not going to say something that would be of definitive value in putting forward or extending a peacekeeping role?

SECRETARY MACEACHEN: Well, most of my life I've been searching to say things that are of definitive value and if I find something I certainly will say it in Damascus (Laughter).

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Thank you very much.

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Press Conference
by
The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
En route from Halifax, Nova Scotia
to
Andrews Air Force Base
October 17, 1983

QUESTION: How do you think it is going to work? How do you see the operation working?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: John just had a phone call with the information. So, you're the one who did the talking. Why don't you tell them what you learned?

JOHN HUGHES: Well, I was told that the President went on television a couple of minutes ago, and announced that Bud McFarlane will succeed Judge Clark as the National Security Advisor.

Bud is going to answer a few questions after the President speaks. And that's the announcement.

QUESTION: He's going to do what?

JOHN HUGHES: He'll take a few questions after the President makes the announcement.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Inaudible) if they don't ask him certain questions, there will be an announcement later, so why don't you tell them --

JOHN HUGHES: If he is asked who his deputy is to be, he will say Poindexter. If he is not asked, the White House Press Office will announce that shortly thereafter.

QUESTION: What happens to Ambassador Kirkpatrick? Has she got a new job, or what?

JOHN HUGHES: I understand that he will say that she will remain in her place at the UN.

QUESTION: Indefinitely, or --

JOHN HUGHES: I don't know.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel this set-up is going to work? Have you had sufficient talks with McFarlane, or some general impression of what the President wants, to give you an idea of what the workings might be, and what way that might be different from the way that it is now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that what we will see is continuity. Bud McFarlane has been part of the process for quite a while. He is excellent, very good to work with, a real professional, knows the issues, fair-minded person, and he'll just be first-class.

QUESTION: Who now names his successor as the Middle East envoy? Does the President, is that you, or what?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is the President's special envoy, I guess is the title, so we will have to make a careful selection. I'm sure that whoever it is will work through the State Department as Phil did, as Bud did, and as Dick Stone does.

But at any rate, I think it is important to have a Presidential envoy. It really makes a big difference.

QUESTION: You want to keep having one?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Absolutely, yes, we do.

QUESTION: Do you think he will come from State, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we will have to pick the best person that we can find, and from wherever that person comes --

QUESTION: Is that going to be among the things on the agenda tomorrow when the NSC discusses the Middle East. When you have that session, are you going to be looking for a new approach for getting the foreign forces out of Lebanon perhaps in advance of some of these other things that are occurring?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we are constantly examining our policies, and we have taken the occasion of Bud's being back here to have a careful and systematic review. We've had quite a few sessions in the Department, and one session with the President. We'll be having another.

And so that is what it will constitute. I don't want to talk about the content of it.

QUESTION: Do you think McFarlane has the same kind of influence with the President as Judge Clark did?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President obviously has a great respect for Bud McFarlane. As far as my observation, in the morning briefing, for example, he was generally there along with Judge Clark, so he was very much a part of the process. He has a personal relationship with the President. Everybody's relationship with another individual has certain unique characteristics. Judge Clark did, and at the same time, Bud McFarlane will, I'm sure.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you be any more specific about your impressions of the initial reports coming out of the Genscher-Gromyko meeting? (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I really don't want to comment on it until I have heard directly from my friend, Hans Dietrich Genscher about what went on. We will have our read-out through Arthur Burns, probably by the time we get back, and then on Thursday, we will have two people who were there who will be in Washington, and we will have a thorough discussion.

In the message I had today from Minister Genscher, he said that both of them were present throughout the entire discussion, so we will have a really first-hand account. And I really don't want to make any comment until I hear those facts.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I can tell you. One is Friedrich Ruth, and the other is Dr. von --

I've got the initials in my coat pocket. If someone could get my coat pocket, I'll give it to you.

QUESTION: Is it von Staden?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it's the person who is Rick Burt's counterpart in the German Government.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about the situation in the Iran-Iraq Gulf area? In other words, can the French actually take those planes out there, as far as you know? If they do, does it really cause grave concern seeing that the Marines are out there, possibly the Iranians retaliating?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Iran-Iraq war has got to be a conflict of great concern: First, because a tremendous number of people have been killed; second, because it represents a continuing tension in the area, an area of vital concern to us; third, because there have been -- curtailments in energy supplies have been felt; fourth, because there are threats that there may be additional third-party problems to Gulf states and to oil supplies. The Iranians have made a number of threats.

I think that on the one hand it must be so, if the Iranians consider that they are supplied heavily through the Gulf, and their oil flows out through the Gulf, and at the same time we have to look to our own resources to do our part to see that the international waterways through there are adequately protected.

We do have -- the Ranger is in that vicinity, and the British have a carrier and a company of ships in that vicinity. The French have had mine-sweepers in the past. What additional they may do, I'm not sure. But certainly we will be examining that issue.

The name you were looking for is Dr. Von Braunmuhl. He's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Soviet and East European Affairs, on the German desk.

QUESTION: On those French planes (inaudible) reports that if they are sent in, is this a real problem for the U.S.?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Where they are literally, I don't have any information for you that I am in a position to give out. What role they will be assigned, I don't know. I do think that we don't want to get ourselves in a position where the Iranians, or for that matter anyone else, says, if you do X or fail to do Y, we'll do something about the Straits of Hormuz and therefore you better not do that. We don't want to put anybody in the position of successful use of that kind of a tactic. But I think we have to be careful about that. In labor relations, there used to be a saying back when I was involved in it, that there's only one thing worse than a wildcat strike, and that's a successful wildcat strike. So I think we have to be careful about that side of it too.

QUESTION: So we're not now opposed to the French --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The French have made their decision.

QUESTION: You have always publicly downplayed or dismissed stories of conflict between the State Department and the National Security Adviser, but it's been a persistent story for the past three administrations. Now there's a new situation. How do you anticipate the relationship with Mr. McFarlane? And would you suggest any kind of structural change that would -- unless this is a figment of the media's imagination -- would you suggest any kind of structural change in the relationship to avoid this kind of thing in the future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think there have been problems ever since the Eisenhower Administration, as I understand it. I don't have a sense that there were any particular contentions in that administration. I may be wrong in that, but ever since there have been and they have varied in their intensity.

My impression is that the process has worked, relatively speaking, well in the last year, which is when I am most familiar with it. And there have been some problems from time to time, but there's been a readiness to work at them and work them out which we have done. I don't see any reason why -- I expect that we'll have a good working relationship.

The task of the NSC Adviser is a necessary task. If it weren't, if we didn't have that there, we would have to invent it, because you do have a coordinating function, and you do have a need for somebody who is there all the tiome as the President's right hand. So it's a role that somebody has to fill, and it need to be filled by somebody who is close to the President, in whom he has confidence and who can work with the various groups involved. Judge Clark did it very successfully, and I have absolutely every confidence that Bud McFarlane will do so as well.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, (inaudible) Germany is bracing for peace demonstrations this weekend. I was wondering if you had some thoughts about whether this represented some kind of deep-seated trend in Germany or whether it could be reversed, or why not be reversed, or what it may mean in your eyes for the future of Germany?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that the people of the West generally, the United States, Canada -- we talked about this with -- Minister MacEachen and I, and in Europe. Why? To see their countries have the strength to deter aggression. They want to -- they understand the importance of freedom, and they want to see that it is defended properly, but they also want their governments to be reasonable in seeking negotiated solutions to these various problems.

And their governments are reasonable. And we work at it very hard. So I think that to the extent that we see people demonstrating, it represents the kind of sense that we have to stay in that posture. And we intend to stay in that posture, and are in that posture. Whether an agreement that's satisfactory can actually be reached, much depends on more than the Allies. It depends on the other side as well. They have the troops.

QUESTION: Do you expect some last minute Soviet offer to try and forestall the deployment, or try to get some certain amount of nervousness in the Alliance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we certainly would welcome the Soviet Union making some proposals. That's the way a negotiation ought to proceed. But whether they will or not, I can't say. You have to ask them.

This coordination business, to get back to your question -- it's a hard job, but I state my conviction now about it having done that myself a couple of times. There is a sense of which the Director of OMB is doing that with respect to the budget. And when I was in the government the last time, I also had, when I was Secretary of the Treasury, I was also Assistant to the President for Economic Matters, and had an office in the White House. And I went back and forth.

And I could see that when I was going to discuss with a group of people an inter-agency matter on behalf of the President, I did well to hold the meeting in my White House office and let somebody else be there representing the Treasury. Somehow it works better that way. So I think I have a little feel for this process. I know it can work well, and obviously it is a matter that requires the patience and give-and-take, but it can be done. And I have a great deal of confidence that Bud McFarlane will do extremely well.

QUESTION: Underlying some of these questions, I think you probably recognize, are reports from time to time (inaudible) are unhappy with the way it worked. There was one report that you had made it known that you might leave the Administration, that you weren't even thinking about continuing on. Have you really been unhappy, and have you said anything to anybody -- or would you say to us, how long you intend to stay there? Is there anything to these stories?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I believe that in my own relationships with the government and in my relationships, let's say with Allan MacEachen, that the way to have a good relationship is, if there is a problem, put it up on the table and talk about it, and try to get it straightened out, or at least get a process going of straightening it out. Or if it is something that happened that is part of the past, but it has created a problem, talk about it and try to avoid having it in the future. And where I have felt that there have been problems, that is exactly what I have done. Judge Clark has done likewise. And I'll do the same with Bud McFarlane. I think that's the way you keep things on a good basis.

So that is the way we will proceed. That's the way we have done a number of things in our discussions in the last few days where we had differences of opinion, as we have in the past.

QUESTION: Did you ever get so discouraged that you thought you would leave?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I have never -- I'm not a believer in threatening to resign, and all that kind of thing at all.

JOHN HUGHES: Okay. Thank you all.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release October 17, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT McFARLANE
AT HIS APPOINTMENT AS
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The Briefing Room

3:40 PM EDT

Q What is the situation in the Middle East? The war is escalating there. The Marines are getting shot every day. How do you see the situation?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: The question is, what is the situation in the Middle East. I believe that the loss of life, first of all, is unacceptable. I think we must recognize the context in which the attacks are taking place. On Thursday, there will be a conference that is oriented toward building a new confessional balance and true reconciliation. The opportunities are obvious. History makes clear that this is a very difficult thing to achieve in Lebanon. I believe honestly that because each of the parties, Shiite, Sunni, Druze, Christians, understand that all of the alternatives to reconciliation are far worse, that they're going to join in a compromise and that there is real promise that this can be a very useful outcome.

Q Why are they being shot at, then? The Marines.

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Well, I think going into a session that there are some who have an interest in diminishing U.S. support. I think that's been clear from the beginning. To the extent that they think threatening, killing will cause us to pull out, they may make efforts like this. Their expectations are wrong, and I think that that has become clear.

MORE

The United States' role thus far has been vital to getting us as far as we've come. As I say, there's promise that the process now set in motion can be successful, giving us a chance to pull out not only our own forces but those of other countries.

Q Do you think Syria would pull back if the Israelis pulled back even further?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: The government of Syria's been very adept at speaking for itself. We have espoused the withdrawal of all foreign forces. I think the calculus which leads Syria toward that decision is one only they can make. But I think there is some basis for optimism, yes.

Q Will the interruption of your role impede the peace process underway there now?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: I don't think so.

Q Mr. McFarlane --

Q Who is --

Q -- patience, please. Why is Lebanon vital to the security of the area? Would not a federated Lebanon be stronger than the situation now? And is the United States doing anything to help Israel stabilize its currency?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: On the first question, the importance of the security of countries friendly to the United States in the Middle East is obvious from a geopolitical point of view. Simply examining a map, this is at the nexus of three continents. It is near vital waterways. It is on vital sea-lanes that are important to ensure access to resources for industrialized democracies and developing countries throughout the world. The importance of its resources I mentioned. The additional point that, I think, is often lost is that Lebanon has been and can once more become again a practicing democracy.

It's very much in the United States' interest to assure the support and the continuity of democracies wherever they may be. The presence of countries friendly to the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean is vitally important for the reasons I put out: geo-strategically, politically, resource-wise, economically and for simply reasons of it being the right thing to do.

It was often poignant anguishing to listen to the tales of Lebanese families who note occasionally that in the past eight years their kids have been to school for two years. But they are still there. Why are they still there? Because they believe, importantly, in their own institutions and in the United States. And we'll stay with it.

Q You said that the loss of life is unacceptable. Is a de facto partitioning of Lebanon also unacceptable to this government?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Yes. On the second question that came before, concerning the economic difficulties being faced in Israel and is the United States helping? The United States is clearly concerned, welcomes exchanges with the government of Israel toward ameliorating the situation. Specific proposals may well be made but we'll have to wait until that occurs. And I'm sure, as always, our concern for the well-being of Israel will be manifested in our own policies.

Q There are reports -- appeared in the press today that you favored better relations -- more cooperation with Israel and the foes of Syria in order to change Syria's mind regarding the -- in Lebanon and on general matters. Is this true? If not, where do you stand on this?

AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE: You've hit a sore nerve with regard to recent quotations of my positions with regard to resolution of the Lebanese problem. I must say I've seldom seen less accurate reporting than with regard to my reported views on how to solve the problems. But setting that aside, I think with regard to the significance of strong U.S.-Israeli relations, I do feel that way. I've always felt that way and I shall remain to think so.

The importance of strong relations with the moderate Arab states, as well, is vital to the security of American interests in the Middle East. The attitude of the United States toward Syria has been to intensify, make more frequent our talks with them. We understand that Syrian interests in what goes on in their neighbors' territory just as our interests in what goes on in our neighbors' territory or any other country in its neighbors' territory, must be taken into account. And we do take it into account. We're looking for common ground that can lead to Syria's interest being accommodated without prejudice to the well-being of the Lebanese. We're interested in the earliest departure of all foreign forces from Lebanon. And I think we can achieve that. It doesn't represent a tilt toward anybody.

Q Mr. McFarlane, there were reports that some members in the administration were concerned that you would not have the access to President Reagan that Judge Clark had. Did you get any sense from the President that you would have similar access that Judge Clark had?

AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE: The President was very clear on that score in our talks today, in our talks going back over the past year. The importance of that access is clearly understood. The continuity of that access was reaffirmed today and I have no reservations about it.

Q Do you think you'll have any problems with Casey, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick or any of the other people in the NSC with whom you'll be dealing?

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AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: No, I don't. I think the President's blessed with having advisors in the national security community who are of towering intellect. I underscore, with regard to Jeane, the essentiality that we continue to be able to exploit her own vision, strategic grasp in the administration.

With regard to Cap, Bill Casey, whom I've worked with for years, regular breakfasts, surely there are disagreements on a given issue. My role now is not to be an advocate, but to be a coordinator. I intend to do that and I don't expect any difficulty.

Q -- will Judge Clark have any role, informal advisory role to the President -- continuing role?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Well, Judge Clark is as close as any man can be to the President. The President values his counsel. I think that counsel will be oriented toward environmental matters; but he'll be a frequent caller, I'm sure.

Q Any role in national security affairs?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Bill hasn't sought it, doesn't seek it. I don't think he will in the future.

Needless to say, I shall call on him as well.

Q Will Poindexter be your deputy?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Yes, I would like at this time to say two things I meant to say at the beginning. Please forgive me if I was a little overwhelmed. But I wanted to say that I've asked Rear Admiral John Poindexter to serve as my Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. John not only has a distinguished record in the Navy, he and I go back 25 years beyond to the Naval Academy. He's a man of enormous talent and intellect and I look forward to his moving into the role I had played before and coordinating interdepartmental activities across the spectrum from arms control to regional policy.

And the second thing that I wanted to mention is perhaps soupy and so be it. But when I said that my wife and I had served for 25 years, I mean that and she's continuing to serve today.

Jerry?

Q When will you take over your new duties and -- go back to the Middle East once more before you do?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: The appointment's effective immediately and I've started and will talk to the President and the Secretary about continuity in the Middle East and that decision hasn't yet been made.

Q Are you in favor of Fairbanks taking the job?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: Well, I certainly hope Dick will stay on. Dick has been an incredibly effective guy, my right hand, effective in taking on assignments independently throughout the Middle East. I've asked him to go in my place as frequently as I've gone myself. So he's imminently qualified. This is a decision for the President to make.

Q Mr. McFarlane, does the departure of Judge Clark mean that the formation of foreign policy will now go back to the State Department?

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AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: I think the President, from his opening days here in the White House, expressed his confidence in Cabinet government. And I think more than many of you allow, Cabinet government has been the name of the game in national security affairs. I think that if the point of your question is do I intend to seek to promote a personal point of view or in any other way to establish some confrontational status with the Secretary of State, of course not.

I think -- The President looks now as he has throughout his administration to the departments as the center of creative -- of conceptual creativity. And he looks to his National Security Advisor to make sure that all of the options are there, fairly presented, decisions, once taken, promptly implemented, for oversight of the community. That's what I intend to do.

Q Have you or President Reagan talked to Mrs. Kirkpatrick today and if so can you tell us about it? And if not, why not?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: I'll defer to Larry on the President's schedule. I've frankly been a little caught up in a few things. I haven't talked to Jeane today. I intend to; but I couldn't give you an answer on the President's schedule.

Q Ambassador, there are concerns in the Middle East that these objectives that the United States is into Lebanon and other areas, will be reached or achieved on over the Palestinian peoples rights and aspirations, whether they are in the West Bank or whether they are in Lebanon.

What are your plans or the administration plans into moving the situation regarding the Palestinians in the area?

AMBASSADOR McFARLANE: I think the President's position with regard to the Palestinian community was reflected and is today in his September 1st address.

I think in the instant case of improving our conditions both in the West Bank and in Lebanon, we have a number of ideas in progress. I think the history of the Palestinian community, like that of the Lebanese, is a very sad history. The opportunities are very high, though. There's a great deal of flux in the community right now, throughout the region. I think the United States has opportunities which it hasn't had up until now. I'm confident that we can take advantage of those. The President is in the process of reviewing our policies there. And I look for a renewed effort shortly -- It's a sad history. It's time to stop reading about it and try to make a little.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:55 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
CENTRAL AMERICA
MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1983, 3:45 P.M.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. The briefing is on BACKGROUND. It is attributable to a Senior Department Official. Although we announced that the topic is Central America, broadly speaking, in fact, we assume that the interest will be primarily Nicaragua, and that is I think what your briefer is principally prepared to talk with you about.

Unfortunately, we have been foreshortened by events over at the White House where the briefer has an appointment, so we are going to have to cut it off no later than 4:10. If you would try to stick to the more critical questions, and then if you have time, do some of the peripheral stuff, that would be helpful.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What I would like to do is, I've been recently, as you know, to Belize and Nicaragua. Prior to that I was at the U.N. and here where I met with a lot of not only Latin but European Government people. Also, I was in Ottawa for an annual trilateral Canadian/United States/ British meeting on Latin America. I'd like to give you some of the impressions with which I came away from there.

First, I think to a certain degree, in the public perception, not only in Europe but in other parts of Latin America and South America, the bloom is coming off the rose of the Sandinista revolution. I think the Pope's visit -- although that was quite a while back, the visit of the Pope there -- didn't win any hearts and minds among the Catholic countries, I found.

Their U.N. move, when they went to inscribe the issue of the United Nations so shortly after they had signed up and the 21 points of the Contadoras, I think certainly upset the Contadora countries and, I think, confused a lot of the others -- the continuation of the expropriation of private property, and the rest of it. That is an impression I gained from people from Europe and Latin America, but to a certain degree it spills over into Nicaragua.

I was in Nicaragua for two days, and let me just tell you some of the quick impressions I had. One is that the level of anti-Americanism generated by their press that is government-generated in either listening to their radio, watching their TV, or reading their newspapers was as high as anywhere I've seen.

I'm told by people who have been there on the scene that that is not a phenomena just recently, that it has been at a continual drumbeat.

The other interesting aspect was, there was a degree of militarism that I didn't really expect there. All their signs, which was not unusual in those kinds of societies, of great, big bill-board sizes, had a militaristic aspect to them. It was more about arms and defense, pictures of guns and airplanes, in this aspect.

In chatting also with the people at the U.N. and especially the Central American countries, and in talking with the Nicaraguans while I was there, Ortega, and D'Escoto, what appears to be coming down is that the attitudes externally from Central America~~n~~ are changing towards them.

The attitude of their Central American neighbors, the fear level against what their -- I think their intentions there being Nicaraguans -- has risen and to a certain degree is coming through to the Sandinistas, because they are getting a mentality that they are not part of the odd-man-out.

I, basically, delivered a message to them. I had two hours with Ortega and almost two hours with D'Escoto in addition to other meetings -- their economic team, out in Montegalpa with coffee-growers; I met with opposition leaders; I met with the editors of La Prensa; I met with trade unionists; I met with their economic team.

The message I tried to leave basically was that which the President had outlined in the letter to the Contadoras, which was, "In order to achieve peace in the area, we think that certain things are important. One is that we try to keep this out of an East-West context; secondly, that we subscribe to the principle of non-intervention, which we think is something that is important within their area; and third, that an internal democratization is linked to the feeling of attitudes on the part of their neighbors; and fourth, of course, the Economic Development Aspect." That, basically, was the message I attempted to leave with them.

I had long sessions with them. They are very civil. They are obviously, I think, feeling the effects of a couple of things: one is, obviously, the pressures of their internal war; and secondly, also, as I have said, I think they have begun to come to the same assessment we have with regards to feelings the Europeans have and the rest of us -- just kind of changing a bit.

But at that point I'll stop, and take your questions. See, it only took about six minutes or so.

Q Could you discuss some reports which have been appearing that this Administration had decided on a two-track policy toward Nicaraga: one the diplomatic, represented by your trip; the other military, in the sense of giving aid or advice to the anti-Sandinista Forces in Nicaragua?

A I think the President laid out his policy fairly well on the 27th. This one policy has got four tracks to it, or four elements to it. That's, basically, the one that we're following.

Q What about the charges that there was U.S. involvement in some of the recent acts of sabotage, for example?

A Those are charges that you hear on a variety of fronts. Our answer is basically the same.

Q When you say that the United States subscribes to non-intervention, obviously you refer to Nicaragua's involvement in subversion or alleged subversion in other neighboring countries. But what about the intervention of American-supported forces in Nicaragua?

A I think when we talk about non-intervention -- I'll tell you something, I think this is a very important, critical element in this whole policy, and it's not so much the question of us and the Nicaraguans as it is as this deal evolves, you have to raise the comfort level of all of them; not just the Nicaraguans but of the Salvandorans, the Hondurans, the Guatemalans, the Costa Ricans, that nobody is going to fiddle in anybody else's yard. You just can't take it in one single direction, whether there is or isn't in Nicaragua, whether there is or isn't in El Salvador.

The fact of the matter is, they all feel that from one source or another somebody is messing in their back yard. In order to go about coming up with a peaceful solution, you have to raise that comfort level on the parts of all five of them.

Q Are you suggesting that if the Nicaraguans desisted from what the United States alleges they're doing that the Contras also would be encouraged to desist in interfering in Nicaragua?

A Obviously the Contras -- the anti-Sandinistas as well as the guerrillas in El Salvador are forces that have to be reckon with in any kind of peaceful solution. How they fit into the picture in a peaceful solution, one is just as important as the other.

Q The 21-point Contadora proposal was signed, if I recall correctly, five or six weeks ago.

A Not quite that long ago, but that's all right; it's about two weeks ago.

Q Two weeks ago? At the Prime Ministers' level, it was five or six weeks ago. There was some encouragement at that time in this building, the fact that they signed it and they agreed not to intervene, and to move toward democracy and so forth.

What is the assessment now? Do they still subscribe to that or not?

A No, they do. I think going back to that original assessment, you're correct. The fact that they did get the signature of five heads of state -- you may recall they required later to get the heads of state in writing to agree to the twenty points. The fact that they did get five heads of state to agree to this statement of objectives, I think, was a significant event for the Contadora to achieve. What they've set up for themselves now is a process that is as much if not more of a challenge. And that is, one, flesh out in language, in either agreements or treaties, and, secondly, which I think is equally as important -- and maybe more so important -- is to build among themselves the confidence that they'll make these things stick. That's the elements that's going to make it go.

Q Do I understand you -- you just said that the guerrillas in El Salvador are also a force that have to be taken into account in any solution?

A In any kind of democratization aspect, in any kind of peaceful solution that you have, you have to take into account the anti-Sandinistas; you have to take into account the guerrillas. Yes, that is correct.

Q I say, in El Salvador as opposed to Nicaragua, could you elaborate?

A No. What I'm saying is that you have to take both of them into consideration. This is why I keep getting back to my point. You can't zero in on just El Salvador, zero in on just Nicaragua.

There are two aspects of it. If you're going to build confidenc in each other to get something done, then, you have to have the confidence that they won't be fiddling within your arena. And, obviously, you take into account all of the forces.

Q What you described to us of their attitude seems to me that they are responding exactly as you cause them to respond. Where do we go from here?

A I wouldn't characterize the answer directly to your question. I think what's happening is this: That as a result of a variety of things, which maybe a subtle change in world opinion; it may be more challenges they're facing from within. It's causing them concern. They think about it. If they think about it, we're hopeful that they'll think about how do we go about getting a peaceful solution, and that's why in the conversations with them they would keep dwelling on their problem within Nicaragua. I would keep pointing out to them that the same problems they were talking about, their neighbors felt felt some of the same problems. So that there had to be a kind of across-the-board type of aspect.

Q Other than sending the message, and seeing that they are hurting from actions that, in great part, are the decisions made in Washington, is there anything that you accomplished on this visit?

A Yes. I think what we accomplished was -- I personally got a good feel for, as much as you can get in two days but it's not my first trip to Nicaragua.

The second thing is, I think I was able to reiterate to them exactly what our thoughts on the matter were. It's not so much what we expect as it is the philosophy that you've got to deal with the whole regional thing which they made a significant change on July 19, when in their speech they said they recognize the regional aspect, and they followed it up by signing up on Contadora whatever the period of time it was.

We're trying to point out to them the necessity of not just dwelling on on ills that they feel they have suffered as well the ills of others.

Q Two questions. The first one is that Ortega, after your visit, insisted again that he was willing to buy more weapons to defend themselves. And the second one, do you think that it's possible for the U.S. and for the Central American countries to (inaudible) to a peaceful solution with this Sandinista government?

A Yes, I think it's possible. I think that it is possible that the points embodied in the 21-points of Contadora and embodied in the President's letter to the Contadora process is a possible thing. I'm under no illusions that it's an easy thing.

As I told you earlier, signing a Statement of Objectives on the Contadora 21 points was a significant event, if you take it on face value. But an even tougher event now is making it work. I think it's very tough, but, yes, I think it's a possibility. I'm under no illusions that it's going to be easy.

Q What about the first question, about Ortega's new declaration about buying arms?

A I think one can understand the situation under which he made that statement. He just had a significant part of his oil storage and receiving facility blown up. It's an understandable statement for him to make. I'm sure we didn't understand him to say he's going to buy less arms.

Q On that precise point, while all the countries in the region have some turmoil, none of the countries has apparently been crippled economically to the extent that they have, like, 30 days of fuel and the possibility that no oil companies will flow, or will ship oil to their ports because of Contra activity.

Did they make the argument with respect to that point, that the United States could only expect them to ask for closer ties with the Soviet Union which could provide them with oil?

A No, they make that point.

Q They didn't raise that?

A They didn't make that point. The other thing is this, too, the economic aspect of how the ravishes of war, which is in nobody's interest, 30-day supply of oil -- how does that equate to seventy percent of your transportation system as exists in El Salvador? Either way, they're bad news for whoever is involved.

(continued on next page)

Q At what point does the United States start abiding by the objectives of the Contadora Agreement, the 21 points about non-intervention in arms and advisers, and things?

A I think if the five countries can arrive at agreement that they are satisfied with among themselves -- not only signed a piece of paper, but they're comfortable with it -- that we've gone a long, long way to satisfying ours which were embodied within those 21.

See, the question is this: You have a process proceeding. That process is among the Latin countries. That process must be allowed to proceed. As it goes and as it signs on to those 21 points, I think it alleviates a lot of people's fears -- obviously, the ones within Central America -- and I think if you look within those 21, I think you'll find that they embody most of what we're involved in.

Q To be clear, then, once they start agreeing and abiding by them, then we will? Is that right?

A No. You're not going to put the chicken before the egg or the cart before the horse. What I'm saying is that to get to the final product, everybody has to be involved.

Q Did the topic come up about our allegations of their supporting the guerrillas in El Salvador? Did they say they were continuing to support them or would stop?

A That topic was raised, and they didn't address it. They went on to other issues.

Q Can I just ask for clarification of your last answer, the previous? How does 30 percent of the oil supply -- how does that relate to --

A 30 days.

Q Yes. How does that relate to 70 percent of the transportation?

A What I'm saying is that -- and maybe I didn't put it well -- but what I'm saying is any war situation, a civil war, that results in busting down an infrastructure -- in one case he said 30 days worth of oil. In the case of El Salvador, 70 percent of their transportation has been wiped out.

So I mean, any civil war aspect has those aspects that nobody is interested in seeing.

Q Could you give us an example of a viable step that should be done, let's say by the Sandinistas, in order to lead to feasible agreement?

A I think a viable step by not only the Sandinistas but also the Corps Four as they're called is quick progression on the 21 points.

Q Can I ask you a question about Grenada since Alan did not categorically rule out veering away a little bit from Central America? What is your impression of --

A Wait a minute. It was Nicaragua, then Central America. But go ahead.

Q He said significantly --

A Go ahead. I give up.

Q Do you interpret this -- what has happened in Grenada over the past three or four days as a significant shift to the left?

A I think that what may have happened or not happened in Grenada yet, to a certain degree that is unclear and something that we're not ready to comment on, even ON BACKGROUND.

Q Do I understand you correctly that you had some feeling that Nicaragua may now be ready to talk about a solution? You went down and presented the framework of a solution, and, if that's true, then did you set up a group to talk about it further? Did you do something to carry it on further?

A I wouldn't necessarily characterize that they are ready to -- I didn't come away with a feeling that they are ready to sign on the 21 points. But I also came away with a feeling that they don't like the status quo as is, and they would like to do something to change it. So, you know, it may grieve me to say so, but the result of my trip wasn't any breakthrough, nor was it a slam of the door in the face.

Q I understand that. You're saying when they did sign on the 21 points two weeks ago, they weren't signing in good faith?

A No, no. I didn't say that. I'm saying you take it on face value. I think that was a major step.

Q But you don't think they're ready to negotiate on the basis of that 21 points?

A No. I think that all the countries had difficulty signing different portions of that 21. I think the fact that you got all five to sign on was a significant step. I think a tougher step now is having agreed to a statement of objectives, which is nothing but broad principles, start to spell out, you know, how you do verification, what do you do about this one, what about democratization, and so on and so forth. I think that's going to be the real challenge.

Q Are you optimistic about that?

A Yes. We are proceeding on the assumption that they're going to proceed, and hopefully they'll arrive at something, but I'm not -- I think you have to go into this thing with a realistic outlook, and that is that it's a complicated issue and negotiations of this type take a long time. There are internal matters, rivalries between the countries involved there that transcend anything that's going on now. It's not an easy deal.

Q In a year and a half yours was the first trip --

A In the year and a half, what?

Q Yours was the first trip of an American official, and even then it was to deliver a message and not to negotiate. Are you ready on your part to negotiate?

A Okay. I think I tried to explain it earlier, maybe I didn't make myself clear. Peace in Central America is going to come about -- negotiations in Central America can came about. It's not just a question of the United States and Nicaragua. It's the question of the five countries among themselves, and, obviously, our interests too.

So you have to have all of those in there. So, no, we cannot go negotiate on behalf of the other countries. That's why you keep pushing this process.

Q Salvadoran guerrillas have asked President Monge to arrange a meeting with Ambassador Stone.

A Pardon?

Q The Salvadoran guerrillas asked President Monge this weekend to arrange a meeting with Ambassador Stone. Is he going to meet with the guerrillas?

A Ambassador Stone is still in Europe. He won't be back for a few days. We have not received any direct query on that, other than what we read in the press. So you got two hurdles there even before I can start to answer your question.

Q Do you have any comments on the reports of contacts between Eden Pastora's group and the Cubans through Madrid? They've appeared in the Spanish-language press in recent days that --

A Yes. I saw something to that. I didn't realize it was through Madrid, but still, whatever the thing may have been.

No. I got to imagine that -- they didn't bring it up to me, but I would think that maybe the Sandinistas might wonder about it. But I have no comment on it.

Q A few weeks ago -- I don't remember when -- I'm paraphrasing this -- I believe the President said there would be no solution as long as the Sandinistas, this present government in Nicaragua, was in power.

You seem to be saying that you believe that we can negotiate with them, that there could be a peaceful solution, and we could deal with the Sandinistas.

A The President's policy leads towards that goal, and that makes the assumption of the existing government. I'm under no illusions as to how easy it is. Aside from all the facts I just gave you a minute ago, there may or may not be a mindset, an intransience, on the part of the Sandinistas. What we're trying to do is plumb that thing and keep pushing and keep seeing what we can come up with.

Q What would happen to the Contras under the 21 points as you interpret them? Are you asking the Nicaraguans to share power with them and in effect --

A No, no. I don't think so, any more than we're saying that the guerrillas in El Salvador ought to share power with the Salvadoran Government.

If you take the statements of the Contras at face value, you will find, and I think that most of the things that they required to return to the revolution, etc., would be covered under the 21 points.

Q But that means what? Free elections?

A Yeah -- well --

Q Is there any prospect, now that you've gone down there, of a continuing dialogue, at least your level, between Nicaragua and the United States? And what is the status of the original eight points of April '82, and the 13 points that came back from Nicaragua with respect to U.S.-Nicaraguan negotiations? Are they finished?

A For openers, they didn't bring up either the 8 or the 13 points, so -- and you've caught me unawares because that was before watch, and I haven't read back that far. But they're probably embodied in these other points. As to the other question, yes, I'm prepared to meet with them. You know, that the first time I went down, or was going down there, they cancelled the trip. We already had the meeting set with Ortega, we already had set the meeting with D'Escoto the night before, and I was in Guatemala. They called and said, "Well, we don't think you can meet with these guys. Why don't you meet with somebody else?" And on that basis I didn't go.

After having come back here, they -- U.S. Congressmen and others chastised them a bit for not doing that, including those that normally haven't voted with the Administration on a lot of things.

So about two weeks after I was back -- a week and a half back -- I sent the message through our Ambassador saying, "I think it's in your interests and our interests, I would like to come back if you'd like to invite me." And they did, and they invited me for the specific dates which I was there. So I think it manifests on our part wanting to talk.

Q   Do you see a continuation? In other words, is there a possibility of a bilateral track as well as a --

A   You've missed the whole point I'm trying to tell you. The only way this thing's going to work is everything together.

Q   Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:12 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
BY
DAVID PACKARD, U.S. CHAIRMAN
U.S. JAPAN ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1983, 12:45 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. We have with us David Packard, the U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission. The Commission is presenting its initial report to the President today through the Secretary of State, and Mr. Packard is here to give you a few words on that and to answer your questions.

MR. PACKARD: Well, we wanted to add that because I'm not going to see the Secretary until 1:30, we would like to have this embargoed to 2 o'clock, if that's all right with you folks. They've had another press meeting after the conference.

Let me first thank you all for taking time to be here. I would like to give you just a little background on this Commission. We will have available for you a fact sheet, a list of the Commission members, a copy of the report that is going to the President, and a press release that will outline some of the background information.

This United States-Japan Advisory Commission came about as a result of the discussions between Prime Minister Nakasone and the President when Nakasone was here in Washington earlier this year. Both of the leaders recognized that our two countries have a very close and important working relationship that contributes not only to economic affairs, but to many other affairs, and they thought that an advisory commission could be helpful.

The Commission is made up of seven members from the United States and seven members from Japan. I serve as the Chairman of the American delegation. Donald Rumsfeld, who was formerly Secretary of Defense, as you know, and president of the G. D. Searle Company, is a member; Jim Hodgson, who was a former Ambassador to Japan; Douglas Fraser, who was formerly head of the United Automobile Workers; Daryl Arnold, who is Chairman of the Western Growers Association; James Bere, who is Chairman of Borg-Warner Corporation; and Bill Timmons, who is the President of Timmons and Company here.

We have a list of the members that will be available for you, but I thought I would outline them for you, in any case. Ambassador Ushiba is the Japanese Co-Chairman, and he is an Advisor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Japan. Some of you may recall he was the United States Ambassador from Japan a few years ago.

Akio Morita, the Chairman of the Sony Corporation, is a member; Yotaro Kobayashi, who is President of the Fuji Xerox Company; Saburo Okita, Chairman of the Institute for Domestic and International Policy Studies -- Mr. Okita has been influential in Japanese policy in many ways; Professor Sato, from the Political Science Department of the University of Tokyo; Ichiro Shioji, who is the Chairman of the Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Union -- so we both have a union member on each side; and Mr. Yamashita, who is the Director and Chairman of the Mitsui Engineering & Shibuilding Corporation. So this group, as you can see, is made up to a large extent of industrial people on both sides.

The Charter that we got from the Prime Minister and the President was to look at the relationship between our two countries on a broad base, limited not to economic matters alone, but to include all aspects of our relationship which would include economic affairs, national security, and other aspects of foreign policy.

Also, we were asked to try and make some recommendations which would look towards the longer-term relationship between our two countries -- hopefully, to strengthen that relationship.

It was recognized, of course, that in addressing this problem there were a great many current issues that were being considered by various other groups of people -- many of them joint groups -- and that we would have an opportunity and be expected to look at some of these short-term problems in-between.

The Commission was established in May of this year. We are expected to take a year for this work, and complete it within one year. We are not required absolutely to make a final report, but I am almost sure that we will. We were also advised that we could make recommendations from time to time on occasions when we thought we might be able to make a useful contribution.

We have had two joint meetings with the entire Commission, one in June and another in September -- both here in the United States -- and we have had some separate meetings of the members of the Commissions of each country. Jim Hodgson and I were in Japan just a couple of weeks ago, and we met with the full Japan Commission over there.

We are going to go to Japan for a joint meeting in January, so we had been working on this issue and had a number of meetings; we felt that in view of the upcoming visit by President Reagan to Japan to meet with Prime Minister Nakasone, that it would be appropriate for us to make some interim recommendations. Those are the recommendations that I will deliver to Secretary Shultz at 1:30 this afternoon and ask him to present them to the President. Ambassador Ushiba will present the same report to Prime Minister Nakasone.

It is very encouraging to me to note that we were able to sit down together at the final meeting and put together a report which we all agreed to -- both sides. We have had some very lively discussions, some friendly discussions, a lot of give-and-take; but this report does represent an agreed to statement that is being given to both of our leaders.

I will just go through very quickly and comment on some of the points. You'll have a copy of the full report to look at later on. The first item we talk about is the importance of the relationship between the United States and Japan. Then, we point out that the national interests of Japan and the United States are highly complementary, that we have a great many things in common. The first area, of course, is in the economy between our two countries. We represent 35 percent of the economy of the entire world at this time. We have very large and very important trade balances.

Japan is now the third-largest economy in the world, so the economic factors are increasing in importance. And as you know, Japan has continued to grow very rapidly so that the economic factors , I think, will be without any question larger and more important in the future.

Q Excuse me. On the 35 percent, you indicate the United States solely, don't you, Mr. Packard? Or do you mean the two countries combined?

A Between the two countries.

Q 35 percent?

A 35 percent, yes.

I'll give you a couple more specific figures on this economic thing, which may help you out; and then I'll try and answer some more specific questions.

There is no doubt about it that our relationship with Japan has been extremely important in stabilizing the political situation in that part of the world. Despite the difficulties we had with our Vietnam involvement, the stability of that part of the world is reasonably good, at least by comparison with some other areas. And I think we all agree that our friendship and our relationship are extremely influential in stabilizing that part of the world.

I think also we see down the line that because of the growing strength of Japan that Japan will, and should, have a larger influence in other international affairs around the world -- and indeed, they are already doing so. They are providing aid to a good many countries -- Southeast Asia to some extent, but also the Middle East. So I think there are very many reasons why we should nurture a strong core of friendship in this relationship.

We point out, however, that there have been a number of areas of friction between our two countries, and I know that you have all heard about a good many of these. To a large extent, they are areas that have to do with trade and economics. There are some people who blame America for not getting their federal deficit in better order, and this is having a serious impact on international trade; and there are people in Japan who think American industry is not very competitive and not very good in quality. So there have been a number of issues here that have kind of aggravated the situation.

We think it is very important to try and address these on the basis that they are nowhere near as important as the long-term relationship between our two countries, and it is essential that we deal with them in ways that they will not exacerbate our relationship, in the long term. So we say here in our recommendation:

> "We believe the most important outcome of your November meeting will be the affirmation of our positive partnership. The overriding theme of the United States-Japan relationship should be that of friends sharing similar problems and interests and working together. As a longer-term vision, we

> see our countries sustaining the closest cooperation; our common interests far outweigh the areas of disagreement. In our judgment, your previous meetings have helped build a fresh sense of understanding and cooperation which will further be strengthened at this visit."

This is in the report, but I wanted to emphasize this, because I think this is an extremely important part of the viewpoint of this Commission and the work that it has done so far.

Needless to say, we talk about trade and investment, and one of the things that has been of serious concern is that our bilateral trade has been getting seriously out of balance. It is basically true that throughout the world economy it is not necessary that every country's trade be in balance on a bilateral basis. In fact, it is almost impossible for that to occur. The balance should be on an overall, multilateral basis.

But the fact is that Japan's exports to the United States have been increasing at the rate of 16 percent per year over the last five years or so, while the United States' exports to Japan have grown at a rate of only 9 percent. This year, there will be an imbalance that is something in the neighborhood of $22-24 billion. And with this rate of growth, if it continues, in another few years, it will be an even more serious problem. So we discussed this with our Japanese counterparts, and we agreed that it is not necessary nor likely that this bilateral trade can be brought into balance, but it should be brought under better control.

The factors that we emphasized here, the first is exchange rates. We say that the exchange rate of the dollar and the yen has become an extremely important factor in the competitive position of the industries of Japan and the United States, as well as a difficult political problem for both countries.

I'm sure you all heard something about the yen-dollar relationship in the last few weeks, but I want to make a few comments about them. You may recall that before the world monetary system was freed up, in the early 1970s, the yen was at 360 yen to the dollar. During that period, it has gradually come down. At one point in, I believe it was 1978, it got below 200 yen to the dollar and went down to 178 for a short period of time. In the last few years, it has been going back up again, and has been in the range of 240-245 yen to the dollar. Fortunately, in the last few weeks, it has come down a little bit.

The reason this is important is because this trend in the yen-dollar relationship has not followed what is considered to be traditional economic policy. These relationships should adapt more closely to the actual trade relationships. And in discussing this issue with our Japanese partners, both the American members and the Japanese members believe that the yen-dollar relationship is out of line, and that both countries would be better off if this relationship were down around 200, instead of 230-240.

The Americans think it would be better if it were a little below 200, and the Japanese think it would be a little better if it were a little above 200, but we were very, very close, in agreeing that it is now out of balance, and that it should be brought further into balance.

I think it is important to explain to you why -- and so many of you probably already know this -- but I want to tell you why a lower (yen-dollar) relationship is acceptable to Japan. Japan has an economy in which they essentially purchase all of their energy in the form of oil and coal. They purchase a very large share of their raw materials. They purchase both of these items in dollars instead of in yen. In order to pay for this, they have to sell industrial products, and the United States is the largest market. So while they do get a break in exports, the cost in their economy would be better because they would require fewer yen to buy the dollars they need for energy and materials; and they could, therefore, live with a lower yen input in terms of trade. So this is a situation in which the Japanese would probably take a little time to adjust to this, but they could, in fact, be better off in the long run.

This is very damaging to United States trade because what in effect it does, it gives the Japanese a competitive advantage that is between 20 and 30 percent in their cost relationship for certain products. This applies, particularly, in products that have a worldwide market, so it affects not only the bilateral relationship, but it also affects the market outside of the country.

You probably have heard that Lee Morgan of the Caterpillar Tractor Company has been making a very important issue of this. This has been a very serious problem in the competition between Japanese firms and American firms, in world markets as well as the market here at home.

There have been a number of studies of this issue, and various estimates have been made about it. It is my opinion that this imbalance in the relationship is costing the United States at least 2,000,000 jobs, and probably more than that.

Q Over what period? 2,000,000 jobs over a long time or what?

A If it could be corrected tomorrow, the 2,000,000 jobs would come back fairly quickly.

Q Just on the yen?

A Just on the yen-dollar relationship, and nothing else.

Q How do you figure that?

A For proprietary reasons, I don't want to identify these products, but we've looked at the cost of specific, particular products that are competitive on a worldwide market. In one case, one company had 90 percent of the worldwide market. The yen-dollar relationship has brought that down to 10 percent, and the Japanese company has 80 or 90 percent now.

So this is something that, obviously, would not happen overnight; but if this yen-dollar relationship could be corrected, it could be a very important factor in improving the job situation here in the United States.

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Let me go on and make some further comments about that. Most of the people who have looked at this problem have said that the blame is on the United States because the overhanging Federal deficit generates the very high interest rates that we have here; therefore, the people who have money to invest are going to invest it in dollars because they're going to get interest in their dollars. It's a stable economy, and there's simply more confidence in that situation.

At the same time, as you perhaps know, interest rates in Japan are considerably lower. So if you invest your money in yen, you won't get as much for it as you invested in dollars. That is, without any question, a very major factor in this problem.

I think everyone in this Administration here in Washington knows this. I think practically everyone in Congress knows this. For political reasons they're not willing to do anything about it in an election year.

We have therefore felt it is extremely important to determine whether there are some other actions which could be taken which would be politically acceptable and do-able in our two countries that would have an effect in bringing this yen into line.

There have been a number of reports prepared. We are recommending to both the President and the Prime Minister that if they emphasize the importance of this yen-dollar relationship, and ask the appropriate leadership in the two countries to work together to bring it more nearly in line, that that can and will have a very significant impact in getting this relationship down where it would be. So probably our strongest and most important relationship in the area of trade is to the President and to the Prime Minister to state the importance of this issue and to encourage people in their Cabinets, their advisors, to do something about it; and we do have a number of reports and a number of things which can be done. They're somewhat detailed. I won't try and go through these in any detail today, except to say that we think this is extremely important, and we hope that they will do this and we believe they will do this.

There are a number of other trade issues that we have looked at. We all talk about the desirability of free trade. As I think all of you know, there are very few examples of free trade anywhere, but there are established GATT principles and those, I think, are important. It would be very desirable to avoid trying to control this matter by tariffs or artificial quotas, or other things, and that's why we think the yen-dollar relationship is extremely important.

We think, also, there are some things that can be done to bring the balance a little bit closer together. Just let me give you a couple other figures which may be helpful in this. Twenty-six percent of Japan's total exports go to the United States. These, as you know, include automobiles, motorcycles, machinery and a number of other things, and the United States is Japan's largest market. So we are a very important market for them to sell to, to be able to get the dollars they need to buy their energy, and so forth, from other countries.

They sell 23 percent of their total exports to Southeast Asia, as you might expect, and from thereon down their export markets to Europe and other countries are very small, because, you see, the United States and Southeast Asia account for almost half of their total industrial exports.

Of the Japanese imports, Japan imports from the United States 18 percent of their total imports. This is largely in food. It includes some industrial products and a whole range of other things. I'll talk about food a little bit more. But just to give you a comparison, from Southeast Asia and from the Middle East, where they get their basic materials and energy, 30 percent of their imports come from the Middle East and 23 percent come from Southeast Asia. So you see over 50 percent of their imports come from these two areas. So the United States is a very important market for them in order to keep this into balance.

If you look at the United States exports, we export only 10 percent of our total export products to Japan. This is very largely in farm products -- food. I think you've probably seen the figure, that there are more acres in the United States devoted to the production of food for the Japanese then there are acres in Japan devoted to the production of food for the Japanese.

So the United States is a very important source of food, and that's an important export market for us. That, of course, is why the agricultural community in this country is very concerned with this problem.

Canada is a much more important market for us. Western Europe, we sell 28 percent of our exports; Latin America, 16 percent; 13 percent to Southeast Asia.

Japan is not a large and important export market for us, and we think it should be a much more important export market and we are encouraging some actions to be taken which will increase the Japanese exports from the United States, and we think something can be done in that general direction.

There are a lot of other issues in trade, and I can't take time today to talk about them. We've talked about industrial policy, and we're going to talk about that a little bit more.

The yen-dollar relationship, while it is I think the most important factor in this situation, it is not the only factor. Because in the case of our company, we are buying more 16k memory chips and 64k memory chips from Japanese companies than we are buying from American companies because the Japanese companies provide better quality and better delivery. Quality and delivery happen to have considerable value that overrides the price differential, but Japanese products are also generally cheaper but not that much cheaper. There are factors that have to do with quality and reliability and industrial management.

This is a complicated problem, and we can't expect to cover it in great detail today.

There are some things that are going on which we think are constructive. There are some private sector consultations. The United States-Japan Businessman's Conference, they had a meeting out in Chicago this summer which I attended. I think these private person-to-person discussions, which address specific issues and specific industries, have a chance of making some useful contribution to this program, and we certainly recommend that they be continued.

Agricultural trade, I've mentioned, and I won't take too much time on that. But there are some things that might be interesting for you to know. Here are the figures for various products in Japan. In Japan, it costs $20.00 a bushel to produce wheat. They can import wheat for $5.00 a bushel; $20.20 and $5.30 are the 1982 figures.

Soybeans, they can produce for $31.00 a bushel; they can import for $7.00 a bushel. Rice, they can produce for $54.00 a hundred pounds; they can import it for $22.00 a hundred pounds. Barley, the ratio of $14.00 to $3.00. This means, essentially, that the Japanese Government is subsidizing the agricultural sector and the consumer is paying the cost of it.

If you look at it, however, this is not an economic problem; it's a social and a political problem because these people who live out on these little rice paddies all around Japan who produce this high-priced rice would have to move into the cities, and it would change the whole social structure of the country. These people work part-time, so they actually get between 75 and 80 percent of their income from non-farm activity. So that even after all the subsidization that the government does to encourage the production, it's a very complex problem.

Our agricultural people look at this and say, look, the consumers would be a hell of a lot better off if they just closed all this rice production down in Japan and bought it all from us, but that's not going to happen because the Japanese society would not accept it. So some of these problems are not economic; they're political. And for that reason, it's very interesting.

The cost to the consumers of price supports for agricultural products in Japan is $3.6 billion. I would add that we're also supporting our agricultural community in the United States. I don't happen to have the figure of what those costs are. Our record on this is not lily-white either. It's a little bit of a two-way situation.

We're going to talk about agricultural trade, and we think there are some opportunities to increase our exports there, but Japan is already a very large market for our products, and will continue to.

A word about international security. I won't take more than a minute on this because we have not gone into detailed studies and we do not intend, at least at this time, to make any specific recommendations about the size and nature of the military forces that Japan ought to have.

We do think, however, that Japan can make an important contribution to the security of that part of the world. In fact, indeed, to the security of the entire world by becoming more involved in other relationships, helping to strengthen the economy of some of the countries that are friendly around the world. They're already doing this with aid, even in the Middle East, and we think, because they're becoming a larger and a more important country and we have a lot of common interests, that they can and should and I think they will make some very constructive relationships to our overall security.

A lot of people think that we should try and get them to spend 5 percent of their GNP on national defense or 6 percent the way we're doing. I don't think there's any likelihood of that being done at all. They have made a commitment to take a larger responsibility for protection of their sea lanes out to a 1,000 miles around the island, and increase their defense expenditures to some extent.

We're going to look at this in more detail. I think there are some other important contributions they can make. What they're already doing is extremely important.

We have not said anything in particular about energy because there's another commission that's studying that problem, and we thought we would wait to see what they had to say about it. We're going to make some recommendations on science and technology which, again, we are not doing in any detail.

I've taken a little more time to go through this than I should, but I thought some of these issues might justify some explanation.

I'll take some questions.

Q Mr. Packard, if you can't get more agricultural products into Japan because of that political situation, what could be done to balance the -- they're not going to sell them cars, I hope?

A There are a number of non-tariff trade barriers in Japan. Some of these have already been corrected. These have to do with the special testing of certain products, and with the fact that the Japanese market has certain requirements.

The Japanese have already taken some steps which have increased the opportunity to sell products.

Our company is a good example of that. In the case of our company, Japan is now our largest market outside of the United States. By learning how to do a better marketing job, we have been able to increase the sale of our products. We're not entirely satisfied with what's being done yet. We think we could do some more. So we think there are some opportunities for the Japanese to accept more industrial products in addition to whatever might be done in food.

Q What specific steps can the President and the Prime Minister take to alter the relationship of the dollar to the yen?

A I wont't try and go through these in detail, but I can give you some general ideas.

One of the simplest ones would be to make it easier to invest in yen and to do something to balance the interest rates. They're a number of actions that can be taken which will do this.

The Federal Reserve in our country could make larger investments in yen, and their Federal Reserve actions could have some impact on this also.

I think there's also a certain psychology in this. I'm convinced myself that this yen-dollar relationship is sufficiently out of balance; that as soon as a few more people realize this, they're going to see that this a way to make some money. I think it might be a good investment to buy some yen at $240.00 because I think it's going to come down. So I think you've got a few, maybe market forces that could help out on this if we could just get the whole process started right.

That's not a very complete answer to your question, but there are a number of specific actions which I think could in fact affect this relationship in the right direction. I think it has the potential of snowballing even to some extent.

There have been some specific recommendations made to both governments on this issue.

Q Does that answer reflect your views or the Commission's views?

A That reflects the general Commission's views. These steps include ten or twelve items. We've got one report from Professor Solomon out of Stanford who is an expert in this field, and a couple other people. I can't say that all members on both sides would agree to all recommendations.

I think we all agree that some of these recommendations should be implemented. I'm almost sure that this is going to be a priority issue that Ambassador Ushiba will present to the Prime Minister. We are encouraging George Shultz to do that for our President.

Q It's been reported today on the wires that Ambassador Okawara, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, is back there briefing Nakasone, I think today. He's supposed to have said the U.S. has substantial expectations for some action by Japan, especially on the trade front, and is expecting some specific actions to be taken around the time, or before, in connection with the President's trip.

Do you think that's a good idea? Should the U.S. have such expectations for some new action on the part of Japan?

A I think we should have some expectations. I think we've got to be a little careful in being over optimistic, because they have political problems the same as we do.

I think that if the Prime Minister and the President emphasized the importance of the yen-dollar relationship and asked their people to take such steps as are epolitically do-able to improv the situation, I am confident that we will get some positive results from it.

On the trade issue, you may recall that Nakasone -- the Prime Minister has already recommended to the Japanese community that they try to buy more United States products. This already has had some impact.

I'm cautiously optimistic that some things will happen. But I want to emphasize again, as I think I have through here, that these are quite often political and maybe cultural factors that are involved in this and not strictly economic factors. If they were strictly economic factors, we might be finding it a little easier to deal with. But I'm optimistic.

Q Could I just make one thing on procedure. The next time we have a briefing by this Commission, or whatever, it certainly would facilitate things from our point of view -- speaking of the press -- if we have before us, when we have the briefing, what it is you're going to do.

A I agree with you. I apologize. I'm sorry we didn't do that. I thought we were going to have the recommendations so that as I went through them you could read them, and I apologize. The next time we'll fix it.

Q A question on energy. You said that there's another commission dealing with that so you don't want to get into that too much today. I'm curious about possible U.S. energy exports from Alaska to Japan.

My question is, this has got some political tough sledding in this country; I'm interest in knowing, are the Japanese interested in that?

A Exporting oil from --

Q In other words, instead of their getting oil from Mexico, as they do now, getting it from Alaska and saving some money?

A The answer is, I think the Japanese are interested in doing this in the long run. They have already, as I understand it, contracts that will meet their requirements for the short term, so there's no great pressure to do this in a big hurry.

Certainly, a larger part of their oil supplied from Alaska would be more secure than oil that would have to come all the way from the Middle East. There are some incentives to do this. But as you know, this is a political issue in the United States, and we've not addressed that or discussed it yet. So I can't tell you where we come out.

I'm sorry, ladies and gentlemen, I have a date with the Secretary at 1:30. I apologize, again, for not giving you this report ahead of time. Thank you for your time.

Q When will it be available?

STAFF: It'll be available in the Press Office. It'll be embargoed until 2:00 p.m.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER BETTINO CRAXI

October 18, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:41 P.M. EDT

MR. ROUSSEL: We'll get going here. This briefing will be on background attributable to senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me start by giving you some of the details on Prime Minister Craxi's schedule, then a bit of background on the visit and the substantitve issues and then taking your questions.

Craxi arrives this afternoon in New York. He comes down to Washington tomorrow evening arriving at 8:00 p.m. at the Reflecting Pool. On Thursday he begins a round of substantive meetings here in Washington. He'll be meeting first with Secretary Shultz, then with Secretary Baldrige, and then he'll have a meeting with the President, followed by lunch with the President. There will be departure statements following the lunch. He'll also be giving a press conference at 2:00 p.m. at the Embassy Row Hotel, following which he'll be holding meetings up on the Hill with the Senate and the House. And he'll be giving a dinner that evening in honor of the Vice President.

On the following morning, Friday, he'll be meeting with the Chairman of the IMF, also with the IBRD, Secretary Regan. He'll be lunching at the National Press Club and departing at 3:15 p.m. that afternoon where he'll be going back to New York. The Prime Minister is accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti as well as by other officials.

Let me say a few words about the background of the visit, put it in some context. This is Craxi's first visit to Washington. It's also the first visit to Washington by a socialist Prime Minister of Italy. Indeed, he is the first socialist Prime Minister of Italy since the Second World War. And he is, I guess, one could say the first politician of his generation to assume leadership in Italy. He's 49. I wasn't able to go back more than a decade. But I couldn't find anybody younger than he who had been Prime Minister and I think he probably is the youngest Prime Minister in some time.

The change in generations that Andreotti symbolizes I think is reflected --

Q Andreotti or Craxi?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, Craxi, I think is reflected in the evolution of Italian foreign policy over recent years in which we've seen Italy adopting a more active, and, from our standpoint, I think a more responsible role in international affairs. Italy was the first country in 1979 to indicate its willingess to accept American cruise missiles.

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It was among the first countries to indicate its willingess to join the Sinai peacekeeping force. It was the first country to indicate its willingess to join the United States in Lebanon and after the Lebanon force initially withdrew, it was the Italians who proposed that it go back. But if Craxi's visit and Craxi as a person can be said to symbolize in part a generational change in Italian policy, I think it also clearly is a demonstration of continuity. Italian governments change pretty frequently but the personnel in the governments tend to remain quite stable. In fact, in Craxi's current government I believe there are four former Prime Ministers. And Craxi's party, the socialists, were members of the last government. They were influential members of the last government having among ministries the Ministry of Defense. And so a number of the policies that I've mentioned, the MNF in Lebanon, the INF decisions and all, were of course decisions made by the last government, decisions in which his party, among the other parties, participated.

The kinds of issues that we'll be discussing -- or the President will be disucssing with Craxi -- will, I think reflect these areas of Italian foreign policy initiative. I think among the most important issues will be the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces, status and prospects for the negotiation. Craxi recently responded to an earlier letter he had received from Andropov and publicized that

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response about three days ago. Craxi's response was a very forceful and eloquent statement of the Alliance's position and made clear his view that the responsibility for the lack of progress in the negotiation rested with the Soviet Union and the responsibility for moving the negotiations along at this stage, in responding to the recent American proposals, also lay with the Soviet Union.

I would imagine that Craxi and the President would also review status of other arms control negotiations, including the START negotiations, the prospects for the Conference on European Disarmament, which is to open in Stockholm in January, the MBFR negotiations, and, more generally, the prospects for East-West relations in which the Italians have maintained a strong interest.

A second major area will be, obviously, Lebanon and the Middle East where the Italians have now made a strong commitment, where they are playing a role which is important now and could grow even more important.

And, finally, I'm sure that the broad area of economics will be touched on. Craxi has come into office with a commitment to a tough austerity policy designed to bring the Italian economy back under control and to reduce the rate of inflation. And I'm sure the President will express support for those policies.

I think that's where I'd like to leave the general remarks. I'll be glad to answer questions.

Q Are there any areas of disagreement that are likely to come up from bilateral problems?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think probably not in a broad area. I think that possibly in the economic area there will be differences of nuance. I'm sure that there may be some specific things the Italians would like to see us do -- improve the production -- the purchase of Italian products in certain areas, that kind of thing. But I don't think those will feature heavily in the discussions.

Q Have they had a debt problem with us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure what their balance of trade is with us. They don't have a debt problem with us, no. They have a balance of trade deficit. But I'm not certain what the bilateral deficit is.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a major problem.

Q Interest rates?

Q What about the U.S. deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sure if he complains about his deficit, we'll complain about ours.

Q No -- plan to complain about ours?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that like any other European leader he is almost inevitably going to indicate the need for the United States to leave Europe out of the current recession and a desire to see us lower interest rates.

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Q -- could you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But I don't think the Italians have any particular slant on that and I wouldn't think he'd put it more forcefully than others.

Q So, why is he coming if there are no problems? I mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he views this as an extremely important visit. As I said, it's his first visit to Washington and he and his party have assumed office at an important time. In the development of Italian policy, you have the INF deployments coming up, for instance, in the next few months. And I think he would view this as a opportunity to illustrate the basic commitment of his government and his party to the Alliance and with the United States and with his European partners.

Q Could you quickly review the INF deployment schedule for Italy? And are social protests there going to be a factor in the deployment, any problems there as they're having in Germany?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're moving toward initial deployment by the end of the year in three countries -- Italy, Germany and the UK. That deployment is on schedule.

Q How about the Italian end of it? How many missiles in Italy and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to get into the exact number of missiles, but the process continues for several years. And you're initially talking about a very small number of missiles. It would be, I think, the same in the UK. I mean, there's no great difference. The Italian situation's not unique.

Q Is the deployment in Italy going to begin before the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Deployment will begin before the end of the year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, in all three of those countries.

Q What about the demonstrations?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been demonstrations in Sicily. They've been on the scale of European demonstrations -- fairly small. I think that our estimation and that of the Italian government is that these will not sway the government, that the government enjoys a broad support in Parliament, a very strong majority and views its mandate as coming from the people in the recent elections.

Q On the Middle East, you said that Italy's role could become more important. Were you referring to Italy's role as an observer of the ceasefire or in what way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In that general sense. I think Italy geographically, obviously, is in a key position in the Mediterranean. It's in a position to play a strong role in that area. And I think that there's a growing sentiment in the country that Italy should play a strong role in the area. And I would guess that it will move in that direction in the Middle East.

I'm not enough of an expert on Lebanon to go into a briefing on where things stand, to be honest. But I was referring

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to that specifically and more generally.

Q They've committed themselves -- provide forces for the ceasefire, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as I know, yes.

Q Yes. Do you have numbers on that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- and when they might go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't.

Q Will that issue be discussed here? Is that among the -- on the agenda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly the issue of Lebanon, ceasefire, where to go next will be on the agenda and will be a major topic of discussions, both with the President and with the Secretary of State.

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Whether one will get into specific details on the size of the observer force and what towns they're to be stationed in, I don't know, to be honest.

Q Would you expect the -- when they talk about the status of the negotiations at INF, would you expect Mr. Craxi to suggest to the U.S. that it would be useful to delay deployment in hopes of achieving an agreement or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I would not.

Q You would not expect any suggestion of that kind coming from the Italian government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I would not. I think his statement -- his response to Andropov, I think, was quite clear, that the deployments will go forward --

Q On the same question, just to press it a little bit further, it was my understanding that Craxi has said publicly that if the Soviets do negotiate more responsibly, the deployment should be delayed six months to let those negotiations carry forward. You haven't heard anything of that sort --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've seen some press coming from a day or two ago which struck me as comments that may or may not have been off the record. At one point he said the deployments will not be delayed and then he said something else.

But clearly, in our view, the considered response to Andropov, which appeared three days ago, and which is a fully articulated policy statement, is the definitive statement of Italian policy on this and it is exactly what I would expect to hear from Craxi when he comes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:53 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER BETTINO CRAXI OF ITALY

October 20, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:02 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: I'd like to introduce to you [redacted] who is here to give you a brief read-out on the meeting with Prime Minister Craxi.

[redacted] is ON BACKGROUND. His remarks should be attributed to a senior administration official. I'm sorry -- just an administration official. I don't mean to demote you -- (laughter) -- but other people come on. So, do you want to come on up and give us a read-out?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, I like the senior administration official.

[redacted]

I'd like to say that this meeting that we had today with Prime Minister Craxi was an excellent meeting. I was struck, myself, by the degree of warmth and personal rapport that was generated between the President and the Prime Minister, although they'd come from different backgrounds -- he'd been a socialist premiere in a relatively short-term of office, and a Republican -- a conservative Republican President.

Upon examination of the issues that they discussed today, there was tremendous degree of similarity in their views on foreign policy and, also, in the way in which they're both attacking their domestic problems.

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The issues that were discussed today I think are most familiar to you. Of most concern at the present time, of course, is the larger question of security in Europe. Both the Prime Minister and the President agreed that is was vitally necessary to pursue negotiations in Geneva, to somehow break through the Soviet intransigence that has characterized those negotiations and search for a solution. If no success is reached at Geneva, then both the Prime Minister and the President recommitted themselves to deployments this year.

They both were especially concerned over recent Soviet statements regarding the future of the negotiations and threats that the Soviets might employ in Eastern and Western Europe. I must say that the Prime Minister was extremely impressive. And he has demonstrated to a great degree the emergence of Italy as a major player in the Western Alliance -- not just in the missile issues in Western Europe but, also, with a special eye toward the Mediterranean and in the broader Mid-East questions.

The President and the Prime Minister went into some depth to the situation in the Middle East, particularly that in Lebanon. Again, they agreed to redouble their efforts to try to secure a peaceful solution there. And both agreed that there were military peacekeeping measures that were necessary at the present time. However, the Prime Minister emphasized -- and the President agreed -- that they must look beyond military training or military peacekeeping missions to try to issue initiatives that would aim at reconstruction of Lebanon. That is, by providing incentives for the various factions to come together to build a more prosperous and democratic Lebanon.

In this regard, the Foreign Minister Andreotti and Secretary of State Shultz will be meeting later to try to develop more specific and concrete proposals in order to carry this forward.

In addition to the security issues, the President and the Prime Minister reviewed other trouble spots in the world to include Central America. And they discussed their different approaches, and their similar approaches, to domestic problems -- where both had agreed that combating inflation was a problem of the first magnitude. The President, again, brought to Prime Minister Craxi the good news on the economic recovery in this country and expressed the hope that the American economic recovery will assist Italy and other European nations in pulling out of their recessions.

The Prime Minister was quite frank in explaining the domestic economic problems now present in Italy, and explained some of the methods which he hoped to pursue in order to alleviate that situation.

I think of special significance growing out of this meeting today was an agreement to establish a joint commission to combat organized crime and narcotics trafficking. As you may be aware, about 80 percent of the heroine that enters the Northeast part of the United States emanates from Italy. Now, the Prime Minister was especially forceful in devoting himself, personally, to the cause of eliminating this trafficking and over the overall problem with organized crime. The President was heartened by this. He has asked Attorney General Smith to proceed further in his negotiations with the Italians on these proposals. And I believe the Attorney General will have more information on this joint effort on combating narcotics trafficking and organized crime later today.

I think I would just conclude on that point. And, again, I think -- just personally -- I'd like to reiterate that the two individuals, the President and Prime Minister Craxi,

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seemed to have developed a strong personal chemistry and I would suspect that this would be the beginning of a long series of coordination between their efforts.

Q The Prime Minister said the path of negotiations must remain open in any case. Do you see any shade of disagreement or even possible skepticism of the U.S. position that the deployment should continue because indeed the Soviets have threatened to end the negotiations? Do they disagree on what ought to take place if there's no agreement in December?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I found absolutely no disagreement. To reiterate again Prime Minister Craxi and the President said we will purse the negotiations in good faith. The Prime Minister was especially adamant that -- he brought to light again the Soviet intransigence and the unrealistic nature of the Soviet proposal in which they would hope to maintain a nuclear theatre monopoly in West Europe and refusing to negotiate seriously.

The Prime Minister stressed that the ultimate goal must be the elimination of missiles from Europe, or at the very least at the lowest possible level. Both he and the President feel strongly that we are going to pursue negotiations. There is I think a reasonable chance that we can succeed by the end of the year. But if the Soviets have not reached agreement with us, then both sides, the Italians and the Americans, have agreed that the deployments will proceed on schedule.

Q -- say they should remain open in any case. And they won't remain open if the American deployment goes through and the Soviets fulfill their threat to walk away.

Now, does he suggest --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Prime Minister --

Q -- that that isn't the way to go?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, Prime Minister Craxi has made it quite clear. He is saying to the Soviets -- He said, "You must remain at the negotiating table. We must proceed here. We must continue to seek out means to reduce the missile threat in Europe."

The Prime Minister was especially concerned, as you may recall, from the letter that he wrote to Andropov and his remarks there. And he, and I think quite clearly, told Mr. Andropov that we must -- "You must drop these intransigent demands. We must continue to pursue the negotiations and we must move away from threats." And the various threats that the Soviets have issued through various spokesmen were reviewed also.

Q How about the reports that the Italian construction of the missile sites is behind schedule and that they might not be able to physically meet the December --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the construction in Comiso is proceeding on schedule.

Q Was there discussion in this meeting on control of the missiles? In other words, who would have operational control of the missiles?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't discuss that.

Q Did it come up in the discussions?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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Q Was there any hint by the Prime Minister playing some sort of mediating role between East and West?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. No, no. No, absolutely not. No, the -- I think the Prime Minister made it quite clear that he is a stalwart member of the Western Alliance and that no time has he considered that he would have some special role in mediation.

Q Did demonstrations, did political unrest come up as the result of the deployment? Did the Prime Minister bring up the point that it could be a tough time in Southern Italy? In Sicily?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That didn't come up. And I'm not sure that the demonstrations have reached a level where that it is such. But it didn't come up in this meeting.

Q Was there discussion of the political implications for the Prime Minister, the deployment's political implications for the government, for the Prime Minister?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Domestically in Italy?

Q Yes.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that didn't come up.

Q The missiles that are going in in Italy, are they all going into Sicily?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Does that begin with the first deployment in December or is it scheduled for later?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: December.

Q You said the threats that the various Soviet spokesmen have been making were discussed. What was the -- What did the President say about those threats?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President just once again reiterated that the Soviets ought to do their negotiating at the table, that he felt that the Soviets hope to employ a combination of intimidation through their nuclear missile monopoly and threats that were designed to foster the peace movements.

I will say that -- and he repudiated this ploy, as did the Prime Minister -- and I think, if -- I wouldn't be talking out of school that the Prime Minister pointed out that the Soviet Union had tried on many occasions to weaken Reagan's position at home through these methods. It was the Prime Minister's observation that in fact they had not succeeded and in fact it probably strenthened his position.

Q Was there any discussion of contingencies that the United States might take in response to Soviet threats?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there was no discussion of any contingencies should the Soviets follow through on one of their threats.

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Q What are these incentives you're talking about in Lebanon?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This involves -- This, as I've told you, would be flushed out with further discussions between Prime Minister -- or Foreign Minister Andreotti and with the Secretary of State.

In concept, this would involve some sort of incentives toward reconstruction, perhaps financial, that the various communities would come together in a commercial sense to reinstigate the Lebanese bond of nationalism to try to downplay the differences between the various factions.

Q You said they agreed on the threat of inflation. Do you see any significance in the Italian leader mentioning the need for international prosperity first? Is this an echo of the disagreement between the United States -- or really between Mr. Reagan and the European leaders as to our policies in economics?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I was going to agree with you at first that it does have a lot to do with international prosperity on the whole and that the U.S. role, as it could pull the other countries out of their recession. But, no, there was absolutely no disagreement on that.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:13 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1983, 10:40 A.M.

MODERATOR: Good morning. This is a BACKGROUND briefing on the Secretary's trip to Brazil and El Salvador. It's ON BACKGROUND. So the attribution is a Senior Administration Official or a Senior State Department Official. It is on the subject of the trip. And I'm sure you may have questions on other events in Latin America. But if you could confine the questions to the trip, we'll deal with those other subjects at the noon briefing or at points thereafter.

O.K.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have been programmed to destruct on any other questions. (Laughter.)

Q That will be interesting to see! (Laughter.)

Q Let's do it after we get the information!

A The Secretary's trip to Brazil and El Salvador has two basic reasons for the trip. As a result of those two basic reasons, it gives us an opportunity to do a third thing that is important to the Secretary.

The two reasons for the trip are: As you may recall, President Reagan in December went to Brazil, in the process of which he and President Figueiredo agreed and formed five working groups in five areas of interest to both countries. Those working groups were then to report back through their respective secretaries of states to the presidents.

That process has worked fairly well. The five working groups have met. At various times Foreign Minister Guerreiro was in Washington in May to put together some of the final guidelines on the five groups. At that time in May, an agreement was made between Guerreiro and Shultz that Secretary Shultz would go to Brazil to finalize this -- receive the reports of the five groups and work on the joint statements up to the presidents. And that is the main purpose of the trip and the purpose for going to Brazil.

The traveling in that general direction gave the Secretary an opportunity to renew his dialogue with leaders in this case of El Salvador -- and this time on El Salvador turf, so to speak, as opposed to meeting in Washington, where they met last July.

Those two trips, putting the Secretary in the Central American region and the South American region, gave him an opportunity to do something that is within his management style that he likes to do -- and that is that he is going to hold two Chiefs of Mission conferences. We will be bringing in to El Salvador the Ambassadors from Central America and the Contadora country for a meeting with the Secretary there, and in Brazil we will be bringing in the Ambassadors from South America so that he can have a

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Chiefs of Mission conference there. Those of you who have traveled with the Secretary and followed him know that he likes to gather with his Ambassadors, his managerial staff. He then has a kind of free-wheeling rounding session to see what's important — what are we doing right, what should we be doing different. It gives them an opportunity to look at things in a regional aspect from a policy point of view and he's found it very useful.

So that third reason has been added to the trip, to take advantage of him being in the area.

With that I'll stop.

Q Where ~~would~~ that second meeting that you said, be, the one in South America? Would it be in Brazil or in Rio?

A It will be in Rio. He will spend a day and a night in Brasilia on business relating to the five working groups meeting with President Figueiredo and Foreign Minister Guerreiro and others and then will spend the last day of his trip in Rio meeting with the Chiefs of Missions.

If you add up the number of nights he's gone, you'll find that he's one night in Brasilia, one night in Rio — and he's gone three nights, and the third night is on the airplane between San Salvador and Brasilia.

For those of you who are going along on the trip, if any of you are, in the interest of full disclosure, if

John Hughes didn't tell you that, we're sleeping on the airplane at night.

Q Did you say on the Chiefs of Mission conference in Central America that it was a Contadora country?

A No, no. It's the Central American countries plus the Contadora.

Q Oh, all right.

A So it will be nine Ambassadors -- a host Ambassador, plus eight.

Q So what does he do in El Salvador? Does he meet with the Salvadoran Government officials?

A He will be meeting in separate meetings with President Magana, with Foreign Minister Chavez Mena, and with Minister of Defense Vides Casanova. Magana is giving a lunch for him, or he is inviting -- or the people in the political spectrum -- and there will be a cocktail hour in addition to the lunch. It gives him an opportunity to chat with a variety of those governmental and political leaders that he would not have seen in these other meetings.

Q Then he has the Chiefs of Mission after that?

A That's right -- and then that fairly late in the evening.

Q Well, how long will he be on the ground?

A He will be on the ground -- we launch out of

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here at eight in the morning, and we launch out of San Salvador at mid- to late-evening.

Q The Chiefs of Mission meeting will be the last thing. Will that a a dinner, a working dinner or something?

A No. I don't think we have time to eat, the last time I looked at the schedule. It will pick up after the meetings with the government officials and then run through a period of time that if you're hungry you may get a sandwich.

Q O.K.

A Whether that's dinner or to sit around with sandwiches, the object of the exercise is to keep the meeting going, not to have some kind of formal dinner.

Q That will be at the Embassy or at the hotel?

A The exact location I am reluctant to put out to you now because the SY guys get all upset about it, but I don't know whether it's going to be held. I can't remember, to tell you the truth, so that's the easiest answer.

Q Can you say what the five working groups are again?

A Sure.

Q And also what your views are about some current developments.

A O.K.

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The five working groups are:

No. 1 was on nuclear matters.

No. 2 was on industrial-military relations. These are in no order; it's just as I remember them.

And No. 3 is on economic matters.

No. 4 was on science and technology.

And No. 5 was on space activities.

At one time science technology and space activities -- if you're interested in a lot of trivia -- were one group. But then we decided, because of the issues and what was important of different ones, to split them into two groups.

The interesting aspect of this whole thing of bringing two of these five out is that those of you that have covered Brazil or looked at Brazil I think would agree with me that it would have been difficult for the United States Government and the Brazilian Government to publicly notice that they were getting together to talk about either nuclear or military things two years ago.

I just think that shows a level of understandings and maturity in relations between the two governments that they can even publicly do it -- because, you may recall, the nuclear issue was a big issue in Brasil vis-a-vis the United States policy, as was the military issue when Brazil in 1977, I believe, did away with the joint

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Brazil-United States Military Commission.

So that fact that you even have commissions on those two to me was a significant step.

Now, I may be less than objective in that analysis, but I think it's there.

You had a second part of your question?

Q Yes. I wondered if you had some comment on the decree on economic legislation.

A O.K. On the economic legislation, as I believe Secretary Shultz has said before -- and I believe it strongly -- we have the confidence that the Brazilian Congress is going to do what they deem to be right for the Brazilian people in the short range and the long range. And that's with regard, specifically, to the wage decree, if that is the thrust of your question.

Q Yes.

A With regards to the other element, which I understand to be not as was originally billed as a state of emergency -- but maybe one of you can help me out on this one. It was not a state of emergency per se. It was localized to Brasilia. It was a singular action taken, as I understand it, by a result of a Congressional request by the Executive Branch that the atmosphere within the Congress be such that they could deliberate the bill. And I

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don't think any other actions were taken on it. I think the first notice on it kind of overblew it. That's the way I understand.

Either way that's a matter within the purview of the Brazilian Government. It's not something that we considered even -- changing trips or doing anything else.

Q When you say you're confident that the Congress will do its right for the Brazilian people, you're saying --

A In the short and the long range.

Q In the short and the long range.

A That's right. It's in the interests of the Brazilian people.

Q You're saying you now agree with them and are opposed to the IMF conditionalities?

A No, no. I didn't say that. I don't think I came anywhere close to saying that. I'll say one more time what I said. They asked me what my reaction was.

Q Well, the Brazilian Congress voted down the wage decree.

A That's correct; and I'm told that there's another wage decree that is being considered.

Q Well, that's being done by the president, not by the Congress.

A Well, wait a minute. I may be wrong to jump in, but it has to go through a period of time in which the congress either accepts or rejects or by a period of time it then becomes law. So I mean congress does have a speaking part in this Decreto Lei.

Q Let me ask you more broadly. What is the Secretary planning to do about the debt crisis? You have figures as diverse as Henry Kissinger saying that you have a major political crisis due to the debt situation and the IMF austerity demands. That's been Lyndon La Rouche's position for quite a while. When those two agree, isn't it something that you should take a look at?

A I think I can say to you with all honesty that it's something that Secretary Shultz and I have been taking a very close look at -- me in my prior position well over a year ago. It's something that Secretary Shultz I think is eminently qualified to address. I think his credentials in the international economic arena are such that his credentials may be more than many of his predecessors have had. So it's something he's well aware of and keeps his finger on as it goes along.

Q Are you going to propose something beyond even that?

A No. The method has been established. There are

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lines of communication in dealing with all of these debt problems, which includes obviously Secretary Regan -- it includes Secretary Shultz, Volcker on the part of the U.S. Government -- and those kinds of communications and coordinations are continuing as we go along.

Q Let me try to put it this way.

A You obviously didn't like that answer. (Laughter.)

Q No. These last matters that were taken in Brazil will delay -- according to some IMF officials and some bankers -- the financial rescue package that's been organized to Brazil. Is the U.S. Government in that light going to give Brazil any regional aid or anything to cope up to the end of the year, or something like that, or until that thing materializes?

A The thrust of your question is this. Let me see if I can answer it. George Shultz is not carrying in his pocket a bridge loan to sign or to announce, or the test of it.

Q Thank you.

Q Can we expect any announcement for a new American Ambassador to Brazil before the Secretary goes there?

A You can expect an announcement soon, hopefully. How's that for being fair and concrete? (Laughter.)

I mean honestly, for two reasons.

There has to be a process of agrement to be completed, which follows a process of selection on the part of the U.S. Government. So I mean I can't speak for the government. I'm not so sure I can speak for the U.S. Government. But, anyway, I assume -- all right?

Q Isn't it unusual in the selection of an Ambassador?

A Yes, I think so. It was unusual in the delay, I can tell you, because I was following it very closely.

Our process of clearances, once a selection is made, is complicated, no matter who the person is.

There were other unrelated challenges in the selection process that added up this way (indicating with hands) instead of being this way (indicating again). That's what's led to the time factor. It was just a series of unrelated things.

Q A follow up question, a quick follow-up question?

A Yes.

Q Are you indicating that an announcement may come during the course of this trip?

A I would say that in my definition of "soon," that that is a possibility.

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I'm not trying to be vague with you, but it's not something that we totally have control over -- as you well understand.

Q Two questions.

How much ESF money has the United States given to Brazil to help them overcome their financial problems, (a); and will any practical results evolve from these discussions on military cooperation?

A To answer your first question, I don't know, but we can get that.

(To assisaant) Write that down. Would you get that? Do you know.

VOICE: Zero.

A Zero.

Q Zero?

A How about that? No wonder I didn't know anything about it. There wasn't anything there.

And your second question was?

Q What practical results will evolve from your discussions on military cooperation.

A I think there are a couple. I believe that that's one of the areas in which an informal memorandum of understanding will be signed. There is a formal science

science and technology agreement that will be signed, and there is a memorandum of understanding on the industrial-military area.

Q In that light, will the discussion of space activities include more than the use of a Brazilian astronaut aboard the space shuttle or will this include also some mapping activities in the Brazilian outpack?

A I think it includes more. And, by the way, I believe that what we're settling on is a payload specialist that the Brazilians were more interested in rather than an astronaut. It's more useful for them.

Q Well, it's just a lump term.

A Yes. Payload specialist.

Q So they would be putting a package aboard the shuttle, would they?

A But a guy doesn't necessarily have to have the right stuff to be that. (Laughter.)

And the second aspect as to the second part of your --

Q The mapping and --

A O.K. It will be a lot broader than that. I mean mapping may be a part of it. I know from my --

Q Geological survey.

A Yes -- geological sounding for meteorological

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testing. It's a whole gamut of areas of possibilities.

Q And Secretary Shultz -- will you have the opportunity to see in Brazil somebody from congress, why you're looking forward to it -- or would you like to avoid seeing somebody from congress during the trip?

A We're not going to avoid seeing somebody from Congress, and I'm always looking forward to talking with congressmen -- and, yes, there will be an opportunity for the Secretary to chat with congressmen.

Q What opportunity will there be? And when is that opportunity?

A I think that it's going to be at a social occasion that the Secretary is hosting.

Q Do you think there will be opposition to it?

A I see no reason why the government's policy that was there when I was Ambassador -- both in the opposition and government -- and the Chargé who was in charge of drawing up the guest list -- would change it. If he would, I'd talk to him about it; but I don't think he would.

Q Could you say what some of the results of the nuclear working group would be? That seemed tohave been a particular sticking point.

A Yes. That one and the military were the two that were difficult to address.

In the nuclear one, I think what we attempted to do -- and with some success -- is to talk through the relative boxes we were in with regards to the resupply of Angra I.

Because of prohibitions of U.S. law and because of Brazilian feelings with regards to what was within their national rights, there was kind of a disconnect; and we were trying to talk about how do we eliminate that disconnect.

Q This is the Westinghouse?

A No, no -- yes; Angra I, Westinghouse.

Q In the resupply of fuels? Is that correct?

A That's correct, yes. The Angra I.

Q Can you say anything on --

Q Can I go back to the Salvador question?

A Just this one; then I'll come back. Yes, go ahead.

Q You haven't explained the real purpose of this El Salvador stop or what you're expecting to get out of that. Can you give us some more indication of what that means?

A El Salvador is a key component of the whole Central American policy in not only its formulation but its implementation. The Secretary had a chance face to face with the leadership in Salvador in July, or whatever it is, and this gives an opportunity which is needed to have another one and discuss where are we and how are we doing and what's important to get done in these aspects. It's an item that isn't "Ho-hum. We haven't talked to the foreign minister of X-country. We ought to do it to show good relations."

It isn't that. It's a business trip.

Q Is there anything specific you expect to come out of it?

A No. I don't think there's anything specific to come out of it. I think that you can expect that the Secretary will be talking about all aspects of things that are important to us as far as our policy goes.

One, we'd like a fair assessment on how their military activities are going -- what are their assessments as to the training of U.S. battalions -- the whole gamut of issues incorporated in the human rights element -- how are they coming on the judicial process, the election code -- what are their feelings on the constituent assembly's meetings on land form?

Those kind of things are especially valuable to somebody like the secretaries of state.

Q I wasn't quite clear where you left Angra I in Westinghouse. What is it that you're going to try to do?

A O.K.

Q You said something like "getting out of a box."

A No, no. This is a whole story, and I'll try to give it to you in a Readers Digest version.

Basically, requirements of U.S. law on transfer of this fuel requires certain agreement certifications to be done by the recipient country. In the case of Brazil, the matter is complicated because we had an agreement that was prior to this law, which was an agreement -- a bilateral action between two countries.

Then the Congress imposed a higher set of standards which the Brazilians considered to be a unilateral action. And the Brazilians are saying, "We had a bilateral deal and now you come in with a unilateral thing." So that's what we're trying to sort out. That's what it boils down to.

Q Can I follow up on the question of El Salvador? Is Secretary Shultz going to be carrying to Salvadoran officials and to the Chiefs of Mission conference the information you gleaned in your meetings with Nicaraguan officials last week and this week?

A I'm sure that in both discussions the whole process of negotiations in Contadora and the rest of it will play a very significant part because it's a very significan

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part of our policy.

Q And you won't respond directly to his question with respect to --

A No. I'm not going to say my earlier statement because he wants to see me self-destruct. (Laughter.) But you're correct in your assessment, that's right.

Q Which is my assessment?

A That I was not going to respond.

Q Oh.

Q You used the word "negotiations." With whom were you talking about?

A Well, the dialogue and negotiations that go on with everyone. It goes on within the Contadora process. We talk to different members of the Contadora in the fourth floor. It gives you an opportunity to carry them off.

Q On the nuclear fuel, do you expect the talks to iron out this whole problem of the supply of fuel? I mean is everything straight now?

A I wouldn't say that everything is straight, but I think that there seems to be a consensus on a path that could be taken in which both sides of the issue can be -- if not totally satisfied, at least we understand what our problems are and figure out some way to not make

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it a major sticking point in our nuclear relations.

Q Will there be a memo of understanding on that?

A I don't think there will be a memo of understanding, but I think we're working in the direction that maybe we can work something out.

Q Can you give us some idea of the progress made in the industrial-military group? I know that your expectations were low in the beginning, but --

A Yes -- well, I think everybody's. Not that expectations were low; but it was a subject, as you know, that was very delicate to deal with between the two countries.

Q Which ones?

A There's a couple of aspects which may or may not be addressed within this memorandum of understanding but certainly were out on the table for discussions.

Look at the different challenges you face.

First is, as you know, under military sales of one type or another, we have a third-country clause that we put in everything. That is, before you can sell either the technology or the product, you have to get our permission to se it and we sell it.

Brazil considers that to be an unnecessary restriction. So you talk about how do you apply it, where do we have to apply it, and these kind of things.

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The fact that you can talk about that aspect I think is significant.

The other is on the transfer, the actual transfer of technology -- regardless of the third-country aspect -- the Brazilians have an arms industry that is the sixth largest in the world. It is at a sophistication level that they have picked. They went after a market that nobody else did, which was a lower sophistication level, and they have done a good job of penetrating that.

They may want to upgrade that. If they do, they may want to buy or transfer U.S. technology. That was an aspect that we had not talked about before, so it is an aspect that we can talk about.

You can obviously talk about the possibilities of ironing out the ground rules for a possible coproduction, although a coproduction has a heavy commercial aspect to it.

So these groups do not include -- on the U.S. side, certainly -- the commercial part of it. But it's generally in that framework.

Q O.K. I have two questions on Brazil.

One is on the new decree. Has the United States studied the decree, and is it in a position to say whether it will --

A You're talking about the proposed Decreto Lei?

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Q Yes, O.K.; all right.

Is it in a position to recommend or to lobby on Brazil's behalf within the IMF that this be accepted as part of the package? That's my first question.

And my second question is: Will Surinam come up and the rapprochement between Brazil and Surinam, and are we supporting that rapprochement?

A As to your first question, we have an idea of what the Decreto Lei says. We don't have any final document because I don't really think there is a total, final document yet per se. There may have been something printed, but that's from which they're working from.

It's obvious that, just like in the United States Congress here, it takes so many votes to get that thing passed in one form or another. Therefore, if Brazil wants to produce it, it may have to negotiate. But that's something they have to do.

So to answer your question, we don't have anything firm here. If we were not, (a), to make an analysis; and, (b), not having done that, we're certainly not going to be in a position to take that second step you talked about.

Now, your second question is about Suriname. Those of you that know Foreign Minister Guerreiro and the reputation of the Tamarachi, they are first class. And it's not unusual in that I have participated in several of these. And when Guerreiro meets with Shultz and/or -- in the case of his predecessor, Haig -- there is a tour de horizon which is more than just a show-and-tell. The Brazilians have not only an interest but a good perspective in several different parts of the world. So there will be a tour de horizon and I am sure that Suriname would be a subject discussed within that context of a tour de horizon.

Q Do we support the rapprochement between Brazil and Surinam that's been going on? Are we behind that? I mean where are we?

A No, we're not behind it. It is not a question of whether you both read or agreed for it. I think there is benefit to be gained by all that are looking for peaceful aspects to see the effects made by Brazil in this case.

Q As a followup, you mentioned on his question --

A You know, in some quarters -- not necessarily in Brazil -- giving a warm hand of approval can be a kiss of death for Brazil.

Q Whose warm hand of approval? (Laughter.)

A A U.S. warm hand of approval can be the kiss of death for people, not necessarily Brazil.

Q All right. On his first question a followup. He was asking if you would lobby for Brazil in the IMF, and you mentioned that this new decree law may have to be negotiated, but that's something they have to do.

Do you expect that there would be some sort of agreement or positioning by different Brazilian groups about the decree law before you go ahead in consideration with the IMF law in that?

A Look, I think the IMF has made it very clear that they expect to see their standards met in this case -- you know, that has had the warm hand of approval of the Brazilian Congress. I mean that's nothing new. They've said that all along since May or June or July. And that hasn't changed.

So whatever comes out of Brazil to be examined by the IMF -- who is the main one that must -- should have that criteria.

I don't know what else I can add to it.

Q O.K. There seems to be a problem of timing in this thing.

If this new decree follows the path of the one that was rejected, it will not be approved until March by the Cursa de Paraz forces.

A Yes.

Q So it messes up the length of time allowed.

A O.K. Let me get back to what I said basically.

I have to believe that the Brazilian Government -- Executive Branch and the Congress -- are well aware of their own laws -- at least, that there is a maximum time frame. There is also a provision in which it can be taken care of within a lesser time frame. There are methods in which that can be done, agreed?

Sure, they vote on it; O.K.? So that cuts it off, right?

On the other hand, I have to believe that the governments also understand that "no tickee/no laundry." If that doesn't get approved, the IMF doesn't act.

So when I said that I'm sure the Brazilian Congress will do whatever is in the best interests of the Brazilian people, in the short range and the long range they will take that aspect into consideration. O.K.?

Q It seems that we've been talking a lot about Brazil. Would you assess that one or the other stops is more important -- or both?

A If you asked me that question four months ago, I could have unequivocally given you a good answer. (Laughter.

But, no, I don't think you could. They're both important I mean.

Q What is the nature of the human rights discussion he's going to have in El Salvador? Would it be proper or correct to say that he's going to inform the Salvadoran authorities about this upsurge of violence?

A I think that it would be proper to characterize that the Secretary will explain to not only Magana but those ot with whom he meets in the political and the governmental structure precisely the effect that news items on rising violence has on the U.S. public and the U.S. Congress and the challenges that it may or may not present to supporting U.S. policy vis-a-vis El Salvador.

Q Hasn't he done that before?

A Pardon?

Q Hasn't he done that before? Hasn't he done that in July last year when the money was up for recertification?

A Yes, but that doesn't conclude that if it is a significant part of our policy -- that doesn't preclude that he keeps saying it and talking about it. Situations change.

No -- I think it's a very valid thing to cover.

Q Has the situation changed?

A I think it goes backwards and forwards, yes.

Q Will there be a meeting with D'Aubisson at any point?

A I don't know.

Q With time closing in on here, I mean Congress is beginning now to write into its aid provisions requirements that trials be held in the case of the murderers of the nuns, and perhaps the AIFLD workers ____ before all the foreign aid money is spent in 1984. You now have a 30 percent hold passing through two Committees in both Houses.

A It hasn't passed one Committee in the House, but go ahead.

Q Well, it has passed the Subcommittee in the House and a full Committee in the Senate.

A O.K., I'm not going to argue. I know what you mean -- the technical aspect. Go ahead. I know what you're getting at.

Q You have a time problem which you didn't have before.

A No. You've always had some kind of restrictions. This one is a new wrinkle, I agree.

Q I'm talking about in the human rights area.

A O.K.

Q To what extent does that affect the dialogue that the Secretary is going to have there?

A I think in the process of explaining to him the mood that may or may not be in the people in the

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Congress, I think certainly that's an aspect that you talk to him about. And it's more of explaining to him the realities of political life in this country and in Washington rather than addressing what we think of the merits of this type of legislation -- "we" being the Executive Branch.

Q Yes. I apologize if this has already been asked, but do the new Nicaraguan proposals presented to you yesterday change anything in the dialogue that you are going to have with them?

A The guidance that was given was that we were going to talk about the trip --

Q That I know.

A -- and not entertain --

Q That includes El Salvador. Does that change anything as far as that stop is concerned?

(To assistant) Do you want to explain to him what?

You'll hear at noon more on that dialogue, O.K.? That's what I was programmed for. (Laughter.)

Q What's the situation in El Salvador?

A I didn't say that the second time.

Q The guerrillas launched an attempt about six weeks ago and they seem to be militarily increasingly successful -- especially in Littan and now they're beginning

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to pop back up in Santa Santevas somewhere. Do you have an assessment right now of the military situation? Are you as optimistic as the Department was, say, in July, when the Santa Santevas operation was under way?

A I think you and I chatted about that subject before -- and whether you're optimistic or pessimistic for it to get better or get worse, the overriding factor -- in my analysis of guerrilla warfare -- is keeping in mind that it is an ebb-and-flow operation and that it's not like set piece battles. You don't have enough Panzer divisions to break through the Maginot line type thing -- they're aren't those kinds. So you will have an ebb and flow.

Let me put it to you this way: I think with the increase in U.S.-trained battalions in El Salvador as each battalion is trained, as more guys are runned through the OCS Sergeant School at Fort Benning, you see a more effecti ability increasing on the part of the Salvadoran Government to control it.

Within that framework of a trend, you will see ebbs and flows.

Q On the economic working group, I understand that all that you wer[illegible] to do was to identify the problems -- the economic problems -- between Brazil and the United States, mostly commercial problems. So that's

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the only group that did not conclude its work.

Where do you go from here? Are you going to pursue the search for recommendations on economic problems or are you going to wrap everything up on this trip?

A No. I think what you have to keep in mind is that some groups may make more progress than others and some groups face some stickier problems than others.

In the economic area, you look across the whole board of trade. You look at Brazil's policy on Eclimaticas — all of these things which we have rehashed over a period of time. They have not gone away as a result of this working group and they will not go away in the future. But they are as such I think a process — be it through the trade subgroup or be it through this group or something, it will obviously continue on that front.

I promised someone over here. Yes.

Q With your background and after all that has been said here, how would you characterize today the situation in Brazil?

A I'm trying to think of one word. (Laughter.)

Q "Improving"?

A I can't do it in one word. I was trying to, but I can't do it in one word.

O.K. I would characterize that Brazil is in --

Q You shudder to think about it? (Laughter.)

A No. Seeing we're off the record, why don't I just say what you said to me a year ago in New York when they had a big black-tie dinner.

Q I did?

A Yes, you did. You said to me: "Welcome to the last dinner Brazil will give." (Laughter.)

Q I don't recall that.

Q You don't recall it. (Laughter.)

Q Have they had any since?

A Yes. (Laughter.)

The answer to the question -- who was the guy here that said my pants were too short there at that dinner? (Laughter.) It was one of you.

To answer your question, Brazil is in a third year of an economic recession. It is in a second year followin a significant move in the political aspect -- that is the Abertura aspect following the elections -- which led to the lower house -- the House of Deputies -- controlled by the opposition.

So now you have economic challenges and a political situation and a major step towards redemocratization. You're going to get a little push and pull between them, but I am confident that that pull and push will not get to the

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point where it will either tear the social-political fabric or cause the economic to get out of hand.

It's a tough balancing act, but it's being handled in a good manner.

VOICE: Do you want to take one more?

A One more. O.K.

Q On El Salvador, the government has already delayed until March of next year the election in the Senate there.

A That's right, their original date before they moved it up as a result of the Pope's visit -- and then they figured out that they couldn't get there physically.

Q Yes. Yesterday the congress has temporarily suspended the drafting of the new constitution. Is this one of the reasons why the elections are being delayed -- because of threats made by apparently rival groups to some legislators?

My question is: Are you at all interested, and is this one of the purposes of Secretary Shultz -- to get a final date and to get a definite answer from the government on the elections?

A The subject of elections within the framework of democratization in El Salvador is obviously something that's very important to us,and has been; and we're interested in seeing it go at as fast a pace as possible, when you take in all of the considerations.

The United States Government is not in a position of saying, "You will hold it in March and don't change it" — that type of approach.

There are several steps that have to take place before that election takes place, and some of them are sequential.

For instance, you can't finally write an election law until you have a constitution. If you have a delay like you mentioned today of a shutdown for a day or two — or whatever — of the deliberation on a constitution, then you have a critical path problem of writing the election law. But I don't think a delay of a day or a week or whatever will affect that aspect.

It's the ability within the constuent assembly to come up with a constitution. Then you just go through the aspect of writing election law.

The other factors are going ahead, like the registrations and the rest of them. They're not in the critical path, so they can go ahead.

So many of the actions leading to the election can continue even though there may be less progress today than there was yesterday on the evolution of the constitution.

Does that answer your question?

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
H.R. ERSHAD,
PRESIDENT OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF BANGLADESH

October 24, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:03 P.M., EDT

MR. JANKA: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm pleased to present this afternoon my colleague to give you a background briefing on the visit tomorrow of Lieutenant General Ershad of Bangladesh. I would remind you that his comments are on background, attributable to a Senior Administration Official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me speak very briefly and then take questions.

First, a little bit on schedule. General Ershad arrived this morning at 10:00 a.m.,and was received by Deputy Secretary Dam at the airport and they had a meeting shortly thereafter.

The rest of his official U.S. government program begins tomorrow with a meeting at 11:30 a.m. with President Reagan in the Oval Office, followed by a working luncheon hosted by President Reagan in the State Dining Room of the White House.

My schedule says thereafter, there will be departure statements at the Diplomatic Entrance of the White House.

Thereafter tomorrow, there will be a meeting with Craig Nalen, the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; a meeting with Peter McPherson, who is the Administrator of AID; a meeting with Secretary Block, the Secretary of Agriculture, for the signature of a PL-480 Agreement.

And, thereafter, a reception hosted by the Ambassador of Bangladesh for General Ershad and a dinner given by General Ershad in honor of the Vice President.

On Wednesday, a meeting with Ambassador Kirkpatrick, a luncheon by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a wreathlaying at Arlington Cemetary, and departure from the monument grounds at 4:15 p.m. on Wednesday.

I have simply gone over the official items on the schedule. There are other items on which the Bangladesh Embassy is somewhat more expert.

This is a visit which I think is characterized by agreement. Our bilateral relations are good. The President has invited General Ershad here in confirmation of those good relations between the two countries.

Much of the emphasis in our bilateral relations is on internal affairs in Bangladesh because we participate extensively through the vehicle of our assistance programs. We provide assistance on, I think it's $164 million in a year, about evenly divided between development assistance and food. And this very substantial amount reflects the extent to which we have been able to agree with Bangladesh

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on development policy. In this case, Bangladesh is an excellent example of a country which has set forth development policies, constructive development policies which we believe will move this country closer to solving its problems.

Of course, it

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started in 1971 in great poverty and in recent years has shown a considerable ability to set forth policies which the government of Bangladesh and we believe can move Bangladesh considerably closer to resolving its food and population problems.

The President will expect to take up with General Ershad a broad range of both international as well as these bilateral issues. We anticipate that General Ershad will seek a reaffirmation of our on-going aid relationship.

He's also meeting with American businessmen to encourage increased U.S. private investment in Bangladesh. Among the major development policy reforms which have been taken in Bangladesh is a giving of much greater emphasis to the private sector. In fact, the government has denationalized a number of government-owned industries, some with rather positive results.

Therefore, in recognizing the role which he wishes to give the private sector in development, General Ershad is seeking American private investments. Obviously, this is something with which the administration agrees and we will be encouraging him to proceed along these lines.

We will also be expressing our interest in General Ershad's plans which he has announced to restore democratic institutions in Bangladesh. In fact, there is a process of elections which he has announced which will begin with local elections next December and proceed on to parliamentary elections, I believe it's in early 1985.

We, furthermore, applaud Bangladesh's constructive foreign policy actions in a number of international bodies in which Bangladesh is active -- the non-aligned, the group of 77, the underdeveloped, the Islamic Conference which is the organization of Islamic -- World Islamic countries and a newly formed South Asian regional organization, South Asian Regional Cooperation Organization which Bangladesh proposed and which has moved now through the stage of foreign ministers' meetings and may go on to one of chiefs of state.

So, we will be noting, as I said at the beginning, our appreciation for many of Bangladesh's policies, its development policies, its moving on to Democratic institutions as well as for its moderate positions on international issues. And I might mention a couple.

Bangladesh has been very strong -- taken a very strong position in regard to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Bangladesh also has -- supports positions which -- of ASEAN and positions which we support in regard to Kampuchea.

I think I would close my opening remarks at that point and take any questions. Yes?

Q You talked about the move toward democratic -- restoring democracy. Is the United States confident that that schedule can be kept and that there actually will be a new parliament in two years?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would not express a view on -- It is for General Rashad to plan and to schedule and carry these things out. But we accept that he has set this forth in full sincerity, that it is his intention to move in this direction.

Q So, the U.S. position is that there's no concern on the part of Washington in terms of the timetable -- when this takes place, only that it takes place?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're pleased by the announcement which he has made because we think that this progression, the return to democracy, is constructive and we of course will be telling him that when he is here.

Q What's the PL-480 agreement that's going to be signed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a further food grain agreement -- wheat.

Q How much of an increase?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- $65 million.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- $65 million.

Q An additional $65 million in wheat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. It's not additional.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh.

Q It's not additional? It's part of the on-going --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a part of our on-going program but it is an additional agreement beyond the last agreement. These are annual --

Q -- part of the 164? Is that it or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a part of the 164, yes.

Q Are they getting any military aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Nothing military, just economic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We have no FMS credits program.

Q Just economic in aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's right.

Q Will he be coming here asking anything else of the U.S. government according to your anticipation at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is obviously for him to say.

Q I know, but would you anticipate that? Are things on the table right now that need to be expedited or anything like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that we're moving forward with this PL-480 agreement. We have under negotiation an investment agreement, but this will not be produced at this time.

Q I'll just go ahead and show my ignorance. I don't know anything about this general. Can you tell me about him -- I mean, how he took power and what's he like?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. He was the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army, had been for some years. And he took control of the government in March of '82 after a period of instability, of what was said to be ineffective government. I think that was probably a situation of uncertainty in regard to government.

Q It was a coup?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, yes, he took over control of government.

Q And what's he like? I mean, is he -- what are his views?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've described his positions on policies, both international and domestic. I think that's the best indication of his views. He will be -- He's having I believe, a breakfast session at the National Press Club. When is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wednesday morning.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wednesday morning, So, that'll be a time for him to state his views.

Q What's the position the government took in the United Nations on the Korean airlines voting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They made quite a strong statement, and they voted for the resolution at the International Civil Aviation Organization, the resolution which we supported.

Q Can you give us from your experience some insight into how life may have changed in Bangladesh since their great difficulties when they got started?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I'd like to do that. Understand at the beginning that this is a very poor country. But the change from 1971 to the present is a change from a great need for relief and from donor countries providing relief to a situation of development in which our emphasis and that of all other donors is on development as on positive movement forward.

There has been substantial progress. There's been progress in agriculture. It's slow. It's difficult. But it moves ahead nonetheless. For example, we were looking at numbers the other day about one winter crop. They have three food grain crops a year. And the winter rice crop, which is the one supported by high technology, has had a phenomenal increase of over 100 percent in the last seven years in productivity.

Don't misunderstand me: The overall agricultural production has been at a more modest rate. But it represents movement ahead with some prospect ultimately of solving their food problem.

Q Is there U.S. AID projection of when they might be self-sufficient in food?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think AID may have its own projections. I've learned to be careful about that, if only because of the unpredictability of weather. Last year they had a drought; this year they've had floods. So, it's -- And the figures, the graphs go like this, overall upward. But it's hard to make projections which I'd like to put into print.

Q Is it something that's conceivable in this century?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. I think so.

MR. JANKA: If there are no more questions, thank you. Let me close by reminding you all that his comments are on background, attributable to administration officials. I also have here a couple of fact sheets on Bangladesh which I'll leave in the Press Office here you may want to pick up. We'll have more available tomorrow. Or if you have follow-up questions, you can call the Near East Bureau's Press Office in the Department of State.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:18 P.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA

October 25, 1983

The Briefing Room

9:38 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Let me have your attention. A couple of matters to bring you up to date before we bring our briefers on.

Last night, from 8:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. in the Yellow Oval Room of the President's Residence, he met with the Congressional leadership. Those present from the leadership included Speaker O'Neill, Senator Baker, Senator Byrd, Congressman Michel and Congressman Wright. Present from the administration were the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Vessey, Ed Meese, Jim Baker, Bud McFarlane, Mike Deaver, Dick Darman and Ken Duberstein.

This morning, from about 7:00 a.m., from 7:30 a.m. until about 8:00 a.m., the President met with Prime Minister Charles of Domenica in the Oval Office.

And from 8:15 a.m. until shortly before you saw him around 9:00 a.m., shortly after 9:00 a.m., he met with the bipartisan Congressional leadership.

We have, besides this background briefing, there will be a number of other background briefings. Defense will brief sometime midday on the military operation in Grenada.

We will have our regular 12:30 p.m. briefing here in the Briefing Room.

At 3:00 p.m., Secretary Shultz with a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will brief on the record at the State Department.

And late this afternoon, we anticipate that the Pentagon will wrap up the military situation with a briefing there.

Q What time is that?

MR. SPEAKES: Late this afternoon.

Now, this briefing is on background and the briefers should be identified as Senior Administration Officials. If you would like, since we have a representative of the Joint Chiefs, you can --

Q The President identified him.

MR. SPEAKES: I understand that. You can identify him as a Senior Military Official, U.S. Military Official.

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Q Is the President cancelling his schedule for the rest of the day? What's he going to do?

MR. SPEAKES: No, the President's keeping his meetings with the President of Bangladesh and departure statements and so forth that are scheduled.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. What I thought I'd try to do is fill in some of the blanks for you and then we'll take your questions.

First, to the organization of the OECS. The OECS was formed in 1981. It is a treaty between seven countries -- Domenica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua, and also Grenada is a member. There are two others -- St. Kitts-Nevis,that just declared its independence a few weeks ago, and Montserrat, who is named in the treaty, but is still a colony.

The ones that were involved in the unanimous request to the United States government were the only ones present there and eligible -- Domenica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Antigua and St. Kitts. The first four have sent troops to the multinational force. St. Kitts has no troops or police. They have just formed their independence, so they were unable to, although they voted for the request.

They originally approached Jamaica and Barbados, who are fellow members in CARICOM, which is the Caribbean Community, a separate organization. Jamaica and Barbados then joined the nations of OECS in making the request to the United States for assistance.

This treaty is like their Rio Treaty. They are not members of the Rio Treaty under the OAS and so this treaty is like their treaty.

The government in Grenada flows from the time it was a British colony to the appointment of a Governor General, who then appoints a government under their constitution and there are elections and such. That constitution was suspended by Mr. Bishop's coup in 1979. So the legal constitutional thread still flows from the Governor General to the constitution.

To reiterate to you the reasons for the U.S. involvement: obviously, the protection of U.S. lives, and we'll get into that in a minute; to restore the order and to assist in the restoration of law.

With regards to the U.S. citizens, as I think the President said,there are approximately 1,000 to 1,100 U.S. citizens on Grenada. Six hundred of them attend St. George's Medical School there as students.

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During this period of time, we have -- through very sporadic bits and pieces of information, we were able to determine that there was a very high anxiety level among the students and the other U.S. nationals that we came into contact with. And they were frustrated by their restriction of movements, which was the total curfew, the "shoot on sight," the inability to get -- when the curfew was lifted for a couple of hours a day, the ability to get in and out of the airports. That has been going on there for awhile.

Following the restorating of order on Grenada, it is envisioned the Governor General, who is a Grenadian living in Grenada, will form a provisional government. That government, then, will go through a process of elections and restore the constitution. As to how long the U.S. troops will stay in Grenada, our object is to remove them as soon as possible after order is restored. We can envision that, through the Eastern Caribbean countries -- that once order is restored -- they will be able to maintain order as this constitutional process, going from the Governor General to a provisional government to elections, goes forward.

Q So we'll say, until after the elections, just to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The object for the U.S. forces is to remove them as soon as possible. I just gave you the process of what's going to --

Q What does that mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I just finish here and, then, we could get into questions, please?

Let me restate this so, maybe, there isn't -- maybe, I didn't put it well.

The process as we envision it is the flow of the constitutional authority from the Governor General to a provisional government, which he appoints. And he has the right under the law. That provisional government, then, following the constitution that was suspended in '79 will hold elections for a more permanent government. Now, that's the process as it goes.

Separate subject: presence of U.S. troops there -- it is our intent to, as soon as order is restored to the island and the ability of the United States to turn over to their follow members in this multinational force to maintain the order there -- and so the object of the exercise is for the removal of the U.S. troops as soon as possible. With regard to other U.S. government actions, we are prepared to establish a U.S. government presence on the island -- we presently have no consul there at all -- and repair to establish an Embassy once there is a provisional government established under this constitutional authority.

And there is a team in Barbados headed up by -- who will be the Charge with a personal rank of Ambassador, the present Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in Inter-American Affairs for Caribbean Affairs. That is Tony Gillespie. He is in Barbados and will be going into Grenada very shortly.

Prior to taking your questions, maybe, sir, if you could, just give them the state of play from a military point of view, the forces involved and what we know up to date.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks.

Basically -- and our information is sketchy because of our principle that the Field Commander, without interruption -- Admiral McDonald -- as the particular overall Commander at CINCLANT in Norfolk, Virginia -- it's his show. And he has fed us some information. But we have not asked him, because of the crunch of time.

But, basically, what has happened -- sir?

Q Can I get the full name of McDonald?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to get that later.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wesley.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wesley.

Q Is he a Marine?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's an Admiral in the United States Navy -- full Admiral --

Q And he's in charge of the operation from Norfolk?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q He's CINC --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's CINCLANT.

Q What's that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Forces.

And the overall Field Commander is Admiral Metcalf. And we'll have to get you a first name and a full rank on that later on. And he's afloat. Basically --

?

Q Is everybody on the island now; McDonald's on the island?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, ma'am. He is Norfolk, Virginia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Why don't we let him go through what he knows and, then, we can get into Q-and-As. I think it's easier.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Basically, what we've done --

Q We want to know who's who, too.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Basically, what we have done is we have put forces primarily in the north, around Pearles airfield. Approximately 500

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Marine forces had that responsibility to secure the airfield, which is the international airport.

In addition to that, we took Army airborne forces and air dropped them in the vicinity of Point Salinas and the Salinas air field that is under construction. The idea with the 700 to 1,000 Army forces in the south is also to secure some areas around the major inhabited locations in St. George's and some locations in this general southern vicinity.

Q How many dropped at Point Salinas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About a thousand, sir, at this time.

Q A thousand air dropped, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A thousand air drops.

Q And they fanned out to St. George's as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir. They have fanned out.

We, in addition to that, have secured, had met some resistance. We have secured the air fields at both locations. There is still some ground fire reported and there is still some resistance going on at both locations, and that is the status of the military operation at this time.

Q Casualties at the moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no figure at all on casualties.

Q There's one report of five killed, five U.S. Marines killed. Do you have any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no figures at all on casualties.

Q Do you know of any casualties?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We know of no casualties at this time, sir.

Q How about the helicopter?

Q What about the helicopters?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a report that a helicopter is on the ground. Whether that helicopter -- whether it was an emergency landing or it was suffered to the ground because of combat, we don't have verification of that.

Q Would you call this a successful mission?

Q What is this airborne unit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At this point, I think it's too early to say, ma'am.

Q How many troops from the other countries are involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Three hundred, sir.

Q All of them?

Q What's the total?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The total will vary, depending on what the demand is. Initially, just to give you an eyeball, at the present time, the latest figure that we have on the ground is the 400 Marines that are available and on the ground, reported in the north, and about 700 --

Q You said 500 earlier.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Four to five hundred. About 700 to 1,000 in the south.

Q Were they all air dropped? The 700 to 1,000 were all Army paratroopers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to qualify that. They were not all air dropped. The principal measure was air dropped, but there is some air-land operation going on.

Q What is that airborne unit? Which one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is a Ranger battalion, sir. Two Ranger battalions -- 1st of the 7th and 2nd of the 75th and I'll have to get where they're from.

Q So total American troops on the ground now range between 1,100 and 1,500? Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's good enough at this time, yes, sir.

Q There's a report that 600 Cubans and 30 Soviets are secure. Who are these Cubans and Soviets and what does it mean by "secure"?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Your figures are correct and jibe with our information as to what was on the island before we went in. Most of those Cubans are construction workers, working on that runway, that 10,000 foot runway that they are building.

Q Point Salinas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is Point Salinas. That runs down right here. That runway is partially complete, as you know.

The 30 Cubans are billed as advisors.

Q Thirty Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 30 Soviets are billed as advisors. There is somewhere -- in the Cuban figures, there is somewhere in the nature of 50 so-called advisors among that crowd there.

Q What kind of advisors?

Q Military advisors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One at a time, please.

Q Military advisors?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Advisors. Including military advisors, yes.

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Q What does it mean that they are secured? Are they in custody of U.S. forces? Is that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What it means by secured is that they are, obviously, within the control of U.S. military forces. That is correct.

Q How would you describe the resistance to the U.S. action and the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You mean the combined action?

Q Yes. What I'm asking is, I mean, has it been fierce resistance? How would you describe the military action there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to characterize it at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. In very general terms?

Q Well, you tell -- no, in specific --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was some -- initially, in the south, during the airborne operation, there was some triple A resistance.

Q What is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Anti-aircraft fire. That was suppressed. And the extent of the resistance to this time amounts to ground fire. And it varies. At the present time, my latest report is that there is some ground fire and crew-served or mortar weapon type fire.

Q -- called small army fire?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Small armed fire.

Q Describe the Grenada Army for us a little bit. Tell us what they have.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Grenadan Army is roughly somewhere around 1,200 troops. They have received -- some of the 1,200 have received Cuban training. They are armed with Russian arms. They have been described -- this is for the total 1,200 -- a range of not useful to trained status.

Q What about the 300 troops from the other countries? Where were they put ashore?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are scattered throughout the operation. I don't have any details for you on that.

Q How were they landed, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How were what landed?

Q How were the 300 landed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be air landed.

Q Three hundred what?

Q Were any Cuban soldiers --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Three hundred of the multinational force from the other six countries.

Q What time did they land?

Q Have we informed the Soviets and when --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct. The Soviets were informed this morning and so were the Cubans and so have our allies -- the United Nations. All of that happened early this morning.

Q How were the Soviets informed, sir?

Q What were they told?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What were they told?

Q How were the Soviets informed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were told that there was a multinational force going in there and that we were involved.

Q And what was the Soviet-Cuban reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have not had any reaction.

Q Do you have any idea how many of the 1,200 troops are still loyal to this new leader?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a very good question because the reports that we had earlier indicated that

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maybe as many as half of that army was not loyal to them. You may recall that when Bishop was released from jail, there were 10,000 people that accompanied him to the military barracks. And out of a population of 110,000, that's quite a number.

Q Do we know about fate of the government of the Grenadian officials, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. You mean, the revolutionary military counsel?

Q Yes, sir.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do not know the fate of that government.

Q Are they in custody, do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We would assume that that is the -- that's the object of the exercise. We have no information for you on that.

Q What's the name of the ground Commander for infantry forces.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to get that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have to get that for you.

Q Can you give us -- can you give us the timing on this thing, as to when this operation took place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The operation was launched at 0500. The airports were taken within the time frame that was expected for it.

Q I want to follow up. Can you give us a litte more sense, besides just when it started? And, also, can you tell us about U.S. air involvement in this, not just dropping the troops but whether there was any air action?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no -- there has been no air action that we know of. Obviously, in an operation such as this adequate measures are taken to protect the troops on the ground -- the ability to get them in.

Q When you talk about the anti-aircraft fire being suppressed, was that done from the air?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was done from the air.

Q So there was air involvement.

Q [redacted], just said, "no."

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Air to ground.

Q Well, see. That's what I'm talking about.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, fair enough. Well, I -- I am sorry. I was thinking, air-to-air.

Q Any naval gunfire?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of.

Q Can you tell us about the air-to-ground?

Q Let him finish this.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Can we find out what the air-to-ground -- how many -- what can you tell us about the air-to-ground involvement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to get in there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The air-to-ground suppression, the triple-A fire was done by an AC-130 gunship.

Q Is that the only U.S. plane that's seen action?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q How were these planes actually landed? Did they come in on transports or parachute or what? How did they actually come in, our troops --

Q Helicopter?

Q -- was this an air drop, or did they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was both, sir.

Q Did they come from helicopters or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The principal method was parachute.

Q General?

Q -- parachute.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir, for the Army forces, the airborne forces.

Q -- the Marines going in?

Q Was that amphibious?

Q General, may we have a question from back here, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am. Go ahead.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be the General. But that's all right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Admiral's fine.

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Q Both of you -- do you have any indication that there were Cuban soldiers there, that they were participating in a military way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What we -- the information we had is what I gave you earlier. And that is that there are 600 Cubans. We know that within their barracks area there were arsenals with arms. We know that they have -- that there are Cuban military advisors in the area.

Q But before, you said they were, mostly, construction workers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct. But they've had military training. We know that. And there are arms available to them in their arsenal.

Q Was there any resistance from them that we know of?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no information on that.

Q May I ask?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am.

Q I want to ask when the Cubans and Soviets were informed, obviously after the landing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I believe that the message -- (laughter) -- that is correct. I believe it was --

Q And one other thing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- early after the landing.

Q -- it was, obviously, not a surprise, right? This was not a surprise invasion, because they had been preparing for it for a couple of days. And we had been sending ships, correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know of any ships that we'd been sending.

Q No?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whether it was a surprise or not, you'd have to ask them to characterize that. I mean, we obviously wanted to keep it a surprise.

Q Well, did you count on its being any kind of surprise?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You take both those -- you hope to be a surprise. You take into --

Q Let him answer. He knows more --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We did.

Q Did the Marines go in --

Q What? What -- counted on its being --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

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Q Were you surprised?

Q -- please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q You've got 400 to 500 Americans in the north, 700 to 1,000 Americans in the south, and 300 people from other countries all scattered around, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Did the Marines go --

Q How did the Marines land?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Marines came in by helicopters.

Q General, it usually takes several weeks to prepare an operation, an amphibious operation like this. How long had you actually been planning it?

Q -- all the American citizens, all the civilians are safe --

Q Can you answer this question.

Q Could you answer that question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right. Let me see if I can address that question.

Q What's the question.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, at the time --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Before he answers, let's try to put a little order into this. He's going to stay here until the last the question is asked.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can't hear the questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And if you'll raise your hand and be recognized, he will.

Q [illegible]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will repeat the questions if you'd like. And we like to ask you to please be quiet in the back -- back there. If you've got to talk, go in the yard, in the rain. They're going to answer all the questions. He'll repeat them. But, please, raise your hands, because nobody's getting anything. Act right. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question went as to how long -- an amphibious landing takes a long time to plan -- I think you said, weeks -- how long has it been planning.

The President was informed of the request, the request was directed to him late last week. Obviously, prior to that time, since the 12th of October when there was the coup in there and Bishop was killed, there was a rising level of anxiety. There was -- half of his Cabinet was wiped out. They

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brought in -- the fact, as I told you, that they brought in the curfew -- all these other things have led to the generation of planning by this Department of State and the Department of Defense with regards to the safety to U.S. citizens. That safety -- U.S. citizens thing -- generated immediately, one, you have an unstable situation, especially when you have 1,000 Americans on the ground.

You have 600 in a school, students, a relatively small area. And, so, the President at that time directed the various departments to start looking at how we can maintain order, evaluate the situation and see what needed to be done.

Later in the week, there was the request from the Grenadans at which time the President undertook that in the consideration and a final decision was made yesterday afternoon -- last night.

Q The actual military, operational planning began around the 12th of this month?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I didn't say that. By the 12th of the month was when we started to take a very close look at it because of the question of the safety of Americans aboard.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Where's Casey?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which Casey?

Q William.

Q William Casey who's been --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I think he is overseas. But I'm not sure on that.

Q Overseas in connection with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, ma'am. I don't -- nowhere near it.

Q Were the Americans in any immediate danger, first of all? And can you clarify what the President and Prime Minister Charles had to say about Soviet involvement and indication that the Soviets were behind the coup?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The danger to the American citizens was the inhibition of being able to move around, the fact that there were people being killed on the island, that there was shoot-on-sight curfews, that there was two hours in which to buy food, that if they wanted to get out they couldn't get out at the airport because there was interruption of all of the air transport, both charter and scheduled.

And your second question was?

Q About the Soviet involvement in the coup?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, sure. If you want to look a perfect batting record in the United Nations, Grenada goes to the top of the list. They have 30 military advisors in there. They're the ones that are building the runways. The Cubans have been involved to a very heavy -- Cubans and Russians -- to a heavy degree right through the whole operations of the Grenadan government since Bishop took over.

Q Yes, but -- coup, we're talking.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- coup. Our analysis of the coup is that those that have surfaced in the coup, if anything, were more pro-Cuban, pro-Soviet than Bishop.

Q Wait a minute. The President was talking about activists going from some Soviet embassy and, I mean, he was much more specific about that. Can you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't elaborate that for you, I'm sorry.

Yes?

Q The --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I can't.

Q The President said that he received an urgent request from these nations on Sunday. Can we assume that the second NSC meeting which lasted three hours here on Sunday, in which we were either led to believe or presumed was focused on Lebanon, was also focused on this subject as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get into the details of what meetings covered what for a couple of reasons. One was that there were a lot of meetings on Lebanon also that I wasn't involved in.

I think I've tried to outline for you the flow of the process of the governmental action. But as to what was covered at each specific meeting, I'm afraid I can't --

Let's try the back of the room before I get chastised again.

Q Could I ask, can you assure us that the American civilians on the island are safe now or are they still in danger as a result of the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't give you an ironclad assurance because, as the President said, what we're trying to do is let the forces on the ground concentrate on completing their mission. They're not sending back reports to us. The fact that the two airports were taken on time within the scope of the plan leads me to believe that things are going according to plan.

Yes?

Q -- that the medical school as well is as secure?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure whether the medical school -- There are two campuses to the medical school. I'm not sure whether either or both of them are secure when I came in here.

Yes?

Q Would you give a breakdown, an approximate breakdown, by country of the 300 troops and could you tell us how they got into Grenada?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They came in by air.

Q You mean they were landed, not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Air landed, that's correct. Let me just see if I've got those numbers for you.

Q After you secured which airport?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's both. I'm

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sure, to tell you the truth.

Q They airlanded by American planes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were prepositioned by some of their own planes and then airlanded by American planes. Jamaica had 120; Barbados had 50; and split between Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Antigua was 130.

Now, one of the things you should keep in mind is that this represents probably somewhere between 50 to 65 percent of their armed forces.

Q The units ashore -- You identified the Ranger Battalion General. Was that two battalions of rangers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Two battalions, yes.

Q What numbers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First -- I'll have to get those for you, sir.

Q First and Second Battalions of 75th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir.

Q And the Marines -- Please, excuse me. Is that BLTE-22?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to get that for you.

Q Was that the Second Battalion, 8th Marines?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know.

Q Where'd they come from?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, ma'am?

Q You keep talking about the security of the Americans being a primary reason for going in.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q The Chancellor of that medical school has already said this morning that the large majority of the students and faculty there felt they were in no danger. Now, that there has been an invasion they feel that they are in danger. Can you address that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I'd be happy to because our assessment does not track with that of the Chancellor. When this thing first started the Chancellor was in New York. We have been in contact with him when he was in New York and when they went back. They have a telex machine in which -- it's an open telex machine -- in which there was communications backwards and forwards.

During this period of time, there were at one time or another three -- four

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U.S. Embassy officers from Barbados. We have been trying to get into the island over this period of time, since October 12th to verify and ascertain the welfare and safety of U.S. citizens. Sometimes we were successful in getting in. Somethings they would stop us. And so it was a kind of a sporadic deal.

But the assessment that our Embassy officers brought when they came out in talking to the students was that they did not share that assessment, the assessment that they were not "surrounded" as such, or barracaded, was correct. But the anxiety level among the students, among some of those that wanted to leave, the fear of unknown, the interruption of schools, the inability to operate, to get out if they want to was a lot stronger than the dean of the school, who likes business as usual, characterized.

Yes, sir.

Q I'd like to ask two questions on that then.

So you're saying -- what you're saying about the security of the students was that they were in -- it was no positive threat against them, none of the new leaders of this country made any threat about them, the danger was if their anxiety level caused them to try to bolt the country despite the precautions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. That is one of the factors, their anxiety level. The other was the instability and the killings and the murders that went on.

The obligation of the United States government goes to the protection of U.S. citizens. That doesn't necessarily mean that it flows just from threats from governments. It is our assessment of the situation. When you have 600 students relatively in one area, you have given yourself a target for either terrorism, hostages or something much more so than if they're spread out.

Yes.

Q -- also ask on another thing you said, in terms of the setting up of the provisional government, we are going to take, as I understand it from what you've said here, absolutely no role, make absolutely -- play absolutely no role in the selection of who is in this provisional government. It's going to be the Governor General that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and as the Prime Minister said, they're all one region, as she described in the Oval Office to the President, she says, "You know, you have like Nebraska and New Jersey and it's all the same, you have land in between. What we have is a sea in between our islands." They know a lot of these people. They've either gone to school with them or they're interchanged within their islands. I'm sure that they will be advising the Governor General who appoints the provisional government.

Yes.

Q -- if this isn't an invasion, what is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a response to the request of allied nations working under their treaty. And it also -- number one -- and secondly what is is a movement to protect U.S. lives.

Q Which country in the eastern Caribbean first proposed this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was proposed -- a unified proposal by --

Q Somebody had to get it started.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know the details of how they got started. When they came to us, it was a collective deal.

Q -- the first we heard about it, you were not engaged in any diplomatic talks with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We knew that they were very upset. And if you go back and look at the public statements they've made since October 12th, that becomes fairly obvious.

Q But you did not make any approaches to them --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. It could be characterized as their unified request to us came to us as a surprise.

Q One other question --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- military side. Where was the staging area from which these people -- our forces took -- Did they come directly from the United States or were they based in Barbados or did they come from carriers or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All three places, sir. From the --

Q Carriers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the United States. From --

Q Can you tell us where?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- from amphibious ships that were located over the horizon and from Barbardos.

Q Can you clarify the numbers on the Soviet and Cubans that are secured? Could you go through that again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes. But this is based now, these numbers are based on our estimates of the numbers there. It's not based on a body count as they walk by.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's 30 Soviets.

Q Right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's somewhere between 300 or 400 to 600 Cubans, the vast majority of which are construction workers. Within that number, be it 400 or 600 there's somewhere around 50 advisors.

Q And what are your plans for them? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a Cuban ship in the harbor. They will be conducted safe passage to that ship and the ship will be allowed to leave for Cuba.

Q The Soviets, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the Soviets is a separate issue.

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Q What happens to them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Soviets, we're still taking that under consideration.

Q Question, please -- three questions actually for your colleague. Can you tell us when the Marine long-range recon mission first established itself

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on the ground in Grenada? And I have a follow-up to that, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Within an hour of the actual vertical envelopment.

Q Follow-up question, sir. Can you tell us, please, whether there were friendly Grenadan forces that were coordinating with our landing? And, if so, how would you describe them by size and by unit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can't tell you that and don't know.

Q What's the status of the Soviet advisors? How are they being --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. To tell you the truth, I don't know. I heard a report that they were being detained. I cannot answer that question.

Q They are being detained?

Q Did we capture them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, wait a minute. Nobody said anything about capturing them.

Q But you were --

Q Have we secured --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I told you I have no report at all on the status of the Soviets.

Q Are you leaving open the possibility --

Q What's going to happen to --

Q Where were they? Do you know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just a minute. One at a time, please.

Q But are you leaving open the possibility that we have captured the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The rules of engagement were to detain and make order on the island. That's the rules of engagement.

Q Where were the 30 and where is the Cuban ship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot tell you where they were.

Q Where is the Cuban ship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Cuban ship is in St. George's harbor.

Q The confusion comes --

Q Are the Soviets going to be put on the Cuban ship?

Q We all thought you said a while ago that all the Cubans and all the Soviets had been secured. Is that --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. I heard that here. I don't know.

Q Yes, we heard -- Percy outside who was at the briefing inside.

Q Percy said that to the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Fine. Well, then I don't know where the Senator got that. I cannot confirm that for you, okay?

Q Okay.

Q Can you tell us, is this the very first time that there has ever been any coordinated, collective action by these countries under that agreement they have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot tell you for sure, but, seeing as it came about in 1981, I would think that that statement is probably correct.

Yes, sir?

Q Are there any indications that the Cubans and the Soviets are going to try to come to the aid of this Grenadian Revolutionary Council? I'm not just talking about the troops on the island, but whether they would try to send troops to the island to try to help them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no indication of that and we took pains to make early notification without giving away the element of surprise in our notifications to the Cuban and Russian government.

Yes?

Q Was it your objective to detain those who were responsible for the coup? Have you already done so? Your answer --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They obviously will be neutralized and detained. Now, the outcome is something for the Governor General and the provisional government to decide.

Yes, sir? In the back.

Q Is there something in the countries' treaty which specifically allows them to go into another country in a situation like this into Grenada?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I missed the first part of the question.

Q Is there something in the treaty amongst the countries which allows them to go into Grenada in a situation like this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, there is. A copy is going to be made of the treaty, available here later this afternoon. You'll have copies of the treaty made available to you.

Q What's the treaty called?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's the Treaty of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.

Q Can you clarify the situation in regards to the medical schools? Could you show us on the map where they're located, for one thing, and --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Roughly, as I understand it, there's one off the end of the runway. That would be the west end of the runway, here. Because, you can imagine the noise factor now that they're building a new runway there, there is a new one being built somewhere in the area. It's under construction, but also being used somewhere north of the runway.

Q But they're both in close proximity to Pt. Salinas Airport?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q When the Congressional leaders were briefed, between 8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. last night, were they informed that an invasion was about to begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I did not participate in that discussion.

Q So you don't know what their reaction was at the time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I could not characterize that at all for you.

Q Did we have any --

Q May I? One other question.

Q -- prior contact with the Governor General of Grenada before this operation started?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Did we have any contact with the Governor General of Grenada prior to the start of this operation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to address that question until we find out what the status of the Governor General is.

Q -- what time did you inform the Soviets?

Q Can you tell us, does the island have a strategic importance to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Can you tell us whether this island has a strategic importance to the United States, particularly in light of the fact that that runway was one of the aerial pictures the President showed last spring in his --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the President and the various Cabinet Secretaries and other briefers have outlined the importance, the strategic importance of the Caribbean area to the United States previously and also the concern which we had for a 10,000-foot runway being built there, ostensibly for tourist use when you couldn't -- if you landed one 747 on the island, you couldn't find enough hotel rooms for all the people that got off of it.

Q Do you expect that runway to be finished?

Q How long do you expect these troops to be there? You said they're going to be withdrawn --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a minimum of time. I can't give you a time frame, but that is the --

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Q Weeks or months or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's a minimum of time. I would hope it would be very short.

Q Well, what's a minimum time?

Q Today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. I can't give you that.

Q What Naval units are offshore?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sir, it's part of the Independence battle group and it's also part of the Marine amphibious ready unit that are both destined for the Mediterranean.

Q When?

Q What was the initial Soviet reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not had any -- am not aware of any Soviet reaction yet.

Q Six to twelve ships?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sir. Exactly.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Were the British asked to join this invasion by the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we did not ask them to join this invasion at all. No, ma'am.

Q Did someone else ask them?

Q Were they in any way involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I know of. We consulted with the British and I think that the OECS may have had conversations with them.

Yes, sir?

Q I need to get -- would like to clear up the status of these detainees. Now, you said the Cubans are going to be --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to clear it up, too.

Q The Cubans are going to be put on the Cuban ship that's offshore.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're going to be offered to be put on the Cuban ship. That's correct.

Q What's going to be done with the Soviets that have been detained?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't address that question at this time.

Q Isn't it correct that the Governor General is appointed by the Queen?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

Q Do you know his name?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It's -- let me just get it for you.

Q He's a Grenadan or a Briton?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's a Grenadan. Paul Scoon, S-c-o-o-n.

Q What is the lesson here in terms of Soviet aggression in Central and Latin America? I mean, are you saying something here about how you're going to respond?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the basic lesson that you see here is that, when you have a government that takes over without benefit of election, as Bishop did, when they cause concern for their neighbors, which obviously is what has happened, that these neighbors, in this case, under a treaty, have taken what they consider to be the appropriate action.

Q Well, I guess my question --

MR. JANKA: Let him finish this and we'll take one more question after this.

Q Well, why didn't you overthrow Bishop then?

Q Wait a minute. We were told that all questions will be answered. I mean, I was standing here quietly with my hand up.

MR. JANKA: Both men have important meetings to go to and we --

Q If I could follow up. What does it say about the U.S.? Is the U.S. now ready to project military power directly into the internal situations --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to -- No, I'm not going to take that question that way. Obviously not. You can't read that into this action.

Q Why not?

Q Well, what can you read into it? I'm just trying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I tried to give you the reasons why we did it and that's the reasons why we did it. Under that circumstances, as I said it, I don't read into what you said.

MR. JANKA: One last question.

Q -- American commitments in the Mid-East --

Q Can you tell us -- will you please tell us how you conveyed and what you conveyed to the Russians when you said a while ago that you gave them an intimation of what was happening without conveying the surprise act?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: After the first troops were on the ground and we knew that the invasion had started, by normal diplomatic means, the Russians and the Cubans were informed. Early in the morning.

MR. JANKA: Last question. I'm sorry. Last question right here.

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Q Between the American military commitments that are now being made in Central America and in the Mid-East and here --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry. Would you start again, please?

Q Between the American military commitments that are now being made in Central America, in the Middle East and in this invasion, in addition to our regular military commitments, are the American Armed Forces having any difficulty covering all these commitments now? Are we being stretched pretty thin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to address that?

Q What was the question?

Q Are we being stretched too thin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The answer is no, we are not being stretched too thin.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:18 A.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Good afternoon.

I'd like, first, to cover four points:

-- First, the reasons for the President's decision to commit U.S. forces in Grenada;

-- Second, our objectives as we undertake this effort;

-- Third, the chain of events as they led up to the President's decision in the immediate days preceding it;

-- And, fourth, the situation on the ground, very generally, as it was as of about half an hour ago.

There are two basic reasons that determined the President's decision.

First was his concern for the welfare of American citizens living on Grenada. There are roughly a thousand of them. And what we saw was an atmosphere of violent uncertainty: of the Prime Minister of the country first put under house arrest, freed from house arrest by a large number of demonstrators estimated in the thousands, with that demonstration in one way or another becoming attacked, and with the Prime Minister and some of his cabinet members being executed.

We see no responsible government in the country. We see arrests of leading figures. We see a shoot-on-sight curfew in effect.

Reports -- their validity uncertain -- but reports are rife about arrests, deaths, and so forth, and certainly random sporadic firing that one could hear.

All of these things are part of an atmosphere of violent uncertainty that certainly caused anxiety among U.S. citizens and caused the President to be very concerned about their safety and welfare. He felt that it is better under the circumstances to act before they might be hurt or be hostage than to take any chance, given the great uncertainty clearly present in the situation.

So that is the first reason why the President acted as he did.

Second, the President received an urgent request from the countries closest to the area, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, who of course followed these developments very closely over a long period of time, and intensively in recent days, and who determined for themselves that there were developments of grave concern to their safety and peace taking place. They brought in Jamaica and Barbados, and along with those two countries, made a request to the United States to help them in their desire to insure peace and stability in their area. So their analysis of the situation, in terms of the atmosphere of violent uncertainty, paralleled our own.

And so in response to the request of this Organization and in line with a request that they made pursuant to Article VIII of their treaty, bringing them -- the states -- together, the President decided to respond to their request and to look after the welfare of American citizens in this atmosphere of uncertainty and violence.

Second, insofar as our objectives are concerned, there are basically two, and very simple:

-- First of all, to secure the safety of American citizens -- and, for that matter, the citizens of other countries -- and to assure that any who wish to leave may do so;

-- And, second, to help the OECS States establish law and order in the country and establish again governmental institutions responsive to the will of the people of Grenada.

Now third, let me just review very briefly the chain of events here.

I think you undoubtedly know that on October 13, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest and subsequently on October 19 the demonstration and the freeing of him from house arrest took place, and then his death -- our information is by execution -- taking place on that date.

On Thursday, October 20, as information about these developments was coming in to us here in the United States, of course the President was receiving them, and he had the Vice President chair a meeting in the Situation Room reviewing these events. That meeting took place in the late afternoon. I was not present at the beginning of the meeting since I was testifying before a Senate committee in closed-door session, but I came in with Ambassador Motley about halfway through the meeting; and essentially it was a meeting to review the grave turn of events and to consider their implications for the American citizens on the island.

Subsequent to that meeting and on the recommendation of that group, the President decided to divert some naval ships in the area, among them the task force that was carrying the group that would be the normal routine replacement of the Marines who are in Lebanon, and diverted them in the direction of Grenada. Other ships were also included. That was essentially precautionary so that if the situation became worse, we would have a capability nearby.

There were various discussions during the course of Friday, but on Saturday, October 22, a message came in from Bridgetown in Barbados. It reached me at 2:45 a.m. in Augusta, and I discussed it with Bud McFarlane. About a half or three-quarters of an hour later, the Vice-President convening the key National Security advisers, in Washington, in their discussion, we joined with him through a secure conference call to again evaluate the situation and the information in the cable.

The information in the cable basically gave the OECS states' analysis of the situation, and stated their very strong feeling that they must do something about it on Grenada and their feeling that they were not able to do it on their own, and so they asked if we would help them. I think you should note that by this time they had not only gathered themselves together, but they had brought Barbados and Jamaica in their counsels.

We shortly got the President up and we went through this material with him, and went over the views of various people that were taking part in the Vice President's meeting. The President talked to the Vice President, talked to the Secretary of Defense, heard their views, gave his own reactions.

The meeting chaired by the Vice President reconvened at 9:00 on Saturday morning. The President spoke to them by telephone. I might say we considered whether or not to return, and we felt that if we were going to respond to this request, then the element of secrecy should be maintained; and if there was a sudden change in the President's plans, it would obviously call great attention to that possibility, so we stayed there.

On Sunday, October 23, of course, that night we received the tragic news from Lebanon of the attack on the Marines, and that stunning news caused the President to decide in the early morning hours that we should return right away to Washington, and we did so.

During the day on Sunday, we met first from 9:00 to 11:00, and then again later in the afternoon from 4:00 to 7:00.

However, tracking back to the decision on October 22, it was felt that we should explore carefully with the leaders of the

OECS and Jamaica and Barbados their information, their analysis, and their intentions. So, Ambassador McNeil and Major General Crist were sent to Bridgetown. They left early Sunday. They met in the afternoon and evening in Barbados with leaders there, and they were on the telephone to us through this period, giving us more information about the evaluation being made in the area and the options that were before us.

It was in the meeting on Sunday, that last meeting on Sunday, that the President made what I think one would call a tentative decision that we should respond to this urgent request, and that particularly so since their analysis and ours was of a very uncertain and violent situation threatening to our citizens.

On Monday, October 24, of course, the plans were being made, the forces organized, and so forth. The President met in the afternoon from roughly 2:15 to 3:30, something like that, with the Secretary of Defense and the Chiefs, and at the conclusion of that meeting, made a sort of semi-final military decision, he having had the advice of all his advisers the previous day that on general grounds we should proceed. I think the directive of the President to proceed was signed at about 6 p.m. yesterday.

That's kind of the chronology.

Finally, where do we stand on the ground? Both airports at Pearls and Port Salinas have been secured. The elements of the Caribbean Task Force, that is, of the countries from the Caribbean, are at Port Salinas. They landed approximately 10:45 this morning. I think there are about 150 there now. The southern campus at the medical college near Port Salinas airport has been secured. There are no reports of injuries to any American civilians.

There are pockets of resistance in the St. Georges area. I don't want to identify further precisely where, because this is an ongoing operation, and the military people need to be able to conduct their operation secure from any such disclosure. So that is the situation on the ground very generally at this point.

Now for your questions.

GREG NOKES, AP: Mr. Secretary, the charter of the Organization of American States, of which the United States is a member, provides that, "No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. This prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form of interference."

Aren't we in violation of that Charter, sir? And if not, why not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Organization of East Caribbean States provides for their collective security. Those states are not members of the Rio Treaty, under which the clause that you've mentioned would operate. So they have asserted themselves under their treaty, and asked us to help them.

As they view it, and perhaps you heard Prime Minister Charles today express her views most eloquently, the developments on Grenada pose definite security and peace risks to them, and that is the basis for their desire to act. Some are members of the OAS, but they are not members of the Rio Treaty; and their equivalent of the Rio Treaty is their own treaty.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, yesterday, in testifying to the Senate, you said, "At stake is the right of a small country to decide for itself how to achieve its sovereign objectives, free of outside pressure, threat, or blackmail." You were talking about Lebanon there. But why should not that same standard apply to Grenada?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it does; and in Grenada what you have at the present time is a set of events like this: In 1979, a constitutional government being in power, it was displaced by a bloodless coup, and Prime Minister Bishop has been in charge since that time.

In the events that I described to you, Prime Minister Bishop was placed under house arrest, and then executed. For all intents and purpose, there is no semblance of a genuine government present. There is a vacuum of governmental responsibility -- the only genuine evidence of governmental authority being a shoot-on-sight curfew. So in the light of that and in the light of the affinity that the other states feel together, they felt that they had to protect their peace and their security by taking this action and that doing so would help reconstitute legitimate government in Grenada.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Cubans and the Soviets were in any way responsible for the execution of Prime Minister Bishop? And to what extent was the action taken, at least in general terms, as a signal to Havana and Moscow that the United States was prepared to act to protect its own security?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've tried to give very carefully what the considerations of the President were, and those are the reasons and the considerations for this action. This was not taken as a signal about anything else. It was taken in the light of the threat to the lives and welfare of American citizens and in the light of a request from the local states who are close to the situation and whose analysis of the situation was parallel, and in fact, went a lot further than our own.

QUESTION: About the first part of the question, sir, do you have any reason to believe that the Soviets or the Cubans were in any way responsible for the overthrow of the Bishop government?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't have any direct information on that point. However, the OECS states feel that such is the case. But that is not the basis of this action on our part.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you have said that one of our two objectives there was to help the OECS states establish law and order and governmental institutions. Does that mean that our troops will remain in Grenada until that is done? And what is your time estimate for how long that will take?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our troops will leave as soon as they possibly can. The forces of the other countries in the Caribbean who have initiated this action will be in the lead and working with Grenadans in trying to establish law and order and some form of provisional government. It will be their decisions to make in seeing how this situation unfolds, and we will leave as soon as we possibly can, leaving the island to those who are closest to it.

QUESTION: Does that mean that our troops will stay there until they are satisfied that law and order has been established -- they, the other countries?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think they will be leaving very, very promptly, and we will have to decide for ourselves what the proper conditions are. We will work the people from the other governments involved, and they will have a leading role in making these decisions.

I might say that the situation is one in which, in many of these countries, there really is no armed force at all. Prime Minister Charles expressed herself -- I might say to the amusement, I guess, of Secretary Weinberger -- she said, "When I took office, I decided the worst thing in the world you could have is an army, so I abolished it. I saved myself a lot of money, and I saved conflict between the military and the police force on the Island."

So, that's what they have. And their belief is that the way to have law and order is not to have military establishment, but just a police force. And I imagine that they will work somewhat along those lines, although Grenada has a population of 100,000, so you have to take measures.

I think you have the next question.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the United States has now invaded this island with help from some other area democracies in the Caribbean to save and protect the lives of a thousand people, none of whom so far as we know, I guess, have been injured or killed. Why did it take the deaths of 200 Marines in Beirut to send Commander Kelley there to start thinking about additional preventive, precautionary measures to save those lives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, we have been concerned about the safety of our Marines all along as they have been there. It didn't take this terrible tragedy to create that concern. I think it is certainly the right thing to do, to have the Commandant of the Marine Corps go promptly to the area and evaluate the security situation in a fresh way. And I think, also, that when you are establishing a presence in an operating, commercial, international airport, naturally, you make decisions that involve some sort of balance between security risks on the one hand, and what it takes for an airport to operate on the other.

I think that, certainly, in the light of the terrible tragedy, that balance needs to be shifted, and the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very significantly. But, of course, we look for General Kelley's report.

I think there is a certain pertinence to your question, because, it seems to me, and the President had to weigh this, with the violent and uncertain atmosphere that certainly was present on Grenada, the question is: Should he act to prevent Americans from being hurt or taken hostage? I think that if he waited and they were taken hostage, or many were killed, then you would be asking me that same question: "Why didn't you in the light of this clear violent situation, take some action to protect American citizens there?"

I don't want to get in the position of second-guessing myself, or the President, but rather to say, one has to weigh these considerations and be willing to take a decision in the light of all of the circumstances, and that is what the President did.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you know, Grenada is a former British colony, and the Governor-General there was appointed by the British, the person you spoke of a while ago. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament over there that their government advised against this and that the British did not wish to go along with it.

I would like to ask you two things flowing from that. First of all, does the fact that the British do not go along with it cause some cloud over the Governor-General, the British-appointed person now being the one we look to? And, secondly, in view of their experience on the island, why did the United States disregard their recommendation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We responded to the urgent request of the states in the area, which are now independent states. They're no longer British colonies. Although obviously the British have had great experience there, so have we. The Caribbean is in our neighborhood, too, so we have a very legitimate affinity for those people.

We responded to their request just as Barbados and Jamaica did. British or other states that may or may not have been asked -- I don't have the list of who the OECS asked to help them. But each state has to take its own decision, and the President took ours.

As far as the establishment of authority on the island is concerned, we believe that the Governor-General is the logical person, given the fact that there is a vacuum of government there, and we expect that it will occur that way. We are, of course, always impressed with the views of the British Government and Mrs. Thatcher, but that doesn't mean that we always have to agree with them. Of course, we also have to make decisions in the light of the security situation of our citizens as we see it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you give us a report on casualties, including whether there have been Cuban casualties in combat with Americans, and the status of the Cubans and the Soviets on the island?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can't give you an account of casualties. I don't have that information at hand, but it will be made available as soon as we have it. I think probably the appropriate place, since they have it, is at the Pentagon.

As far as the Soviet Union and Cuba are concerned, as the operation got underway, we notified both the Soviet Union and Cuba of the fact of the operation, of our intentions, and of our readiness to look to the safety of their people on the island. It's my understanding that the Soviets that are there have been identified; they are safe, and their safety is being looked to. On the other hand, in the case of the Cubans, there are many more there. I think there are some 600 Cubans there. Presumably, construction workers. But it is the case that some number -- I don't know how many, and perhaps the military don't know at this point how many -- are resisting and firing at our forces and, of course, that would cause us to fire back.

QUESTION: I would like to ask two questions. One factual and one more philosophical. Who is in charge of Grenada tonight? I mean, at this minute? Where is Mr. Austin? Are we running the country, or are they still running the country? And, secondly, even though your intention may not have been to send a message, do you think anybody in the Caribbean or anywhere else in the world gets a message from this action?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't. I can't identify the whereabouts of Mr. Austin who was not genuinely in charge insofar as we could see, in any case.

As far as who is running the country is concerned, the country has been in a state since the house arrest of Prime Minister Bishop, essentially, of a kind of vacuum of governmental authority. And that still exists although as the forces of the Caribbean task force are able to develop their contacts there, presumably a governmental structure will emerge.

As far as your philosophic question is concerned, of course, those who want to receive a message will have to receive it. That was not the purpose of this operation. The purpose was as I have stated it.

QUESTION: Traditionally, in this part of the world, there's been a great concern about Yankee force, Yankee imperialism, Yankee aggression, et cetera.

How do you plan -- how do you intend to counter the impression that the United States is once again using its overwhelming military superiority in this part of the world to achieve a specific, political objective?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the principal point here is that the concerns and the requests for help came from the states in the region, and they have put their own forces into this picture. The fact that their forces are small in comparison with ours is only a reflection of the fact that they don't invest very much in the way of resources into military capability; and, of course, they don't have much to invest in the first place. It's in the nature of these countries that they're essentially peaceful. But they have put what they can of their own forces forward, and they have taken the lead in suggesting this, and they are there now in the early stages of this effort. And as law and order returns, they will basically be in charge; not us. So it is no effort on our part to gain control of any other country.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if I can just follow up. The British, who have been critical of this action, took an independent action against the Falklands last year when they thought it was necessary.

If they cannot accept the American justification, how do you think, or how many countries in Latin America do you feel will accept the American explanation now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Certainly, Jamaica, Barbados, and the Caribbean states involved. They have asked us very explicitly, not only in the first instances I brought out, but on further probing from Ambassador McNeil, to really be sure that they had analyzed the situation carefully and they were making a thoughtful and thoroughly thought-through request, which they were and are.

I think that's the thing you have to rest on, and it seems to me people ought to recognize where this request came from; and, also, the fact that we will leave promptly. We have no intention of staying there, and the government that will be produced by the people of Grenada is entirely up to them as far as we're concerned.

QUESTION: Just to clear up one thing, Mr. Secretary, you said that there were contacts with the Cubans and with the Soviet Union to inform them of what we were about to do, or had just done. Had there been any contacts at any level since then, and what have you heard from the Soviet Union about this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to go into detail about diplomatic exchanges. But, of course, in general, their response has been that they expect us to look to the safety of their citizens. And certainly, as one might expect, they object strenuously to this action.

The boss says I have to go. I have to go up to the House and talk to them and then the Senate. So I'm on my way to the Congress.

(Press conference concluded at 3:35 P.M.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
FOR NEWHOUSE EDITORS

October 26, 1983

The Roosevelt Room

10:52 A.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I apologize. I intended to be here at 10:30 a.m. and Secretary Schultz and I were talking to the President about Lebanon.

Let me try just five or 10 minutes and then take your questions. I am confident that your interests surely are focused upon timely events in Lebanon and Grenada, and I'll be glad to treat those. I focus what I have to say, though, in the way of background, or I guess I'd call it perspective from the Presidency on these events, because they do seem, to the President, to be of a piece and reflective of the character of the threat that is present in an era of parity.

That's quite a mouthful. What do I mean by that? The United States has passed through in the decade of the '70s a terribly important era in post-war history. I say that because throughout the first 25 years after World War II the United States enjoyed, without ever saying so or without ever telling American about it in any coherent fashion -- we enjoyed an enormous luxury, a luxury that comes from superiority of power of unchallengeability in any strategic sense. Frankly, that's good news and bad news. It prevents a lot of threats, confrontations, and conflicts. But it also provides an enormous hedge for flabby thinking that allows administrations of both parties -- from 1945 through, I would say, the mid '70s -- to refuse to deal with hard realities of balance-of-power politics that other nations of the world have dealt with for most of their lives. Surely since the turn of modern history in 1815, the Europeans have. But we've never had to do that until about the mid '70s.

But what does that mean, as I say, in contemporary terms? What happens when we move from being superior to being equal, so to speak? Looked at in the corollary sense, what happens to the Soviet Union when they move from being no longer being inferior to being as good as? It's in that latter context, which is easier to understand, specifically. For all of that same post-war period, everytime the Soviet Union wanted to challenge us, by an expansion of their influence some place, they had to stop and think: Is this going to bring into confrontation with the United States or not? Or, if it is, we will lose, therefore we'd better not do it.

That's very simplistically put, but if you look around the globe and you examine places like Iran right after World War II, the Soviet ambitions there -- and indeed their presence there -- there was a confrontation, and it led the Soviet Union to withdraw. It wasn't quite that clearcut in other situations, but in general sense this incredible power of the United States did provide an effective deterrent, and in the post-1975 period you find quite a different change in Soviet behavior, and increasing propensity to take risks, I would call it, in the economic sense.

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Now, the Soviet Union is a cautious power. It didn't reach this point and then suddenly say, "Well, let's go out and try it ourselves, let's barge in someplace and see how the Americans react." They first moved through surrogates: Cubans in Angola, Libyans elsewhere, East Germans in Ethiopia, this kind of thing.

But, as we saw, the United States did not react in any conceret way to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cambodia, and has provided a certain acceleration of Soviet efforts which intensified, leading to ultimately their directives of their own force in Afghanistan.

Well, what is the correlation between that history, or the way that I cast that history, and the past two months, call it? What have the American people seen in the last two months? They've seen violence in a lot of places. They've seen it in Korea, Rangoon, Beirut, Grenada. My point is that the effect of the shift in the balance, the political potential of parity, if you will, is to lead -- not to a greater likelihood of nuclear conflict, but to a greater likelihood of low-order challenges all around the globe, where our interests and the Soviets' conflict.

Now, we are seeing that accelerating pace here and there, and we have seen it in recent days. This is different from facing a challenge of the set-piece battle on the northern plain of Europe, which has been the focus of the overwhelming investment of our conventional and strategic military power for the past generation. This is a more variegated, unpredictable kind of probing threat at points of vulnerability and points of great importance to the United States -- strategic waterways, strategic resources, places which will influence the economic vitality of the West and the industrialized world.

Now, what does that imply? Well, it implies, on the one hand, that you cannot deal with these things by having forces in place that confront, as they do in the northern plain of Europe, the Soviet Union -- and deterrence has to be a more diffuse, a more flexible -- or has to involve a more flexible strategy.

Now, the specific content of these recent challenges have been of a piece to the extent that they represent a terrorist dimension to Soviet strategy. And the terrorist dimension is keenly suitable to dealing with democracies generally and to the United States as a democracy.

Why do I say that? Well, basically, we don't like violence. Nobody likes violence, but because it is violence of a character, which is often difficult to even identify the source of conclusively, because it is ambiguous violence, violence against which there doesn't appear to be any effective counter. I'm saying this from an imputed American point of view, the man in the street -- that there is a revulsion to it and a wish to avoid it and to get away from it. It reinforces a natural isolationist sentiment, I think, and that's what is particularly effective as a strategy on the part of the Soviet Union. What it implies is that the United States has got to first of all recognize the problem and make clear that the premise on which terrorism is founded -- that is, that you can exploit democratic short attention spans -- and isolationism is wrong and that this attention span can be altered, in the American perception, to sustain a willingness on the part of our government to counter, ultimately to deter, this threat; to deter by a record of demonstrating that this terrorism will not be allowed to succeed.

That's a very difficult thing to do. It requires a willingness to respond to violence firmly. It requires a tragic,

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periodic experience of loss of life.

The President feels very strongly that we will see this kind of threat. It isn't a function of anything this administration has done; it is a function of an evolution in the balance of power which has led to this accelerating low-order conflict problem. Indeed, it goes back to the middle sixties, if there a date on which to mark the evolution in the strategic balance, when decisions were made deliberately in the country, with support of both parties, to cease the manufacture of ICBMs, to cease building submarines, to not build another bomber, and to not, indeed, modernize our conventional forces, in short, a deliberate, conscious sense that we should test Soviet motivations with regard to power by seeing whether the example unilaterally of disarmament by us, which is truly what we did, would lead to their corresponding disarmament.

Well, it didn't work that way. The Soviets did not disarm; indeed, when he halted our ICBMs at 1000, they accelerated well past that by 40 percent. When we stopped building submarines, they built 60 in the next 15 years, while we built zero. When we zeroed out B52 production, they came on with two more bombers of their own. So, in short, unilateral disarmament didn't work -- well meaning, perhaps worth a try, but the result is parity and a substantially increased prospect of low-order challenges to the security of American interests.

Well, you don't deal with this kind of thing by menacing or by some kind of jingoistic movement of forces for the sake of rattling sabers. You have to first of all restore your foundation and that's what the President's been devoting his effort to the past two years; we have begun the road back, the restoring of foundation as deterrence in this country.

Now, from that foundation you have to flush out your forces in ways that express your understanding of the diverse or the new kind of threats you face, that it isn't a set-piece battle on the plain of Europe that is your foremost probability, but you need units which are flexible, which can be a different place a different day quickly, not so that they can be used but so that the capability deters. Deterrence, after all, is the name of the game.

That capability can and will deter in the out years. I, for one, having spent my life in the business here, mostly in the military, looking at the force programs that we have coming on line downstream, am confident that the mobility that they involve, the kind of training and equipment, will enable the United States to deter this kind of thing effectively. So, we are in a period now where we are seeing the Soviet Union test us at the margins here and there. The United States need not be alarmed, the United States capabilities are surely effective to deter, and this is what we shall do.

It involves more than this. I think that we are in a period where the Soviet Union is adjusting to this turning of the trend of the seventies, that is, that the expectation that the United States as a nation declined, would continue that downward trend, is being turned, and it is being proven not true. I made the mistake of referencing in my first remarks two weeks ago to the fact that Spengler may be wrong -- I don't mean to be soporific but I think that is what this President is demonstrating, that, indeed, it is not the inevitable course of a free-enterprise, democracy-oriented society that will become materialistic and unable to defined that interests.

The Soviet Union is accommodating to that and it has led to a state of unease and anxiety on their part because it is different, it is different from what they have had to deal with for the past 15 years. Now, it doesn't necessarily mean that the United States is on all fours looking at this Soviet menace and determined to look at it in a confrontational way: absolutely not.

The United States must be; indeed, this President is and shall remain, fundamentally and profoundly committed to solving problems with the Soviet Union. Now, that is a task that we -- that is a commitment, an attitude, which we must make clear and beyond

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making clear, reflect in our engagement with the Russians to solve problems, and we will do that.

Frankly, I believe that while it has been a difficult period, these past two-and-a-half years, a period in which there has been a wrenching within the Soviet Union as they have wrestled with this problem of a reemergent America, that we are entering now a time when you will see serious efforts to resolve problems. The first steps will be tentative and uncertain on their side but the peaceful resolution of disputes is the fundamental obligation of any administration and is surely the fundamental commitment of Ronald Reagan.

I think you will see that translated into serious interest and good will toward solving problems across the board in the weeks and months ahead.

I apologize; I didn't have any script and I've just been thinking about this the last few days. Do you want me to go on talking specifically about Lebanon and Grenada, or do you want to ask questions? I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q You raised some very interesting points and I don't know exactly where to begin. Though you did not state specifically that Soviet Union is responsible for the events of the last couple of weeks, that was the clear import, at least as I got it, of what you said. Do we have substantial evidence to indicate that they were either directly or indirectly responsible for what happened in Beirut and were they responsible for the threats that we saw in Grenada, either directly or through their proxies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first part of it, in Lebanon, the short answer is no, absolutely not. I don't think it's contradictory for me to say that neither is there evidence nor is it my expectation that the Soviet Union would have allowed it to happen, had they known about it. And so while I appear to be contradicting myself, I think this is an instance in which the direct Soviet involvement is not true.

The sources of it are not confirmed. The President's talked to the issue of the circumstantial weight of evidence, which indicates Iranian elements were responsible for the actual conduct of it. Facilitating that activity could not have been an exclusively Iranian

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undertaking. There will be more on that in the next day or so.

Q Who could have put them up to it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think they put themselves up to it. It is a matter of who helped it happen. And there are other candidates for that. And I just will not have anymore to say on that today. But I expect you will hear more about it in the next day or so.

Q Secretary Weinberger said this morning that it had to be with at least the tacit approval of the Syrians.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would agree with him on that.

The situation in Grenada falls within the context of my overall remarks. Lebanon is within the overall context of them. The management of specific events on a given day are important though from the Soviet perspective. And I do not think the Soviets were responsible. Indeed, I think the Soviets would have been opposed to that operation.

Grenada is a different kind of situation, but within the same overall rubric of the kind of threat generally that we face. The establishment of a Marxist regime in the country was surely consistent with Soviet interests and Cuban interests. The potential of Grenada as a country whose geography makes it very susceptible to support and assistance to Soviet interests in the strategic sense: it is clear. The different aspect of what happened there is that without any United States urging, and that is simple truth, the countries of the area saw it as a danger to their stability. And that was not simply a matter of the past week. Since '79 when the Bishop regime was there, the repression of other citizens, of foreign nationals in Grenada was apparent to all of the other countries around. The out-migration of 20,000 Grenadans was, also, a manifestation of the repression that was going on inside.

But it reached a climax when in the coup of the 12th there was such a wave of anarchistic activity that the other countries who had experienced subversion from Grenada over a period of four years and had their own nationals there vulnerable came to us and said that this is intolerable. And we implore the United States to join with us in trying to restore order. The President agreed with their judgment on it. And in response to their request, the United States went in. The effect of the operation is one that will not be clear for days or even weeks. But I think that is, as a manifestation of the willingness of the United States in concert with its friends to join in defending their interests -- can only have a salient effect upon the confidence of these countries in the United States and against the, and upon the willingness of the other side to expand its adventurism in developing countries generally and, surely, those which have any relationship to important interests of the United States.

I think you all are aware of Prime Minister Bouterse's call last evening for Cuba to withdraw its Ambassador in Suriname, not an insignificant event given the trend in Surinamese policy over the past months since Bouterse came to power, an apparent strengthening of ties to Cuba which appear, now, to have been disrupted. But I would not seek to say that there is

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a direct causal relationship there. But I do not think they are unconnected. Sorry; I was too long-winded.

Q You phrase this very much as a response to the request of those island nations. But we had diverted a task force that was purportedly headed to relieve the force in Lebanon a couple of days before that request came. So does it not look as if we might have done this on our own anyway out of a hostage fear or whatever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, sometimes when you are in this job you are, kind of, a victim of circumstance and coincidence. But let me try to tell you the truth about it.

Q Yes. And one other thing -- the fact that that task force had paratroopers, rangers, which I do not think anybody would expect to be used in Lebanon, sounds almost like that that task force was headed for the Caribbean all the time. If you could address that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. First of all, I encourage you to go back to the history of deployments of Marine forces to the Mediterranean in the past couple of years. And you will find that as a matter of course in the last few times that we have sent our relief battalions on over to Lebanon, they have gone through the Caribbean. Now, that is for good and sufficient reason. I mean, anytime there is turmoil in an area, that is what those guys are paid for. You send them where there is the possibility of something going wrong. And then, they continued on to Lebanon and went into the country. And that is what this one did.

Now, the -- but I do not want to be misleading to you. There was of course, in the wake of October 12th and the ensuing murders of people, a prudent -- or a reason for us to take prudent measures such as sending that task force that way again. Now, in fact, it was diverted this time down there. We do not always do it. We have in the past few times. But this one was sent down there out of precaution, but only out of precaution. I give you my word on that. There was no premeditated decision before we received that request to take action in Grenada. And that is fact. These other things were the kinds of contingent, precautionary actions that we take, indeed, all the time.

The reality of the other force involvement, which is a good point -- this was not just a Marine force. It has the 82nd Airborne down there, too. All of that was put together in the wake of the meeting that was called by those five Caribbean countries to ask us to help.

Q You are saying the 82nd was not with the task force when it left and went to the Caribbean, that they went down later?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not, no.

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It went down all by air delivery yesterday.

Q Okay.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the only people on the scene before that was the Marine amphibious unit which is the Marine battalion and the Marine helicopter squadron.

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Q Can I interrupt you with one thing and ask you if you, maybe, misspoke about the unit. From the Pentagon yesterday, it was all the talk it was the 75th Ranger battalions, battalions from the 75th Rangers, not the 82nd. Is the 82nd, also, involved?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good point, there are two different units there. There was the 75th Rangers. And the 82nd Airborne units went in after they went in. And current force level if I am not mistaken is two battalions of Rangers (-) -- they have a couple of companies they did not send -- and four battalions if I am not mistaken of the 82nd.

Q Sorry to interrupt. I was just checking.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not at all.

Q When you talk about the potential for other rather similar action as necessary to Soviet maneuvering, how far can we extend ourselves. Certainly, you have not built the U.S. military machine back to a very great level at this point. Is there not a danger of overextension if some of these things should be protracted, say, in Lebanon, the Caribbean and so on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the short answer to the question, are we over extended now, is no. I think that an assumption of the question is that

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this kind of action requires extended force presence for a long time to deal with. Now you have a valid point. The implication of the Lebanese presence, or our presence in Lebanon, is that -- vindicates what you say. Generally speaking, this kind of threat ought not -- indeed, must not -- involve sustained American presence to deal with it.

It must be a very prompt operation, and I am very confident that this operation in Grenada will be prompt, and promptly terminated.

Q If I --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Go ahead.

Q If I could follow up on that, it seemed to me you were saying, though, that this is a re-emergent America, which the next time the Soviets go into Afghanistan or something that we will do something about it. Did I misunderstand you, or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't intend that, but I don't intend to -- I don't accept that that is likely. What I am saying is that, yes, this is a re-emergent America, and because it is a re-emergent America there won't be any more of those. Now that sounds a little macho, and I suppose with prudence I ought to say that by restoring our foundation we improve the prospects of deterrence, which is a little more hedged, and I guess more accurate, actually.

Yes?

Q The abandonment of the posture of superiority and a movement toward parity has increased low-order threats. What do you expect to gain by moving back toward a posture of superiority? What do you think the Soviet response will be to it and what does our counter-response-have to be?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're not going to lean toward a policy of superiority. I mean if you deployed the entire program in the President's Strategic Modernization Program, the United States would not have a superior force.

Q Don't we have a treaty with the Soviets that Nixon struck that we agree on parity? Is that not written in treaty language?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As a practical matter, it is. It isn't anything codified. It says that neither side will try to seek unilateral advantage, and so forth. And that is true. Nor do we, nor does this deployment approximate any effort toward superiority.

Q May I ask -- take it back to Lebanon for a minute here, and ask about -- what will -- what do you see now, having -- given your experience with a cease-fire recently, what are the next political steps in Lebanon for us? And second to that is, how do you see our training of the Lebanese army going to the point of when they will be able to -- is there some point at which you can see down the road where the Lebanese army will actually be able to take over what the multinational force is now doing in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I definitely do. It's going to take very determined effort, politically and economically and through military assistance. But the opportunity is great in Lebanon -- the opportunity.is high.

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We are pursuing a strategy based upon the premise that the parties within Lebanon, the Lebanese parties, faced with the two alternatives of -- alternative futures of partition and a prevailing influence by Israel and Syria in their affairs, versus a future of Lebanon by Lebanese for Lebanese and the withdrawal would rather have the latter.

And that the government itself, the central government, knows that to get there, to get a Lebanese solution which is compatible with the interests of their neighboring states, a Lebanon in which Syria and Israel would agree to withdraw must be a Lebanon that is -- that includes a government reflective of the population, and politically, ethnically, demographically, and, thus, national reconciliation has been our goal in recent months.

Now I make it sound very easy, and it's not easy. It has almost never happened in Lebanon. You're asking people with bitterness and hatred, blood feuds, to sit around a table and make deals, compromise. And families whose children have been murdered by other leading families, to suddenly compromise with members of those families, that's not easy. But the only thing which gives us some hope that it may now be possible when it hasn't been before is because now there is no -- there is a foreign presence in 90 percent of the territory.

And that all the Lebanese know that however bitter they may be, they are never going to get their country back until they reach accommodations under terms through which the neighboring parties, Israel and Syria, are confident that their own interests will not be damaged. But I believe that there is a chance of success. It depends importantly on two things: it depends on the wisdom of the government in seeing the need for compromise in the fundamental, political framework that has existed in Lebanon for over a generation to accept that there cannot be a prevailing Maronite domination of the country, and of our dexterity in being able to continue to urge it in that direction.

Secondly, it depends upon the wisdom of the opposition elements within Lebanon, the Lebanese elements, to see that the alternative futures, if they want to have Lebanon back, require compromise. And to not overload the circuit and require unacceptable change too fast to make it stable. But I do believe that's possible. Now it's not just internal elements that are going to give you a solution in Lebanon. There are a lot of other elements that are necessary to give you a stable outcome.

The PLO right now, still in Lebanon, 12,000 fighters around Tripoli. We have to find a way to deal with that. But I look at that as an opportunity, not a problem. If, for example, there were a way to find -- to re-engage other parties in the peace process in sponsorship of Palestinian goals, and that this could once more be brokered with Arafat. That is an opportunity. The context of what is going on in the Iran-Iraq war. This is the focus of attention throughout the Islamic world right now, or at least the Arab world.

And if the United States is sensible about how it conducts itself with respect to that conflict, I think that it can play back very constructively on the outcome of Lebanon. I think that the United States, which has historically oriented its Middle East policy upon the security of Israel and good relations with Israel, should reconfirm that and assure that relations with Israel are solid and on a very firm basis, and that our cooperation is thorough and mutually beneficial.

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And that that mutual confidence can play into the solution in Lebanon, as well. There are a lot of elements here which offer great opportunity. High risk, yes, but I think manageable.

Q Sir, in that context, a number of rather prominent, respected members of Congress are continuing to say that aside from the general explanations of what we are trying to do in Lebanon, they still have not heard a clear explanation of specifically what the role of our Marines is in Lebanon, just what the specific mission is.

And could you briefly, if you will, articulate how you see that as of now and the President does, and tell us whether there is any consideration being given to an eventual phasing out of the Marines in conjunction with a phasing in of a United Nations force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. First of all, the presence of U.S. Marines and contingents from other countries has been oriented since their second introduction last fall toward providing a presence which will reinforce the efforts of the government of Lebanon to restore institutions that serve the interest of all of the Lebanese people and the interest of stability throughout the country and the pursuit of policies compatible with the interest of its neighbors.

They are, as well, to foster a process or to assist in fostering a process which will lead to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country. Now what do I mean by that? I mean by supporting the efforts of the government to establish institutions that their presence, underwriting as their presence does, the efforts of this current government to build political, economic and military institutions in the country is a valid concept.

And I say that it's valid based upon the history of the past year. In the past year, the efforts towards building those institutions have begun, and, in some respects, are fairly well along. They have built an army. Now, Lebanon hasn't had an army that has been truly a national army, reflective of the ethnic make-up of the country, in quite a long time. It has built it, it has been sustained, tested in battle, and received in return support, widespread support, beyond the Maronite community, and that's clear.

You can go to Lebanon, ask throughout the community. It has a great deal of credibility. We have not yet finished the work of building political institutions which are equally reflective of the country. That is our stated policy. And to the extent that the presence of Marines there are an expression of support to the government's efforts to do that, and that the government has now declared that that is, indeed, its intention, they have served a very useful purpose.

A year ago that wasn't true. Today it is. They have also been key and

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central to getting the withdrawal of 5,000 Palestinian troops out of Lebanon, a real beginning of the strategic or a resolution of the strategic problem that led Israel to go in there in the first place. It's also been central to getting an agreement providing for the withdrawal of Israeli forces. So, in short, when you look back at what has happened, PLO going out, agreement with Israel, institutions being formed and a process of reconciliation about to take place, all of which would fall apart without those Marines, their presence has been very successful and their mission confirmed in spades.

Now, clearly, no President can hazard the lives of any Americans anywhere casually; this President surely doesn't. And if there are ways in which their pursuit of that mission can be made less risky, we must take it and I think you will see measures of that kind, based upon General Kelley's recommendations in the next few days.

Q Can we expect more responses like our response in Grenada if the Soviets do not cool it? What you seem to be saying is that you think the Soviets will cool it, if I could use shorthand. What if they don't? What if they do do another Afghanistan or something? Haven't you suggested that we're committed to -- this is a very low threshhold operation, obviously, it seems like it's an easy one to win, but aren't there very broad implications of what you've said about our general stance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't intend to be -- to suggest that because the United States reacted to a request from seven governments to help that that means that we're going to go out looking for fights. I don't mean that.

Q I didn't mean to suggest that but what if we get one that we weren't looking for? An Afghanistan is a good example, or a South Yemen. You seem to be saying that things are different now and the Soviets have done all this mischief and we aren't going to put up with that any more and we're sending them this message. But how much --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think I did say that. I said that the character of the threat is different and we must be prepared to deal with this new kind of threat and so to the extent that that is what you mean, the United States must seek to deter threats to its interests and should deterrence fail, to deal with them wherever they occur. It is in the definition of those interests and the character of your response that we might differ.

I do not intend to say that the United States can take on and champion the causes of everybody throughout the world; we cannot, we shall not. But where United States interests are threatened, interests that are important to us, we must deter and I think we are deterring effectively, or we must be prepared to cope with the problem if deterrence fails. I don't suggest that the Soviet Union is directly -- it's likely that they will directly challenge those in the short term.

Q To return to Grenada, was there a group there strong enough and organized enough to provide a free and non-Marxist government in a short time, and how long a time would you think that would be to get our forces out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that isn't any of our business and I don't say that frivolously, nor is it something within our knowledge or our competence. The thinking of the leaders of the other Caribbean neighbors is that, yes, it is possible to form a provisional government and to expect that that provisional government can set in motion a process leading to popular elections and so forth, and popular selection of a government, and that's based on their informed judgments of living there and we're prepared to accept that.

Q There have been suggestions that our movement into Grenada has brought us into conflict with agreements and treaties with the Organization of American States. Is that true and were they consulted and why not, if not?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The specifics of that will be played out today as they were started yesterday at the OAS. The short answer is that, no, we don't believe that those were breached in any fashion. The charter recognizes the legitimacy of regional subgroups and a regional organization undertook to invite United States assistance, and it was in the context of assisting a number of states that the United States acted, but that resolution or resolutions will be considered today and tomorrow in the OAS. But, no, we don't believe there's been a violation.

Q You say that we felt we should help our friends. What about the reaction of some of our other friends in Western Europe, and what about the general anti-missile feeling? Can the Russians use that to their benefit propoganda-wise?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't think so. I think to the extent that this reflects an example of United States responding to a request from its friends for help it ought to have a beneficial effect in the long-term sense. Well, I think that's the extent of it in terms of lasting effects.

Q But people like Prime Minister Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand and so forth have been critical of U.S. action, is that correct? That's what we've been told, anyway.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't speak for them; I look for their comment. Again, I believe that the positions of those governments is going to be one of welcoming the constancy of United States toward its friends. I don't mean to deny that in the forum of public opinion today there happens to be on the agenda the INS issue in the U.K., and to the extent that it is generically a security issue and that the United States has a security issue at play that happens to involve violence some place else, that violence per se is disquieting; it is for us.

And to the extent that an ally is involved in violence and that there is this kind of nonspecific association of an ally, violence, and that ally and us and missiles, then there can be an effect, but I don't think there really is a correlation and if there is one, then it's the political signal that this sends which ought to be helpful.

Q We've had an awful lot of your time -- I wasn't sure what your next appointment was. I'm sure you're leaving on schedule. Maybe we should wind this up.

Q Can I get a last one in here? We have heard in the initial briefings that the congressional leaders were told that you were looking at three to five days of American troops in Grenada, out in five days. Since you're on background, is that a ballpark expectation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our initial estimates haven't changed. If there is any element here that was not congruent to our basic assumptions two days ago, it is that there is -- there was -- a Cuban military presence there in greater strength than we believed and still the earlier estimates haven't been altered.

Q Those earlier estimates are that five days is a reasonable --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't ever make an estimate of five days but I don't think it's out of the ballpark. Down at the far end of the table, you raised your hand and I never called onyou.

Q We've covered it.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:45 A.M. EDT

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE FAR EAST
(SECURITY POLICY IN EAST ASIA)

October 26, 1983

Room 248
The Old Executive Office Building

11:35 A.M. EDT

MR. NEUITT: Good morning -- for those of you I haven't met I am temporarily assigned here from USIA for the planning of the President's trip. This briefing is one more in the series you are aware of now of background briefings for the trip. This one's specialized on security policy in East Asia. It will be on background, and it will be embargoed until after the 2:30 p.m. briefing this afternoon, on the trip schedule itself.

I am pleased to introduce my colleagues. They, of course, will be referred to as a "Senior Administration Official." It's all yours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: How long do you all want to take, and how much do you want me to talk and how many questions and answers?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thirty to 40 minutes, and I think some introduction --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Should I talk for maybe ten minutes or so, and then you can ask questions?

What I will do is just try to touch on security and defense policy in East Asia and the Pacific, and with the emphasis on Japan and Korea that the President will be visiting from the 9th through the 14th of November, and talk a little bit about the Soviet threat and our own military forces in Asia, and a little bit on the Japan and Korea defense relationships with the U.S., and then open it to questions.

Before beginning, I think I probably ought to just say a couple of words about the Soviet threat in the Far East. It has pretty significantly increased over the last 15 years, especially. The Soviets in tangible terms have established a new strategic command in the Far East. They have significantly enhanced their ground forces, more than doubled. Most of these ground forces, it has to be noted, are aligned along the northern border of China, and are primarily oriented in the direction of the Soviet and China differences.

But, in particular, there has been an addition of 10,000 Soviet troops, or about a division into the northern territories of Japan. And these are the southern islands of the Kurile chain, just north of Hokkaido, which were, of course, taken from the Japanese at the end of World War II and have remained a significant item of

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difference. And Japan considers them to be their northern territories, although they haven't been there in many years.

These were not armed for a while, and they are now significantly armed by the Soviets, with the most modern aircraft, and also with a sizable build-up of ground forces.

The Soviet navy in the Pacific has also undergone equally substantial growth, and its principal assets are some 125 submarines. But also, very significant numerous surface combatant and auxiliary ships. The build-up of long-range aviation and also naval aviation, particularly, the backfire bomber in the Pacific, has been significant, as has the build-up of the naval strategic rocket forces of the Soviet Union -- particularly, the Yankee and now the Delta submarine.

And the Delta submarines have the capability of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles, actually from their berth at the Kamchatka Peninsula or Vladivostok or wherever they might be and reaching the United States mainland from there. Of significance in the same vein would be the SS-20 intermediate-range mobile missile of the Soviet Union.

We're talking about a worldwide or global total of these for the Soviets, of around 350. And over 100 are maintained east of the Urals and are a threat to the Far East. We know of three additional sites, with at least 27 more missiles and 81 additional warheads that are under construction. And this is, of course, going to be an issue I'll talk about a little bit later on in terms of the INF.

I won't go into more on the Soviet part at this time. We see a sort of a six-pillar policy, or six themes or features to the U.S. defense policy in Asia. And these are, specifically, that the U.S. has the determination and the ability to remain as a Pacific power; to prevent the intimidation of either the United States or our friends and allies in that part of the world, is the first point.

The second, and I think particularly significant for us here, is that the cornerstone of our East Asian policy is the defense partnership with Japan, and that we have a growing consensus within Japan in terms of its defense role; that Prime Minister Suzuki in May, 1981 established targets that the Japanese are trying to reach: specifically, defense of their territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and the sea lanes out to 1000 miles.

This has been determined to be legal under Japan's constitution, and to be its national policy. However, the military strength of the Japanese at this time does not permit them to implement this policy. And so the effort on the part of the Japanese is to increase their defense forces until such time as they are able to meet these objectives they have set for themselves. Our own goal, and I'm sure part of the President's effort on this trip, will be to provide further encouragement to the Japanese, so that they will reach these goals during this decade.

There is some considerable question as to when the Japanese military could reach these objectives. Really to project the trends of the last five or six years would probably put it well into the 1990s. Therefore, we hope they will, in some fashion, accelerate their progress. Prime Minister Nakasone, building on the stated objectives of Prime Minister Suzuki, has been even more forthright, particularly, of course, at the Williamsburg Conference and in other fora, in expressing Japan's responsibilities for

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defense and building further on the concept of a rational division of labor in the defense effort in the Far East.

The object of this is not to be able to remove U.S. forces and the U.S. umbrella of Japan, but, in fact, to complicate Soviet planning and to aid global and also regional deterrents. The third pillar concept feature of U.S. defense policy is its dedication to freedom and independence for the Korean peninsula. The Korean people over many years have shown a sizable willingness to sacrifice in their defense. The Republic of Korea spends over six percent of its gross national product on defense, and it also supports U.S. forces.

I will go a little bit later into something of the balance of forces in Korea, because I think that's quite relevant to this. The potential ramifications of war in Korea, of course, on great power relations but also the threat to Japan make Korea's self defense contribute significantly to the security of the Far East.

The points, then, of our defense policy, our own determination to remain a Pacific power, Japan, Korea. The fourth point is to build an enduring relationship with China. And, of course, this has marked recently with Secretary Weinberger's trip at the end of September, Foreign Minister Wu's visit and the exchange of visits that we anticipate between Premier Zhao Ziyang of the People's Republic of China and President Reagan in 1984. Several points about our relationship with China.

There is growing commonality of interests in support of global peace and regional stability. We believe in the United States that a strong and secure China is in our national interests. There are issues on which we differ, but there is also a growing range of interests which we share. Our aims, then, are to reinforce these trends, and to contribute in a responsible way to China's modernization, including its defense modernization in ways that do not threaten our own security or that of our allies and friends.

Neither the U.S. nor China seeks nor expects any kind of an alliance. Our aim is to build an enduring relationship that recognizes the differences in our common interests which might enable complementary actions, if our common interests are threatened. The fifth point is the cooperation with Australia and New Zealand, our allies under the ANZUS treaty.

This has suggestions for the Indian Ocean, in which the Australian presence is very helpful, for Southeast Asia, in which there still exists a five-power defense arrangement in which Australia and New Zealand and the United Kingdom join with Singapore and Malaysia towards common defense efforts, really working within and through ASEAN. And also the influence of Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific nations in maintaining stability and keeping this area away from great power security rivalry, great power rivalry.

The last point is the support for ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a politically and-economically aligned group of nations. We are linked to two of them: the Philippines, by a mutual security treaty; and to Thailand, by the Manila Pact. We, of course, maintain facilities at Park Air Base and Subic, in the Philippines. And their unhampered use remains important to our defense effort.

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We have healthy bilateral defense relations with the other three ASEAN countries: Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. And we, particularly, support the unified front of ASEAN in resistance to Vietnamese occupation and pressure on Thailand, in particular, incident to the occupation of Kampuchea.

All of this suggests a kind of a mixed bag, and it is. There is diversity in Asia, and there is diversity in our relations with the Asian countries. The policy is essentially tailored in this diversity. Low key, where the countries want it that way. More obvious in the case of a country like Korea, in which the situation is quite different. So with that overview, I will just make a couple of other remarks, in particular, about Korea and Japan.

Japan -- I don't think I'll go through the self-defense forces. A significant recent development, other than, of course, the shoot-down of the Korean airliner which has had, I think, a pretty substantial impact in Japan, along with the build-up of Soviet forces that I mentioned earlier in the northern territories. The Japanese self-defense forces are not insignificant: 13 army divisions; about 40 destroyers; building in the direction of a modern air force.

As I mentioned, it's not yet equal to the task that the Japanese have set for themselves. Particularly lax in the near term are sustainability, supplies of ammunition and, to a lesser extent, fuel. Things like torpedoes for the submarines -- for the destroyers, in particular, to make it a meaningful submarine operation, and to make the ground self -- forces in Japan a more realistic deterrent to any sort of invasion.

In Korea, we have along the Demilitarized Zone what remains and will be coming up in 30 years in the defense treaty with Korea. It was 30 years last July that we had the armistice agreement. These things have gone on for a long time, and we still have a very tense border along the DMZ. This has been exacerbated recently by the Rangoon bombing, which killed four cabinet members, killed numerous other sub-cabinet members, key Presidential advisors, very nearly killed President Chun Doo Hwan of Korea himself.

The outcome of the Rangoon bombing is still not clear, but all the evidence so far is not completely clear. Every bit of evidence accumulated so far suggests, however, that it was done by North Korea. We have had a steady stream of terrorist incidents in and around Korea, despite a very aggressive and effective defense posture.

I noted, and you may, those of you who will be on the trip, recently that even the golf courses throughout South Korea -- and there seem to be a growing number of golf courses in that country over what I recall quite a few years ago -- have -- I don't know what to call them -- they look like giant children's jacks in the middle of the fairways, so as to prevent the North Koreans from landing short , STOL aircraft with guerrilla forces on board. There is -- that sort of a defense posture typifies all -- not only along the DMZ, but throughout the Republic of Korea.

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The numbers of forces are very substantial. North Korean military forces are very close to 750,000 ground force troops. The arms balance remains on the side of North Korea, particularly in terms of artillery. Most of it's self-propelled, armored personnel carriers and tanks. The North Korean Air Force is numerically significantly larger than the South Koreans, but the balance of our own forces makes that one, I think, considerably more equal.

And the North Korean navy, even that is fairly large, with 20 submarines, I might add. South Korea doesn't have any submarines, although there is talk of buying some from either the United States or the Germans or Dutch. I mentioned 750,000 North Korean troops. This balances with about 540,000 in the south. Our own U.S. forces in Korea consist of the Second Infantry Division, with about -- a total of about 27,000 U.S. Army personnel, of which the Second would be most of that.

We also have about 12,000 Air Force, 8000 of which are in two tactical fighter wings. We have A-10, F-4 and F-16 aircraft of the U.S. forces -- excuse me -- (sirens sounding) -- that's the overall alarm. I'll be glad to go back.

Okay, the U.S. airplanes in Korea in larger numbers are: F-16, A-10 and F-4s, so that a good part of the air defense umbrella of South Korea is provided by the U.S., although the Republic of Korea Air Force with F-5s -- they are planning to buy F-16s, they are committed to buy F-16s, but deliveries won't begin for a couple more years.

Q How many is that, about 50 or 40 or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: F-16s there? I would have to -- I don't have that number right offhand. It's in that vicinity of 40 or 50, and I'll be glad -- my number, incidentally, is 697-2307, and if there's some fact that I don't have right here I'll be glad to --

Q What is it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's 697-2307. Okay, I think that's enough talk. In fact, I've gone much longer than ten minutes. Please begin questioning.

Q What kind of forces do we have in Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In Japan we have a small army, we have a navy because it's a home port for the Seventh Fleet Commander, and also for the carrier Midway and its associated ships. We also have one or possibly two amphibious ships home ported in Sasebo, in Japan. Our largest forces are the Marines in Okinawa, and also a significant Air Force presence in Okinawa, and also at Yakoda in Japan and in Nasawa.

We are scheduled to put F-16 aircraft into Nasawa, in Northern Japan and Northern -- within the next two years.

Q You said that every bit of evidence points to North Korea in the Rangoon bombings. Can you elaborate what -- to the people who were captured?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the people who were captured are the inconclusive part. The Burmese have held these pretty close. Apparently, they were injured in the take-over, and a number of Burmese soldiers were killed. As I understand it, at the mausoleum in Rangoon

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there were three bombs that had been set up. One of them exploded, killing all -- and injuring all the people who were there. But it blew off the electrical connections for the other, which has allowed it to be studied by Burmese and Koreans. This is, I understand, 10 kilograms of explosives fitted into a sort of a hand arrangement with 800 ball bearings. The idea being not just a blast, but an anti-personnel weapon of a serious sort.

Similar weapons have been used. One was found in almost a parallel arrangement in a South Korean cemetery several years ago. There were components used in the bomb that are not available in Burma and that are, in fact, identical to those that have been used in other North Korean bombing incidents. It's evidence of that sort, circumstantial sort of a thing and the individuals who've been found appear to be the keys to it and I don't think the United States has the full results of whatever these people are saying, which I understand is nothing, so far.

Q Do you expect that security issues would be the predominant theme of these meetings, rather than economic trade issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, not at all. I think that -- well, I think that security issues are going to be more significant in Korea because it's something that overhangs the whole situation there in an important way, although the economic strength of Korea and the economic issues have built up in a large way.

In Japan, I think the security issues will be there and I think it's very important that they be discussed and mentioned, but the direction of the Japanese government, although what everyone in our government would want, really appears to be heading in a helpful direction and not something that we need to be very vociferous in the way it's raised.

Whether the President will raise defense issues in Japan publically is not clear. I am sure that he will raise them privately. We have a 6.88 percent projected increase in Japan's defense budget for the year that would begin next March and which is in the final stages of approval. This is not really enough to meet the next step in reaching Japan's objectives. But it is -- most of Japan's surveying departments are having reductions in their budget so that, in that context, it doesn't look so bad. We think it's very important that the Japanese continue the 6.88 percent increase.

Q You're not sure whether the President will raise the security issues publicly in Japan. You are sure, I presume, that he will do so in Korea where there seems to be --

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, because I'm sure the President's planning to visit some of the U.S. units in Korea and that, itself, I think will underscore that. The recent Rangoon bombing and the shoot down of the Korean airliner really require that that subject come up in Korea. Not to mention the presence of 40,000 troops.

Q Do you think this place is on fire, or something. All of a sudden, there's 70,000 people milling about.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's just everyone going to lunch. I don't know. I don't work here.

Q Aside from the encouragement, private encouragement in Japan and public rhetoric in South Korea, do you expect any initiatives on the issues of security in either place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL: Not any significant initiatives. This is going to be an endorsement of the policies that we're following bilaterally with both of those governments.

Q The only stresses, then, the security stresses between our countries would be a slight pressure on Japan to increase its rate of remilitarization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Could you get back to the significance of the IMF Soviet missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. I think what's important is that we need to reassure our friends in East Asia that their concerns will be fully considered in our negotiations with the Soviets and that the export of SS-20 missiles from the European area in the direction of Asia is not a solution that the United States favors. I think there's been consultation on this in the past. I'm sure that it will come up again because obviously the Japanese, in particular, are interested in the progress of the IMF negotiations.

Q Well, that has not been the latest negotiating position so they have serious concerns that they will not do any better and, in fact, they may be somewhat worse?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if they have a concern for doing somewhat worse, but I think what we -- the point that has been made that we favor global reductions, or reductions of all of the SS-20s in Asia as well as in Europe and that would be beneficial. I think that there is not a great deal of apprehension that they're going to do worse and that we will agree to some sort of an export of these things.

I think it's less of a concern, less of a dismay than simply to watch this issue as it develops.

Q To what extent is the -- I'm sorry. To what extent is the human rights in Korea a security concern. With reference. I speak to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think -- in terms of a stable government in Korea, it's always an American concern. The -- anything that would disrupt Korea economically or militarily or divert its military forces from the defensive postures along the border could provide the opportunity that I'm afraid the Republic of Korea has been looking for all these years.

Q Well, what is your assessment --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, North Korea.

Q What is your assessment of the situation? It seems -- things seem to have quieted down, recently, there in terms of demonstrations, and so on. Do you see it turn that way toward liberalization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there is to a considerable extent. President Chun has indicated he will not seek another term. There may be some elections, but I think probably my colleague is a better guy to talk to about that than I am.

Q We were told earlier at a non-official briefing that following the Iranian bombing, the United States had to restrain, as it were, South Korea from overreacting.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think the United States had to restrain them. But I think that we counseled that there are just a lot of considerations and that there are a lot of games and because of the inter-position of our own forces there along the DMZ, that puts, I think, a special tone on our interest in anything that -- excuse me. I interrupted.

Q Well, then, following from that, if the President goes there in the present tension that now exists in the world to talk across the DMZ about the flight of 007 and the bombing in Rangoon in tough terms, isn't there a delicacy that has to be observed about the moods that are now going on across the border?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they're questionably -- I'm not sure I fully understand your question.

Q I wonder if the President would go to far with his rhetoric if we're not careful.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I don't think the President would ever go too far with his rhetoric -- but, you know, I certainly do, and obviously that's a concern for anyone. Although whether rhetoric is a -- the rhetoric has been so heated in Korea for so long that it's hard to see how additional would make much difference.

Q Well, in that part of the world, as we know in the past, certain things that people have said and taken as permission either to do things or not to do things.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that would be --

Q I'm just asking whether it is a concern.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, it's a concern because we have our forces over there and because we're concerned -- it's really something that very much approached an act of war, if it turns out that North Koreans --

Q Well, supposing the President of the United States, let us say, should say at the DMZ that this was something that approached an act of war and taken with the 007, this is brutality at its worst and it has to be stopped at every turn, you see what I mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't know what the President plans --

Q Would you cancel such --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't plan to recommend that he make any statements like that and I don't know anyone else --

Q Statements made in North Korea since that bombing that are very hostile to Reagan, and not just hostile in terms of the normal rhetoric, but hostile in personal terms, is this a concern -- is there a concern that the North Koreans would take some act, either in terms of personal safety or symbolic act that would further heighten tensions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That concern has to enter anyone who is planning this. And, yes, there have been some -- there were some strong statements, exactly as you suggest, and I think everybody is concerned, not just the Secret Service as well. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea has shown itself very capable of containing and controlling the either terrorist threats or outright military threats, but there are limits to how far one can go.

Q How would we interpret these threats? Do we interpret them as rhetoric or do we see an effort by the North Koreans to disrupt this trip and embarrass us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- I would interpret them as an effort on the part of the North Koreans to not have this trip take place and to emphasize security concerns. So in a sense, they're rhetoric, but there's obviously something that that explicitly threatening has to be viewed more seriously.

Q Do you think there's a chance that this trip or this part of the trip will not take place?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not based on those things.

Q How about based on the world situation over the last four days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm really not equipped to talk about that mainly because I just don't know anything about it but --

Q You haven't heard anything --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any reasonable person, I think, has to think as things are going along.

Q Is there any feeling that the bombing was just politics as usual from the North or an effort, maybe to do some such thing as prevent the Olympics from going there or is there a growing concern that they're not actually an attempt at invasion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's always a concern of an invasion but it's not larger than it has been at numerous other times. It appears to be North Korea dominated by Kim Il-song who's been running the place since 1948, and his son will presumably be his heir in what is an interesting, unique Communist manifestation. He's very frustrated by the economic growth of the Republic of Korea. It's North Korea that has the natural resources. South Korea was traditionally the poor part of the country and South Korea is not the poor part of the country now.

The inter-parliamentary union that was recently held in Seoul, the Asian games, and the Olympics that are scheduled to be held there, this Burma thing, in particular, was -- this was an emphasis of relations with one of the -- perhaps, the most non-alligned country, Burma, on the part of the Republic of Korea. DPRK, North Korea, has always felt that they were the ones who had a monopoly on relations with the non-alligned countries and this is something that seems to be bothering them a great deal.

There are some other countries that are shifting more in the direction of the R. of K. and that bothers North Korea a great deal and so this all seems to be a part of lashing out, as well as seizing an opportunity with what was obviously more lax security situation than they had in Korea, itself, to disrupt Chun's oversea's diplomacy and cancell the trip to five other countries, and if they killed Chun, it might have made a very, very unstable situation in Korea because the succession lines are not all that clear.

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MR. NEVITT: Thanks very much --

Q Could I ask one more question? Would you consider here, letting us quote you directly since you were very informative and you said nothing controversial that I don't see why you wouldn't have your name attached to it?

MR. NEVITT: Well, our guidelines to these briefings have been that they're on background.

Q I realize that but I thought I'd ask in case the individual involved would let us use his name.

MR. NEVITT: How do you feel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've always preferred the low profile viewpoint, but if something would really be helpful, I'll be glad to cook up something through our PA people but that may be more trouble than it's worth.

MR.NEVITT: There'll be a transcript available in the lower press room when this --

Q When? In a couple days?

MR. NEVITT: A couple days.

END

12:15 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON FAR EAST TRIP

October 26, 1983

The Briefing Room

2:43 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: I'm pleased to turn to perhaps a more pleasant subject today. I see somebody's still around. I'd like to introduce to you my colleague. He will speak to you today on background with his comments attributable to a senior administration official. He will give you essentially a curtain raiser on the schedule and walk through with you some of the overall objectives and subjects to be covered on the trip and then take your questions. With him is my other colleague who will also help in responding to the questions.

So, let me turn it over to my colleague who will have a few opening remarks and then go to your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I guess I'll start with just few general comments about the schedule itself. The President will be leaving Washington on Tuesday, November 8th, flying directly to Tokyo by way of Anchorage. Refueling stop in Anchorage.

Given the time change, the dateline change, he arrives in Tokyo on Wednesday, November 9th. During a course of --

MR. JANKA: Excuse me. I'm sorry to interrupt. We hope to have a detailed, summary schedule to hand out to you at the end of this briefing.

Q You said the 9th or the 10th because of the dateline?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- 9th.

Q -- 9th?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arrive in on the 9th.

During his time in Japan he will have an audience with the Emperor of Japan who is also giving a dinner in his honor. He'll be meeting twice with Prime Minister Nakasone and, I believe, additionally to that -- correct -- will be a private luncheon for him by the Prime Minister.

Among other major events during the trip, perhaps the most important one to underline, is the President will be addressing a session of the Diet. It'll be a major address, and, I believe, the first time a president of the United States has addressed the Diet.

And there will be a reception for him to meet both American and Japanese businessmen. He will leave Japan on Friday, November 11th -- excuse me, on Saturday, November 12th, going to Seoul.

He will be addressing the National Assembly in Seoul, having a working luncheon on that Saturday with President Chun. A reception with a number of prominent leaders of the Korean community on Saturday. And a reception and state dinner in his honor that night.

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On Sunday, November 13th, he will be going up to the demilitarized zone area to visit with troops of the U.S 2nd Infantry Division and to view the situation at the border itself. He'll come back to Seoul Sunday afternoon and have a second meeting with President Chun, be leaving Seoul Monday morning, November 14th, and through a miracle of modern technology will arrive in Anchorage, Alaska, on Sunday, November 13th. That's the dateline working the other way.

Getting back into Washington around noon on Monday, November 14th. Those are the highlights of the schedule. Let me say a few words about how we view the trip and the President's objectives and then I'll be glad to take questions.

The President's trip to Japan and Korea comes at a time when U.S. interests throughout Asia, not only in northeast Asia and not only with these very important countries, have been growing very rapidly. The economic growth of the region has been strong -- in fact, remarkable. And this growth has had a major impact on our trade and other economic relations -- virtually all the countries of the region.

Starting about five years ago, our trade with East Asia surpassed that of any other region in the world. And the lead of East Asia has been growing since that time. Given continued impressive performance of the East Asian economies, we would probably expect that trend to continue in the future.

Japan, of the countries in -- of the countries in the world, excuse me, Japan is our second largest trading partner. And Korea is our ninth largest trading partner in the world. Of course, Canada, as you may all know, is number one.

We also have very important security interests in the region. And we have to be concerned about the very steady build-up of Soviet military power in the Asia Pacific region, corresponding to that that has been taking place in Europe. We've seen continued deployment of SS-20's and steady strengthening Soviet conventional forces and, indeed, the beginning of Soviet operations outside of the area -- operating out of Vietnam.

That build-up is of concern to us, although with the important exception of Kampuchea, the Asia region is one that is at peace today. It is a rather heavily armed peace. There is a great deal of tension.

We've had two disturbing events just within the last two months -- the shoot-down of the Korean airliner and the recent bombing in Rangoon, both of which underscore some of the tensions in the area and some of the dangers and the important stake that we have in maintaining stability in that region.

I would say generally that this is a region where,

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despite a number of problems -- and I don't think there's any part of the world that doesn't face problems. We remain basically optimistic about the future of the region. That is particularly because the nations of the area have demonstrated not only a remarkable economic vitality but also a growing political and diplomatic maturity.

Increasingly, the nations of Asia and the Pacific have both the capability and the desire to contribute to the solution of major global problems, as well as to handling effectively their own regional problems. That process of greater engagement by the Asian countries -- and, I guess, I might say particularly by Japan -- in problems well outside the region, is one that we would like to support and encourage.

The fact that the President will be visiting twice in only six months indicates the importance that this administration places on our relationships in Asia and the Pacific. I might note in that context that we are all keenly disappointed that the President will not be able to visit southeast Asia during his upcoming trip. The President regrets, in particular, that he will be unable to meet, as he had planned, with the ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta.

The nations of ASEAN have a remarkable record of achievement, both in terms of economic development and diplomatic success. We very much value our ties with the ASEAN countries, both with each of the five individually, and with the group as a whole. In fact, ASEAN, as a group, not only is important politically; it is our fifth largest trading partner. We hope and expect that a Presidential trip to southeast Asia can be rescheduled.

Let me say something now about the specific visits to Japan and Korea. These visits, as you know, reciprocate visits made earlier to this country by both President Chun and by Prime Minister Nakasone. The trip will inevitably have a major economic dimension. The economic success of both countries has been remarkable, and so has the accompanying growth in our bilateral economic and trade relationships.

We believe it is no coincidence -- in fact we believe the fundamental cause of the record or success of those two countries is -- that they have operated on a firm commitment to free market principles. We also believe that the relationships that have resulted from their success have worked to the benefit of the American people as well as the benefit of the Japanese and Korean people, and we are anxious to see those benefits continue to grow.

At the same time, the success of those countries, we believe, also brings a growing responsibility to foster and to protect the open international market system from which they, and we, have benefited so much. That will be one major topic of discussion during the trip.

The President will be discussing, in both stops, the need for continued progress, in liberalizing trade, in resisting protectionism, and in opening up markets.

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Our mutual security interests will be another important topic. I've noted the concerns about the growth of Soviet military power in the region, and, I guess, even more importantly, our concern about the aggressive attitude by the Soviets and by Soviet allies and proxies toward the use of that power. These have created problems not only for the United States but our friends and allies in the region.

Accordingly, we will be discussing security issues in both Japan and Korea. More broadly, we will be reaffirming the strength and vitality of U.S. security commitments and the U.S. intention to remain an active force for peace and stability in the region.

In Japan, we will be continuing the dialogue on our respective security roles and missions, and, I imagine, we will also be discussing the negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces, and the President will, undoubtedly, want to assure the Japanese that we will maintain our global approach to these negotiations and accept no agreement that increases the SS-20 threat in Asia.

In Korea, we will be making clear our firm support for Korean security in the face of a continuing serious threat from North Korea and our political support for the South in the face of assaults to which Korea has been subjected in recent months.

Beyond these more specific issues, we will want to build on the already expanding relationships that we have, I'd say particularly with Japan, but also with Korea, to encourage increased engagement in the solution of broader global problems. Korea has been reaching out to expand its contacts with the ASEAN countries, with other nations and other regions. That is a process that we welcome and that we support.

Our relationship with Japan goes far beyond the specific issues of trade and defense that are necessarily important subjects of intention. I might just note that one starts only in the Japanese relationship with South Korea, Japanese in the last year have made major improvement in their relations with South Korea, part of which has involved substantial increase in Japanese development assistance to South Korea. They have made a similar effort to increase their support for Southeast Asian nations. But also beyond the region Japan's role is noteworthy. Japan, today, is one of the major providers of official development assistance to three of the important countries in the area of the Persian Gulf, that is to say, Pakistan, Egypt, and even Turkey, which is a NATO ally. Japan is playing a major role in efforts to preserve

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the integrity of the international monetary system, and to help those developing countries that face serious debt problems. Japan is, I think, playing an increasingly farsighted leadership role, even on such issues as arms control, where Prime Minister Nakasone's participation in the Williamsburg Summit statement on that subject was a historic first, and I believe a very important contribution to demonstrating to the Soviet Union a solidarity of the -- of our allies on that issue.

I might say that, in general, in the region we see a growing sense of responsibility and a growing community of interests, a growing willingness of the nations of the area to work with one another in dealing with difficult problems, whether they be economic, political or security problems. As a Pacific nation, the United States has a major role to play in that process. And we believe that this trip by the President, and future trips and our continuing policy efforts will enable us to play that role.

Q What's the chance of this trip being postponed, since we're invading one country and we've got problems in another?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe this trip is going ahead. I have no --

Q Despite those crises?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You mentioned that you wouldn't accept any agreement that would increase the INF or the SS-20 threat in Asia. Would we accept an agreement that froze the threat at its current level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our objective in these negotiations is to get substantial reductions in INF missiles at the lowest possible level. In fact, as you know, we would like to see the systems eliminated entirely. I don't think -- we would like to see those reductions on a global basis, and I don't think we're interested in something that's merely a freeze.

Q Well, if I can follow that up, you would rule out, then, an agreement that achieved reductions in Europe that froze the existing threat in Asia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get in the position of answering questions that Ambassador Nitze should properly answer. But we are interested in seeing substantial reductions, reductions -- an agreement of the kind that would lead to reductions in both Europe and Asia. That's our very clear objective, yes.

Q North Korea has broadcast several threats against President Reagan's safety on this trip. Do you feel that he will be secure? And are extra efforts being made to guarantee that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe extra

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efforts are always made to guarantee the President's safety. I don't think he'd be going unless some very skeptical people were convinced that he would be secure.

Q Do you know of any particular additional security arrangement? Are extra forces in place there in Korea, for example?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, of course, the South Koreans are always taking very special security precautions, because they do face that kind of threat on a daily basis. I think, in fact, they have over the years been able to provide a very, very high level of security within the country, and I believe it's sufficient to inspire confidence in our people.

Q In giving the schedule, you mentioned an event in Korea I think you said was a reception or some kind of meeting with Korean citizens. I wonder if you could elaborate on what that involves, and also whether the leading Korean citizens will include Kim Ung-Sang or other representatives of non-government political parties.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry, I don't have additional information on that right now. I'll see if we can get it for you.

Q Does someone else --

Q You can't say who is going to be at that meeting at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure who has been invited; no.

Q Is the Archbishop going to be there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said I'm not sure who's been invited; I'm sorry.

Q Does someone else with you have more information on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, and do you have anything to add on that one?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Do you know who attempted -- made the attempt on the President's life -- South Korea -- in Burma, and the other? Well, he didn't make a -- he didn't arrive at the scene, but in Rangoon. Who is responsible?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Burmese are continuing to pursue that investigation. They, I might say, are doing so I think quite seriously. They have gone to considerable lengths, and probably at some risk and maybe even loss of life of their own security forces in order to capture alive the people that they believe were responsible for it.

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Q What's their nationality?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have identified them as Koreans. I believe they have just announced that, in fact, they have made at least one of them available for a brief interview by South Korean diplomatic representatives. But I think both of them are in fairly serious medical condition, and not really able to be questioned at length right now.

Q Are they North Koreans?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All they are now identified as is Korean. And, obviously, where they came from and who directed them and who supported them is the key question that --

Q It's possible they could be South Korean dissidents; is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to get ahead of the evidence here. There is a great deal of circumstantial evidence that I would just note points to a rather highly organized and highly disciplined operation. But I think until -- we want to be very careful about passing judgments until the evidence is really in.

Q In your opening remarks you mentioned that we're pleased with the growing political maturity in these regions. Is President Reagan likely to make any kind of appeal to the Koreans for the restoration of democracy in that country? Or does your statement mean, in effect, that we're satisfied with the level of political maturity -- at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My reference

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to maturity doesn't mean that there aren't problems and there isn't progress that needs to be made. What I mean by the word is that there is a realistic attitude toward problems. There are serious efforts made to solve them. And we -- I meant that in a very broad sense, thinking particularly, for example, about the very statesmanlike and, I think, impressive way that the ASEAN countries have gone about organizing a strategy and mobilizing international support for their strategy in Kampuchea.

I think on the specific question you asked about the internal situation in South Korea, I think it's clear that there is substantial room for improvement. I think President Chun has made a number of steps starting as long as -- more than two years ago -- to try to begin the building of democratic institutions in that country.

There's no question in our view that that process is important, not only because of the intrinsic value that we attach to democratic and representative institutions, but also because we believe that the long-term political strength of the South Korean government will be enormously increased if it has got a firm representative basis.

Beyond that, as I think you know, our policy is to try to address these questions and make progress on them by being rather frank about our concerns with governments in private. And that's how we handle it.

Yes.

Q With these personal attacks on President Reagan coming out of North Korea, would you characterize them as a move to try to get Reagan to cancel his trip or as a real possible threat to the President by possible terrorist action?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been trying to get a precise reading of what the North Koreans have been saying. You know, their standard rhetoric is so shrill that one might misinterpret the daily morning summary as something unusual. I'm not sure this is out of the ordinary.

They may have the illusion, since they live in rather extraordinary isolation, that that kind of statement might scare the President away. I don't know. You'd have to ask them. But you wouldn't be able to get an answer.

Q For those of us who don't regularly read FBIS, could you tell us something of the nature of these North Korean broadcasts which are said to contain threats against the President? What kind of threats?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of you may have seen them in more detail than I have. I have just seen a summary that suggests they have denounced the President's visit. They view it, as they view almost everything else in the world, as a provocation. And they, as they regularly do, you know, have, in effect, incited, urged their South Korean supporters, of whom they believe there are many, and, of course, there are almost none, to take action against the President's visit.

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Q Like what?

Q Well, that's what I'm getting at. Have they incited -- you used the word "incited" -- incited to make a physical attack against him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have not seen the exact language.

The North Koreans regularly are inciting South Koreans to violence. That is a standard part of their broadcasting.

We'll try to get you some more detail on what these specific broadcasts are.

Q Some weeks --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want to add anything on that --

Q A couple of weeks back, the South Koreans said that they were going to launch a diplomatic effort to isolate North Korea, to get countries to sever their ties as a result of the Rangoon bombing.

Can you tell us where that effort stands right now and if the United States is participating in that effort in some way?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure that the South Koreans said that.

Our attitude is to first -- with respect to North Korean complicity that -- put our attention right now in trying to get the facts and trying to get the evidence and trying to make sure before we take action that we have a firm evidentiary basis for doing it, so that we believe in the end if action is necessary it will be much, much more effective if we have convincing evidence to back it up.

So, as I say, we are anxious to see the investigation pursued and pursued to its conclusion and pursued thoroughly.

I might just say something on the broadcasts. I don't want to -- on the one hand, I am inclined, since shrill propaganda is such a standard thing from the North Koreans, I'm inclined to think that beyond simply propaganda, it is not going to have any practical significance in the real world. It is deplorable and I must say we have been suggesting to all parties that, in this fairly tense time following the Rangoon bombing, that the best course of action for everyone is moderation and restraint. And I would note that the South Korean government has displayed impressive statesmanship and moderation in its approach to the incident. And that kind of broadcasting from North Korea is exactly the opposite.

Q If there is convincing evidence, though, that North Korea is responsible for this attack in Rangoon, what would we counsel South Korea to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll get

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to that when we get the evidence.

Q Well, some officials have said here that there is circumstantial evidence pointing to North Korean responsibility. Aren't we already in the position almost of having made that judgment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we haven't -- we really are looking at the evidence, and I think it's going to -- I mean given, as I said, the -- just if nothing else the medical condition of the prisoners, it will be a bit of time before that's conclusive. Yes?

Q As for the trade relations with Japan, I understand that there are some specific issues under discussion right now, such as Oldsmobile -- technology and so forth. Would you expect that these issues be resolved on this occasion of the President's trip to Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm not a dreamer. I believe that we have, as you've just enumerated, a number of very difficult trade issues with Japan. I think I'd summarize it by saying our feeling is that the Japanese market is not as open as it should be to American imports. Our feeling that it's not as open as our market is. We believe there has been progress in that direction.

If you look at it over a, let's say, 20-year time span which, in some ways, is the real way to measure change, some of the changes have been remarkable. I believe I saw a figure earlier today that in the sixties the Japanese had quotas on over 400 individual items. And I think the number of items on which they now have quotas is down around 20. Of course, two of those items are beef and citrus.

We believe that there is a much bigger market for a -- we know, in fact, that there would be a much bigger market for U.S. beef and citrus if those quotas were removed. And we have been negotiating for some time now with the Japanese government to try to get a substantial liberalization in the market in that area. We have the problem of automobiles. We have problems in a number of areas of high tariffs or on products where we think the United States could otherwise be quite competitive: forest products, paper, semi-conductors.

Some of these we think they're -- and from some recent announcements there may even be some movement on now. We would like to see more movement, and as rapid as possible. Let me say, too, that while we think there is quite a bit of room for making Japan's markets more open, part of the problem in our present imbalance of trade is caused by the rather high value of the dollar, relative to the yen.

Now that is not -- as you know, the dollar is strong really relative to all currencies. And the yen is not unusual in that respect. But we do believe that if Japan's capital markets were more open, so that people could more readily invest and hold liquid reserves and assets in yen accounts that, in fact, the balance between the dollar and the yen would be adjusted further in the direction that it has been going the last couple of months.

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And that would have a favorable effect on our balance of trade. I might say it's important,to keep some perspective on all this, to remember a couple of facts. Number 1, we may have a large trade deficit with Japan, but we export more to Japan than to any other country in the world; on the order of 20 billion dollars' worth a year, and that's a lot of American jobs and benefit to Americans.

Moreover, those imports, although we might like to see the balance a little different, those imports, of course, are purchased by very willing and very pleased American consumers. And in the end, if we were to succeed in removing all the structural barriers to -- and have completely free trade both ways, there would still be a very large trade deficit. That's because Japan has to import virtually all of its raw materials. It, therefore, has to -- it will always show a large deficit in its account on those items.

Q How much is it?

Q I'm still not clear on the trade --

Q What's the figures -- the deficit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Between -- we have a total two-way trade on the order of 60 billion dollars. I think the deficit in 1982 was 17 billion, and it will be over 20 billion in 1983.

Q Over what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over $20 billion in 1983.

Q You say you haven't personally studied the recent North Korean broadcast texts. But given what happened in Rangoon, shouldn't somebody on your staff be scrutinizing those texts, to see if, indeed, there is a sort of escalation of the shrill rhetoric? I mean just in terms of the security of the President and his party.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there is no question about the North Korean intention and desire to do harm and damage. That's a basic problem that we're dealing with. It's the reason why we maintain the kind of security commitment we have in South Korea. And no one in South Korea is under any illusions, nor are we, about the kinds of dangerous actions the North Korean government is capable of. It's not dealt with by studying their texts. It's dealt with by making sure that there are very good security arrangements for the President's visit, as, indeed, there are.

Q How many troops do we have at the DMZ?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our troops I think are not mostly up at the DMZ. If you mean in Korea in all, the figure I think is 40,000.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thirty-nine thousand.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thirty-nine thousand.

Q There's one division at the DMZ.

Q Is it conceivable to you at all that the South -- that the North Koreans could be making these kinds of threats,

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or if they were to carry out any sort of action that they could do that without the Soviet system backing them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I think the North Koreans are capable of an awful lot of viciousness and mischief on their own. They get an unfortunately large amount of Soviet backing, but I don't think the Soviets control everything they do. It's one of the most bloodthirsty regimes in the world, in my impression.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Any questions? Thank you very much.

END 3:14 P.M. EDT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1983

Q Mr. Secretary, can you... Is everybody ready?

A Yup.

Q Can you tell us what, if anything, was decided about the MNF and changing its role or augmenting its size?

A Our discussion was about the MNF, security of the MNF. But I think everyone is of the view that security is something you attain by physical and military measures to a degree, but the real quest for security is through political reconciliation and unity in Lebanon. So our discussion, as you might expect among Foreign Ministers, ranged across the political aspects of the subject. I felt that it was a very illuminating and helpful to me and to the others as well.

Q Mr. Secretary, tell us how this meeting today will tie in with the President's speech tonight if Mr. Cheysson raised objections to you about the Grenada invasion.

A Insofar as the President's speech and any references to this meeting, that remains to be seen. I think the renewed and continued determination of our allies in the MNF to stand firmly for our mission and to continue to work for unity and peace in Lebanon is a very important statement at this moment. I don't know if the President will make any reference to it. That remains to be seen. Insofar as Grenada is concerned, the large meeting that we had didn't take it up as such at all. There was one slight mention of the subject. I did discuss it briefly with Foreign Minister Cheysson at breakfast, although our discussion at breakfast was really more about Middle East matters and, of course, I discussed it at some length with Sir Geoffrey Howe both before the meeting and at a more lengthy session afterwards.

Q Could you share any of that with us? Is it a matter of concern to them?

A The British advised against it, as they have said. They felt the consultation was not timely. The basic attitude of the British and Sir Geoffrey is, as always, constructive and forward-looking in their approach. We discussed the future and the role of the British Governor General and the ongoing effort to return Grenada to an orderly, democratic government.

Q (inaudible) ...Cheysson?

A Our discussion was very brief. I just gave him a brief report on the legalities of it as we saw it and some of the late information that I had at that time.

Q (inaudible) ...Mr. Secretary, that it came up briefly at the four-way meeting?

document: [illegible]

A (Mr. Hughes:) No, it did not.

A (The Secretary:) Yes, I did say that. It was mentioned but not in any way that was about Grenada as such.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you now know any more about who was responsible for the Beirut bombings? And did you discuss any possible counteraction?

A Our intelligence work continues on responsibility. We have arranged to share information with our allies about that. There is, certainly, a fair amount of strong circumstantial evidence that we have. I think we proceed with that not only in the sense of wanting to discover how this happened and who was responsible looking back, but also looking forward. People who did that may think they would like to do it again, so it's a preventive as well as retrospective effort that's going on. We discussed the subject of what to do about it, and I think I'll just leave it at that.

Q Do you draw any link between those bombings and the attempted assassinations of the Jordanian ambassadors... (inaudible)?

A That was mentioned in passing, but I don't think we have any ability at this point to identify a link in a factual way. There are all kinds of links you can make in a speculative manner, but whether you can put together the facts to support it is a question.

Q Mr. Secretary, did any of the ministers express a desire to set a timeframe for withdrawal from Lebanon and, if so, what timeframe did they consider?

A Of course, everyone would like to see the conditions created--unity, peace, stability--in Lebanon under which we would all see withdrawal. But just as we discussed when we went into Beirut the second time that it was a mistake to set a time deadline of some sort because it worked against your efforts to do something constructive, we went around that same circle again. So there was no effort to set some time deadline.

Q Were there any new ideas floated for dealing with Syria or are we at a dead end at getting the Syrians to be more accommodating?

A Obviously, Syria is a large part of the problem. We have contacts with the Syrians; so do the other countries. Foreign Minister Andreotti plans to be meeting with the Syrians. He's going to Damascus November 6-7. I may not have the dates precisely right but it's in that region. We encourage those contacts.

Q I noticed the French yesterday were discussing publicly the notion of expanding the United Nations' forces in Lebanon? Was this something you discussed? What do they have in mind? What might you all have in mind now about the UN?

A There is nothing specific or on the immediate horizon with the UN. I think over a period of time if developments that are constructive take place, we would expect to see the mandate of UNIFIL (?) change. There have been considerable efforts over the last year or so--when UNIFIL's job was difficult to define under the current mandate--great efforts to keep the UNIFIL force in being, keep it there, and have its mandate renewed. That was just done so the UNIFIL is a military force in being there. We look for the day when its mandate can be changed and it can be more useful and a part of the constructive process we look for in Lebanon.

Q As a replacement for the MNF at some point?

A As a replacement or, more likely, as a supplement to the effort if the process of withdrawal of foreign forces can get underway and the effort to stabilize Lebanon unoccupied takes place. It's interesting to total up--and we did just make a rough stab--what the international community has been and continues to contribute to trying to help Lebanon find a peaceful future for itself. There are some 6,000-7,000 UNIFIL forces there. There are 5,000 MNF forces there. There are the UN observer forces there. You're readily up in the 12,000 neighborhood. There is, of course, a lot of support for all those forces that is necessary, and there are quite a substantial amount of naval assets off shore. So the annual financial contribution, you might say, just in terms of these forces that the world community is putting up in this effort is quite substantial. So I think there is a real feeling--it was expressed in our meeting, we all agreed on it, and Claude Cheysson spoke for us--that we think the leaders of Lebanon owe the people of Lebanon and the international community a real effort to pull themselves together because the international community has made a major contribution here.

Q Mr. Secretary, the events in Beirut kind of came in the middle of your policy review of the Middle Eastern subject that was going on. Could you give us some feeling about how far you've gotten in the policy review and what you see now? Is it likely to take some other kind of direction because of what happened with the Marines? Where are we going here?

A Our discussion process has been a very searching one. I don't think that it suggests any major, sweeping changes. But I think there are a lot of things that have come out of that will be constructive. It is now at the point where, I think, all the papers that need to be written have been written. There has been quite a bit of discussion on the issues that are there--some not argued about, some argued about. The President will be putting out a decision memorandum shortly, I am quite confident, and we will proceed on the basis of that.

I don't want to discuss the factual content of it until after there are decided.

Q. May you can help us on this something has been a little unclear to some of us is whether you were really boci boosty on Lebanon or whether you you were boci boosty on the peace process beyond Lebanon. What is it that's

A. The review and discussion that we have been having have been Mid-East as a whole. Lebanon, Mid-east peace process, Iran-Iraq war, Gulf problems and so on. And I think one of the things that happens when you have a searching discussion of that subject and one of the useful things is that you do see that as soon as you get up out of the immediate tactical types of subjects all of these things are connected with each other and you have to think about them in their inter-relationship as well as peace-by-peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary we heard Cheysson make that particularly interesting sentence that suggested the impatience among the MNF and then one of our colleagues gave us a little backgrounder on the word of growing impatience was used. Why in the world should the Lebanese take you seriously? They've got this thing going they can see the U.S. a super-power that if it were to withdraw the various scenarios that the Administration itself talks about. Why in the world should they take you seriously?

A. The Lebanese of all people should take the possibility of peace seriously, because they have lost countless lives and they have lost countless opportunities to create the kind of exciting and prosperous life that Lebanon is completely capable of producing, so the people of Lebanon are the big losers and that's what they have to take seriously.

Q. Mr. Secretary did you discuss the Iran-Iraq situation with Cheysson, could you bring us up-to-date on the supply of the super aton-dar, and what you expect the Iraqis might do with it? And as part of that whether we think that an Iraq free of this war or of the spector of defeat in that war might help us out with the Syrians in Lebanon?

A. To answer the first seven-eights of your question I don't have anything to add. I didn't try to pin him down about precisely where those plans are and in subsequent references he didn't seem ready to be precise about their location. On the last note in your question I think Iraq does have a potentially constructive role to play in the Arab considerations of the Mid-East peace process including Lebanon. And they, I think, are beginning to play it more and more, I was interested just thinking back here that when I went to Paris, some of you were there, after we finished the Israeli/Lebanon Agreement I met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister who supported that agreement and I think he has visited Egypt for example and there have been a number of constructive things that have been done and I think that's a trend to encourage.

Q. Mr. Secretary on the way out you said that one of the things refered these are not you exact words was that the parties you were going talk to had special connections with some of the parties in Lebanon. As a result of the meeting today are those connections going to become used? Are the various parties you talked to going to be talking to their friends Lebanon and communicating their impatience and the need to something beginning Monday in Geneva.

A. I am certain that they will and in, if you will look over the transcript of Claude Cheysson statement among other things he pointed to the importance of the Lebanonese focusing on the importance to them of unity and peace and of those who are interested in this process also of making the point and trying to help arrange the conditions where the Lebanese can do that so, obviously you are talking about the MNF partners and what they can contribute as countries they all of whom have some special relationships there and you have the countries around Lebanon who have very considerable influence.

Q. Well, was that discussed at the meeting today and then they said that they would put the pressure on people to do so.

A. I don't think that's the way to put it. I think the way to put it is that people in different governments have close ties with differing key individuals and those individuals are consulting with the different governments and interesting in their views and I think that provides a setting where you can counsel and advise and push a little, but it isn't just a question of going around pressuring people to do this and that.

Q. What impact did the events over the weekend did on the American Marines and Frenchmen have on the will and morale of the countries involved that you might with today?

A. Well those events are dramatic events for all the countries especially the countries France and the United States that suffered the losses. And each person who spoke started by expressing admiration and condolenses and it's something that we all feel you feel it we all feel that. And the same time I feel it was a determination that acts of terror of this kind are not going to push these countries out of there and away from doing our best to achieve our mission which can be narrowly defined on the ground but which in a larger sense is to contribute to the broader purpose of peace and unity in Lebanon.

Q. Mr. Secretary did you reach any decisions or evolve any principles on the possible redeployment or more effective use of the MNF forces during the meeting?

A. No we didn't try to discuss sort of arrangements on the ground the question of looking to the security physical arrangements for security and so on are being done in our case by the Commandat of the Marine Corps and others and military people from each of the countries have been visiting out there we have a good pattern of colaboration between the countries and so that kind of thing we encourage but it's the job of others to get out the maps and look at those arrangements. But that's going on. I do just make a note in passing, that when you consider that this mutinational force has been there now for about 14 months I think and has had period of calm but also periods of trauma, the capacity to colaborate and cooperate and to work effectively together is truly outstanding it's been a very good effort and of course one of the reasons is that we have talked a lot together about it we have met always when we happen to be at common meetings and we had some meetings, this one being an outstanding example, that where everyone went out of their way considerably to come together and compare notes and see that we're compare our thinking and see that it is going in a pararell direction. And from that standpoint it's been an outstanding internation effort.

Q. There's been a lot of emphasis put on the meeting in Geneva and the idea that Lebanon has to do for itself. How do we see keeping Syria from being a spoiler have you ruled out any kind military action? Is it a question of bringing the Israeli's in bring the the Iraqis in exactly or could you characterize more what you have in mind in order to make that Geneva process work?

A. Well, we haven't in mind any military action against Syria to affect Syria's attitude in Geneva, but as I said earlier the idea of maintaining strong contacts with Syria as illustrated by the visit Andryodi will be making and the discussions with various people who are Lebanese but who have close ties with the Syrians by our partners as well as our selves will certainly go on. But we didn't get together to concock some sort of attack on Syria.

Q. Mr. Secretary I am wondering whether you now have a better understanding of the chain of events in Grenada last week. For instance was the killing of Bishop and some of his colleagues was this purely an internescent struggle or was he bumped off because he was swerving away from the line, was there any outside influence on those who did the deed.

A. I don't know the answer to that question. Of course our attention began to focus in when he was placed under house arrest and was very much reveted on the situation when we got news of his execution and of the increasing pattern of violence and uncertainty in Grenada, and I have gone through that chain of events, I won't repeat it, but that's really the process of our thinking the East Carribean states who are close to the situation and closer to Bishop than most others did feel that he was beginning to have some doubts and have a sense that it might be a good idea to move in a more democratic direction that's there perception and so that led them to speculate as part of their calculation that that was the reasons why he was murdered. And of course that carried an onimous overtone to them and represented a reason why they felt events on Grenada were a threat to them from an outside force.

Q. Mr. Secretary in the last few days two Jordanian Ambassadors have been shot. Three part question 1) Is some one trying to send a signal to King Haussein not to join the peace process? 2) If we think so who might it be? 3) What in you estimation are the chances that the king will or might join the peace process anytime soon?

A. Well all three of those questions are speculative questions and as for the first two I don't have any information that I am able to bring forward to shed light on them. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that it happened just when it happened but has to hard information as I said earlier I don't have anything to put into the public domain right now. As far as King Haussein's interest in the peace process is concerned every contact that we have with him indicates his continued strong desire to see movement in the peace process and there are various impediments to it as he sees it and we keep trying to work with him and others trying to do something about those impediments. So his desire for a peace process is very clear remains strong.

Q. And the prospects you think of his joining?

A. Well that has to take you over into you analysis of what is happening in the Palestinian port PLO organization and to

Palestinian leadership and also to the appraisal to that by the Arab league countries and King Haussein has made a public statement some months ago as to his appraisal it seems clear that Aerofat is increasingly being pressured in Northern Lebanon by the Syrians and as you recall King Haussein raised the question if the PLO is a Syrian dominated organization than how is it to be said that it is an organization to represent Palestinians and so he directly raised the question of it's mandate.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
REGARDING THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS
ON THE SITUATIONS IN
LEBANON AND GRENADA

October 27, 1983

The Briefing Room

7:22 P.M. EDT

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just one or two moments here and I will take your questions. As many of you know, about 10 years ago an important threshold was crossed. And that was the establishment of rough parity between ourselves and the Soviet Union in terms of strategic power. It was an important threshold because, for all of the post-war history to that point, the Soviet Union, in a position of relative inferiority, had had to consider, whenever it wished to expand its influence, whether that effort would bring it into confrontation with the United States. And if it had that potential, they had to discard that initiative and not do it.

However, upon the achievement of parity, the result was not to make nuclear conflict more likely. But it does seem to have been to raise the willingness of the Soviet Union to take risks here and there. I say that not as conjecture so much as an acknowledgment of the history of events from Angola to Ethiopia, South Yemen, Indo-China, finally in Afghanistan. In short, the lesson of the establishment of this parity has been that nuclear conflict is not more likely. But it is, apparently, probable that we will see more low-order probes, a higher level of efforts to probe weaknesses and to omit violence in areas ever closer to vital U.S. interests.

A second lesson of this apparent change in Soviet activity is that rather than prepare for the set-piece battle in the northern plain of Europe, deterrence has to be a more flexible activity. Effective deterrence has to be able to cope with low-order probes whether they are terrorism or liberation movements, insurgencies, but in various places around the globe. And that has an implication for the kinds of forces that we build, not those that are geared toward a set-piece battle, but those that can move quickly, are very mobile and so forth. Well, this is underway. And there is every basis for optimism that in the out years, effective deterrence can be maintained, and that calm and stability can be preserved. But we have to be ready in that period to deter and to cope with conflict if deterrence fails.

However, this is not a despairing set of lessons. It does not mean that we can afford to adopt a confrontational attitude with the Soviet Union. Indeed, if anything, the importance of solving problems peacefully is reinforced. And that, surely, is the thinking of the President and of his administration. As a consequence, efforts to solve problems -- or the readiness of this administration to solve problems where they exist is surely as great today as ever. The importance of it is surely as great.

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Now, in his speech tonight, the President deals with two examples of probes -- we've seen a lot of violence in the last two months: Korea, Rangoon, Beirut, Grenada -- the President deals with two of these: Beirut and Grenada. The speech opens with a narrative -- and I won't bore you; you've read it and you've gone through it. The intentions of the administration with regard to next steps are laid out. That is, to accelerate our efforts to advance the peace process, first in the short term in Lebanon; beyond that, more broadly, to coordinate better with our allies on how together we can work to improve the chances for a success in national reconciliation in Lebanon, and finally to take steps to lessen the vulnerability of the Marines in Lebanon.

The President then turns in his remarks to Grenada, going over once more the chronology of the request that came to us dealing with the objectives of the United States to protect its own citizens as well as local nationals, to restore law and order and to get out as soon as possible thereafter.

With regard to Grenada, I wanted to offer one final comment or -- myself -- and take your questions.

Several things come out of this that are striking to me. First of all, there is the size of the Cuban presence there and apparent intentions to exploit this island as a major Cuban outpost or base, this documented by the find on the base discovered today -- last evening, actually -- with sophisticated cryptographic communications and ammunition, all excluded -- or in an exclusion area -- away from the Grenadans, built by the Cubans, for the Cubans, and not for Grenadans. Weapons stores sufficient to equip terrorists in the thousands, clearly not for local security on the island of Grenada.

The second element that was striking was the excellence, frankly, with which our own military performed. And I could give you self-serving pitch. I won't, but I would just give you one statistic. Thus far, there has not yet been one civilian, non-belligerent casualty, and that's incredible -- to me, at any rate. It's a difficult kind of combat, and the American forces have executed it extremely well.

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I will take your questions now.

Sam?

Q How many casualties were there?

Q I have a question about your statement that the two probes the President deals with tonight with the Soviet Union are Beirut and Grenada. Are you saying that the Soviet Union directed the bombing of our Marines in Beirut?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I am not. And to clarify, my intention is that the Soviet Union has exemplified indirectly through surrogates in Angola, Ethiopia, and the others that I mentioned, doesn't always act directly, nor am I charging that they directed this attack. I don't think that is the case. The family of those associated with the Soviet Union enjoy a climate in which these kinds of activities can take place with lessened risk, or at least they perceive there to be lessened risk than they had in the past. That's all.

Q Well, what do you really -- don't you think --

Q [redacted], there are two questions based on a report CBS ran about an hour ago. One, did we tip off the Soviets and/or the Cubans Monday night to the invasion coming down Tuesday morning? And two, does the United States government have any knowledge of Soviets and Cubans leaving that island on a ship bearing the name Vietnam Star, or for that matter, any other name in any other language, say between Monday morning and the time the invasion happened Tuesday morning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the first question, after the decision was taken to make the landing, the Soviet Union and Cuba were advised that we intended to do this and what our objectives were, as well as our assurance of safe passage for non-belligerent civilians, noncombatants. With regard --

Q When?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this would have been Monday night.

Q About when? Do you know about when Monday night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I will get it for you in just a moment.

Q Why, [redacted]? Why did we do that?

Q Wait a minute.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me follow on the second question, and I will take this one on the right.

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The departure of Soviets or others I cannot document for you. The ship you may be referring to is the Vietnam Heroico. The Vietnam Heroico called in St. Georges a week ago Monday, we believed had delivered stores and dry cargo, left, subsequently returned for no reason that we could identify. But I don't place the Vietnam Star. And as to the departure of Soviets and others, I have no evidence of that.

Q Monday night?

Q When did the Heroico go in and out?

Q We informed them Monday night before our troops landed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The actual notification reached them at about the same time that it had happened, but it was not a -- I will get it for you. I am sorry.

Q But we didn't inform them before our troops landed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q When did the Heroico go out and back in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A week ago Monday it arrived, and it was there for a couple of days, turned around and left, and then came back again.

Q Last week? And when did it come back?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It came back last week toward the end of the week. But it had not called at any other port before it came back. It just steamed out and came back.

Q And it is there now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q [redacted], I am confused. Two things. One, can you clear up for us when we notified the Soviets and the Cubans? Was it Monday night or was it 5:30 Tuesday morning?

And secondly, could you explain the reference that the evidence from that base in Grenada makes it clear a Cuban occupation of the island was planned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. The notification of the Russians and Cubans was at 6 a.m. on Tuesday morning.

Q So it was after the invasion had begun?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

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Q What was the Monday night reference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is all a kind of a blur for me, but it was developed, and I, you know, approved it and chopped off, and I guess that is when it was. But it wasn't actually delivered -- and that is true, I recall, it was a Monday morning delivery, or Tuesday morning. Sorry.

Q Can you talk about this Cuban occupation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my reference was to --

Q Was it in the President's speech, the reference?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The capacity, the level of sophistication of the communications equipment and the physical facilities as well as the level of munitions and weapons, were well beyond any reasonable requirement of Grenadan local security. And they constituted an aggregate capability to sustain, well, significant ground force operations or terrorists operations that would have no place within the island of Grenada.

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Q What type of weapons were these, and in what quantity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are conventional weapons. They're AK-47s. Another -- small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, ammunitions on a very high scale for those things.

Q -- anything large like that?

Q Is it appropriate to repel an invasion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are the weapons of light infantry, as well; that's true.

Q During an invasion, would that be an appropriate cache to have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are weapons that can be used for light infantry; that is true. The base in which they are found is a base that isn't suitable for defending against some kind of invasion. This is -- if that's your point.

Q The Soviet --

Q -- reports about hostages --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me in the front, and I'll get in the back in a moment.

Q Are those Soviet-made weapons --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can you comment on the story moving on one wire tonight that some very large underground bunkers were discovered, with concrete walls and supposedly similar to the kinds of things you'd see in eastern Europe where missile elements are stored. Is there anything to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't confirm that, Mike. I haven't heard that.

Q On the story about hostages --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have no knowledge of hostages. I've heard that there is a report running that General Austin is not yet located and is holding hostages. I have not received that report.

Q Do you have any idea --

Q What were the casualties amongst the Cuban and Grenadan armed services personnel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a figure for you on that.

Q There's about --

Q Are there any --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, do you have a question?

Q Do you have any idea of what specific objective these weapons were being gathered there for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't say anything more than what I've said. I can tell you what they can be used for, but I -- you can draw your own conclusions from it. The base was new, there were VIP quarters, there are barracks, there are communications gear that are not typical for low -- light infantry. This is sophisticated gear.

Q Well, sir --

Q What conclusions, though, did you draw -- would you draw from that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My conclusion is -- and it is only personal -- that --

Q Is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me, the question was what did I conclude about the apparent purpose of this base and trove. And it is only a personal conclusion, and that is that Cuba intended to exploit Grenada as a major base of Cuban operations in that part of the world; nothing more. Sara?

Q Yes, sir, why did this government feel the need to inform the Soviets and Cuba at 6:00 a.m. when they had -- and they really landed at 5:30 a.m. before that? Had they had time to really get in there? And why did you notify them before you even told your press officers here at the White House at -- (laughter) -- at 6:30 a.m. --

Q Pretty good question.

Q -- and you didn't tell any of the rest of the press in the country. Why did you do that? Why did you feel the need to let those people have an edge in?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the time the -- you cannot know how what you are doing will be perceived by the Soviets or anybody else. But in the case of the use of force by the United States, the -- particularly where it calls into confrontation and combat conflict with the Soviet Union or a Soviet client, the engagement by that combat of Soviet obligations and the probabilities, or at least the possibility of the Soviet Union reinforcing its own client or acting in its behalf is high.

And it is sensible, unless you intend to provoke some kind of response, that they understand your purpose, if it is a limited objective, so that they don't miscalculate and take actions which would be imprudent, Sara. Excuse me -- Helen?

Q How is it that you know that there is no -- that no belligerent was killed

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and for three days we cannot find out how many people we killed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the foremost concern of our soldiers I think is rightfully to protect their own colleagues on the battlefield, to assure that they're evacuated and that the wounded are cared for. It is, further, their humane practice to take wounded from the other side, if they're captured, treat them, too. But we cannot, at the time, notify the next of kin of the Cuban wounded. And, therefore, the accounting by numbers has to be of secondary importance at the time, because --

Q I'm not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the objective --

Q -- asking for names. I'm asking for a figure.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a figure. And this is not one of those --

Q Was anybody killed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of Cubans I'm sure that there were.

Q Soviets?

Q How about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no evidence that there were any Soviets killed or injured.

Q How about Grenadans?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have no evidence, and that was the startling point to me that I have no evidence that there were civilians killed at all. Now there may be some, but that's been a striking -- in fact, that was an affirmative report from the island; it's not speculation. Yes?

Q Are you redefining the mission of the Marines in Lebanon by these changes?

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Bob's question is, are we redefining the mission of the Marines today or in the speech or by these changes. No. The mission is portrayed in the speech in political terms as well as in military terms,politically, to sustain the efforts of the government and people of Lebanon to establish their institutions and extend their authority throughout the country -- militarily, to protect a piece of terrain. The piece of terrain is related to the terrain held by other MNF partners, and in the aggregate to the city of Beirut, so that this political reconciliation and institutional maturity can take place.

But the conduct of that mission isn't being changed today.

Q -- number of casualties, and are there still pockets of resistance in Grenada? What is the number of American troops there at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The number of American

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troops right now still there is about 3000.

Q In the President's speech --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The casualty figure hasn't changed since this morning, when the figure of eight -- and I'll get it for you -- of wounded was put out.

Q How many Marines in Lebanon?

Q In the President's speech he seems to assign a different reason for the communications equipment than you expressed as your own opinion. He says that it makes it clear the Cuban occupation of the island had been planned, and you said you thought it was the kind of equipment that could be used as a base for terrorist activities, etcetera, outside of the island.

Do you disagree with the President about that? What does he mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We talked together about that, and the intent -- the sense of what is said there is the same as my own, really, that when he says an occupation, an exploitation, a use of Grenada as a base of operations.

Q Occupation? What did you think the Cubans were going to try to do on Grenada?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I said, to exploit it as a base of operations for activities in that region.

Q How many Cubans are --

Q Are there still pockets of resistance, in your view, in Grenada?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think our information is that there are still in the low hundreds of Cubans still at large, and these are not, however, in the urban areas, and are concentrated in the -- call it the "jungle terrain" in the interior.

Q What is the number of Cubans -- the total number that we estimate is on the island?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the order of 1100. Yes?

Q The President refers at the bottom of Page 5 to "The nightmare of our hostages in Iran must never be repeated." Is there any evidence that there was ever a threat to the American medical students, that they might be taken hostage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've had several calls today from the students that have come out, and I expect you all have, too. And I urge you to seek them out. I -- the calls that I've had expressed in at least two cases that very real fear.

Q Have they all been accounted for?

Q Was that fear based on anything beyond that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the people that talked to me cited, for example, Cubans coming to homes, homes in which they lived with families, local families, living off campus, and one girl, a girl named Helen Nagrand, who

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was a final year med student there said that she and her friends had been, the homes in which they lived had been visited on occasion by Cubans menacing rifles and things like that, and that it was alarming; that there were frequently rifle shots in the vicinity of the campus of the University; and that there was a state of tension, that it had been there since October 12th, about an uncertain future; that she felt unsafe, at risk and wanted to leave very badly.

Q Were there any radio intercepts of any transmissions from the island that raised in any way the possibility of taking any of these students hostage?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not to my knowledge, no.

Q Given the situation as you described it, what makes you think that a police force of local island people can maintain peace there after the U.S. forces leave?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think it does require that the aliens, the Cubans leave. That is a decision for the government to take.

Q But do you think that the island people can maintain peace there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think they can if they establish a constabulary. The other islands in the area have been able to do that. I expect that they will maintain a small internal security force for the island, and it can be effective.

Q How long do you expect that the American forces will be remaining on the island?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say not long. Now that is not a good answer, but I can't measure it for you in specific number of days. But I wouldn't put it in, surely not months. We are talking at the outside weeks.

Q Have all of the Americans been accounted for, the students? There are reports tonight that some may be missing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were a few who lived off campus in a residential area which has not yet been reached, and so they have not yet been entirely accounted for.

Q Is there any reason to believe that they are being held hostage by Mr. Austin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What are the reports from Paris talking about retaliatory action in Beirut? What do those mean?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ask the Parisians. I haven't seen that, John.

Q This comes from sources who the Secretary quoted as, that the meeting of foreign ministers of Lebanon talked about taking measures against those who committed the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll have to wait until he comes back. The President has already said publicly his interest in determining those responsible for the attack. But we haven't --

Q [redacted], several times you all have said that they would be there until elections were held. You have indicated that our troops might be there until elections were held in Grenada. Are you planning that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The hope, and I think the expectation is that the Governor General can, indeed has, issued the orders for the formation of a provisional government. That provisional government can preside over the conduct of elections, but that if the foreign force is removed from the island, that local security could be maintained by perhaps units contributed by the neighboring islands or perhaps the Commonwealth force, or indeed perhaps a small contingent of Americans. What I am saying is that the level of force that is there now I do not anticipate is going to be there for a lengthy stay, not through the election.

Q Would you be willing to continue this after the speech, sir? Would you be willing to continue after the speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am going to do something else after the speech. I am sorry.

Q Do you have any information on the Syrians being tied to the recent bombing of the Marines in Beirut?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not yet concretely.

Q Where are the Russians now? Are we holding the Russians, or what actually has happened to the Russians? Are they in custody, or where are they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they are, at my last report, in their own facilities there.

Q Are we guarding them or anything?

Q Are we now saying that --

Q When did all these Cubans come in?

Q Are we now saying that in addition to the previously stated reasons, another reason for why we went into Grenada was to wipe out this incipient Cuban outpost?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we had no knowledge of this before we got there.

Q So this is strictly a side benefit unanticipated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is correct.

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Q Who is the Middle East envoy? Is there going to be one soon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Or you are not naming him tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not tonight.

Q [redacted], what makes you so sure that the Soviets, given the low order, the step up in low order activities that you are talking about, but also given the fact that they never accepted deterrents and that they are obviously operating on the old Sokolovsky doctrine, they are trying to get in place everything they can, especially for defense, and certainly for offense, as the President lays out time after time, what makes you so sure that they are not aiming for a higher level confrontation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the strategic equilibrium is such as to make their uncertainty of the outcome too high to warrant the risk.

Q Sir, would you give us --

Q What if they develop beam weapons before we do, sir?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think there are isolated technologies which if breakthroughs occurred could be extremely worrisome. I think that our own advanced state of development in virtually all of those gives us a certain measure of confidence that we won't fall behind.

Q Could you explain the discrepancy that is apparent between holding four American reporters incommunicado overnight and the values this nation stands for when we go in to defend free people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if that ever happens, I think there would be a contradiction.

Q Didn't it happen last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 12:06 P.M. EDT
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BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S RADIO ADDRESS

October 28, 1983

The Briefing Room

3:13 P.M. EDT

MR. JANKA: Thank you all for coming this slow Friday afternoon. I'm pleased to present a background briefing by several senior administration officials with regard to the President's radio speech tomorrow, which will deal with the -- and, again, this is OFF THE RECORD guidance -- it will deal with the decision of the NATO planning group in Ottawa yesterday to reduce a number of nuclear weapons in Europe. So, let me introduce to you to start out -- and we'll be having others to answer different questions -- my colleague. He will start out.

I also have here my second colleague. And we hope to have, before the end of the briefing, my third colleague. And we hope he shows up soon. And, so, why don't you start off and we'll --

Q Les, one question for --

MR. JANKA: Yes.

Q -- you, please. Will we be getting the text of the speech this afternoon?

MR. JANKA: That's highly unlikely, Ralph. We will have two, fairly detailed fact sheets which will help you and my colleague will go over with you pretty much the content of the speech. You know the speech is going to be fairly brief anyway. And, I think, Ron will give you a good feel for what is in it.

But the speech will really not be available until tomorrow as is usual. Just a reminder that this briefing is embargoed until speech time tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last two years the NATO high level group that deals with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy for the Alliance has been conducting a review of the nuclear weapons stockpile in NATO. This was in conjunction with the -- following the December '79 decision that provided for the deployment of 572 cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles to Europe.

As a part of that decision in December of '79, 1,000 nuclear weapons in Europe were removed. And it was decided that we would further review the stockpile to take into account the present and anticipated future situation.

Yesterday in Ottawa, the nuclear planning group of the North Atlantic Alliance accepted and approved the high level group recommendation to remove an additional 1,400 weapons from the European stockpile. This is in addition to the 1,000 weapons which

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have already been removed and is in addition to the one-for-one replacement for the 572 -- the up to 572 weapons which would be deployed in Europe absent an arms control agreement which would alter that.

So, you're talking about a theoretical maximum of approximately 2,972 weapons which might be reduced in the years ahead, taking into account those already reduced, those planned and a full deployment of the 572.

The exact determination of the weapons to be reduced will be made by military authorities, taking into account the situation today and in the future.

I'd like to open it up for questions. And I have with me two colleagues.

Q In this particular --

Q And --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And I have a third colleague. I should add that the President's address tomorrow will also give a little bit of an update on INF.

So, at that let's open it up for questions.

Q With these particular weapons, these are the stockpiled weapons, which means that in the event of a nuclear exchange, these are weapons that are backups and essentially are of little use, are they not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think that's absolutely incorrect.

Q All right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, these are the systems we would use as part of our deterrent strategy, and these are the systems that would be used. And the kind of weapons is quite a variety.

Q How many does this leave in the stockpile?

SENIOR AMDINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- stockpile might be misleading.

Q Yes, explain --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The term "stockpile" simply refers to the arsenal. The fact that they are in the stockpile does not mean, however, they're in some rear echelon, unavailable for use. To the contrary, these are --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- deployed in Europe.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: These are front-line, tactical battlefield systems, fully ready to go.

Q How many does this leave once you subtract this number? What do we have left?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is a classified number.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me answer that this way. It'll kind of help you.

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It was widely reported in the mid-1970s that the United States had about 7,000 weapons in Europe. We never commented on that number, and we're not going to comment on it today. However, as you know -- and, I think, as my colleague pointed out -- we've withdrawn a thousand systems over the last three years, and this is an additional 1,400.

Q Talking about nuclear -- also nuclear -- tactical nuclear weapons, not to mention warheads, but shells and different types --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Warheads refer to all forms of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

Q Not just missile warheads?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Not just missile warheads.

Q Is there something new that's being announced, either in the speech or that you're going to tell us today, beyond what was announced yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you right -- ask the right questions, Mike, there's always something new.

Q No, but I mean is there -- is there some -- some news in the speech, or about this -- in other words, is there something beyond what we learned yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't -- I don't think -- that's a judgmental question. I haven't --

Q No, I think in the speech -- in the speech --

Q -- update INF, and what, or what fashion is he going to update the INF talks. Is he going to give new proposals, new information, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what he'll give you is a presidential assessment of the state of play.

Q Is there going to be some response to Andropov's latest -- from yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There -- he will -- there will be a discussion of the state of play in the INF negotiations. We've already responded, in part, to those proposals, and we can talk about them even now.

Q Excuse me. Are these weapons that are being removed state-of-the-art, most modern weapons, or are they somewhat older and more obsolete?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no weapons -- none of the weapons that we have deployed now in Europe are obsolete. We have not deployed any -- in great numbers -- any substantial number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in recent years. So, by definition, most of the weapons we have in Europe are older, but they are certainly -- they certainly can be used; they're not obsolete, and this represents

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a decision on the part of the Alliance to reduce weapons to the lowest possible level consistent with our need for deterrence. And it is also a signal to the other side, which has in the same period we've been reducing, has been building up, that they should also try to reduce to the lowest possible level. It's obvious that they haven't, because they have many more weapons than they need for defensive purposes.

Q Is this a carrot?

Q Are those weapons that are being removed -- are they deemed to be equal in reliability to weapons that are -- remain on the field?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All of our nuclear weapons in Europe are reliable.

Q Are they equally reliable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would assume so, yes.

Q Would this be characterized as a carrot -- some sort of carrot and stick approach on INF?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think they had -- it has any immediate relationship to the INF negotiations, other than to demonstrate that we are prepared to engage both in mutual reductions through the negotiation process and unilateral reductions so that we don't need to have, in Europe, more weaponry than is required for deterrence.

Q Does reduction imply, in any way, that we would like to cut down the costs in the materials there and put it somewhere else in the world?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What is the period of time over which these are going to be removed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Five to six years.

Q And when does it begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you can say it begins immediately.

Q And is it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me clarify. The time frame begins immediately -- it's five or six years from now. As my colleague mentioned, I think, the actual plan for implementing this program is going to be performed not by the political leadership -- of the military stripe that met yesterday -- but by the field commanders -- principally the Supreme Allied Commander Europe -- and that plan will be coming probably in the not-too-distant future and will set things in train.

Q That reduction will go on unrelated to an INF agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Regardless. Although --

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my colleague may have pointed this out, this is a feature of the December '79 decision that is often missed, that if we must begin deployment at the end of the year of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, that for every missile we deploy we will withdraw one nuclear warhead from Europe. So, if you do your arithmetic, we've withdrawn 1,000, we're now talking about withdrawing an additional 1,400 and, in theory, we're prepared to withdraw an additional 572 -- that is, for each missile -- you're talking about a nearly 3,000 warhead withdrawal in a short period of time.

Q These are battlefield warheads, aren't they, not the medium-range warheads and missiles? Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have any intermediate-range --

Q Yes, exactly.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they are weapons -- I wouldn't call them just battlefield weapons. They are tactical weapons deployed in Europe.

Q I've got two questions. One, what is the strength of the Soviet stockpile in the same area? And the other is, is the President going to respond to the Andropov proposals tomorrow in his radio address?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First of all, in the same area the Soviet Union, of course, doesn't deploy nuclear weapons in Western Europe. The Soviet Union deploys nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe and in the western military districts of the Soviet Union. It has weapons in the western military district.

Well, I think that -- I'd just simply put it this way, that while honest men can differ, most analysts in the West agree that the Soviets have at least a three-to-one advantage in nuclear weapons deployed in or around Europe -- at least a three-to-one.

Q Of a same type?

Q Second question. Is the President going to respond to Andropov tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will discuss the INF negotiations.

Q -- the right question -- (Laughter.)

Q The President has said before that there's been no return from unilateral disarmament and that the Soviets have never responded. Does he think that the Soviets are going to match this or has he changed his mind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We, of course, hope that the Soviet Union will match this. But if they don't, we believe, in any case, that we don't need more nuclear weapons than is required for deterrence.

I'll just give you sort of an advertisement here. I think the rhetoric you hear about the arms race is this mindless competition, this mindless piling up of arms. Right now, after this reduction is completed we will have fewer nuclear weapons in Europe than at any time in the last 20 year.

And another advertisement here: the kind of rhetoric you hear from some people like a former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, is that we have increased our numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe. The fact is is that we have reduced them, and we are going to continue to reduce them. And -- the high point in their numbers was when he was Secretary of Defense.

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Q What effect do you think this is going to have on the protesters, the peace movement in Europe? Obviously, it's aimed at that, aimed at those people to do something. Do you think it's going have any positive effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's wrong to say it's aimed at those people.

Q You're saying it's not at all connected with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This result was not quickly patched together as the result of demonstrations over the last three weeks. It's the result of a thorough study of NATO's nuclear requirements, which flowed out of the December 12th, 1979 decision, and, as my first colleague will tell you and my second colleague and my third colleague, who worked on this project, it's taken a lot of analysis, a good deal of discussion. And what it's aimed at are our allies so that we're all convinced -- our allies and ourselves -- is that we're all convinced we can maintain deterrence in Europe but not have more nuclear weapons than are necessary.

Q Okay. I'll follow that, then, and say, if it's not aimed at it, what effect do you think it'll have on the peace movement? Or do you hope it has any effect on the peace movement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do hope that people will look at the facts and recognize that we have fewer nuclear weapons than we had in Europe ten years ago, that we're not interested in a nuclear buildup. We're simply interested in maintaining deterrence and preventing a war in Europe.

Q There's a movement in the House on the defense money bill to put in a delay of the installation date of the first Pershings and cruises -- maybe six months, maybe a year. Is the administration going to fight all those moves.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The administration, of course, will fight it -- any delay in the programs is undercutting the prospects for an agreement in Geneva. And those people who support measures like that have to recognize that.

Q On the INF part of tomorrow's speech, let me try it this way: will the result of what he says be looked at in Moscow as a carrot or a stick?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know where you get carrot and stick. What I will say about the Soviet INF proposals is that we want to negotiate about them. We want to discuss them in Geneva.

Q You're being coy, obviously, about what the topic is, suggesting maybe if we ask the right question, we can divine --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I didn't mean that. I was just simply saying that --

Q Well, could I put it this way? Will the President's address tomorrow change the statements from the State Department and the White House this week that basically Andropov has proposed nothing new and his proposals are part of Soviet propaganda? Those were two clear statements this week.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't want to scoop the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I just respond to the question about timing, too? This decision was taken at a meeting that occurs on a regularly

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scheduled, semi-annual basis. The meeting has been planned for quite some time. The next opportunity for these Ministers to meet in this group would have been another six months from now.

But one might very well ask the question -- I have not heard it asked thus far -- was Andropov's proposal timed in such a way to try to minimize the influence that this move on the part of the United States which, as you all know, has been anticipated for some time -- certainly by them -- so as to influence the peace movement.

Q Well, the deployment has been scheduled for a long time, too, obviously. So I mean you're going to send -- to England the first of next month. So, obviously, this is -- you're talking about timing, the question is: Is this timed to coincide with the deployment of weapons, to take the edge off the deployment of weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I thought I made it very clear that this process is the result of more than three years of discussion.

Q Well, but the gentleman just made the brought -- and he brought it up -- the gentleman just made the point that -- of time on it --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We understood your point.

Q And the point being that the deployment has been -- I mean was this timed to coincide? This particular meeting, obviously, has been planned for a long time. Was the announcement at this meeting timed to coincide with the immediate deployment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the work was completed at this time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By the way, I don't know where we -- you should not, just in passing, think that we are confirming the arrival of missiles in England the first of next month.

Q Almost any proposal by the Soviets would be timed now for the deployment, because it's here. So the question-- we want to know, is the President going to acknowledge that this is a proposal from the Soviet Union to begin with, and how do we respond to it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's obviously a proposal from the Soviet Union.

Q Well, sometimes they say it is and sometimes they say it isn't. Will he acknowledge that this is a serious proposal for the purpose of negotiating the INF agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have just said that we are prepared to discuss it in Geneva.

Q Has it been offered in Geneva yet?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that I'm aware of.

Q Yes.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have described the proposal but not given us any details, and we anticipate they will give us a more precise explanation of what it is they are talking about next week.

Q Since this briefing is embargoed until the radio speech tomorrow anyway, can't you give us some preview of what he is going to have to say? I mean we can't be using this --

Q Yes, it's all embargoed until --

Q So we're not going to --

Q -- 12:06 p.m.

Q -- the President, because it's embargoed.

Q So can you give us some more details of the speech?

Q -- got a career on the line.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll ask my boss, here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q As a result of the speech -- I'll try one more time getting back to basics -- are we still -- as of 12:06 p.m. tomorrow are we still planning to deploy on the schedule that we had previously planned?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No change in the deployment schedule whatsoever.

Q What size weapons are you talking about in the 1400? Are these artillery rounds, missile warheads or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are a mix of different weapons.

Q Are they concentrated at any specific part of western Europe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some are. Let me just go back. Some are artillery weapons, and some are other tactical weapons.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The specific mixture, the location and the timing, as I said a moment ago, will be based upon recommendations coming from the uniform military commanders.

Q And what do you do with them once they are removed?

Q Do you destroy them?

Q Where do they go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're dismantled; the weapons are dismantled.

Q They are not redeployed somewhere else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they are not.

Q They're destroyed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They are -- some of the components are destroyed; other components can be used for other purposes.

Q Why does it take five to six years to remove weapons that you no longer feel you don't use or need? And how will that be done? Are you going to -- is it going to be basically a smooth, steady withdrawal process? Or do you envision withdrawing most of them at the end or the beginning or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to be evasive, Mike, but the problem is one of not simply making sure that you're not upsetting the deterrent value of these systems, but you are also engaged in a process that a military man has got to make judgments about the timing and the whereabouts of the weapons.

And it's going to take some time for him to make his recommendations, and it needs to be an orderly process whereby the withdrawal is done. The five to six years is a planning factor.

Q Presumably --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It could take less time.

Q -- studying this for three years. I mean it's not -- you're not starting over now. You have some idea which weapons you are going to take out already, don't you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that the political figures have some idea -- some notional idea. We are awaiting judgments that will be initiated, now that a decision has been made on the level of weapons from the military men.

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Q Can I ask a very -- another basic question? Why? Is this a political move or are these weapons not needed? Are there too many of them? Is this -- hate to use the word "over-kill" -- but why are we removing weapons at a time of international tension?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think on the basis of a very serious study undertaken by the military authorities within the Alliance, recognizing the desire, the strong political desire, that the Alliance deploy the fewest necessary weapons consistent with deterrence, a decision was taken that we could withdraw 1,400 weapons from Europe.

Q -- over the years, the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: So there was a combination, I think, of military analysis and -- I wouldn't call it political pressure; but a recognition that a step like this is obviously going to be met with some approval by public opinion in Europe. They're uncomfortable living with nuclear weapons and we recognize that. It's never been any secret.

Q After consultation here, can you tell us anything more about the speech tomorrow?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We can talk a little bit about our approach. I'll say a few words and maybe other ones might.

I think the first point I would make is just reiterate, we're prepared to negotiate on these proposals. We haven't rejected them out of hand. We want to stay in Geneva and negotiate, even after deployment starts, if we must deploy. That is, if we don't achieve an agreement that makes deployment unnecessary.

So the first point we would make is that the statements in the Andropov questions and answers that the Soviets will not negotiate after the appearance of missiles in Europe is disappointing and somewhat inexplicable because I will remind you that we have been in Geneva for two years negotiating while the Soviets have been deploying SS-20's continuously on the average of almost one a week. So if we can be in Geneva negotiating while they deploy, we see no reason that they can't do the same, particularly when we're prepared to withdraw any missiles that we deploy in Europe beginning at the end of the year, if we can achieve an agreement.

Now, as you recall there were three principle components to the Andropov proposals. One was this question of reducing numbers of systems, as they put it; i.e., missiles, below the combined total of the British and French forces. And he says 140 on that. Simply point out that the Soviets continue to want a monopoly in INF land-based missiles.

In other words, they are saying that they can have 420 warheads in the western part of the Soviet Union that can target all of our allies, while the United States is forbidden to have a single system. Well, that remains -- has been -- a fundamental part of the Soviet negotiating position. what the President has called a one-sided, zero option, where we get zero and they maintain their monopoly and that remains the Soviet position. That obviously confronts us with some difficulties in the talks.

Secondly -- Well, let me just give you one sidelight on that. You recall that earlier in the negotiations the Soviets said that they were willing to count warheads and in the negotiations in Geneva if we asked them, "Well, how many are you talking about? How many would you want to retain?" And they said, "Well, maybe somewhere in the vicinity of 400."

Well, this reduction to 140 missiles, each with three warheads, 420 warheads, obviously does not represent, then, a great step in their willingness to reduce SS-20's.

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But the important point is is they continue to want to maintain a monopoly and deny us the right to deploy.

Secondly, on the question of their forces in Asia, they say they would want to, first of all, they would take what appears to be a unilateral undertaking by them that they would not increase their numbers in Asia. We aren't clear whether this is a unilateral undertaking or its negotiable. We would obviously want to determine that.

But more importantly, they want to maintain, then, the right to deploy a large number of systems in Asia, which are transportable by definition, can be moved, and thus could increase the threat of weapons facing our European allies.

Now, they have over a hundred systems deployed in Asia. So they're not just asking for the right to threaten Europe with 140 systems; they're asking for the right, in theory, to threaten Europe with over 240 systems with three warheads on each.

Q You're saying if they move them to the other side?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q All right. You're saying --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Which, again, would just add to this monopoly that they would want to maintain.

Thirdly, they say they're willing to be more flexible on aircraft. We've said we're willing to talk about aircraft. If they're willing to be more flexible on aircraft, that's interesting and we're prepared to discuss it in Geneva.

So the bottom line is is that we don't think that this represents a substantial breakthrough in the Soviet position. They

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still want to drive a wedge between the alliance by preventing the United States the right to deploy but, nevertheless, we're prepared to explore these proposals in Geneva and we would find it very difficult to understand, as would Western public opinion, in our view, if they left the negotiating table if we were to start deployment.

Q Is that what the President is going to say tomorrow, more or less?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More or less. Shorter.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:40 P.M. EDT

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983, 11:   A.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. CARLSON: Good morning. This is an ON THE RECORD briefing on the continuing relief aid to Grenada and the restoration of economic stability there.

The briefer is the Administrator of the Agency for International Development -- Peter McPherson. He has a few remarks for you, and then we'll be happy to take your questions.

MR. McPHERSON: Good morning. It's good to be here again.

A.I.D. has allocated $475,000 for immediate relief measures and commenced an airlift of basic supplies to Point Salinas. Food, generators, water tanks, and other relief have been provided to assist displaced persons and seriously affected Grenadians. At this time, we foresee relief measures continuing for at least several more weeks. In addition to serving these needs, we have the primary objective of returning the Grenadian economy to a normal state of activity. A return to a more normal state, of course, is very important so that people can begin to take care of their own needs.

Therefore, A.I.D. is now committing an additional three million for relief and restoration. We will be discussing the details with Congress in the next few days as these plans take final form for the expenditure of these monies.

Medical and public health services have been disrupted by the exhaustion of basic supplies as well as by the repatriation of some foreign personnel. Three U.S. Public Health officials are now in Grenada surveying basic health needs. I might mention as well that Army personnel are now staffing various hospitals and medical situations -- the U.S. Army military personnel. These recommendations of our people that are there now will guide our responses in the next few days as to next steps.

Early reports indicate that damage to the existing systemsin various parts of the country prevent major segments of the population from receiving potable water. One of the things we've done very early here is provide various tanks and other outlets so as to take care of the immediate situation. It's the cities, by the way, that have the problem. About 40 percent of the population has piped water. The rest of it is by way of wells or other local situations. It is those cities that have the potable water difficulty.

The life-support systems for medicine and various other activities are also hampered by a deteriorated road system. Part of this, some small part, was perhaps recent damage. But the road system in the last couple of years has really deteriorated dramatically. It never was very good to begin with.

These problems, this whole set of infrastructure problems -- both the immediate repair as well as perhaps some longer-term difficulties -- need to be dealt with.

I might note that a disaster-assistance survey team of the Department of Defense went in immediately or almost in conjunction with the troops. A.I.D. has had people there since last Thursday. The DOD people and the A.I.D. people have bean working closely, really together, as a team to survey, determine the extent of the damage and the kinds of immediate needs we have.

This team has defined much of the need to date that has brought the expenditures and has helped define the range of the money that we're now talking about. It is anticipated, under consideration. Under consideration in the Executive Branch is the appropriate role that the Army Engineers might play in this reconstruction activity.

A.I.D. is firmly committed to the economic recovery and the long-term development of Grenada. Our efforts currently, of course, are directed at immediate relief and short-term economic reactivation, and then of course this longer-term development more particularly sensitive to the needs of the Grenadian private sector as a central instrument for economic recovery.

It is clear that that private sector has really been the engine that has provided the income and the growth, to the extent that it's been, in that country.

We anticipate working closely with agriculture, with tourism, and so forth to help things along.

Those, ladies and gentlemen, are my comments today. I would anticipate and welcome what questions you might have.

Q Sir, are we going to rebuild the mental hospital that was accidentally bombed and pay compensation to the victims?

A The hospital, as you indicate, was damaged. It was right next to a military installation. There was firing from that proximity, and in fact it was damaged. So far we have provided some medical care, some blankets and mattresses and that kind of thing to immediately respond -- which clearly need to be done.

It is clear that that hospital, some sort of facility, needs to be put back in place. How that is done is something that we have to work out.

As I indicated earlier, the Executive Branch is considering an appropriate role for the Army Engineers in a number of these activities.

Q What about our people?

A Frankly, our focus has been on this immediate humanitarian relief and the restoration of the economy.

Q The Post this morning quotes somebody up on the Hill as saying that apparently we blew up the water system. Is that right?

A As I was saying a moment ago, you need to put the water system in sort of roughly two categories -- the urban system in the capital and in much of the rest of the country which doesn't have a water system as we know it. It's sort of rural systems with wells in the backyard and streams and that kind of thing. The urban system was damaged. Several different --

Q In the hostilities?

A It's a combination of deterioration and damage recently, and certainly the hostilities. There was some damage to the water system.

We're not quite sure just how much damage was directly related to hostilities, but clearly some of it was. You get questions -- you get lines being broken, and you get pump systems being either damaged or not working. It's a situation an we have to assess it in several different points in the system. But it's clear that the water system in some of the urban areas simply wasn't working, and that's why we brought in these tanks and several thousand collapsable water containers -- little five-gallon containers. And that water system has probably been one of the first things that we responded to because we had to provide potable water.

We're going to have to -- not us in A.I.D. but the U.S. Government would anticipate being involved in the repair and the restoration of that system into working order.

Q Mr. McPherson, did you tell us: Did the U.S. blow up the water system?

A I think I did, sir.

Q Well, I didn't hear it.

A Let me say it again then, sir.

Q I heard about deterioration of hostilities, but the question is: Did the U.S. do it?

A I said that the U.S. clearly -- in connection with the hostilities, the water system was damaged. To be honest, I don't know just how that damage occurred; but I assume that certainly part of that was done, as the U.S. came in, by the U.S.

Q Mr. McPherson, the 3.475 million that you are now committing -- is the thought in mind that this money will put Grenada back in the shape it was one month ago, or what?

A I think that what you have is -- it often happens in these kinds of activities. At least in the two and a half years I've been here, I've seen lots of it really. You get a situation where because of neglect or other kinds of reasons an infrastructure, an economy, deteriorates. And then there is a disaster, there's fighting or something. And that fighting, on top of the deterioration, makes the system seriously crumble.

In this case you had some destruction. You had deterioration, neglect. Then you had some of the fighting and destruction that occurred by the Grenadian Government in power at the time -- a couple of weeks ago when, for example, the police headquarters and the administrator buildings were burned down by the then existing government, apparently in anticipation fo wanting to destroy records. And then you had this fighting which caused quite a lot of destruction.

What happens, how you try to restore all that is a question that is difficult. You take care of all the deterioration prior to the fighting, and it's hard to divide where deterioration ends and the destruction from the fighting begins.

The most important thing to do is to try to get that economy viable again, operating again -- get that water in those lines running, get the communication system working -- and that's the kinds of activity that the whole U.S. Government needs to look at right now.

Over a longer period of time you need to think about how to make that economy stronger. The economy hadn't been very strong in the last couple of years. It was buoyed for a period of time by the construction of the airport. That meant quite a lot of work for the local people. But you've got to figure out how to increase agriculture production; you've got to figure out how to increase tourism.

I do not think that this three million dollars is going to totally right or put in tiptop shape the Grenadian economy.

Q Could I just follow that up then?

A Sure.

Q Then, as I understand it, the concept of allocating the money now is that this is only going to be the first year in a multiyear aid program.

A We don't really know, to be honest, just what we're going to do after the three million dollars. We have had, for the Eastern Caribbean in fiscal '83, about 50 million dollars; and we've had a fairly large program for the Eastern

Caribbean. Grenada hasn't been getting any of that. But it's clear that now Grenada is going to need some additional assistance, and we are thinking about how to do that longer term.

This three million dollars, I would expect, will be over the next few months, not for a full year. We'll be back to you with plans or more details.

Q Is it that 3,475 has been allocated, is that correct?

A That's correct, sir.

Q Now, as I listen to you, I see the developing scenario in which the United States is assuming for itself the obligation to get an awful lot of things going that have nothing to do with the hostilities. I'm a little puzzled by that. Under what ground rules do you suddenly begin talking about how it is a U.S. responsibility to help tourism grow in Grenada and the economy and how to rebuild an infrastructure that deterioriated in a way that has nothing to do with the U.S. involvement in Grenada?

I'm a little puzzled about that.

A We think that it's important that these countries have viable economies, that they have democracies. Democracies really generally flourish when there are viable economies. We think that the long-term development of the

Eastern Caribbean is important.

As I indicated a moment ago, in fiscal year '83 we will have spent about 50 million dollars in that part -- in the Eastern Caribbean. We, of course, have a very substantial economic development program in Jamaica. We have about a hundred million dollars in Jamaica. These -- the Congress and the Administration have felt for some time -- are important areas of the world that are fairly relatively poor, that need to have our help.

We don't think that it is our job to right the world. We think that, basically, countries have to help themselves. And I see our stimulating and assisting, in areas like agriculture, basically in a self-help kind of way. We think that people need to be helped to be put back on their feet so that they can earn their own money and run their own lives.

This country has some real advantages. Our Agency works all around the world, and I look at Grenada and I see some advantages that I don't see in places like Africa -- much of Africa -- 85 percent literacy, for example; a fairly low child mortality rate -- a number of advantages that they can build on. And it is not the U.S. coming in and doing it all for them. That won't work we don't think. It will be the U.S. doing some help.

Q Mr. McPherson, I understand that there is this whole question of deterioration. But I wonder if you could give us a better sense of what portion of this assistance is really to fix the things that were destroyed as a result of the American invasion.

A The first need is to make sure that we spend what needs to be done for relief kinds of work-- I mean, for example, the medicines -- that when you have a disaster that's the first thing you try to take care of.

Beyond that, I would expect that at least some money will be spent for reconstruction. But you also have the potential role of the Army Engineers -- I made reference to that --

Q Yes.

A -- and our role. And we need to work that out with the rest of the Government -- our role -- in other parts of this Government.

Certainly we will be in the immediate future focusing on reconstruction. The U.S. Government's effort will focus on reconstruction as opposed to rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is a massive job, and three million dollars basically addresses the immediate concerns.

But the reason it's a little confusing is: Suppose a pipe is broken because it rusted out last week as opposed to having been broken in connection with the fighting. I mean you distinguish as you repair one or the other. But certainly the immediate U.S. effort on infrastructure will focus on immediately needed repairs and not on some sort of long-term rehabilitation effort.

Do I make that distinction for you?

Q I take it from that then that really all of this money basically is to do immediate problems -- and most of which were created because of the hostilities.

A I don't think there's anything wrong with -- I'm not trying to dodge that question. I'm just saying that you can't distinguish very easily. Certainly a bunch of it will be in connection with the hostilities.

Q Sir, is any of this money going to what you consider official, quasi-official--or Government officials, Grenadian military or charitable organizations -- or who gets the money, who disburses the money?

A Sir, I don't see any military officials in Grenada getting any money of this. There are a number of quasi-governmental or charitable organizations that operate in Grenada that are really excellent instruments for distribution of relief and for rehabilitation of certain kinds, everything from orphanages to -- we work extensively, usually with churches, a lot of organizations like that.

Q Of the 50 million dollars that you mentioned in U.S. aid that went to Grenada --

A The what now?

Q The 50 million dollars in aid that went to the East Caribbean.

A The Eastern Caribbean, yes.

Q -- who decided that none would go to Grenada, and why?

A There were a couple of reasons, clearly. We felt uncomfortable with that was going on in Grenada somewhat politically. We looked at the airport and we were concerned about that. As you know, that was a widely expressed concern of the Administration and many in Congress; and we thought, frankly, that the Grenadians weren't doing the best thing for themselves in terms of using the resources they had to build their economy. The agriculture, for example, in Grenada has been going down steadily for several years. And I feel strongly -- and I make this point in programs all over the world -- that our money, to the extent that we politically and otherwise can, needs to go to those countries that are helping themselves. Otherwise your tax dollars don't do the job.

Q Whose decision was it?

A Within the Administration we made the decision.

And Congress was well aware, involved in those allocations. There was quite a discussion about it in some times past, but it was a decision I think widely recognized and understood. Some regional programs had some funding for Grenada, but even those begin to taper off.

Q You just said the airport was one of the things that was helping the economy --

A There's no question.

Q -- the construction of it.

A It was sort of a short-term infusion of cash in that sense.

Q Well, are we going to help them finish the airport?

A I don't envision us finishing the airport. I think we felt for some time the airport, as it was originally, served the economic interest of that economy.

Q But you mentioned tourism. Didn't the Bishop regime say that the airport would accommodate direct flights from here?

A The problem isn't so much the facility of the airport per se. It is the lack of direct flights; it's the lack of accommodations.

Two years ago, for example, one of the major hotels -- the Holiday Inn -- burned down and hasn't been replaced.

You have only a few hundred beds of hotel rooms in the island. You get to Grenada by way of going to Barbados or Trinidad and then going over.

Those are the kinds of problems that you have.

Q Well, wasn't the airport aimed at remedying that so that you can have direct flights from --

A Direct flights wasn't a critical part of encouraging tourism. (Laughter.)

Q I have a couple of questions. First of all --

A I think it's generally recognized it wasn't a critical part of encouraging tourism.

Q I have two questions, if I may. What type of agricultural assistance are you talking about? Are you talking about commodity exports to them or are you talking about helping them improve their own productive capabilities?

A Improving their own productive capabilities. This economy still has 25 percent of the GNP as agriculture production, and 35 percent of the people are employed with agriculture.

Q Do they export it?

A Yes, they do. They export bananas almost entirely to Great Britain. Their largest export is cocoa. And, of course, what Americans have heard the most about Grenada is the export of nutmeg.

Incidentally, a short time ago the Grenadians entered into an agreement to sell most of their nutmeg to the Soviet Union. The nutmeg, the bananas and the cocoa each have problems. I won't burden you with all this -- at least, not much more -- but the bananas, for example, had some disease problems that stem, at least in part, from a lack of care of the banana plants and so forth. That kind of thing needs to be addressed.

Q Are we sending them technological help?

A Sure. We've done a lot of this around the world, and we think at least some of this production can be improved. It takes about three years for a cocoa tree to come to production. There have been some disease problems with some older trees -- that kind of thing. The cocoa production has fallen in the last few years.

It is a question of technology and management, we suspect.

That's a longer-term thing; that isn't something we do in the next two or three months. That's a fairly involved process.

Q Could we ask one other question? You mentioned, let's say, the Holiday Inn had been burned down and things. Do you perceive our longer-term assistance being in the form of grants or things like credit guarantees through Ex-Im

Bank or something where it provides American business with ways to invest with Government protection or Government assistance?

A I would see both. I think that some of the grant work for some of the technology is important. At the same time, we have found that one of the more important things to have available is hard currency so that the local business people have a means to import. We've done a lot of this until the present.

Q Isn't there a local business council there?

A Oh, yes.

Q Is there a business group there?

A Yes, there certainly is -- numbers of them, several.

Q Let me go to the question of the money. The four seventy-five was granted immediately, and is it as of today that the additional three million is being granted?

A Yes, that's correct; that's correct.

Q Now, on the 50 million --

A With the plans evolving and being put in place.

Q I just wanted to get the timing on that.

A Yes.

Q Now, with the 50 million dollars for the

Eastern Caribbean states that you alluded to, what is the largest single sum going to any country? I wanted to compare that to the Grenadan allocation.

A Bernie, let me get those figures for you.

Q On your three million, do you have the money now in a contingency fund or do you have to get permission from Congress?

A To the extent it's spent on disaster purposes as defined, we have that right now. To the extent it's spent on nondisaster purposes, we will need to ask Congress -- not to go through the whole process but to notify it and go through that kind of operation.

Q So what part of that do you have to ask for?

A We've got to decide, really. Certainly I would expect that most of it would be disaster assistance --

Q One more.

A -- and I anticipate no problem with the whole three million.

Q You said that it is envisioned that the Army Corps of Engineers might be called into the mechanism.

A As I said, the idea of the Army Engineers having a role is under consideration --

Q Right.

A -- in the Executive Branch.

Q This presumably would be men in uniform.

A I really don't want to respond for the Army Engineers.

Q Well, the reason I ask is that the Commonwealth peacekeeping force has made a condition of their coming in --

A Yes.

Q -- that the American military pull out. Wouldn't that be in contradiction?

A I really need to leave questions like that for someone else to answer.

Q Well, do you need Congress' permission to send the Corps of Engineers down there or can the President do that on his own authority?

A I'm not in a position those. I mean I --

Q Do you know the answer or do you --

A I think that someone else better respond to that. I find that if I start talking about their business it isn't productive for anybody. But, again, the idea of the Army Engineers playing a role is under consideration and I'm not announcing any decision in this connection.

Q There are reports that Paul Scoon, the Governor General, may come up here to talk about these and other issues. Do you know anything about that?

A I do not.

Q By the way, sir, is there a plan to finish

finish the airport?

A No.

Q It's just going to be left as is? (Laughter.)

A I have no knowledge of any plan to finish the airport.

Q Is the Administration's idea to make Grenada a model Caribbean state?

A We've worked pretty extensively with several of the islands there and we think that each of these countries need to make economic progress, and we will work with them to that end.

Q Is Grenada being selected as one that is coming for a sort of mini-Marshall Plan though? (Laughter.)

A There is no determination on such an idea, but the facts are that you've got a per capita income of $850 per person --

Q Eight hundred and fifty?

A -- not desparately poor by, let's say, Africa's standards -- or like the President of Bangladesh was here last week with a hundred and twenty per capita income -- but still relatively poor when you look at our income -- which is, what? -- nine thousand, or something like that.

The point is that these people are still relatively poor and we're anxious to work with them closely to help them help themselves. It's not some sort of massive dole operation. On the contrary, it's a self-help approach.

Let me take one more question and then over here -- two more -- and then I really need to leave you.

Q Was there ever any funding ever allocated to Grenada before this invasion?

A We had not allocated funding to Grenada.

Q How much are ultimately talking about? You're saying that three million is just in the short term.

A We need to work it through. I mean we have people there, have had people there since Thursday. I am not announcing some large program today; I'm saying we've got these immediate problems and we are working on them -- and so far, we think, successfully. But there are some other things that obviously need to be done.

I thank you very much for your time.

Q Thank you.

A Right.

(Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the special ON THE RECORD briefing was concluded.)

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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SECSTATE FOR ARA/SC, MORLEY, DELOUHY
ASUNCION FOR DERWINSKY

EO 12356: NA
MEDIA REACTION

FOLLOWINGIS TRANSCRIPT OF DERWINSKY PRESS CONFERENCE AT SANTIAGO AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE FROM CHILE NOVEMBER 3.
Q. WHAT CONCLUSION HAVE YOU DRAWN AS A RESULT OF YOUR VISIT?
A. WELL, THE WORLD DOESN'T STOP TURNING AFTER A SHORT VISIT LIKE MINE SO THAT ONE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANYTHING AFTER SUCH A SHORT VISIT. BUT I HAD AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO PEOPLE OF ALL DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW. EVERYBODY WAS FRANK. I WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH MR JARPA AS A PRAGMATIC POLITICAL OFFICIAL AND MY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO GO BACK HOME AND REPORT TO MY GOVERNMENT MY OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND, IN TURN, WHILE HERE TO RE-EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT EVEN WHEN THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF OPINIOM THE UNITED STATES RESPECTS CHILE AND WE WANT TO KEEP A LONG STANDING FRIENDSHIP.
Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THE CHILEAN POLITICAL PROCESS?
A. I AM NOT THE EXPERT BUT THE PROCESS TOWWRD DEMOCRACY EVERYBODY TELLS ME IS INEVITABLE IT IS A MATTER OF WHEN AND HOW ALLTHEPIECES FALL INTO PLACE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE PROCESS IS THERE .
Q. IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YOUR PREVIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF CHILEAN REALITY AND WHAT YOU HAVE LEARNED ON THIS TRIP?
A. I THINK THE REALITY OF VERY COUNTRY LIES IN THE INTERNAL POLITICS AND AN OUTSIDER CANNOT COMPLETELY GRASP THE REALITY OF ANY COUNTRY. BUT YOU HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY AND YOU HAVE AN OBVIOUSLY ENERGETIC GROUP OF PEOPLE INTERESTED IN POLITICS.
Q. WHAT DIFFICULTIES DO YO SEE IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND CHILE?
A. I THINK THEOBVIOUS DIFFICULTY, I WOULD NOT SO MUCH CALL IT A DIFFICULTY, AS AN HONEST DIFFERENCE OF OPINION, IS THAT IN THE US OUR DEMOCRACY HAS NEVER FAILED US. IT IS HARD FOR US TO APPRECIATE HOW THE SYSTEM GOES AWRY ELSEWHERE.
Q. COULD THE LAST DECLARATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SIGNIFY THAT SILENT DIPLOMACY OF PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS BEEN DISCARDED?
A. NO, SILENT DIPLOMACY IS SOMETHING WE PREFER. I THINK WHAT HEPPENED, IS THAT YOU ARE REFERRRING TO AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT MADE BY OUR SPOKESMAN IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE PRESS--AND YOU ALL KNOW HOW THE PRESS CAN ASK DIFFICULT QUESTIONS.
Q. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT RETAINING THE PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD UNTIL 1989?
A. THAT IS AN INTERNAL DECISION FOR CHILE.
FRIEDMANN

EOT

The White House

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 3, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE
GEORGE SHULTZ
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP
TO THE FAR EAST

Room 450
Old Executive Office Building

3:37 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: We are pleased to have the Secretary of State. I want to remind you that this briefing is on camera, on the record, and on the President's trip to Asia only.

Q We didn't hear the rules.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You didn't hear the rules, but I'll enforce them.

Any questions?

Q Yes. What is this trip all about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The trip is about Japan and Korea, and it is about Asia. I think it is worthwhile to recognize how important Asia is to us, and in a way that fact is illustrated and symbolized by the fact that the President of the United States will be traveling to Asia twice within about a five-month period.

So the trip is part of a process of our strong, very significant and developing relationships with various countries in Asia, a very important part of that process. So that is what the trip is about.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the security issues now will take precedence over the trade and economic issues because of Rangoon and because of KAL 007?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are important security issues in our relationship with both Japan and Korea. They certainly have been underlined by the Korea Airline massacre and by the Rangoon atrocity. And obviously those security matters will be discussed; economic matters will be discussed. I might say there are a tremendous number of important subjects around the world on which we have strong mutual interests with both countries. Just to take an example, without trying to hold it out as the most important, but just as an example, the relationship of the flow of oil supplies to the Iran-Iraq war concentrates our attention and concentrates the Japanese attention on that subject. I am sure that is one among many international subjects that the President will be discussing. That is just an illustration.

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Q How much emphasis, if any, will be given to human rights issues in the Korean discussion? What would you look for in that area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the approach the President has and the Administration has to these issues is basically to discuss them privately. So that is where they will remain. And I am sure that it will be discussed.

There has been a fair amount of progress in Korea over the last two or three years. So I think the picture is a promising one.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate this trip will help encourage the Japanese to take more of a role in their own security and the security, the joint security of the Far East?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They have set out certain objectives and a mission, you might say, for themselves. And we agree with what they have set out for themselves involving their own self-defense and the defense of the sea lanes around Japan. And we encourage them to develop the capacity to fulfill that mission. So that is an important thing as they see it, and we agree.

Obviously security problems are dramatized, not only by the events in the earlier questions, but such things as the very large deployments of SS-20's in Asia. And everybody is noticing that more and more.

Q To move to the question of the President's personal security, how seriously can we take North Korean threats against the President, and how sure are we at this point that the North Koreans were responsible for the bombing in Rangoon?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as threats to the President by North Korea, obviously we know about them. The President's security will be attended to by us and by our Korean hosts. Unfortunately in this day and age whenever a President travels security considerations have to be kept in mind, whether it is to Korea, or for that matter, whether it is to Augusta, Georgia. It seems to be part of life.

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So those considerations will be in mind.

As far as Rangoon is concerned, I don't have anything to add to what has already been said. But, basically, we await word from the Burmese and, as it has been noted, there's a lot of circumstantial evidence pointing at North Korea, but we'll await the Burmese word on what they finally determine as a result of their very thorough investigation.

Q Mr. Secretary, will the three countries that were cut from the trip earlier, will they be added to the President's trip to Asia in April?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't have any answer to that. The April trip is just in the early stages of being planned and we'll just have to see. I think that with the hindsight that we have right now and the tremendous amount of work with the Congress that has been going on here, we can see how wise it was to keep this trip much shorter than was originally planned. It was too long a trip as it was planned given the Congressional activity here. So the trip to Japan and Korea is kept down to a minimum number of days. It will be not quite a week, as it is now being planned, and that consideration will have to be kept in mind on future trips, as well.

Q Would the President still have gone if there had -- if the Grenadian invasion had been still going on and there were still -- it had not reached a cessation of hostilities?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the fact is that the rescue in Grenada has been completed and -- (Laughter.) See, I told you I was going to enforce the rules.

Q A rose by any other name.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I told you I was going to enforce the rules. It's basically completed. The military part of the mission has been accomplished. The Grenadians and the East Caribbean forces and political efforts are coming very much to the fore and we will be moving on to other things, in particular, Japan and Korea.

Q Well, would he have gone if it was still --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know what the point is of struggling with that question.

Q I'm not struggling with it. Could he have left the country --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You are struggling with it but I'm not.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you enumerate some of the positive steps that you said South Korea has taken in the last couple of years in the area of human rights?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think, in particular, there have been quite a large number of political prisoners released and the freedom of people whose views are different from the government's views is greater. I think those are two examples.

Q Mr. Secretary, is the President planning to meet with any opposite -- members of the opposition or dissidents in South Korea during his trip there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he'll have a series of events and -- don't you have a schedule? Oh, you just got the schedule. Well, you'll see the events and I don't know how to characterize them, but he will be seeing people from a broad spectrum of the Korean political and economic community and security community.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that Japan -- that we agreed with Japan's objectives, security objectives, their broader objectives, but their proposed budget, which goes into effect, I think, in March, is for a 6.8 percent increase, which is not large enough to meet those objectives. So the question is, will the President either privately or publicly make any inference that they have to do more, and what is the effect of the December elections in Japan on the security commitment?

SECRETARY SCHULTZ: We will be discussing our agreement with the mission that they have set out and our feeling that, obviously, they want to take the steps necessary to be able to carry the mission out and that's what they say, that's what we say. How rapidly you're able to get to an objective you have is always an issue. The Japanese are going about it in, I think, a positive way, but I'm sure the subject will be discussed.

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Q Because of the elections and Nakasone's vulnerabilities, will the President have to be more cautious about raising some of these issues?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I don't want to make any comment about the internal Japanese political situation. Prime Minister Nakasone is the -- he's the prime minister, where -- this will be the fourth time this year, incidentally, the President will have met with Prime Minister Nakasone. It's an ongoing process and relationship, and we are there to talk about substantive matters of great interest, and I might say, almost a sense of partnership in many respects with the government of Japan, and that's the object of trip.

The Japanese politics is a different issue entirely and that's a strictly Japanese set of issues, and we have no comment to make on them.

Q How much discussion do you expect there will be of trade and economic issues and, specifically, issues like the yen-dollar relationship, which have been a problem?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There undoubtedly will be considerable attention devoted to economic issues. It's very important to the Japanese and it's very important to us. The yen-dollar relationship is, I think, a very significant aspect of this and, in particular, the relationship of the present relative values to large-scale capital movements. I think, as sort of the heart of the problem analytically, and therefore at the heart of the problem operationally. So, somehow, actions in the area of capital markets and capital flows and openness in capital markets I'm sure will come in for a lot of discussion. It's a very important set of points. But it is not sort of unique that there'll be a discussion here. This is an ongoing matter and the Treasury and Japanese Finance Ministry have had lots of discussions about this and am sure will continue to do so. The subject has gotten a lot of attention in the U.S.-Japanese Advisory Committee -- this high-level private group that's been appointed by the Prime Minister and the President.

That group has made a report to the President and the Prime Minister, and so we have some input from the private sector there. David Packard, as you know, is the U.S. chairman.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you give us some reading on what the speeches the President will give to the Diet and National Assembly -- what the theme will be or what he hopes to accomplish --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's a great privilege, of course, to be invited to speak to the Diet or National Assembly -- the congress of another country -- and the President views it that way and he will be expressing the United States' view of the relationship and our views of the world situation generally. But, as for previewing the speech, I think we'll wait till we get a little closer to it in any detail.

There was a follow-up question over here --

Q Now that the Japanese have agreed -- or at least we've agreed to allow them to increase their quota of imports on foreign cars, are we going to go to Japan and demand that they open their markets up to more U.S. exports?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there has been a long dialogue between Japan and the United States about opening Japanese markets to our products. And there have been a lot of steps taken, and we believe that there are a lot more steps that should be taken. And, as I said, this is all part of a process -- it's a continuing process.

As far as the auto restraints are concerned, of course those are voluntary restraints undertaken by the Japanese. It's not any quota imposed by the United States. They're voluntary restraints by the Japanese, and that's a restraint of flows into our market and not anything to do with their market as such.

Q But is there going to be any reciprocal demand by the President?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President will be discussing these economic issues with the Prime Minister, I'm sure. But he is not inclined to use inflammatory language like you used. (Laughter.)

Q To follow up on this then, in the public remarks that President Reagan makes -- is he likely to be as blunt about the Soviets -- is it appropriate for him -- to be as blunt about the Soviets as, for instance, he was in remarks today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think you'll have to wait and see what he says and then you can -- you can draw your conclusions. But he will give a good strong speech, and he'll express his views, and in a manner appropriate for the occasion in another country.

Q In your remarks a few minutes ago, were you confirming that the President, in Korea, will meet with political opponents of the regime?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I was just calling attention to the schedule -- and you can look at the schedule -- the President doesn't go out of his way to meet with this, that, or the other group, but he is wanting to meet with a broad spectrum, in each country, of participants in the economic

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life of the country and the security life of the country. And you'll be able to see that by looking at the schedule.

Q The only thing on the schedule is the community leaders. Everything else is either the Assembly or the DMZ.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it'll get developed more. And you'll be able to see who the guest list is and so on.

Q I guess that's a yes, then. The answer to the question is yes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have answered it to the extent that I'm going to.

Q Mr. Secretary, even with the beefed up security, with the philosophy that threats and terrorism are a fact of life, isn't it still fairly risky for the President to go up to the DMZ?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. We don't think so.

Q Why not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, because there will be adequate security.

Q You said that there were a number of steps that you'd still like to see the Japanese government do in terms of opening up their markets more. Could you mention some of those steps and in particular, if the yen-dollar problem is as severe as you and other government officials have said, what would you like the Japanese to do, specifically?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: My opinion is that the particular areas to work on on the yen-dollar are capital market measures. And there is a great, extensive list of possibilities that have been developed to some extent in the Treasury and to some extent out of discussions between our Treasury and the Japanese Finance Ministry and, also, that have been suggested to us by various private groups in this country. The U.S.-Japan Advisory Committee has weighed in on the subject. So there are a great many ideas that are around. And the subject is in the process of being identified as very important. And things to be done about it are getting identified. And I think, as we go on here, we'll start to see things happen more and more in this area.

As far as specifics are concerned, I think you can dig out long lists of things we care about, involving various commodities and types of manufactured goods and so forth. And I don't need to just go through that list.

Q Do you intend, sir, to have a separate series of talks in your capacity as Secretary of State during this visit? Or will all your time in support of the Presidential discussions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I look forward to having a private session, myself, with respective Foreign Ministers and, perhaps, with others. But, basically, I'm there to support the President and take part in the meetings that he will be having.

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MR. SPEAKES: Your staff says, "One more question -- to keep you on time."

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Where'd you come from? (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: (Laughter.) I just appeared.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Laughter.) Gee, you were late.

One more question, the man says.

You pick the questioner.

MR. SPEAKES: Why don't we go right here.

Q Do you expect any major agreements on trade, aid, or security at either stop? Or is this not going to result in any specifics -- this trip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The trip is not designed to be an agreement-signing trip, so that you go out and then you come back with alot of prearranged accomplishments of one kind or another. I think the way to conceive of it is a little different: that there is a process involved in these relationships that's very strong and ongoing. Alot is being accomplished as we go along. We look forward to alot of accomplishments subsequently. The trip is an important part of the process. Many matters, broad and narrow, will be discussed. Clearly, as is always the case on any trip, it concentrates attention on certain subjects. And things get worked out in anticipation. A little bit of that is going on.

But, basically, I think the way to view it is not in terms of some particular agreement that may be reached, but rather as a very significant part of an extremely important process that should bring home to all of us the tremendous importance to the United States of our relationships with these two countries and, also, our relationships with Asia much more generally.

MR. SPEAKES: And before you leave, let me acquaint you with a couple of things concerning the trip. First of all, you have your schedule. The other thing is, this briefing today was the culmination of a series of briefings we've had available to you, probably more extensive briefing for the press than we've ever done in preparation for a trip.

In addition, we'll have a cadre of people with us that I think can be helpful to you throughout the trip. They include Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, who is with us and will be handling a good many of the reporting sessions to you following the bilateral meetings. Secretary Shultz will be with you at the conclusion of each major meeting in a country.

Q Why is the Treasury Secretary not going on this trip?

MR. SPEAKES: Pardon?

Q With all these economic matters at stake, the Treasury Secretary is not traveling --

MR. SPEAKES: I think the Deputy Secretary is going. Tim McNamar is going.

Q Can you explain why -- We've never had a foreign trip before --

MR. SPEAKES: Yes.

Q -- where the Treasury Secretary has not been involved.

MR. SPEAKES: I think the Secretary of State and the President are both well up to speed on these subjects and they will have the support of the Treasury officials.

Q Is there any tension between Shultz and Regan over --

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q -- the deficit issue or other --

MR. SPEAKES: No.

Q -- or exchange rate issue?

MR. SPEAKES: We've been in a series of meetings all week on it and will be through Monday and there's no tension.

Also, we have, in addition, with us will be Gaston Sigur of the NSC staff who is well versed in Japanese matters and has some very personal relationships and long-standing relationships with Japanese and Bill Martin of the NSC staff is very knowledgeable and he will be available to us. Also, Rob Nevitt, who is with us today, has been handling our public affairs aspects of this trip really for about the past six weeks. So he, too, is well versed.

All these people will be available to you on call. In addition, as you know, we're in a transition, as far as our foreign policy person in the Press Office, Bob Sims will remain behind to finish his transition to our office and Marlin Fitzwater will be in that slot on the trip and I think you'll find Marlin well up to speed. And if you have questions on the trip that you can't get answers for, he can go to this cadre of people which we can produce for you.

Anything else we need to do?

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Q Is the schedule of the events pretty much the same, or precisely the same, in timing as on the guidance schedule that we got previously?

MR. SPEAKES: This is the current one.

Q That doesn't have the time. We got one with times on them.

MR. SPEAKES: I believe so. Yes, I believe generally they are. Everything's about upside down.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 3:58 P.M. EST

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
STATE DEPARTMENT

ON
RECENT U.S. VISIT TO ISRAEL

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

- - -

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. We are ON BACKGROUND, which means you may attribute this to a Senior State Department official.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The only reason I do these things is so I get called a senior official once in a while. (Laughter)

I understand there has been a massive upswelling of desire for a BACKGROUND briefing on my colleague's trip to Israel. Let me just kind of run through quickly what we did, and then take questions.

Sometime ago -- I think at about January of this year -- the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shamir agreed that the Israelis and the United States, in the person of David Kimche and Lawrence Eagleburger ought to get together about twice a year to sort of talk about the rest of the world other than the immediate issues of the Middle East, and begin to exchange views and information on other areas. We had our first meeting, I think it was, March or April of this year.

Originally, the trip that my colleague and myself took last week was scheduled as the second round of those discussions, and indeed David Kimche, his associates, my associates and I did discuss, while we were there last week, a number of subjects. We spent a lot of time talking about the Soviet Union, both in terms of what we thought was going on internally and general questions of Soviet foreign policy. We talked a bit about Central America. Believe it or not, we talked about the Pacific Basin, and a fair amount about Africa where the Israelis are particularly interested in the possibilities of recognition on the part of some African states.

We talked about Afghanistan a bit. So we did in the course of this last week carry forward on the original purposes of the visit. But in addition, and in consideration, obviously, of immediate questions, we spent a fair amount of time talking about Lebanon and Syria, and fairly specifically about our views on the Soviet role in the Middle East, and in that regard, for example, the Israelis wanted our judgment on whether, should the INF negotiations this fall fail, was there any likelihood that one of the Soviet responses to U.S. deployment would be an escallation of problems in the Middle East.

We spent a bit of time talking about the Iran-Iraq war. I talked a bit about U.S. relations with Arab states, and we also talked a fair amount about Grenada, where I might say that the Israelis, unlike some others, demonstrated a good bit of understanding of the reasons for the President's decision to go into

Grenada, and equally unlike some others, demonstrated a substantial understanding of the strategic importance of what we found on the Island.

While I was there, I delivered an invitation from the President to the Prime Minister to visit the United States, and indicated to him that our President, our Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense wanted to have a wide-ranging discussion with the Israelis on the whole gamut of our bilateral relationship as well as a careful examination with them of international questions of interest to both of us.

I told the Prime Minister that the President had decided that we would permit the use of FMS funds for research and development efforts on the LEVI aircraft in the United States.

I would have to assume that some of the issues -- well, in fact we indicated that some of the issues we would want to talk about when the Israelis come to the United States would be, obviously, Lebanon and Syria; security assistance and economic assistance and the future of those two programs; the question of strategic cooperation -- all of which, by the way, these same issues are issues which my colleague and I discussed while we were there, and the peace process.

A couple of impressions, and then I will shut up and take questions. I think there is no doubt that we both, my colleague and myself, saw or found a growing concern in Israel over the situation in Lebanon, and indeed a growing concern over Syrian purposes. As one Israeli with whom I spoke described it, the pendulum in Israel has swung from exaggerated expectations of what might be possible in Lebanon to the other extreme of great disillusion about Lebanon, and that pendulum is now on its way back to a more balanced position with regard to Lebanon, and at the same time, a greater awareness, if I may put it that way, in Israel of the problems they face with Damascus.

We found as well great emphasis on the importance of the Lebanese-Israeli Agreement and the importance of maintaining that agreement, an issue on which I think I was able to reassure them.

We talked a fair amount about the state of the Israeli economy, and there I think the impression I came away with was that while they all recognized there were very serious problems they had ahead of them, they all at the same time, seemed relatively confident that they were going to be able to manage those problems.

Finally, I think my colleague and I came away with a pretty good feeling now about the state of the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United States. They, the Israelis, are generally confident about our purposes with regard to Israel, and I think they recognize that not only are we interested in maintaining a close relationship, we are equally interested in strengthening it.

With that, I'd be glad to take your questions, and if they are tough, my colleague will answer them. (Laughter)

Q Can you tell us more about this "strategic cooperation." What, specifically, does it amount to?

A Well, what it will amount to, or does amount to, will depend a great deal on further discussions with the Israelis. I did not try to define it here. I wouldn't want to try to define it now other than to say that it is a question of working out with the Israelis -- For instance, I think a part of strategic cooperation is the sort of thing that David Kimche and I are engaged in, which is trying to take a look at the world as a whole. That is by no means all of it. But it is -- We start on the basis of looking at our common interests on a global, strategic basis. How then, that cooperation is based on a better understanding of where we agree, how we agree, how that cooperation translates itself into specific agreement at this point, I can't predict. I'm not trying to be cute with you. I'm simply saying, there's a lot more discussion that needs to go on before we can define it much more precisely; but suffice it to say at this point, that we have indicated to the Israelis that we are interested in the subject and we want to pursue it.

Q Sir, can you just touch for a minute on the tow mentions of the Soviet Union here that you alluded to, one, I think you said that you said that you had discussed what is going on internally in the Soviet Union, and the other possibility that should the INF talks not succeed, that there might be some Soviet threat of some kind, of build-up or what have you.

Could you touch on both of those in a little more detail?

A Yes. Don't take what I said as being exclusive. One of the things that both we and the Israelis have wanted to do for some time, and began last Spring, is a much closer, common examination of what we know about the Soviet Union; our estimates of where it is going; our judgments on Soviet activities around the world.

Obviously, the Israelis are most concerned with, and have the most to offer, I suppose I should say, in terms of their judgment of the Soviets in the Middle East. But what we've been doing in both of these discussions is an in-depth examination on both sides: for example, "What does Mr. Andropov's cold mean?" I don't mean that we discussed his cold, because at the point we were there, we weren't sure what his problem was. But the question of internal order and "Who's on top?" and "Who's in charge in the Soviet Union" -- we've talked about that, and we've talked a lot about Soviet purposes in various parts of the world. It's, basically, a kind of exchange of views and an exchange of information on the Soviets.

They raised the question of the INF issue very much in terms of trying to get some sense from me of what we thought might be Soviet responses to a failed negotiation, should that happen, and we should proceed to deploy our INF weapons in Western Europe. So they were interested in, did we think that one of the areas in which they might run into further trouble would be a Soviet reaction in the Middle East? We talked about that.

Q What's the answer? (Chorus)

A I'd much rather tell you what we discussed than what, in specific terms, was said. In this particular case, since it won't astonish anyone, I said myself -- and it was a personal reaction -- that while I supposed it was possible that we would see an increase in Soviet activity in the Middle East, I myself doubted it, and thought that we would find Soviet responses more likely to occur in areas closer to the immediate problem, namely Western Europe.

Q But, on the first issue, what prompted --

A But let me make it clear: I also said I was just taking an estimate of it. None of us were certain.

Q What prompted you to raise the issue of internal order before Mr. Andropov had his cold, because you had these talks rior, I understand.

A Well, there has been a certain amount of doubt which I, at least, had been prepared to talk about for some time, about the degree to which Mr. Andropov was in charge. I certainly think that the aftermath of the Korean Airline shootdown has tended to make me think I was right. So there were a fair number of reasons for wanting to discuss this.

Q With the military taking a larger role or --

A I think so, but we're off the subject.

Q Back on the subject --

A I'll be right with you.

Q Taking into account the fact, as you say, that these areas of strategic cooperation are still under discussion, does your discussion include the sort of things that were in the Memorandum of Understanding like joint maneuvers, pre-positioning?

A The M.O.U. itself, by the way, never came up in our discussions. It was not discussed; it wasn't even raised.

Without answering your question specifically, let me leave it this way, that I would not, at this point, want to exclude the possibility of the discussion of anything falling under that rubric.

Q On the security assistance and economic assistance, you're aware that there has been a good deal of reporting in this country, and in Israel, that what you're offering is to make everything grant, rather than a loan.

Can you tell us if discussions got into that sort of detail? And whether those were the details discussed?

A Yes, we got into that sort of detail, not that they were exquisitely detailed discussions; but, yes, we talked about the question of loan and grant and amounts and so forth. It is a subject that we haven't closed out.

I would assume that -- that's what I indicated -- I think it would be a subject that would be discussed again when they come here. No decision.

Q To follow that, would you expect that when Prime Minister Shamir does come here that then it would be closed out, or do you need another round of professional discussions?

A Well, obviously, in the last analysis, it's closed out when Congress comes to grips with it; but in terms of an Administration opinion, an Administration position, yes, I would suppose it would be. I can't promise it, but that's my guess on it.

Q Is there within the U.S. Government now a common definition of "strategic cooperation" with Israel? And is it regarded throughout the government that it's a desirable thing?

A I would say that there is general understanding within the U.S. Government on what it would mean, but again, obviously subject to further discussions with the Israelis, because it's not an open-and-closed issue, and it is one we will want to talk to the Israelis about. And insofar as whether it would be totally supported within this government, when the President makes up his mind, that will be the end of the discussion.

(Continued on page 11.)

Q Sir, a question about what Israel now faces. It seems that over the years they faced an array of hostile forces which, I suppose, in some respects, was good, that if these people who were inimical to Israel were divided, that that was, in a way, a plus.

Now it looks like the PLO is sort of going down the tubes.

How does Israel now confront the situation? Is this more dangerous with just Syria, or less, or doesn't it matter what happened to the PLO?

A Well, what is happening to Mr. Arafat -- and I don't want to speak for the Israelis, but I will now tell you the kind of impression I came away with.

I suppose the Israeli answer to that would be that what happens to Mr. Arafat is not necessarily the end of the PLO, and that their view is that the movement, as such, is a serious problem for them.

I am not at all sure that they would view it as less serious if it were totally under the dominance of the Syrians. We didn't get into a great deal of detail on the discussion there, other than I certainly came away with an impression that they felt that despite what was going on in and around Tripoli, there was and would continue to be for them a Palestinian problem.

Whether the whole thing is now more dangerous for them or not, I don't know. We didn't really talk about that other than, again, they made it very clear to us that they recognized that the situation in Lebanon was one on which some discussion between the two of us was worthwhile, an exchange of views, an exchange of a sense of how it should be dealt with, and they made it very clear to us that they were becoming increasingly concerned about Syria. But more or less dangerous, I don't know.

Q You mentioned concerns about Syria earlier. What are the concerns about Syria that you and Israel discussed this trip?

A Increasing strength of its military. Obviously --

Q In Lebanon or -- ?

A In general. Obviously the reports of additional missile deliveries; the question of the SAM's; the general state of the hard line that the Syrians are taking, were taking, both in Lebanon and during the Geneva negotiations, and their general statements about Israel.

Again, sort of in a very broad way, we didn't get into any terribly specific issues, but it was clear, as I say, that they were becoming increasingly concerned about Syria.

Q Sir, a follow-up on the previous two questions, based on what you learned from the Israelis, and based on what you know from what our government knows, what is your assessment today of what is happening with the Syrians, vis-a-vis the threats they have made about possible use of missiles against the Marines, and how do you see it now?

A Is it missiles or rockets? The reports I have seen -- there is a difference -- talk about rockets. I can't judge whether those reports are correct or not. We have seen some reports.

Let me put the answer to your question this way sort of as a consequence of the talks with the Israelis, and that is -- and I think I would share this myself -- an increasingly hard line from the Syrians; very little indication that they are seriously seeking a reasonable solution in Lebanon, and this is, very much, I think, a fair way to describe the Israeli attitude -- great uncertainty as to the consequences of continuing, what they view as the continuing build-up in Syria, very much of it Soviet-backed, as to how that will affect Syria's conduct over the course of the next year or so.

Q Is there any discussion of possibility of joint Israeli/American military planning in Lebanon?

A No.

Q There was a plan that the State Department officials did not want to discuss while you were away -- I am sure you know what I am talking about -- which the Israelis are supposed to have vetoed with the Congress, and it is dead as of now. Was that subject a topic of conversation, and what can you tell us about it?

A What makes you think I can discuss it if my betters couldn't last week?

Let me simply say that with regard to any discussion of such programs that I can't go into the specifics but if you will look back at what I said when I began, you will note that I did indicate that I had discussed U.S. relations with Arab states.

Q Since your answer was so short to me, let me ask you something else. Was the topic of the broader peace in the Middle East --

A If I answer these questions longer, does that mean I only get one?

Q No, I mean the broader peace and the issue of the settlements, the peace plan that is under President Reagan's plan, and the settlements which the President called as an obstruction to.

A The President's peace initiative of September 1st was discussed, and I made it clear in those discussions that it continued to be our policy, and that we had not in any way backed away from that statement of the President's.

The issue of settlements was also discussed.

Q Can you spell out more specifically where the United States sees eye-to-eye with Israel on Lebanon and Syria's rule, and where you do not agree? For example, as far as the Geneva talks are concerned, we know the U.S. position there. You are interested in having national reconciliation, having all the parties come together, and so forth, but you disagree about the abrogation of the May 17th agreement.

A That is not true. We don't disagree with the Israelis on that.

Q Can you spell it out for us in more specific terms --

A No, I can't.

Q -- on these issues to prevent speculation, if anything.

A Well, I will have to let you speculate. I don't want to get into a long description of my understanding of our view of Lebanon and the Israeli view.

As I indicated, in the discussions which I hope will take place here soon, that is an issue that will be pursued in a great deal of detail further, but I do want to make one thing perfectly clear -- as a fellow in Washington used to say -- and that is that the U.S. stands by the Lebanese/Israeli agreement. We support it. We do not, in any way, walk away from it, and that is not an area of disagreement between us and the Israelis, who also take the same position.

Q Will you continue to --

A Excuse me, one second. I will come back to you.

Q Is that then a point of divergence between you and President Gemayel if he is thinking of finding an alternative for that agreement?

A President Gemayel at this point, as I understand it, so far continues to stand by that agreement. Were he to take a different position, it would be a difference of view between us and the President.

Q Did you see any indications, if you are sticking with the Israeli/Lebanese agreement, as you said, and you supported and protected, did you find any indication that you could really deal with the Israelis to sweeten or possibly reduce their objection to the September 1st initiative of President Reagan, that you want also to stick with it?

A The best I could tell you there, I guess, would be that in our discussions on that subject, we reiterated our position and they reiterated theirs, and we didn't get into a long debate on it, so I can't really make a judgment.

Q There was no convergence of opinion on that.

A We were where we were -- when we left, we were in the same position we were when I got there.

Q Do you have the date of the Shamir visit?

A I don't have a specific date yet. My understanding -- but don't hold me to this because it has still not been decided -- is it would be probably sometime this month, but that is not certain. There has been no decision yet.

Q Could I ask, quite a few people around Washington believe that it was a fundamental error on our part to encouage the Lebanese to make an agreement with the Israelis without reference to Syria, and that at this time it might be worthwhile to persuade the Israelis to have some kind of addition or modification of the old treaty, without throwing it away, that would bring the Syrians in.

A I made no such suggestion at all.

Q You made none.

A No, and what I am saying by that is that on my trip, I made it clear we stood by the agreement as it now stands, and that is our position and that is what I think.

Q During the time you were out there there was a good deal of perhaps unscientifically based speculation that strategic cooperation mean that we wanted the Israelis to get back into the act in Lebanon; that we wanted them to some extent to pull our chestnuts out of the fire, which would be one way to put it.

Do you want us to leave this briefing thinking that still?

A No, it is not true.

Q Could you expand?

A Well, we didn't go there with any intention of trying to get them back into the act. We didn't say anything about their getting back into the act. There was, as you say, a good bit of what I would agree with you was unscientific speculation , but that in fact was what we were going to do. That was a theme for the first couple of days in the Israeli press, but I think after several days of background briefings by members of the Israeli Government -- I have to assume were members of the Israeli Government -- that tended to disappear as a theme in the Israeli press, and the reason it did is because we didn't talk about it.

Q Was there any discussion with the Israelis about closing off the southern Lebanese border, and for what length of time, and would the Israelis revert to that if the need arose in the future?

A The only discussion of it really arose with the Defense Minister when I saw him on Saturday night, I guess it was, which was after the bombing in Tyre. And at that point he made it clear that this was a response to that bombing. He made it clear, as well, that it was an issue in terms of how long it would go on that was still up for debate within the Israeli Government. But, as I think our Spokesman made clear today our view on this -- did you get to that -- made clear our view on that, which is we understand why it was done, and obviously we believe it should be for the shortest period of time possible.

There is a debate going on in Israel very clearly on that question, with, on the one hand, a recognition that there is a real security problem for the Israelis by that traffic across the bridge, and, on the other, that if they close it off for a long time, they may well create for themselves a serious problem internally in that part of Lebanon that is closed off from the rest of Lebanon.

Q On strategic cooperation, again, more philosophic, do you think it is possible for the United States to have a closer strategic relationship with the Israelis without a concomitant strain of relations with the Arab World?

A Yes.

Q Have you had assurances to that effect from the Arabs, for example?

A Sir?

Q Have you had assurances from the Arab World to that effect?

A No. We haven't discussed it with them, to my knowledge.

Q When you discussed the INF Soviet reaction with Israel, what did you tell the Israelis was your assessment of the status of that discussion?

A Of the negotiations?

Q Yes.

A I told them that it was my judgment that we were at about five minutes to twelve, and that at this stage, the Soviets so far had failed to make the one concession that was absolutely critical if there was to be an agreement which was the recognition that the U.S. had a right to deploy INF in Europe, but that until that Rubicon was crossed, there was no possibility of an agreement, but that it was yet too early to tell whether they were going to be able to make that decision.

Q Did you reach any consensus on who is pulling whose string in Syria between the Soviets and the Syrians? What degree of influence, or lack of it, does the Soviet Union have on Syria's ability to act?

A I think this would be a fair description of what we both believe -- at least what I believe. I am not necessarily speaking for the rest of the U.S. Government, but I think it is also probably the view of the Israelis, which is that obviously the Soviets have substantial influence in Syria, but that with all of that said, Mr. Assad is an independent actor, and that while he will make decisions with the Soviet aspect in mind, in the last analysis, he will make those decisions on the basis of his own interests, and that is a long way of saying, I guess, that, yes, the Soviets have influence, but they do not control his every movement.

I think that is a fair statement. I think the Israelis would agree with that.

Q Sir, somebody you once worked for with a German accent on television a couple weeks ago said that there really wasn't going to be any progress in Lebanon; indeed, the U.S. forces there were not going to have much of a mission until the balance of power was somehow restored.

Is that something that you share, that the Israelis believe, or is that something you believe?

A It shows what happens to Henry when he gets away from my influence.

Q Does there need to be a restoration of that balance of power in order for the American presence there to have a real purpose, and can that be achieved? Is that something that is achievable?

A I don't think there is any doubt there needs to be a balance of power in the area if the Syrians are going to make the decisions that are necessary to bring about a peaceful settlement in Lebanon.

I suspect, and I am in a position where I can cut out after I say this, but I suspect where I would disagree with Henry is on how you define that balance and whether or not it is either there or possible to be created on the basis of a clear determination, a clear sense, given to the Syrians, for instance, of our will and determination, plus a clear sense to the Syrians -- and this is what is, I think, tough to accomplish, but it is being worked on -- a clear sense in Syrian minds that indeed the various Lebanese parties to the discussions in Geneva, for instance, have decided that in the last analysis peace in Lebanon is better for them than a divided Lebanon with outside forces sitting there telling them what to do.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

(The briefing concluded at 3:35 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

November 9, 1963

Akebono Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

7:20 p.m. (JST)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know all of you have been on the same travel schedule we have, so I think you're pretty tired. Let me try to be very quick here. I think I could summarize the sense of the meetings today by the fact that they were all very warm. I think each of the three meetings went substantially over the time scheduled, including the audience of the Emperor. There were very warm expressions on both sides of the friendship between our two countries. I think in a sense the theme of the discussions we had today, particularly the expanded bilateral meeting, is best summarized by the President's own statement in that meeting when he said that no relationship between any two countries is more important to world peace and prosperity than the relationship between the United States and Japan.

By pre-arrangement, that expanded session this evening that just ended began with bilateral economic issues, recognizing the responsibility that our two countries have and the impact that we have together on the world economy -- making up 35 percent of world GNP between the two of us and 50 percent of the GNP of the OECD countries. There was extensive discussion of bilateral issues. The President emphasized the importance of trying to make progress on some of the bilateral trade issues between us and then the discussion moved into a broader focus on the yen/dollar problem and the problem of opening up capital markets and investment flows. That included a discussion from the Japanese side -- initiated by the Japanese side of the issue of the unitary tax in the United States, which in their view is a barrier to the kind of two-way investment that we're trying to encourage. That's a very short summary of the discussion this afternoon. I'd be glad to take questions.

Q Did they ever get to the defense issues?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was a long tete-a-tete with just the Prime Minister and the President with the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister present. It was scheduled for about 15 minutes -- ran slightly over half an hour and the defense issue was discussed there, but I wasn't present so I can't give you more detail.

Q How did the President press the trade issue? Can you give us something he said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as I understand from what he did say he had discussed it also in the private meeting. They picked up from there, but he put it both -- he addressed it in its' broad terms--put an emphasis on the importance of making progress on these issues, both because of their economic impact and also because of the effect that failure to solve them would have on our political relationship. I think both the Prime Minister and the President recognized that the details of these issues are ones that are best dealt with by their respective cabinet officers and in fact in the course of the discussion of the yen/dollar exchange rate, which I think it's certainly viewed on our side, I believe also on the Japanese side, as perhaps the single principal cause of the trade imbalance that we're facing right now. They took note of the very extensive discussions that have been held between Secretary of the Treasury Regan and Finance Minister Takeshita. Those two ministers are going to issue a joint press statement tomorrow and

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and the Prime Minister and the President endorsed that and urged the two ministers to make a very careful study of measures that could be taken to open up capital markets and improve that yen/dollar balanc

Q Well, is this some new agreement --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be a new statement tomorrow by the -- joint statement by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Minister of Finance on this problem.

Q It's in the vein of that study you just said the President urged?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me?

Q Is the statement going to deal with a study of the problem --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's going to deal with measures that have been taken and further measures that are envisaged, including further study and discussion between our two governments to push these measures.

It's our feeling that -- Well, there are a number of factors that contribute to the strength of the dollar relative to the yen. And, of course, the Japanese side called attention to the high interest rates in the United States as being a factor leading to a strong dollar. But it's also the case that because the dollar is an international currency, because it's very easy for people to hold dollars in various forms in portfolios, the dollar has a kind of status as a crisis currency, or what Secretary Shultz has called "the safe haven effect."

What we would like to see and what these discussions between the two ministries have been aiming at and leading to is a greater openness of Japan's capital market, so that the yen becomes a more international currency, so that it's easier for people to hold portfolios in yen and so that the yen would assume the kind of place in international financial transactions that would correspond with the strength of the Japanese economy in the world.

Q But what we're going to get is an agreement to study.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they're in part -- you -- they will be calling attention to measures that the Japanese have already undertaken and making statements about further measures to be taken in the future. Let me wait until tomorrow when we have that statement and we'll brief you on it.

Q What time will that be available? What time --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure what -- I don't have a time on it --

Q On the issue of trade itself, what -- were the Japanese any more forthcoming in the talks that -- any specific way on the issue of trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the aim of this visit is not to achieve breakthroughs on specific trade matters. I think the fact of the visit, in fact, is certainly accelerated and intensified discussions that have been taking place in the last couple of months, including the -- I think, without much doubt, the recent announcement by Japan on voluntary restraints of automobile exports.

The approach the President took today was, at least in the large meeting that I attended, was to underscore the importance of progress on these issues and urging our respective ministries to pursue the ones that still remain.

Q When he stressed the importance of progress, what was the reply?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm going to be careful about characterizing what other governments say. I think there's an acknowledgement, though, of Japan's very substantial economic role in the world brings with it a responsibility to take those kinds of actions needed --

Q You mean the Japanese said that -- that they understand that their importance puts on them a responsibility to -- Is that what they said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's a fair characterization.

They have acknowledged the responsibility that goes with being the world's third largest GNP, the responsibility that goes with that to help work to keep markets open.

Q But there was nothing more than that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I said, this was not a meeting to settle specific issues, no.

Q Do you expect that the other meetings that we're going to have will give us anything further on that or is that the end of the discussion on trade?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know if it's the end of the discussion on trade; but we've never had an expectation at all that in this visit we've going -- the President's going to become a trade negotiator. What we're trying to do with this kind of discussion is to put some impetus into the negotiations that are going on to underscore how important it is that we make progress --

Q Well, what I'm trying to find out is what evidence is there that there is more impetus or will be more impetus for the discussions now going on? What have the Japanese told you that gives you -- or tells us that there's more impetus?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there's a recognition by both sides of the seriousness of protectionist trends in the world and a recognition by both sides that we have responsibilities to work to keep markets open and, in fact, to try to open them up further.

Q Was there any indication at all from the Japanese that they would -- following up on the auto restraints, that they would ease quotas or barriers on citrus and farm products or forest products on a specific date which has been the subject of a lot of discussion? Did they indicate that they would do something in those areas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of agricultural quotas is one that we have been going at pretty hard. There's certainly no progress to announce today. I think we have a clear deadline facing us of spring next year by which time we've got to come to some mutually satisfactory conclusion. And I think both sides agree to the importance of getting that solution by the end of March of this year.

Q How did the President respond to the point about high interest rates effecting the yen/dollar relationship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Both the President and Secretary Shultz spoke to that and while we acknowledge that high interest rates do lead to a stronger dollar, we don't accept the view that that's the only reason the dollar is strong and that, in fact, there are other things that -- apart from interest rates that determine the relative value of currencies and one of them is the relative ease with which people can hold large portfolios in those currencies.

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Q Were American deficits mentioned in that context by the Japanese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not specifically. They talked about interest rates.

Q Is the aim of this discussion of the yen/dollar rate to lead to a long term consistent decline in the value of the dollar against the yen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'd like to see a strengthening of the yen. I don't know -- long term consistant -- that suggests that it would strengthen without any limit. I think if we had the more open markets that we envision, we would see a strengthening and presumably, eventually at some point, a new equilibrium. Capital market equalization, that's right.

Q Were you asked about domestic content legislation or was that something else? I didn't hear Andrea's questions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What was said? Did the President volunteer anything on domestic content?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in the expanded session, although he did refer in general to the problem of protection of sentiments in the United States expressed in legislation. That's a pretty clear elusion to domestic content and other such things and there may have been more discussion in the private meeting.

Q Was it expressed as a warning?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was expressed as a concern. It's a concern that we have and it's a concern that presumably the Japanese share. It's our feeling that we both benefit from free trade and in keeping the free markets open and the President underscores the point that in order to do that we need progress in further opening Japan's markets.

Q When the President and Secretary Shultz accepted the thesis that interest groups had something to do with the strong dollar, did they also accept the thesis that the deficits were leading to high interest rates?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They didn't go into discussion of what produces our interest rates.

Q The deficit problem didn't come up in this discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not directly. I mean, the issue of our interest rates did come up, but as I said --

Q Also, is there a view on the micro-computer chips now -- did the Japanese announce something in the last --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last package they talked about -- reduction of tariffs and semiconductors, if that's what you're referring to and we have not yet seen the specific details of what that would entail, but that is clearly an area where we belive that there is a high tariff, that, if lowered, could lead to an opening of a significant market for U.S. products.

Q What discussion was there, if any, about Alaska oil being permitted to come directly to Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the expanded session that I heard, that specific issue wasn't raised. It may have been in the private meeting.

Q -- something you said earlier -- about the agreement of the yen/dollar relationship that's going to be announced tomorrow -- did you say that the two leaders were going to endorse that in their statement tomorrow?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. I was asked if the two leaders were going to endorse this agreement in their statements tomorrow.

Q If Secretary Regan isn't here, when was that worked out with him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL. They've been -- the two ministers and their people have been discussing this issue over the course of the last two months. I think Deputy Secretary McNamar had some meetings with Japanese counterparts recently in San Francisco I believe, and he is here as a member of the official party now.

Q That isn't really related to the trip, is it, except as a matter of timing? This is something that's been discussed and worked out before hand and you're doing it here as a matter of convenience.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, you're the one who's relating these issues to the trip. I said that the purpose of the trip is to try to put some general impetus into discussions that have been going on before the trip and they're going to continue after the trip by the respective people in charge of them.

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One of them is Secretary Brock's discussions on opening up of -- reduction of agricultural quotas, his discussions about automobile imports. Another area is Secretary Baldrige's discussions with his counterparts on high technology products both ways. A third, and in some respects perhaps the most important area, have been the discussions held by the Finance Ministries on yen/dollar problems and capital markets.

I think the fact of this visit in every case has put a certain impetus into those discussions and has tended to get people trying to figure out how they can produce results. And that I think has been useful.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's take two more questions.

Q Would it be fair to say that both sides are avoiding talking about their more serious complaints with the other country? In the Japanese case they are not specifically mentioning deficits which Japanese officials say is the main reason for high interest rates which they say is the main reason for the yen/dollar disparity, and the United States not bringing up the most serious trade issues, things like access to the petrochemical market.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we are not avoiding those issues. Those issues are discussed in detail on the levels at which they can be discussed in detail. For example, in the Finance Ministry discussions the question of interest rates and what are the factors leading to high interest rates are certainly one of the topics that is discussed at considerable length.

Q Why not discuss it at this level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We had one hour this evening.

Q What is the specific agenda for tomorrow? And do you expect any other specific agreements tomorrow that the two leaders will mention other than this currency and investment area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The agenda tomorrow will be, at least according to the plan, principally on global international issues. There may be some specific points of agreement, but I don't have anything comparable to this capital market agreement tomorrow.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much.

END 7:35 P.M. (JST)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

November 10, 1983

Akebono Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

4:15 P.M. JST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The subject of the President's meetings with Nakasone today were international, global issues. And I'd like to just say a word, because I think it is important to recognize what we sometimes forget I think, about the historical background of this really remarkable relationship, and how much it has grown and developed over the 30 years since it began out of the ashes of World War II.

It is a relationship that has changed from the one of the wartime to one of close alliance, and close alliance built on close, shared political values and respect for representative institutions and for individual freedom. And it is a truly remarkable achievement, viewed in historical perspective. And the other thing that is truly remarkable that's gone with it has been the development, the spectacular economic development of Japan from, roughly four percent of our GNP in the early 1960s to nearly 40 percent of our GNP today. And that growth in Japan's economic strength is, also, bringing with it a steadily growing influence in the world, a positive one and one that contributes to the peace and stability of the world.

And I think, given the kinds of developments we've seen in Japan's role in the last five and 10 years, one can expect a much stronger Japan, a much more influential Japan in the future. And it's very much in the interest of the United States and, I think, in the interest of world peace for that Japanese influence to be exercised on a basis of close U.S.-Japanese friendship. And the major purpose of the President's visit on this trip is to strengthen that friendship, and to build the basis for that kind of future partnership.

Just one sort of measure of the kind of development that I'm talking about: five years ago the Japanese role in contributing in general to the Persian Gulf was very minimal. They've substantially, over that period of time, increased their foreign assistance contributions to a number of key countries in the Middle East region to the point where, today, Japan is a major provider of foreign assistance to countries such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey. That's the kind of influence that we would like to see grow, and grow in partnership with the United States.

Let me give you a short summary of what was discussed in the meetings today. The President and the Prime Minister began close to Japan with a discussion of the situation in Korea, particularly concerned about the Rangoon bombing and its aftermath, and the very statesmanlike response by South Korea to that horrible event, and to the importance of South Korea's continuing to pursue its very vigorous diplomatic efforts to build relations, expand its diplomacy.

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They talked at some length about China, about our mutual interest in strengthen relations with China, and about a number of the achievements that have been made by both our countries in that regard in the last 12 months, and expectations for further improvements on the Japanese side when the Party Secretary visits Japan and, on our side, when Premiere Zhao comes to Washington in January, and the President goes to China in the spring.

They talked about the ASEAN countries, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- the five countries of Southeast Asia who, also, part of this spectacular economic growth of the Pacific countries, who have over the last 20 years turned in one of the most impressive economic performances of the developing world. They talked about our common interests in policies that can be pursued to assist those countries and to strengthen both U.S. and Japanese relations with those countries and -- in that context -- also talked about the situation in the Philippines and our concern about that situation -- both the political circumstances and the economic situation in the Philippines.

They had a rather extensive discussion of the Middle East. And Mr. McFarlane, speaking partly from his experience in his position, spoke at some length about U.S. objectives and policies in the Middle East. And they, then, went from that to a discussion of the Iran-Iraq war and the concern that that poses for both our countries for the stability of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region, and the interests that both our countries have in trying to use what influence we have. And, in fact, Japan has a certain amount of influence with both of the warring parties to try to encourage efforts toward a peaceful resolution of that conflict.

There was discussion about the problems of developing countries and, in particular, of the need for replenishment of IMF funds and other forms of assistance to these countries in both their debt problems and their development assistance problems.

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At other points during the discussions there have been discussions, some brief discussion of Central America and some discussion of Japanese foreign assistance and the importance that we attach to it and our encouragement to see continued, rapid growth in Japanese foreign assistance.

Also last night Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Abe had a working dinner of about two and a half hours in length. After discussing in somewhat more detail the Korean situation, they went through an agenda that was mostly, I guess entirely trade and economic issues, talked about the efforts to strengthen the relationship of the yen to the dollar and the measures being discussed by the Treasury and Finance Ministries in that direction, and the institutional mechanism that we are creating to pursue further measures.

Also they talked about the importance of encouraging two-way flows of investment, not only of U.S. investment in Japan where there are barriers that we would like to see lowered, but also to find ways of encouraging Japanese investment in the United States. The United States is the major recipient of Japanese foreign investment by quite a long margin. In a number of states that has made quite a contribution to employment. It is something we would like to see encouraged and continued.

On the Japanese side, of course they are concerned about the impact on Japanese investors of our unitary tax. I shouldn't say "our unitary tax". The unitary tax that a number of U.S. states have imposed on foreign corporations.

Talked about auto restraints, and we expressed our appreciation for the Japanese decision to continue with one more year of restraints on auto exports that should provide an additional period of time for our auto industry to recover from the recession and hopefully return to a strong competitive position.

Talked about the efforts of the high technology group to look at ways of reducing barriers to high technology trade and in particular welcome the progress that seems to be made in the semiconductor area and the proposal for mutual elimination on tariffs on semiconductors.

The agricultural issues were discussed, not resolved. Those are among the most difficult issues, trade issues, perhaps that we face. They are very important politically on both sides as well as economically. And in fact, I think it is worth -- there is a measure here of both how far we have come as well as what we would like to see. The spectacular growth of the Japanese economy has meant a spectacular growth also of markets for U.S. exports; overall the second largest market in the world for U.S. exports after Canada, and in the agricultural area the largest market for U.S. exports. And as a matter of fact, Japan takes roughly 50 percent of our beef exports and about 25 percent of our citrus exports. Nevertheless, there is no question that if the fairly restrictive -- highly restrictive quotas on those imports into Japan were eased, a substantially greater market would exist in this country from which our farmers would benefit, and for that matter, from which Japanese consumers would benefit. But there is a very large farming population in this country, and it is a very difficult issue.

Both sides expressed their determination to reach a successful conclusion to these difficult negotiations by, at the earliest possible date and no later than the end of March of 1984 when the present agreement expires.

They also discussed tariffs, particularly tariffs on a number of products where the U.S. has a highly competitive position and where we believe we could make substantial market gains if the tariffs were eased.

We discussed the NTT procurement agreement, we discussed cooperation in energy. And I believe that was the list of economic

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issues that were discussed.

We also got a partial debrief of the private, the tete-a-tete meeting between the Prime Minister and the President yesterday that was attended only by the Secretary and Foreign Minister Abe. They did, as I confirmed yesterday, discuss defense issues. They discussed in considerable detail and quite directly the political

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importance of addressing these trade issues and making progress on them and, the need to do so if we are to preserve the rather open access that foreign products presently enjoy in the U.S. markets.

There may be a second meeting between the --

Q What? Would you repeat what you said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said there was very direct discussion about the political importance of resolving the trade issues in front of us and the need to do so in order to preserve the rather open access that foreign products have in U.S. markets.

Q That's yesterday, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was during the private meeting yesterday that preceded the extended bilateral.

There will be a long, private lunch between the President and the Prime Minister tomorrow. And we are looking at the possibility of a second meeting between the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State. And, of course, the -- I suppose -- the major event tomorrow morning will be the President's speech to the Diet, which is a speech that's going to emphasize, in the first instance, the common values that -- in fact, that institution is a reflection of and on which the close friendship between our two countries is based. And there will be a discussion of the importance of using that friendship, that partnership to strengthen world peace, to strengthen world economy and reduce barriers to free trade.

I'll be glad to take questions.

Q Were there any distinctions made on defense and Japan increasing defense outlays?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: By the way, there has been just within the last couple of days conclusion of discussions we've had going on for quite a few months about the transfer -- the two-way transfer of technology between the United States and Japan. Japan has had very severe restrictions on any transfer of defense technology to the United States in the past because of its general policy prohibiting the export of arms to any country.

They have interpreted that policy, however, as not covering the transfer of defense technology to the United States because of the obligations of the security treaty. And we have worked out an agreement under which that cooperation can now take place.

The Prime Minister referred in his statement today to the joint communique of May 1981 in which Japan pledged itself to take even greater efforts to take its responsibilities in the defense area, and that was the general approach of the discussions here.

Q Did the President indicate, though, that the United States might like to see Japan taking a more -- a faster pace in this, adopting more of an increase in defense spending than the 6.9 percent that's apparently been settled on for next year?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've made clear repeatedly that we find the direction of Japan's defense efforts exactly right and the focus on the defense of Japanese territoty, airspace and surrounding seas to be exactly right. Neither we nor the Japanese nor the other countries of the region want to see Japan take a larger role.

We've also indicated that we'd take a larger role beyond the immediate defense of Japan. That is correct. We have also indicated that we believe that Japan can do more in that role of the defense of Japan and that we would like to see a more rapid achievement of its ability to play that role. At the same time, Japan, like the United States, is suffering from serious budget problems. It happens that in the present budget only two areas are being increased -- defense and foreign assistance.

And those are two areas that the United States is very anxious to see these greater Japanese efforts.

Q In the discussion on the Middle East, did the President reiterate his pledge to carry out the retaliation against those who carried out the bombing attack on the Marines? And if he did, did the Japanese have any reaction to the idea of retaliation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That specific point wasn't discussed.

Q Did Prime Minister Nakasone, as far as you know, stress more the need for reaching agreement on arms control and talk about his concern about East-West tensions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Actually, this came up in the discussion yesterday when they talked about the Tokyo Statement which the Prime Minister has mentioned at some length in his press remarks today and which the President endorsed, in which he talks not only about his concern about East-West tensions, but about tensions caused by regional conflicts and by the threat of terrorism, talks about the need to try to achieve solutions to those problems and reductions of those tensions through negotiations and through dialogue, talks about the importance of being willing to pursue partial solutions where perfect solutions aren't achievable and talks -- and I think this is in some ways perhaps the most significant part of that whole statement -- talks about the importance of -- and I'll quote from his statement this afternoon -- "of the Western countries standing firmly in unity and solidarity in order to achieve those efforts."

And I think of the common position that, for example, the industrialized democracies took at the Williamsburg summit on the arms control talks.

Q I know, but was there any suggestion that he seemed to be pressing --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States --

Q -- the United States to go a little further?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- urging China to do --

Q Just --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, pardon me --

Q I'm just following up -- urging the President to go the extra mile or take some more steps to establish the

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gradual dialogue and reach an agreement with the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the President has been going the extra mile, and I think the Prime Minister recognizes that and appreciates it and appreciates also the fact that in doing so we have recognized

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very clearly that these negotiations are ones that ffect Asia as well as Europe and that we have maintained as a firm principle the global approach to these negotiations.

Q He didn't indicate in any way his dissatisfaction with the pace of the talks from the American or the allied point of view?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think what there was was common agreement on dissatisfaction with the lack of forthcomingness so far with the Soviet Union.

Q That isn't the way he sounded.

Q -- the issue of North Korea, is the United States or Japan or both trying to use some influence to -- influence North Korea to cut out these bombings and refrain from such actions --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was discussed some in the meeting between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister And we are interested in pursuing all avenues that we can to try to encourage and do some restraint on the part of North Korea. And it's our feeling that at least China shares the objective of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. And so it's certainly the U.S. view that we would hope that China would exercise that influence in that direction.

Q -- China view in Tokyo?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. China is, of course, constrained by the fact that there's another party there, namely the Soviet Union, that has a very strong influence as well.

Q Is there any concern or even awareness in the United States that if Japan does open up coal and meat markets to you it's likely to be at the expense of the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In fact, we're pursuing an expansion of beef quotas, not specifically of the so-called "high quality beef," which is a U.S. specialty, but of beef quotas in general from which all beef exporting countries would benefit. No question that in negotiations of this kind we're going to pursue hardest those areas in which we're most competitive; but we would like to see free and open markets, not some new version of mercantilism.

Q Was there any time scale put on the defense of the sea lanes and was there any mention made as to what perhaps the defense budget will be next year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't believe either of those details were mentioned.

Q Could you tell us what specifically was new that came out of the statements today by the Prime Minister and the President? Is there any new initiative here or is it just a commitment --

Q What's the lead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q What's the lead?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To me the lead is the importance of this remarkable alliance and the fact that the United States and Japan have -- that a close relationships between our two countries can --.

Q That's was a lead Tuesday.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that's my lead today.

As far as -- If you're looking for new things in the statements, and I think Mr. McNamar is going to be here.

Q He's here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. He's going to be here to give you more detail on the joint Treasury-Finance Ministry statement. But, in fact, that is a substantial piece of news. And I want to say, because I'm not quite sure it's officially appreciated that when one goes through a long list of the various trade issues between our two countries, and they are a long list, that not all items on these lists have equal weight. And the problem of the yen-dollar exchange rate, which not only effects the price of all U.S. exports to Japan and makes them less competitiv by the amount to which the dollar may be -- I hesitate to use the word, but over valued.

It also makes Japanese imports in the United States more competitive relative to U.S. products. And what hurts the most often is it makes our ability to compete in third country markets more difficult. And this effects U.S. products across the board. So it's our belief that the yen-dollar problem is perhaps without any doubt, I think, the single most important problem in the trade area. And these measures, we hope, will begin to address that.

Q -- discuss some of the initiatives or requests or demands or however you want to characterize it that the Japanese Diet initiated at these discussions? It seems to me everything you've told us so far is what is on our wish list. What is on the Japanese wish list?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the trade area at the moment it's, I think it's the United States that's doing most of the asking. Obviously, in the area of the exchange rate problem there are policies of both countries that are at issue and Mr. McNamar will discuss that in some more detail.

The question of the unitary tax is something the Prime Minister addressed at some length and they feel quite strongly about and are quite concerned about. They are interested in seeing a new series of GATT negotiations for further tariff reductions. That's something that they asked for and that the President was quite pleased to agree to.

Q Was there any specific mention from the Japanese side during these talks up to now, either from the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister or the officials of the difficulty in their taking further steps toward trade liberalization in this pre-election period?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been some reference to pre-election period. There's been more reference, as you also hear repeatedly from our textile negotiators, about the political problems of lowering trade barriers.

I think it's almost a law of politics that when you create these barriers you create very strong vested interests that can't survive unless the barriers are left in place. And so the problem of dismantling them is always a very difficult political problem.

Q What have they said on that point? What have they said on the point of steps that they can or can't take in this period before their election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd just say that in general when we come to difficulties in taking steps, usually the heart of that difficulty is a political difficulty.

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MR. SPEAKES: Okay. Last question from Saul. If anybody has any particular points they -- the senior administration official will stay a few moments out there and help you out.

Q You say the trade -- the trade area the United States does most of the asking. Aside from the setting up of committees and looking forward to new negotiations, did the Japanese do any of the giving on those --

And if so can you tell us specifically where?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we have first of all the very major fact of the auto agreement and the limitation of Japanese --

Q I'm talking about since the President has arrived.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm talking about things that have happened within the last few days and few weeks that are important issues. This is a very important thing and it's something that took a lot of political strain on their side and which we, in fact, appreciate substantially.

Q That doesn't lower trade barriers.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It helps to ease the trade imbalance, which is one of our problems. No, it's true it is not -- it is a protectionist measure, in fact, rather than one that -- a market opening measure.

In terms of market opening, they have talked about some tariff reductions. Our feeling is with the exception -- an important exception of semi-conductors, we're not yet seeing talk about substantial reductions in the areas where we have big markets, big potential markets. But there has been the semi-conductor point.

We have seen, earlier this year, a very important set of new regulations, new legislation introduced by the Japanese to simplify standards.

Q -- earlier this year. I'm talking about as a result of these meetings.

The President pledged, he said, to combat protectionism in the United States. Did the Japanese make a similar pledge that could be backed up with specifics to combat protectionism in Japan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They were very strong expressions on both sides about the need to combat protectionism and the need to take measures to do so.

Of specific measures that we have to say right now would have happened within the last few days or few weeks it's auto export restraints, principally, some tariff reductions and depending on what it turns out to be, and Mr. McNamar will give you more detail, but I think will unfold in the next few months the opening of capital markets, which could be the single most important step they've taken.

END 4:42 P.M. JST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

For Immediate Release November 10, 1983

BRIEFING BY
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF TREASURY R. T. McNAMAR
ON THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STATEMENT

[illegible]

Akebono Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

4:47 P.M. JST

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Let me turn to a different subject since I can't figure out what time it is here and what time it is at home either sometimes. Let me talk a little about the statement that the President made, the Prime Minister made, and then this joint Regan-Takeshita statement. I will try to take you through that quickly and then open it up for questions.

The President, as you know, said that we have noted the importance of the yen-dollar exchange rate, of free and open capital markets in each country, we stress the need for closer economic consultations between the two governments, a ministerial-level working group is being set up to monitor each side's progress and carrying out the agreed-upon actions to improve the yen-dollar exchange rate, and that our mutual commitment toward specific steps to achieve open capital markets will allow the yen to reflect more fully Japan's underlying political stability and economic strength as the second largest economy in the free world.

Earlier of course he had referenced the joint press release between Secretary Regan and Finance Minister Takeshita. This joint announcement is a result of an ongoing dialogue that the Treasury has had with the Finance Ministry over here. You have it. Quickly you can go through it and talk about our objectives that you see listed in No. 1. No. 2, we talk about the LDC debt problems.

Let me just digress from this for a second to say that the Japanese government and the Japanese banks have been extremely helpful in Latin America and we are sure that they will be in Asia as well.

Then we reiterated the understandings reached at Williamsburg. A discussion in the next full paragraph of the need for open capital markets and free movements of capital; the international monetary system; a recommitment to take prompt steps, and let me touch on these very quickly.

These are the first steps that are outlined here. Particularly, the Ministry of Finance announced its decision to eliminate the real demand rule in forward exchange transactions effective February 1, 1984. That is a specific commitment that the Japanese Ministry of Finance will take.

Why is that important? The reason that that is important is that at the present time there is really no forward market in yen. There is no ability to sufficiently hedge yourself in yen. Why is that important? That is important because large holders of currency such as SAMA, the Saudian Arabian Monetary Authority, or any international company, cannot protect themselves from fluctuation in yen because of the lack of a forward market.

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There simply has never been a forward market in yen in the history of Japan. And this is a major step forward because it represents part achievement, a step forward in the Japanese commitment to internationalize the yen.

Q For those of us who are uninitiated, what is a forward market?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: A forward market is the ability to purchase a contract for the delivery, for either the purchase or sale of a currency at a specified rate so that you take out the exchange rate fluctuations.

Q Options.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Options. Not a bad way to think of it. Why is that important? That is important because the market for yen relative to other markets, the dollar in particular, is so thin that if a major holder of yen were to sell it on a particular day for some reason, they will move the market. The yen is volatile, is more volatile than it should be because it lacks a forward market. This will help to stabilize the yen. And by stabilizing it. I mean take out the short term volatility. If you think about, if you think of it in physics terms, this will dampen the amplitude of the fluctuations on the trend.

Q What are the effective dates?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: April 1, 1984. That is in the joint announcement.

Q That will have no impact. That will not necessarily mean the yen will grow in strength by itself, right?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: This action in itself does not move the yen up or down. What it means is that more people will be comfortable holding yen, which will increase the demand for yen longer term. That should mean that the yen will achieve a rate over time that reflects the fundamentals as opposed to anything else.

Q Can you answer a question as to what would we like the yen to be in relationship to the dollar? What do we think it should be?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: We don't have a number in mind. If you will hold that question until I go through -- I like to keep the questions on the specific points that I am on. If you will hold that question to the end, we can come back to it.

If there are no other questions on this real demand rule -- and again, the real demand meant that you had to have a real trade-related transaction to be able to hedge the yen.

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This eliminates that. This is a movement away from the traditional Japanese approach to abhorence to speculation or aversion to speculation and it reflects a maturing of the Japanese financial market.

Secondly, there was an agreement to submit a bill in the next regular Diet session which begins in December to reform the designated company system after consulting with the agencies concerned. This means that there will be a bill introduced which will eliminate the restricted companies or industries that foreigners cannot buy into. In other words, after this bill is passed during the next Diet session, it will be easier for a German company to buy into a petro-chemical company in Japan, or an American pulp and paper company to buy into a pulp and paper company here, or whatever the original list turns out to be. This is a step towards opening investments in Japan to foreign companies. It is a major step forward.

Let me touch on something in this respect that Paul Wolfowitz reminded me that he did not mention. There was also an agreement by the Prime Minister and the President to instruct the ongoing sub-Cabinet working group to form an investment committee to develop specific ways to promote mutual investment. Not just Japanese investment in the United States, but U.S. investment in Japan as well. That is also a first.

Yes, sir?

Q -- submit a bill, how controversial will that bill be in the Diet and what are the prospects?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: You'll have to ask the Japanese that, but my understanding is they wouldn't have agreed to this if the prospect weren't reasonably good.

Q Isn't it true that a lot of the problem that the U.S. says it's had with Japan has been Japan's alleged failure to follow through once these dropped, although the Prime Minister loved it? When you're talking about putting a bill through the Diet, I mean, that's very often -- introducing a bill is a token gesture without meaning.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: No. I think you are assuming that the traditional problem of falling into the Japanese bureaucracy and being opposed to the Japanese bureaucracy and, therefore, not having followed through, I think that's correct. This says that there is a political commitment on the part of the Minister and the Prime Minister, as you know, endorsed this statement today and, therefore, I think you may assume that there will be a reform of this system or, perhaps, an elimination. I don't know what the bill will look like because they haven't drafted it yet. This is something that we have been chatting with them about and that they have been considering for sometime. It is a nationalogical step in Prime Minister Nakasone's commitment to promote investment in Japan.

The third thing that's in this list --

Q I have a question on that before you get away.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Yes?

Q You said, eliminate designated company system. Are you absolutely sure that reform to the Japanese means to eliminate, because we were told in another briefer that it doesn't?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: No, I'm sorry. If I said -- I thought what I said was the bill would be to reform it. They may even eliminate it. I don't know. No, reform is the proper word. Sorry if I misled you on that.

The third item there is an agreement to submit a bill in the next ordinary Diet session to enable issuance of foreign currency denominated national bonds abroad. At the present time, the Japanese government cannot issue foreign currency denominated national bonds. That is, bonds of the government of Japan abroad. This

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bill will be introduced. It follows on the announcement that Japanese agencies, such as JAL, will be borrowing abroad. At the present time can I ask you not to type. It's terribly disconcerting. Excuse me. Would you mind not typing, it's terribly disconcerting. Thank you. and they have announced that those agencies will be borrowing abroad. This would enable the government to do it. You recall the Carter or Rosa bonds that we used in the United States, the Carter bond operation to strengthen the dollar at a time when the government thought it was too weak. This would be in effect the enabling legislation that would allow them to do that.

Is there a question on this?

Q Would you make any projections as to what the new decisions could mean insofar as U.S. dollar investment in Japan? New investment.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR No. I shouldn't give you a number on that. I don't think anyone can give you a precise number on that. That would be impossible to do.

Anything else on Point 3?

Q On the bond thing, one of the big problems has been interest rates in Japan being so much lower than the United States. What is the projected interest rate on some of these government bonds or JAL bonds that might be issued? Any idea of the range of the interest rate?

DEPUTE SECRETARY McNAMAR The question was, what is the projected interest rate on these kinds of bonds. I have seen interest rate estimates and I have to stress they're simply preliminary estimates, that would indicate that they're probably in about the ten to twelve percent.

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range, depending on the maturity. I can't recall for the moment the long-term bond rate in Japan -- at the moment on government bonds. But I'm going to say it's 8-something. Don't hold me to that. I may be incorrect. It is higher. There's no question about that. There are offsetting steps, in terms of currency swaps, that the Japanese government may consider taking. But we welcome their borrowing on our markets whether they do that or not. I think the real question is their taking the step forward to do that.

Is this on this point?

Q Yes.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Yes.

Q Will there be any difference in the tax treatment of these bonds from dollar-denominated bonds normally sold in the U.S.?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Not that I'm aware of.

The fourth point here, we can just touch on briefly. This is to expedite the study concerning establishment of a yen-denominated bankers' acceptance market. One of the problems with the yen, traditionally, is that not enough trade has been invoiced in yen. My recollection is that about 30 percent of Japan's exports are invoiced in yen. But only five percent or so of its imports such as oil and so on are invoiced in yen. If there were a bankers' acceptance market established here, this should promote the invoicing of additional trade in yen. Longer-term, this should strengthen the yen. There's a study that had been commissioned -- that had been set up with this advisory commission. And the Japanese have agreed to accelerate that.

Any questions on that -- I wouldn't think so.

In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced that it will seek to lower the minimum denomination of CDs to 300 million yen from the current level of 500 million yen, effective January 1, '84, seek to further enlarge how many CDs could be issued. Okay, why is that important? The reason that that's important is there are not enough short-term financial instruments to park your money in yen, yen-denominated short-term instruments like CDs in the United States or in Europe. As you can see, the level here of 500 million yen for CDs, which is about two million dollars -- 300 will reduce it to a little over one million dollars. The Japanese are lowering the minimum denomination down so that more people will have a preference or an ability to hold yen, for example, over the weekend. That means that, on Friday, they won't be selling yen to buy dollars, because they can park it in something over the weekend in dollars.

This is a major step forward. I shouldn't say "a major." This is a step forward in terms of a major liberalization of their CD market. The guidelines on Euro-yen bonds will be eased. Again, these are specific commitments, if you'll notice, with dates to them. I don't think you see that that often. In addition, they have agreed to take another look at the withholding tax on interest earnings on Euro-yen bonds. As you may or may not know, tax withholding in Japan is pervasive. They do it on rents. They do it on salaries. They do it on interest and dividends and everything else. And they have it on this foreign interest. We believe that this is one of the things that weakens the yen, because it lowers the effective, after-tax rate of return on a yen-denominated investment. And, therefore, we think that, if this were eliminated or substantially changed, it would tend to increase the relative value of yen investments to dollar investment, thereby strengthening the yen.

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Let me call your attention, specifically, to the statement by Minister Takeshita on the top of page two of your statement here that says that "we, as one of the major industrial nations, will continue to take positive steps towards the internationalization of the yen and the liberalization of our financial and capital markets." I think the point here is that, as Japan as matured as an economic power, has matured as a trading power in the world, they are, now, taking their rightful place as a financial power. And they recognize that the yen, inevitably, will go through an internationalization process, that the very tightly controlled capital markets that they have here will have to be liberalized, because part of what you're having and part of what is in the yen-dollar relationship is disintermediation. You all remember when we used to have disintermediation in the United States when we had Regulation Q and 5.5 percent passbook savings. And when you had a chance to move it out, all the money flowed out of the S and Ls into the banks. That process, on a different scale, is happening between Japan and the United States today. Net capital outflows this year will be something like $17 billion from Japan to the United States simply because

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the controlled interest rate structure here is so low that if you take your money and put it in the United States you can get the higher interest rate after tax and after inflation. In other words, a higher real after tax return on your money. So you're getting disintermediation, not surprising. The Japanese are moving to try to liberalize these markets that will reduce this disintermediation effect.

Next paragraph we had a clarification that there are no discriminatory restrictions under Japanese law and the acquisition of banks by foreign banks and I think that it's safe to say that this statement was very helpful in clarifying the fact that we have an increasing movement toward national treatment of U.S. banking interest in Japan. That isn't to suggest the acquisition of a bank in Japan by another bank is an easy move. It is not, therefore it's not easy for a foreign bank to acquire as well.

Let me turn to the points that we made. Secretary Regan indicated that we will take into account the concerns of the Japanese authority as we look as the unitary tax question. The Prime Minister specifically raised the unitary tax question with the President today and indicated his concern about this problem. Yes?

Q What is the Administration's view on inquisition by states for this unitary tax and what can the Administration do about it?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: If you'll recall the court case that was decided the container case simply said that it was constitutional, period. There are a number of different unitary tax statutes in effect at the present time. Some are worldwide, some, such as Illinois, have a unitary tax application within the United States. The President has asked Secretary Regan to set up a group to develop either a model statute, remedial legislation or recommendation to do nothing, if that should be it. And that group has already had its first meeting and we're in the process of setting up the technical groups to work through that and we want to have that issue resolved as quickly as we could.

Q Make this into law -- or what was the plan?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: We do not have a plan to ask Congress yet because we don't have our recommendations yet. We may or we may not. It's premature to suggest that we'll do that.

Let me go to the second point here. We simply said we'd welcome them to issue their bonds in the U.S. We recommitted ourselves to try to reduce the U.S. budget deficit through additional measures to reduce spending -- told them that we would work for passage of the IMF legislation as quickly as possible and try to conclude the IDA negotiations as quickly as possible. Those were items that they had raised with us and were of particular concern.

The last part of the communique is an agreement to do something which we have not done before and that is to have a joint ministry of finance treasury group to continue to monitor these steps and see if they're doing what they can and we're doing what we can. We agreed to meet next in February. That group will be headed by Undersecretary Sprinkle on our side and I believe Vice Minister Abe on their side. We agreed to meet in February and then to report back to the ministers in the Spring. I would guess that will be in April, probably around the IMF meeting. Yes?

Q On the welcoming issuance of Japanese government guaranteed bonds in the U.S., essentially JAL and Japan's Ex Im Bank have been crowded out of the domestic market here by the Japanese government's bond issuing needs. Now you are in essence inviting them to come and to help the Treasury Department's foreign needs to crowd out private sectors.

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: I'm sorry -- I got the first part.

Q In essence, what you're doing is inviting Japanese government's public sector borrowers to join the Treasury Department in crowding out the U.S. private sector borrowers. Is that not correct -- in welcoming Japanese government issues in the U.S.?

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DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: No, that isn't correct because what you have in effect is a worldwide market for capital, that's why you have, as I said a while ago, approximately 17 billion in outflow of capital from Japan into the U.S. That was for a lot of reasons. People thought, for example, that the U.S. real estate, which is cheaper than Tokyo real estate, even in N.Y., was a good investment. People thought that owning U.S. stocks were a good investment and if you look at when the dollar depreciated relative to the yen, you'll find that just prior to the time the stock market took off last August, the stock market is up 55 percent -- that would suggest that those people who move money out of yen and put it into dollars and invest it in the U.S. stock market have done rather well. The fact of the matter is, their borrowing on our markets will not increase in crowding out the U.S. because the funds that the U.S. government borrows very often are CDs that get deposited in U.S. banks from Germany that originally come from the Middle East on oil revenues and in effect are relended, borrowed on our markets. It's a continual spectrum internationally for capital markets today.

Q Are you implying here that you expect most of the buyers of these Japanese government bonds could be Japanese investors?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: No, I'm not implying anything. There's no way to predict who will be the particular buyers. I would presume that it would tend to be pension funds, insurance companies, in Europe and the United States, perhaps even in Japan, don't know. Lou, you asked a question a while ago and I cut you off.

Q I wish you would address the question as to what we think the yen would be if it were correctly valued. If you can't do it in terms of saying we'd like it to be, just give us some idea of what it would be if it were correctly reflecting its actual value if all of these things had been done -- I mean, are we talking about 200 to the dollar or a range --

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: We do not have a specific number in mind and we have never discussed a specific number with the Japanese. There is no per se right number at any point in time. You're trying to find an equilibrium situation -- you can have an overshooting or an undershooting caused by everything from flight capital from Latin America and moving up the dollar relative to other currencies to the situation that we had last week, where you noticed the yen weakened two or three points in part because the deutchmark weakened relative to the dollar because of the German banking situation and some concerns about the Middle East. In effect, the deutchmark moved down against the dollar and took the yen with it somewhat.

Q Was there a range at which this equilibrium is likely to be expressed?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: We haven't expressed a range either. It's part of a floating exchange rate system. What we think is needed is to make sure that the equilibrium over time--and I would emphasize over time, as opposed to during any week or month even -- that over time people have confidence that the free flow of trade and free flow of capital is producing an equilibrium rate. And I think that people at the present time do not have that confidence because of concern of the openness of the Japanese market to U.S. goods and concern about the free flow of capital into Japan because of lack of investment opportunities. And I think that once there is confidence in the world that there is, in effect, an internationalized yen with a free flow of capital and there will always be instances of overshooting or undershooting by "x" percent, but over time equilibrium levels will be found.

Q The President and the Prime Minister have met three times this year. Why did this issue become so important in this meeting and not in May or January?

DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Oh, I think it was an issue --

Q Question please?

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DEPUTY SECRETARY McNAMAR: Oh, I'm sorry. The question is: The Prime Minister and the President met three times this year. Why is this issue so important now, as opposed to being important in May or in January?

The answer is that we have had continual discussions with the Japanese that even predate that first meeting and I think that his statement this long would reach a satisfactory agreement on the initial steps that the Japanese are going to take and again I would point out that these have specific dates to them. If you look at this -- these are rather specific commitments on their part, unlike the usual kind of press announcement that you would get. And I think that again it simply reflects Japan beginning to take its' rightful place as an international financial power as well as an international trading power. So I think it simply reflects a maturing of the relationship on the financial sector.

END 5:15 p.m. JST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP
TO JAPAN AND KOREA

November 11, 1983

Second Floor Meeting Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

4:18 P.M. JST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One of the things in my head that have come in since arriving here, mostly, however, in talking to Americans, and I'll be very brief, I think it's apparent from talking to my peers and every American I've seen what comes out is you and I and every other American knows a lot more about Europe than we do about Asia. Our schools are institutions that everybody else talks about -- teaches us about everything from penal systems to jurisprudence is based on a European model.

At the same time, it's very apparent that in the next century and between now and then our lives are going to be far more effected in terms of welfare, economics and everything else by what goes on in Asia. There's nothing profound about that. But I think the President's trip, to the extent that it focuses Americans' attention on what is going on in Asia and why that's important to them, it's probably of greater significance.

Now, there is an agenda and it's a contentious agenda. I'd be glad to take your questions on the extent to which that contentiousness has been ameliorated and there is some prospect for progress.

Q Why don't you tell us what you mean by a contentious agenda.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is disagreement over the degree of openness in both of our markets. We say that theirs is relatively closed. They say that theirs is relatively open, as open as is ours. However, beyond this rhetorical level we've gotten in this visit to a specific methodology for solving the problems in trade, energy, finance, security issues, defense, foreign assistance. And I mean that. That sounds like a lot of blather, but the processes for setting specific goals and milestones and beyond that, since all of this is based on good faith, is the detail with which each of these is treated and accepted by the other side. You know, that's where there is a very high measure of acceptance in each of these areas of our goals as reasonable and achieveable.

Q Well, what did they ask of us? We seem to be pushing them in every direction.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well. they ask a great deal. If you looked yesterday, for example, at im McNamar's Joint Treasury Statement, everything that the Treasury, the U.S. Treasury offered to do was at Japanese insistance and there's quite a lot in there. I'll get it for you; but it's summarized in today's Japan Times.

In the security area, obviously there's a great deal we already are doing

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and the balance, then, is heavily in favor of U.S. responsibility as opposed to Japanese responsibility.

Q Are we getting a sense that after the election, after the December elections, that the Nakasone government might be a little bit more forthcoming politically on movement and trade, movement on security issues, when he may be in a little better political position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not going to comment on that, I'm sorry. I think the extent to which we walk behind this extremely useful and private dialogue to prejudge and preempt the decisions of this government we acted in bad faith.

Q When you talk about milestones and methodology, I don't understand. I mean, have the agreed to some kind of timetable that we're unaware of on these big issues, like military spending and energy and trade and all of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The short answer is, yes. Yes, in that both of us accept that we cannot go on as we are or we will see in the U.S. a wave of protectionism beyond domestic content laws such as we've never seen before before the summer of next year. We understand -- they understand that would be bad for both of us and, thus, there's got to be progress in resolving, particularly, tariff issues, quota issues, financial access, or access to markets in this country, liberalization of the financial system, investment system. And I think the committee that was formed in Don Regan and his counterparts' agreement of yesterday, which provides for investment issues, exchange rate issues, to be treated is very, very promising. So, there's a timetable.

Q On the issues of tariffs and quotas, there's a timetable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is not as precise as in other areas, but it is -- I would take this next summer a benchmark against which both sides accept there's got to be some progress. If there isn't, there's going to be a very damaging legislative --

Q Is that because of our political conventions?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it isn't. It's because of Congress and the state of anxiety about perceived -- the inaccessibility of the Japanese market and the imbalance in the trade relationship which is perceived as overwhelmingly in favor of the Japanese from automobiles, micro-processors, and everything else.

It is a very strong running tide of criticism on the part of Americans and businessmen. And we've explored that in some depth in this session.

Q Going back to the question, without prejudging or preempting what the Japanese may or may not want to do, is the factor, the one factor of an upcoming election -- we're talking about next summer and something has to be done -- is the prospect of an election in any way influencing the Japanese moves right now in order to -- to wait until after that to focus on this issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now, you're asking what influences their decision-making. You'll have to ask them about that.

Q Am I correct, you're indicating -- the President, Mr. Shultz, others, yourself -- much blunter than the President was in his statement yesterday at Mr. Nakasone's residence about this whole problem, this whole feeling of anxiety that something must be done. You're much blunter than he was?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think blunt may be the wrong word. I think, thorough. The exchange was in a spirit of goodwill. There were complaints on their side and they were quite firm, and legitimate in many areas. But my point is, at the end of the day, there has been a very thorough exchange and understanding and commitment to improve them.

Q And they said they would do it by next summer, that they would see what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, what I am saying is that both sides acknowledged that the situation can worsen substantially next summer unless together we can solve problems.

Now I take from your questions that you think I have implied that there is going to be a one-way street of Japanese concessions by next summer. I don't intend that. We have a lot of improvements to make on our side of the issue too.

Q What sort of improvements?

Q What is significant about next summer? It is not our election or somebody's election. What --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Next summer is a kind of a breaking point beyond which American business as they influence the Congress is not going to continue to accept what they believe to be a lopsided, preferential trading relationship.

Q But why next summer instead of Easter or Labor Day? What makes this a summer thing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it will build before that. I think probably you have already seen the beginnings of protectionist legislation. My point is that -- and it isn't related to any political milestone. It is just how long it takes for that spirit to capture a majority of both houses. And I think that is my guess.

Q You are saying that you think it is not related to the upcoming American elections? You don't think it will be a political football that the Democrats will use -- protectionism?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I am sure it can be, of course.

Q Is that what is magic about next summer?

Q Are you talking about -- money going in here and stuff like that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I must have led you astray. I picked next summer just in a sheerly political science guess as to what is the temperature right now and how much hotter it is going to get in another eight months. I think it is going to be quite high.

Q But isn't the election going to -- I think what we are asking is, isn't the election rhetoric and election time going to fan the flames of, "We've got to do something about these Japanese who are taking away our jobs," etc.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will surely contribute to it, yes.

Q Since time is short, if we could just ask a question about Korea. What, if anything, does the President plan to do on pressing the human rights question in Korea, or does he feel that this is sort of an internal matter, that maybe it wouldn't be appropriate for him to put pressure on President Chun about?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The United States attitudes toward human liberties are very well known. Our exchanges with --

Q Grenada, they wiped them all out today. But go on.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- all governments on that score is a public position. The agenda will include this as well as security issues and economic issues as well. But I wouldn't go beyond that.

Q Is he going to meet with anyone? I know there is a meeting with community people. Will he meet at any time, the President, with so-called dissidents, people that are critics of the government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been proposals made, and decisions haven't be reached yet.

Q There was a report last Monday by a couple of tourists that had gone to Korea that they had not made all of the progress that Shultz and others have said that they have, and called upon Reagan, and this report was in a very calm way, to help on human rights when he is there. Is he going to say anything in his speech, or will there be any kind of a public signal that could be easily interpreted as wanting a greater measure of freedom in South Korea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that in terms of the priorities of issues it is the President's judgment that one has to deal with issues in their turn. What I mean specifically is more humane than peace, what is more humane than deterring conflict,

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and what is more humane than assuring that the society has jobs, peace, relative security.

Q What about the possibility of not torturing people which is one of the charges against -- you know, in terms of humanity that is one of the charges. I mean, I haven't been there, but that is a clear-cut, definite charge and legitimate to people.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think probably that I'd do much to elevate knowledge by just giving you my own opinion. I honestly believe that when you get there and you spend very much time in Korea, where you live in artillery range of the enemy and where they constantly come through tunnels or in other manifestations make clear their antagonism to you, that you gain an appreciation for the need for, call it a higher level of discipline than in other more tranquil areas.

Now, that exists in Korea. But what also exists which justifies it is a clear and present danger, and this is something which the Korean people, in overwhelming majorities, endures as essential to peace, to peaceful economic development and some measure of growing prosperity from day to day.

Now, this is not to condone repressive measures in any sense. It is to express that in times of stress the need for alertness to that threat and the many ways in which that subversive threat is expressed is understandable. Now, this is not to say that the President is in no sense concerned about the preservation of human rights there as elsewhere. We think he is.

Q You said it would -- that the President had not yet decided whether to see the dissidents. We've got two days coming up. What makes the decision -- when does he make the decision? What will motivate it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The open time which is there and it's devoted to dealing with issues that are current in Washington -- some on our agenda in national security and some domestic. His time is set aside for that. That is time that conceivably could be devoted to things of this kind, but it hasn't been decided because we simply can't know right now whether you're going to have to fill it up with continuing resolutions and debt ceilings and things like that or not.

Q -- reception that he's holding for community leaders, is this -- are you saying in effect that no one has been invited to this reception who is considered a dissident so that he won't see them there? He'd have to see them at another time or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that you can anticipate that that community is represented there.

Q -- but you -- when you talk about subversive element -- when you talk about subversive elements, is it this administration's view that such people as Kim Yung Sam and Kim Dae Jung and other leaders of political organizations that have been banned by this government are subversive elements?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That certainly isn't what I said, is it?

Q I was asking. I was asking if that is what you meant by subversive elements.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it isn't.

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Q Given the higher level of tension right now between North and South and the superior troop levels and hardware that are in the North, is there going to be any more discussion of further military aid for the government, any increase in military aid?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The ways in which we can cooperate on security issues will be an important agenda item. I believe that the government is well aware of the proposed levels of '85. And I don't expect that to be a contentious issue.

Q You're not going to ask for anymore --

Q Is anyone in the administration expressing caution about the President's rhetoric vis-a-vis North Korea or the Soviet Union in his public statements when he goes here? In other words, are you concerned that -- about inflammatory rhetoric which might be viewed as antagonistic by the Soviets?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. (Laughter.)

Q Is the DMZ dangerous for the President to travel to, or is it very safe?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's, by definition, an area which has been the scene of violence in the past. There's no reason to expect a higher level of threat than generally exists there.

Q How seriously do we take the North Korean threats against the President?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they're taken seriously more in the context of what they say about the possibility for reduced tensions generally than they are as manifesting a personal orientation of threat or, in particular, risk of violence on this trip. It's more a matter of dismay in looking at this level of rhetoric for what it implies on the possibilities for peace and tranquility on the peninsula. But it isn't something that the people are alarmed about.

Q What threats have there been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the kinds of threat that, if you look back before -- alot of foreign visitors come to South Korea, you find that North Korea, habitually, puts out threats that seem, when taken literally, very extreme. And they sound very extreme. But then, when you look at 15 visits and 15 examples of these very, very severe threats, they take on a somewhat grotesque cast. But they are repetitive and, thereby, diluted I think.

Q Haven't they said something about his not getting out of Korea alive?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, yes. Those are the kinds of -- that's the level of rhetoric you see time and time again.

Q But -- published.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- against the United States. It's disappointing. It isn't alarming.

Q After Rangoon, don't you take it more seriously?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No one can ignore that Rangoon shows there's no apparent limit to the -- well, the --

Q Bloodthirstiness? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- of that government. But their

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relations to South Korea is a different one than -- is to us.

Q Are we satisfied with what the South Koreans have considered to be a steady pace of liberalization politically, or do we think it should be substantially stepped up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's always room for more progress than is apparent, but the government's efforts, taken within the context of the pressures that they face, are responsible -- that's all I have to say.

Q How many hours of talks do you see? Tomorrow they'll meet and then they'll meet again Sunday and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was the social gatherings which are likely to be proceeded or followed by sessions that I would expect to be 2 to 4 hours in aggregate.

Q You say the DMZ is by definition an area which has been the scene of violence -- that Rangoon shows there's no apparent limit to what North Korea would do -- why in the world are you taking this man there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that the importance that we attach to the preservation of what exists in South Korea -- democratic country with some considerable promise politically and economically -- a model for developing countries throughout the world deserves to be reinforced and supported. The United States' relationship to Korea goes back generations.

Q I mean, specifically to the DMZ. He doesn't have to go to the DMZ to do that, does he? I just mean why is it so important that he go there in light of what you've said about that particular area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think if you've never been there, this is physically a location to -- it's very dramatic and its contrast -- freedom and oppression, and that's a fact. If you haven't been there you ought to go.

Q We will. (Laughter.)

Q I want to be able to come back, that's all.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For the world to see that is for the world to recognize that --

Q Well, it is to show the flag at a very important outpost, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

THE END 4:43 p.m. JST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

For Immediate Release November 11, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
ON
THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JAPAN

-- -- --

Akebono Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

4:59 p.m. JST

Q Sir, can you tell us whether we struck back yet in Lebanon or whether there's been any more firing at our airplanes?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There's been no more firing that I've heard today, so I don't think there's been any and I have no comment on the first part of your question.

Q Has it been determined who it was that fired at the aircraft?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, not precisely.

Q Is the U.S. commitment to retaliate against the terrorism in Beirut --is that still operative?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I already said I have no comment on that question. That's the same question that Sam asked in a very artfully different way. (Laughter.)

Q If you don't have any idea precisely, do you have any idea generally about this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, we do. Not going to make a comment on it.

Q Well, what about the lack of trade agreements out of this visit? What can you tell us about the lack of any progress on lowering trade values for Japanese?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as the economic side of the Japanese visit is concerned, it's been quite successful in my judgement. I think you have to see this in its total perspective. We have an agreement about expanding trade in energy. We have an agreement that was reached just before coming here about automobiles. There is an agreement that's just been reached having to do with trade and investment and technology transfer and the elimination of all tariff barriers and semiconductors.

The point I'm making is that there have been a lot of specific things of this kind and they continue on before the visit, during the visit, after the visit. But this is a big process going on -- trade between the United States and Japan. It's very large. We are preoccupied to a certain extent, for example, with the subject of barriers to citrus and beef and we're in a continuing process of discussions seeking to open the Japanese market further. However, to keep it in perspective, we should note that 58 percent of the exports of beef from the United States go to Japan and, I believe, 44 percent of the citrus shipped out of the U.S. goes to Japan. So there are problems, but there's also a great deal of trade.

So, this is a process that's going on and I think that on the whole the visit itself has precipitated some further agreements. I should have mentioned also something of tremendous importance,in my view anyway, and that is the addressing of the yen-dollar

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relationship and in particular the recognition conceptually by the Japanese that the yen now must take its place as an international currency with all of the particular things that that conceptual notion applies, and a number of them were announced in the agreement that was set out yesterday. So, I think there have been a great many things that have gone on and it's been a very fruitful discussion in the economic area.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think that enough has been accomplished to ward off protectionist actions in Congress?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that protectionist action in Congress is bad regardless of what happens here. But I do think we can see that our trade with Japan is very substantial and let me just ask you the question -- Should we cut off several billion dollars of exports of agricultural products to Japan because we are not satisfied with the openness of markets on the remaining citrus and beef? Or should we continue to work at the citrus and beef problem as it is? You can shut trade down around the world by reacting in a protectionist way to every problem that you have.

[illegible]

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We'll continue to work at these problems, and I think we'll resolve them as time goes on. But protection is bad, regardless of the agreements that may or may not be reached here.

Q Don't you have to acknowledge that protectionist sentiment in Congress and what has happened there gave you a bit of a lever when you came here to talk?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Everybody is concerned about it. The President is; the Prime Minister is. And we all are. And we point to it, not only in the United States but in countries all around the world. It's a real problem.

And, as the President said this morning in his speech to the Diet, we've had experience in this world with what happens when protectionist sentiment takes over. And that experience is the 1930s, and we don't want to repeat it. It's just a way of shutting trade down, and it's unequivocally bad.

Q But would the Japanese be moving if there were no protectionist movement in Congress?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It helps. On the other hand, I think from our standpoint to raise protectionist barriers doesn't do us any good. Let me just give an example: take the automobile available to the American consumer today. I'm not speaking now about the Japanese automobile available to American consumers, but that produced by American automobile companies. It's much better today than it was four or five years ago. Why? Because our producers are subject to international competition, and they found that if they didn't do better with their product, gradually their markets would erode. And, so, they have done better -- a lot better.

And I think the cars being produced by U.S. auto makers now are very competitive with any other. So, competition does us all good, and if we protect ourselves from it, we're going to lose and lose badly.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q It helps, though, to have it.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You've had two now.

Q Well, taking what you just said is the premise, what was your answer to the earlier question? Has what has happened here been sufficient in your view to dampen this protectionist sentiment at home and in the Congress? How do you feel about that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'm at a disadvantage in that question because I think the protectionist pressure is bad regardless of what happens here. But I do think, as we sense the mood here, and as we look at the specific things that the Japanese have been ready to face up to, that we see a concern here that matches our own with rising protectionist sentiment and the very bad effect it can have on the United States economy, on the Japanese economy, on the world economy. And that's really -- that's the problem that has to be addressed.

Q If some progress is being made as you say, how long is it going to take before Japanese markets are as open to American goods as American markets are open to Japanese goods? How long is it going to take before you think there's an equalization there?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course they are as open as U.S. markets in many cases. Our problem is, in particular, relatively narrow categories and I suppose we'll be arguing about those things for many years and that's in part because technology produces new areas of trade and new areas for argument all the time.

When I was in the U.S. government the last time and came to Japan in 1970, all anybody could talk about was textiles. That's not even on the agenda in the U.S.-Japan trade relationship now because the whole sweep of where textiles are produced and what the nature of the problem is has changed completely. So, these kinds of problems, trade discussions, will always go on as long as we have a high volume of trade -- an expanding volume of trade and a dynamic technology. It's part of a process that you just have to get accustomed to.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you think was really accomplished on the security side, which was another really key topic coming over here, given the international situation? It seemed to kind of fade away?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it didn't fade away, but it was discussed by the President and the Prime Minister in their first meeting and I think that the view that we have that the mission set out for Japan by the Japanese is an important mission, as the President has said publicly at one time or another during his visit

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and we would like to see the Japanese move up to that mission, perhaps a little more rapidly than they are. Nevertheless, one can see definite progress in that regard and many things to point to in the defense field that the Japanese are doing.

Q During the joint statements yesterday, the President said that he hoped that today's meeting with the Prime Minister to talk about setting milestones for reaching agreements on reducing trade barriers. What was accomplished today in their meetings?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, you mean in their luncheon. It was a as I understand it. I wasn't there - I asked the President about it and it was a very pleasant occasion, family occasion to a certain extent. But there also was some substantive discussion, principally about follow up. And I think both the Prime Minister and the President are determined that the sense of direction that they have established in their earlier meetings and reaffirmed in this one be followed up. And from our side, on the United States side, the President considers this of such importance that he has asked the Vice President to, in effect, chair the U.S. effort at coordinating our activities as we then seek to interact with the Japanese in following up on the various problem areas that have been identified. So they did discuss that and the President told the Prime Minister the way we're going to go about it within our own government.

Q If I could just follow up, was there anything specific in terms of timetables in terms of various points in which you want to achieve certain things? Was that left totally indefinite?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think we want to move up on this rapidly and we're looking at 1984 and the first half of 1984 and seeing what we can accomplish then. I meet with Foreign Minister Abe frequently. We try to meet at least four times a year and we've been doing better than that. And we take a reading at each meeting that we have. So we are trying to push in all of these areas. But as far as saying by such and such a date, we should have done so and so, no, we didn't do that.

Q Since nuclear arms was so much a part of the President's speech today, what is the prospect or the possibility or do you think there's any chance that we could possibly reach an agreement before the end of the month, or before we start deploying missiles in Europe?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There is certainly a chance of reaching an agreement if the Soviets will be reasonable. We have very reasonable proposals. Paul Nitze is there to engage in an exchange and we're certainly prepared to bargain with the Soviets about it. On the other hand, there is no way that the United States and our allies will settle for a considerable Soviet deployment of SS 20s and a zero on our side. So there has to be the notion of equality in any result that comes forward.

Q Has the United States put another proposal on the table?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have put a proposal on the table at the start of this round and we have heard a response from the Soviets and we're discussing that response. And when those discussions have been completed, Mr. Nitze will - is taking part in those discussions and we'll just have to see.

Q Is the United States government interested in getting Japan and the Republic of Korea to operate in the sea lane defense with regard to the TsushimaStrait which is between the two? Are you taking any initiative or discussing this issue with both sides?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Not in any precise way, but it certainly is part of what one would consider the defense needs of Japan, and Korea, for that matter.

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Q To what extent do you think the Japanese elections have restricted U.S. achievements during this summit? The upcoming Japanese elections?

SECRETARY SHULTZ Well I really have no idea. I don't know -- have enough of a feel for how that impacts on what Japanese attitudes are and basically it's an internal matter and we didn't [illegible] it wasn't appropriate for us to discuss it.

Q The Japanese didn't mention that they had problems dealing with some of these issues, such as beef and oranges, during this period of time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ The political dimensions of economic problems are well known to

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everybody, both on the U S. side and on the Japanese side and on the European side and so forth. And this whole effort to free up markets is an exercise in arranging the politics to do what is sensible from the standpoint of the economics. So you essentially see that problem all the time and it's certainly referred to.

Q Mr. Secretary, sir, the Governor General of Grenada Paul Scoon seems to have avoided such measures as arrest without warrant, no assembly, press censorship. What do you think of that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Oh, I think that that's way overdrawn from what has been taking place in Grenada. It's -- It is very free and open. There is the clean-up on the island that's taking place just about completed. And a new government is being established. There is an open press situation. People -- press people who have been in jail under the prior regime are released and they're starting up. And I think that the notion that somehow or other repression has returned to Grenada is wrong and it's just not a correct story.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've talked about reaching the goals here in Japan that you have set. Can you tell us what the top several priorities you have for Korea? And, also, specifically do they include human rights questions or would human rights be somewhere down the list?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, as far as Korea is concerned, of course, this is a very important relationship for the United States and for Korea. There is a major security dimension to it that's vital. Korea is a major trading partner now of the United States, our ninth largest trading partner. So, both the security and the economic aspects of our relationship will be discussed. There is no question about the fact that the President will want to express his outrage at the North Korean murder of members of the South Korean government in Burma and to discuss that whole subject. So there are many things to talk about and, of course, the President will want to visit our U.S. forces in Korea. It's very much an area where you feel the tension. I'm sure that's true right now. It's been true in the past as I visited there.

As far as the question of Korean internal affairs are concerned, the President's policy is to conduct private diplomacy on these matters. He always brings up problems where he sees them. I think myself it is noteworthy that the threats from North Korea, the reality of the murders of the people in the South Korean government constitute a deep deprivation of human rights in South Korea, point number one.

Point two, there have been some moves in the release of political prisoners in South Korea that I think are noteworthy as well as the expressed determination of President Chun to have elections and, as he says, watch the Olympics from the bleachers in 1988. So these are all things in a positive direction.

Beyond that, the President will discuss matters as he feels are appropriate. But any question of importance will be discussed, but that will be discussed privately.

Q Mr. Secretary, will the President say anything to try to ease tensions on the peninsula or East-West tensions in general?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, Korea is a tense place right now with these murders, and the President will want to discuss that situation with the President of Korea. We don't want to see, obviously we don't want to see a war on the Korean peninsula. So we want to see restraint. But we also want to see South Korea supported. So our own diplomatic effort, and the Japanese diplomatic effort, and the rallying of people around the world to the side of South Korea I think is very important. And the more that happens, I think [illegible]

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the more tension tends to be reduced somewhat. North Korea does seem to be on a campaign to raise tensions to the maximum degree. But the President will, of course, keep his cool and, at the same time, he is not a person who will be intimidated.

Q Can you tell us whether you know anything about the health of Andropov?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no specific knowledge, other than the obvious inference of his long absence from public view and his failure to show up at this major traditional ceremony recently -- suggests that his health is not too good. But I have no specific information beyond what you or anybody else has.

Q Has he been in power long enough so that it would make a difference? Does it make any difference whether he passes from the scene or not?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's hard for me to comment on what goes on inside the Kremlin halls. I just don't know. Mr. Andropov said, when he spoke at the Brezhnev funeral -- and he said when he spoke to Vice President Bush and me and Ambassador Hartman on that occasion that his policy would be one of continuity. And in so far as tension poits around the world are concerned -- Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Southern Africa, Korean Peninsula, Central America -- it's hard to see -- Afghanistan -- that he has been anything but true to his word. The Soviet Union has not come forward with anything constructive in those areas.

Arms control, obviously, is a subject that seems to have caught his attention. And he's made a number of proposals there. In so far as the INF talks are concerned, we are still looking for a kind of proposal that really meets the fundamentals of our position. There have been some movements in other areas. And what his role as compared with others is concerned, we don't know. I don't think that the Soviet Union, as I see it, handled the Korean airline massacre very well. And saying that, if it happened again, they would shoot it down again strikes me as a cruel thing for any government to say. And if that's Mr. Andropov's policy, I would hope for better.

I guess you're out of questions.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 5:22 P.M. JST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY A
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE
PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JAPAN

November 11, 1983

Akebono Room
Okura Hotel
Tokyo, Japan

7:22 p.m. JST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll begin with a very brief description of the objectives of this visit and then I'll be glad to take questions. I'd say there were really four principal objectives the President is going to be pursuing and the first and by far most important is the objective of affirming and strengthening our security commitment to South Korea. That, given the very high level of military threat that South Korea faces from North Korea, would always be a major purpose of a Presidential visit. In fact, even before the Korean airliner shoot down and the Rangoon bombing, we've always seen that as perhaps the most important thing the President would do when he's in South Korea.

Those two events and particularly the Rangoon atrocity, which is one of the most shocking acts of political assassination political terrorism supported by another state that I can think of, the importance of affirming that security commitment is greatly increased. In fact, I think, the fact that this region has been able to take shocks of the kind that it has witnessed and that South Korea has been able to go through these two shocks in a very short space of time and to react with the kind of restraint and statesmanship that they have reacted is testimony to the effectiveness of the security relationships that we've been able to build up in this part of the world. That has many elements in it including our relationship with Japan and the good relations that have developed between Japan and Korea. But first and foremost is our security treaty with South Korea -- a security treaty that's backed up by the commitment of U.S. troops in Korea -- a commitment that's been affirmed very strongly by this President and it gives South Korea the kind of confidence it needs to handle very serious threats that it faces.

The second purpose would be to talk about economic matters. Those are important because South Korea's economic development has been nothing short of remarkable and continues to be, I might say. They are now recovering from the effects of the world recession that hit everybody. Their real GNP growth for this year is projected to be in the neighborhood of 8 percent. They've averaged nearly that over a couple of decades, and as a result they've gone from a position of being a country that was heavily dependent on U.S. economic and military assistance, to a country that is self-sufficient and self-reliant and -- there's the major share of the defense burden in South Korea. That's important to us. It also has made South Korea our 9th largest trading partner. We do $5 billion exports roughly to South Korea and take roughly the same amount of imports to the U.S. Those are numbers that are steadily growing, so it's an important market to us.

Being an important growing market, as we find here in Japan, we've got trade problems -- trade frictions. We'd like to see a more open South Korean market and the President is going to be raising issues of that kind with President Chun.

Third objective will be to discuss with them the subject of political development in South Korea. I want to underscore that we approach discussions of that kind -- that is to say discussions with another country about their own internal affairs with a

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certain humility and recognize that it's a very delicate subject for one country to tell another country how to run its business. Nevertheless, given the stake that the United States has in South Korea, the kinds of commitments we've made to the security of South Korea, it's important for us to see the South Korea that is strong, and that means not just militarily strong, but strong economically and strong in a political sense. And it's all belief that this [illegible] best political foundation

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is one that rests on representative institutions and that enjoys broad, popular consent. And we, in that context, welcome, very much, the kinds of progress that South Korea's made in the last three years. I note, starting with a very significant decision made shortly after President Chun came to Washington to meet with President Reagan, the announcement to commute the sentence on one of the most important Korean dissidents, Kim Dae Jung -- the later decision to release Kim who's now in the United States. A large number of other dissidents have been released over the last few years. Restrictions on political activity have been eased. And what, in the long run, may be the most significant thing is the public commitment by President Chun to a peaceful constitutional change of power in 1988. I think his phrase is something to the effect that he looks forward to viewing the 1988 Olympics, which will be held in Seoul by the way, and which represent a major political triumph for South Korea. The President has said he looks forward to viewing those events from the general spectators boxes.

So we feel that there's been progress made. And, as I think you know, we believe in approaching issues of this kind which are sensitive through what we call "quiet diplomacy." That is to say, we will talk very bluntly and very directly in private. We don't believe in public lecturing of other governments. We don't believe that that's helpful to the very objective of promoting human rights and greater democracy.

But I think, while there's alot of improvement that can still be made in South Korea, we believe that the trends are in the right direction. And that's very welcome news for the United States as well as for South Korea.

The fourth objective -- and it's a very distant fourth. Although, before the Rangoon bombing, we would have hoped, perhaps, to give it more attention. And that is the subject of reduction of tensions with North Korea. It remains important as an objective. Indeed, in a way, there's nothing more important in the long-term than the effort to reduce tensions and to reduce this extraordinarily high level of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. But it's very hard to pursue serious efforts to reduce tensions with a government that is bent on murdering the leaders of another country.

And so, while we will certainly want to review the bidding on that subject and other diplomatic issues such as South Korea's initiatives to expand its relations throughout the world, I think the realistic prospects for improving relations between South and North have got to be viewed as pretty distant right now.

I'd be glad to take questions.

Q When was the last constitutional change of power in South Korea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are, as a matter of fact, not that many countries in the world that have managed peaceful constitutional changes of power. It's a very difficult thing to do. It's not been done in South Korea. It is something that takes care. It takes preparation. And for a country that faces the kind of direct military threat that South Korea faces, also, it's a process where people want to be very careful about things, for example, like permitting demonstrations that have a potential for violence.

They're under a kind of strain because of that military threat that I don't think Americans can truly appreciate. It something you can really feel tangiably when you go up to the DMZ as we will be doing on Sunday. And when you realize that that massive North Korean buildup of power is within artillery range of the capital of South Korea and poised to go at instant --

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Q No. My question is: when was the last constitutional --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There hasn't been one. As you know, the tendency has been to have governments established by military coup. And it will be a great accomplishment, and a very important one, to see the reigns of power turned over peacefully in 1988.

Q You mentioned Kim Dae Jung. And you and other officials have mentioned the President's remark about wanting to watch this from the bleachers. But Kim, himself, in the United States and many other dissidents who aren't permitted

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back in Korea have viewed with great skepticism this promise to hold elections. What is the U.S. view of that promise? Do we believe that there are going to be elections in a constitutional change in 1988 as promised?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's our view that that kind of change is a very important thing. It's important to the United States as well South Korea. It's a difficult process to undertake and we want to be of assistance and give useful advice. That's our view.

Q With all due respect, that wasn't my question. The question was do we believe the South Korean leaders when they say that they're going to have that constitutional change. If you don't want to answer it, don't. But that's the question

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we believe South Korean leaders when they say they want to have that kind of change. We also recognize that it's a difficult process and it's going to take a lot of care, yes.

Q Will the President meet with any critics of the current government in South Korea? And if so, who are they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will be having a meeting with Korean community leaders, which will include people of a variety of political views including people that have been critical of the government. I don't have the specific list of people that will be there.

Q A list of the people who are invited to that reception?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have a list here. I'm sure -- Well, I don't have the list here. I don't know.

Q -- if the list of guests is going to be made public?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that either. I'll try to find out.

Q And also, will the reception be a truly social event with mingling and all that or will there actually be an opportunity for discussion of some of these issues? And --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's intended to give an opportunity for some real exchange of views.

Q Question? Question? What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is whether this is going to be a purely social event or whether there would be some exchange of views.

Q Will he be meeting with any people -- any of the 300 people who have been banned from taking part in political activity?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that. Sorry. I don't know.

Q Do you know of any plans to include them --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know specifically.

Q Have you explored whether they would be able to meet the President --

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I understand it, the ban on political activity doesn't ban people from getting around the country and meeting with people like the President of the United States. Korea is a country that has problems. It also has a great deal of freedom.

Q Well, will he be meeting with any of these people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know whether he will.

Q Since the first time you briefed us in the White House -- asked you and other members of the administration for a list of the people that would be attending that reception. I'd like to renew that request and note that it has been requested many times before.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. And I will see whether we can get it for you. I don't know. I don't have it myself, no.

Yes.

Q How does the U.S. government view the provocative acts by North Korea? Do we think that they're trying to provoke a war with the South again?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think they were trying to assassinate the President of South Korea and given the very distorted view of reality that I think they supply to themselves, I think they believe that this is going to lead to a popular uprising that would install a communist government in South Korea. It certainly was an extremely dangerous act, one that would have caused great instability and been an enormous provocation to military action. It's hard to think of anything more dangerous and reckless.

Q Let me follow up on that. Yesterday you said that we praised the South Koreans' statesmanlike response to that action. What lesson does that teach North Korea, if any?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the North Koreans are learning a number of lessons. I think the Burmese who have been very courageous in the way they've pursued this investigation and particularly in the way they've revealed the facts of the investigation have already made North Korea pay a heavy price, cutting relations and kicking out the North Korean Embassy. That is something, by the way, that in the very intense competition that goes on between North and South Korea for political recognition, that the two countries pay a lot of attention to, the kinds of measures that Japan has announced, the kind of denunciation of the North Korean action that the Japanese have made is another price that they're paying.

And I think the kind of support that South Korea is finding around the world from the United States and also from many other countries is, in a sense, a price that North Korea is paying and a gain to South Korea. And I think it's that pattern of reactions that encourages the statesmanlike behavior that we've seen.

Q You talk about strengthening -- strengthening the security commitment. Do we have any specific plan to sell any more military equipment or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When I said strengthen, I meant in a political sense. And I guess what I mean is strengthening

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the confidence that people have -- people in South Korea -- in that commitment. As I think you all know, the decision at the beginning of the Carter administration to pull U.S. troops out of Korea was a great shock to this whole region, to Japan and particularly to South Korea. The decision by President Carter to reverse that decision began a rebuilding process, one that I think has been intensified considerably since President Reagan came in and one which I think this visit will contribute to.

And having people feel that way -- and, by the way, also in answer to your question -- having the North Koreans recognize that commitment we think contributes both to the deterrence of North Korean actions and to confidence and, with that confidence, restraint by South Korea.

Q Two questions about the reception for prominent Koreans. The schedule we were given earlier today seemed to indicate that this would only be a half hour in total. Is that correct? And, secondly, who made the invitations to this event -- the American government, the Korean government or who is responsible for that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I had the message that there is a lot of interest in the list, in how it was put together and what the nature of the occasion will be, and I will, first of all, find out how much of this we can make public. I don't know whether there's a limit on that. And if we can make it public, I'll get you as much as we can.

Q Now, what about those two specific questions? How long is the meeting? Is it a half an hour reception?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- half an hour. That's correct.

Q And, secondly, who gave the invitations? Did the United States government invite these people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe this was done by the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. Embassy has contacts throughout Korean society, as we do in many other countries. We don't just -- our embassies deal not just with governments but with people outside of the government.

Q When will you plan to have the answer?

Q Will you come -- will you come back with the list and the answers tonight?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't promise you. I don't know that.

Q I've got a simple question. Is the President and the administration satisfied with the progress that South Korea is making in the area of human rights and democracy?

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question is: are we satisfied with the progress that South Korea has made and, I guess I told you, is making. And I guess the answer is we think they have made substantial progess; we are encouraged by that and pleased by that. And we also believe there's a lot more progress that can be made.

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Q Are you satisfied with the pace of the progress --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think so, yes.

Q What was the question?

Q -- message that you hope to convey to North Korea's supporters by President Reagan's visit there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was what message do we hope to convey to North Korea and its supporters -- is that what you said -- by the President's visit there. I think the most simple, direct message that the United States is committed to the defense of South Korea and that any military action by North Korea would be a very grave and foolish mistake.

Q -- more on the so-called --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could you elaborate a little more -- what you mean by that question?

Q The new guidelines just released -- State Department --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We had hoped before the Rangoon bombing, as I said, to try to pursue initiatives for reducing tensions with North Korea. And in that context, we in fact had considered easing some of the restrictions on our diplomatic contacts with North Korean diplomats. It's one of the consequences of Rangoon is to cause us to, at least for the time being, put off any such change in our policy of contacts.

Q Is the President's speech a warning to North Korea?

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are not threatening North Korea, and we make that clear. And it's important to make it clear. The President is going there to affirm that if South Korea is attacked, the United States will come to their defense. I don't whether that's -- it's a warning only if North Korea contemplates an attack.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 7:41 P.M. JST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Seoul, Korea)

BRIEFING ON TRIP TO DEMILITARIZED ZONE

November 12, 1983

Sapphire Room
Hotel Lotte
Seoul, Korea

1:30 P.M. (Local Time)

A Well, the DMZ, as you know, was established by the Armistice Agreement of 1953. It's 151 miles from sea to shining sea. It runs, basically, sort of like the mountains run. To the west side, it's kind of low. And as the mountains roll and as it goes to the east, the DMZ goes up, too.

It was the line of contact between the opposing ground forces when the armistice was signed. And each side pulled back 2,000 meters, and formed the 4,000 meter buffer which was intended to keep the two sides apart. You know, of course, the war didn't end. We had an ad hoc agreement to bring the shooting to a halt. And that was perpetuated when the political talks that were convened after the truce -- they, also, failed. And the armistice contained a clause which said that, unless both sides agree to stop it, it goes on. So that's the condition that we have today: no war, no peace.

And it's the DMZ that's supposed to be demilitarized. But you've probably heard some of the reports, read some of the reports that it's one of the more militarized areas that you'll find. We have a number of what we call "guard posts." And these are one of the things that the President will visit tomorrow. But for every guard post we have in the DMZ, the North Koreans have surrounded it with two, and sometimes three, and even more. They just gang up on each of our guard posts. And it's these guard posts that have been the scene of most of the fire fights that we have.

The Korean War ended the last two years with what they call the "hill battles." And these were just almost permanent positions. Both sides just dug deep into the mountains. Sometimes, you did it with sandbags and the rocks. Sometimes, you just managed to dig in. Well, it's been 30 years since they re-ended the war. And both sides have dug in much, much deeper since.

Q Do you mean these guard posts are in the 4,000?

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A They're inside the 4,000. We have one guard post, Ouellette. There are 2 guard posts manned by the U.S. troops. Ouellette is the one that's to the east. Its outer perimeter fence is 30 meters from the North Korean side.

Q Is that the closest?

A That's the closest.

Q Well, what's that -- that's what guard --

A That's Ouellette: O-u-e-l-l-e-t-t-e.

Q Okay. Once again.

A O-u-e-l-l-e-t-t-e.

Q Is that the one Reagan's going to visit?

A Perhaps. Have they said which one he's going to visit?

Q Yes. He's going to Collier.

A Okay. Collier is the one that's to the west of there, and slightly south. Collier overlooks the only South Korean village inside the DMZ -- a village called -- hello, Sam -- Tae Song Dong, what we call "Freedom Village." It's a South Korean village that was established -- or re-established, actually -- it was the original residence. People moved back in after the war with permission from the United Nations command and in agreement with the North Korean and the Chinese People's Volunteer side.

Q How close is the Collier guard post to the North Korean side?

A Collier will be probably close to 1,000 meters from the other side.

Q What's the most recent incident that you've had? Have you had any?

A In the American sector, the last time we had an exchange of fire was about two years ago. We have had in the Korean sector -- and this is where most of the activity has been. If you read the North Korean press dispatches, we've had alot. But we go up and investigate them. And we haven't had. But there've been exchanges of fire. We have killed, this year -- let's see. Back in May, we intercepted three agents in the western sector. And then, in July, we intercepted three more down on the southeast coast. And we, also, intercepted an agent boat.

Q Are you saying --

Q "Intercepted" means killed them, right?

A Intercepted means killed them.

Q So how many this year?

A So this year we have killed at least 11.

Q By "we," do you mean Americans?

A By "we," meaning Koreans.

Q Has the --

Q Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Yes. Who has killed these agents?

A The South Koreans.

Q The South Korean force. Americans have not done

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A We have not had any type of exchange of fire in the American sector in about two years.

Q And you said the last -- the last item was your three agents and three -- and then there was a boat?

A There was an infiltration boat, a mother ship, which the South Korean navy intercepted. They challenged it, tried to get it to stop. It wouldn't stop. They fired. And the South Koreans sent a helicopter after it, and sank it with rockets. And we had visual sighting of bodies on board.

Q That's where the four --

A Five.

Q Five of them, then. There were five --

A Five, three, and three; so 11.

Q Right. Okay.

A At least 11. We're not sure exactly how many would have been on the boat.

Q I'm more interested in the U.S. exchanges of fire.

A Yes.

Q Well, the last one was two years ago.

A About two years ago.

Q Were they mortars, 105s, or rockets?

A No this was small arms fire. What it was -- the guard post -- and it was in the vicinity -- actually, both guard posts were basically involved. It was between them. It was a -- North Koreans were picked up by radar, ground radar, in our sector which they could have been doing just for harassment or anything else. They were challenged. There was an exchange of fire, and no casualties.

Q Do we do patroling of any kind?

A We do patroling.

Q Into the DMZ

A We patrol day and night, day and night in our sector.

Q So how far out do our patrols go?

A Our patrols stay within a 1,000 meter sector.

Q So we stay --

A Everything else in the DMZ belongs to the Koreans.

Q -- within 1,000 meters. Well, that takes us right up to their front line.

A Well, not quite. (Laughter.) As far as the guard post goes, we're right up to their -- what they call the "military demarkation line," the line in the middle.

Yes.

Q Yes. Well, there's a gap. And the gap is 1,000 meters.

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A Well, no. We have -- it's like a corridor like the Berlin corridor. It goes in.

Q Yes.

A We have that sector. Everything else, right and left, are Koreans.

Q And the distance between the foremost U.S. post to the --

A To the North Korean -- it's about 30 meters.

Q 30 meters.

Q What are the -- in killing these North Korean agents, what's been the South Korean casualties this year? Have they lost anybody?

A Not this year. But they have -- in the post-armistice period, we had occasional incidents from time to time, beginning in 1956 coinciding with the visit by, then, President Johnson -- no, no -- Johnson -- '66. I'm sorry; '66. The North Koreans kicked off a campaign of violence. And they ambushed an American patrole. We lost five Americans in '66. We killed 16 in '67, 15 in '68 and --

Q Could you must take that -- five in '66?

A Five in '66, 16 in '67, 15 in '68, and we've had a couple since. They blew up one in a tunnel we discovered they were digging in the DMZ. And we've made three discoveries. The first one that we got was in 1974 and then, again, in '76 and, again, in '78.

Q How many casualites?

A The casualties?

Q Yes, when?

A Which one, the four, 15, 16, 15?

Q Since '68.

A Since '68.

Q Yes.

A Since '68 --

Q Any American casualties or South Korean casualties?

A Since '68, let's see. We had -- well, in '68, we lost 15.

Q Right.

Q Since that time.

A Since that time, we've had one in the tunnel --

Q Yes.

A -- three killed when their helicopter was shot down after it strayed across the line.

Q When was that?

A That was in 1976 -- and the two killed at the axe murder.

Q So you've had six since the --

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A So we've had -- the grand total since 1953 -- killed, of American has been 60. Koreans have lost -- something a little over 300. And the North Koreans have lost over 300 -- and over 1,000 wounded.

Q The North Koreans have made threats. And this time about the President. Is there a concern -- as there was -- that there be a repetition of 1966, an attempt to involve our troops or threaten the President's --

A No. Our sector's been very quiet. They haven't bothered -- we get the propaganda leaflets. We get the DMZ broadcast. The threats that the North Koreans have been sending -- alot of times, the headlines on the things -- there'll be a program -- the North Korean program -- they may use their -- they have a phoney patriotic radio station, the Voice of the Revolutionary People's Party that they use that, actually, is broadcast in North Korea. But they pretend that it comes out of South Korean patriots. They'll have very, very strong titles for their programs -- that this will bring about the destruction of Reagan. Then, you go into the body of the thing, and the threat's a little bit softer. They're not quite as -- so they do this. They keep the tension. And that's part of their program.

Q I'd like to get this geography straight. There's this 4,000 meters --

A Yes.

Q -- which is the DMZ. You say, we have a guard post within 30 meters of the North Koreans. The North Koreans are where, down the middle of the 4,000 or up --

A Let me -- I'll show you that particular area.

Q While you're getting that out, what -- in '66 with Johnson, there wasn't anything directly done while he was up there visiting, was there?

A No. This was -- everybody was out at the airport. And I caught alot of harassment from the media, because the decision was made. It wasn't our decision. The decision was made not to tell the traveling media that we'd had the ambush that morning.

Q It occurred while Reagan -- while Johnson was landing?

A No. It occurred as he was leaving.

Q So even if there is an incident, we're probably not going to know about it. (Laughter.)

Q That's not new.

Q Do you have an extra copy of that?

A Yes. I'll leave some of these wth you.

Q Why don't you just pass them over. And we can look at them while you're going through it..

A Okay. Unfortunately, I didn't have access -- I don't have enough for everybody. If you all will share them, I'll give you what I got.

Q I'm sure Marlin will get some copies.

A Let me give -- that's the whole package. I'm going to have many more of these for tomorrow. But they were in a different place.

A Let me just xerox this.

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Q And for those of us who were late, could you start from the top on this?

A We haven't discussed what you're going to see tomorrow. We're just discussing, generally, the --

Q -- not retributions?

A Right now, you all, kind of, share them. Kind of pass them around. I can work without them. This has got the basic information about the 2nd Infantry division, the camps that are in that area, about what it does of course. And why I wasn't really going to pass them out in advance, it contains more information than the President is going to see. But the people who drive up on the bus are going to see these places.

Q Well, can we make one point on that. Alot of us are going to have to write stories in advance of the trip. Is there any way you can get some more to us?

A This is why I'm here.

Q Can you get some more of those for us?

A I can send some down.

Q Because, I mean, we've got a whole press corps out there who could use them.

A I can get them for you. If I can get access to a phone and call my office, I can --

Q Why don't you leave right now and go call your office and, then, come back.

A Is there a phone here?

Q Because I think there's alot of people who are --

Q There's a phone over there on the desk. Over here.

* * *

A We were just covering the DMZ in general, rather than things tomorrow.

Q That would be helpful -- in general.

A Do you all want to go through it again?

Q Sure.

Q Well, some of us weren't here.

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A The DMZ was established by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. What had happened, we had two years of a stalemate. They'd gone into a hill war with both sides just digging in, but no major advances. People would try to take high ground for practical advantage, particularly as it looked like we were reaching agreement. And our worst fighting, our fiercest fighting happened in the very last days --Pork Chop Hill, for instance, when we lost Pork Chop happened in early July of the -- the month that we signed the agreement.

But the idea was that they had reached an agreement that when the fighting came to a halt by a truce and not by a peace treaty, there is no such thing here, each side would pull back from the point of contact two thousand meters and that would be a demilitarized zone, a buffer between the forces. Of course, at the time, everybody thought it would be a temporary thing, no more than ninety days. The Armistice recommended; Let's have a political conference with the parties concerned. That was delayed until the next year, but they held it with no results. We were not going to give up at a negotiating table what we didn't give up on the battlefield. The other side tried. The Armistice remained in effect and it remains in effect today.

So, you never talk about peace negotiations because from the military standpoint and between North and South Korea, there's no such thing as peace negotiations.

Q You have 4000 meters separating the --

A 4000 meters separating.

Q -- and you only patrol halfway out.

A We only patrol halfway out. That's our side.

Q And MDL means --

A Military demarcation line.

Q And that's as far out as we go and as far down as they come.

A Yes.

Q Supposed to go.

A That's as far out as we go. Now, I'm one of those rare critters that's been on the other side, but I did it legally. There are ways -- the other side may shift in their ways of doing it.

Q I know it stretches across the country, so how far?

A 151 miles.

Q At the MDL, is there a fence?

A No, there is no fence. There's a bunch of yellow stakes and signs. They're called MDL markers. There's about 1,090 of them. From any one stake or marker you're supposed to be able to see one on each side.

Q Is the DMZ mined?

A The DMZ is supposed to be unmined, unmilitarized, demilitarized. I'll tell you about the other side, what they have.

Q What artillery of theirs can reach these two camps?

A Back in 1975, they -- not at our two camps, but at ROK Guard Post inside the DMZ, they leveled anti-aircraft artillery and we're using that to fire at our guard posts. That shows how close --

Q Well, a mortar can --

A A mortar can reach it, yes.

Q A mortar will reach it?

A Yes. A mortar will go way beyond.

Q I know you said 4000 meters, but translate that to feet.

A Translate that to feet.

Q Yards, feet, miles.

A What a nasty fellow. What a thing to do to somebody. (Laughter.)

Q You said that each of our guard posts was surrounded by two or three of theirs.

A On their side.

Q Oh, on their side. Well, that's not surrounding them.

A Yes. Each side is separate.

Q So that's not surrounding it then.

Q Wait. Explain that again.

A Well, that's why I wanted to show you all the map. It will be easier to explain.

If you look at the map that you've got there, you see the military demarcation line which runs down through the middle and then there are two guard posts. This is Collier and this is -- well, they don't show that on this one.

Q Yes, it does.

A Oh, okay. There's Ouellette, yes. Ouellette. Now, they don't show the North Koreans, but across from Ouellette, for instance, they have -- the North Koreans have a guard post here, here, and here. And then, Collier is further back. You can see how much closer Ouellette is, right on the DMZ. Collier's well back.

Q And you said Collier overlooks the only South Korean village inside the DMZ?

A Tae Song Dong.

Q What is JSA?

A Joint Security Area. This is Panmunjom.

Q Can you spell the name of the village?

A T-A-E-, S-O-N-G, D-O-N-G.

Q B, as in boy?

A Dog.

Q Is that that phony village?

A No. The other side is Paik Song Ni.

Q How do you spell it?

A P-A-I-K, S-O-N-G, N-I. This is the North Korean village. They have their counterpart on their side, which looks

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an Olympic village.

Q That's Peace Village and Propaganda Village?

A We call ours, Freedom Village, and they call theirs, Propaganda -- or we call theirs, Propaganda Village. And the reason, it started out as a signboard village. They had a nice, beautiful building on a signboard and the wind came along and blew it down, and the wind does blow, and they would just pop it back up. Then they got around to building more and more. At one time, they had the world's largest flag there. Then they found out our side -- our village, the South Korean village had a taller flagpole so they put another flagpole up which is taller. Now, both sides -- unless the wind is blowing, you can't get those flags up. If you want to cover a flag raising sometime, you'd have to wait for a windy day. They're just so big.

Q How far is Collier from their nearest guard post?

A From their nearest guard post, it's going to run close to 1500 meters.

Q Are the people in the guard post armed?

A The people in the guard post are armed.

Q Isn't there a restriction, though, within the Armistice Agreement that allows only small arms?

A Right. The Armistice Agreement is a lot like the Constitution of the United States. It probably shows the American influence in the difference between state's rights and federal government. If the Constitution doesn't say that the federal government does that, then everything is supposed to be to the states.

Q It does not allow machine guns

A The Armistice says what you can have, and then everything else is prohibited.

Q What does it say you can have? Just small arms?

A Small arms, non-automatic.

Q The closest the President will get to a North Korean post is where? Ouellette or Collier?

A Collier.

Q Collier?

Q He's going to Collier.

Q He's not going to Ouellette.

A No.

Q That's right. He's just going to Collier.

Q How far is that from the MDL?

A Collier is about a 1000 meters from the MDL.

Q But it's 50 to 100 to the nearest --

A To a North Korean guard post, but the North Koreans could come up, of course, to their side of the MDL.

Q What kind of weapons do the people in Collier have?

A They have non-automatic M-16's.

Q All you've got to do is throw a switch and an M-16 is fully automatic.

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A It's like the old story, any weapon can be offensive, defensive. So, you're right. It can happen.

Q Technically, it's not automatic.

Q What kind of special measures is the U.S. going to take to keep them from blowing Collier up while Reagan's there?

A Well, Collier, of course, has been under our control for quite a long time and --

Q No, but I mean, you know, shooting at mortar, or whatever they could do if they chose to.

A I think it's the same answer that anybody would give you, that up to a certain point, there's nothing we can do that says they won't. I think that the United States government, and all the rest -- the consequences are there.

Q Are you going to be wearing a flak jacket?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask --

Q It seems kind of -- we know they've done some terrorist things before, just recently, the North Korean government, and here he's going to be in a situation where he's vulnerable. Aren't we taking any special measures?

A Well, I think there's a lot of special measures that are being taken. There's a lot of forces around. There's -- the guard posts are sandbagged anyway for protection. We have 50 guys, approximately, who sit out in the middle of the DMZ twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, and so it's sort of a sandbag castle.

Q Is there any kind of a special alert that the U.S. troops that are up there are on because of this visit?

A The troops that serve the DMZ, both ROK and U.S., maintain a higher degree of readiness at all times than the troops down here at garrison.

Q But is it higher even more now?

A Well, without getting into things that -- it will be, yes. We've been -- at our posts throughout Korea, all our installations, there's been a tightening of the security checks, vehicles, personnel, and so everything will be safer.

The general feeling -- it's been expressed by a lot of people way beyond me, it's been expressed by, I know, General Sennewald, my boss, that we feel that, with the way things are, the radius of the forces, the conditions and things, you know, we're looking for a good, safe trip. But there's no denying that there's tension in the DMZ. We've been trying for many years to de-escalate the tension. There's the other side, we have no direct means to talk to them, other than through Panmunjom, which is through United Nations command channels. Who can have that much influence over North Korea? Who does?

Q How much time have you got in up there? You talked about the LBJ trip. I presume you had a break --

A I go all the way back to the Eisenhower -- the President's visit, not the pre-Presidential visit.

Q When's the last time they met at Panmunjom?

A We met on Halloween Day, October 31st.

Q Was there any mention that the President was coming and any suggestion --

A No, they surprised us a little bit. They brought

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up the Rangoon bombing. They called that a fabrication by the ROK government and we took that occasion to -- although the facts were not all in and the Burmese government had not released it, to point out all the similarities of what happened in Rangoon and what has happened on other occasions down here.

Would that have been an occasion, though, to try and -- since there was public knowledge that the President was coming, would that have been an occasion to say something?

A I can say, we had expected them to bring it up but they didn't.

Q And you didn't bring -- we didn't bring it up?

A We had no reason to bring it up.

Q How often do they meet?

A It's on call. It's a standing body -- it's in permanent recess unless either side convenes it, or requests it be convened.

Q I didn't hear. Did you say you did not bring up the President's trip?

A We did not bring up the President's trip.

Q What was the last casualty we had on the DMZ and can you --

A The last casualty on the American forces? The last one on the American forces was the axe murders.

Q That was in '76?

A '76.

Q How many tunnels have you found and how many tunnels do you suspect?

A We have found three. One of them is within four kilometers of Panmunjom. The other two are to the east of there, one in what they call the Iron Triangle up in the Ch'orwon Corridor, and then, one sort of in between.

Q What Triangle?

A Ch'orwon Valley.

Q What's the purpose of the tunnel? Mining or infiltration?

A Well, the first tunnel we found was very small. It was strictly a personnel infiltration where an Oriental can go through at a low squat very easily. It almost broke my back to do it, but they can do it. The second two tunnels that we found had been blasted out through granite and you can take wide artillery through. You can probably take a small jeep through and, certainly, you can run three or four troops abreast. So, they could have moved a lot of people.

Q Do you suspect there are other tunnels --

A Somewhere between twelve and twenty, we suspect. We would love to know an exact number. And it's a funny thing, but nobody goes in for tunnel detection technology. We do some amazing things but detecting tunnels in Korea's DMZ is not one.

Q When were they discovered? Do you know the dates, offhand, the years?

A The first one was in '74. The second one was in '76, and the last one was in '78 -- I'm sorry -- '75, '76, and '77.

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Q What is the defense --

A I take it back. '74, '75, and '78. That's accurate.

Q What is the defense against the tunnel? To blow it up?

A The first one, because it was so shallow, we exposed it and didn't do much.

Q You found it coming out on this side?

A On our side. Still inside the DMZ but on our side.

Q So, you went down to what? The MDL? And blew it up?

A We went down to the MDL, went that far, stopped, came back up, and on the first one, just took the top off. It was reinforced, prefabricated concrete.

Q Are you all still using concertina wire with beer cans?

A They still -- the stones, the beer cans, everything up on the DMZ.

Q Throughout the DMZ?

A But the other two were down through granite and we had trouble -- we had to dig intercept tunnels to get back down into them. And then we blocked them and we have -- there's a ROK soldier, and sometimes, two soldiers and a poor little bird who sit down there. The ROK soldiers change every 30 minutes, but the poor little bird, that's his permanent home, in case of gas and this type of thing. It's right out of the old mining days.

Q Why don't you blow them up?

A Well, you do a lot of collapsing. The third tunnel is blocked. We block them, we mine them, we do a lot of things. But we also guard them in case they decide to tunnel back through and come back out.

Q How long are these tunnels?

A The tunnels range in -- let's see, 1200 feet, about 1150, and the last one that we found was much shorter. It's about 650, and it started much closer.

Q How deep are they?

A The first tunnel was about ten feet from top to bottom --

Q No, below ground, I mean.

A Below ground? The first, about ten feet. The second one, about 150 feet, and the last one, about 250 feet. If you really want some exercise, climb back out of the last one.

Q Had they started to tunnel up on those deep tunnels to the surface or do they just --

A They were sloping back up.

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Q How do you discover a tunnel?

A That is one of the world's great things. I could tell you fabulous stories about trying to discover tunnels.

Q How were these discovered? By accident or what?

A On all three we were lucky. The first one a ROK patrol noticed steam coming up. The people -- the North Koreans were in there working. It was so shallow that they hadn't caulked the prefabricated concrete top yet.

Q They had steam there?

A And it came through. Just the body heat and their food. So we got it. We got everything there. We got the little rail cars to take the dirt out, we got all their tools, we got the electric lights, we got the whole bit.

The second two being so deep in concrete, we started hearing on the second one, hearing underground explosions. Then we started drilling. If you really want to put a drill to work, and we drilled somewhere near 60 bore holes down 150 feet. You finally, you break through, you pour water down, it disappears; the next day you pour it down, it's still there. The North Koreans are plugging our tunnels every time we drill a hole down.

Q You basically, do you basically think they want these boys to infiltrate? Does this whole idea make sense? Is this some sort of --

A It makes sense in the type of -- they know that we have basically a very forward defense because there is so little room between Seoul and the DMZ. So anything they can do to get behind our eggs in the basket, you might say, they can do it.

Q Is there some light artillery and everything around there?

A They can bring in -- they have 100,000 commando forces, the largest force of its type in the world. These forces are equipped to go down to rear areas and start up a second front if possible, at least to block our resupply of logistics personnel and to attack installations. They can also --

Q They can just carry mortars through, right?

A They can bring mortars, light artillery.

Q How close is the DMZ to Seoul? What is the mileage on it?

A It is 26 miles.

Q Just to make sure I understand an earlier --

A In 1950 it was about 41 miles. They are 15 miles closer now. After the war [illegible].

Go ahead.

Q Just to make sure I understand this, we have never told the North Koreans Reagan is going to go up there? I mean officially.

A We have never told anybody he is going to go up there. In fact, if you all have been told --

Q The White House announced that it is part of the trip.

A That he was going to DMZ, yes.

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Q Yes.

A But it is like us trying to find tunnels. If we are watching and we see a lot of North Korean trucks go to a certain place and all such things, we get an idea that something is going on there.

Q I assume they know he is going there, but we have just never formally notified them?

A Newsweek announced it.

Q Also, can you tell us what is going to happen at the worship service?

A Okay. Any more questions on that. I'll go through that.

Q I have one question. When was the last time the American camps received fire of any sort?

A The last exchange of fire we had with the Americans was about two years ago.

Q Two years ago?

A These were North Korean infiltrators who were running around down below. We called in -- we have an artillery fire base up there, and they called in a mission for it to fire illumination rounds, and we knocked a few holes in some of the North Koreans. So they called a MAG meeting to complain we had fired at them.

Q But I am not clear in what you are saying went on. They went into the American side of the DMZ?

A They were in our sector, right, certainly, down below the guard post.

Q How many of them were killed?

A As far as I know, none.

Q There have been no small arms exchanges?

A Not at our sector since then.

Q Sniper fire?

A We have had a number of exchanges with the, between the South Koreans and the North Koreans. And it is a funny thing. I have been in on some of these exchanges. They are so dug in you can sit with your back against the wall and listen to bullets just go bang, bang, bang, and it is just sort of a chuk, chuk, chuk coming right in. It is very funny.

Q Does this happen often?

A Not too often, but we get more than we would like.

Q I am just trying to gauge the intensity of what goes on out there, whether it is occasional, or it hasn't happened in months.

A It is occasional, it's localized, which is another funny thing. The North Koreans, I told you they have sometimes as many as three guard posts on their side, we'll have one. They will get into a fire fight between theirs and ours. The other two are doing nothing. They are playing music, or making announcements, saying, "Come on over to the wonderful world of Kim Il-song." And it is strictly local.

If something happens like tracer rounds start a fire out in the DMZ, and the winds spread it, then the other guard posts

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get in it also.

Q How far up the line are the South Koreans -- the Koreans facing each other?

A How far up?

Q Yes.

A There is a 1000-meter corridor that goes down there. Everything else is Korean.

Q Will the President always have some kind of head covering, in other words, an overhang? What kind of -- just typically for someone who wanders?

A It is sort of like a baffle. It is a netting situation. So he will be just about any time with netting. So nobody is going to have any type of clear look at anything.

Q So for the obvious angle of a round, it will be like batting?

A A lot of sandbagging and --

Q He will be camouflaged, in other words.

A Yes. It is camouflage.

Q I don't understand what that is.

A Well, if you are at a distance -- well, you can do it with anything. You can put up strings and take some straw and just tie it, and you would be amazed how well it shields you.

Q It is a camouflage.

A It is just a type of camouflage.

Q When was the last time the North Koreans fired into one of your positions?

A Exchange of fire was two years ago. The last time we have had an artillery was when the North Koreans back in the mid-seventies -- I believe it was '75 -- when they flattened anti-aircraft artillery that they have in the DMZ illegally, and actually used that to fire at a ROK position.

Q But the North Korean ROK sniper exchanges have been now daily, weekly?

A No, not daily. We will get sometimes one a month, sometimes less.

Q Are they snipering things, or are they just sort of like fire --

A They are guard post to guard post.

Q Oh, it is not a sniper then, or is it?

A Our side we are getting heavy automatic weapons.

Q They fight with flag poles and music occasionally.

A You have been around too long. He can tell you more stories than I can.

Q Is it possible for you to give us some kind of flavor of the atmosphere? You seem so laid back about it. I mean, is it --

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A I don't really mean to be laid back, but also, I am not an alarmist. My own personal feeling and official feeling too is, you know, this is going to go through the way it is supposed to.

Q I don't mean specifically the President going there, I just mean in general since it has been going on in general. Is it just a part of life and this is just another place where troops are stationed?

A No, we are going to the western corridor. Now this is sort of a goldfish bowl. This is, you know, Panmunjom is just a few hundred meters on up the road. So a lot of people go this way. It is not the type of place that the North Koreans wanted to start something and have an opportunity to blame it on the other side like they tried to do from the Korean War on down. They always say we start it. So this is not the area to do it. There are just too many people in that particular area, which is why I can feel maybe a little more laid back about that than I would.

There are other places in the DMZ that scare me to death.

Q Like where?

A Well, like when you want to go from place to place, like you get into a boat and you travel up tank traps, and you ride a boat for 20 minutes, and then you walk through huge iron gates and you have moats, and you have guard posts that circle -- the circle, circle, circle, up, and you have guard posts with no roads to them. If you want to get there, you get on a trolley and you lay flat, and you go up this way. Those kinds of things scare me to death.

It is a different type DMZ, because the train gets higher and higher and higher, and the forces, because the train is higher, they are on mountaintops that are closer, closer, closer.

Q Does this valley that goes from Ch'unch'on to Seoul have a name? I know they call it --

A I don't know whether it does or not. I really don't.

Q Briefly go quickly through the schedule, what Reagan is going to do?

A He will arrive at Camp Liberty Bell. Camp Liberty Bell is the most forward deployed U.S. position that we have, permanent position. There is a company, A Company of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment that is permanently stationed there. This is our DMZ battalion. Their headquarters are a little further back.

Q What are the numbers on that again?

A First Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment. They are the Manchus. They go back to the Boxer Revolution in China.

However, during the spring, summer and early fall every infantry battalion in the 2nd Division gets a chance to pull the mission. So the unit that is up there now is the 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry. The ROK of the Marne.

Q The what?

A The ROK of the Marne. They go back with the European World War I history.

Q Third Division.

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A It may have been.

Q The 38th Infantry?

Q First Battalion, 38th Infantry.

A Their history is --

Q They are pulling the mission out --

A Right now we have two battalions up in that area. Another reason that our security is so important.

Q How many men are we talking about?

A Oh, in an infantry battalion you are running between 700, 800.

Q So you have 1500 men?

A We have in that area an extra battalion, not for President Reagan, but because we always have it during this good weather. Because this way every trooper who is an infantryman who goes to the 2nd Division gets a chance to pull a mission.

Q There is one company and one battalion?

A No, it's two battalions.

Q So you have 14 to 1500?

A We have a lot of American strength that is up there right now. They are backed by a U.S. artillery battalion that is at a fire base, and back beyond that is a lot of ROK artillery. So we have a lot of fire power in that area.

Q So I am still puzzled.

A It is somewhere between 1500 and 1600.

Q You have A Company from the 1st --

A Well, there are two battalions across the river. One company is forward. But the other one is just a kilometer away.

Q Let's just brief through the schedule quickly maybe, and then you guys can talk soldiers.

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The 8th Army Chaplain will conduct the service. I have his name somewhere -- Alfred Brough. Okay. Alfred E. Brough. He's a colonel.

Q Spell --

A B-r-o-u-g-h. First name's Alfred; middle initial E. He is the U.S. forces, Korea and the combined forces and the 8th Army Chaplain.

Q Does he have a military --

Q Colonel.

A Colonel.

Q And is a normal -- I mean, is that always -- is that outdoor chapel always there?

A No.

Q Or is this set up particularly --

A It used to be the --

Q Oh. So, it's just for this event -- being set up?

Q Can you tell us why it's so beautiful?

A Oh -- it's army netting. It's beautiful. We've got some more and it's baffle -- camouflage.

Q I see you're being sarcastic.

A No, I'm not being -- It's -- I'm not kidding. There's -- You have Korean orphans from Tongashon. Tongashon is the headquarters for the Second Infantry Division. That's a little Korean orphan choir. The young kids they'll run from about six to 11-12. And they're going to sing "Jesus Loves Me" and some other song I did not recognize, which may reflect my lack of --

Q Is there a reason for this? (Laughter.)

A May reflect a lack of attendance at church lately.

Q -- in English or --

A In English.

Q Does this service have a purpose?

A In the -- Well, it's a Sunday service.

Q Oh.

A What religious denomination is the chaplain?

Q He is a Protestant. He's some type of Baptist. If somebody knows the different types of Baptists, I can probably pick it out. I heard it once.

Q Where's he from? Do you know?

A I don't know because he wasn't there. I will try to call him back.

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Q Okay. So --

A I know he's 50 years old and he got married late in life. He's got the --

Q Let's move it on, guy.

Q Let's get going --

Q -- schedule, folks.

A Okay. Okay. So you've got that. There'll be some readings by some other troops who'll come up and they'll read passages from the Bible.

Q Okay.

Q Reagan is not going to take part, right?

A Reagan, he's going to be sitting out there.

You will have troops assembled, both Korean and KATUSA. Do you understand KATUSA troops?

Q No.

Q KATUSA, K-a-t-u-s-a, which stands for Korean Augmentations to the United States Army. That was a program started in the Korean War when we couldn't get enough American replacements in so we were bringing in Korean recruits, putting them through our ranks and it continues today. And they serve with the Second Division. They're up there and you will see KATUSA troops. So they'll be both at the -- at the church service as well.

Q Okay.

A After the church service, he will get into the motorcade, then he will go to Guard Post Collier --

Q -- riding in a -- in what? Jeep? Car?

A No, going in his limousine, I believe. Right.

A I don't know.

A I'm sure -- limousine up there, so it must be.

Q -- the guard post.

A When he goes to the guard post. When he reaches the guard post, he will -- he'll go up. He'll be met by the battalion commander and his name is in the package. This is the first of the 38th. He will then meet and shake hands with a DMZ patrol. Now, their names are all in there, too. They're all in -- They're painted up, all the camouflage paint on their faces. They will give their names and what they do. And that's all in your package.

Q What's a patrol? I mean, there's no such thing as a unit. I mean, these guys are going to come stumbling back in off the column --

A These are the ones that go out and --

Q They're just -- the guys are painted up, though, aren't they?

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A They're painted up. They're camouflaged.

Q But they're not going to be on patrol. I mean, they're not going to be patroling --

A This is a composition of a patrol that goes out and patrols inside the DMZ.

Q Is this for stage effect, though?

Q Yes, I mean, are they going to be coming in from patrol? Are they about to go out on patrol? There's no such thing as a unit called a patrol, right?

A This is -- Well, there is a patrol. Patrols are -- come from platoons.and platoons come from couplings. And we control 24 hours a day, day and night --

Q Is this going to be a patroling unit?

A This will be a patroling unit. This is the unit that's --

Q They're going to be surprised when they stumble on the President of the United States.

A No, no, no. This patrol is not normally stationed at that -- It comes from out of the DMZ, into the DMZ. It's trucked in. It goes out. It pulls its patrol for some hours. It comes back. Tomorrow it's going to be out of sync a little bit. But he's going to see what is -- composes a DMZ patrol.

Q Will it have been on patrol?

A All of the people will have been on patrol many times.

Q No, but I mean that day.

A I doubt it --

Q -- see what we're trying to ask you?

A I see what you're asking.

Q So, I mean, these are not men who just came out from somewhere. These are guys you put together who typify the kind of guys who do it.

A That's true.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you.

Q Then what?

A Okay. So then he's met all those. He goes up to the top of the guard post.

Q Okay.

A And he'll be met by the officer in charge, a lieutenant, whose name is also in here, who will brief him --

Q Can you describe the structure?

A Well, it's a little mountain, a hill, kind of roundish. It's got a concrete road leading up to it which probably runs about 30 degrees. It's a very steep hill. And anybody going up, you know, you get a running start --

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Q -- drives up.

A It's a very steep -- it's a steep hill.

Q In his limousine?

A That's also in his Cadillac limousine -- it'll make it.

Q Okay. He gets up there. He's up on there --

A Now, it's a hollowed out hill. Down below they have the various things that they have. They have artillery people. [illegible] have radar people. They have communications people. They have -- They have other areas that you need, arms room, this type of thing.

On top, out of sight of the North Koreans down below a little bit, they have a barracks. They have a kitchen, their mess facility -- And then they have a shack that's for radar that actually is up high. It's a radar-type shack, sits high. He will visit there and then he will come out of there and go down to the edge There'll be a sandbag thing with binoculars and then look across Tae Song Dong into the north.

Q Look across -- Okay.

A So he'll be using binoculars.

Q He goes down to the sandbags and he's still on the hill?

A He's on the hill and he just goes to the sandbag, to the edge of it.

Q High high are the sandbags? About four feet?

A The sandbags -- a little above his waist.

Q What does he do after that?

Q Says, "Wow."

Q We got to rush --

A And then he goes -- he finishes there --

Q Yes.

A He goes down and he tours the bottom area without any coverage. That's just on his own and the things I told you about they have down there, he'll see all that. Comes back out. Back down out, back down to Camp Liberty Bell. And then he will go to the 4.2 mortar area. These are mortar positions that cover -- would cover the guard post and can reach maybe -- got a pretty good range.

He will then meet with troops from about 10 Second Division subordinate units. They'll have troops in from different units of the second division that are stationed elsewhere, plus troops from the UNC support group. These are our -- troops, the ones that support the armistice talks.

Q What are we talking about in numbers?

A We're talking -- there are several hundred. They were hoping to get up to 600; but looking at that space, I don't know how they're going to do it. So they're getting in as many troops as they can get in there --

Q Is this back -- Liberty Bell --

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A He's back in -- It's part of Liberty Bell. It's --

Q All right --

A -- just on the far edge. And the -- There's -- It's, again, your inevitable netting is off to the side so it blocks any clear view of anything from the north. Anybody who did manage to get into the hills, and there's a lot of our troops'll be out in the hills. We're going a lot of -- our radar is all working, everything that's -- that has to be done from security.

He will talk to the troops for about 10 minutes. He may come down and shake hands. I don't know. That's going to be the his call and the security people. So he may come down and just greet troops, I suspect he probably will, and shake hands all he can. Then he will move over to the mess hall. And this is be permanent mess hall, not a tent mess hall. It's a concrete-block building. And --

Q Is he going to have lunch in there, right?

A And he will have lunch and the names of the people he'll have lunch with --

There'll be several presentations. General Doctor, who's the Second Division Commander will present a tomahawk and a couple of troops will make other plaque presentations and a miniaturized crest of all the Second Division units that will be there.

Q How close will he get to the North Korean lines, North Korean troops?

A Well, I don't know where the troops are going to be; but to the North Korean line it's going to be probably about 1000 meters.

Q That'll be as close as he gets?

A It runs -- You're in a peninsula -- The DMZ is a peninsula there. You're surrounded on three sides by North Koreans.

A We're going to have to break --

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:20 P.M. (Local Time)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Seoul, Korea)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY A
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO KOREA

November 12, 1983

The Crystal Ballroom
Hotel Lotte
Seoul, Korea

5:10 p.m. Local Time

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll give a short summary of the things that have happened so far today and I have a little bit to say about this reception this evening that you asked me a number of questions about yesterday. Of course, as you know, it began with the National Assembly speech which was a very important speech and occasion for the President to put a number of significant points of ours before an important audience, and in fact before the whole Korean people. That was then followed by a meeting at the Blue House and luncheon at the Blue House. The Presidents met privately for a while before the lunch. We then had a lunch that tended to break up into a number of smaller conversations, so I can only give you some snatches out of that. I would say the most important theme that was stressed was the significance of this visit as a demonstration of U.S. commitment -- appreciation of the fact that it takes place against the background of renewed confidence and continued commitment of U.S. forces to the defense of Korea and that the kind of reassurance that this commitment provides has been particularly important to South Korea in weathering the shocks of, first, the KAL disaster and then much more directly related to the security problem that we have here -- the Rangoon assassination.

That was then followed by another private meeting beteeen the two Presidents and then Secretary Shultz and the new foreign minister -- also Foreign Minister Lee -- his predecessor who was killed in Rangoon was also named Lee. That began with a long discussion in just a very small group about the Rangoon developments -- about the significance of the Burmese announcement of North Korean complicity and the Burmese decision to break relations with North Korea and to expel the entire North Korean mission from Burma and we discussed the various ways that we can work together to try to make as significant political and economic penalty to North Korea for this action as possible and also discussed actions that we had begun even for the responsibility for the action was clear to get countries of the world to rally around South Korea and show support. One of the most significant successes in that regard has been the decision of the government of Pakistan to open diplomatic relations with South Korea. This is a very important country for this region and for South Koreas' relations -- also a country that has significant ties with others in the region, such as China, whom South Korea would like to develop better contacts and better relations. So that's a very important success.

Our feeling is that one of the purposes of the Rangoon bombing is to force Korea back into isolation -- to make it difficult for the South Korean President to reach out, as he was doing, and develop South Korea's relations with other countries in the world. And one of the things that we want to demonstrate is that far from having that effect, it will have the opposite effect, as indeed it is having. The decision of Burma to break diplomatic relations, particularly given Burma's stance as perhaps the most neutral of neutral countries, was a very important diplomatic victory for South Korea -- very strong statements by the government of Japan criticizing North Korea -- denouncing North Korea and imposing restrictions on official dealings that Japan conducts with North Korea -- another important gain in this regard and we'll be working closely together and with other friendly countries to try to pursue this strategy

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further. There was fairly extensive discussion between the two foreign ministers of Sino- American relations. The South Koreans obviously have a very deep interest in this and in fact Secretary Shultz stressed that one of the reasons why we view the U.S.-China relationship is so important -- one of the reasons we're working so hard to improve U.S.-China relations is that we belive good U.S.-China relations also serve the interts of our other friends in Asia and that in fact we will pursue the improvement in those relations in such a way as to further the interest of our friends, not to affect them adversely.

Obviously when we're talking, as Secretary Weinberger has been talking with the Chinese about the possible sale of military weapons -- this is something that inevitably has to be of concern [illegible] to South Korea. What we have stressed is that the things that we're considering are defensive weapons and that we are very serious about the limitation on transfer of any weapons technology or even dual use technology to Third countries. The continued South Korean interest in developing its contacts and unofficial dealings with the People's Republic of China was a subject that was discussed. We then turned to a range of economic issues -- particularly the subject of GSP, which stands for Generalized System of Preferences, a system designed to reduce tariff barriers for the products of developing countries that are trying to get initial access to U.S. markets. It's been a very useful program, one from which South Korea has been one of the major beneficiaries. South Korea is now facing the penalty of success of what is called "Graduation" -- being sufficiently developed is to begin to lose some of these benefits. The Secretary explained our position on the matter and our feeling that in order to continue to retain at least some of the benefits of GSP, one of the things that's important on the South Korean side is a greater reduction of South Koreas' own barriers to trade and investment.

There was some discussion of the problems of global debt. The South Koreans very much like to see us succeed in our effort to get an IMF quota increase, but one thing and Deputy Secretary McNamar had fairly extensive discussions on them, as it turned out during the course of the lunch between the two Presidents with the Finance Minister. On the economic situation in South Korea, the picture that we see is a very encouraging one, better than 8 percent growth with less than 3 percent inflation for this year. While South Korea has one of the largest total debt of any country in the world, unlike a number that are making news because they have difficulties in managing these debts, South Korea is in a very, very strong position, particularly now that its exports are picking up again. Their debt service ratio is down to 15 percent of export revenue and on the whole we found it a very encouraging picture.

They are very interested in things that we can do to help ease the burden on them of their force improvement program, particularly some easing of the terms of foreign military sales credits for South Korea. There were a few other topics touched, but those are the principal ones.

Let me just say a few words about the reception this evening because I did promise to try to get you some answers. I have some and there are some that I won't give you.

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Q Why?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll explain that, also.

I think you -- now, the remarks that the President is going to be making at this reception have now been released. Those are important remarks. They indicate part of the purpose of this meeting, and the kind of message that we want to convey. We, also, want to listen as well as speak ourselves. And there will be about 50 Koreans at this reception, prominent figures from the academic, scientific, journalist, cultural, religious and business communit[illegible]

Among these people are a number that are very critical of the present government, some strong supporters, a number of -- a significant number of moderate, independent people. It [illegible] includes people who have been imprisoned and/or banned for their political views. And the purpose of this meeting is both for the President to get a chance to hear some of this range of views about conditions in Korea and, also, to convey our strong wishes to assist in the growth and development of democratic institutions [illegible] this country.

The Embassy feels very strongly that for an event of this kind we do not publish the names of the guests. Any guest that wants to make his name public is free to do so. But it's not our place to take that role on.

Q How much can the President hear in a half hour?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're limited on time on this whole trip. I told you half an hour last night. That is his estimated amount of time at the reception. The reception's actually going to be an hour.

Q Subtracting his remarks, now you're left with 20 minutes?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're limited in time in everything. But it's an occasion to hear and to say what we think and --

Q Did the President raise the human rights issue during his meeting with President Chun?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that. I strongly assume so.

Q Question.

Q Question, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was -- why don't you repeat it?

Q Did the President raise the human rights question in his conversation with President Chun?

SENIOR ADMINISRATION OFFICIAL: The question was whether the President raised the human rights question in his meetings with President Chun. I don't know what took place in the private meetings. I will try to find out more if I can. But my strong assumption is that, in fact, that was to be an occasion for expressing our strong interest in political development in this country.

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Q Could you tell us, apart from President Chun's statement about holding elections in 1988, what is it that this administration is substantially pleased with -- to use the words that the Press Secretary quoted the President as saying? What is it in human rights that this administration is substantially pleased with in Korea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I can go through the same series of things I talked about yesterday. Starting with the commuting of the sentence of Kim Dae Jung and the communting of a number of other severe sentences that had been handed down, the release of Kim Dae Jung and about 100 other political prisoners, the lifting of bans -- political bans on about 300 banned politicians, the commitment which -- while it is distant and while there are many questions that you have raised and other people can raise about the President's commitment to oversee a consitutional transfer of power -- that is a very important commitment. And it will be a major achievement if it can be pulled out.

I'd say, also -- although, this is not directly quite in the area you're talking about. I think, also, the kinds of people that President Chun has brought into the government, and the general tendency that we've seen as governmental personnel changes have been made is one that is in a progressive direction, both economically and politically. In fact, when he brought Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk into the government about a year and a half ago, he was bringing in a man of very independent views, very creative thinker in foreign policy in the area of pursuing reduction of tensions with North Korea and, also, a man who spoke his mind -- at least, in private -- both to Americans and to the President.

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And there's been a tendency, as we've seen it, to reach out more widely. And after the Rangoon bombing when not only Lee Bum Suk but four or five other of the most distinguished members of this government were tragically killed.

The kind of Cabinet that the President has selected, the kinds of ministers that he has appointed seem to indicate a determination to continue moving forward with economic liberalization, showed some sensitivity to issues that have been raised, for example, by university people about the previous -- some of the previous ministers -- and generally an approach in the formation of Cabinets that, I think, is significant. This process that we're talking about of political development is a tricky one, is one that is not just simply a matter of specific bans on a specific politician. It's also a matter of the kinds of people that are brought into government positions.

And, for that matter, it's also a matter of the strength of the security commitment and the kind of confidence that this country can feel that it can deal with military threats from the North. All of those things are related.

Q Given all of that, what is our reaction to the fact that a number of people have been put under house arrest, specifically because the President is here? And others have been put under protective surveillance -- during the President's visit.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Your --

Q Question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question, and I am quoting it as a question -- Why don't you give him the mike and let him ask it?

Q There is no mike.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or -- There's no mike. Okay, let me --

Q -- him repeat it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What about the fact as the question --

Q No, I said, what's the reaction to.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What is our reaction to the fact -- and I say this because I first learned it coming into this building from a reporter, I don't yet know whether it's a fact or not -- that a number of people have been put under -- did you say house arrest --

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- house arrest because of the President's visit.

Q And surveillance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd have to say that obviously if that is true, it would be a source of concern to us. We certainly don't simply, if nothing else, seeing the occasion of the President's visit as a reason for people's political activity

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being restricted. I don't know what the facts are in the matter. As I say, the first thing we heard was when we came in here.

Q Are you going to look into them?

Q -- in fact, that's not a competent answer because it's up to you either to tell us it's a lie and reject it or to say, "I've checked it, and it is true and we are concerned."

Q It's been on the wires for hours and hours. How come there's no spokesman for this administration who can deal with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you want me to give an account of where I've been for the last three hours? I heard it when we first came in, and we will try to find out what we can about it. We are interested.

Q Well, we won't --

Q -- reporters, our colleagues --

Q -- and we heard about it.

Q And our colleagues have interviewed these people.

Q The Embassy said they didn't want the list public. Was it because they fear reprisals? And did the Embassy clear the list with the government of South Korea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they did not clear the list -- the government of South Korea. And I think it is their feeling and it's up to individuals invited to decide whether they want their names made public, not up to us when we invited them.

Q I think that one of the problems here is that there's a suggestion that we don't really care that much if everybody who comes before us has just either not heard of this or has just heard of this. This --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look. Okay, let me be very clear that you're trying to make something out of the fact that we have been moving around in a series of meetings for the last three hours. We got some information just now. It is important information. We'll try to find out about it. We're not unconcerned. But I don't have an answer for you. Okay?

Q Will you come back to us tonight when we're writing the -- this particular story and tell us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't answer that. We'll come back when we can.

Q On another matter, are there any substantial differences between Korea and the United States about the kind of economic, political or military sanctions that ought to be taken as a result of the Rangoon bombing?

Q What's the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was whether there are any substantial -- you tell me if I've got it right -- were there any substantial differences between South Korea and the United States about the economic, political or military sanctions that ought to be taken against North Korea

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as a result of the Rangoon bombing? And I would say, no, there are no substantial differences and, indeed, I think no differences at all. Our biggest problem is persuading other countries of the need to act even though, in some cases, they may perceive political and/or economic cost to acting.

We have, I think, really been

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working closely together in essentially the same approach since the tragedy first happened. Working together and, for that matter, trying to give the government of Burma the freedom to maneuver to come to its own conclusions without either of us pushing them to do so, in thinking through what we might do if the evidence points to North Korea, and in developing the kinds of diplomatic and economic penalties that can help to discourage this kind of thing in the future.

Q Which penalties were specifically discussed or proposed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'd say, the general kinds of things that we are looking -- would like to see are the kind of action that Burma has taken and those countries that have relations with North Korea severing the relations. We'd like to see countries reduce North Korean presence on their territory. In fact, we think that this incident demonstrates that in their own self interest, they ought to consider doing so, and we would like to see those countries that do have economic dealings with North Korea to curtail those or cut them out entirely.

Q On October 20th, President Chun made a public declaration here declaring that South Korea would retaliate in kind without fail against another provocation like Rangoon. Was that discussed by President Reagan and, if so, what was the conclusion of that discussion?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question was that President Chun said that -- I'm going to quote your quote of him -- that South Korea would retaliate in kind in the event of any -- without fail in the event of -- against any future North Korean provocation such as Rangoon. And are you sure about, in kind, in that quote?

Q Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only thing I could say is that I think nothing would justify the -- one doesn't --

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among the many things that were criminal about this action was the use of the territory of a third country to attack another country. And I think there are questions about whether one retaliates in kind or whether one finds some other more appropriate kind of retaliation.

But the subject of the discussions that the Secretary had which are the ones that I know about in detail were focusing on how we can discourage any future North Korean action by developing as much punishment as we can for this one. It was not a hypothetical discussion of "what if" the next time.

Q According to a copy of the Korean Herald, there is a quote from Ambassador Lew which says that the United States does not rule out the possibility of striking the heart of North Korea with nuclear weapons if necessary. I was wondering if you know anything about this statement, and if anything like that has been communicated to the South Koreans.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry to be so ignorant. I don't know anything about that statement. I will check on it also.

Q Well, we thought you knew a little bit about policy. Is that our policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know one thing, the policy in that area is made by the President of the United States, not by the Ambassador of South Korea.

Q The Ambassador further said that the U.S. will do whatever it considers needed to be done in the case of another crisis on the Korean Peninsula. What is U.S. policy in that kind of a situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Which kind of situation, the crisis on the Korean Peninsula?

Q Another crisis. Would it include the possibility of striking with nuclear weapons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the event of a North Korean attack on South Korea, the United States has made clear that we will come to the defense of South Korea. That is the heart of our policy here, and that is the most serious crisis that we are all concerned about.

Q What about the possibility of retaliation that the South Koreans should take against the North Koreans. Do the United States of North America support such kind of retaliation? I mean, an attack on North Korea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Would you repeat that? I didn't hear it too clearly.

Q Yes. In the case of South Korea, we should have a retaliation against a North Korea provocation, will the United States of North America support that retaliation? I mean, in the case of an infiltration from the south into the north should take place, does the United States --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is an entirely hypothetical question, by which I mean also that the sort of judgment you are asking me to make up here is one that is entirely dependent upon the circumstances and the kind of action that one is talking about.

The essential point, and one that we have made very, very clear, and I think it is very clearly understood by the South Koreans as well, that given the presence of our military forces on this peninsula, any action that would engage those forces is one on which, or that could have a substantial risk of engaging those forces is an action on which we would expect to be consulted. And for that

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matter, obviously the reverse applies as well. We have an extraordinary integration of two armed forces. And in fact under the combined forces command that exists here in South Korea, an American four-star general commands South Korean divisions. That obviously imposes on us the responsibility also to consult very closely with the South Koreans about military decisions. We have made that point clear. That is a very clear principle.

Q Can I put it this way. Has the nuclear option been ruled out on the American standpoint?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I frankly have trouble understanding that question. I am sorry. Are you saying the nuclear option in retaliation? Against what?

Q I don't know. Any kind of a situation.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a pretty broad statement. We obviously have not ruled out nuclear retaliation against nuclear attacks on the United States. So I am not going to start to specify how we respond to individual specific circumstances. I think the point is clear that any use of nuclear weapons is putting us in an entirely different area. It is the gravest of decisions; it is one made by the President of the United States and not by anybody else, and certainly not by any official of a foreign government.

END 5:31 P.M. Local Time

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Seoul, Korea)

For Immediate Release November 13, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

The Crystal Ballroom
Hotel Lotte

8:02 P.M. (Local Time)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Quiet, please. Any questions?

Q Yes, Mr. Secretary, we have been talking to a number of dissidents who have been placed under house arrest or have been warned by government officials that they have to be very careful during the Reagan visit and will be punished after the Reagan visit. Is the President aware of some of the measures that have been taken against prominent people in the clergy and in academic circles during his visit? And, if so, did he raise the issue tonight with President Chun?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The general subject of government and the conduct of government has been discussed very thoroughly and, of course, the President expressed himself on several occasions during his visit here.

Insofar as any particular measures are concerned, I think we reported to you the statement that we got from the Korean head of security and that represents the factual situation as we got it from that gentleman.

No question about the fact that there have been very severe and continuing threats from North Korea for disruption here during the President's visit. And so there has been special security taken. But beyond that, I don't have any comment on those particulars because I'm just not familiar with them.

Q Can you say what the President's view is about the amount of progress or lack of progress and what he discussed with President Chun and what the President's response was to him?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, the President's view is that expressing himself about his own views publicly as he did and discussing a wide range of subjects, including governmental matters, in private, as he did, that he has no further comment to make about his private conversations. That that's the most effective way to proceed.

Q When you say on the one hand that you believe in quiet diplomacy and you don't believe in expressing your views publicly about that and then say on the other --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President expressed his views publicly on several occasions --

Q -- yes --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: -- in this visit and you must have heard him express himself.

Q He said that he was pleased -- He said that he was pleased with the progress. And my question, sir, is are you still pleased with the progress in human rights after what's happened here this last weekend?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: There has been progress here. There will be continuing progress here. And I think that the situation is moving in a very positive direction.

Q Mr. Secretary, Fred Ikle has an interview in The Washington Post today in which he says that the United States is going to put 1,000 combat engineers in Costa Rica to build roads near Nicaragua. What's your -- Is that true? And what does it all mean?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I haven't seen The Washington Post today; so I don't know about that story and just what Mr. Ikle may have in mind. But there is -- there has been a request from Costa Rica for help in the economic development of a region of Costa Rica that is in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan border and so it may be that what he's talking about has to do with that. But I haven't seen the story and so it's hard for me to comment beyond just what I said.

Q Well, do we have any rescue missions in mind in terms of Nicaragua?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Press Secretary has already denied local press reports that the President committed himself to a massive beef-up of American forces. Since you sat in on those talks can you tell how those misconceptions might have arisen?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know about that. I do know that, of course, we have our troop strength here. We think it's adequate for the circumstances. On the other hand, there has been a very considerable build-up in tension and we do have additional troops in the area which can be mobilized quickly if the need should arise.

Q -- not going to actually station any more here now at this time. Is that correct?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to return just for a moment to the human rights issue. The President came to Korea because he wanted to reaffirm the defense of freedom. And he also wanted to speak about the promotion of democratic values in this country. Is he and are you disturbed by the fact that dissidents who are not related to North Korea, who have no history whatsoever of violence or threats against President Reagan have been put under house arrest during his visit here.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think you're way overplaying this. There was a reception last night that I went to

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And there was a wide variety of people there, some of whom had a different view of how the goverment should conduct itself here in Korea. They were there. I spent quite a little time talking with them, and asking them about their activities, and how they financed them, what they did, and so forth, and had a very good discussion with them.

So it does seem to me that, if you look over a period of time, you see progress. That isn't to say that there aren't problems. But I think you, also, have to bear in mind that there is a country just a few short miles from here that continually threatens this country, that is way behind this country, that has gone to a third country -- Burma -- and tried to kill the President of this country, and did manage to kill some of the outstanding Cabinet officers.

So it's not a little game that's being played. And I think that security is something that has to be borne in mind. Now, you have to draw a line on that. And I'm not arguing with that point. But I think the basics here are that there are very genuine threats. There is a powerful dterrent force of which we are a part. There is a far greater measure of freedom and openness in this society than the one to the north -- and that there has been progress in that regard.

The President spoke about these matters publicly. And they have been discussed between the two Presidents.

Q According to the new South Korean policy on North Korean provocations, in the case of retaliations from South Korea, would the United States support such retaliations -- invading the North, perhaps?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question is what is to be done about these murders.

And the thing that we are trying to do, working with the government of South Korea -- with President Chun and with the Foreign Minister, is to do everything that we can diplomaticly to have people all over the world see, clearly, what has happened, to get them to express their support for the government of South Korea and the positions that it's taking, and to try in every way we can to isolate North Korea as a reaction to this tragic and despicable event.

In the meantime, the dedication to the reduction of tensions and to the effort to try to bring about a fundamental resolution of issues on the Korean peninsula goes on. And President Chun and Foreign Minister Lee have reaffirmed their desire to do that. But, of course, the atmosphere created by these murders isn't conducive to any early step in that regard. So those are the kinds of measures that are being taken.

Q Mr. Secretary, in advance of the joint statement which we might get tonight or tomorrow morning --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes. That's concluded. And I don't know when it will be --

Q In advance of that, could you tell something about any specific results or agreements that have been accomplished during the President's visit -- in his talks with President Chun?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes. Well, I don't want to try to review that joint statement. You'll get it. But I think that, first of all, there are matters in the security field that were discussed, and the reaffirmation of determination and support, which is important to do from time to time, and which the President did -- personally -- by visiting the DMZ, the discussion of what can be done to deal with the tensions on the peninsula, the discussion of how to respond to the murderous attack and along the lines that I just indicated in my question. So we discussed the FMS Program, [illegible] the importance of it, the terms of it, and a variety of matters having to do with security. And I think all of that was worthwhile.

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Second, there were discussions of economic issues, trade matters, investment matters, and the general look at the flows in trade. Of course, the South Koreans are very interested in the GSP legislation. We discussed that. A variety of things of that nature.

We did have discussion of governmental processes, as I've already indicated, at some length. So those were the nature of of the things that were discussed here. But I think it's fair to say that the overwhelming importance of the visit is to the reaffirmation of the determination of the United States and of the government and people of South Korea to defend themselves, and with all of the reservations that have been expressed here, to defend freedom because there isn't any doubt, whatever, about the relative quality of life on the two sides of this border.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it the Administration's view that progress in human rights in South Korea should be judged by comparing the situation here against the situation in the North?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That's one comparison, but, certainly, the comparison with the North is a very clear one, and, of course, we have our own standards, as do the people of South Korea. Naturally, every country adapts its governmental institutions to its own environment and it takes time to do that. So that's in the process of being done.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Speak up.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that the President did discuss the human rights question with President Chun. Now, some of the people that have been placed under house arrest have been released.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Have been what?

Q Have been released. Do you feel that the release of these people was partly a result of the President's talks with President Chun?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question of the house arrests, the lifting of the house arrests, and whatever relationship that may have to the desire of the South Korean government to see that every precaution was taken for the security of the President during his visit, I really can't comment on in any detail because I'm not that familiar with the particular facts involved. I would doubt that the action that you spoke of was related to any particular talks, but must have been just the process that the South Korean government is going through on this whole matter.

Is that it?

Q There's been some talk in the Korean press --

MR. SHULTZ: I'm sorry, you'll have to start --

Q There has been some talk in the Korean press about our willingness to use nuclear arms to defend South Korea. Could you explain what the policy is, whether there has been any -- addition to the reaffirmation of the commitment, any change in the way we would respond to North Korean aggression?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No change. I don't know where all of this emerged from, but we are here. We have a deterrent force. We expect that the deterrence will deter a return to warfare. That's the object of it. We have successfully maintained that posture through quite a few years, now and there isn't any change. And as you remember from the President's speech to the Diet in Japan, he

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spoke very movingly about his opposition to nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons, and among other things, called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. So that's basically the President's view.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you assess for us, in general, the success or lack of success for this trip, overall, and in particular, have you reached the goals that you outlined in the press briefing in Washington before we left?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Reached a what?

Q Reached the goals that you outlined before we left Washington? For this trip to Korea, and also Japan.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The question is -- did you hear the question?

Q Tell us you didn't meet the goals.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the trip has been an outstanding success.

Q Is that it? Really?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Judged by the standards I set in Washington or almost any other standards you can think of.

Q Why?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's been very important for the President to come here to Northeast Asia to meet with the leaders of Japan to discuss the opportunities and problems that we have, resolve some, develop the process further. The same here in Korea. I heard a phrase this morning by the chaplain who spoke that people up there are on the edge of freedom. And I think it's a very good phrase, a very graphic one. So people who are on the edge of freedom need support and affirmation of that support. So all of these things, in addition to the many particulars that tend to get discussed for a visit like this, during the visit, and after the visit, all of those things are important, but I think the main significance is the recognition of the importance of this area to the United States and the continuing effort to develop our ties and resolve the problems that we have in this part of the world.

Q How is Andropov doing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know. Thank you.

* * * * *

MR. SPEAKES: We anticipate having the joint statement of the United States and the Republic of Korea in about an hour.

Q When?

Q What is the release date?

MR. SPEAKES: We are negotiating that with our friends.

Q What is the possibility?

MR. SPEAKES: The possibility would be Sunday, 6:00 p.m. Eastern.

Q Oh, no.

Q Monday morning.

MR. SPEAKES: What is the matter with that?

Q That --

MR. SPEAKES: Oh, you want it Monday morning?

Q We'll have to redo our shows.

MR. SPEAKES: Well, that is Monday morning -- oh, it gets on your show.

The other thing is that the President's arrival statement probably will not be finished until late tonight, and I would think the earliest we would have it would be in the morning, or on the plane, or the very latest, Elmendorf.

Q So when is the joint statement?

MR. SPEAKES: An hour.

Q What do you think the embargo is going to be?

MR. SPEAKES: We are asking for six.

Q Don't ask too hard.

Q Larry --

MR. SPEAKES: What do you want to know about, human rights?

What?

Q Larry, I missed what you said about --

MR. SPEAKES: Where were you?

Q We can't hear very well. The questions --

Q It is very hard. There is a lot of conversation.

MR. SPEAKES: I didn't answer anything.

Q -- joint speech.

MR. SPEAKS: Let me have your attention please. Let's see if we can get total silence here. Okay. Anne wants to hear.

We are anticipating having the joint statement of the governments in about an hour. We do not know what the release time will be. We are discussing that from our friends rom the government of Korea. And we are anticipating perhaps a 6:00 p.m.

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Sunday deadline, release time, Eastern.

As far as the statement by the President on arrival, at the earliest in the morning, perhaps on the plane, and the latest at Elmendorf.

Q Larry, whenever you determine the release time it would be available for Monday a.m. newspapers, wouldn't it?

MR. SPEAKES: I would presume yes.

Q You can't keep it for the Korean weekly, can yo[illegible]

MR. SPEAKES: Think they'll make it?

Okay.

END

8:24 PM Local

UNEDITED

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON
THE INF NEGOTIATIONS
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1983, 2:35 P.M.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our remarks are pretty brief, and then we will be happy to take your questions.

In an effort by the Administration to be responsive to the Soviets, while maintaining the alliance's basic criteria for an effective and verifiable INF agreement, the American negotiator, Paul Nitze, has gone back to the Soviets to state that while the United States and its allies would like the comlete elimination of INF missiles in the negotiations, we would accept the deployment by the Soviet Union of 140 SS-20 missiles, with 420 warheads, provided that this was the global figure for both sides -- that is, the 420 warhead figure.

In taking this new step, the President is seeking both to demonstrate U.S. flexibility in the negotiations by accepting one element of the Soviet proposal, while also giving greater specificity to the Western offer that was announced in the President's speech at the United Nations at the end of September.

Now, within this 420 warhead level, the existing U.S. approach, which calls for a willingness to entertain a lower level of deployment in Western Europe than the overall global level, some figure lower than 420, that approach remains in effect, as does our willingness to consider reductions in the planned number of Pershing II deployments.

So those facets of our proposal remain the same.

We are asking the Soviets for equal global levels, 420 warheads, which accords to that 140 SS-20 figure that Mr. Andropov raised in his interview, but we remain willing to consider the deployment of a fewer number, below 420, in Europe, and we remain willing to consider the deployment of less than the 108 Pershing II's which was, as you recall, part of the basic December 1979 decision.

This new move -- really, I think we prefer to call it an elaboration or a refinement of our current position -- has been taken after close consultation with out Allies. These consultations were pursued last week when the Deputy Secretary of State was in Europe, and in the Special Consultative Group late last week in Rome, which, as you know, regularly consults on the Geneva negotiations.

The President has informed the Allies, his allied colleagues, of this decision over the weekend. Paul Nitze was able to put this proposal to the Soviets in Geneva today. They, of course, have not been able to give us an official response, although there are reports -- and this is all I have seen -- reports -- that the Soviets have publicly rejected it out of Moscow, which is, if true, unfortunate.

We are prepared to stay in Geneva as long as it takes to achieve an agreement. We believe that such an agreement can be achieved quickly, once the Soviets recognize that their efforts to achieve a half-zero outcome -- that is, a monopoly of deployments on their side -- and no deployments for the U.S. -- is abandoned.

With that, I will be happy to take your questions.

Q What about the Soviet insistence on the British and the French missiles? Is there any change in our stand on that?

A No. Our position remains the same that those systems have no role in these negotiations, and this is why, in our approach, which we have elaborated, we call for equal levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads on a global basis.

Q I understand you are going to specify in your offer, or you are willing to negotiate a specific level of both Pershing and cruise. Can you give us some idea of what those levels are?

A That is not correct. What we have agreed to do is precisely what I told you, which was, we have agreed to specify a global level of warhead deployments.

Now we have said we are prepared to consider lower levels of Pershing II deployments, but we don't have specific

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figures to offer at this time, and may not.

Q On the numbers -- I don't have it with me -- Andropov's proposals were for 140, just in Europe, right?

A That is right.

Q And they have how many deployed now in Asia?

A I think it is safe to say roughly 120.

Q What is the number you are carrying?

A Approximately 243.

Q And your proposal is still the same. You would not put more than 140 in Europe?

A No. That is a global figure, Bernie. We would putt less than 420 warheads. The 140 figure is the Soviet figure for total number of SS-20's deployed in the Western part of the Soviet Union.

Now 140 missiles equates to 420 warheads. We have insisted all along that these warheads should be limited on a global basis, but we have said that we don't have to deploy all of the global level of warheads in Europe. So we would be prepared, if the Soviets accepted a proposal of 420 warheads, or 140 SS-20's, we would be prepared to deploy less than that figure in Europe.

Q Can you tell us why are you negotiating in public?

A We are not negotiating in public. We haven't make an announcement about this figure. We have described this proposal to the Soviets. There have already been leaks, unfortunatley, in the press, including a prominent one today in the Washington Post, and we do think it is important that if these figures become public, that you understand what the state of play is, so people aren't misinformed.

Now there is a difference, I should say, between our approach and the Soviet approach. We have been scrupulous whenever we discussed these, in making sure that the Soviets were informed of our position before making any public announcement.

This has not been the case with the Soviets. For example, with the most recent Andropov proposal which appeared in response to this Q&A's that were published in Pravda, we have yet in the negotiations to gain more information than was printed in those articles.

Q I am just wondering, you say you are not negotiating in public, but the fact is you only made the proposal this morning and there was a leak yeserday, and now you are announcing it, how can you expect the Soviets to take it any more seriously than you take the Soviet proposals, which are released --

A I would hope that they would look at the substance of the proposals. I mean, clearly, there is a tremendous interest in this issue in Western Europe, and it is very

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very difficult to keep this question out of the public eye. Unfortunately there have already been reports. We think it is a sensible, reasonable offer. We have moved substantially from our original position which, if you will recall, was zero-zero. You can tick off the various concessions we have made. We have come forward with an interim proposal last spring which was a substantial move away from eliminating all the systems. We have recognized regional limitations. That is, we have been willing to reduce the numbers of weapons below the global ceiling that we deploy in Europe. We have been willing to reduce the planned deployment of Pershing II's. We have said we are prepared to limit aircraft, which has been a longstanding Soviet offer. Now we are coming forward and accepting the Soviet figure.

They said they wanted to maintain the right to deploy 140 SS-20's, and we are accepting that figure.

Q Wasn't this implicit in the interim proposal? Didn't the interim proposal say that you would have equal levels?

A Yes, but with a number of changes, the most important one being the acceptance of regional limitations, the figure below, because, as you know, we only have plans to deploy these weapons in Europe. And we have said that we are prepared to deploy a fewer number than the two sides might agree on in terms of global levels.

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Q But it is not the same as the Soviet proposal. The Soviets proposed 140 in Europe and presumably they would keep their 120 in Asia, right.

A That is right, but it is a step towards that position.

A There is another important difference, a far more important difference, between our proposal and the Soviet's, which is that the Soviet proposal, in every case, including the most recent ones, would permit zero on the part of the United States.

Q Could I ask, you have gone from 572 now to be prepared to accept 140, presumably even less if you only count those in Europe. Is there a number below which you can't go before it becomes militarily incoherent to deploy anything?

A Well, I think there probably is. I don't think we have agreed ourselves exactly what that number is, but at some point you go down so low that it does not make sense, you know, from the standpoint of supporting an operating system, but we don't have a precise number.

The way it has gone on in the past, we have proposed change; the Soviets have stated a change in their position. We have come up with something else; they have come up with something else. Do we expect now that they will come back with some sort of a counterproposal?

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A I don't know. I think my colleague here made a very important point, and that is while you look at proposals and counterproposals, I think it is important to bear in mind just exactly where the real changes have occurred and where they haven't. And the most important change that has not occurred in the Soviet position is that they continue to support what the President has called a half zero approach in the negotiations, and that is, under no circumstances are they prepared to entertain any U.S. deployments. That obviously stands as a fundamental obstacle to making progress in the talks.

Q Would you have made the concessions that you have outlined were it not for the tremendous interest and pressure in Western Europe?

A I can't answer that. Clearly we factor in political considerations, but I think that the real desire is to see if, at this stage, we can't make progress in the negotiations; that we want to be able to say, and say very candidly, that we have made every effort to achieve an agreement.

Q Can you give us some idea of your feelings now about Andropov's health, any information on Andropov's health? Is he the one who is going to be making the decision here?

A I don't have the slightest idea.

Q When you say we may not deploy 420 warheads in Europe, is the implication that we may not deploy all of them at all, or that they will be deployed to counter the missiles in Asia?

A No. We have gone through this before. All we are saying here is that we do not -- we are willing to deploy a lower level of systems in Europe than provided for in a global ceiling for both sides.

Q But is it not implied that this will be some counter to the 135 now in Asia?

A No, and you shouldn't view it in those terms.

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Q Although it may not be the intention --

A You're not named Mary.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

Q What are you proposing with the Italian position on deployment given Prime Minister Craxi's most recent letter to President Reagan?

A That the Italians are going to -- absent an agreement the Italians are going to deploy on schedule, period.

Q Although it may not be your intention, would it be taken amiss by your side if the Soviets were to see the voluntary limit on U.S. deployment in Western Europe as a counter to their British-French argument?

A We do not directly or indirectly propose to take into account British and French systems.

Q In effect, does it not, though, in Europe?

A Not in our view.

Q Do you know when the INF talks are going to be --

Q There's no plan for U.S. deployment in Asia. Are we continuing to reserve the right to deploy there or not?

A Yes. We continue to reserve the right to match their global ceilings, whether it's in Asia or anywhere else.

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Q Their deployment there seems to have risen rather sharply from 108 to 120 now you just mentioned --

A I think the official number is 117, just so you have the facts. 117. 360 globally, 117 in Asia. But you are correct that their deployments are going up in Asia.

Q Is there a reason for that?

A You'll have to ask them.

Q Do you know when the INF talks will be recessed? Do you have a date?

A On the whole question of the INF negotiations, we would like to stay at the negotiating table through this month and into December. We'd like to see a short break over the Christmas-New Year holiday and get back to the negotiating table, but we can't speak for the Soviets. The Soviets are scheduling negotiations almost on a day-by-day basis, and, as you know, they've threatened to leave the negotiating table with the appearance -- that was the word Andropov used -- with the appearance of missiles in Europe. As you may be aware, the British Defense Minister today announced that cruise missiles had arrived in Greenham Common.

Q Does that mean that you now expect Mr. Andropov to announce a walk-out at any point now that the missiles are there, actually in place in Britian?

A A walk-out could occur at any point, but I don't know -- we don't have a strong feeling or understanding.

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Q If he's not willing to take the game into overtime, as it were, are you going to change the rules of the game eventually and take into account those British and French missiles in some other form of negotiations that incorporates both INF and strategic?

A No. We're not going to discuss British and French systems in bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

A If I might just add a point on the question of the Soviet walk-out, there are many different ways to walk out. It has been characteristic of these negotiations from the beginning that there have been intervals and recess between negotiating sessions. As my colleague indicated, we would just as soon stay at the table and take the Christmas-New Year break in December. But this is always a subject of discussion between the delegations.

I think it would be premature to conclude that the Soviets were walking out if we found ourselves unable to agree on when to take the recess and they decided to take it rather earlier than we wanted to.

So you want to watch very carefully precisely what happens and not assume that going from the active phase into the recess means a walk-out.

A I just might add something, that if the Soviet Union does in a very public way say that they are leaving the negotiations, that from our standpoint such a

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move would be completely unjustified and inexplicable. We have been willing for two years to negotiate under the constant shadow of Soviet SS-20 deployments, an average of about one a week, and we've stayed at the negotiating table in an effort to reach an agreement.

So it is somewhat strange, and, as I said, inexplicable for the Soviets to suddenly announce that they can't negotiate if Western deployments begin, particularly when we have said very clearly that after deployments begin, if they must begin, we will stay at the negotiating table, and we are even prepared to withdraw any missiles that we do deploy if we can reach an agreement.

Q Do you have a mix in mind of Soviet missiles in Asia and Europe that you would be willing to accept under this 420 warhead ceiling? Would you anticipate reductions in Asia and reductions in Europe, or reductions in Asia and no reductions in Europe?

A We would anticipate, really, that reductions would take place in both.

Q The figure 108 -- do you have any better fix on how the Soviets might respond militarily, given their threat on that front as well?

A Just nothing new than what we reported before, that most of their threats so far have been focused on military steps that they already had underway, already had entrain,

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and appear to us to be military steps that they were going to take regardless of what happened in the negotiations. By that I'm pointing to the fact of the deployment of shorter-range systems in Europe which has already begun, even before U.S. deployment. They've already deployed SS-21s in Eastern Europe. The Soviets themselves acknowledge that.

So most, if not all, of the steps that they will point to, if we get to that stage, in being responsive to our INF deployment, will be in the judgment of our experts steps that they already long ago had underway.

Do you want to add something to that?

A Only that anything the Soviets are able to deploy now would have gone on the drawing board about ten years ago. In fact, the things that they are now deploying and prospectively will deploy must have been committed in terms of a decision to succeed existing systems even before December '79. So it looks as though the Soviets will use the excuse of the Western deployment to explain programs that they would have undertaken anyway.

Q (Inaudible) that they would put SS-20s opposite Alaska. Have you seen any evidence of this?

A No.

Q The Soviet Ambassador in West Germany recently said about de facto deployment that the Russians would do

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something. I don't know whether they plan to leave the Geneva conference. Anyway, he talked about de facto deployment, not -- do you know what he means?

A I think -- no, we don't. I use the word "appearance" because that was the word that Andropov used in his article. You talk about de facto deployment. I mean, ask the Soviets. They're the ones that owe us an explanation of precisely what they mean.

Q Does the deployment of 21s, a battlefield weapon with 120-kilometer range, to replace older and, by DOD's own account, much less reliable, less stable weapons, like the SCUD, does it really destabilize the situation, or does it actually stabilize it as compared to when you place --

A I think from our standpoint, the deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe destabilizes the situation. The Soviets have a huge advantage in overall nuclear capabilities. Even if the Soviets were to accept the President's zero-zero option, calling for the complete elimination of all SS-20s, all 4s and 5s, the Soviets would still have, even taking into account the British and French forces, a substantial nuclear advantage in Europe.

Q But weren't the SCUDS already nuclear-tipped?

A No. But the SS-21 is far more accurate, it's far more dangerous.

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Q On a point of arithmetic, the 108-117 figure in Asia, that's warheads, right?

A No, no. It's 117 SS-20s in Asia.

Q But the recent increase was nine missiles.

A That's right.

Q Given the fact that this move today does not specifically address the Soviet requirement for British and French missiles being taken into account, what does this move today accomplish in terms of getting toward an agreement beyond convincing the European public that the United States is offering a new piece of paper at the table?

A What I think it does is it takes into account the variety of steps we have taken over the year, and provides a specific proposal.

I want now here to make a very important point. It is an illustrative proposal. By saying that we're prepared to accept 140 SS-20s and a global ceiling of 420 warheads does not mean that we wouldn't be prepared in the negotiations to accept other possible figures as long as they provided for U.S.-Soviet equality on a global basis.

But the Soviets came forward with the 140 figure, and we're making an effort here in an important phase of the negotiations with deployment around the corner to see if the Soviet Union is willing finally to back off of this unacceptable proposal that it be accorded a monopoly in SS-20 capabilities, or in the ability to target Western Europe.

Q So the answer to my question, then, is that it's not so much the specific number here that's important in terms of furthering the negotiations as it is the sign that the U.S. would be willing to accept even less if the Soviets proposed that on an equal basis.

A That's right.

Q What happens to 4s and 5s in this proposal, or how many do they have now?

A Roughly speaking, the Soviets have I think about 200 SS-4s and about how many --

A I think there's some question on the SS-5s, but the Soviets have indicated that all the SS-5s are gone.

A They've said the SS-5s are either gone or they're shortly going to be gone. What would happen is that they would have the right with 420 warheads to deploy a portion of those 420.

Q They have to be included in this?

A Yes. Absolutely.

Q How about the aircraft? If they were eventually to be included, would you visualize including them in the 420 or that will be 420 plus?

A It's not necessary. What we've said is if the Soviets want -- if they make aircraft limits necessary to

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achieve an agreement, we're prepared to negotiate aircraft limits. Alternatively, if they don't think aircraft limits are necessary for a first-phase agreement, then we're prepared to leave them out. We're completely flexible on the question of aircraft.

A To answer your specific question, they wouldn't be part of the 420.

A No. They would not. I'm sorry.

Q Thank you.

A One more here.

Q If your main thrust today is to get the Soviets to back off of what you call this unacceptable proposal that it be accorded a monopoly to target Western Europe, can we understand from that that maybe in the near future we may be negotiating with both England and France with their missiles vis-a-vis the Soviet Union? I mean, after all, the target is Western Europe, and you said before that we're not going to negotiate with the Soviets in a bilateral sense British and French missiles.

A No. We're not. And you can understand that. I thought I made it clear that even if the only reason in our view that the Soviets have even raised the British and French problem is as a pretext to give us zero. The Soviets told Chancellor Schmidt in 1980 that they didn't have to count British and French systems in these negotiations. They've

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obviously changed their mind because it's the only convenient way for them to be able to argue convincingly or plausibly that the United States shouldn't be able to deploy anything.

They continue to say the U.S. should have zero, and they point to the British and French systems. But, however, as I pointed out, even if the Soviet Union eliminated all its SS-20s and its 4s and 5s, they would still have a substantial advantage over the British and French and their small number of forces. We're not going to negotiate for those systems or over those systems in bilateral negotiations.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:05 p.m.)

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
TURKISH CYPRIOT SITUATION
BY
SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1983, 3:46 P. M.

MR. CARLSON: This is a BACKGROUND briefing attributable to Senior Officials of the Department, limited to the subject of Cyprus and thereabouts.

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I'll just make a few brief remarks, and my colleague and I will try to answer your questions.

We wanted to give you a little bit of background on the statement that you heard today at the noon press briefing.

We have delivered our message opposing the declaration of unilateral independence to the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus as well as the governments in Ankara and Athens for several years, so what you heard today was not a new policy but just a reaffirmation of a consistent U.S. policy.

Today we have been in touch with the Turkish Government in Ankara and here in Washington. We have been in touch with the Cypriot Government in Washington, and we have talked --

Q Could you talk a little bit louder?

A Sorry. --the Cypriot Government here in

Washington, and the Greek Government in Washington. So we are in close touch with all the parties.

We are also in touch with the authorities at the United Nations, the Secretary General, who has a mandate for the Cyprus problem. We are also talking to other interested governments.

The background of this decision is very convoluted and complex, and I don't want to go through the whole history of the Cyprus problem, but I think it's just enough to say that in recent months the threat of the declaration of UDI has been raised and discussed.

It really first emerged in recent months after the debate at the U.N. in the General Assembly last spring on Cyprus. It was raised by Ralph Denktash and other Turkish Cypriot leaders. We have been discussing this threat of UDI in private channels with both the Turkish Cypriots, the Cypriot Government, the Turks and the Greeks. We have not been the only government that has been concerned.

I might just say here that while we are concerned, we are not the major participant or player in this diplomatic game, but we do have very important interests here.

The U.S. opposition and the opposition of other countries, including the British, is based in part on the instability which a change in the status quo in the Eastern

Mediterranean would cause. Also, the adverse impact that this could have on the Grek-Turkish relationship, and on the impact it could have on NATO.

I will just conclude by saying, as we said today in the statement, that we continue to support the concept of there being only one government on the island of Cyprus.

Any questions?

Q Why do you think he moved now? What persuaded him this was the time to declare independence now?

A I just can't say. There was some diplomatic activity underway. The Secretary General had come forward in -- was it August or September -- with his initiative.

Q September.

A September. In response to that initiative, Mr. Denktash proposed a summit which would have included participants -- not only himself and President Kyprianou of Cyprus, but also the U.N. Secretary General. That was being worked out when this announcement came. It caught us by surprise.

A Just to clarify, that was in August the Secretary General came forward with his initiative.

Q Is there a feeling here that the UDI might be reversible?

A I think it's too soon to say. I think we would hope that it could be reversed.

Q Is that because you think that perhaps this is a tactic on the part of the Turkish Cypriots to get people's attention after nine years or ten years of nothing happening?

A If it's a tactic, it's a fairly strong tactic.

Q Do you think that the initiative for this move came from people on the island or from Ankara?

A We just don't know, and it's not useful or helpful at this stage to speculate.

Q Can you say more about the possible impact on NATO as a result of this?

A It is clear that this move has the potential of aggravating Greek-Turkish relations. We know that there is a certain level of tension already between Greece and Turkey -- who are members of the Alliance, who differ on issues like Aegean airspace and the boundary lines, and this will be or could be just another irritant which will or could have the potential of weakening the Alliance in a very strategic region.

(Continued on next page)

Q [redacted] do you anticipate any reaction in Congress against the AID levels to Turkey, as a result of this, bearing in mind the history of the last ten years?

A Well, the imposition of an arms embargo on Turkey in the 1970s was a colossal mistake. It created a major loss in U.S. leverage or influence in Ankara, weakened an important ally, and as a result weakend the alliance. So our position on the question of an arms embargo or the arms embargo that was applied in the 70s was fairly clear.

As for what the Congress will do now, I think that you should talk to Members of Congress. I think that there have been some statements or resolutions introduced today -- and I don't have track of all of them.

We have been in close consultation with the Congress. I have talked to Senator Percy; I know that Larry Eagleburger has been in touch with Members of Congress; Richard Haass has talked to other Members of Congress, so we are keeping them informed.

Q Does some of that talk, [redacted] indicate the clear feeling that there should not be any consideration given to the repeat of an arms embargo against Turkey?

A It's too soon to say. We think what is necessary now is that there be a certain calm while we assess exactly what this means, what the legalities of the step are -- what it means legally; what the Turkish Cypriots actually have in mind. We are asking everyone who can, directly or indirectly influence this situation to not take any rash or hasty actions.

Q Another point, in the contacts with the Turks today, was an attempt made to persuade them not to extend immediate recognition to the Republic of North Cyrpus?

A I don't want to go into the details of what we said to the Turks or any of the others. I just think you can see what our position is, based on our public statement.

Q Did their recognition come as a surprise?

A I don't know really how to answer that question. I don't think it was very clear to us, one way or another, in a fast-moving situation just what the Turkish Government was going to do.

Q If there was the threat of a UDI for some months now, what was the U.S. doing by way of encouraging the principals, so to speak, to avoid taking that action?

A We had a fairly active -- I'd say a not fairly, but very active diplomatic effort underway. We talked to Mr. Denktash in New York, in September when he visited the United Nations. The Secretary of State had conversations

Turkish Foreign Minister, so our views have been very clear on this subject.

Q [redacted] as a practical matter, what changes would this Declaration of Independence have? You have, in principle at least, an independent Trukish enclave on that island, which doesn't have direct contact with Turkey now, which is what this new one will be -- or will it? What is the difference?

A It's not clear. We've just had this announcement. We can't say precisely what has changed legally. From our perspective at this stage, nothing has changed. We see one government on Cyprus. We want to see progress made in reconciling the different communities on Cyprus.

Another way of answering this question is to recognize that there is a very good prospect that the future of any constructive diplomatic activity or dialogue between the two communities is fairly dim, or could be fairly dim. It hasn't helped the dialogue.

Q Do you believe that Ankara knew the decision before hand?

A I just can't say.

Q Is there any danger of a Turkish-Greek War?

A What?

Q Do you think that there is a danger that Turkey and Greece might go to war over this UDI?

A I can't answer that question.

Q Are there any Americans on Cyprus? Do you have any idea how many or --

A Do we know how many? (To Mr. Haass)

Q Is there a Veterinarian School there?

(Laughter)

Q I think there are at least several thousand.

A There is a very large American community.

There is a U.N. Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus. The Island is divided, and the line that runs down the middle of the Island is policed by various U.N., peacekeeping contingents.

Q Is there any consideration of the Administration to punish Turkey on recognizing the Turkish State?

A This is just too premature to be able to answer a question like that.

Q Can you say that now we are not going to have any NATO maneuvers on the southern flank?

A Can't say. We haven't had an opportunity to even look at that question.

Q Have there been any military movements by either Turkey or Greece since this has been announced?

A I don't want to comment on that.

Q You met with the Turkish Ambassador today. Is it a note that was delivered to him, or was it just verbal, talk?

A I don't want to go into those kind of details.

Q We have pointedly asked the Turks to vacate -- if that's the very you fellows use -- to vacate the recognition of the new UDI?

A We have made a statement today publicly, and I think you can just assume that what we've said publicly is consistent with what we have said privately.

O.K.

Q Has there been any changes in the disposition of the U.S. shift in that area, as a result?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:00 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIMEIRI OF SUDAN

November 18, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:02 A.M. EST

MR. SIMS: This briefing is ON BACKGROUND, attributable to Senior Administration Officials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In talking about a place like Sudan, you realize you've got to more or less change your focus. One thing, when you're serving a post and people come to see you, you're often dealing with someone who is stationed in Cairo, or stationed in Beirut, or perhaps Paris, I think is about the longest pull that any correspondent has made in coming to post. And I think that, perhaps from the Washington perspective, the axe to the world doesn't protrude quite so visibly from the center of Khartoum Square as it does to those who are serving there.

But, in general, let me tell you a little bit about the Nimeiri visit and a little bit about Sudan. President Nimeiri is expected to arrive in Washington tomorrow afternoon. He'll be taken to the Sudanese Residence where he'll be -- that's where he will stay while he's in Washington. Then his official visit begins on Monday.

This is not the first time President Nimeiri has been in the United States. He came to power in 1969, so in the last 14 years, or so, he's made four or five trips to the United States. But it is his first official visit to the United States and that visit begins on Monday.

During that time, Monday morning, he will be having a number of meetings. He has a meeting with the President about noon followed by a lunch with President Reagan.

Then the following day he has a working breakfast with the Vice President, a lunch with the Secretary of Defense, a meeting with the Secretary of State. Those will be some of the high points in his official visit. The official visit ends on Tuesday afternoon.

Wednesday, Thursday, he'll be in the Washington area. He may be here through the end of that week as a private citizen staying, again, as I said, at the Sudanese Residence. Towards the end of this next week he may travel a little bit around the United States in order to see some economic installations. Companies who work in Sudan are interested in showing him some of their operations here in the United States. He probably will leave the United States towards the end of next week. But those dates are uncertain. But the official visit will be Monday and Tuesday.

A little on Sudan and our relations with that country. It's a very large country, the largest in Africa, about 1 million square miles. A population of 23 million. They just had a census recently. It abuts -- like a game of jigsaw -- it abuts on to something like nine other African countries and in itself and with its neighbhors, it covers an area of Africa that's almost one-half of the entire African map.

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This brings Sudan into contact with a great many foreign affairs issues in Africa. And all the more so because President Nimeiri, after 14 years in power, has acquired a certain amount of seniority as an African leader.

The country is one with which we have excellent relationships. President Nimeiri is a moderate leader who supports our Middle Eastern peace initiatives. His friendships in the Arab world are most close with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to give you an idea of the kind of family groupings within which Sudan falls.

Economically, Sudan is a very troubled country. You read about places like Brazil and Argentina and Poland, but in terms of balance of payments problems, the Sudan is, although smaller in absolute terms, relatively speaking, is just as bad as any of the others.

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And its exports, its debt service ratio is somewhere around 100 percent, which is about as bad as you can get.

The Sudanese some years ago -- about three years ago -- discovered that they were proceeding into an economic abyss. In conjunction with the United States, a number of other friendly countries, the IBRD, the IMF, they began a program of retrenchment. Again, it's not one of those that you've heard a great deal about, but the Sudanese began to address this drastically serious economic problem earnestly. And they have been working at it in a practical and constructive and -- I emphasize the -- I don't want to exaggerate the success because the moment you talk about too much success, then people think, "Ah, the crisis is over and we can go back to the ways that made the early 1970's so comfortable.

But they are being successful in a very small way in meeting their obligations. Last year is the first year in ten years that they successfuly met all of their obligations to the IMF, the IBRD. These efforts to keep -- on the one hand, to provide assistance from abroad, from Sudan's friends in the national or the international community to meet this balance of payments gap at the same that Sudan works to improve and reform its economy -- these efforts are proceeding slowly. They're proceeding on target. But that target is not going to reached for, I would say, at least another five years.

Our economic assistance programs are substantial. They have been, in the last year and this year, in the vicinity of $200 million. The emphasis has been partly to use economic support funds in order to promote economic change, economic reform, the privatization of inefficient, peristatal organizations and give the government a kind of breathing spell while a more free-market oriented economy can gain way.

The efforts have been quite successful. Prices of things like sugar, wheat, cotton have been allowed to respond to market pressures. Production has risen, and the prices for these commodities has gone up -- that is, the prices which are paid to the local farmers, the local producers.

Good beginnings. But as I said, it will be a matter of another five years before we can say that the economy has reached, shore and does no longer need the life preserver that the IMF, the IBRD and the United States, France, Great Britain are extending to it.

We don't have any outstanding issues with Sudan. It's a kind of a nice thing to have a chief of state coming here that -- in which case the visit represents a high point that our relations have reached through work that has preceded the visit over the last several years.

On foreign policy questions, as I said, the two sides -- there are broad areas of accord. We welcome the responsible role that President Nimeiri has shown on a number of Middle Eastern and international issues. We're pleased at the economic directions that he is supporting at home. His role in intra-African, intra-Middle Eastern questions has been a supportive one and a responsible one.

So, the visit will give us an opportunity to discuss African questions, Middle Eastern questions to see

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where we are now with the Sudan, to look a little bit ahead as to what trends are likely to be in this area where nothing stays in the same place for very long. Obviously, questions of economic assistance will arise. I don't expect any surprises, any departures from form. Sudan already is one of our largest economic assistance recipients in Africa. And I guess that high level of assistance is expected to continue into next year.

It's as if, with this visit, our relations have, sort of, reached the top of a hill. I expect they -- I hope they'll get better. That's part of my job overseas. But we don't see this visit as portending major new departures or surprises in our relations with Sudan. They're good. And we hope to keep them that way.

Let's see. What about some questions?

Q How about the military assistance we're giving Sudan? And will those questions come up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I think the amounts of economic assistance will come up. They have been --

Q No. I meant military assistance to Sudan.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I said -- go ahead.

Q And you said, "economic assistance will come up." I was talking about military assistance.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Military assistance will come up. Our assistance has been -- the levels have varied, but I'd say about $50 million a year. And I expect they'll probably be about that level. There may be some increases. But the emphasis in that has been for practical assistance, not to provide the Sudan with things that are ultra-sophisticated and ultra-expensive, that cannot be used.

The emphasis, this last year, has been on things like communications equipment, trucks, maintenance, logistics. These are things that, from alot of experience with military programs, I come to put at the top of any list -- maintenance, training, spare parts, logistics. And that is probably where the heaviest emphasis is going to go with the Sudanese, rather than the delivery of end items.

Sir.

Q Military assistance is running $50 million a year. Economic assistance is running about how much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, about $200 million. Your target goal's -- the goal you end up with it -- about $200 million.

Q Is Libya still a threat?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Libya is a threat.

Q Is the Nimitz still off the shore?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Libya is a threat. I think -- Libya's a threat to lots of countries, not just those

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with which it is a neighbor. But Sudan, unfortunately, is a neighbor of Libya's. It has a short, common frontier. And last spring, there was a Libyan threat against Sudan that we considered to have been quite a serious one.

And nothing leads me to believe or leads us to believe that Quaddafi's hostile attitude -- disposition towards a stable, pro-Western type country has changed.

Q Well, but has their ability to defend themselves changed with all of our help and reinforcements and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I think their ability to defend themselves is getting better all the time.

Q Do we still have AWACS support there and so forth?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. The AWACS were withdrawn in August.

Yes. I think you were next.

Q What about -- yes -- any American forces on the ground there? What is the status of future American bases in the region? I'm sorry to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are no American bases there.

Q How about for the future? Didn't we look to the Sudan to give us some help in that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have any plans for bases in Sudan. We've got a good military assistance relationship, good military cooperation. They have allowed American servicemen and troops, equipment -- aircraft, F-15s, AWACS -- to come there and be temporarily stationed at the airport in Khartoum.

But as soon as these resources could be withdrawn and returned to the United States, they were so withdrawn.

Q Okay.

Pardon my ignorance, but is Sudan not a convenient

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stopping-over place on the way into the Middle East in times of a crisis?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not very good. The geography of the place is -- I've spent a lot of time in the Middle East and I was quite surprised by it. Just in flying from Khartoum down to one of the medium southern cities, it took me three and a half hours. From one end of the country to the other is about 1300 to 1400 miles. And to get from Khartoum to Luxor, which is [illegible] that much of anyplace, is about a two hour's flight by French Air[illegible] or a 737. The distances are very big.

The country is friendly to us, but it tends to be socked away rather low on the Red Sea. Really, Khartoum is not that far from Sanaa at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula.

Q Do you expect any new agreements out of this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't expect any new agreements. I have not provided talking points for any new agreements in the papers that I have sent into Washington.

Let me get the lady back there in the red scarf.

Q There were reports of American oil executives abducted in southern Sudan. Would that be brought up at all, and also, because there were some French nationals who apparently were taken.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. It's too bad that something like this happens at any time. I was in the south a couple of days ago, about four or five days ago, and one thing that struck me was that it's an area where you have, not to downplay it in any way, but there are a lot of arms awash, floating about in the south, friction between the many different peoples of Sudan and in the south. One missionary linguist estimated there are about 500 different language groups, most of them in the south. It's an area that has a great deal of intra-regional, intra-southern tensions and there is also the tradition of north-south tension in Sudan.

To what extent our people -- there were no Americans involved. That's one thing. Apparently, no Americans -- two British were seized and I think they've now been released. One northern Sudanese may have been killed and a number of French workers for a French project may still be in detention, may still be held.

To what extent these people were held as part of an intra-southern kind of thing or as part of an inter-Sudanese thing, north, south, is something we have to watch. It is a -- I suppose by African standards, it's -- things like this happen. But it is -- these things don't happen very frequently in Sudan.

Q Do they not pose a threat, at all, to President Nimeiri?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, look at the geography. I mean, what is often told -- we've got to look at a map in trying to assess something. The kind of threat this poses to President Nimeiri might be like something bad going on in -- somewhere in the Florida Keys. Those are the distances involved. And when you fly over the south -- I know I'm probably giving you more local color than you can ever use, but you fly over there and you see swamps that -- I mean, I once visited the Everglades. It makes the Everglades look like your teacup. The swamps just go on forever and is it solid ground or is it water? And what goes on there -- these are both in places where the oil executives, the two British and where the French people have been caught. It really is very remote and harsh terrains.

There's a gentleman in the sweater.

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Q Can you give us a little more detail on Middle East and African questions that Presidents Nimeiri and Reagan will discuss?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will -- how can I speak for them? They will discuss, say, in the Middle East -- there's always things to discuss in the Middle East. But things of particular concern to President Nimeiri --

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Let me put it that way -- that's probably what I've got -- since I lived there -- a better feel for than anything else -- start with him. He probably will want to discuss his good traditional ties with the United States, his wonderful relations with Egypt and with Saudi Arabia, very fine countries, his not-so-good relations with Ethiopia, his terrible relations with Libya, his [illegible] concern about Chad. Chad is, after all, has got an awful lot of frontier with him. And he would like to see Chad under a nice stable governmented headed by Hissein Habre.

The -- Yes, one moment, ma'am -- His focus tends to be on the Horn and the Arab world. If the discussion gets on to the Gulf war, he is not very fond of the Syrians and quite critical of the -- quite critical of both Syria and Iran.

What we'll want to discuss with him -- tell him that he's done many -- quite a few hard things well. His Middle Eastern policy has been a responsible one. His -- again, it's sort of a -- it's like turning a coat inside out. His policies towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Chad have been constructive ones maintained under a certain amout of pressure, pressure constantly from Ethiopia and from Libya. On the financial side, he's doing well; but it's not near the end of the road yet. Work must continue before we get to that good goal.

I guess, though, we would probably want to hear primarily what he wants to say. I mean, it's his nickel. We have invited him here and it's -- he is our guest and we want to be good listeners as well as good talkers.

Q Will he discuss Lebanon at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q What is his view of what's happening in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's very critical of the Syrian pressure on Lebanon. He sees his own ability to act effectively in that area as kind of limited.

But let -- take that -- the lady in the back with the white scarf.

MR. SIMS: -- back here and one in front and then that'll be it --

Q What will he substantively ask for? Money? Planes? Arms? Food? Which --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whatever he asks for -- I don't know what we will -- what we will say to him; but we are going to be ready for whatever he asks for. I don't know what he's going to be asking for. He didn't tell me before he left. It --

Q Then how could he be ready?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Because we've been thinking that he might be asking for something and we have prepared for those contingencies.

MR. SIMS: Last question --

Q You don't mention the Islamization of the country or his pouring of the booze into the Nile or, apparently, I understand they're building stadiums for punishment in prisons for Islamic stuff.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, these aren't things that -- Frankly, these are things I've recommended we do not raise with him. I mean, if somebody wants to emphasize an aspect of his religious traditions more than he did in his youth and early middle age, that's his own concern. He has gone to some pains to say -- I'm not saying how successfully he has managed to be heard -- but to say that there is no intolerance, no compulsion implicit in these rules with regard to the traditional rights that Christians or non-Muslims -- That's the thing. Non-Muslims is what you've got to say. You can't talk about Christians because there are an awful lot of traditional religions in Sudan that somehow coexist with Christianity more or less, that no compulsion is implicit in any of this. How well the people hear that --

But a number of legal decisions came out by the Supreme Court just before I left Sudan in which they have gone to the point of saying, "Yes, Christians can have alcohol. Christians can drink alcohol. That's -- There's nothing wrong because under Koranic law, I mean, it only applies to Muslims, so Christians -- "

But there's no doubt that these rules have sensitized and have made

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alot of the non-Muslims in the south with memories -- inherited memories of very harsh relations between the north and the south -- because in the 19th century, relations between Arab Sudan and non-Arab, non-Muslim Sudan were, frankly, preditory, highly colonialistic and quite preditory. And one of the great merits of President Nimeiri is that, in 1972, he more or less extended an olive branch to the southerners, the non-Muslims and said, "Let's live as a community. And you people can differ within these areas."

Q Well, why does he have these prisons, so many prisons?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He doesn't have too many prisons. His human rights policy is pretty good. But he's starting to -- the question was there was talk of implementing an Islamic system of punishments such as the one they have in Saudi Arabia. And Islamic punishments are witnessed publicly. I was five years in Saudi Arabia. And Islamic punishments are the punishments required by justice and by the will of the community. And so they're executed in public.

Q When did you have your last drink? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Religion is not part of this. But non-Muslim communities are, supposedly, a little bit --

Q Did you go to Beirut?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He can have one right now, after this.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:27 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
WITH THE
AMERICAN JEWISH PRESS
HYATT REGENCY HOTEL, ATLANTA, GEORGIA
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1983, 6:30 P.M.

QUESTION: First of all, on behalf of the American Jewish Press Association, we sincerely appreciate the opportunity you've given for this BACKGROUND briefing.

I would like you to comment on the fact that there have been some extensive reports that you personally have led a move within the Administration for a more open and clear strategic cooperation in the Middle East with Israel.

Would you comment on whether or not this is true; and also if the recent raid by Israeli and French planes against pro-Iranian targets in Lebanon will be followed by a similar U.S. action?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On the last question, our policy is not to comment on it because we're not elaborating on that question at all.

On the first question, we certainly want, and I feel that since I have been in office I have had a strong, open, collaborative relationship with my counterparts and friends in the Government of Israel. I know that President Reagan feels that a relationship of that kind for the United States is very important, and he intends to nurture it in every way that we can. That means that we fundamentally support Israel. It doesn't mean that we never disagree about anything or have an argument about anything because there are times when we have differences of opinion, but those are differences in the family, so to speak, and the fundamental fact of the close relationship with Israel and the United States is there. I think it transcends administrations for that matter in either the United States or Israel. It's a basic country-to-country proposition. I am very proud to be part of the effort to work on it.

Sometimes there are people who disagree with me within the Administration and if I get too frustrated, I just suggest that we have a meeting with the President and see what he has to say, and that settles it.

Q It's been battered about that the policy on settlements in Judea and Samaria have been criticized from

Washington. Could you tell us, is it Administration policy that the settlements in Judea and Samaria are (a) legal or illegal, and (b) are they regarded as an obstacle to peace?

A The President made a statement that in his view they were not illegal. I guess that's not the same thing as saying they're legal. But anyway, that's what he said and that is our position.

However, it is also our position that the settlement activity is an obstacle to peace. In the President's September 1st initiative, he called for a freeze on settlements, just as we have called for people to come and negotiate about the proper disposition and final status, as it's called, in the Camp David Accords of Judea and Samaria, or the West Bank or however you want to call it.

I have some comments about that in my speech, and I don't know whether you've distributed copies or not.

Q In view of Syria's aims of consoldiating Lebanon to a Greater Syria, and in view of its current threats, including today against the United States, do you think Syria will relinquish its goals unless a real show of force is shown?

This is a two-part. What is your assessment of President Gemayel's visit today to Saudi Arabia, and do you really think that Saudia Arabia is a viable influence over Syria and could contain Syria's goals?

A First of all, from the standpoint of Syria, Syria, unchallenged, has goals in Lebanon and in the Middle East that are not the same as our goals or Israel's goals.

There are basically different objectives there. I think that means that there has to be some sort of a reasonable balance of forces. Syria has to see that it can't get its way by military force. I think that it is not an accident that the ceasefire that was arranged last September 27th, I guess it was, that resulted in the Geneva talks among the Lebanese leaders, that came not long after the New Jersey showed up and let go a few times.

I think that it is important, unfortunately, to recognize that power, while it has its limitation, it also must be faced up to as something that we need to be ready to use.

In the case of Syria, they clearly seek to build up a capacity to challenge Israel. When you meet with President Assad, as I have -- he meets for a long time, I guess, with everybody; six hours is about average -- and he lectures a lot. I'm a believer that you should listen to people carefully and you shouldn't be afraid to believe what they say. Maybe they're telling you what they think. He has a long lecture that starts by saying that Lebanon was always part of Syria and it was artifically divided by the French, and it's the same people, and points out that they don't have a Embassy in Lebanon; never have. So you get a message there from that.

Then you discuss the peace process, and he says that Israel is stronger than Syria right now. So therefore it's not a good time for Syria to negotiate with Israel. But Syria should arm itself, and it's getting armaments from the Soviet Union. And when it feels that it can successfully face Israel down militarily, then, that's the time to negotiate with Israel. That's what he says. He doesn't leave you in doubt. You can dismiss that, but I don't. I think that is what is the direction of his thinking. And that is why, I think, it should not be dismissed or in any way overlooked; that Syria is building very considerable strength. Don't mistake that.

We have to look at that very seriously. It affects not only the Lebanon situation. Syria is there. But also they are in the process of becoming the controlling factor of the PLO, such that I think it raises the question myself of whether or not the PLO, if it could be said to claim legitimacy as a repesentative of the Palestinian people, it's a question now of who they can claim to represent. They would simply be representing Syria.

Q Can you take again my (inaudible) question?

A What can you accomplish in Saudia Arabia?

Q Right. Today?

A Saudia Arabia is a country that has played quite an active role in the diplomacy having to do with Lebanon. The Saudi Arabian Government and King Fahad have the view that there should be an independent, sovereign Lebanon. They want to see Syria leave Lebanon; obviously, they want to see Israel leave Lebanon. But they have the goal of a Lebanon that has a strong central government and isn't able to be sovereign over its terroritories. A goal which we share; a goal which Israel shares.

In that sense, what Saudia Arabia is looking for is parallel to what we're looking for. They have been unusually active in trying to support that goal. Their more traditional, diplomatic way is to be sort of in the background.

They're always saying that, well, we are in favor of this and this and this but we'll be in the background doing things, never up front. But they got very much up front in the Lebanon situation and, I think, have been playing quite a constructive role.

I don't know, obviously, all of what Gemayel has gone there for, but he's gone there in the light of that Saudi effort and in the light of the importance of Saudi support for his government, including money that Saudi Arabia might make available to help in the reconstruction; and they have made some available through some of the communities.

We've tried to encourage that money should go, let's say, to reconstruct the Druze area, to go through the central government to the Druze; make sure it goes there, but make it go through this government. In that way you can build the stature of the government. We tried to do our own help in the same manner.

Q An air force general, speaking at the John C. West Foundation's Conference last week on Persian Gulf security, completely ignored Israel as a strategic base for rapid deployment of United States forces, deployment going around the tip of Africa, and through Europe; does the United States Government not consider Israel of any importance in helping to maintain the peace in the Persian Gulf?

A I think Israel is of great strategic importance. Israel, I think -- we should keep reminding ourselves, Israel is a democracy. Israel has the kind of values that we have. Israel is a stable country. Israel can have a change of governments and still be the same country, so to speak, just as we can.

Israel can conduct an investigation of something like the Sabra and Shatila problem and investigate its own leaders, and have a report and nobody even raises a question about whether that report is an honest and objective report.

I think that from our standpoint, given all of those considerations, let alone its location and Israel's affinity for us, that it's clearly a country that is very key in our interests in that part of the world.

When it comes to the Gulf itself, and I don't know what this air force general had to say or in what context, but if you put one finger down on Israel and put the other down on the Straits of Hormuz, it's quite a distance. So you're not going to be able to fly a fighter, say, from there and back. That doesn't mean that you can't position supplies and position things there. But in our thoughts about, let's say, maintaining the international waters in the Straits, we pretty much have to do that with carrier task groups where you're right in the Arabia Sea; and we also have quite a good relationship with Oman. Of course, they're right there.

I might just say, if you haven't looked into the question of Oman and read some of the things that the Sultan of Oman has said, you might do that, because he has a different attitude toward Israel than the other Arab countries do. You ought to do a little work on that. He's a pretty impressive person.

Q When you were speaking in response to Mr. Wish's question, you made some reference to Syria mentioning that they wouldn't negotiate with Israel now because they didn't feel that they were strong enough. Are you implying --

A No, they did. They did negotiate with Israel about the Golan Heights, and they have an agreement. When they objected so much to the Government of Lebanon negotiating with Israel, we went and said, look, you negotiated, too. As a matter of fact, in many ways the Lebanese managed to get a better deal out of Israel than you did in some respects. So we've made that point. But, of course, when they negotiated they were weaker than they think they're going to become.

Q Do you think there's a possibility in either the distant future -- well, not too distance future -- within the next year and a half or two years before the Presidential election, for Syria to negotiate seriously with Israel, possibly a peace treaty with the same kind of remarkable, like exceptional, success that Egypt had in negotiating a treaty with Israel?

A I'm interested that you even asked the question. (Laughter) I think it's a pretty remote possibility.

Q You said that a year before at Camp David and Sadat went to Jerusalem.

A Yes, that's correct. Anything can happen, and the Middle East is volatile in both sorts of ways. No question about it. But I think that the much more likely candidate for an Arab leader to come forward and be willing to sit down and try to work out a peace with Israel is King Hussein.

King Hussein wants to do it. He recognizes -- and I think he's right in this, no doubt -- that he has to be able to construct along with him a Palestinian delegation that, on the one hand, is in its way acceptable to Israel. In other words, not a PLO delegation, but, at the same time legitimate in the eyes of the Palestinians. In other words, not looked upon co-authored by Israel but legitimate in the sense that they'll stand up for their constituency, and therefore the constituency will follow them when they cut a deal. So if King Hussein can construct something like that, then, I think he would be in a position, and wants to try to work out a peaceful relationship with Israel, and it may be.

How all of these PLO things work themselves through is always a question. But if Syria clearly dominates what's called the PLO and somehow West Bankers get the idea that whatever that leadership is, it isn't seeming to work in their interest and look to King Hussein, then it isn't impossible that something like that might happen sometime soon. I don't say that it will but it's not impossible at all, and we continue to work on that very hard and work with King Hussein.

Don Rumsfeld, who some of you may know, he's active over there now and he will be pursuing this.

Q Getting back to Oman. I just read recently that last summer the Sultan called for establishing diplomatic ties with Israel, and it's the first I've heard about it. Why wasn't this played up at all in the press, or was it; and has anything been done to use this as some kind of breakthrough with other countries in that area?

A I don't know why you didn't play it up. (Laughter) I handed this to you just now on a silver platter. I told you, go do some research on this.

He was in Washington. He made a State visit to Washington. I talked with him at considerable length. He has absolutely no hang-ups about dealing with Israel. He thinks it's ridiculous not to deal with Israel, and it's refreshing to talk to him. You ought to go interview him.

Q I'd love to. (Laughter)

A He's quite a figure, too; I'll tell you.

Q President Reagan has made it very clear that he is going to stand tough against any kind of communist subsersion in Latin America. He's made many policy statements about this and stands up against communist subversion and infiltration anywhere else in the world. Yet, it seems that the perception appears to be that the President is less than forthcoming regarding the Soviet activity in Syria which has turned that country into a Soviet military base which has endangered both American interest, including the Sixth Fleet, and it's dependable ally Israel.

How would you assess that, or how would you react to that preception?

A I think the President sees the Syrian problem very clearly. Speaking for the President, we've been quite clear if you read, for instance, my Congressional testimony on this subject about the nature of that threat.

I would say this: I think that Syria remains an independent country. That is, you can't look on them as a Soviet satellite in the way that, say, Czechoslovakia is, because Assad is a very independent person. And while they are certainly very much influenced by the Soviets, the Soviets have not only put weapons there, they have some 7,000 or so military people there manning many of those weapons. So they're there; their influence is strong. We know about it and we're concerned about it just as Israel is.

I expect that when our friends, Messrs. Shamir and Arens are here in another week, let alone with President Herzog, this subject will be one of the subjects we'll be discussing. What do they make of it, what do we make of it. We pool our intelligence on this subject and consider what needs to be done.

Q When you first came into office, there was a perception among many of the American Jews that you were somewhat unfriendly towards Israel, and now the perception is that you're one of the friends of Israel in the Administration.

Do you feel your own views on the Middle East changed during your tenure, or how do you account for the change?

A I think I haven't changed, but your perceptions have changed. (Laughter) I feel as though I've always been a friend of Israel. I've been to Israel quite a few times. I don't know how you explain why you have whatever attitudes you have, but I talked about Israel here a little while ago in terms of its values and principles. I suppose, as I have reflected on it, people have asked me that question.

I think about it. A very high proportion of my very close friends for a long period of time happen to be Jewish, and I don't spend a lot of time talking about Israel with them. They're not against Israel. It's a natural attitude of mine.

I have learned quite a bit, though, I think, about the Middle East in the course of my year or so in this job.

You spend most of your time as Secretary of State on the Middle East. (Laughter) It's just a gigantic time-consumer, and you're bound to learn things, and I'm sure I have.

Q When Messrs. Shamir and Orgod and Arens come, will you be able to discuss with them the pre-positioning of equipment in Israel from the standpoint that Israel can no longer afford to keep the balance of power financially? The costs are too high.

Is it possible to arrange a situation where American equipment is placed there and there's a lease-back system to Israel in case of need to use them? And, also, is it possible to consider Israel using the Merkava tank which has proven itself so well?

A As far as the tank is concerned, and the details of this, I think I'll pass on that in the sense that we will have to approach these subjects with those gentlemen.

As for (inaudible) and my friend Misha Arens keeps telling me that Israel produces a better tank than anything we've got anyway. And people tell me that's true.

We want to try to work out arrangements that do everything we can to help Israel maintain its posture of having an effective military advantage in the region so that it isn't going to be knocked over by somebody's superior military power. That is sort of the inpoint of all of these things, and there are all sorts of different suggestions about how that should be done. Misha Arens is very interested in development of a fighter aircraft, of producing it in Israel -- the LAVI. That seems to be going forward. But there are all sorts of trade-offs here; you can't do everything, or Israel can't do everything. It's much more constrained than we are. It's a very small economy, and I hadn't appreciated it really until talking with the President the other day and we were discussing some of the economic problems.

The President made some question of how it would affect us if Israel did such-and-such. I said, Mr. President, you have to remember that we are a $3-1/2 trillion economy and Israel is a $17 billion economy. The U.S. economy grows in a quarter more than $17 billion. There is no constraint, so to speak, in our economy about the sorts of things that need to be done, because the scale is so enormously different.

I'm not really dodging your question, but I don't want to go into the specifics of it. I think that's more for the discussions that would be held and they're, of course, the kind of discussions that would be held between Secretary

Weinberger and Defense Minister Arens, although I try to keep an eye on those talks. (Laughter)

MR. STRAUSS: There are a lot of hands up, and rather than risking the alienation of a lot of you in taking one specific question, I think we better close this session.

(Press conference concluded at 7:10 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON VISIT OF PRESIDENT NIMEIRI
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN

November 21, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:42 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know, President Reagan's meeting with President Nimeiri of Sudan has just concluded. There are a number of other meetings during the program of President Nimeiri in Washington -- he will, in addition, be seeing Secretary Weinberger, AID Administrator, Peter McPherson, Secretary Shultz, the Vice President. So, a number of other meetings are still ahead of us.

I think I would just say a general word or two of context about the visit here of President Nimeiri. The Sudan is for us an extremely important friend in both the Middle East and the African contexts. The importance of our relationship covers a number of different dimensions: economic, where we have worked ardently to seek to enable the government of Sudan to stabilize its economy which faces very serious difficulties of debt and balance of payments problems.

In the area of security, we have worked to try and strengthen, rationalize and modernize the armed forces of Sudan. We've attempted to be a supportive friend in the context of various threats that Sudan has faced, including on several occasions this year, particularly from its Libyan neighbor.

We value the counsel of the Sudanese leadership on a number of African-Middle East questions. And as the departure statements made clear, we have a good number of solid areas of agreement as concerns both Middle East and African questions.

I think with those few words I would open it up for questions.

Yes, sir?

Q How serious does the administration view the military threat to the Sudan, specifically from Ethiopia and also from Libya?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the seriousness with which we view it is best reflected in the fact that twice during 1983 we have been directly supportive of Sudan when it has faced or been the neighbor of threats to Chad, particularly from the Libyan side.

The situation on the Ethiopian border ebbs and flows. There have been recently some warnings and some threats from the Ethiopian side of which we would, of course, take seriously. I wouldn't exaggerate the extent of any conflict or across-border activity at this point. But we obviously watch it closely, particularly in light of the fact that Ethiopia receives very substantial assistance in some of its own policies from the Libyans, including both advisors who come in from Libya as well as Libyan funding and hardware.

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But I wouldn't want to overdramatize the situation that we face -- that Sudan faces at present.

Yes?

Q Is there -- do you have any evidence of Ethiopian, Cuban or Soviet support to the insurrection that seems to be building in the southern Sudan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think there's not too much question that there has been support channelled to Sudanese dissident groups that have gone across the border into Ethiopia. This involves both Ethiopians and Libyans.

Q What about in Eritrea? Is there any evidence that the Sudan is still giving support to the EPLF government, the ELF against Ethiopia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I might ask my colleague to address that question. I would just add a general word on it is that, I think, Sudan believes in a good-neighbor policy, has pretty consistently adhered to that point of view, and, of course, in the context of the many internal difficulties in Ethiopia and other countries, it has been a haven of receiving refugees from neighboring countries. There are a substantial number of refugees in Sudan. But I would look at that in a humanitarian context.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would add to what my colleague said that one nation's insurgents are another nation's refugees.

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And Sudan has got one of the larger shares in the world of refugee populations --some 600,000, the majority of which come from across the border in Ethiopia.

Q How much aid was promised? How much aid was giv[illegible]

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The aid figures?

Q -- both economic and military.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The aid figures are a matter of public record. We discussed the aid relationship with Sudan, and the Sudanese were -- and we communicated to them our firm intention of continuing to support Sudan economically, as we have in the past, and also continuing to support the several very positive and courageous measures that Sudan is taking in order to revitalize an economy weakened by unconstructive economic policies during the past decade.

Q Can you tell us if there was some surprise, or do you think it was a proper forum --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. As a person who contributed some of the raw materials that were subsequently processed by the National Security Council and the Department of State, I think I can say with some pleasure there were no surprises.

Q Well, can I finish my question, and that is do you think it's a proper forum for President Nimeiri to get tough with the Israelis in front of the White House during the President -- was the President expencting that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I would not want to comment on President Nimeiri's action or on President Reagan's reaction.

Q Where those -- was that an expected -- were those remarks expected in the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would repeat, I don't think there were any surprises to President Reagan during his meetings with President Nimeiri.

Q Well, was that topic brought up in the meetings between the two gentlemen?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say that the focus -- the discussions did touch upon Middle Eastern questions, and also questions in Africa and questions in the Horn of Africa. That tends to be the area where the prime foreign policy concerns of Sudan lie.

This gentleman here has not had a question yet.

Q Could you solidify a point made by President Nimeiri in his departure statement. He said that we had called the Soviet Union to assist in our efforts to -- for peace and progress in the Middle East. What exactly did he mean by that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You'd have to talk to the Sudanese on that.

Q Was it discussed in any way during the negotiations with President Reagan?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The role that the Soviet Union plays in the area did come up. It -- I would say there was a measure of agreement that its role has not been a positive one, but rather has been one of making difficult situations worse. There's someone who's not -- the gentleman in the red tie -- there's somebody else, too.

Q On the question of reference to Israel. The President proceeded by saying they were in agreement on the question of the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Are you saying, then, or implying that the President knowingly said that over what Nimeiri was going to be saying in reference to Israel, or does he share the same belief like Nimeiri does?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not take the Israeli remark out of context, but anything that was said should be seen in light of the substantial foreign policy agreement that exists between Sudan and the United States in the words of President Reagan.

Q Can you extrapolate about better understanding of the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Excuse me. Once again?

Q Can you extrapolate a bit on their understanding of the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I think they tend -- I'll say just a word or two, repeating what basically what was said by President Reagan, that on issues of the Horn of Africa -- after all, Somalia is a member of the Arab League -- we tend to see pretty much eye to eye with the Sudanese. The menace of Libyan aggression to Libya's neighbors is something that we see again eye to eye with them on. All in all, the measure of agreement between Sudan's foreign policies and ours in the area is quite substantial.

Q I guess I'm missing a point here, and that is I'm hearing about all this agreement in the Middle East.

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And then, the President -- Nimeiri comes out, and talks about Israel's being the root cause of the problems in the Middle East. There seems to be substantial disagreement over Israel's role in the Middle East, and as to who's at fault in the Middle East.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With regard to Sudan's policies on the Israeli question, I think you should address that to the Sudanese.

Q But I'm saying that our government -- you, as representing our government -- and our President have said that everything is just fine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said, "substantial agreement."

Yes, ma'am.

Q In their meetings, when they talked about the Middle East, did Mr. Nimeiri say the same thing to President Reagan as he did in the -- did he push for a greater U.S. influence on Israel during the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suppose its natural for the press to take the issue of Israel, because it's a question that is of great concern to us. Looking at it from the standpoint of the Sudanese -- and this is the question that you ask: what did President Nimeiri stress; what did he speak of? I would just say that President Nimeiri has got a number of foreign policy concerns much closer to home that might be expected to take up the bulk of his time in discussions and exchanges with the United States sides.

Q Okay. But in the -- put aside the bulk of the time. Did he ask for a greater U.S. influence on Israel at any point during the meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's really difficult to go beyond what I've said with regard to the privileged conversation of our visitor and our Chief of State.

Q Was there much discussion of the problems of Sudan, other than economic?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sudan is a rather stable country. It's had the same government for some 13 years. The Sudanese did share with us their thinking, their views, their plans on the internal administration of the country. But economic questions, obviously, are very much in the public domain and are questions of great concern to the Sudanese as well as to ourselves.

Q Are you intending, then, to pursue the same policy or the same level of aid -- economic aid to the Sudan, or are you going to increase it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't expect it to diminish. Whether it increases or not, I think, here, the emphasis should be that Sudan receives, already, the greatest amount of economic assistance of any country in the African bureau.

Q Was there a request for an -- following up on that question, was there a request for increased military and/or economic assistance?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would say to that that the discussion was kept on a high plane. It was not a discussion in which -- it would not be characteristic of the atmosphere at such meetings for shopping lists and "Dear Santa" messages to be produced. I'm pleased to say that it was, in every respect, a good meeting.

There's a gentleman here on the aisle.

Q Yes. Do you see a contradiction in President Nimeiri's support for both the Fez plan and President Reagan's peace initiative? You either support one or the other or -- what's the exact Sudanese position on this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm very pleased to hear that -- and to be able to affirm -- that Sudan supports President Reagan's peace intiative.

Q And they, also, support -- he said that they support the Fez plan.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think we're very pleased that President Reagan supports -- that President Nimeiri supports President Reagan's peace initiative.

Q Let me put it this way. Did they discuss at anytime to merge the two proposals together in order to bring a solution to the Palestinian problem?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't want to get into the details of the discussion between the two Presidents on that point.

Let's see, the gentleman there in the stripped tie.

Q What kind of assurances did President Reagan give President Nimeiri on U.S. support, should Libya or Ethiopia invade Sudan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's really not necessary to give such assurances, because they are there publicly, to be seen, a matter of record. Twice this year, we have -- in a moment of Sudan's need -- come to the country's assistance. That kind of public

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performance is a very sufficient earnest of our willingness to stand by Sudan if it is overtly threatened by aggression without.

Q Does that mean then the U.S. would permit weapons and manpower to defend Sudan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, no. It does[illegible] mean that precisely at all. It means that Sudan understands that [illegible] we will do -- that we are concerned with its security and its stability. And how we do it, that is one of the things that we h[illegible] a government for. They can come up with lots of different recipes, lots of different approaches to assure that. You have seen a coupl[illegible] of the solutions that we have come to on that point already this year.

MR. SIMS: Okay, we have three hands here. Bob, and then here and here.

Q Does the Sudan support the rebel effort in Eritrea?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said earlier that one person's rebels are another person's refugees. Sudan has been a very hospitable African country, a very hospitable Arab country. It has given refuge, hospitality, humanitarian aid to hundreds of thousands of refugees that have come on to its soil fleeing instability and oppression across the way. And I am confident that it will continue to provide this kind of assistance which is really one of the most generous displays of neighborly solidarity that we have seen in the world in this type of a situation.

Q First of all, a follow-up to that question. You didn't answer the question. Yes or no, is the Sudan supporting the EPLF or the ELF?

Second of all, I wanted to know if the administration feels that the problems in the South Sudan, their factors, are they externally based or are they internally based, with the presidential decree of the Sharia back in September? First of all, yes or no, is the Sudan supporting the EPLF or PLF? Just a yes or no answer, that's all I need.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we are getting towards the Christmas season. Everybody wants to get an answer to certain questions. This a matter that is really not one that I would want to comment on.

Q Well, I mean, either someone is pregnant or someone isn't pregnant. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid you'll have to make up your own mind on that.

Q What about the second question I asked concerning whether the problems in the south are externally based or internally based?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is probably a little bit of both. (Laughter.)

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MR. SIMS: Last question. Do you want the last one? (Laughter.)

Q I would like to take one last bite at the Mideast apple in this thing. You are indicating, when you were saying a little earlier, you were talking about substantial agreement between the two countries on things. Are there some things where there are some different perspectives or different views or something that you want to characterize? Because it doesn't sound as though the two are exactly on the same track to judge from the statements that we hear out here just now, unless there is something new you would like to tell us about the United States' view of the Israeli role in the Middle East.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Substantial agreement does not mean congruence. Substantial agreement means subtantial agreement.

Q But President Reagan used the term basic agreement which is different from substantial agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, substantial agreement, basic agreement, consider that I have been using these terms interchangeably.

Thank you.

END 2:00 P.M. EST

[illegible]

SPECIAL BRIEFING
ON A REPORT BY
THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1983, 2:24 P.M.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I am here to speak about the completed report of the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance. The Commission was chaired by Frank Carlucci and co-chaired by Larry Silberman, Cliff Gordon and Lane Kirkland, and in just a moment, I am going to ask Frank Carlucci to make comments and respond to your question about this report. But I think if you look at the membership of the Commission and remember that this report has been agreed to unanimously by the members, you will see that it is a real milestone, and for this, I know primarily it is a tribute of the importance and seriousness of the subject, but I also give Frank and his colleagues a great deal of credit for putting this together.

The Commission is a public/private joint undertaking funded partly from government sources and partly from the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, and the members of the Commission include people in the private sector and Members of Congress. So it represents a good cross section in every way.

There are a number of points in the report that I would emphasize that come through to me very, very strongly.

One is the fact that security assistance and economic assistance are very much related together. They are two sides of the same coin, not competitive but supportive.

The report makes that point, and I think it is a very important point. And it does give us a little jab organizationaly with a suggestion that organizationally we recognize that point in administering the programs.

It emphasizes the very clear fact that the assistance that we give is to be regarded not simply as something that helps other countries, but very much helps us, so that there is a two-way street here in this whole assistance business. In addition to helping us directly in our security and in our trade, it is very helpful in pointing others toward open societies with values that we admire.

Third, the report calls upon the private sector for a greater emphasis in this field, and emphasizes the importance of new technology, and consequently, of course, the importance of training as a part of this whole process.

I feel very much, myself, and I was glad to see with the wide spectrum of views represented on the Commission, that there was agreement that the levels of resources available for security and economic assistance are not adequate to do the job that we have set out for us in this country, and so I think that is the case, and I am very glad to see that the Commission has recognized it.

So, those represent to me some of the highlights of the report. It is an excellent report. It will be very thoroughly reviewed in the Department of State and the other agencies of the government, and I would say, finally, on behalf of the President, who is quite familiar with the work of the Commission, he expresses his thanks to you, Frank, and the members of the Commission for your work, and he looks forward to a session with the Commission hearing about the report, and, as I said upstairs when you presented it to me, he thinks that the best time to do this is after the Congress returns, because there are so many Members of the Congress involved in it.

So, with that let me just say thank you, very much, and I will turn you over to the tender mercies of the State Department Press Corps. (Laughter)

MR. CARLUCCI: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Let me just make two points, one a point of clarification. The Secretary said that the report had been signed by all the members of the Commission. It has been signed by all the official members of the Commission. There are, I think, three ex-officio members -- four, I guess -- who have said they need more time to read and digest it. But all those who participated actively in the deliberations of the Commission have signed the report.

Secondly, let me emphasize that the overriding theme of the report is one of program integration. The Secretary referred to this.

We believe that there needs to be more emphasis on a country-by-country, region-by-region strategy in building the budgets of the respective international cooperation programs.

The organizational recommendations really flow from that, and are only a subsidiary part of the report. The important thing is that we need to have greater interaction between these programs and a greater focus for the programs so that one can deal with the Congress with greater clarity.

At this point, let me just throw it open to questions to myself and to Larry Silberman or any members of the Commission who are present. I see Joe Jordan here, Wally Campbell, Mike Samuels, all members of the Commission, as well as my co-chairman, Larry Silberman.

Q I am not clear exactly what you mean by program integration, as opposed to what?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, it is our feeling right now that the programs are dealt with, by and large in the Executive Branch and certainly on the Hill, as separate pieces. Sure there is some overall coordination, but we felt they needed to be drawn together much more closely so that they were mutually reinforcing.

That is to say, if you take a given country, you should not impose or develop the security assistance program totally apart from the PL 480 program or from the Developmental Assistance Program, that one ought to look at them in context. And the resulting mix that would come out, as you look at programs on a country-by-country basis and a region-by-region basis, it might be very different than the mix that would come out if you simply look at them as functional programs from the Washington perspective.

Consequently we said, let's have a greater degree of interaction between the programs and let's have a focal point within the Executive Branch that can bring the budgets and the policy determination of these programs together and speak with one voice to the American public and to the Congress.

Q Frank, are you talking about the politization of the foreign aid process. In other words, that a country like, say, Pakistan, that might be concluded serves America's strategic interests, should be more entitled to PL 480 aid than a country like India, for example, that might not be? I don't know. It is a hypothetical, but I mean, are you drawing the two together and politicizing the process?

MR. CARLUCCI: No. We think that the polarization that has occurred, particularly on the Hill, between the constituencies of the respective programs, particularly security assistance on one side and economic developmental assistance on the other, is unfortunate, because, as the Secretary said, they are really opposite sides of the same coin, and both serve U.S. foreign policy goals.

Those foreign policy goals need to be defined in the broad sense, and we have tried to do that in the report. That is to say, when you talk about developmental assistance, this is really helpful in achieving foreign policy goals, as is ESF. So, if you take a country like Pakistan, you look at Pakistan's overall needs and you look at those needs in a broad foreign policy context.

We would have the administrator of this new organization responsible in a quasi-autonomous way to the Secretary of State.

Larry, I don't know if you want to make any comments on the organization structure. Larry Silberman had a subgroup on organization.

MR. SILBERMAN: Just in response to the last question, any time the Congress appropriates money for any purpose, it is a political act. I am not sure I understand the question, suggesting that it is a politicization of the foreign aid program.

What I think Frank was suggesting and that the report makes clear, both in its substantive and organizational parts, is that there is a -- and as the Secretary made clear a moment ago -- that military assistance and economic assistance are two sides of the same coin.

We found in some situations where military assistance to a particular country might be granted without regard to the economic cost of that assistance, particularly on a loan basis, and under those circumstances one would have to bring together the economic and the military to have the most impact. But, as Frank suggested, it is, in a broad sense, under the umbrella of American foreign policy, but that is foreign policy sort of in a long-term sense not necessarily in an immediate sense.

Q As I recall it, the central problem which gave rise to this Commission was the sense that the constituency or support for foreign aid had been declining and that the consensus behind the program was diminishing to the point where its continuation as a viable program was in danger.

Is there something that the Commission has concluded, or has it come up with a line of thinking that will deal with this problem of the political support or consensus behind the program, and, if so, what is it?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, the report points out exactly the point that you made, Don, that the support for the program overall has been declining.

We concluded after quite lengthy deliberations that there is no quick fix to this problem. There is no magic in what could work to develop an automatic constituency for the program, but that the compendium of recommendations, the totality of the recommendations there we are making should be helpful in moving the program in that direction, should be helpful in generating increased public support.

If you just look at some of our early recommendations, the first recommendation is to establish bipartisan leadership support for the program.

The second recommendation is to promote a citizen's network.

The third recommendation is to continue support for development education.

There are further recommendations which would help to satisfy the concerns of some people, promote the private sector, improve an evaluation, and establish a new consultative group with the Congress.

So, all of these, I think, hopefully would go in the direction of building increased support for the program, but our approach was that we ought to look at the merits of the program and not try to approach the subject strictly from the standpoint of constituency building.

Q You talk a bit about the call for an increase in assistance levels, from what to what?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, it was beyond the purview of the Commission to make budget recommendations. Of course that is done by the Executive Branch and the Congress on a year-to-year basis.

We simply said that the programs, in our judgment, were inadequate to meet the kinds of foreign policy goals that the Commission defined at the outset of its report.

Indeed, if you look at such things as concessional security assistance, going back to concessional security assistance, or taking a special look at Africa or the Caribbean, it is quite obvious that these kinds of programs will have to result in increased resources.

Indeed, one of the problems of the whole program is that people tend to look at it as quick trade-offs within a given budget level, and consequently, it is trying to grab a piece of the other person's pie, and that has contributed to the unfortunate polarization of the constituencies for these programs.

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Q Was there any concern that overseas perhaps this coupling of military and economic assistance of programs might have a negative impact in certain countries? And also, how do you reconcile that with programs already underway, things administered by AID, for example?

A The first question, under Joe Jordan's auspices, we held a rather lengthy session with a number of Ambassadors and other representatives from the LDCs. The impression I had from that session was that they would be enthusiastic about greater program integration.

Am I correct, Joe? I think that was the clear message that came out of that session, and I think it is consistent with the experience that various members of the Commission have had. We bring to the table a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives.

Your second question, what we're saying is that ongoing programs ought to be brought into this integration process as well. You don't stop them, and then re-start them, but you say, "All right, we had the following ongoing programs in Country X. How do they relate to other programs that we think are necessary, to provide a total balanced package to that country? And what kind of budget changes or policy changes need to take place?

Q Isn't there bound to be some overlap, then?

A No. On the contrary, I would think that this kind of approach would reduce the duplication. Duplication exists when people in Washington who aren't talking to one another automatically impose programs on a country from the top down.

Q Could you explain why they are enthusiastic? I think you were getting to that, but could you give me some concrete examples? When you start drawing those two types of programs together, on the one hand, the public would see humanitarian and the other, military. Don't you get a blurring of them? You begin to lose track of what is going where?

A I referred, I think -- You're talking about my comment about the enthusiasm of the recipient countries?

Q Yes, yes.

MR. CARLUCCI: My judgment is that it is very confusing to a recipient to have, on the one hand, somebody from the State Department come in and talk to them about developmental assistance, and five days later have somebody from the Defense Department come in and talk to them about security systems; maybe a week later somebody come in and talk to them about PL 480; and then the MDB's might take a totally different approach -- none of them talking from the same policy framework. How much more helpful it would be to have one person come in and say, "This is our assistance policy for your country, and this is the way the various components fit into this policy." I should think the recipient nations would applaud this kind of approach.

Q This hasn't been tried precisely before, but there was a stab at bringing together the foreign assistance components with the IDCA, so what makes you think that this isn't going to happen again?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, the report points out the differences between the current, our organizational proposal and IDCA. The NDSA, as we would define it, will be responsible for both economic and security assistance. IDCA was not: it would report to the Secretary of State, and would have direct control over economic assistance in ESF program implementation, and it would coalesce and integrate the various components of a mutual cooperation program. So, in a sense, we moved way beyond IDCA.

Q If I may follow up on that, what makes you think it won't fall prey to the same sort of bureaucratic difficulties where Treasury wanted to keep hold of the MDB management and State wanted to keep control of the short-term political prerogatives of U.S. aid, what makes you think the Pentagon is not going to keep its piece?

MR. CARLUCCI: Well, we have had Pentagon participation -- I don't know if Phil Gask is here; no he's not -- throughout our deliberations. We have kept in close touch with the various Departments involved, whether it was Treasury, Agriculture, Defense, or State.

Not everybody will agree with this recommendation, of course, and there will be a certain amount of bureaucratic tugging and pulling. But once again, let me emphasize the point that our organizational recommendation flows from the central theme of the report. It is not an end in itself; and if people come together on the central theme of the report --

and we are optimistic that they will -- then there ought to be great support for the organizational recommendations.

Finally, don't forget that the Commission itself is rather large -- 42 members -- and included a wide range of people from the Hill and people with different experiences in the Executive Branch; and I should think that their support should be helpful in implementing the recommendations.

Q Is there legislation really necessary in order to create this new administration, which you are recommending?

MR. CARLUCCI: I'll defer to the lawyer on that.

MR. SILBERMAN: The organizational recommendations probably would have to be implemented through legislation, but it is not our purview to come up with legislation, but rather to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State, who then, as he has indicated, would discuss it with the President in the White House, and they would make their own conclusions as to whether and at what time they would seek legislation to implement it.

Q Who are the four people who haven't signed the report?

MR. CARLUCCI: Let me seek John Wilhelm's help. It's Congresman Madigan, Senator Helms, Congressman Long, and Senator Pell.

Is that correct, John?

MR. WILHELM: And Senator Inouye. There are five.

MR. CARLUCCI: And Senator Inouye. Congressman Madigan came to two of our sessions, but the rest did not participate at all in our deliberations.

Q Did they suggest they were going to sign it, or is it not clear?

MR. CARLUCCI: In some cases, they say they haven't read it. Chairman Long says he wants to read it. I think the same response came from Senator Helms' office. Is that correct?

MR. WILHELM: Senator Helms' office said they haven't had the opportunity to talk to the Senator yet. There have been only two firm "no's": Senator Pell and Congressman Madigan.

MR. SILBERMAN: Of course, we're talking about Ex-Officio members.

Q What was that reason?

MR. CARLUCCI: John, did they give you any --

MR. WILHELM: Congressman Madigan had reservations about the organizational structure because he feared that it may interfere with the prerogatives of the Department of Agriculture. Senator Pell, we haven't had an opportunity to talk to his people yet.

Q Mr. Carlucci, I wonder if you could give us any more help in qualifying what you think the results of your recommendations may be? You talk about increasing money and so on. By how much, two whom? Are you talking about a bigger bureaucracy, fewer bureaucrats?

MR. CARLUCCI: The report makes the point that says -- I've got the language right here: "We see no reason for any increase in government staffing due to our recommendation." Indeed, we think it might be possible to decrease it, because you would eliminate IDCA, and AID would be subsumed as well as the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology.

On the money issue once again, our strategy would not allow us to quantify it -- we would have the capability to quantity our recommendations -- because what we're saying in the Executive Branch, is develop your funding on a country-by-country, integrated approach, so you build it from the bottom up, and interact with the various functional constituencies at the top. The result is your overall funding package. So we did not view it as our responsibility to try to determine funding levels for any of the progams, or for the totality of the programs.

Q Is the bottom line here that by linking the security to other aspects of economic aid, it will be more politically supportable, both by Congress and the American people?

MR. CARLUCCI: The bottom line is that all the programs hsould be better integrated, and that in so doing, it will give us greater clarity of purpose; and this will facilitate the dialogue between the Executive Branch and Congress.

Q What does it mean, the sentence, "The Department of Defense would retain its loyal affairs here in military programs, as it is now the case." If, as you say, everything has been taken together under one authority, what does the line of authority then mean, which the Department had --

MR. CARLUCCI: What the report said is that policy and budget for the programs ought to be integrated, and that this new entity would administer only developmental assistance in ESF, but that the policy and budget for Security Assistance, PL 480, the MDBs would be pulled into the new entity.

The administration of the Security Assistance Programs is a rather large and complex task, and has to be done by military officers, so there was no consideration given to moving that from the Pentagon to the new entity.

Q The Continuing Resolution rather than the regular Foreign Aid bills is handling the foreign aid now. That perhpas indicates a lack of legislative support. On the other hand, there was a separate in the house in which the Foreign Aid passed by the largest majority ever, more than 112 difference between the Ayes and Nays. So how do you quantify the legislative decline in support?

And secondly, was there any recommendation to regularize the process, and go away from Continuing Resolutions to the regular Foreign Aid bills?

MR. CARLUCCI: I would be the last person to try and quantify legislative support for Foreign Aid. I don't think I'm really qualified to do that. I think the participation of so many members of Congress on the Commission was an encouraging aspect. Many members spent hour after hour, working on the Commission Report.

All took it very seriously; all recognized that we had reached an impasse in Foreign Aid, and that was an essential tool of our foreign policy process. All contributed in a very positive way.

What was the second part of your question now?

Q The second part: Was there any recommendation in the forward court to go back to having first an authorization bill --

A No.

Q -- and then appropriations, rather than just tacking on to the CR.

MR. CARLUCCI: The Commission felt very strongly -- and so reflected in its support -- that we needed stability in all of these programs, and that it was desirable to plan as far in advance as possible. So while we didn't tell the Congress how to conduct its business, it is clear that all the members of the Commission felt that the business of Continuing Resolutions was very undesirable, and indeed harmful to the program.

MR. SILBERMAN: May I add something?

MR. CARLUCCI: Sure.

MR. SILBERMAN: With respect to the observation that it is difficult to get consensus in the Congress on authorization bills, we take some heart from the fact that while Frank and the Commission were able to get consensus on this report, which in broad policy aims, should foreshadow, or hopefully would foreshadow the possibility of a consensus on individual authorization bills -- possible.

Q Thank you.

(The Press interview was concluded at 4:15 p.m.)

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unedited

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1983, 11:03 A.M.

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have just a few points to make before we get started on questions. I that there is an inevitable tendency to depict the current situation as a crises or as a serious breakdown. We do not view it in these terms.

First of all, as you all know this has come as a surprise development. The Soviets have, for some time, said that, with the appearance of U.S. missiles in Europe, that the negotiations would not continue in their current form. That's their language -- "current form." So we were prepared for this development. We had discussed it extensively with the Allies, most recently at a meeting of the special consultative group in Brussels which took place yesterday, and there have been a number of exchanges between the Allies, among the Allies, on this possible development.

The second point I would make is that while the INF talks have been suspended, that other negotiations are under way so that business, as usual, in the START negotiations and the negotiations on mutual balanced

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force reduction with the Soviet Union are taking place.

I just might note in this regard that we recently completed a preparatory session of the new conference on disarmament in Europe and Helsinki, and we expect the formal session of the CDE, as it is now known -- Conference on Disarmament in Europe -- to begin on schedule on January 17. There will be 35 nations participating in that conference, including the United States and the Soviet Union.

Just to really repeat what the President said this morning, our posture remains what it has been. We are at Geneva, we will remain in Geneva, and we are prepared to continue or resume the INF negotiations if and when the Soviet Union decides to return.

Q When you say the January 17 meeting will take place with the U.S. and Soviet Union, has that been agreed at the Foreign Ministers level?

A No.

Q So what would you say is the possibility?

A It is a disarmament conference, and all 35 nations will have delegations. Our head of delegation is James Goodby, who was General Rowny's former deputy. Plans at the current time call for him to head our delegation.

Q Have the Swedes indicated that they would like us to begin at a Foreign Ministers level. What is the likelihood of that taking place?

A I just can't say.

Q You said that if and when the Soviets decides to return. Is it the U.S. expectation that the Soviets will return?

A The President indicated this morning that he thought they would. I think that we believe that it is in the Soviet interest as much as the U.S. interest to reach an effective agreement in this area.

Q But do you expect them to come back?

A I think that predicting precisely what the Soviets will do is a fairly treacherous task. I will point out, though, that this in some respects is not the first time that we have been confronted with this situation.

I remind you that shortly after the Alliance in December 1979 took the so-called doubt-track decision, the Soviet Union announced that it would not negotiate over INF systems so long as the Alliance continued making preparations for deployment. They took that position for several months and when it became clear to the Soviet Union that the Alliance was going to go foward with both tracks, that we not only wanted to negotiate but we were going to begin preparations for deployment, the Soviet Union decided to come to the negotiating table.

Q Does this also mean the end of the START talks, or what's the status there?

A I just said, I think, about ninety seconds ago that those negotiations are under way; and I used the phrase, "business as usual."

Q The possibility has been discussed, in terms of a resumption of INF, it might actually be folded into START. What's the current view of that thinking?

A Our view on that is what it has been. That there are two separate negotiations. It makes sense to proceed with two separate negotiations. We have felt for sometime that it could complicate the talks by merging the two. I don't want to speculate on what we might decide in the future. But at present we would like to negotiate on the strategic arms at START and to focus on the problem of the SS-20s in a separate negotiation.

Q That sounds like more of a preference than a ruling-out.

A I never rule out anything in the future.

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I'm just giving you our current policy, which is that we do not support the merger of the two negotiations.

SECOND DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just might add that from our point of view, all of the elements for an agreement are now on the table. We made major initiatives in this area, as you know, during this year. We would hope that in that context the Soviet Union would re-examine its position on suspending the talks and come back earlier next year to resume those talks.

We had, in fact, proposed to them within this session that we continue to talk through to the holidays, take a short break for the holidays, and come back in the second week in January.

Q Is it START?

A No, INF.

Q What do they say on the second week in January? Is there an answer or just a walkout?

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, they haven't told us if or when they will resume the negotiations.

Q What's your answer to Helmut Schmidt's criticism that the U.S. did not bargain assiduously in INF, and particularly with regard to the "walk in the woods" formula, where he claimed that in the last few

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weeks when he was Chancellor, that you didn't even clue him in on that?

A First of all, you just have to look at the record of the negotiations, and just let me briefly take you through it.

We came forward with a proposal for eliminating all together an entire category of weapons. This would have meant that it was unncessary for the United States to deploy a single cruise missile, or a Pershing II; the Soviet Union was willing to eliminate its SS-20 forces which created the need for the December '79 decision in the first place. After giving that proposal a good chance in the talks -- after negotiating for sometime in an effort to achieve that outcome -- we came forward with a so-called interim proposal which said if the Soviet Union would accept zero, that both sides -- this was last March and in April -- that both sides should agree on equal levels of warheads.

When the Soviet Union was unwilling to accept the interim proposal, the President, in September, modified that proposal. There are some important, I think, elements which said we were prepared to deploy a fewer number of

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systems in Europe than would have been provided for both sides by equal global limits, accepting the concept of regional limits. We said we're willing to reduce numbers of the Pershing II missile which the Soviets have said concerns them. We said we are willing to agree to limits on aircraft, which was another long-standing Soviet proposal.

To further elaborate that proposal, just in the last two weeks we made a concrete offer which said that if the Soviets wanted to deploy 140 SS-20s, as their proposal had said it did, we were willing to allow them to deploy 140 SS-20s as long as the United States was given an equivalent capability. So I just don't think that the argument that we have not been negotiating seriously stands up to scrutiny.

And on the question of "the walk in the woods," there, I think, the record is very clear. We were willing to explore privately, and have been willing to explore privately possible outcomes in the Geneva negotiation.

Paul Nitze was authorized by the President to explore in a private manner negotiating results. It was the Soviet Union that blocked any private exchange in an

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effort to work out an acceptable agreement.

Q Can I clarify the very opening point you made. You said that we offered zero deployment if they dismantled the SS-20s, but it was the SS-20s plus the 4s and 5s?

A That is correct.

Q So it would not have been going back to December '79, but it would have been going back to a situation that existed in the early Sixties?

A No; that's incorrect, because of the changed strategic circumstances. In the early Sixties, the Soviet Union had a force of SS-4s and 5s, but that capability was offset by American strategic advantages. We had strategic superiority at the time.

What made the SS-20 such an important military development in the 1970's was that the Soviets, by the Seventies, had arrived at a position of rough strategic parity or equality with the United States which led Chancellor Schmidt in 1977 to express concern about the credibility of the American deterrent in the light of the Soviet SS-20 buildup.

Q How do you assess the Soviet threats to deploy comparable weapons if we go ahead with our

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deployments? As you know, there's been speculation that they might put submarines off our coast with comparable flight times and deploy missiles elsewhere.

What's your assessment of that threat?

A The first point I would make is that the Soviets have pointed to certain steps they could take to respond to U.S. deployment. What's interesting is that even before U.S. deployment has taken place, they have already taken some of those steps. For example, the deployment of shorter range missiles in Europe.

They are in the process of modernizing their shorter range systems; they've begun deployment SS-21 short-range missiles in eastern Europe.

I want to emphasize, this has already happened, and I think it's the view of military specialists within the Administration that these developments would have taken place in any event. It is very difficult to point to any specific Soviet military action that wouldn't have happened, regardless of whether NATO had followed through on the December '79 decision.

Q What about the submarine?

A We'll have to see what the Soviets do. We have not identified any specific reaction, or any

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specific move the Soviets might make that they wouldn't make as part of their overall effort to build up their forces.

Q Supposing they did go ahead with the submarines, or any kind of a comparable flight-time missile to the Pershing II's --

A The Soviets already have a comparable flight-time missile. They have a comparable flight-time missile against Allies and it's called the SS-20. It's somewhat bizarre that we pay attention to Soviet propaganda on the flight time of the Pershing II while we ignor the fact that the SS-20 , which has been deployed against our Allies since the mid 1970's, has the same flight time.

Secondly, the Soviets have a comparable flight-time capability against the United States. Right now, they deploy submarine launch ballistic missiles off our coast that can reach targets in the United States at the same time it takes the Pershing II to reach targets in the Soviet Union. So there's no qualitative change.

Q You suggested two places in which the negotiations might continue in another forum, to paraphrase the Soviet point of view. One is the START negotiations and the other is the, in some manner, the CDE --

A No, you misunderstood what I said. I said

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that other negotiations are underway. I wasn't suggesting that this reflected any particular approach on our part to recognize Soviet concerns.

Q But in questions about the START negotiations, you said that you were, in effect, not ruling out the possibility that a decision might be made differently at some point in the future.

What I'm trying to get at is, what other forums are there other than merging START and INF?

A I think you're really on the wrong track here. We want to negotiate on INF in Geneva within the current framework. No decision has been taken on changing that framework. We will be at the negotiating table prepared to resume these talks if and when the Soviets want to return.

Q The Soviets have said that they're --

A I pointed out before that this isn't the first time they've done this. But we want to negotiate, and our current policy is to negotiate INF in the current framework.

Q Only in that forum?

A That's our current policy.

Q Are there other available forums? Are there other ways this could be done, privately or whatever?

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A Our belief now is you negotiate. If the Soviets want to negotiate on INF, there is a place to do it.

Q Given the fact that the Soviets have said publicly that they're going to take some counter-measures, and we know the SS-21 is already deployed, is it possible that the pacing fact, in terms of when they come back to the talks, if they come back, will be dependent on what it is in addition to the SS-21 that they can do which will sort of back up what they said publicly, and that means, are they apt not to come back until they have a cruise missile deployed on a submarine somewhere or off our coast?

A I don't have the slightest idea. That's a question you should ask the Soviets.

Q I'm asking you what you, in your analysis, think of how long it might be and what the pacing factors might be before they come back?

A I don't think we have any information on that subject.

Q Could you address yourself to the 162 British and French systems? Have the Soviets done anything in the last week or ten days to indicate that they have moved off that demand?

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A The picture here is extremely confusing. They appear to suggest at one point that British and French forces don't have to be taken into account to reach an agreement, although at the same time they want an agreement that continues to give them a monopoly in these categories of weapons.

So even when they say they don't need to include British and French, by the very fact that their proposal calls for a monopoly they do appear to want compensation. But, then, after Soviet diplomats have suggested that British and French forces don't have to be taken into account, we get high-level signals from Moscow to our Allies that, in fact, British and French forces do have to be taken into account. So, again, it's a confusing picture.

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Q What do we think is behind that confusion? Does it reflect any deeper division within the high-level Soviet ranks? When you mentioned before how difficult it is to predict what the Soviets will or will not do, have they become even more difficult to predict because of what appears to be a leadership vacuum or a struggle, or whatever?

A No. It's tempting to try to argue that; and in this brief flurry, confusing flurry of suggestions that they had -- a new proposal and suggesting that it was our proposal and then apparently taking contradictory positions -- it's tempting to think that there could possibly be uncertainty at the higher levels. Beyond just seeing that as a possible explanation, I just don't think we can go. Whether they have a finely tuned diplomatic strategy in mind or whether they're just kind of making decisions on an ad hoc basis is simply unclear.

Q Is Andropov still in charge? What's your information?

A We can't say.

Q Have you any indication that he's more than ill to any of these stories?

A We just see the same reports and rumors that you do.

Q What's the schedule for maybe the U.S. team

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coming back?

A I'll let my colleague talk in detail about Paul Nitze's itinerary because he's going to be spending some time in Europe consulting with different leaders. I just want to make clear that for the time being we are going to keep people on the delegation in Geneva because we think it's important that they be there -- that if and when the Soviet Union is prepared to resume the negotiations that they will have people to negotiate with. But let my colleague --

Q Let me just try one thing with you, if you could share with us the nature of the Soviet walkout today. They left no impression --

A You shouldn't call it a "walkout."

Q Yes. There was no indication whatever of the time. They could come back tomorrow, the way they stepped out today?

A I think that they are tending to treat this as a recess. And, in fact, if you look at the pace of the negotiations and how they were handled over the last two years, this would be kind of moving toward the end of the session in any event.

Q Yes.

A So what they have done is they said that they're going home and they haven't told us when or if they

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are coming back.

Q Well, would they in the past have done that?

A Normally, toward the end of the session, the two sides would discuss the length of a recess and when the talks woudl resume.

Q Well, wouldn't it be properly characterized as a "walkout"?

A I think a "walkout" actually connotes a highly dramatic gesture; and I think you've seen -- if you haven't -- what happened there. There was a 25-minute meeting this morning between the two negotiators, and the Soviet negotiator laughed and simply said that the talks were in recess.

Q He used the word "discontinued," didn't he?

A "Discontinued."

Q And that is not a very harsh word.

A I think the best word to use is "suspend."

Q Not "walkout"?

A I don't think that is the right terminology.

Q Assuming his English is pretty good, "discontinue" under these circumstances is not an especially harsh word. He could have used much harsher language.

A I think that's correct, but I want my colleague to tell you a little bit about Paul Nitze's plans.

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Q Just one thing: Is it your opinion now, as a result of what happened today -- are the two sides at a stalemate in the negotiations -- or, from the U.S. point of view, is there substantive --

A Let me just make a couple of remarks on this.

First of all, we find it difficult to understand or to explain why the Soviets have done this. I will just remind you that we have been at the negotiating table now for two years. During that period, the Soviet Union has continued to build up its SS-20 forces, its INF missile systems, at the rate of approximately one a week.

So, in other words, over that two-year period we had the deployment of some 100 SS-20 missiles with 300 warheads. But the United States, backed up by its allies, has been willing to negotiate under the shadow of continuous Soviet deployments.

We thus don't understand, and we don't think public opinion in the West will understand, why the Soviets cannot negotiate with us with the U.S. beginning deployment.

The second point I would make is that there has been progress in the negotiations.

There is a fundamental obstacle to an agreement; and that fundamental obstacle to an agreement is not, for

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example, the question of British and French forces; but that obstacle is that the Soviet Union has taken the position through the whole period of these negotiations that while it should retain the ability to deploy a substantial force of SS-20 missiles -- a larger force, by the way, than they had when the negotiations were first proposed -- that the Soviet Union has taken the position that the United States should not be permitted to deply a single system.

And they, having taken this position, sought to make this issue a test of Western credibility and resolve because for the last three years in the aftermath of the December '79 decision the Soviet Union has sought to make this a test of Western credibility. And what has resulted, however, is a test, really, of their own credibility because the Alliance has held together and at every major NATO meeting and in every national election that has taken place this year -- countries like Britain, countries like Italy, countries like Germany -- in every parliamentary debate, up to and including the one yesterday in the Bundestag, the December '79 decision has been reaffirmed.

Q Do you exclude the possibility that the January 17th meeting could set the stage for some discussion -- either a new INF proposal by Gromyko to Shultz or vice versa?

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A I think that you have to understand what the subjectand the purpose of this 35-nation arms control conference is. It is to look at arms control from a new perspective to emphasize so-called confidence-building measures -- steps that countries can take to make their own military activities more visible, to lower the risks of accidental war; and to take steps so that in times of crisis, in times of tension, people don't miscalculate -- that that forum is a very different kind of forum, with 35 countries, and the subject of the negotiations are a very different subject than the INF negotiations.

So I think that the point we are making is not that somehow INF is going to become the subject of a different negotiation. There is a negotiation for INF.

The point we're making is that we should not view this step as the end of prospects for progress in East-West arms control.

Q O.K. To come back to my question --

A Well, the answer was "No." I thought I answered it. I just did it in an elegant way. (Laughter.)

Q Has there been substantial progress at the START negotiations?

A Sorry?

Q Has there been substantial progress in the

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START negotiations?

A No, I don't think there has. There has been some progress. The United States position has evolved in ways that are clearly more flexible; but we can't say the same, unfortunately, for the Soviet position.

Q Could you explain in some detail why you believe that merging the talks would complicate the talks when there are a number of experts who believe that the prospects for an agreement would be enhanced if you had more weapon systems on the table to trade off?

A You can make the problem so complex and so complicated by having so many different systems of different capabilities on the table that the problem of tradeoffs is exacerbating; it's not eased.

We have a special problem that we are focusing on in the INF negotiations. That is the problem posed by the unilateral, unprovoked buildup of the SS-20s. And the December '79 decision was designed to deal with that problem, and the negotiation with Soviet SS-20s and older missiles and U.S. deployments I think is one that is understandable. It's one that has a certain simplicity -- that if the Soviet Union was really interested in achieving an agreement either with zero on both sides or permitting some level of deployments on both sides, we could quickly make progress.

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The reason that we don't have an agreement is because, as I pointed out before, the Soviets are proposing what the President has called a "half-zero option" and that wouldn't change, no matter where you were negotiating or how you were negotiating this problem.

Q Let me ask you a different question because the thrust of what you're saying -- what you said today and what the President said -- is: "Well, the Russians will probably be back and it's not a big crisis. And let's not be carried away with words like 'walkout.'"

But there are some people who do think we are entering into a very difficult period with the Russians, that a real chill is under way, and that there is no easy exit from this situation.

Do you share this view at all or not?

A No. I think in part that is precisely the kind of environment or climate that the Soviet Union is trying to create. And here I think we have to be very honest with ourselves. The Soviet Union has been waging a campaign of fear over the last three or four months on this subject in an effort -- and a last-ditch effort -- to stop the Western deployments, arguing that the onset of U.S. deployments is somehow going to qualitatively change the environment in East-West relations.

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We believe that the Soviet Union has strong stakes, just as we do, in preserving stability. We believe that they havean interest in achieving an effective INF agreement, that they have an interest in stabilizing the strategic balance and in reaching progress in other areas of arms control.

Q Soviet civilians have said privately, here and in Germany -- and the civilians in the government but not military -- that the SS-20 deployment was basically a mistake but the military sort of forced it upon them and they don't quite know how to deal with it.

Have they ever given that sort of hint to the State Department or to the negotiators?

A No, and I will just simply make the point that every indication we have about decision-making in the Soviet Union is that the political elite is very much in control and if, as you say, the Soviet Union made a mistake on the SS-20, they certainly would like to compound it -- because they're upwards now to 360 SS-20s with three warheads and they're continuing to deploy.

Some mistake! (Laughter.)

Q It's still not clear to me whether you expect Soviet military countermeasures or whether you just don't know.

A No. The problem is that the Soviets -- we've told you this time and time again -- have a tremendous military momentum. It's not as though, in the absence of deployments, the Soviets wouldn't be moving ahead on a broad front. They would.

It's just difficult to even pick out an area where the Soviet Union could do something that it isn't otherwise already doing. They're already deploying short-range systems. They're already developing and testing cruise missiles. They're already modernizing their submarine force.

Q On the matter of folding these talks --

A Just on this question I go back to I think a very wise thing that Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said when he was in office -- and that is when the U.S. builds, the Soviet Union builds. When the United States doesn't build, the Soviet Union builds.

Q On the matter of folding, does not the December '79 decision say that the INF -- they weren't called "INF" but the talks should take place within the framework or the context of the existing strategy talks?

A No. It says within the SALT III framework.

Q Yes.

A As of that time.

We don't have a SALT III. And we think -- and we have

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said, and the allies understand -- that these negotiations do take place in that broader framework. They're not completely oblivious to the fact that there's another negotiation going on.

We discussed that with the allies. There is a clear relationship between the two negotiations. The two negotiators are General Rowney and Paul Nitze, who stay in very close contact. The members of the delegation closely stay in touch. So there's clearly a relationship between the two.

We recognize that relationship in our own policy-making between the two negotiations back here in Washington. But the fundamental thing is that is a very different point than the whole question of merging the two negotiations -- which, I just want to underline, does not or would not resolve this very fundamental problem in which the Soviet Union simply says that the United States, under no circumstance, has the right to deploy any missiles in Europe while they have the right to maintain this substantial force which can threaten our allies both in Europe and in Asia.

Q Thank you.

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Q What's Nitze's schedule?

SECOND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say that with regard to Ambassador Nitze's schedule what he will do is what's normallydone after a negotiating round, which is to consult first with NATO in Brussels and then to consult bilaterally with various allies, particularly in the basing countries.

The delegation will operate out of Geneva and all the delegation will be there at least through a week from today. Some may return at that point, but we will leave a few people there as well -- particularly Ambassador Glitman -- so that if in fact the Soviets desire to return on a minute's notice or however they wish to get back to Geneva, we will be ready.

Q In the past, this is about the period of time when there normally would be a recess.

A That's right. Normally it's two months on andtwo months off.

FIRST SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just want to underline what my colleague said earlier: that it had been our proposal though --

Q Yes.

A -- because obviously deployments were imminent that the two sides should stay at the negotiating table, and

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we only wanted a very brief recess over the Christmas holidays.

Q Did you say Ambassador Nitze is going to come back here or not?

SECOND SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Ambassador Nitze will then come back here. At least, that's his current plan.

Q When will that be?

A Probably a week from today.

(Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the BACKGROUND briefing was concluded.)

Unedited

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON-THE-RECORD-BRIEFING
ON
AID TO GRENADA
BY
J.F. MORRIS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1983, 2:10 P.M.

MR. MORRIS: Thank you. I think given the range of issues to cover, rather than make any lengthy statement I'll just briefly describe the reasons for my being there and our team being there, and then answer any questions that you have. I think the handouts will be fairly comprehensive.

I went down there wearing two hats and for two purposes. First, was as Deputy Administrator of AID to examine how we were allocating and using the $3.475 million in disaster assistance and immediate rehabilitation assistance that we had programmed. And, secondly, to look at how we might design a program for allocating the $15 million authorized recently by the Congress for economic assistance.

Then, as a member of the White House Coordinating Group on private secular activities in Grenada, I was asked to head an interagency survey team and examine private sector conditions there with a view toward reporting back to our group in the White House what we found and what linkages might be appropriate with the U.S. private sector that has expressed such interest in getting involved.

We made that report last night. They will be releasing it later. And with that, I stand ready to answer any questions that you have.

Q Mr. Morris, does your team believe, Number 1, that there is a market for completion of that airport in terms of eventual tourist travel, or whatever, and have they set a possible price for the completion of that field?

MR. MORRIS: Yes. We are aware there is a potential market. No, we have not set a price nor are we recommending that it be completed at this stage, since we do not have the data. What we are recommending is that a study be done as quickly as possible of what it would cost to complete the airport and necessary support infrastructure.

One thing is clear, however, and that is that the President was absolutely correct in terms of the intent of the previous government being more focused on military than economic matters with regards to that airport. We unearthed further evidence to that effect that I found quite convincing in terms of the government programs on roads, for example.

When we went with them on their road needs, they said one of their high priorities was a five-mile access road directed from the airport to St. Georges. We rode the existing track which is a jeep-rutted road for a short distance and pot-hole filled the remainder of the way. And yet the design of the road proposed was not completed nor was any funding on the book that made it impossible for the road to be available by the original March 1, 1984 date.

Secondly, that government had enacted a tax code that was virtually confiscatory as far as any outside investment in tourist facilities would be concerned. A fifteen percent tax on foreigners buying land; 55 percent corporate tax; 20 percent withholding tax; 5 percent tax on Grenadians selling land.

The tourist industry told us, for example that it resulted in an effective tax rate of approximately 85 percent. If a government were seriously trying to use that airport to generate such business, why did their policies move in the opposite direction? Because there is no investment plan, and the public sector did not get in and begin construction or design of publicly-owned facilities.

There might have been some rhetoric about it but there was nothing on the books about it. It seems to me then, clearly, they weren't that concerned about those aspects. We are. So among the things we're recommending is that the government policy be discussed with the new interim government, which seems quite aware of the problems they've inherited in this regard, and take a look at what can be done to improve the investment climate.

At the same time, we examine what improvements in the infrastructure will be needed to make that airport viable as an economic undertaking.

Q To follow up, the strip is in pretty good shape. Is there a private investment market for purchasing or leasing it and operating it?

A We don't know. We're going to look into that. The strip seems to be in good shape, certainly. They C-1s and 41s landing on it, and C-130s, et cetera. But one engineer told me the runway needed another coat of asphalt; another engineer told me it needed five coats of asphalt.

The water system is not adequate or working there at this time. There's some talk about locating a telecommunications tower there, and no one has thought through the design, the height, the cost, et cetera, of that.

The airport itself, the terminal, is a shell; just concrete and cinderblock walls. Nothing inside. No one knows the value and utility of some of the electronic equipment, navigational equipment, et cetera, that were found crates. The truth of the matter is that no one on this earth at this moment knows what it would take to operate that airport, to construct it, to maintain it every year, to train the personnel and what options there are to finish it short of its original 9,000 foot length. So we are urging that those facts be gathered and put on the table and weighed against the economic benefits that might accrue, given the linkages I mentioned that are now not present and then make a decision what interest there may be on the part of any part of the Federal government alone or in cooperation with other governments or other private investors. I believe that recommendation will be followed.

Q You say the President was absolutely correct because the evidence that you uncovered while you were there was that there were no plans to improve a 5-mile access road to --

A To build one.

Q Or to build one, and because the tax code on the tourist industry was confiscatory.

Did you find any -- from that you're inferring an intent to use it for military purposes; is that correct?

A Either that or they're absymally ignorant.

Q Is that possible?

A It's possible but I would think with the number of advisors they had throughout the government, it's highly unlikely; sophisticated advisors from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other East-bloc countries.

I might add another thing that was interesting to us. As we begin to try and research the true financial condition, balance of payments, other accounts, operation of the various departments of the government, we found that a lot of the data was missing and apparently had left with the advisors.

The Grenadian officials, the permanent civil servants that we met with indicated that that was in fact the case. It appears to me that these advisors in many cases were doing the administration, not just the advising.

(continued on next page)

Q Again, I just want to clarify this. Did you find anything in the structure or infrastructure of the airport or the facilities around it that indicated that it was to be used for any military purpose? Because we have, I guess, the main private contractor saying on the contrary things required for any kind of military facility were lacking and were not planned for in any way.

A Since the storage and apron areas are uncompleted, I think it's a little difficult to judge how they might have eventually turned out. I do know the airport was ringed with anti-aircraft guns and other things, but I'm not an expert on the design of military airports nor am I an expert on the design of civilian airports. But I do think -- common sense dictates -- that if you're trying to use a facility of that size and investment that is going to be scheduled to open in roughly four months, somebody would have given thought to providing the infrastructure necessary to handle the volume of tourists such an airport would require to be an economically sound investment.

We have been told by airlines that between 1200 and 1500 rooms need to be available to justify landing rights. There are only 400 first-class rooms available on the island at this time. There's no evidence that that missing 1100 rooms or 800 rooms, depending on which figure you take, was in the process of being brought into being. So I just simply question how they were going to achieve the economic goal they set as the primary reason for the construction of the airport.

It's clear the military uses were immediate. That's just common sense.

I have no special secret insight or information.

Q What were the military uses?

A That's the landing of military aircraft and the deployment of them from that site, which I would think would constitute under some circumstances a threat to the sea lanes which are of such vital interest to us in the region.

Q Is there a Tourist Council, a Grenadian Tourist Council?

A Oh, absolutely; and we met with them at some length. It consists of tour operators as well as hoteliers, and they set forth their needs for the coming years.

Q What did they say about the airport, about the advisability of completing it?

A They were quite in favor of it, particularly if we were going to be able to go forward and help with the infrastructure.

Q Why were they in favor of it?

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A Because without it they find it very difficult to attract a large volume of tourists -- even though it is a lovely island, I must say. It is one of the most beautiful islands I think I've ever seen.

As it now stands, the airport at Perles, which I'm sure you've all heard many times, is 16 miles away. But that road takes over an hour to drive. It is in abysmal condition, except for some short stretches the Canadians and the European Development Fund worked on. It has no night-landing facilities and, as a result, many tourists have to overnight in Barbados. And when a tour director suggests to them that they buy this package -- it includes the overnight in Barbados -- they often object, we're told by the tour director, and would prefer to take another tour and undergo that form of inconvenience. We're used to getting on a plane and going directly where we're going -- maybe with some stops along the way, but not overnight with expensive hotels and other costs -- taxis, et cetera -- and they're quite right in assuming that unless they get direct flights from Canada, the U.S. and Europe, they're going to have difficulty attracting large numbers of tourists. And unless those tourists have means of getting around comfortably on the island, they're not going to find their stay as pleasant as they might elsewhere, and so they won't come.

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Q Of all the industries on the island, which one holds the greatest promise for economic expansion and growth?

A We think both tourism and agriculture. Agriculture is the leading element in the economy now, and we identified several opportunities in the agribusiness field that we think show promise.

Of course, one of the factors here is what the new government will decide to do with regard to the 40 state enterprises that hafe been created, some of which are in the agricultural area -- such as the Agro Industries firm, a processing firm -- Grenadian state farms, and other state enterprises that are making effective operation of a free market economy rather difficult.

Q Can you describe some of those opportunities in agribusiness that you're talking about?

A Yes. They're set forth in some detail in the report and they include such things as the Agro Industries firm I mentioned, which process various products from nectar of papaya to nutmeg and nutmeg jam and other preserves.

We also think that there is going to be a market, if there is ready transport available, for cut flowers -- in fact, there are three U.S. buyers already expressing interest in that particular product -- also fresh fruits and vegetables, to name a few. Cocoa is very successful already. The problem is inadequate production. They need further assistance on genetics and on fertilizer, pest control, and other things; but they've already sold half of next year's cocoa crop. It's of an extremely high quality.

In the banana industry, they're suffering from mocha disease, which is a disease that attacks the stem, and that is a difficulty that needs to be cured.

But these are just a few.

They also have a very productive continental shelf, one of the largest in the region, with many shellfish -- which, if packaged and frozen, I think would have a ready market.

Q Mr. Morris, when you spoke about confiscatory tax policies on the previous administration, the previous administration was a Socialist government. Is it possible they were thinking of creating a tourist industry without a considerable amount of private investment, and isn't it something socialized countries do?

A They may have been thinking about it, but there was no evidence of our meeting with their government officials that they have any plans to do that. We've spoken to Grenadians, probably the same people you have, who said that Mr. Bishop, at least -- and some other members of his government -- were interested in stimulating --

Q Mr. Ramdhanny, the Minister of Tourism, certainly wouldn't say they weren't interested in stimulating greater tourism.

A I'm sure they were interested in it; but, as I say, when we met with the officials there were no plans on the books -- specific plans for any specific facility being underwritten and planned for fairly new-term construction by that government.

Q This is the chicken-or-the-egg question. Did they need the airport to get the private and outside assistance necessary to bring that kind of investment in there?

A I don't think it is chicken or egg. I think it is chicken and egg. The two have to go hand in hand.

That airport is an enormously expensive undertaking for a small country like that. The regime virtually looted the private banking system to help raise revenue for it. There's no liquidity left. They raised the reserve requirements from 10 to 20 percent, which took 12 million out just like that, last year. And to do that without planning the attendant infrastructure, I think foredooms you to economic

P ac failure. You have to move along hand in hand, and there was no evidence that they were doing that or that the aid they were getting was focused in that direction.

Q Will you explain where we are on that 15 million dollars? Is it now available to be spent this year or what?

A Yes, it is.

Now let me switch for a moment, if I can, from the private-sector team to what the aid proposal will be to the Congress over the next few weeks on how we allocate that 15 million dollars.

The first thing we plan to do is a five-million-dollar economic support-fund grant, balance of payments support, to reinject liquidity into the banking system to provide for capital goods, consumer goods, foodstuffs, raw materials to start the economy moving again so that they can begin to reactivate the labor force which is in severe straits.

I might add with regard to the labor force we found the unions decimated, all the leaders either executed or in detention for doing the execution. And this is another matter that is going to have to be addressed and included in the Social Services section of the aid proposal. We are planning two and a half million in social services, which would include training of civil servants as well as working with AIFLD -- the AFL-CIO overseas arm -- on reconstituting the union leadership and creating the basis for a stable democratic trade-union movement.

We're also going to be programming money in the Social Services area for health and education.

We're planning roughly four and a half million dollars to be allocated to road reconstruction. That will include the training of Grenadian public works personnel, the provision of engineering assistance, and reconstruction of roughly 12 to 14 miles of road.

In addition, we are planning a million-dollars direct private-sector assistance, which will include training and technical assistance for the Chamber of Commerce and other similar business organizations.

Q How much was that again -- one million?

A One million, yes.

So does that add up? Let's see. Five- for the rehabilitation grant, 4½- for roads, 2½- social services, 2- for agriculture -- which would be extension service, land survey, soil analysis, pest control, land conservation -- that sort of thing.

Q You're still 500 thousand short, I think.

A The way I read it, we're right on the money.

Q You're right, yes. That's 15-.

A And that's in addition to the 3.475 --

Q 3.475.

A -- that's correct.

Q Where is the money coming from?

A The money is coming from the 15 million dollars authorized by the Congress -- appropriated by the Congress in the CR. It is money deobligated from the Syria Program.

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Q Whom would it have gone to?

A Syria.

Q Does that represent the whole Syria --

A Oh, no. The rest of it would be obligated too, and going in different places. But 15,000,000 of it is going there.

Q For how long?

A That's through Fiscal '84.

Q Are you recommending increases beyond that?

A Beyond the 15 and 3.475? Not at this time, no.

Q You assume this will be sufficient for the fiscal year?

A No, we're not saying that. We're saying that's all we're asking for in planning the program at this time; but until all the reviews are done, I can't say that at some time in the future we might not request some additional money, but not much more.

I would point out that none of this includes any money for the airport -- I'm speaking now as AID. AID is not at this point planning to invest anything in that airport. We have not studied it -- in fact, no one has, as I said before, which is why we came back with the conclusion that somebody should.

Q I think I know the answer, but why are you cutting Syria? (Laughter)

A Well, the Congress did that. Maybe you ought to ask them, but I suppose because of difficulties in our diplomatic negotiations with them.

Q Are you going to send pictures of Grenada to Syria?

A No, no. I've never seen Syria, but Grenada looks a lot prettier from the photographs I've seen.

Walter.

Q Two things about the airport: one is -- I came in late and I heard you say something about that there were no plans for feeder roads to the airport?

A The principal one to St. Georges, through the Sugarmill, this 5-mile road, they have no design plans. They had mapped out a route, and they said this is the way to solve the problem of transporting this volume of people in and out of the principal city, but they had not proceeded very far with it under the other government, and they had no funding in the pipeline to begin construction, let alone to have done so in time to make that airport opening.

Q The captured documents had two or three examples, beginning I guess in June of '83, when they sat down with the Cubans and actually mapped out, I think it was, 30 miles, of main road and feeder roads, which was part of their next year's construction program.

A All I can say is what these officials told me. They had routes located, but they had not gone far at all in terms of any road design, and they had no commitments on any funding to do any construction. And you can't build a road until in two or three months flat.

Q Have you seen the documents that were passed out here because --

A No, I have not. What I am giving you is what was orally presented to me by the senior officials of the Public Works Department of the interim government of Grenada, the career civil servants. I met with every department of government in a large room for several hours, and had a separate meeting with telecommunications, water, power, and public works sections, to go through the entire infrastructure, and that is when that issue arose.

Is that correct, Jim? You were with me.

MR. HOLTAWAY: Right.

Q If I could just ask one more: You keep emphasizing that AID has no plans for the airport. What other branch of government might have plans for the airport?

MR. MORRIS: None at this point, that I know of; but since I do also represent AID, I want to make it clear in this 18.475 total, there is no money budgeted for that purpose at this time.

In our meeting last night at the White House where we presented our findings and recommendations, some discussion then took place about should such a study be undertaken, and if so, who should do it? It was pointed out that a number of private sector firms with engineering and airport design expertise were willing to donate their services to make that assessment. In addition, representatives of the Commerce Department spoke up and said that they had some skilled people in that area; the FAA was mentioned. It's hard to say. I don't want to speak for any of these agencies, but it is clear that some combination of skills entirely without the federal government, entirely within, or some combination thereof is going to be put together to examine this issue; and that will probably be decided next week.

Q The Pentagon is running the airport right now. They are using it, so you must assume they are running it.

A Well, they are occupying it. They have brought in portable landing lights, a self-contained military navigation system , a portable navigation system, and that is what they are using to guide their own aircraft in and out. They have not done any design studies or operational cost estimates whatsoever.

Q I wanted to find out, have you had a chance to see about the U.S. private sector, if there is no interest besides the cut flowers investing in Grenada?

c-5 A The reason this group was put together was because all our agencies in the White House were being swamped with calls from various individuals and firms expressing interest in either being of assistance, because they felt it was the patriotic thing to do; or for pure business reasons they had their interest. And rather than have each agency send down groups of its own officials, coupled with private sector interest, and private sector interests themselves come down and inundate the place and overburden the Embassy staff as things were settling down, it was felt a coordinated effort would be better, that the agencies could put their resources together, and that we adopt a coordinated approach vis-a-vis the private sector, we can do more faster than by any other method.

There are a number of other firms than the ones I mentioned, not by name, but by category in the cut-flower area that are interested in other things.

What I now anticipate will happen is that in a week or so a group of business individuals will go down there, and meet with Grenadian counterparts, and begin to pursue some of these specific interests. There is a large convention in Miami this weekend and next week -- I guess mostly next week, Tuesday through Friday, of roughly 800 individuals involving most of the Caribbean business interests.

After that conference is over -- because it wouldn't make much sense to have our business people go into Grenada when the Grenadians themselves are in Miami -- we will follow up, I suspect, with something like an OPIC investment mission. In addition, it was said last night in our group meeting, that we will probably conduct a briefing in a week or so for the most appropriate private sector linkages, the firms with the most appropriate linkages, and that might lead to yet another delegation going down and beginning to pursue things.

Q Does that group of business individuals include representatives of the airlines?

A I don't know that because they haven't been selected yet. We are going through the process of beginning to combine everybody's list of querries, and identify now that we're back -- we thought it inappropriate to pick these people before we returned. Now that we've returned, and just last night presented the areas of what we thought were the greatest opportunity, we will now go back through these lists and try to identify the most appropriate linkages. I do know that airlines have expressed interest.

Q Are there any other countries involved in an aid program or is it just totally American?

A Oh, no. The Canadians and the British, for example, have aid programs. The British had a relatively small one, but my understanding is that they have requested permission from their government to begin a rather ambitous program in 1984. The Canadians had a program of slightly over $1 million last year, and I met with their representative as well, and they have requested permission from their government to restart it, and to continue at that level. Neither the British Government nor the Canadian Government have authorized those agencies to proceed. But they were involved in the past; we expect they will be involved in the future, and their representatives in the area have recommended that.

The Venezuelans, too, I might add, I think have expressed some interest, but I'm not sure to what degree.

Q Related to that, do you have an estimate as to the kinds of aid projects that were being pursued by countries such as Cuba and the Soviet Union, other countries that probably will not be interested in carrying on, or not be able to carry on -- what the value of that was on an annual basis, roughly?

And also can you respond to -- In this press release here, you say that PRG "looted the banking system to pay for their pet schemes." What were their pet schemes that you're referring to?

A The airport and other centralized state agencies that were created. The state had borrowed 14 percent of the bank deposits in 1981. The state had borrowed 35 percent of the banking deposits by 1983. State activity constituted 12 percent of the GDP (gross domestic product) when the new Jewel movement came to power; it constituted 41 percent when they left power.

What you have is a classic Marxist, forced collectivization of economic activity at great human and economic cost -- not surprising.

Yes, sir.

Q I'd like you to go back to the first question: Besides the airport, can you identify what projects there were as opposed to the creation of a classic Marist force, and so on and so forth? What was it for?

A They also had, of course, the cost of maintaining their teachers, their doctors, the advisors in all the various ministries. There was talk of that road rehabilitaion, although as I said there was no evidence. Other than that, I am not aware of a list of specific projects that I could give you because a lot of the documents disappeared. On the other hand, I gather, Walter, while I was away, other documents that were retrieved were released here in Washington that I haven't had time to see. I've only been back in the country roughly 36 hours.

If I may ask Jim Holtsaway, the head of our Office of Caribbean Affairs, do you know any more about the details?

The dollar volume was roughly $20 million in total.

Q Of what?

A Of East-bloc assistance, Soviet East-bloc assistance. They also agreed to buy 500 tons of the nutmeg at commercial prices.

Q I'm sorry, again. On the "pet projects." I know that there were these state agencies. What were they to do, these state agencies?

A They did virtually -- they were in every sector of activity. They included such things as the collectivized farms and the state-run factories, mini-factories, I guess by our standards.

I would call that a pet project, just like I would call our private sector initiatives one of our pet projects.

(Continued on page 26.)

MR. HOLTAWAY: No, just the obvious one was the Cuban radio station where the equipment already was installed, and the antenna in place, and so forth, with a capability of broadcasting well beyond the beaches of Grenada.

MR. MORRIS: We flew over it but didn't have a chance -- didn't have time to go and actually look at it.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Will any nurses, doctors, teachers be going down as part of our assistance package?

A I would --

Q Is there any?

A Yes, I would assume so. We have budgeted monies for that purpose in the social services section of the A.I.D. package. But I am working very hard to see what we can do about coordinating a lot of the volunteers that have stepped up and expressed interest. Obviously the Peace Corps is another area to look for assistance. And we have a detailed accounting of every teacher requested and needed by the government, and the level of sophistication and skill they are to have. And the same thing is true in the medical field, through the nursing and technician area as well. And we anticipate, on the short term anyway, meeting that need with primarily volunteers, either through the Peace Corps or directly from our private sector.

But I would like to say that it is our objective to replace them as rapidly as possible with appropriate Grenadians or other West Indians that might be available. We don't want to simply substitute our control of their entire system for the Cuban-Soviet control.

We only want to fill a skills gap in the short run. We also want to provide a lot of technical assistance to speed up that process.

And it's interesting to note that the population of the island has fallen from the figures that I had begun to read when I first was asked to take this on. The number mentioned frequently was 110,000. We are now told the best number is around 85,000, and there are roughly 400,000 Grenadians elsewhere in the world.

So we think there is a reservoir of talent there that under more hospitable circumstances might be willing to come home and help with the process of reconstruction and economic reactivation.

Yes, sir?

Q Perhaps you have some insight into this. Do you have any idea how the Barbadian Government, Mr. Adams, or, say, the Dominican Government, Prime Minister Charles, feels about getting another competitor for the tourist dollar in that area?

A Yes, I have some sense of that, but it is not first-hand. There wasn't time, I'm afraid, for us to go visit those other islands.

They understand they are dealing with a rather unique situation: an island that is in dire circumstances, and therefore may need more front-end assistance than would be average for the region.

But really, at roughly the $18 million or $20 million level we are currently talking of economic assistance, it isn't that far out of line with the amounts being given to those islands, which in some cases is $13 million or $14 million a year now.

But it is clear in the short run it will be more expensive to rehabilitate Grenada, than it is to maintain our on-going economic assistance programs in those other islands.

In the longer run, however, we see that assistance assuming a more normal proportion with regards to the program we have going throughout the region. We are very mindful of the fact that we are dealing with a nation that is part of a community that views itself as a whole. And we do not at this point in time intend to establish any overly extensive or ambitious U.S. presence there, only in the short-run, to try to reverse the enormous difficulties that were inherited rather suddenly.

Q Is there a feeling among, say, the Barbadians that they are Massey's, and they are not wild about having American Government assistance to build up Gimble's?

A No, I don't get that sense at all. I first wanted to deal with the dollar volume, and now let's talk about tourist competition.

Grenada is a rather unique case in that it has catered in the past to what the industry specialists call the "up scale" part of the market--the more wealthy tourists, if you will. Their hotels are small, often very exclusive villas. And they want to keep it that way. While they want to expand the number of rooms so that they can make landings at the airport a reasonable prospect, they told us repeatedly they wanted no facility larger than 150 rooms. They wanted no facility taller than the palm tree line. They wanted to maintain that intimate, and somewhat exclusive, atmosphere they felt would give them an exclusive role in the market place, as opposed to the situation, for example, in St. Lucia where

where more large-scale building took place, and now it is very high volume, but obviously less costly. They felt that would be too directly competitive for their own interests--let alone the other islands'.

So they are trying very hard, as the dust settled. [illegible]ook at the situation and see where they would have special niches and comparative advantage, as opposed to their neighboring islands.

Q In that case, they are probably not interested in the cruise ship market, are they?

A No, quite the contrary.

Q That answers your room problem.

A No. Cruise ships, they could sleep on the ship.

Q That's right.

A And so they are very interested in the cruise ship market and a resumption of the yachting business. Again, of course the type of people who have yachts are the type of people who generally have a little money to spend when they come ashore. And we have statistics on the yachting calls, and they have fallen off rather markedly over recent years. And I discovered one of the reasons why was they used to get shot at when they would pull into some of the coves, because various areas were being declared security areas, and then not again--and they didn't have generalized knowledge of that.

When the word is out that the situation is stable and returned to normal, and they can safely drop anchor virtually where-ever they choose, I think that they anticipate a return of the yachting business. They are certainly interested in a return of the cruise business. In fact, one of the things they asked us was would we please convey that desire, in the hopes that perhaps some of our cruise lines would take a renewed interest, even in this season, in coming back to Grenada--following the turn of the year.

Q Two questions. You said a $13 to $14 million level. Is that all U.S. or is that --

A No, that was just U.S.

Q -- like Tobago or Trinidad -- I mean, St. Lucia or (inaudible), and Dominica--they're all getting that kind of --

A Well, in Dominica it is a $9 point something road project alone, as I remember. And when you add on other projects, the Dominica number comes to $13 or $14 million. Is that correct, Jim?

MR. HOLTAWAY: That's correct, but probably not on a sustained annual level. It is kind of lump because we do it in a project form, and it varies from year-to-year.

Q The other things was, there was some Cuban equipment that was left there, and the Cubans say they want that back and so forth. Did you see this, and the amount of it? And what are the prospects?

MR. MORRIS: I didn't see it up close. I saw some warehouse sheds, open sheds that had no walls, with rows of trucks underneath them. And that was all I saw. I did not have a chance to study the Cuban equipment.

I'm afraid I am going to have to go in just a few minutes.

Q Can you (inaudible).

A I really wanted to answer one last question.

Q Did they say they were going to give it back?

A The subject of the Cuban equipment was never discussed. It didn't appear that extensive to me, but we didn't get into how many turcks they had there, and there were no requests to us for trucks. Trucks did not become an issue at any point.

I didn't see any other types of equipment.

Yes, sir?

Q Do you know how many A.I.D. personnel there are now, and how many that may grow to?

A Shrink to, would be a better way of looking at it.

We have a regional development office in Barbados that covers the entire region, and our plan is that that will continue to be the case, although maybe in the immediate future we will have a semi-autonomous office in Grenada, given the volume that will have to go through there and the short amount of time in managing the contract.

We had at our peak roughly eleven U.S. on detail from Barbados, and a couple from the United States, the first few weeks after the rescue mission. But our plans for 1984 would be roughly four to six Americans, and less than that in subsequent years. As I said, we want to integrate this into our regional program, and some of the assistance we will be providing comes through the regional multi-lateral institutions like the Caribbean Redevelopment Bank, the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, and others. We want to do everything we can to improve those regional linkages because, to a degree, Grenada had put itself outside them.

I'm sorry. I'll be available later individually if you wish, but I have to go to the Hill now.

(The briefing conluded at 2:50 p.m.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

November 28, 1983

The Briefing Room

10:00 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'll just begin by saying a few words about the schedule and then about the agenda and then take your questions. As you know, the Prime Minister arrived last evening. He has with him an impressive delegation that includes the Minister of Defense, the Director General of the Ministry of Defense, the Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a number of other aides of both ministries and of the Israeli Embassy here.

This morning, a very busy schedule began, and I'll just run down the highlights of it. The Prime Minister began by laying a wreath. He'll be meeting with the President shortly. He'll have luncheon with the Secretary of State.

This afternoon we'll have two plenary sessions which are likely to go on all afternoon and perhaps into the early evening. There are no official functions this evening.

Tomorrow --

Q Who is participating on the American side in this plenary session, if you can give us the top people?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Without being absolutely definitive, I can say that it will include top members of the State Department and the Defense Department.

Q We didn't expect it to be low level members. I mean what are the names?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When I say top members, I am not positive whether Cap Weinberger will come. That's what I'm -- but I think he will.

Q And Shultz will be there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Shultz will be there. And I don't say that because I frankly don't know whether he's on it or not. But from the State side, you would certainly have our Ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis, and Assistant Secretary Murphy, Special Representative Don Rumsfeld as the senior people.

Q Well, if Weinberger doesn't make it, who would be the top person from the Defense Department?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think you're really going to have to address that to Defense. I am not positive who they're going to bring.

Q Well, I just came from the State --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm certain that Cap Weinberger will be there for at least the beginning of the meeting.

Q This morning with the President?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He'll be there this morning with the President, too, yes.

Q Will either you or your colleague be there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I expect so.

Let me continue on the schedule and then I'll get back to other questions.

Tomorrow, the Prime Minister will be having breakfast with the Secretary of State. At the same time, the Secretary of Defense has invited the Minister of Defense to have breakfast with him. There will then be a third plenary session at State and a meeting with the President following that, followed by a working luncheon at the White House.

Right now we're open as to the format for the afternoon meetings. It will depend on the progress we've made in the plenary sessions that have been held up to that time and our joint decision about what issues need to be addressed further.

Mrs. Reagan will have a tea for Mrs. Shamir and then the Vice President will host an official dinner in the Prime Minister's honor.

On Wednesday morning, we expect the Prime Minister will appear on one of the morning talk shows.

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He may then meet with some members of Congress who are in town. And [illegible] there could be a further meeting at State; we're just not positive at this time.

The Prime Minister expects to be at the National Press Club for lunch. And in the afternoon, he will depart for New York.

On Wednesday evening, we expect President Gemayel of Lebanon to arrive.

As to subjects on the agenda, it's a very full agenda as this is the first visit of Mr. Shamir as Prime Minister. It's also the first visit of an Israeli prime minister to the United States in roughly a year and a half -- too long a time gap in our view. On the other hand, Mr. Shamir was here last summer in his capacity as Foreign Minister, along with the Minister of Defense.

He's coming at our invitation which was extended by Undersecretary Eagleburger when he visited Israel earlier this mo[illegible]. We'll certainly want to be discussing developments in Lebanon and how we can move forward in achieving our common objectives: the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, governmental authority throughout Lebanese territory, withdrawal of external forces and ensuring the security of Israel's northern border.

I expect we'll discuss the May 17 agreement between Israel and Lebanon which we think is a very good agreement, which we support but which has not yet been implemented. We'll want to discuss Syria and Syria's refusal even to discuss with the government of Lebanon the terms under which it would withdraw its forces.

We'll want to look at the implications of Syria's policies on the prospects for peace in the area, including new Soviet-supplied weapons and weapon systems to Syria, such as the SAM-5s, the upgraded air defense equipment and training and the very large inflow of armor and artillery.

We'll be discussing this subject within the context of our firm commitment to Israel's security and our commitment to maintain Israel's qualitative edge and its ability to defend itself against any combination of potential adversaries.

In this connection, too, however, we will want to discuss our relations with moderate Arab countries such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt and why these relationships are important to the United States and, indeed, to the entire Western world and how strong relations with these states help us strengthen the fabric of stability and security in the entire region. And we'll want to discuss recent terrorist actions in Lebanon with a particular focus, and from our side, of course, on the situation of our Marine contingent serving as part of the multinational force in Beirut.

We'll be discussing economic and military cooperation. This includes in the security sphere ways that we can make our traditional cooperation more effective and in the economic sphere how we can help the Israeli government carry out the vigorous remedial measures that [illegible] to be required to put the Israeli economy on a healthy course.

We will also be discussing the peace process and the President's continuing commitment to his September 1 initiative in all its aspects. This discussion will include settlements and the ways to improve the quality of Palestinian life in the occupied territories.

This is a brief overview of the agenda. Other subjects will undoubtedly come up such as our interest in seeing improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relationships, for example. The important thing, however, is that this is

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a meeting between good friends which comes at a time when our relations are very good and when both sides would like to see them made even better.

This does not mean that we're going to overlook differences or try to sweep them under the rug. It does mean, though, that we don't want to magnify those differences out of proportion, but deal with them within the context of the deep friendship and cooperation between our two states and the relationship of trust that exists between us.

I'd be happy to take questions now.

Q Is all forgiven about the invasion of Lebanon? At one time this administration looked rather harshly on that action. Does it now believe that it was a necessary action and it was all right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A lot of history has happened since then, including negotiation of an agreement under which Israel agrees to withdraw its forces completely from Lebanon.

Q We back that agreement? You've said that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We do.

Q Does that mean that we would not consider some modification of it, some change along the lines that maybe Gemayel may propose?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know as I can comment on that. At this point, we think that agreement is a good agreement. We think it's a fair agreement, one that was negotiated in good faith and at arms length between two countries, and we would like to see it implemented.

Q In what ways might the military cooperation between the two countries be enhanced during these discussions or after these discussions? What kind of closer ties do you envision?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, in the first place, it involves closer and more fuller discussion and consultation about what occurs in the area, what is occurring in the area. It certainly involves ways that we can support Israel's security needs, and I don't know exactly what the Prime Minister is going to be requesting of us in this sphere, but we'll certainly be in a sympathetic mode to consider things. It involves ways that we can work together in the area to strengthen the security of the area. I don't know whether we will agree on specific additional follow-on mechanisms or not right now, or whether we'll feel that our regular dialogue and mechanisms are sufficient. But all of this will be discussed.

Q The Israelis are saying that Moshe Arens is coming back here in a week's time to negotiate a specific, a lot of the specifics -- prepositioning of medical supplies in Israel, tanks, joint naval maneuvers, that kind of thing. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's premature to say that he's coming back specifically in a specific time frame to discuss such things, but I don't exclude the possibility, no. That would be presumably after the Gemayel visit. I just don't think that's pinned down.

Q How do you define closer strategic cooperation? What specific steps do you envision, such as prepositioning of military equipment or joint maneuvers? Are you talking about those types of heightened military areas of cooperation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly think that those things will be discussed, but I can't really run down a full list now of all the areas. It's just going to be a very full list of areas that we think we can cooperate more effectively or more closely on.

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Q But you just said joint military exercises will be discussed?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I think that would be something we'd look at, yes.

Q Are you prepared to give the Shamir administration this administration's proposal for foreign aid levels and for foreign aid types at this meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly would expect the aid levels to be one of the things on the agenda. Now, whether we raise if first of they raise if first, I'm not sure. But we're in the process, you know, of putting into final form our FY '85 budget and this visit is very timely in that regard. And we certainly have had some initial discussions with the Israelis on it, as we do every year, on the level of assistance, both in the military sphere and in the economic sphere and the grant credit mix. And those will all be, I would think, pretty well ironed out at this series of discussions.

Q Can you give us '84 figures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have them right in my head, but we can certainly get them for you.

Q You mentioned a moment ago that one of the subjects on the agenda is to discuss ways of improving Palestinian life in the occupied territories. Does this indicate we're backing away from the concept of Palestinian self-rule or self-government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it doesn't indicate we're backing away in any way from the commitment to the peace process, but it does reflect the interest that our government has in improving the quality of life in the occupied territories for the Palestinians. It is the follow-on, I guess, to what we call the Kirby-Rodman talks that have taken place out in the area and they have been back and reported to the Secretary and we expect to be discussing them further with the Israeli government.

Q What about the settlements? Is our position the same, that they are illegal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position is that the settlements are an obstacle to the promotion of the peace process.

Q Well, it has been that they've been illegal. Some of his predecessors have said so.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think that we should get on with the process.

Q Isn't it true that the President has said that the settlements are not illegal? Didn't Secretary of State Shultz say that last week in Atlanta? Didn't he also say that Jerusalem is undivided? I mean, these are issues that maybe you ought to clarify.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As I say, our position is --

Q Would you clarify that? Is that right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that the settlements are an obstacle to the peace process and should go forward.

Q Are they illegal or not illegal? Didn't the President say they were not illegal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I believe the President has --

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Q Does that policy still hold?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- said what he -- certainly what the President has said holds as the policy.

Q Well, didn't the Secretary say that last week in Atlanta? (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall.

Q Well, there's a text on it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, then you can certainly look it up as well as I can.

Q Well, I mean, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State ought to know that.

Q They're not illegal now. After the election they'll be illegal again, Joe. (Laughter.)

Q Again, as far as the settlements are concerned, the Israelis are reported to have come with what is being called a shopping list like usual aid, financial aid, willing to cooperate on what the United States,they perceive the United States interests to be in the region. As far as what the United States wants from them, in the settlements in particular, Mr. Shamir already stated that there will not be a compromise. How does this administration intend to handle the settlements to bring about a freeze in order to encourage the Arabs to come into the talks and to abide by the talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I expect that settlements will be discussed within the context of the desire to get the peace process moving forward again. The settlements is not an issue that is going to be pushed under the table or brushed under the carpet. We think they have to be discussed within this context because we think they are an obstacle to moving forward this process and we'd like to discuss with the government of Israel the ways that it can be moved forward.

Q But in a way, you're telling us what we have already heard. Are there any new facts or any new thoughts on the part of the administration as to how to bring that about? Do you have anything to tell us new on that subject?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I wouldn't have anything further to offer except that they certainly are going to be discussed.

Q Could I make clear that I understand your position about the May 17th agreement. As I understand it, what you're saying is that we think it's a good agreement, the United States does, that it should be implemented, but you're not commenting on what the U.S. position would be if Mr. Gemayel asked for the agreement to be modified. Is that where you're at?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly would expect us to be able to discuss any aspects of the agreement with either the Israeli government or with the Lebanese government when they come.

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However, we think it's a good agreement as it stands. We recognize that there's a problem, that it hasn't been brought into implementation, and we'll be discussing that.

Q Do you have a position on whether or not it is acceptable to the United States to modify the agreement if one of the parties wishes to do so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our position right now is that it is a good agreement as it stands.

Q Is there any way that the United States -- or the three parties feel -- the Israelis, the Lebanese and the United States feel that without bringing the Syrians into any type of withdrawal agreement that they're seriously going to consider -- that the Syrians are seriously going to consider withdrawing, having not been a part of this process of this agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, this is an ongoing discussion and it's an ongoing problem, of course. The Syrians have refused, so far, to even discuss with the Lebanese government the terms under which they would consider withdrawing. Now, that is a problem. No question.

Q My question, then, is, if this is a good agreement and you're supporting this agreement, will you support a second agreement? Are you looking for a second agreement which involves only Lebanese and the Syrians, rather than a three-way agreement? A modification to bring --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would think it's pretty unrealistic to consider a -- some sort of a Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese agreement directly.. But certainly, we would like to see the Lebanese negotiate with the Syrians for their withdrawal, as they have negotiated with the Israelis for their withdrawal. We think that's the way to proceed.

Q Does the Administration feel that improved relations with Israel will increase pressure on Syria to get out of Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Increase pressure on Syria? I'm not sure. Certainly, to bring home to the Syrians and others in the region that there is no doubt in thinking between the United States and Israel on this subject.

Q Well, I'm not talking specifically about any subject. I'm talking about increased military and economic -- particularly military cooperation. How do you feel that's going to impact on Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think Syria is going to have to take that into account in the decisions that it makes vis a vis Lebanon, and it's general policies in the area.

Q How important a factor is that in improving relations with Israel, trying to have this impact on Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly think that Syria is a problem in the area. The increase in Syrian strength and Syrian assertiveness is an important element in improving and making more effective U.S., Israeli cooperation.

MR. SIMS: Okay, three more. Bruce, Candy -- that's it.

Q Is there anything in these talks that you foresee could impact on the status of the Marines and multi-national forces of all -- there's been a lot of speculation -- there's been some speculation, at least, about plans within the Adminsitration for changes. Is there anything in these talks?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not in very specific terms, I would say. In more general terms, of course. We hope to have, out of these talks, a common understanding on how we'll be proceeding in Lebanon to achieve the objectives which I've spelled out which will ultimately result in us being able to do something about the Marines.

Q Will that be discussed with Israel, and what [illegible] they have to do with it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Israel is part of the whole Lebanese situation and you cannot have a full withdrawal of foreign forces and a full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanese territory without the Israelis agreeing, too.

Q The question of placement, of where the Marines are placed in Lebanon.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, that's not -- not that specific.

MR. SIMS: Okay, Candy, do you have one?

Q How do U.S. officials who have dealt with Shamir view him in comparison to Begin? Is he -- do we think we can get more out of Shamir than we did out of Begin or less?

Q No, less.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I can really answer that question except to say that --

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I can say that the Secretary of State over his past months of dealing with Mr. Shamir feels that they have a very good, strong and cooperative relationship.

MR. SIMS: Okay. John?

Q -- Begin?

Q Is settlements as --

MR. SIMS: Last one.

Q -- settlements as an obstacle to peace, is that an issue that you would expect the President to -- himself to raise with Shamir or for the U.S. side to raise that at a lower level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am not positive.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It will be raised by the President.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Will we move our embassy to Jerusalem?

Q -- task force?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that's on the agenda.

Q It's not?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:25 A.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON THE MEETINGS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND
PRIME MINISTER YITZHAK SHAMIR OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL

November 29, 1983

The Briefing Room

1:45 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: Okay. This briefing is ON BACKGROUND. It is attributable to a senior administration official.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's a pleasure to be with you ladies and gentlemen.

Let me say that I have quite a few actions to review, decisions taken. And let me briefly characterize the visit. It is still on, of course. There were further sessions this afternoon, a possibility of some talks tomorrow morning before the Prime Minister leaves. So it won't be -- today, I won't be able to talk to the full, final view of the visit. But I think we can give you a pretty good idea of what's been going on.

I might -- in case nobody wanted to ask -- make clear at the beginning that there was no set plan to have Weinberger and Shultz doing this for you on the record. That was, apparently, connected to the press conference which the President was -- at that point in time -- thinking of giving tonight. So I am not here as an imposter but as a, supposedly, half informed source.

Q Oh. (Laughter.)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm told there's a degree of irreverence in the audience. Well, we'll build up to that.

The President themes were -- (laughter) -- political, political-military cooperation, our relations with the moderate Arabs, the peace process, and Lebanon -- the areas that he wanted to focus on that he laid out to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense in their first session yesterday. And all of those were covered in great detail.

We had -- I think you were talked through the schedule yesterday -- that went on, formally, until some point after 6:00 p.m. last night -- about three and a half hours of -- four hours of talks yesterday afternoon. Then, a couple of working groups continued to work through the evening, developing thoughts on the political-military working group and sharing our assessments on the situation in Lebanon.

This morning, when they arrived at the White House, there was session just between the President, the Vice President on our side, and the two Ministers -- Prime Minister Shamir and Minister Arens. That was for about 15 minutes, followed by 45, 50 minutes in the Cabinet Room and, then, luncheon.

And one additional subject that was covered at the lunch was the Gulf war -- the Iraq-Iran war, again, sharing our respective assessments of that.

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What I'd like to do is move, first of all, to a number of specific subjects. Now, these weren't in order of priority, but they're in the order of my notes. So bear with me. And, then, we can take the questions afterwards.

The Israelis have had, for some time, a strong interest in the free trade area. There have been informal discussions going on for about the past two years on this subject. They do have a free trade area, which will come into effect with the European community in a year to two -- time, can you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Eighty-nine.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry; '89.

They have been very interested in establishing a similar relationship with the United States. And we had Brock -- William Brock, the special trade negotiator -- open the meeting this morning to give an outline of how he saw

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that issue proceeding. And, basically, we now want to move from what had been informal to formal negotiations on a U.S.-Israeli free trade area.

This, Brock estimates, could be concluded in a few months time. It would be a completely reciprocal arrangement -- free trade for our products in Israel, free trade for Israeli prod[illegible] in the States. It has implications, of course, to our global economic relations. Since 1923, our adherence to the principle of most-favored-nation. Any events -- these questions -- the basic questions have been studied and have been resolved in the affirmative. And we want to proceed with these talks. I think those will probably get started in December.

Now, some defense-economic decisions -- the following ones were taken. FMS financing of offsets in commercial contracts [illegible] the President is prepared to make an exemption for Israel from the general policy of prohibiting offset arrangements in FMS commercial contracts and has decided to place an ad valorem 15 percent cap on that exemption. This is designed to stimulate the Israeli economy and industrial production base.

Second, the use of FMS funds for the research and development on the Lavi fighter: the administration will implement the Congressionally mandated use of up to $300 million for R&D on Lavi projects. That production in the United States. This exceptional use of FMS underscores our support for the Lavi program.

Further decision on FMS was its use for offshore procurement. The administration endorses the Congressional earmark of $250 million for procurement of defense articles and services in Israel for the Lavi program. It will also approve offshore expenditures of $200 million related to Israel's redeployment from Sinai. And we'll consider additional offshore procurements on a case-to-case basis.

Fourth, on cluster munitions, the United States is committed to Israel's security. It is prepared to lift the suspension on shipments and sales of cluster munitions at the conclusion of a satisfactory usage agreement that contains a definitive guarantee against violations. We expect our respective staffs --

Q Could you go slower please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, sure. Where would you like me to go back --

Q Start with the contains --

Q Come on.

Q -- last few words.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay -- committed to Israel's security, prepared to lift the suspension on shipments and sales of cluster munitions at the conclusion

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of a satisfactory usage agreement that contains a definitive guarantee against violations.

Other subjects, subjects in the area of defense economic decisions. On the Lavi fighter, the subject of Phase 3 production technology, the President has not yet made a decision on Phase 3 of technology transfer. In this case, that would permit the production in Israel of the wing and tail assemblies.

The subject was discussed concerning use of FMS to purchase Israeli products by other FMS recipients, by third countries. This we cannot agree to.

We also discussed memorandum of agreement on defense cooperation. We will continue ongoing negotiations which aim at renewing and improving the existing memorandum of agreement instead of renegotiating from what is called, a NATO type text.

Now, that's the list of defense related issues, the free trade area. On the political side, foreign policy issues, the President, the Secretary of State made our position very clear about our commitment to the Camp David framework and the September 1 initiative. They emphasized -- and these were in separate conversations -- that we continue to see 242 as applying to all fronts and that settlements, we see, as an obstacle to peace.

We share the commitment which the Israelis spoke to us about of upholding the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and helping to develop that relationship because if 242 is for peace, that treaty is, of course, of key importance in the process.

We spoke at the main meetings and in private sessions, I understand, that each Secretary had this morning with his counterpart over breakfast, about the quality of life of the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. We expressed the hope that more consideration will be given to what we call, development type projects, developmental initiatives affecting those populations.

We have a number of private voluntary organizations operating in both areas and had a review of their work. The President, as well as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, I know, also participated very vigorously in the discussion, addressed the need, our need, for military relationships with moderate Arabs. It's part of the whole picture of our role in the Middle East. As we said, there are times that this is going to involve arms sales. We recognize this will create problems, has created problems, misunderstandings between us and Israel and we will work to explain our needs in such a way as to minimize any future problems. We have a major stake in maintaining our relationships with the moderate Arabs and we laid that out very plainly as a major theme is the discussions.

Well, I think, since there are no questions, I can --

MR. SIMS: Maybe you'd better take one or two.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Take one or two.

Q Lebanon is, of course, the one -- at least one major subject that you neglected to really go into. What has this visit done, if anything, to facilitate the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, to break the deadlock there, and what could you expect to present or offer to President Gemayel when he comes here that will increase the prospects for a withdrawal of all those forces?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We both reaffirmed our strong adherence to the May 17 agreement. We continue to regard that agreement as a good one, as a balanced one, as a package deal, and we will be discussing that with President Gemayel during his visit here.

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We did discuss ways, didn't reach any specific conclusions, about how to increase the grasp, the outreach of the Gemayel government, the government of Lebanon. But both sides reaffirmed the legitimacy of the government of Lebanon and support for the goal of extending its authority throughout its territory.

There was some discussion about focusing now on those areas which are not under occupation, not under foreign occupation of either Syria or Israel and we will be continuing that study with President Gemayel when he comes. That is, areas where his central government authority is still not pervasive.

Q That agreement is nearly seven months old and it has failed so far to get the troops out of Lebanon. Of course, I'm talking also of the Syrian troops. There have been suggestions, reports, that Syria might be enticed, if this agreement were in some way weakened or made more palatable to the Syrians. I take it that is not the U.S. or the Lebanese intention.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Israeli.

Q Lebanese, too. Israeli, U.S., and Lebanese.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. That's our understanding and we'll, of course, be pursuing that with President Gemayel, but we understand that his position is to stand firm on the agreement.

Q With no modifications, whatsoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry.

Q With no modifications, whatsoever?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: None were discussed.

Q Did you receive any guarantees from the Israeli leaders that in the future, they will not act on their own and will consult with the United States to avoid situations like Lebanon in other places?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the -- of course, the very purpose of the visit was to find ways to smooth out the relationship. I don't think governments are ever able to give each other that kind of guarantee quite as squarely and flat-footed as you suggest. But I think we're both interested in avoiding surprises. We're both interested in closer consultations. And I think the whole tone of the visit brought that out. It was a very sober, warm series of exchanges.

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Q On that political-military committee that the President and the Prime Minister spoke about, could you go into more detail on certain questions such as in that memorandum of understanding that never really went into effect? There was discussion about planning to offset a -- essentially, a Soviet attack from the outside. The Israelis made it known that they would prefer to have some joint planning as well on Soviet-backed Syrian aggression or something like that. Is there any inclination by the U.S. to help in exercises against attacks from within the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, could I drop back one, maybe, and put a little more flesh on the bones of the military group -- political-military group?

We have identified our side. And we expect the Israelis to be sending us their team in the next few days. Ours is going to be chaired by Rear Admiral Howe, Director of Political-Military Affairs at State. It'll include Major General Pixier, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of ISA, Commodore Darby, Deputy Director of Political-Military Affairs in the JCS, Donald Fortier, Senior Director for Political-Military Affairs and Special Assistant to the President on the NSC, and Ambassador Bob Pelletreau, Deputy Assistant Secretary: NEA and State.

Q Could we have a listing of the full names and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. We'll give it to you.

It will meet semi-annually as a regular proposition and, of course, on demand of either party. As the Prime Minister said -- I think -- outside, the first meeting is expected in the first week of January. The venue will be Washington and, then, alternate. The meetings will be publicly announced, but the agenda and discussions classified, without any formal communiques at the end of the meetings.

The President, in his statement -- in his own departure statement -- mentioned among the specific areas to be considered are combined planning, joint exercises, requirements for pre-positioning of U.S. equipment in Israel. That's illustrative, not exclusive.

The emphasis for the Group's planning is, as the President said, priority attention to the threat to mutual interests posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. So I think -- does that answer well enough, having taken five minutes to get there?

Q Well, no. Soviet involvement in the Middle East, of course, would involve, also, their situation that they are -- Syria -- force. Would the joint -- if you had joint Air Force exercises, for instance, would they be planning against possible attacks from the mainland into Israel, or just in the eastern Mediterranean as the previous memorandum had spelled out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to dodge you on that. But that's going to have to be on the agenda of the Group as they move into the planning process.

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Q Does the pre-positioning of equipment go further than just medical supplies?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's open.

Q Are these specific commitments? Or is this all just under consideration?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- this kicks off in January.

Q What about the business of the third-country-use of FMS? Isn't this a step backward since it was already agreed in earlier memorandums with Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we took any steps backward. But let me check my notes again.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was not agreed. It was discussed previously. It was never agreed upon.

Q On the financial side, you -- earlier, I thought you were a bit too technical for some of us on the economics, on finances.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: For me, too -- (laughter) --

Q But can you tell us if the request as we read it somewhere of the Israeli government to ask this government

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to make the remaining 850 million dollars rather than from loans to grants. Was that discussed or did you mention it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, strictly discussed, discussions continuing. That's why I didn't have that in front of me as a decision. The aid levels, here you're talking about fiscal '85, the aid levels, the mix of grant/loan are still under discussion and, of course, they will form part of the President's presentation to Congress in January. But no final decision is reached on that.

Q Is it the Administration's desire to increase the amount of grant aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's certainly the case.

Q But they haven't decided on exactly how much?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Is it also the Administration's desire to cut back on the total package, the total dollar amount of the package if you include both FMS and grant?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Since this -- this is one of the topics we're going back to this afternoon and again, perhaps tomorrow if we don't reach a meeting of the minds. I'd rather not go into any more detail, other than that we are -- we're very much aware of the burden in Israel of the FMS credit terms.

Q Are you saying that until the joint committee meets in January that there won't be any military joint exercises or prepositioning or that one of the tasks of the committee will be to work these things out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that's right. I'm asking you to hold for thirty-six days.

Q Would you explain, please, what is involved in the question of whether you will negotiate on the basis of the memorandum of understanding or a NATO type draft? What is involved with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You asked about -- don't get too technical. I won't get any more technical than I can understand, which is that it's the difference between bidding on contracts affecting U.S. forces in Europe. That NATO type would be to say, you can bid on all contracts save the following listed items. As I understand it, with Israel we've had an arrangement where they could bid on a positive list. You may bid on these. Their position was to turn that around and say, well, tell us what we cannot bid on. That has created delays, that's created misunderstandings on the bidding.

Q Does that mean that the memorandum of understanding turns out, in effect, to be more restrictive than the NATO kind of contract would be?

SENIOR ADMINSTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the effort is to move from our side to broaden the list that you may bid on, positive categories and not to get into the NATO type arrangement. Now, I might just say, on this -- of course, it isn't totally under our direct control because we have certain arrangements with NATO partners. It also is a highly competitive bidding scene up there. So just how much this will be additive in terms of Israel getting -- or succeeding, winning contracts remains to be seen. They seem to appreciate the point, the way the negotiations have been going. This wasn't a change of direction.

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Q You're talking about the Harold Brown agreement of '79, not the memorandum of understanding.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not the MOU of '81, no.

Q How much of this new military cooperation should be read as a message to Syria concerning its behavior in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we think it's a message to Syria, we conceive it as a message to the Soviets, and frankly, to those that are listening in the region and are concerned. It is not a message of threat of a military axis to the Arabs -- against the Arabs, but we are both very concerned about the great buildup of Soviet weaponry in Syria.

Q Aren't there some moderate Arabs who are going to find it difficult to defend the United States to their Arab colleagues in the wake of this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think so. [illegible] sense this anxiety because this -- I think we've been telegraphing this was on the way for a few weeks now. Personally -- I'll share [illegible] you my estimate. I've sensed much less anxiety about this than in '81 over the memorandum of understanding.

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The Arabs' concerns are very substantial about the occupied territories, very substantial about -- on the settlement issue. But a more open, more explicit relationship with Israel -- I don't expect it to be a source of any great problems.

Q When the President pressed his September 1, 1982 initiative, particularly on the settlements and his view that they are an obstacle to peace, what did Prime Minister Shamir say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that Prime Minister Shamir changed his position at all. This is one of the areas of disagreement.

Q Can I just ask you to expand on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm told that up here you don't describe what the visitor says, that you have to go ask the visitor. Is that fair?

Q Well, it doesn't do any good for you to tell us what the President said if we don't know what the reaction was, and many of us don't have the opportunity to go --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israeli position on settlements is identical in private and public. You don't get any double track on that.

Q In that case, may I just ask you whether the President is going through this exercise today, that you're reporting to us, knowing that it's not going to go anywhere, or do you have any ideas for changing the Israeli position?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Israeli position is only going to be changed by the arrival at the negotiating table of another Arab.

Q King Hussein? And was there discussion of that today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q What was said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We want to encourage it, obviously.

Q How is that going to be encouraged by the new military relationship?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think it's going to be discouraged by it. There's -- the intensity, the depth of our relations with Israel, seen from the Arab capitals, has never -- honestly never fluctuated. It's much more analyzed and dissected back here than it is out in the area.

Q Assuming from what happened today, there is an intent by both countries to proceed with things, such as the joint exercise and the pre-positioning of supplies, or are these things that are still to be determined by the working group? In other words, the working group is just facilitating the arrangements -- ?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact that you had that in the President's -- you had the specific headings in the President's departure statement, means we're not fooling around on i[illegible] but we want to discuss the modalities of it -- what is going to be useful --

Q -- what is decided is in the interests of both countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Can I ask you to follow-up some things you said? First, on the moderate Arabs, are you implying that Saudi Arabia, [illegible] Jordan, and some of the countries are softening their position on Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, not at all. I think they just may be getting a little less anxious about the Am[illegible] Israeli relationship.

Q And secondly, can you tell us what the United States wants Israel to do regarding Syria?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, behind your innocent question is trying to get at the joint military combined operation against Damascus. The reasoning on that was not discussed.

We are interested in finding ways -- no problems, no problems --

Q Wait, wait, I missed something.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no. There is no joint planning to move against any Arab state. We heard the high level of Israeli concern about Soviet armaments, Soviet training programs in Syria, and we concur that something needs to be done to bolster the Israeli confidence and the Israeli wherewithal to face that. But that's a very different matter from having a combined plan to -- joint plan to go to war with Syria. There's no such thing.

Q Separate plan. What about separate -- what about Israel separately?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not so; not discussed. They're very apprehensive, though, about Syria. They don't hide it, and I'm not fooling on it.

Q I'm so confused about why the idea is to ultimately codify this military relationship in another memorandum of understanding, or whether that's not --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the -- one of the nicest things, if I may say, though I wasn't here at the time -- there didn't seem to be the hangup about formal texts and elaborate memorandums being agreed on. I think there is a great deal of -- total focus, really, on programs and practical decision-making.

Q Is that a difference between Shamir and Begin?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't end up with Mr. Begin.

Q What about the commitments for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon?

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I mean, has there been any proposal to translate into action of some sort? Or with the May 17 accord, we are still with a deadlock here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We are with a deadlock, but -- and I don't want to clutch at straws on this -- Let me just say that we are convinced, solidly convinced, both of us -- and I think we'll hear the same from President Gemayel, but he'll be speaking for himself on this -- that the May 17th agreement is going to be workable.

Q Sir?

MR. SIMS: One more.

Q Sir --

MR. SIMS: This is it. Last question.

Q -- was there any indication of flexibility on the part of Prime Minister Shamir on the Israeli approach to the September 1, 1982 Reagan Peace Plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we haven't -- any re-thinking -- sorry -- any -- How'd you put it?

Q -- show any flexibility? They've flatly rejected it. You've given them everything they seemed to have asked for. Did he show any flexibility on that key question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: His commitment which he repeated is to Camp David, to 242, 338. And he did not repeat a rejection of the September 1 initiative; we encouraged him to have another look at it.

Q What did he say?

Q Joe --

Q I just want to ask you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will have another look at it.

Q Sir --

MR. SIMS: Okay. Joe gets the last one.

Q -- his objection has any significance?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to read too much into it, but I can assure you that that was -- our position was laid out very clearly and repeatedly that that initiative is the best game plan in town.

MR. SIMS: Could you take one more from Bill?

Q Just one brief question. Regard to the settlements, there was a statement this morning in an editorial that the Israelis are planning to spend $30 billion over ten years on West Bank settlements. Did you ever hear of any such figure or any such programming?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did your colleague hear about it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't hear any such figure.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:21 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL OF LEBANON

November 30, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:10 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The President of Lebanon will arrive this evening and is planning a two-day workin[illegible] visit. His delegation will include Elie Salem, who is Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; Amine Al-Hafez, who is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Parliament; Ali Al-Khalil, who is a member of the Lebanese Parliament from Tyre and a prominent member of the Shia community; Ghassan Tueni, political advisor to the President and former Lebanese permanent representative at the United Nations; Wadih Haddad, who is the National Security Advisor; Brigadier General Abbas Hamdan, who is the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces; Dr. Nassim Saliba from the Central Bank of Lebanon; and, of course, Lebanon's Ambassador in Washington, Abdallah Bouhabib, will be part of the delegation.

The schedule will begin with the official schedule, after his arrival tonight, will begin tomorrow morning and he'll have breakfast with the Vice President. He'll then be meeting with the Secretary of State. Following that, he'll come to the White House to meet with the President and have a working lunch with the President.

Q Do you have times for those?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't have the times right here. I assume they're available.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The White House meeting's 11:30 a.m. Departure Statement, I guess, about 1:15 p.m.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I might just say here that the principal participants on our side for the meetings, the President and the Secretary of State, of course, will be our Ambassador in Lebanon, Reg Bartholomew, Larry Eagleburger, Dick Murphy, Don Rumsfeld. The Secretary of Defense is -- be -- out of town for the meeting, so it will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary of Defense.

In the afternoon, after the working lunch with the President, he hopes to meet with some members of Congress, if he can find any in town, and then with Peter McPherson, who is the Administrator of AID.

Tomorrow, the schedule will begin with a meeting with the Acting Secretary of Defense --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Friday.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, sorry, for Friday. Sorry. Friday afternoon -- Friday morning, with the Acting Secretary of Defense.

Q Who is that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Paul Thayer.

Then a second meeting with the Secretary of State

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and that evening Ambassador Bouhabib will be giving a dinner.

Then he will leave on Saturday morning.

As for the agenda, President Gemayel is coming here as part of a round of international contacts that he was requeste to make by participants of the Geneva Reconciliation Conference t discuss Lebanon's continuing difficulties and particularly the problem of withdrawal of foreign forces.

He's been to Saudi Arabia. He's been to Italy, also the Vatican, to France and he's received Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in Beirut after the visit that he was planning to make to Damascus had to be postponed because of President Assad's illnes

He's coming, of course, as President of Lebanon, du elected

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by Lebanon's constitutional procedures following the assassination of his brother, Bashir Gemayel, in the summer of 1982.

His leadership and his presidency have been re-recognized in the Geneva reconciliation framework and strengthened there as well as through the international contacts that he has undertaken since. He comes as a friend who enjoys the firm support of the Unites States. And he comes, quite honestly, as a man of courage who's trying to steer his country out of the monumental crisis that it has faced over the past several years and to steer it toward regaining its national health, regaining its sovereignty and authority over all its territory, the withdrawal of foreign forces from its territory and the establishment of the Lebanese authority in such way that it will not pose a threatening situation to its neighbors. And here we have particularly in mind that there will be no threat to the security of Israel's northern border.

We expect to discuss with the President and his advisors the current situation in Lebanon. First of all, the fragile cease-fire that is punctuated daily by incidents of firing and how the cease-fire can be strengthened, can be maintained. We'll be discussing, of course, the role of the U.S. contingent to the multi-national force, our determination to stay there as an element of stability, as long as we're needed in the Beirut area, to defend ourselves when we come under fire. We continue to regard the role of the multinational force as a critical one. We feel that its presence compliments our diplomatic efforts in an important way and makes an essential contribution to restoring Lebanese authority. In this way, also, we send a clear signal that U.S. foreign policy is not to be determined by autonomous terrorists.

We'll be discussing, of course, the political reconciliation process in Lebanon. A process that made some progress at the Geneva meetings and in the follow-on committee that was organized out of those meetings and it's a process which we strongly support as aimed at broadening the political base of the government so it can be more genuinely representative of the people, all the people of Lebanon.

We expect to discuss the issue of foreign force withdrawals, of course, and to discuss that within the text of Israel's reaffirmation yesterday of its readiness to withdraw completely from Lebanon in accordance with the terms of the May 17 agreement and in the context of Syria's refusal thus far to discuss with Lebanon the terms under which it would withdraw its forces which are now occupying the northern and the eastern portions of the country.

We expect also to be discussing how we can act together to continue strengthening the government and its institutions. This includes our continued support for the development and modernization of the Lebanese armed forces as an inter-confessional army in the service of the Lebanese State and not of any of its factions and Lebanon's current staggering economic situation and its great need for economic and reconstruction assistance and how, particularly from our point of view, the funds which the Congress appropriated in the Lebanon supplemental last summer can be spent most effectively to prime the pump for private investment efforts by the Lebanese, themselves, and to assist in knitting the country back together, and therefore, assist in the reconciliation process.

These are the broad outlines of the agenda. We look forward to productive talks,

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to reaffirmation of our goals and reaffirmation of the course on how we can achieve them.

Now to your questions.

John?

Q What are you going to tell the Lebanese president if he says that he would like the Israelis to begin withdrawing unilaterally and ditch the simultaneous provisions of the May 17th agreement for simultaneous Syrian withdrawal but in effect that is the only way he can get the Syrians out is to have the Israelis begin withdrawing unilaterally?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we've just been through some discussions with the government of Israel on this subject. And we believe that Israeli withdrawal is not the problem. The Israelis have agreed to withdraw. They have reaffirmed their agreement to withdraw in accordance with an agreement which we think is a good one. So we will be discussing it in that context.

Q What about a partial pullback short of withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I honestly don't know whether that would come up at all. Of course we will be listening to President Gemayel too.

Q Let me try to come at this at a different direction. Perhaps The Wall Street Journal's piece yesterday is the way to go with it. That Gemayel may be coming here telling you there is no way he can get out of Syria's grass, there is nothing you can do to get Syria off his back, and he has to come and tell you the inevitable, that for 400 years Syria controlled Lebanon and he doesn't see any great change, and he is bringing you bad news and there is unfortunately nothing you or he can do about it. What about that theory instead of the Israeli angle which I think we've beaten to death today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would be surprised from what I have read that he would be coming in such a negative frame of mind as that. I think he is coming in a much more positive frame of mind and looking at the possibilities more than the problems.

There was some progress made at Geneva. He feels strengthened in his leadership. And obviously Syria is a problem and Syrian refusal to withdraw thus far is a problem, and we'll be talking about it. But we are not going to build that mountain higher than it really is.

Q Do you have any idea how to get Syrian troops out of Lebanon? Since you are standing by the Israeli withdrawal agreement and so is Israel, and the Lebanese themselves are saying they are not asking you to rewrite the agreement, if the Israeli agreement stands and Syria says it has to go or else they don't leave, how do you get Syria out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I expect that we'll both have some ideas on that, but I can't --

Q Would you expound on any of them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not right now.

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Q What about the letter that Prince Bandar brought this morning?

Q -- Prince Bandar told the President today that Syria is committed to withdraw, that he and the Saudis are absolutely convinced of that. How come you are not convinced of it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it is correct I think that the letter that Prince Bandar delivered this morning had more to do with the coming visit than the visit just past. But I don't have any additional characterization on its contents.

Q He has said that the Syrians are committed to withdraw. Do we have any independent evidence of that or is this Saudi assurance something that changes your approach at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact is that the Lebanese have been trying to talk with the Syrians in substance in detail for some time about the terms under which Syria would be willing to withdraw. Now it is not enough in our view just to say that under some circumstances Syria might be willing to withdraw. We are talking about negotiations of terms of withdrawal. That hasn't happened. We want to see that happen.

Q Let me ask --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that Saudi engagement in this process is constructive and is helpful. So in that regard Prince Bandar's visit here this morning and the strong Saudi interest and willingness to assist in this process is an asset. It is a help.

Q Let me ask you about the point the Saudis want in the letter.

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Having said they want a timeframe for Israeli withdrawal; they want the May 17th agreement to be rewritten to the extent that the normalization part is removed. And they would then promise that Syria would [illegible] begin withdrawing. They made the point that if you don't give this to Gemayel, his effort to hold together and to make that reconciliation conference work will fall apart. Gemayel will go down the drain. That is their view, as they expressed it today. What do you have to say about that? Will the President --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We obviously will be discussing this sort of thing with the Saudis too, but I don't have any detailed comment for you on it.

Q What makes you stand fast on what you've just told us, that you side with the Israelis on their view of their withdrawal timetable and why they've not withdrawn? Doesn't the risk occur that Gemayel does lose completely as an effective instrument of trying to keep this reconciliation movement going?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, we'll be listening to what Gemayel has to say about his situation. He happens to be the Lebanese leader who negotiated this agreement and he has also been sticking firmly by it. He recognizes that this is the only way that has been agreed -- that Israel has agreed to -- to get its forces out of Lebanon, and this has a very positive aspect of it for him and his leadership. Yes?

Q I'm not familiar with all the terms of the agreement, but is there anything in the written agreement that says Syria has to withdraw, or is that a private agreement between the U.S. and Israel?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In the agreement itself, there is no reference at all to Syria --

Q Well, then, why are you pressing it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's the Israeli position.

Q Why did we concede to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is the Israeli position. It's not the position of the United States. We've acknowledged that. We've acknowledged position --

Q There are two separate --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS: -- that the agreement itself does not contain any reference to Syria. The Lebanese government was very insistent on this point, because the whole basis on which Syria was in the country was a very different one. Syria had been invited, at one time, to come in.

Q Okay, so there's nothing in the written agreement that says that Syria has to withdraw simultaneously.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q Then it is debatable?

Q Gemayel was ordered by the reconciliation conference to go around and solicit some ways in which the May 17th agreement could be adjusted and modified. If our answer to him is simply, "We stand by the agreement," will he not then go back empty-handed and won't that be counterproductive?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, now, wait a minute. If you read carefully what the agreement -- what came out of the Geneva, exactly -- what he was to discuss. There was the question of withdrawals, including Israeli withdrawal.

As I recall, the text of that -- it said nothing about May 17 specifically. This was, obviously, a Lebanese compromise.

Q Was there some kind of indication from Shamir yesterday that will give you some flexibility in discussing some further Israeli withdrawals in the south, and, possibly, some better coordination between Gemayel and the Israelis in the south, so that he can have something to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Certainly Israel reaffirmed its support for the government of Lebanon, its recognition that that is the legitimate government of Lebanon and its support [illegible] the overall objectives that we run through with you ad nauseam. [illegible] I don't want to get into the details of how that might be. Sir?

Q You are conceding that the Israelis and insisting on the Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 17 is interpreted in Arab circles and here in Washington that it is an attempt to pre-empt any Lebanese national reconciliation and unity, and, possibly, perpetuate a situation that might lead to a complete partition of Lebanon as the status quo which is existing now in --. What do you answer to that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not our view of the situation at all. We, as you know, helped in the negotiation of the Lebanon-Israel agreement. One of the reasons why we got into helping in that negotiation was because

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there was such skepticism in the Arab world that Israel ever could be brought to agree to withdraw. And Israel was brought to agree to withdraw, and has agreed to withdraw completely in the terms of that agreement. And I would just -- I think that many in the Arab world view that as a very positive thing.

Q I would like to follow up. It was negotiated while Lebanon was under duress, occupation forces, and no withdrawal of Israeli forces there and, therefore, now -- after the situation has cleared a little bit -- the Lebanese have second thoughts, and people have seconds, and the Arabs have second thoughts about the context of this agreement which will lead to more Israeli takeover of Lebanon. Would you answer this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, our advice on the situation -- and, I think, President Gemayel shares this view -- is that this agreement is an asset in the hands of the government of Lebanon. It assures the withdrawal of one of the major foreign forces in the country. That is a step toward the withdrawal of all the foreign forces in the country. And, obviously, it's not the complete package. But it is a positive step.

Sir.

Q Is it a holy bond that you can't amend or do anything about it -- if the situation asks for it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not looking for opportunities to reopen it if that's what you're --

Q No. The principle -- I'm talking in principle.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's an agreement. And we don't enter international agreements lightly. It's an agreement that has been reached by -- we witnessed it.

Q Was there an agreement in Geneva in any way, shape, or form to lay the May 17 agreement aside, to put it aside in order to facilitate Syrian withdrawal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it was. Now it was put aside in terms of the actual agenda that was there on the table at Geneva. And, you know, some things were decided on. A general reconciliation among the people who were present there did take place. A follow-on committee on, kind of, political structure and that sort of thing was put in place. And the President was asked to engage in international contacts.

Q Pursue that, would we support President Gemayel if he says to us, "Look; the only way we can get the Syrians out is if I don't enforce this May 17 agreement; we don't renege on it; but we lay it aside?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think we have to wait and see what he has to say before --

Q What do you make of the fighting today? And what might it portend -- the renewed fighting in Lebanon? Aren't some of the antagonists the very people you think it's helpful to bring into the new Lebanese reconciliation? Or do you see them as terrorists? Who's doing what?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. Look, the ceasefire in Lebanon would be considered something else in many other parts of the world. (Laughter.) That's true. But, compared with what it could be, we feel that it is still a ceasefire that is holding in the respect that people aren't trying to change their positions.

Q Well, don't you get a sneaking feeling --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But there's an "h" of alot of firing and fighting that's going on. That's why I described the ceasefire as "fragile." And one of the problems is that you want to try to strengthen and maintain this ceasefire. And alot of people are working on that.

Q Could it be someone's trying to hurt Gemayel? I mean, do you get that notion that some of this fighting is, somehow, designed to undercut his visit here, and undercut his standing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's been going -- the actual fraying of the ceasefire has been going on for several weeks. So I wouldn't relate it just to his visit here.

Q If the visit goes well, what would you expect to happen next? Would you expect Gemayel to go back to Geneva? Would you expect the United States to go to work with Syria? If this goes well, what next?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know, as we know, exactly. I think that President Gemayel will be reinforced

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in his leadership and in his determination to push forward on this reconciliation process. Now, whether that occurs at Geneva or whether it occurs in continuing contacts elsewhere is something that I don't think we know right now.

Q Are we going to tell them --

Q Is there a date certain for the resumption at Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry?

Q Is there a date certain for the resumption of the reconciliation talks at Geneva?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there isn't right now.

MR. SIMS: Last question.

Q One can draw the conclusion from what you have said that you really don't have any new proposals on how to get the foreign forces out. Barry asked you that question and you said, well, we'll both have some ideas. Do you have any new proposals or ideas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My answer there was intended just to say I really can't talk about details in that respect in advance of the actual discussions that are going to be occurring and that's --

Q Well, what's your answer? Do you have some new proposals and ideas that you can't talk about, is that what you're saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm saying -- I'm trying to outline what the subjects are that we'll discuss without getting into the details of what is going to be discussed, which obviously I can't do.

Q Can I have a qualification point -- I just want to -- okay.

Q When Prime Minister Shamir said that he stands by the May 17 agreement in all its parts, does it include the part in which it says -- I mean, does it include the simultaneous withdrawal of the Syrians or this question -- this issue is debatable?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you have to address it to Prime Minister Shamir. But the agreement, itself, does not include any reference to Syria.

MR. SIMS: This is positively the last question.

Q We know that groundwork is laid for all these meetings. Were you trying to imply to us that you do not expect Gemayel to ask for any modification of that agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly expect that we will be discussing that agreement, Israeli withdrawal, Syrian withdrawal. But I'm not going to really try to guess on the exact context.

END 11:31 A.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

December 1, 1983

The Briefing Room

4:10 P.M. EST

MR. SIMS: Back by popular demand. This briefing is on background, attributable to a Senior Administration Official. He has another appointment and I'm sure most of you do soon anyway; so we're going to make it a very brief one.

Q Or maybe he has nothing to say.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The fact, as you say, that he has nothing to say is quite correct. So we can probably say it quickly.

I think you saw the cast that attended the meeting with the President this morning. It was the Vice President, the Secretary, Mr. Meese was in, Don Rumsfeld, Bartholomew, myself.

Accompanying the President of Lebanon was his Ambassador. Then at the expanded meeting, you had his delegation, that includes former Prime Minister Amine Al-Hafez -- these names, I think, are available in the Press Office, so I won't fuss you with all that -- another deputy from Tyre, a deputy from Tyre, Dr. Khalil -- member of the delegation.

General Vessey was in both sessions and through the luncheon as well.

I'll be honest. There's a limit what I can say with you. We are continuing in meetings. We went directly from the lunch to a session at the Department with the Secretary. There will be a further session tomorrow morning with the Secretary and a meeting that the President will have at the Pentagon with the Acting Secretary of Defense, Paul Thayer. Then luncheon with the Secretary. Further meeting in the afternoon with Don Rumsfeld. And then there's the dinner tomorrow night given by the Ambassador of Lebanon.

The President not only paid tribute, a personal tribute, to President -- our President. I thought you said just "the President" in this place. But anyway, our President paid not only the personal tribute to President Gemayel, but did emphasize in that departure statement the steadfastness of our support for his administration, our efforts to support his program of national reconciliation and to secure the withdrawal of foreign forces.

There is a long way to go and I think both of us -- approaching this situation without euphoria and with a very practical bent. We're looking for ways to move ahead.

It will be in the context of the May 17 agreement. Last night, his first statement on arrival, the statement of President Gemayel was to express the continued support of his government for that agreement and he added that he was looking for mechanisms, mechanisms to implement it. And that is the focus of the discussions that are going on today and will be surely going on tomorrow. But I think that the repledging,

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public repledging and private reaffirmations of his support for the May 17 agreement is a point I do want to underline this afternoon.

We talked about Geneva, both about the meeting of the heads of the Lebanese factions under the Chairmanship of the President, that took place in those five first days in November, and heard some more details about the work of the working group, their designees, that was left behind to continue the discussions. We heard a very eloquent description about the problems of Lebanon, the refugees flowing south from Tripoli, flowing north from the Israeli-occupied areas, back and forth.

There was a good deal of discussion of how to

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reinforce, increase popular confidence in the government. The President has -- President Gemayel came to office at a very difficult and the job hasn't gotten any easier. The cease-fire of September 26th is holding in the Lebanese sense of the word. But it is fragile, I think as was emphasized to you yesterday.

We talked about some specifics on the U.S. program of support for the Lebanese armed forces. They will go into more detail, however, on that subject with the Acting Secretary of Defense tomorrow. They have some equipment requests which they will lay out at that time.

We talked about the economy. What was one of the thriving private enterprise, free enterprise economies of the area, is now facing serious unemployment, a drastic drawdown of its reserves, a major budget deficit. And as was discussed whatever political solutions can be developed, political solutions concerning national reconciliation within the country, withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, however these mechanisms are developed, if great attention is not paid right now to the economy, the economic difficulties could overwhelm even the best of political solutions.

There was discussion, of course, of how to arrange a withdrawal, no conclusions. There was certainly agreement on the need for bolstering the national consensus and how both withdrawal and national reconciliation, achievement of that consensus, can help Lebanon play an effective role in the Middle East peace process because in its present condition, of course, it can't. To do that, it must, of course, have its Arab credentials. It needs understanding with the Israelis to secure withdrawal.

The overall -- the question as it was emphasized is the need for overall stabilization because there is a danger in ad hocing. You have an immediate security problem, a hot point in a given town or city, district of the country. Somebody has the bright idea about, we'll use this militia, that force, that always carries along with it a host of other problems. So the President is trying to look at the national scene -- President Gemayel trying to look at the national scene and work out an overall solution.

Geneva was a beginning. A beginning we both think can be built upon. It was the beginning of reform, understandings which were launched between Lebanese leaders to reform the political, economic, and social order of Lebanon. And it was a step, again, a beginning towards the withdrawal -- securing the withdrawal of foreign forces.

The discussions on the withdrawal and on the May 17 agreement are, as I said, going to have to focus now on the mechanisms for achieving this. All I can say today is we've got some ideas, they have ideas. We'll be meeting intensively with the delegation later today, tomorrow morning, as much time as is needed tomorrow. And we hope by the end of the process of our discussions that there will be a program worked out that the President can take back to his country.

Q What do you mean?

Q When you talk about withdrawals, are you talking about a phase instead of a simultaneous withdrawal that would have one side beginning before the other?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there's any hard and fast conclusions. The simultaneous withdrawal is a statement that came into the whole -- is a phrase that came into the whole discussion by Syria, conditioned, as you recall, back, I think, public statements last May that that would require the Israelis to withdraw without gains. Various statements have been made over the months, but I think simultaneous withdrawal is basically a Syrian phrase which they supposedly communicated to the Saudis and committed themselves to as long as it was done without gains.

So, phase withdrawals: what's needed, we think, is a series of steps. Now, I don't want to link that directly to movement on the ground, but a series of steps that are going to build some confidence that the Lebanese government is moving out, is exerting its control -- its authority over both the occupied -- I'm sorry, about, first of all, over the unoccupied areas where its writ still does not go unchallenged -- and measures which would develop the idea, develop the perception outside of Lebanon that it is going to be able to build security measures which are convincing, reassuring both to its own people and to its neighbors.

Q Would that possibly involve expanding or redeploying the multinational force -- any way fill that vacuum and help the Lebanese army gain control?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There's been no discussion of that at all. And for that, of course, you know we'd have to go back to the Congress for any expansion or change of the role in the multinational force. But that's not been a topic discussed.

Q Did you sense at all in the talks today, though, that there is the possibility of the Lebanese army exerting its influence in some of these areas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We definitely did because we think that the work that started at the end of last year on training, re-equiping has had a positive effect. And the President certainly -- President Gemayel certainly shares our view on that. It's one of the pluses in the story and may be not told quite enough -- what the U.S. Army and the various training groups that have moved through Lebanon -- working with the Lebanese forces ever since last December, January.

Q Sir, could you kindly --

Q Sir, will you clear up some --

Q -- reiterate the May 17th agreement highlights please? Just the high points of it.

Q -- have any copies --

Q Everybody may know it, but we don't.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I do that afterwards maybe?

Q -- all right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I understood there's a very tight deadline. Let me come to that after the --

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Q On the May 17th agreement, could you clear up something? The Lebanese, aides to President Gemayel, have been hollering as best they can in private that there has to be some alteration in that agreement to meet the mandate of that Geneva conference. You're saying that the President publicly and privately had reaffirmed this -- President Gemayel has reaffirmed his commitment to that agreement. Now, please clear up that question: is he dropping any question about altering the terms of that or is he just reaffirming the outline of the agreement and asking for some ways of getting around it or is the U.S. saying, "If you want to change it, talk to the Israelis"?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. He's looking for, as I think I said, mechanisms -- mechanisms to implement it. He's looking to stand by it. He's looking to put it into effect. But the impasse is clear. And there's got to be some ways worked out, part of which -- a major part of this is going to be demonstration by the Lebanese government that it has the confidence in itself, the confidence of its people, the confidence of its army to start moving in the unoccupied areas. There are things that can be done in the occupied areas. We're talking about, pretty obviously, a series of steps. You're not going to get from me -- and I don't thing you're going to get from the government of Lebanon -- a grand plan, a magical -- a description of a magical wand that's going to be waved to get that May 17 agreement implemented. You've got time to go.

Q There has been a tendency here to say that the President of Lebanon supports the May 17th agreement. However, as everybody knows, there are side letters signed by the United States and with Israel and, also, with Lebanon that are outside the agreement but -- now, when you say that he supports this, does he, also, support the conditions that are set down in the side letter? Or is this still a matter of contention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think, only The Washington Post knows about the side letter. (Laughter.)

Q Oh, come on.

Q No. Come on. We all know about it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not discussing it.

Q Would the side letter be included -- be included in the mechanism to implement the Israeli-Lebanese agreement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The mechanisms -- we're not at the point. And that's why I have to disappoint you today. We're not at the point of saying what is going to be an effective, what's going to be an ineffective mechanism. But nobody is -- they're just no decisions reached. I'm trying to get across that there's a -- we do see the need to move quickly. There is a sense of urgency. The security situation is highly unstable. The economy is in very deep distress. And nobody's deceiving themselves in Washington or in Beirut that there's time to play with.

At the same time, we're looking for ways -- concrete, specific ways that the government of Lebanon can be supported, can move itself with the help of all the parties. It's going to require an understanding with us, a coordination with us, an understanding with the Israeli side, even with the Syrian side.

Q Could you tell us at this time, sir, if you have solid reasons to believe that President Assad of Syria is more conciliatory now than he has been in previous days.

And I have a follow-up to that, please.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do I get the follow-up? Or do I wait -- no, I wait. Okay. (Laughter.)

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I think there's been a new tone taken by the Syrians. I think you saw it, heard it first at Geneva -- the fact that Geneva took place, the fact that it was not abruptly terminated, that the people sat down that first day and could start the discussions, and that there's been a visit to -- there's been one visit to Beirut by the Syrian Foreign Ministers. There's been a return visit by the Lebanese Foreign Minister to Damascus last weekend. They are talking.

More or less conciliatory -- I don't think I can characterize it yet. But they are talking. They are communicating. And there was a period, if you remember -- remember where we came from, the illegitimacy of the government of Amin Gemayel, the illegitimacy of the Parliament. And that talk peaked, I would say, shortly after the -- or rose to a crescendo after the signing on May 17. But it continued right up to the ceasefire. You're not hearing that now.

Q The follow-up question, sir, is, based on your conversations with the leaders of Israel, are there indications linking, if you will, the new tone taken by Syria and whatever you heard in the private meetings with the Israeli leaders to make you believe that

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a mechanism can be found over the short run. You say time is critical.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We think we can make a start in the very near future. We are talking in the next month if you need a date on it. We've got to. I mean, it is that kind of pressure.

Q Start to do what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And we've got to find these mechanisms, we've got to find the first steps to be taken.

Q So nothing really has happened yet with this visit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nothing has happened, no, no, no. This visit is still in mid-course. How can I say that anything has happened yet? But there is a very sober, serious review of the possibilities, a sober review of the dilemma that the President of Lebanon finds himself in, and we were able to reassure him --

Q What are the possibilities?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that Israel wants to withdraw.

Q Aren't you afraid that the May 17th agreement that are insisting on with Israel will turn out to be another 1975 Kissinger promise to Israel not to talk to the PLO, and might prolong the misery and the occupation of Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last intent in Washington is to prolong the misery of Lebanon. So absolutely not. We don't see that standing by that as the framework is going to be prolonging the agony of Lebanon.

Q What is the first logical step?

MR. SIMS: We are going to have to call time here in about two minutes.

Q Keeping in mind that May 17 remains a problem in the way of the reconciliation of the Lebanese parties, and keeping in mind that -- or at least admitting the side letters -- would you say, since President Reagan had emphasized reconciliation that there is an intention to send Mr. Gemayel back with something that he could accomplish reconciliation upon? And I am speaking -- linking this with the May 17 letter, I mean, agreement and the letter.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't like your phrasing of sending him back to accomplish something. Gemayel has come with ideas of his own. He is looking for our support, he is looking for coordination. We have some ideas we will share with him, but he is -- while we are trying to work together very, very closely with President Gemayel, with his government, to support the central government, it is not an American diktat. We don't pretend to be experts in the very complex scene that is Lebanese politics or fully understand all of the interrelationships between Lebanon and its neighbors.

Q Excuse me --

Q You wouldn't want to --

Q How long --

MR. SIMS: Wait a minute, we have about five questions here. The one all the way in the back, Bruce, Andrea and then that's it.

Q Would be kind enough to outline to us what sort of measures are you advising President Gemayel to take in the area where he controls, where the Lebanese central government controls. You kept on emphasizing that the measures would have to be taken in this area first. What sort of measures?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I suppose there are really three areas. The area that he directly controls which you know is limited; there is the broader area of the unoccupied, not occupied by either Syria or Israel; and then there is the occupied areas. The short answer is no, I can't discuss it.

MR. SIMS: Bruce.

Q What do you want him to do in the occupied areas?

Q President Gemayel said outside in passing in answer to a question when asked about the prospects for getting the Syrians out of Lebanon, he said it would be very soon. How is one supposed to take that remark? Is that supposed to be taken with any seriousness, or was it just the result of a hit and run question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You better try to arrange a press conference with him. I didn't hear him say it.

MR. SIMS: Last question.

Q What do you think he meant when he talked about getting around the letter of the law in his departure statement?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Getting around the letter of the agreement?

Q Yes, that is what he stated.

Q How does that square with your statement that he still fully supports May 17th?

Q Going beyond the letter of the law.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is looking for a way to implement it, and he has reaffirmed that privately as well as publicly.

Q Looking for ways to get around the normalization aspects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I would hesitate to interpret what he meant by that. If you hit him on the run, I think you ought to try to --

Q This was in his departure statement. We can read it to you.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wasn't here when he departed, so I didn't hear it in his departure statement.

Q I mean, since he said that in his departure statement, presumably it reflects the discussions you all had.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that was his -- I think, if I can -- I'm speculating. I think it's his way of saying, "Find the way to implement it. We stand by it. Find a way to implement it." I mean, if that maybe came out as evading it, that is not the intent that's coming through in the private sessions.

Q Can I just ask some summary questions? Because there's a certain amount of confusion here. I don't mean to be disrespectful, but -- Am I correct in summarizing your statements that you talked to the Lebanese, you suggested on your side that they be more energetic in getting their presence felt, better not only in the areas under their control, but in areas around the Shuf, which are in contention, as well as in occupied areas? By that I guess you mean working something out with the Israelis in southern Lebanon, so that there could be more of a presence there. Is that what you mean?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There are ways of building the government's -- rebuilding the government's activities in southern Lebanon. Yes, that's one. Yes.

Q -- work that out with the Israelis, I presume?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're the occupying power. You've got to work with them one way or the other. That applies to Syrian areas as well.

Q The Israelis have complained that the Lebanese have not dealt with them directly. Is there an effort here, maybe, of reviving some dialogue of some kind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there have been dialogues. There's been the forum that started before the agreement, if I'm not mistaken, was certainly kept going, maintained afterward, the military liaison, what was called, I think, the Haldi Group. sp? That's continued in operation. There is some sort of liaison office, I understand, operating there in -- outside the city, along the coast.

Yes, there are ways. There are ways they could. And they will have to find ways to work out understandings with the Israelis. The Israelis aren't going to be pushed out.

Q In other words, is it -- From the U.S. point of view, as the mediator of May 17th, if the Lebanese and the Israelis reach some understanding on some new mechanisms for getting withdrawal started, that's okay by us, I take it.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Surely. Yes.

MR. SIMS: We've really got to stop. We've got to get the Senior Administration Official going here.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't mean to obfuscate that. Yes, sure.

Q Can't we have one question on Saudi Arabia?

MR. SIMS: No Saudi Arabian questions.

Q No Saudi Arabian questions? We've got an expert here.

Q -- mediators in this and it's their agreement. So you're going to go to find new mechanisms for implementing withdrawal that has to be worked out, presumably by the parties --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, absolutely. Yes.

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Q -- the Israelis and the Lebanese have to talk in some forum.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, but they do talk in forums, various forums, including this military liaison form.
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Q Can we get a quick question as to while you felt the ties with mechanisms, can you help us with interpreting Fahd's position. It's getting very confusing. The briefer, who locked like you, two days ago said that the -- said the moderate Arab countries understand our links with Israel.

The next day, a letter was delivered and the Ambassador stood out in the driveway and said the United States was making a mistake.

Now, there's a letter that's being variously interpr[illegible]ed by The Washington Times, for instance, has the Saudis asking for unilateral Israeli withdrawal.

Can you help us as to what position the Saudis are currently taking in your efforts to crack this deadlock?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not -- That position isn't purely Saudi. The idea of somehow putting the agreement aside, shelving, freezing, whatever the phrase is used, and working out just withdrawal with security arrangements.

You go just so far, though, and then it comes out, yes, there's still the Syrians and the Arabs will get the Syrians out. That just is not persuasive.

Q Were there any further guarantees? Supposedly it was reported that there were probably guarantees that -- by the Saudis -- that the Syrians would get out if the United States guaranteed -- or helps in trying to bring about Israeli withdrawal. Is that in the picture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's been said there are such guarantees. We don't know their nature of how they would carry it out.

Q Would Gemayel have been invited if he hadn't agreed to reaffirm the May 17th agreement? Would he have been invited to Washington if he had not agreed to go along with the May 17 Accord?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we didn't lay down any preconditions. He was asked by

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those meeting in Geneva to come here and make other visits as well to discuss how to work out withdrawals. We didn't say, thou shalt not get on the airplane without reaffirming the May 17 agreement, no. And I didn't write his arrival statement.

Q Did you encourage him to say he's reaffirms it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We welcomed his reaffirming it.

Q Could you clarify one other thing? We're getting very conflicting -- earlier in the week when the Israelis were here, we were told strategic cooperation was intended to send a message to the Syrians. Now you're talking about conciliation on the part of the Syrians. Are there real signs of a new posture being taken by the Syrians, maybe within the last week or two?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I think I can point to is the fact that these meetings have gone on -- the latest being last weekend -- between the two foreign ministers, and I say, let's keep in mind it's not that many weeks ago that that whole outfit was labeled, smeared as illegitimate.

Q Does that mean they reaffirmed their intention to withdraw in that channel as well?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think there's any question that the intention to withdraw without gains stands.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You already had the last question once. (Laughter.)

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 4:41 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1983, 11:05 P.M.
[A.M.]

MR. HUGHES: Good morning, all. We are going to be on background. You may attribute this to senior State Department officials.

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: Good morning. What I will try to do is, first of all, as best I can, give you the itinerary. Secondly, I will give you the meetings that have so far been put on the agenda of the trip, and, very briefly, some themes that we see emerging from the trip.

I will do my bit and then ask my colleague to address Tunisia and Morocco.

Briefly, the itinerary is, as you know, we leave tomorrow very early for Bonn. That is the 6th and 7th of December. Then on to Brussels, where we will be from the 7th through the 9th. Then Tunis from the 9th through the 10th. Morocco is the weekend, the 10th through the 12th. Lisbon, the 12th through the 13th.

The principal meetings we have scheduled -- Bonn with Chancellor Kohl and with Foreign Minister Genscher; President Carstens. And the Secretary is also planning on meeting with some high-ranking SPD figures. I'm sorry I can't give you any names at this stage. We are still in the process of trying to organize such a meeting.

In Brussels, in addition to the NATO Ministerials -- and I will return to that in a moment -- is a meeting with Belgian officials -- Prime Minister Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans.

As you know, Prime Minister Papandreou is also the Greek Defense Minister. He will be in Brussels for the Defense Ministers meeting, and immediately following that meeting, and before the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting, the Secretary will have the opportunity to meet with Prime Minister Papandreou.

There will be a meeting with Foreign Minister Andreotti. And the traditional Berlin dinner, which will give the Secretary an opportunity to have discussions with British Foreign Secretary Howe, French Foreign Minister Cheysson and German Foreign Minister Genscher.

There will be a separate meeting of the MNF Foreign Ministers -- the British, the Italian and the French.

Then at the North Atlantic Council meeting, most of that meeting will take place in what is known as the Super Restricted Session, which means only the Ministers and the NATO Permanent Representatives.

In terms of other bilateral meetings, he will meet with the Dutch Foreign Minister. He will have a separate bilateral with the British Foreign Minister and the Canadian

Foreign Minister.

Of course, at these meetings, as those of you who have come to them before know that there is a lot of opportunity for other bilateral meetings on the margin and that he is able, one way or the other, to probably have conversations with all the NATO Ministers.

Following that meeting, there will then be a -- what is now becoming something of an annual event -- a meeting between the European Community Commissioners led by Gaston Horne, the President of the EC, with a cabinet level group led by the Secretary of State. That will include Secretary of the Treasury Don Regan; Special Trade Representative Ambassador Brock; Secretary of Commerce Mal Baldrige; and Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary Brock. That meeting will be on U.S./EC economic and trade questions.

I am skipping over the North African stop which my colleague can deal with -- in Lisbon, the Secretary of State will meet with President Eanes; Prime Minister Suarez; Foreign Minister Gama.

Just a few words on the European themes.

This is a traditional meeting in Brussels at this time of the year. It obviously has some specifical significance in view of current events, and it is particularly important now that we have the opportunity to consult with the allies at senior levels.

What this meeting will demonstrate, in our view is the solid underpinning of support for the Alliance, as a whole, and the December '79 decision, in particular. It will demonstrate a basic consensus on core security questions, as well as an interest in sustaining a dialogue with the East.

Of course, the backdrop to this meeting will be the two-fold recent events -- the initiation of INF deployments on the side of the West and the -- as the Soviets have put it -- their decision to discontinue the Geneva INF negotiations.

I think I will just stop there. I will be happy to answer you questions, but my colleague may want to add a few points about Tunisia and Morocco.

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: As my colleague said, we will be reaching Tunisia Friday night. Nothing is scheduled for that evening. The next morning, the Secretary will be meeting with the Tunisian Foreign Minister es-Sebsi, and the Prime Minister Mzali, following which he will call on President Bourguiba and be entertained at lunch by Bourguiba. After the lunch, mid afternoon, he will depart for Morocco.

Something about themes -- the Secretary, in his North African stops, is responding to longstanding invitations, urgings, from the two countries to visit, and this occasion presented him with an opportunity to accept that invitation.

In Tunisia, he will discuss our economic programs, where we are phasing out of economic assistance and moving into programs designed to encourage trade and particular investment, and this is a result of Tunisia's success with its development. It is an aid graduate. It still has needs, but it has been a need particularly enhanced by the current economic-troubled world, economic problems. But it has graduated from the need for assistance.

We will be discussing regional matters; in particular, North African, intra-North African cooperation, following moves by Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, to improve their relations with each other.

Certainly the Tunisians will be interested in the Middle East, and that can be expected to be a topic of conversation, particularly since Arafat and some of his PLO have been based in Tunis. When they were evacuated from Lebanon, many of them went to Tunis, including Arafat.

Let me say here that I am not prepared this morning to discuss the Lebanon issue. The Secretary will do that this afternoon.

We anticipate that the Tunisians will be interested in hearing from the Secretary on East-West relations since he will have just come from NATO.

In Morocco, where the Secretary will arrive on

Saturday afternoon, will remain Sunday, leaving for Lisbon early Monday morning. The precise schedule is not yet worked out, so I can't give you specific appointments or discussions.

Q Is that Rabat or Marrakesh?

A It is Rabat at the present time. Of course, the centerpiece will be the Secretary's discussions with King Hassan, whom he last saw when Hassan had lunch with the President in New York in late September, I believe it was.

He will undoubtedly also meet the new Prime Minister, Karim Lamrani, and the new Foreign Minister, Bel Keziz, who were appointed recently as a part of a new Moroccan Government.

Subjects of discussion -- bilaterals, of course, are security cooperation as well as economic development questions; undoubtedly there will be in Morocco also a discussion of cooperation among North African countries -- countries of the Magreb, as the region is called -- and a discussion of the Western Sahara problem, which is at the top of the Moroccan agenda.

Overall themes -- certainly for Tunisia, are our major interest in this successful, stable country which occupies a strategically and important area in the Mediterranean, one which is under threat from Libya, but which is managing its affairs quite successfully, and Morocco is a major security interest as a country which occupies, of course, a strategically important region, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, a country with which we have increasing security cooperation, enroute access rights to Southwest Asia, and a country in which we wish to see a continued stable rule and friendly association with the U.S.

I think maybe that is all.

Q Just for planning purposes, did I catch a touch of hesitance about Rabat, or is it definitely Rabat?

A Well, at this point, it is definite. We have been told it is Rabat, yes.

Q But a chance of a change, right?

A As I said, the program has not been definitely set and until it is definitely set, I cannot say.

Q Why was Algiers dropped?

A Algerian scheduling problems. The Algerians have had a longstanding invitation to the Secretary to visit. They have had scheduling problems. They have reaffirmed that invitation and the Secretary hopes that he will be able to visit at a different time. There is nothing there except for that.

Q On arrival in Bonn, is it possible to be precise about what happens that evening?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: I will try to be as precise as I can. There is always the possibility of last minute changes, but the plan is really the first major event after the arrival will be a dinner. It will be relatively small, with the Chancellor and the German Foreign Minister, and the American side.

Q What can you tell us about the MNF Foreign Ministers' meeting, the focus of that? When that will be.

A I don't think I have the exact time. We can give you the plan. I believe it is on Thursday, but as you know, there have been a series of these meetings. There was a special meeting in Paris. The MNF Ministers had the opportunity to meet on the margins of the UN General Assembly in September, and I think there are, obviously, changes in the situation in Lebanon, and it would be peculiar if, with the foreign ministers all in Brussels, if they didn't get together and discussion the situation there.

Q Which of the countries that will receive INF weapons have to reconfirm it with their legislative procedures?

A The first point to make is that that is a decision or that is a development that is dependent on the internal politics in each of those countries, so it is not an issue that is discussed within NATO. Because under the December '79 decision, no decision to reconfirm or reaffirm support for that decision is necessary. The deployments continue on a continuous basis, and the only thing that changes that schedule is an arms control outcome in Geneva.

Now, in terms of the domestic political situation, the British have had a parliamentary debate and have endorsed deployment, so presumably no new decision is going to be sought by anyone there.

The Germans, of course, have had their Bundestag debate and the Italians have had theirs.

There have been a series of other debates in NATO countries; a series of parliamentary debates, for instance, within The Netherlands. Now, The Netherlands has yet to make a deployment decision, and they are not meant to begin deploying right away, so it is uncertain just exactly when they will take a decision.

The Belgian Government has debated this issue within the parliament. As you know, the Belgians are going ahead with their preparations for deployment. But, you know, based on domestic politics, new debates could take place in these countries if the various parties decide they want to debate the issue.

Q Do you anticipate that at the NATO conference changes in the deployment schedule will be discussed?

A Absolutely not. We do not support any "pause" in the deployment schedule. The decision taken in 1979 was very clear on this point; that the only development that will change the size of the deployments or the schedule for the deployments would be an arms control outcome in the

Geneva negotiations.

Q Do you anticipate that in those meetings, the Alliance will decide, or will consult, on the question of whether or not there should be high level contacts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, specifically the question of whether or not the Stockholm meeting should be a foreign ministers meeting and whether there should be a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko?

A We are very likely to hear different views on that subject, and some governments have already expressed their opinion. But I think this is an obvious question that will be on the agenda, and we will be very interested in listening to various views.

Q Do you consider that deployment is now a fact in Europe? What is the status of it as far as the U.S. Government is concerned?

A We do not like to get pinned down to specific dates.

Q Has it already begun?

A We have said that the missiles that have now been delivered will have an initial operating capability, what is known as an IOC, a Pentagon term, by the end of the year. Obviously the process of deployment is now underway.

Q When would you say that the missiles have been deployed in Europe? Would you say that today?

A I would say that the process of deployment has begun. If you equate deployment with the technical definition of an initial operating capability, simply say that that will not begin -- that will begin by the end of the year.

Q Do you expect much discussion about merging the INF and the START talks?

A You are asking me to speculate, Bernie. I just couldn't say. Our view is that such a merger is unnecessary; that it would probably complicate the negotiations, and no government has formally suggested such a step.

I think there will be a discussion of where we go from here in the INF negotiations, but it seems to me that the major message coming out of the Ministerial will be for the Soviets to get back to the negotiating table.

Q Do you expect discussion of the selection of the successor to Secretary General Luns of NATO? If so, does the United States or actually even -- whether or not that is the case, does the United States yet have a position on a candidate?

A I think there will be discussion of that. There has been some discussion. They have been confidential, and the U.S. position on this subject is confidential.

Q On getting the Soviets back to the negotiating table, are we going to turn up in Brussels with some sort of a plan or strategy that might include modifications in the U.S. position that might induce the Soviets to reconsider, etc.? Are we under pressure from the allies to come forward with some sort of package that would be more attractive to the Russians?

A No.

Q No one at all?

A The allies, they have spoken for themselves, and you can look at the record, but I think all the allies who have spoken out publicly have said that it was a Soviet responsibility and that it is up to the Soviets to come back.

So, I think, again, I don't like to speculate about what can happen in the future, but I can say what has happened in the past, and that is that nobody is exerting any pressures for us to make pre-emptive concessions to bring the Soviets back to the table. The Soviets walked out, they say, because of U.S. deployments, but, of course, all through these negotiations Soviet deployments have gone forward.

Q What do you mean by pre-emptive concessions?

A I just mean that we don't think -- it is not our view that it is our responsibility for the Soviets leaving the negotiating table. It is a decision they took.

Q But the President said he would do everything he could to lure them back.

A Well, we will, but the best thing we can do to get them back is -- we have a very good negotiating position.

Q Any new lures since --

A No. I think I answered that question before by making it very clear that the governments in question so far have said that it is up to the Soviets to come back to the table.

Q After the Soviet reaction, do you still have the view that they will return soon to the negotiating table?

A No, I will be prepared to talk about the Ministerials but let the Secretary of State talk about the Soviet reaction this morning.

Q On the North African visit, the Secretary of State's visit to North Africa comes only a few months after the Vice President's visit to the area. Is there any new importance given to the area from strategic regional considerations?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: We have always given the area importance and the Administration has particularly worked on developing its relations with Morocco, for example.

These trips symbolize that importance. They don't represent any new departure in policy, but I don't mean to underplay the importance of the region by making that comment. Both the Vice President and the Secretary had outstanding invitations to visit the region and both accepted those invitations.

Q One more, if I may? Have the Italians told us that they want to rethink their participation in the MNF and is that likely to come up in the meeting in Brussels?

FIRST SENIOR OFFICIAL: The answer to that is no.

Q One question on the Africa thing, have you looked at Arafat's UN flight departure schedule, and do you anticipate that Arafat would be arriving in Tunis at about the same time Secretary Shultz would be arriving there?

SECOND SENIOR OFFICIAL: That is an interesting possibility. I think we had better wait and see. There are too many imponderables here on that sort of schedule.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 11:30 P.M.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 5, 1983
For

PRESS BRIEFING
BY JAMES BEGGS, NASA ADMINISTRATOR
AND ERIK QUISTGAARD, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY

The Briefing Room

1:57 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: The telephone call between -- the conference call between the President, Chancellor Kohl and the space lab astronauts this morning the President regarded as a highly significant call, first of all because we're participating with European governments a number of who are providing experiments. The European governments have provided the funding for the space lab. So we have with us today some people who have been intimately involved in putting this call together and they are James Beggs, who is the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Mr. Erik Quistgaard, who is the Director General of the European Space Agency. And they will give you some information on that.

Also, we have with us Al Snyder of USIA and Mark Goode of the White House staff, both of whom will be available for any technical questions that people have. They're responsible for the technical aspects of putting the call together.

So, gentlemen.

MR. BEGGS: If I can introduce this, Erik and I have had a long association on this mission. It's been going on for quite a while. We have -- literally we've started the planning on this 10 years ago and we are finally there. And we're having a splendid mission. We have put 70 experiments on the space lab, which is the first time that we've carried anywhere near maybe 10 percent of that number of experiments into space at one time.

We have six astronauts up there, two of them who are scientists, one from MIT, who's been in training for the last 7-8 years for this mission. His name is Byron Lichtenberg, and the other, a German, and this is the first mission on which we've carried a non-American into space and he's Ulf Merbold. He's from the Max Planck Institute in Germany.

We are conducting instruments and experiments which are from the 11 nations of ESA, the European Space Agency, and also experiments from Canada and from Japan as well as from the United States.

The mission has gone extremely well, so well that we are contemplating and have, indeed, just about made the decision to extend the mission for one additional day, from 9 days to 10. And that, of course, will depend on how the weather develops over the next couple of days. But if we can, we will extend one more day and get more data.

So with that, Erik, unless you would like to say --

MR. QUISTGAARD: Thank you very much, Jim. I'm very glad to be here today as I was down in the Cape when I saw the

MORE

whole thing lift off, which is the result of American-European cooperation over the last 10 years.

It was magnificent made and it has functioned well above our expectations. This is thanks to the space shuttle and the whole communications system and, of course, to the space lab and all the instruments on board. But, not least, I will say that the man in space has been able to cure the problems that might have occurred on certain instruments and we are now in a situation where practically all our experiments are going extremely well, as was said just a second ago.

In Europe this has been received as an outstanding international cooperation, not only between the participating European states, but between that Europe and the United States. And I want to say here that I am very proud to be able to be here in the White House and also I listened today through the conversation between your President and the German Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Beggs and I had afterwards the opportunity to meet your President and he certainly expressed great admiration for the achievement and, also, I will say, very, very great admiration of this way of peaceful, international cooperation.

Q What's the next step then, after this? (Laughter.)

Q -- got to find out about Lebanon at some point.

MR. BEGGS: The next step will be

MORE

a continuation of what we're doing now. We will fly the space laboratory, which represents a very substantial investment on the part of the Europeans in the shuttle program. It's about $1 billion that they've invested in that laboratory.

We will fly it four more times in the next couple years. And we'll continue to fly that. And as a result of the success that we have had on this mission, I feel we'll attract experiments from all over the world. We're really looking forward to a continuation of what we have initiated here. The argument I've -- if I can add to that -- the argument that's been put forward by scientists in the past has been that -- that they would sooner fly on free flyers. This is our first attempt to integrate a number of very important scientific experiments on a manned mission. And as a consequence, everyone was looking to see whether the man could really perform as we had been arguing that he could perform. And, indeed, as Erik has stated, the man has proven to be very important in carrying out the scientific experiments.

So, I feel that the plan -- additional launches of Spacelab will probably need to be augmented because the scientists have now learned that they can, indeed, do splendid things.

Q Has the President approved a manned space station?

MR. BEGGS: Not yet.

Q Is he going to?

MR. BEGGS: I don't know.

Q Think he should?

MR. BEGGS: I'm on record.

Q As what? (Laughter.)

Q What's stopping him from doing it in view of this space --

Q Mr. Beggs, why -- If the Spacelab is doing so well and you're able to perform all these experiments, how do you justify the expense of a space station?

MR. BEGGS: The laboratory is a short-term adventure in space. We have a nine-day mission going. We can extend it for one day, which gives us ten. There are many, many experiments which require a longer duration in space. In fact, some of them would be productive over many, many months' time. Now, we can extend the stay time of the shuttle for a discreet period of time. We can perhaps lengthen the stay time from the current nine or ten days to twice that -- let's say twenty days.

But beyond that, it becomes very, very difficult because -- for two reasons. One is that we need the orbiters to do the job for which they were intended, that is, to carry payloads back and forth in space. And, secondly, the shuttle is not instrumented nor is it equipped for life services, the life-support activities to keep people up much beyond that.

So, the argument is that if you want to go for long-duration flights, then you need a longer duration vehicle and that's a station or a platform. And, as I said in my remarks, the thing we are learning through this flight is that the presence of the human intellect is extremely important.

Q How much would it cost to have a --

Q Thank you.

Q Do we have Mr. Speakes now for the briefing? (Laughter.)

MR. BEGGS: You're going to kick me off.

Q Probably we all have reporters down in Florida covering this. We're supposed to be covering the Middle East right now. That's why --

MR. BEGGS: I understand.

Are there any other questions --

Q Where is Speakes? Is he around?

MR. BEGGS: You're asking a man who doesn't know Larry Speakes' schedule.

Q You don't know Larry Speakes?

MR. BEGGS: His schedule. I know Larry Speakes, not his schedule.

Q -- I ask you a question?

MR. BEGGS: Of course.

Q Will there be any military implication of these labs in space -- platforms?

MR. BEGGS: None that I know of.

Q -- no military?

MR. BEGGS: None that I know of. As a matter of fact, they all say they don't have a reason to be up there.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you, sir.

MR. BEGGS: Thank you.

Q Thank you.

Q This is embarrassing.

MR. SNYDER: If there's interest on your part in finding out anything about the production of this feed today, I'll be glad to discuss that with you or to make the diagrams available later.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 2:07 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[December]
November 5, 1983 PR#35
No. 414

PRESS CONFERENCE
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1983

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For further information contact:

PRESS CONFERENCE
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1983, 3:00 P. M.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Questions?

MR. ANDERSON, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL: Mr. Secretary, the process of the Lebanese Government asserting its sovereignty over its entire territory may take a long time. Is the United States prepared to keep the Marines in Beirut until there is a national reconciliation and until the Lebanese Government is able to assert its sovereignty?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We will work with the Lebanese Government so that it can create a broadly based government for itself, and we will work for the removal of all foreign forces so that Lebanon can be sovereign over all its territory.

Precisely what tactical moves will implement that policy remains to be seen, but we intend to see this through with the Government of Lebanon.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in our recent clashes with the Syrians and other elements in Lebanon, don't these place us in the position of becoming a party to the conflict? Are we becoming the enemy to some elements who then want to attack us?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are many who try to put us in that position, but that is certainly not our position. We are there at the invitation of the duly constituted, legitimate Government of Lebanon, and we, as any armed force, are present with the understanding that, of course, we have the right to self defense and that is universal, and we will defend ourselves, as we are doing. But we are not there contending with anybody. We are trying to be helpful. We are there in a peacekeeping role, along with the other countries in the Multinational Force -- the U.K., France and Italy -- and that is our role and that is our objective, but we will defend ourselves.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Syrians appear to be willing to hold the downed American pilot hostage for withdrawal of American Marines from Lebanon. Let me ask that in a larger context.

The Soviets, in a press conference this morning, gave an impression to one watching it live that the whole business of European missiles was a fairly well-controlled situation, but that the situation in the Middle East seemed to be more dangerous than before because it seemed to be somewhat more out of control, maybe on both sides.

Could you assess how serious that is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I will try to take that question apart into its various components, if I could.

First of all, insofar as the airman is concerned, through Ambassador Paganelli we have made strong representations to the Syrian Government requesting his prompt return, and we have made the same statements in international fora, particularly in the United Nations. At least as of this moment, while I have seen some news reports, Ambassador Paganelli has not had anything come back to him, and that is our official channel of communication on that subject.

I think that it is the case that the situation in the Middle East has great points of tension in it, and, of course, we are trying to do everything we can to settle those points of tension down.

One has to do with the emergence of the Government of Lebanon and the withdrawal of foreign forces, as we have been discussing. Still another point of tension comes out of the fact that there is a major dispute, apparently, among factions of the Palestinians, and that dispute is being apparently supported by Syria, and so you have had intense fighting in the Tripoli area. This has nothing to do with many other aspects of Middle East tension. And at the same time there is a major war between Iraq and Iran, and there is always the possibility that the offshoots of that war may involve third parties to a greater extent than formerly, and so we have to be alert to that, and, of course, to continue to try to get that war settled; but barring that, at least to have an understanding that it not spread itself into the Gulf region, as was envisaged in the UN resolution recently passed.

So I think it is true that there are many points of tension in the Middle East and they come from a lot of different sources. The United States, seeing that peace has its enemies, recognizes that it also must have its defenders, and that is one of our roles, and that is one of our objectives in the region.

QUESTION: You haven't mentioned the Soviet Union. Is that one of the third parties?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Soviet Union, of course, has been the major supplier of arms to Syria, and it does have considerable numbers of military personnel in Syria, probably on the order of 7,000 or so:

So it is there. It represents a presence, and it is connected with Syrian aggression. What its advice to Syria is, of course, we don't know, but we urge the Soviet Union to urge Syria to look at the Lebanon problem in a sensible way, and we hope that they do so.

Insofar as the Iran-Iraq war is concerned, they have, obviously, no direct involvement in it and may have the same concerns we do to see Iran and Iraq work out a negotiated solution. But it does seem far away.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the President said yesterday, when asked about the leadership situation in Syria, he said, "Your guess is as good as mine on who's in control there."

Could you articulate a little more today on what we know about, number one, Assad's health; and, number two, how decisions are being made on a day-to-day basis in Damascus?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I believe it's a mistake for me to speculate about something like that. We have all sorts of information coming in and official statements being made, and, as far as we're concerned, we deal with the Government of Syria, and principally our Ambassador deals with the Foreign Minister and the Ministry.

We deal with the Government of Syria here in Washington, and have in the last 48 hours had quite a number of conversations, both here and there, and that is the process through which we're going.

You have your speculations about it, and we hear a lot of information, but I don't think it's worthwhile for me to try to sort that out.

QUESTION: A follow-up if I may, Mr. Secretary. President Assad is such a dominant figure there, would not a leadership problem compound the problems of settling any Mideast -- bringing about a Mideast solution?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We don't know precisely what the situation of President Assad is. As far as we know, he's firmly in control, and until we have some evidence otherwise, that's the assumption we'll go on.

As far as we're concerned, Syria is very much a functioning government, and we deal with the Foreign Ministry through our Ambassador. When higher level visitors go there and may expect to see President Assad, if he's well enough, I'm sure that he will see them.

He'll receive people from other areas if he's well enough, and that will be one way in which we perhaps will know what his condition is.

But there are all sorts of rumors, and I don't think they're worth my commenting on.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Syrians appear to have answered yesterday's attack by shelling the Marine compound in which an additional eight Marines have been killed.

Where does that leave us? Are you now going to retaliate for that, and aren't we engaged in a rather dangerous escalation that could certainly bring us up against the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We can speculate that that is Syrian retaliation, but we don't have any evidence for that. There's nothing that we know about that says it's a direct result. There was a fair amount of shelling in the Beirut area yesterday, not simply in the airport area But it may be.

As far as we're concerned, we're there in a peacekeeping role. We're there as a country offering our good offices. Ambassador Rumsfeld will be heading back to the region tomorrow. Ambassador Bartholomew, having been here with President Gemayel, is about back in Beirut by now, and we're there trying to be helpful.

We have returned fire to those who have fired at us, in terms of the places from which they have fired. We don't say we're firing at this or that country or faction. We return fire to the source of fire.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, does that mean that there are going to be more air strikes? Exactly how will U.S. airpower be used in the future? And, again today, sir, there are calls from Capitol Hill to pull the Marines out of Lebanon.

Can you discuss, what is the commitment on keeping the Marines there? Is this an open-ended commitment?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Marines are there, and our other forces are there to support our policies which are policies having to do with the Middle East and related to the importance of the Middle East, and more particularly in Lebanon to our objectives of helping the reconstruction of that country and the emergence of it as a working, sovereign country, important not only for itself but also for the contribution that such a result can make to Middle East peace more generally.

That's the mission of our forces there, and they will be there in support of that mission, and, as I said earlier, I think discussion tactically of precisely when we're going to do what is not the sort of thing that I want to comment on publicly.

QUESTION: Yes, sir. But it does seem to be a -- this is the first time that the airpower has been used yesterday in this particular way. Is this now part of the operating procedure, is this a one-time kind of thing, or is this something that's going to be considered on a day-to-day basis from here?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The airpower has been there, the ships have been there, and we have flown reconnaissance missions over Lebanon, I think since September, and this is with the authorization of the Government of Lebanon and supports, as an intelligence matter, our MNF posture.

Those flights have been flown. There have been no problems about it until the day before yesterday when a reconnaissance flight was fired on and fired on rather heavily with evidence that we consider conclusive that those firing knew they were firing on a United States' plane. The firing was heavy and, therefore, can't be ascribed to some individual, local person unloading a round on somebody.

So under those circumstances we felt, and since we had told in advance everybody, including the Syrians about these reconnaissance flights, that they were purely defensive, there was no attack connected with them, that we should fire back at those who fired on us, and it's just as simple as that, and that's the best means of doing so.

We have to use the forces that we have to accomplish the missions that need to be accomplished.

QUESTION: What is that mission, because that seems to be a question everyone was asking today in various interview shows?

Is it there to just help the Lebanese get their act together? That doesn't seem to be much good. If it was to be a peacekeeping force, wouldn't you need more men on the ground? You had more men in little Grenada with much less opposition than you have in Lebanon.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We are there as part of a multinational force which together numbers some 6,000, I guess, something on that order. It's not there with the intention of taking military control. It's there to help the Lebanese gain control. It's there in support of the development of the Lebanese armed forces which have come a long way from a standing start, and I think that it's fair to say that with all of the turmoil and the difficulty, that there has been a considerable amount of progress made.

We've had two visits this past week, one from the Government of Israel and the other from the Government of Lebanon, and I think out of that process, as far as we're concerned, we feel that we have an improved basis for working toward the objectives that we are seeking.

And, as I said, our Ambassador is back by now, and Ambassador Rumsfeld will be leaving Washington early tomorrow morning, and he'll be returning to the area, and we're going to push our thoughts very actively.

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QUESTION: What is the understanding you have with the Israelis?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The understanding? We have lots of understandings with the Israelis and with many other countries.

QUESTION: You have an approved basis for the objectives we are seeking. What is the improved basis for the withdrawal?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We've had very full discussions, not only of the situation in Lebanon but other aspects of the Middle East, with the Israelis. We've had a full discussion with President Gemayel of Lebanon. We've explored a lot of more or less operational things, and I believe that they're going to be helpful to us in making some concrete steps here.

At any rate, that remains our objective, to help the government of Lebanon take control of its territory, starting, of course, with the territory not occupied by foreign forces but recognizing that the presence of foreign forces makes even the unoccupied areas hard to control. So that is the immediate objective, and I think we're going to make some progress.

QUESTION: Mr. Eagleburger yesterday said on ABC television that the United States strategic agreement with Israel intends to stabilize the Middle East and that it will work to help Israel and the moderate Arab states. How can you explain that, sir?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that, first of all, the security of Israel is a very important element of stability in the Middle East insofar as the United States is concerned. So, always, in our relationships with Israel we examine that problem and we seek to do everything we can to insure that.

In the present situation, what we have seen is a very substantial Soviet buildup in Syria, and that is a fact. We discussed it in great detail with the Israelis, and it's something to which we need to pay attention and be prepared to respond. I think doing so does help bring stability in the area.

We discussed many other things with the Israelis and we agreed, among other things, with them to establish a joint political military group. It will have its first meeting in January, and it will be a way to keep track systematically of many of these matters that we discuss when we have visits back and forth. So that process will be in motion, and I think it will help the cooperative action between the countries, but it's something for the future, of course.

QUESTION: May I follow up, sir, on that. Are you implying by your answer that Israel asked you to keep the Marines in; and, secondly, if there is an overwhelming --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't mean to imply that at all. The Marines are there, came there originally as the Palestinians were leaving Beirut, and they're there on our decision; not Israel's decision.

QUESTION: If there is an overwhelming clamor from the American public to request the Marines be withdrawn, will the Administration take the Marines out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, we obviously pay attention to what our people want. At the same time we know that people want to see peace and stability in the Middle East. I think it's a very clear fact that the American people recognize the importance of the Middle East to this country, and so we have used our capabilities and continue to use them to support our objectives there, and we'll continue to do that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think the American people have the stomach to continue to sustain the losses of American lives that we've seen? Don't you either have to change what you're doing with the Marines or pull them out if these losses continue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We certainly want to see progress made, and we will work hard, and are working hard to bring progress about or help others bring it about. That is the purpose of having those forces there. The American people are supporting our efforts. We had favorable votes in the Congress on this very subject, and by a wide margin, particularly in the House of Representatives, and this was even following the terrible tragedy of the car bomb in our Marine installation at the airport.

I think the American people are purposeful and determined. We have, of course, to convince people that our objectives are sound, as I believe they are, and that we have a plan and a strategy as we do. We need to keep talking about it, as we do, and I think we'll have support.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you spoke about self-defense for yesterday's attacks, in terms of self-defense. Isn't it also part of a strategy to put pressure on Syria to tell Syria, to send them a signal that staying in Lebanon will have a cost?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The military action that we undertook was part of our commitment to our forces and to ourselves that we will defend ourselves. And that is all the justification that it needs.

I think the presence of those forces, of course, emphasizes the commitment the United States has, and the other countries who are there have to the objectives that we seek together.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think the raid was successful or a failure?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Pardon me?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think the raid was successful or a failure in its mission?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: In terms of the targets that the air strike went to, my understanding is, from the Pentagon, that the strikes were quite effective; that they hit the targets, and so on. In that sense, we did hit what we were after and they were successful.

I think the main point, however, to be driven home is that we will support ourselves, we will defend ourselves. So if you see somebody who will defend himself and can defend himself, then, maybe you better be a little careful how you handle him. Just where we're going to get with that, the future will tell. But those are the objectives. Technically, in terms of the military action, technically, it was successful in the sense that they went after certain batteries that fired on them and they hit them.

QUESTION: What is your feeling about Nicaragua's offer of amnesty for the rebels and the election process announced yesterday?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the statements being made by the Government of Nicaragua right now are vastly different than the statements they were making some six months or so ago. And I welcome that. Of course, what we want is for a reality to be put behind the rhetoric. And so, naturally, we want to probe and find out what is there, and we believe that the best forum for conducting negotiations with Nicaragua and with other elements in the region is through the Contadora process. We support that process.

That process has produced a very useful 21-point set of objectives. So we want to see reality put behind those objectives by Nicaragua and by the other countries in the region. We will be working at that process and with the Contadora Group to hope that it happens. And if Nicaragua is moving genuinely in the right direction, that's fine.

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you.
(Press conference concluded at 3:25 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 6, 1983

BRIEFING BY
PRIME MINISTER KENNEDY ALPHONSE SIMMONDS
OF ST. CHRISTOPHER-NEVIS

The Briefing Room

12:01 P.M. EST

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Good morning. It certainly is a pleasure to be here in Washington. The warmth of the welcome, I think, has made up for the rather inclement weather that we've been having.

I'm just returning from a visit, or rather trip, which involved first the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi, India, where various issues were discussed; then a state visit to the Republic of Korea.

And here in the United States, I was very happy to have had the opportunity to meet for the second time with President Reagan and for us to, in a sense, look at the situation in the Caribbean, where we have come from and where we go to from here. And I certainly would be very happy to answer any questions about any of those matters which I have just outlined.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, where do we go from here? What's the answer to that question?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Well, with respect to --

Q Development of the Caribbean and Grenada. I assume Grenada came up.

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Yes. Well, where I think we ought to go from here, we have to be thinking in terms of reconstruction in Grenada, reconciliation in the Caribbean and general economic development in the Caribbean area as a whole.

I think this is an excellent time for us to apply a little preventive medicine in the Caribbean area. So often we have to try to treat, to cure situations which perhaps are incurable. But I think we are in a position to apply some preventive medicine in the form of economic development, but an economic development which is relevant, which has long-term effects for the overall growth of the economies in the Caribbean.

Q On that point there, preventive medicine, do you think President Reagan intends to sponsor an invasion of Nicaragua and would you support a U.S.-sponsored invasion of Nicaragua?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Well, I have no evidence of that. We did not discuss that issue at all. I hope that the need for that does not arise. But we did not discuss the issue, so I cannot speak about the President's intentions.

Q I understand, but what about your own feelings, sir? Would you support a U.S. effort, military effort, other than the one currently underway, against Nicaragua?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: I would have to say at this point that I would have to evaluate the situation on its own merit. I would not equate any other situation with our situation in the Caribbean, in Grenada. Each one has to be looked at on its own merit.

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Q Did the President give you any indication of when the American combat troops would be leaving Grenada?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Well, the indication, not in terms of day, month or week, but certainly an indication that the United States was very anxious to have the combat troops out as soon as it was safe to do so.

Q Do you think it's safe now?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No.

Q If so, what is your -- Why not?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Because it would leave a vacuum there, in fact, a security vacuum. Grenada does not have a police force. The training of an adequate force would take some time. Several of us in the Caribbean are taking part in helping to provide this training. The British government has expressed an interest. But it will take time to provide adequate training. And we believe that there are still some elements in the hills who would provide a security problem.

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Q Did you, in fact, come here partly to tell the President that it's too early to withdraw those troops, even if the United States has some interest in bringing them back, let's say, for Christmas, that they have to stay there longer?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Not specifically. In general, to discuss the whole situation and, as I said earlier, to look at where we are to go from here. Not specifically.

Q Do you have any idea how long it would before it would be safe for the American troops to leave Grenada?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Not in chronological terms, but what I think needs to be done before it is safe for them to leave Grenada is that there must be the establishment of an adequate security force, a police force, mainly, on the island, and that -- arms which are still -- which may still be in the hands of some of the more fanatical elements of the revolutionary army should be gathered in, if possible.

Q The White House said they'd like to have the U.S. combat troops out by Christmas, which is only three weeks away. Is that possible, in your opinion?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: In my opinion, I do not think it is desirable.

Q Have you been to Grenada recently to take a look at the situation? Is that --

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No, I haven't.

Q Were you there just before it happened, or sometime before it happened?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Personally, no.

Q Have you ever been to Grenada?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No, I have never been to Grenada.

Q Based on your conversations here, do you think that the U.S. government will, in fact, leave the U.S. troops there well beyond Christmas?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No. I got the impression that there will be a general scaling down of the strength of the U.S. military forces there, and that --

Q -- before Christmas?

PRIME MINISTER: That it will -- it will begin before Christmas. This is my impression. And that it will continue after. As I say, that as the security situation improves I believe the process will be a gradual one, and I think that is the best way to go about it.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, did you talk to the President and express your opinion that Christmas was too soon and that the security situation would not prevent a -- would not permit taking all the combat troops out by Christmas? Did you say that to the President?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Not in those words, not by Christmas, but I did say that I thought that we should not be precipitate in taking the combat troops out until the security situation improves.

Q And what did he say in response?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Just what I said before, that there would be a gradual whittling down of the U.S. military presence as the police aspect of the -- of security development in Grenada improves.

Q He gave you no timeframe?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No.

Q Sir?

Q Mr. Prime Minister, you talked about gathering up the arms which still might be in the hands of fanatical elements? What fanatical elements remain on the island, and is there a danger, still, on Grenada today?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: I think there would certainly be some danger. After all, I mean, some -- there was fighting, and the fighting involved the Grenada revolutionary army. It involves some Cubans; most of the Cubans are out. We have no evidence that there might not still be a few left there, and certainly there would be elements of the Grenada revolutionary army who might be interested in continuing hostilities for some time.

Q Is there proof of that?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Yes, we have had -- there have been reports of sniper fire at various times -- in recent weeks.

Q Directed against whom?

Q I don't recall anything --

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: There have been reports of sniper fire at U.S. troops over the past -- well, certainly shortly before I went to the conference. That would have been over two weeks ago. I haven't had any reports of such in the last two weeks.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, would a security force, given the training that you envision, would a security force actually be able to forestall or prevent another situation occurring on Grenada, or is the security force banking on the potential for another American rescue effort there should that happen?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No, I don't think any of us would like to think in terms of another rescue effort by the United States, or any other, for that matter. We would, we are trying to develop the security forces to the level where they can maintain law and order in the country in the normal way. And we will have to depend too on

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the people of Grenada. It is their country, after all, and we are only assisting them to put things right. But they are the ones who have to do it in the long run.

Q Who suggested that you come here? Was it your idea, or were you invited to come?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: It was my idea.

Q Is your government participating in the expanded regional security force?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Yes. Yes, we are.

Q Where does that stand now? I am talking about the Barbados proposal to expand the regional security.

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: We have not formally become members as yet, but we are certainly interested in becoming members, and it is likely that we will become members.

Q How large a force will that be? And will it be a standing army?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: It is difficult for me to say at this point in terms of numbers. But I think from our point of view, the most important element of that security force would be the Coast Guard potential, from our point of view. I think different islands have different -- see the things from different aspects. And also the ability for us to have a relatively small group who can respond fairly quickly to, particularly to the possibility of mercenary assault. For example, like the problem which had faced Dominica some months back, like the situation which had developed on Union Island in St. Vincent and the Grenadines sometime back -- I think that was in 1979 or 1980.

I don't envisage that we will have the capability to establish an Army which could really defend the whole of the eastern Caribbean. We don't have the financial or military resources to do that.

Q How have the incidents in Grenada affected say the tourist industry of your country? What is going on down there in the aftermath of that?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: I think we would be in the process of assessing that right now in the sense that we are now just moving into the tourist season. But there were reports from travel agents and tour operators that they were having cancellations. And in fact, we did mount a mission. Our Minister of Tourism came to the United States a little over two weeks ago, and we did mount a mission to reassure the tour operators and the travel agents that it was safe to come to the Caribbean. The thing is that some people don't quite understand the difference between one country and the next. Some people think that you can drive from one country to the next.

Q Is it your opinion that the situation in Grenada might have been avoided had U.S. officials seen Prime Minister Bishop when he tried to come here? Could the United States have avoided this by dealing with him directly?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Of course, that is a very difficult question to answer because much depends on what would have been said at that time. I doubt it in the sense that the problem was really from within Bishop's own group and not from without. Therefore, I think it would have been extremely difficult

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for the United States or anybody else to be able to prevent it ahead of time.

Q Would you tell us again what the status is in terms of developing a police force for Grenada and how long it would take to train and equip a police force for Grenada?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: That is a question of course that would be better answered by the people who are versed in the training of police officers. But let me say that the process has started. It will be hampered by the fact that a careful assessment of the individuals, of the persons taken into that force will have to be undertaken. And it is more particularly difficult in Grenada's situation because Grenada has not had a real police force for many years, even from the time of Geary, before Bishop. So there is not as much to work with as you would have if the same situation had occurred, for example, in some one of the other islands.

I know you will want me to try and put a chronological time onto it. I think that is very difficult to do. Let us say that the training is going pretty quickly, full speed. The Barbados

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training center is available. We have a small training unit which is available. Prime Minister Thatcher has indicated that the British government is pitching in very strongly to assist in the training of policemen for Grenada very quickly.

Q Mr. Prime Minister, there's a big effort today by the administration to interest private United States businessmen in investing in Grenada. Isn't it going to be pretty hard to do when you talk about fanatical elements still up in the hills and the continued security threat and the fact that it is sufficiently unsafe that we need combat troops in there beyond the first of the year?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: No. It's a question of scale. And we have to be realistic. I'm not talking about any large units of combat troops. In fact, we're talking about gradually scaling the level of combat troops down. But we have to be realistic. A dozen people in the hills can make life fairly uncomfortable for people. And it is because we want to start the process of reconstruction early that I think, too, that it is important for us to try and allay the fears. I think the presence of some U.S. troops might, in fact, help the process of reconstruction by allaying the fears of some of the people who would be willing to invest.

Q Is that your country's flag over there you were looking at?

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Yes.

Q It's an attractive flag.

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Yes.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

PRIME MINISTER SIMMONDS: Thank you very much.

END 12:16 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 6, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
JAY MORRIS,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ON AN INTERAGENCY GROUP STUDY OF GRENADA

The Briefing Room

12:35 P.M. EST

MR. SPEAKES: We have with us today Jay Morris, who is the Deputy Director of the Agency for International Development. This afternoon at 3:00 p.m. in Room 450 -- If anybody wishes to leave and not be present, they certainly may. That is a --

Q Thank you --

MR. SPEAKES: That is a privilege of this organization. I would humbly and respectfully ask you to please be courteous to visitors who come in the White House, much more courteous than you were yesterday --

Q Why don't you be courteous to us?

MR. SPEAKES: -- to a foreign visitor who was here.

Q Why don't you be courteous to us?

Q What foreign visitor?

Q -- German --

MR. SPEAKES: At 3:00 p.m. this afternoon, 125 businessmen are meeting in the EOB to have a briefing on an interagency group study that is taking place in Grenada. The interagency group was organized by Craig Fuller and the press conference will be at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon.

Q Really? Where?

MR. SPEAKES: The interagency group visited Grenada under Jay Morris' direction and they were --

Q You bit like a snake --

Q Well, what press conference? I -- (laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: If you were listening, you would have gotten it.

Q That was a vicious look at you, Sam.

Q -- not vicious.

MR. SPEAKES: The interagency group visited Grenada --

Q Yes --

Q -- Mississippi boy.

MR. SPEAKES: -- some weeks ago and --

Q -- for Philadelphia.

Q Another vicious look.

MR. SPEAKES: I tell you what.

Q What?

MR. SPEAKES: In the so-called "controversial" briefing of a week ago Wednesday, you can look it up, you should listen to

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your quips and your asides in that briefing and listen to mine and we will see how the balance -- the whole bunch out here.

Q I haven't written a word --

MR. SPEAKES: So I would ask you to be very careful in what you say because your quips also are part of the record and you are identified on the tapes of these briefings. So -- (laughter.)

If you want to continue to see who is the villian in these things that people write about in the newspaper, I would urge you to examine -- look within.

I will begin again.

Q "Judge not that you be not judged" --

MR. SPEAKES: Yes. I will begin again.

This afternoon at 3:00 p.m. 125 businessmen are meeting in the EOB to hear a report of an interagency group that was organized about four weeks ago to study ways that Grenada can be revitalized -- the economy of Grenada.

It was spearheaded by Craig Fuller. Jay Morris, the Deputy Director of AID was in charge of the group, the interagency group, that went to Grenada. They are now making their report to the White House and they will brief the businessmen on this report.

So we have them -- Jay available to you --

Q What about the press conference?

MR. SPEAKES: -- at this time.

Q You said there was a press conference at 2:00 p.m.

MR. SPEAKES: Jay. Go ahead.

Q You weren't trying to kid us, were you?

Q Bit like snakes.

MR. MORRIS: We're releasing the report today that we made during our survey of Grenada and we'll be using it as the basis for the briefing this afternoon for these businessmen.

Q Do you have extra copies that we can look at?

MR. MORRIS: Yes, that's being handed out. There's a summary there and then full copies are being brought over now, if you want it.

Basically what we found was an economy that was flat on its back -- (laughter) -- an island that --

Q A lot of bullet wounds --

Q Working for the Yankee dollar?

MR. MORRIS: -- an island that had virtually been bankrupt by the way in which it had been run before. But at the same time, we found a lot of interesting business prospects that I think are worth exploring. And we found a very vital leadership of the business community that had survived those years. In fact, based on my experience throughout the Caribbean with AID, it was among the most talented and impressive group of business leaders I've ever seen. They were relatively small in number; but they have a vibrant core that I think we can build upon.

Now, rather than take you through all the different sectors and statistics, I'll just stop here and answer any questions that you have.

Q Yes, sir. What's in it for these businessmen who are coming today? Are they looking to profit -- for a profit motive out of rebuilding a shambles? And is it in the interest of the United States to allow people to volunteer -- make such profits out of the damage?

MR. MORRIS: Well, I think it's difficult for me to say what each of their motives is; but I wouldn't have any doubt that many of them are interested in making a profit. And if profitable deals can be struck for both sides using credit and technology

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from America and products and labor in Grenada that generates employment and income for them, I wouldn't call that exploitation. That's a two-way street. I, also, know that some, however, are interested in donating services and equipment, because they've said so. They've called up, and offered it. So you, probably, have a blend of motives.

Q Well, is there an imprimatur of the U.S. government on certain businesses or industries that are volunteering to do the work down there?

MR. MORRIS: Not at this stage. The purpose of this was to outline exactly what conditions were in various sectors and, then, to meet with representatives of the American business community and determine their various levels of interest. Following that, we will attempt to assemble an appropriate group that will go to Grenada on an investment mission, probably shortly after the turn of the year. But at this point, no businesses have been selected either for investment prospects or for donated services.

Q Is that a government group you're talking about, or a business group?

MR. MORRIS: No. That's private sector.

Q What business can be best promoted on the island?

Q What was the question?

MR. MORRIS: The question was: what business can best be promoted.

Q In terms of their potentialities and resources.

MR. MORRIS: I would answer it with two examples: one would be tourism, and the other would be agro-industry.

Q What do they grow? What do they raise?

MR. MORRIS: They raise nutmeg. They raise cloves, bananas, many spices. They're called "The Spice Island." For example, their cocoa crop is a very lucrative crop. They just have production problems. They've already sold half of next year's crop. But they're not growing near what they could.

Excuse ma'am?

Q Are they going to build the airport?

MR. MORRIS: I don't know whether they're going to build the airport or not. We have recommended -- I'll come to you, ma'am.

We have recommended in this study that they examine building the airport. The truth of the matter is no one knows what is involved in finishing that airport. There are no valid figures on what it would cost to finish, what infrastructure support would be necessary to make it work, and what annual operating costs would be and, then, what income would be generated and balanced against that.

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Q Why is that difficult?

MR. MORRIS: Well, because you've inherited a place that's half finished with crates of equipment that need to be examined as to what condition they're in.

Q Who would inherit it, us?

MR. MORRIS: No. The Grenadians.

Yes, ma'am?

Q Well, sir, it looks like we inherited, too.

But tell us, please -- if you will, are these people who donate this equipment -- are they going to get to charge that off on their income tax?

MR. MORRIS: I wouldn't know.

Q Well, is that an inducement you people are offering to some of them?

MR. MORRIS: We are not. We haven't examined that question yet.

Q Would you give us the list of the people that you've invited to this conference this afternoon?

MR. MORRIS: Yes. I understand that is being made available at the end of this meeting.

Yes, sir.

Q Can you tell us how the businesses that will attend this briefing were selected?

MR. MORRIS: I cannot, because I did not play that part. That was handled by Craig Fuller's office and Jim Coyne who head the coordinating group within the White House. I assume, it was a combination of referral calls that we and many other agencies have gotten -- we certainly had a number we've transferred to them -- calls that came directly to them, and their own outreach.

Q What is the level of U.S. AID assistance to the nations of the Eastern Caribbean this year?

MR. MORRIS: As I recall, it's roughly $50 million. But I'll have to go back through that; I'd like to respond to that later if I could.

Q At this point, Grenada has gotten $34 million in addition to that. Does that set a precedent for the United States aid to countries?

MR. MORRIS: No. Let me break that figure down if I could. It's getting $18.475 million in economic aid. The remaining $15 million is military assistance that does not go to Grenada. It goes to support the Caribbean peacekeeping forces. So that has no economic impact on that island. That is supporting the sending governments.

Q So it gets more than one-third of all the aid going to every nation in the Eastern Caribbean.

MR. MORRIS: It is going to be a bulge. But I'd point out, for example, that last year I think they had, roughly, $15 million in St. Vincent. This year, there's a $9.8 million road project in Dominica. So, while there's obviously some front-end loading because of the conditions we found there, it is not vastly out of line with the bulges that occur in other, individual island programs. We're quite aware that they're part of an integrated community. And we want to keep it that way. And our plans for the following year are to scale it down more in line with the regional average. This is a one-year bulge, as we see it. And we don't see it -- on the economic side -- as being enormously out of line.

Q On the question of reviving tourism, is there any thought on whether it is a good or a bad thing that our troops remain? In other words, is it an assurance that troops are there if you're trying to revive it? Or is it better that they leave?

MR. MORRIS: Well, I think some security force has to be kept there. But it's really more in the nature of a normal police force. Normal, civilized crime is what you're dealing with. You're not dealing with organized military resistance anymore. So as long as there is a police force of some sort there -- whether it's the Caribbean peacekeeping force augmented with some of our MPs or Commonwealth assistance that's been suggested -- it really isn't critical. As long as some combination is there, I think it's adequate.

Q Did you assess the security situation in Grenada and the impact that would have on investment?

MR. MORRIS: Yes. We did. And our assessment was that the security situation is well in hand. And as long as efforts are continued at rebuilding the Grenadian police capability, it should be no real problem. We, also -- not to our surprise, came to the conclusion that doing that was essential to restore investor confidence.

Q But are you saying that there is no organized opposition or even scattered opposition up in the hills?

MR. MORRIS: Not that I'm aware of. I mean, if it is, it's under 10 people.

Q Well now, the Prime Minister of St. Christopher-Nevis, who preceded you here, said it was still dangerous. And he had reports he said, up to two weeks ago, of sniping from the hills. And he said that's why he thinks that you can't remove U.S. combat troops -- certainly, not by Christmas.

MR. MORRIS: Well, I'm not going to comment on when the troops could or couldn't be removed. I can only tell you what we had happen while we were there. Our briefings indicated fewer than 10 people in the hills. There was one sniping incident. I've known of none since and --

Q When was that?

MR. MORRIS: This was two weeks ago.

Q -- that checks.

MORE

MR. MORRIS: There's been none since. And, if you call 10 people in the hills a military threat, so be it. (Laughter.) It's no worse than a gang in the South Bronx. (Laughter.)

Q So why can't the troops leave?

MR. MORRIS: Yes, ma'am.

Q Aside from police security, what about the economic security? Did he add to our deficits by providing these millions -- down there? What are we going to get back from them? Is there any prospect of our getting anything back for what we've added to our deficits just to pay for it?

MR. MORRIS: I presume, when you talk about adding to our deficits, you're talking about the government economic aid -- the $18.475 million.

Q No. The deficit we all -- we add every time we give more aid to these countries --

MR. MORRIS: Yes. You're talking about the aid.

Q We're continuing all the time. This administration gives more and more aid to these poor countries. And this is an additional one. I'm talking about what do we stand to get back from them.

MR. MORRIS: Well, I think you stand to get back two things. One, is economic. First of all, most U.S. aid results in dollars being spent in the United States. Seventy-five percent of all that aid you think is being given away is being spent in the United States.

Q Do you think you'll get 75 percent back from Grenada?

MR. MORRIS: I think the prospects are it'll probably fall in the average.

But secondly, if we're successful in creating a vital economy and a trading partner, ultimately I think it'll generate far more income for the United States than we have invested, as well as alot more income for them. That's normally what happens when business expands.

Thirdly, I think we have a security interest in creating a stable society. And economic stability is a very important part of that. So I see three things we get back.

Yes, sir.

Q Is there an estimate of when, how early the economy might be revived there?

MR. MORRIS: That is not going to be easy, because it really had slipped into a fairly advanced stage of decay. The infrastructure is a shambles -- not because of any combat, but because of neglect. It's going to be expensive and a long-term I think, rebuilding prospect for the roads, the power system, the water system, et cetera. The civil service, the unions, the work force in general is in need of technical training. And, while there are some investment opportunities, their payoff is probably not immediate. I think you're looking at several years before you're really on a firm footing.

Q Is the implication of that, then, that they'll be our dependent for that period?

MR. MORRIS: No, not at all. I've indicated what the aid levels are. Bear in mind that both the Canadian and the British aid sections have recommended to their governments some fairly extensive aid programs. The heads of government haven't replied yet. But they, and other Commonwealth countries, have an historic relationship with Grenada. And I think that'll continue. The U.N. has programs in there. We're, by no means, alone. We don't intend to become the dominant, sole supplier of external assistance.

Q Do you have any figures of aid recommended by either Canada or Great Britain and U.N. -- what the dollar amounts are?

MR. MORRIS: No. I don't. I don't. I'm not at liberty to mention them. I met with them. But their governments have not discussed it publicly. So I don't feel I --

Q Ballpark --

MR. MORRIS: No, but substantial. Far greater than they gave the entire region prior to this, in the case of the British.

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Q Equal to ours -- half of ours?

MR. MORRIS: I think I'll just say substantial.

Q Was it more or less than ours? That's a --

MR. MORRIS: I would say less, but substantial.

Yes?

Q I'm wondering with all the money that went for the --

MR. SPEAKES: Let's take these two questions here to conclude.

MR. MORRIS: Yes, ma'am?

Q With all the money that went for the airport -- you said earlier --

MR. MORRIS: Sixty-five million --

Q -- that the economy had been looted by Bishop in trying to make the airport. Can we turn it around if we don't follow through with that airport when tourism is the biggest -- would be the biggest money producer -- quickest?

MR. MORRIS: I'm not sure that tourism would be the biggest, but obviously quick and ready access to markets of any kind is important in the economic development. Whether it need be that airport or a revamped version of the other one or a scaled-down version of what was proposed here needs to be examined. But when they took from 14 percent of all bank deposits to 35 percent in 15 months and doubled the reserve requirements, that's what I mean when they took all the liquidity right out of the banking system and spent it on that one, particular project. Sixty-five million is what we estimate's been invested in that --

Q In the aiport?

MR. MORRIS: -- in that airport already by others.

Q But you don't know how long it would take to finish it?

MR. MORRIS: We don't know how long. We don't know how much.

Q What do you mean by others?

Q I've heard estimates of $100 million from Grenadian business officials.

MR. MORRIS: You mean to finish it?

Q That by the time it's finished that is what it will cost. Can you --

MR. MORRIS: I can't comment because I really don't know whether that's a reasonable number or not.

Yes, sir? I think this is the last question.

Q Do you have an estimate on what the total cost of the invasion has been so far or what it will ultimately be?

MR. MORRIS: No, I have no knowledge about how DOD accounts for those things at all.

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Is that it?

Q I have a question about a federal report here, Larry, that you're not going to be able to answer. Can I have one more --

MR. SPEAKES: He can give you his phone number.

Q What is your phone number and the number of your assistants?

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:51 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 13, 1983
No. 421

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
AND
SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ
Bonn, Germany
December 7, 1983

MR. GEERT MUELLER-GERBES, Acting Chairman of the Federal Press Association: A very hearty welcome to you, Mr. Shultz. We are glad to have the Secretary of State of the United States for a press conference during his short visit to Bonn. A hearty welcome also to German Foreign Minister Genscher. May I now ask the Secretary for a short statement.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd like to express my appreciation to my host in this brief visit to Germany, my friend Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and also to Chancellor Kohl, for the time and excellent meeting that we had last night; and then today we had a series of meetings with other leaders of Germany. It's been a very short time, very full, very worthwhile from my standpoint. I must say also that the United States, as in the case of Germany, remains firmly committed to both tracks of the dual-track decision. We are very impressed with the way the German people have handled the deployment issue, and we are as committed as they to continue on and to maintain our own willingness to continue negotiations about these matters at any and all times. Thank you.

MR. MUELLER-GERBES: Mr. Genscher, do you have anything to add? Nothing. Ladies and gentlemen, the next question, please?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what your position will be on the conference in Stockholm which begins January 17? Will you personally participate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have discussed this on this trip with Mr. Genscher and Mr. Kohl. And I expect that we will discuss it in the NATO Ministerial Meeting coming up tomorrow. It's an important conference and there are strong arguments that the presence of Foreign Ministers at the opening of the conference will serve to emphasize the commitment to it and its importance.

The position of the United States is that we will want to discuss this with our colleagues and, if the decision is, as I kind of expect it will be, that we will feel it important to go, that I certainly will be present at Stockholm.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you, following up on that question, address yourself to the issue of whether you will be prepared to meet Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm if it turns out that both you and Foreign Minister Gromyko are in fact there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Surely, if we are both there, I will be more than ready to meet with Mr. Gromyko. But, of course, that depends upon whether we all go, as I believe probably the Western decision will be to go, and whether he is there. And, at least from my standpoint, we will work on our schedules in any way necessary to make such a meeting possible if it is desired by Mr. Gromyko. We certainly will be ready to meet.

QUESTION: Are there differences of opinion between you and the Federal Government over a NATO strategy which, in the opinion of the Federal Government, could be based on the Harmel Report?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't sense any great difficulties in strategy between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. We consult constantly and try to coordinate our views very carefully. And I think the way in which all these matters have been conducted has been an almost unprecedented display of consultation, and in the end a unity of view on what we should do. Would you agree with that, Hans-Dietrich?

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: I believe that the introductory remarks by the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he again pledged his continuing commitment to both parts of the NATO double-track decision, reveal that both elements of the common political security strategies -- that is: the determination to pursue one's own security interests, the necessity to do what is required to maintain security, and readiness to conduct a dialogue and negotiations for disarmament and detente -- are policy objectives of both Administrations.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think that the time will be ripe soon for a new western negotiating initiative in matters of INF?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think, from the standpoint of the INF issue, we have put proposals on the table. We have adjusted them. We have displayed a great amount of flexibility. The one thing that we have insisted on is: a result in which the Soviet Union has a complete monopoly of intermediate range weapons in Europe, and Asia for that matter, is not our idea of equality. But, given that, we would like to see equality defined as zero. But if that's not desired, we'll look at other ways of defining it, but we don't think it's equality to have deployments on one side and none on the other. So, we're prepared to resume negotiations and talks and to listen to what the other side has to say within that framework.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: Mr. Lorenz, it is not up to the West to take an initiative at the INF negotiations, for the West has put its negotiating proposals on the table and the West remains at the conference table as before. It is now up to the Soviet Union to be ready for negotiations again.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, after a possible meeting in Stockholm with Gromyko, would you exclude a coupling of INF and START in Geneva?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I know that there have been good arguments not to do that, that are not changed by what has happened, so I don't know of any great discussion of that question.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) this occasion, Mr. Secretary, that the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles will accelerate as the 5-year period foreseen passes. Is it the case, therefore, that deployment is now proceeding slowly as a tactical signal to the Soviet Union that there is yet time for an agreement? Or is deployment proceeding at a fixed rate?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There has been a schedule that was decided upon and the schedule is unaltered. The first part of the schedule is in the process of being implemented and it will continue, as I said. I think the main point is that we in the West have values that are important to us. And we feel we must defend them, and we are determined to defend them. We also feel that among the ways of defending them is to engage in constructive negotiations. But they have to be constructive negotiations. Now the deployment schedule is part of that process. But I think the emphasis should be on the values and the concern that we have for those values, and our readiness to defend those values.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Polish Trade Union leader Walesa called on the West to drop its sanctions and consider giving further credits. Is the United States Government willing to consider this?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we have had a policy that once again was discussed with our Allies. That's an Alliance policy, of sanctions in view of the actions of the Polish Government. These are sanctions against the Government not against the Polish people, whose performance has been magnificent. Now, I don't see that the Government has taken measures that would warrant just lifting sanctions or extending more credits or anything of that kind. However, we examine the situation continuously, and I am sure that Mr. Genscher and I will discuss it some more. We discuss it practically ever time we meet, and we'll review it. But at this stage of the game, we think that actions that would be taken ought to be a response to something constructive done by the Polish Government and we will just have to examine that.

QUESTION: Despite all of the preparations for the arrival of cruise missiles and Pershings, opponents of these missiles have managed to break through the defenses at Schwaebisch Gmuend in Germany. What does this say about the state of American, German and British security arrangements?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I believe what we are intending to do will take place and I have full confidence in the Goverments to maintain the security and we'll proceed.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: You will have noted that the Federal Government has implemented in the past, is implementing at present, and will implement in the future all decisions recognized as important and necessary regarding security measures.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we discussed that some and I didn't detect any particular difference of opinion. The situation in Lebanon is obviously a very troublesome one. So far as the escalation is concerned, on the one hand, I think, it is important to recognize that our forces are there as part of a multinational force. In fact, the international community is represented further by the presence of UNIFIL in Lebanon, which shows that extent to which the international community worries about and wants to help Lebanon construct itself. That's what we are there for. We are there in support of that objective in Lebanon and we are there in support of stability and peace in the Middle East. So there have been lots of outbreaks of violence and as long as we are there, of course, we will have to defend ourselves and we will continue to do that.

QUESTION: (Largely inaudible question about how the Secretary views the contrast between the agreement of his European government colleagues on the INF issue and the opposition of European publics.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we are democracies. Germany is. The United States is. And we have a way of making decisions; it is through people taking positions and the holding of elections. Then on that basis those who are elected take positions on behalf of their governments. And that's what's happened here. That's what's happened in our country. That's what happens in democracies. So, I think that when you say that a democratic government takes a position on something, that doesn't mean that every member of the population agrees with it, but it means that there has been a proper process gone through, and debate and open elections, and so on. And that certainly has been the case here in Germany.

QUESTION: (Largely inaudible question about the "escalation of American involvement" in Lebanon.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our method of involement is basically to try to help bring about peace and stability through encouraging negotiation. We managed to help the parties a little over a year ago to evacuate the PLO from Beirut and to the great benefit of the people and the physical facilities in Beirut. We have continued to try to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces. I think that's the right route, and the emergence of a broadly based sovereign government in Lebanon. We helped to negotiate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon and there is absolutely no doubt about the fact that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon. It remains to find the way of implementing that agreement and to find the way of bringing about Syrian withdrawal. There is a definite strategy and plan for bringing these things about, although obviously it is not easy because we have all been at it for quite a while. But that's our strategy and I believe that the quality of people we have had in these roles there, Phil Habib, Bob McFarlane, Dick Fairbanks, Morrie Draper, and now Don Rumsfeld, has been very high. Our special negotiator now, Don Rumsfeld, is one of the most distinguished Americans, who has had the political experience of running for office, being a member of Congress who has occupied distinguished posts in the executive branch, including Ambassador to NATO, and Secretary of Defense, let alone running the Poverty

Program in the United States, and also now being a successful business executive. He is a very distinguished and high-quality person. So we try to give our best to this effort.

QUESTION: (First part of statement/question mainly inaudible) What Poland needs now is aid in the amount of millions of dollars. As the spokesman of the Polish regime has stated earlier, even if the sanctions continue, the government will not starve. Are you of the opinion that the sanctions should be continued in order to cause hardship for the Polish people and, in turn, to destabilize the government?

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: We have always held the opinion that a positive move by those politically responsible in Poland should receive a positive reaction from the West. In all our actions concerning the People's Republic of Poland, we have always valued highly what the Catholic Church has said regarding the interests of the Polish people -- and, of course, also what Polish labor leader Walesa has said during the past few days will receive our due consideration. I presume that this will already come up for discussion among the foreign ministers within the next few days.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you think that an active U.S. Military presence in Latin America is necessary? How do you assess the last decisions in Managua?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we don't have a military presence in Central America in the use of military forces. We have exercises that are taking place in that region, particularly with Hoduras. Those are things that have taken place in the past, and so we have put a presence down there, and it is designed for a training mission and also to give a message that we can muster forces in that area. But basically, the policies of the United States are first of all to seek economic development for the Central American people. They need it. Second, to sponsor political conditions that emphasize democratic procedures, freedom, justice, and things of that kind. Third, to help them provide a security shield against those who would support progress in economic development and social reform. And so we have provided assistance to the Salvadoran Armed Forces among others. And finally, to urge that there be negotiations. We believe that it is essentially a regional problem and, therefore, regional negotiations are appropriate. So we support the Contadora process and we support what's going on there. In so far as recent statements from Nicaragua are concerned, first of all we welcome the 21-point agreement worked out through the Contadora process and we welcome the fact that what Nicaragua says now is vastly different from what it said six or eight months ago. What we look for is a willingness to put a reality behind the rhetoric, and that remains to be seen. But we think there will be many opportunities to do that within the Contadora process.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, since the Marshall Plan initiative, all United States governments have hoped for a strong and healthy Europe as a partner. Is a Europe whose leaders have just failed to reach an agreement on any item on their agenda the kind of strong and healthy partner the United States desires?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, Europe is strong and healthy. Like the United States, like lots of other parts of the world, there are problems, I am sure. The fact that one meeting doesn't produce results that satisfy people is not an indication that all is lost by any means. We continue to place great weight on our relationships with NATO, on our relationships with the Community. And I plan to meet not only with the NATO Ministers during this trip but also with the European Community. Insofar as relations between Europe and the Untied States are concerned on the economic side, of course, we have some important strains but I think it is also well to keep that in perspective. There is a two-way trade between Europe and the United States on the order of an annual rate of 90 billion dollars. So we must be doing something right, and that's mutually beneficial. So, as we struggle with the problems, I think it is well to keep in mind the very beneficial results from this huge two-way flow of trade and also from our mutual security support system.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't think that it does have any bearing on the Atlantic Alliance at all, which is strong, and insofar as the accession of Spain is concerned, I'll let Hans-Dietrich address himself to that, but I don't consider that that question is over by any stretch of the imagination.

FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER: There have not been any differences of opinion at all concerning the continuation of negotiations over the accession of Spain and Portugal. To the extent that there was any agreement at all on this issue, it was that negotiations should be brought to a close during the first half year of 1984 so that, directly following, that ratification may begin in all countries concerned. That means: the member countries of the European Community continue to maintain what they have always said, namely, that they desire the early accession of Spain and Portugal.

MODERATOR: Ladies and Gentlemen, this brings the Press Conference to a close.

MUELLER-GERBES: Mr. Secretary of State, I thank you very much for having come here and I close today's conference.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
KING BIRENDRA OF NEPAL

December 7, 1983

The Briefing Room

11:37 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. There have been two pre-brief sessions so far and distinguished colleagues of mine have given you a great deal of background information about the purpose of the visit and the scheduled events and so forth.

I really don't think it's necessary for me to try to recapitulate that. What you're really interested now is -- and is, I suppose, the progress of the visit so far and the talks that have just taken place.

Well, of course, I did not sit in on the private conversation His Majesty King Birendra had with the President; but I have sat in on the fairly extensive discussions that took place after that and I can say that they were entirely consistent with the spirit of cordiality and problem-free bilateral relationship that we were talking about in the pre-brief session. Communication was very frank and very cordial and quite meaningful.

We covered a number of subjects, talked about the Nepal Zone of Peace Project, talked about economic development, talked about world issues, talked about water resource development and other matters related to these subjects.

Q Does the U.S. endorse the Peace Zone?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be a public statement on that later today.

Q From whom?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From the highest level. All right. I think it's permissable to say that there will be a statement of the U.S. position in the President's toast this evening at the State Dinner.

Q Can you tell us now, for those of us who are writing stories at this point, where we stand on it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not if I want to go back to Nepal

Q Does that mean you're against it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Against what?

Q You're against peace?

Q The Peace Zone.

Q He's just against being fired. (Laughter.)

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm trying to stick up for my -- trying to follow my orders and my -- and I -- trying not to anticipate a statement that's it been decided will be made later today.

Q Did they discuss the situation in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon me?

Q Did they discuss the situation in Lebanon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I don't believe -- to the best of my knowledge, that did not come up at all.

Q Since we won't --

Q Did they discuss missile talks and the breaking off of those talks between the U.S. and the Soviets --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Did not come up to my knowledge.

Q Since we won't have any explanation or anyone around after the President makes his statement, I just want to ask you, will it be unequivocal or will it hedge around like the other countries have on the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid I have to answer that the same way I answered the other one: I just have nothing to say further than that we will have a public statement this evening.

Q What are the positions of the two countries on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the context of these talks?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the positions of the two countries are very similar. We're opposed to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Nepalese government is opposed to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Of course, we approached the issue from different perspectives; but we come to the same conclusion.

Q What is happening in Afghanistan? Can you tell anything from --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I'm afraid that's outside my area of competence. You'll have to ask some other people about that.

Q For of us not that familiar with this Peace Zone proposal, what are the advantages of such a proposal?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, it's really up to the Nepalese to explain it since it's a Nepalese proposal. And -- But, basically, it's a proposal that everybody recognize that Nepal is a zone of peace, which means that will not allow its territory to be used for disagreeable actions against neighbors and vice versa and that it will be allowed to devote its limited economic resources to economic development

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rather than armaments.

Q How could the President oppose that, or have reservations about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, why don't you wait and see what our position is and then ask that question.

Q Well, you won't be around.

Q Are the Nepalese afraid of any foreign intervention in their country, either from China or India?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think that's really the issue, but if you want a definitive view on that you really have to ask the Nepalese. I hate to speak for other people; I usually get in trouble when I do.

Q Can you tell me: What has the Chinese and the Indian reaction been to this zone of peace proposal? It would seem to affect them most directly --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, to the best of my knowledge, the Chinese have endorsed the proposal and the Indians are studying it.

Q -- zone of war. (Laughter.)

Q How much money, sir, would they need to get their economic situation going?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, that assumes that --

Q It's really a grant from us, isn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, that assumes that you're talking about a process that can be resolved entirely by the application of money, and what is happening in Nepal is the modernization of everything -- the whole society, including the economy, and I suppose you could put a price tag on the construction their road network and the power network and so forth, but that isn't the whole name of the game. So, it's a total process and there's just no price tag available.

What would it cost to take the 13 colonies that became states back in 1787 or whenever it was and create a modern America out of it? It would cost money, but a lot of other things happened too.

Q Well, what's the name of the game then? What do you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The name of the game for Nepal is to become a modern country and to eliminate the poverty and illiteracy and other attributes of an undeveloped country that afflict the people of Nepal, I think.

Q How much more aid will they get?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In terms of U.S. aid, we certainly have discussed the contribution America -- the United States government has made over the past 32 years to Nepalese economic development, in terms of indicating a willingness to continue this level of support and perhaps add a modest increment.

Q Did the King ask for the increase in U.S. aid?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To my knowledge he did not, and, as I understand it, the King has come here to ratify a bilateral relationship, rather than to request specific things. Yes?

Q Could you tell us if the -- Nepal's Zone of Peace proposal was discussed within the context of hydroelectric power proposals, or Nepal's concerns about declining land for agriculture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To the best of my knowledge, all of these subjects were discussed separately, not together. They were not related.

Q Is Nepal under the threat of Indian aggression?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indian policy toward Nepal has, as long as I can remember, been quite correct. India respects Nepal's independence and territorial integrity and sovereignty, just as we do, and as China does and other countries do.

Q May I ask another question? How strategically important is Nepal in that game of Soviets and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We consider that it's important that Nepal continue to develop under conditions of political stability, because if it should turn out otherwise it would be a source of instability, not only in Nepal but in the region. I don't want to make too much of that, but we do see -- we do attach importance to regional stability in South Asia and the region generally.

MORE

Q Yes. Yesterday, the briefer told us that this Zone of Peace idea was first put forth in 1975. Have we ever taken a position on it? And if not, what's taken so long?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have taken a position on it in the past, yes.

Q And what has it been?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The position basically was that we're all for peace. We applaud the objectives of the Zone of Peace. We recognize that it's basically up to the countries of the region to determine their position on it.

Q Why did we decide to go further today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All I can say is you'll have to wait until the public statement to see --

Q Well, we're not reiterating what we said, that we're all for peace, are we? I'm not trying to find out -- I mean, I just wondered --

MR. SIMS: The President's statement will speak for itself eloquently.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm afraid that picking your way at me isn't going to do any good. I've just --

MR. SIMS: Bob --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- got to stand, hold the line here.

MR. SIMS: -- he'll have the last question. And if any of the Nepalese journalists have questions, we'll take those. Otherwise, Bob's the last question.

Q Tell us what, in general terms, what was said in terms of land for agriculture or hydro-electric power?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think I can get into any specifics of what was actually discussed. I think that there was a considerable development of mutual understanding on all of these subjects. We kicked it around on both sides and we each got a better view of what the other was trying to say and where he was coming from.

MR. SIMS: Yes, sir?

Q Sir, what was the outcome of the talk?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The outcome of the talks was that everybody went away smiling. (Laughter.)

MR. SIMS: All right. Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 11:48 P.M. EST

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 28, 1983
No. 437

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
Brussels, Belgium
December 9, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've been privileged to attend an outstanding meeting of the NATO Alliance. Outstanding in the sense of unity and cohesion that permeated the conversation, outstanding in the sense of determination to carry forward with our program, outstanding in the readiness which we all feel to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and its allies. So taken all together, it's been an excellent meeting. I can't help but feel that much of the credit for that goes to the very extensive consultative processes that have taken place and take place just normally in the course of our business, so that by the time we come to a meeting like this we're all informed and governments have kept each other apprised of their views, and it's a continuing process rather than an intermittent one that might be suggested by periodic meetings. Let me take the occasion, finally, to express my admiration for our retiring Mr. Luns. He's done an outstanding job and will continue to do so through the balance of his term. He has our respect and admiration and I salute him, and, of course, also welcome Lord Carrington who is well known and very much admired in the United States, and we look forward to working with Lord Carrington. Questions?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Secretary General Luns told us that the NATO Ministers have urged the Soviet Union to return to the INF negotiations and the START negotiations in Geneva. In your view, sir, what do you think the chances are that the Soviets will, in fact, return to negotiations?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that, of course, is up to the Soviet Union. What we can control is what we do, and what we do is take reasonable positions and we're ready to discuss them. So the content is there. Let me call your attention to the fact that there is a great difference, I think, between the INF and the START situations. In the case of the INF talks the Soviets have stated that they have left them. In the case of START they have simply not been willing to set a date for the resumption of talks, and whether or not there will be a date for the next round of talks remains to be seen, but we look for them to return for the next round which would normally take place beginning in the middle of February.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there's been some talk that the Soviets are preparing a new initiative to be made public at the Stockholm conference. You're planning to attend along with other Foreign Ministers. Would you consider the CDE conference an appropriate forum for a new arms control initiative on the part of the Soviets?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we'll welcome any initiative that they choose to make, and the CDE conference will be an important opening on the subject that is set out for that conference, and so if they make a new initiative we'll certainly welcome that. I do plan to attend that conference.

QUESTION: In your talks with the British about lifting the arms embargo against Argentina, did you give any assurances to Sir Geoffrey Howe that certain classes of weapons, such as missiles or submarines, which could be used against the Falklands, would not be included in any future arms contracts?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, the action that was taken is not so much about arms sales as it is about human rights conditions. It is an aspect of our outlook in the United States and our statutory requirements that arms sales be prohibited to countries where the human rights situation is judged to be unacceptable, and that was the case in Argentina. Argentina has seen a dramatic change in its posture, and so this action on the part of the United States is a reflection of that change. Arms sales as such are a different matter and they are looked upon case by case, and the situation in the region is considered whenever we think about arms sales, and that will be the case with respect to Argentina, and certainly we will have told the British that we will consult with them.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you expect the Soviets now, after Geneva, to walk out also from the Vienna conference, MBFR, and about Stockholm, all the talks are now on this conference, but do you have any idea if Mr. Gromyko will be actually attending the Stockholm conference?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have no way to predict what the Soviet Union will do and can only describe what they have done and from the standpoint of the two arms control discussions that you mentioned, we will continue. Of course, at the MBFR talks, the current round is coming to an end. There will be another one and we'll be there, and we will be, of course, always examining our positions and wanting to see those talks go forward. Similarly, the CDE conference launches a new arms control initiative. It was agreed to by everybody, including the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, as an outcome of the Madrid process. So we will be there on the basis of the agreement to it in Madrid. I should think they would be there but, of course, that is up to them and I don't have any way of knowing.

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QUESTION: Do you and your colleagues think the basis now exists for a new decision with regard to sanctions against Poland, and are you moving toward some new posture with regard to Polish sanctions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The situation in Poland has been discussed and evaluated. Of course, the whole discussion is highlighted somewhat by Mr. Walesa's statement, and he's a person who we respect greatly. So, of course, we have to take his statements into account. What will emerge from the discussion remains to be seen. At the same time I think we do have to basically look for the Government of Poland to take steps that ease the situation there, including their dialogue with the church and their dialogue with representatives of the trade unions. So, we'll see if something like that can emerge from Mr. Walesa's initiative.

QUESTION: For the record, sir, was there discussion....?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's all on the record.

QUESTION: Was there discussion among the NATO Allies this week of any modifications in the deployment schedules for the INF missiles and will there be any modification in that deployment schedule?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I didn't hear any discussion about it and just assume that we have set out a schedule and will keep the schedule.

QUESTION: Given the declaration of Brussels and this new Tindemans initiative that the Secretary General spoke about, do you see the alliance now putting a new emphasis

- MORE -

or a new overall initiative on detente and a new relationship with the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the Alliance has always had, through its history, a kind of dual track approach -- a track of saying we must be strong and determined and capable of exercising a deterrent capability in support of peace. And it's worked. The other track that's also been present has been one of saying that if it's possible to have a constructive and reasonable relationship we're ready to have it, and I think that it's always good to examine the tactical aspects of implenenting that general approach. I'm sure the general approach -- it's our strategy and we intent to stay with that strategy. It's a good strategy and at the same time there may be some tactical ways of getting at it that will bear a systematic study. I think it's a fair statement that these matters are discussed whenever we have a meeting like this, and they're discussed a great deal in between meetings, and what is in mind as reflected in the Communique is kind of a systematic look at it that will be developed as a result of work done here;and the results of that work, to whatever extent they are fully developed, will be available to the Ministers when we meet in May.

QUESTION: Can you tell us, sir, what is in the Brussels Declaration and how that fits into the scheme that you're talking about?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, that was issued, I think, as a statement, so you can read it. They don't have it? Well, it's a statement that, I think I can fairly say, resulted from an initiative by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who felt that, in addition to the Communique, which tends to be lengthy -- although I think Mr. Luns takes considerable pride that the Communique is about half its normal length, nevertheless it tends to be lengthy -- that there should be a relatively short declaration about the Alliance's stance and determination and readiness to talk. But I don't want to try to summarize it. It will be passed out very shortly. It's a written public document.

QUESTION: I want to deal with the Lebanon crisis. Very recently -- for the first time, if I remember correctly -- Turkey agreed that U.S. forces in MNF use a base in southern Lebanon. What is the implication of this new Turkish approach?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't know that Turkey has any particular capability of disposing of a base in southern Lebanon. I don't follow -- Southern Turkey. Well, Turkey is an ally and we work with Turkey. I don't think it's especially related to Lebanon, so I wouldn't draw any special conclusions except that Turkey, I think, does support us, as does almost everybody. The idea that we want to see is a strong, unified sovereign Lebanon with a strong central government and with its foreign forces withdrawn.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, may I take you back to the Argentina question? Despite the fact that you have pledged to Sir Geoffrey Howe that you will fully consult, don't you think there's a danger that if arms sales are resumed, this might be damaging for the relationship between Britain and the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that we will be consulting very carefully on this subject as we do in the normal course of events, and I don't think that we can expect, out of this, damage to our relationship. Actually, the United States has not sold arms to Argentina for a long while and many other countries have. And the British relationship with those other countries seems to be still in existence. But, as far as any immediate plans for arms sales to Argentina, there aren't any, and we will have a good consultative arrangement about it, I think. I think that the action taken yesterday has, as I've tried to point out in response to an earlier question, been overly interpreted as an arms sales decision. That's what it is about, not any particular arms sale, or any desire to see arms anywhere. It's a reflection of the U.S. appraisal of what the human rights situation has been and how is in Argentina, and to confirm our estimate and our expectations, our Vice President, George Bush, is going to lead the U.S. delegation at the inauguration of the new Argentine President.

QUESTION: Yesterday, you spoke to the Dutch Minister about the situation in Surinamein the Caribbean area. Does the United States especially worry about that situation there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we, of course, pay attention to our neighborhood, and Surinameis a country in our neighborhood, and we have been concerned about certain developments in Suriname We think that it's very constructive that the Surinamese have decided that the close relationship with Cuba that seemed to be developing doesn't seem to be too healthy from their standpoint. That's their decision and we welcome that. And so we'll follow developments there closely and hope that Surinamecan flourish.

QUESTION: I understand that the Israelis today shelled near Tripoli this morning, and there are some reports also that they are putting up some kind of a blockade to keep the PLO ships from leaving Tripoli. What is the American position on that? Do you think that the PLO should be allowed to leave?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Insofar as the Israelis' action is concerned, that's their action and we didn't know anything about it in advance at all, and I assume it is part of the Israeli tradition of retaliation against things that happen to them, and, as I understand it, the Palestinians of all factions claim the credit for what happened in Israel. As far as the PLO internal battles are concerned, I don't have any comment on that. We watch that. It's a matter of great concern that Lebanese soil and a Lebanese city and Lebanese citizens are once again being trampled on in a fight on their soil, and it's a continuing tragedy, and the sooner the source of that fighting, which is foreign forces on their soil, can be eliminated, the better for the Lebanese. And so evacuation and anything that will help cure that problem we favor, but I'm not going to take a position beyond that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Italy apparently wants to cut by half the level of forces in Lebanon. Does that weaken the posture of the Multinational Force and its policy?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I had a conversation with Mr. Andreotti individually and also as part of our consultation of the Multinational Force group, and in both cases, he and I both reaffirmed our determination to continue on with our purposes in Lebanon. And the Italian approach seemed to be similar to the U.S. as far as the actual level of forces is concerned I don't know that it is appreciated that it varies quite a lot, depending on the circumstances in each one of the forces and essentially what happened; and in response to the request to each country by the Government of Lebanon was, you might say, an assigned sector or mission, and then the people who are in charge of the military forces involved -- that is each one separately -- have to make up their mind and they coordinate with the other military, of course -- what it takes to accomplish their mission. Actually the numbers of Italians are considerably more right now than was initially thought, so I take from our discussion that the Italian intention is to continue with the assigned mission and mandate, and to uphold it; and whether that means that some different numbers of forces at a moment of time are necessary is for them to decide. But the basic point is that they continue to cooperate with the other countries in carrying out our mission and to seeking our objectives in Lebanon.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it was announced last night that Pierre Trudeau would be coming to Washington in the next days.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes, I think the fifteenth of December.

QUESTION: Yes, to present his peace plan as such. What do you think will be the outcome of your discussions and will you encourage him to go onward to Moscow, and, finally, what do you think what progress is going to be made, do you feel, in his attempt to get Washington and Moscow talking again?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, he has a program of visitations which I assume he will carry on and that represents the decision that he's made to take this initiative. And we'll always -- as always -- be glad to talk with Prime Minister Trudeau. I'm sure the President will, and I have no doubt but that the discussion will cover his initiative but also many other things in U.S.-Canadian relationships, as both countries have been placing a lot of emphasis on addressing the problems we have between the two countries and taking actions to do something about those problems, and I think over the last two or three years, it's been a very successful effort. I've met with Foreign Secretary MacEachen innumerable times. I think the President has met with Prime Minister Trudeau six or seven times, so basically the meeting will be continued and we'll certainly be interested in his initiative. There's lots of communication between Washington and Moscow. The state of our relationship is not because it's impossible to communicate. It's the substance that is giving the problem.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given concern and speculation over the health of Russian leader Yuri Andropov, with whom are you communicating in the Kremlin?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, people speculate about health, but as far as we're concerned, obviously there is a Soviet Government It is in operation. It makes decisions. It has a normal diplomatic flow, and our capacity to talk with them is as it has been, and for what it's worth, what evidence I see is that Mr. Andropov is at work and, so far as we know, in charge.

QUESTION: You've talked about unity and cohesion in this NATO meeting, but when you turn to commercial and international issues that unity and cohesion seems to be lacking. Do you see any big problem within the two sets of issues for the future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's not correct to say that the unity and cohesion is lacking. There are problems and issues, and there are issues that people get very red in the face about in the field of trade and commerce. And I'm going to spend the afternoon, probably, talking about some of them. On the other hand, I think it is too easily forgotten that the volume of two-way trade between the United States and Europe runs at the annual rate of -- Can you fill in the blank? -- $90 billion. That's huge. So I think the message is: we must be doing something right. And so we have problems and the task for the governmental people who are dealing with them is to figure out hwo to deal with these problems which, you might say, are around the periphery of this $90 billion bundle, without damaging the bundle, because that is a representation of the strength and the mutual advantage that comes out of this trade and commercial relationship. It's very, very large and very, very important. So I just say that to agree on the one hand that there are problems, but to put them in the persepctive of the huge flows of commerce that does take place in the normal course of events. Thank you.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL NEWS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. SCHAFFER: I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss Afghanistan.

It is a country in which I have a great professional interest and which falls within my purview as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Near East and South Asia Bureau charged with South Asia.

As you know, we are approaching the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which occurred on December 27, 1979.

To mark the occasion and focus attention on the tragic war which prevails there, we anticipate another Presidential statement. Also, the Department of State with the United States Information Agency is cosponsoring with the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha a forum on Afghanistan.

This is a major conference which will take place at the Department next Monday and Tuesday, December 12 and 13. It is going to be a very good conference and we are very excited about it.

I have with me Dean Tom Gouttierre, Director of Omaha's Center for Afghanistan Studies, who is the forum chairman.

After I have made a few remarks on the situation in Afghanistan, Dean Gouttierre will tell you about the conference and then we will both be happy to answer any questions you might have.

You will find available today a new Department publication called "Afghanistan: Four Years of Occupation", which has been prepared by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, as has been done in previous years.

I believe you will find it a useful and informative document, providing more detail on the Afghan political and military situation.

I have with me here today the drafters of that document, along with people from the Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh Office, and they will help me with the details of the questions which I expect you will be winging my way.

Let me go on now to talk about the strategic setting.

After four long years of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan remains an important issue in world affairs, unresolved and festering. It continues to be an item of high priority in this Administration and one for which we would earnestly would like to find a solution.

What makes Afghanistan a major problem in world affairs is the presence on what had been a truly independent and non-aligned country of over 100,000Soviet troops thrust beyond Soviet borders by Moscow's willingness to use its ever-growing military might in ways that not only threaten American interests but peace, stability and freedom in the Central South Asian region and throughout the world.

For this reason, we believe it is absolutely essential that Soviet aggression in Afghanistan be checked and not succeed.

In spite of the presence of these Soviet soldiers and a large expenditure of materiel, the Soviet Union has not been able to accomplish what it set out to do -- strengthen the Marxist-Communist regime in Kabul; gain international acceptance of that regime; create an effective Afghan Army; and eliminate the resistance.

In other words, Moscow has failed to create a docile Communist state in Afghanistan. This has been due to the indomitable will of the Afghan people to resist the Soviet invader.

In the four years of Soviet occupation, an indigenous resistance movement has spread throughout the entire country. Virtually every province is now caught up in the Afghan struggle, supported by the vast majority of Afghan people to rid their country of the Soviets. But in spite of their ever-increasing effectiveness and ability to inflict heavy losses on the Soviets in the Kabul regime, the resistance has not been able to oust the Soviets militarily.

Therefore, in the absence of a negotiated political settlement, it appears that the struggle for Afghanistan will continue for the foreseeable future.

The Afghan refugee problem will also continue with the world's largest refugee population of close to 3 million people straining the limited resources of Pakistan. That country has done an admirable job of welcoming and caring for these people and the United States intends to continue its contribution to that effort.

The U.S. strategy remains the same. We want to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. We want to end the agony of the Afghan people and return the country to the ranks of independent nations.

Let me talk briefly now about the military situation.

There has been intense sporadic fighting all through Afghanistan in 1983. In the spring and early summer, there was prolonged, major activity in the Herat and Kandahar areas, two large urban centers. Throughout the summer, the Mujahidin have made major, sometimes spectacular strikes within the capital city of Kabul itself. Fighting has been particularly heavy this fall, particularly in the eastern provinces of Paktia and Paktika, and in the southern Shomali area just to the north of Kabul.

In general the Mujahidin have done very well. They have inflicted a number of serious defeats on the Afghan army during the past year and have inflicted substantial losses on the Soviets as well.

The resistance has been particularly effective against Soviet DRA/Kabul regime supplied convoys this year, and despite signficant casualties, the Mujahidin appears stronger, better armed and more effective with the weapons they have than ever before.

Soviet aircraft and helicopter losses in 1983 have significantly increased over losses in '82. There has been more cooperation among the various resistance groups, and their morale remains high.

One of the most interesting and signficant battles involving the Mujahidin Soviet and regime forces has just occurred, the battle of Guldara, or Flower Valley. This fighting has already received some media coverage, but let me go over what we know about it.

Soviet troops and armor converged on Guldara which is located between Istalef and Shakardara in the southern Shomali about November 26th. It appears that 2,500 Soviet troops were involved in the operation as well as a lesser number of Kabul regime soldiers. Several hundred tanks and APC's were employed along with truck-mounted BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, and a great many MIGs and helicopters flew sorties from Kabul and Bagram Air Base.

Beginning in late November, there began very heavy bombing of Guldara and surrounding towns, but civilian casualties were not too high as most of the population had already fled from earlier shelling.

In contrast to earlier operations in the Shomali when the Mujahidin had avoided direct, prolonged engagement, this time the majahidin, who were in the area in force and whose numbers included contingents which had come over from the Panjsher Valley, were willing to engage Soviet forces over a sustained period. A heavy battle ensued. Although the Mujahidin too significant casualties, they assert that Soviet losses were heavier and that around two dozen Soviet soldiers were captured.

The Mujahidin also spoke of at least three helicopters being shot down. They are reportedly jubilant about the outcome, some going as far as to say that the Soviets have paid part of a blood debt for other destruction in the Shomali. It appears the Soviets began to withdraw from Guldara on December 2, with a large and dusty column of armor and troops returning to Kabul on December 4. Bombing and shelling of villages in the southern Shomali continues.

Although we cannot comment on why the Soviets chose to engage at Gulbara at this time, with the winter setting in, it is obvious that they have been unable to eliminate Mujahidin activity in the Shomali area, which is close to Bagram Air Base and the road leading to the Soviet border.

The foregoing description highlights some aspects of evolving Soviet strategy in Afghanistan which are worth noting.

Soviet military efforts in 1983 have been concentrated on building up key logistical bases, on improving security for lines of communication, and interdicting Mujahidin infiltration from Pakistan and Iran. However, the road links remain insecure and efforts to choke off infiltration routes have not been successful.

As a consequence of the continued serious losses inflicted on the Soviets and the DRA forces by the resistance, the level of bombardment and violence against the civilian population by Soviet firepower appears to have reached new heights in 1983.

Reprisals against villages located near the sites of Mujahidin activity has long been standard practice by Soviet and Afghan regime military forces. Soviet frustration has, however, grown as they have proved unable to interdict resistance activity despite intense efforts, including bribes and truce offers, and direct military action.

During recent months, we have seen the evolution of an apparently deliberate policy of increased terror and brutality against civilians and their homes. Acts of extreme cruelty and destruction are obviously intended both as a vent for the fear and anger of Soviet troops and as an attempt to drive a wedge between the Afghan people and the resistance forces. Throughout the year, we have had many confirmed reports of brutal reprisal actions.

One example is the late October Soviet operation against the historic village of Istalef in the Shomali region north of Kabul, as I mentioned. This was retaliation for resistance activity in the area.

Citizens of Istalef, a town known for the brilliant blues of its fine pottery, were murdered in a several-day orgy of death as resistance forces sought to protect the village from overwhelming force. It is reliably reported that Soviet soldiers bayonetted and slit the throats of children found in the houses of suspected Mujahidin. We have no exact casualty figures, but losses were high on both sides, with perhaps as many af four to five hundred deaths. About forty percent of the village of Istalef has been leveled.

Despite this increased savagery against civilians on the part of Soviet troops -- and we are confident there are many incidents which are not reported -- there is no indication that the people of Afghanistan have reduced their support for the resistance movement. Instead, they continue to provide the Mujahidin with food, information, shelter and recruits.

Let me say something now about United States policy.

As I implied at the outset, the United States does not accept Soviet control of Afghanistan. Our policy goal remains to get the Soviet troops out because we believe it suits the strategic interests of ourselves and our friends to have Soviet troops removed back within the Soviet Union's borders. Both our bilateral and multilateral diplomatic activity are designed to move the Soviets toward a negotiated settlement.

We have repeatedly told the Soviets in our bilateral contacts that their occupation of Afghanistan remains a serious impediment to the improvement of relations with us, and with many other countries as well.

In the multilateral arena, we supported Pakistani efforts at the United Nations General Assembly last month to obtain the overwhelming passage of yet another (the 5th) resolution on Afghanistan. The vote was 116 to 20, with 17 abstentions. This is equal to the highest vote ever, which was recorded in 1982. The resolution calls for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, self-determination for the Afghan people, and the return of the refugees with safety and honor.

As regards self-determination, we have not said how this must come about, but simply that the Afghan people must be allowed to determine the type of government they wish to have in Kabul.

We are glad that consultations in the UN process of indirect talks on Afghanistan will continue. After providing some hope that a political settlement might be possible following last April's session in Geneva, the indirect talks ran up against hard reality in the later June session in Geneva, when the Soviets were unwilling to give a definite timeframe for the withdrawal of their troops.

At the end of the summer, the talks appeared stalled, but the UN announced last week that more active discussions will be resumed early next year.

We support United Nations efforts to develop a negotiated solution and hope they will prove successful.

However, Soviet willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan remains problematical. Current Soviet policy towards Afghanistan makes it appear that the Soviets intend to say for a long time.

(MORE)

They're maintaining current troop levels, they're improving the military infrastructure, they're continuing the Sovietization of Afghan society, and they're attempting to wear down civilian support for the resistance.

Nonetheless, the mujahidin persevere. The struggle continues, and the United States maintains its admiration and moral support of the Afghan resistance. Their stand for freedom and independence is an inspiration to all of us.

Now, let me turn to Dean Gouttierre who will tell you something about the Conference.

MR. GOUTTIERRE: I thought maybe before I mention the Conference, I might mention just a few brief words about our Center for Afghanistan Studies. I think most people are as surprised about the fact that there's a Center for Afghanistan Studies, the only one in the United States in the State of Nebraska in Omaha, as they are by the fact that the Afghan resistance is now moving into its fifth year against superior Soviet forces.

I have working with me at the Center for Afghanistan Studies five research associates; one American and four Afghans, scholars all who have various areas of expertise, and we have over the past ten years, since the founding of our Center, been doing research and constructing projects related to the teaching of history and culture about Afghanistan, the languages of Afghanistan and, of course, recently, research concerning the resistance in Afghanistan.

The individuals who are a part of our Center are supported by funds from the State of Nebraska and other funds that I'm able to obtain through activities that we have in Afghanistan. I'm saying that we're not supported by the Government in these activities although we enjoy, I think a very close working relationship in terms of consultation and keeping in touch with people throughout the United States Government.

I think that -- and it's also important to add that within our list of research associates are some twenty other individuals throughout the world who are members of the Center for Afghanistan Studies as research associates, and we count on them for their information and the research that they can do to help us to keep up with what is going on in Afghanistan.

Considering the Conference that will be held here on Monday and Tuesday, this is an idea that was borne several months back. In fact, nearly ten months ago. The purpose of this conference is to continue to bring attention to the kinds of things that Mr. Schaffer was referring to in his presentation; and that is, of course, the continuing brutality and cruelty of the Soviet occupation armies against, particularly, the civilian population of Afghanistan.

In addition, of course, we hope to be able to explore various alternatives and options that are a part of trying to seek resolution of this crises in a country that little could afford to have any type of sustained war, being one of the poorest of all the third world countries. We feel we have a very distinguished list of panelists who will be present at this Conference and who will be able to address topics that will cover items related to the military situation in Afghanistan today, the repatriation, hopefully, and the status of the refugees from Afghanistan; the impact on the land of Afghanistan, the development relating to the peace initiatives concerning this particular crises, the impact on the Soviet Union, regional considerations, and other strategic considerations.

We hope that as a result of this particular conference, people around the United States will again be made aware of the war in Afghanistan, something we have called at the Center for Afthanistan Studies "The forgotten war." The war that seems to slip off the pages of the newspapers and off of the television and radio programs throughout the country as we focus on other international issues.

Considering the proportions of human suffering in Afghanistan, proportions which we liken to something of a holocaust kind of nature -- the more than hundred thousand Afghan civilian deaths, more than four million total Afghan refugees. We feel that this is a war that should not be forgotten, and that sometimes in the compassion-fatigue I think that we suffer in the United States and in the Western world due to the information that we often receive about other crises around the world, we tend to forget the very severe suffering that the people of Afghanistan are facing as they continue to wage their resistance against this occupation of their country.

That's all.

MR. SCHAFFER: Now, we will be happy to take your questions.

Q Besides you're saying that we want to get the Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, what are any of the substantial significant political, economic and diplomatic efforts you have been doing recently which could put forth the efforts that you are doing in the last three, four years to bring about the evacuation of the troops from

Afghanistan?

MR. SCHAFFER: We have been moving on several fronts. As you know, as I mentioned, we have been giving strong support to the efforts being made by the U.N. Secretary General's special representative, Diega Cordovas, in trying to bring about a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem through indirect talks between the Pakistanis and the Karmal regime in Kabul.

We have also given strong support to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution which, as I mentioned, was passed with an overwhelming vote.

I think you can also look at the efforts we have made through our economic and military assitance programs to bolster Pakistan as it faces the challenge of the Soviets on its border. And as it leads the fight in the diplomatic effort in the U.N. General Assembly, in the Islamic forum and elsewhere to keep the Afghanistan issue before the world and to call through these diplomatic and public efforts on the Soviets to get out.

So these are some of the efforts which are being made. And I must say, and one of the purposes in my talking to you today and our holding this Afghanistan Conference next week, is to do all that we can to keep the

Afghanistan issue in the international eye, and in the eye of our own public here.

We don't want this to become a forgotten war. That's what the Soviets would like. They would like the world to forget about Afghanistan so they can carry out their programs and turn it into a docile communist country, something they clearly have not be able to do up until now.

I must say also that we have had direct contacts with the Soviet Union. We have made it very clear to the Soviets that Afghanistan is an important issue in deterring an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. We have made it clear to them, most recently when the Secretary wrote to Foreign Minist Gromyko in May that we seek a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, and that we support the U.N. diplomatic process which Mr. Cordovas, with considerable effort, has been pursuing.

Regretably, the Soviet response has been uniformally unhelpful, unfavorable.

Q What do you anticipate in 1984 -- a continuation of the present policies or will there be some new initiatives by the United States, by the Pakistanis or by the Afghan resistance? Is time on the side of the resistance or is it not with the Soviets in the effort?

A It's hard to say where time comes out on this one. Quite clearly, the Soviets have long felt that time was on their side; that the world, as I said, would forget all about Afghanistan and that, over time, they could Soviet-ties Afghan society while the world forgot.

I think the trend of the last year has been at least slowly in the direction of the mujahidin. But let's not kid ourselves; the mujahidin are not going to be able to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan. That's quite clear.

As far as other diplomatic efforts are concerned, the United Nations has announced that Cordovas will resume his shuttle diplomacy, probably in April.

The key issue there, though, is whether the Soviets are prepared to show greater flexibility and a real interest in finding a negotiated solution than they have been up until now. The key point on that particular issue is this one already referred to about their willingness to agree within this framework of a negotiated settlement, to a particular timeframe for the withdrawal of their troops; actual dates. That they will start on "X" day and they will be out by "X" plus "Y". They've not been willing to do that.

I can't be optimistic that they're going to. I think that the U.N. effort, though, is the best thing that is going now. And, as I've said, we strongly support it because it is consistent with the UNGA resolutions that we and the vast majority of other countries, non-aligned, Western,have supported over the years.

Q Has there been an increase in cross-border pursuit of mujahidin; the bombing of their camps, and how serious do you view this.

A There is no clearly discernable trend on that. These cross-border incidents will occur from time to time.

One of the determining factors is the degree of fighting close to the border. For example, when there was an outbreak of serious fighting in Paktia and Paktika Provinces in Eastern Afghanistan some months ago, there was at that time an increase in air violations by the other side, including bombing of villages. But I don't see any clearly discernable trend over time. It comes and goes.

Q You mentioned that one of the purposes behind this forum was to bring it back in the international eye. Do you expect anything else to come out of this forum besides just reducing apathy?

MR. SCHAFFER: I would hope that a lot of ideas would be generated by this forum. Tom can speak more to the point than I, but when you consider that we're going to get together here in Washington a lot of people from various parts of the world as well as from this country who have done a lot of thinking about Afghanistan, I would expect -- I hope you would, too, Tom -- that ideas will be generated which could be useful.

Q What's the latest on the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan?

MR. SCHAFFER: Let me give you a statement on that because I want to be sure that you have it right.

In November of '82, Secretary Shultz sent an updated report to Congress on chemical warfar in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. That report on Soviet use of chemical and toxin weapons worldwide contained new evidence of their use by the Soviets in Afghanistan.

This evidence included a contaminated Soviet gas mask which came out of Afghanistan and which showed the presence of deadly trichothecene/mycotoxins, that yellow rain.

In other words, the suspicions that we had before that time had been confirmed. We had physical proof that toxin weapons, in addition to chemical weapons, had been used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

In the most recent State Department report on CBW, submitted to the Secretary General of the U.N. on August 4, lhe evidence dealt with blood samples from Laos and Kampuchea.

We continue to receive reports of the use of agents in Afghanistan, and the examination of samples continues. Detailed analysis of all information gathered in Afghanistan in 1983 is not yet complete.

Q How much aid is the United States giving the rebels, and are you considering increasing it?

MR. SCHAFFER: The rebels themselves, the mujahidin themselves, say that much of the arms that they acquire come from within the country. They're acquired in part from desertions, many desertions, from the Kabul-regime army. As before, I've got to follow the policy of not commenting on arms which might come in to Afghanistan from wherever.

Q Any rough estimate of the Soviets expending dollars, roubles, on an annual basis by maintaining their forces, fighting this guerrilla war, in Afghanistan?

MR. SCHAFFER: The figure I have is that it has cost them in four years of war something on the order of $12 billion. And I think the trend is upward. Let me ask the experts about that. (A staff aid nodded) Yes. The trend is upward, but that's the figure we've been using.

Q What is the significance for the Soviet Union of holding onto Afghanistan? Is it to reach the warm waters of the Arabian Gulf, or what? Is it a way of seeping through that area, or what do you see their strategy of being there?

MR. SCHAFFER: I think there are various points of view on that, and a great deal has been written as to whether they see Afghanistan as a stepping stone to broader conquests in the area, or whether their invasion and their remaining in the country is basically motivated by considerations having to do with Afghanistan itself.

I think the important point, though, is that they are in Afghaistan; that as long as they remain there, it causes a major challenge to the stability of the whole area; that it has potential for Soviet use beyond the borders of Afghanistan. It puts pressure on Pakistan, it puts pressure on other parts of that area.

I'll stop there. Whole books have been written about this subject, but I think that's basically the way we see it.

MR. GOUTTIERRE: Excuse me. I might add on that. One of the things that we've been studying for some time at the Center for Afghanistan Studies related to this particular question is the Soviet interest in controlling the headwaters of the Oxus River which has a watershed equivalent to that of the Nile, and we feel that they consider this perhaps the most valuable resource that Afghanistan offers to them apart from the strategic considerations.

People have commented often about the transportation of Afghan hydrocarbons -- the hydrocarbons in Afghanistan gas and potential oil -- but I think that the water and their development schemes for their own central Asian republics are very much tied to what they think in terms of long term. One could, as Mr. Schaffer mentioned, bring into all kinds of -- bring all kinds of issues up, whether it relates to the Muslim population of central Asia, things relating to the Soviet extension of the Brezhnev Doctrine, opportunity as they saw it perhaps in 1979 when the world body politic was focused on Iran and other things of that nature.

But I think that there are many things, and I think that the Soviets tend to -- from our analysis anyhow and the way we see them going about things in Afghanistan, at least trying to -- that there are many, many issues, you know, that link themselves together in this particular question, and that's why perhaps they see it with the degree of importance, and while, as Mr. Schaffer mentioned, there appears to be no indication yet that they seem to be wanting to leave.

MR. SCHAFFER: Thank you. And that's another reason why I would hope a lot of you would get to that conference. I think questions like this are going to be thrashed out, and there are, as you can see, a lot of different points of view. Again, I'd encourage you to show up.

Q To what extent are the other Moslem states, and particularly Iran, helping the mujahidin, and the refugees that are coming out?

MR. SCHAFFER: Pakistan, of course, is the major contributor to assistance to the refugees and has done amazing work, I think, in running the camps in providing the variety of assistance, especially given the fact that it is, itself, such a poor country.

The organization of the Islamic conference which has just been meeting in Dacca in Bangladesh, has once again passed a resolution calling for the departure of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

The Muslim world has been very much interested in this matter. I think they regard Afghanistan as a Muslim country which has been attacked by an outsider, and they have been, led by Pakistan, in the forefront of those calling for the world not to forget it and to continue to demand the Soviet exit.

Q Without getting involved in the specifics of where the resistance fighters' weapons are coming from, are we at all concerned about their lack of adequate air defense, portable air defense weapons?

MR. SCHAFFER: I think they're doing very well with the heavy machine guns that they've got. Obviously, all resistance leaders are looking for the perfect weapon to use. I think that's about all I can say on that subject.

Q Because your own report last year indicated that the government had pretty well closed off the source of supply from the Afghan side, Afghan Government side, by impounding those weapons.

MR. SCHAFFER: I can again call your attention to the fact that in '83 the Soviet losses, both of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, has been significantly higher than in '82.

Q Mr. Schaffer, I can't help but ask you this question: There were reports in the media in the last few months that the freedom fighters, the mujahidin, the resistance movement itself is almost in disarray because they cannot get their act together in trying to make a solidarity fight and strong unit or force to be worthwhile in their attempts to penetrate through the Russian encampment there. What do you comment on that?

MR. SCHAFFER: Lack of unity has always been a problem for the Afghanistan resistance. It's been a problem both in Afghanistan in waging the war and outside the country in presenting Afghanistan's position to the international community.

Recently there have been indications of a greater degree of cooperation among different mujahidin groups within Afghanistan, though turf battles continue, some of them we suspect prompted by the regime.

Nonetheless, I think the trend is in the right direction. Outside of the most recent efforts to bring about greater cohesion and hopefully unity have centered on the person of the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, who reigned in Kabul until 1973.

We have certainly on our part done what we could to encourage efforts to build greater unity, greater cohesion, among the different forces. We hope these will continue. Clearly, it's not up to the United States or, for that matter, any other outside power to decide who should take the lead, but we have tried in a quiet way to encourage the Afghans in that direction.

MR. GOUTTIERRE: I'd like to echo the statements that Mr. Schaffer made, but I think it's also important to take into its proper context the Afghan society itself, and also to understand where the resistance is coming from and who indeed are the resistance members, the freedom fighters, and to -- while recognizing the difficulties the lack of unit poses from the standpoint of the questions that were suggested by Mr. Schaffer here, that there is also some military advantages at times when you're able to defend your own turf in a very emotional fashion, because Afghanistan is a country made up of many ethnic and other cultural religious groups and oftentimes, of course, people defend more steadfastly their own territory, their own land. And I'm not in any way contradicting, I think, the need for improved unity, but I think it needs to be understood, particularly in the way you mentioned the question that there seems to be disarray, etc. -- I, like Mr. Schaffer, believe that there is a trend towards a diminishing of this disarray, that there is a trend towards some unity, both with inside the country where the fighting is taking place and outside where where spokespersons exist, and that militarily there are some advantanges as well as disadvantages to the current organizational structure of the resistance.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:45 p.m.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

December 19, 1983
No. 426

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE U.S. EMBASSY
RABAT, MOROCCO
December 11, 1983

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I'd like first to express my appreciation to King Hassan for the graciousness of the hospitality here and for the opportunity to talk at length with him covering a very wide range of subjects, and having an opportunity to hear his analysis of important things going on around the world. So, it's been a very worthwhile visit from my standpoint, from the point of view of the content, and also it's been extremely pleasant and naturally we appreciate that as well.

QUESTION: What about the discussions you had this afternoon with King Hassan II?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The discussions went on for around two and a half hours. We discussed matters of mutual interest having to do with the Middle East -- Lebanon, the peace process, the problems of the Palestinians. We discussed bilateral questions involving Morocco and the United States. We discussed His Majesty's initiative in calling for a referendum, and of course the United States supports that. We discussed events in Europe, King Hassan was interested in the meetings I had just been in, NATO meetings. In other words, they were very wide ranging discussions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what's the American perception concerning the development of events in West Africa, if the African parties responsible for the preparation of the referendum refuse the suggestion which was proposed by His Majesty the King as the final solution to the problem of the Sahara?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think first of all we have to wait; there is an initiative that His Majesty has proposed, and I think that if people have an opportunity to express themselves, that's really the proper way to do it. I hope that people from around the world will support this initiative, and I hope that it does come to pass.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did the King or any of the other Moroccan officials have anything to say about the new strengthened relationship between the United States and Israel?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I described the intent of our recent visit from Prime Minister Shamir and also from President Gemayel, and I think His Majesty was well posted among the subjects that we discussed.

QUESTION: Did he show any enthusiasm?

Secretary Shultz: His Majesty is a very sophisticated man and I think I won't speak for him, he'll speak for himself, but from my standpoint we had a searching and satisfactory discussion.

QUESTION: Is it possible that the United States of America will help assure the departure of the leader of the PLO, Mr. Arafat, and his soldiers from Tripoli, knowing that the United States of America helped the PLO departure from Beirut in the past? There is another question.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Wait a minute now. I can hardly remember the first one. Will you say that again?

QUESTION: Will the United States of America help the PLO departure from Beirut as in the past?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Yes we did. We arranged the departure of the PLO from Beirut, and Mr. Arafat's departure from Beirut over a year ago. We felt that there was an understanding that he wouldn't return to Lebanon, but of course he has been there. And we see again the tragedy of the Lebanese as one of their cities and their people are being trampled upon in somebody else's fight. So it's a continuing tragedy. That being the case, the United States has supported the resolution under which an evacuation can take place under the U.N. flag and we expect that evacuation to go forward.

QUESTION: What is your position concerning the Israelis threatening the PLO and not letting them leave the country?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as I know, what has happened recently is that a bus was blown up in Jerusalem and the PLO and Mr. Arafat took credit for that act of terrorism, and there was an act of retaliation by the Israelis. That's my understanding of what took place, and that's the substance of that exchange -- something that happens all too often in the Middle East.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you judge the reaction of your Arab friends concerning the strategic cooperation treaty between the United States and Israel? This treaty which confirmed once more that the United States continues to see in Israel the only strong and stable ally in the region.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I wish some of those who are discussing it would come forward and show me a copy of this treaty. I have not seen it. I will say again -- the United States has had, does have now, and will continue to have a strong and supportive relationship with Israel. There wasn't any treaty signed during Prime Minister Shamir's recent visit to the United States. We discussed a great many things between the U.S. and the Israelis. We discussed military matters, economic matters, general observations about what is going on in the Middle East, and we discussed the buildup of Soviet arms in Syria and many other things. But we didn't sign a treaty, however. I certainly want to say, that we continue to have and expect to have a close relationship with Israel.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the following question on the meeting in Brussels. Have you had any response at all from Moscow to the Allies' proposal for a comprehensive new dialogue with the Soviets? Also, what would be the next step in pursuing this dialogue with the Soviets?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I have not heard of any response. I suppose one next step would be the attendance by Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe that will be convened on January 17 in Stockholm. As you know, in the Brussels meeting the NATO Foreign Ministers agreed that they would attend that meeting, and of course I am included in that group.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, it was announced today that Marshal Orgarkov of the Soviet Union has just spent four days in Algeria. Did you know about this trip, and do you have any feeling about Soviet relations with this part of the world as resulting from Orgarkov's visit?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Soviet Union of course is as active around the world as we are. We believe that their influence in many cases is not helpful. However, as we agreed in the NATO statement, we are prepared to engage with the Soviet Union in a constructive dialogue, if they are ready to do so; but this has to be based on a realistic assessment of what is taking place as we see it and on the basis, of course, of the strength and determination which we and our allies have and have expressed.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did you and the King discuss any ways of putting momentum behind President Reagan's peace plan for the Middle East, and if so, what was said?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We did discuss that at great length and His Majesty had a number of suggestions. Without feeling it proper to try to quote His Majesty, I believe, myself, that the problem of the Palestinians is at the center of the issue, and of course what we look for, and have wanted to see for a long time, is a legitimate group of Palestinians join with King Hussein and be ready to sit down at the peace table with Israel, and try to work out what sort of arrangements will bring about stability in that part of the world. We did discuss that and other issues of the Middle East in great detail.

QUESTION: Is the Orgarkov visit the reason you did not stop in Algeria this time?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No.

QUESTION: Were you aware of it prior to today?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I was aware of it, but it had no bearing on my own schedule.

QUESTION: Can you tell us about the new American initiative in the area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are President Reagan's proposals of a year ago last September, which the President has reaffirmed and stated his intention to keep working to achieve those objectives. We have also had recent discussions not only with the Israelis but with the Lebanese, President Gemayel,and his Government, and as a result of those discussions we think we have some new ideas. Ambassador Rumsfeld, who is the President's special negotiator in the Middle East, has returned to the region and has been in various capitals already. It was announced in Washington that he will be going to Damascus. Perhaps that's what you are referring to.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you heard during your stop in Tunis considerable criticism of the recent U.S.-Israeli policy and I am wondering if you have heard similar criticism here during your stop in Morocco?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have certainly discussed the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and particularly the relation of some of our thinking, with the Israelis, when they visited us, to the Soviet buildup in Syria, but I found the discussion here was constructive and informative in tone, and I tried to respond and describe what we were doing and thinking. So far as I can see, it was received in that same spirit. But of course, I don't wish at all to speak for the Moroccans or King Hassan; they'll speak for themselves.

QUESTION: How does the U.S. view Palestinian-Jordanian negotiations as well as their consequences, in case the negotiations succeed. What would be the effect on Mr. Reagan's plan?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We think that negotiations between Palestinians and the Jordanian King Hussein are a very positive thing to have happened, and we certainly would welcome very warmly a decision on the part of King Hussein and the Palestinians to be ready to enter the peace process with Israel.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 14, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE SHULTZ

Old Executive Office Building
Room 450

12:31 P.M. EST

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought I might just say a word about impressions from around a week in Europe and North Africa, and then we could have a discussion.

The principal reason for the trip, of course, was the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting. Coming as it has after the deployments have started in the basing countries, it was an especially interesting meeting and I think notable meeting.

Because the Alliance in the face of very strong-armed and almost bullying tactics on the part of the Soviet Union has quietly kept its cool, gone ahead, shown its cohesion and determination and having done so, and being determined to keep doing so, nevertheless does it in I think a mature way rather than kind of exultant, saying, "Well, what else did you expect," kind of attitude. I thought it was wonderful.

And there was at the same time a total agreement that the right way for us to proceed as a group of free countries is to look to our strength and determination, but at the same time be sure that our positions are reasonable as they are, and to do everything we can to be sure the Soviet Union realizes that we are ready to have a constructive dialogue with them, a dialogue that can be to our mutual advantage, not a dialogue that is simply to the Soviet advantage and not to ours. And therefore the Alliance continued to reject the Soviet proposition that an equitable answer for instance on intermediate range missiles would be for them to have some large number and for us to have none. That didn't strike anybody any better then than it has over the past months of negotiation.

But it was an excellent meeting, and it projected both the sense of strength and the sense of reasonableness and readiness to negotiate.

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We had a meeting with the members of the European Commission to talk about economic relations between the United States and Europe. And, of course, there are a number of prickly issues, the most difficult, undoubtedly, having to do with agriculture. Nevertheless, I think it was also apparent to everyone that here we have a $90 billion two-way flow of trade between the United States and Europe and that represents something that's of tremendous advantage to both. Otherwise, it wouldn't take place.

And so as we work on these issues, and fight about them, and argue about them, we have to do so in a manner that recognizes the importance of this great, big $90 billion bundle of things that are good. And so, we had, I think, by and large, a constructive meeting. I think the Europeans that I talked to, on the whole, were more downcast about their meeting in Athens where almost in an unprecedented way of meeting of heads of state wound up without an agenda, without a communique, or any agreement on anything.

I said, I thought, to some extent, it was refreshing that they agreed to disagree. They aired their differences, and they hadn't been able to resolve them, so they didn't try to make the world think that they had. That's, perhaps, a mark of a certain maturity, as long as it doesn't continue on too long. And at the same time, having been in lots of international meetings where all you do is argue about a communique, the lack of one was a fresh breeze.

At any rate, I think that, as far as the United States is concerned, of course, their internal problems are their problems. And all we said was, you're going to have to solve them, but don't solve them at our expense. That's all we ask. But it was a constructive meeting.

In Portugal, I signed a base agreement yesterday that gives us continuing access to that most significant base

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in the Azores, and had a very fine discussion with Portuguese officials. And here we see something that, I think, is of great significance on a world scale. Namely: here is Portugal that has emerged from dictatorship into democracy -- strong democracy -- next door to Spain, which has done the same.

Prime Minister Soares returned, and came directly to his meeting with me. He returned from Argentina where, again, he was very stimulated by the movement from military rule to democracy. And I think there is a very real sense that we may miss, as we are preoccupied with all of the problems that we see around us and the things that we're struggling with -- may miss the tremendous significance of the movement toward more democracy, more freedom, more openness, and an increasing feeling that that is the wave of the future.

In Tunisia, I ran into alot of static about our relationship with Israel. And I listened, and made the point to them that, in our conversations here with Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Arens and others, we -- of course -- talked to the Israelis about our relationships with the Arab countries and their importance, about the importance of the peace process and conditions on the West Bank. And we all recognize the Camp David Accords -- in their language -- recognize the importance of finding a reasonable solution to the Palestinian problems.

At the same time, I felt it was important to emphasize there in an Arab capital that the same thing that we say here or in Israel -- namely, that we have had and do have and will have a strong and secure and very important relationship with Israel. And that's a fact of life. And they have to recognize that.

I can't say that they were pleased with my message. But, at any rate, it was delivered. And I had, I think -- on the whole, a very interesting, different kind of conversation in tone with King Hassan of Moracco, where you have a ruler who's view is a sophisticated, world view -- and a very interesting man to converse with.

Well, that's, kind of, a travelogue. I didn't mean to take quite so long,

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but at any rate it is as all these trips are interesting, and I think this one was quite worthwhile from the standpoint of getting our country's interests represented and taking a measure of our allies and getting some very strong sense of assurance of their determination and underlying strengths despite the problems.

Well, questions? I am told that you might give me a few lectures. So I would be glad to hear from you as well as try to cope with your questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am Paul Flynn of the Ft. Myers, Florida News Press. Two questions regarding Cuba's involvement in the Grenada situation.

First, did the Cuban government or the armed forces at any time take any threatening action toward us during that period? And second, did the State Department formally inform either the Cubans or the Soviets of our actions before or in the early stages of the invasion?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Let me take the last part first. After our rescue mission started and our people were on the ground, we made a notification to both the Soviets and the Cubans that this was underway, that its purpose was a rescue operation for our people on the island and in response to the urgent pleas of the democracies there. So we described the situation to them. And we felt it was important to do that so they would hear directly from us, but of course not to do it before the operation because we obviously were holding that as close as we could, and actually did succeed in holding it pretty close. So on the question of notification, that was the situation.

On the question of actions by them, of course we were keeping a very close lookout as to anything that Cuba did as such and any action that they might take to try to intervene in that operation. We had lots of ships there. The President's view was that if you are going to do this, do it in a way that is strong enough so there is absolutely no question in anybody's mind that you are going to prevail and prevail quickly. So I think the forcefulness of the situation was such that undoubtedly the Cubans saw that there wasn't any point in them trying to take it on.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you -- I am Ann Devroy.

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Do you have any plans, at this point, to make any affirmative moves to resume arms control talks with the Soviets, to start this constructive dialogue? Are we still waiting for them to do something first now?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our position is that we have proposals on the table in all of the arms control talks. We believe our positions are reasonable. Our negotiators are there and our posture is one of give and take, ready to negotiate. And so, that is a reasonable posture and we feel that that's where we should be. And the fact that they have left the INF talks shouldn't cause us to change that posture. We shouldn't become unreasonable, nor should we say, "Well, now that you've left the talks, we'll give in to what you want.", because what they have wanted is not reasonable.

So we remain in this posture. As far as the START talks are concerned and the MBFR talks, the statements they have made are different from those in INF. In the START talks, for example, what they did -- in MBFR, too -- was decline to set a date when the talks would be resumed, and it may be that they will say, there isn't any such date. But there's a very careful distinction between saying, "These talks are ended ", and saying, "Well, we can't decide now whether a resumption date of whatever it might be is a good date for us."

Typically, in these talks, of course, when a round, so-called, ends, at the end of the round, the negotiators agree on when the next round will start and the date is set. So that's different. But in the START talks, for example, we have had a lot of very interesting proposals put on the table by the President's decisions a couple of months ago, and really, they haven't had any kind of a response to them.

I think it's fair to say that their attention has been concentrated on the intermediate range issues and the deployments in Europe. So we really haven't seen the kind of response you'd normally expect in a negotiation in START. Once again, I think our position is reasonable. We're ready to negotiate with them, and that is our position.

There is a meeting on January 17th in Stockholm. so-called CDE talks.

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And these are talks essentially on confidence-building measures and notifications of troop movements and things of that kind in Europe taking Europe in its whole. The agreement to hold this conference was joined in by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries at the conclusion of the Madrid negotiations last September. In the case of our allies, we all decided that this was important enough so that we should in a sense send the political message to those negotiations of their importance and do so by agreeing as foreign ministers that we would all go to the opening session. So the opening session of these talks will be attended by all of the foreign ministers of the NATO allies, including me. And of course we don't know whether the Soviet Union will be represented by Mr. Gromyko or not. But at any rate, I have said that if he is there, I am prepared to meet with him.

But what we can do is be reasonable, be there, be ready to talk, but talk sense. But what they do, of course, is for them to decide. We hope that they will be sensible in this time of tension and be ready to talk in reasonable terms now that they see that the tactic of trying to scare the daylights out of Europe just hasn't worked.

Q I am John Curley with the newspaper group in Rosslyn. What is the outlook in Iran after Ayatollah Khomeini?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Gosh, I think it is very difficult to say. My impression is that the, sort of the religious movement that he represents is very much in stride there. So there is no particular expectation that it might shift drastically.

On the other hand, new people could make a substantial change, and I think we just have to wait and see about that.

There used to be a statement -- do you remember Kenyatta in Kenya, and at first they were always wondering what would happen when he died? And then they started changing the question as he grew older and had more children and so on, they said, "Well, what will happen if he dies?" (Laughter.) And maybe we have the same issue here.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am Gary Watson from Rockford, Illinois. Can you give us some insight to the status of the Soviet leadership, particularly Mr. Andropov,

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both short term, his health, and where this is going?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Clearly, he has suffered a health setback because he didn't attend important meetings and they have said that he has had some problems. They've also said that he is back at work and that he is making decisions. Of course, statements have been issued under his name throughout this period and so, I presume that that's probably the case.

It does seem logical to speculate, anyway, that whatever his current capacity is, I assume he is hard at it, that the fact that he has been that sick at his age must cause people to be thinking about what comes next as distinct from an atmosphere where you've said, "Here is a person. He's just taken over and where are we going to go in this new administration?" But I'm just speculating in saying that and we have to wait and see. In the meantime, I think it's very important for the United States to base our policies on what we believe is good for us and to transmit that to the Soviet Union, rather than somehow to speculate about what they may be doing and adjust our policies to that. That's a road to disaster because there's an awful lot we don't know about the insides of the Kremlin and just what Mr. Andropov's health is and what the state of play is between the military people and the communist party people within the Kremlin.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm Charles Overby from Jackson, Mississippi. The President's pledge to get tough has been well received in my hometown, but I wonder how it how it's been received by our allies. Do you think our allies are as tough-minded as we are, or are they a weak link in our defense chain?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there's always a little bit of let's you and him fight in lots of people, and at the same time, I think that, naturally, as firmness, I would rather say, and determination to stand up for our interest is exhibited, it always causes a certain element of nervousness. But I think with respect to Grenada, to which our allies reacted very negatively, that that had settled down. In fact, I told them that, on Grenada, there was a lot of fence-mending to do by them with us because, really, it seemed to me -- what would they be saying about a country that, you know, a thousand of our own citizens on an island that have no government, was in a state of chaos, a lot of people being killed, and a urgent, urgent plea from the surrounding, basically defenseless democracies, and the remaining remnant of governmental authority on Grenada, itself, if we had said, "Sorry.", and walked away. What would they think of us? They wouldn't think much.

And I believe, myself, that the President made absolutely the right decision, carried it through brilliantly, and Grenada is a plus for us.

And I have sat in on innumerable heads of state meetings with the President and a visiting head of state since the time, and it's been very interesting to me to hear, in the privacy of the Oval Office, how many of those heads of state from all over the world have said, "Mr. President, thank goodness for Grenada. And you have no idea of the impact that it's had on our part of the world." So I think it's been an unambiguous good.

The situation in the Middle East is one in which we are experiencing great difficulty. But, again, I think determination and readiness to defend ourselves is very much called for while pursuing energetically the reasonable and negotiating track, which we are doing unstintingly.

Of course, we have allies in the multinational force. We've taken more casualties than any of the other members. The French have taken heavy casualties. The Italians, some. The British, none. But people are concerned about their own citizens in such an operation.

But it's also been very remarkable and interesting to me that when we have met as foreign ministers, as we did last week, out of the meeting has come a joining in support of the mission that we're there for and, of course, a continuing desire to consult and push the negotiations. But nobody said, "I'm walking out." Quite the contrary.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm Bob Weil from the Independent Journal in Marin County, California.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Great. (Laughter.) How is it there in Marin County?

Q Very nice, sir.

If the President is reelected, do you intend to stay on with the administration, and if not, what effect will that have on foreign policy?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, first of all, our foreign policy is always the President's foreign policy. And I, or any Secretary of State's job, is to help him in formulating it and help him in carrying it out. But we work for the President and it's -- whatever happens, good and bad, basically -- it's very good, basically, but it is the President's foreign policy. So it will be

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the President, whoever is his Secretary of State. As far as I am concerned, I came here to serve the President, and I intend to keep working with him as long as he wants me around. At the same time, I think it is a grave mistake for me to make any kind of statement that would prejudice his own complete freedom of decision as he starts a second term. (Laughter.)

And I was caught in a casual conversation the other day in one of these directional microphones you have, and I was standing chatting with King Hussein as we were breaking up, and, you know, and he is saying, "Well, how's the President?" I said, "The President is just fine. He is really vigorous and right in there and all set to go for the campaign," or some such comment as that that you'd make. So that got, as though I had any ability to know what the President's decision was. He'll make his decision when he decides to make it, and in the meantime we can all scratch our heads, and at least from my point of view hope that he does make a positive decision.

Q I am Gerry Bean, publisher of the Sun in San Bernadino, California. Can you tell us anything about what the role appears to be of the increasing number of Soviet troops in Syria?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: They are manning the new weapons that the Soviet Union has put into Syria. That appears to be their main role. There seem to be some 7,000 of them. Whether they will continue to man those remains to be seen, and there is speculation that they will turn them over to the Syrians, but we don't see any evidence of that.

And I might say when we have made demarches to the Soviet Union about the situation in Lebanon and the seriousness and the aggressive behavior of the Syrians, they have made a point of saying that they are manning those missiles and they will use them in defense of Syria, but that is their purpose. They would have us believe that it should be reassuring to us that they are there.

It is I think something you can't help but notice, however, that there are 7,000 troops, and what all else they are doing beyond manning those missiles of course you can speculate about.

Q Mr. Secretary, I am Lou Harris, a poll taker based in New York.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've heard of you. (Laughter.)

Q I would like to ask you about Lebanon. I find now a rising caldron boiling on this whole issue of Marines in Lebanon. Our latest poll shows by 62 to 24 percent a majority say that they don't feel that the loss of lives of Marines in Lebanon has been justified or worth it.

My question is, Mr. Secretary, what realistic options do we have for removing the Marines from Lebanon as this tide of public opinion rises to demand that they get out?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, our job is to make it as clear as we can to the American people, to their representatives here in Washington, what the stakes are in the Middle East, why those stakes are important to the United States, and what the relationship of the situation of Lebanon is to that, and what the relationship of the multinational force is to that situation, and our role in it. In other words, there is a whole series of questions and answers, so to speak, that start from a broad perspective and move to the particular purposes of the Marine presence there.

Obviously we have to work hard to convince people of the importance of that presence, and we have to show some results. I think that's what people want most of all. We have a picture of Lebanon in kind of chaos, and there we are. So what is happening?

I think if we can see some things happen that are positive, then people's understanding will increase a great deal.

Now there are some things happening. Personally I think that whatever the cause of it, the cause is rather odd, but nevertheless 4,000 Palestinian guerrillas are taken out of Lebanon, that's progress toward removal of all foreign forces.

There is a beseiged town just south of Beirut in the mountains that has been in crying need, and we believe that through cooperative effort of the Lebanese effort and the local people, the Druze and the Israelis, that perhaps this seige is about to be lifted.

I think there are a number of other steps that are at least possible to see happen as we move along here, that are, you might say, small down payments on the emergence of a Lebanon that has a broadly-based government and which is able to govern itself and live in peace with its neighbors. That is the objective we want.

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If we're able to achieve that objective -- and it doesn't have to be at the expense of Syria -- but if we're able to achieve that objective, then I think it will be a very positive development for our Middle East policy generally. And perhaps then people will see the point of our efforts. But, it's a hard thing when you're struggling, as we are, to keep the perspective of what we're really there for. But, the objectives that we're there for, the Middle East picture generally, and the relationship of it is pretty clear, those objectives are extremely important to the United States. And if we just sort of pulled up and left, as some people -- even people who aspire to very high office on the other side of the fence -- as some of them seem to advocate, I think it would be a turning of our back on some very important objectives that we have there.

Q Mr. Secretary, Meredith Brokaw from New York City. Could you speak to us, please, about terrorism and our defense of it, specifically the possibility --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our defense against it. We do not defend it.

Q Well, no. I think that's -- in our defense. Isn't there a possibility that by positioning missiles at the White House we are somehow inviting a disaster?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I hadn't heard about the positioning of missiles at the White House. But, at any rate, I think that terrorism is despicable and deplorable. It also seems to me that there is more and more evidence that what -- an act that we think of as an act of terror, and which somehow gets -- has been associated in the public mind with some screwball who gets ahold of something and -- for reasons that he or she may think are justified, but which have no place in a civilized society, some wanton act occurs -- that people have that in their minds.

But it seems to me that what we're seeing is something more systematic and organized and more ominous than that. And that is the use of acts of terror as an instrument of a nation's policy. And I think perhaps the clearest illustration we've seen recently in terms of what is actually known was the Rangoon act of terror by the North Korean government against the South Korean government.

But the degree of systematic use of this

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weapon of terror by governments is something that we need to take very, very seriously, and do take seriously. And we must oppose, and oppose vigorously. And that includes protecting ourselves adequately against it. That includes taking steps to prevent a further use of this weapon. And, I'm afraid, it also, probably, includes the need to retaliate.

Q Mr. Secretary, Sal DeVivo from Utica, New York.

A question on Grenada and one that's pertinent to us. You said earlier that the President was absolutely right in going in there. Do you think the government was absolutely right in not allowing reporters to go in with the invasion forces?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: (Laughter.) Well, I think you have to put your first priority in getting the operation done, done well, and not blowing the operation by this tremendous sense that reporters seem to have these days that they have to know everything before you actually do it.

And it's not compatible with conducting a military operation, and using the element of surprise, and so on. So I think that those must have been considerations which the Defense Department and military had in mind in the way they handled that.

Whether it's possible, thinking back, to conceive of a way to have a few people knowledgeable, I don't know. I think that, when we take the analogy of what happened in World War II, well, there, reporters were involved all along. And on the whole, they were on our side.

These days, in the adversary journalism tradition that's been developed, it seems as though the reporters are always against us. And so, they're always seeking to report something that's going to screw things up. (Laughter.) And when you are trying to conduct a military operation, you don't need that.

But, obviously, it's very important for us as a free and open country to do everything that we do as free and open as possible. And the vigorous press is one of our greatest insurance policies for that. And so I've, kind of, gone around the barn a little bit on your question -- a little of this and a little of that. But I think that's about the way it is.

Time for me to quit?

MS. SMALL: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. (Applause.)

END 1:05 P.M. EST

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON THE VISIT OF
PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU OF CANADA

December 15, 1983

The Briefing Room

12:22 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The meeting went on for a little over an hour and I think, for my own part, that it was one of the most effective meetings that I've sat in on in the Oval Office.

There was a genuine discussion between the President and the Prime Minister and it was a -- I think -- best described as a broad, philosophical discussion, not just on the technical aspects of arms control, specific details about weapons systems and negotiating proposals, but really a broad canvassing of the current state of affairs in East-West relations.

And I think the main thrust of the Prime Minister's remarks were that he thinks that he has substantially accomplished his objective in launching his initiative. He said that -- that a number of very positive things have developed in recent weeks on the Western side, in terms of a readiness and a willingness to have a dialogue with the East. He didn't try to suggest that his own initiative was responsible for this but that he was -- he was very pleased that in several areas he saw a readiness on the part of the West and the United States in particular to talk, to try to solve problems dividing East and West.

He congratulated the President on following through on the December '79 decision on maintaining the strength and cohesion of the Alliance. And he then went on to congratulate the President for several specific initiatives, several times referred to the President's speech to the Diet -- you heard him refer to it just now in the departure remarks -- and expressed some regret for the fact that the public in the West hadn't paid as much attention to that speech, in particular the President's commitment -- his long-range goal to eliminate nuclear weapons.

He spent a good deal of time talking about the Brussels Communique, which was agreed to last week by the Foreign Ministers of NATO, which expressed a strong willingness and readiness to engage the East in a dialogue and was particularly pleased that the President had authorized the Secretary of State to travel to Stockholm in January. So the -- in the hopes that that meeting, the meeting of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, will be a venue for Foreign Ministers from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to meet to discuss security problems.

For his part, the President discussed what led to his speech to the Diet, his strong desire to not simply codify or institutionalize the nuclear arms race through arms control agreements, but to seek reductions. He described his long-range goal of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. There was a discussion of the Vienna negotiations, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations with both sides agreeing on the need to look at our current negotiating approach, to make an effort to make progress in those negotiations. And I think there was an agreement that, as the Canadian Prime Minister put it, that we wanted a genuine discussion with the Soviets, we wanted to avoid Peter Carrington's phrase, "megaphone diplomacy."

So I might just add that there was also a lengthy discussion on the internal situation in the Soviet Union with both sides recognizing -- both the President and the Canadian Prime

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Minister recognizing that -- we do face some genuine difficulties now in trying to communicate with the Soviet Union, given the uncertainty of the leadership position there. When I say that the discussion was philosophical, for example, there was some discussion over just sort of what makes the Soviets tick, you know,

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the history of the Soviet Union, the ideological impulse of communism on the one hand, and on the other hand the historical experience that the Russians have felt, discussion of the role of insecurity in the Soviet Union, the role of communist ideology.

So it was -- as I say, it was not a negotiating session. There was very little discussion of concrete negotiating proposals. But generally speaking, I think an agreement on the need to explore new avenues in our dialogue with the East and to seek ways of making progress on a broad front on arms control.

Q What did they about the summit, particularly either a five-power summit or a super-power summit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The question of a five-power summit really didn't come up. There was some discussion of the utility of summit meetings, with the pros and cons of having a meeting when it didn't look like we would accomplish very much, the problems of building up expectations, with the President pointing out that he has always been open to a meeting with the Soviet leader, that our desire to have some progress made in the relationship so that a summit would really accomplish something.

But again, there was -- there is no specific -- there's not a suggestion, "Gee, you should meet next week or next month." It was more a broad discussion of when and how such a meeting might be useful.

Q In this room yesterday the President sounded lukewarm about the idea of the summit. Was he expressing the same sort of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think his position on a summit has changed. I think, in principle, he is prepared to have such a meeting, but he has said all along that just a meeting for the sake of a meeting would disappoint people and that we want to accomplish something in a summit meeting.

Q Did the President give the Prime Minister any encouragement to take his peace initiative to Moscow now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the President gave -- generally speaking -- gave the Prime Minister encouragement to continue -- seek ways of making progress in arms control and improving the East-West dialogue. I don't think the Prime Minister was looking for the President's approval. The Prime Minister has said he wants to go to Moscow, and we'll be interested in hearing what results are achieved by that visit.

Q Did the Prime Minister indicate he expected to go to Moscow soon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't give us [illegible] details on when he might be going.

Q Did he say that he expected Gromyko to be at Stockholm?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did the subject of space-based weapons come up in the discussion?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were some brief discussions of that, with the President having an opportunity to describe what lay behind his desire to do research in this area; again, his fundamental desire to try to escape the terrible dangers of a nuclear war.

Q Did the Prime Minister respond to that statement of policy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did unemployment in Canada come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There was no -- no U.S.-Canadian bilateral issues -- it really was a good give-and-take on East-West relations.

Q If I understand you correctly --

Q Did the sales of atomic weapons come up at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sorry?

Q The sales of Canadian atomic weapons --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The last time I looked --

Q -- atomic material --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- the Canadians didn't have atomic weapons.

Q Well, atomic materials.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q If I understood you correctly, you said that the President didn't formally give his blessing to the Prime Minister's trip to Moscow. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He wasn't asked. It wasn't even discussed. I mean, you're trying to create a story where it wasn't. We knew that he was -- he's hoping to go to Moscow and the Prime Minister didn't ask for our approval. He's the Prime Minister of a sovereign country.

Q The Prime Minister said the President agreed with -- or whatever his words were -- endorsed his peace initiative. Is that correct?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q In all aspects?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there was no real discussion of the detailed parts of the intiative. And I think the initiative has evolved as events have evolved. And I don't think the Prime Minister was seeking to go through -- I mean, as he himself pointed out, he didn't want to go through all the technical details of a variety of proposals. But the broad thrust, the broad desire to engage the East in a dialogue, that's exactly what the President endorsed.

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Q Any discussion of the domestic controversy in Canada --

Q I understand.

Q -- over testing cruise missiles?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no discussion whatsover.

Q You gave us all the positive features.

Q Be forceful.

Q Could you tell us some of the negative features that were --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I didn't detect any negative features. It was a very warm meeting.

Q Sir, a quick one --

MR. SIMS: All right. Thanks very -- that's the last question.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 12:32 P.M. EST

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING
ON
EMBASSY SECURITY
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1983, 3:10 P.M.

Q You lost the Beirut Embassy in mid April. That was lost in part because the Embassy was not prepared for a car bomb attack. You lost the Marine headquarters to a truck bomb attack on the 23rd of October. We are told today that in September of this year the Embassy in Kuwait sent a request to this building for changes in security. No decision was made on that until apparently the 24 hour period surrounding the actual bombing. And from what we have been able to determine, there was no vehicular block placed in front the vehicular entrances to the Kuwait Embassy. What's going on?

SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It's true that September 16 the Embassy in Kuwait came in with some proposals for improved security around the compound. These proposals were looked at back here and a package was developed back here within two months which was to go back to the post for implementation. Part of that delay was because we wanted the Administrative officer who was at the post to come in; we wanted to talk to him about them.

The specific proposals that came in for the post needed some further work. They were the kinds of things that we had to get some additional expertise brought to bear in it, and the package that went out was one that was much stronger than the original proposal.

Q When, exactly, was the approval given, sir?

A Officially, the approval was never given because the message did not go out because it was waiting to go out when the event occurred.

Q So it hadn't actually --

A It had not been transmitted to the post. In fact, we decided from the very beginning that we wanted to do something about the situation in Kuwait, and a number of other Embassies, too, by the way.

Q What I was driving at, were you getting ready to send it out or had it not been approved for sending out?

A It was ready to go out. It was physically ready to go out and it was pulled back because with the bombing it was irrelevant.

Q Were you planning to send it that day?

A Yes.

Q The day of the bombing, you weren planning to send it out.

A Yes.

Q What interim measures were taken?

A There were interim measures taken at the post to protect against precisely this. The access to the compound was closed. Vehicle traffic on the compound was restricted.

There was a request going to the Kuwaiti Government to limit vehicle traffic on some of the roads in the area of the Embassy. There was more screening of all the vehicles going on to the Embassy compound.

Incidentally, when you say there was barricade, that's not true. There was a gate there; the gate was locked. It just turned out the gate could not deal with a 10-ton Mercedes truck.

Q There's a report that says in addition to your data on September 16, it says a senior official said a hundred thousand dollars was requested. Is that figure right?

A There was a hundred thousand dollar estimate put on the one-time costs for this project.

Q That's the hundred thousand that you did not have, that you had to scrounge around and pick up?

A That's not entirely true. It was not primarily a money question. It's being put in money terms. Our concern was about the effectiveness of the measures that were being proposed, and we wanted to make sure that we were spending this money wisely.

Q Did you in fact at first turn it down or delay it because there were no funds available?

A There was one office in this building that turned it down. That was transmitted to the post. What was not transmitted to the post, however, was that other offices, when that office turned it down, there were other offices looking at it and, in fact, the funds had been found for it.

Q Can you tell us who turned it down and who was still looking?

A The responsibility for this security program is divided, and we have funds for different kinds of purposes here. This was first being looked at against the funds that had been given to us by the Congress primarily for public access controls, and we had given a great of money to Kuwait already for public access questions, for public access control. We had a great deal of progress being made in that area.

This was an entirely new kind of threat, a new situation, and the money came out of the normal security program for this.

Q When did the money get found after the September 16 request?

A I can't get a precise date on that. I can say that this money was ready -- I really --

A During the briefing on the record before, there was a question of finding -- you had to free some money, and the impression was conveyed that money was the essential stumbling block.

A Yes. There was money available by November 18. I don't want to say that was the day the money was found. We can't document it with that kind of precision, but the money was available.

Q Are you say even if the money would have been available in September, it still would have taken this long to get this request put through; it seems that's what you're saying?

A Yes. Put it in terms of your own home. If you were doing some renovations on your home, you've got to talk to contracts, you've got to get architects involved. To do something like this in that period of time is really -- it seems to me that's not unreasonably slow.

Q What urgency had the Embassy attached to that request and by taking the time, by your example, to go over their plans, as such; what urgency did the Department attach to that request?

A We attached urgency to the request. We moved, I think, very quickly on it. I don't want to say that we couldn't have moved more quickly. I don't want to stand up here and tell you that we couldn't have chopped a day off here, a day off there. But I do not think it's fair to say that this sat in someone's in-box for a long period of time waiting for action.

Q Can I get you to put this in a broader context. Because, obviously, this kind of thing, if it hadn't happened in Kuwait, it could have happened somewhere else. Let me get you to talk to the larger security program.

A lot of things have been done. I've seen maybe a dozen Embassies in which heavy security measures have been taken in the last few years.

Can you extrapolate what's been done over the last few years? I suppose in the context of the general rise of terrorism into what is being done now in the current reassessment which, I guess, is in the light of car bombings and the willingness of people to die for whatever their cause happens to be. Is that fair, or would you just deal with that subject?

A Certainly. What we've seen is an evolution in our security program in the nature of threats that we face overseas.

We saw back in the Seventies a period in which we were having to deal with small terrorists groups, attempts to assassinate our Ambassadors, our senior people overseas. This evolved -- in '79, there was a dramatic change in November with the seizure of our Embassy in Teheran, the sacking of our Embassy in Islamabad, and the sacking of our Embassy in Tripoli.

We took measures at that time. We went to the Congress and got special monies -- about a hundred million dollars to deal with this kind of a threat, and it was largely a threat that was focused on mob violence. I think that was a major threat that we had to deal with in many parts of the world during that period.

We have seen, really, over the last year, and in fairness in hindsight, this evolution is clearer than it was at the time. But in April, with the bombing in

Beirut, with the October bombing of the Marines, again, in Lebanon, and finally in Kuwait, this trend was evident.

We had already, after Beirut -- but especially after the Marine bombing -- had started to take steps specifically to address that kind of threat. This means shifting some emphasises in the program.

Q It wouldn't have cost them one dime from a special budget to have parked a big truck in front of the vehicular entrance, the locked fence, as backup. We're talking about an event that happened in December; the Marines were killed on 23rd of October. Why wasn't that done at the Embassy?

A The Embassy had taken -- I don't want to address that particular point. The Embassy had taken a number of steps to improve the security against precisely this kind of situation. They had limited access onto the compound. They had taken steps to screening buses and trucks that were coming onto the compound. They were taking steps to limit service vehicles around there.

Q What happened in Kuwait is exactly what happened to the Marines: The vehicle drove through. It was thought to have been a secure gate. They drove right through it. Had you had a big truck parked out there, they couldn't have done that. They couldn't have gotten the velocity up. Why wasn't that done?

A I really don't know the answer to your question.

Q Are you asking the Embassy in Kuwait why it wasn't done?

A We are looking at all of the measures that were taken in Kuwait. We're trying to see what kind of lessons we can learn from this event.

Q Are you having it done in front of other Embassies in this area of the world, in this region?

A We have talked to all the Embassies not only in that region but throughout the world. We have been in touch with them; we have given them very specific advice about relatively low-cost measures that they can take to protect against this kind of threat.

Q Does that mean parking a truck or some other vehicle in front of the vehicular entrance?

A There are a number of steps that they can take. That's one of them, but there are others, too; others, by the way, that are more effective.

Q I ask you to go back. What prompted the

Embassy on September 16 to send in these proposals about requesting more money for increased security?

A I really have trouble going back to what their motivations are, what precise events stimulated it. But it's my understanding that this case as a result of a periodic review of the security situation at that post by the Security Watch Committee, which is a senior committee constituted in the Embassy under the supervision of the Ambassador. In this case, the charge' d affaire.

Q In other words, though, they had some warning or some indication that somebody might try something like what happened?

A There were some intelligence reports, but I think this was much more the consequence of a general review by the Embassy of what it thought the current situation, what it felt the threats against the Embassy happen to be.

Q Therefore, there was not really an urgent request, that we must do this -- X, Y, Z -- now because of this type of threat we're meeting?

A I don't think it's fair to say it was not treated as an urgent request either by the Embassy or by us. We both saw it as a very important request and one that we had to move on. There was certainly no intelligence that on December 12, or any other date, there was going to be a ramming through the gate.

(Continued on next page)

Q May I ask you a few questions, please?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you have -- you had to come up with that $100,000.00 from somewhere. Is there or has there since been a development of a fund to take care of this? Or, for example, if just prior to the blast on Sunday night -- Monday, are you still scrounging for money?

A The State Department's always scrounging for money, sir. I think -- the fund exists. This money was drawn out of the regular security program. The broader question that you're asking, "Do we have adequate funds, adequate resources, to deal with this new threat, this new kind of security situation that we're looking at all around the world?" and I don't know the answer to that right now.

Q Let me ask you another question to follow up, please.

A Sure.

Q During that period between September 16 and December, whatever, did the Department clear funds for any other Embassy that had requested a step up in its security situation?

A I think the answer's probably most certainly yes, but I'd have to check that because we have scores of requests in the security area for additional funds, but I can't give you a precise answer right now.

Q What is the size of that regular security program? You said that funds were drawn out of a regular security program. Does it have a number per year?

A I would have trouble giving you a figure that would be relevant. Let me check that and get back to you, if I may.

Q You mentioned close to $100 million, and I'm curious to know -- we were told that there were 200 projects among 120 posts around the world underway right now.

Are you drawing down out of that kind of fund, that $100 million you were talking about earlier, to pay for these?

A In part. Yes, sir.

Q Where's the rest of it coming from?

A Out of the regular -- these are different kinds of programs drawn from different parts of the Department, and the monies for them come -- depending on the nature of the projects, are coming out of our regular foreign buildings program. Some of it comes out of the security program, some of it comes out of the money -- the operational funds that are available to the post, some from the regional bureaus responsible for the post, some out of the special SPL money. So there are a number of different sources for these funds.

Q Aren't you going to have to go back in with a supplemental?

A We're not sure yet. We really don't know. We're looking at that, and I think it's a little too early to tell.

Q Could you address what's involved in these projects? I mean, are all these projects now dealing with the problem of truck bombs and the theory that you're always fighting the last war, or are you looking ahead -- or are these all related to specific weaknesses in specific buildings around the world. In one place you'd need glass walls, in another place you'd need restriction of access, and things of that sort.

Can you talk about specific construction things that you're doing in specific places?

A Let me bring that back and put it in a more general context. If that's not enough of an answer, let me know, and I'll try to be more specific.

But out of the SPL, the security enhancement money, the $100 million, we put emphasis on several different kinds of projects, and these were all based on our experience in Tehran, Islamabad. We limited -- we were working on the public access controls. This means, for example, bullet proof glass in some areas, lower levels of the chancery. This means in some instances better protection for our people who have to deal with the public, special offices to keep the public from actually getting inside of the Embassy. Some of these were in -- a second major area was in the communications area, when we were trying to protect classified information, trying to reduce the kinds of information that we have at a post by making it easier for the post to retrieve this electroncially.

All of these kinds of projects now are included in the $100 million.

Q Could you say how many Embassies in the Middle East are now invulnerable to truck-bomb attacks?

A I wish I could stand up here and tell you that every Embassy that we have every place in the world is invulnerable to all kinds of security threats, but I cannot. I really cannot.

Q A two-part question in terms of communication. When did you send out specific recommendations to Embassies as to how to reduce the risk of truck-bomb attack? Before Kuwait was hit, or after?

A There was a message sent out after Beirut. There was a message sent out after the Marines, and there was a message sent out today.

Q A message to what effect, sir?

A The message today was telling all the posts to look at -- there was one message from security channels, laying out some very specific steps that could be taken, and there was a message from me to the administrative officers in the field, telling them to look at their own situation and see if they needed additional funds, if these things could be done out of Post funds, they should try, but if they needed additional funds, to come back to the Department, and we would make it available to them.

Q My question is, had they followed the recommendations that were sent from this building after the Marines were killed, could that truck bomber have gotten in the way he did?

A I really don't want to speculate on something like that. I think that we -- all of these Embassies overseas are concerned about their own protection. We're concerned about their protection. We have sent proposals out to them as to how they can improve their security. I have no reason to believe there's not a single Embassy out there that's not moving as quickly as it can to make sure that it's protected as well as it can be against those kinds of threats.

Q Specifically, it doesn't cost anything to put a big vehicle in front of an entrance. Did you tell them to do that after the Marines were hit? Did you tell them to do that?

A We're trying to give them a whole range of cards to play.

Q The message sent today on security channels, will we see something visible at these various Embassies done, or can you be a little bit more specific what that message was about?

A Yes. The reason I am hesitating, I don't mind telling you, I really have a bit of a problem telling you publicly the kind of measures that we're taking to protect the Embassies. I mean, you can obviously see the reasons on this, and that's why I'm trying to be a little bit circumspect and at the same time answer your question.

But we are -- yes, we've told them about the dimensions for the kind of pipes they should put in for their protection if they wanted to use pipes to protect a driveway, the kind of dimensions they would need for that. We've told them about, some instructions about relatively low-cost gates that could be put in.

There are a lot of things. You know, we're dealing with 156 -- I guess 256 Posts out there, and 130-some odd Embassies, that all are in unique situations. I can't go out and say, "Here's some measure that would work at every Embassy around the world." Every one of them is different, and we really have to have a measure of local judgment in implementing each of these.

Now, we've seen in Washington the introduction of these highway barricades around some of our public buildings. Heaven knows, they're not very attractive, but I think they're effective in the short term against the threat. This is the kind of measure that could be done overseas in some places. Some places these are absolutely unknown. You have to use local resources and local materials to do the same thing.

Q Can you straighten out the numbers for me? You said 130-plus Embassies, 256 Posts. I don't understand.

A Okay. In addition to Embassies, we also have Consultates and subordinate Posts.

Q So they come to about 400?

A No, no. The 256 is Embassies and Posts.

Q Now another question: Were you asked yet whether -- to the degree that one might be able to make a judgment -- had the package gone into effect in Kuwait, would it have stopped this terrorist attack?

A I really don't want to speculate on that. I really don't know. If I could tell you that we've got a package that's going to protect Kuwait or any other Embassy against this attack, let me tell you, it would go out there very quickly, and I would be very proud of it.

Q To clarify further on that, it's not the question -- you're saying it was not the question of money in putting up these barriers, protective measures, whatever;

it was going over the proposals, talking to the Embassy officers, streamlining them, getting them approved. Is that the point? Is that correct?

Q Well, you had the monies for two months.

A This is a question that's very difficult for me to answer, because I don't want to come across saying that money is no object for us. That's not true. We have a limited budget. When we take money for one of these projects, we're taking it from somewhere else. The State Department does not have, the Federal Government doesn't have, an unlimited reservoir of money, so I can't stand up and say money is no object.

On the other hand, this is a very high priority for us. The protection of our people overseas, the protection of our physical plant overseas, is something that we are not going to skimp on resources for. We're going to take care of them, and it's a question of weighing the need against the resources and using them as effectively as possible.

Q I believe you did say that one office did turn it down in the beginning on the -- that was on the basis of money, right?

A That was on the basis of money.

Q Unaware that the other offices were still exploring it and so forth?

A Exactly.

Q Will we have to move some of these Embassies? For instance, the old Embassy -- the one in Beirut -- was right on the roadway, and it would be very difficult to protect that. Is consideration being given to moving some of these very vulnerable Embassies?

A Yes. In fact, after the Beirut Embassy -- after Beirut, we started looking at a series of measures, One of the short-term things that we could do. Parking vehicles in front of the entrances, for example. In the longer term we're having to look at things that are going to take -- well, construction of new buildings, construction of or relocation of Embassies. And there are some places where we're considering that. That's takes a long time. That's very expensive, and it's not something that gives us a great deal of comfort in the present situation.

Q Are you reviewing the quality of decision-making at the local level in Kuwait?

A I'm not.

Q Is the State Department?

A I really don't -- I don't think a great deal is being -- is gained by trying to look at blame in these kinds of situations. I just don't see -- there are things that we could do -- there are things that we can do to help the Post, and we are going to do what we can to help them.

Q General Kelley --

Q Do you have any notion of how many Embassies might have to be relocated, because I think of others -- I think of Buenos Aires, I think of Tegucigalpa, of Embassies that are right on the street, all of which are vulnerable in different ways.

A Yes. I don't know. I can't give you a number on that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:36 p.m.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
ON TEXTILE IMPORTS

December 16, 1983

The Briefing Room

5:25 P.M. EST

MR. FITZWATER: The decision is being handed out -- Let me just mention the ground rules are: this is on background, attributable to senior administration officials. No filing until the end of the briefing. We'll try to keep it short.

Gentlemen?

Q Is this all prospective or does --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's all retrospective in the sense that it will affect imports as we have now calculated them.

Q Would you just give us an explanation of what it is you're doing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd like to start -- hopefully start from step one. The administration has had under review for several months, since at least June, the textile and apparel industry's concerns with what they perceive to be limitations in the management of the textile and apparel program.

A committee was formed under the direction of the White House. And a number of recommendations have been made. Some of those recommendations have been considered in a different forum. The President has reached conclusions today regarding some additional means of dealing with the textile and apparel industry's concerns which we think represent a major improvement to fix a number of the problems which they've identified and which we have agreed with and that -- We think that the industry will recognize it when it's had a chance to evaluate it as something that they've long sought after and have not been able to obtain.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would add that what looks to be rather arcane language in here is designed for both the domestic producers as well as the importers and those other -- and those countries which export to the United States.

It's designed to streamline and clarify the criteria under which the government's Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements would consider as possibly being worthy of action under our international agreement, which is the Multi-Fiber Agreement, most recently renegotiated in Geneva in 1981.

It is our view that this arcane language is consistent with both our domestic obligations and our international obligations and presents no departure from those international obligations as represented by the MFA.

Q Why don't you tell us specifically -- if I could ask this question and we've talked around this point quite a bit -- why don't you tell us what this agreement entails specifically?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Specifically it entails the establishment of specific criteria for the determination or for the raising of a presumption of market disruption or the threat of market disruption. Heretofore, the committee in the administration which has met to consider surges in imports has not had a set of criteria from which to make their judgment. And this announcement by the administration presents criteria which will be used to make the determination of whether market disruption has occurred or is threatened.

Q Before you get into what the criteria are, what happens when there is a presumption of -- or of market disruption or threat of market disruption? What happens then? What does that trigger?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if a conclusion is reached that there is, in fact, market disruption or the threat of market disruption and that conclusion would flow from these criteria in sub-1 and -2 and what follows in the paragraph beginning "With respect to countries ..." --

Q No. My question is: what happens when you get that conclusion.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, you issue a call for consultations regarding that product or products to the country that has exported the quantities that have given rise to the presumption.

Q And then what happens?

Q And?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, and --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Then you go into --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- there is a 90-day period within which there is an opportunity given for consultations and, in that 90-day period, exports to the United States or imports into the United States are stopped.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not stopped; not stopped. They are stopped at the rate that they have been coming in heretofore.

Q -- at the offending rate, or below the offending rate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the -- the technical way it's written is as at the rate of the latest 12 of the last 14 months. But that's a statistical problem.

Let's say the imports have been coming in at an annual rate, at the latest data, of a hundred. They would be, for that 90-day period -- would continue to be allowed at a formula which is, depending on the bilateral agreement we have, either on that annual rate, divided by 12 or 35 percent of the previous rate.

Q What happens after this freezing?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The purpose of the 90-day period is to, under the international treaty under which -- or agreement under which we work, the other country is obligated to consult with the United States to reach a mutually satisfactory solution. That's what the 90-day period is there for.

Q What happens if you don't reach that mutually acceptable --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Then, the United States is free to do what it wants in terms --

Q Specfically, dealing with Chinese imports and textiles, which seems to be the problem for the industry right now, will there be notification to the Chinese and the 90-day clock started?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not sure I follow the question.

Q Has anybody at this point -- at this point, isn't there a threat of market disruption?

Q Under this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. Sure.

Q And those countries, does that include China?

Q Let me ask him the question.

Is there a threat, right now, of market disruption? Or is there disruption in the market due to Chinese textile imports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's too early for us to have applied the criteria listed here to the present situation with respect to Chinese imports.

Q You mean --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: However, I would say that it is a fair presumption that a number of market disruption, or threat of market disruption situations, will be determined to exist. And action will be taken accordingly.

Q Including the Chinese?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Perhaps, including the Chinese.

Q And what is the timetable for starting to apply these --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we'll begin doing it immediately.

Q When?

Q Who else, apart from the Chinese, sir?

Q This weekend?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's not a question in the sense of this weekend. It's a question of taking data and working this process through. And we are talking here, as you will note, about uncontrolled categories. There are many categories in the textile system. We have what we believe is an effective program for the controlled categories. This addresses those categories or products, if you wish, which do not have what is called a specific limit on them, and which have demonstrated over the course of the last year a substantial rise according to this formula in paragraph one.

Q Do you have an agreement with the domestic industry not to reintroduce its cavaliering duty complaint against China?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We do not.

Q Have you talked to them? Have they told you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As soon as I leave

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this session will be discussing the statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary in an effort to have them reach a conclusion that this is a very substantial improvement in the management of the textile and apparel program.

Q Do you expect them to hold off filing suit?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do. Yes.

Q How is this consistent with the international obligation that we have for an injury determination? Does this alter the framework of an injury --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No --

Q -- determination in controling imports?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is a statement --

Q If you have an automatic trigger, doesn't that affect --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it's not quite an automatic trigger inasmuch as what it says is there will be a presumption of market disruption or the threat thereof when these criteria arise. But that's a presumption which could be rebutted.

Q Could this fairly be called a compromise in your view between what the industry wanted and what --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- what some suppliers wanted?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. But I think it's giving the industry a great deal -- a very great deal of what it has felt necessary to control the 23 percent rise in imports over the last year as against a 6 percent growth, or roughly 6 percent growth, in domestic production.

Q Has the Chinese government been informed of the decision already?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They have not.

This -- This I might say, this statement does not go to the Chinese case or the Chinese export program directly or exclusively. It affects, or will prospectively affect all or most exporters of textiles and apparel to the United States. And we will be explaining it in the next several days to the -- as you have pointed out, it isn't the easiest thing in the world to understand. We'll make an effort to make it more coherent.

Q Would you say that this is probably the last adjustment either to trade policy or trade practices regarding textile imports that the administration might make, say, before the election?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: (Laughter.) I'll leave that to my colleague to comment on. I really do think this is a tremendous arrangement for the industry and that they will see it as such. But --

Q Yes, but the industry has wanted some assurance that the consultation called would not drag out endlessly before any action was actually taken. They wanted an automatic trigger for that reason. But now you're saying that it could drag out for some time, couldn't it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. No, we are not saying that. What we are saying -- the fundamental concern of the industry has been with what they call -- or what is called surges, and, particularly in the uncontrolled categories because the controlled categories have mechanisms to preclude that.

What this attempts to do -- and we think it should have -- will succeed -- is to give to the administrators of the textile program in the United States government, which is the CITA, criteria against which they can measure the inflow.

At the same time, it gives to, in our view, both the domestic industry and to the importers criteria which heretofore has been, quite frankly, more hit-or-miss. This is more clarified, more precise.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wonder if my colleague's point on the diversion was clear, the distinction between controlled and uncontrolled. The major single cause of difficulty has been that roughly 60 percent of textile and apparel product categories have been under some form of control. And what that means is that major suppliers, as soon as they reach a certain quota level in the product which is controlled just shift. Instead of providing a sweather with sleeves, take the sleeves off and it's a vest. And it's a moving

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target that is impossible to cover completely. And this criteria with the presumption of the threat of market disruption is intended to get at that --

Q This plan that you have finally come up with varies almost not at all from the one that the industry was proposing. It is a plan which the retailers --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am sorry to hear you say that.

Q It doesn't seem very different, looking at it very quickly. It is a plan which the retail industry has said they will challenge in court. And I suspect that they will go ahead and do that. Does this alarm you at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is already in court a challenge to the existing procedures for the management of the textile program, in part on grounds that there have not been specific criteria.

Q They claim that you are not clear on the question of market disruption.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wouldn't doubt that someone will --

Q This makes it even less clear.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you can guess, I will differ a little bit from my colleague on that in the sense that you say it is almost identical. It is not in my view almost identical.

Q I can see a few small things.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This sets criteria which CITA should use in determining whether it should exercise its right to call. If I understood it correctly, the industry's position was that the call should be made automatically. And what this says is that if there is -- the document assumes that there is a presumption of disruption, and as my colleague says, if it is rebutted, then the quotas will not be imposed.

Q This additional protection for the textile industry, do you think it is going to be consistent, the Chinese will see it to be consistent with the textile agreement we just reached with them? And could you enumerate what the major product categories where there have been surges this past year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Maybe we can provide that to you later, Barry.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As regards the first question, it is doubtful that any exporting country of any product would consider any limitation in its favor. I mean, that just makes sense. So we would anticipate that a measure of reservations at the very least.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It must be remembered that the MFA is by definition, and so states in itself, in the document itself, that this is a derogation from the gap. The purpose of the MFA is to provide for the orderly expansion of international trade, not the unorderly expansion.

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let's have a final question.

Q Does this apply to all groups of textile exporting countries that we know of, the OECD countries as well as the third world countries? Are any exempt?

Also, there has been some talk that there would be a distinction made as to the wage level in countries. Is there any such distinction reflected in here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It does not say anything in -- the document says nothing about low wage countries. It identifies those affected as just growing suppliers.

Q No group of countries is exempt, like is the OECD countries to the extent that they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will abide by our MFA obligations.

Q Is there any way to predict on the basis of this statement whether there will be more jobs or fewer jobs in the domestic textile industry or whether products will become more expensive or less expensive in the stores?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In our judgment it should help restore some jobs to the domestic industry. We do not believe it will have a significant inflationary impact at all.

Q Will it have a significant impact on jobs?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it will have a significant impact on jobs. As measured as best we could, had it been in effect over the course of the last year, it would have had a significant effect on jobs, yes.

Q Can you give us any kind of guestimate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We will try to provide a fact sheet for you later.

Q You just said some jobs, then you said significant impact. Could you --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: If you don't have one, one is significant.

Q Well, what are you predicting here, a little or a lot?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you.

END 5:46 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
ON
THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
EGYPTIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
KAMAL HASSAN ALI

The Briefing Room

December 21, 1983

10:18 A.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as you heard from the Foreign Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, just outside the White House, he was very satisfied with his visit here, and we certainly have been ourselves.

He was asked yesterday at the State Department as he was leaving a two-hour session with the Secretary why he had come, what was the point of coming at this point in time, and he said, and I think it's the best answer that you'll get, he wanted to hear directly, the Egyptians wanted to hear directly from our leadership our views on the peace process and the current situation in the area.

We valued this visit, as we value the very close exchanges we have with the Egyptian leadership.

Let me just give you a little background. He did bring a letter from President Mubarak for President Reagan. That letter covered a whole range of regional issues. While he was here, besides the meeting with the President, which the Vice President attended, he had a long session over lunch yesterday with Secretary Shultz, having had about an hour's session on Monday night just after he arrived. He had two hours yesterday at the lunch. That was attended by Secretary Weinberger, Under Secretary Eagleburger, Aide Administrator McPherson. He met later that evening with Senator Percy, just before the dinner that the Egyptian Ambassador gave. Later today he will have a meeting with Ambassador Kirkpatrick here in Washington.

On the subjects covered, let me start with the peace process. Foreign Minister Ali made clear that the Egyptians stayed committed to Camp David and to support of the Reagan initiative.

They are concerned, and this figured in his talks, as well was a theme in the letter, about stalemate in the peace process, and they are concerned that recent developments in the region should be used to encourage all parties to look at ways to energize the peace process.

The Egyptians believe that for negotiations to be effective they should include a Jordanian delegation. The Foreign Minister reviewed Egypt's efforts to encourage Arafat and King Hussein to work out an arrangement for Hussein to enter the peace process.

As he said I believe just now outside, and he has certainly said it during his meetings, this is the time for a political approach, for more political action, for a dialogue with the Palestinians. And they are going to do everything they can as the government of Egypt to encourage that dialogue between the Palestinians and Hussein.

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Q Did he mention Arafat specifically, or are you doing it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, Arafat came up. His name was mentioned as a -- he commented that he believed Arafat will continue to be the most popular Palestinian leader.

From our side --

Q On this point, is it also the administration's view that the forced Arafat departure from Tripoli will encourage Arafat-Hussein dialogue?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we understand there have been several exchanges between Arafat and Hussein over the last several weeks -- or statements, I'm not sure I should say "statements," exchanges by Arafat that he wanted to get back into a political dialogue with Hussein.

We're glad as far as the evacuation is concerned that it came off without incident. The Israelis, you recall, had said that they had never said they would interfere with the evacuation. They did not interfere. And --

Q Well, what do you mean they did not interfere? Didn't they shell the post for days?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The evacuation proceeded without incident.

Q Finally.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Finally. (Laughter.)

Q How did they get there anyway? Wasn't the Sixth Fleet there permitting them to shell?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Was the Sixth Fleet permitting them to shell? No, the Sixth Fleet wasn't involved in any way.

Q But they could have -- They were around, weren't they?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The Sixth Fleet is in the eastern Mediterranean; but we were in no connection with the evacuation.

The President and the Secretary both stressed our determination to pursue a comprehensive and a just peace.

Now, you asked him outside, and this question, of course, has been a very popular one in the last several weeks, about concern -- what was Egypt's concern or was Egypt concerned about the visit of Prime Minister Shamir, Defense Minister Arens last month. And, as he said out there, Egypt was not concerned itself. It understands -- it understands our relationship with Israel. But it did -- it was concerned. Egypt was concerned that the visit had led some in the region, and he did not get specific, to believe that we had fundamentally changed our Middle East policy. He advised us that Egypt had made an effort to contact other Arab leaders to explain its understanding of our policy and to allay their concerns.

We reassured him that our policy remains constant and that we want to work closely and have the same relationship with our Arab friends in the region as we pursue a comprehensive peace and regional stability.

The President told the Foreign Minister that, as he had said to the Israelis, we intend to have the same relationship with our Arab friends.

The Foreign Minister said he was reassured further by the President's press conference last night and his comments about the peace process, our constancy in Lebanon.

On Lebanon, he discussed and stressed Egypt's support for the Gemayel government and the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. He also underscored the importance of moving quickly to get the withdrawal of all external forces while continuing to support -- while Egypt is continuing to support the May 17 agreement. Egypt does believe that a phased Israeli withdrawal coordinated with the buildup of the Lebanese Army would encourage and promote the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

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From our side, we reviewed with Foreign Minister Ali the Gemayel visit to Washington, our efforts to help him promote national reconciliation and expand government authority, including the work we were doing to train and equip, expand the Lebanese Armed Forces.

On Egyptian-Israeli relations, he reiterated the determination of the Mubarak government to work for improved relations with Israel and he reviewed areas of ongoing cooperation, such as the continued smooth operation of petroleum sales, Israel tourism to Egypt, visits to Cairo of

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senior Israeli officials. He also stressed Egypt remain convinced of the importance of Israel halting its settlement activity on the West Bank.

Q Can I follow up on that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's -- yes, I think that's about the extent of the comments I had, so please.

Q Did he indicate when Egypt would send an Ambassador back, and did the President say anything about this -- situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not --- get into that -- Ali did not get into that, the question of timing. But I think the Egyptian conditions -- or, not conditions -- the Egyptian position about the return of the Ambassador, that appropriate changes need to be made in, in particularly in regard to Lebanon remain unchanged. He did not specifically mention that.

Q Does the U.S. share Ali's view that the evacuation of Arafat's faction from Lebanon creates some new opportunities in terms of the peace process -- in terms of a new political dialogue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can only say we hope so.

Q Do we have any new initiatives in which we're going to try to take advantage of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have the President's initiative there on the table, and we have yet to hear a better outline, a better framework, for a political solution. So, that is our position.

Q Just let me follow up. What do we think of his suggestion that the -- one of the answers in Lebanon would be a phased Israeli withdrawal with a Lebanese buildup without taking into account a Syrian withdrawal at this point?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think the attitute -- and this is a view held not only by the Egyptians, it's been by other Arab governments -- that somehow if there is Israeli withdrawal first, then Arab pressures can be focused, mobilized to get the Syrians motivated to move out of Lebanon. This is speculation. We've not seen the evidence of that Arab pressure on Syria in previous occasions, so we've got an open mind about it. But we're not pursuaded that a unilateral total Israeli withdrawal, even if that were in the cards, is going to motivate Syria to get out.

Q Did the Egyptians ask the Americans to urge the Israelis to accept the Reagan plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He did not discuss the -- what the Egyptians have said to the Israelis on that question.

Q Are you going to do it? No, I mean -- America asking. America asking the Israelis to accept the Reagan plan as condition -- precondition for the implementation of the Reagan plan?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have said --

Q What was the question again?

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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have said about the Reagan plan that each party -- the basic aim is to get the parties into negotiation, and that each party can enter on -- the negotiations on the basis of its own position. We have not insisted that any party accept the Reagan plan, but I repeat, we see no better plan on the horizon for facilitating the negotiations.

Q The Foreign Minister drew special attention to Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit to Iraq. Is there any special importance attached by the administration to that visit, and secondly, is there any move by the Iraqis to normalize relations or is it about where it stays?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, relations with Iraq -- start with the last part -- have not been static. There were absolutely no relations for several years after the June war in 1967. A small interest section was established -- I don't recall the precise year -- but I would say five to six years after that. So, in the course of the last decade, or at least let's say from the establishment of the interest section, you have had a gradually expanding relationship with Iraq. Not diplomatic relations, but an interest section which had increasing access in Baghdad to the Iraqi leadership. I think this -- the relationship has warmed up. It is not normal, but it has been warming up steadily for the past -- I'd say four years, particularly.

Q When do you expect --

Q -- satisfied?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, he didn't begin to get satisfaction. The view of the visit,

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the importance of the visit certainly against the background of our hopes expressed in '67. No new position there. We would like to have normal relations with Iraq.

We are concerned. And we do not have reports about the visit out yet, so I don't have anything specific to discuss today about it. We are concerned, as you know, about the level of violence in the Iraq-Iran war and the danger of that spreading further in the gulf, and I'm sure that that was a topic very much on the minds of Ambassador Rumsfeld and the President of Iraq and the leadership of Iraq when they talked.

Whether there will be diplomatic relations, we just don't know. Our position has been clear for a long time.

Q Mr. Kamal didn't seem terribly upset about the new unsigned agreement between the United States and Israel for military grants. And it's reported that the United States planned to give Egypt military grants totaling $1.1 billion and that, indeed, Mr. Kamal was told this yesterday by Secretary Shultz. Egypt had wanted $1.4 billion. Are they now -- is that no longer an irritating issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He spoke about Egypt's needs on -- for grant assistance in both the military and the economic field. Egypt's problems are substantial. We're not in a position yet to discuss publicly what the administration will propose to Congress on this. I'm sure that whatever amounts we can arrange, the need will always be greater. That's just a given.

Q What is -- do you have a reaction to The Wall Street Journal's item that states what I just stated?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'll wait until it's presented to the Congress.

Q Well, Secretary Shultz -- did he promise it, or not?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He can't promise anything more than they will propose a certain level to the Congress.

They've discussed figures. The figures are not in final.

Q As you know, Egypt and the United States have an existing series of military cooperation agreements that have been made over the past several years. Joint exercises such as the Bright Star, and so forth, and cooperation in various ways. Is there any indication, and did the Foreign Minister express any concern that the United States military cooperation with Israel might, in some way, complicate United States military cooperation with Egypt?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, none, whatsoever.

Q You indicated earlier that Hussein and Arafat have exchanged messages in recent weeks.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: May I correct that, only because I'm not absolutely sure there was an exchange. I know there were a series of Arafat statements.

Q Well, in any event, do you anticipate -- does the administration anticipate that Hussein may be prepared to enter the peace process with Arafat's blessing, and do we still consider Arafat the main Palestinian player in the area?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Arafat's blessing last April was considered by King Hussein to be essential along with the support of the moderate Arabs. He always -- he's always asked for the two before he felt he could move into the peace process.

Whether, in the wake of the evacuation and the wake of the internecine fighting of the -- within the Palestinian movement, what shape the PLO is in, what sort of role it's going to play -- these are questions you just can't answer today. They made their position clear, they think Arafat will remain -- that's a prediction -- will remain the most popular Palestinian leader.

Q Do you agree with that?

Q But we don't know?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Did the President or the Secretary of State raise the matter of Israeli-Egyptian relations with Minister Ali?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes.

Q And what was the thrust of the U.S. message?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That we want to see -- we know that there have been misunderstandings and we know there have been disagreements. We don't find those unusual. And we know there have been disagreements from both sides about the way the peace treaty has been implemented. But we encourage them to work out these misunderstandings and to move ahead.

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We've encouraged them in every way to reconcile their differences. They both place enormous value on the peace treaty. There's no hesitation on either side to endorse the value that they as political leaders and that their people feel -- very attached to the peace treaty.

We've never heard the least measure of doubt on that from either the Israeli side or the Egyptian side. And that is the cornerstone for us in making any further progress in the Middle East.

Q One more follow-up on that point please. Regarding Lebanon, does Egypt want Israel to withdraw before they'll return their ambassador or just make a commitment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it was not specific. Not specific.

Q Well, what are the terms then?

MR. SIMS: A couple more questions.

Q Can we go --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said simply that conditions -- some conditions in the whole Lebanese situation. You remember the reason the Ambassador was withdrawn. It was after the Sabra-Shatila massacres which --

Q -- situation in Libya --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, after the Sabra-Shatila massacres, if I'm not mistaken.

Q Yes, it was after Sabra-Shatila.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Wasn't it? It was September.

Q Yes.

Q -- do we know --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Or at least the statement that he would not return. He may have been on leave.

MR. SIMS: Let's take these two.

Q Do we know --

Q Has the question of Ras Banas -- has been discussed during these talks here either on the Presidential level or on the ministerial level?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The --

Q Ras Banas, the seaport of Egypt -- airport --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have had --

Q -- this time?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- some discussion.

Yes?

Q Without getting into specific numbers, has the U.S. promised Israel more aid in '86 -- fiscal '86 than in '85?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We know just from the whole cycle of procurement that the needs are going to grow.

Q That doesn't answer the question though.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I know.

Q Has the U.S. promised more?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- you've got to up to the U.S. Congress to get a better answer.

Q Has the U.S. promised more though? In other words, if we would -- that the administration will propose more in the '86 budget?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're going to look at it very sympathetically.

MR. SIMS: Thank you.

Q Will Rumsfeld stay in the Middle East during Christmas?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END 10:40 A.M. EST

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ON-THE-RECORD BRIEFING
ON
UNITED STATES WITHDRAWAL FROM UNESCO
BY
THE HONORABLE GREGORY NEWELL
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1983, 3:00 P.M.

MR. CARLSON: Good afternoon. This is our ON-THE-RECORD briefing on UNESCO. The briefer is Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory J. Newell. He has about, roughly half an hour that he can spend with you, and has a brief opening statement, and then will just take your questions.

MR. NEWELL: UNESCO policies for several years have served anti-U.S. political ends. The Reagan Administration has frequently advised UNESCO of the limits of U.S. toleration: For its misguided policies, its tendentious programs, and its extravagant budgetary mismanagement. For nearly three years now, the Administration has applied to UNESCO the same goals and priorities that guide our relations to all multilateral institutions. But UNESCO alone, among the major UN organizations, has not responded.

Now, at the conclusion of a long effort to reason with UNESCO, and a careful reassessment of our relationship to it, the President has concluded that U.S. participation in UNESCO, as it is currently organized, directed, and focused, does not serve the interests of the United States. Our conclusion is firm. The United States has accordingly given notice that it

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will withdraw from UNESCO effective December 31, 1984.

I will be pleased to take questions now.

Q You say "our conclusion is firm." What's the possibility that should there be changes during the next year in UNESCO that we would not leave the organization?

A The work of UNESCO as it was originally organized in 1946, in education, culture, the social and natural sciences, and later communication, is very important to the United States, and we have contributed to and supported the legitimate programs that UNESCO has followed.

We will continue to pursue those interests in other existing alternative mechanisms that are available to us.

One question we did ask in this lengthy review was what can we do, if anything, within UNESCO, to cause change to come about? We stated very clearly June 28 of last summer that we would come out of this review with one of two decisions: Either we would conclude that by staying in we could see major changes; if we concluded that there was no conceivable means by which those changes could come about, that then we would withdraw.

Having stated that, our feeling is that there is no conceivable way that UNESCO could change its policies, its direction, its practices, such that we would be enticed to remain as part of the organization.

Having said that, and stating that the elements of UNESCO are important to the United States in the development

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area, should there be significant progress moving away from politicization, number one, statist approaches, number two, and re-ordering its house managerially and fiscally, then we would be open perhaps at the end of the year to look again to make sure that the decision which the President has made remains. But for the time being, it is our conclusion that those changes are just not in the offing.

Q When you speak of alternative mechanisms to pursue the purposes that you regard as being beneficial in UNESCO, are you talking about other mechanisms within the United Nations?

A We are talking about mechanisms multilaterally, regionally, and bilaterally. I might add here, too, that there are elements of UNESCO that we expect to continue participating in, such as the Universal Copyright Convention. We would hope to find a way to continue participating in and contributing to the International Program for the Development of Communications.

Q You said that at the end of the year we'd be open to reconsidering. Does that mean there would be another review prior to the end date?

A There would have to be another decision taken if there was evidence that there was permanent change in these three areas in significant ways that did not just affect the behavior of member states in the next 12 months, but affected the programmatic direction of UNESCO.

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Let me state again for the record that our conclusion is firm. The decision to withdraw is not a negotiating tactic or a ploy of any sort. We have taken this with full candor with the Director General and other member states of UNESCO.

Q Mr. Newell, could you -- for those of us who don't live by UNESCO, could you give us a few examples of the politicization you're talking about, some concrete examples of what it is specifically the U.S. is objecting to?

A From the political side, number one, we spend a great deal of time discussing Soviet-inspired disarmament and peace initiatives. In fact, in this last budget, appalling to us, was approved more -- in excess of three-quarters of a million dollars for peace and disarmament initiatives, again inspired from the Eastern bloc, while only $32,000 was approved for education of refugees. And I would note that we have over 10 million refugees in the world.

This seems to us to be a misuse of funds and politicization of the educational sector of UNESCO.

A second item would be in human rights, where by UNESCO's own mandate they subscribe to the United Nations Human Rights Declaration, and yet they continually push for collective rights, people rights, cultural rights, etc., which are of the state and not of the individual.

A third area would be in academic freedom, again under the same statist concept.

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Q Mr. Newell, do you have any evidence that any of the UNESCO officials who were expelled earlier in the year from France are still drawing UNESCO salaries?

A It is my understanding that of the KGB agents who were expelled in France, I believe the numbers were in the 20s; that three of those members were on UNESCO staff, and it's my understanding that they are still on leave without* pay, which of course we find objectionable.

Q To what extent is the U.S. decision a reflection on the personal management of the Director General of the agency, and would his departure be helpful to get the United States to reconsider?

A In the past three years, and in particular in this six months, we have not criticized publicly in any way the Director General. When we have had concerns, we have gone to him directly. I have met with him on five separate occasions and taken with me concerns specific that we had in terms of management, budget, direction, etc.

We have no complaint in this review with the Director General of UNESCO. As the letter reflects -- that is a sincere letter -- we have esteem and respect for the Director General.

I might add that the problems which we have identified here in UNESCO are not new since the coming of Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow in 1974. Many of these directional activities were well in place long before he arrived.

*should read "with" pay

Q Could you break down for us some of the budgetary commitments the United States has to UNESCO over the last couple of years, and what we were scheduled for during the next year?

A Taking it backwards, we are scheduled at this point in time with the request to Congress several months ago of $50 million, which is 25 percent of their budget. They have the U.N. scale.

Q Over the two-year budget period, is that correct?

A No. That is an annual assessment. Last year, if I am not mistaken, I believe was 42 -- the last biennium was $42 or $44 million. The year before would have been around $40 million.

The quibble we've had with the budget is that the U.N. budgets throughout system-wide have increased the assessed budgets in the last ten years from $276 million to $756 million. This Administration sought to put the brakes on a very fast moving train. Consequently, we adopted a system-wide policy of zero net program growth throughout the system. We were not alone in this. We had many other member states whose contributions total a minimum of 66 percent, and in some of our organizations up to 89-90 percent of the contributions given, voting against or abstaining on budgets that were in excess of zero or around zero net program growth.

While we worked with the World Health Organization, they being very displeased that they were compared to other organizations inasmuch as the World Health Organization is well managed, they did come in with a budget proposal at their general conference of a negative growth of .31 percent.

The ILO, still spending at 1978 levels, had an increase of 1.92 percent in program growth or budget growth in program side.

The World Meteorological, the World Intellectual Property Organization, both coming in at or near zero.

ICAO came in right at around zero or slightly above.

Then at the executive board meeting several months ago, 26 of the 51 members voted against or abstained on the budget proposals of the Secretariat, which would have had an increase of 9.7 percent, which seemed to us absolutely unconscionable given economic reality and given the behavior throughout the rest of the system.

In fact, even the United Nations budget comes in at about .7 percent in the biennium, which represents about a third of a percent, a half of a percent, a year.

UNESCO then coming to the general conference with that 9.7 percent increase, then worked on a Nordic proposal as a compromise of a 2.5 increase which in real terms works out to 3.8 to 5.5 percent increase.

Q I have two questions: The first is, I saw one story that said that the budget for UNESCO was $374.4 million.

A That's correct.

Q Where does the $50 million being 25 percent-- How does that --

A The $50 million was the original request that we sent forward to Congress. We are working now on the currency rate exchanges to determine, with the strong dollar, there has been a significant reduction. We would quesstimate that our real contribution for FY-85, which is calendar '84, will be in the neighborhood of $25.8 million because of currency rate gains against the franc.

Q I'm sorry. I'm still a little confused. How is that 25% if it's $374 million?

A I might need a Budget person.

Q If you're giving 25% of a budget of $374 million, it turns out to be more than either $50 million or 25.8?

STAFF PERSON: $374 is the bienium.

A $374 is the bienium, number one.

Q I see.

A So we would divide 8 into 37.

Q The second point is, which countries have been lobbying the United States prior to this announcement not to make it?

A Not to make the announcement or not to make the decision?

Q Both.

A Number one, we have initiated on our own over the six months several meetings with friends and allies -- a total of probably 40-50 countries. There has been, first of all, in this country and other countries, unanimous agreement with the problems and the gravity of the problems that we have talked about here today. The question, then, becomes, "What do we do about those problems?" We have concluded that staying in will not change measurably the direction of the organization. Consequently, we can pursue our goals and objectives and development outside of UNESCO in other channels more effectively than in.

Q Does any other government agree with that?

A Other governments that we have heard from understand clearly our position, understand the rationale of the decision, as I have received messages from other governments.

Obviously, no one wants the United States to leave. Obviously, the United States does not want to leave -- we would prefer to stay if we could; but there is general agreement or general understanding as to why we are leaving.

Q But will any other government do what the United States Government is doing if they share that general concern about UNESCO's activities?

A It is virtually impossible to think that other governments are going to follow us, with one day's notice, if you will; it has taken us six months to come to this conclusion. It is likely that in the next year other governments, too, will question their own participation in UNESCO. I would say, though, for the record that we are neither encouraging nor pushing other nation/states to conclude as we have concluded.

Q So you have not asked other states to withdraw?

A We have definitely not, and we have so indicated in the letter to the Director General.

Q May I ask you another budget question? The $374 million is for two years, '84-'85. I was told by UNESCO that the prior budget was for three years and totalled $625 million. If you break those all down into annual figures, it looks like a decline in the budget. Can you explain that?

A It is in dollar terms because the dollar is strong, and the expenses are made in francs. Consequently, we will have a dollar decline. And the Secretariat has argued that we should have no quibbles, then. Our argument is that if we build into the system those increases, in the outyears when the dollar is not as strong, we will be bitten with a whopping increase 2, 3, 5, 7 years from now.

Q 2.5 percent, is that the final figure that has been settled upon, the increase -- 2.5 percent?

A Yes, which is a real 3.8 to 5.5 percent --

Q -- when you convert the francs to dollars?

A Meaning when you put all of the programs together and don't split them out and say, "This is a program growth."

Q First of all, can we have your opening statement, a copy of your opening statement, available to the press?

A Sure.

Q Second, can you address some of the objections the United States is against -- UNESCO's proposed restrictions on the press?

A Well, this is clearly taken from, beginning as I recall in 1974, when there was movement in this direction to license journalists. I would recommend to all of you, if I can recommend The New York Times article on Suriname today, which lays out very clearly some of the concerns we have about a New World Information and Communication Order.

Our concern, of course, is with the licensing of journalists. That means that some journalists might not be licensed; with codes of conduct, we find that unacceptable.

And I might add that just recently, the general conference provided a much different tone than has been in the past with regards not only the communications issues but to others. We note these behavorial changes. Of course, we would argue that if we are satisfied with the results of this general conference, then we can see that we are making progress. Our feeling is, that the general conference was merely a transitory change of behavior. Programmatically, nothing in communications that I have seen -- and I went to Paris during the communciations presentation -- has changed. In fact, just recently, in New Delhi, the Director General stated that the New World Information and Communications Order was here and was with us.

Gerard Bolla, the Assistant Director General for Communications, stated at his concluding press conference in Paris, that the NWICO was here to stay, and then on the 14th of December Leonard Marks stated in New York that, whether we like it or not, accept it or not, the NWICO was with us in one form or another.

Q What's the evidence that it's here to stay, that it's practically speaking something that people are going to have to deal with?

A Suriname is one example that I would point to.

Q A couple of questions: The review that has been undertaken since June, are you going to make the text of that public?

A We will make an executive summary of that available, I would guess within the next two weeks.

Q Then that will be available to the press?

A Yes, it will.

Q And if I could follow up with just a few short ones: How can the United States -- how well -- what are the mechanics of its continued participation in the copyright convention or the IPDC? How will that take place if it is no longer a member, number one? Number two, what formal proposals have been made in UNESCO to license the press?

A On the first question, with the copyright convention we are signatories to that convention. Consequently we operate outside of the full context of UNESCO, beings we have signed on to the convention. Hence, non-members of UNESCO can participate.

In the IPDC, as you may be aware, monies to projects approved by the Council are earmarked, meaning we can pick in Country X, program 21 that we would like to fund. And we hope that inasmuch as there is earmarking, inasmuch as there is consultation with countries as well as with UNESCO's IPDC, that we may very well be able to continue in some way participating in and contributing to the IPDC.

And your second question?

Q Yes. What specific formal proposals have there been brought before UNESCO and by the UNESCO Secretariat for the licensing of journalists?

A There have, to my knowledge, been no specific concrete proposals to begin that. Most of it is all under study, that goes from conference to conference.

Q Do you believe that UNESCO, based on its trends, will enact such a provision despite the fact that it hasn't seen to act in any way on that before?

A I couldn't speculate on that.

Q Since the points you made against UNESCO, you said it's the only agency this bad, paraphrasing your words, but yet constantly, in the U.N. General Assembly there are all kinds of resolutions, etc., that the U.S. is very opposed to. Yet, the letter to the Secretary General says the United States will not withdraw from any other agency or the U.N. Is there any indication of why not? In other words, why shouldn't this be seen as a trend of U.S. feeling about the U.N. in general?

A Eighteen months ago we commissioned reviews of all 90-some-odd multilateral organizations, which has taken now 18 months to produce. We have involved 13 departments and agencies in the U.S. Government with these reviews. We have sat with other departments and agencies as we have charted our course for the next 12 months in each of these organizations. We established for ourselves last June of 1982 five policy priorities that guided our policy toward multilateral affairs: number one: a desire to reassert American leadership in international organizations; a desire to get away from damage limitation and to work toward real international development and cooperation.

The second priority, increasing the private sector in multilateral affairs in each of these organizations. Three: increasing Americans hired in multilateral affairs. Our numbers have gone down annually for the last 20-25 years. Four: to increase the conferring mechanism, by doing a couple of things: number one, reducing the number of conferences we attend. In Fiscal '82, we attended some 914 international

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conferences. The United States has a very hard time servicing the magnitude of such conferences, and consequently, other nations are put at even a greater disadvantage, and we seek to limit that.

The fifth priority deals with the budget, which we have already discussed.

Having taken these five priorities, then we applied them to each of these 90-some-odd organizations, and asked ourselves where in the next months did we want to go in leadership in World Health Organizations? Where do we want to go in the ILO? Where do we want to go on the budget, the private sector? Which policy positions for Americans do we look for in the IAEA, etc.?

At the conclusion of this review, there were three general problems that surfaced throughout the system: number one, politicization of the specialized agencies which, as you know, caused us to walk out of the IAEA September 24 of 1982.

The second problem was the statist approach, the New International Economic Order, the New World Information and Communications Order, and other such world orders, which are proven simply not to work.

The third problem being, again, budget and management.

We then took these findings to the Directors General, the Secretaries General of these organizations, shared with them our concerns, going in companion many times with other

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countries, and stated that we sought change. And over time we have seen significant directional change in the multilateral organizations, such that we have a comment of one Director General of a major organization who stated that while the relationship with the U.S. is very tough at this point in time, because we tend to be a bit demanding, that relations with the Secretariat and the Americans have never been better, because at least they know where the Administration stands.

We had six organizations which caused us serious problems. UNESCO being one of them. The other five, we have seen significant, measurable improvement.

The President stated on September 26, when he was in New York, that the United States not only remains committed but would redouble its efforts to securing real, effective, genuine development, and that is what we seek.

Q Have you made an assessment of whether UNESCO can realistically survive as an international organization without the U.S.?

A "Realistic assessment," I guess, is difficult to define, too. We have asked that question of ourselves. We have asked that of friends and allies. We have asked that of Secretariat officials during, if you will, this probationary period of six months.

This is, again, why we argue that the probationary period has already been given, and the events of the past six months in UNESCO tell us that even with this threat of the U.S. withdrawing, that that is the very best we can expect.

Consequently, we have addressed the question of what happens to UNESCO when we leave. We would hope what would happen is with 25 percent less of resources available that UNESCO would be forced, as the zero-net program growth had its design to do, to force priority-setting.

The budgetary matter is not purely financial. It's management-focused. We feel that if they have set resources that they will have to pick and choose, recognizing that all that needs to be done can't be done; that we can't take resources and spread them so thin that they have no effect.

It is my understanding that there are certain programs in UNESCO whose budget is $5,000.00 and $10,000 for a country project. It's inconceivable to think that any strong developments can come with such a small amount of money. Let me use another example here of a large organization -- ECOSOC -- who, since 1945, has added to its dossier 141 separate projects without ever taking one away. We think that after 37 years -- 36 years in UNESCO -- that surely there are priorities we had then that are either satisfied or priorities that cannot be -- concerns that can't be met effectively and efficiently, and that we should reallocate our resources.

Consequently, with 25 percent less, we would hope that UNESCO would look and ask what their real mandate is in development for educational/social/natural sciences/ communications and culture.

Q What are the other five real problem agencies, in addition to UNESCO, you said had made improvements?

A Consequently, we do not view them anymore as problem agencies. The concerns we had at the time were the IAEA; of course, because of the political questions there. The FAO, because of spending. Their last biennium was 8.6 percent, and concerns about some of their programs. The ILO concerns recurring, of course, programatically; United Nations Environmental Program; International Telecommunication Union. Those are the five that we were very concerned about.

Q In the letter that you wrote to the Secretary General, you say the results of the recent general -- that many of our efforts have been productive, at least in relative terms. Can you go through those areas that have been productive, which is a lot milder word than you used to describe the latest behavior was transitory?

A We are speaking there to the programs which UNESCO has done well, such as an attempt to eradicate illiteracy in the education sector. We would talk of their cultural work with effect, such as Abu Simbel, the City of Venice, etc.

Q I'm sorry, I thought in reading this that you're referring to efforts by you to get UNESCO back on the path.

You were referring in the previous paragraph to that as having been productive, at least in relative terms.

Q There, we're speaking of the general conference, and I guess that's where we talk about proving the point; that directions can be -- movement can be made forward. And the second paragraph says but it proves another point, and that is the one we've already talked about.

Q Aside from the change in tone, what was the forward movement. Can you define that any better for us?

A I'm afraid it's limited to the behavioral change.

Q Will the U.S. Mission remain full strength in Paris?

A Yes. We will continue to participate this year fully. We will keep our Ambassador there. We will live up to our legitimate, financial obligations which will be paid on or about October 1. So we will continue participating.

Q Can you say -- give us a rough estimation of what the Soviet contribution is, or the Soviet-bloc contribution is to UNESCO?

A I believe it's about 11 percent.

STAFF: 12.5.

MR. NEWELL: 12.5.

Q The Soviets or the Soviet-bloc?

A Thank you, Barbara.

Q I beg your pardon, sir?

A 12.5.

Q The Soviets or the Soviet-bloc.

A Is that the Soviet-block or the U.S. --

STAFF: I believe it's the Soviet Union alone.

MR. NEWELL: The Soviet Union alone. I think that might be the Soviet-bloc; I think.

Q Can you give an example of the kind of significant change? For example, you talk about politicization. What do you want -- how do they show the significant change; that it's not just --

A How would they have shown; is that the question?

Q Yes. In other words, you said that's one of the three criteria. What do you want them to do?

A No. 1, in disarmament and peace, which is propagandistic, we would like to see them leave that alone. Disarmament issues are to be dealt with, in our judgment, at it's appropriate place in Geneva, the Committee on Disarmament or in the first committee in New York. We do not believe that UNESCO is the appropriate place to discuss disarmament.

On human rights, we would like them -- UNESCO -- to live up to its own mandate as enunciated in the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights rather than getting off into collective rights which are not a part of that Declaration.

In terms of communications, that they would back away from, cease support for mechanisms which would led us to a New World Information and Communications Order.

In terms of the statist approach, the second problem, they would move away from the New International Economic Order which they inject in virtually every resolution that comes forward.

And, No. 3, in budget and management, that they would seek some type of a ceiling and then we would, of course, opt to slip over to the other track of our five priorities, and increase American personnel.

We are not even in our minimum range there. We would seek further positions for Americans in UNESCO. We would seek greater enhancement of the private sector's involvement in UNESCO.

Q How many UNESCO employees are there?

A There are approved 2,603, I believe. But they normally run at a 20 percent vacancy factor, and they have for several years. That concerns us for two reasons. One is management. The second is those funds that are appropriated for personnel are changed -- they're taken and used elsewhere.

Q Can you tell me how many Americans there are that actually work for UNESCO?

A Yes. There are 89. The range is from 92 to 123. We have 8.1 percent of the professional posts.

Q What impact, if any, did the recent Heritage Foundation study, which reached many of the same conclusions, have on the Administration decision?

A I think we had influence on the article because our review started five months before the article appeared.

Q You didn't mention Israel in this list of problems. That has been a problem, has it not, in UNESCO?

A It hasn't of recent months. UNESCO has behaved well on that question.

Q What are the personnel goals for U.S. personnel in international organizations?

A The personnel goals in UNESCO?

Q No, in international institutions?

A In international institutions would be that the Americans find themselves within the agreed ranges which are established geographically. This is another concern with us with UNESCO. We should be, again, 92 to 123. We're at 89, below the low end.

I was told a year ago that they were really looking for more women in UNESCO. I reminded the Director General that we had sent 128 women candidates to him and one was hired, and not for the same post, meaning that the 128 weren't for the same post. That's Number One.

In all the time that I have been here -- eighteen months -- I know of one other hiring at a policy level which just occurred; which occurred during the period in preparation for this conference.

Our goal there would be at least to get to the minimum of 92 or 93 policy positions in UNESCO. Throughout the system, it would be find ourselves within the range which has been agreed to geographically.

Let me go back to UNESCO for just a moment. Another offensive thing that caused us concern in this last General Conference is that regional distribution was changed -- this Conference agreed; of course, by a majority vote -- to accord to the developing world 700 of the 900 policy posts which concerns us gravely. That means instead of increasing in positions, the Americans would actually decline.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:40 p.m.)

WANG 4583U

END

3 2 88

Duncan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, January 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #1

MONDAY, JANUARY 3, 1983, 12:11 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, has any decision been made about military spares for Guatemala?

A No. That issue remains under review. There's no final decision taken on that, and I can't give you a timetable.

Q Is the U.S. close to a decision?

A I can't give you a timetable.

Q Any comment on disagreements on the talks at Khaldah between the Israelis and the Lebanese?

A No. I understand from the press, actually, that there's been an announcement that they will reconvene on Thursday, I think it was, but I refer you to the wires on that.

Obviously, we believe it's important that the talks move forward as quickly as possible, and as active participants we will do our best to work with the Lebanese and the Israelis to complete an agenda for the talks and then to make rapid progress on the substantive issues.

Q Alan, what's President Nimeiri of Sudan doing in Washington?

A He is here on a private visit for a medical checkup.

Q Is he seeing Dr. Reagan?

(Laughter)

A No official meetings have been scheduled.

Q Do you have any reading on the Pravda piece of yesterday on arms control?

A   Not particulary, Marvin. We had some reaction, as you know, to the interview or the exchange with Hearst, and I think Ambassador Rowney addressed himself to the Pravda piece yesterday.

The only thing I would note is that while we welcome the positive tone of Mr. Andropov's statement, we also had some other comments to say about it substantively and would refer you to that. But we would hope that the contrasting negative tone in the Pravda editorial would not be reflected when the negotiations resume in February.

Q   Do you have any reaction to the Chinese threat about textiles?

A   The U.S. textile negotiating team is currently on its way to Beijing and will hold negotiations January 6-13 concerning the renewal of the bilateral textile agreement.

Because textiles are important to both our economies, the negotiations have not been easy. It's the U.S. Government's sincere desire to continue addressing our textile trade problems through a mutually acceptable agreement, as we've done during the past three years, and we're thus hopeful that the negotiations will be successful and a new agreement will be finalized.

Q   You don't have any reaction to the specific Chinese statement --

A   The idea of a threat of some sort?

Q   Yes.

A   No. I don't have any comment on that.

Q   Alan, if we could go back a moment to your comment earlier on the Pravda piece, you said the contrasting negative tone in the Pravda article.

What is your reading of the contrasting negative tone?

A   I don't have a reading to offer you, Marvin.

Q   Why did you say "contrasting negative tone"?

A Because there was a contrast in the tone, and what I said was that we hope that that would not be what would carry over to the talks in February.

Q Do you see this as two sides of one policy or perhaps two policies?

A I will let you make that analysis.

Q Who is heading the U.S. team to China?

A I do not have a name on that. I think it's being headed by USTR and would refer you to them on that.

Q Sir, I have not been here for a number of weeks for a very good reason, but have there been any background briefings on Mr. Andropov or has State conferred with any of the Hungarians who knew him when he was Ambassador there?

A I don't think there have been any background briefings specifically on the new Soviet leadership, and, without leading you one way or another, I don't think I would get into the question of whether we've been talking to people about --

Q There are people in this area who were there and who were in a position to at least have followed and who were Hungarian nationals in this area.

A I understand that. Steve, did you have another question?

Q Yes. Can you tell us if there's been any change in the multilateral negotiations toward nuclear export controls?

A Any change?

Q Yes. There was an article --

A Let me react to the article which appeared in The Washington Post this morning, simply to say that the article is essentially accurate; that the United States, over the past two years, has been engaged in bilateral and multilateral discussions with other nuclear supplier nations regarding ways to improve supplier controls and coordination to prevent the export of sensitive items to nations of proliferation concern.

In connection with these efforts, we have furnished our control lists to other supplier nations and explained why we control certain items.

Q Can you answer two specifics on that? The article seems to indicate that there has been a major change in the nature of the list of multilaterally controlled items, but there seems to be some dispute about that, whether there's actually been a major expansion of the list or if the list has been clarified or whether that's just clarifications.

Could you tell us the nature of the change of the listing? Can you also get into whether we're still working with the old London group or this new group that the Post mentions, or is it bilaterals?

A I can't get further into the specifics of the confidential discussions that are taking place in terms of your specific question, but I would emphasize that the initiative does not represent a change in the Administration's policy.

The President in his statement of July 16, 1981, made very clear that the United States was vigorously seeking the cooperation of other supplier nations in improving nuclear export controls as one part of his overall non-proliferation policy.

Q Does this have anything to do with the non-proliferation -- didn't we just have talks with the Soviet Union last week here in this building, bilaterals?

A I don't know if it was last week. There were talks recently.

Q Were they connected with mutilateral nuclear export controls?

A I don't recall the words we used at the time. I would have to --

Q They were vague.

A They were vague.

Q Yeah.

A I'm afraid I'm going to have to leave them vague.

Q Did we supply the Soviets with our list of people we have controls against?

A I don't know the answer to that, Bob, and I think that I'm going to have to stick with what we did say which I think Steve accurately points out was somewhat vague at the time about the discussions we had here, and I'm not going to be able to go beyond that.

Q Regarding the visit of the Israeli President, do you know if there are going to be any background briefings before the meeting of President Navon and President Reagan?

A You ought to check at the White House, but my understanding is that there probably will not be a pre-brief, but there would likely be, I would guess, some sort of a readout afterward. But let me ask you to ask the White House about that.

Q And a second question about it. I understand that Newsweek is carrying a story today, saying that Administration officials hope that Mr. Navon will run for Prime Minister in Israel.

Do you have any comment on that report?

A U.S. Administration officials?

Q Yes.

A We certainly would not get into the question of domestic politics in Israel.

Q Getting back for just a second to the nuclear non-proliferation, in the vague statement that you made at the time of that meeting you did refer to non-proliferation.

A Yes.

Q Is it safe --

A That was the topic of the meeting.

Q Right. But is it safe to assume that the topics -- that this topic was included in that discussion or is it --

A As I just said, I am not going to go beyond the words we used at that time to describe those talks. I know that's not helpful, but that's where we are on those talks.

Q Initially the announcement made by this office about the visit of the Israeli President, Mr. Navon, was that it will be an official visit. I see the program now it says official working visit.

What made the change come about?

A I'm not familiar with how it was described. I don't recall that it was described in different terms in the past. I don't think the nature of the visit in essence has changed.

Q Is it a matter of semantics? Because there was official visit, like a head of state, now it's a working --

A No. But it's still an official -- you said it's an official working visit, right?

Q Yes.

A Both words are operative, but I don't think the nature of the visit in protocol terms has changed.

-- MORE --

Q In your answer earlier about the Israeli-Lebanese talks, you said something about the agenda. I was under the impression that the agenda was already set, and you said something now that they're still working on the agenda? Or did you mean the --

A That was my understanding.

Q So the agenda is not yet --

A That's my understanding.

Q So the agenda is not yet ready. I mean, is it -- what I'm trying to also understand is it the agenda or the priorities within the agenda, the list of priorities?

A I refer you again to the statement that was made by a spokesman in the region, at the talk site today; and I believe he referred to the fact that there had not been agreement yet on the agenda, that they were going to move ahead. But let me refer you to his remarks as characterizing specifically what's going on because I don't have them here. And as I said last week, the timing is such that it's difficult for us to have as up-to-date a reading as you might be able to get directly from the site.

Q There are reports in Lebanon that Habib will go out for the reconvening of the talks. Can you tell us if that's true?

A For the reconvening of the talks -- what, this week?

Q Yes, this week.

A I don't have specifics to give you. I would think that that's unlikely. I mean, we've indicated before that he would join in those talks from time to time with Ambassador Draper. My understanding is he may well come to Washington later this week for discussions here; and I would expect that he will go back to the region, as I've said. But I don't know of anything that's quite that imminent.

Q Any information about another visit by King Hussein to Washington?

A No. I have nothing new on that.

Q Any reaction to the quotes from President Saddam Hussein of Iraq?

A In this morning's story on that?

It's long been our position that the acceptance of the right of Israel to exist as a nation is basic to moving the peace process forward, and we would, of course, welcome any moves by Israel's neighbors in this direction. But as for characterizing the conversation alleged to have taken place between Congressman Solarz and the Iraqi President, I would have to refer you to the participants themselves or to their representatives.

Q Do you have a more precise date now for when the Secretary is going to be in China?

A We've announced the trip and it's posted.

Q The reason I asked it is: Is it your expectation that this agreement on textiles will be -- is it expected to be -- completed when he's there?

A We certainly would hope so. The Secretary isn't going to China until February; and the negotiations, as I said, are taking place, I think it was the 6th to the 13th. And we would certainly hope that they would be successfully concluded; we would hope they'd be successfully concluded.

Q I guess last week the White House released the text of a letter Ken Duberstein wrote to Congressman Sharp saying that this Administration had warned Canada to lower the price of exported natural gas to the U.S. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on this.

Q Can you check into whether there have been any U.S. missions to Iraq in the last couple of months?

A No. We have a dialogue on occasion; but, no, I don't think I would get into the question of missions.

Q Where does the nomination of Richard Burt now stand with the new Congress? Does it have to be resubmitted, and does he have to go through hearings again?

A That's, if you will, a technical question. I don't know the answer. I mean, it has more than technical consequences. But I don't know the specific answer. Let me see if I can find out what the state of play on that is.

Q Yes. And will you --

A There are other nominations that are pending as well.

Q Yes. Specifically, the Gray nomination -- does that have to go through the same --

A Let me see what I can find out. I'm not sure there's a clean-cut answer that applies to all cases, but let me check.

Q Can you tell us when the Human Rights Report is going to be issued, and can you tell us when the Administration will make its announcement -- or whatever the term is -- to Congress on recertification for El Salvador?

A On the Human Rights Reports, they're due sometime during January. I'm not sure precisely when. And they will be --

Q I knew that much.

A You knew that much. You know as much as I do. I don't have a specific time. And as you are well aware, it's a very thick volume with a lot of different reports in it and it's not an easy thing to put together and it's hard to predict exactly when it will be ready.

As far as the certification is concerned, my understanding -- recollection -- is that it's due the 28th of January; and I would anticipate that the decision would be made on that and whatever necessary procedures to be followed at that time immediately before it. But I would think that that would be the target date and would not anticipate something two weeks ahead of time.

Q But are the two things directly related? I mean, that this --

A No. I don't think the publication of the Human Rights Report is related to the certification procedure. Obviously, in terms of El Salvador's own human rights performance, the certification is related. But I don't think the publication is related to it, no.

Q Can you tell us where the U.S. stands currently on the widespread Israeli use of M-16 rifles while at the same time Israel is marketing to some sixty countries throughout the world its own Galil soldiers' rifle?

A I'm not a weapons expert and I guess I would refer you to the Pentagon for a question such as that I'm not sure. They could tell you and me both whether they're comparable systems. And I can't confirm what they're doing throughout the world. But, anyway, that's not a question that I would be prepared here to answer.

Q Has Representative Solarz communicated -- did he communicate what he is supposed to have heard from President Saddam to any State Department officials here about his conversation there?

A I don't know the answer to that and I really would have to refer you to him for any comment on what he may have said both to the President of Iraq and to the Administration. I think it's only fair that if he had a conversation that he should have control over what he wants said about it.

Q Is it customary that such members of Congress, when they have such conversations, to report to you?

A He may well have, but I don't know. And, again, I don't think it's a question that I could follow up because it would, I think, be appropriate for him to address.

Q What's the status of the 60 helicopters that one of the American companies would like to sell to Iraq? I think it was mentioned a few weeks ago.

A It was more than a few weeks ago -- I mean, more recently than a few weeks ago. We addressed this last week. And I think that in terms of the status of the sales, you'd have to go to the company, because, as I understand it, the kinds of helicopters that were being talked about in the press were not of a type that would require licensing and there were no licenses issued. So I would have to refer you to the company on that.

Q There was still an offer from Congress for the State Department to review the sale. Do you know if the State Department has made a decision?

A No. I know that as of last week we had received a letter on that subject and that it was being reviewed, but I don't have an update to give you on a response for it and --

Q When you say it's being reviewed, you mean the letter was being reviewed, not the sale.

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A The letter was being reviewed.

Q In Chris Dickey's piece this morning from Guatemala, there's reference to the Bell helicopters.

A Yes.

Q There's been a ban on those sales. Does the Department see any violation in what's reported in the Post?

A I'm not sure, not having the details, that I would agree that there necessarily is a ban on the sales; but there's been a ban on the sales of military spare parts and equipment.

My understanding is that the reference was perhaps to civilian helicopters, which would not have come under the licensing restrictions or regulations.

Q Well, he referred explicitly to some armored equipment as aboard the --

A Yes. I mean, the fact is that there has been, to our knowledge, no sale during the period when there has been a prohibition or a restriction of military --

Q But you wouldn't rule out that Bell has sold them some other helicopters that could be converted to --

A I haven't talked to some experts on this. As I indicated, I think in discussing the possible sale to Iraq, there are differences between civilian and military helicopters -- including hard points, for example, to which one could attach armaments -- but I don't know the details of what the situation may be that Dickey was referring to and I'm not prepared to address it.

Q This is related to all of these sales. The Administration is supposed to come out at some point fairly shortly with its foreign policy bans on exports to various places. Can you give us any indication of when that's going to be?

A No. I don't have anything for you.

Q O.K., thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

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p. 13

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[1983] DPC #2

TUESDAY, JANUARY 4, 1982, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you tell us what the situation is with the various nominations of Messrs. Grey, Burt and McCormack?

A I don't think it's a secret because I think that Larry Speakes has addressed himself to it. I have to refer you to him instead of to me. They're Presidential appointments but I think that information -- he's made some statements today on this.

Q And how about the situation of Director of ACDA Rostow; is there any change, perspective change in his --

A I don't have anything on Mr. Rostow's situation. I don't know whether Larry has anything or whether, indeed, the ACDA Public Affairs people have anything in particular.

Q What happens to Mr. Grey now?

A Again, it's not ours to address, and I'm going to have to beg off with that.

Q Well, he works in this building.

A He works for ACDA. Address your questions to ACDA to to the White House in terms of --

Q He's a Foreign Service officer.

A Fine. At this point I don't have anything to give you.

Q Do you have anything on new Syrian missiles?

A Yes, I do. For those who might not have seen it, there was a wire item coming out of Israel talking about the development of bases for missiles in Syria. Specific reference was made, I think in those reports, to SA-5 missiles.

We have been aware of reports regarding these missiles and we would obviously regret any measure from either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict that would heighten the risk of conflicts in the region.

Q Are these reports press, or your own intelligence reports?

A These are press reports that I'm referring to.

Q So you have no independent confirmation?

A I have nothing to give you beyond that.

Q Have you been able to confirm that they are in fact preparing to put SA-5's on the border?

A I don't have anything to offer you beyond what I just said in terms of that.

Q Has Israel asked the U.S. to do something about this, to talk to the Syrians, or anything else?

A As usual, I can't get into the question of diplomatic conversations, so I'm afraid I can't address that question either.

Q Why are you leaving open whether there's any U.S. confirmation or not?

A I'm not addressing the issue.

Q Do you have any judgment as to whether or not deployments, if they exist, would heighten the chances of conflict, reduce them or not affect them?

A I think I'm going to stick with the statement that I gave rather than making that kind of a judgment.

Q I thought I would ask.

Q You were directing that to Israel or the Syrians?

A I'm going to stick with the statement I just made.

Q The information that you have is that missiles are inside Syria?

A That's what the reports are talking about --

construction of missile bases inside Syria. As far as I read the reports, it didn't talk about deployment of missiles at this point. I'm reflecting my recollection of those wire reports.

Q Is it that you don't have information to confirm or you don't want to get involved in the question of confirming or not confirming?

A I think it would be impossible for us to get into the question of confirming or not confirming. It would be based presumably on information that would come from intelligence, and therefore, it could not be addressed.

Q Your regret would extend to the possibility of Syrians upgrading the level of their air defense inside Syria?

A I'm going to have to stick with the words of what I said. We would obviously regret any measure from either side of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would heighten the risk of conflicts in the region.

Q As far as you know, these missiles, they're used there for the first time outside the Soviet Union?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q What about the Warsaw countries?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q I realize this may sound elementary, but you specifically said from either side. Does that not extend to the Soviet --

A That means from either side.

Q Does that not extend to the Soviet Union? What does "side" mean?

A In the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Q The Arab-Israeli conflict?

A That's what I said.

Q So it doesn't extend to the Soviet Union?

A Obviously, any exacerbation of tensions in the region from anybody would be something we would regret, but this is addressing itself in the context of this particular statement.

Q Can we assume that -- this is a hypothetical statement -- that you don't have confirmed evidence from reliable sources of the presence of such missiles? Usually you don't comment on press statements. You say all the time that you saw the press reports. Do you think this focus means that you have good information that there are such missiles, or is it different from your understanding?

A I'm also, in this case, going to stick to the statement and not go beyond it.

Q Do you have any comment on the other report coming from Israel about an attempt to launch Katyusha rockets on Qiryat Shimona while the talks were held there or around it?

A No, I don't have anything on it. I did see one report on that, but I simply don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Do you have reaction to reports from Israel that the Israeli Labor Party is encouraging the building of homes in the occupied West Bank?

A No, I had not seen that report. Our position on settlments in the West Bank is quite well known. I've not seen that particular report.

Q In the statement now, you mentioned that the U.S. regrets any measures which would heighten the tension. Is the new purchase by Syria of these missiles, if they're true, is it a heightening of tension?

A Again, I was essentially asked that question before, and I'm going to, regrettably from your perspective, have to stick with the language in the statement and just let it speak for itself and not go beyond that at this point.

Q Is there any readout of the meeting between Secretary Shultz and President Navon?

A They met for about a half hour this morning, and had a discussion of issues of mutual interest. (Laughter) It was a good discussion, but nothing special to report to you.

Q Did the Middle East come up? (Laughter)

A Did the Middle East come up? I wouldn't rule that out.

Q Is the welcome and the very high regard accorded Navon due to the fact that the Administration thinks that he is the possible rival or successor to

Menachem Begin?

A No. We discussed this a bit yesterday. The description and the treatment of President Navon is standard for this type of a visit. This is the sort of thing that happens when somebody such as President Navon, who is not on a state visit, comes here but is a guest of the United States while he is in Washington. But I don't think there is anything particularly unusual about it. I think there was a bit of a flurry here yesterday. I don't frankly quite understand it.

Q What time did they decide to have Secretary Shultz meet with them? When was that decision made?

A I don't know when the decision was made. As far as I know, it is not a surprise, last-minute decision or something like that.

Q It wasn't listed on his schedule. You put out a schedule for him, Mr. Navon, yesterday and said he was going to the hotel but it made no mention of the meeting with Shultz. And then today I'm told that the representative of the Protocol Office, when he arrived, said he was going to the hotel but he had no meetings there. It's my understanding that the State Department put out a schedule this morning showing that Mr. Shultz was indeed meeting with him.

A I can't tell you specifically when it was laid out, but, as I say, I don't think there's anything of particular import here. I would steer you away entirely from any suggestion, as I think I did yesterday, too, that the U.S. either is or has any interest in getting involved in domestic Israeli politics. That simply would be a totally incorrect interpretation of any events.

Q Picking up this point, I think one of the implications is that we would appreciate knowing in advance when the Secretary is meeting a guest when there clearly is no such reference to earlier schedules.

A I take your point.

Q Do you have a final decision to announce today on the Guatemala spare parts sale?

A No, I don't have anything new for you on that today other than to indicate that the process is not yet completed. I would say that as soon as it is, we'll volunteer a statement without waiting for the question to be asked. Maybe that will spare us all some agony.

Q Will it be just a statement, or will you have details? Could there be a briefing on that?

A Let's see what the nature of what we have to say is and then determine what it is that we do with it.

Q The language is different today. Has a final decision been reached?

A I've given you what I've got today.

Q Alan, what is exactly the process to which you refer?

A There are a variety of things that have to be gone into in terms of consideration within the Administration and with others outside the Administration in looking at this question.

Q If you don't mind, back on the Middle East. I don't know if you made any comments, or you care to now, about a report that direct meetings between PLO and Israeli officials --

A I don't have any comment on that.

Q On the question related to the Guatemala chopper sale, will you similarly volunteer the answer on the Jordanian arms request if and when it comes?

A It isn't a question of the request. I'm not sure we would volunteer necessarily a request that comes to us. Obviously, if we have a decision, that we were going forward with something, that, I think, would be a different matter.

Q Has there been a request from Jordan for --

A No. There's been no change in that status.

Q Has there been an official communique from the Israeli Government to the United States in regard to the request?

A I don't have anything on that. I've seen some press stories out of Israel indicating that there would be some objections to it. That would hardly be surprising, but I don't have anything and I don't think we would go into the question of our discussions in diplomatic channels on this.

Q What about the use of -- supposedly they were threatening of using some public officials, or the Congress of the United States to stop such sales.

A I'm simply not aware of that story.

Q I would like to go back to the missiles for a minute. I realize you hav a problem with your guidance there, but I think your guidance is defective.

A Impossible! (Laughter)

Q Can you explain to us how it is that defensive weapons such as surface-to-air, anti-aircraft missiles inside a sovereign state's terrority would risk raising tensions or raise the possibility of a conflict?

A At the risk of sounding like a record that's stuck at one point, I am going to stick with the statement I made. I just have nothing to go beyond that.

Q I can only think that you're maybe referring to something else. For example, are you referring to the possibility of Soviet technicians along with these missiles.

A The only thing I can say about Soviet technicians or missile crews, if there were missiles to be deployed and if there were Soviet missile crews to be deployed along with them, that that would not be helpful.

Q Congressman George Crockett from Michigan sent a letter to Representative Clement Zablocki December 7 asking for the Congress to conduct a hearing on the possibility of United States complicity in the September '82 massacre of Palestinians civilians in Sabra and Shatila, and he points a finger at the State Department's answers and communication to this effect.

Do you have any comment on this, or what's your position on this, if there will be such an inquiry by the Congress?

A First of all, obviously it's a hypothetical question and I'm not prepared to address that. Our position, in terms of what we did, what we knew, when we knew it and so on, has been addressed in various ways, both on the record and on background from here. I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

The Secretary, I think, on occasion, has addressed it. Senior officials have addressed it on background.

Q But you cannot comment on the request --

A I'm not aware of the requests specifically, and I think we would want to see if there is a specific request, what it was and so on, examine it before we would comment.

Q I have a follow-up question on the missiles, just because I didn't quite hear the answer to the question on Soviet technicians. Was that a hypothetical?

A I said if.

Q Yes.

Q Do you have any Namibian guidance? Apparently some South African generals are saying that they're prepared to stay in Namibia for another two years?

A No. I think we're where we have been on that. I'd refer you back to what we have said about it as opposed to what some individual generals may have said.

Q Do you have any status update on the talks?

A No, I don't.

Q On the question of Namibia, there was a report last week that a Cuban official had gone to the Soviet Union, apparently to dicuss the question of the Cuban troops in Angola. Do you have any readout on that?

A No.

Q In what phase are we in in the talks right now?

A I refer you back to the last briefing on this subject. I don't want to try and get into it.

Q Is texiles likely to be on the agenda of the Secretary's visit to China with or without an agreement?

A I addressed this yesterday and said that we hoped that this question would have been resolved successfully in the course of the forthcoming negotiations from January 6-13. I don't have anything beyond that to offer you at this particular point.

Q On El Salvador, I believe there's a report that the trial of the five accused of the murders has been delayed again. Do you have any comment on the delay? Will it affect the Administration's recertification process?

A Let me simply say that we have not yet received any confirmation that the Appeals Court granted to the defense its motion to return the case to the investigative

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stage.

Our Embassy is looking into the report. As we understand it, the defense attorney who raised the motion is attempting to secure more time for his clients defense. But in the meantime the accused guardsmen remain in detention. I don't think I could go beyond that to speculate about the effect on certification or anything of that sort at this particular time.

Q You'll wait until you get confirmation of that before you make a statement?

A I don't think I would speculate in any case on the certification process which is several weeks away still.

Q How about on the judicial process which this Department has commented on?

A I don't have anything new to offer you about that. This is clearly part of their judicial process, that they give the attorneys sufficient time to study the record and develop the case. The guardsmen, as I say, remain in detention, and I just call your attention to that.

Q Back to the Middle East, is there a U.S. position on the current crises between the PLO and Saudi Arabia and Britain on major philosphies?

A No.

Q Do you support Britain's position?

A I have no comment at all.

Q Do you have anything on the abduction of 67 Nicaraguans supposedly by a right wing extremist from outside Nicaragua?

A No. I think I had something yesterday which indicated that we didn't have any information on it. I couldn't comment.

Q Let me just go back to your starting point, which was ACDA. Do you have anything on our going to Geneva with complaints about encoding of telemetry being done by the Soviet Union now?

A The answer, I guess, would be in two parts. One is, as far as what we would say in Geneva, in any case, we would not comment about the confidential discussions. Also I have no comment at this point on the story that appeared in the paper this morning.

Q What about plans to -- again, you might not comment -- to talk about on-site inspection? Do we have any ideas on that?

A No, I think again, at least as far as START is concerned, Ambassador Rowney addressed that issue to a certain extent on television this weekend. I don't have anything to add to what he said at that point.

Q Do you have anything on the purpose of Eagleburger's meeting the Romanian ambassador today?

A No. As we've indicated, he is going to Romania.

Q I've been out for a couple days, but has the schedule of that trip been announced?

A No. I don't think we've announced a specific schedule. He will be going to Romania and Yugoslavia between the 10th and the 13th of this month. But I don't have specifics beyond that.

--MORE--

Q As you know, last week Romania announced what's been described as a GATT moritoria. In light of this Department's publications on Soviet active measures involving manipulation of international currency prices, gold prices and so on, do you regard this announcement by Romania as a Soviet-inspired action?

A Let me just respond in this way: We understand that the Government of Romania has requested a rescheduling of its 1983 maturities due commercial banks, and that it intends to suspend principal repayments to the bank. Such a suspension of principal repayments in conjunction with a request for debt rescheduling is not uncommon.

Q Okay, can I ask you another follow-up on that? There have been widely publicized and, in my view, exaggerated stories regarding a Brazilian banking measure also taken last week, which involves a 2-month suspension of principal payments.

Does the Department have any information that the exaggerated publicity around that announcement may be coordinated with the Romanian action in any way and maybe directed toward provoking a bank panic in the United States?

A I have nothing to offer you on that.

Q Do you have any comments on King Fahd's, of Saudi Arabia, visit to the United States here in Washington next February?

A No. I don't have anything.

Q Do you have any additional information on the problem of the $1 million house of the Libyans in New Jersey?

A Yes, I do have something on that. The question was, anything on the purchase by the Libyan Mission at the U.N. of a $1 million house in New Jersey. Let me just give you what I have on that.

In accordance with the general practice of member state missions to the United Nations, Libya did not consult with the United States Government concerning property purchased for use related to its mission functions.

Moreover, at the time the property was purchased, and to date, the U.S. has not generally pursued a practice of monitoring or restricting purchase of property intended to facilitate a member state's U.N. representation.

There is a question regarding the Foreign Missins Act and how that might apply. The provisions of the Act regarding the right to purchase property did not originally apply to missions to the United Nations. The Secretary has taken action to make the Act so applicable, and all missions to the U.N. will be notified of this officially shortly.

Precisely how that implementation will affect this particular property is yet to be determined.

Q Can we get a copy?

A I think you're going to have to wait until this afternoon to get it, but, yes, you can get it later on this afternoon.

Q What's the sentence, the one before the last, about the new measure?

A I don't know that I have it written out. That they're going to be notified, or after that?

Q Just before the end, how this new ruling will affect --

A Precisely how the implementation would affect this property, the Libyan property?

Q The one before that -- the sentence before that.

A The sentence before that was that the Secretary has taken action to make the Act applicable in the question of holding property -- purchasing property -- and all missions to the United Nations will be officially notified of this shortly.

Q How is the Secretary doing that? Is he asking Congress to amend the Act?

A No. I, unfortunately, don't have it in front of me, but under the Act, I gather there is a provision in it which the Secretary could invoke to do this, and he has done that.

Q Just by fiat?

A It's in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

Q Why did he do it?

A I don't have a specific explanation of why he did it. He did it because it was his judgment it was the appropriate thing to do.

Q When did he do that? Was that quite recent?

A I would guess -- I don't know. Why don't I not guess? But it -- quite recent -- I don't think it was in a matter of the last few days, no.

Q Does this apply to consulates around the country?

A I really would have to refer you to the Act itself. As I understand it, on its face, in addition to this provision which could apply to the United Nations, it applies to missions to the United States -- to different missions to the United States -- and I can't answer you technically how it applies to consultates, for example. My understanding is that it may, but I really would ask you to pursue that.

Q Is it a new law?

A The Foreign Missions Act.

Q Was this triggered, by any chance, by the Libyan purchase?

A I don't have the specifics of the Act.

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

[1983] DPC #3

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 5, 1982, 12:13 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. It is nice to be back at the podium, I think.

I don't have a great portfolio for you today, so I thought we'd just take a couple of questions and then run down to the Smithsonian to look at Bernie Kalb's typewriter.

(Laughter)

Be glad to attempt to answer any questions you might have.

Q What is the arrangement on the Navon meeting this morning? Will there be a readout here or at the White House?

A I think that -- you want to check at the White House -- but I think that there may well be a readout after the lunch at the White House.

Q Do you have anything new on these Syrian missiles that we were kicking around yesterday?

A Nothing more than what Alan told you yesterday.

Q How do you comment on the Warsaw Pact proposal of the non-aggression treaty and the offer to dissolve the Warsaw Pact if the West would abolish NATO?

A We don't. We're not going to have any comment on that.

Q Why?

A Simply we're not going to comment on that.

Q Not commenting now or ever?

A I doubt that we will have any comment later, but we're certainly not commenting today.

Q John, do you see any difference between what they proposed today and what Mr. Gromyko had proposed at the U.N. last year?

A Just not going to get into that, Bob.

Q Any comment, John, on the comments by Rostow that forces who don't want an agreement with the Soviet Union are complicating personnel, etc., in his office?

A No, I don't think so. Our arms control policy is the President's policy. The President sets that policy, and I don't think we would want to get into a question of debate within the Administration. Insofar as Mr. Rostow's remarks yesterday, I think he was expressing his own viewpoint, and I think we'd simply refer you to ACDA on that.

Q Do you have any comments on the decision in Englewood, New Jersey, on the Libyans?

A I think we -- Englewood, New Jersey, the Libyan --

MR. ROMBERG: Nothing further.

A Nothing beyond -- did you do something on it yesterday?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

A Nothing beyond yesterday, I'm afraid.

Q Yesterday the question came up, though, that the State Department was looking into how it -- what measures it could take under the Foreign Missions Act.

Could you give us some timetable on that?

A I don't think that has been taken any further. Still looking into it.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Draper's progress or lack of?

A Mr. Draper is in Jerusalem talking with -- I think he probably will talk with the Israeli Foreign Minister today and other Israeli officials.

Beyond that, I don't have any readout for you, Bernie, on how that's proceeding.

Q What can you tell us about Mr. Habib's movements?

A Mr. Habib came in to town last night. I saw a story somewhere saying that he was summoned, and it suggested there was a sense of crisis or urgency about that. That's not true.

I, myself, talked to Mr. Habib in Florida -- he was in Florida last week, as I was -- and he told me at that time that he was planning to come to Washington this week, so he's right on schedule.

He would be here this week. It has always been scheduled that he would come back and talk about Lebanon and the Middle East, and that's exactly what he's doing with a number of officials in this building today.

Q Will he be returning within the week to the Middle East?

A I don't really have anything on travel plans for you. I think if he were going, it would be unlikely that he would go this week -- I would think he would be in Washington for some time -- but I don't really have anything for you on his travel plans.

Q John, can you give us any information about this Soviet satellite of some sort that apparently is in some trouble?

A Not really, Bob. Not at the moment. Don't have anything for you at the present on that.

Q Might you later today?

A Let's just wait and see how things develop.

Q How do you assess so far the Lebanese-Israeli-American talks between Khaldah and Qiryat Shemona so far in the last couple of weeks. Tomorrow will be another meeting, I believe.

A Another meeting would be scheduled tomorrow, yes. I don't think we're characterizing them or getting into the detail. Obviously, we were pleased that the meetings have begun, and, obviously, we hope that they will come to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. But, beyond that, I don't think we're going to get into the detail of where they stand from hour-to-hour and day-to-day.

Q On the Rostow story again, do you want him to quit?

A No, no. It's not a question of any plans or any suggestions that Mr. Rostow is going to quit. You have seen the developments in the past few days where a nomination is not going forward, but that has left Mr. Rostow's situation unchanged so far as I'm aware.

Q As far as you know, why has the nomination not gone forward?

A I don't know. I think you'd have to ask the White House on that.

Q Is there any confirmation of the reported Katyusha rockets in south Lebanon? Do you have anything about it at all?

A No. Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you confirm such reports yourself?

A I can't, no.

Q John, can you take the question as to whether consideration is being given to applying the provisions of the Foreign Missions Act retroactively to the Libyan case in Englewood?

A Why don't we take a look into that for you. Sure.

Q Could you tell me if the Secretary would favor a hyper-inflation of the U.S. economy to bail out the bankrupt international financial system?

A I'm sorry? Would favor --

Q Would favor a hyper-inflationary bailout. The use is very much on the agenda right now, and in 1971 he and Volcker had a lot to do with the U.S. taking certain measures that were in a similar direction. Have you any --

A I'm afraid you have gone beyond my depth both in terms of economics and --

Q Well, let me make it very simple. As Time magazine and a lot of other people --

A Well, you'll have to make it awful simple for me.

Q Excuse me -- are laying out right now, the international financial system is in pretty critical situation, and the obvious solution that's on the agenda from a number of bankers and the Soviets and so forth is that the United States economy should essentially take the brunt of that collapse and bail out the financial superstructure.

I'm just wondering what the Secretary thinks about that.

A I really don't know how he feels about it.

Q Can you find out?

A I think that if he has something to say about it, he will say it in due course.

-- MORE --

Q Here you got anything on Nicaragua, any reply to the Nicaraguan note yesterday?

A No, no reply.

Q Is the U.S. considering a modification of its insistence on a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola as part of the independent settlement in Namibia, given the African states rejection of that proposal?

A No, I don't know of any change in the U.S. position on the overall southern African regional situation. I'm sure there's been no change in our position in recent days or weeks.

Q Back on Navon's visit here to the States, can you clarify what is the accurate status of this visit because it's changing frequently?

A There was some confusion about that yesterday, and I think one distinguished newspaper continued to get it wrong today. It is an official visit, an official working visit. I think my colleague make that clear yesterday, but apparently in one of the papers this morning that continued to be incorrectly stated.

Q What significance do you have to this visit, or do you put on this visit of Mr. Navon?

A I think that it has been adequately explained in recent days. I think that, as I say, you may get some statements at the end of the visit after lunch and a readout, and I would wait for any characterization of the visit to come then.

Q Anything on the fighting in Tripoli?

A Not in the sense of being able to confirm exactly what is going on. We've seen the press reports and they're conflicting, but obviously this underlines, I think, our view that it is urgent that the PLO and Syrian and Israeli forces leave Lebanon, and that would be conducive to peace and stability there. So I would say that what we are seeing seems to underline the validity of that policy.

Q Do you have anything on Poland today. Despite the suspension of martial law, some fifteen hundred people are still in prison on various political charges?

A Yes, I do have something on Poland. The United States Government is very concerned over the fact that thousands of Poles remain behind bars despite the formal end of martial law.

As we have stated in the past, the key to solving Poland's deep-seeded political and economic problems is reconciliation, a goal which is not achievable so long as people remain in prison for their political beliefs.

Q Back on Tripoli, is the United States at all in any position to see to it that the fighting stops, or is the United States doing anything, is what I'm trying to say?

A If you mean in a physical sense, I would think --

Q Are you in contact with the parties --

A I don't want to get into the back-and-forth, as we never do, on diplomatic exchanges, but I think obviously our overall policy and our overall framework of negotiations would be intended and destined to halt such violence.

Q To help it?

A Did I say "help?" I thought I said "halt." Halt - h-a-l-t.

Q There are reports that the Village League heads in the West Bank that were reappointed by the Israeli occupying authorities are asking for arms from the Israeli Government in order to defend the West Bank and establish militias there. What are your comments on that. Can you give us some information on that --

A No, don't have any information to give you. Sorry.

Q Does the U. S. have any comment on the South African proposals of a constitutional reform where blacks, who are seventy percent of the population, will still be left out of the political --

A I do. The decision of the Colored Labor Party of South Africa to consider the South African Government's extension of a national political franchise to the so-called colored community is indicative of a larger process of change going on in South Africa.

While we fully recognize that the current proposals for reform do not address the fundamental question of national political rights for the seventy-two percent of South Africans who are black, a process of change is under way and we support it. The United States has no political blueprint to prescribe for South Africa's unsettled political agenda.

Our position reflects our strongly-held belief that South Africa's future is for South Africans of all races to decide. In the context of our policy of constructive engagement, we have said simply that advocates of peaceful evolutionary change in South Africa, away from apartheid and toward a system of government by consent of the governed, can look to the United States for encouragement and support.

We view developments in the so-called colored community and the reform process generally in this context.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q I have another technical question. The London International Press Institute at year's end always comes up with a rating of nations regarding freedom of the press. The United States has been on the negative side for quite a long time. They stated that freedom of the press in this country has further declined.

I personally add here, I'm a foreign correspondent --

A Is this a question or a statement?

Q It is a question. The Government press policy, accreditation process and so forth has been deteriorating also; I personally can say I have been attacked by a security guard. My leg has been broken. The FBI contacted my foreign and domestic clients.

A So the question is --

Q My question is, what can or what will this Department do to stop this? The Secret Service has informed me that they were informed from the Security Office here in the State Department that I'm a criminal. What kind of thing this is --

A I'm not aware of all this, but I'll be glad to look into it.

Q Could you please check in. My White House pass has been lifted, and the Secret Service has informed me that now the second time your Security Office here has been shedding a negative light on my activity. I don't see anything why I should stand for it.

A I'm personally unaware of this. I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #4

THURSDAY, JANUARY 6, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I just have a little housekeeping announcement, or piece of information really, for those who plan to cover the China portion of Secretary Shultz' Asian trip. They really should look at a fact sheet which is available in the Press Office and which is going to ask those who expect to be in China, either on the plane or traveling commercially, to provide certain information about where you'll be applying for visas, dates of birth, and the kind of material that the Chinese authorities are going to need from anybody who wants to go to China.

If you need any additional help or information, that can come either from Ken Bailes in the East Asian Press Office. He is in room 5310, and I guess he's on extension 21028. He will be the principal contact regarding the requirements outlined in this Fact Sheet, or also from our own Carolyn Johnson in the Press Office.

That's all I have on --

Q John, the President spoke rather briefly on the Warsaw Pact non-aggression matter last night. Maybe he wasn't prepared. Are you prepared to amplify the response?

A As the President said last night, we will consider this proposal in consultation with our Allies. Peace with justice must always be this nation's highest priority. We are, and will continue to be, receptive to ideas which would genuinely promote peace and peaceful settlements of disputes. In our discussions with our Allies, we will consider whether this is such a proposal.

At their Summit in Bonn last year, the leaders of the NATO countries pledged that none of NATO's weapons would ever be used except in response to aggression. The President has underscored this on a number of occasions. Indeed, the principle of non-aggression is a key provision of the UN Charter to which we and our NATO Allies have long subscribed. At first glance, this proposal does not seem to represent anything new. But as the President said, we will look at it.

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We learned from bitter experience between the two World Wars that simple declarations of peaceful intent are not enough. What we need are concrete results, which not only reduce the danger of war, but which contribute to an atmosphere of increased trust. To this end, the proposals that we have made in the Geneva and the Vienna negotiations on both nuclear and conventional forces are designed to achieve genuine, substantial cuts in the arsenals of both sides, as well as measures to enhance mutual confidence.

Q What concrete examples or steps would you like to see the East Bloc take, so it would be more than a declaration?

A I don't want to go beyond what President Reagan said, but in addition to the arms proposals the President has on the table, the President has proposed a number of confidence-building measures, and it seems to me there are various areas in which they could react swiftly to the President's various initiatives.

Q Could you make a copy of that statement available to us after the briefing?

A Surely.

Q So would you say that this appears more to be perhaps a political ploy for support in Western Europe for their arms negotiating positions, or a serious --

A I don't think, Mike, we really want to characterize it beyond what we've said here. As the President said, we'll look at it. But at first blush, there does not seem to be anything new in it; but we're always ready to look at --

Q Do you have anything there on any of the other proposals in that lengthy document?

A No.

Q Herr Vogel, who is the Social Democratic Party candidate for Chancellor of Germany, said this morning at a breakfast that he thought that the proposal was a step in the right direction. Do you know if that is on the agenda for his discussion with Secretary Shultz?

A I don't know what they will discuss.

Q Are you going to have a readout of those discussions?

A I doubt it. We would not ordinarily do so on that kind of a meeting, between the Secretary and a visiting opposition leader.

Q Ordinarily, would you discuss that sort of subject with an opposition leader?

A I really wouldn't presume to indicate what might be on the agenda or not.

Q John, on the subject of Nicaragua, there is a report that a general has met with the Vice-Minister of Defense of Nicaragua.

A Right.

Q What is your comment on that?

A I'm, basically, going to have to refer you to the Pentagon on that for the specifics on the visit, but our understanding is that this is an orientation trip which includes visits to Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras. It is General Odom's first visit to Latin America, with the primary purpose being consultation with U.S. Government officials at the U.S. Southern Command in Panama and in U.S. Embassies of the region.

It is not a new initiative in connection with Nicaragua. The General is not carrying any special diplomatic message, and it is not a response to the Nicaraguan note.

Q How has he been received?

Q Is there any response to the Nicaraguan note?

A No.

Q Also, at the Pentagon there was a report -- I think at the briefing at the Pentagon, the briefer said that the General was in Nicaragua in response to an invitation by a personal friend, Ambassador Negroponte; but Ambassador Negroponte is to Honduras, not Nicaragua. Could you clear that up?

A I don't know of which Ambassador he may be a personal friend.

Q In Suriname, on the exchange of diplomats, do you see any Cuban role in the worsening of relations between the United States and Suriname?

A No, I don't think we have any comment on that.

Q Do you have anything on the SA-5 missiles going into Syria?

A No, nothing beyond what we gave you two days ago.

Q Do you have anything on the reports of Israeli troops and artillery moving back into South Lebanon?

A Well, we have seen those reports. We don't have any independent confirmation of them. We would note, however, that if there are such movements, they would underscore the urgency for securing a withdrawal of PLO, Syrian, and Israeli forces from Lebanon. When such armed units are juxtaposed in the way that they are in parts of Lebanon, there obviously is a continuing and serious risk of further violence and bloodshed. But we don't have any confirmation on the accuracy of the reports.

Q John, there is a report from The Hague that the Common Market will raise farm prices 4.4% next year. That's less than half of what they had planned. This is supposed to be an appeasement to United States criticisms.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I really don't, Peter. I think probably Commerce might be a better place to look for an answer.

Q Can you tell us anything about the status of the talks between the EC and the United States following the meetings in --

A No, not beyond -- I can't really give much more light beyond the press conference at which the series of moves was outlined.

Q John, to go back to the Warsaw Pact statement. If at first blush, this doesn't appear to be anything new, to what do you attribute the Warsaw Pact's desire to make such a statement at this point?

A I don't think we should get into their motivation. As you know, there have been some statements emanating from that side in recent days, and I think we simply want to look at them without getting into a sort of hour-to-hour, day-to-day dialogue.

The President's position is plain, that we will look at whatever serious suggestions are made by the other side, and certainly in the area of arms control, he has said that we will look seriously at any serious proposals. Having said that, we have what we think is a good proposal out there. We have taken the initiative -- we are not stalling. And I think we are just not going to respond hour by hour, day by day.

Q John, given the statements on both sides in the last 48 hours, including Reagan's comments last night, do you think we are any closer to a Summit meeting with the Soviets?

A I think the President really addressed that last night -- his position. I think it has been fairly constant. The United States clearly has interest in a Summit meeting, but it has to be well prepared. There has to be something to discuss and talk about. I don't want to paraphrase the President, but I think that was the gist of what he said last night.

-- MORE --

Q The Supreme Commander of NATO, General Rogers, has given an interview and mentioned that he doubts the willingness of the Finnish army to protect and defend the neutrality of the country in case the Soviet troops cross the country on their way to Norway, and the Finnish Government has strongly opposed that view.

What is your comment on General Rogers' --

A I think we have some guidance that either was used or was available in the Press Office a day or two ago, and if you want to check with the Press Office, you can get that from them.

But, as General Rogers himself said -- of course, he was expressing a personal viewpoint, he was not purporting to be a spokesman for the United States Government -- but I'd refer you to the careful language of that guidance in the Press Office.

Q John, do you have anything to say at this point on the satellite, Cosmos 1402?

A Yes. On the basis of our present information, at the present orbital inclination of this satellite there is a 70 percent chance that it will fall into the ocean.

If the present satellite behaves like the one that fell in 1978, nuclear fuel will burn up in the upper atmosphere, and the only hazard will be from the few radioactive pieces that strike the ground.

Nonetheless, the United States Government is placing its nuclear emergency search team on standby. This team has the capability to fly anywhere in the United States with self-sufficient equipment to locate and clean up debris.

The United States will offer help to foreign nations to locate and clean up debris, should that be necessary.

Q Any change today, John, in the estimate by NORAD of when re-entry might take place?

A No. There isn't. We have seen some suggestion out of Moscow that the satellite will not come down; and, of course, that would be a happy development if it does not. But our information is the same as yesterday, and we are talking to the Soviet authorities about this.

Q Who initiated that exchange, John? Did the Soviet Union give you a warning, or whatever, that that thing was in a decaying orbit and would fall?

A I think that our discussions with the Soviets are going forward today, but I don't want to get into where they're taking place or the exact timeframe.

Q Is there any kind of an agreement that governs those talks, or --

A No. Don't misunderstand me. This is not a negotiation. They say it may not come down. Our information is different. We want to talk about that with them, and, of course, we want to make known our concerns in this area.

Q Did you have to notify them that you wanted to talk about it, or you've received some kind of a --

A We are in the process of discussing this with them.

Q Has there been any preliminary discussion with them on the circumstances, John? In other words, have they told you that they've had an engine failure in the booster stage?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know in what ocean of the world it might come down?

A No.

Q Are part of the discussions that you hope to get going today, or that are going forward today, going to deal with what happens to it if the U.S. does pick it up?

I assume the U.S. would be very interested in cleaning up the debris, but is that an issue as to what happens to the parts?

A I think you're kind of jumping ahead of the game, Ralph. I think that we're going to undertake those discussions and find out exactly what their thinking is about the trajectory and the ultimate outcome.

I think that would be the area of discussion that would be undertaken --

Q Is there a treaty or something that deals with that kind of a question?

A Now you're going beyond my institutional and international constitutional expertise, I'm afraid.

Q Where are these discussions taking place?

A Why don't we just confine my statement to the fact that we are in touch with them through regular diplomatic channels.

Q Back on Finland, please. Does the State Department consider Finland to be a neutral country, and do you consider it appropriate for an American NATO Commander to make such types of declarations about Finnish defense capabilities as he's done?

A I think both those points are really covered in the guidance which we will be able to offer you from the Press Office.

Q Can you just answer whether you consider Finland to be a neutral country?

A I think you'll find that is taken care of in that guidance, and I'd like to use the specific language that we did rather than recast it.

Q Do you have any reaction to the indictment of three businessmen, one Canadian and two Americans, for trying to send machine parts to the Soviet Union for their Kamal truck plant?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that the Syrian Chief of Staff is in the States and having meetings with Americans and Israelis?

A No. I don't. I don't know anything about it.

Q I may have missed something, but on Suriname, have you confirmed that Suriname has expelled a couple of American diplomats?

A Yes. We certainly have that guidance available in the Press Office.

Q Anything today on Habib's plans more than what the President said yesterday?

A Not really, beyond what the President said. As the President said, he will be going back to the area within the next several days. That's about it. He'll be having further discussions here in Washington and then heading out there.

Q John, can you say whether he'll be back in time for the resumption of talks on Monday? I mean, is that in the next several days or --

A I can't pinpoint just when he will go, but I think it will probably be unlikely that Mr. Habib would be involved in those talks. Of course, Ambassador Draper is our representative, and I think he'd want --

Q Yes, but you've said that Habib would participate from time to time.

A Well, participate in the process, but I'm not sure -- in fact, I probably am sure that Ambassador Habib would not be involved in the specific discussions that are going on.

Q Do you think he will not be involved in the --

A I would not expect him to be directly involved in those discussions that Ambassador Draper has been conducting with Lebanese and Israeli officials.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement issued by Foreign Relations Chairman Percy concerning the talks between Lebanon and Israel?

A No. I'm afraid I don't.

Q When you say there's no response yet to the Nicaraguan protest note of a few days ago, is there such a response being worked up, or is there something going to be drafted?

A I'm sure the note is being considered and analyzed right now.

Q But you won't say whether there will be a response.

A No. I can't give you anything on that.

Q John, Ambassador Habib will be back for the President's plan with -- you know, the peace proposal, the peace initiative --

A Don't let me -- I hope I haven't misled you. Ambassador Habib is the President's special representative and will go back and will be involved in the broad question of moving the President's Middle East peace initiative forward, and will also be involved on the Lebanon front.

But what I was suggesting was that I thought it was probably unlikely that Ambassador Habib would enter the specific talks that have been going on between the Lebanese and the Israelis, at which Ambassador Draper has been representing the United States.

Q Is Mr. Habib going to visit more than one capital in the Middle East?

A I don't know.

Q Another shuttle? I mean, another shuttle trip?

A I don't know at this stage. As I say, he'll have further discussions -- I think he saw the Secretary of State today -- and will have further discussions in Washington, and I would think that when those discussions are complete, then we'd have a better idea of his itinerary and departure date.

Q Can you tell us if there is any link between the Lebanese-Israeli talks and the broader peace process?

A No. As we have said consistently, we expect those to go forward independently. We have always said that the one does not wait for the other, and that we continue to move and attempt to make progress on both questions simultaneously.

Obviously, the problems that we have encountered in Lebanon -- that everybody has encountered in Lebanon -- have taken longer to resolve than everybody had hoped, and also just as obviously there is enthusiasm for getting a resolution as quickly as possible of the Lebanese problem. But that doesn't halt the Middle East initiative.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, January 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #5

FRIDAY, JANUARY 7, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I do have an announcement on Guatemala.

After extended consultations with the Congress and analysis of the situation in Guatemala, the Department has decided to permit the cash sale to the Government of Guatemala of previously requested spare parts and safety-of-flight items under the Foreign Military Sales Program. This decision has been communicated to the Government of Guatemala by our Ambassador to that country.

This decision on specific FMS items is part of a broader relationship which includes the disbursement of some $10 million dollars in economic support funds already made available under that portion of the Caribbean Basin Initiative which passed Congress during the past session. This assistance addresses th pressing economic difficulties which the Government of Guatemala shares with its other regional neighbors.

The potential sales which could result from this decision would constitute the first such FMS sales to the Government of Guatemala since the late 1970s, except for $15,000 in FMS training. The decision was made in light of human rights improvements which have taken place in Guatemala since the Rios Montt Government came to power in March of 1982.

In this regard, while we want to see further progress in Guatemala in promoting respect for human rights, President Rios Montt has taken significant steps in this area. Progress has been made.

Similarly, we look forward to the continuing development of the democratic process. Since General Rios Montt assumed power on March 23 of last year, political violence in the cities has declined dramatically; recently there are indications that the level of violence in the countryside has declined as well; villagers have been provided food and medical supplies along with the means to defend themselves; plans are underway for the election of a constituent assembly; the Indian population is increasingly participating in the country's political process; and President Rios Montt has been attacking corruption within the government.

The government has declared its desire to cooperate with independent human rights groups and United Nations agencies, and has permitted a number of private groups to visit the country.

These are steps which we feel should be recognized and encouraged.

Q Copies?

A Surely.

Q How much are the sales worth?

A The total, and I could make this list available, is about $6,300,000. It's about larger-items in that list a million dollars for spare parts for UH-1H helicopters; about $1,350,000 for the inspection and repair of three helicopters; about $260,000 for the overhaul of three helicopter engines; about $2.9 million dollars for radio equipment; and after that the amounts get -- about half a million dollars for earth-moving equipment, and after that the items get progressively smaller.

Q Could we get that list?

A Sure, we'll make that list available.

Q Why do you say the Department has decided? Is this not a decision that would have to be made by the President?

A No, I think it is -- I can give you a little elaboration on that, I think.

I may have to go back and do a little homework on that, but I think, basically, as you know, there's been consultation with Congress, but basically it is the Secretary's decision.

Q These are all government-to-government sales; right?

A Yes.

Q Is this sale expected to have any impact on any restrictions on private sales? I don't know what the restrictions on private munitions sales to Guatemala are.

A Neither do I.

Q Does this mean that the Department has independently investigated the reports of massacres by the Guatemalan military and found them blameless?

A I think what it means is that the Department is satisfied that there is progress in the right direction. As I already said, we want to see more progress, but the Department thinks that the progress that has been made should be rewarded, remarked upon and that this is an incentive for further movement in the right direction.

Q Has there been an Embassy investigation of these reports of military involvement in the massacres in some of the villages?

A Can't answer that specific question, but, as I say, the Department is satisfied overall.

On the response to Don's specific question, the appropriate legislation is the Arms Export Control Act, and the Secretary of State is assigned responsibility for decisions of this type.

Q Does this decision, and what you've said about the broader relationship -- whatever the words were -- presage a much larger program of the United States military assistance to Guatemala in the future? Do you see it likely developing into something a good deal bigger than this one sale?

A We are talking specifically about these items which I listed today. I think if there were to be further requests, they would be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Q But as you pointed out, there has been no sale of this kind for a number of years.

A That's right.

Q And you're saying you see progress in the right direction?

A That's right.

Q It seems to me it sort of suggests that this is the beginning of a new phase in the relationship. Is that the way you see it?

A I think we're going to stand on the language we've offered you. We see progress. We look for more progress. We have before us at the moment this decision, and we've made this decision. It's kind of hypothetical to --

Q Do you have any other decisions under study about further aid to Guatemala?

A To Guatemala?

Q Yes.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than that list, have you got something else that's been submitted by that government for military assistance?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Arms, ammunition?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Any U.S. military advisors or technicians? Will they be sent down to help any?

A I have no knowledge of any such --

Q There is an item for inspection of helicopters and maintenance. Since it's under the FMS list, does that mean it's Pentagon people?

A I have no knowledge of any such plans.

Q If it's an FMS sale, it presumes, as I understand it, that the Pentagon handles the whole -- they become the sales agent.

A I guess you would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q But that is normal on something like this, that they do have people to supervise the --

A I don't know whether it's normal. These are very small amounts. And whether personnel would necessarily be involved or where this is going to take place, I can't answer that.

Q These sales are needed by Guatemala for internal reasons or for outside tensions?

A Internal reasons.

Q What is your assessement of those reasons -- what is your explanation of why they need these spare parts.

A I guess they have helicopters that don't fly, and they need parts for them.

Q Why do they need the helicopters?

A I guess that's part of their --

Q Can you tell us about the insurgency? Does the United States believe that it's Cuban supported?

A No. I can't go beyond what I've given you today.

Q Since the government in the past has been engaged in rather bloody scorched-earth policy, what the President himself called "the scorched-communist policy," is the Department concerned that this reward is kind of a seal of approval on those past actions by the government?

A No. I think the Department has made its position plain in the language we've used, that the situation in Guatemala, as in a number of countries, is not ideal, but we see movement in the right direction; and having carefully considered what has taken place, the positive developments that have taken place, the decision has been made to go with these rather limited items at this time.

Q Is there any word about those past actions? Is there any comment about what has taken place that may have improved but at one point was something the Department may not have liked?

A I'm sure the Department has commented over a period of time, but I don't have a collection of those comments here today.

Q Are there any conditions to any of this? Is there any date upon which they're going to look at the situation again?

A No. As I say, this is a one-time decision, and should further requests be made they will be looked at on a case-by-case basis.

Q You said that this decision is made following consultation with Congress. Can we assume that since you're going ahead with it you don't expect any opposition from Congress?

A I think we should let Congressmen speak for themselves, but we have gone ahead with the decision.

Q When did Guatemala request these spare parts?

A I think there were differing dates for various items. I think some of them were requested back in 1979. Some of them were requested in 1981. The dates are on this list that we'll make available to you.

Q I think you omitted the word "helicopters" in your opening statement. Are all the spare parts for the helicopters?

A Spare parts, but there are other items on this list. There are flight uniforms; there are tools and shop equipment.

Q But nothing for their jet fighters?

A There are ejection capsules for the A-37B aircraft. I don't know what the A-37B is. I don't know what kind of aircraft it is.

MR. ROMBERG: Prop aircraft.

Q Twin engine?

A I think I know what an ejection capsule is, but I'm not sure.

Q In your human rights report issued about eleven months go, it was said that the monthly death toll in Guatemala was about 300 politically-motivated killings mostly non-combatants. Do you have a comparable figure for 1982 against which we could judge whether there has been an actual decline in the number of killings?

A I don't today. But I think that in due course we would be once again having a human rights report which would include that material.

Q On a possibly related matter, do you have anything more to tell us about the visit of General Odom to Nicaragua and the Central American area, and what that's all about?

A No, not beyond what we gave you yesterday.

Q You said it was a kind of routine, long-planned and all that. It's such an extraordinary thing to have a Pentagon General visiting Nicaragua. It doesn't seem to be completely routine.

A Well, don't have any comment beyond what we offered you yesterday. I guess the Pentagon would be the place to go for anything further.

Q You're not suggesting that the State Department doesn't have a good deal to do with something like that?

A No. I'm suggesting what we suggested yesterday, that it was a previously planned trip; that we were aware of it but you should not read into it any new initiative. Maybe I answered the question before somebody asked it yesterday: It wasn't a specific response to the Nicaraguan note, and the General was not carrying any diplomatic message. That was the wise word we offered you yesterday.

Q What will Mr. Eagleburger be discussing with the Soviet Ambassador today?

A I'm not able to get into that. The Soviet Ambassador is coming in this afternoon at 5:30, and will meet Mr. Eagleburger, but in the way of things we won't get into the subject.

Q Who asked for the meeting?

A Mr. Eagleburger asked for the meeting.

Q Is this not related to the satellite?

A It's not related to the satellite.

Q Is Mr. Bessmertnykh or someone at that level coming in?

A I think that Rick Burt has asked to see today a representative of the Soviet Embassy on the satellite matter.

Q Is it set then?

A I don't know that it is set. I know that we have made the request. I'm not sure if a time is firm.

Q There was some some talk that he might come last night.

A He did not come last night.

--MORE--

Q John, can we have a filing break on Guatemala?

A Sure. Filing break.

Q John, I wonder, could you clarify, what was the nature of the ban on military sales? Somebody on the Hill, Congressman Barnes' assistant, told me that there was some sort of gentlemen's agreement between people on the Hill and the State Department prohibiting spare parts sales and so forth.

A You're going back a little before my time, and I can't answer that question out of my own knowledge, but I'll be glad to look into it and see what the reason was.

Q Any comment on the apparent insurrection in Salvador?

A No. We're looking at that, Bernie. We don't know a great deal about it. We've seen Colonel Ochoa's public statement in reaction to his scheduled reassignment and his call for Defense Minister Garcia's removal from office.

Obviously, we're trying to learn more about these developments and are watching closely as events unfold in El Salvador. At this point, to our knowledge, there have been no preemptive acts other than Colonel Ochoa's statement and his placement of the troops under his command on alert.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Anything on the fighting in Tripoli today?

A No. Nothing beyond the same position we've taken over the past several days in that this simply underscores, we think, the significance of our consistent policy that there ought to be the speediest withdrawal of PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces.

Q There are reportedly 25,000 refugees who've left Tripoli in the last few days.

Are we helping Lebanon in funding any relief for them?

A   I don't know the answer to that question. Be glad to take a look at it. I mean, there is a general program, but I'm not sure whether there's been a specific response to these 25,000 you cite. Be glad to take a look at it.

Q   On the matter of troop withdrawal, will you agree with the assessments coming from Lebanon that the Lebanon-Israeli talks are deadlocked?

A   No. I think we would stand by the communique that was issued by the three parties yesterday, Jim, and not go beyond that, and not beyond the expression of our hope that these negotiations, discussions, move forward.

Q   Could you tell us when Ambassador Habib is going to join the talks?

A   I can't. He is still in Washington, and we expect him to continue his discussions. I don't think his firm departure date has been set, but, as I said yesterday, we would expect within the next several days.

Q   Back on El Salvador. Did you say that the U.S. Embassy is involved in negotiations between General Garcia and the Commander in Cabanas, given the Embassy's close relationship with this Commander in the past?

A   I can't answer that question. I just don't know.

Q   Do you have any analysis or impressions to convey now that the trip of President Navon is over?

A   No. Not beyond what you've already had.

Q   There are reports from Lebanon somewhere that there has been an attack on a bus in Lebanon by unknown individuals.

Can you confirm that to us, and if you have any comments about it?

A   No. Sorry, I can't. An attack on a bus?

Q   Yes.

A   I think we've seen some reports, but I can't confirm that, no. I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any comments on statements by Senator Tsongas that the Syrian occupation is an obstacle on --

A No. I mean, our position is clear that the presence of all foreign forces in an obstacle to peace, but we don't have any specific response on Senator Tsongas' comments.

Q Is there anything new on the satellite, John?

A Not really, Bob, not beyond what I told you yesterday. We have been in touch and are in touch with other foreign governments, telling them that we've learned that the satellite is expected to make an uncontrolled re-entry.

As I told you yesterday, the United States will offer help to foreign nations to locate and clean up debris, should that be necessary.

I mentioned that Rick Burt is going to see, we expect, a Soviet Embassy representative this afternoon. I think that's about all that's really new.

Q Do you have any idea more or less now from the technical people as to whether in fact, as the Soviets claim, it's under control or whether it is not? As you said yesterday, you thought it was not.

A Our information and assessment is as it was yesterday, and I assume the Soviet position is the same. We hope they're right, but that doesn't tally with the viewpoint of our experts.

Q This contact with other governments, is this a general thing with all other governments in the world, or is it those in our vicinity or what?

A I think that is to countries that might suffer damage and/or casualties from the impact of this errant satellite.

Q How do you figure out which ones that might be?

A That's a very good question. (Laughter)

Q I mean, is this a worldwide --

A I honestly don't know which governments we've talked to, Don.

Q Could you find out, if not specifically which ones, if it's a general thing all over the world or limited to this hemisphere or something?

A Let me look into it and see how widespread it might be.

Q The other day you made that long South African statement. What prompted you to make it then? Isn't that internal politics? And do you have anything else to add on the Namibian negotiations?

A No. I think we made clear at the time that we, indeed, were not in any way interfering with South Africa's internal affairs, and I think we made it plain on that occasion that these kinds of developments were for South Africans of all races for themselves to decide.

But, having said that, this Administration has on numerous occasions offered its opposition to the apartheid policies in South Africa, and insofar as that action was a movement away from apartheid, we welcomed it.

Q By making the statement did you hope to promote more social change? Is that the idea?

-A It's not a question of promoting social change. It was simply a response on the development that we thought moved in a certain direction.

Q John, there was a piece yesterday in The New York Times, Op Ed, by an Israeli peace activist. You're familiar with it. I mean, he was arguing there that Israel is doing the work of the United States in selling arms to some of those Latin American, which he thought were oppressive regimes, and etc., etc.

Can you make any comments on that? I mean, is Israel playing that role with U.S. approval? I mean, can you tell us something about that subject?

A No. I really can't. I mean, I think there have been reports about some Israeli visits to the area, but I can't offer anything on it, and I don't have any comment on it.

Q May I please? What is the United States' position toward what President Navon said concerning the Israeli-Egyptian relations impact on the peace process now, and concerning that all the Israelis refused to accept their 1967 borders as the borders for Israel despite the Resolution 242 call?

A I think we have made some comments from time to time on the relationship between Israel and Egypt and specifically to problem areas, and I guess I'd refer you to the Press Office to go back and get the specific language on those instances.

I don't think we would have anything beyond the statements made by the President and President Navon, and the amplification that was offered by a senior spokesman.

Q There is a report this morning that quotes U.S. intelligence officials as saying that the SA-5 bases being built in Syria may be manned by Soviet troops, and that there are two sites identified so far -- Mount du Meyer and Homs north of Lebanon -- and that the sites are expected to be completed in four to six weeks.

And the report goes on to say that if they are manned by Soviet technicians or troops, that further increases the delicate nature of the problem.

Do you have any more on that?

A Not beyond what Alan offered you on that earlier in the week. We don't have anything new on the U.S. position on those SA-5s.

Q John, can you give us anything on the Secretary's schedule over the next several days? Specifically his meeting on China tomorrow and whatever else he might be doing?

A Yes. He's in town this weekend. He'll be in the office, as usual, tomorrow morning. He is having another one of his seminars. The subject of this one is China.

The guests will include such people as Winston Lord, Richard Solomon, Michael Oksenberg, Lucian Pye, Doak Barnett, Dwight Perkins, Harold Brown, William Hyland, Robert Scalapino, Henry Kissinger, Jeffrey Gayner.

On the official side it will include the Secretary. He may not be in the session for the entire period. He usually is in and out of those session.

It will also include Secretary Weinberger, either or perhaps both Judge Clark and Bud McFarlane, Deputy Secretary Dam, Under Secretary Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, Stephen Bosworth, Gaston Sigur from the NSC, Richard Armitage, David Gries and Donald Gregg.

Q David who?

A Gries. G-r-i-e-s.

Q Is he a desk officer?

A I think he's the NIO officer for China.

Q And the last one?

A Donald Gregg. The Vice President's office.

Q Follow up on yesterday, the new representative of Taiwan got to the United States. Would he be received by anybody here? Would he be able to meet with Secretary Shultz or Secretary Wolfowitz?

A Did we have some guidance on that that was unused? Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Could you take it?

A Yes. Be glad to.

Q John, when did you say that seminar was?

A Tomorrow.

Q What does the Secretary hope to get from it?

A As you know, he's had a number of such seminars, Don, spaced out at intervals, and I suppose this one is particularly appropriate, given his upcoming visit to the Far East.

He had planned to have one on China, and I'm sure plans to have others.

Q Is he doing anything else over the weekend in terms of appearances or anything of that sort?

A No. I don't think so.

Q Is he going to watch the football game?

A I don't know whether he'll watch the football game. It depends on how full his briefcase is, I guess.

Q You said extensive consultations on the Hill on this resumption of sales to Guatemala. Are you suggesting that Congressmen Barnes and Zablocki and the others have approved this?

A No. I didn't say that. I said I think that the Congressmen should speak for themselves, that we would leave that to them, but we're satisfied with the decision that we're making and satisfied with those consultations.

Q John, Assistant Secretary Enders was in Mexico City yesterday.

A Right.

Q Did he discuss or consult about possible future arms sales in the region?

A He made a trip that had been planned for some time. It was intended to provide an opportunity to share views with the new leadership of the Government of Mexico.

He's going to be there until today, I guess. He comes back, and then he will head for Haiti on Monday, return to Washington on Tuesday. I can't really give you much more on what he did in Mexico.

Q Why is he going to Haiti?

A I can't answer that one for you. He's coming back to make a speech. Anybody know what Enders is doing in Haiti? Be glad to look into it for you.

Q Do we have a situation in El Salvador now where you have two groups of military units, both equipped with U.S. arms, which are in some sort of a standoff?

A I don't know that you call it a standoff. As I say, it's breaking on the ground, and we don't know very much about it.

Q   But are they both equipped with U.S. arms?

A   I can't answer that. I don't know.

Q   John, do you have any progress to report on the formation of the Foreign Policy Development Council, Steve Bosworth --

A   Steve Bosworth's -- I don't today. I know that he's working on it. I don't have anything for you on it, though.

Q   Okay. Thank you, John.

A   Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:53 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #6

MONDAY, JANUARY 10, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I just have an addition to Secretary Shultz' Far Eastern trip. Secretary Shultz will participate in a conference with American Chiefs of Mission in the East Asia and Pacific region February 8 and 9 in Hong Kong at the conclusion of his East Asian trip. This conference will be an opportunity for the Secretary to exchange views with our Ambassadors on global and regional foreign policy issues facing the Administration.

Q It will be held where?

A Hong Kong.

Q Is that after Korea?

A It's after Korea. He'll go from Korea to Hong Kong. He will attend the eigth and ninth. I think that Heads of Mission Conference, in fact, will go on a little after he's left, but he will leave on the tenth. I'm not quite sure what time.

Q Is he heading straight back to Washington or going the Polar route?

A Straight back is technically correct, but I think there's a stop.

Q I mean, he's not planning a layover?

A Not to my knowledge. I think he's coming straight back.

Q Where does it stand with Ambassador Habib? When is he going back and where?

A I think Ambassador Habib will be talking with the President and Secretary of State later in the day. I think we might have something for you on his travel plans after that. I think that will be early afternoon he's meeting with the President at the White House.

Q Is he going to be seeing any members of the press? Will he have --

A I'm not sure whether he will say anything. If he does say anything, it will be, as always, fairly brief. I do not think the President will probably say anything after that. It's a very short meeting. I'm not sure Ambassador Habib will saying anything else.

Q You're saying the announcement of his travel plans will come from the White House?

A I'm not really saying that. I'm saying that after he's talked with the President, if there's an announcement on his travel plans, it will be forthcoming. I'm not quite sure how that will be.

Q What time is he scheduled for the meeting with the President?

A I think he's going over there early afternoon about 1:45.

Q Do you have any comment on the story published today in the Washington Times?

A There are many stories published in the Washington Times. Which one are you --

Q The Middle East; Habib's mission; the talks there in Lebanon, the failure of any progress towards the withdrawal of the Israelis?

A I think it isn't any secret that the Administration would have wished that resolution of the Lebanese problem had moved considerably faster than it has. Insofar as mention of specific individuals is concerned, I understand that Mr. Speakes, at the White House early this morning, spoke very vigorously in support of Mr. Veliotes and Ambassador Draper. Both have been doing an excellent job in our opinion, and obviously the Department of State is just as enthusiastic about the job they have done.

Q There was a report also in the Washington Post that the American Marines stationed in Beirut are not allowed to have any direct contacts with the Israeli soldiers. Do you know anything about such an order and the reasons behind it?

A I don't know what you mean by "direct contacts." You want to expand a little on that for me?

Q It evolved from that story that any contacts between Israeli and American officials should be made, according to the Marine officer who was quoted there, only through diplomatic channels and not in direct conversation between Israeli officers and Marine officers.

A It is absolutely true that Israeli forces have approached Marine positions near the Beirut airport several times in the last few days. We have expressed our concern to the Israeli Government, and have made it clear that the zone of deployment of the MNF is closed to all military forces other than those of Lebanon and the MNF.

Obviously, this development underscores the urgent necessity to get on with the effort to negotiate the prompt withdrawal from Lebanon of Israeli and the other forces that we have mentioned -- PLO and Syrian.

Q Can we have copies?

A Yes, sure.

Q Is there any agreement, or was it agreed when the MNF was deployed that no other forces would be in those areas?

A I think this statement makes it clear that that's our understanding.

Q Is there any written agreement or understanding?

A I can't answer that.

Q I don't understand what you're talking about. Could you explain it a little bit? Did the Israeli forces do something they weren't supposed to do?

A They approached, I think, on several occasions, and I would guess I would have to say challenged the Marines.

Q How?

A By attempting to pass through the Marine lines.

Q Was that against some kind of understanding between the Israeli and American Governments?

A It's against the understanding that I've just read here concerning the zone of deployment. This is at the airport.

Q What kind of representations have we made to the Israeli Government? Have we called in the Ambassador here?

A Don't want to get into how it's been done, but we certainly have expressed our concern.

Q In the Post story they mentioned two specific incidents. One was a lost Israeli patrol; one was they informed the Marines that there were going to be sweeps in the area. Are you saying there were other obvious incidents other than that, and can you be a little more specific --

A There certainly were an initial two. Have we gone beyond that, Alan? There are more than two? Last week there were two and apparently there have been more, but I can't give you the exact number.

Q What did the Israelis say they were about to do, John? Did they tell the Marines there or their leaders as to what they were doing?

A Can we be any clearer? No? I'm afraid we cannot give you anymore than we have given you.

Q You say last week there were two and now you say they have been more than two; does that mean that there have been some yesterday and today?

A I was aware of two, I think, on Friday. My colleague tells me that there are now a total that is more than two. I'm not sure when the other incidents took place.

Q Can we get that?

A Let me take a look at that for you.

Q Have they actually been considered threatening in any way?

A I'm not sure that I would say they're threatening. Clearly, it is something we consider not helpful and we don't wish them to continue.

Q Is it something more than just the Israelis saying, hey, we want to drive down this road; can we go past your checkpoint, or can you describe --

A Whatever the substance of discussion, our position is that they should not proceed beyond that checkpoint, and that's where we're standing.

Q Have you received assurances from the Israelis that it won't happen again?

A Do not know what the Israeli response has been. Why don't we take a look at that for you, too.

Q Do you believe these were on high-level Israeli orders?

A I can't go beyond what I'm offering you; don't know.

Q Can you tell us, you say that they were challenged. Can you be more specific about what you mean by "challenged?"

A I think it is clear that if certain forces are assigned to certain areas and there is a clearly understood agreement, and other forces seek to pass through those checkpoints or through those lines, that is in the nature of a challenge, if both sides understand the lines of demarcation. Clearly, one unit is challenging the right of another.

Q Do you know whether these meetings were at the same place, at the same checkpoint.

A They were all at the airport area, but I do not know whether they were at the same checkpoint.

Q Do you see this challenge as a challenge of political significance?

A Not able to give you an interpretation of why these incidents have taken place.

Q Speaking of expressing concern, has this Administration also expressed concern to the Soviets about the SAM 5 installations in Syria?

A I'm not able to get into any interchange we may or may not have had on that subject.

Q I don't know if you really can do that or not. Can you tell us exactly what happened; were the Marines trying to push through and the Israelis simply stopped them?

A Let me try and get a little more background for you on it. Let me see what I can do for you.

Q On the same area, please. I was this morning told through a phone call to Jerusalem that some American Quaker/teachers in the American Friends community in Jerusalem in Ramallah were called to the Israeli military governors to ask them, or to make them, or to force them to sign the loyalty pledge or something like that.

Can you tell us if the American Consulate there is aware of this, did they send somebody there with them, and what is your position, what is the Administration's position on such loyalty oaths?

Q Are you sure it's a loyalty oath question?

A Yes, yes. I was told that they asked them to come in order to renew their licenses, which would take the signing of the loyalty oath?

A It's not a work permit issue.

--MORE--

Q It wasn't a loyalty oath. It was an oath saying that they did not support the PLO.

A I think it is a work permit issue. Yes, we are aware of that, we're looking at it. The situation is a little confused, so I think until we know a little more about it -- but we are talking to the Israelis about it.

Q Can you tell us if there is any difference? Previously, after the Secretary spoke about this subject, Israel changed. They moved that section of the loyalty oath as such --

A That was an academic freedom issue, yes.

Q Right, and injected in the word "permit". That is the way we understand it. Do you see it as such, or do you see it as a different thing by now, or there is no loyalty oath at all any more.

A Until we know a little more, that is why I am being vague -- well, I am being as helpful as I can, but not as decisive as perhaps you would like, because this is something we have to take a look at and see what the issue is here.

Q When do you think we can have something about it, in your opinion?

A As soon as it takes to clarify the issue.

Q Back to the Syrian SAMs for a moment, do you have any update on that situation?

A No.

Q Can I go to my original question about direct contact between Marines and Israeli soldiers? Is there an order to the Marines not to engage in any conversations or discussions directly with Israeli forces?

A That is why I actually followed up to see whether you were talking about these specific instances, and I don't know the answer to that question that you pose.

What you are basically asking is, is there an order against conversation. Is that what you are asking?

Q Let's call it against discussions.

Q Fraternizing.

A Fraternizing. Let me take a look at that. I just can't answer that question.

Q Last May, the so-called Ditchley Bankers were formed, and since that time they have been engaging in what is clearly a cartel to control world credit, and they have been doing that quite openly. Now that happens to be against U.S. law, against the anti-trust laws of this country.

They are now actively seeking to change those anti-trust laws in order that their international activity would not be illegal. I am wondering if there is a Department position on that yet. Has the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could you look into that for me, please?

A Sure. I will find out for you.

Q Do you have any comment on the meeting of the Secretary with the Japanese Ambassador this morning? Was it to set up the trip of Mr. Nakasone, or what?

A I think it was trip-related, but I honestly don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on a column by Evans and Novak this morning in which they quote from a memo which was reportedly sent by the Secretary to Ambassador Kirkpatrick instructing her on her behavior in a debate on biological warfare, and specifically forbidding her to raise the Sverdlovsk incident, for example?

A Insofar as the column seems to suggest that the United States and/or the State Department has been soft on the question of chemical or biological warfare violations by the Soviet Union, I think that is clearly inaccurate.

The United States Government has forcefully condemned the illegal Soviet use of chemical weapons in the United Nations and elsewhere, and has made a major effort to call world attention to these Soviet violations.

Secretary Shultz presented a detailed update on this subject to Congress and the UN in November.

A resolution introduced by Sweden in the recent UN General Assembly, and opposed by the Soviets, set in motion provisions to attempt to put teeth in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.

The United States Government strongly supported this resolution and sought to maximize the vote for it, and Ambassador Kirkpatrick was deeply involved in the implementation and the approval of this strategy.

That resolution was adopted 124 for and 15 against, with one abstaining.

We are continuing to pursue the objective of strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by working with Sweden and other countries to convene a meeting of states parties to the Convention.

There were several other resolutions concerning chemical and biological weapons on the General Assembly agenda. Two of them dealt specifically with the illegal use of such weapons by the Soviets and were adopted over Soviet opposition by sizable majorities.

Addressing these resolutions which dealt with the "yellow rain" issue, the United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Adelman, made a very forceful statement on December 8 and specifically focused on that issue of Soviet illegal use of chemical weapons.

Q The question that I asked, in this memo that appears to have been leaked to Evans and Novak, dealt with biological warfare. Did the Secretary specifically order the Ambassador not to bring up the Sverdlovsk incident, for example?

A I think we are going to stand on the language we have used here, in response to your query.

I would be glad to chat with you a little bit about it afterwards.

Q Okay, but while we are on the record, I would like to ask, was the thrust of the -- restricting this to biological warfare -- was the thrust of this column -- does it correctly sum up the memo which was sent, which was that the United States did not want to have an East-West confrontation over this issue at this time?

A It is very difficult for us to get into the question of internal documents which may or may not have been illegally distributed and released.

Q Do you have anything new on the satellite?

A No. There isn't anything new today. As you know, Assistant Secretary Burt talked with the Soviet DCM last week, but beyond that there is no new development.

Q Can you tell us anything of their position? Did they stick to their position that it is not falling?

A No. The United States expressed its concern and asked a number of questions, but I can't go beyond that.

Q Any answer?

A We will have to wait and see.

Q Do you have any thoughts about the impasse between Colonel Ochoa and Defense Minister Garcia? Is the United States involved diplomatically or in any way as an intermediary between these two gentlemen?

A I don't have a great deal on that for you. We continue to regard this as basically an internal situation to be resolved by the authorities in El Salvador.

In a general sense, we obviously hope that these apparent internal dissensions do not detract from the reality that the key threat to progress in building democratic institutions in El Salvador comes from the Marxist insurgents.

We hope for a peaceful outcome.

Q Was any consensus reached on the China Seminar on Saturday?

A You know, those seminars have traditionally been off the record. The Secretary has experts in from time to time on a variety of issues in a seminar-like atmosphere, and the rules of the game are that we don't discuss those seminars in order that they may be a very whole expression of opinion in the course of the discussion, so I am afraid we don't have anything for you on that.

Q If I can follow that up, there was a *Washington Post* article which suggested that we are reassessing our policy towards China. Can you say anything on that?

A No, I can't.

Q Do you have any comments on some remarks by Japan's Minister of Industry to the effect that he is not sure that Japan will extend its voluntary restrictions on auto exports to the U.S.?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Thatcher visit to the Falkland Islands?

A Do we what?

Q Any reaction to the Thatcher visit?

A From the United States? No. On the visit by Mrs. Thatcher to the Falklands, no, we don't have any reaction.

Q You don't regard it as a provocation, or anything like that?

A No, we have no comment on it.

Q Do you have any more clarification on General Odom's visit to Nicaragua?

A No, I don't, nothing beyond what we gave you last week.

Q Has there been any new contacts with the Syrians concerning their SAMs?

A Any U.S. contacts with the Syrians?

Q Yes.

A I am just not going to get any more into the question of that particular issue than Mr. Romberg did last week with you, I am afraid.

Q Do you have anything on the China/Bank, China wanting to join the Asian Development Bank and supplant Taiwan?

A Yes. China has expressed a desire to join the Bank. The United States and other Bank members are considering that request and hope to reach a position shortly.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

~~Duncan~~ Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #7

TUESDAY, JANUARY 11, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon everybody. It's nice to see some familiar faces back that have been missing for a little while.

Also, we have a group from Colgate University with us today. Glad to have you with us to initiate you into the mysteries of the State Department briefing procedures.

Just an announcement up front. There will be a background briefing on the upcoming visit of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone to be given by a senior Administration official, Friday, January 14, 10:30 a.m., in the White House Press Room.

That's all I have for you, and a lean day.

Q Can you explain to us what the situation is with Ambassador Starr, the negotiator in Vienna? Why has he been called back?

A I really can't. That's an internal personnel matter. We're not going to have anything for you on that except to confirm that Ambassador Starr is in town. I think will be seeing Judge Clark on Wednesday. Beyond that --

Q In other words, when you say it's "personnel," it's not for consultations on the negotiations; it is because of his career?

A He is back for consultations, but it is also a personnel matter.

Q Does it have anything to do with his appropriation of money at the Embassy for personal use?

A I'm afraid we're going to stand on the statement we've made.

Q Can you freelance a little bit on that? (Laughter.)

A No.

Q Is there consideration of replacing him as the Ambassador?

A I'm going to stand on the language we've given you. I'm having a little difficulty making that clear, I know.

Q The talks have been recessed for sometime. Has he been in Washington for sometime?

A I can't answer that. I don't quite know when he came in. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Will he be returning to his post?

A I'm not going to go beyond what we've given you.

Q Has Ambassador Okun been selected to replace him?

A I'm not going to be able to get into any personnel matters.

Q Would you be able to get into it within about three weeks?

A Time will tell.

Q Is Ambassador Okun's return here this week tied to this issue?

A I'm not aware of what's happening to Ambassador Okun.

Q He's returning here in a couple of days.

A Is he?

Q How about the lawsuit filed with respect to the picture "Missing?"

A I don't really have anything for you on that. That's a civil action. I think the State Department has made rather exhaustive guidance available on that before, and the Press Office would be happy to make that available again today. It contains all the background, a rather exhaustive investigation that the State Department did make into this issue and refutes allegations that have been made over the months. So probably the simplest thing on that is to go back to that guidance. There's about three pages on it.

Q Do you have anything in your book there about the flow of Soviet arms -- an increase in Soviet arms shipments into Cuba as reported by the AP?

A Nothing for you right now on it.

Q When might you have?

A There might be something later, but there's nothing for you right now.

Q Later today?

A It's possible.

Q Anything more on SA-5s that are reportedly being sent to Syria?

A No.

Q Anything new on the challenge by the Israelis to the U.S. Marines in Lebanon?

A Not beyond the later data we offered you yesterday. There have been no more incidents, to my knowledge.

Q Did you ever get a reply from the Israelis?

A I'm not sure that we got a formal reply in the sense of a reply, but there certainly was diplomatic interchange.

Q Do you have anything to say on the Time magazine story that if there is no progress in the talks on Lebanon you might call off Mr. Begin's visit here?

A Nothing on that. As you know, Mr. Begin's visit here was brought to an abrupt halt because of the tragic circumstances in his family. I know of no date scheduled for a returned visit.

Q Could you confirm that there are discussions with the Israelis about having the visit sometime in the middle of February?

A I don't know just what the state of negotiations is. As I say, I'm not aware of any date set.

Q But you expect a visit to take place soon?

A I don't know whether it'll take place soon.

Q Are you interested in having the visit soon?

A It's not a question of being interested; it's a question of the parties involved rescheduling that date.

Q So the problem is just a matter of schedule, not of interest?

A I think the parties have to get together on it.

Q Is the scheduling problem related at all to the developments on the Lebanon talks front?

A It's simply that no meeting is as yet scheduled. I don't have anything beyond that for you.

Q Is scheduling the substance, John?

A I don't know what the state of negotiation is, if any, between the parties.

Q Is there a standing invitation?

A I think at the time that Mr. Begin returned home, the President said that the visit would take place at a later time. I would like to go back to the language at that time.

Q He's scheduled to be here later on in February or early February? Can you tell us --

A I don't know that we have ever talked about February, but I think there's been some speculation about February.

Q Do you have anything on reports that the Saudis are not forthcoming in giving the green light to King Hussein?

A No.

Q Would you characterize the role of the Saudis? Can you say anything about their role?

A I think that King Hussein, obviously, would be mindful of the views of other nations and other leaders in the Middle East.

Q Is there anything specific you can say about the Saudi role itself?

A No.

Q Do you know whether Habib is going to Saudi Arabia?

A I don't know of any plans for him to go to Saudi Arabia, but he is the President's special representative in the Middle East. His principal assignment is Middle East peace and moving the President's initiative forward. I don't know of any plans that he has, but certainly I wouldn't rule out visits by him to any capital in the Middle East.

Q Is it still the hope rather than the expectation that King Hussein might return to Washington sometime this month?

A I don't know that anybody had talked specifically about a visit to Washington this month by King Hussein. I think the visit that King Hussein had with the President was characterized by the President and by King Hussein as being one that moved the process forward. I think King Hussein has gone off to talk with various of his advisors and probably others involved in the overall Middle East process. We would wait to hear from him.

Q There's no plan, there's nothing you know of for him to come back here before the end of this month?

A There is nothing set for him to come back here before the end of this month.

Q To follow that up, John, to what extent might that be conditional on the progress in the Lebanese discussions?

A As you know, we have consistently said that the one does not depend on the other. The two processes are moving forward in a parallel manner. The movement on the Middle East does not have to wait for conclusion of the situation in Lebanon. Having said that, obviously Lebanon is a complication, and the President has expressed his desire to get a resolution of the situation in Lebanon, and obviously a resolution would be helpful. That doesn't mean that it is holding up work on the overall Middle East peace initiative. That is going forward.

Q On the subject of complications, do you have any reaction to the advertising campaign to attract people to the West Bank?

A Yes, I think we do have something on that. The suggested action by the Israeli Government would be most unfortunate and counter-productive. The United States position is clear. Settlements are an obstacle to peace in the Middle East.

We have previously noted our view that such settlement activity has a negative impact on hopes for early progress towards peace, stability and real security for Israel and its neighbors.

--MORE--

Q Copy of that, John?

A Surely.

Q Are the settlements illegal?

A I think the President has said, Jim, that they are not helpful.

Q I know. Are they illegal?

A I think we would stand on the President's language.

Q John, the Israelis have advertised land on the West Bank in Israeli newspapers for some months now, trying to encourage people to buy land from private developers.

Is this the first time you recall that you've addressed this particular issue? Not so much the issue of the settlements, but the private sale of land?

A No. I think we've consistently said that anything that expands settlement activity on the West Bank is not helpful.

Q John, on that subject, can you -- the President of Israel, when he was here last week at the National Press Club, answered a question in which he said the settlements were not an obstacle to Middle East peace. He used that language specifically.

Was that question of what's an obstacle and what's not an obstacle discussed between the two presidents last week?

A I don't know.

Q John, on the previous question here, you're saying that the Middle East broader peace does not have to wait for Lebanon.

As far as we know, the Arabs are waiting for some progress in Lebanon and the settlements in order to really get involved in the broader peace.

With this information, with information coming out of Jerusalem about the advertisement, and nothing is moving in Lebanon, I mean, can you tell us if the Arab point of view or the Arab's understanding, you're concerned because the Arab point of view is that --

A No. I don't believe there's really any contradiction in what I said, that Ambassador Habib and the Administration will pursue the overall Middle East peace initiative with vigor, and will continue to pursue that even though Lebanon is unresolved. Just as obviously it would be helpful to have a resolution of the Lebanese problem, and Ambassador Draper is pursuing that just as vigorously. But one is not going to wait for the one to take place before moving on the other. That action will continue. The one does not come to a halt because there has not been movement in Lebanon.

Q Do you expect any progress with the peace?

A Sure. We're working at it hour by hour, day by day. Of course.

Q Isn't it more difficult, John, for King Hussein to come forward in the manner that the Administration would like him to, that there's no visible demonstration of troop withdrawals from Lebanon?

A I don't think we should speak for King Hussein. I think he has to speak for himself and say what makes it difficult for him to come forward and what makes it easy.

As I said, obviously, resolution of the Lebanese problem would be helpful, but we're not at a standstill because that Lebanon situation has not been resolved.

Q John, since the beginning of the war in Lebanon, how many times has there been contact between the Israeli forces and the Marines and the multinational forces in which you expressed your concern about these types of contacts which meets the point of challenge that you said yesterday?

Can you brief us on this, or can you take the question and see how many times were there such violations or attempts by Israelis to possibly undermine your efforts in bringing peace in Lebanon?

A You're talking about the confrontations, or the challenges between the military?

Q Yes. The confrontations. The confrontation of the helicopters with the mission of the negotiations and other things?

A I don't know. You'd have to go back and catalogue the various statements we've made.

Q You?

A You would have to go back and catalogue the various statements we have made. (Laughter)

Certainly there have been incidents and certainly we have comments on them.

Q Besides your expressing this concern about this campaign of advertisement for the settlements in the West Bank, how much input from this office, the State Department, goes to the Congressional leadership who approved the increase in military aid and assistance, economic assistance, to Israel in order to be able to have $150,000 extra for the campaign of advertisement to sell more settlements there?

A I don't think there's been any doubt about the State Department's position on aid to Israel. I think we've made that clear over the months, and I don't think there's been any question about this Administration's view of the settlements.

I think there are many, many statements on record. The position hasn't changed.

Q Do you have any comment on stories that the Administration is about to approve the licenses for the exportation of American technology, a composite technology for the Lavi fighter, the Israeli fighter?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you look into that?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything about the personnel changes in the consultate in East Jerusalem?

A No.

Q Anything at this point on whether the Administration sees any obstacles to recertification of aid to El Salvador?

A No. I have nothing on Salvador recertification.

Q Do you have any idea when the human rights report is to be issued?

A It is due by the end of this month?

Q But you don't know when it will be?

A I don't know which date.

Q John, do you have any comment at all on the non-aligned foreign ministers' meeting in Managua, or on the call by Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela for, I guess, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua?

A No.

Q John, there are two South African stories in the Post today.

Do you have any statements on a Mugabe criticism of our policy or on a Dirk Mudge decision to quit?

A Not on Mr. Mugabe's remarks. I think Assistant Secretary Crocker is at that conference and responded yesterday. We will not go further than that.

As to Mr. Mudge's situation, the United States, of course, does not recognize the political institutions established in Namibia after the unilateral elections held in December of 1978.

We continue to regard Mr. Mudge as the leader of an internal political party, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. We do not believe that his resignation from the so-called internal government will affect the negotiations to achieve an internationally accepted independent Namibia. We remain committed to that process.

Q Any update on the status of the talks?

A No.

Q There was a report this morning from the West Bank also of the closing of a school in Nablus by the Israeli authorities. Would you care to comment on that?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q You are aware of the report.

A I've seen the report.

Q John, in the past few days have you made any statement on the reconciliation between Iraq and Egypt?

A I haven't. There was a day when I skipped and Mr. Romberg may have made a statement. Did you do anything on that?

Q Is there any statement?

MR. ROMBERG: There may be something.

A We'll have a look. I don't recall it, but we'll check for you.

Q How about the Iraqi statement on recognizing Israel, the one that Shamir said was only for propaganda? Do you have anything on that, too?

A No.

Q Do you want to?

(Laughter)

A Do I want to or --

Q Do you want to make a statement on it?

A No.

Q What about the Hussein-Arafat meeting? Do you have any response to --

A Nothing on it. Guess you'd have to ask them.

Q One last try. Have you heard from the Greek Government about the U.S. approval of the sale of the Phantoms from Egypt to Turkey?

A No.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes. I'm sure.

Q Because the U.S. Ambassador was called in to the Foreign Ministry yesterday.

A Why don't we poke around and see what we can find on that for you. Fair enough?

Q Yes.

A One last question.

Q Davar newspaper reported a couple of days ago that Israel is manufacturing and selling computers to the Soviet Union. Do you have any comment?

A No.

Q Anything on Cosmos?

A No. No change.

Q Yesterday you said the Asian Development Bank is considering accepting China. Would that mean that Taiwan would automatically be expelled?

A I think that we will meet that when we come to it. I'll just use the language we used yesterday.

Q I didn't hear a word you said. Thanks a lot. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:31 p.m.)

Beiber

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12,1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #8

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 1982, 12:38 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry we're delayed a little bit this afternoon. I don't have any announcements, and I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, could you comment on some reports coming out of Jordan in which the Jordanian Government is reputed to have briefed a bunch of people on what the United States is prepared to do to make it easier for Jordan to enter the talks?

A I can't comment in any detail, Jim. As you know, we don't discuss the substance of our diplomatic exchanges. I think you can take it as a given that the President told King Hussein of his commitment to pursue the positions that he set out in his September 1 initiative, and that he would support those positions energetically.

Q And specifically on the settlements in which the President called for a freeze on September 1, how he is prepared to back that up?

A I don't have any more detail on that question at this point. I think that the position on the settlements was laid out clearly by the President. We've articulated it from here and other forums in the government, and I don't have further detail at this point.

Q Reports from Jordan said that the U.S. -- or some American official said to King Hussein that the U.S. would be ready to act to shorten the transition period on the West Bank which, as we know, according to Camp David should be five years.

A We're interested in beginning negotiations as soon as possible to establish a transitional regime which is called for in the Camp David framework.

Once engaged, those negotiations should not take very long, given the previous three years of negotiations. Thereafter, the talks on final status and peace are to begin as soon as possible. In any event, no later than three years. The sooner the better in our view.

The transitional period is set at five years in the Camp David framework. However, if a final peace agreement were achieved before that period expired, the parties might decide to implement it sooner.

Q Would you recommend -- or has the U.S. said to Jordan that it's going to act in order to accelerate or to shorten the transitional period?

A (a) In terms of what we've said or not said, I'm not going to go into the substance of our discussions. (b) In terms of what our position would be, I think I really would have to leave you with the thought I just gave you, that the parties might decide to implement it sooner, but I don't want to try and prescribe from this podium what our position might be in that circumstance.

Q Is there a position? I mean, if they're ready to negotiate.

A As I say, I don't want to try and prescribe from here what our position might be in that circumstance.

Q Where's here? You keep saying "from here." From this podium.

A From this podium.

Q Well, is there a position not from this podium?

A I don't intend to go into what we might do in a particular circumstance which might or might not occur in the future.

Q Alan, among those reports coming from out there was one that the United States was going to impose an actual time limit on the talks themselves.

A Again, I'm going to stick with what I've just said on this, Jim. I don't have anything to take us further on that.

Q Do you have copies on that?

A I think you're going to have to get it this afternoon. I don't think I can give you a copy of what I've just said. I'll have to get it once our transcript is done.

Q Do you have any comment on the official statement attributed to Israeli Minister Sharon, saying that Israel is not ready to -- would reject any PLO participation whether covert or overt?

A No. I think the issue of Palestinian representation is addressed in Camp David, and I don't have anything to take it beyond that at this point.

Q Alan, do you have anything today on Prime Minister Begin's visit? There is some concern in Israel whether there is pressure being exerted.

A No. I don't have anything to add to what John said yesterday on the subject.

Q Still not scheduled?

A I have nothing beyond what he said yesterday.

Q Question on a different subject.

A Well, let's stick with this subject.

Q Just a clarification to what was said here yesteday. Could you just answer the clear question, is there any linkage between the timing of Mr. Begin's visit here and any progress on the Lebanese?

A Again, I don't have John's words in front of me, but I'm going to have to stick with whatever he said on this yesterday.

Q Any explanation for the quote attributed to Hussein that the Arab side has in effect seven weeks, and that there's something magical about the beginning of March and time runs out at that point?

A I think you would have to ask King Hussein what he may have meant by that.

Q No. But he put this within the context of American policy.

A No. I'd stick with that. I think you'd have to ask him what he meant by that.

Q Alan?

A Still on the Middle East?

Q Yeah.

A Okay. Go ahead.

Q I may have missed a transition here, but did the President state his position to Hussein in a new letter to the King?

A Again, I'm not going to get into either the substance or to address the form of our diplomatic exchanges. I'm not going to get into the question of letters or non-letters or whatever.

What I mentioned was that when -- particularly, of course, when they met, he reiterated his commitment.

Q On Monday night a correspondent for our news service was arrested in El Salvador, detained, and then released and expelled from the country. His name is David Halgarve.

I was wondering if the State Department or the American Embassy in San Salvador registered any sentiments to the authorities there?

A I think all I can give you is the following: I'm not aware of the exact circumstances, but two reporters -- David Halgarve, Pacifica Radio News, and a Swedish correspondent -- were briefly detained by Salvadoran army troops in San Vicente province on January 11 and were accused of maintaining contact with Salvadoran guerrillas.

An American Consular Officer has since met with Halgarve, and we understand that both correspondents intend to leave El Salvador shortly, which I think you're confirming here.

But I don't have anything to take it beyond that.

Q Another topic. You put out guidance last night on Tony Street's visit. But do you have any readout of his meeting with Secretary Shultz afterwards. And also, you mentioned the ANZUS partner. Will the other ANZUS partner now, New Zealand, be invited for unilateral talks?

A I don't have anything on a possible New Zealand visit, and I do not have a readout beyond what the guidance indicated. I mean, I think the guidance reflected indeed the general nature of the conversations and the topics that would have been covered in that, but I don't have a specific readout to give you on that.

Q Could you take the first question, please?

A On New Zealand?

Q Yeah.

A I don't until we have something to announce. I would not intend to precipitately announce it.

Q Alan, could you outline what was done regarding the UPI correspondent in Poland and what the status of that detention is at this point?

A The status is, as I understand it, that Ms. Gruber has been released. The representations were made about getting access to her and seeking her early release, and so on and so forth -- explanation of what it was all about.

I don't have a further update as to what the exchange may have been. I'm not sure that we could go into it in any case. But active efforts were made, but she's been released and we're very pleased with that.

Q Is the U.S. going to pursue that at all at this point now that she has been released?

A I can't tell you, Ralph. I don't know.

Q These active efforts, who --

A Yes. The Embassy. Our Embassy in Warsaw.

Q Do you see this as part of a campaign against foreign media here?

A Do I see it as part of a campaign against foreign media there? Without knowing more facts, I don't think we're in a position to characterize it.

Q In this thing about the talks of King Hussein here -- although you don't reveal any diplomatic correspondence or whatever it is -- is it fair to assume that you are -- the United States is waiting to hear or a move from the PLO on the PLO side in the way of recognizing 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist in order to qualify to enter the peace negotiations? Is this the first thing that you are waiting for an answer from them?

A I think those are separate issues. What we have talked about in terms of 242, 338, and recognizing Israel's right to exist is whether we would talk with the PLO. We have not addressed the question of PLO participation in the talks, particularly in those terms.

As I say, I think that the accords provide for Palestinian representation. I would refer you to the accords.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the meeting yesterday between the Secretary and the group of Jewish leaders, and why wasn't that meeting on his public schedule?

A It was designed to be simply a continuation of an exchange that has gone on -- was, in fact, an exchange of views that has gone on before, and it wasn't on his schedule because it was in essence a private meeting. It was not a secret meeting, but it was a private meeting, and it would be up, in our judgment, to the private participants if they wanted it to be known that they were having such a meeting.

The meeting was held at the Secretary's request to continue the dialogue that had been held before.

Q Anything on the content of the discussion?

A Excuse me?

Q Anything on the subjects that were discussed?

A No. I think you can assume that the various issues of interest in the Middle East were high on the agenda.

Q (Inaudible)

A Yeah. I know, John, sometimes they have and sometimes they haven't been --

Q (Inaudible) I mean, can we get a little clearer explanation of whether or not these things will be made public in the future?

CONT

A I suspect it will --

Q I mean, it is a matter of news interest.

A I understand that. I also understand there was no lack of knowledge by the press that the meeting was taking place, so I don't think you were deprived.

(Laughter)

-- MORE --

Q As a result of contacts yesterday in Moscow, does the United States have any different view or any new information regarding the Soviet INF position, specifically the question of the dismantling of some SS-20s?

A That, I think, came out of reports of a talk between the Soviet leadership and Congressman Lantos, or a Soviet representative.

The issue of destroying missiles is an issue we will be pursuing with Soviet negotiators in Geneva. It appears that perhaps they may be recognizing the merit of our position that longer-range land-based INF missiles should be destroyed and not merely withdrawn. We, of course, have proposed to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet missiles of this class, but that's as far as I think I could take our appreciation of what their position is at this point.

Q Do you have any reading on the Vogel meeting with Andropov?

A We haven't seen details and can't offer specific comment, but the U.S. remains ready to consider all serious Soviet proposals and looks forward to hearing any new elements of a Soviet position. We will, of course, be meeting directly with the Soviet negotiators in Geneva January 27 when the talks resume.

As we have made, I think, very clear, the U.S. and our Allies remain convinced that the zero/zero proposal and the total elimination of this class of weapons offers the best and most equitable arms control solution.

Q You said that 242 and 338, et cetera, are separate issues as you have --

A I said that we addressed that in the context of our dealings with talks with the PLO.

Q What I'm actually asking, President Mubarak has been repeatedly calling on the PLO and Jordan to do that. Are you in touch with -- is the Administration bringing other Middle Eastern governments up to date on where things are right now, that maybe this is not exactly what is going on at this precise moment in the Middle East?

A I'm not sure I follow the question. Let me just address it this way. We certainly have an on-going dialogue with a variety of different governments in the region about the important issues with which we are all concerned. I don't want to get into specifics, but I think that you can assume that dialogue, as I say, is indeed an on-going one, but I don't have some sort of readout to give you on any specific conversations or where we might have discussed specific issues.

Q I know what you're saying; it's fine. But President Mubarak this morning again called for Jordan and the PLO to recognize Israel, 242, and I'm trying to find out --

A Fine.

Q That's fine, okay, but you said that these are separate issues, as you consider them now.

A We have addressed -- I'm repeating myself -- we have addressed the question which was raised before about the PLO recognizing Israel's right to exist and accepting U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in the context of our dealings with the PLO.

The question was raised, what about their coming to the peace tables - our condition for their coming to the peace table. I've said that question is a separate question and is addressed by the Camp David framework, and I don't have a further view to offer you on that.

Q Do you have any comment to make about Hans Jochen Vogel's meeting with the Soviet leaders in Moscow?

A I just --

Q You were talking about Lantos.

A No, the second part was on the Vogel meeting.

Q A follow up on that. When Vogel was here, he said he would prefer that if at the end of this year, and there's no agreement, but there seems to be some promise left in the idea of negotiating, he would prefer to continue to negotiate and not deploy the U.S. missiles in Europe. What's the Administration's view toward this option?

A I think we've indicated before that we -- if there was no agreement, we would move ahead with deployment, and this was the NATO decision. I refer you back to the words of the NATO decision, but there's no change in the position that we've had consistently.

Q Back to the Soviet missiles again for a second. Are you saying, when you say we look forward to considering all serious proposals that are made when the talks resume, are you saying there that the U.S. finds it strange or improper or inappropriate for this discussion to be going on publicly and that you would rather deal with this all in the talks?

A No, I'm not addressing that particularly. What I'm saying is the place where the actual negotiations will go on is in Geneva and that's where we would address it, together, across the table, with the Soviets. That's all I'm saying.

Q I guess what I'm getting at, does that mean that you don't view these kinds of discussions publicly as being serious, that they're not serious unless they take place at the --

A I think we've addressed this several times. I would refer you to what the President said on Saturday, what we've said before on this. Again, the negotiations will take place in Geneva.

Q Can you confirm reports that the Soviets have begun resupplying the Iraqis with weaponry? This would be weaponry that has been ordered since the Iraq-Iran war started?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on the Dirk Mudge resignation in Namibia, and what affect it may have on their current negotiations?

A We had comment on this yesterday, and could I ask you to check back with the Press Office and get that guidance.

Q Any comment on the PLO announcement that they are taking responsibility for the attack on the bus in Tel Aviv early this week?

A I've seen conflicting reports. Obviously, that sort of terrorist act by whomever is to be condemned. But the reports I've seen have indicated a greater or lesser degree of responsibility by possibily parts of the PLO. I don't have any confirmation on that, and I don't have a particular comment other than obviously it is a deplorable action that was taken.

Q I read a report this morning that the Embassy in Warsaw may dismiss forty-nine Polish employees of the Embassy. Do you have anything on that?

A I have nothing on that. Don't know anything about it.

Q Have you seen it?

A No.

Q It's in the Post.

A Sorry, I missed it.

Q Do you have anything on Garcia and Ochoa in El Salvador; Is Garcia about to quit?

A No, nothing new on it.

Q Do you have anything to say of what affect this would have on U.S. interests if he were to? What about the New York Times editorial, recommending that the Administration not certify El Salvador; do you have anything to say on that?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Any new readout today on the Namibian talks?

A No, nothing new in Namibia.

Q About the new Central Command --

A Excuse me, what Central Command?

Q About the new Central Command which is replacing rapid deployment forces. There were two briefings which were scheduled, or a briefing which was scheduled twice at the National Press Building for foreign correspondents at the Foreign Press Center. The last one was scheduled for January 6 at 2:15 and suddenly the briefing was called off; it was cancelled although my information says that the people at the Pentagon were willing and desirable of talking about the new Central Command to the foreign press, especially from Middle Eastern press.

Could you give us some information about why this was called off, because I understand also that some people at the State Department, they don't want the Pentagon to talk about the new Central Command in the Middle East?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Could you check on that?

A No. I think if that briefing can be arranged and carried out, it will be, but I don't know anything about it.

Q Do you have anything to say on a report being circulated in Tokyo that Ambassador Mansfield will retire in March?

A No, I haven't seen anything on it. I, myself, I've been aware of reports that Ambassador Mansfield would retire for several years now. I think we'll wait and see if Ambassador Mansfield decides to retire when he wishes to.

Q One day it will be true. (Laughter)

Q Anything new on the Soviet missiles in Syria today?

A No, nothing on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the increasing interest in a way on the part of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, the reported Begin overture on normalizing relations?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Anything on Ambassador Starr's whereabouts, or his doings?

A No, I think that the White House indicated that Ambassador Starr was to meet with Judge Clark today, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Was there any response to charges by Prime Minister Mugabe that the U.S. is attempting to blackmail the frontlines?

A What we indicated was that Assistant Seccretary Crocker addressed this issue at the conference and we would stick with what he said on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1983

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STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, JR.
SECRETARY OF STATE
THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1982, 12:26 P. M.
IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING ROOM

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I thought I would preempt a moment or two of John Hughes' time and make a statement on behalf of the President.

Consistent with the President's firm dedication to pursuing arms controls agreements, based on equality, stability and effective verification, the President is determined that there should be no gap, no matter how short, in the leadership of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency pending the confirmation of Dr. Adelman as its Director.

The President has therefore selected Assistant Director James L. George to assume the position of Acting Director of ACDA.

To assure the best coordination within the Executive Branch of arms control policy, the President has asked Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam to provide day-to-day policy guidance to Mr. George, and to assist in assuring that ACDA's crucial responsibilities in implementing the President's arms control policy are fulfilled.

I may say, beyond that, I had the opportunity two or three days ago with Ken Dam to visit over in ACDA and talk to some of the staff members there, and I know that it's extremely important and helpful for us to have their counsel, help and expertise as this subject goes forward.

QUESTION: Could you tell why Mr. Rostow was fired?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that the statements of Mr. Rostow and the President stand for themselves. There's no particular point in delving into them further.

I might say that I read the statement that Mr. Rostow made this morning in his farewell statement, and I found it to be an inspiring and eloquent statement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you clarify for us the jurisdictional arrangement between the State Department and the Arms Control Agency, and, more particularly, your personal role? Is your authority or your control, or whatever word you choose to use, increasing now with the appointment of Mr. Adelman, or is the division, so to speak, between ACDA and State about where it was under Mr. Rostow?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I knew I should have had that -- do you have that language?

MR. HUGHES: I think we do.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: John really should have conducted this briefing.

MR. HUGHES: Oh, I don't think so, Mr. Secretary. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, I think it's important to recognize that the person in charge of our arms control policy is the President of the United States. He is very much involved, as I have seen, in this and in other areas. So he's the boss.

According to the statute, Section 22 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, it indicates that "The Director of ACDA shall, under the direction of the Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the government for arms control and disarmament matters." So that puts the Secretary of State into this picture.

In Section 33 it states that the Director "is authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of State, and the heads of other agencies, recommendations concerning United States' arms control and disarmament policy."

Within the framework the President has asked, both before and since Mr. Rostow's resignation, that I help to coordinate these matters. That is what I intend to do and am doing. So I don't think that the sort of formal structure of authority is so important as it is to recognize that the President is in charge. There's a very competent set of staff people around in the government working on this, and the senior people are personally heavily engaged in the effort.

QUESTION: What I think we're trying to find out is, what will be different as a result of the changes that have taken place in the last 24 hours?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, the policy of the United States stands. It's a very strong and firm policy, calling

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for dramatic reductions in armaments, for the removal of a whole class of weapons from European soil, and for the reductions in many others, not only in the strategic and missiles area, but also in the conventional force area.

That is the policy. That policy is being implemented by strong negotiators, and that policy stands.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't you agree --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Maybe I can take two more, and then I'll hand it over to --

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't you agree that there is an appearance of disarray in the Administration, not just because of Mr. Rostow's resignation, but because of the nominees that were withdrawn recently? Isn't there an appearance of disarray?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's clear that we have had trouble getting the Deputy Director of ACDA confirmed. That's not the first time that's happened in this government. However, the policy of the government and the conduct of the negotiations is and has been going forward in a strong and purposeful way. That's the real point. I think in the new appointees the President has people who are very capable and will work effectively with him and others.

So I think, quite to the contrary, we have this situation firmly in control. Of course, one of the purposes of the additional statement that I've made this morning is simply to clarify the fact that there will be an acting director, who that is, and that Ken Dam, who has been working on this subject very heavily with me and others -- not only in State but the other interested agencies -- will be over there and will be helping and be sure that the ACDA staff is tied in and its capabilities fully utilized in this period that we're now in.

Maybe one more question.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in a column by Joseph Kraft this morning, from apparently talking to you, he concluded or you told him -- it's not clear -- that after the German elections in March there will be a change in the American zero option position at Geneva.

I just wondered whether in fact it is your view that you should change it or wait until the German elections?

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would make two comments. First of all, Joe Kraft speaks for himself, and I speak for myself.

Second, the recommendations, as I evolve them in this and other areas, I'll make to the President, and we'll conduct our negotiations in Geneva.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #9

THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 1982, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

A I realize that everybody now may leave and all else that follows may well be anti-climatic.

Q That's true.

A Thank you, Mr. Kalb.

There are a couple of housekeeping announcements. There's been a change in the time of background briefing in the Nakasone visit to the White House tomorrow, January 14. The time is now 3:15 in the afternoon and not 10:30 in the morning as was previously announced.

Secondly, U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar will make an official visit to meet with President Reagan at the White House on Friday, January 14, at 11:30 in the morning. Following the meeting, Vice President Bush will host a luncheon in the Secretary General's honor at Blair House at 1:45. Also at Blair House, Secretary Shultz will meet with the Secetary General.

The Secretary General will be available to the press at 3:00 p.m. at the Department of State diplomatic entrance.

That's all I have in the way of any announcements. I'll be glad to take any question.

Q What do you mean "available?" It's not a news conference, or just a stake out?

A A stake out.

Q I see. Thank you.

Q The textile negotiations with China, do you have any comment on reports that those negotiations have ended without an agreement, and that --

A Yes.

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Q I would like to follow that by asking what the Administration's policy will be following the end of those negotiations about imposing restrictions of the U.S.?

A The fourth round of the U.S.-China textile negotiations have concluded without agreement. The negotiations were conducted in a businesslike fashion. We are naturally disappointed that it was not possible to conclude an agreement during this round, but we're willing to continue negotiations at a mutually convenient date.

As we did previously announce, absent an agreement, we will take actions to protect our market. However, it is the United States Government sincere desire to continue addressing our textile trade problems through a mutually acceptable agreement.

As we've said, we're prepared to continue negotiations at a mutually acceptable date.

Q Do you know whether that date would be likely to occur before Secretary Shultz' visit or after or during?

A I have nothing on it. I have nothing on a date for you.

Q Is there any reason to believe that this failure at this time might threaten the visit itself?

A I don't think there's any problem on the visit. The Secretary's trip to China is designed to allow him to review a broad range of international, regional and bilateral issues. We believe the Chinese might raise this issue with the Secretary. The Secretary, if that occurs, will explain the United States position, but we've no reason to believe that it will have any adverse affect on the visit.

Q What actions? You referred to some actions that will be taken to protect the market?

A I think that those are going to be published. They are published in the Federal Register.

Q There are reports from the Middle East that Lebanon and Israel agreed on an agenda. Do you have any comment or any information on that?

A We are encouraged by reports that the negotiators' efforts have been successful, and that an agenda has finally been agreed to by the negotiators. This is clearly a step forward. It is our conviction that the negotiations can and must now move quickly forward toward an agreement leading to the rapid withdrawal from Lebanon of all external forces.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Copy of the China readout?

A Yes.

Q In the Middle East, there's a story by Jack Anderson this morning about the Rapid Deployment Force plan for Jordan. What do you have to comment on that story?

A Jordan is an important friend of the United States with which we have long-standing and well-known military supply relationships.

As both countries have an interest in regional security that is equally well-known, it should surprise no one that questions of regional security are regularly discussed.

That's the background of the relationship, and I'm not going to have any comment on this story or any other speculation along those lines.

Q On more follow-up on a CBS report that Jordan might get more arms above the F-20s and the Stinger missiles?

A Nothing on it.

Q Since you are on Jordan, do you expect any new visit by King Hussein shortly before the end of this month back to the States for consultations, or something; a new plan?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have anything on the meeting of the Secretary today with the President of Sudan?

A No, I really don't. As you know, President Nimeiri has been here, I think, for medical reasons. I think the Secretary took the opportunity to see him, but I don't have any read-out on the meeting.

Q Anything on unveiling or detailing further of the Japanese relaxation of import restrictions today?

A I think I might have something on that. We have been looking forward to the announcement of additional

Japanese market-opening measures. We haven't had a chance to review them, and so we prefer to take that question.

We do take particular note of and appreciate Prime Minister Nakasone's statement, as reported in the press, in which he asked the Japanese people to welcome "foreign manufactured goods and investment without discrimination."

Q Will the question of beef and citrus be raised by President Reagan or by other U.S. officials next week when the Prime Minister visits Washington?

A I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q You said you would take the --

A I'll take the question, sure.

Q John, has Ambassador Mansfield tendered his resignation?

A I don't think so. I think Alan mentioned yesterday that there's been stories over several years that Ambassador Mansfield was planning to retire, but I know of no development or movement on that.

Q Back on the Middle East. There are a couple of stories regarding the relationship between Jordan and the Palestinians. One from Moscow, Yasser Arafat says that the Soviet Union would not object to some kind of Palestinian/Jordanian federation. One from Israel, Shamir says that it's his view that King Hussein's only intention is to take away Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district from Israel.

Do you have any comment on that?

A Not really. It's simply a question of King Hussein having had his meeting with President Reagan; having, as I've said before, gone back to confer with other Arab leaders and other peoples and organizations and groupings in the area, and I think the next move would come from King Hussein.

Q You wouldn't welcome Moscow's support for the Administration --

A We've seen the same kind of press reports, but I think the State Department doesn't traditionally leap to react to perfunctory wire service reports.

Q Do you have anything on Poland on the Gruber thing?

A Yes. I think we can give you something from the Press Office on that.

Q Do you have any readout on the visit this morning between Secretary Shultz and Nimeiri of Sudan?

A No. I just answered that one.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #10

FRIDAY, JANUARY 14, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have no statements. It's a lean book.

Q In your statement yesterday you said that you're considering options on the situation with the Polish explusion of the American correspondent. What is happening on that?

A Yes. That hasn't moved any further. We are examining various possible responses, and we'll let you know as soon as that review process is completed.

Q Other things pertaining to looking through the papers. Two Israeli newspapers say that -- they quote the Israeli Minister of Tourism as saying that one of the reasons hitherto undisclosed for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was that the Israelis wanted to avoid a non-aggression agreement with the PLO which had been negotiated through U.S. means?

A No knowledge of this whatsoever. It doesn't add up in any way as far as I'm concerned.

Q There's something on the FBIS from Jerusalem, saying that Ambassador Habib has told the Israelis he would like to see the foreign forces begin to leave Lebanon by February 12th. Anything that specific?

A I don't think we would get into the specifics of Ambassador Habib's discussions. It isn't any secret that we are eager for resolution on a plan for departure of foreign forces from Lebanon, and for the speediest possible implementation of that plan. But I don't think we would get into any of the specifics of the conversations that he is having.

Q As I understand the agenda for talks that was announced yesterday, there are four points on it. The last point is the question of negotiating a withdrawal of foreign forces. Is the Administration satisfied with that order?

A I don't think from here we can really specify what sequence the discussions are going to take. That's up to the parties on the ground. We're satisfied -- we're pleased with the resolution of the agenda discussion, and we're pleased that it's moving forward, but I don't think we would go any further on the details of order or how they come at those various subjects.

Q My previous impression is that this Administration placed a certain priority on the withdrawal of the foreign troops. That's no longer the case?

A I just said we place a priority on that. We want to see that happens as soon as possible, but I don't want to get into specifics of how the negotiations go forward.

Q John, Mr. Bahr, the Social Democractic arms expert who accompanied Mr. Vogel on his trips here and to Moscow is quoted today as saying that he picked up the impression here of serious differences within the Reagan Administration on what course to pursue in the arms talks.

Do you think he's a good perceiver?

A I don't think we would respond to that particular comment, but, in general, I think that what has been said in the past several days and has been reiterated is that our arms control policy is the President's policy; that it's a good policy. There are specific proposals out there, and I think the Secretary of State made clear that that policy is going forward vigorously and with unity by the arms control team that the President has appointed.

Q But that team is being quoted as saying that they want more flexibility in that the zero option thing may be -- and this is being heard in Europe, too -- may be good in theory but that in practice, at this immediate juncture, it won't work.

A I'm not aware that the team is asking for anything different than what the President has directed.

Q Well, that's come out in print, that Nitze wants a little more flexibility.

A I'm not aware that the team is asking for anything other than the President has directed. I think the President is firm in those directions and will continue to be firm, and as I say I think the team is going forward with a sense of unity and purpose.

Q Incidentally, John, that West German team came back reporting that the Soviets would be willing to discuss arms reductions in terms of warheads rather than launch vehicles, which they seem to think is a shift. Do you?

A As you know, the United States seeks the elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missile systems, missiles, and warheads alike.

Our Ambassador in Moscow sought at a high level to clarify certain elements of the Soviet position on INF. Nothing in that or subsequent contacts with responsible Soviet officials has given us reason to believe there have been any changes in the Soviet position as outlined by Mr. Andropov.

Of course, we will be seeking clarification from the Soviet negotiators when talks resume on January 27th.

Q In other words, you think the Soviets may be planting these various ideas as a means of dividing the Western Alliance?

A I think Geneva is the place where the negotiations have been going on and are going on. That's the place for any clarification or amplification to take place.

Q When did the Ambassador seek this clarification at a high level?

A I don't have a date on that.

Q Can you get us --

A Yes, sure.

Q Is that the one meeting that was announced?

A I'm not sure what meeting that is, but I'll be glad to look into it for you.

Q Can I just follow up your answer here. Are you saying that the American position on the INF talks, the zero/zero option, that it's been decided now that when the talks resume again that will be our position, or is there still a possibility of some change, because you keep hearing from some people that instructions haven't been formalized yet for Mr. Nitze to take back. Others seem to be as yourself, suggesting that in fact they have been and that's the position for the time being?

A The negotiators are about to go back, and I'm sure they're in the process of being instructed in terms of the President's policy. But I don't think we can get into the character of those instructions.

Q Getting back again to the statement made by Ambassador Habib, this date fixed by him, do you consider it part and parcel of the new U.S. move in the area or just his personal suggestion for the withdrawal of the Israelis?

A I didn't refer to any date. I think that the date that you mentioned is something that is coming out of non U.S. government sources elsewhere, so we're not suggesting a date. What we're suggesting, as we have all along, is that really the question of drawing up a troop withdrawal plan is not a terribly complex business, once you get agreement to move forward, and we want to see that movement proceed as speedily as possible.

Q Do you have anything to comment on the reaction taken by the Syrians and the Lebanese on this statement which was somehow skeptical?

A No.

Q Do you now have a date for Jordan to join in the peace talks with Israel?

A No.

Q Or join the peace process?

A No.

Q Do you have anything more on the SAM-5s?

A No.

Q John, can I make sure I understand your answer to Bernie's question. You're not addressing the question of whether the President's policy might be changed?

A No. I wasn't sending any signals. I simply was saying I think it would be improper for us to discuss the instructions.

Q So you're not saying specifically without -- you're just not saying that there will not necessarily be any change in the zero/zero option?

A I'm just avoiding the suggestion of change.

Q In other words, your statement on where we stand is only good for that moment? (Laughter)

A This is a rough group. (Laughter)

Q I mean, because the rhetoric from the Secretary yesterday, yourself, Al, the other day, suggested that the American position on the INF talks was not going to change when the talks resumed again. That was simply to confirm that is -- that's the inference I draw just from the statement.

A That's right.

Q And you won't confirm that?

A I'm certainly not departing from either statements or inferences from those that have been made by the President or the Secretary of State over the past several days. When you say "language," there is no change in that position.

Q If I could ask a supplementary question. I think what's throwing us off a little bit here is, you've said earlier you're not aware that the team is asking for anything different than what the President has directed, and he has a strong policy and he's going to stand by this strong policy.

That seems to say that the policy, the instructions, the direction as of now are not likely to be changed, at least in the next couple weeks which we're talking about between now and the time of the negotiations --

A That's correct. Sure.

Q John, a slightly different tack. Foreign Minister Genscher who's certainly had a little experience in this area is urging an "interim solution," calling for reduced levels by 1984, while negotiations continue toward the goal of something more ambitious. Do you have anything to say about his interim solution?

A No. As I say, we have the President's two good proposals out there. We think they're good proposals. We think they're serious proposals, both on START, for the reduction, and in the case of INF, for the elimination of an entire class of systems in the area. We think they're good proposals, and that's what the President has out there.

--MORE--

Q John, on another topic, please. You had guidance yesterday about a butter barter between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Is such a barter being seriously considered? Do you have anything to report on it today?

A You catch me a little off foot.

MR. ROMBERG: The guidance addresses that.

A I'm told --

Q No. This is a follow-up to the guidance. Perhaps you could take it because the guidance is not that complete.

Could you please let us know, is such a deal being considered and, you know, where are we on it and will any other countries be involved besides the U.S. and the Soviet Union?

A Let me take a look at the guidance, and we'll get back to you on it.

Q Has the time for a visit by Prime Minister Begin, discussed this week by Ambassador Habib in his talks in Israel or in any other --

A I don't know whether it was discussed. I know that no date has been set. We are just as we have been over the past several days when you've asked this question and when we've answered it.

As you know, the visit was firm and, so far as I know, no new date has been set for a visit.

Q Could you clarify -- since questions regarding the visit are coming up again and again, could you clarify if the timing of the visit is linked in any way to the progress in Lebanon?

A No. I think that the timing of the visit is something that Mr. Begin and the President would work out between them. I think we'll leave it there.

Q John, is there any question now of increased U.S. troop increments in Lebanon?

A No. I think not until we see the dimensions of a plan for withdrawal. Our position has been clearly consistent on that. You have to look at the plan for the withdrawal of foreign troops before you can determine whether there is a new role for the MNF, and until you determine whether there's a new role for the MNF, you don't know how many, if any, additional troops would be needed. So it's a kind of progressive thing. You really have to see the plan first before you can make any commitments or decisions on enlargement of the MNF.

Q John, a mechanical question. What is the arrangement going to be this afternoon with the U.N. Secretary General?

A I think it's still set for 3:00 o'clock downstairs.

Q And down in the lobby?

A Yes.

Q What is the purpose of his being here? What's going to be discussed? Is there some particular area, for example, the U.N. force in Lebanon, with the Secretary General?

A I don't know what the subject of the discussions is. I do not think it is -- I mean, I think it's a -- I don't mean to suggest it's a routine visit, but it is not a visit, as I understand it, that was hastily arranged to consider a specific subject.

Q You're suggesting this is a kind of a tour of the horizon?

A Yes, I'm sure --

Q As Damon Runyon used to say, a medium hello to the --

A Yeah. But he's going to be in the building, and, as I understand it, is going to come downstairs at 3:00 and give some remarks to the press.

Q Is the U.S. Embassy in Tehran being used to hold prisoners?

A I do have a little -- I thought I had something on that, but maybe I don't. I guess I do have some guidance on that, but I don't happen to have it with me. Why don't you check with the Press Office afterwards on that.

Q Do you have anything on Secretary Eagleburger's recent trip to Romania?

A Not a tremendous amount, but I'll be glad to give you what I have.

Mr. Eagleburger was in Bucharest and Belgrade between January 10 and 13. In Romania he met with President Ceausescu and Foreign Minister Andrei to discuss a broad range of international and bilateral issues.

The talks were cordial, constructive, as befits the good bilateral relations we enjoy with Romania. Mr. Eagleburger visited Romania as special Presidential envoy and will be reporting to the President on his trip, and therefore we don't have any further comment at this time.

In Yugoslavia he met with a number of senior officials -- Yugoslav officials -- to discuss various international and bilateral topics, including Yugoslavia's current economic problems.

We view the talks in both countries as having been both useful and positive.

Q Can you say when he will meet with the President?

A I'm not sure it is a question of meeting with the President. It's a question of reporting. I don't quite know how he will report to the President, but, no, I don't have any details.

Q Why was he a special President envoy? Is there some particular business with Romania that requires that?

A It so happens that there are some subjects that we've been discussing with Romania. Whether that relates to the manner in which he went there, I don't know.

Q Was he an envoy to both Romania and Yugoslavia?

A I do not think so.

Q Do you have anything on any discussion they may have had on the Romanian education tax?

A Yes. They discussed it.

Q Do you have any guidance?

A No.

Q John, George had a piece yesterday about Hu Na. Do you have any guidance on her? Will she be granted asylum?

A Yes I do have guidance. The Department of State has sent its advisory opinion on this case -- this is the Hua Na case --that's the Chinese tennis player -- to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Responsibility for a final decision in this case, as in all applications for asylum, rests with the INS.

It's not our policy, as you know, to discuss the details or merits of individual asylum cases, and further questions should be directed to the INS, whose number, coincidentally, I happen to have -- (laughter) -- and it is 633-2648.

Q When did the Department do that?

A I don't know when that opinion was sent.

Q Are you bouncing this back to them?

A No. I'm suggesting that for a full accounting of where we are, you probably just ought to call that number.

Q John, the Brazilian Government changed parts of its nuclear agreements with Germany. Considering that this agreement was the center of a lot of attention here by this government some years ago, do you have any comment about that?

A No. Don't have anything on that for you. Sorry.

Q Do you have any reaction to the resolution of the Salvador situation, the General coming up here?

A Not really. Obviously, we're pleased that it is resolved. We understand that Colonel Ochoa has been reported in the press as coming to an assignment in the United States, but we don't have any confirmation of that.

And, if that were to be the question, we would have no -- it's not a question of the United States approving or having any input into assignments by other nations to the Inter-American Defense Board, which I understand is the organization that has been mentioned.

Q Are you saying the Embassy wasn't involved in settling this?

A I'm saying the Embassy wasn't involved in this. Right.

Q How about any reaction to the non-aligned meeting in Nicaragua, some of the charges they have made about American involvement?

A No. Don't have anything on that for you.

Q Do you have any reaction to the statements by the Chinese regarding how serious it's going to be for the relationship of the United States and China if the United States takes action to block some of the textile imports because of this breakdown in the negotiations?

A Not really beyond where we were yesterday, Don, that even though the negotiations came to naught at this stage, some progress was made in them, and we stand ready to go back into those negotiations at a time as yet undetermined.

Q It sounds as thought the United States is planning to just impose this restriction. Is that correct?

A I think that's correct. I think we told you yesterday that the regulations have been promulgated. The controls will be implemented on January 15 retroactive to January 1.

Q You don't see this as something that's going to cause a large-scale problem for Sino-American relations?

A As I think I said yesterday, in the event that there's no further discussion between now and the time that Secretary Shultz is in China, it might well come up, but we see nothing that would jeopardize the trip.

Q One other question. Do you have anything to tell us about the meeting yesterday of President Nimeiri of the Sudan with the Secretary? What did they do in that meeting?

A Yes, I do. As you know, President Nimeiri has been in Washington for the past two weeks on a private visit for a medical checkup. He's made such visits several times in recent years.

Secretary Shultz called on him at the Sudanese Ambassador's residence, both as a courtesy in view of our close relationship with Sudan, and in order to take advantage of President Nimeiri's visit for an exchange of views on matters of mutual concern.

I understand Secretary Weinberger also called on Mr. Nimeiri.

Q Was there any further resolution of the question of United States' aid to Sudan?

A I don't know. I'm sure they discussed matters of mutual interest to the U.S. and the Sudan, but I don't know specifically what was on the agenda.

Q John, do you have anything on talks with the Venezuelan Government in this building on Maritime problems?

A No, I don't.

Q John, does the Secretary of State support an enhancement of International Monetary Fund authority which would give it some kind of decision-making power over private bank loans, credit extensions, internationally?

A I think you'd have to go back and look at the various statements that the Secretary has made.

Q Well, there have been a lot of vague statements about strengthening authority and so on. I'm asking specifically whether that would involve giving power to either veto or direct private credit extensions. Terms that have been used to describe some of the enhancements which have been attributed to the Secretary are to set up a global central bank, an international financial dictatorship, and so on?

I mean, what is this Administration trying to do?

A I really am just not able to go beyond the comments that we've made.

Q Okay. Thank you, John.

A Thank you, Jim.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, January 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #11

MONDAY, JANUARY 17, 1982, 1:31 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: A slight delay this afternoon. (Laughter.)

One announcement on the U.S.-Venezuelan Maritime Agreement:

The United States and Venezuelan Governments agreed January 14 on measures which will avoid possible disruption of their seaborne trade.

The measures were agreed on shortly before the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission was to announce restraints on Venezuelan shipping lines in retaliation against apparent Veneuzuelan discrimination toward the American lines, Consolidated Caribbean Transport and Delta.

The agreement reached with the visiting Venezuelan delegation, headed by the Director General for Maritime Transportation, Jose Jesus Villefana, provides that:

Within 30 days the Venezuelans will grant the American carriers status to allow them to compete for Venezuelan reserved cargoes on the same basis as Venezuelan shipping lines. Earlier denial of this status triggered the dispute, and the proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission.

The U.S. Administration has urged the Federal Maritime Commission to suspend all action in the discrimination case. We understand that the Federal Maritime Commission, upon notification by the Administration and the American carriers, has suspended its proceedings.

The U.S. and Venezuelan carriers will meet within 30 days to consult with respect to details of their status. The two governments will also begin, by May 1, negotiations toward a longer-term agreement on maritime issues.

Q Could you repeat that?

(Laughter)

A We'll have a repeat show at 3:30.

Q Can you give, have you any explanation for the delay, please?

A My time is not always mind to command.

Q Do you have any comment on stories which appeared over the weekend that there had been an informal understanding of an agreement between the U.S. and Soviet negotiators in the INF talks last summer?

A Yes. The negotiations in Geneva are confidential, and I wouldn't want to comment in detail on them for that reason.

Let me say the following things about those stories, though. First of all, our negotiator, Ambassador Nitze, has always been authorized to explore any flexibility in the Soviet position.

As you know, our position in the Geneva negotiations is that the entire class of long-range, land-based INF missiles should be eliminated on both sides as proposed by President Reagan.

In Ambassador Nitze's informal explorations, the Soviet Government proved unwilling to accept any outcome other than one which would preserve its massive advantage and monopoly in INF systems.

We are continuing our effort to seek the best solution, one which will provide for the complete elimination of long-range, land-based INF missiles on both sides.

We will continue to conduct these negotiations at the bargaining table in Geneva where the negotiations are scheduled to resume January 27.

Q The other part of that story is that one of the reasons that Director Rostow was bounced was because he and his people had exceeded their instructions.

What you're saying here is that they haven't, is that right?

A I'm going to stick to the language of this, Jim. I think that to a certain extent Larry Speakes addressed the issue this morning about reprimands and so on. I don't have a transcript of what he said. I don't know precisely what he did say. I'm not prepared to go beyond what I just gave you, though, on that.

Q Was there a piece of paper worked out by Mr. Nitze and his Soviet counterpart listing numbers of missiles that both sides would deploy in Europe that were more than zero and less than the number the Soviets had proposed?

A Again, I'm not prepared to go beyond what I just said.

Q Is it correct to clarify what you said, Alan, that Paul Nitze had the authority to explore a backing off the Administration zero-level option?

A I prefer to stick with the language that I used, which is to say Ambassador Nitze has always been authorized to explore any flexibility in the Soviet position. Go back to what the President said when he introduced his position. It's also what he said when he talked about START, which is we're always willing to consider any serious proposals the Soviets may have to make.

Q Did he have the authority to explore flexibility in the American position?

A I'm talking about flexibility in the Soviet position. Our position is to eliminate the entire class of missiles. I don't have anything to go beyond that.

Q Alan, you say that the other side wouldn't go for anything that failed to preserve their massive advantage, but this article quotes one of Rostow's assistants as saying the numbers under this purported paper -- the numbers allowed both sides would have absolutely the same.

A I've given you what I've got on the subject.

Q Do you expect Mr. Nitze to remain as the U.S. negotiator when the next round of talks commences?

A Yes.

Q Has he told Secretary Shultz that he intends to go back to Geneva?

25

A I don't know whether he's talked to Secretary Shultz about that specifically, but that is my understanding that he fully expects to go back, will be going back, will be the negotiator.

Q One question which is not clear: You say Ambassasdor Nitze has always been authorized to explore negotiating positions and to deal with various options.

Is that what he did?

A Again, I'd have to go back to the very first part of what I said to you, which is that the negotiations themselves are confidential, and therefore I can't go into the details of what was discussed.

All I'm giving you is the sort of general operating instruction and guideline that he had in terms of procedure.

Q In the context of your answer, let me phrase it this way: Was he operating within the context of those instructions that you have just mentioned?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Was Gene Rostow fired because he had given the leeway to Mr. Nitze to explore a backing off of the zero option in return for this presumed flexibility in the Soviet position?

A I'm not going to get into the question of Mr. Rostow's resignation. I think the Secretary addressed this briefly the other day when he was here. It's been addressed in an exchange of letters with the President and Mr. Rostow. I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q Let me just pursue that a minute. You're saying that Nitze had the authority to explore flexibility in the Soviet position, but you're leaving out that he had the authority to, in effect, negotiate with the Soviets by demonstrating similar flexibility in the American position. Is that correct?

A I'm going to have to stick by the words I've used rather than try to answer your question in any other way.

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Q The report that Clark had offered criticism about Nitze through Shultz, are you going to take that question or duck that as well?

A No. I think, again, Larry Speakes addressed himself to that this morning, and I'd refer you to the White House on that.

Q Does the State Department feel, Alan, as Mr. Rostow does that the negotiations so far represent a "promising approach and well worth further study"?

A I think we have said, and the President has said -- the Secretary perhaps as well -- I can't remember who said what when, but certainly senior Administration officials -- that we've had serious discussions, and that there's a basis for further talk, and we intend to pursue that.

Q Is the exchange that took place with the Soviets and this piece of paper now a dead letter as far as the United States is concerned?

A I'm not going to address myself to pieces of paper existing or non-existing.

Q Mr. Nitze is authorized to stay attuned for possibilities of flexibility in the Soviet position.

Is there a matching possibility of flexibility in the American position?

A Again, I understand the thrust of all the questions, which is to find out where we're going in very specific terms, and are we doing this or are we doing that.

Our position, as it has been articulated, is to eliminate the entire class of missiles. Beyond repeating that and giving you what I have earlier, I just don't have anything further on this subject.

Q Are you expecting the Soviets to do all the negotiating without your moving at all? It doesn't sound like much of a negotiation.

A I think that we'll leave the negotiating to the negotiators at the table.

Q Without elaborating on it, can you confirm there will be a new American proposal when those talks resume on January 27?

A No. I can't confirm that.

Q Is Mr. Nitze authorized to explore Soviet flexibility outside the formal negotiations?

A I just will repeat to you: He's always been authorized to explore any flexibility in the Soviet position.

Q And the corollary to that question is, if you won't comment on whether there's going to be a new proposal, is the position that you repeated again today the position that Mr. Nitze will be taking back to the negotiating table on the 27th, or is there some decision to be made between now and then as to what he will take back on the 27th?

A Again, you're getting back to questions you asked the other day of John. I think the only thing I can do is repeat, without getting in the details of negotiating instructions -- no matter what they are because it simply is inappropriate to do so -- that we are continuing to seek what is viewed by this Administration as the best arms control solution, which is the complete elimination of that class of weapons.

Q Has Mr. Nitze spoken with the President recently?

A I can't answer that question. You'd have to ask the White House or Ambassador Nitze. I simply don't know.

Q I was just wondering if there was any idea here in the building of whether the President has had any part or has been briefed on any of this or knows anything about it?

A I think the President is up to date on all of this. Whether he has specifically talked with Ambassador Nitze, I can't tell you. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Alan, I want to come back again just for a second. You said that in the informal exploration the Soviet Government proved unwilling to explore anything other than proposals that would preserve the Soviet monopoly.

Does that imply that if the Soviets should reconsider, there still is something to talk about in terms of the proposal?

A I don't think I'd want to draw implications from it other than to leave you with the words I've given you on that.

Q Another subject.

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q The PLO Chairman, Yasser Araft, affirmed to a Cairo news weekly that the PLO is not asking Egypt to forsake the Camp David Accords.

Do you have anything to comment on that?

A No. I'm not familiar, frankly, with that particular statement, but our position on dealing with the PLO is well-known, our position on Camp David is well-known, and I just don't have any particular observation offhand to offer you on that report.

Q Do you have anything to comment on the new contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union just before the visit of President Mubarak to Washington?

A No, I don't.

Q Would the United States be willing or eager to see a partial withdrawal from Lebanon of external forces before the entire set of negotiations in Khaldeh and Qiryat Shemona are complete?

A I don't think I would want to get into the question, of the issue of how there might be a withdrawal. What we want is a withdrawal to take place -- the complete withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon. We want that to happen as rapidly as possible.

As to the specifics of it, I don't think I would address it from here.

-- MORE --

Q I was going to go back to the nuclear thing. There's an editorial in the Wall Street Journal today that says that the Moslem nation of Pakistan is on the verge of developing an atomic bomb. In the editorial, which is really a story, a news story, they speak about alarms coming up in India and Israel over this.

The United States is mentioned about abdicating to France in the supply of elements for the construction of the atomic bomb in Pakistan, and so on. Do you have something on that?

A No, I don't. Our concerns about the issue of non-proliferation, in general, are quite public and on the record. There has been discussion of the issue specifically with regard to Pakistan during the course of President Zia's visit here, and I would refer you back to the record on that.

Q If I may come back to this. Has there ever been a statement as to why the United States abdicated the supply of equipment to Pakistan to France?

A Why did the United States --

Q Abdicated the flow of atomic elements to Pakistan and let the French do it now?

A I think you may be mixing that up with the Indian agreement which is a whole other matter.

Q Do you have anything on the cancellation of the Soviet official going up to the Baltimore area to talk about Soviet civics?

A There are a number of things I could say about it, depending on what you want to know. The fact is the Department never received a request from the Soviet Embassy, and therefore, was never in a position to deny a permit to travel.

Q Let's say if he had made such a request, would he have been allowed to travel?

A That's hypothetical.

Q Why? There must be a ruling. It's a yes or no answer.

A No, it isn't a yes or no answer. We don't make decisions on Soviet travel requests in the abstract.

The circumstances surrounding travel, the treatment that's being accorded to our diplomats in the Soviet Union on similar travel requests are carefully considered before a decision would be reached on a request of that sort. So I couldn't say definitely whether we would or wouldn't have granted a travel request had it been submitted.

I might say two further things about that. One is that, in terms of the general procedure with which I think most of you are familiar, but in any case, Soviet diplomats like American diplomats in the Soviet Union must seek permission to travel more than twenty-five miles from their city of assignment. The U.S. imposed these requirements only reluctantly and after years of futile attempts to get the Soviets to rescind their own controls.

The U.S. has a standing offer to the Soviets to modify or eliminate travel controls, including closed areas, an offer to which the Soviets have not responded.

I might say, despite many requests the Soviets have systematically denied all requests for American diplomats to visit closed areas for at least the last two years. That certainly would have been a factor had an application been made.

Q Is Baltimore a closed city?

A Baltimore City is open; Baltimore County is closed. I believe that the school which was referred to in the story is in Baltimore County.

Q There were reports coming from Israel --

A Let's stay on this subject.

Q Does that answer the question that had there been a request, and this being a closed county, the answer would have been no?

A No, I'd like to leave it with what I said. Until a specific request is made, I couldn't answer it; in a definitive way, I've given you a number of factors which would have gone into the consideration.

Q But you said reciprocity was one of those things that would be taken into account?

A That's right.

Q Has there been any progess in reciprocity in appearances by American officials and Soviet officials on electronic media in the United States and the Soviet Union?

A I don't have a status report to give you on that.

Q Can you try to find something --

A No, I don't see how we could --

Q Well, this all comes up in the same context.

A You're able to monitor what Americans appear on Soviet T.V. just as we are.

Q There was some reports coming from Israel and Lebanon. First, that Ambassador Habib suggested to move some of the talks on Lebanon to Washington. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I know of no such suggestion.

Q There was also another report saying that it was decided that Ambassador Habib would devote his efforts now to a troop withdrawal from Lebanon while Ambassador Draper would be dealing with the question of relations between Israel and Lebanon. Do you have anything on that?

A Let me just say in terms of what their doing, without trying to get into the specifics of it. The efforts which they are undertaking are complimentary efforts.

Ambassador Draper has been participating and is going to participate in the talks which have been rotating between Lebanon and Israel. He was, today, for example, at the talks at Khaldeh, but is returning in fact to Israel now. I don't know, he may have gotten there by this time.

Ambassador Habib's efforts, as I say, are complimentary, and as was stated at the time that he returned to the region, his objective is to speed up the negotiating process. It's with that goal in mind that he is continuing his mission. But I'm not going to try to draw lines of the sort that you're suggesting between what he is doing and Ambassador Draper's efforts at the formal talks.

Q Is the negotiating process limited to the withdrawal question or the peace process?

A I think that the agenda, at the talks for example, is certainly broader than the withdrawal. We are involved in that effort, and I think that is an agenda which both sides, plus the United States, agreed to.

Q Do you have anything on the Sinai injuries? For example, did an American get killed in that explosion?

A I don't have detailed information. The latest information to us is that the answer is no. Nobody was killed. Really, you would have to refer to the Pentagon or to the MFO headquarters in Rome.

I can, with a great deal of regret, confirm that one U.S. Army officer and one U.S. Army soldier, attached to the American battalion of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai were seriously wounded today when a mine exploded in the Sharm al-Sheikh area. They have been taken to a hospital in Israel for treatment since then. But I really don't have any further information about it.

Q You can't identify them?

A No. Go to the Pentagon. I just don't know.

Q Is there anything to suggest this incident was anything other than an accident?

A I have no information about it beyond what I've given you.

Q Did the United States ever say that the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel should not be held in Israel but only in Lebanon?

A No.

Q Was there any position taken at any time?

A No.

Q There was a question of whether it should be in Jerusalem or not, but otherwise?

A For the third time, no. (Laughter.)

Q Let me ask you to come back to the nuclear business. When are Adelman and Abramowitz going before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

A I don't have information on that. I would assume as soon as their papers are processed the nominations would be sent up and hearing would be scheduled.

Q Would you expect it to be before the end of the month?

A I just don't know.

Q Is there an impression that can be drawn from all this that the Soviets are making some inroads in their propaganda push on the peace offensive?

A I'm not in a position to judge that question. The point that we would want to make is what our position is and how we're addressing the issues. In terms of any flexibility or change in the Soviet position, Geneva is the place where we will be happy to explore that.

Q You portray a picture where the United States is showing no flexibility and the Soviets are showing great flexibility. Doesn't that cause you some concern?

A I'm not sure I would agree with you entirely about that characterization, but I really don't want to go beyond that. We said we would consider whatever the Soviets would put forth in the way of a serious proposal.

Q Are you prepared today to qualify your statement of last week regarding the proposed five-year transition period for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank?

A No.

Q That the United States would be prepared to shorten that?

A I think I would refer you to the exact words I used at that time rather than some characterization of those words. I would ask you to be very careful about looking at the record of that.

Q Do you have any comment on any of the statements made yesterday on television by the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Nakasone, about U.S. relations?

A Not really. The relationship between the U.S. and Japan is one of the most important we have with any other country in the world. We're looking forward very much to discussions with the Prime Minister.

There was a briefing last week at the White House, a background briefing, and I would refer you to that briefing. I'm sure there will be a readout following his discussions at the White House.

Q Was there any specific reaction to the Japanese Cabinet decision to lift restrictions on technology transfer?

A There was some guidance that I think existed on this at the end --

Q I think that was in reference to quotas, but then there was a subsequent decision on Friday regarding technology transfer.

A No, I believe that there is guidance in the Press Office if you check on that.

Q What was your answer when you were asked whether Nitze had exceeded the designated assignment to explore the dimensions of flexibility in the Soviet position?

A I'm not aware of that. But I'm just not prepared to go into the question of what is actually taking place in the negotiations.

Q When you say you're not aware of exceeding instructions, is that what you want to say?

A That's what I am saying. I'm not really going to answer your question directly. I'm just telling you what I personally do or don't know. But in terms of an official response, I'm going to have to stick with what I said, which is that we're not going to discuss the talks themselves. I think I'm going to have to leave it at that and refer you to what Larry Speakes said this morning with regard to the issue of some sort of a paper or reprimand or whatever was there. I think he did have something on this. You might want to refer to it.

Q On that, Alan, usually when officials leave our government, they're enjoined from discussing the confidential nature of their immediate past assignment. Do you look askance at the way Professor Rostow has been rather forthcoming in discussing what you describe as confidential?

A I don't have any comment on his remarks.

Q There are reports coming from Jordan, saying that King Hussein was told while he was here that the U.S. is interested in giving Jordan the control of 98 or 97 -- I don't remember his exact number -- 97 or 98 percent of the West Bank. Can you confirm that language was used or that was the sense of what was conveyed to him?

A No, I obviously could not get into the substance -- without leading you one way or another on that story -- couldn't get into the substance of the discussions. In terms of the general approach to the West Bank issue and sovereignty and control and so on, I would refer you specifically to what the President said September 1, when he addressed the issue.

O Alan, now that Ruth Gruber is out of Poland, has the United States taken any steps to respond to the incident?

A I don't have anything to announce to you today on that.

O Last week SWAPO announced the Namibia talks are deadlocked. Do we have any statement to counter that; what is the status of the Namibia --

A I think I would refer back to our most recent statements on this. I don't think we would view the situation as deadlocked, but in terms of a more forthcoming characterization I'd refer you back to our latest position on that.

Q Could we get a briefing on the subject?

A I don't think at this stage we're prepared to have a briefing.

O Any further information on the confrontation between the Israelis and the Marines in Lebanon; any developments?

A There's been nothing I think since we discussed this recently. I think that that's an issue of the past.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:55 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #12

TUESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements. I would like to remind you that there will be a readout on the meeting between the President and Mr. Nakasone at the White House about 1:30-1:45, I understand, this afternoon.

I have an announcement related to the expulsion of an American correspondent from Poland. In retaliation for the expulsion of UPI reporter Ruth Gruber, the United States Government is today asking the Polish Government to withdraw the Polish Press Agency's Washington correspondent Stanislaw Glabinski. Mr. Glabinski is being requested to leave the country by Thursday.

Q How many correspondents do they have in the country currently?

A I don't know how many Polish correspondents are here. Probably find that out for you.

Q Do you have a spelling on that?

A Stanislaw, of course, you know. Glabinski is G-l-a-b-i-n-s-k-i.

Q Will the United States Government permit a replacement for him to come in?

A Yes, we will.

Q Immediately?

A We will permit a replacement, because we understand that is the position the Polish Government is taking in connection with a successor to the UPI correspondent. If that understanding is correct, in accordance with the principle of strict reciprocity, we will permit the Poles to send another correspondent to replace Mr. Glabinski.

Q Was he singled out for any particular egregious reporting, or did he just happen to draw the short straw?

A I don't know that I would characterize it quite that way. It is simply our decision that this is the appropriate correspondent.

Q Will he be detained?

A That's all I have for you.

Q Do you have a response today to Mr. Gromyko's warning sounded in Bonn last night about the American deployment of missiles?

A Yes. NATO's determination to achieve an arms control agreement adequately addressing Western security interests, and to proceed with deployment in the absence of such an agreement, will not be swayed by warnings of this nature.

The Soviets ignore the fundamental fact that the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles are NATO's response to the massive Soviet deployment of the SS-20.

If the Soviets wish to prevent NATO's modernization program, a solution is on the table in Geneva, that is agreement to the U.S. proposal for reciprocal elimination of this entire class of longer-range land-based INF missiles.

Q Any comment on the proposal dealing with shorter-range missiles that he seemed to float?

A The Soviets have previously indicated a willingness to discuss limits on shorter-range INF missiles as we proposed. We will be pursuing the subject with the Soviets in Geneva when talks resume on January 27.

Q How is "shorter-range" defined?

A I would have to go back and give you a better definition on that.

Q Are they doing a particularly better job than we in keeping up a propaganda effort or a public relations effort? They keep coming up with these proposals and you keep shooting them down. What happens now?

A It's not a question of shooting them down. It's a question of offering a factual assessment of what they're proposing, and that's what we will continue to do. We are unmoved by rhetoric.

The President has a firm arms control policy.

He took the initiative in proposing certain reductions. I think it was November 18, 1981. He has since made other proposals. We have those proposals on the table in Geneva. It seems to me that is a worthy objective -- the complete elimination of that class of weapons. We're going to stand on that proposal.

Q Is that zero/zero proposal immutable from the Administration's point of view?

A It's what we're going back to Geneva with. It's a good proposal. It seems to me --

Q Is it immutable? Can it be subsequently modified upwards?

A As we have consistently said, the negotiations are being conducted in Geneva. But I know of no plans for modification.

Q Give us that copy?

A Sure.

Q The West German opposition leader, Mr. Vogel, when he was here last week, said that he had the impression that the U.S. position was not final or firm, but was subject to possible change. Is he correct or incorrect?

A I don't think I will comment on Mr. Vogel's impression. I think I will simply stand on what the President said, what the Secretary of State has said and what our various negotiators have said, which I think is very clear.

Q The question seems to be whether the United States is negotiating at all or simply sitting there and saying this is our position, and we're not going to change from it. Can you offer us any assurance that there is indeed negotiation going on?

A I think there has been negotiation. We have consistently said that we think what is going on in Geneva is serious; that we have sent serious negotiators to the table. I think we have said that we consider the kind of people the Soviets have sent to the table are also serious. But that doesn't mean that we're abandoning our proposal.

Q You have come back with the zero option as the only option which hardly sounds like a negotiation.

A We think it's a good proposal.

Q The question came up yesterday. I'd just like to ask it again. In the statement Alan read, and in the White House, it was said that Ambassador Nitze had authority to explore Soviet flexibility. When he was asked, did he also have authority to introduce any flexibility in the American position, that was not answered here. At the White House there was a suggestion only if he had specific instructions from superiors. Do you have anything beyond that?

A No. It seems to me what you're saying is that the White House has answered that question.

Q Is there no amplification of that?

A No.

Q Will the President's negotiators, John, be meeting with the President before they return to Geneva?

A I don't have anything on that, but I wouldn't rule it out.

Q Well, the President said so Friday.

A I don't know what specific arrangements may have been made, but I don't have a time or date on it.

Q When you talk about the question raised about zero/zero, is it not, in the way you're offering it, a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and you're helping yourself to the word "negotiation" when, in fact, the U.S. is not negotiating?

A I think the elimination of a weapon system of that character is something that is very worthy. That's the President's position.

Q I'm not getting involved in the elimination, or the worthiness. I don't think anybody would argue with that.

A Wouldn't one logically try to achieve that which is more beneficial to all concerned?

Q You may not be able to get that, so that's why you use the word "negotiation." Can you show me where the U.S. is negotiating?

A In Geneva.

Q Yes. In other words, negotiating in its legitimate sense rather than presenting and rearticulating and re-presenting the same thing in contrast to negotiation? Isn't there a take-it-or-leave-it packaging, at least up to this point, on zero/zero?

A I think the President has said that we would seriously consider any serious Soviet proposal. He said that on a number of occasions. He's also said that we're standing on the zero option proposal.

Q Have you got anything on that incident Monday night involving Israelis and Marines?

A I don't have anything on it. We've heard a little about the incident. We might have a little something more on it during the course of the day, but I don't have anything on it right now. Why don't you keep in touch with us on that, though.

Q Is that the one that was two weeks ago, or is this something new now?

A These are reports of a new, possible incident involving Israelis and Marines.

Q Getting back to this other question, are you by implication saying that nothing the Soviets have come up with so far is a serious proposal?

A I think, as we have reacted where we have to in comments made in the public domain, I think we've made clear that we have not seen a seriousness on the Soviet side yet.

Q It is not serious?

A Yes, in what has been suggested in the public domain, the various --

Q How do you reconcile what you just said with the fact that the Administration, including the President and the Secretary of State have been saying for months, that we are involved in serious negotiations with the Soviet Union?

A I think those statements stand. I don't see any contradiction in that.

Q You said they never made a serious proposal; the two go together.

A I'm talking about the public domain. I was asked about the propaganda type of statements that are being made and whether our position had been that we did not consider these serious proposals. I think we have responded in various ways to those various statements. We have said on occasion that we certainly would take a look at them, and have also said that the experts did not see a great deal that is new.

You would have to go back and look at the specific language we've used in connection with specific announcements.

Q What you just said raises the question that perhaps the United States is saying something in the public domain which it is not saying in the negotiations. I feel certain that it is saying lots of things in the negotiations that is not saying in the public domain, but I'm not sure about the reverse of that.

What you're saying in the public domain is that zero/zero is it?

A Yes.

Q But what you just said it leaves it pretty clear that you may be saying other things.

A No, you're on a wrong tack. We're not going to talk about negotiations. If you talk about negotiations, you're not negotiating seriously -- anymore than a network or a newspaper talks about its labor negotiations in private. They're not negotiations if they're not confidential. Those are going to remain confidential. But you would be misled if you draw the deduction that something different has been offered at those negotiations to what the President has consistently said is our arms control position.

Q Let me be clear on this now, because you're saying "at the negotiations." The question is, how strong does the U.S. believe in that position if its own chief negotiator is willing to discuss something quite different outside the negotiations with his Soviet counterpart?

A I think that was addressed by the White House yesterday, that the negotiator has flexibility, has authorized flexibility to pursue, but that doesn't alter the steadfastness of the President's position on his zero option proposal.

Q John, yesterday, the official statement was that the Soviets, during the informal negotiations, were not interested in anything unless it gave them an overwhelming advantage. Can you give us anything on the record to back that up?

A No, I think that statement came out of the

White House, and I don't think we would have anything beyond that.

Q Did not Alan read it here, too?

A I'm not sure whether that was -- yes, it was, in the statement that was read. It looked like Alan. (Laughter)

Q Could you tell us the basis for that?

A No.

Q It is a rather broad statement, sweeping statement.

A I'm afraid we're going to stand on that language.

Q What is your comment on the statements of Presidents Carter and Ford about the Israeli settlements policy that it is an obstacle to peace in the Middle East, and how do you compare this position with the Reagan Administration's stand on the issue of Israeli settlements?

A Former Presidents Carter and Ford have focused rightly on Israeli settlements. That's a problem President Reagan has identified as an obstacle to peace.

President Reagan called for a freeze on such activity in his September 1 initiative.

Israel's long-term security can only be assured through real peace, and real peace can only be achieved through a negotiated exchange for occupied Arab territory. Our government has said on a number of occasions that the settlement activity damages the chances for peace between Arabs and Israelis.

Q Copy?

A Surely.

Q A follow-up. According to the wire copy, at least, the two Presidents are saying that the settlements are the major obstacle. Do you agree with that language?

A I think "an obstacle" is the language I used.

Q Not in the article, but in the past both of them have described the settlements as illegal. Does this Administration agree with that?

A No. I think the President has used the language on a number of occasions, that those settlements are unhelpful and an obstacle to the peace process.

Q I want to follow this. If the Reagan Administration adopts the language and the provisions of the Camp David Agreement, since President Carter was the main force in bringing the Camp David framework out, why isn't that Administration also taking the same position that has been espoused by President Carter?

A I'm sorry, on what issue?

--MORE--

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Q On the issue of settlements and other issues. You know, the statements which have been said all along during the Carter Administration term, that the settlements are illegal, an obstacle to peace, etc.?

That was the whole thrust of the statement that was in the Reader's Digest.

A As I say, I think we're not addressing that specific question of legality or illegality, which is probably complex.

I don't think there can be any doubt about this Administration's viewpoint on the settlements, and its view of the degree of unhelpfulness that they represent.

They are an obstacle to the peace process. We have repeatedly affirmed that. The President has made his position clear September 1, and repeatedly since then.

Q Also, I thought the article also mentioned that the two former Presidents zero on the idea that Israel has no intentions of withdrawing back from territories, and therefore it goes on with confiscation of territories, land and settlements.

What would you say to that?

A I haven't seen the full text of the article, so I can't give you anything on that, specifically on the settlements.

Q Do you think -- in a direct question, do you think that the Israelis do intend to exchange territories for peace from what has developed since --

A I don't think we can speak for the Israelis. I think you have to ask the Israelis. I think the President's position is clear and has been amplified on many occasions, but I don't think we should attempt to interpret Israeli decisions, motivations, or intentions.

Q On the Lebanon-Israel talks, there seems to be mixed signals coming out of these talks. This morning the Lebanese Government spokesman said that the Lebanese delegate to the talks yesterday made it clear that there will be no normalization of relations until Israel withdraws its last soldier, and that's been officially announced by Beirut Radio.

Does that sum up the U.S. position?

A I don't think we're going to get into any more detail on the substance of those tripartite discussions. They are due to resume on Thursday. As you know, after each session, a full communique is issued on the substance of the discussions. I don't think we're going to pursue the question of the agenda, how they come at the various items, or what the ultimate resolution would be.

As you know, Ambassador Habib is in Israel. I think Ambassador Draper is in Israel today. Ambassador Draper is representing the United States in those tripartite talks. Ambassador Habib is doing all that he can to accelerate the movement on Lebanon. I think we'll have to leave it at that.

Q But, John, do you think that the government spokesman today was correcting misunderstandings about yesterday's session?

A I honestly don't know. I haven't seen what he said today.

Q John, is the United States concerned about reports of the new SA-5 missiles in Syria, and what is the United States going to do about it?

A I think we've previously indicated our concern, and we have expressed that concern to the governments involved.

We have reason to believe that those missiles are being deployed in Syria. I can't go into details, but, as I say, we have raised our concerns with the various governments involved.

Q Are there Soviet technicians with those missiles?

A Can't go beyond what we've offered you on that.

Q Has the concern that you have with those countries involved -- is the Soviet Union one of those countries?

A   I'm sorry. What did you say at the beginning?

Q   The countries involved.

A   I think you can be assured that the Soviet Union is aware of our concern.

Q   On that same subject, do you have any sense of the number of missiles that are involved?

A   No. I don't.

Q   You say they are being deployed.

A   They are being deployed. That is our understanding.

Q   Does that mean operationally, John, or they're just building stuff?

A   I think I'm going to have to stay with the language I have offered you at the moment.

Q   What's the significance of the introduction of SA-5s into Syria?

A   I think Alan gave you some specific language on that at the time of the initial report. I would go back to that language.

Obviously, it's not conducive to peace in the area.

Q   Does the U.S. see it as some Soviet challange?

A   Go back --

Q   To the U.S. --

A   Go back to the language we used before, which we would be glad to produce for you.

Q   Has the deployment taken place since the United States contacted the governments involved?

A   I can't give you the timetable of what is taking place, or when.

Q When did the deployment begin?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, is the United States demanding that they be removed?

A I think I'll just stay with the language that we've used, that we are making known our concern to the various governments.

Q We didn't get very much at the initial time on this, John. All Alan said was that we would regret any measure from either side in the Arab-Israeli conflict that would heighten the risk of conflict, and that was it. Questions such as the one that was just asked have not been answered, the significance of it in terms of the power balance.

A I think we're going to stand with that language.

Q Will Mr. Habib go to Damascus to raise this issue?

A No plans that I know of that he should do that.

Q John, back on the Lebanese-Israeli-American talks. The United States concern was for the withdrawal of external or foreign troops from there.

Information coming out of Lebanon and Israel says that the agenda or the talks now are not about withdrawal, but about normalization, open borders, etc.

How does that differ from -- I mean, how do you react to that?

A I don't think there's any contradiction there. As I say, I'm not going to get into the agenda, how those talks are proceeding, or what the ultimate resolution of various issues will be other than the communique that the three parties issue every day.

I think you'd be on the wrong track if you thought that there was any less urgency about discussion of a troop withdrawal.

Q I, for one, would take it, John, as to what they're talking about first, let's say, and it looks like it is less urgent than normalization, because they're talking about normalization and not withdrawal.

A I don't think there's any less urgency about the desire to get a troop withdrawal plan.

Q John, there's a report out of Israel that the Israelis are insisting on a withdrawal of all PLO forces from all of Lebanon before they will then discuss a step-by-step withdrawal parallel with the Syrians.

A As I say, I don't want to get into the hour-by-hour question of who goes when, where they pull back to, and that kind of thing. Certainly the withdrawal of all PLO forces is an objective that we share.

Q John, why is it that you're so skimpy on information on the SA-5s? You have more to say about the settlements than you do about the SA-5s in the sense that you won't tell us whether you've asked for a withdrawal, you can't tell us when they were installed. I think it was last week when Alan talked about reports of sites being prepared.

A I didn't say --

Q Does that presuppose --

A I said they are being deployed.

Q You said they are being deployed?

A Right.

Q Does that mean that this has taken place in the past few days, and it obviously would mean that this has taken place since the U.S. made its concerns known?

A That's a reasonable deduction, I think.

Q Well, then how do you then interpret that? You tell the Russians and the Syrians, "Bad idea, fellows," and they proceed, and you have nothing more to say beyond that?

A Not at the moment.

Q Why not at the moment?

A I think you're getting into two areas where we have traditionally been a little less forthcoming than you probably would prefer. One involves intelligence and the other involves diplomacy.

(Laughter)

Q That pretty well covers it, doesn't it?

A You mean, I've caught you speechless? I don't believe it. (Laughter)

Q Why don't you propose zero option with respect to the SA-5s? (Laughter)

Q Do you have something on the reported application for a ground satellite tracking station in China?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We have previously indicated our willingness to sell China a ground station to receive signals from the Landsat D satellite which provides information that is useful for agriculture, natural resource exploration, and other scientific purposes.

Since this sale involves proprietary information from the export licensing process, any questions regarding the equipment involved would be most appropriately addressed to the contracting firm.

Q Is there any U.S. Government stamp of approval required on this transfer?

A I personally wouldn't have any problem about answering that question, but the whole question of license applications is also covered by this export licensing process. It's a legal question. You're going to have to ask the company.

Q What you're also saying here is that since the U.S. has previously indicated its willingness to do these limited kinds of things, that if there were any problem with it, it would be in reviewing exactly what the ground station would be capable of receiving?

A Yes, I think that's a fair deduction.

Q Going back to the SA-5s --

A You're just tireless on this one.

Q Because it's really your fault. (Laughter)

What kind of advice is the United States giving Israel on the question of welcoming, living with, or taking out the SA-5s?

A I'm just looking to make sure you have your tongue in your cheek when you ask that question.

Q No, no. Seriously.

A Well, I'm seriously not going to be able to answer that question.

Q You may have another upheaval in the works as a result of the introduction of SA-5s. What is the U.S. doing to keep the lid on there?

A I told you that we've expressed our concern to the various governments, but I obviously am not going to get into any communication we may or may not have had with Israel or other specifics.

Q What does that word "concern" mean?

A We don't like them.

Q There you go. (Laughter) Now you're warming up. (Laughter)

A You knew you'd draw blood if you persisted long enough.

Q Will you say why you don't?

A No, I wouldn't.

Q John, there was a report published yesterday in a newsletter here in Washington that the President ordered that any information regarding those missiles would be shared with Israel.

Could you confirm that report?

A No. I am afraid I can't. That's an intelligence area, obviously, into which we would not get.

Q On this very same concern or that you don't like it -- and I don't know if you're serious or not -- but assuming that -- and it's a good assumption -- Syria is a sovereign country like any other country in the region there, and assuming that it has the right to purchase whatever it deems necessary for its defense and security, why does the United States not like that? I mean, why do you not like it?

A Again, I'd refer you to the specific language that Mr. Romberg offered first time around, but if I were to paraphrase it, I would say it is not conducive to peace in the area.

The entry of a new type of weapon into that country is clearly not in the interests of peace in the region in our opinion.

Q Would you like Syria to withdraw them? Would you like the Soviet Union to take them back?

A I think it's obvious we would prefer that they not be there.

Q John, do you have any information to confirm or to deny reports that were sort of proposals from the Israelis to share power with Jordan on the West Bank?

A No. I don't.

Q John, back to the SA-5s. A key question, I think. Does the phrase "are being deployed" imply those missiles are operational?

A I think the phrase "are being deployed" means they are being deployed. That's what it means.

Q All right, then, let's make it clear. Are they operational?

A I can't answer that.

Q Is the introduction of 75 F-16 jets to Israel helpful also to the peace process?

A Is it what?

Q Is it helpful to the peace process if you say that of the SA-5s in Syria?

A That's a decision that will be made in due course.

Q John, on this issue, there are people who subscribe to the idea that these missiles might be in Syria in preparation for the Syrian-Israeli forces withdrawal from Lebanon, and that the measure was intended to defend Syrian air space from possible incursions from hostile forces in the area.

Do you believe such a thing?

A I'm not going to offer any information on the motivation for them being there.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting this afternoon between the French Minister of Defense and Secretary Shultz? What's the nature?

A I can't, except that when the Secretary was in Paris, he called on the French Defense Minister. It's a reciprocal visit, I think.

Q Do you have any update today on the Namibia talks?

A I have some earlier guidance we can give you in the Press Office.

Q Don't you have anything new today?

A No. I'd just refer to the earlier stuff.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC#13

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 19, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I don't have any statements or housekeeping announcements, so I will be glad to take your questions.

Q Do you have any reaction to the announcement by the Chinese that they are going to begin restricting certain American imports in retaliation for the American restrictions?

A Yes, I do, Jim. On January 19, the New China News Agency carried an announcement that China, effective immediately, will stop approving new contracts for cotton, chemical fibers, and soy beans from the United States this year. The announcement also reported that China will reduce its planned imports of other U.S. agricultural products.

We regret that the Chinese have announced this action. The United States reiterates its sincere desire to continue addressing our textile trade problems through a mutually acceptable agreement. We have made clear to the Chinese that we're prepared to continue negotiations at a mutually convenient and early date, and we strongly believe that retaliatory trade sanctions do not contribute to an atmosphere conducive to a mutually satisfactory settlement.

We note that our textile proposals allow for continued growth in Chinese exports to the United States. Furthermore, the unilateral controls recently imposed on Chinese textiles, absent a negotiated agreement, do not eliminate existing trade as Chinese actions would, as outlined in the New China News Agency announcement.

Q Do you believe that the Chinese actions are in retaliation to the ones you put into effect on the 15th?

A On the basis of the first reports, that would seem to be so.

Q In light of that, then, would the United States be willing to lift its restrictions in expectation that the Chinese might lift their retaliatory restrictions?

A I think our postion is that we are ready and eager to go back into the negotiations.

Q And what is the prospect for the resumption of negotiations?

A We have expressed our readiness and willingness, and we'll have to see how that works out.

Q Was this the first indication the government had of this, or had you been informed yesterday through diplomatic channels?

A I think -- I'm not sure, Bob -- I think this is the first announcement. I'd like to check that for you.

Q John, do you have any figures there on the size of that market that is being cut back?

A Yes. In the first 11 months of 1982, the United States exported $63 million worth of soy beans to China. Our total exports of soy beans in 1981 to China were $129 million. In the first 11 months of 1982, China bought $176 million worth of U.S. raw cotton. Cotton exports to China were worth $464 million in 1981.

Q $464 million?

A $464 million in 1981.

Q So it had already dropped considerably in '82?

A Yes.

Q Do you know why?

A No. In the first ten months of 1982, the United States sold China $76 million worth of polyester fibers, compared to $265 million in the same period of 1981.

Q May I follow up, please? Will this action affect the Secretary's trip to China? And do you have any assessment of how this action might affect trade relations between the United States and Taiwan?

A No, on the latter point I don't. We see no reason why it would affect the Secretary's trip to China. It might arise in discussion; but we assume that both sides want to minimize the adverse effects of this temporary setback in one area of our bilateral relations.

Q John, could you tell us anything about Ambassador Nitze's trip to Bonn on Monday?

A Ambassador Nitze's trip to Bonn on Monday?

Q That's right.

A Sorry, don't know anything about it.

Q He is supposed to stop there on his way to Geneva.

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Who is sending him?

A I'm sure that he will be returning to Geneva, but I don't know anything about any other stops on the way.

Q John, could you address the interview that Nitze gave yesterday in which he raises the possibility of a shift in the U.S. position where he says he is confident that if it became wise for the U.S. to change position in talks with the Soviets on reducing nuclear missiles, it will in fact do so?

A I think Ambassador Nitze's remarks really speak for themselves, Bernie. We remain convinced that the elimination of the class of longer-ranged, land-based INF missiles is the best outcome, and Ambassador Nitze has always been authorized to explore flexibility in the Soviet position.

Q But here, he seems to be suggesting that there could be some flexibility in the U.S. zero/zero position.

A I don't think so. I think Ambassador Nitze gave a number of interviews yesterday, and I think he made it clear that he is going back to Geneva standing on the President's zero option proposal.

Q How do you interpret the remarks that I'm reading to you that are verbatim?

A I think we're covering the same ground that we covered yesterday, in that you sense a contradiction between the President directing that we go back to Geneva with the zero-based option. It seems to me that while there may be differences in this country among some people, nevertheless the President has produced a policy which calls for the elimination of an entire class of missiles. That's a pretty far-reaching proposal -- it seems to me, one that should garner widespread support.

The President is going back, based on that one. The President has also said, as Mr. Nitze has said, we're willing to seriously consider serious Soviet proposals. But there is no contradiction between those two positions. You don't move away from the President's policy which offers wide hope for those involved.

Q But you would be willing to consider any number of Soviet policies, and still not give up ground. These things are on two different tracks. Here we are getting an indication of flexibility on zero-zero, to which you simply -- I'm talking on one channel, and you're over in "left field" not even answering my question.

A It's a question of not abdicating a good initiative which the President has launched and on which we're standing.

Q Fine.

A There is no reason for us to cave on that proposal.

Q I'm not even getting involved in that. I'm talking about your top negotiator holding out the possibility that maybe there will, in fact, be flexibility, which is to say a shift away from zero-zero.

A As the President has said, that negotiator has always had authority to explore flexibility on the Soviet side. If that flexibility emerges at the resumed talks in Geneva, I'm sure it would be reported back to the President.

Q Flexibility in the U.S. position is what I'm talking about, not the Soviet position.

A Well, we're going back to Geneva on the President's good, sound proposal, which surely should be the ideal for people of many diverse views. You may have differences about how to get there, but surely there could not be too much argument that the elimination of that entire class of weaponry in Europe would be a very healthy development.

Q John, on that point, Time Magazine this week, in its lead story, hardly a Kremlin outlet, says that this position is basically unreasonable in that it would call for the Soviets to dismantle existing weaponry while we would make only paper changes, and it would leave intact 162 missiles in Western nations -- France and Britain. They come to the conclusion that this is an unreasonable position.

A   Well, that is a deduction that they may make. That is not the viewpoint of the United States Administration, and it's not the viewpoint of our Allies.

Q   It's a deduction they make, but the arguments they present are pretty strong, that it would lead --

A   That may be your deduction, but we are unmoved --

Q   That is their deduction.

A   Well, we are unmoved by them. You know, it's not a question of the United States imposing a policy. Let's not forget that this a European initiative. This is a NATO, dual-track decision to which the United States is subscribing. This is not a question of the United States imposing its policy on Western Europe. This is a NATO Alliance decision.

Q   John, the President and other Administration spokesmen have repeatedly said that success at Geneva depends on demonstrating U.S. capacity and commitment to undertake a major strategic arms buildup. Now, according to James Baker III, the President is now in the process of adopting a series of proposals to convert the United States into a post-industrial society, and he is considering a number of austerity measures to go along that way.

A   Yes.

Q   Given that the Administration is now undermining its capacity to engage in the kind of industrial buildup necessary for success at Geneva, aren't you about to make some sort of deal or to back off from your positions?

A   I don't agree with your thesis. The President's position has been consistent on the question of achieving peace through strength, peace through leverage, peace through deterrence. That has been a constant policy; there has been no change in it, despite attempts to discredit it or despite attempts to interpret it variously.

Q   Are you saying that James Baker III was not speaking for the Administration in this January 13 speech to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco?

A   First of all, I think you are prejudging budget decisions that might be made; but secondly, I'm saying that --

Q All I saw was the speech whose text was put out on White House letterhead. That's all I'm referring to.

A All I'm saying is that it seems to me that the President and Administration spokesmen have made it clear that we are certainly not dropping our military guard, and whatever steps that may be taken in the budget are designed to bolster, and not deteriorate, the U.S. economy.

Q John, do you have any reports of the Argentines' building up or somehow preparing for military action against the Falklands?

A I think, Jim, you are referring to what were described as intelligence reports, and as always, we're not going to be terribly communicative in that area. However, --

Q Intelligence and diplomacy, right?

A Intelligence and diplomacy. (Laughter) So we're not going to comment on intelligence matters; but I would remind you that the U.S. position is clear. We support the peaceful settlement of disputes such as the Falklands/ Malvinas, and we are opposed to the use of force.

This policy remains unchanged, and was reflected in our support of the U.N. and OAS resolutions of last fall.

Q Are you in touch with the Argentine Government about these reported preparations?

A I'm really not able to get into that, Jim.

Q When is the Administration planning to announce certification on El Salvador? And can you give us any sense of what the current feeling is in terms of human rights and the military situation there?

A On the certification, the Administration is required to certify on El Salvador every 180 days. The next date would be January 23. The necessary staff work on this is continuing. January 23 falls on a Sunday, when Congress is not in session, so our current intention is to try to convey both the decision and any paper work, any documentation, that might go with it on Friday, January 21.

We will try to see that copies are available in the Press Office after the appropriate distribution to Congress -- I would think that would be Friday afternoon. We are looking into arranging a briefing for you, and we might have an announcement on that for you a little later.

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Q Has a final decision been made?

A I think we're just going to rest on the language that we have here, and have you wait with anticipation for the --

Q Is it still "touch and go?"

A Beg pardon.

Q Is it still "touch and go" on the certification?

A Why don't I whet your appetite by refusing to be drawn into that --

Q Do you have any reaction to what Ambassador Hinton said that certification should and will be done?

A No, I don't have any reaction to Ambassador Hinton's remarks.

Q May I make just one more run on the Nitze thing on flexibility?

A Sure.

Q Are you saying that Ambassador Nitze's remarks should be interpreted that he was reassuring everyone that he is in line with the President's thinking on the U.S. negotiating stance, and that anything that anyone might read into it beyond that, on flexibility, is drawing the wrong conclusion?

A As I say, I think Ambassador Nitze gave a number of interviews yesterday, and I don't think -- I think he speaks for himself.

Q Yes.

A And I shouldn't interpret the various statements he has made, but I wouldn't quarrel with your deduction.

Q John, on that same point, you have said earlier that Nitze has been authorized to explore Soviet flexibility. Can you explain what you mean by "explore?" Does that include the possibility of offering his own thughts into the process?

A We are not going to get into the -- I know it is tempting and I know that others involved have been making a number of public pronouncements on this from the other side, for a variety of reasons; but we believe that we should go back into Geneva -- that's where serious negotiations should take place -- and I don't want to get into modalities of how those negotiations will go forth at Geneva.

-- MORE --

Q But, you know, the words you use sometimes raise questions themselves.

A I can't believe that. (Laughter)

Q You say "serious negotiations" should take place. Well, the definition of "serious negotiations" for most diplomats is give and take -- the reply is compromise or at least a search for compromise -- and yet you're saying that Ambassador Nitze's going back with the zero option.

A Yes. That's what I am saying.

Q And only the flexibility to explore the Soviet position.

A That's right.

Q That's not what one would call "serious negotiations" on the face of it.

A I don't understand the problem in perceiving. The President has a good policy, and we're standing on that policy. That is a very desirable policy, it seems to me, that offers great hope to all concerned.

What you're saying is, "Why shouldn't he back away from the policy?" He's not going to back away from that policy going back to Geneva because he believes it's a good policy. He believes it's what the people of Western Europe want.

Q I'm a little bit puzzled, then, about what you're saying the people of Western Europe want, because certainly in West Germany there's a lot of people in the government who don't believe that zero option is achievable, and therefore that something else has to come about.

So as to what they want, what they want is obviously an agreement.

A I don't know who you're quoting, but, I mean, there's a great deal of declaration of support of the zero option proposal.

Q John, do you have any response to Foreign Minister Gromyko's statements in Bonn?

A Not beyond what we gave you yesterday.

Q Another subject. The Middle East?

A Yes.

Q On this subject, please. You repeatedly say that your proposal is the best compromise, the best solution, which implies that there are some good solutions.

Are you thinking on those good solutions or --

A I'm sorry. I didn't get the other --

Q You repeatedly say that U.S. proposals in Geneva provide the best solutions for Euro-rockets or Euro missiles. This implies to me that there are some still good solutions. Are you thinking on those good solutions, or you will just wait for the Soviets to propose something?

A As the President has said, we are always ready to seriously consider a serious Soviet proposal.

Q But what is the framework of a still good solution which is not the best to you?

A I mean, we're not going to negotiate from this podium. We're going back to Geneva, and that's where the negotiations will take place.

Q John, just to tidy one thing up that we all seem to be not having any luck with.

Is there any flexibility whatsoever at the present time in the U.S. position on zero-zero?

A We will go back to Geneva standing on the President's zero option proposal. Ambassador Nitze, as he and others have said, has always been authorized to explore flexibility on the Soviet side.

Q I'm talking about U.S. flexibility. That's my question for today.

A To the best of my knowledge, Bernie, we're going back to Geneva on the President's good, strong zero option proposal.

Q If the Soviet negotiator explored American flexibility, would he find any?

(Laughter)

A Not a bad try, but I think we will continue to negotiate in Geneva.

Q One more on this. We're told that the Soviets made certain concessions last year, but that they then backed off of these in July.

Why do you think they backed off?

A First of all, I've seen the same kind of reports that you have seen, and I'm not commenting on them. So in the absence of any comment, I certainly wouldn't attempt to ascribe motivation.

Q Can you confirm reports that Ambassador Habib offered U.S. manning of early warning stations in Lebanon as part of the withdrawal arrangement.

A No. As we've consistently said, we're not going to get into the detail of those negotiations that he is involved in, but I think you're dealing anyway in a hypothetical situation. As we have consistently said, until there is a plan for the withdrawal of PLO, Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon, the question of any changed role for the MNF or for U.S. forces is really academic and hypothetical.

Q Do you envision any other -- any role to Americans besides the Multinational Force in Lebanon?

A As I've just said, I think we'll have to wait and see what emerges from any plan for foreign troop withdrawal. I think that's the point at which we would be able to make judgment on U.S. troops.

Q Does this correspond to the position that was taken this morning by Mr. Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister of Israel, who was insisting after five hours of Mr. Habib, meeting with him, and meeting with Mr. Begin, that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon will be the last item on the agenda, and all other matters have to be agreeable and done before the withdrawal?

A Again -- and I realize this is frustrating to you -- we're just not able to get into the detailed negotiations that are going on at the moment. They will meet again. I think Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper are both in Israel today.

The tripartite session is scheduled to meet again tomorrow, and I presume they will. Ambassador Draper is leading our delegation there and will be there, and they'll go into the next phase of discussions.

But what they will discuss is revealed in the communique to which all three parties agree at the end of each session on what they have discussed.

Q Let me ask it in a different way. You still insist that withdrawal of all extraneous forces -- Israeli, Syrian and PLO, whatever remains -- is the first priority of the United States Administration is dealing with this matter.

A Surely.

Q Is it that way?

A Of great urgency. Yes.

Q John, on the same issue of the manning of the early warning systems in there, within a broader arrangement in which Israel would be asked to withdraw, would the United States accept the manning of those systems?

A Accept the --

Q Manning of the early warning systems there in south Lebanon.

A You're raising a hypothetical and academic situation. We're not there yet. We have to see that troop withdrawal plan.

Q But, I mean, the Israelis can throw it back and say, "We will withdraw if we are assured of our security which would include the manning and the operating of those early warnings --

A Let's look at that when it's raised.

Q Okay. One other thing. Yesterday there were -- I don't know if you released anything about it -- this confrontation with the Marines in Beirut or in Lebanon -- do you have anything more to tell us about it today?

A Not a great deal. We have been in contact with the Israelis with a view to avoiding problems in the area of operations of the U.S. Marines contingent of the MNF.

We're confident that Israel wishes to avoid any difficulties just as we do. I don't have any further detail on the incident.

Q Was there such an incident?

A Apparently there was -- "incident" may be too strong a word, Jim, but there apparently was some meeting or the forces were juxtaposed, but I don't want to use -- when you say "incident," it give it a sense of drama that perhaps wasn't --

Q Was there some pointing of weapons?

A There was point of contact. I don't know about weapons.

Q Some cocking of weapons.

A I honestly don't know, Bob.

Q Let me follow up on this, please. These things are -- they've happened before. Now, do you think, in your estimation or the U.S. Government's estimation are these things done by Israeli troops on their own will, or are these government --

A I'm not there. I don't know. It's hard to read certainly -- I think you probably shouldn't see these in the -- I think when we talked before there were a kind of series of incidents that came together. I have the impression this is more an isolated incident.

Q John, I don't understand this. I mean, these kinds of confrontations -- the troops come together all the time. They've been doing it since June. Why are there a spate of stories about them now?

A I don't know that there are a spate of stories about them now. You asked whether we had anything more on what happened yesterday, and I think --

Q Are there new rules now that the Americans can't talk to the Israelis, and the Israelis can't talk to the Lebanese?

A It's simply a question of the Marines being in position and policing certain territory and are being approached, I gather, when they were approached by Israeli units.

Q But when they were in position before during the first stages of the PLO evacuation, there was always contact between the Americans and the Marines and the French and the Italians.

A I think that's a somewhat different situation. There you had a lot of movement in a limited area. I think the forces are deployed in a larger area now.

Q John, yesterday I know you covered the Syrian SAMs at some length, but --

A I think very comprehensively and effectively.

Q So I gather from the transcript, but today *Tass* is confirming that Syria is beefing up its air defense. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Also, you said you were in contact with a number of nations regarding it.

A Yes.

Q Would Jordan or Turkey be involved in that? Be among those nations?

A I don't want to mislead you, but I think we're going to stand on the language that we used yesterday.

Q What is the purpose of meetings that Ambassador Draper is holding, according to some press reports, in Israel with members of the coalition in Israel from different parties.

A I don't know. I'm not aware of them.

Q There is quite a lengthy report on it in FBIS today.

A I don't know. As I said, he's in Israel today, but I presume that is in pursuit of the same kind of function as Ambassador Habib, and they're both working together. I don't know anything about these contacts.

Q When do you expect Ambassador Habib to get to Damascus? I understand that he hasn't been in Damascus in his latest round of --

A He has not been in Damascus on this round, that's absolutely true. I don't think he has any immediate plans to go to Damascus.

Q Why?

A I assume what he is doing in Beirut and Jerusalem is fully occupying him.

Q Do you know of any American effort besides Habib personally to talk to the Syrians about the part of -- the Syrian part of the withdrawal from Lebanon?

A No. I don't think we would get into a question of how those views are being communicated.

Q John, there are an increasing number of reports here in Washington and the Middle East in Israel that Hussein has agreed to come into the peace process, and that the United States has a date for it.

Can you confirm that?

A A date for King Hussein's entry into the peace process?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Can you confirm that he has agreed to come in?

A No. We're still waiting. As you know, the President has made his position clear on that, and King Hussein has been consulting with a number of other leaders in the Middle East, and we await the outcome of those --

Q Do you have a date for a possible return visit, John?

A No. There's not a date for a possible return visit.

Q Do you have any comment on the British report of events leading up to the war in the Falkland Islands, particularly --

A No.

Q -- the part that the U.S. was only informed by Mrs. Thatcher's call on April 1?

A No. It's an internal British matter, and we wouldn't have any comment on that.

Q On the Middle East.

A You're all very active today.

Q According to -- Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali is asking the United States to play a more firm role, or taking a more firm attitude towards the West Bank settlements, and this comes just a few days before the visit of President Mubarak.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No, other than I think the Administration's position on settlements in the West Bank have been consistently clear. As we've said on a number of occasions, we see the increased activity there as not helpful, as an obstacle to peace, so I don't think we would go beyond that. I think that's fairly clear.

Q Any date for the visit of Prime Minister Begin here yet?

A No.

Q Not yet.

A No, no. I've seen some Israeli reports talking about it, but I don't think any date has been set.

Q John, do you have anything on South Africa's taking over of Southwest Africa or Namibia again?

A A very brief statement. You're talking about the decision to dissolve the Namibian Council of Ministers?

We note only that we do not regard this decision as inconsistent with an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibian question or with the commitments made by the South African Government in the context of the current negotions.

As you know, we weren't recognizing the structure there.

Q What are your thoughts about the reports that Lebanese forces' hesitancy in disbanding in order to assist President Gemayel to carry on his duties, since you are the guarantor for the Lebanese regaining a hold on its affairs, according to the story of David Ottaway this morning in The Washington Post?

A I guess we might have something for you in the Press Office on that a little later on.

Q John, can I just take you back to Nitze? Did Nitze recommend that the President abandon zero-zero?

A Bernie, I don't know what those recommendations, if any, were, but I just don't think we're going to talk about the kind of discussions that might have gone on within the Administration.

Q So the usual "not confirm, not deny" that one.

A That's right.

Q John, one more question, please. On the Big Pine joint military exercise between the United States and Honduras, will Nicaragua be invited to send observers to that?

A I think the answer to that is yes. I think all countries with military attaches in Honduras have been invited to observe. Yes.

Q Do you know if Nicaragua has indicated it will attend?

A I don't know what their response is. No. You'd have to ask them.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:54 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JANUARY 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #14

THURSDAY, JANUARY 20, 1982, 12:22 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I don't have any announcements. Be glad to take a few questions before we all go to lunch.

Q John, I know the President addressed it during his mini-news conference this morning, but can you tell us anything more about what he called "rumors" that the Soviets threatened to pull out of the START talks if the INF missiles begin to be deployed?

A Jim, I don't think we really want to get into -- as we have persistently, consistently said -- into the details of those negotiations.

I think you would be -- there are a number of reports today, and some of them had different nuances. I think you would be misled if you were to believe reports that the Soviets had actually threatened to walk out of those negotiations.

Q It has been suggested that what they have said, in fact, is that they will not consider reducing their strategic force if we deploy those INF weapons, which would have the effect of ending START.

Is that in fact what happened?

A You're pushing me to get into the area of the negotiations. You know, I wouldn't deter you from the direction in which you're going, but I don't want to get into the detail of the negotiations.

We're negotiating seriously and earnestly in both START and INF, and we hope the Soviets will negotiate with the same seriousness of purpose.

We do not believe that either negotiation should be held hostage to the other. We believe that both negotiations should move forward as rapidly as possible.

Our proposals are based on achieving strict equality at sharply reduced levels of U.S. and Soviet forces and would enhance the security of both sides.

Our position in START calls for deep reductions in strategic systems. Our position in INF is for complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles, and we look forward to returning to these two negotiations in the next few weeks.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Yes. Sure.

Q Does that line about "hostage" mean in your own way to confirm that report?

A I think I'll just let you digest that language, Bernie.

Q John, on that point of holding hostage, Congressman Kemp wrote a letter to the President recently in which he said that unless the MX were approved and deployed, that we should pull out of the START talks.

And the President replied and seemed to accept this idea, in effect holding these talks hostage to a deployment of the MX.

A I don't have the letter in front of me, and I don't have the President's words --

Q There are two letters.

A -- and I don't want to attempt to go over them, but I think it has always been a given that our START proposals were predicated on the belief that there would be an effective MX.

Q John, have you got any additional detail you can give us about this public relations effort that the President mentioned to win over the people who are in doubt in Western Europe about the need for new U.S. missiles?

A You want to be careful not to confuse two things here. There is Ambassador Dailey's appointment, and then there is the Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy.

At the suggestion of Secretary Shultz, the President has asked Ambassador Dailey to serve as his representative in reviewing and suggesting means to strengthen U.S. communications with Europe, and over the next several weeks he will chair an interagency working group on the communications issue. He will retain his position as Ambasssador to Ireland.

In a separate development, the public diplomacy project has been underway for many months. The President has established an interagency committee structure to coordinate the U.S. Government's policies and activities in the area of public diplomacy.

The structure will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Members will include representatives of the White House, State, Defense, AID and USIA. Other agencies will attend by invitation of the Chairman.

Under the new structure there will be four interagency committees concentrating on four areas: International politics, international information, broadcasting and public affairs.

By insuring that all agencies are working closely together, we hope to strengthen the capability of the U.S. to explain to international audiences not only our policy but the values and principles which underpin our society. And this is in keeping, of course, with the ideas set forth by the President in his speech to Parliament in London last June.

Q John, there was a dollar figure mentioned of $65 million in support of this campaign. Could you give us some idea of how that money is going to be earmarked, how it's going to be spent?

A I don't have anything on that, but I would be glad to see whether we can provide something on that.

Q John, can we have copies of that language you just used?

A Yes.

Q How does that work, that program you just talked about, if you translate some of what you're saying?

A I think, Bernie, a lot of this really has been in train, and some of it has been in place for many months. For example, I've been involved in some of these activities, and we'll continue to be in this format.

I ~~think~~ It's our desire to better coordinate our public affairs policy, our public diplomacy policy.

Q Isn't it coordinated now? Hasn't it been for many years? We've had guidance from the State Department and the Government, so what --

A It's splendidly coordinated already, but one can always improve, one can always do better.

Q What's wrong with it?

A I think it's just a question of making it even more effective than the effectiveness it already expresses.

Q John, doesn't the creation of this Dailey group suggest that the Administration's message has been getting across garbled in Western Europe? Where has been the shortcoming?

A I think the appointment of Ambassador Dailey is to ensure that we get our message to Europe as effectively as possible.

Q John, has anybody thought about the revolutionary idea of having regular news conferences?

A Regular new conferences? By whom? By me? I come out here every --

Q I was thinking of the Secretary of State.

A He's always very interested in press conferences.

Q Do you know about any similar and parallel effort to coordinate the Administration's efforts on MX, both in public relations and in Congress?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is there a coordinated view within the Administration about this Saturday's football game?

A I'm sorry. About the what?

Q About this Saturday's football game with the Redskins?

A I don't know. We haven't sent out for guidance on that particular issue, Bernie.

Q John, the President said that in the areas of arms talks and Middle East peace efforts and the American economy that he also mentioned, he said they were all on the mend and that those efforts were all in full swing, and he predicted that 1983 would be a season of hope in those areas.

Can you list some of the things that would lead the Administration to believe that, in Middle East peace efforts and that in arms talks, 1983 will be a season of hope?

A I, obviously, am not going to address myself to the whole range because the President spoke, and he spoke well and forcefully himself; and he knows what he had in mind.

Specifically on that question of arms control, I think the President said that he had hope because it was in the interests of both sides to come to the kind of agreement for which he has been working, and he thought there was a good prospect that reason would prevail and both sides would see the advantages in the kind of proposal that he has made.

So I think that's where he was expressing hope on arms control.

Q So it's a matter of the U.S. side hoping for achievements in these areas as opposed to expecting achievements in these areas.

A I'm not quite sure that I want to draw fine lines between hope and expectation. The President, once again, today reiterated his position on arms control. I really think that he's carried it as far as we're able to carry it.

We're going back to Geneva, that's where we're negotiating, and we're looking to see what develops there.

Q Have the Soviets responded to your questions regarding Cosmos 1402?

A There has been interchange and back and forth, yes.

Q Can you tell us if at this point the United States Government is satisfied that no nuclear material will fall in such a manner as to be hazardous?

A I think that I would do better to refer you to the Department of Energy on that. They're the experts.

Q John, on the Middle East, do you have anything on --

Q Excuse me. One more on the satellite. In their public discussions, they say that whatever fallout may occur will be within the limits recommended by an international commission on radiological protection.

Is that the burden of their answer to the U.S. Government?

A I don't want to get into the detail of the back and forth, Jim. There has been discussion of various points.

Q But in effect --

A I don't think anybody can really effectively answer that particular question that you just posed.

Q I mean, the question is a factual one. Is that what they are saying, whether it's true or not?

A I think they have consistently said that it does not pose a threat. We certainly hope that that is the case.

Q Regarding the reports of Andropov's suspected involvement in the Papal assassination, two months ago the Department stated that it would cooperate with and in -- I think this is a fair paraphrase -- and in effect wait for the results of the Italian investigation which is underway then.

There are three aspects of this that I'm curious about now.

Is the U.S. content with Italian progress in that investigation, and what is that progress, if you can tell us?

Secondly, has the United States initiated any investigation of its own?

And, thirdly, has the United States considered raising the matter in the U.N. since assassination of heads of state may not be compatible with U.N. membership or stability in general in the world?

A I think the United States is waiting for the outcome of the Italian investigation, and, so far as I know, we're well satisfied with the way that is proceeding. But I think it would be improper of us to take any action or to suggest any action until the results of that judicial proceeding are at hand.

Q Is that in response to the U.N. aspect of the question?

A Yes.

Q Well, then it seems to me we've not waited for other countries to complete investigations before in matters that we wanted to press before the U.N.

Is there any valid evidence that you can cite to us here today that the Department of State or the U.S. Government is not involved in either covering up or inhibiting a full investigation of the possibility that Andropov, when he was head of the KGB, conspired to assassinate the Pope?

A The United States is not involved in any coverup.

Q There's no evidence you can cite.

A I don't quite know how you cite evidence to prove that you're not doing something.

Q I should think that's easy, by showing some demonstration of more interest than just waiting for the Italians to complete an investigation, the conclusion of which is open-ended and may never be fully completed.

A I think that's the proper position for the United States to pursue, and that's going to be our polic . It's an Italian investigation. It's something that they' e pursuing, and to all account pursuing competently and vigorously, and we'll wait for the outcome of their investigation.

Q By that answer are you suggesting that while this affects seriously Italian national interest, the substance of the charges don't (sic) affect seriously U.S. national interest?

A I'm not suggesting that at all. I'm suggesting that we're going to wait for the outcome of a perfectly proper ongoing Italian investigation so that we know what the facts are.

Q Do you have anything on the incident in Taba this morning?

A I don't. We've seen the initial reports, but don't have anything on it for you.

-- MORE --

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Q John, do you have anything on this, the Soviets threatening Japan with dire consequences if they, I think in their words, pointed more weapons in the direction of the Soviet Union?

A Sure. I certainly do. The TASS statement to which you refer belies the Soviet Union's professed desire for peace and arms control. The Governments of Japan and the United States want peace in the area. We are not threatening the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Government shares this desire for peace, it should stop using alarmist language and should stop attempting to excite exaggerated fears.

The TASS statement is the latest example of a clear Soviet campaign to employ such public statements in an attempt to intimidate our allies and friends and prevent them from pursuing their legitimate defense requirements. We have seen such tactics used recenty in Europe as well as Asia, and we can expect more of it. We and our allies recognize these tactics for what they are.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Did the Secretary talk about the TASS statement when he said goodbye to Mr. Nakasone?

A I honestly don't know.

Q Do you know whether the United States has any assessment as to whether this will deter the Japanese from making a greater defense role?

A I don't know. All we know is that the visit seemed to be successful and in addition to the various points that were covered, I think a good frame-work was laid for continuing cooperation, particularly at the working level on various issues, various subjects.

I think that those of you who went to Canada remember the Secretary's accord, or plan, or agreement with Foreign Minister MacEachen to meet four times a year in one setting or another, after that visit; and he came to the same agreement with Mr. Abe, the Japanese Foreign Minister. They have agreed that the Secretary and the Japanese Foreign Minister would meet at least four times a year from here on in. At least one of those would be a special, separate meeting; the other three might well be where they take the opportunity when they are at the same kind of international gathering, and have a special bilateral meeting. That kind of framework was established, will go forward, and will be built upon.

Q Do you expect the meeting they are going to have in Tokyo in a couple of weeks -- is that the special one for the year?

A I don't know. I don't know how that counts as one of the four.

Q Is there anything else on the Japanese you have there?

A Not really. I said I think there was a good framework built for continuing discussion.

Q Going back to Taba, do you anticipate that the question of Taba will be discussed with President Mubarak, the Egyptian President, next week when he will be here?

A I don't know. It could well come up.

Q John, how about the other incident which is outstanding, the Israeli defense force incident, has there been any complaint lodged because the soldier was hit by the jeep or anything of that nature?

A We are increasingly concerned by recurring attempts by the Israeli Defense Force to enter the area where the Marine contingent of the Multi-National Force is deployed. Continuing incidents of this kind incur unnecessary risks for both the Marines and the Israeli soldiers involved and violate the spirit of cooperation required of all parties if the Multi-National Force is to carry out its peacekeeping role successfully. We have been in contact with the Israelis and are impressing on them that such irresponsible incidents cannot recur.

As to details on the incident -- you talk about the jeep nudging the Marine -- I think the Pentagon now has a full readout.

Q They did have to some extent a readout, but they were unable to say even if the Marine was hurt.

A I'm afraid our information is no better, and probably not as good as the Pentagon's on that.

Q John, can we have a copy of that?

A Yes, sure.

Q Can I follow this, John? You didn't say if the United States Government, either the Pentagon or the State Department, lodged a complaint against Israel for this accident.

A I think we said we've been in touch with Israel.

Q Do you mean, when you say, "in touch," you have filed a complaint or "in touch" in the diplomatic language?

A We have been in touch with them, and I think the language we've offered here indicates our concern, and we've certainly expressed that concern to them.

Q This is the latest and most serious in a series of incidents that have been similar involving the Marines and the Israeli Defense Forces. In the past you have said following these that the U.S. had expressed its concern. There seems to be some misunderstanding on the part of the Israelis and a justification for their presence in the area. Will the language of these expressions of concern change due to the misunderstanding of the Israeli presence there?

A I think there was a little flurry of incidents -- I forget the time frame, maybe a week, two weeks ago; and I think there were about four grouped together. There were two, and then there was a second pair of incidents. We had some discussion with the Israelis at that time, and the incidents stopped, to my knowledge.

This is one more recent incident. When I talked to you yesterday, we really didn't know too much about it. We have had something more of a readout on it that has led to the renewed talks on this subject with the Israelis, and we certainly hope this will be the last incident.

Q John, are you aware of what the Israeli's interest in that village there is? Is that a Palestinian village? Is there some reason for them to want to get in there?

A No, I don't have any idea of the motivation.

Q John, I asked you this before, and I will repeat my request, if you could maybe -- in a chronology, or possibly gather these incidents for us. I know that you asked me to do my homework and go through this, but I don't have all your statements in front of me or I would have done this very properly.

A I'm sure --

Q But if you could issue a statement on this -- how many accidents since the August confrontation with the helicopter, with the team of negotiatiors, if you could bring it out for us, please.

A I'm sure that our Press Office, which is very efficient, could assist you to compile the various statements over the months, and you could do your research into those statements.

Q Do you have anything about the level of discussions with the Israelis about these accidents, and where they are going?

A No.

Q Is Habib doing it?

A No. We won't get into how we are doing it.

Q John, do you have any information about some unusual Argentine activity in the Antarctic?

A We've seen the same reports that you have and perhaps that your network originated, Bob.

Q No, this is a different -- No, this is something different. I was told that there has been some unusual activity down, even beyond the Beagle Channel.

A Not aware of it. I'm not aware of it.

Q Following that report, are you aware of the British putting their forces on Red Alert?

A I've seen the same kind of report that you have.

Q Is there any diplomatic activity here with regard to the Secretary involving the Ambassadors or representatives of either Argentina or Britain?

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A Not beyond the reiteration of our hope for a peaceful settlement of the problem, which we gave you some language on yesterday. And obviously, that would be made known through normal diplomatic channels.

Q John, would you look into the Argentine reports or the Antarctic reports (inaudible).

A I don't think we have anything further on it, but I'll see whether we do. I don't think we do.

Q John, Libya is accusing the United States of conducting provocative maneuvers close to the Libyan coast. Do you have anything on that or on the maneuvers?

A I don't, no.

Q John, the Commerce Department is putting out projections that the surplus of Japanese exports to the United States over imports will rise to as high as $22 billion this year from an estimated $19 billion last year.

My question is, in our relations with Japan, are we putting the military situation on a higher level than the economic?

A I don't want to ascribe a nuance. It seems to me that there has been very considerable and comprehensive coverage of Mr. Nakasone's visit here this week. You've had a number of background briefings by spokesmen who are much more expert in this area than I am, and I don't think I have anything to add to what they have said.

Q John, reports out of Quiryat Shemonah this morning suggest that a stalemate may be shaping up on the issue of a continued Israeli presence in Lebanon after everything has been worked out.

What is the American position on a continued Israeli presence in southern Lebanon? And have we offered to provide U.S. troops there to fulfill a surveillance role?

A I don't have really anything more on the U.S. troop aspect than I had yesterday, Barry, and that is that I think you would be misled if you thought the presence of U.S. troops really had been injected into negotiations yet.

Obviously, as we have said, we share the Israelis concern about security in the southern area of Lebanon. How that security can be guaranteed is, obviously, a matter for the Lebanese and the Israelis -- and, of course, our own involvement in the tripartite talks -- to discuss. But I'm afraid we're not going to be able to go much beyond the -- As a matter of fact, we'll not be able to go at all beyond the communique which they issued.

Q For several months, the black South African, who is styled as the President of Venda, has been applying for a visa, and the Department of State has had it under consideration. Has the Department reached a conclusion on that? And if not, why is it so difficult?

A I guess you are referring to Mr. Tambo's case, as well, are you, involving --

Q Well, it is a curious fact that Tambo is a communist terrorist, or at least head of a communist terrorist organization, and is admitted beyond the limits of U.N. Protocol; whereas this anti-communist, black South African is not admitted. That is a curiosity that was brought out two months ago, at which time the Department said it was considering the other man's application.

A Let me give you a few words on that. Mr. Tambo was invited to attend meetings of the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid, November 3 to 7 at U.N. headquarters in New York. Consistent with our obligations under the U.N. Participation Act, and with our responsibilities as host of the United Nations, a visa was issued to Mr. Tambo for this purpose.

As you know, the ANC, I guess that is the African National Congress, has been accorded observer status by the United Nations. The so-called "president" of Venda homeland and four other officials have applied for U.S. visas on South African passports, and have stated that their visit would be private. These applications are under consideration.

Of course, the United States does not recognize the so-called independent "homelands" in South Africa. We regard the "homelands" as integral parts of the Republic of South Africa, and view their inhabitants as South African citizens. We are, therefore, only prepared to consider visa applications from individuals who characterize themselves as officials of the so-called independent homelands on the basis of their South African citizenship and documentation.

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Q But you just said that's how they characterize themselves in their visa application. Therefore, why isn't the visa issued?

A I said we have it under consideration.

Q What, for two months? Why is it so difficult?

A I don't know why it has taken so long, but that's where we are.

Q Could you take the question and inquire as to what the problem is?

A No. No, I don't think so. I think when the decision has been made, we'll be happy to let you know what it is.

Q But on the surface, then, would you have any evidence to suggest that the Department isn't discriminating in issuing visas to people who are communist or linked to communist terrorist organizations as against those who are black, anti-communists?

A I would say the Department offers its advice in accordance with the laws that govern entry into this country.

Q Could you tell us, please, if the U.S. was approached during the day by Israel or Egypt regarding the incident in Taba?

A I do not know the answer to that. I don't know whether there has been --

Q Is the United States in contact with the two sides in order to find out what happened there?

A I can't answer that question either.

Q Has the United States ever taken a position on who owns that disputed territory?

A We've offered some language on the Taba dispute, Jim, which we could retrieve for you.

Q John, what is the significance of the Lebanese-Israeli talks conducted in secret, in closed meetings today, I believe, a couple of times. It was, I believe, the first time.

A You mean the reports that the plenary session ended, and the principles then went into informal discussion?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. They set up a number of committees, as you know.

Q John, do you have any comment on reports about differences between Egypt and the United States concerning the U.S. aid to Egypt and how it is used?

A No; sorry, I don't.

Q Do you have any response to the conciliatory statements by Saddam Hussein on Israeli security -- number one -- and the reported Israeli response that motives of the Iraqis were to be questioned on these --

A No, sorry, I don't.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

CONT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #15

FRIDAY, JANUARY 21, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I don't have a great deal for you today, but I do have a few announcements up front. There will be a briefing this afternoon in the press briefing room at 3:30, on the issue of El Salvador's certification. This briefing will be ON THE RECORD, and the briefers will be the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Enders, and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams. Copies of the documentation which accompany the certification itself will be available in the Press Office following distribution to the appropriate committees of the Congress. Distribution would be around 3:00 p.m., we think, and the documents will be embargoed for use until the 3:30 briefing.

I have an announcement on the visit --

Q Embargoed. It will be for release at 3:30 p.m.

A At 3:30, right.

Q Why can't you release it now?

A Because that would spoil all the suspense. (Laughter)

Q You are certifying -- that's the announcement?

A No, I didn't say that. I said we'll give you the --

Q You talked about documents for use in conjunction with the certification.

A That's right.

Q So, therefore, you're saying you're certifying. You're saying that right now.

A I said we'll give you the documents this afternoon that will accompany the decision on certification.

Q You didn't say "decision" on it.

A Well~~, I~~ should have said that.

Q We'll have the documents --

A You'll have the documents.

Q -- before the briefing?

A You'll have the documents.

Foreign Minister Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has accepted an invitation from Secretary of State George Shultz to visit Washington January 25-26. Mr. Genscher will also be acting in his function as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community. He will be received while he is here by President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and he will also meet with other senior officials of the United States Government and members of the Congress.

Q Is this intended as an opportunity to get a briefing on Gromyko's visit to Bonn?

A I think that would come up, George. I think that is one of the things that might be discussed.

Q Is he meeting with Reagan on both days, or which day?

A I don't have a schedule for you, Mike, on that. I think there is not, in fact, a schedule yet as to what hour and what day.

And finally, we will have -- I guess we already have it -- a little fact sheet on the Public Diplomacy initiative available in the Press Office afterwards. I thought I had done pretty well towards clearing up confusion on that yesterday, but I gather there still lingers some. You really need to see Ambassador Dailey's project as separate from the Public Diplomacy project which has been many months in the making, and of course, is a major project.

There is no proposal -- and there still lingers some confusion, I think, in some stories this morning -- about this figure of $65 million. There is no proposal for a $65 million program to promote U.S. arms control and foreign policies to Europeans. The bulk of that money, when it's approved, will be spent on the democracy project and the public diplomacy program. That is the program that is designed to begin the implementation of the ideas expressed by the President during his speech to the British Parliament last year. It is to be a long-term program, global in scope, and will involve private sector organizations, with the working of Congress on that; and the objectives are to support the growth of democracy and to improve understanding by foreign publics and governments of U.S. policies as well as the principles and values which underlie our society. In other words, that's been a long-term, ongoing project, and that is where the bulk of that money is going, specifically into the democracy program.

Q John, am I correct in presuming that Secretary Shultz is strongly behind the President's oft-repeated dedication to achieving every possible economy in government?

A I'm sure that's a given.

Q All right. What is the State Department's reaction to the report this morning in The Washington Post that former Senator Buckley, former State Department official Buckley, is getting paid a $95,000 salary, is provided a servant, and a car with chauffeur, and that National Public Radio President Frank Mankewitz -- this is not a report but I've discovered it -- is paid almost $10,000 more than a United States Senator, or does Secretary Shultz think he is worth more than U.S. Senators?

A I don't know that we have any detailed response -- I don't know that we have any response to that. But aren't you talking about a Radio Free Europe position?

Q Correct -- which is subsidized by the federal government, as you know.

A I'd like to do my home work on that, but I do not think that is a State Department authority.

Q No. I understand. Since Secretary Shultz is certainly the ranking Cabinet member in the Reagan Administration, and Radio Free Europe deals with an area of foreign affairs, I would think that Secretary Shultz would be absolutely appalled at this disclosure -- I mean, horrified at this. He's not getting paid that much, is he?

A I don't know that Secretary Shultz has seen that story, and I don't know what his thoughts might be on that particular incident. I can assure you that Secretary Shultz strongly supports the work of Radio Free Europe, which he happens to value very highly.

Q   But does he think that it is appropriate that the head of Radio Free Europe get $95,000, a car, a servant, and a chauffeur?

A   I don't know.

Q   That's what I'd like to know. And could you take that question, John?

A   No.

Q   You won't?

A   No, because you're asking the Secretary to comment on specifics of employment of an agency that is not under his authority.

Q   But, sir, you said he was devoted to economy in government, in every possible economy.

A   In broad, philosophical terms.

Q   Do you think that's economy, John?

A   Well, I --

Q   You're a spokesman. You're certainly an intelligent man, sophisticated in the ways of the world. What do you think? Do you think that's economy?

A   Flattery will get you nowhere, Lester.

Q   Well, I just would like you to take the question.

A   No, I'm not going to take the question.

Q   Further on the public diplomacy, you used the word, necessarily of course, "democracy," I think, a couple of times in your explanation here.

A   Right.

Q   A month or so ago, a question was asked from this group if the State Department had a rough-and-ready definition of democracy, and the response from the spokesman's podium was that "we weren't going to get into that trap."

Does the State Department, after consideration, now have a rough-and-ready definition of what it is we are supporting when we are supporting democratic forums?

A A feisty group today! I don't think we would ever offer a "rough-and-ready" definition of democracy.

Q Well a highly tuned and honed definition then.

A I think if we were to offer one, it would be a carefully-crafted definition; but I don't happen to have a carefully-crafted one with me. (Laughter)

Q How can you implement a policy and use the word if you don't have something in your mind as to what you mean?

A I think that those who are implementing the policy understand well what democracy means, and I think most of the people in this room --

Q Could you explain to us the basic components of U.S. policy?

A No, because I'm not here to conduct a class in philosophy; I'm here to answer your specific questions.

Q John, is there going to be anything in connection with the Human Rights Report related to the Salvador certification steps or --

A I'm not sure I understand your question, Ralph.

Q Is the Human Rights Report being released at the same time?

A You mean the annual report?

Q That's right.

A No. I do have a date on that, I think, but I'm sure it is not this afternoon. The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982 will be presented to Congress -- that's, of course, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- by January 31, 1983. The report is then published in a single volume by the Government Printing Office, which based on past experience, takes about a week. We can't give you an exact date on publication, but we have assurance from the Hill that sufficient copies of the published reports will be made available to our Press Office simultaneously with their release in published form to correspondents on the Hill. So, the end of the month, give or take a week, I would say, Ralph, is what we are talking about.

Q There is a report in one of the weeklies in Washington that Eugene Rostow was fired because of his Middle East policy which did not correspond with the Administration's policy. What do you comment on such reports?

A No comment. I think everything that has been said on that subject has been said. The President has said what he has to say, the Secretary has, and I think it's a closed chapter.

Q John, the officials of the Nicaraguan Government said yesterday that they believe their former Ambassador may be in hiding in the United States.

Are you aware that the gentleman is in the United States? If so, have you had any communication with him insofar as an asylum request?

A No, not on the question of his whereabouts. But in connection with a possible legal case involving alleged misappropriated funds, we understand that a request has been made to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, which has the matter under review, and in light of that, it wouldn't be really appropriate for us to make any further comment.

Q There will be no involvement by the Department in the matter of diplomatic immunity, I gather, since it is correct that that is extended by the Government of Nicaragua?

A You just catch me unaware. I really don't have anything more for you on this case than that, that there is this pending legal case, criminal action, but --

Q But you have not, can you say, had any communication with him in regard to asylum?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is the sequence of events such that El Salvador could be certified before the Human Rights Country Report is made public?

A I'm giving a layman's answer: I don't see why not because the deadlines for the two are separate, and I see no problem about that.

Q Isn't that a little bit like graduating before you get your final exam?

A I think that any issues regarding human rights in El Salvador would be addressed in whatever documentation accompanies whatever decision is going to be handed down this afternoon. I think the Human Rights Report would be a larger, across-the-board document.

Q John, the Middle East. There are reports that the SA-8 missiles that Jordan bought from the Soviet Union have been deployed already in Jordan. Can you confirm that?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment?

A No, don't have anything on that for you.

Q What is the U.S. position on the purchase of those missiles from the Soviet Union?

A We've made our position clear on the existing class of missiles that we've talked about, but we don't have anything beyond that for you.

You're talking about the SA-5s?

Q No, no, I'm talking about --

A No, no, but I say, we've made our position clear.

Q I'm talking about Jordan, not about Syria.

A Oh, Jordan. Beg your pardon. No.

Q Just to return to Central America briefly, do you have any statement with respect to the declarations of the Dominican Foreign Minister on the Venezuelan-Mexican initiative?

A Yes. We don't have comment on that specific press report. That's all we know about the remarks the Foreign Minister is reported to have made; but our position remains unchanged. We continue to believe the regional democracies which met in San Jose provided the best approach for serious efforts to resolve regional tensions within a peaceful framework.

-- MORE --

Q But Panama, Colombia and the Dominican Republic, all of whom took part in the San Jose forum to which you refer indirectly, have now all endorsed the Mexican-Venezuelan initiative. That leaves a rather small group of people left who signed the San Jose forum and continue in that position.

Aren't we reconsidering in any respect whether we should pursue that avenue?

A No. I think we feel that the San Jose Declaration and the principles enunciated were good ones, and we're standing by them.

Q John, do you see any likelihood that the textile talks with China will be resumed before Secretary Shultz visits?

A I don't know of any plans. As you know, we said we would be ready for resumption of such negotiations, but I don't think anything has moved on it.

Q John, on China, any reaction to The Washington Times' report this morning that the Secretary's preparing to back China's entry into the Asian Development Bank?

A No. I think we offered you some words on that PRC possible request last week, and we stand on this.

Q Prime Minister Nakasone said during an interview at the Post this week that he would like to see Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier", able to block Soviet expansion in that region.

Do you welcome that remark? What significance do you see in that remark?

A I don't think that we responded to that specific detail. As you know, the Secetary and the President and other U.S. officials discussed the question of an increased Japanese defense commitment during their visit here, which of course we have consistently welcomed, while at the same time understanding the realities of their situation.

We offered you some words yesterday on the Soviet response to the Japanese statement, but beyond that we have nothing.

Q John, there are reports coming out of the Middle East that are starting to adopt a certain symmetry to the effect that the United States and King Hussein have developed a plan for the return of the West Bank.

The figures that keep coming out are that 97% of the West Bank goes back to Jordan, and 3% to Israel for security adjustments.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't, but frankly I would steer you away from stories which suggest such detail.

Q The thing is, they're coming from very diverse sources.

A No. I think that --

Q Back to Japan for a moment, a follow-up?

A Yes.

Q Did the subject of the unsinkable Kuril Islands come up, or the unsinkable southern half of Sakhalin Island under Russian control?

A I honestly don't know, but there were a number of briefings by Administration spokesmen. I just don't know whether they addressed those subjects.

Q I see.

Q John, back to these stories, do the reports say that Mr. Rostow was fired because of his support to Israel?

Was Mr. Rostow, in his capacity as director of ACDA, a member of the National Security Council?

A You ask a question I can't answer. I don't think so. I'm told no.

Q Does the United States have any comment on a recent poll in Britain that now shows that 60% of the people there, up from 50% a year ago, oppose the placement of the missiles in Europe, or comment on that type of poll showing that has also occurred recently in West Germany?

A   No. I don't. As you know, the Secretary met with a number of government officials on his trip to Europe, and there doesn't seem to be any change in the position of the Alliance on what we're working toward on arms control. But I don't have any comment on the public opinion polls.

Q   You're drawing a distinction between the governments and the people of the countries?

A   You know, we're not interviewing populations. We're talking to governments and we're talking to government leaders, and that's the tone we're getting from government leaders.

Q   Do you have any new information on the allegations of slave labor being used to build the gas pipeline?

A   No. I think those reports mainly originated in Europe. As I recall, a number of avenues of investigation are open, and I think a number of organizations are in the process of investigating.

We've seen the allegations, and of course, are interested in them, concerned by the allegations, and --

Q   You addressed yourself to the subject of closed areas and open areas in the Soviet Union and the United States in a different context the other day.

I have a Department document which shows the pipeline, and near every major stop on the pipeline there's what's identified as a forced labor camp.

If you look at the similar map of the closed areas, you'll see that most of the areas that this pipeline and those detention centers or forced labor camps are in are open areas.

Have U.S. diplomats of any description traveled, as they are allowed to in theory under the regulations, to those areas to see for themselves whether or not the forced labor in those forced labor camps is being used to build the gas line? And, if not, why not?

A   I'm sure American diplomats have traveled to the extent that they are allowed in the Soviet Union. If you're asking me whether we in our hands today have hard evidence of the use of Soviet forced labor on the pipeline, I'm saying no.

Q That's not my question. My question is, are we using the facilities that we have in Moscow, which is a very large Embassy, to go out on the scene and see with our own eyes, with our own personnel, which is apparently legal under this closed area agreement or mandate or ukase, I guess you'd have to call it in 1978, to see for ourselves?

A I think you may rest assured that we are following up the reports that are available, and to the extent that we are able to check and verify, that process is going forward.

But a lot of other people are also very interested in this particular issue.

Q Would it be public information, the list of trips that U.S. diplomats have applied for, the ministerial --

A No. I don't think so.

Q Why not?

A I don't think that would be appropriate.

Q It's unclassified information.

A Yes. But I don't think it would be appropriate to list travel --

Q But it would reassure Americans that their diplomats are at least attempting to go see these stations along the gas line.

A I think you may be reassured that American diplomats are seeking to check and verify those reports, but I'm not getting into the specifics of how they're doing it.

Q Wouldn't it be better for the State Department to reassure a person with evidence rather than reassurances?

A When we get the evidence, we will make it available.

Q But the evidence is available with the notes that have to be passed prior to going on such travel.

A I don't consider that evidence.

Q Do you have any words of wisdom to offer on the Cosmos? Do you think American officials should follow the examples of the Belguim officials and take to fallout shelters?

A I think that we all should continue to talk to the Department of Defense and heed the advice and information that is coming out of that very expert organization about what may happen this weekend.

Q You don't have any soothing words to prevent panic in this country?

A I think that we should do just what I've said. They should keep in touch with the situation. We may all be in on Saturday afternoon. Perhaps none of us will be out taking a walk on Sunday afternoon. I don't know.

Q On Saturday -- can you touch on what the Secretary's plans are tomorrow?

A Yes. He'll be in the office in the morning. I think his departure time has nothing to do at all with the start of the Redskins' game, but I think coincidentally it will take place about 15 minutes from the office before the game starts. I think he'll be --

Q Does he have a position on the Redskins game?

A He may have a position, but he hasn't confided it to me. He's a super diplomat, you know.

Q Do you have anything to say to explain the Presidential statement issued today that says that the arms negotiators will explore every possibility for equitable agreements with the Soviet Union as opposed to exploring agreements on the zero-zero option?

A I don't have any explanation because the President made it very clear. The President's position has been constant, and he's standing by it.

The negotiators, as they said today -- and I think they probably said all that needs to be said on it -- are going back to Geneva.

The zero-zero option is a good option. We think it's the best one for all the parties involved.

Q But they will explore every --

A At the same time you heard what Mr. Nitze said and what we have said about his authority to probe the Soviet position. And the President has said on many occasions that we will seriously consider any serious proposal by the Soviets. Geneva is the place to get that serious proposal.

Q There is a news report which attributes a statement to Secretary Shultz that he said at a meeting which took place with Jewish community leaders January 11 -- that Mr. Shultz has said, according to the report, that there is an agreement or tacit approval between Israel and Syria about the partition of Lebanon.

What do you make of this report and --

A I think you should be very careful about that report.

Firstly, I'm not going to be able to get into it because the Secretary has consistently, in that kind of meeting, held that those meetings are confidential and has made that clear to the participants.

So I would be very, very cautious about that particular -- you have me in a little box here in that I'm not going to get into what went on there and give you a background to the conversation or give you the exact dialogue, but I will just urge you to be very careful about that particular quotation.

Q Besides being careful, you deny or you reject the total thrust of the statement?

A I would be breaking the Secretary's rule, you see. That's the problem here.

Q It's in public. I mean, in the last issue of the Jewish Week. I mean, I'm just asking you because, you know, it's in the public -- it's made public, and, you know, you have to go to those people who made you swear or allegedly told to keep it confidential, and it's out in the open. So, I mean, what do you make of this statement?

A Without going into the detail of that discussion, I would caution you against assuming that that is an accurate statement.

Q Has there been correspondence during the very few days -- the last few days with the Soviet Union concerning the Syrian missiles?

A As we have indicated there has been communication over the past week, ten days, indicating our concern. There certainly has been communication.

Q Does this mean that the United States has a reply from the Soviets to this representation?

A As you know, we don't get into the question of how we conduct our diplomatic negotiations, but there has been communication, contact. We've made our position clear.

Q I have one last question of the Department on the closeness of the Polish policy of repression. How closely is it linked to Soviet guidance or animus or direction?

A I think we've had much to say on that over the months, and I'd refer you to various copies of the transcript that are available.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #16

MONDAY, JANUARY 24, 1983, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I don't have any announcements. Be glad to take any questions you might have.

Q John, do you have anything you can relate to us fresh regarding incidents between the Americans and Israelis in Beirut, or in Lebanon -- incidents at checkpoints?

A We're talking about Marines, now?

Q Yes.

A O.K. Although we're following these incidents closely and have expressed our concern here, in Beirut, and in Tel Aviv, we would prefer to have the Department of Defense provide any comment on details of the incident.

As far as an incident involving newsmen is concerned, which apparently took place yesterday, it appears that an incident involving American journalists and the IDF did occur in Lebanon on Sunday. Without going into the details of that incident, we note that our position on freedom of the press is clear: any actions taken to interfere with legitimate news coverage would meet with our disapproval.

Q Do you have any assurances from the Israelis on these checkpoint problems, that they will not recur?

A There may be a little confusion about the date of these incidents. It is our understanding that the latest one was last Monday, so if that is the case, obviously, there has not been a recurrence since we've made our views known.

Q The latest what, last Monday?

A The latest involving the Marines, we understand, Bernie was a week ago. The incident involving the newsmen, as we understand it, was yesterday.

Q Are you talking about the incident where the Israelis tried to go through the checkpoint, or are you talking about the incident in which the Marine allegedly had an IDF member in his sights, and was about to shoot?

A There is a little confused reporting on that, but as we understand it, the latest incident was a week ago, and that does refer also to the Marine who allegedly had the Israeli soldier in his sights. I know that some reports this morning suggest that that was Friday, but we think that may not be true. There is a little confusion in the reporting on this by various sources.

Q John, there have been a number of stories including a column today suggesting that the Administration was about to "lower the boom" on Israel, such as cutting aid and things like that, in the light of Habib's mission and Habib's coming home which has fueled additional speculation.

I wonder if you could add any comments to the overall situation?

A On the question of Ambassador Habib's coming back, Bernie, as you know, that had been planned that he would come back, be here for the visit of President Mubarak, and he will be. I understand he is en route today, and will be back for that visit.

The United States, nevertheless, remains extremely concerned over the slow pace of the negotiations aimed at achieving the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Of course, Ambassador Habib will be consulting with senior officials on the Lebanese situation.

I guess you're referring to the Evans and Novak column?

Q Right.

A We really wouldn't have any comment on a specific, although speculative, column; but on a number of occasions, the Secretary has made clear our position on the question of aid to Israel, and there is no change in the policy.

Q John, more specifically, does the Administration now regard the Israeli troops in Lebanon as occupying forces?

A I think you may be referring to a phrase used by the President in an interview in December, and I think you ought to go back and look at the specific language he used in qualifying that. Our position has been constant, is constant, that we want the speediest withdraw of the PLO, Syrian, and Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Q John, if there is no change in policy, why aren't you denying the Evans and Novak story?

A It wasn't a question of denying it. It was a question of not -- I think I said we were not going to comment on it, Bernie.

Q My question, then -- I repeat it: If there is no change in policy and you refer us to the Secretary's known position on aid, why, then, are you not saying that this story has, from your point of view, nothing in it, if that is the case?

A I think it's just a question of not referring to a specific newspaper article, as we have declined to do on various occasions. Of course, there are various parts to that story.

But on the question of aid to Israel, what I'm saying is that the Secretary has made that plain, and there is no change in that policy.

Q For the record, has anyone over here ever commented on U.S. willingness to participate in the security posts in southern Lebanon?

A There was a report last week suggesting that the United States had raised this, and I steered you away from it last week. I think that steering was good and continues to be good. Of course, there is discussion among the parties, and we've seen the same reports you have where the question of manning has been raised, and maybe even controversy over that. We've seen those same reports.

But on the question -- I think last week, there was a report that the United States had raised or had initiated, and indeed was pressing for, American personnel to man those monitoring stations. As I say, the guidance I gave you last week steering you away from that was good, and remains good.

Q But the other report we've seen is that Israel wants Israelis to man these stations, and the Lebanese have countered by saying, either multinational forces or American forces.

A All right. I've got a problem here, in that, basically, we don't want to comment on the details of the negotiations that are going on at the tripartite talks; --

Q You don't --

A -- but having said that, I don't think that the guidance I just gave you is in conflict with the scenario you just offered.

Q It isn't. I just wanted to make sure you aren't denying that somebody else may have raised the idea of American forces.

A No. I'm not denying it.

Q How about, then, narrowing it? You are talking about U.S. personnel. How about U.S. personnel in a mixed force, are you steering us away from that, too?

A What I was steering you away from last week, and continue to steer you away from, is the suggestion that the United States volunteered or was pressing for the manning of monitoring stations by U.S. personnel.

Q My question is now, forget who raised it, forget who is pressing, what is the U.S. position on the basis of the reports of U.S. participation in a multinational force on the manning?

A Those talks are still going on at the tripartite meeting. I mean, all kinds of issues are being raised there, Bernie.

Q What is the U.S. position on U.S. participation in a mixed force for manning those outposts in Lebanon?

A I think we're going to wait and see how those discussions go forward, and rely on the communiques that come out of those meetings rather than attempting to amplify from here.

Q Are you leaving us with the impression that all you're saying is that the U.S. did not propose the idea, didn't press for the idea, didn't volunteer the idea, but you're leaving us with the impression that the U.S. is not necessarily opposed to the idea. Is that what you're --

A I don't want to steer you one way or another on that. As I say, I was concerned with the suggestion that this was a U.S. initiative, and I think we're all clear about that now. Presumably, debate continues about those monitoring stations. It is in, as I've said many times before, an hour-to-hour, day-to-day stage.

Q Does the United States believe that a continued presence of Israelis in a monitoring station would be inconsistent with the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon?

A I don't want to get into the details of the negotiations that they are involved in, but certainly our position has been that all PLO, all Syrian, and all Israeli forces should leave Lebanon, and as speedily as possible.

Q John, you have just expressed concern about the slow pace of the negotiations. It was clear to some of us at the point where the agenda was announced, with withdrawal of troops being the fourth point after resolving three rather complex issues, that the negotiations toward withdrawal would not move very quickly. At that point, a number of us tried to get you to make some comment in that regard. You refused to do it. What is the reason for your expressions of concern at this late date?

A Well, because we haven't yet seen a plan for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q But unless your capabilities are far less than mine -- which with the resources you have, I hardly think they are --

A They probably are.

Q -- you should have known this quite some time ago.

A I don't think that's a fair comment. I remember skepticism that existed among some in this room when we were working on the question of the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut. Some people thought that that would never happen. There certainly may have been skepticism about the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That hasn't deterred us from working at it and continuing to work at it.

Q Is there a concern in the Department right now to preempt some of what President Mubarak might have to say to the President if there are no expressions of this sort coming out of the Administration?

A I'm sure that the question of Lebanon could well come up during President Mubarak's visit here. But we have been pressing, as you know, for movement on Lebanon and for overall movement on the President's Middle East peace initiative, side by side, and with vigor for several months.

Q John, does the United States think that PLO guerrillas or fighters may be reinfiltrating through American-held positions in the MNF?

A I don't have any knowledge of that.

-- MORE --

Q What about Sharon's contention that the U.S. is actually holding up the negotiations; do you have any comment on that?

A No, I doubt we would respond to that. I think the record is clear, and we wouldn't have any comment on that.

Q Just to clarify the Secretary's position on aid to Israel, is there a difference between cutting aid and halting aid, because maybe the suggestion is that there is consideration in the Administration to halt aid, not to cut it, but to halt it?

A No. What I suggest you do is go back to the specific statements the Secretary has made on this question which the Press Office would be happy to dig out for you.

Q There is a related question here, and it has to do with Prime Minister Begin coming to the U.S. Do you have anything today on whether he will or won't, or when?

A No, that hasn't changed over the past couple weeks. As you know, the invitation was out there. I presume the President and Prime Minister Begin will talk about that and set a date for that at a time that is congenial and appropriate for both of them.

Q Specifically, there have been reports suggesting that a message has been relayed saying that he is not welcome until there is some progress in Lebanon. I'm just curious, as of today, if you can say anything more definitive about whether this is correct or not?

A Wouldn't have anything on what messages may or may not have been passed, or communication. I've seen some reports out of Israel where I think Israeli officials have said that probably the visit would occur most happily when there has been progress on Lebanon and the two can devote themselves to discussions on the broader Middle East situation.

Q You said that you have not seen a plan for withdrawal. There have been reports that various sides in the talks have offered plans. Did you mean no agreed plan?

A I mean no agreed plan.

Q Could you just pick up my colleage's question so we can get it from you on Shultz' position on aid. Shultz opposes both cutting and halting, just so we understand that?

A I think it would not be intelligent of me to paraphrase the Secretary. I think we probably ought to go back and look at exactly what he said.

Q Any consideration being given by the Administration to cutting or halting?

A As I said, there's no change in the policy. If you're asking, is there a review, obviously, we would never comment on a question like that. And I don't mean to lead you one way or another on that.

Q Maybe I can put the question in a little different way. The Secretary's position on aid, as he has said several times, he doesn't believe in using aid as a kind of weapon to bring about flexibility. There's some confusion because of the question of what is the aid level we're talking about. Since the Administration in the FY-83 budget came in with one figure, the Appropriations Committee ended up with a higher figure that the Administration opposed, I don't know what the FY-84 projection will be, and it may appear to be a cut from the figures in that continuing resolution.

It would be helpful if we could have a benchmark.

A That's a factual situation. What we're talking about is the aid to Israel. I think what you're talking about is the aid to Israel the Administration proposed versus the add-ons, and obviously the Administration made it's position clear on the add-on. It did not favor giving more aid to Israel than the Administration recommended and thought was neccessary. But I don't think you should confuse that particular factual situation.

Q For instance, if the FY-84 request is the same as the FY-83 request, then it will be perceived in some quarters as a cut in Israel's aid since it will be lower than the real appropriated figures.

A You're getting into the future, and I don't have a crystal ball.

Q Back on the Secretary's statement. I remember the Secretary made his statements in reference to the broader peace and President Reagan's plan. The reference today, I think, is about the withdrawal from Lebanon. Is that inclusive?

A The Secretary has talked in general terms about the question of aid to Israel, and I think you ought to go back and cite the specific language. But there isn't any question about what he said, that he did not view -- you have to go back to see how the question was phrased -- but he considered that peace was the objective, and that you did not talk about cuts in aid as a goad.

Q When you say the policy hasn't changed on that, are you saying the Secretary's policy, the Secretary's statements on it haven't changed? You keep referring to the Secretary as opposed to the Administration.

A No, I was referring to the way the Secretary phrased it. But, no, the Administration's policy hasn't changed.

Q So the Secretary's comments -- I mean, if we were to play the tape of the Secretary's comments at the last news conference, what you're saying is that that represents the Administration's point of view today?

A Sure.

Q One more on Defense Minister Sharon's statement. He is quoted today as saying that Israel would consider other ways of obtaining its security agreement with Lebanon if the United States continues to be in the way, the way I understood it. Are you concerned that Mr. Sharon may actually get something through like he did with the negotiations that are taking place now, where the United States found itself informed through the media about it?

A No. I've seen the reports but don't have any comment on them.

Q John, again, on the question of Begin's projected visit, we've picked up a number of reports that officials of the Israeli Government as well as a number of other governments have been told through people who have been in close association with the State Department that the Reagan Administration is in a state of serious flux, that the foreign policy-making apparatus is in a transition period, and that therefore it would be fruitless to undertake serious discussions with this government at this time. Specifically, it was Secretary Shultz' confident and advisor, Henry Kissinger, who is named as the source of this story.

Q And the question is?

A Do you know if the Secretary has discussed this question with Kissinger --

Q With disarray in the Administration and the serious flux in our foreign policy -- (Laughter)

Q We know about some aspects of this. For instance, sometime ago it was announced that the policy-planning apparatus had been dissolved and was being replaced by a new committee. We don't have anything on the formation or composition of this committee yet; the White House has announced that the President is going --

A It sounds like a speech more than a question I'm hearing. What is the question?

Q The question is the same. I'm just trying to motivate you to answer it.

A I guess I will have to appear unforthcoming and say you failed to motivate me. I'm terribly sorry. (Laughter)

Q Let me try again, John. Can you tell us if an option is being drawn up for the President to consider reducing, cutting off military assistance to Israel in regard to the Lebanon negotiations?

A You're rephrasing a question which I answered earlier, I think, and that is, to discuss options and reviews that might or might not be underway, and we just would never get into that; traditionally have not and would not and will not.

Q Change the subject now?

A On Poland.

Q John, before we leave the Middle East. Do we have anything on backgrounders for the Mubarak visit at this point?

A ON BACKGROUND, I think there will be a backgrounder at the White House probably early tomorrow afternoon.

Q You don't have a time yet?

A I don't. It probably will be in the afternoon. Some doubt as to whether it will be morning -- there's a lot going on tomorrow, as you know -- and I'm not quite sure what time, but I think early afternoon. END BACKGROUND

Q What about the Secretary's testimony on the Hill? When is he going to be testifying?

A I don't think he's up this week. Of course, he leaves for the Far East on Saturday, so I do not think he is testifying this week.

Q In that connection, will there be a backgrounder before he leaves?

A There is indeed a plan for a backgrounder, and I cannot remember what --

MR. ROMBERG: The 27th, I think.

MR. HUGHES: There is a backgrounder.

Q About the Secretary's testimony, the House Foreign Relations Committee, according to their schedule, the Secretary is supposed to testify on Wednesday morning.

A Those things get set and then they get changed. Let me check that for you. The last information I had was that he probably was not testifying this week, but let me check that for you.

Q One more on the Middle East, do you have any comment on the attack near Khaldeh?

A No.

Q Nothing at all?

A No, I'm afraid I don't.

Q On last thing, please. Anything on the review that has been taking place about the Israeli use of American arms in accordance with the --

A No, I'm afraid I don't. Not today.

Q May I ask two South African questions? I've seen this guidance about the revision of South African trade controls. Do you think you could, without reading the four-page guidance, try to put it in English. Is the United States relaxing its restrictions on exports to the South African police and military?

Also, is there anything new on that visa application from the President of Venda?

A There's nothing new on the visa application. Do you have the language?

Q Yes. You don't have to read all four pages, but I don't understand it frankly. It sounds like you protest too much here.

A Why don't I see if I can get someone to confer with you afterwards.

Q Okay.

Q The question that you weren't motivated to answer, could you reveal to us how many contacts the Secretary's had with Mr. Kissinger in the last 30 to 60 days?

A I can't. He sees --

Q Isn't it a matter of public record?

A No, I guess it isn't. He sees a number of people. He doesn't feel obliged necessarily to tell everybody who he sees.

Q In view of the significance and the importance in foreign policy matters with Mr. Kissinger, would he want to be, or would he be motivated to cover up his contacts with Mr. Kissinger?

A No. (Laughter) Are there any serious questions?

Q Can you tell us a bit about the meeting Secretary Shultz is having this afternoon with fourteen American university presidents?

A Yes. I think a number of them wrote to him around last September and asked for a meeting to which he agreed. I think the actual date for that meeting was set in December when we were in Europe, and it comes up this afternoon.

We do have a list; there are 14 university presidents that are going to be present at that meeting, and I think we have that information in the Press Office for you. I can either read them off now or make it available afterwards.

They're coming in for an off-the-record session. A number of others in the State Department will also talk to them, and the Secretary will see them later in the afternoon.

Q Will he be reviewing our arms proposals in Geneva?

A As I say, back in September I think they wrote the Secretary a letter about their concerns about nuclear war and asked whether they could come in and talk to him and he said yes.

Q On the trial underway in Poland today regarding illegal broadcasts of former Solidarity members, do you have any comments on that -- charged with subversion?

A No. Sorry to disappoint you.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:42 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, January 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #17

TUESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1982, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: The size of the audience today seems to be in direct response to the quantity of the information I'm about to impart.

I think you had a briefing by a senior administration official on President Mubarak's visit this morning, and I think some of you have lunch plans. We have the State of the Union address this evening. The White House is not briefing today, and the Pentagon is not briefing today, so I thought I would come out here in person to tell you I don't have very much for you.

(Laughter)

Q It's a conspiracy of silence.

A I do have a couple of announcements. There will be a background briefing on Secretary Shultz's visit to the Far East, to be given by a senior administration official, Thursday, January 27, 2:30 p.m., in this room.

There is a correction on an answer posted yesterday regarding the Secretary's appearances on the Hill this week. The answer gave the wrong day for his breakfast meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. That's tomorrow, Wednesday, January 26, at 8:15 a.m., and not on Thursday. That's not testimony; that is a closed breakfast with the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

That comes to the extent of my offerings for the day. I'll be glad to take any questions.

Q John, where is Ambassador Habib today? Has he met with the Secretary?

A Yes. He's in Washington. He met with the Secretary this morning, and conceivably might see him again later in the day.

Q Is there a chance to see Habib here, to bring him out for a news conference or something?

A I think it's unlikely. I'll be glad to make the request, but I think it's unlikely.

Q Do you have any guesstimate when he might be returning after the Mubarak visit? When he might be returning to the Middle East?

A I really don't know. I would think he would certainly be in Washington through Thursday. Just what his plans are after that, I think a senior official yesterday said that he would be returning to the Middle East, but I think he, himself, does not yet know what his dates and itinerary are.

Q Is he going to see the President?

A I think he probably would later in the week, but I think you ought to ask the White House about that.

Q John, what is the point of Shultz's breakfast with the House Foreign Affairs Committee tomorrow?

A I can't quite remember when this was scheduled and at whose instance, but I think it's part of his ongoing consultations. I think the Middle East would be a central theme.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the OPEC meeting and its breaking up by any chance?

A No. I'm afraid we don't.

Q Do you have anything on Strauss's statements over the weekend?

A I think we offered you something yesterday and wouldn't go beyond that.

Q I didn't hear anything. I was at the Foreign Press Center.

A I will be glad to dig it out for you.

Q There's a story that Perez de Cuellar is talking about talks with the Soviet Union regarding Afghanistan and possible withdrawal. Have you seen those, and do you have any comment?

A I've seen the reports, but I don't have anything for you on where that's going.

Q Do you have anything on a ceasefire in Namibia, South Africa?

A No. I've seen the reports that South Africans and the Angolans are meeting, but we've just seen the same reports you have.

Q Do you have anything on certification for Argentina, or the Fund loan to Argentina?

A No.

Q Certification for Chile?

A No.

(Laughter)

Q Anything there on Lebanon and the Middle East?

A What had you in mind?

(Laughter)

Q Save me asking a lot of questions.

A I imagine your inquiry revolves around the --

Q Right.

(Laughter)

A And in response to your inquiry about Major General Drori's suggestion that U.S. Marines constitute a buffer, there is of course no substance to suggestions that the U.S. Marines are offering sanctuary or support to the PLO.

We have no information to suggest that members of the PLO are slipping through the Marine cordon. There certainly is, should that be thought to be the case, adequate mechanism for these matters to be discussed and resolved.

We are completely confident that the U.S. Marine contingent of the MNF continues to fully discharge its responsibilities to bolster the authority of the Government of Lebanon, particularly throughout its area of operations.

Q May we have a copy?

A Surely.

Q This may be unexpected, and you may not have an answer, but by any chance do you have anything about the status of relations between U.S. and Suriname?

A No. I don't.

Q Are you at all concerned with approaches by the new government there with Cuba, the Soviet Union, Vietnam?

A I don't have anything on that for you. I'm sorry.

Q Do you think you could take something on it?

A Let me look into it.

Q You said yesterday that there hadn't been an incident since a week ago Monday. Have you changed that at all, or is that still the case?

A No. That's still the case, other than the Sunday incident involving the newsmen, but as far as Marines and Israeli forces are concerned, it's our understanding that a week ago yesterday was the last incident.

Q What about the General's statement that the United States commanders don't seem to understand the situation very well because the Chief Commander didn't go to a meeting, and they don't really seem to know what's going on?

A I think the language we gave you refutes that suggestion, theory, allegation.

Q What's behind these accusations against the Marines? Are they trying to get the Marines to ease off and get out of there and take charge of the situation themselves or what?

A I really don't think we can ascribe motivation. As you know, we've been concerned about them, we've made that concern known there and here. One hopes that the fact that there hasn't been a recurrence since a week ago yesterday indicates that that concern has been noted and steps are being taken to avoid repetition of such incidents. But as to why those encounters occurred, we really don't know.

-- MORE --

Q There's some reports from Beirut, I think, that some Lebanese officials are saying that the talks, the Israeli-Lebanese talks, are in an impasse or in a deadlock. Would you share that characterization?

A I don't know that we would talk about an impasse. There certainly isn't any secret that we regret the slow pace at which those negotiations have been proceeding. We are concerned about that slow pace, but we certainly hope that can be changed in these discussions.

Q Will they continue to meet this week while Habib is back here, though?

A I think there has been little confusion out of the area on the meetings of subcommittees, but so far as we know the next regular tripartite meeting is scheduled for, I think, Thursday. Yes, this Thursday.

Q Can you tell us anything about the Secretary's meeting today with the Korean Ambassador?

A No. I think it's a prelude to his visit to Korea. They surely will be discussing a program, and some of the agenda items that would be up for discussion during his visit there.

Q Do you have anything in mind, or the Administration, that would accelerate this slow pace? Are you proposing anything? Do you have any more ideas, or will there be any new ideas taken back?

A I think the Ambassador's return here -- of course, he was coming back for the visit of President Mubarak -- but obviously he will be reporting, has reported to the Secretary and will continue to report to the Secretary this week, and, as I suggested, may see the President later in the week. He obviously will be reporting back to us, giving his views of where we stand and what might be done to move things forward.

Q Are there any considerations to the Italian or French Ambassadors or Foriegn Ministers to increase the MNF forces in there, or do you still stand by earlier statements?

A No, I think that Italy and France have basically agreed in principle to enlarge their forces should that need arise. I don't think anybody has moved beyond the position that we've all held over the weeks, namely, that when we see an agreed plan for troop withdrawal from Lebanon, we will have a better idea of whether more troops are needed for the MNF, what the different mission might be for the MNF and who might be called upon at that time to supply more troops, if needed. I think that's where we are.

We understand their commitment in principle, but until we all see a plan for troop withdrawal, it's kind of hard to determine where those troops would be needed and how many.

Q Do we have a similar agreement in principle?

A I would like to go back to the exact words the President has used. I think he has said we would look at the idea of enlarging the MNF, but I would like to go back to his actual language. He has spoken to that.

Q Two other parties to the MNF feel the same way about slow pace, and have they expressed it to officials here?

A I'm sure there's discussion among the parties.

Q Are events on the ground, after you deployed the Marines the second time, September 20, encouraging or discouraging to the Administration to increase the number of the MNF forces, especially from the United States?

A I think our position is that there is no call to increase the size of the MNF given the present mission. Should the mission change, there might be.

Q On this point, how does Israel see your participation in these tripartite talks going between Khaldeh and Qiryat Shimona?

A I'm sorry?

Q How does Israel see your role in these talks which are going on -- as an arbitrator, a judge, or observer, or what? A full partner?

A I think Israel ought to answer that question itself. We see our role obviously as helpful, constructive and expediting, seeking to bridge differences that might exist.

Q Regarding the question of the early-warning stations, who opposes the manning of those stations by Israelis? Is it the Lebanese opposition or American opposition?

A As you know, we've been reluctant to get into the kind of discussion that's going on behind closed doors between the three. But I think there's enough in the public domain to indicate that the manning of those proposed monitoring stations is a source of discussion between Israel and Lebanon, and I think there's been enough indication that the Lebanese oppose the manning of those stations by Israeli forces. I think that's in the public domain.

Q But on the other hand, in the famous Israeli-Lebanese document that was signed -- it wasn't signed but it was discussed some months ago before the talks started and it was discussed later in the meetings. There was a mentioning of early-warning stations.

A Obviously, we are aware of Israel's concern about security in southern Lebanon, but as to the detail of how that security might be safeguarded, I think the three parties at the discussions have to work that out.

Q Do you also oppose Israeli manning of the stations?

A We have said that we favor the total withdrawal of PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Q May I change the subject? Do you have any comment on the Soviet statement -- I think it is by Gromyko last week -- that they are re-deploying missiles to Asia and Siberia from targets on Western Europe?

A I think we did have some language last week to which I can refer you. I think there isn't any question that various of the Allies have raised questions about the prospect of moving mobile SS-20s from one area to another, and the Soviet Union having the ability to move them back.

Q Just briefly, there is an article in the Times today that the Soviet Union may seek observer status at GATT. Do you have any statement on that?

A We understand that no formal application has yet been tendered.

Q Do we have a position with respect to that prospect?

A We'll look at it should such an application be forthcoming.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:27 P.M.)

Alcorn

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #18

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. A couple of reminders: Firstly, tomorrow at 2:30 p.m., there will be a background briefing on the Secretary's trip to Asia in the press briefing room.

A couple of announcements concerning events this afternoon taking place in this building: At 3:50 this afternoon, Secretary Shultz will receive delegations from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the United States who have just completed a conference on the International Youth Exchange in Williamsburg. This will take place in the Benjamin Franklin Room, on the eighth floor. There will be a photo opportunity, and the Secretary probably will make a few remarks, but he will not take any questions from the press.

After that, at 4:30*, Charles Wick, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to the Williamsburg meeting, will hold an on-the-record press conference here in the press briefing room. He will be prepared to take questions on both the Williamsburg meeting and President Reagan's International Youth Exchange initiative which was the impetus for the Williamsburg gathering.

That's it. I'll be glad to take any questions you might have.

Q Just to follow up, if I may, on that photo op.

A Surely.

Q We were told earlier there would be no coverage at all. Does that mean it is open now to the press -- cameras as well as --

A As I understand it, it is not open to -- It is open to still cameras, yes, just to reassure you, Bernie.

Q Can you come up and tune in on the Secretary?

A Can I come up and tune in?

*Correction: The press conference was scheduled for 4:15, not 4:30.

Q No. Is it open for reporters to go up there, or is it just cameras?

A Yes. But it is not a press conference -- no questions. The Secretary will make some remarks on the subject of the International Youth Exchange.

Q John, is there any link in the minds of the Administration between the forthcoming visit to the United States of Prime Minister Begin and the withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign troops from Lebanon?

A I think we are aware -- and we have been for the past several weeks -- no date has been set. As the Secretary said this morning on CBS, the Prime Minister is always welcome in the United States. But I think, as ABC also said this morning, there are reports coming out of Israel which suggest that both sides feel that the most opportune moment would be when there is progress on Lebanon, and the two can concentrate on the overall Middle Eastern peace initiative.

Q In other words, paraphrasing what you just said, the short answer to my question would be yes, there is a link? (Laughter)

A I wouldn't have paraphrased what I've just said that way, Jim. As the Secretary said this morning, the Prime Minister is always welcome. No date has been set. So apparently there is feeling on both sides that the meeting would be most fruitful and meaningful at a time when Lebanon would not dominate the discussions.

Q And at what point would Lebanon no longer dominate the talks?

A I don't know. I guess Prime Minister Begin and the President would agree upon that between them.

Q John, could I follow up on that? The Post is putting it very clearly in more specific terms along the lines Jim is suggesting, saying, by a U.S. official, Jerusalem, "Reagan is demanding Israeli agreement to withdraw from Lebanon before he would settle on a date for his invitation to visit Washington."

Is that correct, the way it is put?

A I've seen the report; I don't know who the official is, and don't have any comment on it. I think the Secretary made the position clear this morning.

Q Is that true? Is this report true? Do you deny this report?

A I think, as we have said, the date is something that will be mutually agreed on by the two participants.

Q John, yesterday, as recently as yesterday, it seems to me, if I remember correctly, you were referring reports of that kind to Israel and saying that it seemed as though the Israelis have been making that suggestion. Today you're saying "reports from Israel," and it seems suddenly you're saying that apparently both sides feel that way.

Maybe you choose not to admit that, but that's a change in position.

A No, I don't think it's a change in position. I assume that what discussion there is, that is going on, if there is, about the date of that visit apparently there must be a meeting of minds on both sides. The meeting has not been scheduled.

Q Isn't that a matter of U.S. policy and not just something that might apparently be taking place among some low-level people?

A No, I don't think it's a question of policy; I think it is a question of the two participants deciding when is the right time to have that meeting.

Q John, can I ask for a clarification? You said, "The ABC said --" Well, the ABC report said specifically that the letter carried by Habib to Begin said that there was no point in Begin's coming here -- I mean that was the ABC report -- until the situation in Lebanon was resolved.

Have you just confirmed that?

A No. What I have just done is learned never to paraphrase anybody, either myself or ABC.

Q Would you confirm that, though, that the U.S. said, in a message to --

A I wouldn't confirm anything in the way of diplomatic exchanges or correspondence.

Q John, when you say, "Apparently both sides are in agreement, that there is feeling apparently on both sides --" and you say that what you mean by both sides is the two participants, is it accurate to say, then, that there is feeling on Begin's side and there is feeling on President Reagan's side, since he is the other participant, that it would be best to wait until Lebanon no longer dominates the discussions before Begin comes to Washington?

A I think what I am saying is that, as no date has yet been set, presumably, there is a meeting of minds that the time is not yet right to meet, for a variety of reasons.

Q A meeting of whose minds, the two participants?

A It has to be the two -- I mean the Prime Minister and the President are going to get together when they want to get to get together and when they are able to get together.

Q May I ask it in a different way? You said both sides seem to want to wait until Lebanon is resolved. I don't see, since there is clearly an impasse in the negotiations on Lebanon, why doesn't the U.S. seek a meeting with Begin to try to resolve this? I don't -- I mean hell could freeze over if you're going to wait -- What is it --

There is a supposition in the question that Begin has something to lose by not meeting with the President until the troops are out of Lebanon.

A First of all, I'm not sure, Bernie, that I would agree that we are at an impasse. I think there isn't any question but that things are not moving along at the kind of pace that we would like, but I think "impasse" is perhaps a harsh word. There are continued negotiations on the ground. Mr. Habib is back here, and as I have said before, undoubtedly is conferring with the Secretary and the President and considering ways to help move them along. So I think the first part of your question may be going a little harder than the facts perhaps warrant.

Obviously, there is a feeling that when that meeting takes place, it should not be dominated by Lebanon, that it should move on to a broader phase of the discussions.

Q To follow that, do you think, then, it would be dominated by Lebanon so long as there is no agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon?

A I presume that if Lebanon were still a major problem, then if the two met, they might well become diverted, and concentrate all their time on Lebanon.

Q They don't have to. They can discuss other matters, can't they?

A I'm not setting their agenda. I'm just telling you what the state of play is.

Q John, the last time this issue came up, or maybe I should say the first time it came up almost a month ago, the reports then originating in Israel were that the United States was putting pressure on Begin by telling him he couldn't come until there was movement on Lebanon.

Can you address the question of U.S. pressure on Israel through withholding the favor of the visit?

A No. No, I wouldn't get into exchanges that might or might not have taken place.

Q Could you say whether there is now a crisis in U.S.-Israeli relations?

A Bernie, I think I would be ill-advised to respond to such a question. Clearly, there have been, as the Secretary of State has said, there have been problems in that relationship. Israel remains a strong ally, but obviously, there have been differences of opinion between us in recent months.

Q Could you address the editorial in The New York Times today?

A Which one was that?

Q -- that suggests that-- that's headlined, "Waiting for Henry" which suggests that, "If Mr. Reagan will not turn to the high-flying Henry Kissinger . . . . . the President had better find a facsimile."

Could you take that question?

A No need to take it. Don't know of any such plans to do that.

Q (Inaudible.)

A I have a feeling from the glint in your eye that that was not a serious question, Bob. Good I didn't hear it.

Q Is the meeting this afternoon between the Secretary and Ambassador Arens related to the question we are just discussing?

A I don't know that there is a meeting this afternoon between the Secretary and Ambassador Arens.

Q I'm sorry. Eagleburger.

A I don't know. I honestly don't know.

Q Could we find out?

A I would be glad to investigate that somewhat, because I didn't know there was such a meeting. We usually do not indicate what the subject matter of those meetings are.

Q Would you let us know at whose request the meeting is?

A Sure. Yes.

Q Is it your intention to convey the impression that Begin agrees that the meeting should be delayed, because you keep saying "both sides think it best"?

A As I said, I think last week, and again during the past couple of days, Bernie, we had seen reports from Israeli sources suggesting that Prime Minister Begin thought it would be a good idea to have movement on Lebanon before having his meeting with the President.

Q John, there is a statement on FBIS this morning attributed to Mr. Begin, speaking to heads of the Jewish lobby in Washington saying that Israel is not interested in a confrontation with the United States, and wants to solve the differences of opinion between Jerusalem and Washington through dialogue. And he goes on to say, "It is only because Saudi Arabia is pressuring Lebanon not to reach an agreement with us that we find ourselves the focus of United States criticism."

What do you comment on such statements which are not diplomatic correspondence, it's in the --

A Well, was the question that Israel doesn't want a confrontation with the United States?

Q Yes.

A I don't know what the question is.

Q It has two parts. The first part, he is saying that he doesn't want confrontation. What do you see in this signal? And the second thing about is it true that Saudi Arabia is pressuring Lebanon not to come to an agreement, and this is why you are criticizing Israel, and you are not coming to an agreement with it.

A I don't know what discussions Saudi Arabia and Lebanon might be engaged in, if any; but as far as we're concerned, and as far as our relationship with Israel and with Lebanon, we're on the ground working very hard to get a resolution of the Lebanese situation. We certainly are in a dialogue with all the parties involved in the Lebanese problem, and indeed in the Middle East.

Q John, you may recall that only a few weeks ago, almost all hopes were hung on the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Begin for the solution of the Lebanon crisis and the Middle East, the West Bank crisis. Now, it is almost out of hope for them to come to terms to find an agreement among them. What did happen to change the whole situation?

A I guess I don't agree with your thesis that some weeks ago, Lebanon was to be the focus of any meeting between the Prime Minister and the President, and I guess I don't agree with your thesis that there would be no hope of any movement on the overall Middle East situation when such a meeting is rescheduled. So I guess I don't agree with the premise, and therefore, really cannot comment on it.

Q On a related subject, have you heard anything new from King Hussein?

A Related --

Q -- about his possible movements or a visit back to this country?

A No, I haven't.

Q John, regarding the incidents between the Marines and Israeli soldiers, you said yesterday here that the Marines are fulfilling their task. Today there is a quote, I think in The New York Times, saying that it is actually not the task of the Marines to look after PLO people around that area.

The question is, what is the exact task of the Marines? And in case, that there is an attempt of infiltration by terrorists through the Marines' lines, is it their task to stop them?

A As to the exact rules of engagement for the Marines, I really think you need to go to the Pentagon. Internal Security, clearly, is a function handled by Lebanon, by the Lebanese authorities; at the same time, we have no evidence that the PLO are using MNF areas of operation as sanctuary.

As we have said, if the Israelis have other information, there are adequate channels for reviewing that information in Beirut. Obviously, any infiltration by the PLO personnel would be a serious matter, and we're not aware of it.

Q If there is such an attempt to infiltrate, what would the Marines do, in such case?

A As I say, (a) we're not aware of it, so I think you are discussing a hypothetical situation. But insofar as the rules of engagement for the Marines, I really think you would do better to talk to the Pentagon.

Q One more follow up on that? Aren't all the PLO supposed to be out, or the PLO forces out of the Beirut area?

A Yes.

Q So, if it can be proven that there are forces there, then that's a violation also?

A That would be a violation.

Q But on my question earlier about crisis, your reply was one you could give at any time, that there were problems that exist between the United States and Israel. Isn't the nature of the strain at the present time quite different from the usual description of relations?

A I don't know that I would characterize it in that way, Bernie. I mean there are all kinds of other areas where cooperation continues and there is a good relationship, but obviously, we have some areas in which we hold different views.

Q John, in that same general area of the world, there is a report this morning by Jack Anderson about an American citizen, or several American citizens, whose passports were allegedly held by some Saudis, and the failure of a U.S. Consul in Saudia Arabia to assist these people before they ended up, according to this story, paying a good deal of money to get their passports back.

I'd like to ask you two things: First of all, can you shed any light on this incident? And secondly, what is the policy of the United States and the State Department if American citizens have their passports seized by other nationals? What do we do about it?

A I saw the story. I don't have anything for you on it. Be glad to see whether we can get something later in the day on it.

Q Would you look into it?

A Yes.

-- MORE --

Q John, there's another report from the Middle East that Reagan has told Hussein that he needs to be ready to negotiate by March 1 or the U.S. will search for other ways to begin Mideast peace talks.

Do you have anything on that?

A No. No change in the President's position which he made clear in his September speech and has reiterated time and time again. Hasn't moved from our position.

Q Is there a March 1 deadline of some sort for getting talks started?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q John, on the same area, considering the pace of the negotiations for a withdrawal from Lebanon of foreign forces and the report that you, like Jim said, in fact confirmed by saying yes to the --

A What did I confirm?

Q That the Israeli-U.S. relations, that there is something there, and that Begin will not be coming to this country unless something moves in Lebanon, and that the major topic should be the West Bank and peace in general.

Because there is a time limitation that is allowed, March 1 or mid-March, and then American elections, etc. I mean, how do you see things going?

A How we see them going in that is that we are moving to get a resolution of the situation just as speedily as possible, but if you want a timetable for how that -- you know, we couldn't give you a timetable for the breakthrough on the withdrawal of the PLO from Beirut until we got a plan. I can't give you a timetable as to how this might evolve.

I mean, we're working as hard as we can on Lebanon and working as hard as we can on the Middle East peace initiative. It take a little time.

Q John, are we still looking forward to February 12 as a date for conclusion of the negotiations?

A For the conclusion of negotiations?

Q Well, the date that Habib had given regarding --

A I think we're looking for the earliest possible plan for troop withdrawal from Lebanon. I don't know what that date will be.

Q On my question first -- when Mr. Begin says here in his statement, he is not interested in confrontation with the United States.

Does this imply that he thinks that there is a confrontation and there are bad feelings and crisis in relations or what?

I mean, how do you define him saying that?

A I mean, you're asking me what he thinks, but you'd have to ask him.

Q But you say that you don't have a confrontation statement feeling --

A We don't have a feeling of crisis or confrontation. We feel that there have been some problems in the relationship -- no secret about that -- which we're trying to work out.

Q So this is superfluous, what he is saying?

A I didn't say "superfluous," but, I mean, you're asking me to interpret Mr. Begin, and I'm not going to be able to do that for you.

Q Is it still the U.S. view not to use economic sanctions, cut off, reductions in economic aid to prod the Israelis to shift their position?

A The Secretary of State has made clear his position in the past, and, as I think I made clear again on Monday, no change in that.

Q Could I go to a different area of the world?

A Not yet.

Q Anything further you can tell us about Habib's plans? When will he return?

A No. He's been here, of course, today. He's had some talks with the Secretary this morning. He obviously will be here through President Mubarak's visit. I still don't know what will happen at the end of the week.

Q As a follow-up to this, there are some reports from Israel or from Lebanon, saying that as long as Habib is not in the area, there is little chance, if any, of any progress in the talks between Israel and Lebanon. Is there anything --

A I don't see why that should necessarily be the case. Ambassador Draper is representing the U.S. at the tripartite talks. Those plenary sessions, presumably, are still on schedule, still going forward, so I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be any progress.

Q Another area?

A Sure.

Q I just want to follow up with this.

A Excuse me. I have yet another follow-up on the Middle East.

Q If I may, I want to get back to my question. We all remember that the visit by Mr. Begin was about to take place. He was really in this country at the time when his late wife passed away.

By that time we all remember that the situation in Lebanon was even behind the point at which it is now. So how come that could have taken place by that time and Lebanon was still in the front, and now it doesn't take place because Lebanon is very much in the front of the --

A All I can tell you is that, clearly, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel will agree when their meeting -- which I'm sure will take place -- will be scheduled, and they have not decided to schedule at this time. So there are reasons on the part, presumably, of both of them -- of each of them -- why that meeting hasn't been set.

Q John, there are reports that the Guatemalan Government is preparing to execute four suspected guerrillas without any public trial, either tomorrow or the next day.

Do you have any comment on these reports or on the reported execution, and how does this square with the State Department's decision earlier to resume some sort of military supply relationship with Guatemala on the grounds that there has been an improvement in the human rights situation there?

A It's our understanding that three people accused of guerrilla activities have passed through the first phase of the judicial process in Guatemala, and they have been convicted.

But the case is now in the appeals stage. I don't have any further details for you. I'm not able to get into the specifics of our exchanges with other governments, particularly this one, but we have in the past expressed our strong view in favor of an open judicial system, and we continue to believe in the necessity for due process in all judicial proceedings.

Q That suggests that you think maybe these guys didn't get the due process.

A I think we're going to stand on the language I gave you.

Q Would the U.S. be concerned if they're executed in the next couple days?

A As I say, I think what we have said is they've gone through a phase, and there's an appeal process, and we're not able to expand on what kind of communications --

Q How does this square with the U.S. idea that this human rights situation has improved in Guatemala?

A I'm going to have to go back to the language we offered you at the time we made the declaration on the human rights situation.

Q That's before this came up.

A That's before this came up.

Q Is that language still operative, as they used to say?

A I think that language is still operative.

Q John, to follow-up on Guatemala, have the Guatemalans responded to the protest last week on this American who was being held there -- Ernest?

A Mr. Ernest? Yes, we have.

Q What did they say about it?

A We have seen no evidence of Mr. Ernest's involvement in subversive activities. Our consular officials have met with Mr. Ernest on several occasions. Embassy officials have made arrangements for Mr. Ernest's parents to visit their son.

On Friday afternoon of January 21, Mr. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, called in the Guatemalan Ambassador to formally protest Mr. Ernest's continued detention in view of the absence of any convincing evidence of his involvement in terrorist acts, and asked the Guatemalan Government to insure that Mr. Ernest is accorded due process in this case.

Q At the least based on that evidence that he had presented -- to follow up Don's question -- how does that square with your statement that human rights and the judicial system has improved there?

A In both cases --

Q Will you follow up on the protest?

A Will we follow up on the protest?

Q Yes.

A I mean --

Q Have you asked that he be released specifically, or just be given due process?

A The Guatemalan authorities have informed us that they're investigating Mr. Ernest's case to determine if there is sufficient evidence to hold him for trial, so we're still in that process.

Q Can you clarify what Mr. Nitze meant when he said the U.S. is not locked into the zero-option? In other words, are we not standing on the zero-option as our position?

A Yes. We are standing. No change in the President's position. He's made it clear on a number of occasions that the zero-zero option is our position. I think it's a good one. I think it's the best one. That's what we're going to Geneva with.

The President has made it plain that we will seriously consider serious proposals from the Soviet Union in this area, and he reiterated that last night.

He also said last night that there are two basic criteria for arms control, establishing equal balance of forces, and that they be verifiable. So all that is simply reaffirming a position that he has maintained with constancy. No change.

Q Then did Mr. Nitze violate his instructions?

A No. It's not a question of violating. He's going back, implementing the President's policy.

Q What does he mean by it? Do you have any idea?

A What's he mean by what?

Q Saying we're not locked in. You've just said we're locked in.

A The President has said we will consider seriously any serious Soviet proposal. No contradiction between that statement and the one that we're going back to Geneva on the zero-zero option.

Q Certainly there's a contradiction there.

A Why is there a contradiction?

Q Seriously considering another nation's proposal can be done without in any way giving up your own position.

A It can.

Q So what problem do you have answering the question of when Nitze says we are not locked in?

A There never has been any contradiction between what the President has said. We think the best proposal is the zero-zero option. As he's consistently said, whatever points of view one might have about how to get there, surely nobody can be opposed to the idea of eliminating on both sides the dreadful nuclear weapons.

That's been the position. That's been our position. That's the ideal. It's a good position, and that's what we're going back to Geneva with.

Q So how do you explain not locked in?

A Let us see what serious proposals emerge.

Q John, there are rumors that after the German elections the United States will show a lot more flexibility on this issue.

Do you see any reason for that?

A I see no change in the President's position which he's made clear on numerous occasions and which stands. Geneva's the place to negotiate.

Q Is there any -- is it true -- I'm trying to ask you whether a report in The New York Times yesterday or the day before is true that the Secretary will not receive the Warsaw Pact nonagression proposal himself.

A It's not a question of the Secretary not receiving it. I think there is some guidance that we have available. I think Assistant Secretary Burt either is involved in that or is about to be involved in that.

I'm not quite sure what the date is, but we've got something on that for you we can give you in the Press Office.

Q Can I take you back to the invitation for a final question, if I may?

A Final question?

Q Are you saying that Begin doesn't want to come now?

A I'm saying that the two parties have apparently decided that it isn't the time at the moment, because they haven't set a date. I'm sure when they are of a mind that its right, then they'll agree on a date.

Q But it is mutual.

A I assume so. It takes two to agree on when to meet.

Q How does this square with everybody's repeated statement that there's a need for some rapid movement in the Middle East?

Have you considered the fact that maybe you're playing right into Begin's hands by delaying on his invitation to come to Washington?

A You're going well beyond our discussion here today. What I've said is that the two parties apparently haven't found it appropriate to set a date.

Q But you've now passed the halfway point in this Administration. Now comes the Israeli argument that you can't ask them to make any major steps when it's unclear who's going to be the President of the United States.

I mean, it seems to me they've got the ballgame now. They're just playing out the clock.

A I can't imagine that there's any confusion in the minds of any of the parties about our sense of urgency about a settlement. I think that has been very adequately conveyed.

Q One thing about the Secretary also. There was a report yesterday, I think, that the leaders of major American Jewish organizations are unhappy with his running the State Department and U.S. policy in the Middle East.

A I'm sorry. American Jewish organizations? I'm have a little trouble --

Q Jewish-American leaders are not very happy with the Secretary's performance in the Middle East, or U.S. policy which they think is State Department-originated in the Middle East.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. Not aware of it.

Q You have seen -- oh, you're not aware of this report?

A   No. I know that the Secretary saw a number of leaders of the Jewish community -- it was in the past couple of weeks -- but I'm not --

Q   Either the *Times* or the *Post* yesterday or day before.

A   I have to admit that that one --

Q   John, let me take a stab at it. For some time you and other spokesmen for this Administration have been saying that there's no linkage between Lebanon and the overall peace process.

A   Right.

Q   That they can go forward in different directions but at the same time.

A   Right.

Q   And yet by denying a visit here by Mr. Begin, you are missing an opportunity to go forward on that track.

A   It's not a question of denying a visit, as --

Q   By agreeing not to visit.

A   As the President has consistently said, the two -- obviously, there's a relationship, but the two are not linked. The one doesn't have to wait for the other.

Having said all that, there are obvious realities. We are concerned about the slowness of movement towards a solution in Lebanon -- no secret about that -- and, obviously, it's not helpful.

Obviously, we'd like to get a resolution of the situation in Lebanon, but that doesn't mean that while you're working for that you bring everything on the overall Middle East initiative to a halt and wait for Lebanon to resolve. We've always said that that's not acceptable.

Q   And yet you have told us earlier here that both sides agree that this is not the proper moment.

A   But that doesn't preclude movement on Lebanon.

Q That isn't what I'm saying. I'm saying that it would seem to me that you would want to take every opportunity to find progress on the overall track, even though Lebanon may be temporarily --

A We are taking every opportunity.

Q Wouldn't a visit be helpful?

A We are taking every opportunity to produce progress, but I think the key player in that is King Hussein.

Q John, two other topics, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything today on what's going on with the Angolan-South African negotiations?

A No. We've seen the reports that they're meeting -- don't have anything on them -- but, as we've consistently said, a dialogue that would ease tension would be very desirable.

Q Why is the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia participating?

A I think you're talking about Mr. Platt's visit to Angola, and you should not see that in connection with the reports about the Angolan-South African dialogue.

Our Ambassador to Zambia, Mr. Platt, is in Luanda-- I think today -- for meetings with Angolan Government officials. These are part of a series of the meetings that we've been having with the Angolans over the past several months concerning regional security.

You shouldn't link that with the reports of South African-Angolan talks.

Q Does it look like there is some movement there now?

A I think you've talked to the various officials involved in this, in the negotiations on our side, and I don't want to paraphrase their thinking on this particular day.

Everybody's still working on it. The conditions that there have to be for a regional settlement are quite clear, and we're still looking for movement.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:04 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #19

THURSDAY, JANUARY 27, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I don't have any announcements, so I will be glad to take any questions you might have.

Q John, do you have any comment on a statement which appears in a New York Times story this morning quoting a nameless State Department official about the "wisdom and reality of the U.S. position on the INF talks"?

A We don't usually respond to stories quoting nameless State Department officials, Jim, but the President's position on INF is plain; it's been constant. He remains committed, as he has over the months, as a matter of fact since November of 1981, to the zero-option objective.

As the President has said, the Administration is ready to seriously consider any serious Soviet proposals. As the President said in his State of the Union speech, we have two basic criteria for arms control -- that arms control agreements establish an equal balance of forces and that they be verifiable.

As I said, we don't intend to get into specifics of stories like that, but I think I would steer you away from any suggestion that the State Depatment is not fully supportive of the President's position on arms control.

Q So that you're locked into zero-zero? (Laughter)

A It seems to me, Bernie, that we've heard this dialogue before. I don't understand why you continue to believe that there is a contradiction between having the zero-zero option objective, which surely must be the finest objective to hold out for anybody in Western Europe; I don't understand why you continue to perceive a contradiction between that position and our willingness, oft-reiterated, to seriously consider any serious Soviet proposal.

Q Do you have anything to say about the visit of Foreign Minister Genscher?

A Well, what had you in mind specifically, George?

Q A little readout would be helpful. He did spend a couple of hours with the Secretary. Is there a meeting of the minds with respect to --

A I don't think there would be a readout from us on his talks with the Secretary. I think he had some remarks afterwards.

Q I thought you might want to get your two cents' worth in, as well.

A No. We welcome a number of the points that he made. He said that the American proposal to eliminate all Soviet and American medium-range missiles would provide the best solution for Europe, for West Germany, and for the West as a whole. He said, "It must be clear that the date of the schedule for deployment would be unchanged, and no doubt should be raised as to the viability of that date." He said, "This makes it clear that everyone should know that the West is fully determined to negotiate seriously and work for results." We welcome those statements by Mr. Genscher.

Q How about the meeting, John, with Moshe Arens yesterday, anything on that?

A That was a meeting between Larry Eagleburger and Mr. Arens. I'm sure that Middle Eastern issues may have been touched on, but that was not the purpose of that meeting. That was not the main thrust of that meeting. You shouldn't see it in that context.

Q Going back to the "journal of record," John, I notice on page one --

A The "journal of record"?

Q The New York Times, right? Talking about the Pope, Agca and the Bulgarians. They say here, "United States intelligence agencies are watching developments in the case closely, according to senior Reagan Administration officials, and are relying primarily on information provided by European governments rather than conducting a separate American investigation. It is an Italian matter, and it would be inappropriate for the United States to interfere."

I wonder if we could get some guidance on that because it raises a whole series of, you know, great ways to cut the budget, such as perhaps demoting Casey to a sub-Cabinet position, or you might finally be able to do away with intelligence and research.

A I think you ought to ask the CIA about that, but as far as our position is concerned, as far as it impinges on foreign policy, it is an Italian investigation, and they should pursue it. All our evidence is that they are pursuing it, effectively.

Q So would you agree with that, that the United States is not pursuing it, that the United States is not conducting its own investigation of the affair?

A I think we are certainly awaiting the results of the Italian investigation and being helpful insofar as legally and legitimately what might be asked and required of us. But, no, it's basically an Italian investigation.

-- MORE --

Q So we are not looking into it on our own?

A We're awaiting the results of the Italian investigation, and obviously watching it closely.

Q So we are not looking into it on our own?

A I think if you're asking about intelligence matters and the intelligence community looking into it, then you have to go ask them.

Q Can I get to the Middle East. Do you have any comments about Defense Minister Sharon's statement yesterday? Some aspects of it, such as the Israeli insistence to keep Israeli troops to man those posts and the -- I mean, I'll follow up on that. Do you have a comment on this one first?

A Our position is clear. We want to see all PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces out of Lebanon.

Q So you're not taking the statement that was released yesterday by Minister Sharon as negating your American policies?

A I mean, I don't think we can interpret his statement. You have to ask him what he meant. All I can say is --

Q How do you see it?

A Our position is that we want to see all PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces out of Lebanon.

Q On the creation of new militias in south Lebanon, arming them with weapons some of which could also be American as far as we know?

A I've seen the report. No specific comment, but, in general, we have consistently maintained the Lebanese Government's own position that all armed groups in Lebanon should come under the control of the Central Government, the authority of which should extend throughout the country. Only when this is accomplished will Lebanon enjoy lasting stability, and the Government of Israel is fully aware of our views on this matter.

Q I don't know if that also includes the Saad Haddad troops that Sharon did mention in particular yesterday.

A I think our statement speaks for itself.

Q Is the Administration considering the demand of the New York Times that Henry Kissinger be appointed as special mid-East negotiator?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is he being brought into the mid-East negotiations in any capacity?

A Not to my knowledge. As you know --

Q Would you know if he were?

A Beg your pardon?

Q Would you know if he were?

A I think so.

Q You said that the Middle East was not the thrust of the Arens-Eagleburger talk.

A Yes.

Q What might it be?

A Not able to get into that, Bernie, but I just didn't want you to think that it was a call in connection with the Middle East.

Q Would it have to do with U.S.-Israel relations? You're suggesting it could be out of that whole geographic scope.

A U.S.-Israel interests, yes.

Q That could mean a visit by Prime Minister Begin, John.

A I think you would be misled if you --

Q Anything regarding the visit by Secretary Shultz to Israel?

A To Israel? No.

Q As a result of that meeting?

A No. No plans.

Q A housekeeping matter. When will the AID budget figures be available?

A I don't know about AID. I think there is a budget briefing on Monday in this building, 10:00-10:30.

Q That's the general budget?

A That's the general budget. I don't know about AID specifically. I guess you would have to ask them. They have their own press operation.

Q How about the human rights reports. Do you know when they are --

A I think that is the end of this month.

MR. ROMBERG: No. Sent up the end of the month and published about a week later.

MR. HUGHES: Did you get that?

Q Any comment on reports coming out of Peking today that the Chinese are continuing -- have agreed to continue to provide arms to SWAPO?

A No.

Q What can you tell us about the Mubarak visit?

A I think there will be a backgrounder on that at the White House this afternoon.

Q On this also, John. Yesterday, two or three networks mentioned that the United States will tell President Mubarak that the United States is doing all it could on Lebanon and the peace. Are we to understand, really, that the United States is doing all it could, and if "all" has produced what we see now, what do you see next?

A As I think we said, Ambassador Habib was due to come back for President Mubarak's visit here and at the same time he would report on the negotiations to date in Lebanon and on the overall Middle East process. I'm sure that a review of the success of those various activities and how best to speed the peace process, I'm sure that's the kind of discussion that he's engaged in here this week.

Q Not the U.S.-Israeli relations, in view of the negotiations; is that what you're saying?

A A review of the peace negotiations in

Lebanon, and, of course, he's charged with the overall Middle East peace initiative.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #20

FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I've been handed a great amount of paper at various stages today by our Press Office, all of which seems to have to do with football helmets and Redskins and such related non-foreign policy issues, but I'll be glad to attempt to answer any questions you might have.

Q In Israel, the Defense Minister has given a couple of interviews in which he has said a couple of things. I wonder if you have any comment on it. First, he seems to indicate that Israel is prepared to explore the idea of resuming relations with the Soviet Union. Secondly, he seems to say that if it's the only way, Israel would be willing to permit Syria to man early-warning stations in Lebanon if the Israelis were allowed to have such warning stations. Do you have any comment on either of those things?

A On the second part of the question, we have made quite clear -- the United States' position -- that it is our firm belief, which we still stand by, that all foreign forces should leave Lebanon. So I think that takes care of that particular point.

On the other earlier point you made, the suggestion that Israel might start talking with the Soviet Union, that's up to Israel and the Soviet Union.

Q And when you say "all foreign forces to leave," you mean that literally? You would not even permit skeleton forces to remain?

A That's our position. We stand on that.

Q What precisely is it that you object to a small numerical group left behind as a sort of warning force?

A That's the kind of detail that the three parties on the ground are discussing, and I don't want to get into their discussions. But our position remains unchanged, that all PLO, Syrian and Israeli forces should leave Lebanon. Our position has been that all along, that the foreign troops should get out, that Lebanon is best served, and indeed the whole area is best served, by a stable, central government in Lebanon which would extend its authority throughout the whole country.

Of course, the third point, we have consistently stood by that question of adequate security arrangements in southern Lebanon. That's our position and we stand by those points.

Q Yesterday, a senior official, briefing reporters at the White House, said that the U.S. believes that once there is a framework for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon that the Syrians and the Palestinians then will also agree to leave within the same timeframe as the Israelis do.

Today, Prime Minister Begin is quoted as saying he doesn't think Habib has made any progress in getting a Syrian and Palestinian withdrawal. There's obviously some disagreement here. Can you address that?

A I can't. I haven't seen what Mr. Begin said.

Q But do we have evidence, hard evidence that the Syrians and the Palestinians would agree to withdraw as part of an overall withdrawal?

A I think the Secretary of State on a number of occasions has addressed himself to the question of Syrian withdrawal, and talked about statements that had been made by the Syrians. Certainly, everybody is working and has been working on the question of the withdrawal of all. That kind of negotiation and discussion goes on.

Q Just to be clear, it is our position as outlined yesterday that the Syrians and Palestinians would withdraw once there is an agreement on Israeli withdrawal?

A I don't think I'm going to go beyond what was said to you yesterday. What I would say is that certainly there have been and are on-going negotiations on the question of all three.

Q The Sharon statement about the Soviets seems to be an attempt on his part to scare the United States. Are you scared? (Laughter)

A It's not a question of being scared. There are things that presumably Israel and the Soviet Union might discuss. The United States has been very concerned and very active on the question of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union. It might be that Israel might want to get into them. There might be some purpose in that kind of discussion.

Q Would you look then with some favor on an improved relationship with Moscow and the United States?

A It's not a question of looking with favor upon it. What we're talking about is a bilateral, diplomatic negotiation or discussion between Israel and the Soviet Union. That's for the two parties to think about and decide, undertake.

Q John, more on that. I think, again, Mr. Sharon is saying that Israel is not very happy with the U.S. "pressuring it," leaving the Syrians and the PLO there, and this is a warning, in a way, really.

Do you see it as a warning, and is there any pressure on Israel so that Mr. Sharon is justified in saying what he said?

A You have to bear in mind that all we're looking at are press reports, and the same kind of material that you're looking at. So we don't have a very specific readout on what Mr. Sharon said, but it seems to us he was talking about a kind of bilateral discussion between Israel and the Soviet Union.

As I say, that's a question for them. If it's a question of the Soviet Union being involved in discussions and negotiations on Lebanon, we don't think any purpose would be served by that on the basis of the Soviet record, or lack of a record, of achieving any constructive breakthrough in the Middle East. I think the record is perfectly clear. We think the structure that exists is adequate, and I think you just have to look at the record of who is for peace and who is against peace in the Middle East. I think the United States record on the positive side of peace is rather clear. I leave you to make your own deductions as to how constructive the Soviet Union has been in the pursuit of peace.

Q Assuming that those thoughts would apply to the reports that Lebanese officials were also either contemplating or had met with a Soviet mission in the last --

A I don't know anything about that.

Q The readout from the announcement -- the item which was on T.V. this morning -- it interprets like it's a counter-pressure from Israel on the United States. This is the readout, that he wants to use the Soviet Union against the United States or he's using the United States against the Soviet Union, and this is the readout that was delivered in the message this morning.

A That may be your readout.

Q It's not my readout; it's just an interpretation only of the item on T.V. this morning.

Q Do you have any comment on the report about China actively helping Pakistan build nuclear explosive potential?

A Not too much. That story, of course, quoted intelligence sources and, as always, we're not going to comment on stories allegedly based on intelligence information.

As far as the Secretary of State's own position during the visit to China, he'll be discussing a large number of issues of mutual concern to ourselves and the Peoples Republic of China. Undoubtedly, that would include issues relating to peaceful nuclear cooperation. Beyond that we wouldn't respond to it.

Q Will you want to follow some of these reports up? It seems to me that it's an item of concern both in Congress and here as to whether they are working on --

A I think we'll simply stand where we are. I think our position on nuclear weapons is quite clear in relation to the area.

Q Could you answer or take the question directly? Is he going to tell the Chinese there will be no nuclear cooperation agreement unless the Chinese agree to stop helping the Pakistanis?

A I think we'll just stand on the language we offered you here.

Q Has a decision ever been reached on the amount of military sales to be made to Pakistan? It was clouded at the end of the last Congress by the upping of the allocation for Israel and left in doubt the amount that would be available for Pakistan?

A I don't have that at my fingertips, and I don't have anything for you on it today.

Q Have we inquired of the Pakistanis about these reports?

A Don't have anything for you. You know that when President Zia was here, of course, this question came

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up, but beyond that I wouldn't have anything for you.

Q This specific report, was it taken up?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q And you wouldn't take it, either?

A No.

Q Do you expect to have anything for us on this?

A No.

Q Back to Lebanon. Did you have anything on Sharon's trip to Beirut where he met with the Phalangists?

A No. We saw the reports.

Q Another question. There are reports coming out of the Middle East that the Soviets are shipping the Syrians SAM-11 missiles. It's a very new missile. It hasn't even been fully deployed in the Soviet Union. Do you have anything on that?

A No, don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have any response, remarks or guidances on the Soviet-expressed interest in a nuclear free zone in Europe?

A As you know, the United States is making vigorous efforts to reach balanced and verifiable arms control agreements that reduce tensions, achieve substantial reductions in military forces, and enhance security and stability.

The United States believes that nuclear free zones may in some circumstances enhance security if they realistically take account of the existing security situation and defensive arrangements of the region involved. A case in point is the Latin American nuclear free zone.

The United States and the NATO Allies have carefully and thoroughly studied proposals for nuclear free zones in Europe, which have been advanced in various forms in the past. We consistently have found that such proposals are not realistic or effective. We believe that they would not contribute to security and stability in Europe.

Indeed, we are concerned that such proposals can only divert attention from the serious efforts we are making in Geneva and Vienna to achieve dramatic reductions in nuclear and conventional forces in Europe.

We have proposed in START that both sides agree to substantial reductions in strategic forces. In INF, we have proposed the elimination of an entire category of U.S. and Soviet land-based, longer-range INF missiles. In the Vienna MBFR negotiations, we and our Allies have proposed major reductions of military manpower in Europe.

All these proposals would lead to greater security and stability in Europe.

Q Was a similar response given to the Palme Commission when they first suggested this one that apparently tickled the Soviet interest?

A Was a similar response given?

Q Yes.

A I'm afraid I can't answer that.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q In other words, you're saying that it is not realistic and therefore not acceptable?

A I think that's what the language indicates.

--MORE--

Q John, on another matter regarding nuclear issues, what is the Administration's intention toward the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the other treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions that Senator Percy wants to have a decision on?

A On the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the President has decided that the United States should seek improvements to the verification measures contained in these treaties. The measurement of the yield of underground nuclear explosions is a very difficult and highly technical subject. Our study of possible improvements is now nearing completion, and we expect a Presidential decision on such improvements in the near future.

Q Would that involve having to go back and open up the negotiation again to get these verification matters cleared up?

A I'm afraid I can't answer that. I don't know the answer to that.

Q What about the other one, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty? It's a separate treaty.

A I'm afraid I don't have anything on that.*

Q Would you expect that this could be done expeditiously, because Senator Percy apparently is not going to have a vote on Mr. Adelman until he gets an answer.

A I saw that report, but the President is going to make his decision. I don't know when he'll make it.

Q Is it likely that Vice President Bush will announce that decision in speeches in Europe next week?

A I do not know the answer to that question, but I don't think so. If you're asking me in terms of fact, I do not know the answer to that; but it's not my sense of what will happen.

Q It will be announced by the President?

A Yes.

Q One more question about Lebanon, the senior Administration officials that briefed reporters yesterday mentioned the policy review which is underway regarding

* See attached.

Lebanon. Could you tell us if this policy review is still going on and if you expect it to be over before the Secretary leaves for the Far East?

A I'm sure it's still going on. Ambassador Habib, as you know, is back here reporting and taking part in discussions on how best to move forward the process that we hope to see in Lebanon and in the Middle East in general. I'm sure he will be engaged in discussions which will continue today.

Q There is no date yet for Habib going back to the Middle East?

A No, not to my knowledge, unless this piece of paper gives a little more on that -- and it does not. (Laughter)

Q John, on two of my far-flung parts of the world. Reuters had a story that the United States has rejected that butter barter with the Soviets. First of all, can you confirm or reject that?

The reasoning, according to the story, seemed unusual to me.

A I may have to stop you right there, and let you know I do not have anything for you on butter barter.

Q Could you take it? Would you mind checking into it?

A Let me look into it and see what we might have.

Q Also, to try and explain, because the official quoted said we shouldn't trade with the Soviets because it helps them, which didn't make any sense since we're trading grain. So if you look into that reasoning, too, I'd be grateful.

A Let me see what we've got on that.

Q O.K. Secondly, there are some reports from Angola that no deal has been made, but progress has been made in the talks. Do you have anything on those talks today?

A   Not really. I think you would have to talk to the governments involved. We are, obviously, keeping a close watch on that situation as it develops. We are in favor of the dialogue -- have been consistently -- and hope that anything that is moving on the ground brings closer the day when peace will come to the region. Beyond that, I have nothing for you.

Q   Are we in favor of a ceasefire?

A   Of course.

Q   John, do you have any comment on the reports out of El Salvador that the Constituent Assembly there has stripped D'Aubuisson of some of his power, and that it could result in that unity government falling apart?

A   Yes. Yesterday, following several unexplained delays in the Constituent Assembly's proceedings and absences of Assembly President D'Aubuisson in the morning, 39 of the 60 members who make up the Assembly, held a plenary session in the afternoon. At that session, which was not attended by Mr. D'Aubuisson or members of the ARENA party, the Assembly modified Article 44 of the Assembly regulations to require that only three -- instead of five -- of the nine directors of the Assembly sign Assembly resolutions. Following that modification, the 39 Assembly members confirmed the appointment of Mr. Cardenas as Minister of Health. This appointment had been rejected by Mr. D'Aubuisson, ARENA and another Party.

We have never regarded the conservative parties in the Government of National Reconciliation as either monolithic or like-minded on all the issues facing that country. We view yesterday's Constituent Assembly action as an indication of the flexibility of the political parties and the kind of peaceful and pluralistic resolution of differences which that system can offer.

Q   Can we get a copy of that?

A   You sure can.

Q   To stay on El Salvador, do you have any comment on the military situation since it has evolved from your last comment of a couple of weeks ago?

A   As you know, government troops in any strength, specifically U.S.-trained battalion troops have only recently been deployed to the areas where the conflict is going on, and it is premature to make any definitive judgments as to the type of encounters likely to result.

There are a couple of general points to keep in mind: We don't regard it as mere happenstance that the guerrillas have chosen to initiate stepped-up military activity to coincide with the period of certification. Secondly, the information reaching the United States indicates that the guerrillas have been progressively resupplied over the past months in anticipation of this stepped-up activity, both in volume and type. This has been a resupplying effort unavailable through foraging in the field.

Q Is the resupply coming from Nicaragua, or where do we think it is coming from?

A I don't think I have anything fresh for you on the resupply route.

Q Let me go on this resupply for a second. The Red Cross has reported that there have been over 200 prisoners taken by the guerrillas in just the last couple of weeks, and that that has been a substantial source of resupply in terms of weapons and ammunition.

Are you including in your statement about resupply that kind of resupply, as well as foreign resupply?

A No. I don't have anything on that and I'm not discounting it, but that's not the kind of resupply we're talking about.

Q Why were the battalions engaged in these areas which you described only two weeks ago as inconsequential, underpopulated, and of no economic or strategic value?

A No answer to that.

Q Can you take the question since you raised it by your characterization a couple of weeks ago?

A Let me take a look at it.

Q Thank you.

Q Regarding that long question on the resupplying, who is doing the resupplying? Where are the arms coming from?

A I don't have any specific language for you, but I think the same routes we have suggested in the past.

Q In other words, Nicaragua?

A Yes.

Q Is there any possibility that the U.S. Government may be concerned that the new guerrilla-like activity may lead to a retreat on the part of Salvadoran forces, Salvadoran Government troops, a collapse?

A The United States Government?

Q Is the U.S. Government is concerned that a collapse could come about?

A We're not concerned about a collapse, but we're always concerned about conflict and how it turns out.

Q John, you're not being very forthcoming on the resupplier. Are these coming from the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam? I mean, you must have some idea.

A I think that's where we have suggested.

Q Where? Which? I named three countries.

A I think we have suggested in the past the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Q John, do you have any specifics on the nature of the equipment they're getting?

A No.

Q Can you quantify the resupply of arms in recent times?

A No, I can't.

Q There have been reports, all kinds of them recently, that land routes for resupply through Honduras have been effectively closed, and that sea routes -- through the Salvadoran patrol boats that we provided and our own presence there -- have also been curtailed, and all that remains are air routes across the Gulf of Fonseca. Can you confirm that that is the substantial or the largest way?

A No, I cannot, no. I can't give you any more specifics on the routes.

Q When will the Administration submit to the Congress the 1984 Foreign Assistance Program?

A I can't answer that. Can anyone do any better on this than me? No, I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any comment on the results of the Geneva meetings of the OPEC?

A No.

Q Or any expectations out of the collapse of the --

A No.

Q Can I take you back to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty once again?

A Yes, and I want to go back to that, too, because I made a mistake on that. (Laughter)

The answer that I gave applies to both of the treaties involved. Of course, I should have known that, and probably did at the time.

Q Does the Administration think the Soviets have been exceeding the testing limits?

A I'm going to have to hold a little on that, and see if we can produce something a little later on that.

Q John, can you give us any information about when Mr. Adelman's confirmation is going to be brought to a vote in committee?

A No.

Q Has Senator Percy told the Administration yet?

A No.

Q Is he indeed saying that he is going to not bring that to a vote until he gets an answer on the Threshold Treaty?

A I don't know. I think you'll have to ask Senator Percy. I think Mr. Adelman goes up again next week for more testimony.

Q Also, can you tell us, was Secretary Shultz the official who suggested Mr. Adelman for this post to the President?

A It was certainly his recommendation to the President.

Q It was his recommendation?

A I'm certain it was his recommendation to the President for Mr. Adelman in this office.

Q He recommended him to the President?

A That would be the normal procedure in a case of this kind.

Q Does he know him from somewhere in the past?

A Yes. He knew him and had worked with him.

Q Where was that?

A In Mr. Adelman's capacity as Deputy Ambassador of the U.N.

Q John, does the Secretary think Mr. Adelman is the best-qualified man to be the Director of the Arms Control Agency?

A Of course. Otherwise, he wouldn't have recommended him.

Q John, talks between Great Britain and Guatemala over Belize have broken down, and there are reports that the United States has been asked to take a stronger role in those negotiations. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Will you look into it?

A I'll take a look at it. I don't think we have anything on it, though.

Q On that part of the world, you put out a statement on, I think, January 26, Wednesday, I guess it was, saying that you would view with concern any attempts by Suriname to move closer to either the Cubans or the Soviet Union. Since then, do you see any signs that this, in fact, has occurred?

A Not to my knowledge, but that doesn't mean -- I just don't have anything in my hand or on a piece of paper today. I don't have anything on any further development that might have taken place, but I'm not suggesting that there hasn't been anything that has taken place.

Q John, what is the subject of the meeting today of the Secretary with the Foreign Relations Committee?

A He is going down as one of a series of meetings he has had since he has been Secretary of State. I would think that the main purpose would be the Middle East.

Q What time is that?

A I think it's at 2:00. It's a closed session, of course, but I think it's 2:00.

Q John, there have been two reports in the last couple days, in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post today, on U.S. contributions to the International Development Association, and that they're going to drop substantially, and also that you've given up hope for fulfilling the IDA-6 requirements. Do you have any statement on it?

A I do. It is fairly technical and fairly long, so may I suggest that you pick it up in the Press Office afterwards.

Q If the copies are made available.

A Yes, sure.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:36 P.M.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #21

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you give us any idea when Ambassador Habib is due to go back?

A Not really, Jim. He is still here and he is continuing the consultations that he has been having recently. I would think that he would probably not return before the end of the week, at the earliest; but I think it also is fair to say that we would expect that he would return to the area. So it doesn't give you a specific date, but those are the parameters in which we're operating.

Q The fact that he will be going eventually at some unspecified date, does that mean that there are any new ideas, any new American initiatives that he is going to put forward?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you have any reaction to the incidents that were in Beirut during the weekend?

A The shootings and so on?

Q Yes.

A They are, obviously, regrettable incidents; but they also underscore yet again the urgent necessity of getting all foreign forces out of Lebanon.

Q In a Kissinger interview on ABC this morning, he said that the United States should go a little slower on the negotiations in Lebanon. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't think that's quite what he said, David.

Q He said the U.S. should "cool it."

A As I read it, basically what he was saying was that we should move along on each negotiation and each issue on its own, and I think that's what we have been saying, too, that they are related issues, but that we're going to pursue both the overall Middle East peace process and the Lebanon negotiations independently. So I don't see a difference there. But in any case, our position on it is quite clear.

Q Is the Secretary as pessimistic as some stories indicated?

A Is he pessimistic?

Q Yes.

A I don't like to say he is pessimistic. I think we will have available for you, Marvin -- I don't quite know when, since it was a rather lengthy interview on the plane -- but we'll have the transcript of that available for you. It's being worked on now, and I'll let you draw your own conclusions from his remarks. But I don't think he used the word pessimistic during the course of it.

Q Will that be today or --

A I can't tell you. Yes, I think the hope is, certainly, to have it today.

Q Were there any American officials, whether U.S. Senators or intelligence officials, aware 24 hours before the massacre Shatila and Sabra was over that it was going on?

A No. There is no truth to those reports. Let me repeat our previously stated accounts of the sequence of events which still hold. On Friday, September 17, we started to receive fragmentary information that something was amiss in the Shatila/Sabra refugee camp areas in Beirut. We did our best to find out what was happening. It was not until Saturday morning, September 18, that an Embassy officer was able to enter the Shatila Camp and observe directly the evidence of the massacre.

A report of this eye-witness account was sent to the State Department and received there at about 5:00 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, the same day. There simply is no truth to reports that intelligence officials or Senate staffers knew or had any information about a massacre before the 17th.

Q Nor anyone else in government?

A Nor anyone else, no.

Q Are you saying that you had that information at 5:00 a.m. Saturday morning?

A In terms of the eye-witness account that came back. There is nothing new in any of this.

Q Were the Israelis told at that point, or the Lebanese told at that point?

A I don't remember, frankly, what was said. I think we had had some conversations with them before that, indicating that we had reports and asking them to look into it.

Q Could you find out what it was?

A There is a lot on the record on this. I really would ask you to go back and look at it, because I think we've gone into this in great detail.

Q Should we take it as a precedent that you are ready to comment on things related to intelligence information?

A No. But we flatly denied before that the U.S. Government had such information. I'm flatly denying to you now the same thing.

Q Alan, when you say you "did your best," -- I know we have gone through this, but reports keep coming out. When you say the American Government or American officials there did their best, what do you exactly mean by "doing their best?"

A Again, I just don't propose to go back into this whole thing again. There was an extremely full record, description, of what we had, both ON THE RECORD and BACKGROUND briefings provided at the time; and I refer you back to that record. I'm not going to go back and reopen that all again.

Q Why Senate staffers?

A Because there was a story that indicated that Senate staffers -- that was part of the question here. There was a story that was written, I believe, coming out of the London Sunday Times which indicated a Senate staffer said that they had information beforehand. And having checked that out, we find that that was not correct -- it was not a correct account of what Senate staffers had said about information which they did not have before the 17th.

Q Before when? What was the before point? Can you straighten out the time? The story said --

A The story said they had it on the 16th, that Senate staffers had information on the 16th. Our checking on this indicates that that is not the case, that they did not have any information until the 17th.

Q The 17th was Friday.

A The 16th was Thursday; the 17th was Friday.

Q Alan, do you have a comment on President Navon's decision not to seek election?

A No, we have no comment on that.

Q Alan, a State Department senior official Friday, before the Saturday that everything came about, was talking to us from this podium, and he said that he was told of something maybe happening Friday, 7:30 -- I remember exactly.

A No, I believe he was briefing you on Saturday, if you'll go back and check.

Q That's right, but he said he knew about it even the day before Saturday.

A I ask you to go back and look at the record. I think what you will see that he said there was information which came in on Friday, which is what we've said.

Q That's right.

A Friday. The report that we're talking about speaks of something perhaps coming in as early as Thursday, and that's what we're saying is not the case.

Q On another subject, is there any reaction to the increased violence in El Salvador and the apparent -- well, the losses of government troops to the insurgents?

A Bernie, we addressed this -- John did -- a little bit last week, and I really don't have an update on the military situation per se. As he indicated on Friday, government troops had been committed to various areas of traditional guerrilla strength, where the guerrillas had been active. But thus far there have been limited engagements between the guerrillas and the Salvadoran Army.

As has been characteristic of guerrilla activity for some time, they continue to deal substantial damage to the country's economy through the destruction of cash crops, bridges, power lines, transportation, particularly buses, and so on; but in terms of a general description, no, I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q There is no fear at this point that the military situation on the ground is deteriorating?

A I have nothing to indicate that's the case, no.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any update on the question that John said he would look into as to why the military in El Salvador has changed -- it's posted, pardon me, I haven't been here. I mean, I just got here. I withdraw the question.

Q What about to the north of El Salvador? There are more reports of Guatemalan soldiers going into Mexico. The Guatemalans deny they go into Mexico. Do you have anything on that?

A Simply that we've seen the reports. We understand the Mexican Government is checking into them, but I don't have anything independent on it.

Q Do you have anything on the movement of large numbers of Ghanians out of Nigeria toward Ghana through Benin? Any U.S. role in this; any request for help?

A I think all I can give you on this is simply to say that we've seen numerous reports of the hardship being endured by those foreigners who have been compelled to leave Nigeria on very short notice, and we hope that Nigerian authorities will take the measures necessary to insure that those foreigners still subject to the departure notice are able to leave that country in a more humane and orderly set of conditions than apply at present.

Q Has this been passed on to the Government of Nigeria?

A I'd rather not get into diplomatic conversations, but I think you can assume our views are made known when we have views to pass on.

Q What would you think the Nigerians could do? What would be more humane?

A I don't have details. I think, again, orderly conditions would be a phrase I would turn to instead of perhaps a less orderly process that's now going on.

Q But the disorderly process has to do with numbers.

A I don't have more detail on this at this point.

Q Have you offered any help to the Nigerian Government?

A On this issue?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any information about what may have been discussed on that.

Q Do you have anything on a group of Americans and Laotians who went into Laos looking for some MIAs?

A I do have a little bit on that. We are aware of the reports of the rescue operation. The U.S. Government was not involved in any way and neither supports nor condones such activity.

We consider such activities unhelpful to our effort to make progress on POW/MIA matters. As William P. Clark, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs told the National League of Families on January 27, "Well intentioned citizens have heretofore mounted private operations in the belief government inaction demanded such activity. We willingly receive information concerning POW/MIAs from any source, but are resolutely opposed to private cross-border forays. Such actions interfer with and damage legitimate efforts on a number of fronts. Our experience has been that such private initiatives operate with faulty or fabricated intelligence and lack even marginally adequate operational capabilities.

Beyond that, I would simply say that I think you would have to direct questions about this effort to those who were involved.

Q Is there anything illegal about what was done in this reported operation?

A In terms of U.S. law?

Q Yes.

A I guess I would have to refer you to the Justice Department on that. Our concern here primarily is that it is not helpful to our efforts to obtain information on the POW/MIA issue.

Q Is it now just a dead issue as far as the State Department is concerned?

A We're not involved in it and we certainly don't support it.

Q You have nothing there on who and when was involved in this operation?

A No. I've seen a lot of stories about it in the press, but no.

Q How about American citizens who gave financial backing to the operation, is there anything illegal about that?

A Again, I'd have to refer you to the Justice Department about that. I don't know.

Q I have a question that goes back a little bit to last week. Did you have any comment on the arrest by Bolivian authorities of Klaus Barbie and his pending extradition to Germany for war crimes?

A I don't believe so.

Q Could you take the question?

A I'm not sure what it has to do with us.

Q In some respects it has to do with the conditions on future aid to Bolivians so far as Barbie's been connected with the drug trade. But, also, I think it's the first arrest by a Latin American country of a Nazi since World War II to be extradited.

A I don't think so. Our position on dealing with Nazi war criminals in this country is on the record and is, I think, quite straightforward. I don't think I would go into the question of what other countries are doing.

Q Do you have any confirmation on that report in Evans and Novak this morning that the U.S. has decided to maintain its sanctions against Poland?

A No. I have nothing for you on that.

Q Do you have any comment at all on Foreign Minister Jaruzelski's speech this morning to the Polish parliament in which he called on the U.S. to end the sanctions and said if it didn't, all it was really trying to do was interfere with Poland's internal matters?

A I haven't seen it. All I can do, really, is to point out our statements before which make clear that it is not our intention to do that. Our intention is to bring about a change in conditions of the sort that had been agreed on by a number of countries.

I refer you back to what NATO had to say on this, so on and so forth, in terms of internationally recognized human rights. The position has not changed essentially is what I'm saying.

Q More than a month ago the Administration said you were looking at all the changes that have come about in Poland. Is that review still under --

A Yes.

Q Do you have any further information on the trip to be taken by former President Carter to the Middle East?

A No. I understand that there is a private trip that's contemplated, but I'd really would have to refer you to the former President's office for any information about that.

Q Do you have anything on when you plan to introduce, or your recommendations for the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, you don't have anything on a Begin trip today, do you?

A No, I have nothing on that.

Q I want to go back to the question of the massacre. Besides the statements that you just read, there are some grumblings on Capitol Hill and Congress, Congressman George Crockett and others, who believe that the State Department and the intelligence community, they might have more information or they could have prior knowledge up to maybe Friday that something is going on.

A Before Friday?

Q Friday, or before Friday; something like that. There was a statement coming out from Crockett's office to this effect that he is going to ask for an investigation on this.

Will senior State Department officials be able or available for questions and answers possibily on Capitol Hill because of this or for some reporters who would like to quiz them on this matter?

A I'm sure there is not going to be, at this stage, any further press briefing on this subject. If the Hill requests some further information, I think we would have to see what the nature of the request is and that would be worked out with the Hill.

I think the statement I gave you today speaks rather directly to the question of whether we had information prior to what we said before, and the answer to that is, no, we did not have.

Q Anything about King Hussein's visit to the United States?

A No, I have nothing on King Hussein's visit to the United States.

Q Last week I asked about rejection of a butter barter between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. I was told that that was done on commercial grounds, not on political or philosophical grounds. Is there anything more on that today, or can you look into it?

A Is that a taken question that we have an answer to? It's posted already. Let me refer you back to what's been posted.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #22

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Does the State Department have any knowledge of anything unusual going on in Chile this morning?

A I don't have anything on any unusual activities in Chile.

Q Why can't you say that with more authority?

A I'll try.

Q Do you have any reaction to the response from the Soviets which appears to reject the Reagan offer to meet with Andropov?

A The Novosti Press Agency commentary, yes. We're disappointed by the initial Soviet response to the President's letter that was contained in the Novosti commentary. The President's offer to meet with General Secretary Andropov to sign an agreement banning intermediate-range nuclear missiles still stands, and we hope the Soviet Union will give it further consideration.

The issues are now under discussion at the negotiating table in Geneva where we have proposed the elimination of this entire class of weapons. We remain hopeful that concrete results can be achieved.

Q In the rejection, there seems to be a hint that while the Soviets turn down the President's scenario, they hold open the prospect of a value insofar as a summit is concerned.

A couple of questions. Is the President's offer intended to convey an invitation to a summit?

A I think that in terms of the general issue of a summit, outside the context of a specific proposal, that's been addressed several times before. What would be important from our perspective in terms of arranging such a summit, would be careful preparations, prospects for a fruitful outcome, and so on and so forth.

In terms of this proposal, this is a specific proposal by the President to meet with Mr. Andropov to sign what would be a major arms control agreement. The President thinks it's of sufficient importance that both he and Mr. Andropov should devote themselves personally to this endeavor.

As far as a broader discussion on the occasion of such a signing, frankly, I think you're getting ahead of events a little bit. The proposal is for the signing. It is conceivable, certainly, that there would be an interest on both sides in a broader discussion. But, as we've said, that would require careful preparation. So I would focus, I think at this point, on specifically what the President has indeed proposed.

Q Making clear that this would be only for signing and not for discussion about that particular subject; is that correct?

A Yes. The fact is that the responsibility for negotiating the agreement rests with our negotiators in Geneva. Obviously, we have full confidence and the President has full confidence in Ambassador Nitze and his ability to reach a good agreement, assuming the Soviets are willing to do so.

Q So this is not a summit proposal?

A I prefer to stand on the words that I've just given you.

Q You were addressing the Novosti response?

A Yes.

Q Andropov himself has rejected --

A I haven't seen that, so I don't know what the words are, and I don't know what the nature of that --

Q Could you look into that and perhaps get some response?

A I can look into it. Where did you see that appear?

Q On the wires.

Q More specifically, AFP just ran an urgent about five minutes ago -- tomorrow's Izvestia, yes. Andropov says it would be wonderful to have a summit, we want a summit to discuss serious things and not this zero/zero proposal, not what he calls unilateral disarmament.

A I think I'll stand on what I've said.

Q Doesn't this offer of the President for a summit meeting to sign an agreement pre-empt the negotiations? He's assuming, or the only way the signing would take place would be if the Russians would accept our proposal. So aren't we getting ahead of things in offering an invitation before the negotiations have been concluded?

A The President has made a proposal which we have discussed in this room at great length, which if you consider the statements of our various Allies is supported strongly in the Alliance, that the objective of eliminating this entire class of weapons is the best way to approach this problem.

What the President is doing is making clear again the importance of this and attaching himself, personally, to a conclusion of an agreement.

Q To what degree was the Reagan Administration's desire to launch this proposal triggered by the competition for public opinion in western Europe?

A I think that the fact is that the President is, as I said before, trying to make very clear the seriousness of his proposal and the importance he attaches to it and the fact that he thinks that he and Mr. Andropov should devote themselves personally to what would be a historic arms control agreement.

Q Did the President make the same invitation to the Soviets directly?

A I'm sorry? In private channels?

Q Yes.

A No. I think the document itself indicated a letter directed that the Vice President made public in Europe, but it was not conveyed previously in private channels.

Q People standing at that podium, including yourself in the past, have equated seriousness of diplomatic exchanges with privacy.

A That sometimes is the case and it sometimes isn't the case. (Laughter) I would note that the Soviets have not tabled in Geneva a number of the things that they have said publicly, and they wish to be taken seriously on those things, presumably.

Q Is the President's offer to meet with Andropov binding for any agreement that the U.S. and the Soviets reach at Geneva on medium-range missiles?

A I can't speculate on that. I think that the President has made a very specific proposal in this case for a far-reaching agreement, and I can't speculate beyond that.

Q Have the Japanese been given assurances that the SS-20s deployed in Asia would be part of the negotiation?

A I prefer, I think, to refer you to what John Hughes has said in addressing this issue following the Secretary's conversations in Japan.

The fact is, we approach this question from a global perspective, and so on. But I think that John did offer some words on that which are available to you, and I would like to stand on that.

Q Would it also include China at the negotiations?

A I think what I've just said would hold.

Q What are some of the things that the Soviets have said publicly that you would like to be tabled in Geneva?

A I didn't say necessarily that I would like anything to be tabled. What I've said is that they have offered a number of things publicly which they presumably wish to be taken seriously which have not been tabled in Geneva.

Q Can you enumerate them?

A You get me into something of a box on this. I guess I got myself somewhat into a box by mentioning it. The whole recent series of so-called proposals that they have laid out, what have been referred to, for example, as the Andropov proposals, have not been tabled.

Q You mean, the destruction of the SS-20s as distinct from dismantling, stuff like that?

A That range of things.

Q Can you explain the reasoning that went into the decision not to convey, as Jim asked, not to convey the invitation privately but rather to have written a letter a couple of days in advance and have the Vice President carry it and announce it at a dinner in Berlin? What kind of reasoning goes into that strategy?

A I can't help you with that.

Q They want to be an open Administration.

Q Have the Soviets tabled anything at Geneva?

A I think, again -- you mean in this last session? I think I'm going to now sort of draw a curtain on what they have or haven't said, or what we have or haven't said. I think we have had a rule of confidentiality, and I think that probably I've gone beyond what I should have in any case on that. I don't propose to compound the problem by doing it more.

Q Do you have anything additional on the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions?

A I have nothing beyond what John said on that the other day at this point.

Q The President, in his letter, says that he's ready to meet Mr. Andropov to sign an agreement banning U.S. and Soviet missiles all from the face of the earth. Does it mean that it excludes any kind of compromise?

A I just said before, in terms of --

Q It excludes that one compromise --

A This is a proposal. This represents the proposal to eliminate the entire class of weapons, which is the U.S. proposal. We think this is the best arms control solution. At the same time, the President made clear, other spokesmen have made clear since the President's initial statement, that we would listen and consider seriously any serious, Soviet proposal. I'm not prepared to go beyond that.

Mr. Nitze went back with the proposal that we have laid on the table.

Q But does it mean that the door is -- other solutions couldn't validate a summit?

A I said before I just couldn't speculate on that. The President has made a specific proposal in this case.

Q Another area. The White House has admitted that the proposal is no different to the zero option plan that was previously rejected, and this morning said that they expected the sort of response they got today. Isn't that putting in question the seriousness of the proposal?

A I don't know what somebody might have said on this subject this morning. I haven't seen anything on that. No, I don't think there's a question about the seriousness of what the President said. As I said before, we hope that the Soviets would respond positively both to the proposal on the missiles in the first place and on the proposal to get together and sign the agreement in the second place.

Q Is it expected that the Middle East affairs will be on the highlight of the agenda talks between President Reagan and Chancellor Kreisky?

A I do not have an agenda to share with you. Obviously, Chancellor Kreisky has a high interest in Middle Eastern affairs, and it wouldn't surprise me if that were on the agenda. But I don't have one to share with you.

Q You don't have any comment?

A I don't have anything specific on that visit to give to you at this point.

Q There are reports that Chancellor Kreisky may be carrying new ideas from the PLO Chairman to the White House, or to the U.S. Administration?

A I don't know about that.

Q Anything about Habib's planned trips?

A No, nothing beyond what I said before, yesterday.

Q Concerning Michael Ernest, the gentleman from Colorado who is being held in Guatemala, can you give me any update on that situation, the efforts that are being done to secure his release?

A The most recent things I think we have are in the Press Office. I don't have anything new with me today on that.

--MORE--

Q Could you perhaps just for our purposes briefly explain what has been done? I've not seen that release.

A I don't have the guidance with me, and I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you to refer to what we have in the Press Office.

Q Would you care to comment on the reported visit of Minister Sharon to Lebanon and his talks with Lebanese "Christian leaders"? He's reported to have warned them to conclude an agreement with Israel, etc., etc.

Do you care to comment on those?

A No. Obviously, we've seen the press reporting of this. It seems to be somewhat fragmentary and of a private conversation, but in any case I don't have a comment to offer you on that.

Q There is a report this morning put out by several former military and government officials as well as, I think, 43 Nobel laureates and members of the National Academy of Sciences, saying that the United States should disavow any first-use policy of nuclear weapons.

I was wondering if you have a comment on that.

A Yes. We, of course, have addressed this issue in policy terms before. We haven't seen this report specifically, so I can only respond in general terms, but I think it should be representative of what our thinking is on these issues.

Our present policy involves non-first use of force, conventional or nuclear. NATO is a defensive alliance, and we will never use force, conventional or nuclear, unless attacked first.

We doubt that a simple, declarative pledge regarding the non-first use of either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons would have any restraining effect on the Warsaw Pact's behavior in time of crisis.

Indeed, we believe that a nuclear non-first use pledge would undermine deterrence and increase the risk of Soviet conventional agression against our European allies.

As for the argument that I think is also made, according to reports, that current NATO deterrence policy is not credible, we would disagree and simply point to the fact that it has maintained peace in Europe for 35 years, and it continues to do so.

As for strengthening conventional forces, which I believe was also suggested, this too is essential for a credible deterrent, and we strongly support it.

Q Copies?

A Yes.

Q Alan, this morning, speaking to the World Jewish Congress, Ambassador Moshe Arens of Israel said that the Israeli army would not leave Lebanon without a peace treaty -- that was just not negotiable.

Any comment on that?

A Without a peace treaty?

Q He used the words "peace treaty." "Those who say there should be no peace treaty while the Israeli army is in Lebanon are wrong. How else will we get a peace treaty without the Israeli army being there?"

A I think our views on this are quite clear. We think that there is an urgent need to get all of the foreign forces -- that is, the Syrian, Israeli, PLO forces -- out of Lebanon as soon as possible, and that the issues relating to relations between Israel and Lebanon need to be worked out between the two parties in a manner that's acceptable and tolerable to both sides.

Q There are reports that the U.S. Ambassador in Jordan has informed the U.S. goverment of the King's willingness to join up.

Is there any truth to these reports, can you tell us?

A I think this was addressed the other day. One, I couldn't comment one way or another about the diplomatic conversations or reporting, but, quite clearly, we think it is important that King Hussein join in this process. We're hoping that he will. We think he's serious about looking at the possibilities for this, but it's up to him to announce what his intentions are and capabilities are.

Q Do you think he will?

A I say we hope he will.

Q When is the State Department going to release the breakdown of the aid requests to different countries?

A I think that will be later this week. We'll let you know when that --

Q Will there be a briefing on the aid request?

A I think there might well be. You're talking about security assistance?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q Do you have an expected release time on the human rights reports?

A I don't have anything more precise than I've been saying, which is presumably sometime next week.

Q Alan, do we have anything on reports from, I guess Simon Wiesenthal, that the location of Dr. Mengele is known?

A I don't have anything on that at all.

Q Alan, Prime Minister Begin issued another invitation to King Hussein to join the peace talks, and he also called on the Palestinians that they -- as for the Palestinians, he said that their self-determination would be recognized within the framework of the autonomy proposed to them, which is the greatest and broadest ever offered to any national camp whatsoever at any time.

Does this, from your manager's position, and his stand on the autonomy for the Palestinians, does it correspond to the position that President Reagan had in his September 1 initiative?

A I think you really would have to ask him. Our position, as articulated by the President, is out on the table. The next step is to get the talks moving again. Obviously, we have looked to the participation by King Hussein and Palestinians in these talks, and then the talks should take place at the table.

I can't speak for Prime Minister Begin and what he means and how it meshes with the President's proposal.

Q On the same subject, he alluded in his talks with Canadian representatives, I think on January 29, he almost left the impression that Camp David has been tampered with or something like that to the effect that he will not let anybody deviate from it, contradict it, or detract from it.

Does the position of the President in the September initiative -- does it correspond with Camp David, or is it --

A Yes. We've said many times it does.

Q Excuse me?

A We have many times said that it does correspond. It falls squarely within the framework of Camp David.

Q I just wondered if it's your understanding that King Hussein's participation in the peace process is contingent upon a prior agreement on the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon?

A I think that he would have to address that himself. The withdrawal of forces from Lebanon is obviously an important factor in the Middle East, period.

How conditional that is for him in terms of what he can or can't do, he would have to address for himself.

Q Has he given his point of view to you?

A Certainly the question of what's going on in the Middle East, including Lebanon, has been the subject of discussion with King Hussein, but I wouldn't want to characterize those discussions.

Q Ambassador Arens said that Washington does not have a full understanding of the difficulty and complications involved in the Israeli-Lebanese peace talks, and that if the United States continued in its impatience to push for a quick settlement, that it threatened the very talks themselves and they could break up.

Do you have any response to that?

A I think that it is clear that they are complex and difficult. They are complex and difficult issues with which we are wrestling, and the process is likewise complex and difficult. But I think we've also made clear on several occasions that we think it is very important that we move ahead as quickly as possible, and that is important to a successful outcome of those talks.

Q You don't agree, then, that that impatience could threaten the talks?

A I'm not sure I would use the term "impatience," necessarily, but I think that our view on this and the importance of moving ahead quickly are well-known.

Q Do you have a readout on El Salvador, confirmation of the rebel claims, and any comment on what's going on?

A Rebel claims in what respect?

Q Well, the taking of the city of Berlin?

A Apparently guerrillas have taken Berlin following an effort that began this weekend to overrun a small national guard garrison there.

Beyond that, the only thing I could say is that it is my understanding that Berlin has traditionally been a refugee center in the province, and it doesn't have any major military outposts. But I really don't have any comment on it beyond that.

Q Do you see this as any kind of turning point in the war there?

A No. Our assessment continues to be that while there's been heightened guerrilla and heightened army activity, in fact, there is no shift in the overall military picture.

Q Alan, forgive me for backtracking if you will. I have heard rumblings that Mr. Ernest's release from Guatemala was imminent.

Have you heard anything to go along with that? Do you believe that that's the case?

A Again, I'm going to have to refer you, I'm afraid, to what we have in the Press Office.

Q Alan, anything on the exodus from Nigeria?

A We have some guidance on it. Not really anything new except to tell you a little bit about what our cooperation efforts are with the U.N. and other international agencies.

Q Do you have anything today new on Namibian talks or can we get a briefing on it?

A No. Not at this point. I have nothing new, and I don't see a briefing.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY FEBRUARY 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #23

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1983, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay.

I have a couple of announcements for you. First, some procedural things: Available in the Press Office are the testimonies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams. The subject is: "El Salvador's Certification."

Second, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the Administration's FY-84 Security Assistance Request, the FY-84 Allocations under the Continuing Resolution, and the Proposed FY-84 Supplemental. That briefing will be held in this room on Friday, February 4, at 2:30 p.m.

Q Will there by a country by country breakdown, do you know?

A George, I don't know what there will be. I would assume he would be prepared to address some country breakdowns. I don't know.

Q Will there by anything in advance of that, any sheets that you're putting out?

A I can't tell you. Just stay in touch with the Press Office.

Q When is the full AID briefing to take place?

A I don't know. I'd ask you to check with AID.

Q We have.

A O.K. I don't know.

Finally a statement regarding the Vietnamese attack on Nong Chan. Vietnamese forces attacked January 31 the Khmer refugee encampments near the Thai border opposite the Thai village of Nong Chan. While details are not entirely clear, we are appalled that Vietnamese forces would attack indiscriminately a settlement containing thousands of civilian Khmer who fled to the border area from Vietnam's 1978 invasion and continued occupation of Kampuchea. We understand that the Vietnamese destroyed the refugee camps, burned the huts and rudimentary medical facilities and schools of people who have suffered enormously and who have been living with only minimal essentials. We equally deplore that innocent Thai villagers have also been victims in the attack.

We also note the statement by the Government of Thailand which describes accurately that the Vietnamese attack constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of humanitarianism and the U.N. Charter. We join the Thai Government in calling for Hanoi to respect Thai territory and to cease its use of force.

O.K. That's all on the announcements.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any idea how many people became casualties as a result of this?

A I don't have figures at this point. As I say, the details are not entirely clear, but apparently the attack was fairly severe. I just don't know. I don't have casualty figures for you.

Q While we're in that part of the world, does the State Department have any comment on a commentary which appeared in Peoples Daily criticizing the U.S./South Korean maneuvers called "Team Spirit," as a show of force aggravating tensions and generally raising the level of tensions in the Korean Peninsula?

A Jim, obviously, we don't accept the characterization, but for an authoritative response, I believe the Secretary has already addressed that issue, and I would refer you to his words.

Q Yes, I know he has addressed that issue. I was asking on this specific issue of this Chinese commentary. Does it mean anything, in that it comes out specifically now?

A Again, I think I would refer you to what he said on the subject.

Q Do you have anything on the Times piece this morning to the effect that the Administration does not believe that China is as strategically important as was once thought?

A No. The importance of our relationship with China has been addressed and our view of that importance on several occasions, including by the Secretary, I think, in a briefing he gave to the press on his way to China, and I think he has also addressed it in public statements there, so I would refer you again to that.

Q One thing you didn't mention that was available in the Press Office this morning -- I didn't know about it until I saw it there -- was the Eagleburger speech last night. I didn't know about the speech in fact, nor about the availability of the text.

A I didn't know the text would be available either, so we were both --

Q There appears to have been a hiccup in the system, because among other things he says in the speech that the United States simply doesn't believe the Soviet threat to cut off all arms negotiations if INF goes foward.

A I'm going to let Larry's speech speak for itself. I don't have a comment to offer you to interpret it.

Q This is not the same area, but the same subject: there is also an article today that the United States does not view the Persian Gulf area also as significant as it used to be at some point. Would you care to comment on that?

A Yes. I have something I can give you on that. Without commenting specifically on the article and the quotes and so on in that article, let me just say this: Our belief is that this region remains of great importance to the global strategic balance and to our national interest. There are various reasons for this view, only some of which are directly related to energy.

As Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicholas A. Veliotes said before Congress on May 10, 1982, "Events in the Persian Gulf Region impact on our ability and that of our allies to foster a world in which all peoples can pursue their national destinies free of external interference."

Whatever conditions may be in the world oil market at a given time, the fact remains that nearly two-thirds of proved free world petroleum reserves are in the Persian Gulf Region, and we and our principal allies will continue to rely upon Gulf resources for the indefinite future.

Also important from our point of view is the large market in this region for American products and technology and the constructive role played by Persian Gulf States in international finance and economic development.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Don't you see a contradiction between what you have just told us and what came in the testimony of an Administration representative?

A I'm not going to comment directly on the testimony except that I believe there were some questions which were asked which were perhaps put in a different context from this statement, so I don't --

Q But (inaudible) is in direct contradiction.

A No, I don't see it that way; I think that they are consistent, primarily because the questions were put in one way, and the answers were in response to those questions.

Q Have we in any way reduced our interest in having access to territory by the Rapid Deployment Force if something should come down there?

A I haven't addressed, I don't think, in specific terms, Jim, the question of access; but there is no change in our view on the Rapid Deployment Force, the new structures, and so on.

Q Alan, I heard yesterday two views of former Administration officials -- other Administration officials -- I mean the Carter Administration, in particular, saying something like the United States inadvertently, in a way, put the priority on Middle East progress first and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and then on the Reagan peace plan, and that now, because the Lebanon issue is becoming a little too sticky and Israel is standing fast on it, there may be an attempt to kind of by-pass it, or put less emphasis on it, while emphasizing the Reagan peace plan.

Is there any truth to that, or can you comment on this?

A I think I addressed it yesterday, that our position remains as it has been, that we are going to address both sets of questions, that is we're going to address in parallel, separately, the question of the Lebanon situation and the overall Middle East peace initiative and peace process. That isn't to say that they are not related, but they are being pursued independently.

Q Alan, Tomorrow Kenneth Adelman goes back to finish off, one way or the other, his confirmation hearings. Chairman Percy said that unless he got a date certain from the Administration on the fate of these two treaties, the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, he would be inclined not to have a vote.

Will Mr. Adelman be able to deliver any kind of date certain about when an announcement is going to be made on the fate of these treaties?

A I don't want to anticipate, first of all, what Ambassador Adelman will or won't have to say on the subject. Second, I've seen various versions of what Senator Percy is hoping for, and I would really think that the Senator should speak for himself on that. But I don't have anything new for you from here today.

Q O.K. Second question on the Adelman nomination: Is anything being done as far as telephone calls or any effort at all in order to persuade the "undecideds" on the Committee that Mr. Adelman really ought to be the Arms Control Director?

A That is not the kind of question, in any circumstance, that I would get into, so I don't think I can respond to it. Let me just say, obviously, the President and the Administration strongly support the nomination and hope that it moves forward quickly and successfully. But I can't get into the question of what conversations there might be.

Q Just one follow-up: Would a delay in his confirmation have any bearing on the ability of the United States to negotiate in Geneva on either one of the levels, START or INF?

A I think both negotiators are back there, and they are pursuing their negotiations at this point. I think that process goes forward. Obviously, it would help to have him in place; but in the meantime, the process goes forward.

Q On that subject, while his nomination stands in suspense, three of the four Assistant Directors' jobs are vacant; the Deputy Director's job is vacant, and the third set of negotiations' job is vacant, the MBFR.

Does that strike you as worrisome at all?

A I don't want to try to characterize it as worrisome or not worrisome. I think that Ambassador Adelman addressed the question in his testimony last week about appointing or nominating subordinates, and obviously, that is something which would have to await his confirmation. But I don't have a characterization in the terms that you pose it.

Q But two years after the Administration has taken office, that many high-level jobs vacant in an agency such as that does not strike me, at least, as a sign of a vibrantly healthy agency. Does it you?

A I'm not familiar with the day-to-day workings of that agency, Jim, and I really am not in a position to comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on the most recent confrontation between Marines and the Israelis today in Beirut?

A Yes, I do. There was a further incident today. Briefly, our information is that U.S. Marines halted three Israeli tanks which had attempted to cross into territory within the operational responsibility of the U.S. contingent of the MNF. We do not know why the tanks attempted to cross our lines, but the incident was resolved, and the tanks withdrew at the insistence of the Marine officer on the scene.

The recurrence of challenges to the Marines by IDF forces is unacceptable. We view such incidents very seriously, both because they endanger the safety of the troops involved, and hamper the peacekeeping efforts of the MNF.

The Acting Secretary will be calling in the Israeli Charge to discuss this incident and the gravity with which we view it.

-- MORE --

Q What time was the call?

A I don't have a time. When I came down, I don't think there was an appointment set.

Q Is it today that you expect it?

A I think that there was a hope and an intention to do it today. Whether that's actually been able to be set up, I can't tell you.

Q Do you have a copy?

A Copy? Yes.

Q Will that be a protest or what?

A I prefer to use the terms that I've used here: Calling in to discuss the incident and the gravity with which we view it.

Q Why the Chargé? Arens is in town, isn't he?

A I gather not. There wouldn't be a Chargé if he were in town.

Q I guess you have had time by now to review what Sharon told the founder of the Phalangist Party in Beirut, the head of the President of Lebanon?

A I haven't seen any additional reports beyond what we saw in the press yesterday.

Q Gemayel himself told the Assafir newspaper in Beirut that Sharon came to threaten him. He threated him, and he accused him of maneuvering to divide the country. Do you have any comment on this?

A I haven't seen the report. I can't comment on it.

Q Could you repeat that phrase that said about the confrontation with the tanks, a "recurrence endangers the . . ." What was the phrase?

A "We view such incidents very seriously, both because they endanger the safety of the troops involved and hamper the peacekeeping efforts of the MNF."

Q If these incidents are endangering the safety of the troops, why is it that the Administration views the peacekeeping force as being in a non hostile situation as defined by the War Powers Act?

A I think that's a different kind of situation. We are talking about a number -- a small but unfortunately perhaps growing number -- of incidents where there have not -- it hasn't been a shooting situation but there have been some incidents. It's just a situation in which we think there is obviously a certain potential for some unfortunate circumstances to come about, and that it ought to be resolved.

That is not the same thing as saying you're putting troops armed for combat into imminent hostilities. That's just a different kind of concept.

Q Have you not been given reassurances in the past that these incidents would not continue?

A We certainly have discussed this with the Israelis in the past and have sought to work it out, and we thought we were well on the road to working this out. We regret that this has now happened again, and we view it very seriously and will be taking it up appropriately.

Q By your count, how many incidents have taken place so far?

A I don't think I'm keeping count of this. You might want to refer to the Pentagon and see if they've kept count. This is, by the way, the first one since the last time we talked about one, which was the 17th, I believe, of January.

Q Aren't there some British troops in the area? Are they supposed to be acting as any kind of buffer between the Israelis and the Americans?

A I don't know about the deployment of British forces. I've seen some press reports that some British forces showed up quite recently, but I don't know what their responsibilities are.

Q In this particular area?

A Yes. I don't know anything about that.

Q Alan, you say there was a discussion with the Israelis about this incident?

A No. There have been discussions with the Israelis about "incidents." We've talked about it before.

Q I was just wondering what reason was provided for why the tanks were going to present this challenge to the Marines.

A In this case?

Q I'd have to ask you to refer to the Israelis. We don't understand the motivation for this action. As I said, we'll be taking it up with the Israelis.

Q Are they American-made tanks, by any chance?

A I haven't got the slightest idea.

Q The last time the American media press wrote about it, there were meetings between American and Israeli military officials in Beirut, and they agreed on something but they were not able to agree on borders or something like that. Was there something really achieved that we can know about or can become available to us to know exactly what was achieved at the time?

A First of all, I think the conversations you're talking about recently were between General Drori and Ambassador Draper, and accompanying Ambassador Draper on that occasion were some of the Marine officers.

There is -- I would have to refer you to the Press Office. There is a statement that we have in guidance which defines the area of operation of the Marines. I can't go beyond that. I don't think I can go into the conversations that took place except, again, we hoped we were in the process of resolving this and avoiding such incidents. Obviously, we need to do a little more work on it.

Q Can that statement that you mentioned, can it become available to us?

A Yes.

Q Can you say something more about the supplemental aid to Lebanon? I understand Mr. Veliotes is going to talk about it this afternoon.

A I don't haven't anything on it. I'd have to let you hear whatever it is that Nick has to say about it. I believe he's in open session this afternoon.

Q The results of a shooting incident against some French troops, do you have anything on that?

A No. Simply, that we understand that three

French soldiers were wounded in an attack in West Beirut, but don't have any details. Obviously, that sort of attack greatly concerns us and yet, again, underscores the importance for the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon as soon as possible.

Q Do you know if fire was returned by the French forces in that incident?

A I do not know.

Q Fire? Nothing on fire on the French?

A I don't have anything on it; I don't have any details on the incident.

Q There's a report this morning that an American Jewish leader, head of the World Zionist Organization -- whatever it is -- is calling on the Government of Israel to compromise and be -- would you care to comment on that? How do you see such comments?

A No. I don't think I would comment on that. Our positions are laid out, but I have no comment on Mr. Bronfman's comments.

Q There was a report in the Beirut magazine Monday Morning recently about Saudi pressures against Lebanon, not to conclude any kind of normalization with Israel, specifically boycotting certain goods, this kind of thing. Do you have any comments on this?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you take that?

A No. I think that we have addressed before the question of how the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon are proceeding, and what issues are being discussed; they put forth an agenda. The kind of issues related to how these two countries will relate in the future are part of what's being discussed if you look at the agenda, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to try to comment on that subject.

Q To follow up, this is not about the negotiations going on around the table; this is about outside pressures.

A What you're saying relates to what happens at the table, and I'm not going to comment on that.

Q Are you entertaining questions about Central America today?

Q I have one more in that region.

A Let's take the Middle East. We'll come back to you.

Q Where are we in the question of sending additional American troops to Lebanon?

A Where we have been before on this. That is to say that when we have, in essence, a plan before us of how this process of withdrawal of foreign forces is to go forward, and we know therefore -- at least have a better idea therefore of what is going to be required or desired in terms of some further mission for an MNF, if there is such, or further numbers of people if there is such a requirement, we'll look at it. But we don't have that in hand.

Q I would like to follow up a technical point. You referred to the Marines as troops armed for combat.

A I talking about the War Powers Resolution. Yes, that is the language that applies under the War Powers Act.

Q I understand that. It was my impression that the Pentagon has told us that they do not have bullets in their guns.

A I'm not trying to address that issue. I don't dispute that. This is a term of art that is within the language of the War Powers Resolution.

Q I understand that.

Q Do you have anything on Habib today?

A No. I have nothing new on Habib.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to the machine gun attack on the so-called moderate leaders yesterday evening meeting in San Salvador by the Martinez Hernandez Brigade?

A No. I don't know anything about it.

Q Can you take the question?

A I think that really falls under the heading of a news report, and I'm not a new, agency so, no, I don't have anything on that.

Q Let me just ask, though. D'Aubisson has been tied to that brigade in the past, and D'Aubisson said today -- demanded that his powers be reinstated or he would resign from his position on the Constituent Assembly.

A That's something that the El Salvador Government is obviously going to have to work out. I'm not going to comment on that.

Q Do you have any comment with respect to the military situation in El Salvador?

A No, I have nothing new today on that.

Q So you didn't want to entertain any questions on Central America?

A I am willing to entertain questions. It's just a question of whether I have answers for you.

Q I was going to try to get you to -- you said yesterday that there was heightened activity by both army and the guerrillas but that there was no shift.

A In the overall situation.

Q Is there a shift in the region around Berlin? Do you perceive a shift there?

A I don't have information to give you a tactical assessment of that. I gather from wire service reports that the government forces are mounting some sort of a counter-offensive. I haven't seen anything beyond that. I'm not going to try to give you a military sit rep in a local situation.

What I was willing to do is to say -- is it our judgment that the whole situation has changed in some dramatic way? -- and the answer is no.

Q But you won't then assess if asked specifically about the area whether the situation there has shifted?

A No. That also changes presumably in different areas at different times, and I just am not going to get in, as I say, to a sit rep kind of situation.

Q Most of the press reports made it seem like there was a pretty sound defeat to the army that took place there.

A To the seventy National Guardsmen who were there from the five hundred guerrillas who attacked?

Q The fact that the whole town was --

A The town may not be in good shape following that fighting. That's possible. I just don't have information on that.

Q Going back to your earlier statement, and just back to the Middle East for a second, would this be the first time an Israeli diplomat is called in by the State Department to discuss the incidents in Beirut?

A I can't tell you this is the first time somebody has been called in. It certainly is not the first time it's been discussed in diplomatic channels.

Q Why is the Charge actually being called here? Somebody did ask and I didn't get it.

A I have to assume then Ambassador Arens is not available. Otherwise, there would be no Charge. There would be a DCM, but not a Charge.

Q He's apparently in San Francisco.

A One of your colleagues says he's in San Francisco.

Q Do you have anything to say at all about the mass explusions from Nigeria that are going on?

A I don't have anything new to say on that. I have information on what we're doing to try to assist which, if you want, I can give you. You could also get it later.

Essentially, it's working with the U.N. agencies and the international agencies to try and help, but I don't have anything new today on the situation.

Q But we haven't made any sort of statements to the Government of Nigeria as far as whether we think that's a good idea or not a good idea?

A That what is a good idea?

Q The explusion, their decision to expel --

A I think I indicated the other day -- first of all, we don't comment on diplomatic exchanges, but we hope that all parties concerned are cooperating to insure that the disruption and human hardships are help to a minimum. I think I said that to you the other day.

Q Thank you.

A You're quite welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:15 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #24

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 1983, 12:25 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one brief announcement to remind you, or inform you if you didn't know, that there will be a press backgrounder on Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's visit which will be given in the White House press room at approximately 1:40 this afternoon.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a Green Beret being wounded in Salvador?

A I guess primarily I would refer you to the Pentagon, but I do have some information about a trainer.

Staff Sergeant Jay T. Stanley received --

Q I'm sorry. What's the name?

A Jay -- J-a-y -- middle initial T as in Thomas, Stanley -- S-t-a-n-l-e-y -- received a gunshot wound in the upper left leg while a passenger in a Salvadoran helicopter in the vicinity of San Vicente.

Staff Sergeant Stanley is in satisfactory condition in a Salvadoran military hospital. We understand that Stanley was proceeding to a training area from San Salvador when the incident occurred. The pilot noticed traffic backed up on the Pan-American Highway and decided to check out the situation. At this point the helicopter was taken under fire, and Staff Sergeant Stanley was wounded.

I don't have any details beyond that, as I say, and I would refer you to the Pentagon.

Q Under your rules of engagement is he allowed to be armed?

A I think we -- allowed to be armed. We've addressed this question before in terms of ability to carry certain weapons, or a weapon, with him.

Q So the answer is --

A The answer is that they are allowed to carry a weapon. I don't have a definition at this point of what that is. I can't remember what we've talked about. We've talked about this before.

Q Was the Sergeant armed when he was wounded?

A I have no idea, but this was not -- obviously, not a combat situation.

Q Was it a gunship?

A I don't have any details. I have no reason to believe it was a gunship, but let me refer you to the Pentagon. They've got the details, it's their man, it's --

Q Do you know if the helicopter returned fire?

A I have no information to suggest that it did.

Q Why would you say that this was not a combat situation if you don't know whether the helicopter returned fire?

A He was not participating in any combat situation. That's why I say that.

Q Alan, the pilot knowing that Sergeant Stanley was aboard, did he violate any rules of the road, so to speak, by taking him to a place where gunfire might be exchanged?

A Again, I think you'd have to check with the Pentagon, but, as I read the statement here, we're talking about a situation where he was going -- he was being transported, the pilot saw a situation on a highway, not a battle situation, and went down to check it out. So that's all I really have on it.

Q Along the same lines, General Nutting told the Miami Herald yesterday that he wanted more trainers and more military aid to El Salvador.

Do you have a comment on that?

A I don't. I don't have anything on that at all.

Q Could you take that?

A No. I don't --

Q Well, he's a U.S. official. It's the first time it's been said in a very long time.

A I think that various people have addressed their views on this in the past. Some people have talked about maybe it being desirable. I think we've indicated here that we had no plans.

Q So we have no plans.

A I know of no plans. Why don't I check it out, Jim, and see if I can come up with anything for you.

Q Do you have any update on either the military or the political --

Q Can we stay on this one, please? Was that a combat zone that he was flying over in your view?

A I don't have a view on it, Bernie. I'm not an expert.

Q Do you have a State Department view?

A I don't think the State Department --

Q I never talk to you personally anyway, so why do it this time? A State Department view.

A I don't have a view on a combat zone, per se. He was going to -- as I say, a passenger in a helicopter being transported, and I would ask you to check with the Pentagon on details beyond that.

Q What was the destination?

A I don't have the destination. It was in the vicinity of San Vicente. Go to the Pentagon, period. End of subject.

Q Do you have a hometown for this chap?

A No. I don't have his serial number either.

Q Do you have an update on either the political or military situation in El Salvador that takes us up to events of today?

A I have nothing.

Q Nothing at all?

A Yes.

Q What was the question?

A Any update on the political situation or the military situation in El Salvador.

Q Alan, have you anything to add or to clarify from yesterday's statement about the incident outside of Beirut between the Marine and the Israeli officer?

A The IDF? No. As I indicated yesterday, obviously there was some need for clarification of the situation so that we can avoid incidents in the future. I think that the Israeli Charge' indicated the same thing when he was here in the building yesterday evening.

That process is going forward. There has been discussion on the ground in Lebanon by U.S. and Israeli officials, trying to work this problem out so we can avoid further incidents, but I don't have details to provide you at this particular point.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Israeli explanation of the policy adopted by the U.S. trying to put the Israelis as hostile to the U.S. administration?

A I have not seen any statements to that effect. So, I mean, obviously that's not our purpose, but I'm not aware of any official statements to that effect.

Q Do you generally hold by the statement you gave here yesterday?

A Yes.

Q Specifically the point that the area in which this episode occurred was under what was the American operational jurisdiction or what ever?

A Yes. I stand by what I said yesterday.

Q Can you tell us anything more about the talks with the Charge'?

A No. I can't.

Q Was there a formal protest or anything like that you can characterize?

A I think I gave you yesterday the general character that we anticipated the conversation would take from our point of view, the concerns we would raise.

I think that he gave you some words when he came out. I don't have anything further on it.

Q Has the State Department checked what prevented the Marine --

A I'm sorry. Start again.

Q Has the State Department checked why the Marine officer didn't use this direct line that was supposed to have been installed between the Israelis and the Marines in order to solve such misunderstandings, or whatever you defined them like yesterday?

A My understanding is that some effort was made to use it, but it was an unsuccessful effort, but I can't tell you the precise details of why it was unsuccessful.

Q Could you also confirm what the Israelis are saying, that there was supposed to be a joint reconnaissance patrol by Israeli and Marine officers in order to decide exactly on the demarkation line, and this patrol was postponed because the Marine officers didn't get clearance from their superiors?

A No. I don't have anything on that. As I say, today there has been an effort on the ground by Americans and Israelis to go over this situation and clarify it, so we can avoid further --

Q One more follow-up, please. Some Israeli officials are saying that the source of the problem is the directive from the Pentagon to the Marines in Beirut not to conduct any direct negotiations or contacts with Israeli forces, and had such a contact been allowed, such incident could have been prevented.

Is there any reconsideration of this directive?

A I'm not familiar with the specifics of Pentagon directives on this. There clearly is a need, as I've been saying, for clarification of the situation to avoid future incidents, and we are working on it.

Q Are we still standing by the guidance that was issued here yesterday dated January 26 on the perimeters of the Marine operation?

A That is where we were as of that point. Whether as a result of the discussions there would be any change in that, I can't tell you, Jim. I think we have to wait until this process works itself out.

Q The point is that last Friday the Israeli General Drori, Ambassador Draper and the Commander of the Marines agreed that Israeli forces would patrol the area east of the Beirut railroad line, excluding the Rey Han College enclave.

A According to whom?

Q According to the Israelis.

A Yes. Okay --

Q Now, just a minute. But there's a point here.

A Is there a question?

Q Yes, there is, and I think perhaps you went off base yesterday in making -- or not you, but the Administration -- in accordance with this agreement an IDF unit consisting of three tanks patrol the area approximately 600 meters east of the railroad.

A Joe, I think --

Q Well, now, --

A -- let's -- I'm familiar with this --

Q You said that the Israelis were crossing the Marine line. Now there was disagreement. You agreed that there was disagreement.

Was there disagreement last Friday?

A Was there disagreement?

Q Was there an agreement last Friday?

A We thought that the situation that came out of the discussions -- we thought the situation was clear. Obviously, it wasn't.

Q Well, was there an agreement? I'm not asking about discussions.

A An agreement? Big A. An Agreement?

Q An Agreement.

A I'm not sure whether there was an Agreement. I'm not sure --

Q You're not sure. Does the State Department know there was agreement?

A Did you have a question?

Q Well, you're not answering the question --

A No, I'm not.

Q -- and this is very important.

A I don't intend to be badgered, Joe. If you want to ask me a question --

Q Well, you're not answering the question.

A You're not asking a --

Q I'm asking a question. Was there an agreement last Friday between the Israelis and the U.S. officials in Beirut?

A We thought that there was an understanding of how these incidents would be avoided in terms of where various --

Q I'm not asking about understandings or discussions. I'm --

A Well, I'm telling you --

Q Yes or no on an agreement.

A I'll answer -- you ask the question and I'll answer it. Okay?

Q All right. Well --

A Good. I'm answering it the way I'm going to answer it, and if you don't like it, you don't have to like it.

Q Well, you're making yourself suspect, and I'm trying to prevent you from being --

A Well, I'm not --

(Laughter)

Q You talked about you need clarification of the situation and there has been discussion on the grounds, and I believe since August 20 has been this occurrence of events by the Israelis objecting to the presence of Americans all over in that area in the way of Marines.

Besides the clarification did you get the iron clad commitment from the Israelis that they will not cross these lines that you set in the agreement to have your forces deployed with the multinational forces?

A I'm not going to try to address it in terms of iron clad agreements or that sort of thing. The point that we are trying to clarify yet again through, in this case, further discussions on the ground in Lebanon is some understanding of what the situation is so as to avoid further incidents.

I just can't take it beyond that at this particular point. Maybe we'll have some further clarification at some future point to offer you, but I can't right now.

Q Do the talks today involve Ambassador Draper and General Drori again?

A No. I don't think they were -- they conceivably could have discussions either together or with others, but the discussions I'm talking about did not involve Ambassador Draper or General Drori.

Q Alan, what has been our past policy on coordinating on the ground with the Israeli forces?

A There are a number of different mechanisms that have existed for coordination, including through diplomatic channels, through liaison mechanism, between Israelis and the MNF contingents, and so on and so forth. I don't have all the details of how that works out.

Q Following on that, but is it true or not that in the past the U.S. Marine contingent, its officers, have been under instructions not to discuss deployment of forces and things directly with the Israeli forces?

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon on that, John. I don't know what their instructions are, as I said before.

Q Alan, the last guidance we got on who was supposed to be where was dated 26 of January, and, of course, as you know, we had this meeting on 28 of January -- the U.S.-Israeli meeting -- to set up new guidelines about who was supposed to be where which seems to be one of the reasons for this latest incident.

Are you going to issue any new guideline that --

A I don't know what's going to come. Again, it depends, I would think, what comes out of this set of discussions, if it turns out to be a set of discussions that we'll be having. I would presume there would be some desire to get some understanding with a reasonable degree of precision, so that we avoid the incidents in the future.

I cannot tell you at this point -- I can't speculate -- as to whether we would have some other words to put down on a piece of paper for you.

Q Let me be a little bit more precise, then, with that question. The Israelis say X, Y and Z was decided between them and the Americans on last Friday.

What do we say happened, and what do we say was agreed upon?

A I'm not going to try to go back over that ground at this point. I think that the --

Q Have you ever gone over it?

A -- the focus of our concern is to avoid future incidents, and that's what we are bending our efforts to do.

Q 24 hours later on the basis of all the evidence that you've reviewed since yesterday, did the Israeli tanks come into the operating area of the Marines?

I mean, you still -- from all the evidence --

A I said to Hank before I stuck by what we said yesterday.

Q There's no change, no modification.

A Stuck by what we said yesterday.

Q Does that mean you reject the Israeli account?

A I'm not going to try to address the Israeli account.

Q Well, I mean, the Israeli Government has put out a statement that directly contradicts in many respects what you're --

A That's fine. Our point --

Q There's a charge leveled at you personally as the Spokesmen of the Department.

A Our point is that we are going to try to work out the problem so we don't have future incidents.

Q In other words, can we quote you as saying you do not want to comment on what the Israelis said?

A I have no comment on what the Israelis said. Bernie, did you have a question?

Q I'm just calling attention to the same thing they are. You statement yesterday talked about territory within the operational responsibilties of the U.S. The Israeli statement talks about an area under complete Israeli control.

A Well, I can't -- you'd have to ask the Israelis what their position is. I've told you what our position is. There is not a lot of utility, from our point of view, of trying to go back over and review this as an historical event. What we're trying to do is avoid incidents in the future, and that's what we're spending our time on.

Q Alan, one more attempt. Would you say now with the information you have right now, that the incident yesterday was a result of a misunderstanding regarding the exact lines, or was it a premeditated attempt by the Israeli forces to challenge the authority of the Marines thru?

A Again, as I said yesterday, I'm simply not in the position to read the mind of the Israeli forces.

Q No, but --

A If the Israelis have said, as I understand it, that there was no deliberate attempt to challenge the line, I have no particular basis for challenging that, but I can't read their minds and you'd have to ask them.

Q But you said the challenge yesterday.

Q Didn't Weinberger say that yesterday?

A I also said that I couldn't explain particularly why they had --

Q But you're still sticking with yesterday's statement --

A That's right.

Q -- that this is a challenge.

A That's how we perceived it. I'm not telling you what their motives are.

Q Yeah. Well --

A You're talking about -- now you're getting into the question of motives, and I'm not going to try to get into other people's motives.

Q I'm not getting -- I'm reading you back what you said yesterday -- a challenge to the Marines by the IDF. That still stands.

A I stand on what I said yesterday. Let's leave it alone. Dick?

Q Israeli Defense Minister Sharon is quoted as saying that on September 25, 1982, in his home, a Saturday, he met with Habib, Morris Draper, Sam Lewis, and two or three senior Israeli officials -- the Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and so on -- and it was agreed at that meeting that the railroad would be the boundary. And he said that the Americans accepted this.

Whatever happened to that?

A I would have to say that that is one version of what went on in that conversation, but I also don't intend to go back over what another version might be of that conversation. That's not the point.

The point is now to try to avoid incidents in the future.

-- MORE --

Q What gives you the problem of picking up an earlier question of saying that you reject what the Israelis said if you stand by yesterday's statement by rejecting it?

A You may draw whatever conclusions you want to. I'm not particularly inclined to address the Israeli statement. I'm going to tell you what our view is of it and what we are trying to do. I'm not articulating Israeli policy.

Q Does that mean that you didn't say what you said yesterday?

A No.

Q What was the question? I didn't hear it.

A I can't remember.

Q One of the charges the Israelis made is that the State Department issued your statement without checking with Israeli officials first or discussing the matter with them. Is there any truth to that?

A I don't know whether they were told first specifically what we were going to say. Certainly, before noon yesterday there was a clear understanding that we had a very serious problem with what had gone on.

Q But isn't it usual procedure to check and try to find out what's going on?

A We were in the process of doing that. But, in any case, that's my answer to your question.

Q Can you explain why yesterday in this carefully crafted statement there is no reference to wanting to get together with the Israelis, as you're talking about today, to work out a pattern to avoid future incidents?

A Can I tell you why?

Q Yes. In other words, yesterday you just laid down the charges without making the point that you're making repeatedly today and ducking all the other questions.

A I said that we were going to call in the Charge and express our views on this thing. It's also, it seems to me, inherent in the situation that you don't simply let a situation like that fester. You try and do something about it, and that's what we're doing.

I'm sorry if I didn't offer you those words yesterday.

Q Is this consultation on the ground a one-time ad hoc thing or is a regular mechanism for consultation going to be set up?

A I don't know.

Q Yesterday, were also reports of a shell falling in the Marines' area. Do you know where the shell came from and what was the target of it?

A I have no information of this. The general view was that there was a stray shell that fell into the area, but I don't have details about where it might have come from or -- it was not viewed as a specific attack against the Marine area.

Q Let's have a filing break.

A Filing break. Any objection? No.

Q Are these questions of boundary and territory legally negotiated between the two sides outside of the MNF committee? Can the Marines and Mr. Draper work directly with the Israelis on this?

A I'm not sure that this gets into a legal question. I don't think that that's the context in which we're working. Clearly, there is good coordination, has been, is and will be within the MNF Coordinating Committee, and I'm sure that all of this is either undertaken or will be undertaken in the context of that committee, too; that they will certainly be involved in this.

I can't tell you, though, in specifics on the ground when you're trying to deal with a situation that's there when you have people talking, whether you have representatives from everybody. That may not be the case, and I'm not sure that that's necessary.

Again, as I said before, it's not a legal issue, per se. It's an issue of trying to prevent people from having incidents.

Q I want to ask you to put things into perspective. Don't you think we've talked everything now about the Israeli and the Marines and you didn't mention that it's about time, because of the incident, that the Israelis should get out of Lebanon. Would you say it now?

A We have said many times we think it's time for all the foreign forces to get out of Lebanon. Sure.

Q Alan, I would like to read you -- your statement yesterday issued the following things: you said the occurance of challenges to the Marines by the IDF forces is unacceptable. You're other line says this thing hampers the peacekeeping efforts of the Multinational Forces.

Could I understand from this that the Israelis challenge to hamper, which is the motive behind the whole operation of the Israelis, to hamper the peace efforts, because it is in your statement?

A As I said, I'm not going to get to the question of motives.

Q I have a sort of academic question maybe. Was this kind of incident sort of calculated or anticipated by the U.S. Administration when it decided to send the Marines to Lebanon or it was taken by surprise?

A I don't really have an intelligent way of addressing that question. I think it was pretty clear at the time the Marines went in there that there would not be an immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon although we hoped it would be rapid. But quite clearly we would hope to avoid any such incidents and we have hoped to, and we have tried as they have occurred to make arrangements to avoid them in the future. We have not totally succeeded, and we're going to try again. We are trying again.

Q At the current time, what are your estimates about how long the Marines will be in Lebanon, is there increasing pressure to get them out soon, is there any talk of expanding their mission there?

A On the last point, as I said yesterday, we don't have a plan in hand to see what might be required for -- if there were a requirement for an expanded role or for the MNF or numbers.

As far as duration of stay, we've always said that there's no easy way to set a specific limit, or to predict it. Go go back to what we said at the beginning on that, that it just is not possible given the nature of its mission.

Q Perhaps as long as another year there?

A I know that this was addressed as a personal view yesterday in a hearing on the Hill, and that's exactly what it was. There's no way that I can stand here and give you some sort of official estimate of how long it'll be. I don't know.

Q In light of what has been happening, the big hula-hula about this incident, I've got the impression from you that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the other forces from Lebanon is not in the offing. We're not going to see it soon, a little bit longer than soon.

Would you be able to tell us what's happening in the negotiations, and do you share with me this assessment?

A The question for those who might not have heard it because it wasn't on the microphone is, it seems as a result of all this, or at least an implication of all this, is that the foreign forces, all the foreign forces will not be withdrawing soon and what's happening in the negotiations, and do I share the assessment that, in fact, they will not be withdrawing soon. Fair? Okay.

I don't think we can predict, except to say, that it remains very much our objective, and we are working toward the objective, that all the foreign forces, i.e., Syrian, Israeli, PLO forces, get out of Lebanon and get out soon. We've not withdrawn from that purpose and, indeed, are continuing to work toward it.

As far as the negotiations are concerned, I really would have to refer you to what's coming out daily from those talks. I think there's been a lot of activity, a lot of meetings, indications in those statements of progress, but they've broken down into the subcommittees as well as having plenary sessions.

As we've said before, however, we are not going to be commenting from here on the progress of those talks.

Q Anything on Ambassador Habib?

A I have nothing new on Ambassador Habib today.

Q Is he in Washington?

A I think he is still in Washington, but frankly I did not see him this morning so I can't tell you from personal knowledge.

Q In the light of all the questioning here this morning about the incident you reported yesterday, will you undertake a question to respond to the questions that have been asked as to whether (a) there was a specified agreement between the Marines -- between our side and the Israelis last Friday; (2) that the Marine officer involved said that he was acting at the request of the Lebanese commander in the area, and things like that, so we get a clear picture?

A No, I think I'm going to stick where I am on this, and that is that we are working to assure that such incidents are not repeated in the future.

Q The problem, if I may say so, and may ask you, isn't there a problem now that Israel is now being put into the dock, shall we say, in the Congress and elsewhere by Mr. Weinberger whose motivations we don't really know about, and other things, that indicate that the two democracies are fighting each other with perhaps the provocation of the PLO? (Laughter)

A Well, I think you're challenging of Mr. Weinberger's motivations -- I didn't hear the end of it but it didn't sound very appropriate. Your questioning the Secretary of Defense's motivations is totally out of place.

Q To tidy something up, did you or did you not say, so I understand this clearly, that yesterday's incident is a result of a misunderstanding?

A I don't know whether I said that. I think that one could probably draw a conclusion of that effect if you take the Israeli statement and you accept the Israeli statement. You know what we said. If those are two different interpretations and that's a misunderstanding, if that's the definition, there's a misunderstanding.

I'm not going to get to the question of motivations, however. I'm just going to say that we're going to be looking to working this out so it doesn't recur.

Q Motivation is not a -- misunderstanding is not a motivation. I'm asking you --

A No. The opposite of "misunderstanding" would get to the question of motivation.

Q One last thing. Prime Minister Begin is quoted today -- actually yesterday -- today's media, -- the press -- that if freezing the settlements will be what is needed to induce King Hussein to come into the negotiations, he will not do that, he will not declare a freeze.

Comming at the heels of President Reagan's yesterday, actually asking Israel to do something such as freezing the settlements, would you care to respond to that?

A No, I don't think so. Again, the President reiterated his views on this yesterday. The U.S. Government's views, the President's views, are out on the table and I'm not going to respond to what the Prime Minister said.

Q Do you say that the statement by Veliotes on the length, the possible length of stay of the Marines is not the view of the U.S. Government but his own view.

A He said at the time -- he was asked, in fact, at the time to give a personal view as opposed to an official view, because officially he was saying what I'm saying. But he was asked, come on, give us your personal view, at least, and he responded on that basis.

Q What's your personal view. (Laughter)

Q In today's Philadelphia Inquirer, there's an eyewitness account of the incident that took place outside of Beirut with the Marine. That reporter seems to suggest that the Israeli version is a lot closer to the truth as he witnessed it from 400 yards than the Pentagon's version of what happened. Are you familiar with that story?

A I'm not familiar with it, but I don't know that taking a 400 yard distant view of it is really going to be something we would respond to.

Q What he says is that the incident took place in a big, open field, and that the Marine went running out to the tanks and that they left within a very few minutes. His suggestion was that this was an area under the control of the Israelis.

A I don't know what his suggestion is. I don't think that his suggestion has much to do with it. The point is that you got a detailed description of the incident from the Pentagon, and I have no reason to believe that the Pentagon has changed its version of it. We haven't changed what I've said yesterday.

Q New subject, Alan. Do you have any comment on the Washington Post story today that Brazil is taking a significant step toward developing a nuclear weapons potential, and does this concern the government?

A I have a very long guidance which I will, I think, prefer to letting you get in the Press Office instead of doing it here. It's very complicated. It gets to very specific questions as opposed to a general reaction, and I really think --

Q Can it be made available now?

A We can make it available after the briefing.

Q Another subject. There was a report in the New York Times this morning about a memorandum concerning the Namibian question and a parallel withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South African forces in the area. Is there a way to get that memorandum now that it's public information?

A Good try. I wouldn't comment on an alleged leaked document, and I certainly wouldn't undertake to provide classified information. Whether there is a memorandum or is not, I don't know.

Q Is there any new development in this situation? Is the U.S. close to a breakthrough?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you on breakthroughs. We've indicated that we're hopeful. We continue to work on the problem.

Q Hopeful of what?

A Hopeful of a successful negotiation which would involve the Namibian independence and, as we've said before, it would involve a related issue of Cuban troops in Angola.

Q What about a possibility of a ceasefire? Do you have any information on that?

A What do you mean by a "possibility?" What is your question?

Q I said, do you have anything on the possibility of a ceasefire?

A I don't know. There are --

Q Pardon me.

A There are reports that South Africa and Angola are talking about that. I don't have an assessment as to whether they --

Q You have no assessment. Are we hopeful that one will be concluded?

A That a ceasefire will be concluded?

Q Yes.

A In terms of some sort of an agreement between them -- again, I don't want to comment in specific terms -- I could reiterate our belief that the talks that are going on have a potential for a positive contribution to the solution; the overall problems of regional security and progress toward Namibian independence.

On the ceasefire, as to whether -- obviously, it would have to be one of the early steps in moving toward regional peace and security and is, indeed, one of the objectives of diplomatic efforts to arrange a regional settlement. But I don't have an estimate of how likely that is.

Q There was a recent report on a South African newspaper which indicated that the hostages in Zimbabwe are dead. Do you have any new information on that or any reaction to that?

A I have no new information; nothing that would confirm that.

Q Is the State Department investigating that report?

A There is a constant effort underway to stay in touch with the situation. The Government of Zimbabwe continues it's efforts to locate the hostages, following every lead, and we've been in constant and continuing contact with the Government of Zimbabwe and also the families of the people who were abducted -- the hostages -- since the abduction occurred.

Clearly, we are very actively trying to stay with this and so on. But, again I would reiterate, we've nothing to confirm the report that they're dead.

Q Is the State Department involved with the fathers of the two American hostages. They are currently in Zimbabwe, and I'm wondering if the State Department is assisting them in whatever they're up to.

A As I say, we have been in continuing and constant contact with them since the abduction took place. I think I would have to refer any questions about the trip, the trip of the two fathers who are there, to the families. I don't think it would be appropriate for us to comment on that.

Q Any demands made on the kidnapping and, if so, have any of them been met?

A Other than what has appeared publicly, I don't think it's appropriate for me to comment on that. The Government of Zimbabwe has undertaken certain actions and efforts in this regard; intense search of the area of where they were seized, reward has been offered for information. The government officials, including Prime Minister Mugabe, have appealed to the population for any information concerning the hostages.

Zimbabwe radio and T.V. stations have broadcast appeals by the families of the hostages for their safe return. Joshua Nkomo has also called for the release of the hostages and has urged the population not to assist the abductors in any way. But I just think it would be inappropriate to go into any detail.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 4, 1983

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DPC #25

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1983, 12:31 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is El Salvador certification. That was his appearance today.

A reminder: There will be a BACKGROUND briefing on security assistance here in the briefing room today at 2:30.

On Monday, February 7, at 3:00 P.M., there will be an ON THE RECORD briefing here in the briefing room on the President's Democracy Initiative. Under Secretary Eagleburger will be conducting that.

One other announcement: On the release of the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982, it is our understanding that this time that the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982 which were presented by the Department of State to Congress on January 31 will be released to the press on Monday morning, February 7, embargoed for reporting until Tuesday, February 8, at 6:00 P.M. So, Monday morning, but embargoed til 6:00 P.M. on Tuesday. Copies of those reports will be made available to State Department accredited correspondents from our Press Office after 11:00 A.M. on Monday. Keep in mind again the embargo.

Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary Charles Fairbanks, also of HA, will give an ON THE RECORD briefing here in the briefing room at 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, February 8. That briefing will also be embargoed until 6 P.M. on Tuesday.

Any questions on that rather complicated --

Q On the security assistance report, have you had a protest from the Greek Government about the projected increase in the Turkish military assistance program?

A I don't have any information to give you about our discussions with the Greek Government. I would simply note that U.S. security assistance to Greece, as well as U.S. military facilities in Greece, are now under discussion in U.S.-Greek talks on a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, so-called DECA, which began in late October 1982 and are expected to reach a conclusion this year.

The current proposed FY-84 security assistance program for Greece, therefore, carries over the FY-83 levels. The U.S. Government has informed the Greek Government that in the context of an acceptable DECA, the United States Government will seek increased levels of defense support for Greece above the level in the current program.

Q And the next paragraph on your paper there, will that projected increase, assuming an acceptable agreement, keep the proportion which the Greeks insist is necessary to maintain a military balance in the Aegan and the Eastern Mediterranean -- a 7 to 10 ratio?

A U.S. defense support programs are guided by principles set forth in U.S. law, which include enabling Greece and other NATO allies to fulfill their responsibilities as members of NATO and preserving the balance of military strength in the region, not talking in terms of rigid formulas.

Q In other words, you have abandoned the ratio that the Greeks believe the United States has committed itself to?

A Our programs have been, and continue to be, guided by the principles set forth in U.S. law, as I say, which includes enabling Greece and other NATO allies to fulfill their responsibilities as members of NATO, and preserving the balance of military strength in the region. But I'm not going to define it more precisely than that, nor have we done so.

Q When does Reg Bartholmew come bac

A I don't know when he is due back next.

Q Alan, after the discussions that were held yesterday in Beirut, do you have now any new information about the circumstances of the famous incident? There are some major officials quoted by the news agencies saying that the Israelis deserve an apology for what was said by Secretary Weinberger and by some other officials.

A I think I would address this in terms of what has been agreed, as opposed to that particular thrust on the issue. Our Embassy has reported agreement on a "no go" line around a portion of the MNF position close to where the incident involving the Marines and the IDF took place on February 2. So we hope that this situation has been satisfactorily resolved, and there would not be a recurrence of incidents.

Q Was that agreement made in concert with the other members of the MNF?

A Again, I don't know what the specific steps taken were. I'm sure that the MNF as a whole is involved, but I think that it was probably taken on the spot with the Marines. It was a local situation around a Marine and an LAF position and was taken there. All of this, of course, falts, into the entire MNF process. This is not essentially a Marine/IDF question. The issue is an issue of the MNF, which is there, of course, at the invitation of the Lebanese.

Q Besides the understanding about the future, there were some tough things said about the circumstances of the incident, and there are some press reports coming from Beirut that American officials in Beirut are admitting that the incident took place in an area which was outside the perimeters of the Marines' control.

Could you tell us now if you still insist on the version that the incident took place in the area under the Marines' control, and were the Israeli forces trying to challenge the authority of the Marines?

A Basically, I've addressed this. I have no change in the statement that we made initially. I'm not aware that anybody -- and we've tried to check this -- on the American side has said something different about this.

You had a third part to your question. I don't remember it.

Q Maybe you could answer the third part of my previous question: What is your answer to the Israeli official who is quoted as saying that Israel deserves some apology for the way it was treated?

A I think that we think this incident is behind us -- we certainly hope that it is -- and that the series of incidents is behind us, and that there will be no future recurrence.

Q Alan, in this "no go" area, is the point of the incident in that area, is it in the U.S. area, or is it in the Israeli area?

A Of course, there was no "no go" line previously. As it was worked out on the ground, because of the physical features in the area, the actual point of the incident is outside of that area as that line is now constructed. Of course, as I say, that line did not exist at the time of the incident.

Q I don't understand your answer. The specific question was, the point of contact --

A Yes, I say that point of contact --

Q -- where is that now? It is in whose area?

A It isn't a question of whose area. Let's be careful about that. It is outside of the "no go" line, as that line exists. That line did not exist prior to yesterday.

Q If it is outside the "no go" line, then it falls into somebody's jurisdiction. Whose is it?

A It isn't a question of jurisdiction -- that's what I'm saying to you. The "no go" line represents an area, a line beyond which the IDF may not move and has agreed that it will not move. That is just the arrangement now, worked out on the ground yesterday in order to avoid future incidents.

Q Why can't you answer my question?

A I did.

Q You did not answer the question.

A I've answered the question. That position is outside of that line as it now exists; it didn't exist before.

Q Where is the incident area now? Whose area is that now?

A As we have stated earlier -- and in fact as we have informed the Israelis -- the Marine area of operation extends past the railroad to the old Sidon Road, so in those terms, it is within the Marine area of operations, in that sense.

Q The incident took place within the Marine area of operations?

A Yes. I said I'm staying with what I said before. I think you're getting away from the basic point, which is that an agreement has been reached so that future incidents are going to be avoided.

(Laughter)

Q We are not getting away from the basic point.

A That is the basic point. You don't seem to agree with me. Try a different way.

Q Alan, excuse me, were those three Israeli tanks to proceed in the exact same maneuver today as they did the other day, would the Marines challenge them?

A I think today, given the -- I can't say. You know, you're posing a hypothetical situation. That point today, given the agreement on a "no go" line, that point where they were met by the Marine is outside that line.

Q So, whose area is it?

A I'm not going to try and define whose area it is. It's Lebanese area. O.K.?

Q Who is running around -- The tanks could go --

A It is the Marines' area of operation in the sense that we have defined it. The Israelis, however, have been operating in this area before. There has, obviously, been some disagreement on what has been said in the past about who should be operating where. No question about that. What has been tried now, again, is in a practical manner to work out a line around a position where there has been a problem so that that won't happen again.

Q Are you suggesting that there wasn't any agreement prior to the incident about the line and where it --

A I said, clearly, there are different interpretations of what has been said about who would be operating where.

Q So you would define it as a misunderstanding?

A I'd say there are different interpretations.

Q Yes. Now, the question is, if there are different interpretations, why were you and why was the Pentagon so hasty in putting out this statement before you tried to find out what had happened?

A No, I think the point also is that we had informed the Israelis of our view of this, and we felt that that had been clarified, including in the conversation on the 28th of January. But again, you get to the day of the incident and conversations after that, and there are still different interpretations I would say probably if you want to address it in some narrow, legalistic sense there may still be. But we think that this arrangement, in fact, will avoid future incidents.

Q What incident will they avoid, Alan, (inaudible) going to that spot or Marines challenging Israeli tanks that go to the spot?

A I think they will avoid Marines and Israelis confronting one another, if you want to use that kind of a word, in this area.

Q Is it O.K. for Israeli tanks to go to that area?

A I'm not going to try and give an O.K. The point is that we understand the Israelis operate in the area between the Sidon Road and the railroad, despite the fact that we've had different interpretations about how that should work. And although in fact, as I say, the area of operation for the Marines extends to the road, we understand from the Embassy in Beirut that the Marines have not been patrolling in that area and don't have plans to do so, so that we don't anticipate that they would come up against one another.

Q Can you take Greg's question again, please, and answer that question? If the Israeli tanks turned up in the same place today, would the Marines challenge them?

A I can't tell you what all the circumstances would be. I would think that the answer depends on what it looks like is happening. I would suspect the answer, generally speaking, assuming that there were no suggestion that the Israeli tanks were heading for an area beyond the "no go" line, that there would probably not be a meeting of the IDF and the Marines.

Q President Reagan this morning, in his news conference, was asked about whether the Marine officer acted properly, or something like that, and I think the President said that he had no other choice almost, or something like that.

A Right.

Q But my question here is, when you say a "no go" line, is this a demilitarized zone, is this a (inaudible) or what?

A No. It's what I described it. It's a line beyond which it has been agreed that the Israelis may not, and have agreed that they will not go.

It's a practical line.

Q Alan, on Wednesday, you gave us a description of the area, that the Marine control went beyond the railroad to just west of the Sidon Road, and then you said that because of these terrain features, that it might be as much as over 100 meters.

Now, you have a new "no go" line that was not there before. Is the area on the Marine side of that line now smaller than it was Wednesday?

A The Marine area of operations, as we said earlier, extends past the railroad to the old Sidon Road. As I also just said, we understand from our Embassy in Beirut that in fact the Marines have not been patrolling the area beyond this science faculty area and had no plans to do so. But now you're dealing in an area between what is the position and how it is viewed in a general sense, on the one hand, and what the practical operational facts have been, on the other. And the facts have been, except around the science faculty, that the Marines had not been patrolling that particular area.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, would it be fair to say, then, that the area where the incident took place is now under the de facto operational control of the IDF?

A I don't think I would care to characterize it that way. I think that we know that the Israeli patrols enter this area from time to time. We have reached an agreement on a line past which they won't go. We think that will solve the problem.

Q Is the "no go" line, so described, closer to the railroad than the point at which this incident occurred?

A I say, at that point, yes, because of topographical features, as it has been drawn, the precise point where Captain Johnson met the tanks is outside the "no go" line.

Q Closer to the railroad?

A No. I think it's -- the line is closer to the railroad, yes. I mean, the line -- I don't have a map to give you. Let me just describe the line, and if you have a map, you can trace it.

The line starts at the Khalde triangle. It proceeds north along the railroad tracks, forms a semicircle around the U.S. Marine position at the Lebanon University Science Faculty Building, and then meets the Italian area of operation to the north.

But you're asking questions about jurisdiction versus practical operations, and I think those are somewhat different concepts.

Q Alan, besides the agreement on the "no go" line, was there any new agreement regarding contacts between the IDF and the Marines in order to resolve any future misunderstandings?

A At the meeting that took place yesterday? I'm not aware of any new ground rules that have been laid down. But, again, I would -- as I did yesterday, I really have to refer you to the Pentagon on the instructions that the Marines have on this.

Q Can I ask three questions? One is a follow-up to Rafi's. Could you help us out with this matter? Can the ordinary Israeli soldier and American soldier talk to each other?

A Ask the Pentagon. I'll give you the same answer.

Q The second point: President Reagan said today that the same soldier tried three times to challenge that line, and that soldier denied it.

Who's right on that point?

A The President has spoken to the subject. I don't have any different information.

Q The third question -- and this is not facetious -- does that "no go" line apply to PLO infiltrators? Who's going to patrol and keep them out?

A I think that we have addressed before the question of PLO infiltrators. I don't think, to the extent that there might be any PLO infiltrators -- and, as we've said, we haven't found or been given any evidence that PLO are running in and out and using that area -- but, in any case, I don't think a "no go" line has much relevance to them. It has relevance to where we're operating.

Q Have patrols been increased to try to prevent this infiltration?

A I think you can draw your own conclusions from what I said.

Q Did I understand you to say a moment ago -- perhaps even reading from a statement -- that the U.S. knew that the Israelis have entered the area of the incident from time to time?

A That they have patrolled --

Q You said "have entered it from time to time."

A They have patrolled the area between the Sidon Road and the old railroad tracks from time to time.

Q And does that include the point of the incident yesterday as well?

A I don't know.

Q Does the "time to time" include the incident area?

A I don't know. I don't know where they have specifically patrolled. I don't have any specific way of doing that.

Q No, no. It becomes very pertinent.

A Well, certainly there have been incidents -- look, there have been incidents at this same checkpoint that is related to this particular incident. So if you want to talk about a general area, the answer is quite obviously yes.

Q Alan, is there going to be any kind of a formal inquiry into this incident?

A I know of no formal inquiry, but, again, I think that the Pentagon, if you're talking about military operations, is the place to ask that.

Q Alan, was there a checkpoint, a Marine checkpoint, at the point of the incident?

A I think that the Pentagon has explained how that took place, and I refer you to their account of that.

Q Number two, you said that according to the Embassy in Beirut the Marines had not been patrolling that area west of the railroad track -- between the railroad track and the Sidon Road?

A Had not been generally patrolling the area that is outside of what is now the "no go" line.

Q They had not prior to the incident?

A I think that that is generally correct. We're dealing with -- and I really would ask you to go back to the Pentagon's description of the incident and how it relates to the checkpoint which is in that region and why Captain Johnson went out to meet the tanks before they got to the checkpoint. I think that that is explained.

Q I just wanted to ask one more thing: Would it be a reasonable assumption that the Israeli tanks that were in that area were surprised to see Marines there at the time that they encountered the Marines?

A I don't know if it's a reasonable assumption or not. I think the reason for having gone out there, in light of the previous history at that particular checkpoint, has been explained by the Pentagon.

Q Alan, when the question of an apology came up before you seemed to be saying, "No, there wouldn't be an apology," but you didn't say that.

Can you give us a "yes" or "no" answer?

A I think that, as I said before, the issue is behind us, and we hope that there will not be a recurrence of future incidents.

Q Alan, new subject?

A No. Let's stay on this one and get it through. Go ahead.

Q The French today announced that they're increasing their participation in the MNF by 350. Are you intending to follow suit?

A No, I have nothing to announce to you about an increase in the U.S. participation. I don't really have information on the French move of -- the reports -- but would refer you to the French and the Lebanese Governments on that.

Q Alan, as I understand it, despite this "no go" line, there is still an area between there and the road where the Israeli patrols and the Marine patrols could overlap.

Are there instructions to withdraw from any confrontation should they meet each other in that area? What guidelines are operating in this area?

A You'd have to ask the Pentagon about guidelines. But what I'm trying to indicate to you is that as a practical matter, the Israelis don't intend -- said they will not operate north of that line; and, although the Israeli -- excuse me, although the Marine area of operation in fact goes down to the road, they have not been and have no plans to operate south of that line or whatever the direction may be.

Q So the Marines themselves will not go beyond the "no go" line now?

A I say that they have not been and they have no plans to do so, but, again, we're getting in the area of what you might see on a piece of paper versus what is being done at the moment, and I do not anticipate as a practical matter that if both the Marines and the IDF continue their current practices and observe the "no go" line, that there would be a future incident.

Q You consider that the Marines will not themselves move beyond the "no go" line even though you still --

A I can only give you what I just gave you.

Q But do you still consider the Marine responsibility up to just west of that road.

A Yes.

Q So in effect is that a DMZ? Is that an area where they're not going to --

A I'm not going to try to define it in those terms.

Q Is that "no go" a line or a band?

(Laughter)

A Would you explain your question?

Q In other words, do the two areas of operation come flush up against each other, or is there a band that is in effect, some sort of a --

A No, no. I think there is essentially viewed to be a line. There's not a gray area.

Q Can you do any better today, Alan, on the question of motivations?

A No.

Q Israeli and American, in this whole affair?

A No. I'm not going to discuss motives.

Q I just want to clarify one thing about the line. They said they were marking this thing off with colored barrels.

A Yes. Apparently.

Q That is the "no go" line where those barrels are?

A Yes. We understand from our Embassy that the Marines today marked the line with colored barrels.

Q Did the Lebanese government have anything to say about that agreement between you and Israeli forces?

A Again, I'm sure, as I said to Jim before, that all of this has been coordinated in terms of -- after all, we're talking about an MNF operation there at the invitation of the Lebanese Government, in support of the Lebanese Government, and I'm sure that appropriate coordination has taken place.

Q Have you got anything today on Ambassador Habib's plans?

A I think he will be returning to the region shortly, probably be traveling over the weekend, and in the area next week.

Q Alan, I hate to belabor the point, but AP has a story out quoting an Israeli official as saying the Americans ought to apologize, and you're not saying whether or not you will. You're saying you probably won't.

But I hesitate to write at this point that you're saying there won't be an apology.

A I've given you my words on that.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q I'd like to have a clarification on the Brazilian nuclear question. According to yesterday's Washington Post the agreement between Brazil and the United States did not foresee the possibility of Brazil producing its own plutonium in the reactor and reprocessing it in its own safeguarded facility.

Therefore, according to State Department sources mentioned by the Post, Brazil has not violated its agreement technically.

Is that your interpretation?

A Yes. We have no reason to believe that any violation has occurred.

Q Alan, did you see any effort by the Brazilian Government to conceal its plutonium producing activities or --

A I'm going to have to say, Roberto, beyond that and the fact that we don't believe Brazil is building a nuclear weapon, I'm going to rely on the guidance that was available in the Press Office yesterday. I don't have anything further for you.

Q Just a follow-up on that. So one can assume that after your statement of yesterday, that there would be no formal request from the United States Government to the AIEA (sic) on further inspection of Brazilian facilities.

A I can't tell you. I don't know. I mean, whatever -- I honestly did not master that rather long complicated guidance yesterday, and whatever we said on that subject, go with that. But I stand by the statements I made today about violation of intention to build a weapon, or building of a weapon.

Q The statement yesterday said that this kind of thing has to be inspected, so what I would like to know is if there is any formal step from that point? Is the United States Government going to ask formally for inspection?

A I have nothing for you on that.

Jim, did you have a follow-up on that?

Q I don't understand, because what you've just said seems to go contrary to what was said in the guidance yesterday.

A I don't think so. I think the guidance yesterday was addressing itself to a number of technical, complicated questions such as irradiated rods, and so on and so forth.

This is designed to be a rather clearer statement, "yes-no" kind of statement, because it didn't really answer the most pertinent questions that people were putting anyway.

Q Can I stay in that area for a couple of questions? Are any State Department officials accompanying Ambassador Kirkpatrick to Central America?

A Of course, she has a role here in the State Department, but people from ARA you mean?

Q Yes, that would be good.

A I do not know the answer to that.

Q Can you take it?

A No. I don't think we'll get into the question of what staff might be accompanying her. If they were senior officials, that's one thing, but --

Q All right. Also the Foreign Minister of Suriname, is he seeing anyone in this building?

A No.

Q None?

A No.

Q And do you have any statement with respect to the alleged suicide of an army officer in Suriname?

A Simply that our Embassy in Paramaribo has reported that the Surinamese National Radio announced that Major Horb was found hanged in his cell. We don't have any further details.

As you know, we're concerned about a number of incidents that have occurred recently in Suriname, including the brutal killing of Surinamese citizens in December as well as the arrest of a number of people for allegedly plotting an assassination attempt and a series of house arrests.

We continue to watch the situation in Suriname closely and with great concern, and we hope that those persons currently in custody will receive the benefit of full due process.

Q On the Middle East. Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, in his open conference, new conference, yesterday -- he gave the impression, he said that the United States Government has no longer a negative view of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Can you elaborate or maybe could give us some information about this feeling that is going on through the Administration?

A No. I don't think there's anything different to say beyond what we've said before, which is that if the PLO accepts U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognizes Israel's right to exist, we will talk to them.

Q Another area?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on who this Director of the American Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry has been meeting with here in the Department? Anything at all about the purpose of his visit here?

A Simply that Mr. Kinast came to Washington for consultations with the Polish Embassy, and that during his visit he has engaged in discussions with various officials of the Department of State concerning the current status of U.S.-Polish relations, but I do not have details for you.

Q Do you know he met with?

A I don't have details on that.

Q What is the status of U.S.-Polish relations at the moment?

A I don't think I have a general description to give you. They could stand some improvement, and we've indicated some of the things we think could help that, but I'm not going to give you a general characterization.

Q Has there been some kind of attempt recently, particularly with him, to try to smooth over some of these bumps or reaction -- for example, the temporary closing of the UPI office was a rather moderate one compared to your reaction when Ruth Gruber was first --

A I think I would simply -- in terms of Mr. Kinast's visit -- stick with the language I've given you. He's engaged in discussions here. I don't want to characterize those.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:01 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #26

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1983, 12:23 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Afternoon. Two announcements for you.

First, a reminder that there will be a briefing here today at 3:00 p.m. on the President's Democracy Initiative. The briefer will be Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger, and he will be ON THE RECORD.

Secondly, a statement regarding the expulsion of aliens from Nigeria. On January 17, Nigeria announced that all undocumented aliens had to leave the country within two weeks.

While the original expulsion order has subsequently been modified to extend the deadline for four weeks and for certain categories of aliens, several hundred thousand expellees have left Nigeria.

It appears the numbers of expellees traveling home has peaked. We do not have exact numbers, but most of those affected apparently are Ghanaians.

The Government of Ghana has estimated that over 350,000 if its citizens returned home.

We are participating in an international relief effort in which the U.N's Office of the Disaster Relief Coordinator, UNDRO, is taking the lead in coordinating emergency humanitarian assistance.

In Benin, where large numbers of expellees were initially concentrated, owing to closure of the Ghana-Togo land border by the Ghanaian Government, we authorized use of up to 720 metric tons of food and donated $20,000 for purchase of emergency supplies such as drugs.

In Togo we made available up to 30 tons of food and $25,000 for purchase of emergency supplies.

In Niger we have donated $25,000 to purchase fuel to transport the returnees from processing points to their home regions.

In Ghana we made an initial allocation of 60 tons of food to feed returnees.

We are coordinating with other donors under U.N. auspices on what additional aid might be needed in Ghana and elsewhere.

Okay. Happy to take your questions.

Q That's in print, isn't it, that statement?

A Yes. You want a copy of that?

Q Yes.

A Yes, sure.

Q Do you know if American citizens have been expelled from Nigeria?

A I'm not aware of American citizens being expelled, but let me check that, and, if there's anything different, we'll let you know.

Q Alan, does the State Department have any comment on the New China News Agency report just after Secretary Shultz left China on the continuing difficulties caused by the Taiwan issue?

A No. I don't think so, Jim. The Secretary's party, I think, has addressed the issue, and I don't have anything different for you.

Q Did you have anything -- I wasn't here last week -- did you have anything after the reports about his outburst at American businessmen in Peking?

A His outburst?

Q Yes.

A I think, again, he addressed that in his press conference in Peking.

Q Do you expect to have a backgrounder on that trip when he comes back?

A Not anticipated having one.

Q No.

Q No.

Q No.

(Laughter)

Q Have there been any requests from the French Government about any links between Barbie and U.S. Counterintelligence in 1948?

A I can't tell you. I don't know.

Q Do you have any statement on the extradition yet? Still none?

A No. I said, I think this is going to be between the governments concerned. Our attitude towards Nazi war criminals is quite clear and unambiguous.

Q There was a charge that Barbie had been paid by U.S. Counterintelligence, I think in the year or two immediately after '45.

Do you have anything on that area?

A I don't have anything, and I don't know that -- again, the charge relates to intelligence activities, and I don't know how we could address that subject one way or another, Bernie.

Q It's historical.

A I understand, but it still gets us into that question.

Q Do you have any comment on the reported agreement that Israel is said to have achieved between various warring factions in Lebanon?

A We've seen reports that such an agreement has been announced, but we can't confirm them. While we feel that only the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces and the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government throughout Lebanon can lead to stability in the area, meanwhile we would welcome steps which ease tensions.

To the extent that this reported agreement speeds the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the extension of Lebanese Government sovereignty throughout Lebanon, we would view it as a positive development.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy. Yes.

Q Can you tell us what the agreement is? We couldn't hear the question?

A There's a report in the press about an agreement that the Israelis have worked out between the Druze and Christians in areas of Lebanon. But, again, those are press reports, and we cannot confirm them.

Q So, Alan, you're not saying that this agreement does anything toward hastening the exodus of foreign forces? You're just saying if it does, you endorse it?

A I'll stick on what I said. There were a couple of different points including the welcoming of steps which ease tensions and to the extent that it leads or speeds the withdrawal of foreign forces. Then I go on with what I said.

Q Alan, could you comment on a report that Mr. Enders has prepared a memorandum for the National Security Council, saying that the Government of Salvador should either form a coalition with the guerrillas or invite in the Marines?

A We don't talk about internal documents, but I'd just have to say somebody would be using his imagination to come up with that sort of a policy as attached to Ambassador Enders.

Q Are you confident that the Lebanese Central Government would be able to control the Shouf area if the Israelis pulled from it, and this is the thrust of the report?

A I understand the issue. I think that that's something that would have to be worked out by the parties concerned. I don't think that that's something for me to proclaim upon here. Obviously, that would be an issue of concern which the Lebanese Government would want to address directly.

Q Alan, would the U.S. favor a unilateral Israeli withdrawal to that original 25-mile line that the Israelis initially at the outset of the invasion had mentioned?

A Bernie, again, this is a subject for the discussions that are now going on, and I don't think it would be proper to address that.

Q Why not? I mean, you're pushing for a withdrawal.

A We're pushing for a total withdrawal of all the foreign forces -- Syrian, Israeli, PLO -- from Lebanon. As to the specific interim steps that might be a part of that, again, I think that's part of what should be addressed by the negotiators.

Q Where is Ambassador Habib now, and is he carrying any new ideas now with him?

A Ambassador Habib is in Rome now enroute to the Middle East. I don't have anything for you on any instructions he might have.

Q El Salvador?

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q Any definitive conclusion now on the incident involving the Marine and the Israeli soldier?

A I have nothing more for you on that.

Q Sort of on the same line. Did Ambassador Hinton approve the operation last week in which Staff Sergeant Stanley was wounded?

A I think it's quite obviously from what Ambassador Hinton said this morning on television that he did not approve it.

Q The Pentagon is saying that he normally would have --

A I'd have to refer you to the Embassay in El Salvador, but Ambassador Hinton addressed the issue on television. I think we ought to stick with what he said about his role and his attitude towards it.

Q Could you tell us what he said?

A I have a transcript. I can't tell you how exact it is, but I would refer you to the "Today Show" for --

Q The "Today Show." But, I mean, this explains --

A I'm sure they'll be delighted to have that reference.

Q I mean, is this a clarification of what actually did happen?

A No. A statement was issued by the Embassy, and I think also released -- made available here and at the Pentagon as far as we take it at this point. It is being investigated now by SOUTHCOM, and we're going to withhold any further comment in light of the fact that there is an investigation going on.

Q But, in other words, the guidance you had initially is now regarded as not having been correct?

A I can't tell you entirely on that. Again, Ambassador Hinton addressed it, and he indicated that he felt that elements of it in fact -- it was not an invented story, it was essentially right, but that there was more to it.

We have made available the facts as they have been known to us, and we've done it as fast as we can, and there's nothing -- no effort here being made to hide anything. Quite to the contrary. So I think it's now a question of allowing the investigation to proceed, and not commenting while that's going on.

Q You usually provide transcripts of T.V. interviews involving Administration personnel; why not this time?

A We usually do it if it's being done from here. I can give you later an informal version, but I'm not going to let you quote it as coming from the State Department. If you want to quote it off the television, that's fine.

Q Very frequently you put out transcripts when Secretary Shultz or somebody shows up in the studio for --

A That's right. We make an official transcript of that available.

Q I don't see what the difference is this time.

A We have not made a practice of doing that with people overseas who are interviewed on television. I don't care if you want to make reference to what we can make available to you, you may. But I'm not presenting it to you as authorized because I don't know if it's exact. That's the only concern I have about it.

Q How can you explain, in your initial report -- I think it was last Thursday -- that described the Stanley wounding as a result of a traffic jam, in effect, and the Embassy in El Salvador describing that flight as operational?

A Again, I don't think that -- let me refer you to what Ambassador Hinton said. He indicated, as far as I know, that that sequence about dropping down on the road to see what was going on was as he still understands it, but I just think that --

Q Was what?

A Initially as explained was, in fact, right. But I really think it is not profitable for us to be trying to prejudge what an investigation is going to be coming up with. I think this is silly.

Q Wait a minute.

A You want to find out what the facts are. So do we, and so we have an investigation going on.

Q But you didn't hestitate to prejudge it Thursday.

A Those were the reports we had initially. We try to give you what we have.

Q Alan, whereas your intitial report on Thursday was in many ways -- I mean, it was arguably consistent, or it was understandably consistent with what later came out. Who said that they were on their way to a training area?

A I don't know who specifically made that point. The information we had came from the mission in El Salavador. I don't know --

Q So that came from the Embassy?

A It came from the Embassy. I don't know who intially made that statement.

Q And you now understand that to be wrong?

A I think I'm going to stand on what was said in the statement that was issued by the Embassy and made available here, and I think it makes quite clear what the current role in this is.

Q Under normal circumstances, is it correct that the Ambassador would have the final say-so over the use of those trainers in El Salvador as a Pentagon spokesman claimed this morning beyond the specific Stanley wounding incident?

A In terms of approving each individual action that a trainer takes, I would doubt very much that he would approve each individual action. In terms of, is he the general authority --

Q General policy --

A May I finish? In terms of the final authority within country about what is proper and what is not proper, clearly, the Ambassador is the final authority. But I can't tell you what is submitted to him in each case that a trainer is taking an action. I would doubt that he reviews the daily schedule of the trainers personally each day, but he has --

Q Might he begin that?

A He has ground rules laid down. I'm sure they're going to be making efforts -- I think he explained that again this morning -- to be sure that there's no misunderstanding and no violation of those ground rules.

Q Do the same rules that govern the trainers and what they do govern also the MILGROUP itself?

A They're part of the Embassy Mission.

Q There was this report in the Post over the weekend -- Sunday, I guess -- that said that the head of the MILGROUP had been in the same area on a helicopter not less than twenty feet from the ground. Was there anything to that?

A I have no idea. Again, I think the issue here is what is the mission of that particular individual, and the mission, as described in the statement that I hope you have read by now that was issued over the weekend, makes it clear that it was not entirely simply a training mission, but had an operational dimension to it.

Q I understand, but I'm referring to the MILGROUP.

A I don't know.

Q Is that a subject of your investigation?

A I can't tell you what they will want to look into when they get down there. But the investigation, I think, relates, at least in the first instance, to the things that went on with regard to these two flights.

Q When these trainers were first shipped down there, Alan, it seems to me that the training was said to be promised to take place in garrison rather than in the field. Did Ambassador Hinton change those orders?

A I'm not aware of that particular restriction. I think it's been quite clear that trainers have not totally been within a garrison environment, but I don't know what the rules are. Let me look and see if I can find something about what the parameters are in terms of Ambassador Hinton's role in that.

Q Still on Salvador but not advisors or trainers. Any comment on the Archbishop's statement yesterday?

A We don't have the complete text of the Acting Archbishop's Sunday homily, but obviously we would share his dismay about any non-combantant civilian deaths that might have been the result of fighting around Berlin.

Our own understanding, along with press reports, indicates that a large proportion of the civilian population had been forced to abandon their homes in Berlin during the initial guerrilla attacks on the city before the Salvadoran Army had launched its own offensive. The facts surrounding any reported bombing of Berlin are still unclear, and we're simply in no position to make a definitive comments on the subject.

Q On the 16th of January the Archbishop said that there should be negotiations between the FDR/FMLN, by name, and the government and the army. Does the State Department have a comment on his recommendation?

A No. I think our position on the question of negotiations is quite clear.

Q The Post says this morning that former Senator Stone of Florida is being appointed the Administration's public spokesman for Caribbean/Central American policy; is that true?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Enders is going to Madrid, I understand, this week.

A I think he's there now.

Q Can you tell me why he's doing that?

A We consult from time to time with a number of governments outside of the region about questions in the region. We do this with a number of countries on a number of different regions.

Q Is it in connection with the Gonzalez peace plan that's been talked about in Central America?

A I don't have details for you about what he's discussing, but I think that the general issue of our relations and policies and concerns about Latin American would clearly be the focus of what he's talking about.

Q One other question, with respect to the negotiations. You said it was quite clear, but as much as the press commentary has indicated in testimony last week, Enders admitted that there was a certain lack of clarity. Could you spell it out?

A I think what he said, and I think correspondents who wrote on that perhaps did not pay sufficient attention to what he said, was that as a result of the certification proceedings and so on that there were confusing signals coming out of the United States. I don't think he said that the Administration's policy was confused. He clearly did not say that and did not intend to say that. If you look at the quotations, I think you will find that is an accurate summary of what he said. This continues to be picked up as though he said that American policy was confused.

As I say, the only reference to confusion was the fact that you have different voices coming out of the United States but the Administation's policy is not --

Q Can we change subjects? Any comment to the report in today's Washington Post regarding the speculation in Israel over the findings of the Commission of Inquiry?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the upset victory of General Stroessner in Paraquay? (Laughter)

A No.

Q The Lebanese Central Government has sent an envoy to this town and he met --

A To where?

Q To Washington. He met officials in this building and in the Pentagon. The mere reason, as I understand, for his visit is to get you to send some more Marines to jointly enter the area where Israel is going to be pulling out of, mainly the Shouf area where the fighting had been taking place.

A I'm not aware of it. Don't know anything about it.

Q Do you have any response to the Greek Government's protest over the increasing aid for Turkey?

A We addressed this last week, and I don't have anything new for you.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, February 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 27

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one announcement regarding the African Development Bank. Today at 1:45 p.m., President Reagan will host a ceremony in the White House marking the entry of the United States as a new member of the African Development Bank. The President of the African Development Bank, Wila Mung'Omba, will join President Reagan on this occasion. Other guests will include Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, members of the African diplomatic corps and representatives of the U.S. private sector active in Africa.

AFDB President Mung'Omba and Thomas Dawson, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Treasury Department, will be prepared to answer questions immediately after the ceremony in the White House press room.

For a more in-depth discussion of the African economic scene and the operations of the AFDB, Mr. Mung'Omba has agreed to be available to the media, February 9, at 10:00 a.m., in the Douglas Room of the Four Seasons Hotel.

That's all in the way of announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, regarding the Israeli Commission report -- I don't know how you care to address this -- one, will it have any effect at all on the matter of negotiations for the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon? Will it perhaps accelerate or slow that process because of political results in Israel?

A First of all, as far as the report is concerned, in itself, we would not have any views to offer on it. With regard to your specific question, we don't see why the impact of this report, whatever that may be, should affect the Lebanese negotiations or the current Habib mission.

Our view is clear. The issues being addressed are urgent, and they must be resolved as soon as possible in the interest of Lebanese stability and sovereignty as well as in the interests of Israeli security.

Q Does it follow, then, that you make no distinction between the views held by Sharon and the views held by the Israeli Cabinet?

A I don't know to what views specifically you're referring.

Q You don't see why it should have an impact, you're saying, therefore --

A I will stick with the statement I just gave you.

Q Alan, does the United States, which has had its own personnel in Beirut throughout this period, has it ever come to any conclusion of its own as to the responsibility for the massacre? Does the Commission report accord with those views, whatever they are?

A We have not tried to draw those kinds of conclusions. We have noted that both the Israeli and Lebanese Governments have had investigations under way, and have not tried to make judgments of our own on that.

Q In the Commission report, at least according to wire service stories, there is some implicit, at least, criticism of the United States on two grounds: one is perhaps a premature withdrawal of the peacekeeping force initially before the massacre; and second, not enough pressure on the Lebanese Army to take over the policing duties. Do you have any comments on those?

A No, not really. We've addressed those issues in general ways before, but in terms of the report itself, I'm not going to comment.

Q Do you have any information today about the progress of the Lebanese investigation?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, why do you say you don't see why the report should have any effect on the Lebanese negotiations?

A I refer you back to what I said. Our view is clear that the issues being addressed are urgent, and that they must be resolved as soon as possible in the interest of Lebanese stability and sovereignty as well as in the interests of Israeli security.

Q Do you have any characterization of the report itself? As reported, at least from what I've seen on the wires, one of the closing statements was that this was impartial and that the Board of Inquiry hoped that it would be seen as that. Does the State Department have any reaction?

A I don't think it would be appropriate for us to comment on the report in any way.

Q Just to clarify your statement, you say you don't see why the Commission's report should have an impact -- should affect the Lebanese negotiations -- but that doesn't mean to say you don't believe that it might.

A I'm going to have to stand again on what I said here.

Q Alan, the Habib mission, the President said that Mr. Habib was going back with some new plans and proposals. Can you go into any of that?

A No, I have nothing for you beyond what the President said.

Q Alan, there are reports, hypothetical, or scenarios which are circulating now that it may be that Mr. Begin will call for an election, and this will put things behind. What is your position going to be -

A This gets into not only the realm of speculation of the hypothetical, but also into what the Israelis might do internally, and I'm just not going to get into that.

Q To go back to the Lebanese investigation, does the United States consider it important that the Lebanese investigation come to some sort of conclusion?

A I don't have a value judgment to offer you on that.

Q So it has no bearing on our assessment --

A I didn't say that. I said I don't have a value judgment to offer you.

Q This question also concerns the Middle East. Do you have anything about the visit of Mustafa Dudin from the West Bank?

A No.

Q He is in the United States.

A Yes. I don't have anything on his visit.

Q He is not going to meet any of the officials of the State Department?

A I'm not aware that he is. He did not during his last visit, and I'm not aware of a change in that.

Q Alan, is it implicit in your statement that perhaps one outgrowth of the report would be early elections in Israel? And is it not implicit in your statement that that should not have an impact in the negotiations in Lebanon?

A What I said was that we don't see why the impact of the report, whatever that may be, should affect the Lebanese negotiations or the current Habib mission, and I will stand on that.

Q This morning, Yassar Arafat from Amman was interviewed on ABC, I believe. He made the statement that although he was, I think, pleased with the results, he made an accusation against the United States and Israel, and said that the first criminal, Menachim Begin, was not taken to trial. He called for the establishment of tribunals like the Nuremburg Trials to take the United States and Israel to task because of the laxity in this massacre. What do you comment on this?

A I don't have any comment.

Q The PLO spokesman, the head of the information office, also made a statement this morning saying that Lebanon is not demanding that the PLO troops withdraw their forces, just that the Israelis withdraw. Is that Lebanese policy as we understand it? And do we concur?

A I would have to let the Lebanese Government articulate its own policy. I would repeat what we've said before, which is that it is our understanding that the PLO and the Syrians both would be withdrawing, and would be willing to withdraw in the context of the withdrawal of all the foreign forces, including Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces from Lebanon. I have no reason to change that estimate, or to think that that is something different from the Lebanese Government's view as well. But I think that the Lebanese Government would have to articulate its own policy.

Q One more follow-up: did President Reagan's statement yesterday, when he omitted PLO and Syrian troops, indicate any shift in policy or emphasis?

A No.

Q Alan, on the general subject of the Middle East, do you have anything on the new Iranian offensive?

A I have a little bit for you.

Q Can we stay on the same subject?

A All right. Go ahead. We'll come back to that.

Q There was a report in this morning's Christian Science Monitor that suggests that Israel is attempting to establish village leagues in southern Lebanon along the lines of the village leagues it has tried to establish on the West Bank.

Is that in accordance with your knowledge of what is going on? And if it is true, how does it gibe with the plans to get a complete withdrawal of all foreign forces?

A I don't have a comment for you on the specific report, but our position remains that we want all foreign forces, including those of Israel, as well, of course, as the forces of Syria and the PLO to withdraw from Lebanon as soon as possible. At the same time, we want to see the authority of the Central Government of Lebanon extended throughout the country, and we oppose any actions which retard the achievement of these fundamental goals.

Q What does that last phrase mean?

A It means we oppose any actions which retard the achievement of these fundamental goals.

Q Would you oppose, as we've asked you, a unilateral Israeli withdrawal?

A I addressed that before.

Q But I'm asking you about this new language you're using now.

A If you want to apply --

Q Could you give us an example of something you would oppose under that heading? (Laughter)

A I will stick with the statement I've just given you in the context of the question that was asked about the Christian Science Monitor story on the establishment of village leagues in southern Lebanon.

Q Is the Department looking into the question of how the transcript of the meeting of Ambassador Arens, Deputy Secretary Dam, and Ambassador Habib reached Newsweek magazine?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, would you refresh our memories on what you have said in the past concerning a partial withdrawal as a --

A Basically our approach is to get a total withdrawal. I am not going to comment on the question of how that might be achieved in terms of specifics within the context of a total withdrawal. That's something to be worked out on the ground by the various negotiators.

Our objective, stated probably more often than you'd like to hear, is to get a total withdrawal of all those foreign forces.

Q But you are not ruling out countenancing a partial withdrawal to achieve that end?

A That's right. I'm not addressing the question of how that might be achieved, but total withdrawal is our objective.

Q Can I follow this? If there is a simultaneous withdrawal of the Syrian and Israeli forces to come to an agreement, you will object to this type of partial withdrawal or symbolic withdrawal from both sides, the Syrians and Israelis?

A Again, I'm not addressing myself to that question. I think it depends on the context in which anything would take place. It depends on the agreement between various parties, and so on. I just can't address that. That's something for the negotiators to address.

Q You said before that it was our understanding that Syria and the PLO would be willing to withdraw in the context of a total withdrawal?

A Yes.

Q Do you have those assurances from --

A I don't want to characterize what we have or don't have. I think we've said before that the Syrian Government addressed this issue. The Secretary addressed this, I think, in his press conference, and so on. I would stick by what I've said in terms of what is on the public record already about the PLO attitude. But I don't have anything new to offer you in terms of defining that.

Q You're really talking on the basis of statements made by Syria and the PLO rather than our understanding, which would suggest something beyond that, or you don't mean to?

A I'm not sure I understand the distinction you're drawing.

Q Well, there's quite a difference between a public announcement by a government, as you certainly should know, and our understanding of something.

A I think that our understanding is consistent with what I've just said to you.

Q Based on public statements by the two?

A Again, I'm not going to go into the question of the entirety of what our understanding is based on. I'm giving you what our understanding is, and I stand by that.

Q Alan, another subject?

Q Alan, before going to another subject, would you mind answering what I asked you about Iran and Iraq, the new Iranian offensive?

A Right. We understand from various sources that on the evening of February 6, the Iranians attacked at several points along the front, mainly in the area near the Iranian city of Dezful, but I'm not able to comment on the course of the fighting.

Our policy with regard to the Iran-Iraq war has been clear and consistent since the outbreak of hostilities. The policy enunciated when Iraqi forces entered Iran remains our policy today.

The U.S. supports the independence and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq, as well as that of the other states of the region. In keeping with our policy worldwide, we oppose the seizure of territory by force.

We see the continuation of the war, as we have repeatedly said, as a danger to the peace and security of all states in the Gulf region, and we have therefore consistently supported an immediate cease-fire and a negotiated settlement.

We have welcomed constructive international efforts to bring an end to the war on the basis of each state's respect for the territorial integrity of its neighbors, and each state's freedom from external coercion.

We have maintained a firm policy of not approving the sale or transfer of U.S.-controlled military equipment and supplies to either belligerent.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes, fine. You had a question?

Q Yes. Can you confirm yet whether Romania is imposing its education decree?

A A number of cases have now been reported by the U.S. Embassy and other embassies in Bucharest, as well as by individuals abroad who have family members in Romania.

We're concerned that the Romanian Government may have begun to implement the tax, although we have no confirmation from the Romanian Government to that effect.

We're in continuing contact with the Romanian Government on this matter.

Q Will the U.S. deny MFN as a result?

A U.S. law on this is clear. Implementation of the Romanian education tax would mean loss of Romania's MFN tariff status. We've made that point explicitly to Romanian authorities.

Q Alan, when you said -- to come back to that question I asked you before about our understanding that Syria, PLO would be willing to withdraw in context of total withdrawal, if I quote you correctly on the basis of what you said, are you therefore by implication singling out Israel as being responsible singly for the stalemate in the negotiations in Lebanon?

A First of all, I'm not sure I'd agree with the word "stalemate." We have said that these negotiations are proceeding much more slowly than we would like to see them proceed.

Negotiations, of course -- there are different talks which need to proceed, but I think we need to see agreement on all fronts. I'm not going to try to single out, evaluate and weigh the various portions of this.

Q But the thrust of your question would pointedly single out Israel. Is that what you --

A Israel has also expressed its intention and desire to withdraw all its forces, so I don't see a difference in that.

Q Where is Ambassador Habib now, and when do you expect him to go to Jerusalem?

A He is in Jerusalem.

Q He's in Jerusalem?

A That's my understanding.

Q Do you know with whom he's meeting?

A I don't have any details. As usual, I don't.

Q The Washington Post today made reference to a sale of surplus U.S. butter to Egypt. Have we announced that? Is there any --

A I'm not aware of any announcement, but I guess I would have to refer you to Agriculture.

Q There won't be a statement from here on that?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Could you look into it, please?

A No. I think I'd refer you to Agriculture in the first instance.

Q Any more details about the anticipated visit of the Secretary to the Middle East --

A I have nothing.

Q -- in the next month?

A I have nothing new on this. The Secretary's indicated he would go when he thought it would be useful for him to go, but I don't have anything to announce on that.

Q Robert Hunter, the former National Security Adviser of the Carter Administration, suggested that --

A Who's this?

Q Robert Hunter --

A Hunter. Yes.

Q -- suggested on, I believe, CBS this morning that together with the efforts of Ambassador Habib that he sees that the Administration ought to appoint a special emissary or a special negotiator for the West Bank and Gaza in addition to all of the efforts which are done by Ambassador Habib. Do you have any --

A We have Ambassador Fairbanks specifically working on that task.

Q It looks like he has some idea to maybe increase the people in the area to have some --

A We don't have an idea to do that.

Q Alan, why is Mr. Eagleburger meeting with Mr. Dobrynin this afternoon?

A Ambassador Dobrynin requested the meeting. They do meet from time to time. I don't have specifics to offer you.

Q What time is that?

A It's on the public schedule.

Q 3:00 o'clock.

A 3:00 o'clock?

Q At 3:30 it's the Helsinki Watch Committee. Are the two things related?

A I don't have any information, again, on the reason Ambassador Dobrynin is coming in, any specifics of his coming in, so I couldn't comment on that.

Q Excuse me if this has been asked recently, but there's been repeated recently from Israel a story to the effect that American negotiators in connection with the incident involving the Marine Captain and the Israeli tanks, American negotiators in Beirut agreed that the Marine Captain was wrong. These are stories out of Israel. Do you have any comment on that?

A Yes. That is not an accurate report. Somebody in Israel may be saying that that's accurate, but that is not the case.

Q In other words, no acceptance of some --

A I think we've addressed this at more than a necessary length, and I stand by what we've said before, and I'm not going to go back over it. The answer to your question is that it is not accurate that the U.S. changed its position on this.

Q Alan, the supposed links at some point in the past between Klaus Barbie and U.S. Intelligence keep on cropping up in the press.

Has the French Government asked the U.S. for any background information on any possible connection between Barbie and U.S. Intelligence?

A The answer is I don't happen to know, but I also couldn't take it because we'd be getting into the question of diplomatic interchange, and I wouldn't get into it.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Vaclav Havel, the Czech playwright who's supposedly very ill?

A Yes. We're aware of reports that he has been ill. We have made our objections to the arrest, harrassment and intimidation of dissidents, and of Vaclav Havel in particular, known to the Czechoslovak Government on numerous occasions, both through bilateral contacts and in international fora such as the Helsinki Review Conference in Madrid.

We deplore the fact that the conditions of Havel's confinement have contributed to the deterioration of his health. We understand that Havel has been moved to a medical facility, that he is receiving medical attention, and that his condition is improving.

Q Do you have a spelling on that?

A Spelling: V-a-c-l-a-v H-a-v-e-l.

Q And he's a playwright?

A I'm coached from the back of the room that he is a playwright. I don't have that here.

Q One more on Romania: Did Secretary Eagleburger meet yesterday with Mr. Malitza?

A Yes, he did. He met with him at the Romanian's request. They have met on a number of occasions to discuss matters of mutual interest, including the education repayment decree. Yesterday's meeting which is, as I say, was at the Romanian's request was such a meeting.

Q This is the Romanian Ambassador?

A Yes.

Q Alan, your earlier comment, you said, "May have begun with this tax." Why --

A We have reports, and we're concerned that they may have begun to implement it, but we have no confirmation to this effect from the Romanian Government, and we are in touch with them.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #28

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1983, 12:08 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcement. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q F-104s, Alan?

A Yes. F-104s. That's an airplane, I understand.

Q Yes, it is. A very old one, apparently.

A Do you have a specific question?

Q Yes. Taiwan.

A What about it? I'm serious. I want to know what your question is.

Q You have been sending F-104s to Taiwan since December. How many? When was the decision taken?

A I don't have specifics on "a decision." Let me refer you back to a few things. First of all, I would refer you back to our statement of last January; that is, a year ago, in which we indicated that in addition to extending the F-5E co-production program in Taiwan, that we would be replacing aging aircraft now in Taiwan's inventory with comparable aircraft. Start with that.

Secondly, this, therefore, has been an on-going program underway for several months and is consistent with the joint communique of August 1982.

In terms of numbers, there was a shipment of aircraft in December -- December 29th was the first sale. I can't tell you exactly when shipment took place. I don't have sort of detail -- of 23 aircraft, and that sale was valued at $11 million dollars. I understand there's going to be another sale of fourteen aircraft in the next week to two weeks. That is valued at $6-1/2 million dollars.

Q The total figure that the Pentagon is giving out is 66 aircraft.

A I don't know. I don't have information on any future sales beyond these that I've just given you, which I guess adds up to 37. I'm not denying it. I don't know.

Q Has the Chinese Government reacted to this?

A I couldn't address whether the Chinese Government has reacted to it because we would be getting into diplomatic conversations. I would simply point out that, as I said before, it's within the terms of what we announced a year ago and is fully consistent with the communique of August.

Q Was it raised during Secretary Shultz' visit to Peking?

A Again, I think it would be inappropriate to discuss that.

Q Are these 14 and 23 all F-104s?

A Yes.

Q You say that next shipment was $6.5 million?

A Yes.

Q In two weeks?

A In the next week to two weeks; 7 to 14 days.

Q You have no other information on future sales?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you tell us anything more about that plane, Alan? Do you have any biographical sketch of that plane?

A No. It's obviously not a new plane. As I understand, the design is some thirty years old and the production was in the Sixties. But I'm not an expert on this obviously, and I think you have extended the limit of my technical knowledge.

Q When you say "sale over the next week or two," do you mean delivery?

A Again, I don't know what delivery dates, and so on and so forth, are. I can't tell you.

Q You don't know whether any have, in fact, arrived?

A I don't know.

Q On the same subject of aircraft, have the F-16s been delivered to Pakistan now?

A I don't know about that. I think probably you ought to check with the Pentagon on the Pakistan deliveries, or with the Pakistan Government. I just don't know.

Q Why wasn't this announced rather than coming out the other way?

A Announced?

Q In other words, why wasn't this announced that such a sale was being made when the sale was made, I think, you said December 29?

A I don't think all sales are announced. It depends on the circumstances, what it is, that sort of thing.

Q And why was this one not --

A This is a small sale. It's $11 million you are talking about.

Q Does the timing seem appropriate or is that just not important; that is to say, the Secretary in China arranging summit meetings and trying to broaden contacts, and so on and so forth?

A As I say, the first sale was in December, which was a couple months ago -- certainly not in the context of the Secretary's visit. I think that the story came out shortly after the Secretary left China. That's quite separate and distinct from when the sale was made, so I don't see a relationship between the two at all.

Q Can you announce all future arms sales to Taiwan even though you may not consider them important?

A No. I don't think I would commit us to announcing all future arms sales to anywhere.

Q You think this will have any impact on the Secretary's expression that renewed efforts have been made to freshen up the Chinese-American relationship?

A I think the Secretary's remarks stand on their own. I've indicated how we view this in the context of the announcement we made a year ago and of the August communique. I don't think I need to take it beyond that.

Q New subject. Do you have any comment today on the Israeli Commission of Inquiry or the possibile political changes in Israel?

A No, not beyond what I said yesterday.

Q Do you have any comment on the column this morning of Evans and Novak in the Washington Post about the --

A Remind me. I read it but I don't remember the subject.

Q The Jewish lobby is preparing a blitzkrieg against the Administration; something like that?

A No, I don't have a comment.

Q Does the State Department have any reason to disbelieve the figure in the report of 700 to 800 dead in the two camps?

A We don't have an estimate, so I don't have reason to disbelieve it; no. But I don't have an independent estimate either. I can't really address myself to it.

Q In the last issue of Newsweek there was a transcript of the conversation between Phil Habib and Dam and Israeli Ambassador Arens. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Is it an accurate transcript, can you say?

A I obviously would not comment about accuracy or non-accuracy of a private conversation. I just don't have any comment on that.

Q Anything about Ambassador Habib's next step?

A No. He remains in Jerusalem, but I don't have anything further.

Q I understand there is something in the Inquiry Commission report which suggests that Israel repeatedly asked the United States to try to persuade the Lebanese to conduct mop-up operations in the Palestinian areas of Beirut and that the United States refused to do this.

A I think we have addressed ourselves to the question of the role. You're talking about going back to the first introduction of the MNF, and we've addressed ourselves to that many, many times ON THE RECORD and I'm not going to go back over that, and I am not going to get into the question of what the Commission report said.

Q Also on Lebanon withdrawal, is the United States opposed to a partial withdrawal of --

A I've been asked this now two days. This is now the third day in a row. I really would go back and take a look at what I said.

--MORE--

Q Alan, the Lebanese Prime Minister has said that he has written guarantees and assurances from both the Syrians and the PLO that "they will withdraw totally from Lebanon at the appropriate time."

Do you have anything on that?

A As I said yesterday, it's our understanding that they would be willing to withdraw totally. I don't intend to go into what constitutes the basis for that understanding, but I addressed this yesterday. I don't have a particular comment on the remarks that you're citing. Let me just leave it at that.

Q There was this morning a meeting with Phil Habib in Israel. Is it your understanding that the pace of the talks is not influenced by the developments in Israel?

A I said yesterday that we don't see why the impact of the Commission report, whatever that may be, should affect the Lebanese negotiations or the current Habib mission.

I said that our view is clear, that the issues being addressed are urgent, and that they must be resolved as soon as possible, both in the interests of Lebanese stability and sovereignty and in the interests of Israeli security. I don't have any reason to change that view.

Q Alan, Peter Sherman last night and I think this morning on CBS, if I'm not wrong, indicated that there are fears in Lebanon, throughout West Beirut and other areas -- the occupied territories -- that future massacres might happen.

Do your men on the ground, your sources on the ground, warn you or alert you that such a possibility might happen, and what guarantees do you have for the Palestinians now in the way of securing them so that they will not have to fear any more reprisals or any more massacres?

A I'm sure that issue is one that would need to be addressed by the appropriate people in the various negotiations, and that would be certainly a matter of concern.

I don't think I'm going to get into the question of what internal reporting we get on this, but I think that this is a matter we know to be of concern. We know what the history was, and, as I say, it's something to be addressed by the Lebanese with the various parties.

Q You are part of the parties.

A I think it can be addressed, but I don't intend to try to spell out arrangements here, when that is something which has to be worked out on the ground between various negotiators.

Q Let me follow this, if you don't mind. The question that President Reagan said day before yesterday, on Monday, that the possibility of increasing the Multinational Forces and the possiblity of the Marine contingent being increased there -- is this one of the things that could be, you know, interposed into this situation?

A I don't want to try to speculate how those concerns that you've raised might be addressed. The fact is that I'm sure they will be addressed by the people on the ground, but I don't want to try to make the connection that you're making. I just would like to leave that to the negotiators.

Q Alan, in the report released yesterday the Commission seems to praise Israel for what it has done, and in a way criticizing other parties who stood by -- Lebanon, I guess, Arabs, and I understood also that maybe criticism of the Administration here for not at least having looked into it in any way.

Do you understand it as the way I did, and, if you do, do you have any answer or reply to that?

A Again, I'm afraid I'm just going to stick with our position of not commenting in any way on the Commission report.

Our position on the role of the Multinational Force and the question of withdrawing that Multinational Force has been addressed several times in the past, and I don't have anything new to add to that. I'd refer you back to some comments that the Secretary made, I think, on this a long time ago.

Q New subject?

A Please.

Q Alan, do you have any comments on the Spanish Prime Minister's comments or statements on rapprochement between the United States and Havana? How it could be accomplished?

A I guess what I really can do is reiterate what Ambassador Enders said in his press conference, which is that our previous attempts toward normalization with Cuba under Presidents Ford and Carter did not result in more moderate Cuban behavior. The prerequisite for peace in the Caribbean Basin is not restoration of full diplomatic relations with Cuba, but Cuban restraint from fomenting and exacerbating tensions in the region.

We're interested in actions, not in words. Cuba's actual behavior continues to be characterized by flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and increasing closer military ties with the Soviet Union.

There can be no significant progress in U.S.-Cuban relations until Cuba demonstrates it is prepared to play a more responsible international role.

Q Copy?

Q Are those all Enders' words?

A Copy, yes. I can't tell you whether they're all Enders' words. In fact, I'm told that Tom conducted his press conference in Spanish.

Q English copy, please. (Laughter)

A That leaves me out of the parsing business.

Q Did the Dutch Defense Minister bring any word on Dutch intentions toward deployment of missiles today in his discussions with the Acting Secretary?

A I don't have any readout on the discussion.

Q Do you have any reaction to the reported statements of the U.N. Secretary General in Dar es Salaam yesterday with regard to condemnation of the American linkage of troop withdrawal from Angola in exchange for independence for Namibia?

A I'm not aware, first of all, that he mentioned the United States.

Q Yes, he did.

A Second of all, our position, not on linkage but on the relationship between these two events, is quite well-known. I don't have anything new to add to it. It remains our view.

Q Housekeeping, Alan. When is the Secretary due back, please?

A The Secretary is due back tomorrow evening at this point.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Senator D'Amato's allegations in Rome that U.S. intelligence officials at the Embassy in Rome are discouraging investigation into the papal case?

A I wasn't aware that he had made that charge. I've heard that charge before.

Q Yes. He did.

A I thought he said that they weren't pursuing it. In any case, it is certainly not the position of this government to discourage the investigation of this case by the Italian authorities.

We, as we've indicated before, we are not conducting an independent investigation, but it is certainly not our policy to discourage the Italians.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the American who supposedly was set free by the Guatemalans?

A Not really. I understand that Mr. Ernest and his Spanish companion, indeed, have left or are leaving -- let me see what the word here is -- were released yesterday, and they are both returning to the United States today. I don't have any specifics on their travel arrangements or, in fact, any other details at this point.

Q Alan, have you responded to the Soviet request for a resumption of the Aeroflot flights to the United States?

A In fact, there has not been a formal approach by the Soviets on this issue. As you know, Presidents Reagan and Carter placed restrictions upon, and later suspended Aeroflot flights to the U.S. in response to unacceptable Soviet actions in Afghanistan and Poland.

Those sanctions, of course, remain in place.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:24 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #29

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1983, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements: first of all, for your information, we anticipate that Secretary Shultz may have a brief statement to make upon his arrival at Andrews Air Force Base this evening. He is due in at approximately 8:20 P.M.

Second, on Laos and the POW/MIA issue, in response to the request of the United States Government, the Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic has agreed to the visit of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center delegation to the Lao People's Democratic Republic on February 12-14, 1983. That's all for announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any word on the fighting between Iran and Iraq? Is that --

A Jim, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Is there a reassessment of American policy toward El Salvador?

A I'm not, obviously, going to get into the question, as you know, of whether there are papers or not papers, which was the subject that was discussed. I just want to make that clear, though.

On the substantive issue --

Q What was the subject?

A El Salvador. Our position is clear and will not change. We support the Government of El Salvador in its struggle against the armed guerrillas; we will go on supporting it with military and economic aid. At the same time, we support reconciliation in El Salvador, giving all who renounce violence the opportunity to participate in democratic institutions.

We oppose negotiations over power-sharing, believing that only through elections can legitimate governments emerge. We continue to support reconciliation through the democratic principles and specific recommendations enunciated in the Declaration of San Jose, which was signed by a number of countries in the region.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy of that? Fine.

Q What does that mean, San Jose?

A I don't have the principles here. We've gone over this at some length before, Bernie. These were principles and recommendations as to how -- referred to outside military presence in the region, armaments in the region, and so on and so forth, which one would hope that all the countries in the region would subscribe to and would lead to a reduction of tensions and the ending of hostilities in the area.

Q Is there going to be a new effort made to try to bring about what you call this democratic reconciliation?

A That, obviously, is up to the Salvadorans.

Q No. I mean with U.S. encouragement.

A As I say, the question of how they would proceed with the reconciliation really is up to them to find their political solution to their conflict. We support that Government's initiative of a peace commission to promote reconciliation, and we hope that it will be implemented soon.

Q In other words, there is no new effort by the United States?

A No new effort? We discuss the issue with lots of countries all the time, but I don't have anything to announce to you in terms of some new initiative on the part of the United States, and as I say --

Q I'm not talking --

A -- the policy is as I have articulated it, and it is up to the Salvadorans to find a political solution to their own conflict.

Q I'm not talking about a new initiative; I'm talking about the U.S. reviving the effort to bring about what you call a democratic reconciliation.

A I'm not sure I know what you mean by reviving the effort. I'm going to have to stand on what I've got, since I don't quite know where you're trying to go with this.

Q One question that comes to my mind is, this is something that the U.S. has been saying for quite a while. The question here is whether now you're willing to ask a third country to help you in persuading the Salvadoran Government to speed that process.

A Again, I go back to what I said. We think it is up to the Salvadorans to find the political solution to their conflict. I'll stick with what I've just said.

Q Do you see any possible role for Spain in bringing the two sides together?

A Again, I refer you back to what I just said. I can't speak for other countries.

Q What was the purpose of Mr. Enders' visit to Madrid?

A As I said the other day, he went to exchange views regarding the situation in the Latin American region, as we do with a number of countries on a number of different regions.

Q Alan, don't you have a situation here with two prominent figures in this Administration pulling at two totally opposite directions, with Enders going to Spain -- and you outlined what he was discussing there; and Gonzalez is very out-in-front on this -- and then Mrs. Kirkpatrick going down there, and conferring with the Government and saying something quite the opposite.

A I'm not aware what she said. I'm not aware she said anything that was the opposite. I'm also not aware that there is anybody in the government who has taken a position different from the one that I gave you in response to George's question.

Q Is there, Alan, a two-track policy on El Salvador?

A Again, I refer you to what I first said. As I said, I will make the language available to you.

Q With respect to the peace commission, originally the Administration said they expected its formation in October or November, and then in January; now we are in February, and it is still not in sight. When does the Administration expect the formation of the peace commission?

A I'm not sure that it's up to us to expect it. As I say, we support that initiative for the peace commission and we hope that it will be implemented soon, but I don't have a specific estimate --

Q Could I just ask one other --

A Yes.

Q Ambassador Hinton, I assume, speaks for the Administration, is that correct?

A What did he say?

(Laughter)

Q Just establish the foundation. He said, according to an unofficial transcript provided by this office, that --

A By what office?

Q Your office.

A The Press Office?

Q Yes.

A -- that the Pope's visit would create a wonderful opportunity to move ahead toward a political solution, and that he will create a dialogue that should encourage a dialogue. A dialogue is something that the church and the opposition have been pressing for some time.

Q Is that official U.S. policy?

A I think we'll let Ambassador Hinton's remarks stand on their own. I don't have a problem with those remarks.

Q I didn't understand your answer to me when I asked you about a two-track policy?

A Well, the answer is what I gave you, Bernie. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Q You referred me back to your opening statement.

A That's right.

Q But in your opening statement you could have a perpetuation of the present policy, with variations under that heading that could be two-track.

A Well --

Q Is there a two-track policy, or not?

A Again, all I would do is repeat the language for you, and I don't see the utility of that. That is the answer to the question. Our position is clear; it isn't going to change. We support the government; we're going to give aid to that government, and we support reconciliation in the course of the democratic process, so in that sense, I don't know whether you want to define that as two-track or not two-track. But that is our policy, and it is unchanging.

Q There are no variations in our policy?

A That's our policy. I mean, I don't know how to respond to "no variations."

Q Is the Post story accurate, Alan?

A We'll stick with what I said. I mean, this is a statement of what the policy is. I'm not going to try and speculate beyond that.

Q I have some questions about human rights. In the Human Rights Report, which was put out by the Department a couple of days ago, on page 1157, paragraph 5, it says:

> "In June 1982, following a terrorist attack on Israel's Ambassador to Great Britain, retaliatory Israeli strikes inside Lebanon and subsequent artillery rocket attacks by PLO forces in Lebanon against northern Israel, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon and quickly occupied most of the country south of Beirut."

Is this a fair statement, or is this the truth of the matter that the whole war in Lebanon started because of this or --

A The report is out; it's public; it stands on its own. I don't see why I have to comment further.

Q Is this an accepted position by the Administration that because of the attack on Minister Argov, which was linked first to the PLO and then it was made by the Interpol and the, I believe, the British --

A I think that the words in the report speak for themselves, and I don't have a further explanation to give you on it.

Q Alan, back to Central America? Three Christian Democratic trade unionists were abducted and were found dead on Monday outside of San Salvador. They had been active in promoting the possibility of a dialogue recently, and apparently the trade unions with which they are affiliated have accused d'Aubuisson of having something to do with this. Do you have any comment on the disappearance and killing of the three --

A I don't have any information on it or any comment on it.

Q Back to the Middle East: do you have anything on Israeli/American intelligence-sharing?

A No, I really don't. I'm not going to get into that kind of issue in any detail. As a general matter, I'd note that we have longstanding relationships with Israel, cooperative relationships. In the area that was described in the paper this morning, on the intelligence-sharing and other areas, we expect those things to continue, but I'm not going to get into any details.

Q You're not going to say anything about the utility of getting the Israeli information? The United States doesn't want it?

A Again, as I say, we've had cooperative relationships in a variety of areas, but I'm just not going to get into specific detail.

Q Yesterday, and not for the first time, Defense Minister Sharon again accused the Administration of interfering in internal Israeli politics.

Do you have any reaction to that?

A We're not interfering in internal Israeli affairs, and I'm not aware, frankly, of his specific remark. I didn't catch that in the reports; but in any case, it is certainly not our approach to interfere.

Q Do you have any update on the withdrawal of Dobrynin as ambassador?

A No. I saw that wire report, but I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Withdrawal of what, Alan?

A Ambassador Dobrynin. There is a report that he's going to be leaving.

Q Couldn't you take that a different way? Has he told the Administration that he's planning to go back to Moscow?

A Bernie, I couldn't get into the question of what we would or would not have had passed to us in a diplomatic exchange.

Q Ambassador Arens is quoted this morning saying that the Israeli Army will not withdraw from Lebanon very soon. Would you care to respond to that? Is that --

A Our position is quite clear. We are looking for withdrawal of all the foreign forces as soon as possible.

Q Alan, a follow-up on that. When was the last time that Ambassador Habib was in Damascus talking with the Syrians?

A I don't know, Joe. I'm sure that's a matter of public record, and you can find that out.

Q Do you recall more or less the time? Was it three weeks ago? A month ago?

A I don't recall, Joe. I'm sure you can find out in the library.

Q Are we doing anything in terms of putting what we call psychological warfare pressure on Damascus to do something about getting into the act of withdrawal of forces from Lebanon?

A I don't think it's a question of putting psychological warfare pressure on any of the parties. We're trying to help bring about the withdrawal of all the foreign forces and the other objectives we've talked about in terms of Lebanese sovereignty and the control over its territory and Israeli security.

We're moving ahead on a variety of fronts on this, and the Lebanese are actively involved, and I don't have anything further for you.

Q But I'd like to have a specific fact as to when the United States officials concerned with the withdrawal of forces from Lebanon have actually said to the Syrians, "You've got to consider this, too, and we're asking you publicly to do this and often."

Have you done this? Will you look into this and get that?

A No, I won't. I'm not going to get into the question of what we say in our diplomatic conversations, Joe.

Q All right. Would you agree that the public relations aspect of this business of dealing with Lebanon is focused on Israel and not on Syria?

A No, I'm not going to try and draw characterizations.

Q Alan, can you tell us, has the Government of Nicaragua submitted a nominee for Ambassador?

A I don't have information for you. I don't think we would normally comment on that until we had an Ambassador named and coming.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the reports coming out from Israel that the report made by the Commission of Inquiry put blame on the United States?

A I was asked this yesterday. Again, I'm not going to comment on the Commission report in any way. We're just going to refrain from any comment on that.

Q Even relating to the U.S. --

A I think in terms of the U.S. role and what we did and what the Multinational Force did, we're on the record in the past about this subject, and I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q Alan, in connection with this --

A Excuse me. He's been trying to --

Q Back to Dobrynin, the Reuters report said that he is leaving because the Soviets don't feel this Administration is interested in talking seriously with the Soviet Union, so he's being wasted here.

Could you comment in general on that?

A Obviously, we have a variety of conversations going on. We have negotiations going on in Geneva, Vienna. We meet with the Soviet officials here. We meet with Soviet officials in Moscow. I don't know how that fits the description that you've just given me, but I don't see that problem in communicating or having conversation.

Q Alan, if I could come back to the Commission report for a minute, there is a news report to the effect that the Secretary -- Secretary Shultz, that is -- said something about tipping the hat to the Commission's work of how democracy works or something in that order.

Do you have the text of that statement and the context of how it came out and so on?

A Apparently we don't, but I would anticipate that we will be getting this, and that as with the other on-the-record remarks that the Secretary has been making during his trip, it would be made available through the Press Office. But I don't happen to have that at this particular time.

Q On El Salvador, how much concern is there at this point about the military as well as the political situation there now?

A I don't have any new general description to give you on that, Bernie. I think I addressed that the other day in terms of -- we're going back now before Berlin was retaken by Government forces when it had been first entered by the guerrillas -- even at that point, from a military point of view, we did not see a major significance to this, and I have nothing new to offer you on this.

I think Tom Enders may have addressed this to some extent in his testimony, so I would refer you to what he said.

Q Alan, forgive me if you've taken this up before, but has the United States ever said anything to Israel about its reported practice of arming these village militias in the south of Lebanon?

It runs athwart our policy of trying to build up the Lebanese Government army.

A I don't have anything specific for you on that, Bill. I don't know.

Q Would you look?

A Again, I don't think we would look into the question of what we've said to the Israelis.. It's not normally the way we operate.

Q On another aspect of that, Alan, once before you were asked about the trial --

A Excuse me. Let me go back. I did address the other day -- there was a press report of creation of village leagues or something of that sort --

Q No, no. This is in Lebanon.

A Okay. This is in Lebanon.

Q I understand. This was militias. Village militias.

A I just wanted to make sure you were aware of the other.

Q Yes.

A Okay.

Q Once before you were asked about a court where Israeli soldiers are accused of beating and harassing Palestinians in the West Bank, and now the Rafael Eitan, the Chief of Staff, in a way, according to the Hebrew -- Israeli press has in a way confirmed that.

Would you care to comment on that?

A No. First of all, my reading of the press accounts didn't quite say that he confirmed that he had approved beatings. But, in any case, it is a proceeding in a judicial setting in Israel, and I don't think it would be appropriate for us to comment.

Clearly, we do not approve of mistreatment of people, but in terms of the specific case, I don't have any comment.

Q One more thing on the West Bank: Mustafa Dudeen, the head of the Village League, is in Washington. Can you tell us if he has or will be seeing anybody in the State Department, or will anybody in the State Department see him?

A No. I think I indicated the other day he is not seeing anybody in the U.S. Government.

Q Alan, another question on human rights. The first week in January the American-Arab Anti-discrimination Committee submitted to the State Department a memo on Israel's failure to comply with international conventions and treaty obligations, an agreement concluded with the United States Government, and also submitted a report about harassment of Arab-Americans visiting their relatives in the West Bank and being intimidated and being harassed by the Israeli authorities.

And I asked the authorities here in the Human Rights Department yesterday, and they said they have no knowledge, and I went and I asked the ADC, and they told me that they submitted this and nobody gave them any answer or any acknowledgement of this communication with the State Department.

Can you check on that, please?

A Do you know to whom they submitted it?

Q The office of Mr. Elliott Abrams.

A Let me look and see. If they say they didn't have it, I'm a little confused, but let me see what there is on this.

Q Alan, will it be possible to get a transcript of Larry Eagleburger's speech this morning, and is there some way in the future of knowing when this is going to take place?

A Yes. Two things on that: One, there is not going to be a text of his speech. It is not very different, I'm told, from the one you have from the other day.

On the procedures, we will try, when there is an early morning speech, to let you know in advance if we can. We should have done this, but it's a matter of trying to get the administrative things working out smoothly.

Q Alan, did you say that nobody in the Administration is going to see this fellow Mustafa?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Have they ever talked with him?

A I don't know "ever."

Q In Washington, I mean.

A I'm not aware of it, Joe.

Q Will you look into it and see whether --

A No.

Q Why don't they want to see him?

A I think we said before what our concerns were on this score, and I refer you back to what we said the last time this issue came up in terms of the effect on the peace process and so on.

Q Do you have any readout on the visit of the Lebanese official, the adviser of President Gemayel, here?

A No. Not a readout. There was some guidance about whom he was seeing and so on. It's not here, so let me refer you back to the Press Office. It is not a substantive readout of the discussions he had, though, so if that's what you're looking for, it isn't there.

Q Do you have anything on Ambassador Habib? How long is he going to stay in Israel?

A No, I don't. He's still there, but I do not have an indication when he'll be leaving.

Q Alan, is there any idea on when the presentations will be formally made to Congress of the Foreign Aid Program?

A I don't know, Joe.

Q Anything on the Brandt Commission report?

A No.

Q There are new hints that maybe Secretary Shultz is planning to go to the Middle East.

A I indicated the other day that he has said for a long time that he would go when he thought it would be useful for him to do so. I don't know of any specific plans for him to go at this time. I'm not saying he isn't going to, but I don't think there is any specific plan at this point.

Q Alan, is there any American position on the business of the Chinese railway bonds, the billions of dollars of --

A Yes. This is the statement that came out of Beijing the other day?

A class action suit was filed in U.S. District Court in Alabama in November 1979 on behalf of certain individuals who hold bonds issued by the Government of China in 1911 for the construction of the Hu Gong Railway.

The Chinese Government did not appear in court to present its views concerning its immunity from U.S. judicial processes. The judge subsequently issued a default judgment.

We have met with Chinese officials on several occasions to discuss the case. Although the Department has taken no position on the merits of this litigation, we have explained to the Chinese that our law recognizes the concept of sovereign immunity in cases arising from public, governmental actions of a foreign state.

We have further explained, however, that under international law, foreign states do not enjoy absolute immunity and may be sued for actions taken in a commercial capacity.

Under our law decisions regarding whether the defense of immunity is available in a particular case are made by the courts.

We have emphasized to the Chinese that U.S. law is in accordance with customary international law and practice in this area.

Our judicial system is independent, and the Executive Branch has no direct involvement in cases such as this. We will continue to discuss differences of principle with the Government of China.

We hope that the Chinese will make use of the opportunities available to represent their interests and to resolve this problem in accordance with the procedures of our judicial system.

Q Can we get copies?

A Copy, yes.

Q Does that coincide with extra-territoriality?

A I think it's a different issue here. Let me just make this text available to you.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #30

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements: First, the daily press briefing on Tuesday and Wednesday will be cancelled due to the Secretary's appearances on the Hill. He will be testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday. Both appearances are scheduled for 10:00 a.m., and the subject will be foreign assistance.

Second, the Secretary will address the Conservative Political Action Conference on Friday, February 18, at 9:30 a.m. at the Sheraton Washington Hotel. If you wish to cover this event, please contact Tom Edmonds of the Conference, at 683-6446 for information on credentials. The speech will be piped into this room at the time of delivery, barring any technical difficulties.

Q What time was that?

A That is at 9:30 a.m., Sheraton Washington Hotel.

Q For those of us who couldn't sprint, what did you say before the --

A Sprint? You just doubted our punctuality.

Q Is this a speech or Q & A?

A He is going to address the Conference. Presumably, he will have remarks. I haven't seen --

Q Do you have copies yet?

A I don't have them for you. But the briefings will be cancelled tomorrow and Wednesday because the Secretary is appearing on the Hill -- the Senate tomorrow, the House on Wednesday; foreign assistance is the subject -- 10 a.m. both days.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Why is the Secretary meeting the Iraqi Foreign Minister.

A   Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, a former Foreign Minister of Iraq, who is now a Minister of State, has been in the United States on a private visit, and the Secretary will meet with him today. I don't have anything further for you at this point.

Q   He is not Foreign Minister?

A   He is not the Foreign Minister; former Foreign Minister. He is now Minister of State.

Q   Is he here on any sort of -- In addition to being on a private visit, does he carry any official authority?

A   You will have to ask the Iraqis, I can't tell you. He is Minister of State, and he is going to be meeting with the Secretary, but I don't have a specific readout.

Q   Who asked for the meeting?

A   I don't have details on it.

-- MORE --

Q What's the state of our relations with Iraq?

A Don't have a general characterization to give you.

Q On another subject -- Middle East. There were reports over the weekend that the Soviets have doubled the number of Soviet personnel manning the SAM-5 missile sites in Syria. Do you have anything on that?

A Don't have anything for you.

Q You can't confirm it?

A No. We've not addressed that, and I don't think I'll be doing that.

Q Does the previous language you've used on Soviet presence in connection with those SA-5s still stand? That is, if there are Soviets there, that you would consider that not helpful to the --

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us anything about Habib's present activities and plans?

A As I understand it, he's in Tel Aviv at the moment. I don't have anything further on him.

Q Do you know anything about a report by Eagleburger on the use of slave labor on the pipeline?

A Yes. I do have something fairly brief for you. Simply --

Q The question?

A The subject was a report signed off by Larry Eagleburger on the question of Soviet forced labor.

The Department has prepared a study on Soviet forced labor in compliance with a Congressional request, but I can't comment on any aspect of the study at this time pending its release by the Hill. It's their property, in essence, and it's up --

Q I remember writing about this report. Is that the same thing?

A There was an interim report which was issued in November.

Q With a huge CIA study in there?

A It was a large package that was made available, and that was an interim report and we said we would make a more complete, final report which is now being forwarded to the Congress. But that, again, is up to them to release, and you would have to check with them on that release date.

Q Do you have anything on the change of Sharon's position in Israel?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any new language on zero option in view of the statements by the Vice President, perhaps others, over the weekend?

A No, I think the Vice President addressed this yesterday. Larry Speakes had a few things to say about it this morning. I don't have anything to add to that.

Q Do you have anything on southern Lebanon and reports coming out of there of increased terrorist attacks against Palestinians?

A Yes. Though we cannot confirm or deny these reports, they do concern us greatly. For some days we have been in touch with both Israeli and Lebanese authorities and others and continue to urge all parties to fulfill their responsibilities for protecting the lives of inhabitants of Lebanon.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Can you tell us what the report was? We couldn't hear the question.

A The report was that there had been some incidents, including some killings in southern Lebanon.

Q Under the circumstances in southern Lebanon, is there any consideration being given to increasing foreign forces down there in the form of either the MNF or some other configuration?

A I think we're going to have to stick with what I've said. In terms of the MNF we're where we have been on that issue. In terms of what others might do, I don't have anything new to announce to you about that today.

Q Another kind of MNF, other countries --

A No, but you do have UNIFIL in the area; you have others. I would separate out the MNF from possibly anything else. I don't have anything specific. I'm not trying to lead you on this, but specifically with regard to the MNF, we have not gone beyond what we said before, which is that we would consider an expanded role for and expanded numbers in an MNF in the context of an overall withdrawal plan.

Q On that subject, there was a late report that the Haddad militia was moving into the area, especially Sidon; do you have anything on that?

A I think I would stick with what I've said on this, that we've been in touch with Lebanese and Israeli authorities regarding the situation there, and others, and urge that the situation be maintained calm.

Q There was also a FBIS report that Egypt and the Soviet Union have been holding secret talks. Do you have anything on that?

A Egypt and the Soviet Union? No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:10 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #31

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1983, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. Available in the Press Office is the testimony today of Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology William Schneider before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject is security assistance.

A couple of items on speeches to be made by Secretary Shultz: The Secretary will address the Southern Center for International Studies at the Hyatt Regency, in Atlanta, on Thursday, February 24. The speech will be piped live into the press room here starting at about 1:00 P.M. Anyone interested in actually covering this event should contact Hal Gulliver of the Center, at 404-261-5763. That's the Secretary's speech in Atlanta, Thursday, February 24, the telephone number is 404-261-5763.

Q The name of that group again, please?

A It is the Southern Center for International Studies.

Q The subject?

A I don't have a subject for you yet.

On the following day, Friday, February 25, the Secretary will meet OFF-THE-RECORD with the Executive Council of the AFL/CIO in Bal Harbour, Florida. He will hold a press conference following the meeting, at about 11:30 A.M. This will be piped into the press room on a delayed basis starting at 2:30 P.M. Anyone interested in attending the press conference in Bal Harbour should contact Rex Hardesty of the AFL/CIO at 305-865-7511, Extension 1185. That's the Secretary of the AFL/CIO, Bal Harbour, Friday, February 25. If you'd like to talk to the AFL/CIO, 305-865-7511, Extension 1185.

Q John, what time does the news conference actually begin?

A It's going to be piped in here about 2:30.

Q No. When is it live?

A   Live? About 11:30 A.M. He is meeting with the AFL/CIO from about 10 to 11 A.M. He'll come right out and give a press conference in their --

Q   It's not technically feasible to pipe it in here live?

A   I don't know what the answer is to that.

MR. ROMBERG: It's too unpredictable on the timing.

A   Did you catch that? Too unpredictable on the timing.

Q   How close is that to where?

A   How close is that? That's Miami.

I'll be glad to take another look at it, if you like; but as of the moment, it's 2:30.

Q   What kind of hook-up is it?

A   You've gone to the extent of my technical expertise. What kind of hook-up is that? Let's do a little work on that for you, see if we can bring it forward.

In the Press Office there is a statement we're making available to you on the Caribbean Basin Initiative -- a fairly long one -- that concerns the reintroduction of legislation by the Administration on this topic.

This afternoon, just to remind you, the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State Wallis will hold a briefing on the Williamsburg Economic Summit. That's at 3 o'clock in the White House Briefing Room. It will be ON-THE-RECORD. It will be open to White House and Department of State accredited journalists.

Q   The White House said it's Shultz. Has there been a change in that?

A   Shultz and Wallis, right.

Q   Why is this briefing given so early?

A   It is in response to a groundswell of requests for the earliest possible information on this important subject.

(Laughter)

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Lastly, an announcement that may tend to cut short this briefing: A senior Administration official will brief, ON BACKGROUND, at 1:00 P.M. at the White House today, on events in the Mediterranean. Entry to that will be on the basis of White House and State Department credentials. If anybody is in some doubt as to whether his credentials will get him in, he should talk to the White House Press Office, which is at 456-2947.

Q Is that in the regular briefing room, John?

A That is in the regular briefing room.

Q For BACKGROUND purposes can you identify, please, the senior Administration official?

A I can't. I would ask that you ask the White House.

Q I thought the Secretary declared war yesterday on BACKGROUND briefings by unidentified officials who were putting out these things with no basis except to --

A I will be glad to convey your unenthusiasm for this to the White House, and perhaps they'll scratch it. I don't know.

Q I was just wondering about the apparent inconsistency, because he had --

A No, I don't think there is an inconsistency. I think the Secretary yesterday was talking about unsourced reports by unnamed officials, and quoted the President on that particular question.

Q But didn't he say that he thought it was a good rule and that he agreed with it?

A I think he quoted the President as saying, it's a good rule if an individual wants to leak a story, that he stand up and say, "I am Fred Bloggs," or whatever his name is, and, "I work at such-and-such a place, and this is what I have to say about that," so that those using it may evaluate the significance of that --

Anyway, those are the announcements. I'm not going to be taking any questions on the Mediterranean subject in light of that briefing, but if you want me to --

Q One question on the CBI is, when is it actually going to be resubmitted? Do you know?

A It's going up today.

Q Today?

A Yes.

Q A general housekeeping question: Will there be a copy of the Secretary's comments to the Conservative Caucus tomorrow?

A I don't see why there wouldn't be.

Do you have a word on that speech?

MR. ROMBERG: Hope to have.

MR. HUGHES: Hope to have. I don't see why not.

Q Just so we don't have to break up this, why don't we have a filing break for anybody who wants to go over to the White House?

A Fine. Filing break.

I may be getting a little more information here? Alan, is this an alternative phone number or --

MR. ROMBERG: It's the White House Press Office phone number.

MR. HUGHES: O.K. 456-2100, White House Press Office.

-- MORE --

Q What is Mr. Adelman's status now? Is he Acting Director and will he continue to be?

A I do not know whether Adelman is Acting Director. That is not the case. As you know, the Secretary and the President are fully behind him and anxious that this should go to a vote.

Q What did you say --

A No, he's not acting.

Q Is anybody?

A Yes. There is an Acting Director, and that is Mr. George. As you know, Deputy Secretary Dam is spending some time there each day.

Q Anything, John, on the arrest and conviction of the Polish, the founder of Polish Solidarity radio sentenced to jail?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q Have officials of the Department, over approximately the last week to ten days, held any meetings with members of the Club of Life, either here or abroad, specifically in order to discuss participation in an on-going series of conferences that the Club of Life is holding this and next week?

A Not to my knowledge. But I'm always a little leery when somebody says "has anybody in the Department." It's a large Department, but not to my knowledge.

Q Let me ask you a more specific question, which you might want to take. Has anyone in the Department offered money to individuals in order to ask them not to participate in a series of conferences now on-going?

A I think that is extremely unlikely.

Q Would you say that unlikely things have never occurred or you just have a policy against publicly divulging these things?

A I wouldn't say that unlikely things have never occurred. I think that just speaking out of my own knowledge, without having done any research on it, I think that is a very unlikely development.

Q The VOA correspondent who covers the war in

El Salvador says the Salvadoran army is running out of ammunition and is going to need a transfusion of money within about three weeks. Is any thought being given to any kind of a supplemental provision of money for this?

A Not to my knowledge, not beyond what we are arguing for in the case of El Salvador in general. But I do not know of any specific --

Q Can you take the question?

A Okay, we'll take it.

Q I think you proscribed this area, but is Vernon Walters in Khartoum?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was he en route or has he been there?

A I honestly don't know where he is. As you know, he is a peripatetic traveler, and I honestly don't know where General Walters is today. He may well be in the building. I don't know.

Q Could you tell us what the Department's view is of the role of Major Haddad, whether his forces could be incorporated in the Lebanese forces or just how we see it?

A No. That is obviously a question for the Lebanese. If you're talking about reports that Major Haddad's forces have moved into Sidon, I do have something on that.

We're aware of the reports. We cannot confirm or deny them.

In general, our position remains that we support the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Central Government throughout Lebanon in conjunction with the earliest possible complete withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country.

Of course, we are concerned for the safety of the civilian population and have urged Israeli and Lebanese authorities and others to insure that all parties fulfill their responsibilities for protecting the lives of the inhabitants of Lebanon.

As long as Israel is the occupying power, in southern Lebanon, it bears important responsibility under international law for maintenance of public order and protection of the lives of the inhabitants of the area under

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occupation.

The Government of Israel is fully aware of our views and concerns in this respect.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can we read that to mean that since you put that comment on Israeli occupying power in the same bag with the question on Haddad's moving into Sidon, that the U.S. views Haddad's role as being an arm of the Israeli responsibility as an occupying power?

A No, I don't think we want to get into a characterization. As I say, the future of those forces is something that really the Lebanese have to consider.

Q Do you have anything on peace treaties between Angola and South Africa, and the status of that?

A Yes, I do. I guess you're referring to the reports that de facto ceasefire is in effect already between South Africa and Angola.

Our understanding is that no formal ceasefire is yet in place but that, complementary to the negotiations underway between Angola and South Africa, all sides may have seen some advantage in showing a degree of military restraint in recent months.

The objectives that Angola and South Africa are working toward in their direct negotiations are a matter between those two countries. No useful purpose could be served by our commenting on them in advance. However, it's difficult to imagine that even a limited ceasefire between some of the parties in the war-torn southern African region would not be, in fact, a constructive step toward a more comprehensive regional peace.

Q Is this the kind of progress that Secretary Crocker had in mind when he said that there is real progress being made in the talks?

A I think so. Yes, I think this would be within the framework of that.

Q Are there any other examples you can give us?

A No. I think that's about it. We do understand that insofar as the next round of Angolan-South African talks is concerned that this is something that the two parties have to announce, but we understand that those talks might be held soon.

Q Can we get a copy of your statement on that?

A Sure.

Q And also, do you have an opinion as to whether this will actually advance the process toward independence of Namibia because many people within this Department have said privately that they consider this might be a separate peace that will not advance it and will kill the chances for an accord?

A No, we'll have to see. But we think this is a constructive step.

Q Any comment on the Soviet formal proposal in Vienna, the MBFR discussions?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We and our allies will study this proposal as we study all Soviet proposals for their substantive content.

The United States and its allies undertook a major initiative in tabling a draft treaty in which we sought to take legitimate Eastern security concerns into account.

We hope the East will give that initiative the constructive response it deserves.

Q On Australia, has the U.S. offered any fire-fighting equipment or expressed any concern about the Australian fires?

A I don't have anything for you on that. Not to my knowledge.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #32

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements: There will be, due to Washington's birthday Monday, no press briefing and the Press Office will be closed. The Secretary will be testifying on Tuesday before the Senate Budget Committee -- that's at 10 o'clock in the morning, 608 Dirksen Building. The subject will be International Economic Overview. That will be open to coverage.

The Secretary is testifying on Wednesday before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. That's on the State Department's authorization for FY-84 and -85. That is at ten o'clock in the morning, Rooom 2172 Rayburn Building. That is in open session, and as is traditional, we will not have noon briefings on those days when the Secretary is testifying.

Q What was the time of the Tuesday testimony?

A Both ten o'clock.

Q John, on the experience of last week, when the Secretary is testifying on international economics, it does leave a big hole on the other aspects of foreign affairs. I'm not saying you have to have a briefing, but --

A It is not as though the Press Office collapses, however on a day when he testifies; we have a number of press officers who are available. And I've noticed that some of the gentlemen and ladies in this room are not deterred from calling me from time to time on a day when he testifies, so there are other avenues to pursue this.

I've also noticed that even when the Secretary is testifying on a particular subject, the questions do seem to range all over the spectrum, so that sort of --

Q Could you tell the Senators and House Members to be sure and do that? (Laughter)

A We have a statement on the death of Ambassador Watson.

The Secretary, the Department of State, and the Foreign Service are deeply saddened by the news of Ambassador Barbara Watson's death. She was a public servant of unusual dedication and distinction. Her long service as Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs and her more recent tour as U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia made important contributions to American foreign policy.

Her many friends and colleagues in the Department will miss her and convey their sincere condolences to Miss Watson's family.

I have something on the Australian forest fires that somebody asked me about yesterday: Widespread forest fires have ravaged the Australian states of Victoria and South Australia. Information received so far on the disaster indicates that at least 69 people have died, 2200 homes have been destroyed, and whole towns have been wiped out. This is a disaster, and we're following it closely.

Our Ambassador in Canberra, Robert Nesen, on behalf of the United States Government, has already made an immediate emergency relief donation to aid the victims of the fires. Also, our Embassy has notified the Australian National Disasters Organization that the Embassy's pilot and plane are prepared to assist in any manner required.

President Reagan has sent Prime Minister Fraser a message expressing our sympathy and concern.

I have a statement on the Palau plebiscite. Final official results of the February 10, 1983, plebiscite in Palau represent a strong victory for the Compact of Free Association. In the yes-or-no vote, Palauans awarded the Compact of Free Association a mandate of better than 62 percent. The voter turnout was very heavy, substantiating the high degree of support for the Compact in Palau.

Under the Compact, Palau will achieve its long-sought goal of full autonomy. The United States will assume the obligation and authority to defend the island nation. The Compact and its related agreements were negotiated over a fourteen-year period. Two other prospective freely associated states -- the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia -- will vote on the Compact in coming months.

And I think we may have a longer statement on that available in the Press Office later in the day.

Q Will that other statement involve the referendum with respect to their constitutional aspect permitting nuclear --

A I don't know. I haven't seen it yet.

Q Could you take the question of what the Department -- if that doesn't cover it --

A Why don't you take a look at the statement first, and then let's talk about it.

Q John, can I ask you about some related islands, because there has been a controversy again about Kiribati, Tuvalu, and so forth, and there is the conservative challenge to those islands. Does the State Department still support the Senate ratifying the treaties regarding those four Pacific islands?

A I'm afraid I can't answer that just today.

Q Could you take that, please?

A All right.

Q How about Libya? Have you sort of an update as to whether there is a --

A No. You have had a lengthy BACKGROUNDER by a senior Administration official yesterday, and we really don't have any comment beyond that today.

Q Is there still anything you would describe as a Libyan threat to any of the surrounding countries?

A I'm not going to have anything for you beyond what was offered yesterday.

Q Are you going to keep monitoring the situation?

A Of course, we're still monitoring the situation.

Q What can you tell us about the situation with Sudan? Is there any threat?

A No. We have seen something on FBIS today from Khartoum citing sources, but I'm not going to have any comment on that.

Q Can you give us any more on why General Walters is in Khartoum?

A Yes, I can, and I'm happy to do so because when somebody asked me about it yesterday, I simply was personally unaware of what he is doing.

As you know, severe Congressional cuts in global security assistance for Fiscal Year 83 reduced the amounts available for a number of our key friends and allies. General Walters is traveling to a number of these countries, including Tunisia, Sudan, Somolia, and Turkey, to reassure those governments that the Administration is committed to seeking adequate foreign assistance funds from Congress to support the vital security assistance programs worked out with them.

The timing of General Walters' visit to these countries and recent reports about the area concerning Libya are purely coincidental. I just, frankly, was unaware yesterday, when somebody asked me about it, where he was.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you have any reports this morning at all about any skirmishes between Egyptian and Libyan troops on the border Mediterranean town of Soloum?

A I don't.

Q You have heard nothing about that whatsoever?

A I haven't.

Q John, when did General Walters arrive in Khartoum?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Do you know when he is leaving?

A I don't know the answer to that question, but I just want to assure you that his visit is not in connection with recent developments in the area.

Q Since he has been in the area and the developments have come along as they have, has he had an enhanced role?

A No.

Q Apparently there was a wire story today that he was sent with a message, written or oral, that he was reassuring President Nimeiri of American support in light of the most recent events of the last few days.

A No, I am sure -- First of all, as you well know, we don't get into the question of Presidential communications. It would not be unusual that he would be carrying messages to these various countries. But if he were to be carrying such messages, they would be in connection with the mission that was routinely set and directed before any of this, and he would not be carrying any --

Q But there has been a long-time Libyan threat to destabilize the Sudan. Before the latest events, would it have been routine for him to have carried a message of support from the President to President Nimeiri, without regard to the --

A It would be routine for the United States to reiterate its support for the Sudan. But whether or not he was carrying any specific communication, I don't know.

Q John, the briefer yesterday said that in some cases of naval maneuvers there are happy coincidences; they coincide with events that turn out to -- Did the fact that General Walters was there, was he given any additional tasks?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Anything on West's trip to Cairo?

A I think there is something on West's trip --

MR. ROMBERG: Refer to the Pentagon.

A The Pentagon, yes. But that, too, is a long planned --

Q Happy coincidence?

A Happy coincidence.

(Laughter)

Q You will have to get a paper to write all of these coincidences down to keep them clear. (Laughter)

A Well, it is a large government, Bob, and it is doing a lot of things.

Q Are you ready to announce the trip by the Secretary to the Middle East in March?

A No. As you know, the Secretary has a continuing interest in going to the Middle East at some appropriate time, but I am sure he has no specific plans. I mean, I am not suggesting he will not go, but he has no specific plans, no dates.

Q John, can you shed any light on the alleged paper Jean Kirkpatrick is said to have written about Balkanizing India?

A Yes, I can. I take it you are referring to the story in The Post concerning Soviet disinformation in India, that report?

Q Yes.

A Sure. A recent story in the pro-Soviet Indian newspaper, the Patriot, charged that U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Jean Kirkpatrick, had outlined in a cable covert U.S. plans to "Balkanize" India, in addition to other U.S. covert actions elsewhere in the Third World. The Patriot has reprinted the text of this alleged cable, as has the pro-Soviet New Delhi weekly Link, which claimed that the cable was the text of a speech given by Ambassador Kirkpatrick February 27, 1982, to the Conservative Political Action Conference in Washington.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick has denied authorizing a paper on Indian Balkanization, and has labeled the charges "a total fabrication."

We have made a thorough check of Department, USIA, and USUN files, and have established that no document authored by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, as alleged by the Patriot, exists. We conclude that it is a Soviet-inspired disinformation effort.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick also did not speak at the 1982 Conservative Political Action Conference dinner, nor at the following day's public discussions at CPAC.

Q Has this information been given officially to the Indian Government?

A I cannot answer that question, but I wouldn't doubt that it has.

Q When was this supposed to have happened?

A I don't know the date of the Patriot story. The Kirkpatrick speech was alleged to have been February 27, 1982.

Q John, do you have any observations of the uncovering of KGB nests in Italy, and now West Germany?

A No.

Q Another series of happy coincidences?

A Well, I just don't have any response to it.

Q John, on the Middle East?

A Yes.

Q There is a piece out of the Middle East that says Habib has set an April 3 target date for beginning troop withdrawals from Lebanon.

A Not true.

Q Not true?

A We haven't set a deadline. We continue to pursue the goals we have set there as a matter of urgency, but we haven't set a deadline. Mr. Habib is in Israel, and will remain there for the time being.

Q Any new developments regarding the possible visit of Prime Minister Begin here?

A Not to my knowledge; not to my knowledge.

Q What is the status of the trip right now?

A Well, the status -- I've been away, and maybe Alan had something that updated it, but apparently not. I gather from a shake of the head, it is about where it was when I left for the Far East.

Q Has the United States been officially notified yet by Romania that they have imposed that education tax or --

A I don't know whether we've had official --

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

A Yes, I do know that we have had official -- Apparently, Mr. Romberg handled that while I was away.

Q We have been notified?

A Why don't we get you to the guidance that we have. Apparently, there was something on it while I was away.

MR. ROMBERG: There's a guidance in the Press Office.

A   Is there? O.K.

Q   Have you had a message from King Hussein in the last couple of weeks that he has put off his decision until the middle of March, his decision on joining the negotiations?

A   Well, obviously, there is continuing diplomatic interchange.

When you say, "Have we had a message?" --

Q   Yes.

A   No.

Q   O.K. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #33

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1983, 12:36 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I remember most of you. I have a couple of announcements.

First, a reminder that, barring any technical difficulties -- and maybe that will affect the speed with which we get through this briefing -- we'll be piping in the Secretary's address to the Southern Center for International Studies in Atlanta today starting at approximately 1:00.

Second, the Secretary will address the World Affairs Council of Northern California at a black tie dinner in honor of Ambassador Philip Habib on Saturday, March 5, 7:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. in the Grand Ballroom of the St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco, California.

If you wish to cover this event, please contact Nina Robins or Judy Matthews of the Council at (415) 982-2541 for information about credentials.

Q You say an address. Will there be brief remarks, or will there be a text?

A There may well be a text, but I don't think that there's going to be a text available here ahead of time, as far as I know, according to the latest thing I heard.

Q You said March 5?

A That's correct. Saturday, March 5.

Regarding President Magana of El Salvador's announcement, we're pleased that the Government of El Salvador has moved forward with the establishment of the Peace Commission whose formation was envisioned in the August 1982 Pact of Apaneca.

Of particular importance in our estimate is that the Peace Commission, along with the previously formed Political and Human Rights Commission, has the endorsement of the major political parties in the country and, thus, broad popular support.

Both in spirit and substance, the announcement of the formation of the Peace Commission demonstrates the priority political reconciliation will receive in anticipation of El Salvador's March 1984 Presidential election.

As President Magana indicated in his announcement, this reaffirms the "unwavering decision to maintain peace and the firm determination to establish respect and tolerance for different ideologies in order to achieve a pluralistic, democratic and just society."

The Government's proposal, President Magana stated, underlines the point that "the solution to the problem of violence must be essentially a political and democratic one." The President noted that the Commission's success would depend upon an end to "the irrational strategy of violence, destruction and revenge" regardless of what ideology motivates it.

Q Could we get a copy of that?

A Yes. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, regarding the President's comments to newspaper reporters on the Middle East, could you distinguish what he means by "providing a homeland for the Palestinians" as opposed to the definition of a "nation"?

A The President's remarks are fully consistent with his previous statement regarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. As we've indicated before, resolution of this matter can only emerge from direct negotiations between the parties concerned as called for in the Camp David Accords and also the President's September 1 initiative.

Q Alan, could you answer the question about the distinction between "homeland" and "nation"?

A I think that the --

Q The President made the distinction.

A Again, I think that's fully consistent with what he said before. I don't think there's something beyond that to say.

Q Do you have anything regarding the guarantees for the security of Israel's northern borders?

A I think Larry Speakes or others have addressed this question. The President was reaffirming his long stated concern, indeed, one of the three concerns that we've had in the Lebanon effort about security for northern Israel. But Larry's already gone over that. I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q But what about the choice of the word "homeland"? The word itself doesn't appear in any of the previous statements by President Reagan. Shouldn't one read anything into the choice of this specific word?

A I think that we've said before that in the context of Palestinian legitimate rights that this is something -- a concern for a place that the Palestinians could identify with. But, in terms of the legitimate rights and how those would be manifest, again, that's to be worked out in negotiation.

Q The fact that the Secretary will be speaking at a dinner in honor of Mr. Habib suggests Mr. Habib will be back.

A It might suggest that. (Laughter) -- on the other hand, it might not suggest that. That dinner has been laid on for some time, I think. I don't know, frankly, at this point whether he's going to be back, but I wouldn't suggest that you make an automatic assumption that he will be there. Obviously, it would be appropriate if he were.

Q Could you at all sum up where we stand on the talks?

A No. I really don't have any overall summation to give you. The delegations have been issuing statements daily as they have met and talked about progress that has been made on this or that front. Obviously, the discussions continue. Ambassador Habib's efforts continue. I don't have an announcement to give you.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Palestinian Congress' statements?

Q What was the question?

A A reaction to the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers.

I guess I could only say that we're less concerned with what's been said coming out of that meeting than with what happens next. We've seen nothing out of Algiers that would prevent the resumption of negotiations with broadened Arab participation.

Obviously, this was a primary goal of the President's September 1 initiative, and we remain optimistic that that goal will be achieved in the not-too-distant future.

Q Any sign of King Hussein making his speech in the imminent future?

A I don't have any information about King Hussein. He obviously has to make his own decisions about what he would do. Obviously, he's consulting with Mr. Arafat and other Arab leaders, and I think that those consultations will continue and he'll decide what and when he will do something.

Q Alan, Secretary Weinberger gave a news conference a little while ago at the Pentagon, and he said that in discussing the security arrangements for, or assurances of security for northern Israel in southern Lebanon, he said that interim steps could involve placing the Lebanese army or parts of it in southern Lebanon where they would be trained by advisers, as yet unnamed.

Can you tell us anything about whether that is something that's under consideration, or what's your view of that possibility?

A I'm not going to try and give you a judgment. We've talked for many, many months about various possibilities for those security arrangements in southern Lebanon which we agree are important for Israel's security.

Certainly, Lebanese forces playing a role there is one of the very real possibilities, but I don't have a status report to give you on that. That's the kind of thing that's being talked about in the negotiations now.

Q Do you have any indication that Israel is interested in any U.S. forces in southern Lebanon?

A Again, I think that's the kind of thing, if I may go back to the statement I just made, that is to be discussed in the negotiations. I don't think it's appropriate to try to get public with what's going on in the private discussions. I don't want to lead you one way or another. I don't want to discuss the issue because of that factor. Did you have a follow-up question?

Q I just was curious on the advisers, whether that would be a conceivable role in your mind for U.S. advisers since he didn't name any.

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, the report from Cairo is that the exercises there have ended. Are the AWACS returned to the United States?

A You'd have to ask the Pentagon. I don't know the answer to the question.

Q Alan, there's a report that the United States may have increased aid to Sudan in the wake of the events of last week. Have you heard anything about that?

A No. I don't know anything about increased aid to Sudan.

Q The only increases you're aware of were those which were incorporated into the aid bill before what happened, happened?

A That's all I know about it. Let me look into it, and, if there's anything further, I'll try and let you know.

-- MORE --

Q How about aid to Salvador, and is there a reprogramming or switch of aid for Salvador for this year? I've been confused by some stories that have appeared on that.

A There are a variety of ways of dealing with aid questions. Let me just say as a general matter that there's general agreement within the Administration that the sharp reduction in the level of our military assistance from last year's $82 million in military aid to El Salvador to the current $26.3 million that's available in the FY '83 continuing resolution fails to address the pressing security needs in that country.

As you know, the FY '84 request that's been put forward for such assistance totals something like $86.3 million.

I'm not prepared to address the time frame for provision of aid or the extent of the need at this particular point beyond these proposals, but the uncertainties in the availability of U.S. military assistance and its amount has an adverse impact on the Salvadoran army's ability to sustain any initiative.

Of course, the guerrillas, following their late '82 offensive, have not abated the intensity of their own effort and their outside support for munitions continues at a high level, and we will continue to monitor the situation closely.

In terms of how one would provide more aid, there are a variety of mechanisms I suppose available. There is the supplemental possibility. There is reprogramming in emergency situations. There is 506 discretionary authority. We're looking at various options, but I don't have any decisions to announce to you at this point on any of that.

Q Are the guerrillas winning?

A I wouldn't change the assessment that we've given you before on this, but I would say, as I said earlier, the amounts that have been provided are not seen by the Administration as meeting the needs.

Q What was your earlier assessment, to refresh my memory?

A That the situation, essentially, has been unchanged.

Q Enders in testimony said, if I recall correctly, that the guerrillas have been able to score psychologically, not militarily --

A Yes.

Q -- and in addition, however, that they have not been able to sustain any drives over any period of time, and you just said the guerrilla offensive that started in October remains unabated. Continuing aid?

A No. Continuing their drive and continuing their various hit-and-run kinds of efforts against particularly the economic infrastructure, I think, may be somewhat different matters.

Q On the amount that's coming in to El Salvador from outside, I know that the State Department said that it's primarily ammunition. Do you have any estimate, as you did in 1981, as to the tonnage per month that's coming across?

A Yes. I haven't seen it.

Q Can you take the question?

A I can look into it. If I can get something I'll let you know, but I haven't seen a recent estimate that I could make available to you.

Q One other question on Salvador, if I could. Both Secretary Enders and Secretary Shultz before Congress have been talking about possible negotiations, and each says that the record of negotiations as equals between governments and guerrilla groups is not an encouraging one in Latin America. I think Enders said that there isn't one government that didn't collapse afer negotiations.

Can you cite, or can you have somebody cite for us, an example of negotiations between governments and guerrillas as equals in Latin America, say, in the last 30 years? Because I don't know. It seems to me you may be erecting a straw man because I don't know of a single instance.

A Again, let me look into it. I'm not going to commit myself to coming back with a formal answer. They've testified and their statements are on the record, but I'll just take a look at the problem.

Q In connection with the aid to El Salvador, Secretary Weinberger just yesterday or the day before I think said on the Hill that the Department Of Defense wants to increase the number of advisers, military trainers there by "tens" I think was his word. As recently as February 8, this Department issued a statement saying it foresees no need to increase the number of military trainers in Salvador. Do you have any change in the State Department's position on that?

A As you're aware, the number of trainers has varied from time to time.

Q But the ceiling -- he was talking about the ceiling.

A Yes, I know. There, of course, is no fixed limit either from the Administration or from the Congress; and that number has never exceeded 55 as of this point at any one time.

I'm not prepared to rule out the possibility that at some point the number might not go higher than that previous high, but I don't have anything further to give you on that at this point.

Q A question on this same area about Panama. Has there been any easing in the apparent crisis in relations between Panama and the United States to denouncing of the U.S. Ambassador down there? There was a report yesterday that the Panamanian National Guard may have asked the U.S. to recall the U.S. Ambassador there.

A Let me just say briefly with respect to that that Mr. Briggs, as a newly arrived Ambassador, has made a number of visits around the country for the purpose of becoming acquainted with personalities and conditions. These are customary diplomatic activities of a courtesy nature.

It's a longstanding procedure, it's entirely appropriate, and it's in keeping with diplomatic practice.

Q What about the legislature, the Congress? the Panamanian Congress voted to ask him to be expelled. You don't have any response to that?

A No. The question, as I understand it -- I've not seen the report on that, but I understand they made a recommendation to the government. However, I'm not going to comment on that.

Q Is the Ambassador still in Panama?

A Yes.

Q Could you check with some pending issue? Is there anything new on the possibilities of a visit by Mr. Begin here?

A No. I have nothing new for you on that.

Q Anything new on the question of the notification to the Congress on the F-16s to Israel?

A No. Again that's where it was. It's a question that rests with the President.

Q Secretary Weinberger in his remarks on the Hill the other day mentioned that the decision on the F-16 is linked with a decision within the Administration on whether Israel has violated the law in Lebanon.

A I don't have anything for you on this. It's, as I say, a decision that rests with the President.

Q New subject?

A O.K.

Q Do you have any response to a report from Toronto of Air Canada saying that the United Staes has placed some restrictions on its efforts to reduce airline tickets up to 70 percent, that the State Department is blocking this action unless the concessions are granted to U.S. airlines?

A Yes, I do have.

The Civil Aeronautics Board undertook the action that you're talking about -- suspending the number of so-called seat sale fares -- with the concurrence of the Departments of State and Transportation.

The action was taken to insure that U.S. airlines have the same fare-matching capability in Canada that Canadian airlines have in the United States. The action was taken only after a year and a half of unsuccessful efforts to obtain the right to match fares charged by Canadian airlines.

The action taken is consistent with the U.S.-Canada Air Transport Agreement. If agreement can be reached with the Canadians on longstanding fare-matching issues, the "seat sale" will be approved.

Q Copies of that?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

A Thank you.

Q Just one more question.

A Go ahead.

Q Just in an effort to identify the next crisis point, where is General Walters? (Laughter.)

A I don't know where he will next show up, and I honestly don't know where he is.

Q Do you have anything on OPEC at all -- on oil?

A No, I have nothing on OPEC.

Q Can you describe Senator Stone's position here?

A No. I think there was some statement about that in -- I don't know if it was the Secretary's testimony or somebody's testimony on the Hill recently, and I --

Q Do you have anything more than that?

A I have nothing beyond what was said.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, February 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #34

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1983, 12:26 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Couple of announcements.

First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of the Assistant Secretary for International Organizations Affairs, Gregory J. Newell, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject is "U.N. Voluntary Programs to which the U.S. Contributes".

A reminder that we will be piping in the Secretary's press conference following his meeting with the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO in Bal Harbour, Florida, coming in on a delayed basis at 2:30 here in the briefing room.

An announcement regarding radio broadcasting to Cuba: I would like to announce that Senator Hawkins introduced the Administration's bill on radio broadcasting to Cuba in the Senate yesterday. Copies of a longer statement will be available in the Press Office this afternoon.

I would note here that following the bipartisan support given the bill's introduction last year in the 97th Congress, the reintroduction now has followed a period of close consultation with radio broadcasters, the National Association of Broadcasters, and key members of Congress.

The bill introduced yesterday makes significant concessions to the concerns of American broadcasters, the most important of which is not to use any non-governmental frequency on the commercial portion of the AM band.

As President Reagan stressed, on February 22 in a meeting with a bipartisan group of legislators, the Administration believes strongly that the Cuban people have the right to know what is going on in their country and about their government's activities around the world.

The current bill will achieve this objective while also responding to the concerns voiced by the broadcasting industry.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Is the Canadian Ambassador due in to protest the U.S. action on these films?

A On films?

Q Yes. That the United States has ordered --

A I have no information, Jim, regarding any activity by the Canadian Ambassador. The Department of Justice is responsible for administering the Foreign Agent's Registration Act under which the determination about the films to which you refer was made, and any questions about the Act's administration should be addressed to Justice.

I understand that these films may be shown to any audience in the U.S., but, again, for details you're going to have to go to Justice, I'm afraid.

Q Could you check to see whether the Ambassador is coming in and for what purpose?

Q He is in.

A Barrie says he's in. I don't think I'm going to go into the question at all. If you want to ask the Canadian Embassy if they want to, but we don't necessarily comment on what each Ambassador who comes in is coming in for or --

Q How would you characterize the state of U.S.-Canadian relations?

A I don't have a general characterization. It's one of the most important relationships we have, obviously. While we have our problems from time to time, I think that it's a terribly important relationship, it's a good relationship, a strong relationship.

Q Ottawa is requesting clarification from the State Department. Will the State Department take a intermediary role or will it just reflect -- or repeat the Justice Department's position on these films?

A I wouldn't get into the question of what we might or might not do. Again, this is -- essentially, as I understand it, the judgments made here are Justice Department roles, but I don't have enough information to suggest what the Canadian Embassy might be doing or what we might be doing in response to that. I don't think that I would go into that as a matter of diplomatic discourse.

Q Alan, at a news conference, Mrs. Ghandi blamed agitators encouraged from abroad for the troubles and the terrible massacre in Assam. Then someone asked, "Are you blaming American influence?" and she said, "Well, the United States has a reputation for that sort of thing." She was referring to destabilization of India.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I'm not familiar with the statement. It is obviously not correct to infer that there is any U.S. role in the problems over there, but I can't respond specifically to her statement since I haven't gotten it. I don't know, in any case, that we would want to be that direct in a response.

Q Any new development regarding a possible trip of the Secretary to the Middle East?

A No. I have nothing new on that.

Q Yesterday Senators Heinz and Kennedy, together with the other 49 cosponsors, introduced a resolution calling on the Administration not to sell any new weapons to Jordan unless Hussein joins the Camp David process.

Do you have any comment on this?

A I think we've addressed that sort of question before about resolutions of that sort, and I don't have anything to add to what we've said.

Obviously, we also have made known and it still is the case that there is no formal request from Jordan for the kinds of advanced weaponry which I think they're addressing themselves to, so we would need to get that request before we would be able to respond.

Q Anyone in the State Department tried to convince him to delay the introducing of that resolution?

A Again, I don't normally get into the question of our contacts with the Hill, and I don't think I'm going to do that now.

Q The Israeli Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, said that the President's use of the phrase -- I think it was something like a "homeland for the

Palestinians" -- is a violation of the spirit, at least, of Camp David.

Is it?

A We've addressed this. I addressed this yesterday, and Larry Speakes has addressed it. There is no change in the U.S. position, and the President, if you read the entirety of what he said, obviously wasn't suggesting any. I'm not going to try to get into a further discussion of it. I think that's sufficient for it.

Q Alan, there is a report from Israel quoting Prime Minister Begin that Lebanon and Israel are close to signing a non-belligerency agreement.

Are you aware of it? Have you a comment on this?

A I've seen a press report on it. Again, I'm just in a position where I'm not going to be commenting on the talks that are going on out there, so I'm afraid I'm going to unhelpful to you on that.

-- MORE --

Q Are there any plans for Phil Habib from the Middle East back here?

A Travel plans?

Q Yes.

A I don't know of specific plans for him at this point. In any case, we don't generally give an advance schedule for him. He's in Beirut at this point and continuing his efforts.

Q There's a story from Beirut quoting the Jordanian Foreign Minister who's there as saying that Jordan will not enter into peace talks unless Israel pulls out of Lebanon and agrees to no further settlements on the West Bank. That would seem, on the face of it, to make it difficult to envisage King Hussein's coming into the talks at any early point. Do you have any comment on this, or --

A We haven't seen the text of what the Jordanian Prime Minister is reported to have said. The only thing I could say, really, is that two matters he's reported to have mentioned -- as you say, the settlements freeze and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, of course, in the context of total foreign force withdrawal from Lebanon -- are issues in which we are also very interested; and we have a clearly stated policy on that.

Q O.K., but your view on this.

A I don't want to try to make the sort of judgment you're asking me to make.

Q Will American representatives participate next week in the talks between Israel and Egypt on the Taba issue?

A I don't have anything for you on talks between Egypt and Israel next week, so I can't answer your question.

Q Has the State Department disapproved application for the sale of some Boeing civilian jets to Libya?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q According to Boeing, you have.

A O.K. I don't know. Let me see if I can get anything for you. I'm not sure again that we can get into the question of license applications. That gets, as you know, into all sorts of legal problems for us.

Q All right.

A But let me see if I can get anything for you.

Q Since they're the ones who --

A If they want to address it, they can address it, presumably, but I'm not sure that we're in a position, from a governmental point of view, to address it. Let me look at it and see if I can get something for you.

Q There was a small story from Cairo yesterday quoting an Egyptian Foreign Ministry official as saying that the U.S. had lifted its economic embargo, or what have you, on Libya.

A There's been no change in the policy.

Q On another subject, I think it was two or three days ago when the Congress -- Representative Solarz -- told Secretary of State Shultz that he apparently had received a new offer of peace negotiations between the U.S. and Nicaragua that would involve joint patrol and supervision of the Honduran border --

A Yes.

Q -- and perhaps giving up support for the rebels in El Salvador in exchange for U.S. guarantees of nonsupport for Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries. Has the State Department looked at this?

A I presume the Secretary addressed himself to it at the time. Frankly, I haven't had time to --

Q He said that he would like to get a full report to the news --

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q O.K.

Q I don't know if you might have answered it earlier in the week, but there were some reports that the U.S. is going to participate again in the activities of the International Atomic Energy.

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything?

A I don't have it with me. There is guidance that exists on that in the Press Office. We had some from a couple of days ago, so you could get it from there.

Q Before we leave this matter of these Canadian films and the U.S. ruling, at a time when the State Department is asking $65 million for a campaign for democracy and to support democratic institutions and the exchange of information around the world, do you find it inconsistent at all that the United States has ruled in a way that would in effect limit, or at least chill, the effect of these films being shown in the United States?

A I don't have details on this, and I dont think that I'm going to be in a position to comment on a Justice Department ruling on this. I think that the Secretary has been asked today about this question and he pointed out that we stand always for the principles of freedom of expression. But I think he also noted that where that takes us in regard to this particular case he wasn't prepared to say, and I'm not in a position to comment in specific terms on your question.

Q Do you have anything on the situation in Panama, the continued criticism of the Ambassador by the Panamanian Government?

A No. I don't have anything beyond what I said yesterday.

Q The Ambassador remains in Panama?

A Yes.

Q Another area: Has there been any decision yet on how and when Romania's MFN will be discontinued?

A I have nothing new for you beyond what we made available to you the other day.

Q On the Canadian film-issue question, is there not a policy in this country that when some Department other than the State Department takes some action that impinges upon a foreign country that it at least seeks the advice of the State Department?

A   I can't tell you what the procedures are in this case. Again, I'm really going to refer you to Justice. They made this ruling, and I wouldn't get into the interagency dimensions anyway; but it's their decision and I would refer you to them. At this point I just don't have anything further for you.

Did you have a question?

Q   No.

A   O.K.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, March 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #35

TUESDAY, MARCH 1, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office is the statement of William Schneider, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. This statement was presented at 10:00 this morning. It's on the subject of U.S. foreign assistance programs.

Also available at 1:30 today will be Mr. Schneider's testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. That's on the Export Administration Act.

We expect to have available in the Press Office, embargoed for use until 2 o'clock this afternoon, the prepared statement of ARA Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is the proposed bilateral assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean.

I have a statement on the Salvadoran Peace Commission. The United States is fully committed to the democratic process in El Salvador and to a political resolution of the situation there. In that regard, we are pleased to note that yesterday, President Magana swore in the three members of the El Salvador Peace Commission.

In his speech announcing the members, President Magana outlined the objectives of the Commission: (1) revision of the amnesty law and its efficient and just implementation; (2) the creation of adequate social conditions and improvement in mechanisms to ensure peace, i.e. elections, communications, and so forth; and (3) promoting the participation of all social and political sectors in the democratic process.

We view the announcement as providing an institutional basis for national reconciliation in El Salvador within the electoral framework, and look forward to progress as the Commission pursues its objectives.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Surely.

Q John, I lost you on Enders. Is he testifying this afternoon?

A Yes, at 2 o'clock this afternoon. We may even have that testimony now, but we will have it.

Q John, one question on El Salvador I have is whether a decision is being made exactly on the amount of money that will be asked for additional aid to El Salvador?

A No. I think that is one of the questions that is the subject of the bilateral consultation that is going on now. As you know, out of the Continuing Resolution, the amount available this year is in the nature of $20 million. The amount last year, and the amount asked for in FY 84 was $80 million. That leaves a logical disparity, you might say, of about $60 million. But I think that is a process of deduction that is arrived at, that particular figure.

I think the figure and the method by which it might be made available, and indeed other matters that are part of the review, are just the kind of issues that are being discussed with Congressmen and Senators of both parties right now.

Q John, when you used, "the U.S. committed to a political resolution," just to get the paramaters of that phrase correctly, you're back to your original position; that is to say, not for power-sharing, but for the insurgents joining the political process and taking their chances --

A Democratic. Democratic reconciliation, yes, we are consistently in support of that.

Q Is this Commission expected to carry on a dialogue about this implementation with the opposition?

A I don't know.

Q What would the United States consider about such a -- Is that covered by Section 3?

A I don't know. I think we would have to wait and see how that develops.

Q Do we have any association or representation on this Commission, observer status, or whatever you want to call it?

A The United States?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Any role, in any fashion?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Besides supporting the Commission, what else is the United States doing to promote reconciliation?

A I think we have been consistently in support of the movement what we have considered to be in the right direction in El Salvador. You are going to have Presidential elections; you do have the drafting of a Constitution that is going on; you do have the formulation of the Peace Commission. While certainly our statement on certification recognized that there is a great distance to go in El Salvador, we consider all of these to be movement in the right direction, and indeed, perhaps rather remarkably taking place, given the conditions that are on the ground in El Salvador.

Q Is there a search for intermediaries to try to bring the government and the guerrillas together?

A No, I think this is the Salvadoran Government's role.

Q John, when you said a minute ago that you would have to wait and see. I'm not quite sure I heard the question, but I thought the question was, "Would members of the Peace Commission be expected to reconcile with the opposition?"

You said we would have to wait and see.

Is the United States taking a "hands off" attitude on negotiation?

A I can't give you a blueprint. I think tempers run high; wounds are deep. I think it is going to take some time before we see how the Commission operates.

Q Who are the members of the Commission?

A I can give you the members of those. Do you want to get them afterwards?

Q Whom do they represent? For example, is their an army representative?

A I have the names and the institutions they are drawn from, so why don't you get them from the Press Office afterwards.

Q John, do you have any comment on this reported massacre of up to 74 peasants in the western part of the country, and how this fits in with this whole political climate?

A Yes. Members of the Las Hojas Cooperative and other peasant leaders have met with Minister of Defense Garcia and President Magana concerning the killings. Both the President and the Defense Minister promised that justice would be done. The Government of El Salvador has dispatched a member of the newly-formed Human Rights Commission to the area to investigate and to report to the President.

The United States welcomes these initial steps by the Government of El Salvador, which indicate that it is taking this matter seriously. We will continue to monitor the Salvadoran investigation and follow-up action closely, and we expect that the perpetrators will be brought to justice.

Q Can I follow that up?

In view of the certification and the plans to ask for supplemental military aid, do you expect that incidents like this will hurt your case in Congress?

A I think you have to look at the overall situation. As I say, I think our certification statement was a very honest one, in which we drew attention not only to the distance that El Salvador had come, but to the distance it needs to go. But you have to look at the, I think, balance sheet in broad terms.

Q Has anyone been taken into custody on this case?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Is Sonsonate, the province in which it took place, is that an area that has a lot of rebel action in it?

A I can't answer that.

Q Would the failure, if there were a failure, on the part of the U.S. to make the emergency aid of $60 million available, would that lead to an insurgent victory in El Salvador?

A I don't think it is a question of leading to an insurgent victory. I think the President addressed that in his statement yesterday. Obviously, we're looking ahead; we're looking to the future. Substantially less funds have been made available this year than last year and than are sought for next year. So there is a shortfall; there is a deficiency. Funds are needed for ammunition, spare parts -- I think as the Secretary said in his testimony yesterday, spare parts, helicopter parts. It's a question of looking to the future to insure that the situation, which I think the President said yesterday gives some concern, nevertheless does not deteriorate.

Q Why is it the Administration didn't include the $35 million supplemental request when it had that opportunity last month?

A I can't answer that.

Q You don't know?

A I don't know.

Q Will you take the question as to why, because it does take on an emergency kind of character?

A All right. O.K.

Q John, one question I have is, you say that the $60 million is a logical disparity. However, last year, the Administration requested $60-$61 million, it was my understanding. And then in the Continuing --

A I think the total is $80 million.

Q No. For FY 83 you only requested about $60 million.

Q And then in the Continuing Resolution, the Congress slashed that to $26.3?

A Yes.

Q If you're asking for $60 million again, it will shoot it up to $86.3, which is identical to '84.

A I'm not accepting the $60 million figure. I'd like to go back and check that, because my understanding is that it is in the 80's. But even so, if you need $60-$80, and you don't get it --

Q Is the Administration requesting $60 million?

A The Administration is going through a process of consultation, bipartisan consultation. I do not believe that a specific figure was mentioned at yesterday's meeting. As I say, there is a process of deduction between what you sought and what you got. But I don't think that the final figure is agreed on.

Q What is the area of the figure, then?

A I think that logic drives you toward the direction of that $60 million, but I think that's all --

Q Shultz used $60 million without any qualms yesterday.

A That's the shortfall.

Q What is the scope of the consultation with Congress; i.e., is it only with respect to the funding and how to provide it, or does it have larger aims, for example, to reexamine the policy thrust in the area?

A I think it's primarily in the area of funding.

Q John, so there is no interest, particularly, in people taking a different approach? If I can gather this correctly, it is primarily for seeking the best way of getting $60 million in military aid to El Salvador.

A It hasn't been my impression that there has been any reluctance to offer different ideas about the conduct of our policy in El Salvador.

Q Tell us about the question of the advisors.

A O.K. Sorry, I cut you off, Bob.

Q No, that's okay. You'll give the same answer, whatever the question is. (Laughter) What about the old number 55? Are you going beyond that?

A No.

Q Will the advisors roles be changed, and so on?

A First, you're talking about the U.S. trainers in El Salvador, and they will continue to be just that. They will not be combat advisers. Secondly, we'll make the maximum use of what has been our current self-imposed ceiling of 55. That's the highest it has ever been. That's the sort of ceiling that we have used.

As a matter of fact, the average number of U.S. trainers in El Salvador last year was about 45. I think the current figure is a little lower than that. We're running below the 55. Obviously, we would run up to the 55 before we got to the point of considering anything above that.

Q But you have no plan to go above 55?

A There is no plan. We certainly don't rule it out. There isn't any reason why we could not go beyond the 55 if it were determined that that were a good thing to do, but there is no plan and no decision.

Q As recently as February 8, this Department issued a written statement saying "We envisage no need to increase the number of" -- I think the statement used the word "advisors," but I don't have it in front of me.

A That's what I'm saying today. What I'm saying is that there is no reason why you could not go beyond 55, and there wasn't any reason back in February 8 why you couldn't have gone beyond 55. There's no --

Q The statement on February 8 said, "We see no reason to go beyond 55."

A Well, at the moment we don't see a reason to go beyond the 55.

Q Well, what happened between February 8 and March 1 that --

A Nothing in my book.

Q In other words, you still don't see any reason, you don't envision any need to go beyond 55?

A Not at the present time. As you know, there is a review going on, and what decision might be made at the end of that review period, I don't know; but certainly at the moment, there is no decision.

Q Secretary Weinberger last week, John, said that that might be considered in terms of maybe 10s or 20s, but he didn't say anything about stopping at the cap of 55.

A Yes.

Q But you're saying today, that the cap of 55, we might go up to it, and stop there, go no further?

A What I'm saying is that you have a kind of cap that we have had, in our thinking, of 55. That's the highest it's ever been. And currently, we're not there, so we have some latitude to go up to that figure of 55, in the first instance, before we need to talk about going beyond 55. Whether we would talk about 55-plus remains to be seen.

Q If you're talking about expanding their role, how would you expand it beyond what it is and not thrust them into a combat situation?

A I think that's one of the things that would have to be considered in terms of the review and the thinking that is going on now, but certainly there are no plans to put them into combat.

Q John, I have two questions: First of all, who came up with the 55 limit? Is that Congress or was that the Executive?

A No. It's the Executive.

Q So it is not binding?

A It is not binding.

Q Second, at the same hearing last week, General Vessey -- is that how you pronounce it?

A Vessey?

Q Yes. He said that he would like to see the Milgroup, which is separate, increase from 7 to 20. And Weinberger said that he thought that the 55 limit was not desirable, or I mean, that it was desirable to increase it.

There seems to be a conflict here between the State Department and what you're saying and what the Pentagon is saying.

A No. I don't think there is a conflict. I mean, there could well be discussion, and who knows what may come down the road. At the moment, there is no suggestion of that number going beyond 55.

Q Are they going to increase the Milgroup, too, from 7 to 20?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask the Pentagon how they carve those up.

Q How are their operations funded now? Is that through IMET, or is it out of the general Defense Department budget? You've got 40 or so --

A You'll have to ask the Pentagon that.

Q You've got 40 or so training units around the world right now, just like this one.

A Yes.

Q How is that being handled?

A Why don't you ask the Pentagon?

Q John, I'm still not clear on that subject. I think you just said at the moment there is no suggestion of that number going beyond 55.

A That's right.

Q Didn't a senior Administration official only as recently as yesterday suggest that the number would go beyond 55?

A You need to go back and read very carefully what that senior official said.

Q What did he say?

A Why don't you go back and look at the transcript?

Q John, on the question of the role, are you ruling out any combat role?

A Yes.

Q You're ruling out a combat role. Therefore, what other variation could they have?

A I don't know.

Q When you say you're ruling it out, you said, as I understood you a few minutes ago, U.S. trainers will continue to be just that. They will not be combat advisors.

A Yes.

Q Does that statement, like the other statements, refer to the present circumstances before a recommendation is made from this study that is going on, or are you saying that this is an immutable and fixed policy of the Administration?

A I think, again, you should go back to the statement of the senior official yesterday who made it clear that he or she was not talking about a combat role. That was very clear.

Q It has been reported that the United States has broached with the Salvadoran Government the possibility of these advisors being released from the restriction which forbids them from going into combat areas. Will you comment on that?

A I know of no such plan to change the role of the trainers.

Q The question is whether this plan, has it been broached to the Salvadoran Government?

A If it has, I'm not aware of it.

Q There will be no expanded role for the trainers, are you saying?

A Not to my knowledge.

-- MORE --

Q Is it another misreported statement from aboard the plane yesterday?

A You need to go back and look at that statement and what was said in its entirety and the clarification of it.

Q Can we get a copy of it?

A I'm sure we can make it available.

Q You said, "We will make maximum use of the self-imposed ceiling of 55." Does that mean a decision has been made to raise it to 55?

A No, it does not. It means that we're not even using the maximum figure of 55 which we have set for ourselves.

Q If you're making maximum use of it, it sounds like that's a decision to go up to 55.

A No. What I'm saying is that they don't even need to approach the question of using more than 55 when we don't even have 55 there at the moment.

Q As long as we're splitting hairs on this, when you talk about the cap of 55, you have been up till now been referring to an absolute limit of 55 at any one time, or are you moving to another definition which would have 55 as the average for a certain period of time?

A Let me reassure you, nobody is playing games here. We're not seeking to change. However that 55 has been determined hitherto is what I'm talking about. There's no change in that formula, but just how it is being calculated I'd have to go back and check.

Q I'm a little puzzled on your answer to a previous question. You're ruling out a combat role under the current setup. Could the review now underway introduce a combat role?

A My reading of what the senior spokesman said yesterday precluded that. But, again, I refer you to what the spokesman said.

Q Has the Government of El Salvador requested more advisors?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q When was this review initiated?

A I think in yesterday's statement it suggested it had been underway for about four weeks.

Q Was this from the time where the advisor was injured in the helicopter; that was four weeks ago. Was that what triggered it?

A No. I don't know what triggered it.

Q But that wasn't what triggered it?

A I don't know what triggered it.

Q The Secretary made a reference yesterday to the possibility that this will come to a head next week. Are you working against a one-week deadline for making final decisions?

A No. I think probably what he was talking about was the suggestion that came out of the meeting with the President yesterday that a period of consultation would go forward for about a week. I think that's what he had in mind. It would take about a week's consultation. I think that's his thought.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to the rebels saying that they would abide by a ceasefire for a day if everyone else did?

A Yes. The insurgents have declared a unilateral one day ceasefire in conjunction with the Pope's visit to El Salvador on Sunday. Since they're the ones who started the shooting, it's only right that they stop.

The Salvadoran Government has announced that it will not take offensive actions during the Pope's visit but will defend against attacks. That seems to strikes us as reasonable.

Q Can we go to another area?

Q Can we just stay a couple more on this? Yesterday, in the Secretary's testimony he made a reference to two churchmen in response to a question about Soviet (Inaudible) the churchmen who want to see Soviet influence in El Salvador improve. Can you say, was he referring to churchmen in this country who support an aid cut-off or negotiations, or was he referring to the Catholic Church in El Salvador?

A I don't know, but I think he felt that in his exchange with Senator Leahy he had answered the Senator's question satisfactorily.

Q But with all respect, I don't know if that answers mine satisfactorily.

A That's another question.

Q I'm trying to get an idea of what he was -- I'm not asking for names as did Senator Leahy. I just want to know whether he was referring to an earlier comment by Senator Inouye about religious leaders who do not support our role there or whether he was talking about Rivera y Damas in El Salvador?

A I don't know. I would just refer you to his testimony.

Q Could you take it; could you ask him?

A I think he felt, as I recall the exchange, the Senator wanted some further information. I think the Secretary said and felt that he had answered the question satisfactorily, so I think we'll leave it at that.

Q One other, which doesn't relate to his testimony. Yesterday, in a Mexico paper, President Monge of Costa Rica said that the San Jose forum for peace and democracy is now dead. Do you have any comment with respect to that?

A No, I'm not aware of that; haven't seen the statement

Q There is a recent criminal case in Texas involving someone named Ian Smalley who was arrested in conjunction with with attempts to transfer arms to Iran. The press has reported widely that he was released on the basis of some evidence provided by the State Department that they were aware of his activities and in some sense they were approved. Do you have any comment on that?

A None at all. I'm not aware of it.

Q Can you look into it?

A I'll take a look and see what we have on it.

Q There's a related, a possibly related case in Germany, a fellow named Sadegh Tabatabai who was arrested with a pound and a half of heroin. The German Foreign Ministry has attempted to have him released on the grounds that he is a diplomat with immunity from the Iranian Government, apparently also involved in some arms transactions.

A What's the State Department's involvement in that one?

Q What's been reported is that the State Department has worked in conjunction with --

A Reported where?

Q In many German newspapers, that the State Department has attempted to use its influence to secure the release of Tabatabai. Will you look into that one?

A Sure.

Q Any comments on the remarks of Mr. Gritz in Bangkok that at least ten American POW's are alive in Indochina?

A POW's?

Q Pardon me, former American servicemen; however you wish.

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q On that same subject, what is the position today as to whether any of the missing American MIA's are alive?

A We did have some earlier guidance on that. There's no change. I think we do have some earlier guidance on that which we can pull out for you.

Q Can you say anything about the state of the Habib/Draper talks? There was an optimistic piece from Lebanon today in the Washington Post. I gather Secretary Veliotes was quite optimistic on the Hill yesterday. There's a counter-report from Beirut today not so optimistic.

A I think you're wise to treat those swings up and down with caution. We haven't talked about, as you well know to your frustration, about the negotiations as they go on from day to day. They are still going on. They're difficult, as the Secretary has said. We're working at it. But I think I would tend to disregard the extreme swings of optimism and pessimism.

Q Is he coming back here?

A He's in Cairo today, and I guess, he'll go back to Israel probably tomorrow. The question of whether he will be in San Franciso on Saturday night for his World Affairs Council honor session is unresolved. He does not yet know whether he can be there or not.

Q Do you have anything on Jimmy Carter's visit?

A Sorry. On who?

Q Jimmy Carter's visit to the Middle East in his luncheon with the Secretary yesterday?

A No. He had planned the visit to the Middle East. I think he wanted to come in and talk to the Secretary and, of course, the Secretary responded to that very warmly. They lunched yesterday. No, I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Did he convey any message from the Secretary?

A No.

Q Do you have a readout on the El Salvador Foreign Minister's meeting with the Secretary?

A Yes. The Secretary met the Salvadoran Foreign Minister Chavez Mena for about forty-five minutes yesterday evening. They exchanged views on a wide-range of interest of mutual concern, including the political and military situations, the recently announced peace proposals and the Peace Commission. With respect to the latter two issues, the Secretary indicated his strong support for political reconciliation through the electoral process.

He stressed that the guerrillas should not be allowed to shoot their way into a power-sharing arrangement, and I think that's about it. The meeting had been planned for some time. The primary objective is to explain and consult with members of Congress on the current situation in El Salvador from a domestic Salvadoran point of view.

Q "Shoot their way into a power," was that --

A "Shoot their way into a power-sharing arrangement."

Q Did you discourage us from believing the reports on the Middle East; is that the way I understood it? Am I correct on that, of some optimism?

A On Lebanon? The reports on Lebanon?

Q Yes.

A It's not a question of discouraging. It's a question of having been fairly consistent in our reluctance to characterize the discussions that are going on in the tripartite forum. We haven't done that, and I don't want to do that today. I would discourage you from picking up these day-to-day swings. I think that the discussions have been going along on a fairly constant level.

Q What Ambassador Habib is reported, he was quoted saying that I have an agreement for you but will not tell you.

A I haven't seen that quote, but I would look upon it with great skepticism. Ambassador Habib is very, very rarely quoted.

Q One last thing, there are reports also from the Middle East -- I haven't been here. I don't know if you were asked about it -- a shooting of a 4 year-old child on the West Bank?

A The general question of violence on the West Bank, surely.

Q I would like to hear about the general violence, but I would like also if you have something in particular about the shooting of a 4 year-old girl?

A I've been out of town for a few days. I think that happened last week. There was a shooting and a four year old child was involved. I have a reference to it in here. The United States, of course, deplores all violence in the West Bank and trusts that the Israeli authorities are doing their best to bring the perpetrators of the shooting incident to justice.

We are concerned about the recent increase in tension on the West Bank and hope both sides will take steps to exercise restraint. In our view, the recent recurrence of violence on the West Bank only underscores the need for prompt progress towards a negotiated solution of the Palestinian problem.

Q Copy?

A Yes, sure.

But there are assorted incidents. It's not only the shooting of the child. I think there are other incidents involved here as well.

Q One last thing, if possible. There's also a report that the United States has expressed its displeasure with the Soviet Union's supplying of SAM-5s.

A Displeasure?

Q Displeasure, yes, to the Soviet Union. Are you expecting a reply? Have you received anything from there?

A We don't, as you know, get into the exchange. I'm sure that the Soviet Union is well aware of our concern about them.

Q On that subject, three Administration officials came forward yesterday to discuss the SAM-5 situation, from Weinberger to Shultz to Veliotes. Is there some policy -- is there something that we should be seeing beyond -- I'm asking a simple question -- is there something we should be seeing beyond the mere statement that these are unwelcome and that the Soviets have told us that they intend to man the SAM-5s? Is the Administration going to do anything about the SAM-5s?

A I think that we have made clear our regret and disapproval of this from the first reports, and have consistently made clear that it is destablizing in the area and have also consistently made that clear to the Soviet Union.

Q What has the U.S. told Israel about the SAM-5s?

A I just won't get into the substance of the diplomatic interchange.

Q Are you, in a way, confirming the presence of Soviet advisors in Syria?

A I think the Secretary did that yesterday. He said they're manned by Soviet crews.

Q Two questions: First, do you have anything on the role of the U.N. observers in Beirut? There is some report there is some disagreement between the U.N. and Israel regarding the exact role that the observers should have in Beirut?

A Of the present U.N. observers in Beirut?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Another question. Today is March 1, and there are widespread reports that by March 1 we'll have some announcement from King Hussein. Do you have any update information, or anything to say about it?

A No, not really. I think those reports have come out of Amman. There's been some suggestion that the Jordanians had talked in terms of a timetable. But I think there's also been some suggestion that they extended that timetable to the end of March, but you really have to ask the Jordanians about that.

Q Do you still believe that King Hussein is going to join the process?

A We still certainly hope so, and are still working vigorously to bring that about.

Q Where are we on the talks with the Canadians on the airfare dispute?

A I don't have too much on that. Consultations beween the United States and Canadian civil aviation officials began Monday in Washington, but it's still too early to say what the outcome will be.

Both sides suggested detailed proposals for resolving the specific fare issues before them. The consultations are continuing today.

Q Are they to run indefinitely, or do you have a comment on it?

A I don't know. I don't have a timetable.

Q On a related subject, the Secretary was asked when he was down, I think, in Florida about the decision to label some Canadian films as propaganda, and he said he didn't have the -- he wasn't fully apprised of it. Has he come to some attitude or conclusion about it since then, or does the Department have any position on it?

A No. I think his words at the time speak for themselves. It did happen while we were on the road. It is a Justice Department decision, and I think you have to see this within the overall framework of U.S./Canadian relations.

Q Meaning what?

A It's simply one incident in an otherwise good relationship with a much-valued neighbor.

Q Does the Secretary feel that this was a wise decision on the part of the U.S. Government?

A I think the Secretary is leaving it to the Justice Department.

Q If there was a statement, you can refer me to it, or, if not, if you care to comment on how does the United States Government see the response from the Palestine National Council in Algiers, in particular, about President Reagan's plan? Do you see it as a rejection; do you see it as a --

A I think we had something on that last week.

Q There is something?

A Yes.

Q Another area. Do you have anything at all on the visit to Washington by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Romania -- and he's supposed to also meet with Eagleburger this afternoon?

A Yes, he is coming in to meet with Mr. Eagleburger this afternoon. Mr. Dolgu is visiting Washington at our invitation to discuss matters of bilateral interests.

In addition to Mr. Eagleburger, he'll be meeting with Assistant Secretaries Burt and Abrams in the Department, as well as having appointments in other agencies, including Commerce, USTR and ACDA. And, yes, among the topics to be discussed will be Romania's education repayment decree and MFN status.

Q Has the Administration decided when to lift its MNF status?

A I'm not able to answer that.

Q Do you have a comment on Argentina's setting a national date for elections, and could this lead to a decision on certification?

A I don't know about the latter part of the question, but certainly we are in favor of the election decision.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that China has lodged an official protest against the President's remarks regarding Taiwan arms? Does the United States have some position further to take about it?

A A Chinese Foreign Ministry official has made a presentation on this subject to our Embassy in Beijing. It happened last week. I think from the Foreign Ministry comments reported in dispatch from Xinhua today that you can see the tenor of the remarks.

Q What does the U.S. say?

A The United States' view is that the communique speaks for itself. It contains two important statements of policy which should be viewed together, and we expect both parties to the communique to carry out the policies articulated in that document.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Wednesday, March 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #36

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements.

Available in the Press Office are the following testimonies:

Testimony by Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology Schneider before the Senate Banking Committee on security assistance appropriations. That's testimony he is giving today.

Testimony by AID Administrator McPherson before the House Budget Committee Task Force on International Finance and Trade on foreign assistance proposals. That's testimony he is giving today.

Also available on an embargoed basis is the address by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Crocker before a seminar on the African economic crisis at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies. That's tomorrow -- it's embargoed until tomorrow.

Q Is it available now?

A It either is or will be shortly available in the Press Office. The subject is development dialogue with Africa.

Available will be the following testimony:

Again by Under Secretary Schneider before the House Budget Committee on security assistance appropriations; and by Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Veliotes before the Senate Foreign Relations, Near East and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee on aid to the Middle East.

That's it. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q John, what can you tell us about the possibilities of early elections in El Salvador?

A The Salvadoran Government has pledged to hold free elections no later than March of 1984. The United States, of course, supports and endorses that process. The decision is up to the Salvadorans. We have consistently voiced our support for the electoral process in El Salvador. We've discussed this issue with the Salvadoran Government many times, but as I said, it's up to that Government to determine and announce an exact date for the next elections. The important fact is that there are going to be such elections.

We continue to support efforts at national reconciliation and the participation of all factions in El Salvador in that electoral process.

Q When you're talking about elections, are you talking about just Presidential elections or are you talking about doing the whole thing all over again?

A Presidential and Congressional.*

Q Both -- Parliament would be reelected?

A Yes.

Q Would this government like the process to be accelerated, to occur before March '84?

A I think that's a decision that the Salvadoran Government has to make. That's an internal affair of Salvador, but obviously, we are enthusiastic about the development of the democratic process, democratic reconciliation.

Q What do you know about the possibility that the Salvadoran Government will announce acceleration of these elections when the Pope is in El Salvador on Sunday?

A I think you will have to ask them.

Q You can't help at all on the question of whether we are encouraging them to accelerate the date?

A We have been supporting the democratic process.

Q How about dates?

A If the Salvadoran Government thinks that an earlier election is possible and achievable, yes, we're in favor of that. That's their decision.

Q Have you talked to the Salvadoran Government about the possibility of an earlier election, that is earlier than March 1984?

A Sure. We talked to them several times about that.

*CORRECTION: This is a presidential election which does not include voting for a Constituent Assembly. The terms of office for the Constituent Assembly will be determined by the new Constitution whic is now being drafted.

4M

Q Why did that come up, the question of an early election, when you voiced satisfaction previously that the Presidential election had been set for March 1984?

A No later than March '84.

Q That's when it was set, March 30, I believe, 1984.

A Yes.

Q But why did it come up in such conversations when a date had been set?

A It's not my understanding that a date had been set. An outer limit had been set. It's up to the Salvadoran Government to set the date.

Q Considering the difficulties that you have been having getting an increased aid program for El Salvador, isn't it in the interest of the United States Government that elections be held earlier than the outermost date, March of '84?

A I think it is certainly in line with what has been our consistent policy in El Salvador. Of course we have been interested in supporting and bolstering them militarily; but of course, we have been pushing and moving on the whole democratic process. As I think I said yesterday, we're appreciative of the fact that they are working on the Constitution, that they have announced their Peace Commission, and that they have been working on the electoral process. We want to move that process forward.

Q On the election process, I thought the schedule of elections no later than March '84 were specifically talking about Presidential elections and not the whole Congressional election process.

A As I say, that's for the Salvadoran Government to announce and to decide.

Q You, the U.S. Government, would like to see the whole thing, the whole process renewed -- in other words, Congressional as well as Presidential elections?*

A If the Salvadoran Government feels that it is practical and realistic to advance that date nearer, rather than the outer limit of March, yes, of course.

* See page 2 for correction

Q One more question: when one speaks of the elections in El Salvador, one can't talk only of people going to a voting booth; you have to talk about other things such as an amnesty.

A Yes.

Q Would the United States be in favor of an amnesty?

A Well, you've just had a Peace Commission installed, and that's one of the things that they are going to be looking at. But its early days, I think that's one of the things that that Commission will, obviously, have to look at.

Q Is there a military representative on that Peace Commission, as Mr. Enders said yesterday?

A I have to check that, Jim. You got the names yesterday.

Q Yes.

A I'm not sure whether any of those are military people.

Q The question is, why is the representation on the Peace Commission at apparently -- well, there is no army representation, as far as I can tell -- at a relatively low level. The only political representative is from a party that doesn't even have representation in the Constituent Assembly?

A I don't know. It's a Salvadoran commission. You'd have to ask them.

Q John, you're saying you would favor an earlier date for the election if Salvador so decides.

A If Salvador decides.

Q What would be the advantage of an earlier date?

A Well, I suppose it moves the democratic process forward, Bernie.

Q What about the problem of security that Secretary Shultz was asked about? He said that it was a very difficult situation. What arrangements could be made regarding security for those participating?

A Again, I think that is something the Salvadoran Government will have to address itself to.

Q Was Senator Stone in San Salvador the past week?

A Yes.

Q Did he speak with President Magana?

A I think he did.

Q What was the subject of his conversation?

A The overall democratic process, including elections.

Q Would there be any value to the elections if the guerrillas did not participate?

A I don't know. That's a hypothetical question.

Q What is the position of Senator Stone?

A He has been appointed as the representative of the President to assist in public diplomacy initiatives in Central America.

Q John, what are the deficiencies in the present government that early elections would correct?

A Well, this is a provisional government; this is an interim government. It has always been envisaged that you would move to the electoral process that we're now talking about.

Q So it's only the provisional aspects that you're concerned about?

A I think the overall movement towards a more orthodox representational system.

Q I'd like to ask you about the content of the word "reconciliation." Are we talking about reconciliation with the guerrillas and with the guerrilla movement, or are we talking about direct reconciliation, or are we talking about reconciliation through the electoral process?

A We're talking about reconciliation with all the people of El Salvador within a democratic framework, within an electoral process.

Q That does not mean direct talks with the guerrillas?

A Not to my understanding.

Q This is a kind of chicken-and-egg question. Would the United States expect an announcement from the Salvadoran Government as to whether it feels it would be able to support earlier elections before a decision is taken by the Administration or Congress on the $60 million in aid, or would we expect the aid to be an inducement for such an announcement?

A I think the Salvadoran Government will make up its own mind on any question involving elections, irrespective of the aid debate.

Q There is a charge that an election announcement may be made in order to deflect an expected call by the Pope for a dialogue between the forces. What do you have to say to that charge?

A Nothing.

Q Is there any basis to it?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Also, do you have any statement with respect to the elevation of Archbishop Rivera, or the Acting --

A No.

Q John, could I just sum up the discussion we've had so far by asking you: if the Government of El Salvador were to announce earlier elections, it would have the enthusiastic support of this government?

A Yes, of course.

Q I wonder if you could address yourself to the subject of the informal ceiling of 55 American technical advisors.

Yesterday, Assistant Secretary Enders said that there wasn't any thought being given to raising that ceiling. A few days ago, the Secretary of Defense appeared to be chafing at the ceiling of 55, and suggesting that indeed it was being reconsidered.

What about the ceiling, is it firm? Or is it floating up?

A I really don't think we can go any further than we went yesterday. We talked about it yesterday here and Tom Enders did talk about it, and to summarize, U.S. trainers in El Salvador will continue to be just that, trainers and not combat advisors; and we will continue to make maximum use of our current self-imposed ceiling of 55. There has been no decision to increase the number of trainers.

Q I'm really asking about reconsideration of the ceiling. Is this part of the general review of Central American policy that is going on right now?

A I wouldn't rule out that it's being discussed, as I think a senior Administration official said. A decision might be that we have too many, too few.

Q What circumstances have changed, in your view, given the fact that the insurgents last time boycotted the elections, that would make the insurgents in any way entertain the idea of participating in this next round of elections? Why would they come in this time?

A You're asking me to get into a hypothetical area, but I suppose that would depend on the conditions, or inducements, or however you might want to phrase them that the Salvadoran Government might offer, and the assessment of the guerrillas of their interest and situation.

Q What do you mean by the word "inducements that Salvador might offer?"

A We've talked here about -- Jim already asked me about the question of amnesty. I'm not suggesting what the Salvadoran Government might do, but I mean, obviously, there is the question of how the safety of those people might be insured, I would imagine in their eyes.

Q Yesterday, an old-time death squad, named the "Secret Anti-Communist Army," of which, supposedly, one of the founders is president of the Constituent Assembly, Roberto D'Aubuisson, resurfaced again by carving its initials on three corpses. Do you have any comment on the reactivation?

A No. Don't know anything about it.

Q Do you think this is a bad sign?

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Could you take the question?

A I'll look into it for you.

Q Can I have one other on the region as a whole?

A Sure.

Q The Secretary and Assistant Secretary Enders have both indicated support for a new call by the Foreign Ministers of the former Central American Democratic Community for a conference as soon as possible. Can you state what this conference is?

A No.

Q Then, why do we support it?

A We will have to wait and see if there is any movement on this front, who is involved in it, and who the participants might be; but we are dealing in something that is hypothetical at this stage.

Q On the same subject, up until what you're saying now in the stories about U.S. readiness to accept an earlier date, what has been the U.S. position? Has there been any other position taken?

A Not to my knowledge, in that obviously, we welcome the fact that elections would have taken place no later than March of next year, and that we've talked to the Salvadoran Government a number of times about this.

Q And just to recap, what would be the advantage of an earlier election than the outer limit of 3/84?

A I suppose it moves the whole democratic process forward.

Q Why should it be moved forward?

A Why shouldn't it be moved forward? (Laughter)

Q Isn't there a new rhetoric here? I mean, my memory of this is that we've always talked about the Presidential elections to be held in March '84. Was this just misstatements by the Secretary and others?

A I don't know that it's a misstatement. My understanding of the agreement is that elections would be held no later than March of '84, that that was an outer limit.

Q Was this just discovered by some expert? I mean, I've gone to innumerable hearings, and we've always just referred to the March '84 elections as if this was stated in ice.

A Obviously, it hasn't been cast in ice, if indeed the Salvadoran Government is considering an earlier date.

Q John, could you take your reasoning behind the earlier elections one step further to say that it might have a salutory effect on your efforts to get the aid program through Congress?

A I think the United States has clearly a dual policy in El Salvador. Obviously, we are supporting the military in their bid to put down the insurgents and the guerrillas; but on the other track, we have, as you well know from what we have said in the certification statement, paid tribute to the progress that has been made, but very frankly admitted that much progress still has to be made.

In that regard, we have had a healthy and vigorous interest in broadening the democratic process, and moving it forward. That's what we're doing.

Q Just to clarify on what Bernie was asking, are you saying that no date has ever been set, except to say that not after March 1984?

A Now you're going back into an area in which I don't have personal expertise. But not to my knowledge.

-- MORE --

Q Could you look into it and put down an answer as to what it was because there was continued --

A No. I think that's a question of factual and historical research that, really, you could undertake.

Q I have already, and I'm surprised by your statement with respect to that. Are you just uncertain as to the --

A I'm just giving you what my understanding of the situation is.

Q But nobody prepared guidance that said that; is that correct?

A In all the discussion I have heard about this, that has been the situation.

Q Can you take another question? Just flatly, did the United States in the person of Ambassador Stone propose this to the Salvadoran Government?

A Certainly was discussed as it has been on a number of occasions.

Q It's important whether this is an American idea or a Salvador Government idea.

A It certainly has been discussed in the past and certainly was discussed during Senator Stone's visit.

Q John, have you had a chance to ask the Secretary who he meant when he was referring to the churchmen who want to foster communism in El Salvador?

A No, I haven't.

Q Has he volunteered it to anybody?

A No, he hasn't.

Q Do you think he will specify the people he has in mind?

A No, I don't.

Q Why not?

A I think he felt he answered the question during his testimony.

Q On the 3/84 date, was it your understanding that was limited only to the election of a president or a new congress as well?

A I thought that involved both. *

Q Would you say something about what you think the impact on reconciliation might be of the Pope's visit?

A I don't know. We all hope for a successful visit by the Pope, but I can't speak for him. I don't know what he's going to say, what he's going to do.

Q You're talking about reconciliation in terms of the electoral process?

A Yes.

Q And, surely, that's not what the Pope is talking about.

A I don't know. I haven't heard him talk about it.

Q He is surely talking about direct reconciliation.

A I haven't heard him speak on the subject. You have to wait and see.

Q One more question on this. If there were to be an acceleration in the election process, as you understand it, would that only require an announcement by the Government of Salvador or would it also require some agreement by the various other parties concerned?

A I suppose that would depend on how the announcement is made and what consultation there might have been. I don't know. But, again, you're asking me for something that the Salvadoran Government has to decide.

Q It's a good question in terms of how that --

A Whether it's a constitutional question?

Q That's right.

A You've got me. I can't answer that.

Q Can you take that question?

A We'll look into it for you.

* See page 2.

Q When do you expect an announcement?

A I don't know that there will be announcement. You're asking me about a newspaper story.

Q Any arrests on the Sonsonate case yet?

A No arrests. But you probably are aware of Defense Minister Garcia's press conference yesterday.

Q Why did he say they weren't going to observe a ceasefire?

A There's a little confusion on that, I think. There were later statements, reiterating what we had said yesterday that the Government would not undertake offensive operations during the Pope's visit.

Q After his press conference?

A As I understand it.

Q Why? Because the reporters misunderstood -- like they did on Air Force One or someplace?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on the meeting between Morocco and Algeria?

A I think we had something on that yesterday. I think there was some guidance, and therefore it's in the Press Office. I don't have it with me right now, but we had something yesterday on that.

Q Do you have anything on the incidents between Israeli soldiers and U.N. observers in Beirut?

A No. You really would have to go to the U.N. on that. I guess you're talking about the network report last night? You would have to go to the U.N. on that.

Q Any comment on the visit by the Libyan official delegation to Chad?

A Did we have some guidance on that earlier in the week -- again, in the Press Office. I don't have it with me today.

Q The Syrians are saying that the U.S. is opening a propaganda offensive against it on the SAM-5 missiles; do you have any comment on that?

A No. I haven't seen what they have said on that, but our position on the SAM-5s is plain. We consider them a destabilizing influence in the region.

Q John, anything on Habib's plans? Is he coming back this weekend?

A Not quite sure. He is in Israel today. He was in Cairo yesterday, and hasn't yet made the decision, I think, on whether he will back for the World Affairs Council meeting.

Q What will determine whether he comes back or not?

A I'm sure he's involved in discussions in Israel today, and I suppose the overall course of his negotiations will decide whether he can come back or not.

Q Is there a sense that a breakthrough might be imminent and would determine whether he stays or not?

A As I said yesterday, I think I cautioned you against these reports of sharp swings up and down in those negotiations.

Q Can you provide us with some information about the Secretary's speech Saturday night?

A I can't as yet.

Q The subject?

A The subject, no, I can't.

Q You have nothing on the subject?

A No, not yet.

Q Is it going to go beyond the talents of Habib?

A That is a dinner at which Ambassador Habib, if there, he would also speak, but I would not think that it will be confined to that subject alone.

Q I hope he's not going to speak on foreign aid again.

Q What time is that that he's going to speak?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have a contact number and so forth?

A We can get it for you.

Q Do you have a readout on the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, and specifically education?

A Yes, with Mr. Eagleburger. They met for about an hour. They discussed the kind of subjects you might expect. (Laughter) Bilateral and broad international issues and, yes, the Romanian education repayment decree and the question of Romania's most favored nation tariff status were among the topics covered. But I'm afraid I'm not going to be any more expansive than the expansiveness I've already been.

Q A couple weeks ago, I think it was Alan said that implementation of the education tax will lead to a suspension of MFN. It's been confirmed officially by the Romanians that they have implemented the tax. Can you help us out when the MFN will be lifted, or whether it will be lifted?

A I don't have anything more for you today.

Q Do you have anything on these charges about the Russians mixing in the internal electoral affairs of the Federal Republic?

A I do not today. I don't know whether we have earlier made any reference to that. Apparently not. Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you have a readout on the results of the Contact Group talks on Namibia?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on China's proposal with respect to Cambodia that came out?

A Yes. We welcome the Chinese proposal which is consistent with ASEAN's approach which we fully support. The announcement further undercuts Vietnam's claim that a threat from China justifies its aggression and occupation of Kampuchea.

We call on Hanoi to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement based on the total withdrawal of its troops and the establishment of a neutral, independent Kampuchea which is no threat to any of its neighbors, including Vietnam.

Q Can I follow that up?

A Sure.

Q The Chinese, as I understand the kind of new approach was, they called for a partial withdrawal of Vietnam at which time they would begin talks with Vietnam itself. Would we take a similar position?

A Talks with Vietnam?

Q Talks with Vietnam after a partial withdrawal of troops -- understood that there would be a complete withdrawal.

A Can't answer that one for you.

Q Would you look into that?

A It's a hypothetical thing. I think we have to wait and see if there were movements.

Q A follow-up question. Could this proposal coming from China, after the visit by Secretary Shultz, be considered as an outcome of the visit of the talks of the situation?

A No, I don't think so. As you know, the Secretary discussed with a number of Chinese officials matters of mutual interest, and Kampuchea certainly was one of them. And, I think, the Secretary, on a number of occasions, has said that if the Chinese could initiate some movement in Kampuchea, that would be welcome by us and we would support it. But I think it would be an overstatement to say that it stems from the talks.

Q What was the State Department involvement in arranging the visit by Mayor Koch in Israel and in Lebanon, and what advice did he get from the State Department regarding the visit in Lebanon?

A Insofar as the details of the Koch visit, I think you really ought to ask him and the Government of Lebanon. But Mayor Koch did consult with the State Department about his method of entry into Lebanon before he left. The State Department did offer its counsel, and the United States did offer to assist the Mayor with an alternative method of entry.

Q Which means that you didn't like the idea of him entering with the Israeli forces?

A Yes.

Q Why?

A The point is that the Government of Lebanon is a sovereign state and has the sole authority to determine the method of entry and it did.

Q Do you have any reaction to the decision of the Lebanese Government not to grant him an official status?

A No. They're within their rights and that's their decision.

Q Until about two weeks ago, Shultz and President Reagan and others in the Administration have said repeatedly, with regard to the arms talks, that the U.S. hasn't seen a proposal from the Soviet Union. Has the U.S. now seen one?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have any reaction to the report today in which China says that the Taiwan issue of Taiwan's future is purely an internal Chinese affair and that there's no linkage between any Chinese agreement for a peaceful resolution of this issue and our pledge to gradually end arms sales to Taiwan?

A No reaction beyond what we gave you yesterday, and I think we would again, refer you to the communique on arms sales to Taiwan. I would have to go back and get the exact language in there, but there is language in there which talks about the fundamental position of the PRC on the question of peaceful relationship with Taiwan and I think that's an important phrase; but we're going to stand by and implement the communique, the terms of the communique.

Q Back on El Salvador. Your military aid request has problems from Congressmen who want a negotiated political settlement. If you have the early elections and if the guerrillas do not take part, will you see that as evidence that this negotiated political settlement approach is invalid, and will that, in effect, help your case for the military aid?

A I don't know. We're in a process of consultation with Congressmen of both parties -- Senators of both parties -- right now. That has been going on for several days; will go on for several more days, and I think that will have to run its course.

We are seeking opinion from various groups inviting such opinion as rather frank, full discussion, and I think the various viewpoints will emerge during these several days of consultations.

Q Will it be possible to get a backgrounder by the Assistant Secretary on this?

A By which Assistant Secretary?

Q Enders.

A It's possible. Let me ask.

Q Will you look into it, or would you take that question?

A Sure.

Q Before March '84? (Laughter)

Q In this process of seeking opinion from various groups, has there been any contacts by this Administration of the Salvadoran Government with the political wings of the guerrillas?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Last week, both State and INS announced that asylum had been granted for that white South African draft dodge, Dominic Holzhaus. INS was very helpful, but there are a couple of things that are still not clear in their guidance.

Holzhaus charges that he would have been jailed and tortured if he remained in South Africa. INS says that persecution doesn't have to go that far. They told me that it could just mean -- that the U.S. will give asylum if a person can prove that he'll be deprived of a job or that he will be deprived of educational opportunity in his country.

Is that a new, liberalized definition of "asylum?"

A I don't know. It seems to me you're really fishing in waters that are more properly INS. Did we do something on this?

Q I'm looking at your guidance, but I would like to go beyond it because it's a very unusual case. Could you look into it further.

A I'll look into it, but I think, really, you're kind of stuck with INS on this one. But let me see.

Q Pick up on an earlier question, please. You had Stone down there talking to the El Salvadorans. Has there been any direct or indirect soundings taken with the guerrillas as to their interest in earlier elections?

A By the United States? Not to my knowledge.

Q By the United States or by El Salvador.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could you do better than that?

A Certainly, not as far as the United States is concerned. I'm not trying to mislead you. It's just I don't feel comfortable speaking for Salvadoran Government officials, but not to my knowledge.

Q There's a report from Bonn that says that European Community ministers sort of decided at some meeting yesterday that Polish official debt from the Western governments, they ought to pursue that now, that the Polish Government has defaulted on that. Does the U.S. share that view?

A I don't have anything for you at the moment. It's possible we might have something on that later in the day.

Q Thank you.

(Press Briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #37

THURSDAY, MARCH 3, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a few housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations.

We've had indications from the Hill that the questions will focus on the Country Reports, on Central America, the Democracy Initiative, the dispute over Canadian films, and other subjects.

Q What time is that?

A I don't have a time for that.

JOURNALISTS: 1:30

A Is it 1:30? Thank you, gentlemen.

Available in the Press Office at 2:30 will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Nicholas Veliotes before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is "Security Assistance Proposals for Egypt."

Also available in the Press Office at 2:00 this afternoon will be the testimony of Under Secretary Schneider before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. The subject is "Conventional Arms Transfer."

I also want to apologize for giving you some inaccurate information on elections yesterday. I said that -- we were talking about earlier elections, both presidential and Constituent Assembly. That was on the basis of information supplied to me by a geographic area. That was incorrect, and I passed it on to you incorrectly, and I apologize for it.

The terms of Constituent Assembly members will be specified in the new constitution. The constitution will also determine the timing and procedures for gubernatorial and municipal elections. So I think, as you pressed me yesterday -- one or two others -- it really was presidential elections. I apologize.

Q On the subject of El Salvador, do you have anything about an American being arrested by the Salvadoran authorities?

A No, I don't.

Q Maybe you can look into it. He's identified as Jorge Enrique Zapporoli, and appears to be in custody in San Salvador.

A Okay. Any idea for charges or whatever?

Q Apparently was associating or helping guerrillas.

A Don't know anything about it. Will take a look at it.

Q There seems to be some confusion about reports coming out of the White House saying that the President is now determined to do all necessary -- whatever that means -- to bring off the Salvadoran situation. Can you put us right?

A I don't think there's been any change in the situation. I think our position has been clear that we're working for democratization of that country, and we're going to do everything we are able to do that will permit them to run their own country in peace and with ultimate equity. That's what we're striving for, and we're pursuing both the military and the diplomatic tracks to try to help bring that about.

Q Would that extend to providing more U.S. military personnel to help on the military side?

A No. We're exactly where we have been the past several days on the question of trainers. Our self-imposed ceiling is 55. We haven't been up to 55.

Q Wouldn't military personnel fall under the rubric of everything that we are able to do?

A There certainly isn't any change in our position on the number of trainers that are there, or about to be there. As we've said, we've got that ceiling of 55. We haven't used it. We intend to use it to the maximum. That will be the time to look at the possibility of going beyond that.

As we have said, we never ruled out the possibility of going beyond that, but there's been no change and there's no decision before the President.

Q Do you have anything more or anything to add to what might be done to broaden the scope of the trainers' duties in El Salvador?

A No, not really. Again, as we have consistently said in the past several days, they are not going to go into a combat situation. Theirs is a training role. I think there's some confusion in the minds of some about the distinction between combat advisors and trainers. These are not and will not be combat advisors. They are trainers, and that is their role.

Q There's some suggestion now that they'll be moved down to battalion level. To what level will they move?

A No decision, no plan. There's a story in one of the papers this morning talking about a move to brigade level. Don't rule that out; but, again, that would be in a purely training phase.

Q But would that in a sense move them closer to combat areas?

A I'm sure there are people in this room who know more about Salvador than I do. But I'm told that there hasn't been an attack on a brigade headquarters in two years in Salvador.

Q There has not been an attack --

A That's what I'm told.

Q -- in two years on a brigade headquarters.

Q John, you said you're pursuing both a military and a diplomatic track. Could you describe for us what you mean by the "diplomatic track?" What does that entail?

A I probably will disappoint you in that I don't really have anything beyond what we've already said. As we have said, we are working on the issue of elections. We are working in that area of the constitution which is being drafted. We have been enthusiastic about getting the Peace Commission going. It is going. It is talking about the kinds of things it will have to do to safeguard those elections when they take place. All this is very much in accord with our policy.

Q In other words, what you mean, you're talking about internal, political matters within El Salvador when you say "diplomatic?"

A The continuing encouragement that we have offered that government to move into the area of democratization.

Q Could you do a little more on the possibility of a move to brigade headquarters; is that out from a central area to different parts of the country?

A The trainers have been in and out of these areas before and if that is thought -- certainly, we're interested in upgrading the training there. If it is thought to be a good idea that some should move into those areas, undoubtedly they would.

Q Could I just get back -- I don't mean to belabor this -- but when you say "we will do everything we're able to do," that really sounds like almost an open-ended commitment. Tell us what the limits are on everything we're able to do?

A I can't give you a blueprint for the limits. The goals are quite clear: to provide the kind of security, the kind of secure situation in which the people of El Salvador will be able to live in peace and with justice, and we are doing what we can on both the military and the diplomatic front to bring that about.

Q Are you saying there are no limits?

A No, I'm not saying there are no limits. I've told you we're not considering, for example, increasing the number of trainers at the moment. I told you they are not going into combat. That's where we are.

Q But you say "at the moment." That's still does imply an open-ended possibility.

A I don't think one ever rules anything in or anything out, but I don't want you to be misled by that. There are no plans to go beyond where we are at the moment.

Q How do you describe conditions in El Salvador? How bad are they? How good is it? Where are we? Has the situation deteriorated? Are we winning?

A I think the experts have really offered their characterization. Tom Enders has testified, and I guess a senior spokesman maybe did something on this at the Pentagon this morning.

I'm not quite sure what the rules were, so I'll just make it a senior spokesman. Others, I think, have offered characterizations of where we stand. I think the President has described the situation after his meeting last Monday as one of concern, and it's serious. Certainly.

Q On that, I don't understand because the experts seem to not be consistent. When Enders testified earlier this week, he said that the Salvadoran forces face "a genuine emergency," and Sanchez said that they could run out of parts and ammunition in the next thirty days, or some categories of ammunition. However, in the guidance that you put out only last night you said that there's been no major change in the situation which seems to be contradictory with the notion of there being a "genuine emergency."

Could you square that?

A No major change in the situation. I don't understand what you're quoting from.

Q I'm quoting from the guidance that was posted yesterday as to why the Administration did not request supplemental funds under the overall supplemental bill and instead is seeking now $60 million in a different procedure.

A The major change in the situation is that you have about 25% of the money you want for this year to operate. That's the major change in the situation.

Q It's referring to the situation with respect -- on the ground. That is, it doesn't seem to reflect the notion that what Enders says is a genuine emergency. Are you backing away from what Enders said in characterizing the situation as a genuine emergency?

A Not at all. You're operating with 25% of the funds you think you need to keep the insurgents, to keep the guerrillas at bay. If you're operating with a quarter of the funds, I think you would look down the road and you would see a rather bleak future if you're going to run out of the things that you need to provide.

Q How do you counter Colonel Flores Lima's statement of laughter when asked whether or not they were running so short on supplies?

A I think you have to take a look at what he said in its entirety. He may have talked about specific items, but I think he, himself, said the situation is one of concern. I haven't read anything or seen anything by any Salvadoran officials which suggests they do not want that extra assistance that we're trying to provide to them. Some selected items are in short supply.

Q Within 30 days?

A Again, I refer you to the various experts. Some items, I think people talked about thirty days; some items, experts have talked about ninety days.

Q Can you tell us, did General Walters go to Rome and discuss this whole business of the elections with the Pope?

A He has not discussed elections or, indeed, anything else with the Pope, but he has certainly been in Rome. From time to time we exchange views with the Vatican, and as the President's special emissary, Ambassador Walters has done so previously.

In view of the Pope's scheduled visit to Central America, Ambassador Walters gave a general briefing to members of the Vatican staff which covered those countries his Holiness was scheduled to visit. That took place on Monday, February 28. The last occasion he was in Rome and did such a simliar briefing was October 18, last year.

Q Did he get a favorable reaction from those he visited with about the U.S. plan?

A I don't think we get into the discussions that the Ambassador has with the various people he sees.

Q Did the Pope attend that briefing?

A I'm sure that General Walters did not see the Pope.

Q The briefing was on what? Was it on the countries themselves or U.S. policy in those countries?

A It was on the general Central American situation with specific reference to the countries the Pope was going to.

Q With specific reference to U.S. policy there, or not? It seems that the church would certainly have --

A I assume it would center on U.S. policy. It seems logical.

Q Is it ordinary procedure for senior U.S. officials to brief Vatican officials in advance of visits to countries that he visits?

A I don't think there's anything unusual in that.

Q They do it routinely?

A I don't know that they do it routinely, but I don't think there's anything unusual in it.

Q John, to go back to my colleague's question, this gets very semantical, but I guess that's your business, in part. (Laughter) You talk about goals --

A I know this is going to be great.

Q Well, follow me; please.

A I'm hanging on every word.

Q You talk about goals, but Lou Cannon is quoting somebody out there in Santa Barbara, in the President's party, as saying, in pursuit of those goals that "all necessary measures" --

A Who did you say he was quoting?

Q He doesn't say. Are you denying it?

A No, I'm not denying it.

Q Nobody else has either.

A It's kind of hard to respond to that. I don't know who he talked to.

Q If Lou caught some guy out in the woods there and just quoted him, I'm sure they'd deny it.

Q Is Mr. Romberg out there?

A Mr. Romberg is out there. I don't think it was Alan Romberg.

Q In effect, it is what my colleague said, an open-ended commitment. We're determined to achieve these goals there, and we're not ruling anything out in the pursuit of those goals; is that correct?

A I don't want to mislead you. I think people in this spot tend never to rule anything out because that is a foolish thing to do. You never rule anything out; you never rule anything in because as soon as you go one way or the other, you're in trouble. So I never rule anything out, but I don't want to mislead you into thinking that we're talking about an open-ended commitment.

I think what we're talking about is full support for the stated goals that we have been following in Salvador.

--MORE--

Q John, the President, I have the impression, last year or perhaps two years ago, definitely ruled out direct American participation, American forces, fighting in that war. Does that still stand?

A I don't know what he did last year, but certainly, that is the position at the moment. I don't recall his specific statement last year, but there is no talk of --

Q So, when you say that you're not ruling out anything at this stage you're not ruling in this kind of thing that the President previously had ruled out?

A I'm not leading you one way or the other. It's just when somebody says, "Do you rule out such-and-such?" I tend to shy away from that kind of question.

Q But do you recognize that by now saying that we're not ruling out anything, you're opening up room for --

A I'm trying to guide you in the direction of not opening that door. I'm trying to lead you in the direction of understanding that when I say I'm not ruling anything out, I am not suggesting there is anything in the works, because there is not.

Q John, yesterday this Department issued a statement at the end of the day that concluded by saying that the guerrillas in El Salvador had seized the psychological initiative. I'd be interested in having a face behind that statement, because as you just pointed out, it's very hard to quote people when you don't know who is saying it.

A Yes.

Q What does the "psychological initiative" mean? Does it mean that the guerrillas in El Salvador have succeeded or are succeeding in winning the hearts and minds of the people?

A I think it means that they have been very active. I think it means that they have been attempting to destroy the infrastructure of the country. That is something that guerrillas in various countries, not El Salvador, have been able to do with some success. When you have guerrillas operating in the kind of milieu that they operate, it is fairly easy to blow up power stations and bridges. I think, as a matter of fact, the Secretary said that they had blown up 55 bridges -- I forget over what period. I imagine that is psychologically disturbing to the people of El Salvador who want to live in peace.

Q That is the psychological initiative that they have seized?

A I would certainly think that is one psychological initiative, yes.

Q The statement also said that the United States is trying to reinvigorate our friends to enable them, or to put the guerrillas back on the defensive.

A That's right.

Q So the guerrillas are now on the offensive?

A Well, they have certainly been very active.

Q Can you give us a time period? Do you include the last three or four weeks or so, as far as their being very active?

A Yes, I would say so.

Q I think today in The New York Times, military officials down in San Salvador were saying there has been a lull recently.

A Well, there certainly hasn't been a lull in the attacks on the infrastructure of the country.

Q Has the decision been made with respect to the route that the Administration wants to go to get more money that it thinks it needs?

A No. That's just the kind of thing that is being discussed now with Congressmen and Senators of both parties -- what would be the best way to go about that.

Q How is it being discussed, that is, who is representing the Administration? Who are they talking to?

A I think various officials from the State Department and probably elsewhere are conferring with both Senators and Congressmen.

Q On that point, John, could you tell us why is this intensive consultation being done behind the scenes? Why don't you have some Committee meetings up there? How are you doing this, one-on-one?

A A lot of people have been testifying in the past several days, as some of you here know all too well.

Q John, is the summary of what you've been saying for the last few minutes that there is nothing in the works, but we are going to do everything we are able to do?

A What I'm saying is that, in light of some deterioration of the situation in Salvador, and especially in the light of the fact that the funds that we have sought are not available, the President has been reviewing the situation. Bipartisan consultations are going on -- that seems like the right and intelligent way to conduct that kind of consultation -- to decide what can be done and how best it can be done.

But insofar as levels of American trainers there and that kind of thing, there is no dramatic change in prospect; no decisions have been taken. We're observing for the moment the same ceiling that we have been observing -- as a matter of fact, that we have not been observing because we haven't hit that ceiling.

Again, as I've consistently said, no reason why we should not go above that ceiling modestly, if we decide that that is desirable; but that is not relevant at the moment because we're not at that ceiling. And the President is reviewing the situation. What he is reviewing is how best to achieve the United States' stated goals in El Salvador, which are very clear.

Q A neighboring country?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any statement on the executions in Guatemala this morning?

A No. We've seen the reports, but that's all we have seen; haven't gotten any confirmation of them.

Q The Embassy has been unable to confirm?

A We have no confirmation as yet.

Q Did we make any representations in the last few days about such executions?

A I do not know whether we have made any representations. As you probably know, the court upheld the conviction in the case of these six who are alleged to be involved in this execution.

Q You don't know whether we sought clemency?

A I don't.

Q Can you take the question?

A Sure.

Q Can you tell us about Mr. Habib's plans?

A Yes. He's still in Israel. I think he probably will remain there through tomorrow morning, and therefore, he has not been able to come to a decision as to whether he will in fact make it to San Francisco this weekend.

Q On the Secretary's speech, is there a subject yet?

A There isn't really, but why don't you have a word with me about that afterwards.

Q Did you say that Habib is not coming to San Francisco, John?

A I'm not sure. It depends on what his schedule is. He is in Israel, talking with Israeli officials, and I think those talks will probably continue tomorrow morning, so I don't think he will be able to make a decision until tomorrow.

Q Is Secretary Shultz in San Francisco?

A Secretary Shultz is in Palo Alto. He is going to have a session with Foreign Minister Pym -- in fact, he's probably already had it by now. This evening he is going to a state dinner at the DeYoung Museum for the Queen in San Francisco; is going to a state dinner on the Yacht "Britannia" tomorrow night. He will give his speech at the World Affairs Council, San Francisco, Saturday night.

Q May I go back to Habib for a second? How do those conversations that are underway right now determine when he is going to come back? In other words, if something develops from these that causes him to continue negotiating, he'll do that? Is that the idea?

A He's in the midst of talks, obviously, with the Israelis; and I think it really is a question of whether he is able to break away from those discussions and get back for this weekend, and then get back to the Middle East or not.

Q If he comes back this weekend, do you expect him to stay for a while?

A No. I would expect him to go back. But having said that, that's an expectation. But Ambassador Habib makes his travel plans from hour to hour.

Q John, could we put that question a little bit differently? If he comes back, should we take that as a signal that the talks on the Lebanon withdrawal have reached a serious impasse, or a stopping point, and that you would then have to revise some of the optimistic noises coming out of this building the last couple of weeks?

A I've cautioned you against extreme optimism and extreme pessimism in the past several days.

Q Moderate optimism.

A All right -- moderate optimism. I think I would still caution you against excess in either direction. He very much wants to be in San Francisco if he can be there. He would like to be there, obviously. It's a special occasion for him, and he would like to be there; but nevertheless, he's involved in an important negotiation, and it's simply a question of whether he feels he can break away.

Q Should we take it as a signal that things are not going as well as they might if he comes back?

A It's hard for me to answer that until he makes his decision after he has finished this present round of discussions with the Israelis. And we really don't know.

Q What does the State Department think about the Pope's visit to Latin America? Do you think this could possibly help the conflicts in the region?

A As you know, we have consistently said that we hope it will be a successful visit for the Pope, and we stand by that.

Q John, the Spanish Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, has shown again his readiness to mediate in Salvador. First of all, have there been any contacts between this Administration and the Spanish Government? And second --

A Between this Administration and the Spanish Government?

Q Yes. And second, what is the opinion of the United States of a possible mediation of Felipe Gonzalez in that conflict?

A I can't answer that question specifically about mediation, but, yes, of course, there are frequent contacts between the two governments. Of course, the Central American situation was discussed when the Secretary was there, and has continued to be discussed. But I can't answer the question about mediation.

Q It is (inaudible)

A I'm sure, one way or another -- I'm not leading you because I'm not aware of any initiative here, but I'm sure that there are frequent contacts.

Q John, you talked about the decision being made. I wonder if you could give us any idea of when, on Salvador. Is there any kind of briefing tomorrow out in California?

A I think you would have to ask the White House about any meetings involving the President and the Cabinet Secretaries out there.

Q John, can I follow that up? If the supplies were running low that fast as the Pentagon said, you won't get an approval within 30 days, so why not use 506?

A You're making an assumption.

Q Well, O.K. Has 506 been contemplated, in shipping down the supplies?

A That is one of the options, certainly. That is one of the options that has been mentioned.

Q Is there a deadline within which you want to send down those supplies?

A Want to move as speedily as possible.

Q What are the other options?

Q You say 506 is still an option, even despite the very clear warnings that have been given by people on the Hill this week?

A It is an option. I mean I'm not weighting the options. I'm just saying -- Somebody asked me, "Is that still an option?" Yes, it's still an option.

Q Could you weight it for us?

A No, I couldn't weight it for you. The reason I can't do that is a very honest one because that's exactly the kind of consultation that we're in the midst of. That's exactly what everybody's talking about.

Q In fact, it seems you have a pretty clear indication of what station that will get off already, from the consultations that have taken place.

A There are a lot of people to talk to.

Q John, I notice the Vice President picked up on the Secretary's theme about churchmen. You seem very lukewarm about the Pope's visit down there.

A Not at all.

Q I mean, you're giving us sort of just innocuous statements (laughter) about what he's going to do down there.

A As distinct from what I do all the other days.

(Laughter)

Q Are Bush and Shultz telling us that this Administration doesn't really welcome the Pope's intrusion?

A Not at all; not at all. I think we have offered a number of comments on the Pope's visit before, and I refer you to that earlier language. Somebody asked me today how we felt about it. We, obviously, hope that it will be successful -- it apparently is; certainly up to now.

Q Well, you haven't shown any real enthusiasm for this visit.

(Laughter)

A The State Department is always measured in its response.

Q Not always.

Q John, do you have anything on the Most Favored Nation status for Romania?

A I think that on that particular question, the President would make any decision that is to be made. I think you might look for something from the White House soon on that.

Q John, there were some talks earlier this week at the State Department here with Canada about air fares. Those talks broke off last night. Do you have anything on those talks?

A I have a little on that.

The U.S.-Canada consultations on specific air fare issues recessed yesterday. We understand the Canadian negotiating team is still in Washington. Officials of both governments have had informal contacts after the recess on detailed proposals intended to resolve the issue.

Q You have nothing further?

A Don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the new contacts between the Soviet Union and Egypt to resume diplomatic relations?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything more on the Polish debt question today?

A I do have something on that, but it's a longer piece. Why don't you get it from the Press Office.

Q John, back on the Pope, is it still your understanding that the Government of Salvador may make an announcement on the elections while the Pope is there Sunday?

A We'll have to wait and see what the Government of El Salvador does.

Q Yes, but I mean you must have some kind of feeling. You're not exactly --

A That's a matter for the Salvadoran Government. We have to wait and see.

Q In an interview with Hank Trewhitt, Ambassador Kirkpatrick hinted at the possibility of providing guarantees of some kind by the United States for security of opposition figures. Do you have any comment on it?

A No, I really don't. As I've said, the Peace Commission is -- I mean that, obviously, would be one of the questions the Peace Commission, I would think, would take up -- says it's going to take up.

Q She hinted at U.S. guarantees.

A I don't know.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 4, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #38

FRIDAY, MARCH 4, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a housekeeping announcement and then another announcement after that.

The State Department is co-sponsoring a Regional Foreign Policy Conference Tuesday, March 8, with the Institute of International Education in Denver. Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam will deliver a speech on arms control at the 12:00 noon luncheon. Concurrent morning workshops will discuss international trade and agriculture, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance; Mexico, Central America and the Persian Gulf.

A press release with a schedule is available in the Press Office. If you would like further information on that, you could contact either Barbara Butler who is with the Institute of International Education in Denver -- her number is (303)837-0788 -- or Monica Janzer who is with our Bureau of Public Affairs.

Is that our Bureau of Public Affairs? Yes, Monica Janzer, Bureau of Public Affairs, (303)825-1300.

I have a statement on extension of land reform in El Salvador. We wish to note an event in El Salvador. The Constiuent Assembly in El Salvador yesterday evening voted to extend the land-to-the-tiller phase of land reform until the end of this year. The program was scheduled to expire yesterday.

The United States has consistently supported the land reform effort in El Salvador, and is pleased at this action by the Constiutent Assembly.

Thousands more peasants will be able to join the over 450,000 Salvadorans who have already been given land. By anyone's measure, land reform in El Salvador is working. The Salvadoran Assembly deserves special praise for its continued commitment to reform in the midst of severe civil strife propagated by a guerrilla force wedded to the strategy of "rule or ruin."

That's all I have. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Would you expect an announcement soon about the elections in El Salvador?

A That is going to be up to the Salvadoran Government. Insofar as we're concerned, we've supported their electoral efforts since last March's successful Constituent Assembly elections, and the subsequent efforts through the Political and Peace Commissions aimed at insuring that the upcoming elections appeal to as broad a constituency as possible. These electoral efforts continue to represent, in our estimate, the most legitimate and equitable means of achieving true political reconciliation in that country, and we would support that government in whatever decision they make as to a date.

Q Can we get a copy of that also?

A Sure.

Q Is it possible to have really effective elections, free elections when there's a shooting war going on?

A We certainly hope so, and obviously the Salvadoran Government apparently expects that. They've had great success, I think, in the face of some skepticism in undertaking the elections they undertook last year. Obviously, thousands and thousands of Salvadorans went to the polls in some case at some risk. So we would hope that the process would be able to go forward.

Q On the question of elections again in El Salvador, can you confirm or deny if the U.S. applied pressure in any way for the Salvadorans to hold advance elections?

A Certainly, we have supported them. Certainly, we have talked with them about it, as I said before, on a number of occasions and there's certainly no secret that Senator Stone did talk with them about it recently. They have been discussing it with us; we've been discussing it with them. It's kind of hard to say where the initiative began.

Q Whose idea was it originally to schedule the elections later this year instead of in March? Was it an American idea or was it a Salvadoran?

A You can say it was arrived at by mutual consent.

Q Will we be offering our good offices to talk with parties which are recognized in El Salvador but which are member of the FDR, as we did last time?

A I don't know. I can't answer that question.

Q Will you look into it?

A Okay.

Q What do you mean by "mutual consent" when you say --

A It's a bad phrase. I should not -

Q You say it's their decision.

A It's their decision; I meant by mutual discussion, obviously. It's not our business to consent to an internal election in Salvador. Bad phrase. I appreciate that. You want to take the rest of the briefing up here?

Q Yes. (Laughter)

Q Just as a question of clarification, if the Salvadorans decide to hold the elections after next March, your statement suggests that the U.S. fully would support that.

A I think that's academic. I don't think their suggesting they would hold them after March.

Q Early elections are academic, too, since no announcement has been made, aren't they?

A I know, but I think it's been well understood by all concerned that March is the outer limit. I don't think anybody is suggesting going beyond March.

Q But March would be okay, too; the U.S. would support March?

A It's their decision.

Q John, would that be presidential only?

A That's presidential. The constitution, as you know, is being written and the --

Q This election would be presidential only?

A Yes.

Q Would you expect the United States to participate to the point of once again furnishing an election commission to oversee or to watch?

A I don't know. I think that's one of the questions that would have to be worked out at the time the Salvadoran Government, or after the Salvadoran Government makes any announcement it might have on timing of those elections.

Q On a parallel course, would the United States also support, in the meantime, a dialogue, as it's been called, between the various factions in El Salvador?

A We have supported reconciliation in Salvador, democratic reconciliation within the framework of elections. If you mean a dialogue within that context, yes, but I think the Secretary has made it perfectly clear that a direct dialogue with guerrillas who are attempting to shoot their way into the government is something that he does not favor.

Q Let me ask you about the military supplies situation. Admittedly, a technicality, but I don't quite understand it. Last night, Assistant Secretary Enders on a television program said that all of the $25 million dollars or so -- sometimes, it is said, it's $26 million -- of military assistance to El Salvador for Fiscal Year 1983 has been spent and that the material is on its way to El Salvador by the time this week is over. I believe he said, the material will be there and that they would then have 60 to 90 days, I believe he said, of supplies at the current level of combat.

My question is, has there been some speed-up in the sending of military supplies down there, because the Administration has known for many months it's had only $26 million dollars for this Fiscal Year and yet up until the last few days it had not decided whether or not to request additional funds. Suddenly, here we are, the beginning of March, with six months to go with the Fiscal Year and they say everything is right on its way and after this there's nothing for the rest of the year. So, is there something that's happened about the way these supplies are being sent that doesn't meet the eye here?

A I think it's a good question but I think you're going to have to ask the Pentagon for the answer because I honestly don't have knowledge of how those supplies are being funneled.

Q It's the State Department officials who are stating this as a fact. Secretary Enders, and yesterday Secretary Schneider.

A Yes, but the question here relates to the flow of ammunition to Salvador this year, and I just don't --

Q But their willingness to speak to the issue indicates, or presumes that they have some knowledge as to the flow of ammunition if they can say with such confidence that they'll be no more weapons in 30 or 60 days.

A I think Secretary Enders certainly is confident of the facts that he offered last night. I don't think there's any queston about that.

Q Then, why is it different from what Secretary Schneider said yesterday?

A I don't know that it is different.

Q But now, also, they're saying supplies might last up to 90 days when before they were talking about 20 to 30 days.

Q I guess you have different estimates, depending on who is making the estimate and depending on what kind of supplies you're talking about. I've seen some estimates of 30 days, 60 days and 90 days. But I think it depends on who is speaking and what is their particular interest and what particular equipment are they talking about.

Q On that, two or three days ago Lester Sanchez of the Pentagon said at public hearings that within 30 days they could run out of bullets unless they got an additional $60 million. Yesterday, Assistant Secretary of State Schneider said that this is hypothetical and it really depends on -- and he raised the case of Nicaragua's 40-thousand man army invading -- in that case they would run out of bullets.

Do you have any estimate on just how serious the military situation is there? What is the extent of their shortfall? On the other hand, you have the Salvadorans themselves saying the situation isn't really that serious in terms of shortages.

A No. In terms of materiel, in terms of specifics, I think that you need to go to the Pentagon for that kind of definitive answer.

Q Has the President decided yet how much aid he's going to request and what procedure he will follow with the Congress to get it? Will he divert emergency funds; will he ask for a supplemental and go through the budgetary process, or has a decision been made?

A No. I think that consultative process is still going on.

Q They had said earlier in the week they hope to reach some kind of agreement by the end of the week. Obviously, it's not been reached.

A There are some meetings on the West Coast today, and you ought to ask the White House about the participants in those. It's my understanding that the process of consultation is still going.

Q Will a decision be announced today?

A I don't know.

Q When might that come, John? The Secretary talked in terms of about a week, I think, on Monday or Tuesday on the Hill.

A That's right. That's why I'm suggesting to you that today might not be the definitive day.

Q Also, could you give us your views on the assertion made by a senior Pentagon official yesterday in an organized background briefing that more American military advisors might have to be sent to El Salvador unless the Congress gives more aid? When did that become part of this?

A I think that's a little hypothetical at this stage. We are in the midst of a review. Obviously, we would want to improve the training to the Salvadoran army, and how that best may be done, I think, is one of the questions that's being discussed and aired during the review.

Q The fact the Pentagon has taken that line is not hypothetical; that was the line that they advanced.

A It's a line of discussion. But to my knowledge, no decisions have been taken about how best to improve training the Salvadoran army.

Q So that view is not held throughout the government at this point. That is simply one idea that's being advanced.

A I think it's being factored into the review.

Q Do you see any signs in Salvador of military preparations by the guerrillas that would lead you to think that they will have another offensive or planning anything exceptional in the coming weeks that would justify additional --

A I think you would really have to talk to the Pentagon about that kind of assessment.

Q The new Archbishop of San Salvador deplored the possibility of substantially more U.S. military assistance. Those are his words. Do you have any reply to that?

A No, I don't.

Q Would you characterize the situation still as Enders did earlier this week as a "genuine emergency" in El Salvador?

A Yes.

Q Any reply to, or reaction to the actions taken by Senator Hatfield and Congressman Leach yesterday or Congressman Barnes?

A No, no reaction.

Q Do you see a genuine emergency in terms of what? In terms of the brunt of the shortage of ammunition or in terms of the guerrillas about to overrun the country?

A No, no. Genuine emergency in that you have about 25% of the funds and therefore the materiel that you think you need to assist the Salvadoran Government and army this year. It's a 75% shortfall.

Q Strictly in the shortage of ammunition?

A It's a shortage of ammunition and quality of training, surely. I think that assistance involves -- again, you have to go to the Pentagon for the detail -- but I think assistance involves ammunition, supplies; I think it involves spare sparts, and I think it involves training. If you're going to do 75% less of all that than you think is necessary to bolster the Salvadoran army in its bid to put down the insurgency, I would think that gives rise to concern.

Q When did the Administration conclude that available now were only 25% of the funds or material that was needed?

A I should think that was probably very early on.

Q About when?

A If you get less money than you consider to be necessary, you probably know from the moment you receive it that's its --

Q Was it before the end of last year?

A I don't know.

Q Again, the problem of both a supplemental appropriation that the Administration dropped is raised $35 million dollars last fall, and the problem of why they didn't include it in the supplemental, which is only tangentially answered in the posted answer, and it's very confusing to determine when this "genuine emergency" began. The logic of your statement indicates that the genuine emergency began last fall when they realized they only had 25% of --

A I guess I'll just have to leave you in your state of confusion on that.

Q What are the numbers now of advisors to trainers? What are the latest numbers you have?

A We had a March 1 figure which was 40 something; it's in the guidance we gave you earlier.

Q You're saying in answer to my colleague's question that one of the elements in the review is that unless the aid is forthcoming there will be an increase in the number of advisors.

A Bob was airing a point of view, and I suggested in my view no decision had been made on that. If you're talking about training, it's a question of where you do the training. Do you do the training in Salvador; do you do it out of Salvador; where does that training take place.

Q My colleague's question was more advisors -- on the basis of the Pentagon briefing -- more advisors would be sent unless the aid is forthcoming.

A I think that's a very hard statement. What I was trying to suggest was that we're in the midst of a review and such matters are under discussion, but no decision that I know of has been taken to move that 55 ceiling.

Q Do you have anything on the arrest of the 26-year old guy was that arrested yesterday?

A Yes. Not very much, I'm afraid, because we're governed by some legal restraints on that. Mr. Jorge Enrique Zapporoli, an American citizen, was released March 1 in Salvador and charges against him were dropped, but I'm afraid due to the Privacy Act restrictions I cannot give you anything further on that.

Q Do you have anything today to confirm the fact that six people were executed in Guatemala yesterday?

A We've seen those reports. We're naturally disturbed by reports that those executions took place after a secret trial. We cannot render a judicial verdict. We've had discussions with the Guatemalan Government on a whole range of issues. We've consistently stressed our support for due process and an open judicial system, and we're looking into the question.

Q Do you see it as a personal affront to the Pope?

A No, I wouldn't have any comment on that.

--MORE--

Q How do you see it as conforming with the remarks that you made in announcing the decision to approve the sale of the helicopter spare parts to Guatemala about the progress of human rights?

A I think you have to be careful here. As I say, we cannot render a judicial verdict on this case. There are aspects about the secret trial that we question, but insofar as the charges are concerned and the verdict, it is very difficult for us to make a legal pronouncement.

In the whole area of human rights, our views are well known to that government, and there isn't any question that the number of deaths in that country are substantially down, and continue to be substantially down.

Q Could you balance it against -- maybe you can't do it right now, you say, looking into it -- but could you balance that against your own observation that day that while the record needs improvement, it is definitely improving both in terms of actual occurrences and the attitude of the approach of the government in a reconciliation manner --

A That certainly has been --

Q Also the President's remarks that Rios Montt has been getting a bum wrap.

A In our view, it certainly has been improving over the recent months.

Q Does this change your view at all?

A As I say, this is something we want to look into.

Q Would this occasion a review of that policy?

A I wouldn't be able to answer that question until we have looked into this matter.

Q Why was the Embassy unable to confirm the executions yesterday?

A I don't know.

Q These executions, do you know whether these are related at all to the four missing U.S. Embassy employees in Guatemala?

A I don't think so.

Q When were the consultations with the Guatemalan Government made by whom representing -- ?

A I said they have continued over an extensive period of time.

Q The Guatemalan Government yesterday clamped a news ban on reports regarding the Pope's reaction to the executions. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't know. Didn't know anything about it. Didn't know they had done so.

Q Could you look into that?

A I don't think so.

Q Let me tell you why I think it may be important. When the Nicaraguan Government prevented La Prensa from reporting on a letter from the Pope to the hierarchy in Nicaragua, the spokesman made a special announcement, and Secretary Abrams devoted a whole editorial to it, that this was evidence of persecution of the Church.

Now, I wonder if the State Department considers this to be in the same category?

A If we have a statement, we will have a statement. Obviously the United States is in favor of freedom of speech and a free press, but I don't have any special comment on this particular thing.

Q Do you share the language used by the Pope, or used by the Vatican, calling the executions deplorable and incredible?

A I'm sorry, what is the question?

Q Does the U.S. share that language?

A I don't think we would comment specifically on the Pope's view.

Q Not on the Pope's views, on the executions. Do you consider the executions deplorable and incredible?

A We are disturbed -- as I said, we are disturbed by the fact that the executions took place apparently after secret trials, and that is what we are looking into.

Q Speaking of free speech, could you explain the reasoning why the State Department refused a visa to Mrs. Allende?

A Yes, I do have have something on that.

Q What is the question?

A Why did the State Department refuse a visa to Mrs. Allende?

She was denied a visa on March 3 under Section 212(a)27 of the Immigration and Nationality Act because her entry at this time to make various public appearances and speeches has been determined to be prejudicial to U.S. interests.

Q How prejudicial? I mean, in what way?

A Prejudicial because she is a highly placed and active member of the World Peace Council and affiliated organizations. As you know, the World Peace Council has long-standing direct political and financial affiliation with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The World Peace Council's activities, policy line and financing suggest that it is an instrument of Soviet policy.

Q She has denied that she is a senior member of the World Peace Council. Have you made a different determination?

A I understand that she is listed as a member of the organization and as a President of Honor.

Q Other members of the Peace Council were in this country before. Is there any particular thing right now that is especially -- ?

A These cases are determined on a case-by-case basis, and --

Q So it is not regarding the Peace Council, it is her, Mrs. Allende herself.

A It is an enforcement of the law, and, of course, an individual has to apply for a waiver. In this case, the waiver was not approved.

Q What damage can she inflict on the American interests?

A I have to believe that those who made the decision decided that it was considerable.

Q She has been in the country several times before. Why is it now?

A She was here, I think, in 1981, in connection with testimony or an appearance at the UN, which is a different matter. Traditionally, the United States has tended to --

Q She has been here before that.

A Maybe she has. I don't know.

Q Why was she different this time than last time?

A Simply an assessment internally by the State Department.

Q I just want to go back, very briefly, on Guatemala. I have got reports that fifteen other people are scheduled to be executed between tomorrow and Tuesday.

Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Is the U.S. Embassy looking into the possible executions?

A I think, as I said, we are looking into this question of these particular individuals, and I think that would embrace others.

Q Can I go back to this Mrs. Allende thing?

Do you find any contradiction in your government's announced intention to increase communications across national borders on this campaign for democracy, and that same government refusing somebody to come in and speak freely?

A I don't think so. I think if you look at the case on its merits and make a decision, I think the United States is perfectly within its rights, indeed it is acting within the law, to make that determination.

Q I am not denying that. What I am suggesting is that there seems to be a double standard by which you judge free exchange of information.

A The United States does permit many people to come to this country with whose views it disagrees, and they do speak freely, so it is not a question of stifling freedom of speech; it is a question of a judgment having been made specifically in this case.

Q Yes. That gets to the point. If you do permit people to come to this country whose views are not tasteful to the U.S. Government, why not her? What is it about her?

A Because, obviously, in her case what we thought she was going to do here we considered damaging to the interests of the United States.

Q Can't you reveal any more to us?

A No.

Q Is there any contradiction between the ban on Mrs. Allende and the criticism of Israel several months ago when the Israelis wanted to forbid agitation on the West Bank by foreigners?

A No, not that I am aware of.

Q You don't see any contradiction.

A No.

Q There was criticism of Israel then in the public forum by the Secretary, and here is another case just the other way around which might damage the interests of the United States and we put a ban on her. But you don't see any contradition.

A No.

Q Is there any relationship?

A No. I think they are different issues.

Q You think that in one case, when a democracy seeks to protect itself like Israel did on the West Bank, it is wrong, but when we do it, it is right.

A That would open up a long philosophical discussion about the methods in which democracies seek to protect themselves.

Q Can you draw the distinction that you see?

A No. I think it is a different issue. I think the early one is closed and we are dealing with this case on its merits.

Q Can we go back to El Salvador for a minute?

A Sure.

Q Yesterday, Senator Durenberger sent a letter to the President in which he expressed what he called astonishment at Secretary of State Shultz's lack of understanding of the role of the Catholic Church and its clergy in Latin America, and basically criticized the Secretary's remarks on Capitol Hill earlier this week, and sort of sought an explanation.

Do you have any reaction to it?

A No. I think the Secretary feels that he addressed that question during his hearings and answered the Senator's question, and it is a closed issue.

Q Did the Secretary, when he talked about the churchmen wanting to increase Soviet influence in El Salvador, was he including the Pope?

A Not as I understood at the time.

Q Going back to the Allende case, was this a determination -- you mentioned it is under law, there is some law.

A Right.

Q Was this a determination made by the State Department or by the Justice Department.

A The State Department.

Q Does this represent some new trend? I can't recall a case recently where a person who was not a Communist, who is a well-known public figure, has been denied entry to the United States. Does this presage a toughening of U.S. policy about who is going to be allowed to come here?

A I don't have the specifics at hand, but I don't think that statement is correct. I think that there are many such exclusions. I don't think this is a rarity.

Q Would the Secretary of State be informed of something like this, a person of Mrs. Allende's fame?

A In this particular case, I don't know whether he was or not.

Q Who makes the determination?

Q Yes, where is that done, at what level?

A I don't think we are going to --

Q I mean, is it the Consular Bureau, or the Bureau of Latin Affairs, if it is the case of a person from Latin America?

A The decision was conveyed in Mexico City, but it was made here in Washington.

Q Could you say who within the Department, what Bureau, does this?

A No, I don't think I would.

Q Two other topics? Are you going to say anything about Romania and MFN? I understand the announcement is going to be made now.

A I think you should be in touch with the White House on that.

Q Will you say anything about that here?

A No. It will be at the White House.

Q Do you have any statements to make on the Trade Bill, the Agriculture Bill, decided yesterday in the Senate? The Europeans are very upset, and now it looks like --

A No.

Q Are you concerned that this might be the start of a trade war?

A I think we have felt that we were making progress to avert a trade war.

Q But do you interpret the Bill as setting it back in any way?

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q Can you tell us whether Habib is going to come back?

A Yes, he is. May I answer this here before you interrupt? The question is whether Phil Habib is coming back to the United States. Yes, he is. He is going to make that -- by the skin of his teeth he will make that San Francisco meeting. I think he gets in there about four or five o'clock, and the dinner begins at seven.

Q Does he plan to stay here for a while, or go back quickly?

A I am sure he will stay through the weekend, and he will confer with the Secretary on the West Coast. I don't know when he will go back to the Middle East.

Q When is he coming back, please?

A I guess he is coming back today and arriving -- he leaves there sometime this afternoon and will arrive in San Francisco Saturday afternoon.

Q Do you have anything more about the speech that is supposed to be given there? Is it of some important policy significance that we should --?

A I think we might have, by dint of extraordinary effort, we might have an advanced copy of that speech for you sometime tomorrow morning.

Q Do you know the topic?

A I think it will be an Asian speech.

Q This is the Secretary.

A The Secretary.

Q Asian?

A Yes, on the topic of Asia.

Q In San Francisco.

A Yes.

Q Is Habib's return to be seen only in the context of the dinner in his honor, or is it an indication that you are locked into a stalemate on the Lebanese withdrawal issue?

A I think the dinner is the impetus, but obviously he will take the opportunity to confer with the Secretary and review where we are.

Q Also on the Middle East, the Israelis are considering sending a high level delegation to the United States to discuss the SAM-5 missiles in Syria. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Would such a delegation be welcome?

A I don't know anything about it. I am not able to give a comment because I am not aware of it.

Q Do you have anything else on those SAM-5's?

A No.

Q Reports from the Middle East said that a senior State Department official is in Damascus now to discuss the SAM missiles. Can you confirm this report?

A I can't. I don't know anything about it.

A senior State Department official is in Damascus now?

Q Yes.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Probably General Walters. (Laughter)

A I don't know where General Walters is today.

Q He is in Guatemala. (Laughter.)

Q On air travel, in about seven hours there are a lot of ticket holders due to take off on international flights.

A Are you talking about Canada?

Q U.S. citizens and Canadian citizens.

A Yes. Are you talking about the Canadian aviation talks.

Q I am. It also has to do with the fact that there are six American carriers who are involved in this, and they are being in effect held hostage to this dispute.

The recess that you declared yesterday seems to have been extended since the Canadian negotiators flew home.

A Maybe you have better information than I do, but I am told that there have been informal contacts subsequent to the consultations, and that these were on detailed proposals intended to resolve the fare issues.

The United States is hopeful that these contacts will permit the resolution. So I don't know just what the status is of the Canadian delegation, but there seems to be a more hopeful view on the part of the United States.

Q Do you know where these are taking place, because they aren't taking place in Washington.

A I am afraid I don't.

Q And your own chief negotiator isn't there.

A This was a very recent development, I gather. Just a few minutes before --

Q Like ten minutes?

A Yes, literally before I came out here.

Q First of all, has there ever been any figures given out, a dollar figure put on the supplies, military and otherwise, reaching the guerrillas in El Salvador from outside of Salvador?

A A dollar figure?

Q Yes.

A I doubt it. Maybe, but I doubt it.

Q Do we have figures on quantities of supplies and equipment being shipped in, and from where, over, say, the past year or so?

A Oh, yes. Administration officials, as a matter of fact one yesterday, shed some light on it.

Q From that, could a dollar figure be drawn?

A I suppose it could be.

Q Now, let me ask you something else. There was a statement made by a former retired Foreign Service Officer named Curtis Jones who argued that a Foreign Service Officer has the obligation to speak out against the Administration when he thinks that the Administration's policy is wrong.

You know about this?

A No, I don't know about it.

Q You don't. Well, it was in the Foreign Service Journal, and so on.

A I have a feeling you are going to tell me.

Q As a matter of principle, where does the State Department stand on the issue of a Foreign Service Officer -- not a retired one -- in this case he is retired, but he is advocating this. He has said in effect that it should have been done during the Vietnam War, and stuff like that. But he is an Arabist, and he thinks that the Arabists in the State Department are being suppressed and so on and so forth because they are not allowed to speak out.

Well, that is another question.

Q What is this question?

A The point is, in the view of the State Department's policy as of now towards its personnel, does it support the thesis as given by Curtis Jones that a Foreign Service Officer can speak out against the policy of the Administration he is serving?

A I am sure that deep in some manual or personnel handbook somewhere there is appropriate language which covers that topic.

Q Can you find the language or have somebody find it and put it in big type somewhere?

A I have a feeling that this is a rather narrow-gauge question.

Q No, I don't think so, because this goes right to the heart of the point of whether or not the State Department personnel can come out and make speeches and statements against the policy of the government.

A I am sure that somebody in the appropriate division of the Personnel Department could lead you to the language that would respond to your question.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:07 p.m.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #39

MONDAY, MARCH 7, 1983, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a brief housekeeping announcement. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is "Voluntary Contributions to the U.N." That is testimony she is giving today, I understand.

Be happy to attempt to answer any questions you might have.

Q John, do you have any State Department reaction to the West German elections?

A Yes. The United States looks forward to continued good relations with all major parties and to continued close ties with Chancellor Kohl and his government.

Q How about the election of the Greens to a few seats?

A No. Wouldn't have anything on that, John. I think that's an internal German question.

Q Specifically, do you have any comment on the pre-election statements by the Soviets?

A I don't think we really would have any comment on that. I think, as a matter of fact, most leaders of the various German parties have had some remarks to make from time to time about German meddling, or what they have seen as German meddling in the elections --

Q Is that what you're talking about -- Soviet?

A Yes. Soviet. Did I misspeak? Sorry.

Q Yes.

A Soviet meddling. And I think we would leave that assessment to them.

Q How about both candidates before the election -- on the eve of the election said that they expected the Reagan Administration to put forward a new compromise plan on intermediate-range nuclear missiles?

Do you have anything that would indicate that's in the works?

A No. I think the President's position on the U.S. position in Geneva has been reiterated and made very clear, and we could go back to that language and produce it for you, but it would be what he has said on occasions before. No change in that of which I'm aware.

Q There's no consideration of putting forward a new proposal in Geneva?

A The President makes arms control policy of the United States, and he's made it. Should he want to change it, I'm sure that he would make a statement, but I'm not aware of any change.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Pope's statements in El Salvador?

A Yes. We think that what he said was very constructive. As you know, President Magaña announced early elections, and said that the solution to the problem of violence should be essentially political and democratic. Pope John Paul responded to that, and we found his words, as I say, very constructive.

Q Specifically, John, do you have any reaction to his call for a dialogue?

A It depends on what you mean by "dialogue." We have always supported, as you know, reconciliation through democratic elections. If you're talking about a dialogue within that framework that leads to those elections and the participation of all the parties and factions in those elections, then of course we would support that.

Q Could we get that last statement, please, in writing?

A What I just said?

Q Yes.

A Sure.

Q You don't see the Pope's call for a dialogue as in any way a call for a dialogue that would deal in power sharing?

A I'll just refer you to what he said, Bernie. He said, "I pray that the measures announced by the President and all other adequate measures contribute to orderly and peaceful progress in the society, founded on the respect for the rights of all, and that all have the possibility to cooperate in a climate of true democracy for the promotion of common good."

Q To follow that up a little bit. Dialogue has become a very key word in El Salvador for about a year now.

A Yes.

Q The Church first said it in July, or the Pope did, and now it's being used more and more by the Church. Whenever you're asked about dialogue, you always add, "So long as it's understood that dialogue takes place within the context of free and democratic or electoral process," and so on.

They never put that addition on to it. Do you detect a slight difference of opinion with respect to a political settlement for that reason?

A No. I think what we should do is continue to reiterate what we understand by dialogue, and what we mean by dialogue, and that's what we're doing. But we don't see any conflict between the words I've just offered you, uttered by the Pope, and what we're working for.

Q John, do you have any word on plans to get back together with people from the Hill to talk about aid to El Salvador this week?

A Yes. I think the President is going to meet with Congressional leaders tomorrow morning.

Q Do you expect that will produce an announcement of specifically what you're going to request?

A I don't know. I honestly don't know what will come out of that meeting, Jerry.

Q John, in your definition of dialogue, you're not foreclosing negotiations to set the terms of elections with the other side, are you?

A I think that's the kind of thing that the Salvadoran Peace Commission has to address itself to.

Q What about the role of the United States in that regard? Last time we sent Ambassador Briggs down there to talk with some of the parties that ultimately decided to stay out regarding guarantees.

Do you foresee a similar mission?

A I wouldn't rule it out. I'm not referring to what we might do in detail, but I wouldn't rule out the prospect of the United States being helpful. There were certain measures we took before, and it seems to me logical we would consider them again.

We're getting a little ahead of the scenario in that the elections were only announced yesterday. It's going to take a little time for everybody to consider what they might do.

Q But they didn't surprise you, did they?

A We were gratified by the announcement.

Q Was what the Pope said consistent with the deal that was cut in Rome with General Walters? (Laughter)

A Barrie, I do remember saying that General Walters had been in Rome, and there were some discussions with Vatican officials, but I don't think -- in fact, I know the General did not talk with the Pope.

Q That's not the answer.

A It's probably about the best you're going to get.

Q Do you know if the President or the Secretary have any plans to visit the two countries where the elections were held -- Australia or West Germany -- in the near future?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q If you find out, will you let us know, please?

A If I should find out, I'll let you know, sure.

Q Could you comment on what Ambassador Kirkpatrick said about matching arm for arm, or whatever it is, with the Soviets in Central America?

A Yes, I can. We've made the point clear that while we support a democratic, political solution in El Salvador, it's essential to maintain a sustained level of assistance to that government which will allow it to defend itself against the outside-supplied guerrillas in order to allow both the ongoing reforms and steps towards full participation in the electoral process to go forward.

Our support for the Salvadoran Government effort to contain the guerrillas who oppose democracy must be sufficient to upset the external support received by the guerrilla forces.

Q Does the Administration have any objection to a formal link being established by the Congress that would tie the extension of new aid to this election -- electoral process?

A I think you'd have to ask the White House about that.

Q Could we get a copy of that statement, John?

A Sure.

Q John, on the question of external support, Mr. Zamora, who's the spokesman for the Leftists, was in -- I guess he still is in town.

He says that there is no more outside aid coming in, that the rebels now supply themselves by a process that they call recuperation -- seizing arms from the army.

Do you have evidence that there is still external sources?

A Yes. I think that's been made clear by a number of experts in the Administration that the external flow continues.

Q Where is it coming from?

A Well, it doesn't come from a tooth fairy. (Laughter) It comes from --

Q Specifically, where did it come from?

A I think various experts have suggested that the flow is from Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Q Any estimate on the tonnage?

A I don't. I'm sure there have been estimates in the past. I don't have anything.

Q Is it possible to look into it so we could deal with some figures on --

A As I recall, I think a Pentagon official gave some indication of flow last week.

Q In terms of tonnage? Really?

Q No.

A No? Okay.

Q Do you mean Sanchez?

A I'm sorry. I don't have any estimates of tonnage.

Q He did not say there was any Soviet equipment, though.

A That would not -- if you mean, Lester --

Q A high-ranking senior official at the Pentagon --

A But you've got to be careful. Because someone supplies American arms or arms from some other countries to the Marxist insurgents, there's no reason why that shouldn't come from the Soviet Union.

Q I didn't say it did. I'm just saying this is what he said, and --

A But I mean this has been fairly traditional policy not to supply Soviet-manufactured weapons. But that doesn't mean --

Q Go on to another?

A Sure.

Q Would it be possible to put to the Pentagon and the State Department, and to say about what the flow -- what the tonnage of the flow is? Because in Salvador itself people are saying it isn't that significant, and some people are quoting Western diplomatic and U.S. sources as saying it's not that important to the fight going on.

A I think it's really more a Pentagon call than the State Department, and, obviously, it gets into that continuing sensitive area involving intelligence. But I think I'd really have to --

Q What about Meese's indication that we may go up to 100 on advisers? Anything to that?

A The President made his position clear in San Francisco on Friday, and I think that's where we are.

-- MORE --

Q New topic. There was a London Observer report claiming that the yellow rain samples from the U.S. are fakes. Do you have any response to that?

A I haven't seen the report, but certainly the samples collectd by the United States are not fakes.

Q Can you look into that further because there's talk --

A Don't need to look into it. I can give you an assurance they're not fakes.

Q It says the State Department will discuss the findings at a meeting in London.

A I don't know what the State Department is doing about any talks that might be taking place on yellow rain in London. But there's no suggestion that what we have is fake.

Q Another subject. A couple of preliminary questions, just to clarify policy if I could. Am I correct in presuming that the Secretary of State is deeply concerned about the safety or our Ambassadors everywhere in the world and is not hesitant to speak out whenever and wherever such safety is threatened?

A There's no problem about the first part of your questions. Whether he would always speak out, I suppose -- I mean, I don't know what your next question is. But whether he would always --

Q The question will depend largely on your answer to the first. (Laughter)

A That's my fear.

Q You wouldn't hesitate if one our Ambassadors is threatened anywhere in the world, certainly he's not going to maintain a discreet silence; he will certainly speak out as the head of our foreign policy?

A I wouldn't take that as a given. I think there have been instances where there have been threats to American diplomats, including Ambassadors, where that threat has not been publicized.

Q Then, it's safe to presume the first part is that he's definitely concerned about the safety?

A Sure.

Q Secondly, as preliminary, when a host country tells us they cannot be responsible for our Ambassador's safety, does Secretary Shultz believe we should continue sending money to support this Embassy or should we withdraw our Ambassador and all further financial support of that Embassy?

A I don't know which Embassy you're talking about or which country.

Q I just want to know what is the policy. If the host government says we cannot be responsible for the safety, then what do we do -- we just leave them there and continue to pour in support or what?

A I'm leery of responding to a question which is sort of circulating in a vacuum.

Q I just want to know what is policy. We expect the host country to guarantee safety; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay, fine. In Secretary Shultz' own state of California at the University of California in Berkeley, our Ambassador to the United Nations was repeatedly disrupted with shouts of murderer by students and others who were neither restrained nor disciplined by this university, which I understand --

A We're going to get to the question?

Q Right, you are. -- receives extensive Federal money, and the Cal police advised Mrs. Kirkpatrick that it would be worst the following day so she withdrew from her second lecture and subsequently Smith College announced they can't be responsible for her safety.

Question: Does Secretary Shultz, as the ranking Cabinet member of President Reagan's Administration, believe any Federal funding should go to those institutions who cannot guarantee the safety of Federal officers, including Ambassadors?

A I haven't heard him address himself to that question.

Q Could you give us some inkling -- you're his spokesman -- as to policy? Do we feel that we should send money to a university which will not guarantee the safety of an Ambassador of the United States?

A Can't answer that one for you.

Q Could you take that question, John?

A Let me look into it, but I doubt that we will have anything for you.

Q I'd be very grateful.

A It's a very sweeping question.

Q It's kind of an important question. If we're concerned about the safety of our Ambassadors overseas, God knows, they should certainly be concerned about them in Berkeley, don't you think?

Q John, do you have any comment on the allegation by Fidel Castro that the United States has renewed attempts to assassinate him?

A Sure. That is obviously untrue. We don't disregard the laws and the executive orders under which we operate. Mr. Castro's allegation is absurd, and we absolutely deny it.

Q Do you have anything on the plans of Ambassador Habib? Is he coming to Washington; is he going back to the Middle East and when?

A Yes. I think he's on the plane coming back with the Secretary today, and will be here this afternoon.

Q How long will he spend here?

A I don't know. That will depend, I think.

Q Is there going to be any change in policy regarding Lebanon?

A Any change in policy? No, our policy is constant.

Q Obviously, up to now it hasn't given anything tangible.

A We're working at it.

Q Do you have any detail as yet on the kidnapping of an American oil man in Bogota?

A No. Seen the reports, but don't have anything on it or can't confirm it.

Q Do you have any comment concerning President Mubarak's meeting with King Hussein in New Delhi?

A No, I don't.

Q On Amin Gemayel meeting with the President of Syria?

A Sorry, on who?

Q Amin Gemayel, President of Lebanon, meeting with Assad.

A No, I don't.

Q Or him going to the Non-Aligned in New Delhi, bearing in mind that you don't fancy the Non-Aligned group?

A I wouldn't make that sweeping statement. No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the Australian elections?

Q There is some reports from Cairo that President Carter met with two PLO members, one of them a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO. Do you have any comment on that?

A I've got two. I've got the Australian election down here. President Reagan either has sent or is sending a message of congratulations to Mr. Hawke, and we look forward to a close and effective relationship with the new government.

On the PLO. I think President Carter probably did meet with those gentlemen. He's a private citizen, as you know, and that's his decision.

Q I know he met with the Secretary before he left for the Middle East. Did he discuss with him the desirability of such a meeting?

A I don't think so.

Q Could you look into it?

A I don't think he did.

Q Do you have anymore specifics than that?

A I can do no better than to give you the press reports, but it's Mr. Nabil Shath and Mr. Ahmad Dajani, according to press reports. We're not confirming it.

Q To follow up that question, does the State Department, which maintains a policy we are not to meet with terrorists, approve or disapprove of the former President of the United States meeting with such terrorists?

A It's not a question of approving or disapproving. Our policy remains constant, and we will not meet with the PLO until the two appropriate U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, I think they are, and the PLO's recognition of Israel has been effected. It has not, and therefore we're not meeting with the PLO. President Carter is a private citizen.

Q An enormously, Federally-funded former President gets a huge pension, goes and does this and you are tongued-tied in withholding any sign of disapproval. It suggests to me that you're very enormously neutral on this.

A I didn't think I was tongued-tied. I thought I did my best to try to help you perceive what had happened, Lester.

Q What I want to know is what this gentleman over here wants to know: does the State Department approve or disapprove or are you just toungue-tied, as they say?

A That particular question, we're not going to give you an answer. What I'm telling you is that President Carter is a private citizen. I've given you the U.S. Government's position on dealings with the PLO.

Q So he's done something the government wouldn't?

A Private citizens do what they will do.

Q Your answer on whether it was already discussed with the Secretary wasn't as clear as it can or should be.

Let me put the question another way. Did the possibility of this meeting, was it discussed before Mr. Carter left, with the Secretary or with any other official in the State Department?

A I do not think it was discussed by the Secretary. I do not think it was discussed by anybody else in the State Department here. I think, as a courtesy, President Carter may have informed our Embassy in Cairo.

Q Before or after?

A I think before.

Q Would you expect President Carter to report, as is customary, upon return from his trip not only on other aspects of his trip but would you expect him to report on this particular aspect of his trip to the U.S. Government?

A I don't know, because I don't know what plans there are for him to discuss his Middle Eastern travels with anybody here.

Q Isn't it routine?

A I wouldn't rule it out, but I don't know if there are such plans.

Q If that occurred -- and I know this is hypothetical -- but if the routine occurred, which is that a dignitary, a foreign dignitary returns from a foreign visit were to brief the U.S. on this specific visit, wouldn't that in effect violate this government's policy?

A No. Because our policy is firm. We're not talking to the PLO. I think you asked, before President Carter left, whether he was carrying any messages from this Administration, and the answer to that was no, he's not.

Q As I recall, he fired Ambassador Andrew Young because he lied about meeting with the PLO. Does this not suggest an abrupt change in Mr. Carter?

A You know, Lester, I have really all I can do attempting to be a spokesman for the State Department in this Administration, and I really don't think I can --

Q I find that other spokesmen for this Administration certainly are not hestitant to deplore some of the things in the previous Administration. Are you hesitant to do this?

A This one is hesitant to pursue this question of Mr. Carter.

Q You said that former President Carter informed the Embassy in Cairo. Has he been assisted in any way to this --

A No.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

~~Peterson~~
Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, March 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #40

TUESDAY, MARCH 8, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is the speech by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Regional Foreign Policy Conference in Denver, Colorado. The title is: "Insuring Security in the Nuclear Age." Just to remind you, the speech is embargoed until 1:00 p.m. Mountain Standard Time.

Available at 2:00 o'clock today in the Press Office will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject is foreign aid. That's testimony that he's giving today.

Also, we'll hold a briefing at 2:30, here, by AID Administrator Peter McPherson, who will brief on land reform in El Salvador. That will be 2:30, here in the briefing room. That will be ON THE RECORD, for sound and camera.

That's all I have for you.

Q What can you tell us about the possibility of Foreign Minister Shamir coming to Washington?

A We have been talking with the Israelis, and we would expect that Foreign Minister Shamir would be here later in the week for talks with the Secretary.

Q When will the talks be?

A I don't have the days nailed down, but it would be the end of the week.

Q Why? What's the purpose now?

A I think this is an Israeli suggestion that there might be merit in Mr. Shamir coming, and, of course, we welcome that. The subject would be Lebanon and other matters of mutual interest.

Q Is the SAM-5 the specific reason for it?

A I suppose it might come up.

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Q And how about the broader peace process?

A I suppose that any matter affecting the Middle East could come up.

Q How long will he be here?

A That's hard to say. As I say, we haven't quite nailed down when he will arrive, but several days I would think.

Q And is this a prelude to another visit by Begin, perhaps?

A I don't know anything about that. I think what we're talking about at the moment is a meeting with the Foreign Minister.

Q Will Habib take part?

A Yes, he'll take part. Incidentally, I thought that Phil came back on the plane yesterday with the Secretary. He did not. He stayed in California for a couple of days and will be in Washington tomorrow afternoon.

Q John, a follow-up. Do you see meetings over the weekend between the Secretary and Shamir?

A It's possible. Saturday, I think would be unlikely, that being their Sabbath.

Q Do you think it is likely that those meetings would bring -- in those meetings they will be able to resolve the still-unsolved problems that are discussed in the meetings between Israel and Lebanon?

A I don't know. We'll have to see how the discussion develops.

Q That raises the question to me, are you suggesting by saying "seeing how it develops," that it's possible that these meetings could resolve those questions?

A Sure. It's possible that you could get a resolution of the whole Lebanese situation at any of the various meetings that are going on.

Q The U.S. and Israel -- the whole Lebanese situation could be resolved?

A Certainly, the points of contention would be discussed, and if there's resolution on them, that would move the ultimate solution forward.

Q Is there a similiar invitation for the -- rather, suggestion that the Lebanese Foreign Minister and the team of experts come to Washington?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Any consideration of moving the site of the talks to Washington?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q Has the U.S. Government received any response on the Memorandum of Understanding regarding sharing of information that Israel derived from the Lebanon campaign? Any further development in that?

A It's my impression that we had some guidance on that yesterday. No. I guess not. We haven't taken that any further.

Q What is the situation in terms of dialogue in El Salvador? It's confusing because today the President met Congressional leaders. When they came out, you have people like Senator Percy saying essentially that he was for some kind of dialogue as a prelude to the elections, in terms of giving assurances to the guerrillas that they would be safe and all of that. Is that the Administration's position?

A I haven't seen what Senator Percy said. But, in essence, the way you describe it, I think that is in line with the Administration's thinking. We have shyed away from the term "dialogue" in terms of power-sharing. However, in terms of discussion to determine how the election might go forward, let me just say that President Magana and the Peace Commission in El Salvador have made clear their desire for full participation in democratic elections and their intention to hold conversations to work out the terms and conditions of elections, including amnesty, security issues, campaigning, that would provide an opportunity for full and safe participation by all parties.

The United States welcomes those assurances. We support a dialogue on how to participate in the elections and the evolving democratic institutions. That's our position.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Is this any kind of advance beyond previous Adminstration positions on this?

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A I don't think so. I think this has basically been our position, that you don't give to the insurgents what they haven't won in the ballot box. You don't give them a position in the government on the basis of violence. On that basis we would not be in favor of a dialogue. But if there have to be some kind of consultation on how they participate in elections --

Q Is it conceivable that there might be discussions between government officials of El Salvador now and, say, Guillermo Ungo of the FDR outside of the country to work out a mechanism for the election?

A You have to ask the Salvadoran Government, but certainly it's conceivable.

Q Is it your understanding that there would have to be a ceasefire before such discussions?

A That's not my understanding. But, again, I think that's something the Salvadoran Government would have to respond to.

Q Would this government be prepared to set up a preliminary dialogue with representatives of the guerrillas outside the country?

A With the Salvadoran Government?

Q Of this govenment, be prepared to set up a dialogue with the guerrillas, representatives of the guerrillas, outside of El Salvador?

A With the United States Government?

Q Yes.

A I think that's an academic point at this stage. As you know, the elections have only been announced on Sunday and that Peace Commission is going to get into this whole question of discussions on amnesty.

Q It's not totally academic in the sense that representatives of the guerrilla movement have been in the United States; they have tried to see the State Department. The last time they did was December 1981, and they said the State Department told them it's not convenient anymore to talk to them.

A I know of nothing that is proceeding but I think the Salvadoran Government will have to take the lead on that.

Q In other words, you wouldn't?

A I know of nothing that is going forward at this stage. I don't think anything is going forward.

Q To phrase that a little differently, my recollection was in December '81 the State Department sought such a meeting and one took place.

Would the United States welcome a meeting with members of the FDR/FMLN as a way of going over the possible issues?

A I can't answer that question for you. It's an academic one at this stage. I think we're going to have to wait and see how the Salvadoran Commission proceeds.

Q What is the U.S. reading of the insurgent response to the Magana statement on Sunday? That is to say, on earlier presidential elections, and this general question of participation --

A Of the insurgent response?

Q Yes. Of participation in discussions within the electoral objectives?

A I don't think we have a reading on that yet. I don't think we've seen enough to have a reading on that.

--MORE--

Q John, can I just go back again to put a fine point on this if I can?

Does the Salvadoran Government and its Peace Commission have a veto power over contacts that the United States might entertain with members of the opposition?

A I don't think there's a veto power. But I think these are rather early days in the preparation for the election, and I don't think we want to project what might or might not take place in the way of discussions until we have seen more out of that Peace Commission.

Q You just said before that a ceasefire would not be a precondition for a dialogue.

A You ask me whether I understood that to be the case, and that is not my understanding. But, again, I think you have to talk to the Salvadorans about that.

Q What do you base your understanding on about that?

A Just on the basis of our policy up till now.

Q You said, "that is not my understanding," that it would not be a precondition?

A It is my understanding that it has not been a precondition.

Q John, Senator Percy, when he emerged this morning, said that such a dialogue prior to the elections would be a condition for Congress to extend more aid to El Salvador.

Does the Administration object to that being a condition for additional aid?

A I'm a little leery of responding to what Senator Percy may have said, because I haven't seen it.

Q What did he mean by a "serious conversation would have to take place between --

A I think the White House will be having some kind of readout on that session this morning.

Q John, to return to that earlier point about the ceasefire being or not being a precondition, I had understood that the stated position of this Administration had been that a dialogue could take place or an exchange could take place in the context of elections, and that it was up to the guerrillas to lay down their arms and join such a process.

Now you say that the ceasefire is not a precondition. It seems to me that it changed. Could you clarify that, please?

A Perhaps I misunderstood you. Were you talking about a cease for elections or a ceasefire for the purpose of discussions?

Q For purpose of discussions in the context of the democratic process, which I believe is the sort of boilerplate that the Administration has --

A As I say, I think that that's something that the Salvadoran Government is going to have to decide, whether you can have discussions about safeguards in election with or without a ceasefire.

Q But the U.S. has taken a position in August of '81, I believe, with respect to that precise issue, indicating that there could be discussions without the guerrillas laying down their arms.

A Let me do a little research on that.

Q John, on the prior question of aid and advisers, as a result of this meeting today is there any sort of decision about where precisely the Administration is going to proceed?

A No. On trainers, I think there was not a decision, and, indeed, I don't think there was mention of it in any discussion afterwards. But, again, I think there's going to be a White House readout on that meeting, so I guess I'd refer you to the White House.

Q Let me get just something clear here on the dialogue or negotiations. Short of the two sides sitting down and dividing up the government, you wouldn't oppose any contact between the Salvadoran Government and the guerrilla or FDR?

Is that the position?

A   I don't think that's quite what we said. I think what we said was if you're talking about discussions within the framework of democratic elections and how you move to those, but I don't think we said discussions on anything.

What we're talking about is the movement towards democratization in El Salvador.

Q   What could be covered by discussions with respect to elections? One example, Percy said today that there had to be guarantees for the safety of opposition people, including guerrillas, before, during and after any elections might take place.

Is that a relevant subject for a dialogue of the kind that you have in mind?

A   I would think that that would be the kind of question that the Peace Commission would address itself to.

Q   Kirkpatrick said yesterday that -- I don't have the exact quote, but she said that the judicial system was working rather well in El Salvador, and that seemed to contradict what State Department senior officials have said in the past.

I wondered if she spoke for the State Department on that when she said that?

A   I'm not aware of what she said. Where did she say it?

Q   She said it when she was on the Hill testifying on the United Nations yesterday, and she was asked about El Salvador and specifically the difficulty with the judicial system. She said that it works reasonably well in the view of most people who observe it very closely.

Does that reflect the State Department's position?

A   I don't think there's been any doubt that we have sought to see improvement in the judicial system. I think Ambassador Hinton has made that clear, but I also think, on the other hand, that we have seen some improvement in the area of human rights and the area of investigation and the judicial process. So I don't think anybody would pretend that it's ideal, but I think there's been improvement. I suspect that's what she was referring to.

Q There have been a number of reports that the U.S. is very close to certification on Argentina, and that the British have objected very strongly.

Would British objections postpone any certification --

A Consideration of that matter is going forward, and I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Do you expect it before the anniversary of the invasion of the Malvinas?

A I don't know. When the decision is made, it will be announced.

Q It's only three weeks away.

A When the decision is made, we will announce it like a flash.

Q One more follow-up on that. It also was mentioned that the U.S. was talking to Argentina about advisers for El Salvador.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't.

Q John, over the weekend -- I think you addressed this yesterday -- there were published reports that British and Canadian scientists challenged the U.S. findings regarding mycotoxins in Southeast Asia.

Is there any plan for the U.S. experts on this to get together with those people to try to reconcile this because --

A No specific meetings of which I'm aware.

Q It's beginning to sound more like a political rather than a scientific issue.

A No. Not aware of any. I mean, there are routine meetings from time to time for the exchange of information, but I'm not aware of anything specific.

Q John, forgive me if you have already responded to this, but specifically on the outcome of the German elections, the Green Party which many people believe have contacts with the KGB is now in the German Parliament.

The leader of that party, Petra Kelly, has announced that she will make public information which parties have previously chosen to keep classified.

Does the United States have any concern about this development?

A No. I am not aware of what you're suggesting, but we have not had any comment on the party representation in the general election.

Q One more, John. Do you have any comment -- I came in late so you might have spoken to this -- on the decision of the South Korean Supreme Court to uphold a death sentence for two men convicted in the burning of the cultural center?

A Yes, just a brief reference. We are following developments in that case and will continue to do so carefully.

Q You have nothing to say on the severity of the sentence?

A We're talking with that government, but beyond that I don't have anything more for you.

Q Beijing's Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that only the PRC can represent China in the Asian Development Bank, and Taiwan is not admissible for its membership. He also urged the United States to support its position.

Do you have any response to that?

A Yes. I think we've had some guidance earlier which you can retrieve from the Press Office on that question.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, March 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #41

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1983, 12:22 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements on testimony that is available and the composition of the AID Commission and the Deputy Secretary's travel plans.

Available in the Press Office are the following testimonies:

- Statement of Assistant Secretary for International Organizational Affairs Gregory Newell before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject is "Contributions to International Organizations."

- Secondly, statement by Under Secretary for Management Jerome van Gorkum before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "authorization of appropriations, Fiscal Years '84 and '85."

I guess that is it. That's all the testimony today.

The Secretary of State today announced the membership of the Commission on Foreign Security and Economic Assistance. That's the Commission that I think AID Director Mr. McPherson gave an on-the-record session on a little while ago.

The formation of the Commission itself was announced by Mr. Shultz on February 22 during his appearance before the Senate Budget Committee.

The purpose of the Commission is to review the purposes and the various programs of U.S. foreign assistance, and to make recommendations to the President, the Secretary of State and the Congress.

The Commission was suggested to the Secretary by various members of Congress last year and will consult extensively with Congress.

The Commission will operate outside of the Government but will draw on both public and private resources for its staff personnel and financial support.

The Secretary has appointed distinguished experts from the private sector and from the Congress to the Commission under the Chairmanship of Frank Carlucci to study this complex and vital set of programs and issues, and a list of the Commission's membership is available in the Press Office.

Deputy Secretary Dam, at the invitation of the Governments of Norway, Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany will travel to Oslo, Copenhagen and Bonn during the period March 18-27 for consultations on issues of mutual interest.

Mr. Dam will also visit Budapest as part of our continuing bilateral dialogue with the Hungarian Government. He'll also travel to Geneva where he'll meet with our negotiators in the START and INF talks, our Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, and the U.S. Commissioner to the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.

In Berlin Mr. Dam will participate in a biennial German-American Conference organized by the American Council on Germany and the Atlantik Bruecke and will deliver a keynote address on trans-Atlantic relations.

Q What are the dates on that again, John?

A I don't think I have the Berlin date, but we can surely get it for you. I don't have that date with me.

Q Copies of that?

A Sure.

Q Is that it?

A That's it.

Q John, we're hearing various figures on what the Administration would like to propose for aid for El Salvador.

Can you nail that down for us?

A Not really. The process of consultation and decision-making is still going forward. There are meetings taking place. There have been the consultations with Congress. There are meetings taking place with the President and his advisers, and at the appropriate time he'll come to a decision and --

Q Would you argue with the proposal about $110 million is what the Administration wants?

A I guess I will do what I have done consistently while you have asked me about these figures, and that's not get into them. We haven't gotten into these figures from the beginning from this podium, and wouldn't this time I think.

Q Evidently Caspar Weinberger got into them at the meeting in the White House yesterday.

A You're better off --

Q John, just last week you used the $60 million figure.

A Not at all. No, I didn't. Somebody asked me how we arrived at that $60 million.

Q A logical disparity --

A No. Somebody asked me how we arrived at that $60 million figure. I was very careful not to be drawn on that. I responded to reports that had appeared in newspapers, and said I could understand how logically some reporters might arrive at that figure.

Q How did you arrive at the $110 million figure? (Laughter)

A I haven't said we've arrived at the 110 figure.

Q Is it your understanding that the military aid for El Salvador this year might involve as much as $110 million extra beyond the amount in the continuing resolution?

A I think we'd have to wait for any decision on both military aid to Salvador and economic aid to Salvador and Central America until the President has completed his review and his consultations and makes an announcement.

Q When do you expect the President to complete that process and make an announcement? Can you give us some sort of an estimate?

A I can't really except that, again, we fairly consistently said I would think that sometime this week.

Q Have you decided yet what the approach to get the money will be? Will it be a supplemental? Will it be diversion of emergency funds?

A I think that is probably still the subject of discussion at the various meetings that are taking place.

Q Or just to puruse that, I understood from some of the people who were at the meeting with the President yesterday that the President had given them a pledge that he would not dip into the emergency funds.

Is that not accurate?

A I wasn't there. I don't know.

Q Can you take that question because it's --

A I think if anybody were going to respond to that question, it would be the White House.

Q The question of how much you've indicated, or haven't indicated -- speaking algebraically, you said that it's been 25 percent --

A Algebraically. That's the first time I've been accused of that. Okay.

Q You said that the actual provision of military funds were 25 percent of what was needed, we could therefore extrapolate from that algebraically that that would be in the neighborhood of $100 million. So were you telling us all along it was about $100 million?

A No, I wasn't.

Q Why did you arrive at that 25 percent figure?

A I think there was a lot of discussion here about $60 million and $80 million for last year and $80 million for 1984, and so forth and so on, and I think probably some conclusions were drawn, but I don't think we have ever --

Q You said 25 percent from that podium. How did you arrive at that?

A I said 25 percent of the level that was talked about for last year and has been talked about for next year, but I don't think I have ever suggested that we were locked into any figure, and I'm not suggesting it now.

Q No. I'm not suggesting that you're locked into a figure. I was just wondering about how you derived at that quarter percentage that you cited.

A Comparison with the 80.

Q That's all? Not in relation to need?

A Yes.

Q Not in relation to need? Is that right?

A If you used 80 last year and you're going to use 80 in the coming year, I suppose questions might be raised about using whatever the figure is -- 25 or whatever it is -- this year.

Q John, Congressional sources we've talked to had a fairly comprehensive breakdown of the $110 million that's being discussed last night.

Do you think that this was discussed with him in the meeting yesterday and that the President is very near a decision?

A I think he will make a decision this week -- that's my expectation -- but that's his process and his consultation is going forward.

Q John, would the Administration oppose efforts by Congress to attach any conditions to the appropriation of these funds as far as dialogue, negotiations, whatever you want to call it, with the left?

A I think somebody asked me that yesterday, I think, and in response to that I said I think you'd have to ask the White House. It's going to be the President's decision. I can't answer.

Q This Department makes a recommendation.

A It's going to be his decision.

Q At the meeting yesterday Secretary Shultz was quoted as saying he favored a "sincere dialogue." Can you tell us what that means?

A It means what we have consistently said. A dialogue that would produce reconciliation within the electoral process.

Q How would --

A I'm not sure -- you're using the quote, and I'm not confirming or denying the quote, but if you're asking about dialogue, that's what we mean by dialogue.

Q Do you have anything to elaborate on that on that which you had yesterday with respect to the conditions leading to such a serious dialogue?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing more?

A No. I thought I did beautifully yesterday.

Q No. You said you'd take the question.

A Yes. But I don't have anything more for you on that.

Q Also, Congressman Barnes said last night that he'd never been presented with any concrete evidence that there were four airplanes every week going across from Nicaragua to El Salvador, so we had to take it on faith.

Is there any -- can we re-address the question of the tonnage of supplies that's coming in by air to you?

A No. I think we suggested that the Pentagon was the place to go.

-- MORE --

Q I tried.

A What did they say?

Q They said they would get back to me at some future time. (Laughter)

A Then, all is not lost; there's still hope.

Q Do you have anything further on the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister?

A We expect that he'll be here at the end of the week and would expect that he would have discussions with the Secretary and other officials in the State Department Sunday, and probably Monday, too.

Q Is there any plan or consideration of inviting the Lebanese Foreign Minister to arrive shortly thereafter?

A There are some discussions going on on that subject.

Q Would that be simultaneous or shortly thereafter? Would Shamir still be in town when the Lebanese arrive?

A Don't honestly know the details of -- if this comes to anything when they might come, but I think if this did move in this direction, you should be clear that what we're talking about is bilateral talks with the Israelis. In the event that there are any Lebanese in town, it would be bilateral talks with the Lebanese.

Q So there is still no consideration of broadening, of moving the site of the talks to Washington?

A That's right. Absolutely.

Q Does the State Department have anything to add to Secretary Weinberger's report today on the Soviets' war-making potential, build-up?

A No.

Q No comment or elaboration?

A No. I think there's been fairly extensive backgrounders and briefings on that. No, we don't have anything else.

Q Back on this, did you have any comment on Mr. Shamir's proposal that perhaps the United States, Israeli and Lebanese have joint patrols in southern Lebanon?

A Not really. The talks have been going on, are going forward. Undoubtedly, that will be one of the questions raised when he is here, but I don't think -- we haven't gotten into the detail and the substance of the discussions and I don't think we would at this stage.

Obviously, security in the south of Lebanon is an issue, has been an issue. It's something we're concerned about; something the Israelis are concerned about, and that has to be satisfactorily resolved, but there are various ideas about how that might be effected.

Q You don't reject this out of hand; it has merit and is worth discussion?

A We don't reject it out of hand because we've discussed various possibilities over the months -- UNIFIL and some possibility of MNF. There are various options here.

Q You see flexibility in the Israeli position on the observation posts?

A I've seen a lot of reports suggesting one thing and the other, and I think we would be cautious to respond to those.

Q What are you being cautious to, John?

A I've seen reports suggesting there's flexibility and that there isn't flexibility, and that various officials have made certain statements and these have been denied and there's been back-and-forth. And I think until Mr. Shamir gets here, we would wait and see.

Q So let me just ask you on this, John. By this word of caution now, you're going back to the statement from last week, cautioning us against such fluctuations --

A It was good guidance last week.

Q And it still remains as is?

A In my view. (Laughter)

Q What are your plans on -- housekeeping for the Press Office operation on Sunday?

A I think we will have somebody in.

Q Do you have a tentative time when those talks will begin?

A We don't know yet what time those talks will begin. My expections are that they will be on Sunday morning. They will not be all day with the Secretary. It's conceivable that Mr. Shamir or somebody with him might talk with other officials in the Department.

Q Will you let us know if there's going to be a luncheon and so forth so we can plan our time?

A A lunch with Mr. Shamir on Sunday? No, I don't think so.

Q Do you expect a follow-up meeting with the Secretary on Monday?

A Monday, yes.

Q If the Lebanese Foreign Minister does come, would he come while Shamir is here? I didn't get you answer on that.

A It's possible. We don't know yet.

Q It's possible?

A Anything is possible. I really don't have too much for you on this. I'm just saying that there have some discussions about the possibility --

Q It's possible for consecutive bilaterals, then?

A There could be.

Q The Lebanese Embassy officials here are saying that he's arriving on Sunday night.

A Then, they have the advantage over us.

Q Two questions, please. Will Mr. Shamir be seeing the President or is it outlawed?

A I do not think that anything is set. It's possible, but I don't think anything is set.

Q And the other thing, on the reports of progress today, which you must have seen --

A On Lebanon?

A On Lebanon.

Q Are you serious about your statement from last week? Does it really stand by; are you saying that there's no truth to that? Can you bring us up to date; where are things in Lebanon now?

A You proably have seen the same kind that I have. Yes, there is movement, and, no, there isn't movement and there's back-and-forth on it. I think we would be unwise to characterize them until Mr. Shamir gets here.

Q Is there a possibility of a breakthrough out of this cycle of meetings beginning Sunday on removal of foreign forces from Lebanon?

A There's always a possibility of a breakthrough at any meeting. I think you would be misled if you approached this meeting in that context.

Q Do you expect any discussion of when the Secretary might visit the Middle East in the near future?

A It's always possible. I don't know. Nothing has changed on his plans. There may be discussion about it but nothing has changed on his plans.

Q What are his plans?

A His plans are are that at some appropriate time he will go to the Middle East. He wants to do that, but nothing is set.

Q A minute ago you said you would be waiting and seeing about flexibility during this meeting. Is the purpose of this meeting to explore Israeli flexibility on the question of the outposts in southern Lebanon?

A No. I think we're responding to a suggestion from the Israelis that this meeting might be worthwhile, and I think a central topic for discussion will Lebanon. But how that topic will be approached and what the outcome will be, it's premature to say.

Q Another subject. Do you have any comment on a Washington Post report that the Administration is to claim minerals in the sea within 200 miles of shore?

A No, I don't have anything for you. We may have a little something on that later in the week, but don't have anything for you.

Q Did you say later in the day or week?

A Later in the week, I think it's possible. I don't think there will be anything today.

Q Do you also have any response to reports in the Netherlands that Ambassador Dyess is to be replaced?

A I have a piece of paper on that, which says that comment on any Ambassadorial appointment is the prerogative of the White House. We believe that U.S.-Netherlands relations are good and have been so during Ambassador Dyess' tenure in the Netherlands, and I'm afraid we have nothing more for you.

Q What is the purpose of that second sentence?

A What is the purpose of that second statement?

Q Second sentence.

A To be as forthcoming as we possibily can.

Q Is there going to be a new Spokesman?

A Not to my knowledge, but you never know. Is that $700 question? (Laughter)

Q There are reports from Brussels that the Secretary has replied to a letter from Gaston Thorn on new talks on the farm problem with the EEC and the United States. Do you have anything on that?

A No, don't have anything for you on that. I detect a certain restlessness in the group, and before you all escape I have been asked to tell you that in addition to all the other testimony available, there's also, at 2:30 this afternoon will be available the testimony by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Thomas Shoesmith, on Security Assistance for Korea. That's before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia.

Q The Veliotes meeting with the United Jewish Appeal group, is that going to be here in the Department?

A You catch me unaware.

Q It's on the schedule.

A I don't know; we'll check it for you. Find out for you.

STAFF: It's on the Hill.

A Somebody knows. It's on the Hill.

Q Will you comment on a story in the Press Trust of India that the United States has issued, or will issue a visa for Dr. J.S. Chauhan, who is a proponent of an independent state for the Sikhs in India?

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Can I follow up on Bill's earlier question on Gaston Thorn's --

A I'll look into it for you; sure.

Q Do you have any new guidance on this farm war situation?

A No.

Q If you do, will you let us know?

A At the moment we got it, we'll get it right out there.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, March 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #42

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 1983, 2:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A few housekeeping announcements:

-- A statement by Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations. The subject is International Organizations and Conferences. That testimony is available in the Press Office.

-- A statement by Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs Nicholas Veliotes before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is the Lebanon Supplemental.

-- A statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs James Placke before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The subject is Economic and Security Assistance to Jordan, Amman, and the Yemen Arab Republic.

For your information, Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, will brief ON BACKGROUND on the upcoming visit of Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers. That will be Friday, tomorrow, at 4:00 p.m. here in the briefing room.

There is a briefing this afternoon by the President's Special Representative for Law of the Sea and Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs James Malone who will hold an ON THE RECORD* briefing at 3:30 here this afternoon on the future U.S. oceans policy. The briefing will be open to all accredited White House and Department of State journalists.

We also hope to have available in the Press Office later this afternoon testimony by Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. His subject is China.

That's all I have in the way of announcements. Be glad to take your questions.

Q John, apart from the information you've already put out, which is not much, do you have anything to say to the Soviet charges that Richard Osborne was caught red-handed at spying in Moscow?

---

* Correction: The ground rules for this briefing were later changed to BACKGROUND.

A I don't think we have. I think you've probably got about all that we have, Jim. We'll confirm that he has been declared persona non grata by the Soviets. He is a First Secretary in the Economic Section; he arrived in Moscow, August 1982. Obviously, his present plans are not exactly firm, but we anticipate that he will be departing in the near future. Beyond that, I don't have anything for you.

Q Do you anticipate retaliating against any Soviet diplomats?

A Don't have anything on that for you.

Q How do you read this? Do you see it in any way retaliation for remarks that the President made --

A No.

Q -- regarding the Soviet Union? Do you see this as an indication of deterioration of relations?

A No. Just not going to have any comment on it.

Q Did he have those things that the Soviets said he had -- radio and spy material?

A Don't have anything more for you beyond what I've given you, I'm afraid.

Q How old is he, John?

A I don't have that with me. We could probably find that out for you.

Q Can we get that? And where is he from?

A Sure. We can find that out for you.

Q Can you tell us when the last U.S. diplomat might have been expelled under PNG circumstances from the Soviet Union?

A No, I'm afraid I can't; don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you find that out for us?

A No, I don't think we're probably going to be able to respond to that.

Q How about the last one publicly announced?

A We might be able to respond to that.

Q Do you make anything of the fact that they announced this one so quickly, and sometimes they've sat on that for years?

A No, we don't make anything of it. Just going to rest on what we have.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the Russian reaction to the President's speech of last Tuesday?

A No.

Q John, on the visit over this weekend by Foreign Minister Shamir, from the schedule being put out by the Israelis, it begins to sound that the focus of the Lebanon negotiations has moved here, that Shamir and Shultz will be meeting all day Sunday, I gather, and again on Monday. Then, the Lebanese Foreign Minister comes soon after that, I gather.

A I haven't seen the schedule the Israelis have put out. The schedule that I understand we will follow is pretty much the same -- in fact, it is the same as I suggested yesterday, that I think Mr. Shamir will meet with the Secretary on Sunday morning. I do not think he will meet with the Secretary Sunday afternoon or Sunday evening. There may be other meetings or continuing sessions with other U.S. officials that would go on Sunday. It is our expectation that there would then be a continuation of those meetings on Monday.

But I think you would be going down the wrong track, as I said yesterday, if you suggested that the tripartite discussions that are being held in Lebanon are being moved to Washington. That's not the case.

Also, somebody said yesterday that the Lebanese Foreign Minister was arriving on Sunday night. That may or may not be the case, but we have not been able to confirm that; and I understand it is not what the Lebanese Embassy is saying.

Q Do you have any confirmed time when he, in fact, will arrive?

A No, we don't.

Q That he will arrive?

A He is coming and we expect it to be this weekend, but we don't have confirmation. As a matter of fact, I think he is still en route from New Delhi back to Beirut.

Q You say you expect him this weekend?

A We expect him this weekend sometime.

Q John, is the purpose of the meetings with the Lebanese Foreign Minister to discuss things after the talks with Mr. Shamir would be concluded, or do you intend to have parallel, bilateral talks with Shamir and the Lebanese Prime Minister almost at the same time?

A I'm not quite sure how that's going to work out until we know when the Lebanese Foreign Minister is going to be here. If he comes Sunday night, obviously, the first talks with the Israelis would already have taken place, so I don't quite know the schedule and really can't plan that until we know when he's actually getting here.

Q But if you plan on having some kind of parallel, bilateral talks, which means instead of trilateral talks to talk almost at the same time -- kind of indirect talks?

A If they are here together. I mean it seems entirely possible that we would be having talks with the Israelis, and we will be having talks with the Lebanese. But just what the sequence would be one doesn't know until we know when the Lebanese get here.

Q Some sources in Jerusalem said today that Mr. Shamir was instructed not to conduct indirect talks with the Lebanese while he is here, that if there is an interest to conclude such talks, they should be trilateral, or the talks should be direct, not indirect.

Do you have anything on that?

A I don't know what the Israelis are saying. What our thinking about these meetings is is quite plain, that we are going to have bilateral meetings with the Israelis; we're going to have bilateral meetings with the Lebanese. And I think yesterday we steered you away from the idea that there would be tripartite meetings.

Now, anything is possible. I'll not rule that out, but that is not the planning and the intent that is presently underway.

Q Why won't you use that opportunity while both of them are here to have trilateral talks? What would be the reason not to do it?

A Because, obviously, we think that business can be conducted effectively at the bilateral level. But don't rule out -- nobody is saying there could not be -- tripartite talks, but they are not planned, not scheduled.

-- MORE --

Q You want to take another crack at the question about whether this round of bilaterals or tripartites, however it emerges, will produce the solution to the question of withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon?

A It's hard to say until those talks begin. As I think I said yesterday, I suppose that the kind of solution we're seeking, namely the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, I suppose you could get an agreement on that at any meeting you have wherever it might be. In that rather broad sense, I suppose it is possible that there could be a resolution. But we really won't know until we see how these first round of talks go.

Q In other words, it is there as a possibility?

A It is there as a possibility at every meeting in Lebanon, at every meeting here. At any meeting, presumably, remaining differences between the parties could be resolved, and you could get a plan that we've been working for. I caution you against any breakthrough of talk on this particular series of meetings.

Q At whose initiative is the Lebanese Foreign Minister coming?

A I don't know at whose initiative on the Lebanese meeting. As far as the Israelis are concerned, that was an Israeli request, or suggestion to us. I don't exactly know how the Lebanese meetings came about.

Q How long is Mr. Shamir going to stay in Washington?

A I don't know. I think the thinking is that there will be meetings Sunday and Monday, and if the business to be discussed at those meetings is complete by Monday night, I suppose that will be the end of it. If there were merit in further discussion, I think probably the Israelis would be prepared to stay on.

Q Is there a set agenda that you think that it would take two days or more? What exactly is going to be scheduled, say either Sunday or Monday? Is there a set agenda or items that will be discussed which may not go beyond Monday?

A I think it would be inaccurate to say there is a set agenda. I think that the feeling of the two sides is that it will take a couple days to talks through what they think has to be talked through.

Q John, are you ready to take another crack at the question of why now and why here?

A As you know, Ambassador Habib has been working hard at this, as is Ambassador Draper. It isn't any secret that the talks, negotiations, haven't moved as fast as we had hoped certainly, and others had hoped. I suppose it was thought that there would be some merit on the part of the Israelis in suggesting that Mr. Shamir come here, some merit in explaining further the various positions and seeing whether there could be a better understanding of those positions, and whether some progress might emerge as a result of better understanding of those positions.

Q When the Israelis asked for this meeting, did they indicate that they had different positions on some of the key issues that they would like to present to the Secretary?

A Forgive my traditional reticence on not getting into the substance of discussions, but I don't think there is any great secret about the fact that there are different positions and reservations among the various parties.

Q I mean, that they had a new position from the one that they had in the last coversation with Mr. Habib, is what I mean?

A Again, I don't think I should get into the substance of negotiations or the exchanges, but I think I would just again reiterate what I had said in steering everybody away from speculation about breakthroughs.

Q Did the meetings with the Lebanese come up after it was know that Shamir was coming here?

A I think so.

Q Things that you're mentioning now, couldn't they have been worked out through a lower level? I mean, a Foreign Minister of a country coming here, and I guess everybody is speculating that there is something. It could have walked through the Embassy; it could have walked through Ambassador Habib who is still there, and there is a sense that maybe more than that is taking place.

A I assume that as the Israelis took the initiative on this, they thought that discussions at this level would be helpful.

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Q Are you saying the Lebanese visit was worked out after the Shamir visit was set?

A I think that's true.

Q And you don't have a clear answer on who initiated that?

A No, I don't know how that came about.

Q Can we come back for just a second to the Osborne case again? I just have a couple of other questions. One, could you tell us whether you consider him a senior member of the American diplomatic corps in Moscow?

A He's a First Secretary in the Economic Section.

Q Could you give me some idea of the level of that?

A He's a First Secretary.

Q Is he a career FSO?

A I think he is a career FSO. I don't know. My colleague here is unable to give supplementary information on that.

Q Has he served in any other overseas post?

A I can't answer that.

Q Can you tell us what agency he works for in the U.S. Government?

A He's the First Secretary in the Economics Section.

Q The Economics Section of the --

A Of the United States Embassy.

Q Which is an employee of the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Can you find out where he had worked previously?

A Sure. I would think so.

Q Can you tell us what Marisat satellites are?

A No, I can't.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 2:45 p.m.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #43

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two brief announcements:

First, a reminder that there will be a BACKGROUND briefing this afternoon at 4 o'clock on the upcoming visit of The Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers here in the State Department briefing room.

Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs. The subject is the foreign assistance request.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q A housekeeping question, for a second?

A Yes.

Q Are there any backgrounders or anything planned for the Shamir and Salim visits?

A I don't think there is going to be any pre-backgrounder. Whether there will be something at the conclusion of those visits, I don't know yet.

Q Can you put in a request for one?

A Sure.

Q You mean, on Sunday there is a possibility?

A No, not on Sunday. I would not anticipate a briefing on Sunday, but talks will go, presumably, into Monday. Whether they will go beyond that, I don't know. But there would not be anything before that, as things now stand.

Q Have you any new guidance on how long the Sunday talks will last?

A No.

Q What is your reading now, on how long the Sunday talks will last?

A I don't know. I would expect they would go certainly from morning into the afternoon. How late in the afternoon, we don't know.

Q Are they planning to have lunch here, in the building?

A I think that they are likely to be here over lunch time, so I would guess that there might be some eating. I don't know. I mean I haven't seen something which says there is to be a lunch Sunday; but as the timing goes, it is anticipated into the afternoon, but it would certainly be over that period.

Q Alan, you said there would be no contacts with any Administration officials before Sunday with the Israeli Foreign Minister?

A No, I didn't say that. I wasn't addressing that question.

Q Just no meeting with Shultz before Sunday?

A No, there's no briefing for the press until after these visits are completed. That was the issue that was raised.

Q What about meetings either today or tomorrow?

A I'm not aware of any, John, but that doesn't mean that there won't be some. I think tomorrow is very unlikely. Whether somebody at a lower level might be meeting with either Foreign Minister Shamir or somebody in his party, I just don't know. But the Secretary's first meeting would be on Sunday.

Q Is there a schedule already for the meetings with the Lebanese Foreign Minister?

A His arrival and departure times are not yet firmly established, as far as I know; but I expect -- and I can't be held to this because this all may change, of course -- that he will probably meet with the Secretary tomorrow, or may meet with the Secretary tomorrow. Let me put it that way; I think that's probably more accurate. But that all depends on such things as arrival and so on.

Q Now, are there any other meetings with him scheduled for Sunday and Monday?

A I don't have anything about a further schedule. I'm not ruling out further meetings, but I simply don't have any further scheduling on it.

Q Do you have anything on the ouster of the U.S. diplomat in Moscow?

A No. I think John addressed this yesterday, and I have nothing beyond what he said yesterday.

Q What is the Secretary's view on the "hit list" that has been drawn up by General Rowny?

A The only thing I can tell you about the Secretary and this question is simply that he became aware of the issue yesterday, but I'm not going to get into the question of the existence or nonexistence of "hit lists," or the Secretary's views, or anything of that sort.

We haven't commented on Presidential nominees, and I don't intend to start that beyond, of course, the Secretary's expressions of support for the nominee and the nomination. But he became aware that there was an issue of this sort that was in the air yesterday.

Q Well, once aware of it, what did he do then?

A I don't know what he did.

Q Was the list kept from him?

A I said I'm not going to get into the question, Bernie, of whether there is or is not any sort of list or anything of that sort.

Q What was the issue that he became aware of?

A That there was an issue in the air of some sort of recommendations or list, or whatever there might be that you all read about in the papers this morning.

Q Does the Secretary of State have confidence in the delegation that has been sent to Geneva to negotiate a START agreement, or does he agree with the head of the delegation who apparently feels that he's been stuck with a bunch of folks that are not quite on his team, and he'd like to get rid of them?

A Not having asked him that specific question, I can't give you an absolutely positive statement, but let me say this: I have absolutely no reason, based on his discussion of the delegations and the negotiations, to think that he has anything less than full confidence in those teams.

Q In the team?

A That's right.

Q Does he know who is on it?

A I think he knows a number of names of the people who are on -- I'm sure he doesn't know everybody who is on it, Don.

Q The White House was described today as being quite upset about the existence of this list. A senior official over there said, "How could he do such a damned thing? It's a time bomb." Is the State Department equally upset about the existence of this list, or is it you just don't really care?

A As I said, I'm not going to comment on the existence or nonexistence of any such list.

Q The issue that he became aware of, does he find that helpful in the overall --

A I also said, Bob, I was not going to comment on his views.

Q Alan, would you comment on the propriety of the head of a delegation writing a list like this, giving personal characterizations about people who were on his delegations?

A No. I think not commenting at all on whether there is or is not such a list, or anything of that sort that puts me into talking about what I have, in a sense, put into the category of hypothetical, and therefore, I am not going --

Q Do you know of this ever happening before?

A I have no idea.

Q Alan, do you think it's unethical for agencies of the government to hire or fire people?

A "Is it unethical for agencies to hire and fire?" I doubt that it's unethical to hire and fire people.

Q I was just wondering what the issue is here, frankly.

Q To follow up on the issue -- I'm not sure that's such a huge word there -- you mean became aware of the list or whatever you want to call it, the nonexistent or existent list --

A Became aware of the issue as I described it. I'm not going to try to characterize it beyond that.

Q Did he become aware of it from official channels or from the press?

A I'm not going to go into details of how the Secretary gets his information.

Q Alan, I have a couple of questions on Osborne again. I know what you said earlier, but I have to ask them: Yesterday afternoon, a State Department spokesman said that a photo which became available and then unavilable, was unavailable because the State Department doesn't comment on intelligence matters.

John did not call this an intelligence matter yesterday. Is this an intelligence matter?

A Well, it certainly is an alleged intelligence matter by the Soviets. I'm not sure that those are particularly the grounds for not making the photo available. I can think of a variety of reasons, including privacy; but in any case, we have not said anything about the substance of the Soviet charges. So to the extent that one wants to base any withholding of information on those grounds, it would relate to alleged intelligence activities. But in any case, privacy becomes involved.

Q I have another one on that: The President and the Secretary have repeatedly said this year that following the advent to power of Mr. Andropov, that the U.S. is looking for not just words, but deeds to symbolize whether the Soviet Union is interested in improving relations with the U.S.

Does the U.S. put this incident in the category of deeds, or is it not in the category of deeds?

A I think this issue was raised yesterday, and I'd refer you to what John said on the subject.

Q Is the Administration, or are we going to do anything further about Guatemala and the Government of Guatemala in connection with the killings of the aid workers?

A Do you have the guidance that was used yesterday?

Q No, I don't.

A We're very concerned about this tragic case. We've been in constant contact with Guatemalan officials to ensure that they make a full investigation of the events surrounding the disappearances and the deaths of Patricio Ortiz, a Guatemalan contract employee of USAID in that country, and his three Guatemalan companions.

The Guatemalan Government has told us that the officer in charge of the patrol that detained the four people is now under detention and being investigated to determine responsibility in this affair.

We fully expect that the Guatemalan Government will see that justice is done in this case. We are also seeking assurances from the Guatemalans that anyone directly or indirectly in our employ can carry out his duties safely in Guatemala.

Q Does the Government have any intention of withdrawing Ambassador Chapin?

A I would simply say that Ambassador Chapin is conveying, has conveyed, our urgent concern that a full investigation into this case be promptly carried out, and that those responsible for the deaths be brought to justice. And if there is need to have consultations here, we will ask him to return. I have nothing further for you on that.

Q Is there anything possible on the cutoff in the proposed aid package for Guatemala?

A I don't have details of that package. I don't think anything has been made available -- you mean a cutoff of what has already been proposed?

Q Yes.

A I don't have anything on that at this point for you.

Q Alan, one of the people named on the list has already resigned; two others have said that because their names are on the list, they are considering resigning.

Does the Secretary or the Department have any feeling about whether this list will be followed up? In other words, whether any action is contemplated against any of these people, or does the Department or the Secretary want to take the opportunity to say something that might discourage some of the people who are named on the list from leaving their positions?

A Let me say this: First of all, I really have to refer you to ACDA in terms of a lot of this, and also to the White House regarding Ambassador Adelman and the nomination, and so on. So I'm a little bit hamstrung on this.

My understanding -- and again, this is subject to confirmation from ACDA -- is that nobody has left other than under a rotational change. I read the papers and saw some discussion of one individual who talked about that, but also said that some of the reports were inaccurate about his rotation.

As far as purges or things like that are concerned, again, this isn't really for me to comment. Ambassador Adelman talked in his testimony about his attitude and the fact that he, certainly, didn't intend to carry out purges -- totally unrelated to this story. I certainly have no reason to believe that the Secretary would have any intention of looking to that kind of housecleaning.

Again, in light of the fact that this is (a) a Presidential nomination and we're not talking about the issue and (b) the nomination is pending, I don't really know -- (inaudible)

Q I'm not talking so much about Adelman, but for example, three of the people on the list are accused of wanting progress in the talks at any cost; others are described as "dubious," "a disaster," or "can't be trusted, should be fired," down the list. I'm wondering if the Department is concerned that those individuals who are Foreign Service Officers, by and large, having been described in those terms, might be considering leaving.

A Well, (a) I don't know. Again, I'm not commenting on the existence or nonexistence of any list; (b) I can't tell you, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of the list, what individual Foreign Service Officers may be thinking. I've given you what I'm confident is the Secretary's general approach to this issue.

Q Alan, did you say the Secretary has full confidence in the START team?

A I said I had no reason to believe otherwise. I couldn't -- not having asked him specifically, "Do you want to express that?" because there were a number of other things we were discussing today.

Q How would you reconcile that with Rowny's feelings?

A I don't know what Rowny's feelings are. You'll have to ask Ambassador Rowny.

Q You know, Alan, a cynical person might come away from this briefing with the impression that the Department of State and the people who run it think that this is really no one's business except the people who happen to be filling various offices of the U.S. Government at this time.

Is that indeed the attitude of the people who run the State Department?

A No. I think the problem, Bob, as I've explained it, is that this is connected with a Presidential nomination, and it is not up to us to comment on Presidential nominations other than, as I say, the Secretary's expression of strong support for Ambassador Adelman for the Director's position. That is why we are really in a mode of not commenting more specifically or more generally on it.

-- MORE --

Q Does the Secretary have full confidence in General Rowney?

A I have no reason to believe otherwise, but, again, I haven't asked him.

Q When you say that the Secretary has no intention of looking to that kind of housecleaning, are you --

A The kind that was referred to in the newspapers this morning.

Q Usually what happens in this town when something like this comes up is either the memo is acted upon and you have a purge, or you fire the guy who wrote it.

Are you saying --

A If you're correct, I guess we'll find out over time what happens.

Q When you say that he's not looking to that kind of housecleaning, you're not ruling out the possibility that Rowney may be cleaned out?

A John, I can't even address that issue. I mean, you're talking about somebody who doesn't come under our purview, and I can't address the issue.

Q Do you have any comment on the reported confirmation on FBIS this morning of the Soviet cruise missile testing by the Soviet Union?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q What did you say when you were asked whether the Secretary has full confidence in Rowney?

A I have no reason to believe otherwise.

Q Do you have any comment at all on events that have been happening in Poland the last couple of days? There's been a couple of trials, one involving a big Solidarity activist. Walesa has indicated -- started calling for more strikes.

Do you have anything at all on this point?

A I don't have anything.

Q No comment at all?

A I don't have anything for you.

Q What's the status of the U.S. review of U.S. policy? Back when martial law was lifted in December, you said there was a kind of a reassessment of the whole U.S. policy.

A That continues.

Q Follow up. Why won't there be any comment on Polish events?

A I don't have any comment to make.

Q Latin America. In his speech yesterday President Reagan, mentioning the various foreign presences in El Salvador, mentioned the PLO.

Do you have any information on what that presence is?

A Not specifics, but I think it's been said before there are indications that PLO personnel are in Nicaragua.

Q Do you have anything beyond what was said in the White Paper when that was issued some time ago?

A I don't have any new specifics to give you on it.

Q Can you look into -- can you take that question?

A No. I don't think so. I think we'll stick -- I think that what we were referring to is -- to the extent that we'll address it publicly is already on the public record, and I would refer you to that.

Q Also on Latin America, has the Argentine Government protested to the United States the publication of a document?

A Jim, I don't have -- and I guess I wouldn't address the question of protests or not -- but the press reports on this have indicated that Ambassador Shlaudeman addressed the issue, carried his statements on it, and I really have very little to add.

I guess I would only say that the document in question, which was a Spanish translation of a State Department report that was presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has been distributed throughout Latin America, and is in no way meant to address any current situation in Argentina.

That report is, I guess, over a year old.

Q Why was it distributed?

A I don't know. You mean why was it distributed?

Q Yes.

A I haven't read the report. I don't know specifically. But, obviously, it was decided it was useful information to make available. But, again, in terms of the timing and so on, I think Ambassador Shlaudeman -- in Argentina specifically, Ambassador Shlaudeman has addressed it.

Q You're saying it was just a coincidence that that report was sent to newspaper offices the same day that the President of Argentina was talking with Castro in New Delhi?

A Again, I understand the Ambassador addressed it and --

Q It's a lamentable error, in other words.

A Whatever he said about it.

Q Do you have anything on Hu Na?

A No.

Q The Chinese defector.

A Yes. I know who she is.

Q Have you all decided what you're going to do about this reprogramming of the funds? What countries are going to be cut in order to make room for the new military assistance to El Salvador?

A Don, I don't have any specifics on that at this point. Obviously, the specifics will have to be notified, and that will be made available at some point. I don't know when. I've asked about this, and I'm told that it is not yet ready to be made available.

Q Alan, on that point, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee wants to get into the act on this reprogramming.

Do you have any plans to consult with them as well as the appropriations committees?

A I do have something on that if I can find it. The Executive Branch, pursuant to Section 634a of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, provides the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs Committee with a 15-day notice whenever we propose to obligate funds under the Foreign Assistance Act for a country in excess of the level we justified to Congress for that country.

We fully intend to follow this procedure when it is required with respect to the President's recent decision to increase funding levels for Central America.

We transmitted to Congress on Thursday, March 10, 1983, a reprogramming notice concerning our previous decision to provide additional economic support funds to El Salvador and other countries.

In addition, although we are not required by the terms of Section 634a to notify these two committees concerning funding changes for the foreign military sales financing program, we did on Thursday notify both committees of our decision to provide additional foreign military sales credits to El Salvador and other countries.

Q Back to the Rowney story. When you say the Secretary has no reason for you to believe that he has any intention of carrying out a housecleaning on ACDA, isn't that an invitation by Shultz for Rowney to step down?

A I'm not going to try and take this issue any further, Bernie.

Q Alan, if John has responded in a general sense to the question of the Green entrance into the Bundestag, I'd like to ask you to look into something very specific, which is that a number of people in the majority coalition, including a CDU member of the Bundestag -- Shaubelee von Baton Wurtemberg -- have expressed an intention to help the Greens get into sensitive committee positions having to do with NATO, national security issues, defense issues and so on.

I mean, does the United States have any policy, feelings, statement of concern or anything about sensitive security information falling into the hands of the Green Party whom, as I understand the Administration, has pointed out has certain ties to the Soviet Union and so on?

A Without accepting all of your characterizations -- and I don't believe John went into this issue -- let me make --

Q He said it was an internal German question.

A That's right.

Q But he didn't go into this specific issue?

A That's right. Let me make two points. One, as far as parties in Germany are concerned, that clearly is an internal German matter, and I have no intention of commenting on them in any way whatsoever.

Secondly, in terms of concerns for security as a general matter, without specific reference to the German situation, obviously we want to see sensitive material protected in this country and in other countries and other friendly countries. So there's nothing particularly surprising about that.

But I have no intention of commenting on the German situation specifically.

Q Alan, do you know when you'll be able to tell us when the meeting with the Lebanese Foreign Minister is going to take place? Would you know it later today?

A I don't know specifically when we will know. I would ask you to keep in touch with the Press Office, and we will try to keep as informed as possible.

As I say, the indications are at this point that it would be Saturday. I would say likely Saturday afternoon.

Q Another question: Is Ambassador Draper back in Washington?

A He may well be. He certainly is coming in for these talks, and I heard somebody say something about his arrival. I don't remember whether it was that it had actually taken place or it was about to take place.

Q But he will participate --

A Yes. He's coming back.

Q In time for the Lebanese --

A I expect so.

Q Five Soviets who were supposed to be in the conference on U.S.-Soviet relations yesterday on Capitol Hill had to leave the country yesterday morning because they were denied an extension on their visas. Why?

A I don't know. I suppose those were the terms of their visas.

Q Do you have any comment on the establishment or creation of more militias in south Lebanon by Israelis as reported this morning?

A Nothing on the specific report. But, in general, we have consistently taken the position that all foreign forces should withdraw from Lebanon, and that all remaining armed elements within the country must be subject to the control of Lebanon's Central Government. That remains our firm position.

Q To follow up, you do not, therefore, confirm the report from this morning --

A I have nothing for you on that specifically.

Q Can you please look?

A No. Again, we're not a reporting agency, and I don't know where and when we would get that information. I think that that's the kind of thing if you want to have addressed in the region, you can have addressed.

Our position on the issue of armed elements in the country is as I have just stated it.

Q Do you have anything to say about the India-Pakistan agreement to create a commission to examine difficulties between the two countries?

A I don't have anything specific. Obviously, we welcome good relations between Pakistan and India, but I don't have anything specific on that.

Q Lebanon -- there is a report this morning that the Syrian army stopped a Lebanese army patrol and disarmed it. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it at all.

Q Do you know how long the Lebanese Foreign Minister will stay?

A I don't know. On the details of both Foreign Ministers' plans, I really would refer you to their respective embassies.

Q For a couple of days there was a lot of blurred talk from that podium about the Lebanese Foreign Minister coming at all. Now there is a meeting that is set in advance of the Shamir meeting.

Is there any special reason for the lineup of meetings, Lebanese, Israelis and so on?

A No, I don't think so. Obviously, Foreign Minister Shamir would not meet on Saturday, and the doubt that existed before regarding Foreign Minister Salim's trip was simply that -- a question of whether he would be coming and when he would be coming and so on.

As I say, I don't have details even now as to his specific arrival time.

Q At whose initiative is he coming?

A We suggested that the Lebanese might have someone here and thought that it would be useful to have both of the other two parties here at the same time as we examined the issues that are before us.

Q Have you in any way revised those estimates earlier this week, not to look for anything in the way of a possible breakthrough as a result of these talks?

A No. I would stick with what John said. One could always, of course, happen in any given meeting, and, obviously, any breakthrough at any time would be welcome, but that is not the approach that I think the various parties are going into these meetings with.

Q So, in other words, you're going in there hoping there will be no breakthrough?

A Bernie, that's not quite what I said.

Q How would you say it?

A That is not the specific objective in terms of what would come out of these meetings. We're not saying this is a meeting where we expect and are pressing for that magical breakthrough.

Q You're not going to press for a breakthrough.

A We are looking for solutions to the problem. We are looking for the fastest possible withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon, for the re-establishment of the Central Lebanese Government's authority throughout Lebanon, and arrangements to assure Israel's security across its northern border.

Obviously, we want to do it as fast as we can. You've asked and others have asked, do we expect to get some major breakthrough out of these meetings, but that is not -- I mean, we're not setting these meetings up in the expectation that these meetings -- the ones we will be having with the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Lebanon -- will necessarily at this time produce that breakthrough. Is that enough words for you.

Q Assistant Secretary Veliotes said twice in the last three days in testimonies on the Hill that he believes that this summer is going to be a crucial time in Lebanon or a key period in Lebanon because then he believes the forces would start to withdraw.

Does the Administration have any timetable or any scenario of the time from now until this summer to base this expectation?

A No. Obviously, we want to get foreign forces out and the other objectives achieved as soon as we possibly can.

Q Do you have anything on recent events in Zimbabwe?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Excuse me. One more.

Q There are reports coming from the Middle East that the real reason behind Mr. Shamir's visit to Washington is relating to the SAMs in Syria more than to Lebanon. Do you have any comment on that?

A I am sure that during the course of the talks that a variety of issues will be discussed. I think John indicated that expectation the other day as well. So would that issue come up? That issue might well come up, but I guess that's really all I could tell you about it.

Q But you don't take it as the emphasis of the talks between -

A The emphasis of the talks? No. I wouldn't think it would be the emphasis of the talks, but, as I say, I certainly wouldn't rule out the possibility that it could come up.

Q Are you going to have any kind of readout on the Brazilian Foreign Minister's meeting?

A No. I'm told no.

Q Any guidance at all on the visit? I mean, why he's here and so forth?

A No. I had a little bit yesterday. Perhaps, Rush, you could help them in the Press Office afterwards with that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #44

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: A couple of announcements.

Available in the Press Office is testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Daniel O'Donohue before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is Foreign Assistance for Thailand.

Also available at 3:15 will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies. His subjects are Contributions to Internaional Organizations, International Peacekeeping Activities, and International Conferences and Contingencies.

Finally, available later this afternoon will be the testimony by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the question of foreign aid.

I might also note, I believe, that there will be a BACKGROUND readout at the White House this afternoon following Foreign Minister Shamir's visit over there, so I will have nothing to say on that subject here.

Q What time is that?

A You will have to check with the White House, Bill. My understanding is that the meeting is, I think, at 2:30, but please check with them. I haven't --

Q Do you have any idea about what time that might be?

A It depends on how long the meeting goes with the President.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you tell us anything about the situation with the Chinese tennis player, Hu Na?

A No, I have nothing for you on that.

Q You don't? You don't know if she is in Washington?

A I have no information on her activities. Obviously, her activities are her private activities, and I don't try to keep up with them.

Q Has the State Department gotten back in the act on this? I understand that INS has come back to the State Department with additional questions with respect to its recommendation.

A I'm not sure what the exact facts on that are, Ozzie, but in any case, as I understand it, INS has not said anything or issued its final judgments on this. And I would not propose to get in their way on that.

Q Alan, does the advisory opinion given by the State Department to INS several weeks ago still stand? Could we phrase it that way?

A We've not address what was in the opinion --

Q Oh, I know.

A -- but there is no change in what we have provided to them.

Q Is Ambassador Hinton on his way back?

A I am not aware that he is, Marvin. Is there a report that he is?

Q Yes, that he is going to testify this afternoon.

A Could we check that, Rush?

We'll, see, that would be news to me, but that wouldn't be the first time. Tom Enders, of course, is testifying this afternoon.

Q How about the Ambassador to Guatemala?

A   The Ambassador to Guatemala. Yes, I have something on that:

Ambassador Chapin is in Washington for consultations.

Q   He is already here?

A   He is here.

Q   When did he get here?

A   I don't have details on when he got here. Obviously, he got here sometime over the weekend or today. I just don't know.

Q   But not on Friday?

A   He wasn't here as of the time that we last discussed it.

Q   What is the basis of the consultations?

A   He will cover a number of issues while he is here.

Q   You suggested last week that as a result of these killings of somebody who was an AID employee that he might be called back. Is that why he came?

A   That issue will be among the things that he will be discussing while he is here, Don.

Q   Is he going to have anything to say while he is here about Guatemala?

A   I'm not aware of any plan for him to say anything.

Q   What is the answer to Don's question, does his being recalled have any connection --

A   I said that that incident will be among the issues he will be discussing while he is here.

Q   But is his recall intended to be any sort of signal to the Guatemala Government?

A   I think I will leave what I've just said where it is.

Q Is his presence here routine?

A He's here for consultations.

Q No, but is it time for consultations?

A I understand. That's my answer to you: he's here for consultation.

Q Is this in an effort to bring back the U.S. Ambassadors in Central America to Washington for some kind of general discussions?

A I'm not aware of a general pull-back of Ambassadors in the region.

Q The Ambassador from Panama was called back, wasn't he?

A He was back here last week. He has gone back.

Q Has gone back, did you say?

A Yes.

Q Chapin will go back, as well?

A I don't know what his -- I have no reason to believe he isn't going to go back, but in any case, I have no information about his plans to return, when he might do that.

Q Do you have anything on President Monge's offer to mediate between the FDR/FMLN and the Government of El Salvador?

A No.

Q Will you take the question?

A No, I don't think so. I think that we've looked at this before and have welcomed the prospect of a possible regional conference on issues relating to the region, but in terms of that specific proposal and report, I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you see his offer as within the context of the regional solution that the President spoke of on Thursday?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you, Jim.

Q Why won't you take the question?

A I think it's not for us to address, really, the proposals of other governments relating to, yet again, other countries.

Q Do you have anything to say about the U.S. support for a reported plan in El Salvador to take a new method of action against the guerrillas in several provinces, that was reported over the weekend?

A You're talking about the question of dealing with civilians and programs in that area?

Q Yes.

A Yes. This is something that the Government of El Salvador has been working on since the beginning of the year. It's a Salvadoran initiative, although obviously dependent on U.S. financial support, designed to restore Salvadoran security and public services to an area which has been badly affected by guerrilla initiatives. As you know, the Departments of San Vincente and Usulatan represent key highway, electric and communications links to the eastern portion of the country, as well as representing a heavy concentration of displaced persons. The area has been a major target of the guerrillas' continuing economic sabotage campaign.

The program in question would concentrate on creating conditions which would permit the reconstruction of the economic infrastructure along with Government of El Salvador priorities of agrarian reform, increased employment, restoration of vital public services and humanitarian assistance.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Could you answer two questions about that? First of all, you say there will be U.S. support. Is the U.S. support for this plan conditional in some way on Congress' approval of either the $60 million in additional military aid or the $50 million from the Enhancement Fund or any of these other moneys that have been asked? And how much money is it expected to cost anyway?

A Let me look into it, Don. I don't know whether I'll get anything. There will be, as I understand it, perhaps some testimony on this whole subject. In addition, Tom Enders is going to be testifying this afternoon, and I think there will be other testimony later in the week. And I think we may want to leave discussion of that whole package that has been announced to testimony, as opposed to trying to handle it through Qs and As here.

-- MORE --

Q One other question on it. It was somewhat confusing, I would say, statements over the weekend about whether or not the United States will send civilian U.S. officials to live in San Vicente and Usulatan as part of this program. Statements coming from San Salvador seem to suggest that this was the case; someone in Washington said that decision had not been made. What is the status of that?

A Again, let me look into it to see if, away from the context of testimony, I can provide you an answer.

Q Can I just take you back to my colleague's first question. You mean to suggest or not that the U.S. support for this new program, the CORDS program, so to speak, will be --

A I don't think I'd use that term. (Laughter)

Q -- will be in addition to the request for ecomonic aid.

A No. The question was, how do these new financial proposals fit with this, how do they relate to it. I said I did not know the answer, I will try to find out, but I cautioned that maybe I can't come back with an answer because the whole question of what that financial aid is going to be used for, both the military and economic assistance, in testimony during the course of the week. So I will try to get you something but I'm just not sure whether I will be able to.

Q Do you have any comment on the call by the German Government for a new position in the INF talks?

A Just in a general way, to note that the President has stated we will consider possibile solutions that meet the criteria of equal limits, verifiability, no inclusion of third country systems and no transfer of the threat to Asia.

The U.S. and our Allies firmly believe that the U.S. proposal to eliminate the entire category of land-based, longer-ranged INF missiles is the best and most equitable outcome and should be pursued. That would be my response.

Q Is there any consideration, Alan, of putting forward some kind of a new proposal before March 28?

A John addressed this the other day, and simply noted that if there's anything new that the President might want to decide at any point, one presumes he would do that.

Obviously, the whole issue of arms control is a continuing issue of concern within the government, and there are all sorts of discussions all the time. But I would not lead you to believe that that necessarily means that we would have something along those lines. The position is, as I've just stated it, in terms of what we would consider, and I don't have any new policy to announce nor do I think I would get into the question specifically of what kind of deliberations in very specific terms might be going on within the Administration. We don't usually do that.

Q Is any consideration being given to developing new proposals?

A We don't normally do it, and I don't think I'm going to do it in this case.

Q There was a reference in the Post this morning to a meeting of NATO disarmament experts -- Rick Burt will attend and it's going to be later this week -- could you tell us more about that?

A Simply, that he will chair a regular meeting of the NATO Special Consultative Group, so-called SCG, on Friday in Brussels. This is Rick Burt, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

The SCG last met on February 14. It met seven times in 1982. The SCG was established to follow-up the arms control aspects of the 1979 decision on INF modernization and arms control. I will not get into the content of what those discussions might be.

Q I wouldn't dream of asking.

A I know you wouldn't.

Q Will it be here?

A No. Brussels, I said.

Q Why is he meeting with them? Can you give any reason as to why he's meeting?

A It's a regular meeting. As I say, it met seven times in 1982.

On the Hinton question -- you're such smart people -- Hinton is currently on his way to Washington. While there is no testimony scheduled, he will be available to consult with members of Congress.

Q Can he give a backgrounder here as he did last June?

Q He never forgets anything.

A I'm sure he's aware of your concern and interest in the subject.

Q Why is he coming here at this time?

A I don't have anything more than I just gave you.

Q Middle East. There's a FBIS report of a broadcast by Major Saad Haddad today in which he said that since the Lebanese Government is now in trustworthy hands, his forces are at the disposal of the government and he's ordering all the Sons of Free Lebanon to report to Sidon for conscription, or what he calls flag service. Do you have anything on that, and do you have any comment?

A I wasn't aware of that particular report. Our position on the necessity from a Lebanese perspective of having all remaining armed forces in Lebanon once the Israeli, Syrian and PLO forces have gotten out, having those remaining armed forces come under the authority of the Central Government of Lebanon is quite well known. If this is a move which would be supportive of that and consistent with that, obviously it would be something that we think would be quite useful.

I can't comment in specific terms since I don't know what the report is and I don't know what lies behind it.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Non-aligned Conference?

A Yes, I do. The New Delhi declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement is, in many respects, an unbalanced and polemical document which does not reflect the principles of non-alignment which the movement proclaims. The United States regrets this.

The many negative elements in the political part of the final declaration overshadow some other positive elements of the document which are more serious and measured.

The unfair attacks on the U.S. in the political part of the declaration and the absence of criticism of the Soviet Union detracts from the credibility of the declaration and reflects the continuing ability of radical elements within the Non-Aligned Movement to manipulate it.

I want to emphasize that the Non-Aligned Movement includes the majority of the world's nations. Their participation in resolving international problems in a realistic and constructive way is vital. The United States continues to respect the true principles of non-alignment on which the Non-Aligned Movement was founded. We will continue to look for a more faithful application of those principles within the Non-Aligned Movement in the future.

Q Can we get a copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Also, I didn't get one little nuance in there, and I wonder if you could enlighten us. You said there are many negative statements with respect to the political section and you indicated that was kind of the worst, but are you stating, in general, that dissatisfaction with the economics section; is that what you meant to be doing?

A I'm going to leave you with the words I've got. I said some other positive elements which are more serious and measured.

Q Outside the political section?

A I will leave you with the full text of that guidance which you'll be happy to analyze to your heart's content -- 35 pages of declaration you can look at.

Q What are the true principles of non-alignment?

A Again, I'm not going to go beyond the statement.

Q But you support it?

A I'm not going to go beyond the statement.

Q Can I follow up on that. Last week, Fred Wills, the former Foreign Minister of Guyana, and one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, spoke here in town at George Washington University. He said, as a founder of the Movement, that the principle of non-alignment is simply that no nation is part of a military treaty with either one of the super powers which states that the super powers will go to war in the event that they go to war.

Do you find in any way that the New Delhi message contradicts that principle of non-alignment, as defined by the founders of the Movement?

A   Again, I don't think I'm going to comment on any one individual's point. I will leave you with the statement I've just given you.

Q   Do you have anything at all on the demonstrations and things in Poland this weekend?

A   Just very briefly. That we're aware of the reports which once again highlight the pressing need for the Warsaw Government to cease harrassment of Solidarity activist and move toward a policy of reconciliation with the Polish people.

Q   Thank you.

(Press Briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, March 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #45

TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 1983, 12:21 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements.

The Secretary will be testifying tomorrow before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Central America. The subject is El Salvador.

We have had an impassioned and eloquent plea from the State Department Correspondent's Association to conduct briefings on days when the Secretary is testifying, which hitherto has not been our policy. So in instant response to that request, we're going to give it a try tomorrow and see whether we can brief at 3:00 o'clock tomorrow afternoon instead of the usual noon briefing.

Q How about that.

A We'll give it a shot. See how nice you are to us.

Q What time is the Secretary appearing?

A I don't know what time he is testifying. Anybody got a time on the Secretary's beginning of his testimony?

MR. ROMBERG: Tomorrow morning he testifies at 9:30.

MR. HUGHES: And I think he's going to have lunch down there, too.

Also, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations. The subject is "Contributions to International Operations."

Available in the Press Office at 1:30 this afternoon will be more testimony of Mr. Newell before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Organizations. The subject is "International Organizations Programs."

A senior official will give a briefing ON BACKGROUND on the visit of Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers to the President this afternoon. I think the backgrounder, which will be attributable to a senior official, will probably be about 1:20 in the White House briefing room.

Also ON BACKGROUND, we will attempt to make a senior official available at 4:00 o'clock this afternoon for a readout on the visit to Washington of Mr. Shamir. So that will be this afternoon here at 4:00 p.m. on Shamir. White House briefing room about 1:20 on Lubbers.

I have an announcement on a visitor from Nigeria. Alhaji Shehu Musa, Secretary to the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has come to the United States for informal discussions with various U.S. Government officials on matters of common interest to our two governments.

He delivered a letter from the President of Nigeria, Mr. Shagari, to President Reagan. Alhaji Musa will take advantage of this visit to meet with Vice President Bush who paid an official visit to Nigeria in November 1982.

Alhaji Musa and Vice President Bush will be discussing a wide range of issues of interest to Nigeria and the United States, including bilateral economic talks to be held sometime later this year.

That's all I have for you. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q The Bush meeting. When is that meeting?

A I don't have a time on that. Be glad to check that for you, Mike. Anybody got any idea?

He saw Mr. Dam this morning, and he saw Chet Crocker this morning. I'm not sure when he's seeing Bush, but we'll run that down for you.

Q John, I'm aware that some of this may come up at the 4:00 p.m. briefing, but in the meantime, can you say why the Shamir meetings were scheduled today? Why he came back?

A I think I really would prefer to leave that for a full readout this afternoon, but I think at the end of yesterday, Mr. Shamir decided that he and his party would stay another day.

At the end of yesterday afternoon, I think no time had been set, but during the evening it was agreed that Mr. Shamir would come in and see the Secretary at 10:00 this morning, which he did.

That was a one-on-one meeting. It lasted for about 40 minutes, and at the end of that meeting, I think the Secretary suggested that Mr. Shamir might want to come back at 2:00 o'clock this afternoon, and Mr. Shamir accepted. So there will be another meeting at 2:00.

Q This also says something more than just routine. It suggests that some new element has entered the process.

A I think you should continue to be as guarded as you have been in approaching this story. I don't think that you should approach it with a sense of euphoria or suggestion that a breakthrough is at hand.

The Israeli Government in the person of Mr. Shamir has offered its views and explained its positions on a number of key factors in the Lebanese situation.

The United States has listened and has similarly explained its views, and I think you should see today's meetings as a continuation of that exchange.

Q Has there been any meeting of the minds?

A I think I'll leave that until this afternoon.

Q You still don't describe the sessions today as negotiations?

A No. I don't.

Q The one-on-one today, is that the first of the series?

A The first of a series?

Q Of this series of meetings. They've met about ten hours now. Is today's meeting the only one-on-one?

A It may well be that the Secretary and Mr. Shamir have met briefly before the large meetings, but I think this is the first one-on-one of this duration.

Q John, today there is going to be a meeting between, again, Shamir and Shultz at 2:00 o'clock?

A Yes.

Q One-on-one again?

A I'm not sure whether that will be one-on-one. This morning's was one-on-one. I don't know who will be in this afternoon.

Q Will the Foreign Minister leave today, or will he stay?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask him.

Q How about the Lebanese Foreign Minister? Is he meeting the Secretary now?

A No. He saw the Secretary at dinner last night. He may well be seeing other State Department officials, but I do not think he has seen the Secretary today.

-- MORE --

Q The senior official is going to brief on both Foreign Ministers, right? You mentioned just Shamir.

A The Lebanese Foreign Minister is still here and will be here tomorrow, so I would think that the briefing this afternoon would be mainly on Mr. Shamir's visit.

Q Do you see a Shultz-Lebanese Foreign Minister meeting tomorrow possibly?

A I wouldn't rule it out.

Q I couldn't hear John's question earlier, but is the United States presenting new ideas? There was some report to that effect.

A I think there's an attempt on both sides to clarify positions in the hope that this will move things forward.

Q On another related Middle East issue, there was a report over the weekend that Assistant Secretary Veliotes flew a few days ago to London -- a couple of weeks ago to London to see Hussein and he got from him some new information about his readiness to join the peace process. Do you have anything on that?

A I'm not aware that Mr. Veliotes has seen King Hussein recently. I'm not aware of that.

Q Are you aware of the report?

A No, I'm not.

Q Could you take the question?

A Yes.

Q They were described as having breakfast at the Ritz.

A In London?

Q In London.

A I'm not aware of it.

Q Is Veliotes aware of the report?

A I don't know.

Q Will you take that one?

A Yes.

Q Is Mr. Veliotes going to visit the Middle East? There were reports in Beirut that he will be taking a trip.

A I wouldn't rule it out. He is obviously being the man in charge of that area. He's back and forth quite a bit. I wouldn't rule out a trip.

Q How about the Secretary?

A No, no plans. Same as we have been.

Q Any plans for King Hussein to come back here?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know when Ambassador Habib is going back to the Middle East?

A Within a few days I would think, probably the end of this week, but don't have anything firm on that for you.

Q And the first of these meetings will take place now, or are they also cancelled?

A The meetings on the ground in Lebanon?

Q Right.

A I think they will not take place this week because a number of those involved in them are here and could not get back in time.

Q A Foreign Minister said they would meet on Thursday.

A He said there would be a meeting on Thursday?

Q Thursday.

A I don't mean to contradict any Foreign Minister, but I would just plant a question mark in your mind about that.

Q Do you have any comment, again, on the spate of stories out of Europe in which now the British Government is reported to be joining the the German Government in urging the U.S. to go ahead with the new proposal at the

Euro-missile talks?

A No, I don't. I think Larry Speakes addressed that this morning. I noticed that there's a wide range of opinion on that in this morning's papers. One of our papers says the Administration considers a proposal to break the arms negotiation deadlocked, and another of our newspapers says a new, U.S. initiative in arms is unlikely. That's a fairly broad spread of opinion.

Q Were they both in the same paper?

A They were not the same paper. (Laughter)

The President has made his position plain and, as we've said before, if he had anything to announce I'm sure that you would be the first to hear about it.

Q John, in the President's speech on the 10th of March to the National Association of Manufacturers, he said that the Soviet Union is trying to pin the U.S. down in this hemisphere in order to limit our capability to do anything in Europe or the Persian Gulf or Asia. He said that the Soviet strategy had been written about; they know it and they've written about it. Can you give me the reference that the President is referring to?

A The Soviets have written about this?

Q He says they have written about this strategy.

A No. I think you ought to ask the White House for that.

Q Is there a document or a Soviet strategy that the State Department is aware of in which they are deliberately trying to pin us down in this hemisphere to limit our capability to act elsewhere in the world?

A I haven't looked into it, but why don't you try the White House.

Q Do you have any reaction to today's fresh warning from the Soviet Bloc against deployment of the new American missiles? That was sort of a mini-summit in Moscow the last two days.

A No, don't have any comment on that.

You may think that Alan is passing notes saying that my laundry is ready, or something or other.

Q Is he?

A No.

Q It's not ready? (Laugher)

A Pick up drycleaning and -- no.

Our Nigerian visitor is meeting Vice President Bush Wednesday at 5:00 p.m.

And just a little correction: The Secretary is before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

Do you have any more notes for me, Alan?

Q Do you know when the President is going to receive the Lebanese delegation tomorrow?

A I think I would keep in touch with the White House on that.

Q Do you have anything about -- I think it was TASS saying that the Japanese were joining in these U.S./South Korean maneuvers and complaining about that?

A No, I don't. I think that we have said what we've had to say on those -- you're talking about the exercise in South Korea?

Q The exercise.

A No. It was an exercise that was long-planned. The North Koreans were informed in advance. There shouldn't be any flurry about it. It's a very routine exercise.

Q You said "will attempt." Is it not definite; should we call before we come back at 4:00 o'clock?

A I would just check. At the moment, we have it scheduled for 4:00, but in the event that there should be a slight change in that time, you might want to keep in touch with us.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BREIFING
Wednesday, March 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #46

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1983, 3:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements of testimony available in the Press Office. That includes the testimony of the Secretary this morning on El Salvador.

Also testimony by Tom Enders before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. The subject was El Salvador Supplemental Aid.

Also Rick Burt's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning. The subject was Security Assistance for Fiscal Year '84.

Also AID Administrator Peter McPherson's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject of his testimony was International Economic Policy and Trade.

That's all I have for you. I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q Do you have any comment on the decision by a San Salvador court to rule against a trial for the people accused of killing the American churchwomen?

A Seen the wire service reports, and we are in touch with our Embassy -- and the kind of information that we have at this stage is very provisional.

Q Is what?

A Provisional -- preliminary, what we have from our Embassy. I think the time on one of the wire service reports is 12:59. So, obviously, we are checking into it, and seeing where we stand.

I have to say that our preliminary information from our Embassy is that the wire service story suggesting that a court threw out the indictment of five soldiers, that is not correct. I also have to point out that the wire service story is talking about sources, not an official court announcement, and to our Embassy's knowledge there is not yet a court announcement.

As we understand it -- I just want to stress again that we're talking about preliminary reports -- is that the judge presiding over the case has returned the case to an earlier stage of the trial process so that the evidence can be refined. The judge is apparently seeking clarification on three points of evidence dealing with the microbus involved, ballistics and the declaration of the microbus driver.

It's our understanding -- and, again, this is preliminary information by phone from our Embassy -- is that the five national guardesmen remain in custody and it is expected that the trial will proceed on course.

Q On what?

A On course.

Q And the trial, you say --

A The trial will proceed on course. The court case will proceed; the examination will proceed.

Q What's the next step on course?

A I don't want to mislead you. What I'm saying is that at this very early stage where we're trying to check on wire service reports, I would just urge you to be cautious on this story.

Q Does refinement, can that be taken to mean that there may be new evidence available to enter into the case?

A You've really got everything that I've got on the basis of a couple of late wire service reports; a call to the Embassy; caution from the Embassy that the wire service reports may not be correct; preliminary information from the Embassy which is still being checked and worked on, and we will try to get back to you with anything we have later.

Q In addition, the Secretary didn't know anything about this when he --

A He did not know anything about it. As I say, I think 12:59 was the time on that.

Q John, do you mind repeating the elements of evidence that they want refinement on?

A As we understand it -- we're talking about telephone conversation now with our Embassy -- our preliminary information is that the judge presiding over the case has returned it to any earlier stage of the trial process so that the evidence could be refined. I put that into the present tense; "can be refined," I think is what I told you. But actually written here is "could be refined.'

The judge is apparently seeking clarification on three points of evidence dealing with the microbus, ballistics and the declaration of the microbus driver. The five national guardsmen remain in custody and it is expected that the trial will proceed on a normal course.

Q Doesn't this seem odd just on the face of it that all of this time has passed since the crime and the judge investigating is still looking into such obvious things as the ballistics, and interrogating the driver?

A The Secretary talked this morning about reservations we have about the judicial process in El Salvador. He talked about his concerns. You were there; you heard him. I think he said it was deeply troubling, but I don't think that I'm in a position on the basis of a phone call, really, to pronounce on various aspects of what may or may not have taken place there.

Q I don't understand why you say that this is still continuing on course. It appears that this has gone back to an earlier stage. How can the trial continue on course?

A The initial, preliminary information we have from the Embassy is that this case has not been thrown out and that it will go forward. That's what I think they're saying.

Q One question I have on El Salvador, also in referring to Secretary Shultz' testimony, is he mentioned proposals that were being formulated by the U.S. on how to proceed with the election; apparently, guarantees for the guerrillas to take part in the election.

Can you give us more details on what these proposals might be?

A Not at this stage. I can't quite remember his exact language, but I think what he is suggesting is that clearly the initiative has to be taken on this by the Government of El Salvador but that we are vitally interested in insuring that that election process is a fair one, that there is protection for all concerned, and that every opportunity is given for everybody to participate. But as for specifics, no, I think it's a little ahead of the game.

Q Is there a possibility of maybe an international peacekeeping force to separate the two sides?

A I think that is one thing that might be discussed. I don't want to mislead you. As I say, I think we're at an early stage, but I think we are going to be very eager and anxious to see that appropriate steps are taken to guarantee the fairness of those elections.

Q Back on the nuns case, the Secretary said that he agonized over this when he signed the certification. Now, perceptions being what they are on Capitol Hill, do you think that a development like this, whatever it may be, is going to hurt your case for more aid or --

A A development like what?

Q The fact that there seems to be a further delay in the case of these five people.

A We're going to have to wait and see what has happened. It would be foolish, I think, to speculate on the basis of some reports that we have that we're in the process of checking. Let's find out; what is actually happening, and then we can judge.

Q I got the impression in the Secretary's testimony today that he would be submitting a report of some kind to the Committee with respect to the kinds of guarantees that might be discussed. Is that correct?

A To which Committee?

Q To the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.

A I don't know what specifically he has in mind. I didn't get that -- I didn't pick that up.

Q There are no plans [illegible] such a report with respect to guarantees or talks with them?

A We are going to be very interested, and are going to be supporting the Government of El Salvador as it moves forward on such plans, but I don't know whether there is any specific plan to present anything to a Committee.

Q Clarence Long last week said that he had asked for detailed clarification on five points, and that Secretary Shultz had promised to provide him with this.

A The Secretary consults a great deal with the Hill, and continues to keep them informed. I'm sure he would do that. But I'm not sure about a formal report in the sense that Jim --

Q It's my understanding, and I'm quoting, unfortunately, an unnamed source within the State Department that a "piece of paper" was being prepared for Representative Barnes.

A You'll have to go back to your unnamed source for further clarification on that.

Q Long himself aftewards, today, said that he was seeking answers, the Committee was seeking answers to a number of questions on specifically how more aid would be applied to the success of land reform and the furtherance of that, in particular, to this business of how you get guerrillas involved in the December elections, if it is December, and questions like that. Detailed answers, and that it would be based upon these answers, their decision ...

A As I say, I'm sure they'll be no problem about consultation and communication with Congress on this, but I'm not quite sure in the sense of a formal report, which Jim seems to be suggesting, I'm not quite sure what the form will be. But consultation and communication, I'm sure.

Q If there is a report that outlines the points that were just suggested, is it possible that we might receive a briefing on them?

A If such a report is planned or is in existence and is in the public domain, sure, I wouldn't see any reason why not.

Q I would just like to follow up on just two very quick ones. The Salvadoran Government has turned down an offer by the President of Costa Rica to mediate between the opposition and the government. Does the United States have a view on that?

A I haven't seen what you're talking about.

Q It's in the FBIS.

A I haven't seen it. One of the problems, or perhaps one of the pluses of briefing in the afternoon after having been tied up all morning is that one might not have seen everything that has come across your desk.

Q The second question I had is that the President of the Human Rights, the Independent Human Rights

Commission of El Salvador was killed and the army alleges that she was a "terrorist" who was killed during an ambush by terrorists against the army in Suchitoto. I was wondering if you had a reaction to that and if you were urging an investigation by the Government Human Rights Commission, into this killing.

A I don't know that we have very much beyond what you probably already know. Salvadoran officials said that the bodies -- I think the initial report was of two journalists were found by government troops among twenty dead after the battle; white woman, tall black man. Salvadoran officials believe they've identified the woman as a Salvadoran national, formerly president of the private Salvadoran human rights commission. We don't know how that identification was made.

The American Embassy in San Salvador is attempting to learn more about the case and the two persons to clarify this question of their citizenship and identity.

No news organization insofar as the other individual is concerned, no news organization has informed the Embassy that anyone of its employees is missing. That's about all we have.

Q You say the Embassy is trying to determine -- to clarify the situation with respect only to the identity and nationality of those killed? Are they also looking into the circumstances under which they may have been killed?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Could you look into that question?

A Sure.

Q Another question on Salvador but somewhat unrelated to what we were just talking about. There was a report issued by the Embassy on loan guarantees, which I understand said that $25 million worth ought to be basically written off.

Obviously, you wouldn't have anything critical to say about that. How does that --

A Wouldn't have anything critical to say about it?

Q How is that going to help the Administration's campaign to get more economic aid and to convince people that the land reform program is working?

A First of all, I think the United States has a healthy interest in how funds are spent in Salvador. But I think we might have something for you on that in the way of guidance later in the afternoon.

Q Also on El Salvador, if I may. There was a report earlier this week that the Foreign Minister of Costa Rica might have come to Washington to speak at the Organization of American States today, probably related to the possibility of an offer to the guerrillas or to the Salvadoran Government, but the trip apparently was cancelled. Do you have any information about that?

A I don't. I don't know anything about it. Foreign Minister of Costa Rica? No.

--MORE--

Q Can I just follow up one more on this Monge question. If the position of the Administration is that the countries of the region may be best suited to arrive at a settlement of the various conflicts that are going on, why is it that the United States doesn't have an opinion with respect to Monge's initiative to negotiate an end to the civil war in El Salvador?

A It's not a question of not having an opinion. You're asking me about a piece of paper that you've seen and I haven't. How do you expect me to have a comment on it?

Q I'm sorry. I apologize for that. But could you take the question as to Monge's offer because it has been widely reported and the rejection has also been widely reported.

A Okay.

Q On El Salvador, do you have any idea on the whereabouts of the driver of the microbus? The person you are talking that -- you say that the Embassy is -- if I understand well, you say that the Embassy said that there are questions on the driver?

A Declaration of the microbus driver.

Q Yes?

A They need to further clarify his declaration.

Q And do you have any idea on the whereabouts of this person?

Q He's in jail.

A If he's -- I guess -- yes --

Q He's the one who turned state's evidence.

A Is he?

Q As far as I know, he's in jail. He's one of the five.

A Okay.

Q Another subject?

A Sure.

Q Okay. There's an L.A. Times story today concerning a national security directive on a shift in American strategy towards influencing internal Soviet policy and direction in order thereby to influence Soviet foreign policy.

One, is that story correct as written? Does such a directive written? And is that the thrust of the Administration's thinking at this point?

A I don't have anything for you on it, Marvin, and, as I understand it, the story suggested that this was a confidential document.

Q It said still confidential. You can always unconfidential it.

A If there is such a document, and if it were confidential, obviously we wouldn't have any comment on it.

Q Confidential doesn't necessarily mean classified.

A In my terms it does.

Q Is the Administration considering through economic measures to influence the internal developments of the Soviet Union, in that way to influence the foreign policy of the Soviet Union?

A I don't have anything for you on that, Marvin. I'm afraid that's a dry well.

Q Could you check that?

A I'll look at it, but if, indeed, a story's been written about a document that may or may not exist that is classified, I doubt that we'd have anything further on it.

Q What do you mean by "may or may not exist"? Are you raising a question as to whether the document --

A No. But I mean you're asking me virtually to confirm the existence of a classified document or a policy, and we wouldn't do that.

Q Well, a policy line is certainly something you can talk about, whether you talk about a document as such existing or not.

A Okay. All right.

Q So I asked you a question not based upon the document. It was a more general --

A All right. I still don't have anything for you on it.

Q That's why I was asking. Could you look into that?

A I said we'd look into it.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Middle East. Can you tell us when and where this meeting between the Lebanese and Draper-Habib took place today? A senior official speaking on background at the White House today said that there would be a meeting today between the Lebanese delegation and --

A You've got me. Again, I was on the Hill all morning. I don't know. There was a meeting scheduled today?

Q That is my understanding. I wasn't there.

A There may well be.

Q A senior official said, speaking on background.

A Okay. I'm sure that he was a well informed senior official, and I'm sure his information was good. It doesn't surprise me, but I don't know anything about it.

Q He didn't specify where or when.

A I don't know. I think that the meetings that we have had with the Lebanese while they were here were mainly in the Department, but I don't know about this particular one.

Q John, I have an "iffy" question, and I don't mind an "iffy" answer.

A As distinct from all the other clearcut ones I've had today.

Q What happens if on Sunday the Israeli Cabinet rejects all the proposals that were carried by Shamir from here? What happens next to the momentum that we witnessed over the last couple of days, and where do we go? Do you have anything up your sleeves?

A Why don't we wait and see what happens. But you have better information than I do. Sunday they're going to look at all this, are they?

Q I got the "iffy" answer.

A No. I mean, we'll wait and see. I'd just refer you to Foreign Minister Shamir's comments that he thought things had moved forward and was going back to Israel to explain the position to the Cabinet. We'll wait and see what happens.

Q John, anything on trips by Shultz or Veliotes or anybody else to the area?

A Veliotes could well be going out to Cairo on a quick trip. Not peace plan or anything like that. A straightforward trip.

Q A holiday?

A Not a holiday, Bernie. No.

Q Then for what? I mean, you say --

A It's a regularly scheduled trip. I'm not quite sure of the subject matter to be discussed, but it could be within the next few days. It will be a quick trip out there.

Q Is it Cairo only?

A I think it's Cairo only.

Q And no Hussein in the scene?

A No Hussein.

Q When did he last make a regularly scheduled, few-day trip only to one country in the Middle East?

A I don't know.

Q To see whom in Cairo?

A I think he's talking with our Ambassador. Let me give you a little bit about that afterwards.

Q Any reaction to the attack on the Marines in Beirut today?

A Not more than the factual account of what we really know. There were two incidents. The first involved the Italians. The second was against U.S. Marines.

At 8:30 local, about one kilometer north of Beirut International Airport, an Italian motorized patrol was attacked by rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons fire. Five members of the Italian MNF were wounded. The area was cordoned off. Italian and Lebanese troops searched the area. Nothing further on that at the present time.

At 8:50 a.m., local, March 16 -- that's today -- an MNF foot patrol, consisting of 11 Marines and 1 Navy corpsman, while transiting an urban area approximately one kilometer north of the Beirut International Airport had 5 Marines sustain superficial wounds when a hand grenade was thrown at them.

The grenade was thrown by a lone man from the second floor of a building in the vicinity of the patrol. In 30 minutes a Marine reaction force, assisted by the Lebanese armed forces, had the area cordoned off, and the subsequent search of the area by Lebanese authorities resulted in the arrest of one individual suspected of committing the act.

All the wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter to the hospital aboard the U.S.S. Guam standing at anchor off shore. Because of the proximity of innocent civilians, the Marine patrol did not return fire when attacked.

This incident took place about 1500 meters west of where the Italian patrol was attacked. There's further investigation into both incidents, and that's all we have at this time.

Q Did the Marines carry . . . were their weapons loaded?

A I don't know whether they were loaded at the time, Bernie, or not. I'd have to ask the Pentagon, but I think their standard operating rule has been to carry their weapons unloaded, but in this instance I don't know.

Q Who was the individual?

A I don't know.

Q You don't have a nationality?

A I don't. No. That's all I have for you.

Q We don't know or you can't tell us?

A I don't know. I don't have anything more for you than this at the moment.

Q There were various reports in the press today about the new ideas allegedly presented by Secretary Shultz on the Middle East.

Can you comment on them, and is the United States willing to increase aid to Israel and Lebanon, or to have anti-terrorist training in Lebanon?

A I think that we're really not prepared -- or I'm not prepared to go any further than the background briefing you had yesterday by a senior Administration official who I think declined to get into the detail.

Q John, in connection with that backgrounder, the question that I wanted to ask yesterday and didn't get a chance to because the senior official didn't look in our direction -- both the senior official and Mr. Shamir on the record said that the U.S. and Israel discussed bilateral issues in addition to the Lebanon situation.

Could you tell us what those bilateral issues are?

A No, I can't.

Q You can't say anything about them?

A No. I think you'd be right in assuming, though, that most of the discussion was about Lebanon.

Q But you know, for example, the memo of understanding, some of those things would be related to Lebanon in terms of progress on one and progress on the other.

A I can't --

Q Two questions, please. First, have the same ideas that were presented to Israel been presented already to the Lebanese?

A I think that we really are not going to be able to get into the kind of diplomatic back and forth that's going on.

Q Another question: Do you have any more precise details on the plans of Ambassador Habib? When is he going to the area?

A I think this weekend. I think both Draper and Habib will go back this weekend, and I think that the regular tripartite meeting on Monday will be held on Monday. I'm sure that is the plan, and I think that will go forward.

Q And one more: Is the Secretary going to see the Lebanese Foreign Minister before he goes back tomorrow?

A I don't know of any plans for him to see him. I'm sure he will not see him today. I don't know what time he's going back tomorrow.

Q Any plans for a news conference with the Secretary?

A We're thinking about it, Bernie, but nothing's scheduled.

Q John, can we get a readout on these South African talks going on when they're over? They're going on in this building.

A The South African talks going on?

Q With Secretary Crocker.

A Let me look into that for you.

Q Wait a minute, please. New subject. Has the Secretary of State received a letter from Senator Syms and/or Senator Helms regarding Soviet weapons in Cuba? And, if so --

A I don't know.

Q -- do you have any comment on their -- you don't know anything about the letters?

A No. I don't know whether he's received such a letter.

Q Do you know anything about the subject? Whether or not he's received the letter, has the State Department any comment on the installation or the availability to Cuba of a slightly different version of Soviet bombers that have capability of dropping nuclear weapons?

A I don't.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on a claim by Senator Helms that he intends to hold Salvador aid hostage for --

A I'm sorry. I was so busy reading this latest dispatch from the front that I'm sorry, I missed the question. I don't mean to be rude, but --

Q My question is, one of the Senators who says he's sending a letter is Senator Helms, and, although you know nothing about the letter, Helms says that he's going to hold his vote on Salvador aid hostage for release of information about Soviet weapons in Cuba and, more specifically, release of the 1962 and '70 and '71 agreements with the Soviet Union on the placement of weapons?

A I don't know anything about it, Ralph. Sorry.

Q Would it be possible for you to look into those questions?

A Okay.

Q Do you want to read that?

A I'll read the dispatch from the front that I just got.

Ambassasdor Habib and Mr. Salem did meet today. Veliotes, Habib, Draper and other Department officials met with Mr. Salem at 11:30 for an hour and fifteen minutes.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 3:32 p.m.)

Olennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BREIFING

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #47

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 1983, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all.

I have an announcement on the El Salvador churchwomen's case. Yesterday's reports from San Salvador of an appellate judicial decision in the case of the murders of the American churchwomen have raised questions about both the legal status of the case and about U.S. and Salvadoran policy.

On the first, the accused national guardsmen remain in custody. It is our understanding that the judge has requested clarification and refinement of the evidence on three specific points: (1) the microbus; (2) the declaration of the microbus driver; and (3) ballistics. After these points have been resolved by the lower court, it is our understanding that the case will proceed on course. However, without an official announcement of the decision and authoritative details on its implications, it is difficult to be any more specific.

The official United States position on this case and other cases involving the murders of American citizens, and on the need to bring to justice those guilty of crimes against individuals of whatever nationality, is clear and emphatic. Democracy is impossible without justice.

We do not ask that the Government of El Salvador violate its judicial process. We do expect justice.

That's the end of the statement.

Q May we have a copy?

A Yes. I'll be glad to answer any questions you might have.

Q So the U.S. Government has formally relayed this same statement to the Salvadoran authorities and in such terms, emphatic terms?

A I don't know whether we have relayed this specific statement word for word, but I think there is no question that the Government of El Salvador has long been familiar with our position on cases such as these, and is familiar with our position on this case.

I do want to point out that we are still looking at this case. We've despatched an Embassy officer to the area, and he is going to be reviewing with court officials the legal documents, and try to determine the exact status of the case. So on the one hand, we have reports that are still preliminary -- there still hasn't been an official announcement, as we understand it, by the court.

But on the other hand, our position, our sentiments, our feelings on this case are very clear. Our aim is justice. What we want to see is justice done; we want justice done as rapidly as possible, consistent with the rights of the individuals and consistent with the judicial system operating in El Salvador. But our concern is justice.

Q At whose request is the Embassy officer going to San Vincente?

A At whose request?

Q Yes. Was he invited to consult with the court officials, or is he inviting himself?

A I don't know. I don't know whether he was invited.

Q John, that Embassy official, you said he would review court documents.

A Yes.

Q Will he do that in the same way that any member of the public would go to the court and look in the publicly-available file, or is the U.S. Government being given access to legal documents in the case? Is it intervening, in effect, in the --

A No, we're not intervening in the judicial process of El Salvador, but I'm not familiar with the system in operation there. I'm sure he is going to be operating in conformity with that system, and is going to be asking for whatever he asks to see, and sees whatever he sees in a perfectly proper and legal way.

Q "In a proper and legal way" as a member of the public observing the legal system, or in a way that involves diplomatic contacts between the two governments?

A I'm sure that he will have no special rights, but at the same time these are American citizens involved. There is, obviously, an acute interest in and sensitivity to this particular case. We don't expect that he would have any problem in determining on the ground what the situation is.

Just remember that we're still dealing with those initial reports, which were confused when I spoke with you yesterday. We still don't have an official announcement from the court, so he is going to the scene on an information-gathering mission.

Q Does that include speaking to the judge regarding threats against his welfare?

A I don't know how the Embassy officer will operate.

Q Are you satisfied that this jurist is operating of his own volition, that he is not being threatened in any form?

A That our Embassy officer --?

Q No; the ruling officer in this case -- the judge.

A I'm sure that that's one of the things that would be taken into account in the Embassy officer's investigation.

Q Is there any reason for the United States Government to rethink its package of aid to El Salvador because of these developments?

A No. I think the testimony the Secretary offered yesterday has made our position clear. The Secretary made clear his concern, both personally and the concern of the United States Government, about the judicial system in El Salvador. I think the Secretary spoke very frankly about the concerns that he had when he signed the certification on El Salvador back in January. Those concerns are real and valid, but our position has been that there continues to be movement in the right direction. I see no change in our position on the aid package.

Q Will whatever information that is obtained by your officers be communicated immediately to interested Members of Congress?

A I think we'd have to wait and see what report comes and when, and what the time frame will be. We're just in the process of despatching it.

Q Do you have anything more today on either the death of the Human Rights Commission president or the Monge offer for mediation?

A No.

Q What kind of problems is this ruling going to create for you on the Hill with the El Salvador package?

A I think we're in a process of investigation. As I say, we are interested in justice being done, and we expect that justice will be done. That's where our efforts are directed. But this is a very rapid development, a very early development. We're still investigating it, and we have to see what other facts come to light.

Q Do you have any comment or reaction to the Pope's statement against more military aid to El Salvador?

A No.

Q I have a question related to El Salvador. In the meeting today between Secretary Shultz and the Dutch Foreign Minister, are the Dutch raising the subject of the Dutch reporters who were killed in El Salvador?

A I don't know.

Q Are they still asking the U.S. Government to help in that case?

A I don't know. Sorry. I can't answer that, don't know.

Q Is Ambassador Hinton still in Washington?

A Yes, he is.

Q Is Ambassador Chapin also still in Washington?

A I don't know the answer to that -- Ambassador Chapin. Don't know the answer to that.

Q America's Watch put out a report alleging that the human rights situation had not improved in Guatemala, that in some cases it had worsened, based on a recent visit there this month. Do you have any reaction?

A No. No. I think we have said what we had to say on the human rights situation in Guatemala over an extended period of time, nothing new.

Q John, could we ask you about the Russian statement, Arbatov saying that -- I suppose what he said, if I understood correctly -- if we deploy missiles in Europe, that they will deploy missiles close to our borders?

A Yes, Bob, our position is that no NATO weapons will ever be used against the Soviet Union except in response to aggression. The United States has always regarded its security as inseparable from that of our allies.

As the NATO Charter clearly states, an attack against one NATO member is an attack against all. Indeed, one reason the Alliance took the dual track decision in 1979 in the face of the massive and unjustified Soviet SS-20 build-up was to strengthen the linkage between Europe and the U.S. strategic deterrent, and thus preserve the ability of the Alliance to deter aggression.

Q What would U.S. reaction be to the idea of the Soviets' stationing new missiles close to our borders, presumably Cuba, I take it?

A I think we clearly would not be enthusiastic about that. (Laughter)

Q Isn't there a specific agreement with the Soviet Union that would bar such a step --

A I'd have to do a little homework on that for you, Ozzie.

Q -- having to do with defensive weapons deployed in Cuba?

A I'll have to do a little homework on that for you.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Post story today on the preparation of the new bargaining position in Geneva?

A Well, I'd have --

Q Build up, build down, stand pat, and so on?

A Well, we, obviously, wouldn't have any comment on internal policy procedures, but the United States has proposed the elimination of the entire class of U.S. and Soviet longer range intermediate range nuclear missiles. We are convinced that that would be the best outcome for both sides in the Geneva talks.

At the same time, this proposal is not being offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, as the President has said. Ambassador Nitze is empowered to explore any proposed solutions which would respect certain basic principles vital to U.S. interests. And as the President has also said, these are: equal rights and limits for the U.S. and Soviet Union; non-inclusion of the French and British systems; non-transferrence of the INF problem to Asia; and no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrence capability; and effective verifiability.

Q John, number one, a copy of that; and two, can you re-read the sentence in which you used Mr. Nitze's name?

A Yes. "Ambassador Nitze is empowered to explore any proposed solutions which would respect certain basic principles." That's not new.

Q Does use of the word "explore" represent a change in U.S. policy?

A No.

Q Does it represent a change in the instructions to Mr. Nitze?

A No.

Q Can we get a copy of the first part of your statement about NATO?

A Sure.

Q The answer begs the question -- when Nitze left here to go back to Geneva, he said that he had authority to explore Soviet proposals. I think he said it at his press conference, that if the Soviets would be forthcoming, there was some Soviet give, they would meet a good response here.

Since then the discussion has been whether the U.S. should in fact wait for a Soviet proposal or bring one forth on its own without waiting for another proposal. I guess that's my question: Is there a debate going on about this within the Administration, because your statement seemed to suggest you were waiting for a Soviet proposal by saying, "He's ready to explore any proposal," but it doesn't quite say it that way?

A Well, Bernie, I suspect what I'm about to say won't be too helpful, namely, one, the negotiations are in Geneva, and that's where they'll take place; two, the President's position on arms control reduction is the zero option. Should he at any time have anything else to say about that, he will say it.

Q John, can I get back to the Soviet statements for a minute?

A Yes.

Q Correct me if I'm wrong, but it sounded to me like the answer you gave to Bob's question was intended to be an answer to the question of any U.S. reaction to the Ogarkov statement, as opposed to the Arbatov statement. Please correct me if I'm wrong; but is there a separate reaction to those two?

A No, that's all I have.

Q That's what you have on both of them. So, is it accurate to say that in effect, you are answering the Ogarkov statement, but declining comment on the business about, the threat about posting U.S. missiles close to the borders? The Ogarkov statement that you read responds directly to the idea --

A -- an attack on one is an attack on the others.

Q -- an attack on one is an attack on the others.

A Yes.

-- MORE --

Q Also on that subject that you thought you'd have to do a little homework on the question of what the American policy would be if the Russians were to put missiles into Cuba.

Are you unfamiliar with the agreements reached in 1962 after to the Cuban missile crisis?

A I'm loathe, Jim, to give quick and uncrafted policy statements from this podium.

Q I can understand where you might be unfamiliar with it, but you're speaking for the Department, and it suggests that the Department doesn't know anything about some rather important agreements signed or reached between the governments.

A No. That suggests that you don't understand what I said when I said I'd do some homework on it. I'll be glad to do some homework and give you some words on it.

Q You had a response prepared for the question. Didn't this question come up of the '62 agreements in preparing your statement?

A I think you'd have to assume, Jim, that I don't have a piece of policy statement on every single issue confronting the United States in this book, and I'm not going to be drawn --

Q I think that when the spokesman for the Soviet Government talks about putting missiles somewhere near the United States after the crisis in 1962 that somebody in this department would have thought to prepare a response to the question.

A I'll leave you with that thought. Are there any other questions?

Q Can I follow up on something I asked about yesterday just to see whether you had any -- when you checked on it -- the alleged letters from a couple of Senators to the Secretary regarding placement of Soviet -- certain type of Soviet plane in Cuba.

Do you have anything on that?

A I haven't got anything. I don't know whether we have. Not yet, no. Still working on it for you.

Q On another question regarding Soviet statements, do you have any comment on statements out of the Middle East which suggest that the Soviet Union would take some kind of action if there were further hostilities between Israel and Syria?

A No. Just seen the initial report on that, Don, but don't have anything on it, no.

Q Speaking of hostilities, John, can you address the letter of General Barrow to Mr. Weinberger in which he says that it is time for firm and strong action by the United States that we do not have a continuation of these incidents with the Israeli forces.

What is he suggesting and what are you preparing?

A I think basically on that report I'd refer you to the Pentagon. It is a Pentagon matter, and the correspondence involves the Pentagon, but I think we obviously are concerned about both sets of incidents -- those involving the Marines, and those involving American personnel with the U.N. force.

On the question of the U.N. forces, we have been in touch with the U.N. They are aware of our concern, and I guess I'd refer you to them for anything further on that.

In the case of the Marines, we have raised this with the Israeli Government at high levels. We are concerned about the situation. The Israelis are concerned about the situation, and we understand that steps are being taken to resolve the situation.

Q Such as?

A I don't want to get into the details.

Q Has the letter or the gist of the letter been relayed to the Israeli Government? Barrow made some very strong charges, including that U.S. officers have been in a life threatening situation, had been verbally abused by Israeli officers, that this was an orchestrated plan by the Israelis for political purposes, and so on and so forth.

Do you have any more comment?

A No. And I think you ought to talk to the Pentagon about that letter.

Q But this becomes a diplomatic type situation when he makes those charges.

A All I will say is what I've just said, that we've taken it up at a high level with the Israeli Government. We're concerned.

Q Do you know what those life threatening situations were that he talks about?

A I assume that in an area like that, where you have forces side by side in any -- I'm talking in general terms now where you have armed forces side by side and you have misunderstandings and confrontations, I'm sure that leads to the possibility of a dangerous situation.

Q I'd like to follow up. I mean, he doesn't talk about misunderstandings, he talks about provocatons by the IDF, and that's why --

A I think I'd have to ask you to go to the Pentagon for the detail on that.

Q When, John, did you take it up with the Israelis last?

A I don't think we're going to get into the details of how we did that.

Q Has it been done recently?

A Yes.

Q Was it in the last few days?

A Yes.

Q By whom?

A I'm not going to tell you.

Q There is a story out of Israel saying that Ambassador Lewis raised it with Arens yesterday. Is that true.

A I'm not going to get into how we -- but I think I told you, at high levels.

Q John, have you been informed by the Soviet Union of a similar position to that expressed by Ambassador Soldatov in Beirut?

A No. I have nothing beyond that initial report.

Q Would you look into it and tell us something about it later on?

A Would we look into it?

Q Yes.

A Into a Soviet announcement --

Q It was a statement made by a Soviet official in the Middle East.

A It was a radio report of a statement.

Q I mean, there's a statement, John. I don't know how it came out. It was reported, I guess, through radio, but there's a statement obviously in the Middle East circulating that the Soviet Union is offering its potential involvement if there is an Israeli instigation in there or --

A I think we'd have to see more than the radio report.

Q So you will not answer until you see?

A That's right.

Q John, do you have any comment on the police raid against the special correspondent of The Washington Post, Mr. Sparks, in South Africa?

A Yes, I do. The State Department's 1982 Human Rights Report notes that there has been a progressive erosion of press freedom in South Africa over the last decade.

Nonetheless, the press in South Africa, we noted, remains a vital channel of communication within South African society, and between South Africa and the rest of the world.

The State Department strongly condemns any effort to restrict, fetter or otherwise intimidate the press, actions which can only result in a diminution of information available to the public.

Insofar as we're aware, no charges have yet been placed against Mr. Sparks in this case. We reaffirm our strong conviction that the processes of freedom and democracy can only be advanced in an atmosphere where the press has the ability to report news without harassment and censorship.

We've raised this matter with the South African Government which is fully aware of our views on the matter.

Q Has any U.S. official talked directly to any of the South African police officials about the question?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Did the United States have any advance knowledge that they were going to take such action against a correspondent for an American publication?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have anything on the meetings here with the South Africans?

A Not a great deal. I have something on that for you. We are holding discussions March 17 and 18 with representatives of the South African Government. Those talks will be part of our continuing consultations with the South African Government in the context of our efforts to achieve a Namibia settlement.

Q Who is he holding talks with?

A I don't have any names. We could probably get those for you, Don. I don't see why not.

Q Is Secretary Crocker involved in these --

A I do not know that of my own knowledge, Jim, but I would think that Chet Crocker would be involved in it. Again, we could check that for you.

Q Where are these discussions being held?

A I think they're in the building.

Q John, could I return for just a moment to General Barrow's letter? After the February 2 incident in which the American Captain got involved with some Israeli tanks, this Department -- at least as I recall in general terms -- made a very strong protest to the Israeli Government. I think that Mr. Dam was involved and called in the Israeli Charge', and there were some tough words from this podium.

Today you seem to be referring questions about it to the Pentagon, and I wonder how you actually evaluate the current situation? Is it as serious as it was in early February, or is it generally improved?

A That's a very hard question to answer, especially from a long distance away. To my knowledge there were not a string of incidents between the one you mention and the latest series, so I suppose in that respect there was improvement in the situation, but we're dealing with these latest incidents which do concern us.

Q The latest incident -- the General's letter apparently, from the way it was worded, was touched off by some incidents which he said had received a lot of publicity over the weekend, but I wasn't aware of anything more than a few graphs in the paper.

Do you have any idea what the incidents were that touched off the General's concern?

A They're Marines, and I think you ought to go to the Pentagon and have the Pentagon describe or give you whatever description they are willing to give of the incidents.

Q You don't have any more information here about any of the incidents themselves that the General discussed?

A No.

Q John, can I ask about Osborne again? There's a report that says he is now out of the Soviet Union. My questions are: Can you tell us anything more about him now that he's gone, and/or can you tell us anything more about whether the U.S. will retaliate or take any action?

A I really can't. I think an Embassy spokesman in Moscow had something on that today about his departure, but I don't have anything further.

Q John, 17 members of Congress have made public a letter regarding human rights violations in Malaysia where a number of people have been executed by the Government.

Does the Department have any comment on the situation in Malaysia, or the Congressmen's letter, or the fact that the United States is supplying a certain amount of assistance to Malaysia?

A I think there is some -- I don't have it with me, Don, but I think there is some guidance from either the --

Q Can you make it available in some way?

A Sure.

Q Anything on the Thai parliament, in that part of the world?

A No.

Q Okay. Also, do you have any reaction to Senator Inouye's suggestion yesterday that there be a certification requirement connected to negotiations?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the Adelman situation today?

A No. That's a Presidential appointment, Bob, and I don't have anything further on it, no.

Q The Secretary still supports Mr. Adelman? Is that the position?

A Yes. Of course.

Q Is the prohibition on Mrs. Allende still in effect?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on Senator Percy's amendment to the IMF quota increase request which is his --

A No.

Q Do you know what it is?

A No.

Q Can you look into it? It's an amendment requesting that the Administration study participation in the Bank for International Settlements, or joining that bank?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the Shultz trip to the Middle East?

A No. Nothing. Exactly where we have been for some time on the Secretary's thinking.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #48

FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1983, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Couple of announcements.

Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for International Narcotic Matters Dominic Dicarlo before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject: "Narcotics in East Asia."

Available this afternoon in the Press Office at 2:00 o'clock will be testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel O'Donahue before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is "FY 84 Foreign Assistance Requests and FY 83 Supplemental Appropriation Requests for the Philippines and Indonesia."

Q What about -- do you have anything on the Secretary going to the Middle East next week -

A No, no. He's not going to the Middle East next week and hasn't any plans. Ambassador Habib will be leaving, I think, this afternoon; will be routing himself through London.

King Hussein is in London. We think probably there will be a session between Ambassador Habib and King Hussein.

Q That is certain? What day? Saturday, Sunday?

A I think it will be tomorrow afternoon sometime. I do not think we have a firm time on it.

Q How about the purpose of it, John?

A I think updating on the talks that were being held here, and continuing consultation on both Lebanon and the overall Middle Eastern process.

The Secretary of State was a guest last night of Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia at a dinner in McLean, and some members of the Lebanese delegation were also at that dinner.

Q Which members, for example? Salem?

A I think so, Bernie. There was just one thing I saw about some travel arrangements that caused me to pause and not give you who I thought was at that dinner, but I think they really were all there. That, obviously, was a discussion about Lebanon and the overall Middle East process. I understand the Lebanese left after the dinner last night.

Q Do we expect Hussein to declare himself in the near future on the Reagan proposal?

A I think King Hussein will obviously speak for himself on that insofar as his plans are concerned. Again, the Jordanian Government ought to respond, but I think he is returning to Amman after his visit to London. I presume that he would then give consideration to the various discussions he's been having, and it will be up to him to make any announcements.

I'm not leading you. I'm just saying I think that's what the mechanics of it would be if there is to be some announcement.

Q John, will Habib go on to the Middle East or will he return for consultations?

A Yes. He'll go on from London to Israel.

Q Do you have any advance words from the Israelis on what the Israeli reaction to the talks of the past week have been?

A I don't think, Bernie -- and I know this will depress you -- but I guess I just don't think we're going to be able to get into the back and forth of the diplomatic exchange.

Q Do you have anything on the new row, U.S.-Israel, in connection with the Weinberger letter from the General and so forth?

A Not really beyond where we were yesterday, Bernie. We have taken it up at high levels. We are concerned about it, the Israelis are concerned about it, and we expect it to be worked out -- expect the problem to be worked out.

Q Do you have a reaction yet from Israel?

A I guess I would say the same thing I just said on the Middle East, that we're in the midst of those discussions and probably wouldn't go very far down that road as to indicating where we are and what the back and forth is.

Q John, regarding the Marines, from reading the letter that -- or parts of the letter that were published yesterday in the Philadelphia Inquirer and some other newspapers, it seems that most of the incidents that are mentioned there were between Israeli forces and U.S. officers who were under the capacity of the U.N. observer force and not between the U.S. (sic) and the Marines who are part of the Multinational Force.

A I think there are two situations. I think there are the U.S. Marine officers attached to the U.N. force, but there are also incidents involving the U.S. Marine component of the MNF and Israeli troops.

Q Do you know of any incidents regarding the Multinational Force, that Israeli forces were firing at American officers?

A The Marines, you know, belong to the Pentagon, and I think you ought to, as I said yesterday, ask the Pentagon what they are able to say about the circumstances surrounding those incidents.

Q But it seems from reading those incidents that there's a totally different problem between the Marines who are members of the Multinational Force and those Marines who are moving under the flag of the U.N.

A Yes. I think they are different. They are separate, and we understand that. But, nevertheless, there have been incidents involving both.

Q Do you see a difference in the level of the severity, let's say --

A I think you'd have to ask the Pentagon. They've got the details.

Q Follow-up. Do you see any orchestrated pattern to undermine the effectiveness of the Multinational Force?

A If you mean do we see it as a sort of systematic campaign -- are you talking about the Israeli incidents now or the general attacks on the MNF?

Q If you had a response for both, go ahead with both.

A I think I've probably said all I'm able to say on the incidents involving the Marines and the Israelis. As far as the general level of violence, our people in Beirut have increased their vigilance. There is insufficient information to label this part of a systematic campaign, but the Lebanese authorities are investigating all the possibilities.

Q John, have you heard from -- I mean, there are confusing reports from Israel and the Israeli Embassy here. Some in fact are denying all of these reports. Have you --

A Denying all the what? Sorry.

Q Denying some of these so-called harassments. Can you tell us -- I guess you will not -- but what is your view of these denials? I mean, does the State Department stand by those accusations and allegations?

A Again, I think you should go to the Pentagon for a factual description of what in fact took place; and, obviously, we would stand by that accounting.

Q John, I wasn't very clear on mine. Can I try again? There was one news report that said senior Pentagon officials accuse Israel of trying to impinge the integrity of the Multinational Force, I guess allegedly so that they can say that the Force would not be effective to patrol the Lebanese border.

Did you have any response to that?

A I don't know that anybody is talking about the MNF patrolling the Lebanese border. I think that's an academic situation.

Q What about the first part of the charges?

A I think we would let the Pentagon respond to that, insofar as they're prepared to give a description of the incidents. I think that's really their story. The Marines belong to them.

Q John, do you have anything on the meeting that's supposed to be held today between the President and his senior advisers on the Euromissile questions?

A I think you should really go to the White House, but it may well be that the President would meet with his -- he does meet, obviously, with his foreign policy advisers reguarly, and it may well be that there is some meeting this afternoon. But I think you ought to go to the White House on that.

Q John, back on Lebanon, please. We have read somewhere that it is being interpreted as not really for military but for political ends whereby the MNF is supposed to be perceived as not capable of controlling and therefore leaving the Israelis the only power there.

Is this the view of the U.S. Government, or is this somebody's --

A That the MNF is not capable of controlling its area of operation?

Q It is believed that this is the Israeli intention behind such acts.

A You know, it's awfully hard for me to ascribe motivation. I think we have to deal with facts as they are on the ground.

Q Why do you think these things are happening? I mean, yesterday I know you tried to answer some of these things, John. It's not the first time. It's the third or fourth time.

A I know it's not the first time, and we're concerned about it.

Q Can you tell us why does the State Department think these things are happening?

A I think it would be awfully difficult for us to ascribe motivation. What we want is for them to stop, and that's what we're working to achieve.

Q If you don't know what they are or what's causing them, it would be hard to know how to --

A I didn't say we didn't know what they are. I said you ought to go to the Pentagon and have the Pentagon tell you what it wants to tell you about what transpired.

Q It's not really military, John. It's really diplomacy and political. It's not really military. It's not, you know, something --

A There may be other dimensions, but certainly these are troops involved in incidents with other troops. The troops belong to the Pentagon, and I think that's where you're going to have to get your story from.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you have any comment today on the statement made by the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut yesterday?

A No. Still don't. Sorry.

Q Not even on the Israeli reaction to the statement?

A No, don't have anything for you on it.

Q There have been reports in the Israeli press, criticism from Israeli Government people, on efforts by some of the Christian Fundamentalists in the United States; they name one person named Terry Reisenhover out on the West Coast, who are running a foundation to rebuild the temple on the Mount in Jerusalem. I think a few days ago 45 people were arrested under the Dome of the Rock tunneling; armed men were arrested that seemed to be connected to this Fundamentalists group in the U.S.

Has the State Department looked into that at all, since there are Americans providing financing for this.

A Don't know anything about it.

Q Can you check on that and see if there's been any looking into it?

A Let me see whether there is anything available on that, but I don't know anything about it.

Q On the question of the Soviet statements regarding Syria. There was a report yesterday in the Christian Science Monitor coming from Moscow saying that a senior Soviet official said that they have submitted to the U.S., told the U.S. exactly what's going to happen if Israel starts an aggression act against Syria. This Soviet official also said that they assume that the U.S. passed it on to the Israelis. Do you have anything on that?

A You well know that we have had extensive discussions with the Soviets on this question, but we haven't talked about the character of those discussions and we wouldn't do so now, nor would we talk about the exchanges with Israel. Sorry.

Q One more question about the question of the Marines. In the reactions the Israeli Embassy here released yesterday, they are saying that the other countries that participate in the Multinational Force -- namely, France, Italy and Britain -- all of those countries have a direct liaison between their forces in the MNF and the Israeli army. The only country that doesn't have such a direct liaison is the U.S.

I know that usually you refer us to the Pentagon but since the Pentagon is not so forthcoming on answers to these issues, I wonder if you have anything on it?

A I think that our position on that would be that there certainly are adequate channels of communication to avoid the kind of incident that has taken place, but nevertheless in the exchanges that we have had with the Israeli Government, obviously, we would be looking at all kinds of solutions to insure this problem does not recur.

Q And among them might be a direct liaison?

A I'm not being that specific.

Q Do you have any new developments on the Adelman situation today?

A No. I don't have any new developments on it. It's a Presidential appointment.

Q Has the State Department asked the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to withhold the documents that were forwarded?

A Not to my knowledge. I think that would be extremely unlikely.

Q In the document that has General Rowny's name on it, the so-called talking points, there is reported to be a section in there in which he describes one of the members of the delegation as a CIA representative which, according to people critical of the document, violates the regulations against exposing CIA people in an unclassified document.

The State Department have any feeling about that?

A I think that Ambassador Rowny has responded as to his view about those documents, and I think one really has to rest with his statement as to the extent to which such documents represent his viewpoint. I think you have to go back to his language and be clear about that. But, certainly, there are regulations in existence affecting security and they are adequate to the case should there have been a contravention.

Q Is the Administration looking into a dismissal of Rowny?

A No. The Secretary of State has full confidence in Ambassador Rowny, who is a capable and expert negotiator.

Q In light of what you just said, though, maybe you can clarify something that is confusing. If General Rowny has said these documents do not represent his view, then or now, why was he delivering them to Mr. Adelman? For what purpose and in whose behalf?

A I think that General Rowny has spoken, and I think you have to remain with his description of what occurred or did not occur.

Q The Secretary has full confidence in General Rowny. What about the other people in that document; does he have full confidence in Ambassador Goodby?

A I don't want to, by what I'm now about to say, mislead you, but I haven't talked to him about that and so I can't give you a specific answer. I have no reason to doubt that he would not have confidence. I don't want you to misinterpret what -- I'm just trying to give you a very honest answer here.

Q You have not talked to the Secretary?

A I have not talked to him about the entire delegation. It's a question I haven't put to him so I can't honestly answer your question, but I have no reason to suspect that he's not confident.

Q You have talked to him about the situation in general?

A I'm aware of his full confidence in General Rowny.

Q I guess what I'm leading to here is that, has the Secretary looked into this himself? It would seem this would be a matter that would be of some concern to him since these people, in effect, work for him?

A I don't think I'm really going to go any further. On the question of Mr. Adelman, that's a White House matter; on the question of General Rowny, the Secretary has confidence in him, and I guess I'm not going to be drawn any further.

Q El Salvador?

A Sure.

Q Is the Administration considering a cut in the $60 million request?

A Absolutely not.

Q What?

A Absolutely not. Our request stands. We expect to pursuade the Congress of its merit. The current military and economic assistance program requested from the Congress represents the results of a lenghty review of the policy at the highest levels of the government and continuing consultations with the Congress. The amount of assistance requested represents the assessment of what is required for this year. No one is thinking of reducing the requested level.

Q That's the $110 now?

A That's right.

Q Repeat that last sentence again.

A No one is thinking of reducing the requested level.

Q Do you have any confirmation on the Washington Post article about the South African security chief being here and, if so, why?

A Yes, I do. This relates to Don's question yesterday, and I didn't know this at the time.

I think the question was whether Lieutenant General Johann Coetzee is in Washington. Yes. Following a meeting between the South African and U.S. delegations with Under Secretary Eagleburger, Assistant Secretary Crocker had a meeting in his own office with General Coetzee.

Q Why would he be here?

A He is part of the South African delegation.

Q What are they discussing besides South West Africa and Namibia?

A That is the topic of discussion, as far as I'm aware.

Q Yesterday, there was a report out of Zimbabwe that said that the Government of Zimbabwe received a letter from some people who apparently were holding some Americans hostage. Could you comment on that letter, and if that is a new development?

A Yes, I do have something on that. Zimbabwe officials have informed us that a note was left by the kidnappers of a white farmer who was abducted on March 16 near Bulawayo. The official said that the authors of the note claimed to be holding six tourists who were abducted last July and threatened to kill them if Dumiso Dabengwa and Lookout Masuku, two former military officers, were not released by the end of the month. But we're not able to confirm that the authors of the note are, in fact, those who abducted the tourists.

Q Do you think the contents of that note are legitimate?

A If you can't be sure who wrote it, it's difficult to know how legitimate it is.

Q How is it being followed up?

A There's very close attention to this case.

Q Is there any evidence the hostages are still alive?

A I just really don't have anything for you on that.

Q On El Salvador again, Senator Hatfield, talking about future aid being conditioned on unconditional negotiations and so forth, do you have any --

A No.

Q You have no reaction to that?

A No. I don't have any comment for you on that. I think we've referred you to the White House on that before.

Q On unconditional negotiations?

A Yes. Oh, I'm sorry. Conditions attached to the aid?

Q No, that future aid; you know, a cut in the present package and future aid should be conditioned on the Administration accepting, calling for unconditional negotiations to find a political solution.

A Our position on negotiations or discussions remains unchanged.

Q So the answer then is no?

A The answer is that we would be happy to facilitate or support a dialogue which would involve bringing the insurgents into the democratic procedure.

Q John, earlier today, in a briefing, a senior Administration official, speaking about El Salvador, described negotiations without preconditions -- as I recall his words, were "one of the silliest ideas I've ever heard." Is that a fair characterization of the Administration's position with this idea?

A I think I'm really not going to respond so soon after that briefing by that senior Administration official, having not been here for part of it. I would like to wait and see what that senior Administration official said before I had any comment.

Q Do you have today anything on the Arbatov remark? It was in Pravda yesterday -- two days ago.

A Not really. As I said yesterday, he did not specify Cuba, I think, if that was your question.

In the case of Cuba, those '62 agreements still hold. The essence of those agreements is in the public domain, and, as I said yesterday, either we or you can go back and get it.

Some of the discussion revolving around those agreements is classified and we wouldn't get into that. It isn't a new suggestion. As a matter of fact, we've seen that from the Soviets before. Such threats deliberately obscure the fact that the Soviet Union has an overwhelming advantage in such missiles which threaten our allies and friends in both Europe and Asia. NATO will not permit this monoply to exist.

Moreover, the USSR already deploys thousands of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long-range bombers that can strike U.S. territory, so it's hard to see any military rationale for deploying additional missiles. The Soviets would be better advised to cease making such threats and begin to negotiate seriously on a mutually acceptable outcome in Geneva.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Has the State Department been asked to go any further in its disclosure of the Cuba agreements?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:46 P.M.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #49

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1983, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I'm going to have to, I'm afraid, be rather brief so let me start and get it going as fast as I can.

I do not yet know the answer to the question "will we have a briefing tomorrow?" in light of the Secretary's testimony which was previously announced. We'll let you know perhaps no earlier than tomorrow morning, so I would ask you to keep in touch with the Press Office on that.

Second, in a BACKGROUND briefing last week, a senior Department official named Algeria as one country which supplies arms to Central America. We'd like to clarify Algeria's role as follows: The senior official accurately noted that Algeria has supplied Soviet arms to Nicaragua. This occurred in 1981 and in early 1982. We are aware of no such shipments from Algeria to Nicaragua since that time.

Further, it has not been established that any arms sent to Nicaragua were intended for or reached El Salvador.

Q Any arms, with respect to Algeria?

A With respect to Algeria.

Q What about the other countries that he rattled off, and then he included Algeria?

A I'm only prepared to give you that today. That is the one clarification.

Q Let me make one clarification? Were the other arms of other countries' origin, is that also defined by the same statement, that is, they went to Nicaragua and no one knows whether they went on to El Salvador?

A This statement specifically refers to Algeria. I have no information about --

Q Will you straighten that out because it's a very confusing statement in context?

A I'll pass back that it is confusing, but this one refers to Algeria.

Q Alan, "not established" means that it might have gone, but you're unaware of it?

A It simply means what it says. That's right, that it has not been established that any arms sent to Nicaragua were intended for or reached El Salvador.

Q In 1981 and '82, or just -- In '81 and '82?

A Take the statement as it's given, Bob.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Finally, a statement on Afghanistan Day:

I would like to note that today, March 21, the Afghan New Year, is being commemorated again this year as Afghanistan Day. Various private organizations, including many Afghan exile groups and some state governments and municipalities, are planning events throughout the United States to show their continuing support for the struggle that the Afghan freedom fighters are waging against Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

In the three years since their invasion, the Soviet forces have been unable to subjugate Afghanistan. They are pitted against an extraordinary people who, in their determination to resist, have organized an effective and still spreading country-wide resistance. The resistance of the mujahidin, or Afghan freedom fighters, is an example to all the world of the invincibility of the ideals we in this country hold most dear, the ideals of freedom and independence.

The Secretary of State expresses his solidarity with the Afghan freedom fighters and sends his New Year's greeting to Afghans everywhere. He would like to recall for all the world America's unflagging sympathy for a determined people, its support for their refugees, and its commitment to achieve a political settlement for Afghanistan, based on the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, which would also include self-determination for the Afghan people, independence and non-aligned status for Afghanistan and the return of the refugees with safety and honor.

I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q On that statement, you mentioned support for the --

A Excuse me. This is just to let you know that Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, will be delivering the keynote address at the Afghanistan Day rally in Lafayette Park at noon. I guess he's been doing that. The text of his remarks are available in the Press Office.

Q You mentioned American support for the Afghan freedom fighters. What does that consist of?

A I think we've addressed the issue before, Jim, and I have nothing new to add to what was said on this.

Q Alan, on Friday, you posted a response to a question I asked on the IMF quota increase bill. Your response states you have support for the bill. I think we all knew that. But the question was specifically on an amendment regarding the Bank for International Settlements. Do you have anything to say on that?

A I wasn't here on Friday so I, frankly, don't know the answer to that. Let me look into it and see what I --

Q Going back to Nicaragua for a moment, the Nicaraguan Government says that it has been invaded by some place between 500 and 1500 exiles,they claim U.S.-supported. Do you have any confirmation or comment?

A We were aware of the reports of heavy fighting, but we're not able to confirm them. Beyond that, I don't have anything for you.

Q Alan, the reports being press reports?

A Yes, press reports.

Q On the subject of Latin American also, last week there was a report out of Moscow that Arbatov had threatened to place missiles near U.S. borders, and there was a suggestion that maybe this was Cuba.

At the time, John Hughes said that he had to do some homework on that. Do you have any guidance on that now?

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A Did we not get an answer? Has it been posted?

Yes, I believe an answer has been posted.

Q Has the United States received a formal protest from the People's Republic of China over the proposed levels of arms supplies to Taiwan?

A Ralph, as you know, we don't get into the question of what we do and don't discuss in diplomatic channels. The Chinese position, I think, has been expressed in public statements; and I don't think there would be any reason to assume that just as we say privately a lot of the things we say publicly, there is no reason to assume they don't do the same thing. But I'm not going to get into the --

Q Do you have any response to the reported position they have taken, presumably a position delivered formally last week here to the State Department?

A We have addressed this issue. I think that there has been guidance which existed for some time on this issue. There is nothing new on that.

Q Anything on textiles, if I may follow that?

A Sorry?

Q Anything on the textiles conclusion?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Some stories coming out over weekend indicate the United States has now "announced," or made known in some way, what the level of arms to Taiwan is to be for this year. How was that done?

A Don, there was a Congressional Presentation Document that was sent up to the Hill some time ago -- I would guess almost two weeks ago. It's an open, unclassified document that went up to the Hill. I think it is that document which makes these various estimates or projections public.

Q Would you get those and make them available to us, because we've repeatedly asked the question in the past about these levels, and the answer was given that they had not been established?

A Well, projections -- Again, there are projections -- I will check and see whether the Congressional Presentation Document is available. I'm not sure that we're the ones to do that.

Q Is it a State Department document?

A I don't know the answer to that. But again, let me say to you that, again, they are projections; they may not be realized. I think that the thing to do perhaps is to look at that, and then come back with some specific questions. There is some guidance which I think could be useful. But I don't think addressing it in the abstract is going to be very productive.

Q Could you get the guidance plus the document or whatever it is, so we could find out what is being talked about when they, the Chinese are complaining about something that we've never heard of up to now?

A The document, I will see where the document is available. If it's available here, we'll be happy to make it available.

Q The Chinese say that the projected level is $1.6 billion annually, something in that order --

A No, no, no. They didn't say annually; they said over a two-year period.

Q All right, a two-year period. And they said that, in effect, is a renegging on the implied or explicit promise by the United States to have a diminished supply of arms going to Taiwan. Would you comment on that?

A Let me just say this on that: First, as I say, the figures are projections, and may not be realized in the course of the fiscal years which are cited. The figures which are cited in that document are $800 million for FY-83 and $780 million for FY-84.

-- MORE --

Q The second figure?

A $780M. Should these levels be realized, they would be fully consistent with the August 17 communique. As the communique says, the reductions will be gradual, and, although there may be occasional fluctations, the trend will be apparent over time. As the Secretary has said, we intend to keep our commitments.

There are various tables which explain how figures for past years might be adjusted to bring them up to '83 levels in terms of this year's dollars to make comparisons and so on, and that's in that same document.

Q You're saying that the figures are consistent with the Taiwan communique -- with the communique of August 17, and the People's Republic says they're inconsistent, and that's the way you're going to leave it at this point?

A I can't speak for the Chinese. They have to speak for themselves on this issue.

Q They have spoken for themselves.

A Fine. I am saying to you that, yes, we view these as consistent with the August 17 communique.

Q It sounds like from what you're saying is you have adjusted the previous sales figures for Taiwan by an inflation factor.

A That's right. We haven't adjusted it, but there is provided in the Congressional Presentation Document a table which would give you an inflation index.

Q Why, then, did not the commitments say we will supply less arms adjusted for inflation?

A Don, as you know, we haven't tried to get as specific as that. As John Holdridge said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August, we had no figures in mind of any dollar limit. We haven't gotten to that sort of specificity.

Q You've gotten to it now, right? That is what you're telling us.

A Not in terms of a limit. I'm not trying to set limits. I'm just trying to explain to you what is in the document to the extent that I can without your having it in front of you, and why it is not inconsistent with the August 17 communique.

Q This August 17 communique is all about limits. You're now citing some figure, but you're saying they're not limits?

A For example, let me give you one example, if I have a figure. I'm not sure I do.

The 1979 level, for example, was $598 million which, if adjusted for inflation, would be $830 million in 1983 dollars. But I'm not again -- no, I'm not trying to set a benchmark or a specific limit.

Q What's the point of producing the figures then?

A Just because it is assumed that there would be questions about how this fits with previous years' sales.

Q Alan, a minute ago you said you were trying to explain why these levels are consistent with the communique, and maybe I'm being obtuse, but I didn't hear anything you said that explains why they are. I heard you say that they are. Why are they consistent?

A As I said before, as the communique says, the reductions will be gradual and, although there may be occasional fluctations, the trend will be apparent over time. I've just given you a figure for example, 1979, which adjusted into 1983 dollars is $830 million as compared with the projections.

Again, I've got to stress they're projections of $800 million for FY-83 and 780 for FY-84.

Q Would it be fair for us to conclude, if we were to write our stories and say that if the figures go up in FY-83, then it would be reasonable over time to see them go down more sharply than gradually so that the trend would become apparent?

A I think I'll stick with the words that I've used.

Q Alan, could you give us the constant dollar figures for the intervening years as well?

670

A FY-80, 630, and FY-81 was 330. But, again, I would point out that --

Q These are in '83 dollars?

A '83 dollars.

Q Do you have '82, Alan?

A I don't have it here. I think that the statistic was 600. I don't know what the adjusted figure would be on that.

Q You were going to point out something about '81.

A The earlier figures -- we told the Chinese in December 1981, and we announced publicly in April 1982 that we contemplated no new decisions on arms sales for those next few months when our talks were underway. Therefore, during most of FY-82, U.S. sales to Taiwan were held at extremely low levels.

Q Why is '81 so low? You just said it covers '82, it doesn't cover '81.

A I can't tell you how far back the policy goes. Also, there are, as I said before, fluctations from time to time. This is not something that you can take in the abstract. You have to take the point that we're making that it is gradual, that it will be apparent over time, and I'm not able to be pinned down more than that because we have not defined it in more precise terms.

Q My recollection of the principle involved in the agreement was that the United States would agree to keep the dollar level fairly constant, and the effect of inflation would be to diminish the actual supply of arms.

Is that not the principle as explained to the Chinese?

A I will leave you with what was said at the time, both on the record and on background. I'm not going to try to go back and open that up again.

I'm going to have to move very quickly here I'm afraid. I'm sorry.

Q The Washington Post mentoned today that President Mubarak said that he thinks that Jordan's King Hussein might soon announce his readiness to join the peace talks, and that Egypt shares the United States' view concerning Jordan -- must joint the talks.

Did you have a partial comment about that?

A Not except in general that, obviusly, we continue to hope that King Hussein will decide to participate in direct peace negotiations.

Q Do you have anything on some report about 75 U.S. Army trainers arriving in Beirut?

A No.

Q During the last few days we had a no comment on questions relating to the statement made by the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut, talking about intervention from the Soviets in case of renewed hostilities.

At the same time, Ambassador Kirkpatrick on Israel Radio was very much outspoken about this question.

Do you endorse the same things she said?

A I don't know what she said. I can't comment on it.

Q There was a report in a column over the weekend that quoted Israeli officials as saying that the proposals put forward by the United States when Shamir was here were unsatisfactory. It was in Tony Lewis' column.

Can you tell us if that's true?

A I think that really all I could say about that, we have not commented in detail. I believe that Israeli officials, whether on background or on the record -- I'm not sure -- are being quoted by the press as saying that the discussions here and various ideas presented are the basis for continuing discussion.

We certainly think that the discussions are continuing to move forward, and I think I'd have to leave it at that.

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Q Do you have any information about new developments regarding the question of sharing the information of the war in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything here to offer you. I don't know whether the Pentagon does or doesn't.

Q Also, Alan, does the United States have any statement on the monetary situation in the Common Market today?

A No. We're glad that they were able to work out an arrangement that was satisfactory to them.

Q Do you have anything on expulsion of the priest from Chile?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you have anything on the renewed visit by special branch police to Allister Sparks in South Africa?

A No. Didn't know about that.

Q Could you look into that last question, please?

A I think we've expressed ourselves on this subject before.

Q No. Because the visit is the second time, and Secretary Crocker in between the two incidents met with General Coetsee who's in charge of that branch.

A I'll look into it.

Q Anything new on the question of the Marines in Beirut? Any new discussions with Israel? Any new arrangements?

A No. I think I'd go back to what we said before, which is that, obviously, the incidents that have occurred have been of concern. We've raised them at high levels with the Israelis who have also expressed concern about them and have told us that they are taking effective steps from their point of view to bring them to a halt. So I think that that is moving forward.

Q John said that in the contacts with Israel -- he said it on Friday, I think -- you are going to look into all kinds of possibilities.

Is there anything new on the question of "directly" as between Israel and the Marines?

A Again, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you know whether Colonel Mead in the interview he gave the AP had to obtain advance clearance to give that interview?

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon, Bernie.

Q Two follow-ups on the Marines. Did the President make another commitment to increase the Marine force? Salem said that he did, but is that anything new?

A I can't speak here. You'd have to check with the White House on anything the President might have said, but I think the President's position in this has been articulated publicly in the past. I don't think that's changed, to my knowledge.

Q And on my colleague's question about Kirkpatrick's statement, you didn't answer the question, though. Do you have any new guidance or anything new to say on the Soviet threat regarding Lebanon, regardless of what Mrs. Kirkpatrick --

A I have nothing to say beyond what John said or was put out. I'm not aware of the details of it, but there's nothing new today.

I'm afraid I'm going to have to break it off. I'm sorry.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

Glenn

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #50

TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 1983, 3:04 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements.

Available in the Press Office are the following testimonies:

-- Statement by Secretary of State George P. Shultz before the Senate Appropriations Committee on El Salvador.

-- Statement by Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Africa. The subject is foreign assistance.

-- Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel O'Donohue before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is Americans missing in Southeast Asia.

-- Statement by Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations. The subject is radio broadcasting to Cuba; that is, Radio Marti.

A reminder that there will not be a press briefing tomorrow due to the Secretary's appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on the State Department appropriations bill.

Q What time is that?

A The testimony?

Q Yes.

A Ten o'clock. I'd ask you to make sure there is no change on the Hill, on their scheduling, too.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Speaking of Congress, Alan, maybe you can clear up some confusion. Does the State Department object to Congress releasing the text of the so-called Rowny memo?

A I don't have anything for you on that subject. I think we're all aware of an expressed interest by Senator Percy in that subject. I've seen reports on that, but I don't have anything to give you on that here.

Q Do you have anything on Senator Inouye indicating that the Administration might settle for less than the $60 million on the reprogramming aid for El Salvador?

A I think the Secretary testified at considerable length this morning on El Salvador, and I really don't have anything to add. I think the clear answer to that question is that the Administration put forward its request, wants what it requested, and has justified it. The Secretary addressed it at great length, and I'm not going to go beyond what he said.

Q So it's that you stand with the $60 million request?

A We stand with what the Administration has put forward. The Secretary has addressed this question. I didn't listen to everything he said, and I really would refer you to his remarks.

What's your problem?

Q He was asked whether the $24 million that might be provided under Inouye would be adequate to their purpose, and he said it would relieve the necessity for out-of-country training, or in-country training.

A I had heard part of the exchange. I'm going to leave that subject alone. The Secretary addressed it. I don't know precisely what he said, and I think his words are somewhat more authoritative than mine.

Q Do you have anything on the taken questions on Monge's offer of mediation?

A There are a number of taken question responses that are either posted or going to be posted, including that one.

Q Today?

A Yes.

Q Alan, can you fill in on what the Secretary is doing today after his hearing on the Hill on El Salvador? Is he also meeting Hill committees, privately or whatever, on El Salvador?

A I don't recall what his schedule is today.

Q Do you have anything on Nicaragua, Alan, on the reports of fighting -- invasions and so forth?

A In terms of invasion and a status report, no, I don't have anything beyond what I said yesterday, which is that we have seen reports.

Q In other terms?

A It depends on what you're interested in.

Q Accusations. "Other terms" can be accusations of support, U.S. support.

A All right. While it is the longstanding practice of this and previous Administrations not to address questions of that sort, we have made it equally clear that we do not support any return to a Somocista government in Nicaragua.

It is a fact that over preceeding months, there has been rising opposition to the Government of Nicaragua, including within Nicaragua itself. Nicaraguan opposition to the GRN ranges from disillusioned popular sectors to ethnic groups such as the Miskito Indians, former national guardsmen, former Sandinistas themselves such as Eden Pastora, as well as other anti-Somocista groups. Members of these groups, represented by Eden Pastora and leaders of the FDN (the Democratic Nicaraguan Front) have recently been taking their case against the Sandinistas to Western Europe and hemispheric capitals. The opposition in Nicaragua is diverse, nationalist, and independent.

Twice over the past two years, we have addressed concerns between our two countries bilaterally. In October of last year, along with the democratic countries of the region, we addressed the regional concerns in San Jose, Costa Rica. The San Jose Final Act, in fact, addressed many of the very concerns the Sandinistas have raised, including the presence of foreign advisers or trainers in the region, arms flows, and non-intervention.

Q Could we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Can you answer the question that was raised, please?

A I said that in terms of charges of that sort, it has been the longstanding practice of this and other Administrations, previous administrations, not to address those questions. That's hardly a new or surprising position to you.

Q O.K. So there's no change in that. You're just offering additional information in your longer statement?

A There is no change in our position on that.

Q Can we go back to square one a minute? I didn't quite hear the question.

A The charge, as I understood the question, was there U.S. support for insurgents, or whatever you want to call them, anti-Sandinistas in Nicaragua whom the Nicaraguan Government has talked about in recent days as launching attacks. In response to the question about U.S. support, I said what I said, and went on to our policy --

Q May I, just for clarification purposes. When you say it's been a longstanding practice not to address such charges, do you mean in reference to Nicaragua or charges in general that --

A The charges would logically have to address a question of whether there would be covert support, which would get us into the area of intelligence activities; and by definition, without leading you one way or another on the issue, we don't address any intelligence or alleged intelligence activities.

Q I have over the years sat here and heard Spokesmen ringingly deny, on many occasion, charges by various countries that the United States was involved in some kind of activities against them. I mean, this is all on the record, so I just don't understand how you support your statement that this is a longstanding practice.

A You haven't been listening to a lot of our briefings then.

Q I mean on intelligence questions.

A I understand.

Q In your statement, you mentioned, if I got it correctly, that you do not support the return of any Somocista government in Nicaragua. And you also said that the opposition is diverse, so that means that there are also non-Somocista elements in the opposition.

A Including anti-Somocista elements.

Q Do we imply from that, since you only specify the Somoza groups, or the pro-Somoza groups, that you do support the other ones who do not want the return of Somocism to Nicaragua?

A No. I think you just have to take the statement as given, and you can draw whatever conclusions you want from it.

Q I'll try one more thing. Would it be possible for you to, in addition to listing the Somoza supporters, whom the United States does not support, could you list the other elements whom the United States does not support?

A I think I'll stick with the statement that I've just given you.

Q Actually, are there elements --

A I'm going to stick with the statement.

Q The Nicaraguans have called for an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council. What is the Administration's position on that?

A I don't have a position to offer you on that. We have to wait and see what happens.

Q Have we been in contact with the Honduran Government?

A About --?

Q Well, Nicaragua said today that what they feared was not the success of the guerrillas, but the possibility of war with Honduras.

A On the question of the war with Honduras, we really have not seen anything beyond the press reports. But implicit in at least some of those reports was a threat, and such threats are not helpful to the situation. Official public statements from Managua recently have made no mention of any internal dissent, and have attributed the current anti-Sandinista armed dissent in that country solely to alleged Honduran- or U.S.-supported-and-supplied forces from outside Nicaragua.

These allegations have overshadowed a February 18 invitation (made public in the OAS February 22 in a letter to the President of the Permanent Council of the OAS, Dr. Raul A.

Quijano) in which Honduran Foreign Minister, Edgardo Paz Barnica, invited Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto to "visit in my company, the border zone between our two countries, in order that you may ascertain that there are no grounds for the slanted campaign that the illustrious Nicaraguan Government has raised at international level, intending to put in doubt the absolute neutrality of Honduras in the internal conflict that is taking place in your country."

The Honduran Foreign Ministry announced that Nicaragua, on February 23, declined that invitation.

Q Can we get a copy of that statement also?

A Yes.

Q Is it, thus, our view that, in fact, these guerrillas or the disturbances that are going on have not, in fact, come from Honduras?

A I'm not going to offer a view. I can't confirm what's going on in any case, so I can't --

Q Have you asked your embassies in either of these two countries?

A Asked them what?

Q What's going on?

A I don't know. I don't know what has gone back and forth.

Q Why do we have embassies there, then?

A Embassies do a lot of things.

-- MORE --

Q Are you leaving us with the impression that you have no information about what's going on in Nicaragua except for what you read on the wire service?

A Not necessarily, aside from reading the wires. I don't have confirmation of the kind of reports that are appearing in the press. I can't give you anything. Frankly, if we had more specifics, I'm not sure it would be from the kind of information that I could share with you. That's where we are in any case.

Q Some of the earlier reports of this began with a purported large influx of refugees into Costa Rica last week. First, is that continuing? Second, has anything been done to find out from them what they were running away from and why? Have we been getting any further information on this from the Costa Rican Government?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have confidence that the Honduran armed forces are protecting its border from the possibility of incursions from Honduras into Nicaragua?

A I don't think that's a question for us to issue a judgment on. I think that's a question you might ask of the Honduran Government.

Q It's a question of whether the United States has the confidence that the Hondurans are protecting the border.

A The Honduran Government, and the statement among others I just quoted you, have offered to have that border inspected, and so and so forth. I have no reason to throw into the question anything with regard to that. I am not speaking here for the Honduran Government, and you should ask them your question.

Q Is this the same border over which alleged arms supply flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A There have been a variety of routes over which arms supply flow.

Q Does the United States keep track of the alleged arms supply that goes from Nicaragua to El Salvador over that territory?

A I am not going to get specific about what we do in terms of trying to keep track of the arms flow, but we certainly try to keep track of the arms flow to the extent that we can.

Q   But allegations have been made to that effect on the record, have they not?

A   I'm not totally familiar with the record. If you say yes, I'll accept your testimony.

Q   Accepting that argument, why is it that the United States then would not keep track of any flow in the opposite direction?

A   You get into the question of doing different things, and you don't always do it the same way. And besides which, as I understand what the Sandinistas are saying, they're talking about things that are happening well inside Nicaragua.

Q   When you used the word "threat" before, were you suggesting what -- a Nicaraguan invasion?

A   There was a suggestion in some of the reports that Nicaraguan officials were talking about a threat of war with Honduras. That is what I'm responding to.

Q   Still on this subject. Maybe I'm obtuse, but I seem to detect a very elliptical kind of formation of words in the way you keep answering all of these things. Is this intended to steer us in a certain direction?

A   No. It's to answer you to the extent that we can respond based on the information that we have, on the policy, and on the sources of information.

Q   Let me just get this straight. So the sources of information are based on press reports and official communiques by governments in the area, and not on anything else?

A   Sources of information about what?

Q   That you cited here for your remarks.

A   Whatever I indicated was from press and from public statements through the press was based on those sources.

Q   Is it fair to say that the State Department has other sources of information with respect to this?

A   Yes. With respect to this? I have not seen any official reporting on the statements, for example, that

Nicaraguan officials are reported in the press to have made. That isn't to say there isn't official reporting. As a response was made -- after all, the wire services are just as fast as any embassy reporting would be, and they've come across with specific reporting on statements that may have been made.

Q We've gotten the story for at least 24 hours.

Q On the Middle East, there are reports today that there are 7-15 new settlements being planned, and some have already begun on the West Bank. Do you have any comments on those?

A We, again, are aware of the radio report on that. Our position on the question of settlements activity is clear, long standing. We believe they're unhelpful to the peace process.

As the President said in his September 1 speech, "the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create confidence needed for wider participation in negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting Middle East peace."

Q Does the timing of these statements, Alan --

A Does the what?

Q The timing. Everybody is trying to see what King Hussein has to say, or wants to say about entering the talks, and suddenly Israel announces more settlements. Do you read anymore into it?

A I don't think I can really get to the question of motivation. I would observe that there have been various statements about settlements over a period of time. But you would have to ask the Israelis the purposes of a particular announcement might have been.

Q Do you have anything on the Israeli turning over of information to the United States?

A Not really beyond what was said, I think, at the Pentagon on this subject. We welcome the announcement by the Government of Israel to proceed with the sharing of information on the lessons learned from the Lebanon conflict on the basis of previous exchange agreements. And I might say we appreciate the efforts of the Israeli Government in this matter.

Q Can you tell us something about the negotiations there? After Foreign Minister Shamir returned, what signs or hints are you getting from the Israeli Government?

A I don't think I can get into details of how the arrangement was worked out, but I believe that Defense Minister Arens had a press conference and announced what he announced.

Q Do you have anything to say at this point on the case of Osborne's ejection from the USSR, or any retaliation?

A No, I have nothing new for you on it.

Q Have you got any response to the election of the new Israeli President?

A No, I don't at this point have any response to that.

Q Any new information regarding the question of the liaison between the Marines and the IDF?

A About arrangements between --

Q Arrangements --

A No, I have nothing new on the question of arrangements between Marines and IDF. I don't know if it was addressed at the Pentagon today or not. In any case, I don't have anything on that subject.

Q Any response to Helms' letter been prepared yet?

A I don't have anything new beyond what we've -- I mean, we've posted on that yesterday and I have nothing new on that.

Q Do you have anything on the U.S. position on China and the Asian Development Bank?

A Yes. I think that some of you are aware of the position on this.

It is obviously a complex question which is being addressed by the Bank.

Let me comment on the general context. The United States recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and as the representative of China in international organizations. The PRC qualifies for membership in the ADB. The U.S. has also reiterated, in the August 17, 1982 Joint Communique with China, that it does not support a two-Chinas or a one-China/one-Taiwan policy. Our approach to this issue will be consistent with the foregoing positions.

At the same time, we understand the views Congress has stated regarding Taiwan, in particular the expression of Congressional intent contained in the 1980 ADB Appropriations Act and support the basic thrust of Congressional sentiment.

The people of Taiwan play an important economic role in the region and this constructive role should continue to be recognized. How this issue will be resolved is not clear, but we have made it clear that the expulsion of Taiwan would have serious implications for continued U.S. participation and funding for the Asian Development Bank.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A You can get a copy. It may take a few minutes afterwards.

Q Is there any precedent for any member of the Asian Development Bank being expelled?

A I don't know the answer to the question. I'm not aware of any, but I don't know, and I think you would have to --

Q Do you have anything on the executions in Guatemala?

A There have been some guidance. Did you not get guidance? It's been around for a couple days on this, on executions in Guatemala. Maybe it was yesterday; maybe the guidance was available yesterday.

Q I called but they didn't have anything.

A You probably called too early.

Q Before it happened; right?

A You want an answer?

Q Yes, please.

A You withdraw the last comment?

Q I will.

A I knew you did. (Laughter) I don't have a lot for you. We understand there's five persons, including two members of the security forces were executed Monday morning in Guatemala for crimes including murder and rape.

Q Is Chapin still here?

A No. Ambassador Chapin is back in Guatemala.

Q So everything's fine?

A Ambassador Chapin is back in Guatamala. (Laughter)

Q There's one other point, back on the Nicaraguan/Honduran business. No where in your statement do you suggest that this is a really serious situation. The reports, if you believe the press reports, talk about thousands of troops and hundreds of casualties.

Does the Administration view this as a serious fighting situation?

A Again, I don't have specifics on this fighting situation. I don't know how I can give you an evaluation of something that I can't give you specifics on.

Q Just going on the press reports, wouldn't it indicate that --

A I prefer not to make judgments on the basis of the press reports.

Q This Administration has expressed long-standing concern about international drug trafficking. However, on Friday you posted a response to a question I asked about the case of Saddac Tabatabai who's an individual who's extended diplomatic immunity by the Iranian Government to carry out international opium smuggling. Your response to that was simply that the United States did not seek Tabatabai's release but you had no other --

A That was your question.

Q I believe my question was a little bit broader than that, if you go back and look at what I actually asked as opposed to the version that was posted.

My question now is, do you have any other comment on the case? Are you satisfied with this kind of diplomatic activity?

A I'm not going to try and make judgments of that sort, but I think your question was narrow.

(The press briefing concluded at 3:25 P.M.

Glenn

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #51

THURSDAY, MARCH 24, 1983, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. I hope everybody is fit and well, and nobody is suffering from cicadian dysrhythmia. (Laughter)

Q Is that what you had once?

A I find that cicadian dysrhythmia is the medical name for jet lag. I learned this from the latest issue of Signature magazine. This magazine has a piece entitled, "Traveling Super-class: A winged correspondent who journeys with Secretaries of State finds the high diplomatic life is flying in a class by itself."

I don't want to embarrass the writer by --

Q Oh, yes, do.

A No, I wouldn't dream of doing that. I just point out that in a photo display of various correspondents who travel with the Secretary, there is a picture of B. Kalb with Secretary Shultz, a picture of B. Kalb with Secretary Haig (laughter), a picture of B. Kalb with Secretary Kissinger, (laughter) and a picture of B. Kalb with Bob Pierpoint. I don't quite know what that is. (laughter)

Q I guess Marvin wrote it. (Laughter)

A Anyway, the paragraph I liked best was, "The very presence of honest-to-goodness news is an elixir. The back of the plane turns into a clattering newsroom, with reporters setting their portable typewriters on food trays and pecking away so that on landing, the story can be quickly filed, and the pursuit of the Secretary can continue without delay. By contrast, the absence of news turns the back of the plane into a den of caged correspondents (laughter) suffering from acute journalistic undernourishment." (Laughter)

Q It reminds me of the briefings. (Laughter)

A I will adopt the traditional posture from this podium of not offering any comment on that kind of article. I would point out, I'd like to flatly deny that there is any cage at the back of the plane in which the correspondents are confined. They may be gagged and tied from time to time, but there is no cage.

Q How about news? (Laughter)

Q Is that a prelude to saying that you've got nothing to tell us today? (Laughter)

A I think that's fine. See you tomorrow.

(Laughter)

I have no statements other than that to entertain you with.

Q Filing break?

(Laughter)

A I'll be happy to attempt to answer your questions.

Q John, has there been any contact with the Soviets on the President's speech last night, as well as anything from the Soviets indicating any change since Mr. Gromyko is now First Deputy Prime Minister?

A Nothing on the reports on Mr. Gromyko. I think the Soviets were informed of the President's speech and the content. I don't know what official response there may have been. We've seen some unofficial response today.

Q Has there been any informal discussions with the Soviets about a Shultz-Gromyko meeting sometime this Spring?

A Not to my knowledge. I mean I don't want to --

Q The President mentioned the possibility in an interview last week.

A Yes. That's always a possibility, but there is nothing in the works, to my knowledge.

Q When does he go to Mexico, incidentally?

A We will confirm the story in The New York Times this morning saying the Secretary has been talking about a visit to Mexico. I'll be glad to chat with you about it a bit afterwards. We expect to have a dual government announcement on that in the next day or two.

Q What is the time frame, roughly?

A Why don't we chat about it afterwards?

Q Is this normal consultation, or is it for a specific purpose?

A It is something that the Secretary has wanted to do for a considerable time, and the question has been getting his schedule and the appropriate officials in Mexico, getting their schedules to coincide. If your question is, is it a sudden, swift -- No, it is not; it is something that has been in the works.

Q What I meant was, there had been a mechanism set up for an annual or semi-annual consultations. Is this part of it, or is he going down for a purpose that goes beyond normal consultations?

A I'm not sure. I know that in the case of Canada and in the case of Japan, he set up a scenario in which he will have four meetings a year with the Foreign Ministers of each of those countries. I think Mr. MacEachen will shortly be in Washington to conduct another one of those, as far as the Canadians are concerned.

I don't know that four-meeting-a-year formula has been set in the case of Mexico yet. It might well be.

Q But there has been a joint -- it goes back several years -- exchange of visits each year.

A Yes. I'm not sure. Obviously --

Q They come up here once and we go --

A I'm not sure whether this one is within that framework or not.

Q Do you have anything on the Middle East situation about this Lebanese talk of a deadline for --

A No. I've seen the report, Bernie. We're just continuing with the kind of deliberations we've been involved in. Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper are in Israel today. The tripartite talks are going forward, and so far as we know, will continue on schedule. It is along those tracks that our negotiations will continue.

Q Do you know anything besides the press reports on this reported deadline set by the Lebanese?

A I wouldn't go into any diplomatic interchange that we've had, so let me just say we've seen the press reports.

Q Do you think that setting such a deadline is helpful for the negotiations?

A We've seen the press reports on the deadline. Don't have any comment. We're going to pursue it in the kinds of channels that we have.

Q Is there a deadline?

A Not in our sense of the word, Bernie. Our position has been that we want the speediest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Anything about new accusations coming out from the Israeli side regarding the Marines in Lebanon?

A No. No. I think that discussions on that problem of incidents have been going on, are going on, and moving along well. I'm not aware of any new incident.

Is that a "shot in the dark," or have you got something specific?

Q Today, I mean, there are new accusations that the Palestinians are working from within the lines of the Marines in Beirut.

A I haven't seen that. No, I haven't seen that one.

Q John, do you have anything on the latest round of fighting in Nicaragua?

A No, I really don't. It's difficult to make an appraisal. I think as we read in the press reports this morning, the Nicaraguan Government is barring correspondents from the area of the fighting, so it's kind of difficult to get a fix on what's going on.

Q Do you have any fresh guidance today on that subject which we might elicit if we ask the right questions?

A On Nicaragua?

Q Yes.

A No. You've got everything I've got on Nicaragua.

Q Are you standing on the guidance that was issued last summer about the difficulty the Honduran Army has in patrolling the border area between Nicaragua and Honduras against anti-Sandinista guerrillas?

A I'm not familiar with that guidance, Jim. I'll have to go back and take a look at it.

Q Could you?

A Sure.

Q Where do we stand on the reprogramming request for El Salvador? The Long Committee is going to come back after Easter on this.

A Yes. We are pleased by the endorsement of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees of the full amount of our economic assistance and by the Senate endorsement of the full $60 million in military assistance for El Salvador. We believe that these actions demonstrate a bipartisan consensus that the route to peace in Central America is through democracy and reforms behind a shield of military security.

As you know, the House Appropriations Subcommittee has delayed a vote on the military assistance portion of the package until after the Congressional recess. We look forward to continuing our work with the Committee at that time.

Q So you will not move ahead on any further action until the Long Committee acts?

Q Do you have any problems, John, with the conditions that the Senate Subcommittee set?

A The Senate attached four conditions. The first asks that we reaffirm the position we had expressed in 1981 on the subject of trainers; that is, we could maintain them to roughly 55, and would consult in advance with the Congress if we intended to go significantly over that number.

The President has made clear that we will determine our need for trainers on the basis of the funds available for training out of El Salvador. We can do the training out-of-country if we have the resources. The Senate has approved the full amount of the funds requested in the reprogramming, and as I said, we are hopeful that this spirit of bipartisan cooperation can be maintained in the consideration of the supplemental.

We are in full agreement with the second and third conditions relating to judicial reform. On the fourth condition, the President has made clear our position. We favor negotiations between the parties on elections. Either side may, of course, raise whatever issues they may want to bring forward, but we do not believe the Salvadorans would be prepared to engage in negotiations on power-sharing. We certainly would not advise them to take this course, and indeed, we found substantial Congressional opposition to this.

Q Can we get a copy of those statements?

A Sure.

Q Could I follow up on those statements? They want an agreement in writing by the Administration to a ceiling of 55 military advisers, in their first condition; and in fact, on all their conditions, they require an agreement in writing.

Is the Administration prepared to provide such an agreement in writing?

A I don't know what the status is of the exchange of letters, but I assume the Secretary would respond to the Kasten Committee's --

Q Will your reply be made public?

A I don't know.

Q John, following that up, you say that they ask that you reaffirm the 55 on the trainers, and consult if the numbers go significantly higher. This is not my understanding of the language which they approved, and I don't think it is the understanding of Senator Kasten and the members of the committee. They said they want a commitment that you're not going beyond the 55, not consultations.

A I guess we're going back to the basic commitment made by Secretary Stoessel. We can get that language out for you. But I think we'll have to wait and see the language of the Kasten letter and see how we respond to it.

Q Another question: There is the possibility, since the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as you know, the House Appropriations Subcommittee theoretically could vote. In the event of a different outcome, does the Department have a position on which committees' action would be operative or binding, in the sense that Senator Kasten, I know, said that he believes that which would be the most restrictive would be the one that would be operative. Does the Department have a position on that?

A No. I think we're faced by pending decisions by three committees, and I think we'll have to wait until we see the outcome of all of that consultation and negotiation. Our position is very clear: we've asked for what we think is needed. We certainly hope that our arguments have been persuasive and we will get all of what we've asked for.

Q John, on point number four, does that represent any shift in your position, when we talk about either side may raise any issue it choses?

A No. That is something that --

Q And if the other side raises power-sharing, how do you handle that?

A I assume the Salvadorans would have a response on that. You can't talk about something unless both sides agree to talk about it.

Q But heretofore, there were negotiations without power-sharing to look over the electoral process on how to vote, et cetera. This leaves open the possibility that the other side, if they chose to come in, could, in fact, put power-sharing on the table.

My understanding was that up until now, that was not possible.

A As we've said, we're not counseling the Salvadorans; we're not advising them so to do. But your question is a theoretical one: In a negotiation, could one side raise an issue the other side did not want to discuss? Yes, I guess that is theoretically possible; but it is also sort of logical that if both sides did not want to discuss it, you could not have a very meaningful discussion on that.

Q But would you be willing, as this calls for, to make a commitment to do everything possible within a multinational framework to bring about such negotiations without --

A Negotiations on elections?

Q On elections, or as the language is, "or other subjects?" I mean it calls on you to do everything you can in concert with other countries --

A -- on other than power-sharing. Other than power-sharing. That's where --

Q But this says "anything," I mean, which --

A Then, we'd have to look at that language and get a little clarification.

Q I take it, you have not read the letter itself?

A No.

Q Is it possible, just to make a request, that you do issue a reply publicly to the letter so that we might see it, because that's the critical point that I'm raising.

A Sure. All I'm saying is I don't know how a response will come, under what kind of circumstances, and who should release it. When you're back and forth with correspondence with Congress, matters of manners, and taste and so on about who releases that correspondence, but I would certainly be glad to look at it.

Q So I understand your answer to Mike's question, you will not go ahead with shipping the reprogrammed aid, in any case, until the House Foreign Operations Committee gets a chance to meet after the Easter recess, is that correct?

A With shipping, reprogramming?

Q Well, with providing the money.

A No, of course not.

-- MORE --

Q Is the Administration waiving the 15-day reprogramming notice rule?

A You've got me on a technical question. I'll have to pursue that other than here.

Q Could I ask some questions about the Adelman situation?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Adelman, in one of his memos, makes reference to a meeting that he had with the Secretary of State and Mr. Dam about discussing personnel matters.

Since that seems to be a question at issue before the committee, have you talked to the Secretary about what that discussion involved?

A I know that in one of the early meetings that the Secretary had with Mr. Adelman, there was a reference to personnel matters, but a reference within the framework of not proceeding on them and not in detail.

Q What I don't understand is, Mr. Adelman seemed to come away from that meeting and sent a follow-up memo saying that he would later present a package, a personnel package; he and Robin and Kenneth Dam.

A I don't want to get into Presidential nominations, but in terms of the facts, as I understand them, what Mr. Adelman was doing was putting himself at arms length from personnel matters and not making decisions.

As you all know, when anybody gets nominated to a high office in this town, there follows rather speedily an extraordinary amount of advice, suggestions, including suggestions from certain friends and certain experts, that qualified people be appointed to positions under that individual's control, and I'm sure that happened in Adelman's case.

As we understand it, what he did was say, "Okay, I'm going to put that aside, I'm not going to get into that until after my confirmation."

Q His memo suggests just the opposite. I think you could interpret them as suggesting just the opposite. But is the Secretary confortable with the testimony that Mr. Adelman gave to the Foreign Relations Committee?

A Yes.

Q He doesn't find it at variance with anything in the memos?

A No, he does not. He does not feel, if you're talking about the specific question of personnel matters, he does not feel that Mr. Adelman got into or had detailed discussions with him on personnel matters.

Q He is still satisfied with the answer that Mr. Rowny gave, that the paper that he passed onto Mr. Adelman did not represent his views?

A Ambassador Rowny has disavowed those are his views.

Q Did the Secretary or anyone ask Ambassador Rowny why he would pass onto Mr. Adelman the paper that didn't represent his views?

A I don't know whether the Secretary has talked with Ambassador Rowny. I just don't know the answer to that question.

Q Anybody ascertain who specifically prepared that paper for Mr. Rowny?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Why was the memo passed on by Adelman with the words, "These are Rowny's own views?"

A I don't know; I can't answer that.

Q Are there any personnel changes being contemplated at this moment in the START or INF delegations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q My understanding is that Ken Dam had fairly lengthy discussions over the weekend with some people in Geneva about making some changes.

A I don't know. He certainly has been in Geneva. It's part of his European travels, but I'm not aware of those changes.

Q Are you aware of a report that the Administration is considering appointing Mr. Nitze as the Director of both the INF and the START negotiations?

A No. Report where?

Q Can you take that?

A No. It's a report where?

Q It's a report in some papers.

A Which papers?

Q In our papers. (Laughter)

A Now, I'm aware of that report. No, don't have anything for you on that.

Q I'm told that the Secretary has been given that advice or counsel by some close advisors and is considering that?

A You're ahead of me. I don't know anything about it.

Q Can you take the question?

A Okay. We'll take a look at it.

Q John, you say Shultz feels that Adelman -- does not feel that Adelman got into or had detailed discussions with him. Which is it? Did they get into it, or were the discussions not detailed?

A Of course, there was discussion, and I think that the discussion was in the broader sense in that detailed personnel matters, even moderately, detailed personnel matters, would not be discussed until after Mr. Adelman's confirmation.

Q So there were discussions on personnel?

A I think that always when a new appointee assumes office, as I say, he is getting a lot of suggestions and certainly may have ideas about how he plans to run whatever agency he is scheduled to head. But I think, in the sense that there was a discussion of personnel, it was agreed that this was a very preliminary stage, and there was no need to go further into this.

Q And there is no discussion about people replacing other people?

A No.

Q Or being let go?

A No.

Q Just a review of personnel --

A Not in the discussions between Mr. Adelman and the Secretary.

Q John, isn't the issue the narrow one of his having had these discussions about rather large-scale changes in personnel prior to his -- a few days before he told the Senate Committee that he was planning no such changes?

A I guess I'm doing what I said I wouldn't do, which is to get into the details of a Presidential nomination. But I think, insofar as the Secrtary's discussion is concerned, what you're talking about is either a broad reference to the possibility of personnel changes in the future, or maybe not of personnel changes in the future, and a kind of detailed discussion.

I assume that anyone in this room who becomes a bureau chief or an editor has certain ideas about how he might run that bureau or that newspaper, and just conceivably could have a few ideas about personnel changes that he might make.

Q So they did discuss that -- personnel changes?

A What they discussed was the postponement of that discussion. What they agreed was that there was no point in discussing the personnel question.

Q They discussed the postponement of personnel changes, is that correct?

A Let me try to put in the most accurate context that I can, not being there. I would say that the question of personnel changes was raised briefly, and that the Secretary and Mr. Adelman agreed that there was really no point in discussing them at this stage. If that's discussing personnel matters, so be it. I guess I would say that that is agreeing not to discuss personnel matters in detail, simply because it did not appear to be sensible or pragmatic at that stage.

Q Did the Secretary know about his plan to have his friend, Mr. West, undertake this study?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Did it appear odd to him, when he found out about it, that --

A No, it did not appear odd.

Q -- from the Interior Department to take on this?

A No, I think it appears proper that Mr. Adelman was trying to put this personnel question at arms length.

Q If they decided at the meeting with the Secrtary not to discuss personnel changes, what was the point of Adelman, in the memo, saying that he had discussed a package of personnel changes which would be implemented after he became ACDA Director at the meeting with the Secretary? In other words, why didn't he say, we've decided not to make personnel -- the Secretary has instructed me, or whatever, not to make personnel changes? He said the opposite.

A I think that not a great deal of significance was attached to that conversation at the time because it was a fleeting conversation. I think perhaps you're going back to it and reading into it a directive not to discuss -- I mean, it wasn't in that context, as I understand it. It was simply a pragmatic agreement that there was no point in discussing this.

Q Could you date that more or less? Would the Secretary have known about the Rowny memo at that time?

A I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know what --

Q Was the Rowny memo in existence at that time?

A I don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on EEC communique in Brussels concerning the Middle East?

A Concerning --

Q EEC communique concerning the Middle East in Brussels last Tuesday?

A No, I'm afraid I don't.

Q John, can you take my question about whether the Secretary --

A The date of the meeting?

Q The date, as well as whether the Secretary knew about the Rowny memo, or whether there was a Rowny memo?

A Okay. Let me look into that for you. The Secretary's position on the Rowny memo is quite clear, though, that General Rowny has disavowed that memo.

Q Is the State Department instituting any new investigation of yellow rain in the wake of those Australian charges last week?

A No.

Q You still stand by the American studies?

A Absolutely.

Q There is an NBC report that some changes were made in the staff of the Embassy in Italy as a result of the investigation into the attempted assassination of the Pope.

A I think that related to the CIA personnel.

Q Is that --

A It's not our call.

Q John, now that the United States is resuming delivery of Sidewinders to Israel, does this mean that the F-16s are in the pipeline to the Israelis?

A No, no decision on the F-16s.

Q Any comment on the decision itself?

A On the Sidewinders?

Q Yes.

A Sure. For specifics, obviously, you need to go to the Pentagon. But, in general, we would note that this is in keeping with our long-standing policy of support for Israel's security.

Q There's a story by the Knight Newspapers that said that Soviet diplomats had explicitly told American diplomats that if the medium-range missiles were deployed in

Europe, SS-20s would go up in Cuba. Were there such conversations?

A I've heard about that story. I understand it came from an unsourced source, and therefore I can't talk about that anymore authoritatively than the Signature Magazine story.

Q My question is simply a follow-up of what we've asked earlier. Have the Soviets in any diplomatic channel been more explicit than what Mr. Arbatov was in a general way?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could you take the question?

A We obviously wouldn't disclose what had happened in diplomatic back-and-forth, but let me just refer you to the guidance we did give you a few days ago. That we were not aware of any specific mention of Cuba in those threats.

Q Is the Secretary going to be with the President when he gives the foreign policy speech next Thursday?

A Next week? No.

Q He's not?

A No plans at present.

Q Is he involved in helping him prepare for that speech?

A I think he obviously is, sure.

Q What was the Secretary's role in the preparation of last night's speech? Specifically, is the Secretary -- does he have a view on ABM systems or laser-beam technology?

A I think that obviously the President has been thinking about this for a long time. I think, obviously, insofar as specific movement on this particular proposal is concerned, the President would have talked to Pentagon officials and the Joint Chiefs and scientists. But insofar as it has foreign policy implications, naturally, that has involved the Secretary, and the Secretary has been involved in the evolution of that policy.

Q But the Secretary wouldn't have been involved in the proposal regarding ABM systems and laser-beam technology?

A On the specifics, I don't know how expert the Secretary is in that area.

Q It's become kind of a search here in Washington to find out just who the President did confer with on that particular part of the speech.

A I guess he's talking about an up-coming and a long-range, on-going research and development program. That certainly would be a part of it, but I don't think any decisions are made yet.

Q Do you have anything on military reorganization in El Salvador; a state of alert in Grenada, or the lifting of the state of siege in Guatemala? (Laughter)

A I've got one out of three for you. The last one.

We welcome that the new electoral decrees, the removal of the state of siege and the amnesty are indications that the Guatemalan Government is taking positive steps to return Guatemala to democratic government. Of course, we favor that.

Q You don't have anything, by chance, on Rios Montt's declaration that the USAID worker who was killed should have been shot before a firing squad?

A I am totally unaware of that statement. May I ask what the source is?

Q No, he did it in a televised press conference. He was asked about it.

A Do you have a transcript?

Q I personally don't. I heard it. Maybe FBIS will provide one. I'll look at it.

Q It was on National Public Radio.

A Okay.

Q You were asked about the story about the Soviet diplomats specifically telling you -- that was Bernie's question. How did you --

A I said we wouldn't get into any diplomatic interchange, but I guess I'd refer you back to the guidance of a few days ago -- it's three or four days ago -- that we were unaware of any suggestion that the Soviets would put that weaponry into Cuba.

Q If it should occur that that guidance is no longer operative, would you let us know?

A Sure.

Q John, just trying to mop up two things on the Middle East, do you have anything today on last week's Soviet statements threatening to --

A No.

Q Anything on a Begin trip?

A No.

Q A news conference by the Secretary?

A Nothing set.

Q What's he doing this weekend?

A I'll be glad to give you a rundown on that tomorrow. Don't have that today.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, March 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #52

FRIDAY, MARCH 25, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements up front.

Available in the Press Office are limited copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951: Korea and China, in two parts. The embargoed date is April 2, 6:00 p.m. One copy per organization. Sorry, I have to be so parsimonious.

Q What?

A Parsimonious. It's like jet lag. (Laughter)

Q The level of these briefings continues to soar. (Laughter)

A There'll be a background briefing on the upcoming visit of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. That will be on Tuesday, March 29, here in the Press Briefing Room, 10:00 in the morning.

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz, will depart Washington on Monday for a trip to the Asia/Pacific region. That will include visits to Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. He'll be back in Washington April 15.

Q Is he taking press?

A No. (Laughter) We don't want anymore articles written about travel with high officials.

The trip will provide Mr. Wolfowitz with an opportunity to exchange views with senior officials of host governments at each of his stops on matters of bilateral and regional concern, and other subjects of mutual interest.

An announcement on Korea/U.S. economic consultations. These are a Subcabinet Economic Consultations that will be held in Washington March 31 and April 1. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Roh Jae Won will lead the Korean delegation, and Under Secretary of State Allen Wallis will lead the U.S. delegation.

Periodic economic consultations of this type were agreed to by President Reagan and President Chun during their February 2, 1981, meeting in Washington, and this agreement was incorporated in the Joint Communique issued at the conclusion of President Chun's visit.

This will be the second round of these Subcabinet Consultations. The first was held in Seoul in June 1981. The two delegations will review the full range of bilateral and multilateral economic issues of importance to both countries, prospects for global recovery, and the outlook for the respective national economies. These consultations reflect the importance both governments attach to the U.S./Korean economic relationship and our growing bilateral trade which exceeded $12 billion in 1982.

That sort of exhausts me.

Q The date, again?

A The date of the meetings? March 31 and April 1.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Before we go into weightier matters, do you have an announcement about the State Department banning Cuban overflights of the United States?

Q What did he say?

A Cuban overflights of the United States.

Effective March 25, Air Cubana will not be permitted to overfly the United States on its flights between Cuba and Canada for 14 days. This action is in response to two serious violations Cubana flights committed while overflying the United States on March 4 and 5.

On March 4, a scheduled Cubana Flight 481, enroute from Montreal to Havana, deviated from its assigned air traffic control routing by approximately 27 miles.

On March 5, Cubana Flight 9086 from Cuba to Quebec City deviated from its assigned air traffic control routing by approximately 13 miles.

Q Thirteen.

A Thirteen. Both violations occurred near Syracuse. Both flights passed near Griffiss Air Force Base. We believe the deviation was intentional, but I'm not going to have any further comment on that.

Q Were they equipped with any camera equipment, these planes?

A Don't know.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q What was the answer to that camera question?

A Don't have any response on that.

Q How long is it -- this is for 15 days?

A Fourteen days.

Q What explanation, if any, did the pilots of those flights give to air traffic control on route control?

A I don't have anything here on that. I don't know that there was any.

Q What altitude?

A Don't have an altitude.

Q Did they give any reason?

A I don't know --

Q Engine problems or pilot error?

A I have nothing on the discussion. I do have a little statement suggesting that these overflights were not accidental. In both cases, weather conditions were good and the flights were operating under air traffic control.

The March 4 flight failed to observe its prescribed routing even when air traffic control called attention to its deviation and instructed it to correct its course.

The March 5 flight failed to respond to inquiries by air traffic control as to why it was deviating from its approved route. But what discussion, if any, beyond that has taken place, I don't know.

Q Do you know what control center that was? Was that Philadelphia?

A I don't, but we could probably -- I guess FAA would probably be able to help you on that.

Q Any further action contemplated or is this it?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Why 14 days; is that standard?

A You mean how does it compare to previous? I don't know; I can't answer that question.

Q Why did it take us three weeks to penalize them?

A Can't answer that question, either. You might want to talk to FAA again on that.

Q I'm a little puzzled. You come out here and you have nothing to offer us in the way of a Cuban explanation. Was one sought?

A I can't answer that question. Be glad to do a little research on it for you.

Q I know what FAA is going to say already. They'll say the State Department ordered it and the State Department is going to tell you why, and we're going to come right back to you so if you can find answers to this, it would be helpful.

A I'll see if we can go beyond anything that we have here.

Q John, is this the first time there's been such an incident with Cuba?

A Let me see if we can answer that one for you, too.

Q Does the State Department believe these aircrafts were engaged in spying over these air bases?

A I think we'll let the facts sit out there and speak for themselves.

Q Do you know how often they run that route?

A I don't, no.

Q Do you know whether there were passengers on the plane? Were they all Cubans or Canadians as well?

A I don't.

Q How many overflights are there?

A How many Cuban flights?

Q What they are, what frequency?

A I don't know that either.

Q The burden of your announcement is that the flights are not stopping; it's just that they have to make a detour out over the Atlantic before they go to Canada; right?

A Not permitted to overfly.

Q Does that include the 200-mile EEZ that was declared? Do they have to go beyond that also?

A You've got a lot of good questions on this. I don't have an answer to that either.

Q Do you anticipate you might have a longer statement yesterday (sic) or this afternoon?

A No. As a matter of fact, this statement is not a new one today. It has been available for several days.

Q Did the State Department deliver the violation and the restrictions or was that handled by the FAA? I assume it came from here, didn't it, in dealing with the Cuban Government?

A I'm afraid I don't have any background on how that was communicated. If we get anything else that we can give you, we'll be glad to develop it during the day.

Q John, what sort of a base is Griffiss? Is it "Griffiss?"

A G-r-i-f-f-i-s-s Air Force Base.

Q What sort of a base is that?

A I don't know.

Q John, what would be the punishment involved here? Is it that by making them go around they would use more gasoline, fuel?

A I assume gasoline, inconvenience; I don't know. I'm not expert in these areas. They're just not going to overfly our territory.

Q Is this the first time this has happened?

A I was already asked that, and I don't know. We'll try to find that out for you.

Q On another subject. The Nicaraguans seem convinced that they have been invaded, and they are also convinced that there is some U.S. role in it. Would you care to comment again today?

A No, I think Alan has addressed this over the past several days. We wouldn't really have anything beyond that. Ambassador Kirkpatrick responded to this question in the debate at the U.N.

Q When?

A The day before yesterday. I think the Honduran Government also responded in the U.N. debate. And, no, we have nothing beyond that.

Q They said they were -- two days ago -- quite interested in participating in this five-plus-five meeting, but they had not received an invitation. Do you know when invitations are expected to go out?

A No, I don't. That's a regional conference and we're supportive of it, but I don't know how the inviations will be extended.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to their willingness to participate?

A No. We're supporting that conference, as you know.

Q Is there any response to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's action yesterday in recommending cutting aid to El Salvador in half?

A We made an interim response yesterday, noting that we had a written statement of Congressional views from the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. We now have a letter from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and, as you all know, we're expecting another communication or letter from the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee after the recess.

There are differences in the two responses we've received thus far, and I think we'll wait to address specific questions and to craft a reply when we get the full Congressional response.

Q But yesterday you gave pretty detailed answers to the Senate Subcommittee's action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has also taken very specific action, cutting it to $30 million and then also outlining some recommendations, not conditions this time.

You don't have any detailed response?

A No, I don't. As I say, we'll wait and see what the three committees have suggested, and then we'll have a response.

Q Two questions, please. You will not use any of that reprogrammed money until this is resolved; is that correct?

A Military. Correct.

Q And, secondly, how do you handle one subcommittee recommending $60M plus conditions and the full committee going for $30M plus conditions?

A I think that's why we'd like to wait and see what the third committee suggests and then we can formulate our response.

Q Is there a feeling you can get by with $30 million?

A Our position is that we made a sound request for carefully calculated funds, and that's what we want.

Q You said yesterday, though, that you were pleased by the action of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. Can you characterize your reply today with respect to the Foreign Relations Committee recommendation as one of pleasure?

A What we said was that we were pleased with their response on the economic assistance.

Q No. You said both the economic and the military.

A Everybody's response. We're very pleased with the response from everybody on the economic part. Obviously, we have a little way to go on the military.

Q Is it the Administration's view that they will respect the figure that is set by the committee if the committee stands firm on that?

A Which committee?

Q The full committee, the $30 million figure?

A I think this is what the Department will wait and see until it has the requests -- you know, we've been consulting on the Hill, and I think we're still in that process of consultation. We have made our case; they're making suggestions. Obviously, we're considering very carefully and seriously the views that have been transmitted, but we have one more committee to go and when that's all in, then we'll take a look at it.

Q And if it should stay at $30M, is there consideration for a meaningful jump in the 55 figure?

A Let's wait and see when the response --

Q Do you have anything today on the demands by various military commanders that Garcia leave the Defense Ministry?

A No.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to the Air Force Commander's statement that in the last year and a half they have no evidence of any kind that arms are coming in by air from Nicaragua?

A No, I don't. I haven't seen that particular statement, but it certainly would be at variance with our impression.

Q That's why I asked it. Page P3 of FBIS, 23 March, I wonder if you could look into that because it contradicts --

A Don't need to look into it. I think we have made clear insofar as we're going to make clear what our assessment of the arms flow is and where it comes from and how it comes. I think that's all out there. We're not changing that. We think it is an accurate statement of the situation, so there is no need to comment on that statement.

Q Do you share information with respect to arms flows with the Air Force Commander of the El Salvadoran Armed Forces?

A I think that is an area we obviously wouldn't get into.

--MORE--

Q Has the State Department received any reaction from the countries interested from the letter sent by 54 Congressman to the President rejecting a political solution in Central America?

A Has the State Department received --

Q Received any reaction from the countries interested? I mean, Mexico and Venezuela.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Can we go to the Middle East?

A Sure.

Q One more on Nicaragua. Last night the Nicaraguans said that Honduran troops had crossed their border. That's new since Alan made his other comments.

Do you have any reaction to that or know of that?

A No. I don't. I guess that would have to be something the Honduran Government would have to respond to.

Q John, there are some press reports today in Israel that some Israeli Government officials are proposing a unilateral partial Israeli withdrawal to a few miles south of Beirut from the lines which are being held now.

Do you have any reaction to this idea?

A I don't. I haven't heard that one. The tripartite talks went on today as scheduled at Netanya. I don't know what came out of them. Ambassador Habib is in Beirut today.

I assume Ambassador Draper was at the talks. But, no, I haven't heard that one.

Q What is the U.S. position on the question of unilateral partial withdrawal?

A The U.S. position is for the speediest withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q John, there are also some reports of pessimism about those talks now. Do you have any comment about these reports, that there might be an April deadline that the Lebanese are setting because of no progress?

A No. We, as you know, traditionally haven't gotten into the back and forth on those negotiations, and I think would not even at this stage.

Q Can I also ask something else? There is from Israeli -- some of the Israeli press is also reporting that the optimism which Foreign Minister Shamir expressed here was based on something that when he arrived in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, and Ambassador Habib did, too, the actual details of the talks in writing were a bit different from what Foreign Minister Shamir had reported or thought were concluded.

Do you have anything on that? I mean, first of all, did Ambassador Habib take anything in writing to Israel?

A I know this is always frustrating, but, as you know, we will not get into what kind of interchanges are going on. I don't think there is any doubt that the Israeli Government and the Lebanese Government are fully aware -- were fully aware and are fully aware of the United States' position on these matters.

Q On the same general topic, yesterday when you were asked about a deadline you said that we didn't understand that in our sense of the word.

Is that still the American understanding today?

A I think you have to ask the Lebanese about a deadline. If the Lebanese Government is setting a deadline, you have to talk to them about that.

In our minds we don't have a magic date in our heads. As you well know, we have been frustrated that it has taken so long to get a troop withdrawal plan, and we continue to work on it hour by hour, day by day. We want it done as soon as possible, so there's not a magic date in our thinking.

Q John, a follow-up to this: I think the reports from Beirut mentioned that if there won't be progress til early April, the Lebanese Prime Minister would come to Washington to present the Lebanese ideas.

Do you know anything about such an idea?

A I don't. I think perhaps you or somebody asked me that yesterday. I'm sure that it's not couched in quite those terms. I don't think that what the Lebanese Government has said publicly is quite as specific as that. But even if that were to be the case, no, we're not aware of that.

Q Press reports from Israel that Israel rejected the American proposal -- do you have anything?

A Again, we wouldn't get into the back and forth. Ambassador Habib has talked with the Israelis since Mr. Shamir was here, has talked with the Lebanese. That process is continuing. As you know, he travels from one country to the other, and that's going forward.

The tripartite talks are going forward, and, obviously, there are ups and downs in these negotiations.

Q Do you have anything on the record on the U.S. position regarding Major Haddad?

A No. You mean a new position or some --

Q No. On record, what is the U.S. position regarding the status of Major Haddad?

A I think you'd need to go back to the specific words we've offered before, but the intent and the objective is quite clear -- namely, that the Government of Lebanon should have authority over its territory and over all of the forces under its control.

Q Prime Minister Shamir was here and so was the Lebanese Foreign Minister and the former Lebanese Prime Minister, and there were extensive talks, as you well know.

Can't you tell us how things are going there about those reports? There are some proposals -- I think American new suggestions brought to both parties.

Can you tell us exactly? And it's been a week or more since these parties have returned to their countries.

A Yes. Obviously, it takes time.

Q How have things gone so far?

A There have been refinements and explanations of positions that were taken back, were communicated while Mr. Shamir was here, and undoubtedly that process is still going on. We're working to achieve continuing movement on both sides.

Q John, when you say the process is still going on, Gwertzman has a story here quoting U.S. Administration officials: "Israel has refused to accept the ideas proposed by the U.S., causing irritation at the highest levels of the Administration."

Is it a refusal, or is it back and forth, as you say? Could you sort that out?

A Bernie, I know this continues to be frustrating, but I guess we are not going to get into the back and forth of where it stands and who said what on any particular day.

Q You just talked about ups and downs in the negotiatons. Are we in a down phase now?

A I really wouldn't want to be trapped into such a characterization. We're working hard to achieve the goal that is very clear --

Q How long is Ambassador Habib going to stay there now?

A I have no idea of his travel plans. He moves between the two countries, but there's no suggestion that he would return to the United States in the next few days.

Q Could we get an answer from you to Rafi's question on the U.S. position on the unilateral partial withdrawal?

Are you opposed to that?

A This is, I gather, a question relating to a veiwpoint expressed by some Israeli official, and I think it would be foolish to respond to that from here, Bernie.

I think it would have to be seen -- if indeed there is such a proposal and if it indeed is an official proposal, I think it would have to be seen in the context of the talks that are going on.

Q But if it were official, you would react, if I understand you; and, since it is not, you have no comment. Is that what you mean to say?

A Clearly, Ambassador Habib and clearly the Secretary, when Mr. Shamir was here, one of the obvious points they're discussing with Israel is the withdrawal of Israeli forces. That has to be a given before the Syrians and the PLO will leave.

Q If there is talk of a partial unilateral withdrawal, why aren't you welcoming it?

A Because (a) it's a report of which I'm not aware, and (b) I'm not sure of the source, and it seems to me I just would not want to comment on a partial withdrawal or characterize what kind of withdrawal or to what lines. It seems to me that that is something that would be accomplished in the talks on the scene.

Q John, isn't it true that at an earlier stage in this negotiation, which now stretches out to almost six months, the United States firmly opposed any phased withdrawal that did not have a final date certain for total withdrawal?

A That's why I don't want to get into what seems to me to be an interim suggestion and evaluate it or discuss it. What we're working for is an overall plan.

Q Does that position then still stand, John, that what you answered earlier, that the United States is looking for a full, complete withdrawal of all foreign forces?

A Absolutely. Never been any variance in that position.

Q But in answer to Bernie, you kind of made it sound --

A No. I'm not going to be drawn on a report that somebody in Israel is talking about a partial withdrawal. I think that's a very kind of vague report on which to comment, and I'm not going to be drawn on that.

Q Can you describe the talks that are going on with King Hussein, or are we in contact -- the U.S. Government in contact?

A We're certainly in contact with King Hussein.

Q Is there any indication from him that any public statement he might make is conditional on the Lebanese withdrawal question being resolved or close to resolution?

A I think, Bernie, we're going to have to let the King make any announcement that he might make on joining the talks. We are very hopeful, are very eager that he should join those talks, as you know. He has been considering it and discussing that with various parties involved, and we look forward to whatever announcement he may make, whenever he may make it.

Q You say you're still hopeful after his somewhat negative statements in London?

A We're still hopeful.

Q John, do you have anything on the outcome of Nick Veliotes' trip to Egypt?

A No, I don't. Mr. Veliotes is back, but I don't have anything on his trip.

Q He saw Hussein, didn't he?

A No, he did not see Hussein.

Q Haddad.

A Nice try.

Q Do you have any reaction to the promotion of Andrey Gromyko in the Soviet Union?

A No. I really don't. Not on the record.

Q Do you have any reaction, John, to the Soviet characterization of the President's plans for new weapons as being contrary to the ABM Treaty?

A I think the President made his position quite clear on that. It's a long-term research and development program, and that kind of research is not banned under the ABM Treaty. The President does not see it as a contravention.

Q John, in The Wall Street Journal today there is a report coming from Amman that if the process does not move ahead the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza will be irreversible Israelis (sic).

Do you agree with that?

A I think the President and the Secretary have made their position clear on a number of occasions on the settlements, and the unhelpfulness of the expansion of the settlements. I think that's where we stand.

Q John, the Administration's considering an interim proposal in the INF talks -- that is, something between zero option and full deployment -- and the President today says that he was going to talk about that next week.

But at the same time it's been widely reported the Administration is nonetheless sticking by the zero option as its ultimate goal.

Could you explain how an interim proposal -- the relationship between an interim proposal and zero option, how you square the two, how the two are being connected? Can you shed some light on --

A No. I don't think I will. I think I'll leave it to the President to say whatever he might say on his arms control policy, but certainly in terms of the ideal goal, it's difficult to understand why there would be opposition to the zero option to knock out and eliminate an entire class of missiles. That seems to me would be a very desirable objective, so it's difficult to understand the objection to that.

Q I'm not talking about the objection. I'm saying that it's everyone's understanding that there will be some sort of an interim proposal, yet the Administration will also maintain zero option as a goal or whatever.

How are those two ideas being connected?

A I don't know. I think we'll have to wait for the President to speak on that, but I think everything that he has said about the desirability of the zero option clearly still stands and is obvious.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

Clenner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, March 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #53

MONDAY, MARCH 28, 1983, 12:11 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q How does the State Department read the current situation with Hussein apparently delaying again any decision on getting into the peace process? Are you now less hopeful than you were?

A I don't think we've offered a characterization or a qualitative judgment on hopeful or unhopeful except in broad terms that he has been supportive of the President's initiative in general terms, of looking for support to come in, and would make an announcement when he felt it was appropriate to do so.

I don't think there's any change in that situation, and I'm not sure I would agree with the premise of the question that there necessarily has been any particular development in that regard.

Q In fact, John did say on Friday he was hopeful and eager that King Hussein would join the peace process.

A Okay. That he would?

Q Yes.

A There's no change in that. I think that's been our position for some time.

Q And you feel that there's any time limit or any diminishing chances for success as time --

A No, I don't. Time limits, I don't think that we have tried to address these issues, either the Lebanon or the overall peace process issue, in terms of time limits. In both cases, clearly, we would like to move forward as fast as possible.

Q Is there a new document that the President has given the Saudis on this question of the West Bank following a meeting the President had a couple of weeks ago with Prince Bandar?

A I'm not aware of it. But, in any case, I don't think we would get into the question of what diplomatic exchanges might have taken place.

Q I understand there's a letter that further spells out American views on the West Bank to the Saudis. Can you take the question?

A No. I don't think we'd get into the question of official exchanges. Obviously we've had a fairly active give-and-take with a variety of parties, including the Saudis, on the issue, and I think that that's a very natural thing. But I'm not going to comment on specifics.

Q I want to switch subjects.

A We're going to stay on this subject.

Q Is it true that American nationals are involved in the invasion of Nicaragua? (Laughter)

A That's the same subject? I addressed this issue myself. I don't know what John did when I was away, but last week I addressed it. It's a long-standing practice of this and previous Administrations not to address allegations of this sort one way or another. But we've made it equally clear, as I said last week, that we don't support any return to a Somocista Government in Nicaragua.

It's a fact that over preceding months there has been rising opposition to the Government in Nicaragua, including within Nicaragua itself. Clearly, these opposition elements are now making their pressure felt both inside and outside Nicaragua and it is not surprising that the Sandinistas are trying to convice their public and the outside world that there is not an internal problem in Nicaragua when there is.

As we've mentioned before, Nicaraguan opposition to the government ranges from disillusioned popular sectors to ethnic groups such as Miskito Indians, and includes former national guardsmen, former Sandinistas themselves such as Eden Pastora, as well as other anti-Somocista groups.

Members of those groups, represented by Eden Pastora and leaders of the FDN, the Democratic Nicaraguan Front, have recently been taking their case against the Sandinistas to Western European and hemispheric capitals. The opposition in Nicaragua is diverse, nationlist and independent.

Twice over the past year we have addressed concerns between our two countries bilaterally, and in October of last year, along with the democratic countries of the region, we addressed the regional concerns in San Jose, Costa Rica. The San Jose Final Act, in fact, addressed many of the very concerns that the Sandinistas have raised, including the presence of foreign advisors or trainers in the region, arms flows, and non-intervention.

Q If you don't fear the resurrection of the previous regime, what type of government would you like to see installed in Nicaragua?

A We went back to this -- I think we had a long exchange on this last week -- and, yes --

Q On what?

A On that question; specifically, on that question. I think that, again, I would refer you to statements we've made in the past about pluralism and also attitudes towards other countries in the region, armaments, advisors. I think the record is rather full on this, and beyond that I don't have any specifics to offer you.

Q On this subject now, a reporter from my newspaper was in what he said was a camp inside Honduras of people who identified themselves as Nicaraguans. In the place, according to his description, was filled with crates of American-manufactured motar shells, grenades, other kinds of infantry equipment that, clearly, that you don't just buy at the corner hardware store.

The question is, again, for the record, is the United States supplying these people with this equipment.

A Again, for the record, we don't address --

Q We're getting --

A Without addressing that question, I would simply point out to you that there are a variety of ways of getting arms on the open market, but I'm not going to go beyond that to get to the specifics of this.

Q Let me just finish the questions here. It's been alleged -- I think it's in Time Magazine this week again that Ambassador Negroponte is directing this insurgent effort from Honduras into Nicaragua, and I'd like an answer on that question. You say you're not going to get into the question of whether we're helping these people in Honduras?

A It's the same question -- it's the same answer in both cases to the question about Ambassador Negroponte or help. It involves an allegation regarding covert activities. We do not address questions relating to covert activities.

Q It's not so much covert now, Alan, when they're out in the open; and, secondly, the stuff you're putting out is a kind of -- very reminiscent of past years. The impression you're trying to create is that this is really a legitimate sort of opposition within Nicaragua and the Nicaraguans have their own problems. It's a self-generating problem, and you won't answer the question whether, in fact, it's U.S.-instigated and supported. I just think in this day and age that really is very unacceptable.

A That may be your judgment on it. It happens to be the approach that not only this Administration but previous Administrations have taken. And in terms of any operations or any kind of intelligence activity, obviously, there is appropriate oversight that is undertaken by the Congress, and that's the way the government functions.

Q Alan, you're not shy about addressing where the guerrillas in El Salvador get their equipment.

A We don't talk about what we do. We might be willing to talk about it to a certain extent, but --

Q I mean, without revealing -- I mean, can you give us any idea of what this equipment they have is and where it comes from?

A I don't have any details on that at all.

Q Wait. You just offered a minute ago, that you said, that you volunteered that there were a variety of ways of getting arms on the open market.

A Yes.

Q Okay. Now, you applied that in the case of people who may be fighting in and around Nicaragua.

A I said as a general matter, but I was not going to address the issue specifically.

Q Have you ever noted that as a general matter with respect to arms coming into El Salvador?

A I think we have noted that open markets are available. We've also noted that we have other evidence.

Q And do you have any comment with respect to alleged prisoners that the Sandinistas took about their activities in Honduras and the relationship with U.S. organizations?

A No. I saw a wire on that this morning, but beyond seeing it I don't have anything.

Q On just a parenthetical question -- the same area of the world -- about an half hour ago, I think, the Foreign Minister of Grenada, in a news conference to the U.N., said that his country would be invaded by the U.S. -- they had information -- within the next few days. Any reaction to that allegation.

A I guess we'll find out in the next few days. No. That's a ridiculous charge.

Q Alan, he also said that his government had sent a bill of particulars to the State Department and in it asked for information, last Thursday. Have you received such a communication from Grenada?

A I don't know. But, again, I would be reluctant to get into the question of an official exchange, but it's ridiculous to assert that the United States has any intention to invade Grenada.

Q For the record, you're not denying that the United States is helping this opposition to the Sandinistas, are you?

A I'm not addressing the issue at all. We don't, and I'm not leading you one way or another because of that. I'm simply not addressing the issue. We haven't; we're not going to.

Q On Grenada, the Government of Grenada has also said that the airfields have been funded -- the airfield in question has actually been funded not just by the Cubans but also by the European Economic Community, Venezuela and Mexico. Do you know that to be true?

A I don't know that to be true. I don't have details on the funding of their airfield re-enforcement and extension.

Q Could you please take that.

A Let me see if there's any detail I can provide on that.

Q As I recall, this has come up before, and I think from this platform, the spokesman acknowledged that we have sent a protest to some of the EEC governments about this assistance.

A I said I would look into this and see if I have anything further. I don't recall that frankly, but I'll look into it.

Q While we're on Venezuela --

A While we're on Venezuela?

--MORE--

Q Well, they were providing money for the airfield.

(Laughter)

A I see.

Q Since we are in the general region, Herrara Campins said that the Salvadoran civil war should be settled between Guillermo Ungo, a Social Democrat, and a prominent figure in the Christian Democratic Party. He also suggested that the Prime Minister of Spain take a mediation role over the whole region as well as with respect to El Salvador.

Do you have any comment on this?

A Not specifically on that, no. The Secretary has testified extensively on our approach to negotiations, or dialogue, or whatever you want to call it; and I refer you to the record.

Q Have U.S. officials consulted with the Spanish Premier or his Foreign Minister with respect to a possible mediation role?

A Again, I'm not going to get into specifics. As you know, Assistant Secretary Enders was in Spain. We certainly have a full dialogue with the Spanish on a variety of issues, but I'm not going to get into specifics about this particular issue.

Q What you didn't have last week and you didn't even attempt to give was some sort of an appraisal, from our point of view, of what the situation on the ground is along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. You said you just simply didn't have the information.

Do you have anything like that now that might give us some idea of how serious, in your view, the fighting is?

A I can't beyond noting that the Government of Honduras has stated that Honduran armed forces are not in an offensive posture in the border area and that reports that Honduran and Nicaraguan troops have clashed in Nicaraguan territory are false. Also, they have noted to us that their forces are not on alert -- this is the Honduran Government -- and that it has not reinforced its forces along any of its borders.

Q I didn't understand the first part. Did you say that you were labeling as "false" reports that there were battles or that the Honduran Government is labeling it --

A I'm telling you what the Honduran Government has said.

Q O.K. Finally, just one other on this. Do you have any guidance on the question I raised on Friday with respect to the Salvadoran Air Force commander's statements?

A I wasn't here, as you know, and I don't know anything about -- Was that a taken question or a "look into" question or --

Q It's status was extremely unclear; but he contradicted everything that a senior State Department official said the week before about arms flow coming in by air into El Salvador.

A Beyond what you were given last week, I can only say I don't have anything new on it.

Q Do you have anything in the way of a private communication from Andropov to the President on arms control?

A No, I don't have anything, and I don't think I would, in terms of private communications, by definition.

Q On that subject, Alan, there is a Reuters story from Brussels that says, among other things, that Nitze was given a new proposal to bring in, I guess, on the final day of this session of the INF talks, and also to propose that the recess be shortened so that they resume again in May rather than in June, and that the general outlines of the proposal were in a message the President sent to the NATO chiefs.

Anything there you care to talk to?

A Only to a limited extent, Bernie. As you know, we don't talk about the details of our exchanges either with our Allies or with the Soviets, the private discussions. Obviously, we've been in constant consultation with our Allies on INF at all levels.

The INF negotiations, as you know, resulted from the NATO decision of 1979, December, to deploy modernized U.S. longer-ranged INF missiles in Europe and to offer arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union on long-range INF. There has been full agreement in the Alliance -- most recently expressed by the NATO Defense Ministers at the meeting of the

Nuclear Planning Group in Portugal, March 22-23 -- that the proposal we had presented for the total elimination of the entire category of longer-range, land-based INF missiles, represents the best arms control objective.

Beyond that, I would not discuss instructions to negotiators. The issue of arms control will be, I think, addressed later this week by the President. But I don't --

Q I'm just trying to -- A lot of the guidance that is probably still on that sheet is that no final decision has been made, and that the President is going to make it in his speech Thursday. This story suggests that it has already been made and that, in fact, the proposal has been tabled.

You can't answer that?

A Again, I'm not going to address the specifics of the negotiations.

Q Alan, I've been trying to get a question in. Before I do, can we have a copy of that and also the Nicaragua statement? I don't know if anybody asked for that one.

A Yes.

Q Also, on your statement about the variety of ways of getting arms on the open market. Could you take it? Is our government doing anything to try to tighten up those arms? Can you give us any more information on how those arms are getting around, are they private purchasers, or what?

A That's a very broad subject. I don't think I'm prepared to try to address it in terms of a taken question. I would suggest that you might want to try to get in touch with officials who can discuss that. It's a longstanding, very wide open subject.

Q Is there any heightened concern, or do we just accept this as a fact of life, something we have to live with?

A I think, obviously, there is concern when arms are being, in an uncontrolled way, marketed around the world; but beyond that, I'm not prepared to try to address it.

Q Was the announcement about delivering 200 sidewinders and F-16s to Israel helpful as you (inaudible) encourage King Hussein to come to the peace talks?

A I frankly am not aware of an announcement on this. Is this a DOD announcement?

Q It was last week. I wasn't here last week.

A I don't know what the specifics are.

Q The sidewinders were announced last week.

A The sidewinders were announced last week?

Q Yes.

A O.K. Any decision taken on the supply of weapons to any country represents the result of a considered process, and it includes all sorts of factors. I think you have to take it as a given that the various factors in the Middle East are taken into account when any decision on arms shipment to any country in the region is made. But I'm not going to address specifically these sales to Israel. I think you could put it in the context I just gave you.

Q Alan, do you have anything there on the latest stories over the weekend on Klaus Barbie, our attempt to keep him out of the French intelligence hands, et cetera?

A No. The Justice Department, I think, has noted that it is, at the President's request and with the cooperation of other agencies, looking into this matter very seriously. I think it would be inappropriate to do anything on this, or say anything about this, until the Justice Department was prepared to do so. But I would refer you to their statement about the seriousness with which the issue is viewed by the Administration and what specific measures they have said are being taken.

Q How can you translate Secretary Weinberger's statement of yesterday about United States' wish to have more friends in the Middle East besides Israel, and what are you going to do in order to encourage having such strategic friends and allies in the area?

A I really think the best thing for you to do on that is to go back and look at a variety of policy statements that have been issued on the entire region, and there is nothing new or startling. Everything that we are doing in the Middle East peace process in terms of bilateral relations with the countries, the Lebanon effort, certainly is all related to that question.

Q Talking about Lebanon. Excuse me. Are you optimistic like the Lebanese Foreign Minister that by this weekend, an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon can be reached?

A I wasn't aware that he had said that, but in any case I don't think that we have tried to set time limits. We would like to see the process move forward as quickly as possible.

Q There is a story in, I think, The Post today saying that there are people within the Government of El Salvador who are saying that it would be absolutely impossible to offer any protection to insurgents should they choose to participate -- leftists, at any rate -- in the elections in December.

If it is the Administration's point of view that there should be no negotiations with the left, but that on the contrary, they should take part in the elections, why is there the emphasis on moving the elections to December, as they are now scheduled, rather than allowing a bit more time so that perhaps the mechanism to protect those leftists could be put into place?

A I've seen the reports that you're talking about, or at least some of the reports you may be referring to. First of all, the reports talked about individual sources without identifying who they were. I think it's very clear that the Government of El Salvador has undertaken to find ways to bring the left into the elections, and they are looking at a variety of possibilities. We have said we would have some suggestions to make along those lines. And I would take that as both the official Salvadoran position, as they've articulated it -- whatever it is they've said on it -- and our position is as we have articulated it.

They made the decision to bring the elections up. I don't think we have opposed at all the idea of a dialogue or negotiation in the electoral context, so I don't accept what you said about that. If there were discussions about that, I'm sure that concerns about safety and so on would be a very important part of that.

Q Are those proposals that you are talking about that the U.S. will be making, are they ready?

A I don't have any specifics on what the status of various proposals are.

Q In those talks, is either party able or encouraged to bring up any issue that it may want to discuss on the table?

A I would think that would be up to them to set the terms and conditions for any agenda they would have.

Q How soon will the Peace Commission be making its formal offer to the leftists to participate, because I note that the Costa Rican Government offered to mediate between the Salvadoran guerrillas and the government there, and that the Salvadoran Government seemingly rejected that --

A We had some guidance on that last week, which I don't have with me, on the specific point of the Costa Rican offer, and I would refer you to the Press Office for that.

I don't want to try to speak for the Salvadoran Government in terms of when the Peace Commission might make its proposals formally known. I would suggest that you might address that to them.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

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Clennor

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BREIFING

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #54

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 1983, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one brief announcement relating to something I think John indicated to you last week. Secretary Shultz will be traveling to Mexico on April 18-19 for meetings with Mexican Government officials. He will be joined by Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan. While in Mexico City, Secretary Shultz and Secretary Regan are expected to meet with Foreign Secretary Sepulveda and Finance Secretary Silva Herzog and other senior Mexican officials.

There will be a trip list posted after the briefing today and taken down at noon on Monday. However, I must caution you that it is not at all clear that there will be press on the aircraft, and it is not clear, if there are press on the aircraft, that there will be more than a small number. So this is a way of warning that this may be what the future holds on that score.

Q It's a one-shot thing, I assume, just to Mexico and back?

A As far as I know, that is correct.

O.K. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you bring us up to date on what you think is happening in Nicaragua? Is there still no evidence of any foreign troops, as far as you can see, inside Nicaragua?

A I have nothing by way of a status report to offer you. I have nothing beyond what we've said before on what is going on.

Q On the guidance that you issued yesterday, with respect to the difficulty of covering the Honduran-Nicaraguan border, you say, "Neither Honduras nor Nicaragua would find it an easy task to control completely all crossings of the border."

A Yes.

Q Are you, therefore, saying that alleged supplies of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador by way of Honduras may not be able to be controlled by the Government of Nicaragua or the Government of Honduras?

A I think the evidence that has been cited on that question goes well beyond the question of the physical movement that goes to the kind of support that we've seen in other ways, so, no, I'm not saying that.

Q Is there a possibility that we might be able to resuscitate what you were talking about a year ago now, that is a BACKGROUND briefing on the covert arms supply, or even an ON THE RECORD --

A I think that to the extent we have been able to address the issue, we have done so in a variety of ways over the last year or more. I don't see the likelihood that there would be anything different done at this point.

Q How about a White Paper? (Laughter.)

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Alan, did the United States present a new proposal on intermediate nuclear missiles at the talks in Geneva today before the recess?

A I don't have anything for you on the negotiating position or positions that might have been tabled. I understand the White House has made it known that the subject of arms control will be addressed tomorrow by the President, Also, of course, he is giving a major arms control speech in Los Angeles on Thursday. I think I would have to leave any discussion of that issue to the President.

Q Is Mr. Nitze returning to Washington?

A I believe he is returning to Washington. Precisely when and by what route, I don't know. He may be making some stops on the way. You might want to check with ACDA and see what they have on that subject.

Q Is he going to Brussels before he returns?

A I don't know. I have the impression that he may be doing some stopping on the way, but I don't know what, precisely.

Q Do you have a firm recess? When do we resume the talks? Has that been set?

A Again, I don't know. I saw a press report this morning that had been announced by the delegation in Geneva. I don't know that to be fact, but I have no reason particularly to question it, so I refer you to whatever the delegation has announced.

Q Alan, can I just go back again to Central America for a second?

A Yes, sure.

Q Was Eden Pastora, whom you mentioned yesterday in guidance, was he supposed to have come to Washington two weeks ago to meet with U.S. officials?

A I have no information.

Q Could you take that question?

A Sure, I can look into it.

Q Alan, also on the subject, regarding Nicaragua, do you have any observations, or is the government or the Department in any way disturbed by reports out of the United Nations, both of the comments of delegates from other governments friendly to us, to the effect that they don't exactly believe the statements we've made about a lack of knowledge of the situation or a lack of involvement?

A I don't think I am in a position, because of all that we've discussed the last several days in terms of addressing the issues of alleged intelligence activity, to get into that question or cut at it from quite that angle. I will say that we have won support from a number of countries speaking in the Security Council, especially in yesterday's session, from countries of Latin America including Brazil, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Several speakers have given balanced statements, putting the issue in its proper regional context and endorsing the proposals made by the democratic governments of the region.

It is true that we are disappointed in the position adopted by some speakers. Several countries have apparently been reluctant to accept the fact that the Nicaraguans inside their own country are turning against the excesses of the regime. Among those rejecting this fact were countries which routinely echo Nicaragua's anti-U.S. rhetoric.

Q Like Colombia?

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A   I said among those rejecting this fact were countries which routinely echo Nicaragua's anti-U.S. rhetoric. Nevertheless, we remain hopeful that this fact will be increasingly self-evident as the Council debate continues, and that additional countries will join those who have spoken in a balanced way on this question.

Q   Can we get a copy of that?

A   Yes.

Q   Do we consider that the standard of balance here on their presentations would be equivalent to those speeches given by the representatives of the United States, Honduras, and El Salvador?

A   I'm not going to try and hold up a standard other than -- I think that the statement speaks for itself in addressing the -- and looking back at what we've said over the last several days, indeed going back quite some way about what is happening inside Nicaragua by the Nicaraguan regime, in its own country and what the reaction has been by the Nicaraguans in response to what the government has done.

Q   But does the U.S. Government find itself in agreement with the presentations made by Brazil, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic?

A   I don't want to try to address all the details. I don't know what they are, and I don't think we would want to go through to try and identify ourselves with each particular. It may or may not be. I'm not trying to steer you in a particular direction. But in general, obviously, we felt that not only were those statements supportive, but generally speaking, were balanced and addressed the regional perspective. I can't speak to each one of those. I don't know what each one said, but --

Q   But within the Security Council do we feel isolated?

A   No.

-- MORE --

Q I had a question to echo another reporter's from last week. You say that it's traditional for the United States Government not to comment on allegations that might involve intelligence or covert activities. Yet, yesterday, you had no hesitation in charging as ridiculous or absurd the notion that the U.S. might be behind an alleged invasion of Grenada.

A The question, I was later informed -- I haven't seen it, as you recall, when the question was raised. He, I guess it was the Foreign Minister, had said the U.S. was about to attack Grenada. The question was not put, and I had not seen the wire service report which put it in the context of some sort of intelligence-type activity, and I was not addressing it in terms of an intelligence-type activity.

Q Then, let me ask you a question. (Laughter) Grenada has charged that the United States is supplying, supporting and financing groups that wish to overthrow that government there. Do you have any comment about those charges?

A No, we don't address that sort of issue. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome, I guess.

Q Does the State Department have any information regarding the yellow dust found in West Bank schools?

A About the --

Q Yellow dust that was found in West Bank schools where about 400 --

A I think that the question of what happened in the schools -- you're talking what appeared, at first anyway, to be poisionings. I think the Israeli authorities are looking into it, and I don't have anything to offer.

Q No further information or --

A No, I think the Israelis are the ones who are looking into this question.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Israelis refusing to let the Red Cross to examine the poision?

A I don't know what the specifics are of what is happening there, so I'm not prepared to addressed it.

Q Mr. Saeb Salam, the former Prime Minister of Lebanon who was here in the States a few days ago, is now calling for Lebanon to withdraw from negotiations with Israel. Do you have any comment on that?

A I'm not familiar with his particular remarks. I simply would say, in general, without addressing his statement, that obviously we think that the talks are important and that they should move forward, and we look for as fast a resolution and successful conclusion of the negotiations as possible.

Q Do you have any comment on the very tense situation now in the Bekaa Valley with Israel and Syria?

A I've seen press reports of that, but I'm not able to confirm that. I don't have any particular comment to offer on those reports.

Q Anything about Habib?

A No. I believe he's still in Beirut. Let me just double-check that. Yes, he and Ambassador Draper are both in Beirut.

Q There are some reports that he's coming back.

A Yes, I think it's possible that he may be coming back. He has some obligations here that he needs to fulfill, long-standing obligations here.

Q If he comes back, it won't be as a result of problems in the negotiations?

A His plan is to come back. Whether there would be consultations that would surround that coming back, I don't know. The plan is a long-standing plan for him to return.

Q When is he expected here?

A I don't have a specific for you on that.

Q Could you tell us what are those commitments that he has here?

A I can talk to you about it later. They're not official.

Q On Nicaragua, the Nicaraguans were calling for talks between the United States and Nicaragua at the U.N. Do you have any reaction to that?

A No. We have addressed for sometime the way in which we think that a dialogue might move forward, which is essentially in a regional context, looking at the San Jose principles. Beyond that, I guess I really don't have a comment to offer.

Q Alan, have you ever formally responded to the Nicaraguan statement -- I think it's just about a year ago -- to the effect that after then Secretary of State Haig authorized the Mexican Foreign Minister to consult the Nicaraguan Government on the possibility of some kind of dialogue or talks, they sent a message up here saying that they were ready to begin talks at any time on any subject of interest to the United States with no preconditions.

The last time I looked we were still in the posture of seeking clarifications and studying a possible response to that.

A I'll look into the question.

Q Have you learned anything about this matter?

A I will look into the question. I won't promise you a specific response to it. Again, I think that the point is that events have moved on a lot since then, including the San Jose Conference.

Q At the time that the story was written, saying that we were going to ignore this and do nothing about it, it was characterized by then Deputy Under Secretary of State Bosworth as ridiculous, and he told a Congressional Committee that this was a very serious matter, that would get our utmost priority and attention. That was a year ago. Could you get an official status report on this?

A I will look into the matter.

Q Alan, you just changed policy a minute ago. (Laughter) My understanding was that --

A I retract the statement.

Q I should retract it?

A No, I said I retract the statement.

Q Didn't you make a list of proposals? I think there were 8-points.

A Right.

Q The first of which, "sine qua non," was the cessation by the Nicaraguans of supporting the Salvadorans, doesn't that remain on the table, or are we saying --

A Sure.

Q -- San Jose is the only way we're going to come to the table with Nicaragua?

A I'm not going to try to get into the question of how a dialogue might proceed, except that those principles are very much central to it. Clearly, continuing Nicaraguan support for subversion in El Salvador is of major concern, as are other questions that have been mentioned in that proposal, for example.

What I was addressing was the context in which we might look at how we would proceed. There has been a regional context developed since that was all first talked about, which we think is very important.

Q Do you have a date yet?

A And I don't think that's contradictory.

Q Okay, pardon me then. Do you have a date when the Santo Domingo Conference is going to take place?

A I don't have a date on the Santo Domingo Conference.

Q Is that what we understand is the regional context now, when you speak of a regional context?

A I'm talking about the principles that were adopted at San Jose. The next meeting that has been talked about is the so-called five-plus-five meeting that might take place in Santo Domingo. I don't know, frankly, what the status of that is. The United States was not included among those to attend, and I would suggest that that would be a question to address to others.

Q We support the initiative, do we not?

A We don't have a problem with that at all.

Q Do we support it with any urgency because of deteriorating --

A I think this is a Central American initiative, and it is up to the countries who are participating and sponsoring it to speak for themselves on that.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the Post story quoting the views of Soviet and foreign political observers that the recent exchanges between the President and Yuri Andropov foreshadow the possible advent of a second cold War. Do you have any views on that?

A Not specifically. The President, the Secretary and other officials have made clear that we would like to have a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, but that there are a number of things that get in the way of moving too far and too fast on that, including primarily Soviet behavior in various places in the world. It's not a secret in terms of our position.

I don't think I want to address a characterization about new cold wars. Certainly, we're not looking for that sort of thing. What we are looking for is improvement, but that requires actions.

Q Was that a prepared statement?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, March 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #55

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1983, 12:34 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One reminder, that there will be a readout on President Kaunda's visit, his meetings at the White House. I would give you a range of between 1:15 and 1:45; I suppose the average would take that to about 1:30. But, anyway, just to remind you of that, in the White House Press Room.

No other announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Anything on Habib's movements, can you tell us?

A Not beyond, really, what I told you yesterday. He's in Israel. As I indicated, he will be scheduled to come back here shortly to fulfill a number of long-standing personal commitments, but I don't have details of those.

Q How long will he be back, and is it anticipated he will go swiftly back to the Middle East again?

A I don't have his schedule beyond what I just gave you.

Q Alan, who was the last American official who had communication with Hussein on the spot, and is anybody going over to see him?

A I don't know the answer to that. I mean, the last American officials may well have been, since there is frequent contact, Ambassador Viets.

Q Have we sent anybody else out quietly to see him in connection with the President's plan?

A I don't know. If you're talking about senior officials, there are all sorts of officials who are travelling all the time.

Q I'm talking for example, do you remember the Veliotes trip prior to September 1, was not announced until later. Has there been such a trip in recent weeks?

A By somebody of that level?

Q Yes.

A I don't know of a trip by anybody of that level.

Q Do you have any comment on the story today in the Washington Post regarding some American promises to Hussein?

A There were a couple of elements to that. Which specifically are you --

Q We start with the first one about the settlements.

A With the settlements?

Q Yes.

A The article this morning about supposed promises. We have, on a number of occasions, stated publicly that the continuation of settlement activity is a major obstacle in the way of broadened negotiations.

Without getting into the substance of our diplomatic discussions with other governments, let me recall for you the President's own words of last September 1. He said "The immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel more than any other action could create the confidence needed for a wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated."

That's really all I think I can respond to you.

Q A follow-up to this. Was anything said to Hussein; in what ways do you plan to persuade Israel to agree to such a freeze?

A Again, what you're asking me to do is to get into the details of the discussions, and I just am not able to talk about that. Our attitude toward the freeze is clear. Obviously, I just articulated it for you, but I don't, I can't, go beyond that in terms of what discussions took place with him or with anybody else.

Q There was another part of the story, to the possibility that the expelled mayors from the West Bank would be representing the PLO in the negotiations.

A Again, on that, I think what I can do really is to reiterate what we have said about Camp David. The President, of course, endorsed the Camp David negotiating process which provides for the participation of Palestinians who are either inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians who are mutually agreeable to the negotiating parties.

Within this context, it's up to the Palestinians themselves to decide in conjunction with Jordan or Egypt whose delegations they would join.

Q Do you see those two mayors as possible candidates?

A I don't think we've expressed a view on that. That, as I say, is up to the Palestinians to decide within the framework of those requirements.

Q Do you have any comment on reports in the Arab press that King Hussein will be coming to the States by mid April?

A No, I don't.

Q I think your answers to Rafi are not a denial at all.

A It's the same thing we've been saying. That anybody who fits into this context of the Camp David requirement, that either is a Palestinian from the West Bank and Gaza, or is a Palestinian otherwise mutually agreed could participate.

Q But as well on the question of assurances to Hussein to persuade the Israelis on freezes.

A I'm not addressing what we may or may not have said. I am not going to get into the question of our diplomatic discussions.

Q What's the latest that you have on the possibilities that Hussein will have a positive announcement?

A I don't have a reading to give you, and I don't think we're going to try to do that. I think we're really going to leave it to King Hussein himself to decide not only what it is he says but when it is he says it and so on, and we're not going to try to anticipate that.

Q One more thing about Habib. Do you have any readout on the status of the negotiations now that he's coming back?

A No, I don't have a readout. As I say, his coming back is related to long-standing commitments here. I would expect that he would take the opportunity while he's here to consult. But in terms of the relationship to the status of the negotiations or what else he might be doing while back here, I just don't have anything further.

Q There are some reports from the Middle East saying that he's coming back to the U.S. empty handed since the talks are again deadlocked. Do you have any comment?

A Our view is that the talks continue, that they are important, and that we hope they will be swiftly, successfully concluded.

Q Alan, the month of March has another day to go, and King Hussein still has not come forth. Is there any disappointment that he wasn't able to fulfill his promise or statement that he would do it? I guess he said, first, March 1, and that was interpreted here as meaning the month of March. Is there now a broader context on March 1 to the rest of the year or something?

A First of all, I don't think I want to address our views in terms of disappointment or whatever. Obviously, we hope that this process, the overall peace process as well as the Lebanese process will move forward as quickly as possible. I think it's important that that happen, and we hope that it will.

As far as dates that he may have used, obviously there were dates mentioned in the Jordanian press and so on. I'm not aware of any formal announcements by King Hussein or anybody else. So I don't think I'm going to address that particular thing.

Q He made a speech and he set it forth quite explicitly.

A Okay. In any case, I don't think I would characterize our position on this except to say that we hope this process will move forward swiftly. We hope that he will find his way clear to join the process.

Q Do you have any comment on the British decision not to expand their forces in the MNF?

A I wasn't aware that was an issue. So, no, I don't have a comment. The British, of course, came in with a unit as a contribution more recently than the others, and I think it was originally for a limited period of time. But I was not aware that they were not going to expand it nor do I have a particular reaction to it.

Q Are you discussing with the Saudis the question of Jordan joining the negotiations?

A Of who joining the negotiations?

Q Are you discussing with the Saudis the question of Jordan --

A Jordan joining the negotiations? I'm not going to get into details but we do have a full dialogue with the Saudis as with many other Middle Eastern governments on the relevant questions.

I think it's fair enough to assume that the question of the Middle East peace process is one of the subjects which is of great concern to both our governments. So it would be a natural topic for discussion.

Q Are the two visits of the Saudi Crown Prince to Jordan related in any way to messages conveyed by the U.S. regarding the peace process?

A I think I would stay away from any comment on discussions between other governments and also diplomatic discussions that we may be engaged in. I know that's not responsive, but I just think that's something I'm going to have to do.

Q New subject. Do you have any comment on the Chinese statements that relations with the United States are unsatisfactory after the August 17 communique of last year, and Secretary Shultz' visit?

A Simply to note that both we and the Chinese are well aware of the issues on which we differ, and Secretary Shultz' visit to China in February was a part of an on-going effort to promote a more stable and enduring Chinese relationship, particularly by confirming common views and interests and by clarifying positions in instances where we differ.

Beyond that, no, I don't have a comment.

Q Do you have anything on the story that we will not grant asylum to the Chinese tennis player?

A No. I have, as you are well aware, not commented on that subject and don't intend to. Let INS make whatever announcement they're going to make. I'll just leave it to them.

Q What about what they said about the ADB, and what you had to say about the ADB?

A I don't have a reaction to that. I said what our position was on the ADB the other day, and I have nothing to add to it.

--MORE--

Q Did you say the INS, or who has made a decision?

A No. I say when they -- Connie indicated that there's a report that we are going to deny asylum. What I am saying is I have no comment on the issue on that report or any other aspect of the issue. It's going to be up to INS to make its announcement.

Q There are some House members in El Salvador that are being quoted as saying they have evidence of a new massacre.

Do you have anything on that?

A I don't. I'm sure that they have taken it up with the Embassy, though, and I'm sure the Embassy will be looking into that question, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on reports that a journalist has been released in El Salvador?

A No. Which journalist are you talking about?

Q T. J. Western.

A Is this a very recent report?

Q Yes.

A Over the wires?

Q I'm not sure about that.

A What I have here I can give you, but it may be -- it really relates to the question of an FBI investigation which was reported in the paper and is provided on the presumption that he was still under detention. So if he has been released, it's out of date.

Q That's of interest anyway.

A That's of interest anyway?

Q Sure. (Laughter)

A I should have known. Okay. Let me just -- It's somewhat in the nature of a status report.

First of all, on any questions regarding an FBI investigation, go ask the FBI. (Laughter) You like that.

Okay. We understand, however, that the Commander of the Salvadoran Treasury Police, Colonel Francisco Moran, said yesterday that he had made a request about some sort of assistance from the FBI in connection with the detention on March 26 of Mr. T. J. Western on suspicion of contact with subversives.

Mr. Western acknowledges that he spoke with a person who works for a Spanish language radio program in San Diego, California, on March 24 to file a report on economic effects of the war in El Salvador.

Mr. Western denies, however, that he said anything about arms trafficking in that report or in other conversations with this person.

My information, Larry, was that he is still being detained by the Treasury Police at their headquarters in San Salvador. A Consular Officer accompanied Mr. Western from his apartment, where he was detained, to the police headquarters on March 26 and has visited him on three occasions since his arrest.

Q What has the FBI got to do with it?

A As I say, apparently, we understand that the Treasury Police Commander made some sort of request for FBI assistance, but you really would have to go to the FBI to get details about what was involved there. I'm telling you what was said apparently in El Salvador.

As far as the U.S. side of it is concerned and what the FBI might be doing, I've got to refer you to them. That's what the FBI has to do with it.

Q Alan, I understand that a member of the congressional delegation that Max mentioned -- the one from New Mexico, his name escapes me -- got into a shouting match, shoving match, or both with a Salvador Government official.

Have you had any report from the Embassy on that?

A I can't tell you whether there's been a report from the Embassy on that. I'm not aware of a report from the Embassy on that.

Q Kenneth Kaunda in the last two days made some pretty starteling statements about South Africa claiming there'd soon be a revolution worse than the French revolution.

Do we have any comment on that, or any assessment that --

A No. I don't have any comment on that.

Q Is there a statement today on Nicaragua?

A I don't have a statement on Nicaragua. What do you -- I mean, there are a lot of things on Nicaragua that are in the newspapers. What are you interested in? I'm not volunteering anything. I don't have anything I'm going to put out to you clearly.

Q Do you know the population? (Laughter)

A I'll have to take that question.

Q Thank you. That's the first one you've taken. (Laughter)

A Go to your public library.

Q At the conclusion of the Security Council debate, are you satisfied with the results?

A I don't have a judgment to offer on that, Jim -- I talked about it yesterday -- and I really am not going to go beyond that.

Q Allegations of cross-border fighting.

A With Honduras?

Q Honduras, Costa Rica, anybody. (Laughter)

A You're not picky. On Honduras, the Nicaraguans apparently have claimed that the Hondurans crossed the border and fired on them. We don't have any knowledge of this incident, but we would call your attention to the Honduran Government's repeated denial that it has built up its forces along the border with Nicaragua, and we believe that all the fighting in that area that may be occurring is occurring within Nicaragua.

As far as Costa Rica is concerned, there have been reports that because of fighting in Nicaragua, Costa Rica is bolstering its border patrols, and that's the issue that I could address here.

The Costa Rican Government has for some time been concerned about its capability to defend its northern border, both because of the tensions with Nicaragua and signs of military activity in the area by various groups.

While one might expect that the border patrol might be at an increased state of alert, given the internal situation in Nicaragua, there has been no significant increase in the number of rural guards patrolling the border area.

Q Copies?

A Yes.

Q Have they asked for any aid from the United States in recent weeks with respect to security assistance or anything like that?

A I'm not aware of any increased requests. Obviously, we have our request before the Congress in a variety of fashions.

Q Are there any U.S. Naval vessels in Nicaraguan waters?

A You would have to address that question to the Pentagon, Mike. I don't know. In Nicaraguan territorial waters?

Q Yes.

A I would think that would be very doubtful, but I would ask you to refer to the Pentagon.

Q New subject. Could you say what is the status of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty? The President mentioned it yesterday and said that there have been numerous violations.

A What he said was that we have reason to believe there have been numerous violations. In 1976 both the Soviet Union and the United States stated separately their intention to observe the 150-kiloton threshold.

A number of Soviet nuclear tests in recent years have produced seismic signals of sufficient magnitude to raise concerns about Soviet observance of the 150-kiloton limit. However, because of the uncertainties in existing means of verification, we cannot conclude with certainty that the Soviets have exceeded the 150-kiloton limit.

Even if we were to implement the provisions of the existing treaties, the improvement would be marginal. When we've raised these specific tests with the Soviets directly, they have told us, stated, that the test did not exceed the threshold.

Similarly, the Soviets have raised questions about several U.S. tests, and this explains the importance that we place on improving the verification provisions of both the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Have they turned down the suggestions for upgrading the verification?

A They have. I think the President indicated yesterday that they indicated they would not go ahead with discussions on improving the verification provisions of those treaties as we had suggested.

We're disappointed in the Soviet response, and we will be discussing it with them more in the future. If they continue to refuse to discuss our concerns, we would be forced to question how genuine their commitment is to effective limitations on nuclear testing.

Q When did they say no to the improved verification procedure?

A I believe it was at the beginning of this week, Hank.

Q You questioned their what? That last --

A We would be forced to question how genuine their commitment is to effective limitations on nuclear testing.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Yes. Sure. Which do you want a copy of so I make sure we get it.

Q What you just read.

A Okay.

Q Angola. Can you tell us anything about the Czechoslovak Government asking the United States to assist in the release of 64 of its nationals captured by the UNITA groups in --

A No. I don't have anything on it, but I would suspect that if there were anything to that, that it would be something we would probably want to handle in diplomatic channels rather than through the press in any case. I will inquire, but I would be somewhat dubious, even if there were something, and I'm not saying there is because I don't know, but I would be dubious that we would want to talk about it.

Q You have no report that the West German Government has asked the United States on behalf of Czechoslovakia?

A I don't. I can't tell you that there hasn't been -- I'm not saying that -- but I don't know of any. I will look into it, but I am somewhat dubious on the nature of the subject that we would -- even if we had something, that we would respond to it.

Q Do you have any comment on the Evans & Novak article this morning?

A On the Brzezinski -- the forgery?

Q Yes.

A Yes, I do. The memorandum in question is clearly a forgery. It was never drafted by Dr. Brzezinski. In view of the KGB's well-known global disinformation campaign against the U.S. and its allies, we can only speculate as to the origins of this memorandum.

Furthermore, suggestions that the U.S. Government in some way influenced the election of Carol Wotyla as Pope are absurd and an insult to the Roman Catholic Church.

Q Can we get that?

A Yes.

Q Can you issue copies of that memo?

A I understand that the memo was printed in an Italian paper*, and further that the Embassy has sent it back to the Department, but it hasn't arrived. I assume you have a Rome Bureau that can pick it out of the paper.

Q Is it in Italian?

A It was in El Tiempo, so I have to assume --

Q Alan, do you have any readout on the meeting between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister of Chile yesterday?

A I think there is a readout, not extensive, but it's in the press office at this point. I don't have it with me, so why don't you check there later.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:56 p.m.)

*According to the Evans and Novak column the article was apparently first published in the Madrid, Spain weekly El Tiempo.

Alexson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BREIFING
~~WEDNESDAY~~ Thursday, MARCH 31, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #56

THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 1983, 12:24 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement for you concerning Vietnamese attacks on refugee settlements.

We are appalled that Vietnamese forces March 31 attacked indiscriminately settlements containing thousands of civilian Khmer who fled to the border from Vietnam's 1978 invasion and occupation of Kampuchea.

We strongly condemn these attacks which are a consequence of Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea in violation of the U.N. charter and U.N. General Assembly resolutions.

While details are not entirely clear, thousands of civilians have been forced to flee for survival from the March 31 attacks.

Just two months ago the Vietnamese attacked a Khmer refugee camp near the Thai border village of Nong Chan, putting to flight some 40,000 civilians and destroying their settlement.

We noted the Royal Thai Government statement of March 31 about the attacks and join the Royal Thai Government in calling on Hanoi to respect Thai territory and in condemning the attack on peaceful civilian inhabitants of the border area.

We applaud the prompt efforts of the Thai Government and international organizations to render humanitarian assistance to the unfortunate victims who have fled into Thailand and will lend our own support to these efforts.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Can we get that, please, Alan?

A Sure.

Q Following up on that, do you have any statement with respect to the visit of an IMF mission to Hanoi?

A I have nothing on that. I don't know anything about it.

Q Have you had time to look at the general response to the President's speech in Moscow? What do you think of it?

A To which response?

Q To how the Soviets have responded to the President's arms control speech.

A I've seen a variety of statements from commentators of various sorts. I haven't seen, if you will, an authoritative response and statement, and I think we've indicated we hope that the Soviets indeed will study this carefully and go to the table in May prepared to negotiate seriously on the proposal.

There was some suggestion in at least one of the commentaries that we saw that talked about this being no different from the zero option, but simply a new wrapping. That simply is not true.

While the President has made clear that zero remains our goal, he has made a very significant new offer in stating U.S. willingness to negotiate an interim agreement that would substantially reduce the level of warheads on land-based, longer-ranged, INF missiles to equal levels on both sides. As I said, we will be negotiating in Geneva for such an agreement. As to Soviet agreement to zero, while that is a long-term objective, it's not a precondition.

Q So what you have seen thus far, you do not take either way as a rejection, criticism or whatever you wish to refer to it?

A I haven't seen an authoritative Soviet statement on that.

Q As Paul Warnke says, could this latest proposal have the result of the deployment of all 572 new American systems?

A Could it have that result?

Q Yes.

A In the absence of an agreement, certainly it would have that result.

Q With an agreement?

A I think there are a lot of numbers between zero and 572. While not all of them would be acceptable because there would have to be a number of considerations looked into, nonetheless, what has happened is that the U.S. has put forward a proposal that there be an interim agreement.

There might be any one of a number of levels that might be more satisfactory than others to the Soviets within that 572 ceiling. As the President said, he wants a number lower than our planned deployments. He wants to reduce below what we're even planning to do in the absence of agreement.

I suppose theoretically it could be an agreement on 572. Clearly, he would like to see it lower than that. He would like to see it at zero, but in terms of this proposal he'd like to see it lower than that.

Q Was the proposal, Alan, given in any form to the Soviets before the President made it public?

A Yes. I think the President indicated that Ambassador Nitze had made that proposal.

Q But apart from that, I mean did Shultz meet with Dobrynin here particularly?

A They had been informed ahead of time that there would be this proposal.

Q In the proposal given to the Soviets, were there as in the President's proposal no numbers specified?

A That's correct.

Q Alan, you mentioned several considerations would come into play about the levels that might be reached, and that kind of phraseology has been used several times in briefings.

Can you tell us what some of those might be?

A I'm not an expert on what might be needed for various kinds of mixes. The fact is that from a military point of view, I am told that there are certain mixes which have -- you have to have a certain kind of mix. Obviously, this is a proposal which includes both Pershings and ground-launch cruise missiles. It is not to exclude Pershings, for example, which has been raised as one thought. It doesn't do that.

The question is what kind of a mix you would have, and I think that that mix would depend on the number you would arrive at, among other things. I can't tell you all the technical considerations, but that certainly is one, that different levels might entail different mixes.

Q We might be getting something here. You're suggesting that whatever numbers might be reached could not include, as long as we're not at zero, elimination of the Pershings.

A There's no intention here to eliminate the Pershing from the mix.

Q It's been understood that the U.S. has asked the Soviets to suggest a number sometime between now and May 17 when the talks resume. There was a report this morning that if by that time the Soviets have not suggested a number, the U.S. would.

A To my knowledge that's not accurate. My understanding is that in fact what we intend to do is to go back to the table in May. While there may be some discussion some place -- that I don't know -- that's where the negotiation is going to take place. That is where Adbassador Nitze indicated to Mr. Kvitsinsky that he trusted they would come back and have a look at this, and that we would proceed with the discussion.

I can't tell you how the negotiation will proceed in terms of who will say what next about specific numbers or anything of that sort.

Q Did Ambassador Nitze specifically ask the Soviet representatives to suggest a certain number?

A I don't know whether he did or didn't, but, again, I think that sort of negotiating detail I would not get into.

Q Are we waiting now for the Soviets to come up with a number before we do?

A   I don't want to try to characterize again how that negotiation would go forward. I think the point here is in general terms that we have put forward a proposal, and having put forward one before which we think is in fact the ideal and which the allies -- the "we" is an allied we -- think is the ideal.

Obviously, the Soviets have real problems with that. In order to try and get something that's better than everything, get something lower than the levels which might otherwise obtain, the President has put forward this suggestion, the proposal, that there be an interim level.

Again, I can't say how the numbers will eventually be entered in. But, as I said before, the Soviets may have a view that certain numbers within that 572, for example, would be better than others. I think that if they have views on that, that's the kind of thing we'd like to hear.

Q   Alan, understanding what you said about not being a technical expert in this field, could you give us some glimmer of why certain mixes are necessary? Is it a technical problem?

A   I can't really. I just don't have the knowledge to do that.

Q   Do you have any comment on the reported speech by Mr. Arafat in Damascus in which he said no to the Reagan plan?

A   Yes, but only to say that we've not seen the full text of what Arafat said. I think that the only thing I could do would be to restate our view that the prospects for peace would be best served through broadened Arab participation in direct negotiations based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

Q   Do you have any reaction to the Soviet statement and kind of warning to Israel regarding possible attack on Syria?

A   Yes. There are a couple of different things, I think, that were involved here. One was a charge, I guess, that Israel is adding to its forces in the Bekaa in preparation for a "piratic strike" against Syria.

We don't have any information which would suggest that a buildup is underway or that Israel is contemplating military action in the Bekaa or against Syria. I think that the Israeli Government has already rejected that charge as well.

Q Are there some other problems?

A No. The whole thing seems to be somewhat -- at least the one Tass piece, seemed rather exaggerated in tone and perhaps calculated to inflame emotions and increase tensions in the region. Such a statement we would view as irresponsible and could only serve to undermine the political efforts of all parties to achieve a "fair, comprehensive settlement" for which the statement itself called.

Q What progress can you report on Mr. Habib's mission?

A I'm not going to try to give a progress report on Mr. Habib's mission. We haven't done that. He is returning. I expect him in the U.S. later today, in fact.

Q Where? When?

A I don't have details on it for you. We have not tried to do that to spare the fellow. But, as I indicated, he's got personal commitments, and, of course, he will be also coming to Washington for consultations before returning to the area.

Q How long do you think he will be around for these commitments and the consultations?

A I'm sorry. I didn't hear that.

Q How long do you think he'll be in the United States?

A I don't know precisely. I don't think it is knowable at this point. Clearly, he will be here through at least part of next week, perhaps beyond that, depending on what he and others seem to think fits appropriately.

Q There are reports in Israel that Prime Minister Begin might come here, possibly to conclude an agreement, failing to do it in Israel.

Do you think it's a good idea at this point?

A I don't think I would express a view on good idea or not in that respect. There's nothing, as far as I know, that's planned at this point.

Q Is Morrie Draper coming back, too, or is he staying with the talks?

A I don't know the answer to that. I believe that Morrie is staying, but let me check, and, if there's something difference from that, we'll post it.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to a report in The Washington Post this morning that the Administration here is sort of apprehensive, or they believe that Israel is aiming toward a de facto partition of Lebanon?

Is there such a feeling going on through the Administration about this?

A I think that we are bending all of our efforts, together with the officials of Lebanon and Israel, in those tripartite talks that are now going on to try to reach agreement there and to move ahead to the rapid withdrawal of all foreign forces, including, of course, the Syrian and PLO forces as well as Israeli forces from Lebanon.

Q Do you consider, though, the talks now are at square number one or even square zero going --

A I saw a quote somebody saying to that effect. I think that, as I say, our characterization would be something else which would be that we're working together with the others to move forward on this.

Q Unless there are some more Middle East questions --

A Let's stay with the Middle East. I think we do have some more.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli Foreign Minister's remarks to Israeli TV in which he said that Egypt is not loyal to the peace agreement and there is no interconnection between the Egyptian issue and the events in Lebanon?

A I was not aware, frankly, of the statement, but, no, I wouldn't have a comment on it. Obviously, we hope that relations between Egypt and Israel are as smooth as possible.

Q Have you discussed with the Israeli Government those Soviet statements and accusations in the last few days?

A I don't know the answer to that question, but, again, that would get us into diplomatic exchange. I just don't know.

Q In light of the release of the Aim 9-L Missiles to Israel, are there any plans for releasing the F-16s that were held up?

A Somebody the other day said Sidewinders. Is that an Aim 9-L?

Q Yes.

A I don't know of any change in the status of the F-16s at this point. It is something that rests with the President.

Q What is the status at this point?

A It rests with the President.

Q It's not under review?

A It rests with the President. It's up to him to make a decision when they'll go.

Q Anything on the Hassan initiative to convene a summit?

A The reports that we've seen don't indicate that there's anything firmly scheduled. But, in any case, the important thing is a decision for King Hussein to enter the peace process.

Q In that connection, and given that report about Arafat, has the U.S. been in any special communication with King Hussein with a view toward his participation in the peace process?

A We have very frequent contact with King Hussein.

Q I understand that, but since the report of Arafat's statement, has there been any new contact?

A I don't think I'd want to go into the schedule of meetings that are held with King Hussein. But, as I said, Ambassador Viets sees him quite frequently. That is a normal and frequent event, so it wouldn't surprise me if that had, indeed, happened. I'm not going to try to track down when they were last in contact.

Q Going back to this alleged preparation of a tyrannic raid into Syria, would the U.S. Government expect to know about Israel's advance preparations in this sort of matter?

A Sometimes we get indications through one means or another what other countries are doing. But the point I made to you is that the Israeli Government has made a very strong statement about this, and we have no reason to think otherwise.

Q You have no reason to think otherwise?

A That's right.

Q Have you any memory?

A Yes.

Q Alan, in light of Arafat's rejection of President Reagan's peace plan and the up-coming meeting between Arafat and King Hussein, what do you anticipate, what do read out of this upcoming meeting?

A I don't think I would care to -- they'll meet, and we'll get a result out of it.

Q Let me follow this. What is your reaction to the violence and the shooting in the West Bank, and the conditions there?

A I'm not aware of the details of what precisely has gone on. I'm aware of a reported arrest, for example, of an editor of an East Jerusalem paper; I gather for alleged incitement. I don't know what the specifics are. But in any case, we've seen the report. We are looking into the matter, but don't have enough information to comment.

Of course, we are very concerned about the wave of unexplained illnesses in the area, and we're not surprised it has led to an increase in political tension.

Q What about the shooting in Hebron of one 16/17-year-old boy, I believe.

A I don't know the specifics of that. We have in the past expressed, and it would obviously apply in this case, great regret over injury and so on, but I don't have a specific comment on that case.

Q Do you have any information about the poisoning cases which were in the schools there?

A No. I say that we're very concerned about the wave of unexplained illnesses in that region.

Q Is the Consulate trying to look into it to find out what's going on there?

A On the illnesses?

Q Yes.

A I don't know that they have the expertise to do that. I think the Israeli Government has been devoting a fair amount of attention and medical expertise to that question.

Q I just wonder if we've offered -- just following that up -- if we've offered our medical assistance?

A I don't know that we have. I'm sure if it were requested that there are a variety of experts, not just in the United States but elsewhere. But I don't know what the Israelis judgment is on what's needed at this point to try and clear that up. That's their call.

On Morrie Draper, he is in Jerusalem, and according to current plans, he is not going to be coming back. So I will not post an answer later.

Q Give us some guidance as to how we should read Habib's coming back?

A Yes. That he's had long-standing plans, as I've said for three days, to go and take care of some commitments that he's had out in another part of the country, and that he's fulfilling those commitments.

Q Obviously, there had been a good deal of hope in the Administration that by the time Arafat and Hussein met there would be genuine progress if not a settlement itself in Lebanon. It obviously hasn't happened.

A We have hoped all along that we would be getting rapid progress, and it hasn't happened.

Q Are you disappointed?

A We would always hope for more rapid progress.

Q You're not describing things as a stalemate at this point?

A No.

Q Just a follow-up. Did you have a readout on today's meetings in the Middle East, because they came out with more upbeat statements afterwards?

A No, I haven't seen that. Again, I would not describe things as at a stalemate, so that would be consistent.

Q Representatives of Grenada held a news conference here in Washington this morning to repeat some of their responses made last week by their U.N. representative and to assert again that they have evidence of a plan to attempt to topple the government there. Do you have any comment on those charges?

A Again, as you well know, we simply do not comment, without leaving an impression one way or another, on allegations of covert activities. I'm not going to violate that stricture.

Q Further, they indicate that their Foreign Minister will be in Washington, will be visiting very shortly. Are there plans for any U.S. officials to meet with him?

A I don't know. Why don't I look into that and see if there's anything on that?

Q Last week you said it was a ridiculous charge.

A The question that was asked by Bill McLaughlin was about a half hour after the report came over that the U.S. was planning to invade Grenada. I said that was ridiculous, and it is. I was later told that it included both an overt and covert allegation. As far as the covert activity is concerned, we don't address those questions.

As far as any suggestion that the U.S. is going to invade Grenada with military forces overtly, it's absurd.

It puts us in a dilemna. You can ask the question each time --

Q (Inaudible) in the position of not saying that the charge that we are going to attempt somehow to overthrow the government of Grenada is a ridiculous charge.

A We don't comment on alleged covert activities. It makes a nice target each time to be able to get that statement out of us, but the fact is that we don't do it, and I'm not going to.

Q It's ridiculous if it's overt that they're going to invade it; but if you're going to covertly invade it, it's "no comment," right? (Laughter)

Q I want to get the answer to that one.

A You had a question?

Q Yes, I do. Yesterday, you posted an answer to a question about Nicaragua. You said that it's your understanding that Nicaragua does not want to go to the five-plus-five meeting. Can you tell us what the basis of that understanding is?

A I don't have specific information. I don't know that -- well, I don't have specific information. Why don't you go ask the Nicaraguans if you think there's a different answer.

Q I honestly have.

A What did they say?

Q They said that in every statement we've made, we've indicated a willingness to take part.

A Good. If they show up, that's fine.

Q Wait, Alan. Are you saying that there is no basis for this understanding, then?

A No. That obviously is the basis of the information available to the folks who work on this problem. If they're going to show up, that's fine.

We have expressed certainly that we think the five-plus-five might be a useful thing to do. I'm not going to try to speak to you on that if you think that the Nicaraguans are saying something else. Let them do something else; that's fine.

Q Alan, would you comment on the Grenadan charge this morning that the United States interfered in the international financial community with that republic's ability to get money for the airport, and at the World Bank also?

A Let me look at that. "Interfered," I'm not sure what that means. You mean, we took a position in the Bank?

Q Lobbied against them getting the money to build the airport or by other means discouraged the international financial community from offering them funds or loans.

A Let me look into it. I don't know what facts might be available on that.

Q Do you have any comment on these various charges out of the People's Republic of China regarding U.S. policies toward China and Taiwan?

Several of them -- some of them have come out of the Chinese media; others seem to come from Chinese officials, and so forth, all within the last few days?

A I've already addressed this to some extent, which was not to say a great deal except to talk about our approach yesterday. You might want to look at what I said on this subject yesterday.

As the Secretary made clear during his visit, we're abiding by the August 17 communique, and we will continue to do so just as we expect the Chinese to abide by the communique.

Regarding the charge in one Chinese newspaper of double-dealing and trying to dicate terms on settlement of the Taiwan question, that is simply not the fact. We have repeatedly made clear that the U.S. does not advocate any plan or formula for resolution of the Taiwan question. We believe this is an issue for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan strait to resolve themselves, and our sole concern is that any resolution be by peaceful means.

Q Copy of that?

A No. I think I'm going to have to ask you to get it from the transcript.

Q Do you have any readout on that earthquake in Columbia -- readout from our Embassy on the extent of the damages?

A I don't. I was told about it just before I came out here. I gather it was a rather severe quake. Somebody indicated to me that it registered something like seven on the Richter scale, but I don't have a readout on it.

Q Do you have anything in response to the statements by President Kaunda of Zambia that the settlement in Namibia should not be tied to this Cuban patrol from Angola?

A Our position on Cuban withdrawal is oft-stated and on the record. You can get it from the record. I'm not going to try to draw the words out of my head at this point except to say that it is a clearly related, although not formally linked aspect, and it is also important.

Q Would you see the fact that, coming from him -- a respected, senior African leader -- is this likely to cause any re-evaluation of the U.S. position or is the U.S. to stick by its --

A I think that this issue was addressed, to a certain extent, in the readout following his meetings at the White House, and I would refer you to that.

A Do you have anything on the murders going on in Zimbabwe, or the statement by the government today criticizing the Bishop's message regarding --

A No, I think we had some guidance on this general question of the Bishop's message and Zimbabwean Government reaction to it the other day. I'd ask you to check on that in the Press Office.

Q Can we get a copy?

A I don't know that we made copies of it, but I think you can get it there.

Q Do you have anything new on El Salvador, specifically on this massacre, alleged massacre in Las Ojas?

A No.

Q Anything with respect to the military situation today, the reports of a major battle?

A Where? Which one are you talking about? They are several battles that --

Q Involving the Bey Oso Brigade in San Isidro?

A I don't have -- yes, I saw, I guess, a wire report on that. No, I really don't have --

Q What battle are you thinking of?

A There are all sorts of battles that are being reported.

Q Defense Minister Garcia is going to sue UPI, he says, for defamation. Do you have anything on that?

A No. Maybe Mike does. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #57

FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 1983, 1:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I appreciate your cooperation with the delay. With only one of me here, I can only do so many things at one time.

I have a couple of announcements. I'd like to note that we're losing another member of the Press Office staff today, Paula Lorfano, who is dressed pink, someplace. Is she not in here? She didn't come in. We delayed it too long for her. Anyway, she starts work Monday as an editor at the Foreign Affairs Information Management Center. Her work in the Press Office has been very much appreciated and she will be missed.

Secondly, there will be a briefing at 3:00 p.m. today here in the Press Room by AID Administrator Peter McPherson and Columbian Ambassador Alvaro Gomez Hurtado on the relief efforts to Columbia.

Finally, the Secretary will speak in Dallas at an April 15, noon lunch, jointly sponsored by the World Affairs Council and the Chamber of Commerce at the Annatole Hotel. The speech is scheduled for 1:00 P.M. Central Standard Time -- that is 2:00 P.M. here. Barring any technical difficulties we would plan to pipe that speech live into the Press Room.

Anyone interested in covering the event should contact Frank Chavez of the Chamber at (214)954-1478.

Q Subject?

A Sorry?

Q Subject?

A I don't have a subject for you at this point.

Q Saturday?

A That is on the 15th; Friday, I think.

Q How does that fall in with his travel plans for Mexico?

A It comes before. (Laughter)

Q Will he be returning to Washington after that speech?

A I don't have details of a schedule to give you at this point.

Q Is he taking the press to Mexico?

A I don't know yet. I told you when I announced it that there was a question both about whether, and if so, how many. We'll have to see.

That's all for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, there are reports that Israel and Lebanon have agreed in principle now for joint patrols in southern Lebanon after Israel withdraws. Do you have any comment on those reports?

A No. I've seen the reports. I'm not going to, again, get into the substance of the negotiations. They do continue, of course. Obviously, if there is progress on whatever front, without confirming that particular point, it is very welcome, but I don't have a comment on that particular report.

Q What is very welcome?

A Any progress in any of the various areas that still are up for discussion, but I'm not confirming that this particular report is accurate or not. I'm just not going to comment on the substance of those talks.

Q You would still be opposed to any military presence in southern Lebanon?

A Our positions haven't changed. I'm not addressing the substance of the negotiation.

Q Alan, yesterday, Reagan seemed to be issuing a decision under the Arms Export Control Act that Israel has violated U.S. law by using American weapons in the invasion of Lebanon. Is that what he meant to do?

A As the President pointed out, under law, any weapons that are supplied must be used only for purposes of legitimate self-defense.

While Israeli forces remain in Lebanon, concerns arise as to whether it would be consistent with the spirit of the law to go ahead with Congressional notification regarding these aircraft, which have been held up since Israel went into Lebanon.

However, the President was not stating that he was making a determination of ineligibility under U.S. law.

Q If the Administration suspects there is a violation under the law, isn't the Administration compelled under the law to so notify Congress, and why then didn't the Administration notify Congress that they think there may be a violation?

A As required by the Act, the President did report to the Congress that a substantial violation may have occurred.

Q When he made the statement yesterday?

A No, no. This goes back, I think, sometime ago; last year sometime.

No determination but -- let me finish -- no determination has been made under the Act as to whether such a violation actually did occur nor is the President under any obligation to make such a determination.

Q Alan, the jets -- the history of the jets begins approximately in May when the Administration notified Congress informally that it intends to supply Israel with 75 jets. Israel moved into Lebanon in June, so logically it would seem that if there was any suspicion of a violation, there would have been notice to Congress since then. You're going back into previous incidents involving other weapons. We're talking about jets.

A Let me just give you the background information I have on that sale.

Israel already has 75 F-16s. The proposed sale of 75 more F-16s, which we first discussed with Israel in 1978, follows on that earlier sale. On June 13, 1982, the 20-day informal Congressional notification period of this second sale of F-16s ended.

In light of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon a week earlier, the President decided not to proceed with formal Congressional notification at that time. Since then he has not felt the situation has changed appreciably enough to proceed with the notification.

Q But he's not notified -- the Administration has not notified Congress, has it, in that period, that they suspect there may be a violation of the law?

A There has been, since Israel went into Lebanon, a notification, as I said, that there may have occurred, as the law requires, there may have occurred a substantial violation.

Q When was that?

A I don't have the specifics. I don't have the date.

Q The only one we know about was sent in June '81 after the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

A Okay, maybe they can get some details on the date of this. I don't think you're right that this was --

Q Are the Sidewinders a special category of weapons to which the law doesn't apply?

A The question of whether -- you've got to listen to the words.

Q I'll listen real hard.

A The question of whether you would apply the same reasoning to other weapon systems is a question of judgment. It's the President's judgment that this should apply to the F-16s. He has not made such a judgment with regard to other weapon systems.

Q You say it's a matter of judgment whether weapons are used for defensive purposes or not?

A No. It's a matter of judgment as to whether this reasoning that I've given you, is in terms of the consistency, with the spirit of the law.

Remember now, we're not talking about whether a determination should or shouldn't go forward. He has made a judgment with regard to the F-16s.

Q Is that a legal judgment or a political judgment?

A I can't --

Q I mean, is there anything in the law that differentiates between F-16s and Sidewinder missiles?

A He has not made a determination.

Q But he's made a judgment. That's your word.

A He's made a judgment.

Q And is that based on a legal interpretation or a political decision?

A It is a judgment, as I said. I think I can give you the language of what I said before -- that while the Israeli forces remain in Lebanon, concerns arise as to whether it would be consistent with the spirit of the law to go ahead with the Congressional notification. That's the judgment that he has made with regard to the F-16s.

Q I don't understand the distinction.

Q Let me come back to something. There have been questions asked since last summer on whether the Administration believed Israel was in violation of its agreement with us in using arms in Lebanon, and your answer has always been that matter is still under review.

A It is.

Q But you're also saying that at sometime a confidential letter of some sort was sent to the Hill, saying a violation may have occurred?

A I don't recall whether it was confidential or not.

Q It was certainly made public.

A We've discussed this issue of notifications to the Hill before.

Q When was this --

A Excuse me, others want to ask questions too.

Q When was this judgment, which the President declared yesterday, when was it made? Was it made recently, or was it made a long time ago and just made public yesterday?

A His judgment about the F-16s has been in effect since he first decided that he wouldn't go forward with the notification to the Congress.

Q It never was declared that it has any connection to Israel's staying in Lebanon?

A I can only tell you that the situation has not changed.

Q How does this decision that the President has announced jive with the statement by Secretary Shultz and other high officials that he would not use pressure on Israel?

A I don't think it's inconsistent. This question of holding off on the notification to Congress on the F-16s has been in effect for many months now.

Q Alan, what do the Israelis have to do to get the F-16s now? Is it a pure and simple withdrawal by Israel from Lebanon?

A I don't think I could try to give a judgment on that. It's the President's decision.

Q Alan, if a decision hasn't been made, what's the exact status of the planes now? Are they under review? They're again under review?

A What? The planes?

Q Yes.

A No, that's up to the President to decide.

Q But your statement that the President made this judgment in June does not square with what I recall has been the basic standing guidance that you've using here and at the White House for several months, which has been that this is a matter for the President to decide and that in due course he will decide it.

Now you're saying he decided it some months ago.

A I can only leave you with the words I've given you. He made a judgment at the time to hold off. That is still his judgment. And if he wants to change that, and in his judgment circumstances warrant it, then he will make that decision.

Q The notification of a possible violation went to the Hill by the President after the invasion -- the dates you don't have -- but that's after the invasion; correct?

A I will be checking on the dates.

Q But it has to be after the notification?

A Sure.

Q Doesn't that related to cluster bombs?

A No, there was a separate item.

Q Could you take another shot at what is clearly an unsatisfactory response? On reconciling what the Secretary has said, for example, "We don't have any plans to try to maneuver people in the peace negotiations by talking about withholding aid, or anything like that. I think the emphasis has to be on the positive side of this, and that's where it has to be." That's Secretary Shultz on September 5.

How do you reconcile the withholding of the F-16s, or whatever justification you set forth, with what the Secretary has said here, as I've just read it?

A You're going to have to make the characterizations of it. The decision to hold off on the notification to Congress -- what was the date of that thing you just read me, the statement?

Q The date is September 5.

A Okay. And the President's decision to hold off on notification to the Congress pre-dates that. So the point I'm trying to make is that that is a decision that was made. The attitude expressed by the Secretary still remains in effect.

Q In other words, the President may have already reached this judgment and Shultz did not know what he was talking about?

A No, not at all. I don't buy your characterization of the inconsistency.

Q Did Shultz know at that point about that violation, the President had reached at a possible violation?

A I don't know at that point. I would like to find out. I think Rush is checking to see what the day was it was sent up.

I can't tell you that the decision may have intitially been reached in terms of looking at that precisely in the terms of the possibile violation; I can't tell you that. But in any case, that is certainly where we are as of today.

Q Do we have anything on Habib's meetings this weekend; what's his schedule?

A He was meeting extensively today with the Secretary and others. I don't know what meetings he may have over the weekend. I don't know that he has any long meetings scheduled.

Q Any chance he'll speak to us or brief us?

A I'm sure not.

Q Alan, you indicated that you didn't feel this was pressuring the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon. But if this, in fact, has been a long-standing decision, now the only change is that President has directly linked it to Lebanon.

What other meaning can you attach to it if not to pressure the Israelis?

A It is not a change in the situation.

Q There is clearly a change in that it has been linked to Lebanon.

Q If this is a legal or political decision -- is part of the effort to explain this, if it's a legal decision we ought to be able to expect something fairly soon on a review that's been underway since last June or thereabouts.

If it's a political decision, it explains why we haven't yet had a decision. Can you give us some indication where the review is and whether there might be some --

A No.

Q Is there eventually going to be a finding on it?

A As I say, there's no obligation to make a determination, so I can't tell you. I can't get out a crystal ball and tell you that.

Q If now F-16s are being held up, some determination is going to be required at some point?

A Not necessarily, with regard to the law. That may or may not follow.

Q Can you tell us when, if you haven't already, when the Secretary of State became aware of the President's judgment which you say was communicated to Congress at some point?

A The F-16 --

Q No, that there may be a violation.

A It depends on when that notification was sent out. I don't have the date on that, but I'm sure he was aware of it when it was sent. Again, I can't put it in terms of his --

Q Reading the morning newspapers, I get the impression the Secretary heard about it when we did yesterday, about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

A I can't help what you're reading in the newspapers.

Q Are the papers all wrong? Has the Secretary known this all along?

A That the President notified the Congress that there may have been a serious violation? No, he didn't learn about that yesterday.

Q When did he? Did he learn it when Congress was notified?

A I'm not sure whether he was Secretary when the Congress was notified.

Q You see, we have all in our files, and you've read some and there were others that some of us have gathered today, statements by the Secretary saying that pressure cannot bring -- for instance, I have one in July where he said, "Pressures and threats are not in my mind the best way to bring about stable and lasting solutions in the Middle East."

A There's no change in that.

Q This isn't pressure, then, is it?

A I have not characterized it as pressure.

Q If you were an Israeli, would you feel pressure if 75 jets were being withheld from you?

A I don't think I'd try to speculate on that.

Q Alan, I'm confused. You said the President made --

A How can you be confused, John?

Q You say the President made a -- I have two questions -- the President made a determination of this sort back in June.

One, was there any public announcement at any point that he had so informed the Congress of his finding that this is a violation?

A There may not have been --

Q You were asked several times about this. Do you recall --

A I recall discussing this issue here at some length.

Q That there was such a notification. The second question is this: Why, if he made this determination at that time, have Spokesmen for the Department of State been saying, I would say on the average of at least once a week, that this is a matter that is under consideration by the President and he hasn't made a decision about it yet? Could you go back and read us the guidance?

A Are you through with the question?

Q Yes.

A Thank you. The thing that the President has had, that we said is up the President -- let's put it that way -- is a question of when the notification should go to the Congress. That hasn't changed. That is still up to him. He has laid, obviously, some points about how he will go about that decision, and what he feels applies here. There's nothing --

Q This is a change then?

A Wait a minute. Back in July we confirmed -- and I think if you check, I recall that this was used -- that a report was sent to the Congress but it was classified, and that we didn't discuss the specifics.

I don't have more specifics, in fact, to discuss with you about it at this point. If you go back into the record, I think you will find that --

Q Do you have a date?

A The guidance is dated July 15. I don't recall whether it was used on that particular day, but I do recall using it at about that time.

Q Was that report a Presidential report?

A Whether it was sent specifically by the President or not, it comes under Presidential authority. I can't tell you; I don't recall.

Q You just said that the question is still when the notification will go to the Congress; is that correct? That's the President's decision?

A That's the President's decision, and it relates to the statements I have given you here regarding to the law and his judgments under that law.

Q The issue here is not whether Israel will receive those 75 F-16s; the issue is simply when that formal notification of the sale will go to Congress?

A I think that's a fair statement.

Q So Israel will get the planes eventually?

A As I said, I think your statement was a fair statement.

Q Alan, do you know what context we were told of the report that had gone to Congress in July? Was it as a report on the invasion, or was it a report on the status of aid, or a report of what?

A You're asking me to reconstruct something that you were also here for. I think, basically, it was in the context of Israeli actions in Lebanon which were obviously in July, the subject of considersable discussion in this room. That's as much as I have on that.

Q Is the President's statement designed to get the Israelis out of Lebanon?

A I don't think I could speak to the purposes. I wasn't sitting inside the President's head as to why he got a question yesterday. He answered the question. Obviously, it is his desire that all the foreign forces get out of Lebanon.

Q Most estimates are that delivery couldn't begin before early 1985 at the earliest. Do you happen to know if this delaying tactic that the Administration is now engaged in will necessarily delay delivery should the Administration decide -- within a few months, for instance, if Israel's nice about things in Lebanon -- to go ahead with the F-16s?

A I'm not a technical expert on that.

Q Is it the President's intention, the Administration's intention -- I guess I include Mr. Shultz -- is the Secretary -- because you can't speak for the President, you're the State Department -- is it the State Department's intention to delay delivery of jets to Israel?

A The decision, obviously, has the effect of delaying the notification to the Congress. I'm not enough of an expert to know what the consequences are for delivery dates.

Q Alan, I want to ask something based on the wording the President used. He said while those Israeli forces are in the position of occupying another country, we are forbidden by law to release those planes.

Is the Israeli violation occupation, or is it a specific action in July, or what was it?

A I'm going to leave you with the President's statement on that.

Q Is this finding, or this position taken by the President, one of the President complying with the law as he understands it, or is it a case of Presidential pressure on the Israelis to pull out of Lebanon?

A I think, again, the President addressed this yesterday. I don't have anything beyond what he said on that.

Q Is there any relationship between the President's statement and the State Department's comments today that has anything to do with the difficulties that have arisen over the question of Soviet equipment, Soviet threats, and so on against Syria?

A I would say that we've spelled out the context, and the President spelled out the context yesterday in which this issue is being addressed.

Q Is this an oblique way of saying to Moscow, "Don't worry, the Israelis aren't going to attack Syria"?

A We've expressed our views on that quite frequently.

Q Can you give us any guidance as to why the President chose yesterday to declassify essentially this information?

A Again, in a sense I would question the assumption of your question. That is to say, that while the letter was classified -- and we have not discussed the details of it -- the fact that a report regarding a possible violation went forward was made public at the time. That was on the record, so I don't accept the fact that that was a secret.

Q But the information was classified --

A But I haven't given you, nor do I have authority to give you, the text of that notification.

Q Didn't the President do that yesterday when he asked for withdrawal of troops from Lebanon?

A No. I wouldn't interpret it that way.

Q Didn't you say, yourself, the gist of the contents, that the Israels may have violated --

A The law --

Q Is that the gist of the contents?

A The law requires that if there may have occurred a substantial violation of the terms of sale, that has to be reported to the Congress. In that sense, yes, but beyond that, no.

Q If the question had not been put to the President yesterday in the Q&A part of his appearance in L.A., would he have made this public?

A I have no idea.

Q Is, then, this disclosure the result of a random question?

A Again, I don't have any idea. It's cutting the other way on the question. I don't know.

Q Has there been any feedback, officially or otherwise, from the Israeli Government to this Government that you can tell us about?

A I don't have anything to give you on that. If there were, it would be private, diplomatic exchange.

Q I don't suppose it would be private if somebody requested a meeting and would like to come in and see somebody to talk about it.

A I think we often don't talk about the subjects of meetings.

Q I know you don't, but you often talk about whether there will be a meeting.

A I don't have anything.

Q Why don't I put my question?

A I don't have anything for you on the subject.

Q Let me try the question, and then you cannot answer it. Has the Israeli Government requested to see somebody in this Government about the President's disclosure yesterday?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you tell us specifically who on the Hill received this notification in July? Was it the Senate Foreign Relations, was it the entire Senate, was it the House Foreign Affairs?

A We can check. There is a standard procedure as to how notifications of this sort are handled. We can check on that. Why don't you check with the Press Office later? We'll have that information.

Q Without going into the specifics of what the letter contained, when Israel bombed the Osirak reactor in June, there was no attempt to keep that notification secret.

Why in general terms was this one classified?

A Sometimes things are handled one way; sometimes another, depending on circumstances. I don't mean to be facetious. I'm serious. It depends on circumstances.

I have the briefing here from July 16 where Dean Fischer was asked about the letter having been sent up to the Hill about use of arms. He said, "I can only confirm that such a report was sent to the Congress today." Then there were questions about Senate Foreign Relations Committee people saying they received it last night. There was some confusion, I guess, about the exact timing of that, but, in any case, the point is it was made public, on the record, on the 16th.

Q Can you do better?

A That's exactly what I had. The guidance that Dean used is what I gave you.

Q This is the letter that was sent under Presidential authority that said the Israelis may have violated?

A It was in accordance with the law, and you can see what the wording of that law is.

Q On the day Shultz was sworn in.

A Is it?

Q Yes.

A Okay.

Q Alan, I don't understand your reluctance to characterize the nature of the decision if the President, himself, says, "We are forbidden by law." Isn't that a legal decision there?

A Again, I would leave you with the words I've already given you on this in terms of the determination and the way in which this decision came about?

Q Do you have anything further that you might say, getting back to another question about Begin's potential visit?

A No. I said the other day there's no plan for such a visit, and I stand by that.

Q Under the terms of the legislation, the President's explanation for his action, does that conform in fact with the stipulations under the law that while these forces are in a position of occupying another country we are forbidden by law to release those planes?

A Again, I think that the President addressed this question yesterday, and I'm not going to go further on this.

Q Somewhat related, the President in that Q&A spoke in terms of being unable to move ahead with his initiative until the Lebanon issue was resolved.

There's always been some confusion, at least in my mind, if the Administration thought it could move on both fronts simultaneously, even though one effects the other.

Is any effort to proceed on his initiative frozen now? Will there be no further effort by the Administration to bring about negotiations until the Lebanon issue is resolved, or, indeed, are they moving on both fronts?

A No. I think that efforts are moving on both fronts. The question is that, indeed, as we have said many times, there certainly is an impact of development in one of the areas on the other.

Q Alan, can we have a filing break, please?

A Filing break? Anybody object? Okay. Filing break.

Q Is it fair to say on the basis of the President's explanation of this action that these are sanctions taken by the U.S. to prod Israel to leave Lebanon?

A I am not going to try to characterize them in that way. I would leave you with the words that I've already given you and what the President said yesterday.

Q I have another question. A month ago March 1 in testimony on the Hill by Pentagon Assistant Secretary Sanchez and Mr. Enders it was said that the Salvadoran forces were in a state of crisis and they could possibly run out of ammunition if additional military aid wasn't forthcoming in 30 days.

Can you give us some reading on if they have enough ammunition there or what?

A I don't have that kind of information. I believe if you go back, you would see that -- I think it was Mr. Sanchez who talked about it, and would refer you basically, therefore, to the Pentagon. But, as I recall it, he talked about under certain scenarios and levels of fighting that that could be a problem, and I think probably in certain categories. Beyond that, I can't go.

Q Back to the Mideast -- and this may be a broadening of another question from earlier -- is there any concern in the Administration that there is some potential, or was as of yesterday, some potential for heightened tension or conflict in the region between Israel and Syria or involving the situation in the West Bank or elsewhere?

A I think we're always concerned about the possibility of heightened tension. After all we're spending considerable effort to helping obtain a broad Middle East peace, and in order to deal precisely with that concern and allow the various countries and peoples in the region to live in peace and security.

Q Can I ask something related to the same region? Some weeks ago you posted a response saying the Department knew nothing about a situation which certain Americans, as well as others, were involved in an attempt to rebuild the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem on or near the site of the Dome of the Rock.

Has that situation changed at all?

A No.

Q Can I ask you whether Michael Ledeen still has any relationship to the Department?

A I don't know.

Q On Poland, does or will the U.S. Government oppose the visit to Poland of American Jews on the anniversary of the Waraw ghetto uprising? Would you like to take the question?

A I'm not aware of their being an issue particularly.

Q Is there any problem with Jews traveling to Poland for that anniversary that you know of, American Jews?

A I'm not aware from our point of view of any problem.

Q David Ensor wanted me to ask you.

A Give my best to David.

Q On Cuba, Senator Wiecker on his return from a meeting with Castro said today that three American prisoners are going to be released, and also said that Castro expressed a willingness and a desire to sit down with the United States and talk over some of the problems.

He says he's communicated with the State Department. Does this Department have a response?

A I'm not aware of that report, so I can't say. I think I'd have to pass on that.

Q You're also unaware of the three prisoners being released?

A I'm unaware of it, but there have been various prisoners released. I think there were a couple released not very long ago also, so there have been some prisoners released. There are also a number who are still held, and I think if you checked in the Press Office you could probably get some numbers on that.

Q Do you have any comments on the anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist statements made yesterday in Moscow?

A Yes, I do. The so-called appeal against Zionism is part of a continuing Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at both the State of Israel and Jewish activists within the Soviet Union.

While this particular statement also purports to reject anti-Semitism, in fact the basic thrust of this and other anti-Zionist propaganda is anti-Semitic.

Code words such as "chauvinism," "racial intolerance," "ideological sabotage," and "perfidy," which are words used in the statement, all evoke old ethnic stereotypes and are clearly aimed at Judaism, Jewish cultural traditions and those Soviet Jews who have sought to practice their religion and culture or who have attempted to emigrate to Israel.

It is particularly deplorable that the Soviet regime should now enlist some people with Jewish ancestry to participate in their anti-Semitic diatribe.

Whatever the source, anti-Semitic propaganda under the guise of anti-Zionism or any other cover, is absolutely unacceptable.

The United States Government calls upon the Soviet Government to cease its so-called anti-Zionist propaganda campaign since such a campaign will only inflame anti-Semitic prejudices.

We also call upon the Soviet Government to end those discriminatory practices in education, employment and elsewhere that deprive Soviet Jews of their just and equal rights in Soviet society.

Q May we have that?

A Copy available. Sure.

Q On that, are you saying there -- which it sounds like you may be saying -- that any anti-Zionism is anti-Semitic, or that some anti-Zionist statements are a cover for anti-Semitism?

A I think that this speaks for itself. Whatever the source, anti-Semitic propaganda under the guise of anti-Zionism or any other cover is absolutely unacceptable.

Q Back up a couple of sentences, and there's something there which may not be quite so clear.

A I'll leave you with the statement. You can use it.

Q Could I change the subject? Mr. Moynihan and several other members on the Hill are questioning the legality of some of our government's activities in Central America, particularly Nicaragua and particularly in reference to the CIA.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. As to the alleged activities, as I've said frequently, we don't address those from here. He talked about the Senate Intelligence Committee and appropriate Committees on the Hill looking at the question. I think that that's something that's obviously perfectly within their writ to do.

Q So my question won't seem self-serving, CBS News has film of American equipment and weapons sold, so say the American companies, directly to the Pentagon, which is now in Honduras and Nicaragua and being used by the rebels.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I have a number of things I guess I could say, but I think that given the subject, which is again supposedly covert activity, I think I'd have to stay away from it.

I would ask you to think to yourself, though, how that fits into the question of covert activities. It sounds rather strange to me.

Q Back to the Middle East, do you have anything regarding the Arafat-Hussein meeting that's supposed to take place tomorrow? Anything you hope to see come out of it? Any comments on it at all?

A What we hope comes out of the whole process, obviously, is King Hussein coming to the table together with Palestinian representatives, and we get moving in discussing the peace process.

Specifically what might come out of the meeting between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat, I don't propose to try to give you any speculation on that.

Q Alan, Moynihan raised the legality question, and I've heard at least one senior Administration official insist that this Administration is following the law.

A I have no quarrel with that. This Administration is following the law. But if he wants to have Congressional oversight function operate and look at that question, that's obviously his right.

Q If the Administration is following the law, how does the Administration interpret the law?

A I'm not going to try to get into the question of what might or might not constitute appropriate intelligence activities. That's for this whole process with the Congress to sort out.

Q Just one other -- I hope it's not interpretted as a silly question -- but does the Administration take a view as to whether the United States participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion 20 years ago?

A I don't have something to offer you on that. No. I'm not going to go into it.

Q Can I explain the relevance?

A Afterwards you can explain the relevance. (Laughter)

Q Do you have any reports that counterinsurgents may be making more progress in Nicaragua than the Nicaraguans have so far admitted?

A I don't have a progress report to give you.

Q Alan, back to your statement on anti-Semitism. Until you define what it means, I can't determine whether it's an anti-Semitic statement.

Is it your belief -- and I ask this because there is a distinction --

A Then you didn't listen very carefully.

Q There is a distinction in the United States Constitution between religious beliefs and political beliefs and the rights according thereto.

Is it your belief that Zionism is a political movement or a religious movement?

A I don't intend to try to define Zionism, but I think that what we've made very clear -- and I think I'll stick to this instance of what the Soviets have done -- is that their anti-Zionist propaganda equates to anti-Semitism. I don't intend to --

Q Do you intend to have any broader application except in the specific case of the Soviets?

A I am not going to take it beyond that in terms of this statement.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded 1:57 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #58

MONDAY, APRIL 4, 1983, 12:24 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement and one statement.

The announcement is that on Monday, April 11, Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam will speak at a luncheon sponsored by the World Affairs Council of St. Louis. The topic of his address is "New Realities in the Middle East." The luncheon will be held at 12:00 noon at Stouffers Riverfront Towers in St. Louis. For further information you should contact Helen Morrin with the St. Louis World Affairs Council at Area Code (314) 361-7333.

Statement on Vietnamese attacks on refugee settlements. Since our statement of March 31 condemning attacks by Vietnamese forces on Khmer civilian refugee settlements, we have seen reports that indiscriminate attacks on refugee camps have continued along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

We condemn Vietnamese actions which defy humanitarian principles and which have increased still further the suffering of Khmer who fled to the border to escape Vietnam's occupation of their country.

We note the joint ASEAN statement of April 1 about the attacks and join ASEAN in condemning unprovoked and indiscriminate attacks by Vietnamese armed forces against Khmer civilians and threats to Thai territory.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Can I just follow that up? Do you have any comment on a report that Thai aircraft attacked Vietnamese positions inside Cambodia?

A I don't have confirmation of that. I've also seen reports that I can't confirm that Vietnamese forces made some incursions across the border, too.

All I could say is that we are concerned about the escalating level of violence which has been instigated by Vietnam.

Q In light of that, have the Thais asked for any additional military assistance or is such a thing under consideration?

A The Thai Government has not asked for further U. S. assistance, but we will consult closely with the Thai Government on how we can be of assistance.

Q So we might initiate a proposal?

A I think we're in consultations with them on this issue in general, and as a general matter of how we can be of assistance. I'm not sure that we're going to propose something specifically in terms of further assistance -- that is, military aid -- but it's a question of talking with them to see how we could be of help in general.

Q Is our military assistance agreement with Thailand invoked in this in any way?

A I don't think there's been any formal invoking of any agreements here, but, obviously, we're concerned with what's going on, and we're following it very closely.

Q Alan, what can you tell us about asylum granted to the Chinese tennis player?

A Nothing, really. I understand an announcement was made this morning at the Justice Department about an INS determination, and I have to refer you to Justice for any further questions.

We have not gone into the substance of what our views were as transmitted to INS. I'm not going to do that now.

Q What do you mean? I don't understand.

A This is up to INS to comment on is what I answered.

Q Does the State Department play a role in this, or does it make a recommendation, or --

Q Do you expect any clear announcement from the King today, tomorrow --

A I don't want to try to speculate on that.

Q But you expect --

A I don't want to try to speculate what he might do and when he might do it. I think we'll leave that to King Hussein.

Q There are reports that they're going to issue a joint communique later today. Do you expect you might have a comment later on today?

A I frankly hadn't seen that, but, in any case, I guess we would have to see what the nature of any statement was before we knew whether we would have anything to say about it.

As I indicated, it may well be that until there is a final announcement by His Majesty, that we would not have a specific reaction to offer, but I can't say in the hypothetical.

Q Again, there are reports in the Jordanian press about a phone call from President Reagan to King Hussein in which the President is purported to have pledged to bring about a freeze on Israeli settlements in the West Bank if Hussein comes in to the talks. I know we've had this theme now for many weeks.

Can you say anything more about what the extent of the American commitment is on this?

A No. I can't, except to point to what the President said in his speech on September 1 about the importance of a freeze on settlements and to underscore that, but beyond that I don't think I could properly get into the question of conversations that might have taken place.

Q How many calls took place between Reagan and --

A I don't know. I've seen reports the White House apparently has confirmed a call at the end of the week, I think on Friday. I saw a report this morning in the press suggesting there had been a second call on Saturday. I simply don't know, and I would have to refer you to the White House on that.

A Yes. In the past we've indicated that we sent our views over to INS as is standard procedure, but we're not commenting on what those views were.

Q Why is that?

A It's an internal intra-governmental matter, and we don't comment on those sorts of things.

Q Is that a normal procedure in these matters?

A Yes. Very much so.

Q Did you hear from the Chinese?

A The Chinese Government has been officially informed, I understand, following the Justice Department's announcement this morning.

Q Do you have any views on how this decision might affect U.S.-Chinese relations?

A I wouldn't speculate on that, and I also wouldn't try to speak for the Chinese Government on what their reaction might be.

Q Have they responded to the notification?

A I don't know what transpired when we notified them, and, in any case, again we would be getting into diplomatic conversations, and I don't propose to do that.

Q How were they notified?

A I don't know specifically how that was done. It was to be handled here, though.

Q Any comment on the talks between Hussein and Arafat?

A No. Not really. We understand that the consultations are continuing, and it would be premature to try to offer any statements before there was some sort of final result. I'm not sure, in any case, short of King Hussein making an announcement on whatever decisions he might make that we would have any comment.

Obviously, we remain hopeful that King Hussein will soon be able to make an affirmative decision to join broadened negotiations to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Q What is the basis of your hope that there will be a positive outcome in this? How are you keeping in touch with what is going on in Amman?

A We have an Embassy there that remains in touch. The basis of our hope is unchanged. That is, that the President has put forward a very serious and well-thought-out proposal. King Hussein has indicated that he would hope to be able to come into the negotiations, but that he needs to have appropriate consultations and support, and it is our hope that he will be able to reach an affirmative decision on this.

Q Any comment on what Arafat said in Amman to the fact that nothing short of the Fez plan is acceptable?

A The President continues to believe strongly that the best and only viable way to achieve peace in the area is through the process of broadened negotiations which he described in his September 1 speech.

Q Alan, do we think that Hussein should step forward and participate in broad negotiations even if Arafat doesn't give him a green or yellow light?

A I don't think it's for me standing here to make that kind of a judgment or express that kind of a judgment.

Q Have you been getting any signals, Alan, that the King will not come in before something is done by the Israelis, such as the settlements and the withdrawal from Lebanon?

A Again, in terms of any private conversations, I'm not going to get into that. You have what has been said on the record by the King and by other Jordanians. I leave it to you to look at that.

Q Do you see any positive things coming out from calling an Executive Committee of the PLO for a meeting in Jordan and the call for an Arab Summit to discuss the the next step in the peace process?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the story today in The New York Times about the possible sale of 1200 M-1 tanks to Saudi Arabia?

A Yes, I do. The story covers a number of points, and it contains many inaccuracies. We've had a long history of security cooperation with Saudi Arabia based on mutual intersts. We have sought to assist the Saudis in enhancing their defense capabilities with a view to improving their own and regional security.

As one aspect of this cooperative relationship, we have agreed to provide a demonstration of the M-1 tank and the M-2, M-3 APC's in Saudi Arabia this summer at Saudi expense. This demonstration is at Saudi request following a similar demonstration in the U.S. last year.

There are a number of Saudis in training at Fort Knox on the M-1 in connection with this demonstration. We have no formal request for the M-1 tank from Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have asked only for a demonstration.

Should we receive a request for the M-1 from Saudi Arabia, this will be considered in accordance with established procedures, including consultation with the Congress. In the absence of a request, it would be inappropriate to speculate on any numbers.

We have no plans for stockpiling M-1's in Saudi Arabia, nor have we ever discussed the matter with the Saudi Government. This assertion is unwarranted speculation.

With respect to Mr. Halloran's quotation of the 1 March Defense guidance, that is a classified DOD document, and any question about it should be addressed to the Pentagon.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, while they haven't asked to be sold the tanks, have they asked for specifications on the tanks?

A I don't know about specifications. They have already, as I said, had one demonstration in the U.S., and they've asked for a demonstration there. I think one would have to draw from that that there is some interest in the tank, but I can't take it beyond that.

Q It's hard to say, and you partly answered the question. I would say that the fact that there's been one demonstration and another planned shows an active interest.

Have they indicated informally that they might want to buy the tank?

A I don't know.

Q Any comment on Israeli reaction to the so-called poisonings on the West Bank?

A - No. As we have indicated before, we have been asked by Israeli medical authorities to send a team of doctors to identify the nature of the illness which has struck several hundred Palestinian school children on the West Bank.

In view of our real humanitarian concern for those afflicted, we have sent a team from the Centers for Disease Control, the CDC, to Israel this last weekend to investigate the nature of the illness. Requests for this type of service by CDC are not unusual. There are standard procedures for study of outbreaks whose causes have not been determined, and CDC has vast experience and substantial international reputation in this field.

Q What's CDC?

A The Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta.

Q Is this a government agency?

A I think it is a government agency. Yes.

Q Will these reports be made available to Arab Governments and our representatives on the West Bank?

A I can't get ahead of the game in terms of what would be done with the reports. I have no sense that we're talking about something which is being done secretively. After all, we're talking about it, the Israelis have been talking about it, so I don't have any reason to think that there would be something --

Q The Arabs are apparently this morning talking about asking for U.N. involvement, and would we support that?

A We're aware that there have been various calls for international involvement, investigation. As for our own involvement, though, the pressing humanitarian aspects of this problem dictate that speed and scientific quality of the work to be undertaken are of the utmost concern.

We are, of course, advising the relevant international organizations of our actions. While there are these calls, our response is entirely appropriate in view of our legitimate humanitarian concern for the peoples affected by the phenomenon.

I can't speak beyond that to what might happen in terms of one international organization or another getting involved. We're doing what we can at this point.

Q You say it's standard for the CDC to send a team. Can you give an instance in the past where they have?

A Why don't you call CDC and ask them? This is my understanding of what the situation is.

Q You say this was an Israeli initiative that the team is sent?

A They have requested it.

Q Did anybody else request it? The Arab Governments?

A I'm not aware of any other requests.

Q Alan, copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Did you have any initiative maybe last week or early over the weekend possibly that you offered any assistance besides that Israeli Government requested the CDC to go there? The United States Government has technical knowledge and know-how about going and investigating there what's happening.

A I'm not sure I understand your question.

Q Did the United States offer anything by its own volition without being asked?

A I don't know what the specifics of the back and forth were. In any case, at this point there is an Israeli request.

Q Let me ask you another question. It's almost relevant to this. Is the United States offering any technical assistance to assist the Gulf States in clearing and getting rid of the oil spillage in the Gulf waters?

A Yes. I do have something on that. In response to an urgent request from the Government of the United Arab Emirates, the two Co-chairmen of the U.S. National Response Team, which is the permament interagency organization responsible for responding to marine spills of oil or hazardous substances, departed for Abu Dhabi on April 2. Two other members of the response team will be joining them today.

The purpose of their going to the UAE is to advise that government on the best means of mitigating the worst effects of the oil spill should it threaten the UAE's Gulf coast.

While in the Gulf area, members of the team would be available to consult with other governments that might seek their advice and with the regional organization for the protection of the marine environment which is based in Kuwait.

In response to requests received from several Gulf states, we're working on arrangements to provide them with whatever LANDSAT satellite photography may be available that shows the extent and direction of the oil slick.

Q Copy?

A Yes. We can make copies.

Q Alan, are there any Americans on that team?

A This is a U.S. National Response Team.

Q Do you have anything on Habib's consultation here?

A No. He's still here, or was as of this morning. Still carrying on his consultations here before he proceeds to his other business.

Q Could you possibly just define what is our policy at this point toward the Nicaraguan Government and the extent of our support for it as well as our support or lack of support for the various covert activities that are going on -- or not so covert activities going on against it?

A Our concerns about activities of the Nicaraguan Government are well documented and on the record, and I don't think we need to go through all of those. It includes, obviously, their support for subversion outside of Nicaragua, their military buildup, the quashing of pluralism at home and religious freedom and so on.

I might note, for example, that the Easter Sunday broadcasts were forbidden unless they had been precensored. As I understand it, the Church authorities in Nicaragua refused to go along with that.

But this is all well documented, on the record. We have sought, particularly through the medium of the San Jose principles, to get a regional approach to the problems. As I think I've indicated before, the most recent initiative on this was the so-called five-plus-five proposal which I understand thus far has not yet been fully booked, and some indications that the Nicaraguans in fact have not indicated a willingness to participate in that. We'll see. It was indicated the other day that perhaps that wasn't the case. If it isn't the case, the Nicaraguans can always let the proposers of the five-plus-five conference know.

As far as alleged covert activities are concerned, as I said last week, I sort of stand up here as a punching bag on that issue. It is our standing, and has been for many, many years, the standing position of the U.S. Government not to comment on alleged intelligence activities, and I am not at liberty to vary from that policy.

Q Do you have any response to allegations that the Administration is in violation of the Boland Amendment?

A I think I indicated last week that the Administration is not in violation of the law, and, obviously, the various Congressional committees which have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities are free to look into this question. I expect from what I've seen in the press that they will be doing that.

-- MORE --

Q How does the State Department interpret the intent of the Boland Amendment?

A I don't think I'd try to go to intent on that. This is a matter -- the Boland Amendment is on the record. It's an open amendment. It talks about what is restricted, what's prohibited. Any discussion about what might or might not be prohibited, I think, really, should remain at this point for discussion between the Administration and the appropriate committees because it requires getting into rather specific topics, and I don't think I will start down that particular road.

Q I'm not asking you to detail what's prohibited and not prohibited. I'm asking you what the Administration's interpretation of the intent of that amendment is.

A I refer you to the wording. I think the intent is expressed in the wording of the amendment.

Q There are reports that Vernon Walters is in Nicaragua, or has been there this weekend.

A If he's in Nicaragua, he's in two places at one time. I saw him this morning.

Q Was he there?

A I don't know the answer to the question of whether he was in Nicaragua. I saw him late last week, but I don't know whether he was there. I'll try and look into that and see if I can get anything on that for you.

Q Can you say whether the United States is going to give a visa to Tomas Borge?

A The short answer to that question is that no decision has been taken on that yet. He has applied for a visa. The issue is under review, but I can't give a timeframe for a final decision.

Since Mr. Borge is a Minister of the Government of Nicaragua, a member of the Sandinista Directorate and head of that country's internal security, his application is more than a routine visa request. So we would be reviewing that.

Q When did you get the application?

A I don't have --

Q Could you find out?

A I can look into that.

Q Is this the first application?

A I don't know whether it's a first application or not. You might ask the Nicaraguans.

Q Do you normally question visa applications from countries we have normal diplomatic relations with?

A As I say, he's a Minister of the Government of Nicaragua, a member of the Sandinista Directorate, and head of his country's internal security. His application is more than a routine visa request, and we will be reviewing it.

Q On a related subject, is the State Department making any recommendation about the Nicaraguan share of the sugar quota?

A I don't have anything. I've seen the press reports. I don't have anything on that subject today for you.

Q Because he is those three things that you listed, does that mean it's more likely that he would get a visa approved or that he would not?

A I wouldn't try to speculate. What it means is that it's more than a routine request. It requires a review. It is being reviewed. There will presumably be a decision forthcoming.

Q Can you at least comment on whether you're considering the Nicaraguan sugar export quota?

A I don't have anything on that today.

Q Let's go back for a second. Last July, the State Department said that with respect to the formation of Honduran Fifth Battalion near Fort Mocoron, where many Miskito refugees are, the State Department said that the Hondurans were creating a Fifth Battalion in order to limit somewhat the impunity with which Nicaraguan security forces had carried on kidnappings and harassment of the Honduran population in this area.

Does the State Department stand on that guidance? Is that still applicable today?

A Is it still applicable today?

Q Yes, is that why the Fifth Battalion is there?

A I have no reason to change what was said at that point.

Q I wanted to follow up on this question which was asked by Bernie Weinraub a minute ago in a different context.

Quite apart from your normal reticence, what comment do you have to make on statements by the people waging the war in Nicaragua that they are getting their supplies from the United States and their advice from the United States?

A For the same reasons for which I haven't commented before, I don't have any comment on anything having to do with allegations of U.S. covert action.

Q This is't an allegation; this is what they say.

Q Also on the question of Nicaragua, the Nicaraguans have nominated a person to be their ambassador in the United States, and they sort of indicate that the State Department is deliberately delaying the acceptance of its ambassador. Has there been an acceptance of the ambassador?

A I have no idea. Again, even with our own requests for agrement, we don't get into the question of what happens in the process of seeking to appoint ambassadors before they're announced.

Q Just a procedural question, again, aside from all the questions that are directed to you by this situation.

Sometimes you offer comments or reaffirm previous comments with respect to the situation along the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. Sometimes you say you won't answer on the basis that it involves, perhaps, an intelligence question. Is there any way for you to delineate what kinds of questions we can ask and what kinds we can't?

A I think the general parameters of what we do and don't comment on are reasonably well known. It involves intelligence activities, diplomatic activities, governmental consultations.

Q What is your understanding, then, today of recent fighting along the Nicaraguan/Honduran border?

A I don't have a readout to give you on recent fighting along the Honduran/Nicaraguan border.

Q Alan, this may seem a little bit naive. But in response to Don's queston, how do you automatically determine that a question about whether -- that people down there say they're getting arms from the United States; how do you automatically determine that's an intelligence question you can't answer? It seems to be --

A If it were happening, it would presumably be a covert operation which, by definition, is an intelligence activity.

Q In other words, they didn't get these arms on the open market?

A If it involved the United States, which is what Don says that they say it involved, then it would involve a covert action program.

Q When does a covert action become so overt that it's no longer covert? (Laughter)

A You'll have to answer that yourself.

Q The Ghanaian Government has alleged that some American diplomats there have engaged in improper activities. Do you have any comment?

A Yes, I do. I might note as a preface that I understand that the charges relate to both alleged CIA activities and alleged activities by our diplomats, including the Ambassador.

In line with our usual practice, I'm not going to comment about the alleged intelligence activities. (Laughter) But, regarding our diplomats, over the course of recent months the United States Government and its representatives in Accra have been subjected to a barrage of unjustified charges of anti-regime activity. First, at official inspiration in the Ghanaian press and now by a senior government official. We have called to the attention of the appropriate Ghanaian authorities the inaccuracy of these charges, the dangers that they constitute to the well-being of our diplomatic personnel, and the damage that they risk doing to our bilateral relations.

Mr. Tsikata's charges are patently absurd. They are based in large measure on what we have reason to beleive is a fraudulent document, and otherwise are without foundation. They appear to reflect a deliberate effort to disturb relations between the United States and Ghana.

Q Can we get a copy please?

A Yes.

Q Where might this fraudulent document have emanated?

A I don't know where it might have emanated. I understand that the Ghanaian Embassy here has indicated it is fraudulent as well recently, in the last day or so. So you might ask them about that.*

Q My colleague here asked a question and I guess you did not hear it, but who does the U.S. medical team report to and how long do you think its duration will last?

A The team that's gone to the West Bank?

Q Right.

A From CDC?

Q Right.

A It comes from the Centers in Atlanta. I guess it would probably come under Health and Human Services. I don't know more specifically who it reports to. Obviously, it is a U.S. Government organization or agency, and I think the purpose there is to cooperate with the Israeli authorities to do an independent investigation. I don't know what would happen with their report specifically. Let's give it a little time and see what happens. I'm sure that this is not going to be a great secret operation, as I say.

You might check with the Centers and see what their normal procedures are [illegible] something like this. I simply don't know. I think as time goes on, we can probably help more, but I don't have more at this point.

Q Could you clarify -- in other words, you don't comment on intelligence or covert operations unless you think they can be denied flatly as in the case of Ghana; is that it?

A As I said, I do not comment on the alleged intelligence activities. I hope you listened to the first part of what I said.

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* Correction - It was the German Embassy in Accra which issued a statement on April 2 saying that the document in question - which had purportedly originated at that Embassy - was in fact fraudulent.

Q Alan, you know, that raises an interesting question. I've lived in Washington a long time. What are your guidelines? Are you allowed to answer questions here or is your job description such that you're allowed to bring down a list of prepared handouts, and if someone asks the correct question, then you can read that?

Are you ever allowed to answer questions from the news media?

A Yes.

Q On your own?

Q Do you enjoy this job, Alan? (Laughter)

Q I raise that as a kind of serious question.

A I answered. The answer is yes.

Q We might save a lot of time here if we just came down and said, what is the answer on Page 1, and what is the answer -- of course, I never know -- we never get any hint as to what you're prepared to answer. We go through these long rigmaroles, like playing "Clue" or something and try to find out what answer you -- are you ever allowed to truly answer a question?

A I think we answer quite a number of questions.

Q Can I second what he is saying. Is it possible to second -- all right, the President. Go ahead.

Q No, go ahead.

Q We realize the system is that you have to push the right buttons to get the right answers, but isn't there some way you could give us better guidelines, or couldn't you supply us with more answers rather than having us to try to second-guess and read your mind as to what buttons to push?

A If we have news or information that we want to put out, we put it out. Otherwise, we try to be responsive to your questions. Sometimes you're not satisfied. It's an occasional event that you're not satisfied with what we have to say.

I do not limit myself only to what is on the written paper, and if we don't -- if I don't have a satisfactory respose, or there isn't in the guidances, to the extent that we can help in terms of getting an answer for you, we'll do that.

Q Can we get an answer to the question that Don raised and Greg raised about why you cannot answer the charge or the assertion, say, by the Honduran who is quoted in the New York Times about receiving a variety of forms of aid from the United States? That's a flat assertion; why can't you answer that?

A Because it involves an allegation or a matter which, by it's very nature, would have to be in the realm of covert action. We do not address questions one way or another. It puts us in a very difficult spot. As I said, it makes a very nice punching bag technique for you all but it nonetheless puts us in a position where we're simply not able to comment.

Q And you can not deny that this is not true?

A No. That's the whole point, we don't. That's exactly the point.

Q As you deny the Ghanaian story.

A I made very clear that the charges involved both diplomatic and alleged intelligence activites, and that I was not going to comment on the alleged intelligence activities.

Q In which sense, keeping this --

Q You did comment on it?

A No, I did not.

Q You called the document not being accurate.

A You've got to listen to the whole -- go look at the transcript of what I've said. I preceded it by making clear that I was not commenting on the allegations of intelligence activites. But the document also referred to alleged activities by our diplomatic personnel, and that was the basis on which I responded.

Q So a lot of the stories from Honduras have to do with charges that Ambassador Negroponte has been directly involved in planning this operation?

A It's still talking about an operation which is allegedly a covert action operation.

Q It still involves a diplomat. You originally split the hair, I didn't.

Q Alan, aside from splitting hairs, we have an enormous, potential big story here. There's a government down there -- a lot of charges being made by a lot of people, many of them publicly, with a fair amount of evidence to back it up that the U.S. is involved up to its neck in what is going on. I think the American people have a right to know what the Government's position is on this. And hiding behind the rubric of something that is intelligence or not intelligence, to me, is just phony, Alan.

A That may be your view on it. I think we've expressed it before. I've said what our view is in terms of the kinds of people, the broad range of Nicaraguans who are opposing the government. But in terms of any alleged activity, I'm simply not in a position to go beyond what we have.

Again, I would say to you, in terms of the American people, that there is certainly an established procedure of oversight by the Congress, representatives of both sides, Senate and House, who not only have that writ but, according to what they're saying publicly, intend to exercise oversight and look into this question.

Q But they're not supposed to comment publicly on this either; right? Members of the committees?

A I can't tell you what the rules are. Obviously, they are not -- yes, I think basically except whether they could reach conclusions and talk about those conclusions, I don't know. I can't parse it that finely.

Q This is probably futile. Isn't it true that you could invent the cover of intelligence versus anything you didn't want to talk about?

A That would imply bad faith, and I would reject that.

Q On the point of consulting with Congress, you said before that this Administration is not in violation of the Boland Amendment.

A That's right.

Q Then you said that when you get into it with them, the appropriate committees, that that would require getting into specifics. It seems to me the essential thing about the Boland Amendment is that this activity shall not be to overthrow that government.

Are you suggesting by that that this is simply an effort, sort of, to destablize them, to rattle their cage?

A I'm not suggesting anything other than that it is appropriate for the Congress through those committees to look into those matters if they want to look into them, and they evidently do.

Q Alan, the Administration characterized the opposition in Afghanistan to the Soviet operation there as freedom fighters. Do you apply the same characterization to those staging operations against the Nicaraguan Government?

A I don't have a title. I just don't have an appellation to give you for that.

Q Has there been any characterization made of those people within the government circles here?

A I don't know.

Q Also on the question of covert actions, just by you saying that the Administration is not in violation of the Boland Amendment, isn't that an acknowledgment that there is covert action or not --

A No.

Q -- because the Boland Amendment is specifically language lifted out of classified documents.

A It is specific language, and I'm referring specifically to it in saying the Administration is not violating the law. Beyond that, I'm not commenting, and I wouldn't make any assumptions about it.

Q Alan, you're saying that when you get into it with the people on the Hill, that you're going to get into specifics. Are we going to dot "i's" and cross "t's?" You're suggesting --

A To the extent that there are any "i's" to dot and "t's" to cross, that would be up to those committees in their discussion with the Administration. I'm not suggesting there are or are not "i's" and "t's" that need to be dotted and crossed.

Q The facts are known now. The question is, what's the motive?

A I see. (Laughter) Any other questions?

Q I'd like to go back to the CDC for just a moment.

A To what?

Q CDC. Does the fact that this, at least, quasi-government team is going over there imply that the United States Government believes that the problems there are real medical ones rather than some kind of mass hysteria or propaganda move on the part of the Arab community?

A I don't think I would make any -- I'm not in a position to make any assumptions other than obviously there is a problem. There are illnesses. CDC has vast experience and a substantial international reputation in looking at illnesses. If they can be of assistance, that's what they're trying to do. I'm not trying to make any judgments at all as to what the nature of the illnesses may be.

Q One more subject, if I may. The leader of the West Germany anti-nuclear weapons movement told reporters this morning that public opinion in West Germany will soon make it impossible for the government to deploy American missiles. How does the U.S. regard the threat, and what confidence-building measures, if any, are planned by the President beyond his speech of last week?

A I don't think I would address that particular statement. As was indicated in statements by the North Atlantic Council and the Chairman of the NATO Special Consultative Group last week, as well as those by individual Allied Governments, the Allies fully support the President's latest initiative in the negotiations which is the product of close Allied consultations.

They are also determined, if there is not an arms control agreement in the meantime, to keep the modernization part of the 1979 NATO decision on its schedule.

Q Since there are reports, Alan, of the illnesses in the West Bank which indicate or say that this could be chemical warfare that Israel is trying to experiment in the Middle East, in the West Bank and Lebanon, and possibly the next war will be chemical warfare war, are you concerned that you'll have sort of an investigation into these allegations or these stories which are spread out --

A We've got some medical professionals who have gone over there to help, investigate, and see what's going on. Let's let them do their job and see what they come up with.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)

Journal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #59

TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements for you. I'll be happy to try to answer any questions you might have.

Q Do you have any reaction to the talks in Amman between Arafat and Hussein that seemed to end without any results?

A The process of consultation between Jordanian and PLO officials is continuing. What is needed is a prompt move to the negotiating table. It is only there that a solution to the Palestinian problem in all its aspects can be found.

In our view, the President's September 1 initiative, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, provides the best means for accomplishing that goal.

King Hussein has taken the lead in recognizing the opportunity currently available for revitalizing the peace process. We hope that others as well will recognize that this is a unique moment which must be seized before it is lost, and that they will support the King in his desire to move forward toward peace.

Q Copies?

A Sure.

Q John, would you care to be any more specific about who you mean by "others?"

A As you know, we've all seen reports that Mr. Arafat has left Amman, and is in the process of continuing his consultations. We await the outcome of those consultations.

Q Does that "others" mean that this then is essentially a U.S. appeal to Arafat?

A I think we're just stating what we have consistently stated. I don't think there's anything new in what I've just said.

Q What makes this moment unique?

Q It must be seized before it's lost -- over here.

A We've been moving along, and everybody has been talking about deadlines. We have tended to discount deadlines but, nevertheless, they have circulated and they have been discussed. It seems to me that there is a good deal of discussion that's taken place. King Hussein has been talking to people; Mr. Arafat has been talking to people. I think there's been a sense that those talks are coming to a conclusion.

Q What would you foresee as a consequence if this unique moment is not seized?

A We would continue. We believe that the President's September 1 platform is a good platform, offers real hope for the Middle East, and we would continue pushing to bring that about.

Q Could you be any more specific when the "prompt" runs out?

A No. I think you've all seen reports about Mr. Arafat's travels. There's been some suggestion that he might return to Amman later in the week.

Q So you would anticipate a move following the end of this week's consultations?

A As I understand it, Mr. Arafat and King Hussein will have further contact.

Q John, how do you read what came out of Amman? Is it something that the United States was expecting or less than it was expecting? Do you see it as a step forward or a step backward? How do you characterize the talks?

A I think it is too early to read. On the one hand -- I mean, you've seen the same kind of reports that we have seen on the one hand. There were reports this morning that Mr. Arafat left Amman abruptly. On the other hand, there were very upbeat reports about what he said in arrival at his next port of call. So I think it is too early to determine what mood --

Q So this is not, therefore, the end of what you're expecting. What you're saying is that he may come back to Amman and --

A The process of consultation, as we understand it, is continuing.

Q John, two questions. First, aren't you disappointed that this round of negotations that were described before as crucial didn't achieve an announcement on joining the negotiations?

A One is always hopeful that King Hussein will make his announcement to come to the table as early as possible. But I'm not sure that I accept the premise of your question that this round is over.

It seems to me, if you mean Arafat being in Amman this time around, I suppose in that sense you can say that that series of meetings is over. But in the sense of this round of discussions between Mr. Arafat and King Hussein, we think that is continuing.

Q What is the U.S. position regarding the possibilities that they'll decide to move everything to a discussion in a new Arab summit today?

A I think we'll have to wait and see. We'll wait and see what the outcome is at this round of discussions between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat.

Q Do you think another Arab summit to discuss a Reagan plan would be a helpful one?

A I think we'll have to wait and see. I think it would be unwise to comment on a decision that hasn't yet been made.

Q When you say that a prompt move would be a right move at this time, would a prompt move encompass the idea of waiting until mid-April?

A I think we would have to wait and see what it is they will announce when they announce it.

Q Who's "they?"

A I don't know how that announcement will be made, but obviously the talks that have been going have been going on between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat.

Q Did we get a fill-in from the Jordanians about those talks?

A I don't think we'd go into that. That would be a communication between government-to-government.

Q There are reports from Amman, from Mr. Arafat himself, as a matter of fact, saying that the United States is expected to do a little more, I guess in terms of its contact with the Israelis, to be more forthcoming in order for the PLO to enter. Do you understand it to be that, and is there anything the United States can do more to help the process?

A I think the President is very clear about what he announced on September 1; and I think his strict adherence to that position has not changed.

Q If you're sticking by the September 1 peace initiative of President Reagan and his statement about the settlements, freezing the settlements, have you seen any development which indicates that there is a response or there is lack of response from the Israelis? Do you have a call for freezing the settlements, or what is the situation?

A Have we seen any evidence that there's been any freeze on settlements?

A Yes, please, or reduction or stopping whatever it is?

A No.

Q So, actually, the intiative which is based on asking for the freezing of the settlements didn't move any further in --

A If you mean, are we aware of any freeze in settlement activity that has taken place up until today, the answer is no.

Q Since some of us have to go, could we ask your indulgence so we can move to another subject. Do you have anything to say about reports the Administration may take away Nicaragua's sugar quota to this country?

A That's under consideration. The question of Nicaragua's sugar quota is under review.

Q I was trying to get one more out of Hussein. Do you know if President Reagan spoke with King Hussein within the last twenty-four hours, and how many times did they speak in the last week?

A I don't. I know there was -- did Mr. Romberg clear up one or two calls over the weekend; he didn't. There was at least one call over the weekend, but I do not know whether there have been any further calls.

Q Is there any way to find out whether they've spoken since Arafat left?

A I guess you'll have to ask the White House.

Q From the President to King Hussein?

A That was the question.

Q Any information about the part played by Egypt in the contacts between Hussein and Arafat?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment, John, on Joe Kraft's column headlined "Where's George?" (Laughter)

A No.

Q Anything on the Soviet diplomats and other citizens being expelled from France?

A No, I think that's a matter between France and the Soviet Union.

Q Anything on U.S. explusion of any Soviet officials from here?

A No.

Q Anything further on the Osborne case?

A No.

Q Anything on Nicaragua's letter yesterday to the President of the Security Council on negotiations?

A You're talking about the -- I've seen a FBIS report of a Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry --

Q It was submitted to Kirkpatrick yesterday.

A I just want to be sure we're talking about the same --

Q It was from the Foreign Ministry.

A No. We're aware of the FBIS report, but don't have anything for you on it. As you know, we support the question of a regional conference.

Q Anything on talks between Nicaragua and Costa Rica yesterday?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the visa for the President of Venda? You remember, that came up about three months ago -- South Africa, yes.

A No, I don't.

Q In that context, you remember, there was mention that Tambo, the President-General of a terrorist organization, was admitted at about that time. Now, according to the UPI, Moses Mabhida, General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, was given a visa by the Department of State to attend a meeting in New York on March 14, celebrating the 100th Anniversary of the death of Karl Marx sponsored by the U.S. Communist Party which was addressed by Gus Hall.

Q And the question is?

A The question is, why is it taking so long to come to a decision on the admission of a black anti-Communist from South Africa when a black Communist from South Africa is admitted apparently --

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Will you take that question and find out?

A I'll look into it and see if we have anything. Sure.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything on the Chinese reaction with respect to the Hu Na case?

A Yes, I do. We're not going to get into the government conversations, but I think in public statements in the past 24 hours the Chinese have made their position clear. We really don't have anything to add to that.

Q You have no reaction?

A No reaction.

Q To their charge that she was coerced?

A We're not going to get into the government-to-government consultations or discussions that have taken place.

Q Can you get into the public reaction to their statement that she was coerced by the United States Government to remain in the United States?

A Obviously, we don't agree with that statement.

Q Does the Chinese Ambassador have any appointment in the building today?

A Not that I know of.

Q Could you take that, please?

A Okay, sure. That's whether the Chinese Ambassador is coming in?

Q Yes. Whether he is coming to see the Secretary.

A Okay.

Q What harm do you see in this action on cultural exchanges with China?

A We certainly hope that it will not have any harm and will not adversely affect the relationship between the United States and China. This was a matter handled in accordance with our own laws and procedures, dealing with a person who was in our country.

Good relations between the United States and China are of benefit to both sides, and the United States believes it's important that we view our differences when they occur in the perspective of the broader bilateral relationship.

Q Could you explain why at the outset you said you have nothing to say, and you've just come up with that statement?

A What I said was that we're not going to get into -- you asked me would the Chinese have been in or what official --

Q No, no. We asked you, do you have any reaction to what the Chinese had to say about the Hu Na case? That was my question.

A Yes. No, I don't. We would not have any public reaction at this stage other than to say that the suggestion that the United States was guilty of coercion is obviously incorrect.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on the revelations -- if they are revelations -- being made by Michael Straight in connection with pushing his new book?

A No.

Q Does the U.S. have any -- is the Administration considering at this time charging the Soviet Union with violations of the unratified SALT II treaty?

A I think the White House has really responded to that. That is a complicated matter. It is under consideration and review, and I think that in due course we will get some indication of what that review has turned up. However, I don't have anything today.

Q John, can we have a filing break for those wishing to attend the luncheon?

A Filing break. Sure.

Q Do we have any reaction to the latest murders in Zimbabwe?

A Yes. You're talking about Senator Savage and a member of his party?

Q Yes.

A We've seen the reports, and we are very sorry about the Senator's death and the continuing tragic loss of innocent life in Zimbabwe.

These acts highlight the need for the killing and the brutality to stop and for restoration of peace and a beginning to the process of healing to begin.

Q Can I ask another part of the world?

Q On the same part of the world, on the South African community leader who was shot --

A Mr. Mkhize?

Q Yes.

A The Department of State deplores the shooting death on April 2 at Driefontein in South Africa of black community leader Saul Mkhize. The Department anticipates that a full investigation will be carried out by the appropriate authorities to determine the circumstances surrounding Mr. Mkhize's death.

It appears that Mr. Mkhize was shot while organizing a peaceful protest against Government plans to remove a community from its present location to one of South Africa's ethnic "homelands."

The United States has consistently made clear its view that South Africa's problems are not constructively addressed by the arbitrary relocation of peoples on an ethnic basis within South Africa, or by any effort to divide the country into pieces by creating "homelands" or by depriving the displaced peoples of their South African citizenship.

Q Copies of those two statements?

A Sure.

Q John, comments on the situation on the Thai-Cambodian border?

A Yes. What did you have in --

Q Specifically, do you regard it as a dangerous escalation in the use by Thai aircraft of napalm against Vietnamese troops?

A I'm not going to be able to confirm the use of aircraft and the use of napalm, but I think Alan indicated yesterday our concern about the situation on the border.

Q Follow-up on that. Are American arms perhaps supplied to Thailand being used in any way in this situation?

A I can't answer that question. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Could you let us know? Could you look into it?

A I'll look into it.

Q John, was the United States able to do anything about the 20,000 or 30,000 refugees who were reported coming into Thailand? Are we taking a hand in that?

A I think there was some guidance yesterday. I think the United States recently made available about $10 million, and I think we have some guidance from yesterday to give you the detail on that. But I think the United States recently made available somewhere in the region of $10 million for refugee work.

Q I understand you may have something on the visit of the Angola petroleum minister?

A Yes.

Q Did he meet with Department officials?

A Yes, he did. They did, I guess. The Angolan Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Pedro Van Dunem, and the Director of the Angolan state oil company, Sonangol, Herminio Escorcio, visited Washington April 4, and they had discussions with U.S. officials. Minister Van Dunem was in the United States for discussions with various American oil companies which are working in Angola.

Mr. Van Dunem and Mr. Escorcio took the opportunity of their visit here to meet with Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chester Crocker and Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Wisner for discussions on matters of mutual interest. They also met officials of the Department of Energy.

Q That should have been on Crocker's schedule. I don't think it was.

A I don't know whether it was or not.

Q Could I have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any other guidance on southern Africa in there? You've pulled up with some good ones.

A No. You've got the whole wad now.

Q Alan, do you have anything on Soviet --

A John.

Q Pardon?

A This is John. He's Alan. (Laughter)

Q Yes. Could you respond to the Soviet charge in Pravda that the United States may station Pershing missiles in Alaska capable of --

A That report is not true.

Q Back to the Straight matter. Would, under present State Department regulations, a man be violating State Department regulations if he had uncleared conversations with Soviet agents and ventured his personal opinion on to those agents after he had, of course, full access to classified documents? That's what Michael Straight said he did in the 30's.

A Uncleared conversations?

Q Without access to the classified documents, in Straight's opinion.

A If he had uncleared conversations?

Q Uncleared conversations, yes.

A With a Soviet official?

Q With Soviet officials.

A What do you mean by "uncleared"?

Q And offered the Soviet officials his personal opinion on matters over which he had been -- with which he'd been dealing after having viewed classified materials?

A I'd have to look into that.

Q Would you look into that?

A Sure.

Q Because essentially that's what Michael Straight's story is that he did, with the exception that Michael Straight denies he had access to classified materials, which is a little --

A That would change things considerably.

Q That would change things considerably, but every FSO, as I understand it, is cleared for very high classifications.

A Let me see what regulations might apply.

Q Do you have anything on the granting or denying of a visa to the Nicaraguan Interior Minister?

A It's still under review.

Q Do you have anything on the Palestinian school girl sickness situation? Has the CDC in Atlanta been allowed to --

A No. From that particular source, no, we don't have anything further. You're aware of the developments at the Security Council last night, of course.

Q If you have anything there that does relate to that question, we'd like to have it, too.

A Relating to that question? Sure. That's what I meant by the Security Council statement last night. We believe the Security Council statement was a constructive action which should reinforce the international effort already underway to determine the nature of these reported poisoning cases.

As you know, at Israeli request the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta sent a team to investigate this mysterious phenomenon. The International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Health Organization are also looking into the problem, and Israeli medical authorities have conducted their own investigation.

Thus, the Secretary General is in a position to build upon a series of careful inquiries done by competent specialists and to carry on in the same spirit, and, of course, we support this investigation.

Q Will the team from the Centers for Disease Control report to the Secretary General?

A I think that Mr. Romberg was asked that question yesterday, and I cannot improve on his answer of yesterday which is that he didn't know, and I'm afraid I don't know today either.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure. All done?

Q No.

A I'm having signs made across the neck up here.

Q Very briefly, in The New York Times today they had a senior member of ARDE, the anti-Sandinista coalition in Costa Rica, denounce another group as having an open contradiction to certain ideals held by ARDE? Do you have any comment with respect to that?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

Alleman

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, April 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #60

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1983, 12:13 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements. The Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency has delivered to members of Congress copies of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1971-1980. This edition, the 14th in a continuing series, contains the most reliable information available for each of 145 countries on their military expenditures and arms transfers. Copies are available in the press room. Anybody who would like further information or briefings on this document should be in touch with Matt Murphy at 632-5970.

I thought you might be interested in something that didn't appear in the Secretary's public schedule and should have this morning. He met with three young American Russian-speaking students who recently were part of a debating team in the Soviet Union. The Secretary caught a glimpse of them on a PBS program one night -- one of the Jessica Savitch programs, I understand -- and expressed an interest in meeting them if they would be so kind as to come and chat with him. So we found them, and they came in and met with the Secretary for about 30 minutes this morning.

They are John Tokolish who is presently on Senator Moynihan's staff. He is from Audubon, New Jersey. They happen to be visiting with us today. Margaret Niles, who is a student at Stanford and had nothing to do with the Secretary's particular interest in this group. She's from Portland, Oregon. And Bill Skundrich, who is from Pittsburgh.

As I say, they met with the Secretary for about 30 minutes this morning, told him their impressions and of their activities in the Soviet Union, and he was fascinated by their views and their comments.

Q What's the university on the last gentlemen?

A On Mr. Skundrich. I think that is University of Pittsburgh.

Q And the first one?

A The first one was -- Mr. Tokolish, you were at --

MR. TOKOLISH: Middlebury.

Q Hometown is the same on Mr. Skundrich? It's Pittsburgh as well?

A Yes. I think that's right.

Q Both school and hometown?

A Yes.

Q Can you address the complaint you have from the Chinese today regarding the Hu Na decision?

A Not really, Mike. You've seen the press reports. We know that a statement has been made -- a protest has been made to our Embassy in Beijing. That is still being transmitted to us. We hadn't received it by the time I came out here, so we'll examine it when it comes. Beyond that, we wouldn't get into diplomatic interchanges.

Q On another aspect of this, there's some confusion -- at least in my mind -- about the number of Chinese students or other Chinese who have applied for political asylum. Various reports say a thousand out of maybe ten thousand have applied.

Can you clarify that in some way?

A Yes. Glad you brought that up. Various press reports have erroneously stated that there are 1,000 pending cases, all from the People's Republic of China.

While it's true that there are currently about 1,000 Chinese asylum applications on file, that figure includes persons from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC. It's my understanding that the PRC figure alone is much smaller, but I don't have exact statistics. The distinction, I think, is important to keep in mind when discussing the asylum issue; and each one of those cases, along with more than 140,000 other asylum cases currently pending worldwide from more than 140 countries will be decided individually on their own merits.

Q When you say the number from the PRC is much smaller, much smaller than what? Much smaller than the other two, much smaller than a thousand, or what?

A I can't give you an exact breakdown, Don, but it's much smaller than a thousand.

Q Do you have anything on this scientist in San Francisco, a top Chinese scientist who defected about six months ago?

A I think we may have had some guidance on that earlier in the week, John, and it's available in the Press Office.

Q John, on the basis of your opening comments about the Secretary seeing the "Group of Three," how are you characterizing U.S.-Soviet relations right now? (Laughter)

A I don't think I'm prepared to ad lib a characterization for you, Bernie, from here today. I think the Secretary has addressed that, the President has addressed it. There are, obviously, some problems.

Q Would the Secretary be interested in a debate with Mr. Gromyko?

A A debate with Mr. Gromyko?

Q Since debate is very much on his mind this morning, I wondered if he'd like to challenge Mr. Gromyko to a public debate?

A No. The Secretary has met, as you well know, with Mr. Gromyko on a couple of occasions and had a lengthy discussion -- I don't know whether I'd call it a debate -- and I'm sure that there's always the possibility of another one.

Q What sort of impact do you think the expulsion by the French will have on Soviet-West relations?

A I don't have anything for you on that, Bernie. As we said yesterday, that particular incident is between the French Government and the Soviet Government. We'll have to leave it there.

Q How possible is a Gromyko-Shultz meeting? You say there's always a possibility. Is there something that's being discussed?

A Nothing set. Nothing planned. But it's always possible.

Q John, can I follow up Bernie's question? Has the Department received a formal or informal complaint by the French Embassy regarding a Departmental leak to Safire on the French expulsion?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Can you take that?

A Sure. I'll take it, but let me caution you that we probably will once again invoke that marvelous phrase that we do not discuss our diplomatic exchanges in detail. I'm personally unaware of anything along those lines, but let me take a look.

Q The lady who was in our basement in the Embassy in the Soviet Union has been allowed to leave the country.

A Yes. And we're pleased by that.

Q Do you have any other comment other than you're --

A No.

Q What role did the Embassy, if any, have in this?

A I think we're just going to stand with the language that we're happy.

Q But, John, you don't have any more information about the rest of the family, what status their visas are, if anything has moved forward on that?

A No. Not at the moment.

Q The President sent a personal message some months ago regarding those Pentecostals to the Soviet leadership. Can you take a question --

A No. I don't think we'd get into Presidential correspondence.

Q Did she go to Israel, John?

A I think you ought to ask the Israelis about that.

Q John, apropos of Bill's question, if I may, on the Safire leak, there are reports today which suggest that the United States leaked the information about the Soviet spies in France as a way of forcing the French into taking the action which they took.

Could you address that analysis?

A No. The answer to that is no, I couldn't, but it seems a rather fanciful scenario, Barrie.

Q Another area. Has any decision been made about Nicaraguan sugar quotas?

A No. Still under review, consideration.

Q What about Borge's visa?

A Still under review.

Q On the same area of Central America and the Caribbean, the Grenadan Foreign Minister addressed the Organization of American States today just a few minutes ago and again repeated his charge that the U.S. is mounting a CIA mercenary invasion of his country and that there's training going on in Miami. Do you have any comment?

A No. I had heard that he was going to speak this morning, but we haven't seen -- I know you're giving us a preview, but we haven't see what he said, so wouldn't have anything on it until we have seen what he said, if we have anything on what he said.

Q Do you have any reply to the letter sent to the Security Council President two days ago?

A Yes. That's the --

Q Nicaragua.

A To Ambassador Kirkpatrick. We've repeatedly made the point, highlighted by our participation in last October's San Jose Conference, that a comprehensive regional approach to the tensions in Central America appears to offer the most promising results.

Our concerns about the Government of Nicaragua are well known, and our previous efforts at resolving these issues through bilateral discussions have not been productive.

Our support for a regional discussion of these issues was reiterated yesterday in the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States in support of a Honduran resolution calling for a regional agreement on a stable and lasting peace in Central America.

Q Does that mean that the United States' previous offer to have meetings with the Nicaraguans on a bilateral basis is no longer valid?

A I would simply say that our experience has not been a happy one, and insofar as this latest overture is concerned, what we're saying is that we would place the emphasis on a regional conference.

Q So in other words, this is kind of closing the door on that initiative that was made by Secretary Haig during his period.

A I think we would just stand on the language that we've offered, that it hasn't been a happy experience.

Q You're saying you prefer now to do it on a multilateral basis, not a bilateral basis?

A That has been our position for some time.

Q If the United States does not take part in these talks that were proposed by the Hondurans, how is it that there will be any settlement reached between the United States and Nicaragua?

A Why don't we wait and see how such plans for a conference mature, but we have not pressed for inclusion of the United States. The United States has accepted that it might well not be at a regional conference.

-- MORE --

Q I want to get some precision on that for just a second. Does the United States support the five-plus-five formula, or does it support the Honduran resolution solution yesterday.

A We supported the five-by-five, but we support what was proposed yesterday.

Q If that proposal is taken up that was proposed yesterday, would the United States support it if Cuba were to be invited to serve as a witness?

A Why don't we wait and see how that transpires.

Q Do you have any problems with the wording of the Honduran resolution which makes that a possibility?

A No, we don't have any problems with the wording.

Q No problems with it.

Q John, for about the past year the Reagan Administration has consistently refused to grant an entry visa to Roberto D'Aubuisson, the head of the ARENA party. That was until last week when the Reagan Administration changed its mind and issued a visa to D'Aubuisson. He's now in Miami raising money among the exiles for his party, and whatever other activities, I don't know, in El Salvador.

Could you comment on that switch, and comment on D'Aubuisson's activities in this country?

A I'm not able to because I guess that all took place while I was away.

There is guidance in the Press Office.

Q There is guidance about D'Aubuisson being here in the Press Office?

A He's not in the Press Office. (Laughter)

Q We can all be thankful for that, I guess.

A At least he wasn't when we came out.

Q Do you have anything on the sale of a number of howitzers to India?

A No.

Q Did the United States sanction that sale?

A No, I don't --

Q Have there been any fresh communications between the President and King Hussein?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have some reading now about what the resolution is after the meetings between the King and Mr. Arafat seem to have recessed, at least, for a while?

A No. We think that the process of consultation is continuing. Just how the King and Mr. Arafat will communicate and when, we are not sure, but we think that the process is continuing.

Q Do you think this unique moment is being seized?

A We certainly hope so.

Q Has the Secretary had any communication with King Hussein in the last couple days?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is Secretary Veliotes planning a trip out there?

A Not to my knowledge. When you say has the Secretary had any communication, you mean --

Q Telephone or a letter?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Anything on the schedule of Ambassador Habib; when is he going back?

A He is involved in personal affairs this week. I don't quite know when he would go back. I would think several days time probably from now when he'll begin to firm up his plans.

Q Has he left Washington?

A He's left Washington; yes.

Q Do you have anything on the Catholic Bishops' statement?

A Yes. It's a lengthy document, as you know -- 150 pages -- so we haven't had an opportunity to study the draft in depth but we are pleased that the letter explicitly endorses many of the far-reaching objectives which the Administration seeks, notably negotiated agreements for substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals.

In our opinion, this third draft has been substantially improved over the previous versions. It distinguishes more clearly than before between universally binding moral principles and their practical application in the world.

It notes the Soviet Union's global ambitions, its human rights record and its military programs as important factors also to be considered on this issue.

It no longer advocates a nuclear freeze which we believe would codify high current levels and imbalances and which would pull the rug out from under our arms control negotiators. Instead, it calls for efforts to curb and reduce nuclear arsenals. That's an objective fully shared by the President and his Administration, and reflected in our reductions proposals at the START and INF negotiations in Geneva.

It takes a more nuanced view of the dilemmas of deterrence in the nuclear age and clearly notes the importance of the Papal teaching that nuclear deterrence is morally acceptable as long as serious efforts toward disarmament continue.

It reflects a far better understanding of actual U.S. strategic policy as this is authoritatively described by senior U.S. officials.

While we do not necessarily share all of the Bishops' judgments, we believe this document marks an important and serious contribution to the public discussion of what is surely one of the most vital issues of our time.

We may have some more to say on that whole question of the letter when we've had a little more opportunity to study it.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q What aren't you sharing in their letter?

A That might be something that would emerge in due course.

Q In your interpretation, does the letter call for a no first-use doctrine of -- for a no first-use nuclear doctrine?

A You may be referring to a wire service report that moved last evening. Is that what you had in mind?

A No, I'm referring to what Mr. Burt said yesterday.

Q I don't think there's any divergence between Mr. Burt's views and what we've offered you here today. I think at the time that wire service story moved, Mr. Burt hadn't seen the entire document.

Q John, what do you think persuaded the Bishops to change?

A I don't know. I think you'd have to ask them.

Q On that particular subject, John, about a month or so ago General Walters was in Rome and met with Vatican officials, and we were told at that time that he did discuss the situation in El Salvador and the Pope's visit and American policy in Central America.

Did he by any chance also discuss the question of our nuclear philosophy and the Bishops' position and the relationship between --

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Has any other American officials discussed this issue with the Vatican?

A A number of American officials have talked with the Vatican. I cannot be sure what might have been on the agenda.

Q Bush said he discussed it.

A Bush said he discussed it, I am told by a correspondent.

Q Did you have anything on my question yesterday about any American military assistance in Thailand which might be used in this current conflict?

A Yes, I think we gave you an answer and posted that yesterday afternoon.

Q I didn't see it. Can you tell us what kind of guidance you have there? Is there any American military assistance being used in the current fighting in Cambodia/Thailand?

A I don't like to paraphrase guidance, but I think the guidance basically was that the United States has a program of military assistance to Thailand, and we assume that American-supplied weapons may well have been used internally for defensive purposes.

Q Does the United States sanction the use of napalm by the Thai air force against the Vietnamese?

A The U.S. hasn't supplied napalm to the Thai Government.

Q Do we have any policy? Do we approve or disapprove of that use?

A I'm not getting into the use of napalm. What we're saying is, we haven't supplied napalm to the Thai Government.

Q The Thais have appealed to the international community at large, and I guess the United States and other countries, for additional help. Is the U.S. doing anything about it?

A Yes. We have -- if I can put my hand on it -- we have some figures on that. I took a crack at some figures yesterday and there are some more up-to-date ones today. We do have some guidance. Let me see if I can get that for you afterwards -- on figures, on refugees, mainly, on refugee aid.

Q As I understand the story this morning, what they're asking for is help regarding not refugees but in this military problem they have with Vietnam.

A We are talking with them about that. Assistance Secretary Wolfowitz is in Thailand. He's on the scene, and I think that we will perhaps know more when he has finished his discussions with the various Thai officials.

Q Do you have anything to say about the Secretary's meeting with Clarence Long this afternoon, what it's about?

A Obviously, the Long Committee is considering the aid request for Salvador, and I would think that will be a logical area of discussion.

Q Is Congressman Long going to present his decision, then, to the Secretary?

A I don't know.

Q Is it true that Secretary Shultz will be briefing reporters tomorrow from this podium on the Middle East subject?

A There's nothing planned at this stage, nothing set at this stage.

Q Would it suprise you if he did?

A I think the Secretary would be interested in having a press conference sometime in the next several days, but let's see how it develops. It's possible.

Q In case the guidance with respect to D'Aubuisson doesn't address the question, will he be meeting with any U.S. --

A An unworthy thought. (Laughter)

Q Will he be meeting with any U.S. Government officials while he's here?

A Not to my knowledge, but you really have me cold on this because apparently this took place last week and I'm just getting caught up.

Q And, also, is it possible to get a copy of the statement you read with respect to the U.S. response to the Nicaraguan letter?

A Sure.

Q Have you gotten any response from the South African Government on your criticism of yesterday, or do you expect any?

A I'm not aware of any response.

Q Do you expect to get one?

A I think that would be up to the South Africans.

Q Do you have anything to offer on the upcoming visit of Sultan Qaboos next Tuesday to the United States?

A No. Nothing on it. He is here next week. I think he'll be seeing the Secretary on Tuesday.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #61

THURSDAY, APRIL 7, 1983, 12:26 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a number of announcements for you.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger will visit Algeria and Tunisia for a general discussion of our bilateral relations and matters of mutual interest. He will leave Washington on April 9 and return on April 15. Just to respond before you ask the question, the trip has been planned for some time, and, while current events in the Middle East will no doubt come up, his trip is not directly related to any new development.

Q Just those two countries?

A Just those two countries.

Q Will he be meeting any third-country officials on that trip while he is in Algeria or Tunisia?

A Mike, I don't want to mislead you. I assume it's possible that while he's in those two countries he could well meet diplomats from other countries, but I don't want to suggest that there is anything special or anything significant about that. There is not. This is a trip that has been planned for some time, and it is Algeria and Tunisia, so you'd be drawing an incorrect conclusion if you thought others -- I wouldn't say other diplomats of significance -- that would be unfair -- but if you inferred that other diplomats related to other developments in the Middle East were to be there to meet him.

Q Can I ask one? Do you expect Western Sahara to come up?

A I don't know.

Q I know this is going to sound silly, but is there a chance that General Walters is going to be traveling with him? (Laughter)

A General Walters is certainly not traveling with Mr. Eagleburger, and I have no knowledge of General

Walters' being there at the same time. But I don't keep in my pocket General Walters' itinerary.

Q Maybe you should. (Laughter)

A Maybe I shouldn't. The second one: On April 14, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Houston Institute of International Education are cosponsoring a conference on U.S. Trade and Investment in Africa.

The day-long conference will be held at the Shamrock Hilton in Houston. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker will deliver the opening address at 9:00 a.m. U.S. Trade Representative William Brock will be the luncheon keynote speaker.

If you want any more on that, you should be in touch with Mrs. Alice Pratt. She's at the Houston Institute of International Education, (713) 223-5454, and a complete conference schedule is available in the Press Office.

I have one further announcement on the story appearing in The Washington Post today concerning Secretary Kissinger. With respect to a story in this morning's Washington Post about a meeting former Secretary Kissinger had with an aide to Mr. Arafat, we would like to state the following:

Dr. Kissinger has been scrupulous in keeping the Department and the Administration as a whole fully informed regarding his conversations in the Middle East, although those conversations have, in fact, been undertaken by him as a private citizen and have not been on behalf of the United States Government.

Neither that conversation nor any of Dr. Kissinger's private activities have been a "complicating factor" in our diplomacy or have delayed the process. Dr. Kissinger has not established any "back channels" or done anything which was improper.

We regret that Dr. Kissinger's activities have been mischaracterized. The Secretary of State highly values Dr. Kissinger's counsel and support and will continue to welcome it.

Q Can we get copies of that?

A Yes.

Q At the time that he called in, he must have been purple. (Laughter)

A That's all I have in the way of announcements or comments.

Q Tell us who wrote that statement, can you?

A No. I wouldn't dream of doing that, Bernie. I know you have an acute interest in the literary craftsmanship, but I think I'll not reveal the author.

Q John, if those conversations, such conversations the former Secretary has had -- are those continuing with the approval of the Department?

A Are the conversations between Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Shultz continuing?

Q Are the conversations between Dr. Kissinger and representatives of the PLO still continuing with the approval or encouragement of the Department?

A I think, as I say, Dr. Kissinger -- his travels and the travels he's about to undertake in the Middle East are as a private citizen, and I think you would have to ask him. But to my knowledge, he is not meeting with any PLO representatives.

Q And carrying nothing -- no mission on behalf of the Administration?

A No mission on behalf of the Administration.

Q Answer the rest of Mike's question, if you would.

A I'll try to. What was the rest of his question?

Q He asked about approval or encouragement which -- and your statement didn't say anything about what the U.S. view is of Kissinger's meetings beyond the fact that they are private meetings.

A Any meetings that Dr. Kissinger has in the course of his many travels are in his private capacity. As far as the U.S. position on the PLO is concerned, that, of course, remains unchanged. We will not recognize nor negotiate with that organization until it accepts U.N. Security

Council Resolution 242 and recognizes Israel's right to exist.

Actions of private citizens, including former officials, do not change or alter this policy. As Dr. Kissinger himself was quoted as saying in the same article, his meeting with the person in question had absolutely no political significance.

Q Has the Government spoken to Dr. Kissinger about what Middle East negotiation participants might think of such meetings and, regardless of the fact that they are private meetings, that participants in the negotiations in the Middle East in Amman or perhaps in Jerusalem might view them in some way, and has the Government suggested to Dr. Kissinger that that is not -- that even though they're not approved by the Government, it might not be helpful for them to continue?

A I don't think it's a question for us to direct Dr. Kissinger as a private citizen in what he does and what he does not do. We have made our position plain insofar as the PLO and insofar as the distinction between Dr. Kissinger's private travels and Administration policy.

Q John, what's the Department reaction on China?

A China?

Q No. Hold it just a minute.

A Want to keep going?

Q John, try that slightly differently. Has there been any feedback through indirect channels that the PLO putting their own interpretation on that meeting with Kissinger last November is in fact hoping that there could be a shift in Administration policy? Is there any feedback to the Administration along those lines?

A I don't know what feedback there has been, Bernie, but if there were to be any feedback like that or there were to be any thought like that on the part of the PLO, they would be making a grievous error in interpreting U.S. position.

Our position is firm. It has been constant. There is no change in it, and there will be no change in it, and they would be deluding themselves were they to think that.

Q And you don't have any feeling that that intrepretation, if that should have been reached by PLO officials, has in any way contributed to the long protracted negotiation under way?

A As our words earlier said, we do not consider that, should there have been such a misunderstanding or misinterpretation, we do not feel that that has contributed to -- it's not been an impediment.

Q John, you just quoted Dr. Kissinger saying the meetings had no political significance. Does the Department accept that characterization?

A Yes, of course.

Q Do you know what the significance of the meetings were? Was it purely social, business?

A I think you'd have to ask Dr. Kissinger.

Q Does the Department know what the substance of the meetings were?

A I think there have been indications that at time Dr. Kissinger has shared some of his views with us on the Middle East, as he has shared his views with us on a number of topics, but I just want to reiterate that he is not representing the Administration.

Q John, that article said that the meeting was set up with the help of our Ambassador Reed out there. You didn't address yourself to that.

A Bernie, I wouldn't want to get into the activities of Ambassadors in the field, so I am not going to comment on that. But I wouldn't want what I just said to delude you or lead you in any way.

Q You accept Dr. Kissinger's explanation that he was at this meeting and that some Moroccan said, "Here's a Palestinian I want you to meet."

A Yes. Surely.

Q John, as I recall, General Walters was in Morocco at the same time as Henry Kissinger was. Did he by any chance run into that same PLO fellow? (Laughter)

A You, Barrie, are becoming the all-time leading expert on the travels of General Walters, and I'm afraid you have the advantage of me. I cannot remember his being there at the time.

Q John, is it true that Ambassador Habib had to explain the Kissinger meeting to King Hussein in London? To that extent has the meeting played a role in formal U.S. --

A I'm sure that Ambassador Habib has had many conversations with King Hussein, and I wouldn't get into them. But I think you have to accept our statement that whatever misinterpretation there may have been of such a meeting, it has not been an impediment to the consultations and negotiations that we are having.

Q As I recall, this was a cultural conference in Morocco that Dr. Kissinger and General Walters were at. Do you know what their cultural contributions were there?

A No. I don't.

Q I didn't think so.

A Why don't you ask them?

Q In the story there is a paragraph about an interview that King Hassan of Morocco gave to a French newspaper, and he says that, "I have in my possession certain elements that I am sorry I cannot give you here, but (inaudible) my optimism about the possible shift in the policy of the United States direct PLO-U.S. negotiations."

What do you comment on this?

A I don't want to comment directly on -- that's by the King, you say?

Q King Hassan, yes.

A -- on a statement by a monarch. I would just reiterate what I said earlier, that there is no change in the United States' position towards the PLO. That policy remains constant.

Q So that this statement that the King said --

A I don't want to go the extra step and contradict a monarch, but I will just tell you what our position is and let you make the deduction.

Q John, does Mr. Kissinger have the encouragement and approval of the Secretary to engage in further conversations as this?

A It's not a question of the Secretary. I mean, Dr. Kissinger's a free agent and is representing himself.

Q I know, but I'm asking you to speak for the Secretary.

A I think it would be improper of the Secretary to advise Dr. Kissinger of his itinerary. Dr. Kissinger's a free agent, but the Secretary certainly has confidence in Dr. Kissinger, has talked with him about a variety of issues and continues to, and will in the future.

But I don't think it's a question for the Secretary to advise Dr. Kissinger where he should or should not travel.

Q John, on what basis do you say he's a free agent? Have you ever tried to hire him?

Q You said that whatever misinterpretation there may have been, it has not been an impediment to the negotiations.

A Yes.

Q Have there been misinterpretations?

A I think you would have to leave that to the other parties. I don't think we can speak for them, Bernie.

Q If Ambassador Habib did, in fact, have to give King Hussein an explanation, to that extent you can speak for Habib's role, for the U.S. Government's role, in having to correct any misinterpretations.

A But I'm not going to get into specifics. Obviously, I don't think we ever have, and I think it's very unlikely that we ever would get into specifics or the kind of diplomatic discussions that are going on.

Obviously, in those discussions there are frequent clarifications of position, frequent corrections of misapprehensions, especially in an area like the Middle East, and I'm just making that a broad statement and not relating it to this instance specifically.

Q You say that Mr. Kissinger did nothing wrong or improper. Has the Department considered the fact that he might have violated the Logan Act, since his conversations weren't authorized by the U.S. Government. You say he was not representing the U.S. Government?

A He was not representing the U.S. Government.

Q Then has the Department considered his having violated the Logan Act?

A I do not know.

Q Since your clearance of what Department -- that excellent statement posted on the board yesterday -- what Foreign Service Officers may say and may not say and what must be cleared and what must not be cleared, clarifies the situation for Foreign Service Officers --

A That's right.

Q -- do any of these regulations apply to ex-Secretaries of State who are having current conversations from time to time which are highly valued by the incumbent Secretary of State?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Have you cleared that -- have you asked --

A You asked me a question. I gave you an answer.

Q Yes. I understand that. But have you asked the Legal Office whether or not it shares your horseback opinion on this?

A No. I haven't.

Q Could you give us your reaction to the Chinese action taken today of stopping sports and cultural exchanges with the United States?

A Yes, I can, Don. Just the factual situation. We understand that two separate actions have been announced today by the Chinese Minister of Culture and the All-China Sports Federation, and these have been fully reported in the Chinese press which is available to you.

But to summarize, the Chinese have (1) cancelled all planned remaining activities under the 1982-83 U.S.-China Implementing Accord for Cultural Exchange, and (2) cancelled all remaining U.S.-China sports exchanges scheduled for 1983.

The United States Government regrets this unilateral decision by the Chinese side, considers it to be an overreaction and inappropriate. These exchanges are valuable for the people of both countries, and we regret any action to curtail them.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Does the United States plan some retaliatory action of its own to cancel something that is going on with China?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you anticipate that Secretary Baldridge and the Science Adviser Keyworth who are supposed to go to China within the next couple of months will be going, or will they not?

A We haven't had any suggestion that either of those visits are to be cancelled yet, Don, as of the present time.

Q Is there any indication whether the Chinese now intend to have their Premier come over here some time later this year as previously anticipated?

A No. There has been no further development on that since the Secretary's visit to China, and that situation is left just exactly where it was. I think we proferred the invitation, they accepted the invitation and said that the exact timing would be a matter for further consultation through diplomatic channels. But no time has been set, no date has been set.

Q John, how would you characterize the current state of U.S.-Chinese relations?

A I think I will do the same as I did yesterday, and that is steer away from what one gentlemen over here called "horseback" characterizations from this podium of the state of China-U.S. relations.

Obviously, we think that the case that has led to this action by the Chinese is a specific case, and it ought to be seen within the framework of overall U.S.-China relations.

Q John, could you round up for us again the overall situation regarding numbers of Chinese in this country and the number that have asked for political asylum?

A Number of Chinese within this country -- I think I'd have to do a little research on that, but the figure 10,000 students is in my head, and I think that is approximately right.

Q Talking about Mainland China.

A Talking about Mainland China. The number of applications for asylum of Chinese origin is just over a thousand. We gave you that figure earlier in the week, and that is made up of PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Don't have the exact figure for the PRC.

But the point we were trying to make earlier on, I think there had been a kind of deduction that there were 10,000 Chinese students in the United States, and if the United States has 1,000 applications for asylum, one in every ten of those students is seeking asylum. That's a totally erroneous impression.

Q Of the 1,000, could you take some sort of estimate what is Mainland China, and do you characterize these applications for asylum as defections from China?

A We did have some guidance which I think was available earlier in the week on this, Bernie, and I think I'd prefer to go back to that specific language. I think we weren't able to break out the figures in those three categories, though.

Q But are they defections?

A I think we'd have to go back and look at the legal definition of "asylum."

Q John, have you had any indication that this rupture would extend also to the student exchanges?

A No indication so far.

Q Have you had any indication that they will not?

A No.

Q No indication either way?

A Either way.

Q I see.

Q Do you expect the matter in effect now is closed in regard to retaliatory action by the Chinese, or do you expect it to spill over to trade or other matters?

A I don't think that we can project. I think we would have to wait and see whether the Chinese take any further action.

Q John, do you have any idea what the numbers are? The ten thousand students, on the surface of it, are not affected by this decision.

A On the surface are not affected, that's right.

Q Do you have any idea of the numbers of people who are affected -- cultural exchanges, art exhibits?

A I think USIA, which is the signatory to that cultural agreement, probably is the right place to go for some further detail. I can give you a line on the projects.

The projects are an exchange of film festivals, an exchange of small-scale, high-quality --

Q Do you have dates when these were planned for?

A Sorry?

Q Do you have dates when these were planned for?

A I don't, but I'm sure, insofar as dates are set for these, USIA would have them.

Small performing arts groups. The Julliard String Quartet was to have gone there. The Chinese Traditional Music Group was to have come here. Small-scale art exhibitions. We were to have received a show entitled, "Five Chinese Painters." A Brooklyn Museum exhibition was to have gone there. The VOA, Voice of America, and Radio Beijing were to have exchanged Directors. The Director of VOA was to have gone there, and the Beijing Radio Director was to have come here. Four delegations, including a Chinese cultural delegation, and Voice of America Chinese language broadcasters were to have gone there. And an American journalists' delegation and foreign-language publishing delegation was to have come from there here. But I think USIA could probably give you a better rundown and give you an indication. I haven't the numbers.

Q Are any of these situations in progress now that will be terminated immediately?

A No. The only one of which I'm aware, a Chinese Foreign-Language Publishers Group, began a tour of the United States on April 5th; and so far as we know, the Chinese announcement does not affect that group. Nothing has happened that we know to that group.

I do not know whether we have anybody in China, but I think VOA may be on the brink of sending someone, so you ought to check with USIA.

Q John, you recall the Fort Worth Chamber Orchestra was in Tokyo ready to go into China. Do you have anything on that?

A O.K. It may be. I don't have it listed here, but again USIA could give you some detail on that.

Q John, two questions, please. Was the granting of political asylum of Hu Na the first such granting by the United States to a defector from the Mainland?

A I'd have to do a little research on that, but I do not think so, Bernie.

The first, you say?

O.K. My excellent colleague here recommends INS as the --

Q You have no answer on that?

A I'm not ducking it. It's just a question that factually, I don't know.

Q And the other question is: The suspension for 1983 of various cultural and sports exchanges -- is it true as well that private exchanges are not affected?

A That's correct. Well, the sports exchanges that they have cancelled -- that's a private exchange, and that is so far the only private one we know that is cancelled.

Q What other private exchanges are there?

A There are other private cultural exchanges, and we just don't know what --

Q Can you give us an example of those?

A USIA could.

Q John, will you address the point that the interests of Taiwan meddled in this affair regarding Hu Na to encourage her to seek asylum in this country?

A I think we've been over that ground many times before. The United States took its decision based on the laws of this country. This is a law-abiding country, and the decision was weighed and taken and implemented in accord with U.S. law.

Q Then you exclude any influence by Taiwan addressing this?

A Sure, yes.

Q What?

A Yes. No meddling with that process.

Q Beijing said that the Chinese were upset because the U.S. had not gone along with an arrangement that they thought had been worked out in which Hu Na could stay here and go back and forth and travel -- in other words, just become an international tennis player. Had the U.S. ever given serious thought to having her stay here in ways other than as finally announced?

A To my knowledge, no such undertaking had been given; and it seems to me, in light of the legal process, that that would have been improper. The process followed the legal procedure.

Q Well, there was reported to be a recommendation by some elements of the State Department that instead of being granted political asylum, she should be granted some kind of -- I can't remember the name of a status where you can stay as long as you want in the United States but it's not a formal political asylum.

A Yes.

Q Are you meaning to argue with that possibility?

A No. But the question that was put to me was whether the Chinese were disturbed because some kind of agreement that the State Department had made with the Chinese authorities had been violated. But that is not the case.

What the internal deliberations were as the various appropriate bodies sought to properly implement the laws, I do not know.

Q John, one immediate bilateral issue is this question of the textile trade agreement. Any signal that the negotiations on that are going to be affected? And, in any case, do you know what the next step is supposed to do?

A No, I don't. I have no sign or no indication that they are affected, and I don't know what the next step is.

Q New subject?

Q No, wait a minute. Is there a date for renegotiation of either the cultural exchange or the sports agreements?

A Yes, there is, Barrie, and that date is -- there would have been a negotiation on a new implementing accord that would be for 1984-1985 probably this fall. But, obviously, at the moment it's impossible to say when such a negotiation would take place or when exchanges would resume.

Q Will the United States make overtures to seek out the possibility of doing this, or are you going to just sit? Do you have any sense of that?

A I think it's a little premature to respond to that. I just don't know what the response would be on that, Barrie.

Q John, another question --

Q Is there any message, for example, from the Chinese about Americans who would like to go to China as tourists --

A No.

Q -- as to visas being affected?

A No.

Q John, another question was asked yesterday, but it takes new significance today. Has the Chinese Ambassador either asked to come in to explain, or has the U.S. asked him?

A No. He certainly did not yesterday, and I do not think he has today.

Q How about the other way around? Has --

Q He's presenting his credentials --

A No, no, no. That's White House; it's this afternoon. But I think you're asking specifically about, yes --

Q About State, yes.

A Yes.

Q And how about the other way? Has State asked him to?

A No.

Q John, could we ask you that if in fact the Chinese Ambassador is coming, that the Press Office tells us that?

A The Press Office has told you that -- or tells you that --

Q No. If he does come, so we don't have to make a thousand calls.

A Sure. We'll make a thousand calls. (Laughter.)

Q Do you have any other details you can give us on Secretary Wolfowitz' announcement that the U.S. would speed up deliveries to Thailand, and does this mean there will be greater American involvement in that situation?

A I think what is happening at the moment is -- the speedup is of military equipment already in the pipeline, already earmarked and destained for Thailand. So at the moment there is no additional effort.

Mr. Wolfowitz just completed a brief working visit to Thailand. He had extensive discussions there with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. He visited the Thai-Kampuchean border. Discussions with the Thai leaders focused on the serious situation caused by Vietnamese attacks on refugee encampments and penetrations into Thai territory.

The talks went well. The Thais were pleased with Mr. Wolfowitz' visit. They did ask us to speed deliveries of military equipment already procured, and we're doing that.

On the border, Mr. Wolfowitz went to a refugee hospital. He got a first-hand impression of the seriousness of the situation. He's now left Thailand, and he is in Kuala Lumpur.

Q Two follow-ups about the second part, about greater American involvement -- did you answer that? And can you give us any idea of the nature --

A I'm sorry. About greater American involvement?

Q Yes. Does this signal any sort of greater American involvement?

A As I say, what we're doing is speeding up what is already in the pipeline. At this stage, nothing beyond that.

Q And can you give us an idea of what's in the pipeline?

A I think you'd have to talk to DOD about that.

Q Do you have anything on this new Soviet cruise missile and how might it affect the INF talks?

A I think not beyond saying we're aware of what the Soviets have been doing in development in that area. I think it was in the Pentagon's recent publication, "Soviet Military Power," and it's just one aspect of the massive ongoing Soviet military buildup.

Q John, can you skip on, please, to Central America? Can you address: what is the status now of the request for additional aid for El Salvador as a result of the Secretary's meeting with Representative Long?

A As you know, we have suggestions from three committees, and we're looking at them and listening to and examining the various points that have been made by those committees; and that's an ongoing process of consultation.

Q Well, how does this ongoing process of consultation affect the aid situation for El Salvador -- the need for ammunition, *et cetera*?

A Yes, sure. Nothing has diminished the need or urgency of our request. But, as we've said before, we've acceded to the request of the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee to delay the obligation of the funds until the Subcommittee could meet after the Easter recess.

So we consider the request to be urgent. We consider the need to be urgent. But we're talking to those committees.

Q How do you define "urgent" on the ground?

A Sorry?

Q How do you define "urgent"?

A I think we've done that on a number of occasions before. We've said that in some cases material was in 30-days supplies; in other cases 60 days, 90 days. We've talked about that on previous occasions.

Q When do you think they're going to vote?

A I don't know.

Q The Secretary got no indication yesterday from Mr. Long.

A No. I think you'd have to ask Congressman Long.

Q You said you received suggestions from three committees. Do you consider yesterday's meeting to have been a formal suggestion by the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee?

A Yes. I think that in the discussion yesterday, Congressman Long offered views, and ideas and the Secretary will consider those.

Q John, are there officials in high places at the State Department who are questioning whether the United States is complying by the law in continuing to support certain elements in Nicaragua?

A I think I -- tell me which story you're referring to.

Q Leslie Gelb, right? (Laughter.)

Q Do I have to give the man's name? (Laughter.)

A It might be a good idea to get it.

Q Mr. Gelb's story in The New York Times.

A O.K. As you well know, we don't respond to stories of that character about alleged internal meetings. But, as we've many times said before, senior officials of the State Department -- including the Secretary of State -- do not believe that we are violating the law.

Q Well, are some of those senior officials questioning whether we are complying with the law?

A I would give you the language I've just offered, but it would seem to me that that language indicates that there was not questioning.

Q On the matter of Cuban-American citizens who've -- I guess the Department's already addressed this a few months back -- they're being held when they visit Cuba on valid visas increasingly by the Cuban Government on what are characterized as trumped-up charges. Does the Department have anything to state today on that?

A Nothing new, if you said we've responded to that before.

Q What are we doing about it? It might be an important question.

A I have nothing for you on that.

Q John, is any news conference in the works?

A No. I think it would be unlikely there would be one this week.

Q John, back to the law business, you've stated this several times. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, and I guess Secretary Shultz, have stated that the United States Administration is not violating the law --

A Yes.

Q -- yet a number of members of Congress have gotten up publicly and said that there is great question in their mind about whether the law is being followed or violated.

Now that Congress is coming back to town, does the Department -- or some other part of the Administration, for that matter -- plan to do anything to clear the doubts which have been publicly expressed on Capitol Hill that the law is being followed?

A When you say "plan," that suggests an initiative; and I'm not aware of any initiative. Certainly the institutions do exist for oversight and the Administration and the Department would cooperate in the event that there is a request for testimony. Of course, I can't give you a schedule of just how that would be done. But of course we would cooperate.

Q John, Mr. Walesa will be coming to the United States.

A Sorry?

Q Lech Walesa will be coming to the United States to address a Harvard commencement. Are there any thoughts being given to inviting him to Washington to see the Secretary or any officials in this Government?

A Are you talking to some kind of report that I haven't seen, Mike?

Q Well, the report is out today. You may not have seen it. Are you aware of the reports that he is coming to the United States?

A Well --

Q Would you like to take that question?

A No, I don't need to take it. I am in a difficult position in that I thought that the inviting institution had embargoed that information (laughter). If you have seen it in a published form, then that is --

Q Yes.

A You have seen it in a published form. Tell me what the published report said. (Laughter.)

Q The UPI Wire Service --

A Aha.! (Laughter.)

Q -- reports Mr. Walesa will be speaking as the commencement speaker at Harvard.

A I wouldn't steer the UPI away from that story.

Q Well --

A I wouldn't predict the reaction of Harvard University to the news that that was carried on the UPI wire, but that's up to Harvard University.

Q Will he be coming to Washington, or is there an invitation out? Has he requested to come to Washington to see anyone in this Government?

A I am really only aware of the embargoed Harvard University invitation, I'm afraid.

Q Formally requesting that, all right.

Q Except that Mr. Walesa has to get a visa to come here.

A Yes, yes. We're unaware of it, but of course we would look at that; but we're unaware of that. There's no such request from him at the moment.

Q Back on Long, he indicated that there would be three conditions which he felt the State Department should satisfy --

A Yes.

Q -- and that should report on in the next several weeks before there's any hope of getting the appropriation through his committee --

A Yes.

Q -- reprogramming request. Do you have any reaction. Do you have any reaction to those, to what he said?

A No. As I say, we've had suggestions and recommendations from three committees now, and I'm sure the Secretary and the Administration is looking at all of them. But, no, I don't have any response.

Q And, also, do you have a comment on the other New York Times article with respect to an alleged national security leak?

A We don't, as you well know, talk about leaks of alleged documents, so on the specifics I'm not going to have any comment. If you want to talk about Administration policy in general, I'd just point out that that has been stated publicly a number of times in the past few weeks, and I'd recommmend you to the Secretary's testimony on March 16th before the House Committee on Foreign Operations as a clear statement of our policy in Central America.

Q I don't understand. You don't comment on leaked documents? And then the other comment was you don't comment on internal --

A Yes.

Q So you can't confirm that that --

A No, that's right.

Q In view of the Administration's new policy regarding leaks and possible use of lie detectors, do you have any estimate of the number of people who have to take a lie detector test because of that particular leak?

A Haven't a clue, Barrie. Nobody has asked me. (Laughter.)

Q In that connection, the Director of the FBI last night said one out of three accredited diplomats is involved in espionage activities.

A From which country?

Q Eastern European countries. And this was in connection with all kinds of espionage.

Has the Department taken cognizance of that statement? Does it agree that that figure is about right?

A I don't think we'd get into specific figures. I think we're aware of certain trends in the representation of diplomats from Eastern Europe.

Q You wouldn't disavow that figure.

A I'm not going to disavow or confirm it. I just don't know. I'm sure the FBI has a good reason.

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #62

FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: It's rather a lean day, I'm afraid, but I do have a couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office is a press release on the April 6-7 United States-Japan Working Group meeting held in the Department on energy cooperation between United States and Japan in the energy sector.

I think you are all aware that there will be a BACKGROUND readout on the Ecuador meeting with the President. That will be around 1:15 at the White House this afternoon.

I have a statement on U.S. military assistance to Thailand: Over the next ten days three shipments of American-built military equipment are due to arrive in Thailand in response to Thai requests for speeded up delivery. The initial delivery will take place this weekend, when a U.S. military plane is due to unload a number of Redeye ground-to-air missiles at Don Muang Royal Thai Air Force Base. That will be midday Saturday, April 9.

On Monday, April 11, a special airlift of two American C-5 transports will deliver 155mm extended-range howitzers, along with ammunition. These new model-198 howitzers were made available from America's inventory for its own forces to underline U.S. support for Thailand. On April 19, additional extended-range howitzers will arive in Thailand aboard the merchant ship SS Benjamin Harrison. The procurement of these weapons for delivery to Thailand was also accelerated as a result of a Thai request.

These weapons have been purchased by Thailand under the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program. Thailand annually purchases military equipment averaging between $150 and $200 million in value. In addition, last year (Fiscal Year 1982) the United States allocated to Thailand $80 million in credits and grants for this purpose. So far this year, $66 million has been made available, and the Administration is requesting a supplemental appropriation of an additional $25 million.

In addition to speeding delivery of military supplies, the United States has responded to the situation created by Vietnamese attacks along the Thai-Kampuchean border by an immediate grant of $1.5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency medical care and other humanitarian assistance to victims of the fighting. Our Ambassador there, John Gunther Dean, also recently presented $3 million to aid Thai villagers affected by the continuing conflict in Kampuchea and the influx of refugees.

That's all I have.

Q Is this the announcement made by Wolfowitz out there this morning?

A I don't know whether it is the identical announcement made by Wolfowitz, Jim; but in substance, it is the same.

Q Can we get copies of that, John?

A Sure.

Q To follow up, John, will there be more personnel needed to go along to deliver this equipment or --

A Not to my knowledge, at this stage.

Q Did you say the first shipment would have surface-to-air?

A Yes. Ground-air.

Q Why is that being sent, given the nature of the conflict?

I presume the Thais feel that there is a need for that kind of equipment?

Q What is your reading of the military situation in the area?

A On the border? I don't have anything up-to-date for you on that.

Q What are the Secretary's plans for this weekend?

A Why don't I chat with you about that after this session.

Q Let's stay on Thailand a minute more.

A Sure.

Q In addition to this speeded up stuff that you're sending them in the next few days, is there any consideration being given to additional assistance of any kind to Thailand, beyond giving more of what they have already ordered?

A No decision has been taken, and nothing has been sent. What is being sent is materiel that was earmarked for them, that was in the pipeline, is going faster at this stage. Obviously, should events change or should there be a need for more, I'm sure we would consider that.

Q These are all things they have already paid for or ordered, and it is just the question of making delivery faster?

A Yes.

Q If events change, the U.S. will send more?

A No, I didn't say that. I was asked whether there was any consideration of additional aid. As you know, the Thais have asked for assistance in various spheres. I wouldn't rule out consideration of other measures if such requests were made. But I'm not misleading you: what we have done up to now is send materiel that they would otherwise have had. And that's where we stand. But I don't want to draw the line there, and say the United States would never do anything else.

Q The "other issues" is military equipment. Period.

A Yes.

Q How serious is the situation? Is Thailand in danger in some way?

A I think I would let our friends at the Pentagon give you a characterization of the military situation.

Q Mr. Wolfowitz, in some of his remarks quoted from Thailand, was quoted as saying, "The Vietnamese are responsible and that the Soviets are, to some degree, responsible for this situation."

A I think we're all aware of Soviet involvement in Kampuchea.

Q I guess the question I was getting to is, has the United States done anything, or is it doing anything diplomatically in addition to sending these missiles and howitzers over there, regarding the Soviet Union or the Vietnamese?

A Yes, I think we have made clear our views to the Vietnamese, and I think a number of other countries have made very clear their views about this, too.

Q How about with the Soviets?

A I'm sure that the Soviets are well aware of our viewpoint.

Q Are we doing anything now, or is this just something we did some time ago, before all this latest round began.

A Well, you know, we continue not to get into diplomatic exchanges--

Q Except when you want to. (Laughter)

A But I'm sure that the Soviets are aware of our strong feeling about what is going on along the border.

Q Has there been any contact with the Chinese over this? The Chinese, in the past, have played a very direct role in helping, sometimes, to thwart --

A Again, I don't think we'd get into a diplomatic exchange with other governments about this.

Q When you say, "The Soviets to some degree are responsible," could you amplify that, please?

A I think I would go back to -- I'm not suggesting -- I don't know what Mr. Wolfowitz was pinpointing, in specific instances; I would have to go back and see what he said. But I think the question of Soviet involvement in Kampuchea is well known.

Q In what sense?

A In terms of aid and support.

Q -- to the Vietnamese?

A Yes.

Q Whose helping the Vietnamese? Are the Chinese backing them? (Laughter)

A I think my reference to Bernie's question on Soviet support really answers that.

Q Wait a minute. You said Soviet support for Kampuchea.

A For the Vietnamese in Kampuchea.

Q I'm sorry. I missed the point of Kampuchea. (Inaudible)...get in there.

A I got Hank back here.

Q Really, who is giving Kampuchea their aid, then, if the Soviets were supporting --

A I think that ASEAN has made clear its position in terms of support for the coalition forces.

Q Can we get a briefing from Secretary Wolfowitz, when he comes back?

A I think that's entirely possible. Sure.

Q John, do you have anything there on strategic guidance about what the Vietnamese purpose is, whether this is all locally-oriented or whether there is an element of Vietnamese pressure on Thailand beyond the local situation or what-have-you?

A No, I really don't.

Q I was just going to ask you on this Soviet angle, if you could take a question as to whether there is new evidence of Soviet involvement, or are you just talking generically that the Soviets have long supported the Vietnamese, and therefore are --

A I was talking generically. It may well be that Mr. Wolfowitz, on the scene, has something more specific; but I was talking generically.

Q I wonder if you could take the question as to if there are new specifics about any kind of a Soviet step-up?

A I won't take the question, but let me see if there is anything that we would volunteer.

Q John, on the Secretary's plans -- and I know you're concerned about leaking classified information -- but the answer to that question about his plans are posted in all the elevators in this building.

A Ah-hah! Well, I'll still be glad to talk to you about it after this session.

(Laughter)

Q Why is it in the elevators?

Q Why is it a secret?

A I don't know that it is in the elevators.

Q Yes.

A You don't think I'm going to respond to a question that it's in the elevators until I'm sure it's in the elevators, do you? That's an old dodge.

(Laughter)

Q Why don't we call a recess?

Q What does the notice in the elevators say?

Q I can't tell.

A That is an issue to which Jim cannot address himself.

Q An embargo. He embargoed it to the fourth floor.

(Laughter)

Q I was sworn to secrecy when I got on the elevator.

Q Are we going to continue going up and down on this thing? (Laughter)

A One last serious question.

Q John, do you have anything to tell us about the start of new trade negotiations on Monday with the Japanese on agricultural products?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on the Middle East situation? There are reports now that the PLO has sent emissaries to Amman informing King Hussein that they will not support the Reagan initiative?

A No. Somebody mentioned to me that there had been that late report, but I think that we will just wait and see how things transpire. As far as we're concerned, we are awaiting some kind of announcement from King Hussein and Mr. Arafat at the conclusion of their negotiations.

Q You're waiting for that rather than an announcement following the summit next week?

A I think that is up to the parties involved to determine how they will announce progress or lack of progress in the negotiations they have been having; but I think it's been clear that there will be some kind of announcement at some appropriate time.

Q Would you care to comment on the column of Evans and Novak today?

A On what aspect?

Q Well, the Israeli officials soliciting and trying to sell land on the West Bank to American Jews, in direct opposition to President Reagan's proposals.

A Our position is that, who is buying the land on the West Bank is not the primary issue. We have, on a number of occasions, stated publicly that the continuation of settlement activity is a major obstacle in the way of broadened negotiations. Let me recall for you the President's own words in his September 1 speech when he said, "The immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel, and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated." That's the end of the President's quotation.

Our feeling is that direct negotiations, based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is the basis of the Camp David Accords, have been the goal to which all of our efforts have been addressed since the President announced his Fresh Start on September 1.

If Jordan publicly announces its willingness to enter such negotiations, we are determined to do our best to assure that the results of those negotiations are not prejudiced from the outset by activities of any party which reduce the prospects of a negotiated peace.

Q Including settlements? Activities including settlements?

A Yes.

Q What would you contemplate doing?

A I don't think we're going to spell it out; I think we're going to leave you with these words and our intention. I think it would not be appropriate at this time to indicate how we will go about that.

Q But you are prepared to say that you are willing, if Jordan enters, to do something about the settlements?

A We will do our best to assure that the results of those negotiations are not prejudiced.

Q -- by things such as the settlements?

A -- such as the expansion of settlements.

Q This is something new. We have never heard this before.

A I think the President's position on the settlements has been clear since September 1. He has consistently said that expansion is not helpful.

Q Would he be encouraging King Hussein that he would be, in a way, "rewarded" or that he will do something if he enters? That is new, isn't it?

A I think that is a clear and continuing expression of the President's feeling on this.

Q Are you making public now for the first time what you have been telling the King in various messages?

Q We can't hear the question.

A Do you want to repeat that a little louder?

Q Are you now making public what you have been telling the King in various messages since December?

A No. I think we are simply reinforcing and clarifying what the President's position has been constantly.

Q That has not been your public position, however. You've been urging Israel to have a freeze on settlements, but you've never suggested the U.S. would do anything to bring it about.

A I think we're making it clear that that is a position we would pursue.

Q Is this public statement in any way linked to the situation the King finds himself in today?

A I was asked to respond to this question of land sales, and I think the language I have offered is in response to that. That is a continuing indication of apparently of settlement expansion, and we are reiterating our unhappiness with that expansion and our opposition to it.

Q But we've been manifestly unsuccessful in the past years in getting the Israelis to stop settlement activity. Why does the Administration believe now that it might be more successful?

A I don't think the Administration has ever believed that the art of diplomacy could not bring good results when such a fine, ultimate goal, namely peace, is the attraction.

Q John, when you were asked about what the United States might do to bring about this objective of a freeze on settlements, you're not going to spell anything out?

A No.

Q Does that include the cut-off of military and economic aid to Israel?

A No, you should not imply or read into that statement a threat, or any indication along those lines.

Q Well, what then?

A I think that our position on urging the various parties to participate in those negotiations and to bring them to a successful conclusion has really been constant, that the end result -- peace -- is such an overwhelming attraction, and should be so widely desired by the parties, of course including Israel, that discussion and diplomacy can remove the obstacles, and clearly settlements are an obstacle.

Q Let me just follow up: If you're saying it is not a threat, can we paraphrase it the other way? Are you ruling out a cut-off of military and economic aid to Israel?

A I think I would, Bernie, refer you to the statements which are on record by the President and the Secretary, and have been since September 1, and very clearly spelled out --

Q Well, the President has already gotten involved in that with the F-16s. Secretary Shultz has said other things that are at odds with that. You're not answering the question. If it is not a threat, which is what you're saying --

A Yes.

Q -- are you, then, to take it at the other extreme, ruling out a cut-off of military and economic aid to Israel?

A What I'm saying is that I'm not going to spell out the diplomatic tactic at such time as the parties sit down --

Q -- until?

A -- but what we do, I'm sure, would be consistent with our policy as we have expressed it.

Q In the answer that you read, you used the plural of the word "activities." You said settlements was one such activity. What would be other examples?

A I'm just going to stand on the language we used. We will be interested in removing any impediments, anything that prevents peace in the area.

Q John, what about the narrow issue of the original question which was the legality of Israeli officials participating in the sale of land on the West Bank to Americans? Is there anything questionable about that?

A I think that is a question for legal analysis, and we would be undertaking that. It's not clear at this stage whether the Department of State would be involved, but we certainly are still looking into this.

Q But when, as you said a moment ago, the President held out the prospect of a settlement freeze on September 1st as one incentive to King Hussein to join the negotiations; now the Administration is saying, "Forget about that as an incentive to join the negotiations. Go ahead and join them, and we'll promise to try to do something after you join them." Is that an accurate --

A I don't want to paraphrase our position. I think that there are adequate words on record which express our position, and I don't think I'm going to go beyond that, especially at this particular juncture.

Q But you say it's consistent. It's not consistent to say, on the one hand as you did a few minutes ago, that a settlement freeze would do more than anything else to bring about the negotiations, and then on the other hand say, "Bring about the negotiations, and then we'll work to get a settlement freeze."

A I think the President was speaking of a goal and what was desirable.

-- MORE --

Q What would happen if -- I know you don't like to handle "if" questions, but things may happen this weekend, and I'd like to get some feeling on how you stand on this.

If King Hussein makes some statement which falls short of his agreeing to enter the negotiations, what would that do for the Reagan initiative? So much has been placed from this podium and elsewhere on the initiative hinging on King Hussein coming into the talks. Would that amount to the obituary for the Reagan plan, or what?

A I think you kind of set me up for the answer by saying I don't like to answer "if" questions, and that is a very iffy question at a very significant stage, I think, of the discussions that the King and Mr. Arafat have been having.

I think we really would have to wait and see what kind of statement and what kind of readiness or lack of readiness is expressed.

It's hard to suggest a diplomatic scenario when you don't really know what you're responding to.

Q Does the Administration, as far as you know, have any reason to believe that the Israeli Government is considering such a freeze in the event that King Hussein joins the negotiation, or would consider such a freeze? Has there been correspondence along this line?

A I think we have seen no evidence to date of a freeze. What might transpire in the future, I think we'll have to wait and see.

Q John, to follow up on another question, you said "the activities." Can the other activity, or if there is another activity, could it be the withdrawal from Lebanon also? I mean, is the withdrawal from Lebanon, also, being used within this --

A I think you would be on the wrong track if you were looking for specific elements. I think that is a general statement, and I was asked, "Does it include settlements?" and it certainly does. But I think we're talking of impediments in general.

Q John, to put it in another way, what's your understanding of what King Hussein wants to see from the United States before he will enter the talks?

A I think you'd have to ask King Hussein that. I don't think --

Q I want to know what your understanding of what he wants --

A But then you'd be getting into government-to-government exchanges, and we wouldn't get into that.

Q John, the question has come up here several times in past months about U.S. aid to Israel and what proportion of it has been spent on settlements, and the answer has always been that it's impossible to figure out.

Has any study ever been commenced to try to determine --

A I don't know. Not to my knowledge, but I just don't know what may be going on in --

Q Can you take the question to find out if there is any effort being made by the State Department to determine --

A I don't think so, because even if there were such a study, it would be an internal study and an internal document.

Q Coming back to my first question, would the State Department Legal Office be able to provide us with some answers to this, to the legality of a foreign government -- Israel is a foreign government -- trying to solicit things in direct, as we see it --

A I don't think they'd be able to offer anything today because it's something that obviously we're going to have to take a look at and are taking a look at, but in due course we might or might not.

Q On what basis would you look at such a thing? In other words --

A The legality.

Q What legality would be involved? Is it because it represents what you would interpret as opposition to the President's plan, or is it a different basis of legality? Is it a political or a legal --

A No. I think it's a legal question whether American citizens can be solicited and should buy land on the West Bank. That is the issue.

Q John, this news story was first covered in Executive Intelligence Review over six months ago. In that time period you haven't examined the legality of it?

A I guess we probably missed it the first time around. (Laughter)

Q Maybe you should be more attentive.

Q There is a legal matter involved.

Q It's a political question in a way. The article said that some Israeli officials were here involved in this meeting -- that is to say, Evans & Novak's article. Has the State Department or somebody else talked to the Embassy about it?

A To the Israeli Embassy?

Q To the Israeli Government about it?

A No. I think that would be premature until we look at the legality and the correctness or otherwise --

Q Was the article this morning the first time the Department knew about it?

A That I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q You sound as though your looking into it is rather recent.

A I think you're on the right track, but, I mean, I wouldn't want to get caught out by finding that somebody has been doing something on this prior to that. However, I think it is.

Q John, has Helmut Schmidt recently been a houseguest of Secretary Shultz in his California home in the last two or three weeks or so?

A I don't know whether he's been a houseguest of the Secretary in his California home. I know he has visited the Secretary here in Washington. I don't know whether he was a houseguest, but they are old friends.

Q (Inaudible)

A He may have been. I don't know. I don't know the answer to that. I mean, it wouldn't surprise me.

Q Can I go to a new subject?

Q No. Middle East, please, again. Earlier this week you were suggesting that the talks between Arafat and Hussein would continue, and you said we have been waiting --

A No. I said --

Q -- will resume.

A -- I thought they would communicate. I mean, how they communicate is up to them.

Q Is that still the State Department's view that that communication will continue?

A Yes.

Q Or that anything has -- that the communication has concluded?

A No. So far as we are aware, it is to continue.

Q John, is the requirement to stop activities which you describe will prejudge the outcome of the talks a precondition to King Hussein to join the peace process or just a requirement after King Hussein joins?

A I don't want to get into the timeframe and what is a precondition and what isn't a precondition. I think that at this current stage I'm going to leave you with the language that we've offered here.

Q On another issue related to the Middle East, is there anything established for Phil Habib to go back, a date, or --

A I have lost track of Mr. Habib's movements. He is on private business in California, I think, this weekend, and may be going back at the end of the weekend, or perhaps even Sunday. I don't know. He's due to go back when he gets through --

Q Can I ask the obverse of the quesion that was just asked by the Israeli correspondent? The implication of your statement earlier is that if King Hussein comes into the peace talks, then the United States would do what it could to bring about a moratorium on settlements.

If King Hussein does not come into the peace talks, can we assume that the U.S. will not be active on the settlements question, or as active as it would be if he comes into the talks?

A I don't want to interpret the President of the United States, but he said what he did, and his view seemed to be strongly held and constant. I think he uttered it as a matter of principle. We're going to stand on that principle.

Q The reason I ask is it's been six months or seven months since he uttered it, and no actions have been taken in Washington in any kind of way to penalize or otherwise do anything against the Israelis for continuing the settlements.

Your statement today, as well as statements that have come out of Amman, here and there over the last couple of months, have suggested the U.S. was urging Hussein to come in to the talks, with holding out the promise that if he did the U.S. would be more active in trying to bring about a freeze.

So my question really was, would it be the same situation as it is now if Hussein doesn't come in the talks?

A I don't think it's really fair to say that nothing has happened in the seven months. Diplomacy is a long, and to a former journalist, sometimes tedious affair, but a lot has moved in these months.

We do have movement and activity on Lebanon. We have had movement --

Q I just meant on the settlements.

A What you're saying is should something have been done of a dramatic character within that period, but I think if you'd look up what had happened, the parties are being nudged closer.

Everybody's waiting to see what will transpire in the next few days, and most people are hopeful. I think you have to give a little credit to the way diplomacy has been handled on the part of the United States, including its treatment of the settlement question.

Q What is it that prompts you to make that statement at this time?

A I think there is an alleged new development on the West Bank, on the settlements. There is a report that there is a further extension of land transfer or land sales. I think at any time you see a new and complicating factor on the settlements issue, one's concern mounts.

Q So you're linking it to the Left Bank, but your statement talks about --

A West Bank.

Q West Bank. Your statement talks about Hussein. My question is addressed to that area, and although you won't answer "iffy" questions, you did set up an "iffy" condition in your policy statement.

A That's because it's my briefing. (Laughter)

Q But there are questions. Why now on this statement? Why now are you going public with a statement addressed directly to Hussein, with a threat to the Israelis, and so forth?

A That's your interpretation of it being a threat. That's not my interpretation. My interpretation of it is as a projection of what has been the President's policy consistently.

Q John, is this intended in any way, this statement coming at this time, to offer clarification or guidance to the talks that have been taking -- or to the participants of the talks in Amman?

A It's a very straightforward and easily understood explanation of the American position.

Q John, setting aside the legality of the idea that Americans would buy land on the West Bank, do you think that just the idea of it, of Americans buying quantities of land in the West Bank, would further complicate the problem and may be detrimental to America's role as a mediator?

A We think that the extension of settlement activity, irrespective of nationality and irrespective of the legality, is not helpful to the process that we're embarked on.

Q But would American ownership even further complicate it?

A It would not be helpful. Certainly it's a complication.

Q Something is still a little bit unclear to me. President Reagan came up with his plan on September 1 calling for certain things, including the freeze on settlements.

Just picking up on this question again, now you're saying that if the King enters, we will do more to bring about a freeze of settlements.

A No. I didn't say that. Go back to my language. That's not what we said.

Q Would you reread it, please, John?

A I said if Jordan publicly announces its willingness to enter such negotiations, we are determined to do our best to assure that the results of those negotiations are not prejudiced from the outset by activities of any party which reduced the prospects of a negotiated peace. Somebody asked me, "Does that include settlements?" and I said yes.

Q My question was actually -- I don't know -- about the President who said that the plan called for a freeze on settlements. Isn't that by itself enough actually for the United States to pursue that policy of reaching a freeze on settlements without the King's entrance of lack of it?

A We've been pursuing a policy of trying to bring the parties together which I think has been moving along. Should that transpire, then we would pursue a policy of working as hard as we can to remove obstacles and remove that which is prejudicial to a settlement, to allow an agreement.

Q John, how do you evaluate reports that Hussein says that he will conduct a national referendum or national plebiscite on the issue?

A We'll have to wait and see.

Q New subject. Any comment on the information which supposedly reached the State Department about the Salvadoran Government investigating Congressman Miller?

A Yes. I do have something on that. The Congressman, I think, has presented the Department with several dozen detailed questions. We've been gathering information since we got his letter. We expect to respond shortly. We've been in communication with him, obviously, and I think that's really about it.

Q Have you been in communication with Mr. D'Aubuisson about the matter?

A I'm unaware of any communication.

Q Since he's the guy who's supposedly involved in it, why don't you talk to him?

A I don't know, but at the moment we're talking with the Congressman.

Q Was this information available to you at the time that Mr. D'Aubuisson applied for and was granted a visa?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q I understand it was your information that he was being investigated.

A That who was being investigated?

Q That the Salvadorans were investigating Mr. Miller. According to the Time's story, you were the ones who learned about it.

A The nature of the material that we are discussing with the Congressman is classified, and I'm not going to be able to go beyond what I've given you.

Q I'm very puzzled by this. Has the FBI ever sought to speak with D'Aubuisson about alleged activities, either relating to inside U.S. borders or Salvadoran borders, of investigations with which the FBI has been concerned?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask the FBI.

Q Has the State Department ever requested that the FBI do that?

A I don't know.

Q Has D'Aubuisson ever approached a U.S. Government official, indicating his willingness to talk about such activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Lopez Sibrian who was released and has been a prime suspect in the killings of the agrarian reform workers, he's also described or acknowledged by the State Department to be rather close to D'Aubuisson.

Has there ever been any attempt to talk to D'Aubuisson about that by U.S. officials?

A I don't know, but the Administration clearly is interested in the Lopez Sibrian case. I think the Secretary made some comments about that in his testimony, and made clear our unhappiness with the slow pace of the judicial procedures in a number of cases, particularly that one. But I don't know the specific answer to your question about who was talked to and when.

Q Would you think that Mr. D'Aubuisson's apparent unwillingness to come forward and talk about what he knows about these cases is evidence of his democratic vocation that you spoke of?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q A couple of straight forward questions on Nicaragua --

Q That's perfectly straightforward.

Q I didn't say it wasn't.

Q I have have another one, if I can interpose a second. It flows from this one. Congressman Long has said that before Congress went into recess that he was expecting certain information and answers to your policy questions from Secretary Shultz, and the Secretary had promised to provide this material. As of yesterday he says he still hasn't heard from the Secretary.

A He had a meeting. Congressman Long? Of course, they had a meeting earlier this week. They met.

Q What day was this?

Q Monday.

A Monday.

Q He still doesn't have the material according to him.

A I don't know. They met.

Q Oh, yeah. That's what he said. He said the Secretary is still working. Do you have any idea of when it is --

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on Tomas Borge's visa application?

A No.

Q What about the Nicaraguan sugar quota?

A Still under consideration.

Q That's what I meant by straightforward.

Q Anything on the article about General Garcia and U.S. pressure?

A No.

Q You have nothing to say about that?

A No.

Q And anything on Congressman Fowler's statement yesterday to the press?

A Our position is the same as I indicated yesterday that senior State Department officials, including the Secretary, are perfectly satisfied that we're not breaking the law. Insofar as oversight committees are concerned, they are there. There is the mechanism for consideration and discussion of these matters, and we would cooperate fully with any such request.

Q Is he suggesting that he's -- well, he's going to propose legislation with respect to the operation of the Intelligence Committee, and was proposing a veto power in certain policy standards which they should follow.

Does the State Department have any opinion on what he said about that?

A No. Not at this stage.

Q John, briefly back to the West Bank, that article you discussed also alleged that these Israeli sales were only to American Jews, not to Americans who were not Jewish.

Could you take this question? Because if that is the fact, that would seem to violate U.S. law.

A I think that would be part of the investigation that we have underway. I think that would be an aspect of it.

Q Is it your understanding that the sale of land on an ethnic or religious basis would violate U.S. law?

A I think that is something -- I'm not saying it would violate U.S. law. I'm saying that we would be looking into the question of whether it violates U.S. law.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Alennen

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, APRIL 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #63

MONDAY, APRIL 11, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements.

We hope that we will be able to have a briefing for you this afternoon sometime on Canadian Foreign Minister MacEachen's visit. We recommend you stay in touch with the Press Office on that one.

Q Do you know if he's having a new conference at 4:00?

A I think the Canadians' at 5:00, as I understand it.

Q It's at 4:30, to be precise.

A We'll split the difference and call it 4:30.

Q I heard 5:15.

A Any advance on 4:30? We will take that into consideration when we schedule ours.

Second announcement: The U.S. Food & Drug Administration of the Health and Human Services Department and the Japanese Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare will exchange notes regarding good laboratory practices for pharmaceutical products in a brief ceremony Tuesday, April 12, 10:00 a.m., Room 6210. Any interested member of the press is welcome to attend.

Q How brief will it be?

A I don't know. I haven't seen them. That's about all I have. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q On the Middle East, in light of the developments over the weekend, where does the United States plan to go next to keep the peace process alive?

A As the President said yesterday, and the Secretary reiterated today, we are determined to go forward with the September 1 initiative.

King Hussein and King Fahd share our resolve. While it is unfortunate that a formula has not yet been arrived at to bring a Jordanian delegation to the negotiating table, we do not accept the view of some that this marks the end of the process. On the contrary, we are as determined as ever to exert our efforts for peace.

Our friends in the Middle East support this effort, and we have a good deal of support around the world.

Q Could you tell us, John, about some of the telephone calls that the President made yesterday, and has the Secretary made any phone calls today on this subject?

A I don't think the Secretary's has made any phone calls today. I think the President spoke by phone with King Hussein yesterday from Camp David, and I think with King Fahd. I think the Secretary was present when those calls were made. I think that the --

Q And Hassan; right?

A I think that when they got back to the White House there may have been a further telephone conversation between King Hussein and the President and possibly one with King Hassan. There may have been others but those --

Q Practically, where does the process remain? As long as the Jordanians and the Palestinians can't come to some kind of understanding about how they'll be represented, doesn't that practically kill the President's initiative?

A No. The President doesn't think so, and especially in the light of the phone calls that he has had with other Arab leaders.

Q Does that suggest, John, that some of these leaders may be willing to go forward to some extent on their own, or to continue the process?

A I think that's an assertion for them. The President has said, I think, and the Secretary has said that if you can talk about the future of the Palestinians, you have to have Palestinian representation. That's what King Hussein has been trying to work out. Just what that representation is, of course, is a matter for the Palestinians and for King Hussein.

Q But if they were willing to come forward, they could invite whatever Palestinians would be willing to join them to come foward without a particular green light from the PLO. Is that what the President hopes will now happen?

A No. I'm not going to say what the President hopes. The President is continuing vigorously in pursuing his policy which he set up last September 1. He never suggested that it would be a quick or an instantaneous resolution of the problem. This is a problem that has long been going on. I think he warned at the time of his September 1 speech that we would have to endure and that he would have to have patience and the American peope would have to have patience as we worked our way through this.

Q In light of what King Hussein said yesterday, however, somebody has to do something to start this process again, if you're still sticking with the original process and the original objectives. How does that come about?

A As you know, the President talked with King Hussein yesterday; he talked with King Fahd. As a result of those conversations he is confident that they have certainly not given up, and that the process is going forward.

Q Is there some reason to believe that there will be an Arab summit in the near future at which there may be some movement?

A I don't know. From time to time, we've seen these reports about a summit conference in April. I haven't seen any reference to that summit within the past day or two.

Q In the conversations that the President is having with these Arab leaders, have they signaled that they are contemplating such a move?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Have those Arab leaders asked anything new for the President to do in order to continue the momentum or the process going forward?

A No. I think what has happened has been an agreement that the process which is under way, which is based on his September 1 initiative, should go forward. I think there is agreement on the part of those he has spoken to that that is a good initiative. It's an initiative that has offered more hope than anything we have seen in a long while for peace in the Middle East, and it's on that basis we are proceeding.

Q Can you address the question of what should go forward? That is to say, how? Hank's question? What elements? So far you're tossing off generalities about the need to go foward.

Can you provide any specifics that would, in fact, keep the process alive?

A I would think here would be continuing discussions between the President and various other Arab leaders, presumably, to keep the process moving forward and not let it become derailed.

Q Does the Administration have new ideas on how this might be accomplished?

A The President has a good September 1 initiative out there. The question is how do you move that initiative forward.

If you're talking about a new plan, then, it seems to me, you're conceding that the September 1 approach is invalid. We're not conceding that and neither are other Arab leaders.

Q But the alleged (inaudible) of the September 1 plan was King Hussein. He's dropped out out it. Where do you go now?

A You're saying he's dropped out of it. There was a Cabinet communique that spoke of the decision by radical elements of the PLO.

Q But the King essentially has washed his hands, hasn't he?

A You're making that interpretation.

Q How would you characterize it?

A I wouldn't make that characterization.

Q Can you say whether Arafat, in fact, is responsible for the decision of the radical elements of the PLO or shares that decision?

A No, I do not, and we have not seen any declaration by Mr. Arafat.

Q Are you holding out then the hope that Arafat might come through with something different from what has been presented to Hussein?

A I guess that would be something for Mr. Arafat to decide. I haven't seen any declaration by Mr. Arafat. We've seen the report of the mission from some PLO members to Amman. We've seen the Cabinet communique from Jordan which speaks of that decision by radical elements in the PLO which seems to cut across an agreement, or a near agreement that had been reached between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat, and that's where we are.

Q You don't see Hussein as out of it?

A I haven't seen it. Maybe King Hussein has made a statement that I haven't seen, but I haven't seen such a statement.

Q On the basis of the Cabinet's statement, you do not regard Hussein as out of the President's peace process?

A I think that on the basis of the President's talks with King Hussein, they are agreed that the process continues to go forward, and there is support by both of them, including King Hussein, for that process to go forward.

Q In the proposal, the Reagan proposal, it includes a reaffirmation of 242. Were Arafat to give Hussein his approval to speak for the Palestinians, would that constitute an acceptance of 242, and would we then talk to Arafat?

A Our position on the PLO has been unchanged, is unchanged and will not change. There's no question of any change. We have made our position quite clear on the basis of how we would talk with the PLO.

In terms of the amendments, or the changes that the radical elements apparently are seeking to make, those bear no reference to the President's initiative. They talk, as we understand it, of direct PLO presence at those talks.

In other words, what the PLO is talking about is direct representation at those talks without endorsing Camp David, without endorsing 242, without recognizing Israel. Those are unacceptable.

Q But, John, we closed last week, or they were close to some sort of a communique that would have made it possible for Hussein to step forward. As I understand it, some acceptance of 242 was a part of that, to some degree.

On the basis of what we know about that communique, would that have been enough for us, then, to talk with Arafat and the PLO, or the part of the PLO he represents?

A I think that it really would not be wise to talk about an agreement that was not made public.

Q I have a question just on what you said just a minute ago. You started by saying, "Radical elements have suggested changes that bear no relevance to the President's initiative." Then, you went back and you said the PLO, and you didn't qualify it by saying radical elements.

Is PLO and radical elements at this point interchangeable, or can you distinguish them?

A I think that the President was speaking of radical elements in a broad term. But, certainly, those who took the amendments to Amman, I think, would be in that category.

Q Also, do you have a formal reaction or interpretation of the Jordanian Cabinet statement yesterday?

A Simply, what I gave you at the beginning of this session.

Q Is there any possibility that the Secretary will be making a trip out to that area?

A On the Trip, we stand where we have all along, that the Secretary wants to go at the appropriate time. The President want him to go at the appropriate time. But certainly, as of today, no plan has been made, no dates have been set.

Q How do you define appropriate time? Can you help us with that at all?

A I assume when the President and the Secretary decide that the time is ripe for him to go.

Q John, that does raise a question. Let me just ask. Is the Secretary ruling out going out there to negotiate anything? I understand what he said this morning, that he would go when conditions are right to go. But does that mean that he does not want to have a negotiation? That he will go only after something has been agreed to there, then he would go? I don't understand.

A It's hard for me to specify what role he would fulfill. Also, given certain changeability in the situation, fluidity at the moment, he's going to make that decision, as he's consistently said, when he thinks such a trip would be useful. How you interpret the usefulness of the trip is something that I think that he and the President will have to make, to decide.

Q Do you see a way of proceeding with this Middle East peace process by somehow or another going around the PLO, or must, in your mind, the PLO stand as a central element without which you cannot proceed?

A I think the President and the Secretary have said that you can't talk about the future of the Palestinians without involving the Palestinians. Who those Palestinians are, I think, is not for us to say. I think we can urge that they have credibility, but I think that the character of the Palestinians, who would come with King Hussein to the negotiating table, is something the Palestinians and the Jordanians have to decide.

Q Is that, then, a way of getting around the PLO in order to continue the process, or do you find that wherever you turn you come to the PLO as a central element; and at this particular point, they're not permitting Hussein to continue?

A That's, I'm sure, one of the things that will be debated in the next days.

Q Debated by whom?

A By the Palestinians themselves, and by King Hussein.

Q What I'm asking you is, can you see a way of doing it; is there a policy option that you are examining?

A I think the United States' position is that you can't talk about the Palestinian's future without Palestinians being involved.

Q I asked you about the PLO.

A I'm not being drawn on the makeup. It seems to me that is something that the Palestinians have to decide, which Palestinians speak for them.

Q Is it the U.S. view that the PLO is the spokesman for the Palestinians?

A I think that we're going to have to let that be the -- what we're talking about --

Q What about the U. S. view?

A What we're talking about is the composition of that delegation that would go to the peace table, and you have to bear certain realities in mind. It would be unlikely, it seems to me, that Israel would sit down at the peace table with PLO members present.

Q I'm not asking you that question. I'm asking you, does the U.S. see the PLO as the spokesman for the Palestinians?

A We're not going to specify who speaks for the Palestinians.

Q Would you encourage a plebiscite, a vote among the Palestinians to determine that issue?

A That's up to King Hussein to decide.

Q On a narrower question, can you say whether the Arab leaders that the President spoke to gave him any reason for encouragement that they were going to pursue this further, his peace plan?

A Yes, they did.

Q Did they say in what manner; at a summit or in what --

A No, I'm not aware of what was spelled out.

Q But they said that they still consider the plan valid and that they would try to act on it?

A Correct.

Q Can you just clear one thing which, of course, we have to deal with the black and white statements. The statement by the Jordanian Cabinet said that Jordan would not negotiate either by itself or in lieu of anybody else for the Palestinians.

It would seem to everybody out there to mean that Jordan was not interested in coming into negotiations under present circumtances, at least. Was this amended in anyway? Was the U.S. Government told, or the President told not to take this to heart? Because it's difficult for us reconcile that statement with your --

A I understand what you're saying. All I can say is that the President, after his telephone discussions with King Hussein and with King Fahd, came away convinced that those two Arab monarchs, those two leaders, were determined to pursue the process.

Q On what basis? How?

A I wasn't a party to the phone call, so I don't know.

Q When the process is pursued, does the process, as you define it, must the process include King Hussein coming to the table or can King Hussein and King Fahd pursue the process without the end result that King Hussein ends up at the table as part of the delegation representing the Palestinians?

A You're asking me to speculate. I think King Hussein --

Q I'm asking you what the process is that is going to continue.

A I'm not able to respond to that. But it seems to me that King Hussein does plan a key role in this.

Q What is the murder of this moderate Palestinian auger for the future of this process of sorting out who would come to the table?

A I think it's not a very encouraging commentary on the kind of violence and turmoil that would exist unless there is some movement towards peace in the Middle East. It's a very tragic event. I think as the Secretary said this morning in his interview, that seems to be the kind of alternative to the peace plan that we are furthering.

Q In what sense does this statement change the process? Are you --

A Which statement?

Q The statement by the Jordanian Cabinet.

A I think, clearly, emissaries from the PLO have changed the agreement, or near agreement, that King Hussein felt he had, and clearly that is a setback. But neither King Hussein nor we are going going to be deterred.

The President is a very determined man. He made it clear. This turmoil in the Middle East goes back to the dawn of history. It's a long, long and tired kind of hostility that we have seen there. It may be that you cannot, over night, bring that to an end. The President has made that clear, that he's going to hang in there, he's going to work at it, and he's not going to give it up because he thinks the goal of peace is a very desirable one.

Q If for whatever reason Hussein is not going to play an active, dynamic role, is there anyone else the Administration is planning to turn to?

A I think you're jumping ahead of the game. We are talking with King Hussein and with others, and we'll have to wait and see how those talks go forward.

Q John, let me take another try at the question. You call it the Jordanian (inaudible) setback, but you're saying that the King and the U.S. are not going to be deterred. That raises the question of how you are able to vault the obstacle that is before us. Can you be of any help on that?

A I really can't, to the specifics, but I think the determination is important.

Q May I ask you this please? What is the U.S. reading on the sentiments of the Palestinians on the West Bank as to whether they themselves are in favor or not in favor of the President's plan?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Did you find any substance or truth in Israeli reaction to the position of King Hussein that from the beginning they said to you that we told you so, that Hussein will not come forward to the peace talks? Is this true?

A There are ups and downs, and there are doubters and those who are confident. We have never thought that this was going to be a simple, easy, or swift process, and we are going to continue working at it.

--MORE--

Q But for these talks, there were all indications that King Hussein wants to enter these talks. And the second point, do you blame the whole thing of this on radical elements of the PLO on Arafat personally or his leadership or what?

A It's very hard. You are as aware as we are of Mr. Arafat's travels, of what it was thought he had agreed to do in Amman, what it is now thought some elements of the PLO have not agreed to do, and I think your interpretation of those is as good as mine. It's very hard for us to offer their motivation or an analysis of why various people did various things.

Q John, what do you expect the PLO to do?

A I think that what we had expected them to do and what King Hussein had expected them to do was to follow through on what had been agreed to last week.

Q I have two questions, please. Do you know anything about a possible visit of King Hussein here to Washington?

A No, I don't.

Q And the second question, pursuing what was asked before, the language of the Jordanian statements seem to be quite clear, "We in Jordan having refused from the beginning, will neither act separately nor in lieu of anybody in the Middle East peace neogtiations."

I know that your reluctant to talk about the conversations between the President and King Hussein, but this is a very clear statement. Is there any evidence to the contrary that would say something differently than what this very clear --

A Yes. I think the evidence to the contrary is in the conversation that the President had with King Hussein.

Q Did he tell him to just disregard this public statement?

A I'm not saying that. What I'm saying is that as a result of at least two phone calls, the President is assured that the King is determined to forge ahead with the process of consultation.

I know I'm not giving you specificly who's going to do what next, but --

Q -- to continue the process of consultations with the aim of joining the peace process?

A I'm sure that is the intent, on the basis of the President's peace initiative of September 1.

Q John, in your last briefing Friday you focused on the settlement activity by Israel in the West Bank as a major impediment to progress.

A Yes.

Q Would you focus on this today, too?

A No more than I focused on it on Friday. What we said Friday still prevails.

Q You still think that this is an obstacle to progress in the peace talks?

A I'd refer you to the language we used on Friday.

Q John, do I take it on the basis of what you just said that the Jordanian statement is now out of date on the basis of at least two phone calls to Hussein, since Hussein is now determined to forge ahead with the process?

A I don't think we can say. I don't think we can make that characterization. I think you have to talk to the Jordanians.

I think what we can say is that the President is talking with Arab leaders. Those Arab leaders to whom he has talked have assured him that the process is going forward. It has not, in their view, come to an end; they are still working on it.

Q Don't you feel any obligation -- or maybe this is asking too much -- but don't you feel any obligation, perhaps, to explain what you mean by all of the rhetoric that you put forward in the last half hour?

I mean, the words are all there, it's all very nice, and we're continuing the process and this, that and the other. But there's the statement of the Jordanian

Government, there's a certain reality about the position of the PLO, and then you're telling us that Hussein told the President he's assured he's going to continue with a view towards joining the peace process, and then you get to the PLO. Now where are you?

A I could tell you that the President has thought this whole thing over and thrown up his hands in despair, as has Hussein, as has everybody, and the whole thing's off. Unfortunately, that would not be accurate. I think you'd prefer me to be truthful and accurate insofar as I --

Q And a little more complete.

A You know, developments took place yesterday. People are contemplating them and thinking about them today. I cannot tell you -- I cannot give you factual information about events that have not yet happened. I know that's very disappointing, and I spent many years trying to write instant stories myself --

Q John, you said earlier that the President is a very determined man. The two things that this Administration has shied away from in the past few months are (1) calling some of the leaders here at the same time; (2) sending the Secretary of State out to the Middle East.

Is there any new consideration of either of those options today?

A Insofar as the Secretary's visit is concerned, as I have said, certainly week by week and perhaps almost day by day, that is something that is under consideration, but as of today no decision has been made about dates or --

Q But can you help us? Does the development yesterday make it more likely or less likely that he will go?

A I really can't give you --

Q There's a general impression that it is somewhat less likely because of the previous impression that he would only go out there once something had been achieved, and he didn't want to go out there on either a fact-finding or a negotiating mission.

A I'd steer you away from the deduction that it is less likely. But, in steering you away, I wouldn't want to steer you in the direction that it is more likely, if you get my drift. (Laughter)

Q John, have either the President or the Secretary received a call today from President Mubarak?

A I do not know whether that has happened, I wouldn't rule it out, but I don't know whether such a call has been made.

Q Can you say anything about the role of Egypt in these negotiations?

A No. I really cannot, other than that the role of Egypt has been helpful.

Q Can you tell us, John, if you know, that Mr. Arafat will be coming back to Jordan from the conversations he had?

A I don't know.

Q To Amman. You cannot --

A I don't know.

Q One other thing, please. The issue, I think that's been also brought out here is that the PLO, really, since Camp David or before Camp David -- I mean, we have learned that this party has to be dealt with. I know you set conditions. But can you tell us how are you going to bypass them? Is there anything being planned that will leave the PLO aside and you will have its approval of putting forward Palestinians, non-PLO. We know that.

A You're kind of asking me to go over the same ground we've already gone over, and I'm afraid the answer is the same, that the President has a good initiative out there, is continuing to talk to the parties involved, and I think it's just not intelligent to speculate about shifts and changes.

Q John, could you tell us what you alluded to before more specifically when you talked in terms of a new agreement having been reached between the King and Arafat in their last round of talks?

A I don't think I can, because it isn't anything that has been made public. I think one would have to wait. It would be improper to make public any agreement that the two parties had come to and had not themselves made public.

Q John, why do you make the distinction between specific elements within the PLO and the PLO itself, since it seems to be a PLO decision to stay away, which Hussein refers to?

A I don't think you should attach great weight to that, but I think you have to look at the facts. I think given a situation as fluid and as delicate as it is, I think it really is important to be sure about the facts. The facts are, as I understand them, that emissaries from the PLO went to Amman. But I haven't seen a statement from Mr. Arafat.

Q In the conversation between King Hussein and the President yesterday, did King Hussein make reference to the Cabinet statement?

A I don't know that specifically, but I wouldn't see why he wouldn't have done that.

Q Did he say they changed his mind or anything?

A Oh, no. Obviously, I can't --

Q John, you said before that the Palestinians must choose their representative in the peace talks. But Secretary Shultz this morning said that it's necessary to have Palestinian representation in the peace talks, but not official members of the PLO.

A Yes.

Q Who are the representatives of the Palestinian people?

A I think that's what we've been saying, that that's what the Palestinians and King Hussein have, themselves, to decide. But we have never thought that the PLO should adopt the various points that we have suggested they adopt -- of course, that might be another thing -- but we have never suggested that the PLO be present at the negotiating table.

Q John, I'm just curious if you have any fuller response of Roberto's question and what we expected from the PLO.

A What we did expect?

Q What we expected them to do.

A That causes a problem because it seems to me I then would be discussing an agreement between Mr. Arafat and King Hussein which is not in the public domain.

Q Could you clarify one thing? The Secretary this morning said that what happened was Mr. Arafat took what he and King Hussein had agreed to and changed it. You seem to be suggesting here that it was certain other elements within the PLO that were responsible for the changes, and that we haven't heard the last word from Mr. Arafat yet.

Did King Hussein lead the Secretary or the President along those lines to believe that, or is what the Secretary said this morning operative, that Mr. Arafat was indeed resonsible for the harder line taken by the PLO?

A I think the Secretary was trying to be strictly factual in what transpired in response to a question from Bob. What he was saying was that apparently Mr. Arafat and King Hussein had come to an agreement, or certainly a near agreement, last week, and that as the Jordanian Cabinet communique indicates, Mr. Arafat left to confer with others in his organization, having undertaken to return in two days.

He did not return in two days, and at the end of five days others returned with new suggestions which, as soon as they were seen by King Hussein, were perceived to be unacceptable, and they are unacceptable to King Fahd, and they are unacceptable to President Reagan.

Q But are those Mr. Arafat's suggestions, or are you suggesting here that perhaps those are --

A I'm not suggesting anything. I think what the Secretary was trying to do and what I'm trying to do -- and I realize your frustrations -- is to be strictly factual about what has happened and not to make interpretations of certain events of which we're not, obviously, fully cognizant.

Q You seemed to be suggesting at the beginning of this briefing that we hadn't heard the final word from the PLO or Mr. Arafat.

A All I'm doing is making a factual statement that Mr. Arafat, to my knowledge, has not pronounced on this.

Q John, on the basis of the talks that the President had with the Arab leaders, you said that they all indicated the process must go forward.

A Yes.

Q Who will help the process go forward? Was a decision reached, or was the discussion centered on the question that the United States might come up with some initiatives to push the process forward and the Arab leaders would wait, or would the Arab leaders, themselves, come up with some ideas?

A I think that would be getting, probably, into too much detail -- more detail really than I should on those conversations. Obviously, the Saudis have been very helpful in this process. Other Arab leaders have been very helpful.

They convey -- it's not a conveying impression -- they are emphatic that the President's initiative is a worthy one, that the initiative should not be lost. I think you need have no doubt that they are determined to do what they can to keep it on track.

Q John, may I ask you a question? Why are these demands unacceptable to Fahd? Does he care if the PLO is at the table or not?

A I guess you have to ask the Saudis for a specific interpretation, but some of the things are unacceptable to them for the same reasons as ourselves, namely direct PLO representation at the peace talks. There's been a suggestion of an international conference involving the Soviet Union, and the rewarding of the PLO, the PLO not having accepted Resolution 242, not having accepted Camp David, their not having recognized the independence and sovereignty of Israel.

Q Does the United States still consider Yassir Arafat to really have the power to head the PLO?

A You're asking me to go into interpretation that I'm unable to go into. I can't answer that.

Q John, you just went through a litany of things that you said the Saudis found unacceptable. Are you saying they find each part unacceptable?

A No. What I'm saying is that the Saudis have made clear that the amendments or changes that the PLO emissaries took back to Amman were unacceptable.

Q Does that include -- you included in that the direct presence of the PLO at the peace table?

A I said you had to go ask the Saudis for specific reasoning.

Q You're not saying that the Saudis disagree --

A No. But I'm telling you of some of the things in there that are unacceptable for a variety of reasons.

Q John, the agreement, if we may call it as such, between King Hussein and Arafat, was it really a full agreement, or wasn't it the understanding that Arafat would have to present it to his people and to come back? I'm asking this just in order to try to find out if some people in the Administration here believe or think that King Hussein or Jordan jumped the gun and spoke too fast, that they should have probably given the process a few more days. I mean, Arafat cannot, it seems, as far as we know, decide like some heads of state there decide. Their words are the final -- Arafat --

A You know, it's hard for me -- I mean, you'd have to ask them, but I think King Hussein clearly felt that they had moved quite close together.

Q Was there any time or date set by which the United States expected King Hussein to respond?

A No. But I think the Jordanian Cabinet communique said that they expected Mr. Arafat to return in two days.

Q John, I think a few months ago or with every time that you repeated your position about the PLO to accept 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist, when you were asked about who are the Palestinian representatives, and if the PLO is one of the Palestinian representatives, or representing the Palestinian people -- you said it's among other people that represent the Palestinians, there is also the -- if I'm not wrong, that the PLO, also, among other people, is not the only representative of the Palestinian people, not the sole representative of the Palestinian people. You still stick with this point that the PLO, among other people --

A There are others besides the PLO who can speak for the Palestinians?

Q Yes?

A Yes, of course.

Q John, this persistent optimism of President Reagan, coming after the phone calls with King Fahd and King Hussein could be explained as based on some sort of promise from President Reagan to both Kings of steps to be taken by the United States --

A I didn't hear the phone calls. All I can tell you is that the various parties came away from those calls determined to go forward and assured that they were still going forward. But as to the details of the exchanges, I really can't help you.

Q How about the impact of the Lebanese situation after the --

A Mr. Habib went back to the area yesterday. He is in Israel. I think there was a tripartite meeting today. I don't have a readout for you on that.

Q Is there going to be a press conference this week by the Secretary?

A Possibly.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the Chinese accusation that President Reagan seized away the Chinese tennis player?

A Yes.

Q John, can we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

We made our position clear on this case last week, including our view of the various comments made and actions taken in Beijing. Miss Hu's decision to seek asylum in the United States was hers alone to make, and the decision of the United States Government on her application was ours along to make in accordance with our laws and procedures.

Q Would you have any reaction to the accusation of the Chinese, the specific accusation that implies bad faith on the part of the United States?

A You mean in attempting to lure her --

Q Influence, lure her, whatever.

A We've denied that and would deny it again. There was absolutely no enticement by the United States. She was a free agent, she was here, she made her decision, and we made our decision in terms of our laws.

Q The Chinese quoted Mr. Viguerie as saying that the President said he would adopt her before sending her back. Did the President make the decision ultimately to grant her asylum?

A No. I think this decision was made by INS in terms of internal regulations and in accord with our laws.

Q Without any hints or suggestions or guidance from above, INS did this out of the --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Wasn't it reported that the Attorney General overruled the initial preliminary determination --

A The Attorney General, of course, is in charge of the Justice Department of which INS is a part, but I don't know what, if any, his involvement was.

Q He has oversight.

A You have to go to Justice and INS and have them explain their operating procedures.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that the United States is establishing a training base in Honduras for Salvadoran soldiers?

A No, I don't.

Q You have nothing at all on that?

A No.

Q Could you look into it?

A Let me look into it, but I wouldn't be too optimistic.

Q Do you have anything on the Colombian President's running around, so to speak? (Laughter) Not in any derogatory sense.

A The Colombian President's running around? (Laughter)

Q Running around the region.

A Would you like to be a little more specific?

Q Yes. He went to many places.

A No. I'm afraid I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the Contadora Group or on the reported collapse of the five-plus-five?

A Not really, Jim. We have, as you know, consistently supported the regional approach. I've seen those reports, but there are other moves afoot for a regional conference.

Q Am I not asking the right question? I saw you make a move for your glasses there. (Laughter) That's a question, and I'd like an answer on it.

A There may be that there is a lot of written guidance which I'm not about to read. Maybe we can pull it out for you. I'm getting tired of this briefing.

Q We all are!

Q You're not alone!

Q The question of the five-plus-five is important because the report this morning suggested that it's about to collapse. The question here is, is it viable? Do you think it's still alive, like the peace plan?

A Why don't I refer you to some lucid, comprehensive, written guidance that we may have available here?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:58 p.m.)

Clenner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #64

THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I don't know whether Bill Beecher is here. I don't actually see him, but I guess we all ought to tip our hats to him for winning the Weintal Prize for diplomatic reporting yesterday. Shall we all tip our hats to him?

A couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is the following testimony: a statement by Deputy Secretary Ken Dam before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy. The subject was the reauthorization of the Export Administration Act. I guess that testimony was this mornng.

Also a statement of Assistant Secretary Enders before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject was Nicaragua.

A statement by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations.

Also a reminder that Secretary Shultz will speak in Dallas tomorrow before the World Affairs Council and the Chamber of Commerce. The speech is scheduled for 2:00 in the afternoon Eastern Standard Time. Barring any technical difficulties, we will pipe that speech live into the Briefing Room. If anybody is interested in covering the event in Dallas, they should be in touch with Frank Chavez of the Chamber of Commerce. He's at (214)954-1478.

Q What about the text?

A I think there's a good chance that we will have a text for you early tomorrow morning.

Q Subject?

A Central America.

Q Will there be Q&A?

A There will be Q&A. Also, there will be a post visit background briefing on Chancellor Kohl's visit in the White House Press Room tomorrow, 1:30 p.m.

Q On that same thing -- excuse me, Jim -- anything on the Secretary in the Middle East?

A On a trip? No. No decision on that.

Q John, the other day the Lee Hamilton Subcommittee effectively decided to increase aid to Israel by $365 million and at the same time reduced PL480 aid to Egypt by 10 percent, I think it was, to $25 million. The State Department had nothing to contribute at that hearing. Have you anything to say about it now?

A No. We remain committed to the President's budget request, what we went in with.

Q Also on Congress, there seems to be a growing feeling on the part of some Congressmen that the Administration is breaking the law, and there are even attempts to strengthen the law. Do you have any response to those?

A On that question, I think the Secretary made clear his position earlier in the week at his press conference, and a number of officials have consistently said that, to the best of their knowledge, we are not breaking the law.

As far as specific reaction, I take it you're referring to the Barnes Committee -- various actions. As far as that committee's actions, it slashed the budgetary portions of the Administration's requests for Central America, thereby weakening the capacity of friendly democratic countries in the region to defend themselves. Then, the other action it took was to adopt a rigid, complex and highly ambitious certification requirement for El Salvador.

Beyond that, its actions, regarding Nicaragua, would signal to the Sandinistas that they could act with impunity regardless of how egregious their actions might become.

Decisions of this type destroy the capacity and continuity of our efforts. They also destroy confidence in our ability to pursue an effective foreign policy. On the basis of consultations we've had with a wide range of members of the Congress, we believe that there's a broader understanding of the need for increased assistance to Central America as being in the U.S. national interest.

We look forward to further consideration being given to the important issues of our Central American policy as the legislative process continues.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, is that to say that you feel that at this point, with this broader understanding that you're talking about, that you have the votes to get the request that you ask for?

A The consultation is certainly going forward, and we certainly are hopeful that the validity of our argument will be clearly seen. I'm not going to predict on the outcome of the vote.

Q What do you mean, when you said before, that the Sandinistas will now get the message that they can act with impunity? What is it that you're specifically referring to there?

A I think some of the proposals that are being suggested, I don't want to get into, as we have traditionally not commented on covert activity, but if you were to take certain restricted measures, it seems to me that that would hobble the conduct of foreign policy under any circumstances.

Q John, on that point, the Post this morning quotes our Ambassador to Honduras as saying the Boland Amendment is simply a "legal triviality."

I'm wondering if the Department backs him up on that? Is that you're position, too, or do you disown it, or are you going to bring him to task for that? How do you feel about that?

A We have been in touch with our Embassy, and the Ambassador flatly denies having made such a statement.

Q So you say the Congressman isn't telling the truth?

A No, didn't say that. I said the Ambassador flatly denies having made such a statement.

Q Is that his view?

A Is that who's view?

Q Regardless of whether he made that statement --

A That is not his view.

Q That is not his view?

A That is correct.

Q Can I go back to the statement that -- on this question of Nicaragua, that we would signal to the Sandinistas they could act with impunity. Are there not weapons that can be used of an economic or a constitutional nature that the United States could still resort under the language that was passed by the Barnes Committee? Why do you say "with impunity?"

A I'm really not going to proceed any further on this one. I'm going to leave you with the language that we have offered and not get into more specific --

Q Picking up that same question, there's almost a suggestion in what you're saying, that you're setting up a series of scapegoats in Congress should there be a collapse or should there be increasing failures on the part of the Administration's policy on Nicaragua. Is that the intention?

A No, I don't think that's the intention. I think events will have to take their course and historians will have to make their judgments as to how events have turned out and who's responsible, but we're not setting up scapegoats.

Q Also on Central America, has the Department heard any rumblings of a possible coup, or at least an upheaval within the Salvadoran Government?

A No.

Q John, on Nicaragua again. With respect to the U.S. view of the OAS charter, the relevant provision, Title 18, can you put forward this Administration's view of its adherence to that charter and what its responsibilities are in that respect?

A I'm not going to be able to give you a detailed reply, but we are very aware of our international legal obligations, and we are fully in compliance with the applicable Congressional restraints. But, as we've also said, any further detailed explanation of that is reserved for our testimony before the Congressional oversight committee.

Q Secretary Enders said that the OAS Charter was one thing that had to be considered by a president. Among others, he said, would be the constitution which provides that the president must do everything he can with respect to protecting national security. Is that a correct statement?

A I don't know. Is that this morning; is this testimony this morning?

Q Yesterday.

A No, sorry, I don't know.

Q You don't know?

A I don't know.

Q Does the Administration have any evidence to support the placing of missiles by the Soviets or requested by the Nicaraguans in Nicaragua?

A No.

Q There's been talk about it.

A There's been talk about it?

Q Apparently, from some Administration officials. Do you have anything on that line at all?

A Evidence that missiles are placed in Nicaragua?

Q Are being requested, are being sought?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Did you hear Enders testimony this morning, John?

A No, I didn't.

Q Mr. Enders, after being asked the question, suggested, yes, that the Administration thought Nicaragua was searching for Soviet missiles, and Mr. Torricelli referred to the letter that he sent to Secretary Shultz?

A Still not to my knowledge, but Mr. Enders is obviously taking a --

Q Has the Secretary responded to Mr. Torricelli's letter?

A I do not think so.

Q Do you know if he will, John?

A I don't know.

Q Ambassador Kirkpatrick said yesterday morning on television that the Soviets and the Cubans are toting around and planting --

A Toting around?

Q Toting around and planting in Central America missiles aimed at the United States. Are you saying that she's incorrect?

A No, I'm not. I'm just saying, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Before you said you had no evidence on this.

A That I didn't.

Q Could you take the question?

A Okay.

Q John, another part of that. Is there any information you have on Soviet military advisers in Central America anyplace?

A There's a lot of information, I think, on advisors of various countries, Marvin, that has come up in the past.

Q Cuban?

A Yes.

Q And Soviet advisers?

A Let me go back and see what we have -- I don't have anything new for you, if that's the question. But let me go back and see what we have said on Soviet advisers.

Q The American Ambassador to Nicaragua has been quoted by Robert White and by others as saying that the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador is a trickle, and has been vastly exaggerated by the State Department.

Is that, in fact, the case? Is our Ambassador to Nicaragua making that --

A No, he's not, and he is denying that statement, too. He is well aware of the trickle and he is -- (Laughter) He is well aware of the flow, and his own thinking is in full accord with recent Administration public testimony on this point. I'm sure the Ambassador, like all of you, is also very aware of recent broadcasts by the Salvadoran guerrillas, who have made clear their dependance on their support from Nicaragua.

Q The question is, I suppose, is the flow a trickle?

A The trickle is a flow. I think that's the answer.

Q Seriously, can you get us any kind of detail on what you think --

A No, I think you've asked us, in the past, and we have said the problem there is that that relates to intelligence gathering.

Q Let me just follow that up. It seems to me there's a legitimate credibility problem here, because for more than two years now we've been told about the Nicaraguan flow to El Salvador of arms, and only on one occasion we've been given rather scanty evidence of the actual flow.

A I don't think that's true, John. I think that various Pentagon people have offered some background on that. I'm not sure how detailed we have been in the State Department; but insofar as the restraints, I'm talking about information that is gathered through intelligence channels is concerned, I think we have made available what is available, what we can talk about.

Q There was some detail at a background briefing by a senior official about three weeks ago. He works in El Salvador.

A Yes, that's right.

Q Can I follow up on that last one? You said that the broadcast by Radio Venceremos indicated they depended on a source of supply from Nicaragua. Did they mention Nicaragua in that broadcast?

A I can't recall the exact words, but there wasn't any question, but in their terms they did not seem to be restricted by borders or by ethical problems about illegal traffic across their borders.

Q Across the Nicaraguan border?

A Let me go back and look at the exact words.

Q John, Enders, you said, is being quoted, or as someone here said, suggesting that Nicaragua is searching for Soviet missiles, and Kirkpatrick was quoted about toting and planting missiles. Can you take that and tell me what there is?

A Yes, I said I would take that question.

Q John, further on the Nicaraguan trickle, or flow, Congressman Torricelli this morning -- and I realize you haven't heard it, so I'll probably ask you to take the question if you think it's worth taking -- told Secretary Enders that he was told during his visit by five American Embassy officials, including the U.S. military attache in Managua, that there has been no arms flow in the past 30 days, little arms flow in the past 60 days, and insignificant arms flow in the past six months. He attributed it directly to the military attache the statement that there are currently no flows of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

A Did Mr. Enders answer the question?

Q Mr. Enders said that he could not answer that because -- all he said in answer was that he would offer the Congressman a briefing, a secret briefing with information that obviously was not able to be made public.

There was some question in both of their minds as to the fact that the Ambassador is here, and his top staff, if the Congressman is telling the truth, saying something different in Nicaragua. Would you at least look into that question?

A I'll look into it. If Enders replied, I doubt that we would be able to go much beyond what he said.

Sure, I'll take a look and see what he said.

Q Do you have anything on (inaudible) plans for training Salvadoran soldiers in Honduras?

A No.

Q Or (inaudible).

A No.

Q Also, do you have an update on the five-plus-five and the Contadora groups running around, so to speak?

A As you well know, Jim, there are a number of groups. I think, basically, we would really like to wait until we get a fix on their various proposals. As you know, we have favored the regional approach.

We hope that the activities of the four in recent days will be helpful in that they have been talking to people and soliciting opinion. But, I think, beyond saying that we are committed to the regional approach, I really can't go into much more detail until we see the various proposals, how they shake out.

Q Did the four members of the Contadora group speak with Shultz at the end of their deliberations at Contadora? They say that they had, and they also talked with Castro.

A Talked to Shultz where?

Q By telephone.

A I'm not aware of that. Be glad to look at it.

Q Another part of the world. On the Middle East, you were asked before about a Shultz trip and you said no decision.

A Yes.

Q Is there planning for such a trip now?

A It's not a question, I think, of planning. The Secretary, as you know, has said and did, I think, again at his press conference on Tuesday, that he obviously will go to the Middle East at an appropriate time. So I think the question is, what is the appropriate time? I think that is the question that he and the President must be revolving in their thinking at the moment.

Q Do you feel that there has been sufficient progress on the Lebanon withdrawal negotiation to warrant his going there within the next several weeks in an effort to finalize the deal?

A On Lebanon, I guess I would continue to caution against zigs and zags, or reports of zigs and zags, in those negotiations. I think they did meet again today. They probably will not meet again until next week. That's right, I think there is the national holiday of Israel, and the weekend intervenes.

There are various reports about what various people think of the progress of those talks, but I think we will just hew to our position, which is not to talk about them, to urge the speediest possible conclusion of a plan for troop withdrawal. We are not there yet.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee regarding the need for certification from the President before any arms can be sold to Jordan?

A Yes, I do. Our position is that Jordan accepts Israel's right to exist. It is obvious that Jordan has been doing everything it can to move the peace process forward. King Hussein continues to support the President's peace proposals and remains interested in finding a way to enter the peace process.

There is in fact no formal arms request pending from Jordan. In the meantime, it is important for the United States, including the Congress, to encourage the King in his efforts to move the area towards peace.

Above all, we must avoid giving the impression that we do not understand the real risks he is running or that we might not support him in facing these risks. Such a posture is common sense, as well as good policy.

Q Can we get that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, Israel has just inaugurated an airfield in the Lebanese town of Damour, which is quite --

A I'm sorry, I didn't get the first part of the question.

Q Israel has just inaugurated an airfield in the Lebanese town of Damour, which is far beyond the

40 or 45 kilometers from the frontier. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't. I never heard of it.

Q Do you consider this to be positive to the talks in Lebanon?

A I don't know anything about it, so I think I would be unwise to offer an opinion until we can find out a little bit more about what you are suggesting is taking place.

Q While you are talking about the Congress, is the Administration happy with the House Appropriations Committee add-on of $365 million to Israel over and above what the President and the Secretary of State had requested?

A No. I think, as I said earlier, we stand by the President's budget request.

Q Besides your saying that you will stand by, what will you do about the $365 million, and before there was half a billion dollars which were --

A Our position with regard to add-ons has been consistent. The President went in there with what we felt was appropriate and what was needed, and we stand by those figures.

Q John, do you have anything on the Arafat statement yesterday in Stockholm that he is ready to resume with King Hussein?

A Yes, Bernie. There have been various statements, and we have to wait and see. We are not confirming the validity of whatever is being suggested is about to take place, but, in our view, the issues have been discussed sufficiently. What is needed are decisions from the Arabs which clearly support the entry of King Hussein into peace negotiations with representative Palestinians. Only in this way, through direct negotiations with Israel, will the Palestinian people realize their legitimate rights. As the Secretary said on Tuesday, now is the time for decision.

Q Where is, from the U.S. point of view, the Arab support for Hussein coming from?

A I think, as you know, the President has had private calls with a number of Arab leaders, and you may be sure he is in continuing touch with them, and I think we have gone over the various --

Q Can you tell us the countries that are supporting Hussein?

A As you know, the President had a phone call with King Fahd over the weekend. He has talked with King Hassan. He has talked with President Mubarak, and I think that the various Arab personalities are being helpful.

Q Has the President made any effort to deal with the Syrians, President Assad?

A I am not aware of any interchange there, Bernie. There may be, but I am not aware of it.

Q To follow that up, has the President or the Secretary had messages from these Arab leaders --

A Yes, of course.

Q Let me finish -- that King Hussein's action of a couple of days ago is in no way final, that in fact the process is continuing, and that there may still be a positive outcome?

A That is absolutely the case. That was the case on Monday, which you have treated with some skepticism, and it remains so today.

Q John, have you addressed the question earlier this week of some reports that I have seen about Soviet military advisers with Syrian forces in Lebanon, eastern Lebanon?

A There may have been some guidance on that area. Yes, there is.

Q Do you have --

A I don't have it with me, but you can pick it up from the Press Office.

Q On that point, the guidance was somewhat inconclusive, to put it mildly.

A What an unworthy thought!

Q Do you have any more information? Can you confirm that there now are Soviet advisers in the Bekka?

A It is where it was.

Q Apparently there is nothing more.

A Nothing beyond that early guidance.

Q John, your position is that there is no need for more consultations and it is time for decisions. Is it also your reaction to the possibility of another Arab summit to discuss this question?

A I think, as the Secretary has said, the time is here for decision. We can't outline how the Arabs will go about whatever deliberations they may have, but we think that there has been enough talk. We have staked out our position. The President stands by his position. Other Arab leaders, apparently, are convinced that that is a good platform. It is up to others now who have rejected and who have placed an impediment in the forward motion of that initiative to take some action.

Q On that specific point, the dialogue between the PLO and the Jordanians is not the only thing which has resulted in the rejection of the Reagan plan. The Israeli cabinet has already rejected it. What makes the Administration think that the Israelis would show up?

A You mean when King Hussein enters the -- well, the same kind of rather dynamic motivation that the Secretary has consistently suggested, namely, the rather worthy goal of peace and the prospect of yet another Arab country making peace with Israel.

Q Can I just follow up on that question?

Do you have anything more on that -- in other words, is it the U.S. expectation -- has the U.S. been told that if King Hussein accepts, under a formula that he feels comfortable with, that Israel would or would not turn up, notwithstanding the rejection of the Reagan plan, but arguing instead that Israel perhaps might be coming on the basis of Camp David?

A I think we have always said, Bernie, you will have to see what kind of announcement is made, and what reservations, or whatever, might be attached to any announcement by King Hussein and the PLO, and I think we would have to wait and see at that time. It is a little hypothetical to ask whether thus and thus will happen on the basis of such and such a decision, when you haven't had or been able to read such and such a decision. So I think it is premature.

Q But do you have a reading, for example, of King Hussein saying he accepts the Reagan plan, and he is prepared to have negotiations without conditions? Is it your expectation, is it your certain knowledge, that Israel, notwithstanding rejection of the Reagan Plan, would appear on the basis of Camp David?

A I don't think we can speak for Israel. We certainly have a hope for that.

Q I am not asking you to speak for Israel, I am asking you if you know --

A No, no. I am not going to --

Q Israel has not told you it will be there?

A I am obviously not going to go into that kind of back and forth.

Q Why not?

A Because it is a government-to-government exchange.

Q John, if I could perhaps put it a different way: what earthly sense does it make to pursue the Reagen initiative if both Israel and the PLO say no, and have said no, and are on the record?

A What do you suggest is the alternative?

Q Well, maybe doing nothing, for a change.

A I think we are waiting to see who moves here.

Q I believe Israel has said it would talk if Hussein did.

A I think so, too, but I don't think we can speak for Israel.

Q I just want to try to understand some of your logic expressed a moment ago. You were asked who was supporting King Hussein among the Arabs, and you said that the President talked with Fahd, Hassan, and Mubarak.

So, question one, talking with, is that the same as support?

A I think that the President made it clear that after his discussions, his telephone discussions, with them, there was a belief on the part of those Arab leaders that the process was still alive and that there was enthusiasm for it going forward.

Q Okay. Now the three leaders you have mentioned supported the effort of King Hussein to join in the peace talks, supported his plan.

A Yes.

Q So you had their support before and you have it now, but before you thought you were getting Hussein and now you have a question about that.

Who else in the Arab world supports the idea of Hussein joining the process?

A I think King Hassan has made some positive statements.

Q But you dealt with Hassan, Fahd and Mubarak. I am asking who else in the Arab world -- to whom are you reaching?

A It was just pointed out to me that there is the Sultan of Oman

Q Oman.

A Has anybody got any more ideas? (Laughter.)

Q Sudan.

A Sudan. Any other spokesman?

Q Lebanon.

A Lebanon.

Q Lebanon supports it?

A My assistant says that.

Q John, why does the Administration think that it will be better for the negotiations with Hussein joining the negotiations? Would it be better than having private conversations between those Arab leaders that this Administration thinks are supporting Hussein, that it would be better than a summit of Arab leaders?

A I'm sorry, I lost the trend of your question.

Q I mean, what does the Administration consider better for the process, private conversations between the Arab leaders, the moderates, or a summit of the Arab League?

A I think that is up to the participants to discuss. Somebody asked me about a summit, and I quoted the Secretary, earlier this week, who said that the time for decision is here. We can't orchestrate this, and, indeed, are not attempting to orchestrate it.

We have made our position clear and are looking for movement among others now. So, if they decide that they want a summit and go forward, that is not a question for the United States to have a position on.

We do not see the need for a delay, however. We see a need for action. It is very simple what has to be done.

Q John, did the United States distinguish between PLO and PNC?

A What we have said is that if you are going to talk about the future of the Palestinians --

Q We want to know if the officials of the United States are ready, or they have met with PNC people?

A Have they met with PNC people?

Q Or are they ready to meet with them?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could you tell us, in that connection, about the trip of Mr. Eagleburger?

A Yes. He has left Algiers, and he is in Tunis, as he was scheduled.

Q Has he had any discussions with any non-PLO Palestinians in those places?

A There are none that have taken place, to my knowledge.

Q Any plans?

A He had a schedule to be in Tunis. He is keeping to that schedule. I don't know who else he might see.

Q Has he also added Rabat to his schedule?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have any reaction to that African Subcommittee's work on Tunis and Morocco yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q Can I folow up in that same general area -- can we change topics?

Do you have anything on the report that General Rodriguez met with Secretary Shultz?

A Yes, he did.

Q Is the U.S. closer to establishing diplomatic relations with Angola?

A They discussed a number of matters of bilateral and regional interest, as you may imagine, but we wouldn't go into any detail as to that discussion

Q Just back on the Eagleburger trip, Tunis is the headquarters of the Arab League. Is he having any Arab League discussions there?

A I know of nothing that is so far planned.

Q John, what do you comment on the reported statement by the Israeli Chief of State wherein he said that Israel should plan more settlement around Arab towns and villages so that the Palestinians would go around like cockroaches and have no place to move in.

A We haven't changed our position on settlements since yesterday and the day before and the day before and the day before.

Q I mean, the Israeli Government stated that they would be building 64 more settlements in the area.

What do you comment on that?

A Our position is as it has been, namely that the expansion of settlement activity in the West Bank is not helpful.

Q John, one more on Angola?

A Yes.

Q Are there any other meetings now scheduled between U.S. officials in Angola as a result of this visit?

A I think that the Interior Minister may be seeing the Vice President.

Q But in the future, I mean, the next few weeks or months, nothing has been decided?

A I don't know the answer to that.

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Q Can you look into it?

A I don't think we would announce such a meeting. As you know, there are meetings that have been going on, and it wouldn't surprise me if some are scheduled.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #65

FRIDAY, APRIL 15, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements: One, a reminder that the Secretary's speech in Dallas before the World Affairs Council and the Chamber of Commerce will be piped here into the briefing room at approximately 2:00 p.m. barring any technical problems. An advance embargoed copy of the speech is available in the Press Office.

Second, Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige will be accompanying Secretary Shultz and Secretary Regan to Mexico next Monday and Tuesday. Secretary Baldrige's presence will help ensure that all aspects of our relationship, including our commercial relationship, will be addressed during the visit.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, could you kind of bring us up to date? Where are we now on an agreement for troop withdrawals from Lebanon?

A Without really trying to be facetious, we're in the middle of negotiations. I'm not going to try to characterize it, Mike. We haven't; I'm not going to.

Q There are reports that they are near to agreement.

A I would reiterate John's continual cautioning to you about reports of breakthroughs, impasses, and so on. I think the negotiation proceeds, and we hope that it will conclude soon successfully.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the L.A. Times story today on the U.S. State Department receiving highly reliable information two years ago on D'Aubuisson and about a dozen active-duty security officers drawing lots for the right to plan the assassination of Archbishop Romero?

A Bernie, the only thing I really have on that -- I don't have a specific comment on that report. As we've said before, we're well aware of allegations that link D'Aubuisson to the death of Archbishop Romero, but from the facts available to us, we have not been able to reach any conclusions.

Q Are you denying the existence of the cable?

A I'm not commenting specifically on that report; I'm simply talking about -- We don't comment on the existence or nonexistence of documents of that sort, but I'm simply commenting on the facts in terms of our understanding of what happened, the allegations, and our conclusions, which are that we don't have information on which to draw conclusions.

Q I see. There was a -- how shall I put it? -- a Congressional inquiry by Representative Stark into D'Aubuisson, in which he requested all relevant State Department and other material on D'Aubuisson's background last year.

Were all relevant cables and so on provided to him?

A I can't answer that question, but that's an issue between the Congressman and the Administration.

Q One other question on D'Aubuisson, please: When he was here, why wasn't he questioned by the FBI, especially with respect to allegations by the State Department in the Spring of 1981 that groups or individuals associated with him were supplying weapons in violation of the Neutrality Act?

A I'd refer you back to the guidance we had at the time of his recent visit, and that's all I really have on it, Jim.

Q I yesterday asked John, but I think I wasn't clear, my question. I wanted to know if there is any holdback from the Administration --

A Any what from the Administration?

Q I mean, not to meet with PLO people and PNC people?

A You were trying to draw a distinction between them, or see whether we drew a distinction between them.

Q No, I'm not. I'm asking if you draw any distinction between them.

A I can't answer the question specifically. Our policy applies to the PLO. Whether there are PNC people who would not be considered members of the PLO in our judgment, I can't --

Q Could you look into that question?

A I can look into it, but I'm not sure I can come up with that fine of a definition of it.

Q Alan, yesterday on the briefing, the guidance that we got late in the afternoon seemed not to answer the question that was put to John yesterday going beyond the expressions of American concern about the implanting of Soviet missiles in Central America, Cuba, et cetera.

The question that was left with you was the more general one, are there any Soviet missiles now implanted in Nicaragua, Cuba, and elsewhere?

A Bernie, to the best of our knowledge, the only Soviet missiles in Central America at the moment are the SA-7 crew-served anti-aircraft missiles in Nicaragua.* And I might note that they have been there for more than a year.

Q Soviet crew?

A Are they crewed by Soviets?

Q Yes.

A I don't have information about that.

Q Are they aimed at the United States?

A They are anti-aircraft missiles, Jim.

Q Are they aimed northwards, then?

A Why don't you go investigate?

(Laughter)

Q I wish I could.

Q Alan, do you have anything more on the kind of missile it is, please?

* CORRECTION: SA-7 missiles are not crew-served; rather they are hand-held anti-aircraft missiles.

A SA-7? No, I don't. You might check with the Pentagon as to what they might have. I don't think, frankly, they are going to have a lot more, but maybe on the details of what an SA-7 is.

Q And that is it for the area?

A Yes, for Central America.

Q When did the United States cut off aid to Nicaragua?

A When did the United States cut off aid to Nicaragua? I don't know specifically when the United States cut off aid to Nicaragua.

Q Was it under this Administration?

A I can't -- Your question obviously gets to the question of what this Administration has done, and I can tell you what this Administration has done. I can't tell you -- I can't go back and give you an historical record I don't know.

What we have done is that on April 1, 1981, the Department announced the Administration's decision to invoke the provisions of Section 533-F of the Foreign Assistance Act terminating ESF assistance to Nicaragua -- that's Economic Support Fund assistance -- based upon the Government of Nicaragua's involvement in activities supporting violence in El Salvador. The determination was made based upon the accumulated intelligence which had been begun by the previous Administration and continued by the present one.

Q So it was this Administration that cut off aid?

A I'm telling you what this Administration has done.

Q All right. So did the President make a mistake when he said it was the previous Administration yesterday?

A I don't know about what the previous Administration has done. I can't answer the question.

Q O.K. With respect to that, at that time when the decision was made, did the United States have evidence that there was a particularly great flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador at that time?

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A I think the best I can do probably on that, Jim, is to refer you to a report that appeared in The Washington Post in January of 1981 by former Secretary Muskie, who said that there was no question that arms were flowing from Nicaragua to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador "with the knowledge and to some extent, the help" of Nicaraguan authorities.

Q Is it not true that in March and April of 1981, State Department spokesmen speaking from that podium were saying that the alleged armed shipments had drastically fallen off after February?

A I can't tell you. I don't know. You've got the record. You can check it.

Q Do you have anything in a general way, to begin with, about Karen House's pieces in The Wall Street Journal about the quotations attributed to the President?

A No. You'd have to get into the whole issue of communications between governments and so on, and I'm just not going to do that.

-- MORE --

Q A follow-up on this. Any comment on the remarks attributed to the King that he reached the end of the peace effort and that he tried every possible avenue and he decided that there are no more avenues to check for peace?

A Again, the only thing I can really do is to refer you back to what the President said following his telephone conversation with the King, which was that the process continues.

Q So how should we read those remarks?

A I don't know. I'm telling you what the President -- I'm referring to what the President said following his conversation with the King. I don't think I can give you more authoritative statement than that.

Q Could you confirm this story or the part of the story today about a message from Hussein that had the list of points after his decision not to join the peace process?

A No. We wouldn't get into the question of communications back and forth specifically between the governments on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the impression that the U.S. gave a different answer or assurances to the Jordanians and to the Saudis?

A I think the only thing I can say on that, without commenting specifically on Jordanians, Saudis or others, is that the Administration has been consistent in what it has said to everybody on this.

Q Do you have any further information on a planned trip by Secretary Shultz to the Middle East?

A No. We're still where we were on that. It's always possible. No decision has been made that he should take a trip.

Q Any comment on the situation now in the Bekaa Valley?

A In the Bekaa Valley? No, I don't have any.

Q Alan, anything on yesterday's Wall Street Journal article on allegations that Kissinger was sending some messages to King Hussein on behalf of this Administration, or someone else, regarding discussion with the PLO?

A No, I think we addressed before the question of his encounter with a PLO member, and included in that statement at the time that he was not acting on behalf of this Administration.

Q Do you have any idea who he was working for?

A Who he was working for?

Q That's one of the questions that Hussein is reported to have asked about.

A You can ask Dr. Kissinger.

Q The impression that certain Arab leaders, who have been here with week, from Secretary Shultz and President Reagan is that the agreement on Lebanon is very soon. Can you elaborate on that?

A No. As I said in answer to Mike's question earlier, we are not accustomed to and I'm not going into the business of characterizing the the deliberations, but I would --

Q The President said "very soon."

A We hope so.

Q I would like to ask you about, now after the visit of the Sultan of Oman, are there any other movements from the Arab League toward the U.S. Government so they can associate with the Reagan initiative -- I mean, to encourage it, and other Arab leaders were going to visit the U.S. in the near future?

A I frankly don't know what scheduled visits might be. The basic point I would make is that our position on this question is well known. It's stated in the President's initiative of September 1, and it really is up to those whose support King Hussein's seeks, to make the necessary decisions to allow him to come to the negotiating table.

Q King Hussein's what?

Q Anything about King Fahd's visit?

A About --

Q King Fahd.

A No, nothing about the visit of King Fahd.

Bernie, you had a question. I'll come back to you.

Q I lost a word or two. On King Hussein's what?

A To those whose support King Hussein's seeks -- it's up to those people to make the decisions to allow him to come to the negotiating table.

Q There is a high official Jordanian visiting in Washington these days?

A I'm sorry, any --

Q A high official Jordanian visiting Washington these days?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Do you have a -- I know it's not yesterday's news -- a comment about Moshe Arens, Israel's Secretary of Defense, reassessing Israel's defense policies regarding the F-16s?

A Not really. I guess I would simply say that there's no question about our commitment to Israel's security. Beyond that, I guess I would refer you back on the specific issue to what we've said before. But I don't have a specific comment on his remarks.

Q About the Atlanta CDC, do you have anything to tell us about it?

A Yes, I can give you something of an update on that. The CDC communicable diseases, or Centers for Disease Control, I guess it is.

The team has continued its work and is expected to return to the United States over the weekend to complete its analysis and write a report of its findings. We would expect to make that report available when it is concluded.

We understand that the team has enjoyed excellent cooperation from all relevant medical authorities and has been able to visit all the necessary sites and interview patients as required.

With respect to the illnesses themselves, we're not aware of any further outbreaks over the past two weeks, and we understand that all, or almost all, of the patients have been released from the hospital.

Q Alan, they will report on their own; they'll report to some government agency where we can seek that information?

A As I say, we would expect to make the report available when it is concluded.

Q Can we have a copy of it?

A A copy of the statement? Yes.

Q Alan, let me run through just a couple of things in case you might have a response.

One, do you have anything on an agreement with Japan on citrus and beef imports?

A The wire service report this morning about citrus and beef? No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything regarding the hijacking from Turkey to Athens, if any Americans are involved?

A I don't. Why don't we see what information can be developed later, and ask that you stay in touch with the Press Office to get whatever there is.

Q Any indications of terrorists activities, whatever, in the explosions at the U.N. Plaza Hotel in New York?

A Don't have anything on that at all.

Q Anything on the continued --

A And I think that you really ought to go to the police and other law enforcement type authorities.

Q Anything on the continued interrogation of Mrs. Walesa in Warsaw, a follow-up to her husband's?

A No. I think we've expressed our concerns over this continuing approach and harassment of Mr. Walesa, but I don't have anything specific today.

Q Anything new on Borges' visa?

A Nothing new on Borges' visa.

Q Going back to this Wall Street Journal thing on Kissinger, what John said about that was not only that Kissinger wasn't working as a representative of the U.S. Government but also that the State Department concurred with Kissinger's characterization of the meeting as having no political significance. The Wall Street Journal obviously alleges that --

A I think you really ought to look at the words instead of characterizing because I think you've already mischaracterized what was in that statement.

Q I will look at it, but I don't think so. I asked John specifically if the Department concurred with Kissinger's characterization. He said yes.

A I don't have a problem with it, but that isn't what the statement issued was. Go ahead.

Q Just to make it clear, it seems to me that the Wall Street Journal is saying that the State Department is wrong on that. You have nothing to say about that?

A If I read the Journal -- I'm not going to get into a discussion of that article, but I don't read it the same way as you're reading it. I think you're reading too fast, frankly.

Q Alan, another one on that one. Does Shultz continue the consultative relationship that he has said in the past that he has with Dr. Kissinger?

A He continues to call upon Dr. Kissinger for his views and advice, and that was stated also in that statement that we issued at the time.

Q But you're not concerned about who it is that Dr. Kissinger is working for, whether it's another government or another sort of political association of a non-governmental character?

A I think the Secretary is quite confident that when Dr. Kissinger speaks with him, he's giving him his personal judgments and it doesn't reflect a conflict of interest.

Q Can I ask one more thing about the -- there were reports yesterday from Israel in the Israeli press that Israeli air force fighters are overflying the Bekaa area.

Can you tell us something about how does the U.S. see these things now days in light of the Habib agreement and the talks for peace and Israeli/Lebanese negotiations? How do you see such overflights?

A I don't really have a reaction to that. This is the kind of issue which -- I mean, I can't confirm it's happening for one thing. I'm not saying it isn't happening, but I just can't confirm it.

It's the kind of issue, if it is happening, if it's of concern to the Government of Lebanon, which would be an issue to be discussed between the Lebanese and the Israelis. I'm not going to try to address it from here. I don't think this is the appropriate forum from which to address it.

Q Any comment on the report that the Polish Government is going to allow the PLO to participate in the ceremonies for the commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto?

A No, I hadn't heard that particular report. No, I don't have anything for you.

Q Alan, does Ambassador Negroponte still flatly deny calling the Boland Amendment a "legal triviality?" I ask that because a second Congressman who was present now has come forward and said that he did say it.

A John, I've heard that but I don't have anything beyond what we said yesterday, which was a flat denial and was based on a conversation with the Ambassador. So I wouldn't expect to take it beyond that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, APRIL 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #66

MONDAY, APRIL 18, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Let me just say on the situation in Beirut, the President, as you know, has issued a statement. I anticipate that within the next hour, perhaps less, the Secretary will be issuing a statement, and I therefore do not have a particular statement to give you from here.

Before we go onto questions, let me, however, make an announcement on a different subject, and then we can turn it over to what you're interested in.

An announcement regarding Nicaraguan seizure of American citizens. On April 15, Nicaraguan patrol boats intercepted and seized two Costa Rican sport fishing boats off Barra de Colorado in Costa Rican waters. Three American citizens, one of them over 70 years old, and their two Costa Rican guides, were forceably taken to Bluefields, Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan Government denied permission to Costa Rica to send a plane to Bluefields to transport the five persons back to Costa Rica on April 15. On April 16, they were flown to Managua, and then driven to the Costa Rican border. Costa Rican authorities arranged for their return to San Jose later that day.

We are protesting to the Nicaraguan Government this irresponsible act carried out against American and Costa Rican citizens well within Costa Rican waters, and the abduction of American citizens to Nicaragua.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q We can have copies?

A Yes.

Q What form of protest? Was this a verbal protest, a diplomatic protest?

A I don't have specifics on the protest.

Q Alan, can we go back to Beirut. What do you know in terms of casualties, and also do you have any indication who did it?

A On the second, in terms of who did it, no. I understand there have been press accounts of three different groups who claimed responsibility.

In terms of casualties, I don't have anything I can give to you at this point. The situation is confused. Obviously, there are a number of injured as well as dead, and we want to be very careful to put out accurate information. We recognize that speed is important, but we think that accuracy is also very important in this situation.

Q There are several reports from the hospital that at least six American Marines are verified to be dead.

A I can't confirm that. I'm aware of those reports. We do not have reports which confirm that information. I think we have to be very careful, as I said, in a situation, where there's obviously tremendous turmoil and confusion, to be very careful about what we're saying, and that does not accord with our information as of this point.

Q Can you give us what you do know? Can you go through the chronology of what happened?

A I don't have much beyond what we said this morning. I think we presented some guidance on this. I guess, going by press accounts, it was approximately 6:05 this morning our time that a massive explosion took place at the Embassy; that there were obviously a number of injuries, as well as deaths; that Ambassador Dillon was in touch by telephone with the State Department from his residence after that. Apparently, he had pulled himself out, or had been helped out of rubble in his own office, got to his residence, made the call and began giving situation reports at that point.

Ambassador Habib was not at the Embassy. He and Ambassador Draper and others were at a meeting away from the Embassy. Ambassador Habib also called in. Fire and rescue/police were all at the Embassy fairly quickly. That's about where we are.

Q Alan, how many people are assigned to the Embassy, diplomats --

A I don't have a specific number. I asked about this. Part of the problem is we don't know how many were there among the permanent staff, how many TDY people were there. Normally, I'm told that it is roughly a 30 to 35 figure.

Q That includes everybody?

A Includes everybody. But, again, we don't know how many people were actually there, and how many TDY personnel were there so I don't know that you can use that figure as any guide, really.

Q But, basically, there are about 30 to 35 diplomats and American support staff?

A That's my understanding. I will try to check this out further as we go through the day, but that's what I've got at this point.

Q Including the Marines?

A Including the Marine guards.

Q That includes the Marine guards?

A That's what I was told. But I think if we can check this out and give you more precise information later, we'll do that.

Q Is there a Lebanese civilian staff you can add to that or is that part of that figure?

A No, it's certainly not part of the figure. I don't know what the size of the Lebanese civilian staff is.

Q Could you be anymore specific or go into anymore detail about Ambassador Dillon's telephone call? I know that normally you don't deal with diplomatic exchanges, but in this case could you tell us anymore about how he described his own involvement and how he had described the situation there?

A Pretty much the way I've described it to you. He indicated that it was a massive explosion. He indicated that there was serious damage to the building. That there was fire; that there were injuries at that particular time. He had no information on any deaths whatsoever. But obviously that was the very first report he could get out and get back to us. So I think that in terms of what was going on at that time, it probably is not fair to go back and look at that as a representative account.

Q No, but you said that he himself was in the building, trapped in the building for sometime.

A I don't know how long he was there. He certainly called within an hour of the time the explosion took place. I might say that his report was crisp and factual, and he obviously was very much in charge of his operation there. He then went back, came back, and reported later. I think subsequently there were other communications established.

Q Can you tell us about the status of his wife? Was she in the building, and what about other --

A I don't have specific information on other people.

Q How would we characterize the security at the Embassy, particularly our ability to thwart this sort of an attack?

A I don't have a characterization to give you of that. I don't even know specifically what happened in terms of where the bomb was when it went off. That's the kind of thing we just don't have details on. There are a number of reports about this, some of them are conflicting. I think it would be inappropriate to try to comment until we really have more detail.

Q A follow-up. I understand the Embassy was included in the security enhancement program that was put into effect in the wake of the hostage-taking in Teheran. Was that completed, and was that partly directed at preventing bombing attacks?

A I don't know, and I'm not sure we could get into that specific question for obvious reasons.

Q Have there been any military moves to either re-enforce -- excuse me, to supplement or to somehow further protect the Marine contingent in Lebanon because some of the reports indicated that some of the Marines moved up from south of Beirut to around the Embassy?

A I think that they did move up to form, in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, to form some sort of a perimeter. But I think I would really have to refer you to the Pentagon with regard to that.

Again, this was an attack against the Embassy, not against the IDF -- not the IDF, the MNF.

Q There seems to be some fear that there may be a trend at work here, and that there could be attacks against the IDF, and I'm just wondering --

A The MNF. You're picking up my mistake.

Q The MNF, and I'm wondering if there is concern about that and if there's anything being done to sort of ward off that?

A I don't know. In response, or regard to this specific incident, I'm sure that would heighten concerns, but there has been concern with incidents over the past several weeks. As you know, there was some change in the Marines' pattern of whether their weapons were loaded or not. But, again, this is something I really would have to refer you to the Pentagon to address.

Q There are reports that Lebanese security has warned, or informed the commanders of the French, Italian, English and American Marine contingents there to be on guard against possible attacks later today. Have you heard anything about that?

A I don't have anything. But, again, for security reasons, I don't think I would be able to dig into that for you either.

Q To follow that up, if I may, from what you know, Alan, of the politics of the area, can you speculate as to who -- what group might wish to single out the U.S. Embassy?

A No, I don't think I would want to do that.

Q Had there been any advance warning, any calls that a bomb might -- a bomb threat, or a bomb might go off?

A I'm not aware of any specific warning that would have been related to this incident.

Q The explosion that was described now, do you know if it's a car bomb; if it's a time bomb that was placed in the Embassy or what is it?

A Don't. There were some initial indications that it was a car bomb. I can't confirm that. Again, I think that this is the kind thing that during subsequent investigation we will find out about.

Q Does this have any effect, one way or the other, on the Secretary's contemplating a visit to the Middle East?

A I have no information on that.

Q Do you have anything to say about the reports that the car that was involved had phony diplomatic plates on it?

A Again, that's assuming there was a car. I've seen a report which talked about a car with diplomatic plates crashing the gate, and so on. I don't know whether that's an accurate report or not.

Q Ambassador Dillon didn't report any of that?

A Not in the coversations I'm aware of, no.

Q You said that there are three groups that claim they did the --

A That's right. That's what I've been told.

Q Do you have the names of these groups?

A No, I don't. They've been on the wires; it's things that are in the wires that I've seen.

Q I know this is early at this stage of investigation, but will the United States Government publish the results of the investigation when you finish into the bombing of the Embassy; no matter whom was responsible for the bombing, and this will make it public and not part of classified documents or whatever it is?

A I can't comment because part of an assessment of this obviously would have to do with security, and I don't think we would intend to publish information which would degrade security or measures that might be taken to enhance security in the future. So I can't say that for sure.

Obviously, in terms of deaths, casualties, that kind of thing, and anything we can know about what really happened, I think that we would make that information available. But I think we're really, as you suggested in your question, in much too early a stage to talk about the findings.

Q Can you describe in any detail the rescue operations at this point? Are Marine divers, for example, looking for people who might be found in the water?

A Can't tell you. I've nothing on that. I suspect that the press is more up to date on that than anybody else.

Q Alan, did you say that Ambassador Habib called in here?

A Yes, he did. He just wanted to be sure -- he did not know what the situation was at the Embassy in terms of Ambassador Dillon or anybody else being able to get to the Department so he called in and said, "I just want to let you know what's going on here." He was told Ambassador Dillon had already, shortly before that, called in, and that was that.

Q He wasn't there at the time, was he?

A That's what I said. He was not there, Ambassador Draper was not there; their party was all at meetings away from the Embassy.

Q When did the Embassy reopen for business?

A I don't have --

Q It was closed all during the fighting between the Israelis --

A Most of the people were operating out of the residence.

Q Are the American naval units there ships or hospitals or something, are they helping in the --

A I simply don't know. I think probably the Pentagon could help you with that kind of information.

Q Alan, when you do get some more information like this afternoon, can I suggest that you have a briefing?

A We can look at it. I'm not sure that we're going to have information which is going to be any better than what you're going to have from your colleagues on the scene. We can look at it and see what's feasible. Certainly.

Q What kinds of communications were there with the Embassy? Were they radio or telephone, and were they all cut?

A The initial communication was by telephone. I can't tell you what the subsequent communications --

Q From the residence, not from the Embassy?

A Yes. That's my understanding. He said he was calling from the residence.

Q I'm asking you what do you know about the communications within the Embassy?

A No, I don't.

Q Can we change the subject?

A Yes, let's go ahead with something else.

Q I was going to ask you if you have any updates on three things on Nicaragua. One is the visa for Mr. Borges.

A No, no update.

--MORE--

CONT

Q What about the sugar quotas?

A Nothing new.

Q Is there any agreement yet on the Nicaraguan envoy, the one they proposed? Has the U.S. accepted him?

A I have nothing to announce on that.

Q What comment do you have on Mr. Begin's statement yesterday that he will not freeze settlements on the West Bank even if this will improve relations with Egypt?

A We have said many times that we regard settlement activity as an obstacle to peace, and our position in this regard has not changed.

Q May we have a filing break?

A O.K. Filing break.

Q I wanted to ask you about a reported Presidential letter to President Assad of Syria concerning the Golan Heights? Could you --

A Well, as is the custom on a country's National Day, a congratulatory message was sent from President Reagan to President Assad prior to Syria's National Day which was April 17. But as is our custom also, Marvin, we informed the Syrian Government when delivering the message that we did not plan to release the text, but we had no objection if the Syrian Government wished to do so. Therefore, we are going to leave it to the Syrian Government to decide whether it releases --

Q In a congratulatory message on a national day, do you get into issues of negotiating strategy toward the Golan Heights?

A I'm not going to comment on the substance again. If they release it, you'll see what it says. I will reiterate what I said last week, which is that we're not telling other people what to do; it's up to others to give King Hussein the support that he needs to come to the negotiating table.

Q Well, maybe you're jumping ahead of the question I haven't asked. I was just wondering if, in a congratulatory message, that is the form in which you passed on negotiating strategy about the Golan Heights.

A Again, Marvin, I just said I'm not going to comment on the substance because --

Q Is that the regular --

A -- because it's up to the Syrian Government to release the text.

On the Golan let me say simply that the fundamental basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, upon which the Camp David framework and the President's initiative are firmly founded, and that this has application to the Golan as well.

Q Why did the Secretary decide to let the Israelis buy components for the LAVI fighter while the Administration is still holding back on the F-16s?

A On the F-16s, the President made a statement and we indicated further the position early in April -- I think it was on the first -- and I don't have anything further to say about that. As far as the LAVI is concerned, the Government of Israel had recently indicated that the LAVI's overall schedule required U.S. approval of the systems that were addressed this weekend urgently in order to avoid disruption of the program. We wanted to be as forthcoming as possible in view of the long-term U.S. commitment to Israel's security.

Q Can I please follow up on this?

A Yes.

Q The decision to not send the F-16s at this time, I understand it to be for political reasons to accelerate the possible withdrawal out of Lebanon.

A I would refer you to what the President said rather than accepting that characterization.

Q O.K. Let me put it another way: Does the sale of American components for the LAVI aircraft, would it help what the United States policy is trying to achieve in the Middle East right now -- for Israel, I mean?

A Well, as I think I indicated in my earlier answer, the decision on the LAVI is based on broader concerns than the immediate situation in Lebanon. Our cooperation on military systems is an important aspect of our long-term bilateral relationship; the decision on the LAVI should be taken from that perspective.

Q Different subject do you have anything on the appointment of a special envoy to El Salvador?

A Not a great deal, actually. Let me address in general the question of the reports about some sort of agreement in principle in which this was included in reports over the weekend.

While we are not prepared to offer any comment on specific agreements reached to date with the Subcommittee -- that is the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee -- it is fair to say that we have been engaged in sustained conversations on the subject of the Administration's proposed reprogramming of $60 million in additional military aid for El Salvador. In the course of those conversations, we have discussed ways of advancing the process of negotiations leading to elections. We are aware of Chairman Long's and the Subcommittee's concerns and are actively engaged in arriving at a common understanding. Beyond that, we have no time frame to offer you.

Q May we have a copy of that, please, Alan?

A Yes.

Q Will you send some kind of a letter to the Chairman when these decisions are made?

A I don't have anything to offer you in terms of the --

Q Also, the Chairman of the other subcommittee in the Senate had asked for something in writing three or four weeks ago. Has that letter been sent to him?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Back to the LAVI thing. This morning, in one of the reports that the consideration was mostly commerce and financial that the American companies will be losing possibly $1 to $1.5 billion, and this is why possibly this was put into the consideration that you are talking about a broader concern and the security of Israel, that you are afraid that Israel was asking Germany and other European countries to buy the components or the system. Would this be a fair statement that the economic consideration was taken into consideration?

A I would give you the rationale which I did before.

Q Regarding the message to Syria, since there are some reports coming from Damascus about the contents of that message, would you consider releasing the text here to clarify exactly what is in it?

A No. As I said, we informed the Government of Syria that we would not release the text, but if they wished to do so, they were free to do that, so I will stick by that.

Q Would you say that the press reports coming from the official Syrian news agency describe the contents of that message accurately?

A I don't recall specifically what was in those reports as opposed to other reports.

Q In connection with this, is it still the U.S. understanding -- and this flows from the report out of Damascus over the weekend -- that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon would take place on some kind of simultaneous basis, there was an indication from Damascus that the Syrians would not leave unless the Israelis had left first.

A Right. The Government of Syria has expressed its willingness to withdraw its forces from Lebanon in the context of the agreed complete departure of all foreign forces from the country. As to interpretations of statements made this weekend or press articles, editorials, or what-have-you coming out of Syria, I really have to refer you to the Government of Syria. Our understanding of their position remains as it was.

Q On the LAVI, there were actually two issues to be decided. One had to do with the release of the technology, and the other had to do with the Israeli desire to use American military aid to help pay for the development of the plane.

It wasn't clear yesterday, but my impression is that the aid decision was not made over the weekend, that that is still pending. Is that right?

A You're talking about yesterday and FMS credits?

Q Yes.

A To date, the U.S. has approved the use of FMS credits only for the purpose of purchasing engine components manufactured in the United States; no other use of FMS has been approved.

Q Does that mean that it is not going to be approved in this case?

A I can only give you what I've just given you.

Q Do you have anything on the China-Vietnam fighting? Do we think this is serious?

A Bernie, I don't have a lot for you on that. We are aware of the reports. As you know, there have been incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border for a number of years. We don't want to speculate on the reasons for the reports of increased firings recently, nor on their possibly linkage with the situation along the Thai-Kampuchean border.

Q Alan, can I ask you, last Friday you told us that you may have something about the CDC. Do you have anything today or can you refer us to something?

A I don't have anything in terms of a report or anything. I don't have anything new beyond what I gave you on Friday.

Q Do you have anything at all on the latest arrest of Lech Walesa, in Poland?

A Well, very briefly, we are aware of the reports. We call on the Polish Government to release Mr. Walesa and to end this harrassment of him, his family, and his close associates.

Q I just wanted to ask you, there seems to be a pattern. Have you taken this up directly with the Polish Government?

A I don't think I would get into the question of diplomatic exchanges on this. Our attitude, approach to this is quite clear, however, from a variety of public statements we have made.

Q Can I ask, would it be possible later in the day for you to try to reconstruct for us some of the detail that came back from Beirut in these phone conversations?

A No, I don't think I would do it that way. If we have something further, as Jim requested before that we can give you that will be useful, we'll do that. But I'm not going to try to go through phone conversations.

Q Do you have anything on General Garcia resigning this afternoon?

A No.

Q Again, concerning the explosion in the American Embassy in Beirut, the Israeli officials were quick to say that that's why we are cautious not to get out of Lebanon. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I would refer you , in terms of our approach, to the departure of all the foreign forces, to what we have traditionally said and to what the President said this morning in the Rose Garden.

Q In his speech made last Friday and I believe also in testimony during the week by Enders, there was reference made to some messages to Soviets and Cubans regarding the escalation of their military presence in Nicaragua (inaudible) Central America.

Can you flesh out further what this is referring to?

A I can't answer that. I don't have --

Q -- the situation that's been going on.

A I don't have details. As you note, they were in, I think, testimony twice; as well as in the speech as it was prepared.

Q Do you have anything on The New York Times article yesterday on the human rights situation in Latin America vis-a-vis U.S. Embassies?

A No.

Q Do you have any update on the arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador? Has it increased in the last week?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that.

Q Is there anything beyond what you posted on April 14?

A I don't remember what we posted on the 14th, but I don't have anything new.

Q Ambassador Kirkpatrick claims that there has been an upswing just in the last week.

A This past week?

Q I note guidance to the effect that there has been a lull, and I wondered if you could square the two?

A I'm not aware of specifics that I can give you at this point.

Q Are any State Department people going up to the Hill-- I'm told for a meeting at 4:30 on the House side -- to brief them on the Beirut bombing at the Embassy?

A There may well be something on that, Marvin. I don't know of anything that was fixed, but I do know there was interest expressed by the Hill, and the House specifically.

Q Do you know who is going up?

A There was some talk of Larry Eagleburger going up, but again I don't know if that had been firmly fixed.

Q In that connection, does this have an effect or an impact on the Congressional appropriation funds for the rehabilitation of Beirut?

A I'm not sure why it would, Spence. It's an urgent requirement.

Q In light of the 200 Sidewinders to Israel and now the LAVI components to be sold to Israel, do you see any revival or putting into force the Memorandum of Understanding in a new strategic cooperation between the United States and Israel to force some kind of --

A I don't have anything new for you on that today.

Q Do you have anything on the U.S. access agreements to Colombian airfields, as indicated in *The Post* article yesterday?

A Also, one of the FDN leaders, Chamarro Rappaccioli, was interviewed by NPR yesterday, and he acknowledged receiving funding from the United States, but said that they have never tried to interdict arms supplies between Nicaragua and El Salvador because they didn't have the means to do so and weren't fighting in the area. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Anything on the U.S.-Chinese textile negotiations to be resumed this week?

A I don't have a current reading as to when they are likely to pick up again.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

Dun Hennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, April 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #67

TUESDAY, APRIL 19, 1983, 12:29 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements.

First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology William Schneider before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is security assistance.

Also available in the Press Office is a speech by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the East-West Round Table in New York. The subject is human rights. Please note that the speech is embargoed until delivery.

Also, there will be no noon press briefing tomorrow here. The Secretary will be appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee at 10:00 a.m.

Q What's the subject?

A MX.

Q Is that appealable, that decision?

A No. There's no appeal. We've gone through this. We will perhaps be briefing during other appearances, but in this particular one we won't be.

I have another announcement regarding deaths in Beirut. We regret to announce the death of Mr. Frank John Johnston, 47, of New York. Mr. Johnston was serving as First Secretary in our Embassy's Economic and Commercial Section where he had been assigned since January of this year. He had previously served in Singapore, Tehran and Bonn. He is survived by his wife Arlette.

Also, at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency we regret to announce the death of Mr. Robert Clayton Ames, 49, of Philadelphia. Mr. Ames was Director of the

CIA's Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia. He was in Beirut on consultations at the time of his death.

Q Spell the last name, please?

A A-m-e-s.

Q Can we have a copy of that announcement?

A Sure.

Finally, regarding expulsion of two Cuban U.N. Mission Diplomats. On April 18, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations requested the Cuban Mission to the U.N. to arrange for the departure from this country of two officers of the Cuban Mission, Ramon Salup Canto and Joaquin Rodobaldo Penton Cejas.

Although accredited to the United Nations for the purpose of engaging in diplomatic activities there, Salup and Penton have engaged in hostile intelligence activities aimed at the United States in blatant violation of their privileges of residence within the meaning of Section 13(b) of the headquarters agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Can you elaborate at all on the type of hostile activities, and for what period this was conducted?

A It's not our policy to discuss intelligence matters. Suffice it to say that both officials engaged in hostile intelligence against this country.

Q You say it was "blatant," though.

A Right.

Q You're using the characterization. Why can't you tell us what was so blatant?

A I'll have to stick with that characterization.

Q Could you tell us what "hostile" is versus "non-hostile" intelligence activities? I mean, that's not a --

A I'll stick by the statement. Let me say that the illegal activities of these Cubans have been blatant and directed against this country, and they're a serious matter. The activities are an abuse of the privileges of residence granted to Cuban diplomats at the U.N. and inconsistent with their proclaimed diplomatic status and alleged duties at the United Nations.

Diplomats at Cuba's Mission to the United Nations, which is the fourth largest mission at the U.N., and larger than those of most major world powers, have a record of continuing abuse of their privileges of residence. I don't have specifics that I can give you about their particular activities.

Q Copy of that, please, Alan?

A Yes.

Q What period and how soon must they be expelled?

A I'm sorry?

Q When will they leave the country? How much time do they have?

A We have asked that the Cuban Mission assure their expeditious departure and assume that this request will be promptly honored.

Q Do you have a figure on how large that mission is?

A I don't.

Q What's the previous record of misbehavior by the Cubans at the United Nations that you alluded to?

A I don't have a complete record. I can give you a little bit, however.

Q Can you get into the previous expulsions a few months ago?

A These are the fourth and fifth Cuban U.N. Mission officers expelled within one year. Two others, Mario Monzon Barata and Jose Rodriguez Rodriguez, were expelled in July 1982 for deliberate violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act. A third, Juan Bandera Perez,

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was expelled in August of last year on the same grounds. In 1981, Ricardo Escartin of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington was expelled for violating the Trading with the Enemy Act. He was also identified as involved in intelligence gathering activities while in the United States.

Q These aren't being expelled for trading with the enemy, right? This is different. This is a different ground.

A I've given you that it was hostile intelligence activities aimed at the United States.

Q Has the Cuban Government had any official reaction to this?

A I can't tell you what they have said in response to this.

Q Is this appealable by the Cubans or --

A I should think not.

Q Were these gentlemen in any way arrested, picked up at the scene, or whatever you want to call it, wherever their activity occurred?

A I don't have details, but, obviously, action of this sort is not taken without proper consideration of what is involved.

Q Could we ask for the guidance for the spellings of all these names you've mentioned today?

A Yes.

Q I don't remember an announcement --

A There was an announcement.

Q Was there any involvement in this case by the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

A I can't tell you. I don't know.

Q Alan, can you at least say if hostile intelligence involves any overt actions rather than gathering intelligence?

A I don't have details, but again I would refer you to the language of the announcement. It talked about hostile intelligence activities aimed at the United States in blatant violation of their privileges of residence. That's as far as I can take it.

Q Can you give us some idea of who these people are in the Cuban Mission?

A No. Why don't you go to the Cuban Mission and ask them.

Q What about the visa denial of the Cuban? Do you have anything on that while we're on Cuba?

A Yes.

Q Question, please?

A The question is regarding a visa denial to the Vice Minister of Culture. I assume that's whom you're talking about.

Vice Minister Julio Pedro Garcia-Espinosa was denied a visa because the United States Government has a long-standing policy of denying visas to Cuban State and Party officials seeking to enter the United States for purposes other than conducting bilateral relations or attending meetings of international organizations such as the United Nations.

Vice Minister Garcia-Espinosa's visit did not meet these criteria. The visa was therefore denied under Section 212(a)(27) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act which excludes those aliens whose activity could be prejudicial to the U.S. public interest.

Q Do you have anything on Borge?

A No. I don't have anything on Borge.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q When was the visa denied? Do you have a date for that?

A No. I don't have a date on that.

Q Is there any indication when you might come up with a date or --

A I would guess it was about two weeks ago.

Q What did he want to do here?

A I gather he was going to a film festival or film festivals. I'm not sure. I might mention that there were five other Cubans connected with the Cuban film industry who also applied to come to the U.S. for that same purpose who received visas.

Q Is there any indication when you might decide what to do with the visa for Borge?

A I don't have any time to give you on that one.

Q I would like to go to Beirut now, please. Do you have anything now you can say with a little more certainty on who's responsible for the Embassy bombing and the manner in which it was conducted?

A No. On the manner in which it was conducted, I don't really have anything new. The Lebanese Government has undertaken a full and vigorous investigation to bring those responsible to justice. While the investigation continues, I think I would withhold comment on questions such as that, or even who might be responsible. Obviously, as you know from the press, a number of dissident groups have claimed responsibility. So I'm going to hold off on that.

Q Do you have an update on the casualty list?

A I believe that Ambassador Dillon talked about this subject this morning. I think he said that there were seven confirmed American deaths and eight missing and presumed dead. I think those columns have now switched, according to my information, that there are eight confirmed deaths and seven missing. They have found, obviously, another body.

Q The Pentagon announced yesterday the names of the soldiers that were dead. You've announced a Foreign Service Officer and a CIA official who was, I guess, on TDY there.

Mr. Eagleburger yesterday said there were two Foreign Service Officers and two AID. Is Mr. Ames the other Foreign Service Officer?

A I don't know what Larry was talking about.

Q Do you have any other names from other agencies?

A No. I think that AID did make an announcement of some sort.

Q We haven't seen it.

A They, I think, were preparing to do that. However, I don't have more than I've given you in terms of names.

Q Do you have any idea where these people were when they were killed?

A No, I don't.

Q Mr. Ames, can you tell us a little more about him? Was he working with the Embassy or --

A He was there on consultations. I would really refer you to the agency. I don't know how much they're prepared to say. In any case, he was who he was, and he was out there for consultation.

Q Can you tell us something about the sequence exactly? Was it a pickup truck, was it a car, was it --

A No. As I said in answer to another question, I don't have details. There are all sorts of accounts of what might have happened. I think Ambassador Dillon talked about an eyewitness account, but he again was relying on what somebody who was there saw. I think what we're going to wait to do before commenting officially is for investigations to proceed and see what comes out of that.

Q Any travel plans for the Secretary?

A No. I have nothing new on travel plans for the Secretary.

Q Peter Jennings last night on "Nightline" said that the PLO was in charge of protection of the Embassy when they were in Lebanon. What do you comment on this statement?

A I think that the fact is that the host government under the Geneva Convention is responsible for protecting diplomatic personnel and installations. In Lebanon as elsewhere around the world we have worked and will continue to work closely with the government to assist it in performing that role. We're assured that the Government of Lebanon is indeed pursuing -- first of all, has carried out its responsibilities, discharged its protective responsibilities.

I would note that in the final analysis there are unavoidable risks associated with serving with the U.S. Government abroad. Our Foreign Service, military, and other public servants, are aware of this and will continue in Beirut and elsewhere -- everywhere that men and women are serving the U.S. abroad -- to make all possible efforts to minimize these risks.

As far as the PLO is concerned, I don't have specific knowledge. I understand that in a time of particular tension there had been some cooperation on that particular front of a very special and limited nature. I think we've talked about that before. But I don't have details on that.

Q I want to follow this, please, because there was a charge this morning by the Israeli Charge' at the Embassy here that the PLO might be involved in the bombing. I believe that Mr. Eagleburger said this morning or yesterday that there is no evidence that the PLO is involved in this bombing. So could you make the position clear about the PLO involvement or non-involvement in this matter?

A I can't make anything clear in the sense that there has not yet been an investigation, but I'm not aware of any evidence at this point that would suggest PLO involvement.

Q Considering the Lebanese have yet to finish their investigation of Sabra and Shatila, do you have any confidence that they're going to be able to handle this investigation with any speed?

A It's evident from what we know about what they've done at this point in terms of investigation on the scene and so on -- which I don't want to go into more detail about at this -- maybe they're talking about it out there, but I'm not prepared to here -- that they are pursuing this vigorously.

Q With any kind of a deadline in mind as to when they are going to have any kind of results?

A I don't know about deadlines.

Q I wonder how we're involved in the investigation? To what degree are we getting into this?

A Our security people out there are cooperating. The investigation essentially is a responsibility of the Lebanese Government, but we are fully cooperating with them.

Q Are we sending people from here to help?

A I'm not aware at this point of our doing that. I would think that if they requested it, we will certainly consider that most sympathetically, but I don't have any information that they have asked for that.

Q I want to ask you if Eagleburger and/or Veliotes are going out there?

A I don't have anything to give you at this point on that. I wouldn't rule that out, but I don't have anything on that at this point.

Q I thought you said that you were satisfied that Lebanon carried out its protective responsibilities.

A Yes.

Q What makes you conclude that?

A It's a judgment about how things functioned and what could be done and so on. I think, as I said earlier, and as I think Larry Eagleburger pointed out on "Nightline," there's only so much you can do if you're trying to function effectively. You can't seal yourself off from the world. You do what you can, but there are compromises between being a fortress and being an Embassy, and you have to function.

-- MORE --

Q Let me follow this. Are you saying that your satisfied that the Lebanese perimeter guards performed their job properly in this case?

A I've said that we're sure that they discharged their protective responsibility. I really can't talk to the specifics of this case beyond that since we don't know what the facts are. We have various, so-called eyewitness reports, some of them -- I think it simply remains to be seen and for the investigators to work that out.

Q What about the GAO report that points out that three or four years ago, after what happened in Islamabad and at Tehran, it was decided that security had to be upgraded in at least 25 embassies which were on a classified list, in dangerous parts of the world, and so far that work has been disorganized and has lagged. Only about four of the 25 embassies have had a security upgrading. Have you anything on that?

A I don't. I really don't know what the specifics would be.

Q What is the problem? Is it money?

A As I say, I don't have specifics.

Q Do you have anything to say about the -- there have been some suggestions on the FBIS from Beirut of warnings of additional attacks on other U.S. targets following yesterday's attack. Do you have any comment on that? Is there any stepped-up security being taken outside the Embassy compound?

A I think that it is fair to assume that in the wake of an incident of this sort people are heightened in their vigilence against possible attack or incidents, and that, indeed, would be the case here.

I don't have specifics to give you as to what measures might be taken. But, obviously the Marines were deployed in the perimeter around the Embassy building itself yesterday together with others providing protection there. I think that it's a fair assumption that there's been some beefed-up protection, generally speaking, there, but I don't have specifics to share with you.

Q Anything on any other additional threats? Has the U.S. received them or --

A I'm frankly not aware of additional threats. I don't want to try and rule out that somebody someplace hasn't said something.

Q Yesterday, Barry Goldwater called for the removal of Marines from Lebanon. From your reading of Congress, do you think this sentiment is growing, or do you think it's waning? Is it still a cause for concern for you?

A I think that the President addressed yesterday, or approached the issue, and said we will do what is necessary. That's a paraphrase. I refer you to his full statement on that.

I didn't get the sense, and I think if you look at what Nick Veliotes said this morning, for example on television, I think he also reflected that we didn't have the sense that there was a ground-swell of opinion. This was not an attack on the Multinational Force. It was a cowardly attack against an Embassy. We are certainly not -- to not coin a phrase, we're not going to cut and run.

Q Alan, just before I came in, I was informed that both the appropriate House and Senate Foreign Affairs Subcommittees are in the course of considering the '84 foreign aid authorization legislation. They may have even passed it by now.

We're dealing with language that would place restrictions on the President's ability to send more Marines to Beirut by requiring them either to consult with or get the permission of Congress before he can do that. Do we have a position on that?

A We do. I think that Larry Eagleburger addressed it this morning when he came out from a briefing he gave up on the Hill. I guess I would really prefer that you use the words that he used this morning.

Q I haven't seen it.

A I'm sure they've been reported. The basic thrust is simply that we think we need the flexibility in negotiating with the various parties on numbers and deployment pattern, and so on, to be able to make that effective. Then, we would of course be going to the Congress for authorization for that.

Q There are some people who are saying the fact that the Lebanese security forces weren't able to prevent this attack indicated the Lebanese are incapable of taking upon themselves the responsibility for security all around Lebanon.

A I think I addressed that yesterday, and our position on the overall effort to move towards a settlement in Lebanon, to get all the foreign forces out and allow the Lebanese to exercise sovereignty throughout their own terrority while at the same time paying appropriate attention and serious attention to Israeli security concerns is unchanged. That is with specific regard to your question.

Q The question is a question of judging their capabilities.

A That's right, and that answer takes into account that question. We obviously think that adequate measures can be taken by the Lebanese.

We're talking here about a terrorist incident. Terrorists' incidents, unfortunately, happen lots of places. As I said before, in terms of an embassy, you don't have a fortress; you have an establishment that's doing business with people. You cannot simply create an impregnable fortress and pretend to carry out the proper functions of an embassy.

Q How soon do you expect to be sending new diplomats to those posts in Beirut to replace the diplomats who were --

A I can't answer that question. I will say, though, that at this point in Beirut, the Embassy there is, despite this tragic loss and trauma, moving ahead in a professional, methodical way, setting up offices in nearby buildings. They're moving to resume normal -- to the extent that "normal" is an applicable word here -- but normal embassy functions.

I don't think at this point they had actually resumed consular functions but I understand that, in fact, that, too, is to be resumed soon.

Q But it was suggested that one of the locations to be used for consular offices was a hotel just down the street from the Embassy, or not far from there, but that's a rather vunerable position.

A I can't comment on specific locations. I don't know.

Q The Italian Government has called for a reunion or meeting between the commanders of the MNF for --

A Excuse me, who called?

Q The Italian Government. Do you know anything about that, if the meeting is going on?

A I don't know.

Q Can we have a filing break?

A Any objection? Okay, filing break.

Q The Chinese Premier in Canberra said today, at a news conference, that he wants to have talks with President Reagan. Is that, in your view, a change of the Chinese position? Does that advance the possibility of a visit here at all, or is that a restatement of desire on both parties for a conference?

A I've seen only one press account which suggested that. I saw another which talked about other aspects of US-PRC relations without mentioning that specific point. I don't think that I can comment.

First of all, I'm not sure how accurate that report is. Second of all, I would simply point out to you that there have been on-going consultations, that an invitation is out there, has been accepted in principle by Premier Zhao, but there's nothing new in terms of a visit.

Q Can you give us any insight on the border warfare that's going on between China and Vietname at this time?

A No, nothing beyond what I offered, I think, yesterday.

Q Any comment on the departure of General Garcia?

A Yes, I have something on that. As announced yesterday, President Alvaro Magana has accepted the resignation of Minister of Defense Garcia which was submitted on March 18.

Through his steady 3-1/2 year leadership, Defense Minister Garcia helped guide El Salvador through a turbulent

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period that led to a democratically-elected Assembly in March 1982. Under his stewardship, the armed forces of El Salvador have been firmly committed to social and economic reforms.

This reform process will be continued when presidential elections are held later this year. He has supported the Government of El Salvador's efforts to create democratic institutions, and we wish him well in his civilian endeavors.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Copy.

Q I thought I heard you say March 18.

A That's correct. I understand his resignation was actually submitted on March 18.

Q Do you know when --

A I don't, no.

Q Do you have any comment on the assumption to the same post of the head of the National Guard?

A About --

Q His replacement.

A His replacement -- General Vides Casanova?

Q That's the one.

A At this point, General Vides Casanova's appointment to serve as Defense Minister has been announced, but not yet confirmed by the Constituent Assembly.

Our only comment at this juncture would be that our human rights concerns are fully understood, in terms of those issues that I've just been addressing, by the Government of El Salvador. We fully expect that if his appointment is confirmed, General Vides Casanova would bring a commitment to the full range of democratic reforms and the war effort to his new position.

Q Can this be interpreted as a slight concern that this man was chosen?

A No, I don't think I would interpret it that way.

Q Just one second. What about his being the head of the National Guard? The National Guard has one of the worst records, and that's been admitted on the record by U.S. officials. They are alleged to be responsible for the deaths of nuns, for a massacre in Soyo Pango, for many things. Do you have any concern about that?

A I think I'll stick with what I've just given you.

Q Has the United States ever worked with General Casanova in terms of providing military aid to the National Guard?

A I don't know.

Q Could you take that question?

A I think I'd ask you to address that to the Pentagon which would have been the liaison for that.

Q Is there now an agreement in principle between the Department and Congressman Long?

A I don't have anything to advance what I gave you yesterday on that.

Q You didn't advance anything yesterday.

A I gave you something on that, but I don't have anything to advance beyond that. I just said we were in discussions with them, and I didn't have anything --

Q So you don't have any agreement, as yet?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the -- can you give us anything on the Polish Charge's appearance here at the State Department today? Is it related to events now going on?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on Walesa's trials and tribulations?

A Nothing beyond what I said yesterday.

Q Back on Central America, I wanted to ask you if there was any decision yet on the sugar quotas?

A No.

Q The Nicaraguan envoy who was proposed?

A No, nothing new on that.

Q Anything on the visit of King Hussein back to the States? Any date, any approximate date or anything?

A No. I've heard nothing to suggest that's planned or imminent.

Q He is expected, though, isn't he?

A No. I'm not aware that he's expected. Obviously, he's welcome whenever he wants to come, but I'm not aware that there's any planning for such a visit.

Q I'm referring to when he was here last, we were told by a senior official that the King will be back following his consultations --

A As I say, I'm not aware of any planning, or expectation of a specific visit at this point.

Q Alan, can you confirm that Dr. Henry Kissinger is staying in the residence of Maxwell Rabb in Rome?

A No.

Q Can you comment on this article --

A Sorry, Bill Colby's article?

Q Yes, do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any reaction to reports from Buenos Aires that an Argentine judge is seeking extradition of Michael Townley from the United States?

A Very little. We've read the press report. As you're aware, Michael V. Townley is currently serving a sentence for crimes committed in connection with the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffit in 1976.

Neither the Department of Justice nor the Department of State has received a request for the extradition of Mr. Townley, and any comment on possible legal action at this time would be inappropriate.

Q Do you have anything on the meetings in Panama City that have begun today?

A I didn't have a specific report this morning that they've begun. I'll take your word for it that they --

Q They're beginning today.

A I don't have detailed information on the agenda and the format. But, in general, let me say that we look to a regional meeting as a potentially important step by providing an opportunity for the countries of the area to discuss the regional issues of concern to all the countries of Central America, such as peace and the development of democratic institutions.

Q Does the State Department consider what's going on in Panama City to be such a meeting?

A I think that we would look to such a regional meeting as a potentially important step. I can't take it beyond that. I don't know what's going to happen specifically there.

Q Yesterday you said, about the Government of Syria, that I agreed to complete its withdrawal from Lebanon upon completion of foreign forces withdrawal, especially the Israelis.

A No, I did not say that.

Q Something about that we'll withdrawal when the Israelis will begin to withdraw; something like that.

A Why don't you look at the specific words I used? I think it said that they had agreed to withdraw in the context of an agreement for the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces.

What's your question?

Q Was this position delegated by you to the Israeli Government, or does the Israeli Government know about this, because Mr. Arens, when he was on ABC Sunday, he almost said that we are sort of preparing ourselves, if I could understand him right, to a possible confrontion or military situation with Syria?

A I've given you our position. I think the Israelis are aware of our views on this, and I don't have

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any particular comment on Mr. Arens' statement.

Q Alan, on the Mexico visit, is there any formal readout, and can we expect any briefing when they come back?

A I don't have a readout. I'm leaving that to the party. We can look into the question, if there is sufficient interest, of a briefing here.

Is there a lot of interest here? I see about three hands. All right. I'll pass it on.

Q Did any U.S. official meet with the Spanish Foreign Minister when he was in Mexico City this week?

A I don't know.

Q Can you take it?

A No. I think if you have somebody down there who could ask the party, why don't you do that?

Q Alan, do you have any comments on reports that Dr. Henry Kissinger was questioned by magistrates in Rome yesterday on the subject of the death of Aldo Moro?

A No. I don't have any information at all.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

Clenner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #67a

THURSDAY, APRIL 21, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office are the testimonies of Secretary Shultz and Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Gregory Newell, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Justice, State and the Judiciary. The subject is the Department's appropriations.

There will be a background briefing on EC President Gaston Thorn's visit today at 2:00 p.m. in Room 2207.

Q Was it 2207?

A 2207. The Secretary will deliver a keynote address at the Save the Children Distinguished Service Awards Luncheon honoring Mr. Rafiq B. Hariri, Chairman and General Manager of OGER International, and Saudi OGER and Mr. Ralph P. Davidson, Chairman of the Board of the *Time, Inc.* The event will take place from 12:00 to 2:00 p.m., Wednesday, April 27 at the Washington Marriott Hotel, the Western Ballroom. The Secretary is scheduled to make his remarks at 1:37 p.m.

Q Subject?

A I don't have a specific subject. Obviously, it is children. If you plan to cover the event, please inform Jonathan Deull or Betty Woodward at 822-8426 of Save the Children.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Does that mean the Secretary is not going anywhere before Wednesday?

A I don't have anything new for you. The situation remains as it was.

Q Do you have the phone number?

A The phone number again? Sure. 822-8426.

Q Can you make available that statement for the spellings of the various names?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything for us regarding Syrian troop movements in Lebanon? There are reports from Israel today of warnings that Israel said Syria is preparing for war?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Apparently at the Appropriations Committee, in a response from a question from Senator Specter, or a statement by Senator Specter, the Secretary --

A Which committee?

Q Appropriations.

A This morning?

Q This morning, yes. The Secretary suggested that the Administration might be thinking in terms of sending more Marines or other troops to Lebanon. Is that the Administration's intention?

A I didn't hear what the Secretary said. We have said all along that at an appropriate time when there is agreement, we can look at what's necessary. As we're working that out, we'll see what might be appropriate. But that's the context in which one would address that issue.

Q Is it being actively addressed right now in terms of a specific number of troops to go in the immediate future?

A Without leading one way or another, I don't think I would get into the question of what considerations might be going on in that regard or any other with respect to any agreements.

Q Has there been any request from the Government of Lebanon to send further troops?

A I think that we've talked about Lebanese requests and so on in the past. I don't have anything new to add to what we've said about that.

Q Alan, just to be clear, were you saying that no troops -- no Marines would be sent to Lebanon; no additional Marines sent to Lebanon unless there is an agreement?

A What I said is we would consider -- again, I don't know what specifically the discussion was this morning, but we would consider what contributions might be necessary. To go back to what we said here before, whether an expansion of the Multinational Force would be appropriate, whether an expansion of its role; if so, or even if not, whether an expansion of its personnel would be appropriate. If so, whether we would contribute more forces to that. All that would be considered in the context of an agreement and what the provisions of that agreement would be.

Q I didn't understand it before it was to be that there would be no consideration of an increase unless there were an agreement. In other words, everything now is within the context of an agreement?

A I think we have said that we would have to see what would be required. I don't think that's new. Go back and check what we've said; that's not new.

Q It's always been in the context of an agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces?

A That's what I'm talking about.

Q And without an agreement, no additional Marines?

A I don't want to rule absolutely anything ever out, but I think that we have always made it clear that the consideration would be in the context of the overall withdrawal of foreign forces and a settlement there.

Q On the Syrian front also -- not military front -- you may not want to comment about the message to President Hafiz al-Assad from President Reagan. But in a way, Prime Minister Begin is replying to what he believes what the message was as to the annexation of the Golan Heights being forever and permanent and unchanged.

Do you have any comments about that?

A We have addressed the issue before of the action that Israel took with respect to the Golan. This is a subject for international settlement, for negotiations, and so on. It's part of all of this. I don't have anything new -- no new position to add to this. There's nothing new on that from our part.

Q You're not confirming that the message did touch upon the --

A No, I'm not addressing the question of the message. As far as the message to Syria on National Day is concerned, as I said, that is up to the Syrians to release it if they wish to. We said that we would have no objection but that we would not be releasing it.

Q Also on Lebanon, do you know anything about the Peace Corps starting a program in Lebanon?

A I don't.

Q Could you take that?

A No. Why don't you ask the Peace Corps.

Q In a speech he made in Khartoum, President Mubarak did confirm that there are contacts between Syria and the United States. What can you tell us about that?

A About --

Q Contacts between the United States and Syria?

A We have contacts all the time. We have diplomatic --

Q Pertaining the Golan Heights or --

A No, I don't have anything in particular to offer you on that.

Q A follow-up to this. Minister Arens said yesterday that Israel passed a message to the Syrians that Israel did not have any offensive plans regarding the Syrians in the Bekka Valley. Was the U. S. involved in any way in passing this message?

A Again, you're asking me to get into diplomatic exchanges, and I just can't do that.

Q Is the U.S. involved in any way in the issue of alleged troop movement in the Bekka Valley?

A I don't know how to address that issue. I said I had nothing on the alleged movement, Number 1; and you're asking me about what we're doing diplomatically, Number 2, which I won't get into.

I wouldn't lead you one way or another with that, but just as a matter of principle I wouldn't get into that.

Q Does Shultz have plans to go to the Middle East?

A As I said before to Bernie, we're no different from where we were. It's still under consideration.

Q Who are the Lebanese officials that the delegation that went to Beirut are supposed to meet? Are they going to be meeting with Foreign Minister Salem or President Gemayel?

A I honestly don't know what the plans are at that end. I think that probably our Embassy in Beirut will be providing media with the plans at that end.

Q Do you have any response to Karen Elliott House's piece in the Wall Street Journal yesterday?

A No.

Q None at all?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the PLO meeting in Tunis, anything new that has come out of that?

A No.

Q Any comments on it at all?

Q Anything you'd like to see come out of that?

A What we want to come out of this whole business is to get the negotiations going, have King Hussein come to the table with representatives of the Palestinians. But in terms of any specific meetings, or whatever, that's not for us to determine.

Q   Have you heard Arafat's statements in Eastern Europe about the desirability of an international conference, including the PLO; I mean, rejection of the Reagan plan? He said it over and over again.

A   He said a lot of different things. I don't think I'll address specific reports of remarks of his.

Our position on that is quite clear, what we think needs to happen. What needs to happen is a decision by those to whom King Hussein has been turning for support in order to allow him to come to the table.

Q   Anything on El Salvador and Ambassador Hinton? Specifically, a request --

Q   Can we stay on the Mideast?

A   No, let's finish the question while we've got it. Go ahead.

Q   Specifically a request that he be replaced?

A   A request that he be replaced?

Q   Yes.

A   I know of no such request.

Q   Do you have any comment on the death of Mr. Carpio, the guerrilla leader?

A   Yes, I can give you something on that.

Q   What was the question?

A   The question had to do with the death of Mr. Carpio, the Salvadoran guerrilla leader.

It's pretty clear that gang warfare has broken out among the insurgents. (Laughter) Both Carpio and Ana Maria belong to the FPL, and one could even speculate on the internecine fights which might have led to this. The fact remains, however, that all this seems to be going on in Nicaragua.

Our Embassy in Managua has confirmed that the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry communique reported in today's press was issued yesterday. The Nicaraguan communique states that guerrilla leader Salvador Cayetano Carpio committed suicide April 12 "disheartened and shocked by the irrefutable evidence" that "one of his most trusted men," a Salvadoran and member of the Central Command of the Peoples' Liberation Forces, the FPL, masterminded the assassination of his second-in-command, Commandante Ana Maria in Managua on April 6.

Q Gee, Alan, I thought you were going to express sorrow at his untimely death. (Laughter)

Q Can we get a copy?

A Copy? Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on this piece of news coming from Algiers, saying that the Polisario Front has declared itself ready for talks with the U.S. Government?

A The Polisario Front -- no, I don't have a comment on it.

Q Alan, the other day I asked if you had any comment on Bill Colby's article, and my impression was that you didn't because it had just happened that day.

A No, I don't. Period.

Q There won't be any?

Q Could you tell us -- back on Carpio -- do you have any reason to believe that he did not commit suicide? Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that beyond what has been stated.

Q But your "gang warfare," that doesn't necessarily apply to his taking his own life?

A I think that if you look at what the statement said about who was involved in the murder and so on --

Q Okay. Do you have --

A I don't have any information one way or another on that. I'm not trying to make a judgment.

Q I understand. Do you have anything on the state of negotiations in Panama City today?

A No, I do not.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything on the Spanish Prime Minister saying he supports Contadora?

A No.

Q And, finally, is Ambassador Briggs in Panama holding talks with Central American Foreign Ministers during these Contadora meetings in Panama City?

A I'm not aware that he is. Why don't I check and see if I have anything on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything regarding renewed fighting, intensified fighting, in Cambodia, the Vietnamese?

A No. I have nothing new today on that. We've talked about that before, about cross-border shooting and incidents and so on. I don't have anything beyond what I said.

Q On Latin America still. Any comment on the Libyan planes in Brazil?

A Yes. I can give you some more on that. Why don't you specifically -- I mean, it's a little hard. I don't have anything that's sort of a general statement.

Q There are reports that it was U.S. intelligence that sort of clued the Brazilians into looking at these planes.

A Let me say two things, then. One is that -- well, they're related. We were not asked for nor did we offer advice or suggestions as to the detention of the aircraft or the disposition of its cargo, and prior to the official Brazilian decision to seize the aircraft, the Brazilians did not communicate their intentions to us.

Q But before the planes landed, was the U.S. in touch with the Brazilian Government about the fact that Libyan planes were on their way?

A I can't say. I don't know. I think that the Brazilians were certainly aware that the planes were coming. They had obviously gotten landing rights. I think you ought to turn to them in terms of what their feelings were and why they made their decision to search them.

Q But you're saying sort of after the fact the U.S. hasn't said anything about what should be done once the planes got there. But before the planes got there, was the U.S. advising what might be on the plane?

A I say, we were not asked for nor did we offer any advice or suggestions as to the detention of the aircraft or the disposition of the cargo.

Q Do we know the origin of the arms? There are reports they were actually made in Brazil, and the Brazilians sold them to Libya?

A I saw that. The basic answer to your question is no, but I must say in reading that report it sounded to me somewhat like surmise, because Brazil has sold arms to Libya in the past rather than some sort of factual report.

Q Did the United States in any form or fashion offer any advice, suggestion, whatever, to the Brazilians regarding the ultimate destination of those aircraft?

A Again, I say we were not asked for nor did we offer advice or suggestions as to the detention of the aircraft or the disposition of the cargo. I'm not sure what more I can --

Q Was the United States aware in advance of the plane's actual landing or flight over Brazilian airspace, that there were such planes coming in, that they held similar cargo to what may be on board?

A You're asking me to get into an issue that touches on intelligence, and I wouldn't do that. But, as I said, the Brazilians did not communicate their intentions to us prior to taking their decision.

Q Two questions. Was this, so far as you know, a usual route for the transport of military supplies into Nicaragua? Is this the first time you know that Libya has been transporting --

A I don't know, Marvin. I can't comment. I would certainly say it was not a usual route in the sense that -- I'm not aware that this is a common event. Whether it's been done before or not, I guess you'd have to ask the Brazilians and the Libyans and the Nicaraguans.

Q One of the planes, I understand was a Hercules. Do you know whether it was one of the Hercules sold by the U.S. to Libya during the Carter Administration?

A I don't know.

Q Could you check that, please?

A I don't know how we would check that. I think if you could get information from Brazil on what aircraft it was and go to the Pentagon with a tail number or something, maybe they could tell you.

Q Do we know what was on board?

A My understanding is that they have not unloaded those planes, based on press reports. I saw something this morning in the paper which suggested they were going to unload them in the presence of a lot of observers, so I think we can wait.

Q Let me try to get this: Did the United States at any time prior to the flight over Brazilian airspace communicate in any way with respect to those planes with Brazilian Government officials?

A Again, I think I've given you a statement on this in general. I'm not going to try to go --

Q But that doesn't answer that question.

A I'm not going to get into the question of diplomatic correspondence beyond -- or communication, rather -- beyond what was said. I think that I have substantively addressed that issue.

Q Alan, back on the route, do you have how they got to Brazil? I mean, did they stop in West Africa to refuel, which they presumably must have done, because this C-130 couldn't have gone that far.

A I don't have any information I can give you on that.

Q You don't know where they stopped before they landed at Recife?

A I don't have information I can give you on that.

Q Alan, there was a report that there were some Russians in the planes. To your knowledge, is this correct?

A I don't have any information on that. I've seen those reports, but I can't confirm that.

Q Do you have any observation on what this means in terms of the political or military situation? If, in fact, this is where they're getting their arms?

A No. I think that the question of this shipment was addressed yesterday, and I would refer you back to what was said. I think Larry Speakes addressed it. I think we addressed it through guidance available here, and I don't have anything beyond that to say.

Q Alan, with all respect, your initial statement was so specific that it really doesn't respond to the general question as to the proposition of whether the United States was in contact with Brazil over this flight prior to its appearance over Brazilian airspace.

A With all respect, you've got my answer.

Q The American Ambassador was invited to talk with the Foreign Minister and to some high advisers of the Brazilian President the night before yesterday, before the Brazilian Government issued statements in public about it.

Do you know what was the nature of the conversation?

A No, I don't.

Q Has there been any communication with the Libyans in any fashion?

A We don't usually have direct communications with the Libyans.

Q I know, but through our Interests Section or anything?

A I'm not aware that we have been in communication with them. I think that our attitude toward this is rather clear through the public statements, though.

Q Any comment, Alan, to Qaddafi's explanation of the cargo?

A Again, keep in mind that this is basically a Brazilian-Libyan matter. Libya has clearly violated international aviation practice, and, as such, they've made themselves subject to whatever action Brazil decides to take, but it is between them.

Q Can't you say anything about the implications of this incident?

A Again, we addressed it yesterday. I refer you to what we had then.

Q Is the Department at all concerned about the relationships between the Islamic Jihad organization and the militias of Camille Chamoun or Major Haddad?

A I can't say whether we have information specifically that would make that linkage, so I can't say that we're concerned. Obviously, we're concerned about anybody who might have been involved in the bombing of the Embassy, but I would not have information to confirm that kind of a linkage.

Q Anything on that investigation?

A No. I don't have anything new on that, Marvin.

Q One more on Latin America, Alan. Has any request been made for the extradition of Michael Townley?

A I have no update on that to suggest that there has been a request. I will check and see if there is something on that.

Q Alan, there was last night, I think, a report that some of the officials that were killed in Beirut were CIA officials besides Mr. Ames. Since you confirmed the fact that Mr. Ames was a CIA employee, could you confirm the fact that there were other employees of the CIA that were killed?

A I think we put out information on the people who were killed -- put out biographic information on them I guess yesterday afternoon -- and I stand by what was there.

Q About the movements of troops on the Syrian border, you said you're not aware. If there were, will you be aware, and would you tell us? Or you're saying that you're not aware of the reports, or you're not aware of movements?

A I can't tell you for sure whether I would be aware. I would hope I would be aware of it. I think you have to take my answers in the context of the questions as they're asked and put them together, and I'm not suggesting to you that there's something going on that I'm trying to hide from you.

Q Alan, the Secretary this morning said that the explosion at the Embassy was caused by a vehicle being parked in front of the Embassy and blowing up, but his answer seemed a bit tentative. Does he have a definitive report that he was referring to or --

A I don't know, Bernie. I have not seen a definitive report or a summary of the report on that, so I guess you'd really have to ask out there.

Q Alan, do you have any information on the deaths -- the killings of the three CIA agents, all the CIA agents in Beirut?

A No. I think I answered the question before about that.

Q This is a question which I would ask you to take: Does the Secretary think that communication will be enhanced or foreign policy will be better understood as a result of the proposed statute which would make the disclosure of classified information a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in jail?

A Again, I think that this issue -- rather than trying to get the Secretary's personal view, we're talking about what would or would not, depending on what the facts are here, be an Administration position. I believe the White House and Justice either have addressed or are prepared to address this from an Administration point of view, and I would propose to leave it to them to do that.

Q He wouldn't have an opinion which would --

A He might well have an opinion, but I don't think that we generally get into the business of providing individual opinions or recommendations or anything else in the course of what eventually becomes an Administration position. I would refer you to the White House and the Justice Department.

Q In view of the fact that this particular statute, if indeed it were passed, would have an extraordinary impact on the relationship between those of us who cover this building and people who work in it, I thought perhaps that it would be interesting to know what his thoughts were.

A I guess it would be interesting to know. I'm not aware, Barrie, that in fact there is such legislation being proposed, but, again, I refer you to the agencies which would be speaking for the Administration on it rather than trying to give you an individual opinion of the Secretary's.

Q An Op Ed piece today by Philip Geyelin in The Washington Post touches on two issues: One, that a State Department official was present when a House Subcommittee added $365 million to Israel, and that official did not present any opposition.

Do you care to comment on that? I mean, is this story true, first of all, and, if this is an Administration policy, why did not the Administration representative from the State Department pursue the President's policy, if that's what it is?

A The session that's under discussion was a mark-up, not a hearing, and in such sessions there is no presentation of Administration positions as a customary matter.

The Administation witness is present at a mark-up session such as that as a resource for the Committee while they're conducting their mark-up if they want to call on him. In this case, in fact, the Committee did not request a comment on this particular proposal.

Q When it comes to the eventual, final voting, would you do something to block this $365 million?

A I don't know in terms of that. I'd simply say that our position on the President's budget is that the President's budget as submitted is what we want.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #68

FRIDAY, APRIL 22, 1983, 12:22 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q Could you tell us what the travel plans are for the Secretary?

A The Secretary met with the President this morning and a number of the President's other foreign policy advisers. I think the White House may have something for you a little later in the day. I'd be glad to chat with you a little bit at the podium afterwards, but on any announcement, I think you'll have to look to the White House.

Q When is it coming?

A Why don't you check with the White House right after this session?

Q Has the Secretary completed his meetings at the White House?

A He has completed his meetings, but he has not actually returned to the building.

Q What have I missed? (Laughter)

Q He's giving a speech in Dallas on Sunday. (Laughter)

A A number of people rushed out to file on a very important story that I just revealed. No. I was asked, what are the Secretary's travel plans, and I said the Secretary had met with the President this morning, and I think the White House might have something in about an hour.

Q John, do you have anything to say in response to the Trilateral Commission report on strategic policy?

A No.

Q Do you have anything to say about the praise from Moscow for the Trilateral Commission report on strategic policy?

A No. Next question.

Q Any comment on the status of Soviet-American relations following yesterday's announcement of the expulsion of three Soviet diplomats?

A On the state of the relations?

Q Yes.

A No, not beyond what we gave you on the specifics of those expulsions and the factual information.

Q I've asked this question before, but on the words and deeds question, is there anything you can say about the status of U.S. deeds and Soviet deeds, vis-a-vis the expectations that deeds will reveal --

A No. I don't think I would give you some hasty language from the podium. I think the Secretary has characterized the relationship, and there are a variety of aspects to that relationship to which he's spoken.

Q Back to the Middle East. Tensions seem to be increasing in the Bekaa Valley. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have any confirmation of any troop buildup on either the Syrian or the Israeli side. Naturally, such reports concern us. If there were to be such a buildup, we would be very concerned by that. However we have no evidence of such troop movements.

Q Do you have anything beyond troop movements? Any other type military activities?

A No, not on the Bekaa.

Q John, a follow-up to this? Part of the tension is not so much the actual troop movements, if there are, but statements that are coming from both sides. Do you have anything to say about this?

A No, I don't. I'll leave you to evaluate them.

Q John, on the Middle East, your Office for Combatting Terrorism said this morning that we lead all other nations in the world in the number of times in the last decade that our diplomats have been kidnapped and murdered and our Embassies invaded, occupied, burned and blown up.

A two-part question: Since host governments have apprehended an apparently very small percentage of those responsible for these murders and kidnappings, does Secretary Shultz believe it is now time to combat such terrorism with something more than an office or not?

A I don't know of any plans to change the internal State Department structure for dealing with this reprehensible problem, but I think the Secretary had some remarks yesterday in his testimony.

Q I didn't mean the State Department should -- I mean, is he planning to ask the President for some involvement by those more specialized in action against terrorism rather than just confining our government's reaction to an office?

A I think you ought to go back. One dimension of this, I think, was covered in the Secretary's testimony on the Hill yesterday. I would go back and look at that testimony in which a number of Senators referred to the need for increased security and the Secretary responded to that. I think you will get the feeling from that exchange. Perhaps more might be done in terms of expenditure and security measures.

Q Right. A couple of follow-ups. When Israeli diplomats are attacked, the attackers are usually and relentlessly pursued by the Mossad.

Does Secretary Shultz believe it would be wrong for the CIA or other Government personnel to take similar action against those who murder our diplomats or not?

A There are, obviously, rules, regulations and laws as to the CIA's practices. I think our position is clear that we rely on the modest security provided by ourselves plus the protection afforded by the host governments.

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Q Last one: As Spokesman for the State Department you've undoubtedly familiarized yourself with the problem of terrorism against Embassies. Have you found that the Soviets have experienced anywhere near the number of such attacks on their Embassies as we have, and when such attacks have taken place, have the Soviets confined their reactions to deploring, handwringing, flag-lowering, and mourning our dead?

A I'm going to disappoint you. I just don't happen to have familiarized myself with that and have it in my head.

Q John, this is a really tragic situation where it doesn't seem that anything is going to be done except the memorials. No reaction is taking place to try to chase down these people.

A I think Under Secretary Eagleburger has made very clear our feelings about this terrible tragedy, and that is that Embassies cannot be fortresses in compounds. An Embassy is intended to do business with the people of a country in which it is located, and the United States cannot withdraw within inaccessible fortresses, and all the countries must live with this.

Q I understand that, but the thing is that we are the number one target in the world because we don't retaliate.

A Well --

Q Like the Israelis or the Soviets, John. Is that wrong?

A I'm simply not going to respond to that question.

Q Can you comment or give me the rationale of the State Department decision to revise the map of Jordan, Israel and the occupied territories as it appeared in the last few days?

A Unless Mr. Romberg has dealt with that earlier this week, I'm afraid you have me at a total disadvantage. I'd be glad to look at -- where did this map appear?

Q This map was the -- I think this week's Jewish Week newspaper about the --

A The State Department revised the map?

Q Yes. It is that Dr. Lewis Alexander on December 10, 1982, signed a document considering the West Bank no longer appear as part of Jordan, and it is --

A Why don't you let me have a copy of that after the briefing, and I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q John, anything on the Lebanese -- on the Embassy that we haven't -- that you haven't told us about yet?

A Simply an update on the casualty situation. The remains of the final two Americans who had been counted as missing had been recovered, bringing the total count of Americans confirmed dead to 17.

The remains of all Americans believed to be at the Embassy at the time of the explosion have now been recovered. A high-level delegation now in Beirut -- that's the one headed by Under Secretary Eagleburger -- will bring the bodies of the victims back to Washington tomorrow -- that's Saturday.

Q Do you know what time?

A We have detail on that which you can get from the Press Office, but I think it's 6:30. The President will be on hand at Andrews when the airplane carrying the American victims returns. There will be a memorial service for the dead Americans and the Lebanese. That will be at the National Cathedral on Tuesday, April 26, 12:00 noon.

The families of the victims will make final arrangements for the deceased. I think that's about all I have on that.

As of this time 18 foreign service nationals are confirmed dead; 15 are counted as missing and presumed dead.

Q I lost those numbers, John.

A Lebanese foreign service nationals --

Q Lebanese?

A Lebanese. Eighteen confirmed dead; 15 missing and presumed dead. Americans were 17 confirmed.

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Q How many injured? Do you have a number on that?

A I don't have a figure here, but I think we could probably do the best we can for you.

Q I hate to raise this, but our count, with two more, the count I would have had was 18. Are you counting that soldier who's a British national as an American?

A Yes.

Q You are?

A Yes.

Q Was there one subtracted? I remember somewhere that somebody was --

A There may be a little confusion about somebody who was thought to be out of the country.

Q Can we get his name if he was put out earlier as presumed dead?

A Let me see what we can do.

Q You're counting the wife, Mrs. Lewis, as one of the dead, too? The total seems to be off by one.

A I think this is the very latest we have, but why don't we give you -- can we give a list of names of all 17?

MR. ROMBERG: We'll have to check.

A Let me see what we can do for you afterwards.

Q Are you commenting on whether any of them were CIA employees, any of the others?

A I think Mr. Romberg covered that earlier in the week, and I think that one of the officers involved was a CIA analyst.

Q John, how many were apprehended? According to your lastest reports of this, I understand there were four -- there was one report that four were arrested.

A And released, I think.

Q And released. So did we in any way assist with this arrest?

A I wouldn't think we would assist with an arrest on Lebanese terrority.

Q On informing, and that sort of thing?

A I'm sure there's excellent liaison between our security people and the Lebanese.

Q And these people were released because they were not --

A Presumably because they were not involved.

Q Anybody being held, John?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Can you please tell us why you would announce one CIA dead and not the other?

A I didn't say anything about any others. I said that the CIA had announced the death of one of their analysts who happened to visiting Beirut at the time.

Q You won't comment on the stories that there were more?

A I think Mr. Romberg --

Q He didn't comment.

A -- addressed that earlier and gave you the employers of the various people who were killed.

Q Do you have anything there on the reports that there are now between 4,000 and 5,000 Soviet military advisors in Syria manning very advanced electronic equipment systems?

A I don't have any problem with that figure. I think we may have addressed ourselves to that earlier.

Q What about the -- I may have missed this, but did you ever make public the text of the President's letter to President Assad?

A No. We said that if the Syrians wished to make it public, that would be their choice; we have not.

Q Did it go further, in your view, in commiting the United States to the return of the Golan Heights to Syria?

A I think our position on the Golan has been consistent and there's been no change in that. It is my impression that the text has been published by Syrians. You might want to check that out.

Q Has there been a response from Assad, do you know?

A I don't know.

Q John, do you have any comment on Evans & Novak column this morning in the Washington Post about --

A Failure to talk with the Syrians?

Q Yes.

A The United States Government has been in regular contact with the Syrian Government over the past year. Our two governments periodically exchange views on the Middle East peace process.

Foreign Minister Saddam visited the United States on several occasins, participating in meetings with the President and the Secretary of State. You remember, he had a long session with the Secretary at the U.N. last year. Ambassador Habib, the President's Middle East envoy, has discussed issues related to the peace process with top Syrian officials during his visits to Damascus. We will continue to be in regular touch with the Syrian Government on the range of bilateral and regional issues that conern us both.

Q Can we get a copy of this?

A Yes, sure.

Q Can I follow this, please. Yesterday, Mr. Geyelin in the Washington Post, and today Evans & Novak in the Washington Post mentioned something about Mr. Robert Pelletreau's position in the way of increasing aid or cutting aid? What's the status and what is the source of these stories, and what do you comment on it?

A The President proposed to the Congress a fair and well-balanced foreign assistance program. Because of budget stringencies and concern that increases for one country will require decreases for others, the Administration has not supported increases for any single country.

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As far as Egypt is concerned, the United States has a special relationship with Egypt, and we believe that special relationship is fully reflected in our $2.3 billion aid program.

Over $1 billion of this aid is in the form of economic assistance, making Egypt the largest recipient of U.S. economic aid.

I would note that the Administration strongly defended its request for aid to Egypt against Congressional efforts to cut the PL-480 food program.

Q What kind of program does the State Department provide for our diplomats overseas in embassies by way of life insurance?

A I can't answer that question.

Q There is? We do have some kind of life insurance program? Has it been increased at all, do you know?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q John, over the last several weeks there have been significant number of Soviet agents and diplomats who have been expelled from several Western countries. Do you have any proof that there is stepped-up Soviet espionage going on, or is this a coordinated effort by Western countries to get tough with the Soviets, or is this just a coincidence?

A I don't really have any comment on the coordination aspect. Insofar as the recent explusion or PNG in the United States, I think the facts speak for themselves. Clearly, the individuals were engaged in activity which we considered hostile to our national interest, and we took appropriate action against them.

Q But why are we seeing so much of it in so many places now? Is there increased activity?

A I'm not able to comment on how active the Soviets are at a given moment. I think all those of us who have traveled around the world are well aware of their activities over a period of time, but I'm not going to be able to give you an indication as to whether there's a step-up or whether simply there are more specific incidents that have triggered these responses.

Q To follow that one up, does this --

A You're about running out of your share of questions.

Q Yes. Just one last one. Does that apply to the Soviet diplomat who apparently, according to the Washington Post, the State Department refuses to identify, and the police in suburban Maryland refused to identify, but was apprehended as shoplifting and he had a vase and a woman's bathing suit under his clothes?

A Does what apply?

Q Are you going to have him declared PNG?

A I don't have an answer for you on that question, but it seems to me that is an entirely different kind of activity to -- (Laughter)

Q I couldn't agree with you more. I don't think there's any -- but I'm just wondering, why are you concealing the identity of this bathing suit -- woman's bathing suit, by the way, why are you concealing his identity, John? Why? Is this classified?

A I didn't know we were concealing his identity.

Q That's what the Washington Post said, John.

A Ah, well. (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

Olennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, April 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #69

MONDAY, APRIL 25, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office is the Centers for Disease Control report on the West Bank illnesses. I will give you a brief statement on that in a moment.

Also, to note that tomorrow we will delay the briefing by one hour until 1:00 due to the memorial service for the Americans who lost their lives in the Beirut bombing; and also to inform you, finally, that there will be a BACKGROUND briefing at the White House tomorrow at 3:30 on the Trudeau visit.

Regarding the report --

Q The White House?

A The White House.

Q What time?

A 3:30.

Q Tomorrow?

A Tomorrow, Tuesday. I believe Mr. Trudeau arrives on Wednesday and has meetings on Thursday, so tomorrow is the day for the briefing.

Regarding the report from the Centers for Disease Control, you will recall that three weeks ago, in response to an outbreak of unexplained illnesses on the West Bank, we dispatched a team from the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta to study the cause of the outbreak.

During their time in the area, they enjoyed the full cooperation of appropriate Israeli and Palestinian medical officials and were in contact with counterparts from the ICRC and the World Health Organization.

They have now completed a report on the visit. Copies are available in the Press Office. We are also making copies of this report available to the Secretary

General of the United Nations, to other organizations such WHO, ICRC, and UNRWA, and to other governments.

The report itself is a technical, medical discussion of the team's methodologies and findings, and it is better left to the medical experts for discussion.

That's what I have on that.

Q That's it?

A That's it.

Q Do you have your own conclusions from the findings of the committee?

A We don't. I can give you a paragraph which I have here from the summary of the report to give you a flavor of it, but, obviously, the thing I would ask you to do is to go to the whole report and look at it.

That paragraph reads as follows, again, from their report: "We conclude that this epidemic of acute illness was induced by anxiety. It may have been triggered initially either by psychological factors or by subtoxic exposure to hydrogen sulfide. Its subsequent spread was mediated by psychogenic factors. Newspaper and radio reports may have contributed to this spread.

"The epidemic ended after West Bank schools were closed. We observed no evidence of malingering or of deliberate fabrication of symptoms."

That's the end of the quote. Again, I refer you either to the report or, beyond that even, to the Centers for Disease Control.

Now, I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on what the Brazilians found aboard the four, or three Libyan planes which supposedly had weapons aboard?

A Today, we have not received a report from the Government of Brazil on a detailed list or description of the materiel that was found on those planes.

We've seen press reports to the effect that some of the materiel is of Soviet manufacture and reportedly out-of-date U.S. materiel which came via Vietnam. But official announcements from the Government of Brazil have not been specific, and if they were to provide us with a detailed list of what was found on the Libyan planes, we would analyze it prior to making any judgment on next steps. But that's about where we are at this point on that.

Q Do you expect to be getting any reports, detailed reports from there? Have you been asking for any?

A I don't know whether we'll get that. I think you ought to ask the Brazilians about that. Again, we consider this essentially a matter between Brazil and Libya.

Q You have not made any formal request for any such information?

A I think this is something you would have to address to the Brazilians as to their intentions.

Q I'm asking you.

A As to their intentions, I would ask you to ask them.

Q Would the Secretary conduct what we are hearing now, what is called shuttle diplomacy; would he be traveling from one capital to the other if the need arises?

A I think that the Secretary addressed this question on the plane, and that was reported back from correspondents in Cairo.

I would refer you to those reports. My understanding is essentially what he said is he'll do what's appropriate, what can be productive; if it turns out to be some sort of shuttle, that was a possibility. But I think that at this stage of the game his plan is to go to Cairo where he is now, then on to Israel and to Lebanon, and we'll see after that.

Q Do you have any comment on President Mubarak's statement that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people?

A No. Our position on that is quite clear.

Q Do you have any comment on the status of troop movements and/or activities in the Bekaa area by the Syrians, by the Israelis, by the Lebanese?

A Nothing to change what we've said about that before.

Q I was going to be more specific. The U.S. and NATO intelligence reports increased state of alert by the Israeli military.

A According to a press report this morning. I can only tell you what I know, and that is, in terms of troop movements, preparations for war, that sort of thing, we've addressed the issue; there's no change in the status beyond that.

Q This morning Moshe Arens said that -- he was asked on the "Today" show if Secretary Shultz would be proposing, would be taking proposals such as increasing U.S. troops in Lebanon to patrol the areas that the Israelis would presumably pull out of, and he said it wasn't a very good idea should a proposal be made. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I think beyond saying that we have said all along that we would address the question of perhaps an expanded role, or perhaps expanded numbers for the Multinational Force in the context of an agreement. That is how we would address it, in the context of discussing a possible agreement. But I don't have specifics to offer you. He was talking about a specific deployment in southern Lebanon, and I don't think I want to go into that sort of detail or go beyond what I've just said.

Q Any comment on the discussions in the Israeli Cabinet on the possibility of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal?

A No. We've said before, I think, that anything which would inhibit a total withdrawal would not be welcomed but if there's something that would not be in that light, I suppose we would look at it. I don't have a real reaction to give to you, but our objective remains a total withdrawal of all the foreign forces, and, again, the effective spread of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the terriority and security for northern Israel across the border. That hasn't changed.

Q The Secretary said in his interview in the Post yesterday that in the last week or so he had been getting different signals from Syria in relation to the whole concept of a phased withdrawal from Lebanon. But it was just a sentence in the interview and it was not elaborated.

Are you in a position to elaborate?

A I think what he was referring to, as I understood it, was the various press reports coming out of Syria. I think there was a public statement by one party official there. I think that's really what we're talking about.

Q Do you dismiss all of that as meaningless?

A I think what we have said before, and stand by, is that the Syrian Government has indicated its willingness to withdraw from Lebanon in the context of total withdrawal of all forces. We don't have any change in our assessment of that.

Q Was that within the timeframe of these recent changes that the Secretary noted?

A I think their statements initially dated from before that. But, as I say, the Secretary addressed this. He indicated that that's where our assessment remained, I think. I'll leave you with the words that he used, in that area.

Q Do you have anything on the Soviet military presence in Syria?

A No, John addressed this last week. He said he didn't quarrel with the reports that there were perhaps 5,000 Soviets. Beyond that, no.

Q Do you have anything on the sightings of Soviet advisors with Syrian forces in Lebanon?

A No, nothing beyond what we've offered before.

Q What have you said before?

A I'd have to go back and check the record, frankly.

Q Did you say anything before?

A I think we said something that was not definitive. I know that would surprise you; that would surprise you, I know. (Laughter)

Q Latin America for such a second. Has the State Department -- has the Administration made a decision on Congressman Long's request for a special envoy?

A We continue consultations with the Congress on the whole question of El Salavador. Congressman Long is in El Salvador now, as you know. He's meeting with both Embassy and government officials -- Salvadoran Government officials down there. I don't have details on his schedule.

Obviously, we're extending every possible assistance to him. I'm not prepared to offer a comment on specific discussions with the subcommittee. As we've said before, we're actively engaged in arriving at a common understanding through sustained conversations with the Congress on the subject of the proposed reprogramming of $60 million in additional military aid and the various other sums that have been discussed, but I don't have anything specific to offer to offer to you today.

Q You can't say whether a decision has been made even if you won't tell us what the decision is?

A I don't have any comment on the discussions.

--MORE--

Q What sense does it make for the President to speak 24 hours after the House Committee is supposed to vote?

A You're talking about one House subcommittee, a very important one, but nevertheless one House subcommittee. There is a lot of action that is going to be taken on the Hill. I think the purposes of the President's speaking have been addressed by Larry Speakes this morning, and I refer you to what he said. But it certainly is a longer-range concern than simply the vote of any one subcommittee, no matter how important that subcommittee is.

Q If that subcommittee says no, that means the $60 million is dead, right?

A There's a rather long process that is involved on the Hill, as I'm sure you know. But the point is -- let's not try to get a head of the President on this again. I think Larry addressed this morning, in general terms, the purposes of the President's speech, and I think we should wait for the President to make his remarks.

Q We have reports of U.S. officials saying this morning that there is steady military progress by the guerrillas in El Salvador. Would you confirm that?

A No. I really don't have an update to give you on the military situation.

Q Or on Ambassador Hinton's comments about the military needing to be more aggressive?

A No. I don't have anything beyond what we may have said before or what he said on it.

Q On espionage, last week John was asked about whether the expulsion of the three Soviets last week was part of a coordinated effort with the Western allies, and the State Department said it wouldn't comment on coordination.

Can you comment at all on the newspaper articles that have appeared since that have suggested that even though there may not be coordination, that there is a common allied policy that deals with expulsions in connection with curtailment of trade technology flows to the Soviets?

A I can't really. There is a common Allied concern about technology flows. This is one of the subjects that has been under discussion for some time among the Allies. What has been happening is a response to specific acts of espionage. And when they are found, they will be dealt with.

Q There are reports, Alan, that the Secretary of State in his visit now to the Middle East, this trip, that he might go to Syria and propose a new plan for Syrian participation in the peace talks based on 242 and 338, which Syria accepts as a matter of fact, and possibly handing back of the Golan Heights to the Syrians if they will participate in the talks.

What do you make of these reports?

A I'm not even aware of the specifics of that. I think that the possibility of travel beyond the three countries which have been named thus far has been left open. We've said that that is something that would be looked at during the course of the trip.

As far as the Golan is concerned, we have reiterated in recent days our standard position -- our longstanding position indeed -- on the Golan whose final status to be something to be negotiated. I don't have anything really for you beyond that.

Q Do you have anything on the Les Gelb piece in The Times the other day about El Salvador?

A You'll have to be a little more specific than that.

Q I think the general thrust of the piece was that unless there is a sustained American effort in both economic and military terms, the guerrillas would win.

A Again, I think that in light of the fact the President is going to speak tomorrow, I don't want to get into a great deal of detail. We have made clear, in the various presentations made to the Hill, the importance of the assistance. If it weren't important, it wouldn't be requested. I don't have a characterization of the sort that you're asking about to offer you.

Q Could you explain, then, what does it say to you that the Administration has to expend so much effort over so much time to get what might be regarded as a limited sum of money from the Hill for aid to El Salvador?

A I don't have a judgment to offer you on that. The Administration's purposes and aims have been laid out and are going to be laid out again in the most authoritative form in the President's speech. I really would leave you to that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the story in The Times yesterday tying continued U.S. military support for Europe to Europeans stemming the flow of technology to the Soviet Union?

A First of all, as I understand it, it was a story about a private conversation that took place supposedly between a U.S. Government official and some European officials. I don't have access to the record of that talk; I can't comment on it. I understand that Mr. Brady, who was supposed to be the American involved in that conversation, said he didn't make any such linkage. I think there was a quote from me to the effect that we do not indeed link our security forces or our NATO commitments to that issue, and I certainly stand by that.

Q You don't have anything more?

A I don't have anything more.

Q Again on the interview yesterday with Secretary Shultz, at some point the Secretary made it clear but then I thought he shifted away a little bit from it -- what I'm talking about is he answered a question there saying that if, in principle, King Hussein showed willingness to join the talks, the United States may have found itself in a position where it can do a little more to bring about a freeze of settlement activities.

Is my understanding correct?

A I'm not going to try to interpret the Secretary's remarks. It's a full transcript of what he said, and I would leave you with his remarks on that. I don't think I'm going to go beyond what he said on that.

Q But what I'm saying, I mean, "O.K. this was," and then later on he said it would be helpful if the king comes in. Can someone clear that up with us as to where does the U.S. policy stand now in terms of the King's willingness to join the talks or not? And what will the United States do if he accepted or agreed to come, without pressuring him to come, but his willingness to come in order to bring about U.S. more -- I don't want to use the term "pressure," but to bring about a freeze on the settlements? (sic)

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A Our position on the settlements was laid out by the Secretary in that interview, and I don't have anything to take you beyond that. I assume that's the issue you're focusing on, the settlements and what would happen with regard to the settlements. I really have to leave you with his remarks on that.

Q With all due respect, the reports, at least as they were in the press, seem to be somewhat garbled -- the language seems somewhat garbled. You're not suggesting that that was actually the words used by this Secretary, are you?

A I didn't find the words garbled. Maybe it's a little difficult for you to comprehend it, but I didn't find it garbled.

Q Could you tell us anything about Secretary Burt's trip to Athens?

A My understanding is that under current circumstances -- and I haven't seen it -- but I'm told that the Greek Government has decided that the Prime Minister and the Deputy Foreign Minister would not meet with him. Mr. Burt is not going to be traveling to Greece.

Q Why did they decide not to see him?

A You'd have to ask them.

Q Had he planned to go there?

A I understand that he was planning to go there, yes. And I must say we regret the decision by the Greek Government not to proceed with Mr. Burt's schedule as planned.

Q Was he going in connection with the talks over bases?

A I don't have an agenda as to why he would have been going. Maybe that would have come up. I couldn't rule that out, but I don't know that that would have been specifically why. We have a negotiator there. I would have thought that it might have been a broader agenda than simply that.

Q Had he planned to visit Turkey, as well?

A I believe he's been in Turkey. He had been in Turkey and was planning to go to Greece.

Q When was he supposed to go to Greece?

A I don't have that.

Q Alan, do you have anything new on our position regarding the Asia Development Bank and Taiwanese participation?

A No. I think I'll stand on what we've said about that before -- nothing new.

Q There are reports coming out of Cairo and Tunisia that the United States will be looking into the possibility of having a new peace plan for the Middle East, possibly based on 242 and 338. What do you make of these things, and possibily Mr. Shultz will be exploring these possibilities with the people in the area?

A I think that the position of the United States is well laid out in the President's initiative of September 1 which is based squarely on the Camp David Accords, which in turn is based on 242. I have no reason to suggest a change in that at all.

Q Can I ask you a couple of questions about Grenada?

A You can ask. I don't have any answers for you, but go ahead.

Q With regard to the airport the President showed photographs of in his last televised address, we understand that apart from the Cubans, at least 16 other countries are helping to equip this airport, including Britain.

Can you confirm that?

A I can't confirm what countries are participating. I know that there are others beyond Cuba.

Q Finally, why was it considered necessary for the President to show an aerial photograph, when in fact anybody, including television press teams, can go to the runway, can go to the airport without visas or any restrictions?

A I don't know. I would refer you to what the President said at that time.

Q Back on Greece, is Burt the highest ranking U.S. official to have wanted to go to Greece recently, in the last six months or so?

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A I can't answer that. Why don't I check and see if I can get an answer for you?

Q Can you say anything about the scheduling of the talks in the Middle East? I understand that the troop withdrawal negotiations have in effect been suspended during the Secretary's trip there. So he's not going to be participating in those talks?

A I don't know what the schedule is, frankly, of those talks except that Ambassadors Habib and Draper have joined him and other Chiefs of Mission in Cairo at this particular point. Whether over the course of the next couple of days they would stay with him or go back and continue the discussions, I simply don't know. I guess I'd have to rely on reports coming out of the region.

Q I was wondering if you could characterize the state of relations between the United States and Greece?

A I don't have a general characterization to offer. I think that we have had good discussions with them. We've been negotiating on the bases and expect that to move forward.

I don't have an overall characterization to offer you. We regret this particular problem.

Q Those negotiations have been going on for a long time?

A I think that those negotiations have been going forward. I don't have anything more to offer you on that today.

Q The Australian Labor Party has a platform calling for the resumption of economic aid to Vietnam. This has been opposed by the Chinese Prime Minister during his visit there. What is the position of the U.S. on that?

A I don't have a position to offer you on that issue right now.

Q Alan, a couple of weeks ago you posted a statement on some terrorist activity around the site of the Dome of the Rock in Israeli-occupied territory saying you weren't particularly interested in the question.

A I don't think that's quite what it said, but go ahead.

Q That's what it sounded like to me, but I sometimes misunderstand these things.

A Yes, I guess so.

Q Now that Meir Kahane, who is the leader of those terrorists, has issued a statement of endorsement of the bombing of the Embassy in Beirut, are you again looking at perhaps that activity and some of Kahane's other connections, such as his connections to Yuval Neeman and Ariel Sharon, or to Dr. Henry Kissinger? (Laughter)

A I knew that had to come in some place here.

The issue of terrorism is, obviously, one that concerns us. When it takes place in a particular country where it involves criminal activity, as it obviously does, it's up to the country concerned to do the investigation. To the extent that we can cooperate and are asked to cooperate, we clearly do so, but I don't have anything specific on it.

Q Alan, do you see a particular significance to the fact that Secretary Shultz started his Middle East trip with Egypt?

A Any significance?

Q Yes.

A I think, beyond saying two things, not really. One is that Egypt is a key player in the region and has been; it is, obviously, one of the countries which has been involved most intimately in the peace process.

Beyond that, there is the meeting that is taking place among the Chiefs of Mission, and that worked out as a good place to hold that meeting. So for those two reasons, I think it is a perfectly appropriate place to go.

Q Why was it selected as the site for the meeting at this time

A It worked out as a good place to hold it.

Q But why?

A A variety of reasons.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #70

TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 1983, 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q There is something in this week's U.S. News and World Report. I quote: "White House aides are filling the skies with planes and helicopters flying back and forth to Williamsburg, Virginia, site of the May 28-30 Economic Summit. Won't it break the White House budget?"

"No problem," officials insist, "because the thousands of dollars involved will all be charged to the State Department."

(Laughter)

Comments, please?

A I wasn't focused on that particular question. Let me look and see if there is anything on that issue at all.

Q Alan, anything on a special envoy?

A No, I have nothing on that.

Q Another question: Will the Secretary attend a meeting of the ten in Paris? They have called for a meeting following or within the framework of OECD to discuss Common Market problems with the United States?

A I can't answer that.

Q They have invited the Secretary, apparently.

A Frankly, I am not specifically aware of that invitation. As you know, he is planning to go to the OECD meeting May 9-10, I believe it is. I just don't have any specific response to that, though. I don't know.

Q Alan, on Salvador aid or whatever, what is the recommendation or agreement the Department has with Chairman Long?

A As you know, we've been discussing the Committee's concerns and Chairman Long's concerns. He visited El Salvador the last couple of days. The subcommittee is scheduled, as I understand it, to vote this afternoon on the Administration's request for additional military assistance, and we've been in continuous consultation with them. I don't have anything further, though, on those consultations at this particular point.

Q Once the vote occurs, are you going to be able to speak with regard to your side of the agreement or understanding, or however you wish to phrase it?

A Let's see what happens this afternoon.

Q Will there be a briefing before the speech tomorrow?

A Will there be a briefing before the speech tomorrow? I don't know. I would ask you to check with the White House.

Excuse me. They said there is going to be?

Q Yes. 6:30

A O.K.

Q Is there anything new on the plane in Brazil, any evidence of where those arms are going?

A Where the arms are going? You mean what the disposition by the Government of Brazil would be?

Q That's right.

A I don't have anything --

Q No, where the arms were going once they got to Nicaragua. Do we have any proof?

A I don't have anything further on that. No.

Q Alan, do you have anything now, just so we know on the eve of the President's address, about the U.S. view of the Contadora group's work?

A I don't have a specific response to give you on the Contadora group, no. They've issued, I think, a couple of different statements coming out of that set of meetings, and as I understood it, talked about a possible meeting in May. But I don't have an evaluation to give you.

Q Have they talked to the State Department or any U.S. official about what their plans are now, since last week?

A I think we have had discussions with individual representatives, or representatives of countries that were there, about that prospect for a meeting in May. But I don't have anything --

Q Are you referring to the Briggs talks or something more formal?

A I'm not going to be more specific than that. We have not, to my knowledge, met with the Contadora group *per se*.

Q No, I know. But there has been no specific demarche to your knowledge by the Contadora group to the United States about what their intentions are, about what they would like to see the United States do in the interim?

A I'm not aware of any such demarche.

Q Can you look into it?

A I think I probably wouldn't. In any case, we would be getting into the realm of --

Q To look into? I didn't say --

A Well, if I look into it, I can't come back to you. I will look into it, but don't hold your breath on my coming back.

Q Following the report that you released yesterday on the poisoning on the West Bank, doesn't the Department -- I asked it yesterday; maybe today you have -- any conclusions of your own as to the people who may be responsible for it, or to anything behind just the pure medical findings?

A No, we don't. We don't have information on which to make any such judgment.

Q Alan, any reaction -- back in Central America again -- on the apparent threats from a Nicaraguan Government official to Costa Rica?

A I wasn't aware, frankly, that there were new threats. Obviously, we have expressed concerns in the past about the possibility, when there was the suggestion of a threat at one point. We would view that as troubling.

I'm not aware of the specific report you're talking about, so we clearly would like to see the tensions in that region resolved through the regional approach that we have talked of before. But I can't address the specifics, because I don't know them.

Q Do you have anything about the visit of the Secretary? Is he going to meet with any Palestinians on the West Bank or in Jordan?

A I don't know. Again, I'm going to leave comment throughout this trip on the Secretary's meetings and the results of his meetings to the party. I'm just not going to be able to try to keep up with that. There is a rather large press contingent.

Q There is another question I had about a group of Palestinians coming to Washington from the West Bank.

A I don't know anything about that.

Q Do you know anything about that?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q A follow-up to the previous question, can you confirm that the Secretary will be meeting with King Fahd during this trip?

A I'll break my own rule to a certain extent to comment that what we have said before that the concentration at this point is going to be on his visits to Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon, focusing primarily on the Lebanon question. Whether he will go elsewhere would remain to be seen, depending on what happens between now and any such consideration and decision.

Q You wouldn't be surprised if he went, though?

A I don't have a judgment to offer. As I say, it's open as to what he might do beyond this, but his focus at the moment is on Lebanon.

Q To follow up on the last question, has there been any contact then with any members of the Saudi royal family -- the king or any other officials in Saudi Arabia?

A There is frequent contact between our government and their government.

Q Yes, but the Secretary, from Cairo to Saudi Arabia, has he been in touch with --

A I don't know whether he's been in touch from Cairo to Saudi Arabia.

Q Do you have any reaction on the Greek Premier Papandreou's statements on television last night?

A Do you want to be more specific as to which --

Q More specifically, he's saying that he is threatening to cancel the talks on the bases.

A As previously scheduled, the negotiations recessed on April 25. They will resume in mid-May following the pattern that was established last October. There are still differences between the two sides on some issues, and it would be inappropriate to comment on the substance of the negotiations, obviously, while they are in progress.

For our part, the United States will continue to work to reach a satisfactory agreement with the Government of Greece.

Q He has been quite specific in two of the problem areas. Can you not respond to those?

A As I say, I don't think I would get into the specifics of the negotiations.

-- MORE --

Q Where is Rick Burt today, Alan?

Q Where is Vernon Walters?

A Where is Rick Burt? Are we going to collect a list of people, and ask where they are? I don't know where Rick is. I haven't kept up with him. He is not, to my knowledge, in Greece, however.

Q He's not making any speeches today, is he?

A He is not making any speeches today. I don't know what his schedule is for the day.

Q Do you have anything on David Dodge, speaking of where are our people?

A I have nothing to announce on David Dodge.

Q Do you have anything more than you had yesterday, 24 hours ago, concerning the circumstances under which the trip to Greece was cancelled, the meetings with the Greek officials were cancelled?

A I don't really in substantive terms. I think essentially what we were able to offer yesterday which is that we understood there was some Greek Government dissatisfaction with some remarks that were reported in the Turkish press which were allegedly made by Assistant Secretary Burt in Ankara.

But since his statements in no way departed from well-known U.S. positions, the reason for that action is not really clear to us. So you would have to depend on what has been said in Greece for that. I don't have a more detailed readout.

As I said yesterday, we regret the decision by the Greek Government not to have Mr. Burt's visit proceed as planned.

Q On the Burt visit, Alan, do you know whether Richard Burt discussed with the Turkish authorities Turkey's voluntary inclusion in the MNF in Lebanon?

A I don't know.

Q Did any State Department personnel accompany the trip that went down to Honduras and Nicaragua with the Intelligence Committee?

A I do not know the answer to that.

Q I wonder if you could look into it?

A No, I think I probably wouldn't because we're talking about a trip which (inaudible) was a trip, according to press reports, was sponsored by the CIA. I think we would be getting into a somewhat dicey area to start getting into who accompanied, and all of that.

Q You're not thinking of maybe, in view of all the publicity surrounding all of this, of modifying your policy to some extent, with respect to not commenting on anything that would have remotely to do with intelligence activity?

A I don't think I suggested that I was.

Q Apparently not.

Q Do you have any comment on Sweden's recall of its ambassador to the Soviet Union on charges of violation of international law by the submarine activity in its waters?

A I don't really have a comment on the recall of the ambassador. I could comment very briefly on the Commission's conclusions which, I believe, were connected with that action, which is simply to say that we have not had an opportunity to study the report in detail, but that the Commission has rendered a valuable service in highlighting concerns about Soviet conduct which we all must share.

Q Are the Saudis continuing to, in any way, aid the President's peace initiative in the Middle East, or has there been a falling off since Hussein has dropped out, more or less?

A I don't intend to get into a question of what individual countries may be doing. I would say that we have said before, the Saudis were playing a constructive role in this process. I would repeat that that is our judgment but I'm not going to go into any detail.

Q They're continuing to play it?

A I think I would continue to say that they are playing a constructive role.

Q Is there anything, Alan, on the textile talks with the Chinese?

A No. We had something earlier on that, and we thought they were resuming, I believe. Beyond that, in terms of a readout, I do not have anything.

Q A fill-in process or recess or what?

A Why don't you let me check on that? I don't know. I'll check.

Q Any comment on the Portguese elections?

A No.

Q Anything you want to volunteer?

A No. I really don't have anything to volunteer.

Q Do you have anything on the possible kidnapping of Americans in Ethiopia by guerrilla forces?

A Yes, I have a little something on that. Apparently there were wire reports about an American and several other foreign nationals who were doing relief work in Ethiopia having been captured by guerrillas.

One American citizen was known to be working in the Ethiopian town of Koren which was reportedly attacked by guerrillas last week. We don't know what that American's status is.

We have expressed our concern about the welfare of this American citizen to the Government of Ethiopia and expect to take appropriate measures to insure his safety.

Q I just want to ask you about the letter on El Salvador to the Long subcommittee. Has it been completed as yet?

A I haven't addressed the question of a letter or communications, in specific terms, with the subcommittee. I think since I don't have anything to volunteer or announce on it, I prefer to let any details go at this point.

As I said, the subcommittee is, as I understand it, due to take a vote this afternoon. In fact, I was told, probably around 2:00 p.m. I think I would leave anything, at least, until that time.

Q Would you be able to tell us whether a letter is to be delivered --

A No. Again, I think at this point I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q Three questions. Two are housekeeping questions. There's a sign about an Abrams briefing outside. Is he going to brief, or has he briefed? It's on the door. It says it's been moved to another room.

A Apparently he's at the Foreign Press Center. You'll have to check in terms of what the ground rules are.

Q Last week I requested a Wolfowitz briefing. Can we get one before he goes on his next trip, or has he left already?

A I'll check on that.

Q Okay, third: There have been several charges from the French and others, and there were several requests that the U.S. change it's policy again on linkage between Angola, South Africa, and so forth. Do we have any comments, especially to the French criticism the other day?

A I think we had some guidance which was probably available yesterday. I'll give it to you, if you want.

Q Okay.

A The agenda of the Contact Group, as defined by U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, is substantially complete, as Minister Cheysson said in Paris.

Through the cooperative efforts of all parties, we have reached the point where, with the exception of the electoral system for the Constituent Assembly and final agreement on the composition of UNTAG, we are close to being able to implement the U.N. plan for Namibian independence.

In his speech, the Foreign Minister called attention to the fact that very little remains on the formal U.N. Security Council Resolution 435 agenda. Meanwhile, we are working very hard to achieve success in our separate discussions with Angola, and we have had the full support of all our Contact Group partners to that end.

We have sought and will continue to seek an understanding that meets the basic concerns of all parties and that opens the way to a stable and peaceful regional context in which Namibia can achieve its independence under the free and fair process envisaged in the U.N. plan.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

JLennox

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #71

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one announcement. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz, before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is foreign aid for East Asia.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything for us regarding troop build-ups, military activities, et cetera, in the Bekaa Valley, Syrian troops?

A I don't. We're aware of reports of some clashes or firing on a bulldozer and so on, but we don't have information of our own to confirm even that.

In general, we are always concerned by such incidents and view them as underscoring the urgency of the most rapid possible, total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. But I don't have anything new on the subject of build-up to offer you beyond what I've said the last several days.

Q Do you have anything for us on the number of Libyan service people in Syria?

A Libyan?

Q Libyan, yes.

A No.

Q There are reports, again, that Libyan troops are manning various types of weapons.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q On the same question about Soviet presence with Syrian forces in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything beyond what I've said on it before.

Q I know, but what you said before was really, -- with all due respect -- you could do better.

A I can do better?

Q I know you can do better than that. It's kind of curious as to why you don't choose to do better, in fact, on that issue.

A Let me look at it and see if there's anything more we can say.

Q What estimate are we giving -- 5,000 or 6,000 --

A No, we're talking about -- Marvin's question was Lebanon. You're talking about Syria.

Q What estimates are we giving?

A The other day the figure of 5,000 was used in a question which John said he wouldn't quarrel with.

Q And what about Soviets in the Bekaa; do we have a figure on that?

A That's what Marvin is asking about.

Q That's in the Bekaa; that's not Syria?

A That's right.

Q And do we have another number for Soviets in Syria in addition to the Bekaa?

A We'll go through this again afterwards. I've just gone through it. I think you better get it straight though before you report it.

Q In the Bekaa, Alan, the Soviet -- I mean, troop movements in the Bekaa area.

A Soviet troop movements?

Q No, no, Israeli/Syrian troop movements, you have been really not talking about this at all, and there are repeated reports. We see everywhere that there is something.

Are you aware of the reports, and you think they're incorrect, or what are you telling us?

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A   I stand on what I've said before. That we're aware of the reports, but I can't confirm those to you. I would refer you back to what I've said on the subject before.

I'm aware that there are a lot of press reports out about it.

Q   If there were, Alan, would you be aware of them?

A   I think I would be aware of it, yes.

Q   Have you anything on this $30 million aid for El Salvador you got, half of what you asked for?

A   A reaction to that?

Q   Yes.

A   We welcome the responsiveness of Chairman Long and the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee in working out a way to address our mutual concerns in El Salvador.

The result required concerted efforts by all parties to meet halfway in a spirit of bipartisanship.

As the Secretary's letter to Chairman Long indicates, there has been significant progress on the issues of prison conditions and unannounced visits, a stepped-up program of political prisoner release, a review of all evidence available to us on the U. S. churchwomen's case, and a mutual commitment to advance the objective of a political solution through the process of free and fair elections.

As the Secretary's letter indicated, the President will designate a special envoy. We consider the Subcommittee's action to be part of an on-going process which will involve future discussions regarding the remaining $30 million reprogramming which the Administration proposed and will continue to seek.

Q   Copy?

A   You can get a copy of that. It may take a little bit.

Q   Do you have any kind of timetable on when another submission for the extra $30 million --

1:25

A I don't.

Q What about a timetable for the special envoy?

A Timetable for a special envoy? Your voice is gone.

Q No, I'm preparing for the speech tonight. (Laughter)

A I see. I don't have a timetable --

Q And for the U.S. attorney who will independently investigate the investigation?

A The U.S. attorney who will --

Q Well, a U.S. national attorney that was requested to look into the matter?

A I have nothing on any of these subjects beyond what was in the Secretary's letter.

Q Do you have anything on the massacre that was reported in Newsweek at Guazapa Volcano last month?

A No, I don't.

Q Could you look into the question?

A Last month, this was?

Q Apparently -- it was by the correspondent who was in Guazapa for two weeks for Newsweek and submitted the report. He reported that 70 civilians had been killed.

A I thought I had some guidance on that before, but let me look at it.

Q In connection with the Secretary's letter, the letter, as I read the transcript of it in the Times, said that the Secretary agreed to the provision that the parties could raise whatever issues they want to raise in their discussions but that the U.S. would not support power-sharing negotiations. That seemed to me to be a slight shift of position.

A I would't lead you in that direction.

Q Do you have anything to offer on Mr. Boucetta's visit to the State Department today?

A Simply, that King Hassan has sent his Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, M'hamed Boucetta, to Washington to exchange views on developments in the region of mutual interest.

Q Back in Central America, have you got anything on the Panamanian flagship that was stopped in Costa Rica, apparently with arms?

A Yes. Costan Rican authorities have confirmed that a Panamanian-registered ship which put into the Pacific port of Puntarenas yesterday with mechanical trouble has been found to be carrying a large quantity of explosives.

While they have not yet completed their examination, the authorities report that the cargo, manifested as "agro-chemicals," includes dynamite and detonators. The cargo was destined for Nicaragua.

The captain and multinational crew have been detained while the Costa Rican authorities continue their inspection of the vessel and its cargoes.

Q But no arms beyond TNT and dynamite?

A Dynamite and detonators is what I've got on it.

Q But you wouldn't descibe those arms then, would you?

A I can't go beyond essentially what I've got here. I would not describe them as "agro-chemicals." (Laughter)

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any idea where the ship sailed from?

A I don't have any further information on it.

Q Where was the ship? It was on the Atlantic coast or the Pacific coast?

A Pacific port, I said.

Q Anything on the quantity, Alan?

A It says "large quantity." I will make this available to you and let you just look at it.

Q It has been reported in the New York Times, among other places, that the United States and Argentine advisors have trained certain -- what are called "Contras" in underwater demolition. Would you comment on whether or not the U.S. may have played any indirect role in disabling that ship?

A Again, you're getting into the question of covert activities, alleged covert activities, and I could not address it one way or another.

Q Any news about plans for Secretary Shultz making a visit to Syria anytime soon, possibly after he ends his talks in Israel?

A I have nothing beyond what I've said before, that discussions of how the trip will proceed will come from the party.

Q Who did Boucetta meet at the State Department? How long? Can you tell us something about this discussion?

A He's going to be meeting, I believe, at noontime, or a little after, with the Acting Secretary, Mr. Dam. I think it's on the public schedule so let me refer to that, and I believe there is a luncheon that is involved with that as well.

Q The topic would be the --

A Again, issues of mutual interest.

Q Not bilateral --

A I'm not going to go into specifics on it.

Q Middle East, not bilateral things?

A Issues of mutual interest. I'm sure the Middle East will be a topic of -- it would be of some concern to both parties, but I just am not going to go into an agenda.

--MORE--

Q The Cuban Government says it has delivered a formal protest over an overflight of that island by an American spy plane. Have you received such a protest?

A The Cubans did present a protest note, diplomatic note of protest, on April 26, but I don't have any comment on it or on the substance of the charge.

Q You don't have any comment. Can you tell why you don't have any comment on the substance of the charge?

A I don't think we normally comment on charges regarding SR-71 flights, for example.

Q An intelligence matter, in other words.

A I think it would come under reconnaissance/intelligence, military operations, or not operations, but the kind of thing we wouldn't talk about, Ralph. You could put it under one of a number of categories.

Q Are you prepared to concede or deny their accusation that it was a deliberate provocation?

A We're just not in a position, Dick, to comment in any way other than to say we have received a --

Q While we're on Cuba, have you had any reaction from the Cuban Government to your action in restricting travel by their UN Mission?

A I don't know the answer to that question. In any case, the restriction is being put into effect.

Q How do you enforce that?

A This is a requirement that is imposed upon them, and I think it doesn't behoove us to try to talk about enforcement per se. We expect them to observe the rules when they are in this country under that status -- in this case, under the UN.

Q Well, suppose that one or more of them would just decide to violate the restriction. What penalty is available to you?

A I don't think I would want to prejudge that. I'll just let it go and not speculate.

Q Is there some sort of procedure?

A I'm sorry. Is there a procedure for what?

Q For dealing with the violation.

A I think there must in the past have been cases. Where there are travel restrictions on others, there have been violations, and I think what we would do would depend upon the circumstances of the case.

Q Do you recall what you have done in the past in any particular case?

A I don't have specifics to offer you on that.

Q In the intelligence activities which they were alleged to have carried out, was that outside of a distance of 25 miles from New York City?

A I think that the guidance that we have on that, Jim, which is reasonably extensive and is available in the Press Office, indicates that that is the case; but I'd refer you to the guidance.

Q O.K. And do you have any comment or further comment on how the Brazilians are wrapping up this plane matter?

A O.K. For those who can't hear our laryngitis friend, anything further on the Brazilian wrap-up?

No, I don't have anything further on the Brazilian wrap-up. (Laughter.)

Q Well, I just thought I'd clarify the question. (Laughter.)

Q Alan, do you have anything on the renewed call for a ban on weapons in space?

A I think I can repeat for you what we have said in the past about our position on outer space arms control; that is, the Soviets possess the world's only operational ASAT interceptor, which they continue to test. That, plus the wide scope of their other military activities in space, belies their pose as champions of peace in outer space.

U.S. use of space has been non-aggressive. Other than a commitment to develop an ASAT capability to match the Soviets, we are not planning any space weapons systems.

The U.S. has supported responsible efforts to control arms in space -- in the the Outer Space Treaty, the ABM Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and so forth. Our national space policy commits the United States to consider further space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit specific weapons systems if those measures are shown to be verifiable, equitable, and in U.S. national security interest.

The question of space arms control is complex, with daunting problems -- for example, verification -- and until these problems are resolved, we will not be able to address questions of future negotiations.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A We can provide a copy.

Q How are you working to resolve those problems? Are you talking about it to the media in a sense or what working groups are there?

A I'm not aware of what specific discussions might be under way.

Q Alan, I recall you said talks were broken off because of Afghanistan. Are you changing the ground rules now in saying that you won't resume those talks until there's some assurance that you can verify whatever treaties you agreed to?

A I said there are a lot of complex issues and until they're verified we would not be able to proceed. That is, I'll leave you with the words and I'll make that available to you.

Q Alan, anything else on the current state of French-American relations -- specifically, given charges made by Mitterand and Delors and the French position (that) they will not attend any meetings of the seven in Paris when Shultz is there?

A I'm not aware that that's been a specific position that they had taken on that, Bill. I saw a report which indicated they might not attend a meeting of Finance Ministers and so on.

Q They're working on it.

A I don't know whether that's --

Q And a dinner to be hosted by Shultz, too, (there was) another report yesterday on that.

A I can't verify any of that. I don't know.

Q How about the charges of monetary imperialism by them?

A I don't think I'm going to respond to that.

Q Anything on the Norway claim of another Soviet sub and/or on the Swedish Soviet sub?

A No, not beyond what I offered you yesterday.

Q Anything on the Palestinian press services?

A On the Palestine press services? Yes, very briefly -- that we're aware of the press report, according to which the Israelis have said that publication of a newsletter in question was halted because it lacked a license. We really don't have any information of our own on that reported incident at this point, but our position on freedom of the press is well known.

Q Was there a Consul there receiving the newsletter?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q On the same area, Alan, anything on reports coming out of Israel yesterday that the government may resettle Palestinian refugees out of UNRWA camps and in fact try and do away with UNRWA on the West Bank?

A We're opposed to any involuntary resettlement of refugees from the Palestinian camps in the West Bank and Gaza. These camps are connected to facilities run by UNRWA, which we support and help to fund. That is not to say, however, that we are opposed to refugees leaving the camps voluntarily to seek better living conditions outside.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes, I'll make a copy.

Q What is the American contribution to UNRWA? Do you have a figure there?

A I don't have a figure here on UNRWA.

Q Do you have any comment, either for now or could you refer me to a comment you may or may not have made in the past, on the use of napalm by Salvadoran Government forces in the Salvador civil war?

A I don't know how I can refer you to a comment I may not have made.

Q Well, I think -- no, I think you made a comment --

A By a comment, I don't have anything here.

Q Do you have any resource?

A I'm not sure that we would -- well, we did have a comment, it seems to me, going back on -- O.K.; I'm told I'm wrong. That's another issue, another issue. (Laughter.)

I'll check and see if there's anything to say. I'm not aware of the reports which you may be referring to, however, regarding use of napalm, so I'm not sure that I will come up with anything on it.

Q Did you have a comment on it?

A I don't have anything on that, again.

Q Any news about the possibility of King Hussein visiting next month here to attend a conference, International Association of Arab-Americans, and possibly he might be meeting with officials here?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the Americas Watch Report that came out this morning on Central America?

A The Americas Watch Report on Central America that came out this morning?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, a technical point. Are the various space treaties on a schedule of modification talks or where they would be renegotiated on a periodic basis?

A I'll have to check that for you. I don't know, Dan.

Q Would you, please?

A I don't know the answer to that. Yes, right; sure.

Q Alan, did officials of the U.S. Embassy in Rome tell Italian law enforcement officials that they thought it would not be advisable for them to interview Dr. Henry Kissinger on the subject of the Moro murder?

A I don't know what Embassy officials in Rome normally say, but I would be doubtful that we would advise law enforcement officials in other countries on matters of that sort.

Q It didn't seem proper to me. That's why I wonder if you could look into that. Since that's the information we have from the Italian officials involved.

A Yes. Again you're asking us -- I've given you my general judgment on it, but you're asking me to get into the conversations between our Government and another government. I don't think I'd do that, but I would leave you with the thought I did.

Q Can I go back to my first question? And bear in mind we can't hear very well back here. The Bekaa Valley is Lebanon and Syria. Now, you're saying there are five thousand Syrians in the Bekaa Valley in Syria.

A No, I didn't say anything about five thousand.

Q Excuse me. I mean Soviets.

A I'll repeat it one time and I'm not going to go over it again --

Q O.K.

A -- that is to say, a question was asked the other day about reports of five thousand Soviets, military, in Syria.

John indicated he had no quarrel with that figure. Marvin has raised the question about reports of Soviets in Lebanon in the Bekaa, and we addressed this the other day -- apparently not quite to Marvin's or others' satisfaction because of the impreciseness of our answer. I said I would look into it and see if we had anything further on that.

That is Lebanon, not Syria.

Q We can expect more then on this?

A I didn't say that. I said I would look. (Laughter.)

Q Alan, is there any direct connection via satellite between those SAM-5 sites and Moscow?

A I don't know the answer to that nor, if I did, would I provide it to you. (Laughter.)

Q I remember a few weeks ago you said following the request of the United Arab Emirates that a team of technicians went to offer any technical assistance in the removal of the oil slick or to overcome the oil slick in the Gulf. Do you have any information about possibly the latest information or what we have accomplished or what?

A The only thing I really have on that is that regional states are continuing their diplomatic efforts to permit technical experts to undertake activities necessary to cap the Norwuz wells, and we support those efforts.

I think that the press has been rather complete in its reporting about what has been said in the region about those efforts.

Q Is the team back from there or it's still there?

A I don't know about what technical personnel might still be out there.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing was concluded at 12:40 pm.)

Glenna-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, April 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #72

THURSDAY, APRIL 28, 1983, 12:37 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Available in the Press Office are copies of the testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker this morning before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee. The subject of the testimony is the FY-83 Supplemental and the FY-84 Foreign Assistance Requests for Sub-Saharan Africa.

I have a statement regarding the death of Lincoln White. The Department of State is deeply saddened to learn of the death on Wednesday of Paul Lincoln White who served as Press Spokesman from 1955 to 1963 under Secretaries John Foster Dulles, Christian Herter and Dean Rusk. Throughout his tenure as Spokesman, Linc upheld the standard for honesty and integrity in dealing with the press. He knew the importance of the Spokesman's role in enriching public understanding of foreign policy, and he was admired for both his professionalism and his good humor.

We extend our sincere condolences to his wife and his family.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have anything for us regarding the special envoy the President appointed for Central America?

A I don't.

Q When do you expect, or do you -- today, this week?

A I don't know. I would stay in touch with the White House. We're talking about a Presidential appointment. I just don't have anything on that.

Q Can you clarify his role? There seems to be some difference between the role as outlined by Shultz and the role as outlined by the President, particularly with respect to the negotiations or discussions in El Salvador.

A I don't agree that there is an inconsistency in those roles.

Q The President didn't address any role with respect to talks between opposing sides in El Salvador, whereas Secretary Shultz addressed that primarily in his letter to Congressman Long.

A I don't have the text. Again, there is no inconsistency. I don't have the text of the President's remarks nor of the Secretary's letter in front of me. But I think if you look at the President's remarks, he talks about assisting the governments of the region in their efforts in this respect, and I don't find an inconsistency.

Q The inconsistency, if there is any, Alan, is the obvious one. The Secretary seemed to be addressing the various political factions within El Salvador. The President's directive seems to be that the envoy deals with governments.

A I think that if you look at the Secretary's letter, it also talked about governments.

Q It did? What about that other point?

A I think to the extent an envoy -- I don't think I can get into a great deal of detail about what that envoy might do. That's something that would have to be worked out in certain cases in terms of what the governments down there might find it useful, helpful for him or her to do. The emphasis in both the Secretary's letter and in the President's speech, beyond the Congressional role in the President's speech, was working with the governments.

Q Is Stone out of the picture so far?

A I don't have anything on the question at all.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Brazilian President's speech last night?

A No.

Q Was any request made by the Israeli Government for a meeting between Ariel Sharon and anyone at the State Department when he comes to Washington?

A No, I'm not aware of his plans, in terms of coming to Washington. I'm certainly not aware of any request on his part, or on the Israeli Government's part, that he's seeing anybody.

Q Any reaction to Israeli reports that the Soviet Union is establishing a submarine base in Syria?

A I don't have anything on that. I can't confirm that to you.

Q I want to go back to Central America. Should I?

A Sure.

Q Can you comment on whether the United States is preparing sites in Honduras to train Salvadorans there?

A I cannot comment on that. I don't know. I think that the general issue of training, outside of El Salvador, was raised in the context of the reprogramming and the supplemental reprogramming, and the supplemental request as whole. I'm not aware of decisions and so forth on this at this point.

Q Are there discussions between the Government of the United States and the Government of Honduras about this?

A I don't know. Again, I don't think I could get into that. I'm sure when we have a training program in place, there likely will be.

Q I would also like to ask, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Nicaragua today went through a whole number of times where he claims Nicaragua requested negotiations, unconditional negotiations, with the United States over the past two years. He has a list here. It would bore everybody to go through it. Maybe I'll just give this to you later.

One of the things he said was that they haven't received a single piece of paper with respect to substantive proposals for negotiations since April 1982; and also that last August, a member of the -- that is, from the United States -- last August, at the inauguration of President Betancur a member of the Directorate asked Vice President Bush for negotiations, or for talks, and has received no reply of any kind from that de marche. Can you address that?

A Simply to point to what we said before on the issue of talks with Nicaragua. I don't have the text of what we've said here, but I'm sure you have it, and it's also readily available.

Without getting into the specifics of that list that you have, the point that we have made is that we have not found our efforts at meaningful bilateral dialogue to be fruitful, and our approach, of course, has been focused recently on regional approaches. Principally, in the context of the San Jose principles, but a variety of different things have gone on. The recent meetings with the Contadora Group plus the Central American countries.

We think that this entire issue needs essentially to be addressed in a regional focus.

Q How will the differences between the United States and Nicaragua be addressed when the United States isn't participating?

A As I say, I'm not going to address the specifics of what he's got there. I can't get into the specifics of what exchanges have taken place between ourselves and Nicaragua. But our general approach is quite clear and on the record, and I would have to leave you with that.

Q Let me ask one other question. It seems to me that what you're saying is that there is no place for bilateral negotiations but --

A I didn't say that.

Q I just don't understand because they say they want unconditional talks; they say it's been consistent since April of 1982; they say the United States has never responded in any substantive fashion.

A Again, I don't think I can get into the question of what the back-and-forth might have been. Our position, though, has been on the record, articulated, and I'm not going to be able to go beyond what we said about it.

Q Under what circumstances could bilateral talks be initiated between the United States and Nicaragua?

A I think that's something that we would have to work out with the Nicaraguans rather than trying to articulate it from here.

Q Would you welcome, in principle, holding bilateral talks with Nicaragua?

A Again, I don't have an "in principle" answer to give you. What we want are solutions to the problems. We think that the most fruitful approach would be a regional approach.

Q That doesn't involve the United States -- I mean --

A It could or it couldn't, under certain circumstances.

Q Can I submit this and ask you to take what responses --

A No, I'm not going to address the question of our discussions with Nicaragua.

Q You have in the past.

A Not in substantive terms.

Q Yes, you have. You've gone through eights points in April of 1982.

Q Sometimes we do these things, as I remember. I knew you were going to do that. (Laughter.)

Q Alan, anything on human rights in El Salvador, generally or specifically in response to Tony Lewis's piece?

A No, not in response to Tony Lewis's piece. The Americas Watch, I can give you a response on. It may apply to the same issues in any case.

We addressed our specific assessment of the human rights situation and the judicial system in El Salvador was included in our January certification submission to the Congress. The statistical basis used by our Embassy to measure progress has been consistent since the certification process began, and we continue to feel it represents an accurate indicator.

On the Americas Watch's general indictment of the system of justice in El Salvador, the expectation of an almost overnight reform is unrealistic.

In order for the criminal justice system to function effectively, we feel the following serious problems must be addressed: the disruptions caused by severe guerrilla warfare; acts of terrorism against judcial officials, especially at lower levels; inadequate police investigations; illegal use of public law enforcement agents for private interests; and rules of evidence and procedural abuses which tend to discourage successful prosecutions.

Progress in legal reform will not come quickly, but the largest obstacle to judicial effectiveness is the pervasive terrorism and intimidation of judges, attorneys and jurists which can only be alleviated as the security situation improves from both ends of the political spectrum.

We will continue to offer the Government of El Salvador our assistance in addressing these priority issues. The recent visit by an interagency team, led by Attorney General William French Smith to El Salvador, is one illustration. His visit revealed that the desire to reform the system is genuine. As the Salvadorans move toward a reform effort and identify specific needs for external assistance, we will be ready to help.

Q Copy, please?

A You can get a copy.

--MORE--

Q Do you have any other general statement with respect to the report on Nicaragua and Guatemala or the general thrust of the report, which was that the Reagan Administration is using two standards of human rights and that Nicaragua bears no relation to what's happening in Guatemala and El Salvador in terms of the magnitude of human rights abuses?

A I don't have a general response.

Q Will you take that question? That was the primary reason for the report being issued.

A I don't think that they've been able to go through the entire thing at this point, but let me look into it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Q Do you agree with the judgment of Ambassador Hinton that it may require a generational change in the Officer Corps before you could have a substantial improvement in human rights?

A I think that, first of all, he appeared on television this morning on a network that may be familiar to you, and there appeared to be some question as to how accurately he was reported in that newspaper account, based on what he said during the interview this morning. In any case, it would be, as I indicated in the previous answer, unrealistic to expect quick reforms in basic social patterns. The Administration's policy recognizes the problem and has been attempting to address it.

As the President indicated last night, however, that assistance must be sustained and at a level which can seriously support any change. To date, for example, we've been able to train only one out of ten in the Salvadoran military.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q He said -- or he's purported to have said, anyway -- and I didn't see the television show -- that with respect to President Magaña's coming to power, "One had to resort to the military" to put him there. Do you have a comment on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Could you look into that?

A No.

Q It's a very provocative question.

Q It can enrich public understanding.
(Laughter.)

A I can enrich public understanding?

No. I think you may be drawing conclusions from the way you're reading that text --

Q Could you tell me if I am?

A I would just suggest that you might want to look at it carefully.

Q I am.

Q Can you affirm to us, either by checking with the Embassy like you did with Ambassador Negraponte on the two Congressmen's charges, that Hinton did in fact say that? It's an extraordinary thing to say after what the President said last night.

A No. I don't think I'm going to. I think that he's addressing a process within El Salvador. He used the term "one," as I heard you talk about it.

Q That's correct. It appears in the context that he was speaking of himself.

A I'm not going to try and parse it that finely.

Q Do you have anything on the missing American among other relief workers in Ethiopia as to their condition or to their possible release?

A No, I don't. I can say that his name is Brother Gregory Flynn. He was working for Catholic Relief Services.

We can't comment on his status. We haven't had any contact with him, obviously.

Since the abduction occurred, we've been in continuous contact with Ethiopian officials about our concerns for the safety of this American as well as the others who have been abducted. We've been in contact with the embassies of the other nations whose citizens are thought to be among the several foreigners abducted. We don't see how the abduction or holding of Brother Flynn and the other relief workers can serve the interest of any organization, and we appeal for their prompt release.

Q The same part of the world, Alan. Anything on the strafing reports -- strafing of Berbera by Ethiopian jets, and were there any U.S. naval vessels in the area?

A I think I'd have to refer you to Defense on that question. I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have a home town for Brother Flynn?

A I do not.

Q Age?

A I don't have any other detail on it.

Q Alan, did you see the story in Post today about the students in the U.S. hunted by the Iranian Government, and do you have anything on that. Since the Algerians are acting to serve the interests of the Iranians in this country, have you approached the Algerians at all?

A The fact is that the American Council of Education was in touch with the State Department on the matter and was advised, first, to consult with legal counsel as to the applicability of the Buckley Amendment, which regards privacy of school records of students. Counsel apparently concluded that the Buckley Amendment precluded the provision of the release of that information, so they have closed the matter there. We are not further involved in it, or our views never arose.

Q So you don't see where you would be involved in any way?

A Not at this point. This is how they have handled it.

Q Do you have anything further, Alan, today on the ship that was detained in Costa Rica with dynamite and detonators?

A No, I don't.

Q Well, I think there's to be a further investigation in the cargo.

A I think they are continuing their investigation of the incident, but it's up to them to both further deal with the matter, and also I think to comment on it. We simply provided you what we had yesterday in terms of what they had confirmed at that point.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Secretary's plan, now that he visited the three capitals intended? What is next?

A I'm going to have to stick to my rule about not getting into his schedule. I think he has addressed it to a certain extent, or somebody in the party has anyway, in the briefings he's given. This has been reported in the wires I've seen coming from the area. But it's a little hard to try to keep up since there is a fairly continuing process of briefing going on after each meeting, and we're several hours behind, and so on. So I really prefer that those kinds of points come out of the party.

Q In a column today and in a number of recent stories, there is a suggestion that Soviet Embassy personnel are involved in a much more active way recently in trying to acquire high-tech information, and according to these stories, getting caught at it; and that explains why there's a lot of expulsions, an unusual number of expulsions of Soviet diplomatic personnel from different countries. Has the Department looked into that? Is that a conclusion that it shares? Do you want to talk about that in any way?

A I think the only thing I could say about it is that it is obvious that high technology is an area of considerable interest to the Soviets. It's obvious from the incidents that have taken place that various means are being tried in an effort to get technology. I don't have a reading to give you on the relative level of such attempts today versus sometime in the past.

Q I'd like to make a stab at that and see whether you want to say something.

A I can try, but I'm not sure that given the nature of the activity involved we would be able to do anything; but I'll try.

Q On the subject of espionage, Alan, anything today on today's indictment of Waldo Duberstein and is the Department in touch with the Governments of Israel and Egypt regarding the alleged passing of secrets of those two countries?

A I'm not familiar with the --

Q DIA.

Q Retired DIA -- Waldo Duberstein.

A Oh, I see. O.K.

I don't know, but I doubt very much that I could get you anything on it. First of all, it's a case that's under adjudication at this point -- or he's been arrested, I guess, at this point -- or indicted -- and I don't think we would get into that. I will take a stab at looking at that too, but I'm very doubtful that we could provide anything on that.

Q Alan, now that you've had time to find out what Assistant Secretary Burt did say in Ankara --

A As I presume you have. (Laughter.)

Q Yes. Do you have any comment on either the reporting, the Turkish reporting of that press conference or Mr. Papandreau's reaction to it?

A No. I think I've addressed the issue a couple of times here, and I don't have anything new to say about it.

Q But at the time you did not know what exactly Mr. Burt had said.

A No. I did say that what he said was consistent with U.S. policy. There was no diversion from U.S. policy in his remarks.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, April 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 73

FRIDAY, APRIL 29, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon.

I have one announcement to make regarding parliamentary elections in Turkey. We have learned that President Evren has just formally announced that parliamentary elections will be held in Turkey on November 6, 1983. Taken together with the just-issued law authorizing organization of political parties, lifting of the ban on political discussion and debate and submission of the election law to full debate in the consultative assembly, formal setting of a date for election marks substantial progress on the road to establishment of full democratic government in Turkey. We welcome this development and applaud the steadfastness shown by the Turkish Government in carrying out the return to democracy.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Alan, could you go into detail of why did Secretary Enders meet with Mr. Robelo? At whose request? And isn't it rather exceptional to find a high-ranking member of the State Department meeting with a rebel leader committed to the overthrow of a government with which we still have diplomatic relations?

A I leave to Mr. Robelo to explain the aims and goals of his group. I'm not sure he has articulated it quite in those terms. But in any case, the meeting was requested by Mr. Robelo. He gave Assistant Secretary Enders a full review of what is happening in Nicaragua with respect to the developing opposition to the government there, stressing the warm response that the two groups, the ARDE and the FDN, are receiving from the population as they expand their operations in Nicaragua.

Mr. Enders discussed U.S. policy toward Nicaragua as discussed in the President's speech to the Congress on the 27th.

Q But going back to the other question, Alan, is it or isn't it exceptional for a high-ranking State Department official to meet? I mean, Mr. Robelo, without mincing words, is committed to a drastic change of government in Nicaragua. Isn't it unusual for a high-ranking diplomat to spend more than an hour with a rebel leader?

A I don't have a judgment to give you on that. He requested the meeting, as I say; Mr. Enders met with him, and the conversation went along the lines I've just given to you.

Q Did Mr. Enders offer any moral support or other kind of support to --

A The only thing I have for you is, as I say, that he expressed our policy toward Nicaragua as articulated in the President's speech.

Q Alan, at any other time can you remember an Assistant Secretary of State meeting with a rebel leader of a country with whom we have diplomatic relations?

A I personally can't draw that out. I'm not sure that --

Q Cyrus Vance met with Clodomiro Almeida in 1977. He was Allende's foreign minister (Chile). So this was not only an Assistant Secretary; this was the Secretary of State level so it is not unprecedented, by a long shot.

A Thank you, George. I appreciate the institutional memory.

Q Yesterday after a television appearance by Mr. Enders, Tinoco, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, said that he had a private conversation with Enders after the broadcast, and Enders said that he would respond to the Nicaraguan Government's request for high-level talks.

Did you have the same information?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q When was the last time that Mr. Enders saw a representative of the Nicaraguan Government?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q George? (Laughter)

Q Is this a new subject?

Q Touche.

(Laughter)

Q One short question about the --

A I will see if I can give you a short answer, too.

Q O.K. The Americans who are in Beirut who have not been receiving Danger Pay and there is a little piece in today's Times. Why have they been removed from that list?

A O.K. I will provide this to you afterwards too, but let me read it to you.

Q Can we have the question, please?

A The question is regarding Danger Pay. It was reported in, I think, The New York Times this morning that the people there were not receiving "danger pay."

The Standardized Regulations for government civilians in foreign areas, which implemented Danger Pay, as provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1980, link the granting of that benefit to the evacuation or authorized departure of dependents and non-essential personnel. This linkage comes directly from House and Senate Committee Reports.

Beirut was designated a Danger Pay post for the period June 7 - November 1, 1982, a period during which dependents and non-essential personnel were not authorized at post. When the Department approved the Ambassador's recommendation that it was safe for certain dependents to return to post, the Danger Pay was terminated for Beirut, but was maintained for the rest of Lebanon. At the same time, the post differential for Beirut, which measures a wide range of environmental hardships, was raised from 15 percent to the maximum 25 percent permitted by law.

The question of when Danger Pay should be awarded has been a difficult issue. The Danger Pay policy was most recently raised by the Senate during the mark-up of the Department's FY 1984 authorization bill. The Foreign Relations Committee was divided as to whether to maintain the nexus between dependents and non-essential personnel not being at post and the granting of Danger Pay.

Q So you think that now in light of the Embassy tragedy that it would be reinstated?

A I think I would refer you to what I've just said and that is, that there is a linkage through the legislative history and the law between Danger Pay and the presence, or evacuation of dependents and non-essential personnel. I don't know whether there would be a change in the attitude of the Congress toward this, but this is implementing what has been done in devising this up on the Hill.

Q What about (inaudible)

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q A follow-up on that. Don't the House and Senate Committee Reports allow the Secretary to make an exception and have both dependents and Danger Pay?

A This is what I've given you, the interpretation of the Department at this point.

Q So you saying there can't be an exception?

A I've given you what I've got on it.

Q Yesterday, during the mark-up of the foreign aid bill in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy indicated that the Administration won't object to add-ons to Israel if the Congress approves all the bills to other countries -- in other words, if the add-on is not at the expense of aid to to other countries. What's your comment on this?

A First of all, as I understand it, it was not a formal mark-up yesterday. It was establishing the mark from which they will then mark up next week.

I think the only thing I can say at this point is what I've said before, that we stand by the President's request, and I don't have anything further at this particular point for you.

Q Do you have any comment on the Argentine Government's document on terrorism and "disappeared"?

A Yes. We've only seen press reports and don't yet have a copy of the actual report. As we've said before, the question of accounting for the thousands of people who disappeared in Argentina in the middle and late 1970's is a very important one in Argentina and one which the Argentines themselves must resolve.

We have consistently encouraged Argentine authorities to make available whatever information they may have to the families of the missing.

We have not seen what is reported to be a lengthy document yet, as I said, and it would be premature to make a substantive judgment. It refers to a complex, controversial and very tragic period in Argentine history, and we recognize the importance of trying to resolve this issue as that country proceeds to the election of a civilian government.

Based on the press reports, however, we note that human rights groups and others in Argentina have apparently found it inadequate. We would hope that through these groups' communications with the Government of Argentina at least some of these misgivings could be resolved.

Q Copy of that?

A Copy? Sure.

Q A follow-up. Another question on Argentina. How does the U.S. view the British threat to use military force to stop the visit of relatives to the graves of the soldiers that are buried in the Falkland Islands?

A I don't have any information on that. I don't have a comment on it.

Q Would the U.S. feel the same about visits of relatives to Viet Nam to the Americans buried there?

A You're raising a hypothetical situation.

Q I would like to get back to this Danger Pay question for just a minute. What was the basis on which the Ambassador made the judgment that it was safe for dependents to come back to Beirut?

A I don't have information on the basis for that recommendation.

Q Would that be available?

A I'm not sure that that kind of internal back-and-forth would be available. As I say, I leave you with the language. It's obvious there was a recommendation made for some dependents. I don't think it was a total recall.

Q On that, Alan, are there American officials anywhere else in Lebanon besides Beirut? I understood that you said it was lifted on November 3 for Beirut. Are there Americans somewhere else in Lebanon outside of Beirut?

A I don't know what the situation on that is. Let me check. I see the point of your question. Let me check.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement of Shafik El Hout, the PLO representative in Lebanon, who said that the PLO is ready to withdraw from the Bekaa, all of Lebanon, whenever an agreement would be reached between the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel?

A We have said before that our information indicated that the PLO would withdraw. As we have said, we have information that Syria would withdraw in the context of a total withdraw of all foreign forces from Lebanon. So this is consistent with what we have said our understanding is before.

Q Alan, is it possible to restrict payments from El Salvador by El Salvadoran citizens to the United States? Has there been any consideration, any study of this as a possible means of controlling what is alleged to be the return of a lot of U.S. aid money to the United States?

A It sounds like measure that would presumably come under either (a) the Salvadoran Government's authority, or (b) some sort of currency control, and I think in that case it really sounds like a technical question which you ought to put the Treasury Department. I don't know what can be done or would have been considered in that respect.

Q The Baltimore Sun carried a piece about a bill that would offer the PRC long-term Most Favored Nation status. Has the State Department or the Administration taken any position on this?

A We haven't yet seen the text of Representative Gibbons' bill and therefore couldn't comment directly on it until we have had time to review the specific provisions.

I would note, though, that since our normalization of relations with China in 1979, the Administration has recommended waiver of the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, in order to grant China Most-Favored-Nation tariff treatment.

This recommendation has been based on China's steadily improving and now excellent record on emigration.

We support the basic concept of multi-year MFN treatment for those countries with which the U.S. has a trade agreement and that have satisfactory procedures and record of performance on emigration matters under the provisions of Section 402 of the Trade Act.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

Glennox

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
MONDAY, MAY 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #74

MONDAY, MAY 2, 1983, 12:16 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, how about this new -- described as fury and anger in Israel over Secretary Weinberger apparently torpedoing the agreement that Secretary of State Shultz had made with Israel, the LAVI fighter?

A Bill, as we announced on April 18, the U.S. has approved seven export licenses dealing with three of the LAVI systems: Five licenses for the wing and tail composite design, one for the fly-by wire computer control system, one for the servo-actuator system that controls the flight control surfaces.

The licenses implementing this decision were issued early last week. These are highly technical matters, obviously, and we've had subsequent discussions with the companies and with the Israelis further on defining and clarifying the items that would be included.

Subsequently the licenses were amended to reflect a greater specificity and to define more accurately what was contained in the license applications. We believe we have now met the requests put to us by the Israeli Government, and at the same time we have safeguarded critical U.S. technology.

Q Alan, isn't it true that the original licenses that came from the Pentagon to State -- they were only for engineering and not for production, and that's specifically what got the Israelis furious.

A I can't get into the question of what went on. I don't know, frankly, but I don't think I could get into it in any case of what might have gone on between Departments. But, as I say, we believe that we have now met the request put to us by the Israelis as well as safeguarding critical U.S. technology.

Q Have the Israelis complained about this in private?

A John, I wouldn't get into the question of diplomatic interchange, as you know.

Q What about the question of the public diplomatic interchanges going on now? Would you comment on that?

A No. I've seen sourced stories and so on out of Israel. This is our explanation of what has in fact happened, and I think that's what we'll stay with.

Q Alan, is the amendment of the licenses a result of further consultations between Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz on the promise Secretary Shultz made, or was the amendment the result of conversations between the U.S. and Israel?

A You're asking me to get into two areas that I've just said I'm not going to get into. One is interagency discussion and the other is intergovermmental discussion. The fact is that the licenses were issued, that these are highly technical matters, that we've had further discussion, the licenses were amended to reflect greater specificity and define more accurately what was actually in the license applications, and we believe we have met the Israeli request.

Q You say, "We had more discussions." Who is the "we" involved in that? Has the U.S. had more discussions --

A We had discussions, as I understand it, with some of the companies involved and also with the Israelis.

Q What do you mean by "greater specificity"?

A I really can't go beyond this. It's a very technical kind of question, and you're beyond my competence on it.

Q How would you describe the impact of the controversy last week regarding this matter and the Secretary's mission in the Middle East?

A I don't know that I would think that there's an impact. First of all, I'm not sure what the controversy -- I wouldn't address the reports of controversy, so I'll set that aside.

But in terms of the -- I don't see any impact of any discussions that have been held on the Secretary's mission at this point. As I say, logic dictates if we've met the Israeli request on this that it shouldn't have any impact, of course, and the reports coming out of the region, I think, coming from the press and otherwise are -- while they are long, detailed, difficult discussions -- nonetheless they're good discussions and moving ahead.

Q Alan, the Israelis also said they're angry because they claim that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey, has been told -- he's now on a Middle East tour and he's been told not to go to Israel, and to go only to Arab countries. Now I know you could say that's a Pentagon matter, but, if true, it does affect our foreign policies, specifically Shultz's negotiations.

A Bill, I don't know anything about it, and I really am going to have to refer you to the Pentagon because that's were the facts presumably rest on that issue. I just don't know.

Q Aren't you curious about it?

A I'm curious about all sorts of things.

Q Alan, the decription that Bill just used that Israel is angry, do you take it -- is that your understanding --

A I'm not going to try to characterize the Israeli position on this.

Q How have they reacted to this -- to the --

A Again, I'm not going to get into our discussions with them, I'm not going to try and characterize the reaction. This is a statement of the facts as they exist, and I'm --

Q What do you mean when you say "subsequently"? When was it that the thing was amended?

A Subsequently after the initial issuance.

Q When was subsequent? Can you get that, please?

A I don't think I can get that.

Q You just said you were getting the facts. I don't see why you're so leery about it when this thing was amended.

A I will try and get it, Don. I don't know. We're getting into --

Q You said when the thing was issued, now you've said subsequently --

A I said early last week. I didn't say specifically when beyond that. Between early last week and early this week.

Q Would you get the dates, please, when those things were done?

A I will try to see what I can get for you on that.

Q In this regard, there were press reports that the licensing or this permit that you just mentioned, the three components for the LAVI planes, were given to the Israelis, or that Secretary Shultz played a major role in getting this agreement to be implemented or to come to this net result of the negotiations about it contrary to what the White House or the Pentagon were not in favor of giving this at this time to Israel.

Can you confirm, deny, or do you stand by what you just said before about that?

A No. I'm not going to comment on it. I addressed this, essentially not commenting on this sort of thing when we first made it known that the approvals had been given, and I don't have anything beyond what I said at that point.

Q Alan, I maybe lost you somewhere. Why were the licenses amended?

A I can only offer you the words I've got here, that these are highly technical matters, and we wanted to define and clarify what should be included and the amendments provided greater specificity and clarity, define more accurately what was contained in the Israeli applications in the first place.

Q Are you saying that you have met Israeli demands? You also said that, didn't you, somewhere?

A I think we have met their requests.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Yes. Sure.

Q Alan, is it possible to get someone who can go into some of the specificity you're speaking about from that podium?

A I can ask, Bob. I'm not sure that we really could, but let me ask.

Q Alan, what does it say about the lack of cohesion or lack of coordination within the Administration? At a time when the Secretary of State is trying to get an agreement, apparently Secretary Weinberger is doing his best to interfere with the process.

A I haven't accepted that contention, and I'm not going to comment again on allegations that that's the case.

Q Alan, why the timing at this juncture?

A Timing of?

Q Of the approval this last week --

A I refer you back to what I said about the LAVI. I would refer you back to what I said on this when we originally made it known last week. I don't have those words, and I'd rather be precise about it than trying to paraphrase it.

Q On the Middle East subject, what do you comment on President Mubarak's statement about the need to involve the PLO in the peace talks as reported this morning?

A I don't have any comment to offer you on that. The Secretary had discussions with President Mubarak. I think they both spoke after that. Our position on the PLO is well known. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Do you have anything to say about the rocket attack near the U.S. Ambassador's residence?

A No. I think that whatever has had to be said, or whatever there is to be said about the rockets, has been said out there. I gather they're still looking into the matter. It's quite up in the air as to what the circumstances were.

Q Does the U.S. Government view it as an attack on the Ambassador's residence, does it?

A Not to my knowledge. No. I think that everybody's said that they don't really know what the facts are and have not characterized it that way.

-- MORE --

Q Another area?

A Go ahead.

Q Do you have any reaction at all to the demonstrations in Poland yesterday?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing at all?

A No. The President, of course, issued a statement on May 1.

Q That was before the demonstrations and the --

A I think I'd refer you to what he said in terms of the U.S. Government's sentiments and so on.

Q Does the Administration agree with Kirkpatrick's assessment about Dodd's speech, that it was demagogic and irresponsible?

A I'm not going to offer you a value on that. The President spoke; his speech was clear on the U.S. policy.

Q Let me ask it in a different way: Does Ambassador Kirkpatrick speak for the United States Government on Central American policies and --

A Jim, I'm not going to -- You are asking it another way. I'm not going to get into the question. The policy is what I'm talking about here -- the policies articulated by the President in his speech.

Q Mrs. Kirkpatrick apparently told the *Times* that the ratio of military-to-economic aid was 3 to 1 in El Salvador -- or 1 to 3. The President said it was 1 to 2. In January, we had State Department officials say here, ON BACKGROUND, that it was 5 to 1.

Is there some consensus in the Administration as to what the ratio is, and can we get it?

A Let me see. I think maybe the points are being addressed somewhat differently in terms of time period and so on, but let me see what I can get you on that. I'd like to think that's a serious question, as opposed to simply a needle. But I will go on and take the next question.

Q The Nicaraguan Government responded to President Reagan's speech with a lengthy and rather detailed list of alleged U.S. violations of Nicaraguan air space, in some cases specifying numbers on planes, dates, and so on.

Do you have any response to that? Have you seen it? And if not, would you take the question?

A No. I've seen wire reports of it. It would involve allegations of intelligence activities and so on. I don't think I would be prepared to get into that.

Q The intelligence response you use in connection with the alleged air space violations?

A I think that is what was being referred to by the Nicaraguan Government.

Q On Jim's questions, would you like the statement of the Ambassador to stay as is that the Senator is whatever she said about him? Don't you care to add something, to clarify, to -- (Laughter) I mean, she said something --

A As I say, the President stated our policy, and that's where we'll leave it.

Q Do you have anything on the attack on Nicaragua by the contras in which the death of one West German doctor was one result?

A I don't have anything on that, Jim.

Q Back to Beirut, yesterday, Mr. Eagleburger said that he felt pretty sure that the Embassy would be rebuilt -- of course, not at the same site. Are there any plans underway now for reconstruction, the site being selected? What's happening as far as getting a new Embassy going?

A I can't give you details on that at this point. I can say the matter is under active consideration, but I really can't go beyond that at this particular point.

Q When would we know, or would you know, or when can you tell us?

A I don't know at this particular moment. When I have something, I'll be happy to share it with you. But as I say, it definitely is being given urgent consideration.

Q And as he said, they will go ahead to rebuild?

A Oh, yes.

Q Does the Administration have any comment on the extension for 30 days of the El Salvadoran Government's state of seige?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, in light of the Administration's concern for a free press as an important element of human rights, do you have any comment on the beating of a French journalist, Madame Claude Albert, outside a Paris press conference, which was carried out by the personal bodyguards of Dr. Henry Kissinger?

A Don't know anything about the case; don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you plan briefings on the Williamsburg Summit, or are there already plans in the works?

A I'm sure there will be a fair amount of briefing on that, Spence. I don't know of specific --

Q There is one this afternoon at the Foreign Press Center.

A Is it at the Foreign Press Center?

Q At 2 o'clock, yes.

A O.K. But I don't know, in terms generally, for the American press, for example. There have already been some, and I'm sure there will be more. We will let you know when those are held.

Q Do you have anything about the visit of King Hussein?

A King Hussein? No, I have nothing on the visit of King Hussein.

Q Alan, back on Williamsburg, have any of those studies been completed?

A The studies?

Q Yes, the multilateral studies.

A I understand. I'm not aware that any studies have been completed. They are certainly going forward, but I'm not aware at this point that any have actually been finished.

Q Do you expect some will be before the Summit?

A I can't say for sure. Let me see if I can get anything on it. I don't know that we would want to try necessarily to predict without the studies in hand. Certainly, it is the intention of the various people concerned to make headway, as they are doing in these various areas in the context of not only the meetings of the experts and so on that are going on, but the various meetings that will take place before the Summit -- OECD and so on. I'll see if I can get any further definition, but I'm not sure I can.

Q Alan, the Vietnamese news agency has announced that a group of its troops have begun today withdrawing from Kampuchea. What is your reaction?

A Don, it's unclear precisely what is involved. I've seen the announcements regarding this. If they are pulling out some forces, I suppose that's all to the good. I saw one report that they are pulling out 15,000. If that's true, I suppose it would be nice if they pulled out 165,000 more. Last year there was an announcement that they were doing this, and it apparently was not much more than a troop rotation, so I think we have to wait to see what this really means.

Q But suppose they are pulling out 15,000 troops?

A Suppose they are?

Q Yes. You say it would be nice if they pulled out 160,000 or whatever number.

A I'm assuming 180,000 and just adding --

Q What would be the significance of any substantial withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, or do you think it would have any?

A I'm not sure in the context of 180,000 total forces what the significance of the withdrawal of 15,000 would be.

Q Does the U.S. have any attitude about it, a partial withdrawal of Vietnamese forces?

A I don't have anything to add beyond what I've said. I think, Don, there were some words the other day. There is some guidance you might want to get from the press office that perhaps is more formal.

Q Was there any response to the suggestion by Ambassador Dean that they open it to the press? And do you know whether the press have been permitted to watch the withdrawal?

A I'm not aware of Ambassador Dean's suggestion. I'm aware of reports that the Vietnamese offered to make this action a press event. But I don't know what the extent of coverage beyond particular actions where they took press, if they did indeed do that, or if they are doing that, what the extent of free press coverage is in terms of verifying what it is and so on?

Q Can you tell us whether Secretary Shultz in his travels in the Middle East is discussing with Israel at all the Memo of Understanding from 1981, or is that not a subject of these discussions?

A I couldn't get into that.

Q Secretary Shultz said this morning, I believe I heard on that, that he is going to stay in the Middle East as long as it takes till he gets an agreement before he comes back to the United States. Is there a time limit, or is it going to be weeks or months or what?

With the pace of talks which is going on between Tel Aviv and Beirut, what do you estimate as the length of time that he will be spending there?

A I really can't. I just don't know. I think the party has addressed this. They don't know at this point, and I have no way of knowing. I don't think at this particular juncture it's knowable. But we'll see.

Q But it's do-able?

A It is do-able. (Laughter)

Q Over the weekend Under Secretary Egleburger and Deputy Assistant Secretary Michel talked about Cuba and drug smuggling.

A Right.

Q Is it your understanding that they are saying that it is Cuban Government policy to smuggle drugs, or that it merely went on and the Cuban Government knew about it and didn't stop it?

And a second question: Is it still going on or not?

A All I can do is really offer you reference back to Mr. Michel's testimony which stated that the U.S. has developed new evidence confirming that Cuban Government officials have facilitated narcotics smuggling through the Caribbean, and that the evidence gives strong indication of official Cuban approval.

The U.S. has made clear on numerous occasions, including in Assistant Secretary Enders' testimony before the Denton Subcommittee last March that there is evidence implicating Cuba in narcotics trafficking. Additional evidence has come to light since then with the indictment of four Cuban officials in Florida and with convictions of other traffickers related to that.

As Mr. Eagleburger said yesterday, the evidence is such that it's hard to believe that the Cuban Government, in fact, did not approve.

Q Thank you

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

Allemann

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #75

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. First, Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam will testify tomorrow at 9:30 before the Senate Appropriations Committee. The subject is MX.

Second, in line with my promise to keep you up to date on what's going on in Beirut in terms of the Embassy, I would just simply note that a Department survey team, which included a structural engineer and an architect, has completed its preliminary survey of our damaged Embassy in Beirut. The team concluded that the building which was leased by the U.S. Government is unfit for further use.

The city of Beirut engineers have reached the same conclusion and will determine whether the building should be demolished for public safety reasons.

The Department's Office of Foreign Buildings is considering various options for our temporary and permanent building requirements in Beirut.

That's all I have on that, and that's all I have on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, further on that, do you have any estimates, in terms of cost damage, and how much it would cost to start up a new Embassy?

A I don't have anything further on that.

Q Or how much the Department will be asking Congress --

A That's what I'm saying. I don't have anything further for you on it at this point. As we have something, I'll be happy to provide it.

As far as the building is concerned, I guess, since it's a building that has been leased, I think you would probably have to go to the owners to find out what their costs are, in terms of replacement or whether they're covered by insurance, or whatever. I don't know about that.

I can only give you what we have from our side of it. But at this point, this is all I've got.

Q I would like to know what the costs are to the Department as well as within the building.

A When we have some cost figures, I'll be happy to provide it.

Q Who is responsible in such a case of terrorism? Is the owner, as you say, and his insurance, if any? Is it possible to get -- I presume it's possible to get insurance against terrorism.

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Does the United States have responsibility, because it wouldn't have happened unless the Embassy was situated there.

A Why don't I see if I can find out anything about that? I don't happen to know the answer.

Q Same subject, for just one second. Do you happen to have the lease amount?

A No.

Q Is there an agreement between the U.S. Government and the Government of Poland to provide asylum in this country for jailed Solidarity leaders?

A I know of no such agreement. I'm aware that that question was of some interest and that there had been some sort of report about it. We checked it, and we know nothing about such a report.

Q If there is no agreement, Alan, how do we explain 34 Solidarity types arriving in New York right about now, and more than a thousand so far have come in since May?

A Why don't you ask the Polish Government what their policies are in releasing people?

Q Don't we know who comes into this country?

A You're asking me whether or why they are being released and why they are travelling, and I would suggest you ask the Government of Poland.

Q But if they're coming into this country, they have visas, Alan.

A We have visa people. But you're asking me about motivations, and I'm telling you that I can't answer your question about motiviations.

Q Not motivation, but policy; do we have a new policy towards --

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on Poland's denial of -- the Pope requested amnesty for political prisoners prior to his June visit, and that was denied. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't.

Q Any comment on the unrest in Poland today?

A No, not particularly. I would note that the Polish police have resumed a blockade of our Embassy at approximately 11:00 today Warsaw time. The apparent aim is to prevent Polish citizens from using the Embassy library. The Poles who convince the police they're not planning to use the library are allowed to enter the Embassy.

The Department will protest this unwarranted interference with access to our Embassy.

Q Is there any reaction to the speech by the Chinese Ambassador in New York?

A No.

Q Can we get back to the Middle East for a few minutes, or a minute or two? There was a shooting yesterday on the West Bank of a Palestinian West Banker who was supposedly protesting the confiscation of land or new settlements on the West Bank. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the shooting of the Palestinian on the West Bank?

A I don't have any reaction to that particular incident. We have time and again stated our concern about incidents, but in terms of that specific one I don't know anything about it. I can't comment on it.

Q Senator D'Amato has protested the non-appearance of Mr. McPherson of AID to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, saying at the last minute -- it dealt with Syria, U.S. aid to Syria. It was a fairly strong protest. Is there any reaction at all to this?

A It's the first I've heard of it, so I don't know what the facts are. Let me see if I can find something out. In the meantime, I would also suggest that you might want to check directly with AID, but I'll see if we can find something on it.

Q President Mubarak, in his speech on May Day, indicated that King Hussein sent to him a message in which he continued the Jordan commitment for maintaining dialogue with the PLO; do you have a comment on that?

A Maintaining --

Q Dialogue with the PLO.

A Dialogue with the PLO? Between whom and the PLO? Between --

Q Jordan and the PLO.

A Jordan and the PLO? No, I think that our attitude on that remains as it has been. The action on the peace process rests with those whose support King Hussein seeks so that they can take the necessary action to allow him to come to the peace table.

Q Has Secretary Shultz any plans to meet with Major Haddad during his trip?

A I know of no such plans.

Q Do you have any comment on Herblock's cartoon about Hussein?

A No.

Q Any confirmation of reports that feelers were going to Damascas to find out, or to prelude the visit of --

A Who is going to Damascas?

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Q U.S. feelers to prelude or to pave the way for Secretary Shultz to visit Damascas?

A I think that the Secretary has indicated to the press travelling with him that he does hope to be able to go to Damascus at some point. Specifically, when that would be, I can't tell you. To my knowledge, there was no firm decision about that, but I think that that kind of announcement would have to come from the party.

My last understanding was that there was no firm decision, but, yes, indeed, he did hope to be able to do that. There have been discussions about this.

Q Is there anything further on the LAVI aircraft?

A On the LAVI, no.

Q Anything new, Alan, on the Soviet military buildup in Syria?

A No, not beyond what we've said before.

Q This morning, Ariel Sharon said that he was sure from intelligence reports that Syria and the PLO were behind the bombing at the Embassy in Beirut, and ultimately the Soviet Union. Does your information jibe with that?

A I'd stick with what we've said before on this. First of all, we don't know. Second, I guess, it was Larry Eagleburger who addressed the subject to a certain extent, basically saying that, but perhaps in more words, on Sunday on television. I would refer you to what he said about it, but I think that really does represent the extent of what we know at this point.

--MORE--

Q About Sharon, Alan, he also said that he had informed or told the U.S. officials of such acts, that they may happen. If true, did the American officials take serious precautions to prevent these things?

A I can't confirm to you that he made any specific warnings. It is, at the same time, clear that everybody is aware of the possibility of such terrorism virtually anywhere, and certainly in a situation which perhaps is more inflamed than most places. You do what you can. I'd refer back to what we've said before on this about the business of an embassy and how you have to deal with the country and the people where you are, and you can't make yourself a fortress. You do what you can within that framework.

Q One more on Sharon, please. Will he be seeing any American officials while in the United States?

A I'm not aware of any plans for him to see any American officials. I'm not aware that issue has arisen.

Q Any comment on Mr. Eagleburger's meeting with the Afghan group today -- the purpose of the meeting, and the outcome?

A Very briefly, Under Secretary Eagleburger met with three Afghan resistance figures this morning. They will also meet with representatives of the Bureaus of Humanitarian Affairs and Refugee Programs.

These Afghans testified at the International Afghanistan hearings in Oslo on Soviet atrocities in mid-March and are visiting the United States privately under the joint auspices of the Afghanistan Relief Committee and Freedom House.

Washington is their second stop after New York, and a series of meetings, interviews and TV appearances have been arranged for them so that they may explain the horrors of what is happening in Afghanistan under the Soviet occupation.

Q Alan, is the U.S. providing any arms to Afghanistan?

A We have indicated before that's a question we couldn't address one way or another.

Q Alan, there seem to be growing differences on the interpretation of that August 17 Communique between the United States and China on the flow of arms to Taiwan.

Can anything be said at this side here about getting some clarifications on this --

A I have nothing new to say on that subject. We've addressed it at some length, and I have nothing new on it.

Q Do you have anything to say about the China-AMC deal on the cars?

A The jeeps?

Q The jeeps.

A No. I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the disappearance in Honduras of a prominent left-wing academic?

A I don't know anything about it. I don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on the alleged invasion of alleged Somocistas from Honduras into Nicaragua?

A No. I saw a wire on that, but I don't have any comment.

Q Do you have any comment on the report in The Washington Post this morning by Edward Walsh, I believe, about some reports that Israel might be getting out of flexibility in Lebanon and possibly coming to an agreement soon, and possibly the Memorandum of Understanding will be put back into operation or the 75 F-16s will be released or something --

A I don't have any comment on any of that. The Secretary is engaged in very intensive discussions, and we hope that there will be agreement soon on the Lebanon question. I guess I'd leave it there.

Q I want to follow up on a question with my colleague about the West Bank. Since according to a story this morning that one was killed during this protest against the expansion of the settlements, or the protest of the new settlements, in light of your repeated position currently about not to allow any more settlements or to call for a freeze on settlements, why don't you make a case about this issue of people protesting? The land is their land; it's not proper land or common land as the Israelis claim.

Can you take a new position, or can you take a question about that?

A No. Our position on the freeze of settlements is quite clear. I don't have anything to add to it.

Q Does anyone in this Department plan to meet with Guillermo Ungo while he's here?

A I don't know of any plans to meet with Mr. Ungo at this point.

Q Do you think Senator Stone will meet with him at some future date?

A That's very hard to say. The efforts of the new envoy will be to encourage all governments and opposition groups in Central America to talk with each other. However, ways to advance these talks are still under consideration.

Q You're not ruling out such a meeting then; you just don't know any specifics about it?

A I think the only thing I could say is, again, ways to advance the talks that the envoy will be encouraging are still under consideration. There's nothing further I could really say on that.

Q Yesterday you said that you'd look into providing a ratio of military to economic aid with respect to El Salvador. I guess that's still --

A No. We have an answer. It will be posted.

Q Can I add just a couple of basics to clear up a couple of things?

A Why don't you look at what we've posted before you add.

Q Can't I? I'd be saving time, I'm sure.

A I'm not sure you would. You don't know what our answer is.

Q Could I ask a question -- I'm sure there's an answer -- which is how many guerrillas does the United States believe are fighting in El Salvador?

A How many guerrillas do we believe are fighting there?

Q Yes. What do we base -- what is the number?

A What's our --

Q There have been varying --

A I've seen it. I don't think we've done a roll call recently.

Q I'm sure you haven't done a role call, but I'd like to know just so we can get it on the record as to how many we think there are.

A Let me see if I can get you a figure on that.

Q Alan, several Congressmen have written letters, signed letters, linking arms control and their support on the MX. Does the State Department have any comment on that movement, if you will, or on those letters?

A I believe that Larry Speakes addressed this question this morning. You're talking about the letter from Senators Nunn, Percy, Cohen. I think that he indicated that letter had been received at the White House over the weekend, that we've been studying it, that there's a similar letter we understand that's coming from the House -- although I believe he said it hadn't been received yet -- and that we would respond to those letters once they had been reviewed.

The letter that has been received, as I understand it, calls for the President to endorse the full recommendations of the Scowcroft report which indeed he has done. Again, I think Larry referred to a statement on April 19 when he said, "After reviewing the report, I met with the National Security Council. They endorsed the Commission's recommendation as do all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so do I." So in effect we certainly endorsed the report.

I can't comment further on the letters, though, at this point.

Q Alan, on the Scowcroft report, White House officials have said that the President said he endorses the recommendations in the report. What he means by that is that he endorses the recommendations regarding the MX and the Midgetman if it proves to be feasible, that he's studying the arms control recommendations, and that he doesn't necessarily agree with the "narrative" of the report.

Are you now saying that you dismiss what these White House officials have said, and you're saying that he endorses the full recommendations of the report?

A Again, I would refer you to what Larry Speakes has said on this, but I believe that there were three basic recommendations in, as you're suggesting, the arms control, single-warhead missile, and MX areas. It's those recommendations which the President has said that he endorses.

I would refer you to what the White House is saying on it, but I don't think there's anything inconsistent here.

Q Has the Administration achieved a compromise with the Senate and House Intelligence Committees on the question of U.S. Government activities in Nicaragua?

A I don't have anything for you on those discussions. I gathered that the House Committee might have taken a vote today. I haven't heard whether they did or didn't yet, but, in any case, I don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #76

WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1983, 12:19 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, have you had a chance to study Mr. Andropov's statement on missiles and do you have anything further to say or elaborate on our statement of last night?

A No. I think we're going to stand on what we said last night on that.

Q Is it your reading of the statement that it again expressly excludes the deployment of the Pershing and Tomahawk Missiles?

A Again, I think at this point we will simply stand on what we've said. Obviously, this is a subject we would look to discussing when the talks resume.

Q Is there any reaction to the vote yesterday on Nicaragua?

A On the Boland committee?

Q Yes.

A The Committee reported out favorably a bill which, if enacted, would authorize in fiscal years 1983 and 1984 assistance to governments of countries in Central America willing to accept it, amounts as much as $80 million for the specific and limited purpose of interdicting the supply of military equipment from Nicaragua to Cuba, to individuals, groups, organizations, or movements seeking to overthrow governments of countries in Central America.

The Committee action is most unwise. It is true that the committee by its action recognizes the importance of maintaining, even enhancing, one aspect of the Administration's efforts to interrupt the export of revolution and to deny to the Salvadoran insurgents arms and materiel now being provided them by Sandinista Nicaragua and Cuba.

But the Committee action imposes rigid restrictions and limitations on the United States and any friendly country or countries which might choose to accept the proffered assistance. Nothing in the legislation is designed to influence Sandinista behavior. On the contrary, the legislation gives·carte blanche to the continued use of Nicaraguan territory as a sanctuary for insurgents, and as a base for their command and control apparatus, as well as their terrorist activities in the region. Thus, taken as a whole, the Committee action encourages continued Sandinista aggression against Nicaragua's neighbors.

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q I was just wondering what with respect to all the appeals for bipartisan support for the President's Central American policy, this is a rather harsh statement. And coupled with Ambassador Kirkpatrick's statement about Dodd's reply, how is this going to aid the Administration's search for bipartisan policy on Central America, especially given the partisan nature of the vote yesterday?

A Jim, I think that the President's appeal for bipartisan support on this remains. What I've given you is a response to the action that was taken, and I don't intend to address it in partisan terms. It's a matter of what the substance of the decision was.

Q Alan, the statement refers to one aspect of the Administration's policy on Nicaragua and says something about "the Committee's action leaves unanswered the Administration's effort to influence Sandinista behavior."

Can you tell us what the other aspects of the Administration's policy are other than arms interdiction which the Committee did address?

A No. I'm not going to get into specifics. The program's concern expressed in general policy terms before has been not only for the specifics of the flow of arms, but also for the use of Nicaragua as a sanctuary, for command and control basing, and so on. That has all been part of our expressed concern about the Salvadoran guerrillas' use of Nicaragua as well as other uses of Nicaraguan territory.

Q If I can follow that up, don't those words leave the strong impression in your mind as well as in our minds that the Administration has been engaged in activities designed to deal with those other aspects, the sanctuary aspects?

A Clearly, the Administration's policy has been to try to approach those issues. If you're asking me, does it leave in mind the question of covert actions --

Q -- which is what the Committee was addressing.

A -- that I'm not going to address, and I wouldn't try to lead you one way or another. But what you've got here is a restriction which limits, if you address it strictly in terms of covert action, for example, without addressing what may be going on or may not be going on at the moment, it imposes a restriction on a tool that the Administration might or might not want to use at some point.

Q In the future.

A And together, obviously in consultation with the Congress. In general.

Again, I'm not going to try to address it in a time frame, and get into the question of whether we are or are not doing anything now. But as a matter of principle, it restricts use of a tool which administrations have traditionally liked to have as an option, and you, obviously, under the procedures have ways of dealing with this with the Congress with appropriate oversight.

Q Instead of saying restricting the use of a tool, would you go so far as to say that the Committee action would tie the hands of this Administration?

A I don't think I'd want to try to think that one through all the way, Ralph.

Q Talking about this matter at a reception yesterday, the President is reported to have said that,"We'll keep right on fighting." Do you know precisely what he meant?

A I don't. I gather, though, that the White House addressed this this morning in terms of continuing efforts on the Hill with those who share our concerns about the legislation, to get the kind of legislation that we want or to eliminate the kind of legislation that we don't want.

I think that's what the President -- as I understood that remark as quoted what it meant. I don't know precisely what he said myself beyond what I saw in the newspaper, but that's the thought that we're talking about.

Q Doesn't it mean that the President is going to try to use other countries to do the same thing that the U.S. was doing in this case?

A I didn't take that comment to mean that.

Q So where do you go from here, Alan?

A Where do we go from here?

Q Yes.

A As I said, we would expect to continue to work with members of Congress who share our concerns about the impact of this action, but I can't really take it beyond that.

Q Did the White House read the same statement you read?

A I don't know if they've got exactly the same statement.

Q They said something which reflected more or less what you just read to us.

A I think more or less. I'm not sure it's exactly the same.

Q For whatever it is worth, it did use the words "tie the hands."

A Fine.

Q I just wanted to go back to Andropov for a second. Would you characterize his offer as progress?

A Bob, I'm going to stick with what we issued last night. You have that, I assume?

Q I'll get it later.

Q Back on this question again on Central America, in The New York Times, Wyche Fowler is quoted as saying, "The impact of the Committee's action, the strength of that action, and the reasons for that action indicate that the Committee will be listened to." I presume he means the Administration.

Can you say whether this will have any impact upon ongoing efforts by the Administration in the region?

A Again, I can't address that. If you're asking will it restrict things that are now going on, you're asking me to comment on allegations of covert activity or discussions of covert activity, and I'm not going to do that. If you're asking will it, in its overall impact, in some other, broader way affect what is going on, I'm not prepared at this point to address that from here.

Q Also, one of the Committee members said that Enders, in his appearance up there, was questioned closely about any policy for negotiations, and was found to have "no discernible policy for negotiations."

A We've address the issue before, Jim. I don't have anything new.

Q Are there any pending -- I think there are.

A I've addressed the question of discussions with Nicaragua before, and I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q Enders said on television last week that he would reply very soon to an offer that was made on "Good Morning, America" by the Deputy Foreign Minister.

A I'm not aware that he said that on television. I'm aware that somebody said to me -- one of your colleagues said to me -- that after the broadcast was over that he had, presumably, made some sort of remark to that effect. I'm not aware of what the remark was, and I don't intend to address it.

Q Can I go to the Middle East?

A Sure.

Q Can you tell us something about the new shooting by the Israeli IDF on the American Marines?

A On the American Marines?

Q In the direction of the American Marines?

A No. I don't have a status report. I gather there was some firing. I don't know by whom and in what direction in the Beirut area this morning, but I don't have details on that.

Q Any further information on the --

A Excuse me. I think, though, I would dismiss the idea that there was firing by Israelis against Marines. I would dismiss that; that is not correct. I don't have details about what specifically the firing was. There was an incident, I gather, in Beirut where there was a mine or something that --

Q No. It's a report in FBIS.

A O.K. Anyway, I don't have it, but I would again dismiss the idea. I have nothing to suggest that Israelis were engaged in action against the U.S. Marines.

Q The report states that the IDF spokesperson there refused to deny or confirm that there was a shooting in the direction of the U.S. Marines so how can you dismiss it? There is almost a --

A I'm telling you I have no information to support such an allegation.

Q O.K.

Q Do you have any further information on the mission of Secretary Shultz in the area?

A No, I don't think beyond what we've had in the past, which I think is being addressed pretty fully by people with the Secretary. He still would like to go to Syria; still nothing absolutely laid on there; still planning to go to Paris this weekend.

Q How do you read the new developments between the PLO and the Syrian Government?

A Well, we've seen reports of the meeting that took place in Damascus between Mr. Arafat and President Assad. While it's true they haven't met for some time, we cannot comment except to state that we would hope that such discussion would help lead to the speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and move forward the overall peace process.

Q Does the Government have any reason to believe that that would be the direction of those talks as opposed to hoping that it would be?

A I think I'll stick with what I just said.

Q Did you say that the Secretary would be going to Europe on --

A I said that as of now, my understanding is that what the party is saying is that he does intend to go on to the OECD meetings, but I don't think that I can really give you a minute-by-minute, blow-by-blow determination of what that schedule is likely to be. That is where they are at this moment. I think the Secretary himself may even have addressed this in talking with correspondents.

Q Does the U.S. have any evidence that PLO elements are making their way back into southern Lebanon at this time?

A I don't have anything to offer you in terms of evidence. Obviously, if the PLO were reinfiltrating back into Lebanon, that would be a violation of the agreement that was worked out last year, and would be a matter of considerable concern.

Q Has Israel brought that to the U.S. attention?

A I don't think I could go into the question again without leading you one way or another of what we might have discussed.

Q What status does the United States Government give to Saad Haddad in his present position in Lebanon?

A I don't think it is up to us to define a status for Saad Haddad. His future role is quite clearly one of the central issues being discussed in the region by the Secretary and the other parties at the moment, and I don't think it would be particularly fruitful for me to try to go into that issue.

Q I want to follow this: do you see any significance in FBIS of yesterday carrying a speech delivered by Saad Haddad through the "Voice of Hope" Radio in Lebanon which has been branded as -- what do you call it? -- scuttling any peaceful efforts in the area due to the fact that the radio station "Voice of Hope" is sponsored by some American missionaries in Van Nuys, California. It was carried on three pages, and I thought that there was a significance that in FBIS of today -

A   Because FBIS carried it?

Q   Yes.

A   FBIS picks up all sorts of broadcasts. I would not assign value to it because FBIS picked it up. They pick up what is on the air waves.

Q   On a new subject -- on Afghanistan: Do you have any comment on the reports that the Administration is now publicly admitting aid to the Afghan rebels, and can you be any more specific about the extent of that aid?

A   I do have a response. I don't think you're quite right in saying the Administration has addressed itself to that subject. We've seen the report in today's paper, and as you know, we don't comment on intelligence matters or allegations of intelligence matters so I don't have anything specific to offer. But I would reiterate for you our views regarding Afghanistan.

The United States strongly opposes the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and seeks an early end to the agony it has brought to the Afghan people by means of a negotiated political settlement. The Soviets have been responsible there for the death of many thousands of Afghans, the flight of a fifth of the population to Pakistan and Iran, massive violations of virtually the entire spectrum of human rights, and gross violations of the rules of warfare, including the use of chemical and biological weapons.

A negotiated political settlement must be based upon the principles outlined in the United Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan which call for: the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces; self-determination for the Afghan people; an independent and non-aligned Afghanistan; and the return of the refugees with safety and honor.

Believing that every avenue leading toward a peaceful settlement must be explored, we support the efforts of the United Nations to determine the possibilities for a settlement consistent with the UNGA resolutions.

Q   Does the supply of weapons to the Afghan rebels promote a negotiated political settlement?

A Don, you're asking me to comment on allegations of covert activities and I can't do that.

Q You brought it up. I mean, you brought up the negotiated political settlement.

A I'll stick with what I've just said.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

-- MORE --

Q Can I ask you another question on a different subject? Do you have any information you can give us, or any comment on a report that the United States had made some kind of an arrangement to bring out Solidarity people from Poland and give them a special status in immigration?

A Yes, I can give you something on it. The United States has made no agreement with the Polish authorities on a program for accepting former internees as refugees. Those former internees who decide that they cannot continue to live in their own country because of political persecution by the regime there are being assisted in applying for refugee status at the U.S. refugee processing facility in Frankfurt. This obviously requires the cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany, and an arrangement has been agreed upon to this end between the U.S. and the FRG.

Q Do you have anything more about this? I mean, you say --

A No, I can give you some numbers, I guess.

Q Okay.

A Approximate numbers; okay. It is not possible to say how many former internees may ultimately elect to leave Poland and seek resettlement in the U.S. or elsewhere. So far, approximately 300 to 400 former internees have been resettled in the U.S. Together with their families this amounts to approximately 1,100 people.

There have been other countries that have accepted Polish expelees for resettlement. Western countries have cooperated in assisting former internees. More than a thousand people, former internees and their families, have been resettled in western Europe, Canada and Australia.

Q How are these people handled in terms of their immigration into the United States? Is there some special arrangement that has been made so that they go without the normal formalities to come here?

A I think what I have to do -- I think I can get you some answers, but let me ask you to put your question specifically in trying to get you specific answers.

You want to know whether there are some special formalities?

Q Basically, what I want to know is, what is the U.S. Government doing, or has it been doing, to facilitate the departure from Poland and the arrival in this country of people who were Solidarity people or former detainees, whatever you call them, and their families?

Q Could I add to that, if I may, a specific aspect of that question, is the United States spending any money? Is there any government money being used to assist their relocation to the United States? I don't mean money in terms of U.S. bureaucrats stamping papers and so, but I mean transportation, perhaps, housing assistance, medical supplies, that kind of thing?

A Let me add that to it.

Q Alan, what role is the Polish Government playing in this?

A As I say, we have no agreement with the Polish Government, as I answered Bill's question the other day.

Q What actions are they doing to facilitate or after the fact, however you want to characterize it, to see that these people do get out, knowing they're in this pipeline?

A I think you would have to ask the Polish Government what their approach to this question is. I can't speak for them on this.

Q These are Poles that have fled to West Germany, is that it?

A These are Poles who have been interned in camps or in prison for political activities or beliefs.

Q And how did they get out of Poland? They just immigrate?

A I don't know in terms of the Polish side of it. I think this comes under the heading of Don's question, and let me see what I can get for you.

Q On that, are they coming directly from these camps, prisons, what-have-you, into Germany?

A Directly?

Q Are they coming from --

A I see. Are they coming out of camps and being put on trains or something?

Q Whatever you want to characterize it, yes.

A I think the answer to that is no. I'm very sure the answer to that is no. We're talking about former internees. Let me, again, refer you to the language.

Q Can we get copies of that language?

A Yes. "Former internees", so I think you can take the answer to that as no.

Q If you would add one more, Alan, is it the understanding of the U.S. Government that these people are being allowed out of the camps, or out of the prisons, with the understanding that to get out they must leave Poland for the United States or some other destination?

A I'll see if we have anything to provide you on that. Again, that would suggest that we know something about what the Poles are doing internally. Maybe we have something on that, but --

Q God forbid, we should know what they're doing.

A Let me check.

Q Can I follow up a little bit on a question asked by Mike about your statement that the United States has no agreement with the Polish authorities about this.

Has the United States, quite short of an agreement, discussed this whole program with the Polish governmental authorities?

A I'll look into that. But as a matter of principle, I'm not sure what we're going to get into in terms of discussion, but let me look into that.

Q Really, the whole question here is, is there some kind of understanding between the two governments short of an agreement, something you could call an agreement, that's signed on a paper?

A   Let me check. I would not take the word "agreement" here to mean some sort of document with a seal at the bottom of it.

Q   Put it this way: Could you find out whether there's some kind of understanding, informal or whatever between the two governments on this matter?

A   Okay.

Q   What if Senator D'Amato reschedules an appearance for Peter McPherson on the Hill before the Secretary returns from his trip; do you plan to stop that, I mean the State Department?

A   Do we plan to stop it? That's a very hypothetical question. I don't intend --

Q   Are there any objections to his appearances?

A   Are there any what?

Q   Objections to his appearance since the hearing yesterday was stopped at practically the last minute for the aid to Syria?

A   As I understand it, there was a misunderstanding in terms of Mr. McPherson's testimony and that he does intend to testify before the subcommittee on this issue at a mutually agreeable time. I don't have details, and I don't intend to speculate about what-if-this or what-if-that.

Q   Do you have any comment on the Bishops' letter now that it's been finally voted upon?

A   Yes. The Bishops undertook a difficult task in seeking to develop a comprehensive moral framework for nuclear deterrence. While we do not share all of their specific judgments, we nevertheless believe that the document marks an important effort to contribute to the discussion of complex issues with which we, as people and as a government, must deal.

In particular, the Bishops recognize the necessity and morality of nuclear deterrence while genuine arms control efforts continue, and they support the U.S. efforts to achieve deep reductions in nuclear weapons and to do everything we can to reduce the risks of nuclear war.

Q   The last time out, you had a statement about how you were gratified that they didn't support the nuclear freeze. Now that they do, do you have any comment on it?

A I don't know that I could comment on all the specifics until we see specifically what the words are.

Let me just say -- I can give you some response to the specifics of it. Based on what we have heard and read at this point, we would disagree with the priority that the document appears to give to seeking a halt to the production or deployment of new nuclear weapons, rather than to directly seeking deep reductions and to promoting a stable military balance at a lower level of arms as a first priority.

While we share the Bishops' goals of reducing the risks of war and of achieving the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, we believe the most promising step in that direction is to negotiate for deep reductions as a first priority. A call for a halt on production and deployment at current high and unstable levels, as a priority, would have the practical effect of diminishing the prospects for achieving the deep reductions that we are seeking at the START and INF negotiations in Geneva.

Further, while the Bishops recognize the necessity of deterrence while genuine arms control efforts continue, their broad condemnation of nuclear weapons does not resolve the dilemma of maintaining a deterrent that is credible and effective in preventing war. Particularly in light of the Soviet preponderance in conventional military forces, the U.S. nuclear deterrent has helped to assure the prevention of war between the superpowers for almost four decades.

Q Copies of both those statements?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on this news report coming from an Israeli official, saying that the U.S. is going to give Israel aid in the field of the space program for the Israelis?

A Don't have anything on it.

Q Now that you've gotten a report on Argentina, or the full text of their decree on the disappeared, do you have any reaction?

A I think I gave you a reaction the other day.

Q No, you only --

A I've given you the reaction that we have at this point.

Q Did you have any reaction to the article in the Times today about the elections in El Salvador and/or the prosecution of the alleged killers of the two U.S. agararian reform killers -- murderers?

A On the elections, President Magana has assured us that the elections in El Salvador will take place as scheduled later this year. Obviously, funding a major project such as an election is difficult for a country whose economy has been battered as much as that of El Salvador over the past three years.

We are studying options of ways in which we might be able to assist. In this regard, two U.S. elections experts who advised the Salvadoran Government on the elections in March 1982 -- Howard Penniman and Richard Scammon -- are now in El Salvador to discuss technical aspects of the election with the Commission.

As far as the -- what was the second question?

Q With respect to the dismissal or the striking out of -- dropping charges against three of the defendants in the agrarian reform --

A The AIFLD case?

Q Yes.

Q We are disappointed at the appeals court decision which upheld a lower court decision dismissing charges against three persons implicated in the January 1981 murders of two American labor consultants and a Salvadoran land reform official.

We want effective justice in the cases of those murdered in El Salvador, especially U.S. citizens. We believe there has been a less than exhaustive investigation into the involvement of other individuals in this case.

The appeals court upheld the decision, dismissing charges against two alleged civilian accomplices in the murders as well as charges against National Guard Lt. Lopez Sibrian, who, according to the testimony of the two confessed gunmen, ordered the murders. In the case of Lopez Sibrian, however, charges can be reinstated against him within a period of one year from the date of the appeals court decision, April 29.

The Salvadoran Attorney General's Office is considering taking the case to the Supreme Court. We understand that in order to elevate the case to that court, the Attorney General must demonstrate that there was an error in procedure or a mistake in applying the law by the appeals court.

Barring any further appeals by the Attorney General, the case against the two former National Guardsmen will go to trial. You can rest assured that the Government of El Salvador is in no doubt as to our views on this matter.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Also, with respect to that, Lopez Sibrian, is he still on active duty in the National Guard?

A I don't know.

Q Can you look into that?

A No, I think I'd ask you to ask the Salvadorans about that.

Q Can we have copies of the election statements also?

A Yes, sure.

Q On this question that my colleague asked about the U.S. Space Agency providing Israel with a system to build Israeli communication satellite, could you take the question and give us some information on this matter?

A I can look into it. I'm not sure what we would have here. Sure, I can look into it.

Q Excuse me, if you can also look into possibily giving us a status report on the Arab's request for buying a telecommunication satellite from the United States, INTELLSAT, I believe it was --

A The ARABSAT, the so-called ARABSAT?

Q ARABSAT, yes.

A Yes, I can look into that. That, I think, was reported up to the Hill sometime ago. I don't know, beyond what we've done on that, what we can tell you. I'll look into it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #77

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1983, 12:40 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay this afternoon. I have a couple of announcements.

First, this afternoon at 3:00 p.m. in this room William Schneider, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, will hold an on-the-record briefing on the topic of U.S. visa policy in technology transfer cases.

Second, available in the Press Office is a limited number of copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia. Please note on the press release the embargo until 6:00 p.m., Wednesday, May 11, 1983. One copy per organization, and please sign your name on the sheet next to the books before you take one. A summary of the volume prepared by the Office of the Historian is attached to the press release included with each volume.

Q What's the area?

A That's Africa and South Asia.

Q What is Schneider's topic?

A U. S. visa policy in technology transfer cases.

Q "In," not "and."

A In. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the House vote on the nuclear freeze resolution?

A I don't, Mike. I understand that the President has issued a statement, and I'll refer you to that.

Q What do you make of the American Indian Movement members who've met with Qaddafi in Libya, and is the State Department doing anything or does it know about any of those meetings?

A I don't personally happen to know about it, and I don't have a comment to offer you on it. Our regulations which were issued, as you know, affected use of U.S. passports -- not travel per se -- and I don't know what the situation is with respect to those individuals, so I can't comment.

Q Anything on the Soviet expulsions in Iran?

A No, I don't.

Q There are reports from Beirut that the helicopter of General Mead was hit today. Do you have any reaction to the bombing of Beirut area today?

A Colonel Mead. I don't. I would have to refer you to the Pentagon for anything on that.

Q On the bombing?

A No. I don't have anything on it. I understand that there was some explosion or were explosions. I don't know what it consisted of. I believe it's been addressed to a certain extent by John Hughes in Jerusalem with the Secretary's party, but they're in a better position, as are your colleagues, to look into that than I am at this particular point.

Q Do you have anything on either Shultz's travel plans or the Syrian movements in the Bekaa?

A No. I have nothing new on the latter question. On the Secretary's travel plans, again I'd have to depend on what he has been saying. I gather he has said that he intends to go to Syria on Saturday, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Do you have anything, Alan, on the criteria that the United States uses in determining whether or not a foreign government is legitimate?

A No. I don't have.

Q You have no elaboration on the President's remarks yesterday?

A No. I have no elaboration on the President's remarks.

Q Does the State Department consider that the present government in Managua is the legitimate government of Nicaragua?

A The present government in Managua is the government that we deal with as the Government of Nicaragua.

Q Why do you then not consider it to be the legitimate government of Nicaragua?

A I believe that, as Larry Speakes indicated this morning, the President addressed this issue yesterday. I don't have anything to add to what he said.

Q But, I mean, this is a very fundamental point of policy --

A I don't have anything to add, Jim.

Q I guess what you're telling me is that you don't have anything to add to the President's speech. (Laughter)

A I think that's -- yes, that's consistent with what I just said.

Q Alan, on Nicaragua also, there's a reported statement by Daniel Ortega that Nicaragua requested bilateral meetings with the U.S. in May, August, September and October of 1982 and again in March and April of 1983, and that the United States declined to engage in bilateral discussions with Nicaragua.

Did the U.S. receive such invitations, and what was the U.S. response?

A Ralph, this goes back to the question I answered the other day when Jim raised it with regard to Mr. Timnoko's list. I'm not going to get into the question of back and forth between ourselves and the Nicaraguans. Our attitude towards dialogue has been stated many times. I don't think I need to repeat it on this occasion, but there's no change in what we've said about that.

Q But Secretary Enders has several times gotten into the question of back and forth on the Hill. In two or three testimonies he outlined the instances in which the U.S. proposed discussions with Nicaragua and said what the Nicaraguan Government responded to those.

How is that different from outlining what the Nicaraguans asked for and what the U.S. response was?

A I'd refer you to what his testimony said on that subject.

Q For some clarifications -- there are only a few -- on the President's speech, where do we go?

A Where do we go on what? If you want clarification, where do you go?

Q Yes.

A I think that the President's remarks yesterday -- rather than his speech -- I assume that's what you're referring to.

Q I'm sorry. I got mixed up.

A I'm surprised you got mixed up. (Laughter) I don't expect that you will find clarifications. I think the President expressed himself, and those remarks --

Q Speak for themselves.

A -- speak for themselves.

Q Where do we get in terms of like legal interpretations by the Reagan Administration on pending legislation?

A Legal interpretations?

Q I mean, on what pending legislation means. How the Reagan Administration interprets --

A That's a very broad question. At times we will address that publicly. At times we will address that to the Congress. It depends on the specifics of the legislation. At times we would wait until we're asked to testify. It just depends, Jim. There's no --

Q Shall I make a stab?

A Make a stab, sure.

Q Does the Reagan Administration believe that the legislation passed by the House Intelligence Committee earlier this week permits the United States to funnel supplies or money or arms to anti-Sandinista freedom fighters in Nicaragua through other countries?

A I don't think I am prepared to address that for a number of reasons. First of all, to a certain extent that was addressed by the President. Secondly, that was a committee action, and I think we would want to look at what emerges from the Congress rather than trying to comment on what has come out, at least in terms of that particular piece of legislation, what's come out of the one committee.

Q But you did comment on its effect yesterday, did you not?

A I commented to a certain extent about the principle of restrictive legislation and the effect that that might have on attitudes in the region. I didn't comment on what effect it might have on anything specific or in that specific regard.

Q Yesterday you said that President Magaña had informed the United States that elections will be held later this year. Later in the day a member of the Electoral Council in El Salvador said that the electoral law would not be ready until June of next year.

Does that affect the assurances that you have received from President Magaña?

A I'm not familiar with that statement. I can only tell you that we have been in touch with the Salvadoran Government certainly very closely on this subject, and we have no reason to believe that those elections would not take place this year. But I don't know what the specific comment you're referring to is, and I can't address it in specific terms.

-- MORE --

Q Also, on Central America, the Costa Rican Government apparently is ready to request the formation of a peace force from the OAS. Do you have any views on that?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you look into that, because we know that you had reports yesterday on it? It seems significant in terms of a regional agreement.

A I can look into it. I'm not sure, as a matter that would be pending, that we would express a public view, but I'll look into it, sure.

Q Alan, who was Ambassador Dobrynin meeting with today? And were any Middle East topics discussed during those meetings such as Soviet troops in the Bekaa Valley?

A Ambassador Dobrynin did come in today at his request. He met with the Acting Secretary. I would not go into the question of what was discussed.

Q Alan, what do you have on the Chinese plane that landed at an American base in Korea?

A I don't have a lot. I can give you the specifics that we do have, which is that at about 2:15 a.m., Eastern Standard Time -- except we're now on Daylight Time so I'm not sure what that means, but Eastern Standard Time -- a CAAC Airliner enroute from Mukden to Shanghai entered Republic of Korea air space. It was intercepted and escorted by ROK Air Force planes and landed at a military air field at Camp Page, near Chunchon, about 40 miles northeast of Seoul.

Two injured crew members were removed from the plane and are undergoing treatment at the U.S. Army 121st Hospital. At 8:36 a.m., 99 passengers and crew were released and six hijackers, five men and one woman, were taken into custody by Republic of Korea authorities.

Basically, I should note this is an incident that is being handled by the Republic of Korea with USG cooperation, as appropriate, in accordance with the 1971 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Hijacking, to which the ROK is a party.

Q Do you know whether the hijackers are Chinese military personnel?

A I don't have information about that, and I guess I would really, since the hijackers are in Korean custody, I think the questions about them would have to be addressed to the Korean authorities.

Q Alan, in that connection, the Republic of Korea indicated that for a brief time -- and I think it was quite brief -- there was a feeling in Seoul that this was an invasion from the north. Air raid sirens went off and all kinds of preparations began to be placed underway for the response to the invasion.

I would be interested to know whether the U.S. was involved, for however brief a time, in the feeling that this was an invasion from North Korea?

A I can't answer that, Ralph, and I don't know that I would be able to get into that. You could ask the Pentagon whether there was any military alert status called into effect, but I just don't know.

Q Alan, could you just explain this briefing this afternoon? What is that about?

A No. I think I'd rather leave that for Mr. Schneider to address rather than try and anticipate it.

Q Do you have anything on Kirkpatrick's reported comments on Congressmen and Congress?

A I have very little. I would have to refer you, basically, to her office in New York. As I understand it -- and again, this is all sort of _ad referendum_, that is, I would really ask you to get the authoritative version from her office -- she was interviewed on a shuttle airplane between Washington and New York in less than ideal conditions, and in fact, I gather had to repeat some answers a couple of times. She did not, according to a brief conversation I had with her office, say what she was quoted in the paper as having said.

I don't know what the Buenos Aires paper actually wrote. All I know is what is in the U.S. account of it, so I can't comment on that. I think last night, at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles, she addressed this and there were media present, so you ought to be able to get a quote some place there.

But I don't think it is accurate. As I understand it, she did not say that there were members of Congress who were in favor of Marxists taking over. I think she attributed that to what some others had said to her about what they thought.

So anyway, go to her office and get an authoritative version of it.

Q Alan, on arms control, when Nitze goes back, does he go back with new instructions or does he go back with instructions to explore? Precisely what conditions is he going back with, what directions?

A I can't tell you specifically. I can look into it, Bob, but I also suspect that there may be an occasion before he goes back to at least talk to this a little bit. And let me see if we don't do it here, whether it will be done in some other way. But I will look into that question.

Q Something else, in the current U.S. News, Clark has an on-the-record interview in which he talks about the traffic between Dobrynin and Shultz having kept Dobrynin busier than he has ever been since he's been in this country -- which is a long time -- and talks about five or six issues under active discussion. Can you shed any light on that?

A Not really. There have been a series of conversations; I expect there will be more. As I say, he was in today talking with the Acting Secretary. I'm not personally able to make a comparison. I don't question Judge Clark's characterization. I don't know how one would -- how I -- could do that, but I don't think I could get into the subjects that have been discussed, except I think we have talked before about the range of issues we've discussed with the Soviets. I would refer you, I guess, to what we have said on that before. But I really don't want to try to give you a rundown on what is being discussed in these various meetings.

Q Is there any chance you can take the question and come back?

A I don't think so. I've looked into this before in terms of when he's been in and what can we say about it. There is a very decided feeling that these should remain private conversations.

Q Alan, can you refresh my memory? Has the Department received official warning or notification from the Soviet Union that it would deploy missiles aimed at the United States if we deploy Cruise and Pershing in Europe?

A I don't think I've addressed that issue. I don't know anybody else who has addressed it. I think that the Soviets have addressed themselves to that general topic on the record, and I suppose I would refer you to what they have had to say about that. I'm not going to try to characterize it for you. But I'm not going to get into the subject of what may have gone on between us privately.

Q Alan, does anybody in the building find a dichotomy between what was said here yesterday about the bishops' letter and what the President said in his interview yesterday where he said the bishops' letter is basically doing the same thing.

You cited major differences yesterday. Do you have a problem with that?

A I don't see a difference. If you look at the full portion of what the President said about it -- he was talking about ways to promote peace. Nothing that I said or any other spokesman said that I'm aware of suggested that that was not an objective that we shared with the bishops.

Q Does the U.S. have any comment on Egypt's apparent willingness to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

OConnor

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #78

FRIDAY, MAY 6, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon.

I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Wires pass.

A Wires pass? O.k. (Laughter)

Q Have you any comment on the news coming from Jerusalem about the agreement in principle for the withdrawal of the Israelis from Lebanon?

A I don't have anything independent that I could -- Has there been reporting of what the Secretary said so you are all aware of that? I can give you an account of what that was, but ask you to rely on reporting coming out.

Why don't I just read what I've got as an account of what he said as he was leaving the hotel on his way to the airport. He said, "We're really pleased that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Israel have decided to accept this agreement. We recognize there is a tremendous amount of work to be done, but this is a milestone; and we are determined to keep on and do the additional things that are necessary to see that it works. But at this moment, I just want to say how grateful I am for the hard work and efforts, constructive atmosphere, earnest intentions throughout that the negotiators both here and in Lebanon have displayed throughout this period.

"I would point out that this agreement was very close to completed when I arrived due to the good work of the negotiating teams who had been here, with the help of Phil Habib ard Morrie Draper, and I had the pleasure of helping to put a little of the 'icing on the cake,' but at any rate we hope it is going to be a real good cake. Now we are going on to Jordan to talk with King Hussein."

That was the Secretary's -- the account I've got, again, that came over the phone -- remarks as he was leaving the hotel. He is now -- I don't know how long the flight is, but he was on his way to Jordan where he will overnight before going on to Syria, Saudi Arabia, and on Sunday on to Paris.

Q May we have a copy?

A Of his remarks?

Q Yes.

A Yes, but I would say that you are going to have to get the authoritative version from the reporting from the field. I'm not sure if this was absolutely verbatim. I wanted to give you a sense of what he said.

Q Home from Paris, as far as you know?

A As far as I know, he will be coming home from Paris, yes.

Q Do you have copies of the actual agreement?

A I don't have anything on when the text might be made available, or indeed when it might be signed, or any of the details of that sort of thing.

Q To follow up, do you have any reading or explanation to the words "in principle" and the Israelis asking for explanations from the United States?

A For clarification? I really can't specify. My understanding is that, in terms of the clarifications, there is no question here of principle or fundamental commitment, but beyond that, I cannot specify.

Q Are there any preconditions before the agreement itself takes effect?

A Jim, I'm simply not in a position to get into the sort of detail as to even what the mechanics are here, much less the implementation.

Q Alan, do you have anything more to add beyond the guidance given the other day on Polish refugees, former Solidarity members, being given preferential treatment coming either into this country, into the West, or any informal or background understanding that this government has with the Polish Government to facilitate their exit from Poland?

A I think we addressed this and indicated there are no agreements and there are no understandings.

Q Alan, double-checking, did you say the Secretary will not be going to Bonn?

A My underestanding is, he is going to Paris.

Q But wasn't he originally tentatively scheduled to go to Bonn?

A I think at some point way back before he started his Middle East trip there was some talk about that. But my understanding is he will go on Sunday from Saudi Arabia. I think he is going to make a brief stop in Jerusalem on the way back, and then go on to Paris. Then, I understand the plan was to come home.

Q Another subject?

A Yes.

Q Two House committees yesterday and the day before took action to influence U.S. policy towards South Africa, and I wonder if you have any comment on that? I think it was the House Foreign Affairs and a Banking subcommittee.

A Yes. I think that the only thing I could say about that -- this regards the IMF lending?

Q There was one on IMF; there is an earlier one in today's paper, the House Foreign Affairs.

A But it was also on IMF, on international institutions.

Q That was the action yesterday, and the day before yesterday there was a House subcommittee action on general economic relations between South Africa and --

A I don't have anything on -- On the general economic relations, I think Frank Wisner testified recently on that issue, and the testimony is available. I would refer you to that. I think it's available in the Press Office.

Q And on the IMF?

A On the IMF, I simply would note that if legislation requires that we abandon our longstanding policy of judging IMF drawing requests on their economic merit, we would strongly oppose the legislation.

Q The legislation was grounded in a finding in the technical and economic sense, that is, the system in which the labor force worked unduly constrained that labor force, so what does that have to do with politics?

A I have to stand on the statement I just gave you. But if the judgments are not to be made on economic merit, we would oppose it. I'll stand on that.

Q Alan, Costa Rica asked yesterday for a peacekeeping force along the Nicaraguan border. What is the feeling of the U.S. on this? Do we support it? Are we going to help them out with money or -- ?

A I can't give you details. I think we posted something on this, did we not?

STAFF: Yes.

A Let me refer you to that. We may have more to say beyond that posting, which was based on a very preliminary indication, I think, yesterday. If we have more, we'll make it available. Let me just refer you to that.

Q Do you expect something this afternoon?

A Anything more this afternoon?

Q Yes.

A I don't know.

Q What about Nicaragua going to the Security Council?

A Nicaragua's request for action by the Security Council was clearly an effort to undermine regional efforts now underway to achieve peace in Central America. The OAS is presently seized of the problem in Central America, and Costa Rica has requested that a peacekeeping force be placed to guarantee the sanctity of its border with Nicaragua. Our support for these ongoing regional efforts to resolve the Central American crisis is well known. In light of these continuing efforts to promote a resolution of these problems, we trust that others will join us in discouraging efforts to upset this process in the Security Council or elsewhere.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can you shed any additional light if we ask questions about that? Is that all you have?

A That's all I have.

Q You don't have any "if asked," or anything like that? (Laughter)

A I don't tell you what I carry around in this little book, Jim. I don't have anything more.

-- MORE --

Q What I'm confused about is that Costa Rica is seeking, apparently, OAS endorsement for a Contadora Group force; that's what's coming out. Do you consider that -- do you think that Nicaragua's going to the Security Council over problems between it and Honduras is undermining that particular regional initiative between Nicaragua and Costa Rica and the Contadora countries? I don't see the relevance.

A There are a number of regional efforts under way, and I would stand on what I just said in terms of how we view action in the Security Council in relation to those efforts. I'll leave you with that.

Q Alan, do you have anything else on the hijacking in South Korea?

A No. I'm going to have to refer you to Korean authorities on that. This really is their business.

Q Do you have anything on the detention on charges of subversion of the head of the Catholic Relief agency in El Salvador?

A I don't. I don't think so.

Q Can you look into it?

Q Alan, you responded yesterday that "This is an incident that is being handled by the Republic of Korea with U.S. cooperation, as appropriate, in accordance with the 1971 Hague Convention."

What kinds of cooperation do you give to the Korean authorities?

A I don't think that is something I really would go into here. The point is, of course, that the plane landed at a U.S. military facility in Korea, and the two injured people were taken to a U.S. hospital, and in others ways we would try to cooperate as we could. I really would leave comments on this to the Korean Government. It's their business.

Q Do you have anything on the Socialist International support for Puerto Rican independence?

A Yes, I do. Our position on the subject of independence for Puerto Rico is a matter of public record. We have fully and consistently supported the right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-determination. We note, however, that this issue has been put to the Puerto Rican electorate numerous times; the vast majority have repeatedly and consistently rejected independence.

We are disappointed that the Socialist International chose to ignore the evidence on record on this matter. We join with the people of Puerto Rico in rejecting any kind of international interference in their affairs.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Yes.

Q Can I just go back. Can you look into the question of this man's detention?

A Whose again? The Catholic Relief Services?

Q Yes, the guy who has like a Japanese name.

A Yes.

Q Also, there's an allegation now that the two Lutheran officials who were picked up last week, disappeared for a day and then turned up at National Police Headquarters, were tortured by National Police units. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any information on it.

Q Can you look into it?

A I'll try to look into it.

Q And just so that everybody knows that I'm balanced, do you have any statement on the Amnesty Decree the day before yesterday?

Q On the Amnesty Decree? We did have something on it. I don't know if I still have it with me. Yes, I think I do, just to show that you're balanced. (Laughter)

This is the Amnesty Decree approved by the Constitutent Assembly in El Salvador.

We are pleased with the unanimous approval by the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly of the new amnesty law, and would echo those reported statements by deputies in the Assembly which see the action as a serious step toward peace.

We have noted the country's stepped-up prisoner release program which is already underway. The current amnesty law has some significant improvements over previous efforts such as providing those beneficiaries of the amnesty who wish to leave the country with special free passports, and those remaining being protected by a new Commission for Rehabilitation of the Amnestied.

The current amnesty law, unlike its predecessors, is fully civilian in character. Of particular note, in our judgment, is the fact that the law could lead to freedom for political prisoners, as well as offering an alternative for the guerrillas.

That's it.

Q Copy?

A Yes. It may take a few minutes afterwards.

Q You didn't reformulate the Amnesty Decree just while you're reading it?

A I do all sorts of things up here.

Q Do you have an actual copy of the Amnesty Decree that we might be able to see?

A I don't have one. I think I'd really have to refer you to the Salvadoran Embassy. They may well have a text of it.

Q What is happening with Ambassador Stone?

A What is happening with him?

Q Does he have to be confirmed?

A Yes, he does. He will be confirmed. I don't know that there's a schedule at this point for confirmation. I don't work --

Q What ever happened to the idea that somebody might be named as an assistant?

A We saw that discussed in the press. That really is a premature issue before he's even been confirmed. I think we have to go one step at a time on this.

Q Does one presume that until he's confirmed, he won't be travelling down to the area?

A I think that is correct. I don't know of any plans of his to travel to the area.

Q Does he work in the State Department, or will he?

A Will he have his office here?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. He's in the building, but in terms of once he's confirmed and so on -- I don't know what his permanent facilities will be.

Q He would be reporting to the Secretary of State like any other Ambassador?

A I think the President indicated he would be reporting to the President through the Secretary.

Q Also on the legislation that was yesterday at the Banking Committee, they revised human rights language with respect to the Multilateral Development Banks by dropping the word "consistent" from the phrase "with respect to gross violations." Do you have any reaction to that?

A I don't; I don't have anything on it.

Q And also on Argentina again, has there been an opportunity, or will there be an opportunity for the State Department to take some position with respect to the disappearances report if -- that's my first question.

A I will see if there's anything further we want to say. Despite the fact that what we said the other day was based on preliminary information, there was an attitude expressed in that which, I think, probably will hold, and I'm not sure we will go beyond that.

Q Can I follow that up? That attitude seemed to say that they hoped that the government and the human rights organizations in Argentina can work it out, which seemed to be like an internal matter, but other governments in Europe are taking the position that it may, in fact, be an international matter because they may have involved crimes against humanity.

Does the United have a view as to whether the disappearances in Argentina may have been a crime against humanity and, hence, a subject for international comment?

A At this point I'll stick with what I've given you. If I have anything further, I'll let you know.

Q Alan, as a matter of housekeeping, to whom does election expert Scammon report? Does he report through the Secretary of State?

A I don't recall what the situation was the last time. I'm not sure it's so much a matter of reporting. I don't know what the administrative arrangements were --

Q Where his home base is; is it here?

A Let me check and get some information.

Q I appreciate it.

Q Alan, anything new on Soviet advisors in Lebanon?

A No. Nothing new on that.

Q Thank you.

A Your welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:36 P.M.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #79

MONDAY, MAY 9, 1983, 12:22 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Have you decided on retaliatory measures vis-a-vis the expulsion of an American diplomat from Afghanistan?

A The Department of State has informed Mr. Salem M. Spartak, the Charge' d'Affaires of the Afghan Embassy in Washington that the presence in the United States of his second secretary, Mr. Masjaedi Hewadmal, is no longer acceptable to the U.S. Government.

Q When does he have to get out, Alan?

A We ask that he leave within 48 hours which is the same amount of time accorded our second secretary in Kabul.

Q Any comment on the charges against the second seceretary in Kabul?

A Only what we said yesterday, which is -- why don't I go through the guidance we had on this, which is that the Afghan Government unexpectedly informed us Saturday of the PNG order against Mr. Peter Graham.

Graham, who had planned to leave Kabul anyway at the end of May on reassignment, will depart Afghanistan within a few days. I can't give you an exact update as of this moment. I don't know.

The DRA's explanation for Graham's ouster that he was using pornographic literature to purchase rugs is ludicrous and wholly without foundation.

Q You got any of the pictures with you? (Laughter)

A Talk to you in the Press Office. (Laughter)

As we said on Saturday, we don't know what their motivation might be. We pointed out that there is no substance to the explanation given to us and have asked if they could provide another one.

We are also puzzled and concerned about recent arrests by the Afghan secret police of most of our Embassy's white collar Afghan emmployees who were performing routine administrative duties in the Embassy.

Q Alan, the explanation that the United States is giving for the expulsion today is that the seccond secretary is not acceptable.

A His presence is no longer acceptable to the U.S. Government.

Q What is the substance -- what were the words you just used to describe the lack of substance for the Kabul Government? What is the comparable explanation to justify this Government's --

A I think you can draw your own conclusions about our action against the second secretary in the Embassy here. I will stand on what we said about the fact that the charges against Mr. Graham are ludicrous and wholly without foundation.

Q Are there any charges against the second secretary?

A I'm not aware of any particular charges against him, no.

Q Do you have anything on the reported departure of Soviet dependents from Beirut?

A I don't. We're seen the reports. We don't know any more about it than you do. It's what's been on the wire.

Q Follow up on that. The Phalangist Radio says that the dependents of Soviet Embassies in Amman and Damascus have also been given similar instructions.

Do you have anything on that?

A No. I haven't even seen that one.

Q That was in the same report.

A It wasn't in the same report of the one I saw. In any case, I don't have anything on it.

Q When is the Secretary due back in the Middle East?

A Back in the Middle East?

Q Yes. (Laughter)

A I'm not aware that he has any specific plans to go back to the Middle East.

Q On the Afghan expulsions, what does it say about U.S. relations with Afghanistan and, by extension, U.S. relations with the Soviet Union?

A I don't think, number one -- to take number two first -- I would try to extrapolate on relations with the Soviet Union.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, I can't offer you a general statement either, but we find the explanation given in terms of Mr. Graham's expulsion not satisfactory and inexplicable. I'm not in a position to try to explain the Afghan Government's motives.

Q I'm sorry. Could you spell the Charge's name, please?

A Sure. First name is S-a-l-e-m. Middle initial M. Last name, S-p-a-r-t-a-k.

Q Who suggested that this was an unexpected or surprise move by the Afghans? Was there any incident or any circumstance involving Mr. Graham which was unusual and might have led to this, or was it really a total surprise?

A My understanding is that it was a total surprise. It was unexpected, as I said.

Q Was he buying rugs?

A That I can only refer to what I've actually seen in the paper coming out the Embassy, and I think that the answer is no.

Q Alan, could this possibly be a ploy by the Soviets to divert attention from the fact that a lot of their people were expelled from Iran a few days ago? Has that thought occurred to you?

A It hadn't occurred to me. I don't want to try to get into the thinking behind it.

Q Do you have any numbers of personnel in Kabul -- U.S. personnel?

A I don't have.

Q You have said, sir, that you do not want to get into their thinking, but some Americans feel that possibly Mr. Graham was expelled because some Afghani freedom fighters or refugees were received here, and that it was in retaliation for that.

A I can't answer. I don't know. All I know is that the charges against Mr. Graham are unfounded.

Q New area. Middle East. Can I ask, the Secretary and other American officials have said repeatedly over the past few months that they believe that they had a Syrian commitment to go along with the withdrawal if an agreement were reached between Lebanon and Israel.

Do U.S. officials still believe they have such a commitment?

A Again, I think the Secretary addressed this in the region. I think he's been reported on this, and I don't see the wisdom of trying to paraphrase his remarks. So I'd refer you to what he said.

Q Alan, can we expect in the near future notification to the Congress on sale of 75 F-16s to Israel?

A I don't have anything on that. As we've indicated before, that's something that the President would decide. I don't have anything specific to offer you on that today.

Q The President linked it with an agreement on Lebanon.

A I understand. I don't have anything to offer you on that today.

Q Anything on the Begin visit in that same line?

A No. I don't have anything --

Q Also a Presidential --

A I think the Secretary, though, did talk about the fact that Prime Minister Begin is always welcome in

Washington. He may have had some other words, too, and I again would refer you to those remarks.

Q Do you have any comment on the reactions made by different Arab capitals aside from Damascus --

A No.

Q -- opposing the new agreement?

A No. I don't have a general reaction or even a specific reaction to others on this.

Q Do you have any comment on the recent fighting in Lebanon?

A Yes. The fighting, as you know, is continuing. We are currently engaged in asking those with influence on the parties to urge maximum restraint by all sides in the fighting.

Such fighting underscores the need for the reestablishment of Lebanese sovereignty throughout Lebanon as quickly as possible.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Who are these people you are talking to, Alan?

A I'm not really in a position to go into specifics of whom we're talking to, but we are talking with people with influence on the parties concerned.

Q Are you getting any positive response, you feel, from the people with whom you're talking, whom you would like to identify?

A I don't think I'd want to characterize it. We obviously hope that there will be a cessation of the fighting, and certainly the Lebanese Government hopes there will be a cessation of the fighting.

Q Let me follow up on that. In your dealings with them in the past -- I assume you have dealt with them in the past -- have you felt that they were forthcoming enough, and would that give you reason to believe that they will be, or have they been negative in the past and --

A Again, I don't really want to try to characterize. Let's just see how things develop.

Q What do you comment on that fact of Mr. Arens yesterday, the Defense Minister, on Egypt that the agreement with Egypt is not working, and he was very critical on the relations between Egypt and Israel.

A I don't have a general comment to offer you on that. We've indicated we think that relationship is an important one. We hope that any problems they have might be worked out, but I don't have a comment on his specific remarks yesterday.

Q Alan, there are some contradictory reports. Can you straighten this one out? What is the impression here, that the Syrians will leave, will not leave? What does the Secretary -- some places he said that the Syrians will be, without stating any times. Others who have heard that they've told him, no, we will not leave, and that they've told the Saudis they will not.

Can you clear that one up?

A Again, I'd have to refer you to what the Secretary said on that. I think he indicated that no doors were slammed. On the other hand, that there was a certain lack of total enthusiasm for the agreement which had been signed, but I would again refer you for an authoritative statement on that to what the Secretary himself has said about that.

Q How does the United States regard the reported building of new Soviet missile sites in Asia?

A We continue to monitor very closely the Soviet military buildup, including the SS-20 program. The continuing buildup of SS-20s, which has been underway since 1977, is a matter of serious concern to the United States, our NATO allies, and allies and friends of ours in Asia.

This buildup long ago exceeded anything required for legitimate defensive purposes. It was precisely to address imbalances caused by deployment of the SS-20 that NATO made the two-track 1979 decision on INF modernization and arms control.

Continuing Soviet SS-20 deployments can only further aggravate the existing dangerous and destabilizing imbalance in longer-range, land-based INF missiles.

In Geneva the United States has proposed total elimination of the entire category of Soviet and U. S. longer-ranged, land-based INF missiles which includes the SS-20.

We and our allies are convinced that this remains the best and most equitable outcome in Geneva.

Moreover, as President Reagan announced March 30, we are also prepared to negotiate an interim agreement for equal U.S.-Soviet levels of warheads on longer-range INF missiles to an equal level on a global basis.

We have repeatedly made clear that we will not accept any shifting of the threat from Europe to Asia. We continue to be in close touch with the Government of Japan on all aspects of the INF question as well as with other Asian allies and friends.

The most recent figure for operation of SS-20 missiles is 351. No new figure is now available, although we do expect the number of deployed SS-20s to increase in the future. We continue to monitor closely developments regarding Soviet SS-20 deployments.

We will neither confirm nor deny allegations relating to intelligence information.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Alan, a story from the Times of London saying that the United States fears Argentina may explode a nuclear device before October to warn the British over the Falkland Islands and to demonstrate its military potential. It quotes American officials, diplomats and analysts who are almost unanimous in their belief that Argentina has a technological ability to produce such a device and will explode one shortly.

A I don't have anything beyond what we have said before on the case of concerns about proliferation, and what we may have said about Argentina specifically. I have nothing new today to offer you.

Q To go back to the SS-20s, when you say you expect an increase in the future, you mean both in Europe and Asia?

A I said in the number of SS-20s deployed.

Q Right. Are you saying --

A I don't have a more specific focus to offer you at this point.

Q Alan, how long has that number, 351, stood in your guidance? That's some weeks old now, isn't it?

A It is some weeks old.

Q Isn't it due for an update, or have they stopped deployment?

A We have not, I think, given you a week by week number. We have indicated, though, that the deployment activity continues, but we are not able in all cases necessarily to give you an updated number. But, as I said, we expect that that number will increase.

Q Do you mean to say that the deployment continues as well in the European part of the Soviet Union?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that today. We have said before what we felt was happening in the European part of the Soviet Union.

I don't have anything specific to divide all this continuing activity down as between Europe and Asia at this time, but I think if you go back -- not too far back -- we've addressed this question of deployments which we have stated have continued since the statements initially made about not deploying either in European U.S.S.R. or --

Q They have continued.

A They continued after they made their initial statements. I cannot give you an update today as to whether they've got bulldozers and construction workers and soldiers out there putting stuff up. I don't have a readout to give you.

But certainly since the statements about a moratorium they did continue, and I will stand on what we have said on that in the past.

Q Could you check on whether there's any grounds for believing that there are no SS-20s being built now in the European part?

A Let me see if I can get anything on that, responding to both yours and Bob's interest in it.

Q Secondly, that last sentence of yours about the intelligence things that you can't confirm, what did that make reference to?

A I think the press reports about it --

Q About the 10.

A -- mentioned specifically that there were intelligence reports --

Q About 10 bases and all.

A I don't remember the figure "10," but, yes --

Q In the Siberian part.

A Yes.

Q And that's what you can't specifically confirm --

A And I cannot specifically confirm it. That's right.

Q Back on Argentina for a second. Do you have anything on the rumored amnesty?

A No. I don't have anything at this point on that.

Q Anything on the disappearances' report yet?

A No.

Q On the SS-20s, what is the significance of this? How do we see it?

A I guess I'd ask you to stick with the statement that I gave you. We see no military justification for it, and we think it's inconsistent as a general matter with the hope of bringing to control the longer-range, land-based INF missiles.

As I say, we've got proposals out on the table, and we would hope that those proposals will be acted upon.

Q Alan, on Central America, do you have any reaction to the reports of the Post about the size of the force that we seem to be backing in Nicaragua?

A No. I wouldn't have any comment on that.

Q Can you tell us something more about the extent of Saudi support to the agreement and what things really --

A Support to the --

Q To the agreement concluded between Lebanon and Israel.

A No. I'm sorry. I'm going to be, I'm afraid, unhelpful to you on this, because again these are issues which have been addressed. The Secretary addressed himself to this, for example, when he was leaving Saudi Arabia, and I don't want to take it beyond what he said at that point, or what he might have addressed himself to then.

-- MORE --

Q You're impression is they are supportive from what the Secretary has stated?

A Again, let me refer you to what the Secretary has said; let me refer you to his words.

Q Does the Secretary plan to meet with or consult with Secretary Weinberger while they're both in Paris, do you know?

A I think it's quite possible that they might meet. I don't know of specific plans, but I think it's quite possible they would meet since they will both be there.

Q Alan, just to be clear. On the Post story about the 7000, you have no comment on that? Is the reason because the figure comes out of briefings provided by intelligence officials?

A The reason, basically, is that at this point it all revolves around allegations of U.S. -- the question was, the U.S.-supported forces in Nicaragua. It gets to the question of allegations of U.S. covert action, and I have not been and don't propose to address --

Q That certainly is true, and you've been consistent on that point. But I want to understand why you can't address the figure of 7000, and that story which was rather detailed and went through the whole litany of the --

A Let me see if I can get you an estimate of the number of anti-Sandinista forces without addressing the assumption that was in the initial question as asked as to whether or not the U.S. is specifically supporting them.

Q But you're not denying that you're supporting those people?

A I'm not addressing the question. I haven't addressed the question, and I don't intend to.

Q That wasn't the original assumption. It was just fishing for any kind of reaction from the State Department to the story itself -- about the size.

A That is the way you phrased your question, though. Anyway, I'll look and see if there's a number that one could provide you with.

Q In that connection, if we phrase the question to say, what about the report, do you have any comment on the report that the number of freedom fighters has reached 7000; would that enable you to comment on it? (Laughter)

A I said I would look into the question.

Q Is it the U.S. analysis that those groups that are now armed and fighting the Sandinista regime constitute a threat to the survival of that regime?

A I don't think that I would be in a position to comment on whether they constitute a threat to the survival of the regime.

We have addressed our policy, which is not to overthrow the government. I can't tell you what the policy -- I think that they have made policy statements actually, a number of the organizations that are involved. I would refer you to what those statements have said.

My recollection is that a number of them have talked about changing the policies of that government, and I refer you to them.

Q Has there been any contact between U.S. officials and leaders of these groups?

A I don't know what there has been --

Q Robelo.

A Robelo, I was going to say. Beyond Mr. Robelo's being here, I'm not aware of specific contact.

Q Do you have any comment on the opening today of the meeting of the U.N. Security Council in which the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister called for unconditional negotiations or talks with the U.S. to settle differences?

A No. I've addressed the issue before of our approach to talks. I might say, in general, that Nicaragua's efforts, again, to bring to the Security Council Central American problems is a diversion to avoid coming to grips with the efforts of its neighbors in seeking to achieve a regional solution.

CONT

We have addressed that before, and I don't have anything new on a negotiating front.

Q The American proposal that was accepted by Israel and Lebanon, it was published or it's public already, or --

A No. As far as I understand the text of the agreement between Israel and Lebanon has not been published. It also hasn't been signed. I think they're going through -- I may be behind events in the region, but it had yet to be signed. It has to be ratified by whatever processes those governments need to go through.

Q Anything more on a couple of churchmen said to be held in El Salvador? You had some briefing papers put out this morning. Do you have anything more?

A The churchmen held in El Salvador?

Q The Lutherans.

A I don't have anything beyond what we've put out on that.

Q There was an article that appeared yesterday in the Times by Lydia Chavez about finding a dead body outside the Camino Real with a message threatening a prominent Christian Democratic member of the Constituent Assembly. Do you have any statement about that?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the timing of the fighting in Lebanon; if it has anything to do with the visit of Secretary Shultz and the agreement?

A I can't really comment on the motives of those who have started the shooting in Lebanon.

Clearly, we are dedicated, together with the governments we're working with, to moving ahead to finishing off that agreement, implementing it, getting all the foreign forces out of Lebanon. However, I can't address the motives of those who may have -- whether they're seeking to disrupt that or not. But in any case, we're determined to move ahead with that.

Q Do you have anything on this Office of Technology Assessment Report on the efficacy of embargoes? Do you agree with the conclusions?

A Not on the specifics. We haven't had an opportunity to study it and its conclusions. It did talk about the question of who got hurt more. No one disputes there are costs involved for the imposing nation in the use of trade sanctions. Nevertheless, our commercial relations with the Soviet Union cannot and should not be divorced from our overall national security and foreign policy objectives.

The United States must make clear our strong opposition to unacceptable Soviet international behavior and to the extent that sanctions demonstrate our refusal to engage in business as usual in the face of such actions, they serve this purpose.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A Yes, I think we can do that.

Q I want to follow this. Last week I asked a question about if the Israelis were going to be getting an Israeli communication satellite, and you posted an answer for me that the private companies can do the actual negotiation for a sale, whatever it is.

My question here is, if the American companies will transfer such technology to Israel, will the United State Government be interfering or questioning the feasibility, or will be consulted -- the government will be consulted by these companies on such a thing?

A I don't know. That's a technical question as to what the requirements are, and I simply don't know what those requirements are. Obviously, we would follow whatever procedures are required by law and regulation.

Q On technical assistance, I know there as a team of American experts who went to the Gulf to check on the oil spill. My information is that some companies are ready to clean the oil spill, but it's going to be costing billions of dollars. They're asking billions of dollars from the Gulf States. Can you check possibly for us on this, what is the amount that these companies are asking for since you sent technical teams to inquire about this?

A I'll inquire but I'm not very optimistic that we would be in the middle of those particular negotiations. I think what we offered to do was provide technical assistance as to how you did it as opposed to getting into the middle of the cost factor. I'll look into the question and see what we've got.

Q Can you confirm, or comment on whether a large-scale new arms sale for Taiwan is now under preparation, in it's final stages as reported?

A I really couldn't get into the question of what might be or not be being prepared. I think that we have a regular procedure, that you're aware of, for notifying the Congress when there are proposed sales. I'm sure we would follow those procedures when we had such sales prepared, but I'm just not ready to talk about the preparedness.

Q You're not denying that something is in the works here?

A I'm not either confirming or denying it. I'm not addressing the question because we do not address our internal deliberations.

Q On Nicaragua and El Salvador, since the Administration is now apparently ready to accept the anti-Sandinista actions are directed to stop the flow of arms to El Salvador, do we have a status report on that flow of arms and the extent -- it's quite a while since that covert actions has been conducted?

A Without addressing the question of covert action, I think that we gave you not too long ago a posted answer, I believe, on the issue of arms flow. I would refer you to what we said then. I don't have anything new. It wasn't all that long ago, but it wasn't within the last week and a half or so, but that's the latest thing I have on that.

Q So there's no change in that?

A I don't have anything to update that.

Q As distinct from the question of fighting in Lebanon, do you have any comment on reports of again increased PLO and Syrian military activity in the Bekaa Valley over the weekend particularly?

A I don't. Obviously, we're talking about the -- we talked about the fighting, as you say. In terms of preparations or things of that sort by Syria or others, I don't have any update to give you on that.

Q We all remember that just after the 18th of April a statement coming out of Amman, President Reagan was quite sure that -- he was positively sure of the Arab position with him, again, as to the so-called "extremists Palestinians." It seems now the impression from this

Administration after the agreement of Israel, in principle, to withdraw from Lebanon is not quite the same.

A I'm not sure why you draw that conclusion. I think that the difficulties in the situation have been talked about and certainly acknowledged. But I think if you will look again at what Secretary Shultz said, following his meetings in Amman and elsewhere, we remain dedicated to, and think there is reason to continue to work on the proposals made by the President in September.

Q On the agreement itself, does the Secretary believe that Ambassadors Habib and Draper can hammer out their differences that seem to revolve around the Syrian intractability at this time without necessitating his return to the area in the foreseeable future?

A He's talked about this a little bit, and I refer you to his remarks. He indicated that he was asking Ambassadors Habib and Draper to stay in the region, to work on the agreement and on the Lebanon problem.

I don't think he has or will rule out going back, but I don't think he's indicated that he has any specific plans to go back. I think that at this --

Q They're confident that they can work out those remaining differences?

A I think he's indicated it's a very difficult issue in some respects and there is work to be done, but that certainly it is his hope that they will be able to do that.

Q Do you have any response to the Senate Intelligence Committee's action on Friday?

A Yes, I think I do.

Q It's under "covert." (Laughter)

A We are pleased by the strong bipartisan support indicated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's decision which, subject to the Committee's review and oversight, would allow the Administration to pursue our foreign policy objectives in the region.

Q So the Administration accepts the notion that an Intelligence Committee can veto by vote, a majority vote, a decision taken by the Executive Branch; is that correct?

A I didn't put it in those terms, and I think you're getting to a much broader question which I think I would prefer not to address from here. It's a rather complicated issue, as I'm sure you're well aware.

Q Is the United States providing "subsistence" to people who are fighting against the regime in Nicaragua?

A I think we'll leave the record where it is.

Q That statement you just made is to suggest that the Administration accepts the Senatorial resolution of this by your being pleased that it allows you to continue foreign policy objectives. But, explicitly, is this an acceptable resolution as far as this Administration is concerned?

A The Senate Committee's action supports the President's program now, and has included program funds to continue in FY 84, subject, again, to the Committee's review and oversight.

Q Which says it continues.

A We are certain that the objective review of Administration goals in Central America will win the necessary votes.

Q So you do accept it?

A I'm going to leave you with the words. Again, we are pleased by the strong bipartisan support which would allow us to continue the policy objectives in the region.

Q You see, the problem here is that it was stated by the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Goldwater, that the President had agreed to this. But we've heard nothing from the Administration directly to say whether the President or the Administration, as a whole, had in fact accepted the idea that you must submit a new program by June 30, and any further spending after that will be subject to a majority vote of the Committee.

A I think that the basic attitude of the Administration is laid out in what I've given you. I can't address the specifics of any issue relating to covert action for obvious reason, so I'm somewhat hamstrung on that. I think you can look at the words and draw fairly clearly the Administraton's attitude towards --

Q I wonder if you could ask the question, or take the question, as to whether or not the Administration accepts this Congressional -- this Senate Committee's resolution of the issue, because it is rather important and you're addressing the question but you're not really taking that final step to say whether you accept it.

A Again, I can look at it but I would refer you to what I've said about the Adminstration being convinced that an objective review of the Administration's goals in Central America will win necessary votes, for whatever is being requested.

Q Suppose it doesn't?

A That's a suppose. That's a what-if question, and I don't propose to speculate on it. I think I probably will leave you with that, but I will look into and see what I have --

Q Because Congress is asserting, the Senate Committee is asserting the right by majority vote to stop you from spending further money.

A I understand. That gets back to the question Jim was asking before, and I'm not sure we're prepared to address it in that particular way.

Q What does the Administration mean by "subject to review?" What does "review" mean?

A I'm going to leave you with the words. I'm not going to try to give you a legal argument about the separation of powers all the rest of that.

Q But don't you hate being imprecise like that? (Laughter)

A I sometimes am imprecise, and I'm sometimes not.

Q Can we get a copy of that -- of those words?

A Yes, I can do that.

Q What's the significance of President Assad's trip to Saudi Arabia immediately after Mr. Shultz not getting any agreement --

A You would have to ask the Syrian Government and Saudi Government about that.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

alennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #80

TUESDAY, MAY 10, 1983, 12:37 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement regarding the TASS attack this morning on the Lebanon agreement.

It ill behooves the Soviet Union, which has 100,000 occupation forces in Afghanistan and is supporting 180,000 Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, to criticize an agreement between two sovereign states -- Lebanon and Israel -- providing for the withdrawal of forces, the establishment of mutually agreed security arrangements, and improved relations.

In an area plagued by tension and fighting, when dedicated efforts are underway to create conditions to prevent the recurrence of war, the people of the area had a right to expect a constructive Soviet role. Instead, while others search for peace, for which the peoples of the region yearn and which they so richly deserve, Moscow has irresponsibly chosen to play to historical fears and animosities.

That's it. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Alan, how was this conveyed to the Soviet Government other than your announcement today?

A I think that in terms of the specifics, what I've just said is obviously on the record and they can read it for themselves. In terms of concerns for maintenance of stability and avoidance of tensions in the region, this is certainly a subject which is discussed between our governments on appropriate occasions.

Q Do you think the Soviet evacuation of families in Beirut was a way of playing on Lebanese fears?

A I'm not really prepared or equipped to address their motivations in doing that. You might ask the Soviets what their purposes were.

Q The question of tension in the region, do you have any information about reported influxes of Palestinians and Syrians into Lebanon as well as Soviet advisors?

A I have nothing on the question of Soviet advisors beyond what we have said before.

As to the rest of your question, there has been some movement of Syrian forces and materiel into Lebanon but no sign that Syria is preparing to attack. There's also clearly been some reintroduction of PLO forces into Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

We have noted repeatedly that with Israeli and Syrian forces juxtaposed in a tense situation, such as exists and has existed since last summer in the Bekaa, there is a persistent threat of renewed hostilities. To that end we have been working with the parties involved to bring about complete foreign troop withdrawal and a lessening of tension in Lebanon. That remains our paramount objective and is the publicly stated objective of Syria.

We continue to urge restraint on all the parties involved in Lebanon so that negotiations and troop withdrawal can proceed apace.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes. It may take a little while, but you can get a copy.

Q Alan, do you view this as a rotation, or does it increase the basic strength in that area? What figures do you have, or can you make available on Syrian troop strength?

A I don't have figures to offer you, and I can't really comment. I think I will stick with what I've just given you. There has been some movement of forces and materiel into Lebanon.

Q You can't say if it's rotation or in any way an increase or diminishing of strength?

A I think the suggestion here is that there is something beyond simply a rotation at this particular moment.

Q Alan, would you quarrel with the figures that have been circulated in the last two days that there has been a 10,000-man increase in the Syrian side and a somewhat smaller increase on the PLO?

A I don't have figures I can share. I can't quarrel or not quarrel with it. I can't guide you on that, basically.

Q Do you know of any plans of any American official to return to Syria?

A I know of no specific plans at this moment for an American official to return to Syria. I think it's been indicated that as the discussions proceed, it may well be that there would be Americans who might join in that, although, in fact, the basic discussions would be taking place between Lebanon and Syria on the question of Syrian troop withdrawal.

Q Alan, can you help me on one point? You said earlier that it's the publicly stated objective of Syria to withdraw forces?

A Right.

Q When did they say that last?

A I'm not sure. I don't have with me when their last statement --

Q Because you say it's regularly stated. I'm wondering when they publicly stated they wanted to get out?

A There have been a number of occasions. Let me see if I can get you an example later of when a recent statement was --

Q Could you see if anything has been said publicly or even conveyed privately since the Secretary began his effort in the Middle East?

A Since he went out there, I'm not aware of a public statement, and I couldn't get into the question of private statements. However, I would refer you to what the Secretary said about this question.

Q He put it negatively, as I remember it. He closed the door.

A He said they had not slammed the door. He said they were hardly enthusiastic about the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, but he did say while he expected there would be some tough negotiations going on, that they had not slammed the door. That's, I think, where we are at this point.

Q But that preceded the Syrian statement by the Foreign Minister; it preceded the communique in Jidda.

A I don't have any statement to take you beyond what the Secretary said, and I would leave that as a statement that we continue to believe has validity.

Q You'll try to find something that says that Syria wants to get out?

A There are things on the record I will help you find.

Q Within recent weeks that makes it germane to our current discussion?

A I think it is germane. I think if you go back, too, you might find -- one thing I can simply refer you to is the statement by the Saudi Foreign Minister at the airport with the Secretary, in terms of Saudi Arabia's understanding as well. I think there are a number of statements by people on the record about this issue.

Q Your remark, "there is a persistent threat of renewed hostilities" -- the context wasn't clear to me. Is that in terms of the chronic situation there, or is that in terms of the most recent buildup of Syrian troops?

A No, I think that that is a statement of a situation which has continued to exist for sometime. It is relevant as well, clearly, to the current situation, but it's an on-going situation.

Q Do you have any updated figures on the numbers of Soviets who possibily would be in the Bekaa Valley?

A No. I said I don't have any guidance to take you beyond what we've said on that before. We have not confirmed those reports and don't have any figures to attach to those reports.

Q Would you be willing to discuss a little bit more, though, whether the tensions are greater now? What exactly in the State Department's view is going on; why there are more Syrians in the Bekaa?

A I don't think I can do that. As to motivations, you really would have to ask the parties directly involved. Obviously --

Q Or what is being done?

A Obviously, we're concerned. However, I cannot ascribe motives or try and give you a thermometer reading on the level of tension particularly.

Q Are there any discussions going on for the expansion of the Multinational Force?

A To my knowledge there is no specific discussion going on about that at this point. I think we would address that again in the context of how this entire withdrawal would be effected.

Q How about in the context of not an entire withdrawal, but simply a unilateral Israeli withdrawal?

A No, I have nothing to suggest there's a discussion going on about that at all.

Q The new movement into Lebanon, the military movements into Lebanon, did it start before, during, or after the visit of the Secretary?

A I can't give you precise dates as to when this movement has taken place. It's recent, but I can't give you precise dates on it.

Q You said that there is no sign that Syria wants to attack. Do you have any indication that Israel doesn't want to attack either?

A No. We have no sign that Israel wants to attack.

Q I asked you yesterday about the Saudi position. Since yesterday, we've heard some things on the media. Can you update us on where the Saudis stand now?

A No.

Q What they told the Secretary and what they told the Syrian President?

A No, I think I'd have to refer you to the Saudi Government to speak for themselves on that.

--MORE--

Q One more thing, please. The American objective, as long as since the Israelis invasion of Lebanon, was to bring about sovereignty and the central Lebanese Government's control of all of its territory. The agreement that the Secretary just produced will provide for that, according to American estimation right now?

A Yes.

Q In connection with your comment on the TASS statement, was your response, the business about playing on tensions, specifically directed to the TASS statement, or can we take it that your response is directed to the TASS statement in combination with other things, for example, the increase in Syrian movement and the movement of Soviet dependents out of the area?

A I'm responding to the TASS statement.

Q Is there anything on increased Soviet arms in the past week or two?

A To Syria?

Q To Syria and also to the Bekaa?

A I guess the basic answer to your question is that I don't have anything on Soviet arms, period.

Q Changing the subject slightly, on Afghanistan, have you seen reports of widespread of bombing of civilian areas at Herat, I believe, a reported 3,000 civilian casualties?

A I don't have anything specific on the reports. We've some indications that major Soviet/DRA bombing and air operations are underway in several locales.

Our position on Afghanistan and the Soviet presence and actions remains as we described it. I think May 4, I gave you a statement on that. We would like to see Afghanistan's agony brought to an end through Soviet troop withdrawal.

Q Could we go back to Lebanon for a second? Any reaction to --

Q Can I just go back? What kind of bombings? I didn't hear that.

A Major Soviet/DRA bombings and air operations in several locales.

Q Any reaction to today's report in _The Washington Post_ that Iran was behind the Beirut Embassy bombing?

A No. I don't have anything on who might have been responsible for that bombing.

Q Can I try a different subject? Do you have anything on sugar quotas in Nicaragua?

A No. I don't have anything on that. We might talk about that a little bit at the podium afterwards, but I don't have anything on that.

Q To go to the Middle East for once, there were reported two explosions in Amman today of American offices or interests. Any comment on that?

A We strongly condemn deplorable acts of violence such as these bombings. Our Embassy in Amman is in close contact with Jordanian authorities investigating these incidents. We understand that there were no casualties or injuries.

I might add that we've seen the press report of one group claiming responsibility, but we are not in a position to confirm that.

Q So there were no casualties?

A No casualties.

Q Any report of the material damage that you're aware of?

A I don't have a report of that. As you may be aware, they were private --

Q These are private organizations, or is it -- because one of the papers today mentioned, touched on government connections or government --

A I don't know what precisely -- where it gets all its money. I don't think it's a government organization, per se.

Q Can you tell us anything about Secretary Weinberger's meeting with the Saudi Defense Minister regarding Syria and the Middle East?

A No. I don't have anything on it. I know that Secretary Weinberger met with Secretary Shultz earlier today, and whether this came up in their discussion, I don't know. But I don't have anything on Secretary Weinberger's meetings.

Q On Paris, is there any reaction to President Mitterrand's call for a new Bretton Woods meeting?

A No. I understand that the party, perhaps even Secretaries Shultz and Regan, have addressed the issue. Whatever has come out of our delegation in Paris, in any case, is what I would refer you to. They have addressed that issue.

Q Anything on the meeting between the Mexican Foreign Minister and the Costa Rican Vice President on a U.N. role in Central America?

A We haven't really seen the statement that was issued afterwards, or I understand was issued afterwards, so I'm not in a position to comment on it. We're not aware that Costa Rica has changed its plans to ask for or seek OAS consideration of its request that the Contadora Four provide a peacekeeping or observer force along the border with Nicaragua. Beyond that I really am not able to comment specifically on the document since we haven't seen it.

Q The Ambassador there is reported to have said yesterday that the United States would be willing to contribute whatever aid Costa Rica deemed necessary to patrol the border.

Do you have any elaboration on those remarks?

A No. I wasn't familiar with the remarks. I can't comment on them.

Q On the same general area. An unusually large number of bodies have been found around San Salvador that have been multilated, and one human rights organization apparently said that some of these people are being taken out of prison in anticipation of the amnesty and put to death.

Do you have any comment?

A Our Embassy in San Salvador is checking with Salvadoran authorities at this point to verify the circumstances of the incident.

We can confirm that some eight bodies and one injured individual were found near Mariona Prison. At this point the bodies have not been identified, but there is nothing to indicate that the bodies were of individuals taken from the prison itself.

Q But do you have anything on the Lutherans or the Caritos head?

A I don't think we have anything beyond what we provided the other day.

Q You say the bodies were found outside the prison or --

A They were found near the prison.

Q There was a report in FBIS that Israel says that if Syria will not withdraw, they will be asking to put the Multinational Force as a buffer zone between the Syrians and Israelis. What do you have to comment on that?

A I'm not aware of that particular report. As I say, I don't think that there's any discussion going on at this point of the Multinational Force playing that role. However, I'm not aware of the specific report you're talking about.

Q It was in FBIS today.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a report that's in a West German newspaper about a high-ranking East German security officer that has defected to the United States and is in the United States?

A No, I don't.

Q The Egyptian Foreign Minister issued an official statement three days ago in which he announced Egypt's support for the Israeli-Lebanese agreement as a first step toward comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Do you have a comment on that?

A I think that we would hope that indeed that proved to be the case as well.

Q Do you have anything to offer us on the purpose of the meeting between the Chinese Ambassador and Secretary Dam today?

A Nothing beyond the fact that they are going to discuss a broad range of issues. Mr. Dam invited the Chinese Ambassador to come to lunch so that they could have a general conversation.

Q When you said that we have nothing to indicate that Costa Rica has changed its position, has the United States yet formulated a position on the request?

A I can't take you beyond what we posted the other day.

Q Do you have any reaction at all to the Banking Committee's action yesterday with respect to loans and the IMF?

A No. I don't.

Q Do you have a comment on that story in The Washington Post that says that the CIA had seven agents or seven people in the Embassy which were killed?

A No. As you know, I have not commented on those kinds of stories.

Q Alan, just to clear one thing up. Do you have anything in your guidance at all about Syrian military movements in and around the Bekaa Valley, PLO movements in and around the Bekaa Valley, or Syrian --

A This is a vacuum cleaner type -- go ahead.

Q -- or Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam's rather lengthy explanation of the Syrian position which appears in just about every newspaper today.

Do you have anything on any of those three?

A I've given you what I have to give you on that.

Q But those were forced out of you. Not that much either. Do you have anything at all on what Khaddam said? Nothing?

A I did address that briefly in response to your question.

Q You did?

A I did. You'll have to go back and carefully examine the --

Q Okay. I'll take another look.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC#81

WEDNESDAY, MAY 11, 1983, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

Regarding the Secretary's arrival back this afternoon, as most of you probably know, he is due in at 2:30 at Andrews. I do not know at this point whether he will have an arrival statement, so I think you're just going to have to -- We'll try to inform you if we know ahead of time, but you'll have to stand by and see what happens on that.

He will then be proceeding, as I understand it, directly to the White House where he has got some meetings including specifically with the President. I can't tell you what the activity there will be. I again ask you to stay tuned at the White House regarding that.

Q What time is he due at the White House?

A I think he's going directly from Andrews.

Q By helicopter?

A I think by car.

At 2:00 P.M. today, AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson and the Deputy for Middle East negotiations, Wat T. Cluverius, will testify before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations on Syrian assistance pipeline. The opening statement by Mr. McPherson will be available in the Press Office at 2:00 P.M. Mr. Cluverius has no prepared statement.

Also, just to give you a "heads up," Deputy Secretary Dam is scheduled to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in closed session tomorrow at 9:30 A.M.

Q The subject?

A It's on the HR-2760 which I gather is sort of the Boland-Zablocki bills. You'll have to check with the Committee. They have, I think, announced what the subject of the hearing is in perhaps more specific terms.

Q Alan, is there any further testimony planned for the rest of the week on Central America on Capitol Hill?

A This is the only testimony I'm aware of at this point. Do you have some sense that there is something else?

Q No, just a fishing expedition.

A As far as I know, that's what there is.

O.K. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote on military aid to Turkey tied to the Cyprus question?

A Yes. The Administration is strongly opposed to the House -- This is a House committee, right?

Q Yes.

A The Administration is strongly opposed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee vote to embargo assistance to either Turkey or Greece in FY-1987 if either country has more troops in Cyprus than allowed by the 1959 treaty. Security Assistance funding is provided to help these allies meet their NATO commitments and should not be used as leverage in other situations. We understand that the Commitee voted this morning for a revised amendment that would permit continued Security Assistance to Turkey for NATO-related purposes. We find this a helpful development.

We also oppose the $715 million limit that the Committee approved on a subcommittee's recommendation. We had requested $525 million in guaranteed loan financing and $230 million of grant military funds for Turkey for FY-1984, a total of $755 million, and hope to see the original level restored.

We note that both actions were taken in a very close -- 14 to 13 -- vote.

Q May we have copies?

A Yes, we can do that.

Q Alan, yesterday one of the committees voted for $300 million more to Israel, and the State Department representative there said that the State Department stands for the President's proposal, but will not oppose the $300 million.

What can you tell us about this? Is there a contradiction here or what exactly has happened?

A No. I could give you some more words, which I would be happy to do, but basically, I'd stand by what the State Department official said yesterday.

As you know, the Administration's FY-84 budget proposal for Israel calls for $550 million of the $1.7 billion in foreign military sales funding to be provided on a grant basis. We have continued to support our proposal, pointing out that we believe it is sufficient to meet Israel's security requirements, and that increases for Israel in the confines of the budget ceilings run the risk of crowding out assistance to other countries of strategic importance to the United States.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee action is but one of several actions in the Congressional budget process. The budget committees, the appropriations committees, and authorization committees have yet to complete action.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes, we can provide a copy of that.

Q Alan, can I follow up on this? Why, then, did not the Administration lobby for it? Why didn't the representative of the State Department oppose it in order to have some members vote on the Administration's side.

A We expressed our views on this. I don't think that I'm going to go into the rationale of how we do or don't decide on each particular statement we may make and how we make it, but the position is clear on that.

Q How do you account for the mixed signals that were sent out yesterday by the three different spokesmen from State, DOD, and the White House about the increased troop movement, Syrian troop movement in Lebanon?

A I'm not sure that there were mixed signals. I saw one account of a broadcast which suggested that there were some inconsistencies. I think if you look at the specifics, however, it wasn't a question of whether there were movements. It was a question of degree and how one described it. So I don't see that.

Q The question of foreign aid and your reference that it squeezes out others, to refresh my memory, does the Secretary believe that the state of human rights in Zimbabwe today justifies our sending $75 million a year to Mr. Mugabe's government?

A Lester, I refer you to both what we said in the Human Rights Report and what we may have said in --

Q That was quite a few months before; and I'm just wondering today, in view of the latest Catholic bishops' report and and the fleeing of Mr. Nkomo. Do you think, as the Spokesman for the State Department, that human rights are being protected in Zimbabwe enough to justify $75 million -- just a straight question? Now, if I could get a straight answer.

A A straight answer is I refer you to testimony that's been given on this subject.

Q But couldn't you tell me what it is?

A No. I don't have it in front of me.

Q Is there any comment on the further withdrawal of Soviet dependents from Beirut?

A I don't have anything further today on that.

Q Is there anything further on Syrian-PLO movements in the area?

A No, nothing further on that.

Q Alan, who did Ambassador Dobrynin see in the State Department today?

A Ambassador Dobrynin came in this morning at his request and met with the Acting Secretary.

Q What general subject was discussed?

A Subjects of mutual interest. (Laughter)

Q A large range of topics.

Q Did he say anything further about the apparent sequence of meetings at the Soviet request in the last, I'd say, probably week or so?

A No. There have been several meetings, as I said earlier. I expect there will be more. It's a perfectly natural thing to happen.

Q This was at Ambassador Dobrynin's request?

A This was at his request, this morning.

Q Also, on the PLO-Syrian, yesterday, Mr. Catto of the Pentagon said -- and I'm almost quoting him -- "cannot confirm PLO buildup in Syria." You told us yesterday that there are signs of, or actually told us that there were PLO movements in -

A I said there had been some. This gets back to the question I was asked before. There is clearly some infiltration. How one characterizes that -- I didn't give you a number or anything of that sort, and I don't know. I suspect that that's the quality of the question that was being asked at the Pentagon, "Is this a sizeable buildup" or something, and I can't give you a measure of that sort.

Q So you stand by your statement yesterday, and you do not see any contradiction between what you said and what Mr. Cato said?

A That's right.

Q You do not see any contradiction?

A No.

Q Do you have any word of PLO fighters still in the Beirut area?

A I don't have anything on that, Bill.

Q Alan, what does the Department feel about the Soviet responsibility in this Syrian buildup?

A I think we addressed ourselves yesterday -- I did here; the Secretary did in Paris -- to the question of Soviet attitudes and Soviet statements, and I refer you to what was said at that point.

Q I have one more question before I flee.

A We'll be sorry to see you leave, Lester.

Q I know you will, Alan. But cheer up; I'll be back. (Laughter)

Frequently, Alan, we've heard that one of the most cherished aspects of American freedom is freedom from fear of a knock on the door at midnight by the police. My question: In the light of this, how is the State Department explaining to nations of the world last week's use of the Chicago police for this purpose?

(Laughter)

A I must say, Lester, I'm not aware that we have been explaining to the world the actions of the Chicago police or the San Francisco police or the --

Q No, no. But that has been kind of in the news. It isn't a question -- Do you hope that the other countries haven't heard about this, or is it just that the State Department doesn't care?

A Lester, I think this is beyond the province of what I might address in this briefing.

-- MORE --

Q One follow up. There was a report on one network, and I can't remember which it was, that reported a rumor that Secretary Shultz and the President will ask Mr. Habib, when he leaves Beirut, to go to Chicago; is there any truth to that?

Surely, you must be concerned with what is going on in Chicago, aren't you? There's no truth to that rumor, is that --

A I'm unaware of any truth to that particular rumor.

Q Do you have any comment on additional reports of the severity of the Soviet bombing in Afghanistan. I had a question on this yesterday.

A Yes, I can give you some more on that today, I think.

Q (Inaudible) general subject discussed with the Ambassador today?

A I wouldn't go into what subjects were discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin today.

On your basic question, though, reports from refugees and others tend to confirm extremely heavy, brutal and prolonged Soviet bombing in the Shomali area north Kabul. Heavy bombing also reportedly occurred in Herat and Paktia in the west and southeast, respectively, although the Mujahedeen do not appear quite so hard-pressed in the latter two areas.

Our position on Afghanistan and the Soviet presence and actions there remain as described here on May 4th and I can refer you to the words that we used at that point. We'd like to see Afghanistan's agony brought to an end through Soviet troop withdrawal as part of a negotiated settlement.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on greater numbers of Afghan refugees fleeing into Kabul or out of the country?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Is the United States helping the rebels who are fighting the government in Afghanistan?

A We have never addressed that question. Don't propose to now.

Q Anything on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee action with respect to El Salvador?

A Yes. (Laughter) I was even going to volunteer.

The compromise that was reached yesterday represents a substantial improvement over the original Kassebaum-Dodd proposal, and we appreciate the spirit of compromise that resulted in this improvement. Nonetheless, we continue to support the President's budget request.

Q Can I ask you again on El Salvador, related please, on that. Do you have any comment on the renewed, intense fighting in El Salvador that is reported today in --

A No, don't have anything on it. Go ahead.

Q Yesterday, you said there is no sign that Syria is preparing to attack. Syrian and the PLO representatives in New York said that they are on the defensive, and they are trying to protect themselves from possible attack by the Israelis; also, some Israeli journalists on NPR yesterday said that there is also a buildup from the Israeli side.

Do you consider an act of trying to protect yourself, for instance, in the case of the Syrians and the PLO in the Bekaa Valley as necessitates this alarm that you put out through the whole entire week?

A I addressed the issue yesterday of what we saw happening. I also indicated yesterday, we saw no indication of any Israeli intent to attack, and I think I indicated afterwards to some people that we are aware of a limited degree of Israeli re-enforcement as well which appears to be in reaction to what the Syrians have done in re-enforcing their forces.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports that the Soviets have tested a new ICBM within the last two weeks?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the change in U.S. arms strategy to accommodate the build-down idea?

A Not really. I think, to the extent that issue is going to be addressed, I would refer you to the White House. In general, I could point out that the significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads have been a prominent feature of the U.S. START position since it was announced by the President in his speech at Eureka a year ago.

At that time, the U.S. proposed reducing ballistic missile warheads by about one-third from current levels to an equal ceiling of 5,000.

The Administration is currently reviewing the U.S. START proposal in the context of the Scowcroft Commission report and recent Congressional initiatives. A number of alternative modifications are under consideration.

Any changes in our proposal will be consistent with our objectives of seeking enhanced strategic stability at the lowest possible levels of forces.

As I say, anything specific that might come out though, I think would probably come to you from the White House.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q May I also ask whether the State Department has seen the report and how it regards the report of a so-called Soviet SS-40 missile under development? Do you regard that as a serious --

A I don't know anything about it. I would think it would come under the heading of intelligence information which I couldn't comment on from here in any case.

Q There are reports from Beirut that the Administration is considering appointing another special envoy to deal specifically with Syria. Do you have any comment on those reports?

A I have nothing on that. I think that the Secretary indicated last week that -- or maybe it was earlier this week; I can't recall -- but anyway, sometime during his trip that it was conceivable that there might be some American officials travelling to Syria in connection with that, but that basically, as I think I indicated yesterday, this is a matter between Lebanon and Syria.

As far as your question about a special envoy to do this and somebody being named in this function, I have nothing on that at all.

Q Will Ambassador Habib be going to Damascas?

A I have nothing on that. I wouldn't rule it out, but at this point he's been moving between Beirut and Jerusalem, working on finishing up that agreement.

Q Prince Hassan of Jordan will be in town this weekend. Is there any schedule for him to meet with officials?

A Let me check on that. I don't know what might be on his schedule.

Q What's the next step to be anticipated now from the U.S. side towards the situation in Lebanon?

A There's an on-going effort right now with Ambassador Habib, Ambassador Draper, others out there who are working on bringing to conclusion the agreement, working on the clarifications, and so on. We would hope that that process would be concluded in the not too distant future, and that the agreement would go ahead and be signed.

Obviously the two governments concerned have to go through whatever ratification procedures are appropriate for them. But beyond that, I'm not quite sure how to respond to you.

Q Anything new about the clarification asked by the Israeli side on the agreement?

A No. The work on that continues to move ahead.

Q Just a quick one on El Salvador, Alan. Anything new about D'Aubuisson? There are rumors concerning his possible travel plans to the U.S.

A I don't have any confirmation. I'm aware of the rumors. I don't have any confirmation at this point that he's either coming to the U.S. or there was a suggestion he might be coming to Washington; nothing specifically that would suggest he's coming to Washington.

I'm not denying he might be intending to do this but --

Q Do you know what kind of visa he used the last time? Was it a multiple-entry or a one-time only that the Embassy gave him?

A I do not know.

Q Yesterday, on Nightline, Ariel Sharon suggested that there be worked out some sort of a coordinated effort between U.S. forces, Israeli forces and the Lebanese Army to stem the, or to stop the fighting in the Shouf area outside of Beirut and then to try to coordinate some security efforts in Beirut itself. Is that being considered at all?

A Use of U.S. forces for that purpose?

Q As part of the Multinational Force or as part of the Marine contingent.

A I'm not aware of any consideration of using U.S. forces in that particular role.

Q Anything more on any of the prisoners -- Lutherans, Catholics in El Salvador?

A No, nothing.

Q Do you have anything on the by-elections in South Africa?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you have anything on Secretary Shultz' plans for the rest of this week? Is he planning to take some time off after this trip, or does he --

A I don't know for the rest of week. I think, in terms of going beyond the week into the weekend and so forth, we can talk about that later.

Q Back on South Africa. Do you have any reaction to the statements made by Mr. Botha, the Foreign Minister

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yesterday, that seem to further solidify South African opposition to Cuban troops in Angola; and also say that the United States'-- that that is their position, too?

A I think our position on Cuban troops and the importance of those troops departing has been frequently stated and nothing is changed on that. I don't have a particular comment on the remarks you're asking about, though.

Q He said more specifically that there will be -- the United States now says that the withdrawal of Cuban troops is definitely linked to independence for Namibia, which was --

A I'll refer you back to what we've said before. The position on that hasn't changed. They're not linked in some formal sense, but there is a practical relationship which we have talked about before.

Q How do you see the continuous interest in Israeli circles, offical circles and criticism of the media, U.S. media coverage of the war in Lebanon, taking into consideration that this has been discussed and now there has been a seminar which was held for the last three days criticizing the U.S. media coverage of the war in Lebanon?

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, May 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 82

THURSDAY, MAY 12, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office is the opening statement of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Committee on Agriculture, the Subcommittee on Cotton, Rice and Sugar. The subject of his testimony is South Korean rice purchases.

Second, I'd like to introduce a new member of the Press Office staff. She's Jacqueline Straub, in the turquoise dress over there. She begins work today as a Public Information Assistant. Jacqueline has worked in government for three years, most recently in the Personnel Office of the Bureau of Administration. We're pleased to have her with us, and I'm sure you will make her feel welcome as well.

That's it on announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you address the question of Soviet test-firing of a new missile, apparently and possibly in violation of unratified SALT II?

A I can confirm that on May 5 the Soviets conducted a test launch of the missile which they first tested on February 8. We are still analyzing the results of the latest test. As we have indicated before, the February 8 test did raise concerns about the consistency of this missile with SALT II Treaty provisions.

Q Was the information on this encrypted or could not be detected?

A I couldn't get into the question of encryption.

Q But Alan, by saying that you are analyzing the latest results suggests that there are results, meaning that it was not totally encrypted.

A I'm going to leave you with the words I've got here. You can draw your own conclusions.

Q What do you know now that you didn't know in February? It seems like an awfully long time to be waiting for the latest results.

A I say we're still analyzing results of the latest test. These are not easy matters.

Q Alan, just to be clear, it is the test of the same type of missile that was test-fired on the February 8th?

A Correct.

Q So far as you know, these are the only two times it's been test-fired?

A I don't have numbers of tests and so on to give you.

Q Just for the record -- You may have been answering this over the last couple of weeks -- but since the United States has stoutly said it will not sign the agreement -- we've said that we would live up to certain provisions of it -- how can the U.S. question the Soviets about living up to provisions of an agreement that the U.S. says it doesn't accept?

A We've gone into this extensively in the past. Let me say this: We have indicated, as a matter of policy, that we would not undercut the provisions of the agreement so long as the Soviets did likewise; and it is on that basis that we certainly will continue to raise questions when we have them, as the Soviets indeed have raised questions when they have them. It's a perfectly appropriate thing to do.

Q Was this matter in connection with Ambassador Dobrynin's visit yesterday?

A I'm not going to get into the question of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit yesterday.

Q Have the Soviets raised recent questions about American compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty?

A I don't have any information to give you about any --

Q Could you take that -- in terms of the SCC, whether or not they have come to us with questions?

A I can't get into SCC deliberations on that. Those conversations, as you are aware, are confidential. We would not get into breaches of that confidentiality. In any case, if the Soviets want to address those sorts of questions, they are free to do that.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Alan, where are we now with regard to the Lebanese signing, initialing of the agreement arranged by Secretary Shultz?

A I cannot give you a specific prognosis other than to say good progress has been made. We would hope to have some information on this in the next couple of days -- be able to say something about that, but I really cannot give you anything today on it.

Q Alan, is the United States going to sign the agreement, together with the other two parties?

A I think I prefer not to get into the specifics of how the signing and so on will take place. We certainly have been involved, and will continue to be involved. As to the specifics of the signing, let me leave that until we are at the point of signing. But there is no question the U.S. has played a role and will continue to play a role in this process.

Q In what connection with that is Mr. Habib's mission today? He's in Jerusalem, correct?

A What is his -- Sorry, I don't know where he is today. He's still in the region. He still some place either in Lebanon or in Israel.

Q Everybody has to be somewhere. (Laughter)

A He's not in Chicago today, no. (Laughter)

Q Can you confirm that there are substantially more than 35,000 officially-reported Syrians in Lebanon?

A Can't give you any numbers on that.

Q Alan, there is an AFP report, reported on FBIS, based on an apparent news conference that the Saudi prince had after his meeting with Secretary Weinberger in which the Sultan reportedly said there should be no linkage between Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, that the Israeli withdrawal would be, in his words, inevitable, but that there should be no linkage to a Syrian withdrawal.

What is the U.S. view of the two withdrawals?

A I don't know that we've addressed it in quite those terms. I think the Secretary made clear that we understand that the Syrians view their presence there as based on a different set of circumstances from the Israelis, so we understand that, and that the Syrian withdrawal, PLO withdrawal, is not addressed in the agreement, per se, between Israel and Lebanon.

But it is also very clear that if there is not withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces in the same context, that you're not going to get an Israeli withdrawal. I don't know whether you call that a formal linkage or a practical relationship, but it is a fact.

Q Alan, along the same line, can you describe Saudi Arabia as being helpful in the current peace process?

A We have indicated several times that we think that Saudi Arabia has played a very constructive role.

Q How are they doing that?

A I don't intend to get into the details of that.

Q Defense Minister Arens said that the Soviets are placing increasing pressure on Syria not to withdraw from Lebanon. Do you agree with that statement? Do you have a view towards that?

A Again, the Secretary addressed this the other day. I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q The new Lebanese Ambassador to the United States arrived a few days ago. This morning on ABC, he sounded optimistic and possibly was not very alarmed as much as the statements which have been emanating from this office in the last few days about the situation in Lebanon.

Do you share his optimism and his statements?

A I'm not sure that we have sounded alarmed. I question that characterization. We, obviously, hope that the plans for withdrawal of all the foreign forces will move forward quickly, and I think that is what he was expressing -- his hope and indeed his expectation, as I read an account of it.

Q Yesterday and today, the Lebanese Ambassador expressed the view that eventually Lebanon would not be needing too much U.S. aid, both economic and military, but for the foreseeable future there needs to be some infusion of funds.

Have any figures been given since his arrival, for new projects, in other words for beefing up forces in the Lebanese army for training and for new economic projects?

A I think that there have been various instances of testimony on the Hill on aid to Lebanon, and I really would have to refer you to what has been there. There is a fair amount of detail in the various --

Q Are there any new figures?

A I'm not aware of -- In the last week or two weeks, or something of that sort?

Q Yes.

A No, I'm not aware of anything at this point; but clearly, anything would have to go before the Congress, and there is not going to be any secret if there is anything new. But I'm not aware of anything at this point.

Q There seems to be some confusion as to whether or not the Lebanese have actually requested that the Syrians leave. They have not done that publicly. Do you predict or expect that the Lebanese will publicly ask that all foreign forces leave their country?

A I can't make a prediction like that. It's quite clear that the Lebanese want all the foreign forces to leave Lebanon. How they go about that, either privately or publicly, is not a matter for me to address. But the objective is quite clear.

Q Haven't they already actually done that since the mandate to the Syrians has run out and --

A They have made various statements. I don't want to try to speak for the Lebanese Government, but I don't think that there is any question about their desire that all the foreign forces leave.

Q Can you tell me what the current U.S. position is on the resumption of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East?

A The current position on the Geneva Conference? I think that, again, our focus is on the efforts that we have been engaged in. We think that the President's initiative of last September is the most fruitful approach, based as it is on Camp David, based in terms of 242; and there is no change in that.

Q Alan, do you have any comments on the accusation by King Hussein in one of the Lebanese weeklies that Dr. Kissinger was responsible for the failure of his efforts with the PLO?

A We addressed the question of Dr. Kissinger's role in a statement on, I think it was the 7th of April, and I refer you back to what was said at that particular point.

-- MORE --

Q Can I bring up two other topics, or are we still on the Middle East?

Q Middle East, please.

A Go ahead.

Q There are reports circulating in Arab media, the Arab press, that there are some additions or changes which will not change the basics of the Reagan plan -- that will be added the word "self-determination," and negotiation about the word "self-determination" with the Administration for the Palestinians, after which the PLO will accept the plan and will send their key delegates to the peace talks. What do you comment on that?

A The President's statement in September on his approach is on the record. It is the position that the United States is taking. There were briefings that went along with that, and I'd refer you to what was said in those briefings. I have nothing to suggest any change.

Q If not the change, it will be addition possibly and will not be a part of the document outside of the context of the talks between Jordan and the PLO --

A I think I just answered that position as it has been laid out.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the F-16s for Israel, by any chance?

A No, I don't. As the Secretary indicated yesterday, that's someting that rests with the President.

Q On Begin's trip --

A Don't know anything about Begin's trip.

Q Alan, could we ask something about Central America?

Q I've got first for switching --

A That's right. I guess that's right. I'll come back to you.

Q I've got two questions you won't answer, so, first on South Africa. (Laughter)

A No.

Q (Laughter) No. It's -- do we have any assessment on whether it will slow up the process of reform or affect U.S.-South Africa relations in any way?

A As I said, no.

Q Australia. This recent spy scandal or something. No comment on intelligence, I know. Do we have any comment on possible U.S. involvement in bugging incidents or in passing information, clandestine information, to Australia and New Zealand?

A Why do you ask? I'm not going to comment on that whole area, as a matter of fact.

Q Alan, this measure reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on aid to El Salvador places rather tight constraints on the conduct of foreign policy.

Do you have any -- you do.

A It depends on what your question is. I can give you a general reaction --

Q What's the answer, and then we'll find a question. (Laughter)

A In general -- okay? Obviously, this is a step along the way, but in general we regard the House Foreign Affairs Committee action yesterday as a significant improvement over the subcommittee action. While we still have a distance to go, we've been working closely with the members of Congress from both parties, and the Committee's action yesterday reflects an important spirit of bipartanship which is essential for effective foreign policy.

Q Okay. The question was, how do you regard the action taken yesterday?

A That's the answer I gave you.

Q Okay. We thought you ought to have a question. (Laughter)

A That's very good. Thank you.

Q Can we get a copy of that, Alan?

A You don't really --

Q How do you regard the stipulation on unconditional talks with the leftists?

A We're not going to get into a semantic analysis of the language while the issue still is before the Congress, but we do endorse the Committee's expressed intent to make the electoral emphasis of any dialogue clear.

Q Wait, wait.

A You go back to the language that the Committee adopted, and there's emphasis on election context. As I say, I'm not going to get into parsing the language in great detail while the matter is still before the Congress, but that expressed intent to put emphasis on the election process is something that we endorse.

Q Alan, do you see it as consistent with present policy with respect to --

A You're asking me to try to get into an analysis of the language, and I'm not going to do that.

Q I'm just asking a very simple question, whether or not you consider it consistent with the present Administration policy on negotiations.

A Again, I'm not going to get into that detailed analysis. It called for free and fair elections which we certainly are for. It called for providing physical security which is something we've indicated was important. Beyond that, I'm not going to try to draw out the implications of it as written and compare it with anything else.

Q But it said that the talks should be one part -- I'm sorry -- that elections should be one part of the context of those talks rather than the main thrust of the whole --

A I've given you my response to it.

Q Do you have anything new on letters from Senator Levin to Secretary Eagleburger on PLO? I think they were on the PLO in Lebanon. They were in the Congressional Record yesterday.

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Could you look into it?

A I don't think so. I think that if there's correspondence with the Hill, it would be a matter of correspondence between us and the Hill.

Q Can I try one more, then, on Wolfowitz and your first announcement? Can we repeat our request, please, for a briefing from him now that he's stopped his travels for awhile?

A Yes. I'll put it in again.

Q Do you have anything on a reported expulsion by Saudi Arabia of five persons, including a Christian minister? I gather Senator Hatfield is interested in the case.

A Yes. I can give you something on that.

Q Can you repeat the question?

A The question again related to reports that five -- describe again -- the Christian leaders, was it?

Q Well, one minister and four others, he says --

A Expelled from Saudi Arabia.

Q From Saudi Arabia.

Q Any Americans there?

A Let me cover that in my answer. Five persons, including two U.S. citizens, were ordered by Saudi authorities on May 9 to depart Saudi Arabia.

We understand that these persons have departed or are about to do so. We have not yet been informed of any reason for the expulsions.

The apparent connection among the five persons was their prominence in a private, informal Christian fellowship group in Riyadh. The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia has expressed our concern to Saudi Arabia authorities and is looking into the situation.

Q Could we have copies?

A Sure.

Q Can you identify the Americans?

A I do not have names to give you.

Q On the Afghanistan situation, do you have any further comments to make about additional bombing raids, and, if so or if not, can you suggest any -- what the U.S. views as the meaning of the severe and heavy raids that the State Department has reported over the past few days?

A I don't have anything new to add in terms of a situation report. Obviously, it represents a stepped-up effort to the extent that it is more intense than before to try to squelch the efforts of the Mujahadeen against the Soviet and Afghan repression.

Q Do you view it as kind of a final drive of some sort?

A I can't give you that kind of analysis. I don't know.

Q Would you support negotiations aimed at power sharing in Afghanistan?

A Our position on Afghanistan is on the record. I'll give you the four points if you would like them.

Q Alan, there are reports that civilian employees at the American bases in Greece are starting a three-week strike in opposition to American policies.

Are you aware of that? Are you concerned about a civilian strike at those bases?

A I've seen reports alluding to that subject, but I don't have anything on it for you.

Q Can you take that, please --

A I'll look into it and see if there's anything on this.

Q -- and see how the bases will function or what preparations are made --

A That strikes me as a DOD questions, and I think that you probably ought to go over there. I am not going to get into anything regarding the base negotiations.

I guess I will not look into it. I think that in terms of the effect -- if this is happening, and I can't confirm that -- but effect of any action of that sort on the bases, I would refer you to DOD.

Q Anything new on a new embassy site in Beirut, and if any construction is going to be underway soon, any figures --

A I don't have anything for you today on that. I will continue to inquire, though. That is a standing inquiry, and I will look at it.

Q Alan, the other three, do you know what nationality are they?

A I do not have information to give you on that.

Q To follow up on this question about Saudi Arabia, how do you characterize the relations now between Saudi Arabia and the United States?

A I think the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States is quite good. Obviously, this is a matter which we're looking into, and we don't have an explanation regarding it. But in general that's what --

Q As good as ever.

A As good as ever? I have no reason to quarrel with that characterization, but I mean it's very hard to make -- I can't go back through history and --

Q Saudi Arabia -- there have been reports coming out of the instability of various factional goings back and forth. Do you have any report on that?

A I don't either have any report nor would I have any comment.

Q Is Colonel Garcia, the former Defense Minister of El Salvador, in the Embassy in Managua?

A I'm sorry. I have no information on that whatsoever.

Q Alan, has the State Department or the United States Government received any complaint or any expression of concern from the Government of Pakistan relating to the reported leaks of information about giving arms to the rebels in Afghanistan? It was a front-page story, and I would be glad to have your comment on that.

A Were there any such communications or conversations, they would be privileged as diplomatic conversations, and I would not address them.

Q Does the Department have any approval or statement on these talks that are going on between the Iranians and these American companies about rebuilding their devastated facilities?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q The recent bombings in Amman of AMIDEAST. Is that an American agency? Is that in any way --

A It's not a government organization.

Q It's a private organization.

A It's a private organization.

Q Can you tell us if there are any more meetings scheduled between Secretary Dam and Ambassador Dobrynin, and, if so, at whose request?

A I cannot tell you of any more meetings that are scheduled.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 13, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #83

FRIDAY, MAY 13, 1983, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Let me make a few announcements.

First, available this afternoon in the Press Office will be the text of the Secretary's remarks before the Business Council in Hot Springs. I do not know, however, what time precisely those remarks will be available, and I would also call your attention to the fact that it would be embargoed and ask you to look at that embargo time.

Q Will you tell us what the subject is?

A The subject is Middle East.

Q When will the embargo be for?

A It's for delivery time, I believe, which -- do you know what time that is?

STAFF: No.

MR. ROMBERG: Don't have an exact time.

Q Tonight?

A Tonight.

Q We'll read it in tomorrow's papers?

A It's tonight. Yes.

Q Do you have a text in hand?

A I do not have a text in hand.

Q But you did say "this afternoon" as opposed to "this evening."

A It will be available this afternoon, but it will be embargoed until this evening. But you'll have it to write.

Second, Secretary Shultz will make brief opening remarks at a conference on international monetary issues on Tuesday, May 17, in the Jefferson Room at the Washington Hilton.

The conference has been organized by Congressman Jack Kemp and Columbia University Professor Robert Mundel. The Secretary's remarks will be piped into the briefing room starting at 9:15 and concluding at about 9:30.

Anyone interested in covering the event should contact Ron Pearson at 547-4177.

In addition, the Secretary will receive the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce Man of the Year Award at a black tie reception and dinner in the New York Plaza Hotel May 19. Also receiving the award is Brazilian Finance Minister Ermane Galveas.

The Secretary's acceptance remarks should come at about 9:45 P. M. Do not anticipate those being piped in.

Because of an overflow audience, camera coverage in the ballroom will be extremely limited. There will, however, be a photo opportunity for still cameras and mini-cams without mikes immediately prior to the dinner.

For further information about coverage please contact Bradley Coley, at area code (212) 575-9030.

Q I missed that date.

A That is on the 19th, Thursday.

On Romania, Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei of Romania will be in Washington for a working visit May 16-18 at the invitation of Secretary Shultz.

The Foreign Minister will have meetings at the State and Commerce Departments to discuss bilateral and international questions of mutual interest.

Finally, I promised I would volunteer information about what's going on as far as our facilities in Beirut are concerned, so let me just give you a progress report on that.

As far as the operation now is concerned, it's very difficult to find a suitable office building in Beirut that meets our security requirements. Embassy personnel and a survey team have investigated a number of buildings, but most were judged to be inadequate.

Several which appear to meet our needs are being reviewed in depth, and one is expected to be selected soon that can be used on an interim basis.

As to the longer term, the Department intends to complete the Chancery building that was under construction when the civil war in early 1976 caused us to terminate construction.

An architectural engineering team will visit Beirut in the next ten days to inspect the partially completed building and determine its condition.

Q Question?

A Please.

Q Can I have a copy of this?

A It may take a little while to get you copies.

Q Do you still consider the war in Lebanon as a civil war?

A I'm not going to try to get into definitions at this point. I was referring back to 1976. I'm not going to try to go back and give you legal definitions of recent events.

Q Alan, on the Andrei visit, has there been any change in the U.S. decision to withdraw Romania's MFN at the end of June?

A There has been no change in the decision. We've seen reports that there may be some change in the application of the education decree, and we're looking into that.

Q Is that why Andrei is coming at this time?

A I think I'd leave the reasons why he's coming at this time as I stated them. He's coming to discuss bilateral international issues of mutual interest. He'll be having, as I say, meetings not only here but at Commerce.

Q Who will he be meeting with here?

A I don't have details at this point.

Q The Secretary, do you know?

A I don't know. We can provide you next week, I'm sure, a fuller readout on the meetings scheduled.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the reported reaction of the Syrians today?

A There's an agreement between Lebanon and Israel which will bring about the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. As we've stated previously, our basic objective and that of the Government of Lebanon is to bring about complete foreign troop withdrawal from Lebanon.

As I say, we have an agreement to get the Israeli forces out. The issue now rests with Syria and the PLO to reach agreement with Lebanon to get their forces out.

Q So there's no comment on the alleged rejection of the Syrians?

A That's my comment.

Q Copy, please, Alan?

A That may take a while. Later this afternoon.

Q Alan, would you comment on the Syrian claim that the accord between Israel and Lebanon threatens Lebanese security?

A The Syrian claim that it threatens Lebanese security? No.

-- MORE --

Q Sovereignty. I'm sorry. Sovereignty.

A No. I don't have a comment on that. I think we've addressed -- I've just given you our reaction to recent statements and so on. The Secretary has addressed this extensively in various comments. I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q Anything on the report for a push toward direct talks with Syria -- renewed direct talks with Syria?

A Direct talks between Lebanon and Syria?

Q Between the U.S. and Syria.

A As I say, the issue essentially at this point is for Syria and the PLO to reach agreement with Lebanon about the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon. We've mentioned before Ambassador Habib will be in the region -- the Secretary has talked about that -- and possibly could go to Damascus, but I would emphasize that the issue now is for Syria and the PLO to reach agreement with Lebanon.

Q Nothing has happened which would supersede the Secretary's remarks on Wednesday that he is confident that the Syrians will withdraw their forces?

A I think that that remark stands.

Q Alan, do you accept Syria's claim that she has sort of security interests in Lebanon and that there must be sort of differentiation between their military existence in Lebanon from that of the Israelis?

A In a sense, this is the same question Bill was just asking. We have addressed before the fact that we recognize that Syria looks at its presence in Lebanon, its military presence in Lebanon, as being on a different basis from Israel's. I addressed this yesterday, pointed out as the Secretary had that Syrian forces, for example, PLO forces, are not mentioned in the agreement between Lebanon and Israel. At the same time, the withdrawal of all those forces, obviously in a practical sense, in terms of timing and so on, is related.

Q Another area?

A Sure. Go ahead.

Q TASS carries an article today which predicts a gloomy future for the reconvennng of the INF talks. Do you have any comment on it?

A No, I really don't. Our proposals are out there. We will be, as you mentioned, meeting again very shortly; and our negotiators will carry on those talks and see where we go from there. We obviously have very serious intent in going back there. We hope that they will be fruitful.

Q Will Dobrynin be here today?

A I have no information about Ambassador Dobrynin coming in today.

Q Alan, leaders of the PAN Party in Mexico said that on April 22 they had a clandestine meeting with Antonio Arredondo, who is the U.S. Consul in Hermosillo, and with other U.S. Embassy officials and other officials in Mexico.

Can you look into whether that meeting actually took place?

A Who had that meeting?

Q Leaders of the Pan Party, including Rosas Lopez. It's a right-wing terrorist party in Mexico.

A Let me look and see if we have anything on that. It would be helpful if you provided perhaps some of those details to us so we can pursue it a little bit.

Q I'll do what I can. The other specific thing to look into is did you discuss at that meeting the campaign which the PAN has now launched against the Mexican Government's anti-drug program.

A Let's see if we know anything about a meeting before we start wondering about what might or might not have been talked about. I can't confirm, obviously, that such a meeting took place.

Q Contadora Group -- anything today?

A Not really.

Q Give me a hint!

A All I've seen really -- the only thing anybody has seen at this point -- are some wire reports coming out of those meetings. I don't think we really are in a position to comment on the basis of those preliminary reports about what really might happen, what our attitude might be, and so on.

Q O.K. I thought you were hinting that you had some guidance that might vaguely relate to it.

A No.

Q Do you have any guidance relating to Central America today? (Laughter)

A Ask a question, Mr. Lobe.

Q More specifically, is there anything in the works within the Department, within the Administration, to help the Salvadorans out with this little funding problem they have with their elections?

A We have some guidance, Fred, from before on that subject. I don't have it with me today. Let me just refer you to it. I think we're looking at it. I don't think there is anything that is very specific.

Q I know that it's been under study, but --

A I don't think there is anything specific to give you at this particular point, so if that's the thrust of your question, I can't really take you beyond where we've been on that.

Q On El Salvador, do you happen to have anything now on that Lutheran leader, Ibarro, who I guess continues in detention. There have been reports, I think on National Public Radio, which said that doctors who were able to examine him said that he had been tortured and that he also related that when he was kept in a "safe" house, apparently by the national police, he saw a number of torture implements.

A I think our guidance, which was provided to you some days ago, refers to the question of torture, but I don't have anything on the specific follow-on that you've just cited today.

Q Are we investigating --

A I don't have anything beyond what I gave you the other day on that.

Q I came in late. Do you have anything fresh regarding the reported massacre, execution, of about 18 Salvadoran soldiers, para-military members as well? I know you issued a statement earlier.

A Did you get --

Q Yes.

A There was guidance yesterday. Did you get that?

Q Yes.

A All right. I don't have anything new.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:26 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #84

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1983, 12:32 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement, on the death of the former Mexican President.

The Department was saddened to learn of Miguel Aleman's death on May 14th. He served as the first civilian president of Mexico from 1946 to 1950, was a friend of the United States, and the first Mexican president to visit this country in 1947. Later, as president of the Mexican National Tourist Council, he did much to promote U.S. tourism in Mexico. He recognized the importance of the close relationship between our two countries, and his administration fostered those close relations, a trend that has continued to the present.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, the Secretary said Friday night that "only through a negotiating process can the Palestinian people hope to achieve their legitimate rights and their just requirements." Now comes Arafat with more talk of war. Do you have anything for us on that?

A As the Secretary has indicated before, we're on the side of peace and negotiation, the resolution of conflict through negotiation. One must ask how war or guerrilla actions help the Palestinian people or the people of Lebanon. This has been Arafat's policy for 10 years, and look what it's brought. Now there is a chance for peace, and he should get on board.

Q Copies of that?

A I think you're going to have to get it later.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the approval, the ratification of the agreement in the Middle East?

A I don't have a specific comment to offer you since that was just reported this morning, but obviously, it is a very welcome development. We look forward to the continuation of the final elements of this process and the signing of that agreement in the near future.

Q Do you anticipate that following the ratification on Lebanon's part that now would come a formal request to Syria for Syrian forces to leave?

A I think I would have to leave that to the Lebanese to address.

Q Alan, what was a very welcome development!

A To the parliamentary action.

Q In the Middle East?

A Yes, in Lebanon. Yes.

Q Do you think the Secretary is still optimistic regarding the Syrian attitude toward the agreement?

A I think what we've said on this before essentially remains. Obviously, we regret Syria's initial objection to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, which was approved by the Lebanese parliament today. However, discussions between Lebanon and Syria on the issue of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon are just beginning. We recognize that there are risks in any action or inaction, and in this case the risks of withdrawing are outweighed by the risks of not withdrawing.

We hope that in the final analysis the Syrians will act in ways that make possible an early Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

Q How about Syrian-U.S. contacts in this regard?

A I don't have anything new for you today on Syrian-U.S. contacts regarding this.

Q What are the state of those contacts, Alan?

A As I say, I have nothing new for you.

Q What, just over the course of the last few days?

A The last few days? I'm not going to try to give you a play-by-play. The Secretary, obviously, was there, and I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q Has there been a visit by Mr. Habib or Mr. Draper or any --

A No.

Q Will you have comments on reports that there might be direct involvement of the Soviet Union to get out of this stalemate -- that the U.S. will approach the Soviet Union to get them involved in the peace process?

A We don't see a particular role in that regard; we don't agree with that thought. The issue now that we have an agreement between Israel and Lebanon is for Syria and the PLO to reach agreement with Lebanon on the withdrawal of all the forces from Lebanon.

Q Based on the assumptions that you have been saying before that the Soviet Union might be hardening in the position of Syria and to get them to come to agree to the withdrawal, do these reports have any substance that you are possibly entertaining this idea to get in touch with the Soviet Union to possibly water down the Syrian objection or the Syrian disapproval of the contract?

A Two things: (1) Clearly, the Middle East is a subject which has been and will be discussed between the United States and the Soviet Union, but in the context of negotiations and a role in that negotiation, as I just said, the answer is, we don't see that.

Q Has the Middle East been discussed with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in the last few days?

A I can't tell you whether it's been discussed with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin within the last few days. The issue certainly has been discussed between our two governments.

Q Has there been any discussion with the Soviet Ambassador about the possibility of a meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A John, I'm simply not going to get into the question of what has been discussed or not discussed between the Secretary and the Ambassador.

Q When you're saying you don't see a Soviet role, you mean within this narrow context of the withdrawal agreement?

A That was the question that was asked. I'm not trying to suggest that there is a role in a broader context in some negotiation either.

For example, a question was asked last week, what about a broader conference of some sort, and I think I pointed out at that time that we believed that the President's initiative of September 1 provides the framework for moving ahead. The obvious next step in that is for King Hussein to obtain the backing that he feels necessary from other Arabs and for the Palestinians to come to the table.

I think that's quite a different proposition from looking to a conference of the sort that I think you were asking about.

Q Alan, Secretary Weinberger this morning on ABC, played down the tone of saber-rattling and preparation for war and attack, or whatever it is. He said Syria did not say that they reject the withdrawal themselves, but that they are against the Israeli-Lebanese accord. But from that point, it is still the understanding of the Administration that Syria will withdraw under the circumstances which will be feasible.

What are your thoughts on that?

A Our understanding is that the Syrians have not indicated a backing away from their position on withdrawal. They have questions; the Secretary addressed these and noted that there were some things that obviously were of concern to the Syrians that needed to be worked out. The Syrians have expressed themselves in a variety of forums on this in the last several days, but I don't have anything to suggest a change or reversal, or "We are not going to pull out of Lebanon, period" kind of position.

Q How do you think leaders in the Middle East will read into the "Dear Misha" telegram that was printed in today's Washington Post under the Evans and Novak column? And does that not undermine the Secretary's efforts at this time in trying to secure agreements?

A I'm not going to comment, obviously, on the issue of alleged leaked documents.

Q You say it's not true, then?

A I'm not going to comment on the issue of alleged leaked documents, one way or the other. I would note that it is completely untrue to suggest that there is some linkage between the decisions on the LAVI, and the licensing for it, on the one hand, and Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, on the other.

Q On the issue of the LAVI, could you tell us if all the licenses were issued?

A If all the licenses were issued? To my understanding -- First of all, I understand that 25 licenses for U.S. export of aircraft parts and technical data have now been approved. I am not aware of any pending applications that have not been acted upon, or parts and data and so on for which licenses have been requested, which have been turned aside.

I can't talk to the future. Obviously, every future application would be looked at case-by-case.

Q I'm not talking about the future. My question is whether those licenses that were approved were issued to the relevant companies that are involved in this? Is it still within the Administration?

A You're talking about between approval and actual issuance?

Q Yes.

A I don't know what the technical aspects of that are.

Q Could you take the question? Can you look into that?

A Yes, I can look into that. I'm not sure whether we are the people to look at it, but I will see what I can find out about that.

Q Another question regarding the Lebanese agreement. There was a report, I think, yesterday quoting an official in Beirut, saying that if the Syrians won't agree to withdraw soon, the Israeli-Lebanese agreement might be nullified.

Do you have any reaction to this, and how long do you think Israel and Lebanon should wait for Syria to join?

A I can't give you an estimate on dates or anything of that sort. As we've said from here before -- I've said it, John said it, I think -- Israel has made clear for sometime it will withdraw its forces from Lebanon only in the context of Syrian and PLO withdrawal as well.

With the conclusion of the Lebanon-Israeli agreement, a mechanism exists for Israeli withdrawal. As I said before, it's now incumbent on Syria to do its part so that the Government of Lebanon can get on with the urgent task of rebuilding its country.

Q Can we have a copy?

A No. I'm going to ask you to get that from the transcript.

Q On Friday, the Secretary referred to a side letter accompaying the agreement which addressed the issue that you just discussed, namely, the order of withdrawal. Are there any other side letters, side agreements or accompanying agreements beyond this main agreement?

A I don't have an answer really for you on that. I think the Secretary indicated, obviously, there were a lot of conversations that went on and statements made in meetings which constitute part of the record but which will probably not be all made public, part of a negotiation. But the agreement itself, I would anticipate, indeed, would be made public, and I think that the Secretary will be consulting, briefing the Congress, the Senate this afternoon, and if I recall he briefs the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday morning. I'm sure he will be discussing precisely what's involved with them.

Q In the same context, the Secretary said that there were no secret commitments that he made on behalf of the United States. He was fairly careful in his choice of language. There may not be any secret commitments made directly on behalf of the United States; are there any secret aspects of the agreement between the other parties?

A Again, I think that that is -- if there are secret aspects between the others parties, I guess it would be not up to us to talk about that particularly. But I think that the basic agreements -- I'm not confirming that there are. I'm just not in a position to address that question.

Again, I think that the Secretary will be dealing with the Congress, talking with them, explaining precisely what's involved here and I think that, from our point of view, is the appropriate forum for that to be discussed.

Q Has the Secretary informed the President of all aspects of the agreements?

A The President is fully informed of all aspects.

Q So he's broken with Kissinger's tradition in this particular matter?

Q There are reports in the New York Times that the goal of this agreement between Israel and Lebanon is to get an Egyptian-Israeli-Lebanese partnership assisted by the United States and Saudi Arabia. What do you comment on that?

A I think that the objectives of the agreement have been laid out many times before. Our objectives in Lebanon, in terms of reassertion of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country, withdrawal of all the foreign forces, and assurance of security across Israel's northern border, have been stated many, many times, and there's no change in that.

Q Do you have any elaboration on Secretary Weinberger's statement on Friday night in which he said "It is the basic policy of the United States to retaliate in the event of Soviet-sponsored military action in the Middle East?"

A I don't think that's what the Secretary said. I really would refer you to his words on that, but I would not accept that characterization of it. But I refer you to the words.

Q However characterized, he talked about retaliatory measures. Could you develop that, please?

A No, I have nothing to add on the question of what he said on that.

Q We've been under the impression for months that the United States is supporting an effort to try to encourage other Arab countries to back King Hussein on moving into the talks. Is there a separate but similar campaign underway now to encourage other Arab countries to back Syrian support of the withdrawal agreement?

A I'm not sure that I would accept your characterization of a "campaign" on the peace process, and I'm not going to get into the diplomacy on that peace process in specific terms, nor am I going to get into it in the case of Lebanon.

Obviously, this subject, the peace process as well, are topics of conversations that go on regularly between ourselves and various governments, including governments in the region. But we don't take decisions for other governments, and I don't pretend to speak for other governments on this.

Just to go back, one thing I might note, not specifically with regard to retaliation. But I think the concern here is that whenever there are opposing forces in close proximity, such as in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, there is the possibility of incident and escalation, and it's thus essential that the parties act with caution and restraint.

Q What about his use of the term "retaliation?"

A Again, I would refer you -- I don't have anything to add to what he said, but I would refer you to his specific words and caution you against characterizing those words.

Q In rhetoric, to take that --

A I'm sorry?

Q The escalation, that's in rhetoric, to take that point a bit further, there is a statement, quoted, stated by a Syrian foreign ministry official in today's New York Times, the gentleman says "With these new weapons" -- meaning the SAM 5's -- "things will be different next time," meaning the Syrian air force will not be humilitated by the Israelis as it was last year." That seems to imply that the Soviets are certainly willing to go for broke there, or to try something or that they will be willing to back the Syrians in any military action.

A I can't speak to that specifically. I don't know what Soviet intentions may or may not be. We have indicated on a number of occasions we though that the introduction of the SA-5's and other weapon systems into Syria and their manning by Soviet personnel was a destablizing and unwelcomed development.

Q I just wanted -- two things. Have you, in fact, delivered the essence of that message to the Soviets, the concern about the escalation intention in the Bekaa Valley?

A I think the Soviets are well aware of our position on that.

Q The other thing I want to ask you is, do you have any figures there that are more accurate than -- there seems to be a range of figures about the numbers of Syrians and PLO in the Bekaa Valley?

A I don't have figures to give you.

Q Forty to 50,000 Syrians and eight to 12,000 on PLO; do you have anything that pinpoints it a little more accurately?

A I don't have figures to give you.

Q On your concern, is that statement about guarding -- cautioning against escalation predicated on a real fear of an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria, or do you think both sides are posturing?

A I would put it on what I said, which is, that whenever you have opposing forces in close proximity as they are in the Bekaa, there is a possibility of an incident and escalation. I'm not speaking to some intent on the part of any party to try to do that.

Q In another part of that region. There were reports that the United States has sold cluster bombs to Morocco. Can you confirm that, or tell us something about it?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Can you look into that, please?

A I can look into it. Again, I'm not sure what is available, but I can look into the question.

Q Do you accept the Soviet claim that they have also interests in the Middle East?

A Sure.

Q A point of clarification on the licenses around the LAVI, you said there are 25 that have now been agreed --

A Approved.

Q -- or okayed. How many are pending in that particular --

A Let me check on it. Again, to my knowledge, we have met the Israeli requests --

Q Entirely?

A -- that have been made, but let me check on that in looking at Rafi's earlier question about if there's any space between approval and issuance. I said I would look into that.

Q Do you have anything today on the visit by the Romanian Foreign Minister?

A I can give you something on that, yes. Foreign Minister Andrei met with Under Secretary Eagleburger this morning and will pay a courtesy call on the Vice President this afternoon. Tomorrow, May 17, he will meet with the Secretary who will host a luncheon for him.

The Foreign Minister has a meeting at the Commerce Department today with senior officials there, and we also understand he may have appointments on the Hill.

Q Any kind of readout on the Eagleburger --

A I don't have a readout. As I indicated at the time we announced the visit, they'll be discussing various bilateral and international questions of mutual interest; certainly, the education repayment decree and the future of Romanian's MFN would be among the issues discussed.

Q Does that decision still stand today?

A I have nothing new to announce on that.

Q Can you give me a status report on the Carlucci Commission which is the Presidential Commission on Foreign Aid?

A No, I think there was a briefing on this the other day on the Hill, and I would refer you to that. The Secretary was up there.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

Glemon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #85

TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements.

Secretary Shultz will address an ON THE RECORD luncheon meeting of the Foreign Policy Association Thursday, May 26, at the New York Hilton at 12:00 noon. The speech will be piped into the Briefing Room starting at about 1:00. The topic will be North-South relations. Anybody who wants to cover that should be in touch with Mr. Reavis of the Foreign Policy Association. He is at (212) 481-8465. That's New York; Reavis; Foreign Policy Association; (212) 481-8465.

I also have an announcement on the U.N. Secretary General coming in this afternoon, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar will call on the Secretary of State at the State Department today at 5:00. The Secretary General is also visiting the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. The Secretary and the Secretary General will be discussing topics of mutual concern growing out of their recent travels.

If you need anything on the Secretary General's visit, you can get that from the U.N. Information Office here in Washington. Their number is 296-5370. That's the U.N. Office in Washington, 296-5370.

That's all I have for you.

Q Do you have anything on the Syrians cutting the Beirut to Damascus highway?

A No. As you heard from Secretary Veliotes, we are not able to confirm that.

Q Do you have anything on a report that links Iran to the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut?

A We traditionally have not gotten into intelligence matters and that does derive, if I understand the report, from intelligence sources, and so we wouldn't have anything on that.

Q Anything on the reports that the Soviets are ready to sit down and talk about grain purchases?

A Yes, I think there was an announcement at Agriculture this morning on that, and the U.S. Trade Representative.

Q John, President Gemayel, in an interview with the Times urged Shultz to get back to the area as soon as possible. Does the Secretary have any response to that?

A He doesn't have any plans to go back to the area. As you know, he has full confidence in Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper.

Ambassador Draper is in the area; I think Phil Habib will be back in the area later this week.

Q Is he back yet? We're confused.

A No, I think he was briefly in Europe. I think he was in Rome, actually. Then he is going back to the area. So the Secretary has no plans; nothing set.

Q Where will Ambassador Habib go first? Do you think he will go back to Beirut or - A I'm not sure; I'm not sure. He very often doesn't indicate his plans until quite soon before he arrives.

Q And what about the chances of his going to Damascus?

A I wouldn't rule it out. There are no plans for him to go to Damascus, but I wouldn't rule it out.

Q On the basis of what Veliotes was telling us before, I got the impression that Habib might, in fact, undertake some form of shuttle diplomacy between Beirut and Damascus. Was that the intent?

A I don't think that that was the intent. I think where we are at the moment is that we've just seen the ratification of the agreement by the Israelis and the Lebanese. That has gone forward in a very satisfactory way. I'm sure at an appropriate time, we would be prepared to be involved in whatever discussions are appropriate with the Syrians.

I don't think anything is in hand at the moment, but I think it's a little premature to talk about shuttle diplomacy or specific visits, but I wouldn't rule anything out that could be helpful.

Q What will he be doing when he goes back to -- Veliotes said he was going back to Beirut, did he not?

Q Wednesday, he thought.

Q The other agreements are already done; what he came to do.

A Then, I think that obviously he would -- he's involved in the overall Middle East process, and obviously I would think he has an interest in the Syrians, now moving on their withdrawal.

Q So that the focus of Habib's efforts for the moment will be on trying to achieve a Syrian withdrawal rather than on the President's peace plan?

A I'm not sure I can weight it like that, because I honestly don't know how he's going to direct --

Q Then, the first emphasis, that's the emphasis of whatever he's doing now, just to tidy that up.

A I'm sure there is some tidying up, probably still to be done on the Israeli-Lebanese agreement.

Q But how does he get the Syrian withdrawal unless, in fact, he -- you're just simply ruling it out in a customary fashion, but doesn't he have to engage --

A I'm trying to be as straight with you as I can, and that is, I know of no plans for Habib to go to Damascus. That doesn't mean that he won't; that doesn't mean that we're reluctant that he should do that, but I just don't believe that any plan is in hand for him to do that.

These things move fast and maybe he will. I'm just really trying to give you a factual --

Q The Foreign Minister of Israel is quoted in an interview on Israel radio this morning as saying he is going to sign a Memorandum of Agreement this afternoon with Ambassador Lewis. Is a similar agreement being signed here, and can you at all give us some inkling of what is in this?

A No, I think I'm really going to have to rest on Secretary Veliotes' explanation and remarks earlier this morning.

Q John, could we try to get a bit beyond that, because, indeed, Secretary Shultz went considerably beyond that at several points on the trip, saying (a) that there are no secret commitments by the United States; (b) that there were, however, separate documents between the United States and Lebanon and the United States and Israel that had bearing on the agreement, and that probably it would be signed.

A Yes.

Q Can we go beyond this? Is there going to be a similar signing in Beirut between Dillon and Salem?

A I don't know. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Could you find that sort of thing out?

A I think there's no contradition between what Secretary Veliotes said and what the Secretary of State said. The Secretary of State said that there are no secret commitments, but at the same time I think he made clear what is obvious, that traditionally in this kind of negotiation there usually have been. Historically, I think in previous negotiations -- and probably there are in this particular negotiation -- there are aspects, and perhaps a negotiating record, or aspects of the agreement which for a variety of reasons various of the parties have asked to be held confidential, and I'm sure that would be the case. I think that's what Secretary Veliotes was suggesting.

Q Now, since the two governments concerned have signed the agreements, will you release it here in full as was, for example, Camp David and other Middle East agreements?

A I'm not sure what we will release, but I'm sure we will release some aspect of the agreement. There's a small technical problem in that I think it's obviously incumbent upon us to make it available to Congress first before we make it public.

Q Why do you say some, for example, in relation to the same question that you've been receiving now? All, at least as far as we know, all aspects of the letters between the United States and Cairo and Jerusalem were released eventually. Would you do a similar thing with this agreement?

A I can't tell you. At some point somebody is going to make a decision about the degree of confidentiality of certain of the documents of which there are many, obviously, in a negotiation like this.

I think Secretary Veliotes made the point this morning that the package in its entirety would go to Congress, and I don't know what parts of that might be classified at this stage.

Q One more thing on Veliotes, John. It's probably not really a logistic problem. Many of us Middle Eastern correspondents were not aware at all of Veliotes, the Under Secretary's briefings at all.

A You mean the briefing he gave this morning?

Q Yes. I don't know what you can do.

A My apologies. Two points: One, he made the decision, or we made the decision only this morning that he would brief at 11:00. Two, I don't know what time the transcript would be available, but if that would be a help you will be able to see that fairly soon, I would think.

Q Shultz, just to get this straight, he said no secret commitments and no new commitments to either Israel or Lebanon?

A If that was the language the Secretary used --

Q I want to run it past you.

A I think what he said was there are no secret commitments.

Q To either party?

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by "secret" and what do you mean by "commitments?" Obviously, there's some piece of paper that we don't know what's in it. Now, Congress will at some point, so it's not secret to Congress so, therefore, it's not secret to the representative of the American people, but it's secret to us.

A They are the representatives of the American people.

Q Yes, but it's secret to us; right?

A If the package that goes up contains some of those documents that are classified, they would be made available initially to Congress and not to the press.

--MORE--

Q You are not saying there are no commitments or undertakings by the United States in this document.

A I think that "commitment" is the word to keep your eye on. Clarifications and understandings, of course -- I think what you are groping for is, are there some major commitments in terms of aid, in terms of troops -- no.

Q No. I am assuming there isn't. I am assuming, however, there are some undertakings in connection with the agreement.

A As I say, I think I am really going to have to stand on what Secretary Veliotes said this morning, but it doesn't seem unreasonable to me that certain points might be made in documents which are not part of the agreement, and I would think some of the reasons for that are obvious.

Q What kinds of things would that be? Just give an example. (Laughter.)

A I think I will not rise to your bait, Bob, but it gave me pause for a moment.

Q No commitments, but you introduced the idea that whatever may be classified, not made public, may deal, rather, under the headings of clarifications and understandings.

A I think that is a fair summation.

Q Is it fair to say that?

A Yes.

Q Which committees then in Congress will the package be given to -- Foreign Relations and Intelligence?

A I don't know, but I think that would be logical. I think the Secretary briefed members of the Senate last night, and I think he is going to be briefing the House Foreign Affairs Committee tomorrow morning. I think it is at breakfast tomorrow morning. But I don't know which committees, specifically, the documents will go to, but I think that is logical.

Q John, when you say there are no secret agreements, and you say that they will be releasing some of the points of the agreements or commitments, or whatever. You know, this comes into the whole thrust of, possibly, the Syrian and the PLO and others' objections to this type of agreement, which is going to carry with it a lot of classified documents and other things that possibly Lebanon and Israel, with the help of the United States, are planning something, or working out some agreements behind the back of the Arabs in the area.

So, let me ask you this. Did you release everything which is related to the document of Camp David, or are there secret agreements of Camp David that are still withheld?

A I don't know. You will have to go back and talk to people who are more familiar with that process than I am. I can't say.

Q This agreement is put in the perspective like it is another peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon, and this is peace number two, et cetera. So, it has a value. If it is not a treaty, it is an agreement.

A It is an agreement.

Q Sorry?

A It is an agreement.

Q Yes, an agreement, but --

A It is not a treaty.

Q But even after six months with normalization, are there things to have a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel?

A You are making that interpretation.

Q But by holding some documents --

A No. When the text of the agreement is made available, you should focus on the text of the agreement. That is the operative part of the negotiation.

Q You just said whatever may be classified. This is the thing, if it is classified, that is going to hold the Arabs from coming forward to agree on the contents of the agreement.

A I don't agree with your thesis. I think that the Arab countries have a good understanding of what transpired.

Q What are the Arab reactions, in general, to the agreement?

A I think we have had -- from Iraq we have had favorable reaction. I think we have had from Jordan a favorable reaction. I think we have had from Egypt a very strong, supportive reaction. You saw what the Saudi Foreign Minister said at a press conference at Jiddah Airport after his meeting with the Secretary. Those words speak for themselves.

So I think there are four governments right there that leap immediately to mind who have spoken out, and I am sure others are doing and will do.

Q John, there is some confusion in my mind that you may be able to help clear up that is a fall-out of what Secretary Veliotes said this morning about when the agreement takes effect, and what you are saying now about what Habib is doing in the region.

The agreement as published, and as he quoted, is very specific that the agreement will take effect when the documents of ratification are exchanged.

A That is right, legally.

Q When the instruments are legally exchanged.

A Legally effective, yes.

Q Is it correct to assume that what Habib will be doing now in the region will be negotiating a new set of negotiations that will deal with when those instruments will be exchanged, and that in effect the signing today and the ratification last week, or earlier this week, is not the conclusion of the agreement, but that the conclusion of the agreement will be when those instruments are exchanged, and that that is now the subject of additional negotiation?

A No. I think you are wrong in thinking there is additional negotiation on that, no. I think Secretary Veliotes was quite clear.

Q Well he said that he hoped that would happen in the near future.

A There is no problem. To my knowledge, there is not a necessity for further negotiations on that point. It is simply a technical point.

Q It doesn't have to wait for some agreement with Syria on Syrian withdrawal before Israel agrees to exchange instruments of ratification with Lebanon?

A Not to my knowledge, but obviously it is an agreement between two governments, and obviously there are certain realities, and that is that the Israelis have made it clear that they will not withdraw until other foreign forces withdraw. That is a reality. It has nothing to do with the legal standing of the agreement.

Q Of the rest of the agreement. They have said that about the withdrawal, but my concern is the rest of the agreement. You are saying that that concern on Israel's part does not relate, or does not apply, to the exchange of instruments of the agreement.

A I don't think there is a problem about the legal effectiveness of the agreement in terms of when you see Israeli troops leaving Lebanon. Clearly the reality of that situation is that that will not take place, the Israelis have indicated, until other foreign forces leave Lebanon.

Q John, to follow up, what about the other essential points of the agreement? During that time period, between this day and whenever in the future the Syrians and the PLO finally do leave, if they do, will any of those other aspects of this bilateral agreement come into effect?

A I think that is what the two governments are going to have to negotiate. A lot of the agreement is something that will be implemented in the future, and you have a joint liaison committee which will make determinations by unanimous decision on the implementation.

I think that is the kind of thing that the two governments, plus the United States, which would be a member of that committee, will do.

Q So, just to clarify it, except for the joint liaison committees, which include military and political, nothing else is firm that it will actually take place until such time as withdrawal is effectuated.

A You are pressing me really beyond my knowledge on that. I really can't answer that question.

Q Well, there is a broad -- I mean, the one thing that leaps to mind is the state of war, and that is, you know, in the first article of the agreement. It is not a technical matter that deals with the joint commissions.

A As Secretary Veliotes said this morning, when the agreement is legal, it is legal, and what is in it presumably is in effect.

But there are realities about the implementation of it. If you have a large number of Israeli troops still on Lebanese soil, that is not in accord with the agreement. The agreement hasn't been implemented. You have to be realistic about the pace at which it can be implemented.

Q John, just a follow-up again on one of the questions earlier, do you have under the law to send this agreement to Congress, or are you doing it because some members of the Congress have asked for a copy of it?

A I am sure there are legal obligations, and you can get an expert to spell them out for you, but there isn't any question of total consultation and submission of the documents to Congress on this.

Q Okay, and when that is done, the Congress cannot release some aspects which may be sent to them as classified?

A Congress cannot release classified documents, that is correct.

Q John, do you have anything on the reported crackdown of dissidents in Cuba? A round-up?

A No.

Q One thing more --

A One final one.

Q There are reports today out of the West Bank of closing universities, such as the Women's Teacher's College in Ramallah, and some placing more people under arrest in the town of Essert. Are you aware of these things, and do you have any comment on them?

A No.

Q Is it something that you can look into?

A If we get anything on it during the day, and if we have anything to say, we will say it, sure.

One last question over here.

Q Just two weeks ago, the Argentines put out a final document on their war against subversion, and you said at the time it was premature to comment on it because you only had press reports.

Do you now have a comment?

A Yes. We share the sense of disappointment others have expressed that an occasion has been lost to begin the resolution of this question. It is an issue which the Argentines themselves must resolve. We have consistently encouraged the authorities to provide as complete a report as is possible on the fate of the disappeared.

Q Why did it take so long for the United States to react to this?

A I can't answer that question, I'm afraid.

Q Another one. In Paraguay there has been restrictions placed on the press and a number of arrests of people involved. Can you comment on that repression in Paraguay?

A No. I am not familiar with that specific incident. Our stand on freedom of the press is obviously well known, but I don't have anything specifically on that.

Q On Chile, the demonstrations on the weekend --

A Keep going.

Q -- two people were killed. Do you have no comment on that?

A No, I'm sorry, I don't.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:54 p.m.)

Olenna

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #86

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 1983, 12:14 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have just one housekeeping announcement.

The Secretary will be testifying before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, chaired by Congressman Clarence Long tomorrow, 10:00 a.m. The subject is foreign assistance appropriations. The hearing will be held in 2359-A of the Rayburn Building.

Even though the Secretary will be testifying, we will have a press briefing tomorrow on the usual time schedule. That's all I have for you.

Q As a point of information, Mr. Hughes, may I inform you that the word hardly got into the press room that the briefing had started, so people are just beginning to stream in.

A Ah-hah. We'll probably all survive that.

Q John, is that about Central America primarily?

A His testimony tomorrow?

Q Yes.

A I think so.

Q What time was that?

A Ten o'clock. I'll be glad to attempt to answer any questions you might have.

Q John, do you have anything to say about Syria's apparent refusal to allow Philip Habib to return to Damascus to deal with Syria's participation in the withdrawal from Lebanon?

A It is true that the Syrian Government has said that it does not want to receive Ambassador Habib at this particular time. We continue to believe that dialogue is the way to advance the cause of peace. The Syrian attitude regarding Ambassador Habib's visit is certainly not in the spirit we hoped to have. We remain ready to engage in the dialogue.

Q Can you explain how you would engage in such a dialogue if -- do you know, for example, whether they are refusing to receive anyone from the United States?

A I don't know that. I think they have specifically refused to receive Ambassador Habib. That's where we are.

Q John, had there been a request by the Embassy to receive him, and they told us diplomatically as well as publicly?

A Yes, I think that is correct, that we had hoped that Ambassador Habib would go to Damascus.

Q Does this raise the possibility, then, that the Secretary of State might personally participate?

A No. There is no change in the Secretary's plans at the moment. You know what his travel plans are, and he has no plan to return to the Middle East at the moment.

Q Would he be willing to?

A I don't think you should make that transition from this story to that story. He has consistently said that he is not averse to returning to the area at some appropriate time.

Q John, can you tell us what the Syrians said in turning down the request for a visa for Habib?

A I can't really. As you know, we don't publicize the diplomatic correspondence that goes back and forth. But I think basically what they said was that they would not be able to receive him at this time.

Q Did they link it with the agreement in what they talked to you about?

A I'm not going to go beyond that, but I think the reasons for their refusal to receive the Ambassador at this time are probably obvious, but I think you'd have to ask them.

Q Might it not be possible that the negotiations or the dialogue -- whatever you are calling it these days -- could take place some place else? For example, could the Syrians perhaps come to Lebanon or here?

A I'm sure anything is possible, but I don't want to lead you in the direction that something else is afoot. I mean the fact is that Ambassador Habib, for the moment, is not going to Damascus. He is returning to the area -- I think is in the area today -- and undoubtedly will be conferring with Lebanese and Israeli leaders on how best to move the process forward that we want to see for a troop withdrawal.

Q Could you tell us when the request for Habib into Damascus was made, please?

A I can't. I don't know the answer to that.

Q You got the turn-down when?

A I don't know the answer to that either.

Q John, I recall that when we were leaving Damascus, the Secretary said that President Assad, I think, had told him he, or that rather U.S. representatives would be welcome to come back at any time.

A That is correct.

Q In turning down Habib now, did they say at this particular time? I mean, was this part of the message?

A I think their position is that they are not able to receive Ambassador Habib at this time. But you're absolutely correct in your understanding of what the Secretary said and what he was told when he was in Damascus.

Q John, if adding that at this time constantly, can't you formally and officially link the refusal to the Syrian feelings about the agreement, because they had the same feelings when the Secretary saw Assad? What's the change?

A They have said that they --

Q You're not suggesting that it is a question of inconvenience rather than --

A I'm not suggesting it's a question of inconvenience.

Q John, this may seem like an obvious question, but in addition to a possible change of venue, is there any change in the personality involved at this point?

A Not at the moment, not to my knowledge.

Q The U.S. is not making a request that Ambassador Draper go there?

A Not that I am aware of.

Q John, now that the Syrians said what they said, how do you plan to pursue the efforts?

A I think we will await Ambassador Habib's thinking. As I say, I'm sure he would be in touch with Lebanese and Israeli officials to consider what next steps we all might take.

Q John, do you consider this a setback in any way for the prospects of getting the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon?

A I think the advantages of dialogue are clear. We are ready to engage in that dialogue. That is the way to achieve the objective, but clearly the dialogue cannot go forward for the moment if nobody is talking.

Q John, is there any concern that there may be third party interference in this, perhaps from the Andropov regime?

A I think the Secretary has said on a number of occasion that we don't know what the Soviet Government is saying to the Syrian Government and President Assad. Syria is an independent nation, a proud nation, and we assume that Syria will make its own decisions about troop withdrawal from Lebanon, and all other matters affecting its interests.

Q John, have you actually received a reply from the Syrians? I mean received a communique, official, or something from the Syrians? Or are you just picking it up from the news media that the Syrians will not see you?

A No. We understand from the Syrian Government that they are not able to receive Ambassador Habib at this time.

Q Would you say that you underestimated the Syrians' opposition to this whole thing, because as recent as yesterday, or the day before, you were telling us that that was not the end it. Some officials were saying that there are still prospects, that they have not turned it down, et cetera.

Do you now believe you underestimated the Syrians' reaction to this?

A I don't think it is a question of underestimating or overestimating. I think the Syrian Government has made plain its attitudes towards the agreement between Lebanon and Israel. We continue to believe that the argument in favor of foreign troop withdrawal from Lebanon is an overpowering one, and we will have to see how that dialogue takes place and continues. There are a number of Arab states who are of that view and who are making that view known, and we will have to see whether that argument is persuasive.

Q On that issue also, are there any more Arab states than the ones you mentioned to us yesterday that have expressed approval?

A I think the ones I listed yesterday are the ones of which I'm aware.

Q One other thing: Yesterday you weren't able to tell us about the reports of Syria's closing of roads and communications.

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us something about it?

A I think the road is open today.

Q The roads are open today?

A I think the roads are open today.

Q And communications -- telephones and telegraph?

A I cannot answer the question about communication, but I think the roads are open today, as we understand it.

Q Can you take a crack at explaining if Assad, ten days ago on a Saturday when the Secretary saw him, said he or any other American is welcome to Damascus -- and the rejection? How do you explain that?

A I don't explain it. I guess you'd have to ask the Syrians to explain it.

Q During the whole period of negotiations with Israel and Lebanon, this Administration kept saying that it is against any pressure against Israel because of fear of a sort of backfire. Does this apply to Syria now?

A I think what the Administration said was that peace was the objective and peace was the lure. That was more effective, rather than pressure. I think that was the argument and the position that was used.

Q Do you think this applies to Syria now, taking into consideration the differences?

A It seems to us that there are overwhelming arguments for the rationale underlying Syrian withdrawal, and we hope that those will be evident to the Syrians. Certainly, it is evident to us; certainly, it is evident to the Lebanese; certainly, it is evident to a number of Arab Governments.

As the Secretary has said, it is important that the Syrians not let this moment pass. They have the opportunity to remove Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. They have to make a decision about that.

Q A couple of questions, please? What can you tell us about the status of the Lebanese-Syrian dialogue on the issue of troop withdrawal?

A I can't give you anything on that.

Q Has it started?

A I don't know.

Q Another question: Could you clarify the President's remarks yesterday regarding the F-16s? He said that there is need for some consultations between the State Department and Congress. Nick Veliotes said here yesterday that it is a matter for a Presidential decision. What is there to be consulting about, and where does it stand now?

A I think the State Department obviously will, and is consulting with Congressmen and Senators. The Secretary was on the Hill this morning, and that process is going forward.

Q What are you consulting about?

A I think it is a matter of conferring and exchanging views. I think the Secretary did this morning. When we've got something to move forward on --

Q Is it a view on the legality of the Israeli use of the F-16s?

A No.

Q Is it a view on the sense of sending forward F-16s?

A No. I think it is just a process of consulting and the need for that equipment.

Q Do you have a time frame on that?

A I don't have a time frame on it.

Q Is the Secretary going up today or tomorrow --

A Let's wait and see how that transpires. I'm just not quite sure how the decision will be announced.

Q John, is there any doubt that the F-16s won't go forward?

A Why don't we wait and see what the outcome is?

Q Isn't the procedure, in fact the Letter of Offer, would come from the Department of Defense?

A That might be the vehicle.

Q Are they involved in these consultations?

A I'm sure they would be.

Q John, if they were released, would they go forward on the original delivery schedule, which I believe is 1985?

A I would think so.

Q There would be no interruption?

A I wouldn't see any reason for any interruption.

Q John, just a second to get back to Syria and Habib, did the tenor of the Syrian statement to the United States suggest to the U.S. that that is Syria's final word on the subject of negotiations on a withdrawl, or does the phrase that you used earlier, "at this time," mean that this is some kind of temporary glitch or temporary stop in this?

A I don't think that we have accepted the suggestion that this is a final closing of the door.

Q John, last week the Secretary, in Paris, called on the Soviets to start playing a constructive role in this whole process. First, has there been any response, or is perhaps the Syrian statement an indirect response, do you think?

A Obviously, there is the opportunity for a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on a number of issues, and that does take place; but I'm not aware of any specific response on this particular question.

Q You don't take this Syrian refusal to receive Habib at this time to be that answer?

A An answer from the Soviets?

Q An answer to the Secretary's call for the Soviets to start playing a constructive role?

A I think we have to wait and see. The Syrians are doing what they are doing, saying what they are doing, but there are many more steps to be taken down this road.

Q Talking about the F-16s for a minute, I don't understand, while you're talking to Congress, is this something that you feel is legally required, or is this something that is simply a matter of bipartisan foreign policy, trying to create a consensus, that sort of thing? What justifies --

A I think this Secretary of State certainly has sought, and this President has sought that consensus, and I would think it is within that spirit that those consultations are going forward.

Q So you're not maintaining there is any legal need to do that?

A I don't want to get into that question, but certainly, the exchange that took place this morning seemed to be within the bipartisan framework.

Q And you're saying that the Administration has not yet made a determination in its own mind whether or not it should go forward, and that this will only grow out of a consultation, or you're not going to try to get --

A I'm saying what the President said, what he said last night at his press conference, that the Secretary was on the Hill this morning, and that when something is to be announced, it will be announced.

-- MORE --

Q John, what can Ambassador Habib achieve in the area if he is unable to go to Damascus?

A I think that's what he's going to start talking with his colleagues about. A visit at this time by Ambassador Habib apparently has been ruled out. I think we have to wait for him to get back to the area to discuss the situation with his own colleagues in the United States and also with his colleagues in the Lebanese and Israeli Governments and come at the problem in a different way.

Q Don't you think that it's a fair assumption that if he was unable to go to Damascus to hold any talks that he would have no useful purpose to serve being there?

A No. I don't think that's a fair assumption.

Q Sir, has Mr. Assad been invited to Washington recently?

A I cannot answer that question specifically. I do not know the answer to that question.

Q Except for when he was there, I believe on the 7th of May with Secretary Shultz, can you tell us roughtly the last time that Habib was in Damascus?

A Prior to that?

Q Yes.

A I can't. It's a matter of record. I don't know when it was.

Q Do you expect him back in the United States -- back in Washington any time?

A No. I know of no plans for him to be back here. He might visit other countries in the area.

Q Is this whole complex operating under any kind of deadline? Have you been given any date by the Israelis suggesting a time at which they will take unilateral action if the Syrians don't go along?

A No. But I think everybody's operating on the basis that the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon should take place as soon as possible. That's the framework -- as speedily as can be achieved.

Q Now we're talking days or weeks or what?

A As soon as possible.

Q Follow-up to this, please? Do you have any comment on Mr. Arens' remark that if the Syrians won't come along, Israel should consider some unilateral partial withdrawal?

A Not a great deal. With yesterday's signing of the agreement, a formula for Israeli withdrawal now exists, and the burden is therefore upon Syria to make the kind of decision that will restore Lebanon's sovereignty. So I think the kind of thing Mr. Arens was talking about is hypothetical.

We have an agreement. We have the framework in which the withdrawal can take place, and that's where I think our focus of attention should be for the moment.

Q Would you answer that particular point, John, that he did say yesterday that -- he didn't set the time limits within which Israel would go back to the unilateral --

A No. He did not set time limits, no.

Q Not the way you understand it. But do you know when the time --

A No.

Q How long would you give the Israelis before you would go along with such a move, or would you at all go with such a move?

A (A) That's not only a hypothetical question, but (B) it's not a question of setting timetables. We have only just recently concluded an agreement. It's just been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament; it's just been ratified by the Israelis. We have to move along down that path.

I know two or three days have gone by since we signed that, but it does take a little time.

Q It's not the time, therefore, you're saying now. I mean, it's not --

A I'm not aware of any deadlines.

Q Do you have any readout there on the talks that were held here this week with the Romanian Foreign Minister?

A Yes, I do. Foreign Minister Andrei's visit was useful and constructive. He met with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, Under Secretary Eagleburger, as well as senior officials at the Commerce Department and Congressional leaders.

His presence here gave us the opportunity to hold extensive discussions on a wide range of bilateral and international questions, and the discussions on the question of the education repayment decree were positive, but it would be premature to go beyond that at the moment.

Q When you say "positive," does that suggest -- I mean, you only had one meeting that --

A I think that the conversation was positive, but let us wait and see what happens.

Q Is there a commitment to do anything about the tax?

A No.

Q Where does it stand now? Is it correct that where it stands now the United States announced that it cuts off MFN as of some time in June?

A I think June is the date. Yes, that's right.

Q Has there been any change in the U.S. position?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is there any change anticipated?

A I think we have to wait and see.

Q Is there any reconsideration?

A I think we have to wait and see.

Q Could I ask you a related -- possibly related matter?

A Sure.

Q Yesterday after the announcement of the negotiations for long-term grain agreement with the Soviet Union, Senator Baker, the Majority Leader, was quoted as saying in explanation of it that things were a lot better in Poland than they were one year ago or two years ago, suggesting that some change in the situation in Poland is at least in part the justification for the United States returning to a long-term grain agreement negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Could you clarify, first, what is your estimate of the situation in Poland? How do you view the situation there in its perspective as compared to a previous period, and, secondly, is this part of the decision to go to the long-range grain agreement negotiation?

A I don't want to attempt to interpret Senator Baker's --

Q No. I wouldn't ask you to do that.

A The President has said what he has on this issue, and I guess I'd refer you to his remarks. I don't have a kind of impromptu assessment of the situation in Poland, but I think it would be a mistake to see the grain agreement or the willingness to engage in negotiations about a long-term agreement -- I think it would be a mistake to see that as a political signal.

Q Could you see if you could get some statement -- or maybe there is one that's recently made, I'm just not aware of it -- of the U.S. view of the situation in Poland?

A Sure. Be glad to.

Q Do you have anything on those ships in Nicaragua?

A Yes. The three American pleasure boats with seven American citizens aboard were reportedly seized off the Pacific coast of Nicaragua yesterday while enroute to Costa Rica. They were seized by an armed Nicaraguan patrol boat.

The captain of one of the American boats reported the seizure by radio and stated that the three boats were well outside the 12-mile territorial limit which is generally observed under customary international practice.

The captain said that the three boats were being taken to the Nicaraguan port of San Juan del Sur. The United States has requested information about the seizure from the Nicaraguan Government on an urgent basis, and we are seeking consular access to the detained American citizens.

The Nicaraguans have not yet given us an explanation.

Q One of the captains of the boats gave --

A The captain of one of the three boats radioed. Yes.

Q Do you have the identities of any of those boats?

A The identity of the people?

Q Yes.

A We do have names of some of those people as reported by radio, but we have a problem in giving it in terms of the Privacy Act.

Q John, are you aware of the latest report out of Nicaragua quoting someone from one of the boats, apparently a captain, who says that they were nearly on the beach when they were picked up, that everything has been very cordial, and that they're free to go?

A I'm not aware of that. No.

Q What about the port of departure?

A I don't have their port of departure. I understand one of the boats was out of San Diego, and one was out of San Francisco.

Q You say these are private Americans. Can you, without impinging on your rule about intelligence matters, say whether these people had any relationship with any activities of the United States Government in this area?

A I'm really not knowledgeable on that. I'm not sending any signals. You're absolutely right. If there were to be a question of intelligence involved here, we wouldn't comment, but I just have no more information than that.

Q Do you know what kind of boats they were? Were they fishing --

A I don't know what kind of boats. They're described as pleasure boats.

Q Do you know anything at all of what their purpose there was? What they were doing?

A No, I don't.

Q John, since this seems to have become a popular vacation area recently, do you have any advice for Americans who might want to take their vacations and pleasure trips in these particular waters?

A In Nicaragua? These were not in Nicaraguan waters as we understand Nicaraguan waters.

Q In the vicinity.

A There may be some special advice about travel in Nicaragua, but maybe the Press Office can dig that out for you. These were not in Nicaragua.

Q Back to the Middle East, if I may, how far do you share the idea that all moves towards the West Bank problem have been shelved?

A I'm sorry. I didn't get the beginning of the question.

Q How far do you share the idea that all moves by the U.S. Administration towards the solution of the problem of the West Bank have been shelved for the time being?

A I think the President's initiative of September 1 is seen by many Arab nations as the best that they have seen for some time.

I think it has support, and support has been expressed for it by a number of Arab leaders in recent days. I think that the agreement between Israel and Lebanon proves that there is movement, obviously. If there were to be a total troop withdrawal from Lebanon, I'm sure that would be also helpful. But I think that this agreement that has just been signed indicates that there is movement, and there is progress. As the Secretary of State has said on a number of occasions, that negotiations really work, that there is a payoff.

They have worked in the case of Egypt and Israel, and now they've worked in the case of Lebanon and Israel. That is the alternative to the kind of bloodshed and terrorism that has bedeviled the Palestinian people for many years. That's the alternative that we're working on. Nobody's suggesting it's easy. Nobody's suggesting it's just around the corner. It takes time. But there's no lack of continued commitment to it on the part of the Administration.

Q John, how much has that progress, do you think, been hampered by the fact that Ambassador Habib cannot go back to Damascus right now and in that framework of implementing the agreement of the total troop withdrawal?

A As I think I said earlier, clearly the refusal of the Syrians to receive Ambassador Habib at this time is not the kind of spirit that we had hoped for, and therefore that is disappointing, but that doesn't mean that we have given up.

Q John, one more on the Middle East. Now that more and more details about the Memorandum of Agreement that was signed yesterday between the U.S. and Israel are out in the press, could you tell us if you are going to release a text of this Memorandum?

A I cannot. There is really no change in the position since yesterday in that we are continuing to coordinate that package, which is a fairly complex package of documents in its final form. When we have completed that, we'll decide what will be made public, what will remain confidential and what will go to the Hill.

Q Did you confirm yesterday that this was signed, that something was signed?

A I didn't confirm yesterday that something was signed.

Q Could you confirm this today?

A No. I couldn't.

Q Are you then confirming what the press is saying about it at this moment?

A No, I am not.

Q You are not now telling us that the press has what you -- what you --

A It's very difficult to confirm contents of classified documents. As a matter of fact, not only difficult, it's illegal for me.

Q How can you have a signing of something and not admit it, with another nation?

A I haven't really thought that there's been a problem over the years in the government's signing confidential documents.

Q They usually get reported, if you sign an agreement with another country.

Q It was reported in Israel that it was signed over there.

A If that's what Israel says, fine.

Q John, over the last several months, whenever the Secretary was asked about what Syria would do, or was Syria willing to withdraw its troops, he always said that he had asked the Syrian Foreign Minister and he had been assured that --

A That's right.

Q And President Assad recently saying that he would welcome American representatives and now Syria is saying they won't accept Ambassador Habib.

Do you think that Syria is acting out of bad faith? Have they gone back on their word or broken any promises to the United States?

A I'm not sure that I have seen an official statement, saying that Syria would not withdraw its troops from Lebanon. It has said all kinds of things about the agreement, it has said it would not receive Ambassador Habib, but I'm not sure that I have seen a statement saying they will not withdraw their troops.

Q But, clearly, the Secretary seemed to think that based on his conversations with his counterpart in Syria that something would happen if there was an agreement with the Israelis to withdraw. Otherwise, what is this whole exercise about?

A There are a number of statements on record by Syrian Government officials, not only with the Secretary of State, but with journalists and with others and in various Arab forums to the effect that Syria would withdraw its troops when asked by Lebanon. Those statement are all on record.

The Secretary took them and continues to take them at face value. He was given those statements, and those statements still stand there. We have to wait and see.

Q Okay. Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #87

THURSDAY, MAY 19, 1983, 2:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q On Syria, the latest statements from Damascus appear to be even more adamant than the one yesterday. Do you still hope that the dialogue will take place?

A Jim, I'm not going to get into the question of commenting on every report which supposedly reflects the Syrian position regarding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. The President said on Tuesday that the Syrians are on record as saying that they will leave Lebanon when the other forces leave.

We believe that a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon -- Syrian, PLO, Israeli -- would help bring peace, stability, and security to all nations of the region.

Q And do you still think they are going to keep their word?

A As I say, I'm not going to try to comment on every report. We have addressed this in recent days. I'm not going to try to do this on a daily basis.

Q But they are now on record both ways. I mean, they're not only on record now as saying they'll leave; they're now on record as saying they won't leave.

A I'll stand on what I just gave you.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a report from the Voice of Lebanon that apparently says that Syrian forces in the Bekaa have asked doctors to evacuate patients from hospitals between Shtauraw and (inaudible). Do you have anything to that effect?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, back on the Syria question for a moment, the Secretary said on the Hill this morning, in response to a question -- he was asked whether the United States proposed to Syria any financial aid, economic aid, military aid as an inducement to help them decide to withdraw from Lebanon -- the Secretary said he and President Assad did not discuss any specific program of aid, and he underlined the word "specific," but that he felt the door should be kept very wide open to a good relationship.

Can you be any more specific about what kind of aid program the Secretary did discuss with President Assad?

A I can't help you on that.

Q Did I just hear you in your first answer say that the Syrians said they would withdraw when all other forces have left? Is that what you said?

A I said they have indicated they would withdraw when other forces left, when other forces leave.

Q So you're saying it's still up to the Israelis to leave, and therefore, then the Syrians would follow?

A No, no, no. No, no, no. I'm not saying that at all.

(Laughter)

The context of the departure of all foreign forces, I think, is what we're looking at, for the withdrawal of everybody. We've indicated before that however various people have expressed themselves, the realistic prospect would have to be one in which everybody was withdrawing in the context of total withdrawal by everybody.

Q The way I understood it is that you were saying --

A O.K. Well, if you take it the other way.

Q Another subject? El Salvador. The Secretary said on the Hill that he agrees with Dean Hinton's interpretation that it will be a long-term effort of funding. Can you be any more specific about how long-term the State Department sees that?

A No.

Q Alan, back to the Middle East. There is something in this week's Jewish Week that mentions a report put out by the Heritage Foundation which claims that State

Department officials have been providing funding for United Nations projects which directly and indirectly aid the PLO, and they were referring particularly to UNESCO, the U.N. Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, and some of the other suborganizations.

A That sounds to me like an interpretation of what some of the recipients of U.S. aid are doing with their money, and I'm not prepared to go into the question of what various agencies might be doing. Our relations, or non-relations with the PLO are quite well known.

Q Yes, but the report is critical of how the money is allocated which ultimately ends up in "PLO hands."

A I don't have anything to offer. That's an interpretation, I think, by that paper.

Q Could you look into it?

A No, I don't think I'm going to respond to individual press interpretations.

Q What can you tell us about our talks with the Romanians and their emigration policies? Are we on the way to a compromise with them?

A I addressed this before. I don't have anything new. The emigration issue and the education tax, if you will, were among the topics discussed when Foreign Minister Andrei was here. Our position on that is well known, but I don't have anything new today to offer you on that subject.

-- MORE --

Q But have we made any progress?

A I think that John Hughes indicated in answer to a question about this that we viewed those talks as positive, but I don't believe he went beyond that.

Q Do you have an update on the Nicaraguan boat incident? Anything further to say, to change about where the boats were or what they were doing?

A No.

Q Were they outside the 12-mile limit?

A First of all, our Embassy in Managua has confirmed that all three boats left port last night, and as of this morning were off the Costa Rican coast.

The information that we have sort of is in two parts. One, as I think we indicated before, the Nicaraguans denied consular access to the Americans, so it hasn't been possible to determine what happened.

I think that we did indicate that on May 17, as the boats were being detained by the Nicaraguan patrol craft, one of the American captains reported by ham radio he believed the three boats were well outside a 12-mile zone. That's the information that we have at this point. Not having had access to the people, it's a little difficult to be more specific than that.

Q So at this point you know only what the captain -- the person on the radio told you he thought. You don't know really where they were?

A The information we have has come through those broadcasts, indicating that they were outside of 12 miles. I think from those broadcasts they also indicated who they were, and there has been -- I guess that the one captain had a meeting with the press in Managua, but we were not present at that.

Q I was going to ask if the State Department is doing anything about the request for extradition of Mr. Townley?

A I think we had something on this previously. I guess I don't have anything new. If you haven't got that, let me ask you to check in the Press Office because there was some guidance on this.

Q Yesterday Senator Tower at the National Press Club said that if the need arose, he would be willing to endorse sending more U.S. troops to Lebanon to beef up Multinational Forces or the Marines over there.

Do you have anything new on that? Anything to add to it?

A No. There's nothing new on that subject. I think that subject also came up during Nick Veliotes' briefing here the other day, and I think he told you where we were on that.

Q Do you have anything on the reports that Captain Avilla, the Salvadoran army captain, that there was State Department traffic and Embassy traffic about Avilla being responsible for the death of Archbishop Romero.

A I'm stuck on that because, obviously, we don't comment on any alleged leaked documents, so I can't really respond to that.

Q Is the Department in any way urging the Government of El Salvador to pursue any reports on Captain Avilla's alleged responsibility for --

A My understanding is that he left El Salvador while the investigation --

Q Yes. That's true.

A -- into the AIFLD murders was under way, and I understand he's being sought on charges of desertion by the Salvadoran Government. I don't think it's a question of our urging them to do something at this point. They're already trying to find him and get him.

Q No. That's with reference to the other murder. I'm talking about Archbishop Romero's --

A Again, I can't get into the question of discussion between us, but I think that the fact is, they apparently are seeking him in any case, and what they might want to question him about when they got him would be something they'd have to look at.

Q Any new readout on alleged police brutality in Poland?

A No. I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on the meeting today between Mr. Veliotes and the Ambassadors of Egypt and Lebanon?

A Ambassador Bouhabib came in, I believe, as a courtesy call. He's recently arrived, as you know, and that's the purpose of that meeting.

Ambassador Ghorbal, I understand, has been out of town for awhile, and, again, this was a routine meeting. Obviously, such meetings take place periodically. There was nothing terribly special about it.

Q Anything on the itinerary of Ambassador Habib?

A No. As you may know, he's in Saudi Arabia, but I don't have anything --

Q Is he going to Cairo?

A I don't know. I saw one account, a wire story, that he had stopped briefly in Egypt on his way to Saudi Arabia. Whether he plans to go back there or not, I simply don't know.

Ralph?

Q That was my question.

A All right.

(The briefing concluded at 2:14 p.m.)

Hlennox

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, May 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #88

FRIDAY, MAY 20, 1983, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good morning all. I have three announcements up front. The first is on F-16s.

The Department of Defense has transmitted to the Congress today formal notification of our intention to sell 75 F-16 aircraft to Israel. While the timing of this notification is related to the Israeli agreement with Lebanon, the decision on the sale itself, which was approved over a year ago, reflects our long-term commitment to maintain Israeli's qualitative military edge in the region. Our heightened concerns about the Soviet challenge in the region, particularly the Soviet supply of the SA-5 integrated air-defense system to Syria, makes it timely for us to send this notification to the Congress now.

Q Do you have a copy?

Q A copy?

A Sure can.

I have a statement on Afghanistan, recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

Numerous reliable reports continue to reach us from refugee and other sources of extremely heavy, brutal and prolonged Soviet and Soviet-mandated bombing of civilian areas within Afghanistan in recent weeks, especially of areas around Herat, the country's third largest city, and north and west of Kabul. These reports leave no room for doubt that casualties among the civilian population have been extremely heavy. It's not possible to measure precisely the extent of those casualties, but they certainly number many hundreds and are probably in the thousands. Such a massive and ruthless assault on people who are, for the most part, without any means of defending themselves is intolerable by any standard of civilized behavior. It would appear that the Soviet Union believes that the world is either unaware of or no longer cares about what it is doing in Afghanistan and that in its desperation to subdue the spirit of the vast majority of Afghans who yearn for their nation's freedom the Soviet Union is willing to employ any means, no matter how brutal.

The United States cannot stand silently by and witness this slaughter. The Soviet Union is aware of our strong concern. We call on it once more to desist from its heartless assault on a courageous and independent people and to urgently seek a solution to the crisis in Afghanistan which preserves human life and responds to the principles outlined in four successive resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly.

These call for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, self-determination for the Afghan people, an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan, and the return of the refugees in safety and with honor.

Q Copies, please?

A Sure.

Finally, a little update that you have asked for from time to time on the Embassy in Beirut and the work that is going on there.

As you know, the President on May 17 forwarded to the Congress the Beirut emergency supplemental request. This request includes funds to obtain an interim office building and to complete the office building that was under construction when the civil war in early 1976 caused us to terminate construction.

This weekend, two engineering survey teams are leaving for Beirut. One team will survey an office building for an interim Chancery that is very promising. We're optimistic that arrangements will be completed in the next week for obtaining this site.

The team will determine whether it meets our needs and what should be done to make it ready for use as an interim Chancery building.

The second engineering team will survey the partially completed Chancery building and determine the additional design and engineering required before construction can be restarted. The building is about 16 percent completed. That's the new building that was to have replaced the existing Chancery.

That's it.

Q John, can we go back here to your Afghanistan statement there?

A Sure.

Q Can you explain what you mean by "the United States cannot stand silently by"?

A We're not going to be silent in the face of this action. That's why we are making this statement.

Q You're talking only about verbal action.

A Verbal action.

Q You're not implying the possibility of the United States --

A Verbal and diplomatic action.

Q Diplomatic through what channels?

A A variety of channels. I think the Soviets are well aware of our views, both privately and publicly.

Q John, has the U.S. taken any action other than verbal or diplomatic on Afghanistan in the last few days, months, weeks?

A No; no new action.

Q No new action since what time?

A Other than the continuing action we've been taking over the months and years.

Q John, are these air strikes halted or are they still continuing?

A I can't answer that, Larry; I can't answer it.

Q What do you say to the Soviet allegation that part of the problem stems from outside support for the rebels?

A I think that senior Administration officials have addressed that question before and I think given a fairly thorough estimate of where the arms are coming from.

Q John, does the release of the F-16s mean that the United States is convinced that Israel did not violate the agreement -- the arms agreeement that they have with the United States?

A I think we can stand on the words that the President used at the times he has made his various announcements on the F-16 before.

Q John, previously those words have included his linking the transfer, or the release of the sale, to the withdrawal of Israel forces. Obviously, this is a change in that policy, since the forces have not withdrawn. Could you explain why that change was made?

A I think the situation has changed in that you have an agreewent between Israel and Lebanon for the withdrawal of those forces. You have an Israeli willingness to withdraw those forces.

Q Any count on the SAM-5s in Syria?

A I don't know what we have done on SAM-5s while I have been otherwise engaged.

I guess not, Jim.

Q Do you have any comment on the ending of talks between Egypt and the U.S. concerning the Ras Banas facilities?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

As part of U.S. and Egyptian cooperation to preserve security in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the Egyptian Government has offered temporary military facilities at Ras Banas for use by U.S. forces should they be needed to assist any Arab or Muslim country requesting assistance to repel an armed attack.

We have been discussing with the Egyptians U.S.-funded improvements at their base in Ras Banas. But as a result of these discussions, the Egyptian Government is itself considering funding and construction of the improvements at Ras Banas. Egypt remains firmly committed to the offer it has made concerning the use of those facilities, as it remains firmly committed to other aspects of our strategic cooperation -- for example, the upcoming Bright Star exercise this summer.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, are you denying that these talks have broken off?

A No. What we're saying is that the Egyptians have decided to do that work themselves. There's no change.

Q So the talks on U.S. funding are over?

A On funding of construction, that's right.

Q But the offer to make those facilities available under certain circumstances stands?

A Stands. Correct.

Q John, the upgrading of the base funded by the Egyptians would be according to the American specification of what the U.S. Navy needs?

A I think you have to go to DOD on that. You're going beyond my expertise.

Q One more question about the F-16s. Do you have any more precise information about the delivery time of the planes? Would there be a delay because of delays in notification of Congress?

A No. I think you'd have to ask DOD. I think they were originally scheduled for '85. I suppose it is conceivable there could be some slippage, but I think you'd have to ask Department of Defense on that.

Q John, when is Bright Star '83 scheduled for in summer?

A I do not no what month. Try DOD.

Q John, what's the status of arms sales to India?

A I've got something on that for you. That's the story in this morning's Times you're asking about?

Q Yes.

A Insofar as the Times article implies that there's a major government-to-government sale in the offing, that's not correct; and there have been no secret talks towards such an arms sale.

Over the past several years, the Government of India has discussed various types of U.S. military equipment with U.S. manufacturers. The United States Government has issued advisory opinions approving the marketing of C-130 aircraft and 155-millimeter howitzers to India, and we recently issued a license for export of machine guns to India.

We anticipate that should India decide to purchase U.S. equipment, the purchases would be made on a direct commercial basis and actual sales would have to be approved and export licenses issued.

We want to help India meet its legitimate security requirements and believe military sales would make a positve contribution to U.S.-Indian relations.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, I want to go back to the Ras Banas statement. What is the significance so that the Egyptians are funding the improvement in the bases instead of the United States? Because I remember last year there were extensive talks about giving about $250 million or more to increase the capability of the base to welcome big jets or whatever it is.

I mean, what significance is this to you?

A As I say, I think you'd have to go to DOD for details, but the facts are that the Egyptians have concluded as a result of those discussions that it would be more appropriate for them to consider the funding and the construction in this case. They have expressed an interest in U.S. technical assistance.

It's possible that the U.S. would contribute some U.S. funds for the construction, but the Egyptians are going to carry out the construction.

Q John, was there opposition in the Arab world to more direct U.S. involvement in it?

A I understand that the discussions revolve around legal questions -- legal and constitutional questions that Egypt faces concerning foreign involvement in military installations on its soil.

Q On another subject, sir, yesterday, in a strong statement, Greek Premier Papandreou protested the infringement by American aircraft and Turkish aircraft of the Athens FIR in the exercises during the Eastern Mediterranean -- the

NATO exercises. Will that have an impact or do you anticipate any difficulties in the negotiations concerning the bases and will Mr. Bartholomew return to Athens as scheduled tomorrow?

A We noted the statement and we're looking into it.

Q When are you going to look into it?

A It takes time.

Q How long?

A I cannot tell you.

Q John, let me get back to the F-16s, please. Let me put the question in a different way.

Q Excuse me. Before we finish on that subject, how soon can we have the answer?

A When it is available. (Laughter.)

Q During the war last summer, there were repeated questions from us here about Israel possibly, likely, may be in violation of the Arms Export Control Act; and at the time we continued hearing that it was, or it's continued to be, under investigation. And what is the status of that investigation now, if there is one at all?

A I think there is no change in the status of that investigation, but why don't you go back and look at the language that we used at that time? There's no change in that language.

Q John, what we know we were told -- and I have some mild recollection --

A Various legal questions were raised, and I think we provided rather careful language to respond to them and I think I'd refer you to that language.

Q So is there an inquiry going on to find out if Israel violated the Arms Export Control Act or is there not one now?

A Let me take a look at that for you and see where it's at.

Q Would you, please? Let me ask you something else, about the so-called secret agreement. There was an item this morning --

A Sorry, so-called -- ?

Q A secret agreement.

A Secret agreement.

Q -- by an unnamed official that Israel -- I mean, it is going to the article in The New York Times of last week -- that Israel is authorized or entitled or has the authority to retaliate on Lebanese territory, if it perceives its interests or its border accesses to it are threatened or in danger.

Can you tell us any more about it now, or is it still the same?

A No. It is still a classified document. I think what you are referring to is a newspaper report suggesting that Israel had the right of self-defense in accordance with international law. I think that was the newspaper story.

Q It was within the land of Lebanon.

A I don't recall the territory being specified in the newspaper report, but, anyway, it is a confidential document, and we won't get into it.

Q Just one more on this, John. If it is recognized as self-defense, why does the United States, why there should have been something in exchange between the United States and Israel or Lebanon and Israel about it? I mean, who does not have the right to self-defense?

A You are raising a general question, and you are free to raise a general question, but I am not going to talk about any documents that might be confidential that are involved in that agreement.

Q John, is the United States aware of any conditions that Syria has made known to it on its withdrawal from Lebanon?

A No. I think the Syrian position on the agreement that Israel and Lebanon have signed is clear, and as to the question of a pull-out of Syrian troops, I think that those statements are in the public domain, too, such as they are.

Q From the standpoint of the United States, do we see any problem with allowing Syria parallel privileges in Lebanese territory to those afforded Israel in the agreements?

A I think that any agreement that might be reached between Syria and Israel is a matter for those two countries. I think the Secretary of State has said that he is aware of legitimate concerns that Syria might have, but I presume that these would be a matter for discussion between the two countries.

Q Between Syria and Israel or between Syria and Lebanon?

A I'm sorry. Between Syria and Lebanon. Thank you.

Q John, on the point of the secret agreement, CBS had the item that a U.S. official, unnamed, said something to the effect of what my colleague was asking.

Isn't this an infringement on the territorial integrity of Lebanon to allow hot pursuit? I can't understand it is hot pursuit for the supposedly terrorist authorities to go inside Lebanon.

A I realize you are trying to sweeten the pill here by injecting an unnamed official beyond a confidential document, but I am still not going to respond to the question.

Q It was a briefing. In other words, the report on CBS was true, I mean, at noon?

A I am not familiar with it.

Q John, a follow-up on Hassin's question on the legality of the F-16's. If there is an on-going investigation on the legality, or lack thereof, or, rather, on violation of the export act, then how would that jive with the President's decision to release the F-16's under the circumstances if the investigation is on-going, and could you check on the legality of it?

A I am sure there is no question of the legality of the President's decision, but on the other question of an on-going investigation, let me take a look and see what we might or might not have on that.

Q Alan, do you --

A I'm John. He's Alan. (Laughter)

I know we look alike. (Laughter)

Q I'm sorry. Call me Sam.

Q He's got more hair.

Q Could we have Alan? (Laughter)

Q John, do you have anything to say about whether the United States has renewed its invitation to Prime Minister Begin, and whether any date or even general time-frame has been set for a visit by Prime Minister Begin?

A No, nothing really beyond what we have said before, namely that Prime Minister Begin is always welcome. I don't have anything for you on that, but should there be something maturing, I think that that would be coming out of the White House.

Q How about something coming on an invitation to President Assad, for example?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q John, on a different area, in connection with the meeting between the Secretary and Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans, did they discuss the proposed Belgian sale of some $200 million of computer software to PRC, or could you give us the United States' position on the possible transfer of the Bier Company's products to China?

A I can't tell you what they discussed because they went into the meeting just a short while ago, and I haven't heard any outcome. But I doubt that we would be very specific about the subject matter that they discussed, anyway.

Q Can we get a read-out on that, John?

A I doubt that we will have a read-out on that.

Q John, parallel to what was said a couple of days ago about what Ambassador Lewis signed with Mr. Shamir a letter of understanding, or whatever it is, as part of the agreement, can you confirm or deny that such an agreement or a letter was signed by Mr. Shultz and the Israeli Charge d 'Affaires, when he came here a couple of days ago?

A No, I can't.

Q John, do you have anything on Ambassador Habib today? Where is he?

A He is due to leave Saudi Arabia and should be arriving in Cairo about this time, I think, or very shortly.

Q Has Argentina asked for the extradition of Michael Townley?

A I know that Alan did something on that yesterday.

MR. ROMBERG: Nothing new.

MR. HUGHES: Nothing new. Go ahead, Peter.

Q Do you have any reaction to the Post story on the subject this morning?

A To the Townley story?

Q Yes.

A No, nothing beyond what Alan said.

Q What about the other Post story on Argentina with respect to the disappeared Americans?

A Yes, I do have something on that. That is the reports that there were three Americans?

Q I guess there were.

A The three subjects are Billy Lee Hunt, Jon Pirmin Arozarema, and Toni Mota. In the third case, although inquiries have been made by U.S. officials to the Argentine Government about reports of her disappearance, our Embassy has been unable to confirm Miss Mota's presence in Argentina, or, indeed, in any of the other Latin countries that were listed on her itinerary.

Our interest in and concern for American citizens listed among the disappeared is well known to the Argentine authorities, to the few families concerned and human rights organizations in both countries.

Our Embassy has consistently pursued all leads of new information as they became known. This effort has been sustained since the mid-1970's when our Embassy in Buenos Aires became actively involved in such efforts on behalf of families and relatives about people with both a claimed and a substantiated basis of citizenship.

To the best of our knowledge, the three individuals listed in the story represent the total number of American citizens listed among the disappeared.

Q A couple of follow-ups, then.

One, does this change our attitude about the decree late last month by the Argentine Government that the matter of the disappeared is a question solely between -- for the people of Argentina to decide with its government and the people, or does it raise an international issue such as those reflected in the statements by Italy, France, Spain and the Vatican?

A I can't answer that as to international law. All I can do is indicate our continuing interest.

Q Also, it suggests in this article that records with respect to these disappearances, or alleged disappearances, were destroyed during the Falklands crisis, as part of a general operation with respect to our Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Can you explain what happened?

A No. I don't have anything beyond what I have given you.

Q Can you look into the question as to why numerous Embassy documents bearing on the fates of citizens in Argentina would be destroyed?

A Let me take a look and see what we have got.

Hold on a minute, I think we have got a little amplification on the Townley case. Well, it is that there is no new guidance. There is some previous guidance in the Press Office. Further questions to Justice.

Q A related question on Argentina. There has been discussion in the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Soviet Union might sell attack aircraft to Argentina to offset the trade bill it has for grain.

Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Could you take the question?

A Whether we would be aware of it?

Q Yes.

A Let me see whether we know anything. I doubt that we really would have much on that.

Q John, do you have anything on the Washington Times report suggesting that Libya is meddling in twenty Latin American countries?

A No.

Q I have a question on the human rights. The National Academy of Sciences two days ago called upon the Government of Morocco to release a Moroccan scientist who is in prison since 1972.

Do you have any comment, or do you know of any parts played by this Department concerning this, please?

A No, I am afraid I don't. Not a word of it.

Q John, there are a couple of reports on the FBIS today, one from Saudi Arabia and one from Lebanon, that suggest that Saudi Arabia has told Lebanon that Syria has told Saudi Arabia that it is interested in negotiations with Beirut on the subject of troop withdrawals, and that there are certain conditions under which Syria will withdraw its troops following those negotiations.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. Our position has remained constant. We are aware of Syria's position on the agreement, but we remain open to the question of a dialogue on that question of withdrawal of Syrian forces.

Q Can I follow that up, on the question of Syria, John?

A Yes.

Q Since the President said at his news conference that Syria would be able to have the same kind of relationship with the United States that other Arab states have, pursuing that, is Syria able to qualify for American economic aid under current regulations?

A I don't know about the question of qualification, but I don't think the Administration was speaking in terms of an aid program. I think what was in mind was the kind of normal social and cultural relationship. I think it would be ill-advised if you were thinking of an aid program.

Q There is no consideration, despite the stipulations, I guess, which would preclude that for the moment of reconsidering aid to Syria.

A Not that I am aware of. I think the last aid appropriation for Syria was in '79. Now there, I think, may still be some aid in the pipeline as a result of that, but there has been no new aid voted since '79, and I know of no intention that there should be.

Q There is a bill on the Hill to provide some money for building a road that the Syrians want. Do you know anything about that?

A No, I don't.

Q Can I follow up on that? Could you explain the thinking behind what you just said, there being a very large aid program to Israel, another one to Egypt, another one to Lebanon, and it seems like practically every country in the Middle East has some kind of U.S. aid program, if they don't have oil.

Why is the Administration not thinking of an aid program to Syria?

A I would have to do a little more research for you and provide some specific language, Don, but I don't think there is any question of any aid program under consideration at the moment. But as for the rationalization, I would have to get some language for you. I don't have it in my head.

Q I would appreciate it if you could get some language.

A Okay.

Q John, in that connection, just yesterday Secretary Shultz was asked that question on the Hill, and his answer -- he seemed to take his time answering it, choosing his words -- and said that when he talked with President Assad, they did not discuss any specific aid program -- and he underlined the word "specific", and then went on to say that he and Assad had talked about keeping the door very wide open.

A I think you would be reading too much into what you perceive to be his underlining of the word "specific". I don't think he intended to accent "specific". There is no consideration of an aid program.

Q John, going back to the Afghanistan statement, you just made very strong charges against the Soviet Union on whatever the action is involved there.

Now, this is a parallel to negotiations for the grain exchange, or whatever they sell to the Soviet Union.

A No, there is no parallel.

Q You are not making the grain sale as an element to be used in trying to the --

A No connection. Just we have strong feelings about Afghanistan.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing was concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, May 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #89

MONDAY, MAY 23, 1983, 1:01 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Secretaries Shultz and Regan will hold an on-the-record briefing in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building tomorrow at 11:30. Williamsburg Summit will be the topic. As a result of the timing of that briefing, our own State Department briefing will be at 1:00 o'clock tomorrow.

Just a little note, on Thursday, as you know, the Secretary is addressing the Foreign Policy Association in New York at 1:00 o'clock. We will have that speech piped into the briefing room live that day, and there will not be a daily State Department briefing on Thursday as a result of that.

Q What is the subject?

A That is North-South.

Q And what time will that be?

A New York? 1:00 o'clock.

Q Q&A?

A I'm not sure whether he's giving Q&A on that occasion. I'll have to check that one out for you, too.

Q Is there any briefing scheduled in connection with the speech?

A With the North-South speech?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q Will there be an advance text?

A As always, we will do our best.

Q In New York as well?

A Sure. We will have it just as soon as it's ready.

Q Do you have anything to report on what's going on in Mozambique and the border area there with South Africa?

A Not a situation report, but I can tell you what our feeling is about that. The United States deplores the tragic events in southern Africa over the past several days with the attendant loss of life.

These acts underscore the urgent need to reduce tensions gripping the region and bring a halt to the escalating cycle of violence which serves no useful purpose and can only lead to continuing loss of life, damage and destruction.

We have been encouraged by the growing dialogue between South Africa and Mozambique of late, exemplified by two ministerial-level meetings within the past five months.

We believe that only through discussions among the states of the region can a serious effort be made to address and reduce the underlying causes of tensions.

The United States is working to help find peaceful ways to address and resolve the problems of southern Africa. We've made known to both South Africa and Mozambique and, indeed, to all of the countries of the region our willingness to help.

We are in urgent contact with the governments concerned to review what further role the United States can play to renew progress toward the vital goals of peace and stability in the region.

Q Specifically, do you have any reaction to the reported bombing raid into Mozambique by South Africa?

A We feel that neither side -- as you know, there was the bombing of the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria last week, and now there are reports of the action today. We feel that neither side was justified in taking the action they did, and neither action was justified.

The United States' policy is to identify and support alternatives to cross-border violence, because such violence cannot solve the problems of the region.

Q By saying that, are you indicating that the United States believes that Mozambique was responsible for this bombing?

A No. I think there has been an indication on the wire today of an admission of involvement in the Pretoria bombing by the African National Congress.

Q But do you equate that with Mozambique in some way?

A I think that the raids were against ANC positions -- the South African raids were against ANC positions.

Q Were there any Mozambiquan casualties, to your knowledge?

A I don't know.

Q But going in the other direction, do you think that the Mozambiquans were in any way responsible for what happened in South Africa?

A We're talking about the violence. I think the African National Congress today claimed that it was responsible for the violence in Pretoria. We're deploring the violence on both sides. We're saying neither was justified.

Q Can we first get a copy of the statement that you originally read?

A Sure.

Q And also, then, as a follow-up, are you saying that the explosion on Friday came as a result of a cross-border action?

A No, no. I'm saying that today's raids were clearly a cross-border action, and we deplore this the same as we did the --

Q Do you have information that suggests that the perpetrators -- the ANC, if they did it -- of the act on Friday resulted from specific cross-border activity?

A No.

Q You don't have information like that?

A No. I'm not saying that.

Q So South Africa could --

A I'm talking about the explosion at the Air Force headquarters in Pretoria on Friday, and I'm talking about the reports of today's cross-border action by South Africa into Mozambique.

Q You're condemning cross-border violence here --

A Yes.

Q But what I want to know is what is cross-border about that explosion on Friday?

A The planes presumably flew across -- I'm not talking about Friday. I'm talking about the planes that flew cross the border today.

Q I'm sorry. No. Maybe I'm -- am I just obtuse, or does somebody else want to pick this up?

Q I think there is a question that -- maybe we're just not reaching you with the question. The statement you read appears to attempt to be evenhanded in its criticism.

A Correct.

Q But it does so by referring to dialogue between states and by referring to cross-border violence.

A That's right.

Q I think Jim's question was we all understand that today's air raid was a cross-border action --

A Right.

Q -- which you say -- you know, you condemn because it was from one state to another. What his question is, was Friday's action also a cross-border action which the State Department condemns?

A We're not making an analysis of whether it was cross-border, although the ANC positions attacked today clearly were in Mozambique. We're not saying whence the attackers came; we're deploring the bombing of Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, but we're not making a judgment as to where the people who blew that building up came from.

Q Can I follow that up?

A Sure.

Q The statement refers to supporting dialogue among states. Does the State Department -- does the U.S. support dialogue among anything other than states?

A I don't know quite what you mean by --

Q Considering the ANC involvement --

A I think we support dialogue with those who can eliminate such violence.

Q How would a forum among the states take care of the question of ANC violence within South Africa?

A I think there's a question of sanctuary involved. There has been a question of sanctuary. Certainly the South Africans see a question of sanctuary here.

Q But do we accept that? Then you're kind of indicating that there may have been a cross-border element to this raid on Friday.

A There may have been. We're not making a judgment.

Q But there may not have been also. Is that correct?

A There may not have been. I mean, I don't know whence -- the ANC has claimed responsibility for this, but I don't know where the people who are presumed to have undertaken the action, where they came from.

Q Your statement might be less ambiguous if you would just strike the word "cross-border" from the statement. Is that fair?

A You do have a cross-border situation today. We are deploring it.

Q Yes, but violence applies to both cross-border and non-cross-border.

A It may. You have sanctuaries, and presumably people in those sanctuaries may cross borders. We would deplore that, too.

Q What is the assessment by the State Department of what this series of events has done to the dialogue between Mozambique and South Africa to which you referred?

A I don't know. I think our words today were couched in hopeful terms trying to underline to the parties the desirability of continuing those negotiations, but I can't speculate on what this will do to them.

Q Do we support talks between the ANC and the South African Government leading to elections?

A I'd have to do a little research for you on that.

Q Could you?

A Yes.

Q Another topic: Today the Al Baath, which is the daily of the Baath Party in Syria, denounced the Lebanon-Israel agreement. They said they have no hidden agenda. It's a final rejection. There's nothing more to it.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q Are you still optimistic?

A Our position is the same as it has been.

Q Which is?

A That we hope to engage in the -- to be helpful in the kind of dialogue that would effect the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Do you have any comment on the violence in Lebanon over the weekend?

A Which -- what are you --

Q The kidnappings and the assault on the U.S. positions.

A The grenade attack? You're talking about this morning's --

Q But also the kidnappings between the Maronites and the Druze.

A We have just a little factual statement on this morning's incident which took place about 7:30, I think.

At 7:30 this morning four hand grenades were thrown in the vicinity of a joint U.S./MNF/LAF checkpoint. One of the grenades exploded. There were no casulaties.

The LAF responded by deploying a reinforced platoon into the area, and at about 8:20 the LAF arrested some 18 suspects and they are presently being held for questioning.

I don't have anything on the weekend bombings.

Q Today the Maronite Bishop of Sidon and one of his priests have been kidnapped allegedly by the Druze militiamen.

The area is controlled by Israeli forces. The two factions were fighting for the last three days. They've been fighting in an area controlled by the Israeli occupiers.

What do you have to say about this?

A I don't have anything specifically on that. That does seem, however, to underline President Gemayel's argument that the sooner foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon, the sooner Lebanon can start putting its house in order.

Q This is philosophy. Can you get down to a little bit --

A I'm sorry. What are you talking about?

Q You're giving me a philosophical answer, I guess.

A Was it a philosophical question?

Q Would you put the responsibility on the Israelis since they are the occupiers under the international law?

A As I said, I don't have anything specifically relating to that subject, and, indeed, I did give you a philosophical answer.

Q The Bishop's been released.

A Okay.

Q In regard also to the Marines, there's a report that some Christian workers fled from some Druze Moslems who were attempting to kidnap them and took refuge with U.S. Marines.

Do you have anything on that?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q Have you got anything today on Prime Minister Begin's visit here?

A No. As I think I said last week, should there be anything on that, I think it would come from the White House.

-- MORE --

Q Do you know whether Assistant Secretary Enders told some Congressional Committees in the last two or three weeks that the freedom fighters will be in control in Managua by the end of the year?

A I think I can give you something on that. As you know, it's our usual practice not to respond to questions on intelligence. This, however -- I take it you are referring to the Times story this morning -- represents an exceptional case.

On behalf of the Department and the Administration as a whole we wish to say the Times' article is an inaccurate and misleading account of testimony given by Administration witnesses to the relevant committees on the implications that it presents of Administration policy toward Nicaragua. This Administration respects and will respect the Boland Amendment which prohibits actions undertaken with the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government.

Q Copy, John?

A Yes.

Q Are you speaking for Mr. Casey, as well?

A Yes.

Q I'm still left up in the air by that statement. The question was whether or not -- I think the question was whether or not U.S. officials believe the freedom fighters in Nicaragua will be able to topple the Sandinista Government by the end of this year, not whether the U.S. is doing anything that has anything to do with (inaudible) matters.

A Now, there are two questions. Now, you're talking about the second question, which is an analytical and a hypothetical question.

Q It's the substance of the story; it's the gist of the story.

A I'm not going to have anything for you on that as it was in closed testimony. But insofar as any suggestion that we are not observing the law, that is not correct. Our policy is to observe the law. None of the testimony that was offered was inconsistent with that position.

Q So the thrust of your statement today is, if a reader got the inference from that Times article that the United States was supporting forces for the purposes of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua, they would be incorrect?

A That is correct.

Q But you're not saying -- you're not specifically denying either Enders or Casey having indicated to people on the Hill that anti-Sandinista forces could win by the end of the year?

A Not denying; just not commenting.

Q You're no commenting on that part?

A That's right. You got it.

Q The words "misleading" and "inaccurate" do not apply to that aspect of the story; it only applies to the aspect that deals with the legality of what the U.S. is doing?

A Correct.

Q Why aren't you commenting on the first part -- that is to say, the lead of the Times story?

A Because that's an analytical question. What we're refuting here, which is somewhat contrary to the position we usually take on closed testimony, is a misleading impression that Administration officials suggested that this Administration was involved in activities to overthrow that government.

Q If you put Enders aside for a moment, is it the Administration's view that there's a good chance that the anti-Sandinistas could be in power in Managua by the end of the year?

A That's what I told you we weren't commenting on.

Q That's the main thrust of the story which you just said is in accurate and misleading.

A No. What we are talking about is U.S. involvement in the overthrow of that government.

Q The story didn't say that they said that the U.S. was planning the overthrow or anything.

A You have a good clarification of our position.

Q So long as you're commenting on one part of closed testimony, why don't you just shoot the works? (Laughter)

A It's very tempting, but I think I will --

Q What it quotes is, it said these two gentlemen made predictions. That's not hypothetical. Did they make such a prediction?

A That's closed testimony, and I'm not going to get into that. We are simply correcting what we consider to be a misunderstanding, misleading --

Q Can we have a sitrep on the situation in Nicaragua, sort of like the one we had on Afghanistan the other day?

A I will certainly convey that request.

Q On the same area, there's a report in the Evans & Novak column that General Alvarez of Honduras was here last week. Did he speak with anybody in this building?

A Yes. I think he spoke with Enders.

Q Is there any readout on that?

A No. He was here on an unofficial visit, but I think he saw -- he certainly saw Assistant Secretary Enders in this building. I think he may have seen people at DOD.

Q Last week we asked a question about the ongoing investigation into the legality or the lack thereof of the use of Israeli weapons, and you said you would look into that.

A Yes, I think we do have something posted on that for you. Why don't you check with the Press Office.

Q Okay. Another thing, where is Habib now?

A Habib is in Beirut today.

Q You don't know how long he'll be staying there?

A Don't know how long he'll be there.

Q I have a question on Lebanon, John. Does the United States take a position on Israel and Lebanon signing a formal peace treaty?

A That's an academic situation. What they have signed is an agreement.

Q What's the question?

A Do we have a position on the signing of a peace treaty.

Q Well, on that academic question, does the United States take a position?

A I think we would take the position we have taken in the past, that should the parties, at an appropriate time, decide to engage in discussions for a real peace treaty with which both were happy, comfortable, that would be up to them.

Q Back on Central America. Do you have any comment on suggestions from several quarters that the number of U.S. advisors in El Salvador is insufficient and will have to be raised?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the suggestions either from General Nutting or from Senator Goldwater about sending troops to El Salvador?

A I think the White House really responded to that this morning, but there's no thought of sending American combat troops to Central America. They haven't been asked for, they're not needed, and the President has made that point on a number of occasions. All our neighbors are asking of us is assistance in training and arms to protect themselves while they build a better and freer life, so nothing to that.

Q Further south, John, do you have anything on the apparent expulsion of some U.S. diplomats from Guyana?

A I think I might have something on that. No, I don't. I misread something here. I don't have anything on that. Sorry.

Q Anything new with our relations with Poland?

A I think the White House pretty much applied itself to that this morning. The United States is certainly discussing and reviewing with its Allies the current situation in Poland. If there are changes and reconciliation in that country, we're certainly prepared to take actions that would further economic development and other progress in Poland, but there's no change in U.S. policy. We're where we have been all along: discussing it and reviewing it with the Allies.

Q You say there are changes or if there are changes?

A If they are changes.

Q Can I follow up on that? Can you explain why Mr. Burt suggested to a meeting of NATO political directors that they ought to consider ways to change the sanctions levied against Poland?

A I'm not confirming or denying what Rick Burt may have done, but it seems to me that if there had been such discussions they would be in line with the kind of consultation that I've suggested might be taking place.

Q But this goes a little bit beyond consultation when you suggest that you work out a plan for taking a certain action.

Let me put it this way: Was anything that he might have done along those lines something that the Department and the Administration, as a whole, had decided to do or is the European Affairs Bureau capable of taking such an initiative on its own hook?

A I think that you're suggesting that we are in a decision-taking mode rather than a mode of discussion and consultation. The Polish situation has been going a long time. There have been all kinds of developments, some positive and some negative. You have the Pope's visit coming up. It seems to me not unreasonable that the Administration might look at the situation and consider possibilities, dependent on actions.

Q What kind of possibilities? The gradual lifting of sanctions, which is the issue?

A Well, I assume that that is something. If you look over the long haul, if you do contingency planning over the long haul, I suppose you would look at the possibility of changes in Poland and decide how you would respond to them.

Q John, before you said that there's been no change and whatever discussions have been taking place have been the same kind of discussions taking place since December of '81.

A That's right.

Q Is that what you're saying?

A Yes, I'm saying --

Q You mean, since December of '81, when the sanctions were imposed, there have been discussions with the Allies about lifting them?

A No, I'm not saying that. But I would think that there is thinking about how you respond to various developments in Poland, and that thinking has been going on over a substantial period of time.

Q Does that thinking now include the gradual lifting of sanctions, depending on what happens when the Pope travels there?

A I said I wasn't going to get into the detail of any discussions that Mr. Burt might have had. But if he had had such discussions, they would be within the framework of the language I just used.

Q And that the discussions of the last two or three weeks, you are saying, are the same kinds of discussions on the same options that have been taking place since December of '81?

A If I get into that, then I'd be telling you what he talked about, if he did talk about anything.

Q That's what you said before. Just on the surface, it makes utterly no sense so I was just wondering if you wanted to stick with that.

A I think I'll stick with it.

Q Is there some anticipation that at the forthcoming meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers a new position will be taken with regard to Poland?

A I don't know about a new position, but it seems to me that it would not be unreasonable that the kind of consultation and discussion that has been going on might go on in that forum.

Q I wanted to get back to Jim's question about an Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty. At the Secretary's first press conference he was asked if he favored it and he said he did; and he was asked if the United States would actively work towards one, and he said it would. I was wondering if that was still operative policy?

A I think you have to see that statement within the framework of this feeling that that would take place at a time the governments of both countries were eager to pursue it, and that it would be a real and meaningful peace treaty. I think that's been our position.

Q A clarification: I don't know if you mean to call it a "peace treaty." Is that really what it is? Is it a peace treaty?

A Is the agreement that Lebanon and Israel signed a peace treaty?

Q Is what Lebanon and Israel signed a peace treaty?

A It's an agreement.

Q But you keep calling it a peace treaty and I was --

A No, I don't keep calling it a peace treaty. People keep asking me whether, succeeding that, there is likely to be a peace treaty.

Q Oh. But actually you answered the question of Jim earlier -- peace treaty --

A No, no. I'm not confusing the agreement that is signed between Israel and Lebanon with a peace treaty, and neither should you.

Q Do you have a statement on Pinochet's declaration that there would be no elections in Chile until 1989?

A No.

Q Could you look into whether we have a position on that?

A Okay.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:25 P.M.)

Alnnon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 24, 1983

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Reported expulsion of two U.S. officials 5-7

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #90

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1983, 1:02 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A housekeeping announcement. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Nicholas Veliotes, before the House Appropriations Committee. That's testimony he's giving at 1:30 today. The Subject is FY-84 Foreign Assistance. I'm afraid that's all I have for you.

Q Do you have anything on frictions between the United States and Panama as reported in the Times this morning?

A No, I really don't, but I think DOD had a statement to make which they did make earlier today. I guess I'd refer you to the Department of Defense on that.

Q On all that was in the article, on every little item? You don't want to comment on anything?

A I don't know how full their statement was.

Q It was three sentences.

A It was three sentences? Certainly, the use of Howard Air Force Base and other military facilities in Panama is in full accordance with agreements we have with the Government of Panama, but as for details of the story mentioned this morning, I guess I'd still refer you to the Pentagon.

Q Could you address the issue of whether or not there are any strains in the U.S.-Panamanian relationship because of the use of Howard Air Force Base?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q You have not had any indications from the Panamanian Government that they are concerned to the extent to which that base is being used?

A No.

Q Can you give us a situation report on Colonel Quaddafi's tongue?

A Colonel Quaddafi's tongue? (Laughter) Do you want to be a little more specific?

Q No, I don't have any more specific question.

A Then I don't have any specific comment.

Q Do you have anything there on this PLO mutiny in the Bekaa?

A No, I don't.

Q What about the request, the seeming request by President Gemayel for increased Multinational Forces in the area where kidnappings have been taking place in Lebanon?

A All I saw was a wire service report this morning, and I certainly don't wish to denigrate a wire service report, but that's all we have seen. I have seen nothing beyond that. There certainly is no official request that I'm aware of.

Q And no intention, as yet, for the U.S. Government to beef up its own troops in the area that you know of?

A No. On the MNF we stand where we have been all along, namely, when we see a plan for a troop pullout from Lebanon, we would examine at that time whether a different deployment of the MNF is called for, a different deployment of the American contingent in the MNF, and whether more American troops are needed. It's a hypothetical situation.

Q A few days ago you said that the matter of Saad Haddad will be decided by the Lebanese Government, or it was left up to the Lebanese Government. Do you consider that this matter has been settled or what is the status of Saad Haddad after --

A I don't know. You'll have to ask the Lebanese Government.

Q It was left up to them only. I mean, you have no side in deciding what will happen with him or the Israelis?

A That's a Lebanese Government decision, and they will make whatever decisions they -- they will implement whatever decisions they may make at whatever time they see fit.

Q Do you have anything at all, John?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the reported Chinese protest against Pan Am flying to Taipei?

A Only a very brief comment, namely, that Ambassador Hummel met with the Chinese last Friday to discuss civil aviation matters, but I'm not able to get into the substance of his exchange. You see, we did have something after all.

Q John, I haven't been here for a few days. You don't have anything substantive on MFN for Romania?

A No.

Q Do you know when that decision is to be made? There's a deadline.

A We have some guidance from about three days ago, and there's nothing beyond that.

Q Do you know when a decision on MFN -- it's next month sometime, right?

A I think June is the actual cutoff point, yes.

Q Do you have any plans to hire Vladimir Danchev of Radio Moscow?

A No, I haven't heard his name bruited about as a candidate for anything.

Q Any reaction to those Moscow radio reports on Afghanistan?

A No.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything on the reported truce in Afghanistan?

A Yes, I do have something on that. Basically, that's a fairly old story. We've been aware for some time of reports from many sources that Panjsher Valley resistance leader, Masud, may have worked out some sort of ceasefire with the Soviets. It's difficult to know what the terms are or what it may mean in this struggle against the Soviet invaders, but it seems clear from all reports that there is no current fighting in the Panjsher. This valley, about 80 kilometers to the northeast of Kabul, was the scene of the heaviest and most publicized fighting between the Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Armed Forces and the Afghanistan mujahidin last year during the spring and summer campaigns.

As we stated last Friday, reports continue to reach us of extremely heavy and brutal Soviet bombing and fighting in various areas of Afghanistan, especially around Herat. In spite of this, the Soviets appear unsuccessful in their attempts to break the back of the mujahidin.

Our outrage at the loss of civilian life grows, and the Soviets are aware of our continuing concern. Surely, all the world must demand an end through a negotiated political settlement of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the sole cause of the destruction and suffering of the Afghan people.

Q I didn't understand. Are you confirming something?

A What we're saying is that the activity by the Soviets continues despite this ceasefire.

Q Are you confirming that such an agreement was reached, or are you only saying that you imply an agreement from the reports that there hasn't been any fighting?

A That's what I'm saying. We've been aware for some time of reports from many sources that they may have worked out a ceasefire.

Q Do you know when it took effect?

A I do not, no.

Q Could you look into it?

A We may be able to pin it down a little -- sure.

Q John, is it the first sort of ceasefire there?

A I don't know, Bernie.

Q Can we have a copy of your statement?

A Sure.

Q Can you be any more specific about the U.S. claims of intense bombing, about either the sources of the reports or the sorties, or anything like that?

A No, I can't really. I thought we were fairly specific last Friday.

Q You said that perhaps hundreds may have been killed, probably thousands. That's a pretty big range.

A If we can produce anything more specific, we'll be glad to. We'll take a look at it.

Q I don't suppose you respect this very much -- and perhaps neither do I -- but the Afghan Government, of course, came out with a routine denial yesterday. That's why I was asking you, is there any way you could suggest to us that one statement would be any more reliable than the other?

A I would think that there wouldn't be much -- Well, I shouldn't say that.

(Laughter)

Q Good question.

A We're confident of the veracity of our statement and our assessment; but let me see if there isn't anything more specific we can give you.

Q Do you have anything on the statement of the Government of Mozambique that they will continue to provide facilites to the ANC, or anything after the raid since yesterday?

A No, not really beyond what we did yesterday.

Q Or anything more on the reported expulsion by the Guyana Government of two U.S. officials?

A   Yes, we do have something on that. We're not going to get into the diplomatic exchanges that might be going on between our two governments on that question, but allegations were made that two U.S. Embassy officers were engaged in improper political activities in the town of Linden. The fact is, those allegations are without foundation.

In keeping with the normal practice of visits on a periodic basis, two of our diplomats visited Linden on May 16. They met with bauxite mining officials and also attempted, without success, to call on the regional chairman of the Ruling People's National Congress Party. A protest by bauxite workers over food shortages began more than a week before that visit by U.S. diplomats.

Q   This is what you had on Sunday. You don't know whether anyone is coming home?

A   No. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q   A few days ago officials met with the leaders of the American Jewish Committee here in the State Department --

A   I'm sorry. I didn't get the beginning.

Q   Officials, State Department officials, met a few days ago with leaders of the American Jewish Committee. Are there any plans of meeting with the Arab-American Committee?

A   Yes, there sure are. And indeed, such meetings may have taken place. I'm not quite sure. But certainly corresponding groups are coming in from the Arab community.

Q   Can we get more information on that?

A   Yes. We'll dig out the details for you.

Q   On Guyana, has the Department decided not to address the question of whether they are being expelled, or is it you just don't know?

A   It's just a question that we're not going to get into the situation where it stands at the moment.

Q   Normally, you do in such cases.

A   O.K. normally, we might do. But at the moment, we're not going to get into it.

Q Does that mean at the moment nobody has been recalled or transferred or come out?

A Why don't we just leave it that we are in diplomatic consultations with that government, and I don't have anything for you at the moment.

Q John, Habib?

A Habib is in Beirut and has no plans, that I know of, to leave there in the next day or so.

Q Any change in the Syria non-invitation?

A No.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to Karen de Young's article in The Post today?

A No.

Q The Israelis are saying that Prime Minister Begin will definitely be here the middle of June. Are we confirming it or --

A No. We're not confirming it, but as I said, there has been discussion about the Prime Minister coming here; he's welcome. But there is no specific date set that I'm aware of.

Q Anything new on that cross-border warfare situation in southern Africa?

A No.

Q Or anything on southern Africa?

A No.

(The briefing concluded at 1:13 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, May 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #91

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a number of housekeeping announcements. Just a reminder that there will be no daily press briefing tomorrow, Thursday. The briefing also will not take place on Friday due to the Economic Summit in Williamsburg. And, as Monday is a Federal holiday, there will be no briefing on Monday either, a long weekend.

The Press Office will be closed on Monday, but will operate on the Sunday schedule.

Although the usual briefing will not be held at noon, there will be a background briefing on the Secretary's North-South speech before the Foreign Policy Association. We do expect to have that speech available on an embargoed basis tomorrow morning in the Press Office.

For foreign correspondents there will also be a background briefing at the Foreign Press Center at 10:30. That's the Foreign Press Center at 10:30; here at noon, there's the North-South speech.

Q How about in New York?

A No plans to.

Q Those of us who go to New York to cover the speech will be unbriefed?

A You'll probably know more about it than the briefer.

Q What time will he give the speech, John?

A About 1:00 p.m. I think it's piped in here at 1:00.

Q Is there a Q&A?

A   There is a Q&A for members of the Foreign Policy Association. They get to ask questions.

The Secretary will be traveling to Paris, June 7 to 10, to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting. There's a sign-up sheet in the Press Office for those of you who are interested in applying for a seat on the plane. The sign-up sheet will be taken down, applications closed promptly at noon on Tuesday, May 31.

Q   It's just Paris, no place else?

A   It's just Paris. He's not going anywhere else. He'll leave on Tuesday, come back on Friday night.

Also, tomorrow, 2:30 in this Briefing Room, there will be a background briefing on Premier Nakasone's visit.

Q   What time is it?

A   That is 2:30 tomorrow, here.

While Secretary Shultz is in New York tomorrow, he will meet with the Foreign Ministers of the Front Line States. That's Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

In addition, he'll meet with Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization. Finally, he will be talking with Zairian Foreign Minister Kamada wa Kamanda, who is serving this month as President of the U.N. Secretary Council.

The Secretary will be discussing with the Front Line States' foreign ministers the state of play in the negotiations to secure independence for Namibia. His meeting with Mr. Nujoma is in the same context. Those meetings will be held at the United Nations Plaza Hotel.

The Press Office for the Secretary will be in Room 3528 of the U.N. Plaza, and you can reach Darlene Kirk, who will cover the office at 355-3400, Extension 3528. That's the U.N. Plaza Hotel, Extension 3528.

Q   Will you be briefing after these meetings?

A Yes, I think I'll do something after the meetings.

Q It will be late afternoon?

A It'll be late afternoon, early evening.

We are also making available in the Press Office, right after this briefing, a statement concerning a request by the United States that Cuba take back certain Cuban nationals who came to the United States during the Mariel boatlift of 1980. If you have any questions or queries about this statement, you should be in touch with ARA Press Office at 632-2391. That's the ARA Press Office, 632-2391.

That's about it. I'll be glad to take to take your questions.

Q Do you have the statement itself; can you read it?

A It's a long statement. I'm not going to read it. You can pick it up in the Press Office afterwards.

Q But it's a request as opposed to --

A It tells of a meeting between Secretary Enders, I think, yesterday and the head of the Cuban Interests Section, making our request and telling what action we will then take.

Q Was that a cordial meeting?

A It was a businesslike meeting; businesslike and brief, I think.

Q John, do you have anything on a reported encounter over Lebanon between Syrian and Israeli jets?

A A little. The situation is not really clear. As you know, there are conflicting reports. We've seen those reports. We cannot confirm them. If they are true, they point up the continued danger and tension brought about by the presence in Lebanon of external forces. Such incidents are counterproductive to the efforts undertaken the United States and countries in the region and elsewhere interested in achieving the expeditious withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and restoring stability to that country. We urge all parties to exercise full restraint.

Q What can you not confirm -- that there was a clash or that the --

A Obviously, there were aircraft in the sky. We cannot confirm the firing of the missiles.

Q And you do confirm that they were Syrians and Israelis?

A We can confirm that there were Syrian and Israeli aircraft in the air, yes. There's no question about that.

Q In light of the treaty or agreement that was signed, how do these Israeli overflights fit within that? I mean, are they legitimate and legal by the United States?

A There's no relationship to the agreement because the agreement is not in force yet.

Q Regardless, how do you view those overflights by the Israeli Air Force over Syrian-controlled Lebanese area?

A You have certain realities. You have Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon; you have Syrian forces in Lebanon. While that continues you have the danger of confrontation on the ground or in the air.

Q Israel states, John, that it is necessary for its security. Do you agree with that? Do you see that as --

A I'm not getting into what they're doing now or what the difference that there might be when the agreement is in force. I think the facts speak for themselves.

You have a situation where you have forces almost nose-to-nose, and you have aircraft in the area, and that is not a good situation.

Q Are you saying that it is because the agreement is not in force? I mean, the agreement was signed by both parties.

A Yes, but I think the instruments of ratification have not yet be exchanged.

Q And once it is, will such flights be --

A I'll let the two parties explain what that means.

Q So it's up to the two parties, then?

A Yes.

Q The Pakistani Foreign Minister is meeting with the Secretary this afternoon.

A Yes.

Q Do you know what the talks are focused on?

A I think he actually was in this morning. The Foreign Minister is visiting the capitals of the Security Council's permanent members to brief them on the results of the latest round of U.N.-sponsored indirect talks on the Afghanistan crisis, and his visit to Washington at this time is part of that mission.

In his meeting with the Foreign Minister, Secretary Shultz reiterated U.S. support of the U.N. negotiations and U.S. support for the applicable U.N. resolutions, which call for total Soviet troop withdrawal, an independent non-aligned Afghanistan, free of outside interference, Afghan self-determination and return of the refugees with safety and honor.

This has been the consistent U.S. position.

Q John, any bilateral questions brought up?

A I'm sure there were.

Q Can you give any indication --

A I don't have a readout on them.

Q Is Ambassador Draper coming home tomorrow and, if so, why?

A Yes, I think he'll be home tomorrow, more or less on schedule. I think he'll probably take a few days off, and then be in the Department for consultations.

Q And Ambassador Habib?

A No. Habib is in Beirut, and for the moment will stay there.

--MORE--

Q John, can you tell us whether in connection with the Syrian-Israeli confrontation today, even though the agreement is not in effect -- is not technically in effect yet -- can you tell us whether Israeli complied with the terms of what will be the agreement; that is to say, notify Lebanon in advance? Have they scheduled the points?

A I don't know; I have no idea.

Q There have been reports that Secretary Shultz extended an invitation to Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. Is this true; and, if so, when?

A I think certainly not in the sense of a formal invitation. If you mean when he was in Syria did he suggest that Foreign Minister Khaddam was always welcome in the United States; yes, but I do not have anything beyond that.

Q John, can you say what developments there may be in the provision of high technology to China?

A Yes, I can. I think you have most of this guidance, but let me just repeat it.

Over the past two years, this Administration has taken numerous steps to expedite and to raise the level of U.S. dual-use exports to China in order to respond to the needs of U.S. business and to support Chinese economic modernization.

For the past several months, the Administration has been further reviewing its policy. This review has led to a decision in principle to improve administrative and procedural aspects of our export controls in order to make those controls reflect more accurately our relationship with China. When details of these improvements have been finally worked out, an appropriate announcement will be made.

Q Can I have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, on the Damascus visit, it's my understanding that the Secretary said something along the lines of Khaddam having [illegible] in the United States on two Arab League missions, but never having been here as a Syrian Foreign Minister and that he was always welcome to come in his own right.

A Yes, sure.

Q Is it now in his own ballpark to explore the possibility of arranging dates or is it up to the Secretary to suggest --

A You know how those meetings get scheduled, I don't know. It's kind of hard to say in whose ballpark it is, but you're absolutely correct in your recollection. The Secretary did say the Foreign Minister of Syria was always welcome, and he'd be happy to see him in Washington, but I don't think it's gone beyond that on either side.

Q There's been no --

A No.

Q -- feeling now with the prospect on the Syrians coming?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q John, there is a report that I just heard that Prime Minister Begin sent a letter to President Reagan articulating, complaining, bringing to the President's attention, the increased armaments, as he calls them, in the Bekaa by Syria, that he believes, would increase the tension. Can you confirm the receipt of such a letter?

A As you know, we don't get into Presidential letters back and forth. I mean, it would be logical that there would have been correspondence, I suppose, between the President and Prime Minister following the agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

Obviously, Israel is concerned about developments in Syria and involving Syrians in Lebanon, but I'm not going to get into any of the details of any correspondence that might or might not have taken place.

Q Not details, just the receipt of a recent letter.

A I wouldn't steal you away from the idea that there has been an exchange of correspondence; it would be logical.

Q John, you said earlier when you answered the question about the overflights or the dogfight, that you urge all parties to exercise restraint. Can you also apply this asking of both parties or all parties to exercise restraint in the matter of the overflight and reconnaissance flight, because this heightened the tension and increased the instability in the area. Why aren't you addressing this question because you refuse to get into the agreement or disagreement about Israel's overflights?

A I'm not sure I get the drift of your question.

Q You said that --

A We're always for restraint.

Q Including the overflights, including the reconnaissance flights? Can you answer this?

A I'm not talking about the agreement which is not in effect. I'm talking about the situation as it exists today.

Q My colleague asked you whether if -- Israel is saying this morning that they would continue their reconnaissance flights over Lebanon or in that area, or in the Bekaa; so by insisting and continuing these overflights and reconnaissance flights, this is heightening the tension in the area instead of -- you are asking them to exercise restraint in fighting each other, it looks like, but you are not asking them to stop overflights.

A What we're asking is for a withdrawal of all foreign troops. You have certain realities while you have troops there. You're probably going to have aircraft movements. If troops were up there, then you maybe have a different situation.

Q If there are forces which are occupying a part of Lebanon -- which are -- and they have the normal routine of flying, it's different from intentionally overflying other people's area and trying to reconnaissance.

So routinely it is acceptable, but it is not a new situation -- even with the presence of occupying forces there.

A No, but you have certain realities. You have troops on both sides, and you have air cover or air patrols taking place.

Q Do you have any further information on the differences between the U.S. Government and Egypt concerning the Ras Banas base?

A No, nothing beyond what I gave you earlier in the week, or whenever it was -- a few days ago.

Q John, can you tell us anything about whether the Administration is in fact negotiating with Congress over some plan to deal with the vote on Nicaragua aid?

A No. Consultations have been taking place with a number of Congressional committees, but I don't think it would be appropriate for us to get into the details until there's some conclusion to those negotiations, discussions, consultations.

Q Can you confirm that Mr. Enders has sent to the Hill a draft of a proposal calling for Congress to be able to exercise a veto over the Nicaraguan operation by a joint resolution adopted by Congress?

A I can't confirm that he's sent a draft, but it would be logical that Mr. Enders would have been involved in these consultations.

Q John, let me just --

Q Wait a minute. Are you confirming the content of the draft as spelled out anyway?

A No. I'm confirming that there have been consultations and that Mr. Enders would logically have been involved in them.

Q Is there anything either misleading or inaccurate about the account by Phillip Taubman in the New York Times today about what the Administration is saying to Congress?

A I must confess I would have to go back and read it more carefully, but I think we have said rather specifically what we have felt about the issue covered in that story.

Q John, did you make public the Dobrynin meeting with the Secretary last week?

A I honestly don't know whether we did make public the Dobrynin meeting, but there's no problem about -- I can't remember what day such a meeting took place.

O Do you know whether at the meeting a Gromyko meeting was discussed between the Secretary and --

A I do not know whether such a meeting was discussed. I'm not aware of it.

Q Could you take the question of whether there are any discussions about it?

A I would doubt that we would confirm what the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin had discussed.

Q John, I want to go back to the "certain realities" that you mentioned earlier of occupying forces. Would you consider the "certain realities" applicable to the Syrian overflights over that area of the Bekaa Valley while trying to protect their government?

A We think Lebanon is a sovereign, independent country; we think it ought to be able to operate as a sovereign, independent country, being in control of its own territory and its own borders. That's what we're working towards.

That involves the speediest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces. We have an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. We're looking for a similar kind of understanding or agreement between Lebanon and Syria which would permit Syrian forces and the PLO to withdraw. We believe that when the withdrawal of those forces has taken place, the danger of such confrontations as may have taken place today in the air, or on the ground, would be substantially lessened -- if not removed.

Q John, would you call Syrian surveillance of South Lebanon normal, as you did now -- just for the heck of it?

A I really don't think that there's any purpose in that. You have certain realities when troops are on the ground, when airplanes are flying, and we would prefer that they all not be there.

I'm sure Lebanon would prefer that they all not be there.

You have certain realities with working to get that situation regressed.

Q John, can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q I have one more. When the Secretary meets with the Front Line States, are there any other bilaterals scheduled, specifically with the Angolans?

A No; not to my knowledge.

Q O.K., thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, May 31, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #92

TUESDAY, MAY 31, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have any response to what appeared, I believe, in some Damascus radio broadcast or a Syrian newspaper today that indirectly suggested that in a new round of fighting, the United States would be targeted as well, and there was a suggestion of the Marines.

A I don't. I might note that as far as the area itself is concerned, as I think the Secretary indicated over the weekend, we are encouraged that the tensions in the area seemed to have eased somewhat over the weekend.

We, once again, urge the parties to exercise the utmost restraint in order to reduce the risk of conflict. As we've noted several times during the past week, renewed violence serves no ones interest and further complicates diplomatic efforts and the achieving of the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Q In that connection, the same announcement from Damascus made reference to rapid deployment force maneuvers off the California coast. Do you have any comment on that?

A I'm not aware of the report; I'm not aware of what connection was being drawn. In any case, I think I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon in terms of maneuvers.

Q Is Habib back?

A No. He is in Beirut.

Q Is he coming back soon?

A I don't have anything in terms of onward plans. As you know, we have not tended to give his schedule out in advance.

Q Do you have anything on the mutiny in the PLO in the Bekaa valley?

A I don't.

Q Anything about the reports in Damascus about seizures of depots, that sort of thing?

A No, I don't have anything on that at all.

Q On the Lebanese radio, it says Lebanon made approaches to France to mediate in the troop withdrawal question. What would be the U.S. attitude to a French mediation?

A I don't have a ready response to give to you. I'm not aware of that particular report. My understanding is that there have been some discussions between the Lebanese and the Syrians, and that the Lebanese are looking forward to perhaps having some further discussions, but I don't have any indication to back up the troop withdrawal --

Q Would there be any objection to the French trying to play a role?

A I don't see a particular objection to the French playing a role, but I'm also not aware that that's happening. Obviously, we have remained in very close touch with all of our Allies, including particularly the MNF contributing nations.

A French role is not surprising, it seems to me, but I don't know of a particular role that I can turn to.

Q Then a French role wouldn't necessarily undercut the U.S. effort, you don't think, at this point?

A You're asking me to comment on something that's quite speculative, and I really am not prepared to go into it. I think we're all working towards the same objective which is to get all the foreign forces out and help Lebanon re-establish it sovereign authority throughout the territory of Lebanon.

As to what particular steps might be the most effective, I really am not in a position to say.

Q A few days ago there was a speech by President Mubarak of Egypt in the Sudan where he was reported to have criticized for the first time the agreement and drawing a difference between Israel's presence in Lebanon and that of Syria's. Do you have any comment on that?

A I saw a report. I don't have an official response, but I must say I saw a report which indicated that that initial report was not accurate, so I would ask you to check that out.

Q Can I ask one other thing? There are reports today that Israel is opening new roads in the Bekaa area and the mountain areas of Lebanon where they are present to minimize the so-called casualties. Do you have any comment on this?

A I'm not aware of the report, so I can't comment on it.

Q The Kuawaiti parliament denounced the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q No comment.

Q Over the last several days, Moshe Arens and some other Israeli officials have made public pronouncements regarding a possible pre-emptive attack against Syria. Does the United States have any position on that?

A I'm not aware of discussions of pre-emptive attack by the Israelis, so I think that would be quite speculative.

Q Just as the Lebanese attack was last summer?

Can I ask one more on that question? Does Shultz expect to last in office any longer than Haig did after he helped arrange the attack in Lebanon last year?

A I think that that's a quite tendentious and inappropriate question to be asking.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports from Manila that the United States and the Philippines have reached a bases agreement?

A Simply that our discussions with the Philippines Government on military bases have gone well, and we're hopeful the conclusion of the military base review will take place tomorrow.

Q Can you tell us anything about the funding involved in the base agreement?

A We would be prepared to address future security assistance programs with the Philippines when we announce the conclusion of the bases review.

Q Anything on the postponed visit by the Israeli Prime Minister to the States?

A I don't have anything new on that. I think it has been addressed here before last week. John talked about it a bit; he indicated that the Prime Minister would be welcomed at any point but that at that point, and to my knowledge, as of this point, there has been nothing specific set.

I'm not steering you away from the likelihood that there might be a visit, but I don't have anything specific to offer you in terms of how that would be evolving.

Q Do you have an explanation to three letters which were sent last week to the Secretary, Mr. Dam and Mr. Veliotes and, I believe the third one, Mr. Richard Fairbanks, about the meeting of Arab-American organizations? Three organizations refused to attend the meeting due to the invitation of the American-Lebanese League, and they sent a letter to the Secretary, to the State Department.

Do you have any response, or do you want to check on that for me?

A I don't think I would respond publicly. I'm not aware of it, first of all. But if there was a concern, I'm sure that there would be a response to whoever wrote --

Q I understand that five organizations -- at least four organizations broke up the meeting which was called by the State Department due to the invitation of the American- Lebanese League which is supposed to be outside the area of these organizations, if you'll check on that for me.

A I'll look into it. I can't promise you an answer because it may come down to a matter of our wanting to communicate privately. But in any case, I'll look into it.

Q What is your analysis of the outcome of the Hartman-Gromyko meeting?

A I don't have an analysis. I understand that they did meet for about an hour at Ambassador Hartman's request and covered issues of mutual concern. I understand the

Ambassador gave to Foreign Minister Gromyko a copy of the statement issued in Williamsburg on arms control, but I don't have --

Q Gromyko repeated the statement that the Soviets had issued on the eve of a summit, too, I understand.

A That, I don't know. In any case, I don't have a readout, and I don't have an assessment.

Q On the bilateral issues, was there anything on the Middle East at all?

A I think that we have tended not to try to list agenda items when we've had bilateral discussions, for the most part, with the Soviets, and I'm going to have to leave it at that.

Q Anything on the travel plans of Ambassador Motley or the reassignment of Ambassador Hinton?

A No. My understanding is that Ambassador Motley is still in Brazil. I don't know of immediate travel plans for him.

I have nothing on Ambassador Hinton. I do know he's due for home leave sometime soon, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q In the letter last week, about the meeting with the Arab groups, you also said that American-Jewish groups would be meeting. Have they met somebody at the State Department, and who did they meet?

A There was a session that I think John talked about --

Q With American-Jewish groups?

A With American-Jewish groups.

Q Who did they meet?

A In about the same timeframe. Perhaps a day or so before the Arab-American --

Q Can you tell us who they met?

A Let me see what we had on that. I don't have it in my head specifically who was involved. You might check at the Press Office, and we'll see what we can produce for you on that.

Q Getting back to Latin America again for a moment. First of all, any comment on the offensive by the guerrillas in El Salvador that was begun on Friday and reported victories today?

A I don't have anything for you.

Q Can I follow also, do you have any comment on the New York Times editorial on safehaven for Salvadoran refugees in the U.S.?

A I do. We've addressed this issue before, but I will give you something on that again.

Granting of extended voluntary departure requires the most careful assessment of the situation of the countries concerned. Extended voluntary departure is granted by the Attorney General, usually upon the recommendation of the Department of State, to aliens in the United States based upon an overall assessment of our national interest, including foreign policy, immigration policy and humanitarian issues.

It means that those who would otherwise be deported from the United States are permitted to remain here. Extended voluntary departure is not appropriate for Salvadorans at the present time because it would encourage further illegal immigration to the United States from El Salvador, a country from which there has long been substantial illegal immigration. Moreover, Salvadorans in the United States passed through other countries before they arrived here in which they could have obtained refuge.

--MORE--

Q Can you tell us whether you have any comment on the Contadora conclusion?

A The Contadora conclusion? In what sense?

Q The communique that was issued by the Contadora Group, I believe today or late yesterday, at the conclusion of their meetings in Panama City -- the establishment of a commission?

A I don't have anything for you.

Q One of the groups belonging to the FDR/FMLN has claimed responsibility for the death of Commander Schaufelberger. One of their spokesmen, Ruben Zamora, is a frequent visitor to this city. Will this affect the issuance of visas in the future to Zamora, the death of Schaufelberger?

A Let me just comment on the claim. I don't have anything to give you on Zamora. Regarding the claimed responsibility, we've seen reports to the effect that you cite, but at this point, we don't have anything to confirm the claim.

Related to this, we have had reports of an apparent change recently in guerrilla tactics, which have been characterized by executions and assassinations. As an illustration, on the evening of May 24, after a lengthy firefight, a company of Salvadoran Army personnel surrendered to a significantly larger guerrilla force after the Army unit had run out of ammunition.

Available in the Press Office is a report which has been declassified that describes the execution of these soldiers by the guerrillas following the army unit's surrender. Many of those executed had been shot in the head and their bodies mutiliated. This incident follows closely on the heels of a similar execution of soldiers and civil defense forces in Cinquera, Cabanas Department, two weeks ago, as reported in the press.

Q Copy of that Alan?

A Yes.

Q Do you know or have an analysis of why there is this change in tactics?

A I don't.

Q May we have a copy of that Salvador refugee statement also?

A Sure.

Q Can I ask a question on the Middle East, please? There is an article today in The New York Times about collective punishment, locking up people on the West Bank at 1:00, and children and women are asked to do certain things. Do you have any comment on these reports?

A Without addressing the specific allegations contained in the article, I would simply point out that, as is well known, we are opposed to collective punishment wherever it occurs. For a further readout on our assessment of the situation in the occupied territories, I would refer you to the 1982 Human Rights Report.

Q You have no specifics on this particular report?

A I don't have a specific --

Q Will somebody be able to look, to verify these things in the --

A I think I'm going to stand on this. I think that what I gave you at the beginning of that --

Q I have a point here. The point is that Israel is the recipient of about $3 billion a year. I, as an American, a reporter, would like to know what this government views about these things are --

A I gave you a view.

Q -- instead of citing something from 1980-something.

A As I said, as is well known, we are opposed to collective punishment wherever it occurs, but I'm not commenting specifically on the allegations in that report.

Q Do you have anything on the suspension of the civil rights in Peru?

A Yes, I do. The measures taken by the Peruvian Government in response to the recent terrorist attacks are internal matters of Peru. I would note that the State of Emergency declared Monday is within the terms of their constitution.

We, of course, strongly condemn these violent terrorist attacks against a friendly democratically-elected government.

Q Do you have any comment on who is funding the guerrillas in Peru?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Alan, earlier on you said that you were encouraged that tensions had been somewhat eased, or whatever you said, over the weekend, in the Middle East. Can you ascribe a reason to it? Why has that happened?

A I can't ascribe a specific reason other than some of the activities that were going on, such as the exercises the Syrians were conducting have apparently come to a halt.

While we are encouraged by this reduction, I would not want to lead you to believe that we are still not concerned about the situation.

Q Has there been any withdrawal of the forces from Syria and Israel that were brought in last week?

A I'm not in a position to confirm that for you. I've seen some reports indicating that there may have been some withdrawal of some of the Syrian forces that were introduced, but perhaps not all of them. But I can't confirm that.

Q What is your estimate on the number of Syrians in Lebanon?

A We haven't been giving an estimate. I don't have one at this point.

Q Aside from the public inability of diplomacy so far to get the Syrian forces to agree to pull out, can you tell us whether you are equally encouraged on whatever we can't see diplomatically leading toward the withdrawal of foreign forces.

A I would say that we are continuing to work the problem quite assiduously; others are trying to work the problem. We still think that it is an important objective, one that is achievable.

To go back to what was said at the time that the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement was reached, there is obviously a lot of hard work to be done. But as we also indicated at the time, the risks which are attendant to any action and the risks of not withdrawing are higher for all the parties, we believe, than the risks of withdrawing.

Q Have the U.S.-Soviet contacts contributed to the lessening of tensions?

A I don't want to try to make an assessment of that sort. We have made clear before that we have indicated our views on the situation to the Soviets and the seriousness with which we take the situation there in the hope that they would make a positive contribution to the reduction of tensions. But I don't think I could take it beyond that or try to give you some assessment of whether those conversations have been a particular factor here.

Q Alan, you said others are working on the Syrian withdrawal. Were you referring to the Saudis, or did you have other people in mind?

A I don't think I really am in a position to try to specify.

Q Would the Saudis be among them?

A Why don't you ask the Saudis what they are doing?

Q Can you comment on the story which appeared by the Jewish Telegraph Agency that 60 Congressmen signed a letter sent to the Ambassador of Syria here in Washington, and copies were sent to you? It was a campaign by Congressman Gary Ackerman about an Israeli-American soldier from Brooklyn who was missing since June of last year. You have copies of the letter.

My second point in this question: Would you show the same concern to the fate of these people on the West Bank as much as the State Department and the Congress will show to the fate of a 20-year-old American-Israeli soldier who has been missing since last year?

A I think the concern about the missing has been addressed before. It's one that has been addressed as an important issue in the overall resolution of tensions and conflict in the region. I think it has been addressed largely in the context of the entire group of people who might be concerned on all sides, and I don't think that I would care to comment on an individual case.

Q Without taking me back to the 1982 Report of Human Rights which we saw last year, would you read a phrase or reiterate your position about this collective punishment and this persecution of Palestinians who are living on the West Bank and all of this maltreatment that they are exposed to daily?

A I gave you a statement on that.

Q Have you determined if there are any Soviet advisers with the Syrians in Lebanon?

A I have nothing really to give you beyond the precise statements we've given you on this before.

Q No change on that at all?

A I don't have any change.

Q You're still that precise?

A That precise. (Laughter)

Q Just back on El Salvador briefly, this execution incident, was that the first --

A Which incident?

Q I think you said the May 24 incident, execution of soldiers.

A Yes.

Q Was that the first evidence that you have of this change in tactics?

A I don't have a history to give you on that. I would take from what I have given you that there is perceived to be a change. Whether that is absolutely the first instance of that sort, I can't really say. But I would stick with what I've just given you about the indications that there seems to be something worth looking at there.

Q Alan, on the INF statement issued by the Department on Saturday, in that statement it made reference to the fact that the Soviet alleged moratorium on the deployment was not followed. The statement said that we note that the deployment has continued last year.

My question is, does the deployment continue this year?

A In terms of SS-20 deployments?

Q Right.

A Yes. I think the Secretary indicated in Williamsburg that there is continuing deployment of SS-20s.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, June 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #93

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1983, 12:41 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements.

I'm not going to read to you, but I have a rather lengthy announcement which is available in the Press Office, together with accompanying guidance, on the Philippine base agreement. I would simply note that in Manila today, June 1, the United States and Philippine Government representatives signed a Memorandum of Agreement concluding our review of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement. Copies of the Memorandum of Agreement, the joint U.S.-Philippine statement, Ambassador Armacost's statement, and the text of the letter by President Reagan to President Marcos are available in the Press Office, together with a more expanded version of this announcement. Let me ask you to get that later.

Second, a statement about yellow rain and the articles and stories which appeared about the great bee caper.

Q The what?

A You haven't been following the news. The bees.

Q Is that a State Department appellation? The "great bee caper"?

A No. That's my appellation.

Q A bee caper is called a sting. (Laughter)

A Thank you. That's very good.

We've seen the press reports on the hypothesis advanced at the American Association for the Advancement of Science, AAAS, in Detroit that the source of yellow rain may be bee excrement. (Laughter)

The hypothesis that yellow rain, trichothecene mycotoxin, may be a natural phenomenon has in fact been exhaustively studied and subsequently rejected by responsible and qualified scientists in and out of government.

Samples of trichothecene mycotoxin taken from actual attack sites comprise only a portion of the total body of evidence that toxins are being used as weapons. The full range of evidence includes eye-witness accounts of attacks by victims, and further testimony by medical and relief workers, journalists, defectors, private U.S. and foreign citizens, and government officials.

Data from other samples, human blood and urine and tissues analyzed following the autopsy of victims have confirmed the presence of trichothecene mycotoxins. Direct interviews with attack victims by medical personnel, information from sensitive intelligence sources, and analysis of toxin residues actually found in the area of attack corroborate our conclusions.

Taken as a whole, this evidence contradicts the natural phenomenon hypothesis. It is incorrect to speculate and draw conclusions on the basis of a narrow analysis, admittedly incomplete, of one limited aspect of a portion of the evidence in isolation from the full range of available data.

Specifically, the notion that trichothecene mycotoxins originate in bee droppings is proven false by the following: One sample residue, droplet, in which toxin was present was removed from a rock at an attack site and weighed 300 milligrams, certainly more than a bee could drop. (Laughter)

The toxic effects of falling yellow rain have been reported to be immediate. The level of toxin causing immediate debilitating and often fatal effects in humans is certainly sufficient to kill a bee. Trichothecene mycotoxin affects all living systems. In short, a bee could not survive to excrete the toxin.

The bee speculation ignores the fact that pollen was not found to be present in all samples analyzed, including three that were found to contain the toxins.

Yellow rain attacks have been limited in both geographical location and to groups resisting the regimes in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. If the occurrence of trichothecene mycotoxin were of natural origin, such as from bee droppings, toxic effects would surely be more widespread in the region, afflicting other areas and groups of people. Nothing of the kind has been reported in any of the three countries, nor has such a phenomenon been observed in neighboring countries.

Our evidence continues to mount that trichothecene mycotoxins are being used. We believe that in drawing independent conclusions, people should focus on the entire body of evidence. In the face of this persuasive and incriminating data drawn from multiple sources, speculation which serves to divert attention from the continuing human tragedy in Asia does little to contribute to a solution of the problem.

Q Is that all?

A That is all.

Q Could you give me a buzz if you get any more?

Q Copies, copies.

A Copies, copies. Yes.

Q Alan, the study did admit that this was only an element of the problem, but your statement doesn't seem to indicate that.

A I think, again, the point of the statement is to say that you have to take all of this evidence together, and that in fact when you take it -- including this part about levels and sites and all the other evidence taken together -- it just doesn't hold together that this would be the cause. That is the whole point, that you've got to take it across -- it isn't to deny that there may be some pollen or not. That is not addressing the specific. It's a question of whether this can, in fact, be taken as a refutation of the point that's been made now several times about yellow rain, and the conclusion is quite clearly that that previous evidence stands.

Q Putting aside for a moment the scientific debate over whether or not the conclusion is valid, aren't you afraid that the conclusion reached and announced at the scientific convention will have the effect worldwide of bolstering the skepticism about U.S. evidence on chemical weapons?

A I can't say. It might, in the sense that if people do not take into account the full body of evidence that is available and the various factors cited in this statement, for example, they might be led to that kind of a conclusion, that indeed there is nothing here. But I

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think that indeed one of the points of this statement is to make sure that people don't lose sight of this entire body of evidence which does exist.

Q Has this ample body of evidence, of which you speak, ever been made available to independent scientists?

A Yes. I'd refer you back, Roberto, to the transcripts of on-the-record briefings which have been held here about how these samples have been analyzed and so on. I think you will find that independent analysis is a very important part of that.

Q Another question, a follow-up. When you say that this may be a diversion of -- an effort to divert the discussions --

A I don't think that's quite what it said. I think what the statement said was "speculation which serves to divert attention" whether it has that intention or not, I'm not trying to ascribe motives.

The statement is simply saying, in the face of this persuasive and incriminating data drawn from multiple sources, speculation which serves to divert attention from the continuing human tragedy in Asia does little to contribute to the solution of the problem

Q Is this a product of the East Asia Bureau, this statement you read?

A I don't think I would get into the question of where it came from. It is the --

Q What is the impulse in the building for putting this long statement out?

A I think it comes from those who have, over a long period of time, worked on this problem and are concerned that information be kept straight on the issue. But I don't think I'm going to get into the question of who's drafting what.

Q I understand that Ambassador Stone is leaving for El Salvador tomorrow morning. Could you tell us something about his trip -- who he'll see, how long will he stay, and will he be taking any press?

A I can give you a little bit about this. Ambassador Stone, as I'm sure you're aware, will be sworn in today in the Department this afternoon at 3:30.

As to his travel plans, he will be traveling to the region June 2-14. The purpose of the trip is to allow him to meet those senior officials in Central American countries, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico whom he has not previously met and to renew his acquaintance with those whom he already knows.

Q You've said Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico. You didn't say El Salvador.

A I said Central American countries, which incorporates --

Q Oh. Well, then could you tell which countries is he going to, Alan?

A Yes. He's going to El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama -- I mentioned Colombia and Venezuela -- Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Belize, Mexico, and then back to Washington.

Q Who's he going to see in Nicaragua?

A I don't have details of individuals he might be seeing in any of these stops.

Q But he will be seeing Nicaraguan officials?

A I do not have details. I presume that in fact he will be seeing officials in each of these stops, but I don't have at this point -- and I'm not sure that in each of these stops in fact the names of the people he will be seeing have been set.

Q Given the extended itinerary and the relatively brief time that he'll be gone, can this be seen anything more than a get-acquainted trip?

A One objective is to get the views of the regional officials on the issues facing Central America and the U.S. aspect of those issues. This is intended as a fact-finding trip, one designed to enable him to take the measure of the leaders and their concerns.

The trip is in the context of his new mission, to support discussions and conferences among the countries of the region and within each country.

Q I had asked, Alan, in that long question of mine, if he was taking any press.

A I'm not aware, Bill, that he's planning to take any press with him.

B1/

Q Is he meeting with any leaders of guerrilla movements or opposition movements in any of these countries?

A Again, I don't have details on any people that he will be meeting.

Q Could you take the question so we can be informed on that?

A I can certainly look into it.

Q Does he leave today or does he leave tomorrow?

A Tomorrow.

Q Who will swear him in? Secretary Shultz?

A Secretary Shultz, I'm sure, will -- or I understand; I shouldn't say I'm sure -- but I understand will be at that swearing in ceremony. Whether he actually does the swearing in or whether it's done by a Protocol official or something of that sort, I don't know.

Q That ceremony is closed?

A That's correct. It's not a press event.

Q Is the first stop El Salvador, or is it -- what is the first stop?

A The first stop is El Salvador. I think I could probably give you the list with the --

Q Itinerary?

A Yes. It's sort of "if it's Monday, it must be Colombia" kind of thing.

Q Do you have dates for each country?

A Yes. It's basically a day in each country.

Q Also on Latin America, the appearance that the Secretary is making this afternoon, is that going to be available?

A It's not a press event either. If there's any change on that, I will -- you're talking about in the --

Q Council on the Americas.

A If there's any change, I will be sure that you know, but we'll also see if we cannot make available the text of remarks he might have. But I don't have that for you yet.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, why is that not a press event, because in past years all of those sessions with senior officials who have addressed this organization have been open to the press? Last year and the year before.

A Okay, maybe last year and the year before. We have a lot of conferences and events in this building which are not press events, per se. They're not run as press events.

Q Yes, but I'm asking why this one is changed from previous years. Stoessel and Enders, for example, spoke both last year and the year before where press coverage was invited.

A I don't think it's always true that that has been the case. In any case, at the moment, that is where we are. If there's a change, I'll be happy to let you know.

Q Why is the swearing-in ceremony closed to the press?

A Again, we have not had swearing-in ceremonies in -- maybe at some distant time in the past but recently they certainly have not been press events, per se.

Q I think it was just a photo opportunity; that's all.

A I understood there was a photo which was taken of Senator Stone this morning over at the White House, so there's certainly a photo of him today. Again, we can look into that sort of thing, but as of the moment I'm telling you where it stands.

Q Could you characterize this as a news blackout? (Laughter)

A No, I would not characterize it as a news blackout at all. Happy to let it be known he's being sworn in today.

Q Another on Latin America: Can you comment on a report that American military trainers in El Salvador were personally present and perhaps involved in directing a Salvadoran Government defense of a communication center in the Morozan Province on last Tuesday; yesterday, I guess it was?

A I guess I would refer you to the Pentagon. I have no information that would support that.

Q That they were there?

A That there were any Americans involved in any combat operation, which would obviously be a violation of the guidelines.

Q But if they were there at the communications center --

A When it was attacked?

Q -- when it was attacked, you might not consider that a combat operation and thereby be saying --

A Again, I refer you to the Pentagon. I have not seen any information that suggests that, however.

Q Any statement on the reshuffle in El Salvador of military -- of Colonel Carranza?

A Very briefly, that we've noted the changes and would regard this as an internal Salvadoran issue. We would note, however, that our views on human rights issues in that country, including the issue of discipline within the military and security forces, are well known to the leadership in El Salvador, including the designees to these new positions.

Q Has his behavior changed in any way as a result of that information in the last four years? Do you know of any allegations with respect to death-squad activity on the part of Colonel Carranza?

A I don't intend to address allegations regarding any specific individual.

Q Do you have anything on the denial by the guerrillas of the declassified cable that you made public yesterday?

A No.

Q With respect to that, can you go --

A One more and then I'll go to somebody else. You're on a roll here. Go ahead.

Q I'm on a roll?

A Yes. You're about to end it. Go ahead.

Q Apparently, on the original on this cable it says that this was just raw intelligence data and had not been gone over by regular intelligence personnel. The source that's quoted in here is very uncertain.

Can you shed any light on what this source might be, whether he was with the garrison when it surrendered; anything like that?

A I don't have information.

Q Is this considered a final intelligence product?

A I think it's considered whatever it's described at the top of page as, and I would leave you with that.

Q On the Middle East, do you have any comments on President Assad's statement, according to Radio Damascus, that the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is in it's death stage? And did Ambassador Habib go to Israel today?

A I don't have any comment on the first part of your question. As far as Ambassador Habib, he is in Israel today.

Q Just for the record, what can you tell us about attempts to destablize the Government of Suriname?

A There were articles and reports of various sorts relating to alleged intelligence plans and activities. As you know, it is our standing policy not to comment on allegations of intelligence activities.

I would say, though, as a matter of policy, it is not the policy of the United States Government to overthrow the Government of Suriname.

Q On the Middle East, if you don't mind.

A Go ahead.

Q One of the networks last night broadcast a report claiming, alleging that the U-2 spy planes overflying the area of Lebanon, Syria and Israel had been passing information to Syria as well as to Israel. Is this true, and why?

A Again, it gets us into an area of intelligence matters, and I'm afraid I'm hamstrung in terms of ability to respond to it. I can't do it.

Q You deviated last week.

Q Was the U.S. Ambassador to Syria rushed back from Washington to Damascus with a message for President Assad, and could that be a precursor for a vist for Secretary Shultz to the area?

A Ambassador Paganelli was here. He has gone back to post. I don't think I want to get into the question of dialogue on that. Obviously, we have made clear from the podium as well in other ways the concerns we have about the situation in Lebanon and the dangers we see there, but I don't intend to get into what he might be doing specifically in his diplomatic work.

Q Did he carry a message, specifically to --

A Again, I don't want to get into the question of diplomatic exchanges. As far as a visit by the Secretary, we're where we have been. There's no plan for a visit.

Q Going back to the matter of the U-2 spy satellite pictures, it's believed that this was an agreement in the disengagement agreement that was agreed between Egypt, Syria and Israel since in the '70s to do this exchange of pictures and data.

Without going into the intelligence, can you deny or recall or accept that?

A No, I can't address the question of intelligence activities one way or another.

Q Do U.S. officials have any plan to meet with the Grenadan Prime Minister?

A My understanding is that consideration of what U.S. officials he might meet is still on-going. There's no determination on that, as far as I know.

Q So you're just trying to decide at what level to meet with him?

A I think I'd have to stick with what I just said. I can't refine it for you. I understand your question but I can't refine it for you.

Q You can't tell us whether you're at least interested in meeting with him?

A   I said that the issue is under consideration. I think you can draw a certain inference.

Q   Will there be a decision before he leaves? (Laughter)

Q   Alan, in another area, on Saturday a Polish military court sentenced the head of the Polish Service of Radio Free Europe to death in abstentia, and they said he was some kind of a CIA agent. Can you say anything at all about it? Was he, indeed, working for the CIA, and has the U.S. had any response or reaction to that?

A   Obviously, I can't address the specific of your point about any relationship with CIA, without leaving any implication one way or another. It's just is not something I would do.

I can say that we are deeply shocked at this action by the Polish Government. The sentencing of this distinguished Polish literary figure and journalist to death for expressing his political views illustrates just how insecure Warsaw's leaders are and the lengths to which they're prepared to go to discourage the free flow of information guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act.

Q   Do you have anything more on the assassination of Schaufelberger today?

A   No, I don't have anything on it.

Q   Alan, on the sharing of intelligence, unless my memory is bad on this, I think that you have addressed the question of sharing intelligence data with Israel from this podium on the record. Specifically, in recent months -- recent weeks when it was announced, virtually announced, that the agreement had been resumed, the sharing had been resumed; namely, that Israel was sharing with the U.S.

I'm not quite sure I understand that distinction.

A   I think you're talking about a question of not so much intelligence in that case as an agreement, or an arrangement that was made. You're talking about the lessons-learned question?

Q   Right.

A   And I think that comes under a different category from the kind of thing that was reported.

Q Can we talk about an agreement that may or may not exist in this case?

A No, I don't have anything to give you on it.

Q Governor Harriman was in Moscow last week, I guess. Was he there on any quasi-official mission for the U.S. Government?

A In the Press Office, I think, there is guidance on Governor Harriman's trip. It was a private trip. As far as I know, he was not taking any messages. He did talk with the Secretary before he left. I think we would be interested in his views. He's a very knowledgeable figure, and so on. But it is a private trip.

Q On that, are there plans for him to meet with the Secretary on his return?

A I don't know of specific plans, but I certainly wouldn't rule it out.

Q There was a report in Eastern Europe, Alan, that as a condition for acceptance of the Reagan statement on nuclear weapons at Williamsburg, it was agreed that Secretary Shultz would be sent soon to meet with Gromyko in Moscow. Do you have anything on that at all that you can share with us?

A No. I know of nothing to support that.

Q Alan, back on the Middle East. The President said yesterday in an interview with the seven or eight journalists that you have achieved progress in convincing Assad and the Syrians to pull out from Lebanon. And here is President's Assad's statement today that the whole thing is dead, or it's dying, in the process of dying.

What's the rationale behind this upbeat, this positive attitude towards the Syrians pullout?

A I'm not going to get into the specifics of what kind of dialogue there has been either with us or with others. I go back to what I said yesterday, despite a certain skepticism in the way it was reported, that we do feel that the pullout, the goal of withdrawal of the foreign forces -- Syrian, PLO and Israeli forces -- and the reestablishment of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the terrority of Lebanon is an achieveable and important goal.

Q Alan, Brzezinski is in the Mideast going around from one place to another. Is he doing that for you? Is it a private trip? What can you tell us about it?

A I don't know anything about that trip. I saw a report in the paper this morning that he was there. I'm not aware that he's undertaking any official mission.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:05 P.M.)

Glenn04

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #94

THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1983, 12:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements.

First of all, available in the Press Office at 1:30 this afternoon will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicholas Veliotes before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The subject is "A Mideast Update."

Second, Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam will lead the U.S. delegation to the 6th United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD, to be held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, June 6-30. UNCTAD, which meets every three to four years, is one of the major U.N. forums for discussion of trade and development matters, especially as they impact on economic relations between developed and developing nations. The designation of Deputy Secretary Dam reflects the importance which the United States Government attaches to the conference.

Q Will he stay there the whole time?

A He will not stay there the whole time. He will be there from the 10th through the 14th.

Q Regarding the importance you attach to it, are you going to have a briefing in advance?

A I'm not sure there is a briefing scheduled. Is there a great outcry?

Q It's just a test of the importance.

Q It seems like an important thing.

A It's partially a -- I'm sure that if you want to talk to somebody, we can easily provide somebody to talk to you.

Regarding AID Administrator McPherson's recent trip to South America, AID Administrator M. Peter McPherson, who is also the President's Coordinator for International

Disaster Assistance, visited Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador over the Memorial Day weekend to conduct a firsthand assessment of the damage caused by the prolonged drought in the highland areas and the persistent rains and flooding in the lowlands of those countries.

Total damage and economic loss in the three countries are now estimated at more than $1.2 billion. Mr. McPherson will be submitting his findings and recommendations on possible additional U.S. assistance to the White House in the near future.

Finally, on the El Salvador Peace Commission: In a declaration to all Salvadorans, widely publicized over the past two days by the Salvadoran media, the Salvadoran Peace Commission has reaffirmed that "the solution to the problems of violence should be essentially political and democratic," and appeal to all armed groups to participate peacefully in democratic elections scheduled for later this year.

In its declaration the Peace Commission called on the Leftist Revolutionary Democratic Front to begin a constructive dialogue for their peaceful incorporation into the Salvadoran family. The Commission also appealed to the armed guerrilla groups to participate in the democratic process which allows the Salvadoran people themselves to choose the officials who will govern them, noting that the government's amnesty is an important step in the process of political reconciliation.

We welcome this initiative, and it has our full support. As President Reagan indicated in his address before a joint session of the Congress on April 27, we will support dialogue and negotiations within each country, with the terms and conditions of participation in election being negotiable.

The United States, the President stated, will work toward a political solution in Central America which will serve the interests of the democratic process. This recent initiative by the Government of El Salvador is very much in support of this objective.

Q Copy?

A Copy. Yes. That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Also on Latin America but not El Salvador, are there any plans to see the Prime Minister of Grenada?

A I don't have anything new for you today on that.

Q In other words, it is as it was? There is nobody who will see him now?

A It is as it was yesterday that the issue remains under consideration.

Q Is it under active consideration?

A I'm not going to try to go beyond what I said yesterday on it.

Q On the statement you made on negotiations just now, perhaps because of the stumble there I wasn't sure I understood exactly what was paired with what. As I understood it, you said that you supported fully two things: (1) constructive dialogue, and (2) invitation and negotiations on joining the democratic process.

A Let me read you that sentence again. We welcome this initiative, and it has our full support. As President Reagan indicated in his address before a joint session of Congress on April 27, we will support dialogue and negotiations within each country, with the terms and conditions of participation in election being negotiable.

Q Where is the Secretary of State?

A The Secretary of State? The last I knew he was in the building.

Q He's not flying now to Westover Air Force Base?

A Westover Air Force Base?

Q Massachusetts.

A No. I will be happy to talk to you later about his plans for the weekend, but he's in the building, I believe, at the moment. That was my last --

Q What was the purpose of his visit to the White House this morning?

A Don't have anything for you.

Q Going back to Central America for a minute, on Richard Stone, how will he actually operate? Will he have an office here, an office somewhere else in Central America? Will he have a staff down there working with him or some people or what?

A He will have an office here in the building and a staff. I don't know personally what the size of the staff is. I refer you to what we said yesterday about his travels. We had a couple of different things we put out on this yesterday at noon and later on. He's traveling in the region, but he is certainly based in this building.

Q Right. And he'll work out of the Embassies in the different countries? This is the idea?

A Sure.

Q Has the Secretary accepted the invitation to attend the ASEAN annual conference in Manila this month?

A I don't have a -- in Manila or Bangkok?

Q I beg your pardon. Bangkok. Right. June 24.

A I do not have anything to announce to you at this point.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that the United States is preparing to send some more medical personnel down to El Salvador? Could you explain what it's all about?

A I can give you something on that. I would also refer you, however, to what I believe was a briefing to be held a little less than an hour ago over at the Pentagon by some experts on this subject, so --

Q Do you have something that goes beyond what they have?

A I don't have anything which I think goes beyond what they had. I can give you what I've got. I also think the President addressed this very briefly this morning on the lawn as he was leaving the White House.

The military and public health care systems in El Salvador provide little else but rudimentary care to most military and civilian victims of the war. Much more is needed.

Full consultations with the Congress are now underway on how we can help alleviate a devastating situation. It is our intention to provide basic humanitarian medical relief through training medics, helping to establish a medical supply system, and repairing medical equipment.

We're also developing through AID a medical health service emergency package to address the severe shortfalls in medical assistance available to the civilian population at large.

Initially a 20-25 person military personnel medical team composed of medical specialists, technicians and physicians would undertake an extensive survey of the military hospital medical system and begin repair of equipment and establishment of a medical logistics system, and would instruct El Salvadoran armed forces medical personnel in field medic techniques.

The same rules on travel which apply to all other U.S. military personnel in El Salvador would apply to the medical team. This is an humanitarian project to help correct a bad situation which is getting worse. The medical team would not come within the 55-man training complement.

Q Get a copy of what you just read?

A Yes. We can provide a copy.

Q Also, there are reports now that U.S. military trainers or advisers may now be based in provincial capitals as opposed to before when that was not the case.

Can you address that question?

A Let me look into it. I would also suggest you might want to check with the Pentagon to see what the rules are there.

Q Do you have any comment on the meeting in Cartagena, Colombia -- the agreement or the announcement that was signed, and the fact that Cuba and Nicaragua participated?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q You have nothing on that at all?

A No.

Q Did you have a readout on Contadora?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q The other day you were unable to give us an explanation of why you thought that the guerrillas had a change of tactics and were involved in assassinations now and mutilations.

Given these attacks and apparently increasing statements by Radio Venceremos which seemed to be directed to the people of the United States, can you now change your view on that? Do you offer an explanation for the change in tactics?

A I cannot offer an explanation. I would note that we've seen some reporting about apparent threats to kill American trainers. I can't offer you anything specific on that again, other than to note the marked contrast between recent indications of a guerrilla commitment to stepped up violence, with the Peace Commission's call on the Revolutionary Democratic Front, the FDR, and the guerrilla groups to begin a constructive dialogue.

As we've indicated, we welcome to the Peace Commission's initiative and lend it our full support, but I cannot offer you any explanation as to why there may have been this change. I just don't know.

Q Alan, with the full support lending, will Ambassador Stone himself be participating in this dialogue with the armed representatives of the left that you referred to earlier?

A We're posting something this afternoon in response to the question yesterday, but the basic answer to your question is I can't tell you precisely whom he will see during this trip. I don't have an answer to that, and I'm not going to be able to provide one to you.

As I said yesterday, not all the people he's seeing have been detailed at this point, and I don't know where that might go.

Q Aside from his participation which obviously you're pursuing, the negotiations and the dialogue that you mentioned, does U.S. support for that include U.S. participation?

A Participation --

Q In the same way, for example, that the U.S. participated in the negotiations on Lebanon. Will the U.S. be part of the negotiations or will the U.S. basically say to the Government of El Salvador, "We think you ought to sit down and talk with these people?"

A I think that our attitude towards negotiation and dialogue is contained in various statements that have been made from the President on down. I don't intend to go over that again.

As far as what specific role might be played again, I think at this point I would refer you to what we said yesterday about Ambassador Stone's mission and how he's going to conduct this mission and the purposes of it and leave it at that at this particular time.

Q On your statement by the Peace Commission, was there any clarification as to whether they were imposing any conditions to the dialogue that they're calling for? It's not clear by what you said. Are there any conditions to a dialogue?

A I think the only thing I could do for you on that is to tell you there is a Spanish language version which is being translated into English and perhaps we will have that tomorrow.

Q Alan, you're not excluding the likelihood that Ambassador Stone will be meeting with "leftist organizations."

A Don't misread me. I'm not excluding it in the sense that I'm not saying it's not going to happen, but I'm also not suggesting to you that it is going to happen. I don't have a reading on how that issue might be addressed. I'm not trying to lead you one way or another at this point.

Q Do you attach any significance to the fact that the Nicaraguans apparently have agreed to receive Ambassador Stone? I believe this will be the first high-level contact between the two governments in at least 18 months.

A I'm not sure, again, precisely what his appointments in Nicaragua will be, so I think we'd have to withhold any evaluation. Whether or not we made one publicly, I think we'd have to withhold evaluation until we see what actually happens on the ground.

Q Is he going into Managua, as opposed to going via Honduras? (Laughter) That's a serious question.

A Into Nicaragua directly from where? From his previous stop?

Q No. Is he going into Managua, as opposed to going via Honduras and the jungle? I was wondering whom he might be seeing, that's all.

A Barrie! Shame!

Q Do we dare infer that the schedule is still being arranged as he goes along?

A I said yesterday that it was not clear precisely whom he would see at each stop. I don't know if that's true of every stop. I don't have anything to say to you about whom he might see at this point in Nicaragua.

Q Are you suggesting that he might go to Nicaragua and not see the governmental officials there?

A I'm not suggesting anything to you, Don, except that I don't have names of anybody he might see, and I don't think that the name is available of anybody he might see in the Nicaraguan Government at this point.

Q No. The question back here was the question of, are they willing to receive him, and it would be a high-level contact. And then you said --

A That was an assumption I think George was making. I'm not aware of anything specific that the Nicaraguan Government has said about this.

Q Alan, one more question on this whole complex: I find it strange -- maybe the others do as well -- that the Ambassador-at-Large goes off to see, among others, a regime which this government considers to be a surrogate of the Soviets, while a Prime Minister of a Caribbean country is in Washington and can't even get to see a doorman at the State Department.

A I think you're making a caricature out of the situation. I believe I'm going to have to stick, Jim, with what I've said before which is that the matter remains under consideration and I just don't have anything further for you. But I don't accept your characterization of it.

Q Will Yehudi Ben Meir meet with the Secretary or with Dam tomorrow? Will he be coming back to the Department tomorrow?

A I can't tell you what his specific timing is. I guess I would ask you to check with the Israeli Embassy. He is going to be meeting with Mr. Dam. He is meeting with Mr. Eagleburger; he will be meeting with Veliotes and others. But I don't have a schedule for him.

Q He will be meeting Dam?

A Yes, he will be seeing Mr. Dam.

Q Do you have a readout?

A Don't have a readout. In fact, I think as we came in here, the meeting with Mr. Eagleburger may still have been going on.

Q Alan, on the Middle East also, there are reports today of the likelihood of an Israeli unilateral pullback. First of all, what is the U.S. position on this? And two, if they do pull back, the information is that they would like either Lebanese troops or multinationals to fill "the vacuum."

Is the United States considering more seriously now sending more troops into Lebanon if Israel does that?

A I don't have anything for you on that specific question. As far as our general attitude towards pullback, we have addressed it several times in the past, and I would refer you to what was said on that before.

Q I'd like to go back to South America for just a minute. Has Peru asked for, or the U.S. offerred, any help in the current battling the insurgents?

A The insurgent question -- the emergency question?

Q Yes, on the insurgent question?

A I'm not aware of that. I will check, and if there is anything further to give you, I'll put something out.

CONT

Q Back to Salvador again for a second. The other day -- I think yesterday or the day before -- we discussed the question of the Communication Center and whether the U.S. trainers were present when that attack took place. Do you have anything further on that?

A What happened when you asked the Pentagon? Did they give you an answer?

Q They gave me an answer, but I want to know whether you have --

A I don't know what they said. They are the ones that have --

Q Do you happen to know?

A I don't know.

Q Also, on Central America, can I also ask whether you have any comment on the report about the Costa Rican Ambassador or the Guatemalan Ambassador being replaced?

A You mean our Ambassadors to Costa Rica and Guatemala?

Q That's right, U.S. Ambassadors.

A I may be mistaken, but I thought that there was an announcement about Costa Rica sometime in April. I will refer you to the White House on that.

Q And Guatemala?

A And Guatemala -- I don't know of any plans for a change there, but again, I would check with the White House.

Q Are there any meetings scheduled for Phil Habib yet?

A He is enroute to California where he will be giving some speeches and have some time with his family. He will then be coming here some time next week and will be consulting here.

Q When is he scheduled to go back?

A I don't have anything specific on that. I imagine that would be one of the things that would be discussed when he comes here.

Q Alan, a couple of days ago, the State Department Counselor, Derwinski, said something about Romania and he was castigated in The Washington Post. Did the State Department ever respond to that castigation of the former Congressman?

A I'm not aware that we made any public comment.

Q There is a report that between May 13-15, there was a meeting held in London with the participation of Philip Habib and representatives of the European Community about the Middle East, especially the withdrawal of Lebanese and Syrian forces from Lebanon.

Do you have anything to offer on this or to comment on that?

A I don't. I think that John indicated in one of his briefings that at some time during that period -- I don't know if it was exactly then -- that Ambassador Habib was in Europe. I know he was in Rome; I think he was probably in London as well. But what consultations he might have had, I don't know.

Q Was this European initiative to consult with the United States to get them out of them stalemate in the Middle East? Who was the initiator of the meeting?

A I don't know what the specifics were.

Q Can you get us some information on this?

A No, I don't think I'll go into the specifics at this time.

Q Can we go back on Derwinski a minute? He said that the U.S. was just waiting for some notification from Romania or official word that they were going to stop imposing that education tax. Has the U.S. received any notification or heard from the Romanians officially or otherwise on the lifting of the education tax?

A All I really can say about this is on the question of continuing Most Favored Nation treatment for Romania, the President will be sending a letter with his recommendations to Congress on June 3. But I don't have anything about what that letter --

Q The Romanian Ambassador was here yesterday and saw Eagleburger and was back in the building today. Is there some kind of a dialogue going on now to try to get MFN back for Romania?

A I think it was indicated at the time that the Foreign Minister was here that we had discussions including this specific topic, that the talks had been positive, but we had nothing further to announce at that time. I still don't have anything further to announce to you at this time.

Q Alan, June 3 is tomorrow. Will that letter be available here?

A I can't tell you. As I say, it's a Presidential letter, to my understanding, so I would, I guess, ask you to be in touch with the White House. If we have it available, we'll be happy to make it available to you.

Q Derwinski said that today was the last practical day that the U.S. could get something in writing and still renew the MFN. Have you gotten anything in writing?

A I have nothing further to give you on this.

Q What time tomorrow?

A I don't know. I honestly don't.

Q Do you have any response to former President Nixon's suggestion that the United States should have a Summit Meeting with China, something before the Summit between the United States and the Soviet Union, or do you have any new development on possible visits to the United States by Premier Zhao Ziyang?

A I don't have any comment on the suggestion of the relative timing of any meetings. As far as the possibility of a meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang, I do not have anything further than we've had before, which is that an invitation had been proffered and has been accepted, but there is no specific date set at this time.

Q Will the Lebanese Foreign Minister meet with anyone in the Department next week?

A I understand that Foreign Minister Salem is coming here on a combination of private -- part private business and also will be consulting. I don't have the specifics of whom he will see; I'm sure he will see officials while he is here next week.

Q Do you have anything on the report that the U.S. Government has asked its civilian personnel in Beirut, and possibly elsewhere in the Middle East, to take new and more stringent security precautions such as, for instance, varying the route between home and work?

A I don't think I can get into the specifics of what advice might be given on security issues. Obviously, we have had a rather tragic reminder of the difficult security environment in Lebanon, and clearly there are other places as well that one has to be particularly careful. So I think you can take it as a given that various precautions are taken and people are certainly advised as to how they can best protect themselves. But I don't really think I can get into the specific measures that might be recommended.

Q If I may follow that, do you have any update for us on the search for new quarters in Beirut?

A No. Were you here when I gave out the statement about the --

Q Yes.

A O.K. That was, I guess, about 2 weeks ago or so. I have nothing new on that.

Q Do you have anything new on the status of the investigation into the Embassy bombing?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the report from El Salvador that up to as many as 40 Salvadoran doctors may have disappeared?

A No.

Q Do you have anything officially on a successor to Hinton?

A No, I don't think anything has been announced one way or another on those reports that appeared in the paper. I might note that last evening, I think, when Larry Eagleburger spoke to the Council of the Americas he made some remarks about both Deane Hinton and Tom Enders, whose names have figured rather prominently in the news recently in a somewhat different context, perhaps.

Let me just read to you what he had -- I don't know if he actually said all of these words, but they were in his prepared remarks, and I know they are what Larry and the Secretary and others feel. He said:

"Let me close with a few words about two men whose service to their country has earned each of them the deepest gratitude of their President and Secretary of State, and should command the respect of every American.

"Ambassadors Deane Hinton and Tom Enders have served magnificently and with great professionalism in two of the most difficult, often frustrating, always-challenging positions in American diplomacy, positions I should add that neither sought. In the best traditions of the Foreign Service, they have gone where needed and given their very best. Deane Hinton has played a central role in formulating and carrying out our basic policy objectives in Central America for more than two years now. In San Salvador, he has been literally on the front lines of our country's efforts to be loyal to and supportive of our friends, and true to our peaceful democratic principles. Deane's personal commitment to the nurturing of democratic institutions in El Salvador has been more than matched by his personal and intellectual courage.

"Tom Enders' job, Assistant Secretary for the American Republics, is as tough as any in this Department. Yet, that did not inhibit Tom from giving the task all the courageous leadership and bold initiative it demands. He has done the job as well as anyone in memory. The tough, fair-minded professional Tom Enders' exceptional quality will be called on by Presidents and Secretaries again and again. I know Tom will bring to his new assignment the same personal and intellectual gifts and the same deep commitment to fundamental American values that have served us so well over these past two years.

"Deane Hinton and Tom Enders are the best the Foreign Service produces and have earned the utmost admiration and gratitude of their colleagues. They have served their country with courage and wisdom. We are all in their debt."

Q Why were they relieved of their jobs?

A I think the President has talked about the question of the Assistant Secretary -- I think the Secretary has addressed this -- about the change there. There has been no announcement, I think, on the Ambassador in El Salvador, so I don't have anything to --

Q Alan, do you really feel that the question of why Enders was relieved has been addressed?

A I think the question has been addressed. The Secretary addressed it.

Q Does the President share -- Was Secretary Eagleburger speaking for the President as well?

A I will leave you with his remarks.

Q You made reference to the Secretary and to Eagleburger.

A No, and I think that -- I'll give you the text that also refers to the President. But in any case, you have to, I suppose, to get a personal view from the President, ask the President. But I've got the statement and I'm going to leave you with that.

Q In another part of the world? Do you have anything on Selig Harrison's article that appeared today in the Foreign Policy Magazine on Afghanistan?

A There is some guidance on that article. I don't happen to have it with me, so let me refer you to the Press Office.

Q Will it come out after the briefing, then?

A We can make it available to you in the Press Office after the --

Q Anything new on the situation in Chad that you talked about yesterday?

A No, I don't have any update on Chad.

Q Do you have an update as to the Lebanese Government's investigation of the Shatilla and Sabra Camps massacre?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you get something for us?

A Why don't you ask the Lebanese Government?

Q Do you have any comment on the meeting of Qadhafi, what took place in Tripoli and the statements which came out?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything on a report quoting Richard Perle as saying that the Pershing and Cruise deployments had divided the allies beyond the value of the missiles?

A I'm not aware of any such statement.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 1:44 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #95

FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements.

We will hold a background briefing at 3:00 p.m. on Monday, June 6, on the Secretary's upcoming trip to the NATO Ministerial meeting at Paris. The briefing will be here in the briefing room.

Also on a briefing, the President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, will be in Washington June 6-9 on a state visit. A special background briefing will be given in the White House briefing room on Monday, June 6, at 10:00 a.m.

A statement on the CSCE semi-annual report: On behalf of President Reagan, Secretary Shultz, on June 3, transmitted the Fourteenth Semi-Annual Report on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These reports are submitted to assist the Commission in its function of monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Accords.

The present report covers the period December 1, 1982, to May 31, 1983. It provides a factual survey of developments in the areas covered by the Final Act -- that is, human rights and humanitarian concerns, security, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation and educational and cultural exchanges. The report concentrates on Soviet and Eastern European compliance with the Final Act. Copies are available in the briefing room now.

Q On that point, is the Romanian letter on MFN out?

A I don't have anything here on that, Jim. Why don't we talk about that for a moment after the briefing? I don't have anything to announce to you on that.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you tell us anything about this policy gathering of State Department officials on the Middle East? Is there some sort of reassessment going on?

A No. It simply is a question that over the next week several Chiefs of Mission from Middle Eastern posts will be here for consultations, and we are going to take advantage of their coincidental presence and that of Ambassador Habib to review developments. But they have not been summoned together; there is not some sort of major review here.

Q Ambassador Draper is back too, is that correct?

A He is back. I'm not sure where he is at the moment.

Q Washington?

A If he is here, he might well participate. I don't know; I don't have that detail.

Q You say it is not a major review?

A No. They will be here and they will just get together in the next week.

Q Just as a routine thing?

A It's a coincidental thing, as it turns out.

Q Why did Mr. Veliotes, in his testimony yesterday, made public that thing? Is it of significance?

A I think he also made clear in talking with people afterwards that this was not some major development.

Q With whom they are going to meet?

A I think, basically, they will meet with each other. I guess it depends on who is around. The Secretary, of course, will be in Europe most of next week.

Q Who are they?

A O.K. The Ambassadors who will be back are Ambassador Lewis, back from Israel; Ambassador Viets from Jordan; Ambassador Murphy from Saudi Arabia; Ambassador Dillon from Lebanon.

Q Alan, can you tell us when the first coincidental meeting of that group will be? When will Ambassador Habib return to the State Department?

A I don't know Ambassador Habib's schedule, and I don't know when they might get together to talk.

Q Is there any chance it will take place before the Secretary leaves for Europe -- in the Secretary's presence on Monday?

A I don't know what that schedule might look like.

Q Could you take that question?

A I'll see if we have something on that. But again, the point I'm trying to make is that this is not some called gathering, as seems to be the impression that is out there. That's the point I'm trying to make.

Q I understand that, and I'm not trying in any way to challenge that. I'm just asking from a scheduling and picture point of view, and so on, if we could find out.

A At this point, I think there is no schedule. Obviously a schedule will be developed to the extent that they all have to meet in the same room if they're going to talk together. I'll see what we can do about making that available.

Q As long as they are here, Alan, coincidentally, will they see the President or have anything to do with the White House folks?

A As a group, I'm not aware of any plans that they should do anything. Whether any individuals might see the President, I'm also not aware of any plans for that at all. That is something I guess you would have to check --

Q Veliotes in there yesterday said that the Secretary would be meeting with the President next week to discuss what to do next in the Middle East. He mentioned that in the same context as this review.

A I don't have anything on a scheduled meeting between the President and the Secretary on the Middle East. I'm not saying that won't take place but I'm not aware of a schedule for that to take place.

Q Does the United States Government have any new assurances from the Lebanese Government about the safety of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon after the agreement is signed with Israel?

A Any new assurances? I guess all I could really say on that is that the question of the safety of the Palestinians is one, obviously, of concern to everybody involved in the situation in Lebanon, including of course not only ourselves but very importantly the Lebanese Government. But I don't think I would get into the question of what kind of discussions we might have held on that. It is an issue that everybody is aware is a very important one.

-- MORE --

Q On that matter, I understand that at the last meeting, although you don't want to reveal what happened at the meeting of the Arab-American organizations with the State Department officials --

A Right.

Q -- that the State Department will then discuss with the heads of these organizations the issue of the Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners who are prisoners of war at Ansar Camp because that issue is not covered in the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Is this true?

A As you started out by saying, we are not discussing what went on at the meeting, so I can't very well address the question.

Q Considering Secretary Shultz's schedule is going to be kind of tight early next, will he have time to meet with Foreign Minister Salem the early part? And did Shultz meet with Ben Meir yesterday, Yehudi Ben Meir?

A He did not meet with Mr. Ben Meir.

Q He did.

A The Secretary did? Excuse me. All right, I stand corrected.

Q Briefly.

A I didn't see that on the schedule. I don't have a schedule for Foreign Minister Salem's meetings here, so I can't tell you whether he's going to have a chance to. I'm a little bit skeptical, given the timing. But it will or it won't occur, and I guess we can find that out as his schedule develops.

Q He's appearing at the American Enterprise Institute on Wednesday, but he's going to be here the earlier part, I think, of the week, too.

A I just don't know what that might entail.

Q Alan, one more on this, the Ambassadors. Would you say that the focus of their talks would be the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, or beyond that?

A I don't think I would take it to more specific characterization than what I said before. They would be looking at recent developments in the region. I don't think that there's some grand agenda laid out. You and I could sit here, or stand here, or whatever, and think of a number of topics that would be of interest to them, but that's a different matter.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a report out of Moscow that the U.S. had protested a TASS report on Ambassador Hartman's meeting with Gromyko?

A Simply to confirm what I did confirm before, that Ambassador Hartman and Foreign Minister Gromyko met May 31 at the Ambassador's request for a discussion of a number of outstanding issues.

During the meeting, Ambassador Hartman gave Foreign Minister Gromyko a copy of the Williamsburg Summit Declaration on Security and Arms Control Issues. Beyond that, I'm not going to go into the substance of the exchange between them.

The TASS account of the meeting was inaccurate and has appropriately been brought to the attention of the media, but no formal protest is planned.

Q In what way was it inaccurate?

A Again, I'm not going to go into the reported remarks of the senior Western diplomatic source in the press reports. I don't intend to get into the specifics of it.

Q Do you have any comment on the story published yesterday attributing to President Reagan that he does not consider the settlements, the Israeli settlements on the West Bank, as an obstacle to peace?

A Let me refer you to the Press Office. There is some guidance on that. I think the basic point is -- and I refer you to the specific words -- the basic point is that the settlement activity is an obstacle, the activity that's going on, has continued, and he referred to it in his September 1 speech. It's that activity that has continued since that speech which is of particular concern.

But let me ask you to turn to what there is in the Press Office.

Q Any comment on Governor Harriman's meeting with Secretary General Andropov?

A Yes, actually.

Q Question?

A The question is, any comment on the meeting between General Secretary Andropov and Governor Harriman?

The General Secretary's expression of interest in an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations is welcome. We can only hope that it will be accompanied by positive and concrete Soviet actions on many issues which our dialogue has addressed in the area of human rights, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

For our part, the U.S. approach to relations with the Soviet Union is serious and seeks to explore realistic ways of cooperation to mutual advantage. Our diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union on all outstanding issues is intensive and comprehensive and will continue.

If the Soviet Union is seriously prepared to address our concerns and take concrete steps in the interest of better relations, it will find a ready partner in the United States.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure.

Q Had the Governor discussed his trip at any length with Mr. Shultz before he left?

A I indicated earlier that he did talk to the Secretary. I don't know at what length. I can't tell you that, but he did discuss his trip.

On the other hand, he was travelling as a private citizen, and I think he indicated in his press conference in Moscow that he was not conveying messages either way.

Q And Mr. Swiers, what was he doing?

A Let me get you the formal words on Mr. Swiers. Mr. Swiers is a Foreign Service Officer, presently assigned to the Political-Military Bureau. He worked as a special assistant to Governor Harriman when the Governor was a senior official in the Department. In a response to a request from the Governor, the Department has released Mr. Swiers to accompany Governor Harriman on his visit to Moscow.

I might note, we've done this before, in terms of providing escorts on requests to members of Congress or former high officials.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:32 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JUNE 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #96

MONDAY, JUNE 6, 1983, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Secretary Shultz will speak at Stanford University commencement on Sunday, June 12, at 10:45 a.m. Pacific time, 1:45 p.m. Washington time. If you plan on covering the Secretary's speech, please inform University news director Bob Beyers, 415-497-2558 or 497-2431.

A reminder that there will be a background briefing this afternoon at 3:00 p.m. here in the briefing room on the Secretary's trip to the NATO Ministerial Meeting. Finally, an embargoed statement, embargoed until 2:00 p.m. It's embargoed because there will be a White House announcement on this sometime between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. but embargoed until 2:00 p.m., on behalf of the Secretary:

"The President today announced his intention to nominate Thomas Enders as United States Ambassador to Spain. I am delighted Tom Enders will continue his exceptionally distinguished government service. He has served his country faithfully and forcefully in Asia, Europe, North America, and Latin America. Over the past months, I have come to know his considerable talents. His creativity and tireless efforts on behalf of the President's policies in Latin America are of the highest professional order. Ambassador Enders has my deepest respect and gratitude."

Q What is happening to Terence Todman?

A I don't have anything for you on that, Jim.

Q Is that a two-year assignment, Alan?

(Laughter)

A Glad you're smiling this morning.

O.K. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q What is Shultz going to speak about in Stanford? Do you know?

A I don't have a topic to give you on that.

Q Expulsion of the Americans from Nicaragua?

A Oh. Are you ready to go to questions? O.K. We can confirm that we have received a note from the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry announcing the GRN's intention to expell three U.S. diplomats. We reject the Nicaraguan allegations that our personnel were engaged in non-diplomatic activities, and we are protesting this action to the Government of Nicaragua.

Q Are you going to retaliate?

A We have under consideration what steps might be appropriate in light of this particular action.

Q Can you characterize the charges in any way?

A I think I just did.

Q No. You said you reject them.

A Yes.

Q Are they true?

Q Usually, you have no comment on these things. It's interesting that you are rejecting the allegations this time.

A No. I think that sometimes we do and sometimes we don't. Among other things, they suggested that these people were engaged in planning for assassination activities. We have rather consistently denied any such activities.

Q What about motivation for their saying and doing these things -- the expulsions, the declarations?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on their motivations.

Q Does it fit into anything larger that they have been doing?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on their motivations, nor do I have a particular answer to that.

Q Aside from the accusation that U. S. officials were involved in plotting murder, which you say you reject, what about the other accusations that are made? Is the U.S. position the same as the President said, that the U.S. is aiding the freedom fighters, but is not attempting to overthrow the government?

A I'm not going to go back to that issue. We're talking about the accusations against these individuals. And as I say, we reject the allegations that they were engaged in non-diplomatic activities and we are protesting it.

Q Can you amplify a little bit more about the steps you may have under consideration --

A No, I can't do that.

Q -- on similar expulsions?

A I don't have anything to give you on that.

Q Are you calling anyone in from the Nicaraguan Embassy here?

A I don't know if we are calling anyone in here or not. I simply don't know the answer to that question. It certainly is being protested, but I can't tell you by what channels.

Q In the meantime, what about the three individuals involved? Where are they and what movements will they be making?

A As of this moment, I am informed they have not left Managua, but I don't have anything on their possible departure date.

Q Do you know anything about their backgrounds or their assignments?

A I don't have anything other than the one -- I think the names have been in the press -- is the head of the political section and the others were in the political section. But I don't have details, beyond that.

Q Can you comment on the expulsion by Moscow of Mr. Thomas over the weekend?

A I think we had some guidance over the weekend. Did you not get that?

Q I didn't see it, but I'd like to have it on the record anyway, if you don't mind.

A Let's see what we've got. Basically, confirming that he was declared persona non grata, that he is an attache in the Administrative Section, arrived in Moscow July '81; is planning to depart Moscow, in any event, since his tour was coming to an end, and will, of course, be leaving. I don't have any details on his actual departure.

Q Any comment on the accusations there?

A There were specific accusations that he was engaged in espionage activities, and again we're getting back into the area that we specifically don't comment on charges of that sort.

Q Any comment on the Newsweek report regarding Mr. Habib?

A Yes, I think you had something from the White House this morning, but in any case, the report in Newsweek this morning was the suggestion that he was to be replaced. I would simply say that that is nonsense. The President has full confidence in Ambassador Habib and he remains the President's special representative for the Middle East. No consideration has been given to a replacement.

Q When is he going back to the area?

A I don't have anything on that. He is, as you know, coming here this week for consultations, and I think that one would then determine, according to the situation, what would be the most appropriate --

Q Could you tell us a little bit more about those consultations -- when and with whom will he participate?

A I think we talked about participants earlier -- last week we talked about who might be there. As far as more about them, basically, is what I indicated before, that some of those Ambassadors from the region -- I think I named four of them for you last week -- plus Ambassadors Habib and Draper are going to be here and are going to be getting together with Assistant Secretary Veliotes later this week. It is an informal session, taking advantage of their presence here; not called together for some special purpose.

Q Can you be more specific about when that takes place?

A It is later this week. Indications I had earlier were that it might be perhaps on Thursday, but I don't have a firm time on that.

Q Is Habib back yet in Washington?

A I don't know if he is actually in Washington at this moment, but he'll be here shortly.

Q A couple of questions: They are not taking place today, then, those consultations?

A No.

Q On Rosenne's meetings, do you characterize those as consultations? And when will he present his credentials to Secretary Shultz or has he done that today?

A I don't think he presents his credentials to Secretary Shultz.

Q Well -- the White House.

A My understanding is as follows, that he has presented his credentials informally --

Q That's what I meant.

A -- to Assistant Secretary Veliotes so that he is now, under the rules of Protocol, able to go ahead and function. I do not know of a scheduled time for him to present his credentials to the President. But I do know that he has been around paying calls on various officials, certainly in this building.

Q Are these considered consultations or just courtesy calls today?

A I'm not sure how I would distinguish between them. They are certainly courtesy calls, and I assume he may be discussing, briefly at least, some of the issues. But he is paying those initial calls on the people with whom he will be dealing.

Q Can you explain why the Press Office today categorically denied that Habib would be meeting with Secretary Shultz while NEA said he would be meeting with the Secretary?

A No, I can't.

Q Can you tell us which is true?

A No, I don't know. I haven't got anything on my schedules that I've seen to indicate he will be seeing him before the Secretary goes to Paris, but I don't rule that out necessarily. The Secretary has a rather tight schedule, but I just don't know. I'm ignorant of the facts of the case.

Q Alan, just to clarify, hasn't Mr. Rosenne presented, informally, the credentials to Kenneth Dam rather than to Veliotes?

A Well, I was informed it was to Veliotes.

Q Veliotes?

A That's what I was told.

Q Another question is: Won't Secretary Shultz take part in the consultations with the Ambassadors, because he is going to Paris --

A No. He will not be in town. Neither will Mr. Dam.

Q Are the Ambassadors going to stay on until he returns?

A No, I don't believe that's the case. A couple of them, I think, have seen either the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary individually; but I don't think all of them will, and not as a group.

-- MORE --

Q If Secretary Shultz does drop in on these Rosenne talks today, can you let us know because, you know, last week he just kind of dropped it on the Meir one.

A I'll try to keep up with it. I can't promise that we necessarily can keep up with something of that sort.

Q One or two questions.

A Let me just say there's obviously no question that we'll be dealing with the Israeli Ambassador quite frequently, so I'm not sure -- I mean, as from a news point of view, fine, I will try to keep up with it, but --

Q You did call the Newsweek officially "nonsense." Is that what you said, or that was a comment but not official?

A It's on the record.

Q It's on the record. Okay, one. Two, do you have any comments about the Justice Department official not meeting with the Israeli Justice Department officials in East Jerusalem?

A No. I think this is a story that goes back to last week. I thought I had that guidance from last week. I think I do.

There's nothing really changed. Talks between our Justice Department and the Israeli Ministry of Justice over deportation to Israel of alleged Nazi war criminals have taken place. They're continuing. We look forward to a successful resolution of these talks.

Q Have taken place?

A They have taken place. There have been talks. I think there's going to be, they go through phases, as many of these kinds of talks do, and I understand that they will be meeting again.

Q You know, the issue, I think, as far as we saw in the media is meeting in East Jerusalem which the United States does not accept or recognize as part of Israel or part of the capital.

If they met, where have they met? Can you --

A I don't know where they met. As I'm sure you're aware, it's been our policy since 1967 not to call on Israeli officials in offices that they may have in East Jerusalem. But, as I say, these talks have been held, and they will be continuing.

Q Middle East. Do you have anything on the PLO fighting over the weekend?

A Anything on the PLO fighting over the weekend? No, I don't have anything.

Q Okay. Do you have anything on the shooting of the Libyan Charge' or the reports about Libya having an atomic bomb?

A Yes. I can give you something on each of those. As far as the attempted assassination of the Libyan Charge', we deeply deplore all such acts of violence regardless of their motives or the nationality of their victims. We sincerely hope that Mr. Ghouqa recovers rapidly from that atttack.

As far as the reports of Libya having acquired nuclear explosive devices, we have no information whatsoever which would confirm such a report, and we would note that Libya is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore has a commitment not to develop nuclear explosives.

Again, just to catch up with a question before about Ambassador Habib, it's pretty much what I was saying before. He has no meetings scheduled with the Secretary as of this point, as we're here right now, but I can't rule out that there will be one scheduled.

Q Follow-up on the Libyan bomb. Do you have any record of inspections of Libyan facilities by the IAEA?

A I don't know. I guess I would have to refer you to the IAEA on that question.

Q Regarding Habib, I understand that the reasoning behind -- the story in the Newsweek brings the reasoning for replacing Habib, the fact that he's unwelcomed by the Syrians.

The last that we heard, you confirmed that the Syrians said that they don't think that it would be right for him to come to Damascus because there is nothing to talk about or something like this.

Do you have any new information that Habib is now -- that the Syrians have changed their position and Habib is now welcome in Damascus?

A I don't have anything new to give you, but I also think I am not going to get into the question of the tactics that might be employed in terms of -- at this point as we look ahead to dealing with the problem of Syrian withdrawal. Obviously, our views on that subject are on the record.

Your question about Ambassador Habib, though, I don't have anything new to give to you at this point.

Q So you don't know of any changes in the Syrian position that originally was that he is not welcomed in Damascus?

A I don't have anything new to give you about that position. No.

Q Mr. Sharon this morning on NBC suggested a couple of suggestions about what to do next to deploy the United Nations force between Syrian and Israeli forces in Lebanon, and to keep the Israeli forces on the Damascus-Beirut highway and evacuating the Shouf Mountain area. What do you comment on this?

A I don't have any comment to give you on that.

Q What are your feelings about these suggestions?

A I don't have any comment go give you. I think we've discussed before the question of our attitude towards withdrawal, and I've nothing new to offer you on deployment of the MNF outside its current mission. That's as far as I can take it at this point.

Q Do you know when Ambassador Hinton comes back to Washington?

A I do not. As I indicated to you before, my understanding is that he has been due back on home leave and that this change would presumably affect his travel schedule. Whether he might not still be coming back and returning to post, or coming back and staying back, or delaying his coming back, I don't know. I don't have his travel plans.

Q One other question. I just want to raise a mechanical point because there's a time element involved.

A Sure.

Q Why is the opening of the George Marshall Room upstairs closed to coverage?

A I don't know the answer. Rush, do you know the answer?

MR. TAYLOR: It's a private function. We normally do not have press. We have cameras up there.

Q Is it open for photo?

A Is it open for photos?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes.

A It's apparently open for photos, not for writing press, I gather. Is that correct?

MR. TAYLOR: Yes.

Q Alan, on that same NBC interview with Sharon this morning, he said, and I quote: "American diplomats made a mistake not to negotiate at the same time with Syria while they were negotiating with Israel and Lebanon and with the PLO pullout."

Do you have any comment on that?

A We think we have approached this in the best way we can. I don't particularly intend to respond to that. Obviously, we do what we think is doable and right and so on.

Q Do you have any comments on Philippe Gonzalez's criticisms of American policy in Central America?

A Not particularly. I've seen various reports of what he may have said, but I have seen nothing detailed. I understand that part of what Prime Minister Gonzalez was saying was that he was backing the Contadora approach, and we, of course, have also done that. So I'm not sure where differences might lie.

Obviously, we would look forward to the meetings with him. I understand he's coming the 20th and 21st for an official working visit, and that would provide an opportunity to discuss the issue.

Q He talked about negotiations between Havana and Washington.

A I don't have anything beyond what we've offered you previously on that.

Q Would you take the question of Ambassador Hinton's return and try to find out for us more specifically what his plans will be?

A I will look into that.

Q Do you have any comment about the revelations over the weekend from Israel about the premeditated nature of the invasion that Mr. Sharon has mentioned and the idea that former Secretary Haig knew about it according to Mr. Begin and Mr. Sharon from last weekend?

A Not really. We've gone over all of that over many, many months --

Q Well, this is coming out --

A -- and there's nothing -- I, myself, have addressed the issue of the so-called "green light" and indicated that there was no green light. The question of our attitude towards the actions that were taken is on the record, I refer you back to the time when the actions took place. I'm not going to try to rehash that particular record.

Q But now there is new information coming from the highest Israeli officials, do you have any comments on those?

A No. I think that there have been statements before coming out of Israel on exactly these same points. I don't think this is "new information," and what we've said before stands. I am not going to try to go back and dig it out. I welcome your doing that.

Q It's a different subject. I just wondered if Ambassador Harriman has any meetings in this building set up?

A I've inquired about it. I did not get a response. I don't know whether he does or doesn't, but, again, the best I can do at this point is to say that I certainly wouldn't rule that out. But I will try to find out if there's anything on that.

Q Do you have any response to Harriman's comments yesterday or olive branches he's brought back?

A We responded the other day to part of what he said. I don't have anything new to respond to.

Q The visit of Prime Minister Bishop from Grenada is for three or four more days. Do you know if there's been any resolution as to whether he will be meeting with anyone in the White House or in the State Department?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that today.

Q Is it still under consideration?

A As I say, I don't have anything new to offer. It's where I think the Secretary last addressed this issue, and I would leave it I guess where he did when he was in the briefing room the other day.

Q Is there any change in Ambassador Stone's itinerary specifically with regard to Nicaragua as a result of the expulsions today?

A I know of no change in his itinerary.

Q He still plans to go to Nicaragua and to meet with officials as --

A Yes. I know of no change in his itinerary.

Q Has that meeting ever been firmed up between Stone and the Nicaraguans?

A I don't have details, but I think that there was a public statement issued by the Nicaraguan Government, indicating that they were welcoming him and that they would see him.

Q Anything beyond that?

A I'm not going to get into diplomatic dialogue on it, but I think that we can take that as an indication that they said they would meet with him and would look forward to talking with him.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #97

TUESDAY, JUNE 7, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of brief announcements. First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliot Abrams, before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law. The subject is refugees, as the issue relates to asylum. You'll have to look at it to get a further definition of that.

Second, just to correct something I said yesterday. A question was raised about the person to whom Ambassador Rosenne of Israel had informally presented his credentials. I had been informed that it was to Assistant Secretary Veliotes. The question was raised here in the briefing room. Apparently the Israelis were saying that it had been to Mr. Dam, the Deputy Secretary. I was wrong, and apologize for that.

That's it for announcements.

Q Alan, do you have a response to the vote by the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning on the bill -- resolution stopping the United States support for the guerrillas in Nicaragua?

A Just simply to note that the House Foreign Affairs Committee amendment votes yesterday were one stage in continuing Congressional consideration of this issue.

We have stated before our basic opposition to any legislation which would constrain the Executive's policy tools to deal with the extremely complex situation in Central America.

Q You're talking about the amendment yesterday?

A I'm talking about the amendment votes yesterday.

Q That applies to what happened today, then; full committee vote?

A I'm sorry, I wasn't aware what they had done. Again, we're talking about an on-going, very multi-faceted Congressional process. I don't think we're going to comment at each stage along the way.

As I say, we've stated before our basic opposition to any legislation which would constrain the Executive policy tools to deal with this complicated situation. I think I will stand on that as a general principle, and not try to get into each individual vote.

Q Can you comment on what type of resolution you would like to see come through? What language you're substituting?

A No. It includes not getting into that.

Q Alan, any reaction toward Nicaragua, retaliatory measures?

A No, I don't have anything to announce to you at this point.

Q Anyone being brought in?

A Again, I don't have anything to announce to you at this point.

Q When might you have something to announce?

A I can't tell you specifically when we might have something for you, but I think I indicated that we had under consideration an appropriate response. As I said yesterday, we reject the charges. We rejected them yesterday, we reject them today. We protested it, and I don't have anything further, though, in terms of steps at this moment.

Q Where are those diplomats today? Have they left the country, or are they en route to the United States?

A My understanding is that they have left Nicaragua. They are en route here. We're not going to be giving a detailed itinerary, but I do understand they are due in Washington perhaps later today.

Q Can they be made available?

A No, I don't expect that they would be made available.

Q Are things still as they were with the visit of Ambassador Stone to Nicaragua?

A Ambassador Stone is still planning to go to Nicaragua on the 10th.

Q The New York Times today reprints an excerpt from Harrison's Foreign Policy article on the U.N. mediation effort in Afghanistan. What is the U.S. attitude to that mediation proposal?

A I would refer you back to what we've had on this the other day. I don't know if you've got that guidance. It was available --

Q I've only been here for a few days.

A Okay, that's fair enough. There is guidance available which referred to the basic Foreign Policy magazine article. Let me ask you to take a look at that.

Q The Middle East?

Q Just a moment, please, on Central America. Alan, there are reports, published reports from El Salvador that the government there, President Magana will propose that the elections set for late this year will be delayed for two more years.

A For two more years?

Q Yes.

A I'm unaware of anything to substantiate that at all.

Q Two years or any time period --

A No, there was a report the other day that I saw in the press suggesting that in any one of his conversations some other official had suggested to Ambassador Stone that there would be some delay. Again, we don't have any information that would indicate confirmation of that idea. Our information is that the elections will go ahead on the schedule which we've talked about before, at the end of this year.

Q Still on Central America. The Foreign Minister of Honduras, Edgardo Paz Barnica, said yesterday as he did ten days ago that as far as he knew there was no agreement between the United States and Honduras with respect to a base at which Salvadorans might be trained. And also members of the ruling party have also said that if there is such an agreement, they have not been notified and that it violates their Constitution for that to occur without Congressional consent on their part.

Do you have any -- can you tell us anything about that agreement, like who were the signatories to the agreement in the Executive Branch of the United States Government, and whether we consider that there is, in fact, an agreement?

A I think on the question of the facts of who was involved, I would need to check and see what I can produce on that.

As far as the internal deliberations or concern within Honduras that you're talking about, it's simply would be inappropriate for us to comment on the constitutionality of the establishment of the regional military center. As we've said, it would be a Honduran facility, and I don't think that we would want to get into discussion of an internal Honduran matter.

Q Are you asserting that there is an agreement; is the United States Government saying that there is an agreement?

A I don't recall the phrasing that we used the other day about agreement or non-agreement. I would have to check and see whether the formalities of this turn into an agreement or not.

Let me just look that up, but I don't think we would comment on the internal processes or concerns that have been expressed as reported in the press.

Q In spite of the agreement or not existing, how are the preparations for the bases themselves?

A I don't have anything for you. I would suggest you might want to check with the Pentagon.

Q Middle East. Two questions regarding the Soviet Union. Do you have any comment on reports of messages between King Fahd and the Soviet, or any messages between Andropov and Arafat?

A I do not.

Q On neither one?

Q Do you have anything on -- if memory serves me correctly -- a Wall Street Journal article that said that there had been a meeting between PLO and American officials regarding terrorism in the United States?

A I don't know the article, and I'm not familiar with any conversations.

Q Do you have any comment on the report by an anti-Zionist group in the Soviet Union that all Jews in the Soviet Union who wish to emigrate have done so; that there are no great numbers?

A The so-called appeal againist Zionism is part of a continuing Soviet propaganda campaign aimed both at the State of Israel and Jewish activists within the Soviet Union.

While this particular statement also purports to reject anti-Semitism, in fact, the basic thrust of this and other anti-Zionist propaganda is anti-Semitic.

The contention of the anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet public that the majority of Jews who desire to emigrate from the Soviet Union have already left is patently false. Many thousands of Jews, some estimates range into the hundreds of thousands, are still seeking to emigrate from the USSR and have been denied this fundamental right of freedom of movement on the flimsiest of pretext.

It is particularly deplorable that the Soviet regime should now enlist some people of Jewish ancestry to participate in their anti-Semitic diatribes. In particular, we condemn the statements of one committee member, General Dragunsky, who equated Zionism with Nazism. Such anti-Semitic propaganda under the guise of anti-Zionism, or any other cover, is an extreme distortion of history and the truth and is abolutely unacceptable.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy. Sure.

Q Do you see this as a step to restrict Jewish emigration?

A As a step to restrict Jewish emigration? I think it certainly is a manifestation of the restricted emigration.

Q Alan, it should have been asked yesterday, I suppose. Over the weekend there was that report about the Grand Rabbi of Moscow who has passed away since, I think, complaining to the U.S. Embassy about a U.S. Embassy member showing up at the --

A There is some guidance in the Press Office on that, so if you could check that.

Q Regarding Romania, do you expect any public announcement by the Romanian Government as to the decision to stop the immigration tax or you're satisfied with the assurances that were given, I understand, in some diplomatic exchange between Romania and the U.S.?

A I have no idea whether they would be making some statement, and I guess I would have to suggest to you that you address your question to the Government of Romania.

Again, I think I would refer you, since there was some wording on this that was available yesterday, let me ask you to refer to that as to how this matter was dealt with between the two governments. I think rather than try to paraphrase it, I would refer you to that.

Q Alan, to facilitate, could we get that guidance and also the guidance about the rabbi; could you put it out for us?

A Make it available? Yes. Rush, if we could make that available.

Q Today, the Washington Post reported that King Fahd sent a letter to --

A Excuse me, before we go into that, I'd like to look and check on the Romanian one and make sure that we've got the one I'm thinking of.

Q The Washington Post story that King Fahd sent a letter to Andropov about the oil prices and about the Iraq-Iran war.

A I have no comment on it.

Q How would you look at some sort of rapprochement between your allies in the area, your two Arab allies or friends -- Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union?

A You're presupposing a lot of things in your question. In any case, I'm not going to get into the question of commenting on relations between two other governments. I don't think that's for me to do.

Q Do you have any comment on this statement made by President Mubarak of Egypt to Le Figaro, the French newspaper, expressing the idea that money given from the United States to Israel comes mostly from Arab sources?

A No. I wasn't aware of that, and I think I will pass on that particular one.

Q Alan, with whom is Foreign Minister Salem of Lebanon going to meet here in the States, and how would you describe the purpose of his visit here?

A Foreign Minister Salem will be coming to the Department. He'll be meeting with Acting Secretary Dam on Wednesday, and he will meet with the Secretary on Saturday. I don't have a description particularly to give you of his visit. I would suggest you might want to check with the Lebanese Embassy, and also with regard to any other meetings he might be having. Not here, but he will be having those two meetings.

Q (Inaudible)

A I think we had something on this before about what our understanding of the nature of his overall visit, and would refer you back to what I think I said about this the other day. But, certainly his conversations here are not unofficial. He's coming here and he will be having discussions with the Acting Secretary and then later in the week with the Secretary.

Q He is seeing Mr. Veliotes today?

A I don't know whether he is or isn't. I haven't got anything on that.

Q Is he meeting with the President tomorrow?

A You would have to check with the White House.

--MORE--

Q There are some reports that the United States Government is not pleased with the level of activity of some European countries -- and mainly France -- in helping to persuade Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.

Could you comment on those reports?

A No. I wouldn't have any comment on that. Obviously, an important objective is to effect the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon, including the Syrian forces, but as to how we would go about that and what the various parties might be doing, I would not comment on that.

If you want, I can give you some of these things that we have been talking about here before on -- I don't know if it's helpful to you or not -- on the Honduran center -- at least what we said about this before; on the synagogue visit; and, on the Romanian MFN. Should I do those three things?

Q Yes.

A Just to go back over, I think this may have been used before, but on the communique -- there was a press communique issued in Tegucigalpa, as I can best make out probably on the 26th of May, which said as follows:

"The Armed Forces of Honduras, with the authorization of the Government of the Republic, have been in negotiations with the Government of the United States of America regarding the establishment in Honduras of a Honduran center of a regional nature for technical training in military and security elements within an academic framework of military and security elements from different countries.

"Fundamentally, it will permit the overall improvement of the armed forces and will contribute to a climate of stability and security. This will also foster a solid awareness about the full development of democratic institutions resulting from the popular will, and containing the necessary guarantees for stability and security.

"The eventual operation in Honduras of the aforementioned center will not constitute any deviation from existing cooperation agreements between Honduras and the United States of America. These agreements call for improving the quality of the armed forces.

"The center would have a basic structure for the achievement of its goals and would be located in the area of Trujillo-Puerto Castilla, a relatively isolated area which is a reasonable distance from population centers and far from Honduran borders with El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.

"The Honduran Government will control the real estate, will provide physical security, and will have under its direction the operation of the center, using Honduran personnel. It (that is, the Government of Honduras) will also be able to negotiate bilateral issues in the future with governments in the region and outside of it which want to make use of the facilities that the center will offer."

Q Copy?

A We can get a copy of that.

Q Can you tell me on the basis of that whether that announces an agreement or not?

A I can't tell you whether this constitutes some formal agreement.

Q Could you look into that?

A Yes. I will still look into that.

Q And specifically who the signatories are on behalf of the Defense Department?

A Let me look into the general question and see.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me. Let me just go on with the others and I'll come --

Q On this matter --

A Go ahead.

Q You started by saying that the military authorities are negotiating --

A Have been in negotiations.

Q And do you mean by that that the negotiations have ended, and they have been successful, and there was an agreement? Because --

A Again, I --

Q -- at the end of the communique you gave the impression that the decision has been made also.

A I think that my understanding is that this represents an announcement of sorts coming out of Tegucigalpa. There may be a problem here, of course, in terms of translation and tense and so on. I'm sure you can get from the Government of Honduras the original of that.

Let me go on with the other two. On Romania, let me just make this statement, then we will not make it necessarily available. It's fairly short. If you want, we can.

As you know, Romania's decree requiring an education repayment tax on intending immigrants has been a subject of discussion between our two governments for several months.

As a culmination of that process there was an exchange of letters last week between President Reagan and President Ceausescu. Assurances that the tax would no longer be applied were contained in President Ceausescu's letter to the President, but the texts are going to remain confidential I might add.

Finally, on the Soviet protests on the synagogue visits that you raised before about the rabbi. We reject the unsubstantiated and, indeed, false allegations contained in the rabbi's letter of protest. As Ambassador Hartman pointed out in his letter of response to the rabbi, the diplomat in question visits the synagogue in a legitimate effort to retain contacts with various religious and other communities in the Soviet Union. He does not engage in provocative or illicit activity, and he does not have and has not had anything to hide regarding the nature of his visits.

Furthermore, as the rabbi himself acknowledged when delivering his letter, that diplomat has always conducted himself courteously and openly. Additionally, the Ambassador knows from personal contacts with other members of the synagogue congregation that, despite the rabbi's claims to the contrary, many practicing Jews do not object to our diplomat's visits.

Consequently, we must reject the rabbi's insinuations that our diplomat has displayed religious intolerance and has used his visits to the synagogue for improper purposes. We can only question what outside influence might have prompted so groundless a protest.

Q Copy?

A Copy of that one. Sure.

Q What was the date of that, may I ask?

A That's from this week. The rabbi's protest -- I don't know what the date of that was.

Q Reuters reported recently that Mark Richards, the U.S. Deputy Assistant to the Attorney General arrived in Jerusalem to discuss Israel's receiving of --

(Press Officer entered the room with a five-candle candelabra which was placed on the podium.)

A Go ahead, Lester. (Laughter) I can't hear you, Lester. (Laughter)

Q (Laughter) Well, let me shift -- (laughter) -- I just wondered, are you aware of the fact that the Pentagon Spokesman this morning strongly supported your strong skepticism over the Harvard theory that yellow rain is really the bowel movements of bees?

A I'm pleased to hear that.

Q Could you tell us what is the worldwide reaction to the Harvard bee BM theory? Have you had any?

A Lester, I don't have anything for you.

Q All right, I've got a couple of others.

Q Do you have anything on the new guidelines on technology transfer to China?

A No. We had some guidance the other day on that. Again, I'd refer you to that.

Q What are these candles for?

A You'll have to ask Lester about his outburst at the Pentagon briefing.

MR. KINSOLVING: They have ears and eyes everywhere.

A We try to stay informed. Yes, we do.

Q Alan, would it help our case any if we talk about the situation about getting in the building when the guards are out front since all of our officers seem to be absent today? It was total chaos this morning. Sometime you could get half way in and then you were blocked the other half of the way, and if it weren't for Mary Maserini I don't think any of us would have gotten up.

A What was the occasion?

Q There's some police out there at present --

Q Houphet-Boigny.

A I'm sure there were security concerns and real reasons for doing this, but let me ask you to take up your concerns on that with Rush, and if there's anything that can be done with security, we will. But, as you know, when there are security concerns raised, indeed, sometimes life becomes a little bit difficult.

Q But if we could make it public, because it really doesn't seem logical. We're a much greater security risk if we're kept outside, and in this case they were keeping us half way in and not the rest of the way.

A I'm not going to try to argue the security risk with you.

Q Do you have anything on when the gentleman will come down, if they will, in the lobby today, after the luncheon?

A Why don't you check later in the Press Office and see if we can get something for you on that?

Q Do you have anything on when Pickering or Motley will be taking up their posts?

A They both obviously need to be confirmed.

Q Well, when they'll begin to assume responsibility?

A They won't have formal responsibilities until they have in fact been confirmed. When they might actually show up to follow the flow of activities that would -- I'm sure that Ambassador Pickering will not be going to his post until he has been confirmed.

Regarding Ambassador Motley and his responsibilities, I think that he may be coming back before -- I mean, obviously, he has to come back and prepare for hearings and go through hearings, and so on. I don't know precisely when that will be. I know he has or had some business he needed to take care of before he finished up his chores in Brazil. I don't have a date.

Q In negotiations last week with the House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats over a possible compromise, who represented the State Department after the announcement that Enders would be leaving his post?

A I don't have details for you on any discussions that might have taken place, nor do I really intend to try to get them for you, but I would note that Ambassador Enders continued in his position certainly as of then -- as far as I know as of now -- as Assistant Secretary. If he were to leave before Ambassador Motley assumed his position, I'm sure that Jim Michael would take over as Acting Assistant Secretary.

Q And one final -- did you have anything today on Gonzalez's statements in Latin America about U.S. policy in the region?

A No. I don't.

Q A two-part question, if I could? Senator Helms, of the Foreign Relations Committee, has noted that now the Nicarguan sugar situation has been redistributed so that they are not sending in the amount of sugar they were before, and it's been redistributed to Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador.

He says there was opposition from the State Department bureaucracy to this, the same crowd that thought up the $75 million handout to Nicaragua during the Carter Administration. And I called, and they stipulated it's the Department of Policy Planning.

What is your reaction? Is Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee in error?

A Lester, as you know, without leading you one way or another, it is our practice not to get into the question of internal deliberations, and I don't intend to do it.

Q All right. Let me ask you this: Will you confirm -- either confirm nor deny that your State Department did what Senator Helms said they did? You're not disputing Senator Helms?

A I won't address the issue.

Q All right. Could I go to another issue? One other issue?

Reuters reports that Mark Richards, the U.S. Deputy Assistant to the Attorney General, arrived in Jerusalem recently and was supposed to meet with the Israeli Attorney General at the Justice Ministry to discuss Israel's possible receiving of Valeria Trifa. But it says Richards cancelled the meeting when he learned the Ministry Building was in East Jerusalem.

Number one, is this accurate? And, number two, does the State Department have anything to do with this disruption of getting a Nazi war criminal out of the United States and into Israel?

A Lester, let me just paraphrase guidance we've had on this subject and refer you to the Press Office. It indicated that there have been talks going on, that the talks will continue, and I refer you to what we said about that.

Q In other words, it cleared up this --

A I also noted, in terms of the question of East Jerusalem, it's been longstanding policy since 1967 that U.S. officials have not met with Israeli officials in offices if they are in East Jerusalem.

Q Do we have -- in other words --

A But as far as those discussions are concerned, I'll refer you to the guidance.

Q Right. I just want to get clear on two things. In other words, what you're saying is there was a momentary disruption in the discussions, but the discussions are continuing.

A I didn't say anything about momentary disruptions. I said there have been discussions, and the discussions will be continuing.

Q They are continuing, is that correct?

A I think there's another phase that is to come. I don't know what the precise dates might be on that.

Q And let me ask you this: How long are we going to boycott part of Israel's capital? I mean --

A As I said, I just articulated our policy on East Jerusalem.

Q I mean, how long is that anticipated to run, Alan? It's kind of silly, isn't it? Do the British boycott part of Washington and so forth, or what? Why do we do this?

A Spence?

Q Alan, do you see any hopeful signs of a settlement of the Afghanistan problem?

A I don't have any words of wisdom or even particularly of hope to offer you on that, Spence. I think our position is well known. We can provide that to you if you want. Obviously, we're looking to a solution along the lines of the U.N. Resolution on this, and we've made that clear before, but I don't have a judgment to offer you about hopefulness or lack of hopefulness.

One point, Lester, just to go back, you might check also in the Press Office if you need a statement on our position on Jerusalem. That's available there, too.

Q On what? On East Jerusalem?

A On Jerusalem, period.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:40 P. M.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, June 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #98

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 8, 1983, 12:27 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one announcement. Tomorrow, Thursday, June 9, at 10:00 a.m., in this room there will be a BACKGROUND briefing in conjunction with the release of a Department study, "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace."

We will have available, on an embargoed basis, this afternoon at 4:00 o'clock in the Press Office copies of that report, but, again, please note it is embargoed until the briefing.*

Q What time is the briefing?

A The briefing is at 10:00 a.m.

Q Is it for release at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow?

A It is for release when the briefing is finished.

Q What is it about?

A The subject is "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace." Let me ask you to look at the book when you get it. It's a reasonably hefty booklet and special report, and the reason we're making it available today is so that you can read it ahead of time and have your questions --

Q It comes out in favor of peace?

A It does come out in favor of peace, yes.

Q Does it cover all areas of the world, or is it -- I mean, does it touch on various areas of the world or --

A Yes. Let me ask you to take a look at it. It is an arms control and security report.

Q The place of the briefing?

A Here in the briefing room.

Q Anything in it?

A I commend it to your careful attention, Mr. Kalb.

* later changed to 7:00 a.m.

Q Is that all?

A That is more than enough. Yes.

Q The Lebanese Foreign Minister said this morning that the Syrians will probably be looking for a high-level American involvement in whatever the next stage of troop withdrawal negotiations will take place.

Is the United States still prepared to play such a role?

A I think that at this time it would be premature to speculate on what specific role we might play. We have said, obviously, we have a continuing deep interest in this question and the issue of getting all foreign forces out of Lebanon, and we continue to have an active diplomatic dialogue with a variety of parties on the subject.

How that might manifest itself in the terms that was suggested this morning by the Lebanese Government or a Lebanese official -- I'm not quite sure who said that -- I can't say, and I don't think I'm prepared to speculate on that.

Q Have you had any corresponding signals or signs from the Syrians that they would welcome such an American role?

A Again, I think it would be inappropriate to get into details or substance of diplomatic exchange. Our objective remains unchanged, but precisely how this might proceed, I think I'm not prepared to address.

Q Alan, along the same lines, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Elie Salem, also indicated this morning that, according to him, there have been frequent U.S.-Soviet contacts with a view toward getting a mutually acceptable solution to the Lebanese problem, ergo, the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Any comment on that?

A Not beyond what we've said before, which is that we have discussed the Middle Eastern issue, obviously including the Lebanese question, with the Soviets, and our objective is to get all the foreign forces out of Lebanon, to restore Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country while assuring security across Israel's northern border. But I don't think I again could get into the details of the exchanges.

Q Is Mr. Habib in Washington?

A He is in Washington.

Q Without going into the details, is it the American position that the Israeli-Lebanese agreement can be reopened, or is it a closed case and no conditions by the Syrians can open this agreement?

A I'm not aware of any consideration of reopening the agreement. I think what we have indicated before -- the Secretary indicated at the time he was in the he was in the Middle East -- that there are some legitimate concerns that the Syrians might well have about specific aspects, and that they might want to account for those concerns in one way or another in the course of working out the withdrawal. But that does not equate to a question of reopening the agreement.

Q What would be, Alan, the U.S. view toward, say, the convening of an international conference involving the Soviets with a view toward finding a resolution of the Lebanese issue?

A I think that the present path that we are on and the Lebanese specifically are on is the one that we think at the moment is what we should be doing. I don't see any prospect, frankly, for the kind of conference that you're suggesting.

Q That is, an international conference with Soviet participation. You don't see that?

A I don't see any prospect of that at this point.

Q Does the U.S. see, in the search for a solution, any possible linkage between return of the Golan, parts of, etc., to Syria in return for Syrian acceptance that would then trigger the withdrawal of all foreign forces?

A I don't think I could get into the kind of substance, if you will, that you're trying to get me to go into as to what might formulate either the specifics or the surrounding elements of what might be discussed diplomatically.

I don't want to mislead you. I'm not suggesting one way or another on that. I just don't think I can address the substance and the possibilities of what diplomatic dialogue might produce.

Q Another area?

Q Can we just finish up with the Middle East first?

A Let's stay with this.

Q A follow-up to Shalom's question: Could you state it in a clearer way, would the U.S. agree to discuss with the Syrians things that practically mean reopening the signed agreement between Israel and Lebanon?

A I think I really did express it fairly clearly in terms of that we're not -- that it's not something we have looked to in terms of reopening that agreement. I would repeat that, obviously, there are legitimate concerns which the Syrians may have which would need to be taken into account in their consideration of their withdrawal. But, as I said, that does not equate to reopening the agreement.

Q Pose any --

A I'll just stick with what I said. I think I've really been quite clear.

Q You're talking about these legitimate concerns for the Syrians. Would you be able to tell us what are these concerns?

A Again, not in specifics beyond what the Secretary cited as an example when he was on his trip. He talked about the fact that the security zone would go over to the Syrian-Lebanese border, for example. That would be something which the Syrians would clearly want to look at in terms of how they wanted to deal with that.

Q How about the Secretary's schedule? Is he planning to pass by Syria on his way back from the post-Ministerial Asia meeting?

A I know of no plans for him to do that at this point. I never would rule out anything on his way back from anywhere to go anywhere, but there's no plan for that.

Q Would you characterize the Syrian position now as more forthcoming?

A I don't think I'd characterize the Syrian position at all. I don't think that's for me to do.

Q In light of the latest developments and contacts?

A Again, I don't think it's for me to characterize their position. What we want is to get all the foreign forces out.

Q I just wanted to ask whether the effort to get the Syrians out in your view remains an essentially Arab effort or one in which the U.S. could or even should play the major role?

A I don't think we have played the major role, in terms of the discussions up to this point, and that is, I think, an accurate description.

Again, I'm getting back, I guess, to the earlier question. I don't want to try to specify what the future might hold. Certainly, there is a very active dialogue going on among the various Arab countries, and I would presume among Palestinian groups, too. I think that is essentially where the action has remained. I don't want to try to prognosticate on that.

Q What can you tell us now about the in-house Mideast review? Does it begin today or tomorrow? And who all will be there?

A Again, you're putting that all in caps, and I don't think that that's consistent with what we said about it. What we've said about it is that there are some Ambassadors who are back for a variety of reasons, not having to do with having been called back for this purpose.

They will be getting together. I'm sure they will be getting together one on two, or whatever. They're all here, and they're all interested in the same kinds of subjects. They will be meeting, I think, later this week. I believe I was right earlier when I suggested that there would be a meeting tomorrow, but, again, I put this in small case. It's not some sort of major review that's underway here.

Q Is Atherton also back?

A No. I don't believe he's back.

Q Do you know who would be in? It would be Lewis, Draper, Dillon --

A The Ambassadors from the countries that I mentioned, if I can recall, are Lewis, Murphy, Dillon and Viets, and, of course, Ambassadors Habib and Draper are here.

Q That's just a coincidence that they're all here right now?

A Yes.

Q Just a pure coincidence?

A Yes. Your verbal smirk notwithstanding.

Q Just to clarify, I think that the term "review" was used by Assistant Secretary Veliotes on the hearing on the Hill. He used the term "review."

A He mentioned it, but I think that also he wanted to take some -- yes, there's nothing new about this -- he wanted to take some care in explaining this, that it was of the nature that I'm describing to you, and I think I've been describing now for about three days.

Q You said earlier that there is a very active dialogue going on in the area including the Palestinians. Do you have any people on the ground there in contact or representatives in the area who --

A We certainly have our embassies and diplomats there. Also, Ambassador Draper's team, or parts of that team -- certainly Chris Ross remains there. But in terms of our Embassies, they certainly are there and able, whether an Ambassador is present or not, to interact with their host government.

Q What do you comment on the story in The Washington Post this morning about the apprehension of Syria towards--

A About the what?

Q The apprehensions of Syria towards joining if -- when the matter is related to water and water diversion --

A I really don't have any information on the Syrian attitude. I really can't comment on that, and I have no evidence to support the suggestion that Israel is diverting that water.

Q Permit me to go back to --

Q Could we go to Nicaragua?

A Yes. Let's go on to another subject.

Q Alan, the Nicaraguans have denied, hooted at, whatever you want to say, your charges that their consultate offices were used for intelligence operations.

What is your reaction to that? Can you give us any more about this charge?

A I can't really. As you know, it's the kind of subject which becomes very delicate for us to address at all, and I think you had some guidance on this yesterday afternoon when the announcement was made about the action that we had taken. I really cannot take it beyond what was said.

Q Isn't it a little odd, though that you had to announce that coincidentally after the Nicaraguans expelled the three?

A I don't think it looks a little odd.

Q If these places were being used as spy nests or whatever, why didn't you throw them out a long time ago?

A Decisions of how to handle situations like that are made on the basis of a variety of factors.

Q It couldn't have been very serious intelligence operations if you let them sit there and do it.

A I don't share that as a necessary conclusion, but I can't get into it. I'm just anticipating your follow-on. I can't get into it. You can press on it, but it just doesn't do any good. There's nothing I can say to characterize it or describe it in any way. I think you have to take what we said as our position on this.

Q Can you tell me why 21 were thrown out instead of three? Was this because of the seriousness of the intelligence operations that were going on? Why the disproportion in numbers?

A Again, you had guidance on this yesterday which I will repeat for you: The Nicaraguan Government's precipitous action in expelling U.S. officials, giving them an unreasonably short deadline for leaving the country and then the public show staged in Managua on June 6 called, in our opinion, for a strong response. An important additional consideration was the Nicaraguan Government's use of its consultates for intelligence operations.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, do you have assurances that these officials have indeed left? Are they out of the country as yet?

A I don't think actually they were, as I recall it, due to be out at this particular moment.

Q Can you do better on John's question about if there were intelligence operations why weren't they thrown out earlier?

A No, I cannot. I don't propose to get into that.

Q Are there any intelligence operations being conducted out of the Nicaraguan Embassy here in Washington?

A Again, I don't propose to get into that. We chose to make this statement yesterday. We don't often do that, but it was made yesterday and I think you have to take it as a sincere statement. If you don't, that's your privilege.

Q Is Ambassador Quainton being recalled?

A I have no information that suggests he's being recalled.

Q Are there any additional measures contemplated against Nicaragua?

A No, and I don't know of any other additional measures.

Q Whom will Ambassador Stone see in Managua?

A I don't have details on that. I guess we'll have to wait and see. I just don't know whom he will see.

Q Is there any change in Ambassador Stone's schedule?

A There's no change in his plan to go on Friday.

Q There is a report from one of the tribe of journalists traveling with the Secretary that there might be a full break in relations.

A That was an erroneous report.

Q That's flat-out wrong?

A Flat out wrong.

Q Anything new, more ample a statement than the one that -- the brief one of yesterday regarding the meeting between Bishop of Grenada and Secretary Dam and Judge Clark?

A Really not. You got the statement I think last night, or the guidance last night that was available on this. They did meet.

Q But that did represent an abrupt change, because -- I think it was last Friday the Secretary of State said, well, we offered him -- who was it now? Ambassador Middendorf, and he apparently missed the appointment. And then suddenly, with no announcement from you, we see Bishop all smiles, coming out of this building, after meeting no less than Dam and Clark?

A These things happen from time to time. I don't have details to give you on the diplomatic back-and-forth on that.

I think, again, we gave you yesterday as much characterization as we're prepared to do.

Q Would you read that, please, what you gave yesterday?

A I don't know if this is exactly what was on the piece of paper yesterday, but it's close.

We can confirm that Prime Minister Bishop met yesterday at the Department with Acting Secretary Dam and National Security Advisor William Clark. The content of the conversation will remain confidential by mutual agreement.

The exchange was general in nature and reflected the concerns of both governments.

Q Last week, when asked about it, the Secretary said that there was no toughening of the U.S. position in Central America, no hardening. Nevertheless, after the actions taken yesterday, there is a feeling, at least a confirmation of many of the feelings that the U.S. was toughening this.

How would you characterize what is happening?

A I think what the Secretary indicated was, there was no change in policy; there has been no change in policy. There were certain actions taken by the Government of Nicaragua and we responded.

Q Do you have any reaction to the House Foreign Affairs Committee action yesterday?

A On the covert action question? No, I don't have anything beyond what I offered you.

Q Would you use the same guidance as you did when the House Intelligence Committee passed the same bill?

A I don't recall specifically what it was.

Q You use words like "most unwise."

A I gave you the other day -- it was yesterday or the day before -- some language about our basic position which has been articulated on this before, and I'll leave you with that.

Q Do you have any comment on reports of death threats against the family of human rights activist in Argentina, Emilio Mignone?

A I don't have any information on it.

Q You're aware of the reports or you have no comment on it?

A I'm not aware of the reports.

Q Alan, are there any changes in the plans for elections in Salvador; the timing of those elections?

A There has been, because of delay in completing a constitution, which would contain the election provisions, and also the necessity of formulating an electoral law following the adoption of that constitution, there has been some discussion in El Salvador of changing the date. But there has been no decision to do that, and in any case as far, as I understand, there has been no discussion of slipping that, if it were to slip, beyond the original March 31, '84 deadline. But, again, I would emphasize my understanding is that this has been a matter of discussions but certainly not a matter of decision.

Q There is no slipping beyond the March '84 --

A March 31, '84; the original deadline.

Q So in other words, it's possible it might slip beyond the first of next year; right?

A That, as I say, is something that has been discussed in El Salvador but it is not something that has, by any means, been decided.

Q Whom did these discussions involve -- America officials? Whom do these discussions involve?

A I don't have details on who has been involved in the discussions.

Q What would be the U.S. view on slippage? Because the U.S. was pushing for the earlier elections?

A I don't know that we said we were pushing for the earlier elections. I think we welcomed that, but, as I say, the factors involved here include the delays in completing the constitution and the election provisions in that constitution, and the necessity to formulate an electoral law following the adoption of that constitution.

Q So you consider that understandable or just you --

A I would just leave you with those words. I'm not going to try to characterize it.

Q Do you have a timetable on the completion of this process, the constitution and the election law?

A I understand that the constitution will be presented to the drafting committee for public debate and passage by the Constituent Assembly as a whole soon. I don't have a further definition of what the word "soon" means. I can't help you on that.

Q When will the ruler of Bahrain begins his official visit to the United States?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Is it true that a high-ranking U.S. official visited Libya -- Tripoli, Libya -- in the last few weeks prior to the uprising in the PLO, (inaudible) ranks in the PLO?

A I'm unaware of any --

Q This is a story from the West Bank.

A I'm unaware of any visit by a high-ranking official recently to --

Q While you're on this constitution in that part of the world south of us, did you have any comment in the last several days, or do you now, on the announcement by the Prime Minister of Grenada over the weekend regarding the constitutional process that he has announced is starting in Grenada leading toward an eventual election?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Could you get something as to what the U.S. view of it is?

A I'm doubtful, but I will look into it.

Q Has not the U.S. been critical of their failure to do anything in the past?

A I think that we would -- there has been a recent discussion, obviously, and I'm not sure that we would get into commenting on that question. I'll look into it for you, though.

Q Could you restate what the U.S. view is on elections in Salvador as to their timing?

A I'd ask you to go back and look at the record of what we've said before, and I'll ask you to look at what I said today. I don't have anything to summarize it all and put it in a nice, neat package for you.

Q Is there a date now? Has a date ever been set?

A I don't know if there's a specific date that's been set; whatever the Salvadoran Government has made known on this. You would have to check with them. I don't recall it. I'm sure you know as much about it as I do.

Q Jean Kirkpatrick is supposed to give a briefing to Congress today. Since she's not testifying before any particular committee, do you know what that is?

A I don't. I'd ask you to check with her office. I don't know --

Q Is she the lead person now on Central America policy for the Administration at this point, because I understand that Enders is no longer occupying his office?

A As of yesterday, Jim Michel is the Acting Assistant Secretary. Lead person really is the President of the United States. Beyond that, everybody has the various responsibilities, including, obviously the Secretary of State.

Q Clearly. But up until now, Jean Kirkpatrick said many different things of a factual and of another nature, some of which are questionable.

I haven't raised them very often here at all, and I want to know whether she speaks for the Administration on Central America because now there just seems to be -- you know, it's just not clear who does on Central America.

For example, she said just a couple weeks ago that the United States considered the government in Nicaragua to be a "Stalinist regime." I'd like to know what that means if she speaks for the Administration or not. I'd appreciate --

A I'm not familiar with that speech, and you would have to check with her office on that particular formulation. Obviously, she's a senior official of the government, and when she's speaking in that capacity, she is speaking officially.

Q Where is Ambassador Vernon Walters, and when did he visit Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in the last few weeks?

A He visited them -- I don't know -- a couple of weeks ago. It was in all the papers in those countries, and John Hughes addressed it from this podium. I suggest you go back and look at the record.

Q Speaking of speeches, to change the subject, can you give us an idea about the availability of a text for the Secretary's commencement address at Stanford?

A I don't have anything for you today on that.

Q You believe, though, one will be made available here?

A I'll have to check. I would hope that we could make it available. He's away and he doesn't get back until Friday night. The speech is on Sunday. So whether he will still be working on it over the weekend, I can't tell you, and I wouldn't want to promise you something which we couldn't deliver on.

Q Do you have anything with respect to the Honduran training base that could clarify what the status of it is?

A I don't. We're still working on answering your question on it.

Q Also, do you have anything with respect -- has the United States transmitted anything to the Pretoria Government with respect to the executions that are scheduled for tomorrow morning?

A I have a guidance which goes back to yesterday, which I think I would want to use rather than trying to talk specifically about anything we might be doing directly with the government. Let me just make a statement for you in response to your question.

The Department has taken note of the announcement that the State President of South Africa has commuted the death sentences of three self-proclaimed members of the African National Congress -- the ANC -- convicted of taking part in activities in which no one was killed, but denied the clemency appeals for the three who were convicted of murder.

The latter three were convicted of participating in attacks against South African installations which resulted in four deaths. They had waived their right to appeal their convictions and applied directly for clemency, which has now been denied.

The United States voted on December 7, 1982, in favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 525 which urged the Government of South Africa to commute the death sentences of the three. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 525, the United States made known its concern to the South African Government regarding the six South Africans condemned to death.

In the wake of the car bomb attack in Pretoria, in which 18 were killed and 200 injured, responsibility for which was subsequently claimed by the ANC, and the South African attack on Maputo, Mozambique, the United

States calls on all parties to the conflict in Southern Africa to halt the growing cycle of violence and to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of peaceful resolution of the problems of the region.

The United States rejects both the status quo of apartheid and the use of violence as a means to bring about change or resolve problems. We do not believe that further deaths will contribute to a resolution of the problems of Southern Africa.

Q Can we have a copy of that, Alan?

A We can make a copy.

Q Yesterday, it seems like 66 or 67, some number like that, members of Congress signed a letter asking for the Secretary of State to make a personal intervention in this case to keep these three people from being killed. Did he do anything, or did the State Department do anything in response to that appeal or at the same time as the appeal?

A Let me look into it. Again, you get into an area of if we did do something directly, I'm not sure whether we would be able to talk to it; but let me look into it and see what I can come up with.

Q Alan, do you have Wisner's testimony; is it going to come out?

A Rush, do we have -- no.

Q Pardon?

A Do not.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, June 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #99

THURSDAY, JUNE 9, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple brief announcements. A reminder, I guess, there will be a background briefing tomorrow, June 10, in the White House Briefing Room at 10:30 a.m. on Australian Prime Minister Hawke's visit.

Also available in the Press Office is the testimony of Acting Secretary Larry Eagleburger before the House Ways and Means Committee. The subject is CBI.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q The subject was what?

A CBI, Caribbean Basin.

Q That's the only question, I had.

TAPE RECORDER: Joe Fraser won! (Laughter)

A I'll have to look into that.

Q What time did you say that is? (Laughter)

A Jim?

Q I pass.

Q I pass.

A I pass. That's it?

Q Nobody want's to leave.

Q I want to leave.

A Do you have a question?

No, we have not declared war.

Q Does the State Department have a reaction to the hangings in South Africa?

A I don't have anything beyond what we said yesterday at the briefing, and I think we provided something later on it.

Q Do you have any reaction to the arrest of opposition figures in Nicaragua?

A I believe there was something on this earlier. Rush, do you recall -- I think in the Press Office there is some guidance on that. I don't have it with me, but you can get it.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:12 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #100

FRIDAY, JUNE 10, 1983, 12:25 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements.

First, to say that there is available in the Press Office a statement issued in Paris on June 8 following the Namibia Contact Group Ministerial meeting that day. Sorry we didn't have it for you yesterday.

Second, a statement with regard to $25 million in additional food aid to drought-stricken southern Africa:

The United States Government will release an additional $25 million in emergency food aid to drought-stricken southern African countries. The food consists principally of sorghum, corn, wheat and vegetable oil.

Africa, in the best of times, faces serious food shortages because of declining per-capita food production. Chronic malnutrition is a fact of life on the continent. The drought in southern Africa can mean the difference between malnutrition and starvation.

In Fiscal Year 1983 the U.S. is distributing over $68.2 million, or some 250,000 tons of food, through the PL 480 Food for Peace program to ten southern African countries.

Beyond the most immediate humanitarian needs, the United States expects the effects of the drought to continue to be felt throughout the region for the next 12 to 18 months. The U.S. Government recognizes the difficulty and the long-term nature of the effort that must be made if southern Africa is to achieve food security and self-reliance.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy.

Q And also of the $68 million figure that you used, does that include the $25 million that you announced today?

A The $68.2?

Q Does that include the $25 million that you announced today?

A I'll have to check on that. I can't answer that for you.

Q Just on the same thing, how is it distributed? Is it allocated --

A Why don't you check afterward with those who are handling the aid?

Happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have confirmation or comment on reports that the Soviet Union is increasing troop strength in Cuba?

A I cannot confirm those reports. Obviously, we watch that situation carefully, but I cannot confirm those reports.

Q Can you do better than that? Does the U.S. Government know or not know?

A We don't have any evidence at this point regarding an augmentation of the Soviet brigade.

Q What is your reading now on the level of that force in Cuba?

A I don't have a number to give you.

Q Could you get a number?

A I don't think I would probably be doing that. I don't think we usually have been putting out that number.

Q You have in the past.

A Well, if it's in the past, then it's on the record.

Q What stage is your review of this report in? Is it something that's been checked over pretty thoroughly and you've come up with a conclusion that we don't have any evidence for this? Is it something that's in the preliminary stages where --

A I'm giving you our best reading of the situation.

Q I'm trying to find out whether that's a final reading on it or not. Can you help me out just a little bit with that?

A I don't think anything is ever final, but I think in light of the reports which came out last night, people have looked into this and this reflects the results of a further review of the situation.

Let me go back to the announcement on food aid, the $25 million is in addition to the $68M.

Q So altogether about $93M.

A I think you could probably add that up and come up with that. (Laughter)

Q Have these reports sparked any enhanced concern about that Soviet force?

A I don't have any judgments to give you about that. As I say, we don't have the evidence to support those stories. We continue to watch that question with care, but don't have anything further for you.

Q Does this fit in the pattern of their troop rotation in any way?

A I haven't talked about what fits in what pattern or what has necessarily gone on, and I don't think I would be in a position to go into that kind of detail. I'll have to stick with what I've given you on that.

Q Have you spoken to the Cubans or the Soviets about this?

A Again, just a matter of principle, I don't think we'd get into that. I don't know why, given the response that I've given you, that question particularly arises. If we were talking about some major augmentation, I would think that that might be a question that we would want to consider, whether we would address it from the podium or not.

Q Also on the Soviet Union, skipping a bit, do you have any comment on the TASS response to the President's arms control proposals, again stating that they're designed for military superiority over the Soviet Union?

A This is on the START proposals?

Q Yes.

A We've made an important new proposal to move the START negotiations forward, taking into consideration basic Soviet concerns. In the new round of negotiations which began this week we are offering a very flexible and equitable framework for a strategic arms reduction agreement which would benefit the security of both nations.

Because we're serious about making progress in START, we do not intend to negotiate these matters through an exchange of press headlines and instant commentaries such as yesterday's unhelpful TASS article.

Q Can we get that copy?

A Yes.

Q New subject?

A Go ahead.

Q Middle East. The Israelis lost three soldiers again this morning and one kidnapped I think. Any comment to what seems to be a new campaign against Israeli presence in Lebanon?

A I don't have any new comment to offer. Obviously, any loss of life in this situation is tragic and underscores the need for a resolution of the problems.

Q Have the Israelis made any new indications about their level of patience, vis-a-vis a war of attrition?

A I think that's something you'd have to talk to the Israelis about.

Q But they have talked to us about it.

A But we don't normally talk about what they talk to us about.

Q Can you confirm the story about the -- that the United States refused to give to three Israelis status of diplomats in New York as a "revenge" of Israelis refusal to give status of three diplomats serving in --

A I'll have to look into it. If you could provide some details later. I don't know anything about that. I haven't seen that.

Q Also on the Middle East, any comments about the demonstrations or the protests in the Ansar camp? There are reports coming out for the last four days that there are strikes and protests and violence and burning of tents. Do you have anything on that?

A Nothing beyond the fact that, as we have noted many times before, we remain concerned about the prisoners held on both sides, or by both sides. We obviously are hopeful that their release can be successfully negotiated at an early date, but I don't have specific comment on that. I'd just leave it at that.

We've made that concern, I think, known a number of times before, and made clear that we're active on that issue from time to time when it is appropriate to do so.

Q On the same area, Alan, there are also reports (inaudible) that Israelis have blocked the supply of food to Sidon with the admissions of the Israeli authorities.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any information on it. I don't have any comment either.

Q Is any consideration being given to sending Deputy Secretary Dam to Syria?

A There are no plans for Deputy Secretary Dam to go to Syria. You ask a broad question: is there any consideration? Is there any consideration to doing any one of a number of things -- and I don't think we ever get into comment on that kind of a question, but there are not plans.

Q Could you bring us up a bit on the Middle East talks within the Department over the past few days, where they stand, have they been concluded, any recommendations, etc.?

A I don't think I can really give you a detailed readout on them. The talks -- the ones we've been talking about -- were held yesterday, as we indicated. As I've also indicated, there are a lot of people talking outside of that particular one framework all the time.

I don't have any particular results to offer you. It was a meeting which included the participants that I mentioned. I think there were also some people who came in from outside to either participate or kibbitz. I'm not sure quite how that went. But anyway, they met, and --

Q Alan, where does the troop withdrawal agreement -- Lebanon-Israel -- stand at the present time? What sort of future does it have from your point of view? Is it finished?

A It obviously remains to be implemented, but it is an important step. It provides the framework for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon. The obvious next step in the overall process in Lebanon is to get agreement on withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces, but I don't have anything to update you today on that subject.

Q Just to follow that up, that would logically lead to our talking to Syria at a high level. The Syrians have said quite clearly and repeatedly that they will not receive Habib, so that brings up an ansillery question of what has Phil Habib got to do for a living right now if he can't go to Syria, and what are we going to do?

A Two or three things: One is I'm not sure that that logically or necessarily brings up the conclusion that you have suggested, but I'm not ruling out the possibility of future talks at various high levels.

We obviously have ways of talking with the Syrians today without high-level visitors going one way or the other.

What Phil Habib's plans are, as I have indicated before, I don't know about plans for returning to the Middle East at this point. That's part cf what is being considered in terms of the consultations that he's holding here and when it might be appropriate for him to go back.

I really think that's about where I have to leave it.

Q Have you got anything on Secretary Shultz's visit to India and Pakistan, the itinerary and --

A I don't. We haven't announced a trip yet, so I don't have anything on that question.

Q Are you planning to have any backgrounder here or a readout when the Secretary gets back from Paris?

A I hadn't planned one. It's been fairly broadly covered over there. I don't know that we would do that. Is there a great desire? Would there be a lot of people who would be interested in that?

Q I would be.

A Okay. I think maybe, Steve, the thing to do is to pursue it individually, though, because I don't think -- our experience has been that while there have been requests when the Secretary has been travelling for a briefing, in fact there are very few people who show up. I think the people who do the briefing have tended to find that somewhat --

Q I was at that one.

A I think there has been more than one instance. So can you follow up individually on that?

Q Sure. Let me ask a second thing. Will there be a transcript made available of anything that happens on the plane on the way back?

A We can make it available when -- yes. As it is available to us, we can make it available to you.

Q Do you have any idea when that might be?

A I don't know. They're coming back. They'll be back late today. I would hope --

Q Do you have a time on that, Alan?

A Rush?

MR. TAYLOR: 6:45.

A 6:45 is the latest. I would think sometime tomorrow would be a reasonable --

MR. TAYLOR: Monday.

A No? Well, we'll talk about that later.

Q Do you have a time for Minister Salem to be with the Secretary tomorrow?

A I have a tentative time of 10:30, but you might want to check.

Q Do you have a schedule for the new Israeli Ambassador to meet with the Secretary this weekend?

A No, I don't have it, but I think that they have been in touch and indicated they would be getting together after the Secretary got back. I don't think he's going to be meeting with the Secretary before the Secretary goes away to give his commencement address at Stanford.

Q Does he go tomorrow -- Shultz?

A Yes.

Q He goes tomorow?

A Yes.

Q The address is Sunday?

A The address is Sunday.

Q And is there a special subject that you want to share with us?

A Why don't we talk about that later.

Q Do you have anything on reports that the Salvadoran Foreign Minister has told reporters in Columbia that his government is considering withdrawing U.S. advisors under certain circumstances?

A As you're aware, El Salvador and the United States were signatories to the San Jose Final Act in October of last year which, among its recommendations to lessen tensions in the region, supported a comprehensive, verifiable and reciprocal agreement among Central American countries leading to removal of all foreign military advisors, non-importation of heavy offensive weapons, an end of support for insurgencies on the territory of neighbors, and the establishment of democractic institutions within which opposition groups can compete for power through elections.

The Contadora Group, of which El Salvador is a participant and which we support, has itself begun to address these same factors. Within this context, we would support the search for viable solutions to achieve peace in the region.

Q Well, but answer the question.

A I think that does answer the question.

Q It does not.

A It envisages -- the San Jose Final Act envisages, in the context of a comprehensive, verifiable and reciprocal agreement, the withdrawal of all foreign advisors from the region. I'm not aware that there's any inconsistency between that and what --

Q A copy of that statement?

A Yes.

Q You are not anticipating a sudden or unexpected request for withdrawal of advisors?

A I'm certainly not aware of anything like that, no.

Q Do you have anything more on Salvador on the statement made by the FDR/FMLN yesterday in Mexico City -- talking with Stone, Congressmen and so on?

A We can confirm that a message has been received. As you are aware, Ambassador Stone is still engaged in his first familiarization trip to the region, consulting with the governments in each country. The letter will be studied in the context of that trip after his return.

Q What is the question?

A Let me go on with this and then I'll get back to you.

We are concerned about the purpose for the public release of the letter, and would hope that it does not indicate an FMLN/FDR rejection of the invitation extended to them on June 2 by the Peace Commission of El Salvador to engage in a "constructive dialogue for their peaceful incorporation into the Salvadoran family."

Bernie, this relates to a report that the FMLN/FDR, I guess, had a press conference of some sort in Mexico about inviting Ambassador Stone to meet with them. I think you can look it up and see what the reports say about that.

Q It was to meet in the U.S., Alan.

A I know; I understand that. As I say -- I've given you the statement. You can get --

Q Can we get a copy?

Q We'll be studying that when?

A We'll be studying in the context of the trip after he returns.

Q So, in other words, no action is going to be taken prior to his return on this trip? He's not going to meet with anyone from the FDR/FMLN before he comes here?

A I'm not aware that he is, and I don't think that this proposal was that he would do so either.

Q Can we get a copy of your reaction?

A You can get a copy of what I just gave you, yes.

Q It's not a turn-down of the proposal?

A As I say, the letter will be studied in the context of the trip after Ambassador Stone returns. But I would also emphasize what I said after that, which is that we hope that the purpose of the public release is not an indication of a rejection of the invitation of the Peace Commission to carry on a dialogue.

Q Why do you stress that point?

A I think I would take a look at what they said about whom they wanted to meet with. They didn't talk about meeting with Salvadoran officials.

Q Isn't it true that Stone in his confirmation hearing said that it would be useful and he would be willing to meet with the FDR/FMLN?

A I think I'm going to leave you with what we've got at this point. I think that's as far as I can take it.

Q Going back to the prisoners in Ansar, I noticed in the news reports today that the Israelis through the bullhorns or the loudspeakers told the prisoners that an imminent solution to their problem or exchange and freeing of them is coming soon. Do you have any information about this?

A I don't have any information about it nor do I have any comment on that. Obviously, as I said, we hope that the release of all the prisoners can be effected soon.

Q Do you have any comment on the meeting -- reported meeting between Qadhafi and Arafat in Yemen?

A I do not have anything on that.

Q Alan, can I follow up the Ansar thing? You said earlier that we had been active on that from time to time. Is this one of the times?

A I don't have anything to give you about what may be going on with respect to that, and I don't think I really could, on an individual basis do that. But this is an issue --

Q Let me make the question a little broader. We've had an agreement now between Lebanon and Israel which, at least, changes things politically. That would seem an appropriate time to bring up the matter of the prisoners again.

A Clearly, the issue of prisoner exchange has been one which has been of concern to all the parties who have prisoners. From the beginning, or virtually from the beginning of the conflict in Lebanon, we have taken an interest in the subject of prisoners. I'm just not able to go into the details of what we have done, but I can assure you that we have been active, and will continue to take an active interest so long as there are prisoners who have been captured and are being either detained or who are unaccounted for.

Q Our interest is to get them released; is that right?

A Sure. Our interest is in their release and our interest also has been from time to time when there have been reports of concern over treatment one side or the other.

Q Is there anything more being yielded by the study into the blast of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, as to the specific objectives -- that is to say, the U.S. negotiating team, Habib, etc., in contrast to the symbol of the U.S. Embassy?

A I don't have anything new at all to -- any new light to shed on the subject of responsibility or motivation on that.

Q Can you address the question of prisoners in light of the statement by President Amin Gemayel yesterday calling on Israel to release all the prisoners? You are aware of the statement?

A A statement by --

Q President Amin Gemayel.

A I don't have anything new to offer beyond what I've just given you.

Q One more thing, please. In answer to one of the questions earlier, you said that the United States could be in touch with the Syrians, or maybe is at any level, not necessarily a high level.

Is the United States in touch with Syria right now at any level?

A Sure. We have diplomatic representation that is --

Q That's granted. Are you in touch with them to pursue --

A There are discussions which go on in those diplomatic channels; sure.

Q Different subject. Can you comment on the withdrawal by Congressman Fascell of the enhanced role that he had envisaged for the Coordinator of Telecommunications and Information for the bill passed yesterday?

A I don't have any information on that. Can't help you.

Q A gentleman who is an official of the Libyan Student Aid Office is being detained; his visa has been cancelled, I understand, on grounds that his presence in the United States is prejudical to U.S. interests. Is this correct? Do you have any comment on why he is being detained, and is he to be deported?

A I don't have details for you. I can say that Mr. Ghadban's visa has been invalidated pursuant to Section 212(a)27 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. It was determined that he undertook activities unrelated to his student status which were prejudical to the public interest.

Q Is he to be deported, and when?

A Again, I don't have any details on this, and I don't think this is something which we're directly involved in at this point.

Q Can you describe what these activities were?

A No, I cannot.

Q On another -- if I may skip to this -- do you have any comment on the reports that the Government of France has declined permission for the United States to speak to Klaus Barbie?

A No. As I gather it, what you're talking about are reports that Justice Department officials seeking to speak with him were unable to. Personally, I cannot confirm that. I don't know. I'm not denying it -- I just don't know -- but I think you would probably have to go to Justice to see what's happened with that.

Q Do you have anything on Carter's comments on human rights policy?

A I don't.

Q Two U.S. citizens of Arabic heritage, one Lebanese and one Palestinian, at the news conference yesterday at the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, accused the State Department of showing a lack of concern in the fate of their brothers in Ansar Camp. I believe Mr. Veliotes and Mr. Peletreau met with representatives of other organizations related to the subject and other matters.

What do you answer to the charges that were made public in a news conference that the State Department showed lack of concern in the case of Samih El-Youssef and Ghassan Zaidan, and their brothers?

A I can't comment on the specifics. I don't know what the specific charges are. I would say that it is incorrect to assert that we have no concern for the prisoners in any of these camps. I think I just made a statement which indicates quite to the contrary.

Q Do you have anything on the successful beginning of the OAU meeting?

A I don't have here. I think there is some guidance which existed from before which is available in the Press Office.

Q Do you have anything on reports that appeared in the press today about Honduras and more military aid?

A No, not really. There was some discussion of this over at the Pentagon, I believe, and I just don't have anything more, really, to offer on this.

Q Has General Alvarez seen anybody on his visit in this building?

A I don't know whether he has or hasn't, frankly. I would think he may have.

STAFF: Mr. Schneider.

A Schneider, yes. Under Secretary Schneider.

Q He did see him, or he may have seen him?

A No, I think he has seen him. My recollection is that he was going to see him yesterday.

I just might note -- just to go back on this question of assistance -- simply, that our FY 84 budget request for security assistance to Honduras is a matter of public record.

Again, I'm not going to speculate on future assistance nor am I going to get into the question of what might have been discussed during his visit. And, of course, he also talked with the Senate committees in closed session, and I don't know what he said there.

Q Do you have any comment on the study of the military airfields in Honduras?

A Again, I refer you to what Henry Catto said about that yesterday at his briefing. He indicated we had no plans to get involved in any construction at this point.

Q Alan, there are wire reports quoting a West German diplomat saying the U.S. has made very considerable progress in its negotiations with Angola towards reaching an arrangement for elections in Namibia. Do you have anything on Crocker's progress?

A No, other than the fact that, as I said before, there is a Contact Group statement which is available in the Press Office.

Q Do you have an update on the Embassy investigation of the Schaufelberger death?

A No, I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JUNE 13, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #101

MONDAY, JUNE 13, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements for you.

First, regarding a trip. Secretary of State Shultz will visit the Philippines, Thailand, India and Pakistan June 23 to July 5. In Bangkok he will attend the annual Foreign Ministers dialogue, following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting there, and hold discussions with leaders of the Royal Thai Government afterwards.

Specific dates for the trip are: the Philippines, June 24 to 26; Thailand, June 26 to 29; India, June 29 to July 2; Pakistan, July 2 to 4. He returns to Washington July 5. A sign-up sheet has been posted in the Press Office for those of you who wish to apply for seats aboard the Secretary's plane. The sheet will be taken down and applications closed at noon on Thursday, June 16th.

Second, to remind you that there will be a readout this afternoon, guessing between 1:20 and 1:40, sometime in that period, on the Australian Prime Minister's meeting with the President.

Q Is that here?

A No. Sorry, White House.

Q When will that be?

A Roughly, 1:20 to 1:40. Sometime in that period.

Q Sorry, what day?

A Today

Q Third: Regarding action taken by the Peace Commission in El Salvador, I would like to take note here that on Saturday, the Government of El Salvador publicly appealed to the opposition to begin discussions at the earliest opportunity on leftist participation in the electoral process.

The head of the country's Peace Commission offered to meet with the FDR and those that have taken up arms against the government to begin discussions on electoral participation. As a show of "good faith" in this regard, the Government of El Salvador has released over 425 political prisoners -- over half of those that had been incarcerated -- instituted an amnesty for all guerrillas and their sympathizers willing to eschew violence, created an Amnesty Group to provide security and vocational training to amnesty beneficiaries, begun work to re-open the National University, which was closed during earlier civil strife, and is reviewing the current State of Siege Decree in order to safeguard the rights of future detainees.

As the head of the Peace Commission stated on Saturday, "The Peace Commission does not necessarily beleive that 100 percent of the amnesty beneficiaries released from prison will take the road to peace. However, it does believe that 99 percent will do so, and it was in that spirit that the amnesty program was established."

The Government of El Salvador has shown its strong desire to meet with the opposition and to send the appropriate signals of their willingness to enter into discussions. We applaud these calls as indicative of a government attempting to bring the armed opposition and their political front into what was referred to by the Government of El Salvador in their call of June 3 as the "Salvadoran family." The Government of El Salvador is awaiting an FDR/FMLN response.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Copy?

Q Questions on it?

A I don't really have --

Q Answers?

A -- much to give you beyond what we've just said. Let me go through and make one other just very brief announcement, and we'll go back to it.

That is, to note, that we will have available in the Press Office some figures on economic and military assistance requests for Central America for FY-84. There apparently has been some confusion about what constitutes military assistance as opposed to the broader category, for example, of security assistance for budgetary purposes. And so we've tried to put together some figures for you. As I say, those will be available in the Press Office.

Q They're not new figures now?

A It should be available after the briefing. There's nothing new except that it does break it down in a way that makes clear what is really military and what is economic.

Okay, questions.

Q On that, what do you call "security assistance?" Is that military or economic?

A Security assistance -- why don't you look at the statement. There are differences between security assistance -- basically the issue is ESF, economic support funds, which comes under security assistance but is not military assistance. It's not used for military purposes. In fact, my understanding is that it's prohibited by law from being used for military purposes, but it comes under the security assistance budget.

Q But as you've pointed out, since the money is fungible it replaces money spent by these countries on their own defense funds?

A It may or it may not. But in any case these figures are available to you.

Q Any update --

A Sorry?

Q Do you have any update about the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q Just a couple of questions on the original statement. One is, does this constitute your response and an implied rejection of the offer made last week by the FDR/FMLN?

A I gave you a reaction last week to that. I don't have anything new on the --

Q So this doesn't address that at all?

A No.

Q It's the U.S. response; go talk to the Peace Commission and don't talk to us?

A I have nothing beyond what I said last week, which is that we would consider their letter in the context of Ambassador Stone's visit after he had returned.

Q The second question I have is, the Archbishop in San Salvador, in his homily last Sunday, said that while it's great that all these prisoners are being released, more are being picked up everyday, he said. And until the state of siege -- that is, Decree 501 -- is lifted, you can't really talk about any return to normality.

Do you have any response to the Archbishop's points?

A Not specifically, but I would point out that in the statement I gave you it talked about consideration being given, in fact, to the State of Seige Decree. I call your attention to that, but I don't have any --

Q Does Stone plan to meet with the guerrillas on this trip?

A Again, I think that I indicated last week that their suggestion to meet with him, which was a suggestion, as I recall, to be in the United States, would be considered after he returned in the context of his trip.

Q There's nothing for the trip itself?

A I'm not aware of anything for the trip itself.

Q He's due back here tomorrow; is that not correct?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any schedule for him? Could he meet with us, for example?

A I'll be happy to look into that.

Q What time would that be, Alan?

A When is he due back?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. I'll try and see if we can find something.

Q Alan, would it be fair to desribe the approach taken by the Government of El Salvador as a dual-track?

A I don't think I'd try to characterize it one way or another.

Q Do you have any comment on what seems to be heightening tension between Honduras and Nicaragua, including Nicaraguan charges of firing across the border and the Honduran military head suggesting that American troops may be needed to defend his country?

A I don't have any particular comment to offer on that. We have expressed in the past our hope that the tensions in the region could be resolved through adoption, in practical ways, for example, of the various principles in the San Jose Declaration. But as to the specifics that you're raising, I do not have a reaction at all.

Q Do you have any information as to whether or not it's true that Honduras is firing across into Nicaragua, the Honduran Army as alleged by the Nicaraguans?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Do you have any kind of a readout on Stone's visit to Nicaragua on Friday? With whom did he meet, and --

A I don't have any information beyond what I believe has been fully covered in the press report coming out of Nicaragua. I'm not aware of any meetings that were not made public.

Q Can you say anything in context of the diplomatic flap? Does the U.S. believe it now has a dialogue, a continuing dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you. Again, in terms of what was stated following Ambassador Stone's conversations, I refer you to what he said. I don't have anything new (inaudible).

A On Nicaragua, is the Nicaraguan consul from New Orleans who announced he was seeking political asylum last week, is he in Washington now?

A I have no idea where he is.

Q Could you find out? We have a report that he's here.

A No, I don't think I would do that. Again, you're getting into the question of an asylum case and we don't talk about individual asylum cases. Obviously, he made known his intention in public, but beyond that it is not something that we go into from here.

Q Do you intend, if you aren't already, to debrief him, as it were?

A Again, I think that is not the kind of subject that we would address publicly.

Q With that, specifically, did the New Orleans consulate engage in intelligence activities as well as the others that was alluded to in your --

A I have no specifics to offer you beyond what we've said before.

Q And, also, why were these charter flights cancelled by the Civil Aeronautics Board at the behest of the State Department?

A I thought there was some guidance available on this over the weekend.

Q Was it related to the expulsions or related to something else?

A Again, I'd refer you to the guidance that was available over the weekend.

Q President Magaña's visit -- anything on the details of that?

A I don't. Do we have a schedule yet?

STAFF: Not yet.

A We hope to have one soon. He's coming towards the end of the week, so meetings, I guess, with the President are Friday.

Q You don't know what day he's coming?

A I'm not sure. I think Thursday was the last I heard.

Q Before the New Orleans diplomat applied for asylum, he was among those accused of gathering intelligence activities; is that right?

A Again, I don't have specifics to offer you on what any individual person or consulate may have been doing. The question of intelligence activities by consulates of Nicaragua was addressed in what we said following the announcement, or in the context of our announcement about ceasing their functions.

Q He was listed specifically as one who had to go.

A All of the consular personnel were asked to leave, and he then --

Q But he was listed among those who had to go because of, however you want to phrase it, broad spectrum intelligence activities leveled against consulates?

A No, he was among those who were asked to go when we responded to the action by the Nicaraguan Government against our personnel. In the announcement -- I refer you back to what we said at the time -- we cited additionally to their precipitous action against our personnel and the way in which they carried out the press briefing, and so on that. An additional factor was the fact that consulates of Nicaragua had carried out intelligence activities in the United States.

We do not try to measure that in our statement against the other factors.

Q Alan, this may be public knowledge, but has that diplomat been granted asylum?

A Again, I don't know. I think you would have to go to INS to ask them -- I don't know if they'll address that.

Q Do you have anything on the statement that was quoted in the Post by Ambassador McNeill?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, Ambassador Rosenne this morning said that -- he called, rather, for the imposition of international sanctions against Syria for not withdrawing its troops from Lebanon. Would the United States try to dissuade Israel from trying to rally any such support for imposition of sanctions against Syria?

A I don't think I would care to get into the question of that sort. Obviously, we are bending various diplomatic efforts toward getting the Syrians/PLO to agree to withdraw their forces from Lebanon. We hope that will take place.

Q Do you have any comment on the latest events in the Ansar Camp for POW's?

A I don't have any details on the reporting that's come out on that. We've seen reports of shooting, and so on, but I can't confirm that.

Obviously, we would regret any violence which has taken place, but I just don't have details.

Q Following Elie Salem's statement on Saturday, voicing some optimism about Secretary Shultz' involvement in the efforts to get the Syrians to withdraw, has there been any new consideration here of a Shultz return to the Middle East or an invitation to the Syrian Foreign Minister to visit Washington?

A We haven't made a practice of talking about what consideration is given to this, that or the other thing. I simply would say as a matter of fact that there is no plan for the Secretary to go to the Middle East at this point nor is there any specific plan beyond the Secretary having invited the Foreign Minister to come here and his having accepted during the trip, in principle, there's no specific on any trip by the Syrian Foreign Minister to come here.

Q Has there been any follow-up on that invitation -- discussion between the two sides?

A Again, I don't think I would get into the question of any diplomatic exchange. I'm not trying to lead you one way or another, but I just don't think we would --

Q I'm just wondering if you could give us some guidance on how any new American -- what form any new American involvement would take? Would there be --

A Not at this point.

Q Would it be desirable for the Syrians to come here before the Secretary goes out there?

A I don't have anything to offer you at this point.

Q Salem said on Saturday, as well, that there would soon be a discourse between the U.S. -- between Americans and Syrians. Is there anything scheduled?

A Again, I don't have anything in terms of any visits that are planned. We do have our Embassy which functions quite actively in Syria, but I don't have anything specific to offer you on it.

Q But he was talking in a different context, Alan. Do you have anything -- in other words, what he said doesn't mean anything?

A I didn't say that. There are no plans at this point for a visit, and that's as far as I really can take it. There's not much more to say.

Q What's the extent of your consultation with the Soviet Union about Lebanon, because I believe Mr. Draper, yesterday, said something that there are serious consultations with the Soviet Union, and you didn't care last week to define them that way.

A I said we have discussed Middle East issues, including Lebanese issues with the Soviets. I didn't see anything different in what Ambassador Draper said from what I've said.

Q I want to follow on this matter of the Ansar Camp. Besides expressing your regret about violence, this morning on the news reports, I believe one of the wire services said it was by helicopters, by tanks and by sniper shooters, and whatever it is, are chasing the people who broke away from the jail, from Ansar.

Do you find an opportunity now to call on both sides to try to bring this to an end, this incarceration of 5,400 Palestinian and Lebanese and exchange them with the eight Israeli prisoners and bring this human tragedy to an end?

A I indicated last week that, as we have on many occasions in the past, we take an active interest in the prisoner issue both in terms of looking for an ultimate resolution of that issue and also in terms of concern for treatment of prisoners on both sides. I don't think I could take it beyond that today.

Q Alan, Ambassador Lewis said the other day -- I think it was Friday -- that he expected Mr. Begin to visit within the next few weeks. Now you have the Secretary going off.

Is there a plan, or are arrangements being made for Mr. Begin to come here, and could he come here before the Secretary returned from his travels, or would the Secretary want to be on hand for that?

A First of all, as far as I know, there is no specific plan at this moment, but we have indicated before that Prime Minister Begin would certainly be welcome. I can't tell you what the exact state of play might be on that. I don't challenge Ambassador Lewis' statement on that, but, again, as I say, as far as I know there is no specific date as of this point.

Whether the Prime Minister would come before the Secretary comes back, it's hard to say, but I'm sure that the Secretary would want to be here.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that the U.S. Administration is now against or opposed to unilateral withdrawal by the Israelis to --

A Unilateral withdrawal?

Q Yes.

A Again, we addressed this previously. I don't have anything further to say beyond what we have said before. Our objective is to get all of the foreign forces -- Israelis, Syrian and PLO and any other associated forces that might be there -- out of Lebanon, and that remains our steady objective.

Q Simultaneously?

A In practical terms, certainly in the same time frame. Simultaneously is a little precise perhaps, but certainly in the same time frame.

Q Alan, Elie Salem said that there had been "half a dozen" meetings between high American officials and Soviet officials concerning Lebanon in the last month or so.

Can you characterize at all what the Soviet attitude is at this point?

A No. I don't think I would care to do that. What I've said before, and remains fact, is that we have expressed to them our concerns about the situation and our hopes that they would play a constructive role in this situation.

I would agree with what Ambassador Draper said about the nature of that role, though, yesterday. Beyond that, I don't care to characterize. I think it would be -- we have not characterized Soviet responses or the nature of the dialogue we've carried on with them.

Q Alan, is it the U.S. position that the Israelis are correct in not withdrawing until they're sure that the Syrians and PLO pull out?

I ask because Mr. Tueni -- if that's how to pronounce his name -- the Lebanese general coordinator of the talks has an article coming out in which he says maybe the best way to break this impasse is to have the Israelis come out first. He's, you know, sympathetic to Israeli's position, but he's also concerned about Lebanese sovereignty, and he is urging this course on the U.S. Government.

Do you know if the Lebanese have come to the United States with such a proposition, and/or if you can address that, is it the U.S. position that under no circumstances should Israel withdraw unless it knows the others are pulling out too?

A I cannot get to the first part of your question. I don't think it's a question of what the U.S. position is specifically on that issue. It has been a matter of practical reading of what the Israeli Government has said many times that they do not -- and I think reiterated quite recently -- they don't intend to withdraw unless there are arrangements for Syria and PLO withdrawal at the same time.

Q Would the United States --

A So I don't think -- I would prefer to address it in those terms rather than trying to lay out for you some theoretical U.S. preference.

Q But the U.S. does -- its objective is the removal of all foreign forces, right?

A That's right.

Q What if the only way to get them all out, or at least have a shot at it, is for the Israelis to pull out first? Would that be unacceptable?

A I don't think I can take it really beyond what I just said to you.

Q Elie Salem said on Saturday that it would not be acceptable if the Israelis only did a partial withdrawal, and he said this was the view of both the U.S. and Lebanese Governments. Is that correct?

A Again, our objective remains the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q On Barry's question also -- I don't know if somebody asked you already about it before I came here -- Philip Habib is quoted this morning saying that the way he proposed somewhere -- on CBS at least -- that the Israelis -- the best way to get both Syrian and PLO is to -- actually for the Israelis to withdraw. Have you any comment? Have you heard it? Can you confirm such a piece of news?

A No. I gathered it was one of the news magazines today, according to a source, that Ambassador Habib had said that. I don't think I will comment on a source story of that sort.

Q You cannot confirm the report itself?

A I would not talk about what had been discussed internally.

Q The Soviet Minister met with the Pakistani Foreign Minister over the weekend, and there seems to be some optimism about troop withdrawal. Would you care to react or comment to that?

A Troop withdrawal from Afghanistan?

Q Yes.

A No. I was asked, I think, last week about optimism or pessimism. We certainly have a firm objective of implementation of the U.N. resolutions which include -- obviously, would require troop withdrawal, but a variety of other things as well, and we stick firmly by that desire and that hope.

Q What is your reaction to reports from Zimbabwe about the killing of six hostages, including two Americans, shortly after they were abducted last July?

A We understand that several dissidents who may have information concerning the six missing tourists have been captured by the Zimbabwean authorities and are presently being interrogated.

The Zimbabwean Government is keeping us informed of all developments in this case, and the Department has informed the families of the two Americans of these developments and will continue to keep them informed.

Q When were the dissidents captured?

A July 23, '82.

Q What were the circumstances surrounding their admission, if you've had them, in custody --

A Surrounding what?

Q Surrounding this new information, apparently, as you say, that the dissidents have been captured.

A I don't have details to provide you.

Q The kidnapping occurred on July 23.

A That's right. I'm sorry. Is that what is being asked?

Q When were the dissidents captured?

A I'm sorry. When were the dissidents captured?

Q Yes.

A I do not know the answer to that question. Sorry. I misheard you. Thank you, George.

Q You don't know that they are necessarily implicated in the kidnapping?

A I think I would have to leave you with what I've just said, that several dissidents who may have information are being interrogated at present. I cannot take it beyond that.

Q In short, you have no confirmation of the reports of the deaths of all six?

A I do not have anything beyond what I've just given you. That's right.

Q Could you comment on reports out of Bonn toward the end of last week that the negotiations between the United States and Angola regarding the Cubans have entered what the diplomatic sources in Bonn called the "final, crucial stage"?

A I addressed this last week, basically saying no, I don't have any comment, but there is -- if you want some further words on it, there was some guidance provided after that which says, obviously, we have been working diligently on the overall issue of southern Africa, Namibia, and related although unlinked question of foreign military presence, but I'm not able to comment directly on the Bonn report.

Q Is there any plan for another meeting between the U.S. and Angolan authorities?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q One other, if I could ask you, on Central America. Does the United States feel itself committed to come to the military assistance of Honduras in case Honduras is attacked by Nicaragua?

A I believe Secretary Weinberger addressed this question over the weekend. I don't have anything to add.

Q He addressed it, but he didn't address it very well, because he misstated what the Honduran General had said.

A He also said it was a hypothetical question which he didn't care to address, and I think we have to leave it there. Obviously, there are international agreements out there, but other than that I don't --

Q What international agreements are there which would pertain to this --

A I'm not sure what would necessarily pertain here, and I think, again, what we've got here is a hypothetical situation which I don't care to address.

Q Could you address the question of what international agreements there are which might trigger United States' military involvement in Honduras?

A No. I think, again, it depends on the circumstances, and I can't predict what the circumstances would be.

Q Wait, Alan. You've got, I mean, a low-scale war going on, shells going back and forth, and the head of the Defense or the Secretary of Defense, or the Minister of Defense of Honduras, who's regarded as a very powerful man, calling the Sandinistas the enemy which must be exorcised, and he comes up here and says he's going to want U.S. troop support if the Nicaraguans attack his country.

A Again, it's a hypothetical situation. I don't intend to address it.

Q What you are saying and what you're refusing to address by Don is that you're not going to give us any idea of existing commitments between the United States and Honduras that presumably are law in this country. I don't understand --

A I invite you to do your research. Those commitments are available. They're there for you to look at.

Q Are there any secret --

A I'm not going to address a hypothetical situation.

Q Are there any secret agreements with respect to Honduras and the United States?

A I'm not aware of any secret agreements regarding the U.S. sending forces into Honduras. I mean, secret agreements between the U.S. and Honduras is very broad. I don't know of any, but --

Q Can you check that out?

Q Alan, has any assurance been provided to the Government of Honduras regarding this question?

A I couldn't tell you.

CONT

Q Does an emergency situation exist now which the law allows the President to move without Congressional approval or even informing the public?

A I don't --

Q Is there a state of emergency now?

A I'm not aware of a state of emergency of that sort.

Q To come back to Afghanistan, has the United Nations kept the United States informed of the terms offered by the Soviet Union for withdrawing forces, and do these constitute a step forward in any way?

A Without characterizing in answering, the second part of your question we have had continuing consultation with the U.N. officials dealing with -- the Secretary General and others -- dealing with this issue.

Q But do you consider the proposals made by the Soviet Union as a step forward in any way?

A Again, I don't have a characterization to offer on that. I would again refer back to the specifics of what we think needs to be done, which is what the U.N. has said needs to be done to make an agreement work.

Q Do you have confidence in Cordova's negotation effort?

A Confidence in it? Sure. But in terms of what it's going to produce, I'm not in a position to predict what that would likely produce.

Q One more on Central America. You may have answered this last week. I don't think you did, though. Do you have any comment on the statements made by the Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez about the U.S. role in Central America?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the end of the OAU or anything on the OAU Conference?

A We have always supported the OAU as an instrument of the African nations to consult together in a search for solutions to common problems but don't have any specific comment on the resolutions that they adopted at this time.

Q Alan, can you tell us when Ambassador Habib will return to the region, what his schedule is now, and is the Middle East review that was conducted last week now complete with the Secretary having met on Saturday with Habib and others?

A Amassador Habib is in California at this point, and I don't have anything further on his plans. I'm not going to address the question the way you've asked it. The review. You keep on going back to this, suggesting it's some formal review.

Q I'm simply using Secretary Veliotes' words.

A And I think I would look at all his words.

Q I'd be glad to paraphrase.

A In any case, I understand the Ambassadors who were here on routine consultations are still around, but I'm not going to get into questions of all of their schedules. It isn't our practice to provide the schedules of Ambassadors who may be around on consultation or home leave.

Q Do you have any idea when Habib is going back?

A When he is going back specifically, I do not have anything to give you.

Q Is there a plan? If we phrase it in terms of the Secretary going to Damascus, is there a plan for Habib to return to --

A I don't have anything for you on his plans to go back.

Q Ambassador Draper over the weekend said that the Syrians will need the same security arrangements provided for the Israelis in southern Lebanon.

Is that position going to be maintained officially by the United States in negotiations perhaps, or in mediating efforts with the Syrians?

A Any agreement regarding security arrangements to meet Syria's concerns -- concerns which we've indicated before, or indicated before that they have legitimate concerns -- obviously would be a matter between Lebanon and Syria. So we hope that indeed Lebanon and Syria will be negotiating in ways to pave the way to bring about the withdrawal of Syrian and also PLO forces. But those negotiations will go forward. That's what we've been looking for.

Q But the United States will not then officially promote the notion that Syria does require these same security arrangements?

A Again, I don't think that that's up to us to say specifically what -- we've noted that they have legitimate security concerns. As to how those concerns are met, that's up to Syria and Lebanon.

Q Yes, but the United States noted the same legitimate security concerns with Israel --

A And those were met in negotiations between Israel and Lebanon.

Q Can you tell us when Ambassador Harriman will have his meeting with Secretary Shultz?

A I don't know when that is. I'll try and make sure that that is on the public scheduled. I'm pretty sure it's not today, so --

Q How about Ambassador Rosenne? Will Secretary Shultz be meeting with him in the next, what, week and a half?

A He will see him, I understand, later this week.

Q Why is Larry Eagleburger meeting with the Beach Boys?

A I understand that the Beach Boys indicated an interest in coming to the Department and seeing the facilities on the 8th floor, the reception rooms up there, and he'll be receiving them?

Q Why does the European Assistant Secretary -- why is he in charge of the Beach Boys?

A I didn't know that the European Assistant Secretary was in charge.

Q Oh.

A Mr. Eagleburger, of course, is the Under Secretary.

Q Do you have anything on emergency economic assistance to the Andean Pact countries in Latin America?

A Anything on?

Q Emergency economic assistance to the Andean Pact countries?

A I don't have anything on that beyond what we've said before. It's obviously a serious situation and one that deserves looking into. Precisely how that could be handled and so on, I don't have anything further.

Q Alan, has Secretary Watt been invited to help tour the Beach Boys through the Department?

(Laughter)

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #102

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 1983, 12:16 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Mr. Romberg has just asked whether I want him to introduce me. My name is John Hughes. I'm happy to be paying one of my occasional visits to Washington. (Laughter)

Q Is this on the record?

A It's on the record.

Q Is this a two-year assignment?

Q Are you just here for a --

A I'm just here for a short spell, passing through.

Q What's the purpose of your visit to Washington?

A Bilateral and regional matters for discussion. I understand there have been some innovations while I was away. You will all please remark that at my briefings there are no candelabra, no piano, no sequinned suit, nothing like that. Just straight stuff.

Q Answers?

A No. None of those either. I understand Mr. Romberg also broke the all-time record for the briefing duration while I was away. He had a 2-minute briefing one day, I understand.

Q One of the best we ever had. (Laughter)

A I should warn you that with what I came out here today we're likely to break that record. (Laughter)

Q Thank you. (Laughter)

A Hold on. Hold on. I've got a brief housekeeping announcement. The Secretary of State will be testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow at 10:00 on U.S.-Soviet relations. Because of his testimony our daily briefing tomorrow is cancelled. The next one will be on Thursday. Now you can say "Thank you," George. I really have very little for you today, I'm afraid.

Q What does he have to say about U.S.-Soviet relations at this point?

A I imagine you'll be there and can catch every word.

Q I wonder, could you bring us up to date on -- I understand there have been a number of bilaterals that he's held and that Ken Dam has held with Ambassador Dobrynin, having to do, to some extent, with the Middle East?

A To some extent, yes.

Q Can you fill in on any of that?

A No. They've covered a wide range of territory.

Q Any sign on the Middle East that the Soviets are more willing to play a constructive role or not? Any reason to hope for any?

A I think I'd refer you to the more precise language used by the Secretary, I think, during his press conference on the plane back from Paris on Friday. But certainly the presence of the Soviets in Syria is not helpful. The presence of the SAM-5 weapons is not helpful, and we've made that plain.

Q Does he have any response to the reports that follow the meeting of the Pakistani Foreign Minister and Minister Gromyko, looking towards a possible Soviet move on Afghanistan?

A Afghanistan? No. The four conditions that we have set for resolution of the Afghanistan problem still pertain. We're following the course of those negotiations but don't have any characterization of them for you.

Q John, on the Soviet relations, the Secretary is seeing Governor Harriman today, right?

A Yes. This afternoon.

Q Mr. Harriman will be reporting on his talks in the Soviet Union?

A Yes. I think they had a telephone conversation before the Secretary left Paris and agreed that they would meet when he got back. This is the first opportunity for them to get together.

Q Speaking of Paris, can you put into perspective for us some remarks made by the Secretary on the airplane about the French and their quality of being aggravating?

A I think he was referring to the technical business of communique drafting. I think you have to see this in the context of the overall relationship, which is good. But I think he was asked a specific question about why it takes so long to draft a communique. He was expanding on that and pointing out that the French, while members of NATO, are not part of the integrated NATO military establishment. That gives them pause sometimes when you've arrived at a consensus. They want to see very careful language injected which underlines that position, which of course is understandable.

I think it was in that kind of context that he was discussing this.

Q Have you heard from the French Embassy on that?

A I'm not aware that we have.

Q John, getting back for a minute to the Soviet's role in Syria and Lebanon, let me ask an old question and see if there's any new answer.

Does the U.S. have anything to say about whether there are any Soviet advisers or troops in Lebanon at this time as opposed to as in Syria?

A I think we have not responded to that particular question. There are reports, obviously, and others say, I believe, they are there, but I think we have not responded.

Q The Secretary and you have used the words "unwelcome" and "not helpful" to describe the presence of Soviets in Syria.

A Right.

Q Are there any circumstances in which the U.S. would consider the Soviet presence in Syria or Lebanon to be helpful in the sense that it actually might be better to have the Soviets manning the missiles than it is to have the Syrians manning them?

A I suppose one never rules anything out, but it stretches the imagination, given their performance. They certainly have not been helpful hitherto, and I can't envisage the circumstances under which they would be helpful. But, as you know, we never rule anything out from this podium.

Q You would deny the thesis that the Soviets may actually be acting as a restraint on the Syrians' hot temper?

A I suppose you can engage in an argument about whose finger on the trigger is more or less trembling, or is more stable --

Q That's my question.

A -- but the fact is that those missiles are destabilizing to the area, and we have made that plain, no matter who operates them.

Q John, on Sunday Eagleburger said in his speech that if the Soviets or the Syrians attack Israel, the United States would come to Israel's aid. Do you have anything further on that?

A No. I think Secretary Eagleburger's words spoke for themselves.

Q What about a Shultz-Gromyko meeting? Is there any new consideration being given to that?

A No. Nothing planned; nothing set. Always possible, but nothing arranged.

Q Is there any talk about it between --

A I note talk about it in the press, but the fact of the matter is that nothing is arranged, nothing is set. I wouldn't rule it out, but nothing is --

Q When you talk about not ruling it out, can you give us any idea of over the summer? We're not looking at, for example, the tail end of this trip to Asia, or during it or --

A Not to my knowledge are we looking at it at the end of this trip. No.

Q Or during the trip?

A No.

Q So we're looking at it more over the course of the next several months?

A You have the U.N. session coming up in September. As I say, don't rule anything out, even before then, but there are no plans, no arrangements.

-- MORE --

Q Along the same lines, although Alan has said as recently as yesterday that there are no specific plans, is there any active consideration being given to the Secretary ending his Asian trip with stopovers in the Middle East? Any consideration?

A Not at the present time.

Q Not even consideration?

A No, not at the present time.

Q Two procedural questions. Do you have anything on a stakeout after the meeting with Governor Harriman today, and what about Ambassador Stone this evening at Andrews?

A I don't know what Ambassador Stone will do at Andrews tonight. He gets in about sixish, I understand. I don't know what he will do. If he does something at the airport, that's his call. There will be nothing this evening from him.

As you know, some of you have requested a briefing by him and we have that request in, but I don't know what the answer will be yet.

Q You say there will be nothing this evening from him?

A I think you need to look at what may or may not happen at Andrews. Other than that, there will be nothing from Stone this evening.

Q Do you have anything on Harriman?

A A stakeout on Harriman? Rush, are you aware of --

MR. TAYLOR: I'm not aware of it.

A Not aware of it.

Q Shultz is not coming out with Harriman?

A No.

Q Anything on other pending Ambassadorial changes in Central America?

A No, I don't.

Q How about trying Costa Rica?

A No, I don't.

Q Will Ambassador Stone be going right to the White House after he comes back?

A I don't think so.

Q Will he be coming in here?

A I don't know whether he'll be coming here. I don't think he'll be going directly to the White House, but I do not know whether he'll come to his office here.

Q Do you have any word on what David Kimche's appointments in the building at all? I gather he's on his way to Washington.

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q Yesterday, you said --

A Not me.

Q I know, Alan said. (Laughter) At least I didn't use his name for you.

He said the Government of El Salvador is awaiting an FDR/FMLN response, presumably to the Peace Commission; and on last week in Mexico City the FDR/FMLN released a response asking for clarification. Do you consider that a response?

A I don't think we're going to get into a sort of a court-by-court ball bounce on this dialogue. I think the fact is that the Salvadoran Government has been responsive, has been acting in good faith, and it's up to the parties now to determine how that should proceed. I don't think we should characterize every volley.

Q Another thing that was confusing here was that the Salvadoran Government or the Peace Commission has never said that they were directing their appeal directly at the FMLN.

A I think we've probably --

Q And you say they are.

A I think our statement probably, more wisely yesterday should have used the language of the Peace Commission's June 3 call for a dialogue when it referred to all Salvadorans, including the members of the FDR, including those who have risen in arms. I think we probably were unwise to use the language we used yesterday.

Q If you had to reissue it, you would drop that last sentence then, I take it?

A I guess it's hypothetical, because we're not planning to reissue it. I guess if we had to do it again, we might do it somewhat differently.

Q Does the United States believe that the FDR/FMLN as a coalition is the party to which the Peace Commission is appealing?

A I don't think we can interpose ourselves in this. That is a debate going on by the parties. Ambassador Stone is returning from the area, bringing back some thoughts. He has said that he will offer those thoughts once he has completed his listening trip, and we will await to hear from him.

Q Anything on the situation with respect to the Nicaraguan/Honduran border today?

A No.

Q Do you have any response to the OAU, to Mengistu's statement?

A We haven't seen the full statement. We'll take a look at it when we see the full text, and decide whether we would have any comment then.

Q One question on El Salvador, if we can go back to that a little bit. Do you have any schedule yet on President Magaña's visit to the U.S.? What he's going to do exactly?

A Apparently, not. No, not on our schedule.

Q Ambassador Stone will report to the President when? Will he report to him on the road somewhere, or will he wait until the President comes back?

A On the road?

Q Yes. Will he travel to where the President is to report to him? The President is out of town.

A I think you'd have to ask the White House for the scheduling on that.

Q Ambassador Stone, in other words, will be operating out of the White House in connection with his return?

A His office is here. But whether he will come here tonight, I don't know. I'm sure he will not see the President tonight. Whether he'll see the President later in the week and when that will be, I think you probably ought to ask the White House.

Q It sounds like there's not much urgency in his report?

A I'm not commenting on the urgency or the non-urgency. The President has got a heavy schedule. If and when he sees the Senator, that's up to the White House to decide.

Q John, is the State Department involved in any way in the dispute between Pam Am and China regarding Pam Am's resumption of flights to Taiwan?

A I think we have some earlier guidance suggesting that Ambassador Hummel has had some talks in Beijing on this question. We can make that available to you.

Q Do you have anything on the current situation on the talks in Washington?

A No.

Q The Libyan use of the Embassy mentioned in New Jersey, can you pursue that statement on the record?

A Yes, there is some more stuff on that. We can make that available to you.

Q Could you say something about it for me for the cameras?

A It's very technical, very legalistic. I'd be happy to make the statement available to you afterwards.

Q Do you have any comment on the Egyptian Government's complaints against the Israeli Government stationing policemen in disputed areas in the Sinai?

A As I understand it, the Egyptian-Israeli Governments are in discussions on that question, and I think that's up to them.

Q Today, a Soviet official, Constantine Chernenko, charged that the United States is seeking military superiority behind what he called a camouflage of myths about a Soviet military threat. Do you have any reaction to that?

A No, I don't have any.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #103

THURSDAY, JUNE 16, 1983, 12:31 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. At 3:30 this afternoon, there will be a background briefing in the White House briefing room on the visit of Salvadoran President Magana, which begins today. The briefing is open to all White House and State Department accredited press.

A little background on Mr. Magana's schedule -- he arrives at Andrews at 3:45 this afternoon; proceeds from Andrews to the Washington Monument Grounds where he will be greeted by Secretary Shultz, who will accompany him to his hotel for a short meeting there. Tomorrow morning, President Magana is meeting with the Congressional leadership. At 11:30, President Reagan will meet with President Magana at the White House. That meeting will be followed by a working luncheon in the White House. Tomorrow afternoon at 3:00, President Magana will speak at the Organization of American States; at 4:15, he will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, at Arlington Cemetery. The Magana party will depart from the Washington Monument Grounds for Andrews enroute back to El Salvador at about 4:30 on Saturday afternoon.

Q Have you got there the time of the departure from the White House?

A Departure from the White House? No. 11:30 is the meeting. I don't.

Q Is there a lunch, a working lunch?

A There is a lunch after --

Q Is there going to be a readout after the working lunch?

A Yes, I should think so.

Q John, why isn't he staying at Blair House?

Q It's being refurbished.

A Yes, that's a very good answer. (Laughter) I don't know if it's the right answer.

Q Will the briefing be at the White House?

A Yes.

Also tomorrow at the White House in the Press Briefing Room at 4 o'clock there will be a backgrounder concerning the upcoming visit of Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain.

Q When is that?

A It's tomorrow, 4 o'clock in the White House Briefing Room.

Q Are there still going to be backgrounders in this room?

A Are there going to be backgrounders? Always, in the case of Presidential visits, the backgrounders are always at the White House. Always has been. I wouldn't say always has been; but in my experience, they always have been.

Q Do you have anything on Stone's possible appearance before us?

A I don't. I would think that should he hold a briefing, it would not be before he sees President Reagan.

Q Do you know when that might be?

A No. You'll have to talk to the White House about that.

Q He has not yet seen the President?

A He has not yet seen President Reagan.

Available at 2:30 in our Press Office will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject of that is the Philippine Bases Agreement.

There will be a background briefing tomorrow* at 3:30 in this briefing room on the Secretary's upcoming trip. I just realized as I said that that we are giving you two briefings close together; but at any rate, at the moment that's the schedule -- for 3:30.

Q What is the subject of that?

A That will be the Secretary's trip to Asia.

Q That's tomorrow?

A 3:30 tomorrow.

Q John, ordinarily, wouldn't Ambassador Motley be the briefer at the White House -- counterpart of Rick Burt?

A I don't think Ambassador Motley has been confirmed in his position yet.

Q Still learning it, is he?

A It's not a question of learning. You don't speak as an official until you are an official.

Q Is there any way to make it possible to cover both briefings?

A As I said that, I realized we have put them pretty close together. Let us look and see whether we can't move those apart a little.

Q Switch one to the White House.

A We'll see what we can do for you.

Q Also available in the Press Office is an update to our statement on the hijacking of Eastern flight 414. That's the Cuban story.

I guess that's all I have for you in the way of --

Q On Latin America, do you have any comments, reports, or assessments of what is going on in Chile?

* Subsequent to the briefing, the background briefing will be at 10:00 am, Tuesday, June 21.

A Yes, I do have something on that for you. You're talking specifically about the arrest of the labor leaders?

Q And associated disturbances.

A I've seen reports on the disturbances, but don't have much on the disturbances. Factually, as far as Mr. Seguel is concerned, he was previously arrested along with several other copper workers' union leaders after the first demonstration for alleged violation of Chile's Internal Security Law. He was re-arrested in the early hours of June 15 by the Investigations Police, and was turned over to the judge who handled the earlier case that same afternoon on additional charges of inciting public unrest. The judge, who must now review the case and issue his preliminary finding, remanded Seguel to the Santiago public jail where we understand that his attorneys, his family, and others have full access to him.

The State Department has recently reiterated its hope that political and civil rights would be fully respected in Chile. That certainly applies to this case. We hope and expect that Mr. Seguel will enjoy all the rights of due process to which he is entitled by law.

Q We can have that?

A Yes; I'm not finished, though. Mr. Seguel is a major free labor union leader in Chile who has stressed the peaceful nature of the political and trade union dissent of the movement he represents. In this position, he speaks for an important segment of the people of that country. Mr. Seguel and other democratic leaders can be expected to voice both their economic and political concerns. Obviously, there can be a gray area between compliance with laws and the fundamental right of free expression. These two concepts must be clearly distinguished in the case of Mr. Seguel and for the many voices he represents as a leader of the free labor movement.

Q Does this in any way affect U.S. relations with the Chilean Government?

A I'm not going to characterize them, Jim. I think we'll stand by this statement in this particular case.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Is there any assessment of the situation there, whether it represents a general deterioration of the situation before --

A No. I don't have anything beyond this.

Q I don't understand to whom you're directing the remark that there has to be a careful distinction between possibly gray areas.

A We're not directing the remark; we're just making an obvious point that there obviously is a gray area. That'sjust a general statement in cases like this. Obviously, sometimes there is a gray area between freedom of expression and compliance with the law. We understand that, and we're simply remarking upon it -- making that point along with our other comments.

Q Has the Embassy been in contact with the government over Seguel's case?

A I don't know.

Q Did Ambassador Theberge in the last month meet with Seguel?

A I don't know. Can't answer that.

Q Will you look into that?

A Yes, sure.

Q Do you have anything on the problems between the Chinese Government and Pan American World Airways?

A Not a great deal, George. We'll confirm that our Charge' in Beijing was called today to a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss Pan Am's Taipei service. We're not going to get into the substance of that or other diplomatic exchanges, but we would note that Pan Am is a private, commercial entity and that service to Taiwan by Pan Am would fall within the area of unofficial, commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of Taiwan and the people of the United States.

Q John, Xinhua released a report saying that based on the notes to the Embassy, they made a few points: Number one, it charged that the United States has violated the communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations of 1979 by designating American, Pan Am to fly to Taipei; the second point is that China asked the United States to designate another airline to fly to Beijing; and the third one, it asked for consultation between two sides.

What is your response?

A I have no response for you on that. Obviously, we were involved in the meeting today and those consultations and negotiations are going on, but don't have anything for you on that.

Q Is it a violation of the communique?

A Sir?

Q Do you think it is a violation of the 1979 joint communique?

A We have expressed on many occasions our determination to implement fully the terms of the Communique, and we consider that we have done that. But that is a general comment.

Q Any future role in this? Any mediation or are you just -- What are you doing?

A This happened today. We had a meeting on it today. I think we will wait until we have anything further, if we have anything further to say on it, but don't have anything for you today.

Q Xinhua says that the letter was delivered by China's Civil Aviation Administration official to Mr. Brown. The meeting is between the Charge and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs?

A Yes, as I understand it, yes.

Q Do I take from your statement in reference to the private, commercial nature of the arrangement that Pan Am has that the United States would not designate another airline to --

A I don't have anything for you on that, Barrie.

Q Do you expect to have anything more on this, or the next couple of days?

A It's possible.

Q Does the United States designate airlines?

A I don't have anything beyond what I've given you, which I realize is not a great deal.

Q John, anything on the Kimche talks here?

A He's here. I think he is seeing Mr. Eagleburger and seeing Mr. Veliotes today, but I don't know how the (inaudible).

Q Would it be unreasonable to assume that an Israeli redeployment within Lebanon would be a subject?

A I don't know. If Mr. Kimche wants to bring that up, I'm sure we would discuss it; but I don't know what he will bring up.

Q Has the Syrian Foreign Minister said no to the Secretary's invitation to pay a visit to Washington?

A The Secretary spoke in general terms when we were in Damascus. That general invitation clearly still stands. I'm not aware of any negative response to it.

Q Could you check, because I've seen a story --

A No. I don't think I need to.

Q There has not been a negative response?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q To follow up on that, John, is any consideration now being given to a trip to the Middle East by the Secretary of State?

A No. We're where we were the other day. You asked whether there was a possibility at the end of the Asian trip that he might stop in the Middle East. There is always the possibility, but no, it's not --

Q How about by Ken Dam?

A Not to my knowledge.

(MORE)

Q How about Nick Veliotes? (Laughter)

A I'm sure Mr. Veliotes would accompany the Secretary for part of his trip to the Far East because at least two of those countries fall within his area of responsibility. I'm sure he would be on the trip, or part of the trip.

Q That's south Asia. We're talking about the Middle East.

A If we went to the Middle East, after south Asia, I'm sure Mr. Veliotes would be there, but I don't know yet.

Q Another follow-up. Does the United States still oppose any sort of partial withdrawal by Israel in Lebanon?

A Our position is very clear. We're for total withdrawal of all foreign forces. We think the mechanism exists for that. We think that Israel and Lebanon have taken a step towards the implementation of that mechanism, and now we look to the Syrians to take the other steps which would make that total withdrawal possible.

Q And you don't think a partial withdrawal by Israel at this point, an interim partial withdrawal would facilitate it?

A Our policy is for a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That's what we want.

Q How about if you withdraw totally in steps? (Laughter) You certainly don't expect every Israeli, every Syrian, and every PLO to be whisked away on one airplane.

A I think we realize that it probably would take more than one airplane, yes.

Q But isn't there a Lebanese feeling that as many troops as they get off their terrority, so much the better?

A I don't know. You would have to ask the Lebanese. The Lebanese have signed an agreement with Israel which is very clear.

Q We have asked the Lebanese and they said that, as you do, that they would like a total withdrawal.

They say if the Israelis pull out of any area, the Lebanese would move in immediately and maintain security in that area. Does the United States Government think it would be unhelpful for Israel to pull some of its forces out and move back some part of the way?

A What you seem to be outling does not seem to me to be a total withdrawal.

Q But I say, with the ultimate intention of withdrawing once the Syrians and the PLO agree to.

A Ultimate intention -- that's a little vague, it seems to me.

Q That's too vague?

A That's hypothetical.

Q All right, here's a concrete question. What is the current status of the possibility of Mr. Begin exercising his general invitation to visit Washington?

A I think that Ambassador Lewis is talking with the Prime Minister, probably around now. There have been discussions about the date. As you know, the invitation is out there. And in principle, there's been an agreement that that visit should take place, but as to a date I think you would have to be patient a little longer and look to the White House for any announcement.

Q Is he talking to him on the telephone now; is that what you're saying?

A No. I think Ambassador Lewis is talking with the Prime Minister around about this time.

Q He's back in Israel?

A Yes.

Q Are there dates being discussed with the Syrians for a return visit by the Secretary?

A No.

Q This morning, Ambassador Clovis Maksoud of the Arab League held a news conference in which he stated that, "We are aware of the strategic understanding -- the MOU that's being reconsidered -- represented only the tip of the iceberg, as it were, of the actual stratetic relationship between the U.S. and Israel."

And he concluded by saying, "The U.S. presents us with the sugar-coated threat that the arm of Israel is bound to strike and that the U.S. role is limited to softening the blow as much as possible."

Do you have anything to say to that?

A No, I don't. As far as the MOU is concerned, I'm not aware of it being a subject of discussion at the present. As far as the agreement between Israel and Lebanon is concerned, I think we have made very clear the dimensions of that agreement and made clear that there is no suggestion of additional aid or -- we've been asked various questions about that and have responded to those, and the shape of that agreement is very clear.

Q But it is bound to be brought up again by the different Arab countries, especially the confrontation states because it does figure into the whole picture?

A The Lebanese-Israeli agreement?

Q In great part, yes.

A What you read seems to suggest that there's something beyond what has been agreed to and what is in the public domain, and I'm just reiterating that that is not the case.

Q Bill Safire says in his column today that there are new ways to knock out SAM-5 missiles jointly being explored by the U.S. and Israel. Is this true?

A And the question is?

Q Is this true, that the U.S. is jointly exploring with Israel new ways to knock out SAM-5 missiles?

A I have no comment on that. I'm not aware of such discussions, but Bill Safire is always a good read, I feel, in the morning.

Q John, in the past Ed Derwinski told us that the Pope's visit, of course, is being watched very carefully in this building for any possible signs of easing of the more repressive aspects of that regime.

Do you have anything to offer to us today on the visit; anything new --

A I think you'll have to wait and see how it fares before we had any -- if we had any comment, I think we probably have to let the visit take place before we gave, if we did --

Q You have no advice for the Polish Government?

A No. Have no advice for the Polish Government.

Q Would you like to see a meeting between the Pope and Lech Walesa?

A I have nothing for you on that.

Q How about an easier subject, John.

A What have you got? (Laughter)

Q I just want to ask you how you interpreted the Secretary's statement on the Hill, because there seemed to be widely differing --

A I noted a certain discrepancy in the interpretation this morning.

Q How would you interpret it? Do you think it was a conciliatory statement or do you think it was a hardline --

A I think that the Secretary's words clearly spoke for themselves. (Laughter) He made it clear that his words had been personally vetted by the President of the United States; that they did represent the Administration's viewpoint.

It didn't seem to me that there was anything different to what the Administration has been saying and, indeed, what the Secretary's has been saying. I think he stressed the same kinds of points. You have to be strong -- the United States has to be strong as it looks at this relationship. You have to be realistic in appraising what the Soviets have done and are doing in various parts of the world. But having said all that, it has to be ready to talk, which it is. He has made clear we are talking with the Soviets in a variety of fora.

Q When you mentioned that the speech had been personally vetted, did you say by the White House or by the President?

A I think the Secretary said yesterday that the President had gone over the speech; had gone over the testimony.

Q What does "vetted" mean?

A Had read it; had approved it.

Q How about written?

A Beg your pardon?

Q How about written it?

A We never indicate who writes --

Q Conversely, does the State Department have any comment on the statement yesterday by Yuri Andropov?

A No, we don't. We'll take a look at it and see whether we might have anything.

Q How about Mr. Andropov's latest electoral success?

A I assume that appropriate letters would go from appropriate officials in this --

Q A telephone call?

A I'm not aware of any telephone call.

Q Letters from whom?

A I'd look to the White House.

Q Does the State Department share the opinions that Mr. Weinberger said that there were no more obstacles in the way of resuming the strategic understanding between the United States and Israel?

A I think that I will refer you to my colleague Mr. Catto for any comments on Mr. Weinberger's statement.

Q Let me follow this. How do you describe the current state of relations between the United States and the Arab world in light of the development in the last few weeks?

A It is very tempting for me to offer snap judgments from this podium on the state of U.S. relations with various countries, but I have steeled myself not to do that.

Q Pardon me if I am being a little bit persistent because this morning -- referring to my colleague -- the League of Arab States representative in Washington came with very serious apprehensions about the intentions and about what's happening in the last few days. He said that the Arabs say that there is imput of good will towards the United States which is not matched by anything from the United States in the last few days.

The state of relations between the Arabs and the United States need to be clarified in light of what Mr. Weinberger said and in light of other things that happened. Can you give us a statement on that?

A I'm not going to offer a program -- a categorization of the United States' relations with the various Arab countries. I think that U.S. efforts in the Middle East, specifically Lebanon, over the past months are rather adequate testimony to the United States' sincerity and the degree of energy and commitment that it is making to peace and development in the Middle East.

I think that policy, and what we have so far achieved and what we hope to achieve, speaks for itself.

Q Can I ask you -- I hate to quote Dan Rather. It goes against my grain. Have you been able to check out this strange story; two nights ago they started out and they said, on CBS, "the State Department has taken note of," and it was this misrepresentation of -- I don't know. It was a picture of Ben Kingsley supposedly being beaten up by the South African police, and it was in a Soviet publication.

I can't track it down anyplace in the State Department.

A I'm afraid I missed that one.

Q Can you please look into it. It was very strange, but nobody in the State Department seems to know what Dan Rather was talking about, and if you could find out I would be very grateful.

A You want us to look into what Dan Rather was talking about?

Q Yes. He started out by saying, "The State Department is taking note of."

A Without making any promises, let me see if we are able to clarify what Dan Rather was talking about.

Q Do you have anything on the suggestion by Jackson and Mathias yesterday about Central America?

A It's an interesting proposal, and I'm sure the Administration will be taking a look at it.

Q Is it now pretty straight that the elections will be postponed until March in El Salvador?

A I don't quite know where we stand on -- probably that was discussed while I was away. There was some guidance on it. I think it's still -- where it was. Okay.

Q John, do you know, or could you maybe take the question, what's the policy of the Administration on shipments of arms to Iraq and Iran now?

A Our policy?

Q Yes.

A We are are neutral in that.

Q What is the policy --

Q (Inaudible)

A That's not what I said.

Q On the shipment of arms, U.S. arms, either private or whatever?

A I'm sure we have some good language on that in the Press Office.

Q Any reaction to a Moscow call for an arms freeze that now includes China as well as everybody else?

A No.

Q John, question. Yesterday, the Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez met with some visiting journalists in Havana and apparently issued a new, or made a new offer of negotiations with the United States, and also said that Cuba would very soon be responding to the U.S.

request to take back the unwanted Mariel refugees. Is there any comment on that?

A Mr. Rodriguez speaks about the U.S. threat but argues that Cuba has the right to foment revolution and violence in Third Countries, and it's this Cuban position which is at the root of our differences.

I think a careful reading of what he said would indicate that Cuba does set preconditions in terms of negotiations that it might embark on with us.

Insofar as immigration matters, we've asked the Cubans to take back certain aliens under final order of exclusion. And if they're prepared to do so, we would be ready to discuss the modalities of that with them.

Q He also said that Cuba is willing to talk to the United States about the situation in Central America. Do you have any response to that?

A Not beyond what I've got here.

Q That's all you have?

Q John, what is the U.S. threats -- that Rodriguez referred to U.S. threats; what U.S. threats is he referring to?

A You'd have to go back and look at the text.

Q Is one of the things that provoked him an option being studied by the Administration to transport the unwanted Mariels to Guantanamo and march them through the gate?

A I believe we have had fairly extensive guidance on this before.

Q There's no change?

A There's no change in our position since we issued it.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 P.M.)

Olenner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #104

FRIDAY, JUNE 17, 1983, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

One, to say what I think most of you know by now, and that is that the background briefing on the Secretary's ASEAN, India, Pakistan trip which originally had been scheduled for 3:30 today here in the Briefing Room has been rescheduled for 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, the 21st. That was in response to the concern about a conflict with another briefing going on this afternoon.

Also, to note something which is not on the schedule this morning and something which has been of interest to a number of you, and that is that the Secretary will be having a get-acquainted session this afternoon with the new Israeli Ambassador, Ambassador Rosenne, together with a number of the Secretary's principle deputies.

Q Time?

A I believe that's scheduled --

Q Do you have the names on that?

A I don't have a full list. Besides, I'm not sure who is available. Basically, it is the Deputy Secretary and the Under Secretaries who are here, and maybe one or two others -- I'm sure Ambassador Veliotes and Ambassador Fairbanks, and so on. 4:30, I think, is the time on that.

Q Any press coverage?

A No.

Q I thought so.

A Okay. That's it. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, on a technical matter first, to get it out of the way. The Chinese, have they protested to the U.S. Government about the Pan Am flights to Taipei?

A I don't have anything to say to you basically beyond what we said yesterday, which was to acknowledge that our Charge met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 16th to discuss Pan Am's Taipei service, and we are currently in the process of reviewing that matter.

Q They have taken a number of measures, stopping short of cutting off Pan Am's service but making it more difficult, I guess; changing flights routes, and things like that.

Does the United States intend any retaliation?

A Again, I don't have anything to add to what we said yesterday. I would also, I guess, repeat what was said yesterday, and that is that Pan Am is a private commerical entity and that Pan Am's service to Taiwan falls within the area of unofficial commerical, cultural and other relations between the people on Taiwan and the people of the United States, as stated in the January 1979 communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Q Does the service of CAAC, the Chinese airline, fall in that same category?

A I believe --

Q To the United States; their service to this country?

A I don't believe that has to do with people-to-people contacts between Taiwan and the United States -- CAAC.

Q Taking together what you said today with what you said yesterday, I'm trying to discern whether that amounts to a statement that, at this point at least, the U.S. Government does not intend to change carriers that are authorized to fly to Peking.

A I don't have anything to take you beyond what I have already said and what John said yesterday on that kind of question. That's speculative at this point.

Q Just a technicality on that point. The Chinese Ambassador was here today. Can you tell us whether that was in connection with the Pan Am thing, and who he was seeing?

A He was in this morning. He saw the Secretary. I will not go over an agenda of issues with you.

I can't tell you whether that issue may have come up. It might have come up, but that was not the purpose of the meeting this morning.

Q You won't tell us what the purpose was? That was not it?

A No.

Q Who asked for the meeting?

A I don't know what the genesis of that is. They have met before, and I expect they will meet again. The Secretary does meet with ambassadors. It's part of his job and theirs.

Q Another on China?

A Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything on the story in the New York Times this morning that the United States is going to loosen export controls on China?

A No, we had a statement on that, I guess, or some guidance on that before, sometime ago at the time of Secretary Baldrige's trip, and I don't have anything new to give you on the expanded flow of technology to China at this point.

Q I'm talking about change in U.S. policy. Do you expect anything within the next foreseeable few hours?

a I don't have anything new, and I would not anticipate something in that kind of timeframe. If you want to talk about changes in policy, I refer you back to what we said. I think I would be very careful about how you address that. But look back at what we've said before on that issue.

I don't have anything to announce to you in any case.

Q The new Nicaraguan Ambassador said today that he has requested a meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister D'Escoto. Do you have a response to that request?

A Personally, I was unaware of the request. It's interesting that it was made as a public request, apparently. But in any case, I don't have anything on such a request or any response to it.

Q Would the United States find it useful for talks between the Secretary and Mr. D'Escoto at that level, or would you prefer talks again on a regional basis with lower officials?

A Again, I don't have anything for you. I understand that he presented his credentials yesterday, and obviously presented them at the White House. I don't have any answer to that particular question at this point.

Q Why it was interesting -- it was a public request?

A It's a question of why is it being made as a public request. I think that's a question I'll simply leave out --

Q Why?

A Often, those are not made that way.

Q On Central America, Richard Stone -- what's the situation with him now in his reports?

A What's the situation with him in his reports? He certainly is in the building and doing various things; attending meetings and so on. I think he has had a number of conversations with the Secretary. In terms of when he might see the President, I would suggest you check with the White House on that.

Q Has any Congressional committee invited him to appear?

A I don't know whether there is a specific invitation or not. I think that there probably is a considerable interest on the Hill in talking with him. I am sure he would be happy to talk with them, but I think that probably what has to come first on that schedule is his meeting with the President, and I would again ask you to check with the White House on that.

Q May I ask a China question? Has there been any advisory, or anything like that, sent to our people -- our official people in China about flying on domestic airlines over there?

A As a response to this action that has been taken with regard to Pan Am?

Q No, in regard to the report about the condition of the domestic Chinese airlines.

A I see. I don't know. I can check and see if I can find anything out about it.

Q Is there anything serious about this, or is it just --

A I just don't know. I'll try and check on it.

Q What is the status of arms sales to Taiwan? Has a request been made to the Congress as yet for further sales for this fiscal year?

A I'm unaware -- there certainly has been some requests that have gone up. I'm not aware of a recent announcement of a request having gone up from the Pentagon. I can check and see if there's anything particular on that, but you also might check with the Pentagon since they are the ones who would send up that request.

Q Do you have anything on Gromyko's statements yesterday on foreign policy and various blasts at the U.S.?

A Yes, I do.

Q What was the question, please?

A The question is, is there any response or reaction to Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech at the Supreme Soviet.

Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech to the Supreme Soviet did not appear to break any new ground in its survey of Moscow's foreign policy positions, nor did it offer much encouragement about Moscow's readiness to engage in a constructive search for ways to ease East-West tensions. We, of course, welcome Mr. Gromyko's assertion that the USSR seeks "smoother" relations with the United States, but will judge the significance of this statement on the basis of Soviet actions.

We regret that the Soviet Foreign Minister misrepresented the position of the United States on virtually every issue, and that he repeated the false allegation that this Administration takes lightly the dangers of nuclear war. Such distortions do not contribute to a productive dialogue between our two nations.

We are also disappointed by Mr. Gromyko's critical remarks about the President's new START proposals. The changes in the U.S. position announced on June 8 -- as well as the flexibility that has been given Ambassador Rowny to explore alternative ways for meeting U.S. objectives -- were intended to promote progress in the negotiations. We remain hopeful that the Soviet side will demonstrate similar flexibility in the current Geneva round, so that we can achieve substantial reductions in strategic arms and a more stable strategic balance.

Q Copy of that?

A Copy? Sure.

Q What was said on the Middle East; do you have any comment?

A I think we've addressed the question of the Middle East, our concerns there, and the fact that we've discussed the issues with the Soviet Union before. I don't have anything new to add.

Q Have you also had a chance to examine the speech the day before by Andropov?

A I haven't got anything to give you in reaction to that speech.

Q Alan, do you have any comment to make on the first day of the Afghanistan negotiations in Geneva; any kind of a readout at all on that?

A Yes, I do. As we've stated before, the United States supports the U.N. negotiating effort on Afghanistan. The policy of the United States in regard to Afghanistan is clear. We seek a negotiated political settlement at the earliest possible moment to end the agony of the Afghan people and to get the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan.

In our view, any settlement must incorporate the four elements which are contained in the UNGA resolutions on Afghanistan -- that is, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the independent and non-aligned status of Afghanistan, self-determination for the Afghan people, and return of the refugees with safety and honor.

Our hope is that progress toward settlement can be achieved in this session. We believe that the key to a settlement is Soviet willingness to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

Q Also on the Soviet Union, the talks on nonproliferation ended yesterday, I think, in Moscow; right?

A I think we had the dates of those and whatever --

Q 14th through 16th.

A Fine. I don't have a readout on that, if that's what you're looking for.

Q One, could you get us a readout; and, two, is it true, as has been reported, that the Soviets have accepted the principle of on-site inspection by the IAEA?

A I think we've had something on that before. Maybe you could check in the Press Office. They've talked about on-site inspection by IAEA in the past. Let me ask you to check what exists in the way of guidance and see if that's adequate, because I think it is direct.

I will look into the question of whether there's anything we can say about the talks. I'm not sure that we would have a great deal to say since we've tried to maintain confidentiality in order to promote progress on the talks, but let me check.

Q Were there any communications from the Soviets beyond what Andropov and Gromyko have been saying?

A Any communications?

Q That may cast a different interpretation in a private way on what is coming out of Moscow? In other words, are they offering guidance for how to read?

A I'm personally unaware of any such communications, but I'm also loath to take on the commitment to provide you anything about our dialogue. But I guess I would basically suggest that what they have said in public is what we would take as a statement of policy, quite authoritatively.

Q On the get-acquainted session with Rosenne today, is any such similar meeting being set with, let's say, the new Lebanese Ambassador; and do you plan, in the future, to have any, since he's also new?

Also, what's the status of reconstruction of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut?

A I've got nothing new on the Embassy reconstruction. As far as the Lebanese Ambassador is concerned, why don't I check and see what there is in terms of any meetings he might have had or might be scheduled with the Secretary. I'm not aware of any at this point. The Secretary, of course, is going to Asia this coming week so I'm not sure there's much time for that.

--MORE--

Q The Israeli Ambassador already has had what has been described as virtually dozens of meetings with U.S. officials in this building since his arrival. You have made this public announcement about a get-acquainted session at the highest level. Is there something significant to be read in what you are saying about the very public and very open and very in-depth welcome being given the Israeli Ambassador?

A I think, obviously, we have very close relations, and the relationship is important between the United States and Israel. But I think you have to look at this in a couple of different ways.

First of all, his calls on people -- I don't know whether it's dozens or not, you'd have to ask the Israeli Embassy -- but it's not unusual that an ambassador would call on those officials with whom he or she will be dealing over the course of his or her incumbency. So I don't find anything particularly unusual or signals in that.

The Secretary, I think, as we had indicated was looking forward to meeting with the Israeli Ambassador in taking up his new post, but that he had taken off on a trip to Europe just about the time that the Ambassador arrived in Washington.

There had been a number of questions here about a meeting, and that's why I took the opportunity to mention it because there has been interest, and I don't want to pretend there is not such a meeting. There is a meeting. It didn't happen to make it on the public schedule this morning, but the relationship clearly is important, close, good, but I don't know that I would read major new signals of some sort into this.

Q Clovis Maksoud, the U.S. Representative of the Arab League, said yesterday that the Arab League, and he says the Arab world, sees a new shift by the United States away from Arab nations toward Israel as symbolized by some recent occurrences in the United States, including Secretary Weinberger's announcement at the Press Club earlier this week that the Memo of Understanding between the United States and Israel can go into effect basically at the will of the Israeli Government.

A Again, I think John addressed this yesterday. I don't see a shift in U.S. policy. I'd refer you to the basic policy statements that we've made, including, of course, most importantly in terms of the peace process, the President's speech of last September 1.

Q Alan, on Cuba, the story --

Q Few more Middle East back here.

A Let's go on, Bernie, and I'll go around.

Q On Cuba, the interview, saying that the Cubans are ready to open serious negotiations on re-establishing normal relations with the U.S. I see John has some answer here as well.

A That's right.

Q But he tends to narrow the agenda. What about the broad one? Serious negotiations on re-establishing normal relations with the U.S.

A I would really refer you to what John said yesterday. The question revolved around supposedly this proposal being made in terms of no preconditions, and yet if you look at the terms of the statements that were made in that interview, obviously there have been some preconditions laid down. I don't have a reaction to give you beyond that. Connie?

Q Thank you. Can I get this over with?

Q Alan, could I pursue this? Same subject.

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q One could read into that that the United States is prepared to open negotiations with Cuba without conditions.

A No. I think I will leave you with what we've said about that.

Q That's certainly implicit in what John read yesterday.

A I leave you with what the words were yesterday. Connie?

Q Thank you. Two things. Do you have any readout on Kimche's meetings, and are they still going on?

A Are they still going on? Yes. As we, I think, made known initially the sessions with Larry Eagleburger were scheduled to go on both yesterday and today, and indeed they have done so.

Q Is he in the building now, though, or --

A He was here -- I don't know, 45 minutes ago. The meeting was scheduled, I think. It was on the public schedule. You can look.

Q Yes. I just wonder when it's supposed to end.

A I don't know when it was supposed to end.

Q And that's the last --

Q What's the question?

A This is David Kimche's meeting with Larry Eagleburger. He discussed, as we indicated he would, global issues with Under Secretary Eagleburger. He also yesterday, prior to that meeting with Mr. Eagleburger, met with Assistant Secretary Veliotes and Ambassador Draper to discuss both Middle Eastern regional and bilateral issues. As I say, he continued discussions this morning with Under Secretary Eagleburger.

He also, you might note, has been invited to the meeting this afternoon with Ambassador Rosenne, and I understand he's expecting to attend. I don't know. That's his option.

Q Okay. Will there be any other readout besides what you just gave us?

A I don't expect that there would be.

Q One last question: Have you yet announced a date for Begin, or will that be the White House?

A I think when an announcement is made, it would be a White House announcement, but I wouldn't look to an announcement today.

Q Alan, what is the U.S. position on the possibility, in the event the Israelis take that action, on a partial unilateral withdrawal?

A Bernie, we're where we have been on this issue, and that is it is U.S. policy to help bring about a total withdrawal of all the foreign forces -- Israeli, Syrian, PLO -- from Lebanon.

The mechanism exists for the withdrawal of all the Israeli forces in the agreement with Lebanon, and the issue is now for Syria to reach agreement with Lebanon, and for the PLO as well to withdraw their forces. That is our objective, and we remain steady in that objective.

Q Yes. But that could be your objective, but increasingly there are reports that the Israelis are considering a unilateral partial withdrawal.

What is the U.S. view on that?

A I don't have a view to offer you from here on that subject. I guess as a matter of general principal -- and I will tell you the answer is I'm not going to comment to your follow-up question which is, "Would this or would this not be in this category?" -- anything which contributes to the total withdrawal is, based on what I've said about our objectives, per se good, something we would support. Anything which would lead away from total withdrawal would obviously be something we would find difficulty with, but I'm not going to try to characterize what various proposals discussed in the press might or might -- where they might or might not fit in that particular spectrum.

Q Would the U.S. go along, for example, with the Multinational Force, including the Marines, into an area that might be vacated by the Israelis?

A Again, that's hypothetical, and I don't think I'm prepared to address that.

Q Alan, can you comment on a report on Voice of Lebanon radio today that Kimche and the United States may have already reached an agreement on a redeployment of Israeli troops?

A I would steer you away from that kind of story.

Q Do you have anything on Chile today?

A On Chile? What -- anything on Chile?

Q ,The number of dead now, which resulted from the original demonstration, the continued detention of the free labor union leader, the strike and the mass dismissals. Do you have anything on any of that?

A I guess I can give you something on it. Our Embassy has reported that the strike at the El Salvador mine in Chile is continuing into its second day, and there are conflicting government and labor assessments as to its effectiveness.

CODELCO, the managing agency for the Government mines, has announced the firing of approximately 800 striking workers. The Andina and El Teniente mineworkers have apparently joined the strike today as scheduled, but we don't yet have information about how those strikes are progressing.

We have reports that the national command labor coalition is continuing to meet and will arrive at its assessment of the situation over the weekend. We will continue to follow developments closely, and we will continue to urge respect for political and civil rights for all concerned.

Q Do you have anything with respect to the mass firings as something that you support or do not support?

A I'm going to leave you with the statement.

Q You have nothing more on that?

A Nothing more on that. That's right.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A You may have to get it a little later, but we can provide you a copy of that.

Q Do you have anything on Senate passage of the CBI?

A I don't have anything on CBI here with me.

Q Do you have anything on Zamora's statements to the press yesterday morning?

A Yes, I do.

O We've read the press reprts on Mr. Zamora's statements yesterday and would hope that his apparent rejection of the left's participation in the upcoming elections in El Salvador is not final. We would also hope that his remarks were not intended to be interpreted as a rejection of the recent invitation by the Salvadoran Peace Commission to engage in a constructive dialogue.

The inclusion of elections as simply one of the six points in his outline of a political solution -- which included the composition of a provisional government, an apparent restructuring of the army (to include, one would presume, the guerrilla forces), social and economic changes, the international posture of a provisional government -- would seem to be a demand for power sharing. The Government of El Salvador and U.S. policy have repeatedly rejected power sharing as an acceptable means of political reconciliation in that country.

We've reached a point where we would have to question the sustained effort by the left to direct its statements so clearly at the Americna public, rather than diplomatically to the Salvadoran Peace Commission. While we've noted our desire to be helpful in facilitating dialogue, that dialogue should be between the left and the Peace Commission.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q In addition, I'd like to ask you about that, if I may. When you say "the left," whom do you mean precisely?

A I'm not going to try to define it further.

Q Well --

A I understand your question, Jim --

Q Alan --

A -- we went over this the other day. I'm not going to try to define it.

Q Does it include the FDR/FMLN?

A I'm not going to try to define it further. John addressed this the other day.

Q There's a report today that the Administration has agree to accept the FMLN/FDR proposal that Ambassador Stone meet with them.

A I don't have anything for you beyond what we said on that before which is that we would consider this question.

Q Just a technical point to follow on that: Do you even know which day Ambassador Stone is likely to see the President next week?

A I think you'd have to check with the White House. I don't think it would be appropriate for us to make that known, but they may be prepared to say something about that.

Q To whom was the Salvadoran Peace Commission's offer addressed?

A I'd refer you to their offer and the text of it which I think is available.

Q Was it made to, in your words, "the left"?

A Again, I think John quoted from it the other day, and I'm sure you have access to the text, and I refer you to it. Joe, you had a question.

Q Yes. I was going to ask you about, you know, there's been a lot of comments again about settlements on the West Bank and all the rest of it. And I wonder if the State Department will provide us with a legal statement as to the Administration's position on the question of Jewish settlements on the West Bank.

The President said they're not illegal, and that's the way it's been --

A No. I don't think we'll do that, Joe. The point that we have made many times is the issue is not legality or illegality; the point is that the continued settlement activity is an obstacle to peace. That remains our position, and we're not going to get into trying to provide some nice refined legal questions. It's a political reality question.

Q My point is that about four years ago or so when I asked a question about the Carter Administration's view of this, there was a statement made on the rationale for calling them illegal, so I'd like to see where the illegality comes in or the legality comes in.

A I will stick with what I just said.

Q One more question, if I may. You're not going to take the question?

A No, I'm not.

Q All right. The other question is that there is a report to the effect that Secretary Shultz made some comments about Assad's views -- which I won't repeat here because I don't want to bring it out on the public record -- but they indicated that Assad is not a very savory character.

Would you look into that for us and see what's said about this?

A No. I wouldn't. I would not by that, though, give any credence to those reports. I'm not going to get into characterizations.

Q Why? They're public.

A People can make public characterizations and try to force us to respond.

Q Directly in quotations. That's why I'm very --

A Assad, you're saying?

Q Yes. The Syrian President.

A I think that the Secretary addressed his conversations with President Assad after he had those conversations, and I think that represents the authoritative view of the Secretary on his dealings with President Assad.

Q Do you have the date?

A During his trip. I don't have the specifics.

Q Can we get the text?

A I think if you check in the Press Office, you can probably get the text of that.

Q Alan, Mr. Eagleburger reportedly, when addressing the APAC convention during the last week, said that the U.S. would be willing to back Israel in the event of an attack by Syria and/or the Soviet Union.

What, exactly, does he mean by "back Israel"?

A I don't think that's an exact quote of what he said, and I think I would not try to characterize -- I don't happen to have a text of what he said. I think the basicpoint that would be made is that we have a close relationship with Israel and that we value that relationship, but I don't think that that's an accurate characterization based on my conversation with him, because I saw that reported the other day of specifically what he said. So I don't have that.

Q What did he say?

A I don't know what it was he said.

Q Alan, do you have any observations to make about the speeches being made by the Pope in Poland?

A No. I don't have any comment.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JUNE 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #105

MONDAY, JUNE 20, 1983, 12:18 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Couple of announcements.

First, an addition to the trip schedule that we announced previously on the Secretary and his Asia trip. He will be stopping in London July 4 and 5 for a rest stop. (Applause) Call your tailors. (Laugher)

Also, a reminder that there will be a background briefing on the Secretary's upcoming trip tomorrow at 10:00 a.m. here in the briefing room.

Q Alan, on that first one, is he still getting back the 5th, or will it be the 6th?

A We'll have to check on that. I don't know what this means. I understood it would probably be two nights, so I'm not sure what that means. It may mean the 6th.

Okay. That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Evans and Novak mentioned in their column today that President Reagan has said to a convention of Jewish writers that he doesn't think the Jewish settlement in the West Bank is considered as an obstacle to world peace. Is it true, and what's your comment about that? Because this means that there is a change in U.S. policy toward that issue.

A No. I'm aware of that column. I don't think it represents a change. I'd refer you back to the speech the President made September 1 in which he launched his Middle East peace initiative. He stated at that time, and I quote:

"Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated."

As I say, that has been and remains U.S. policy. In his remarks on the 26th of May, the President was underscoring the particularly unhelpful impact of settlement activity initiated since he launched his September 1 initiative.

Q Copy, please?

A I don't have it in exactly that form. Why don't you get it this afternoon from the transcript.

Q So the reference in Novak and in this article to the President as having said this, it's not true?

A I don't know precisely what the wording is. I don't have a transcript of what he said. What I'm saying, though, is that the point that he was making at that point was that it is a continuing settlement activity since September 1 which has had a particularly unhelpful impact.

Q Anything on Habib's plans? When is he going, if he's going?

A No. I don't have anything on his specific plans. He, of course, is in Washington at this point, saw the President this morning, has also been meeting with the Secretary prior to the Secretary's departure for Asia later in the week, and of course he's been consulting with others as well.

I think that Larry Speakes indicated that he expected that he would return at some point. Obviously, he remains engaged in the Middle East issues.

Q Do you know when Ambassador Draper is scheduled to go back to the Middle East?

A Don't have anything new for you on that either.

Q Alan, in an interview today Foreign Minister Shamir said that while the United States didn't view an Israeli redeployment to the south with any enthusiasm, it wasn't opposed to it. Do you you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything new to say on the subject of redeployment at this point. What we've said before that our consistent position has been and remains to seek the prompt, total withdrawal of all foreign forces -- Syrian, Israeli, PLO -- from Lebanon, and that the mechanism exists for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces through the agreement with Lebanon, and it is now encumbent upon Syria to take decisions necessary that would lead to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty.

Q Ambassador Stone indicated he wouldn't have anything to say about his Central American trip until after he briefed the President. He did that this morning.

I wonder if now you could give us some idea of what he came back with?

A No. I really can't. It's an ongoing situation. We're working with the Government of El Salvador and particularly with the Peace Commission in that particular respect. As you know, the Peace Commission has offered to meet with the left, for example, if we're talking about El Salvador specifically, and we've indicated that we thought that that was where the attention should be focused in terms of participation in a democratic process.

Beyond that, and in terms of his general trip, as far as I know at this point he doesn't have any plans to speak publicly. But I can't say for sure how that will evolve over the next several days.

Q What's the reaction to the resolution by the European community about Central America?

A Don't have anything for you on it.

Q Alan, are you suggesting that Ambassador Stone has no plans to meet with leftist representatives?

A I'm not going to address the question of what might or might not be done. At this point I have nothing to give you on that.

Q He hasn't met with any of the rebel spokesmen or representatives during the weekend or since he returned?

A No.

Q Does he have any plans to meet with us on any basis?

A I say, I'm not sure what his plans might be in that regard. At this point I don't have anything to give you.

Q You say we're working particularly with the Peace Commission. How are we working particularly with the Peace Commission?

A We've been talking with the Peace Commission. I'm not going to go into great details on all of this, Jim. The point is we're working with the Government of El Salvador in official channels. We've been talking with the Peace Commission. We've talked about this many times, and we support their efforts to establish a dialogue on participation in the electoral process, the democratic process.

Q Could you tell us any more about General Ochoa. Les's story yesterday in the Times?

A Yes. We do have information that places General Ochoa in Nicaragua and which suggests that he has been assigned duties there, but beyond that I can't offer you anything.

Q But is his presence there more permanent perhaps than just, say, a tour of a few weeks or a few days? I mean, do you believe --

A I can't go beyond what I've just said. We have information which places him there and which suggests that he has been assigned duties there.

Q Alan, do we regard the fact that Ochoa's in Nicaragua as ominous in some way?

A Again, I just don't want to try to characterize it. It's a matter of telling you what we know.

Q Getting back for just a moment to Ambassador Stone, is his next step to meet with people on the Hill to brief them on w[illegible]ame out of his trip? Or he's now briefed the President. [illegible] he talk with Secretary Shultz some more before making a next move, before announcing whether or not he will -- or perhaps not announcing but making a decision of whether or not he will meet with the left?

A I've said what I have to say about any meetings with the left. As far as the Hill is concerned, I don't know what specifically may have been set up. I'm sure he will be meeting with people up on the Hill and briefing them, but I don't know what his schedule in that respect is.

Q Whether a decision has been made in the Administration yet on the question of the meeting regardless of whether or not you would tell us what the decision is?

A No. As I say, I'm not addressing that issue.

Q Alan, anything on the warning by the Polish Government that relations between the Church and the State may be damaged, and that all of the restrictions on martial law will not be lifted if there are continued opposition demonstrations?

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Would you have any comment or reaction on the report -- allegation by Indira Ghandi that the U.S. is the base for Khalistan separatist movement in India?

And, also, what are your comments on the demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy, calling for an apology from Ambassador Barnes, and criticism by four members of the Indian Parliament of the Ambassador's statement on the demand for Khalistan.

Does this add a new dimension on the eve of Secretary Shultz's visit?

A Don't have anything on any of that for you. I'm not aware of Mrs. Ghandi's reported statement, as you've suggested, so I can't really comment on it.

Q Does the stopover for Secretary Shultz imply that he is definitely not stopping over in the Middle East on the way back from Pakistan?

A I think you have to take it at what it is in terms of the dates. I don't have anything new to offer you to suggest that there is a planned stopover. We've said all along that there is no plan at this point.

Q This means that it's definitely not going to take place?

A Well, definitely -- nothing is ever definite as far as I can tell from the way this all works.

Q Any comment on the accusations coming from the Syrian Government against the United States, saying that the States is preparing for an attack against Syria?

A The United States certainly has no plan to attack Syria.

Q Do you have any comment on the story that appeared Friday -- I think in the Philadelphia Inquirer -- regarding the GAO report on aid to Israel?

A No. Did we have something on that at the end of the week? Okay. I guess not.

Q Could you confirm this report --

A No. As a matter of fact, I guess that's right. As I understand that GAO report -- and I have not seen it -- it is a classified report, and I guess we would not be in a position to comment because of that.

Q Alan, anything further on Shultz's efforts to become directly involved in the Syria thing? Has he reissued an invitation with a new date perhaps to the Syrian Foreign Minister?

A As I think was indicated at the end of last week ON BACKGROUND, the Secretary late last week did invite Foreign Minister Khaddam to come to Washington before the Secretary left for his Asian trip.

Foreign Minister Khaddam was not able to do that due to a scheduling conflict. I don't have anything to take you beyond that.

Q Can I follow up to one question, please? Does this mean your answer is unconditional, whatever the case? The U.S. is not going to attack Syria, whatever the case is? (Laughter)

A I mean, how do you deal with that?

Q Politically --

A Do you want to play out a scenario 50 years in the future, something? The United States has no plans to attack Syria. What am I supposed to say? I think that's a pretty flat statement.

Q Is the Department planning to produce the Nicaraguan defector who spoke so interestingly in The Washington Post?

A We're not producing him. I think that if there is interest in trying to get hold of him -- I don't know what his own preferences are at this point, frankly, so what I would suggest, if there is further interest in talking to him, what we could try to do is to ask you to leave names -- and I guess phone numbers too -- with the Public Affairs adviser in ARA on 632-4726, and they can try to get hold of him or somebody who has contact with him and see if he's interested in talking further.

I think there was some concern on his part to protect his identity, anonymity, in terms of photos and so on and so forth, and I don't know what his preferences are. But if you want to try that, we'll see what comes out of it.

Q Did the State Department make this chap available to The Washington Post?

A I think that that -- making him available -- his availability was a fact. There was an offer through the Heritage Foundation to make him available there. That was done. I don't know more details about it. It was obviously a very long process of interviews, and I think there was some feeling that rather than trying to put him out before a big press conference or something like that, that it would be more suitable to do something smaller like that.

-- MORE --

Q Let me just follow that up. Could you just take that specific question: Did the State Department make him available to the Washington Post?

A I don't know how to answer that in terms of "make available." I don't know what you mean.

Q That's a typical question. Did the State Department call up the Washington Post and say, we have this chap, would you like to interview him?

A I'm am not aware of what specifically took place. I guess you would have to ask those who were involved.

Q Can you take that question, please?

A No, I think, I'm going to, again, say that -- I'm not saying that the State didn't have a role here because it seems to me that there was a role, but it was decided by whoever was involved in this decision to do it this way, and that's as far as I can take it with you.

Q Can you tell us why one newspaper was chosen over others?

A I cannot give you that beyond what I said in terms of the type of interview that is an indepth interview, that he was not anxious to be photographed, that it was decided rightly or wrongly to make him available in the first instance, and he was freely making himself available in this way.

Q Who made the decision?

A I can't tell you who made that --

Q Can you take that one?

A I can look into it. I'm not sure I can, in fact, come back with a specific on that.

Q Was this decided in the government? You keep putting the emphasis --

A I think that probably it was a process rather than a formal decision.

Q Who decided it, if it was decided? Or was it a kind of consensus that came down from the blue?

A I don't know if the consensus came down from the blue. My understanding is that the consensus wouldn't be a bad way of describing that; but specifically as to who was involved in that consensus, I can't tell you.

Q I don't understand your wording just a minute ago. It was thought to be better to use this format.

A Again, it all fits in the same answer.

Q Was it the case of the people responsible for bringing this to us or to the Post were the same people who brought Tardencilla up here, for example? (Laughter)

A The answer is I don't know, and I'm not going to try to get into it.

Q As to any pending charges against this individual, either in Costa Rica or in Nicaragua for air piracy, since we consider that such a major issue, what is the disposition of those charges?

A We may be able to provide you an answer on that. I'm a little concerned, and I have asked before we provide you an answer to check on his rights in terms of our talking about that. Let me see what we can get for you on that specific issue. It's perfectly legitimate.

Q Is he free --

A I understand your question. I'm not sure that we are free to answer the question, but I will try to get you an answer on it.

Q Alan, is the United States prepared to supply spare parts to the Tarapur nuclear reactor in India which had to close down?

A We have some guidance on that from last week, and I would ask you to refer to it. It's rather lengthy.

Q Will that be one of the things the Secretary will be discussing, I presume, in New Delhi?

A I don't have an agenda. It wouldn't shock me to hear that that subject had come up. I simply don't know. I'm operating on the basis of an assumption as opposed to anything else.

Q Back to Lebanon. Two things. Do you have anything on the fighting within Fatah over the weekend, number 1; and number 2, there were reports that Syria is setting up a Lebanese authority to administer northern Lebanon. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on either of them. I hadn't heard the second one.

Q There were reports from Lebanon that Saudi Arabia is involved in an effort to moderate the Syrian position and there are some signs to this effect. Have you any comment on this?

A No. I think I would have to leave it to the Saudi Government to talk about their own efforts. We've indicated rather consistently we thought they were playing a constructive role, but I don't feel it appropriate for us to specify what that role is.

Q There was a report from Israel that suggest -- that attributes this to Mrs. Shulamit Aloni, a member of the Israeli Knesset, saying that the Israeli Government has evidence that suggests that Jewish settlers committed crimes against Arabs in the West Bank and occupied terrorities which included the killing of five Arab youths and many more violent acts that the Israeli Government refuses to discuss the evidence with even members of the opposition party.

Will you be concerned about such charges and reports which have been reported by Reuters and other places?

A I don't know anything about it. Obviously, we are always concerned about human rights, but I really can't comment on the specific case since I don't know, and it sounds to me like it's a law enforcement issue in Israel.

Q What's holding up the formal announcement of the Begin trip? First, there were reports it was announced and then it wasn't announced.

A No. There has been no formal announcement to my knowledge.

Q Why is there such a delay?

A I don't think I would say there is "such a delay." We have been talking with the Israeli Government about the specifics; a date. There's no question that we look forward to having a visit and believe one, indeed, is going to take place but I think that we would have to wait until we have something to announce to announce it.

Q Is it still the Administration's policy that there should be no dialogue with the left in El Salvador until the guerrillas lay down their weapons, or get involved in a ceasefire discussion?

A I don't think we have quite put it in those terms or tried to be as specific as that. The question of a dialogue is really up to the various parties involved, and the ways in which they could work that out. We're happy to be helpful, if we can be helpful, but I can't specify in what ways because I don't know at this point.

Q I thought it was pretty well stated policy of the Administration, that there would be no dialogue until they laid down their arms.

A I'm not aware of having made a statement of that sort.

Q On that same question, is it possible to get some clarification now as to what kinds of talks the United States would support, because there are a lot of conflicting statements that have come out? Specifically, for example, whether the FMLN should be involved in any talks with the Peace Commission. In addition, whether the Peace Commission should now respond to the clarification request made on behalf of the FDR/FMLN?

A I don't think that's up to us to do. I think it's up to the parties directly concerned.

Q Finally, about a month ago, or a month and a half ago, you made a statement to the effect that in any dialogue or talks between the two, each party would be free to bring up whatever issue they wish to do. Does that still stand as U.S. policy?

A I have no reason to change that in the terms you've just raised it. But obviously it would be up to the parties themselves, if they could agree to sit down and talk, to agree on what the ground rules would be.

Q Alan, do you have any information on the coup attempt in Ghana?

A I have very brief guidance which says that we can confirm that a group of individuals did in fact attempt to stage a coup in Ghana on Sunday, June 19th. We understand the group sought to take over several key facilities, but succeeded only briefly capturing the government radio station. The U.S. Embssy in Accra reported all was quiet as of Sunday evening with the government back in control.

We don't have information, I might note, about the numbers of the people involved or political orientation or anything of that sort.

Q "Back in control," you mean they never really lost control? Retaining control?

A I will have to give you what I've got. I saw various wire reports over the weekend which were somewhat ambiguous on that point. I don't really know.

Q Will Ambassador Stone be meeting in the talks that Prime Minister Gonzalez has here this week -- be involved in those?

A Will Ambassador Stone be involved in those talks?

Q Yes.

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Can you look into that?

A I think he will either be there or not, and that will be rather obvious in terms of whether he shows up.

Q Was Ambassador Hinton involved in the talks -- I know, but we may not see who shows up. You're not trying to evade that?

A I'm not trying to evade it. I don't know --

Q It's just with humor; right? But, seriously, I'd like to find out.

A I believe you.

Q Okay, Hinton -- was he involved in the talks with Magaña?

A I don't know.

Q Any reaction to Magaña's statement about negotiations?

A I don't have anything now.

Q Also, do you have any comment on Chile?

A Not a comment. I can give you, in a sense, an update on this.

At present, the situation in Chile seems to be calm. So far as we know, no new strikes have been called. Our Embassy reports that strikes are continuing at three mines, El Teniente, El Salvador and La Andina.

The government has announced military control over mining areas. The largest mine at Chuquicamata is continuing to function normally. Numerous striking workers have been notified of dismissal at the three mines, and we understand that total estimates approximate 2,800.

Although there is still strike activity, management and union officials are in contact. CODELCO, the government mining corporation, has begun discussions with union leaders, who have also been dismissed, regarding the possibility of selectively rehiring workers who are willing to return to their jobs.

The U.S. Government supports trade union freedoms and hopes the current strike is resolved without violence. We are continuing to follow developments in this situation.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes, sure.

Q And, finally, anything on Guatemala, in view of the Times article today; Rios Montt's problems. His arrest of the opposition.

Q Yes. Over the past weeks a number of individuals in Guatemala have expressed concern about the government's election timetable. On June 12, Rios Montt announced that Constituent Assembly elections would take place during the latter half of 1984, a positive step in returning Guatemala to democractic government.

During his weekly television and radio address last night, President Rios Montt expressed the desire to meet with political party leaders, private sector representatives and the church leadership to discuss some of the issues they have raised.

Q Are there any plans to provide aid or in any other way help in Boliva and Peru, because of the floods and draught there?

A I think we've addressed that question before in terms of emergency assistance and looking at what might be done. I don't have anything new to announce at this point.

You might want to check, beyond what we've already said, if you haven't got access, you might want to check in the Press Office on that, but you might want to check with AID, too, to see what they may have on that.

Q Thank you, Alan.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:41 P.M.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 106

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1983, 12:12 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all -- a couple of housekeeping announcements: There will be a BACKGROUND briefing at the White House somewhere around 1:30 or 1:45 this afternoon on the visit of Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez.

Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam is scheduled to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Thursday, June 23, at 10:00 A.M. The subject is Arms Control. That will be in the Dirksen Building, Room 419, Thursday, June 23, 10:00 A.M.

Thirdly, available in the Press Office today is a status report on our Embassy in Lebanon, the reconstruction and the change of site situation.

Q Do you have any comment or assessment of the disturbances that have apparently taken place in Poland surrounding the Pope's visit?

A No, don't have anything for you on Poland.

Q Will you withhold all comments on Poland until after the Pope goes?

A Well, certainly, I don't have anything for you today.

Q Is that a policy decision not to say anything while he is there?

A Well, I think we just don't have anything for you. We will not have any comment today.

Q Do you have anything to report on the sale of technology to China?

A I think you should check, Jim, with Commerce. I'm not quite sure what time today they are planning to do whatever it is they are planning to do, but I think there will be an announcement from Commerce.

Q You think it will be today?

A I think it will be today.

Q John, can you tell us what Habib's mission is at this point and when he is expected to return to the region and what he will do if and when he returns to the region?

A As you know, he reported to the President yesterday. He conferred with the Secretary and other officials at the Department yesterday. That process will continue today. I really don't have anything for you on his travel plans.

Q Can you tell me whether he is expected to return to the region?

A I think that the kind of discussion and consultation that he is presently engaged in with various Administration officials would have a bearing on that, would determine that?

Q Is he going to step down? There's a question --

A The question of stepping down, there's no -- I mean, the President has total confidence.

Q What's that?

A The President has total confidence.

Q I'm not talking --

A You're implying --

Q I'm implying nothing.

A But having said that, Ambassador Habib has done long and enduring work. I'm sure at some stage, he would like to go back to California; but also he has made it clear that he remains at the disposal of the President.

Q He is what?

A At the disposal of the President.

Q Has he told the President this week that he thinks now is a good time for him to bow out and for someone else to move in?

A I do not know that, Ralph, although I saw some reports saying that that was not discussed at yesterday's meeting; but I haven't asked Ambassador Habib.

Q Could you take that question?

A Why don't we wait and see? I'm sure that within the context of the kinds of discussions he's having, at the end of those discussions, his plans will be clear. I don't think they are clear now.

Q Just to try to sort it out, would you say it would be fair for us to report that Habib is discussing with Administration officials, including the President, at this time not only the nature of his mission in the Middle East, but also the question of whether he will play a role in that mission?

A I think it would be fair to say that discussions of our overall tactics in the Middle East are currently the subject of discussion, and Ambassador Habib is playing an important role in those consultations and discussions. When they are concluded, then I'm sure he and we would have a clearer idea of his travel plans.

Q Is it assumed that this decision will be made before the Secretary leaves on his trip?

A Decision on --

Q -- on whether or not Habib is staying.

A I would expect a decision to be made on Ambassador Habib's travel plans. He came from California for a few days' consultation here, and I assume he would either go back to California or somewhere else, if you follow a kind of logical process of deduction. That decision, I'm sure, would be made fairly soon.

Q John, last week -- and I don't remember the exact date or who it was that said it but I believe in this briefing -- the same line of questioning was brought up, namely the question about Ambassador Habib's desire to step down. I believe the word "baseless" was used to describe that kind of a story.

Would you still use that word to say that it is "baseless" to write anything about Ambassador Habib's stepping down at this point?

A I don't want to speak for Ambassador Habib so far as his personal plans are concerned. I certainly would say that it is baseless to suggest that there is any pressure on Ambassador Habib to stand down. That is not the case; he is much valued.

Having said that, he has served for many months, as you know -- and again, I haven't talked with him and shouldn't speak for him -- but I'm sure California beckons. At the same time, he is a loyal and dedicated diplomat, and I think he has said that he has never turned a President of the United States down. The President, as I understand it, has said that he hopes he continues.

Q How about the elevation of Mr. Draper's position to become --

A I know nothing about any change in Ambassador Draper's position. Insofar as his travel plans, he is involved in these consultations, and so far as his travel plans and his role are concerned, I think that is also the kind of thing that is being discussed in the context of these consultations.

Q What are the travel plans that you alluded to? Is there a possibility of Habib's going out to --

A Both Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper have been in the Middle East and are here in Washington. I think it is a logical question about when and if they would return to the area.

Q But is there some consideration of his, in a sense, advancing a possible stop by the Secretary of Syria -- Damascus?

A Habib or Draper advancing --

Q Or have the Syrians in fact said that they would not receive him?

A No. The Syrians to my knowledge have not said that they would not receive Secretary of State Shultz; but on the other hand, I don't know that Secretary of State Shultz has suggested that he go there. As we have consistently said, there are no plans -- and there are not -- for him to visit Damascus at the end of this Far Eastern trip.

Having said that, I think Alan and I have said -- and I would reiterate -- that you never rule anything out.

Q The issue is being framed in the press today in terms of his leaving his post and in effect resigning, or not. Is it possible that he might, in fact, take just a leave of absence and be retained at the post?

A I really don't know how more clearly I can say it, that he is involved in consultations here as to our tactics and strategy in Lebanon and in the Middle East. I think his own plans, hopes, and expectations would become clearer at the end of that time.

Q I know that the question was asked a few times here in the last couple of weeks, but let me try one more time? Could you clarify what is the American position regarding the Israeli thoughts or statements regarding the possible partial redeployment of Israeli forces in Lebanon?

A Sure. The American position is that we are in favor of the complete, total pullout of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Yes, but what is your position regarding the possibility of partial redeployment?

A Our position is that our goal is the total withdrawal of all foreign forces; and what contributes to that is what we are pursuing.

Q Do you think that an Israeli redeployment would contribute to this then?

A I think that's the kind of question that is involved in the kind of discussions we're having now. I'm sure that's a logical question to consider.

Q Would you confirm that this is the main issue of discussion with the Lebanese officials who --

A No, I couldn't. If you're referring to Mr. Haddad's visit yesterday, that was in fact, a courtesy call. He did see the Secretary. It could well have come up, but it was scheduled as a courtesy call. I think he did see Mr. Veliotes; may see Mr. Veliotes again today. I think he may see Mr. McPherson, the Director of AID, and will discuss a number of questions of interest to Lebanon. But I'm not suggesting that that didn't come up.

Q Do you have anything on the visits of President Gemayel and Prime Minister Begin?

A I think the White House announced President Gemayel's visit for the 22 of July. And, as you know, there have been discussion on the visit by Prime Minister Begin of dates from Israel. I know there's speculation in the Israeli press about the dates, but I don't think the White House has received an official response confirming dates. Until that happens, I guess the White House will be reluctant to make any statement.

Q In light of what you just said about the American position, that you are in favor of total withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon, what will happen if the Israelis have to pull unilaterally before Mr. Begin comes and you have a fait accompli?

Do you have any assurances from the Israelis that they will not do that?

A You're drawing me into a hypothetical area. I've told you what our policy is, and we stand by the policy and what contributes to the policy. You're asking me whether other possibilities are the subject of discussion. I'm sure they may be the subject of discussion, but our policy remains constant.

Q I wouldn't consider it hypothetical myself because it has happened before, you see --

A It hasn't happened yet.

Q -- and everybody knows that there was some fait accomplis and prepared facts, and after the action, you know, you can talk about things.

A Unless you know something I don't, it hasn't happened yet.

Q Also on Lebanon, two things. One is, there are reports of an Israeli and Syrian exchange of artillery fire in the Bekaa today. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I've seen the reports but don't have anything on it. Of course, it underlines what we keep on saying. Namely, that if all foreign forces were removed from Lebanon, there would not be such exchanges.

Q The other thing is, the anti-Arafat rebels are reporting new gains on the ground. Do you have anything on that?

A No, don't have anything on that for you.

Q Going back to your opening announcement, the thing on Thursday with Deputy Secretary Dam, is that just a general review of arms control policy, or is there something new or different about that?

A Let me do a little further homework on that for you, including the question of when that testimony might be available. I haven't seen it yet.

Q Can we stay on the Middle East a little longer, please?

A Sure.

Q There is a report today about this big lie coming out of Lebanon and Israel being responsible for the massacres in the camps. Have you anything on that?

A I guess you're referring to --

Q I came in late.

A I guess you're referring to the Lebanese inquiry into the massacres. That's an internal matter for Lebanon, and we don't have any response on it.

Q An internal matter for Lebanon?

A Yes.

Q Have you seen anything on it, in any case? Has the Embassy in Beirut taken it up?

A I've seen the initial reports on the inquiry findings.

Q Another thing is, the impression is getting around that what the President or Under Secretary Eagleburger or what Defense Secretary Weinberger may say to audiences outside of the -- are sort of obfuscated when questions are asked here as to whether you could confirm it from the podium -- not you particularly, but I mean the Department. This came up yesterday with reference to President Reagan's remarks to the Jewish editors and publishers in Florida last month.

A I'm not sure what the question is.

Q The question is, why is this happening?

A Why is what happening?

Q This obfuscation at the State Department of statements made by the policy makers of the United States Government?

A (A) I'm not sure what obfuscation you're talking about, but I'm still kind of zeroing in on the question.

Q I'll try to give you examples. Eagleburger told the Anti-Defamation League, when he was asked a question as to -- not the Anti-Defamation League but the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, he was asked the question, if the Syrians and the PLO go to war, will the United States stand by Israel. He answered in one word: yes. That was all there was to it. But when the question was raised here, well, what he meant actually was that relationships between Israel and the United States are good, which is not an answer at all. This is what I call obfuscation.

Do you confirm that Eagleburger said that?

A I would have to go back and look at the transcript. I wasn't here last week, but I'd have to go back and look at the transcript of what he said.

Q Have you got the transcript of what the President told the American-Jewish Press Association --

A No, not in my hand.

Q Not in your hand, no. But the White House arranged this. I mean, this is not something that came out of the blue. And yet when the question was raised here yesterday, the answer was, well, what the President really was referring to was the September 1 initiative, when he was saying -- he was asked the question, are settlements an obstacle to --

A You did get something on the settlements. You did get a clarification on the settlements.

Q Have you put it out?

A Yes.

Q I didn't see it. Where is it?

A That's not my fault. (Laughter)

Q The question was raised here yesterday. There was no clarification here yesterday.

A It was either yesterday, or within the past several days. Why don't you check in the Press Office and see what they have.

Q The clarification was -- if what I heard yesterday -- what you're talking about --

A Settlement activity.

Q -- is not a clarification at all but an obfuscation, which I'm talking about.

A Let me assure you that any obfuscation from this podium is entirely coincidental. (Laughter)

Q If I may just say one more thing, and that is, the Weinberger expression at the National Press Club about the Memo of Understanding between the United States and --

A We gave you something on that, too. Why don't you check with the Press Office. There's some language on that, too.

Q The language was that the reference was to check with the Pentagon.

A No, that was not the language. The language is that this is not a question under active review by either Israel or the United States, but why don't you check the exact language. You'll be safer if you use the exact language.

Q On Latin America for a minute. Can you tell us whether the Administration has made a decision yet as to whether Ambassador Stone will meet with representatives of the left in El Salvador?

A I think, as Mr. Romberg said yesterday, we're not going to get into the question of meetings and negotiations that he might be involved in in advance. If you're in negotiation, you don't show your hand.

Let me just say that anything that Ambassador Stone might do or any initiative on which he might embark would be in total consultation and coordination with the Salvadoran Government. It would not be to involve himself in any way in power-sharing negotiations. It would be to facilitate involvement of all parties in the democratic process. But beyond that, we're not going to get into the specifics of his plans.

Q Stone himself got into the specifics of his plans when he arrived by criticizing the invitation because it was made in public.

A That would not be out line with what I'm saying. That if you're in this kind of a discussion, it is better to do it in confidence rather than in public.

Q Why?

A I think that confidential discussions would be more fruitful --

Q What?

A Because I think there's a danger that when they are conducted, or preconducted in the glare of television lights and so forth and so on, there is the danger that parties may posture and utilize those events for propaganda purposes.

I think if you're engaged in serious discussions, sometimes, they are better conducted in confidence, and the judgment of the Administration on this particular issue at this particular time is to hold his plans in confidence.

Q The subject has not come up about taking television cameras into the meeting. The simple question is to whether Stone will meet these people. You've given us a rationale as to why he might meet them. What prevents your being forthcoming as to a meeting?

A Simply, a decision that should he be involved in any negotiations, they would be held in confidence.

Q Can you tell us what his travel plans are?

A I can't. I don't know what travel plans he has.

Q Do you know if he's in Washington?

A He's in Washington.

Q Would those meetings be held here or down there?

A I didn't say any meetings were going to be held.

Q What time will they begin? (Laughter)

Q There's a report which originated with the Executive Intelligence Review, and has been picked up by Jiji, the Japanese wire, and some other Japanese press of a feud between the State Department, and particularly under Secretary Alan Wallis, and the National Security Council on policy vis-a-vis Japan. The State Department apparently making criticisms of Japanese trade policy which the NSC has tried to squelch and a few other details in it. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, haven't seen the report.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

Cilennan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #107

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1983, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. Available in the Press Office are the following testimonies: Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning. The subject is Arms Control;

Also Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is Soviet Jewry.

Also, to note that Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, is speaking to the National Conference of Newspaper Editors today, Thursday, at 8:00 p.m. Pacific Time at the Sir Francis Drake Hotel in San Francisco.

It's been some time since a senior official of the Administration has reviewed southern Africa and our policies toward the region, and therefore at 3:30 this afternoon here, in the briefing room, there will be somebody here to take questions, if you care to ask them, regarding that speech.

Copies of Mr. Eagleburger's speech will be available in the Press Office on an embargoed basis; embargoed until delivery which, as I say, is 8:00 p.m. Pacific Time. That's 11:00 p.m. Eastern Time.

Q When will the copies be available?

A They will be available after the briefing is over.

A similar background briefing will be held at the Foreign Press Center at 4:00 this afternoon.

Also in response to interest which was expressed here previously, Ambassador-at-Large Richard Kennedy will be available to answer questions on his recently concluded conversations with the Soviets on the question of non-proliferation. His remarks will be on the record here tomorrow, Friday, June 24, in the Briefing Room at 11:00 a.m.

Q Any chance for Stone?

A No, I don't have anything for you on any briefings by Senator Stone.

Okay, that's it, I believe, for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, are you still not prepared to comment on the Pope's visit to Poland?

A I believe that the President had some remarks this morning about Poland, including about the Pope's visit, and I would refer you to those remarks.

Q Specifically, do you have any comment on the Soviet jamming of the Voice of America broadcast on that?

A I don't have, but I gather that Mr. Tomlinson has made a rather forthright statement on that, and I'd refer you to his remarks.

Q Has the State Department protested to the Soviets?

A Can't answer that question. Let me look into that for you.

Q Can you go beyond what the Secretary said yesterday about Ambassador Stone and the invitation from the rebels?

A No, not really. I'd just refer you to his remarks. He indicated that the effort essentially lies with the Salvadorans, and with the Peace Commission dealing with the left; that we would be happy to facilitate that, and if it seems appropriate we can do that. But I'm not going to address the question of what Ambassador Stone might or might not be doing specifically at this point.

Q Do you have any comment on today's Washington Post story that there is a secret American air base in Egypt with one hundred men?

A The United States has no base in Egypt, and I want to emphasize that fact. As stated in President Sadat's July 1981 letter to President Reagan, Egypt has offered us the temporary use of military facilities in Ras Banas for the purpose of assisting any Arab or Muslim country requesting such assistance to repel armed attack affecting its sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

In his letter, President Sadat emphasized that the use of such facilities should not contradict the non-aligned status and policy of Egypt. The United States and Egypt cooperate in a number of ways fully consistent with Egypt's sovereignty aimed at enhancing security in the Middle East.

Egypt is a full partner in the Middle East peace process, and has often affirmed its interest in promoting security in the region. We believe that any cooperation undertaken to support this objective is mutually beneficial.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Yes, sure.

Q So this story is unfounded?

A I'll leave you with my statement.

Q Can I have a copy of this, please?

A Yes.

Q Are there a hundred people permanently based in Egypt?

A The U.S. has no forces permanently assigned in Egypt...

Q Are they there on TDY?

A ... apart from defense attaches and the Office of Military Cooperation, there are a number of U.S. military personnel on temporary assignment at various locations in Egypt supporting our military assistance program and providing training in the use of U.S. military equipment.

As you know, we don't comment on the operational details of activities of that sort -- training. But the number of personnel in Egypt is not classified, and I believe it's available from the Department of Defense.

Q What you're saying is that it's not a base but it's a facility.

A I'm not saying anything other than what I've just said.

Q You didn't answer it.

Q Aside from Ras Banas, are there any other facilities the Egyptians agreed to let you make use of?

A Again, I've given you what I have on this. As I say, the Egyptian Government indicated its willingness to make those military facilities available, but I've addressed the --

Q The military facilities at Ras Banas.

Q Are you saying that facilities are not available at Cairo West?

A I don't have details, as I say, where specifically people are. As I say, military personnel are on temporary assignment at various locations in Egypt supporting the military assistance program and training Egyptians in the use of U.S. military equipment. But I don't have details on that and I don't think, in terms of operational detail, we would be able to provide that sort of thing.

Q Alan, you're not answering the question which is basically, is there a facility out there? No matter how you define "temporary," is there a facility out there, a storage facility involving the use of 70 to a 100 American personnel?

A I think I have answered it, and I'm going to leave you with what I just said.

Q Well, you haven't.

Q Can you explain the statement of the Defense Department, the person who was testifying before Congress about a secret base; and why would he use those words?

A You're talking about testimony before Congress which was classified. I can't really address it. I don't believe, from the press accounts that I've seen of it, that a specific country or countries were named, so I really can't get into that.

Q There was a secret base of a hundred and --

A I can't comment on what was classified testimony.

Q Alan, would you say that regardless of secret or a hundred, or whatever, would you say that the numbers 70 to 100 are consistent with the words you just used on saying "a number of American troops?"

A I say the numbers of Americans who are in Egypt are available from the Defense Department. I don't happen to have them, so you check with the Defense Department.

Q Would you say that the number in any one place is consistent with what you've just said?

A I don't know what the number in any one place might be.

Q Where do AWACS operate out of in Egypt?

A I'm not sure I have specifics on where AWACS operate. Again that, I think, would come under the heading of an operational -- AWACS obviously have deployed from time to time in exercises, and so on, but I'm not going to get into the detail of where they operate out of.

I don't think the Pentagon is prepared to talk about their operational details. You can ask them, but I doubt it.

Q Do you have any comment on the accusations by the Defense Minister of Israel, Moshe Arens, about military buildup by Egypt against Israel?

A Frankly, I missed that. But, no, I don't have any comment. I would have to see it before I would even consider a comment, but I haven't seen it.

Q You mean you don't have any information to confirm or deny --

A I haven't seen the reports, so I just can't comment on it.

Q I mean, the fact that there is military buildup by the Egyptians, is it --

A I'm not aware of a buildup by Egypt against Israel. I'm giving you just a sort of a personal awareness of, "Is there such a thing?" But I don't know what the statement was, and I can't give you any guidance on that statement.

Q Are the AWACS that are operating out of the secret base in Egypt monitoring the situation in Chad today, and can you tell us what that is?

A Without addressing the facetious first part of your question --

Q Facetious?

A -- we have been informed by the Chadian Government that Faya Largeau came under attack this morning, but we have very few details at this point. I think you're aware of the statement that we posted yesterday, and there was guidance available to go along with that yesterday. I have nothing beyond what I just gave you in terms of an update.

Q You have no information whether the Libyan air force struck this town?

A I don't have anything at this point beyond what I've just given you.

Q About Ambassador Habib's return to the Middle East, will that be tomorrow? And why is he going back? Obviously, the Syrians don't want to talk to him and someone else is going to have to go to Damascus.

A The Secretary addressed the question yesterday.

Q I know; I asked the question, but I'm asking you.

A He is going back to the area, probably tomorrow and he will be accompanied by Ambassadors Draper and Fairbanks, but I don't have anything on their schedule. We're not going to provide advance statements on where they're going in keeping with our past practice, although I'll keep you posted as they move around.

--MORE--

Q What is their mission?

A They're going to try to, as the Secretary indicated yesterday, see what can be done about furthering the process in Lebanon of re-establishing Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country, getting all the foreign forces out, and in the context of security across Israel's borders.

Q Alan, does that mean the mission stops in Beirut?

A I don't have, again, details.

Q Not even the first stop?

A I don't think I can give you that in advance. We have not had a practice of doing that. I don't want to start a precedent.

Q Two questions: First of all, what is Mr. Fairbanks going to do on this mission?

A He's going to be working on the Lebanon portion. That's somewhat of a change from what he has been concentrating on. He will be assisting, working with, Ambassador Habib and with Ambassador Draper.

Q The second question: Is there already a decision on who will be the one that will go to Damascus instead of Mr. Habib?

A I don't have anything beyond what the Secretary said yesterday on that subject.

Q Are there any more discussions with the Syrians about the meeting with Khaddam either in Europe or here in Washington?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that today.

Q New topic, or are you still on the Middle East?

A Let's stay on the Middle East if we can.

Q When do you think we'll know who will replace Habib in Damascus or who will be sent to Damascus at some point?

A I can't give you a guess on what might develop in terms of a dialogue with Damascus at this point. I just can't tell you.

Q On southern Africa, according to the Post you commented recently on the Supreme Court ruling in South Africa about the migrants -- I didn't realize that -- but do you now have a comment on the fact that they won't allow the families to join the migrants in the white areas?

A I haven't seen that, but I did see a statement this morning about the South African Government accepting the judgment of the Supreme Court on granting those permanent residency rights to the black South African migrant workers.

On that I could say we welcome that announcement. While the decision does not constitute the total freedom of movement for all South Africans, black and white, which is their right, it does represent a definite step on the road to full participation by all South Africans in a society of their own determination.

The policy of constructive engagement, followed by the Reagan Administration, has been premised on the firm belief that forces seeking positive reform away from apartheid are gathering strength in South Africa. Nothing could confirm this assessment more concretely than this announcement by the South African Government that the South African Supreme Court's decision will stand.

Q Copies, please?

A Copy. Sure.

Q Do you still welcome it even though the families are discouraged?

A I'll stand by this statement. I think if you have further questions, perhaps in the context of asking questions this afternoon you might want to put that one.

Q In connection with copies, may we be sure that in addition to a copy of the very first statement you made on Egypt, you also give us a copy of the words you used on the temporary assignment of troops in answer to the second question?

A I'll see if that's in a form that I can make available, otherwise you may have to wait, but I think it's probably available.

Q New subject?

A Go ahead.

Q Earlier this year Secretary of State Shultz told Congress that the debt bomb had been defused, referring to the outstanding Latin American debt situation. Is that still the Secretary's position?

A I haven't talked to him about it, so I can't answer your question.

Q Can you look into that?

A I think the Secretary is in an airplane on the way to Asia. It's a little hard.

Q Is the United States Government going to protest to the Nicaraguans on the deaths of the two journalists?

A Yes.

Q When?

A Very shortly, if not already. I can't tell you, though. I haven't got a report back.

Q Will there be an investigation as requested by the L.A. Times?

A An investigation?

Q Of the circumstances of the deaths.

A I'm not sure what that means. I'm not aware of the specific call. I think we have provided some information. We have probably a little bit more about what we know, but there were eyewitnesses to the attack, so --

Q What can you tell us that you know now that you have more knowledge of?

A I'm not sure it's all very new. I think that a lot of this has been described before. Messrs. Torgerson and Cross were traveling on a Honduran road in a clearly identifiable passenger vehicle. Civilian Honduran eyewitnesses have confirmed that the rocket-propelled grenade which killed the journalists was fired from Nicaragua.

I would note that Soviet-designed RPG rocket-propelled grenade launchers are in common use by the Nicaraguan army, and the journalists car was well within the effective 350-550 yard range. Also, I would note that the retrieval of the bodies by the Honduran army was delayed for some time by fire coming from the Nicaraguan side.

Q But are there any other forces in the area which might have similar grenade launchers?

A I can't give you an answer to that specifically, but I don't know of any other forces in the area -- or any reports from anybody, press or anybody else, of any other forces in the area which were firing from Nicaragua into Honduras, and firing on civilian vehicles.

Q What kinds of armed forces exist in the area?

A I haven't got a list here.

Q Do you have any idea?

A I think you probably have some ideas, and I may have some ideas.

Q I know, but I'd love for you to tell me.

A I know you would. (Laughter)

Q In connection with that statement, just so I'm clear, you said that you would note that the Soviet-designed launchers are in common use.

Have you determined that the grenade that was fired was from a Soviet-supplied weapon?

A I don't have any way of giving you that.

Q Did you describe that as a clearly designated passenger vehicle?

A Clearly identifiable.

Q How was it clearly identifiable?

A One looks at it. It was not a military vehicle. It was a passenger car. It wasn't a truck that was carrying troops or anything of the sort.

Q It's commonly known that the Honduran troops in that area do tend to travel in civilian vehicles.

A I think that there is some responsibility involved here that one has to look at.

Q Follow up to that same thing. There was another vehicle damaged in that same attack. Do you have any details of what kind of a vehicle that was?

A Don't.

Q This was traveling right in front of the car that the journalists were in. Don't know about that?

A No. I heard about a vehicle that was following behind it. But a vehicle in front -- I gather that this was a direct hit on that car.

Q Alan, what form will this protest take? Is it a formal note?

A I don't have details, nor do I think in the line of not commenting in detail on our diplomatic exchanges would I really be able to do that.

Q How were these witnesses provided?

A How were the witnesses provided?

Q Yes. How did they get from the area in which the attack took place to a press conference?

A I am not aware that they were at a press conference.

Q To make their statements known. Under whose auspices were they? Were they under the Honduran military's auspices.

A I don't have detail. I gather that the Honduran military went out and retrieved the bodies and questioned people who were there. I think we had people who went out there too, but I don't know specifically --

Q Were they reporters?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q General Alvarez, when he blamed the Nicaraguan soldiers for the attack, also said there were no counter-revolutionary forces -- that is, anti-Sandinista forces -- in Honduras in the area at all. Do you accept that?

A I don't have any basis for commenting on that.

Q You have no basis for commenting on it?

A He made a statement. I would refer you to his statement.

Q But does the United States Government believe that there are no anti-Sandinista forces that are armed, operating in that area, including on the Honduran side.

A I don't have any information on it.

Q Could you look into it?

A No. I think that I'd refer you to the Government of Honduras. They're the ones whose territory you're talking about.

Q I'm asking -- the question goes to the credibility --

A I know what you're asking, and I'm telling you that I would refer you to the Government of Honduras.

Q Alan, a moment ago you said there is some responsibility here that has to be looked at. Whose responsibility is it that has to be looked at?

A I think that this firing which came from the territory of Nicaragua must be ascribed, responsibility, to Nicaragua.

Q How do you get from there -- I mean, how do you get to there from your previous statement that I would have to ask the Government of Honduras about who operates in the region? How is it the United States Government can conclude that Sandinista soldiers were at fault when it refuses to comment on anything else?

A I guess it's easier for you, sitting here, than the civilian witnesses who saw it to make those judgments, Jim. But I'm telling you that there were civilian witnesses who have said they saw it, they've described it, and if you think you have better information, you're welcome to publish it.

Q The United States Government has no view as to what armed forces exist in that territory?

A I've given you what I've got on it.

Q Someone said yesterday it would be very difficult to make a direct hit on a moving vehicle from even 100 yards, much less 350 or 500.

A I don't know if it was 350 or 500 --

Q Do you know how RPGs -- you know, do they have that kind of accuracy?

A You'd have to go ask somebody who's a military expert. What I said was it was well within the range of an RPG launcher.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing condcluded at 12:42 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, June 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #108

FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1983, 12:07 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Two announcements: First, available in the Press Office are a very limited number of copies of Volume VI of Series C, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Volume VI, the final volume of Series C, covers November 1, 1936, to November 14, 1937, and is the last of 19 volumes planned for publication under the auspices of the Tripartite Project.

Q Are they genuine? (Laughter)

A Let's be a little serious in this room. (Laughter)

As some of you are aware, many of you, Rush Taylor is leaving the Press Office for greener pastures. He is currently on a brief but well-deserved vacation, and will return for a brief time later in the month. In the meantime, I would like to introduce Brian Carlson, who has assumed the duties of the Director of the Office of Press Relations. Brian comes to us from USIA. His previous assignments have included Caracas and Belgrade, where he worked as Information Officer, and Sofia, Bulgaria, where he was the Public Affairs Officer. Most recently, he worked as the Executive Assistant to the Counselor of USIA.

We're pleased to have you here, and know that all of you will make him feel welcome.

Q What's "greener pastures?"

A That, perhaps by any definition, is anything other than (Laughter) --

Q Where is Rush going?

A I don't have anything to announce. That's up to Rush to make known.

Anyway, happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, yesterday on your statement about the Egyptian bases or non-bases, do you have anything to add to that?

A No.

Q Because the Congressional testimony has come out, and it sounds like there are bases -- or a base called "Site Mike."

A I don't have anything to add to what I said yesterday.

Q You still stand by that?

A Yes.

Q O.K. Do you have anything new to report on Chad?

A Yes, I can give you an update on Chad. First of all, there are conflicting reports as to whether the town of Faya Largeau has fallen to the Libyan-supported dissidents, so I can't confirm to you, one way or another on that.

The dissident forces under former President Goukouni have a long history of Libyan support, including logistics, money, arms, and recruitment. It is clear Goukouni could not have advanced to the outskirts of Faya Largeau without extensive Libyan support. There are Libyan advisors with Goukouni's forces, and they are giving logistic support to the attack. So far, we have no evidence of direct participation by Libyan ground attack aircraft, though there are unconfirmed reports of Libyan transport aircraft support.

We deplore this externally supported aggression against Chad. We continue to consult closely with the French and with interested African countries.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Is the United States prepared to do anything other than deplore it?

A I am not in a position to say anything beyond what I said on this, Jim, which is that we continue to consult closely with the French and interested African countries.

Q Which African countries?

A I don't have the list to give you, and I don't think I could --

Q Has Chad been in direct contact with you?

A With -- ?

Q With you.

A Well, we have an Embassy there. Sure.

Q But since this latest crisis, have there been any requests for help or anything like that?

A I don't have information that I can give you on that.

Q Do you have any comment on Mr. Arafat's problems with the Syrians?

A I don't.

Q What about coordination with the Egyptians and/or the Sudanese regarding Chad?

A I don't have anything on specific countries that we might be talking with, so there is nothing I can give you on that.

Q Alan, does the State Department have an assessment on the impact or the effect of the Supreme Court decision of yesterday?

A No. At this point, I think I'm going to have to refer you to the Justice Department for any comment on that decision. Obviously, people here, our legal people and others, as well as in other agencies all around town, I'm sure are looking at that; but I don't have any assessment to give you.

As I say, at this stage, I think Justice would be the place to go for any comment.

Q Has Habib left yet?

A I don't know whether he has left yet. I don't have specifics. I think he is due to go today. Whether he has actually left as of this moment, I don't have that.

-- MORE --

Q On that decision, what does the State Department do in a situation like that -- as if it were precedented? Does it specifically say -- with respect to the War Powers Act, does it consider it to be in effect in its planning, or what status does it give you?

A I think the first thing we do is have our lawyers look at it. Seriously. I don't think anybody is going to rush out --

Q No, but is there a presumption --

A Obviously, there is a whole range of important questions to be asked along those lines.

Q You can always declare war.

Q Is there a presumption -- in terms of planning, don't you have to make certain assumptions as to the validity of your actions or what you have to do in the meantime until there is clarification, or do you just put everything on hold?

A I'm sure that people will make determinations as to what they need to do and how they're going to view existing legislation and pending legislation based on the assessments which are being made and going to be made, but they are doing that now and I can't give you a readout on something that hasn't been done.

Q Can you say whether they're looking at the certification on Salvador as one of these things?

A I can't say specifically what they're looking at. I would be sure that over time they would be looking at everything that would be affected one way or another by this action. It's only logical.

Q Do you have anything on Chile today?

A No, I don't have any update on Chile today beyond -- we had some guidance yesterday which you may have gotten.

Q Has the U.S. told Eden Pastora's people that they will not support them?

A You're asking basically a question -- without leading you one way or another -- you're asking basically a question which relates to what would have to be in the category of covert activity.

Q Well, no --

A Yes, you are. He may be talking about it in one way or another -- I've seen press reports -- but the activity that you would be talking about would, by definition, if it were taking place -- if the U.S. were supporting it -- be covert activity, and I cannot address from this podium the question of covert activity.

Q Why "by definition?" Seriously.

A Seriously, because of the way he's described what his actions are.

Q Aren't options available that don't involve covert action?

A I'll leave you with what I've just said.

Q Do you have any feeling about his forces going out of action?

A I don't have any comment to give you on that. He's apparently made some statements. I don't have any comment to give you on that.

Q Did anybody talk with Robelo here yesterday about the decisions?

A I'm not aware of whether anybody saw Mr. Robelo, saw him yesterday. He has met with USG officials in the past, but we haven't gone into a great list of specifics and I don't think would go into the question of what topics might be involved.

Q Could you look into the question of whether he saw anyone here yesterday?

A I don't think I'm going to try to get into a detailed schedule. We have seen him. I think that he has seen people; he's been here; he has seen people. There's no secret made of that. We talked about his seeing people last year, and so on. I'm just not going to get into providing a schedule. If he wants to talk about what he's done, that's up to him.

Q Do you have anything on the military situation in El Salvador today, and the capture of the two dams?

A I think you put an inquiry before, earlier this morning, about that and somebody has checked that and found nothing to substantiate whatever report you may have about any activity, much less any takeover of a dam. That's our information. We're not a news agency, but that's what we've got.

Q Do you have any comment on the closing of the Palestine Research Center in Beirut, and the arrest of the director and the staff pending deportation or something like that?

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Anything on Israel planning to extend its territorial waters reportedly to protect --

A Whose?

Q Israel extending its territorial waters into the Mediterranean?

A I don't know anything about it.

Just a note given to me to confirm that Ambassador Habib has not yet left. He will be leaving this afternoon.

Q Is Ambassador Draper going with him?

A I assume that they are going out together, yes, and Ambassador Fairbanks as well, as I said yesterday.

Q Can you assume that Mr. Draper will be going to Syria by the end of this week?

A No, I wouldn't make any assumption of that sort. I said yesterday I don't have anything on who might be going to Syria, if somebody is going to be going to Syria.

Q Have you got any assessment on the latest developments in Syria?

A Sorry?

Q Any assessment on the latest development in Syria -- i.e., the expelling of Chairman Arafat?

A No, I said before that I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, did you say somebody is going to Syria?

A No, I said *if* somebody were to go I wouldn't make assumptions one way or another on that. We're not in any different place from where we've been on that.

Q To broaden that question beyond Arafat personally, do you have any statement of humanitarian concern or other concern for the Lybian, Syrian and Soviet coordinated action to wipe out the Palestinian camps in the Bekaa?

A I'm not aware of a major push on the camps. Obviously, the fate of the people in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon has been one -- particularly since the tragedies at Sabra and Shatila, but even before -- which has been of concern to us, an issue which has been of concern to us. But I don't know of any specifics to comment on.

Q Is there any U.S. quid pro quo with Libya regarding our silence at this point, or relative silence, regarding their actions in Chad in exchange for their operations against against the PLO?

A That is absurd and grotesque.

Q But it's what's going on.

A I disagree.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:19 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #109

MONDAY, JUNE 27, 1983, 12:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one announcement which may be of passing interest to you.

Department of State press passes have been extended until the end of October. The new pass will have an expiration date of June 1985. Further information concerning renewal will be announced in September.

Okay. That's all.

Q Do you have any comment on the Soviet action in letting the Pentacostals out?

A I have very little on that, simply to confirm that the Vashchenko family received permission, and that they departed the Soviet Union for Vienna on June 27, today. But I don't have any further comment on it.

Q Can you tell us what the status is of the Chmykalov family?

A As I understand it, they are still in Chernogorsk.

Q Have they applied?

A Again, I don't have anything further, simply that they remain in Chernogorsk.

Q This is something that the United States has apparently been seeking for a long time, is it not?

A We certainly have made our position on this quite clear.

Q Then is it a good or a bad thing?

A I think that at this point they're getting out. That, clearly in and of itself, is good, but I think that there are other considerations here, and I'm going to hold with what I've got.

Q What other considerations?

A As I say, I'm going to hold with what I've said.

Q Do you have any evidence that this action might extend to other minorities in Russia?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q What's the latest status report on Habib and Draper?

A They are, to my understanding, either in or about to be in Saudi Arabia.

Q Today?

A Today.

Q Fairbanks is with him?

A Fairbanks, yes. The three of them.

Q Aside from the Secretary's remarks over the weekend, do you have anything today on the PLO fighting?

A No. I don't have anything.

Q Could you tell us what the State Department's view of the centrality of the PLO to the peace process is at this point?

A No. I don't think I'm going to try to give you that kind of an assessment.

Q Can you take that question?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the reports on Ethiopia and the U.S. food aid question?

A I have simply very little, and that is that we always respond to requests for assistance in conjunction with what other nations are doing in order to avoid duplication of effort.

The U.S. has provided a response to various international appeals on behalf of Ethiopia. We've contributed food and funds. I don't have details here, but hope perhaps we can have some available to you later.

Q Today?

A Hopefully today. Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on Prime Minister Begin's report today to the Knesset, saying that the Americans are changing their assessments and are moving closer to the U.S. (sic) position that the Syrians do not intend to withdraw?

A No. I don't have any comment.

Q Has the Administration said anything about the Pope's visit beyond what the President said I think last Thursday?

A I think what the President said was a rather authoritative statement, but, no, beyond that I don't --

Q Amplification or elaboration?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on Bishop Tutu's statement, calling constructive engagement a disaster?

A I think I would have to refer you to what Larry Eagleburger said in his speech in California as a comprehensive statement of our southern African policy.

Q Last week you said that the United States was consulting with France and other nations on the situation in Chad. Are there any fruits of this consultation to announce?

A I don't think I'd be in a position to get into that diplomatic dialogue. I think, as you are well aware, the Libyan-backed dissident forces did succeed in occupying the northern town of Faya Largeau.

It was accomplished with massive logistical and advisory support from Libya. As of this point there's no indication of further movement -- that is, out of Faya Largeau -- by the dissidents.

Q Would the United States oppose some kind of international force to unseat Qaddafi and dismember Libya?

A   That's a very hypothetical question, and I don't propose to address it.

Q   Let's try once more on Poland. Do we have anything to say on how we view Walesa's continuing position there? Whether we think he should continue to play an important role in the opposition or whether we think his usefulness has passed?

A   I don't have a judgment to offer you on that. Our views on the situation in Poland remain as they have been in terms of what we think is important in terms of reconciliation. The same position applies as has applied in the past. I don't have anything new to suggest to you today.

Q   On Chad again, you've said that the U.S. was in consultation with France and other interested African countries. What is the development? Any development?

A   Again, I was asked that before. I don't have anything specifically with regard to those consultations to give to you. I do understand -- sort of as a pause, paragraph, second subject -- that I understand the French are airlifting military supplies to Habre, but, as I say, that's just a factual situation.

Q   What about with respect to the claims that dissident forces control a third of the country. Do you have any confirmation on that?

A   I can't give you a reading. I don't know how far, if one takes Faya Largeau and the area immediately around it and measures it, I don't know what it comes to. But, in any case, I don't have a measurement to give you on it.

Q   Do you have any further guidance on Chad that you want to offer us?

A   Nothing to offer you in particular.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything on the UNIFIL mandate --

A I'm sorry?

Q UNIFIL in Lebanon, renewed on July 19th, the status; what will be the position of the United States Government?

A As you indicate, that mandate is due to expire almost a month from now; more than three weeks from now. I don't have anything on that. We've indicated before the useful role we feel that the UNIFIL has played in Lebanon, but I don't have anything specific to offer you on the renewal at this particular point.

Q There are reports attributed to a senior official that the Soviets had rejected the American proposals in the INF talks. There's a newspaper report yesterday, I guess, that the Soviets have been constructive or forthcoming in the START talks. Can you talk to either or both of those stories?

A I really can't. The rule of confidentiality has applied, as you know, and we have not gotten into details.

On INF, to repeat what you already know, that in accordance with the President's interim solution proposal, we've been pressing the Soviets to tell us what equal levels of warheads on land-based, longer-ranged INF missiles they would be willing to accept, and unfortunately so far they haven't been willing to do so.

As far as the report on START is concerned, similiarly, we have a confidentiality rule, so I can't get into that in any specifics. The details of any Soviet responses and what we would say again, in response to that, would obviously be the proper subject for Ambassador Rowny to discuss with his counterparts in Geneva.

The President's new proposal provides a flexible framework for the negotiations, and should give them a new impetus to achieve the deep reductions we all want. If the Soviets show similar seriousness of purpose, and we hope they will, the prospects for agreement obviously would be enhanced.

Q Do you have any details you can add on President Reagan's trip to Asia? Larry Speakes said that if he goes to China it would be a separate trip. Why would that, why couldn't they --

A I think given the fact that this is a Presidential trip and Larry addressed this at some length, I would not really go into that. I'd refer you to what he said on the subject.

Q One question on El Salvador. Last week a number of Congressmen met with President Reagan at the White House, and one of them proposed that the U.S. Government evict Ruben Zamora from the U.S. Is there any move to do such a thing?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Does the rule of confidentiality apply to Ambassador Stone as well? You don't have anything on his --

A I have nothing about his activities. As I believe I've indicated before, we're probably going to maintain that general posture regarding Ambassador Stone's specific activities.

Q A follow-up on Ambassador Stone. He's supposed to brief the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow afternoon. Will there be a readout after that?

A I'm sure there would not be. He's held a number of meetings, conducted a number of briefings on the Hill, but those have been confidential, and we would expect that they would remain confidential.

Q Do you have a reaction either to the end of the general stike in Chile or the provision by Cuba of the sentences of hijackers?

A On the latter question, I think we had some guidance at the end of last week, and I would refer you to the Press Office for that.

On the Chilean strike, we can confirm the strike has been suspended. Activities appear to have returned to normal.

We understand that several sectors of Chilean society, including the church, have called for dialogue and avoidance of confrontation. We hope that these efforts will prosper and we will continue to follow the situation with interest.

Q You made reference to further steps needed to calm things last week, after they announced that some exiles could return. Did you have anything in mind specifically?

A I don't have anything further to give you beyond what we said at that particular point.

Q Do you have anything on the international democratic unions there?

A No.

Q Do you have anything to suggest about the proposed visit by President Reagan to Jerusalem in December tc address the Conference of the Year of the Bible, possibily the end of December or January 2nd?

A I don't know anything about it. You might want to check with the White House.

Q Do you have anything on the Secretary's meetings during his rest stop in London?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you confirm that we're meeting with Lord Carrington?

A No, I don't have any details at all on what meetings he might be having. Again, as you note, it is designed to be a rest stop. That doesn't mean he won't be having any meetings.

Q I didn't know it was called a "rest stop."

A That's what it's designed to be.

Q Do you have any evidence one way or another about whether Pakistan may have detonated a nuclear explosion?

A Yes. Obviously, we've seen the reports. We have no information that would substantiate those reports -- an allegation, I guess -- that was made by the lefist Indian newspaper Patriot, and we're confident that such a nuclear event did not, in fact, take place on June 13, as the Patriot alleged.

Q Can I have that last sentence again?

A We are confident that such a nuclear event, as the Patriot alleged, did not take place on June 13th.

Q Anything on the selling of the spare parts to India for Tarapur?

A No. I don't have anything new for you beyond what we said on that recently.

Q Do you have any comment on the GAO report that came out finally on Friday about the aid to Israel?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything about selling more F-16's to Pakistan?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #110

TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements: First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Under Secretary for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittees on International Operations and Europe and the Middle East. The subject is Beirut.

Second, yesterday I indicated we would try to make available further details on the emergency food assistance to Ethiopia. We will be posting that information after the briefing. We have some more numbers to give you.

Q Is that in addition to what you had yesterday toward the end of the day?

A I don't know specifically what was there. I think that there is some updating, though, of what was available -- what I saw yesterday as being proposed. I didn't actually see what was finally put out. But I think it is a little different perhaps from what there was.

Anyway, that's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you tell us about the recent communications you've had with the Cuban Government about their taking back the undesirables and other subjects?

A I think there was guidance which was available -- indeed I believe there was even a posting on this subject May 25; and if I recall it correctly, there was some sort of a supplement on the 26th. It's a rather extensive guidance on what we have said to the Cubans.

I can go through it. I have this guidance here, but it's a month old, and I'm pretty sure that it is on the record.

Q I'm interested in the response from the Cubans?

A On the response from the Cubans, they handed our Interests Section, in Havana, a note on this subject on the 17th of June. The note is under study -- I can't go into the details -- but I can say that it was not considered responsive to our request.

Q Was it considered a positive step?

A I don't have a characterization of that sort to give you other than to say as I indicated, it is under study and we do not consider it responsive.

Q The reason I asked is because the nominee to the Acting Assistant Secretary said today on the Hill that he considered it a positive step, and I was wondering if he was speaking for the Administration or only for himself.

A I don't know what he said. I don't have the text; I can't comment on what he said.

Q But the original request by the United States for Cuba to take back the undesirable Mariel refugees, that remains, regardless of this note?

A Oh, yes. Our request made to them, the things we made known in late May, are certainly out there to be acted upon. Their response, their note given to us on the 17th, allegedly or supposedly in response to this, as I say, was not responsive to our request; but we are studying it. I don't have anything further to give you on that.

Q Did they try to link it with any broader questions?

A Again, I think I indicated before, Jim, I don't have any content details to give you at this point.

Q You've had it for ten days and, it's still under study, and this is the best you can do?

A I guess that's right.

Q Alan, a procedural step in the interest of saving time, when the nominee to the Assistant Secretaryship makes statements in his confirmation hearings, does he speak for the Government or does he speak for himself?

A I don't think there is much point in trying to parse that particular distinction. He's speaking as the nominee, and I don't quarrel -- If that's a view that he expressed up there, fine. You can take that as a view he has expressed up there. I don't quarrel with it.

Q He said a number of things on a range of issues that weren't consistent with what people up there and other people in the Administration have said -- and I don't want to go through each one to clarify what policy is. I just want to know if he does speak for the Administration.

A He speaks as the nominee for the position.

Q Alan, what is the position of this Administration on the possibility of holding talks or resuming the talks with Cuba that were held last in January of 1981 on normalization of migration between the two countries?

A Again, I think that we indicated, when we put our message to the Cubans in the first place, the circumstances under which we would be prepared to resume normal issuance of immigrant visas in Havana. I think, again, all that was spelled out in the guidance that's available.

Q On a related subject, have the Cubans taken a positive step in their handling of hijackers?

A Again, I said I don't have that guidance with me. That guidance is available, and I refer you to it. It was available last week.

Q Is this the same guidance with the list of hijackers that the Cuban Government provided, or is there an update to that one?

A No, I think at the end of last week, we had something which indicated they had provided some information. I'm not sure they had provided at that time a prepared list. I don't have the guidance in my head at this particular moment, but I know that it was available; and I don't have any update to give you beyond that.

Q Alan, do you have any guidance on what the U.S. Government knows about the situation in Poland following the Pope's visit, any deals that were struck, or what-have-you?

A No. Deals struck between whom and whom?

Q There are some reports that the Church and the Polish Government made an arrangement in which Walesa would be asked to step down as the leader of Solidarity.

A No. I don't have anything on that. I think all I could say is that our own position, as the President has stated it -- he spoke on the 23rd of June, said we're currently consulting with our Allies on the Polish question, and we'll decide how to proceed in our relations with Warsaw once we've done that. In addition, I think he reiterated on that occasion what he had said on December 10th, which was that if the Polish Government takes meaningful, liberalizing measures, we are prepared to take equally significant and concrete steps of our own.

That's a readout. Obviously, that's a reiteration of our policy as opposed to the kind of information you're asking about, I'm afraid.

Q Alan, is there any subtle shift in the Administration's policy on the Polish sanctions, re lifting them?

A I think what I've just given you goes back to what the President said, for example, in December -- goes back some ways.

Q Can you give us a timetable of any kind on the consultations with the Allies?

A No. I don't have a timetable to give you. It's an ongoing process.

Q You can't tell us how long it's going to be ongoing?

A No, I can't do that at this point. But it is an ongoing process. It isn't something that's "dead in the water," either.

Q Can you tell us who is leading it?

A No, I can't do that either.

Q Alan, do you have anything about the -- what is it -- a constitutional amendment being proposed in El Salvador which, in effect, would emasculate the land reform program?

A I gather, at least from the press stories, you are talking about a provision of the draft constitution that has been referred to in various press reports. The provision of land ownership is a critical question in the draft constitution that the members of the Constituent Assembly are working on. The deliberations, obviously, will take some time as the various parties mold this critically important document.

Our concerns about land reform in El Salvador are well known. The ultimate key to the success of the new Constitution will be how well it addresses the needs of all the Salvadorans, that they have a deliberative process going on in an elected assembly. I think we should let that democratic process work its way through.

Q How have we made our concerns known since this was taken up by the Constituent Assembly?

A I'm not going to try to date when we have done what, Jim. We have talked about our concerns about land reform over a long period of time in a variety of ways. I'm sure you have them all on file.

Q A status report on Habib and Draper? Also, is Eagleburger heading for Damascus any time soon?

A You won't let go of the Damascus story, will you? (Laughter) Eagleburger? I don't know of any travel plans for Under Secretary Eagleburger to go to Damascus.

As far as Ambassadors Habib, Draper, and Fairbanks are concerned, they are in Cairo. I don't have any onward plans, as is our usual practice.

Q Who is going to Damascus? Nobody is in touch with Damascus?

A I have nothing new to say to you about anybody going to Damascus.

Q Is the Secretary planning to pass by Damascus?

A I have nothing new to say to you about the Secretary's travel plans.

Q Have you been in consultation with the Egyptians recently about the Chad situation?

A Again, I indicated the other day that we have been in consultation with a number of interested governments, but I'm not going to try to specify other than that I did mention the French; but other than that, I didn't specify, and I don't think I can.

Q Alan, there are some press reports in Israel that the government decided that the redeployment of the Israeli forces in Lebanon will take place before Mr. Begin's visit here in late July. Do you have any comment on this?

A Not really. That was a press report. I've seen other statements indicating, official statements, that the Government of Israel would consult fully with the others involved -- I think specifically Lebanon and the United States have been mentioned -- before it would take any steps. So I can't tell you what the significance of these press reports may be.

Q But do you read the promise to hold those consultations as not taking any moves before the visit here in late July?

A I don't want to try to define that any further. I can only refer you to what they have said. I can't interpret what Ma'Ariv's story may be based on.

Q Is the United States now in the process of trying to get more troops into the multinational force?

A No. There is no movement on that issue.

-- MORE --

Q You are not talking to the French or the British, the Italians, on that subject now to increase forces there?

A I'm not aware of any active discussion at this point to change either the scope or the role or the size of the MNF. Obviously, that is a consideration in the overall context of what might be coming down the road.

But as of something for this time, I'm not aware that there's any active discussion under way.

Q Alan, is the United States aware of any plans by France to lend Super Etenard aircraft to Iraq, and, if so, does it have any position on it? Was it consulted, and has it taken any position with the French?

A I don't have anything for you on that. Our own position on our actions with regard to military supplies to both Iran and Iraq is well known, and I refer you back to the record on that. But I don't have anything for you on the reports about French supplies.

Q From Cairo, where is Ambassador Habib's next step?

A I said we're going -- or I am anyway -- going to hold to my usual reticence about incurring the wrath of Ambassador Habib by giving his plans.

Q Anything about talks in Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia?

A No. I don't have any readout on any talks. I know I am sure I will not have to give you.

Q Alan, is the U.S. position on the possibility of Israeli redeployment now somewhat softened from what it was about a month ago? In other words, about a month ago, I think, the Secretary, among others, was saying we were not in favor of that since that might lead to permanent division of Lebanon.

Since the Israelis seem to be determined to go ahead with this, there's not much you can do about it. What is your position now?

A Without accepting the basis of your question -- the last part of it -- the Secretary addressed this question in his last press conference on the record, which was very consistent with what I had said before, which is essentially that our objective is the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and anything which contributes to that we would favor. Anything which would lead away from that would be a problem.

Q He kind of punted that question, as I remember.

A That's your definition. That's the position --

Q In other words, the Israelis will just say that they're there until something else happens.

A I can't tell you what the Israelis are going to say. I can only tell you what our policy is and what our view is on withdrawal of forces.

Q You don't have a positive statement saying you oppose a redeployment?

A I've given you what our position is on that.

Q Could you confirm a report that there will be a Jordanian delegation watching the American M-1 tank once it is shown to the Saudi army in the coming months?

A I don't have anything on that. I don't know anything about it.

Q Could you take the question?

A I can look into it. I can see if we can find anything here. You also might want to pursue that both with the Jordanians, I would guess, and perhaps with the Pentagon. But, anyway, I'll see if I can find something on that for you.

Q Do you have any comment on remarks attributed to the Al Fajr of Jerusalem concerning U.S.-Syrian collusion, which also involves, I think, an offer of a permament place in paradise to anyone who assassinates Hafiz al-Assad?

A I was not aware of the remark. We are not involved in any assassination plots, and I don't --

Q I didn't ask if you were involved.

A Anyway, I don't have any comment.

Q Do you have anything on the status of the aid request for El Salvador in light of the legislative veto decision by the Supreme Court?

A No, I don't. Again, I think, as I indicated the other day, that that whole question of what that decision means for a variety of pieces of legislation is under study. But I don't have anything to offer you specifically on that.

Q Who's doing that?

A At this point I think Justice is certainly looking into the overall question.

Q In terms of the Department?

A The Legal Adviser's office is looking into that question. I'm sure others who are interested in specific pieces of legislation are also looking at it, but certainly it is a legal question. Once the legal determinations are made or the positions are drawn up, I suppose then others will want to look at it and see what that means for policy. But it's a very complicated decision. I've talked to a couple of lawyers who've looked at it, and it's not simple at all.

Q Alan, a senior official traveling with the Secretary of State is quoted as saying that the U.S. Government has some information that there may be the remains of several hundred Americans still in the hands of the Vietnamese.

Do you have any further clarification on what the evidence is?

A I don't have anything further for you on evidence. I think what we have said is that there are very credible reports indicating the Vietnamese know more about missing Americans than they've been willing to tell us, and that they could make available the remains of many missing Americans.

We have repeatedly urged them to cooperate on this humanitarian issue and to turn over the remains of the missing Americans. Obviously, there has been some cooperation in this effort, but there's a lot more to be done. But on specifics on reports, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.

Q Have the Vietnamese -- in whatever discussions you may have been holding -- have they linked the return of the remains with any other subject?

A I can't get into the question of communications with the Vietnamese on it. We have pursued the issue as a humanitarian issue which needs to be and should be pursued in its own right.

Q I just want to make doubly sure that we're talking about the same -- we're talking about the remains of dead Americans? There's no evidence of any live Americans?

A No. Talking about information about missing Americans and the remains of dead Americans. That's correct. I agree with your statement.

On the other hand, we have also indicated before that we are going to not pass by any information which would suggest that there might be another situation. If we hear something, we'll pursue it. We're not going to make the assumption that there is absolutely nobody there if there is other information which could be pursued.

We've said this before. I think you could probably turn to the words of art we have used on that. But the fact is that what we're talking about and I think what was talked about by the Secretary's party was information on remains specifically.

Q Alan, at what level of the Department will officials be meeting with Walid Jumblatt, and will anyone here be meeting with Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem?

A I don't have anything at all on Mr. Freij. On Mr. Jumblatt, it depends on a lot of things, including specific dates of his visit to Washington. So I don't have any more specifics.

Q He's going to be available then?

A That certainly would be an important consideration, sure.

Q When you talked before about the very credible reports, are these reports based on information you've gotten very recently?

A I think this goes back over a period of time. I don't know whether there are absolutely new reports or not, but we have indicated over a long period of time that we felt that the Vietnamese had more information or could develop more information and provide more remains.

The fact is that over time they have -- on a relatively small scale -- but they have done that. But we think there is more to be done.

Q But you think now that there are actually hundreds of bodies that --

A I can't quantify it. I don't have numbers. There obviously is a large number of missing.

Q Large number missing, we know. But large number of remains?

A I don't have information to --

Q Because I remember for a long time the State Department kept on saying it had no real information about this, and whatever is out, is out, and you really didn't know anything more than that. So I'm trying to remember where this quantum jump took place between knowing or very credible report, suddenly that they know a lot more than they're telling you, and that there may be many remains there?

How do you know that?

A I can't quantify the remains. Again, let me refer you to the Defense Department for more specifics on the reports.

Q Do you have any reaction to either the Italian or Japanese elections today?

A On the Japanese election, simply that we obviously have had very good, close relations with the Government of Japan, and we'd expect in every way to continue to do so.

As far as the Italian election is concerned, we anticipate continuity in Italian foreign and security policy. Again, with the Government of Italy, we look forward to working closely with the new Italian Government once it's formed, as we have with Italian Governments in the past.

Q Also, on El Salvador for a second, has the U.S. position on facilitating negotiations between what it calls the left and the government changed in any way? In other words, do elections remain a framework within which those negotiations should be conducted?

A The position remains that dialogue would be in the context of the electoral democratic framework, not for power sharing.

Q And finally on Ethiopia --

A Dialogue, by the way -- obviously, the primary dialogue that one is talking about is among Salvadorans, but that's certainly the context of our own actions.

Q On Ethiopia, there's a remark in today's Post from Ambassador Kirkpatrick to the effect that diversion of relief goods to the military is a "big problem" in Ethiopia, and that may be a way of explaining why we haven't been as generous as perhaps in the past.

Is she speaking for the Reagan Administration that there is such a "big problem"?

A What she was speaking to was a very serious problem. That is, how to respond to humanitarian concerns in a situation of military conflict. The drought in Ethiopia is most severe in an area actively contested by government and rebel forces.

We seek every possible way of assuring that humanitarian assistance reaches the intended recipients. In Ethiopia we've provided our assistance to private and international organizations which are in a position to ensure that the delivery of our aid and to minimize the risk of diversion.

So I don't understand -- you're suggesting there is some --

Q The European Community did a report about two months ago on specifically this issue as it related to Ethiopia, and they gave the Ethiopian Government very high marks in terms of their not taking advantage of relief shipments and diverting them to military uses, but it is to provide for the others, and I was wondering if she was speaking for the U.S. Government in implying that the U.S. Government did not accept the findings of the European Community's report.

A I'll refer you to what I just said.

Q Can I get a copy of it?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #111

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1983, 12:33 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements. First, we discussed yesterday the question of a possible visit by Walid Jumblatt. I just wanted to tell you what we've got on that.

I understand he has decided to postpone for personal reasons his previously scheduled private visit to the United States, so that's where we are on that at this point.

Also, simply to tell you that available in the Press Office are two press releases concerning Pacific Island plebiscites. One deals with the results of the June 21st vote in the Fededated States of Micronesia in which the unofficial returns indicate approval of the Compact of Free Association. The second concerns the announcement of a September 7th plebiscite in the Marshall Islands on their future political status.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, about the Jumblatt visit, you said "for personal reasons?"

A Yes.

Q And you knew about it through -- I mean, he informed you, or how did the State Department know about this?

A I don't know specifically how we knew about it. But he decided for personal reasons that he was going to delay. Obviously, there was thought as to whom he might see when he was here, so it was a fairly natural thing that we would know about.

Q In light of the President's statement at his news conference last night on Poland, can you tell us, do the conditions listed in December for lifting of U.S. sanctions still stand or as the President seemed to say last night, does it only require establishment of trade unions free of government control?

A I would refer you to what the President said last night. I addressed this question yesterday. I indicated that on June 23rd in his speech the President had said that we are currently assessing the situation together with our Allies, consulting with them, and that once those consultations were completed we would decide how to proceed in our relations with Warsaw.

I also referred you to the President's speech of December 10th, and the quote there, which was, "if the Polish Government takes meaningful, liberalizing measures, we're prepared to take equally significant and concrete steps of our own," and I'm going to have to leave you with that as the statement of the policy as it is and it has been for some time.

Q That's what I'm trying to pin down, what kind of time are we talking about. When the sanctions were imposed and then when they were renewed one year after that, we were told that there were basically three conditions: establishment of a genuine dialogue, elimination of martial law and release of the political prisoners. Do those three conditions still apply?

A I would refer you to all of the statements we've made, including the statement that the President made on December 10th. I can't take you beyond what the President has said. He is the final authority on policy, and his statements are the final authoritative statements on policy.

Q That's why I'm quoting his words to you from last night. It seems to indicate that the policy is changing. I'm asking you if it is.

A I'm not going to try to interpret the President. I would leave that to you if you want to do that from your own analysis. But I think, again, I would refer you back to those statements that I've just mentioned.

Q What can you tell us about the situation in Guatemala?

A Not a lot. We have heard a variety of reports, as I think you have, concerning Guatemala. Our Embassy is looking into them, keeping us informed. We don't have specifics at this point. So there's really nothing much I can give you.

Q Is there some kind of a state of emergency there?

A I don't know what has been declared, frankly, in terms of state of emergency. I would think that, again, the press is as up to speed on that as the government is, and certainly more than, at the moment, I am. I just don't know what the government of Guatemala has declared or not.

Q Alan, first a status report on Habib-Draper-Fairbanks; also do you have anything on statements attributed to President Assad that Syria is preparing for war and that no U.S. officials are welcome there now or in the foreseeable future?

A On the first part, Ambassador Habib and company are in Lebanon. On the second part, I wasn't aware of any such statement and could not therefore comment on it.

Q What was the question? I'm sorry.

A The second part of the question? The first was the status of Habib, and so on; the second part was a report that I have not seen that suggests that President Assad has said that no Americans are welcome in Damascus. Is that correct?

Q And that war is imminent.

A And that war is imminent. I haven't seen anything to suggest such a statement.

Q Can you cite what evidence you have of the attack on the two American journalists on the Honduras-Nicaraguan border, that it came from the Nicaraguan side?

A You're aware of what we said before about that. We are aware of the press report this morning in a paper which may be dear to your heart, that according to a Honduran official there is a possibility that the journalists, Dial Torgerson and Richard Cross, were killed by a land mine rather than, as an eyewitness had reported by, a rocket-propelled grenade.

There has not been an official report from the government of Honduras at this point. Our Embassy is looking into these reports, but until we have further clarification, I'm simply not going to be in a position to respond more specifically to that press account.

Q Alan, you're aware that 28 members of Congress have asked Secretary Shultz to respond to this question?

A No, but I don't think that that really is the point here. The point is that obviously we are concerned to find out what's going on. I would guess that the government of Honduras is continuing to pursue the facts as best they can, although, of course, there has been firing across that road. It's been difficult to get up there. So I think that over time we may have a clearer picture of what's happened. But some suggestions were raised the other day that the government of Honduras might, for some reason, be uninterested in pursuing the facts. I think that the report this morning proves, if there's anything behind it, it simply suggests that, indeed, they are continuing to pursue it, as are we.

Q How are we continuing to pursue it?

A We continue to be interested in what facts are available. Embassy officials interviewed the eyewitnesses at the time, for example, although they couldn't get to the scene of the incident because, as we indicated then, and as I think journalists had indicated, the area between La Trojes and Cifuentes had been subjected from the Nicaraguan side of the border to fire, making it too risky.

Q So no U.S. officials have actually visited the site of the blast or whatever it was?

A To my understanding, at this point, that is correct.

Q Do they intend to?

A I don't know. I don't have anything further.

Q Is it likely that somebody from Honduras would have planted the land mine? Is that --

A I could give you an answer based in logic, but I think rather than that I would simply say that we're still waiting for clarification from our Embassy.

Q Why don't you give the answer based on logic?

A No, I'll let you draw that conclusion.

Q It's best not to depart from practice, I suppose.

Q There is a report that according to which 5,000 members of the anti-Sandinista rebels are gathering in Honduras to cross to Nicaragua. Do you have any comment about this?

A I don't have anything on it at all.

Q Are you aware of these reports?

A I've seen the reports in the press; yes.

Q Does it concern you at all?

A I don't have any comment to make on that. I've seen the press reports. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Alan, to follow up on that. In that report, Chamorro, who is a member of the FDN leadership, apparently told the Times that Pastora meet with U.S. officials over a matter of days back in March of 1982.

Do you have any comment on that? Can you confirm that that in fact happened?

A I think we addressed the question at that time, whether he had met officials, and I would refer you back to what we've said.

Q At that time you said that he had met no one.

A That's my recollection of it also, so I cannot confirm that. I don't know what those reports may refer to.

Q So you are contradicting what this FDN --

A I can only tell you what we said at the time when we were looking into it.

Q Alan, do you have any status report on the kidnapping in Sudan?

A Yes. Some of this may be repetition because, I guess, there was some of this information available last night.

Five men, including two Americans, have been taken hostge at Boma, in southern Sudan, by an organization calling itself the Liberation Front of Southern Sudan.

We have no further information on this group, although they claim they are fighting in the hills near Boma and recently seized a Sudanese police station.

According to information available to us, the rebels have demanded ransom money from the organizations employing the hostages, and a quantity of clothing.

In accordance with our long-standing policy, the U.S. Government looks to the Sudanese Government to take the lead in securing the safe release of these hostages. We are in continuing contact with the Sudanese Government, the organizations concerned, the families of the American hostages and other interested governments.

So far, we understand that the hostages are reported alive and well. But this is an on-going incident, and we're not going to have further comment to make on the matter.

Q Alan, to follow up, the kidnappers apparently, among their demands, have asked for radio time on the Voice of Amercia and the BBC. Is there a U.S. response to that?

A I guess all I could really say in response to that is that our policy on terrorist demands is well known and contained in testimony that former Under Secretary Richard Kennedy made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 10, 1981. I can make copies of that available to you in the Press Office.

Q Does that mean, Alan, that the United States does not intend to accede to that demand?

A It has been our standing practice not to accede to demands of terrorist groups.

Copy was requested of that initial statement, and we can make that available.

Q Are the names of the Americans available?

A The names, yes. I'm sorry, let me just finish this off, Lester.

The Americans are John Haspels, 36, of Lyons, Kansas, who is an employee of Africa Committee for the

Rehabilitation of Southern Sudan; and Ron Pontier, 29, of Claremont, Florida, of Africa Inland Mission.

Q Africa what?

A Inland Mission. I understand the others are German, Dutch and Canadian, but I don't have information on them.

Q Can I follow up on one of your -- you made some reference to the families. Do we have a policy on whether the families provide assistance or ransom to terrorists?

A Again, I'm going to refer you to what Mr. Kennedy said as the definitive statement on our approach to these issues.

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Q As I recall, Alan, it was explained from that podium some months ago that in its hiring the State Department does not necessarily disqualify applicants because of sexual orientation.

A Oh, Lester, we haven't heard about this in a long time.

Q Right. Since that time, as you know, one State Department employee was discovered to be a patron of a homosexual ring in Georgetown, and another retired Foreign Service Officer pleaded guilty to being leader of another prostitution ring -- homosexual prostitution ring -- called "The Stables."

My question is, could you tell us what is the State Department doing about the danger of possible transmissions of AIDS which is -- (Laughter)

Well, I mean, maybe it's funny to these gentlemen and ladies, but it killed six people in DC and eight people in Maryland already. That's about a 40% death rate which, to my way of thinking, isn't very funny.

A Lester, without connecting the two parts of your question, our policy about the first part, and so on, is all in the dialogue that was conducted back some months ago, and I refer you to it.

On the second part, I'm not aware of any special efforts, but I suppose that the health authorities locally and so on are making the efforts they would make. But that's not a State Department question.

Q Just one second. What I wanted to ask is this: If your Personnel Department knows that there are practicing homosexuals in the State Department -- if there are -- is there any effort being done by the State Department to isolate or treat or do something? This is a very serious epidemic, as you know.

A I suppose there may be people who practice giving blood, too. I'm not aware of any special efforts being made by the State Department, Lester. That's my answer.

Q You're doing nothing. Is that what your answer is?

A I'm not aware of any special efforts by the State Department per se --

Q Could you take the question?

A No. I think I'd --

Q You won't take the question. You don't care about it, Alan?

A That isn't the issue, Lester.

Q You won't take the question --

A Lester --

Q -- so you don't care about it.

A No.

Q Okay.

A No, no, Lester. For your tape recorder -- you might leave it on --

Q I'd be delighted.

A This is --

Q You have more for me. Bring in the candelabra.

A It is a public health issue and will be dealt with by public health officials. Go ahead.

Q This is not a follow-up. (Laughter)

A I trust not.

Q Any reaction --

A Unless you're in favor of necrophilia, which Lester -- (Laughter)

Q Any reaction on Moscow's summit communique?

Q A good time was had by all.

A Any reaction on --

Q On Moscow Summit communique?

A That's a rather broad question. On what specific aspect? I don't have a general reaction to it.

Q You don't have any general reaction? Do you have anything on any aspect of it?

A There were two things I guess I could comment on. One would be the advocacy of a freeze and I simply note our position on a freeze which is rather longstanding and well known. We feel that a freeze at this stage would codify current advantages that the Soviets have in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces and would prevent us from redressing that balance.

It would also divert us from the task of negotiating reductions.

As far as the comments about INF talks and references there, obviously we're going to be studying this statement carefully. A preliminary reading does not suggest anything new. The statement calls explicitly for no deployment of new U.S. missiles, so the Soviet position would appear to be unchanged; that is, they would hold on to their SS-20s with zero land-based, longer-ranged missiles for us.

We've made clear before that we could not accept that, and hoped the Soviets would adopt a more realistic position in the future.

Q Can we get a copy?

A I think you're going to have to get that largely from the transcript.

Q In their statement, they draw attention to the proclaimed position of their supreme state bodies which, according to some interpretations, is a reference to a warning by the Soviets that they might deploy nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe if the United States deployed its Pershings and so on.

Is that your reading of that part of it?

A I'm not going to try to analyze the specifics. There are a number of things in there, but I'll leave you with what I've just given you.

Q Alan, a question seems to have arisen over private searches for Americans missing or dead in Laos and Vietnam. What is the U.S. policy towards these kinds of searches?

A Let me say a few things about that. First of all, the U.S. policy is clearly that the U.S. Government does not support or condone illegal, private, cross-border forays allegedly to rescue POWs.

I would note that the Secretary addressed this several times, including in a press conference today in Bangkok, in which, because of the confusion which arose out of his initial statements -- and I might refer you back to the totality of what he said, which was that he didn't -- the first question was not entirely clear to him, it was a very long question that was asked of him, and he made clear that he certainly did not mean to endorse border-crossing forays at all. He said, "I think such forays are counter-productive and serve neither the deep and emotional interests of our country, nor the families involved in finding out about the missing in action and having their remains returned."

I think that's quite clear. I am not sure what one of our newspapers this morning found so startling and newsworthy about the statement which apparently somebody in the party made about not ruling out the possibility of some people being alive, if information came, although we don't have any information that confirmed at all about live people being held.

The statement which was quoted is one which I think one could trace back to something Judge Clark said last January and remains a continuing approach to the issue. So I don't quite understand the point there.

Does that answer your question?

Q Yes. What you're saying is there's nothing to suggest that there's anyone alive there?

A No. We have received reports from time to time and, when we receive them, we'll pursue them, but there certainly is no evidence today that there is somebody alive.

Q Alan, do you have any comment or anything to say about the nature of the visit made by Dr. Kissinger to Israel?

A   No. I frankly don't know about that visit.

Q   Or about the timing of the visit?

A   I know of no reason to suggest or think that Mr. Kissinger is visiting Israel in connection with any U.S. Government effort, so I would have no reason to know anything about it or comment on it.

Q   There is a lengthy article in Foreign Affairs magazine by Rabbi Arthur Hershberg, which he implies that 242 and 338 are, for all particular reasons, dead, and that all Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank is almost gaining the approval of the United States.

Would you care to comment on that, or would you like to look through this article? It's very, very important that you give us a statement on that.

Q   I have not seen the article, so I can't comment directly on it. Obviously, we continue to attach importance to Resolutions 242 and 338. Our position on settlements and continuing settlement activity and the fact that that continuing settlement activity constitutes an obstacle to the peace process is well known.

Q   It has other implications and other things which talks about the strategic alliance between the United States and Israel, and I think it requires some clarification.

A   No. I don't think we've made a practice of commenting on articles, generally speaking, and I don't intend to break that and make general -- to go through and analyze what people are saying.

The point you raise, in terms of U.S. policy, I'm happy to restate what our policy is if there's some misunderstanding in the article or otherwise. But I'm not going to go through and try to analyze a magazine piece, as important as that piece may be.

Q   This magazine is very prestigious --

A   I understand that.

Q   -- and reflects a lot of things in this country, with a lot of, you know, think tanks and other people who read it and reflect to it, and I believe it's not one of these normal magazines that you quote and reflect on it or not, but --

A I think, again, you've asked me some specific questions. I've given you a specific response. I'm happy to do that.

Q On the question of whether the U.S. Government has answered the Cuban notes on the hijackings and also the Mariel refugees --

A I have nothing new for you today on that.

Q It was reported on June 27 that Washington had officially changed its position towards the IDF redeployment in Lebanon, and that Washingtion is considering that as a legitimate Israeli decision.

Do you have a comment on that?

A I addressed this question yesterday in terms of foreign forces in Lebanon and our attitude towards withdrawal, and I would refer you to what I said. Our position on that has not changed. It's consistent.

Q Alan, on that same subject, what is the staus of the investigation now into the bombing of the Embassy? Have there been any arrests lately or --

A I think Larry Eagleburger addressed this on the Hill, and I would refer you -- I don't have the --

Q When, specifically, did he do this? This morning?

A Yesterday.

Q Oh, I see.

A I don't have a transcript of what he said, but I would refer you to that, though. I think he did talk about this.

Q Alan, on the 1st of June, New Mexico's Republican Congressman, Manuel Lujan, introduced a bill which would allow the survivors of Bataan to file legal action in the Court of Claims for damages against those Japanese industries such as Mitsubishi which held them as slave laborers during the Second World War.

Does the State Department support or oppose this legislation introduced almost a month ago?

A Lester, I'm not sure that we have taken a position, but why don't I look into it and see if we have a position to offer you.

Q Could I ask one that's very similar to this, and that is, what is your attitude to the proposed billion dollar reparations for relocated Japanese-Americans?

A Again, I think that is --

Q The Reagan Administration's opposed to that, I gather, isn't it?

A That is not a State Department issue, and I don't have a comment to offer you on it.

Q Anything on Chad today?

A No. I don't have anything new on Chad today.

Q Alan, did you have a comment to go along with the Pacific Islands plebisicite?

A I don't have a comment on that. There may have been some guidance on that a few days ago. Why don't you check and see. I seem to recall something, but I don't have anything here.

Q One last two-part question. Am I correct that one of the purposes of the Department of State is to try to explain the United States to countries throughout the world?

A To try to explain the United States to countries?

Q Yes. In other words, when people are puzzled about developments in America, that's the function of our, you know, all of our Consulates and Embassies. ✓

A We engage in that effort together with a number of others.

Q Right. Then could you tell me, how is the State Department explaining the phenomenal concern about an allegedly filched or possibly leaked political strategy book by newspapers who received and published unquestionably stolen government classified material called "The Pentagon Papers"?

A I'm not aware the question has particularly arisen, Lester.

Q You mean nobody wonders about this?

A I said I'm not aware the question --

Q You think there's a new morality that has come to The New York Times and The Washington Post, Alan?

A I think I'd let you make that judgment, Lester.

Q Well, thank you very much. You'd rather duck it.

(The briefing concluded at 12:59 p.m.)

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Alennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #112

THURSDAY, JUNE 30, 1983, 12:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement about a visit by Foreign Minister Genscher. The Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, will be visiting Washington on July 11 at the invitation of the Secretary of State.

The two leaders are expected to discuss issues facing their two countries, as well as the visit of the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister to Moscow.

That's it on announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do we have any reaction to the new developments in Guatemala where a state of alert has been declared?

A The announcement of Decree Law No. 7183, which outlines what the government can do to enforce the state of alarm, was made amidst a wide array of political rumors and disparate political criticism.

While we're not in a position to comment on the rationale for the decision, we would hope the Decree will be temporary and applied moderately in keeping with the government's announced intention to inaugurate today the Supreme Electoral Tribunal which will be initiating planning for the Constituent Assembly elections.

Q Is there any overall assessment about this situation in Guatemala, about where it might be going, or --

A No. I don't have anything of that sort to give you.

Q Also, on the same general area, this group of rebel fighters in Nicaragua -- the Nicaraguan Democratic Force -- released a statement today here in Washington, saying that they are proposing a dialogue with the Nicaraguan Government in Caracas, Venezuela.

Do you know anything about that, and do you have any comment?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Would you support that kind of dialogue?

A Again, the question of dialogue is something I would refer you back to what was said even in the context, for example, of Ambassador Stone's appointment, his mission, is to promote dialogue. So, sure, we favor dialogue. I don't know about that kind of dialogue. I don't know precisely what's involved, so I can't comment in specific terms.

Our concerns about Nicaragua and the obligations that it undertook, in terms of its own domestic political structure, the concerns we have for its relations with its neighbors, are all clear. I don't know what this specific proposal would involve, so I can't really relate it.

Q Do you know what the strength of the Contras is at the moment?

A I don't have a figure to give you. I think we've given you a figure in the past. I don't have a --

Q Do you know whether that figure has increased in recent months?

A I don't have, again, an update. I can check and see if there's any new number that can be provided.

Q On the subject of a U.S. boat that was intercepted off the Nicaraguan coast last night -- the Caribbean coast -- any idea what it was doing there?

A The only information that I have on this is that the captain of an American boat, the Motor Sailor Siri -- S-i-r-i -- out of San Diego reported by ham radio June 29 that his boat was boarded and searched by a Nicaraguan patrol craft off of Nicaragua's Caribbean coast. The captain reported four adults and two children, all believed to be U.S. citizens, were aboard.

We understand the boat was later permitted to continue underway but has since run aground and is attempting to free itself. I do not have more information about who the people are or what they were --

Q Do you know where it's run aground?

A I don't have any more information than I just gave you.

Q Was it in Nicaragua's territorial waters?

A As I say, I don't have any more information than I just gave you.

Q What is the current position of the United States Government about Israeli unilateral partial withdrawal from Lebanon?

A I have nothing new to say to you beyond what I've said.

Q Back on Nicaragua for a second, do you have any explanation about the veto of the IDB loan by the United States?

A We previously made our position clear with respect to loans by the multilateral development banks to Nicaragua in present circumstances. I refer you back to some things we may have said, guidances which were available, in early February.

In reviewing Nicaragua's request for a second extension of an outstanding IDB loan, we felt conditions in Nicaragua did not warrant a change in our position, and we opposed the request.

We've also previously made clear our hope for improvement in conditions in Nicaragua which have prompted our decisions on such loans.

Q What kind of conditions?

A Again, I think I'd refer you back to what we have said. We've also indicated before our clear view that the multilateral development banks are technical, non-political institutions which make their decision on economic and financial criteria. We've not singled out Nicaragua.

I would cite, for example, that we have opposed 14 loans to 10 different countries around the world in 1982 on economic grounds, but it's those kinds of conditions that we are talking about.

Q The major Japanese wires and some of their financial press and some press now in Germany are reporting a story that Volcker has made an agreement with the major money center banks that he would actually use the authority of the Fed to purchase loans specially from Latin American countries that might find themselves in default and in a situation where the default can't be covered up any longer.

I'm wondering what the position of the Secretary would be on that, given the rather severe political implications of the United States actually being the holder of the debt of these countries.

A I don't know anything about it, and I think you'd want to verify the fact with Chairman Volcker before you went on --

Q Excuse me. But the press picked the story up from the Executive Intelligence Review, and I know what the sources are for this story, and I happen to know it's true.

A Well, that may be, but I --

Q I'd like to ask if --

A Well, I --

Q Well, could I just finish? If I could put this in perhaps slightly more abstract form and simply ask what the Secretary's opinion would be, or what his position would be, on any plan to have the U.S. engage in that sort of a bailout of the banks. Would you be able to get me a response?

A The Secretary has addressed in general terms these kinds of questions before. He happens to be on the other side of the world, and I can't get his views at the moment.

Q Do you have anything on the release of an American citizen from Moscow named Byrnes --

A I don't have anything on that.

Q -- being held for the last six or seven years?

A I don't know anything about that. Is it on the wire?

Q I think so.

Q What is that?

A Release of an American from Moscow.

Q Yes.

A Don't have anything on it. Don't know anything about it.

Q Libya: There was a report over the wires that two Libyan jets were turned back by American fighters over the Gulf of Sidra. Do you have anything on that?

A As I think has already been reported in the press, the U.S.S. Eisenhower conducted routine operations off the Gulf of Sidra on June 29. The ship and its aircraft were in international waters and airspace. The U.S. Navy conducts routine operations in the Mediterranean and elsewhere on a regular basis.

Libya is entitled to claim as its territorial sea no more than the waters within 12 miles off its coast. As we have indicated before, we exercise our right of peaceful transit of international waters there and elsewhere.

I would suggest that you might want to ask the Pentagon your question, but I do understand that at some point during the exercises by the Eisenhower, two Libyan MiG-23 aircraft were intercepted by U.S. Navy F-14s. That intercept occurred in international airspace north of the Libyan coast line. The MiG-23s departed the area and returned to their home base.

Q Copy?

A I can't give you a copy of that.

Q Was that a routine exercise by the U.S.S. Eisenhower or was it made in response to anything that took place that wasn't previously scheduled?

A I said they conducted routine operations.

Q No. Were there routine operations taking them to the specific location off the Gulf of Sidra, or were they conducting routine operations once they were in the Gulf of Sidra?

A You'd have to ask the Pentagon what its schedule was. I doubt that they will get into its operations.

Q Do you know how many miles off the coast this was?

A I don't know how many miles off the coast this particular intercept took place. During this entire operation my understanding is that the closest point of approach to Libya was 25 nautical miles, well clear of Libyan airspace. But I do not know in this specific instance how far this was.

Q Is this the first time we've gone in beyond 200 miles since the time the two planes were shot down?

A I can't answer that. I would also point out to you that the issue, as you pointed out to me when this came up two years ago, is not 200 miles, but rather the claim to the Gulf on a different basis. But, in any case, I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Has there been any communication with third parties between Libya and the United States regarding any of this?

A I'm not aware of specific communication. There was a notice of intent to operate aircraft within the Tripoli Flight Information Region which was issued.

Q When was that?

A I don't have the detail on that. Again, you might want to check, and the Pentagon may have some detail on that.

Q Were any shots fired? Any missiles fired?

A No.

Q Where is the U.S.S. Eisenhower now?

A I don't know.

Q Were the jets scrambled or were they already flying?

A What? The 14s?

Q Yes.

A Again, I don't know the answer.

Q Alan, what's your opinion that this kind of interception happens any time there is tension in that area?

A I don't think I have a view of that sort to give you. As a general matter, aircraft operating in the vicinity of a carrier are routinely intercepted for identification purposes and to determine their intention.

Q For the record, was this in any way related to events in Chad?

A No.

Q Can you bring us up to date?

A I don't have anything further on Chad. It was not related to events in Chad.

Q There were warnings from Egypt to Libya today not to interfere in Chad. Do you have any comment on those?

A No, I don't.

Q Are we involved in sending any stuff to Chad?

A I don't have anything. I don't think we have an arms supply relationship with Chad. I think the French have announced something on that.

Q A few days ago the State Department refused to comment on the in-fighting between the PLO factions and their relationship to Syria. Now Mr. Shultz made a statement saying that he expects the PLO to follow Syrian direction. How do you answer that change in position and development?

A I don't think that's quite what Mr. Shultz said, at least not the reports that I read. I don't have the text of his remarks. I think we will probably be getting them in due course, but that isn't even what I read in the papers, so I'm --

Q The headline in The New York Times was to this effect. I mean --

A That's not how I read the remarks as quoted.

Q Do you have a comment today?

A I don't know that I have a comment. I think the Secretary's remarks speak for themselves. But in terms of what specifically he said, I don't have a text of it.

Q Was the interception of the Libyan airplanes the only interception -- the only incident that took place in that part?

A I haven't labeled it an incident, but, in any case --

-- MORE --

Q There was a report saying that your planes intercepted a Kuwaiti civilian airline?

A Yes. I gather that -- I don't have anything on that. I gather that, again, something -- there was a Kuwaiti Airline airplane which was headed towards the carrier. I ask you to check with the Pentagon because they have whatever information is available on it. I just heard about it in conversation on the phone with them.

But, again, simply for identification purposes, planes went up, identified, found that this was a civilian airliner and our planes went back on their way.

Q Why would the abundance of international water that is available to you, why would you take the pain to go to a place that you described many a time as "a volatile place" near Libya, and decide to have these maneuvers?

A We've addressed this before when this issue has come up and I would refer you back to the record; it is international waters, international air space. There's no reason they shouldn't be operating in those areas.

Q I want to confirm what you just said. That is, you're saying the presence and actions of the U.S.S. Eisenhower were not related to events in Chad; is that correct?

A That's right. The exercise was scheduled prior to the events in Chad and was not conducted in response to events in Chad.

Q Two questions on another topic. Another Soviet-Jewish dissident scientist was sentenced to three years in jail for anti-Soviet activities. Do you have any comment on that or any comment on increasing anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism in the Soviet Union?

A I don't know anything about that particular case. I don't have a general comment to offer you on the subject --

Q May I ask on another topic -- there is a report that said Egypt and Iraq will re-establish diplomatic relations. Do we have a reaction?

A I don't have anything on that.

I don't know if you're interested. There was, in terms of -- I don't want to mislead you -- in terms of what we have, there was a book which came out on Zionism which I have some reaction to, if you're interested in it, but I don't have a general comment of the sort that you were asking.

Q Is this new reaction as opposed to what you gave a few weeks ago? If you have something else, I'd like to hear it please.

A This is on the Korneyev book. I'm not aware of what we've said about the specific book in the past. The book apparently is entitled "The Class Essence of Zionism."

Judging from all accounts, Korneyev's book, which alleged, among other things, that Jews collaborated with the Nazis in exterminating hundreds of thousands of people during World War II, is a viciously anti-Semitic work, and the U.S. Government condemns its hate-filled message. Such anti-Semitic propaganda, under the guise of "anti-Zionism" or any other cover, is absolutely unacceptable.

Unfortunately, "The Class Essence of Zionism" is merely one more manifestation of officially-sanctioned Soviet anti-Semitism. These propaganda efforts have also taken the form of a spate of anti-Semitic broadcasts and articles, and the formation of an "anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Citizens."

The U.S. Government has spoken out against this campaign aimed at both the State of Israel and Jewish activists within the Soviet Union, and will continue to denounce this Soviet government-approved anti-Semitism whenever it shall appear.

Q Copy, please.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on this New York Times story today about increased contacts between the Soviet Ambassador and the State Department on various matters and the conclusions that were drawn?

A As we've indicated before, Secretary Shultz meets regularly with the Soviet Ambassador as part of our on-going diplomatic dialogue with the Soviet Union at all levels on a full range of U.S.-Soviet issues.

I'm not going to go into the particulars of the article however, or of our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Q Do you have anything on the banning of Winnie Mandela?

A Yes, I do. The United States is committed to the principle of freedom of political expression in a non-violent context. Our opposition to banning is a matter of record. We have commented on the Mandela case extensively in the past, and I have nothing to add at this time.

Q I just wanted to clarify for the record, going back to Libya. You're saying that the Eisenhower was previously scheduled to be in the area; it had nothing to do, no relation to Chad. Are you saying there's no deterrent effect -- purpose behind this -- no-deterrent purpose -- behind this operation at all?

A I'm not speaking to the specific genesis of this operation. It's not a provocation. It's not intended as such, and it is not related to the events in Chad.

Q Do you know when and where Mr. Motley is going to be sworn in?

A I don't know.

Q No plans set yet?

A I simply don't know. I haven't checked on it.

Q Alan, what do you have on Habib and company's schedule for today?

A I believe that they are in Israel. Let me check that. Right.

Q Any plans for the Secretary to pass by Damascus on his way back?

A No change in that situation.

Q Anything on the American hostages in southern Sudan?

A Nothing new on that today.

Q Do you have anything today on those explosions in South Africa?

A No, I don't.

Q Also, did you -- maybe I missed this -- but did you have anything today -- have you established who planted those mines in Nicaragua -- on the border area?

A No. I think that the Government of Honduras, or the Honduran Chief of Army Intelligence has -- he's, I guess, noted that they don't have similar mines. But at this point, I can't take it further than that.

Q Can you tell us what the, in terms of the Habib mission, what the specific purpose is?

A It is focused on our efforts to promote the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty throughout the terrority of Lebanon, and security across Israel's northern border.

Q After this time that he's traveled around to the various countries, how is he doing?

A I have not and don't plan to get into any sort of status report. We have not done that in the past, and I don't think I can do that.

Q Again, concerning this Libyan affair, does this Administration have a sort of list of conditions for Libya to improve its relations with the United States?

A We've addressed the question of policy toward Libya and our concerns about Libyan policy in the past, and I really would have to refer you back to the record. There's no change in what we said about that. It's on the record.

Q Alan, at Christmas time last year, there was a similar incident. There was tension at that time, I think, in Sudan and AWACS were sent and also an aircraft carrier; I think it was the Nimitz -- I'm not sure -- was sent also to the Gulf of Sidra.

There were conflicting statements all over the place from NSC, from here, from the Pentagon as to whether this were being sent in response to the crises that was blossoming?

A No, there are no conflicting statements except in the press.

Q What is the final statement?

A Statements of the government were quite consistent, and that is that that exercise at that time was decided upon and conducted on its own and was not related to the other events taking place at that time.

Q Both the AWACS and the aircraft?

A I didn't say. I was talking about the exercise of the --

Q Of the Nimitz?

A I don't know what the ship was. I don't remember.

Q Just another question on Honduras. According to an eyewitness, who was writing in the Post today, there were no bullet holes, or no obvious bullet holes in the wreckage of the car. That contradicts the testimony of eyewitnesses who were produced by the Honduran Government. Have U.S. officials now visited the site or examined the car?

A Embassy staff, to my understanding, have had an opportunity to review photographs of the vehicle as well as a number of land mines from the area itself. I have to assume that these are not there for observation made up in the area, but we haven't yet received a full report from our Embassy, and we're awaiting additional details.

Q So this is just a press report at this point. You're not according it any particular significance?

A I don't want to comment on this beyond what I've just said, which is what we had done and what we can tell you.

Q But did those photographs show evidence of bullet holes in the vehicle?

A As I say, we haven't received a full report from our Embassy and we're awaiting additional detail.

Q One more follow up. There was another report about 5,000 anti-Sandinista rebels massed at the border. Do you have any reports of an imminent conflict?

A I don't have anything. I was asked about that yesterday. I don't have anything on it.

Q Who is negotiating for the release of the hostages in the Sudan?

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A   I don't have anything beyond what I said yesterday on that situation. As I indicated yesterday, we will not be continuing to comment on that. It's an on-going situation. As we have, in the past, in cases of hostage situations, tended to adopt a rather low profile for rather obvious reasons.

Q   Have they been contacted since Wednesday?

A   Again, I have nothing to add to what I said yesterday.

Q   Six ex-Latin American Heads of State are now meeting in Venezuela at the conference called the Conference on Latin American Thought, and they've issued some statements concerning the International Monetary Fund which this Administration has strongly supported, saying that it exercises totalitarian economic policy, and a few other things along those lines. Do you have any response to that?

A   I don't know what they're specific statements are. Our policies on the IMF are on record on a variety of occasions from a variety of officials.

Q   Could we request that full report being prepared by the American Embassy in Honduras be made public once it's completed?

A   I'll take your request and see what can be done about it.

Q   What's the position of the United States Government regarding dealing and negotiating with the PLO at this juncture?

A   Unchanged.

Q   Any response to the Cuban note of June 17th?

A   No, I don't have anything for you on it.

Q   Is Pakistan presenting Secretary Shultz with a shopping list for new or upgraded arms?

A   I guess you ought to ask Pakistan what they're going to be presenting Secretary Shultz with. I don't know.

Q   Is there a response to the 27-28 Congressmen asking for an independent investigation of the (inaudible)

A   Not a very substantive response that I can give you from here. We haven't received a letter of the sort that's been described in the press, and in the absence of specifics, I can't offer a comment.

I gather that part of the request is to have an investigation by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the OAS. Beyond simply a factual statement that the rules permit private parties to present petitions to the Commission. It's the policy of the United States to cooperate with the Commission in all cases properly before it, and we encourage other member states to do the same.

But, as I say, we haven't yet gotten the request, and absent that I can't go beyond what I just said.

Q   A question on the Zamora situation again. Yesterday, some Congressmen urged again that his visa be cancelled. Is there any reaction to that?

A   I don't have anything on that. I don't even know if he's left the country.

Q   That, I don't know.

A   He hasn't left the country?

Q   No. He's still sleeping in my living room, as you can well imagine.

A   He's in your living room? (Laughter)

Q   No. I was trying to give you some propaganda points.

Q   Anything about going to the Pentagon yourself?

A   Going to --

Q   Are you going to the Pentagon to be the Spokesman there?

A   No.

Q   Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

15M

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, July 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #113

FRIDAY, JULY 1, 1983, 12:38 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two announcements.

First, the Press Office will be closed Monday due to the Federal holiday, Independence Day. We'll be operating on a Sunday schedule, so there will be, of course, no press briefing. I know you'll miss it.

Second, a visit by the British Foreign Secretary. At the invitation of Secretary of State Shultz, British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe will make an official visit to the United States July 13 to 15. In addition to his conversations with Secrtary Shultz, Sir Geoffrey will also meet with other U.S. Government officials to discuss a wide range of subjects of mutual concern.

That's it on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you tell us what sort of things are being discussed by Ambassadors Habib, et al, out in the Middle East with the Israelis and others?

A What sorts of things are being discussed?

Q What sorts of things, yes.

A No, I really can't tell you what sorts of things are being discussed beyond what we've been saying before.

Let me react a little bit, I guess, to some of the stories that appeared today and last evening on what our policy is with regard to withdrawals.

The policy of the United States has been and remains that there should be as soon as possible a total and concurrent withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. In the course of his consultations in the area, Ambassador Habib has been reviewing the situation and discussing a number of ideas on how best to make progress toward our continuing goal of the removal from Lebanon of all foreign forces, the establishment throughout Lebanon of the sovereignty and integrity of its central government, and the achievement of adequate security guarantees for Israel's northern border.

We will continue to work with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel, and any other parties who can be of assistance in achieving these goals. All of our ideas and efforts have been in the context of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. There has been no thought that one party should withdraw without withdrawal by all parties.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure.

Q How are your attempts going to involve the Syrians in this process?

A I don't have anything further at this point to offer you on that particular subject.

Q You're saying that the reports that the United States has asked, through Ambassador Habib, Israel to do a unilateral withdrawal are wrong?

A I prefer to do two things: one, is use my own words; and two, is not to address the specifics of what might be discussed between Ambassador Habib and Israel or anybody else.

I've given you, I think, a fairly clear statement of what the policy is.

Q Mr. Begin, this morning, according to the news, rejected the idea. Does this imply that the United States approached Begin with the request or the suggestion of a unilateral and complete withdrawal or not?

A I think I just said I'm not going to get into the subject -- without leading you one way or another -- I'm not going to get into the subject of what is being discussed specifically, but I've given you a rather clear policy statement.

Q Would that not be viewed as sort of a flip-flop of U.S. policy toward the area since there seems to be so many conflicting reports, particularly within the last week to ten days? Every other day we hear something --

A I don't know specifically what you have reference to. The answer to your question, without reference to specifics, is that the U.S. policy certainly has not flip-flopped.

Q The withdrawal, the Israeli withdrawal will be a unilateral pull-back, partial or not?

A Again, you're asking me to get into details, commenting through a backdoor, if you will, on the specifics, and I'm not going to comment on the specifics.

Q Can you address what it is that the Israelis are objecting to?

A No. I'm not going to get into the specifics of negotiations. (Laugther) I'll put a sign up here.

Q Did they reject something?

Q You're referring to a number of ideas. Would you characterize these ideas as new ideas, all of them or part of them?

A I'm not going to try to characterize the ideas. No, I don't think I'll try to characterize the ideas.

Obviously, as I said, Ambassador Habib has been reviewing the situation, discussing a number of ideas how best to make progress towards the goals that I cited.

Q Alan, is it possible that Secretary Shultz may go to Madrid for the conclusion of this round on CSCE? There seems to be a lot of reports about the Foreign Ministers getting together.

A I have heard nothing to suggest that.

Q So if it concludes favorably, then Kampelman would do it?

A I have to assume that's the case. In any case, I've heard nothing to suggest that the Secretary is planning to stop in Madrid.

Q Do you have any reaction to the reports of a ceasefire between warring factions in the PLO?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, is he planning to stop in Damascus? Anything new on this?

A Nothing new on that.

Q Is Fairbanks going to Damascus or Habib or Draper?

A Nothing new on that. No plans for anybody to go at this point.

Q There is a news item somewhere I've heard this morning that President Reagan sent a, or telephoned President Assad this week.

A Who?

Q President Ronald Reagan has called President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria; is this true?

A I don't know anything about it. You might want to ask the White House, but I don't know anything about it.

Q Anything about the developments with Libya?

A With Libya? You mean with Chad? (Laughter) Libya and Chad?

Q Both.

A I don't really have any developments. In the current situation, simply to note that the capital city of N'Djamena and the countryside south of Faya Largeau are calm; no indication of a move southward or toward the capital by the dissidents.

I might note that the United States welcomes the French action in providing military support to Chad. As we've said before, Libyan logistic support was a key factor in the rebel takeover of the northern Chadian town of Faya Largeau. The U.S. is strongly opposed to this flagrant intervention by Libya in the affairs of its neighbor.

Q Copy?

A I can provide you a copy.

Q Is the United States prepared to offer any logistic support, perhaps transport?

A I have no indication of that. Our military relationship with Chad, I think, is limited to a $50,000 IMET program which, in fact, has yet to be implemented.

Q Alan, are you still consulting with France and other African countries?

A Sure.

Q All the time? (Laughter)

A We try.

Q Let me try something. There are stories on the front pages of two major U.S. newspapers on a supposed U.S. idea which seems to be a major change in our position in Lebanon. You say there's not been a change.

We have a story out of Israel that the Israelis have rejected something which appears to be identical to what the newspapers are suggesting. Aren't we concerned to the point we want to at least clarify to public opinion on what actually has transpired here?

A I don't think we need to clarify the specifics of negotiations, no. But I think that it is proper to seek, in these circumstances, a clarification of policy, and that's what the guidance I've just given you is designed to do.

Q Is anybody doing that with the Syrians? Aren't the Syrians likely to have some questions on what's going on? Are we communicating this to Syria?

A I don't know whether this is specifically being communicated to Syria or not. Obviously, the statement I've just given you is now in the public domain and presumably will be available to Syria, at least in that channel. I don't know whether it's being conveyed in other channels.

Q How is it that something like this can happen? How is it that something can be reported and the Israeli Prime Minister can reject it and yet the State Department can say with a straight face that it isn't true? (Laughter)

A I've given you a policy statement. We do that very frequently, or at least we try to. Perhaps not always to your satisfaction. That's how it happens.

Q It doesn't seem to address the particular issue here of some sort of a unilateral timetable which the Syrians are undoubtedly going to look at with a great deal of interest. You're really not saying whether that's true or not true.

A Let me refer you again to the last couple of sentences of what I gave you.

All of our ideas and efforts have been in the context of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. There has been no thought that one party should withdraw without withdrawal by all parties.

Q Do you have any complaints from the Lebanese authorities about Israeli-occupying forces not allowing the Lebanese trucking companies to go into southern Lebanon in order to haul produce and fruits from the orchards and the farmers in southern Lebanon?

A I don't have any comment to offer you on that.

Q Can you look into that?

A I can look into it. It seems to me -- and I will look into it -- but it seems to me that that basically is a question which the Lebanese and the Israelis would take up, and they have presumably, at least, some mechanism for doing that. But I'll look into it and see if we have anything on it.

--MORE--

Q Alan, just back to Libya for a moment. A couple of years ago there was going on for quite awhile supposedly a massive investigation throughout this government and with the allies of illegal acquisition of aircraft by Libya. It was referred to several times in this building, but hasn't been in a couple years.

Could you just look into that and see if that is still going on?

A I will see if anybody has anything on that.

Q When you say you're against the withdrawal of any party without withdrawal of the other party, are you talking about regrouping -- also about regrouping? Because withdrawal means, you know, from one point in the country to another point in the country. This is what --

A On a question of partial withdrawal, this is -- I've addressed that before, and I would reiterate what I've said on those occasions and what the Secretary has said, which is that anything which contributes to the overall objective of total withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon would be a positive development, something we would support. Anything which moves the other way would be a problem.

Q In this context would you support a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Shouf Mountains to the Awali River?

A As I've said in answer to that question before, I'm not going to try to make a judgment on something which has not taken place.

The issue of possible redeployments by Israel has been something which obviously is on the Israelis' minds. They have indicated they would consult with concerned parties, including with the United States. We have had some consultations on that. We would expect that we would continue to. I would note that Mr. Porat, in Israel, also noted Israel's intention to continue that process.

Q Are you talking to the French within the context of the MNF to coordinate with the Lebanese army to move into the Shouf Mountains in case the Israelis pull out?

A I can't answer that question in specific terms. Obviously, all of the parties who are involved in this situation, which would include all the MNF contributors, would have an interest in what the situation would be like.

In regard to possible MNF movement, which is your question, again, I don't have anything to offer you in the way of suggesting that that is about to happen or would happen. I think we'd have to reserve any comment on that as a hypothetical.

Q Alan, apparently the Secretary has announced the visit in October of the Chinese Foreign Minister.

A Yes.

Q In the context of that visit, where is the visit now of Premier Zhao? Is that still on? The invitation is still open, or is that pretty well washed out now?

A No. I think it's where it has been -- that is to say, the invitation was extended; that invitation has been accepted; no dates have been worked out. But that's the same place we have essentially been. But I wouldn't agree with the characterization that that trip has been washed out. I don't think that would be right.

Q In other words, the Foreign Minister's trip here is not in lieu of a visit from Zhao?

A I would not characterize it that way. No.

Q Alan, yesterday you said that the U.S. had voted against 14 loans to 10 countries for economic reasons. Would it be possible for you to give us a list of those 10 countries?

A Let me suggest that you might want to check with Treasury on that. I'm not sure how publicly we go with that kind of information. Maybe we do. But it seems to me that that would more properly be in their bailiwick.

Q Alan, is there any recent contact between the Administration and the Syrian Government and about the withdrawal, and at what level, if there is one?

A I don't think I can give you details. We have, obviously, as I've indicated before, an Embassy in Damascus which has contact with the Government of Syria at various levels -- very senior levels.

We have not, as I indicated before, had any change in the situation regarding somebody specially visiting Syria.

Q Can you say at all if your understanding is that the Syrians would accept a higher or a different level from that of Ambassador Habib?

A I'd refer you back, I guess, to what the Secretary said in his press conference on that subject. I don't have anything new to offer on that.

Q Still no plan for him to go to Damascus?

A No. There is no change in that. He has no plan to go there this month.

Q Can you confirm the reassignment, or the planned reassignment, of Ambassador Negroponte from Honduras back to this Department?

A I have no information to confirm that.

Q Will you take it?

A No. I'll stick with what I just said. If there were a change, not only of that sort for him or anybody else, in any case it probably wouldn't come out of here. But I'm not suggesting that I'm hiding something. I don't know of anything to suggest that.

Q Can you explain the meeting between Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Shamir, according to FBIS yesterday, that they discussed the Syrian withdrawal and Shamir said that they meet together (inaudible) according to their consensus that Syria would withdraw from Lebanon?

Was Mr. Kissinger doing this on his own or in a mission of the United States Government? Was he reporting to the Secretary after that? What's the story on this?

A The last question I can't answer, whether he would talk with the Secretary or not. As you know, they have talked frequently, and I expect that that would continue.

As he indicated, Dr. Kissinger was on a private visit and in the Middle East in a private capacity, so he was not acting on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Q Do you have anything new on the Americans kidnapped in southern Sudan?

A I have nothing new on the Sudan. No.

Q Anything on Guatemala and the measures announced yesterday?

A A little bit, but also a little bit on the situation. The situation remains calm. We understand that the Government is discussing July 1984 as a possible date for Constituent Assembly elections.

Obviously, setting the date itself would re-emphasize Guatemala's commitment to a return to a democratic government.

Q Do you have anything with respect to the negotiations offer that was made both in Costa Rica and up here in Washington by the FDN?

A By the Sandinista group?

Q Anti-Sandinista.

A Excuse me. The anti-Sandinista group, or whatever.

Q No. There were two groups.

A The Nicaraguan groups?

Q Two groups.

A There were two different statements made. Let me just give you what I have. Simply to note that the President in his April 27 speech before the Joint Session of the Congress indicated that we will support dialogue and negotiations, both among the countries of the region and within each country.

The terms and conditions of participation in elections are negotiable.

Q How does that address the question?

A Your question was rather broad, and I'm telling you what our approach is. As I understand it, they were talking about establishing some sort of a dialogue. Is that your question, or would you be more precise in your question?

Q Do you want me to be more precise --

Q Can we get the question and answer again?

A Why don't you ask your question again? Maybe you could formulate it more precisely.

Q All right. I'll try. The FDN proposed a dialogue, not necessarily leading to elections but to be witnessed by the Contadora Group.

Do you have a specific statement about the procedure that they have suggested?

A No. I don't have any comment about the specific procedure. I'd refer you, as I did, to what the President said on April 27, which was that we support dialogue and negotiations, both within each country and among the countries of the region.

I would also note that apparently the representatives were seeking restoration of principles of pluralist democracy. I mean, that was framework, as I understand it, of what they were talking about.

Q Do we support that? Do we support their position?

A I'm not going to try to express support or a value on that since we haven't seen specifically what they said. All we've seen is press reports. But again, they're talking about restoration of principles of pluralist democracy and mixed economy for which they said that the '79 insurrection was fought. Certainly, principles of pluralist democracy and so on are things that we would support. That's as far as I can take it with you.

Q Have we provided them with any more support than the support you've just indicated?

A That's a rather broad question. We've indicated before our position on what we think of Nicaragua's policies and maybe the origins of their problems, and I don't have anything new to offer you today on that.

Q Could we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Yes. Go ahead.

Q Also, on Nicaragua, do you have anything on this American yacht which --

A Nothing new on that American yacht.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the Federal Republic of Germany loan guarantees to East Germany? Any thoughts as to whether that violates the agreements?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Also, one other on Germany. Eagleburger's meeting with a Bundestag member this afternoon -- do you have anything on what her party is, what her committee assignment is, what the purpose of the meeting is?

A He is meeting with whom? I didn't look at the schedule.

Q Mrs. Matthaues-Maier.

A I don't have that schedule. I'm not sure who --

Q Mrs. Matthaues-Maier is what was on the schedule.

A I don't have that. I don't know what it is.

Q On the Nicaragua mediation, there was this other group which held a press conference in San Jose. You have no guidance with respect to what they said? This was --

A I have no guidance on the subject of what the various Nicaraguan groups said beyond what I've given you.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:59 p.m.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JULY 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #114

TUESDAY, JULY 5, 1983, 12:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one announcement, a fuller statement of which is available in the Press Office.

The Secretary of State today announced the appointment of Otto Juan Reich as an adviser to the Secretary. Mr. Reich, who will report to the Secretary of State, will coordinate foreign and domestic public policy efforts related to Latin America in general and Central America in particular.

In this respect, Mr. Reich will work closely with the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs who has overall responsibility for policy issues in the region. The Secretary will recommend to the President that Mr. Reich be accorded the personal rank of Ambassador.

As I say, there is a longer statement, including biographic information, available in the Press Office.

Q What is he going to be doing?

A Again, as I say, he will be generally facilitating, as Ambassador Stone did in his previous role, the Government's ability to respond in a timely fashion to the public's questions and concerns about our Latin American policy, particularly Central America.

Q Don't you do that all the time?

A There has been a perceived need to do it in perhaps a more effective fashion. That's why Ambassador Stone was brought into that position. He's now moved on to a different position, so Mr. Reich will fill in behind him. It's fairly simple.

Q What's special about the public side of the policy that you now have to have two people to do what normally is done by the Public Affairs Bureau of the building?

A There obviously is a lot of public interest in the issue. It is an issue which has attracted a certain amount of attention on Capitol Hill as well. As you'll recall, we had somebody who worked on that sort of a basis with regard to arms control issues for awhile. In any case, there's nothing new about the position or the function. It's simply a filling in behind. Ambassador Stone has been assigned different duties.

Q Also on Central America, over the weekend there were reports that the flow of Soviet arms has increased dramatically -- doubled, I think is one report.

Can you confirm that, and can you quantify it?

A I cannot. Why don't I look into it and see if I can get you something on that?

I just might go back to you on the previous question again for one brief sentence, and that is that certainly the public has a right and the government has an obligation to respond to interests and to respond in a coordinated fashion. That's what this is all about.

Q Not to belabor the point, Alan, but that has been true from the beginning of the Republic, so what is so special about this?

A From time to time there are issues which have, in fact, had more attention paid to them than others.

Q Alan, is there a special adviser to the Secretary on the Middle East, or is the Middle East no longer a prime issue?

A That's not exactly the point. The point is on the Middle East there is no special public diplomacy adviser, no.

Q No public diplomacy about the Middle East?

A There is no public diplomacy adviser.

Q No public diplomacy adviser.

A In the same way that Mr. Reich will be Ambassador Stone's --

Q There are not as many questions asked?

A Joe.

Q I know. I'm not the one to belabor it.

Q I've been away for a week, so just tell me if this has already been discussed last week. Ambassador Stone's new responsibilities -- are you referring to his assignment as an Ambassador to Central America, or is there some -- I mean, he was not formally a public diplomacy adviser prior to --

A Oh, yes, he was.

Q Was he, formally?

A Yes, he was.

Q So the position's been vacant for about a month, is that it? Since he was --

A I don't know precisely how that transition has worked, but he certainly has moved out of that function into his current function.

Q Alan, how does this position work? Does he like take calls from reporters or -- (laughter) -- Mr. Juan Reich, in this dissemination of information?

A I cannot tell you specifically. The job as it normally has functioned has been one of coordinating the government's approach to the public, as opposed to necessarily being the principal answerer of questions. But I don't know how it will work on in that case. He may well be doing some of this himself. I think that all remains to be seen. I don't know.

Q That might be a help in getting out the information. I keep reading these stories from the White House about how they're so interested in disseminating that information, but I have a lot of trouble finding the disseminators up in that region sometimes. (Laughter) Maybe he'd want to think about that as part of his coordination.

A I will pass that on.

Q Good.

Q Do you have anything on Stone going to Central America later this week and what the purpose of that trip is to be?

A He does plan to depart later this week for the region. His first stop will be San Salvador, but I am not going to be able to offer you anything on his itinerary beyond that. His purpose, as you know -- his general mandate -- has been announced at the time of his appointment, so I really don't have any specifics to offer you.

I think that the Secretary and others have talked about the importance of confidentiality in carrying out his mission, so that we will not be giving a lot of details.

Q Will he broaden the number of contacts?

A Again, I don't have anything for you on that. I think that's precisely the kind of thing which the Secretary and Ambassador Stone himself have indicated is more appropriate in terms of seeking success simply not to be too specific about it.

Q Follow-up, please. Could you re-state the mission that he's going to be carrying out in Central America?

A I don't have the language that was used in front of me. His basic mission includes facilitating a dialogue within and between countries.

Q Is he going anywhere else on this trip besides Salvador?

A I expect he might, but don't have anything to offer you on the specifics of where he might go.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the situation in Nicaragua as of this moment?

A No.

Q I've wanted to also ask if you have any reaction to the reports of Mr. Motley's apparent problems in departing Brazil?

A As I understand this, Ambassador Motley responded to a letter critical of U.S. policy in Central America that had been sent to the U.N. Secretary General, a letter which was signed by 209 Brazilian Congressmen.

Seven Congressmen sent a copy of that letter directly to the Ambassador. His letter in response refuted several of the points in the Congressmen's letter and explained U.S. policy in Central America.

It was not a letter to the Brazilian Congress, I might add, but rather a response to each of the individual signers of the letter to the Secretary General. But Ambassador Motley is still not back here yet, so I really don't have more detail.

Q Alan, going back to Otto Reich, I still don't have clear the main purpose of his new function as special adviser to the Secretary in Central America. Will he be dealing mainly with the press or is this a private advisory job with the Secretary?

A I'll read you what I read to you earlier. He will coordinate foreign and domestic public policy efforts related to Latin America in general and Central America in particular.

Q In that connection, will he be dealing with the formulation of that policy, or will he be dealing with the dissemination of information about that policy?

What does "coordinate the policy" mean?

A Public policy efforts. He will coordinate foreign and domestic public policy efforts with regard to Latin America in general.

Q My question is will he have any role in formulating the Central American policy, or will he be in effect a public relations manager who will decide how much of it to tell the public about and what way to tell the public about it?

A I think that basically, of course, there is a policy structure and the person in this building who is most closely associated with that and responsible for it is the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs. There's no change in any of that.

The only reason I hesitate a little bit is anybody who gets involved in articulation of policy, obviously has some role in one way or another with respect to policy. But that is a function of the articulation of policy as opposed to some policy role that is assigned to that individual. His role is in public policy efforts as opposed to the basic formulation of the policy.

Q Another subject: Today was the deadline set by the Southern Sudanese Liberation Front who kidnapped five people, including two Americans. Have you had any contacts with them? Do you have any word?

A I don't have anything new for you. I'm not aware that today necessarily was the --

Q They mentioned July 5.

A I've seen other dates mentioned, too. But, in any case, I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q Middle East? Do you have a date at this point for the Secretary's return to Washington?

A Let me go through precisely what it is he's doing. I understand that he probably will be back late Thursday, but that always is subject to change.

The Secretary is taking advantage of his passing through the area to make brief stops, during which he will have the opportunity to talk with the leaders of the countries he's visiting, and to assess their views and convey ours in regard to how to achieve our common objectives in Lebanon.

He's already visited Saudi Arabia. Today he was in Lebanon. He's now in Syria. He will return to Washington after he concluded his talks in Israel.

Our objectives remain as the Secretary described them on June 29: Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, the emergence of a fully sovereign Lebanon, and security for Israel's northern border. As the Secretary has made clear, these objectives are served by the Israel-Lebanon agreement, which we fully stand behind.

I'd reiterate what I said to you last week about U.S. policy. United States policy is that there should be, as soon as possible, a total and concurrent withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Concurrent?

A That there should be, as soon as possible, a total and concurrent withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. As I said, the U.S. stands fully behind the Israel-Lebanon agreement.

Q Alan, so in other words, if he plans to come back on Thursday, should he encounter any stumbling blocks in Syria, he will not necessarily engage in any shuttle efforts?

A I think he has addressed this and would refer you to the press reports that have come out. I don't think that's the kind of trip that he has envisaged. I think I'd stick with the description that I've just given you about his intentions at this point.

-- MORE --

Q Copy, please?

A We can give you a copy.

Q Can you elaborate on his statement that he has no inducement to offer the Syrians? What's the purpose of his trip to Syria?

A As I say, he's going to talk with the leaders, assess their views and convey ours regarding how to achieve our common objectives in Lebanon. I don't have any way of taking you beyond that. He spoke for himself, I thought, quite clearly on that subject.

Q I'm not really very well familiar with -- was the Secretary invited, or usually he does not have to be invited a foreign country. I'm not really very well acquainted with this.

Previously, the Syrian Administration's view was that they don't want Habib or Draper or anyone, and suddenly we hear that the Secretary is going there. Did he receive an invitation or he does not need an invitation to visit Syria at this point?

A The visit was certainly coordinated with the governments of the countries to which he's going. As I'm sure you're aware, following his communication with the President last week, the President asked that he try to stop by the region on his way back for the purposes that I've just outlined.

I don't think there's anything new about our previous understanding, for example, that the Syrian Government was interested in continuing a dialogue. So I don't see a particular problem. But, clearly, this was coordinated with the Government of Syria. He didn't just touch down and call from the airport telling him he was there. (Laughter)

Q Did Pakistan have a role in arranging for his going to Syria?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q French Foreign Minister Cheysson is in virtually the same places and more or less the same times; is there any coordination at all between the United States and France, since he's also Syria and Egypt and Israel and Saudi Arabia?

BM

A Clearly, we have had a lot of discussions with the French and other governments about the issues involved. But in terms of the purposes of the visit, and so on, the Secretary's visit was scheduled independently.

I can't tell you what kind of communication there may have been between the Secretary and Mr. Cheysson in the aftermath and knowledge that they were both going to be in the region. I'm not sure whether there has been anything.

Q Is France offering to help mediate, for instance, with Syria?

A Again, I think that that would not be something that I could get into from here. You might want to address it with the French. That's the kind of detail that I don't think in any case we would --

Q Will they meet at all, Cheysson and Shultz?

A No, I don't think so.

Q New subject. A weird report carried by the Syrian news agency quoting an Israeli newspaper, Homid'a, that last Monday Philip Habib narrowly escaped death and an assassination attempt.

A Yes, I saw that last week. I have absolutely nothing to substantiate that whatsoever. I think it's just wrong.

Q Alan, your use of the word "concurrent," what does that mean?

A "Concurrent" means --

Q Everybody gets out at the same time?

A At the same time.

Q Everybody gets out at the same time?

A That's what we're talking. I would, again, go back to -- sure. This is wording that I used last week, "a total and concurrent withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon."

Q In other words, the stories last week were not true, that the United States never asked this --

A Again, I addressed that last week.

Q Do you have a readout about the position or the statements which were made after the visit of Mr. Shultz to Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia saying that, according to the press reports, they were not all the way behind the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, and there is a new position of the Saudis?

Do you have more clarification on that?

A No, I haven't seen those particular reports, but in any case I don't speak for the Saudi Government.

Q Has there been any discussion in Moscow with the Soviet Union about withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon?

A I'm not going to get into the specifics of what we have discussed with the Soviets. We have discussed Middle East issues with them. I've made that point before, but I'm not going to get into the details of it.

Q In what period of time? Last week, this week, over the 4th of July?

A I'm not going to get into the specifics of how --

Q Not even on the timing?

A No.

Q Alan, to return to an earlier answer of yours, it was reported a couple of days ago that Pakistan has been serving as an intermediary between the U.S. and Syria.

A I think this was addressed by somebody in the party. I can't remember whether it was done on the record or on background, but this question was asked and was knocked down.

Q There was no such intermediary.

Q Would you care to characterize --

A Excuse me, I think the answer was sort of, not to our knowledge, if they had been talking with them. I can't speak, again, for the Pakistani Government. But if they have been doing it, it has not been some sort of coordinated effort.

Q Would you care to characterize the Saudi attitude in the discussions with the Secretary yesterday?

A No.

Q Second, do you have change on your stand on Israeli regrouping, moving from the Shouf area to the Awali River?

A No, I have nothing new to say beyond what we've said about that before.

Q Will you back this movement if it is part of a total withdrawal of the Israeli forces, and how would you go about it?

A I can't give you specifics. All I can do is really go back to what has been said before. Anything which contributes to the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces is good; anything which leads in the other direction is a problem.

Q You do contribute --

A I think you even asked that question last week, and I wasn't going to make that judgment.

Q I think you've said in the past that Saudi Arabia has played a constructive role, either you or John?

A I don't change that assessment. I was asked about the specific meetings that were just held.

Q What I want to get was, would you still characterize their role as constructive, and are they doing anything different following the meetings with the Secretary?

In other words, if you say, yes, they're playing a constructive role, have they changed their role at all since the Secretary --

A I really can't address that in specific terms. The answer is, I would stand by the characterization we have used before, that they have been, are playing a constructive role. But I can't get into details.

Q Is there any question of the Syrian Foreign Minister coming to Washington in the near future to pursue whatever discussions the Secetary has there?

1602

A I don't know of any specific plans at this point. I suppose one would have to wait to see what came out of the discussions the Secretary is now holding. That's just a general point. I'm not trying to give you some sort of a signal.

I think at this point that dialogue is being carried out in Damascus.

Q Another topic. South Africa has lifted its banning on some banned people, but not all. Do you have any comment on that?

A Many persons in South Africa, both inside and outside the South African Government, agree with the Reagan Administration that the practice of banning represents a fundamental violation of the rule of law through the denial of due process.

Our position, which is shared by many there, is that those guilty* of a crime should be charged and allowed to defend themselves through recourse to the judicial system.

The progressive elimination of banning orders over the past 12 months, from 96 in July 1982 to 11 in July 1983, represents a strengthening of the rule of law and a victory for those in South Africa working to enhance it.

As is our practice I wouldn't discuss our private exchanges with the South African Government on this or other subjects. Nonetheless, the fact that there are still 11 people under banning does remain a matter of concern.

Q Could we have a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q One more follow-up. Do we have any response to Prime Minister Botha's criticism of the Eagleburger speech?

A No. I would simply note that it was a rather comprehensive statement of policy, and I think ought to be read in its entirety.

Q Can you elaborate on the decision to supply spare parts to India for its nuclear reactor?

---

* Subsequently corrected to read "accused"

A No, this was addressed at some length, I think, by the Secretary's party, and I don't have anything to add to it.

Q It wasn't clear as to where they were going to get the -- how they were going to get the spare parts, from which country?

A That's not up to us to determine.

Q I was going to ask you whether or not -- is there anything doing here about the Greens coming to Washington this week from Germany?

A I think there is some guidance, if you've got some specific questions, but I don't happen to have it with me, and I would --

Q Are they going to be coming to the State Department to visit with our people?

A As a general matter, I would note that members of the Bundestag are regularly received in the Department of State from whatever party. But there is some more explicit guidance in the Press Office to which I would refer you.

Q Do you have any background information on these people?

A No, I don't.

Q There is a story in FBIS today about the Karb Commission finding in Israel. This is about the practices in the occupied terrorities, the safety of the Arab population.

The finding says that they established that complaints filed by Arabs were investigated negligently. There were a host of other things. If you care to comment on this, occupied terrorities still under consideration and under discussion which is not Israeli terrority; if you care to comment on this?

A I haven't seen the report. I don't have a formal response to give. Obviously --

Q On Page I-5 of today's FBIS, if you care to look at it.

A We'll look at that and see if we have anything to respond on that.

Q One more question on the Middle East, please. The State Department's geographer said that orders have been issued by the State Department, or a memorandum has been issued by the State Department to all agencies of the government making maps involving the Middle East; that Gaza and the West Bank, Israel and Jordan should be in different colors so as to distinguish the areas from one to the other.

Can you tell us more about that memorandum, and to whom it went and the number of maps that are being printed?

A I don't know how much detail there is. I don't know anything about it, but let me look into it and see what there is to that.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that the White House has asked the State Department to prepare a list of achievable policy goals by the end of the President's Administration, prepared by the end of the President's first term?

A Why don't I look into it and see what I can get you on that?

Q There's a story out of Tokyo after these talks that were -- in which the American delegations, lead by Under Secretary Wallis, saying that the United States has, in effect, changed its attitude about shipping of Alaskan oil to Japan. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Could you look into that, please?

A I can look into it and see if there's anything to be said.

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #115

WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, on the Sudanese hostages, (1) do you have anything to report, and (2) is the U.S. consul in that part of the world involved in the negotiations?

A As to a status report, our Embassy in Khartoum has reported the deadline set by the rebels passed without incident. Talks between the Sudanese government negotiator, representatives of the relief organizations, and the rebels continue.

I don't have anything to indicate a direct role. It seems to me that this brief update I just gave you indicated who were the players directly. Obviously, we are in touch with the situation with the Sudanese Government.

Q You mentioned the talks. What's being talked about?

A I'm not going to go into specifics. It's a delicate situation. I don't see the advantage to trying to talk about it very much.

Q Have the kidnappers dropped their demand for broadcast time on VOA and BBC?

A Again, I don't have anything to give you about their demands specifically.

Q And is the U.S. position still that there will be no ransom?

A I'd go back to what I said the other day, but I just don't have anything new to give you on any of this.

Q Has a new deadline been set?

A I don't have information. I've seen some press reports talking about this question, but I don't have anything to offer you. Again, we're talking about people who are being held hostage, whose lives are at stake, and I don't see the point of trying to get into detail.

Q Is there a third party other than the Sudanese and the Americans in the attempts to get them released?

A I didn't mention Americans. I said that the talks between the Government of Sudan negotiator, the representatives of the relief organizations, and the rebels, the talks between those various groups continue.

Q Any comment on the talks between Chancellor Kohl and Mr. Andropov?

A No. As you know, Foreign Minister Genscher will be coming here next week, and I think it would be appropriate to withhold any comment until we've had the report directly from him.

Q Did the Kohl-Andropov talks give you a clue what the position of the Soviets might be at the time after deployment of the Pershing II's?

A Again, as I say, I think it would be appropriate to withhold comment until we've had a report directly from Foreign Minister Genscher.

Q Do you have any comment on a story appearing in the Knight-Ridder papers about tension and dissension within the U.S. START delegation?

Q The question?

A The question was with regard to a Knight-Ridder story reporting alleged tension and dissension within the U.S. START delegation. It also had a number of other elements to it, I would note.

In any case, my response to you is that the story is erroneous. Our negotiators in Geneva are working in a flexible and innovative manner in an attempt to reach a START agreement. While there are clearly differences between the views of both sides, the meetings in this round of negotiations have been serious and businesslike.

The U.S. delegation is working well under Ambassador Rowny's leadership and has renewed its efforts with determination to secure the reductions we seek.

As you know, the delegation's instructions from the President provide for substantial flexibility in working toward this result. With corresponding good faith by the Soviet side, there is no reason why progress cannot be made.

Q Copy?

A Yes, we can get you a copy.

Q Could you spell out in what respect this is erroneous? That article made a lot of different points?

A I'm not going to try to do more than I've done here. It addressed the question. I'll just point out to you that it addressed both the workings of the delegations -- and I'd point out to you that in this statement I've said the U.S. delegation is working well under Ambassador Rowny's leadership -- and it addressed the question of the atmosphere in the talks between the U.S. delegation and the Soviet delegation. I would point out that in what I've given you we talked about the meetings being both serious and businesslike.

Q Could you get somebody to spell -- if you don't want to, could you get someone else to spell out precisely what's erroneous in that story?

A I've just pointed out two specific aspects. I'm going to leave it at that.

Q It's important in view of the promises that the President made to the Senators and the Congressmen in connection with the MX missile. He said that the negotiations are going to proceed, as you just mentioned, in a flexible and serious and diligent and sincere manner. I'll admit that what McCartney outlined there is certainly innovative, but I don't know whether it would fulfill those other premises.

A I will repeat to you what I've just said. And the answer is, no, I will not go beyond that and I will not try to get somebody else to respond to your question. That the negotiators are working in a flexible and innovative manner in an attempt to reach a START agreement. I go on to point out that the instructions from the President provide for substantial flexibility in working toward the reductions that we seek. I think that is responsive to your question.

Q On the part that said that the negotiations -- that the negotiators were essentially screaming at each other, you're saying that that's not true; that the talks were serious and businesslike? Is that --

A Yes.

Q Did shouting matches occur, Alan? The story says that at least three times Rowny squared off for more than four hours of loud and angry argument with his Soviet counterpart. Did that happen or is that erroneous?

A I would, again, refer you to the words I have used: Serious and businesslike. I am sure that, as in many negotiations, there may have been spirited exchanges, but I would not use that to be a confirmation of the kind of language that you just cited to me.

Q I don't understand whether you're disputing the facts of the story that's a fact -- or whether you're disputing the generalizations of the story. Clearly, you're disputing the generalizations. You're saying the atmosphere was serious and that the START delegation works well together. Those are generalizations. What about the facts? Are you saying that those are erroneous or not?

A It's a rather long story and I don't think it's going to be productive to try and get in -- because we don't -- to the specifics of what we're proposing to the Soviets and the very, very specific ways, and so on. The rule of confidentiality applies here.

I think that what I have said does address the kinds of question you're asking.

Q Alan, is there a thought being given to combining the two sets of talks under one negotiator?

A I'm not aware of any consideration of doing that.

Q What about the detail of communications between Rowny and Nitze? Can you tell us whether they do in fact talk to each other; whether they have to go through aides?

A I don't know what the specifics are of that. My understanding is that they certainly communicate well and effectively.

Q But could you look into whether they speak through aides or whether they talk directly to each other?

A No, I don't think we have to get into the question of how any two officials in this government communicate. I'm sure it varies from time to time.

Q The story implied that there isn't much cooperation between the two of them, except very indirectly, and it seems that the negotiations have to be carried on with a great deal of synchrony.

A I don't have anything on the details of their communications, the mechanism which is what you're asking about, and I really don't think it's appropriate to speak from here about not just them, about the way anybody is communicating.

Q Do you have anything to tell us about the situation in Chad today?

A Yes, I can give you a little bit on that. Libyan-supported rebels have attacked the town of Oum Chalouba, about 180 miles southeast of Faya Largeau. Fierce fighting was reported yesterday between rebels and government troops at Oum Chalouba. The rebels appear to be engaged in a push toward the strategic town of Abeche in eastern Chad.

Q Is there any evidence that that indicates an eventual effort to get to the capitol?

A I don't think I could take it beyond what I've said at the moment, but obviously they are pushing out from Faya Largeau.

Q Can you tell me whether, in addition to the French assistance which you have referred to in the past, whether Egypt is also providing assistance to the government there?

A I can't. You would have to ask the Egyptian Government.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports from Israel that they're definitely going ahead with the redeployment?

A No. The Secretary is in the area. He will be talking with Israeli officials. I think it would be appropriate to leave it to him in his discussions and whatever he may want to say about his discussions rather than trying to address it from here.

Q Do you have anything about his talks today in Syria?

A I don't.

Q How about his travel plans?

A I understand that he is planning to make brief stops, in addition to what we've already indicated, brief stops in Jordan and Egypt on his way back, which, for those of you who are rushing out to the airport to meet him, would put him in at an hour that I would suggest you would want to take some hot coffee or something out with you, or maybe cold coffee, depending on the --

Q Breakfast, in other words?

A Getting close.

Q Is that still scheduled for Friday morning, early?

A Yes.

Q When will he be going to -- where will he first stop from Israel? When will he leave Israel and then where will he go?

A I don't recall, frankly, whether he would go first to Jordan and then to Egypt, but that would strike me as possible, likely. But I don't have the detail of that in my head.

--MORE--

Q That would be today, Alan?

A No. That would be tomorrow, I think.

Q What can you tell us more about those "small working groups" between the Syrians and the United States?

A I can't tell you anything about it. Again, I'm not going to get into the question of what's going on out there with the Secretary. I think I would have to leave that to the Secretary and his party to discuss. I just don't have the details, and as with Phil Habib and others it's not profitable to try and keep up with them.

Q But you don't dispute this.

A I don't have any information to give you on that at all.

Q How brief are these stops in Egypt and in Jordan, and will Habib and company stay in the area after the --

A I don't know what Ambassador Habib's plans are. As far as how long those stops would be, I would measure them probably in hours.

Q Okay. So basically just a brief, or --

A Yes. But I think that they also offer ample opportunity for a good discussion with the leaders.

Q Do you anticipate the Secretary having any kind of a public appearance on Friday upon his return, summarizing this trip, particularly the Middle East portion thereof?

A I'm not aware of any plans to do that. I'm sure that he will want to report to the President. Whether that would include any sort of public appearance or whether he would be doing something separate, I don't know. I have no indication at this point that he would be planning to do that. But if there's something that develops, obviously, we would let you know.

Q On Senator Stone's trip, can you say if he's going to meet with representatives of the FDR/FMLN in Mexico?

A   Again, as I said yesterday and I've indicated before, we're not going to get into the details of what he will be doing. The only thing we've said about his trip is that he does anticipate leaving later this week, that his first stop will be San Salvador.

Q   There's a story in the Times today, saying he's going to Mexico, and he in fact will meet perhaps with Mr. Zamora.

A   I'm aware of the story, but I'm not going to get into the question of his schedule and whom he may be meeting and so on.

Q   Again, regarding the working groups to be set up between the United States and Syria, is it valid to assume that this will put an end to the third party's intervention in the diplomatic efforts?

A   Again, I'm simply not prepared to address the issue much less to talk about working groups, or, if there were working groups, what the working groups might be designed to do. I've got to leave that to the Secretary and his party. I can't do that from here. I'm sorry.

Q   On the same subject, Alan, not the working groups: Do you have any indications that the Saudi government's position regarding the agreement, post the Secretary's visit there, have changed, or would you say it still is the same? Reports from there indicate that the Saudis have shifted a little bit.

A   This question was raised yesterday, and I've indicated that, with respect, I could not address the Saudi position. That's up to them to talk about. Again, it's up to them to talk about their position, and I'm not going to get into the question of what was discussed. That may not be helpful, but that's where we are.

Q   Forgive me. I am asking not for -- you are a party. The Secretary was there.

A   Right.

Q   So you could say if you don't want to comment on it, I will take it, but if you say you don't want to answer for the Saudis doesn't -- I'm not asking you to answer for the Saudis.

A In terms of our reading of it, I don't intend to give a reading from here. I don't know what the Secretary may have done on that. Okay?

Q Can't argue with that.

Q In Latin America, there was a posting just this morning on Soviet-bloc arms shipments to Nicaragua, and said that they were running at a rate higher than in 1982. Can you quantify that at all?

A No. I cannot.

Q Any kind of breakdown?

A Can't give you any more detail than we did.

Q You can't give any better indication of the rate higher than '82?

A No.

Q I mean, there were some specifics in that Defense Department report in May --

A I understand.

Q -- about a shipment of tanks here or a shipment of something else.

A I understand that, but I don't have more detail to give you.

Q Back to the Middle East for just a second. There was a report on the Beirut Embassy bombing which attributed it to an inside job. Do you have any comment on that report, or do you have any comment on the Embassy bombing, the results of any investigation?

A As far as we know, there is no evidence supporting the theory of Embassy employee involvement in the Beirut bombing. Also, as far as we know, no such evidence has been presented to those conducting the official investigation.

All evidence we have seen indicates the use of a car bomb. Thus, we regard the report as entirely speculative and without foundation in fact.

We are, of course, in regular contact with the Lebanese authorities in charge of the investigation and will expend every effort to see that there is a successful conclusion to the investigation.

Q Copy?

A Yes. We can provide copies.

Q On Cuba, a while ago you acknowledged receiving this note on June 17, and you said it was being studied.

A Right.

Q It was reported at the time that the Cubans had expressed an interest in an overall review of migration matters. Any response yet to that note?

A There was been no reply yet.

Q There is a report from Israel that 5,000 dunums, Arab owned, in the District of Ramallah, were confiscated yesterday. Are you familiar with the report or do you have any comment on it? And, if not, can you please look into it?

A No. I'm not familiar with it, but, again, I think that this is a kind of issue which would be -- I presume you're talking about a legal issue that would be settled in courts, if there is a dispute.

I don't know what the facts are -- I haven't heard of this -- but I don't know that we would be commenting on that.

Q Roland Voigt and some other members of the Green Party faction that's being entertained at the State Department have been involved in a series of meetings with Muammar Qaddafi to plan actions in Germany against the German-U.S. alliance, and to plan actions against the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles and so on.

Does the State Department view these meetings as an opportunity for indirect talks with Qaddafi?

A No.

Q On the same subject, does the State Department have any information, linking the people who will be entertained here with the Krefeld attacks on George Bush's car?

A First of all, let me go to your word "entertained." I think that we pointed out before that we receive delegations from the Bundestag and meet with them, exchange views, and that is being done in this case. So let's keep the characterization accurate.

I have no information about who is responsible, involved, in the Krefeld demonstrations or that these individuals were involved.

Q If they were involved, would there be grounds for denying them visas?

A That's very speculative.

Q Two questions, please: Do you have any comments on the steel quotas and their effect on our allies?

A I'm not sure that I have.

Q (Inaudible) don't export that type of specialty steel, that might still be affected?

A I think that most of those questions would have to be addressed by STR or others. Obviously, the Mission of the European Communities yesterday expressed their view here, but I don't have anything to add to it.

Q Do you have anything on UNITA movements in southern Africa?

A No.

Q Anything on the visit of the President of Honduras to the States?

A I understand that he is in Houston, or going to visit Houston, on a private visit.

Q Is he having any meetings with Administration officials?

A No. My understanding, as I say, is it is a private visit. He has no plans to come to Washington.

Q A kind of a leftover from yesterday, you were asked yesterday and the Department answered late yesterday with a taken question on the list of achievable policy goals by the end of this term. And the answer, when it came back, was in answer to a question about whether the President had requested a list of goals and priorities.

The question was about achievable goals --

A The answer essentially is in response to that. I'm sorry if the question as put up on the board was not precisely that, but the question that was answered was about the --

Q The list was given to the President, in other words, was a list of things that the Secretary of State believes can be achieved by the end of this Reagan term.

A It was in response to the President's request for that.

Q Thank you.

Q Alan, now that the conference on Latin American political thought in Caracas has concluded -- the conference in which six former presidents of Latin American nations participated -- they've issued a couple of statements that are highly critical of IMF policy which the United States has supported. They also call for establishing a Latin American coordinating council on debt.

A Yes. Could you ask a question?

Q Do you have any comment to that, response to that, at all?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:49 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #116

THURSDAY, JULY 7, 1983, 12:02 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have anything new to report on the hostages in the Sudan?

A Not really. The five humanitarian workers, including two Americans, remain hostage in Sudan. Our latest information from our Embassy in Khartoum is that negotiations continue with the rebels holding the workers. That's all I've got on it.

Q And no new deadlines have been set?

A I don't have anything on deadlines.

Q Have you heard anything about any unrest or disturbances in northern Jordan? It's being reported by Syrian radio.

A I've seen nothing on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the assassination attempt against the Prime Minister of Lebanon?

A No, I don't. I've seen the wire reports, but I don't have anything independent on it.

Q What is the State Department's feeling now about Israeli redeployment?

A I have nothing new to say on that subject. The Secretary, I believe, has addressed it, to a certain extent, in his briefings with the press, but I have nothing beyond that.

Q Do you have the timetable on the Secretary's return from the Middle East?

A I think the estimated time is sometime around 3:30 a.m.

Q Friday?

A Friday.

Q Is he going to meet with the President tomorrow?

A I believe the White House had something on that. Let me ask you to check with them.

Q At 1:30.

A Jim says they've said something about 1:30.

Q Tomorrow?

A Tomorrow.

Q Has there been anything at all (inaudible) that you can say about what you've heard from the Germans on what Kohl was told, what new proposals he might be planning to communicate to the U.S.; anything at all?

A No. I don't have anything on that. Again, Foreign Minister Genscher will be here next week, so I think we should wait until then at least.

Q Alan, has the State Department been asked to furnish any information regarding the "Briefing Gate" question? Have people here been asked to cooperate in any investigation, or has there been any contact with the White House regarding that, as to tracking down information; anything of that sort?

A I'm not aware of anything. I gather from news reports -- as opposed to anything else -- that the Justice Department is conducting its own investigation of this, and I think it would be up to them to talk to that point. But I'm personally not aware of any such --

Q You don't know of anyone here that's been questioned at this point?

A I don't.

Q You have been asked this question many times. Let me try it again. Refer me to something in particular. Now that the Israelis are certain to redeploy, we keep hearing, what is the United States' new assessment to this?

A I was asked this earlier. I don't have anything new to say. The Secretary, to the extent we're prepared to address this, the Secretary did address this, I think, with correspondents accompanying him. I would refer you to the reports coming out of that. I don't have a transcript of his remarks, so there's nothing I can say about that. I have nothing new on that.

Q When was the last time he commented on that? Just today?

A I think he's talked about the general issue -- yes, today, yesterday -- in response to questions.

Q Is Begin still coming here on the 27th; is that a fixed schedule?

A My information is that he is, yes.

Q Do you have anything on the report from El Salvador today on the massacre that took place?

A I don't have anything here with me. No. There might be something later.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:05 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, July 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #117

FRIDAY, JULY 8, 1983, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two announcements:

First, available in the Press Office are a limited number of copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Volume 5, Western European Security. Please note that on the press release the embargo is until 6:00 p.m. July 13, 1983. One copy per organization. A summary of the volume prepared by the Office of the Historian is attached to the press release included with each volume.

Second, I'd like to note that today is Carolyn Johnson's last day in the Press Office. Next week she assumes duties as Staff Assistant in Under Secretary Schneider's office. Obviously, we will miss her, and we wish her well in her new assignment.

I would also like to introduce Robert Williams, sitting next to Carolyn, a Foreign Service Officer who has temporarily joined the Press Office. Robert joined the Foreign Service in 1980, has served in San Salvador and Adana, Turkey, and we're very grateful to have him with us. I know that you will make him feel welcome.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q A couple of standing things: Anything new on the Sudan hostages?

A Yes, I can give you something on that.

Q Sudan what?

A Sudan hostages.

At about 0700 A.M. Sudan time, which is 1:00 A.M. EDT, the Government of Sudan military forces conducted an operation to secure the release of the hostages being held in the vicinity of the game park headquarters at Boma in southern Sudan. This operation was carried out entirely by the Sudanese.

One of the American hostages was confirmed alive and well by the Sudanese military. We have been in contact with the family. At this time, we have no information on the other four hostages. The Sudanese military is conducting a search for them. For further details on this operation, you should consult with the Government of Sudan.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Do you know which of the Americans?

A I cannot, for Privacy Act reasons, Jim, give you the name.

Q Was this done with our acquiescence, or what?

A Throughout the incident, the U.S. Mission in Khartoum was in close touch with the Government of Sudan. Our mission was also in touch with the private aid agencies which employ the persons taken hostage.

The Department also consulted closely with the other governments, with U.S.-based representatives of the relief organizations, and we were in touch, of course, with the families. In every instance, I should point out, these contacts reflected the fact that complete authority and responsibility for managing this incident rested with the Sudanese Government. We were not consulted about this operation.

Q So you don't necessarily agree that it took place, that they charged the location where the hostages were kept, since you say --

A Our information is dependent upon what the Sudanese Government has given us. I've given you in the initial statement that point.

Q I was just trying to find out whether the United States thought this was a wise move.

A Bernie, this was a judgment where the Government of Sudan saw a need to conduct the operation to protect or assure the safe release of the hostages, and we are not in a position to second-guess that decision.

Q Alan, the time you gave us, was it Sudanese time? I don't remember.

A I gave you both.

Q O.K. Sorry. I couldn't remember.

Q After the Sudanese authorities carried out the operation, did they contact you and tell you that they had an American alive?

A We were informed of the operation after it had begun. I can't give you an exact time on that.

Q When it began or after?

A After it had begun.

Q When did it take place? When did the abductions start?

A I'm sorry.

Q When did they abduct them? When did they take them hostage?

A I'll ask you to go back and look. I don't have the dates in my head at this point, but I'm sure that's all available.

Q Alan, you said the operation was undertaken wholly or entirely by the Sudanese.

A That's right.

Q Does this mean the decision of undertaking the operation was solely by the Sudanese?

A Sure. That's what I've been saying.

Q Isn't it odd that they wouldn't have notified us ahead of time, though, since Americans were involved?

A I don't know --

Q Alan, how soon after the operation was underway was the U.S. Government informed?

A I say I don't have an exact timing on that.

Q Is Secretary Shultz planning to go to Madrid for this Foreign Ministers' meeting?

A Bernie, I don't have anything new on that. As far as I know at this point, there is no decision to do that. The conference hasn't concluded in any case, so it may be premature to discuss that.

Q When would he be going? Is it the 18th?

A I don't know. I suppose it depends on what happens at Madrid, and I can't predict that. So I can't give you a date when such a conclave of Foreign Ministers, as has been discussed in the press, might be held.

Q Is the Secretary planning to talk to the press this afternoon after meeting with the President, or no plans?

A At this point, as far as I know, he has no plan to, but I can't predict that. I guess you will have to wait and see what happens following his meeting with the President.

Q Was the Middle East the topic for the NSC discussions this morning at 11:00?

A As you know, we have not discussed subjects of NSC meetings.

Q Who is accompanying him to the White House? Do you have a listing?

A No, I don't.

Q What is the readout of the total picture from the Syrian position? I know that the mission has failed, but what are the basic demands or requests of the Syrians in order to come to an agreement to --

A I think we would, obviously, let the Syrians speak for themselves on this. In terms of the characterization of the mission and what it accomplished or didn't accomplish, I would refer you to what the Secretary said.

Q Do you have anything on the disturbances in Hebron?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

We deplore the murder and condemn those responsible for it. We also condemn the burning of parts of the Hebron market. Indeed, we're greatly concerned by any development which increases the likelihood of confrontation and violence in the West Bank.

Yesterday's events underscore the need to find some way to address constructively the underlying causes of unrest in that area.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, on that point, I asked the other day about the Karb Commission Report -- Judith Karb; I think she is a lawyer. And it also talked about the violence which has been precipitated on the presence of ultra-fanatic settlers and others. And you said that this could be addressed to -- if I were to quote you -- the Israeli authorities, and the Israeli authorities will answer to my request, if you have any comment on it.

Subsequently, this, if not maybe all of it, part of the whole violation on the West Bank, and you didn't address it. Now, you're addressing this, which means -- has the picture changed, your understanding, or what's the -- (sic).

A No. You asked about a specific report. I didn't comment at the time on the report, and we're not going to comment on the report.

The attitude, I gather, of the Government of Israel in taking and looking at that report is also addressed in the particular article you mentioned.

Obviously we have been, and will continue to be, concerned about violence, and hope that ways can be found urgently to end that violence.

Q Forgive me if you have addressed this topic once before. Next week there is that conference in Vienna, supposedly on the Israeli-South African alliance. Does the State Department have any position on this conference?

A We do. I'm not sure -- let me just see if I have it. Yes, I do have it.

The United States unequivocally opposes this conference. It will exacerbate, not help, to solve the problems of the Middle East or South Africa.

We also oppose the conference taking place under any UN aegis because two of its three sponsors are Soviet-front organizations -- the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. In last year's General Assembly, we cast the only vote against the Resolution which authorized U.N. participation in the conference as a part of the work program of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid. The United States will not participate in the conference.

Q Are we withdrawing funds for it?

A I'll have to look into that, Connie.

Q Can we get a copy of that statement?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on Stone's schedule?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, did the State Department representatives on Wednesday tell the Green delegation that was here that the U.S. position on Pershings was not that the Pershings were designed as a counterweight to the SS-20's but were rather part of a new military stragetic doctrine?

A I don't know specifically what happened, but our position on the SS-20's, which would not be consistent with that, is quite public and well known.

Q The reason why I ask you that is that, as you may know, representatives from that delegation, or I think actually the entire delegation, held a press conference yesterday afternoon in which they said they got what they called an official statement from the State Department to that effect which they said would be very useful to them in their propaganda against the Helmut Kohl administration in Germany.

On that basis, I thought I might want to give you the opportunity to deny that that was said.

A Okay, let me look into it. It's totally inconsistent with our approach.

Q I thought so.

A I'm glad you thought so.

Q Yesterday, there were reports of disturbances in northern Jordan, and you didn't have anything on it. Do you have anything on it today?

A No. We have seen the various press reports on it, but don't have anything on it.

Q On another subject. A couple of base negotiations -- can you bring us up to speed?

First, what's happening with the Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement?

A There is some guidance which I would refer you to. It's in the Press Office. Instead of trying to recall -- basically at this point Ambassador Bartholomew is back here. As you know, we think that those negotiations are important, the relationship is important, but let me refer you to the guidance that does exist.

Q And another one. President Marcos of the Philippines is quoted this morning as saying that unless the United States produces X amount of rent for the bases that he will turn to the Soviet Union for some sort of an arrangement.

A I have not seen that. I'd would refer you, instead of some press report on that particular issue, to the various official statements that were made during the course of the successful conclusion of the review recently.

Q Has there been any communication through the Interests Section from Havana on this latest hijacking?

A I don't know the answer to that. I can look into it and see what we have.

Q Any comment on the court decision yesterday that affects those who are seeking to return to Cuba?

A I think that, in general, at this point, the Administration is pleased that that program, or that policy, will not be held up for the moment until, I gather, that there is another proceeding to go through. This was a temporary decision until the issues are argued more substantively.

Is this the point that you're making about the use of -- this was not yesterday; this was a couple days ago? Or I may be talking about the wrong thing. What are you talking bout?

Q There was a court decision by a Federal court judge yesterday, at the District Court level, who said that the excludables were entitled to certain --

A I'm sorry. I am addressing the wrong issue. I don't have any reaction to that particular statement.

Q Is this a State Department matter? Since the State Department made some kind of diplomatic representation recently, will the State Department lawyers undertake to determine its effect?

A I don't know what the State Department might get into, but obviously, in terms of the court, it would be a Justice Department matter to handle.

Q Has the U.S. Government been approached by the Government of Egypt to assist with a cholera epidemic, to the best of your knowledge?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q Can you check into it?

A I can try and check into it. I'm not sure whether we would have -- I can check and see what I can find out.

Q Habib, Draper and Fairbanks, have they all returned with Shultz or stay out in the region --

A No, Ambassador Fairbanks returned with the Secretary. Ambassadors Habib and Draper have remained in the region. I cannot tell you specifically where they are at this particular moment.

Q Can you tell us anything about their mission at this point? How long they might stay?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, another question on the Greens. At the same press conference, they announced that the major purpose of their trip, aside from the meetings here at the State Department, was to recruit Americans to participate in illegal blockades and other action against NATO and other military facilities in Germany and also to encourage Americans to carry out that sort of action against military facilities here.

Does that in any way violate the terms of their visas?

A I don't know whether it does or doesn't violate the terms of their visas. I'm not aware that they've said those particular things.

Q They said it publicly. You could find out as easily as the FBI could find out about KGB involvement in the peace movement, if they wanted to. Can you look into it?

A I will see if anybody has anything on it.

Q Alan, the Secretary having just come back with the results as they are, what is next on the agenda for the Middle East? What is --

A The very next thing, obviously, is for the Secretary to report to the President in about an hour. Beyond that, I can't tell you. I think that session and review that might come out of that, people would decide what they will be doing next.

Q There's a story out of Bonn quoting a German spokesman as saying one of the positive results of the Kohl meeting with Andropov was a suggestion by the Soviets that the INF talks resume a week earlier, in September. Has that been conveyed to the U.S.?

A I saw that report just before I came out here. I also saw at the end of that report a suggestion that Foreign Minister Genscher was going to convey that when he came to Washington. I can only tell you what I've seen in the press.

Q Does the U.S. have a position on deploying the UNIFIL forces throughout the area which Israel might recede from?

A The UNIFIL forces?

Q Right.

A No. I don't think we have come up a position on what might happen in that contingency.

Q On that, there's an editorial today, or a public piece, by the leader of the opposition in Israel where he's suggesting that Saad Haddad still may play a major role in there. How does the U.S. Government see that?

A I'd refer you back to what we've said over the months about the disposition of those forces and Major Haddad's own role. I don't have anything new to offer you on that. There's no standard position.

Q Evans & Novak column this morning suggested --

A Who had a column? Evans & Novak?

Q Evans & Novak column this morning suggested that you censor the -- the State Department censored the GAO report and U.S. aid to Israel not because of reasons related to U.S. security but because of bilateral U.S.-Israeli relations. What do you make of this suggestion?

A I don't have any information on it. I can only tell you that there are rules for classifying things, or keeping things classified. I would presume that those rules are being followed, but I don't know anything about that particular report.

Q Now that the Secretary is back in town, can you look into whether or not during his meeting with Averell Harriman the question of Andropov's orders regarding fomenting the current Briefing Gate scandal came up?

A I think I can safely said that the subject was not even in the air.

Q You don't think Harriman and Andropov wanted to bring the Secretary in on that one.

A Madga, did you have a question, a serious question?

Q Some press reports coming out from some of the Arab capitals are suggesting that the positions of these Arab capitals are now leaning towards the Syrian position more than before. Do you have any comment on this?

A No, I don't. These governments will have to speak for themselves. The point is that we will remain actively involved in trying to find ways to effect the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon, to restore Lebanese sovereignty throughout the terrority, and to assure security across Israel's norther border. We will continue in that effort.

Q Would you comment particularly on the joint communique by the Moroccans and Libyans just a few days ago?

A I don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you have anything on D'Aubuisson's statements yesterday about civil defense forces?

A I don't know what they were, so I don't have any comment on them.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, July 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #118

MONDAY, JULY 11, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A brief announcement. A press backgrounder will be held this afternoon on the visit of Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. That backgrounder will be held here in this Briefing Room today at 4:00 p.m.

That's it on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can you bring us up to date on some visitors to Washington? First, the Chinese team negotiating on nuclear matters; and, also, whether Ambassador Kampelman is back in town?

A Yes, I can give you something on both of those. As far as the Chinese delegation is concerned, when Secretary Shultz visited the People's Republic of China earlier this year he invited the PRC to send representatives to Washington for detailed discussions on nuclear matters. The PRC delegation arrived July 9. It's being headed by Jai Weiwen, Commissioner of the State Science and Technology Commission of the PRC.

There will be three days of discussions in Washington today, July 11; tomorrow, July 12, and Thursday, July 14.

Ambassador-at-Large Richard T. Kennedy, the Secretary's advisor on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Energy matters will head the U.S. side of the talks. As far as --

Q Before we leave this, can we ask you something more or do you want to do the other ones?

A Go ahead. I'm not sure I have much more to give you.

Q There's a report from UPI that says that the United States has drawn up a draft agreement which suggests that it's pretty well close to a nuclear cooperation deal with the Chinese. Is it true?

A I'm not aware that we're close to an agreement with the Chinese.

Q What is the issue dividing the two countries?

A I don't have specifics on that. Let's see how these talks go and see if we have anything to say on that or any other aspect of that after they've concluded.

Q That's a Chinese statement. That's what Don's referring to, a Chinese statement.

A On IAEA, or not?

Q Saying that they're willing to discuss a draft agreement on nuclear cooperation.

A Let me look at it and see if I can get something. That's fair enough.

Q Alan, can you be any more specific about the areas of discussion other than just nuclear?

A No, I can't. And, as I say, let's let the talks finish and then if we can provide some further readout, I'll be happy to do that. I'm not sure that we can, but let's let the talks conclude which will be through this Thursday.

Q Alan, is your phrase "nuclear cooperation?"

Q Nuclear matters.

A Nuclear matters.

Q You're not even ruling out nuclear weapons matters?

A No. Again, I would remind you that Richard Kennedy is the advisor on Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Energy matters.

Q Would you say this round of discussions is comparable in any way to the two round of discussions the U.S. has had with the Soviet Union on the nuclear non-proliferation?

A I don't try to draw parallels between various sets of talks.

On Ambassador Kampelman, to reiterate a point I made last week, the United States has not agreed to a final concluding document at Madrid. Ambassador Kampelman was in Madrid over the weekend; is in Washington for consultations with the Secretary today. He's returning this evening* to Madrid where negotiations are continuing.

Q Has any decision now been reached on whether the U.S. should accept this compromise?

A I don't have anything further for you beyond saying that we have not agreed to the final concluding document.

Q When is he seeing the Secretary?

A I believe he saw him this morning. I don't know if he has any -- I don't think he has any further meetings with him today. He saw him early this morning.

Q Is a trip to Madrid --

A Excuse me?

Q Is Kampelman expected to see President Reagan?

A I don't know of a plan for him to see the President, but I'd ask you to check with the White House.

Q Can we assume on the basis of your statement that the U.S. then will not accept the compromise as it stands?

A No. I don't lead you to any conclusions other than I'm making a factual statement. I'm not trying to lead you in a direction of will or won't.

Jim, in answer to your question about meetings, was that it, will the Secretary go to Madrid?

Q Yes.

A At this point, again, that is premature, given the fact that we haven't got an agreement on a concluding document.

Q Are you saying then that if there were agreement on concluding a document that a trip by the Secretary of State would be a possibility?

* After the briefing it was learned that the Ambassador would return to Madrid tomorrow morning.

A It's a possibility. I'm not ruling it out, but I'm not trying to suggest that that has been decided, that if there were a concluding document, that that necessarily would follow. But to answer your question, a possibility? Yes, I would agree with that.

Q Is the U.S. backing down on the human rights part, and is any bargaining going on behind the scenes concerning the Soviet Jewish situation?

A I'm not going to get into the specifics. As I indicated, Ambassador Kampelman is going back to Madrid where discussions are continuing.

Q Are you saying, as of now, the U.S. has not agreed but you're not ruling out a possible agreement?

A That's right.

Q Would you say that since Kampelman has just come back for one day and is now going back again, it's possible he'll be back again later this week; that the negotiations that will continue are virtually pro forma, that a decision is being made, has been made perhaps this morning and that Kampelman will go back to say yes or not and that that would be a conclusion of the --

A No, I wouldn't steer you in that particular direction.

Q When you say the United States has not agreed to a final concluding document, are you saying that after the Secretary has met Mr. Kampelman this morning, no decision has been made that the United States will agree, or what?

A I wasn't addressing --

Q This wasn't from guidance; you said this from last week.

A No. This is current.

Q As of this momement now, 12:25 p.m., the United States has not agreed to it?

A That's correct.

Q And has instructions been given to Mr. Kampelman to agree to it when he gets back?

A That, I wouldn't go into. I just can't go beyond the fact -- the fact is that discussions will continue, and I would leave you with that thought.

Q The discussions will continue in Madrid?

A Yes.

Q Another area.

Q I want to clear this up. There's a clear-cut compromise offer by the Swiss, that this Basket III Conference on Human Contacts Experts be announced in a chairman's statement and then be included as an annex to the published document. There's opposition to this from people in Washington. A lot of delegations have agreed to this.

Can you give at least your view on that particular conference?

A I can't. I think that's the kind of thing that among others perhaps which would be for Ambassador Kampelman to discuss in his negotiations and not for me to try to articulate from.

Q Would you also -- you say discussions will continue, would you be willing to say negotiations will continue?

A Yes. That actually is the word that was in the original statement I gave you.

Q Is there any change in the schedule for the visit by Mr. Begin to this country?

A No. The President, as I understand it, I'm sure is scheduled to meet with Prime Minister Begin on July 27, and also with President Gemayel on July 22. I think that both of them will also be meeting with senior department officials and other Administration officials during the course of their visit.

Q Do you have an explanation of the atmosphere of doubtness surrounding the visit of Israel?

A No.

Q Can you give us any readout on why Ambassador Stone's mission failed, and what's the next step?

A Let me just give you one answer on the whole question regarding Ambassador Stone. We're not going to comment on the events of the past weekend.

In general, however, as outlined by the President in his April 27 address to the joint session of the Congress, Ambassador Stone's mandate to facilitate dialogue within and between countries of Central America is a sensitive one and, in our judgment, is best implemented with a large measure of confidentiality.

We have undertaken this effort with our eyes open, aware of both the potential obstacles and the limitations involved, but in good faith.

While the policies of the Government of El Salvador and our own regarding the necessity that any political settlement in that country be in the context of the democratic political process, we will continue our policy of not imposing advance requirements on the holding of any meeting. We would regret any effort to exploit this effort publicly, which would create misunderstandings. We regard a serious diplomatic effort to secure democracy, peace and stability in the region as essential.

Ambassador Stone will be consulting within the Executive Branch as well as briefing Congressional leadership in Executive Session.

Q Copy of that?

A Copy. Sure.

Q When is he going to go up on the Hill?

A I don't have an exact schedule for his --

Q Will he do that before he sees the President?

A I don't know what his schedule is with regard to the President. You might want to check with the White House. I can't answer your question.

Q You don't anticipate a meeting today, for example, between Senator Stone and the President?

A You would have to check with the White House.

Q When you say you regret any effort to exploit the offer publicly, are you referring specifically to any event?

A I'll stand on the words I've used.

Q The agenda put out by the left wing groups says that the reason they didn't meet with him was a disagreement over the agenda. They apparently wanted to talk about everything and Stone arrived with a limited agenda. Is that correct inference?

A Without addressing what they said or not said, I will go back to what I said in that statement, which is that "While the policies of the Government of El Salvador and our own, regarding the necessity that any political settlement in that country be in the context of the democratic political process, we will continue our policy of not imposing advance requirements on the holding of any meeting.

Q So you're willing to discuss any issue?

A Again, I will leave you with the words I've used.

Q How does Stone's mission differ with that of Ambassador Briggs in 1981; can you distinguish it at all?

A I'm not going to try to discuss Ambassador Stone's mission any further than we have, which is not in great detail. So I'm really not in a position to make that kind of a comparison.

Q You don't think that's --

A It's not a question of whether it's a legitimate question. It's a question of not going into any further detail about Ambassador Stone's efforts for the reasons that I've cited.

Q Has he already met with Motley?

A Met with him? They have met -- they've been in meetings together.

Q This morning?

A Yes, this morning. He met, I believe, with the Secretary this morning, Ambassador Stone did.

Q Secretary Shultz?

A Yes.

Q Do you think his trip to Costa Rica would at least fulfill the requirement put forth by Congressman Long, that the U.S. undertake to have unconditional talks with the rebels?

A Again, not addressing the question of his mission in any greater detail than I have, I'm not in a position to try to address that question, I'm afraid.

Q Two on Lebanon. One is, do you have anything on reports that France has agreed to send in an additional 3,000 troops to Lebanon?

A No, I don't.

--MORE--

Q There was also a report that an Israeli warplane fired a missile at a Syrian position in the Bekaa. Do you have anything on that?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q Do you have anything on reports out of Israel that the Israeli Government plans to rehabilitate or fill up the center of the town of Hebron with Jewish settlers. Do you have any position on that?

A Yes. Our policy on settlements remains. As the President stated in his September 1 initiative, "Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further, settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated." We do not consider the plans to build settlements in Hebron to be helpful in achieving an atmosphere on the West Bank conducive to the peace process.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q What about the reports, Alan, that some Israeli tanks and positions had been withdrawn from some areas in Lebanon? This was this morning.

A I don't have anything on that other than some press reports which I saw quoting Israeli officials as some sort of a regular part of a rotation, but I don't have anything independent to give you on that.

Q On Hebron, the Israelis would argue, though, that there were Jewish settlers in Hebron for a long time.

A Well, I refer you back to the President's specific words about increasing settlement activity.

Q On Chile, do you have any reaction after the arrest of Mr. Gabriel Valdes?

A Yes, I can give you some reaction. Former Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes, former Senator Jorge Lavendero, and Jose de Gregorio were asked by a judge of the Santiago Court of Appeals to appear before him Saturday, July 9, ½- connection with his investigation of the earlier arrest of two men and a woman regarding the seizure of a large number of pamphlets calling for a peaceful anti-government protest on July 12. Following the hearing, he ordered them detained and held incommunicado.

The three persons arrested earlier had been turned over to the court on July 6 by the Ministry of Interior, which accused them and unidentified other persons of violating the 1958 law on internal security. Under general provisions of Chilean law, an investigating magistrate can order people detained for up to five days while he decides whether to indict or release them.

Appeals for the release of the political leaders detained on Saturday are expected to be heard today in the Court of Appeals.

In Chile, as elsewhere in the world, we support the right to peaceful dissent. The detention and solitary confinement of prominent democratic leaders such as Mr. Valdes can only be regarded as a regrettable manifestation of the serious tensions and divisions affecting Chile.

In previous comments we supported calls from various sectors of Chilean society in favor of dialogue to overcome those divisions. We viewed authorizations for the return of certain prominent political exiles as a positive development. Whatever the legal basis and eventual disposition of these new arrests, such actions illustrate the need for moderate leaders on all sides to find ways to halt the trend toward confrontation and to establish the basic consensus needed for the transition to democracy sought by the vast majority of Chileans. We firmly support that transition, as defined by the Chileans themselves.

We have communicated our views and our concern about these arrests to senior government officials.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything further with respect to the arrest and also with the expected day of protest, tomorrow?

A No.

Q Do you regard that as a legitimate exercise of democratic freedoms?

A I'm going to stick with the statement I've just given you.

Q You have nothing further at all on that?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the Chad situation today -- who controls what? Or "whose in charge" there? (Laughter)

A We understand that the Habre forces have mounted a counterattack on Abeche and that fighting continues in the vicinity of the town. There was fighting reported yesterday there at Abeche and the surrounding area. We don't have independent confirmation on the government's controlling the town, for example, which was reported recently.

Q Can you be more specific than you have in the past about Libyan support for the rebels?

A The only thing I can add to what we've said in the past is that we've heard reports of spokesmen for the dissidents admitted that the Goukouni had received and are receiving logistical and materiel support from Libya. Such a statement would serve to confirm active Libyan involvement.

Q Alan, do you have information on other nationals, East Germans or others involved in that?

A Don't have anything further on that.

Q Do you have any report of any actual Libyan forces with the rebels?

A I don't have any reports on that at this point, no.

Lester?

Q Alan, The Washington Post this morning published a report and a commentary on the Los Angeles Times' asking President Reagan about his personal sex life.

In your monitoring of the Soviet Union, is there any indication that any reporters, domestic or foreign, like the Los Angeles Times have asked Mr. Andropov about his sex life, or is this just one of the benefits of a free press? (Laughter)

A Lester, I haven't seen any such reports.

Q Well, how do you explain --

A I don't try to explain --

Q You don't try to explain it, but there's no report that they did this to Andropov? Thank you.

A I'll let you try to explain it.

Q Alan, there are more and more reports from the European press of an agreement by the Soviet Union for a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan in return for recognition of a pro-Soviet government in Kabul? Does the U.S. have a policy about possibly recognizing a pro-Soviet government in Kabul in return for --

A Let me refer you back -- I don't have the language with me -- but let me refer you back to what we have said before about the four points required for settlement, and it talks about independent, non-aligned --

Q Is there any movement forward from that toward accepting what appears to be Diego Cordova's or Yakob Kann's mediation?

A I'm not aware that the mediation departs from those four points.

Q Back on the Middle East, do you have any comment on the firing of the Mayor of Hebron?

A We had something on that last week, and I refer you to what we had at that time.

Q Do you know if the Secretary plans to come down with Mr. Genscher after their meeting?

A I doubt that he does. That reminds me, though. Let me take the opportunity to say that I understand Foreign Minister Genscher is probably due in the lobby at about 1:45, that there is likely to be a freeze -- which means that if you are interested in being there, be there at least 15 minutes ahead of that. They are due at the White House at, I believe, 2:00 o'clock so it's going to be very tight. I don't know what that means in terms of what the Foreign Minister will say or not say here, but he hasn't g ot a lot of time, so anyway, just as an administrative note, let me caution you on that freeze.

Q Are you getting any guidance that he will stop and talk with us?

A I don't have any information on whether he intends to stop. As far as the Secretary is concerned, I don't really expect that he would come down. That has not been his usual practice.

Q I thought freezes were only for heads of governments?

A I can only tell you what I've been given in terms of the security plans involved here.

Q Can you say anything about the reports of the coming visit of a Syrian delegation --

A I don't know of any report of a visit of a Syrian delegation --

Q -- published by the Boston Globe yesterday?

A Don't know anything about it.

Q On the increased French presence in Lebanon, does that mean that there will not be a need for any more Marines as part of an MNF, and is it just a coincidence that the French have just announced that they will be increasing their forces there as the Israelis seem to be pulling out of the area?

A I'm not aware that they've -- now the press reports again; I'm only dealing with press reports here -- that they said they were increasing their forces. I thought that the press reports indicated they were prepared to increase their forces, but I don't know that that is a valid press report or not. In any case, I don't have anything to say to you at this point about the MNF, its disposition, its expansion, its change in role, or anything of that sort. We are where we had been, as far as I'm concerned at this juncture.

As far as I know, there has been no change, generally speaking, on the MNF.

Q Alan, there is a discussion in the Israeli Parliament on the so-called deterioration of the situation on the border between Isrsael and Egypt. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. I think I was asked about this the other day, and I just am not aware of them. I've seen various press reports coming out on this, but I don't have anything to comment on it.

Q Alan, on another subject, in the State Department's job to explain, or try to explain U.S. Government policies to the world, what specifically is the possible crime justifying the use of the FBI in the Carter briefing book caper? And how many regular reporters in the State Department here can say that they have never used leaked documents or information?

A You'd have to ask your colleagues and the Justice Department.

Q I did. That's exactly why I come to you, Alan, because I asked four times, and the Justice Department will not tell us what the law is.

A I'm sorry, Lester.

Q Could you as a spokesman of the Reagan Administration, there must be some crime to justify the FBI's going after this, even though it looks like a summer farce. Do you have any idea what crime it is?

A Lester, I appreciate that you want to confirm the all-wisdom, but I'm afraid I'll have to step aside.

Q Do you have anything on the bipartisan commission approach to Central America?

A Yes, a little bit on that. We believe that the effort under way in Congress reflects growing awareness of the importance of the search by countries in the region for democratic forms of government, economic development, and assured human rights for their citizens in a secure and stable environment. U.S. policy is always enhanced by bipartisan consensus in support of such objectives.

We are carefully considering the proposed Congressional resolutions, but at this point have no comment on their specific provisions.

Q So there has been no decision on whether to appoint a commission as such, right?

A That's my understanding.

Q Alan, there are continued reports about Moraji Desai's possible connection with the U.S. Government. Can you say whether at any time he had any connection with the United States in a formal sense?

A Again, you're getting to a question which alleges intelligence activities, and without in any way lending credence or anything to that report, I'm simply not in a position to comment on that kind of a report.

Q Alan, could you comment in any way on the disturbances at the Washington mosque today, the possible international implication?

A I don't have any words for you.

Q Do you have any further information or updating on the contacts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concerning the Lebanese situation or the Middle East --

A No, I have nothing to offer on that today.

Q Alan, is it possible for you to help us by inquiring upstairs whether Genscher will talk with us in the lobby?

A I could try to find out for you. You might also independently try to find out from the German Embassy whether they have any information on that.

Lester, go ahead.

Q Alan, Congressman John McCane of Arizona, when he was a prisoner of war in Hanoi, was requested by the Hanoi authorities to attend and participate in an appearance with Jane Fonda (Laughter). When he refused, they broke both of his arms, and one of them is still maimed.

He has expressed great concern about NASA inviting Jane Fonda to the Space Shuttle launching. Does the Secretary of State approve of this, or does he care?

(Laughter)

A I don't think that this is really an issue --

Q I mean, what's funny about it? Could you tell me? I don't understand the humor when one of our people is tortured --

A Yes.

Q -- and I hear laughter back here. What's humorous about it, Alan, do you have any idea?

A Lester, I'm not addressing humor in this --

Q Would you take the question and ask Secretary Shultz if he thinks it's appropriate for a U.S. Government agency in the Reagan Administration that they invite Jane Fonda?

A No, I don't think I will, Lester. This is --

Q You won't take the question? All right. O.K. It's not important.

A No, that isn't the issue. It is not a State Department matter.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

Alennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, July 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #119

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 1982, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is a release on the Massachusetts Legislative Resolution regarding Sri Lanka. It's important -- especially for the Boston Globe.

On Secretary Shultz' plans, he will address a Department of Agriculture-sponsored meeting today at the Shoreham Hotel, at 2:15. The session is not open for coverage, but the text of his remarks will be available in the Press Office later this afternoon. The subject of his address will be "Agriculture and Foreign Policy." The Agricultural Summit is a day-and-a-half meeting, July 12-13. Agriculture Secretary Block said he initiated the Summit meeting to give agricultural leaders and representatives of related businesses an opportunity to take a comprehensive look at current issues common to everyone involved in the food and fiber system. If anybody wants additional information on that, please be in touch with the Department of Agriculture's spokesman, John Oaks, at 447-4623.

Q Are there going to be questions after that, John?

A I don't think there are going to be questions at that.

On Saturday, Secretary Shultz will make remarks at a National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia reception. That's this coming Saturday, 6:30 p.m. at Stouffer's Hotel in Crystal City. The Secretary's appearance is a segment of the League's annual meeting which begins on Thursday and concludes on Sunday with a church service.

If you wish to cover the Secretary's remarks or want any additional information, please telephone Deborah Marsh of the League. She's at 223-6846.

Q Text?

A I don't know when or whether we'll have a text on that.

Q It's at 6:30?

A It's at 6:30.

Q It's a topic consistent with the --

A I would think so.

Finally, the United States-Japan Economic Subcabinet Consultations will be held in Washington, here at the Department of State, on July 14-15. They are held twice a year; they address bilateral and global economic issues.

The head of the U.S. delegation will be Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis. The head of the Japanese delegation will be Deputy Foreign Minister Moriyuki Motono. There will be a brief photo opportunity on Thursday, July 14, at 10:30 a.m., in Conference Room 1107. There will also be a joint press conference by Under Secretary Wallis and Deputy Minister Motono on Friday, July 15, at 2:30 p.m., here in the press briefing room.

Looking at my guidance, I suspect you have had the meat of this briefing, but nevertheless, I will do my best to endure 2 or 3 fairly simple puffball questions.

Q What can you tell us about Kampelman and what he's bringing back from Madrid?

A Ambassador Kampelman is still here; he is still consulting in Washington. The United States has not agreed to a final concluding document at Madrid, and it would be inappropriate to comment further under the circumstances.

Q Is there any chance of getting a briefing by him on background before he returns to Madrid?

A I'll be glad to forward the request.

Q Please do.

A Sure.

Q Will the Secretary attend the final signing of that document in Madrid?

A Haven't agreed yet, John, so --

Q If there were agreement?

A Well, I wouldn't rule it out.

Q John, it was on his schedule that Kampelman and the Secretary were going to see the President. Now it's cancelled. Is there some --

A I'm not sure where that stands. I gather there are some scheduling problems in the full schedule. I'm not sure whether that is on for today or tomorrow, but I think you are going to have to keep in touch with the White House on that.

Q You mean Kampelman will be staying on again another day?

A Well, if he did not see the President today, and a meeting was scheduled for tomorrow, I guess he'd stay on another day.

Q "Has not agreed as yet," is that it?

A No, I didn't say, "as yet." I said "has not agreed."

Q Has not agreed? Will not agree?

A Would you like me to go back to the specific language?

"The United States has not agreed to a final, concluding document in Madrid."

Q Yes, that's what I'm asking you about. Is that the U.S. position not to agree, or is that wide open?

A No. I didn't say we had decided not to agree, and I didn't say we had decided to agree. I said we have not agreed.

Q Has Shultz recommended agreement?

A I wouldn't get into that kind of recommendation or internal discussion. I'm told that Ambassador Kampelman does expect to see the President tomorrow.

Q Tomorrow?

A Tomorrow.

Q Is it unlikely there will be an agreement before September?

A You're probing beyond where I'm prepared to go.

Q John, the Vice Chancellor of Germany yesterday said that President Reagan, "still wants to take the decision," -- those are his words -- on the Madrid Conference document, but that Mr. Genscher was, "I'm very confident."

Do you think that Mr. Genscher was making that remark on the basis of anything he was told by American officials, or do you think he was just dreaming and hoping that the United States would go along?

A I don't know. I'm not going to get into his -- There was a background briefing yesterday, at which I think you were present, on the substance of those talks, and I don't think I'm going to go beyond that.

Q John, has the Soviet Union asked for the current session of INF to be continued for another two weeks in Geneva? What will happen to it? Will it end, as scheduled, on Thursday?

A I think that where we stand on that is that the sides have agreed that the current round will close as scheduled.

Q On Thursday?

A If that's when they're scheduled to close.

Q That doesn't quite answer the question. Did the Soviets ask for an extension?

A I don't have anything beyond this, I'm afraid. I've got to be constricted by what I've got here.

Q Anything on Ambassador Stone's plans?

A No, not on his plans. You've had about as much as we're going to be able to offer on the events of the weekend. Beyond that, we would note the official communique from the office of the President of the Republic of Costa Rica yesterday, and I think we could probably make that available to you in the Press Office. It notes that the FDR/FMLN called for "certain guarantees" which "became converted into preconditions for holding the meeting."

The official Costa Rican communique goes on to note that "Ambassador Stone reiterated that he maintained the will and the spirit for a private dialogue with an open agenda and without pre-conditions."

Q Where does that rest now, John, the effort to arrange a meeting?

A As we have said, we think the purpose is best served by confidentiality, so I'm not going to get into where we go from here.

Q Can we assume that there are still discussions going on about the terms for arranging such a meeting, or has everything stopped in the wake of this?

A I think you can assume that the United States would be willing to pursue this, and is willing to pursue this.

Q And is pursuing it?

A Yes.

Q Did you say you have copies of the Monge communique?

A Yes.

Q Could we get that?

A Sure.

Q And also the guidance?

A Sure.

Q Did Monge consult with the United States in view of its interest in confidentiality?

A I don't know. You mean this communique?

Q That's correct.

A I don't know.

Q Can you take the question?

A I think we would be unlikely to get into -- I mean, assuming that they were; and I don't know that they were -- I think we would be unlikely to get into that discussion with the government.

Q How do we consider a government that was to be a mediator making a public statement, going further than either of the other parties in explaining what had taken place?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on the United States-Chinese nuclear talks?

A I really can't. There is not much more I can tell you beyond what Alan told you yesterday. We think that those talks will end on Thursday, and it's possible we may be able to get a background briefing for you on them.

Q On Thursday?

A Yes.

Q Back on Central America, can you tell us about the proposed AID funding for the Salvadoran elections?

A Some months ago, the Government of El Salvador requested United States assistance in improving the country's electoral process and for U.S. financial support to cover some of the costs of this year's Presidential election. We sent U.S. election experts to El Salvador some weeks ago to make recommendations on how we might best be of assistance. Following informal consultations with some Members of Congress, we formally notified the Congress yesterday of our $3.4 million proposed assistance to the electoral process. This will not require new appropriated funds, but will make use of economic support funds which have been already appropriated. We believe this assistance is necessary and appropriate in helping El Salvador's transition to pluralism and democracy.

As far as the $3.4 million is concerned, about $1.3 million is budgeted for computer and other equipment; about $900,000 would be for consultant services to help establish an electoral registry; about another $900,000 for some 200 international observers of the campaign and the election; about $200,000 for consultants to help establish voting procedures.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Was this the trip that -- when you say "election experts went down," that gentlemen from the NSC accompanied --

A I don't know. It could be that AID could be a little more helpful on this. I personally don't know.

Q Could you enlarge on the international observers' aspect of it?

A I can't.

Q I mean, is it that the United States will be inviting, on behalf of the Salvadoran Government, private individuals or private institutions, or will they be consulting with other countries?

A I'm afraid I can't. I've given you the budgetary considerations. It may be there is not more detailed thinking, but maybe AID has something on this.

Q John, what is the latest on the election? Do we still expect them in December?

A As far as President Magana is concerned, there has been no change in that.

Q John, on a related Central American matter, do you have anything on the Honduran request for an OAS meeting later this week?

A No more than to confirm that such a request is in the works. The meeting has been requested by the Honduran Permanent Representative to the OAS to present to the Council "the serious events and circumstances surrounding the critical situation now prevailing in the Central American region."

Q Does the United States back this meeting? Have we been polled? Have we said we believe it should take place?

A I think we'd have to wait and see. It's premature to have an opinion until we see what they are going to discuss and how it's going to develop.

Q How does the United States consider this in terms of its support for the Contadora process?

A I don't have anything beyond what I've got.

Q On the aid for the election, is there a precedent for this? And is there danger that too close an identification with the election --

A A precedent for electoral observers?

Q No; for, I say, U.S. direct aid, to practically set up an election?

A I would have to do a little homework on that, but I don't think so. I think -- I'd have to do a little homework on the previous experience in that particular country and other countries, but I don't think it's a first.

Q Is there a danger that this might compromise the credibility of the elections by too close U.S. identification with it?

A I would think that it depends on the credibility of the system, the observer system, and of the observers.

Q This isn't part of the Project Democracy, or whatever it is called? (Laughter)

A I don't think so.

Q Another question relating to Central America -- actually two questions: One is, are there any plans for Senator Stone to return to Central America?

A As we have consistently said, we are not talking about plans and how we put this together; but as I also said earlier, I think it is a given that the United States continues to be interested in being as a facilitator as it can in this particular --

Q So, you wouldn't rule out another trip, if it's necessary?

A No, I wouldn't rule it out.

Q Another question on the Central American area: It's my understanding Assistant Secretary Motley is going to be sworn in today.

A Yes.

Q Is that going to be open for coverage?

A No, I don't think so. Traditionally, swearing-in ceremonies for Assistant Secretaries have not been open, and I don't think this one is.

Q The swearing-in ceremony for Stone was open.

A Well, I think that was a little different. He wasn't an Assistant Secretary.

Q John, could you help us out a little bit with this phrase, "dialogue without preconditions," which appeared in another form yesterday in your statement? Does this mean that we would be willing to talk to the leftist guerrillas about things other than their participation in the electoral process?

A It means that we'd go into the preparations for such a meeting without preconditions. Our position on power-sharing is quite clear and our aversion to it; but in terms of establishing preconditions for talks, we are not setting those preconditions.

-- MORE --

Q You said you would go into the preparations for such a meeting without preconditions?

A Yes. We would go into the preparations and the meeting without preconditions.

Q They could raise anything they want?

A I assume that anybody could raise anything they want at such a meeting.

Q But you're still ruling out any kind of an agreement on power-sharing?

A Of course.

Q You would let them bring it out if they want to?

A You're going beyond where we are. I think that's a little academic, because we haven't gotten into such a situation. But, of course, any party in such a meeting could bring up anything that it wanted even though the United States would be strongly opposed to power-sharing.

Q Your agenda is bounded by the electoral process at such a meeting?

A Yes.

Q Would you say that it's fair to characterize that as a shift from the past U.S. position that such talks --

A No.

Q Just a minute. -- that such talks should be centered only on the question of participation in the elections?

A No, it's not a shift in that you cannot prevent any party raising any issue in that discussion. Presumably (inaudible) all around position.

Q Previously, I believe our position was that we would enter such talks only for the purpose of discussing participation in the elections.

A I didn't say we would enter talks about power-sharing. I said I presume we could not prevent any party from raising an issue.

Q But I mean, when questions were asked in the past about whether the other side could raise questions like power-sharing in their agenda, the answer has, I believe, been that we believe such talks should be only for the purpose of discussing participation in the election.

A That is our belief; that's correct.

Q John, therefore, there has to be a pre-arranged agenda; is that correct -- an agreed agenda?

A There are no preconditions for such a meeting.

Q Does there have to be a pre-arranged agenda?

A Not to my understanding. If there are no preconditions for such a meeting, that seems to me that is not a pre-arranged agenda.

Q Would you argue that this is at least a change in emphasis?

A No, I would not argue it's a change; it's not a change in emphasis.

Q Wasn't there a letter from Secretary of State Shultz to the Congress that said that they could bring up any issue they wanted to? This was about three months ago.

A I can't remember that. It might well be. I don't know. I can't remember.

Q What about on procedural preconditions? Would we object if the other party wanted international observers to these discussions?

A I can't answer that question. I think I've gone to about the point of my discussion of the preliminaries for such a meeeting as I'm able.

Q Could I just follow up, please? In what you said about preconditions before, you didn't say they were substantive preconditions, so I'm wondering about procedural preconditions. Wouldn't that be covered by what you just said?

A I'm going to stand on the language I've used hitherto, I think.

Q There is a news report this morning to the effect that the United States opposes international observers; is that incorrect?

A Opposes international observers, where?

Q Being present at any such talks or negotiations?

A I'm not aware of that report.

Q It's in the New York Times, quoting U.S. officials.

A Missed that one.

Q Saying that this was the problem with Monge.

A I missed that one.

Q Could you find out if that is correct or incorrect?

A Sure. I'll take a look at it.

Q One more on Central America.

A Okay. Let's do Central America.

Q The question is essentially whether if these international observers would be coming from the OAS? Are you asking the OAS for help?

A I don't think I can specify. I think what we're talking about here is budgetary authorization, and I don't think we can get into where they come from or how they operate at this stage.

Q Another one on Central America?

Q Were there any discussions between Secretary Shultz and President --

A Excuse me, let me do one more on Latin America.

Q I don't know whether this is too philosophical for a briefing, but elections are after all such a delicate expression of a society's will. I just wonder whether you're not afraid that by financing -- getting involved so deeply in the preparation of these elections, even financing international observers to it, it seems it's a way to guarantee the authentication, international authentication of the results of the elections even before it's held, whether this will not cause some impression that the United States is making a show out of it.

A It's my impression that authentication of the earlier election in Salvador contributed to the credibility of those results, far from undermining the credibility. I would assume that that is our charitable motivation in this instance. But you're right, it was a philosophical question.

Q You said that this is not the first time to assist an election process in Salvador. Did you have in mind South Vietnam?

A That was an impression, but I'd have to do some homework on it. But it's my impression that this is not a precedent.

Q But you didn't have South Vietnam in your mind?

A I didn't have anywhere in mind. I would have to do some homework on it.

Q Were there any discussions between Secretary Shultz and President Assad about Saad Haddad's role in southern Lebanon?

A No.

Q A second question on this. Is it fair to suggest that Syria, although it objects to the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, as reported, will accept the agreement as long as it doesn't lead to normalization of relations between Lebanon and Israel?

A It seems to me you're splitting hairs there. In the discussion between President Assad and Secretary Shultz, Syria clearly expressed its disapproval of the agreement in its entirety.

Q Nothing about the normalization of relations, if it will not?

A No. They made clear their unhappiness with the agreement.

Q A question on Poland --

Q Can we stay on Syria just for a minute? I want to ask you if there are any plans for the Syrian Foreign Minister to visit here during the first week of August?

A First week of August?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't think there's anything to that. There are no plans. There obviously has been discussion on the Secretary's previous visit to Syria and again on this occasion of Foreign Minister Khaddam's coming to the United States. There was the formation of the working group, but I think nothing is set on any of those dates.

Q Have you checked in the last 24 hours?

A I don't think I need to check. I'm not aware of any pending visit.

Q Of any Syrian?

A Of any Syrian visit.

Q Following the Secretary's trip and his meeting with the President Friday, where do you go from here? What's next?

A The Secretary has reported to the President. A series of consultations of a kind that one would expect in the wake the Secretary's trip are going on, and obviously diplomatic activity is going forward. When we have anything to say beyond that, we'll say it.

Q Isn't Phil Habib coming back?

A Habib, I think, is already back.

Q What's the diplomatic activity that's going on? Can you give us some examples?

A No. We never get into that kind of thing. But a number of people have been helpful on this overall question; are active, continue to be active. We're working with them.

Q Would you agree with the assessments that the failure to convince Syria to withdraw has brought the whole Middle East peace process to a halt?

A We don't accept that it's been brought to a halt. I think the Secretary was frank in his assessment of the disagreement between himself and President Assad and the lack of movement at this time by the Syrians, but that doesn't mean that we have given up our efforts to persuade all foreign forces to remove themselves from Lebanon.

Q A broader question. Could you point me to some place where there is movement?

A No, I can't point to movement at the moment. I think, as I say, the Secretary was very frank about the results of his talks with President Assad.

Q John, yesterday, the Lebanese Prime Minister put some question marks on whether or not Gemayel was coming here. As far as you know, Gemayel --

A It's all on schedule and he'll be here.

Q Do the diplomatic activities, trying to get Syria to withdraw, involve the Soviet Union, and has there been any talks with Ambassador Dobrynin?

A To my knowledge, there have been no talks between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin since he got back from the Far East. I don't think there's been communication. The Soviet Union is clearly well aware of our viewpoint on Lebanon and the Middle East.

Q But on the first part of the question, they are involved?

A I don't know of any new involvement with the Soviet Union since we got back.

Q There is still consideration in some manner tying the Israeli redeployment to an effort to get the Israelis to accept a fixed schedule for total withdrawal?

A First of all, the Israelis haven't announced a redeployment, so I think you would have to wait for that, and whether it takes place, whether such an announcement comes.

Q Are we consulting --

Q Wait a minute. Is there consideration in this building at this time of trying to get the Israelis to link any redeployment to a fixed schedule for a total withdrawal so that the Americans can use that in an effort to get the Syrians to withdraw?

A Our approach to any redeployment, should it be announced, is very clear. The Secretary made it clear on the trip that this has to be seen and looked at within the context of our objectives which are sovereignty for Lebanon, security for Israel and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. What works for those objectives, we're for.

Q The Israelis have apparently asked for some American help in the redeployment. What I'm asking is, is consideration being given to this government's tying any help we might provide the Israelis to a --

A I don't think the United States has given any commitment or any indication, if you're talking about the MNF, which I gather you are, of any increased role at this time for the MNF.

Q If I may follow up? But you don't rule out the possibility of an increased U.S. role because --

A You always get trapped in these questions, "do you rule out," because then everybody goes off and writes a story that the United States does not rule out. I want to stress that we're talking in an abstract academic sense in the same way that we have all along. Namely, when you get a plan for troop withdrawal from Lebanon, should there be a request for a redeployment of U.S. forces or an increase of U.S. forces that will be the time to look at it.

Q So it is possible --

A But there's no change in that position.

Q May I ask another question?

A Sure.

Q Will Habib be joining in the meetings next week with President Gemayel, and is Draper coming back for that?

A Sorry, the latter part was?

Q And is Draper coming back for this?

A Ambassador Draper is in Israel today, and I think may well be back in the United States shortly. I don't know what Ambassador Habib's plans are. As you know, he operates on a very tight, short schedule from day to day. It certainly would be logical that he would be here for the preparation for those meetings. I don't know whether he would be involved in them directly.

Q When did Habib get back?

A I think he got back over the weekend. I'm not sure. I haven't actually seen him.

Q Is there anything set on the coming visit of Mr. Salem, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon?

A No. If he's in Washington, I would expect that he would see various officials here. I don't know exactly what his schedule is. I know that it's been announced that he's coming to the States.

Q When is he coming?

A Anybody have a date on Salem's visit? No.

Q Do you have anything on Chile today?

A No.

Q Nothing?

Q Anything about the extension of the UNIFIL mandate in Lebanon?

A No.

Q John, Poland? I understand the Polish Government has raised claims of $12 billion in damages against the United States over the sanctions. Does the U.S. have anything to say about that claim?

A No. Just saw an initial press report on it.

Q To come back to INF, has there been any progress made at all in this session on INF, Geneva?

A I don't think I'm going to paraphrase the various statements we've made on the progress of INF.

Q Is U.S. reluctance to continue the meeting for another two weeks implying that it would be a waste of time?

A I think I'm going to stand with what we've given you.

Q Before we break up, I would like to make an announcement for Overseas Writers, but I'll wait until you've finished.

A Sure. Go ahead. An announcement for Overseas Writers.

Q I have two questions.

A And two questions. You want to do the announcement first?

Q Finish with that other stuff.

Q Do you have any guidance on a southern African conference yesterday? There were some strong statements made.

A No.

Q Do you have anything to add on the additions of President Reagan's trip to Asia? The White House announced the other --

A No. Simply, the White House, I gather, did announce them today. I think it's Thailand and Manila.

Q Will Secretary Shultz go back with him?

A Yes, sure.

Q A question on Chad. There are reports now that France may be considering sending troops to the side of the government there. Is there any comment on the part of the U.S. Government, or do you have any --

A I think there were reports that Zaire and France might be sending troops. I think obviously those are the two governments concerned, but obviously we support moves by other governments to support --

Q Is the U.S. going to get involved militarily also or --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q -- in logistical supply for France as it did in the past in Zaire?

A Not that I'm aware of.

You want to make your announcement?

Q Yes. The Overseas Writers luncheon with Larry Eagleburger, scheduled for Wednesday, has been cancelled due to the illness of Mr. Eagleburger. It will be rescheduled for late August.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 P.M.)

Olennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #120

WEDNESDAY, JULY 13, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be glad to try a few questions.

Q Anything further on Mr. Kampelman, European security wrap-up for Shultz-Gromyko?

A No. I think Ambassador Kampelman is seeing the President in about an hour and ten minutes from now. I think he's going back to Madrid tonight. I don't have anything beyond that for you.

Q Do you have any sense of whether this is going to be wrapped up optimistically this month or whether it will look like September?

A I don't have anything for you on that, John. The Ambassador is seeing the President.

Q Can you let us know, or can you bring us up to date on what the current demands, or what the conditions are that the United States is posing to Poland in order for a partial easing of sanctions?

A Well, I could refer you to the President's language. As he stated in his speech on June 23, "We are currently consulting with our Allies on the Polish question. Once these consultations are complete, we will decide how to proceed in our relations with Warsaw."

And, in his June 23 speech, I think the President reiterated what he had said on December 10. Namely, "if the Polish Government takes meaningful, liberalizing measures, we are prepared to take equally significant and concrete steps of our own."

Q Would these be taken in concert with the Allies, or would each one follow his own pattern?

A I think we are consulting closely with our Allies right now.

Q In other words, the execution of the decision, would it be done in concert or --

A I would assume it would be taken in concert with our Allies.

Q Do you now expect the Polish Government to follow through with its advance indicators and lift martial law on July 22?

A We'll have to see.

Q In the Secretary's speech last night before the Agricutural group, he made no mention of Solidarity and talked in terms of the workers if they were to get more rights, among other things, the U.S. would appraise its position of sanctions vis-a-vis Poland. Was that an off-the-cuff thing or --

A No.

Q -- or is the U.S. dropping the call for a dialogue between the government and Solidarity?

A No. There's no change in position. The fact is that he was speaking extemporaneously, and you should not read any significance into that. There was no change in the U.S. position.

Q On the sanctions, is it accurate to say at this point that changes in the U.S. policy on sanctions will be related on a one-by-one basis, sanction-by-sanction to any specific moves in Poland, or is the consideration being given to more general action, group action on sanctions, groups of sanctions rather than --

A I'm not going to get into the kind of discussions and thinking that is presently under way. We are consulting with our Allies. We are considering the situation, and when we've got something to say, we'll say it. But I don't have anything for you today.

Q That message was given by Eagleburger to the Polish Charge if significant numbers of political prisoners --

A I'm not going to get into the context of those discussions, but Mr. Eagleburger did talk with the Charge last week.

Q On the political prisoners, are you talking about all the detainees or are you talking about these 13 Solidarity --

A I think I'm going to stand on the rather carefully crafted conditions that we have set out in the past and not try to interpret those again today.

Q Do you have concrete information, John, or is it from press reports that the Polish Government is about to do these things to which you're replying now?

A Why don't we wait and see what happens? I think that's the position that we're going to take.

Q Do you have the schedules for the Emir of Bahrain and the President of Lebanon, and when can we have them?

A You mean the detailed schedules for their visits here? We may -- no, I guess I'm being told we don't yet. I mean, we know the dates they'll be here but I don't have the details of their program.

Q Have you gotten a request today from the Rome Embassy? They're apparently concerned about two cables, alleged cables from the Embassy to Washington. One, dated August '82, the other December '82, in which they are both signed by the Ambassador, allegedly, which go into details of how the Embassy would like to get on the Bulgarian bandwagon and, you know, drum up a whole propaganda campaign.

I understand the Embassy would like to go into details with the press in Rome about how cables are -- the kind of language that is used in cables to demonstrate they are forgeries? Do you have anything on that?

A No, don't know anything about it.

Q Anything on --

Q Would you take that question?

A I don't know anything about it. But assuming that the story is correct, I don't think we would comment or analyze the confidential cables between Embassy and alleged --

Q They're secret?

A Yes.

Q What they're asking State is to be more forthcoming on how cables are -- you know, the kind of language and code that is used to demonstrate that they are clear forgeries.

A Don't know a thing about it.

Q Can you take a look and take it?

A Sure.

Q Another one on the thing about China. Are we withdrawing or considering withdrawing the right of Chinese to transit without visas?

A I do have something on that. That's a fairly complicated situation, and I have something on that for you.

The United States and China did initially allow nationals of both countries transiting on direct and continuous passage the privilege of transit without visa on a reciprocal basis.

Since last December a number of Americans seeking to transit the PRC, the Peoples Republic of China, on Pakistan International Airlines have been detained and fined in Beijing for failure to obtain a Chinese visa. When extended negotiations in Beijing failed to reach a satisfactory resolution to this unilateral action by the Chinese, the Department of State in conjunction with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, withdrew the privilege of transit without visa on direct and continuous passage through the U.S. from Chinese nationals. This decision went into effect June 30, and will be noted in the Federal Register later this week.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q The UPI story I saw from Beijing suggested that actually the U.S. was the first to take people off planes.

A It doesn't appear to be the case.

Q What about the issuances of visas by Taiwan? Has the United States responded to protests from China on this?

A I can't answer that. I'll take a look at it for you.

Q On the Middle East, can you take another crack at the question about a Syrian delegation?

A Nothing on it. There's nothing happening.

Q I think the White House is saying something regarding a Syrian delegation. Do you have any detail?

A I'm not aware of any Syrian delegation coming.

Q The first week of August?

A No. That's what you asked me yesterday, and my answer is still the same. I don't know anything about it.

Q Can you check with the White House?

A I have already checked; I don't know anything about it.

Q Has the White House put out something --

A The White House put out a statement on a Syrian --

Q A Syrian delegation is coming. It's a forgery. (Laughter)

Q Can we get back to Rome for minute, please? To pursue that just a little bit further, could you take the question of whether the State Department unit which publicizes investigations, or publicizes its relevations of KGB forgeries of American documents is investigating a similar incident regarding alleged American Embassy cables?

A Just as soon as I find out what unit is charged with --

Q You can find it in the Press Office. There's a big release that was put out in the Press Office about a month ago with pictures and everything.

A You know, you blindsided me on this particular thing, so let me look at the whole thing and see what we can find out for you.

Q Do you have anything on the protests yesterday in Chile?

A A little on that. Our information is still incomplete, but in general our information appears to be consistent with most of the press accounts we've seen. While considerable evidence of discontent was manifested and one person is reported to have died, preliminary reports indicate that incidents of violence were limited.

As we have said previously, we believe the current political tensions in Chile can best be resolved peacefully through moderation and dialogue regarding national issues such as the transition to democracy.

Q Related question on Chile: In light of the situation in the country now there, would it be fair to say that the U.S. is postponing indefinitely its desire to certify Chile for military aid?

A Don't have anything for you on certification.

Q Is that still under review, then?

A I'm sure it's still under review.

Q The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee issued a statement this morning or yesterday, calling on the Justice Department to investigate the reasoning for the pressure put on the State Department to delete 50 paragraphs from the GAO report, and that a deletion of these parts puts Israeli interests above U.S. national interests.

Do you have a comment on that?

A No. Don't have any comment on it.

Q Is the State Department entertaining a request for asylum from two Soviet musicians, Viktoria Mullova and Vakhtang Zhordania who defected in Finland on the 26th of June?

A I think that there is some earlier guidance on that, although I don't happen to have it with me at the moment, but I think there has been some in the past few days. We can dig that out for you.

Q May I ask a follow-up? Does the United States recognize the principle of artistic asylum? That is, asylum being granted to artists who are not free to practice their craft as they choose? Is that considered a political --

A You're going beyond my off-the-cuff interpretation of international law, I'm afraid.

Q Has the U.S. visa for Ruben Zamora been lifted?

A We have some guidance on that, too, as of a few days ago, and I understand the answer to that question is no.

Q He doesn't have an existing visa.

A Maybe I shouldn't try to recall guidance. Unwise action. But there is in fact guidance on it.

Q Could I follow up Lars' question a little bit? Apparently these two Russians may be given asylum because they didn't like the kind of music they played -- repertory -- and, on the other hand, we're being very hard-nosed about Salvadorans and Haitians who say they're going to get killed.

I mean, you know, is there some kind of imbalance here? (Laughter)

A Let me look at the earlier guidance before I try to address the alleged imbalance.

Q On the visa for Zamora question again, he gets a waiver, I understand, every time he comes into the U.S.

A That's correct.

Q Is there a decision now not to grant that waiver if he tries to return?

A The waiver application is on a case-by-case basis, and because of his category he has to apply for a waiver. As I understand it, the United States makes a decision on that waiver case-by-case on each application, so we're talking about another application, presumably.

Q So we have to wait for another application for a decision to come up?

A Right. With a specific travel time.

Q Yesterday the Mexican Foreign Ministry said that Stone had cancelled a visit to meet with the Mexican Foreign Minister. Can you confirm that?

A No, I can't.

Q Do you have anything on Stone's plans now?

A I think he is conferring with our Congressional leaders, and it may well be that he would testify in closed session before certain committees, but I don't know what they are.

Q Do you have any response to the question raised yesterday about U.S. objections or non-objections to an international observer like Monge --

A I think we did. It will be posted.

Q On another subject, is there some doubt now that the Chinese Premier will be visiting the United States this year?

A Nobody has specified when. As you know, that is --

Q The Chinese Foreign Minister is coming here and --

A The Chinese Foreign Minister is coming in --

Q September.

A Around U.N. time.

Q Have you now had any indications from the Chinese that the visit of the Premier may be in question?

A No.

Q Can you take the question?

A Don't need to. I've given you the answer.

Q To follow that, at what level were the protests made to the Chinese about the transit visas?

A I don't know at what level. I'm sure it was through our Embassy in Beijing, but I'm not sure at what level.

Q Has a protest been made here to the --

A Anybody got any light on that?

MR. ROMBERG: Discussion.

A Does anybody know whether we did anything here as well? (No response) Don't know. Sorry.

Q Can you say anything about Chinese nuclear matters, talks that --

A No. Still hope to get you a backgrounder on that when they're finished, which will probably be tomorrow.

Q What about the story on the U.S. START talks in the Post this morning?

A As you know, that principle of confidentiality applies to that as well.

Q It was broken.

A It wasn't broken by us, and that is an agreement we have with the Soviet Union about the confidentiality, so we're not going to comment on the details of our day-to-day negotiations.

Just to remind you that on June 8 the President announced changes in the U.S. START position designed to move the negotiations forward. The United States now has presented a draft treaty in the negotiations which reflects those changes as well as the additional flexibility which the President has given Ambassador Rowny to explore all appropriate avenues for meeting our strategic arms reduction goals.

Without commenting on the details of this morning's Washington Post story, during this round the Soviets have provided additional information, elaborating their proposal. We hope that the further information they have provided indicates a Soviet intention to show similar flexibility and to move the negotiations forward.

But I want to emphasize that these are serious negotiations, and we do not intend to characterize them beyond that.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Would you not characterize whatever the Soviets have put forward as a new proposal?

A I would refer you to the language we've used here, and that is providing additional information elaborating their proposal.

Q Are the talks going to adjourn this week as --

A On schedule, as far as I know.

Q The sources at the talks say that there is no schedule.

A I can't help you on that.

Q Does that additional information add up to flexibility?

A I think, again, I'd refer you to our hope that the further information they've provided indicates a Soviet intention to show similar flexibility.

Q Why can't you tell by looking at it whether its flexible or not?

A It's a complicated matter, and those negotiations are taking place in Geneva, not at this podium.

Q Does the Secretary plan to meet with Ambassador Dobrynin today?

A I don't think Ambassador Dobrynin is on his schedule today. I don't think so. I would have to check on that one.

Q If he were not on the schedule, he would not be meeting him, is that correct? (Laughter)

A I know that's a trick question. I don't think he's seeing Dobrynin today, but I'm not sure.

Q On the public schedule there's a listing for Eagleburger to meet with Israeli Ambassador Netangahu. Is that --

A Minister, yes.

Q Is that a misspelling for Netanyahu?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I thought it was.

Q Is that in preparation for Begin's visit?

A I don't know what they're going to talk about. He sees him from time to time, as you know.

Q Veliotes is meeting with Ambassador Ghorbal?

A I don't know what they're talking about either.

Q What is the State Department's position about a reported conference called for by former President Jimmy Carter about the Middle East, with the participation of the Israelis, the Egyptians, the Jordanians, and the PLO?

The invitation was to be sponsored by the Carter Center at Emory University.

A I think my colleague, Mr. Romberg, had some carefully crafted words on that while I was away. There is some guidance on that.*

Q Anything on fighting either in Chad or the Western Sahara?

A Not in the Western Sahara. I don't know that what we have to say about Chad is very illuminating. We've seen the reports that Habre's forces have retaken Abeche. Fighting continues in the vicinity of the city. As I think I told you yesterday, Habre's forces seized Oum Chalouba earlier in the week. That's about the extent of my illuminating update.

*Note: The Spokesman misunderstood the question and there is not any guidance on this Conference.

Q Also, do you have anything -- there are hints that Brazilian officials have spoken with State Department officials here about their debt problems that are coming up at the end of this week.

A I might have something for you later in the day on that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, July 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #121

THURSDAY, JULY 14, 1983, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I would like to pay tribute to the State Department engineers who have reduced the temperature in this briefing room today over the last few days. I don't know who's responsible for that, but they certainly deserve an accolade.

Q Does this mean the news will increase in substance as well? (Laughter)

A Be careful, I'll freeze you out, Bernie.

I have a few announcements. The first relates to the assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Brussels today. The United States deeply regrets the senseless murder today of another Turkish diplomat. Durson Aksoy, an Attache' at the Turkish Embassy in Brussels was shot and killed this morning as he was driving to his office. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia reportedly has claimed responsibility.

This attack is the latest in a long series of terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats throughout the world. The United States strongly condemns these vicious and senseless acts. We call upon all nations to take strong action against such terrorist acts.

An item on the Secretary's public schedule inadvertently was left off today. Secretary Shultz will be meeting in closed session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon at 4:15. He will be discussing his recent trip to the Far East and the Middle East.

Also available in the Press Office at 3:00 o'clock this afternoon will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is POWs-MIAs.

Also available in the Press Office is a statement on the signing of an extradition treaty between the United States and Ireland. This was a treaty signed in Washington yesterday on the United States side by William French Smith, Attorney General, and on the Irish Government side by

Mr. Peter Sutherland, the Irish Attorney General. That statement is available in the Press Office.

That's all I have for you in the way of announcements.

Q Can you tell us anything about reports that the United States is prepared to increase its activities along the Nicaraguan border?

A No, I can't. But traditionally, when we have been asked about alleged intelligence activities, we have declined any comment and we'll continue to do so.

Q Could you then address possibly the numbers of Contras. In early May they were estimated at 7,000, by early June up to 8,000, and last week the State Department said they were 8-10,000.

Can you explain the sudden rise in numbers?

A No. Afraid I can't. I don't know how we issued that figure last week. I wasn't here last week. I don't know quite how we came to that calculation.

Q Are these numbers still accurate, or has the number increased since last week?

A I don't know. I have no idea. I'll have to do a little checking on that for you.

Q What is the Reagan Administration's attitude toward Article 18 of the OAS Charter which deals with the use of force?

A I would have to draw on material which we undoubtedly have offered you before on that question.

Q It's not been stated publicly? It's not been stated on the record?

A I would have to draw on various policy statements we have made before in this area. I'm sure we've addressed the general principle.

Q Secretary Enders, I think, was the only one to comment publicly, and he said that it was one of the considerations to be taken to determine national security interests of the United States. That was on the Hill.

I was wondering if we could just get a more -- whether we consider that a pledge to the OAS?

A I don't promise to do a great deal of research into statements we may have made, but let me look and see what is instantly available.

Q President Reagan, in the April Joint Session speech, talked about the U.S. position vis-a-vis Nicaragua, and he said that the only thing the United States wants to do in Nicaragua is to prevent the flow of arms and revolution.

Is that still the case today?

A I'm sure the President stands by his words, and I'm sure they remain constant.

Q But is that still the policy of the United States?

A To my knowledge, it is. Surely.

Q What is the status of negotiations between the Administration, to the extent you can tell us, and members of the House of Representatives on covert actions?

A I'm afraid I can't tell you. I'm sure that those consultations have been going on and are continuing, but I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Follow up further on that: The House Intelligence Committee back in May, following the President's speech a week or so after, wrote that there are lots of ways to interdict arms, but that the way the Administration has chosen to do it strains credibility.

Does the Administration, using any methods other than the ones that it does not acknowledge to --

A Tempting though it is to be drawn into a discussion of what we might or might not be doing in the area of intelligence, I'm going to decline that tempting bait.

Q I wasn't asking about intelligence; I was asking about arms interdiction.

A I think you are in fact asking about intelligence.

Q Does the United States seek a change in the Government of Nicaragua?

A I think that, again, I would refer you to statements we have made on that particular point, which I know we have made before.

Q Change. I didn't say "overthrow." I said change. (Laughter)

A I'll refer you to the statements that we have made on this subject previously.

Q Do you expect any statement out of these talks with the Chinese on nuclear matters? Any agreement?

A We are striving to get a backgrounder out of those talks. I do not know whether it will be this afternoon, in view of the possible lateness of the hour at which those discussions conclude.

It conceivably could be late this afternoon. I think it is now more likely that it will be tomorrow morning if we can produce --

Q Do you expect that there will be an initialing or a signing, whatever, today?

A I can't tell you.

Q If there is going to be one, will it be today?

A I honestly can't answer that question, because they're in session, and they will be in session until late this afternoon. I honestly can't tell you.

Q Quite apart from the backgrounder -- or a possible backgrounder -- when the talks are concluded, will you then as expeditiously as possible put out some statement that you have either accomplished or not accomplished, or whatever the result is?

A We don't have any problem with that, but there are two parties involved here, and the two parties, I think, will have to agree on how that information is disseminated. But, as far as we're concerned, we will be as cooperative as possible.

Q Could you possibly be more specific about the lateness of the hour at which the talks will conclude?

A I think it may be after 5:00 o'clock.

Q Much after 5:00 o'clock? 6:00, 7:00, 8:00, 9:00, or --

A I don't know. It depends on them.

Q To the Middle East: There was an announcement that President Amin Gemayel will be delivering a speech Saturday the 23rd in the Washington Convention Center.

My question is about the State Department requiring that everybody who will attend this, to listen to the lecture, will have to give his name, address or phone number or Social Security, due to the request of the State Department.

Would you answer why is this procedure undertaken?

A I didn't know we had suggested this procedure. Anybody know anything about this, that we should list names, addresses and Social Security numbers of everybody attending the speech?

Q Yes. The National Association of --

A A public speech by the President of Lebanon?

Q The National Association of Arab-Americans which is sponsoring the function has put in the pamphlets and brochures that they sent out and the telegrams, that the State Department requested that each one will have his name, Social Security and phone number given in advance before entering the --

A I'm sorry. Which is the organization?

Q The National Association of Arab-Americans.

A Is quoting the State Department?

Q Yes.

A There's something that doesn't quite hang together here for me.

Q That's why I asked the question, because I thought this was abnormal.

A I'm not sure whether to ask you to pursue that with the organization or with ourselves. I'm not aware of any --

MR. ROMBERG: It may be security.

A It may be a security provision, but I'm not familiar --

Q You know, you requested that. According to the brochures it's the State Department --

A Let me see if we can dig up something on it --

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything on the questions we asked yesterday about the alleged forged documents that were published or made available?

A Yes, I do. I very carefully thought I had brought those with me. I think I now discover that I haven't. We can produce those for you in the Press Office after this briefing.

Q The text?

A The text of the forgeries, yes, unless I can put my hand on them. We have retrieved the situation. We'll have to make this a two-man briefing. You may still collect the text of the forgeries from the Press Office afterwards. What I will do is go over what our Embassy in Rome said yesterday as a result of inquiries.

The two purported telegrams sent from the American Embassy in Rome in August and December 1982 are fabrications. They fit a pattern of KGB forgeries and similar fabrications which the Soviets have been circulating in Europe, and we call your attention to the April 1983 Foreign Affairs Note which we produced on Soviet active measures. That's available also in the Press Office afterwards with the text which describes similar incidents.

The two cables are clearly intended to discredit the United States as well as the Italian magistracy that is investigating the possible involvement of Bulgarian agents in the Papal assassination attempt. This forgery fits into the pattern of other KGB faked U.S. Government documents that have come to our attention in recent months. These include a phony Carter Administration NSC document on Poland that surfaced in February in the Spanish news weekly Tiempo; a fake speech on U.S. policy toward the Third World by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, that surfaced in India in February; and a fake internal Embassy document that appeared in Nigeria in April, alleging that our Ambassador there, Ambassador Pickering, wanted the assassination of two political leaders.

We know from defectors from the Soviet Union that this is the type of activity the KGB frequently undertakes. As you know, there's quite a history of Soviet efforts to try to mislead public opinion by floating false documents to the press as well as other active measures.

It's unfortunate that the Soviets stoop to this type of activity, and naturally we deplore efforts such as these which suggest that the United States is in any way interfering with the Italian investigation of the possible communist involvement in the assassination attempt on the Pope.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q By issuing that sort of statement, and the language in it, aren't you kind of implicitly tying the KGB to the plot itself?

A No, I don't think so. I think we're attempting to be scrupulously objective. I think we're saying also that we're not able to prove these are KGB documents, but we're drawing some obvious implications as to who has the most to benefit from such forgeries, and pointing out that this is in the framework of similar activity. I think we'll just try to make factual observations along those lines.

Q What does the U.S. think the KGB or the Soviet Union has to gain -- I don't have the exact words, but it sounded like you were saying something like, we take a look at who has to gain from that. What do they have to gain by making it look like the U.S. is drumming up a PR campaign to involve the Bulgarian connection?

A I think that the United States in this particular situation has been scrupulously correct in supporting the judicial process that is going forward. I think it would be improper of the United States to interfere, or to be seen to have interfered in any way with that process.

I assume that any disinformation which would suggest that the United States is manipulating the situation would react against our credit and to the credit of those who seek to sow mischief.

Q My question is also aimed at determining whether the U.S. believes that these forgeries were aimed at discrediting the U.S. or at bolstering Bulgaria's position, or do you see them as both the same?

A I leave the interpretation to you. But it seems to me it could have both.

Q I have two questions. Do you have anything to say today about Israeli redeployment in Lebanon?

A No.

Q You won't confirm -- have we been discussing with the Israelis or giving them any sort of approval?

A No. Our aims remain constant in Lebanon. Namely, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, security and sovereignty of Lebanon, and Israel's legitimate security needs on their northern border.

As you know, there have been no announcements of a deployment, but we would look at such a deployment within the context of those goals.

Q Let me ask one more question. The other day I asked about this Israeli-South African Conference that's supposed to be going on in Vienna, and I asked whether the U.S. is going to withdraw funding. Has it?

A Did I offer to look into that for you?

MR. ROMBERG: There's a posting on that.

Q No, beyond that answer. You remember, I asked whether the U.S. was going to take off funding; you said you would look into it.

MR. ROMBERG: There's a posting on it.

MR. HUGHES: Mr. Romberg is being very stern.

Q I'll try a third one. Do you have any comment about the continuing controversy over the GAO report regarding Israeli aid?

A No, I don't.

Q Regarding the question of redeployment, did anyone from the State Department participate yesterday in the meeting at the Pentagon where two Israeli generals presented the Israeli ideas on redeployment?

A I'm not sure whether anybody from the State Department was present at that or not.

Q Could you take that question?

A Let me not promise to answer it because I don't really want to be tied down to answering which State Department officials were where at any particular time. But let me see if there's something we might offer you on it.

Q You said in your answer before that there was no Israeli announcement on redeployment, but did Israel notify you about any such decision?

A Under which circumstances? Notify us when, how, where.

Q That might be the next question. (Laughter)

A Not to my knowledge.

Q In other words, you're talking public announcements. I'm talking about --

A I'm talking about public announcements.

Q I'm asking you about any notification or announcement which wasn't public but informing you about such a decision.

A As you know, the Secretary of State was in Israel and had discussions with a number of officials. As you know, Israeli officials meet American officials here all the time, but I'm not going to get into the substance of those discussions and whether they have or haven't discussed it.

Q And one more question. Do you expect now any redeployment to take place before Mr. Begin comes to Washington?

A You're asking us a question which I think you have to address to the Israeli Government.

Q Any steps being taken in the direction of the formation of working groups, U.S.-Syrian working groups; anything in that area?

A Nothing, I think, beyond what was announced when we were in Damascus. I don't think we have anything more to tell you beyond that.

Q Is there going to be a working group formed?

A There is such a working group; it is in existence. The coordinator of that group is the Assistant Secretary for the area, Mr. Veliotes. I think the Secretary announced at the time that the U.S. representative on the scene would be Ambassador Paganelli, but I don't have anything for you beyond that.

Q Have they met their Syrian counterparts?

A I don't think they have their Syrian counterparts. I don't think such a meeting has taken place yet.

Q Yesterday, you promised to look into the case of the two Soviet musicians who defected, Vakhtang Zhordania and Viktoria Mullova. The question that was raised was whether there was some concept of artistic asylum that the U.S. Government accepted. Do you have anything to say today?

A I have looked into it and refer you to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Q John, do you have anything on Chile and the release of Valdes?

A Yes, I do have something on Chile. We note the decision of the Chilean Court of Appeals to release unconditionally Christian Democratic President Gabriel Valdes and others. The court's decision is an indication that peaceful dissent is protected by Chilean law.

We also have received a report that a representative of the copper workers, after meetings with high Chilean Government officials, stated publicly that the state copper company, CODELCO, would be re-hiring workers who have been active in promoting the June strikes.

Q Have you gotten any confirmation of that?

A No. We have a report. We have a report of his public assurance.

Q Do we still maintain that -- could we get a copy of it?

A Sure.

Q Do we still maintain that dialogue is essential to resolving the present crises or does this relieve tensions enough?

A No. I have to stand by what we've said before on dialogue.

Q The Council of Hemispheric Affairs yesterday issued a communique criticizing this Administration for its relative silence on the events in Chile. Do you have something to say on this?

A No. I think we've said what we have to say.

Q Any further information on the talks between the United States and Egypt on the Ras Banas base?

A No, I don't.

Q There was a report in the Washington Times this morning that when Mr. Begin comes to Washington, he will be discussing the financing of the LAVI -- $6 billion that Israel will be asking the United States to completely undertake the financing of building the LAVI air fighter. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't. I don't know what is on the agenda. I don't know what they will discuss, but it wouldn't strike me as suprising if there was discussion of the LAVI.

Q I have a question related to the GAO report. This morning, the Counselor from the Israeli Embassy in his op-ed piece in the Washington Post, he said that the United States considers Israel as a deterrent force or deterrent against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. This was the reasoning for this special relationship. Is such a thing in the mind of the Administration in the presence of the fact -- the fact of the presence of the largest communist party in the Middle East is inside Israel. You'll undertake this --

A I don't think we're going to change, especially from this podium today, our position on the close relationship the United States has with Israel and the value we attach to that relationship.

Q It's taken, the matter of Soviet deterrence against -- to deter the Soviet expansionism in the area. Is this one of the considerations by the Administration?

A I think there are many reasons that underlie the relationship between the United States and Israel.

Q Would you include this too?

A I'm sure that there are strategic considerations as well, but there are sentimental and emotional, all kinds of reasons for that attachment.

Q Can you confirm that the Syrian Foreign Minister will be here the first week of August?

A No, I cannot confirm that the Syrian Foreign Minister will be here the first week of August. I think you're chasing a hare that is off the track.

Q But you're not precluding? (Laughter)

A One never -- I've long since learned in this situation never to set one's face against anything, but I know of no such plans for meetings.

Q Do you have anything on the United States and the Soviet Union possibily beginning talks on banning anti-satellite weapons?

A I think we might have some guidance later in the day on that.

Q Can I take you back to your favorite subject on Central America for just a moment, please?

A Sure.

Q Will you comment at all on the size of the budget for arms interdiction activities in Central America?

A No.

Q Will you comment on the apparent discrepancy between what House Minority Leader Robert Michel believes is the number of insurgents in Nicaragua, and what the State Department said the number of insurgents in Nicaragua is?

A Comment on it? No.

Q Do you have a comment on Hinton's remarks yesterday?

A No, other than Ambassador Hinton's remarks were -- we were aware of the remarks before he made them.

Q Are there still plans for him to go to a forward assignment from here now?

A To -- sorry?

Q I can't remember it. It's State Department lingo. A forward assignment --

A State Department lingo? I do not think that in my absence a new assignment has been announced for him.

Q They said, when they made all of the announcements official, as to the various departures and installations, they said he would be going on to a forward assignment.

A To another diplomatic assignment?

Q Yes.

A I'm sure there's no change in that. I'm sure he will.

Q Do you have any information about an alleged letter sent by 400 European legislators to the Congress about the U.S. policy in Central America, and if you do --

A Alleged? No, I'm afraid I don't. I'm not up on that one.

Q Now that Ambassador Kampelman has gone back to Madrid, can you tell us anything further about what he's going to do there, or is the situation still as described several days ago; if it were the last of his conferences, that he's going to go back and do some further negotiation, or what?

A Yes, that is the case. The business of the Madrid meeting is not yet completed. Ambassador Kampelman met with the President yesterday and received his instructions on the meeting. He went back to Madrid last night, and he will carry out the President's instructions at the appropriate time. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, July 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #122

FRIDAY, JULY 15, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a number of announcements. First, on that query we had yesterday concerning President Gemayel's address, no State Department request has been made for name, address, Social Security number. That must have been something that came from the Embassy of Lebanon, and you might want to talk to them about that; but we have made no request for such data. That clears up that one.

Q It wasn't my question, but I understood that the NAAA is saying that this is one of the State Department's requirements. Did you talk to the NAAA about this, did anybody?

A Talk to who?

Q National Association of Arab Americans.

A No, but I can assure you that there has been no State Department request for that data. So that statement is not correct.

A couple of other announcements, the Thirty-second meeting of the ANZUS Council is being hosted by the Secretary of State at the State Department, Monday and Tuesday. The Council members will be the Honorable Warren Cooper, Minister of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand; the Honorable William Hayden, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia; and the Honorable George Shultz, Secretary of State of the United States. Other key participants will be Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Australian Minister of Defense Gordon Scholes. I may not be getting that pronunciation correct.

The ANZUS Treaty is the security treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, in force since 1952. The Treaty established a Council of Foreign Ministers which meets annually.

The Council meeting will consider global and regional issues of concern to the ANZUS alliance. It also will review current ANZUS activities and the future directions of the alliance.

There will be a joint press conference by the Council members at the conclusion of the Council meeting on Tuesday at 5:00 p.m. in the Loy Henderson Room. We'll get details on that press conference to you later.

Q You left out the New Zealand Minister of Defense.

A Did I? Beg pardon. Apologies to New Zealand.

Q We'll get Miss Universe after you. (Laughter)

A Apologies to New Zealand.

The Greek base announcement: The Governments of the United States and Greece announced today completion of successful negotiations on a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. Negotiations, begun last October in Athens, were conducted by delegations headed by Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kapsis, on the Greek side. The text was initialed by the negotiators, and the agreement will be formally signed at a future date.

The United States sets great importance on its relationship with Greece, a relationship based on shared values and enriched by ties of kinship. Throughout our history as independent states, we have been close friends and allies. We believe this agreement will benefit both countries, their bilateral relationship, and the NATO Alliance to which they both belong.

The agreement authorizes the United States to maintain military facilities in Greece under terms and conditions that have been agreed between the parties. As an element of United States-Greek defense cooperation, the Administration has requested up to $500 million in foreign military sales credits for Greece for Fiscal Year 1984.

In that connection, we will hold a BACKGROUND briefing on the conclusion of the base negotiations this afternoon at 4:30 here in the briefing room.

Q Is it possible to get some information before then, John?

A I could give you --

Q Is there a fact sheet or something?

A No. As a matter of fact, I really don't have anything I could give you before then. We can hold that until --

Q It's much too late.

A It's the best we can do. We haven't had --

Q They've had a briefing already in Greece hours ago.

A I'm sorry, Bernie, but ours is going to be at 4:30 this afternoon.

Q John, there's one --

A Do you want to let me finish these before you get into this?

Just to remind you, at 1:30 today in the briefing room, there will be a backgrounder here on the China nuclear talks.

Another reminder that at 2:30 today, this one ON THE RECORD, here in the briefing room, there will be a joint press conference by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Allen Wallis and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Moriyuki Motono on the United States-Japan Economic Subcabinet Consultations.

Let me just run over those again for you, as it's a busy day: 1:30 today, BACKGROUNDER, on the China nuclear talks; 2:30 ON THE RECORD here today, joint press conference on the Japanese Subcabinet Consultations; 4:30 this afternoon, BACKGROUNDER on the Greek base negotiations. That's all I have.

Q You won't take any questions on the Greek bases?

A No. You'll get a full readout this afternoon.

Q John, let me just try one because we're getting some calls on this already. Our story out of Athens quotes Papandreou as saying there is a provision to remove the bases after the five years' term has expired. We're getting calls from sources who won't identify themselves saying there is no such provision in the agreement.

Can you address that?

A No. I'm going to leave that for the briefer who will be here at 4:30 to address those questions.

Q On another matter, do you know if any serving diplomats accredited in the United States are involved or --

A Sorry. "Are any --"

Q Are any foreign accredited diplomats serving now in the United States involved in this kidnapping of the wife of the former Salvadoran Ambassador?

A That investigation is going on, Jim, and I think I really would refer you to the FBI. There have been some reports about involvement of a Guatemalan diplomat, and we are really not able to give you anything on that because the investigation is still going on. However, I understand that the Guatemalan Embassy -- without confirming this in any way, and we're not confirming it in any way -- has said that in the event any of their diplomats were involved, diplomatic immunity would be waived in this case. But I think you'll have to talk to the FBI and to them.

Q John, in regard to "some reports of the involvement of a Guatemalan diplomat," are those your reports -- just to make a distinction on that? Is this a State Department report?

A We're just simply addressing ourselves to reports that have been given to us by others.

Q Others. But these are not press reports?

A Yes, some of them are press reports.

Q Concerning the Greek agreement, you used the word "facilities," is it intentionally that it's being used in the report?

A We're talking about the existing facilities. You shouldn't read any significance into that. We're talking about the existing bases.

Q John, getting back to this Salvadoran diplomat kidnapping, does the State Department draw any connection at all between this criminal incident and recent threats made by the left in El Salvador against American officials?

A I don't think I have anything for you on that, Ralph, because the investigation is continuing. We've seen those same reports that you're talking about, but as the investigation is going on, I think it would really be unwise to speculate.

Q Just to clarify, are you saying that at this point you consider the matter to be a totally criminal matter and not in any way a policy, diplomacy matter? Or are you saying at this point that because you're not sure of the results of the investigation, you can't draw that conclusion yet one way or another?

A I think what we're saying is that the FBI is investigating it; and until we have some further word on what is involved here, it would be unwise to speculate -- foolish to speculate.

Q Do you have any comment on the developments in Beirut today?

A Well, not a great deal. I take it you're talking about the clashes?

Q Yes.

A We've only got preliminary reports, and we regret these incidents apparently taking place as the Central Government of Lebanon moves to assert its control. We continue to support the efforts of the Lebanese Government to consolidate its authority, and we hope that all parties in Lebanon will cooperate in these efforts.

-- MORE --

Q Just for guidance on this 1:30 briefing on the nuclear talks, is there some formal agreement attached to this or is it just a kind of --

A Let me give you a few words on that. At the invitation of Secretary Shultz, a nuclear delegation from the Peoples Republic of China, headed by Comissioner Jia of the State Science & Technology Commission, has been visiting Washington from July 11 through July 14, and, as you know, they've had talks with the U.S. delegation headed by Ambassador-at-Large Richard T. Kennedy.

The talks were held with a view to establishing a firm basis for bilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and they covered a full range of issues. The talks were thorough, frank and friendly, and good progress was made. Both sides agreed that they will continue the talks at an early date. I think the briefer, at 1:30, will expand on that statement.

Q In other words, there was no agreement?

A I think the words speak for themselves.

Q No, it's a legitimate question.

A Why don't you wait until 1:30 and have the expert tell you exactly what happened?

Q On Lebanon. The head of the Shi'ite sect, the spiritual mufti chief, had called for the resignation of the Government of President Gemayel --

A The Government of --

Q Gemayel -- the Gemayel Government. How do you look at this? This is the biggest sect in Lebanon calling for the government to resign, and your comment to support the government is in direct opposition to the sect.

A I don't have any specific comment on that. There isn't any question about the United States' view of the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government.

Q Did any shells fall near the Marines or on the ships that you have there?

A I don't know. I honestly don't know. We haven't got a report on that yet.

Q Where is your call for national conciliation? Where do you stand on it?

A Our call for national --

Q For conciliation between various Lebanese sects?

A Unchanged.

Q Unchanged?

A Yes, of course.

Q The mufti of Lebanon, of the Sunni sect now, called a couple days ago for the government to treat Sunni Moslems and Christians alike. Where do you stand on this?

A We're not going to respond to such specific statements by individual leaders and politicians. But our statements about the legitimacy of the Government of Lebanon, our support for the Government of Lebanon to restore its authority, sovereignty, over the entire country, our insistence on the withdrawal of all foreign forces -- Israeli, Syrian, PLO -- along with appropriate safeguards for Israeli security on its northern border, those principles are unchanged and clearly stand. We will look at developments in Lebanon within that framework.

Q But, John, I'm not asking you about the principle of your policy in this regard.

A I know. You're asking me for specific comment, and I'm saying I'm not going to give you a specific comment on specific calls by individual leaders.

Q Will you support the Lebanese Government regardless of how the rest of the Lebanese feel towards this government?

A Our recognition of the legitimacy of the Lebanese Government is unchanged.

Q On the GAO report, if we may rehash a little bit, the Justice Department seems to be initiating some sort of action upon the recommendations of the General Accounting Office to look into the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee's release, purported release of the classified segments, or rather segments classified because of the State Department.

What is the State Department's involvement in that action, if there is going to be any legal action to follow? Were any recommendations made by State on that?

A I don't think the State Department would have involvement in judicial action undertaken by the Justice Department.

Q Only because those segements were deleted upon the recommendation of State.

A I'm not aware of any involvement.

Q Could you look into it in case --

A I think we probably wouldn't comment on interagency dialogue, if there is any. And I'm not aware that there is any.

Q There is information in Beirut today that President Gemayel ratified today the agreement with Israel. Do you have any information?

A No, I wasn't aware of that. I didn't know that.

Q Change subject?

A Change subject? Still stay on the Middle East? Okay.

Q With Lebanon, in particular. Has there been any contacts with the Lebanese Government concerning the possibility of postponing the visit of President Gemayel?

A Not that I'm aware of. As far as I'm aware, plans are unchanged for President Gemayel's visit.

Q One more question about the -- since the agreement was mentioned, do you have any information when the exchange of ratification, the instrument of ratification would take place?

A No, I don't.

Q Is the U.S. involved in --

A No, I think that will be a decision for the Lebanese and the Israeli Governments.

Q Do you see any importance that this step, this stage would take place as soon as possible?

A No. I think you'd have to ask the governments concerned.

Q Is there a redeployment by the Israelis taking place now?

A A redeployment taking place now?

Q The start of the redeployment?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q How do you call the movements carried on now by the Israelis?

A I don't know. I've seen some press reports of movements, and I've seen some press reports denying that redeployment is underway. But I'm talking only about press reports. Are we all done on Lebanon?

Q Do you have anything on the U.S. position on the International Development Association that was exposed yesterday?

A No.

Q Could you look into it because the decision seems to be at odds with Shultz's statement.

A I'll see if we have anything for you on that.

Q There's a report from Bonn that Foreign Minister Genscher has publicly welcomed the U.S. decision approving final agreement on the Madrid Conference. Anything from here on that?

A No.

Q Back on the Greek agreement for a minute. I was interested to note that you characterized the talks with the Chinese as thorough, frank and friendly. Would you characterize the Greek-U.S. negotiations as thorough, frank and friendly as well?

A I'm sure they've been thorough, and I'm sure that they've been frank, and apparently they've been friendly.

Q Apparently they've been friendly?

A On the base agreement?

Q Yes.

A Apparently.

Q Do you have anything on passage of the CBI in the House, and do you have anything on Goshko's article on Chile today?

A Nothing on Mr. Goshko's article on Chile. I think the President addressed the welcome passage of the CBI question, and I think you can get that statement from the White House.

Q Do holders of diplomatic visas travelling in the United States, or visiting the United States, have the right to recruit individuals for illegal attacks or other actions against U.S. or NATO military bases here or abroad?

A I think you may be referring to a specific, if I can reduce this question --

Q I have both general and specific interest in the question.

A Why don't you be a little more specific. Of whom are you referring?

Q Specifically, you posted a statement two days ago regarding the visit of Greens to the United States, saying that you have no information indicating that they've violated their visa status.

A That's correct.

Q They stated publicly that the major purpose of their visit was to recruit people for illegal actions against U.S. military and NATO bases, so I want to know, does that -- it would appear that either, when you say you have no information, you don't even pay attention to the public statements of the visitors or that a diplomatic visa does entitle someone to recruit for these illegal activities.

I want to try to pin you down on where the problem is. Whether it's a lack of information or --

A If you keep on going, I actually won't bother to respond at all.

Q I wanted to make clear what my question was.

A What I'm going to say is that the language we offered you on the specific visit of the Greens made clear that in our view they had not contravened the condition under which their visas were issued.

As regards the general philosophical question --

Q No. You said you didn't have information. You didn't say that you were satisfied they hadn't contravened the conditions.

A Why don't you go back and look at the specific language we used.

Q I think I know the specific language. Why don't you look at it.

Q Do you have anything on this U.S. report that the U.S. sent a new warning to the Soviets on not sending missiles to Nicaragua?

A We are not going to get into the specifics of our exchanges with the Soviet Union.

I just would say that both the Governments of the Soviet Union and Cuba are aware and have been aware over a period of time that escalation of the kind of activity we have seen in that area, and particularly the introduction of high-performance aircraft, would be considered a serious matter by the United States. We have said that before. Without getting into the specifics of any communications that we might or might not have had, that position is unchanged.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, JULY 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #123

MONDAY, JULY 18, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q What happens next on the Middle East consultations? Who sees what; what is the intention?

Q Didn't hear the question?

A What happens next in the Middle East. As you know, President Gemayel will be here later this week, and we will be discussing with him a range of ideas during that visit aimed at achieving the goals of the negotiations with and regarding Lebanon. That is, the full withdrawal of all the external forces -- Syrian, Israeli, PLO -- from Lebanon, the extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory, and a strong, stable Lebanese Government and security for Israel's northern border. We look forward to President Gemayel's visit later this week during which we will reaffirm our commitment to these important goals.

Q Are any new ideas coming into the mix?

A We are going to be discussing a range of ideas. As I said, I'm not in a position to predict how those will evolve.

Q New ideas?

A I understood.

Q Alan, the Lebanese Foreign Minister yesterday on "Face on the Nation" asked for a US-USSR dialogue in order to solve the Lebanese crises and the problem of withdrawals. Where do you stand on this?

A As we've said here before, the Middle East has on occasion been discussed beween the U.S. and the Soviet Union, including between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko. Those discussions have always been to keep the Soviets informed about the objectives of our diplomacy in the region. They have not been negotiations.

As the Secretary said in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we urge the Soviets to take a constructive approach toward efforts to find peaceful solutions to regional problems. We will continue those efforts although, as you know, the Soviets have not been very helpful in this regard.

Q How would you describe their role in Lebanon up to now?

A As I say, they have not been very helpful.

Q On previous occasions, I remember that you described it as "destructive." Do you still would like to put this label on it?

A I don't remember the specific quote you're going back to. I think we talked about the presence of the SA-5's and the associated Soviet forces there as a destabilizing element. I believe that's the term that we've used. I don't remember the other one.

Q Can we anticipate any increased role for the Multinational Force in the event of a partial Israeli withdrawal in Lebanon; and, more specifically, are we considering an increase in the U.S. contribution?

A Again, it is still premature to talk about any increase in an MNF role.

Q It's been announced on the Presidential airplane that Dr. Kissinger will head this Commission on Central America. Does the Secretary have any comment on the choice of Dr. Kissinger?

A I haven't had a chance to ask him this morning for his views on that particular subject, so I can't really speak authoritatively to it. As you know, he has consulted frequently and closely with Dr. Kissinger, and has expressed himself in press conferences, for example, on his appreciation for the counsel he's gotten from Dr. Kissinger. But I just haven't asked that specific question. I have no reason to assume that he is other than pleased with the choice.

Q Have any other choices been made?

A I don't know, frankly, whether the other choices have been finally made. Obviously, there must be names being considered, but I would think that that would have to remain, at this point anyway since it's a Presidential Commission, a subject to address to the White House.

Q Does this have any affect on Richard Stone's mission or lack of it?

A I don't know of any affect that this would have on Ambassador Stone's mission; no.

Q Is this appointment made in response to request from figures in the Mideast that they be given assurances that Kissinger not be named to a post there? (Laughter)

Q Are you confirming that he has been appointed?

A I'm not confirming -- Bernie is telling me that there's been an appointment announced on the airplane.

Q It was Shultz who said it, was it not?

A No, the Secretary is --

Q So you can't confirm that in fact a choice has been made?

A No, this is a White House matter that's being discussed. The Secretary talked a little bit about it, I think, this morning on television.

Q Did he confirm it at that time?

A No, he did not confirm it.

Q Do you have anything on the Contadora meeting?

A That's a rather broad way of putting it. I have a couple of different points. I guess the basic one would be that on the reports that the Presidents of the Contadora Group have said that they would be contacting the United States and Cuba about becoming involved in the process. The basic response is that, yes, we've seen press reports but as yet we've received no communications to that effect from the Contadora Four participants. It would be premature, therefore, to offer any U.S. positions.

Q When you said -- not you personally, but a spokesman in the Department said on Friday, when this was announced, that the United States supports the Contadora process as well as initiatives by the Organization of American States.

Why did you mention the Organization of American States? What initiatives are pending before the OAS?

A I think the issue here -- I'm not aware specifically of what might have been in mind, in the mind of the person who was talking about it. The point is that we have addressed these issues -- regional and Central American issues -- before and said we thought that they should be addressed primarily in regional context, by regional institutions and mechanisms, and the OAS certainly has been one of those, the Contadora Group and others.

Q The Contadora Group seems to communicate with the international communities through the United Nations Secretary-General and the U.N. Security Council.

A Not only.

Q Where else have they communicated formally?

A Apparently, they're talking about communicating directly.

Q With respect to a larger international organization of which they are all members, they seem to prefer the Security Council and the Secretary-General, and yet you said explicitly the Organization of American States, leaving no role, apparently, for the United Nations.

Do you take issue with Contadora's propensity to keep reporting to the U.N. and not to the OAS?

A Again, I don't have anything to give you specifically on taking issue or not, but I would repeat what I've said; that our own preference is that these issues be addressed by regional mechanisms and organizations such as the Contadora process itself and such as the OAS.

Q But you're not ruling out a role of the United Nations, are you?

A I'm not ruling anything in or out beyond what I've just said.

Q On the Contadora, they've issued quite a long statement, or declaration yesterday, making a good many points about their view of where the Central American matter stands. Understanding that at this point you only have press reports of it, when you do have their lengthy declaration, which I believe has been made public, will the United States have some comment about how it sees these questions? They raised a whole list of diplomatic, military, political questions in the area. Can we get some U.S. reading on it?

A Let me try and address at least some of that now and see if I can help you on that.

As I said before, we haven't had a chance to fully assess their communique so I can only offer you general observations at this particular point. They did, apparently, address themselves to such issues as limits on arms brought into the region, foreign military advisors, so on and so forth.

As you recall, the United States was a signatory to the San Jose Final Act last October which addressed the elements of a plan for peace and democracy in the region. Some of the same elements reportedly were considered at Cancun. That is, the elimination of foreign military advisors, reductions on the introduction of offensive weapons, non-use of terrority of one country to conduct acts of aggression against another country, and the importance of economic development.

To the extent that those are consistent, we obviously find that those are things that we have already endorsed.

Q Has the United States abided by the San Jose Communique and the principles set forth therein since October when it was put out?

A I don't know if it's a question of abiding by the principles. The idea was to get regional agreement and regional performance and not have any unilateral performance. It's a matter of trying to get everything done in a regional context.

Q On this same subject, among the other things that's mentioned, I believe, is international border patrols. Does the U.S. have any view on that? Would the U.S. be willing --

A I don't have a specific response on that. I think we'd want to look at specifically what's proposed, and also understand what the reaction of the countries in the region to that would be.

Q When you get, I would assume today or within a day or two, the actual text of what they said and get some report about what they're pushing for, be prepared to give some further -- you or somebody -- some further U.S. reaction to what it is the Presidents of these countries are asking for?

A I will pass it on. I cannot promise that in a sense that there may be some desire to do this diplomatically as opposed to publicly. But let me pass on your interest in having that done.

Q There were, over the weekend, a report that Hubert Humphrey (inaudible) to carry reportedly a letter from King Hussein to Mr. Begin, and Mr. Begin had a negative response to it. Do you have anything about that?

A I've also seen reports this morning that both Israel and Jordan have denied that there was any message passed. All I could really say, though, is that Mr. Humphrey was in the Middle East on a private trip, met alone with King Hussein and Prime Minister Begin, and I suggest you check with Mr. Humphrey regarding that.

Q Alan, may I get back just for a minute to the Commission. What is the relationship now of the Commission to the State Department? Will the State Department still make policy recommendations to the President about Central American or does this pretty much remove Central America and that problem from the State Department and put it in another compartment?

A You have a way of asking questions. I think the answer is clearly that the policy process, or mechanism remains here, as it has been, including the interagency process.

As far as the role of the Commission is concerned, I will have to refer you to what briefers, who are briefing on that subject today, may be saying. Perhaps we can also see if we can get a briefing either here or at the White House either tomorrow or at some other point to answer your specific questions. But I would not think that the Department is going to be out of this process. It's a different sort of context, but let leave the subject of the Commission really to people who are specifically addressing that subject today. I don't have anything more to give on that.

Q Who's addressing it today? I didn't hear anything about it.

A The question was just raised. Maybe you didn't listen.

Q No. I'm sorry.

A Who at the White House is addressing it? Again, apparently it was addressed to a certain extent on the plane. I gather from looking at wire reports that there may be some discussion of this in a speech that's coming up. I don't know, so we'll have to look and see.

Q You don't know of any specific briefing on this subject in a sense that we use that word here?

A I don't know of a State Department briefing or a briefing held at the White House, per se. But, again, what the President's party may be saying, I can't tell you.

Q Do we have a time yet for certification briefing?

A For certification briefing?

Q Yes.

A I don't have anything for you on certification at this point.

Q Is the Commission a State Department idea?

A I think that the Commission has a number of people who are interested in it, including, of course, very important people on the Hill. But I can't tell you who all the various players were.

Q Does the Secretary of State have a role in recommending that this Commission be formed, or did he say it wasn't necessary, or it was a good idea?

A I can't go very far down that path without violating our rule about not talking about recommendations to the President and interagency papers. But, certainly, the Secretary supports this.

Q Did you mean to suggest a minute ago that Ambassador Stone is going to have absolutely nothing to do with this Commission, no coordination or --

A No. I didn't mean to say that he will have absolutely nothing to do. But in terms of his role and whether his mandate remains as it has been, and so on, that is unchanged by the Commission. He has a mandate from the President. I'm sure he'll be as interested and pays as much attention to the recommendations of whatever Commission there might be announced -- it hasn't been announced yet -- as anybody else. But it's the President's policy that he will be carrying out, and directives from the President and the Secretary that he will be carrying out.

Q Is there any coordination between former President Carter and anyone in the Department over his reported interest in getting one or two other former Presidents to work out some kind of an arrangement and get leaders from the Middle East to talk to other people here in the United States, or some kind of effort underway to resolve the Middle East problem?

A I'm not aware of any, and I think that President Carter himself indicated that he was looking towards academics and the private sector more than he was towards government.

Q Against the background of the two visits -- Gemayel and Begin -- is there any movement on convening the working group, U.S.-Syria?

A I don't know of anything at this point on any convening of meetings of the U.S.-Syrian working group.

Q Do you have any new indications, or any indications about the Jordanian position towards --

A About the which talks?

Q Do you have any indication about any change or new position of Jordan regarding the peace process?

A I don't have anything new to offer on that, no.

Q Talking about the Commission, you don't happen to know, do you, about how many people are going to be on this Commission?

A I don't have any further information I can share with you on that. It really is going to have to be up to those who will be addressing it when they're addressing it.

Q Let me ask this one detail. Will they have access to cables and documents here?

A Again, I'm going to refer you to whatever briefings are given on the subject. I don't have backup information provide you.

Q Despite the fact that the Cubans, as you requested, are publicizing the sentences they're handing out, the hijackings appear to be continuing. Are there any talks with the Cubans about any other methods or any other possible ideas for deterring or preventing such hijackings?

A I guess I'd offer you two thoughts on that. One is, as we have in the past, we continue to urge the Government of Cuba to continue to make public the punishment of those found guilty of the crime of hijacking. If Cuba continues to sentence hijackers to substantial terms in prison, as it indicated it did, that should serve as a deterrent to further hijackings.

I would note that we don't have the names at this time of the people involved -- the hijackers -- nor do we know what the motive is. It is possible, however, that the seven hijackers involved were people who resorted to violence, in part, because they had been denied a legal means of return to Cuba. To the extent that Cuba would be willing to take back persons who are presently ineligible to return to Cuba under Cuban regulations, take back persons who may wish to return, the number of potential hijackers would be considerably reduced.

Q Has the U.S. responded to the Cuban note of about a month ago?

A I will have to take that question.

Q Is the United States prepared to facilitate their return, to supply the transportation, in other words?

A We have said that if the Cubans would agree to discussing this subject and to moving ahead on this subject that we would be willing to discuss modalities. I can't take it beyond that.

Q These hijackers are not part of the excludables. They're just Mariel refugees who don't want to live in the U.S. anymore. They want to go back. Are they part --

A As I said at the beginning of the second part of what I gave you, we don't have the names of the people who are involved and we don't don't what their motivation is. I was suggesting, in reponse to Jim's question, about what else could we do beyond having them publicize the sentences to try to reduce the hijackings. That is one possible way of handling it, or helping. It may or may not have applied in this case.

Q Are you suggesting any of these ideas directly to the Cubans rather than doing it through this indirect public message?

A We certainly have raised with the Cubans the idea of taking back the people who were sent here who are not able to remain, who are ineligible.

Q In effect, is that not an answer to the note of the Cubans about a month ago?

A We said this consistently. This is not a new position. So I'm not trying to give you here a public answer to that note.

Peter, you've been trying to ask a question.

--MORE--

Q But this is the same subject. I beg your forbearance.

A Go on.

Q I don't understand the public policy principle you're enunciating. What you seem to be saying is that a precondition for an orderly return of people who want to go back to Cuba is that Cuba itself agree to return -- or to have returned on the basis of an agreement with the United States -- all of the excludables from Mariel.

Is that the position you seek to be taking?

A Instead of trying to give you new words, I refer you back to what we said about that in the past.

Q You just said it indicated a precondition.

A I will leave you with the words.

Q Could we get a copy of it? Because it would require much poring over.

A Sure.

Q On Poland, what's your understanding of these reports that indicate the Polish Government is going to transfer several of the laws which are now restricting civil rights and Solidarity and press rights and the martial law to civil law if they lift martial law on the 22nd?

A I don't have anything on that. I think we'd have to wait to see what happens before we would have any response to that.

Q Would this have any effect at all on what our reaction is?

A Again, I think we'd have to see what happens before we respond.

Q The Vice President of Sudan is coming today on a visit, I guess. Do you have anything on this?

A I don't have anything on it. Didn't know it. Sorry.

Q On El Salvador, what is the position of the U.S. on universities and academic freedom, given the arrest of the University Secretary General, Ricardo Calderon Jimenez?

A I don't know anything about the specific case. Our position on academic freedom is quite well known and publicly stated.

Q It applies to El Salvador?

A It applies as a general principle.

Q Would we like to see the universities reopen there?

A I don't have anything to give you on that specific issue today.

Q Aboard the White House plane today apparently the press was told that Ambassador Stone expects to return soon to the region.

Could you narrow that down a little bit?

A I can't really narrow it down a lot for you. He's continuing to consult with congressional leaders and congressional committee leadership in executive session.

As I said before, his mandate continues, and I think it is fair to assume he would return to the region at some point, but there is nothing definite in terms of a schedule to offer you today.

Let me go back. There is some pre-existing guidance, and I will retract my having taken a question and try to give you an answer here on the notes.

The Chief of the Cuban Interests Section, Ramon Sanchez-Parodi, was handed our reply on July 7. This is the reply to the Cuban note of June 17 on return of certain Mariel excludables.

Q Who handed it to him?

A This was done by, I believe, the head of the Cuban Affairs Office.

Q He wasn't called in like the last time to see the Assistant Secretary? It was one of Enders' final acts.

A I'm telling you who gave it to him.

Q Was there any word on the substance of this?

A We reiterated to the Cubans our interest in knowing their response to our specific request, and we also reviewed what we were prepared to do in case they respond positively. For that I would again refer you back to what we said before about renewing immigrant visa issuance. I can't give you details about the meeting.

Q I thought the Cubans responded by saying they were willing to have broader talks on questions of migration. Did we turn that down?

A Again, as I said, I'm not prepared to give you details of the meeting. The talks that we have proposed and would be willing to engage in would be limited to the subject at hand.

Q In other words, would it be fair to assume, then, that you are rejecting the latest Cuban note, telling them that it has to be much more forthcoming than it was?

A I think that, again, I would have to refer you to what I said. We reiterated to the Cubans our interest in knowing what their response is to our specific request, and indicated what we would be willing to do if they responded positively.

Again, we sought, in addition to reiterating that position, clarification of their position on their willingness to entertain the return of these individuals.

Q Do you have anything about the restrictions that will be announced, or were announced, regarding the sale of F-15s and F-16s to four Arab Gulf States? What was the rationale behind this decision?

A I think we have some guidance that goes back some time on that subject actually. The U.S., as it has done in the past, will continue to urge the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to consider seriously purchase of F-16/79 and F-20 aircraft. Both of those fall under what has been called previously FX aircraft.

We believe these highly capable aircraft meet the near-term requirements of these states for modern air defense fighters. These aircraft will also allow the GCC states to provide for their own defensive needs while lessening dependence on external support for operations and maintenance.

We have informed the GCC states that, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Oman, we're prepared to sell advanced aircraft after they have first procured an integrated FX aircraft into their inventories.

Regarding the two exceptions, Saudi Arabia has already purchased advanced aircraft, and we would be prepared to sell an advanced aircraft to Oman if it so requests.

As we discuss aircraft fighter needs with our Gulf friends, we will ensure that FX aircraft are included in all official data presentations and flight demonstrations.

I might note that, for the purpose of this policy, the aircraft covered are F-15, F-16A, F-16/79, F-18, F-20, and fighter-bombers A-7, AV-8 and A-10.

I note that some of the other countries have been given briefings on advanced aircraft, including the F-16, but with the understanding that that did not imply a commitment to sell.

Q Copy of that?

A I'll give you a copy of the first part of it. Yes.

Q Let me ask you this: This means that they will get these FX aircraft and later on they will be able to buy F-16 and F-15 as a first step?

A I'll refer you to the words I've used. I'm not prepared to go beyond that. I said we are prepared to sell advanced aircraft after they have first procured an integrated FX aircraft into their inventory.

Q Why are you urging them? I mean, in competition with whom?

A I'm not trying to address competition with anybody. I'm going to have to leave you with the guidance that I've given you.

Q But I don't understand why you're urging them to buy aircraft.

A Again, I refer you to what I've said. We believe that these highly capable aircraft meet the near-term requirements of these states for modern air defense, and would allow them to provide for their own defensive needs while lessening dependence on external support for operations and maintenance.

Q Do they have anything comparable right now, do you know?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q First, a simple one. Is there a Gemayel backgrounder planned?

A I think there will be backgrounders provided on both President Gemayel's and Prime Minister Begin's visits. You might want to check, since they would involve White House, with the White House.

Q Secondary to that, at the time these meetings were established, I think there was a widespread belief in this Department that there would have been some progress on the withdrawal agreement.

Is there anything that you can now say about what the purpose of these meetings is other than routine consultations with these heads of state?

Is there any possibility of a substantive change in the situation in the Middle East?

A I addressed before the issue of President Gemayel's visit and the objectives and what we intended to do there. I think we've also addressed the terms of Prime Minister Begin's visit. There's certainly a broad agenda to discuss with Mr. Begin.

But I think that probably for more detailed readout or account of what's expected, you should attend those pre-briefs.

Q Over the weekend, President Nimeiri of Sudan issued a statement with regard to Chad, in which he said, among other things, the United States has announced it will assist the legitimate government of Chad; also said it would look with sympathy at any request for aid by the Habre Government.

In addition, the French announced that they were, as I understand it, asking their citizens to leave or telling them it's not safe there.

Does the U.S. (a) have anything to say about its policy towards aid for a Habre Government, and has any warning or other caution been issued to American citizens there?

A   As far as any assistance might be concerned, we've undertaken consultations on the Hill on the subject of how we might be helpful in the present situation, but I don't have anything further for you at this particular point.

In terms of the status of what we might have done regarding American citizens, let me try and get you something and post it a little bit later. I think I can get you something.

Q   Can I ask one other related to this? Also over the weekend, subsequent, I believe, to the briefing which was held here on Friday afternoon, the spokesman for the Greek Government in Athens -- Mr. Marudis or something like that -- stated according to Greek domestic radio that the process for the withdrawal of the American bases will begin effective 1st of January 1989.

He said that the five-month notice -- that is, the termination notice which is called for as part of the agreement which we are making with the Greeks -- does not contain and does not envisage any possibility of renewing, prolonging or revising the agreement.

Is this the understanding of the United States Government?

A   I would refer you to two things. One is the briefing that was given here on Friday. Secondly, I would simply note that the recently initialed agreement -- the DECA -- permits either side to terminate the agreement at the end of five years, or thereafter by giving written notice of termination. This is comparable to agreements we have with other countries.

But I believe that the briefer on Friday also addressed the question of his understanding of that subject, and I refer you to those remarks which I think you probably already have.

Q There was a report in the Times on Sunday about this inter-agency committee saying the situation in Salvador was very grim, and that there should be recommendations for an increase in aid for the Central American region of about 40 percent.

Can you comment on this?

A No. I'm not going to comment specifically on that story or any alleged, leaked document. On the general subject of security assistance, though, I would note that Congress has not yet completed action on the FY-83 security assistance funds requested in March, nor on the FY-84 security assistance proposal, both of which are on the public record.

We've consistently maintained that U.S. policy is not to seek a military solution to the tensions of Central America, but the continued military aid is essential to providing a shield for growing democratic reform.

Our level of security assistance is continually under review. What we need now is what we've already asked for.

Q The Times said that things were going poorly, and the Post said this morning that things were going just fine. Who's correct?

A I think that I will probably, in those terms, stay out of that particular issue, but I can address a little bit the subject of what's happening on the ground.

Since the onset of the Salvadoran national campaign plan on June 10, the Salvadoran military has re-established government control in the strategic department of San Vicente. To coincide with this operation, military department commanders have also increased military operations in their respective areas, causing several guerrilla units to relocate.

These operations have also provoked disruptions in the delivery of supplies to guerrilla groups throughout the country, particularly in the central region of the eastern part of the country.

While the military component of the plan quite obviously must come first, the critical objectives are to re-establish a civilian government presence and to provide for the basic needs of the populace in the operations area.

To date, thousands have been provided with food, employment, and credits for reopening agricultural cooperatives, and to small farmers. Teachers have been rehired, schools reopened, and mobile health teams dispatched. We're encouraged by this well planned military and humanitarian initiative on the part of the Government of El Salvador.

Q Get a copy, please?

A Yes.

Q Also, could I have a follow-up on that? Apparently part of this plan was to establish civil defense forces in remote areas which the army has difficulty keeping under its control.

What are the recruitment provisions of civil defense forces, and the question goes to who is being recruited to serve in those --

A I think you'd have to check with the Salvadorans on that.

Q Do you have any recent information about the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A I don't have a recent update for you on that.

Q In the last few months, I understand there was an intensive effort by the United States to interdict this flow of arms.

You're not talking about it, either because you don't have anything to show or because you're --

A One thing, I think, again I would point up in this particular statement I've made to you -- the sentence which notes that these operations have also provoked disruption from the delivery of supplies to guerrilla groups throughout the country, particularly in the central region of the eastern part of the country.

Whether that, then, translates back into supplies flowing in from outside or whether it's a distribution problem inside, I don't know. I will take a look and see if I can provide you any sort of a more recent update on that.

Q If I can make a follow-up: Were there discussions recently in Managua between the U.S. Ambassador and the authorities there about the flow of arms, and can you report anything about these conversations?

A No. I don't think I would get into the question of diplomatic conversations. Ambassador Quainton does meet, from time to time, with senior officials of the Nicaraguan Government, but I couldn't get into the topics.

Q Are these arms still flowing in from Cuba?

A Are the arms still flowing from Cuba to Nicaragua?

Q To El Salvador.

A Again, as I said, I will check and see what I can get in the way of a more recent reading.

Q Can I just ask a few southern Africa ones? Apparently you announced a new U.S. Ambassador to Mozambique, which I missed. Did you have that announcement? And do you have any reaction to -- there was another bombing in Namibia?

A The answer to the second one is I don't have anything on it. The answer to the first one is it would be a White House announcement, and I would refer you to the White House.

Q I want to ask you two things: One, on the report issued on Friday on the incident in Honduras. Is this the final report, or are you going to update it? Specifically, it would be of interest to find out what kinds of mines these were allegedly, and whether the Nicaraguan army has, to the knowledge of the United States Government, such mines, since you say the Honduran army does not?

A Again, I don't know that there's any plan at all to update this. I think that if there is further information which is relevant, that, obviously, is always a consideration.

We're not exactly in a position to do an inventory of the Nicaraguan army, and the records on that kind of mine go back longer than the records -- we don't have records going back that far on where such mines might have been sold. They're apparently old mines.

All we do know is that the Hondurans don't have them.

Q But you would know whether or not the United States provided such mines to Nicaragua.

A No. That's my point. They go back sufficiently far that there are no records. You can check with the Pentagon, but I think you will find out that there is no record going back as far as those mines go, so you can't do that. Obviously, there was an effort made to try to do that.

Q And I would ask formally for you to reconsider the reference to the Salvadorans on the question of civil defense patrols for two reasons: (1) It's been a matter of policy by this government, enunciated by people at that podium, that the army and nothing but the army should control weapons that are supplied by the United States to El Salvador and not any paramilitary groups -- and that's been a matter of concern.

And (2) because of the overwhelming human rights considerations and concerns of the United States Government with respect to El Salvador and the fear that civil defense squads such as Orden which was outlawed in 1979 abused that, and I'd like you to look into it for those two reasons?

A I will look into it. I can't promise you now.

Q A little follow-up on the Honduran report. When you say that a mine was planted by Nicaraguan forces, do you mean the Government of Nicaragua forces?

A Yes.

Q One final question: Apparently there are people in the world burning to know what's going on in this ANZUS Council. Is there going to be a briefing today or a readout?

A I do not know at this point whether there will be any sort of a readout. I don't know the answer to that question. There will, of course, be the press conference tomorrow.

Q Can you confirm that the Secretary is meeting with Foreign Minister Salem this afternoon?

A No. I heard that Foreign Minister Salem was out of town.

Q They're apparently trying to arrange a meeting this afternoon prior to Gemayel's arrival.

A I don't have any information on it.

(The briefing concluded at 1:06 p.m.)

Olexnor

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #124

TUESDAY, JULY 19, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a few announcements. First, after this briefing we will have a statement available in the Press Office on U.S. aid to Chad. Second, Prime Minister Begin telephoned the President this morning and said that for personal reasons, he will have to postpone his visit to Washington. President Reagan expressed his understanding. The two agreed that they would think in terms of rescheduling the visit sometime later this year.

Announcement on a couple of backgrounders: There will be a BACKGROUND briefing this afternoon on the President's new national bipartisan commission on Central America. That will be in the White House briefing room at 3:00 p.m. The briefing is open to all accredited White House and State Department journalists. The briefing will be piped into the State Department press briefing room.

Lastly, Secretary of State Shultz, along with New Zealand's Foreign Minister Warren Cooper and Australia's Foreign Minister William Hayden will hold a joint press conference at the conclusion of the annual ANZUS Council Meeting this afternoon, at 5:00 p.m. in the Loy Henderson Auditorium. The press conference will be limited to questions concerning ANZUS matters.

Q Is there any opportunity to get the communique in advance?

A The communique? I don't quite know what the timing of the communique's release will be. I think probably not, because I think that the Secretary had to leave the ANZUS meetings this morning in view of arriving dignitaries, and I think he will return this afternoon. So my guess is that they probably will sign off on the communique just before they break, but let me see what we can get for you on that.

Q What impact do you think the Begin postponement will have on the Middle East negotiations in general?

A I think the negotiations will go on. There are all kinds of avenues for that. There are good contacts, good channels for communication with Israel here in Washington and good channels in Jerusalem. Obviously, we're disappointed that the Prime Minister is not able to be here at this time, but we look forward to the rescheduling of his visit.

Q John, can you tell us anything about the substance of the visit of the Amir of Bahrain? Is the future of the base being discussed, and is military aid being discussed?

A I have a stitch dropped there. I'm not sure whether there was in fact a readout at the White House on his visit this morning.

STAFF: There was.

A There was.

Q Back on the Begin visit, is there any thought, was there any suggestion that he could have been replaced by, say, his foreign minister or the defense minister?

A I don't know because I wasn't party to the conversation. I don't know whether that came up. I have no suggestion that it did. I think the Prime Minister simply said that he was unable for personal reasons, for private reasons, to come at this stage, and looked forward to rescheduling it. I don't know that there was any suggestion.

Q In that connection, the issue of possible Israeli redeployment has been sort of pending this visit. Do you expect the Israeli Government to take any action now before the rescheduling of the visit, before the visit actually occurs?

A I don't know. There hasn't been an announcement by the Israeli Government. I think you'd have to ask them, but I think that in terms of any discussion of that, that there has been discussion. Those discussions are able to continue without the Prime Minister being here.

Q John, can you speculate at all on what the personal reasons might be?

A No, I can't. I think you'd have to ask Prime Minister Begin.

Q John, on another scheduling thing, the press reports out of Madrid today, at least the ones that I've seen, have said that the signing ceremony for that conference is now likely for the second week in September. Is there a consensus on that?

A I don't know whether there is a consensus on it. I don't think I'd steer you away from the thought that it would be difficult, maybe, to schedule that in the next couple of weeks. I note all the speculation that if you couldn't do it in the next couple of weeks, September was the next logical time; but I don't know that there is a consensus on that.

Q John, on the Begin visit, do you have any indication at this point when "later in the year" might be?

A No, I don't. No.

Q John, on another visit, we were all under the impression that President Gemayel would be in on the 22nd, but he is arriving today. Do you have anything on that one?

A That President Gemayel is arriving today?

Q He was supposed to arrive on the 22nd, and I understand that he will be here today at some point. Do you know --

A He is arriving today, but so far as I know, that is on schedule and indeed in line with everything that we have given you about his schedule. It's certainly in line with the printed schedule.

Q Is the official visit, then, to start on the 22nd? Is that it or --

A Not to my knowledge. I think everything is on schedule with an official arrival today.

The meeting of the President with him, do you mean? Is that what you mean?

Q No, no. I got it now. O.K. Thank you.

A All right.

Q Is there a change in that schedule, or is that still according to the printed schedule?

A No, no.

Q Has it been moved up?

A Well, the arrival time may be an hour off, something like that.

Q Forty minutes.

A Yes, but in the sequence or the scheduling, there is no change.

Q President Gemayel made a statement, I believe, in a press conference in North France before arriving here, where he was sort of optimistic, and he is expecting a speedy withdrawal of all forces. I just want to know if you share the same optimism that he has about the withdrawal of all forces from Lebanon?

A I think that our statements on the withdrawal situation are perfectly clear. I think the Secretary expressed his view of how his talks with President Assad had gone. There was no progress in those talks, but we keep working for that withdrawal. Undoubtedly, as I think Mr. Romberg said yesterday, this will be, I'm sure, one of the topics of conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, and President Gemayel.

Q Do you expect the cancellation or the postponement of the Begin visit to have any impact on the discussions with President Gemayel? In other words, were you expecting to discuss something with President Gemayel that would then be carried forward the following week with Prime Minister Begin and now cannot be done?

A No, I don't see any reason why the present talks with President Gemayel would be affected. It seems to me the gender of those discussions would go forward as planned, and whatever might arise from those talks will be discussed with the Israelis. As I say, there are excellent channels for pursuing that.

Q News reports from Israel lately, after the death of Mr. Begin's wife, that he went into depression, that his health conditions were not as strong as they used to be, that the whole thing was done by the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense and others, and that he is away from the limelight and everything -- do you think that this could be attributed to health reasons that he could not make it?

A I don't know. Again, you would have to ask Prime Minister Begin what those reasons are. It isn't any secret that he suffered a great personal tragedy with the death of his wife, and his health problems aren't any secret.

I think the President -- I can't quite remember whether there have been phone calls or messages, but certainly the President has expressed compassion and concern about the death of his wife and his own health problems. But I think, as far as what the reasons are for the postponement of the visit, you will have to ask him.

Q John, Mr. Jumblatt who was supposed to be visiting with you a couple of weeks ago, and postponed his visit, is coming tomorrow. He is leaving Beirut, actually, today. Is he going to be seeing any official in this building?

A I don't know. I don't know what -- Jumblatt -- what we had said while I'd been away on that. I'm not up to speed on the earlier guidance, and I'm not up to speed on his plans that you say he is coming here tomorrow. I didn't know that. I'd be glad to take a look at it, though.

Q Do you have something on aid to Chad?

A Yes. We'll have a statement in the Press Office for you afterwards.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything on the hijacking, the one last night?

A Not a great deal. Just a little update on that, if I can put my hand on it. I guess I cannot put my hand -- yes, I can. I can put my hand on it, but it may not have been worthwhile waiting for. (Laughter)

The hijacking of Eastern Airlines Flight No. 1 occurred shortly after midnight. The plane spent three hours on the ground at Jose Marti Airport and departed when the lone, unidentified hijacker surrendered to Cuban officials. There were 232 people on board. Nobody was injured. To date this is the 8th hijacking to Cuba in 1983. Four of them have occurred in the past month.

Q You still have no indication of the identity of the hijacker?

A No.

Q Have there been any communications from the Havana Government about the disposition of this person?

A Of this particular person? No. Not that I'm aware.

Q How about the one a couple of days ago or last week?

A I'm not sure about the most recent ones, but they have been in touch with us, or we are aware that rather severe sentences have been imposed on earlier hijackers.

Q That was as of June 15, but there's been nothing since. Is that correct?

A I don't have anything more recent.

Q In that connection, yesterday Alan commented that perhaps the problem of the hijackings could be linked to the problem of the Mariel flotilla, but he said that the U.S. was unable to determine whether any of the hijackers were in fact any of the so-called "undesirable" refugees.

Has the State Department made any progress on that score?

A Since yesterday, not that I'm aware.

Q There have been two hijackings since yesterday.

A I am sure that what Alan said yesterday was a model of of conciseness and completeness.

Q Can we ask -- would the State Department make it available when it finds out, if there is such a link?

A If we've got anything more to give you, we'll be glad to give it to you, sure.

Q Will you tell us anything more about the U.S. reaction to the declaration or statements by the Presidents of the so-called Contadora countries?

A Yes. I do have a little on that. We note that the Cancun Declaration reiterates many of the essential conditions for peace articulated at last October's San Jose Conference of Democratic States, including a verifiable freeze on the acquisition of offensive weapons, a ban on support for subversive groups, and a halt to arms trafficking.

We are particularly pleased that the declaration makes clear that the establishment of strong democratic institutions must be included in any peace process. Specifically, the declaration called for guarantees of access to the electoral process of all groups, for popular consultation, and for full participation of all citizens in their countries' political life.

We continue to support the Contadora Group's efforts and would encourage all the Central American states to continue serious discussion on the issues the President has identified.

Q Get a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Also, there is a report today in The New York Times that the Administration is planning large-scale military maneuvers in the region.

Can you tell us anything about those reports and how they further the goals enunciated by the Contadora Group?

A We have had exercises from time to time in various parts of the world, including the Central American region, and no doubt will have them in the future, but I don't have anything specific to announce today.

Q But what about with respect to these steps in relationship to what the Presidents of the Contadora Group have asked for?

A I'm not responding to those specific reports, but where we have had training exercises, they have fulfilled a useful military function as well as from time to time underlining our concern about unrest in the area and expressing our determination and our support.

Q Last time such maneuvers were held, particularly with respect to Honduras, a senior Honduran officer, who was unnamed by The New York Times, said that they were used to transport large quantities of war materiel to anti-Sandinista groups based in Honduras.

Do you have any comment as to whether this will be a similar exercise?

A No, because I haven't commented on exercises that might or might not be taking place?

Q John, if we could go back to the Middle East for a moment, President Gemayel was quoted last night in Nice as saying that contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union would help to soften Syria's stand.

Has the United States asked the Soviet Union to use its good offices, if that's the right phrase, in Syria?

A No. I don't think that's the right phrase. I think Mr. Romberg had some language yesterday, and I refer you to that, but the thesis basically is that we have talked from time to time with the Soviet Union about the Middle East. They are aware of our attitudes, particularly towards their destabilization efforts in Syria.

But over all we have not found the Soviet Union to be helpful or constructive in the Middle East.

Q You have not asked the Soviet Union to be helpful?

A We have had discussion with them about the Middle East, and they are aware of our views on the Middle

East, but they have generally not proved to be helpful in that area.

Q What do you mean by "their destabilization efforts"?

A I think there was a little matter of missiles in Syria.

Q John, do you have anything on the assassination of Mr. Ungo's brother in El Salvador?

A No. I am afraid I don't.

Q John, back on the Contadora Group, the President of Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid, called for direct talks between the United States and Cuba. That wasn't part of the official Contadora declaration, but do you have any comment on that?

A Not really. We've had some language, to which I refer you, on talks with Cuba over the years which have tended to be not productive. I think that the Secretary of State has made the point that there needs to be some indication of change of heart on the part of Cuba before any such dialogue would be useful. But I urge you to go back to the specific language we've used. There is no change in that.

Q Doesn't the reflection of this Kissinger Commission indicate a plan to talk with Moscow on the future of Central America?

A A plan to talk to Moscow? I think we'd have to wait (a) for the members of the Commission to be announced, (b) for them to undertake their study, and (c) for them to report. I think it would be very premature to speculate about where they might go.

Q The Vice President of Sudan arrived here yesterday. What is he going to do?

A I don't have anything. The Vice President of Sudan?

Q With a military group.

A I'm not aware of it, but I'll be glad to take a look into it and see what we have, if anything.

Q Rabbi Meir Kahane, head of the Jewish Defense League, is an American citizen who carries also Israeli citizenship, called for annexation of the West Bank and expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs from there in an Op Ed piece in The New York Times yesterday.

Since he is a citizen of the United States, what do you have to comment on such ideas?

A We believe in freedom of expression and freedom of the press, so --

Q Isn't this a call for violence in the West Bank?

A Our position on the West Bank is clear and is unchanged.

Q John, do you have any comment on the various actions taking place in Poland, these laws being passed, and --

A I don't really, Bernie. No. Nothing on that.

Q John, on Central America, are you aware of a report quoting the U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala, saying that Kissinger is going to Guatemala in August and made a --

A No. Not aware of it. Not aware of the report and not aware that there are any plans for Mr. Kissinger to go to Guatemala.

Q In connection with the kidnapping of the former Salvadoran diplomat's wife, is there anything the State Department can say at this point in the investigation as to possible connections between the accused?

A No. I think that's still in the hands of the FBI.

Q Any connection between the accused and any other countries other than Guatemala?

A I don't know that we've taken it any further beyond where we were the other day, mainly that the Guatemalan Embassy, I think, indicated that if any

Guatemalan diplomats were involved, they would waive immunity. But I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Can I also ask you whether you have anything to say about the status of the recertification for El Salvador? Shall we expect that tomorrow?

A Keep in touch with us tomorrow. Sure. I don't think we'll have anything today for you.

Q Anything on the Green Peace people who are held by the Soviets?

A I did not get it before I came down, but there is something coming. We'll have that a little later in the day. Maybe it will be down by the time we're through with this briefing.

Q John, there's a conference today up in the Dirksen, on --

A I'm sorry. Where?

Q Dirksen Senate Office Building, sponsored by something called the "Ad Hoc Committee for Democracy in Nicaragua."

Can you tell me, is there any -- Kirkpatrick is speaking at it this very moment. Is there any relationship between this conference and the U.S. Government? Will she be speaking on behalf of the Reagan Administration?

A I think that Ambassador Kirkpatrick rarely expresses views that are not those of the Reagan Administration, but I'm not aware of this particular conference or the background or the organizers or the auspices.

Q Could you look into it to see what the relationship is?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #125

WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject is the legislative veto.

Available at 2:00 this afternoon will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Economic & Business Affairs Richard McCormack before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is the export of Alaskan oil.

I would like to draw your attention to a statement released by the Justice Department yesterday regarding that Department's discussions with the Israeli Ministry of Justice on the deportation and extradition of Nazi war criminals. We have copies of that statement in the Press Office. If there are any queries on that, they should go to the Justice Department.

There will be an ON THE RECORD briefing Thursday, July 21, at 11:00 a.m., here in the briefing room, on the Regional Administrative Radio Conference on Direct Broadcast Satellites, which was just concluded in Geneva. The briefers will be the Coordinator for International Communications and Information Policy, Ambassador Diana Lady Dougan, and the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the conference, Ambassador Abbott Washburn.

On President Gemayel's visit this afternoon, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing at the White House on President Gemayel's working visit to the United States. The briefing is open to all accredited media representatives with State Department or White House press credentials, in the White House press briefing room at 3:00 p.m.

That's all I have.

Q John, do you have any initial assessment of the Israeli Cabinet today on redeployment?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We are still in the process of consulting with the Israelis in order to learn the details of the Cabinet decision. Israel, of course, makes its own decisions, but our position on partial withdrawal has not changed. Our basic objective is the full withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. Any partial withdrawal, therefore, should be within the framework of that objective and should not complicate the very difficult tasks facing the government of President Gemayel.

Q In your assessment so far, is there a decision now within the framework of a total withdrawal?

A I think the situation is that we are consulting with them and looking for details of their position and of the decision that apparently has been taken. I think, as you know, the Israeli Cabinet spokesman declined to give details after the Cabinet session, and we are looking for those details. When we have those details, I think we would be in a better position to --

Q Did the Secretary of State ask the Israelis to delay this decision?

A To delay this decision?

Q Yes.

A Not to my knowledge.

Q When he was out there, it was widely reported that he had asked them to put it off.

A No. Obviously, there was discussion of Israeli intentions, and there have been discussions between ourselves about various options they have been considering, but I'm not aware of any press to delay.

Q Would you characterize your reaction? Are you disappointed? Happy? What?

A I think the words I've offered you here are the characterization that we offer.

Q Does the Israeli decision, as you understand it at this point, complicate the matters for President Gemayel's government?

A I think we will have to see what the details of that decision are. As I have said, our objectives are clear. We are for the full withdrawal of all foreign forces. Whatever actions fall within the framework of those goals, we are for; whatever actions do not fall within that framework clearly give us problems.

Q Do you have any comment on the reported decision of Prime Minister Begin to delay or postpone his visit here?

A No. We had some discussion about that yesterday. He called the President, as you know, and said that that was for personal reasons. I think the Israelis have stood by that statement. I don't think there has been anything further coming out of Israel, and therefore --

Q Do you have any clearer understanding today of what was responsible for the decision?

A Personal reasons, I gather.

Q Your statement with regard to the partial withdrawal, it's the first time I can recall when you, in addition to talking about the objective of full withdrawal, spoke of the question of whether or not this would complicate the difficult problems of the Government of Lebanon.

In view of the fact that the top rank of the Government of Lebanon is here in Washington, can one assume that you will determine, in a large part, whether it complicates the life of the Government of Lebanon by what the Government of Lebanon has to say about it?

A I think we would be also waiting to see what the Government of Israel has says about it, to flesh out the details of this rather brief announcement.

But I think you're off on the wrong track, Don. This may be the first time we have said this, but I don't think there is any divergence from our goals. We have always said that our goals are the departure of all foreign forces and a stable and sovereign Lebanon. Clearly, I think it is in that respect that we are talking about complicating the task of the Lebanese Government, plus the third goal of Israeli security.

Q What do you mean, then? Could you explain a little bit more what you had in mind when you talk about complicating the task of the Lebanese Government?

A I think the task of the Lebanese Government, of any government, is complicated if it does not have authority and stability throughout its entire territory. That is the goal of President Gemayel's government, and that is the goal we want to be achieved within the framework of these two other goals, one affecting Israel and the other one affecting the withdrawal of foreign forces.

It's difficult to be sovereign, independent, and have control and stability of your entire territory when you have foreign forces occupying that territory.

Q In view of the recent call by the Contadora Group --

Q Let's stay on the Middle East.

Q John, did you have anything on a news report about a GAO report which claimed that Israel has too many arms?

A No, I don't.

Q Could you look into that, please? It was a CBS report.

A No. Is this not the same GAO report that people have been asking about for several days?

Q It would seem to be a different slant on it. It was one that came out today. If you could look into that --

A I'll look into it, but I doubt if we would have anything on it.

Q John, I'm still a little bit confused. Are you saying that this does not create problems for the United States if indeed any redeployment is linked verbally to a commitment to full withdrawal?

A I'm saying that we are for, and it is our policy that all foreign forces should withdraw from Lebanon. We are for actions that hasten those goals, and obviously, we would be opposed to actions that prove an obstacle to those goals. But until we see some more details of the apparent Israeli decision, it is kind of hard to offer you any analysis.

Q Does the decision, as far as you know now, create any new responsibilities, obligations, or need for Israeli-American talks or cooperation in terms of filling the security vacuum that might be left by redeployment?

A I think the channels of communication are perfectly adequate. If you're asking me, I don't see a need for any further developments. It seems to me that the channels of communication are good and they are open. What communication there needs to be can be through existing channels.

Q John, also on Lebanon, it appears that there has been some very intensive shelling in the city of Beirut today. Do you see any wider purpose in that? Do you see any wider dangers than before?

A I'm not sure that I can give you an analysis of it, but I can give you a comment on it. This brutal and indiscriminate shelling of populated areas is especially distressing at the very moment the Lebanese President is engaged in talks here in Washington aimed at the withdrawal of all external forces leading to national reconciliation and the extension of Lebanese central government authority throughout the country. This latest incident poignantly underscores the necessity for speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces, which remains the key and paramount objective of our efforts with all the parties.

Q (Inaudible.)

A National reconciliation?

Q Where, with the Americans?

A No. I think we're talking about the various political and religious groups in Lebanon.

Q John, when can we have copies of both, please, the statement on the bombing and the statement on the redeployment?

A I think instantly. Have I overcommitted us? Right after the briefing.

Q Does the United States have an agreement with Lebanon regarding what the U.S. position will be on Israeli redeployment? In other words, has the United States told Lebanon that it will do something other than merely consult with Israel regarding Israel's decisions on redeployment?

A We have been, as you know, for many months in constant diplomatic contact with Lebanon and Israel, but I don't think I'm really going to go into the day-by-day details of those discussions.

Q You won't say whether the United States and Lebanon have an agreement on what to do about Israeli redeployment?

A I think there is an agreement on goals. We are in agreement that all foreign forces should leave Lebanon.

Q Are you drawing any distinction between the words "redeployment" and "partial withdrawal?" You chose to use the words "partial withdrawal."

A I don't think you should play with words. I think you should keep your eye on the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. That's what we're working for. Call moves within that framework what you like, our test of them will be whether they contribute to those goals.

Q You mentioned national reconciliation, and yesterday I asked you about whether Jumblatt was coming.

A I think he is not, actually. I think he's not, in fact, but still go ahead.

Q He is not coming?

A That's my understanding.

Q Well, fine. The area that the Israelis are trying to pull their troops from is the Shouf area where the majority of the inhabitants are the Druze, where Walid Jumblatt is their spokesman, the President of the party that represents them.

He and the Shi'ite leader, Nabile Beri, issued a statement in Damascus last week saying, we're not going to allow -- we refuse the allowance of the Lebanese army into our area in the Shouf, unless we reach political agreement with the government. The government refused. So, what will happen?

A I think you're talking about internal Lebanese political developments, and I don't think we can comment or offer views about those. I think this is a matter for Lebanon, the Government of Lebanon to resolve.

Q Yes, but if the Israelis pull from the Shouf area, the void that the army will try to move in, the Druze will fight it, and you'll have an explosion the way you have seen in Orly last week.

A We will have to wait and see developments. I don't have the details of what the Israelis are planning to do. I suspect you don't either.

Q What do you have to say about the lengthy statement by Mr. Ortega?

Q Would you repeat the question, please?

A It's the Nicaraguan statement yesterday. The United States welcomes any sincere and verifiable proposal to lessen the tensions in Central America. Taking Mr. Ortega at his word, we believe the Nicaraguan proposal is a positive step in that it acknowledges the regional nature of the problem and the need to address external support for insurgencies and terrorist groups.

The proposal still contains a number of serious shortcomings. For example, the proposal seeks to put the insurgents in El Salvador on the same level as a democratically elected government. It fails to take into account the need for true democracy as a means to resolve the internal problems of the countries of the region. It does not deal with Nicaragua's military buildup, and there are no clearly articulated provisions for effective verification.

Nonetheless, we would hope that the Nicaraguan proposal, along with those put forward by other countries of the region, would be considered, refined, and expanded as necessary at the next meeting of the Contadora Nine, scheduled for later this month.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q A follow-up on that. Would the United States consider, in the light of the Contadora Group's call for positive responses and this new Nicaraguan gesture, would the United States consider something along the line of cutting back on the military maneuvers that are taking place off the coast of Nicaragua now as a corresponding gesture?

A I don't know that any consideration is being given to that.

Q We have been told for the past few days that today is certification day, and I was suprised there was no mention of that in your opening announcements. Do you have anything on that?

A Yes, I do. It is certification day. I do not think we would be able to have a BACKGROUND briefing before your deadlines. As you're aware, the Administration's decision on certification is due to Congress today, but insofar as a briefing on that, such a briefing would have to be arranged after delivery to Congress, and I am doubtful that we would be -- keep in touch with us -- but I'm doubtful that we will, in fact, have a backgrounder within your deadline.

Q Can we at least get the letter?

A Let us see how the process develops during the day.

Q You will send the report to the Congress this afternoon?

A I think we are obliged to indicate our decision by midnight tonight.

Q Can you tell us now?

A No.

Q When you speak of our deadline, what is our deadline that you're speaking of?

A I think it is a legal requirement.

Q No, I understand. When you speak about "our deadline," that we can't get it before our deadline, what we want to know, is that midnight tonight?

A I do not think we would be able to give you a backgrounder before maybe 8:00 or 9:00 this evening, and I suspect that for most people that is --

Q When is the letter going to be issued? Do you know?

A I do not know.

Q Why wouldn't you be able to do that, John?

A Because of the schedule, and because of the process that is going forward and the fact that it has to be notified to Congress before we can discuss it with the press.

Q Why are you unable to notify Congress earlier than that?

A Because of the process, because of the fact that it hasn't yet gone to Congress.

Q It doesn't have anything to do with the fact that you'd rather release all of this after the newspaper deadlines, after television deadlines?

A No, no, not at all. If we give it to you tomorrow, the backgrounder tomorrow, it would be before tomorrow's deadlines.

Q What about the possibility of an embargo on the briefing for release of the document?

A Keep in touch with us, but I'm just tipping you that I do not think the backgrounder will be within your deadline period.

Q We understand the certification to be delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at 2:45 today.

A I don't think your information is correct.

Q It will be later than that?

A I'm sure it will be later than that.

Q Any sense of how late?

A Late afternoon or early evening, I would think.

Q What time does the Secretary have a --

A The Secretary has a pretty heavy schedule, among other things. A lot of people have a heavy schedule.

Q Can we have a filing break?

A Filing break. Sure.

Q If the certification --

A Sorry, go ahead. I didn't get the first part.

Q As a practical matter, if the certification decision, as you say, is going to be delivered today, late this evening or late this afternoon, you wouldn't be delivering anything if you weren't recertifying?

A I think we are obliged to notify Congress of the decision. I don't think you should anticipate the decision. I'm not leading you one way or another, but I don't want you to jump to conclusions either way.

Q You're only obliged to recertify that El Salvador is making progress in human rights if you want the aid to continue. Tell me if I'm wrong, but there's no obligation to say anything to Congress if you don't want to certify that they're --

A I don't think you're correct on that. I think we are obliged to indicate the decision.

Q Do you think we can expect a surprise in this certification? (Laughter)

A Why don't we wait until the document goes up and we can see for ourselves.

Q On Salvador, there is this -- these recent developments regarding the treasury police involvement, allegedly, in the nun case, and so there's going to be a further delay. Do you have any guidance on that at all?

A I don't. I'm sorry.

Q And also the conference committee meeting last night, late, said they would give the Administration $25 million on the supplemental request out of the $50 million on El Salvador, do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't have any reaction on that.

Q And do you have anything on Carter's statements with respect to --

A With respect to --

Q -- to Central America, Nicaragua and El Salvador, specifically.

A Yes, I do. I guess you're talking about President Carter's speech in Tokyo?

Q I think it was a press conference.

A Okay. I would just like to point out that President Carter reinstituted military assistance to El Salvador in the last days of his Administration.

We cannot agree with President Carter's characterization of the Salvadoran Government as a "bloodthirsty regime." Those are his quotation marks. Violence levels have been reduced markedly since January 1981, when President Carter decided to send military assistance to El Salvador. Civilian deaths attributable to political violence are about 25 percent of what they were at that time.

The government has made significant gains in land reform, where now over 500,000 Salvadorans who were landless at the time of the Carter decision now enjoy the benefits of agrarian reform. The process of democratization is continuing; a popularly-elected Constituent Assembly is in place; elections are planned for later this year.

Nobody is denying that there are persistent problems in El Salvador, and violence levels are never acceptable. However, in our view, the situation in El Salvador is markedly improved from what it was in January 1981, when President Carter left office.

Q Is that language from the certification --

A Pardon?

Q Is any of this wording for certification?

A I'm not anticipating any language is for certification.

Q Can we get a copy, and can you address the issue that you raised with respect with Nicaragua?

A I'm sorry, I don't understand your question.

Q I'm sorry. I would like to get a copy of what you just read.

A Sure.

Q And in addition to that, I wonder if you would address what he had to say about Nicaragua?

A I'm afraid I don't have anything on Nicaragua.

Q Is there any thought of Senator Stone getting into a dialogue on this?

A As I think we indicated a few days ago, Senator Stone, I think, does have travel plans in the region. I don't have the details on where he is going, but I wouldn't rule out any itinerary.

Q Do you have any timing on that?

A I guess we don't have anything to announce on the timing.

Q You expect he'll probably leave this weekend?

A I think he will leave soon. I think he will leave soon.

Q John, do you have any schedule on Dr. Kissinger's move back into the building?

A Yes, I do. I think he's going to be here early next week. He will be at the Department the first few days of next week. He will meet with the Secretary of State on Monday. We expect he would have an early meeting with the President, but I think you should talk to the White House about that.

As was indicated, I think in a backgrounder at the White House yesterday, Dr. Kissinger and his executive director and their immediate staff will be situated at this point in the Department of State which will provide logistical and other support. It's our understanding that Dr. Kissinger is not going to Guatemala next week.

Q Has the State Department's Legal Office given you a decision on whether the certification, that you're talking about, is in fact now continued to be required because of the Supreme Court's decision on executive veto?

A I cannot answer. I do not know whether such a decision has been sought or offered. All I know is that the process is going forward; we are going forward with the process.

Q Is there any precedent, John, for a former Secretary of State occupying an office in the State Department under a succeeding Secretary?

A I suppose we'd have to do some research on that if you're seriously interested. But, obviously, former Secretaries of State have been very much involved with have been very much involved with foreign policy in various consultative and other roles after leaving office, and have certainly been in and out of the building. I don't know whether they have physically occupied an office. I suspect they probably have.

Q What is your guidance on whether former Secretary of State Kissinger will be traveling to the region? He has said he has no foreseeable plans.

A I think that will up to him and the members of the Commission.

Q Is $25 million, if that figures stands, that came out of the conference committee, is that in your view sufficient to meet El Salvador's needs, or until that (inaudible) that you ask for will create problems for the Salvadorans?

A I might have something on that later in the day for you, but I don't have a comment on it.

Q Did Dr. Kissinger present a report to Mr. Shultz about his last Middle East trip?

A I honestly cannot remember, but certainly the two --

Q Can you check on that?

A I don't think I really need to in the specific sense you are asking. I really don't think I need to do research because, obviously, they have talked and consulted frequently.

Q I'd like to ask you about the withdrawal or the redeployment of Israeli forces. There are reports that the personal reasons that Mr. Begin is not coming to the States were that there was pressure on him from his advisors in order to lift this Cabinet decision to pass and to get that decision on the redeployment, and as a result they asked him not to go, told him not to go at this time because they're anticipating some uproar over this decision. What do you comment on that?

A No comment, because you're asking me what his advisors advised him, and I have no idea what his advisors advised him.

Q Among the personal reasons also, according to the reports, is that he told the President that he has nothing else to discuss with the Administration besides the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Is it true?

A I don't know anything about that. As our statement said yesterday, he called the President. He said that for personal reasons he wasn't able to come at this time, wanted to reschedule the meeting. The President was understanding and accepted that explanation, as far as I know it.

Q Can I just return very briefly, just as a housekeeping matter? If Kissinger's commission is housed in this building, will questions about the work of the commission be appropriately addressed to you or to the White House?

A It's a very good question. I do not know what arrangements Dr. Kissinger will make for handling inquiries to the commission. I think that will be largely his decision.

Q Does he have a staff yet?

A I don't know. I suspect that kind of decision really won't be taken until next week.

Q John, have you heard from the Soviet --

A I don't want to mislead you. You're talking about staff in general context. I think as far as an executive director is concerned, I think there will be a White House -- there may have already been a White House announcement on it, but I'll leave you with the White House. That's their announcement.

Q Have you heard from the Soviet Government yet on this alleged detainment of the Greenpeace members?

A We are in touch with the Soviet Government. At this stage I don't have very much more beyond what we gave you yesterday, but we might, as the story develops during the day, have something this afternoon. Obviously, we're very concerned about it.

Q Do you have any details on what's going on, the status of the whole thing?

A On the Greenpeace thing?

Q Yes.

A No.

Q John, why are you very concerned?

A I think one is always concerned when American citizens are detained.

Q They were in another country illegally; right?

A We would be concerned -- I think one is always concerned at the detention of Americans under whatever circumstances. One is always compassionate.

Q A couple questions on the hijacking again. The FAA apparently had a press conference urging the State Department to, again, restate its desire to have hijackers brought back to this country. Do you have any response to that?

A We're looking at what additional measures or actions we might take. I don't have anything for you today. We might in a day or two.

Q Can you tell me what the status of the latest communication with Cuba on that is? Where does that stand now?

A I don't. I don't have an update on that, I'm afraid.

Q John, anything to say today on Poland on the --

A No.

Q I would like to go back to the question about the Greenpeace people. The statement yesterday indicated that this was a group that did not use, I believe the term was standard modalities or usual modalities. Does the State Department have anything to say about what these people were doing there?

A No, no, I don't.

Q About their methods of operation?

A No. Looking into their detention, I think that's our present concern.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Ollennon

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #126

THURSDAY, JULY 21, 1983, 12:27 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have no announcements, just to point out for your convenience that there will be stakeout, I understand, after the luncheon for President Gemayel. The Secret Service has told us that they will freeze the lobby at 1:30, and President Gemayel will come down shortly after that. I can't guarantee those times. As you all know, those luncheons sometimes run over the scheduled time. But that is their plan, to freeze the lobby at 1:30.

That's all I have for you.

Q Who will appear at this stakeout? Will that be Mr. Gemayel?

A I cannot guarantee what the Secretary will do, but I think he ordinarily comes down with heads of government.

Q John, excuse me, will there be a readout from anyone at State after the meeting?

A There will not be a readout today. There will be a readout after the President's meeting with President Reagan. Whether President Gemayel will say anything when he comes down and passes through the lobby, as always, is up to the visitor.

Q John, what can you tell us about the release of Mr. Dodge?

A Not a great deal, beyond the White House announcement, Jim. As you know, the announcement at the White House said that Mr. Dodge, who was kidnapped July 19 last year from the campus of the American University of Beirut where he was serving as acting President, has been released.

The Government of the United States is grateful to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and to his brother, Dr. Rifad al-Assad, for the humanitarian effort they undertook which led to Mr. Dodge's release.

The President is deeply gratified by Mr. Dodge's release and has directed that a U.S. militry aircraft be put at Mr. Dodge's disposal for his return to the United States.

I think the announcement at the White House also expressed the President's appreciation for the excellent work of the State Department in assisting in Mr. Dodge's release.

Q Do you know now who kidnapped him?

A Not going to have anything for you on that, Jim.

Q Was any ransom --

A It was Mr. Dodge's own request that we confine our remarks pretty much to this statement. No, no ransom.

Q No ransom was paid?

A No ransom was paid.

Q Was he leaving from Damascus?

A Not going to be able to get into that, Bernie, I'm afraid. Can't tell you. Have a little more, and then I really don't have much beyond that. Based upon a preliminary examination by a State Department medical officer following his release, it appears that Mr. Dodge is in good physical and mental condition.

As to his present whereabouts and when he was released and how he was released, Mr. Dodge has asked that no further details be provided. The important thing is that he was and is released.

I'm not able, in line with Mr. Dodge's request, to give you any information about his arrival time or whereabouts in the United States, and he has asked that you will understand his need for quiet and rest away from the glare of the media.

Q John, can you tell us, if you know, when did you learn he was going to be released?

A No. Not going to be able to get into any of the details, I'm afraid.

Q Could you be more specific about President Assad's role, for which the United States --

A Only insofar as the White House announcement has chronicled it, and let me simply add that we're very pleased with the help that Syria was able to provide.

Q Did Secretary Shultz speak to President Assad on this matter today, recently?

A I'm not going to be able to give you any -- I know that this will be a source of frustration to you, but I'm going to ask your understanding of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Dodge's ordeal.

Q John, did you say where he is, or you can't even say that?

A I didn't say where he is, Bernie. I said that the President had made an aircraft available to bring him back to the United States.

Q Could you tell us how long Assad has been involved in this?

A No. I really can't.

Q You're not saying that he was released in Beirut or Damascus?

A No. I'm not saying where he was released.

Q Was it in the Bekaa?

A No. I'm not saying where he was released.

Q Is there a Palestinian role in this matter?

A No. Not going to comment on that.

Q I can understand if he asks that you not give out details on where he is and so forth. What is the reason for no other details, even to say whether the Secretary of State spoke with President Assad?

A I don't want to get into the reasons -- Mr. Dodge's reasons for his strong feelings about this. There are good reasons.

Q No, no. But, I mean, surely Mr. Dodge wouldn't care if you told us whether the Secretary of State spoke to the President of Syria. Is that also at his request, or is that the Secretary's request, and, if so, what is the reason for that?

A I don't know that that is at his request, but I do know that the words I am giving you have been specifically requested by Mr. Dodge and agreed upon with him. Therefore, I'm confining myself to his words.

Q John, another topic?

Q No. On the same subject. John, did the President or the Secretary call President Assad or his brother, Dr. Rifad Assad, to thank them personally, or is it enough putting out this statement?

A I think, as far as the President is concerned, I think you'd have to refer that question to the White House and see whether they would answer it.

Q How about the Secretary?

A No. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Does that tie in, in any way, with President Gemayel's visit? Is there any link?

A No.

Q What personal communications have taken place with Mr. Dodge? Has the President or the Secretary spoken with him directly?

A I don't think the Secretary has. Whether the President has -- I don't think the President has, but, again, I think I'd have to refer you to the White House on that.

Q How long -- there was some information that the Syrian President and his brother had anything to do with this. Can you tell us -

A I'm sorry. First, what are you --

A How long since you knew or the Government knew that the Syrian Government, President and his brother, had anything to do with the release or whereabouts of Mr. Dodge?

A   Sorry to disappoint you, but I'm really not going to get into this. As you know, Mr. Dodge has been in this situation for a year. The State Department has been very active throughout all of that period, and we're delighted that it has come to this happy fruition, but I'm not going to get into what we have done, when we did it, and with whom we did it.

Q   Also on Lebanon, can you tell us why Ambassador Lewis is coming back?

A   I think he's coming back for a number of reasons. I think to report on discussions he's had with Israeli officials, and I'm sure he will have an interest in President Gemayel's visit here, too.

Q   Have you now made an assessment of the impact of the Israeli Cabinet decision?

A   Nothing beyond what we had yesterday.

Q   John, also on Lebanon -- not on Lebanon, the Middle East -- there is a report today that the American Government approved Israel's sale of arms to Honduras.

Can you give us any more on this or comment on this at all?

A   That's a story about PLO arms are finding their way to Nicaragua?

Q   Yes.

A   No. I really can't. I don't want to steer you either way on this, but, as always, in stories that obviously have a relationship with covert activity, we decline comment without steering you in any direction. So I would decline comment on that.

Q   You cannot tell us if the report is correct or not?

A   No.

Q   Can you confirm the --

A   No. I'm not confirming it, not denying it, or telling you --

Q   Have the Israelis --

A I don't quite know how I say it more clearly than -- but I'm not going to comment on it.

Q Okay. Let me ask you something else.

A Try again, but the answer will still be "no comment."

Q Can I try a follow-up on it, then? Is Israel helping the United States train any of these Central American troops --

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q In Lebanon again, yesterday there was a bomb by the Druze on a beach hotel in Beirut. Do you have anything you can tell us?

A Is that the Summerland Hotel?

Q Summerland.

A We are shocked by the latest in a series of tragic incidents. The perpetrators of terrorist acts of this nature can find no justification among civilized men and women for such activity. Don't have any more details on that for you.

Q Don't have anything further?

A No. Don't have anything further.

Q Would you agree with the President of Lebanon by saying -- by alleging that the bombs that had been thrown on Beirut, the source of it is Damascus, and if they continue to throw these bombs, these bombs would be thrown back at the heart of Damascus?

A I think the President of Lebanon clearly speaks for himself.

Q I'm asking for your assessment, if you agree with him on this or not.

A I've given you our assessment. We have no more details on this particular incident. It's very hard to ascertain just exactly who pulls the trigger in this kind of action.

Q Do you have anything on Moshe Arens' visit to Washington?

A No. Don't have anything on that. I've seen those reports, but don't have anything specific on it.

Q You're not even sure that he's coming?

A No. I don't think it's sure that he's coming.

Q John, the President of Lebanon said this morning --

A I mean, I'm not suggesting that he might not, but we're not aware of specific plans.

Q The President of Lebanon said this morning that a partial withdrawal the Israelis are planning gives the appearance that the U.S. effort to get an entire foreign troop withdrawal has failed.

Do we have any response to that?

A Only that partial -- as we have said consistently, we have to look at any action taken within the overall framework of total withdrawal of foreign forces, and that's how we look at it. We are for that, that is our policy, we are working for that. That is a primary objective on our part, and we're going to continue to try to achieve that goal.

Q John, to follow up to this please, there were some press reports from TV and I think one of the news wires, quoting American officials as saying that the Israeli decision was taken yesterday despite strong American opposition to such an Israeli move.

A Must be unnamed American officials.

Q Some of them are unnamed, but the question is if you could clarify your position? Have you --

A No. I think I'd refer you to the language I used yesterday. Our position hasn't changed, and I haven't changed --

Q No. But the question is in your contacts with Israel before the Cabinet, did you and other officials confirm there were discussions about it between Israel and the U.S. for the last month I think?

A As I said yesterday, there certainly was discussion in general terms, and, also as I said yesterday, when we get the details of what is planned -- which, so far as I know, have not been announced yet or communicated to us -- then we'll look at it and see how it fits in with our goals.

Q The question is in those contacts, did you advise the Israelis not to take such a move?

A I think I'm not going to go beyond the language I've offered you. They're well aware of our position and our goals, and we look at any action taken against that litmus test of whether it meets that objective. But I'm not going to get any further into diplomatic dialogue that we might have had with Israel.

Q When do you expect to know the results of the litmus?

A I don't know. I guess as soon as we get the details.

Q Are there any bilateral letters between Israel and the United States?

A Bilateral letters?

Q Letters. Besides Israel and Lebanon agreement?

A I think the Secretary's addressed himself to that. I'd refer you to his remarks that are on the record.

Q Who?

A The Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz.

Q Today the President of Lebanon said that he doesn't know of these bilateral letters.

A Why don't you do a little research on what the Secretary of State has said.

Q Excuse me?

A I would prefer to stand by the language that the Secretary has used.

Q What does he say exactly?

A   Why don't you do a little research and find out?

Q   Let me try again, please. Two questions: Is Israel acting as a surrogate for the United States in Central America?

A   I just don't have anything for you on Israeli activity in Central America.

Q   Okay. One other try: If the Honduras Government is paying for weapons from a third-party source, can Honduras pay with U.S. funds or U.S. financial aid to Honduras?

A   Gosh, I don't know. That's a technical question. I'd have to take a look at that.

Q   Can you please take a look at that?

A   Sure.

Q   Also on arms sales, do you have any comment on --

A   You're talking about arms to the Government of Honduras? That is your question? If you're talking about --

Q   Arms to the Government in Honduras, which are being filtered to the Nicaraguan --

A   I said that if you are asking questions that have a relationship to covert activities, we're not going to answer that question.

Q   Can I just follow that in a different way?

A   Sure.

Q   I won't ask anything about covert activities. Does the fact that Israel may be involved in some way, at least as an arms supplier into the region, affect the U.S. view at all that these issues in Central America should be discussed not at the U.N. but at the OAS where Israel's not a member?

A   No. I think our position on a regional discussion remains the same. There's no change in that.

Q John, also on arms sales, do you have any comment on a report in Time magazine this week to the effect that there have been rather wide-scale and continuing sales by various U.S. outlets to Iran of U.S. arms?

A Yes. I do have something on that. The United States remains firmly committed to a policy of neutrality in the war between Iran and Iraq. We do not sell arms to either side. Neither do we authorize U.S.-controlled arms to be transferred to either Iran or Iraq, and we have not deviated from that policy since the war began in September 1980.

Q The article doesn't say that the U.S. Government countenances it; it says that it is going on despite and perhaps because of somewhat lax U.S. controls.

A I suppose one can never rule out the possibility, Jim, that there is a slender trickle of illegal arms flow to any country, and I don't think we can state categorically that that doesn't happen, despite U.S. efforts, but certainly all of the United States Government efforts are designed to prevent such illegal flow.

Q Are you checking out the allegations made in the Time account?

A I don't know that we're doing any checking on it, George. I think we're satisfied that our controls are effective, but I don't know whether anybody is specifically looking into it.

Q The Foreign Minister of Iraq yesterday accused America for helping this illegal transfer of arms to Iran. What's your comment?

A I have no comment beyond what I've just offered you. We're opposed to that.

-- MORE --

Q Does the partial withdrawal announced by Israel in any way jeopardize the future of the Israeli-Lebanese troop withdrawal agreement?

A I think I will really not have anything further to say on that until we see what the details of the redeployment are.

Q (Inaudible)

A Then, you're asking a hypothetical question. You're saying, "Will a reedeployment, the details of which you don't know, have an adverse effect on the situation?" Well, how do I know whether it will have an adverse effect on it until we know what they can do?

Q What you want them to do is total withdrawal, right?

A Correct. All foreign forces.

Q John, can you confirm that Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Arens are coming here in the near future to discuss the redeployment of IDF in Lebanon?

A No, I can't confirm. I've seen the reports, and obviously don't rule it out. But so far as I know, there is no specific plan or dates for them to be here. I'm not suggesting that they won't come, but I don't think anything is set.

Q John, President Mubarak has called for a Palestinian government-in-exile, and Arafat has said on television that he is considering it. Would the United States look with disfavor on such a development?

A Don't have any comment on that for you. Our views on the future of the Palestinians are quite clear; we've said it many times.

Q The Australian Foreign Minister is still in town. The news conference the other night was not, looking back at it, a model of clarity on what exactly the U.S. -

A Must have been the questions.

Q Do you have any words which would clarify what was meant by the U.S. commitment to ANZUS and vice versa?

A I think the commitment was very clear. There may be contingencies which one of the parties threatened possibly could handle without outside military support. I suppose if there were a small-scale attack on one of the signatories which they felt they were able to handle by themselves, that would be one situation.

In those circumstances, our mutual interests might be best served by non-military allied responses rather than the military response which, conceivably, could broaden the conflict. But there should be no doubt that any armed attack on an ally would require, and would receive from the other allies, full and prompt fulfillment of the ANZUS security commitment including, when necessary, military support.

Q But military support would not be automatic, is what you're saying?

A I think that was made clear, that if you had a small relatively localized situation, and military support is thought by all concerned not to be necessary, then it is not automatically triggered. You have a variety of responses.

Q John, two follow-ups to that. The Australian Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister continue to complain that the Americans will not allow them to fully supervise the three communications facilities in Australia. Why is the United States balking? Does the United States have something to hide in those bases?

A I think it was made clear by both the Australian Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State that discussions about those facilities in Australia, that that discussion would be pursued in bilateral talks which --

Q They have been pursued, right?

A No, I think they are still going on. For example, I think there were some talks today.

Q One more follow-up just in response to Jim's question: Australia and New Zealand, though, are not required to assist the United States? That is very definite?

A Well, again, I think it depends on the circumstances. The provisions of the treaty are clearly there, and have the full support of the signatories. But I suppose there are situations where an attack on the United States might not call for a military response, say, from New Zeland or Australia.

Q John, can I ask a couple on Central America? First of all, do you have any comment on The Washington Post report on the Administration's plan to seek an additional $400 million worth of aid to Central America?

A Yes. Our current requests for fiscal 84, both for security assistance and economic assistance have been sent to the Congress and are a matter of public record. We have made no additional requests. Our levels of assistance to all countries are, obviously, continually under review.

Q The President said that that was way out of line, suggesting that at least part of it is accurate. (Laughter) Are you saying that the part that is accurate is the part that has already been asked for?

A No. What I'm saying is that we have made no requests beyond what is on the public record, but that, as I said, our aid programs to all countries are continually under review.

Q Can you tell us more about Stone's travel plans?

A Yes. He is leaving this afternoon. He will visit the Contadora Four. He expects to be away for a little more than a week. He will also be visiting a number of Central American countries which have been engaged in the Contadora process.

At this point, Ambassador Stone's general mandate is known, as is the importance of confidentiality in the pursuit of his task. Without being specific, we can indicate that he will be consulting with the leadership in these countries about ongoing regional efforts to achieve peace in Central America.

In the specific case of the Contadora Four, Ambassador Stone will be delivering a Presidential message to each of those countries and conveying our ongoing support for the Contadora process. His first stop will be Mexico. I think that's about all I really have.

Q What time is he leaving today, John?

A I don't know what time. I think it is early afternoon -- early or mid-afternoon.

Q Does he have any plans to arrange to try to see leftists as he did as he did before -- El Salvadoran leftists?

A Sorry?

Q Does he have any plans to try to put the wires up again on this meeting with the El Salvadoran leftists?

A Well, as you know, on the previous occasion, we really didn't get into the planning for any meetings with the left, so I don't have anything on that for you.

Q Is he going to Nicaragua?

A His itinerary does not specifically include Nicaragua at this point, but I wouldn't rule it out.

Q The Fund for Constitutional Government says the U.S. Navy has been regularly discharging radioactive materials in Japanese and British waters. Do you have any information about radioactive (inaudible)?

A No.

Q Could you take that question?

A I think probably the Pentagon might be the right place to start with this.

Q On Nicaragua -- not Nicaragua, but Central America, can you tell us a little bit about the substance of that Presidential message or --

A No, I can't. We very rarely talk about the substance of Presidential messages.

Q with the proposal by Nicaragua and the Contadora statement last week? Is that reasonable to --

A I think it would be logical if that would come up.

Q Is he going to overnight in Mexico?

A I'm not sure -- I honestly don't know, but I would think he probably would, given the time --

Q John, on the Middle East question --

Q Could we stay on Central America? John, on the navy ships that are moving down there at the same time Mr. Stone is, can you give us some enlightenment on the political purpose of that maneuver? Is this something that is a matter of weeks, or is it a matter of months?

A I think I'll have to do a terrible thing and refer you to the Pentagon on that.

Q It seems to me it involves your shop if it's going to be a matter of months and be an act of intimidation and rehearsal for blockades and all the rest --

A I think in terms of where they're going, how long they are going, and the purpose of the exercise, I think you ought to talk to the Pentagon.

Q On that, the Panamanian Foreign Minister has said he doesn't think this is necessary; the Venezuelan President said today that he thought it was inappropriate. Those are two members of the Contadora group, the two most closely identified with the U.S. position.

Have we tried to assure them in any way that this is peaceful and not designed to inflame tensions?

A I'm not aware of any such talks that anyone from the Pentagon might have had. As I say, I suggest you talk to the Pentagon.

Q John, the President, on Monday, described what's going on in Central America today as "the first real communist aggression on the American mainland by the Soviet Union and Cuba."

A Sorry. Who described that? Who said that?

Q The President, in a speech down in Hollywood, Florida, on Monday. He said it was "the first real communist aggression on the American mainland....."

A Uh-huh.

Q We have a treaty obligation under the Rio Treaty, in which an attack upon or aggression against one state down there is regarded as an attack on all. The Rio Treaty further prescribes a mechanism of procedure, the convening of an organ of consultation.

Can you tell me whether the President's words have been followed up by any action, or it simply rhetoric when he talks about the communist aggression?

A It's a good question. I wish I had a good answer. Let me see what we might have on that. It seems to me you're raising a number of points of international law. Why don't we take a look at it? I'm not aware of any such --

Q Are you looking at Article 18 at the OAS -- You said you would look into it last week -- and what our position with respect to that article was?

A Did I say we'd look into it last week? If I said we'd look into it last week, then, undoubtedly, we're looking into it. Let me look into the fact that I said we'd look into it.

Q That's a reassuring response.

Q Do you have a recent new position on the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A I cannot remember how recently we gave you a readout on that. I think it was fairly recent. And I think we also said at that time that we weren't going to give you a kind of day-by-day update on it. I think we gave you a readout within a week or the past few days, wasn't it?

MR. ROMBERG: El Salvador. There is a very brief something.

Q Do you have any reaction or even first impressions to the announcement from Poland?

A I think, basically, we're going to examine the situation, Don. The United States, of course, will welcome concrete progress to meet the aspirations of the Polish people. We'll be studying the specific steps the Polish Government is taking as they become known, and whether they have any practical, positive impact on the situation. In particular, we'll be focusing on whether the vast majority of political prisoners are being released.

Q What is your attitude toward the Amnesty Bill that has been passed?

A I don't know that we have offered you any words to date on that. Let me take a look and see what we have here.

Q It was just passed.

A Just passed? I don't.

Q How will you ever know, then, if --

A You mean, do I have it in my head here at the podium? No, I do not have it in my head.

Q The United States Government knows how many there are?

A Yes.

Q You said, what was it. "vast" majority or "great" majority? What did you say?

A Let me go back while I give you -- I'm sure that I said "vast."

Q Could we get that figure, John?

A Let me see what we can do to help you on that.

Q Are you talking about numbers or quality here. "Vast majority" suggests the most, an overwhelming majority; but what about these few top leaders whom the reports say will not be released?

A I think these words suggest numbers, but I cannot imagine that we would not be concerned with the quality of the individuals.

Q Can I have a turn here?

A Sure.

Q O.K. Thank you. Do you have anything in there on a media crackdown in Paraguay?

A Yes, I do. On July 9, the Government of Paraguay closed down for 30 days a popular Asuncion radio station, "Radio Nanduti." The Paraguayan authorities claimed that the radio station engaged in "misleading public opinion, thus endangering the political tranquility of the nation." More recently, on July 15, Mr. Zuccolillo -- and I apologize if I'm giving that pronunciation wrong -- the owner and editor of ABC-Color, Paraguay's leading independent newspaper, was arrested and accused of having violated a statute protecting the judicial system by publishing a document critical of the judiciary.

The Department is aware that the newspaper ABC-Color has, in the past, been the object of government efforts to limit both its editorial content and its circulation. As we previously indicated on May 18, we are concerned when there are efforts of any kind which infringe upon the freedom of the press, which is a fundamental and essential element of a democratic society.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything on the Greenpeace members who were detained?

A Not a great deal. That is a continually changing or unfolding development, but the Soviet Government has offered to allow the Greenpeace vessel, the "Rainbow Warrior" to receive the six Americans and one Canadian presently being held. We are working out the details, but we believe that the transfer will take place at sea. When and where, I'm afraid I'm not able to --

Why don't you keep in touch with us? We'll let you have whatever we have during the day.

Q What do you mean by "transfer," just handing over the --

A I don't know, quite physically, how they'll do it. But if it's at sea, presumably, it will be from one vessel to another.

Q Are there any plans for the United States to attend the Paris Club meeting on Polish debts July 29?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q On a related matter to the above question, do you have any reaction to the problems that the IMF is running into in conference, in the House in particular? Do you have any rection to the IDA appropriation on the conference and the $25 million El Salvadaor --

A No, I don't. The El Salvador, the $25 million I do, but not on the IDA. Let me see if we can provide you a little reaction on the $25 million from the Press Office afterwards. But, basically, our position is that the Administration needs what it asked for.

Q Also, one other: Do you have any reaction to the President's remark about being extremely difficult to reach any kind of peaceful settlement in Central America with the present Sandinista government?

A I haven't seen the entire text. I suggest you go back and read the text. But I think there is no change in our policy. What he was saying, I think, is it was very difficult to bring peace and stability to Central America while that particular regime pursues the policies it does, and is aided by the external forces that presently aid it.

I think what he was talking about was a change in policy of that regime.

Q He was talking about a change of policy, not a change of governments, is what you're saying?

A I think if you read what he said, that's what he was referring to.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.?

(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the briefing concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, JULY 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 127

FRIDAY, JULY 22, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I think the size of the audience is an indication of the length I expect this briefing to be lasting and the quantity of material I have in my book.

Q We'll see about that.

MR. HUGHES: I have no announcements. I'll be glad to attempt to answer a few brief, simple questions.

Q John, I have a question about these two Navy ships, the "Gallery" and the "Louis B. Porter" that yesterday were reportedly involved in an hour-and-a-half exchange of fire with Nicaraguan gunships.

A I don't have anything on that for you. I'm sorry.

Q My question relates to the role of the Navy on the Caribbean Coast of Nicaragua.

A These ships were of what nationality?

Q U.S. ships.

A And they were involved in what?

Q They made a 90-minute fire exchange with Nicaraguan boats.

A I'll be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q Could you?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q In general, to the question of what role are we playing right now in the Caribbean Coast? What role is our Navy playing there?

A I think that you should address to the Pentagon.

Maybe I did have one announcement, just that I should remind you that there will be a readout on the visit of President Gemayel with President Reagan. I guess that will be about 1:45, something like that -- at the White House.

Q You've got nothing at all on the story, though?

A I don't.

Q Are you aware of it?

A I'm not.

Q Do you care? (Laugh)

Q When did that happen?

Q Yesterday, and it was involving also apparently some Honduran boats.

Q Are you trying to get in here, Mike?

A Do you have a view toward efforts in Rome of Socialist leaders to form a government?

A That effort, of course, is going on. If Mr. Craxi is successful in forming a government, we would certainly look forward to a constructive working relationship with him. We have long respected Mr. Craxi and his Italian Socialist colleagues, many of whom we know well and have worked with during their participation in previous Italian governments. We certainly expect that under Mr. Craxi our relations with Italy will continue to be -- or would continue to be, assuming that he forms a government -- excellent, as they are now.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Why did you have a prepared statement on the request (inaudible)

A We attempt to have prepared statements on every possible question you could possibly ask here, Jim.

Q Do you want me to test that proposition?

A Go ahead and test. We may not do very well on a scale of 1-to-10, or even a scale of 1-to-5.

Q I'm curious about the report that was published in the Christian Science Monitor --

A Aha.

Q -- on Indonesia having to do with East Timor, an Amnesty International press release with respect to a torture manual or a manual about East Timor given to Indonesian troops. Do you have anything on that at all?

A No, I don't.

Lester.

Q There has been wide distribution of a number of Candidate Ronald Reagan's comments on Secretary Kissinger which is attributed to Facts on File, Economist and Newsweek; and since these include Mr. Reagan's reported contention that Dr. Kissinger cozied up -- I'm just quoting what is here -- "cozied up to Cuba, let down Nationalist China, abandoned Angola, winked at Communist enslavement of Eastern Europe, abandoning captive nations, permitting the nation to fall behind the Russians in military strength."

It also reports Mr. Reagan suggested that President Ford was "powerless in the clutches of Secretary of State Kissinger." I was wondering if you could tell us, are these inaccurate, or has President Reagan changed his mind, or has Dr. Kissinger changed?

A I suppose you ought to ask President Reagan that question.

Q If you can arrange an interview, I'd be more than happy to do that, John; but since this is on foreign policy, I'm sure that Secretary Shultz must have an in here, and you as his spokesman --

A I think you can be assured that Secretary Shultz has full confidence in the role that Mr. Kissinger is going to perform and certainly was active in encouraging Mr. Kissinger to take on this assignment, so the Secretary of State has no reservations whatsoever about Mr. Kissinger's ability to perform this assignment.

Q In other words, he thinks --

A No, I didn't say that, Lester.

Q Well, what does he think about -- I didn't even say it --

A I know you didn't.

Q John, what does he think about all these statements attributed from the Economist and Facts on File, and so forth, attributed to Ronald Reagan about Kissinger being in the "clutches of" and so forth?

What does he think, that that is past history?

A I think that the Secretary of State thinks that Dr. Kissinger will do a fine job in fulfilling this assignment.

Q A question on the same subject, but perhaps a little bit more substantive --

CROWD: Ooooooo.

A This is a rough group today!

Q Lester never has any questions to ask on anything except homosexuality.

A I didn't hear that in there.

Q Wait just a minute. I really think we ought to --

A Order. Order. Order. What's your question?

Q Was there anything in here about homosexuality?

Q I thought that was the central subject.

Q No, no, it's not.

A Let us have a little order, otherwise I will be compelled to end this briefing even sooner than I had anticipated.

What's your question?

Q Can you confirm that during the period of this Administration prior to Kissinger's appointment in his current post, he has been traveling abroad on a diplomatic passport/ If so, is that a general practice for former Secretaries of State, or is this something special in the case of Dr. Kissinger?

A I cannot confirm it of my own knowledge, but I would not be surprised if he were to travel on a diplomatic passport, and I think that would be common practice.

Q Can you look into it and try and get a definite answer?

A I'll look into it. I don't think it's a very major issue, but I'll be glad to look into it for you.

Q It may bear somewhat on the contention that some people have had that Kissinger has, prior to this public appointment, actually served as a diplomatic representative of the United States.

A No, no, no. Even if that were to be the case, that a former Secretary of State had traveled on a diplomatic passport, I think it would be improper necessarily in drawing that inference.

Q I said it might have some bearing on the matter.

A Lots of people travel on diplomatic passports but are not engaged in a specific assignment.

Q Does Dr. Dodge have any plans to meet with the press at any time soon?

A Not that I'm aware of. He is back in the country. He arrived yesterday afternoon on a military aircraft, but at his request, we're going to continue to be as unforthcoming as we were yesterday, I'm afraid. I apologize for that, but I'm sure you all understand his desire for privacy.

Q His desire?

A Yes. Yes, it is.

Q John, another 24 hours or so have gone by, have you any further reading of the United States attitude on the Polish question, what the Poles have done?

A No -- still looking at it, Don.

Q Can you tell us, as I understand it, the United States representatives are going to attend a meeting of the so-called Paris Club one week from today on July

29. The question is, will they be prepared at that time to undertake discussions with Poland about its official debts?

A I can't answer that question. Don't know the answer to it.

Q Is it because instructions have not been given, or because you just don't know whether they have been given?

A No. I'm just unaware of whether they will or whether they won't.

Q Do you think instructions have been given to them?

A I don't know.

Q Could you find out?

A Would you like me to take a look at it?

Q Yes.

A Sure.

Q John, would you at this time give us some more exact time of the hand-over of the Greenpeace members?

A Yes. I think they are 17 hours ahead of us. The exchange is scheduled to take place at sea on the evening of July 23 local time -- that's tomorrow, I guess -- which is early morning July 23 Washington time. The time difference between Washington and the exchange point at sea is 17 approximately -- I don't know why it's approximately; I think it is - hours. I don't think there is an approximate time difference. (Laughter) They are 17 hours ahead of us.

The Soviet authorities have requested that a U.S. Government representative be aboard the vessel which receives the detainees. The Mayor of Nome, Alaska, Mr. Leo Rasmussen, has agreed to the State Department's request that he represent the United States Government, and he will be aboard the vessel. As I say, that exchange will take place at sea July 23.

Q Is there an exact hour or a ball park --

A I don't know the exact hour. I'm not sure that they would either, because as you know the two vessels will be coming from different directions.

Q Why was it necessary for a U.S. Government representative to be present?

A I think it's a good idea to have an official present to monitor the exchange.

Q Was that at your initiation or the Soviet Government's?

A Let me refresh my memory on that. I guess it is at the Soviet request.

Q John, do you know how far off the coast that exchange will take place?

A I don't. I don't know whether anybody else has anything in their head on that.

Q Do you plan to set up a stake-out? (Laughter)
A We can't guarantee whether they will speak or face the cameras.

Q You don't know where?

A No, I don't.

Q John, do you have anything on the situation of the North Korean diplomat in the U.N. Mission in New York who has been in the Mission since about last September, if he was charged with assault?

A You're referring to The New York Times story this morning?

Q I believe it may be. Yes. How is that situation evolving? Are we threatening to expel one of their diplomats?

A Well, the information in The New York Times story is essentially accurate; but because sensitive discussions are still going on in this case, I'm afraid we'll not be able to say any more at this time.

Q Sensitive discussions at what level?

A They are, obviously, government-to-government* discussions, but I can't give you the level.

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*NOTE: Please see page 12 for a clarification.

Q I want to ask you a question on Cuba, related to Cuba. There was a report that 23 persons hijacked a boat from Cuba and brought it to Florida. Do you have any comment on that? And also how this would have an impact on the United States' drive to get Cuba to take back or to send back earlier hijackers?

A I think we need to do a little more investigation into the circumstances surrounding that; but, yes, the Seventh District Coast Guard took a Cuban flag vessel, the Unidad 32, into custody after it was found anchored in U.S. territorial waters. The boat was taken to the Coast Guard base at Islamarada where the passengers and crew were questioned. We believe there were 26 people on board, including five women, seven children, and four crew members. We understand from the Coast Guard that the four crew members, who had expressed their desire to return to Cuba, left in the boat for Cuba at 9:05 this morning. I guess additional questions should be addressed to the INS.

According to statements from those on board, two or three men forced the crew to pick up several families, and then sailed for the Florida Keys.

As I said, the investigation continues. Once we have all the facts, we will be in a better position to provide additional comment. In the meantime, the Department of Justice will decide whether any criminal or civil actions are warranted, and determine the status of the individuals involved.

-- MORE --

Q But in a general way, if it is found that these men actually hijacked a boat, they would be --

A Subject to the provisions of U.S. law.

Q And they would be prosecuted as hijackers?

A If the Justice Department so determines.

Q So that 22 remained behind; is that it?

A Four went back; 22 remained. That's right.

Q Two quick ones on Central America. One, do you have any reaction to the OAS statment that there is no such contract as alleged by President Reagan?

A Yes, I do have something on that. President Reagan was repeating the United States position that the Sandinista Government has violated its pledge to the OAS as communicated to the OAS Secretary General in a telegram, the date of which was July 12, 1979. That cable was distributed to all OAS members and it promised to (1) establish full observance of human rights; (2) provide a peaceful and orderly transition; (3) embrace civil justice in Nicaragua, and (4) call "the first free elections our country has known in this century."

No vote has been taken on the Nicaraguan question in the OAS since 1979, but from our consultations within that organization we know that other member states share our disillusionment with the Sandinistas on the fulfillment of these pledges.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Do we have any plans to then formally request reopening of the Seventeenth Consultative Session in the OAS?

A I'm not aware of such plans.

Q And then just an additional question on the same area. Any reaction to the heads of state of two of the Contadora countries regarding exercises?

A No.

Q How is it that we -- can you tell us how it is that we are furthering the Contadora Group's efforts in the last week since they met on Sunday, especially in view of the two Presidents saying that this was not helpful?

A I think there's been a fair amount of misunderstanding about the purposes of these exercises, and I think you should talk to the Pentagon and, indeed, you might want to keep in touch with the Pentagon throughout the course of this afternoon to see whether they might want to have some fuller kind of backgrounder.

Q Have we sought to reassure the Venezuelan and Panamanian Presidents about this?

A I don't have anything on that for you.

Q Does the Pentagon have prepared guidances; is that what you're suggesting?

A I'm suggesting that the Pentagon would obviously be able to answer instant questions. But I think you might want to keep in touch with the Pentagon about the idea of a fuller backgrounder -- not a fuller backgrounder, a backgrounder, I guess.

Q With respect to the answer of the question on the OAS and the guidance that you'll provide us, is it possible that the State Department would publish copies of the telegram?

A I shouldn't think so.

Q On the Cuban story, was that boat intercepted yesterday or taken into custody yesterday?

A She left today.

Q No, no, when it was picked up by the Coast Guard?

A I'm working backwards. I honestly don't know when she came in.

Q You said that if they were found to have hijacked the vessel they would be prosecuted. Here or --

A They would be subject to U.S. law.

Q Would they be returned to Cuba?

A I think we're going to have to wait and see what the Justice Department would decide; whether there is criminal or civil action, and therefore what the appropriate penalty would be.

Q Do you have any comment on the deterioration of security situation in Lebanon?

A Not really. There is a late press report about additional shelling, I think, in Beirut. Insofar as the shelling of the airport is concerned, you really ought to talk to the Pentagon. But as I understand it, I think what they will say -- but please confirm this with them -- is that three U.S. servicemen were slightly injured: two Marines and one naval personnel.

Q I didn't mean to ask about the Marines. I meant to ask about the whole situation in general. There are fierce battles and shellings in the Shouf and the airport area and different other areas of Lebanon.

A I'm not sure that what I've just described at the airport I would characterize as a "fierce battle." I think that about twelve rounds came in. But, no, I don't have a general comment.

Q Do you have anything to say about the report in the New York Times today about Egypt defaulting on its interest payments, and also we don't know whether or not they met the payment that was due on June 15; also another one on July 15? It also said something about -- it's one of several countries that recently had difficulty in meeting its obligations, and so on.

A The facts in the article in the New York Times this morning are essentially correct -- (Laughter)

Q That means absolutely.

A Essentially correct is about as lyrical as we ever get. (Laughter) We have been in contact with the Egyptians on this matter and expect that payment will be made shortly.

Q In connection with that, do you have anything on the fact that other countries are in difficulties? We had a report the other day to the effect that Jordan --

A Yes, that's right.

Q -- Lebanon and others also have difficulties.

A I don't know about Lebanon but I do remember the Jordanian situation, and I remember well giving you the guidance on that.

Q When was that? Do you remember?

A I would say it was within the past tën days. My memory sometimes lapses, but --

Q May I ask you, in connection with your statement just a few minutes ago about the Nicaraguan pledge to the OAS, about the full observance of human rights and embracing the civil justice in Nicaragua, is there any comment or do you have any information as to whether the Government of Nicaragua legally, within the Nicaraguan law, had the right to seize the only synagogue in all Nicaragua, the one in Managua?

A I don't have anything specifically on that incident, but I think that if you check with the Press Office there is some guidance from yesterday or the day before on anti-Semitism in Nicaragua.

Q Can I make one observation --

A We don't like observations in this room. We like questions.

Q Let me ask you a question, then. I tried to raise the question earlier in this meeting about some remarks that were passed between two members of this press corps, and I was suggesting, perhaps, not in a loud enough voice, that they be expunged from the record. I don't think it's decent for stuff like that to get around. So if I may ask the question, will you do it?

A Let me take a look at the transcript. I should just say that it's been pointed out to me by my colleague that whereas the New York Times has a high record of accuracy today, the Spokesman does not, and I made a reference to government-to-government contacts on that question of the North Korean. I should have said -- and, of course, knew at the time -- that (Laughter) any contacts have been in the U.N. context or with local authorities.

There is, of course, no change in our policy of talking with the North Koreans which, of course, I realize.

Q I have a domestic State Department question.

A A domestic State Department question?

Q Yes. The Pentagon has distributed 7,000 reprints of this Steven Hess article in the Brookings Review in which he reports the following, and this is a quote: "I asked Alan Romberg, the Deputy Spokesman, to estimate the number of truly serious reporters in the diplomatic press corps. Fifteen, he said, but there were usually 70 reporters at a noon briefing."

A As many as fifteen, he said? (Laughter)

Q This is the thing. Since your Deptuy has now evaluated the State Department press corps in which I would certainly not deny that there are some reporters here who take themselves very seriously, could we get a list -- the State Department's list of the truly serious fifteen lest all of us be suspect?

A I think I'd like to break it down into the very serious, the less serious --

Q I thought fairly serious, slightly serious, blithe spirits, and so forth. I mean, this is somewhat unprecedented, and was he just speaking on behalf of you when he listed 15 favorites or --

A No, no, he didn't say --

Q Can we get some elaboration on this?

A He didn't say "favorites," Lester. You shouldn't be of the view that the more serious of the correspondents are necessarily our favorites. (Laughter)

Q Here's the thing. One of the reasons I ask this is the Washington Post not long ago reported that the White House, in its seating charts for Presidential news conferences, had a section reserved for what they call "dependable friendlies." Is there a similar trend here? I would be very much -- can we hear from Alan? Who are the 15 serious?

A I've never understood the seating arrangements at the noon briefing. I'll have to get them --

Q No, we don't have them here. It's more democratic. I just wonder if there is some connection between the Romberg Fifteen and the Dependable Friendlies? (Laughter)

A Mr. Romberg never comments on White House affairs. He's much wary --

Q Could he tell us who are the truly serious 15?

A No, Lester, this is my briefing. Only I am speaking today.

Q Can you tell us?

A No. (Laughter)

Q Where is Ambassador Stone?

A Stone is en route from Mexico to his next port of call.

Q Where is that, John?

A I guess I need to check on his itinerary for you.

Q Can you say (inaudible)

A Let me work on that for you.

Q Do you have the Secretary's schedule for next week?

A Yes. Why don't I do that after this fantastically colorful, ON THE RECORD briefing we have.

Q Is there any decision on whether he would visit Nicaragua, Senator Stone?

A Not a decision. As I said yesterday, I wouldn't rule it out, but he hasn't scheduled a visit to Nicaragua yet.

Q Can you elaborate now on this Presidential message that he was supposed to be carrying?

A No, I don't think so. We usually don't publish Presidential messages.

Q Is he going to meet with any Nicaraguans?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q How about Salvadoran rebels?

A I don't know the answer to that, either.

Q When you say he's not scheduled to go to Nicaragua at this time --

A He has a schedule of the countries he's visiting, and that is not presently -- I mean, I don't have a time and a date for him to be in Nicaragua. I don't want to mislead you by saying that he's not going there. It's a possibility.

Q Yesterday, you said that they would be going to the Contadora countries, and he'd be going to Central American countries that have taken part in the Contadora process. That seems to indicate that some Central American countries are on the schedule.

A Yes.

Q You said that Nicaragua is not presently on the schedule.

A That's right.

Q So it is Central American countries other than Nicaragua at this point?

A That's right.

Q Could you take those two questions about whether he met Nicaraguans in Mexico City or the Salvadorans?

A I'll be glad to take a look at it, sure.

Q (Inaudible).

A There's a groundswell of opinion down here from one of the more serious reporters in the briefing that we should end this charade.

Q John, a quick one. Can you confirm that American military advisors are being sent to Chad?

A To where?

Q To Chad?

A No, they're not.

Q Do you have anything on Pickering?

A I don't have anything on Pickering. No, I really don't.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, ~~JUNE~~ July 25, 1982

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 128

MONDAY, JULY 25, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement. You may already be aware that Dr. Henry Kissinger, Chairman of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America will hold an ON THE RECORD press conference on the Commission at the Department of State's Loy Henderson Room this afternoon at 2:00 p.m. The briefing will be open to all Department and White House-accredited journalists.

Q Is that why you buttoned your jacket when you came in?

A That's right. Be happy to take your questions.

(Laughter)

Q Alan, just for the record, can you give us any guidance on reports that the United States plans to increase its covert activities around Nicaragua?

A Jim, as usual, we will be staying away from any comment one way or another on alleged covert activities.

Q Do you have anything on a request by Senator Dodd for an urgent meeting with Secretary Kissinger and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

A I don't have anything on that. I think that would be something that would be handled by Dr. Kissinger's office.

Q Wait a minute. I'm sorry. With the Secretary.

A Oh. You said Dr. Kissinger, I thought.

Q Did I say that?

A Yes.

Q I'm way ahead of myself. I'm sorry.

(Laughter)

A I'll give you a piece of chalk and a blackboard and you can go write on it --

(Laughter)

Q Alan, can you expand for us on Ambassador Quainton's remarks over the weekend that the United States is trying to substantially influence events and the Government of Nicaragua; by what means are we trying to do this?

A The question is, could I expand on Ambassador Quainton's remarks over the weekend, as John is describing them, that we are seeking to influence -- And what was the other verb?

Q That's enough.

A -- substantially change Nicaragua's policies and what means we might be using to do that.

Q That's correct.

A O.K. The answer essentially is, I don't have much to say beyond what Ambassador Quainton said. I think his words were quite clear, and we have talked before about problems we have with Nicaragua's policies, both in terms of the commitments that the Sandinistas made to the OAS about their own domestic policies and also Nicaragua's practices vis-a-vis its neighbors. Beyond that, though, I don't have anything to offer you.

Q Can you tell us anything about Ambassador Stone's whereabouts?

A I can give you a little bit on that, a very little bit. He is in Panama, I gather, at the moment. Later today, he goes to Caracas. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Would he be meeting any members of the FDR - FMLN?

A Again, Jim, because of the confidential nature of the mission and what we've talked about before in that respect, we're not going to give details of his schedule regarding whom he is meeting, when, where, and so on.

Q You're still not ruling out a trip to Nicaragua?

A Have nothing new on that, so we're where we are.

Q Can you give us anything on with whom he has met?

A I don't have anything on with whom he has met.

Q Do you have any comments on the reports that the President is being presented with a proposal for an increase, a sharp increase in the number of advisers in El Salvador?

A I believe Larry Speakes addressed that this morning indicating that there is no such proposal before the President at this point. Obviously, we continue to review all aspects of the policy all the time, and the self-imposed limit of 55 trainers would be something that people would look at from time to time. But as I say, I would refer you to what Larry said this morning that there is no proposal before the President at this time on that subject.

Q That doesn't mean that that proposal is not at the White House? It just means it is not before the President?

A I don't know how far Larry went with that, but I would not lead you to believe that there should be such a fine line drawn that you're trying to draw.

Q You mean that there is no such proposal, or no such proposal before the President?

A My understanding is that there is no proposal at the White House at this point. I'm not trying to play games with you on this.

Q O.K.

A But I think I also ought to say that having said that, I would reiterate what I said before, what I just said, and that is that, obviously, various aspects of the policy continue to be under review, and I don't know that we're going to get into a day-by-day reading of what proposals may or may not be before the President. But as of this point, I will tell you that.

Q Just to get this out of the way, you're not denying here that Secretary Weinberger has formulated such a proposal --

A I have no --

Q -- or that there is such a proposal at the Pentagon?

A I have no idea whether there is such a proposal at the Pentagon, Bob. You would have to go to the Pentagon for that.

Q Alan, could you help us with whether or not the review that is going on now on this and perhaps other aspects of the Administration's Central America policy is in the nature of the review that went on in, I guess it was late January and early February that was, it seems to me, characterized even by the Administration as a sort of major review -- periodic, major review. Or are you just saying, everything is always under review, and you know, anything could come up any day?

The fact, for example, that Kissinger, Shultz, Kirkpatrick, and Clark all met with the President this morning -- shall we read that as just a shaking-hands session at the beginning of the Commission, or is there a major review underway?

A I don't think that would relate to a major review. I think that Dr. Kissinger's and the Commission's role is different from the one you're suggesting.

You have capitalized it; I haven't said "the review" or "a review."

Jim.

Q What about an update on all these exercises that we were promised off and on last week? Is there going to be one?

A I don't have anything new for you on that.

-- MORE --

Q Also, another question about a posted answer last week about arms flows from -- it says Cuba through Nicaragua to El Salvador. It says, "we have nothing new to report; the flow continues." But last time this office said that, in mid April, you say there had been a lull, and also on May 27, some senior Administration officials confirmed that there wasn't much of anything going across the border but mainly inside El Salvador. So I don't understand the response to the question.

A I'm not sure I agree with you about quite the totality of what was said in May. In any case, that's what we have at the moment. That is, that the flow continues, and I can't quantify it for you.

Q But when you say you have nothing new to report, that seemed to date back to a previous time, and the previous time, it was indicated, that there was hardly anything, if anything at all.

A I don't think I agree with you about that.

Q May I ask you to review that?

A (inaudible)

Q A question related to Cuba, can you confirm whether a Cuban official has defected to the U.S. and asked for political asylum?

A As you know, we don't comment, as a general rule, on defections or asylum cases except in extraordinary cases.

Q This was already reported in some of the media.

A That doesn't change the situation.

Q On the question of arms flows, smuggling from Nicaragua, Cuba, et cetera, and El Salvador, is anything planned at all to give us information on this? I ask because so much attention is being given to this in terms of devising the Administration's policies. That the Nicaraguans are supporting the rebels in El Salvador with goods, advice, men, material and what-not. We're given very little information on which to watch this, to give our own assessment, to tell the public what's going on. Can't we have a briefing, or some information on this?

A I will pass on your interest. We have always had a problem with this, as you know, because of the nature of the information, largely intelligence information. What we did at one point, as you will recall, and I think it's been a sort of continuing process, is to brief the appropriate Congressional committees and let them make their evaluations independently and let that be known as they saw fit.

Clearly, continuing briefing of the Hill is going on, but I don't know that there's any large, new briefing planned of that sort and therefore I don't know whether I can answer, or satisfy, rather, your request. But I will pass on your interest in that.

Q One more on Central America. There have been reports in the Times about the U.S. planning to build a $150 million facility in Honduras at which American supplies would be prepositioned. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Is the U.S. asking Israel to postpone the redeployment of the Israeli forces in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything on that. Obviously, the whole situation in Lebanon, including the recent visit by President Gemayel, will be a subject for discussion with Ministers Shamir and Arens are here later this week.

Q Tell us about that?

A I don't have a great deal of detail to give you on that. They will be departing Israel, I understand, later today for the United States to meet with the Secretary and other senior Administration officials. We expect the meetings to begin sometime on Tuesday, tomorrow, and to continue for several days. But I don't have further detail on the schedule or for any agenda beyond what I've given you.

Q At this point, who will be the players who will be participating in these meetings? Mr. McFarlane and Mr. Fairbanks; and the others, Mr. Draper and Mr. Habib will not be taking part in these meetings?

A I don't know specifically who will be taking part in the meetings. And, of course, there will be different meetings so that presumably the cast of characters could change to a certain extent. I'm sure that Mr. McFarlane, in his new role, would be participating. Precisely who else will be, I think you would have to wait a little bit and see what happens on that.

Q In the general area, are you aware of reports that Iraq is threatening to close the Persian Gulf oil lanes, and, if so, do you consider this a credible threat?

A That Iraq is planning to close it?

Q Yes.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you bring us up to date on the government's policy towards the Multinational Force? What would it do if asked to fill in behind the Israelis if they withdrew, when they withdraw?

A I don't have anything new on that today. There had been no consultations yet among the various MNF contributing countries, for example, so it's really premature to get into that kind of question.

Q Two on Lebanon. One, there was an emergence of an opposition front in Lebanon. Do you have anything on that?

A Yes, I do. Simply, to note our hope that all parties in Lebanon recognize the importance of national reconciliation behind a strong central government in the pursuit of common national goals.

We also emphasize again our hope that senseless violance in Lebanon will end in the interest furthering a worthy goal of a united, independent and sovereign Lebanon, free of all foreign forces. Continued strife and bloodshed serves no one's interests.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes. It may take a few minutes.

Q President Gemayel, at first, said that the opposition was, you know, within a democratic framework, legitimate, and then later he changed his position and said it was illegitimate. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q Another thing. He's talking about a referendum organized by the United Nations for Lebanon. Do you have anything on that?

A I saw a press report of that. I'm not aware of the details, and I don't have any comment for you on it.

Q Do you know by any chance if it was discussed with President Reagan while he was here?

A I do not know.

Q Last week you said you were going to reserve judgment about the effect of the Israeli redeployment. Now, after the visit of President Gemayel, do you have a better reading of what is going to be the result, or what are the results of this kind of possible redeployment?

A No, I don't. As I said, I think that this will be an obvious topic, Lebanon as a whole, and I'm sure the redeployment is part of it when Ministers Shamir and Arens are here.

Q Have you received any details about the redeployment from the Israeli Government, or that's what the two Ministers will be bringing here?

A I'm sure that there's been some follow-on discussions. I can't tell you whether there has, in fact, been detail. I saw some reports indicating that the details are still being worked out in fact. I can't tell you, though, what degree of consultation there has been other than there continues to be, and I don't think in fact I would be able to give you details from here of what our diplomatic conversations are about. Clearly, we will be discussing it.

Q I'm asking because previously some spokespersons on backgrounds were not able to make any comments because they said they don't have any details on it. I'm trying to find if you have details, would you make any comments about it?

A I'm not sure at this point what we would do and when we would do it. Let me just say, right now I don't have anything further to give you.

Q Are there any plans for the two Ministers to meet with the President?

A Again, the details of the schedule are being worked out. I don't have that to give you at this point.

Q Does the United States have any plans to grant political asylum to Dennis Brutus, or do you have any comments on that case?

A We have some standing guidance. I don't have anything really new to give you on the Brutus case. It goes back now some time. The Department does not disclose details of asylum requests except in exceptional circumstances. However, Mr. Brutus has reported that the Department of State has advised INS that, (1), he has a well-founded fear of persecution in South Africa; and (2) he should not be returned to Zimbabwe.

The Department, for its part, will continue its policy of not discussing individual asylum cases, notwithstanding Mr. Brutus' public remarks. Whether Brutus will receive asylum will be determined by an INS immigration judge. If he does not receive asylum, he will be free to apply from abroad for a new non-immigrant visa.

Q Alan, a similar topic. Can you go beyond last week's comments on the Dodge case now that he's back and apparently safe and sound, and so on?

A No. I think he himself talked about this a bit last week, indicating that it would serve no useful purpose to talk about the details, and we will not be doing so.

Q Is it true that Secretary Shultz's press conference which was supposed to be taking place this week was cancelled in order to make room for Mr. Kissinger to have his news conference today?

A No.

Q Do you have anything Sri Lanka?

A Anything on what?

Q Sri Lanka?

A I have nothing on Sri Lanka.

Q I don't have the information at hand, but it's my understanding that the House-Senate Conference last week cut $15 million in aid to Jordan. Do you have a comment on that?

A I don't have any comment on that. Let me take a look and see if there's anything that I can come up with on that.

Q Do you have anything on the status of the fighting in the Iran-Iraq war, and are Americans being advised to leave Iraq?

A I don't have anything new on that, and I'm not aware of a new travelers advisory on that.

Q Do you have any readouts about the status of the Israeli request for funding for the LAVI fighter, and do you expect this issue to be discussed when the Ministers will be here?

A I don't have anything new, and I don't know whether it will be discussed. I certainly wouldn't rule it out, but I just don't know.

I've seen a press report from Israel suggesting that if the Prime Minister had come, for example, that he would have intended to raise it. I can't tell you whether the Ministers will raise it or not.

Q Would you tell us, or could you take the question, what is the status of this request in the deliberation within the Administration?

A No, I don't think I would get into that kind of detail for you.

Q What are your comments on the report that Mr. Veliotes and Mr. Draper will be assigned an Embassy role as a result of the shift in the Middle East policy?

A I don't really have any comment on personnel assignments. I can say, though, that on Ambassador Draper that we would, of course, be calling on him and his expertise as the negotiations proceed. I do expect that probably -- that ultimately he would be given a new assignment, but I don't have anything on that specifically, and I certainly don't have anything on Assistant Secretary Veliotes.

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CONT

Q Is Habib still in town?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q I think it's well known that the Israeli Government has its reasons for a redeployment of forces. Do you find these reasons as rational or excessive?

A I don't have anything new to offer today on that. We've talked about it before, and I just don't have anything beyond what we have said about this.

Q Will there be other bilateral issues between Israel and the U.S. discussed or is Lebanon going to be the focus of the discussions? For example, the strategic cooperation or economic cooperation agreements, and so on?

A I think that we'll be discussing other issues, but I would expect that certainly a focus, an important focus, will be the situation in Lebanon. But I wouldn't rule out other topics.

Q Can you be more specific about "other topics"?

A No, I can't.

Q Do you have any comment on the Gulf Corporation Council states plan to have their own maneuvers, I believe, this week and military exercise in the Gulf?

A No.

Q Do you have any response to the declaration issued by the Andean Pact Summit regarding economic cooperation in Latin America and so on?

A I don't have anything on it. No.

Q Question on El Salvador: Do you have any guidance on the report that Senator Helms is holding up the nomination for Pickering in El Salvador?

A No. That was in the paper, I think, last week, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything at all on the U.S.-Syrian working group?

A No. Nothing new on that.

Q There was a report on this question -- there was a report in a Saudi newspaper, Al Jazirah, saying that there was a Syrian group in this town when President Gemayel was here, and they have had talks with him and with the State Department officials.

A That a Syrian group did?

Q Yes.

A I would cast great doubt on that. No. But I would also point out to you that I think it's been made known that Mr. McFarlane will be going out to the region shortly, and so I think that --

Q Do you have a date?

A I don't have a specific date yet.

Q Have the Syrians said they'll receive McFarlane?

A I don't have anything to give you on that, but I would not expect that to be a problem.

Q Not expected to be a what?

A A problem.

Q Are you ruling out any Syrian delegation coming to the United States, Foreign Minister or any other --

A Ruling out? No. I'm not ruling it out, but I think in the immediate future there is nothing planned.

Q The Wall Street Journal said today that the State Department and White House had blocked a briefing on the maneuvers. Do you have any reply to that?

A No. I saw the story. I think there was some thinking about having a briefing last week, and it wasn't held.

Q One other --

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't know. I haven't heard whether there's anything firmly --

Q I think it's on the wires today.

A Okay. I haven't heard anything whether that's firmly scheduled.

Q Is the Secretary doing anything -- the House is beginning debate on the IMF. Is he devoting time to that today?

A I can't tell you specifically what the Secretary may be doing on the IMF issue. This is an important issue, and I know he considers it important. But I can't tell you specifically what activities he may be engaged in relative to it.

Q Senator Inouye is introducing a resolution today in the Senate on the Contadora effort, urging the United States to support it more strongly. The tenor of the resolution is that we're not supporting it.

What's the latest U.S. position on that?

A The latest U.S. position has been the standing U.S. position which is that we do support the effort. We have been consistent in saying that we thought that the issues of the region should be addressed in a regional context, citing both the Contadora effort and the principles of the San Jose communique, but I don't have anything new, therefore, to offer.

Q But one of the premises of the Contadora effort was also called -- maybe not in the communique, but separately by the Presidents for the U.S. and Cuba, to discuss the issue in Cuba as part of the region, so would that be --

A I think we'll stand on what I've said. We've looked at a regional approach, and I think we've expressed our views on specific dialogue with Cuba in terms of our experience in trying to establish such a dialogue earlier.

Q So you would rule it out?

A I think I'd stand on what I've just said.

Q Since the Contadora resolution by Mr. Inouye supports the Contadora process and the Administration supports the Contadora process, does the Administration support the Inouye resolution?

A I don't have a position on the Inouye resolution for you, Ralph.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #129

TUESDAY, JULY 26, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements. Yesterday the Secretary sent to Speaker O'Neill and Minority Leader Michael letters urging House support for the pending legislation to provide increased funding for the International Monetary Fund.

The Secretary was joined in signing this letter by former Secretaries of State Dean Rusk, William Rogers, Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, Ed Muskie and Alexander Haig. Copies of that letter are available in the Press Office.

This afternoon at 2:00 the Secretary will come down and greet Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir and Israeli Defense Minister Arens at 2:00 upon their arrival at the Department. There will be a photo op at the diplomatic entrance, curbside.

After that meeting in the State Department there will be a stakeout. I can't really tell you when it will end, but we think it will end around 4:30 this afternoon.

I have a statement on the Iranian threat to prevent Gulf oil exports.

We note that Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, in responding to recent statements from Iraq threatening attacks on Iranian oil installations, has again asserted that Iran would act to prevent all oil exports from the Gulf if its own export capabilities were impaired.

The United States deplores the continuation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq and hopes they will pursue the opportunities available to them to enter into discussions leading to restoration of peace in the Gulf region in a manner consistent with their continued sovereignty and independence.

In this regard, the State Department reiterates the United States' commitment, first expressed at the outbreak of hostilities, to freedom of navigation in the Gulf, a matter which is of vital importance to the entire international community.

That's all I have for you. I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Can you explain that last statement where you reiterate your commitment to freedom of navigation? In other words, would the United States be prepared to send partrols out there --

A I'm not going to get into what the United States might or might not do. We just want to make it very clear that there should be no misunderstanding of the United States' position with respect to freedom of navigation in international waters. This position was first enunciated by President Carter in September 1980, and it continues under the Reagan Administration. Nothing has changed, but it is a restatement of standing U.S. policy on freedom of navigation.

Q It's not clear to me what your commitment amounts to.

A No, I'm not going to go beyond what we've said, that we take it very seriously.

Q President Carter said he would be willing to possibly send troops there. Are you talking that way?

A I am not going to go beyond what we have said other than to stress how seriously we take it.

Q Is it because of the exchange, at least the verbal exchanges on this issue between Iraq and Iran that your concern has reached the point where you feel it is necessary to make this statement?

A Yes.

Q You consider the possibility as real, then, of a cutoff?

A We note what the Iranian Foreign Minister said, and in it's in response to that apparent threat that we make this statement.

Q Are you issuing any special warning to ships to stay out of that area?

A No, not that I'm aware of.

Q Is there a standing warning to mariners?

A I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q Is the U.S. in touch with any of the other Gulf States about this issue?

A I'm not aware --

Q Including Saudi Arabia?

A -- of specifics as of today, but I don't think there's any doubt that our concerns in the past have been communicated to them.

Q To finish that, is there a reverse to that? Has the Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, communicated its concern to us?

A I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q Would the Bright Start '83 maneuvers that you intend to undertake the middle of next month, during next month, would it not exacerbate the situation in the Gulf?

A I don't see why.

Q They have been saying that it does, both Iraq and Iran.

A I know of no change in our plans.

Q As far as freedom of navigation, would that also include, therefore, the threat that Iran perceives to be to its own oil exports?

A We're talking about the specific activity I've mentioned in the Gulf.

Q But you're talking about freedom of navigation. Does that include Iran?

A I'm talking about freedom of navigation in the Gulf. That's what I'm talking about.

Q What I'm trying to find out is, does the threat against Iran, which brought about Iran's threat in return, included in your idea of freedom of navigation?

A I'm not sure what you mean. Any activity by anybody which would impede navigation in the Gulf, would of course be encompassed by our statement.

Q Have Central Command Forces been put on alert?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have more than the verbal exchange that's causing your worry?

A No.

Q No more solid information that they will?

A No.

Q Was this specific situation discussed with the Emir of Bahrain?

A I'm not sure about the details. I'm sure that, in general, but I'm not sure how detailed that discussion was.

Q Since you're making this statement today, have you sent this reiteration to the Saudis, for instance, those of our friends in that region?

A As I said, I'm not sure what has happened in terms of specifics in the past 24 hours, but I don't think that anybody in the region would be unaware of our concern.

Q If it is your intention to clarify the U.S. policy, I don't think you've succeeded. I am --

A I think we've clarified our policy in terms of our concern. What you're asking me is to say if X happens, what will the United States do, and that's what we're not going to say.

Q No. What I'm asking you is what does the U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation mean?

A Again, it's a good try, but I think you're asking me to say what specific physical, military, diplomatic, or whatever, action would the United States take and we're not going to do that.

Q Are the two countries capable militarily, in the U.S. view, of actually shutting off oil flows to the rest of the world?

A I don't know. I think you'd have to ask the experts, but I would think that one takes such a threat seriously.

Q That's what I was getting at was, how seriously does one take a verbal exchange between two countries that are at war.

A I think you take fairly seriously a threat of this kind.

Q Have you expressed your concern about this matter to the French who are willing to provide certain types of missiles to the Iraqis?

A I don't know whether we've been talking to the French.

Q I'm sorry?

A I don't know whether we've been in touch with the French.

Q You're adopting the Carter doctrine on the Persian Gulf?

A Yes, in this respect.

Q And this is --

A No change in foreign policy.

Q -- in expressing concern on this only? Does it stop?

A Maybe I'm having trouble in getting you to use the words I used before. Let me read them again. The United States deplores the continuation of hostilities and hopes they will pursue the opportunities available to them to enter into discussions leading to the restoration of peace, and the United States reiterates its commitment to freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

Q Would the blocking of tankers be considered an act of war?

Q Without being specific about what you're going to do, can it assumed that the United States is willing to back up in one form or another its commitment to freedom of navigation?

A I think we're just rest on what we've said here, that we are serious about it but we're not going to specify what would happen --

Q I understand you're not going to specificy what may happen, but we can assume that the United States is prepared to back up its commitment with something.

A By activity, certainly, yes. But we're not going to specify what that activity is.

Q Would the blocking of tankers --

A I'm not going to specify what we might do.

Q I'm not asking you. I said, would the blocking of tankers be considered an act of war?

A I don't know. You would have to ask someone who is more versed in international law than I am.

Q Can you say that the United States is determined to maintain freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf?

A I think that's a fair statement.

Q You say you take the verbal threat seriously which suggests that you take the verbal threat to be more than -- to contain more than just words. Is it accurate for us to conclude that the United States' verbal commitment contains more than just words?

A The Iranian Foreign Minister asserted that Iran would act to prevent all oil exports from the Gulf.

Q Will the United States act to prevent Iran from accomplishing that beyond --

A You're asking me for the tenth time the question that I said I'm not going to answer.

Q Do I understand you correctly to say that this Administration is continuing intact the so-called Carter doctrine?

A In this respect, yes.

Q The Carter doctrine, among other things, said that the Persian Gulf is of vital national interest to the United States, and that is still the policy?

A That is my understanding.

Q And vital, in the sense, that, for example, Western Europe is of vital national security interest?

A I think I would like to go back and draw on language. You're drawing me far afield now, and if you're going to get into that kind of policy statement on it, I'll have to go back and do a little research and draw on words that have been used previously.

Q That was the essence of the Carter doctrine.

A But in terms of the importance of the Gulf and our commitment to keeping international waters open, that is a strong commitment.

--MORE--

Q John, the Gulf supplies oil for a great number of nations, allied nations to the United States. Do we have similar commitments from those allied nations?

A I don't know what consultations have taken place.

Q Can we shift to the other part of the Middle East?

A Sure.

Q Any reaction to the shooting today in Hebron?

A Yes. The United States deplores this criminal act and condemns terrorism from any quarter. We extend our sympathy to the victims and their families. We fervently hope that those guilty will be arrested by the responsible authorities. We urge all in the area to be calm and to refrain from further acts of violence.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, back on the original subject, do you have any information available at the podium about the number of barrels of oil a day out of the region --

A I don't, Larry. No, I don't.

Q -- and what the intensity of the shipping is?

A I don't.

Q On the Shamir-Arens talks, what does the United States hope to achieve by these?

A I don't think we're going to get into that. They're here. They'll be here the rest of this week. A number of, obviously, bilateral and regional matters will be discussed, and perhaps at the end of the visit we might have something further.

Q Who are they meeting with, apart from Shultz?

A They will meet with Secretary Shultz today. I think tomorrow they'll be back in the State Department for other meetings here with a variety of officials, probably Secretary Shultz again tomorrow.

I think they will have a separate meeting with Secretary Weinberger tomorrow, and they will also see the President while they're here.

Q Only Shultz today?

A I think there will be other officials on both sides.

Q Can you say who?

A I expect that McFarlane would be involved. I expect that Ambassador Fairbanks would be involved.

Q Veliotes?

A Veliotes, of course. It might be that Ambassador Draper would be involved. Ambassador Habib would not. I think he is not in town. Those are the obvious ones.

Q A matter of clarification: There have been some reports to the effect that U.S. and Polish officials will be meeting soon in Paris on the matter of debt problems, but other reports about apparently the same meeting have said that no Polish officials will be involved, but just other countries that are involved in having to extend its loans.

Can you clarify this?

A Let me look into that for you.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports of additional Israeli casualties in Lebanon --

A No.

Q -- that relate to the issue of withdrawal and redeployment?

A No, I don't.

Q You don't have any fresh statements there on the Israeli redeployment plan, do you?

A No.

Q Would the Administration, John -- can you tell us if they would seek in any way to stop or to reverse the Israeli decision to redeploy?

A I think the United States will look at that decision within the framework of its goals for Lebanon which is the full and prompt withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q Has anybody -- or I don't know if you told us before -- if the Israeli decision to redeploy fits with those American goals of total withdrawal, safety for northern settlements in Israel, and sovereignty for Lebanon?

Does the Administration see the Israeli comment as fitting within those objectives?

A Have we said whether we see it within --

Q Yes.

A No. We haven't.

Q Can you say that now?

A No. I can't. I think that's one of the likely areas for discussion during this visit.

Q John, would we favor a complete Israeli withdrawal regardless of what Syria does?

A We would favor the total withdrawal of all foreign forces, but as to how --

Q The specific -- if Israel were to withdraw without any Syrian withdrawal, what would our attitude be toward that?

A That would not be withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q But initially, the U.N. resolution we voted for over a year ago, that at the time was narrowly focused just on Israel. Have we changed --

A There is the Lebanese-Israeli agreement on withdrawal, but, obviously, that was always predicated on the belief that Syrian forces would leave too.

Q But Lebanon is not a party to that particular aspect of the agreement. There is no agreement with Lebanon that the Syrians have to withdraw.

A No. But there are realities in the area, though, that everybody has to be aware of.

Q So we would not favor a unilateral Israeli withdrawal, not coordinated in some way with a Syrian pull-out.

A We're for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and would have to look at individual actions and plans within that framework. What furthers that is something we'd be for, and anything that would obstruct that gives us problems.

Q Would the United States favor implementation of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement if the Syrians, which are not a party to that agreement, remained? That seems to be basically the question. I mean, are we now saying that we do not want implementation of the agreement unless the party not party to that agreement does something to --

A I think we have to engage in these discussions with Israeli officials here, see what they have in mind, and I think it would really be unwise to engage in hypothetical discussions about when the agreement comes into effect or --

Q Would there be objections to Israel implementing the agreement? That's basically all we're asking.

A I think we have to wait and see what -- we're still waiting for details, which I'm sure will come during this visit, on what the Israelis have in mind about the timetable.

Q John, have the Israelis discussed the number of years in which from that podium the occupation of Syrian troops of Lebanon -- large segments of Lebanon -- was approved?

A I'm having a little trouble --

Q I'll try and rephrase it. For years, I remember from that podium every time I'd ask a question, do we want the Syrian troops to remain in Lebanon, it was explained from that podium, Department of State, that they were a peacekeeping force approved by the Arab League.

My question is, have the Israelis noted the years of appoval by the Department of State of the occupation of Lebanon by Syrian troops?

A I think you should address that question to the Israelis.

Q I just wondered -- I'm addressing it to you because I just wonder, has the State Department -- have they brought it up to the State Department?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Does it seem consistent to you now that we want everybody out that we spent all those years approving of Syrian occupation? It comes as a sort of a sudden shift, doesn't it, John?

A No. You're certainly drawing me into dangerous waters when you want to tax me on consistency in foreign policy, Lester. (Laughter)

Q What was it --

A But I will certainly talk about the foreign policy of this Administration.

Q Can you do this, John? One last follow-up on this: Could you pinpoint when it was that we suddenly decided it would not be good for the Syrian troops to stay in Lebanon after all those years of approval?

A You'd have to do a little more energetic research on that than I'm able to do.

Q I thought you'd have it at your fingertips, John.

A No. I don't have it at my fingertips.

Q It is a shift.

A I know that surprises you and shocks you but --

Q It is an abrupt shift. You'll agree with that, because you're smiling, right?

A Oh, Lester, I smile at all kinds of things that go on in this briefing room. (Laughter) We should read no significance into that.

Q Another subject, John: Has the United States heard either negatively or postively from any Central

American governments about the military maneuvers which were announced yesterday by the Pentagon?

A I haven't gone into that. I'm sure there is consultation and traffic back and forth, but I'm not able to give you that.

Q Yesterday on "Nightline," a member of the Knesset, said that --

A I'm sorry, a member of --

Q -- of the Israeli Knesset, said that the areas vacated by the Israeli troops would have to be filled by both Lebanese and MNF troops.

Can you give us an idea of what the increase in terms of U.S. Marines would be in order to fill --

A There's certainly no plans for an increase in the MNF at this time.

Q Because it seems almost inevitable.

A Why don't we wait and hear how it's all going to take place, if it is going to take place? You seem to be jumping the gun on these talks that are taking place here.

Q Does the State Department approve or disapprove of the Bingaman-Inouye resolution?

A I'm sorry. Of the which --

Q The Bingaman-Inouye resolution.

A You're going to have to give me a little more on that, Lester.

Q It was introduced yesterday.

A I don't have anything on it, I'm afraid.

Q Well, it just says that it's the sense of the Senate that they should support the peace initiatives of the four-nation Contadora group, and they should indicate its willingness to cease the flow of arms into Central America, and in conjunction with other nations should terminate all programs of assistance to guerrilla forces in Nicaragua.

Do you support or oppose?

A I think there's no question of where we have stood on arms in Central America, and there's no question of our position on the current efforts of the Contadora group, but I don't have anything specifically on that.

Q The State Department's position is that we certainly support the arming of the Contras or not?

A The State Department's position has been made very clear, Lester, and I'm not going to wing it on that language again.

Q John, do you have any response to the Borges' statement yesterday?

A Who?

Q Borges' statement yesterday.

A Saying what?

Q It was an elaboration on the peace plan proposed last week.

A No.

Q You have nothing?

A No.

(The briefing concluded at 12:27 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #130

WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 1983, 12:18 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one housekeeping announcement and one statement.

The housekeeping announcement is that available in the Press Office at 1:30 p.m. today will be the testimony of Counselor Edward Derwinski before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Operations, and the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. The subject is trade reorganization.

The statement regards the attack on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon. The United States deeply deplores the terrorist attack today on the residence of the Turkish Ambassador in Lisbon.

We have received reports that four attackers used explosive devices to take the residence by force. The wife of the senior Turkish diplomat and a guard were killed, and several others, including children, were seriously wounded. Later the attackers themselves were killed by explosives they set off in the residence.

The Revolutionary Armenian Army has claimed responsibility for the attack. This attack is a grim reminder of the need for the international community to take strong measures to bring an end to such vicious attacks of terrorism.

We extend our deep sympathy to the Government of Turkey and the families of the victims of this attack.

Q Copy?

A Sure. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the speech given yesterday by President Castro of Cuba?

A Jim, the President addressed the purposes of the military exercises which were part of what Mr. Castro talked about during his press conference last night, so I'm not going to respond to that aspect of it.

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Let me simply say that we're interested in all sincere efforts to reduce tensions in Central America, and, as the President said last night, we're encouraged by some recent statements from Cuba that seem to indicate that they, too, now recognize the merit of regional negotiations.

But we would note that Cuba has been responsible for much of the increased violence in the region by organizing, training, supplying and providing other support to guerrilla groups in Central America.

As the President said, we would welcome a change in deeds, not just words.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any idea where the Armenian Revolutionary Army gets their arms and explosives?

A I don't have anything on that at all.

Q Back on Central America for just a second, do you have any response to this study on evictions in El Salvador?

A I do. The figures which were contained in the certification report, which were submitted to Congress on July 20, are based on the experience of FINATA, the Salvadoran Government agency, in charge of Phase III of the agrarian reform.

The certification recognizes that illegal evictions continue to pose serious problems and specifically refers to a study being conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture to give a better indication of the scope of the problem.

Field interviews and a sample survey were completed on July 15, and preliminary results of the study were compiled late last week, too late to be included in the certification.

The results of that survey are still being studied since the full data have not yet been fully analyzed. I might note that last night Peter McPherson, AID Director, issued a statement which we can make available in the Press Office, but let me summarize.

Basically, he noted that we're pleased by the announcement by Colonel Galeleo Torres of FINATA of a new drive to sign up beneficiaries under Phase III of the land reform, and to put evicted farmers back on their land.

Several months ago, Colonel Torres led a similar drive and almost doubled the number of land reform beneficiaries. Some 21,500 new beneficiaries filed applications for land as a result of that drive, and hundreds of evicted peasants were reinstated on their land.

The agrarian reform program remains a subject of great concern to us, and we're confident that the new Salvadoran drive will reinstall and add thousands of new beneficiaries to the land ownership rolls.

Q Copy of that, too?

A Yes. I think on the second part of it what I will do is make Mr. McPherson's statement available to you. I can give you the first part of it.

Q What I don't understand is, are you saying that the report in the certification was based entirely on figures provided by the Salvadoran authorities, not on an independent U.S. investigation? Is that what you're saying?

A The figures are based on the experience of FINATA. I refer you to the text. I don't have in my mind what was said in that certification report, but the report describes it, and I'm going to leave you with that.

Q Do you quarrel with the statements that are made in the Times study?

A I'm going to leave you with what I've just given you.

Q Do you have any information that you could share with us now to back up the charge that Cuba's responsible for all of the violence or much of the violence in the region?

For example, the President talked about one Soviet ship that was unloading materiel yesterday. Could you give us information about what is being unloaded, what the -- we're told about increased numbers of Cuban advisers in Nicaragua, et cetera?

A I don't have anything new to offer you today, Marvin. This subject, as you know, has been one that's been addressed over months, indeed years.

Q I know, but people are talking about recent increases in the number of advisers and recent shipments of Soviet-bloc materiel.

A We've talked about the recent shipment of Soviet-bloc materiel. I don't think we've been able to give you precise quantification of it, but we've provided some information on that.

We've talked about the presence of, I guess it's a total of something like 8,000 Cuban advisers, of whom maybe 2,000 are strictly military advisers, and some 6,000 others. Again, these are figures that are available in the Press Office that we've done before.

I just don't have anything new to offer you at this particular point. I would -- well, go on.

Q I was just going to make the point made the other day, that it probably would be helpful from your point of view to put some of this material out above and beyond the generalizations which we hear about every single day.

A We've given you --

Q I mean, information like 8,000. That's a nice hard figure, if you had it, on materiel --

A It's been available for some time.

Q Right. I understand. But the recent increases in materiel. Can you quantify that?

A I understand that, and we've had some requests to see if we can quantify various and sundry kinds of shipments, and we have that in to see what we can do. Part of the problem, as you know, is that these figures come from intelligence sources in good measure, and the question is whether we can do something with those figures in public.

So I understand the point, and we have it under active study.

Q Alan, back for a moment to the eviction study. Does the United States stand by the figures on evictions as put out in the certification report, or does it now believe those figures are not accurate?

A As I've said, the results of the field study which came in last week have not yet been fully analyzed, so I can't tell you whether there would be an adjustment in the figures that were previously put out or not. We haven't finished with it.

Q Alan, several times it's been noted that the Nicaraguans had shown some flexibility in recent days, and you note now that the Cubans also have done so.

A The President did that last night.

Q Yes. What, if anything, are we doing to explore what that might mean?

A I think at the present time the Nicaraguans and the Cubans, I guess, have both indicated that they would participate in some way in the Contadora meeting which is coming up, and I suppose that would -- I don't know precisely what the participation will be, but I suppose one would look to that meeting at least as the first possibility of seeing what it might mean in real terms. I think that's, at this moment, what we would be doing.

Q Participation? Cuba has said it will participate?

A Well, cooperate. I'm not sure.* I don't know precisely what was referred to, but again Castro referred to this process. As I say, as a first step, let's see what happens at the Contadora meeting and what emerges from that.

Q On that same subject, the President released his message yesterday, which you wouldn't release last week. I have two questions about it.

One, why are we resorting to doing the opposite of confidentiality when last week we said that was the important aspect of all of this so that nobody would take advantage for propaganda purposes? Also, why did you release it?

And, number two, in this note he suggests specific kinds of mechanisms, including the notion that all this has to be settled at one time, and through the OAS as the overseer, when that hasn't been decided by the Contadora group and when we say we support the Contadora group's efforts?

---

*Clarification: Cuba is not participating in the Contadora meeting.

It seems to me like we're saying through this, this can only be solved in such and such a fashion, to a group who we have supported, saying that they should devise whatever they can to solve what's going on.

A I don't have the text in front of me. Let me say two things.

One is, I think if you go back and see what John said last week when he was asked about the text is that normally we do not release texts of Presidential messages. Obviously, "normally" has exceptions to it. An exception was made in this case. There was a lot of interest in the message that Ambassador Stone was carrying with him.

As far as where the focal point would be, we have been consistent in saying that we felt this was a regional problem requiring a regional-focused solution. I've mentioned both the OAS and the Contadora group, and I think that that is consistent.

Q But, Alan, with respect, it may be consistent, but if you say you support a group's effort and the group hasn't yet devised the mechanism, you're saying there's only one way to do it; and when he goes so far as to say there must be a regional basis which treats simultaneously the concerns of all the states, that contradicts the statement made by you, praising the progress with respect to bilateral mechanisms and international mechanisms that were worked out between Nicaragua and Costa Rica two months ago. I don't understand where that's come about.

A I think the emphasis on a regional approach which includes the concept of, if you will, comprehensiveness -- that may be a sweeping term, but that's -- if you will, in a general sense that concept is consistent with what we have said before and what the President's letter says as released.

Q Middle East?

A Sure.

Q Reaction, comment, on the incidents in Hebron?

A I don't have anything new on the incidents in Hebron. I gather that there has been further tension today. I can only reiterate what we said yesterday, which is to deplore the violence that took place recently in the school and to urge calm.

It's obviously a very delicate, tense situation, and we hope that it will not get worse.

Q Alan, also on the Middle East, last night in his news conference the President said, "It looks like Syria is simply trying to partition Lebanon, reduce Lebanon, and grab off some territory for themselves."

Since we haven't heard that here before, is this a new analysis?

A I don't have the full text of what he said, Bill. I'm going to have to stand on what he said --

Q You can have it.

A I'll stand on what the President said yesterday. I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q But this would be a new analysis, then, of what Syria's up to.

A I haven't looked at it that carefully in terms of what we've said before. I will stand on what the President said.

Q Is the United States asking Israel to postpone or delay the redeployment of its troops?

A Ralph, again the talks are going on as we are here right now. I don't think we're going to get into the question of what is being said in those talks from here. I can't tell you whether we'll have anything further to say when they conclude, but at this point I'm not going to go into the substance.

Q Would it help to phrase the question differently and not ask whether the U.S. is asking Israel to do it, but whether the U.S. would like to see Israel --

A No. It wouldn't help. (Laughter)

Q Alan, would you think accusing Syria of partitioning or planning to simply partition Lebanon and grab part of it is an inducement to get them to talk to you and the working group that you formed with them?

A Again, you're quoting to me, I think, out of a rather long statement the President made on the entirety of the issue of withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, and I think that one ought to take that statement in its entirety in terms of the hope that we have and the work that we're doing toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

As you know, Mr. McFarlane will be going to the region very shortly and will certainly be pursuing that issue, so I really don't think I am going to complicate his life by commenting further at this point.

Q When does he go, Alan?

A Again, I don't have a specific schedule for him. You might want to check with --

-- MORE --

Q Where does one check these days to find out what McFarlane is going to do -- here or at the White House?

A At the moment, I don't know if he's actually, physically set up yet. He will be operating on this mission out of the State Department, but I don't know. I saw him this morning. I think where he's operating at the moment is out of the meeting rooms, but I don't know whether he has moved himself and staff, and so on.

Q Could you find out about his intinerary?

A I don't think we're going to be giving out an itinerary. We're going to be playing it at least as closed mouth as we did with Phil Habib for similar reasons, and whether he's going to want us -- it's up to him basically and whether he's going to find it suitable to his mission to handle it even more restrictively. I can't tell you. That's up to him.

Q Do you know what the schedule is on the meetings today?

A I don't have that schedule with me at the moment. Was it not on the public schedule?

Q Any idea of how long they're going to go?

A I don't know. I'm sure that they will continue as long as they need to. I think it breaks up into different sorts of meetings at various parts of the day, but I think starting this moring I believe there were some meetings scheduled over at the Pentagon. I just don't have that.

Q Alan, you made a statement yesterday about Hebron. Have you discussed the situation inside Hebron with the Israelis Ministers who are visiting with you at the State Department, and what, if you can say, was their reaction to what has happened and continues today?

A It would not be appropriate to get into what our discussions may or may not be with government officials, so I'm going to stay away from it.

Q Besides expressing the concern that you just repeated, you didn't get to the bottom of the whole crux of what's going on in Hebron, the avowed statements from Israeli Ministers who are saying that they have to inhabit the Jewish quarters of Hebron or to live there and expand the Jewish community there. What is your comment?

A There are a lot of complicated aspects, as you well know, in terms of the Hebron situation. I can get into a lot of them.

Q On the President's statement again, can you tell us what you understand the President as saying yesterday?

A I'm not going to try. I don't make a practice of trying to interpret the President.

Q I would like to, for one, know if the President was paying something new yesterday by saying that Syria intends on partitioning Lebanon? I would like to know what is U.S. policy in this regard right now.

A Again, you're not asking for policy, you're asking for a judgment. I'm going to leave you with what I said before about looking at the entirety of the President's remarks and not try to go beyond it.

Q Are you telling us that, what Bill just mentioned now, is not the correct interpretation of what the President said yesterday?

A I'm going to refer you back to the entirety of the President's remarks. That's all I'm going to say.

Q Can I ask you one more thing? Minister Arens is quoted, or the L.A. Times and Israel's radio, as favoring Israel extending its sovereignty over the West Bank. Would you like to comment on this, and would you tell us how would the United States perceive that to be?

A Again, let me refer you back. We're on record in terms of our view of the West Bank and how the status of the West Bank should be resolved many times. And rather than trying to conjure up those words in my mind at this point, let me refer you back to that. But there's no change in our position on the need to have that resolved through negotiations.

Q Let me rephrase the question somewhat differently. Would you say that Syria is attempting a partition of Lebanon? Never mind about what the President said. Assuming that the President said so. (Laughter)

A Good try. I'm not going to go beyond what I've said. As I say, in terms of the diplomacy at the moment, Mr. McFarlane will be going out to the region, and I don't intend to complicate his mission by going on further on issues which, presumably, he will be discussing.

Q On Ethiopia, Peter McPherson of AID testified the other day concerning projected food aid for Ethiopia for the next fiscal year. Up to this point, it's been the policy of the U.S. Government to give that aid only to the Mengistu Government which does not exercise sovereignty over the entire territory. At the same time private relief agencies which distribute U.S. surplus food under a State Department program tell me that they're prohibited by the State Department from trans-shipping food from Sudan into Eritrea and Tigre. The end result is that there's about ten million people who are prohibited from receiving famine relief and the U.S. is, in effect, supports the Mengistu program to starve out the insurgency.

Will this continue to be the U.S. policy?

A I'm not sure I can agree with your characterization since I don't know what the facts are. I will endeavor to look into it but I also would advise that you might want to go to AID and put your question there.

Q Yesterday, other than the shooting in Hebron by unknown individuals so far, there was another shooting in Nablus by the Israeli forces in Nablus of a 20-year old woman. Would you care to comment on that? This is the Israeli forces; it's not unknown individuals.

A I don't know what the circumstances were, and I really can't comment other than obviously to regret any deaths that are taking place and, again, reiterating a call for calm. But I just don't know what the circumstances are, and I cannot comment.

Q Anything on Sri Lanka?

A No. I think we had something on Sri Lanka. I know we had the traveler advisory the other day. No, I don't have anything on Sri Lanka.

Q Yesterday, after the meetings, I asked one of the conferees whether he felt that they could wrap up a framework that would make partial Israeli withdrawal acceptable. He said, what's acceptable? I said, can you do it by Thursday? He said this has been going on for 20 years; it can't be done this Thursday or next Thursday or many Thursdays to come. Is that view shared by most State Department top officials that this is something that's going to linger on endlessly?

A I'm not going to try to do a survey of individuals. I can tell you what the policy is, and that is to try to move forward as rapidly as we can toward the total withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon in the framework of those goals which we've articulated before, including the extension of Lebanese Central Government sovereignty, control throughout the territory of Lebanon, and protection of Israel's northern border.

Q Alan -- excuse me -- but despite this outward optimism, the gentleman in question seemed to feel that it seems like a very long shot that there's going to be any --

A I am sure the Secretary would be interested in knowing, if you'd care to tell me who has that view. I'll pass it on to him. Maybe they can talk about it.

Q What kind of relationship do you see between the latest events in Hebron and the policy introduced by the Israelis which is supposed to be opposed by this Administration?

A Which policy is that?

Q The policy of expanding the settlements in the West Bank.

A On settlements? I'm not going to try to draw connections between them. I think that at this moment you've got a very tense situation, and we are hoping it will calm down and that further injury and loss of life can be avoided.

Q There are reports that the United States has asked for a summit meeting of the ASEAN countries when the President is there next November in that area. Is this correct?

A I think I'm going to have to beg off of Presidential trips and refer you to the White House on that question. I don't think it's a question I properly should be addressing from here.

Q Central American, again, for a second. I'm referring to the Washington Post story this morning about the finding of need for aid to the Contras. Can you tell me whether the Administration has changed its justification for that aid from arms interdiction to something else, and, if so, what the something else is?

A I haven't addressed the question of what findings there have been in the past or might be in the future, and I couldn't get into that kind of covert action/intelligence activities, and I wouldn't get into it.

Q Same area but not the same subject so you don't have a dodge. FDN and ARDE. There's a big article in the Wall Street Journal about their problems and that they won't unite. Do you have any comment about that?

A No.

Q Are we going to have somebody to brief us when the two Israeli Ministers leave or finish their visit here?

A I don't know.

Q Would you put something for us? We would like to know your views.

A I think that your interest has been assumed, so that question is under review but I can't tell you now that there will be something on it.

Q What does that count for? (Laughter)

A You tempt me.

Q What are the specific precautions the United States will undertake in the Arabian Gulf if Iran will block the oil cargo ships in the Strait of Hormuz?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on specific steps that might be taken. John addressed our concern in the statement that he gave you yesterday, so that our concern and our commitment to free navigation is quite clear, but I'm not going to try to speculate on a hypothetical situation.

Q Any new development on that issue, Alan?

A Any what?

Q New developments?

A No.

Q Alan, you had a statement a few days ago regarding the attempts by Craxi to form a government in Italy. At that point were you aware of the individual discussions that Craxi was holding with the Andropov government regarding stationing of cruise missiles in Sicily?

A I'm not aware currently of discussions of that sort, and I don't think that our statement was addressed to that issue.

Q Does the State Department support plans to delay or postpone the stationing of cruise missiles? I know the Administration does. I'm asking if the State Department does?

A I think you can take that the State Department's position is the Administration's position.

Q Do you have anything on the political asylum request of those Soviet musicians? Has the Department received such a request?

A Again, we don't comment on such requests, and I would not have a comment on this case.

Q For housekeeping, on the Israeli talks, are today's discussions at the working level with the State Department, the conclusion of them; and then the Presidential meeting tomorrow is the conclusion of the talks in Washington, or will there be working level discussions tomorrow?

A I don't usually call the Secretary the working level.

Q The Secretary -- you know, we understand that the Secretary and the Ministers meet in the Operations Center and poured over maps yesterday. Regardless of what you call that -- it was not meant with any insult in mind. It was just clearly a working level discussion. They weren't talking about general --

A I'll give you a glossary of terms. Go ahead.

Q So the question is, will there be more of those type of talks tomorrow or is that level of discussions expected to conclude today to be followed tomorrow by the Presidential discussions?

A I do not know what the schedule of talks may be at the Ministeral level tomorrow. I can't tell you that. I don't know.

Q Where is Mr. Stone? Do you have his travel plans?

A Yes. He's in El Salvador at the moment, going on to Tegucigalpa.

Q When?

A Today.

Q Going to --

A Tegucigalpa. Let me just make sure that I'm right on that. No, I don't have anything more on that.

Q Has he been able or is he trying again to meet with Salvadoran rebel representatives?

A Again, we have not been commenting on that, and we're not going to.

Q Do you have any comment on Arafat's announcement that he's ready to resume the dialogue with Jordon as soon as possible?

A I haven't seen that particular announcement. I think we would be looking to see what might happen rather than trying to issue statements about --

Q Can you check on that?

A No. I think that -- I will look into it but I don't promise you to come back with an answer. The issue in the peace talks clearly is whether King Hussein would get the necessary backing that he feels he needs to come to the negotiating table, and we've been at that point for some time.

Q There are press reports, especially in the Middle East, that President Reagan may be going to the Middle East.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A Okay. You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

Alennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, JULY 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #131

THURSDAY, JULY 28, 1983, 12:01 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements: There will be a BACKGROUND briefing at the White House on the President's meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Arens and Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir. The briefing is open to all accredited media representatives with State Department/White House press credentials. It will be in the White House briefing room at around 2:00 after the two Ministers and the Secretary of State finish their meeting with the President.

Tomorrow, in this briefing room, at 4:00, there will be an ON THE RECORD briefing on Ethiopian drought relief. The briefing will be given by AID Director Peter McPherson and Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker. That will be ON THE RECORD.

That concludes about everything I have for you today.

Q John, have you seen the reports of alleged comments by Ambassador Stone on Central America regarding the purpose of the U.S. Fleet exercises?

A Yes, I saw those comments last night. I think that the party was contacted and issued a statement pointing out that those reports were totally inaccurate; and the Senator said he made no such remarks.

Q Come across on that again, please? This office has talked to Ambassador Stone and --

A Let me give you some carefully crafted words here.

Q If you would.

A Ambassador Stone and members of his party, the Deputy Chief of our Mission at the Embassy there, and the Political Counselor who attended the meeting and took notes have all denied the attributed remarks.

Q What about the two Salvadoran Ministers who confirmed them?

A Salvadoran Ministers?

Q Legislators.

A I don't know. I don't know how the misunderstanding occurred, but our people are absolutely emphatic.

Q What language was he speaking?

A I'm sorry, I don't know.

Q Do you have comment on the report from southern Lebanon that Israel has closed the offices of some Phalangist headquarters and things there?

A No, I don't.

Q Are you aware of the reports?

A No, I'm not.

Q How would you look at such a measure taken by Israel if it decides to take it?

A We'll look at it when we learn of it, I think. That's how we would look at it.

Q Still on the Middle East, any reaction to Syria's criticism of the President?

A No, no. Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks will leave on their mission shortly, and we anticipate no problems with their mission.

Q On what day do they leave and where are they going?

A I think they may be leaving tomorrow, Mike, but as with Ambassador Habib and Ambassador Draper, we'll do our best to be as helpful as we were in the case of Ambassador Habib; but for obvious reasons, we're not going to give you a blow-by-blow -- where they're going, when they're leaving, and that kind of thing.

Q You cannot give us his first destination, his primary destination?

A I think in the case of Ambassador Habib, we did not give you that destination until he had actually gotten there, and therefore, I think we probably should follow the same procedure with Mr. McFarlane.

Q John, there is a report in FBIS, the Voice of Lebanon reported, "The Syrian army has withdrawn from all quarters of Tripoli, and handed over its position to the Islamic Unification Movement."

A I just saw that a few moments ago, but don't have anything for you on it.

Q Did Mr. McFarlane finish recruiting for his group, and who are the people who are going to be working with him besides Mr. Fairbanks?

A I don't know who will go -- You mean staff people?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have a list of that. I think McFarlane and Fairbanks are the two principals, obviously. I'm sure there will be some supporting staff. Or, I'm not sure, they may pick up supporting staff out there. I don't know who will go with them.

Q John, can you tell us today how does the Administration view the Israeli redeployment?

A No, because the two visiting Israeli Ministers will see the President with the Secretary later, and at the conclusion of that meeting, you'll get a BACKGROUNDER. I think that will be the time to say anything we have to say about it.

Q On the same area, can you say if you are seeking a date for the next Israeli stage of withdrawal towards the final American objective?

A I'm going to leave that to a masterful BACKGROUNDER after the visit.

-- MORE --

Q There is a report circulating in the State Department that with the departure of the two Ministers from the State Department, Israel has completed the first phase of its withdrawal from Lebanon, that the Ministers will withdraw all the way across the Israeli border to Jerusalem probably by the end of the week.

A The Ministers will withdraw?

Q Yes. The Ministers. And that as a face-saving gesture to the Israelis, the United States has agreed to allow 15,000 Israeli troops to remain in Lebanon in exchange for the concession for the Israeli withdrawal, the first phase. Do you have any comment on any of that?

A No. I'd be glad to take any more serious questions. As to the Israeli Ministers, you should ask them. But as I understand it, Mr. Shamir will leave later today, and I think Mr. Arens is going to stay a day or two later. I'm not quite sure what his departure is.

Q Do you have any comment on the characterization by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Boutros Ghali, saying that the Reagan initiative is a failure now?

A I haven't seen that particular statement. Are you talking about the overall Middle East, the September 1 speech?

Q Yes.

A I'm not responding to a particular statement which I haven't seen, but obviously we would not consider that the President's Middle East initiative is dead or is a failure. We're still working on it.

Q This statement coming from the State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt is, for the first time, such a characterization is coming from Egypt.

A I haven't seen that particular one. And as I say, my comment is a broad one. I'm not responding to his alleged statement because I haven't seen it, but obviously we are still working on the overall peace mission.

Q Do you have anything on a London Telegraph story that the State Department forgery people confirmed that the KGB concocted some tapes for Mrs. Thatcher's election? It purportedly shows some conversation between Reagan and Thatcher.

A Let me see. A Soviet disinformation ploy relating to Mrs. Thatcher? Sure. Let me see what we can produce for you. I don't have anything with me at the moment. Let me see what we can get for you during the day.

Q On the Middle East, please. An Egyptian comment also, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs I think, is claiming Israel as the responsible authority on the West Bank for the events there and for the killings of the three -- four Palestinians there. Is that a view that the United States agrees with?

A I think we made our view plain the day before yesterday, I think it was, and offered --

Q You didn't claim responsibility of any party, and I'm trying to find out --

A I think it criticized such tragic events from wherever, or from whomever initiated them and instigated them, but I refer you back to that language.

Q Do you have anything new in the discussions with -- the discussions, the accusations with Iran in closing the Straits?

A No, I really don't. Nothing beyond what I gave you a day or two ago and what Mr. Romberg gave you yesterday.

Q Do you have any comment on the Capitol Hill deliberations on the covert aid now?

A No.

Q Anything on the Iraq-Iran war that you can share with us.

A No, nothing beyond the remarks we had yesterday and the day before.

Q Anything in your book at all?

A No, I think you've drained me dry.

Q Can you confirm a report that the Administration has ordered a review of U.S. participation in UNESCO?

A Are you referring to --

Q The AP story.

A That is a -- that's right. You want to be careful about an interview in which Mr. Stockman is quoted because I think Mr. Stockman has issued a denial of -- I just want to be careful that what I'm now about to say is not connected with that Stockman comment. But the United States is concerned about our current relations with UNESCO and has begun a thorough review of our participation in that organization. But I just want to be sure that you're not linking that to Mr. Stockman's remark which he has --

Q What is that? Can you give us some background?

A There have been a number of controversial issues.

Q Such as? Can you refer us to something?

A Press freedom has been one, but there are others. It isn't any secret that we have had our differences with UNESCO over various issues.

Q This goes back to a previous Administration, doesn't it?

A Yes.

Q To follow up on this. There were reports recently published by the Heritage Foundation which is supposed to be quite near to this Administration, claiming that the U.S. is very much under quota in the staff of the United Nations. Is this a matter of --

A Under quota in staffing?

Q In the staff of the United Nations General Secretary?

A I don't know. I can't answer that question. I don't know.

Q So this is not under discussion by the Administration by any means?

A I just don't the answer to your question. It may well be. We're reviewing a number of controversial issues with UNESCO.

Q Is Senator Stone in Costa Rica today?

A He is or was in Honduras this morning, and I think had intended to go onto Costa Rica today. I think that's his plan.

Q There is some expectation that he was going to make another attempt to meet with Salvadoran guerrillas in Costa Rica?

A I think we will be as unforthcoming on that as we have traditionally. We have said that any contact he might have with the left we would treat as confidential, and plans for it we would treat as confidential. So without leading you one way or the other, I guess I'm going to be --

Q What are your expectations for the Contadora meeting today?

A Have to wait and see.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, July 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #132

FRIDAY, JULY 29, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just a reminder that there will be an ON-THE-RECORD briefing on Ethiopian drought relief in the Press Briefing Room today at 4:00. The briefing will be given by AID Director Peter McPherson and Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker. On the record, 4:00, here this afternoon. Be glad to take any questions you might have.

Q Can you tell us anything about Mr. McFarlane's travels?

A I think he's due to leave today. Ambassador Fairbanks will be going with him, but beyond that I don't have anything for you.

Q You don't know his first stop?

A I know his first stop, but in the same manner as we handled Ambassador Habib's travels, and for obvious reasons, we are not going to tell you where he's going until he gets there.

Q In a general way, can you characterize McFarlane's mission now, not so generally as to say to achieve peace in the Middle Peace but --

A That, too.

Q My question specifically is, for example, is he charged with dealing with Syria as well as convincing Lebanon that the Israeli withdrawal is not dangerous to Lebanon's future?

A He's charged with dealing with all the countries in the area who are involved in the Lebanese situation and, indeed, with the larger Middle Eastern situation. So his mandate would include them all.

Q In terms of the subject of what he will be dealing with, is part of his responsibility to convince Lebanon of what Secretary Shultz said yesterday -- namely, that the Israeli redeployment is not a threat to Lebanon's sovereignty?

A I think he would certainly be discussing with Lebanese authorities the implications and the consequences of the Israelis' visit to Washington, yes.

Q Do you have anything on the Times story this morning about the Israelis ordering two Phalangist bases close in southern Lebanon?

A No. I've seen those reports but don't have any analysis or interpretation of it.

Q There was one question that wasn't fully clarified yesterday in the briefing after the meetings. Does the U.S. expect Israel to carry out the redeployment even if there will not be reconciliation or some political arrangement between the Druze and the Christians in the Shouf Mountains?

A I don't really think I am going to go beyond the backgrounder that you had yesterday. It seems to me that the briefer on that occasion said about as much as he cared to say or was able to say on the next stage in Lebanon. And, obviously, I think Ambassador McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks will be raising these particular questions, undoubtedly, with both the Lebanese and also with the Israelis. I'm sure they will be going to Israel as well.

Q What sort of approach will the Ambassadors take with Syria? Will they demand or urge strongly that they withdraw from Lebanon?

A I think so far -- and I would't see any reason why they would change this approach -- I think our approach to Syria has been to attempt to amplify what it is the various parties are seeking in Lebanon and to seek to remove misunderstandings and eliminate misinterpretations of which, I think, there have been a number.

Q They offer any inducements?

A Simply, the great and obvious inducement, which is peace and which is the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Q At this stage is amplification quite sufficient? I mean, should there not be something a little beyond that?

A What did you have in mind?

Q To entice? No, but I mean not necessarily in terms of threats, but there's going to be some sort of quid pro quo and peace seems -- well, that's something that's been bandied for so long that it doesn't seem to be sufficient.

A It's still a very powerful magnet, we believe.

Q John, are you threatening to invade Syria if they don't withdraw? It seems to have peace either way --

A Perhaps I haven't made myself clear this morning. I didn't think that there was any such implication in anything I said today, but let me hasten to assure you there was no such implication.

Q Well, you say peace is the impetus for withdrawal. If they stay, what are they getting?

A What I'm saying is that one of the incentives for Syrian withdrawal is Israeli withdrawal.

Q Would it be safe to conclude from the briefer yesterday, and since you're the Spokesman of this building, the State Department's policy, is it safe to conclude that the Israelis are not going to pull from the Shouf area before there's some sort of understanding between the various factions in the Shouf and the Lebanese Government?

A I think it's safe to say that all the parties involved see the wisdom of vacating territory which is left in a peaceful state and into which the Lebanese authorities can move and over which they can extend their sovereignty.

I think that was established during the meeting of the Israelis here. Everybody has an interest in working toward that end; and insofar as the Israelis can be helpful, obviously, we'll be discussing with the Lebanese how they plan to tackle that.

Q Where have the Syrians ever put that view on the record?

A I guess I'm talking about the Israelis and the Lebanese.

Q I thought you said all parties.

Q Let me follow up, please. In this sense, are you intending to discuss further this issue with the representatives of the various sections in the Shouf area?

A You mean the United States?

Q Yes.

A I don't know how Ambassador McFarlane will proceed. Ambassador Habib talked to a wide range of people in Lebanon, but I don't know how the McFarlane-Fairbanks mission will proceed.

Q The Druze faction -- I mean the majority of the Shouf, the people we're talking about, they are represented, for example, by Walid Jumblatt and his group.

A I understand.

Q Have you been talking to these people in Washington, or are you intending to talk to these people?

A I think you asked me an earlier question some while ago about Mr. Jumblatt, and I think we responded to that. Mr. Hammadi, who, as you know, is an associate of Mr. Jumblatt, has been here in Washington and he has met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Pelletreau as part of our continuing U.S. contacts with representatives of all of Lebanon's communities. But I don't know specifically what Ambassador McFarlane will do yet.

Q When did the meeting take place?

A I don't know the date on that. I could try to do a little research for you and find out when.

Q Will he be meeting anyone else?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Since Mr. Arens is quoted to have said that Israel will use its good offices with both parties in the Shouf, do you know if any meeting Mr. Hammadi and Mr. Pelletreau and any Israelis have taken place?

A I don't know whether there was such a meeting.

Q Did the meeting take place after President Gemayel's visit to Washington?

A I'll try to do a little research and find out when it took place. I don't know when it happened.

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Q Can you -- just clarify for myself, do you now have information that the Syrians will receive Ambassador McFarlane?

A We've seen no impediments to Ambassador McFarlane's mission.

Q Do you have any reading of the Syrian move yesterday to pull out of sections of Tripoli?

A No. I saw the reports that you did but don't have an analysis or interpretation of it.

Q What has been the activity, if any, of those working groups the Syrian and U.S. seem to be forming?

A The working group that was set up when -- I don't have anything for you on that. I don't know what has been happening on that, in that area.

Q John, in the talks that took place here in Washington in the last few days, the Israelis say that they raised their serious concern about the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel with the United States.

Is the United States concernd about the apparently frozen level or lower level of contacts between the two? Are you planning to do anything about it?

A I think that we have expressed in the past our concern for that relationship and our enthusiasm for a strong relationship between Egypt and Israel, and in anyway that we could be helpful we would.

Q Have you recommended that the Egyptians return their ambassador to Israel?

A I don't think I'm going to get into diplomatic negotiations.

-- MORE --

Q Well, let me put it this way: Would you like to see the Egyptian Ambassador returned to Israel?

A I think we'd like to see strong, cordial, friendly relations between Israel and Egypt.

Q In regard to the meeting with Mr. Hammadi in Washington, do you have any comment on the reports that the so-called Lebanese forces are asking to arrest and to put to trial Mr. Jumblatt?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on the Tripoli situation today? You were asked about it yesterday.

A Well, I actually was asked about today. No, nothing; no analysis. We're aware of it.

Q Sorry.

Q Another subject?

Q I have one more.

A O.K., take it first.

Q A technical thing you may not be able to answer today.

A When you set me up like that, I'm sure I won't be able to.

Q Yes. I have here a list. (Laughter)

In April we brought up the idea that the maps -- or the information given out by the Geographer's Office about the status of the West Bank was wrong because it gave it to Jordan, which even Jordan no longer claims.

I'm told that the new maps coming out, and particularly the CIA World Fact Book which has just been published, now corrects the maps. However --

A "However." What have they done now?

Q However, you know, things move slowly in this Department, I guess.

However, the information accompanying this -- the textual material -- still gives the square area of the West Bank and Gaza and Jerusalem to Jordan.

A   Ah ha.

Q   In other words, you have appeared to have made a step, but now you are in a position of having your maps inconsistent with the textual detail.

A   With the textual detail.

Q   Would you take a look at that and have your folks straighten it out and come back with an answer?

A   I'm certainly glad you've pointed out that alleged discrepancy. We'll take a look at it and see what we can do about it.

Q   Like before April? (Laughter.)

Q   John, on another subject, do you think the vote yesterday in the House on Nicaragua will have any repercussions in Central America? And, if so, how do you think the different parties will react to it?

A   If you mean will it affect our policy, no. The House passage represents but one stage in the continuing Congressional consideration of this issue. We were disappointed by the House passage of the resolution. We have opposed any legislation which would constrain the Executive's flexibility, policy tools, to deal with the extremely complex situation in Central America.

I should also point out, while nobody seems to be paying a great deal of attention to it, that we were delighted that the Caribbean Basin Initiative was passed by the Congress. That was the result of strong bipartisan support and will represent a significant spur to economic development in Central American and Caribbean countries through the encouragement of trade and investment within the region.

CBI passage represents an important complement to our significant economic assistance program to that region and constitutes an important aspect of the Administration's overall policy for the region as presented by the President in his April 27 address.

Q   Can we have copies of that?

A   You sure can.

Q   As a follow-up, how do you think this action of the House will be taken by the different parties involved in the conflict in Central America? Do you think it will harden the Sandinistas, for example?

A I don't know. I mean, you're asking me to analyze their responses and, of course, we don't do that.

Q John, do you have any reaction to the statement or the declaration of the non-aligned countries in the UN against maneuvers in Central America?

A No, I don't.

Q John, thank you for the assessment of the bipartisan importance of the passage of the CBI? Would you care to express an assessment of the status of the bipartisanship involved in the vote on Nicaragua?

A I already did that. I did that before. I gave you all that.

Q I don't think I heard any indication of whether you thought there was a bipartisan consensus on the --

A I think we said we were disappointed.

Q Is that because you don't think there is bipartisan support for the Administration?

A I'm saying we're disappointed in the vote.

Q Well, are you saying it won't make any difference what the House -- I didn't understand that in your statement.

A There's not going to be any change in our policy because at this point the House passage does not represent legislation which has passed through the full cycle of Congressional consideration. The close vote, 225-198, does not represent a definitive judgment on overall Administration policies which emphasize the importance of support for the security of the region as a shield for our support for democracy, for reform of human freedom, support for economic development, and support for dialogue in negotiations among the countries of the region and within each country.

So we will continue to pursue that policy as outlined by the President.

Q Can we have copies of those various statements?

A Sure.

Q What about the call for an OAS Foreign Ministers meeting, which is contained in what the House passed?

A We have been very much involved in this question of dialogue and the quest for peace, and I think that is exhibited by Senator Stone's mission down there and other overtures -- our support of the Contadora process and other ways in which we have indicated our support for a dialogue and a peaceful approach.

Q What's your assessment of the Contadora ongoings at the moment?

A I don't know. I'd have to wait and see, I think, how today's sessions develop.

Q I understand that Castro has made another statement, which some people think is a little bit conciliatory. Do you have any reaction to that?

A It was a long statement. I think it was more than an hour in length. And so we're going to take a little time to analyze that and see what our reaction to it is. But I can say that, as you recall, that question of removing military and security advisers was addressed in the San Jose Final Act last October and the United States was a signatory to those recommendations -- always understanding, of course, that removal was on a reciprocal and verifiable basis.

And I'd just note also that in his April 27 address -- that's the one which I've already referred to -- the President stated: "The United States will support any agreement among Central American countries for the withdrawal under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions of all foreign military and security advisers and troops."

So I suppose as our analysis proceeds, insofar as Mr. Castro has moved substantially in that direction, we would welcome that.

Q Are you encouraged at the prospect of Castro agreeing to withdraw his forces?

A As I say, I think with speeches like that one one always wants to take a little time and analyze them; and I think that's where we are.

Q John, I'm not very expert on Central America, but you mentioned somewhere U.S. support for democracies in the region.

A Yes.

Q Can you just mention to me who these countries are; who the U.S. considered to be democracies in Central America?

A I think Costa Rica is such a country. I think we have been rather vigorously in support of the movement towards democracy in various other countries, and El Salvador is a rather striking example. Nobody pretends that everything in El Salvador is the way those in favor of democracy would like to see it. There are problems, and we have talked very frankly about those. But, on the other hand, they made a great deal of progress and we are supporting them.

Q John, do you have any more that you --

A I can come up with other examples if you wish, but I don't want to take the time of everybody here now.

Q Do you have any confirmation of what those Russian ships are carrying to Central America?

A No, not beyond the President's remarks on Tuesday. I don't have anything further.

Q It seems that the authorities from Venezuela have (inaudible) one boat.

A They have -- sorry?

Q They have seen what the boat was carrying, one of the boats.

A They searched it?

Q Yes. And do you have any information from that?

A I don't.

Q John, to change the area, has there been any response as yet to the Chinese protest over the sale of arms to Taiwan, the one that was delivered a week ago?

A I'm not aware of a response to the Chinese -- sorry?

MR. ROMBERG: I'm not sure whether there will be one.

A No. I have nothing for you.

Q John, a minute ago I think you said "Insofar as Castro has moved considerably in that direction" -- meaning in the direction of a reciprocal and verifiable agreement on removal of troops. Do you mean to say, if he moves considerably in that direction --

A Yes. What I'm saying is --

Q -- or insofar as he has in his speech?

A What I'm saying is it's a long speech; we want to take a look at it. Our position about what we want to see in Central America is plain. And if he has moved in the direction of those peaceful initiatives, then that would be progress; but I'm not saying that we've examined the speech. We're still in the process of doing that.

Q Do you have anything on the CSCE conference in Madrid and the Maltese problem?

A No, I don't.

Q Poland -- the release of two prominent Polish Solidarity supporters, as reported on the FBIS this morning?

A I don't have anything on the release of prisoners.

Q Do you have anything on negotiations over the Polish debt?

A Yes, I do. I guess you're talking about the Paris Club meeting?

Q Yes, sir.

A The Paris Club agreed in principle to proceed with the process of rescheduling. The group agreed to review technical issues and decided that implementation will await the elucidation of certain questions.

For the United States, the actual release of the vast majority of political prisoners will play a critical role in determining our future policy toward Poland.

Q What's your reaction to the Polish Parliament's action in giving the government broader powers of censorship and powers to arrest dissidents?

A Like the Polish Catholic Church and other independent voices in Poland, we are deeply distrubed by the passage of these laws. The question now is how these laws will be implemented.

The United States will be watching this very closely. Clearly, the literal implementation of these laws would only serve to intensify the deep-seated divisions which already exist between the populace and the government in that country.

Q Can we have a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q O.K., thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #133

MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 1983, 12:37 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Sorry to be off to a little late start. That's what a "weekend in Paradise" on Cape Cod does to you. It takes you a little time to catch up.

I don't have any announcements. I'll be glad to take any questions you might have.

Q John, can you tell us what the results were on the meeting between Ambassador Stone and Mr. Zamora?

A I don't think I'm going to be able to tell you what the results were, Jim. Ambassador Stone is in Bogota this morning. He will be traveling to Nicaragua later in the day.

As far as his meeting with Mr. Zamora in Bogota yesterday is concerned, his general mandate is well known, as is the importance of confidentiality in the pursuit of his task. His mission, as outlined by the President on April 27, continues to be to facilitate dialogue and negotiations both among the countries of the region and within each country, so we did have that preliminary contact with Ruben Zamora yesterday, and there may be other contacts in the future. Beyond that, we're not going to have anything to say.

Q Mr. Zamora said later that the meeting had positive results. Would you agree with that?

A I think we would leave those comments to Mr. Zamora. I think we're going to have nothing more to say in line with our view that the process is best served by confidentiality. I'll be happy to tell you about meetings after they have taken place, but we're not going to talk about the end product or talk about the substance of them.

Q These other meetings will take place during this trip, or is he going to come back here or what?

A Can't give you anything on that, Jim.

Q Do you expect him back?

A No, I don't.

Q You put special emphasis on the word "facilitated."

A Yes.

Q "Facilitated dialogue."

A Yes.

Q Does that mean he's on a pretty short leash?

A I guess that's my emphasis to underline that it is a facilitative mission, that we are not the negotiators; we are helping to get negotiations moved forward. But we are not negotiators ourselves.

Q You talk about "facilitated dialogue." Toward what end, in El Salvador?

A Towards involvement of the left in the democratic process in Salvador.

Q There are reports, John, that Mr. Ungo has put forward a four-part or a proposal for talks with the El Salvadoran Government, that it would be a committee or commission of two representatives -- the rebels and two of the Salvadoran Government. Is this one of the issues that Stone will be taking up in his further discussions, further contact?

And is there any comment, generally, on that?

A He did fly, as you know, to Salvador and then back to Bogota, and talked with the President and members of the Peace Commission; but I don't know what was involved in those discussions.

Q Is it the sort of thing he would discuss with Zamora or the (inaudible)?

A Well, it seems to be logical that anything which would move the process forward might well come up.

Q Did he see Zamora again today?

A No -- not to my knowledge. I'm not aware of that.

Q Whom did he see in Bogota?

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A He saw President Betancur.

Q Who does he see in Nicaragua?

A I don't know, Bob. Don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, this is going to sound facetious, but it's not intended to be a facetious question. Zamora has been in the United States a number of times -- fairly recently as well. I'd be curious to know what the explanation is for the need to meet Zamora in Bogota when the opportunity is available to meet with him in particular; I can understand the need to meet with others in the leftist movement in Central America. But Zamora, particularly, has been back and forth here almost as much as Stone has, and perhaps more.

A Yes.

Q Can you suggest --

A No. I think, really, the participants will decide where they will meet, when they will meet, and when they are ready to meet; and I think that's up to them.

Q Does the Administration have a view about signals, if any, that would be sent by having a meeting in Washington?

A I haven't heard any plans to have a meeting in Washington.

Q John, you said last week that the Administration was studying the comment by Castro.

A Right.

Q Have you progressed beyond that?

A Not really.

Q Can you give us any more --

A Not really, Bob. We're continuing to study both the Nicaraguan and the Cuban recent suggestions on Central America. In our judgment, the ongoing Contadora process represents a key forum for the consideration of these and other ideas which have been presented. The President, in his letter to the Contadora Four, made clear the United States' support for that process -- the Contadora process.

In brief, he made clear the important contribution made by the Cancun Declaration, and noted that a solution of the crisis in Central America must encompass those four basic principles which we've discussed before: (1) that democratic institutions be established and strengthened; (2) that there must be respect for the principle of non-intervention; (3) that the conflict must be removed from the context of an East/West confrontation through such measures as verifiable withdrawal of all foreign military and security advisers; and (4) that the countries of Central America must work among themselves and with their neighbors to achieve and sustain a level of economic growth that will guarantee the basic needs of their people.

Q Does that mean that you wouldn't pursue direct talks with Castro?

A I think it means that we look upon the Contadora forum as the promising one, one that has yielded promise. And insofar as they move toward these principles that the President has outlined, that would make, I suppose, particiption in that process more agreeable.

Q So, in other words, that's another way of saying that at this point, the Government does not intend to pursue the comment that Mr. Castro has made --

A Well, --

Q --that there is no interest here in having talks with Castro to try to resolve these --

A Direct talks? I'm not aware of any plans for direct talks with Cuba.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Sure.

Q John, was there any comment or reaction to the report out of El Salvador -- I guess it was over the weekend -- that the elections are not going to be held this year, but next year? As I recall, we had encouraged that the elections be held this year?

A Yes.

Q Were we consulted, by them, and are we dismayed by them?

A Well, we've been in favor of early elections. We have also been aware of what some people have been saying about technical problems. We favor elections as soon as practicable. The precise timing, obviously, depends on the completion of numerous preparatory stages, for example, debate and passage of the draft Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, promulgation of the electoral law, decisions on an electoral registry.

I suppose we also ought to point out that the Peace Commission is engaged in an effort to discuss with the left wider electoral participation. So these are illustrations of the complex process involved in the development of a constitutional democracy.

We've consistently supported this process. We believe the problems in El Salvador require a political solution with elections being fundamental, and we continue to support the government's efforts to build those democratic institutions. But insofar as how they schedule their elections, that, obviously, is a decision for the Salvadoran Government.

Q John, a follow-up to that, could we conclude from this that the move toward developing democratic institutions is going slower than we would have hoped?

A I think that is what one is hearing from voices in Salvador, that the process is taking longer than they had hoped, and obviously, than we had hoped.

-- MORE --

Q What about the special commission that the Administration sent to Salvador, the Election Commission there; are they still in operation? What do they have to say about this, John?

A I don't know. I'll take a look at that. I don't know where that stands.

Q You mentioned earlier the Contadora Group as a key forum for the negotiations. What about the President's comments on the OAS?

A The President hasn't ruled out OAS involvement, but the two are not contradictory. The OAS has merit, too, to that forum. But while the Contadora process is going forward, I think that needs to be given a chance.

Q No, he hasn't ruled it out; he has maybe better, insisted on the role?

A No. I think you would be misreading what he said.

Q Can it be assumed that if the Contadora process fails, then the U.S., Honduras and El Salvador may resort to enter the OAS?

A I guess it's possible. Anybody could take the issue there; sure.

Q On Nicaragua, do you have anything on the Nicaraguan claim that the U.S. frigate Sprague violated their territorial waters.

A Yes, I do. That's not true. I have a fairly brief statement which says, those charges are incorrect. No U.S. ships have violated the coastal limits of Nicaragua, so we completely reject that charge.

Q Have there been incidents?

A No.

Q What do you accept as their territorial waters?

A I don't know. You would have to ask the Pentagon what the actual territorial limit is.

Q Just for the record, would you also give us the text of those remarks regarding the timing for the electoral process?

A Sure.

Q On Nicaragua, a question was asked on Friday of the Central Intelligence Agency about whether or not they could carry on any operation in Nicaragua in Fiscal Year 1984 if the House had not passed the money for it. The reply came back for their spokesman that they could only operate within their budget.

Does the State Department have any observations to make on this question with regard to the spending of money for those kinds of operations in Fiscal 1984?

A No, I don't have any comment for you on that.

Q Do you have anything on the arms flow into El Salvador?

A Yes. We believe that significant amounts of ammunition, explosives and logistic supplies, including clothing, radios, radio parts, propaganda material continue to arrive in El Salvador from Nicaragua by air, sea and land.

However, with a stable force previously well supplied, and having captured some arms in the field, the guerrillas have had less need of external supply of basic weapons since the early months of 1983.

We have detected cyclical rises in deliveries prior to insurgent offensives, such as prior to October 1982 and January 1983 offensives, but I don't have anything new to offer you other than, I think what we have said before, namely, that I think the emphasis has been on the flow of ammunition and supplies such as I have mentioned rather than heavy equipment for which the guerrillas may not have immediate need.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you agree with the officials who told Charlie Moore of the New York Times that for many months the flow into El Salvador has been only a trickle?

A I think that I agree with the words I've just given you which --

Q When you say "significant amounts," what do you mean by that?

A I also told you we can't give you quantity.

Q Can you put anymore precision on "significant amounts?" What is significant to you? Anything, or anything big, or what?

A I can't. As you know, we have been pressed day by day to say how does it look today, is it up, is it down, and we've shied away from that. I don't have anything beyond what we last gave you.

Q Is this to suggest that if there is an increase -- you talk about cyclical rises before offensives, that you may now be looking towards a period of negotiation.

A It's hard to analyze. I suppose those who are initiating the flow from Nicaragua may be having some difficulties. I suppose the need on the ground may be less. There are a number of factors one might take into account.

Q On what is that based? Is that a view of the Department, or is it one particular segment of the Department?

A No. That's a view of the Department.

Q Because I, myself, have been told by officials of this Department that the supplies have dropped off in recent times simply because the Nicaraguans needed more of the equipment at home to fight the Contras, and they cited that as one of the things to show that the Contra backing had been a successful one.

A The two are not contradictory, though. You're talking about the cycle but you could still have significant flow without it being as large as it had been.

Q So in other words it has dropped off. While it's a significant flow, it has dropped off?

A I'm not talking about the flow as of Monday, whatever it is, August 1, but I'm just pointing out that the two statements are not contradictory.

Q Does "significant" mean sufficient to maintain the present level of warfare; is that a fair description?

A I think that's a fair definition.

Q To go back to the Stone trip for a second.

A Sure.

Q If he is down there to facilitate a dialogue between the guerrillas and the government, would you consider that his round-trip mission of last yesterday is the beginning of that dialogue?

A I think it's what I said it was. I think it's a preliminary contact, and we don't rule out the prospect that there would be further meetings.

Q Does it aim to have both sides meet under the mediation efforts of Ambassador Stone? Is that the point you're getting at?

A I think it's a little early to say how such a meeting would be structured. In the end result, the Salvadorans themselves on both sides are going to determine what kind of contact there is and how it takes place. But the United States clearly would be helpful if that help is sought.

Q But if the people are not supposed to shoot their way in, and the thrust is supposed to be, as you said, fundamental as the democratic process --

A That's right.

Q -- what you're looking toward, then, is what? That the rebels would lay down their arms and begin a political process with the government, involve themselves in elections; is that what you're talking about?

A That's the end result. I would assume that there are a few stages before that.

Q You would rule out still the possibility of any power-sharing discussions?

A Yes.

Q No negotiations on that?

A Of course.

Q In your guidance on Salvadoran elections, did I understand you to say the Peace Commission is involved in talks with the left? This would be news, I think. Have they actually started some talks?

A I think you would have to talk to the Salvadorans, but I think there have some reports suggesting that there has been contact.

Q Are you confirming those reports?

A No. I'll let the Salvadorans speak on that.

Q Isn't that what Stone is trying to get them involved in?

A We don't have any problem with that, and we would be encouraged by it. But I think you have to have the Salvadorans speak for themselves. I don't think we should be talking for them, and we're not going to.

Q In your statement you say the Peace Commission is involved in talks with the left. I believe I heard that correctly. So that's saying, yes, they are.

A I still think you ought to talk -- I don't think there's any problem about talking to the Salvadorans.

Q Can you elaborate on the plan of increasing grant assistance to Israel and the extent of the involvement in assisting Israel financially in building the new fighter LAVI?

A I think you're talking about -- are you talking about that report from some unnamed Israeli official that the President had made a commitment; is that the one you're talking about?

A Yes, sir.

Q The President hasn't made a commitment, and certainly made no such commitment during the visit of Mr. Arens and Mr. Shamir, but the Israelis have discussed with us on a number of occasions over the past few months the terms of our financial assistance as well as use of FMS financing to develop weapon systems. The subjects were naturally raised in the course of discussions held last week, and just as obviously are under consideration by the United States Government, but no commitment has been made.

Q Can I get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q May I follow up, please? Is it true --

Q Can I follow that up. I don't think the Israeli official who is quoted said there had been a commitment. He said the President said it would receive favorable consideration. Is that in fact true?

A Favorable consideration, it seems to me, would be tantamout to a commitment. In other words, we're looking at it. It was raised while they were here but there has been no Presidential commitment.

Q How about the LAVI part of it, the part about the airplanes?

A No Presidential commitment.

Q How about somebody else -- Weinberger or someone?

A I think that will be unwise and unlikely.

Q Does the "favorable consideration" -- that is the quote -- you are saying that is the same as a Presidential commitment?

A I guess we have to --

Q Because you're hardening up the language beyond the story.

A A favorable consideration, in my estimate, means that you've virtually made a decision to do something, and I think I would be cautious about that commitment. We're not predicting how this will come out.

Q Did the President say that he would give favorable consideration to the Israeli request?

A That's not my understanding.

--MORE--

Q May I follow: Is it true that the issue of Jewish settlements in the West Bank were not mentioned significantly in the talks between the United States' official and Israeli delegation last week, as it was reported also, one of these --

A Is it true that that was not mentioned?

Q It was not, because they said about a couple of paragraphs or a couple of minutes, whatever it is, in the whole talks, you know. They were not standing as significantly to reflect the position that was undertaken last year --

A The question of settlements certainly was raised during the visit here, but if you're talking about the Presidential involvement, then I guess I'd have to refer you to the backgrounder that was given by an Administration official. I wasn't in the Presidential meeting.

Q In the talks here, were the talks centering around the settlements, too?

A Sure.

Q In a significant way at State?

A I mean, I don't know what you consider a "significant way," but the question of settlements was raised.

Q I'm concerned about the reports that say only a couple of minutes, or whatever, a couple of paragraphs in the whole thing --

A I think that would be a misleading report.

Q John, do you have any comment on the news report that Mr. Veliotes may change his -- leave his position?

A No, I don't. We don't get into questions of personnel announcements that might or might not be in the works, so we're not going to lead you one way or the other on that.

Q John, Tel Aviv Radio says that the Israeli Government has decided in principal to accept a timetable for withdrawal. Can you comment on that, and also on the

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reports that Ambassador McFarlane is taking a four-stage, four-phase, withdrawal plan with him?

A No, I can't. The Israeli decision on redeployment is, of ccurse, an Israeli decision, but in the talks they had here with us, we were assured that Israel has no intention of contributing in any way to a permanent --

Q But you can't confirm or deny that McFarlane -- or that the U.S. Government has put forward a four-stage plan?

A No. I won't talk about what Ambassador McFarlane is discussing or might discuss.

Q Would you welcome the Tel Aviv Radio report that it has been accepted in principal, a timetable for withdrawal?

A I think we will stand on the discussions that we had with Israeli officials when they were here, and the assurances that we had that what they are doing is in line with our objectives in Lebanon.

Q But would a timetable not be inevitable?

A I don't think we're going to respond to radio reports. I think we'll stand on --

Q In the abstract, would a timetable not be inevitable --

A We hate to answer questions in the abstract.

Q John, do you have anything on the fighting in Chad?

A Not a great deal, Jim. There was some more bombing there today. We're consulting with various friendly, interested governments. There were additional casualties today as the Libyan air attacks continued, and we are talking with a number of other governments who can share our concern about Libya's blatant intervention in Chad. That is particularly so in the case of the French Government, and also a number of African governments.

I think that's really about all I have on that. We have kept Congress informed. The President, of course, was informed about this throughout the weekend. The Secretary of State was deeply involved in it.

Q In light of the direct Libyan involvement that you described, is it under consideration that the United States will change the scale or type of its aid to Chad?

A You know, we're embarked on that $10 million program. I think it's fair to say that in light of the situation, we're reviewing what else we might or might not do.

Q The French, according to a news report, have agreed to send anti-aircraft guns to Chad. Is the United States contemplating sending any kind of anti-aircraft or aircraft related things to Chad in view of the Libyan bombing?

A I don't know what's within that $10 million figure, Don. Be glad to take a look at it for you and see what's in there.

Q Originally the $10 million was mostly non-weapons, and they seemed as thought they might send some small arms. That wouldn't be very effective against the aircraft.

A That's right.

Q Are they considering adding on some airplane related things to it?

A I think that in light of the fast-moving situation, we're reviewing it.

Q Could you confirm that a United States aircraft carrier has been put on alert because of this situation?

A No. I think you'd have to talk to the Pentagon about that.

Q John, on the textile agreement with China --

Q Could we stay on the Middle East for a couple more questions?

A Sure.

Q Two follow-ups to previous questions. First, regarding Veliotes, last week you were asked the same question and you had a different answer. You said that you didn't know anything about it. You didn't use this explanation that you can't comment on personnel changes.

A It's just simply something I'm not going to get into, in general. If personnel changes are to be announced in the Department at any level, they will be announced when we're ready to do it, but I have nothing on that.

Q But you don't repeat your denial of last week.

A No. I don't know what I said last week, but today I'm saying --

Q That you didn't know of anything like this.

A Don't have anything for you on it.

Q Another follow-up: Regarding the question of the aid request from Israel, do you have any information about joint Israeli-American teams or inter-agency American teams that are looking into the Israeli requests?

A No. Don't have anything for you on that.

Q Yet another unnamed Israeli source was quoted in today's Christian Science Monitor as saying that sources here, i.e. in Israel say the Americans differentiate between south Lebanon and east Lebanon's Bekaa Valley where the Israeli presence, face to face with the Syrians and only 16 miles from Damascus, is seen as an important source of pressure on the Syrians to leave.

Does that mean that the U.S. is more amenable to an Israeli partial pullback in the south because it's not that much of a hot point as it were as the Israeli forces' presence in the Bekaa?

A I think we're really not going to get into a phase by phase. We have an initial Israeli position. We are assured that that is going to be taking place within the overall framework of the goals we've set, and that's what we're going to be working for. The goals are well known, namely, the withdrawal of all foreign forces: PLO, Israeli, Syrian, from Lebanon, and we're going to be working with the various parties to achieve that overall objective.

Q Then why the big play-up on the partial withdrawal to the south and not that much mention --

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A I don't think we've made a big play-up, as you say, on Israeli partial withdrawal. It's an Israeli decision. They came here, they've explained it. We have understood it within the context of our goals and are assured that it is within that framework.

Q Yes, but you're going along with it whereas -- well, not an equal amount of "mention or play," was given to the Bekaa situation.

A You say "going along along with it," I think if one is assured that this is within the framework of our objectives for Lebanon, I think our role is to play our part in the management of that in a way that contributes to those goals, and that's, I think, what Ambassador McFarlane is now doing in his discussions with the Lebanese. We have had discussions with the Israelis. Might have more discussions with the Israelis.

I think our role has to be to make sure that what takes place, takes place within the framework.

Q And those goals include the Bekaa?

A The goals include the withdrawal of all foreign forces from all of Lebanon.

Q John, what is Mr. McFarlane's schedule to be meeting with President Assad of Syria?

A I can't give you anything on it. I think that he's in Beirut today, and that's really about all I can give you. I'm afraid we're going to continue to disappoint you on his travel plans ahead of time. No problem about telling you where he is once he's gotten there, but for other obvious reasons, given the volatile character of the Middle East, we're not going to tell you where he's going.

Q John, do you have any comment on the Syrian decision to withdraw from Tripoli? Is this a positive development or a negative one in view of who they're handing it over to?

A No.

Q You don't care whether they go or not?

A It's not a question of don't care, but the position is as we said last week. We don't have an analysis or an interpretation for you.

Q John, do you have any comment on the ruling by the black South African countries to bar South African-based reporters?

A Yes, I can. While, obviously, this is a decision that each of the African countries has to make for itself, our own strongly held view is that no attempt should be made to restrict freedom of the press, and therefore we would particularly regret any restrictions on access to information posed by those countries.

Q Do you plan to do anything about it?

A I think our views on this are well known to the countries involved.

Q John, on the textile agreement with China, can you comment on it? Also, can you say if the growth that's built into that agreement is any larger or smaller than for other countries in that area that have textile agreements with the United States?

A I can't really, Spencer. I think your best prospect is to go to the U.S. Trade Representative at 395-4647. The agreement is retroactive to January 1. It will expire on December 31, 1987. The U.S. and the P.R.C. are planning to exchange notes this month, at which time the details of the agreement will be made public. But as for quota levels and any additional information, I think you'll have to go to Mr. Brock.

Q Do you have any comment on this -- while you're on China -- about the statements of Deng Xiaoping about what he'd be willing to do with regard to Taiwan that were made in the last several days?

A No. I really don't. We've always, as you know, made the point that this is a matter for the Chinese people themselves, and I don't have anything on it.

Q But the U.S. also has at times hung various policies on the view that the Chinese were really serious about negotiating with Taiwan.

A Yes. Don't have anything for you.

Q Do you have any new reports on what's going on in Sri Lanka?

A No. I don't. It's possible we might have something a little later in the day.

Q Do you have any indication and in any form that the Government of India is involved in what's going on there?

A No.

Q Can you give us your assessment of the current state in the Iran-Iraq war as it evolves now?

A No. Do you mean on the relative situation? No. I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:06 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, August 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #134

TUESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1983, 12:45 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two brief announcements.

First, available in the Press Office is the testimony of Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology William Schneider before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. The subject is an overview of the Administration's science policy.

Secondly, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the visit of the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, in the press briefing room here on August 3 at 2:00 p.m.

That's it on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, Radio Libya says that President Habre of Chad has been killed. Do you have anything to indicate whether that's true or false?

A I don't. I've seen the wire, but I don't have anything to confirm that.

Q What is the news that you have from Chad?

A In the way of a situation report, I can't tell you as of this moment. I imagine it's getting dark. But speaking of today, Libyan air attacks are continuing and are of increasing severity. Habre, according to our last reports, remains in control of Faya Largeau, but his forces and the civilian population are taking increasing casualties as a result of the Libyan air attacks.

Q Has there been any decision made by this Administration to supply the Chad Government with anti-aircraft weapons?

A Yes. I think that was indicated yesterday. I can confirm that we will be providing Red-eye missiles as was reported in the press this morning.

Q How many?

A I don't have numbers for you, and I don't think I will be able to provide numbers to you.

Q Do you know how soon?

A Again, I can't give you specifics on that. I would simply say that we expect them to arrive, or they will arrive shortly. They are enroute at this point.

Q In light of the continuing and increasing attacks, are you continuing your consultations with allies, including France, about further steps?

A Yes.

Q Alan, did you all say how you're delivering this stuff? Does that go by U.S. Air Force planes?

A I think you would probably have to check with the Pentagon to see how that's going in. I don't have an answer to give you.

Q On a technical point, the Red-eye missiles, is that in addition to the $10 million?

A No. At this point those Red-eyes are being funded out of the $10 million previously allocated. Obviously, if there were a further requirement in light of the continuing discussions and continuing situation, we'd have to look at that, but this is within that $10 million.

Q Alan, as far as I know, these people don't know how to use these things. Are our people going to instruct them in the Red-eye's use?

A Again, let me refer you to the Pentagon in terms of what training might be provided them.

Q Do you know what the political purpose of the Libyan attacks would be?

A You tempt me to try to give you an instant analysis of it. I think that question might better be addressed to Libya as to why they've engaged in what is quite clearly interference in the affairs of a neighboring country in an overt military way.

Q Do you see a strategic interest to the United States in Chad particularly, or is it Sudan that is concerning us by extension if the Libyans --

A I think in terms of our concern about it I'd have to refer you back to the statement that we issued Sunday evening, and I will stand by that.

Q What is the current status of the Eisenhower and the Coral Sea vis-a-vis Libya?

A Again, I would have to refer you to the Pentagon.

Q What's the input that you received from the Organization of African States (sic) and the neighboring states in Africa, according to your contacts with them in relation to this action?

A We have been in touch with a number of the countries that are concerned about this, but I am not going to get into the question of what the content of that dialogue has been.

Q Will the U.S. consider further military aid to Chad if the situation continues?

A Again, I'm not in a position to say what we would do in the future, but we obviously have been responding to President Habre's request, others are as well, and we would have to consider the situation as it evolves to see what might be useful and possible.

Q Alan, have you been in diplomatic touch as well with the Sudan and Egypt?

A Again, I think we have not specified beyond the French the names of countries we have been in touch with, and I don't think I'm in a position to change that ground rule at this point.

Q Alan, you don't want to go into diplomatic exchange, but what was the reaction of these countries? Was it favorable to your action of sending the Red-eye and the other things that you are planning to do?

A Obviously, other governments should speak for themselves on this, but I think there has been a general concern about what is happening in Chad, and I don't think I can go beyond that.

Q Alan, are you aware of the longstanding ties between the government of Muammar Qaddafi and the Italian Socialist Party, and have you re-evaluated your support for the Craxi Government coming into power in Italy on the basis of these new Libyan attacks?

A I think we've addressed ourselves to that possibility of Mr. Craxi taking office some time ago and would refer you to that statement.

Q Alan, Middle East. There are new reports of fighting around Baalbek, apparently very intensified. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on fighting in southern Lebanon?

A Again, I don't have anything on fighting.

Q In the upper lefthand corner in _The New York Times_ -- are the Secretary of State and Commerce Secretary recommending relaxation of controls on the export of oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union?

A I'm basically going to refer you to the Department of Commerce which I think is prepared to give some detail on what's involved here. Let me simply say there is not involved here any recommendation for a change in policy. There is no recommendation here for a change regarding high tech exports. But having given you that as a general parameter, let me refer you to Commece.

Q Just a minute on south Asia. There was a report yesterday that Sri Lanka had appealed for U.S. pledges of military assistance in case of a foreign attack. Is this true?

And, also, anything new on the situation in Sri Lanka, in particular the involvement of the Marxist element?

A Let me give you what I understand in terms of a situation report first, which is that we understand the security situation is slowly improving, and that the Sri Lankan Government is increasingly turning its attention to the problems of relief.

As far as assistance is concerned, we have provided on our own initiative a small amount of relief aid and are considering what further we might do to meet Sri Lanka's humanitarian requirements.

We believe the situation in Sri Lanka is a matter for the Sri Lankans themselves to resolve. We have not, to answer your specific question, been asked to provide any military aid.

Q Any involvement of the Marxist element? Have you had any reports of that?

A I don't have anything to give you on that. I think you would have to turn to the Government of Sri Lanka on that.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the warm welcoming words coming from Syria to McFarlane? (Laughter)

A Do I detect a note of sarcasm in your question? I don't have any reaction to the statements that have been made recently from Syria. I'd refer you back to what John said the other day about Ambassador McFarlane's trip, and that we don't anticipate any problems with his going there. I don't have any specific schedule to offer you regarding that.

Q Is he in Beirut today?

A He was in Beirut. He may have left within the hour on his way to Israel.

Q On this point, is it true that there were reports that Syria sent an emissary to meet with Mr. McFarlane in Beirut in preparing for his visit, and Syria is ready to accept the agreement, if it will be rewritten from the beginning to the end?

A If it would be what?

Q Rewritten. I mean, you know, the whole agreement, if it will be renegotiated.

A I guess I can't respond to your question at all, simply on the grounds that we have not been and will not be discussing Ambassador McFarlane's mission and the substance of his discussion. Let me leave it at that. I can't give you anything on his trip.

-- MORE --

Q While he was in Beirut, was he in contact with some Syrian --

A I understand your question. I think that, again, we have not made a practice with Ambassador Habib -- and indicated that we will do the same with Ambassador McFarlane -- we have not made a practice of talking about the specifics of his discussions, and I'm not going to do that from here. We could chat a bit about it later if you want.

Q Speaking of roving ambassadors, do you have a detailed readout there on Ambassador Stone's mission, or even a less than detailed readout on Ambassador Stone's mission?

A Quite a bit less than detailed. The readout on Ambassador Stone's mission --

Q Can we stay on Lebanon?

A Let me deal with this while I've got it.

Q Basically, I think that we're not going to give, as usual, specifics. We consider that his talks in Managua were wide ranging and useful. I think that he's addressed that in very much the same words. I expect that he probably will be meeting with the Secretary later today. I don't have specifics on that at this point. That's about all I can give you on that.

Q Was he there for any kind of negotiation or simply to -- was he there to address directly the recent Nicaraguan peace proposal?

A I don't have anything to give you beyond what I just have. I think John addressed yesterday the question of his general mission, reiterating the mandate to facilitate dialogue both within and between the countries of the region, and I will leave you with that.

Q One more question about Lebanon. There was a press report yesterday to the effect that the United States is interested in postponing the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement as part of the negotiations effort with Syria. Do you have any comment on this?

A No. I think that would be an issue, though, that would be properly a matter largely between the governments of Lebanon and Israel, but I don't have a comment on it.

Q Will Stone be meeting with Kissinger as well?

A I don't know.

Q Two brief things. Does the State Department have any role in the efforts of Mr. Aquino to return to the Philippines where apparently the government says they will not allow him to enter and may revoke the landing rights of any airline that brings him to Manila?

A I don't have anything on that. I was not aware that he was specifically intending to go back to the Philippines at this point.

Q Ruben Zamora has said that another meeting between the U.S. and a delegation of the leftists from El Salvador has been set, although he's reticent about the time and a place. Would you comment?

A I think that John indicated that he certainly didn't rule out a meeting in the future, but I can't give you any specifics at this point.

Q Is this the first meeting with Zamora that the Administration's had at a high level, the one with Stone?

A I don't know. I honestly don't know the answer to that question.

Q Could you take that question?

A I can look into that question. I'm not sure, depending on -- going back over what period of time?

Q This year.

A Let me look into that and see if I can get it.

Q Alan, Zamora also said that ten days ago the FDR wrote to the Peace Commission in Salvador to talk about setting up a meeting. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. Simply to note that he apparently did say that to the press. We believe that contact between the left and the Peace Commission would be a positive step.

Q So how would this contact be brought about? Would Stone set up the date, the place, guarantee the --

A You're not serious?

Q Can you take the question?

A No. I'm not going to get into the question of the detail of what he's doing.

Q Does the State Department consider that Zamora speaks for the entire FMLN/FDR coalition?

A I don't think we would try to put a reading of any sort, one way or another, on that from this podium. The question of how the dialogue proceeds is a matter between Ambassador Stone and the people he's dealing with.

Q Who was Stone meeting with when he met with Zamora?

A I'm not going to try to define that. You're trying to the get the question the same way, and I just said I'm not going to answer the question.

Q Do you have anything on the greeting from a protest fleet to the U.S.S. Texas when it entered the harbor in New Zealand?

A I wasn't aware of it. I don't have anything on it.

Q Would you like to look into those meetings?

A No, I'm not going to do that.

Q There's a story in the Washington Post that says American advisors in Honduras are carrying out training missions along the border in Nicaragua. Do you have any comment on that?

A Yes, that report is misleading. I would refer you to the Pentagon for details. U.S. trainers have provided instruction to the Honduran military on the techniques of patrolling. But as stated in the terms of reference, the trainers are prohibited from participating in combat operations or areas of likely risk of combat.

Q Techniques of patrolling are carried out along the border of Nicaragua, correct?

A I don't know how close to the border those training parols go. As I say -- I refer you to the last phrase I used -- the trainers are prohibited from participating in combat operations or areas of likely risk of combat.

Q There are reports from the West Bank that indicate that the United States is conducting a search for Palestinians who are not PLO supporters, that these contacts are conducted through Mr. Wat Cluverius in East Jerusalem, and this has been done with the approval of Mr. Arens, the Defense Minister of Israel. What do you comment on this?

A I don't have a specific comment on that. It has been traditional that the Consulate General in Jerusalem has contact with a wide variety of people, but don't have any comment on that particular report.

Q Has the State Department recommended a scaling-down of the projected exercises in Honduras?

A First of all, I'm not sure what the full scale of this is. I've seen reports of briefings that have come out of the Pentagon, but I'm not aware of any plans for change in what has been agreed. I'm not quite sure what the status of how far along some of the specific, later stages have gone. You'd have to really refer to the Pentagon.

Q Nobody knows exactly how big these exercises will be.

A You'll have to go to the Pentagon for that.

Q But you are not recommending that they be limited in size and duration?

A I'm not aware of any change in it, but I couldn't get into the question of agency recommendations. It's just, again, a question of principle.

Q Would it be fair to assume that that comment that you made may have rested on a recommendation to scale them down?

A No, I wouldn't make any assumptions like that.

Q There are two schools of thought about the negotiations in the West Bank from the autonomy talks, that the United States' position is not clearly expressed as to -- that it will accept the Egyptian side of the autonomy talks on the Israeli side, and as a result of this, what do you comment on also reports that King Hussein has said to the United States that he will be ready to enter the talks with Israel only if as a result of what's going on in the

Bekaa and the rift in the PLO if Arafat and his Fatah group will come and join him, the only loyalist to Arafat that they will join him?

A I don't have a specific comment on the second part, but I don't understand the first part of the question. On the second part of it, we have said before that King Hussein has been looking for, and we hope he will get the necessary backing to come to the table, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Can you explain about the first part, that there are two positions about the autonomy talks: the Egyptian interpretation or the Israeli interpretation, or what's going to amount to as an autonomous solution?

A Let me refer you back to the President's speech of September 1 in terms of our position on it.

Q Anything on Poland in rescheduling of the Polish debt?

A No, nothing beyond what we had last week.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:03 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #135

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Deputy Secretary Ken Dam before the House Ways and Means Committee, Subcommittee on Trade. That was testimony today. The subject is the Generalized System of Preference.

Also available in the Press Office is the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Tony Motley, and Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America, AID, Marshall D. Brown, before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. The subject is U.S. Support for the Electoral Process in El Salvador. That was also testimony today.

Available at 2:00 this afternoon will the following testimony: That of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Tony Motley before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Human Rights. The subject is El Salvador Certification.

That's all I have in the way of announcements. I'll be glad to take any questions.

Q On Chad. One, have the American missiles arrived, and are they accompanied by U.S. advisors?

A I think the missiles have arrived in Chad. Insofar as military technicians, there are a small number of military technicians accompanying the equipment we are sending to Chad who will stay for a brief period to train the Chadians in the use of that equipment.

Q A small number; like what, four?

A I think that's about right, but I don't know exactly what the numbers are but that sounds like the figure I've heard.

Q Are they going to be training the Chadians, or there are some reports that they are actually going to be training some French technicians on these?

A Everything that we're doing for Chad is to support Chadian defense against Libyan aggression. Obviously, we have cooperated very closely with the French. We consult frequently to insure that our assistance is complementary and used as efficiently and effectively as possible, but I'm not going to get into the details or the form of that cooperation they actually take on the ground in Chad.

Q Just a technical point. What's the difference between a military technician and an advisor?

A I think, in fact, the official nomenclature is "trainer," but I use the word "technician" loosely. I don't want to let there be any misunderstanding about the possibility of Americans being involved in combat. They would have a brief training role. They would not go outside N'Djamena, the capital, and would not be exposed to hostile --

Q These are not contractors' representatives along with military personnel, are they?

A I think they are military.

Q You said cooperating with the French on the ground, does this imply that there are French technicians on the ground?

A Technicians? I think, really, we shouldn't talk for the French about what they have there. I think you probably ought to ask them.

Q How do we cooperate with the French on the ground if there aren't French people there?

A I said, why don't you ask the French what they're doing on the ground.

A The French don't seem to think there are any there, and that's why I was wondering whether you knew if there were any there.

Q What I have said is, we have been in close cooperation with the French, and we're not going to spell out what we might or might not be doing with them on the ground, but insofar as the French presence, if there is one, is concerned, why don't you ask the French.

Q How are you describing the disposition of the Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the moment and its location, vis-a-vis, the Gulf of Sidra?

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A I guess I'd refer you to the Pentagon on that, and I suspect they probably won't be very communicative as to the exact position of the ship. I mean, they traditionally are not.

Q Have you seen the threats from Libya threating to sink --

A You look suprised. I can't understand your surprise.

Q Have you seen the threats from the Libyan Government threatening to sink the Eisenhower if it goes into the Gulf of Sidra?

A Yes, we've seen those threats. We don't have any response to them other than to make the point that we recognize a 12-mile limit for the Libyans, and we maintain our right to operate in international waters.

Q Can you confirm that the U.S. are sending ten Stinger ground-to-air missiles to Chad?

A No. Won't talk about numbers, and won't talk about specifics. It's a mix of anti-aircraft weaponry, but for rather obvious reasons, we're not going to be anymore explicit about what is included in that mix.

Q Is the U.S. happy with the French response to the crisis in Chad? Would it like the French Government actually to do more in terms of --

A We have been consulting closely with the French, continue to consult closely with the French, and in fact they have done more than the United States so far in terms of aid against the Libyan aggression.

Q You expect them to do more still?

A No, I don't think I can address that. It's a fast-moving situation. We are appreciative of what they have done. As I say, they have done more so far than the United States. I think that both the French Government and ourselves and other governments are watching that situation very closely.

Q Do you have any further information on President Habre, whether he's alive and well, or whatever?

A We think that report that he is dead is not correct.

Q Does this mean you're not so sure that he is alive? (Laughter)

A We think the report that he is dead is incorrect.

Q Neither dead nor alive? (Laughter)

A I don't happen to be on the scene there. There are no newsmen on the scene. It's a long way from the capital. It is difficult to confirm these things, but our information is that the report that he is dead is not a correct report. I don't know how I can be anymore explicit than that.

Q What I expect is that you have information if he has shown himself already during the last 24 hours, at least?

A Communications are very difficult. It's difficult terrain where the fighting is taking place. It's a long way from the capital, and U.S. diplomats. So I can't do any better. I guess I could say nothing, but we're trying to be a little helpful in saying to the best of our information the report is false.

Q John, the Libyans are also reporting that eleven Zairian troops were killed. Do you have anything on that?

A Were killed?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't. I don't have anything on that. It's my impression, however, that the Zairian troops are in the capital, or are in N'Djamena. I think there are about 1800 Zairian troops, and I think they're all in the capital.

Q They're not involved in combat?

A Not to my knowledge, but I guess you'd have to ask the Government of Zaire about that, but my understanding was that they were in the capital.

Q Just to the point of asking, for the record, within the past few hours, have there been any other incidents over the Gulf of Sidra?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q On a broader question of the strategic value of Chad and our relationship with Chad, we asked about this yesterday and referred to the Sunday statement which really doesn't mention American interests in Chad. Can you handle the question or can you take the question of why we are doing anything at all on the question of --

A Let me take the question and see if we can do any better for you than we did yesterday.

Q Because it's really been pretty much a drought on that question.

A Okay. It's a dry country.

Q Do you you have any information as to what the situation is in the north, who holds what?

A We understand that Libyan aircraft have been intensifying their attacks on Faya Largeau. Senior Chadian officials report some losses to the dispersed forces of President Habre, and extensive damage to the town as well as civilian casualties.

The Libyan attacks constitute direct, military aggression. the United States condemns that in the strongest terms and is continuing to provide military assistance to President Habre. As of now, as of today, about $7 million worth of the $10 million authorized has been shipped. That includes trucks, jeeps, medical supplies, some ammunition and small arms, quartermaster equipment. And as we told you recently, becuse of the intensification of the attacks, we did provide and are providing some anti-aircraft equipment. That's really about all I have.

Q We finally pressed the right button. (Laughter)

Q Is the presence of the Eisenhower, north of Libya, a direct response to the fighting in Chad?

A I think you'd have to ask the Pentagon about that.

Q In the past, I think, there was some -- when the ships were there, there was some talk about these being maneuvers and planned for a long time, and that sort of thing. Is that the case this time, or is this --

A I wouldn't steer you away from the line you're going down, but I would prefer the Pentagon respond to that.

Q Do you know if the Government of Zaire has sent to Chad the three Mirages that it has offered?

A I don't know. I know that they've sent troops. I'm not up to date on what the disposition of the aircraft is.

Q Have you had anymore consultation with the OAU or any of the OAU leaders on this?

A I don't know of any such further consultations. There may well have been, but I'm not aware of it.

Q I really find it somehow difficult to understand the policy adopted by this Administration towards Nicaragua and the policy adopted towards Chad. You are in Nicaragua against the government, and you are in Chad for the government against the rebels?

A I think that in the case of Libya, you have a ratherclear-cut case of external aggression. I think that's the central factor underlining the Chadian situation.

I think our views on Nicaragua and the conduct and the policy of the government there are quite well known. They have been amplified by a number of officials, not the least of them the President of the United States.

Q But you do recognize the Nicaraguan Government as the legal government of Managua?

A Yes.

Q Regarding the McFarlane trip, does the fact that he didn't go yet to Damascus, despite some reports that he will go there after visiting Beirut, does it show any problems with him getting to Damascus?

A No, he is in Israel today with Ambassador Fairbanks. I don't know when he will leave Israel, and I can't give you anything on his itinerary, but as was indeed the case with Ambassador Habib in the area, those decisions remain at fairly short notice and depending on the course of discussions and negotiations. But I wouldn't say that anything has changed in his mission up to now.

Q Is it still clear to you that he will be able to visit Damascus on his trip?

A Yes, we see no impediment in that mission.

Q Yesterday, the U.S. vetoed a resolution in the Security Council considering the settlements in the West Bank as illegal and an obstacle to peace. We have heard so many times from this podium and from other podiums in this Administration that this Administration considered the settlements an impediment to peace. Why did you veto such a resolution?

A We share the anguish of decent people everywhere about the loss of life and destruction of property the West Bank has witnessed in recent weeks. However, the draft resolution did not adequately address this series of criminal acts, mentioning only the July 26 terrorist attack.

The United States condemns all the recent criminal actions, starting with the murder of an Israeli settler and including the wanton destruction of the Hebron market and, of course, the brutal attack at Hebron University.

There were elements in the draft resolution that were completely unacceptable to the United States. It implied that Israel had carried out forcible transfers of Arab population from the occupied territories, and that's an assertion for which there is no body of evidence. Moreover, it called for the dismantling of the existing settlements, an impractical demand. Nor could we accept continuing the sterile argument as to whether the settlements are illegal, an argument that deflects attention from the basic issue, namely, the harmful impact of settlement activity on efforts to achieve a fair and peaceful resolution of the conflict over the occupied territories.

The United States Government does not support Israel's settlement policy. On the contrary, as President Reagan stated last September 1, we beleive a freeze on settlements throughout the occupied territories, more than any other single action, would foster the kind of atmosphere needed for negotiations leading to peace. But for the reasons I've outlined, that's why we took the position we did.

Q May I have a copy of this?

A Sure.

Q Can you amplify your statement that dismantling of the settlements is an impractical demand?

A Yes. I think we're looking at the realities of the situation on the ground as we face them.

Q Then why did you back the dismantling of settlements in Sinai?

A I think you have a somewhat different situation. I think you have to face realities.

Q Would you draw the difference for us? Would you be kind enough to tell us what the difference is?

A No. I think the realities of the situation on the ground are different, and I think the President has made clear and has responded to this question of illegality versus undesirability and unhelpfulness, and I think I'm going to leave you with President Reagan's words. I think he's made it very clear what his position is.

Q Is the Jordanian Government aware of that nuance -- rather significant nuance in the American position?

A Everybody should be aware of it.

Q It would be impractical to dismantle settlements.

A Existing settlements? I think everybody's aware of the United States' position.

Q I have two questions on Latin America. First of all, have you received any information from a medical team, apparently sent by the Administration to Honduras to care for the health of the President?

A I think we made the offer of a medical team in the event that it should be requested by the Hondurans in the illness of their President.

Q But it hasn't been sent?

A I don't know what the situation is, but certainly the United States would be helpful. I think there would be assistance actually on the ground that would be available.

Q Second, have you received any demand from the Government of Peru regarding the leftist terrorism there?

A A demand?

Q Yes. I mean help to combat the --

A No. We understand that President Belaunde indicated on Monday that his government will seek international support for training programs that could assist his government in better dealing with its present security problems. Insofar as the United States is concerned, Peru has not asked for U.S. assistance specifically related to the terrorists.

However, for several decades the U.S. has had training and an arms sales relationship with the Peruvian armed forces which have an indirect relationship to various potential threats to Peru's national security. But there's no specific request.

Q Going back to the Middle East, to the West Bank, if I may, do you have any comment on the reports coming out from Israeli sources about the formation of death squads in the West Bank?

A No. I don't.

Q John, on your statement that it would be impractical to dismantle existing settlements, that would seem to carry some implications for the peace process if it ever resumes.

A I don't think so. I don't think it's in contradiction with what the President has said in his September 1 speech. He called for a freeze. He called for a freeze on additional activity and the addition of additional acreages -- I recall the speech; I guess we'd both have to go back and look at it -- to existing settlements. So it's utterly --

Q But that's been disregarded, though, hasn't it, in the meantime?

A Not to my knowledge. The September 1 statement represents policy, represents his policy, in the Middle East.

Q It's been disregarded by the other side.

A We consider it a very good proposal. I don't see any other proposals out there that come anywhere near it.

Q That's not my question. My question is if you're saying now that it's impractical to dismantle existing settlements, and you've already asked for a freeze and the settlement activity is continuing, then aren't you basically giving a stamp of saying that what they continue doing is acceptable? Isn't it in contradiction?

A No. The extension of settlement activity, we have made -- I'm not sure I understand why everybody is having such difficulty with this. We made clear on September 1 that we were opposed to it. We have remained consistently opposed to it and remain opposed to it today.

The fact that it's going on against our inclination and our wishes doesn't change our position.

Q John, would it be fair to say that it is any less practical to dismantle settlements begun after September 1 than those existing prior?

A I think we'll stand on the President's position.

Q John, a backup for Roy's question: You've asked on September 1 to freeze the settlements, right?

A Yes.

Q Since then, Israel has built more settlements, announced that it's going to build more settlements. It didn't heed your request. Now you're saying we're anti-dismantlement of the settlements.

Actually, you're simply telling them, go ahead, build, we're not doing anything, and we're backing you.

A We're not saying that at all. You asked why we vetoed this particular resolution, and I've given you the rationale for our action.

(a) It has other unrelated material in it, but (b) it makes a call for something that is not practical. That is not, however, a contradiction of the President's September 1 position.

CONT

Q John, it's very good, you're talking about practicality from this podium. We rarely hear it these days. In the same practicality terms, you're simply blessing the settlements' building.

A I don't understand how in the world you can arrive at that conclusion. The fact that one is opposed to something that has continued, how in the world does that constitute a blessing?

Q May I answer you?

A No. I'm answering the questions.

Q Well, you're asking the question I've asked of you. I mean --

A (Laughter) That's a rhetorical question on my part.

Q Why is it not practical to dismantle settlements?

A I think we'll stand on the language. Without going into detail, I think the reasons are obvious.

Q Your remarks suggest that the U.S. is powerless but to stand idly by, and certainly we have an enormous amount of leverage on Israel, and if we chose to put a little something behind that, we could.

Are we putting any measure of pressure on Israel at all to back up our supposed position?

A I think that since September 1 we have addressed ourselves on many occasions to the question of leverage against Israel, and how we perceive leverage. I think the Secretary of State has made it very clear what his approach is to that question.

I suppose what you're saying is although the President announced his plan on September 1, it has not come to fruition. I just remind you that at the time the President announced it, he said we're in this for the long haul.

As I understand it, this problem has roiled the Middle East for some 30 years, been a lot of effort to resolve it, and I think this Administration is continuing to make a rather forceful effort.

Nobody could criticize this Administration for lack of engagement on the Middle East. True, is there a settlement, something that nobody else has been able to achieve? No. I guess there hasn't been, but that isn't any reason for the Reagan Administration to run out of steam on the President's proposal which he's going to pursue. He hasn't changed his position.

Q Have the Secretary and Ambassador Lewis made clear to the Israelis since September 1 that this was an integral part of our position that the settlements could not practically be dismantled?

A I think that our position on settlements has been made clear on many occasions, both prior and post September 1.

Q But specific elements.

A But the President's position is very clear. What he talked about on September 1 was a freeze on future activity and extension of territory for existing settlements.

Q Did he say it would be impractical to dismantle existing ones? Did he say that?

A I don't know whether the President has said that, but this is the State Department's position in terms of an explanation of our veto of the resolution.

Q On this point, since you say that all sides are aware of this American position, and you don't claim to state here a new American position on this issue, could you help us by searching the records in the Department if any statement like this was made by --

A The record is the President's September 1 speech.

Q No. But I'm asking about the specific statement that you made that the United States feels that it's impractical to dismantle settlements.

A That is in line with the policy that has been enunciated. There's no contradiction.

Q Was it ever announced this way by an American official spokesman?

A If you're saying, was this choice of three or four or five words used identically in previous U.S. statements, I don't know. But, clearly, the thrust of the President's September 1 speech and policy is evident and is unchanged.

Q But is it possible to -- I know that you have --

A No, but I'd be happy to provide all sorts of support for you to do the research.

Q John, it sounds like either an unfortunate use of words that wasn't intended, or a departure in policy.

A It's not a departure in policy.

Q So then it might be the former.

A That would have to be your conclusion. I don't see it as an unfortunate choice of words.

Q So the future of the settlements will be decided on the negotiation table, or this is a departure --

A That's the United States' position.

Q Yes. But the United States' position is that the future of the West Bank will be decided at the negotiation table, right?

A That's correct.

Q This September 1 initiative.

A Yes. Sure.

Q Including the settlements, right?

A Of course.

Q So the future of the settlements will be dependent on the negotiations between the parties --

A Yes.

Q -- not because it's impractical that dismantling the settlements is impractical. Right?

A In our assessment of our position on this particular vote, we thought that the call for the dismantling of the settlements was impractical, and that's one of the reasons we voted the way we did.

Q Can you say anything about how far this position was cleared, this specific --

A I really don't know, but in any event, you know, we usually don't get into how decisions are formulated in the Administration.

Q This is not the first time that something of this nature is said or similar things that the Administration then discovers that it was a blip or that it happened without enough interagency consultation, or whoever wrote this knew the exact meaning of what --

A I don't think you need have reservations about the language --

Q So this is the policy of the United States --

A -- the language that we have used here to explain our vote on this issue at the U.N.

Q John, to clarify, if a settlement is started tomorrow and is completed, say a week or two weeks from now, do we then say based upon the President's September 1 speech we disapprove of it, but it is impractical to dismantle it? Is that what our position is?

A We had a Presidential appeal on September 1 for a freeze on additional settlement activity, and that's what the President was calling for, and that's his position. The fact that the settlement activity has gone ahead does not negate his position or the forcefulness with which he presented his position.

Q You're not answering the question. The question is if one is started tomorrow -- that is, we're talking about future settlements -- and it's then completed, do we say that its dismantlement is impractical?

A No. I think that you would be misreading the President's September 1 speech if you said that.

Q I'm trying to understand what you just said.

Q John, how far does this go? Is this finding or characterization of impractical restricted just to the proposal in the resolution, or is this a general comment that any proposal to take away the settlements is an impractical idea? If it comes up in a negotiation, we're going to call it impractical and oppose it? Or is it just restricted to this one case, this one resolution, this one reading of it?

A I think that the language we offered was certainly relevant to this resolution, and that we considered what was being called for in this resolution, was impractical.

Q Is the policy that you have enunciated in referring to this resolution broadly applicable, or is it applicable only to the resolution?

A I think I'm going to stand on the language that we have offered you here, and the language in the President's September 1 speech. I do not see any contradiction between the two.

Q Is this policy known, or that policy what you've announced from there?

A Of course it's policy.

Q It is policy.

A Of course.

Q John, would you be willing to say that your feeling of the impracticality of the dismantling of settlements is within the context of there not being a political solution out there? That you're not taking the view that within the context of an agreed solution it's still possible to dismantle the settlements?

A Of course. One cannot speculate as to what lies down the road. Anything is negotiable, presumably.

Q In the absence of an agreement, it's not practical to dismantle settlements?

A That's right.

Q Are you putting this particular question of impracticality in an open-ended time frame, or are you saying specifically that this is something that --

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A I think one never puts anything in the Middle East in an open-ended time frame. I think we're talking about the situation as it presently persists.

Q Having offered a policy pronouncement that could and probably will be interpreted in various ways by the various parties, do you think that the formulation of the language could ultimately wind up being unhelpful in any future negotiating process?

A I don't have any confusion in my mind about the policy of the President of the United States concerning settlements. That policy is clear, it has been clearly enunciated, and I think that anybody who attempts to interpret it in a different way is simply being mislead. It's very clear.

Q What is the alternative, the practical alternative of this impracticability?

A I think I'm going to leave you with the language I have offered you --

Q I mean, speaking from the initiative --

A -- and interpretations I have offered you, and let you work with that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:56 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, August 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #136

FRIDAY, AUGUST 5, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have an announcement on the visit to the United States of the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, who will visit the United States from October 10-15 at the invitation of Secretary of State George Shultz. The visit will follow Mr. Wu's participation at the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York.

During Secretary Shultz's visit to Beijing last February, Minister Wu and Secretary Shultz agreed on the importance of developing strong and stable U.S.-China relations. To that end, Mr. Wu will hold discussions in Washington, October 11-13 on a broad range of bilateral and international issues with Secretary Shultz and other senior U.S. officials, including Congressional leaders.

That's all I have. Be glad to take any questions.

Q John, do you have any word on a coup in Upper Volta and who might be behind it?

A Not a great deal. I'll be glad to give you what I've got. Our Embassy has confirmed that a coup has taken place. All Americans in the country are safe. We've seen reports that the former President is under house arrest. Our Embassy reports that there has been firing in the capital.

The coup has apparently been led by the former Prime Minister, Captain Thomas Sankara, who has formed a National Council of the Revolution. We have no information about the composition of the new government.

There are between 400-500 Americans in the country. The U.S. Mission -- that includes State, AID, and USIS -- amounts to about 200 employees and dependents. The Peace Corps has about 70 volunteers and trainees and about 10 staff and dependents. There are about the same number of that total, another 200 plus, of private Americans, which includes missionaries and representatives of private assistance agencies.

We understand the capital is now calm. As I say, we have no reports of any injury or arrest of any U.S. citizens.

Q Do you have any suspicion that Libya might be behind --

A I think it's too early to speculate on that.

Q Do you see any connection with the events in Chad?

A I think we at this stage tend to relate it more to the kind of continuing instability that has beset Upper Volta. But again, I think it's too early to make any connection.

Q John, on Libya, do you have any information on the reports of Libyan troop movements, tank movements, general mobilization?

A No. We have seen those wire service reports. I guess they are attributed to diplomats in Cairo, so there is no confirmation of that. Obviously, we are watching the situation, monitoring the situation.

Q Specifically, can you say anything about whether any Libyan troops have crossed the border into Chad?

A There are Libyan troops in Chad, yes.

Q How long have Libyan troops been in Chad?

A I can't give you a time factor on that. There are Libyan ground forces in Chad.

Q Do you have a situation report or a readout on the situation on the ground in Chad, John?

A The situation is serious, and we are concerned about it. We've seen the reports that Oum Chulouba has been captured by the Libyan-backed rebels. We believe that report to be correct. We are continuing our cooperation and coordination with the French and other interested governments.

I think you got the news yesterday that we are going to use a second drawdown of $15 million beyond the initial $10 million that we allocated to this project. It will be used to provide the Government of Chad a reasonable chance to defend itself against Libyan escalation. I can't tell yet at this time precisely what the additional assistance will require. The situation is very fluid, and no one has been very successful at forecasting the actions of Colonel Qadhafi, so it will depend on how the situation develops.

Q Do you have any estimate of when that second drawdown should be on its way?

A I really don't. Of the first $10 million we have expended about $7.5 million as of today. That included vehicles, personnel gear, medical supplies, communications equipment and light weapons, ammunition and air defense missiles. Obviously, we're looking at the situation, but can't tell you when we would start drawing on such a --

Q Within the $15 million, you think additional American technicians, advisers, or whatever will be sent in connection with that?

A I don't know. I think it's premature at this stage. We'll have to wait and see.

Q What about extending the current mission of the trainers?

A I don't honestly know the answer to that question, but they went in there to perform a specific task. I would think that when that task is complete, they would be out. They might even be out by today. I don't know.

Q In regard to the Libyan troops, do you have any numbers or estimates?

A No, I don't.

Q What about Faya Largeau? Are there still air attacks on Faya Largeau?

A Yes. As far as we know, yes. Heavy attacks.

Q How about Habre's state? Anything new to that?

A No. I don't have anything for you on it. I noticed that there was a Libyan report suggesting discussions might take place between Habre and the opposition. That would seem to run counter to the earlier Libyan report that he was dead. (Laughter)

Q On Libya, please, a question here -- on Chad, rather -- since you are backing negotiations between the rebels and the U.S.-backed Salvadoran junta in Salvador, would you support a dialogue between Mr. Habre and the rebels who are Libyan-backed, to quote you, and Chad?

A We're always for peaceful resolution of conflicts. I would think that's a little academic, given the present circumstances.

Q Have you been in touch with Colonel Qadhafi? Have you been discussing with the Libyans on what's best to be done in Chad because this poor country needs bread and butter; it doesn't need arms and missiles.

A I'm not aware of any contact with Libya.

Q John, have any of our diplomats or other official personnel been in touch personally with Habre since reports began to circulate that he was dead?

A I can't answer that, because I honestly don't know the answer to that question.

Q Can you take that question?

A Yes. Sure.

Q What's your comment on the report of Israeli refusal to give Mr. McFarlane a fixed timetable for complete withdrawal from Lebanon as reported this morning?

A I'm not going to get into Mr. McFarlane's mission.

Q Back to Chad for a moment. You say you're monitoring the situation. Can we infer that the AWACS are now operating in that area?

A The AWACS are there in connection with a previously scheduled exercise, and I think I would refer you to the Pentagon on that.

Q Is that what you are referring to?

A The AWACS? Monitoring? No, no. Don't misunderstand me. What I meant was that we have seen the reports and we will continue to watch the situation. I didn't mean electronic monitoring.

Q John, in terms of the Department's organization on this, have you established a working group, task force, whatever, to keep track of events in Chad, and to formulate and guide your policy?

A I don't think we really would get into that kind of discussions about how the Department is responding, but I think you could take it as a given that we are concerned, and that this is getting a lot of attention.

Q Any new sorties of F-14s from the Eisenhower, any of the other --

A I'm sure there are regular training exercises.

Q But, no, I mean engaging Libyan aircraft, MIG's and all that.

A No.

Q John, the other day the Congressional leaders emerged from the meeting with Secretary Shultz, saying they had a strong impression that the Administration would follow up the Cuban overtures of last week.

I was just wondering, is that impression accurate?

A I think the Administration has said that, naturally, it would follow up any suggestions that appeared promising. I think the President said that. As to how we might do that, I'm not going to be able to expand.

Q Could you -- I mean, because in the past there have been other overtures from the Cubans and the allegation of some people -- outsiders -- is that they haven't been followed up.

Is there any evidence that you're following up this one?

A I'm not going to get into our diplomatic interchange.

Q Wait a minute. Let me follow that up. I'm not sure what you mean by "diplomatic interchange." Have there been any bilateral talks with the Cubans to ask them what Fidel Castro meant?

A As a matter of principle, I'm not going to get into what discussions we might or might not have had, but I don't want to mislead you on that. I don't think you should go down the road of thinking that a great deal has been taking place in terms of face-to-face consultation.

Q I was also interested in Secretary Shultz's remarks yesterday that the earlier talks with the Cubans had not proved fruitful.

A That's correct.

Q And he mentioned General Walters' meeting, which I don't recall having been discussed on the record before.

A I don't know whether it's been discussed on the record. It certainly has been in the public domain.

Q Can you say exactly why those talks were not fruitful?

A No. I can't.

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Q Yesterday, I asked a question when Mr. Shultz was here and you interrupted me. I would like to ask you this question.

A I interrupted you because it didn't seem to me germane to the kind of subject that he come down to discuss. He came down to talk about personnel moves.

Q I will ask you this. Do you believe that there is something practical for the Israelis in Gaza to demolish Palestinian homes while it is an impractical demand to ask for the demolishing of Jewish settlements in the West Bank which, according to the State Department position, are not helping the peace process?

A I don't have anything for you on that. I don't have an answer for you on that.

Q Can we get an answer on that?

A I don't think we would pursue that.

Q On Libya and Central America, there were reports over the AP a couple days ago that there have been Libyan activities in the Caribbean, mainly training students, and Libyans sending them back. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I don't think I have anything for you, but there is a fair amount of Libyan activity that is on the record, the supply of arms to Nicaragua, for example.

Q Could you take that question?

A Let me look into that and see whether we would be able to give you anything on that. I don't give you a promise on that.

Q Does your information indicate a significant decrease in fighting in Nicaragua in recent days and weeks?

A I don't have anything on that for you. Just don't have an update.

Q Anything on the clash between North and South Korea at sea?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q On the trouble in Sri Lanka, I understand there's some request by the Red Cross to go into refugee camps. Does the U.S. have any position on that?

A No, I don't. We have given some aid to Sri Lanka. I think we have, as I recall, a cash payment, and I think we've also provided some support in terms of shelter and that kind of thing, but don't have anything on the Red Cross initiative.

Q What about the French decision to cease arms shipments to Nicaragua? Does the Department --

A I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Do you welcome that?

A I don't have anything for you on it.

Q It was criticized in testimony by --

A I don't have anything for you on it.

Q Have the U.S. and Israel agreed on a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon beyond the discussions of the move to the Awali line?

A I think that really falls within the scope of the discussions that Ambassador McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks are having following the visit of Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens here. Again, we're not going to be very forthcoming. As a matter of fact, we're not going to be at all forthcoming about what Mr. McFarlane is doing.

Q Anything on reports that Iran has closed its border with the Soviet Union?

A No. Sorry. Don't have anything for you on that. I'm a real bubble of information today.

Q On McFarlane, when does he go to Damascus?

A I think he's going this weekend.

Q You haven't been informed in advance of the Israeli plans to dismantle the Phalangists positions in south Lebanon?

A I don't know. I'm not aware of any such information.

Q Is there anything you can tell us about Ambassador Stone's itinerary, either in Washington or elsewhere?

A He is here. He is, I think, consulting with various people on the Hill at the moment. I don't have anything on his travel plans.

Q Would you care to enunciate the foreign policy goals of the U.S. ships hailing the Soviet ships on their way into the Central American region?

A The foreign policy goals?

Q Yes. What is the Administration's foreign policy goal by having that take place? The Secretary has talked about the goals of having the maneuvers take place down there.

A I don't think it's a foreign policy goal. It is a fairly -- and you'll have to talk to the Pentagon about it, but I am fascinated to find out, perhaps like you, that this is fairly normal procedure followed by a number of navies, other than our own, including the Soviet navy, and it is not at all untoward. As a matter of fact, it's a matter of routine in international waters apparently to identify a vessel coming at you and get as much information about it as you can.

Q How about following the vessel for two hours?

A I guess you've probably gone to about the limit of my expertise, and I would refer you to the Pentagon.

Q When will Ambassador Murphy be coming to assume his new position, and when will Veliotes go to Cairo?

A I can't give you any dates on those. Ambassador Veliotes, of course, will have to undergo the confirmation process and that will take some time, given the fact that -- I guess that's still under -- no, this is Veliotes. I guess that there hadn't been time for that to go through, so that will be obviously a matter of some weeks.

Q When is Murphy expected back?

A Mr. Murphy also will have to undergo the confirmation process, but I don't know when he will be here.

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Q Would you keep us updated on that?

A Sure.

Q Do you anticipate that Ambassador Murphy will do any traveling in the region prior to his return to Washington.

A I don't know. I honestly don't know.

Q Can we have a copy of that Chad list of materials that you gave?

A Sure.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 1982

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #137

MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 1983, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of housekeeping announcements.

We are posting for the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America -- that's Dr. Kissinger's Commission -- we're posting a press release for them which in essence says that the Commission will hold its first meeting beginning Wednesday afternoon, August 10, and will run through Friday afternoon, August 12. I think that the Commission will have its own press operation in a day or two, but we're just flagging you in advance to that meeting.

Number two, there will be a background briefing in this room tomorrow, August 11, on the visit of President Abdou Diouf --

Q 9th.

A Is the 9th tomorrow? Beg pardon. Well, it's tomorrow at 11:00 o'clock, a BACKGROUND briefing on the visit of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal.

That's all I have for you. Be happy to take any questions you might have.

Q What do you hear from Guatemala? Is there a coup in progress?

A I've seen the press reports, Jim, that a coup is underway. I have nothing to -- no reason to quarrel with those reports, but can't confirm them. I really don't have anything for you. We have been in touch with our Embassy there. We will continue to be in touch with our Embassy, and as we have anything more that we're able to tell you during the day, we will make it available. But at the moment I can't --

Q Is this how the Embassy characterizes it at this moment?

A No. I can't give you any more than I've just given you, I'm afraid.

Q Do they know what is going on?

A They are aware of the fact that there are disturbances in the capital.

Q Have we offered any help to Rios Montt or been in communication with him?

A We have just seen wire service reports, and you have everything that I have.

Q Would you say this is fighting or is it just --

A As to whether the Embassy -- whether there is gunfire within earshot of the Embassy, for example, I'm unable to answer that. I've given you everything we have.

Q Does the Ambassador have anybody on the street checking it?

A I do not know.

Q How about the earlier decision this year on spare parts for the helicopters and things? I realize that that's a policy decision that's not likely to be made quickly, but --

A I imagine that no decision is being made on that just at the present time, Ralph.

Q Is there any decision being made to put in suspension anything that may be under consideration while --

A I am unaware of anything beyond what I've given you. We are very close to the events. They've just happened, and I really don't have anything beyond what I've offered.

Q Do you know how many Americans are in Guatemala?

A I don't. We could probably take a look at that and find out for you.

Q Chad? Can you tell us what the situation -- (a) can you tell us what the situation is today, and any American plans to send either aid or personnel?

A The situation is serious. Faya Largeau is beseiged by Libyan troops and Libyan-supported rebels. We have reports that these troops have a substantial number of Libyan armed vehicles and Libyan heavy artillery.

At the moment there are no reports of actual fighting on the ground. We estimate the Libyan troops to number somewhere between 1500 and 2000. Some of those Libyan troops are operating in mechanized units.

While there has been air activity near the city, there have been no confirmed reports of Libyan bombing since Friday, and we consider, obviously, the situation to be serious and the city to be threatened.

Q Is there any comment on the French Government's refusal to go beyond what it perceives to be its commitment in Chad?

A I think you really ought to talk to the French about that. But, as a matter of fact, the French have told us, and I understand the French press is reporting today -- if you're referring to the Defense Minister's statement -- that the Defense Minister was quoted out of context. I think you probably ought to go back to the French on that.

As far as our understanding of the French position, it is that they will reach the necessary decisions in light of the situation in Chad. We are consulting closely with the French. That process goes on.

Q Then the French, as far as the United States Government understands, have not ruled out sending in direct military support?

A I think you ought to talk to the French, and I think you ought to get exactly from them in their words what they're prepared to do. But I'm saying that the report over the weekend, quoting the Defense Minister as saying they would not intervene directly with military force -- the French are now saying and their press are now saying that those remarks are taken out of context.

Q Foreign Minister Cheysson was quoted in Paris this morning as saying that there was no particular consultation between the United States and France over the weekend over this.

A On what particular aspect?

Q On the situation in Chad.

A I think there's obviously some misunderstanding there. The fact is the United States has consulted extensively with a number of friendly countries, including France, regarding all the actions we've taken.

It is true that Mr. Cheysson has been out of France for the last couple of weeks, and it may be that he has been unaware of some of the consultation that has been taking place.

Q John, is there a need to upgrade U.S. aid beyond AWACS, F-15s, and what's already been sent? And how many F-15s have been sent out?

A We're not going to get into explaining the details about the kind of aircraft. We confirmed over the weekend that there are two AWACS and supporting defensive fighter aircraft, other supportive aircraft.

They are in the Sudan. We can confirm that. But there's certainly no plan to change any of the actions that have been taken.

Q Are AWACS flying out of Sudan?

A They're not flying out of Sudan.

Q They're flying out of Cairo West, aren't they?

A No. The AWACS have been sent to the Sudan, and they are in the Sudan. They are not flying out of the Sudan.

Q They're not flying out of the Sudan?

A They're not flying, period.

Q John, what other contingencies does the United States Government have in dealing with Qaddafi besides showing force and might in the Mediterranean and sending U.S. arms and personnel, as news reports indicate, to Chad?

A What else might we do?

Q Other contingencies besides, you know, either at the political level or through the OAU, or some other --

A I don't know of any action pending at the OAU. The OAU made its last position known, I think, in early July. There is some activity at the U.N., and diplomatic activity, obviously, continues. But in terms of military activity, nothing is going on beyond what we have announced.

As far as the training role in Chad is concerned, the three trainers have finished their role and either have left or will leave very soon as the availability of aircraft becomes possible.

Q John, under what circumstances would the AWACS fly? You say they're not flying.

A I think I'd refer you to the words we used over the weekend which I'd be glad to pull out for you. That is, that they are there for a monitoring role should that become necessary.

Q Does that mean that they are not being used?

A They are not being used at the moment. They are not flying at the moment.

Q So they are not monitoring anything at the moment.

A At this moment they are not monitoring.

Q They're not operationally ready?

A No.

Q There's no necessity at the moment?

A A decision would have to be given to them to be used.

Q Would you say the AWACS depend on a decison by the French Government to take some sort of action?

A I think we will have to wait and see how the situation develops in Chad. Have to wait and see what decision the French might take.

Q John, where was the AWACS sent from? From the United States or from --

A I think I will probably maintain the position we took over the weekend that we're really not going to get into where the aircraft came from. Some of the aircraft came from the United States; some of them came from bases outside the United States, and that sort of covers it really. (Laughter)

Q Follow-up: If the AWACS aren't flying, I assume their fighters are also not flying, is that correct? Or haven't they arrived there yet?

A The fighters are not flying.

Q Are they on the ground with the AWACS?

A I presume they're on the ground with the AWACS.

Q A point of clarification, John: Senator Tower said yesterday that even if there were no French or other national fighter aircraft for the AWACS to vector, that the AWACS could perform a service by flying over Sudanese territory and observing Libyan attack aircraft approaching whatever targets they might be heading for and providing some early warning to folks on the ground who could then take cover.

Are you saying that that is not currently contemplated as a role for these --

A I didn't say it wasn't contemplated. What I'm saying is that the AWACS are not currently, presently flying, and that the order would have to be given for them to perform specific functions and assignments.

Q How many fighters are there over there, John?

A I told you over the weekend we aren't going to tell you how many fighters are there.

Q Less than a squadron?

A It's a protective number of fighters for the AWACS. There's nothing beyond that.

Q What type of aircraft?

A I think we said we weren't going to tell you that either. Certainly not a question of our not telling you. It's a question of the Pentagon asking us not to disclose that.

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Q John, you said a moment ago that you'd have to wait and see what decision the French take in the context of --

A No. I said we'd have to wait and see how the situation develops on the ground in Chad, and then, obviously, what action the French might take would be a factor in deciding how to use the AWACS.

Q In other words, until the French make a decision that the U.S. acknowledges as a firm decision on whether to send in planes or troops, then the AWACS are going to be on the ground?

A I don't want to mislead you. I mean, I guess as the President says, you never say "never," so I guess you'd never say that the AWACS will not leave the ground.

All I can say is that for the moment they are on the ground, and they are not being used.

Q Is AWACS communications equipment compatible with French aircraft?

A I think that the personnel assigned to those aircraft will be able to communicate adequately with whoever else might be involved if that need arises.

Q John, I have the impression that U.S. national interests would lead you to take independent action if necessary. That's not the case?

A The United States is not thought to be a policeman in Africa. We have not had a major arms flow to Africa. We have no substantial military presence in Africa, and I think in many cases, in many ways, it's appropriate that the French should take the lead in that particular area of Africa.

At the same time, we are disturbed by what is clearly a clear-cut case of Libyan aggression. We're not looking at this in terms of ideology. We're looking at it in terms of action by Libya in an independent country whose government we recognize.

Q Has Secretary Shultz been in personal touch with anybody at the Elysee Palace or at the level of the Foreign Ministry?

A   Secretary Shultz has been very much involved in this over the weekend, as has the President, but I'm not going to get into what calls he might or might not have made.

Q   But he has been personally conversing with French officials?

A   No. I didn't say that. I said I wasn't going to get into what calls he might or might not have made. Perhaps I didn't make myself clear.

Q   Is the *Eisenhower* still outside the Gulf of Sidra?

A   Yes. Well, I guess I should refer that question to the Pentagon.

Q   What was the question?

A   The question was, is the *Eisenhower* still outside the Gulf of Sidra. I guess I really should refer that to the Pentagon.

Q   The 1500-2000 Libyan troops you talks about before, are those freshly introduced into this area, or they've been there all the time?

A   I can't give you a reading, Marvin, on how many have been introduced over what period of time. There have been Libyan troops in Chad for some time.

Q   Right.

A   But I think that this particular number, some of them, necessarily must be fresh.

Q   John, in that connection and in light of your comment about not being a policeman in Africa, what is different about the current situation in Chad from the continuing rebellion which has occurred over years -- I don't even know the number of years -- between similar or the same groups, Libyan-backed -- what makes it different now that requires the trainers, the missiles, the AWACS?

A   I suppose if you asked President Habre's men in Faya Largeau, I guess they would argue that being bombed by Libyan aircraft and being beseiged by a couple of thousand Libyan troops makes things a little different.

Q   What's different for the U.S.?

A The difference, as I have said, is this question that Libyan success in this particular country obviously raises consequences for other countries in Africa, and that's one factor.

Q But that's not different from what -- I mean, the Libyan success last year or the year before presumably would have raised the same questions, wouldn't it?

A I don't think we've seen Libyan activity on this scale.

Q John, my question was that Habre only took power after French and American combined pressure had led to the Libyan withdrawal. There was a government there that was -- after that overthrow by Habre's forces.

In this sense the Libyan withdrawal led to Habre's takeover. Isn't this correct?

A You have a government which is considered by us and many others, including the OAU, the legitimate government of this country, and it's being threatened by Libyan subversion and aggression. That's the situation as it exists, and that's what we're responding to.

Q Did you get any negative response from some African countries? You tried to get them involved in Chad like the French?

A Have we had any negative response by African countries --

Q Right.

A -- to what?

Q You are insisting that France should do the job because that's an ex-colonial thing, and they have troops that are still there. While you have many countries in Africa, especially in northern Africa, who have the troops and the planes, are they reluctant to go in or you are not approaching them?

A You have fairly substantial involvement by one African country -- Zaire -- which I understand has already sent 1800 troops to Chad and is now moving in another 700 troops, so that's an indication --

Q I mean the northern Africans -- Egypt, Morocco, those countries, and Sudan -- those countries that you are saying Qadnafi's action might threaten them. Are they involved or they are reluctant to get involved?

A I think you have to address that question to them. I don't think we can speak for other countries.

Q Because you are talking about --

A But if you're asking me whether we have been urged by any African or North African country not to take the action that we are taking, I'm not aware of a single country that's made such a plea.

Q Have you urged countries to take action, and those countries that you have been urging have been sitting back? I think that was the thrust of the question.

A As we have said, we've been consulting closely with the French. We've had discussions with a number of other countries.

Q Can you translate "consulting"? Have you been urging them to take action in their own self-defense as you interpret it?

A No. I think that's up to them to respond to that kind of question as to where they stand and what consultations they might have had.

Q Have you urged them to take action? It's a simple question.

A It's not a question of urging; it's a question of consulting with a country that has already taken substantial action. They've asked us for help, for example, in airlifting. That's Zaire.

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Q Since both Egypt and Sudan regard Libya as a threat, are you saying that they have not discussed possible intervention themselves?

A I think that's a question you'd have to address to them.

Q But if they discussed it with the United States, you would know.

A (Inaudible) the United States would know, that any spokesman of the United States Government is likely to discuss Egyptian or Sudanese intervention.

Q I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about whether they have discussed with the United States their concerns about what's going on in Chad and whether they intend to do anything about it.

A I think that it must be obviously that most governments in the region have discussed with the United States and others what is going on.

Q Including possible intervention?

A (Inaudible)

Q Did you say that the U.S. was air-lifting or had air-lifted the 700 or the additional 700 Zairians?

A I think we've been asked for assistance in that respect.

Q And have provided it?

A And have agreed to assist, yes.

Q When will that take place?

A I don't know. I think some of those Zairian troops are already additional. Zairian troops are already in Chad and I think have been moved by non-American aircraft.

Q What was the Embassy in Ouagadougou reporting about the coup in Upper Volta and Libya's involvement in that?

A I don't know that we have a great deal more to give you than we did on Friday, but I'll be glad to give you what I have.

Captain Sankara announced, as you know,that he led the move to depose the former government. He is the Chairman of the National Revolutionary Council, and we have no further information on the composition of a new government.

At a meeting of the diplomatic corps on Saturday, Captain Sankara read a statement in which he said, *inter alia*, that the National Revolutionary Council wants good relations with all nations and that in foreign affairs the nation would follow the path of non-aligned nations.

The United States welcomes this indication of a desire for good relations and the intention to follow non-aligned foreign policy. We regret violent and unconstitutional changes of government anywhere, but the nature and form of the government is basically an Upper Volta matter.

We would hope to be able to continue a productive and cooperative relationship with Upper Volta based on mutual respect and understanding.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Also, there have been reports that a number of Libyan military aircraft are flying into Ouagadougou Airport.

A I can't help you on that one. I don't know anything about that one.

Q You don't have anything?

A No.

Q Well, I'll pronounce it right next time.

A O.K. (Laughter.) There's nothing wrong with the -- I got the capital; I just don't have any information for you.

Q If the situation is so dangerous as you expressed it and Mr. Speakes at the White House, did you express your concern or have you brought the Soviet Union into the situation or into the picture to possibly help you with Libya to bring about peace? Most of the workers and other things are Soviet-supported or Soviet-supplied.

A I think the Soviet Union is well aware of our concerns. They have been well aware about our concerns in general, and we are certainly raising our concerns with the Soviet Union.

There can be no lack of information on the part of the Soviet Union about how we regard the situation.

Q In what way are we raising our concerns with them on this?

A You do have a penchant for wanting to get into the detail about diplomatic negotiations, don't you? (Laughter.)

Q John, two questions: Would the United States accept the Goukouni Government?

A Would we accept the Goukouni Government?

Q If the Habre Government fell, would we accept Goukouni?

A I think you've moving into a very hypothetical area.

Q Do you have an answer?

A Even the OAU, I think, has recognized that you have some realities on the ground that have to be taken care of before you can talk about more diplomatic kind of enterprises.

Q John, can you tell us about Mr. McFarlane's travels? What's he up to?

A Yes. Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks are in Saudi Arabia today. They were, as you know, in Damascus over the weekend.

Q Yes. And where are they going?

A As always, I don't want to tell you where they're going next. I know that's always frustrating, but the reasons are obvious.

Q There was a report that he had been authorized to offer the Syrians up to a $130 million dollars in agricultural food subsidies. Is that accurate?

A I will follow our traditional path of not getting into the detail, or indeed not getting into the broadness or the detail, of the kind of diplomatic activity that he's engaged in. But I guess I would steer you away from that kind of speculation.

Q Any reaction to Jack Anderson's invisible bomb that might have demolished --

A No. I must confess I haven't read Mr. Anderson's story on the invisible bomb.

Q Are the AWACS in Egypt flying or are they grounded like in Sudan?

A I'm sorry. I didn't get that.

Q Are the two AWACS you've sent to Egypt last week flying --

A No.

Q -- or are they grounded?

A No. It's not a question of being grounded. I said that they are on the ground.

Q On the ground. Are they on the ground then?

A They are on the ground.

Q In Egypt, not in the Sudan?

A They're on the ground in the Sudan

Q What about the two you sent to Egypt before them? Before the two you sent to the Sudan.

A You're talking about Bright Star involvement?

Q Yes.

A There's been no diversion from Bright Star, no diversion of aircraft from Bright Star.

Q Is the Bright Star operation under way now or are they --

A I'm not playing games; you'll have to ask the Pentagon. But nothing has changed, to my knowledge, on Bright Star.

Q John, can you break down at all that $15 million in emergency aid that was announced last week?

A No, I can't. I don't think we did because we said that it was provisional and we really couldn't specify how it would be --

Q So there's no progress on it?

A I don't think there's any progress on it.

Q John, the Secretary, when he was asked about the settlements, said something about the right to live. Now, what's the difference between the right to live for Jews on the West Bank and the right to settle? And will this right apply to the Palestinian refugees who were expelled from their homes in the West Bank?

A I think I'll leave you with what the Secretary said yesterday. I think he really was --

Q I really want to know what's the difference between the right to live and the right to settle -- I mean living and settling. This is what --

A I think I'm going to leave you with what the Secretary said yesterday on the whole question of settlements.

Q John, can I go back to Libya and Chad for just a minute, please?

A Sure.

Q The U.S. in its statements about Central America repeatedly points to Cuban and Soviet involvement by way of funneling arms to Central America. Does the U.S. also see the Soviet hand directly involved in the Libyan involvement in Chad?

A I just don't have anything for you on the kind of equipment. I take it that's what you -- you're talking about personnel or are you talking about equipment?

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Q Either/or, I mean -- or even equipment, personnel or direction.

A No. That's one I can't answer for you. I think there's a lot of equipment there. But I don't think I can really answer it.

Q Soviet equipment?

A I really don't think I have anything for you. I just don't know what --

Q Could you take that question about Soviet-hand-involvement?

A I'll take a look at it -- take a look at it.

Q Thanks.

Q John, is there U.S. diplomatic contact at all indirectly with Libya over the Chad crisis?

A I'm not aware of any such direct contact on this.

Q Can you look into it?

A I think I'll stand on that. I'm not aware of any such contact.

Q John, you were asked earlier about the other North African countries and you said you were not going to say or you were not going to say that there was no urging on the part of the United States. Are there any consultations -- to use your word -- between the United States and the other North African countries about the Libyan intervention?

A Oh, yes; a lot of consultation -- diplomatic discussion. Sure.

Q With the Egyptians, Sudanese, Moroccans?

A I'm not going to specify which countries, but I mean, I think that in a situation like this it would be logical to assume that a lot of countries would be involved in discussions with each other and with us and with other Western powers.

Q John, has the United States Government characterized the Libyan intervention as an "invasion"? Fifteen hundred to two thousand troops is nothing to be --

A We would call it "aggression."

Q Not "invasion forces"?

A I don't know that you would want to split hairs over the word "invasion." I'm not aware that we've used the word "invasion," but I suppose it would fit with two thousand troops on somebody else's territory.

Q John, there was a meeting this morning between President Reagan and the new Ambassador to El Salvador. What was the purpose of that?

A I think that Ambassador Pickering is just being confirmed, and it was for him to meet with the President. To underscore that the President's concerned with and involved in the situation in Salvador. I think it was a fairly brief meeting.

Q Do you have anything on the breakoff in the dialogue between the government and the political parties in Uruguay?

A No, I don't.

Q Is the air-lifting of the Zairian troops into Chad going on now?

A I'm not sure what the time frame is. I think it's 700. I think some have gone in on another country's aircraft, and we are looking at the request to help with U.S. transportation.

I'm not sure. You'd have to ask the Pentagon just what the situation is, whether the aircraft has moved or not.

Q Was that agreed to last week when the President of Zaire was here?

A I can't give you a time on that. I think there were discussions, obviously, between President Mobutu and President Habre, but I don't know when those discussions took place.

Q The Moroccan aircraft -- have they gone in there?

A Moroccan aircraft?

Q Yes.

A I don't think so.

Q You said foreign countries.

A No, no. I don't know.

Q John, (inaudible) in the absence of a French decision or in the absence of a certain Libyan act?

A The planes were sent there to be ready to monitor the situation, should that need arise; and I think they will stay on the ground until a decision is given that the need has arisen for them to get into the air.

Q Given that definition, why was there such urgency attached over the weekend to dispatching these aircraft? You would think that the President signed off on it Saturday morning and they were rushed to the scene that it's a hurry-up and wait situation that --

A If you have people besieged in Faya Largeau, are you suggesting we should move tardily?

Q No. But I mean it's reported that there were fresh --

A I don't understand the current --

Q -- bombings this morning.

A We've just been accused of moving with extraordinary urgency here.

Q And then not following through.

Q Moving to sit and wait is what it is.

A You have a situation on the ground where you had bombing last week. You have had no bombing since Friday.

Q The bombing has been reported today, three waves --

A One has been reported today?

Q Three waves of bombing attacks.

A O.K. You're ahead of me. Your communications are better --

Q Well, you're the one with the AWACS, not me. (Laughter.)

A But I haven't dispatched them. (Laughter.)

Q But, seriously, it's a legitimate question -- especially if the accounts of new bombing attacks today are accurate and at the time when those aircraft were bombing your friends in Faya Largeau, the AWACS were sitting in Khartoum.

A I would say that if your reports of new bombing today are accurate, then you have a very serious situation.

Q What do you think of the spread of the insurgents or all of this upheaval against Habre -- and, possibly, there could be demoralization of the situation in other African countries that you are putting the forces there to watch that?

A As I said earlier, I think that is certainly something that should trouble all thoughtful men. I think that if you have this kind of operation by Libya into Chad, you at least have to raise a question. Given Libya's record of subversion and trouble-making in other countries in Africa and elsewhere, I guess all reasonable men would ask themselves whether that might not happen in other countries. So I'm sure that is a factor.

Q Have you exhausted all of the other avenues that you could to solve their problem and not to make that big thing about Libya with this Chad, besides going to show the American force and possibly distracting from the other area, which is the Middle East, and this is what the people are talking there -- that, you know, you live in the Middle East or --

A There's no deflection from elsewhere in the Middle East. If you're talking about the Bright Star exercises in Egypt, there's no diversion or no change in that situation. So there hasn't been diversion. But if you mean have we been extremely active on the diplomatic front in order to avert a more serious situation in Chad, why, of course -- as have others.

Q John, what are the troops of Zaire supposed to do? Are they going --

A I think they're mainly in the capital. I think that's their --

Q It wouldn't be used in this to break the siege or anything of this nature?

A I think at the moment they're mainly in the capital, in N'Djamena.

Q John, do you attribute the lack of Libyan bombing over the weekend to the mere fact that the AWACS were dispatched; is that what you're saying?

A I'm not sure that I would attribute it to the AWACS.

It might be attributed. I don't know; we'll have to wait and see, especially in light of your colleague's suggestion that there is new bombing today. But I suppose it well could be attributed to diplomatic and military activity that has been going on over the weekend.

Q John, would deploying the AWACS radar be of any value if there was not fighter-attack force available to coordinate with them?

A I suppose the AWACS has an intelligence-gathering capacity, but I don't really want to get into how it might be used in any particular situation.

Q I mean there's no use waiting for the French. If the French decide to send in the Jaguar aircraft that Mr. Habre has asked for, then you've got a reason to put the AWACS up.

A I assume that if that were to take place, then we would have to make some decisions about the use of the AWACS.

Q John, given the range of the AWACS radar, are you ruling out the idea that the AWACS assigned to Bright Star are not doing double duty as early-warning radar for lift-off of Libyan jets?

A Not to my knowledge -- not to my knowledge.

Q John, can you say that the French suggested in any way or at any point that the United States send the AWACS into Sudan?

A I don't think I would put it that way, but certainly the French were very close -- the cooperation and the consultation between ourselves and the French have been very close and very good.

Q I mean would you have sent the AWACS if you didn't have some idea that there would be some use for them? In other words -- and since you're linking it to the French --

A I think, as we said over the weekend, the aircraft have been sent there for a monitoring capacity in the event they are needed.

Q Well, I assume --

A You wouldn't send them unless you thought that there was the possibility of their being needed.

Q But if this is coordinated with the French, then that implies that the French are about to make a decision or that --

A I think you have to talk to the French about the kinds of decisions that they might be debating. I don't think we can speak for France.

Q Is there a major technical problem here? The French would have to have IFF in any case so that friend or foe would appear as blips on the radar AWACS screen as friends, and they would not have that equipment.

A What devilish cunning. You have gone far beyond my expertise. (Laughter.)

Q Well, I just don't see how they're going to communicate.

A I'm afraid it may well be that someone in this audience has the ability to answer that question. I'm afraid you've gone well beyond --

Q Could you take that question as to whether the AWACS could communicate with the French aircraft?

A I think that that is really a question that the Pentagon would have to answer. I think that's where those kinds of experts are.

Q O.K.; thank you, John.

A O.K.

(Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #138

TUESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I should say that I have passed on to the good folks who run this building your request for some improvement in the air conditioning system in this room. It is not the first time, I should add, that we have requested relief. I gather a couple of the units are down, and it will be some days before we can get back to near normal, which is still pretty hot in this room. But they and we are working on it. I suggest shorter briefings, or we'll take them out on the lawn outside if this gets really bad.

I don't have any announcements, so I'll be glad to take any questions from you.

Q John, do you have any further reading on the conditions in Guatemala?

A On Guatemala?

Q On what the conditions are there? Stabilizing?

A As far as we understand, it is calm there. Guatemala City has returned to normal activity. We have no reports of Americans being hurt in the coup. A small number of people were injured. We understand a few may have been killed, but we don't have any confirmed report of the numbers involved.

Our Ambassador there, Ambassador Chapin, met earlier today with General Mejia. The General outlined the government's plans to lift the state of alert later today. He said that he would eliminate the special courts, and that he would continue the process of returning the country to democratic government. These are positive steps which the United States fully supports.

As far as Rios Montt is concerned, we understand that he is in his house, and that both he and his closest advisers are safe.

That, really, is about all I have.

Q Is this a change for the better in Guatemala, as far as U.S. relations and human rights conditions?

A I don't think we would comment on that. I think we would simply stand with the language which I have offered you here. Our Ambassador has met with the new leadership, has heard some of their plans. Insofar as we understand them, they are positive steps which we fully support. I don't think we would be prepared to go beyond that.

Q Does the meeting imply recognizition or does it otherwise --

A I think we offered you some language on that yesterday. The U.S. practice is to focus on continuation of diplomatic relations. Normal practice is for a new government to pledge respect for its international commitments, and to evidence a desire to continue friendly relations with the United States. I think that's where we stand.

Q When you speak "positive steps," is that within the context of another violent coup in a region in which we are trying to promote democratic institutionalization?

A Always, the United States deplores violence; but the fact is, you face some realities on the ground there. We have met with the new leadership and heard some of what they have in mind. Insofar as what we have heard, we have commented on that. We will proceed from there day by day.

Q John, did he specifically pledge to hold elections next July as Rios Montt had pledged?

A I do not have any more detail than we have just received from our Embassy there. That phrase is, "continue the process of returning the country to democratic government." I can't tell you whether he gave a specific pledge on elections, a date, or anything of that kind.

Q Was there any discussion on his campaign against leftists?

A I'm sorry -- the question?

Q His campaign against leftist elements in Guatemala. What did he say he would be doing in that regard?

A I don't have anything else to relay beyond what I've got for you.

Q John, what do you have on the reports that on Sunday Mejia met in Honduras with the Defense Ministers of Salvador and Honduras and an American General of the SOUTHCOM?

A Yes, they did meet -- I think it was over the weekend -- in Tegucigalpa. He met with the Defense Ministers of Honduras and El Salvador and with a number of officers from the U.S. Southern Command in Panama. That was in the process of a familiarization visit to the USS Ranger. The visit was a courtesy call.

Q Was there any talk during these meetings of his plans against Rios Montt?

A Was there any talk during that meeting of a coup attempt? (Laughter)

Q I'm asking you.

A No.

Q No?

A No talk. The United States was totally unaware.

Q Do you have the names of the Americans?

A I don't. Maybe it's possible the Pentagon can give them to you.

Q He toured the aircraft carrier?

A He toured the aircraft carrier. I think he went out there. I think he was on the Ranger. He either was or --

Q All three?

A I know that invitations have been issued, and a number have -- You had better check with the Pentagon as to just exactly who was on the Ranger at what time. I'm not sure in what sequence they were.

Q Where is it now?

A Where is the Ranger?

Q Yes. Where was it when --

A I guess you would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q John, just to be clear again, you specifically said that this was a courtesy call. Can we assume, then, that there were no substantive discussions about the future of the democratic process in Guatemala, or anything of that nature?

A This was simply a *Ranger* visit, and I guess some questions have been asked about it. But the suggestion that this was a plotting session in any way, is just ridiculous.

Q O.K. But aside from whether it was a plotting session or anything, did the U.S. engage in substantive discussions about the policies of the Guatemalan Government?

A Not to my knowledge. This was a session to discuss how you get out to the *Ranger* and how you get back.

Q At this time did you say who the Ambassador met in the leadership?

A The Ambassador I think met with the General.

Q At the Presidential Palace, or where was that?

A I don't know where it was.

Q Did he raise in his discussion anything about whether the new regime was pledged to protect human rights -- to free the Indians in Guatemala? Was that a subject of conversation?

A I don't know of my own knowledge, but I would think within the context of the language I've given you that human rights would be a logical question to come up. But I don't know that of my own knowledge. I wasn't monitoring the telephone calls when we got the report from the Embassy.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Can you give us an update on conditions in Chad -- the fighting on the ground and the AWACS' role?

A Not much has changed since yesterday. The Libyan and the Goukouni forces are poised for an offensive on Faya Largeau. The United States has had no confirmation of Libyan bombing since Friday. The conditions there are very difficult. It's about 125 degrees in the shade; the winds are high; there is swirling sand. Communications between the capital, N'Djamena, and Faya Largeau are not very good.

The troop numbers are the same as I gave you yesterday: about 1,500 to 2,000 Libyan troops with armored vehicles now in northern Chad. The Goukouni forces around Faya Largeau we estimate at about 2,000. That's about all I have for you as of 12:35 on Tuesday.

Q Are the AWACS being used yet?

A I think I'll refer you to the Pentagon on operational details, and I think they briefed this morning. In fact, I think the Pentagon will tell you that the AWACS are in the same posture as they were yesterday. They are not in use on AWACS-type missions. The Pentagon will confirm this. They may have taken off and flown around on some training exercises or to warm up the engines, or whatever you do with an AWACS.

Q But they are not monitoring?

A They are not monitoring.

Q Is napalm being used by Libyan forces?

A I've seen the reports. I can't confirm that.

Q Does the use of the AWACS depend upon the French sending in their planes?

A I think, as we said yesterday, we went over that ground at some length. The AWACS have been sent there for a monitoring role, should that prove necessary. If the decision is given that they should monitor, under whatever circumstances, then that they will do.

Q What is the latest news from the French?

A I think you'll have to ask the French.

Q I thought maybe they had told this government, and we had expressed some advice or opinion.

A We have been in very close consultation with the French, as we have been all along. But I don't think I can speak for the French on a case like this.

Q In this press conference yesterday, which just came over the wires just before the briefing yesterday, he did complain that the U.S. had not consulted in advance with respect to the deployment of the AWACS in the area.

A You ought to be careful about what he said, and I think you ought to look at French statements in their totality. There have been statements from a number of French officials. I think I would look very carefully at the distinction Mr. Cheysson may have made between consultation and independent action.

Q Are you hinting at something in which I --

A No. I'm simply saying, I guess I would refer you to what we have said consistently, that there has been excellent cooperation and consultation between ourselves and the French, and I think the French would confirm that.

Q Did the United States consult, in advance, with French authorities over its decision to dispatch AWACS to Sudan?

A I think we'll leave it at close consultation between ourselves and the French. We, obviously, wouldn't get into detail of what operational discussion had taken place. I think that you can be assured that the consultations were detailed and convival.

Q When you say "close consultation," you're not saying that you're in close agreement in the consultations. You're simply saying that you're on the phone with them a lot. You may be yelling at each other, but --

A There hasn't been yelling. There's been no disagreement between ourselves and the French on our respective position.

Q Do you have anything on differences with the Egyptian Government concerning the AWACS deployment?

A No. We have not sought to involve Egypt in this matter. Our AWACS have been sent to the Sudan, and we consider that the appropriate place for them.

Q Is this because of the differences with the Egyptians?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask the Pentagon what operational requirements they have.

Q Is it political anyway? Is it political if the Egyptians are against having the AWACS operating from Egypt against Libya?

A I guess it's an academic situation. We have sent our AWACS in connection with the Chad monitoring operation to the Sudan, and there has been no request for them to go to Egypt. That's an academic situation.

Q Does this mean there were no prior consultations with Egyptians before sending the AWACS?

A There have been a lot of consultations between ourselves and a variety of countries in the area, and I think you may be assured that there has been close consultation with Egypt.

Q John, any reports of increased Libyan troop infiltration into Chad, actual Libyan troops or upgrading of the weapons?

A No. I don't have anything beyond these figures we gave you yesterday of 1500-2000. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Not rebels. I'm talking about actual Libyans.

A Those are Libyan forces. We estimate between 1500-2000.

Q By saying that the Libyans are poised to attack, which they appear to have been for the last couple of days, is there any implication there that they may be declining to press an attack?

A I think it's a fair question. I wish I could give you an analysis. I think your analysis is probably as good as ours as to why they have not yet attacked. There are all kinds of reasons.

I suppose it could be the diplomatic and military activity that has gone on. It could be local conditions. It could be preparation. I don't know. I think it would be inappropriate for us to speculate because our speculation is no more informed than yours.

Q John, are you encouraged by the situation?

A I think it's a little premature to be encouraged when you have that number of troops with heavy artillery, armored vehicles in the area. Although they haven't been bombing since Friday, we're not suggesting that there hasn't been aerial activity by the Libyans and reconnaissance activity. I guess it's simply unwise to speculate on what is going to happen. They are in a posture where they could launch an attack. We'll have to wait and see.

Q Do you have any figure, John, on how many government troops there are on Faya Largeau?

A I do not, I'm afraid.

Q John, have you asked any government in the area -- Egypt, Sudan or Morocco -- to raise the question in the context of the OAU?

A I'm not sure whether we have asked anybody to raise it at the OAU. I'm not aware of any such request.

Q Is there any movement in the --

A I don't know. I guess you'd have to ask the OAU.

Q John, may I pursue a question I asked yesterday about the U.S.S.R. and its hand in the Chad-Libya situation? There's a Libyan delegation that has either just arrived or is already -- is about to arrive or just arrived in Moscow.

Does the U.S. see the Soviet hand directly in the ongoing operations of the Libyans in Chad?

A I have no information that the Soviet Union is directly assisting the Libyan forces in Chad, but of course much of the military equipment being used by the Libyans there and the aircraft, much of that is of Soviet origin. We have no evidence of any direct Soviet involvement in Chad.

Q When you say "assistance and involvement," are you referring also to direction of strategy, and so on?

A I guess we're talking about personnel.

Q How about, for example, the "poised for attack." Would you suggest that the Soviet Union is behind decisions of that nature?

A No. I wouldn't suggest that the Soviet Union is behind that. No.

Q Do you have any reading on what you think the Libyan delegation is doing there? What they're seeking? It's a military delegation.

A No. Don't have anything on what they're doing.

Q John, are you saying reports of bombing in the last 24 hours are wrong?

A I'm not saying they're wrong. All I'm saying is that we have no evidence that such bombing has taken place.

Q If there were, wouldn't you know?

A I again refer you to the problems of communication and so forth and so on. I guess I'd simply have to say that we're monitoring it very closely, and we have nothing that would confirm that bombing had taken place -- aerial bombing as distinct from aerial activity on Faya Largeau since Friday morning.

Q Has the military equipment that the U.S. sent reached Faya Largeau?

A I think you would have to ask the Government of Chad about how they dispose of the military equipment we're sending them. I think for obvious reasons that is a question, if they're going to respond to it, then they should respond to it. If they want to tell you where pieces of military equipment are, that's up to them.

Q John, when you say that the AWACS are there for the purposes of monitoring, does it mean that they're strictly there to monitor the flights of Libyan aircraft or could it also be to monitor the flights of F-15s which are deployed alongside the --

A Our F-15s are to protect the AWACS.

Q Is that their exclusive role?

A That's an exclusive role.

Q Do you have any comment or response to events that took place a couple of days ago in Germany where a Green member of the Hesse Parliament dumped his own blood on a U.S. army official?

A I don't know whether we responded to that. No. I don't have anything on it.

Q This action was endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Green Parliament. Does this change the State Department policy on granting diplomatic visas to their members?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Was the State Department at all involved in the planning of the demonstration at the Pentagon this morning? (Laughter)

A Was the State Department involved in the planning of the demonstration at the Pentagon this morning?

Q Your collaboration with Petra Kelly and the Greens --

A Not this morning that I know of.

Q On Chad, please. Can you tell us anything further about the airlift of Zairian troops by the U.S.?

A No. I think you'd have to talk to the Pentagon. The Pentagon will give you the details of how the planning for that is proceeding.

Q How about military supplies? Have you any further word on the provisions of supplies?

A No. I don't, beyond what we have said earlier that obviously we've allocated $10 million and gone for a second allocation of $15 million, but I don't have any breakdown of what will go.

Q Anything about the location of the aircraft carrier, Eisenhower?

A No. Try the Pentagon.

Q John, on Lebanon, have you had a chance to mull over the reports yet that Lebanon is willing to reverse itself on the agreement with Israel, if that's going to get the Syrians out?

A No. I think that kind of speculation would really fall within Ambassador McFarlane's activities, and we haven't discussed those. Ambassador McFarlane is in Jordan today. As always, can't give you anything on his future travel plans.

Q Can you tell us anything about his visit to Saudi Arabia?

A No. I really can't. We traditionally haven't.

Q But there were reports that he was given, so to speak, the cold shoulder. Is that --

A I don't think that's true. Ambassador McFarlane asked for an appointment with the Saudis on Monday. He was given an appointment with the Saudis. King Fahd, as I can testify from personal knowledge, very often meets at midnight and into the early hours of the morning. I gather it was a midnight meeting. There's nothing untoward in that.

Q He asked for a meeting on Friday, you said?

A I don't know when he asked for the meeting, but he asked for it to be set on Monday, and it was set on Monday. I don't know when he made the request.

Q John, do you regard the statements made by the Saudi Government after the meeting with Ambassador

McFarlane as in accord or on the same track with the statements made by the Saudi Foreign Minister to Secretary Shultz when they were there in May?

A You have me at a disadvantage. I'm going to have to catch up with the Saudi statement, I'm afraid.

Q The thrust of them, as I understand it, is that they insist on an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from -- full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.

A I haven't seen the statement, so it would probably be unwise to comment on it either before or after I'd seen it. (Laughter)

Q But help me understand something, John. You have been in touch with the Saudis with Habib's negotiated plan, or Shultz's plan, over withdrawal of foreign troops when it was a few days old.

What are the Saudis' views about the Syrian -- I'm sorry, the Lebanese-Israeli plan for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon?

A I don't think that I should speak for the Saudis, especially in my present uninformed state.

Q What is your view as to what the Saudis' plan is?

A I'm just not going to bite on speaking for the Saudis.

Q Do you have any comment on this morning's report on the Washington Times about Carlos Diaz Alejandro, the member of Kissinger's Commission?

A No, I don't. That's a Presidential Commission. I suggest you talk to the White House.

Q Are you aware of any relinquishment of his membership in --

A No, I'm not. But why don't you try the White House?

Q Do you have anything on the disappearance yesterday morning of the head of the medical faculty of the University of Honduras and the head of the students' association?

A No. I don't.

Q Could you look into it?

A Sure.

Q On the Kissinger Commission, will all 12 members be sworn in tomorrow? Do you know?

A I don't know. The Kissinger Commission, I think, as of today has its own press office, so I would suggest you try either the Commission itself or the White House, it being a Presidential Commission.

Q Do you have anything on the elections in Nigeria, whether your position seems to be moving ahead?

A No, I'm sorry.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #139

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: When I see the coat rack in the hall with the sign which says the door will be open, I know that bodes not well for the temperature in this room. That's the signal.

Q It's cool back here, John.

A Is it cool back there?

Q Yes.

A Why don't I come back there and you come up here? (Laughter)

Housekeeping announcement: There will be a background briefing at the White House briefing room today, at 3:00 p.m. on the President's trip to LaPaz in Mexico. That briefing will be open to all accredited White House and State Department correspondents.

That's all I have for you.

Q Can you tell us what is going on in Chad, and what the United States is doing about it?

A I'll give you what I have, Jim. The situation on the ground is not clear. We have received information that the town has fallen. We are not in the position of denying that, but we certainly cannot confirm that. We do know that Libyan and Goukouni forces are in the immediate vicinity of Faya; we have seen the press reports that Goukouni has claimed that Faya has fallen.

We do have reliable confirmation of reports that Libyan armored elements and troops are in strength on the outskirts of Faya. We have not had confirmation that Libyan aircraft have bombed the town. We don't know the condition of Habre's forces which may have withdrawn, and indeed just a few minutes ago, we saw one report that chronicles Chadian claims that they are counter-attacking. So as I say, the situation on the ground is not clear. As we get information during the day, we will pass on to you what we can.

We continue to be deeply concerned about the Libyan aggression against Chad, and we condemn their blatant military intervention in that country.

Q And the AWACS?

A The AWACS are in the Sudan. They remain in the area to be in a position to monitor the situation in coordination with our friends.

Q They are flying, then?

A I think I'll refer you to the Pentagon on the operational details of what they're doing.

Q Copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q What is your latest information on the activities of the French Government?

A The French, as you know, have announced some troop movements to Chad; but I think beyond that, we're not going to have any comment on what action the French may or may not be taking in Chad. We remain in very close continuing touch with them about the situation in Chad.

Q Do you have any analysis as to the consequences of the fall of Faya Largeau, the long-term consequences for the Habre government?

A I don't know about an analysis, Barry. As I say, we'll have to take a look at the situation during the day. Clearly, we have said that the Libyan threat to that town is serious, and if it has fallen, that is certainly not good news. But there are other towns in that area, and certainly it does not mean that the battle for Chad is over if the town has fallen.

Q Is there any indication of increased Libyan troops in Chad today?

A We don't have anything beyond what we gave you yesterday -- 1,500 to 2,000.

Q Any air strikes by Libya?

A Do not have any confirmation, as was the situation yesterday where we did not have any confirmation of air strikes since Friday morning. And that position remains the same: we have no information that would confirm that air strikes have taken place on Faya Largeau. Now, there has been air activity; but as far as bombing, we do not have confirmation.

Q Artillery?

A I think there was artillery fire yesterday.

Q Can you be more specific about ground activity than --

A I really can't. As we've told you, we've confirmed the presence of Libyan units in the area; but insofar as who is where, what condition the Habre forces are in -- if they have indeed been withdrawn -- that kind of thing, we really have no further information. It's a tough area to get information out of. The lines of communication are long, and it is a tough business.

Q Are the weather conditions the same as they were yesterday, or have they improved?

A I don't know. I don't know what they're like today.

Q Aside from the military folks who are delivering equipment into Chad at this time, John, what American military presence do we have in Chad?

A I think that two of the three trainers who went in to train on the anti-aircraft equipment have actually left. I think one is left behind. He will be leaving shortly, but I gather is taking care of some kind of problem that has arisen, and the Chadians have asked for some additional expertise in that area. But he, too, will be out of there in a matter of days.

I think the Pentagon, I guess, would have to answer the question of how many have gone in with this team which is checking the quality of the stuff that comes over. I think they said less than six. I have a feeling that someone has mentioned three in that connection. But the Pentagon, really, would give you the --

Q That's -- (no microphone)

A I don't know what's in the Embassy in terms of regular -- military attache and that kind of thing; but in terms of additional personnel, that's if --

Q Are you aware of any discussions with either Sudan or Egypt about sending forces to help the Chadians?

A Even if there would have been such discussions, I don't think we would get into them. As you can imagine, there have been consultations with a large number of countries in the area for the past week.

Q John, to clarify a point, I believe you've been saying that the AWACS in Sudan were not diverted from "Bright Star," is that correct?

A Correct.

Q -- because there are reports attributed to the Egyptian Defense Ministry to the effect that "Bright Star" has been held up pending the Chad situation, because the AWACS planes are not there, other support aircraft are not there, and other field personnel are in the Sudan instead of Egypt. Can you address any of those?

A I had seen the report this morning that there possibly was a delay. I hadn't seen the suggestion that it was connected with AWACS. I guess you'd really have to talk to the Pentagon about that; but the fact is that the AWACS and the supporting aircraft in the Sudan were not diverted from "Bright Star."

Q AWACS ?

A They were additional aircraft.

Q As far as I know, at least, the AWACS are also capable of monitoring tank movements on the ground. You said that there is no evidence of Libyan air bombardment.

A Evidence.

Q There is no evidence, you said.

A Evidence.

Q Right.

A That we can confirm.

Q If Libyan troops are helping out -- and there are 2,000 -- one must assume that there are some tanks. Why aren't the AWACS up there trying to monitor if the Libyans really are taking part or not?

A I think you really will have to go talk to the Pentagon about what the AWACS are and are not doing.

Q O.K.

Q John, assuming the correctness of this information about Libyan intervention, how do you explain the determination of the Libyans to go on with their plans despite the very strong statements made by the United States and the movements in the Mediterranean?

A I'm not a very good analist of what motivates Mr. Qadhafi.

Q At least, you have an interpretation for this?

A I think that Mr. Qadhafi's record in terms of intervention, in terms of subversion, in terms of terrorism in various countries of Africa, and indeed other parts of the world, is quite clear; and I suppose you would have to look at Libyan aggression in Chad within that framework. But as far as a detailed analysis of why he has taken the action that he has, I leave that to you.

Q John, last night, Mr. Ali Houderi, former Libyan diplomat in Washington, D. C. on "Nightline," live from Tokyo, said that it is an act of self-defense -- Libya is trying to protect its borders from the presence of the alien forces inside Chad, and they have to undertake this operation to assist the Guokouni forces who is the President and not Habre as the President. Habre is supposed to be the Minister of Defense -- at least (inaudible) to him.

A That the Libyans are responding to Zairian --

Q Yes.

A I think that statement is ludicrous. I think you just have to look at the time frame of who intervened in Chad and who is the aggressor. The Zairian troops are there at the request of the President of the government which is recognized internationally, and by the OAU, to assist in thwarting Libyan aggression. Libyan troops, to my knowledge, were not invited into Chad by the legitimate government of that country.

Q On the same show, one American political scientist from, I believe, Washington, Johns Hopkins, I think, in Baltimore -- I forget his name -- said that, really, the United States shouldn't have jumped its guns that fast, that quick and in that huge way, but leave it up to the European community and France to handle the situation, since they have more experience in the area.

What do you comment on this?

A As we have said before, the United States does not consider itself to be the policeman of Africa. We have not had major arms shipments to Africa; we do not have military bases in Africa. And we have quite properly thought that the French, with their long tradition of involvement in that part of Africa, should have the lead; and I think we have continued to hold to that position.

What we did in terms of moving the AWACS was to be in a position to monitor, should that monitoring activity be necessary, and in terms of the arms shipments to Chad that was really quite modest in terms of the amount of money involved -- part of that $25 million goes for the transportation, which is quite substantial -- and that was in response to a legitimate request from the government of that country for help in beating off aggression.

Q John, have you seen the reports of a Libyan pilot reported to have been shot down.

A Seen the reports.

Q The Libyans deny it, saying that he, in fact, was shot down in 1981, and they are just producing him now. Do you have any confirmation that a Sukhoi fighter plane was in fact shot down?

A No, we don't. We just simply are aware of reports and aware of the fact that the Chadian Government has produced him, and has said what they have said about the circumstances surrounding his capture.

Q These weapons -- whose weapons are they using?

A Sorry.

Q Libya isn't able to manufacture weapons. Whose weapons are they using?

A I think a lot of them are Soviet weapons.

Q A lot of them. Anybody else's?

A I don't know.

1964

Q Is there any way of finding out to see whether or not some of them --

A We may have said something about it in the past. I don't know. You'd have to look into it.

Q How are --

A Hold on.

Q You said something about France taking the lead a moment ago. Does the U.S., in view of the French announcement yesterday, believe that France is taking the lead?

A As I said, I'm not going to get into additional action beyond what France has announced that they might or might not be taking, but our consultations with the French are continuing.

Q But in light of the announced action that they have announced. I'm not asking about anything that they have or have not --

A We, obviously, welcomed their despatch of para-commanders to N'djamena.

Q But are they "taking the lead," in your words?

A I think I would refer you to what the Secretary said in his "Meet the Press" interview on Sunday.

Q Have you said anything else about the visit of the head of the government of Senegal?

A I think that there has been a briefing on that, and I'm not sure whether there is scheduled to be a post-briefing. There may well be.

Q Is he here scheduled to meet with people here in the Department?

A The President of Senegal?

Q Yes.

A Well, his schedule, I think, has been posted.

Q Has it been posted?

A Posted, and there has been a briefing on it. I guess you missed it.

Q I missed it.

A Yes.

Q Can we change the subject -- Lebanon violence?

Q Can we stay on the Middle East?

A I take it you're referring to the shelling of the Beirut Airport. That took place about 5:30 this morning, local time. Shells fell in the vicinity of the U.S. Marine contingent at the airport. There were about 20 rounds -- they were either shells or rockets, but about 20 rounds -- hit the airport, and the Beirut-Khalde Road, and the nearby suburb of Awzai. One Marine received minor shrapnel wounds in the legs. His condition is good. We've not been able to confirm reports of civilian casualties, but there were some.

Q Were the Marines the subject of the shelling?

A As you know, indiscriminate shelling in Beirut has occurred in the past. We don't know whether or not the shelling was intentionally aimed at the Marine position.

The area identified as the possible source of the shelling is about 3 kilometers southeast of the airport. This is a predominantly Druze area, which is currently occupied by the Israeli Defense Force.

The Lebanese Armed Forces scrambled helicopters when the rounds started falling. We do not know what action the Israeli forces took.

Q Do we know from what country these rockets and shells originated?

A No, I don't.

Q Are you looking into it?

A I'm sure the Marines have a very healthy interest in that kind of thing.

Q I mean, will you get the information here?

A I don't know whether we will get the information, but I think, as a matter of routine, the Marines send out parties afterwards, and pick up fragments, examine them, and do that kind of thing.

Q While you are talking about the Middle East, there is a report by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak of the appointment -- regarding the appointment of Richard Murphy.

Have you any comment on that?

A No.

Q None at all?

A No.

Q Was the appointment made -- did the appointment originate with the Secretary of State or with the White House?

A I don't get into that kind of discussion on personnel matters.

Q Well, I suppose that the appointment was cleared with the people at the White House before it was announced.

A That appointment for an Assistant Secretaryship is a Presidential appointment.

Q A Presidential appointment subject to confirmation.

A Of course.

Q Is there any comment about Murphy's background as being --

A It's excellent. He's a very experienced --

Q Excellent. Is that because he was in Syria and Saudi Arabia it's excellent, is that it?

A He is a very experienced and highly regarded diplomat, personally known to many people in this room, I think, who share my respect for him.

Q Well, what I'm getting at is the fact that he did serve seven or eight years in Syria and Saudi Arabia, and he never set foot in Israel.

Does that make him a very experienced diplomat?

A I don't think that -- I'm not sure that your statement's correct about not having set foot in Israel, but I think not having served an extended period in Israel doesn't necessarily disqualify a diplomat for handling Middle Eastern --

Q It qualifies him, but I mean the --

A It apparently does.

Q Some people think he's the most anti-Zionist Assistant Secretary of State since Dulles was Secretary of State.

A We'll have to leave that assessment to those unnamed people. It's not our assessment.

Q Was Ambassador McFarlane at the airport during the shelling today, or, if not, where was he and where is he now?

A I think he was there for part of the shelling, Mike, but I guess I really am relying more on wire service reports, probably from your particular institution maybe, than I am State Department reports.

Q Where has he gone now? What is he --

A Both he and Fairbanks are still in Beirut.

Q Does he have any plans to return back to Washington, do you know?

A I'm not quite sure when he will return to Washington, and what additional calls he will make in the Middle East before he comes to that decision.

Q Two questions, one in follow-up to the question on Evans & Novak. The report says that there are some quarters in the U.S. Government who still don't accept the Israeli commitment to withdraw from Lebanon.

Is the U.S. Government convinced that Israel plans to fully withdraw from Lebanon?

A As we've said before, the decision is an Israeli decision. The Israelis made that decision to redeploy and informed us of it.

Q I'm not talking about the redeployment; I'm talking about the question, do you accept at face value the Israeli commitment down in the agreement with Lebanon to fully withdraw from Lebanon?

A The Israelis committed to that in that agreement.

Q And another question: There was report that the Near East and Asian Bureau might be reorganized and divided into two separate bureaus. Do you have anything on --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q John, do you have any comment which goes beyond stating the fact about the shelling and the renewed violence?

A No. Obviously, we are unhappy about the continuing violence in Lebanon, and it just underlines what we have been saying consistently that the sooner one can get foreign forces out of the area, the sooner that the Lebanese can take sovereign control of their own country and their territory. We think that is a goal to be worked for.

Q John, let me follow up on the question of full withdrawal by Israel on the commitment. You said Israel is committed to that.

Is the State Department convinced, persuaded, or feels fully sure that Israel will withdraw under the terms of the Lebanese -- agreement with Lebanon?

A Israel has made that statement.

Q No. I understand that. But what I'm saying is how does the State Department feel about that? Is it sure that it will be done?

A I'm sure the United States accepts Israeli commitments.

Q In other words, you're saying in effect, if I may quote you properly, that the State Department is sure that Israel will withdraw in accordance with its commitments.

A I guess I wish you would quote me on what I said rather than what you think I said.

Q Why don't you agree to --

A Why don't you go back and see what I just said?

Q Well, that's why I'm asking, because I'm not sure that you're saying that exact --

A I'll take another question. Mike?

Q Yes. Move on to Guatemala for a moment.

Q Well, may I stay on the Middle East for one more thing, John?

A No. I think your colleagues are kind of losing patience.

Q Well, I know that, but they always lose patience --

A Well, so am I.

Q -- in defense of Israel. Let me ask a question about the Reverend Crossley --

A No. I'm going to take UPI.

Q John, what's the readout on --

Q Will you come back to it again?

A I may. I'll see.

Q -- conditions today in Guatemala?

A Yes. The situation in Guatemala remains calm today. The country has returned to normal activities. That's really about the extent of my --

Q Any other meetings with the General and the Ambassador or any other officials?

A Not to my knowledge. I don't think that they have met today. I don't have anything.

Q What is the situation with Rios Montt? Do you know where he is or what he's doing?

A The same as yesterday. I understand he is at his home with a number of his aides and that he is safe.

Q Has he asked for any political asylum in the U.S.?

A I guess I should say that we don't comment on applications for asylum, but I don't want to mislead you.

Q There's a report in the Miami Herald today that local television -- that is to say, Guatemalan local television -- has pictures of an assistant U.S. military attache in the Palace during the time of the coup speaking into a walkie-talkie. Could you account for that?

A I think they're referring probably to the Deputy Military Attache, Major William Mercado, who certainly did go to the Presidential Palace after the Embassy heard reports of unusual activity in that area, and in order to report back to the Embassy on what was happening.

He did carry a walkie-talkie in order to communicate with the Embassy, and there was nothing unusual in his actions.

Obviously, the Embassy wished to know what the situation was, and Major Mercado was reporting on it.

Q He was in no way participating in the action?

A Absolutely not. No. He was not directing the coup. (Laughter)

Q There is also a report that the coup was put off for a week because of the Agriculture Secretary's visit to --

A The Agriculture Secretary? Our Agriculture Secretary?

Q Yes. Block. At the U.S. request they postponed the coup.

A I think that's a very fanciful and untrustworthy report. (Laughter)

Q But there's another report that suggests that the United States indicated neutrality with respect to this coup, and that it was common knowledge it was going to take place, whereas before it had indicated opposition to military coups against Rios Montt.

Do you have anything to say about that?

A I think we would reject those allegations. The United States did not favor a coup by any sector of Guatemalan society. We support the opening of the political process that will return Guatemala to democratic government.

The Guatemalans are well aware of our views. As we said yesterday, the reality is that there has been a change in the Guatemalan Government, and we consider the pledges by General Mejia to continue the process of returning the country to democratic government to be positive.

We have no reason to believe that the new government will not carry out reforms begun by the past government, such as the reductions in violence, the efforts to eliminate corruption, increased trade union activity, and programs addressing the economic plight of rural areas.

I should go back to a point --

Q Could we get a copy?

A Sure. -- that we referred to earlier and say that we apparently do have information, indicating that the Habre forces recently did shoot down a Libyan Sukhoi aircraft.

Q John, back on Guatemala, 24 hours before you made that statement about the Guatemalan coup, you made a similar statement about a coup in Upper Volta in which -- and I'm paraphrasing here, but you said, in effect, "we deplore violent and unconsitutional changes of government."

A Yes.

Q Would you apply that same feeling to what happened in Guatemala?

A Sure. I mean, we deplore violence and unconstitutional change of government in any country. But, nevertheless, you have to look at realities on the ground once those take place and what kind of government has taken power. But in principle, of course, the United States deplores unconstitutional --

Q Can you be more specific on when this military attache went to the Presidential Palace?

A I guess as soon as he heard reports of unusual activity. I should say for those of us who worked as correspondents in various countries that have had upheavals, this is not at all unusual. It is absolutely routine as soon as one hears reports of turbulence or violence in a capital for the Embassy officers to fan out and find out what is going on.

That is part of their normal political reporting procedure, and it seems to me that what happened here was absolutely in line with everything that I personally have seen in a number of capitals over the years.

Q John, when you speak of the return to democratic rule, can you identify a government in Guatemala that -- what are you returning to? Can you identify a government that did have democratic rule in Guatemala?

A I think I will refer to this particular government, and of course at his press conference yesterday, General Mejia said he was considering accelerating the timetable for elections in Guatemala, and that he will be discussing this with the Guatemalan elections commission.

Q If I could follow on that: See, what's confusing about Guatemala for those of us who have covered it during the Reagan Administration is that Rios Montt --

A Probably in prior Administrations too. Probably you were confused over a fair amount of time.

Q I was in Seattle at the time. It seemed all clear to me. (Laughter)

A If you'd been covering it from Seattle, it probably would have seemed confusing too. (Laughter)

Q I agree. When Rios Montt took power, he overthrew the results of an election which senior Administration officials here considered fair, and that Guatemala was considered democratic though it had terrible human rights violations.

Now this fellow comes along and overthrows Rios Montt, and we're told he's going to return to democratic rule, and you cite the acceleration of the election process.

Does that mean that we consider the Lucas-Garcia Government which Rios Montt overthrew, to be a democratic government? It goes to the question of human rights versus elections.

A Tempting though it is, Jim, I don't really think I'm going to get into a question of characterizing various governments around the world. I think we're working with the realities of the situation as they exist. Where you see progress in the right direction in the estimate of the United States, it seems to me that we have to support that and work with the facts as they emerge.

Q Let me ask you about this government. The White House today -- the Spokesman for the White House is quoted as blaming the news media and major U.S. churches for confusing public opinion about the President's strategy in Latin America.

Is that the view of that person alone, or is that the view of the State Department and Secretary of State Shultz as well?

A Bob, when you say the White House Spokesman said that, I'm not sure I --

Q White House official -- Mrs. Whittingsley I believe is her name.

A I think that the Spokesman for the White House addressed himself to that at the White House briefing this morning, and I think I would be wise to --

Q What he said, that he didn't want to touch it with a ten-foot pole. (Laughter)

A That's right. He addressed himself to it, Bob. (Laughter)

Q So I thought perhaps you'd like to follow up on that since he didn't go into detail.

A I concur with Mr. Speakes' response. I thought it was a full and fair and objective and clinically detached response, and I just support Larry Speakes in everything he said about it.

Q (Inaudible)

A That's right.

1974

Q John, prior to this coup in Guatemala, did Ambassador Stone inform General Mejia or other Guatemalan officials that the situation in Guatemala with regard to congressional approval of aid and so forth would be much better were there changes made in the Guatemalan Government?

A I don't want to mislead you or give you a headline here, but (a) I'm not going to get into discussions that Ambassador Stone had. But I think you would be going down a very unwise track if you made that deduction.

We have made it clear. I mean, what you seem to be suggesting is was there some prior collusion with the United States to a change in government --

Q Or we're suggesting, if not collusion --

A I want to be sure that I'm maintaining our position that we do not talk about Ambassador Stone's conversations. But having said that, let me just reaffirm very strongly the United States was not involved in the change of government, had no previous knowledge of it.

Q It had no previous knowledge of the coup? You're stating that categorically?

A Yes. Said that yesterday. Told you that yesterday.

Q Will you confirm or deny the story of Jack Anderson today about the reason for Ambassador Habib's retirement or --

A No. Not going to have any comment on that. I would just make the point that Mr. Anderson says that he's referring to classified, secret cables. We don't comment on that kind of thing.

Q Do you have any latest information on Ambassador Stone's travel plans?

A No. Don't.

Q Do you have anything on Chile's democratization process?

A No.

Q Are you going to ask the Reverend Crossley to come in and show you the films he's made of those guns that he saw in Israel that were emblazoned with the insignia of Saudi Arabia?

A I don't have any plans to --

Q Well, not you, but is the Department going to do that. Will it ask him to come in?

A We're not aware of --

Q He's prepared to come in, he said.

A I don't know.

Q Will you look into it?

A No.

Q Why not?

Q John --

Q Wait a minute, wait a minute. Why not?

A I don't see why we have to look into every single relatively minor fact that you bring up.

Q Is it a relatively minor fact when we send guns to Saudi Arabia and they're transferred to the PLO? Is that minor?

A I am getting increasingly hot at this briefing. I am getting increasingly tired of your harrangue. If you were to ask --

Q Are you tired with me or hot with the humidity?

A I'm getting tired of you, actually.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY AUGUST 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #140

THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A couple of housekeeping announcements. Our colleagues in the Press Office would like to remind you that correspondents sometimes get mail addressed to them and delivered at the Press Office, and we urge you all to check the mailbox in the Press Office regularly. I infer from that that there may be some mail piled up for somebody out there.

Secondly, the Press Office has available copies of two letters which Ambassador Kirkpatrick sent to the President of the U.N. Security Council August 10. The letters discuss the situation in Chad, and are in response to letters also available sent to the President of the Council by Libya and the Soviet Union. Those two letters, in our view, grossly misrepresent the situation in Chad and the surrounding area, but nevertheless the whole package is available in the Press Office.

Q Was it put out in New York; do you know?

A I do not know that of my own knowledge, but I'm sure they would be put out in New York. Anybody have any reason to doubt that, that they would be put out in New York as well? I would assume so. That's it.

Q TASS says that the Soviet Government has protested, or it has called "provocative" actions by the U.S. Navy in stopping that ship off the Nicaraguan coast. Can you tell us what you received?

A "Protest," I think, perhaps is not the right word. We understand that our Embassy in Moscow did receive a Soviet demarche on this subject this morning. I'm not going to get into the nature of our diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets. However, in general, speaking in general terms about the contact between one of our vessels, the U.S.S. Lynde McCormick and a Soviet ship last week.

We would just like to make the point that the actions of the U.S.S. Lynde McCormick, with respect to the Aleksandr Ulyanov, were in no way provocative, were not in violation of international law. The U.S. vessel simply requested that the Soviet vessel state her indentity, her destination and her cargo. There is nothing at all unlawful in asking such questions and, indeed, such questions are often asked of vessels encountered on the high seas.

At no time did the U.S. vessel use force or threaten to use force, nor did it interfere in any way with the safety or the navigation of the Soviet vessel.

Warships have an internationally accepted right-of-approach of foreign vessels on the high seas and may ask for information such as that requested by the *Lynde McCormick*. The merchant vessel is not required to reply.

Q In other words, you reject the demarche or the protest, or whatever?

A Sure.

Q A copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, is it customary for a warship to detail a merchant ship like that for some time?

A I don't know whether that is customary. It is apparently done. It is certainly not illegal, but I do not know whether that is done routinely.

Q In the demarche, the Soviets mentioned three ships and one helicopter. Are we only acknowledging the *McCormick* as the leader of the task group, or what are you saying?

A I'm not aware of the involvement of any other vessels.

Q What's the difference between a "demarche" and a "protest?"

A I guess we'll have to get you a marvelously diplomatic response --

Q Since you introduced the word --

A "Protest" is harsher language than "demarche," but I'm sure there's a better diplomatic interpretation of that.

Q Nine Libyan students have been detained in south Florida for studying aeronautical engineering and nuclear engineering. Apparently, this is a result of a March 11 immigration ruling that it poses a threat to our national security. What are the circumstances surrounding this detainment, and should other Libyan and all our other adversaries, students, have reason to believe they also will be detained?

A I think I ought to ask you to go to INS for the specifics on that particular question. But a recent decision published in the Federal Register -- that was on March 12, 1983 -- does prohibit Libyans or third country nationals under Libyan auspices from taking pilot and aviation mechanic training in the United States, and from studying certain nuclear-related subjects in the United States. It was determined that such studies were not in the U.S. national interest. And so while I'm not responding to the detail on this, you obviously have to talk to INS, I think you should see whatever action may have been taken within that framework.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q How many Libyan students have you got in this country?

A How many have we got in the country? I don't know.

Q The INS, when asked yesterday about this, said that they were doing this in the case of these nine students and pursuant to directions from the office of the Secetary of State; that they were now following up on this order of last March. You know nothing about that?

A I don't know what recent contacts there may have been or may not have been, but I'm sure that the Department of State would not be out of sympathy with the action that was taken in the sense that we are for what prevents any enhancement of Libya's airlift capability; and obviously studies in the area of nuclear weapons technology, we don't think that it is a good thing that Libya should have that capacity or that we should be involved in activities which would enhance it and further it.

I don't know what the recent contacts have been, but it's certainly in line with our thoughts.

Q INS further says that this is the first time this has happened since the March --

A   That may be. I wouldn't contradict them if that's what they say.

Q   Is there any correlation between that, in your analysis, between that and the present situation in Chad?

A   Not after the order was issued in March. I would assume that would have been pursued vigorously since March, and I wouldn't see any reason why it wouldn't have been.

Q   In regard to Chad, all the reports are saying that Faya Largeau has fallen. Do you have a readout, any response?

A   Yes. I think it seems now fairly conclusive that Faya Largeau fell about the middle of yesterday. To the best of our understanding, government troops have extricated themselves. The attack was carried forward by rebel and Libyan ground forces with tanks and armored personnel carriers and supported by Libyan aircraft. There was air activity, Libyan air activity, but we are not able to confirm the reports that there has been actual bombing by Libyan aircraft.

We are aware of reports that there were casualties, but they do not seem to have been heavy casualties. The indications are that the Habre forces have withdrawn largely intact even though they have been undergoing severe attack. There are those reports which you undoubtedly have seen today which we're not able to confirm, that the government forces have taken Oum Chalouba and are in the vicinity of Koro Toro, but we're not able to confirm those. We're just aware of those reports.

It's about 115 degrees in the shade there today with gusting winds somewhere between 30 and 45 miles per hour. The process of moving in the additional 700 Zairian troops -- I think that Zaire already has about 1800 troops on the ground in Chad, and they're moving an additional 700. That process is ongoing. As a matter of fact, I think the bulk of them may now be in Chad, but you have to talk to DOD about that.

You've seen the reports from the French of their troop movements and, again, there have been reports of different numbers, and I think you should talk to the French for the full picture of what they're doing.

Q What happens to the nine Libyan students now?

A You have to talk to INS.

Q Do they get kicked out the country?

A You have to talk to INS.

Q Are you saying that this is just a coincidence that this action was taken against these nine Libyan students and the situation in the Chad?

A I think you would have to talk to INS about why -- I don't know when they were aware of these students. I don't know when these students arrived, so I really can't answer that question.

Q But it was Shultz that made the order, so why do we go to INS, instead of right here?

A Because INS implements the law of this country in connection with immigration and deportation.

Q Going back, if we can, John. What about the French? Do we have any indication that the French are going to finally follow up on the request by the President, Mr. Habre, and send in air power?

A I don't accept the suggestion implicit in your question, that we have asked for certain things.

Q Mr. Habre has asked.

A All right. I think you really have to continue, as you undoubtedly have been doing, talking to the French about what they are going to do. We're consulting with the French. Some of our appropriate officials are conferring with the French about the possible uses of the AWACS, but anything further on that, you will have to go to the Pentagon and ask them.

Q The Pentagon has sent us back to you with questions about the deployment of AWACS and the anticipation of French jet fighters. Will AWACS --

A Why don't you tell me who in the Pentagon has suggested that we might give you information about the deployment of AWACS?

Q Whoever conducted the briefing today; that's what I just got from our people there. But the question seems to be --

A I rather doubt that.

Q The AWACS, are they going to be used unless the French commit fighter squadrons?

A I'm not going to talk about the operational use of the AWACS beyond to tell you what I've just told you. That some of our people are discussing with the French possible uses of the AWACS.

Q What sort of air support are the Libyans flying -- 21's?

A I don't know. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Is the implication that you have no reports (inaudible) they're using them for spotter aircraft for the army?

A I think there have been reports of spotter aircraft. I think there have been reports of resupply. I think there have been some reports of air-drops and that kind of thing.

Q Are the AWACS still on the ground in the Sudan?

A Why don't you talk to the Pentagon. Contrary to what my friend over here says, I think the Pentagon will address the question of --

Q Is there any way in which, if the situation settles down a bit, that the United States would be prepared to countenance some sort of diplomatic process beginning in Chad?

A I think that the diplomatic process has been going forward all the time. You may argue that it has been unfruitful in the light of what has been happening militarily on the ground, but certainly we have been pursuing the diplomatic track very vigorously.

Q Can you be specific about that?

A No. We've been talking to a variety of countries in the area, obviously, and they are considering -- certainly, there are diplomatic overtures that they have discussed and are contemplating.

Q What's your current assessment of the Libyan goal in Chad?

A I don't know. It's awfully difficult to --

Q You must have thought about it.

A Oh, thought about it a great deal. It's very difficult to ascribe motivation to Colonel Qadhafi. Some people collect antiques. I think Colonel Qadhafi seems to collect countries by force.

Q I mean, there is one school of thought that says that Colonel Qadhafi wants to install in N'Djamena a government which is acceptable to him, and perhaps to finish off the annexation of the Aozou Strip in the north. Is that what you think it was, or do you think he wants to continue --

A It's awfully hard to ascribe motivation. The fact is that his forces, despite denials, are clearly in Chad illegally, and Libya is clearly guilty of aggression in a country which has not asked the Libyan forces to enter their country, and they are there illegally.

Q Has the United States been getting a series of false or mixed signals from the French, beginning a week ago?

A Our consultations with the French have been close and are proceeding.

Q How do you account for the continuing discrepancy between reports out of N'Djamena of Libyan bombardment, aerial bombardment and your inability to confirm them?

A I don't know. There's 500 miles of desert wasteland, I guess, between N'Djamena and where the actual action is taking place. Communications are very difficult and primitive. We are trying to be clinical and objective about it. The fact is that we are unable to confirm them. There are all kinds of reports, not only from N'Djamena but I see them coming out of Paris, I see them coming out of all kinds of places.

I think what we have to do is try to be as scrupulously accurate as we possibly can in giving you what information we have.

Q On Monday, though, you kind of hinted that a renewed aerial bombardment might create a new threshhold in the seriousness of the situation there as well as Libyan participation in actually storming Faya Largeau. Are we to take it that your reluctance to confirm these reports is due primarily to a fear that we're not prepared to go into a more serious situation until we have more ducks in line?

A No. I don't know. I think you would be going down the wrong track there. I think what we're simply -- there may have been bombing there; we do not know. What we're saying is we are unable to confirm it. We haven't seen the evidence. And in this kind of activity, far from good communications, there are sometimes wild stories circulating. And as best we're able, we won't be party to rumor and we will simply tell you what we've been able to confirm.

--MORE--

Q Just one more. Do we regard the situation now as more serious in Chad than we did a couple of days ago?

A Yes, of course it is serious. It was serious when the Libyans and the rebel forces threatened Faya Largeau, and as it now seems to have fallen, the seriousness of their presence aggressively in Chad persists. What they are going to do, whether they continue moving, and in what strength, of course, is a matter for speculation.

Q John, have you got any reading on the degree to which U.S. military equipment was used, and how much may have been lost in the fall of the oasis?

A Of the initial $10 million and the second tranche of $15 million, we have used about $9.7 million to date. That includes transportation. So, we have just about used that initial $10 million up.

As far as -- you are talking about --

Q The equipment sitting on the ground there, has it been expended by the forces there, or has it been lost to the other side?

A I think we have been a little reticent to talk about where it is and what the Chadian Government has done with it, for obvious reasons, and I think we probably should continue to be reticent about where it is deployed and how it has been used.

Q John, along that line, there is a report that the Redeyes didn't work. Has the Pentagon enlightened you on that?

A Don't have anything to give you on that, Hank.

Q John, can you give us a cost estimate on what it would have cost for the F-15's in that part of the world to wipe out the Libyan Air Force and the tank columns that were used to take Faya Largeau?

A I don't happen to have that with me.

Q Do you think that the United States -- you say it is a serious situation. Is the United States now doing everything that it can in that situation?

A The United States is doing everything that the President of the United States has decided should be done in that situation.

Q On a point of order, I am going to suggest that you don't answer questions from that questioner. As one reporter who has grown tired of seeing this briefing used by non-reporters, I am going to suggest that the questioner forfeit his right to ask questions by being on the sidewalk yesterday with placards and a bull horn accusing the former Secretary of State of being a homosexual and a murderer.

A Jim, I think there are two questions here. There is one --

Q What country are you in?

A On the question of -- would you mind not engaging in a dialogue, please? I am going to answer a question here.

I will be glad to take a look at that situation, Jim. There may be two questions involved here. There is one, the question of journalistic ethics, and I personally feel very strongly that reputable, professional journalists do not go out and demonstrate. There is also the question of individual rights and accreditation here, and we have to take a look at that.

Q My point is that we also have individual rights as reporters to get the news, and I think at some point we, as reporters, are going to have to draw the line, and I suggest that standing out in front of the State Department with a bull horn, with placards, making libelous accusations, goes beyond the line.

A As a journalist, I certainly agree that that is, in my view, my personal view, unethical and unprofessional behavior, but on the broader question, let me take a look at --

Q Congressman Wolpe made a statement, which you may have seen today, in Addis Ababa about the drought and the food needs of the country.

What, if anything, is the United States doing to relieve starvation in Ethiopia?

A I can't give you anything on that. I will be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q John, going back to Chad, you said you are conferring with the French about the possible use of the AWACS. That would mean that you would have to use the F-15's as back up, and would that not involve U.S. troops in a combat situation which you have been trying to avoid all along?

A It is not a question of using U.S. troops. If the AWACS were to be used in a monitoring mission, I am not going to get into how the F-15's would operate, but they are there in a purely protective posture for the AWACS, but I think that the appropriate consultation has gone forward with Congress about their presence and their state of readiness.

Q But, as you were saying, for protective cover, they would have to be protecting, and if they have to protect the AWACS and they come under attack, they are going to have to answer that, I assume, in which case they would be in a combat situation.

A I think the appropriate notification has been made as to how they are armed and what the potential danger is.

Q Is it true that Secretary Shultz has decided to recommend Walt Cutler as the new Ambassador to Saudi Arabia?

A We never talk about ambassadorial appointments until the President announces them.

Q John, yesterday you said that if Faya Largeau had fallen, it would not be the end of the battle for Chad. Now that it has fallen, what is the dominant goal of the Administration at this point? Is it to just wait and see what Libya does next? Is it to take some military steps with the additional $15 million? Is it to engage in some fresh diplomatic approach?

A I don't know what will happen with the rest of the $15 million. I assume that that will be going forward, Ralph. I assume that the Pentagon is considering what additional equipment might be needed, and that would go forward.

As to activity with the AWACS, I have given you all I can. The French are doing certain things. The Zairians are doing certain things. There are some things going forward.

Q John, is the capital of Chad in danger of falling without air cover?

A It is not my understanding that the capital is in danger. It is 500 miles from the front.

Q But considering the success at Faya Largeau, and the apparent Libyan commitment to continue the battle?

A I don't know. You will have to ask some military experts that question. I can't answer it.

Q John, can you fill us in on what is going on in Lebanon, particularly with the three Ministers, and what effect that is going to have?

A Yes.

Q Can't hear the question.

A Fill in on Lebanon. A cease-fire in the Beirut area went into effect at 12 noon local time today. We understand the cease-fire is holding, but the Beirut International Airport remains closed. Artillery exchanges between Druze forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces continue, or they did continue as of the time we began this briefing in the Shouf area which is occupied by the Israeli Defense Force, and that activity is taking place near the village of Kafr Matta. That is two words -- K-a-f-r M-a-t-t-a.

Beirut Radio is reporting that the three Ministers who were detained yesterday have been released and that they are safe. And, obviously, as far as the United States is concerned, we are in close contact with the Lebanese leadership, including President Gemayel, and are also talking to the Israelis regarding the situation in the Shouf.

Q Is McFarlane still there?

A McFarlane was in Israel, and I think he is heading for Beirut, but in light of the airport situation that may be a question mark.

Q But did he go out after the attack yesterday when he was at the airport --

A He went in Israel late yesterday, that is correct.

Q Where is Fairbanks?

A Fairbanks is in Beirut.

Q John, what do you make of the story in The Washington Post this morning about Mr. Draper will become Ambassador in Tunisia, and some new changes in the Administration?

A No. Never talk about ambassadorial appointments.

Q John, can you give us any more information on how the three cabinet ministers happened to be released and safe?

A No, I really can't. I have given you all we have.

Q No further information. Can I ask another question, sort of off the beam a little bit, and that is, we understand that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko will be meeting in Madrid some time in September. Do you have something on that?

A I wouldn't rule it out. If the Secretary does in fact go to Madrid for the CSCE meeting and Mr. Gromyko is there, it is entirely possible they will meet.

Q On that basis, as of now?

A As of now, that is about the way to put it.

Q John, going back to Lebanon, what do all of these events of the last 48 hours or so do to the future of Lebanon?

Q Question?

A What do they do to the future of Lebanon? That is a tough question to answer, Jim. Obviously, the kind of violence that has been initiated against the Lebanese Government is something which we deplore, and have consistently spoken out against. The Lebanese are responding to that.

Q Does this appear to be a possible beginning of partition?

A We certainly are not accepting that possibility.

Q John, a couple of questions on Central America --

Q George, George --- (Laughter.)

a John, you say that you are talking to the Israelis. On what level and for what purpose?

A Oh, I think at many levels.

Q For what purpose? I mean, --

A They would discuss a great deal of things.

Q No, no. You say about the situation in the Beirut area.

A I think that the Israelis and ourselves have an interest in the Shouf area being stable and calm when the Israeli deployment takes place.

Q John, you have been deploring the violence against the Lebanese authorities. From one side or both sides?

A We deplore all violence in that area.

Q Well, the father of the Lebanese President whom you support is quoted to have said yesterday that if it is a civil war, let the stronger win, and we are ready to embark on it.

How do you assess such statements by the ruling party chief?

A I don't respond to a specific statement, but I think the Secretary has made clear on many occasions the sadness and sorrow of the United States over the violence that has riven Lebanon for a number of years, and I think the record of the United States in the past year or two very clearly indicates our desire to see that come to an end. The people of Lebanon have been through an extraordinarily tragic time, and we think the time has come for the foreign forces to withdraw and for the Lebanese to come together and get a stable government and impose their sovereignty over the whole country and get on with the business of economic development.

Q Did I ask you this question?

A Did who ask me what question?

Q I think, you know, you are reciting a poem that is disrespecting my question or is disrespecting the situation.

There is a President of the Republic that you support. His father, who is the President of the Party whom the President is a member of, the Politburo --

A I understand the question.

Q -- who said that they were ready to resume the civil war.

A I told you that we were not going to respond to individual statements, but I was offering you a philosophy, our philosophy, towards Lebanon, and I am sorry if you find it boring and if you heard it too often, but it happens to be our policy towards Lebanon, which I think is rather a constructive policy.

Shall I take another question before I close this briefing?

Q A question on Lebanon, the current fighting in the Shouf area, how does that affect the plans for the Israeli withdrawal or any possible deployment of the Lebanese Army?

A I don't know. You would have to ask the Israelis.

Q John, yesterday when the shells were falling around the Defense Ministry, it is not too far from the U.S. Ambassador's residence. Were there any reports that the residence may have been affected at all?

A I did not hear such a report, and I think I would had there been serious problems there. It is not unusual to have firing and activity in the vicinity of the residence, as we all know.

Q But you did not hear of any stray bullets or anything?

A I don't know if there was any such thing.

Q John, Israeli sources in Washington claim that the delay in aid to be presented to the Israeli Government in building the LAVI --

A Sorry, the delay in -- ?

A In giving aid to Israel to build the LAVI fighter, is considered harassment by the logic of the Israeli sources in Washington, that you didn't give them the money as they requested, and it is considered harassment according to FBIS on page I-2 of today, if you want to look at this.

A No, I was not aware of any lingering problems on the LAVI situation.

Q John, do you have any travel plans for Ambassador Stone?

A Nothing on Ambassador Stone's travel plans.

Q Do you have anything to add to what was said yesterday on background at the White House to the effect that the Salvadoran insurgents may meet with the Salvadoran Peace Commission?

A I will give you something. I don't think it will really go much beyond that, George. The question is best addressed to the parties involved. As you know, there have been press reports over a week ago indicating that the Salvadoran left and the Peace Commission had been in contact with each other. As a matter of fact, we said at the time that Mr. Zamora had confirmed such contacts and the possibility of such a meeting to the press, and we believe that such contacts would represent a positive step.

That is still the case, and all of Ambassador Stone's efforts in this regard have been to facilitate that kind of contact. But I suspect that that wasn't quite the hardness you were looking for.

Q No. Maybe you can do better. There is a report about an American having been killed in Honduras. Do you have anything?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on the disappearances of the two medical university personnel?

A Yes. I think our Embassy is looking into that.

Q And also, if I could, do you have anything on this new government or the reshuffle in Chile and the protest tomorrow?

A New government? Hold on, we may have. No, I'm sorry to disappoint you as you were waiting breathlessly for that statement. I am afraid we don't have anything.

Q Finally, one other. Do you have anything on Mejia's statement that the Contadora group "has nothing to do in Central America?"

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

Abrine

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY AUGUST 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #141

FRIDAY, AUGUST 12, 1983, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. First, it relates to new Soviet charges against Lev Elbert. We are informed that refusenik Lev Elbert in May of this year was convicted of evasion of reserve military service, was transferred to a new Soviet prison camp in early July. At that time a bag of hashish was reportedly found sewn into his coat, and Mr. Elbert was charged with violation of Article 229 of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Civil Code, "possession of drugs for personal use," a charge which carries a sentence of three years. He was held in a punitive cell with common criminals for four days during which time he staged a hunger strike and reportedly attempted suicide. Eventually, he was moved to a regular cell and was permitted a visit by his wife, his son and his father.

Based on the reports we've received, the United States finds the narcotics charges leveled against Mr. Elbert unconvincing. He has no history of drug abuse and has no reason to risk worsening his situation by attempting to smuggle hashish into a prison camp.

Furthermore, we are informed that the bag of hashish reportedly did not contain his fingerprints, and that the authorities examining this case did not even confirm that the clothing in which the bag was found belonged to him. This incident, in our view, is disturbingly reminiscent of practices seen in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist era in which a prisoner's sentence was commonly compounded by additional falsified charges against him and in which certain prisoners were singled out for especially repressive treatment so they might serve as examples to others.

The United States condemns this latest move against Mr. Elbert and calls upon the Soviet authorities to see that he is not further victimized by such implausible accusations.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

A I also have an announcement on U.S.-Cuban broadcasting talks. U.S. and Cuban representatives met August 8 and 9 in San Jose, Costa Rica, to exchange views on a range of AM broadcasting issues. The participants were attending a World Communication Year seminar of the International Telecommunications Union. The U.S. side, which included government and broadcasting industry representation, was headed by Kalmann Schaefer, International Telecommunications Advisor to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. The Cuban spokesman was Rene Hernandez Cartaya, the First Vice Minister of Communications.

That's all I have for you in the way of announcements.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q There's a brief follow-up on that. Is there any demarche by the Cubans with respect to broadcasting the Olympic games and securing --

A There is some lengthy guidance on that available in the Press Office.

Q A couple of arms control matters. Does the United States have any reason to believe that the Soviets have built a new radar which could be used as an ABM which might be in violation of any arms agreements?

A I'm not going to be able to get into great detail on that because, obviously, it does relate to intelligence matters. But the existence of this radar does raise serious questions with respect to its consistency with the ABM Treaty, and the United States is studying these questions in detail. This is the subject of diplomatic exchanges which necessarily remain confidential.

Q You are confirming then that there is a new radar system?

A We are not going to get into detail. I can't describe it for you, but I can confirm that we're talking with the Soviets about --

Q Can you confirm its location?

A No, can't give you anything beyond what I've given you.

Q Did the U.S. request a Special Consultative Committee meeting before yesterday with the Soviets --

A Is that in connection with the missile?

Q To discuss the question of violations.

A Let me see what I can get you on that.

Q According to a story in the Times this morning, Secretary of State Shultz called in the Soviets and asked, or read a list of possible, or questionable matters to the Soviets. Is that in fact the case?

A Let me see what I can get you on that.

Q Another subject. Do you have anything on the reports that the Secretary devised a plan to bring Palestinian refugees to the United States?

A Yes. There was a little flurry about that yesterday which I would be happy to clarify. The Secretary, as you know, has had a keen interest in the overall plight of Palestinian refugees, has referred to that on a number of occasions, and certainly in that context asked for ideas within the Department.

The story to which you're referring, in fact, was the focus of a draft paper initiated at the working level in order to examine one aspect of the problem. As we tried to explain yesterday, some drafting was done on this within the context of the Secretary's overall concern, but this particular study was done at a working level and is not under active consideration.

Q The Secretary did personally order the --

A Not the Secretary. He did not ask for a study on the question of Palestinian refugees. In the context, as you know, I think he talked publicly and Mr. Arens did, and Mr. Shamir. This was discussed when they were here. The prospect of being able to do something to help the plight of the Palestinian people is very much in our minds. Within that context, certainly ideas are being called for, but the Secretary did not call for a specific report on the refugees nor has he seen this particular working paper.

Q Was that matter discussed with President Gemayel when he was here?

A I don't know whether that was discussed with President Gemayel. I don't know. It might well have been.

Q In other words, you're saying he didn't ask for a study as to how you might bring them into the United States, and that sort of thing?

A Correct. But in terms of his concern about the plight, as you know, he's said on a number of occasions said, "We talk a lot about the PLO and their role and so forth and so on, and who's involved in this. But in the meantime what is happening to those people on the ground?" I think those concerns of his are well known.

Q So he asked for studies on the plight of the Palestinians?

A In general, broadly, what might be done, if anything, to improve the lot of the Palestinians in the area.

Q Tell us about the other report; exactly what was it? The study, the draft?

A I don't know who drafted it. I suspect in various of your news organizations people are writing reports on all kinds of things at given moments which never see the light of day, never get anywhere, never get to the front office. I think it is in this context that one should see this.

Q How far did this get?

A Not very far.

Q It didn't get to the Assistant Secretary level?

A I don't know whether any Assistant Secretary would have been aware of it, but it certainly didn't go beyond any Assistant Secretary or approved by any Assistant Secretary.

Q And it is no longer under consideration?

A It is no longer under consideration.

Q What's the status of the report?

A I don't know where the overall discussion is.

Q Was the subject raised yesterday between the Secretary and Jewish leaders?

A I don't think it was. There was a brief portion of that meeting which I missed, but I was there for most of it. Unless it was in that very small section during which I was out of the room, I don't think it was.

Q Do you have anything to tell us about this meeting?

A No more than I said yesterday, and no more than the leaders did after the meeting.

Q Could we come back to the report for a minute? Why is it no longer under active consideration?

A I think it was considered to be an impractical report which was not advanced at the working level.

Q Impractical, why?

A I don't know. There are lots of reports floating around this building that I'm sure are determined to be impractical and not proceeded on. That's a kind of normal, brainstorming, think-tank, presentation-of-ideas process.

Q Is it part of the overall discussion of the Palestinian refugees that this portion of bringing the Palestinians, or 50,000 which was scaled down to 10,000, according to the draft paper, to the United States? Was it a comprehensive study which was ordered and this portion was suggested in a way of bringing --

A I think ideas have been called for on how the plight of the Palestinians might be lessened; what might be done to improve their lot. I think the Secretary and the Administration are concerned that as time goes by, and as politics and diplomacy takes its course, conditions for the Palestinians are not improving. He's said that on a number of occasions. I think within that context, certainly, he is seeking ideas and asking for creative thinking within the Department about what might be done. That's the sort of procedure that you ordinarily follow when you're tackling a new project. I think it's within that context various ideas, probably others, probably other draft papers, that have been circulating around the building and some are being proceeded with and some are not.

CONT

Q In the process of preparing for this report, from your information, did they consult with any Arab country or Palestinian leaders or Palestinian people or United Nations agencies, from your information?

A I don't know the answer to that question, but I would think it's unlikely.

Q Could you check on that?

A No. I don't so, because what you're really doing is asking us to talk about the way decisions are made inside the Department, and we really don't do that. But I'm not aware of any contact.

Q Can you tell us what other ideas may have been floated as part of this broader mandate?

A No. I can't. I really don't know.

Q Also, to summarize what you're saying is that it's no longer under active consideration because it was considered to be impractical; is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Was anything else taken as more practical, any other idea?

A You're not listening to what I have been saying over here. I'm not going to get into the other matters.

Q You said there was none. Now you're saying you're not going to answer. Is your answer that you're not going to answer, or the answer is that there are no other ideas? Maybe I didn't follow you.

A Yes, you're not following. Let me take another question.

Q Can you please tell me, John, what you just --

A Why don't you go back and read the transcript, and you'll get it.

Q Why is the United States, as such, being considered as the refuge or the final place for them to come to? Why not, let's say, Europe, and is that being considered?

A You're talking about a hypothetical situation. The United States is home to many refugees of various nationalities. I would draw your attention to the large number from southeast Asia. That's traditionally been the United States' position, but also, in connection with the refugees from southeast Asia, many countries have done a great deal, too. But we're talking about a hypothetical situation here.

Q Only because this was something that was brought up in today's piece in the Post that it obviously would have encountered a lot of problems, if not Congress, but certainly people --

A I don't know. As I say, it was simply an idea that is not being proceeded with. I don't know how it would have been received or perceived.

Q Can you tell us at what point this idea was dropped? When?

A I can't. I don't know the timeframe.

Q Was the Secretary aware of this specific portion in the report?

A No. He's never seen the paper.

Q So he learned about it from the publication yesterday?

A I would assume so. I haven't discussed it with him, but I would assume so.

Q Was the idea, John, of -- the idea of bringing initially 50,000 or 10,000 discussed with Ministers Arens and Shamir, this particular idea?

A I am sure not. But if you are asking, as I've just said, which you apparently didn't hear, was the general plight of Palestinians discussed during the Shamir-Arens visit here, the answer is yes, of course.

Q Can you tell us where McFarlane is today and what he is going to do?

A McFarlane is in Israel.

Q And?

A I have nothing for you beyond that, but I admire the optimism with which you always pursue --

Q What can you tell us about the Russian boy?

Q Can we have one more question on McFarlane? What do you say about Syria saying that he should go home and he's mounting a mounting a campaign of lies?

A I don't have anything on that. I don't have any reaction; I don't have any comment.

Q Just to clarify, what is not under consideration right now -- only the portion that deals with the possibility of bringing the Palestinians to the U.S., or is the whole study on the questions --

A I'm sure that within the Department work is continuing on this question of how the plight of Palestinians might improved, what might be done to improve their lot.

Q So when was the specific idea dropped from consideration?

A I don't know. As I say, there may have been other -- I'm trying to respond to questions which surfaced as a result of a story and inquiries we got yesterday. I don't know. There may be a dozen other working papers that people wrote and somebody looked at and said that's a poor idea, forget it. I have no idea because the thinking is still going on about it.

Q When was this report or other reports initiated? When did the Secretary ask the staff in NEA and others to start bringing up ideas like this?

A I don't know what the timeframe is of that. I think the problems of the Palestinians have certainly been in his thinking for sometime, but I don't know when he asked for ideas to be submitted.

Q Just one more. At what level can you tell us was it adjudged to be, or deemed to be impractical?

A I can't tell you that. I really don't know.

Q You said it was below the Assistant Secretary level.

A I think it was below, yes.

Q Do you have any reaction to the events yesterday in Chile?

A Chile?

Q Yes.

A I'm sorry to keep you in suspense, but I will get there.

Preliminary reports indicate that the levels of crowd violence and represession by security forces were greater than in the previous anti-government protests. There's an unconfirmed death toll of 10 with almost 100 people injured, including soldiers and police, and hundreds arrested, mostly for violating a dusk to dawn curfew.

This morning, Santiago and other major cities appear normal.

The United States deplores the loss of life and the injuries.

We also regret that recent efforts to promote dialogue, to avoid violence, and to build a consensus, have so far been unable to halt the process of polarization.

As we've said before, we believe the Chileans from all sectors will have to find ways to overcome their differences, within a framework of respect for civil and human rights, so that a real transition to democracy can take place as the vast majority of Chileans fervently seek.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

--MORE--

Q Have you expressed your concern directly to the Chilean Government?

A I am sure the Chilean Government is aware of our views.

Q I have a question about the Middle East.

Will you confirm reports that visas granted to Palestinians by the U.S. Administration during the last year represent a high or sharp increase over that of the last years?

A I don't know. I can't answer that question. I don't know whether -- is that an INS -- I have no idea.

Q Will you take the question?

A I will be glad to take a look at it. I have no idea what we will be able to come up with for you. I will be glad to take it.

Q Can we get to the Russian boy?

A Sure can. What would you like to know?

Q I would like to know if this Department has any hope of speaking with him at all.

A Basically, you have all seen The New York Times story this morning, and that is correct. The Soviets have not yet agreed to an interview with the young man. We continue to insist that the young man not depart the United States prior to such an interview which would permit us to ascertain his intentions.

There have been diplomatic exchanges and exchange of formal diplomatic notes on this question on several occasions between late yesterday afternoon and this morning, but I am not going to be able to get into the content of those exchanges.

Q Do you know where the boy is?

A I don't have any comment for you on the whereabouts of the young man.

Q Is he still in this country, do you know?

A I don't have any comments on the whereabouts of the young man.

Q Do the Soviets have a right to remove this boy from U.S. territory without our permission?

A What we are doing, our requests for the interview -- our insistence on the interview is consistent with United States law. We want to talk with him. We have presumed that he has written a letter received by the President, and we presume that he wrote the letter to The New York Times and he makes certain requests in those letters. We are consistent, we feel, within U.S. law in seeking to interview him prior to departure from the country.

Q What is your response to the Soviet charge that this is a forgery?

A I think that is a good reason for wanting to talk to the young man. If there are allegations that the letters are forgeries, that would seem to me to underline the logical character of our request to talk to him.

Q How do you do that? I mean how do you attempt to talk to him? Do you go to the Embassy, or do you go to his house?

A I don't think we are at the point yet where we can establish how such a discussion would take place, because we are in this kind of exchange with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet authorities here. What we are saying is, we insist that we see him before he leaves the country.

Q Would it have to be out of the presence of his parents?

A I can't get into that. That is a little ahead of the game.

Q What if he tried to leave the country?

A I don't think we should get into what is at the moment a hypothetical situation.

Q If they haven't agreed to an interview, have they refused one?

A They have not agreed to an interview. Let's leave it at that.

Q As a member of a family of diplomats, does he also have diplomatic status?

A   I knew you would ask that question, and I really can't answer that at this stage, because we are still doing a little research on that. The situation is a little complicated by the fact that he has been at school in the Soviet Union and has been visiting here, as we understand it, this summer, so I can't give you a clear-cut answer on whether he does have diplomatic immunity.

Q   Is there a legal course, John, for the United States to keep him here until an interview has been conducted?

A   I think that we are going to stand by the words that I have offered you and not really go into any additional legal matters.

Q   When did the State Department find out about all this?

A   Well, The Times story is correct. The young man, we were informed by the Soviets on Wednesday, had disappeared from his house. We understand that his parents were not aware that he could drive and therefore were disturbed when he disappeared with the car.

We were informed, or the local police authorities were informed, and conducted the kind of search that they do in that instance. The following morning, which was yesterday, the Soviets informed us that the young man had returned to his home and his parents during the course of the night, and that there was no longer any cause for concern.

Q   John, at what point did this take on political dimension? Did you have any idea of the political implications of this before you read The New York Times this morning?

A   Oh, yes. (Laughter)

Q   When?

A   I don't think I want to get into a blow-by-blow, but certainly the State Department has been involved in this case since mid-afternoon yesterday.

Q   Did the Secretary himself get involved in this?

A   Oh, yes.

Q In what way? Did he talk to Dobrynin, or what?

A Well, I probably shouldn't get into -- Dobrynin, I think, is not here. He is back in Moscow. Probably I shouldn't get into who; that was unwise of me. But, yes, he certainly was involved through yesterday afternoon and late into the night.

Q John, why was this not treated as just a case of a 16 year-old boy having an argument with his parents and --

A And taking off with the car?

Q Yes.

A I think on Wednesday -- I don't know. I don't know what the police thought. I think that might well have been the presumption. Obviously, when a foreign embassy requests your assistance, you take it seriously. I think when they then came back and said, "Everything is fine, he has returned home", I suspect the interpretation was that it was a jaunt by a teenager.

Q Do you see any connection between this incident and the charges raised against the U.S. citizen in the prison in the Soviet Union?

A I'm sorry, the charges against which U.S. citizen?

Q Those included in the first announcement you had.

A No. There is no connection between the two.

Q No connection whatsoever?

A No.

Q John, during the period in which he was away, during the period in which he had the family car, and you didn't know what the story was, during that period only, did you have any suspicion that this had more than just the implications of a kid going off for ice cream, or whatever? I mean, did you have any idea it had any political implications during the period in which he was gone before you heard he had returned?

A No, I don't think so. I am not suggesting that it was treated in a cavalier fashion, but I think the implication was that the young man had disappeared from home, and it was basically a police matter, a question for inquiry by the police.

I think the character of that changed when we became aware that letters had been received by The New York Times and the White House purporting to come from this young man, and making the statements that were made in those letters.

Q So, it wasn't until The New York Times called you that you knew that there was anything more to that than --

A I don't think I want to get into the question of when The New York Times called us and when the letter was received at the White House, and who did what. But, things took on a different character as of yesterday afternoon.

Q Was it last night that the Secretary worked into the night on it, or the night before?

A He was here late into the evening on it, yes, and --

Q Last night?

A Yes, and then was, of course, in touch with the situation when he finally did go home.

Q Was the Secretary in touch himself with the Soviets at all?

A I don't think I should go into who talked to whom about this, but we were in touch here with the Soviet Embassy.

Q Were the Soviets the ones who informed you that the boy was away, or was it the police who informed you?

A No, the Soviets informed us on Wednesday that the boy was missing.

Q At what point on Wednesday?

A I honestly don't know what time that was. I think he was supposed to have left home around ten o'clock in the morning, or it was established that he left home around ten o'clock in the morning. So it was sometime after that, but I don't know what time it was.

Q Would that be standard procedure for a Soviet boy running away from his family for the Soviets to notify you?

A That is a hard question to answer. I suppose some embassies would inform us and some would not. I guess it is like all of us who are fathers. You have to make your own interpretation of what the absence of a son or daughter means.

Q John, when the Brazilian boy that went to the night club, did they inform you?

A I'm sorry?

Q The son the Brazilian Ambassador, when he went to the night club and -- bang-bang. (Laughter)

A I don't happen to have any background on the diplomatic interchange on that matter.

Q John, I don't like to take the low road on this, but do you know whether this young man has a girlfriend? (Laughter)

It is a perfectly legitimate question.

A It is a perfectly legitimate question, but I am sorry I don't know the answer to that.

Q That is why they want the interview. (Laughter)

Q John, to be more serious, do you have anything on the Lebanese situation, and have you been talking to the Druze representative, Mr. Jumblatt?

A We have talked with a large number of Lebanese leaders, but we wouldn't really get into the details of that and tell you who we were talking to.

As for the situation in Lebanon itself, I don't have a great deal. Apparently there were artillery exchanges resumed today between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Druze units. I don't have any further details. As of 11:00 a.m., which was about now two hours ago, because this briefing is going on, the Beirut International Airport was closed.

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That is about all I have.

Q Can you comment on the Government's plans to renovate the former Embassy buildings of Iran, Viet Nam and Cambodia? Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

A I don't know whether I can elaborate. I can give you some of the background information I have been given.

The foreign-owned properties that are now under the custody of the Department of State since the Foreign Missions Act include twelve Iranian properties, two Cambodian properties, and one Vietnamese property.

They are variously here in Washington, in California, Texas, Illinois and New York. Some of them are in extremely poor condition since they have been abandoned at dates between 1975 and 1980, and are in need of extensive repair.

Some impounded funds have already been released by the Treasury Department. These will be used to renovate the buildings in order to restore them to their original condition.

The Foreign Missions Board is discussing the renovation and rental of these properties with commercial firms in order to maintain them in the best interest of the community. That is about all the background I have.

Q Is there any reason why this is happening now as opposed to a year ago?

A I am afraid you have come to about the limit of my background information on it.

Q Can you give us a read-out on the situation in Chad?

A On Chad, sure can.

Q Like the temperature in Faya Largeau?

A I don't have a temperature for you. I understand it is hot and sandy. (Laughter)

It appears that the Libyans are consolidating their position at Faya Largeau. We don't have any exact figures on casualties among Habre's troops, but there is reason to believe that a substantial part of his forces succeeded in withdrawing in an orderly fashion.

We have got reports now that the fighting at Faya Largeau was intense, that it involved artillery bombardment, and that there was aircraft strafing by Libyan forces of the Habre forces extricating themselves from the battle.

We have also since then had some reports that Libyan planes have bombed Oum Chalouba. That is the oasis to which apparently government forces, or on which they consolidated themselves. There are indications that government forces are in control of Oum Chalouba.

The airlift of Zairian troops which the United States is conducting at the request of Zaire will probably be complete today. We expect it to be complete today. I think about 1,800 Zairian troops were there already, and so you have an additional 700 for about 2,500, and that is really about all I have got for you.

Q John, can you confirm -- you said there were reports of Libyan's bombing of Oum Chalouba. Can you confirm those reports?

A I think we are fairly confident that that bombing has taken place.

Q AWACS?

A The AWACS situation remains unchanged.

Q John, when do you expect the American trainers, logistics experts, and the other military personnel to return? I understand two of the Red-eye trainers have returned, but one remained behind, and there are at least three logistics experts and three quality-assurance team members.

A Those figures sound about right. I must confess I haven't checked that for a day. I remember that two of the original three are out, and whether the third is out yet, I don't know. You might ask the Pentagon.

Q I asked there this morning.

A I am sure their information is better than mine.

Q Do you think that their mission will be extended, now, with all the --

A I don't know. What did the Pentagon say? I guess they will be out as soon as whatever their respective missions are completed.

Q Do you have any confirmation of a report that the Red-eye missiles didn't work because they can't distinguish between the landscape and --?

A No, I don't have anything on that for you.

Q The President referred to many African countries as having contributed forces. Are there any others besides Zaire that we know about?

A I wouldn't get into discussions with other countries who may or may not have indicated assistance, but at the moment I think the French have talked about up to five hundred paracommandoes going in there, and maybe they are all in there by now, and the Zairians, of course, have 2,500.

Q But you don't know of any others?

A No.

Q John, have you received any requests for additional military aid from the Habre Government?

A I don't quite how to respond to that "additional requests". I think Habre has made --

Q The Pentagon says that all that had been requested as of yesterday was delivered, and in the wake of the fall of Faya Largeau, has anything else been asked for?

A I don't know that anything has been asked for specifically of ourselves. As you know, Mr. Habre has talked in general about the need for support and help, but I am not sure of whether there has been anything in the way of a specific request to us for more specific items.

Q What about this notion of a settlement based on the removal of Habre and Goukouni? That has been floated. Do you have anything?

A I know. I guess the Libyans have put out some reports about deals and negotiations, and I think you would have to ask them.

As far as we are concerned, the first step towards establishing peace in Chad would be for Libya to withdraw its troops from that country, and to stop its aggression against what is the legitimate government of that country.

Q John, if the Iranians will ever restore diplomatic relations with the United States, will the United States, the State Department, return their Embassy to their owners?

A I don't know. You are asking a hypothetical question.

Q Do you have anything on Lesotho and the support it is apparently seeking?

A I may have something on that. Is that the question of the South African refugees?

Q Yes.

A The Ambassador of Lesotho did meet with officials in the Department of State, that was on August 4, to tell us of the decision to evacuate the South African refugees currently in Lesotho.

That is it.

Q Do you have any view with respect to the evacuation of some 3,000 refugees?

A I am afraid you have got all I have.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:15 p.m.)

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Alennex

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, August 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #142

MONDAY, AUGUST 15, 1983, 12:32 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. If my answers are less lucid than usual, it's because I got back at 4:00 this morning, but I'll be happy to try.

No announcements for you.

Q Alan, are we still planning to talk to the Soviet youth, and when will that occur?

A It remains our desire to ascertain the young man's intentions. Our position on it hasn't changed. I can't tell you when it's going to occur.

Q Alan, what legal precedents or statutes apply in this case that make it just for us to want to talk to this guy?

A I don't think we're going to get into that question in great detail. Our lawyers have, however, reviewed the issue and have advised us that the actions we are talking about are consistent with law.

Q Can you tell us what law you are talking about?

A No. I just said I wasn't going to get into the detail.

Q Alan, since you undoubtedly saw the long, page one story in *The Washington Post* today which reports that Secretary Shultz has been decisively eclipsed by Judge Clark, you're here to tell us that this entire *Post* story is balderdash, and that there is no truth to it. Is that right, Alan, or wrong? (Laughter)

A The entire story -- I'd have to go through it word by word, Lester. I would say that the thrust --

Q You did this morning, undoubtedly, --

A I did read it, Lester. Yes, I did.

Q O.K. Fine, Alan. Is it true or false, Alan?

A The way you have just phrased it, which I think is an accurate summary of at least the headline and perhaps a good part of the story, I think is --

Q Is balderdash?

A -- is simply not true. And I think if you talked to Judge Clark, he would agree with that. I did talk to him yesterday, and I don't know why these stories persist.

Q Alan, I want to tell you that is the most straightforward and substantive answer I've ever heard, and I congratulate you.

(Laughter)

A Thank you, Lester.

Q Does the Secretary still plan to stay on until the end of the present Administration?

A He made that very clear yesterday.

Q Getting back to this Soviet youth for just a moment, are there any cases in which a similar situation has occurred in Moscow, with an American dependent?

A An American dependent who said he didn't want to leave the Soviet Union?

Q No, but with a request by the Soviet Union to interview an American dependent, and the United States agreed to do that?

A I don't know, Ralph, and I wouldn't get into that sort of question.

Q How about the question of whether -- On Friday night, I believe, or Thursday night; I've forgotten which --

A But let me go back: I think you can rest assured that I know of no instance in which an American dependent has said he wanted to stay in the Soviet Union.

Q I'm talking about the question of interview.

A I understood your question. Go ahead. What's your second question?

Q The second question deals with the incident at the airport in which another Soviet dependent apparently was detained briefly or questioned before departing, as I understand occurred on Friday night or Thursday night -- I've forgotten which.

Do the American dependents in Moscow undergo that same kind of procedure when they come and go?

A I think there was no -- Well, I guess I'm not going to comment, first of all, on that specific case, but I think I recall through my fog that it was addressed by the Press Office over the weekend, and we'll refer you to what they said about it.

Again, I can't tell you what the procedures are in Moscow.

Q Alan, are negotiations currently underway between the State Department and the Soviet Embassy to conduct an interview with the boy? And at what state are these negotiations?

A We continue to have contact. I'm not going to try to characterize it for you, or describe it in any detail.

Q You don't believe the boy is in the United States?

A I don't think we've tried to give you a detailed answer on where he might be, and I'm not going to try to do that now.

Q A Soviet diplomat came to the State Department on Saturday.

A Yes.

Q Was he called here by the State Department or did he request to the State Department? And have there been other meetings since then?

A Again, I don't think I want to get into the details of our conversations. It is true that Mr. Sokolov was here, but I guess I really can't get into that further, Bob.

Q Have there been any more meetings like that?

A Any more meetings, somebody physically coming over? I don't know the answer to that. I've been out. But as I say, I'm sure that the contact is continuing. So whether it is by meetings, phone calls or what have you, it continues.

Q Has the FBI analysis of these letters turned up to show that these are forgeries or are real?

A Again, I don't have anything to give you secifically on that. I'm not sure I would, in terms of what the FBI has determined.

I would say that we don't have any reason particularly to believe that they are forgeries, on the one hand; on the other, that is, of course, one reason that we want to talk with the young man, to determine whether this indeed represents his own view.

Q But the two letters do match up?

A Again, I'm not going to go try to get into the question of the FBI analysis.

Q If you refresh your memory, Alan, where does the State Department stand in the case of Walter Polovchak?

A I'm not sure where the State Department stands on that. I guess it's a matter that is in the courts, Lester.

Q A similar situation, isn't it?

A It's a matter that is in the courts, Lester.

Q Does the Soviet youth in Washington have diplomatic immunity?

A I don't have anything new on that.

Q Doesn't the fact that he was traveling on a diplomatic passport mean that he has immunity?

A Not necessarily. I've traveled on a diplomatic passport in areas where I haven't had diplomatic immunity.

Q Could I change the subject? I heard another question back there.

A On this subject, you mean, finish it off?

Q Usually, when a diplomat is expelled from a country, there is a sort of retaliation in the same manner. What sort of retaliation do you expect from the Soviet Union?

A I can't say whether there would be any retaliation. I don't know that there would be any particular reason for retaliation; but in any case, there hasn't been any, and I'm not going to try to speculate. We would hope this issue would be resolved satisfactorily, and we wouldn't have that issue to consider.

Q Alan, a spokesman at the Soviet Embassy says they will send the boy home without first subjecting him to an interview. What if they try to do that?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on that, Greg.

Q (Inaudible) Department Press Office did issue a statement saying that the United States has been given assurances that he is still in the United States. So I repeat my earlier question --

A I have nothing beyond what they may have issued on Friday.

Q Has his father been called to the State Department?

A I guess that would come under the heading of what kind of exchanges we've had with them, so I think I prefer not to violate that principle.

Q You mentioned Sakolov by name.

A Well, he is the Charge. O.K. Can we go to another subject? You had a question, Jim.

Q Do you have anything on this alleged report between Guatemala and El Salvador, specifically with respect to the provision by El Salvador of U.S. weapons?

A Yes, we've seen the press report, obviously, but are not aware of any plan for a program of cooperation of the sort that was described this morning.

Q Can you tell us what U.S. law is with respect to the necessity for U.S. permission to transfer U.S. weapons to a third country?

A To transfer U.S.-furnished weapons/ arms to third countries would require authorization of the U.S. Government.

Q And would such authorization be forthcoming?

A That's speculative.

Q No. It's hypothetical.

(Laughter.)

A That, too. That answer would be speculative; the question is hypothetical. Do you want to brief today?

Q Do you have any comment on the interview yesterday published in the Post with President Assad of Syria?

A We saw the interview, obviously, but the U.S. has an official dialogue with Syria. We're working to strengthen it. We understand that the Government of Syria might also want to inform the American public of its positions on regional and international questions through such means as this interview. But we don't have any comment on it or on the substance of it.

Q Do you think that the Syrian position as expressed in this interview gives a lot of room for continuation of the negotiations?

A As I say, we have our own dialogue, and I'm not going to comment a on press interview that President Assad has had.

Q Is McFarlane in Beirut?

A Yes.

Q How long is he going to stay there?

A I can't tell you, and we haven't tended to do that, Peter.

Q There are reports that he is planning to go back to Syria on Wednesday.

A Again, Syria is one of the countries with which we have been conducting a dialogue as I just indicated. But, beyond that I'm not going to try to give you any specifics on the travel plans.

Q The official dialogue, Alan, is it through the Embassy only or are you referring to the McFarlane recent visit there?

A There are a variety of channels for carrying out a dialogue.

Q Any comment on the latest fighting in Beriut, and report of some American equipment was captured by the Druges?

A I don't have any comment on the last part of your question. As far as sort of a sitrep is concerned, we've seen press reports indicating that the Beirut area was calm this morning and that artillery exchanges had ceased, but that the Beirut International Airport remains closed.

We continue to urge all parties to exercise restraint and to work constructively with the Government of Lebanon to achieve national reconciliation and an end to needless bloodshed.

Q Alan, would you want to comment on this paragraph in the Post this morning that the Administration officials have acknowledged that President Reagan is privately impatient with the Contadora Group's effort for a regional peace settlement and is concerned that the effort may be providing world respectability to Nicaragua?

A I think that question might perhaps better be addressed to Larry Speakes, but I do know from talking with him that if you are familiar with what the Secretary said at his press conference yesterday, he gave strong backing to the efforts of the Contadora group and the Contadora process and the President stands fully behind what the Secretary said.

Q Back to the Middle East with one more point. There is a report in the Israeli press that El Salvador is about to transfer its Embassy from Tel Aviv back into Jerusalem.

Considering your position on Jerusalem, do you have any comment on that?

A No. I wasn't aware of it. Don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you have anything about any sort of new U.S. effort this week, more arms shipments, anything we're doing to help bolster the Chad Government?

A I don't have anything new to give you. My understanding -- and I would ask you to check perhaps with the Pentagon for a definitive number -- but I understand that the amount of equipment, including transportation costs provided thus far, is about $11 million.

We are studying further aid requirements, but I don't have anything further to give you at this particular point.

Q What are the latest developments on Chad?

A There are no reports of renewed fighting today, but there are indications that the Libyans continue to move their forces and equipment into Chad.

Q What about the French?

A What about them?

Q What about their maneuvers?

A Their maneuvers? Their deployment of trainers to Chad is in response to requests for assistance from the Government of Chad based on their requirements at this point, and we support the French efforts to strengthen the position of the legitimate Government of Chad.

Q Has there been any additional dialogue between French officials and U.S. officials on using the AWACS?

A I'm not going to get into the details of discussion. I think John indicated that appropriate officials were in contact on that issue. I don't have any update to give you. I don't intend to give you a day by day.

We do remain, however, in close contact and consultation with the French, and that's where it's been.

Q No change in the AWACS status, right?

A No change in the AWACS status. I understand it has done some exercising within Sudan, but again, beyond that, we're not going to comment on operational plans or other details.

Q What about exercising? What do you mean?

A Check with the Pentagon as to what that means. I guess they go up and they fly around and flap their wings or whatever they do. (Laughter) I don't know. I don't know what airplanes do when they exercise. You tell me.

Q Alan, the Lebanese Ambassador was in the building on Saturday, I understand, appealing for more troops for the peacekeeping force.

What's our position on that?

A I understand that he was on television this morning and indicated that he had not in fact discussed the MNF, so I would just point that out to you. I'm not speaking to that. He has spoken to that.

The Secretary did have a brief meeting with the Lebanese Ambassador on Saturday morning, but I'm not going to get into the details of that exchange.

With regard to the MNF part of your question, the U.S. position is clear. While we have received a request from the Government of Lebanon to consider ways in which the MNF might play a role in the area to be evacuated by the IDF, it is still premature to address the question of what an expanded role for the MNF might involve.

Q Alan, back to Chad: Do you have any further information about talks between the French and the Libyans?

A No. I don't have anything on that. I think you'd have to ask the French about that.

Q I just wanted to follow up on something you said before. Do you have a new estimate on the number of Libyans in Chad now?

A I think at the end of the week we indicated that we have now -- are carrying a minimum of 2500 Libyans in Chad south of the Aouzou Strip.

I might note that this is a buildup of about 2000 over the last couple of weeks; that Libyan equipment includes tanks, APCs, trucks, tank transporters, jeeps, artillery, multiple rocket launchers, attack helicopters, transport helicopters, and light transport aircraft.

Q Can we confirm there has been any Libyan bombing since a week ago Friday?

A I think that John indicated last week that we had indications, which we attach credibility to, that there had been bombing last week.

Q I just wanted to go back a little bit over the questions about Secretary Shultz's position in the Administration to make sure that I understand where you're coming from.

Is it your position that the Secretary is still the principal figure and spokesman in the formation and the public enunciation of foreign policy in this Administration?

A Other than the President?

Q Other than the President.

A I think that that's fair. The principal foreign policy adviser and articulator in the Administration. Certainly.

Q A number of questions, as you know, have been raised in the press and the media about Mr. Clark's role, and the general thrust of this has been that Mr. Clark has become the dominant figure in foreign policy in this Administration.

I just want to be sure that I understand what you're saying about this. Is it your position that this is not true?

A Again, I would refer you to -- I guess the whole interview is not available. But the Secretary has made various statements himself about Judge Clark's role and the cooperation that they have between them, and I don't think I need to expand on that.

It was partially addressed in the article which appeared yesterday in The New York Times Magazine, but I don't think I'm going to try to get into that question, Jim. The Secretary has addressed it on numerous occasions, and I'm not going to go back over it.

Q You're saying the Secretary addressed it but the transcript isn't available? Could we get the transcript available?

A No. There are partial quotes that are available, and I think you could look at it and you can see that the Secretary certainly has a positive approach to what Judge Clark's role is and the way they work together.

Q Sir, the Secretary of State holds a constitutional office. Therefore, would it not be unconstitutional if anyone else considered himself or was in fact more powerful in reference to the President?

A You stretch my knowledge of the constitution, but I don't think that issue really arises.

Q In terms of a specific incident, do you have anything on what Newsweek was reporting, that the Secretary talked to the President and claimed that decisions were being made without his input?

A Again, the Secretary addressed this yesterday, and I don't have anything beyond what he said at that time.

Q Do you have any comment on the decision of Liberia to renew diplomatic relations with Israel?

A Yes.

Q Who?

A Liberia. The question is any comment on Liberia's decision to establish diplomatic relations -- or resume normal diplomatic relations with Israel.

The United States welcomes the Government of Liberia's independent decision to resume relations with Israel. Libya made this -- excuse me. Not Libya. (Laughter) I'll start again. (Boooo)

Q Get some sleep, Alan. (Laughter)

A You're right. I'll go back over it.

The United States welcomes the Government of Liberia's independent decision to resume relations with Israel. Liberia made this important move on its own initiative, and we continue to encourage other countries to extend full diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel.

Q Another African question, Alan: On July 10, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and his congregation near Harare were attacked by a mob of Mr. Mugabe's ZANU PF people led by a motorcycle with government plates, and this mob stoned the Bishop and his people at a church dedication, and the Bishop said that these attacks are widespread throughout the country and the conditions in Zimbabwe --

A Question?

Q I beg your pardon?

A Could I have a question?

Q I'll finish it if you give me a chance.

A It's rather long, Lester.

Q Thank you. I'm trying to tell you what the question is. I know you're not impatient, Alan. Maybe it's a lack of sleep --

A Good going, Lester.

Q -- but I'll finish if you'll allow me. And he said the conditions in Zimbabwe are worse today than under Ian Smith, and my question is, since the State Department arranged $75 million for this Marxist-oriented government, what are we doing about this attack on Bishop Muzorewa, his people, his Methodists throughout Zimbabwe?

A Lester, I think that --- (a) I don't know what the specifics are about any such incident, but you may --

Q It was reported by Religious News Service to 800 clients, but somehow the big media failed to report this as they used to report things in Rhodesia.

A Lester, instead of a speech, let me answer my question.

Q I am trying to clue you in.

A My answer to you is the U.S., as you know, always deplores violence. I cannot comment on the internal affairs, though, of another country.

Q Well --

A That's my answer.

Q Wait a minute. I have a follow-up on that.

A That's a surprise.

Q Would you contend that there is any evidence that the State Department has shown as much concern about human rights in Zimbabwe as about human rights in El Salvador?

A Lester, we are concerned about human rights everywhere.

Q Yes. But why are Hispanics entitled to more concern for their human rights in El Salvador than blacks in Zimbabwe? Don't you care about the blacks in Zimbabwe?

A That's your judgment, Lester.

Q No, no. I want to ask.

A That isn't U.S. policy.

Q It isn't. In other words, we're just as concerned --

A Lester --

Q No. You haven't clarified it.

A Yes, I have.

Q Alan, are we as concerned? Then what are we doing to show our concern for Zimbabwe? Could you tell us?

A Lester, I refer you to the Human Rights Report.

Q Back on that Contadora just a minute, the President didn't mention that in his speech. Was that -- the whole effort in Mexico, was that by neglect? Was it inadvertent? I'm just curious as to --

A I wasn't involved in the drafting process of the speech, but, as I say, the fact is that the President supports everything that the Secretary said -- in his press conference -- at which time he spoke at some length in support of the Contadora process. So I think that drawing the kind of inference you're suggesting is inaccurate.

-- MORE --

Q It's an inference that the Mexicans are drawing, so that's incorrect, that it was inadvertant?

A Again, I don't know what the drafting process is, and I can't possibly answer that question. I can only tell you what the policy is and what I have discussed with the President's spokesman on this subject.

Q On a related matter, on what the President said on Saturday. He used languaged that seemed to suggest more direct questioning of the Nicaraguan Government. He said "We oppose the unelected government of Nicaragua." How are we to interpret that statement as opposed to a statement such as we oppose the policies of the unelected government of Nicaragua?

A Again, I don't have a specific transcript. I wasn't there. The President addressed the issue; we have addressed it at various times. The record is rather complete on the views of Nicaragua's policies.

Q If I could just follow, Alan. Does the United States still recognize Nicaragua as the legal government, the Sandinistas as the legal government of Nicaragua?

A We certainly have diplomatic relations with them. I think that speaks to that question.

Q You mentioned you spoke with Judge Clark yesterday. Would you want to say anything about what his -- does he share fully the views of Secretary Shultz on that Contadora process?

A I have no reason to believe otherwise, but I'm not Judge Clark's spokesman so I don't think I can really speak for him.

Q Do you have anything on Zia's political program in Pakistan and/or the violence that they had over the weekend?

A Yes. With respect to the plans that President Zia announced about the ending of martial law in March 1985, we welcome any step toward ending martial law and returning Pakistan to an elected government.

I can't really speak to the demonstrations other than to say that they were planned long in advance to coincide with Pakistan's independence day and with President Zia's announcement. I would note there have been reports that indicate there were also demonstrations in favor of the President's plans. Obviously, there is some disagreement within the opposition as to whether or not to participate in the called elections.

Q Can I come back to Mr. Clark, please. There are reports today in Europe that Europeans are quite concerned that the senior arms control policy group is headed by the National Security Advisor. Shouldn't that be at State?

A We have addressed this at some time in the past. There continue to be the existing mechanisms which have already been created, and they continue to do the work they were doing. It was felt, including via the people involved in the State Department who work on this problem, that it was an appropriate and necessary thing to do, to also have this other group functioning in order to handle issues at that appropriate level. So there is no perception here -- Indeed, there was -- let me step back. There was support here for creating that structure.

Q To follow up on your answer on Liberia, what is the reason that you emphasized it twice in this statement, is it the fact that it's an independent decision taken by Liberia by itself? What's the reason for this?

A I think that it's simply a fact.

Q Would you make a characterization of the press coverage of Secretary Shultz during the last two weeks as a sort of campaign pressure to force him to resign?

A By the press?

Q Yes.

A You would have to address your colleagues in the press. I don't pretend to try to analyze the motives of the press.

I tend to doubt that, frankly, but you'd have to do your own assessments of that.

Q On the question of Shultz and Clark, was it Secretary Shultz' first choice that Ambassador Stone should be appointed to his job, and Ambassador McFarlane, and was the Kissinger Commission his idea or was it Judge Clark's idea or somebody elses?

A You're asking me to get into the dynamics of appointments, and so on, which we have tried very hard not to do. I can only tell you that he supports all of those appointments and he has made that clear on the record.

Q Alan --

A No, you've had enough right now. I'll come back to you, Lester.

Q Senator Wilson, is he carrying any message to the Sandinistas today, and is it related to these reports of concessions by the Sandinistas with respect to getting a negotiating process underway.

A I'm not aware of any messages being carried, particularly. I would assume -- I don't know, but I would assume that any Congressional delegation would have received briefings if they desired to, but I'm not aware of any messages that are being carried on that.

Q What do you make of the reports that surfaced today or yesterday?

A About what?

Q That the Nicaraguans wanted to talk directly about a Cuban arms cutoff?

A It's been a consistent part of our policy that we would favor verifiable and reciprocal agreements on the withdrawal of all foreign military advisors in Central America as well as on the importation of heavy offensive weapons as part of a regional solution to the conflicts in the area. We have been on record with that policy since before the San Jose Conference in October 1982, and the President stated it again yesterday in Mexico when he said, "We will consider it a beautiful day in the history of that region when all foreign elements, including our own, may be safely withdrawn."

We have supported the Contadora groups' efforts in this regard as well, as you know.

Q Senator Cranston is going there to visit all four countries this week. Was he in here for any briefings?

A I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know whether he was or wasn't. You probably should address your questions to the Senator's office.

Q Alan, getting back for a moment to the Judge Clark question. A moment ago you made a statement on behalf of President Reagan, after talking, what you said was made as a result of talking with Larry Speakes; then, you declined to make a similar statement after talking with Judge Clark. I'm not sure I understand.

A I didn't talk to him about that question. I did talk to Larry Speakes about the question.

Q When you spoke with Judge Clark, you did not discuss --

A I didn't ask him his views on this, that and the other issue. I was talking about -- I'm not going to get into my discussion with him beyond what I've already said. But I'm reporting to you -- maybe I should try and be less forthcoming and I'll take that under advisement, but I was trying to report to you that the President's views, as discussed with me this morning by his Spokesman, are as I have articulated them to you.

Q Should we read anything into the fact that you won't make a similar report on a conversation with Judge Clark --

A That I didn't discuss the issue.

Q Alan, since John Hughes, reportedly, caused something of a sensation by declaring that it would be impractical to dismantle Israeli settlements in the West Bank, could you tell us who the State Department regards as the legal owner of the West Bank if Israeli settlements there are illegal?

A I would refer you back, Lester, to statements we have on the record. I'm sure you can do the research on it.

Q Couldn't you just enlighten us? Tell us who is it; it's simple.

A I'll refer you back to the record, Lester.

Q You would rather duck it?

A No, I'd rather refer you to the record. I assume you know how to do some research.

Q Two questions on Nicaragua and Honduras. One, in the New York Times today, it asserts and cites Western diplomats that the Nicaraguan army struck on June 29 on an insurgent base in Honduras. Do you have anything on that?

And, secondly, with respect to the alleged massacre that took place by the FDN last week, have you received confirmation and are you seeking confirmation?

A I don't have anything for you on either of those.

Q Can we return just for a moment to the question of the Russian boy. If the interview does take place and the youth asks to remain, is there an established mechanism and procedure to go down the line on that, assuming his parents don't want it since he's not of majority?

A Again, as Jim would point out to me, that is a hypothetical question, and I'm not going to try to address it.

Q What's the policy on it, Alan? That's a dodge. That's a very legitimate --

A I'm sorry, Lester, if that's a dodge, but I'll answer the questions and you can ask them.

Q Back on Lebanon just for a bit. Is there a heightened sense of concern about these problems there? I'm thinking of the airport as having been closed for six days; the Druze continuing to pressure the Lebanese Government; and McFarlane is in Beirut still. No reports of him moving out except for the possibility of this Wednesday thing. But can you have a characterization of the situation; are you concerned about what's going on?

A I'd say that certainly we are concerned. I don't want to try to give you a temperature reading in terms of heightened concern from day to day. It is obviously a question of concern to us and we would hope that these issues could be resolved.

I refer you back to the statement I made before about reconciliation.

Q Are there any practical things that we are doing such as the Lebanese army reportedly using helicopters to ferry people over to Cyprus and back? Are we doing anything to support that?

A You would have to check with the Pentagon about what's being done in that respect.

Q On that point, there is a report today that McFarlane's, one of his priorities is to try to delay the Israeli decision to redeploy in order to create mechanisms to safeguard that region. Is that one of McFarlane's points? Can you confirm that?

A We have not been addressing the question of what he has been doing. But lest I mislead you, let me note that as the Secretary has said, we view the Israeli redeployment as the first step toward the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q One more question on Chad. You mentioned attack helicopters being brought in but you didn't mention fixed-winged aircraft --

A Yes, I did. I mentioned light aircraft.

Q What do you mean by "light aircraft?"

A Again, this now goes back to last week in terms it was based south of the Aozou; what was available south of the Aozou,.excuse me.

Q Spotter planes or do you mean --

A I don't have more detail on that at this point. There certainly has been bombing from Libyan planes.

Q That's what I want to ask. Is the bombing from fixed-wing planes or from attack helicopters?

A No, I think the bombing is from fixed-wing aircraft.

Q As I was going to say, the helicopters wouldn't be able to bomb.

A The bombing is from fixed-wing aircraft.

Q What's the most recent date of the bombings that you have, Alan?

A I don't have a date to give you. Sorry.

Q The story in the London Sunday Times yesterday, a long story on this Barbie case; it was turned back to French authorities, but the (inaudible), refers to the State Department. It says, informed sources, and this is on the basis of the freedom of information documents -- informed sources in London told the Sunday Times that there was a disagreement centered on the State Department's unhappiness, about the Justice Department's main recommendation, that is, that the United States should apologize to France for helping Barbie escape French justice after the war.

It is understood, said the Sunday Times of London, that U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz has become personally involved in the interdepartmental argument over whether the report should be changed. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I think that the report will be released in due course. I can't give you a specific time on that.

But in terms of the interagency consideration, I obviously would not get into that question.

Q A brief follow-up. I understand the Secretary is on vacation up in Massachussetts for the next two weeks?

A That is correct.

Q Can you say where?

A He's in Massachussetts. I don't think I'm going to send people scurrying up there.

Q For some reason they wanted to know, did he go directly there from Mexico City or New Orleans?

A No, he did not go to New Orleans. He wasn't in Mexico City either, though.

Q Does this mean we'll have you for the next two weeks?

A Yes, Lester, you're going to have me for the next two weeks. Smile. Grin and bear it.

Q On the Russian boy, can you tell me how long you intend to keep up your vigil outside the Chancery?

A Our policy and approach to this is as it has been stated. I don't have anything new to offer you on that in terms of the future. It is as it has been.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:07 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, August 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #143

TUESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have just one statement to give you. Apparently there's been some confusion about the status of a Congressional Research Service study that was the subject of a press release, I guess, the other day, and was the subject of a story. I have a statement on the status of that just to make sure that is clear.

The Congressional Research Service has released an issue brief entitled, "British and French Nuclear Forces in the INF Negotiations." That report discusses the United States and NATO position that British and French systems should not be addressed in the INF talks. The Congressional Research Service is a fully independent research department of the Library of Congress. As such, it speaks neither for the Administration nor for the United States Congress.

On the specific issue involved, the rationale against inclusion of British and French forces in the INF negotiations is compelling. We believe the Soviet position that they be included in the talks is designed to justify a demand for unequal levels of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The British and French forces are strategic nuclear forces and are very different from the INF systems under negotiation in Geneva. The United States' position on third country forces in the INF negotiations remains unchanged. We are not prepared to negotiate limits on or compensation for such systems. This is also the strongly held position of the British, the French and our other NATO allies.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy, Alan?

A Yes, sure.

Q Just a follow-up on that. What about the British submarine missiles which are assigned to NATO? Do you address that specifically?

A I don't have anything further on this. Why don't I take a look and and see if I can get anything further for you on it?

Q Alan, can you bring up, please, on talks in the Middle East with Mr. McFarlane, and as well what knowledge you have on the Defense Minister going -- I've forgotten his name.

A Mr. Arens; is that the --

Q That's the guy, yes.

A Ambassador McFarlane is in Israel today. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut, Lebanon. I don't have anything on Defense Minister Arens' activities.

Q Do you have anything on the story in the Post today regarding Mr. Grove and the refusal of Kuwait to accept him as a U.S. Ambassador?

A Yes, I do. It is correct that the Government of Kuwait asked the United States to withdraw its request for agrement to the assignment fo Mr. Grove as the next American Ambassador to Kuwait, succeeding Ambassador Francois M. Dickman.

In making its request, the Government of Kuwait indicated the sole reason for rejecting Mr. Grove's nomination was that he had until recently served as Counsel General in Jerusalem. We profoundly disagree with the suggestion that because one of our finest professional officers has been assigned to one post he cannot be assigned to another.

We have made known our views at the highest levels of the Government of Kuwait. A practical consequence of the Kuwaiti action is that the United States is not now represented at the Ambassadorial level in Kuwait. We have no immediate plans to nominate another another candidate.

Q A copy of that?

A Sure.

Q A follow-up to this. When do you expect to start reconsidering sending an Ambassador to Kuwait?

A I don't have anything further beyond what I just said; no immediate plans to nominate.

Q You talked about the Kuwaiti explanation. Besides the mentioning of the fact that he served in Jerusalem, have the Kuwaitis said anything about his positions on the Middle East conflict, or any other things regarding his role?

A As I say, in making its request they indicated the sole reason for rejecting it was his service in Jerusalem.

I did see in the story this morning a suggestion that somehow this represented possibly a turning by Saudi Arabia and others, or an effort to distance themselves from the U.S. I would say with regard to that, we've seen no signs that Saudi Arabia is trying to distance itself from the U.S. in recent weeks. Contrary to the allegation contained in the story, Ambassador McFarlane did not receive a "very cool reception" in Saudi Arabia last week. He was cordially received by King Fahd and other Saudi leaders. His discussions there were useful and ended with mutual agreement that the United States and Saudi Arabia will continue their respective efforts to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, and the restoration of the Lebanese Government's sovereignty over all its territory.

Q You said that you profoundly disagree with the Kuwaiti decision, but you didn't really say why you disagree with it. Would you explain?

A Yes, I think I did.

Q You said because you don't think that because he serves in one place he can't serve in another.

A You got it.

Q That's not an explanation. What's the --

A I think it is.

Q What is the reason why the U.S. feels that a country should not place previous service, use previous service as a consideration?

A It's not practice anywhere to impose such conditions.

Q Alan, it's past diplomatic practice?

A It's standard practice.

Q Just one more follow-up. Is it actually the first case like this, that an Arab country rejects a U.S. diplomat because of his service in Israel, or were there some cases like this in the past?

A I am not aware of a precedent for rejecting a diplomat for service in Jerusalem or in Israel.

Q The question was service in Israel. Was he actually accredited to the Israeli Government or not?

A No. That's why I phrased my answer the way I did in response to the question. We would find objectionable a restriction of this sort in any event. In light of U.S. policy on Jerusalem, however, we find it especially ironic that the Government of Kuwait chose to take the decision it did. We've had a consistent Jerusalem policy for three decades. We do not recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital. We have never recognized unilateral actions by any state in the area as affecting the status of Jerusalem.

We regard East Jerusalem as occupied territory within the meaning of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 and subject to applicable international law and conventions.

The Counsel General in Jerusalem, therefore, holds a special status. He is not accreedited to the Government of Israel. He reports directly to the Department of State rather than through the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Yes. It may take a little while afterwards.

Q Wasn't someone being objected to because they served in Chile about a year ago?

A Sorry?

Q Zaire objected because of --

A I don't recall that specific instance, though.

Q You said that he's not accredited to the Government of Israel. Is he accreditred to any other legal entity?

Q What about the assignment of diplomats from Taiwan to the People's Republic? Do they go directly from Taiwan to the People's Republic, or do they in fact come back to the States for certain periods of time?

A Of course, we don't have anybody on official status in Taiwan. I am not aware of any restriction of the sort that somebody who has been serving in a private capacity in our office in Taiwan, if he re-enters government service and then going on to China.

Q Could you perhaps find out how many diplomats in different posts have served in Israel and have subsequently been reposted to Arab countries since then?

A No, I'm not going to try to do a survey on it.

Q Why not?

A If you want to try and do the research, you've got access to various sorts of lists where you can do it.

Q With respect to press speculation of distancing by Saudi Arabia, which you dealt with, do you interpret the Kuwaiti move as an effort to distance itself from U.S. policy?

A I think that we take at face value what we were told.

--MORE--

Q How do you think --

A I'm sorry, I couldn't hear the first part of your question.

Q How do you think this incident, how do you say, would affect the general relations between Kuwait and the U.S. besides the fact that you won't have an Ambassador there?

A I don't want to try to give a judgment on that.

Q Do you believe that there is a message that the Kuwaitis are sending you through this refusal of Mr. Grove since early this year, I believe, in February and March the Kuwaitis refused to exercise their right when they bought Sante Fe Company in California and they couldn't dig the seashore, whatever it is, oil and minerals as the action of Mr. Watt, the Secretary of Interior?

A I don't see a relationship.

Q You don't see any relationship with that?

Q You mentioned a practical effect of this decision in Kuwait. Are there any other effects that you foresee as a result of this decision on relations between the U.S. and other Arab countries?

A I don't have any reason to offer a comment on that.

Q Could you describe the nature of Mr. Grove's duties? Was he assigned to East Jerusalem?

A Yes, in the Consulate General.

Q East Jerusalem as opposed to --

A Yes. That's where the Consulate General is located.

Q Is there also a Consulate in the other part of the city; are there two?

A Maybe somebody in this room knows, to answer the question. I see a nodding head.

Q Yes.

A Okay, the answer is yes.*

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*See page 13 for further clarification.

Q Has the United States launched an official protest, lodged an official protest with the Kuwaitis?

A I said in the original answer that I gave you that we have made known our views at the highest levels of the Government of Kuwait.

Q Are you asking the Kuwaitis to come up with more valid reasons, or you're just --

A I'm not going to get into the back-and-forth between us. I'll stick with what I've just given you.

Q Where else did he serve on post besides the staff positions at the Department?

A Sorry, where --

Q Where else did Grove serve on post in other Embassies?

A I don't have his file.

Q I think you said that there is no Ambassador now to the United States from Kuwait. How long hasn't there been one?

A I'm not sure when he departed post. It wasn't all that long ago. My recollection is that it probably was a matter of weeks ago, but let me see if I can get you something on that as to specifically when he left.

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't know.

Q What is Dickman's first name?

A Francois.

Q Do you have anything on a Justice Department report on Klaus Barbie in which we supposedly give our regrets to France?

A I think I'm going to withhold any comment on that until Justice holds a briefing on the subject, which I understand was scheduled for 1:00. At the time of their briefing, we'll be prepared in the Press Office to address questions relating to that report, but I don't think it would be fair to Justice to jump the gun on their briefing.

Q Same subject. Will they be referring some questions here?

A They may well be.

Q Alan, when is Charge' Sokolov seeing Burt? Do you have anything new on the Berezhkov case?

A Nothing new on it. The contacts are continuing. Don't have any specifics to offer you.

Q Do you have a time when Sokolov is seeing Burt?

A I don't have anything specific on future conversations to offer you.

Q I think the Russians announced that. It's 4:30. Couldn't we be as forthcoming as the Soviet Embassy?

Q A status report on Chad?

A A status report on Chad?

Q Before we do that, may I just ask one other question about the Russian. Alan, are the Justice Department, the White House and the State Department lawyers in concert that the United States is on firm, legal ground in trying to detain this youth and question him before he goes to his --

A I refer you to what I said yesterday. I don't have anything to add to what I said.

Q You won't add anything?

A I don't need to add to that.

On the situation in Chad, we've seen no reports of renewed fighting in Chad. However, the Libyans continue to fortify their position in Chad. As I indicated yesterday, we're carrying a minimum number of Libyans in Chad at 2,500. I'd say that's a minimum figure. I can't give you a maximum figure.

Q What about Habre's offer to negotiate directly with Oadhafi?

A I don't have a specific comment to offer you on that. He's the head of the legitimate government of Chad.

Q There are some reports floating around now that we do have some signs of direct Soviet participation in Chad with the Libyans. Can you address that?

A I'm aware of a report that there was supposedly a Soviet adviser, a single Soviet adviser with the Libyans, I guess. I'm not going to have any comment on that because I think the sourcing would be intelligence.

Q Last week you said specifically, or there was some guidance posted, or something, saying specifically that there was no information available to the U.S. that there was direct Soviet participation in Chad. Are you still staying with that?

A As I say, the information concerning this report would have to have come from intelligence materials. We don't comment on reports coming from alleged intelligence materials. I can't help you on it.

Q Have the rest of the American trainers and logistic experts returned?

A You have to check with DOD. I don't have it.

Q In light of the survey which was, I believe, conducted in France that 53 percent of the French people are against any involvement of France in the Chad thing. What do you see your position that you'll be taking in light of your asking France to increase its involvement there?

A First of all, I don't accept your characterization of our dialogue with France, but I'm not going to comment on that dialogue in any detail. In any case, I don't have a comment on the report of the poll. I saw that this morning but don't have any comment on it.

Q Here's one that's sort of out of the blue. There's a domestic program in the U.S. that sprays paraquat to prevent the growth of marijuana. Is there a foreign policy consultation on that? Does the domestic program -- is it part of a foreign policy goal as an example, perhaps, to other countries?

A I think there's some guidance on that which came in very late. I couldn't deal with it before the briefing. It's in the Press Office.

Q Do you have anything on the U.S. citizen being kidnapped in Columbia?

A Yes, I do have something on that. We have been in touch with our Embassy in Bogota about this matter. U.S. citizen Russell Martin Stendal, who operates a ranch in the eastern plains area of Columbia some 180 miles southeast of Bogota, was reported seized by a group of armed men about 4:00 p.m. last Sunday afternoon after landing his private aircraft at an airstrip near his ranch. Stendal apparently was not injured during the incident, and we are in close touch with Columbian authorities about the case.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Sure.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything on Uruguay?

A We continue to follow developments in Uruguay with concern and interest. We had some guidance available in the Press Office about ten days ago, noting the Uruguayan Government's decree suspending all public political activity, including press reports and comments on such activity, as well as the new institutional act extending the applicability of rules regarding political proscriptions.

These new measures constitute potential obstacles to democracy in Uruguay. Our relations with Uruguay have improved as the country has progressed in returning to democracy. In this context these new decisions are cause for particular concern.

We have also noted the renewed commitment of the Government of Uruguay to hold elections in 1984 for a constitutional government, assuming office in March of 1985, and their declaration that the armed forces are open to a dialogue with Uruguay's political parties.

Q That's the same guidance as last week, right?

A Some of it is; some of it isn't.

Q Are you saying that our relations with Uruguay will be dependent on the steps they take toward achieving real democracy?

A I'm not going to try to give you anything further than I have on this.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli Chief of Staff, General Levi, I believe, statement that redeployment of Israeli forces to the Awali River will begin within a few days, and that he was asking the Lebanese Government to send their forces to that area where they will be withdrawing. He said specifically that after Israel withdraws from there, we are not responsible for anything that is going to happen.

A I don't have anything specific on that. Obviously, the subject of what happens in the course of the first phase of the Israeli withdrawal is something that is the subject of ongoing dialogue.

I would repeat what we have indicated before, what the Israeli Government has indicated very clearly, that this withdrawal, this movement of forces, is the first part of a movement which would lead to the total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q One thing on the Middle East, please, or actually three. The United Nations conference that took place in Geneva the last two weeks, the United States did not take part.

Do you have anything on that?

A The U.N. conference on --

Q To combat racism.

A We've had guidance on that before.

Q There was something.

A Yes. Very explicit, strong guidance on that. I would refer you to the Press Office on it.

Q Last Friday, 241 members of the Brazilian House of Representatives signed a document -- that's an absolute majority of the House there -- signed a document condemning the IMF agreement that is attempting to be imposed now on Brazil, calling for an immediate moratorium, and saying that, if necessary, Brazil should simply break with the IMF rather than suffer this sort of social chaos that would result from going along with the agreement.

Major industry leaders in Brazil have issued similar documents, and the army in particular has been making major statements that what the IMF is demanding actually threatens the national security of the country.

I'm wondering if you can just make a statement about U.S. policy in those situations where what the banks and the IMF are demanding, indeed does threaten the national security of a close and important ally of this country?

A I don't have a specific comment to offer on that. We obviously vote in international financial institutions based on our judgment of the economic and financial considerations.

I'm not going to comment on an internal Brazilian judgment on that.

Q Alan, getting back to that Soviet youth for a minute, do you have anything on a Soviet complaint about a TASS report, that a TASS correspondent and his family were stopped and questioned out at Dulles with their 15-year-old son?

A I don't have anything with me. I think, again, this question was raised yesterday. I think it was addressed over the weekend. I would refer you to what was said at that point.

Q Is everything still the same on that? The United States still wants to interview the youth?

A There is no change --

Q They're still insisting that he not be allowed to leave the country before the interview?

A There is no change in our position.

Q No change?

A No.

Q Do you have any specific dates on the visit -- of a planned visit of President Mubarak?

A I'm sorry. Say again.

Q Do you have specific dates on the Egyptian President's visit to the United States next month?

A No. I don't have anything on that. Excuse me. I have a correction that I have been given.

U.S. policy is that there is one Consulate General in Jerusalem. The Consul General's office and residence are located in West Jerusalem. The consular and commercial section are located in East Jerusalem.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the article that appeared about the pending IMF legislation in the Post today and what the Administration position is with respect to the amendments?

A Yes, I do. The Administration is concerned that the provision which has been discussed in the press today could politicize the IMF. The IMF is a key institution in the international financial system.

Attempts to politicize decisions would invite similar actions by other nations. Such actions could impair the ability of the IMF to pursue its role in maintaining international financial stability.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes. We can do that. Just one second, if you would. Okay. Go ahead.

Q What exactly are you commenting on? I don't understand.

A There was a story this morning which I would suggest you might want to read. If you want to get that, it was in The Washington Post.

Q Yes. But what are you referring to?

A There is a provision in there on loans to what are called -- well, countries that practice apartheid and to communist dictatorships, and that is the provision that we're --

Q What in fact you are saying is that the State Department opposes this legislation, this amendment, that would prevent the American director to the IMF to vote in favor of loans to Communist countries?

A I will stick with the language I've got here, which is, as I've said, the Administration is concerned that such provision could politicize the IMF.

Q (Inaudible)

A Would you go to a microphone so people who are listening can hear you?

Q You're referring to both the apartheid provision and the communist dictatorship provision, not solely the communist dictatorship provision about which the article was written?

A There is one provision.

Q Okay. So your remarks cover the apartheid provision as well.

A It covers the section that was -- the language that was introduced on that issue that would result in politicization.

Q Do you have anything at all on Poland and events in the last couple of days?

A I don't.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #144

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I do not have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any response to President Mitterrand's comments? They're critical of U.S. pressure in the Chad situation.

A You're referring to the stories that appeared in this morning's paper, the Le Monde piece. If the story is accurate, we regret this apparent misunderstanding. We have consulted fully on a daily basis during the entirety of this problem, with numerous French civilian and military officials at the highest levels.

Q Is that all?

A Yes.

Q The President is quoted as saying that he read about the AWACS deployment, or the AWACS movement in the newspaper.

A I can only say to that that the AWACS were deployed with prior consultation and with the full knowledge of senior French Government officials.

Q I'm sorry, what did you say, our regret was based on -- what are we regretting? I just didn't hear what you said.

A You're not listening.

Q At the very beginning, you --

A We regret this apparent misunderstanding, is what I said.

Q So there is an apparent misunderstanding?

A I said if the story is accurate.

Q And how are we communicating our regret?

A I don't think it's a question of communicating regret. I think it's a matter of expressing it in response to your question about our reaction to the story.

Q Does the State Department have any objection to the Veterans of Foreign Wars announced campaign to help the Nicaraguan freedom fighters?

A I understand, if I recall the wires yesterday, that Larry Speakes addressed this, and I would refer you to what he said on that.

Q What does the State Department -- that's what I --

A I have no problem. I would fully support what Larry said on that, but I'd refer you to what he said.

Q I know. But in the story there was no mention of that, as I recall. Could you just tell us, do you approve or disapprove?

A I would refer you to what Larry said.

Q Back to the French-Chad situation again. If the consultation has been at the highest levels and has been so close, why is it that the United States is unaware of President Mitterrand's apparent -- why is it unaware of whether the story is true or not? Wouldn't you know if the consultation was so close?

A I don't think that Le Monde has shared with us a transcript of various interviews it may have had.

Q No, but President Mitterrand presumably has --

A But that's where the story appeared.

Q But President Mitterrand presumably has discussed with the U.S. in the close consultations that its had any dismay he may have had, so you're casting doubt on whether or not there is a problem and yet issuing an apology at the same time.

A I've given you our response to it.

Q There's a report from the West Coast that Larry Speakes is saying that there will be a redefinition of the role and the number of U.S. advisors in El Salvador. Could you expand on that?

A No. I'm not aware that Larry has said that. I think there were some reports last night. There was one on television last night, I think, and there's some reporting in the papers this morning on this question.

I don't have any comment really at this point. We've indicated before that the number of trainers in El Salvador was continually under review. It remains under review. No decisions have been taken on that.

Q And we've recommended that the limit stick to 55?

A I'm not going to address specific recommendations that may or may not be in the process of being made. I don't think it's appropriate. We deal with decisions and policy, not recommendations.

Q I'm trying to recall whether in fact you ever confirmed that you made such a recommendation, or that the Pentagon made such a recommendation?

A No. We've never confirmed what recommendations may or may not have been made.

Q Could you make any comment on the story in The Washington Post that Israel is planning to supply arms to Salvador?

A That would essentially be a matter between El Salvador and Israel. I guess I don't have anything, I mean, that would be a bilateral issue for them.

Q If I may add, the reason for supposing that we might have something to say is that we have a peculiarly intense interest in both of those countries.

A No, I don't think so. The question of security assistance from Israel to El Savaldor is really a bilateral matter.

Q Was the U.S. involved in the discussions beween El Salvador and Israel regarding moving the Embassy to Jerusalem and reopening the Israeli Embassy in San Salvador?

A We were not consulted on this issue, and I would repeat, this is a bilateral issue between them.

Q Could I just ask a question on that? Why is it that this is just considered strictly a bilateral matter between Israel and El Salvador?

A Because it is.

Q When, on the other hand, the question of external -- the supply of Nicaragua by external powers, external to the hemisphere, is considered something more than that, something that we have a definite judgment about?

A I think you're comparing situations which are quite different. We've talked before, and I'm not going to try to roll out the language we've used before about concern about Nicaraguan military buildup and why that concerns us. That's quite a different matter from the question of El Salvador and its efforts to deal with the situation that it poses.

Q How is it different? I'm terribly perplexed. I can't see any difference at all. I think the gentleman's question is very well taken. Could you tell us, unless you really want to duck this embarrassing question, could you tell us how specifically it is different? It's a reasonable question. We'd love to have a reasonable answer from you, Alan.

A If you've finished your question, maybe I could respond.

Q I am.

A Thank you. We've addressed the issue before about the nature, as I said, of the Nicaraguan situation and our concerns for the buildup in Nicaragua, going well beyond any needs that we have seen justified, and also dealt with the situation in El Salvador where the government faces a Nicaraguan supported and otherwise externally supported insurgency, and they're trying to deal with it, and it's quite a different situation.

Q You think that the El Salvadorans do need more arms, is that what you're saying, from Israel?

A I'm not saying from Israel. I'm not talking about --

Q That's the source and nature of the question, I thought, Alan.

A I wasn't addressing the sourcing. I say, that's a matter between Israel and El Salvador.

Q You're ducking his question.

A No, I'm not ducking his question.

Q Yes, you are.

Q Just one more on the same subject. Would the U.S. Government welcome Israeli military assistance in any manner to El Salvador?

A It is a matter between the governments of El Salvador and Israel whether there is an arms relationship or not. I don't know whether there is or not. We're not going to get into the question of (a) whether there is, and (b) whether it's appropriate or not appropriate or anything of that sort. That's a bilateral issue between those two governments.

Q On this also, Alan. If Israel is supplying to El Salvador weapons of American-origin that were captured in Lebanon, will the United States then have something to say about that?

A American weapons which were captured in Lebanon?

Q Right, that's it.

A I can only answer you, I guess, in a broad sense; that is to say, in order to transfer U.S.-origin arms, or arms with U.S.-supplied components, any country is required to obtain U.S. approval prior to such transfer.

Q That means captured U.S. arms --

A May I finish, Lester?

Q Of course.

A Thank you. I appreciate that. The U.S. has not approved any Israeli requests to transfer U.S.-origin arms to El Salvador or any other Latin American country. Israeli arms from non-U.S. sources that are produced in Israel without American components would not require prior U.S. approval, obviously.

Q On the issue of Jerusalem, doesn't the move of El Salvador's embassy into Jerusalem in a way prejudge the final status of Jerusalem, which the United States actually does not want, but through negotiations.

A The location of El Salvador's embassy in Israel is a matter for El Salvador and Israel. U.S. policy with respect to Jerusalem has been consistent for over three decades and was reiterated by President Reagan when he presented his September 1 peace initiative.

In our view the final status of Jerusalem must be resolved in negotiations among the parties concerned in the context of a comprehensive, just and lasting Middle East peace.

Our position is that Jerusalem should remain undivided, with free access to the holy places. In accordance with this policy, and pending a resolution of Jerusalem's status, our Embassy is located in Tel Aviv.

Q Two more questions about El Salvador. First, would you welcome the decision of the Israeli Government to reopen the Embassy in El Salvador?

A Again, I think that this is a matter between them. I'm not in a position to express -- it's not up to us to express views on these decisions.

Q Another question. Since you are supporting the Salvadoran Government, wouldn't you, again, welcome similar assistance from other countries around the world?

A Obviously, as a general proposition, we support the government, certainly, of El Salvador in various ways which are quite obvious to everybody. I think that speaks for itself. I don't think it is up to us, however, to comment on relations between El Salvador and other countries, tempting as it may be to do so.

Q One more on this question. I want to focus the question on the extracontinental aspects of it. There are lots of regional peace negotiations which are predicated on the elimination of arms supplies to countries in the region, and the elimination of advisors as well. These people as asking people to stay away. Insofar as we want ultimate recourse to the OAS, we haven't welcomed the involvement of extracontinental powers in the local dispute there.

How does this further the chances of peace, and how does it further the argument that the OAS is going to be the ultimate forum in which this has to be decided?

A I haven't addressed the issue of a purported, or questioned, about Salvadoran-Israeli arms relationship, and I don't therefore see how I can get to that question. Clearly, you are correct in stating that there are a variety of proposals out there for a regional solution which include cessation of offensive weapons shipments and a variety of other things on a verifiable, mutual basis, and so on.

I refer you back to all the things we've talked about before. That certainly is our policy. I'm not commenting on this particular thing.

Q I'm curious. On Monday, you said, as far as the resumption of relations between Israel and Liberia, that you welcome such a move and you encouraged other African countries to follow suit, those that had severed relations. Why, then, is the issue of re-establishing an embassy, an Israeli Embassy in El Savador something of a bilateral nature and not --

A The one question the other day related to establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. This is related to not establishing diplomatic relations, but the location of embassies. That's the basic story, and I'm not discussing that.

Q Regarding Jerusalem, Kuwait said that it had apologized for its rejection of the Ambassador-nominee. Is this correct? Do you have any comment?

A It has apologized?

Q Yes.

A I'm not aware of that. I'll look into it and see if I've got anything on it, but I'm not aware of that.

Q You said earlier that the United States hasn't approved any requests from Israel to send arms to El Salvador. But has there been any requests?

A That I don't know.

Q Just a little broader question. We now have the Israelis helping Salvador. There was a story earlier this week on Guatemala in an arms accord with Salvador. There's the well-known relationship with Honduras and El Salvador. Are these things something that the United States approves of, has planned, or that we have no opinion on and are strictly Salvadoran?

A First of all, I don't know what arms relationship may exist between Israel and El Salvador, and we were not consulted on the question of the location of embassies.

I believe I saw a wire report -- we said we knew nothing about the reported agreement between El Salvador and Guatemala. I saw a wire report after that from El Salvador denying there was any such agreement. So you're asking me what is in essence a hypothetical question. I'm not going to address it.

Q Since we, in principle, agree with the declaration of the Contadora countries that oppose the flow of arms to the region, wouldn't we also in principle, therefore, oppose the flow of arms from Israel to El Salvador?

A We would favor an agreement on a regional basis, verifiable, mutual basis, covering a variety of issues including the flow of offensive weapons to the region. We're not in that situation. I'm not going to address the question of the Israeli-Salvadoran relationship in that context.

What we are talking about, though, in terms of an agreement is something which, as I say, mutual and so on. We clearly have continued to provide military equipment to El Salvador. What we're talking about is that would also have to be addressed as would the presence of trainers or advisors, or whatever, throughout the region. But that's a different context. We're not there.

Q Can you confirm and make a comment on a report that the Government of Lebanon -- the report is attributed to State Department officials -- that the Government of Lebanon intends to evict up to 75 or 70 percent of Palestinians in Lebanon?

A Again, I think that we're back to the reporting about a working level document which is not currently under active consideration, and I'm not going to fuel public speculation about it or comment about it beyond what we've done before.

Q Alan, new subject, please. Did the State Department have any role, or have any comment regarding the meeting today with Mr. Andropov, Mr. William Winpisinger, the President of the Machinists' Union?

A The short answer to the question is no. Mr. Winpisinger and the Machinists' Union delegation made a decision on its own to visit the Soviet Union as guests of the Soviet Labor Organization.

Our Embassy in Moscow was not informed of the visit either in the planning stages or upon the arrival of the delegation.

Q Have they made any contact with the embassy following this meeting? Is there any effort underway to discuss it with them?

A I'm not aware of any contact, but I don't know. I may be behind the curve, but I don't know of any contact.

Q While on the question of Andropov, do you have any reaction to Andropov's latest statement about INF deployment?

A I just saw a wire before I came out. I don't have a reaction to that.

Q The Soviet journal, Literary Gazette, on August 10, carries an attack on the President's March 23 so-called Star Wars speech by Mr. Burlatsky who is a close associate of Andropov's. Burlatsky says that these weapon systems would give the U.S. a first-strike capability, and that the Soviets would consider this a causus belli.

Since Burlatsky was one of the leaders of the Soviet so-called peace delegation here in the United States several months ago, would you care to respond to his characterization?

A No, I don't think I would respond to him particularly. We have explained at some length the nature of the ideas the President was talking about; that we were talking about exploring this together with the Soviets. We're talking about essentially a research program at this particular stage of the game. But I'm not going to respond to a particular Soviet story.

Q What's the situation with the Berezhkov -- the Soviet boy, the sixteen year-old?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that. We remain in communication with the Soviets on the issue.

--MORE--

Q Have there been any meetings today on it?

A I guess I'm not going to get into a sort of a rundown on meetings. I will repeat what I said: There is continuing communication. I don't think I want to get into the question of how that is carried on.

Q Any progress being made?

A Again, I'm not going to characterize it.

Q Alan, what would happen if the Soviet Union chartered an airplane and put the boy on it? Would that violate anything that you know about that the State Department is -- Would the State Department have the right to tell a chartered plane not to leave?

A You're asking me a legal question. I think that as a general matter, I prefer to stick with what we have said before, which is that we want to talk with the young man to ascertain his intentions; and that is where we are on that.

I think you might want to research the law, but I think you will find that certainly there are clear, legal provisions about international traffic and the control of international traffic.

Q I think the Immigration Service has referred all questions over here.

A I didn't refer you to INS; I referred you to your lawyers and the law books. But clearly, there is, as I say, control. Each country controls entry and exit of international carriers from its territory. I can't cite you the specific provisions and all of that, but --

Q Has Secretary Shultz had any involvement in this issue direct whatever since on his vacation?

A He has certainly remained very much in touch with the issue.

Q He hasn't made any calls to any Soviet officials or any (inaudible) --

A I'm not going to get into that kind of thing. He certainly has remained very much in touch with this issue. I'm going to leave it at that.

Q Alan, on the other part of my question, these officials also expressed concern about the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Can you comment on that? Is there reason for concern? Do you see any danger, really, for the Palestinians in Lebanon?

A Ghassan, I guess what I'd have to do is refer you back to statements we have made before on this subject. We have addressed the issue before, and said as a general matter, we have looked at this, and when there have been problems, we certainly have been concerned about them. But I don't have a specific comment to offer you on the reports that came out today.

Q Just one last thing: There is also a report that the Saudi Government advised the Government of Mauritania not to receive David Korn as Ambassador because he is Jewish. That is also attributed to State Department officials.

A Yes, I saw that.

Q Do you care to comment on that?

A I don't have anything on it. I saw that.

Q Is it true?

A As I said, I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, considering the report that the United States has formally apologized for sheltering Klaus Barbie, are we similarly apologetic about the sheltering of another Nazi war criminal, Romanian Archbishop Valerian Trifa, for two decades by the National Council of Churches?

A Lester, I'm not familiar with the specifics of the case. I think the issue of our attitude toward the Barbie case was gone over at considerable length at the Justice Department yesterday, and I think you're probably familiar with what was said in that event had to do with U.S. Government personnel who, for reasons discussed yesterday at the briefing, did take some actions which prevented Mr. Barbie from being turned over to the French.

I'm not going to try to compare various cases, and I have nothing to say about the Trifa case.

Q I just have one follow-up: Does it appear strange to the State Department that the French gladly received Barbie, but the Israelis won't take Trifa who led in the murder of at least 1,000 Jews in Bucharest, in 1941? Does that appear strange at all?

A Again, I don't have anything on the Trifa case.

Q We don't have any comment on that?

A I have no basis for commenting, Lester.

Q Alan, TASS says Nazi war criminals are still being harbored by the United States and carry out subversive intelligence operations against socialist countries.

A Again, we've addressed the question of Nazi war criminals in the United States and the Justice Department's efforts to track them down, and I would refer you to Justice. Certainly, there has been an active effort to do that, but let me refer you to Justice. They are the ones who are engaged in that.

But it is simply untrue to suggest that the U.S. Government is using Nazi war criminals for any purpose.

Q Alan, on Barbie, based on the Justice Department's report, why is the United States Government not extending regrets or whatever to the Government of Bolivia, which accepted Barbie not knowing who he was?

A I think that the circumstances suggested to those who were involved that, given the fact that the French were the ones who were trying to get Barbie back for trial, that expression of regret was appropriate.

Q That's true, but the Justice Department documents his involvement with para-military groups in Bolivia since the 70s and with senior military officials there.

Why is this different, for example, from our outrage over the Cubans sending their excludables here? Why wouldn't (inaudible)

A Our study was addressed principally to the question of how he got out of Germany, were we involved, and was he involved with the U.S. Government after this brief period of time from 1947 to 1950? The answer to which was no.

I don't have a lot to give you on that. There is an extensive report and documentation backing it up, and I really would refer you back to it.

Q In connection with the Barbie case and with the Chad/French consultations, and the reported disagreements prior to Williamsburg between the United States and France, is Secretary Burt or anyone else in the Department planning to engage in any kind of a special round of talks with the French to go over bilateral relations, and see if there is a way of improving consultations and communications between the two governments?

A I'm not aware of any particular effort in that regard. We have very close and frequent consultations with the Government of France, and I think that the fact of the matter is that the Williamsburg Summit was quite successful, so whatever reports you're referring to about strains before it, I can't confirm. But in any case, the results were quite good.

As I said, we have had frequent, virtually daily, close consultations with the French on Chad and so on, so first of all, I don't know of any particular effort, and second, I don't see that one is called for.

Q Developments on Chad, if you will?

A I'll get to you in a second.

Q Thank you.

Q Why is Jesse Jackson meeting with Dam?

A Why is Jesse Jackson meeting with the Acting Secretary?

Q Yes.

A Simply because he felt that an additional meeting -- you will recall that John talked about this when he was asked about it a little while ago. Mr. Jackson felt that an additional meeting in preparation for his visit to Europe was needed; he made this request through Senator Percy.

I would also note that I believe he has met with officials from the Defense Department and other departments and agencies in the government as well as having been in touch with, as I say, Congressional leaders.

Q If I were to make such a request, would I be given the same treatment?

A I couldn't guarantee that. (Laughter)

Q What's the criteria, Alan?

Q Why through Senator Percy?

A I don't know what the circumstances were, particularly, with regard to that recommendation or request.

Q If Ralph were running for President, if he announced his candidacy, would you give him the same courtesy, Alan?

A I don't know the answer to that. It's a rather hypothetical question. (Laughter)

Q I suspect it is.

A But I don't think that's the issue here. I think the issue is that he certainly is a prominent American citizen, and the request was made in a way that I have just indicated, and I --

Q You mean all prominent American citizens are given this special treatment if Percy asks, is that correct, or what is the criterion? I don't understand.

A We make an effort, Lester, to be helpful to everyone, and sometimes it gets done one way and sometimes another, but we make an effort to be helpful. I know you don't think we succeed all the time, but we try.

Q Oh, I think sometimes you do, Alan.

Q Will you please give us the latest developments that you have on Chad?

A Yes. No reports of renewed fighting in Chad. The Libyans continue to move equipment and troops into Chad. We estimate that currently there are about 2,500 to 3,000 Libyan troops in Chad.

Q Are diplomatic efforts underway? Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have any statement on the Brazzaville conference?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Are our embassies overseas being alerted to extend hospitality to possible-candidate Jackson?

A I think that they would, within the resources that they have, as they do with other Americans who visit, would extend what courtesies they could, but their --

Q What are those courtesies -- put him up, take him places, chauffeurs, limousines, and that sort of thing?

A No, I don't think that's what we're talking about, Lester.

Q What are you talking about insofar as courtesies? I'm quite interested in this, Alan.

A I don't know what specific requests he might make, but I don't think -- He's not a Congressional delegation or something of that sort where we would be providing --

Q But as you said, he's a prominent person. I just wondered what courtesies you have in mind. And do you think that he is a probable candidate?

A I have no opinion on that, Lester.

Let me just say on the question about diplomatic process on Chad. I would simply note that we favor a peaceful settlement with the withdrawal of Libyan forces and an end to Libyan aggression. We support the legitimate Government of Chad and the territorial integrity of that country.

Q President Habre is quoted today as having said that the only people with whom he will negotiate are the Libyans. Does the United States support that position?

A As I said yesterday, the question of what President Habre, as the President of the Government of Chad, wishes to do is his decision on that. As I said, we favor a peaceful settlement with the withdrawal of Libyan forces and an end to Libyan aggression.

Q Alan, another Alan -- Alan Cranston -- is leaving today, or he already left, on a four-nation trip to Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico, and he was briefed yesterday afternoon by Ambassador Richard Stone. Is he carrying any special message from the State Department to these countries, and what was the purpose of that briefing?

A Again, as I said -- I think this issue came up yesterday -- you'd have to ask Senator Cranston, but we frequently provide briefings to traveling Congressional delegations. I would not assume that he is carrying messages. We certainly have an active diplomatic dialogue with those countries.

Q Back to Chad, the Information Minister there suggested there might be Soviets along with the Libyan troops in Chad. Do you have anything more on that?

A I don't have anything beyond what I said yesterday, which is that I couldn't comment because information would presumably come from intelligence sources.

Q Do you have a rundown on the military equipment the Libyans are carrying with them into Chad?

A I did that the other day, Bernie. I think you can find it in the Press Office if you need it. I don't think I have it here.

Q I note that you are reluctant to say much about the McFarlane trip, but there have been reports that he is trying the last few days to postpone the Israeli redeployment, which is, according to the Israeli Chief of Staff, suppposed to take place within days.

Do you have any comment on this?

A No. Again, I'm not going to comment on his specific mission. Obviously, we would hope that the Israeli deployment occurs in a way which furthers the goal which is shared by Lebanon, Israel, and the United States, of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. But I can't get into the question, specifically, of what Ambassador McFarlane is discussing.

Q Are you satisfied with the level of coordination between the Israeli and the Lebanese Army regarding the coming redeployment?

A Between whom and whom?

O The Israeli Army and the Lebanese Army.

a I don't know that I can give you an evaluation of that. It isn't a matter of our being satisfied particularly on this, or expressing publicly our views on this. I think I would really leave it to the Lebanese and the Israelis, if they wish to comment.

Q Alan, Radio Damascus today called for the overthrow of President Gemayel because of the Arens meeting in Beirut yesterday. Do we have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it. I wasn't aware of it.

Q Back to the redeployment, is the Department at all concerned that the multinational force, the American contingent of that force, would in any way be in danger if, in the process of the Israeli withdrawal, the Lebanese Army couldn't assume those responsibilities in the Shouf, isn't that apprehension in this Department?

A Again, I would repeat what I just said: We would hope that the deployment occurs in a way which furthers the goal of total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. I don't really have anything to offer beyond that and what I said the other day about that, obviously, there is a need to assure that things be done in the smoothest possible way. But I don't have a specific comment on that question.

Q Back on Klaus Barbie, I know you're referring most questions to the Justice Department, but has the State Department received any specific complaints on harboring or collaborating with ex-Nazis from France or any other country since the inception of the Barbie affair?

A I can't tell you the answer to that question. I don't know, and I don't think I would get into that question basically because we're talking about a question of diplomatic exchanges. I don't think I would normally get into that.

We did talk about our expression of regret to the Government of France on this occasion, but beyond that, I don't think we would go into it.

Q Do you see Mitterand's consternation with our role in Chad as possibly connected to their deplorable characterization of our handling of the Barbie affair?

A I think you would have to ask the French those kinds of questions.

Q What information or comment do you have on the occupation of the Spanish Consulate in Los Angeles?

A I'm going to have to refer you, basically, to the Los Angeles Police Department on that. Obviously, we deplore any attack on foreign diplomats, and obviously, also deplore any act of terrorism. We're glad that the situation seems to have been resolved peacefully.

Q Do you have any idea what will happen with the family of the man who occupied the Consulate, or if there is any precedent there?

A Again, I don't have anything to add. I would refer you to --

Q Are we monitoring --

A Excuse me, Lester. I'll come right back.

Q Is Mr. McFarlane returning back to Washington this week?

A I don't know what his onward travel plans will be.

Q Did he go to Syria today?

A No. He's in Beirut. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Damascus conferring with Syrian officials.

Q Are we monitoring the return of Joshua Nkomo to Zimbabwe?

A Are we monitoring it? I wouldn't say we --

Q Well, are we watching to see what happens? I mean, are we keeping a close eye on that? You monitor a lot of things. It was prominently featured in this morning's paper.

A We're aware of it, Lester.

Q Does he have life insurance, do you know?

A I think you'd probably better ask him.

Q I'd be delighted. I thought you might have inquired into this. What happens if he is hurt, Alan? Are we going to be concerned?

A Lester, that's a hypothetical question.

Q I see. O.K.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:05 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #145

THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One statement, and then I'll be happy to take your questions.

Regarding the sentencing of the hijackers of the Chinese aircraft. The United States is pleased to note that the hijackers of a May 5 CAAC Trident Airliner, enroute from Shenyang to Shanghai and diverted to the Republic of Korea, were sentenced today by Korean authorities to jail terms ranging from four to six years.

This vigorous enforcement of the Hague Convention on the suppression of hijacking by the Republic of Korea will be welcomed by all nations that are seeking to eliminate this serious threat to commercial aviation.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, have you seen the reports of statements made by Mr. Andropov in the meeting with U.S. Senators, particularly in regard to his pledge that the Soviet Union would not be the first nation to place an anti-satellite weapon into space? Do you have a response to that?

A We don't have the details of the Soviet proposal. We've only seen a TASS report, so I can't respond in detail at this point. I would note that the Soviets have the world's only operational ASAT system, which they have maintained and continued to test for more than a dozen years.

With regard to space arms control, the President on July 4, 1982, said the U.S. "Will consider verifiable and equitable space arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons should those measures be compatible with U.S. national security."

Such measures are now under study, but there exist serious technical, substantive problems, related to verification among other issues.

In the context of the President's policy, the U.S. will of course study carefully any serious Soviet proposal on space arms control.

I would add also that the U.S. has participated fully in the discussion of space arms control in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Is this the first time that the Soviets have specifically made this offer?

A I think that there are -- you would have to do some research on this -- but my understanding is that there have been various proposals made on ASAT systems in the past publicly, and that they have been addressed in the past. I don't happen to have a record of that but I'm sure it's in the --

A Can you further address his comments on the Geneva negotiations on missiles? That the United States is not seriously interested in an agreement?

A This is to the same delegation or to Mr. Winpisinger?

Q To the Senate delegation.

A I don't have anything specifically on what he said about that. I do think that he made similar comments, if we are talking about INF missiles, to the union delegation, which I can respond to. They talked about taking countermeasures, and so on.

Q (Inaudible).

A Okay, fine. I didn't see that.

Mr. Andropov's comments should be viewed in light of the Soviets' intensifying public campaign to undermine support for U.S. INF deployments. We are negotiating seriously in Geneva and believe that satisfactory results can be achieved if the Soviet Union decides to negotiate responsibly and make serious proposals on the central issues which take into account the legitimate security interests of our NATO allies. We will continue to work for this goal when the negotiations resume on September 6.

As regards the threat of countermeasures, the Soviets have already deployed massive numbers of long-range INF missiles. They also have other weapons programs in progress which they will likely implement in any case.

The deployment of U.S. long-range INF missiles, which is scheduled to begin in December of this year in the absence of concrete results in Geneva eliminating the entire class of land-based, long-range INF missiles on both sides, is a NATO response to the deployment of SS-20 missiles by the Soviet Union which began in 1977.

As of early 1983, the Soviets had deployed 351 SS-20's with 1,053 warheads. The United States, of course, has zero deployed long-range INF warheads. I would also note that more than 70 of these SS-20's, with 210 warheads, have been deployed during the INF negotiations. Nevertheless, the United States has continued to negotiate seriously and in good faith despite these Soviet deployments, and we would expect the Soviets to do the same should we be obliged to begin our deployment process.

Q Do you have copies?

A Yes.

Q Alan, would you repeat the date at which the Soviet Union had 351 SS-20's?

A It says as of early 1983.

Q What was the question?

A The question was what was the date by which the Soviets had deployed 351 SS-20's with a 1,053 warheads. What I have here is as of early 1983.

Q Do you have a breakdown on where they're deployed as regards to Asia and Europe or elsewhere?

A I don't.

Q (inaudible) figure anywhere?

A That's the latest figure I've got.

Q On Lebanon. Can you tell us anything about the progress that Ambassador Fairbanks achieved with Syria as reported in the press?

A I can't, really. Ambassador Fairbanks, by the way, has now gone to Beirut where he and Ambassador McFarlane are at this point.

I think that it was noted by people in Syria, or where they are, but those who were familiar with what had gone on, that the discussions would continue by experts over the next several days, and that is currently going on. This is the discussion of the agreement as they were looking at it. I can't go into the detail of --

Q Is Mr. McFarlane going to Syria?

A Is Mr. McFarlane going to Syria? I don't know what his plans are. I don't have any onward travel for either of them. I think that it was made known that Ambassador Fairbanks and Foreign Minister Khaddam might get together again depending on their schedules to review the progress of the experts. But I don't think that is scheduled, and I can't tell you if it were scheduled precisely when it would take place.

Q Alan, do you mean legal and/or military experts?

A No. These are basically legal experts on those areas.

Q I'm not sure. I just think I misheard or didn't hear something you said. They're discussing the agreement.

A The Lebanese-Israeli agreement.

Q Thank you. That's all.

Q Lebanon. You were asked this question earlier this week and you didn't have any comment. But new developments resulting from Minister Arens visit to Lebanon, something which is today reported to be a government crises.

This government has insisted, or one of the basic objectives were to emphasize Lebanon's sovereignty. How do you, from that aspect, see Minister Arens visit to Lebanon without consulting the official government, meeting with a splinter group and creating such a government crises?

A We can see why Mr. Arens might have visited the Beirut area in his capacity as Defense Minister, given the presence there of Israeli troops and the need to conduct discussions with Israeli military officials there prior to the redeployment from the Shouf.

With regard to the redeployment, we are stressing the necessity and importance of maximum coordination between the Israeli and Lebanese authorities. This will help assure that Israeli withdrawal and subsequent Lebanese deployment into areas vacated by the IDF occur in such a way so as to strengthen the Lebanese Central Government, to show its ability to extend his authority, and to lay the basis for additional withdrawals of foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Have there been fresh assurances from the Israeli Government that the withdrawal will be conducted in that fashion?

A I have no reason to assume that the Israeli Government has changed its position as previously articulated.

Q Were there any consultation between Mr. Arens and the United States before he went to Lebanon since the United States is part of this whole disengagement in bringing about all of these settlements in Lebanon? Did he consult with you? Did he tell you that he's going there?

A I'm not aware of any consultation on that.

Q And as a result of this crises, what do you see -- was this a fruitful, or did you get any input from the Israelis after he visited, that the visit was only for the redeployment forces and nothing to -- get with the other factions.

A I don't have any readout to give you. I don't have anything to say further about that visit other than what I've said, except with regard to the dimension of the story that the referred to Prime Minister was on. I would note that we've longed admired Prime Minister Wazzan's dedication and courageous performance of his duties under trying circumstances.

Q Do you consider the visit fortunate?

Q You think Mr. Arens' visit was circumscribed to the objectives that you mentioned, or they went beyond? I know that he met with the Lebanese forces. He put flowers for the dead; he made an homage to the dead of the Lebanese forces. Was this according to the visit --

A I can only repeat to you what I said in the guidance which is that, we can see why Mr. Arens might have visited the Beirut area in his capacity as Defense Minister, given the presence there of Israeli troops and the need to conduct discussions with Israeli military officials there prior to the redeployment from the Shouf.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Yes, you may have a copy.

Q A follow-up to one of your answers. You were asked if the Israelis stay committed to full coordination with the Lebanese army regarding the redeployment. You said that you don't think there is any change in the Israeli position. What do you know about the Lebanese position on the question of full coordination?

A Again, I'm not going to try to do more on the side of either party than to repeat what our position is, which I did in that statement, to note that we are stressing the necessity and importance of maximum coordination. I don't think I'm going to try to get into stating their positions or criticing those position or anything else. This is our policy. This is what we're working for, and I'm going to have to leave it at that.

Q One more question about it. Mr. Arens, I understand, in his remarks, criticized the Beirut Government for not having enough communication and negotiation with the Druze in order to enable some kind of agreement in the Shouf Mountains. Do you have any comment on this criticism?

A Again, I think I would have to go back to what I just said to you about what our approach and policy is on this issue, in general. I don't have a specific comment to give you on that.

Q What can you tell us about the status of the Russian young man?

A I have nothing new to offer you today.

Q There were representatives of the Justice Department, the FBI and various government agencies over here today. Were they meeting with State Department officials about that case?

A I wasn't at such a meeting. It may well be.

Q Let me ask you another question. It's my understanding that the Russians are going to present this young fellow to a small group of journalists this afternoon. Will that satisfy the U.S. requirements as to an interview, and if he says he wants to go home, then will he be allowed to go home?

A At this point, as I say, I just simply don't have anything further to offer you on that. It remains, just to go back to basics, it remains our position that we want to ascertain his intentions and desires, but I don't think I can get into is-this-okay and that's-not-okay, that sort of thing. At this point, I just simply don't have anything further to offer you on that.

Q On the same subject. After this 3:30 interview at the Soviet compound, will the Department be in a position to change its position and tell us about it?

A At this moment, I cannot tell you whether or when I will have something further I can offer.

Q You're not at this point rejecting such a proposal? It's still being --

A I'm not going to address it. I would not take my answer as sort of a State Department today did not rule out. Don't take it that way.

Q Could I go back to the SS-20's for a moment.

Q Can we stay on this one.

A Stay with this one. I'll come back to you.

Q Just for detail, in your reiteration a moment ago of the policy, you said it remains our position that we want to ascertain his views.

A Right.

Q But the position up to now has been, it remains the U.S. position that it wants to interview him to ascertain his views. Was that a slip of the tongue, or --

A No, I think if you go back, you will find that I have been rather consistent in talking about it --

Q The substance you have.

A The substantive issue -- I'm not going to go further with it. The substantive issue is that we need to ascertain his desires and intentions.

--MORE--

Q And the method of doing that is not necesssarily an interview?

A I'm not going to get into the question. We need, certainly -- well, I'm not going to get into the question.

Q The same subject, Alan?

A All right, go on.

Q Could you tell us -- do you have any information as to who are these "small group of journalists selected by the Soviets" (laughter) and are you going to be satisfied by a small group? How big is "small"?

A I have not --

Q You have no knowledge of who this small group and select --

Q You're invited, Lester. (Laughter.)

Q Are you with the Soviet Union? I had no idea.

A Excuse me, Lester. Do you want to call off the briefing now or will you listen?

Q No. I didn't interrupt.

A The answer to the question is you would have to talk to the Soviets about anything they have set up. I'm not speaking for the Soviets on this issue.

Q On this, Alan, I went over there and interviewed the people at the embassy. That's when they told me Lester was invited there. (Laughter.)

Q You speak with forked tongue.

Q They gave me a full list, very long.

They take the position, after studying it, that there's no legal justification for your position. I mean, I wonder if you could -- you've been reluctant before, I know, to spell it out; but would you give us an idea of what you based this on?

A No. I think that I would frankly rather rely on U.S. Government legal expertise on U.S. law than on Soviet expertise on U.S. law.

Q To go back to the SS-20s, you said earlier that the number was 351 and that was the number as of early this year.

A That's right.

Q That's also the current number.

A That's the current number we're carrying. We have not updated that number.

Q Well, you had been updating it regularly, as the new ones were added, up until now. Can one interpret this to mean that they are not adding any more?

A No. I think we indicated, even after we used that number, that the deployments were continuing. I can't tell you, frankly, whether at this moment exactly something is precisely going on; but that is not a correct interpretation of that.

Q Could you take the question?

A No, I can't take the question because I think we've indicated that when we can update the numbers we will update the numbers for you; but that depends on a lot of factors beyond simply what's going on on the ground.

Q Do you have any comment on the remarks of the Mayor of Jerusalem regarding the U.S. position on the status of the city?

A On the question of Jerusalem?

Q Yes.

A Not really. I refer you basically to what I've said the last two days.

Q Alan, Kuwait put out a statement yesterday responding to your statement the day before about Mr. Grove, the Brandon Grove rejection, saying that Kuwait is exercising its legal right for refusal or acceptance of a candidate ambassador to its country and they are doing this based on their holding on to the basic principle and this is not against Mr. Grove personally or to Washington relations between Kuwait and the United States. Do you have any comment to that?

A No, not really. I think we talked about this the other day. I didn't talk about the rights or lack of rights of countries; I think we addressed ourselves to the specifics. And I don't have anything further to give you on that.

Q In that context, are they still standing by their rejection of him or what? Can you tell us?

A On Mr. Grove?

Q On Mr. Grove, yes.

A I'm aware of no change.

Q So they still are turning him down?

A That's right.

Q Can I, please, ask you something else? There was a report yesterday from Jerusalem that Israeli authorities sentenced a journalist for six months for possession of unlawful material -- weapon material, not guns -- and they put out of order another Arab publication, Al Shira'a, a monthly. Are you aware of this?

A I'm not aware, and I can go back and I can tell you, as we always will and mean, we have a very strong view on freedom of the press. But I don't know what the substance of this particular issue is, and it sounds to me like it's clearly a law enforcement issue of some sort within Israel and presumably it will be handled within the legal system; and I don't want to comment on that.

Q Alan, do you have an update on Chad?

A Yes, I can give you some update on Chad.

There continue to be no reports of renewed fighting in Chad. The Libyans continue their buildup, and we now believe there are between 3,000 and 3,500 Libyan troops south of the Aouzou Strip in Chad.

Q Alan, could I switch to Central America?

A Yes. On what?

Q I'd like to ask a question on the Chad region.

A Go ahead.

Q Can you sort out for us at this point, Alan, with whom the U.S. Government discussed in the French Government the deployment of AWACS aircraft?

A No. I'll stick with what I said yesterday. I'm not going to try to take that any further.

Q Alan, on that, just as a springboard, you say "no reports of renewed fighting."

A Yes.

Q There are reports of escalated fighting in the border area of Honduras and Nicaragua.

There's also a Defense Intelligence Agency, a secret report floating around here, to the effect that we expect continuing escalation of that fighting. I wonder if you could elucidate that.

A I don't usually comment on secret defense reports; but I would say, obviously, our hope that in a regional context these various problems can be addressed and we can reach agreement which would reduce tensions, address itself to the various issues we've talked about -- offensive weapons, trainers, and so on and so forth. And I'm going to refer you back to that, but I'm not going to try to address myself to a secret report.

Q Can we have a filing break?

A Any objection to a filing beak? O.K., filing break.

Q Alan, you may have already answered this and, if you have, I apologize. But the Reverend Joseph Lowry of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference stated in a press conference with Mrs. Martin Luther King: "We support the Govenrment of Nicaragua but not the Government of El Salvador." Has the State Department any comment on that? And I have a follow-up.

A I don't address comments by various private people.

Q All right. Then my other question is this: Since page 1 of this morning's Washington Post reports that in Zimbabwe Congressmen Solomon and Wolpe engaged in what might be termed "a public and frank exchange of opinions on a wide range of topics." And since you, Alan, have cautioned us against such Post reports as the alleged Shultz eclipse, could you tell us what actually took place in Zimbabwe and is it Mr. Solomon or Mr. Wolpe who is accurate in describing conditions in Ethiopia?

A I think that it is not either prudent or even possible (laughter) for me to get into that particular discussion.

Q Well, I mean, Alan, there is a report on page 1 --

A I recognize that.

Q -- of a leading daily, and it tell us two members of this very important committee --

A Lester --

Q -- with very contrary opinions. Could you tell us which one is accurate? We're being led in all directions.

A Look, the members of the CODEL -- congressional delegation -- can respond to their own views of the meeting with Mr. Mengistu.

Q Do you have any opinion?

A I can only say that as for relations with Ethiopia, as you know relations have been strained, are strained, have been for many years -- although they continue to be correct and our governments do exchange friendly visits. And we have been prepared to discuss improved relations, but I'm not going to comment on that story further.

Q Excuse me, Alan; I'm sorry. I've been away so this might have been addressed. But the story last week about the Lesotho refugees, has there been any progress in this? Does the U.S. have an official attitude toward those refugees from Lesotho, and are we pleased that it's working out the way it is?

A I don't know whether we have any guidance on that issue or not. Why don't you check with the Press Office? And if we don't maybe we can -- I'd see if there's anything that we would --

Q O.K.

A -- want to say on that subject.

Q On Central America, Senator Tsongas yesterday was in Managua and he was reported as having said that the government of the Sandinistas are there to stay and he is invited, or he has invited Ortega for a visit to the United States. Do you have any comment on that?

A I've seen the press reports about the meeting, but I don't have any particular comment to offer.

Q Will they welcome Ortega?

A Will who welcome Ortega?

Q Will you welcome Ortega?

A Visa applications, if he were to apply, would be judged case by case in light of the circumstances at the time.

Q If they're valid.

A They would be, as I say, judged in light of the circumstances, the law, the purposes of his trip. We'd have to look at it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Turkish Government position to suspend publication of Milliet and Tercuman?

A Do we have something on that?

No, we don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, you were considering the application for a visa by Tomas Borge?

A I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q Is that still under consideration?

A I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q Alan, will you take that question?

A What?

Q The Turkish papers. Since you made a comment on suppression and the freedom of the press.

A I'll look and see if we can get anything on that.

Q Have you looked into the Liberian paper?

A The what?

Q Liberian paper.

A What is this, freedom of the press day? What's going on? (Laughter.)

Q We just want you to be --

A Are you afraid your agency is going to be attacked? (Laughter.)

Q You're the one who said that. I have no reason to believe -- no: the Lierian paper, the main independent paper, was closed out.

A Again, I'll look at it; but I won't promise that we'll come back on specific cases.

Q And on Chad, do you have any comment on the allegations in The Washington Post that Saudi Arabia pressured Mauritania not to accept David Korn as an Ambassador there because he's Jewish?

A No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the vote on paramilitary groups in Salvador?

A The vote on paramilitary groups? No, we're not going to have any comment on the constitutional process and debate on the constitution as it proceeds.

Q Alan, do you have a situation report on Afghanistan?

A No, I don't have one. Sorry.

Q On Chad, could you address yourself, if you would, on the statements by background officials at the California White House with respect to the charge of disinformation with respect to France?

A No, I'm not going to address myself to source stories. We addressed this -- I think it was Larry Speakes and I -- yesterday.

Q In addition, apparently Mitterrand's interview expressed criticism at Washington for having backed Habre when he overthrew the Government of Oueddei two years ago? Do you deny that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything on the Polish debt rescheduling?

A No, I don't.

Q Anything about the planned meeting between U.S. officials and 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, the Foreign Minister of Syria, at the United Nations next month?

A At the United Nations?

Q Yes.

A I don't know anything about it. I believe that he met with the Secretary last year at the UN, so --

Q Will there be --

A I don't know if there will be a meeting scheduled this year or not. I just don't know what the schedule is. I don't think we've announced it.

Q Anything on Argentine nukes? (Laughter.)

A Argentine nukes? Would you care to refine that question, perhaps, a little bit?

Q There was an article that appeared in The Washington Post about how the United States is providing heavy water to provide Argentine nukes or nuke power, as it were.

A I think there was a difference. I think it was related to a nuclear reactor -- just so the record is very clear here.

Q I wasn't trying to make it tendentious.

A Yes, yes; I think you were. (Laughter.)

I would note that the approval does not represent a reversal of U.S. policy, since U.S. exports to Argentina of nuclear components and materials were approved during the previous Administration.

The decision to approve the sale by the Federal Republic of Germany of 143 metric tons of U.S.-origin heavy water to Argentina was based on the determination that all the requirements of U.S. law and regulations were met and that the transfer would not be inimical to the security of the United States and its nonproliferation goals. The transfer is to be subject to the U.S.-Argentina Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, the applicable Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency -- the IAEA -- and additional nonproliferation assurances and guarantees from the Government of Argentina.

Q No reaction from the Falklands on this, Alan?

Q We can get a copy?

A You can get a copy.

Q Was there anything more?

A There are some answers to specific questions, but why don't I let you try and figure out what you really need with the Press Office later because it's rather lengthy and it basically sticks with the same point. This is a continuation of policy consistent with our nonproliferation policy and of past Administrations, not only this Administration.

Q Can I simply ask one that might not go to that?

A Yes.

Q Was this taken up, in any respect, with the United Kingdom?

A I don't know the answer to that and I don't think we would get into the question of our relations or dealings with other governments in this matter.

Q Bernie, did you have a question?

Q No.

A All right.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, August 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #146

FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, 1983, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements:

First, Secretary Shultz will address the Shimoda Conference, Friday, September 2, at 8:30 a.m., at Airlie House, located near Warrenton, Virginia. The conference is co-sponsored by the Japan Center for International Exchange, which is in Tokyo, and the Japan Society in New York. This is the sixth conference and the first to be held in the United States.

If you plan to cover this event, please inform Mary Allis of the Japan Society at Area Code (212) 832-1155, or Betsey Weltner of Gray and Company in Washington at 333-7400.

Q Alan, will that be piped in here?

A We are checking that. There are apparently some diffilcuties, including the telephone strike, but also some other things too, but we're checking on that, Mike.

Q What time will he speak?

A 8:30 a.m.

Q Pardon?

A 8:30 a.m. Good morning, Mike.

Secondly, a statement on the August 21 anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Sunday we mark the 15th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By this brutal and cynical act, the Soviet Union sought to crush the aspirations of the people of Czechoslovakia.

Unfortunately, the Soviet role in Afghanistan and Soviet pressure in Poland stand as harsh reminders that the Soviet Union has been unwilling to abide by the standards of international behavior embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, does the Department have a view as to the aftermath of the Soviet teenager matter, the effect on U.S.-American relations --

Q Can't hear.

Q -- and what will be the long-term effect?

A The question is any view on the long-term effect of the Berezhkov case on U.S.-Soviet relations.

As we said in our statement yesterday, this was not a situation that was sought by either government. We don't believe it will affect U.S.-Soviet relations. It certainly will not affect our policies toward the Soviet Union.

Q Alan, on that issue, the State Department had control of the situation at the airport and they barred television cameras. There was a television camera at the Soviet Embassy. What was the reason for that?

A You recognize, Don, that that interview that took place at the airport was the one based upon which Assistant Secretaries Burt and Abrams made their judgment, and it was felt that introducing television cameras into that situation would create an atmosphere which would not have been as conducive to ascertaining the true intentions of Andrei Berezhkov as without them.

Q Alan, a follow-up on the statement issued at the airport yestereday. There's an firm indication here that we're accepting the authenticity of Andrei's letter to President Reagan -- the flat statement that those letters were written by young Berezhkov.

On at least two occasions he denied that he wrote those letters. If we disbelieve his statement that he denied writing the letters, why do we accept his other statements that he wants to return to the Soviet Union and doesn't want to stay in the United States?

A Gregg, we obviously noted his statement about the letters, and, as we've said, the existence of the letters raised reasonable doubts in our minds about his intentions. Based on the statements he made yesterday, we have now satisfied ourselves that his departure from the United States was voluntary.

I might add that following the press interview, Assistant Secretary Burt stayed with the family for about -- I don't know -- 45 minutes, roughly, on the mobile lounge, went out to the aircraft with them, and so on and so forth. During that period of time everything that he saw convinced him that the right judgment had been made on that.

Q What about the letters? Do we feel that he wrote those letters?

A I'm not going to try to rehash that. We've addressed that issue in the past. What was important in terms of our determination yesterday was what he said during that interview and the judgments that were made at that time.

Q Could you discuss why it is that in this case the United States settled for considerably less than had been the case in the past?

A I don't know that I'm going to try to make comparisons. The point that we made consistently was that we wanted to ascertain his desires and intentions, and we feel that that was done and it was done in a manner that was satisfactory to us. We don't think that that standard was overlooked.

Q I surely think it's important for the historical record here that the government should explain why it is -- and you may have abundant reasons for doing so -- moving from the official interview capacity, which is what was maintained previously, into the press forum. Was that a Soviet suggestion?

A No two situations are identical, and we made a judgment in this case as to how we could best serve the purposes that we had, how we could uphold the principles that we had. The Soviets obviously had principles they were talking about. We think that this solution was one which met the principles of both sides, and we're quite satisfied with that.

Q Did Richard Burt talk to the boy during that 45-minute period in the mobile lounge?

A He talked with the boy; he talked with the family. Sure.

Q Alan, the statement of Czechoslovakia, can --

Q Excuse me. Before we leave this, could you amplify that? You say he did talk to the boy?

A Yes. I'm not going to try to go into the conversation, but he did talk with him. As I said before, everything that transpired during that 45-minute period when he was with them lent to the assurance that the right decision was made.

Q But, Alan, the decision was already made to allow him to depart.

A The decision was made at the time of the press interview --

Q So that --

A -- at Dulles.

Q So that precluded Soviet objection to any personal conversation that Burt might have thereafter?

A This ws not a "formal" interview that he was holding on the mobile lounge, anything of that sort. That's right.

Q Was Secretary Burt prepared to change the government's position if, during his conversation in the mobile lounge, he determined that the boy really wanted to stay?

A That's hypothetical, and I'm not going to get into it.

Q Alan, on videotape after his conversation -- that 45 minutes -- when he escorted the family onto the plane, Assistant Secretary Burt can be heard quite clearly saying to the senior Berezhkov, pointing to the cameras, "You know on this flight you don't have to talk to them."

Is that a function of the Assistant Secretary of State?

A Fred, I don't know. I wasn't there. I didn't see it. I'm not going to comment on it.

Q Alan, in answer to a question here as to whether Secretary Burt was prepared to change the position, you had said that that's hypothetical. It was reported last night the United States had a contingency plan which would have provided quarters for the child if he decided to stay.

Is that incorrect, then?

A Again, all of this is hypothetical. The situation was resolved. He's gone. I'm not going to try to go over alleged contingency plans or alleged contingencies.

Q Who else, Alan, was on the mobile lounge, employees or representatives of the U.S. Government?

A My understanding on the mobile -- well, "involved." I don't know whether there was an operator there, but I think Assistant Secretary Burt was the only U.S. official. The family was there and Mr. Sokolov was there.

Q Was any American security agent personally involved?

A On the mobile lounge itself?

Q On the mobile lounge.

A I'm not aware there was any on the mobile lounge. No.

Q Do you still maintain that the State Department had a legal ground to detain that boy when he was here under the Vienna Convention?

A We had legal grounds to do what we did.

Q Could you cite those now that the case is over? Why not clarify the record and tell us what the legal grounds were in view of the fact that there is considerable dispute among legal authorities about the legal grounds?

A I think, Murray, I'm just going to have to leave that dispute out there. We are satisfied with the advice that we got from Justice Department and State Department lawyers that we had the legal authority to take the steps we took.

Q Are you going to publish that?

A No. Okay. Shall we go on?

Q Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that you are saying you don't know exactly who wrote the letters.

A I'm not addressing that question. I'm going to what we had in terms of the interview situation yesterday and the judgments that were made then.

I'm not going to go back and rehash the letter situation.

Q Can the letter sent to the White House now be made public?

A I don't beleive it's going to be, Murray.

Q For you the case is over.

A The case is closed. Yes. Okay. Anything else?

Q One more question on that. Does the Assistant Secretary of State intent to follow Andrei's request and contact Mick Jagger? (Laughter)

A Gee, I don't have any answer to that, Larry. Can we get on to other matters?

Q Are you saying that the case is closed? You're saying that there's no investigation into who wrote the letter?

A As far as I'm concerned -- as far as I understand -- this case is closed.

Q If it was a forgery, wouldn't anybody be interested?

A No. Shall we go on to another subject? No other subjects?

Q Do you have anything on the Middle East?

Q How about Chad?

A Anything on the Middle East. That's a little broad. (Laughter)

Chad. Let me go to Chad, and if we could get a more specific -- boy, we're really hard up.

Although we know of no renewed fighting in Chad, the Libyans continue to increase their forces and reinforce their positions. We believe there are about, as I indicated yesterday, 3000-3500 Libyan troops in Chad south of the Aouzou Strip.

We do not know if this buildup is being made with the aim of further Libyan thrusts into Chad, but in any event our view is that the Libyans must withdraw their troops from Chad.

Q Any reaction to the French decision to send the fighters, Alan?

A I don't have any particular reactions to that story.

Q Any buildup of Libyan personnel in the last 24 hours? Is it the same that you gave yesterday?

A As I say, the Libyans continue to increase their forces and reinforce their positions. I don't have numbers or specifics to add today.

Q Alan, liaison between the French and the AWACS now that they're sending in fighter planes? Can you tell us about that?

A No. I don't have anything to add to what we've said about that in the past.

Q Alan, anything about contacts between the French and the Libyans to negotiate about Chad?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on Prime Minister Mugabe's comments which appeared in the Post this morning?

A About U.S. policy?

Q Yes.

A Prime Minister Mugabe, like many other African leaders, has on many occasions expressed his views about South Africa. Likewise, the United States has on many occasions and at very senior levels discussed our policies toward that region and what it was we were trying to accomplish.

The most recent such policy speech was given by Under Secretary Eagleburger in San Francisco on June 23. We respect Prime Minister Mugabe's views, but we believe the policy we are following has the best prospects for contributing positively to the resolution of the problems of that region.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have anything related to that on the alleged bombing by South Africa of a town in Angola this past week?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have the dates for Mugabe's visit?

A I don't know what has been made available on any visits at this point.

Q Any new progess with respect to the Namibia negotiations?

A I don't have anything new to offer you today on that.

Q On China, do you have anything on State Department involvement in the case involving the Chinese railroad bonds?

A Yes, I do. On August 12, the People's Republic of China filed a request that the Court's September 1982 default judgment be set aside and a request that the case be dismissed.

The Court that we're talking about is the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

The United States Government filed on August 18 a Statement of Interest in the case supporting the PRC's request to set aside the default judgment, and urging the Court to permit the PRC to have its day in court. The U.S. Government Statement of Interest was supported by affidavits from Secretary Shultz and Legal Advisor Davis Robinson.

If you want copies of the pleadings, those can be obtained from the Legal Advisor's Office, Room 6427. The phone number is 632-8900.

Q Do you also have any response to the texile agreement signing?

A Response to the textile agreement? Simply to note that the agreement was signed today in Beijing. It's for five years retroactive to January 1, 1983. It's very similar to the old agreement except that the number of specific limits have been increased to 33.

Q Is the United States going ahead with the development of the anti-satellite weapons, or has that been altered in any way by Andropov's proposal yesterday?

CONT

A I think we addressed this yesterday. I guess you weren't here.

Q You said you were going to carefully study it, but apparently a test is scheduled. Will that test be cancelled or delayed?

A I guess you would have to ask the appropriate agencies on that. I think I could give you some further words on the proposal yesterday, but I don't -- let me just give you what I've got.

Because of its ambiguous language, the precise proposal is not clear. For example, Mr. Andropov is quoted as saying the Soviets "will not be the first to put anti-satellite weapons in space." However, the Soviets have tested their ASAT system in space repeatedly, and it's been operational for about a dozen years.

Part of the proposal is similar to their 1981 draft treaty submitted at the U.N. and suffers from the same problems. For example, it is not clear about the definition of the weapon, and there are no provisions for verification.

Their proposed moratorium on ASAT activities is new, but also suffers from problems. These include unilateral advantage to the Soviets, who have an operational system, and verification.

With regard to the problems of verification, there's also the difficulty of verifying effectively the dismantling and destruction of the operational Soviet ASAT system.

First, the system is relatively small. It's fitted into a Soviet space booster used for other space launch missions. We don't know how many such ASAT systems have been manufactured and it would be relatively easy for the Soviets to maintain a covert supply of interceptors for use in a crises.

Second, since satellites which serve U.S. and Allied national security are very few in number, any Soviet cheating on an ASAT agreement, even on a small scale, could pose a prohibitive risk.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q On a similar subject, do you have a comment on The Washington Post story quoting unnamed Administration officials as saying the Soviets are either close to or moving toward a system of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles?

A Yes, I do have something on that. You're going to have to ask me more specific questions. But basically, because of the confidentiality rules, I can't confirm or deny what Soviet officials have or haven't said.

I can say that the development of a mobile ICBM would not be inconsistent with what appears to be current Soviet force planning.

Q Does the United States think this is a negative or a positive development as far as its own forces are concerned, or as far as the arms talks are concerned?

A The fundamental thrust of the U.S. proposals in START is to move toward greater stability at lower levels, and to the degree that the development of a mobile ICBM, or mobile ICBM's would contribute to stability by reducing vulnerability, it would be a positive step.

Q How imminent is Soviet deployment of mobile missile systems?

A I don't have specifics to offer you on that.

Q Do you have any further information about the meeting held in Beirut between Mr. McFarlane and Mr. El-Baz, Counselor of the President of Egypt?

A I don't have details on any meetings that were held. I believe that Mr. McFarlane is now in Cairo, and Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut.

Q Do you have any comment about the report that Syria agreed -- a U.S. official affirmed that Syria agreed to review the Lebanese-Israeli security agreement clause by clause?

A I addressed this yesterday. I indicated that that was --

Q But they deny it.

A That that was -- who denied it?

Q Syria.

A I addressed this issue yesterday, and I would refer you back to what I said on that issue yesterday, if you could check in the Press Office.

Q Back to Soviet ICBM's?

A I think Ghasson had a question.

Q The head of the Association of the Village Leagues, Mr. Dudin is in this country. Do you know if he will be meeting any officials here at the State Department?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Did he apply for a visa to reside in the United States?

A I don't know, and I don't think we would be in a position to address visa applications unless the applicant himself were to make public the --

Q Where does the development of this mobile ICBM by the Soviets fit into the SALT II agreement?

A The Protocol to SALT II, which expired December 31, 1981, contained a ban on mobile ICBM's. The SALT II Treaty itself does not address mobile ICBM's, so by definition they are allowed.

Q Do you know which Soviet missile is involved in this? Is it the PL-5?

A I don't have any specifics to offer you on that.

Q Back on southern Africa for a sec. Lesotho's asked for help from the U.N. They're saying that South Africa is now demanding that all 10,000 refugees leave the country. Do you have anything on it?

A I think we had something -- is it something that we're posting on this? -- let me check later. I thought I saw something this morning on this. Let me check and see if we have anything.

Q Do you have anything on the denial of a visa to Gabriel Garcia Marquez to enter this country?

A No.

Q And do you have anything on rumored aid that Guatemala has now requested of the United States Government?

A Anything on rumored aid? What's your question?

Q There are reports that Guatemala has requested aid from the United States through Senator Wilson. Do you have anything on that?

A I thought the reports were that they would request it, actually, not that they had requested it. I'm not aware of a request, and I'm not going to speculate on requests that might come in the future.

As you know, our security assistance request for FY-84 was submitted to the Congress earlier this year, including $10 million for Foreign Military Sales credits and $250,000 in IMET training funds, and that's still pending. But of course we still have under review the issue of assistance, but I'm not going to speculate on --

Q For what fiscal year is that?

A That was FY-84.

Q Just one question in the sports department. Has Ivan Lendl asked for political asylum?

A If he had, I wouldn't be able to address it.

Q Is there anything new on drought aid to Ethiopia?

A Yes. I think there was a suggestion in an article this morning that there might have been a change in policy on that. The U.S. Government has always responded positively and willingly to disasters throughout the world. The U.S. Government has not stopped humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia. We recently indicated that funds for an ongoing feeding program run by Catholic Relief Services in FY-84 would be provided.

Because of the severe drought and famine situation, the United States Government asked Congress for funds to continue the program as well as provide several million dollars in emergency assistance. In short, humanitarian assistance has not been interrupted and the reason for a change in the funds request is tied directly to the famine situation that currently exists there.

Q That went into '84?

A As I say, we recently requested -- sorry, we recently indicated that funds for the on-going feeding program run by CRS in FY-84 would be provided.

Q Do you have anything on the vote on the Guyana loan?

A Yes. The U.S. vetoed the concessional financing on the loan. Our vote was cast on economic and technical grounds. We had previously advised the Guyanese, both here and in Georgetown, that we would vote against the loan for these reasons.

Q Any elaboration as to what economic and technical grounds you're objecting to?

A The loan doesn't require sufficient specific actions by the Guyanese Government to change its rice sector policies in any of three areas -- pricing, marketing and milling -- which are critical to inducing positive changes in the sector and to the success of the project. Without these changes being made, the project's objectives of increasing rice production and improving the welfare of the Guyanese farmers and consumers will be impossible to meet. We've discussed these concerns with the IDB and the Guyanese Government frequently over the past several months.

Q Can I get a copy of that? You just read it very quickly.

A Yes.

Q Back on the -- I'm puzzled about the Andropov proposal. Since neither anti-satellite system, either side, is supposed to be stationed in space, rather acquired from the ground, is he not perhaps opening up a new pathway to negotiate on the so-called Star Wars permanent orbiting systems that the President has suggested?

A I can't tell you what he has specifically in mind. Obviously, there are existing mechanisms for discussing these other than through visitors. And as I said yesterday, we would seriously consider any serious proposal, but I don't have any new words on that.

Q Are you actually saying that the President would seriously consider proposals on the space-based laser initiative? He announced that last March 23, and in the following weeks the statements that he and the Secretary made were quite --

A That program, of course, is in a stage where we're talking about design and engineering and experimenting, and things like that. Any serious ideas the Soviets have on any of these issues, obviously we're willing to discuss. We said we wanted to discuss this idea with them in fact. The President made that quite clear.

Q That was not to not develop these things; that was to discuss with the Soviets a sort of joint competition in development.

A We would hope they would want to discuss what we had in mind as well as what they had.

Q Could I ask you one other thing? Have you asked them for clarification?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

Clenna

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, AUGUST 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #147

MONDAY, AUGUST 22, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Will the AWACS be used now that French combat planes are in Chad?

A I don't have anything new for you on AWACS. I think that the Pentagon will be prepared to address what the status of them today is.

Q Can you tell us about the Philippines, and what it is that you can share with us?

A We really don't have anything significantly new that hasn't already been reported in the various media reports from Manila. We still don't know the identity of the dead gunman who was dressed in the garb of an airport mechanic.

Our Embassy in Manila has been in close touch with all of the appropriate Philippine government authorities on this political assassination. The Embassy will continue to maintain close contact with the Philippine Government. As we stated yesterday, we expect their investigation to be as objective and thorough as possible.

I might note that Embassy reporting indicates that the report alleging that Mr. Aquino was killed by shots from several security personnel using rifles is erroneous, and most likely the result of confused impressions from passengers who were inside the plane.

Q How can you say with such certainty that those reports are erroneous?

A Again, I'm basing this on the Embassy reporting. I don't know specifically what information they had, but that is what our information is.

Q Meaning that you believe that Marcos has no responsibility for the killing at all?

A I prefer to stick with what I've said. I'm not suggesting otherwise, but it's a little early to talk about specifically what happened. As I say, our reporting from our Embassy, which has looked into this and has been in touch with various people, indicates that the reports which were in the news yesterday that the security guards, several security guards shot Mr. Aquino, that reporting seems to be erroneous. I can only share with you what I've got. I don't think that I can really go beyond that. I think you have the text of what we said yeserday, so I don't need to repeat it.

Q Were you aware of threats to his life?

A I think Mr. Aquino talked about being aware of threats to his life.

Q Did you have any independent view?

A I'm not going to go into what information we may or may not have had. The point is, that was hardly something that he was unaware of.

Q Were there contacts between the Government of the United States and Mr. Aquino immediately before or in the weeks before his departure for his homeland?

A I don't know whether there were contacts at that point. He certainly has been around quite a bit.

Q Do you know whether the U.S. Government tried to dissuade him from returning to the Philippines?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Two related questions. First of all, does the Administration have any plans to send any kind of a delegation there either to involve itself in the investigation or to assist in the investigation in the Philippines, or is there any coordination of investigating with authorities here in the United States, perhaps dealing with events immediately prior to his departure?

A I think it's premature to talk about what might happen as an investigation unfolds. I'm not aware of any plans at this point to send anybody. We indicated yesterday that we trusted that the Government of the Philippines would swiftly and vigorously track down the perpetrators of this political assassination, and bring them to justice and punish them.

I would note that President Marcos has stated that all the resources and powers of his government will be employed in the quickist possible time to find the perpetrators.

Q Does your government put great trust in that statement?

A We have expressed our feeling that, our trust that, that will be done; the President has said it will be done.

Q The Egyptian-Sudanese political and diplomatic committee issued a joint statement today in Cairo in which they call for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and a specific timetable even if the Syrian troops remains there. Do you have a comment on that?

A I don't have a specific comment on that. We've addressed that issue before of the total withdrawal, and so on. I just don't have a new comment to offer you today in response to that.

Q Another question.

A Yes, sure.

Q The Egyptian newspaper Mayo said yesterday that President Mubarak will arrive in Washington, I think, October 3. Do you have any information about the schedule, the schedule in Washington?

A No. We do understand that President Mubarak intends to address the U.N. General Assembly. I believe it's in late September, although you should check with the Egyptian Government on that. I don't have anything on a visit to Washington. I guess I would refer you to the White House on that, but I think at this point that probably is accurate.

Q The Prime Minister of Jordan today had a statement saying that the American Administration's current policy in the Middle East would push the area towards the brink of war. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have a comment in response to that. I haven't seen that particular report, and I can't comment on it. Obviously, we feel that our policy -- certainly our policy is designed to enhance peace, and that is the purpose of it.

Q Do you have any comment on the change in the Egyptian position toward the withdrawal from Lebanon?

A I don't have any comment on what was said on that subject.

Q Alan, may I get back to the Philippine thing for a minute.

A Sure.

Q What is the status of the President's trip? Does he still plan to go to the Philippines?

A I think that the White House indicated yesterday that there's no current plan to change that trip.

Q And also, can you tell us what sort of contacts the U.S. Government has had with the Philippines Government? Is our Ambassador there?

A Yes, he is. I'm sorry.

Q Has our Ambassador in the Philippines spoken to officials of the Philippine Government? What sorts of contact has there been?

A I can't detail it for you. As I said before, there has been communication with various parts of the Government of the Philippines, but I cannot detail it. I don't have that kind of detail. Ambassador Armacost is there, and certainly is actively attending to this.

Q But obviously you have said that we expect a fair and impartial investigation. Surely, that is part of what has been passed on; we don't just make public statements like that, do we? We also tell them privately that that's our desire?

A I guess that you put me in a position where I have to say we don't get into the details of our diplomatic exchanges. Our views on this subject are contained in our statement of yesterday and what I've said today.

I think it's fair to assume that the Government of the Philippines knows what our views are, but I just don't want to get into the exchanges.

Q Back to the Middle East. There was a threat by the Druze today to resume shelling the Beirut airport which, of course, is where the Marines are. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have anything on that. We have before urged everybody to work towards reconciliation and peaceful resolution of the various outstanding issues, to allow the Lebanese Government to assert its authority throughout the country, and to get all the foreign forces out, and to have security across Israel's northern border, but I don't have a specific response to that.

Q Two Philippine-related questions, please. Is our government concerned that this assassination is going to fuel the insurgency that Mr. Marcos has said has been the reason for his continued, very strong authoritative rule?

A I don't have a view to offer you on that.

Q The opposition, the moderate opposition of the Philippines has seemed to have been coalescing in an anti-U.S. base philosophy. It's been getting harder and harder in the last year.

Is there concern on the part of our government that the assassination will will fuel that?

A Again, I don't have anything to offer you in a way of that sort of assessment today.

Q One more thing about Lebanon. I understand that there is a report in Newsweek magazine that there is some criticism in Israel as to the way that Ambassador McFarlane is conducting his mission. Do you have any comment on this?

A I don't have a comment on that. I think that he's had good discussions in Israel, but I tend not to comment on source stories of that sort.

Q Marcos said yesterday that he had information about a specific -- concrete information about a specific assassination plot against Aquino that he passed on to Aquino. Has he passed that on to the U.S. Government as well?

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A Again, I don't have that information, and I think it probably gets us back into the area of communications between the government which we are reluctant to comment on.

Again, as I answered Roberto before, Mr. Aquino certainly was talking about, aware of threats on his life and the fact that such threats existed was hardly a secret.

Q The point is, did the U.S. Government know about these plots, and did the U.S. Government pass this information on by way of confirmation to Aquino before he left?

A I'm not going to get into the kinds of conversations we may have had. The fact that there were reports of threats was well known to Mr. Aquino, and he talked about it to the press. I'm not sure what our conversations with him particuarly would contribute -- in talking about that here -- would contribute to that. He knew he was going back to a situation in which people had talked about threats to his life. I think that's -- in terms of judging his return -- that's the salient point.

Q It would help to understand whether the U.S. Government tried to dissuade him from going back?

A I understand, but I think that it is not -- I will check and see if anybody wants to talk further about those conversations, but I'm rather doubtful that I could get anything further for you on that.

Q Is the information that you passed on to us before, in a flat-out statement that the reports were erroneous, and that comes from the Embassy, the Embassy talked to Philippine officials; is that where that information comes from? You're basing it all on what they told you?

A I'm basing it on what the Embassy reported. As I indicated before, I do not have the backup to their judgment as reported to us.

Q Ambassador Elekdag of Turkey is calling at the State Department today the second time in five days. On both occasions Ambassador Veliotes is there even though his bureau doesn't cover Turkey. Can you tell us something about what those discussions are about?

A No, I can't.

Q Are they all on the Near East?

A I don't have anything on what they're about.

Q Is the United States doing anything to help the Aquino family get back, either expediting them or helping with their transportation or in anyway helping them return to the Philippines?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Have you heard anything about funeral arrangements?

A No. Don't know anything about funeral arrangements.

Q Will the United States be represented?

A I don't have anything on that at this point.

Q I have a domestic question.

A A domestic question?

Q Yes. A State Department domestic. There has been very substantial coverage, as you no doubt have seen, of Barbara Honegger of your Administration's Department of Justice gender discrimination review, and her charge that her assignment is what she terms a sham.

Can you assure us that equal sexual opportunity at the State Department is not a sham?

A Yes.

Q And that Sue Pittman, and other ladies, will be given some opportunity at conducting these briefings rather than being confined to such chores as carrying candelabra, because I recall only once that I've ever seen a woman up there. Could you tell --

A Cut off the microphone I'll answer your questions, but I won't stand for speeches.

Q Censorship. All right. I was finishing the question.

A The answer to your first question is yes, I can assure you there is no discrimination, and how we conduct our briefings and who conducts them is our business, and we will do it our way.

Q It's not the public's business --

A It's not.

Q If it's discrimination against women? I have seen almost nothing but males up there. It kind of illustrates Honegger's position, doesn't it?

A I don't think so.

--MORE--

Q You don't think so. Could I have one follow-up?

A No. You may not.

Q Oh, I may not.

Q Alan, also on Turkey, do you have any reaction to the banning of the Social Democrat and Correct Path parties on Friday?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q Could you take that question?

A I can look into that question.

Q Do we have a general attitude toward the banning of parties?

A We've addressed the question of the political process in Turkey before, and I can refer you back to that. But let me also see if there's anything specific to say about this.

Q Alan, on Central America, if I may? The representatives of the FDR here in Washington are publicly saying now that there's a meeting underway for the next few days with Ambassador Stone, and they're even saying that they're having four people represent them: Ungo, Zamora and two people from the FMLN.

Since they're already talking about that, is it possible for you to tell us something about what's underway?

A No.

Q Or about the composition --

A Look, we have followed a rule of confidentiality on Ambassador Stone's mission, and we're going to continue to be doing that. As we can provide information about possible travel he may undertake, we'll certainly endeavor to do that for you. But I don't have anything today to offer you on that particular subject.

Q What about the composition of his delegation, of his group?

A Again, I haven't got anything to say to you about any possible travel as of this point. I would remind you, aside from the question of who might go with him if he goes again -- and I don't have anything to give you on that -- that the purpose of his mission is to facilitate dialogue, broadly speaking, both within and between the nations of Central America.

In specific terms with regard to El Salvador, we've indicated before that the purpose is to facilitate dialogue between the left and the Peace Commission, and that indeed, if he does go off again to the region and if he were on such a trip to meet with the left, would be the thrust of his efforts.

Q One other question in this regard: The people from the FDR say they do not meet with Ambassador Stone as a mediator or as a facilitator, but rather they are meeting him or will meet with him as a representative of the U.S. Government.

Do we partake of that position? Is Ambassador Stone representing the U.S. Government to the FDR?

A I think that they indicated that they were meeting with him as some sort of a representative of the U.S. as a belligerent, and we certainly don't agree with that characterization.

We've not talked about him as a mediator ourselves -- we've not done that -- but we have talked about a role of facilitation, and that is what he is engaged in.

Q Two questions: Chad update, and where are Fairbanks and McFarlane today?

A To take them in reverse order, Ambassadors Fairbanks and McFarlane are in Beirut. As far as Chad is concerned, no reports of renewed fighting. Libyans continue to strengthen their positions in northern Chad.

We continue to believe there are between 3000 and 3500 Libyans in Chad below the Aouzou Strip. By "Libyans," I mean Libyan troops. Don't have any information to confirm reports that the Libyans are moving tanks toward Oum Chaluba.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the report appearing today in The Washington Post about the campaign that is going to be launched by some conservative groups on Central America?

A No.

Q Do you think that such a campaign will be a negative or positive approach of this Administration?

A I'm not going to try to judge that. The Administration's policy is as has been articulated several times, and I'm sure will be articulated a great deal more in the future.

Q Alan, since the Administration is referring to the assassination in the Philippines as a political assassination, will the developments that occur from now on in that specific case be taken into account and be kept track of as regards the U.S. human rights policy or human rights evaluation of the Philippines?

A I don't think I want to try to put it into a particular box, Ralph, without knowing what the facts are beyond what we already have. It's a little hard to make those sorts of judgments.

Q But you did draw the conclusion that it was a political --

A I think the point that was being made is that the judgment is that it was not a question of some personal issue that was involved, but it in fact had a political background and character to it. But beyond that I don't think we're prepared to go, and we would obviously want to look at what the investigation would turn up in that respect.

Q Have there been any contacts with the Soviet Union during the last few weeks concerning Chad?

A I can't tell you specifically whether there has been in the last few weeks concerning Chad. I guess I'll have to leave it at that. Don't know, but the Soviets are certainly aware of our concerns regarding Chad, regarding Libyan actions there.

Q Alan, there were reports in Beirut yesterday that legal talks going on between Syria and the United States were suspended yesterday.

Do you have any confirmation of that report, or do you have any information on it?

A I don't know. I'm not sure, even if they were concluded, and I simply don't know the answer to that question. I'm not sure "suspended" would necessarily be an appropriate word.

The question was one of going over the agreement, and whether they concluded their business, which may well be. I don't know. But I'm not aware of some sort of break, which is what the term "suspension" indicates.

Q Alan, there was a story in The New York Times yesterday about a meeting between Deng Xiaoping and a visiting American professor in which Deng Xiaoping apparently spelled out terms for unification with Taiwan.

Do these terms represent anything new? Is this a new concession by China?

A Again, that's not for us to address. We have consistently said that the Taiwan question is one for the Chinese themselves to resolve, and that our only concern is that any resolution be peaceful. I'm not going to get into trying to critique these stories.

Q In regard to Syria, when the Secretary went there, they were going to set up the U.S.-Syrian negotiating team. Has anybody been named to that? Has it ever met?

A I think it was indicated at the time that Ambassador Veliotes would be the head of the -- I don't think "negotiating team" was quite the term used. Working group, I think, was the --

Q Working group.

A He would be the head of it for the United States with Ambassador Paganelli being the person on the ground following through, and I think that the Foreign Minister was the head of it for their side.

I don't know whether there's been any meeting between any representatives of that working group. We certainly have had dialogue since then in a variety of ways, various parts of Ambassador Fairbanks' mission and people who are accompanying them and so on.

Did you want to follow up, Lester?

Q Yes. This is an East German question.

A Go ahead.

Q *The Washington Post* has published a report this morning that the East Germans are injecting their female discus throwers with male hormones.

Could you tell us the Reagan Administration's attitude towards this practice?

A You tempt me, Lester, you really do. (Laughter)

Q Yield.

A No. I won't.

Q When temptation comes, you'll give right in. Tell us, do we have any attitude?

A No.

Q We're certainly not thinking of doing anything like that in the United States?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could I have one follow-up to this?

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q *The Washington Post* also reports this morning that White House Spokesman Larry Speakes in the daily briefings in Santa Barbara is dispensing "pap." To your knowledge have you or any other State Department spokesman ever been so charged with dispensing pap?

A I don't know whether we've ever been charged, Lester. I haven't read every word you've written. (Laughter) But we try not to.

Q Getting back to Central America for a minute. Stone's mission is to facilitate talks, you say, between the guerrillas and the government.

A Right.

Q Yet the guerrillas say that they are in fact also meeting with the Peace Commission, and they say, and as does the Commission, that in fact Stone had nothing to do with those talks, so is there any further need for Stone's mission down there?

A We think that there is continuing need on the facilitation front. Otherwise we wouldn't be continuing to engage in that effort.

Q Could you explain? In what way?

A No. I think that would get us into more detail than we're prepared to get into. I think I'm just going to have to leave it there.

Q Talking of political assassinations, there was another political assassination on the news in Athens. Do you care to comment on that one?

A I don't have a reaction. I'm aware of the story, but I don't have details or a reaction to give you on it particuarly.

Q And one more, please: Reports from the Awali River that the Israelis are fortifying their positions and signalling that they are not about to go into the second stage of their full withdrawal as the U.S. Administration hopes, do you have any comment on that?

A I would refer you back to the statement that was issued by the White House at the end of last week for our position on that.

Q I just have a couple of quick ones on the Guayana loan situation, following up your statement last week.

A On the which?

Q On the Guayana loan situation. I realize your statement was only addressing the IDB loan veto, but around the same time the United States also cancelled two major AID loans for rice production.

I'm wondering if you're going to deny for the record that either the veto or the loan cancellations was in any way related to the fact that Guyana refused the IMF conditionalities of a very massive devaluation, which they did refuse a few months back.

A I think on the cancellation of the AID projects, I would refer you back to some guidance which exists in the Press Office on that.

Q I think I'm familiar with that, and it didn't directly address this.

A I think it addressed what the reasons were for it.

Q But in other words, you're saying that those are the only reasons, and deny there was anything else? That's what I'm asking, to give some reasons --

A The reasons that are in the guidance are the reasons for the cancellation.

Q Okay. And I have a second question, because I said I had two: Is there any place in the Department -- the Population Bureau, AID, or any place else -- where you've estimated the number of people who will probably die from these loan cancellations? The Guyanese Government and senior officials there are indicating that the situation is so critical that this in fact means a very large number of deaths.

A I consider that not a serious question in this briefing.

Q Do you have any comment on The Washington Post editorial article today on Chile?

A The Washington Post editorial?

Q Yes. On Chile, saying that this Administration has had differences of opinion in human rights about Poland and Chile. Would you care to characterize the difference of human rights in Poland and Chile?

A No. I wouldn't. I would note, though, as long as you mention Chile, that apparently there has been a new list published of over a thousand exiles who are being allowed back into Chile.

Our Embassy informed us about that on Friday. The list apparently this time is significantly larger than those previously announced and reportedly contains the names of Jaime Costillo, the former Minister of Justice in the Frey Administration and Christian Democratic leader, as well as other political figures from a range of parties.

We regard this as a favorable development which could help reconcile political divisions within Chile and contribute to effective dialogue between the government and opposition sectors and to the restoration of democracy.

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Q Can we get a copy?

A Yes.

Q Also, do you have any information of any threat to the life of these exiles?

A To the life of these people who are being returned?

Q Who are being returned to Chile.

A I don't have any, but I also wouldn't look into that because presumably that would be based on intelligence or other kinds of sensitive information, so I really couldn't share that with you, which is one reason I've also tried to stay away from this question about --

Q Isn't it related to the threat to the life of Aquino --

A I say, that's the kind of thing that I've also tried to stay away from in the case of Mr. Aquino.

Q A continuing problem at the Islamic Center has made it difficult for the DC Police plus more than 60 Ambassadors are embroiled. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, August 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #148

TUESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1983, 12:25 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a statement regarding AWACS deployments in the Sudan.

We continue to monitor closely the situation in Chad and to cooperate with concerned friends and allies on the dangers posed by the Libyan aggression against that country.

Our assessment of the current situation is that for the immediate future we need not keep our Air Force assets deployed in the Sudan. After consultations with concerned governments, the United States has therefore decided to begin redeploying the aircraft and personnel to the United States.

Nonetheless, as was demonstrated by the deployment, appropriate assets can be rapidly moved to the area should the situation warrant. The AWACS were deployed to the Sudan August 7 after consultations with the governments of Chad, Sudan and France to perform a monitoring role should that become necessary.

We believe the deployment clearly demonstrated U.S. concern over the events in Chad. It also demonstrated once again the close ties between the United States and its friends and the ability of the United States to respond quickly and appropriately when circumstances dictate.

The United States has expressed its appreciation to the Sudan for its assistance in this operation in response to overt Libyan military aggression in Chad. In this context we have also reaffirmed our concern for Sudan's security in the face of Libya's military intervention in Chad.

We are continuing our $25 million emergency assistance program to Chad. We are continuing to work with the Government of Chad and other concerned governments to effect the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad and to protect Chad's territorial integrity. There can be no doubt that regular Libyan army units are occupying territory well within Chad's borders, and that Libyan air force units have bombed Chad.

We are encouraged by the French deployment of substantial forces to Chad. The United States again condemns Libya's blatant act of aggression and affront to international order and calls upon Libya to withdraw.

The United States maintains its support for Chad's territorial integrity and sovereignty and does not wish to see a resolution of the conflict resulting in a partition of Chad.

That's it for the statement. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q Has there been a lessening of your concern about the situation in Chad, or the Sudan for that matter, by the withdrawal of the AWACS?

A I wouldn't take this as a lessening of concern or reduction of support or anything of that sort. We remain fully supportive of the Government of Chad and the objective of removing Libyan forces from Chad's territory.

Q But what mission --

A We are simply returning the AWACS to the U.S. because there's no immediate need for their presence, but, as I indicated in the statement, that we can return the appropriate assets to the area quickly should the circumstances require, and our substantial aid program for Chad is continuing.

Q When will they begin to move, Alan?

A They will begin to move, I understand, today. You might want to check some of this sort of detail with the Pentagon, but I believe if I'm correct, it will begin today and should take about three days.

Q Did those aircraft ever fly operational missions?

A They did not conduct missions related to the situation in Chad, but they did perform one training mission. There was practical utility for us in this deployment in that it was an outstanding training experience for our crews and support personnel, and it also bolstered the confidence of our friends in the region of our commitment and ability to help.

Q But why were they never used?

A The circumstance never arose where a decision was taken to use them.

Q But is the situation not worse now than when they were dispatched?

A The decision to use them depends on a lot of things, and that's a judgment that has to be made on the basis of those variety of --

Q Many people were under the impression that they were sent in case the French sent fighter aircraft, and they could be used to help the French monitor aircraft that they might run into. They were never used, and now the French, as we understand it, have sent aircraft, and they're being brought home.

A I think that John indicated at the time of the deployment that the French deployment would be certainly a factor in whether they might be used or how they might be used, but I'm not going to comment on French operational plans or indeed on our own. To refer you to what I said in the statement, there is no immediate operational need for them at this point.

But I would re-emphasize that they could be brought back, together with their associated support equipment, on a fairly quick basis.

Q It sure sounds like the whole northern section of Chad has been written off by the French, otherwise they would be mounting an operation to require AWACS support.

A I don't know that I can accept that. I would simply say, certainly the U.S. does not accept the partition of Chad. As I've said before, our objective remains to be the withdrawal of Libyan forces and a secure Chadian Government, and we categorically oppose foreign intervention, occupation, partition of Chad.

Q Am I wrong, Alan, to assume that the French asked for these aircraft in the first instance and then decided they did not need them, for whatever reason?

A I think we have declined to go into the details of the consultations that we've had with the French or, indeed, with others on this deployment except to say that we have had consultations both before and following the deployment, and certainly in the case of the withdrawal we have consulted as well. I don't think I really can take it beyond that.

Q Alan, do the French have aircraft monitoring capability of their own?

A I think I'd have to ask you to talk to the French about that.

Q Alan, could you give us a dollar figure on the cost of sending these planes with the fighter escort to Chad and returning them?

A Again, I think this probably is the kind of question you've got to address to the Pentagon, but my understanding is that the deployment costs would come out of the DOD operations budget, and that at this point the total cost can't be calculated. I really would have to refer you to the Pentagon to follow up on that.

Q When you say we're continuing our $25 million assistance to Chad, where are we in that and did any of this operation come out of that package?

A The answer to your second question is no. This came, as I say, out of DOD operations budget. We are still, to my understanding, at about a $10 million plus point in that assistance, but are looking at what further assistance might be appropriate.

Q Would F-15 fighter planes also be withdrawn or just the AWACS?

A No. I think that all of the aircraft that went in with the AWACS and the associated equipment will come out. I'm sure the aircraft will come out. I'm pretty sure indeed that all of the other equipment that was brought in related to this particular deployment will be brought out, but you might want to double check that with the Pentagon.

Q How about the personnel, the 600 people?

A Yes. All the people will come out as well.

Q What can you point to in your evaluation of the mission of the AWACS? What did they accomplish in deterring aggression?

A Again, let me refer you back to the statement. I think that addresses the question.

Q Do you think the deployment of the AWACS was a factor in prompting France to deploy more personnel and to deploy aircraft to Chad?

A I have no way of evaluating the French decision process on this. I think that you would have to ask them what went into their decision process. We certainly consulted closely with them before we deployed, since we deployed on the decision to withdraw at this particular point.

Q The military exercise that's taking place in the Sudan now, it still is going on, isn't it? One. And, two --

A I don't know, number one. I understand it may be, but, again, the Pentagon would have to address that.

Q Okay. Are there any AWACS left with the exercise other than the two that will be returning now?

A In the Sudan?

Q Right.

A Ghasson, let me refer you to the Pentagon. I think I know the answer, but I don't want to mislead you on that. I'm sure that they would have the answer to that readily at hand.

Q Did the French say that at this point the withdrawal made sense?

A I'm not going to get into it. The question that we had, we consulted with the French, and I wouldn't want to lead you in a direction of suggesting disagreement between us.

Q Did they agree that we've consulted?

A I don't think there's any question about whether we've consulted.

Q Do we know of Libyan air missions against Chad while the AWACS planes were in the Sudan?

A I can't answer that specifically. I think that there were air missions. Whether there was bombing, I can't put a date on the last bombing.

Q I guess I'm asking you to say whether you think that the AWACS presence in the Sudan may have deterred Libyan air strikes.

A I guess I was asked a different question about that before. No. I can't give you a judgment on that.

Q Do you know whether the decision to withdraw the AWACS is related to diplomatic efforts to bring about a withdrawal of Libyan forces?

A I guess all I can really say to that is that the diplomatic efforts continue. We continue to support those efforts. We continue our military assistance. I think that the decision to withdraw the AWACS was based on the consideration that I mentioned to you in the statement: That for the immediate future a decision based on our assessment of the current situation is that we didn't need to keep the AWACS deployed there.

-- MORE --

Q I just want to be clear that the withdrawal is not part of a possible deal for a diplomatic solution of this particular problem.

A I would not try to lead you in that direction.

Q May I ask one more? It was at the time said that the two AWACS were taken out of Egypt. If so, are they being returned --

A No, that's wrong.

Q It is wrong?

A That's wrong.

Q It was sent to the United States here?

A Yes.

Q New subject?

Q Can I continue on on Libya? I just wonder if you could tell us what the State Department's position is on the sale of $40 million of offshore Marine warning system to Libya?

A That's a sneaky way of getting your question in before Mike.

I think, as the story which reported that this morning indicated, our position is that we do not comment on interagency deliberations. I would also note that the confidentiality provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, Section 2(c), if you care to check it, prohibits discussion of individual export license applications.

Q Do we have a general position on the sale of equipment of this kind, or of any other kind? There's been a lot of discussion about it. Can you address it generally?

A Yes, I think I could. Current U.S. export policy toward Libya is set forth at Section 385.7 of the Export Administration Regulations, and afterwards we can make copies available in the Press Office if you would like to look at that.

Under the current regulations, export license applications for oil and gas equipment destined to Libya will generally be considered favorably if the products are available from foreign sources and are not controlled for national security purposes. The licensing procedure provides the Administration with sufficient latitude to deny those exports which would be contrary to the foreign policy interests of the United States.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Is the warning equipment currently available from competitive sources?

A I think you would have to check that yourself. I'm not an expert in that area.

Q Can you bring us up to date, please, on the events in Manila?

A Events in Manila? I don't really --

Q Regarding the investigation and your knowledge of efforts to pursue the killers of Mr. Aquino?

A I don't have any general information to offer you. A couple of questions asked yesterday, is there going to be a separate U.S. probe on that? To reiterate, this probe is being handled by the Philippine Government. I don't have anything yet on attendance at the funeral.

The Philippine Government has, apparently, asked us for some technical assistance in investigating the source of the murder weapon.

Q I think the President said yesterday that he was going to consult with the State Department on whether or not he could attend the funeral. Do you have any more new language on that issue?

A It wasn't a question of attending the funeral.

Q I'm sorry, making his visit in November.

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that subject.

Q Is that question still open?

A I don't have anything beyond what was said yesterday. I think it was addressed by Larry Speakes yesterday.

Q What he said was it opened the possibility that the trip might not be --

A Let me refer you to what Larry said. I tend not to address Presidential trips.

Q Yesterday, you commented on the report in the press that suggested that the shots may have come from Philippine Government security people at the airport. Would you care to comment on a report in the press today that seven of the Philippine Government SWAT team members are under what apparently is called "technical arrest."

A I don't know what the facts are. I suspect that people are being questioned about what they know, but I don't know anything more about that. I don't know anything about it at all, but I'm sure a lot of people are being questioned. We're looking for a thorough and objective investigation.

Q In other words, you would view that as being that they're under arrest for questioning?

A I'm not sure what "technical arrest" is, and I don't think I'm going to get into the question of the Filipino investigation.

Q What type of technical assistance are they requesting, and what agency would provide it?

A I don't have detail on that. Again, it's on the source of the murder weapon, as I said, but I don't have detail beyond on that.

Q Are the FBI ballistics people involved in this?

A I can't tell you.

Q During his press conference, President Marcos made reference to high officials of an unnamed government as having been involved in providing papers for Mr. Aquino, his travel papers, that is, on which he returned. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything.

Q Also regarding your statement yesterday characterizing the reports that -- characterizing the news reports that it might have been security personnel involved. Are you still reiterating that position given what that freelance Japanese journalist has been saying, not only about his impression that security personnel did shoot Aquino but what seems to be even more intriguing is his very clear-cut assertion that he saw the alleged assassin being shoved out of a vehicle onto the tarmac after Aquino was shot? Are you still --

A May I answer the question? I would refer you back specifically to what I said yesterday. I think you characterized it somewhat. Secondly, I've seen conflicting press reports about what that journalist said, and I would think that is something that the people who are investigating the case will want to look into, what he did see and what he didn't see.

Q You mention that the Philippine Government had asked the United States for certain technical assistance in connection with the murder weapon. Does that mean it was of American manufacture?

A Again, I don't think I'm in a position to go beyond what I just said on that.

Q I don't know if you mentioned this yesterday. The announcement of who will represent the government at the funeral, will you make that, or is that a White House announcement?

A I assume we will know here when a decision is made on that. As I said before, I don't have anything for you today on that question. I understand from news reports that the funeral is going to be in several days time, so I don't know when that decision --

Q Do you have an idea if you think it would come here or --

A I think we would have the information available here, yes.

Q On McFarlane. There's some report, I understand, coming from Israel that McFarlane is, like his predecesor, unwelcome personally again in Damascus. Do you have anything on this?

A I find that not a credible report.

Q Just a follow-up -- when and if you expect him to go back to Damascus?

A I don't have any onward plans. As you know, we have not tended to give information on onward travel.

Ambassador McFarlane today is in Israel conferring with Israeli officials. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut conferring with Lebanese officials, but I'm not going to try to project when either of them might go back to Syria. But I would steer you away from the suggestion that you raised in your question.

Q Do you have any information about the outcome of those technical-legal teams that were supposed to go through the Israeli-Lebanese agreement?

A I don't have any readout to give you on that, no.

Q Alan, there's a story out this morning that the USIA has commissioned an opinion poll in West Germany on the German peoples' feelings about the deployment of missiles there later this year? Can you confirm that the State Department or the USIA has commissioned that public opinion poll?

A I think I'm going to have to refer you to USIA on that since it's a report on something they presumably commissioned.

Q We have information that the Greek Government has made an agreement with the Soviets to allow Greece to be used as a trans-shipment point for war materiel to Libya, and diplomatic sources in Europe, from the Greek Government, have said that they -- despite the fact that they're in NATO -- they see no problem with this and that the United States and France have not expressed any concern about this and doesn't it seem to be inconsistent with U.S. and French policies? Could you clarify whether that's the case?

A I don't have anything on that. I don't know anything about it.

Q Can you take the question as to what our position would be if a NATO country were to act as a trans-shipment point for war materiels from the Soviet Union to Libya?

A I can look into it. I don't know whether I'm going to come back with a response beyond what we've said in the past about our policy toward Libya and what we talked -- there have been briefings in the past about, going back some months now, on how we were dealing with other countries on this issue.

Q Relating to Greece, specifically? Have you gotten to that point?

A Generally, in relation to other countries. As I say, I'll look into this and see if we have anything specific to say on this. I'm not sure that we will.

Q Do you have anything on Stone travel plans?

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Is he here?

A Yes.

Q Any update on the Syrian-American working group?

A No.

Q Senator Cranston returned today from Central America saying that if the United States is serious about negotiating peace with the region, the U.S. will have to deal directly with Fidel Castro. What is this Administration's position on such a dialogue with Castro?

A I would refer you back to our record which is rather extensive on this subject rather than trying to rephrase it here. I'm sure we can help you find it.

Q On Poland, do you have any comment on the decision of Mr. Walesa not speak at the shipyards, one of the shipyards in that area, because of the fear that he might be jailed?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Back on Cranston. He also came back today and said that the U.S. tough talk and military moves are undermining the Contadora peace effort. Do you have any reaction to the Senator's comments?

A No, not specifically. I think the Secretary has addressed, as have others, the purposes of our exercises in the region.

Q Do you have any guidance on a new Soviet draft treaty to the U.N. on space weapons?

A No. I think I addressed not the submission to the U.N., but the general remarks that were made about that the other day. I refer you to what that was.

Q Do you have anything further to say on a question you were asked yesterday about President Mubarak's possible visit with President Reagan in Washington in October?

A I have nothing new on that.

Q Anything on that Jane's Fighting Ships report about China launching and testing a nuclear submarine?

A No.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:45 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, August 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #149

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1983, 12:04 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Could you bring us up to date on renewed fighting in Chad; a new offensive there?

A We've seen a press report of a minor skirmish near Oum Chalouba between government and rebel patrols, but we cannot confirm it. There have been reports of Libyan-backed rebel patrols south of Faya Largeau, but, again, I have no information that an attack is imminent.

The Libyans continue to fortify their positions, but we have no new figures on Libyan troops in Chad south of the Aouzou.

Q What's the disposition of our air units there now?

A The air units in the Sudan? The AWACS?

Q Yes.

A I would refer you to the Pentagon but I understand that the AWACS aircraft have taken off already together with some tankers. I think some of the other aircraft are still there. But as we indicated, we expect everything to be out within a three-day period.

Q Where are they bound to?

A I don't know specifically. I guess you would have to check with the Pentagon.

Q There was also a report about Libyan forces moving 80 kilometers south of Faya Largeau toward N'Djamena. Did you address that in your earlier --

A What I said -- yes -- there are reports of Libyan-backed rebel patrols moving south of Faya Largeau, but we have no indications of an imminent attack. I think we just really don't have very much detail on this beyond what has already been out in the public.

Q Why are some of the F-15's still there in Sudan? Why weren't they brought back as well?

A You would have to check with the Pentagon as to how redeployment is effected. I can't answer that.

Q On another subject, though, so if there are any other questions --

A Go ahead.

Q What about Filipino military agents operating in the United States? An unclassified DIA document confirms the practice of Philippine military agents operating in the United States. I'm sure you read the press report, and I don't know if you have a copy of the document but this is a DIA document. What is our government's position on agents of foreign governments operating on the territory of the United States?

A I'm not aware of the report about which you're speaking. I really can't comment.

Q In general?

A I don't have a general comment to offer.

Q Are foreign agents operating in the United States?

A "Foreign agents" is a rather broad term. I think that you have to be much more specific to know what's appropriate. We have foreign officials operating in the United States in a variety of capacities.

Q To quote from the language of the Defense Intelligence Agency memorandum, the attache is referring to senior military attaches in the Philippine Government "will undoubtedly report on, and possibily operate against, anti-Marcos Philippine activists in the United States."

This is a Defense Intelligence Agency document. This is reasonably specific.

A First of all, I can't believe that that purports to be an unclassified document, so I have to assume that it is a presumed leak of some sort. So if it weren't --

Q It was obtained from the Freedom of Information Act.

A I haven't seen it, I can't comment on it. Attaches obviously do report on a variety of things. Specifically, with regard to that, why I don't just try and take a look and see if there's anything, a general statement one could offer you on that; but I don't have anything at this point.

Q In that area, Alan, do you have anything additional on the assistance the United States may be giving the investigation of the Aquino murder?

A Just a little bit more than I gave you yesterday. We have provided information to the Philippine Government on the murder weapon. I can't give you specifics, though, because of the on-going investigation. And also we have just received a Philippine Government request for assistance in the techniques of fingerprint search which the Department of Justice is processing.

Q Can you comment at all on the Marcos Government's establishment of a $45,000 reward, and on the Marcos Government's confining to quarters of the military guards responsible for security at the airport?

A No. I don't have anything on it.

Okay, are we done?

Q Is Murphy in Israel now? Any comments on what his mission is?

A No, I think Ambassador Murphy is, as you know, on his way back here to assume duties, appear for testimony, and so on, and confirmation, and assume duties, if confirmed, as Assistant Secretary. So he will be stopping in the region. I don't have an itinerary to give you on his way back.

Q Is the Administration expecting difficulties in the confirmation process of Ambassador Murphy?

A I can't try to predict what will happen on the Hill. Obviously, Ambassador Murphy is a very well qualified and highly regarded professional officer.

Q Do you have any comment on the signing of an agreement with Canada regarding the research and the cause of acid rain?

A I do. On August 23, Ambassador Paul H. Robinson, Jr., and the new Canadian Environment Minister

Charles Caccia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on CAPTEX, which is Cross Appalachian Tracer Experiment.

The U.S. asked the Canadians to participate, and they agreed. It's just the type of research cooperation which benefits all of us.

CAPTEX is designed to improve our understanding and modeling of the mechanism of long-distance atmospheric transport and dispersion of air pollutants.

Q Where was it signed?

A It was signed by the Ambassador in Canada. I don't know specifically where.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Will they be working in this experiment with the various industries that are suspected of producing acid rain? Will they have any way of enforcing cooperation?

A I think that it is a research program, essentially, and I would refer you basically to the Executive Director of the task force -- there's an interagency task force on acid precipitation, and the Executive Director is Dr. Chris Bernabo, whose telephone number of 395-5773.

As I say, it's not a control program, per se. It's an experimental program, but it should provide a basis for other activities in addressing acid rain concerns.

Q A housekeeping question regarding the Secretary's remarks Friday, 8:30 a.m.?

A Friday, a week.

Q Are you assured yet that that will be piped in? Are you still working on it?

A I don't have an update on it for you. We are still talking about a week; we're not talking about this week.

Q Back to Murphy, Alan. In what capacity is he visiting Israel? Is that official or unofficial?

A I'm sorry?

Q How would you characterize Murphy's visit to Israel?

A I don't have a characterization to offer. He's visiting in the region on his way back.

Q He is not yet Assistant Secretary, but he's still Ambassador? I mean, is that considered an official visit?

A I'm sure it's an official visit, but it's not in the capacity of Assistant Secretary. He's not Assistant Secretary, but I don't see anything terribly unusual or special about it.

Q Also, what about Fairbanks and McFarlane; where are they today?

A They're in Beirut today.

Q In the Ma'Ariv newspaper, the Israeli newspaper, they have a report today saying that the Israelis are disappointed with the McFarlane mission, that they described it that it failed to achieve progress in Lebanon. Do you have any comment on this?

A I'm not going to comment on a specific newspaper report. We think that the mission has had a number of good conversations. They're continuing to work hard together with the various parties to resolve the problems they're addressing, but I'm not going to get into the specifics or try to respond to a newspaper characterization of --

Q Are there plans for Mr. McFarlane to go to Damascus?

A I don't have anything on their on-going travel. We just haven't been doing that for obvious reasons, but we certainly will let you know when they show up. Again, I would steer you away from the kind of implication in a question, I believe it was yesterday, that somehow the mission was not welcomed in Damascus. That is not accurate.

Q Iran seems to be paying back a lot of the financial claims dating back to the hostage crises. I was wondering if there is any political dialogue in sight with Iran, or do you have any reaction to the payoffs?

A I don't. Let me take a look and see if we have anything I can give you on that later, but I don't have anything at this point.

Q Anything Alan on certain Israeli redeployment now that it's expected to be on Sunday? Do you have anything to say about that?

A I don't have confirmation that -- I've seen the various reports, of course. I've also seen that the Israeli Government has not confirmed those reports, but I just don't have anything to offer you on the subject at this point beyond what we've said before.

Q Anything on Argentina? There was another incident today of an opposition leader who was allegedly kidnapped by the police, the local police; do you have any comment on it?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on El Salvador? D'Aubuisson has said that they would need more mercenaries instead of advisors.

A No, I don't have anything on it.

Q Stone's travels?

A No. Nothing new on that.

Q Will you let us know about that beforehand, or is this in the category of secret?

Q Covert.

A No, not covert. I can't tell you for sure. I would expect -- the last time we did let you know before he actually took off, and I expect we would make some effort to try to do that again. So I can only leave you with that.

Q Minutes before?

A Minutes before? Thirty seconds? No, I think we gave you enough time to know that he was going if you wanted to cover the departure.

Q Thank you.

A You welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:15 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, August 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #150

THURSDAY, AUGUST 25, 1983, 12:04 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one announcement, and that is that there will not be a briefing tomorrow.

Q: Good.

Q Why is that?

A Happy Friday. Because there won't be anybody here to brief. (Laughter)

Q Why?

A I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, President Mitterrand says he did get information from the AWACS on Libyan troop movements. Is that true?

A I'm not aware that he said that, particularly. I haven't the text of his interview, so I'm going to have to beg off that. I don't think we would get into that kind of detail in any case. I haven't seen the text. I've only seen some wire service reports and gotten a brief precis of it.

Q Can those AWACS do that from the ground? (Laughter)

A You find out and we'll both know.

Q The latest developments on Chad?

A Chad? There really is nothing new to give you beyond what we had yesterday. We've seen reports of dissident movement but can't confirm them. That is toward Koro Toro and Oum Chalouba. We have seen some information indicating various movements south of Faya Largeau by Libyan-supported rebels, but, again, no suggestion or information that an attack is imminent. No reports of renewed fighting, and the Libyans continue to fortify their positions and redeploy their equipment. That's really it.

Q Regarding Lebanon, two questions. First, could you confirm that Israel has agreed to postpone the redeployment for a few days on a request by the U.S. and

Lebanon; and, second, could you confirm that the Lebanese Government has asked the U.S., and some other countries, to move the Multinational Force into the Shouf once Israel moves out?

A No, I can't confirm any of that. I wouldn't get into the question of discussions of that sort. Obviously, the issue of the MNF and what it might do or might not do in the wake of the Israeli pullback is something that people are thinking about, but in the absence of information of various sorts, including specifically what the situation will be in the area from which the Israeli forces will be pulling back, it really is premature to make decisions or even to consider recommendations on that.

Q Is there a consideration now to increase the MNF force?

A Again, as I say, people are thinking about a variety of possible things that might be done or might not be done. I would refer you back to what I just said: Given the absence of information about the circumstances into which an MNF might be asked to play role, it simply is premature to make decisions or even really recommendations, serious recommendations.

Q Alan, would the movement of American Marines as part of the MNF into the Shouf be in violation of the original mandate under which it was sent?

A That, again, takes us into the future, into a hypothetical situation, and I think I'd wait until, if we get to that situation, let's address it at that point.

Q On this question, do you think that the attack on the French contingent this morning Beirut in which a number were injured would be an obstacle to any future deployment of the MNF in the Shouf?

A I can't really address that, and I don't have details. I've seen the wire service reports on that incident, but I don't have details on it. I just can't address it in those terms.

Q Another question. Is McFarlane in Rome now?

A Yes, he is.

Q Is he on his way back to Washington?

A I just think I can't give you his itinerary or his travel plans. We haven't done it; not going to get into it. I'm afraid we're going to have to go on a day-by-day kind of thing.

Q Is the implication that he will not be visiting Damascus?

A I don't know about the implication that -- again, I would refer you back to what I said yesterday about Damascus, and I would not to lead you one way or another about the possibility of people visiting Damascus. That certainly is not out of the realm of possibility, but I don't have something specific to give you today on somebody going to Damascus.

Q On the MNF, have additional U.S. units been earmarked for possible assignment to an expanded MNF if such a decision were made?

A I haven't got the slightest idea. That would be in the realm of DOD contingency planning, and I guess you would have to ask them.

Q In your realm, how is McFarlane doing?

A How is McFarlane doing? I think I addressed that yesterday, how Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks are doing. I said they had a number of good discussions. They continue to work hard on the problems they're addressing.

Q Two questions. First, what is the purpose of McFarlane's stop in Rome?

A The purpose of his stop in Rome? He's obviously -- we and the Italians share a number of common interests and concerns about what's going on in the region, and specifically in Lebanon. They are a contributing member to the MNF force, and certainly that will be a natural topic for discussion. I think it's a perfectly natural thing to do to carry out that kind of discussion.

Q Asking an earlier question a different way: what do we know now about the timing of an Israeli pullout? Have we been consulted closely on that?

A I don't have anything to give you on timing of an Israeli withdrawal.

Q How about consultations on it, Alan?

A Again, I'm not going to try to get into specifics of what the consultations have addressed. We have certainly had discussions with the various parties on the relevant issues. I know that's nice State Departmentese, but I don't think we're in a position where we're going to start detailing the agenda or the topics that are being covered.

Q Alan, can you enlighten us on a report that the American Embassy in Kuwait was slated for an attack similar to that that occured in Beirut and that it was foiled?

A No, I can't. I can't enlighten you on that.

Q Also on Iran, do you have --

A Also on Iran?

Q I think that was Iran-related. (Laughter)

Q The Iranians were behind it.

A Go ahead.

Q The Iranians were supposedly behind it. All right. There was this taken question yesterday concerning Iranian repayment.

A We'll have something to post after the briefing on it.

Q You're still at it, huh?

A No, we'll have it after the briefing.

Q On the Iranian plan to convert the American Embassy into a military training school?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q I had the feeling that there's a change here in the U.S. role in the MNF being thought about. It surprised me a little bit. Maybe I'm wrong, but my impression had been that the Administration was pretty firm on not moving the MNF into the Shouf. In fact, the Secretary spoke rather strongly about that on his way back from his last Middle East trip. But you're sort of leaving the impression, at least, that this is now under consideration.

A As I said, various people are thinking about various things that the MNF might or might not do, but it is in light of the absence of specific information of the sort that I think the Secretary, indeed, was talking about -- for example, the political situation there, and what the situation is that obtains all together -- it's premature to be addressing decisions or even hard recommendations. So I think that people think about these things all the time, but that is not to suggest that there's about to be some sort of decision made. I would steer you away from that kind of thought at this point.

Q You have not mentioned the Lebanese army in connection with this. I understood the standing position was that the Lebanese army would be able to do it and that they should do it, and you've not --

A I haven't addressed the Lebanese army; you're right. I've talked about -- the question came up about the MNF, and a possible role for the MNF certainly would be in support of the Lebanese. Again, I'm not going to get into the details of the kinds of contingencies and specific roles that -- we could stretch out a number of hypotheses on this and I'm not going to do that.

Q Would it be correct for us to perceive that there is a new flexibility in our consideration about the use of the Marines?

A I wouldn't steer in you in that direction, no.

Q About Aquino's funeral --

Q Can we stay --

A Go ahead, Rafic.

Q Another question about the redeployment. Just to clarify the U.S. position, do you expect the Israelis not to carry out the redeployment as long as there isn't some kind of reconciliation in the Shouf?

A Just to clarify my position, I haven't commented on the Israeli redeployment and timing and conditions for it, and I'm not going to try to do it. I've not even addressed it from the podium, and I'm really just not going to try to spell that out.

Q Can you address the internal Lebanese situation that he referred to?

A No, I think I addressed this the other day, and I refer you back to what I said then.

Q Would you accept the U.S. position -- sorry, I want to hear your definition of your position, vis-a-vis the entry of the Lebanese army to the Shouf. Would you accept the Lebanse army to enter the Shouf without a political reconciliation between the Druze and Maronites?

A I would say two things. First of all, it isn't up the U.S. to accept or not accept Lebanese deployment of Lebanese armed forces within Lebanon.

Second of all, I'm not going to get into the question of what is a likely scenario, in terms of either timing or modalities, of an Israeli withdrawal and what would happen in the wake, or in coordination with or in association with that withdrawal. I'm just not going to try to address that question.

Q Sorry, a back-up on this. Your position had been that you favored a reconciliation before the entry of the army or the pullback of the Israeli forces. Is there a change in this position?

A I would refer you back to what we said on the record. I don't have anything to offer you specifically today on this question.

Q One more on Middle East. Has the Administration or the State Department made "polite inquiries" to the French Foreign Ministry about the possible loan of Exocet and Etendard combination weapons to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq fight?

A We have talked to all parties, including France, interested in the war between Iraq and Iran and the security situation in the Gulf, and have highlighted the dangers of escalation. We have not taken a position on the specific arms transfer that has been talked about in the press, that you've just raised, while we seek to learn more about it.

The U.S. remains neutral in the war. We do not export directly or indirectly U.S.-controlled weapons to either Iran or Iraq.

A Can we have a copy that?

Q Yes.

Q If I may follow up, does that mean, well, is the United States concerned that this transfer may occur?

A I'm going to leave you with the words that I just gave you.

Q Doesn't the prolonging of the war, as it is going on now, stem from the fact that there is no decisive battle which put an end to it, and possibly this action on the part of Iraq by taking on the oil fields of Iran could bring it to an end, and possibly bring about a discussion, because a prolonging means more war to continue?

A I'm not going to respond to that.

Q Getting back to the Exocet, does the United States have any theories about the two bombings today, one in Berlin and one some place else against the French?

A There was one in Beirut.

Q Beirut.

A I don't have anything.

Q Nothing?

A Nothing.

Q Arms control?

A Arms control, yes.

Q There was a conference that just concluded --

A Oh, I'm sorry. We're going to switch topics. I guess you were in line.

Q Aquino, the Aquino funeral. Is there going to be any American representation there, and if so, who and at what level?

A I believe that Ambassador Armacost will be the U.S. representative.

Q Can you comment on reports this morning that the United States is prepared to distance itself from Marcos if it's found that he or his people were responsible for the assassination?

A That's an "if/then" question. It's highly hypothetical and highly speculative, and I'm not going to get into that kind of speculation. We certainly have an important relationship with the Philippines. I'm not going to try to speculate on the future -- "if such-and-such".

Q Alan, yesterday, you were asked about a copy of a Defense Intelligence Agency document that is being widely circulated, and you declined to comment --

A Yes.

Q -- on the grounds that you said it appeared to be a classified document.

A Still does.

Q At any rate, if I may continue a second, since you spoke yesterday, Representative Don Edwards and another Member of Congress has referred to this in a public press conference, has distributed it widely to the people who were in there, and has made a charge that it appears to represent on its face official U.S. knowledge of, if not complicity in, activities that are illegal, and has demanded of the government an explanation. He has said that he probably will hold hearings on this next week.

In the light of all of that, are you still declining to comment about this document?

A Yes. It's still a classified document, John. Whether it's been published on the front pages of the papers or distributed by a Congressman, that doesn't change the nature of it.

In terms of the general question which was asked yesterday about our attitude towards harassment or operations against opposition activities in this country, we have a response which we will post later on. But there is the general policy statement on that.

Q When will this be posted?

A It's being retyped and will be posted early this afternoon. I can't tell you whether it will be available immediately after the briefing or not, but it will be available this afternoon. But that does not address the specifics of any alleged Philippine action on that particular piece of paper.

Q Can you address the specifics of charges that are made that don't deal with this document? There are a whole flock of charges that have been made by Filipino exiles and everything to the effect that harassment --

A No, I don't have anything to say on that. You might want to -- I suppose if the Congressman or committee is going to hold hearings, perhaps that would be an appropriate time to address it.

Q What I'm asking you to do is, as I say, you can call up all manner of Filipino exiles who claim that harassment or intimidation activities take place, that they complain about them to the State Department and the FBI and that nothing is done about them.

Can you respond to that?

A I will leave you with the statement we are going to post this afternoon, John.

Q Can you tell us what the statement is? We can pick up the typed copy later?

A I don't have it with me.

Q Alan, just as to a point of order on this. You're not having a briefing tomorrow because you say there is nobody around to brief. I can't recall in my two-and-one half years here that that has happened before.

A Well, I think you're wrong, in fact.

Q Let me finish my question. Secondly, something is coming out, obviously, later today that people have a lot of interest [illegible]

A Uh-huh.

Q Now, it's going to be three, four, five days before --

A We've got a press office. You're most welcome to call on its services.

Q But this is customary? You do this on briefings, and there is nobody to brief? I mean, Susan Pittman --

A We have had other times, Greg -- maybe your memory is shorter than mine; but I've been here for two years, and there have been occasions when we haven't briefed, so --

Q At a conference that just concluded yesterday of international laser scientists, which included Edward Teller from the United States, and Mr. Velickov, the head of the program in the Soviet Union, a document was signed by everyone involved which indicates that the Soviets, at least the scientists, are now willing to cooperate quite closely on the question of beam weapons development.

Do you have any response to this? The President did send a telegram greeting the conference and reemphasizing his commitment to develop these weapons. This is the first indication that the Soviets might be more flexible than they've been before.

A Why don't you let me take a look, and see if anybody has any response to that.

Q Thank you.

Q On Chad, there is a report that the rebel leader, Goukouni, has disappeared since July 30, and may be dead or shunted aside. Do you have any information on that?

A I think the best I could do for you on that is to say that our information would not support a disappearance of that period of time, over three weeks. Obviously, we don't exactly have contact with Mr. Goukouni, but our information would suggest that you be cautious with that story.

Q Do you have anything on the signing of the grain agreement with the Soviets, any more information available now that it has been signed?

A I don't have anything more. You might want to check with Agriculture on the specifics.

Q Do you have any guidance yet on the Soviets' latest proposal at the United Nations on space weapons?

A There is a rather lengthy guidance on that, and I'm going to refer you to the Press Office on it. It's in quite a bit of detail and I think we will probably --

Q -- release it this afternoon?

A It will be available to be used this afternoon. I don't know whether we are going to post all of it, but you certainly can get the information from it.

Q Alan, do you have anything for us on the CSCE in Madrid, and in particular, is Secretary Shultz expecting to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A I think we are still where we have been on that issue in terms of we have not yet gotten an agreement. So I think that --

Q There was an invitation from Spain today.

A I've seen the wire stories on this. I think what I'm saying is an accurate accounting of where we are. I don't have anything to comment in specific response to the wire stories on this. I think we're just going to have to see what happens.

Q At this point, there are no firm plans for the Secretary to leave?

A That's correct.

Q What is the extent of the involvement of the United States Embassy in Beirut in the case of the missing building construction supplies from Beirut building sites, as The Washington Post story quoted this morning?

A The direct answer to that question is, frankly, that we saw that and we're looking into it, checking to see what that might have been referring to. I don't know.

In terms of the reports that equipment and so on in large amounts were seized, we decry any interference in the activities of organizations which work to ameliorate human suffering in Lebanon.

We understand that the Government of Lebanon has taken steps to improve the situation at the Hariri Medical Center.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that the United States Administration got a letter signed by President Mubarak of Egypt similar to that one which was signed before by the late President Sadat concerning the military facilities in Egypt?

A I couldn't address a question of correspondence between Presidents. Sorry.

Q Do you have any information on the travels of Assistant Secretary-designate Murphy in the Middle East?

A I don't have details. As I indicated yesterday, he is on his way back here from his post. He's stopping off in the region at a couple of places. I don't have a specific itinerary to give you. It's a perfectly natural, normal, and useful thing for him to do, but I don't have any either itinerary or readout to give you on conversations he may have had. I've seen he has addressed the press at least in Israel after a meeting, but I don't have any details for you.

Q Alan, did General Walters give the French, Mitterrand specifically, the word on the AWACS being sent to Chad?

A Marvin, I can't get into the content of discussions we've had. General Walters did meet with President Mitterrand, but I cannot get into -- .

Q Was it in connection with Chad?

A I'm just going to have to, I think, leave the subject. I understand that President Mitterrand addressed this in his interview, but I think from here, I'm just not going to get into the subject of the discussion.

Q Alan, there was a report that came out of Rabat yesterday saying that the relations between Morocco and the United States are very tense as a result of a deal worked out between Qadaffi and King Hassan recently on the Polasario frontier vis-a-vis Morocco's position on Chad. The report said that part of the reason why Vice President Bush is going there is to patch up and clear the atmosphere.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have a -- I guess the general comment would be that, clearly, number one, the Vice President's trip was laid on sometime before recent meetings were held, or conversations to which these press reports allude; but secondly, we have a good relationship with Morocco. I wouldn't lead you in the direction of agreeing about tense, strained relations, that sort of thing.

Q The fact that the story came out of Rabat would indicate there might have been a partial green light from the authorities there.

A I can't try to figure out why stories come out of particular places.

Q When would the United States be ready or willing to send back the AWACS to Sudan?

A When? When a judgment is made that they are necessary.

Q Have they all left?

A The AWACS left, I think, yesterday. I don't know about the rest of the aircraft.

(The briefing concluded at 12:25 p.m.)

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Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, August 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #151

MONDAY, AUGUST 29, 1983, 1:00 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Sorry for the delay. I have a couple of announcements.

First, regarding a trip to Madrid. The Secretary of State has accepted the invitation of the Foreign Minister of Spain to a Foreign Ministers Meeting in Madrid September 7 to 9. Although the meeting is scheduled to take place outside the format of the CSCE Conference, we are continuing to work to achieve agreement of all governments to the draft concluding document in its current form.

I might note that a sign-up sheet has been posted in the main Press Office for those of you who wish to apply for a seat aboard the Secretary's plane. The sheet will be taken down and applications closed promptly at noon, Wednesday, August 31. No applications will be accepted after that time.

Q Will he be seeing Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A I'll answer your question, but let's hold off other questions on that until I've finished with my second one. The question was, will he be seeing Foreign Minister Gromyko. The answer is yes.

Secondly, a statement regarding events in Beirut this morning. Two U.S. Marines were killed and eight wounded when a U.S. Marine position was shelled in the Beirut suburbs this morning at 3:49 a.m. Washington time.

The attack on the Marines followed a day and night of sporadic fighting between forces of the Lebanese army and Lebanese Shi'ite militia groups in south Beirut. There has also been firing from Druze militia positions.

We are shocked and grieved by the deaths of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon. They died serving the United States in its efforts to help the Lebanese Central Government restore order to the greater Beirut area. We condemn those who are responsible for the continuing violence which has claimed many victims, including our own Marines.

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Our forces are there at the request of the Government of Lebanon, helping to provide security for the Lebanese people. Once more, we call upon all armed elements to end this senseless violence and unite behind the Lebanese Government to restore national harmony.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Copy?

A Copy? Sure.

Q Does this change anything as regards the War Powers Act? The fact that they have been killed in hostilities, does that require the Executive Branch to go to Congress to get a new mandate?

A On the question of War Powers, this question is under intensive study at the present moment and we will, of course, take whatever action is called for with respect to the War Powers Resolution, but I don't have an answer beyond that to give you at this point.

Q I'm not absolutely sure of my ground here, but one of my colleagues just told me that Mr. Weinberger had said that he had sent some notifications to Congress. Now, what would that relate to?

A There have been, I think, a number of phone calls to the leadership on the Hill regarding the events that took place in Beirut this morning, the ones that I've been addressing. But in terms of formal notification under the provisions are consistent with the reporting provisions of the War Powers Act. That, again, is being looked at as I described it.

Q In other words, you're looking at whether the Administration wants to -- feels it has to invoke that part of the War Powers Act which allows, or which calls on Congress to give its positive affirmation after 60 or 90 days?

A I don't want to disagree with that. What I would rather do is simply say, we're looking at the situation and the War Powers Resolution and that we will take, of course, whatever action is called for with respect to the War Powers Resolution.

Q Are you contemplating any change in the deployment of U.S. troops because of this, either more or less?

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A I don't know of any contemplated change because of this event, or series of events this morning.

Q Is it a matter for the Executive Branch to decide or is it up to Congress to demand that the Executive Branch comply with Congressional understanding of the War Powers Act?

A I think I would refer you to the Act itself. We have described and discussed the War Powers Resolution and our reporting under it on an previous occasions, and it certainly is something the Administration, in terms of its reporting, will be looking at very closely.

Q Alan, one point here. Is there any consideration being given by the U.S. Government to withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Lebanon?

A I know of no consideration being given to that.

Q When the War Powers thing -- does the Administration hold or consider the Act still valid in light of the Supreme Court decision?

A Again, that's a very long, complicated question, and I would refer you to the testimony that's been given on the Hill on the subject by Deputy Secretary Dam and others, and I think that this specific subject has been addressed. I don't want to try to paraphrase what they've said on that. But I would repeat to you that we will, of course, take whatever action is called for with respect to the War Powers Resolution.

Q When was that testimony?

A I think we can help you in the Press Office later on.

Q Within the last month?

A My recollection would be within the last two months or so. It was certainly after the Supreme Court decision, and I don't think it's been within the last three weeks.

Q Is it the U.S. understanding that the targeting that led to the casualties was meant specifically to hit the U.S. Marine positions?

A Our understanding is that fire fights began among Lebanese elements and spread throughout west Beirut. During the course of the fighting, elements of all the MNF contributors came under fire. However, whether they were specifically being targeted or, in fact, by whom, is not known.

Q I would like to box Marvin's question. Is any consideration being given to increasing the size of the force in Lebanon?

A As a result of this incident?

Q Yes.

A I think I answered this before. I know of no contemplation being given as a result of this morning's events to changes.

Q To any changes up or down?

A That's my understanding at this point. I've not heard of any.

Q Following up on Bernie's question, it would seem essential politically to try and determine whether the Marines were specifically targeted, because if they were that would perhaps indicate a new political complexion in Lebanon.

A It might. We certainly are interested in that question. But at this point, all I can tell you is that we don't know.

Q Secretary Weinberger pointed out in his airport statement this morning that there was no -- I believe he said something to the effect that there was no proof that the Marines were specifically targeted but it was well known to all sides, and has been advertised by the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, precisely where the Marines are, precisely what they're rounds are and their patrols are so that everyone knew where they would be, where they could be hit.

A I think that they are also not all by themselves in some of these locations either.

Q I read the Dam testimony this morning, and in it --

A I take it that is without an --

Q I'm sorry. That was a reference to the gentleman's surname. I didn't realize; sorry.

He pointed out that there were four particular requirements in the War Powers Act and one of them he described as constituting a legislative veto and therefore illegal under the Supreme Court rulings of June 23 and July 6. He specifically underscored that while this was a preliminary determination by the State Department, that that was the position they were then holding. Do you still hold that position?

A I don't have anything new on that to give you. Again, I think that on War Powers I'm really going to have to stick with what I've given you, whatever your questions. I'm just, at this point, not going to go beyond it, and I'm not going to take questions beyond it.

Q Does "nothing new" mean no change?

A I don't have anything new to offer you. I just don't have any words on that today.

Q The impact of today on the McFarlane visit, and the diplomatic effort to bring about a resolution?

A Ambassador McFarlane has returned to Beirut, and he is continuing his efforts. So I think that that, in fact, will proceed. I really can't try to speculate on some effect of the events in the last several hours on this, or, indeed, there was some firing yesterday that we're hoping to bring about -- help to bring about the ending of this firing and improve relations among the various groups there.

I can't really try to give you some sort of readout except to say that Ambassador McFarlane is certainly continuing actively, as is Ambassador Fairbanks, to pursue the mission the President sent them on.

Q Alan, is there any disposition in this building to look at this tragedy there of the Marines being killed as possibly stemming from the failure of diplomacy by the United States there? You've been working at this thing for months and months and you haven't gotten anybody out of there. I mean, there seems to be no resolution of it. Is there any interest in trying to intensify your efforts there?

A I think the efforts have been intense. They will continue to be intense, and I would not ascribe the said events of this morning to diplomatic failure. Obviously, we would look for, hope for, work for diplomatic success, and a resolution of these various issues we're addressing.

Q In regard to McFarlane, I wonder if you had anything on Evans & Novak this morning?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Leaving aside the effects of what's happened in the last twenty-four hours, can you give us any sort of reading on how close McFarlane actually has come to helping work out a reconciliation in the Shouf that might let the Israelis withdraw?

A I can't really do that. I've stayed away -- we have traditionally -- from trying to give evaluations and updates of that sort, and I think I'm going to have to try to stick to that at this point.

Q Just a follow-up on the gentleman's question about the meeting between Ambassador McFarlane and Walid Jumblatt in Paris. Sources in Lebanon said that the talks were not that fruitful. Do you have any comment on that?

A I think the only thing I really could say about this whole set of meetings, which took place, there were a lot of discussions which took place apparently in Paris, including between representatives of the Government of Lebanon and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt.

We obviously welcome the meetings which took place between the Government of Lebanon representatives and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and we hope this will be an important part of the reconciliation process which we know President Gemayel is energetically purusing.

Ambassador McFarlane participated in at least some of the discussions. As I said before, he's returned to Beirut. But I can't give you a readout beyond that.

Q One other question, please. There were reports from Beirut that was there aerial bombardment of certain positions at the outskirts of Beirut and Burg al Barajinah and certain positions in the Shouf, in the Shouf area under the Druze militiamen. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any readout on that at all.

Q Is it possible that because of these latest developments the U.S. might call upon Israel to postpone, at least temporarily, the plan to withdraw?

A I have stayed away, again, from the question of any details regarding Israeli plans or any discussions regarding it, and I'm afraid that I'm going to stick to that today.

Q In light of what's happening now in this faction of the war in Lebanon, did you ascertain, or did you find out from your sources what were the reasons for this continuous rivalry and war --

A This continuous --

Q What are the reasons for this interfight inside Lebanon between these militias? Did you find any reasons for why it is continuing?

A In terms of proximate causes, I don't have anything to offer you. In terms of the historical problem, I suspect you have a library which is rather large on the subject.

Q Alan, had you ever anticipated this transformation of the McFarlane mission into a sort of mediation between the Lebanese themselves?

A I don't have a characterization to offer of that sort. I think we've describe his mission and what he's doing and how he's doing it to the extent that we can, and I'm afraid I'm just going to have to stick to it.

Q If Prime Minister Begin resigns, do you expect it to affect U.S.-Israeli relations, and will it slow down plans for a U.S. review of the Middle East situation?

A I think Larry Speakes addressed this yesterday, and I don't have anything to add to what he said about that.

Q Can you tell us exactly what he said?

A I don't have his statement.

Q Will there be a review of the Middle East policies from here after the new team is in place?

A A review? I mean, we're always looking at the situation, but I don't see some sort of major "REVIEW" coming along.

Q Are we specifically characterizing that the incoming fire came from Amal militia positions, or are we just saying generally that it was a Shi'ite area that fire came from?

A No. As I say, we don't know who was responsible for it.

Q I think you've read the Evans and Novak article today. Do you care to comment on what it contained?

A No, I don't. I'm sorry, you may not have heard before. I don't have any comment to offer on that.

Q Going back to the trip to Madrid, is the purpose of the trip to see Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A The purpose of the trip, the purpose of the Spanish invitation, is to mark at senior levels the agreement which was achieved by 34 of the participating states on July 15 on the review of the CSCE process indeed.

There was agreement by all 35 states, although Malta had an additional point which was, obviously, causing difficulty. That's the purpose of the meeting, and that's the purpose of our going.

Q What did you say before, "that it was outside the purview of the.....?"

A I said that -- I'll go back and read you what I said before: "Although the meeting is scheduled to take place outside the format of the CSCE conference, we're continuing to work to achieve agreement of all governments to the draft concluding document in its current form." That means we haven't stopped trying to get agreement on the concluding document.

Q It means, in other words, there is not yet the consensus needed for --

A That's correct.

Q -- but he's going to go anyway.

A Well, I've just explained to you --

Q Yes, I understand. I'm just trying to put it into some sort of (indaudible) --

A It's a different context. This is not --

Q There won't be a signing, _per se_?

A That's right. It's outside that context. It's not a negotiating meeting.

Q And on what day specifically will he meet Gromyko and where?

A I think he's going to have a series of meetings, some bilaterals, some perhaps group meetings. When we have a more complete schedule, I'll be happy to try to provide that to you.

Q Alan, just for the record, what is the purpose of the meeting with Gromyko?

A I don't have a specific piece of guidance to give you on that, Greg, as to the purpose of the meeting. There is, obviously, a lot to discuss with the Soviets, and the Secretary and the Foreign Minister will be meeting, as I would expect they would, also be meeting at the General Assembly.

Q Do you have any indication whether Prime Minister Begin will or will not step down?

A No, I don't.

Q What is the original purpose in having it at the Foreign Minister's level, that there be a signing at the conclusion of the negotiations of the last three years?

A That was in the context in the format of the CSCE Conference. The Spanish have issued an invitation on a different basis here -- issued it specifically to individual countries.

Q It is because of the Malta problem?

A I think I'd go back to what they said about that. Essentially, that's right; we've not been able to resolve the problems which would lead to -- and if we can resolve them before that date -- will lead to a Foreign Ministers' Conference within the CSCE format.

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Q So if there is not going to be any kind of signing, what's the point of the Secretary's going?

A I think I just gave you the purposes, and I'll leave you with that, Marvin.

Q To be clear, the CSCE meeting will not be concluded until the Malta problem is resolved?

A Let me go back to what I've just said in the statement. Our efforts are continuing to achieve agreement of all the governments to the draft concluding document in its current form. Let's see how that process works itself out. You're leading me into a hypothetical situation. I prefer to address it in terms of what our purposes are and what we're working for between now and the seventh of September or whatever date that was --

Q If they don't have an agreement, why is he going? When did he decide to go on this?

A Again, I just said to you that the purpose is to mark at senior levels the agreement that was achieved by 34 of the participating states on the review of the CSCE process.

Q Will this take the place of the signing ceremony?

A I would, again, leave you with the thought that the effort continues to achieve agreement on the concluding document in its current form. Let's see what happens.

Q Have the invitations gone out to all of the Foreign Ministers of the --

A You'll have to check with the Government of Spain which issued the invitations. My understanding is that that is the case, but I would ask you to check with the Spanish. It's their invitation.

Q Will the Secretary be traveling with a proposed solution to the Malta dilemma?

A I don't know. I would hope that we would see a resolution of that situation before we get there.

Q If Begin resigns, despite the fact that the United States and Israel will maintain the same relationships, what complications can you foresee?

A I wouldn't try to speculate about complications. We have a close and important relationship with Israel. We intend to maintain it and expect it will indeed be maintained.

Q Does the Secretary plan to visit any country beyond Spain?

A On this trip?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any indication he is going elsewhere on this trip beyond Spain.

Q Is he also going to be seeing Gromyko, presumably in New York, the week of the 25th?

A I don't have a date on it. As I said before, I would expect that he will see him in New York. I don't have a date, though, for that.

Q Do you have the dates that he will be in New York?

A I don't have those dates to offer you at this point.

Q Do you have any indication from either the French or the Italians that they might be willing to increase their contribution to the MNF in Lebanon at this point, in light of what's been happening?

A I don't have any information on that in terms of -- You're talking about specifically with regard to events in the last several hours?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any indications on that.

Q What are the plans for the meeting with Mr. Gromyko? Is this a major bilateral meeting?

A I think when the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union get together, that probably qualifies as a fairly important meeting.

Q How do you read the Syrian position in the events of the last 48 hours?

A I don't have a reading on the Syrian position on that.

Q Senator Stone is in El Salvador today, is that correct?

A Senator Stone is in El Salvador today. He is going later today, as I understand it, to San Jose, Costa Rica.

Q Will he meet with the Peace Commission and the guerrillas there, or does the Peace Commission have to meet with the guerrillas first before he can meet with the guerrillas?

A Will he meet with the Peace Commission or the guerrillas? You'd better -- I'm not sure what you're saying.

Q Will he meet with the guerrillas in San Jose?

A As we've said before, setting aside any site, whether it's San Jose or any place else, as we've said before, a meeting with the Salvadoran left is possible, but I don't really have any information to give you. We've made it clear before that an important element of his mission, facilitating dialogue both within and between countries, is confidentiality about the details of his activity, and I therefore, can't really get into it.

Q To be more precise in my question, do you have any comment on the Syrian statement threatening to give help to the Druze against the Lebanese Army?

A I haven't seen that particular statement. I don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you have any characterization of the meeting in Colombia between the Government of El Salvador and the guerrillas?

A Between the Peace Commission?

Q Yes.

A No. I don't have anything on a meeting. Obviously, we have given our full support to such a meeting, but any information on a meeting would have to come from the parties themselves.

Q Do you have any new guidance on Namibia? There seems to be another stalemate now. And do you foresee any time the U.S. might back down on its call for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola?

A I think our position is on the record and well stated. I don't see any change in the basics of our position. I don't have any comment on recent developments beyond what we provided the other day. If you haven't gotten that, you might want to take a look in the press office.

Q That's after the stalemate -- one day things looked good and the next day there was a problem?

A I'd be careful about too many ups and downs and so on, anyway. All we've got is what is available from the other day.

Q Excuse me, Alan, if this is old -- I've been away -- but has the United States informed the United Nations officially that it's going to refuse to -- that it will withdraw its share of the contribution equivalent to what its share should have been for the U.N. Conference on Israel and South Africa that took place in July?

A I can't tell you what the state of play is there. There are a few conferences around that --

Q There is also the Palestine one in Geneva, and so on.

A That's right, and I can't tell you what the state of play is with regard to notifications to the United Nations.

Our position on the various conferences has been laid out in different pieces of guidance, and I would refer you to those. But I don't know the answer to notifications or intentions; however, to the extent that we are able to state them at this point, they have been laid out, and we can help you later if you want (inaudible) ---

Q Could you take that?

A No. We have existing guidance on that, Bill, and I'm not going to try to get into the question, necessarily, of what we have or haven't said to the U.N. itself; but our positions have been stated publicly, and I don't think there is any ambiguity about that.

Q Yesterday, the White House said it was encouraged by McFarlane's progress after his talks in Paris. Is that the State Department view today?

A Again, I refer you to what I said about the meetings in Paris.

Q You said you welcomed them.

A We welcomed them, and we hoped the meetings would be an important part of the reconciliation process which President Gemayel is energetically pursuing. Obviously, this morning's events are sad events. I haven't tried to draw some connection -- cause and effect -- between those events, the firings and so on the diplomatic effort. As I say, the diplomatic effort is proceeding, and I don't have any reason to steer you away from the suggestion that those efforts are proceeding apace. We continue to be deeply engaged and --

Q You remain encouraged?

A I have not tried to put quality words generally on those negotiations, and I think I would try to void that again today.

Q Alan, there were some reports out of California that Judge Clark awakened the President to --

A Yes.

Q -- and there were some statements on the air that the Secretary wasn't involved. Do you have anything -- was the Secretary talking with the President about this situation in Lebanon this morning?

A The Secretary has talked with the President this morning.

Q This morning. What time?

A I don't have time to give you on this, Max, but the Secretary has been deeply engaged on this issue. He has stayed in touch throughout the time he's been away from Washington, but he certainly has been deeply engaged and informed and involved in meetings on recent developments with regard to Lebanon throughout the last 48 hours -- if that's the time period you want to use -- and he continues to be.

Q Was he awakened during the night?

A He was called early this morning. I don't know if he was awake or not awake. I'm afraid I can't tell you that. But he was called early this morning, well before he normally -- one would hope -- he would get a phone call.

Q What time does he usually get up?

(Laughter)

Q Alan, should we expect that the killings of the Marines will cause a substantive change in American policy in the Beirut area, that is to say, deployment of forces or any other serious change at this point?

A I don't perceive any change of that sort in the offing, Jeff, no.

Q Alan, last week I asked you a question about your response to this major development at a conference of scientists where the Soviets -- major scientists on lasers -- and Ed Teller agreed to study a kind of joint cooperation on laser weapons development.

I since read the communique that came out of that. It actually indicates that these individuals are going to formally propose to their governments that the governments sponser this sort of joint cooperation, which is a rather high level thing.

A O.K. Well, I --

Q Wait a minute. I can understand that you might not have been able to get me a response to my original question because it didn't include this. Could you find out for me where this sort of request is going in the Administration, who will be responding, and so forth?

A No, I don't think I could do that. I think you'd have to talk to the people who sent the message; but we're still pursuing the original taken questions.

Q Back to Madrid for a moment, despite the lack of total agreement in the conference, and now comes an invitation by the Spanish Government, do you think it is helpful to convince Malta to agree, or do you see it as some kind of pressure on Malta -- to agree to --

A   Do I see what, as some sort of -- the conference?

Q   No, the invitation, all the foreign ministers going, and then --

A   I don't know. The purpose is as I've stated it to you. I can't tell you what Malta's thinking is at this point.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 p.m.)

Glennon

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, August 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #152

TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1983, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Nice to see you all. Nice to be back from vacation.

I should warn you that back from vacation, I'm armed with a gift that I found waiting for me on my desk when I got back. It is new, improved "Press Repellent" (laughter) from the makers of the "No Comment Mouthwash Company." This has been "J" School-tested, and the directions are that you "shake well, hold the can in an upright position, and spray for 8 to 10 seconds or until room is clear." (Laughter)

"TV reporters may require additional application." (Laughter)

"Will not harm polyester." (Laughter)

Q That's for the sake of the Spokesman!

A "Use on dailies, weeklies, newsletters, radio, television cameramen, roaches. Especially recommended for use on free-lancers." (Laughter)

"Contents: 10 percent hot air (used as a propellent); 50 percent truth serum, 40 percent yellow rain, 10 percent off-the-record." (Laughter) "Rids the average room of reporters in seconds. Leaves a fresh, clean scent. Will not harm pets or plants. Also try our other fine product, Leak Stop -- stops leaks before they start." (Laughter)

So I warn you, I'm armed!

It's from an anonymous donor, or perhaps I should say even, admirer.

However, for the serious business of the day -- and sad business of the day -- concerning French casualties, the State Department has learned that a French soldier assigned to the Multinational Force in Lebanon has been killed in the sectarian violence there and that a second soldier has been seriously wounded.

The United States greatly regrets these casualties and extends its profound sorrow to the families of the victims and the Government of France. We renew our call on all involved to exercise the utmost restraint so that further violence and loss of life can be prevented.

That's all I have in the way of announcements. I'll be glad to take your questions.

Q The appeals that you and others have been making don't seem to have had much effect. Do you see any Syrian role behind the fighting that appears to continue in Lebanon?

A I suppose what you're asking is, specifically -- you're referring specifically to the fire on the Marines, are you?

Q The whole complex of battling.

A Insofar as the fire that was directed at the Marines yesterday and some additional fire that came in this morning, it is impossible for us to pinpoint who was actually firing those weapons, who was pulling the trigger, but obviously, the situation would be improved were the occupying forces in Lebanon not to occupy.

Q By that, you wouldn't want to imply that you are encouraging the Israelis to withdraw now?

A I think what we're doing is trying to encourage people to withdraw in a manner which will permit the Lebanese Government to restore its authority over the areas vacated, and get on with the business of governing Lebanon in its entirety as an independent country.

Q Let me just restate the original question. Do you see behind the whole complex of fighting any Syrian role?

A I think, clearly, the presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon has not proved helpful.

Q John, if I could follow up a little bit on that question, now that we see Marines being fired at for three days, French killed today, English fired on also today, do we perceive a pattern emerging? The first reports out of both the Pentagon and the State Department, speculated a little -- perhaps it was accidental; you know, rounds fell short, hurt the Marines, and so on. But now, virtually all of the Multinational Forces, in one way or another, are coming under fire. So is this now a concerted attack on the peacekeeping force as such?

A I don't know that we can really give you a judgment on that. Our report of the small arms fire which our Marines are taking today came in just about 45 minutes ago. The report we have is that they are returning fire. Just what that fire is, we really don't know. It's very early.

Insofar as yesterday's events are concerned, I can't really go much beyond what we said yesterday, that namely we're not sure whether the Marines were targeted or not.

Q Where are the Marines taking the fire today, John?

A At the airport.

Q There is another report, though, from both, I think, Syrian and Phalangist radio that the Marines are taking fire in the Embassy area, from the Holiday Inn Hotel.

A I can't confirm that one. I've seen that report, but our report is they are taking fire at the airport.

Q And returning fire?

A And returning fire. This is small arms fire.

Q Yesterday the State Department and the Pentagon were saying that it could not be directly said that the Marines were engaged in hostilities, since they apparently took a couple of stray mortar rounds. With the small arms fire being directed at them, does this now consist of their coming into hostilities?

A I think it's a little early to judge. As I say, we just got this report 45 minutes ago. You're making an assumption that it is being directed at the Marines. I don't know. All we know is that they are receiving fire, small arms fire, and they are returning small arms fire. What the character of that is, I don't know.

Q What about the modest agitation from some Members of Congress for a new determination on the War Powers Act, a new submission to Congress?

A As you know, lawyers in various agencies within the Administration, have been considering that question. I'm sure that the White House and the President would have any announcement to make on it at such time as they have considered the recommendations and made a judgment.

Q Could you give us -- or find out, if you couldn't -- could you restate for us the definition of what the purpose of the Multinational Force and the Americans in it is?

A I'd prefer not to wing that one.

Q In the past you've had a set of things that they are not a peacekeeping force, that their mission and purpose is to be sort of a confidence-building thing to lend authority to --

A Yes.

Q Is that still operative?

A The definition of their role is unchanged, but I prefer to go back to the specific language we've used before. I don't disagree with your --

Q But it's incorrect to call them a peacekeeping force.

A I think I'd prefer to use the language we have used consistently.

Q Are you satisfied with the three to four days in which the Israelis are going to postpone its redeployment from the Shuf area?

A I think we should leave any official announcement on that to Israel. Ambassador McFarlane was in Israel, did talk with the Prime Minister, did convey a Presidential request that there be a little more time elapsing before that redeployment takes place.

I understand the Israelis have responded favorably to that, but I don't think we should be making that announcement for them. I think you better --

Q Is it enough, this kind of timetable?

A Well, it will enable Ambassador McFarlane to continue his diplomatic work. He did go back after his visit -- attempted to go back. I understand there was some helicopter trouble. I think he now is either back in Beirut or will be there in a matter of minutes, and that will give him time to pursue his diplomatic initiative in Beirut.

Q Following on that, how does that differ from the request that we made last week, when the Israelis were asked for a delay?

A You catch me unaware, because I wasn't here last week so I'm not up to speed. I can only tell you --

Q Last week it was made known, I guess without anybody -- Well, I guess the Israelis did say something publicly that McFarlane had requested a small delay in their redeployment from the Shuf, and they had agreed to it. Will this mean a few days more or --

A A Presidential letter, I think, was transmitted yesterday, and I think Ambassador McFarlane spoke to the Prime Minister and other Israeli officials today.

Q John, could you catch us up to date on the Crisis Management Group? Are there any threads left dangling from their meeting yesterday? Are they planning to meet again?

A I don't know that they are planning to meet again, although I wouldn't rule it out, today. I understand the Vice President did not return to Maine, but stayed in Washington. The Vice President and the Secretary of State have talked several times on the phone this morning, but I don't know that any meeting is set for today.

Q What about an agenda? You answered a little earlier saying that the White House would make an announcement on the War Powers Act when they made a decision on it. Is that something that you expect? Is it a matter of hours, days, or --

A I think you should be in touch with the White House on that one. They'll let you know on that.

Q Can you tell us whether the Presidential letter to Prime Minister Begin discussed also Mr. Begin's resignation?

A I don't want to mislead you. I don't want to get into the content of it, but I think you would be going down a dead-end if you assumed that it did.

Q John, before in response to Jim's questions about Syria, you provided, as I remember, some diplomatic pablum, but I didn't get the --

A What an unworthy characterization, Marvin! If I were to talk about your broadcasts like that, I mean, really!

(Laughter)

Q -- didn't get the true essence.

Is the State Department trying to say that Syria has no role, or would the State Department like to back up what is coming out of the western White House yesterday that Syria has a rather direct role of responsibility?

A I think we're not trying to duck the question, but I mean if you're asking, "Who pulls the triggers of which weapons?" that is, obviously, impossible for us or for the Marines on the ground to indicate.

Q Who is behind the people who pull the trigger?

A If you mean that weapons fired from areas occupied by various forces cause death to our Marines and instability to the country, of course, that is so. It is our object to get those foreign forces removed in an orderly fashion. So insofar as foreign forces occupyng areas from which arms are fired, that is not helpful.

Q Are you talking about Syria?

A Syria, of course, occupies territory from which those arms were fired.

Q Do you feel that Syria is instigating the current trouble in Lebanon?

A I can't give you an analysis. I don't know.

Q Some of those weapons are being fired in areas occupied by the Israelis.

A Yes. I'm not being exclusive. I'm saying that when armies occupy territory, they bear some responsibility for weapons fired from that territory.

Q Let me be a little more specific. There were some reports from Lebanon yesterday that indicated there might be Syrian guns actually firing some cover rounds for the Shi'ites. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q John, to follow this, the Syrian official media are whipping up emotions in a broadcast in the Damascus domestic service. This morning, they say that the "organized military campaign by the Phalangist gangs, the Lebanese Army, and the United States Forces is aimed to empy Beirut and its suburbs of all the nationalist forces. The new massacre is being carried out by the Phalangist gangs with the participation of U.S. forces."

They close by saying, "Will the Arab nation move to ward off the impending danger?"

Does that not sound to you like official instigation?

A It sounds to me like Syrian propaganda and rhetoric.

Q But considering the fact that two American Marines have been shot and killed, apparently by Shi'ite gunmen, or people who are called "Amal" gunmen, does this not lead you to believe, at this time and place, that the regime in Damascus is encouraging additional such acts?

A Impossible to give you that characterization. We just don't know.

Q Do you believe that these broadcasts by official Syrian media are responsible, considering what's going on now?

A I don't know. I'm not there. What you're asking is whether a Syrian radio broadcast has inflammed opinion and have caused certain actions to happen. I can't answer that question.

-- MORE --

Q Are you briefied to talk about any of the details of the War Powers Act?

A I think you should talk to the White House about that.

Q John, given what's the nature of events that are taking place in Lebanon right now, do we consider that the Gemayel Government is in a position where it has any chance of asserting it authority over the country, and what, if anything, can the United States, or will the United States do now to --

A We're doing quite a lot. We've been active in Lebanon on the diplomatic front for quite some time. I think that the presence of our military there and the casualties we're taking is an indication of our will. We stand very firmly behind the legitimate government of Lebanon and President Gemayel, and are working to help him achieve reconciliation and to extend his authority.

Q But do you figure it having any effect?

A It's a big challenge. Nobody would underestimate the problems that we all face.

Q Is this symbolic American and other foreign presence there really enough? I mean, in its present size and its present deployment?

A As the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense agreed with others yesterday to recommend that at the present no change is foreseen in the composition or deployment of that force arising out of the events of the past 48 hours.

Q Does the United States feel that the Gemayel Government is doing enough to achieve reconciliation? Is it showing sufficient flexibility with the minority groups?

A I think that there's a lot of diplomatic and political activity underway on the part of the Lebanese Government, and we are being helpful where we can. Others are being helpful, too. It remains to be seen how that will turn out.

Q The latest reports from Beirut this morning indicate that, really, the security situation is out of control. Militias have occupied the Union Building where some of the news agencies are, the Murr Tower is under attack, the Prime Minister's Office is under attack, et cetera.

If this is not an indication that the Lebanese Army is not in control, my question is, suppose you end up in a situation where the Lebanese Army is not in control and President Gemayel asks the U.S. and the Multinational Forces to move in and to help clear up these pockets and these militias from west Beirut. What would be the U.S. response in that respect?

A I think we would have to wait --

Q It seems we are heading into this direction.

A It's a hypothetical situation. No such request has been received. I would say, it's difficult to comment minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour on what is happening this morning. Certainly through yesterday, I think this government's feeling was that the LAF had done rather well; the Lebanese armed forces had moved out into areas and were acting with vigor and professionalism that, I think, made quite an impression on the U.S. military people and our diplomats on the scene.

Q Why was the Eisenhower sent to the Lebanese coast?

A I think you'll have to ask the Pentagon about the Eisenhower, where she is and what she's doing.

Q Has the Lebanese Government made any requests to increase the Marine contingent as part of the Multinational Force in light of what's been --

A I think you'll have to bear in mind two things. We're talking about these incidents of the past several days, and there's no change in that situation and no request to my knowledge. As we have always said, on a broader canvas, given a troop withdrawal plan for Lebanon, we would look at a new role for the MNF and see whether that required any enlargement. That's quite divorced from what has been happening on the ground in past several days.

Q Yes, but at least partial withdrawal of Israeli forces seems imminent.

A I think that a number of parties are working on that question of redeployment and on the question of the stability of the areas vacated by the Israelis. I think that's one of the things that Ambassador McFarlane is working on now, with others.

Q Is he's still in Israel, or has he gone back to Beirut?

A He was to have left Israel this morning. I understand he had some helicopter difficulties, but I think he probably is now back in Beirut.

Q To follow that up, is one of the options as the Israelis withdraw from the Shouf Mountain area to increase the American presence in that area, or in other areas, as you build up the MNF.

A What are the options?

Q Is one of the options?

A Not at the moment. Not to my knowledge. No suggestion that the American Marines would head into that area.

Q John, another area. Do you have any comment on the situation in the Philippines after a week of demonstrations and --

A Not really. We, as you know, have been monitoring closely the investigation, and will continue to monitor it. That is an internal Filipino matter, and we certainly expect that the report of that Commission would be a full and satisfactory report, but we look to let the Commission conclude its business.

Q Do you have any communication from the Philippine Government about the identification of the murderer of Aquino?

A I don't know that we received any communication from the Filipino Government. I think it would be unlikely. We're aware of all the same reports that you're aware of.

Q Also, in Chile, do you have any comment on the assassination of a general this morning?

A Yes, I do. You're talking about -- the question was about the commander of the military district of Santiago?

Q Yes.

A The United States deplores the assassination today of the Intendente of Santiago, Major General Urzua. This tragic terrorist action should not be allowed to impede continued progress towards the peaceful resolution of political differences in Chile or to obsure the recent positive moves taken by the Government of Chile to restore important civil and political liberties, including lifting the state of emergency and permitting the return of several thousand Chilean exiles.

In that context, we view the dialogue begun August 25 between the Interior Minister and leaders of the Democratic Alliance as an important step to give urgency and direction to the process of restoring democracy in Chile. We hope these discussions can continue and help bring an end to confrontation and to the violence which only serves the purposes of those opposed to a peaceful return to a genuine parliamentary democracy.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Could I take you back to the Syrian thing. It seems to me against the background of casualties, I have a sense of confusion on the basis of what you're saying about the degree, if any, to which you ascribe to Syria in connection with yesterday's casualties. It would seem to me that rather than in response to questions, as we've been going after you and getting it a scrap at a time, and rather reluctantly it seems to me, can we get from the U.S., against the background of the casualties, to what degree the Syrians are or are not in any way responsible or to blame to whatever degree for the fire leveled at the U.S. Marines? I wonder if you could just tidy that up?

A I don't think we can tidy that one up for you. I think, clearly, the attitude of Syria has not been helpful in the removal of foreign forces in the overall goal of removing foreign forces from Lebanon, and letting that tortured country get back to a stable kind of existence where the central government exerts its sovereignty over the whole area. Clearly, we have negotiated with Syria, and so far those negotiations have not come to any fruition.

Then, I think you're asking specific questions about who fired the rounds, or caused to be fired, the rounds that hit the Marine emplacements yesterday, and I don't think we can answer that question. We don't know. The Marines at the airport looking into the muzzles of those guns don't know. So it's very hard to give you a categoric answer as to who is response for that fire.

Q But is there any blame that you mean to level against Syria at all?

A Only in the general terms. I think it is unfair and unjust to ascribe action to a power, or to an individual when you cannot prove it. It cannot be proved yet. So I think that we would be immoderate if we tried to ascribe specific blame to those who fired those weapons. But in terms of occupying forces in that country, clearly, that is not a helpful presence.

Q The Israelis are still occupying it as well.

A Our position is that all foreign forces -- the Israelis, the Syrians and the PLO -- should leave Lebanon.

Q You think there is some blame on the Israelis, that they have fired on the Marines?

A As I say, if we knew who fired on us, I think we would be the first to tell you. But it is very difficult. Many of those in this room have sat on that airport in Beirut and looked at those guns firing, and I suspect that each of you would have great difficulty in saying what nationality the crew is that fired weapon, especially if it's a mobile weapon and it's moved quickly after firing. It's not a question of ducking it. I think we would very happy to tell you who fired it if we knew.

Q You think the Isralis are suspect?

A That's an impossible question to answer.

Q John, let me try it another way. I understand you can't say who pulled the trigger yesterday. Some of the statements that were made in Santa Barbara yesterday seem to go beyond the question of merely being unhelpful by refusing it.

Would you say that the totality of Syrian actions and statements over the last several weeks has served as an incitement to various factions in Lebanon to --

A No, I don't think I could say. I don't think I would say that.

Q Would you say that there is kind of a gap between statements coming out of the State Department and those coming out of the White House?

A No, I don't think so. I think there's perfect concord. (Laughter)

Q Do you have anything fresh on the imminent change in the Government of Israel?

A As you know, we don't have a formal tendering of Prime Minister Begin's resignation. As we have said before, this is an internal Israeli matter. As for the future, and assuming that formal tendering of the resignation takes place, this of course is a matter for the people of Israel to work out.

The United States is absolutely confident, however, that the partnership and the close cooperation which has always existed between the United States and Israel will continue regardless of the outcome of the present situation.

Q Is the fact that the Eisenhower is poised so closely to the Lebanese coast an indication that the Marines on the ground are ill-equipped to handle the situation?

A I don't think so. I think you ought to ask the Pentagon about where the Eisenhower is and what she's doing, but I think the answer from the Pentagon will be that there are adequate forces in the area to support the Marines.

Q But the Pentagon said this morning -- I called them -- that the presence of the Eisenhower is to provide this additional support should it be needed, and it seems it may well be at this rate.

A So the question is?

Q The initial question was that the Marines themselves alone, the twelve hundred, are not adequately equipped to handle the outbreak of violence?

A I think you would have to ask the Pentagon that. I think they feel that they are adequate forces in the area. The Marines move forces around a lot.

Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, September 1, 1983

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KOREA/SOVIET UNION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I think the way we'll tackle this briefing is that I'll give a housekeeping announcement, and then I will ask Rick Burt to take all your questions about the Korean airliner, and let Rick go. In the event there is any interest in any other subject after that, I will take a few more questions.

The background briefing on the upcoming Foreign Ministers Meeting in Spain, which we were going to have this afternoon at 2:15, has been cancelled. Secondly, as you know, the Secretary was speaking before the SHIMODA Conference at Airlie House on Friday. We hope to have an advance text of his remarks, but we can't be sure at this time. We'll know more tomorrow. We do plan to have his speech piped into the briefing room at 9:00 a.m. Friday as it is being delivered.

I think I will ask Assistant Secretary Burt to come up and take questions on the Korean airliner.

We have had a fair amount of noise (a) in this briefing room and (b) at the Secretary's press conference yesterday, mainly from the camera crews, and I'd appreciate it if you would keep that noise down so we can all hear what is going on.

Rick.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT: Thanks John. I do not have anything new to add to what the Secretary of State said earlier this morning other than the fact that the President has been in touch with the Secretary of State -- he called the Secretary of State a few minutes ago, and they discussed the situation. So I will take your questions.

Q Rick do you know how many Americans were aboard?

A We do not have, at this stage, a precise number of Americans. We are, of course, looking into that right now -- the State Department Operations Center, together with other U.S. officials.

Q Rick, can you take us through the blow-by-blow starting with last night, your contacts with the Soviets?

A We were alerted, I think, approximately between 10 or 10:30, that the aircraft in question was off course and was no longer in radar or radio communications. At that time, as you probably know, there were conflicting reports about its status. There was a suggestion that the aircraft had been forced down, and that it had landed on Sakhalin Island. In fact, some Korean airline authorities actually made public statements to that effect. There were other indications that much more tragic circumstances had taken place.

At approximately 11:00 or 11:30 at the State Department Operations Center a working group was quickly formed of U.S. officials, State Department officials and the Department of Defense official who normally serves in the Operations Center. As it became increasingly apparent that the report that the plane had been forced down was not accurate, or that we could not confirm that report, we got into direct contact with the Soviet Charge Oleg Sokolov, here in Washington -- I got on the phone and woke him up, explained the situation, and told him that we insisted on an explanation or any information they could give us about this incident. He had no information to offer us. We double-tracked that communication with the Soviets with a conversation with our Embassy in Moscow, where our Charge in Moscow, Warren Zimmerman, got in touch with a senior official in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and asked for information.

In the meantime, we picked up, through various sources, increasing signs that the aircraft had gone down. There were indications that a Soviet air-sea rescue operation was underway in Soviet territorial waters. And as further information came in, it became increasingly apparent, I would say very, in the wee hours of today, this morning, that the aircraft had in fact been shot down.

The intelligence community was generally able to confirm the fact that it had been shot down early this morning, so that at the opening of business today senior officials were informed of that fact.

At that stage, the decision was taken to ask the Soviet Charge, Mr. Sokolov, to come immediately to the State Department, where he saw Lawrence Eagleburger, the Under Secretary of State, and where we reiterated our demand for information. As you know, the Secretary of State then made a public statement.

I might say we have continued to be in very close touch with the authorities in Seoul, and we are working closely with them.

Q Have you gotten any clue from the Soviets at all why they have done this?

A No.

Q As you mentioned rescue operations, Rick, does that mean that you are of the impression that they were rather embarrassed by the incidents, and if so, were trying to (inaudible)

A Well, whether one calls it a rescue operation -- I said air-sea rescue -- it can be best called an air-sea reconnaissance operation. They were obviously trying to find the remains, if any, of this aircraft.

Q In what area, specificaly, are they trying to find the remains?

A I can't give you any specific coordinates. We can probably be more helpful later in the day.

Q Rick, can you say why there was such a time gap between the time the plane was shot down and before anyone was really able to confirm that that had happened?

A I can't, Bernie, other than to say that we do not, the United States Government does not continuously monitor the movements of every aicraft around the world. This aircraft was over Soviet air space for a significant period of time -- between two and two and a half hours -- and while it is over Soviet air space, it is even more difficult, obviously, for the United States Government and others to know precisely what is happening.

Q Secretary Shultz gave a rather precise account of what was said, who said it, and what the sort of communications were. What can you tell us about the monitoring effort, about the sources of the monitoring, about when those statements became available in this country?

A I'm certainly not going to go into detail on the sources, and you'll understand that; but I can tell you that we did not have real time information. As I relayed to you, that information was picked up through various sources.

It had to be filtered; it had to be translated; and we were not able to form a firm judgment on the fate of the aircraft, as I said, until early this morning.

Q Was this U.S. technical means, exclusively or --?

A No, I wouldn't say it was exclusively U.S. technical means.

Q Rick, after the Japanese defense agency monitored that the aircraft was off course, was there an attempt by the Japanese authorities or any other authority with which we are allied, to contact that aircraft and say, "Hey, you're off course?"

A We aren't aware of any such attempt, but I wouldn't want to leave you with the impression that no such attempt was made. Let me make a general statement: We are in the process now of collecting as much information as we possibly can about this episode. You received a good deal of hard information this morning in the Secretary's statement, and as more information becomes available, we will make it public.

Q Did the aircraft ever report that he had been intercepted or say anything about the presence of the fighters around him?

A Again, not that we are aware.

Q Are you aware of an order that went out to the Soviet pilot, who according to what the Secretary said, at 1826 shot the plane down, to shoot the plane down? Did he have an order to do that?

A We know that, first of all, the plane was shot down, and that the pilot reported that the plane was shot down, and that the pilot was in continuous contact with ground control.

Q In the course of that continuous contact, do you know that he was ordered to shoot the plane down?

A I just simply stand on what I said, Marvin.

-- MORE --

Q Can you rule out that there might have been some miscommuncation?

A No.

Q Is it possible that the pilot misunderstood?

A I wouldn't rule out any possibility at this standpoint, but it is very clear to us that the aircraft was shot down.

I would make a general comment which is that the Soviet Union exercises a very tight and very disciplined and centralized command and control capability for its military forces including fighter aircraft.

Q Why was the hot line not used, and do you anticipate its use soon?

A The hot line was not used because, very simply, we did not have the information. As I said before, we did not have real time information. We only learned that the aircraft had been shot down hours after the fact, and as soon as we learned, though, that the aircraft might be in trouble, we did get in touch immediately with the Soviets.

Q You're suggesting in your statement here that the Soviets have very tight and disciplined control; that there is almost no possibility that this Soviet flyer was disobeying orders?

A I just want to stand on the fact of very tight discipline and centralized --

Q We just don't want to misinterpret, you see, and if they have very tight and disciplined control, as you say, and he was in constant contact, you're not suggesting -- you are not even hinting that there was any disobedience of orders by this pilot, are you?

A I am not trying to hint that. No.

Q Did the length of time between when the Soviets intercepted the plane and when it was shot down indicate to our intelligence people that this went very high in the Soviet military command before a decision was made to fire on that airplane?

A We simply don't have any information to tell us where --

Q What is the history of the Soviet position on violation of their airspace in that part of the world? For example, have they ever said that they would shoot planes down, civilian planes, if they ventured in that area?

A I am not aware of any kind of public declarations along those lines, but they obviously do take violations of their airspace seriously. You'll recall the episode with another Korean airliner where that airliner was forced down and was fired upon and people, passengers, were injured.

Q Rick, what does Sokolov say? When you're talking to the Soviets -- when you spoke to him on the phone and then when he was summoned today, met Eagleburger -- what do they say when you have this incontrovertible evidence?

A They have said nothing to us so far. They have not provided us an explanation or any information to clarify the situation.

Q Was the airliner approaching the Kamchatka test site, or was it approaching anything else that would indicate why the pilot chose to shoot it down right there?

A I don't have any information on that.

Q When you say that you don't know of any attempts by the Japanese or the South Koreans to get in touch with that airplane to say, "You are off course," and the Secretary said that you weren't aware of any communication between the Russian MiGs and the aircraft, and that they might have been incapable of communication, how can that be that they would be incapable? What kind of incapacity?

A I don't know. You're asking me to speculate, and I can't do that.

Q Was there any evidence of wreckage found? Any sign of anything? What has been found?

A There has been some evidence of wreckage, some kerosene on the surface of the water has been found, and apparently some other debris.

Q Any indication of any survivors at all?

A No.

Q When you say that they say -- that this Soviet Charge' says nothing, do you mean this literally? He sits there in silence? Do you mean he says, "Nyet"? Does he say "No comment," or does he say, "We don't understand," or "We don't have any message"? What do you mean by not --

A I'm not going to go beyond that.

Q Nothing?

A I've described in a general way what they have told us so far. I'm not going to get into details of what they said.

Q I wonder what you mean by "nothing." You're not being literal?

A They have not given us any information.

Q You indicated that the Secretary has talked to the President since he had his news conference with us.

A That's right.

Q At the news conference he said he was going on to Madrid. Is that still the case?

A He said he was going to Madrid because he wants to raise this issue, among other issues, with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Q I meant after speaking with the President that is still the case?

A That's my understanding.

Q Rick, what did the President tell the Secretary in essence? Is he backing him in this statement?

A Yes, he did. Very strongly backed him up.

Q What did he say? He approved of it or --

A My understanding is that he approved very forcefully of the Secretary's statement.

MR. HUGHES: He watched the Secretary.

MR. BURT: He had watched the Secretary on TV.

CONT

Q Can the United States do anything about this aside from complain orally?

A We are examining options now. We need to, as I pointed out, learn as much as we possibly can about this situation. I would make the point that this is not a U.S.-Soviet bilateral issue. It is partially a bilateral issue because a U.S. Congressman and other American citizens were on board this aircraft.

But this is an issue that clearly involves the South Koreans, and it's an issue that involves the international community. There are aviation procedures and rules for both civilian and military aircraft, and we're looking into those rules.

So I wouldn't want to say exactly what we will or won't do at this stage.

Q Rick, what was the visibility like, according to your best sources, at the time of the shooting of the missile?

A I would just simply say that the aircraft, the Soviet fighter aircraft, had visual contact.

Q It was night, wasn't it? Is that right?

A I'm not sure.

Q Wait a minute. You said GMT was about 1800. That would be, we figured, about 2:00 in the morning out there.

Q Night time.

Q It happened in the afternoon.

A I would just simply say --

MR. HUGHES: 2:00 in the afternoon. You're right.

Q This aircraft was trying to leave Soviet airspace, was trying to return to his correct route, when the missile was fired?

A This aircraft was in Soviet airspace for, as I said before, some two, two and a half hours. My understanding is that it was shot down as it was leaving Soviet airspace. But it was shot down in Soviet airspace.

Q What's the situation with regard to any further contact with the Soviets on this subject?

A We expect the Soviet Union to be back to us with information.

Q Rick, any indications that the Soviets tried to signal the plane to land or force it down or anything at all before it was shot down?

A We have no indications of that.

Q Rick, what do you mean when you say, "We are examining options now," by way of the U.S. response? Can you give us some idea of what you mean by that?

A No, I can't. It's much too early to do so.

Q Rick, is there any indication that that plane's communications system failed, or that its radar or anything failed? Any indication like that?

A We're not aware of that.

Q Rick, what's missing from the detail that the Secretary gave us, is it clear to you that there was an order to this pilot to shoot, as opposed to -- the question was asked whether he disobeyed an order, but was there -- you're saying there was an order for him from the ground to fire on the airplane.

A Mike, I would just repeat what I said. There was continuous contact between the aircraft and ground control, that the pilot was in touch with ground control in explaining each of his steps, as he prepared to engage the aircraft, and shot down the aircraft, and described that event to ground control.

Q I would think it has relevance because we're trying to find out whether the plane was induced to fly into Soviet airspace or whether it was a technical error that it was there.

A Marvin, I do not have information on that at this time. I just can't help you.

Q Rick, how much deviation was there from normal flight patterns?

A Substantial.

Q And did it occur during the entire two and a half hours or only in the last ten minutes or --

A South Korea does not recognize the Soviet Union and vice versa, and South Korean airliners do not normally fly over Soviet airspace.

Q So it was two and a half hours in an illegal area? *

A That's right.

Q You said you'd provide us later with as much detail as you can about this incident. Will you provide us with transcripts of translations of the communications that you have available to you?

A I doubt that very much.

Q Rick, when you said before the plane was shot down as it was leaving Soviet airspace, had it tried to escape from airspace before? Had it been boxed in by the eight planes?

A Bernie, we just don't have any information on that.

Q When you say you were examining options, who do you mean by "we"? Is that State, is that other agencies, is that U.S. intelligence?

A We have an interagency group which is examining the situation, and we are in touch with our allies on this subject. As I pointed out, we are in touch very closely with the South Korean Government, and we will be in touch with other interested governments.

Q Can you just tell us which agencies are on the interagency group?

A The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the State Department. I presume other agencies, other interested agencies.

Q Rick, there's a late radio report that aides in Representative McDonald's office are contending that the Soviets knew that the Congressman was aboard before they shot it down, and that although this ought to bring an end

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* Correction: The plane was tracked by Soviet aircraft for some two and one half hours, during which it was over Soviet airspace on at least two occasions. We are unable to say how long it was in Soviet airspace on each occasion.

to U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations, they predict "business as usual."

Do you have any reaction on that?

A My reaction is to quote the Secretary of State. The United States reacts with revulsion to this attack. Loss of life appears to be heavy. We can see no excuse whatsoever for this appalling act.

Q Did they know? Do you have any evidence that they knew he was on board, as they are suggesting in his office?

A Not at this time.

Q Rick, every time a major power or even a minor power commits to a military action, there's usually a policy reason behind it.

Can you perceive any kind of policy motive for this kind of attack?

A I think it's really too early for me to try to answer that question.

Q Rick, would you predict -- although I know it's hard to predict in your business -- but will you predict that the impact of this on U.S.-Soviet relations is not going to be good at least in the short term? (Laughter)

A I think after a senior U.S. official like the Secretary of State makes a statement like that, that question answers itself.

Q Rick, you said the Soviets would be getting back to you with information.

A We expect the Soviet Union to get back to us. I don't want to --

Q Is Sokolov going to be coming back to the State Department with that information?

A We certainly hope and expect that both here and in Moscow that the Soviets are forthcoming in answering our questions about this affair.

Q Can I draw you out on relations a little more? Can you at all speculate on how this might affect U.S.-Soviet relations?

A No. I don't want to speculate.

Q Rick, if the plane was for two and a half hours flying in illegal territory, did the United States or the Japanese or any other friendly power try to warn the pilot that he was --

A That question has been asked. Not to our knowledge.

Q Rick, what is the U.S. policy? If a similar thing happened in our airspace, what is our policy?

A I find it totally inconceivable that the United States Air Force would shoot down and unarmed, commercial aircraft.

Q Do we know how strategically important or sensitive is the area to the Soviets?

A I think that is a question you should ask the Soviet Union, and certainly it provides no excuse whatsoever for shooting down an unarmed civilian aircraft.

Q Rick, during the two and a half hours that it was in illegal airspace, if you want to use that word, how much of that time was it being shadowed by Soviet fighters?

A Our understanding is continuously.

Q Rick, this seems like an obvious question in light of everything you've said, but I just want to make sure that the answer is clear on the record. Was there any Soviet contact with the United States or with the Republic of Korea indirectly or through Japan or whatever prior to the shooting down of the plane, or even at the time the plane came into their airspace?

A There was no Soviet contact with the United States, and we are not aware of any Soviet contact with South Korea.

-- MORE --

Q Can you be at all anymore specific on the location? You say substantial deviation. Is that hundreds of miles inside the Soviet territory air space or thousands of miles? Any specific location you can say where it was shot down?

A The aircraft was flying for more than two hours in Soviet air space, so you're talking about hundreds of miles.

Q Was there a serious atmospheric disturbance that would have gotten in the way with normal sideband communications between that sophisticated aircraft and its own base?

A I'm not aware of any atmospheric problem.

Q Do we know -- maybe it came up before. Was the pilot at any time, seeing these planes -- one or two or the eight, or whatever -- ever sought to leave the Soviet air space?

A I just can't answer that question.

Q About Madrid, to what extent are you letting this incident revise the agenda for the talks, the upcoming talks between the Secretary and Mr. Gromyko?

A It's revised the agenda for Madrid in one important way. As the Secretary of State has pointed out, he will hope to receive an explanation and to discuss this issue with the Soviet Foreign Minister. He also pointed out we expect to get information from the Soviet Union prior to any meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

Q A follow-up to that. Do you expect this topic to so dominate now the meeting that --

A Again, you're asking me to speculate. I wouldn't want to.

Q Was the airliner at all aware that they were in Soviet air space, and, if so, why didn't they move out of it during the two and half hours of the flight?

A We just don't have an answer to that question.

Q Do you have any better coordinants as to where it was shot down?

A Again, I hope that we can give you more information on that later on.

Q When you said it was leaving Soviet air space, was it on its way into Japanese air space?

A We'll try to get you more information on that.

Q Had it been your perception that U.S.-Soviet relations had been improving in recent months?

A That's kind of off the topic, really, of this question. Our position on U.S.-Soviet relations has been, for sometime, that we are deeply disturbed about several aspects of Soviet behavior but at the same time we're willing to work for improvement. But beyond that, I don't think it's helpful for me to get into U.S.-Soviet policy at this briefing.

Q In your conversations with the Charge and in Moscow, have they as much as said we admit or we acknowledge that this has happened; we're looking into it?

A No.

Q Were U.S. forces ever put on any sort of alert after we learned that this might have been shot down, the aircraft?

A U.S. Air-Sea Rescue Forces, following confirmation that the aircraft had been downed, have been participating in their own search and potentially rescue missions. But during the episode itself, during that period time that the aircraft was being followed by Soviet fighters, there was no movement of U.S. forces.

Q How close do our planes have to get into Soviet air space before --

A Sorry?

Q How close close to Soviet air space do U.S. air-sea rescue operations have to get if they're looking for evidence, for wreckage?

A I'm sorry, I can't answer that question.

Q Is there any indication (inaudible) other than what would be normal for a commerical airliner?

A No.

Q No electronic or surveillance gear?

A No.

Q It is at least implied, in response to questions, that the pilot who shot the plane had orders to shoot down the plane, because you said they were in constant communication. Could you be a little more explicit about that since you obviously have a lot of the details from intercepts?

A I will only say that the pilot, in communicating with his ground control, described and discussed the sequence of movements and actions he was taking to engage this aircraft, including the arming and firing of a missile.

Q How did you learn that, Rick? Did you monitor that?

A Just through various sources.

Q And those sources are even hinting that he was not given orders by the Soviet Government?

A I said that I'm not trying to hint anything.

Q Did your monitoring suggest that the pilot described this plane as a commerical airliner? Did he say that to ground control?

A What he had was visual identification of the aircraft.

Q But you heard him say he fired. Did he say this is a commerical airliner flying this way?

A I think that it was understood that it was a commercial aircraft. But, again, we are looking into this whole episode, and hope to acquire greater detail.

Q Was there any indication that he exchanged with the pilot of the plane, of the Korean plane, any information to ask for his identity from 1812 to 1826, which is according to the statement?

A We have no indication to that.

Q Have you seen the transcript of the following two lines, "I am going to fire a missile; the target is the KAL plane?" Have you seen that?

A Off the top of my head, no.

Q You have not? Were there pauses in the transmission from the pilot to his base that indicated he was receiving response? You said that there was a sequence of messages.

A There was a sequence of messages where the pilot was in touch with ground control. I don't want to go beyond that.

Q The last time there was an incident of this nature, the people in the intelligence community who were considerably upset that relevations of how we had picked up the information compromised American intelligence abilities. Are you concerned that this is happening again?

A I'm not aware of any statements by any U.S. officials that have compromised intelligence. We haven't discussed our sources or methods.

Q Thank you, Rick.

MR. HUGHES: I don't know if there are anymore questions on any topics.

Q John, on Lebanon, what is the situation today?

A The Lebanon situation is fairly calm in Beirut today. Lebanese Armed Forces have control of the highways, cross points, intersections. Some shells fell in the area of Yarze in the vicinity of the Ambassador's residence this morning, but no indication that they were aimed at the residence. That's the kind of pattern that there has been over the past several days.

The airport was closed earlier this morning, but I think it's probably open now. That's about it.

Q Have you seen the report that Jumblatt, and apparently others, have refused to join this dialogue that the Secretary was speaking about yesterday?

A There are a lot of reports floating around, both in the public and private area. I think we'll stand on the Secretary's position and the Administration's position yesterday, which is the same position today, that we're supporting strongly President Gemayel's initiative and that our diplomatic endeavors to support the Lebanese Government go forward.

Q John, anything on the reports of the massacre in --

A No. Seen those reports, concerned about it, and are monitoring it but don't have anything for you on it.

Q Has Secretary Shultz spoken by phone in the last, say, twenty-four hours or so with Howard Baker and perhaps Tip O'Neill in connection with the Middle East situation?

A Sure.

Q Has he suggested that they come to Washington for some kind of a meeting with the Secretary?

A I'm not aware that he suggested they come to Washington. I mean, I wouldn't rule it out, but I'm not aware of that.

Q Has the Administration suggested it, as opposed to he suggesting if that's the key?

A I'm not aware of it.

Q Are you expecting any such high-level personal face-to-face conference with Congressional leaders on the status of either the War Powers Act or the status of the Marines or --

A If you're asking me, is it going to happen, I have to say I don't know. If you're asking me, is there a lot of consultation going on (a) on the question of Lebanon and now on the question of what happened today, in connection with the Korean airplane, yes, there's a lot of back-and-forth. But where it will come down in terms of face-to-face meetings as distinct from phone calls, I don't know.

Q John, in talking to the Secretary yesterday about the provisions of the War Powers Act, we didn't quite pin it down. Maybe I can do it now with you.

In light of the combat situation that has developed in the last 48 hours, does the Administration accept the right of Congress to suspend U.S. participation in a Multinational Force?

Q I think I will really stand on what the Secretary said yesterday, which was quite clear. But I think in essence what he was saying is the Marines have been there for eleven months. Clearly, there has been a change in the situation over the past three days. Clearly, the Administration is looking at that changing situation. But, for the moment, we see no change in the reporting procedure that has been followed.

Q The Lebanese Charge' is in the building today. Who is he meeting?

A I didn't know he was. He may be. I didn't know that.

Q On the basis of the talks that Ambassador McFarlane had with Walid Jumblatt in Paris, prior to the latest outbreak, have you been optimistic about the prospects of national conciliation as a result of what Jumblatt said or accepted?

A I haven't heard any characterizations since that meeting between Ambassador McFarlane. I think he described that Paris meeting as productive.

Obviously, intensive discussions and soundings are now going on in connection with President Gemayel's initiative.

Q As far as you can tell also, as a follow-up on this, is the Gemayel Government, from the information that you have, ready and open to meet the demands of the various militias that have opposed the regime so far?

A I think you have to ask the Lebanese. That's a very detailed government, and I think it calls for a response from the Lebanese. I think the President's statement and request yesterday is quite clear that they sit down and talk, and see whether they can produce a mood of national reconciliation. But what the details are, who will say what and who will suggest what, I can't answer.

Q No, but to put it in another way, will the U.S. encourage the Gemayel Government to meet a lot of these demands so that there will be a successful national reconciliation and dialogue?

A I don't think we can suggest what strategy the Lebanese Government will pursue in negotiations and talks that might take place, but we are supporting that initiative and that overture very strongly. We think it is an important overture. We think it offers great hope for Lebanon, and we're supporting it.

Q What is the U.S. explanation for the sudden flareup of fighting, the offensive taken by the left there?

A I think there are all kinds of estimates, and I will not offer an analysis.

Q Did it come unexpectedly? Did we have any advance intelligence that it might be coming?

A That fighting on this scale would take place? No, I don't think anybody had -- I think you would have to look at the way some of the street fighting developed, the way a great deal of it is uncoordinated; uncoordinated sometimes by leaders of various factions. I think there is quite a deal of evidence indicating that individuals and factions within factions are operating not necessarily always under strict discipline.

Q Do we see any evidence of inter-militia discipline this time that we haven't seen in previous occasions?

A Inter-militia discipline?

Q That is to say, the Druze, the Amal, and others.

A Do we have evidence that they got together and said, let's have a concerted assault on any one objective? No.

Q Is McFarlane still on the Iwo Jima?

A No, he's in Beirut.

Q He's back in Beirut. He's spending today in Beirut?

A McFarlane and Fairbanks are in Beirut, and will be there today.

Q I have a feeling that you don't want to have anything to say to us.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, September 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #154

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A couple of housekeeping announcements:

The Press Office will be closed on Monday as a result of the Labor Day holiday. There will be no press briefing, and we expect to be operating on a Sunday schedule.

The background briefing on the Secretary's trip to Madrid, which we had hoped to have for you yesterday and then had rescheduled for today, as you know, because of Mr. Burt's involvement in other affairs, was cancelled and that has been rescheduled for 10:30 here tomorrow morning. But I urge you to keep in touch with the Press Office on that one to make sure that one will be held on that timeframe.

I have a statement from the Secretary of State on the death of Senator Jackson.

"The nation has suffered a great loss with the untimely passing of Senator Jackson. He was a man of great intellect and reason. He was an essential element and proponent of bipartisan U.S. foreign and national security policy. His imprint will remain on many crucial issues that face our nation, such as arms control, trade legislation, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and Central America. Most recently Senator Jackson has provided me" -- that's the Secretary of State, this statement being in his name -- "and others within the Administration excellent advice and guidance on our policies in Central America, and on our dealing with the Soviets, and on China.

"I" -- it continues to be the Secretary of State -- "along with others in the Department will miss valued counsel. On behalf of the Department of State, I extend condolences to Mrs. Jackson and the Jackson family." And the Secretary has been in touch Mrs. Jackson.

That's all I have. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q John, there's suggestion made to me that we get other matters out of the way before we get to the airplane, if that's all right with everybody else.

Q No, no --

A There's a counter-suggestion. I love the way newspapermen make decisions. There's an instant counter-suggestion that we do the airplane first and get the other matters out of the way.

If this group is anything like editors, when you take a vote, it's always one-third for, one-third against, and one-third can't make up their minds. (Laughter)

Q So let's do it the tyrannical way. Let me ask about Lebanon first. Do you think the situation has stabalized itself with the Lebanese army in charge of Beirut, essentially?

A The situation is relatively calm in Beirut today. The army appears to be in control of west Beirut and is moving into the city as a whole. There was no shelling of which we are aware today. The airport is still closed for the moment. That's about it.

Ambassador McFarlane is coming back from Beirut. He'll be here over the weekend. That's about it.

Q John, why are we sending additional Marines to the area?

A I think that was addressed by the White House yesterday. I really don't have much beyond that.

Q It talked about -- the White House statement, as far as I know what it said -- it talked about a backup role. That's all pretty vague. At his press conference the other afternoon, Shultz said there was no plan to expand the role or the size of the force. Certainly, this looks like, at the very least, a contingency plan for expanding the size of the force, because if they're there as a backup to support the MNF contingent, that gives them a role in the MNF, does it not?

A I think the Secretary, as you say, said there's no plan to enlarge the force, and there is not. But, obviously, the military and the President have considered that it's desirable to have additional forces in the area in the same way as we have changed the disposition of carriers and ships in that area from time to time. They feel they want those forces in a position to be able to support if needed, but no plans --

Q Are you suggesting that Shultz had not supported this decision?

A No, not at all. There's no contradiction.

Q Two questions: One, there's a report of a massacre of Christians in the Druze area. I wonder if you have anything on that. And there's a report that the French are dispatching an aircraft carrier to Lebanon. Do you have anything on that?

A I think the French report is correct, but I think you ought to ask the French about that. Insofar as the massacre report is concerned, it's our understanding that the Lebanese Government has confirmed the deaths of 25 persons. This latest tragedy underscores the need for reconciliation in Lebanon, and the need to restore the authority of President Gemayel's government.

Q Who massacred the 25?

A I don't know who was responsible, but I think the Lebanese Government is saying that Christians were the victims.

Q John, would you care to comment on the Evans and Novak column today?

A No, I don't think so.

Q Let me rephrase this question. If our Marines are hit by further attacks, will we -- are you ruling out the use of air strikes?

A Never rule anything out, never rule anything in. The Secretary said --

Q There's a possibility that we may decide to really go after them?

A Never discuss contingency plans in the military area.

Q In connection with the Marines again, when the Secretary of State spoke, and when he was asked about the War Powers Act, the decision had not yet been made to send in the additional backup troops. Is the Administration considering or prepared now to make a change in its reporting to Capitol Hill under the War Powers Act?

A I don't know of any change in the reporting procedure the Administration has been following.

Q Could I follow on another question in that area? Do you have any comment now on the Lebanese request to Jumblatt to join in a meeting to discuss with the Gemayel government the political future of the government?

A Of course, we support President Gemayel's initiative, and hope that all the parties to whom he has addressed that plea will accept and those who may have initially rejected it will reconsider their position and will cooperate with him. We consider this to be a useful initiative on his part and support it strongly.

Q Do you have any comment of an apparent Lebanese Government formal request to the Arab League to withdraw the mandate for the Syrian troops?

A No. I've seen the report of that request. I don't know whether the Lebanese Government would confirm it, but that's their decision to ask for that withdrawal.

Q Do you have any comment on views being said in the Middle East in that the U.S. Administration is siding with one part or one faction of the Lebanese community, the Lebanese society?

A Not true, not true. The United States is supporting the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and supports that government's appeal and efforts towards national reconciliation. Always has, and is currently so doing.

Q Chad?

A Chad?

Q Do you have anything on the fighting in Oum Chalouba and the French aircraft getting involved?

A Not a great deal. Seen those reports about the French aircraft in action. We cannot confirm that. I understand the French Government has declined comment on that, so I can't confirm involvement in combat by the French. There certainly are reports of some fighting in the area of Oum Chalouba, but the situation is unclear. Not very much for you on that, I'm afraid.

Q Why don't we have a filing break.

A Filing break.

Q Couple other side topics. Anything on the Shamir election now that that's been formalized? Comment on the --

A The process is moving forward. It's an internal matter for Israel. As we have said before, I don't think we would have any comment on that.

Q Anything on the Schaufelberger case announcement yesterday?

A I think we had some guidance yesterday which you can get from the Press Office.

Q Let's have a filing break.

A Filing break.

Q What do you have new on the airplane?

A Nothing very new beyond where we were yesterday. We have not had -- there has been further discussion with the Soviets both here and in Moscow today, but that was mainly in connection with informing them of our search and rescue efforts and indicating our desire, should the downed aircraft be found in Soviet territorial waters, our desire to help search in those territorial waters. We have not had a response to that request yet nor have we had a response to our demand yesterday for a satisfactory explanation of their action.

Q They haven't produced any further information?

A They have produced no further information.

Q Do you have any better fix on where the plane went in?

A No.

Q In your search and rescue effort, in the U.S. search and rescue effort, have you flown into Soviet territorial areas?

A No, we have not. So far we have not.

Q Have we asked for the South Koreans -- asked the Soviets to give us the voice recorder if they find that in the wreckage, if they find the wreckage?

A I don't know that that specific request has been made at this point. I think that may be a little ahead of the game, because, you know, we still have to locate the site, see what the weather conditions are, what the water is like, what the depth is like.

Q Do we have any further indication of why the plane was so much off course?

A No.

Q And also, why the pilot didn't get out into international air space?

A No, we don't.

Q There are some reports that the Soviets are actually impeding the search for debris. Anything on that?

A No, I don't. I'm not aware of that.

Q Any conversation between the government and any international civil aviation organizations as to any sanctions that might be appropriate?

A I think one of the remarkable things is the extraordinary international outpouring there has been on this issue. It's a long time since I've seen this depth of feeling expressed in the international press, and that has certainly paralleled by declarations of feeling and suggestions of intent by various organizations. There may well have been some contacts between ourselves and various organizations, but I'm not sure that anything has come to a conclusion yet.

Q Has there been any movement toward a decision, or any action taken that would represent some sort of response, retaliation to the Russians -- that is to say, you've had calls for a suspension of Aeroflot flights, annul the grain agreement, etc. Under that heading, has the Administration decided yet on any action it will take directed at the Soviet Union?

A It's a good question, but I think it's a little premature in that the President is just about on his way back, will be back this afternoon and will be meeting with other leaders of government. I think that at that time he would have in front of him various options that have been developed and are being developed, and the President would make a judgment on any action that he might take.

Q Is that holding out the possibility of action will be taken?

A I think what we are saying is that, aside from the suggestions you've mentioned that are being made in the public domain, I think the Administration is working on a variety of possible options that the President might take. And in the way of things, those options have been developed, and I think are continuing to be developed until he should arrive, which will be in a few hours' time, and then I think he would meet with his senior advisors and would consider those options at that time.

Q But is there a decision to take action, to implement an option?

A No. Those options will be presented to the President.

Q John, wouldn't you expect that -- I suppose there's no way to know when that decision would be made, but would you expect some announcement after the National Security Council meeting this evening?

A I really don't know. I think you would have to ask the White House on that. It would be late this afternoon or early this evening, I think.

Q When the Secretary spoke yesterday of the Reagan Administration's revulsion at the Soviets shooting down of this unarmed passenger airliner, am I correct in presuming that this was not merely for public consumption but rather that he is deeply and personally appalled at this mass murder?

A I think there's no question about it.

Q Good. A closely related subject: Considering that an Air Rhodesia unarmed passenger airliner was similarily shot down by the "Liberation Forces of Robert Mugabe," am I correct in presuming that the Secretary has no intention of meeting this month with this mass murderer whose troops murdered missionaries and whose ZANU people recently stoned Bishop Muzorewa?

A I don't know what the status is of the Mugabe visit. I have nothing for you on the Mugabe visit.

Q I just want to ask this question. If there is real revulsion at the Soviets shooting down of an unarmed passenger airliner, could you tell me why there is no revulsion at Mr. Mugabe and why he's being invited to the United States? That's my basic question.

A I don't have anything for you on the Mugabe visit.

Q Could you take that question --

A If you will allow me to finish my answer. I don't have anything for you on the Mugabe visit. I don't have anything for you on the particular incident you mentioned, but I think that the shooting down of the Korean airliner, with its extraordinary loss of human life -- and I don't think any of us who saw the photographs last night of the small children who were involved in that could not but be totally moved -- I think that stands rather uniquely as an example of extraordinary callus murder.

Q One last follow-up on this. You're not at all suggesting that all of the civilians that went down on that Air Rhodesia plane, that was unarmed, are less important than --

A No, of course I'm not.

Q Then, John, how in God's name can they invite a man whose forces were responsible for this right on the -- at the same time? How can you do this without damnable hypocrisy?

A I think that the question of the Mugabe visit is something that you should address to the White House. That is a Presidential visit.

Q I will.

A And I think you're question is more properly addressed there.

Q Is there any reconsideration being given to the Secretary's intention to go to Madrid and Gromyko, and so forth, in view of the building criticism that we're hearing now?

A No, I don't think so. The Secretary made his position on the Madrid visit and the Gromyko talks plain yesterday when he talked to you, and so far as I know there's no change in that position.

Q Will there be any conditions that the Secretary will set forth -- that is to say, for example, an apology, as one element -- that he might require before meeting with Gromyko? Or is this a meeting that will take place in the environment of a human rights meeting without any yield on the part of the Soviets?

A I would think that the atmosphere and the agenda of the meeting is probably somewhat changed.

Q So there are no conditions for that meeting?

A I'm not sure that I'd cast it quite in those terms, in terms of conditions. But I think the format of the discussion and the priority of the issues conceivably could change.

Q I'm sorry, I just didn't understand you.

A What I'm saying, to slice through all this, is that I would think that this particular incident looms large and first on the agenda.

Q Could you describe a little bit the process that's underway here in preparing options that will go to the President?

A No, not really, I don't think --

Q I was talking about -- people are wondering what the government is doing and what's your -- to respond to this extraordinary situation, and what you're telling us is wait until they get their act together tonight.

A No, I didn't put it quite in those words. What I would suggest is the government, the Administration is proceeding carefully and cooly in its assessment of this situation.

It is not only a bilateral question; it is an international question. Many others besides ourselves are concerned, as I mentioned earlier. I can't remember when I've seen such an extraordinary outpouring from the world's press. That has come from governments, as well. We are in touch with those governments. They are in touch with us. But, also, there are bilateral options that we are considering. Officials in this building and others are moving forward in a careful, thoughtful consideration of those options to recommend to the President.

--MORE--

Q John, does the Administration consider the second clause of the grain agreement signed in August to be absolutely binding?

A As I say, I think it would be out of place for me to discuss options or changes in our relationship with the Soviet Union until the President has had a chance to consider those this evening. But specifically on the grain question, I think you'd be misled if you thought that there was major consideration to any serious change in the situation.

Q When the Secretary gave the chronology of events leading up to the plane being fired on, from the point where he talked about the missile being armed and he talked about the conversations and gave us some of the quotes, did he leave out at all any of the conversations between the pilot and the ground and the ground and the pilot in the Soviet plane? Or did he give us all of the --

A No. He certainly didn't -- I think he was trying to be precise. Although everybody said that it was a fairly full account of what had happened, I think that he was trying to precis and capsualize his accounts, so surely he did not give all the information that was available.

Q How much do we know about this incident, John? There are various reports that we have more than two hours of transcripts of these conversations; that we don't have that many.

I guess the question is, how much do we know and when did we know it?

A We know a lot. There's a lot of material. I don't think I really am going to get into great detail about how much we have in quantity and how we acquired it and so forth and so on, but there is a great deal. And I think, as Secretary Burt has said and as the Secretary of State has said, there isn't any question in our minds as to what transpired. The evidence is there.

Q Will any of that be made public?

A The Secretary made some of it public, and I suppose --

Q More of it?

A I suppose it's possible.

Q How was the decision made?

Q To follow up this gentlemen's question over here, I recall -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- is that several times a number of us tried to get Secretary Burt to answer the question, was this Soviet pilot under orders from ground control to shoot down that airliner? And he never would say that. He diddled around yesterday.

A I think you're misreading --

Q I'm misreading?

A I think you're misreading what Secretary Burt said. What you were pressing Secretary Burt for was whether we had a line in the transcript of a specific order from ground control to the pilot to fire, and the honest answer to that is no.

But he made clear that there was no question that there was a great deal of coordination and the pilot was under orders, the pilot was informing at every step of the way the action he was taking, including the arming of the missile, the pointing of his aircraft, the distance he was, the point at which he would attack, and that was all clearly known to his controller.

Q To follow this up, if I may, in view of the fact that there is no report that I'm aware of -- you can correct me if I'm wrong -- that we have taken any retaliatory steps to the people that blew up so many of our people in Beirut, now there is a long pause waiting for options -- we don't even know what the options are -- and it looks as though a kind of a hunting license is issued and so forth.

Is there any report that we've taken any retaliatory steps towards those who murdered so many of our people in Beirut and now we have a situation where 30 more of our people, including a Congressman, have been murdered in the skies.

How many more cases of murdering Americans are going to have to take place before we begin to get tough?

A As far as the Embassy is concerned, Lester, you have to have the perpetrators of the terrorism in your hands.

Q Tell me this, have you checked with Mossad? I'll betcha Mossad knows who they are.

A The investigation is going forward, Lester. There is action, I think, you've missed. I think you're behind the curve on some of the action that is being taken by the Lebanese authorities, criminal court action --

Q Any news you can give us I'd be very glad --

A No. There's nothing I can give you while that proceeds. I just would say, I think what I see behind your apparently implied criticism is the suggestion that the Administration is not moving forward with the speed that you would like on a response.

Q That's exactly it. I look at that memorial plaque, and I find that more of our people have --

Q Come on --

Q Listen, I'd like to speak --

A No. You're not here to speak, Lester. You're here to ask questions.

Q You're not asking.

Q Listen, I don't need any help from any of those --

A I suspect -- would you cut his microphone off? I'm not going to tolerate this.

Q No, no. But if you will not let them interrupt.

Q You're editorializing.

A I told you I'm not going to tolerate that.

Q One, do you have any arrangements or expect the Soviet Charge to come in today?

A I think if we do not hear further from the Soviets by this afternoon, that we will be in touch with them again. I don't know whether that will mean they're coming, but certainly there will be further contact.

Q All right. On another matter: Could you brief me, please, on what is happening in the U.N. as far as your position is up there now, moving on this situation, and the hold on that?

A The U.S. asked with urgency for the session. I don't quite know when that will take place. There's a possibility that it will start this afternoon.

Q Beyond that, though, nothing at this point has developed.

Q Start this afternoon?

A It's a possibility it will start this afternoon.

Q Will we have a text of the U.S. statement?

A I don't see why we couldn't get that for you, Jim.

Q Is the Secretary going there to address the United Nations?

A No, he's not going.

Q Why not? In circumstances like this usually the Secretary of State --

A I think the Secretary is deeply engaged here, and he will be involved with meetings with the President tonight and over the weekend, and that's his decision.

Q John, could you give us a housekeeping message here on what the Secretary plans for the weekend -- Saturday and Sunday?

A He plans to be very much in town, and he plans to be very much involved in clearly this situation and the Lebanese situation. As I say, Ambassador McFarlane will be back. The Secretary asked that he come back to be here over the weekend, and discussions on both those major issues, possibly others, will go forward.

Q John, can you clarify the situation on the search for the plane's debris, whether there's any chance of getting any survivors, finding any bodies, how involved the U.S. forces are?

A They are involved. Our aircraft has been on the scene. As I say, they have not yet entered Soviet territorial waters, but they have certainly been searching outside Soviet territorial waters. It's dark there now, so there's a pause in the search, but our activities will go forward. The Pentagon can tell you what we're doing in terms of moving aircraft.

Q Can you tell us whether there's any information that you have been able to get as to whether this plane was blown to smithereens in the air, whether there are pieces in the water that are big enough to find?

A No pieces have been discovered in the water. Kerosene has been seen on the water.

Q In the conversations with the Soviets so far, has the thrust of what the United States has been saying been the pursuit of additional information, or is the U.S. as well asking for apologies, punishment for the pilots or that whole military command that gave the order to fire, compensation, etc.?

A We're not at the point of compensation, although consideration obviously is going on in another form of such questions. But insofar as our discussions with the Soviets are concerned, what we have demanded is an explanation. They have responded to that demand with words that are totally unsatisfactory and uncommunicative which accept no responsibility for this.

We have told them that that is unacceptable, and we are asking for an explanation. I think that is the first step.

Q John, are what else we going to do but accept it?

A I have told you, Lester, on several occasions that the President will consider various options when he returns.

Q In other words, some action?

Q Can you be more specific about the U.N. session today than you were yesterday? What is the U.S. going to do or say in the Security Council session, and what is it going to expect the Council to do, if anything?

A That session, I suppose, Ralph, will probably not conclude today, and I would think that we would have a statement, if there is such a session today, and that we would be seeking international condemnation of the Soviet Union and possibly other action.

Q Who will make the statement?

A Ambassador Kirkpatrick is in North African, and I'm not quite sure whether she will be back for the opening of the session or not.

Q So it would be from New York.

A It would be from New York.

Q Has she been asked to come back to join this session?

A She is in a remote area of North Africa, and I'm not sure what the status of attempts to reach her currently is.

Q John, do we know how far up on the Soviet chain of command that these orders to the pilot came from?

A No, we do not.

Q Do you see any comparisons being made now between this deplorable action by the Soviets and the action done by the Israelis in '71 against a Libyan airplane which was civilian?

A We deplore the shooting down of civilian airliners. There's no question about that, whoever shoots them down. That is a terrible act, and we deplore that.

I think you have to see the Soviet action in light of the kind of viewpoint that this Administration has fairly consistently had of the Soviet Union. This is the country which, after all, has invaded Afghanistan; this is the country which has used yellow rain in Southeast Asia; and while this is a monstrous act, I think this underlines the steadiness of this Administration's appraisal of this particular government.

We have consistently said that we view the Soviet Union with great realism. I think the Secretary has used those words. I think the President has on a number of occasions said that the first plank of our foreign policy insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned is military strength, and this Administration has gone far down the road toward achieving that.

The second point is to approach what the Soviets do with realism, and I think we have tried consistently to do that and have looked at what the Soviets do in terms of their actions with people.

Here you have a clear indication of the attitude they have toward human beings. I think that justifies our insistence on taking up this question of human rights in our discussions with the Soviet Union.

Having said all that, this Administration has also said that we're prepared to talk with the Soviet Union in those areas where there is the prospect of reducing tension.

Those are the three planks of this Administration's policy, and I think that what we have seen in the past few hours underlines the wisdom of that policy.

Q To go back to the grain business which you talked about earlier, indicating that we would be misled if we thought that there was serious consideration being given to the grain --

A I don't want to pre-empt -- I don't want to get into this discussion of options that will go to the President and what he may decide, but I'm not aware of any major consideration of cancelling the grain agreement.

Q I assume that this is for the reasons that have been given before, but if you could say that again now, it would be helpful. Why isn't the grain --

A I think the reasons have been given before, but, as I say, I think that's about as far as I'm going on options.

Q John, two things: Do I also assume from what you said that the plans for the resumption of the INF talks are going ahead for next week?

A I'm sure that the President will look at all options, but so far as I know, there's no change in those plans.

Q The question is, do you have any confirmation at all of some of the statements made in the Soviet note -- that is, that the Korean plane did not have navigation lights on, and that the Soviets tried to get it to land, but that the plane didn't do so?

A Obviously, we don't know what discussion, if any, took place between the two aircraft, and, indeed, we have no record of such discussion.

Insofar as the navigation lights are concerned, there isn't any question that the attacking pilot specifically mentioned the blinking navigation lights, so that seems to be totally at variance with their own combat record.

Q Blinking?

A Yes. You know, when a plane flies, those lights change. I think their word in the translation was blinking, but I think what they're talking to is the fact that the navigation lights were on and operating in a normal manner.

Q Picking up Bernie's question about your indication that there's no change on the grain front and so far as you know the START talks next week will continue, etc., are we in a position right now that until the President reviews the available options and makes his decision, whatever has in fact been taking place by way of U.S.-Soviet contacts is proceeding in a business-as-usual way. Is that correct?

A "Business as usual" is kind of a catch phrase, Bernie. I'm not sure that I would use that particular phrase.

Q Forget the phrase. Is everything going on --

A Business is going forward. Business is being conducted. But certainly the atmosphere has changed.

Q But has any business stopped?

A I'd have to do some research on that, Bernie. I'm not sure.

Q John, is it the position of the Administration that whatever action is taken should be first of an international sort of nature and a bilateral response should be secondary to that, as a fallback?

A I don't know that I'd place them in that order. We've already moved on the international front in the sense that we've taken this up at the United Nations and are in touch with other governments. I don't know what kind of order to give it. I think they'll both probably go forward in tandem.

Q Could you be a little bit more forthcoming about the Secretary's schedule on Saturday and Sunday? For instance, is he going to attend the meeting the President is having with Congressional leaders?

A I'm sure he will be attending the President's meetings, but I don't know what specifically he'll discuss with the President.

Q Is it possible that during the day, if you don't know now, you could add specifics?

A It's possible, but I think that the schedule on those meetings will really come from the White House.

Q Or other meetings, whatever kind. I'm not just talking specifically about those but other things.

A We'll let you know whatever we can.

Q Can you tell us anything about what he did today?

A He was at the Airlie House, the Shimoda Conference, this morning, and I guess he got back probably somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00. He's been in his office since then actively --

Q Has he been working on this --

A Among other things.

Q Should we assume that this is the main thing he's worked on today? Most of his time was spent on that?

A I think you can assume that that's correct.

Q Can you tell us if he's talked to the President, if he's talked to Judge Clark?

A I don't think he's talked to the President this morning, because, as I say, he was down at Airlie House. I don't think he's talked to the President this morning, and I think the President has now left to come back here.

Q Did he talk to anybody out there, any details like that?

A I don't know if he's had any phone conversations out there this morning or during the night. He may well have. I don't know.

Q To follow up a question over here regarding the Israeli shooting down of an Arab airliner, can you refresh my memory --

A No.

Q -- because I think that there was no contrast. This airliner was within minutes of Tel Aviv, and it was ordered to alter course and refused. Isn't that correct?

A I think that I said that we deplore the downing of all commercial aircraft, but I'm not going to get into comparisons, and I think this particular one is rather unique.

Q Thank you, John.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, September 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #155

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1983, 12:37 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a statement on the death of Marines in Beirut.

The deaths of two U.S. Marines and wounding of three others in the early morning hours of September 6 saddened us all. We condemn those responsible for the continuing violence that has claimed thousands of innocent lives. We are proud of our own forces and the important role they are playing to achieve security for the Lebanese people.

The Lebanese Government has issued a call to all parties to unite to restore national dialogue. We will continue to work with them toward that end. The goal of a newly united Lebanon, free of foreign forces, is a dream of the Lebanese people regardless of their religious community.

Together with our Italian, French and British partners in the Multinational Force, we are performing a critical role in support of the efforts of the Central Government. No one should mistake our determination to continue in this just cause.

That's it for statements and announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, is there any plan to send ashore additional Marines?

A I don't have anything on plans to send additional Marines to Beirut. No.

Q Any new language of the War Powers Act?

A No. The issues, George, remain under intensive study, but I don't have anything new to say about that today.

Q Alan, you said that they're playing a critical role. Could you redefine for us again the role of what the Marines' mission is in Beirut?

A I would refer you back, rather than try to wing it, because we used language which was carefully crafted at the time, John. I refer you back to language that was used at the time they were initially deployed.

Q Right. The language was that they were there, as I recall, as has been explained several times, to provide a confidence-building kind of structure for the Lebanese forces.

But the question is starting to arise now, do you regard that the -- do you consider, rather, that the Marines are indeed performing this function in their current status there, or are they just becoming a target?

A No. We think that, as I said in the statement -- and I will refer you to it and make the text available -- we are performing a critical role in support of the efforts of the Central Government. We continue to believe that role is a worthy one and a necessary one, and we will continue to persist in it.

Q Alan, following up on John's question, I recently reread that text, and I raised it with the Secretary. It said that you had no expectation that these Marines would become involved in hostilities.

The whole thrust of it was, as John said, that they would be a backdrop, a confidence, just their presence, and you sold it to Congress on the basis that there would be no possibility almost that they'd become involved in this.

The whole thing has changed. How can you rely on that which has become completely negated by the present situation?

A I don't know that I would agree with your premises, but in any case, as you said in the opening of your questioning, you did address it to the Secretary and he did respond to your question.

Q Not too fully, Alan, and John's asking you again.

A Max, I think quite fully enough.

Q Do we see the Marines now in a combat situation?

A As I said, if you're thinking in terms of War Powers, we continue to look at the situation, to examine the issues involved, but I have nothing new to offer you today on that subject.

Q Alan, were the Marines a target, and who do we think did the firing?

A There had been sporadic firing in the area, and because of the nature of the rocket fire, we can't be certain whether the fire was directly or specifically targeted on the Marines.

We do not know specifically who was responsible. Apparently the shelling, the rockets, came from the vicinity of Alayh which is about 10 kilometers to the east of the airport which is a region which is currently under the control of the Druze.

But we simply do not have information as to who specifically fired the rockets.

Q Alan, could I go at this again?

A You've been waiting for a question. Go ahead.

Q You won't say or go back and repeat the language of what the Marines were -- it was intended they do. Can you describe what they are actually doing?

A In terms of their specific day-to-day activities, I refer you to the Pentagon. In terms of the role, I'm not trying to back away from the role. What I'm trying to do, in fact, is to be sure that I don't stray from the description of the role as initially presented. Since I don't have those words in front of me, I would refer you to the record on that.

Q Going back to your saying they're performing a critical role, can you cite what it is that they're accomplishing there?

A We think that they have provided the kind of presence which has helped thus far in movement towards re-establishment of Lebanese Government authority. Obviously, there is a ways to go, but we think that the role that they're performing is an important one.

We think that the objective is an important one. Our objectives in Lebanon have not changed, and we will persist.

Q You think that's the case -- that under present circumstances, that by staying in these fixed, essentially defensive positions, they are performing a role in helping the Lebanese Government to establish its authority?

A I think I've answered the question to the extent we're --

Q I wanted to ask another version of the same question. I wonder if you could please repeat our national self-interest in being in there.

The Lebanese themselves are still maintaining these militias of every stripe and every religion just as they were a year ago, and they don't seem themselves to have a national will to establish a government of national unity.

I would like to ask you what our national self-interest is in being there.

A I'm going to again refer you -- I'm not going to try to make grand policy pronouncements here that have already been addressed on the record, and I'll refer you back to statements that have been made.

I would note that in response to President Gemayel's call for talks on national unity, that discussions are continuing among all of the concerned parties of the area, and we strongly support these efforts to achieve national reconciliation in Lebanon and are doing our utmost to help in that regard.

Q I think the crux, though, Alan, is if an armed force sits and remains impotent and does not return fire, does it any longer serve the purpose it was sent there for?

A I think that in terms of what they have done, returning fire or not returning fire, is -- I think you know the Marines do have the charge to respond in self-defense. As I understand it this morning, or at the time of this shelling, what they did was to fire illumination rounds. They discovered that the area from which the rockets had come was heavily populated, and therefore did not follow up at that point with explosive rounds.

But I'm going to stick with the statement I've given you. Obviously, we do think that they serve a very useful purpose, and we will continue in our mission there.

Q The Israelis pulled their forces back in part because of casualties to their troops. We've had two Marines killed last week, two this week. Don't we reach a point where if the casualties continue, we simply cannot stay in the present posture?

A I'm not going to try to speculate about that.

Q Alan, are there conversations going with other members of the MNF about changing the ground rules, any changes in the way that the deployment is carried out, or --

A I don't know what the state of negotiations or consultations in this case may be, but there is no contemplated change in the deployment at this point or in the ground rules that I'm aware of.

We are continuing in the mode we have been in. As I say, we will persist in our presence and our support of the efforts which they were originally designed to support.

Q Would you address the Syrian role in this, please, Alan?

A The Syrian role specifically in the incident this morning?

Q If any. I don't know. In the incident, if any, and in broader terms.

A I think in terms of the incident, as I said before, the area from which the rockets apparently came is now occupied or under the control of the Druze. It is not under the control of the Syrian forces. So I think that's about all I could say about the incident this morning.

I think the Secretary addressed in his press conference the question of Syrian presence in Lebanon, and said it would be helpful if that presence, along with the other foreign military presence -- but the Syrians have the largest presence -- were to be removed. If all those forces would get out of there, we think that this would be conducive to the national reconciliation process.

Q Alan, there are reports here this morning from the Lebanese Government service saying that the United States and Ambassador McFarlane are attempting to involve Saudi Arabia in the process of trying to bring the parties together. Can you give us anything on that?

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A I don't have anything specific I can offer you on that. We have said before, and I will repeat, that the Saudis have been helpful in the process, but I really think I would have to refer you to them to speak to their own efforts. I don't think it's appropriate for me to do so.

Q Alan, has any consideration been given internally or in conjunction with President Gemayel to allowing the Marines to search out and destroy the positions that target them?

A I think I've addressed as far as I can the role the Marines are in, the mode they're in, their rules of engagement which, if you want to address further, you should go to the Pentagon for in terms of responding. But clearly they are permitted to respond in self-defense, but I'm not going to try to get into that kind of question. There is no contemplated change in the deployment pattern of the Marines.

Q You mentioned the two that were killed this morning. Were there wounded or seriously wounded you can tell us about?

A I think I indicated in the statement initially that there were three wounded. I don't have anything about their condition. Again, I would refer you to the Pentagon. I think they might have more detail.

Q And you don't know if the Marines are being intentionally targeted or not intentionally so?

A I said before that, because of a pattern of sporadic fighting and so on and so forth, and the nature of the rocket fire, we cannot make a judgment about that.

Q Do you have anything you can tell us about Ambassador McFarlane's visit to Damascus today? And another question, do you have any comment on reports in the press that Syria is calling on the Arab governments to cut relations with Lebanon?

A As far as Ambassador McFarlane's travel is concerned, I don't have anything to give you on his purposes other than to continue, obviously, the effort he is making to try to help resolve the situation in Lebanon in accordance with the policies we've been following.

As far as the Syrian action with the Arab League, I believe it was, I do not have anything for you on that.

Q Isn't MacFarlane in Damascus now?

A I understand he is either in Damascus or on his way to Damascus. I am not sure whether he has arrived.

Q What could he possibly say that would interest Assad?

A I think you would have to ask President Assad how interested he is, but I think that there is a considerable Syrian interest in Lebanon and there is considerable American interest in Lebanon. So, it seems to me that there might be something for them to talk about.

Q Alan, whom do you mean when you talk about not being mistaken that you intend to continue in your efforts. Don't you mean the Syrians?

A I think I will leave the words as they are. I think it is addressed to whomever it might fit.

Q In the White House, Larry Speakes has been saying that the Syrians know that we have enough fire -- considerable fire power off shore, and they should be circumspect in their own active involvement in instigating any violence in the area. Don't you find -- you know, your attitude is a little bit softer than Speakes' attitude, and what are the reasons?

A I wouldn't try to make those distinctions, Bassem.

Q Secretary Weinberger said this morning that one of the Navy ships returned fire today. Can you confirm that?

A No, I think that that is not accurate. I think that there is some misunderstanding there. I think if you will check with the Pentagon, you will find that there is no Naval ship which returned fire.

Are you talking about today?

Q Yes.

A I am not aware of any. But you should check with the Pentagon specifically on that.

Q In addition, there was a report yesterday that the Druze were advancing in Syrian supplied tanks. Do we have any information about any recent large infusion of Syrian arms to the Druze and other Moslem militia?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, on Sunday, Congressional leaders are quoted as saying that President Reagan told them, in sending these new offshore forces to the vicinity of Lebanon, he was laying down a marker for Syria.

A Who was quoted as saying that?

Q The President was quoted as saying that by several of the Congressional leaders who were present at the meeting with him.

At what point do we consider that the marker or that the line delineated by the marker has been crossed?

A I (a) don't comment on either Presidential statements, and particularly on statements which were in a private meeting; and (b) I am not going to try to speculate on the future in any respect, that or any other respect. I think that we will just have to see how things develop.

Q Can I take you back to Bassem's question. The White House was more forthcoming on actually calling on Syria, warning Syria, etc., and you have that "no one should mistake" sentence in your prepared remarks.

What is the hesitancy about clearly addressing the U.S. warning to X, Y, or Z? Why are you hesitant here?

A Oh, I am just hesitant by nature. (Laughter)

Q Well, you know, get over your bashfulness.

Q There is a dichotomy.

A I don't think there is a dichotomy. I think I have given you a statement. I will stick with the statement. We can move on to something else.

Q Let me try it one more way, or once again.

A One more way, John.

Q On Saturday, a White House official, speaking to the press, but going on background for that particular remark, although it is in the transcript as a White House official speaking on background, said that Ambassador MacFarlane, in his briefing of the President and his advisers, had said that Syria continued to play a very negative role in the situation in Lebanon.

Now, why is the State Department unwillng to take the same position?

A You are asking me about a background statement, a source statement, and I don't have anything to offer you on that kind of statement.

Q But you know who --

A I don't have anything for you, John.

Q Can we change to the Korean airliner?

A The Korean airliner? We can turn to it. I would caution you, though, that I am not going to necessarily have a lot to say because Ambassador Kirkpatrick has been addressing that at length this morning, and I think is also going to have a press conference a little later on, so I think I will probably defer most of the questions.

Q Can you say specifically what bilateral negotiations have been broken off with the Soviet Union?

A I think this was addressed again yesterday at a backgrounder. I don't have anything new to add to what came out of that. I don't have a lot of detail. I think I would refer you to the transcript of the White House backgrounder.

Q Alan, a very fast one, the President, in his speech last night, said that we are redoubling our efforts with our allies in the flow of military and strategic items to the Soviet Union.

Could you just tell me, or find out, if he was referring to something new or if he was just observing current policy?

A I think in terms of the policy, he was not referring to anything new. What he was referring to is that we have a position, the policy on high technology transfer, which we have discussed at some length before, as you are well aware, and there is a lot of activity which goes on in terms of conversations and meetings, and so on and so forth, and we think it is important to pursue that policy and get agreement among the various parties concerned and get it implemented. It is not to say that there is some new departure that is being contemplated; as the words say, it is a redoubling of an effort, but it is a pursuit of a consistent policy. It is not a change in policy.

Q It is merely observing the current redoubling. There is going to be no change, no intensification because of the Korean airliner? Is that what you are saying?

A I think that it is, as I understand it from some conversations that I had this morning, it is being pursued in a fairly active way, and I think it is that activism to which the President was referring. But it is not a policy departure.

Q Alan, in connnection with the upcoming Thursday meeting between the Secretary and Gromyko, have we received any kind of assurance from the Russians that Gromyko plans to attend that meeting?

A I have nothing, Bernie, new on that meeting. We have no indication that Mr. Gromyko would not intend to join in that meeting, but I can't speculate -- you are asking, in a sense, that I speculate on the future. If you want me to go beyond that, I can't do that.

Q Have we asked the Soviets whether the meeting is on as scheduled?

A Again, I am not going to get into the question of our diplomatic dialogue on this. All I can tell you is that as far as we are concerned that meeting is still scheduled to go on Thursday.

Q In your reading of anything that the Soviets have said, have they said anything at all about their readiness to sit down with Secretary Shultz?

A Again, I think I will leave what I just gave you.

Q The Soviets, this morning, characterized the President's speech as aggressive, hateful, and mendacious. Does that contain anything more than the propaganda response you would expect?

A I don't think I will get into the tit-for-tat struggle on a propaganda front.

Q Have you had any communication with the Soviets at all about the upcoming meeting? In other words, has there been any conversation on that meeting?

A There have been conversations on the meeting.

Q Do you have confirmation that Malta has accepted the final document of the conference in Madrid?

A I don't. Have you seen some report indicating that? Okay. I have not seen that report. I can't comment on it.

Q TASS said that the Soviets have protested this demonstration at Glen Cove, New York, last Sunday. Have we responded to that protest?

A I can't get into detail. I can tell you, yes, the Soviets did protest the incident. I can't get into the detail of what that protest consisted of, or what we may have responded. I would note that we firmly oppose violation of diplomatic premises. We feel strongly about that, and the impact of such violation on normal diplomatic international practice, and, indeed, the impact longer term on stability. We are concerned with the safety of innocent people, our own as well as people of other nations. So, our attitude towards violation of diplomatic premises is quite strong and very much up front.

Q Do you have any new information on the downing of the airliner or the circumstances?

A No, I don't have any new information, and, again, I think in respect to that, I would refer you to Ambassador Kirkpatrick. I think if we have got too many people speaking -- the facts are all the same, and there is no point in having people using slightly different words to say the same thing.

She made a very strong statement this morning. She made a presentation to the Security Council, presented a full transcript of the tapes that were available, and I would refer you to that.

As I said, she is also having a press conference later on, which I think we are going to try to have piped in here, if that is feasible, and we are working on that.

Q Is the text of her statement available?

A I don't have the text of her statement. I think we can try and see, but you also might want to ask your colleagues in New York. I am sure that they have it.

Q Is there any Iraqi official visiting Washington now on an official visit?

A   Is there an Iraqi official visitor in Washington now? There was a Foreign Ministry official who was here. I don't know the entire purpose of his visit. He did meet with some officials, but I think you would have to check with the Iraqis on that visit.

Q   Did you say that she is going to release the transcript of the tapes available?

A   I think the transcript is to be made available, yes. Can we make that available here? Yes.

Q   Is that the full -- is it 29 minutes, or can you make something more available, like two hours?

A   I think that what is available is the transcript coming from a tape over what I believe was something like a 55-minute period, or something of that sort. I mean, you can see, because the times are on the transcript, and I don't have it in front of me.

It was a voice-actuated system, so that in fact it was compressed, and if you were to play the tape, you would find that it wouldn't take you 55 minutes to play that tape, or whatever the full period of time is. But what is there is the full content of what we have from that particular tape. That is being made available both I think in the original Russian and in translation.

Q   Can that be made availabe as a videotape as well?

A   I think it is also being made available. Why don't you check afterwards. I think that your people in New York may already have that, though.

Q   Is this a Japanese recording or an American recording?

A   Again, I think that was addressed by the President last night, and I would refer you to what he said about that.

Q   When will you have the transcript here? Did I understand you to say that you would release them here, too?

A   I think we can have them pretty shortly. Soon after the briefing, Brian tells me.

Q   Who is the Iraqi official --

A   I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you.

Q Can you find out for us, who is the Iraqi official that was here, and who did he meet in Washington?

A Yes, I think I can get you something on that. I think we had something on that earlier, and I just don't happen to have it with me.

Q Do you have any more information or comment about the cancelling of the visit of Assistant Secretary Motley to Nicaragua?

A I think we had some guidance over the weekend. Do you have that?

Q Yes, but they don't explain very well the explanation given by the Sandinista government why they were cancelling.

A I think you would have to ask the Sandinistas why they did that. In terms of what we know about it, we have provided that in the guidance.

Q Have you received an extradition request from the Canadian Government for the four top Amway officials?

A Amway officials. It seems to me there is something I have on Amway officials. Not very much, I think. It is our policy neither to confirm nor deny the receipt of an extradition request in a specific case unless and until the Department of Justice files a request in open court.

I am afraid I can't go beyond that.

Q Anything new on Chad, and does anyone really care?

A Does anyone really care? Yes, I think there are quite a few people who really care.

Q The Chadians care.

A The Chadians care a great deal, I suspect.

I think the best I could say is that Chadian Government patrols continue to control the Oum Chalouba area. We have seen press reports of Libyan bombing of Om Chalouba yesterday, but we cannot confirm those.

At this time the situation can be characterized as static and our information does not indicate that any major Libyan or rebel offensive is imminent.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:03 p.m.)

Cameron

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #156

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1983, 12:14 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Two announcements. One, to let you know that available in the Press Office are background materials regarding a United States statement distributed to the Security Council of the U.N. on August 31. The statement provides information on U.S. administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and rebuts charges by the Soviet Union that the U.S. has used the U.N. Trusteeship to annex the Pacific Islands of the Micronesian region. The statement by Ambassador Fred M. Zeder of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, and U.N. background documents are included in the materials.

Second, I would like to introduce -- over against the wall -- a new member of the Press Office, Kathleen Lang, who begins work today as a Press Officer. Kathleen joined the Foreign Service in 1980 and recently completed her first tour of duty as Vice Consul in Prague, Czechoslovakia. She's a graduate of the College of William and Mary and Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She speaks Czech and Russian, and we're very pleased to have her with us --

Q English? (Laughter)

A -- and know that you will make her feel welcome. She speaks English now. By the time she finishes dealing with you, I'm not sure. (Laughter) That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you give us a reading of the situation in Beirut today?

A I don't have a real update on the situation on the ground, a military sitrep for you, Mike.

Q Do we know, Alan, whether or not the French actually attacked the Druze positions?

A No. My understanding is that in fact there was a reconnaissance flight. Let me see if I can find the guidance on that. I can't find it at the moment, but I understand there was reconnaissance activity, but there was actually no aircraft attack per se. But I would have to refer you to the French for any details on that.

Q How about the MNF Foreign Ministers? Will they meet separately in Madrid to discuss the situation in Beirut?

A I don't know, Bill. I can't rule that out, but I think you'd have to get that from your colleagues with the party. I don't know about that.

Q Do we have any advice that we give the French on whether or not they might carry out air strikes? What would be our position on that?

A I don't want to try to formulate or articulate a position on that. Obviously, there is a great deal of coordination and consultation, in any case, among the various MNF contributing countries and the people on the ground and in other ways. But I don't have anything specific to offer you on that.

Q Any word on Ambassador McFarlane's meeting today in Syria?

A No. I don't have any readout for you on that.

Q Are the MNF contributing nations working under similar rules and guidelines?

A Yes. I think that if you'd go back to the -- I think that these were spelled out at the time the MNF went in.

Q Right.

A And I would go back to that.

Q The reason I'm asking the question is my recollection is that there is supposed to be a set of guidelines in existence for all of the MNF.

A I'm not sure. I think there certainly are general parameters about what the missions are and so on and so forth which are essentially identical. In terms of the rules of engagement, for example, if that's the kind of thing you're getting to, I can't speak to the rules of engagement of other countries' forces. We have our own rules of engagement.

I'm not trying to suggest to you that they're significantly different, because I think that that's not the case. But I can't speak for the other countries about that.

Q If the country decides that it is going to use its own aircraft to attack certain positions, is that a decision that is made after consultation with the other members of the MNF? Is there a requirement that there be that kind of consultation, or is each country essentially on its own?

A I can't tell you specifically in terms of using aircraft. I think that it's obviously not a situation which would apply to all the countries. It would not have applied, for example, to the French until they brought their aircraft recently within range. I can't take it beyond that, Marvin.

Q What consideration is being given to the deployment of the New Jersey to the eastern Med?

A My understanding is that there has been -- beyond the announcements that have already been made about deployments in the Med the Marines will be off shore there, there have been no decisions to move other forces. So I think that's where we are at this point.

Q If the Marines are increasingly targeted and specifically targeted, and are coming under more and more shelling, is there any discussion now about the possibility of changing the ground rules under which our forces operate in order to protect the Marines?

A As you know, Bill, we have not accepted or drawn conclusions about the Marines being targeted. We have not said that they've been targeted. Our evidence cannot sustain a decision --

Q The Marines on the ground say they are targeted.

A I can understand --

Q The French say they are targeted.

A May I respond?

Q Sorry.

A I can understand if you're on the ground and you've got incoming rounds coming near you, you might feel that you would indeed were being targeted.

As we have indicated, as others have indicated around town, the evidence, however, for specific targeting of the Marines as opposed to being involved in the general firing in the region, in the area, just isn't there to draw conclusions, so we can't do that.

We've addressed before -- I've addressed, Larry Speakes has, others have -- the question of the ground rules under which they're there, and, as we've said, in terms of War Powers, for example, which is what I assume you're getting to, that that situation remains under review. But I don't have anything new to announce to you.

Q How do you handle a story, for example, in the Times today on the front page, on the question of morale among the Marines, given the nature of the rules of engagement under which they're operating? It is a front-page story where a young Marine says, "We're guinea pigs. We feel helpless."

A I read that, and one can understand the feeling of individuals who are, as I say, under fire, if there is fire coming in on them. But I think in terms of Marine morale, that's an issue for the Pentagon to address. I'm only able to address how we view this situation and what we're prepared to do about it.

Q There is an item on page one of both of today's papers which says that the ships of the Sixth Fleet are firing back at the Druze positions. Is that true?

A No. I think that was in the paper the other day, or in the press the other day -- I'm not quite sure where it appeared -- and we indicated that that was not correct, that they had not fired.

Q The Marine commander in Lebanon is saying that he feels that the Marines are specifically being targeted because they are being bracketed. That is, the shells fall around them and closer and closer and finally they're hit.

Are you still saying that the Marines are not the specific targets of the incoming mortars and --

A Yes. I think I just said that overall the feeling is that clearly there has been fire taken, there have been casualties, there have been deaths, but that the evidence that we have at this point doesn't allow us to draw conclusions about that.

Q One thing, there are reports from Beirut that two F-14s overflew the Lebanese capital after McFarlane's finale (sic) of the meeting with the Syrians. Would you tell us why did they overfly Beirut?

A Don't have anything on it.

Q Second, do you know if McFarlane is going to Rome to meet with Jumblatt and Mr. Fares Habib, the Lebanese Government.

A Don't have anything on McFarlane's future travel plans. He was in Damascus this morning, but I don't have anything beyond that. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut, by the way.

Q Would you care to characterize the Syrian attitude and response to your statements that you have fireworks --

A That we have what?

Q Firepower, whatever -- arms and ammunition on the offshore of Beirut that they have to take it into consideration?

A Are you talking about naval fire?

Q Yes.

A Again, this issue was raised before. As I say, I have no information to suggest that that's happened. I think if you check with the Pentagon, you'll find that what I'm saying is correct. Other than to say that I haven't seen that particular statement -- but if it's as you describe it, it's based on a false premise -- I can't go beyond that.

Q Yesterday, here and at the White House, the Reagan Administration called strongly on Mr. Assad to act in a constructive fashion. Why should he, considering the situation? What should motivate him to play our game?

A I think the only response I will give to you specifically is that obviously Syria has a continuing role as a major arms supplier to the Druze militias and the PLO and bears considerable responsibility. It also has a large military force we estimate at about 40,000 in Lebanon.

Until the Syrians and the other foreign forces agree to withdraw and do withdraw, it will not be possible for the Central Government to extend its control to the other parts of the country. Syria bears considerable responsibility for the situation. We renew our call on them to exercise restraint. We think it's in their interest, as well as everybody else's interest, that they do that.

Q Why should Mr. Assad go along with our request? What's in it for him?

A I think I'm not going to try and give you -- you're looking for some broader policy statement. We've addressed this before; I think the Secretary's addressed it. I don't have anything new to give you today.

Q Alan, can you do a little better on that last sentence, "bears considerable responsibility for the situation"? Meaning what?

A Again, it is a conclusion of the point I was making before that they've got forces there, they're a major arms supplier to the Druze militias and to the PLO, and until they and the others -- the PLO and the Israelis -- pull their forces out, it's not going to be possible for the Central Government of Lebanon to exercise its control throughout the country. For those reasons, it therefore bears responsibility.

Q Alan, there are two reports which I wish you'd address. One, that there are Syrian advisers with the Druze gunners; and, two, according to the Israelis that there are Soviet advisers with Syrian forces in Lebanon.

A I don't have anything for you on either of those. I have seen those reports, but don't have anything I can give you on that.

Q I want to ask you two questions: You mentioned the PLO twice. You are not saying that the PLO is involved in the fighting.

A I'm not saying that. I would say that we've seen reports that have suggested that in fact, and we're concerned about those reports and we're looking into them. But I'm not saying that as a fact at this point. No.

Q And the other one, Alan, if I may follow up the other one: Yesterday you told us here that the shelling was coming from Alayh, and you indicated, I think, that there was no proof that it was from Syrian guns.

At the White House someone said otherwise. Can you tell us where do you stand or where the Administration stands now on this issue?

A I think that the White House statement Larry Speakes made yesterday was a broader statement about a question of where firing was coming from. The point I was making yesterday was in terms of where firing is coming from, specifically in terms of what's hitting the Marines. I don't have anything beyond what I said yesterday in those terms.

I don't think Larry's point was focused -- or I can't remember whether he did it or there was also some background statements that were made, so I don't know. But, in any case, the statements that came out of the White House I think were addressed in a somewhat different context.

Q Are you now saying, Alan, that there is shooting somewhere else other than on the Marines?

A I don't have anything for you beyond what was said yesterday.

Q Clarify the same point: Are Syrians involved directly in any of the firing?

A Again, I don't have anything beyond what we said yesterday. We continue to analyze information as it is available, and we will continue to do that.

Q You say there are some reports that suggest that the PLO is involved? Are these your reports or --

A No. That we have seen. I saw a wire, for example, that --

Q These are press reports.

A Press reports --

Q You can't confirm any of that.

A No. I say, I'm not stating this as fact. I was pointing out that there are reports.

Q Could I take you back to a basic, please, on the Marine mission? They are sitting there, they're taking casualties during the past week or so. What purpose are they serving in that present static position?

A Bernie, we went over this yesterday. I don't have anything new to say to you today, and let me refer you back -- it may not be satisfactory to you, but there's nothing new to say on it today.

Q This morning the Lebanese Ambassador, Mr. Bouhabib, said that if the Syrians continue to actively arm and train the Moslems, or if the Syrians begin moving any closer toward Beirut, his government's army simply can't handle it -- they're not equipped -- and he suggested that there may be a request for the Marines to get more actively involved.

One, are you getting any pressure along those lines from the Lebanese; and, two, is there any contingency plan to use Marines if the Syrians become more aggressive?

A Let me say in response to your two points, three things: One, I wouldn't talk about diplomatic conversations; two, I wouldn't talk about contingency planning. But, three, the purposes of trying to get the foreign forces out of Lebanon certainly would not be served if Syrian forces, for example, were to move into areas from which Israeli forces have withdrawn. The purpose of withdrawal overall, obviously, is to allow the Lebanese forces to move into those areas -- Lebanese Government authority to take effect in those areas so that the sovereignty can be restored to Lebanon.

Q You've been accusing the Syrians of supplying major arms supplies to the Druze, which you can be correct on this, but how about the Israelis who were the occupying force in the Shouf area when they have confiscated these arms, did not allow the arms to go in. Why did they turn the -- don't you blame them for turning a deaf ear and closing their eyes on this?

A I don't have anything on this in terms of -- I just don't have anything for you on the specific point you're making.

-- MORE --

Q What will you actually do if Syria moves in, or are they going to wait for Syria to move in?

A Again, that's hypothetical and I'm not going to try to address a hypothetical situation, but I think that our attitude is as I have expressed it.

Q There were reports from Jerusalem that Arens has stated that Isaraeli further withdrawals do not any more depend on Syrian-like movements. Are you familiar with the statement? Can you confirm such a statement?

A I saw Mr. Arens on television this last weekend and I can't give you more than what I saw -- which is that if it were possible in certain areas, that the Israelis could withdraw further from certain areas. But I think he also made the point -- and I'd refer you to the transcript; I'm, not trying to speak for Mr. Arens -- I thought he made the point that they would not withdraw totally from Lebanon unless the others withdrew as well -- that is, the Syrians and the PLO.

I've seen the wire reports that you're referring to, which don't have that little nuance to it, but I have seen more recent ones in fact which do make that point that we're talking about withdrawing -- or he is talking about withdrawing -- from certain areas, but not totally from Lebanon in the absence of Syrian and PLO withdrawals.

Q I get the impression that the Marines are being maintained in that stationary position and being prevented from really responding and defending themselves from the Druze fire simply to protect the theory of executive privilege vis-a-vis the War Powers Act.

A No. I think that again I refer you back to what the Secretary said -- and, that is, the Marines, if attacked, if fired upon, will fire back and defend themselves vigorously. And I don't think there's any question about that, and there's no question that the Marines would be put in danger because of some political consideration. They have the right to defend themselves and they will do that.

Q Can I change subjects?

A Sure; go ahead.

Q What kind of cooperation is the U.S. getting from its West European allies concerning the Korean plane incident?

A I don't have a lot really to report on that. You're aware from the press, as much as I am I think, on what's been announced by various people. Canada as an ally has suspended Aeroflot landing rights for 60 days.

Q West European.

A I think that there have been some announcements from the Netherlands and so on. The point, however, basically, is that there is a lot of consultation going on now. This is not a question of instant gratification of some sort; this is a question of an ongoing consultative process looking toward some sort of agreed and orderly action.

There is, as you know, an ICAO meeting which is coming up -- in about a week, I guess. That might well be a point of focus at that meeting.

Also, as I read wires this morning, the British Foreign Secretary talked about this subject as having been discussed at the breakfast this morning among the NATO Foreign Ministers in Madrid.

So I think that there's a lot of discussion about what might be done. That doesn't mean it can be done today or was done yesterday, but I think that this is an active issue and one which will be pursued with some vigor in the days ahead.

Q Alan, on the Korean aircraft, there's a report this morning that the U.S. has tapes of chatter among the Soviet pilots which proves that they knew it was a passenger airliner -- although I'm not clear about whether they knew it before -- just after they shot it down. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I don't think I can get into the question of information which we might have available beyond that which we have made public at this point. I would refer you to Acting Secretary Eagleburger's statement of last night regarding our attitude and judgments about what the Soviets either knew or should have known and the implications of their position.

Q Well, why don't we release the whole tapes, Alan, and to clear up any lingering questions that there might be?

A You're making a suggestion that there specifically are more tapes as opposed to information of other sorts, and I'm not about to get into that subject. I think that what we have said about this is pretty clear. What the situation is is pretty clear. I didn't see a lot of skepticism about the fact that the Soviets, indeed, have shot down a civilian airliner and killed 269 people. It took them a long time to come around to acknowledge that, having initially said -- if you'll recall -- in the Tass statements of September 1 and 2, that having tried to signal this plane it then exited Soviet airspace on its way to the Sea of Japan.

I think the facts are pretty clear. In terms of whether it knew it was a civilian airliner or didn't know, I can't give you a definitive reading; but, as I think Larry Speakes indicated, if they didn't know, they sure should of have.

Q Alan, can you tell us what new devices or procedures the United States or the allies might suggest at this ICAO meeting to all?

A I can't; I can't. I think that as that meeting comes up and proceeds, we will provide whatever we can; but I just can't predict for you when and how that will be done. It's something that we're going to be working together with others on. So we also may not be talking a lot about what might be done before agreements are reached, so you'll just have to bear with us on that.

Q No proposals you can talk about.

A I have nothing I can talk about at this particular point, no.

Q Alan, the correspondent for the Soviet news agency Novostoi said last night on "Nightline" that commercial flights are routinely used for intelligence-gathering operations.

A Yes. That just simply isn't so.

Q Do you have any language to flush that out? It never happened?

A You're asking me to go beyond my own specific knowledge. But, if you're making a general proposition -- and I'm not trying to duck it and hide behind some nuance here -- I don't know of any instance in which it's been done, but I do know that certainly the Soviet characterization of that is totally without foundation.

Q I just wanted to check. On the issue of Soviet political control over the air defense side of its military forces, that has been talked about a good bit over the last 24-48 hours. Do you have anything to add to that? Do you have any judgment to make about the degree of political control over the military?

A I don't; I don't have anything. Again, to the extent that we're concerned about what the Soviet statements and the incident say about the competence of Soviet air defense, I refer you to what Larry Eagleburger said last night.

Q Do you have anything on whether there was any disagreement at the top Soviet level about whether to execute that attack?

A I have no information at all on that.

Q Did we at all monitor the ground-to-air communications?

A No. I think that we've indicated that we don't have -- in terms of the time during that tape and so on?

Q Right.

A We don't have anything on the ground-to-air communications.

Q That's a definite thing -- we don't have it?

A Yes.

Q Alan, without being specific, because it is a matter of intelligence, did the RC135 crew monitor any traffic with the Korean flight?

A I can't answer that question. I think that you might check with the Pentagon to see if they have anything on that. I just don't know the answer to it. And, as you suggest in your question, even if we did, I'm not sure what we can say about it. But I think I could say safely that the RC135 would of had no reason to believe, in the time that it was operating, that there was anything amiss. I mean they certainly would have reflected that.

Q They didn't pass --

A I think we'd know if they thought that anything was amiss. But whether they reflected the aircraft per se, I can't tell you that.

Q It seems they passed geographically during the pass-over of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

A As I recall, the closest point of approach between those two aircraft was 75 miles; and at the time that the RC-135 crossed the track of that aircraft, the KAL flight, they were about 300 miles apart.

Q Alan, the President talked about restitution in his speech Monday night and he said that this would be an issue that the Secretary would be talking with Gromyko about.

A Yes.

Q Does that have any further definition in numerical terms?

A No; I don't have numbers to give you on that. But we will be making a claim with the Soviets, and we'll initially be doing this through diplomatic channels. We'll be looking, together with others, whether there are other appropriate fora in which to make such claims. But I don't have a number, if that's what you're looking for.

Q Yes.

A I don't have that.

Q But you will be proposing a lump sum?

A I'm not sure quite how that would be handled and whether in the initial claim there would be a figure referred to.

Q Yes; that's what I meant.

A I can't tell you that that necessarily would be the case.

Q Forgive me if you've already answered this, but I wasn't here last week. In The New York Times on Friday, General Keegan was quoted as saying that the South Koreans had puzzled him by routinely flying in very close to the Soviet airspace; and I think he used the word "bruising" it. He said they repeatedly bruised it and that this puzzled him. Do you know that that's a fact?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, the Soviets alleged in a story yesterday that they had heard a tape or something that the South Korean airliner had radioed at one point: "I have just crossed south of one island and am on my normal course." Was there anything in tapes to indicate that the pilot thought he was on a normal course going across Soviet territory?

A I think that the indications are that the Korean plane did think it was the pilot's thought that they were on their normal course.

I can't provide you anything in terms of a transcript or anything of that sort. I think that that would to the extent that there was chatter between the plane and the Narita air controllers, that would be something which would come under Japanese authorities.

Q But did he specifically refer to (inaudible) Island?

A I think in the absence of the transcript being available at this particular moment, I'd rather not get into that; but I think that this is something which the Japanese are considering as to what they might do, and let's see if there's any more information available on that later on.

But, as I say, there is no indication to indicate that the Korean pilot thought that he was anywhere but on his normal course.

Q Alan, is Secretary Shultz supposed to evoke the situation of Lebanon with Gromyko in Madrid?

A No. I think Secretary Shultz indicated to the press on the airplane traveling with him to Madrid that he intended to raise only human rights issues and, most particularly, the Korean Airline issue as a human right issue.

Q Alan, Secretary Shultz also said on the lane that he would consider the reunion with Gromyko at the UN if Gromyko did not give him a satisfactory explanation. Has that been considered before Shultz went to Madrid?

A I don't think I want to get into that. I think that the Secretary indicated that he was looking to this meeting and, as you say, indicated the possibility that the other meeting might be called off depending on circumstances; but I don't have anything beyond what he said.

Q Do you have anything about today's meeting of the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq?

A Yes, I do. I also took a question which basically I will give you and then we'll post later, in response to the question of yesterday.

Under Secretary Kittani of the Iraqi Foreign Ministry called on Under Secretary Eagleburger and NEA Assistant Secretary Nicholas Veliotes today. During his stay in Washington, Mr. Kittani also will be seeing other Department officials, including Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell. Under Secretary Kittani's working visit is part of an ongoing high-level dialogue with the Government of Iraq on bilateral and regional issues. Under Secretary Kittani will also be meeting with the press and private American groups during his visit.

Q Alan, will that be available?

A We'll post that afterwards, too, in response to yesterday's questions.

Q Is he meeting with anybody from EB?

A This is all I've got on it. I don't have --

Q Will this be on diplomatic relations between you and Iraq?

A I'd say that, first of all, the press is going to have an opportunity to interview him, so you can raise your questions there. His visit is one of a series of candid and welcome high-level contacts between the U.S. and Iraq.

My understanding, though, is that Iraq has stated that it does not intend to implement a decision it made sometime ago to exchange ambassadors with the U.S.

Q Is this the same official, Alan, that you said earlier had visited Washington from Iraq?

A I think that my information was probably anticipatory. It's supposed to reflect it.

Q Will there be an opportunity for -- do you mean in this building or it's going to be arranged --

A No. I understand that he's going to meet with the press separately, and you might talk with the Iraqi officials about that; but I just don't have anything on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #157

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1983, 12:35 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I've got two statements for you.

First, on an advisory opinion of the State Department on travel to the U.S.S.R. The governing body of the World Pilots Association, the IFALPA, has recommended to its national associations a 60-day ban on civil airline flights to Moscow. IFALPA notes that this recommendation was made in response to "the action of the Soviet Union in destroying a defenseless civilian airliner," Korean Airlines Flight 007. IFALPA concludes that "we expect our members to fully comply" with the ban.

American travelers to the Soviet Union should be aware that the proposed IFALPA ban could seriously disrupt air travel to the Soviet Union. Flights to and from the Soviet Union may be cancelled without notice.

Arranging alternate transportation to and from the Soviet Union could potentially involve substantially higher costs to the traveler. Travelers should also anticipate lengthy delays in obtaining such transportation from Moscow should the ban be fully implemented.

Second, a statement on signature of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement with Greece. The Governments of the United States and of Greece signed today in Athens a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. The agreement was signed for the United States by Charge' d'Affaires Alan D. Berlind and for Greece by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Kapsis.

We are pleased that our traditionally close relationship with Greece has been reaffirmed by the signature of this agreement. It will continue our bilateral defense relationship on mutually acceptable and beneficial terms and will contribute to the strength of NATO, the alliance of which we are both members.

We hope the conclusion of this agreement will also lead to expanded cooperation in other aspects of our bilateral relations.

That's the end of it. I might note with regard to the DECA, the Greek agreement, that the text of that will be available tomorrow. We don't have it today.

Q Is there a time on that, time limit on the agreement? How long is it for?

A I think that you will find again the text of the agreement will make that clear, but I'd refer you back to the briefing that was held here, I think July 15, which was the date of initialing and what we said at that time.

Q Copies of both, Alan?

A Copies of both. Sure.

Q But your opinion of the agreement at that time on July 15 has not changed?

A That's correct. I refer you back to what we said at that point.

Q Alan, back on the advisory you mentioned, do you have an opinion on the wisdom of that and support it or --

A It is our advisory --

Q Of the pilots. Would you like to see it expanded in any form?

A I think simply -- two things on this, I guess. One, as I say, the advisory opinion is a State Department opinion being issued in response to this action in order to advise people about inconveniences that they might face. So that's the nature of this particular action.

In terms of the action by the pilots, which I think is your question, that is something for them to decide in their private capacity. Certainly the kinds of actions that they're taking reflect the concern, condemnation, horror at the action by the Soviet Union consistent with our own position.

Q Is there any significance in using the term "defense" instead of "military" in describing the agreement with Greece?

A It's what it's been called. I think if you go back and talk about the relationship, we've talked about it as a defense -- I mean, there's no new terminology here.

Q I mean, it's different from the name of the agreement, the title of the agreement, the last one.

A I don't believe that's correct. Most of our agreements refer to defense, if you look at the titles of agreements.

Q On the Middle East, please?

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q Alan, regarding the firing of the U.S. ship today at Druze positions, would you characterize this as indeed an escalation, or this authority to do so has always been there?

A I think that Larry Speakes addressed this, this morning, and I'll refer you to what he said about that. I don't have anything to add to what he said.

Q Can this be expanded to use of U.S. military aircraft in the region to spot or attack similar positions, or is this type of order limited only to artillery fire from Marine positions or ship positions?

A "This type of order," I'm sorry?

Q To attack a hostile force --

A I'm not going to try to speculate. I think that you know there was some reconnaissance yesterday, and there's some guidance that was available on that. It actually had a dual purpose, but there was reconnaissance. I can't try to predict the future on this.

Q Alan, do we understand that the Marines are now working under different orders to fire back?

A No. They've been under orders all the time to be able to return fire. There's no difference in that.

Q Why didn't they return fire before?

A They have returned fire before. That's wrong.

Q From the ships?

A Oh, from the ships? I can't tell you why the decision was made on the ground to return fire this morning from the ships as opposed to doing it some other way. That you can check with the people who were involved in that. But in terms of the ability to do this, there's nothing new about that.

Q There have been a lot of articles during the last three or four days. One of them, the last of them, had been The Washington Post editorial today asking the Reagan Administration to re-evaluate its stand on its diplomatic initiatives on political maneuvering regarding the government of President Gemayel.

There is some sort of a conclusion from these articles that you have been backing one faction in Lebanon against others, be it in power or be it otherwise.

A That would be an incorrect conclusion. We have not backed one faction against others or a group of factions against others. We have backed the Government of Lebanon, and we have continued to work very hard to try to help bring about a national consensus and reconciliation, and it would be an incorrect statement of significant magnitude to suggest we're backing any one faction.

Q One of the major conditions of Mr. Jumblatt and his allies for a national reconciliation to join in these efforts is to freeze the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Before this step is taken by the government, Mr. Jumblatt is not ready to talk national reconciliation. Is this your understanding and --

A I don't think I'm going to get into the question of specific terms for the national reconciliation. Obviously, those are part of the discussions that are going on rather intensively in a variety of places, so I don't think it would be helpful to get into that.

I think our position on the agreement is quite well known and I don't have any change to offer you with regard to that.

Q Alan, I just came from the Hill where I picked up a definite feeling among staff members and members, concern that the United States and the other members of the MNF are about on the brink of entering the civil war in Lebanon on the side militarily of the central government against the dissident Muslim elements there.

What's your feeling on that? Is that an incorrect concern?

A I think that I've addressed that already partially. I would also say that there is no change in the mandate of the MNF.

Q Is there one contemplated?

A Is there a change in the mandate contemplated? I'm not aware of a change in the mandate that's contemplated.

Q How about consultations among the various members of the MNF in response to the Lebanese request for more troops?

A There is no formal request for a change in the role, mandate, or size of the MNF. Obviously, those kinds of issues have been discussed for some time. The Lebanese have discussed it publicly, and we've talked about it here. But there's no formal request.

In terms of discussion among the MNF forces, or countries I should say, there's continuing consultation on a regular basis in Beirut. There's a mechanism which exists for this and it's carried out. But I think the premise of your question is incorrect.

Q Alan, do you know how the numbers were set at the beginning of the deployment? Was this a judgment on what the minimum force for deterrence was required, or was it through negotiation between the members of the MNF, or how was it worked out to begin with?

A I would have to refer you back to the briefings that were given at that time about the numbers. I think that, in fact, there was some question, as you may recall, going back to that time exactly how many were going to go ashore as opposed to how many were staying on ships, as far as the Americans were concerned. I don't know about the others. But I don't have anything new to offer you, and that's all on the record.

Q Is there one non-formal request for aid?

A For aid?

Q Non-formal.

A I'm not sure what you mean by "aid." There is a lot of aid going in.

Q No, but of increasing the number of --

A No. The issue has been discussed --

Q There is no request at all, or --

A The issue has been discussed, as I said, and we've talked about it here, and the Lebanese have indicated that this might be helpful at some point. We've indicated a change might be helpful at some point. We've indicated that at an appropriate point we would consider whether that seemed to be in the cards and what was required, but there is no formal request and we don't act on that.

Q The formal spokesman for the Marines in Beirut kept saying during the past days that they do not want to shell back -- fire back against the Moslem Druze because they are afraid of hitting civilian targets.

A Yes.

Q Is this still the rule, or will the new move by the ships of the American fleet mean that this doesn't matter now?

A It's not a question of not mattering. I think there are two things: One, you're going to have to ask the Pentagon about that question. But, two, I think that the response to firing on the MNF, be it American or any other, I would guess, but certainly in terms of the Marines, it would depend on the circumstances. I think that you make a -- I'm going over the line of what one should address from this podium as opposed from the Pentagon, but I think that there is an assumption in your question that a firing from a ship cannot be as precise as firing from a Marine location on the ground. I think that would be an erroneous assumption, but you better ask the Pentagon about that sort of thing.

Q Are the ships offshore part of the Multinational Force -- considered part of the MNF? If they're not, then they don't have to abide by the same guidelines of the MNF, is that true?

A I'm not sure quite how to respond to that except to say that what they did this morning was in response to an attack which came -- or rounds hit in the

Marine area, and where, as we have indicated before, we will defend our own forces. The Marines will defend themselves, and they have the ability, have had the ability, to call in other fire if necessary from those ships, and they did it this morning.

I think the kind of distinction you're drawing and the suggestion that somehow the ships are going to do something independent of what the MNF forces are asking is probably off base -- or is off base.

Q Are they part of the Multinational Forces?

A I don't know how to define that. I guess Larry addressed that at the White House this morning. I personally don't know how to address that, but I don't think that's the point. The point is that they have been available, are available, will continue to be available, for help in defending against attack on the MNF, and that's what they did this morning. Again, there's no change in all that.

Q Alan, will you be kind enough to give us a capsule of what the White House said because we're working --

A No. I think I'll --

Q We can't be in two places at one time.

A I'm sorry. You're going to have to go to them.

Q Also on Capitol Hill next week there's going to be an effort to force the Administration to make a finding, to file a finding under the War Powers Act, to justify keeping the Marines there.

Could the Administration justify that under the War Powers Act?

A Could the Administration justify keeping the Marines there?

Q Right. Under the War Powers Act, by making a finding?

A I'm not sure how to address that. We have reported, consistent with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, more than once certainly, including quite recently. We will continue to do that as appropriate.

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We also have indicated that we have under review continually the question of whether our reporting is consistent, indeed, with the War Powers Resolution's reporting requirement. Our judgment is that it is. But, as I say, that review is ongoing on a continuing basis.

Q Let me put it a different way. There's concern up there with the recent deaths that it is in fact a combat situation which the Administration --

A I'm sorry. I guess maybe you weren't here. We've addressed this several times in the last week. We feel that the reporting that has been done is consistent with those reporting requirements.

I'm aware of statements by various people on the Hill expressing some concern about this issue, but I think that our position on this is as I've just stated it to you. We will continue, as I say, to review that situation.

-- MORE --

Q Do we have any comment at all on the Druze PSP reported promise not to fire on MNF positions, or on Lebanese Army positions located near the MNF?

A Obviously we hope that the firing all around would stop and that there would be the kind of political reconciliation that would end that. We also quite clearly would like to see any firing that would impact on the MNF stopped, also, but that is hard to get.

Q Did that promise come at all during the meeting?

A I am not talking about promises and what has been discussed, and so on and so forth. I think, again, that gets us into the kinds of discussions that are ongoing, and it is not going to be productive to address that sort of thing from this podium.

Q Is the Administration talking to Members of Congress, or supporting a resolution that they would pass that would approve of the Marines in Beirut, which would, in effect, go around the War Powers Act? Is there any discussion about such a resolution?

A I think that in terms of a resolution, I saw some reports about that. That really is a matter for the Congress, and you should direct your questions to the Hill.

I guess I have to refer back to what I just said about the War Powers resolution, and ask you to just stick with that.

Q Alan, two quickies. One, the Israelis have been reported to have crossed the Awali line back to the area, moving back to the area where they pulled back from. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't. I saw the wire report which suggested that they moved out to remove a blockade of some sort that had been established short of their position, but I don't have any information beyond the wire report, and I don't have any comment on it.

Q Second, the Saudi efforts have been resumed today. They sent Prince Bandar to Damascus. Do you have any assessment of this?

A No. We have said before that we have consulted closely with the Saudis, who have played a consistently constructive role in a very complex and difficult search for a peaceful solution to the problems confronting Lebanon.

We would expect to continue to consult closely with them.

Q Back on the plane for a second, have you been notified by the Soviets that they have found any additional wreckage? Have you gotten any answer to your request to help join the search?

A The answers are -- I don't believe we have been contacted ourselves. I saw the wire reports from Tokyo, I guess it was, but I don't have any detail on that, and I don't believe we have been contacted. As far as the search is concerned, the Soviets have not yet responded to our requests that we be allowed to search in their waters, and we will continue to pursue that.

Q Are American ships and planes still in the area, in the international waters, just outside?

A There certainly are ships and planes. Exactly whose -- I am sure there is American participation, but I don't know to what degree American, Japanese or Korean. I guess I would have to refer you to the Pentagon to see what the details are.

Q Alan, I think MacFarlane is back in Beirut. Do you know anything about his current travel plans, or how long he will stay in Beirut?

A You haven't been listening to my constant line about not talking about his travel plans. I don't know. I mean, I don't have anything for you, in any case.

But you are right, he is in Beirut, and Fairbanks is with him in Beirut.

Q Yesterday you mentioned something about the PLO being involved in the fighting with the Druze militias, and you made your statement based on news reports, and you said you didn't have any hard evidence.

Do you have any hard evidence beyond what you just said yesterday, and if these PLO people are members of the Fatah belonging to Yasser Arafat, or other groups there?

A Let me simply say that there are conflicting reports about who is included in the fighting, and I can't comment beyond what I did say yesterday. But more important than that is that the fighting be brought to an early end so that the loss of life is stopped and political remedies can be sought and achieved.

Q Alan, yesterday you said that the Secretary was looking into the possibility of not meeting with Gromyko --

A I didn't quite put it that way.

I think I am going to refer you to what the Secretary said. I don't have anything new to say. I gather that they met for a couple of hours, a little more than that, this morning. The Secretary apparently did say something to the press on his way out. I am going to leave those kinds of questions to the party, I am afraid.

Q Can we have a filing break?

A A filing break? Okay.

Q How about a new subject?

A Go ahead. George.

Q On the incident at the airport in Nicaragua today, do you have any information?

A I don't have any information on it. We have seen the report. Apparently there were sounds of a bomb, or bomb explosions, coming from the area at the airport, but I don't have any confirmed information. Our Embassy is checking into it.

Q Have the two U.S. Senators landed as yet?

A I do not know the answer to that question. I do know that Senators Hart and Cohen were scheduled to arrive there, but I don't know if they have landed.

Q Do you have any information on where the plane was based?

A I'm sorry, what are we talking about?

Q Do you have any information --

A The plane that reportedly was involved in the bombing? I don't have anything more than reports that are in the press. I can't even confirm to you that there was a bombing. You may have somebody who witnessed it, but I can't tell you from my own knowledge or from the reports I have, so I am just going to have to leave it with that.

Q Was there any consultation at all between the U.S. Government and the International Pilots Union on their sanction. Was there any suggestion as to what the United States considered appropriate?

A This was clearly their decision. I can't tell you whether there is anybody who has, on sort of a regular basis, liaison with them. It certainly wouldn't come out of here. There is no question that this is not a U.S. Government project. This was their own doing, and I think if you look around the world at the action taken by other pilots associations, you will find a similar pattern.

Q Alan, have you been in contact with the Soviet Union during the last few days concerning the situation in Lebanon?

A I think I am not going to be terribly specific, except to say that we have discussed the subject of Lebanon and the Middle East with the Soviets from time to time. We continue to do that, and I would expect that there would be further discussions about it. It is a very important subject, and we would doubtless raise it on certain occasions.

Q Can I understand that this covers the latest developments?

A I don't have a specific reading. I don't think I am going to get into the details of our diplomatic dialogue with the Soviets. I just would make that general statement.

Q Can you give us any dates?

A No, I can't.

Q Dobrynin apparently is back in town. I was just wondering if he was on anyone's schedule today?

A I don't have anything to offer you at this point.

Q The United Nations Conference on the Palestinian question ended in Geneva with the statement, or saying that there's implicit recognition of Israel and other parties living in the area. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't. I saw it said a number of things in that final statement. Our attitude towards the conference in general, of course, we articulated before. I don't have anything on the final statement of that conference.

Q Do you have anything there regarding the Administration's changing its position at all on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty negotiations?

A Yes. This is a question that I think relates to an article that appeared in the press this morning about the Administration position on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The last session of the Trilateral CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban, negotiation was in November in 1980. Although a CTB continues to be a long-term objective of the United States arms control policy, the President has decided not to resume trilateral negotiations at this time.

Our primary concern is our ability to verify effectively Soviet compliance with the CTB, which is problematic.

In the context of the verification procedures discussed in the CTB Trilateral negotiations, there would still be substantial uncertainty about our ability to detect and identify clandestine testing.

We are actively discussing verification and compliance problems related to a nuclear test ban in the forty nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

It is the Administration's position that a CTB be considered in the context of deep and verifiable arms reductions, expanded confidence-building measures, and improved verification capabilities.

We are committed to these goals. At the same time, it should be recognized the security of the United States and our allies is dependent upon a credible United States nuclear deterrent.

The U.S. also employs nuclear testing to insure the continued reliability of existing weapons, and to incorporate safety and security features to prevent accidental or unauthorized detonation.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy, yes.

Q Alan, you said the President has decided -- when was this?

A Oh, Mike, this is old.

Q This is nothing relating to any recent action on the part of disfavor with the Soviet Union?

A No. This is reflecting existing policy.

Q Are you talking two years ago he decided?

A No. We talked about this several months ago when this issue was raised. I refer you back to the record on it.

Q The guidance hasn't changed in these several months that have passed since then?

A No.

Q Could you discuss any other measures that might be under consideration at this point in light of the Soviet's refusal --

A The question you couldn't hear is discussing the other measures that are under consideration in light of the Soviet --

Q -- refusal to meet any of the U.S. demands?

A -- refusal to meet our demands. It is not just our demands, it is the demands of most of the people around the world.

No, I think I am not going to go beyond what the President said about that, and I guess there was some discussion of this yesterday following some meetings over at the White House, but I don't have anything new on it.

Q Are there more meetings regarding this now?

A I think that there is a constant pattern of meetings on this overall issue, yes, but I am not going to try to specify meetings to do this or meetings to do that, but there is a lot of activity in this government and in other governments about the shoot-down.

Q Alan, in that light, what presentation will the United States make, or what help will we offer at the International Civil Aviation Organization meeting in Montreal?

A As I said yesterday, Jim, I am not prepared at this point to talk about what our position might be or what proposals we might make, or what proposals we might support at the ICAO meeting, I guess, next week in Canada.

I think I am going to have to leave that for the moment. We think that is an important meeting, and we will just have to look at the situation and whether it is appropriate to speak publicly before we go in, or at the time we are there, or just what, and obviously we will have some things to say around the time of that meeting.

Q Do we think it will be necessary to do a presentation similar to that at the United Nations?

A I don't have anything for you on that. I don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on the assessment by the Israelis that President Gemayel's Government is in danger?

A No, I don't have any assessment on that. I think that we have made very clear our support for the Government of Lebanon, but I don't have any comment on that particular report.

Q Has there been any change in your position on the Iraq/Iran war after the meeting here by the Iraqi official?

A No, there is no change in our position on that?

Q Will you characterize, as Newsweek magazine says here, as blackmail the using by Iraq of the French fighters aimed at getting Washington to pay more attention to the conflict?

A I think that we have paid a great amount of attention to that war, and we would like to see it resolved through negotiations. We talked about that before. I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q One question, please? Has there been an agreement with Pakistan to extend base facilities to the Rapid Deployment Force?

A I have nothing on that, Spence. I don't know.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:03 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, September 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #158

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1983, 12:15 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few statements, announcements, etc., for you.

First, to let you know that on Wednesday, September 14, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam will speak at a luncheon sponsored by the Forum Club in Houston, Texas, at the Shamrock Hilton. The topic of his address will be "Economic Development and U.S. Policy in Central America. I understand there will not be an advance text, although obviously we will have a text at some point. Press contact, should you be interested in covering it, is Larry Kurtz, Area Code (713) 960-1924.

Second, there will be a backround briefing on the visit of Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, here in the press briefing room September 12, Monday, at 2:00 p.m.

The Department has invited the families of U.S. nationals who were aboard Korean Airlines Flight No. 007 to the Department for a briefing this afternoon at 4:00 p.m. to explain the claim for compensation that the United States intends to present to the U.S.S.R. for their benefit.

Acting Secretary Eagleburger will welcome the families to the Department and express our condolences. Department attorneys will explain the claim itself.

Finally, a statement on reports of massacres in Lebanon:

During the bitter and tragic factional fighting that has erupted between Christian and Druze militias in Lebanon, innocent civilian lives are needlessly being taken in terrible acts of vengeance. Druze and Christian alike have fallen victim and are equally threatened.

We condemn the senseless loss of life. It can only serve to aggravate the bitterness and hatred that already exists. Lebanon has endured too much bloodshed through the many years of fighting. Further bloodshed can in no way serve the cause of peace and national harmony and is a blight on humanity.

The United States calls for an immediate ceasefire, and we appeal to all those involved in the fighting to respect human life and to alleviate the suffering that war has brought. Nothing good can come of indiscriminate killing regardless of its perpetrators or its victims.

Lebanon owes it to itself to turn a new page in its tragic history so that peace and human decency can prevail.

Q Copies?

A Copy. Yes. Happy to do that. That's it for announcements.

Q Alan, could we turn briefly, please, to the plane? Regarding the statements of the Soviet Army Chief of Staff in Moscow today, again that the Korean jetliner was on a spy mission, it was a deliberately, thoroughly planned intelligence operation.

Have you seen those remarks of the Chief of Staff, and do you have a response?

A We've certainly gotten reports of it, Mike. Let me respond in this way. The Soviet event today clearly did not provide us and the rest of the world with answers to the questions we all have about Soviet actions in this case. The Soviet Union still owes the world answers and assurances that civil aviation will not be targeted in the future.

It is interesting to note what the Soviets did not do today. They offered no evidence to support their assertion that the plane was on a reconnaissance mission. They offered no evidence to support their claim that they attempted to identify or force down the KAL plane. They offered no answer when asked why Soviet authorities did not try to contact U.S. or Japanese authorities before firing on the aircraft.

I might also add that the plane's black box would provide data which would help clear up questions about the KAL flight's movements. Soviet refusal to allow us to search in their waters reduces the likelihood that the black box will be recovered and answers provided which could help clarify the situation.

Q Copy?

A I'll give you a copy of part of that.

Q Do you have any information on recovery of debris or bodies?

A I can give you part on that. Going back again partially to what I just said, thus far the Soviets have turned aside our request for permission to enter Soviet territorial waters and airspace to participate in the search and recovery of debris and casualties from the downed Korean airliner.

They have argued that since the Soviet Government has not yet found any debris within Soviet territorial waters, there is no need for such a U.S. search in that area.

The Soviets have given coordinates of points outside Soviet waters where they state they have found aircraft debris, and stated that no bodies have yet been recovered and that further information on results of the Soviet search would be provided in the near future.

We're obviously disappointed by this uncooperative Soviet response. We believe that the Soviet Union must adopt a more forthcoming attitude in facilitating international recovery and investigation efforts.

I've seen the reports, Mike, of a German ship having recovered bodies or of the body of a child having been picked up or washed up. I simply don't have any information for you on that at this point. Obviously, we would follow up on those reports, but I don't have anything for you.

Q In your opening statement, did I understand you correctly that it was a Soviet "event" -- is that the word you used -- in Moscow? What were the first few words of that?

A Yes, the Soviet event.

Q You do not term that as a news conference? You have some judgment about that?

A I think I'll just stick with the words that I've got.

Jeff?

Q Alan, in Madrid, the domestic Spanish news service radio says that French Foreign Minister Cheysson called the NATO sanctions on the Soviets "over-excited," and said that France is not going to be going along.

What about that?

A I've seen that report, Jeff. I don't have anything on it. There were meetings, as you know, in Madrid yesterday. There were going to be further meetings today, and I believe there are going to be some meetings in Brussels and elsewhere. I think that, rather than try to preempt the process and comment on press reports, we'll just let the process play itself out a bit.

Q There were reports that the Korean plane carried a sonar transponder of some kind that would facilitate locating it underwater. Has there been any luck in doing that?

A I'm not aware of that, frankly. I can't --

Q Do you know whether or not those satellites which can receive emergency distress signals picked up any? We have one; the Soviets have two.

A The answer is, I have no information regarding it. But I would have to say, based on what I do know, that it is unlikely that anybody has any such information. The information we have, for example -- the chatter at the end of the flight between the plane and the Japanese tower -- suggested that the plane simply did not know it was off-course.

If you're suggesting some sort of automatic transmittal, I'm not aware that any such data has been made available. Obviously, the plane was off-course, but I don't know what data there is. I simply don't know.

Q For logistics purposes, Alan, do you have an arrival time for the Secretary tonight and know whether he will make a statement at the airport?

A Keep in touch with the Press Office, but as of this point the arrival time is somewhat before 6:00 -- earlier than the original schedule, I think. My understanding was that he was not planning on an arrival statement the last I checked, but I really think that that is something you will have to see later on. I don't know that that necessarily is how we'll end up. We'll have to see.

Q Alan, can you tell us anything more about the claims for compensation? Have these yet been given to the Soviets?

A I really am not going to be able to give you anything on claims other than we -- I did have some guidance on this. Let me see. The fact is that the President said, when he announced claims would be presented, he said they would be presented within a week. They haven't been presented. I think a week would take it, what, to next Monday.

Q Would they be presented, do you know, directly to the Soviets or to an international body?

A I think we've indicated, John, that in the first instance we would present claims through diplomatic channels. But until it has been presented, it would be premature and inappropriate to discuss its contents. However, we will make the claim public, and we will provide information, a briefing, or whatever is necessary, on it once it has been presented.

Q I understand from the White House that there are precedents under which even Libya has paid reparations in a similar event. Do you know about any of those precedents?

A I just don't know. I'm sorry.

Q The Soviet statement says that when the plane started to veer off course, it was still under the range of U.S. radar aids. Can you confirm that?

A No. My information is that the Anchorage radar, which would control it when it first took off, followed it out -- I forget how many miles; 200 miles, I guess -- and that, as of the time it left the range of that radar, there was no indication that it was off-course. I'm not saying that it might not have diverted to a certain extent -- I can't really tell you that; but anyway, there was no indication on the radar that Anchorage had that there was anything seriously wrong at that point. Then, it went out of radar range, as you know, and didn't go back into anybody's range until it got near Tokyo.

Q If I may follow, Alan, they also mentioned 120 shots of tracers. Have you had any confirmation of this?

A No; nor, as I said in the opening answers to the questions on the flight today, is there any evidence that the Soviets have presented other than an assertion that they did that. And I think I would refer you back to the transcript of the Soviet pilots, which certainly did not indicate any such activity.

Q Alan, do you know about the encripted information that is in the possession of the United States that proves conclusively that the Soviets knew they were shooting at a civilian airliner?

A John, I think we've addressed this before, and I don't have anything new to add to this. I'm not going to get into the question of any more intelligence information than we have already provided. The fact of the matter is that the Soviet aircraft which shot down that plane, if it didn't know, it sure should have known that it was a civilian aircraft. It was close enough; it had an obligation to get close enough; it had an obligation to do an awful lot of things that it did not do.

We pointed, in Acting Secretary Eagleburger's remarks the other day, to questions of competence which are raised by this whole Soviet explanation of what went on.

Q My question is, leaving encription aside, do we know that the Soviets knew they were shooting at a civilian airliner?

A I'm going to stand on the answers I've just given you.

Q Where do we stand now, Alan, on the Secretary's meeting Gromyko in New York at the U.N. sessions?

A I think that the Secretary's party has indicated that at this point, we're not addressing that issue just yet. I'm sure that issue will come up soon. After all, the General Assembly will open soon. But I think that the Secretary will want to come back and report to the President, and I think we'll figure from there where we're going.

Q What will the activities of the Secretary be tomorrow? He will be reporting to the President and what else?

A Why don't we talk about that later.

Q Is he considering advancing his trip to New York from the previous schedule, going up earlier?

A I have no information. We haven't announced his trip so I haven't got a schedule to compare it against, but I have no information about any particularly early trip.

Q Does the Administration plan any further steps to discourage cultural ties between the United States and the Soviet Union? And does it wish to discourage Americans from perhaps traveling on their own to the Soviet Union for cultural or business purposes?

A Our attitude toward private travel to the USSR for exchange activity, tourism, or any other purpose remains what it has been, that we neither encourage nor discourage it. The decision to proceed with planned travel to the USSR is for each individual to make.

Anyone considering travel to the USSR in the near future, however, must take into account the advisory that we issued on September 8 about the ban on flights to Moscow proposed by the World Pilots Association. Actions taken in response to that proposal may seriously disrupt travel to and from the USSR, and could involve travelers in delays and substantially higher costs.

Q Would the Administration like to see Americans who had business or other ventures planned curtail them?

A I think I just answered your question. I said our position remains what it has been: we neither encourage nor discourage such travel.

Q Alan, I'm wondering why the timing of your statement on the massacres, as the massacres have been committed at least three days ago, and one a week ago?

A Bassem, we continue to get reports here and there of different massacres that are going on. We, obviously, have condemned those massacres in the past, but it just appeared that there is so much going on, so much threat of possible -- just because of the situation where you've got a large number of refugees in various places, that it could turn even more tragic.

Q Is it not designed for the Deir Khama where the Phalangist forces in the Shouf are concentrated now?

A It is designed to cover the entire situation.

Q Following up on that, is there any evidence that this Administration has that the Syrians have been involved directly or indirectly in the massacres?

A I don't have any information on that, Jeff.

-- MORE --

Q Are any of the groups that have been involved in the massacres alleged to be under Syrian control?

A I'm not going to try to get into identifying who is responsible for what massacres. Our concern is that everybody stand down from that kind of horrible activity, and I will refer you back to the statement. I'm not going to try to get into who is responsible.

Q Alan, is the U.S. Government planning to do anything about those refugees and the displacement of those thousands of people in terms of any particular assistance programs, relief, or anything of that nature?

A I don't have anything here at this point to offer you on that. Certainly, as I say, the issue is of concern to us. We've paid attention to it, but I don't have anything to give you from here.

Q Has Iraq asked the United States to take any steps with regard to finding a solution to the Gulf war?

A I assume this comes out of the reports in the papers, specifically with regard to Mr. Kittani. I'm not going to get into our diplomatic discussions with the Iraqis. Iraq and many others have repeatedly pointed out the dangers of a continuation of the Iran-Iraq war which threatens the stability of the entire region. The U.S. has long recognized that danger.

In our view, it's a grave mistake for anyone to believe the continued warfare, whether through economic or military means, will accomplish constructive political objectives. We have avoided steps that could contribute to the prolongation or escalation of the war and we continue to encourage other countries to take that same approach.

Q A copy of that?

A Yes.

Q Has there been or is there likely in the near future to be any change, however imperceptible, in the U.S. attitude towards the two countries involved in that war?

A We have not tilted toward either party. The independence and territorial integrity of both countries contribute to the stability of the region. That is our position; that will remain our position.

Q Any comment on this report that Gromyko might be willing -- that the Soviets might be willing to regard the British and French missiles as strategic rather than including them in the INF talks?

A Soviet insistance on introducing the independent national deterrant forces of third countries in the bilateral negotiations has been an impediment to progress since the talks began. But, as with the remarks by Mr. Andropov on the "liquidation" of SS-20 missiles, it's essential that the Soviets present any new ideas at the negotiations in Geneva. Genuine flexibility on this issue would be a sign of Soviet seriousness toward the negotiations.

Q Alan, I have a follow-up on the Iraqi. Have they asked you to stop supplying Iran through a third party?

A Two points: one, as I say, I'm not going to discuss diplomatic conversations; two, we have not been supplying either party directly or indirectly.

Q Alan, do you have anything new on Palestinian involvement in the fighting in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything new today beyond what we said before.

Q How about anything on the involvement of other forces in the fighting in Lebanon?

A I really don't have anything new with respect to that at all. I can give you a little sitrep, if you would like, on Lebanon.

The Lebanese Cabinet issued a statement yesterday in which it called for a cease-fire. The statement also gave the text of a proposed four-point peace agreement.

Beirut is relatively quiet today, although neighborhoods in the city itself and some suburbs were shelled last night. According to radio reports, the Barbir Hospital in West Beirut was hit and set afire. However, no one was killed.

The LAF issued a communique on Friday morning which claimed that it had silenced batteries which were shelling West Beirut. Some radio reports indicate that the LAF is continuing its deployment to the southeast of Beirut;

and we've seen some reports of shelling after a quiet night at Beirut International Airport where the U.S. contingent of MNF is deployed, but no Marine casualties have been reported.

Q Does the Marine mandate there allow them to return fire when they are fired upon?

A Sure.

Q So that, Alan, will be customary then?

A It has been part of the rules of engagement since they first went out there. I'm afraid by missing our briefings you don't -- really, we've discussed this over the last several days, though, and I'd refer you back to the record on it.

Q The Israelis put out a statement today saying that they are not ready to leave the "Christians in (inaudible) to be massacred." Where do you stand on this, on their return to the Chouf, if they haven't already?

A I'm not aware of that statement, so I don't have a comment to offer on it. Our attitude towards the massacres which have taken place and the potential for others again is contained in the statement I gave you, but I don't have anything on that particular report.

Q Anything on the demonstrations in Chile?

A Yes; I do have something on that.

Preliminary reports from our Embassy in Santiago indicate that there was less violence and fewer arrests than occurred in the last protest on August 11. Nevertheless, we remain concerned about the situation.

There were some incidents of excessive use of force against demonstrators, including leaders of the Christian Democratic Party, and of violence by the protesters. There was no curfew this time, since the government had lifted the state of emergency previously in effect; and, as opposed to August 11, public order was maintained only by the national police and not by the armed forces. Most of those arrested have reportedly been released. Santiago and other cities appear normal at this time.

Q CBS said that there's a massive air- and sealift of U.S. ammunition to the Lebanese army and they said it's the largest in the Mideast, the largest Mideast supply operation since the 1973 war. Is that correct?

A I can't give you comparisons and so on. What I can do is try to give you some sense of what we have been doing though.

Since January 1983, we have agreed to provide Lebanon with approximately $400 million worth of military equipment. This includes tanks, APCs, howitzers, machine guns, rifles, vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, tents, uniforms and other personal equipment. So far, approximately $200 million worth of this equipment has been delivered. We are providing this equipment to rebuild the army so that it can assist the Government of Lebanon in maintaining security and extending control in the countryside.

Q Alan, I have a follow-up to that.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A A copy, yes.

Q Still, how would you characterize the provision of that equipment? Has anything been done to expedite it? Is it a massive airlift under way?

A I don't have any information on specifically how it's being provided.

Q But nothing in addition to what had already been in the pipeline?

A Again, all I have is this.

Q Yes.

A I think if you want to check with the Pentagon and see about deliveries, you can do that, but I just don't have anything else.

Q Alan, where are McFarlane and Fairbanks today?

A They are still rattling around in the area. (Laughter.) I really don't have anything very specific on them. I don't know specifically where they are, actually, but they're continuing their discussions. They have done that. I just don't have it offhand, no.

Q Are they going to Cyprus?

A Are they going to Cyprus? I don't have it; I don't know.

Q Do you have a readout at all of what's going on in Nicaragua, more information on the attack yesterday? And there were reports of a new attack today in Corinto -- air attack?

A Yes; I do have something on that.

While we've seen the reports quoting the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry communique and the communique by the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance, ARDE, claiming credit for the attacks on both the base for the Sandinista Air Force at Sandino Airport and on what ARDE described as a Soviet-run electronic communications center used by Nicaragua state security, we have yet to receive any official Nicaraguan protest -- which was also mentioned, I think, in the various press reports about this -- in any allegations of U.S. involvement.

But I should note that even in the absence of an official protest, we should make it clear that we would deplore any attack which would endanger the lives of innocent civilians.

I've also seen a report in the wires this morning of an attack on Corinto. Again, I don't have anything specifically on that.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.; you're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #159

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements for you.

First, a correction on the speech title of Deputy Secretary Dam's speech in Houston on the 14th. The correct title is "Economic Growth and U.S. Policy in Central America." I think we had announced it as "Economic Development and U.S. Policy in Central America." Never say we're not accurate. (Laughter)

Secondly, a reminder that there will be a background briefing on the visit of Robert Mugabe, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, here in the Press Briefing Room today at 2:00 p.m.

Third, to let you know that the FAA is releasing today the transcripts and tapes of communications between the flight crew of KAL 007 and the FAA traffic control tower, or facilities at Anchorage. As I understand it, those -- well --

Let me just go on with the announcement. These tapes and transcripts indicate that no one was aware that KAL Flight 007 was off course. Since the communications cover a period of several hours, both the transcripts and the tapes have been compressed by eliminating all material that doesn't relate in any way to the flight of KAL 007, and anyone who wants to listen to the full tapes can make arrangements with FAA. I suggest you set aside quite a bit of time if you're interested in doing that.

Q Alan --

A Let me go on and finish what I am doing. As I said, the tapes do indicate that the KAL pilot was not aware of any problem in maintaining course. He followed all of his required position reports in U.S.-controlled air space. However, the FAA only has radar coverage for approximately 165 miles from Anchorage, so there normally is no effective way for the agency to check these position reports for accuracy, and it was impossible to tell from these tapes the pilot-controller communication where KAL 007 began to deviate from its assigned route.

One thing I should note. The tapes show that KAL 007 was relaying its position reports after it left the mainland through another Korean airliner in the general vicinity. The chief of FAA control center in Anchorage says, "It is not unusual for an aircraft to relay information through another aircraft. In itself, this relay would not alert a controller that an abnormal situation exists."

For your convenience, we have copies of the transcript available in the Press Office for you after the briefing.

Q Are the tapes here --

A No, we do not have the tapes here. You have to go to the FAA for that.

And, finally, an announcement -- make sure it's finally -- about a note presented to the Soviets this morning. At 10:30 a.m. today, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John H. Kelly presented the Soviet Embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission, Sakoloff, with a diplomatic note demanding compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives of U.S. nationals aboard Korean Airlines Flight 007.

The note indicated that the United States considers the Soviet Union's destruction of that aircraft as a "flagrant and unjustifiable breach of applicable principles of international law" and as a "direct violation [illegible] internationally-agreed procedures to be followed when [illegible] aircraft inadvertently intrudes on a state's territorial airspace."

The note further characterized the Soviet Union's action as wrongful and as giving rise to "responsibility under international law to make reparation." The United States' diplomatic note did not specify an amount of compensation but indicated that the United States will supplement its claim with specifics at a later date.

Soviet DCM Sakoloff refused to accept the note. Acting Assistant Secretary Kelly refused to accept Mr. Sakoloff's rejection of the U.S. note. (Laughter) At the same time the U.S. note was presented to DCM Sakoloff, Mr. Kelly presented a similar diplomatic note on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea demanding compensation for its losses as well. DCM Sakoloff also rejected that note.

We shall continue to press the Soviets to meet their clear obligation under international law to pay compensation to both the United States and Korea.

We will also make available to you the text of both of those notes in the Press Office. That is it for announcements.

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Q What happens next? Does the United States take it to the International Court of Justice or try to get the Soviets to accept it or what?

A I think we are going to be presenting that note again; sending it over to them. In terms of what one could do with the International Court of Justice, specifically, or even in general in an international fora, we're carefully considering every possible avenue by which we might press the claim.

As far as the Court of Justice is concerned, the ICJ has jurisdication over claims between states only to the extent that the states accept its jurisdiction. The Soviet Union has not accepted the Court's general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, as I say, I can assure you that we will be carefully monitoring all of our options.

Q What is the status of the note, since we didn't accept their refusal to accept it? Do they have the note or what? What does that mean in real terms?

A We will re-present that note.

Q In other words, they have not taken it physically?

A They did not physically take it this morning.

Q (Inaudible).

A I'm not going to go into the details of what the exact next step will be in terms of presenting it, but we will continue to press this issue.

Q In other words, you just resubmit it to them?

A I think I'll leave you with what I just said about it. We'll re-present the note.

Q Was it read in toto to Sakoloff?

A Was the note read in toto to Sakoloff? It was.

Q How long was it, please?

A You'll get the copy of the note.

Q The note is in our possession, then?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q Alan, a technical point. Do we represent South Korea in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on all issues?

A No, we don't represent the --

Q Who is their representative?

A I don't know. You would have to check with the Koreans.

Q Has Canada and other nationals presented to the Russians similar demands?

A The short answer to the question is, there have been others. Based on information we now have, it would appear that passengers from the following places were aboard the aircraft: Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Australia, Malaysia, India, Thailand, Canada, Great Britain and Sweden.

In addition to Korea, for which as I had mentioned, we presented a claim at the same time as our own, several other countries already have presented claims. Thailand and the Philippines did so almost immediately. Canada presented a claim on Friday to the Soviets. We expect several others to do so this week.

I would note, too, that a great many other countries that do not have claims of their own have called on the Soviet Union in the U.N. and elsewhere to fulfill its international legal obligation to compensate the families of the victims.

Q How many countries were there, please, Alan (inaudible)

A I think it's 13. 12 plus the U.S. is 13.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A I identify 13 -- No, I think I'm going to refer you to the record instead of presenting all these Q's and A's.

Q Were the other claims refused as well?

A You'll have to check with the other governments as to what happend with their claims.

Q When you say exploring options, one would assume that if the note is presented again it will be similarly rejected. What are the other options?

A What I was talking about in terms of exploring other avenues or considering every possible avenue, I'm talking about other than in terms of presenting a bilateral claim. I'm not going to try to predict or project what conclusions we'll come to in that respect.

Q Without asking you to explore every possible avenue, could you specify some of the possible avenues that are being explored?

A No.

Q What was the hesitancy about numbers in connection with the demand for compensation?

A I think that at this point, it simply has not been determined what claim, what number, we will be presenting in that respect. I don't think it's hesitancy beyond that.

Q Alan, since you have now raised a legal matter here, let me just put it this way: Since in the first instance the Korean airliner is responsible to the passengers, and they've said that they will pay, I guess they said $75,000 per person -- or "head of household," I think they said --

A Yes.

Q -- is the United States also going to ask the Koreans to waive that limit?

A Is the United States going to ask the Koreans to waive the limit? I think that what you're talking about is a relationship between the Korean airliner and the passengers, and that would be up to the passengers to pursue.

Q In the courts.

A I don't know how they would pursue it, but that's not -- This is a government claim.

Q How does a government get involved with another government on something involving private American citizens on claims? I'm just asking you as a legal question.

A Let me just answer that we do not intend that this action, this claim presented by the U.S. Government to the Government of the Soviet Union, had any effect on other legal remedies which U.S. nationals may have. It is being presented, as I say, on a government-to-government basis, as a claim governed by international law. I'll just leave you with that.

Q Would the compensations requested, had they been accepted in a negotiation proved to be successful, be forwarded to the families?

LEGAL EXPERT: The short answer to that is that typically the money comes back to the United States Government and is then distributed through some mechanism by Congress. Normally --

Q To the families?

LEGAL EXPERT: To the families. Normally, some means has to be worked out to determine the proper heirs and whether the money will be distributed equally or by whatever means. Congress does that by legislation, and frequently it delegates the specifics to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

A O.K. I'd prefer not to turn this into a technical briefing if we can stay away from that.

Q Why wasn't the Sokoloff invitation on the official schedule today of the State Department? As far as I know, it wasn't.

A I don't know. Sometimes we put things on; sometimes we don't. But we have not hidden from you the fact that he was here.

Q Why couldn't we have known about it in advance?

A I don't think we've got every diplomat who comes in here, particularly below the rank of ambassador, on the schedule.

Q This is something you haven't been bashful about publicizing.

A I don't think I'm being bashful about publicizing it at this point.

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Q After the fact.

Q What is the significance of the 165 miles you referred to in the FAA tape?

A The 165 miles, which corrects something I said the other day in which I indicated 200 miles -- apparently, because of the topography in that particular direction, the radar going out of Anchorage is only effective up to 165 miles, and that is the significance of it.

Q But the tapes are beyond 165?

A Oh, the tapes go on for several hours.

Q I understood you to say that KAL was relaying information to another Korean airliner. What kind of information?

A It was the regular back-and-forth between the plane that would normally have been carried out directly between Anchorage and the aircraft -- they relayed through another aircraft. But as I say, the FAA control indicates that that is not particularly unusual.

Q Is that because he is so far? I mean, the radio communication --

A I don't know what the technical -- Ask FAA. I don't want to get into that.

Q Alan, the current issue of Newsweek says that U.S. evidence includes radio messages intercepted from Soviet ground stations. In one communication shortly before Flight 007 was shot down, Soviet Air Defense officers notified local SAM batteries that an RC-135 had penetrated Soviet air space. Is this correct?

A I'm not going to comment on information which, from the nature of your description, clearly would fall into the intelligence category. We have provided what we can provide at this point, and I just don't have any --

Q Practically everything you have provided would ordinarily fall into the intelligence category except for the FAA tapes --

A Don, I can't try and give you each individual decision.

Q It's an important point because the point when the RC-135 matter was first brought up at the White House, Sunday a week ago, the statement was made that a Soviet transmission identifying this plane as an RC-135 had taken place, but an hour and a half to two hours prior to the shooting down of the airplane. This says "shortly"; it doesn't say how many minutes.

A Well, again, I'm not in a position to go through that. I will repeat what we said before on this, which is that the Soviet aircraft had an obligation to identify that aircraft, and should have gone close enough in terms of carrying out its obligations under the international procedures to recognize the rather distinctive outline. I find somewhat surprising, to say the least, a claim by a Soviet general this morning that an RC-135 and a Boeing 747 are of the same shape and geometric design.

If, indeed, the Soviets thought they had a U.S. military aircraft in their airspace over a period of 2-1/2 hours, one has to ask why they didn't use the "hotline" to try and find out something about it.

Q Would you take the question of whether the U.S. does have in its possession a communication as described by Newsweek?

A No, I will not.

Q Why not?

A Because it gets into the area of intelligence activities. I'm not going to go through that again.

Q (Inaudible)

A I'm sorry. That's the way it is.

Q For heaven's sake. This entire matter has come from intelligence sources, and you're saying you can't comment on sources?

A They don't all come from, presumably, similar or same sources. I'm just not going to be able to get into it.

Q Where does all this other stuff come from?

A It's been explained as much as it can be.

Q Alan, without going into detail, could you cite some precedence for this matter of government-to-government seeking compensation and redistribution through Congress?

A Yes. There are innumerable examples dating back many decades where states have demanded by diplomatic note compensation for the wrongful death of their nationals. In the civil aviation area alone, I would note by way of example first, that the U.S. Government demanded compensation from Yugoslavia, by diplomatic note, when Yugoslavia shot down an unarmed U.S. transport plane in 1946, killing five U.S. airmen; secondly, the incident in 1955 in which Bulgaria downed an El Al flight, where the United States and a number of other nations with nationals on board, presented claims to the Bulgarians, in diplomatic notes, similar to the ones we presented to the Soviets today.

Third, in 1952, when the Soviets forced down an Air France flight going to West Berlin causing serious injury to several passengers, the Allied High Commissioners in Germany protested by diplomatic note; and four, in 1954, the United States and Britain made diplomatic demands when the Peoples Republic of China mistakenly shot down a Cathay Pacific aircraft.

Q In all the cases, did the governments accept the notes and did they all pay compensation?

A I can't tell you about the diplomatic back and forth on that, Max. I can say, however, with regard to compensation that we're still researching all the historical precedents, and I'm unable to give you complete information. But we do know, again, that Yugoslavia paid the U.S. Government $150,000 in 1946 approximately five weeks after downing an unarmed U.S. transport and killing five U.S. Airmen.

Bulgaria eventually paid several hundred thousand dollars as a result of the 1955 incident; that Israel promptly paid compensation as a result of the 1973 incident, and that the PRC paid compensation to Britain in 1955, approximately one year after one of its military aircraft mistakenly downed a Cathay Pacific flight -- that amount covering all individuals aboard the aircraft, including three U.S. nationals.

Of course, there are numerous other examples of states' paying compensation for the wrongful death of foreign nationals in their territory.

Q Why, when the original transcript was released, was there no indication that a portion had been deleted? Are there other portions that were not included? And what is the meaning of "unspecified?"

A I can't answer your last question other than just reading the transcript. First of all, nothing was deleted from the tape. The tape, as played, was the full tape. So the question is simply one of the technicians' and experts' having spent a lot of time going back over the tape to see if they missed anything.

After spending a lot of time, they were able to make the three clarifications, changes, whatever, that were noted this weekend. It's as simple as that.

Q Was there an "inaudible" on the first round, when they were listening to it? I mean, did they hear something and were unable to tell, or did they just simply not hear anything?

A No. I think that it was probably essentially unintelligible. But as I understand it -- and again, I am not a technician and not an expert on this area -- but I understand that there was some feeling by the technicians that maybe they ought to keep on working on this; but they have worked very hard, obviously, to get out what they got out, in the first place.

I think it should be quite evident by our having put this out that we are making as sincere an effort as we can to make sure that the record is complete on this.

Q Why wasn't it indicated that there was something unintelligible? It was presented originally as a complete transcript.

A The people who were dealing with the transcript and so on were not aware of that.

Q The original Russian transcript -- I don't want to be too technical here -- had an illusion there. It said "pulsef" in Russian (Inaudible) "pulsef" 80 pulses. I couldn't figure out what is 80 — Is that what it sounded like or was that a technical term?

A I can't answer you.

Q Can you give us a copy of that summary you gave us on filing of claims over the years?

A Yes, I can give you -- It may take a while to do some of that, but I can present to you --

Q Alan, were the U.S. policymakers who commented on this tape aware that the people, the technicians, who were working on it felt there was a sense to keep working on it?

A No.

Q May I follow up on that?

A All right, Bob.

Q They thought this was the finished product, in other words? They didn't have any reason to believe there was anything that needed to be gone over?

A No.

Q Is it unprecedented for the Soviet Embassy to reject a U.S. Government note?

A I'm not going to try to get into what is common, John. I think that rejecting notes has happened before in the world, and I'm not going to comment on that.

Q I have a follow up on that, then, to explain to the American public what is going on. Can you think of any value whatsoever of having a Soviet representative here who will not even take written instructions that are passed to him by a U.S. representative?

A Clearly, we are going to continue to press this claim, and I'll leave it at that.

Bernie.

Q Alan, did the rechecking of the tapes take place after the Russians insisted that there were these warning shots?

A The rechecking of the tapes had nothing to do with the Soviet insistence on any of this. It simply had to do with the technicians' feeling that they might be able, through a lot of effort, to get something more out of it. In the end, that proved to be correct. But it had nothing to do with Soviet (inaudible).

Q Did they ever make the caveat to the officials, "Look, we're giving you what we have, but it's not complete?"

A No. I said to Bob before that we had no indication that this was continuing to be worked on. But as our statement indicated yesterday, that review is now complete.

Q Alan, on Friday -- and I may have missed the response to this -- on Friday, the Soviets in the news conference said that the RC-135 and the Korean plane merged into one blip for a period of about 10 minutes during the incident.

Do you have any comment on that claim?

A I think you have to find somebody who is an expert on these sorts of things, but as we have indicated, the two aircraft never came closer than 75 miles; and at that point, they were going in roughly opposite directions -- certainly very different directions.

The RC-135 did cross the track of the Korean airliner, but only when those two aircraft were 300 miles apart. You find the radar experts, and they can tell you whether that would result in a merger of their images at all, and if at all, for how long. I'm not going to try to give you a conclusion on that, Ralph, but will simply give you the facts of where the aircrafts were.

Q But you're saying that the two planes did not travel together for a period of ten minutes?

A That's correct.

Q Does the State Department see any connection with the announced expulsion today of an American diplomat and his wife with this airplane incident?

A I'm not going to try to comment on the motives for the Soviet expulsion.

Q Can you say anything at all about it?

A Can I say anything at all about it? Yes, I guess I can.

Q Thank you.

A I can confirm that Lon David Augustenborg has been declared personna non grata by the Soviet Union. He is an officer in our Consulate in Leningrad. I would also note that we have protested most vigorously Soviet physical mistreatment of the Augustenborgs.

I would also note that on August 19, 1983, Yuriy Petrovich Leonov, Assistant Air Attache at the Embassy, was declared personnal non grata for engaging in espionage; and on August 17, 1983, Anatoli Yevgenyevich Skripko, an Attache at the Embassy, was declared personna non grata for espionage.

Q And you're suggesting this is retaliation?

A I have no comment on their motives.

-- MORE --

Q Do we reject any charges of wrongdoing against --

A I don't comment -- we don't, as a general matter, on charges of intelligence activity.

Q Could you repeat the dates again, and was that made public at the time?

A No, it was not made public at the time, to my knowledge. The dates: 19th of August --

Q Spell the names, please.

A We'll spell the name. Yuriy --

Q Can you give us a handout?

A I think I can just give you a handout on that particular piece of information.

Q Do you have any reasons why they were made PNG?

A Why who was PNG?

Q Those two Soviets.

A I say, for engaging in espionage.

Q Any details on that?

A Maybe we can talk about it a little bit later.

Q Can you tell me if the American diplomat who is declared persona non grata is now going to be given a responsible position where the Soviets will have to deal with him in Washington or deal with no one, or if he will be exiled because of his no wrongdoing to some job where he'll have no contact with Soviet diplomats?

A I don't know what his assignment is going to be. He's a junior officer. I can't tell you what --

Q Alan --

Q Alan --

A Excuse me. Excuse me. Let me take --

Q Can I have a new topic for a minute?

A No. Let's finish up on this one.

Q Do you have anything more about the mistreatment that you mentioned?

A No. I'm afraid I can't give you anything specific on that.

Q Can you tell us about his wife who also I understand is being expelled? Was she an employee of our government?

A I don't have anything on the family.

Q You don't know what circumstances she was in the Soviet Union? Simply as his wife, or was she an employee?

A I honestly don't know the answer to that question.

Q According to published reports by the admission of the intelligence community in the United States that it is sort of practical or it is customary for spying planes to shield passenger planes, not all the time.

Will this process, as it was reported, continue to be practiced, or will there be a change in this manner of shielding or going by passenger planes and doing --

A Without commenting on the premise of your question or giving any credence to it, commenting one way or another, I'm not going to get into the question of what the patterns are of our aircraft. You might want to ask the Pentagon if they have any comment for it, but I don't have any comment.

Q The question was, there was admission by some in the intelligence community and it was published that some practice --

A I saw some source stories, but I'm not going to comment on those.

Q Can we get on to the Middle East?

A Yes. Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything you can tell us on the talks or cease-fire or any update on the Marine situation?

A Not really. Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks remain in Beirut. I can give you a sitrep on the situation there.

We understand that the Lebanese armed forces repulsed an attack over the weekend on the town of Suq Al-Gharb. We have seen press reports indicating that the Lebanese armed forces positions there were being shelled this morning, although no major attacks had been reported since yesterday.

Beirut was generally quiet as of this morning Beirut time. Neighborhoods in East Beirut received some shelling last night.

The Marine contingent of the MNF has reported that the situation is currently quiet at Beirut International Airport, although ten rounds landed there during last night.

We remain deeply concerned about the continued fighting in Lebanon, and we appeal once again to all those involved in the fighting to recognize that further conflict can in no way serve the cause of peace in Lebanon.

We also support humanitarian efforts being conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure that relief reaches Lebanese towns in the Shouf, both Christian and Druze, that are presently in difficulty.

Q Can I ask two follow-ups?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any information that the Syrians and the Druze have been involved in attacks or in massacres against the Lebanese armed forces or against the Marines for that matter?

A There is increasing evidence that some Syrian-supported Palestinian forces are involved in the fighting in Lebanon. This Palestinian involvement is a serious breach of the agreements reached last year.

This is obviously an additional cause for concern and we repeat our calls to all parties to the conflict to join in an immediate cease-fire.

Q The British are advising their nationals to get ready for an evacuation -- not quite an evacuation but I think they call it "Stage Two", just short of an actual call for an evacuation. Is the U.S. Government considering something similar for U.S. nationals?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Would you look into it, please?

A No. I think not. I think that in terms -- if we were to carry out an evacuation, we would obviously have to let people know what we were doing in order to do it, but I don't have anything for it.

Q About the assistance and humanitarian aid, is there anything specifically being done in terms of AID or actual government assistance that's being sent out for --

A Again, I think at the moment the issue is one of ICRC efforts, and we are certainly supporting those efforts.

Q Could you do anything more with the ten rounds last night? They struck the Marine area, is that what you're saying?

A No. I think that what we're talking about is struck the -- let me just check -- I think it struck the airport area.

Q Was that artillery rounds?

A I don't have a detailed -- beyond what I gave you on that.

Q There's also a report that --

A It landed there. Excuse me. The framework of "there" is the Beirut International Airport, so it landed at the airport.

Q Did the Marines also exchange fire with them last night?

A I don't have that, Bob.

Q There's a wire report. But you don't know if that's artillery or rifle rounds?

A "Rounds" doesn't strike me as small arms, bullets.

Q Well, they can be used -- it's interchangeable.

A Check with the Pentagon. Okay?

Q Marines injured?

A No reports of Marines injured.

Q Could you do anything more with the Syrian-supported Palestinian forces involved in what area of fighting?

A Again, I think I'm going to have to stick with what I've got. I think that Larry Speakes may have addressed this a little bit this morning. You might want to refer to what he said.

Q And how about direct Syrian involvement?

A I'm going to stand with what I said, Bernie.

Q Any indication, Alan, that the Palestinians are involved in the attacks on the Marines?

A I don't have any indication about the attacks on the Marines beyond what I've given you already on that, Gregg.

Q You don't have any evidence of Syrian, direct Syrian involvement in the fighting?

A I'm going to stick with what I said. I have nothing for you beyond what I've just given you.

Q What do you comment on the warnings that Mr. Jumblatt issued yesterday on ABC "This Week With David Brinkley," that the United States ought to take the Marines to the ships in the Mediterranean or to get out of there because they are hindering the national consensus of reconciliation, and that since they are hit, they are side by side with the Lebanese army, that they couldn't distinguish who is shooting, who is not shooting, therefore, he's returning the fire. I mean, the whole ball of wax of what he said yesterday on ABC.

A I'm not going to try to comment on his remarks. Obviously, the MNF is in Lebanon at the request of and certainly with the agreement of the Government of Lebanon. It is there to support the effort to extend Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country and to achieve the other objectives that we have talked about in terms of security across the borders and removal of all foreign forces.

In terms of what the Marines are doing, it's very clear the Marines are not firing on anybody unless fired upon, and they will defend themselves.

Q Alan, what is the evidence? You're saying there is more evidence. Can you tell us what was the evidence that you're --

A I'm afraid I cannot. It's evidence that would come from sourcing that I could not get into. But I stand by the statement as a statement of our information as of this point.

Q Is it press information, these agencies, or more --

A No. It is not press information.

Q To what degree is there concern that the Moslim or the Druze push could lead to a takeover in Beirut?

A I don't want to try to speculate on that, Bernie.

Q Alan, can you confirm the reports that the member nations of the MNF have decided to reject the Lebanese Government request for beefing up the size of that force and the nature of the force's mission?

A I think I indicated before that we have not received a formal request to that effect. We have obviously discussed this issue. I think the Secretary indicated in his press briefing on the plane on the way back from Europe that we had discussed this issue with them, but we've not had a formal request. In any case, there certainly is no decision to change the mandate or role of the MNF.

Q Would that constitute or apply also to what's happening on the Hill? Do you have any change in terms of your position on the War Powers Act?

A No. That continues to be under study, and we obviously would be, have already been, discussing this question with members of Congress. We know it's an important question. It's important to us, too, and to the Congress, and we'll just continue to examine the issue.

Q Alan, when you said Palestinians, you mean PLO or Palestinians who are living in Lebanon?

A I think I'm going to have at this point to stick with the language I've given you on that. But I would note, as I say, that certainly without trying to be comprehensive, it would have to involve some PLO because, as I've said, it represents a breach of the agreement of last year.

Q Anything we can do about it?

Q Can we have a copy of the statement?

A I'm going to have to ask you to get it from the transcript, but you can get it later.

Q Alan, about this meeting that Shultz has at 2:00 o'clock with the Jewish leaders.

A Yes. It's fairly simple. It's another of the off-the-record meetings that the Secretary holds from time to time with American Jewish leaders for a discussion of American policy in the Middle East.

On this particular occasion he's also going to introduce NEA Assistant Secretary-designate Richard Murphy to the leaders.

Q Is he planning on testifying this week on the Hill?

A I think it's possible he may be up on the Hill this week, Wolf. I don't have anything specifically at this moment to give you, but we could talk about that a little bit later. But at this time I don't have anything to announce.

Q Talking about Shultz?

A That's whom I'm talking about, too. When I use the word "he" in this room, I'm specified it -- it generally means the Secretary.

Q In that line before about Syrian-supported Palestinian forces are involved, what is the rest of that? Are involved in what, in what area, etc.?

A Again, I don't have further detail that I can give you. I think you asked that before, Bernie. I just don't have --

Q You have nothing at all?

A I have no more detail I can provide you.

Q But involved in the fighting there, or just involved in logistics, or --

A No, no. Fighting.

Q Is there anything new we can do? There are violations, but what can we do about it?

A I think I'll have no comment on what we'll do about it.

Q Another subject?

Q Continue with the Middle East.

A Yes, please.

Q Is the meeting with the Jewish leaders becoming sort of periodical meeting or --

A As I said, it takes place from time to time. I don't have a periodicity to add to it.

Q Another question on the Middle East, please. You told us three or four days ago that the U.S. Administration is keeping into contact with the Soviet Union concerning the situation in Lebanon.

Would you characterize the position taken by the Soviets to this effect?

A No. I have nothing on it.

Q Alan, why don't we have a filing break?

A Okay. Filing break. Yes. Go ahead.

Q Do you have anything on Chile?

A Yes. I can give you something on Chile. Over the course of the past several weeks we've repeatedly stated the full and unequivocal support of the United States for the peaceful transition to democracy in Chile.

As we have said, the process is a matter for the Chileans to decide. A dialogue between the opposition and the government has involved meetings on August 25 and September 5. We support these talks as a positive step.

We hope the Church leaders and other moderate forces, both in the government and the opposition, will be successful in their commendable efforts to minimize the violence associated with these protests and that the dialogue can continue.

Q Alan, last Monday's issue of The Telegraph published from Calcutta, India, reproduced a copy of a letter sent by the Indian Ambassador to Washington in 1979, Mr. Palkevolla to then Prime Minister Desai.

In his own writing he had informed Desai that he had got a tipoff from the State Department's intelligence unit that Moscow was trying to destabilize the Janata Government.

Have you got anything on that, and was the State Department really giving that tipoff?

A No. As a matter of general policy and principle, we wouldn't comment on a story like that.

Q Alan, I have a follow-up on Chile. Since you made a statement on the Czechoslovakian anniversary, have you something special on the 10th anniversary of Pinochet --

A I don't have anything.

Q On southern African matters, a couple of things: Did you have any statement on Mugabe's visit? Do you have anything on Vorster's death, and do you have anything on Lesotho expelling some of the refugees?

A I have nothing on any of that, but I remind you, as I said at the outset, that there's a briefing on Mugabe at 2:00 o'clock.

Q Do you have anything on reports published yesterday, I believe, that the Soviet Union was in the midst of or may have already launched a new missile test at the time the Korean plane was flying over the islands?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Will Mr. Robert Murphy be reintroduced, or introduced to the Arab-American community leaders likewise introducing him to the Jewish community leaders today?

A Mr. Murphy?

Q Yes.

A Not today.

Q There will be a schedule for him?

A I don't know specifically what's scheduled. As you know, we also meet with the Arab-American leaders from time to time.

Q With respect to Korean airline again, as you mentioned that there were some victims from Taiwan, and did you also try to make a request for compensation for the Taiwanese?

A As far as I know, the only compensation requests made were the two that I talked about. Our own, and on behalf of Korea. I confirmed that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:16 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY,SEPTEMBER, 13, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a number of announcements. First of all, I understand the Japanese Government has released the transcript of the air-to-ground communications with the Korean airliner, KAL Flight 007. We can make that available to you as a courtesy. We're not releasing it, but if you would like a copy of it, we have that, and can help you with that.

Q Where is that?

A In the Press Office.

Q Second, to note that available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m. today will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicholas Veliotes before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The subject is Lebanon.

Third, regarding a new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canadian Affairs, the Department of State today announced the appointment of James M. Medas as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canada in the Bureau of European Affairs. As part of the same effort to strengthen management of U.S.-Canadian relations and reflect their increased importance, the Bureau has been renamed the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs.

Mr. Medas, formerly Special Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs, is the first incumbent of the new Deputy Assistant Secretary position established effective September 1. He is a native of Ohio, holds degrees from Miami University of Ohio (BA) and from Harvard Law School (JD), and is a member of the California State Bar Association.

Regarding the Secretary's travel to New York, Secretary of State George P. Shultz will be attending the thirty-eighth U.N. General Assembly between September 26 and October 7. As is the usual practice, the Secretary will be meeting with many of his colleagues for discussions on bilateral and multilateral issues.

I might note in that connection a couple of points for your convenience in dealing up there. First of all, we will provide the phone number of the Department's Press Office at the U.N. Plaza Hotel as early as possible. We would hope to have that information early Saturday morning the 24th. For those correspondents traveling to New York, it would be helpful if you would let the Press Office know, if you plan to be in New York over this period, where you'll be staying, what phone number you can be reached at, et cetera, and we will post a list for you to give that information. It's not a matter of traveling with the Secretary, but in terms of supplying that information, we would be happy to have that.

As has been customary in the past, the Secretary's official schedule of meetings will be made available early each day at the Department's Press Office in New York at the U.N. Plaza Hotel.

Q Does he now intend to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A Jim, I don't have anything new for you on the subject of a meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q A decision will be made on that?

A I don't have anything new for you on a meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q What is "nothing new?" Nothing new in contrast to what?

A In contrast to what we've said before.

Q Which was --

A That the Secretary's party addressed this issue saying that they were not looking at it at that particular point, but they would have to address it, obviously, before the time came.

Q So it's not a fixed session as it has been usually in the past?

A I don't want to try and compare with what we've said in the past on how we've handled it, I'm just simply saying --

Q You just said it.

A I don't have anything for you on a meeting with Mr. Gromyko at this point.

Q Alan, is there a plan to announce what you intend to do on that before he goes up there, or will that be announced after he is there?

A In accordance with the general schedule, one would say the answer to your question is, it will be announced the day that it is happening; but obviously, it's a somewhat different issue. We'll look at it. I don't know the answer to your question, but we will certainly look at it. If we have something that we can give you before then, I'll be happy to get that done.

Q Alan, how about other bilaterals? Will you announce them in advance?

A No. As I say, the daily schedule will be provided daily, each morning.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the warning by the Syrian Minister concerning the U.S. attitude in Lebanon?

A I'm not sure which particular warning you're referring to.

Q The Syrian Minister was saying that the Syrian Government is warning the United States not to resort to a military solution of the Lebanese situation.

A I don't think I'll respond to something I haven't seen, but as a general proposition, obviously, we are bending significant effort to the search for a political solution to national reconciliation, and not looking for a military solution to that problem. Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks continue their efforts, as do many people not only in the region beyond them, but also back here, of course.

Q Alan, may I follow up with this?

A Go ahead.

Q It has been said yesterday that Ambassador McFarlane was one of those who suggested, or put the proposal for air strikes in Lebanon. Does this mean that the nature of the mission of Mr. McFarlane is now different?

A I'm not going to address the question of what any individual may or may not have recommended. I'm just simply not going to go into that question without leading you in any particular direction.

The answer to the question about Mr. McFarlane's mission is that it continues as it has continued, and the MNF mission continues as it has been.

Q Alan, with Larry Speakes announcement today at the White House, it certainly seems the United States is getting more involved in the war between the Christian Government of Lebanon and its Moslem opponents.

What kind of problems does this pose to U.S. relations with its Arab friends, and what are we doing about it?

A You're making assumptions I'm not going to accept. I simply would refer you to what Larry has said about the Marines' authorization to defend themselves and the ways in which they can do that. We do not accept any characterization of the U.S.' supporting any faction, or anything of that sort. What we're talking about is support for the central Government of Lebanon in its efforts to exercise sovereignty and control throughout the territory of Lebanon.

As I said before, we have continued to make strong efforts to help bring about a national reconciliation, and arrive at a solution in that manner.

Q But isn't the effect on the ground that American forces have now been essentially unleashed at the Commander's discretion to deal with Moslem units? Marines have not been targetted by Christian units.

A I think I indicated yesterday that we had increasing evidence of Syrian control of Palestinian units who are involved here. I would refer you back to the record of yesterday on this subject. I'm not going to take it beyond that.

Q How does that change with the (inaudible)? What does this (inaudible)?

A First of all, I don't accept the basis of the question, so I'm not going to address the question.

Q But you did answer it in a way that I would like to ask now, what does Palestinian involvement -- how do you answer the question based on the addition of Palestinian involvement in there?

A I don't think I'm going to try to give you sweeping --

Q But you did, Alan.

A -- generalizations about the effect of the situation in Lebanon on a broader issue at this particular point. But the question of Palestinian involvement is one which we take very seriously.

Q I don't know if you would try -- The President recently, I think on the weekend, called the war in Lebanon a "civil" war. How does the Administration justify its involvement in what the President, the highest authority in the land, has called a civil war?

A Again, I'd refer you back to something Larry Speakes said, I believe, yesterday. He referred to the full context of what the President said. I would refer you to that because it was a broader context than that. Why don't you check what was said over at the White House?

Q Alan, since you have made a charge about Palestinian involvement, can you in any way amplify it?

A I can't amplify today what I said yesterday.

Q Alan, in light of the announcement from the White House regarding the Marines, the air strikes, and so on, has the Administration made a new decision, or made a decision now on what it is going to do about the involvement in the hostilities section of the War Powers Act vis-a-vis Congress?

A That issue remains under study, and we remain in consultation with the Congress. I don't have anything new to say to you today about that.

Q As I understand the announcement at the White House, there are several circumstances under which air strikes could be called in, one of which is to defend the Lebanese Army in instances where the defeat of the Army would threaten either the United States or other members of the Multinational Force. It would seem that that would open the potential for much greater U.S. involvement in that area. Could you address that?

A Not, I think, beyond what Larry said this morning. I think he made clear we're talking about, in all these cases, a case-by-case evaluation of the situation. We are talking about the existing mandate and self-defense. I think there really isn't much more that I could say about that at this particular point.

Q Another question, if I may. You say we are supporting the Central Government. Is that open-ended support? Might there not come the time when we could no longer support them, or are we going to support them to the bitter end, if there is a bitter end?

A Never? How can I address that question? The point is that we have a very strong policy and a firm policy of support for the Government of Lebanon. I just can't take it beyond that.

Q How does the involvement of the Palestinians in this latest round of fighting violate the agreement that was reached last summer? You said that yesterday, and I'm confused as to what (inaudible) --

A I refer you back to the text where the Palestinians were moved out of the area and were not going to return. If they are moving back into the area, that changes the situation, and goes against what was agreed last year.

Q I was just going to ask you, you used the words "national reconciliation" as being one of the American aims at the beginning.

The Lebanese put together this National Committee in an effort to try to attract some Druze leaders to join this movement towards reconciliation. Is the United States independently doing anything to try to hasten that?

A I don't think I'm going to get into the details of what we are doing diplomatically, but we certainly are coordinating very closely with the Government of Lebanon in the efforts to help that process along. I don't think I'm going to get into the question of what who is doing when, and what the specific issues are that are being addressed. I don't think that's fair to the negotiators and so on, and I'm not going to --

Q I guess the question I want to ask is whether the United States would like to see a broadened government as a means of stopping the fighting?

A Again, I think that we'll work on this project and prospect of national reconciliation and political solution in pursuit of the goals that we have articulated before, but I'm not going to try to be more specific than that.

Q I wanted to ask in connection with what Ghason had asked. If this is not a civil war any more, how would you characterize it, as an invasion? What is it?

A I think what we have indicated is that there are certainly elements of both involvement of the kind of factional and confessional problems that have existed for sometime, and of the sort of involvement of forces that I talked about yesterday. I talked about increasing evidence of Syrian-controlled Palestinian units that are involved. I don't think I want to characterize it beyond that, though.

Q Alan, how does the continued presence of U.S. Marines in Beirut promote the idea of a national consensus and support for the Central Government?

A I think in the same way it has all along; that is, whatever problems may exist -- and we're not denying that there are problems -- that the presence of the Multinational Force, not just the United States contingent, but the entire Multinational Force, does contribute to a sense of progress on this prospect for extending Lebanese sovereignty throughout the territory.

As I say, it is not a problem-free situation, but it is still the judgment, the very clear judgment of this government, and I believe -- although you would have to check with them -- of the other contributing MNF governments, that is still the case.

Q In what areas has the progress manifested itself, or there has been a --

A You have had, I think, in Beirut itself an improved situation, generally speaking. You obviously now have some situations -- problems up in the hills and around. Those are serious problems; we're trying to help deal with those as best we can.

There is a lot of diplomacy going on, a lot of discussion to try to reconcile the various views and bring about a ceasefire and a political solution to the situation.

Q Alan, I'm not aware that it was stated at any point if any officials here or in the Administation believe that the Marines are being targeted?

My question is, if they are not being targeted, are they, the MNF in general -- you can probably let me know -- are they to be there in a fixed position within Beirut? And if not, why aren't the Marines moving a bit away from the Lebanese Army so that it will spare American lives, to say the least?

A I'm not going to talk to the issue of specific deployment of the MNF forces. They've been in the areas that they are generally in, all of the units, now for some time. I think -- I don't know how to address that question. When there is shelling that comes in from the hills, for example, I don't know how one necessarily can say that if you move from here to there, you're going to avoid that, so I don't think that's the issue.

Q Do you still stand by the idea -- excuse me, Alan -- that the Marines are not intentionally being targeted?

A I think what we've said is we do not have sufficient -- I haven't said, "No." We've said we don't have sufficient evidence to make conclusions of that sort. But in any case, when the Marines are fired upon and when there is a need for self-defense, they will fire in self-defense.

Q Alan, the battleship New Jersey has crossed the Panama Canal and is heading east presumably to the Eastern Med. Might that not change the mission of the Marines since its going to, obviously, mean an increase in U.S. troops in the area?

A First of all, I'm not aware that there has been any particular announcement made on the deployment of the New Jersey, and I would have to refer you to the Pentagon on that. Second of all, there is no change in the mandate or role in the MNF.

Lester?

Q Is it possible to go to another subject?

A No, let's finish up on this.

Q Oh, sure.

Q Has the Lebanese Government requested an increase in your fire power and direct air strikes or the increase in the Multinational Forces?

A I don't think I'm going to get into a lot of the detail of the discussion back and forth. I don't have any reason to change what I've said to you the other day about the MNF. The fact of the matter is in any case, that there is no change in the mandate or role, or indeed at this point, any change in the size of the MNF.

Q Excuse me. I want to continue regarding the situation in escalating your confrontation with the opposition forces on the ground, like the Druze are warning you -- and I asked yesterday about Walid Jumblatt, saying, "Take off your forces, and put them on the ships in the Mediterranean so they will not be hit," because it looks like this confrontation is with the Lebanese Army or with the Phalangists. Now, the Syrian Ambassador, or Syrian official, said he is warning them not to get involved.

In this heated situation, do you find any justification for your confrontational conditions now, with the forces on the ground?

A It's not a question of confrontational conditions. The question is that the MNF is there with the agreement and at the invitation of the Government of Lebanon, and it will continue to perform the role that it has performed. If fired upon, it will fire in self-defense.

Q On the question on that statement about no change in the mandate, the role, or the size, as you put it, of the MNF, how can you say that if previously the mandate, the mission, the role was always to be to occupy territory and maintain peace within that territory, but now there is an outreach capability that has been approved to areas where the Multinational Force is not located and has not been located?

A I think you're misconstruing something here. The fact is that the Marines have always been authorized to defend themselves. They have done so, and they will continue to do so. They have always had the ability to call on those off-shore elements. And what was it, last week, whenever the Bowen fired those rounds, yes it was the first time they had fired explosive rounds in that particular role. But the concept, the policy, the role, and the mandate have not changed.

Q The way you've just said that makes it sound like they've always had the ability to call upon air strikes. The White House would not have made an announcement to that effect if they had always had that ability.

A Again, calling on the offshore units has always been in the concept of what the Marines have done, and I can't really refine that further for you.

Q Do you rule out U.S. air strikes in support of the Lebanese Army?

A I think we addressed this before, and I think again, Larry Speakes addressed it this morning in the terms that the question was raised; that is, he indicated that the President had decided recently that the Marines could use fire power, call on offshore fire power, in defense of the Marines or the MNF, or of the LAF if they were under attack and if that attack would endanger Marines of the MNF. Obviously, this would be looked at case by case. But again, I would refer you to what Larry said. He did address it.

Q Alan, is it the analysis of the U.S. Government that without the Multinational Force being in Beirut, that the Central Government of President Gemayel would fall?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on that sort of thing.

Q I see frequently on American TV --

A I'm sorry. I can't hear you.

Q I see frequently on American TV -- and I'm certain that you see also this, too -- that commanders of the Marines in Beirut saying that in spite of what the U.S. Government is saying here in Washington, they are there, and they know that they are targets.

On what do you base your assertion that, you know, the situation is unclear and it's not --

A We base it on the best information we can and make the judgments that we can. We've talked about it before, and I think that question has been raised before. I don't have any change on that.

Q A few days ago Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens told an Israeli journalist that he believes in extending Israeli sovereignty on the West Bank, and that Jordan is a Palestinian state.

Where do you stand on this?

A We have had a rather consistent position on this. We've said many times that the U.S. supports the territorial integrity, independence, sovereignty, and unique and enduring character of Jordan. We do not agree that Jordan is a Palestinian state.

In terms of the sovereignty issue, without specifically commenting on the Minister's personal views, again let me just simply reiterate that the United States is opposed to the annexation of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan, which we believe to be inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 and the Camp David Accords.

We continue to believe that the final status of the occupied territories can be determined only through negotiations among the parties. As the President said in his September 1 speech, the United States will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel in the occupied territories.

Q Copy?

A Yes. We can provide copies.

Q Anything on Mr. McFarlane's activity during the next two days, please?

A I'm not going to try to project his activities. He has been in Saudi Arabia. I don't know, or don't have for you at this point precisely where he's going to be going. Ambassador Fairbanks has been in Beirut.

Q Is he intending to go to Damascus?

A Again, I don't have a projection to offer you on that.

Lester, are you on the Middle East? Because I want to stay on it and finish it off.

Q Yes. I just wondered if it's possible some time shortly to go to another area?

A Sure, but I'd like to finish the Middle East.

Q Alan, I just want to make one more stab at this. You're saying that even though the Marines now have the authority to defend the Lebanese army, if they're coming under attack would endanger them, you're saying that does not mean any change in the mandate or the mission or the role?

A Again, the basic concept here is defense of the Marines and the MNF.

Q Do you think there's any parallel between the situation now and 1965 when a similar State Department Spokesman said the first organized Marine units were now going into Vietnam to protect the base -- just the base perimeter? That was your own response.

A I don't think that -- we're not talking about bases, and we're not talking about --

Q But there seems to be an inexorable escalation, but you keep insisting there's no change in mission or anything.

A We are talking about self-defense efforts. We're talking about an MNF which has not had a changed mandate or role or size, and I think that it would be off base to try to make the kind of comparisons that you're suggesting.

Q Alan, by the very fact that you say the President decided recently, that means it's changed.

A No. What he did, in taking a look at the situation as it now exists in terms of within the current mandate and role, at what might be done in a more refined kind of guidance to people, he did look at that, and he did make some decisions on this.

But the concept has not changed, and they have always had this ability. As I say, again going back to the fact that the Bowen fired some rounds a short while ago is an indication that clearly that has been something that has existed as a potential within the existing role for some time.

Q Quite apart from the concept, how do you explain the fact that now offshore naval units are shelling in Lebanon, airplanes are authorized to execute air strikes against not only those who are firing against Marines, but against those whose actions in the broader situation may eventually affect the Marines.

In other words, bombs and shells in the mainland of Lebanon in a Lebanese context, and you say the concept hasn't changed, but the shells and the bombs have changed.

A There has been some increased firing. The Marines have been subjected to some fire, and they, in exercising their self-defense, are now firing back. So it's simply a question of that sort of situation.

Q Now for the first time they're authorized to shoot against places which haven't fired at them.

A I think, again, as I say, this is an issue which has to be looked at case by case. The basic concept, again, is one of defense of the Marines and the MNF, and I can't really take you beyond that. I mean, we've gone around this several times now. I can't --

Q How can you determine, you know, the source of fire in that part of Lebanon? If you will pardon me, I'm a Lebanese and I know the area, I think, much more than a lot of people.

It's awfully difficult to determine from what village, which is less than three miles or two miles from the Marines, and who in the village is shooting at them.

A I think you're getting into what is, I believe, a more technical question of how one determines this. I would have to refer you to the Pentagon for that. But I think that -- I mean, it's a relevant question, but it comes down, in my understanding of that issue, to a technical issue.

Q But the Phalangists and the Druze and the Lebanese army, siding with the Phalangists, have been exchanging accusations that the Druze saying, "No the Phalangists shot at the Marines to get the Americans to increase their involvement." And the Phalangists are saying, "No, the Druze and the Syrians and Palestinians and Iranians and what-have-you."

A I don't think the issue here in terms of the self-defense and the firing on those positions from which firing has come rests upon who's firing. It's a question of where it's coming from and returning --

Q Well --

A Again, I say determining that is a technical question, and I'm just not prepared to go into that.

Q Alan, I want to ask about a specific locale. If the Lebanese army lost the town of Suq al-Gharb, would that -- can you tell us if they would threaten the Marines?

A I'm not prepared to address specific situations.

Q Doesn't the policy that's now in place with regard to the MNF allow -- to be sort of blunt, doesn't that allow the PLO if it's back in the area to simply draw the Marines more and more into active fighting on the ground in Lebanon?

A Again, I would caution you that this concept that we're talking about does not include any anticipated ground action in this sense that we're talking about here. That is not --

Q What about air strikes?

A Strikes? I suppose if somebody wants to fire on the Marines in order to get fired upon, they have that privilege.

Q No, in order to draw the Marines and the U.S. more and more into active military activity, as opposed to peacekeeping.

A It seems to me you're suggesting a suicide mission of some sort, and I don't know that that's in the concept. Lester?

Q Alan, since a Miss Sadza, who was identified as Press Spokesman for Prime Minister Mugabe, yesterday grabbed Mary Masserini and pulled her into a room and ordered her to order all reporters off the 15th floor of the Madison Hotel which Mary said she couldn't do, could you guarantee, Alan, that Mary will not suffer any punishment by the State Department?

A Will not suffer any punishment by the State Department?

Q Yes.

A I think I can assure you, whatever the circumstances -- and I cannot vouch for those circumstances, Lester -- but whatever the circumstances, Mary Masserini is not going to suffer at the hands of the State Department. (Laughter) I know you're pleased.

Q I have one follow-up if I may, Alan. Since Mr. Mugabe has called a press conference for tomorrow morning but restricted attendance to unidentified but government-approved reporters, can the State Department tell us whether or not this is a racially segregated event being held in the Madison Hotel which is a place of public accommodation?

A I don't think the United States Government is involved in determining whom Mr. Mugabe is going to see, so I can't --

Q Let me just follow -- rephrase it. Will the United States Government apprise Mr. Mugabe of federal law -- and I'm sure D.C. law -- that you are not supposed to have racially segregated events in places of public accommodation like the Madison Hotel?

A I'm sure Mr. Mugabe and his staff are aware of our laws, but, in any case --

Q Do you know whether --

A I have no idea what his plans are, Lester.

Q I have a question on the very same point.

A Excuse me. Let me keep on going here.

Q Would you characterize the U.S. Administration policy towards Lebanon by saying that the United States will not allow the downfall of the Gemayel Government by any means?

A You're asking very sweeping questions, and I'm simply not prepared today to address sweeping questions.

Q Alan, has the United States Government consulted with any of the Arab, friendly countries, for instance the Saudis, prior to the escalation of the situation and the ordering of the air strikes in retaliation for being shelled?

A I don't think there's been any escalation, so I can't accept the basis of your question. I think that the fact of the matter is that we remain -- I'm not going to try to get into a diplomatic dialogue, but we remain in very close contact with the various parties, including specifically those in the region who are directly involved. That's as far as I can take it.

Q Are you going to publish a record of the briefing that was held yesterday at 2:00?

A Whose briefing?

Q It was a briefing on the --

A The BACKGROUND briefing?

Q BACKGROUND.

A We do not publish and put out BACKGROUND briefings.

Q Some general material on the trip in detail. That's what I was interested in, because the briefing seemed to indicate, and the quote in the press today from Mugabe says, "I'm here not only to improve relations between my country and blacks here, but also with the U.S. Government."

There are no whites on his delegation, he's seeing black mayors, he's meeting with the black caucus. Insofar as we know, it's an exclusively black tour, and I want to know if the U.S. Government feels that it's proper to encourage a foreign government to improve relations with a mere segment of this country?

A I don't think it's proper for the U.S. Government to be advising other governments on what they do with people other than the U.S. Government basically, and I think that in terms of yesterday's briefing, I'm sure you have a tape of it.

Q Japanese. Do you have a guidance for us on the Japanese interception of the Soviet planes?

A No. I don't. I did hear before I came out that there, indeed, had been some sort of a simulated Soviet strike against radar targets in Japan. The Japanese scrambled, as is indicated in the wires, and the Soviets turned around and went away.

I gather the last time they did this was in September of '82.

Q Do you have a response to the U.N. Security Council action or inaction of yesterday to the Soviet leader?

A Yes. We're pleased that a draft resolution clearly naming the Soviet Union as responsible for the KAL tragedy and calling for an investigation by the Secretary General attracted the nine votes necessary for passage in the absence of a veto.

Although the Soviets did veto, the vote nonetheless expressed the world community's revulsion at the plane's destruction, and its rejection of the Soviet explanation.

Only two countries -- the U.S.S.R. itself and Poland -- voted against the draft resolution, while four countries abstained -- China, Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. I might add that an extraordinary number of countries, some 48, addressed the Security Council on this incident. Only those few countries directly submissive to the Soviet Union made any defense of Soviet behavior, for example, Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany.

Q Copies?

A Copy, yes.

Q Will the State Department discuss Zimbabwe's strange abstention? While Mr. Mugabe is a guest of our government, how in God's name could he abstain from this?

A Lester, the --

Q Did we ask that question? Do you know, or not?

A The United States, as you know, attaches great importance to the world community's condemnation of this brutal, barbaric Soviet attack on an unarmed civilian passenger airliner.

Obviously, we are disappointed that Zimbabwe did not join in the Security Council vote against the Soviets, and I would note that the Prime Minister is fully aware of the strength of our views.

Q One follow-up. Do you attribute this in any way to the fact that the Patriotic Front, of which he was co-leader, shot down an unarmed passenger airliner in 1978 with 38 victims in the crash landing, and then they sent their troops in to shoot down ten out of the eighteen followed?

Is Secretary Shultz going to discuss that with Mr. Mugabe, our honored guest?

A You had an opportunity to ask that, I assume, and I haven't seen any record of the conversation, but I have to presume, Lester, that you did ask that question yesterday, and I have nothing further to say on it.

Q They had an astonishing answer. I was astounded.

A Let's not get into a debate. I have no information on why anybody voted the way they voted.

Q Alan, I'd like to ask you about those tapes that the government released yesterday. When you put out the transcript, you said that the tapes suggested there was nothing abnormal going on, I believe, at least the way --

A We had no indication that the plane was off course.

Q I read in the paper this morning where some government officials are saying that the tapes suggest that the airplane had radio trouble.

A I think I indicated that yesterday.

Q You said that -- no, I don't think you did.

A That they did go through -- I think I did.

Q You said they went through another airplane --

A That's right.

Q -- but there was nothing abnormal about this --

A That's right.

Q -- that this happens all the time.

A That's right. But I suppose what you're getting on reflection by people who are looking at it is a judgment after the fact, although many times apparently planes do relay their radio signal through other planes. In this case why that might have been a particular problem --

Q Is that, indeed, the conclusion that people in the government are reaching, that the airplane was experiencing radio trouble?

A Again, I think you'd have to go to the FAA, because I have not got any conclusions out of this building, and I'm not sure that they've reached any firm conclusions at this point either.

Q Nor am I. All I know is what I read in the paper.

A I've got to refer you to the FAA. I can't make that judgment.

Q Alan, in any comparison of the Japanese translations of the air-to-ground communication, do they precisely parallel the American translation?

A I'm sorry. The air-to-ground communciation between --

Q That the Japanese have released.

A They released their own civil aviation conversation with the Korean airliner. It's their conversation.

Q Oh, their -- sorry.

A I'm sorry if I misled you.

Q Do you have any comment on Jack Anderson's columns from Friday, September 9, and yesterday's, September 12 -- one about the State Department advisers, or the United States Government advisers who advise the President, have been ill-advising him about the Middle East? And the second one about the AID money for building bakeries in Egypt?

A I don't have anything on any of those.

Q Alan, are U.S. officials in this building and in other agencies still combing through the tapes of the air-to-ground communication between the Soviet fighters and the ground controllers to see if there are any new translations?

A No. I think our statement on Sunday made clear that that review was complete.

Q Has the United States yet delivered the notes which Mr. Sokolov refused to accept yesterday?

A The notes have been recently forwarded to the Soviet Embassy.

Q Has there been a follow-up?

A I don't have any details to give you.

Q In the U.S. mail? (Laughter)

A I don't have any details.

Q Alan, has the Secretary, since he's returned, either talked to or met Ambassador Dobrynin, or have any plans to do so this week?

A I don't recall his having seen Ambassador Dobrynin. I don't know whether he talked to him, and I can't give you anything about any plans. I don't have anything on it.

Q Any decision on him seeing Gromyko or not at the U.N.?

A As I indicated before, I have nothing new on that.

Q On the matter of the contrapuntal theme of the Soviets is that they didn't do anything wrong because it was a spy plane. Now they've augmented this by the Leningrad expulsion of a man they accuse of being a spy, and the State Department doesn't release any biographic data on the man whatsoever, not where he was born, not where he was educated, not what his previous background was.

It seems to me that the U.S. Government is playing into the hands of those who would accuse this man of espionage.

A John, I can't help what your judgment on this is. We tend not to --

Q It's not my judgment. It's the world judgment that's important.

A I think you're making the judgment. We tend not to comment on charges of this sort.

Q Just one question, Alan. Will the State Department, to your knowledge, suggest to Mr. Harry Belafonte and his fellow artists the idea of boycotting the Soviet Union along with South Africa, or do you think they would react like Zimbabwe?

A I think I'd refer you back to what we've said before, Lester, on the question of private exchanges.

Q Alan, you don't have anything further on the two Soviets that were PNG'd, do you? You know, you said yesterday --

A No. I said I've given you everything I've got on it.

Q When you talked about forwarding of those notes to the Soviets, were they accepted?

A I don't have any readout for you.

Q Thank you, Alan.

(The briefing concluded at 12:49 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #161

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1983, 12:29 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A few announcements.

In connection with the state visit of Portuguese President Antonio Ramalho Eanes, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing by a senior Department official in the State Department briefing room here at 2:00 p.m. today.

Also, to tell you that, our broken-down Xerox machine and other reproduction facilities in the building willing, there will be available in the Press Office following this briefing copies of the speech by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam to the Forum Club in Houston, Texas. The text is embargoed for use at 2:00 p.m. EDT. The subject, as described in the speech, is the U.S. response to the "economic difficulties that lie at the heart of much of Central America's instability." While questioning the term "Marshall Plan" as a literal analogy, Mr. Dam describes Americans as "every bit as committed to the peace and prosperity of Central America as they were to the reconstruction of Europe after World War II."

On ICAO: The 33-member International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council will meet September 15 in Montreal in an extraordinary session called by ICAO President Assad Kotaite of Lebanon at the request of the Republic of Korea.

In requesting the meeting, the Republic of Korea stated that they wished the Council to discuss the shooting down of KAL Flight 007. The United States will be represented at the Council by FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms and our U.S. Representative to the ICAO, Edmund Stohr.

The press contact for the meeting is Stan Zuckerman who can be reached in Montreal at Area Code (514) 285-8304.

Q What time does that begin, Alan, tomorrow?

A I don't think I have details on the time for tomorrow, Bernie. I don't. I'm sorry.

Finally, to let you know that available in the Press Office is a statement on the allegations made by Valeriy Repin in a "confession" broadcast on Soviet television and in an interview with Sovietskaya Kultura magazine that the Solzhenitsyn Fund, a fund which was established by that author in support of Soviet dissidents, allegedly received CIA funding.

Okay. I think that's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q You are saying they did receive CIA -- (Laughter)

A I don't think that's what I said, Bernie. The allegation is that they did. I think you'll find the statement indicates that is rather far from the truth.

Q Alan, can you give us an assessment of the fighting in Lebanon today? Has it settled down, or what is the situation on the ground, particularly involving the Marines?

A Yes, I can. Beirut and the surrounding area are quiet. The Lebanese army repulsed attacks against their positions at the town of Suq Al-Gharb last night, while some of the positions in the hills near Khalde were shelled. Our reports indicate that the airport area is quiet, as is the area near the Ambassador's residence in Yarze.

Q Alan, is a makeshift airport being -- runway strip under construction in northern Beirut?

A I saw the reports on that, Mike. I don't know anything about that.

Q You don't have anything on an accelerated resupply of the Lebanese army by American transports?

A I don't. I think you'd have to check with the Pentagon on that question.

Q Alan, do you have anything on an Eagleburger mission to Israel or to the region?

A No. Under Secretary Eagleburger has had longstanding plans to go to Israel later this fall as part of our ongoing dialogue with the Israeli leadership, but he has no immediate plans to visit Israel.

Q Alan, there is a -- has the United States encouraged Lebanon to shelve the security agreement with Israel to bring about a Syrian withdrawal?

A The U.S. position on the security agreement -- or, not the security agreement -- on the agreement between Lebanon and Israel is quite clear. We're on the record on that. We're certainly in no way backing away from it or suggesting that others would back away from it.

Q Can you tell us anything about the meeting -- usually you don't -- between Israeli Ambassador Rosenne and the Secretary today?

A And the Secretary? I think it was with Mr. Eagleburger on the schedule, if that's what you're talking about. In any case, I don't have anything on that, but the Israeli Ambassador, obviously, as many others, comes in here and talks.

Q Yesterday it was announced that the U.S. will use its firepower to protect also the other members of the MNF. Was that done in agreement with those countries representing the MNF?

A There is no automatic provision for a U.S. military response in the event of an attack on one of our MNF partners in Beirut. The point is simply that the commanders of the contingents are joined by a communications net and consult frequently about problems of mutual concern. It would be in that framework, if there were to be a response, there would be one.

We certainly are talking with them, and it would be a question, clearly, if another MNF partner were fired upon, if they wanted us to assist. It isn't something that we would automatically do without a full consultation with them.

Q This would have to be if there were the potential for jeopardizing the U.S. element of the MNF. Is that correct?

A I think I prefer, rather than paraphrasing today, Bernie, to go back to the language I used yesterday, which I don't happen to have with me. But I think that -- let me just ask you to do that.

Q If, say, one of the other MNF elements were hit, would the U.S. then, if it so chose, go into an offensive posture?

A Into an offensive posture?

Q Well, the air strikes or naval strikes, and so forth. In other words, it doesn't have to be the targeting of the U.S., does it?

A We said that targeting of the Marines or the MNF, or indeed the U.S. diplomatic presence. But, again, I would stress the point that I just made in response to Ghassan's question, in terms of any other MNF contingent, clearly that would be something that would be done only in consultation with the other MNF contingents.

Q Do you have anything on the diplomatic efforts for a cease-fire? Secretary Veliotes said yesterday that he thought within 24 to 48 hours we'd know.

A I don't have anything in that particular kind of a measure, Bernie. Ambassador McFarlane is, as you know, actively engaged in the negotiations aimed at achieving a cease-fire in Lebanon as quickly as possible as a prelude to negotiations for a political settlement there.

Predictions are always risky, but there is a proposal on the table which should satisfy the legitimate requirements of all parties. We would hope for a speedy acceptance. But, beyond that, I'm not going to be able to get into the substance of the complex negotiations or to characterize for you what those proposals are.

Q Who remains to accept?

A Again, I'm not going to try to get into the substance of negotiations or the procedures. I think this is something which is clearly ongoing. Ambassador McFarlane is in Damascus today. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut. I think I'll just have to leave it at that.

Q Is Bandar there in Damascus also?

A I don't know where Prince Bandar is.

Q Have you been able to confirm a massacre of Lebanese Christians in the town of Masrah Al-Shouf.

A I haven't got any confirmation on any particular massacres. I would refer you back, though, to the statement that I read to you the other day regarding our attitude toward massacres. But I don't think we're going to get into the business of trying to "confirm" them or to assign responsibility. Obviously, there is a lot going on, and we're very concerned about it.

Q Who brought this proposal to Lebanon? The proposal that you just mentioned.

A Again, I'm not going to try to --

Q Is it an American proposal?

A I wouldn't characterize it in any way. I think that this is for the parties there when they have agreement to announce agreement on. It's something we're working very hard with the parties on, and we hope that we will be successful and that they will be successful.

Q Are the Saudis still playing a role?

A Yes. The Saudis are still playing a role.

Q Is Syria one of the parties you're referring to?

A Is Syria one of the parties?

Q That you're referring to when you talk about all the parties?

A Again, you're asking -- obviously, Syria is involved in this process. As I said, Ambassador McFarlane is in Damascus. I'm not going to try, though, to define any particular party's role more precisely, Jerry. I think that the point is that there is a lot of discussion going on between the parties who are concerned, but I'm not going to try again, as I say, to say whose role is what.

Q (Inaudible) if there's a cease-fire agreement, whether Syria would sign that.

A I understand your question, and that's why I say I'm not going to try to define the roles here. I think we'll just let the parties deal with it.

Q Alan, Lebanese official radio reported today that the Saudis have requested 48 hours delay -- according to Lebanese radio -- 48 hours delay before you execute the plans that you have announced yesterday, raising hopes of some factions in Lebanon that you're going to be more and more involved militarily in the Lebanese conflict on the side of the Lebanese army.

A I don't have a particular response to that. I was not aware, frankly, of that particular statement. I guess I just don't have a response to that. I would stand on what we said in terms of the Marines and their self-defense. As I think you're probably aware, as I said, in terms of the situation there, it seems quieter, and I think the fact of the matter is there have been no air strikes, there have been no naval firings, there have been -- as far as I know. I don't know. You could check with the Pentagon, but I'm not aware of the Marines having been engaged in any way in recent hours.

Q Would you be able to (inaudible) if you have received a request from the Saudis for 48 hours delay --

A I think I probably could not do that. It would get us into the details of the diplomatic exchanges, and I just couldn't do that.

Q Alan, we can make reasonable assumptions on who the parties are in connection with the cease-fire negotiations with the possible exception of one party. The United States just yesterday and the day before made mention of Palestinian and PLO presence back in the Beirut area.

Can we make the assumption that the Palestinians and the PLO are direct parties to these negotiations, or shall we make the assumption that they are parties through another party? Can you help us on that?

A Again, I think that you're trying to make this too formal in a sense. Certainly we are not in contact with the Palestinians. I don't think I'm really going to be able, though, Ralph, to go beyond what I said in terms of how this is proceeding. I know that's unsatisfactory, but I just have to leave it that way.

Q Can you acknowledge the four points which have been published about the agreement?

A No. I can't comment on any of that. Lester?

Q I want to go to another subject, but I'll, of course, yield.

A All right. Go ahead.

Q Alan, has the United States in any form asked the Israeli Government for air strikes against positions in the Shouf? There's a report today in Ha'aretz that says that Israel rejected a U.S. appeal that the Israeli air force be instructed to operate and silence the Shouf positions.

A You put me in somewhat of a dilemma because I think the fact is I would not steer you in the direction of that particular story, but I'm also not going to comment officially on a story about a dialogue between the United States and Israel. So I just am going to have to leave it out there like that.

Q Do you have anything to offer on the talks with people on the Hill on how to resolve the issues regarding the War Powers Act, and a continued --

A No. I don't think I have anything for you on that, Max. The Secretary, as you know, was up there not specifically on that subject, but on broader subjects.

I think he addressed himself to this bit when he came out, indicating that Mr. Baker -- Jim Baker is the Administration's point man on this -- and that he is conducting those talks with the Congressional side. I think, as I understood it, the Secretary indicated he wasn't about to play any of Mr. Baker's cards or take any cards out of his hands, so I think that sounds like a pretty sound position to me.

Q Would the U.S. be prepared to shelve the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, if that's what it took to get a cease-fire that would involve the Syrians?

A That's a very hypothetical question, Bernie. I think I will stand on what I said about the U.S. position on the agreement.

Q Just going back to this question on the Ha'aretz story, I mean, you have on occasion commented on stories of U.S. contact in which the allegations were just outlandish.

Might you take this question and look into it?

A I'll see if anybody wants to say anything further. I'd be willing to do that. But, again, I just simply caution that it does get into an area, just on its very face, of a discussion between two governments. But, as I say, I'll look into it.

Q Okay, along the same lines, is the United States at this point interested in preventing a Syrian-Israeli war?

A The U.S. certainly is hopeful there will not be a Syrian-Israeli war.

-- MORE --

Q There were also reports here that the United States force would activate, or become activated, if Suq Al-Gharb, the town you mentioned yesterday, was about to fall into "Druze hands." Can you confirm that? Is that true? Will the United States --

A I was asked this question yesterday with specific reference to Suq Al-Gharb, and I declined to comment on any specific situation, simply pointing to the general case that I had made in terms of the ground rules and the decisions that were made. I'm really not in a position today to take you beyond what I said at that point.

Q May I ask you one question short of that? Would the Druze occupation of that area represent a threat to the Marines?

(Laughter)

A I think that's asking the question in different words, Bernie.

Q That's sort of that. You can answer.

A I may be hearing you wrong, but, again, I will stick with the words that I used yesterday on the subject.

Go ahead, Lester.

Q If it's all right. Alan, after the White House briefing with senior American officials of the State Department was over yesterday, Ambassador Keeley told reporters that there is a comparison between Mr. Mugabe's Patriotic Front forces and General Washington's Continental Army -- this is in reference to what the President said -- because, in his words, "The Tories went through a great deal of suffering, raping, and burning, but we don't emphasize that in our textbooks, except the new textbooks."

My question is, does the State Department have any evidence of any such Continental Army atrocities that match the Patriotic Front's? The reason I ask, Alan, because he said the State Department wrote the President's speech because Professor Challiner of the History Department at Princeton, where Keeley was educated, says he is unable to understand any such comparison based on history. He said that this morning.

A I think I'm going to try to stay away from historical issues, Lester; I have my hands full dealing with contemporary policy issues.

Q Can I ask one follow-up?

A Yes.

Q The Washington Times this morning published an account of the 1977 blowing up of Woolworth's department store in Salsbury which killed 11 and wounded 26, a number of whom were blacks, for which Mr. Mugabe claimed credit.

My question is, since the column reporting these things called Mugabe a "barbarian" and a "terrorist thug," does the State Department believe that John Lofton is inaccurate in the report, or in his editorial conclusion, or what?

A I believe you raised this question -- or one of your colleagues raised this question -- in the BACKGROUNDER that was offered the other day, and I don't have anything to add.

Q No, I did not.

A Well, the question might not have been quite as specific, but the issue was addressed, and I refer you to what was said at that time.

Bernie, go ahead.

Q In the ongoing negotiations, does the United States detect any sense of readiness on the part of the Syrians since the White House threat of the last couple of days to join in that negotiation that could lead to a ceasefire?

A Two things on that: First of all, I would not accept the characterization of what was said yesterday as a threat.

Q Well, an announcement.

A But in terms of the basic question, which was any characterization of the Syrian position or the Syrian willingness to move forward, I really think it is inappropriate for me to try to address that. As I say, Ambassador McFarlane is in Damascus, and it is not fitting for me to try to do that from here.

Q Alan, on that, as Bernie said, we have on the record a time frame that is just about right now he's in Damascus. Are you trying to suggest that this isn't a key to this situation?

A I think that the Syrian attitude is certainly important to this situation, but I'm not going to try to characterize that. That's up to the Syrians to do.

Q Another subject? On the Soviet news conference today by the two high Soviet officials regarding the nuclear disarmament negotiations, does the United States have any comment on the statement that -- I guess it was a long series of statements, actually -- that were made?

Do you want me to be more specific?

A What are you focusing on?

Q I'm just focusing on the general conclusion which was that the Soviets appear not to have anything new to offer at the current round of the negotiations, and suggest that "the ball is in the U.S. Court, for a change."

A As you know, the United States and our NATO Allies remain firmly committed to NATO's 1979 dual-track decision, under which the United States would deploy land-based, long-range INF missiles to Europe unless the current arms control discussions with the Soviets lead to an agreement which would preclude such a deployment.

Since the U.S. began the INF talks in Geneva with the USSR two years ago, the Soviets have deployed more than seventy SS-20 missiles. Yet, the U.S. continues to negotiate seriously and in good faith.

The U.S. seeks to eliminate the entire class of U.S.-Soviet long-range INF missiles under the zero/zero option or, short of Soviet acceptance of this, to limit missile warheads to equal numbers under an interim agreement. The Soviets have failed to respond positively to either proposal.

The President has emphasized that despite the Soviets' actions in the KAL incident, we will continue to press for effective and verifiable arms control agreements. Ambassador Nitze has confirmed this to the Soviets in Geneva, and is prepared to consider any serious Soviet proposal. Instead of making inflexible and uncompromising statements such as Mr. Korniyenko did today, we would prefer that the Soviets adopt a flexible and serious attitude at the talks in Geneva.

Q May I ask you one more question about the Middle East?

A Go ahead.

Q Can you confirm the presence of a side letter to the agreement between the United States and Lebanon whereby the agreement is null and void, or becomes null and void, if it does not produce the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon?

A I don't have anything new to say about the agreement or any documents that might be accompanying that agreement. I think that that has been briefed in the past, and I would refer you back to what was said on the record about that agreement.

Q A Lebanese official mentioned this, actually today, and at the time it wasn't, to me, at least, known that there was such a letter.

A Again, I'm not prepared to address the existence or non-existence of particular documents today. I don't think that this is a new issue, however, in terms of the general situation out there; but I'm just not prepared to address your question. I'm not trying to lead you one way or another. I just simply don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, I'm sure you recall -- it was about 7 or 8 days ago, I think -- that Hans-Deitrich Genscher said that, after a meeting with Gromyko, that the Soviets may drop their insistence on counting the British and French strategic weapons as part of the NATO group.

A The intermediate range missiles?

Q Yes, the intermediate weapons. Thank you. And today, in Moscow, the Soviet official said, "It is absolutely necessary to include the British and French nuclear systems."

What do you think happened there?

A You would have to ask the various parties involved. I can't answer that question.

Q Did you say that there was prior consultation with the other MNF countries on yesterday's announcement by the White House?

A I don't think I'm going to get into the question of prior consultation. What I said was that in terms of the issue of how the MNF might respond, or the Marines might respond, or the off-shore elements might respond to an attack on our MNF partners, that there is no automatic provision for a response by the United States, and that would be the subject, obviously, of consultations.

In terms of what we have, ourselves, decided and made known, we have certainly been in touch with our MNF partners. I don't think I would care to get into the exact back-and-forth on that, though, Bill.

Q Back to the Soviets agains for a second on a somewhat different subject. Moscow released considerable detail on the expulsions of the two American diplomats. Does the U.S. have any comment on any of that detail? Do you either deny it or say nothing about it, or --

A Again, it is our standard practice not to comment on alleged intelligence activities. How ever much alleged detail the Soviets want to put out, I just can't depart from that particular practice.

Q A follow-up to that: Consistent with your -- the detail the U.S. gave on the three Soviets who were expelled following the Richard Osborne case, would you care to be any more specific now about the two who were expelled in August?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything further on Soviet maneuvers or other activities involving their aircraft over the Sea of Japan?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, can you confirm the departure of Ambassador Louis from London?

A I can't, really. I understand that our Embassy in London has issued a statement. I haven't seen it. But from here, I think I'm constrained to refer you to the White House on any ambassadorial appointments since they are Presidential.

Lester?

Q Do you expect an announcement later today?

A You mean from the White House?

Q Yes.

A I have no idea.

Q Alan, this is a housekeeping question, if I may.

There was a recent report in USA Today that John Hughes is taking under advisement one wire service reporter's contention that another reporter, who reportedly demonstrated outside this building, has forefeited his rights.

My question is, has your press office received any such complaint about the accreditation of The Washington Post's George Will and his involvement in the Reagan campaign? What is the standard here, if you're considering forefeiting one reporter's. Would you forefeit George Will's?

A Lester, I don't have anything on that. I don't think I would get into that question. In terms of the basis of your question, I don't remember whether you were here at the briefing the day that this issue was raised.

Q Somebody sent me the clipping; I'm not a reader of that newspaper. Somebody sent me the clipping.

A You can check back with the record. I don't have anything --

Q Can I ask you --

A I don't have anything new to offer you.

Q O.K.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Nicaraguan assertions regarding the plane attacks on Nicaragua?

A Yes. I guess I have two things to say about that: One is that, in terms of the specific charge that the U.S. is involved, obviously, I'm hung up on the same point that I have been on any other allegation of intelligence activities -- I can't comment on it. But I would point to the statement that I made the other day deploring any attack on citizens, in terms of an expression of the U.S. attitude towards that particular attack.

Beyond that, in terms of the documentation, if you will, that was referred to, things that were in his pockets, I guess, again, I can't comment specifically on the intelligence activity angle to it. But even assuming that the documents described were authentic, any person who had lived for a period of time in the U.S. could have obtained such documents. We fail to see that the documents support any allegations about U.S. complicity in those air attacks.

Q How about the allegations of the supply of the planes and other supplies perhaps that were --

A Again, what you're now trying to get me to go back to do is to comment on the dimensions of it, which I say I'm precluded from by our standing rule about not commenting on intelligence activities. I'm afraid I really can't do that.

Q Would the U.S., on the whole, search for a cease-fire in the Beirut area? Would it support a package that would call for an overhauling of the Gemayel regime?

A I don't think that's an appropriate thing for me to talk about in those terms, Bernie. What we have talked about is an effort at national reconciliation. That's what President Gemayel has talked about, and I would have to leave it in those broad terms and to the negotiations and political settlement, eventually, to spell that out for you, as to what it means.

Q Alan, would you acknowledge that there is a big difference between calling people in for a conference on national reconciliation and bringing them into the decision-making and policy-making aspects of the government?

A I can't try to put those particular aspects together in terms of the current situation in Lebanon. I think that is something for the Lebanese to work out; that's not for us to comment on.

Q Is there any indication that President Gemayel is moving in that direction, that kind of substantive -- bringing people in to work together on governing, as opposed to just talking?

A Again, I think I would have to refer you to what he has said.

Q Alan, you talk about the United States supporting the Gemayel government.

A You're talking about the Government of Lebanon?

Q Yes, the Government of Lebanon. But you're not ruling out the possibility of a "revised" government, if that is what is required for a cease-fire?

A I'm not really trying to make any judgments about that. Our posture on strong support for the Central Government of Lebanon and for the extension of its sovereign authority throughout the territory of Lebanon, and freeing its territory of all foreign forces, and to repeat the third goal, which is the assuring of security across Israel's northern border, that all remains as it has been.

I don't think it is up to me, or up to us, to talk about the composition in any way to address the question of the composition of the Lebanese Government, particularly. That is for the Lebanese to talk about.

Q Alan, does the Administration oppose negotiations on power-sharing in Lebanon, as it does in Central America?

(Laughter)

A Clever, Ralph, clever.

Q That's a serious question. That's a serious question.

A Again, I'd have to refer you to the kinds of statements which have been made by the Government of Lebanon, by other parties concerned. I'm not going to try, in the middle of a negotiating process which is very active and very delicate, to respond to that kind of a question.

Q Thank you. You might give them guidance, though.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

- - -

Glenney

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #162

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 1983, 12:13 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I've got a couple of housekeeping announcements.

There will be two BACKGROUND briefings in this room this afternoon. A senior State Department official will give two BACKGROUND briefings here. The first one will be at 1:45 p.m. That is a readout on the state visit of the Portuguese President. I'll just make that clear again, that while it is usually done at the White House, today it will be done here because that same senior official at 2:00 p.m. will give you an update on international reaction to the shooting down of the Korean Airlines Flight 007. For your information only, and not for publication or broadcast, that official is Assistant Secretary Burt.

Later this afternoon in the Press Office there will be a press release on the results of a plebiscite held in the Marshall Islands, September 7, on the Compact of Free Association.

Then an announcement on another briefing tomorrow in connection with the release of the State Department's Special Report #110, on Soviet Active Measures, Friday morning. There will be a BACKGROUND briefing by a senior State Department official here at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow.

Q What's that on?

A Active measures, Soviet active measures.

Q Soviet active measures? What's that?

A That's all the skullduggery, the disinformation.

Q What time is that?

A The briefing will be at 11:00 a.m.

Q Is that ON THE RECORD or ON BACKGROUND?

A ON BACKGROUND.

Q What is the release time on that?

A I'll tell you afterwards.

Q Why is the Korean update ON BACKGROUND? Are you planning to say less than you said on foreground?

A No, no. I think we're interested in information rather than the individual being on camera. I think that's the rationale there.

I haven't finished on this one, Bernie. Copies of the Soviet Active Measures report will be available as early as 8:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. Of course, it's embargoed until the completion of the briefing.

That's all I've got.

Q I don't suppose we could get that this afternoon?

A I don't think so.

Q John, on Lebanon, can you tell us where things stand now with the mediation attempt to bring about an end to the fighting?

A It's a fast-moving situation. I really don't have anything. Ambassador McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks are both in Beirut this morning obviously engaged in trying to move this whole thing forward diplomatically. The Saudis are engaged; others are engaged. But frankly, it is moving fast, and I really don't have a readout for you on where it stands.

Q How is it moving?

A Fast.

Q In which direction?

(Laughter)

A I think I'll refrain from any characterization of how it's going.

Q John, do you have any information that would confirm or deny reports that the Syrians and Saudis have agreed to be observers at the national dialogue --

A No, I don't.

Q -- or what is part of a national dialogue?

A No, I don't. What you are saying sort of presumes that there is an agreement. I think you may be a little ahead of the action.

Q But is it going the other way, do you know? I mean, are the Syrians --

A Now, you are going the other way. I didn't go one way, and I didn't go the other way.

Q Can you give us any help on what happened in Damascus yesterday?

A No, I really can't.

Q John, what happens to Veliotes' forecast about mid-day Tuesday -- 24 to 48 hours?

A I guess we've gone beyond that Rubicon. Obviously, he was optimistic, and we all remain hopeful that this can move along, but it's going to take a little longer than Ambassador Veliotes imagined, I think. These things do happen.

Q Why?

A It's just a question of discussion, some consultation, negotiation, various parties, different points of view, bringing them together.

Q You can't be any more specific than that at all?

A Gosh, I thought I'd been totally revealing.

Q John, along those lines, last night the State Department was unaware of any request to the Israelis to take some action against the Druze forces in the Shuf. However, two morning newspapers managed to find officials in the government who were aware of such a request.

Have you got up to speed on that one yet?

A With a slight distinction, I think. I think that our guidance yesterday talked of a U.S. request. I think the stories this morning talked --

Q It said the U.S. had passed on a request from the Israelis. That's splitting it rather fine.

A I don't know that it's splitting hairs, but anyway, we wouldn't get into that kind of discussion of diplomatic exchanges.

Q But Alan also said he "would steer you away" from that story.

A That the United States had asked for Israeli support? I think that's why we offered you that guidance.

Q Isn't it true that when the United States passes on such a request, there is an implicit support for such a thing?

A I don't think I'd care to get into that.

Q What about the visit of the Israeli Ambassador here yesterday?

A I don't have a readout. I think he saw Larry Eagleburger. I don't know --

Q Do you know what the subject was?

A I don't know.

Q Anything to do with it? Was this the passing on of the request?

A I think The New York Times' report this morning talked about a message being passed about a week ago.

Q Was this passing on some new request that we will find out about tomorrow?

A Not that I'm aware.

Q Is the United States concerned that Israeli assistance for Phalangists, at least as reported by the papers, at the same time the United States is assisting the Government of Lebanon, may appear in the Middle East that we and the Phalangists are hand in hand -- and the Israelis?

A I'm not going to get into that kind of detail. Our policy in Lebanon has been clear, is clear, and we are working for a truce and for the ultimate withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Q I'd like to follow on the question of an Israeli request, whether it came from the United States or from the Government of Lebanon through the United States. Has the United States passed a request from the Government of Lebanon for IDF assistance in the Shuf?

A You, obviously, didn't hear my answer to the question over here. I said, we're not going to get into that kind of diplomatic interchange. We're not going to tell you what messages we pass for what governments, if we did pass such messages.

Q John, any reaction to the Soviet charges that the U.S. is prepared to unleash a war in the Middle East?

A Those charges are ridiculous. I think the record speaks very plainly. I think the world can see who is for peacekeeping and who is for warfare in the Middle East.

Q John, there is a report this morning that Mr. Cheysson of France is saying the United States pressured France to allow U.S. Marines and U.S. forces to preserve the security of French Multinational Forces in Lebanon.

A I haven't seen that; haven't seen that one by Mr. Cheysson.

Q Independent of whether you've seen the report or not, did the United States suggest that the air strikes that the President authorized this week, did the United States tell France that that would also cover French forces?

A I think Mr. Romberg really responded to that yesterday. Our Marines, if they require support from offshore, certainly have it. There certainly is consultation between the various components of the MNF, and I think that where that support might be used in the support of other elements of the MNF would be something that would be determined on the ground in the light of a particular situation.

Q In consultation with the other members of the MNF at that time on the ground?

A Yes, sure.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on Palestinian fighter involvement in the combat that is under way now, or the fighting that is under way now, in the area of the Shuf?

A I don't know that I can be more specific today. I think we have offered something on PLO and Palestinian involvement, but I don't have an update for you.

Q There is a hard report out of a Lebanese Government official in Beirut saying that (unintelligible) PLO or PLO-related fighters are still on the ground. I'm just wondering -- we are not advised by our own resources that there is increasing Palestinian involvement?

A I don't have an update for you today, but certainly we have had words before on the extent of Palestinian and PLO involvement.

Q Is it increasing now?

A I would have to look into that for you.

Q John, I think the business about the reply yesterday and your replies today cannot end there.

A Ah-hah.

Q It raises a very, very serious credibility problem eminating from that lectern. If you choose to take these legalistic responses, and find refuge in a word such as "request," and we get guidance yesterday to "steer you away from the story," that would seem to be less than the kind of candor and integrity we should be expecting from that lectern. I would like to call the attention of this briefing to that point -- and make that point.

A O.K. You've made your point. I guess you don't have a question. I guess I would underline, however, that there are two different aspects of the story. There is a question of whether the United States made a request of Israel -- and we're not going to comment on that -- and whether the United States was the vehicle for the transmission of messages from other governments.

Q But the point has already been made, John, that the two are not quite that distinct. If you are becoming a vehicle to relay a request, it indicates some comment on that request, does it not? An approval, an endorsement?

A I guess I'm just really not going to get into that.

Q But that speaks to the point that is being raised by several others here. You can't really differentiate between the two. So it does seem the reply yesterday was somewhat lacking in candor.

A Why don't we leave the discussion there?

Q John, do you have anything on Mr. Son Sann's request for military assistance?

A No.

Q He is seeing the Secretary, I see, today.

A Yes. As you know, there has not been U.S. military assistance, and there would be no change in that. That's the general statement.

Q No change in our overall policy on this whole question?

A No.

-- MORE --

Q No military aid?

A Correct.

Q John, on the Korean airliner incident, are there other measures that the Administration has under consideration vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

A I think the focus really today is on Montreal. The ICAO meeting was due to begin at 11:00 a.m. Korea was to speak first. The United States will be making a statement today, and we expect a large number of other countries to speak.

I don't have the text of the U.S. statement available at the moment. I might have it a little later on. There have been extensive discussions about possible resolutions and a number of draft texts are circulating, but there's no formal text been presented yet. We expect the meeting will last through tomorrow.

Q I'm talking about bilateral U.S.-Soviet actions. Are there other steps, measures, being considered, particularly at the National Security Council?

A Why don't you ask the official who will be doing a briefing very shortly on that? He'll be talking about measures.

Q John, have the President and the Secretary discussed the question of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting later this month, and has a decision been made on that?

A I don't know whether they have talked about it this week. The Secretary has seen the President several times, I think, this week, but I don't know whether they specifically discussed that.

Q Is it unlikely that the meeting will be held?

A I don't know. As the Secretary and others said after Madrid, we would be talking about that possibility later.

Q One official I understand -- not the Secretary, but another official -- has been quoted as saying that it's 98% impossible or unlikely to occur. Is that accurate?

A I'd wait and see what the decision is.

Q Do you expect a decision this week?

A I don't know.

Q John, on the negotiations with Syria, the Middle East, Lebanon, etc., does the U.S. believe that Syria is interested in peace and stability in Lebanon?

A Certain aspects of the Syrian role clearly have not been helpful, but, nevertheless, we believe that all the parties can be persuaded of the obvious advantages of peace, and that is the thrust of our diplomatic endeavor.

Q Based on what? Given the record of --

A It is in the interests, I think, of most countries in the region that there be a stable Lebanon, and that is what we're working for.

Q Are the Syrians supplying the Druze with their material for war?

A I can't pinpoint the supplies, but there certainly isn't any question about Syrian supplies moving into Lebanon.

Q Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem this morning on "Good Morning, America" said that he expected the Marines to be withdrawn within the next few months. Is that too optimistic a view, and what's the latest on War Powers Act debate?

A I don't know of any plans to remove the Marines or to change their number or change their role. As for the War Powers situation, I think you'd have to talk to the White House about that. As you know, they are involved in discussions about that.

Q John, back to the Syrians, is the United States in the McFarlane negotiations offering the Syrians anything on the part of the United States for a Syrian agreement to the cease-fire package?

A What do you mean by "offering"? I mean, offering the hope of peace, offering the hope of stability, or offering packages of tangible things, or --

Q Exactly.

A The answer to the latter is no.

Q So it's just simply an offer of peace in the area?

A And underlining the obvious advantages to all concerned for a stable Lebanon and the end of bloodshed and the end of killing.

Q Is the United States agreeing to anything that the Syrians may be asking for? For example, I think of a sort of, let us say, an international conference in which the United States and Moscow would get together to talk about future Middle East --

A I think the role of the Saudis and ourselves is really to facilitate and try to bring the parties together and provide the forum in which differences might be resolved. It's not so much a question of the United States advancing plans and being a direct participant. It is really a facilitative and diplomatic role.

Q Is Syria asking for any Moscow role in these talks with McFarlane?

A I'm not aware of that, Bernie.

Q Could you take a crack at it?

A Okay. Let me see what we have on it.

Q Has the United States talked --

A I need to go back and make it clear that I won't get into what is going on between Ambassador McFarlane and the Syrians. But on the broader question of whether Syria has made any pronouncements about the involvement of the Soviet Union, we'll take a look at that.

Q John, has the United States talked with the Soviet Union about this Syrian-Lebanon issue since the KAL flight?

A I'm not sure what kind of discussion there has been since the shooting down of the KAL flight, but I think you may be assured that the Soviet Union is well aware of our position. But I don't know what specific discussions, if any, have taken place.

Q What I'm getting at is that the negotiations obviously are at an interesting point right now. My question is whether the United States and the Soviet Union are dealing with one another on this issue?

A I can't answer that question for you.

Q Do you have any response, John -- to follow that up -- to the Soviet statement about the arms talks, that they're unrelated to the --

A I think you were offered something on that yesterday.

Q John, now that Prime Minister Begin has formally resigned, do you have a statement?

A I think probably not a great deal more than we had before. We obviously wish Prime Minister Begin well. He's played a unique and central role in the history of his country.

His dedication to peace and his efforts on behalf of the Israeli people are truly commendable. His statesmanship and leadership have been a source of inspiration.

Prime Minister Begin has shown the courage and determination to make the kind of difficult decisions for peace as demonstrated at Camp David which are so necessary to bring stability to this troubled region.

Q Do you know if the President or the Secretary will communicate directly with him, will send him any messages?

A I think you ought to ask the White House about that.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Does the United States Government have any information that leads it to believe that President Hafez al-Assad has given up his long established goal of incorporating much of Lebanon into greater Syria?

A I think the Syrians have made clear that they have interests in Lebanon, but we are certainly pursuing -- we support very strongly the sovereignty of Lebanon and the legitimacy of its government, and we are underlining that support in the course of our negotiations.

Q To follow, that's established, but you spoke in terms of the Syrians having something to gain from peace and stability in Lebanon.

A Yes.

Q What?

A How about the absence of war?

Q Hafez al-Assad has been pursuing a policy of attempting to incorporate as much of Lebanon, hasn't he?

A I guess you'll have to ask him what his motiviations and aims are.

Q My question to you was, does our government have reason to believe that he has abandoned that path?

A We have reason to believe that there is merit in pursuing these diplomatic negotiations to bring peace to Lebanon, and that's what we're doing.

Q John, do you accept the premise of his question that Hafez al-Assad is --

A No. We're not going to characterize Syria's motivations. I mean, that would be a --

Q There was a report this morning that the Soviets had a ship with diving equipment in the Sea of Japan and may be involved in some kind of a salvage operation.

Do you have any --

A I don't have any independent confirmation. I have seen the reports. There seems to be a certain amount of validity to those reports that there is a fair amount of Soviet naval activity.

Q We have no indication that they have found anything or about to find anything?

A No. We have ships in the area as well. You might ask the Pentagon whether we have anything from our people.

Q Are those ships in Soviet waters as far as you know?

A No. Our ships in Soviet waters? No.

Q Are you sure?

A I'm positive. (Laughter)

Q John, what has happened to the U.S. request for compensation? Have we found a way to make the Soviets accept it?

A I'll have to do a little homework on where that has gone.

Q What about that letter? Did we ever get that to the Soviet Union?

A That's what I'll have to do a little research on. Do you have anything? The deliverance of the letter after the non-acceptance?

MR. ROMBERG: It was provided to the Soviet Embassy.

MR. HUGHES: It was delivered to the Soviet Embassy?

MR ROMBERG: It was sent.

MR HUGHES: It was sent to the Soviet Embassy?

Q Was it received in the mail?

MR. ROMBERG: We don't have details to provide.

MR. HUGHES: That's why I said I'd have to do a little homework on that. (Laughter)

Q Do you have something on the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Brazil?

A No, I don't. I might have something later in the day. I don't have anything for you now.

2-16

Q   Is Shultz seeing Dobrynin or planning to?

A   Not to my knowledge.

Q   Any plans?

A   I don't know of any plans.

Q   Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, September 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #163

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1983, 12:32 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a couple of announcements up front:

Firstly, your State Department press passes' renewal will begin October 10. That's --

Q Would you start again? I'm sorry.

MR. HUGHES: The renewal of your State Department press pass will begin on October 10, Bernie. I think everybody else got it, but I just repeat it for you.

The pass is valid through the end of October -- the existing pass -- and I'll give you further information on that as it becomes available.

At 1:00 o'clock today we will have available for release the text of a letter from President Reagan to Bruno Kreisky, responding to the former Austrian Chancellor's letter on the impact of arms control questions on European public opinion.

Thirdly, a statement on presentation of a diplomatic note to the Soviet Union this morning:

This morning Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Richard Burt called in Soviet Minister Sokolov and presented him with a second diplomatic note demanding that the Soviet Union accept diplomatic notes which the U.S. has attempted to present the Soviets on its behalf -- that's the United States -- and on behalf on the Republic of Korea.

These notes demand compensation from the Soviet Union for the lives and property of United States and Korean nationals lost as a result of the wrongful shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 on September 1. The presentation of claims of this nature by one state against another through diplomatic communications and the consequent payment of appropriately substantiated claims is an established international practice with hundreds of precedents going back several centuries.

After this briefing we will be happy to make the text of the notes available, but briefly the note presented this morning reiterated the U.S. position that the Soviet Union's actions in firing upon and destroying the airliner were wrongful under international law and require compensation. The note also reiterated the similar position of the Republic of Korea.

Today's note said that the United States would regard a second Soviet refusal to accept the previous diplomatic notes as an additional delict or violation which would give rise to a right to additional redress under international law. So we'll make those --

Q Did he accept it?

A He did not accept the note formally on this occasion, but the note has since been delivered to the Soviet Embassy.

Q Was it accepted there?

A It has not, as of 12:36, been returned to us.

Q I lost you there.

Q What does it mean, John, when he doesn't accept it? Does he throw it back at you? Does he refuse to take the thing in his hands, to --

A I guess he refused to accept it formally during the meeting, and so we sent it around physically.

Q Did he read it out to him during the meeting?

A It was presented and handed. It was left at the Soviet Embassy. It has not so far been returned.

Q Could I just follow on my question? What happened during the meeting with Burt? Did Burt read him the thing and then try to give him it to him, and he said, "I'm not going to accept it?"

A I wasn't at the meeting, but I think that that's a fair, I think, scenario.

Q Are you talking about the second note?

A I'm talking about a second note today.

Q Did he accept that second note?

A No. He did not.

Q Does the second note differ in any substantial manner from the first one of a few days ago?

A I think it makes the point that continued refusal to accept these notes would open the way to international legal action.

Q Otherwise it repeats the other part of it?

A It repeats the substance of the other. We'll give you these notes. But you can have --

Q Was the note left at the Embassy left inside the Chancery or outside the Chancery?

A I don't know how it was delivered physically.

Q Can you find out about the mechanism on that, John?

A No. I think we'll just assure you that it was delivered, and it has not so far been returned.

Q Could you tell who took it? At what level?

A No, I can't.

Q Could you discuss additional international redress? What do you have in mind?

A That's something we're looking at. I don't have anything for you in detail.

Q What are available?

A There is the International Court of Justice.

Q They don't recognize its jurisdiction.

A We're looking at what --

Q Was it one note that was read today, or two? You're a little blurred --

A It was a second note referring to the two previous notes, one presented by ourselves on behalf of the Government of Korea and one in our own right, which they had earlier refused to accept.

Q John, can you say what his response is in not accepting the note? Did he say anything at all? Did he give any explanation?

A No. I don't know what he said.

Q John, the other day Alan said that the notes had been forwarded -- the first notes had been forwarded to the Soviet Embassy.

A That's correct.

Q Were they returned on that occasion?

A They have not, to my knowldedge, so far been returned.

Q John, did --

A You need to be careful about the difference here between physical delivery of notes and formal diplomatic acceptance of notes.

Q John, there's a conflict here. Yesterday, on background, an American official said that the note had not been -- this is the first note -- had not been delivered to the Embassy.

A You need to be careful about the distinction between physical delivery and official diplomatic acceptance. It is one thing to put something in the mail or hand it in at an Embassy. It is another thing to formally present it to a diplomat and have it accepted.

Q John, can we infer from what you're saying now that continued refusal to accept these notes by the Soviet Union could conceivably jeopardize our diplomatic relationship?

A No. I don't think we said that. I think what this language suggests is that continued refusal to accept these notes opens the way to further international legal action.

Q Where? How?

A You weren't listening when I said I wasn't going to talk about that. You really have to listen more carefully.

Q It was a jangle of voices, John. It was very unclear.

A Okay. All right.

Q While we're on the note business, Taiwan also had a number of people on the plane. Have they asked the United States to deliver a note for them requesting compensation along the lines of the one of the Koreans?

A I'm not aware of any such request.

Q Could you check and see if that's the case.

A Let me see what we might --

Q Did the matter of the Governors of New York and New Jersey refusing landing rights to the Gromyko plane come up during this meeting with Sokolov?

A I do not know whether that specifically came up at this meeting, Jim, but I'm aware of the situation in which you're --

Q What is the situation?

A I think the facts are that Mr. Gromyko will not arrive on an Aeroflot plane, and we are looking at the manner in which he might arrive. That, of course, is a U.N. representation which we accept. We're not going to bar people from attending the U.N., so we have no problem with Mr. Gromyko coming.

Q Have the Soviets told you he is not coming on an Aeroflot --

A No, no. We're saying that he will not come --

Q You're not going to allow him to land anywhere.

A Let me see if I can give you a little more specific language on that. He will not be coming on a civilian Aeroflot aircraft. The Department of State has approved Soviet requests for a special flight to bring Mr. Gromyko and the Soviet delegation to New York to participate in the U.N. General Assembly session, but the Soviets have been informed -- and I'm not sure whether that was at this morning's meeting or not -- by Assistant Secretary Burt that they will have to use non-civilian aircraft, and that plane will not land at a U.S. commercial airport.

Q Non-civilian means military?

A In my book it does. Yes.

Q Wait. Can I distinguish on this? He usually comes in a plane that carries the Aeroflot designation, but it's clearly a government plane. Does that meet your requirements, or does it have to have "Aeroflot" not on the --

A I can't get into the details, but he will not land at a commercial airport, and I presume that means a military airport, which is something we're looking at; and, obviously, the Pentagon has all kinds of rules and regulations about what kinds of aircraft fly into those bases.

Q But wait -- his plane has landed in the past at Andrews.

A Yes. I'm not suggesting that it will land at Andrews.

Q John, have you heard whether he may not care for the specifics that you're outlining here and may boycott the meeting?

A I have not so heard. Have no indication.

Q Are you suggesting a non-civilian aircraft, a Soviet military plane?

A Yes.

Q And would it land at, say, McGuire, or some place like that?

A It might land somewhere in the vicinity of New York.

Q A lot of commercial airports have military sides to them, whether National Guard or -- are you thinking in terms of something like that?

A No. We're in the middle of this, but I don't want -- we do not expect him to land at a commercial airport.

Q John, what's the significance of not allowing him to land in an Aeroflot plane, but allowing him to land in a Russian military plane? What's the difference?

A I think you'd have to talk to the Pentagon about that. They run military airfields.

Q This is as a result of the ban on Aeroflot, isn't it?

A As I understand it, the local authorities in New York and New Jersey would not permit him to land at a commercial airport, so its academic.

Q John, are we trying to discourage him from coming, or just trying to embarrass him?

A No. It's not a question of trying to discourage him from coming. It's a question of facing the realities of the decision by the local authorities in certain states, which have said that he can't land --

Q You won't let him land at a military airfield in an Aeroflot plane, is that what you're saying?

A That's correct.

Q Have they -- have the Russians -- I'm a little lost on this. You say he will not be coming.

A No, no. I didn't say that.

Q That's what you did say.

A No, I didn't.

Q You say, "He will not be coming on a civilian aircraft," the rest of the sentence --

A You have to listen more carefully, Bernie.

Q I'm listening very carefully, and your reminders of that will not get you off the hook when you start blurring your replies to us.

A I'm not going to blur my replies to you, but I'm --

Q The question is: He will not be coming on a civilian aircraft --

A Correct --

Q Does that mean --

A That's what I said the first time around. You didn't understand that, but that's what I said.

Q Shall we continue this, or --

A No. I'll take another question. Let's take another question.

Q The question is, is this --

A I'm not answering your question --

Q -- have the Soviets been told that?

A I'm not answering your question, Bernie.

Q Is it possible, John, that the -- is there a legal thing here? Is it possible that the local governments might be taking action in violation of the U.S.-U.N. host country agreement?

A I think that's a legal question, but, I mean, you have to face the realities of what is happening. They have so decided: that they are not going to accept this plane.

Q How about the other Aeroflot flights that have been coming in ever since the ban?

A I'm not aware of any.

Q Well, about 15 come in a year to -- bringing in stuff for the Embassy.

A Not since the shooting down of the Korean plane.

Q Did the State Department protest --

A I don't want to mislead you. The fact is that the schedule has not provided for any to come in since the shooting down of the Korean plane.

Q You're saying that none -- after the Korean plane incident, unless things change, those diplomatic Aeroflot flights would not continue?

A No. I think that was made clear in a background briefing you had yesterday, that those are an exception to the ban on scheduled Aeroflot flights. But the fact of the matter is that none of those flights covered under that exception have come in since the shooting down of the Korean plane, and none were planned.

Q Can Gromyko come in on a diplomatic flight? Is there a diplomatic exception for Mr. Gromyko?

A To what airport?

Q You tell us. Where can they come?

A They cannot come in to a commercial airport, and we are saying that they cannot bring an Aeroflot plane into a military base.

Q Does that, then, -- just to get to the bottom line -- does that mean it must be a government or miliary plane, and it must be at a government or military airport?

A This is exactly what we're right in the middle of, but it seems to me you're going in the logical direction. I mean, obviously, this is a matter for discussion back and forth.

Q Have you precluded him coming in on a Polish or a Czech or any other type of airline?

A I'm not aware of any plans for him to come in on any other plane.

Q Did you say that the Department of State had approved a Soviet request for a special flight for Gromyko?

A In connection with attendance at the U.N., yes.

Q But they have asked for him to come in on a military flight, so if --

Q No. They did not ask.

Q Have they asked or not?

A It is my impression that they have.

Q They have asked. So much of what we have said here is academic and beside the point, is that not the case? They have asked for him to come in on a military flight; you've said yes. Question closed.

A What I've said is that he is not able to come in at a commercial airport. That is clear. He's not going to be permitted to do that because of decisions by the local authorities.

In line with our agreement on attendance at the U.N., we're not going to prevent this flight, but that means, presumably, that he will have to come in to a military airfield, and that's the kind of thing we're discussing right now.

Q And have they asked --

A But if he comes in to a military airfield, it will not be in an Aeroflot plane.

-- MORE --

Q Have they asked for him to come in in a military plane?

A We're in the middle of discussions now.

Q I just want to make sure so that you don't look like you've lost the battle here. As I understand it, there are no such things as a VIP Soviet military aircraft. There are Soviet VIP aircraft that are used by Soviet leaders just as Secretary Shultz uses Air Force planes, except those Soviet VIP planes always have Aeroflot on them. If he uses his government plane, will that be regarded as a civilian airliner?

A When we get the specifics, when and if they tell us what kind of aircraft they're coming in on and when we tell them where they can land, I guess then we will attend to those details. But our position is that he will not come in on an Aeroflot plane to a military base.

Q Did we advise the local authorities in New York or New Jersey on this? Did they ask the State Department's opinion? Did we try to discourage them or encourage them?

A No. It's not a question of trying to discourage them. We made the normal applications to the Port Authority to permit them to land, and they declined those applications. They decided against them.

Q What if he would boycott the United Nations General Assembly and he will hold a meeting in Geneva or another place, other third world countries, and possibily split the whole United Nations as a result of this?

A Well, hypothetical situation.

Q Another subject. Would you be able to clarify for us an initial -- my understanding of the permission of President Reagan is for the local commander of the Marines to use the aircraft against anybody who hit the Marines, your political and diplomatic presence, the MNF or the Lebanese Army -- hitting the Lebanese Army endangers the safety of the Marines. Is it so?

A I'm sorry, I didn't get the question. It was rather a long preamble. Your question is?

Q The question is, the permission for the local commander of the Marines to ask -- my clarification -- is he permitted to use it or to ask to use it, and who makes the decision?

A As has been the case, he is, and has been, authorized to request air and artillery support.

Q But who makes the decision? Is it Washington or he himself makes the decision?

A I can't tell you how far up the line that goes.

Q Second. In what sort of case -- yesterday, in the face French assistance that they don't need your help, you issued a statement a couple days ago saying there is no automatic provision for the Marines to send the fighters to defend the MNF forces.

What is left is the fourth point in the four points that I've mentioned -- namely, when the Lebanese Army is hit and the safety of the Marines is in danger. ABC Nightly News, the correspondent of ABC in the Pentagon, quoting high offcals in this Administration, says that this decision has been rescinded, which means that the aircraft would not be used to defend the Lebanese Army in this case. Is it true?

A Let me see if we have something for you in terms of guidance. Let me take a look at that.

Q Along those lines, do you have anything on the Lebanese Air Force plane that was downed and the others that had to land in Cyprus instead of Lebanon, and if that ties in?

A No, I really don't have much more than a very brief report. There was fighting today in the vicinity of Suq al-Gharb and Qabr Shamun on the ridgeline overlooking Beirut. The Lebanese Army was supported by Hawker Hunter aircraft from the Lebanese Air Force. To our knowledge, one of the aircraft ditched in the waters off Beirut. Its pilot was rescued by a U.S. Navy helicopter.

Beirut itself remains relatively quiet. There is occasional, sporadic and uncoordinated firing.

According to our Marines, several mortar rounds landed near one of their positions early on Friday morning. Thee were no casualties, and around mid-morning Beirut time three rounds hit near the British Embassy.

Q Do you have anything on McFarlane and Fairbanks today?

A No. McFarlane is in Beirut today, continuing with his diplomatic --

Q You said the ceasefire negotiations were moving very fast. How would you characterize their movement today?

A It's still a fast-moving negotiation, but I don't have anything beyond what I had yesterday to offer you. Everybody is deeply involved in the back and forth; the Saudis are, we are.

Q Is your main concern now to create this --protecting the Marines and the Lebanese Army -- much more than to go about the national reconciliation efforts which have been stymied? What is your priority now on that?

A It's not a question of putting them in priority. Obviously, we are going to defend our Marines, but obviously we are working hard on the diplomatic front for a ceasefire. There has been talk of further conferring towards national reconciliation, and where we can facilitate all of that diplomatic movement. And we are deeply involved in it.

Q Are you taking into consideration the two statements which were aired on ABC "Nightline" and "This Week with David Brinkely" by Walid Jumblatt, saying that as long as the Lebanese Army and the Phalangists are in the Shuf Mountains, we will let the Arabs sit around the tables and talk?

A I think you have to keep on trying. I don't think you conduct your diplomatic business on the television programs or in the newspapers. You do it privately, and sometimes, I think, people say different things privately to what they said publicly.

Q On the War Powers Act, I would like to ask, the Administration seems to say that the War Powers Act will send the wrong signal to the Syrians by putting a cap to the length of the stay of the Marines.

How can this argument hold water in face of the apparent will by the majority of the Democrats in both Houses to permit the stay of the Marines if the War Powers Act is invoked?

A I think that on that War Powers situation, you really ought to talk to the White House. They are involved in discussion and consultations with Congress, and

I think while that is going on we won't have anything to say about it from here.

Q Before we go on another thing, could we have a filing break, please.

A Sure.

Q So far, have you substantiated the Syrian involvement in the war in the mountains in Lebanon?

A Nothing beyond what we've given you in terms of obvious supply and training, but I don't have any new data for you today.

Q Do you have anything today on further Palestinian involvement, especially in the battle at Suq al-Gharb?

A No, not beyond what I've given you to date.

Q Do you have anything on the Marine commander's statement about the infiltration of the Amal militia into the slums near the airport?

A No, I don't.

Q This is just a detail on counter-measures. Could you confirm, or give any information on the statement made by Larry McDonald's administrative assistant that we have been prevented from building our Embassy in Moscow while the Soviets have continued to build theirs here, and he suggests this as a counter-measure?

A I don't know what the state of construction is on the new Embassy in Moscow.

Q Could you take that as a question?

A I'll take a look at it. Yes. Right away.

Q John, since the Western airline ban began today in the Soviet Union, are you at all concerned by U.S. travelers over there possibily being stranded and having to make other arrangements to get out?

A There are some stranded there. That's absolutely true. As we indicated in our September 8 travel advisory, American travelers should be aware that the ban on civil airline flights to Moscow by members of the World Pilot Association and the decision of several countries and airlines to suspend flights to and from the Soviet Union have disrupted air travel to the Soviet Union.

Some travelers have been obliged to arrange alternate transportation out of the Soviet Union, and it also appears that the Soviet airline Aeroflot is no longer honoring tickets on U.S. carrier stock, obliging travelers with such tickets to purchase new tickets. The Soviets are requiring them to pay in hard currency or with credit cards. So far most American travelers have been able to leave the Soviet Union, but often after delays and additional expense.

Q Is there anything the State Department will do to help out if the situation gets pretty bad?

A I don't know of any specific plans, but I'm sure our Consular officials in Moscow are being as helpful as they can.

Q Can I go back for a minute to -- what was the sequence in which you advised the Soviets that they could not come in here with an Aeroflot plane for Gromyko? Did you advise them first and they then got your approval, got approval for, made application for a military flight?

A This is an on-going situation, so I'm not suggesting that everything is cut-and-dry. What I'm suggesting is that there was an application, in terms of our obligations in terms of U.N. attendance. We sought permission for them to land in New York or in the New York area. That permission was denied by the local authorities. So when that became evident, one was presented with a situation where you have to discuss alternative methods for them to get here, but I don't know quite --

Q You then advised them that they could not come with an Aeroflot plane?

A Not into a military base.

Q And is that the sequence of events, John?

A So far as I know, but obviously this is moving along --

Q When exactly did all this take place? Can you tell us that?

A I don't know. I imagine very recently.

Q You said before about asking the Port Authority of New York, you said "we made the normal application."

A Yes.

Q Does that mean that everytime somebody comes in, that somebody from the State Department has to make an application to the Port Authority of New York?

A I don't know how wide that permission goes. But certainly I think in the case of the Soviet Union -- I don't know. I would have to check on what other authorizations were --

Q Have we ever allowed a Soviet military craft to land at an American military base?

A I don't know. A good advisor back there is nodding his head, but of my own knowledge I don't know that.

Q Since Dulles Airport is owned by the FAA, is it considered a commerical airport?

A You'll have to go to some people who have more technical expertise on this than I do.

Q One other question. A while ago someone asked you if the Soviets had asked for a special flight for Gromyko, I thought you said yes.

A Yes.

Q They did?

A Yes, to my knowledge.

Q A special diplomatic or military flight?

A They've asked to bring him here for the U.N. session.

Q Why has the U.S. decidied not to attend the World Energy Conference in India?

A I think we have some guidance from yesterday on that. Why don't you check with the Press Office.

Q Do you have a reaction to the expulsion of the two U.S. diplomats from Afghanistan?

A Not a great deal beyond yesterday, although we did call in the Afghan Charge d'Affaires in Washington. That is Mr. Haider Refq. He was called into the Department yesterday at which time he was told by Deputy Chief of Protocol Richard Gookin that the charges against Mr. Turner and Mr. Blackburn are baseless. That is the new development.

There are in fact, just for your information, about twenty Americans at our Embassy in Kabul. That includes six Marines. The man in charge there is our Charge d'Affaires. His name is Edward Hurwitz. Beyond that, I don't have anything beyond the guidance we gave you yesterday.

Q You can't say they have actually left the country?

A I can't, no.

Q What about the man from Leningrad and his wife who were expelled on Monday? Have they left that country?

A I don't know. Don't have anything further on it.

Q Why do we regard the U.S. presence in Afghanistan as being accreditation to an independent government when the government appears to be under Soviet occupation and it's really, at the moment, a kind of Soviet protectorate? Why don't we have our protest to the Soviets?

A Make a protest to the Soviets?

Q Make it just as a continuation of our problems with the Soviets.

A Because our Embassy is in Kabul and accredited to that particular government.

Q So we're recongizing them, in effect, as independent?

A Yes, with obvious implications about the activity that is going on in that country.

Q I don't recall the charges against the Augustenbergs being also labeled "preposterous and baseless." Should one assume that those terms apply there, or if not, why not?

A I just don't have anything for you on that situation.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:00 P.M.)

Clennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, September 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #164

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1983, 12:30 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Couple of announcements up front.

Secretary of State Shultz will travel to Halifax, Nova Scotia on October 16, for another of the periodic meetings with his counterpart, Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan MacEachen. He'll leave October 16. He'll come back to Washington October 17, the following day. They will discuss bilateral and global issues. This is another of the four such meetings that the Secretary and Mr. MacEachen agreed to hold each year.

We'll put a trip list up for those of you who are interested in going on this trip right after this briefing, and we will take it down Thursday noon.

Q What's the big rush?

A Big rush?

Q Yes.

A Get some decisions before we all take off for the U.N. I think that follows pretty closely on the U.N.

Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden on September 15 in Canberra concluded a major Australian Government review of the ANZUS Treaty and Alliance with an important parliamentary statement. It is a thorough and thoughtful statement on the Alliance and the Treaty on which that Alliance is based.

The United States believes that it admirably reflects the conclusions drawn in the communique issued following the July meeting in Washington of the ANZUS Council. Foreign Minister Hayden's statement thus reaffirms a view held by successive Australian, American and New Zealand Governments for over 30 years that the ANZUS Alliance is vital to the common defense and broader interests of three nations of peoples with a long history of shared values, traditions, friendship and close cooperation in peace and war.

That's all I have for you. Be glad to take any questions.

Q John, can we start with Lebanon? What do you understand the situation there to be, and does it change anything in terms of the War Powers Act?

A We understand that there's been intense fighting in the area during the night and early morning hours involving ground attacks, accompanied by artillery strikes on Lebanese Armed Forces in their positions overlooking Beirut as well as some increased shelling of the city itself.

At last report the LAF had been successful in defending their positions. The LAF has reported the capture at Suq al-Gharb of several foreign military personnel, including a Syrian and a Palestinian. In addition to the LAF utilizing their artillery and limited close air support, the U.S.S. Virginia and U.S.S. Rogers fired naval gunfire in support of the LAF in its defense of those key positions.

That is all I have in the way of an update.

Q Over the weekend the Syrian Government made a statement saying that they would retaliate or respond if any of their people were hit by American gunfire? Do you have any comment on that?

A Not specifically on that, Jim. We're returning fire against artillery positions in Lebanon that are firing on the Marines and the MNF. The nationality of the personnel manning the artillery sites firing against us isn't clear, but we are able to clearly identify which site is firing upon us and return purely defensive fire. In other words, the Marines can target the battery from which the fire came, but they have no way of knowing who is manning that battery.

Q Do you draw any conclusions from the capture of the Syrian?

A No. I don't think so. I think we don't have conclusive evidence of direct Syrian involvement in hostile action against the MNF. As far as the Syrian captured by the LAF, I think we'll have to wait and see what they have to say about that -- what the LAF has to say about that.

Q John, has the U.S. Government said or hinted to the Government of Israel that the Reagan Administration would not be averse to Israeli air actions in Lebanon?

A I think that was already addressed by Mr. Romberg last week.

Q This is fresh. This has to do with whether or not we have hinted or said --

A Don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, is it possible that if the Syrians become more directly involved, that the United States would have to do more in helping out the Lebanese Armed Forces?

A I don't think our rules of engagement, Bernie, have changed. It's not a question about not thinking, I know they have not changed. Our posture is a defensive one, and we have spelled out the extent of that defensive activity, and there's no change in that position.

Q What about the cease-fire efforts? Where's Mr. McFarlane?

A Both Ambassador McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks are in Beirut today. They are continuing their diplomatic efforts to assist in bringing about a cease-fire.

Q John, on that, last week, Alan made something of the McFarlane visit to Damascus, and there was the hint later on background that a senior official suggested that there was the possibility of a breakthrough. I gather that fell through.

A I think that there was a suggestion in some Congressional testimony that one hoped for a ceasefire within 48 hours. Clearly, those hopes have not been fulfilled, and I think any predictions about a time span that might elapse until a ceasefire is achieved is probably unwise to make.

Q How do you explain the fact that there was a such a bad call by a top U.S. official in front of Congress on this issue?

A I don't think it was a bad call, Bernie. I think that official was offering his viewpoint of the situation at a particular point when he was testifying. I think that I and others have said this is a very fast-moving and changing situation, and I think he was expressing hope that we might be near. We still express hope that a cease-fire is near.

Q But his hope had a time element attached to it. Yours does not.

A No. Our does not.

Q May I just pick up. At the outset, you said that U.S. naval gunfire is being used in support of the LAF in defense of these key positions. There was no reference at all to the fact, to the Marine tie-in. Does that mean that it has nothing to do with the Marines?

A There may have been -- I do not know what the situation is. If there was any gunfire on Marine positions today, it was very, very limited. I'm not sure that there was any. But the position insofar as Suq Al-Gharb and its commanding presence over the airport is unchanged.

Our position, I think as we have explained before, is that we would fire defensively on a position if the capture of that position by hostile forces would bring the Marines in danger.

Q That's the point I'm getting at. There was no mention of that at the outset. I'm wondering whether you were changing the policy?

A No. No change.

Q Could I just clarify? I thought you said the first time around that the artillery is in support of the MNF; is that what you said? You were firing on positions which were firing at MNF positions?

A I'm not sure what fire came out of there today. But, clearly the premise holds that fire from Suq Al-Gharb can be directed on the Marines. Whether they fired from there today, I don't know, or what the extent of the shelling was today.

Q I'm just trying to clear up what you said before. I had understood you to say that you were returning fire which had been directed against MNF positions?

A No. "...close air support, the U.S.S. Virginia and and U.S.S. Rogers fired naval gunfire in support of the LAF in defense of those key positions." I'm not sure whether those guns, in fact, today, fired on the Marine positions.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement made by the French External Relations Minister, saying that shelling by U.S. warships off the Beirut area was not the best way to solve the Lebanese crisis?

A No, I don't. We're in close consultation with our Allies, as you know. It's a Multinational Force, and they're operating in its entirely. They're operating with coordination with each other, but I don't have any comment on that report.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that as a result of your -- of the Marine commanders being able to call for -- respond to fire, directed at them, that this has led to any improvement or to any reason to hope that the situation will improve now?

A I don't know. I think that's a judgment that the Marines would have to make. In terms of their military situation, you mean?

Q In terms of the political outcome of this crisis.

A I think that initiative continues to go forward. As far as the Marines and the offshore guns firing back, I think there have been some suggestions that the incoming fire on the Marines has lessened. But I think you really have to ask them. They're on the scene.

Q What effect has this had on negotiations that the U.S. is conducting to try to find a solution to this crisis?

A We're still engaged. The Saudis are still engaged. People are still working at it as energetically as possible. It's (inaudible) problem.

Q Do you have any comment on the implications of Yasser Arafat's return to Lebanon?

A No. It's illegal. It is illegal in terms of the agreement that we undertook, or the Lebanese undertook with the PLO.

Q How about the contention he's making that the agreement was breached because the United States didn't guarantee the safety of the Palestinians?

A I don't think that holds water. We stand by the agreement.

Q I'd like to follow up on that, John. Arafat admits that some Palestinians are fighting in the Shuf. He said their actions -- that is to say, those who are fighting -- are unofficial actions.

How does the United States see the situation, and what if anything can you tell us that's new about Palestinian deployment in the Beirut-Shuf vicinity?

A The reintroduction of PLO forces into the Beirut area is not in accord with the agreement that was signed.

Q Can you flesh that out a little bit? How many PLO, which factions?

A No, I can't.

Q What about Soviet involvement; do you have anything new on that today?

A I really don't. I might have something we can offer you a little -- but it doesn't take it any further, I think. We might have something we can offer you later.

Q On the question of breach of the agreement, is it the U.S. position that there has been no breach of the agreement that was reached?

A That's the U.S. position, that there has been a breach of the agreement --

Q No. With respect to the incidents to which Arafat referred, has there, previous to this, been a breach of that agreement in the U.S. view?

A I think there have been a number of infringements of that agreement which we have addressed in the past.

Q And how would you characterize the Israeli entry into Beirut? Is that a breach of the agreement?

A I'd go back and refer you to the language that we've used previously.

Q Do you have a comment on the Washington Post story today which mentioned that the U.S. Administration is seeking advice, options to halt the Iran-Iraq conflict?

A No, I don't. Our position has been to be uninvolved in that conflict. I don't have anything beyond what we gave you last week, I think, on the visit of an Iraqi minister here.

Q Does the government have a view, or an idea at this point as to what the Syrians would want in exchange for encouraging the Druze to observe a ceasefire?

A No, I don't think we'll get into that. I think that would fall within the purview of Ambassador McFarlane's negotiations, and I don't think we'll expand on that.

Q Are you still sticking with peace and stability the Syrians want?

A Yes. In terms of -- I don't want to steer you in the direction that specifics are being asked for in terms of dollars, or whatever, and are being offered; that's not so.

Q For example, are the Syrians demanding that the agreement between Lebanon and Israel be junked? In fact, is there still an agreement to be junked, or is that pretty much gone by-the-by?

A As far as the United States is concerned, there is an agreement. But I think as far as the Syrian position on that, that would really -- you would have to get that either from them... I guess you would have to get it from them because you won't be able to get it from us.

Q When you said before you don't have any conclusive evidence of direct, hostile actions by Syria against the MNF, do you have that against, by Syria against the Lebanese armed forces?

A I think you really have to talk to them. As I say, they say they captured such an individual today, but I think they will have to expand on that. I think we can speak for what is directed against the MNF.

Q Does the U.S. Government have -- and you quoted the general -- you just quoted what the LAF is saying, about the capturing of Syrians forces --

A Reporting what the LAF was saying about the capture.

Q And the U.S. Government doesn't have any proof of that?

A We do not have any proof of that, no; but have no reason to doubt it either.

Q John, do you find indirect Syrian involvement in the attack?

A I think we've always suggested that there is indirect Syrian involvement in Lebanon.

Q No, I mean in the attacks on the U.S. Marines in the area?

A That's very hard to pinpoint. As I say, you can tell where the gun is but you can't tell who's firing the trigger.

Q What I'm getting at is the testimony that was given by Mr. Veliotes and General Kelly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week when they argued that any actions by Congress were likely to be interpreted by Syria as a weaking of American resolve or cause them to pull the Marines out and would cause them to increase the pressure there.

There seems to be something inconsistent --

A I don't think so. I think those words speak for themselves. But as to a specific question as to whether you can identify who is manning a specific gun, I'm afraid --

Q They must have had something in mind when they referred to Soviet activities.

A I'm sure they have in mind the overall Syrian performance in Lebanon, the continuing occupation throughout Lebanon by the Syrians and the fact that, certainly, some of that artillery which is firing at the Marines is in territory controlled by the Syrians. I think that's what the Marine spokesman out there said today. That doesn't necessarily mean that it's a Syrian crew manning that gun. But that some of that fire has come from Syrian-controlled territory.

Q Associated with that, John, the Times yesterday pointed out that this new series of shelling was the first time American ships had fired at targets within Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon, and the first time American ships appear to have shelled anti-government artillery positions in response to an attack on an non-American target.

Doesn't this represent an escalation of the United States involvement?

A It may represent something that hasn't been done before, but it's not a change in the rules of engagement, and it's not in contradiction of what we have said would happen. Namely, that we may well fire on a position -- if taken by hostile forces -- that would put the Marines in jeopardy.

Q May I ask you one that may be a change? Toward the end of last week it was said that fire would be directed -- I guess fire actually was directed -- against positions which were shelling not the Marines but which were shelling near the British Embassy where the United States diplomatic headquarters is now temporarily located.

At least one statement was made, I believe out of Beirut, saying that an attack on any American could be cause for retaliation by the forces there. Can you explain how far this extends? Americans are widely disbursed there in Lebanon in some places. The story pointed out that the British Embassy is very close to some other targets which are presumably the targets of the shelling.

Who decides, and on what basis, whether some action, which may harm some American in Beirut, is the cause for return fire by the American offshore forces?

A I think the guidance we offered last week did make clear that the protection would encompass diplomatic personnel. It's not only MNF, but it's diplomatic personnel as well.

I think that obviously is in the Beirut area. Who makes the decision, I guess that would start with the Marine commander on the site when called upon to return fire. But how far up that decision is made, I can't answer. I guess you would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q This is removed from the area that the Marines are in, as I understand it. (inaudible)

A For example, the American Ambassador's residence is one area that has been cited, and I'm sure we would protect other American personnel in Beirut.

Q The point is, when you say the decision might start with the Marine commander, the Marine commander, as I understand the situation, may not be anywhere around the area that is getting shelled, if it's around the American Ambassador's residence or the Lebanese President's Palace, or someplace else.

A I'm not sure who is the principal American military agent in Beirut. There may be another individual, but maybe the Pentagon should clarify that for you.

Q You're saying that it is diplomatic personnel --

A Yes.

Q -- who are primarily the ones being protected by this kind of order.

A I wouldn't say "primarily," but I would say that the guidance we offered last week did specifically include diplomatic personnel.

Q On the same question, I was wondering about the other end of the equation. Does it matter to the United States, so far as its response, who is doing the firing and who may be in the vicinity? For instance, there's some theory that the Soviets are in Lebanon but not in this area.

Would the United States pause and consider whether it has a right to retaliate if the retaliation might hit Soviet advisors?

A I think the United States' position in the rules of the engagement are quite clear, that the Marines will defend themselves and they may fire at an artillery piece firing at them. They cannot always be sure who is maning that piece.

Q Do we have a precise definition of the so-called Beirut area, because it seems this is an important point to put if we are talking all around about the Beirut area. When we are talking about the return of the Palestinians, we are talking about the Beirut area.

A We are talking about Beirut and the towns on the ridgeline that command Beirut, but I think I'd urge you to go back to the language we used last week for the specifics of that area. I think we spelled it out.

Q New subject.

Q Only one follow-up, please.

Q Are there Soviet advisors with the Syrians inside Lebanon?

A I think I will take that question for you.

Q Is it now the Administration or government policy that setting a public deadline for withdrawal of the Marines from Lebanon would, in fact, endanger the lives of the Marines that are there now?

A I don't know of any discussion of setting a deadline.

Q Various officials of the Administration have been saying ON BACKGROUND that that would be one of the consequences of setting a deadline. I just wondered, is that, as an official spokesman for the government --

Q It's testimony by Veliotes, your legal advisor, and General Kelly in open session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A I'll leave you with their words. They speak for themselves, but I don't have anything for you today on that.

Q I just checked the wires before the briefing, and the way they're reporting this military engagement is that this U.S. navy fire is in direct support of the Lebanese army to prevent the towns on that ridgeline from falling into anti-government hands.

A That may be correct.

Q Do you dispute that their interpretation of --

A No.

Q You don't?

A I just explained it.

Q You see it that way?

A I don't know -- I mean, obviously things are happening on the ground. I don't know what's happening on the ground. But if that is what is happening, that would not be a contradiction of the rules of engagement.

Q I believe you were asked before whether or not today's actions constituted an escalation. I don't think you gave a direct answer to that. You said it was within the context of the rules of engagement. But within that context, is it an escalation?

A I don't think it's the first time -- it's certainly not the first time we've had naval gunfire.

Q Forty rounds in forty minutes is a lot more than four rounds in a space of 24 hours.

A I'm not sure. I'd have to go back. I think we had something like 60 rounds last week, but I'm not sure. I'll have to check on that. The Pentagon can tell you that.

Q My question still stands. Do you regard this as an escalation?

A How do I know if it's an escalation unless I'm sure we fired more rounds today than we did on the previous occasion. I suppose if we did, then, if you wanted to call that an escalation, I suppose you could. It's certainly not the first time that naval gunfire has been called for.

Q Does it continue to be the Administration's point of view that this is not in the variety of imminent hostilities that would trigger the War Powers Act?

A I think the White House is engaged in discussions with Congressional leaders, and we'll leave that to the White House.

Q I'm told just last week that the Syrians and the Israelis agreed on certain proposals. Since now it failed, can you tell us about these proposals?

A No, I can't. I don't know anything about a Syrian-Israeli agreement.

Q I have two questions please. Does the U.S. Government see any validity to the argument of Mr. Jumblatt that the fighting is taking place because of the presence of Phalange forces and the Lebanese army forces which he also sees as Phalange forces in the Shuf Mountains, and once these forces are out, he thinks that there will be talks on reconciliation?

By the U.S. Government taking a position in direct opposition to that, he thinks that it is taking side with the Gemayel Government.

First of all, do you see any validity to his argument, and do you see his interpretation as being correct?

A The United States is not injecting itself into -- there are obviously internal conflicts, but there are obviously external pressures on Lebanon. We are not injecting ourselves into internal factional disputes.

Basically, the position, not only of the U.S. Marines but of the Multinational Force made up of four nations, is to support the legitimate government of Lebanon, and that's what it is doing. That legitimate government has a national army which has done rather well, and I think that the disposition of that army is something that the President of Lebanon and the Minister of Defense of Lebanon have to decide and would take into consideration in any political decisions that are made concerning a ceasefire, but that's not for us to dictate.

Q Okay. It comes back to the same question that everybody has been asking: How far would the United States be willing to go to protect the legal authority, as you call it in Lebanon, Mr. Gemayel's government, considering the nature of civil war in Lebanon? I mean, how far are you ready to go?

A That's exactly the kind of thing that Ambassador McFarlane is involved in now in attempting to get a ceasefire and attempting to be helpful in the area of national reconciliation. But those are decisions that the Lebanese themselves of various confessional colorations have to make.

Q Just one last thing, please. You said that the argument of Mr. Arafat doesn't hold water. Can you tell us why? I mean, maybe it doesn't but can you tell us why? He claims that the Israelis and the Americans breached the agreement, first, by the Israelis moving into west Lebanon, and (2) by the massacres occurrence which he thinks the United States is responsible for also?

A Yes, I know. But you also have an agreement for an Israeli departure, and the fact is that the PLO were to have departed Beirut with their leadership and they did in terms of that agreement and certain commitments were made to them in terms of their security which were carried out. They were not supposed to come back and they have come back.

Q To Beirut or to Lebanon?

A Sorry?

Q To Beirut or to Lebanon?

A To Beirut. They have come back.

Q They have come back to Beirut?

A If one is to believe these reports of the Palestinians that have since been captured and held --

Q Can you substantiate these reports?

A I think Mr. Arafat's words speak for themselves.

Q To Beirut?

A He talked yesterday of his forces in the environs of Beirut, certainly.

Q What does the U.S. plan to do about it?

A We're doing all we can to bring peace to Lebanon. Have you got a good idea? (Laughter)

Q Yeah, I got some. I'll tell you later.

Q Can I go back to the question that was asked previously about Iran and Iraq? The French Foreign Minister has announced that they're going ahead with their sale of some -- France is going ahead with its sale of some attack airplanes to Iraq, and the President of Iran made a statement over the weekend saying that if any action is taken against Iranian facilities they will close the entire Persian Gulf to oil, at the outflow of oil.

Does the government have a view, the U.S. Government, of France's sale of these attack planes to Iraq, and does it have a view of the threats coming from Tehran to take some action regarding the Persian Gulf?

A I think we've offered some words before on the question of the Gulf, and we can look those up for you. I don't have anything on the French sale. But, I think, in fact, there's a later wrinkle. I think there's a report out today that they're not going ahead, at least for the moment. I think I've seen something a little later on that.

Q If they don't go ahead, does the U.S. have a view on that?

A Still don't have anything for you.

Q To get back to the question of the PLO in Beirut, there were reports out of Israel last week that about 1,000 PLO members were infiltrating in small groups back to Beirut. Can you confirm that?

A No.

Q Are you going on the basis of that information?

A I can't. I don't have anything on that. I'm not steering you one way or the other. I just don't have anything on it.

Q Mr. Raymond Eddih, a Christian Maronite Lebanese leader, well known as a friend of the United States of America, is coming --

A I missed the beginning.

Q Raymond Eddih.

A Oh, yes.

Q He is a Maronite Christian and well known as a friend of the United States, and he is now coming against Gemayel's government operations in Lebanon.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have anything on a report of a Soviet general showing up in Damascus?

A No, I don't, Bernie.

Q One on Syria, please. There is an editorial in today's Wall Street Journal, which recalls the gratitude that the State Department expressed upon the release of Mr. Dodge, the president of the American University in Beirut.

It goes on to suggest that the Syrians were able to exert their influence because they, or in fact the President's brother, were directly involved in the kidnapping in the first place? Do you have any evidence on that?

A I think we're going to be as tight-lipped on the circumstances surrounding Mr. Dodge's release and his imprisonment as were at the time, I think, Jim.

Q Why the secrecy about the involvement of Rafaat Assad? Why the secrecy?

A Primarily, because Mr. Dodge asked for it to be that way. I can't pretend that there are not other factors involved, too; but the base of the motivation was that --

Q Is there any danger that there will not be more Americans (inaudible) Assad and his gangs?

A No. Simply that Mr. Dodge at the time, and consistently since then, has said he prefers not to discuss where he was held or how he was released; and we are honoring that wish on his part, as well as having some consideration of our own.

Q Foreign Minister Cheysson, in his statement today, said that the --

A I'm having difficulty seeing --

Q The Foreign Minister of France today called that U.S. shelling unilateral, and said it could divide the MNF, and I was wondering if there was consultation with the MNF before that took place.

A Our shelling from the -- ?

Q Yes.

A I can't answer that. There certainly has been a lot of consultation there between the governments. The Secretary met with the various Foreign Ministers of the other MNF units in Madrid, and there certainly was harmony of viewpoint at that stage, and there has been consultation since. There certainly is consultation on the ground between the various units, but I don't have anything on it, or whether we informed the others that we were firing, I don't know.

Q John, is there a clear order of battle agreed upon by the members of the MNF, or are they essentially making it up as they go along?

A I think it's a fairly fluid situation.

Q Can you take the question about whether the other UN Multilateral Forces were informed prior?

A Let me take a look at it, sure.

Q Could you in any way give us the U.S. sense of the Syrian attitude in these negotiations? If you can't go into details, that's one thing; but whether the U.S. believes the Syrians are engaging in serious discussions or simply just foot-dragging or stalling, or whatever.

A I think the fact that the Saudis and ourselves have engaged, and continue to engage, in what I presume must be an exhausting business for those involved. The way they are moving around and the hours they are working -- and working through the night, I don't think anybody is getting much sleep. I think the fact that we all persist in this endeavor means that there is hope that there can be a successful diplomatic conclusion.

It's hard to give you odds on the various degrees of enthusiasm of the various parties including the Syrians. You know, it's just very difficult to assess the degree of commitment. But one can only look at the facts: everybody is continuing to talk, including the Syrians.

Q John, on that, the facts, I mean the military situation, I mean, any analysis would suggest that that is really paramount. Would you say this is the decisive battle that is now going on? In other words, if they lose that --

A I think you would have to ask the military experts. I think certainly that town is very important -- there isn't any question about that; but you'd really have to ask the military experts.

Q Do you see a connection between that and the negotiations?

A Well, there often is a connection between the military activity and diplomatic negotiations.

Q John, should the Syrians read the shelling by the U.S. warships in the last 24 hours as a statement by the Reagan Administration of its determination not to let Suq al-Gharb fall?

A I think we've made clear our concerns about Suq al-Gharb and our intent to assist militarily to see that that does not fall into hands of people who could shell our Marines, so we take that seriously.

Q Are the other nations of the MNF as commited as the United States to Suq al-Gharb? It makes one wonder when Cheysson says it's a unilateral action.

A I don't know what their position is -- which points represent -- I don't know whether that point represents a threat to their forces or only to the Marines. Again, I think you would have to ask the military. I guess that point commands the airport where the Marines are. I don't know whether you can fire into the other MNF positions from that point.

Q This point wasn't very clear last week when I happened to have asked the question about Suq al-Gharb. When did it really become so clear, or was there a change as to the United States commitment not to let Suq al-Gharb fall, because I asked this very same question last week, and the answer was --

A I don't know when somebody looked at a map. I guess if you were a Marine sitting at the airport, you probably were fairly conscious of Suq al-Gharb all the time, but I don't know when somebody looked at a map and said, "That is a point from which fire can be directed at the airport."

Q Any chance any Marines might be sent up there to help out?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q On another subject, does it make any difference to the State Department that Foreign Minister Gromyko is not coming to the General Assembly?

A Well, as you know, although there were problems about his flying into a commercial airport in New York, the State Department was working on alternative means for him to come here, and we pursued that, and would be still willing to pursue that. I think the statement that the State Department issued over the weekend indicates that, and indicates that suggestions that we would not take adequate steps to insure his security, and so forth and so on, were incorrect.

We worked at it and remained ready. I think you would have to ask the Soviet Union what the implications are of his not coming.

Q I was asking for the implications as far as the State Department is concerned. Does it make any difference that if the Secretary sees a Soviet he is not seeing the Foreign Minister, but rather the Permanent Representative, for example?

A I can't really give you a "fix" on that particular meeting at the U.N. There are, obviously, other channels for communication between the two countries.

Q Does the Administration believe that perhaps Governors Cuomo and Keane made a strategic error in giving Gromyko a more nearly graceful way to avoid going to the U.N.?

A Well, I don't know. That's sort of academic. The Government had to deal with the situation as it existed. New York and New Jersey made their decisions; the State Department sought to produce alternatives. The Soviets have declined to pursue those.

Q Do you have any guidance on visas to be given to some members of the Council of State of Nicaragua, as well as to Mr. Zamora of El Salvador? Apparently, all those visas have been denied?

A I have a bunch of visa guidance. Which ones are you talking about, basically the Borge one?

Q Well, there's Borge, but there are five other members of the Council of State of Nicaragua who are to come this week.

A I don't have anything on the others. I do have something on Borge which you probably had before.

Q Could we hear that one, and then could we hear --

A Sure. He did request a U.S. visa earlier this year to speak to a number of private groups here. He was informed in August that his entry to the United Staes was approved, but he did not travel here. That apparently was his decision. Should he apply again, we would look at it in accordance with U.S. Immigration law.

Q How about Mr. Zamora of El Salvador, is there anything on that?

A Yes. He is not going to be here; he was refused a visa by the American Embassy in Managua. He is ineligible for a visa under the Immigration & Nationality Act, which prohibits the issuance of visas to aliens who are members of anarchist, communist, or terrorist organizations, or who advocate anarchism, communism, or terrorism.

While the United States is fully supportive of the widest possible dialogue directed toward bringing the Salvadoran left into a democratic process, the State Department's decision took into account Mr. Zamora's remarks when he spoke as a spokesman for the FDR/FMLN during his June visit here, when he said the FMLN took "full responsibility for the murder of Lieutenant Commander Schaufelberger.

Q Just one more question: Does the recent speech last week by Fred Ikle represent U.S. policy in Central America? Other members of the ARA here in this building are saying that that speech distorted U.S. policy. I'm wondering is it in fact policy or not?

A I think you have to look at what Mr. Ikle said in its entirety, and I think Larry Speakes at the White House already addressed that question and answered it.

Q On the same area, do you have anything on the report that Suazo Cordova, the President of Honduras, sent a letter here asking for $400 million in compensation?

A Yes, I do, and I will read it to you just as soon as I find it.

We don't, as you know, basically comment on reports of exchanges of communications between heads of state. However, the Honduran Government has never requested aid in exchange for holding joint military exercises with U.S. troops or for establishing a Regional Military Training Center. Also, that training center is not a U.S. base, but it is a Honduran facility.

Our requests for economic and security assistance for Honduras are a matter of public record. FY-83 economic assistance will total just a little over $100 million and security assistance $37 million. The FY-84 request, which is still before Congress, is for $85 million in economic assistance and $41 million in security assistance.

Q A copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Also, are you denying the existence of such a letter?

A I think we've gone a little further than we would ordinarily do. As you know, we don't ordinarily discuss communications between our leaders, but we are going a little further than we ordinarily do in order to correct some misapprehension. But I'm not confirming a specific letter at a specific time.

Q John, beyond the recent (inaudible) I understand that Commander Carlos Nunez who was the president of the Council of State of Nicaragua, had applied for a visa to be here today, and that it was denied.

A I think that one is still under consideration. Yes, it is.

Q Going on on the same subject, if Rubin Zamora was refused a visa, presumably, for advocating anarchism, communism, or terrorism, what about the representatives of the FDR/FMLN here in Washington now? They have, I understand, two representatives here in Washington.

A Permanent, you mean?

Q Yes.

A I can't answer that one, just don't know. Don't know the answer to that question.

Q On Gromyko, can I take you back there, please? You said we'd still be willing to pursue, looking for alternate ways.

A Yes.

Q Has the U.S. formally told that to the Russians, and have the Russians responded?

A Oh, I think that's implicit, Bernie, in what we've said to them, and I think they have been just as clear that they are not interested in pursuing it.

Q But we haven't told them that formally, it's just a --

A I think in the discussions back and forth on alternatives, it was quite clear that we were prepared to be helpful within the guidelines we had set in assisting them to come here. We were not saying Mr. Gromyko should not come here; we were responding to the Port Authority decision in New York and New Jersey.

Q You regard that as a closed case now, since you seem to be putting that in the past tense?

A I think it's closed as far as Mr. Gromyko is concerned. Obviously, members of the delegation will come here, and I think they have indicated they will come by commercial means. But I think as far as Mr. Gromyko is concerned, he has made it clear that he will not be coming.

Q Do you know why the State Department never has criticized the governors for their action?

A I don't think it's a question of not criticizing; I think it's a question of facing a *fait accompli*. We had made the routine application; they denied it, and we then quickly got into a discussion of alternative routes and bases.

Q The State Department often issues statements even in a most minor interference by local authorities in foreign matters. In this case, you have been unusually complacent, I think, or would you not agree with that?

A I'll agree that we haven't issued a statement on it. We have moved on to other alternative methods of arrival without specifically taking it up with them.

Q John, recently you issued a statement on an action of the Massachusetts State Legislature in regard to Sri Lanka.

A That one got by me, I'm afraid.

(Laughter)

Q Why -- (Inaudible)

A With legislatures so busy, one can't keep up with all of them, I guess.

Q The implication of what you're saying is that this was really due to a response to the governors' action. Was the U.S. Government moving to deny the landing of an Aeroflot plane even before the governors took their action?

A On the question of Aeroflot, yes; you have a point on Aeroflot. Irrespective of what kind of aircraft, if your question is, was the United States moving to stop Gromyko's coming here, the answer to that is no.

Q I meant in an Aeroflot plane -- Gromyko in an Aeroflot plane, not this general, world-wide --

A I think perhaps not initially, at the time of the initial application to the Port Authorities in New York and New Jersey, but I think on reviewing the situation, yes, the Administration clearly decided that it would not be appropriate.

Q Even before the Governors took their action?

A I can't give you the time frame of when that decision was made; but I think clearly, the Administration was moving in that direction, that it would be inappropriate for an Aeroflot -- In view of the fact that various other governments are taking action against Aeroflot, it would not be appropriate.

Q What generated the second thinking of the Administration on the subject?

A Oh, I really can't give you a detailed accounting, Don.

Q But officially, you were ready to accept an Aeroflot -- would you say that?

A It might have been. I'm not sure what the initial thinking was about the initial flight. I'm not sure how much detail it had gone into, or had been gone into about what kind of aircraft it was. It may well be that initially the thinking was that an Aeroflot plane might have gone into New York; but it certainly at some stage, the Administration decided that it would not be appropriate.

Q If you had found an airfield in Connecticut, or Boston or somewhere like that, even then, which would accept an Aeroflot plane, the State Department would not have accepted it; is that what you're saying?

A I think that the Administration -- and I can't tell you over what precise time -- had arrived at the point where a plane with Aeroflot markings would not be appropriate.

Q So, the matter of the Governors was really irrelevant; it was a State Department decision?

A The State Department moved beyond that, and were looking at other alternatives. I mean there is not a question of his not having been able to come had he really wanted to. But certainly, we had said that an Aeroflot plane would be out of the question.

Q John, what is to stop the Governors of New York and New Jersey from denying access in the future to other unpopular leaders?

A I guess that's a legal question that we'd have have to take a look at.

Q Do you think that you have complied with the Headquarters agreement by offering alternative landing sites?

A You're getting into an interesting legal question about the role between the local authorities and the Federal Government. I think the Federal Government has, because obviously, there were other alternatives and other airports available, and we attempted to pursue them. So I think we did not contravene the agreement, have not contravened the agreement, because we have sought to find ways to bring him here.

As to the legality of the decision by a local authority to bar a specific flight, I think that's a question I can't answer.

Q John, I wanted to ask the same sort of question John did. Isn't this a treaty, this agreement, doesn't it have the status of a treaty, and isn't a treaty the law of the land, and doesn't federal law take precedence over state law?

A The Federal Government sought to adhere to the agreement by making it possible for Mr. Gromyko to come here. What you're asking is, did the local authority get in the way?

Q They created an impediment. That's what the language of the agreement is -- it's an impediment.

A If he had been prevented. I mean, there are lots of airports in the United States.

Q No, it doesn't say "prevention"; it says "an impediment."

A But the agreement doesn't say he has to come into that particular airport.

Q Of course not. Probably, that airport wasn't even built at the time, in 1947.

Q Do you have any reaction to some apparent action by some Afghanistan planes bombing across the border of Pakistan?

A Yes, I do.

On September 18, six or seven MIG aircraft entered Pakistani airspace near the City of Parachinar -- not sure I'm in the getting that pronunciation correct -- Northwest Frontier Province. We don't know whether they were Afghan or Soviet planes. The aircraft dropped nine bombs on a neighboring village, and injured at least two civilians. There is an unconfirmed report that one person died in the attack. The aircraft penetrated some 16 to 17 miles into Pakistani airspace.

The United States believes that this sort of incident highlights the need for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Afghanistan caused by the Soviet's invasion of 1979 and their brutal war against the Afghan people. The United States calls upon the Soviets to cease their disregard for international legality and the accepted norms of civilized international behavior.

Q Copies?

A Sure.

Q John, would you say that the United States Government is pleased or disappointed that Mr. Gromyko has decided not to come?

A Don't have a comment on that.

Q Back to Afghanistan, has there been any further action by the U.S. Government or any further ramifications of the action taken last week by Afghanistan in telling two U.S. diplomats they had to leave right away?

A No, I do not think there has been any further action. Let me check on that for you, but I don't think --

Q Have they left, do you know?

A I'm not sure. Be glad to check for you.

Q John, could you take the question of whether, consistent with the denial of the visa to Zamora, does the Administration plan to review the status of the two Salvadoran citizens who reside in Washington, who claim to represent the FDR?

A Let me look at it. O.K.?

Q Do you have anything either on the difficulties reported about arranging a meeting in El Salvador between the Peace Commission and the FDR/FLMN?

A No.

Q You had nothing? Secondly, do you have anything on the reports of renewed "death squad" activities by the anti-communists?

A No, I do not.

(The briefing concluded at 1:18 p.m.)

Glen C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, September 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #165

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1983, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements up front. Available in the Press Office is the testimony of Dr. Charles Fairbanks, Jr. He's Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. He gave his testimony before the Human Rights and International Organization Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The subject was psychiatric abuse in the Soviet Union.

Q Where did you say that was available?

A In the Press Office.

You want to pause and rush out and get it?

At the invitation of the Secretary of State, Foreign Minister of the Hungarian Peoples Republic, Peter Varkonyi is paying a working visit to Washington. It begins September 19 and lasts through September 22. The purpose of the meeting is to review the state of our bilateral relations, to exchange views on current issues and matters of international concern. During his stay in Washington, the Foreign Minister will also be meeting with other U.S. Government officials and representatives of the legislative branch.

That's about all I have for you. I'll be glad to take any questions.

Q John, there's a report that there are at least four Americans on the mountains which are being shelled, acting as spotters. Do you know if there are any Americans serving up in the mountains?

A I think the Pentagon is going to respond to that, and is preparing something.

Q Okay. Can you give us a readout on what the situation is there today?

A In Lebanon? Yes, sure can.

It's pretty quiet there today. Beirut was calm this morning. Radio Lebanon has been reporting occasional exchanges of fire in the Suq al-Gharb area. The Marines reported that a few shells landed near their positions last night. No casualties. There's been no action near the Ambassador's residence in Yarze.

I understand a couple of our planes did fly reconnaissance missions over Beirut this morning.

Q Do you have any kind of note from the Soviets with regard to Lebanon?

A A note from the Soviets?

Q Any kind of a protest over the --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q -- American shelling of the Syrian position?

A Not to my knowledge. No, I don't think so.

Q Can you check it?

A Why don't you take my statement as being accurate unless I get back to you?

Q Did the Marines fire back?

A I don't think so.

Q And the U.S. ships have not been firing?

A I don't think so.

Q What importance do we attach to the Prince Bandar mission?

A Prince Bandar mission? The Saudis have been deeply engaged in the diplomatic negotiations, and Prince Bandar has been very much at the forefront of those.

Q Are we placing a lot of hope on this?

A I think we certainly appreciate the rather vigorous involvement of the Saudis in this, as we have all along.

Q Do we take the quiet today to indicate any kind of change in people's positions, progress in negotiations, or is it as some people have suggested, it's the day of a funeral of a major Druze leader and that's --

A It's hard for us to make a judgment, I think. There are different views on what it means.

Q We hear from Italy that Spadolini said that a cease-fire was imminent. It was his understanding.

A I guess we're a little reluctant -- Spadolini had said a cease-fire is imminent? I think, while not seeking to contradict him in any way, I think we're a little reluctant to make predictions about it.

Q Could you give us the U.S. sense about the possibility, imminence or lack of a cease-fire?

A Still working at it. Still working at it. Hopeful.

Q Can you confirm or deny, I guess, the reports that some of the shells that fell on Suq al-Gharb yesterday were of a cluster-bomb type?

A I find that astonishing, but I think you would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q One more thing, John. Have you received any, if you can tell us -- usually you'll say no, but let me ask it anyhow -- Arab governments' protests about the escalating U.S. firepower --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q No Arab governments have communicated --

A Not to my knowedge.

Q Are you concerned about the negative impact of the recent escalation of the fighting there on U.S. interests in the Arab world? I mean, don't you think that --

A A negative impact?

Q Yes. For instance, how can the Egyptian army hold joint maneuvers with the same army that's shooting at other Arabs? How can the Jordanians --

A I guess you would have to ask the Egyptians. I haven't heard anything from the Egyptians.

Q Are you concerned about it?

A It depends on how you read what is happening there. You're saying that there is a negative impact. I don't accept that judgment.

Q Many Arabs are saying that there is a negative impact.

A You must make your judgment, and they must make their judgment.

Q Were there any civilians found in the areas which were bombarded by the U.S. Navy in the last couple days?

A I don't know.

Q Were there any ways to forsake or to protect civilians so that the bombs will not fall on them?

A I don't know specifically about that particular shelling. If you talk to the Pentagon, I think they will have some words for you about our concern regarding civilian casualties, and the steps that the military are taking to insure that there are no civilian casualties.

Q Let me follow this with another question. Were all of these hits on military installations and bunkers, whatever it is? They didn't fall on private property or people? And who is going to be paying for the damage of the civilians if there is any damage assessed after these shellings?

A Certainly, they were all aimed at specific batteries firing in the other direction, but I think you would have to ask the Pentagon for details, for their evaluation of what they hit.

Q Can you tell us anything about the mechanism of coordination between the Lebanese Government and the U.S. naval firepower, insofar as the targeting is concerned?

A No, I can't. You would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q How about clearance for use of the firepower against Lebanese soil?

A You have to talk to the Pentagon.

Q Do you have any information there that would update either Soviet arms deliveries to Syria or Soviet presence with Syrian troops in Lebanon?

A No. I gave you guidance on Soviet troops in Lebanon yesterday. I have nothing on the Soviet arms supplies.

Q On that same area, do we have any sense of what the Soviet-Syrian discussions reveal to the extent that we know, or to the extent that we speculate, about what sort of advice the Soviets are offering the Syrians -- whether to hold back to avoid a clash with the U.S.?

A It's hard to speculate.

Q Is there some working estimate within the Department?

A I'm sure there are ideas with different analysts, but I think hard evidence of what is transpiring between those two governments is pretty sparse.

Q Isn't there some sort of an assumption that the Soviets are not telling the Syrians to cool it, and don't go too far up the ladder of brinksmanship?

A I can't help you along those lines.

Q John, has there been any diplomatic contact with the Soviet Union about Lebanon?

A Certainly, the Soviets are aware of our position on Lebanon, but I'm not aware of any specific meeting or interchange in recent days on Lebanon.

Q Have they communicated their position on Lebanon to us?

A I think we have seen some TASS statements.

Q I mean directly.

A I'm not aware of a government position.

Q What about the TASS statement? Do you have a reaction to that on the U.S. fanning the flames, and so forth?

A I think that's ridiculous.

Q Can you briefly, if you will, tell us what are the U.S. objectives right now in Lebanon, and how could those be achieved through the firepower that the United States is using now?

A I think we've really spent quite a lot of time outlining objectives. I think I will ask you to go back and do your research on the rather careful words about the Marines' role, and certainly the words that I have used and Mr. Romberg has used over the past week about the defensive character of the fire that we are directing.

Q Can I follow on this, please? The four U.S. Marines that died in Lebanon were not from Suq al-Gharb. Yesterday we were told, more than once I guess, that Suq al-Gharb -- the United States will not allow it to fall, because if it does it provides, or it creates risks for the U.S. Marines.

In light of that fact, I know that the four U.S. Marines, and shells that landed yesterday on the Marines, were not from Suq al-Gharb. Can you tell us what other reasons are there for the United States' commitment not to let Suq al-Gharb fall into anti-government hands?

A I think the reasons for the defense of that particular town are quite clear. But that doesn't mean that is the only location from which hostile fire might be directed.

Q Can you tell us what else is there?

A No, I cannot.

Q Is one of them the U.S. --

A I'm not going to go beyond what we've said. Obviously, this particular town is currently an area which we are concerned should not fall into hostile hands, but not going to speculate on where else we might fire.

Q No, what I'm asking, John, is, what, besides the shelling or the risk to U.S. Marines, are the other reasons that the United States will not allow the fall of Suq al-Gharb. Is one of them the risk for the Gemayel Government as a whole?

A No. You've already set out the reasons for our involvement in that town.

Q Anything new on PLO involvement in the Shuf, any numbers?

A No, don't have anything beyond that.

Q Have we contacted the Israeli Government recently in terms of military coordination or asking for any Israeli military involvement?

A No. We're certainly not asking for any military action.

Q How about diplomatic action with the Druze since the Israelis have got their own ambassador (inaudible)

A I don't know what might be going on diplomatically.

Q John, given the personal relationship that the Secretary has with President Assad and --

A Personal relationship?

Q Well, the fact that they've met and talked at great length. As I recall, a spokesman was talking about the fact that they had gotten along quite well, despite the fact that they disagreed.

A I think that spokesman was talking about the chemistry that obtained during that time, rather than a personal relationship.

Q That's what I was alluding to, but given that chemistry, has there been any contact between the Secretary and any Syrian officials beyond the contact --

A No, not to my knowledge. I mean, not even directly, other than through diplomatic channels.

Q Not on the phone or anything?

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know of any change in the pattern of diplomatic efforts made by Saudi Arabia after the shellings from the --

A Sorry, any change in the --

Q In the pattern of the diplomatic efforts done by the Saudis?

A No, I don't think so. I think the effort is still to produce a cease-fire and still to be engaged with the obvious two parties involved.

Q Do you have a date, just to finish up my question, for the meeting between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Khaddam in New York?

A I do not. I don't know. I'm not sure -- I'll have to check on whether Khaddam is coming to New York.

Q Assuming that the Pentagon will confirm the presence of artillery spotters in Suq al-Gharb, would you put that within the self-defense definition of the U.S. role?

A I think you would have to ask the Pentagon. Why don't you wait and see what they say about those individuals?

Q I would like to follow up on Red's question. Has there been any change in the mandate or the mission of the Marines and their other support units in Lebanon?

A No.

Q Do you have any indication of an increase in Libyan or any other foreign elements behind the Druze lines in the Shuf, or Iranians?

A No. I think the figure we have seen of Libyans in the Bekaa over an extended period of time, and I don't think there's any change in that, has been some 300. I don't know of any change in that.

Q You say in the Bekaa, but not necessarily in the Shuf?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Can you talk about the talks that have been going on in the last few days with the European Allies, what they're about? I gather Mr. Burt was in Europe rather suddenly.

A As you know, we don't confirm specific meetings, or the travel plans of Assistant Secretary Burt, but there certainly has been consultation.

The United States is negotiating actively in Geneva in an effort to achieve concrete results in the INF talks, if possible, by the end of the year. With this objective in view, the United States has been consulting closely with its Allies. These consultations include direct contact with Allied governments, and an intensive series of meetings by the Special Consultative Group, the NATO body responsible for consultations on INF. But I'm not going to get into timing and form or the content of those consulations, except to say that our Allies fully support the U.S. approach to these negotiations and share our commitment to full implementation of the December 1979 decision through arms control, if possible; through deployment, if necessary.

Q Is that in essence some kind of a new target to achieve concrete results by the end of this year?

A It's not a new target.

Q I never heard that formulation before.

--MORE--

Q In that connection, do you see anything new in the statement by Andropov put out by TASS today?

A No. I really don't see anything new on that. This is regarding the freeze?

Q Yes.

A Okay. The proposal's about the same as that which the Supreme Soviet and Foreign Minister Gromyko announced in June. As we've said previously, the freeze would preserve current Soviet strategic advantages and reduce their incentives to agree to substantial reductions about which we're negotiating in Geneva.

Moreover, many elements of the proposal are virtually impossible to verify. The British, the French and the Chinese -- to whom the Soviet freeze proposal was also originally made -- have rejected it as well. We are negotiating for genuine reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces that could contribute to greater stability, and we believe this objective deserves priority in the negotiations.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, how do you view the Andropov appeal to the Bundestag? Where does that fit?

A It certainly doesn't break new ground, so I guess you'd have to analyze his motivation for yourself.

Q What is our position on the INF missiles in the eastern Soviet Union?

A I think we've got some guidance on that we can roll out for you.

Q There were reports that the President had circulated a letter to the NATO leaders in which he indicated that there would be some measured flexibility or some controlled modifications in the U.S. position on the Nitze talks.

Could you tell us anything about that?

A Not really. I think the White House would, or will confirm that the President has written a number of letters, but I think you'd have to go to the White House for anything that they might want to talk about in terms of content. It's not usual to talk about the content of Presidential letters, but why don't you try them?

Q Can you confirm the information or comments on the position taken by the French yesterday about the shelling of Suq al-Gharb?

A No.

Q Over the weekend, John, there were reports that within 24 hours to 48 hours, originating from Saudi Arabia, that something, possibly a solution, will come or a cease-fire will come about, and then the Marines bombarded -- the ships bombarded.

Do you believe that this has contributed to possibly an escalation of the situation and washed away the possibility of a cease-fire as the Saudis were expecting?

A I think various people have to make judgments as to what it has done. Barrie was asking me earlier for an assessment of the quiet today. Is it a prelude to additional activity, or have people backed off? It's very hard to make those judgments.

Q John, coming back to the Soviets just for a minute, has the Secretary ruled out a meeting, regardless of who heads a Soviet delegation to the United Nations?

A I don't know what the current thinking is on what meetings might take place between the U.S. and the Soviet Union at the U.N.

Q Is such a meeting still possible?

A I don't know. I mean, I think I'd have to think about that and see what we can produce. I doubt that it would be involving the Secretary.

Q Have you been informed that Mr. Kornienko was going to head the Soviet delegation?

A No. I have not.

Q If he does, would you envisage, as he seemed to be suggesting, possibly an Eagleburger-Kornienko meeting or something of that --

A Let's wait and see who comes and --

Q You haven't been informed that the Soviets are, in fact, sending a delegation that will come through Mexico City?

A We know there's a Soviet delegation. I think part of it is already here.

Q Do you know the names of these?

A I'm not aware that we have. I don't know.

Q You said earlier about Suq al-Gharb, that we were concerned that this town should not fall into hostile hands.

Could you help us out on who is hostile in the U.S. view?

A I think in the case of Suq al-Gharb, we mean people who would fire on our Marines. As you know, we have said it's very difficult to be sure who is responsible for a particular battery firing on the Marines. But whoever is firing that battery, we will fire on them, or we reserve the right to fire on them.

Q What would we do to prevent that town from falling, where it's shelling now? Has the United States reserved the right to do other things beyond what --

A I don't think we should really speculate about what else we might do. I think you've seen the action to date, and we'll leave it there.

Q Without getting excessively semantic about it, if you're facing hostile fire from these people, is that not by definition hostilities that the Marines are engaged in?

A I mean fire that may fall on you and do physical, bodily damage to you, I guess the Marines would consider that to be hostile in a practical sense, perhaps not a strictly legal sense.

Q Doesn't that trigger something?

A I think the White House is deeply involved in that issue.

Q Would Secretary Shultz like to keep the United Nations in New York? If other nations wanted to move it, would he oppose that? (Laughter)

A Oh, I think the attitude of the United States as to the presence of the U.N. is well-known. We take seriously our responsibilities as host country and expect to continue those.

Q What about Lichenstein's words yesterday?

A I think he was offering a very personal, robust comment in the face of Soviet provocation.

Q Not a matter of U.S. policy that we want to wave bye-bye at the dock?

A I think U.S. policy on the U.N. is well-known, I think, probably.

Q Have you had a talk with the Ambassador about this?

A I haven't had a talk with him.

Q Has anybody?

A I don't know.

Q We want the U.N. to stay here?

A We want the U.N. to stay here. Sure.

Q You want Lichenstein to stay at the U.N.?

Q John, are you saying that Ambassador Lichenstein was talking for himself, not for the U.S. Government yesterday?

A As I say, I think he was expressing in the face of considerable provocation a sturdy, robust, personal comment.

Q John, do you regret what he said?

A It's not a question of regretting what he said.

Q John, in other words, he was not speaking for the United States?

A I think he was not articulating U.S. policy. (Laughter) I think that's quite clear. (Laughter)

Q John, it was said -- possibly as a result of what you said, it was said that he was also addressing the other countries who are unhappy with the security that was accorded or afforded to the delegates and other people and possibly the harassment that they've been exposed in certain circles from --

A Others may have been present, but I think he was goaded by Soviet comments. I think that is what he was reacting to.

Q Would you say the United States' actions in Lebanon -- the latest actions in Lebanon -- are having the support of Arab Governments? Does that support Mr. Reagan's plan?

A What we are doing in Lebanon is defending our Marines. We're not interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The Marines are there as part of a multinational force at the invitation of that government, and I think we have a responsibility to defend them, and that's what we're doing.

Q John, there's a story out of Tokyo -- if I may just take you to another thing which is kind of interesting -- which says that the Soviets have told the Japanese they are prepared to turn over fragments of Flight 007 on the 26th of September.

Are you aware of that, and how do you read it?

A Yes. The Soviet Goverment has informed our Embassy in Moscow and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow that it is prepared to transfer to the United States and Japan what the Soviets call "objects and documents" recovered from KAL Flight 007.

We have no indication regarding the specific nature of the objects and documents involved. We were informed, however, that the objects did not include the remains of any of the victims of the Soviet shootdown.

Q Is this September 26 date correct?

A What we're doing, Barrie -- we're going to talk with our Japanese and South Korean colleagues on this question. Of course, we're interested in ensuring that everything that is retrieved from the downed airliner is returned to the rightful owners.

We've just had this report. We're going to talk, as I say, to our colleagues, but I think the wire service reports of the date, which is Monday, are correct.

Q Is the United States involved because it's acting for South Korea?

A Yes. I think that's the premise, and, of course, because of our own citizens involved in that crash.

Q And these documents -- do you know if they include flight documents?

A Beyond what I've given you, we don't know what's in it. No indication whether the black box is included, or what else is there.

Q Do you have anything at all on the black box?

A I think the Pentagon may have something for you as their ships are obviously involved in the search.

Q What interpretation do you put on the Soviet move?

A It's hard to say until we see what it is they're turning over.

Q Do you have a robust comment for us on that?

A No. I don't have a robust comment.

Q Just after the briefing yesterday a story moved out of Moscow that the Soviets now are saying that the KAL plane that was shot down was working in close coordination, not only with the KC-135, but what was described as a Ferret spy satellite.

Do you have anything on that for us?

A It's the kind of nonsense, disinformation and lying which has characterized the Soviet response to the shooting down of this airliner from the beginning and with which they have attempted to justify their attack on the plane.

As we've said before, KAL 007 was not involved in any intelligence-gathering mission. The United States, unlike the Soviet Union, does not use civilian airliners for intelligence purposes. There's absolutely nothing to the Soviet contention that the plane delayed its departure from Anchorage to synchronize its approach to Kamchatka with the flight of any American intelligence satellite.

If the Soviets are going to make charges, then it seems to us that they should produce the evidence as we have consistently produced the evidence of what we have said throughout this whole situation, and that includes producing the black box.

Q (Inaudible)

A I mean, if they have evidence, if they have the black box, it seems to me the black box is one of the most conclusive pieces of evidence as to what happened.

Q We have no evidence that they --

A We have no evidence that they have it.

Q Do your experts say that one could falsify the contents in the black box in a convincing fashion?

A Do our experts say that?

Q Yes.

A I don't know. It would not be surprising if the Soviets came up with some piece of manipulated evidence, but I don't know specifically what you can do with a black box.

Q John, excuse me, at the annual fund World Bank meeting coming up, I'd like to ask you what the U.S. State Department says in response to friendly countries in the developing sector who tell us that because of IMF conditionalities and the conditionalities now attached to the World Bank's structural adjustment loans that it's becoming increasingly difficult for them to maintain stable governments and democratic processes?

In other words, do you tell them that that is less important than maintaining the Breton Woods system? You know, my usual IMF question.

A This may come as a surprise to you people, but I have nothing to tell them at this moment, but I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q John, any other information about any increase in the Soviet military presence in Syria? I mean, sending more --

A No.

Q Any incursion of soldier experts or personnel in the Shuf area?

A No.

Q Why don't you wait until I finish my question, sir?

A I thought you had finished your question. Soviet --

Q Well, I didn't say where.

A You said the Shuf area.

Q Yes. I didn't say the Shuf yet.

A Why don't you finish your question?

Q Thank you.

A What is your question? Are you all through?

Q Yes, sir. Thank you.

A Okay.

Q Why is Minister Abu Ghazala of Egypt meeting with Secretary Shultz, Schneider and Veliotes?

A I don't know. I think it's routine. I don't know what they're going to discuss.

Q I was looking at the story about the downing of the Libyan airliner by Israel in 1973, and I find out that the United States abstained from condemning Israel at the International -- I believe it's Organization of Aeronautics, whatever it is -- this one which met in Paris the other day to discuss the KAL thing.

Can you please justify or find the reasoning, if you want to take the question, why the United States abstained from condemning Israel?

A I don't know. I'm sure we offered -- if that is the case, I'm sure we offered a rationale at the time, but I don't know what it is.

Q The rationale, I would like very much to know what was the reasoning.

A Why don't you do a little checking and see what we said at the time?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #166

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1983, 12:30 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Couple of announcements. Yesterday marked the 150th anniversary of relations between the United States and the Sultanate of Oman. That relationship began with the signing of a Treaty of Amity and Commerce on September 21, 1833. It has grown and flourished over time. A press release available in the Press Office outlines some of the activities taking place in commemoration of this event.

Available in the Press Office at 2:30 this afternoon will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations. The subject of that testimony is human rights in the Philippines.

Finally, the Korean Government today issued a statement (saying) that they will deliver to the International Civil Aviation Organization all important wreckage, including the black boxes, when and if recovered from the KAL 007 crash site. The Korean statement also urged other nations, including the Soviet Union, to cooperate in providing ICAO with all pertinent data and materials. The United States Government strongly supports this Korean request and joins in urging the Soviet Union to give, as we are doing, full support to the ICAO investigation of this incident.

That's all I have for you.

Q Do you have any suspicions as to whether the black box is or is not recovered?

A No. Don't have anything further on that, Jim.

Q Anything new on contact with the Soviet diplomats here or in Moscow?

A It continues.

Q At the Shultz level, or --

A No.

Q Is there going to be a Kornienko-Eagleburger meeting in New York?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Is that being considered?

A I don't know anything about Kornienko coming.

Q John, on the basically the same topic, over the weekend Le Figaro reported that at some point in the recent several weeks -- they weren't clear on exactly when -- an Air France airliner was shot at over East German airspace and forced to land, and that the United States and other Western governments at the request of the French Government haven't said anything publicly about this.

A Don't know a thing about it.

Q Can you look into that?

A I'll be glad to look into anything that there is on it, but don't know a thing about it.

Q Can you give any background to the President's statement yesterday alleging Soviet-sponsored aggression in Lebanon?

A No. I think that the President's words spoke for themselves. Don't think we'd have anything further to say on that, Bernie.

Q John, on the airliner, have you got any -- you saw the statements by the BBC interview with this fellow, Viktor Linnik, Soviet political consultant. Have you anything on his remarks, including his description of the Soviet pilots as being "trigger-happy?"

A Not a great deal. The comments by Mr. Linnik, while not those of an official Soviet spokesman, simply confirm what is now obvious to us all, that the Soviet Union shot down an unarmed civilian airliner without having made a serious effort to identify the nature of the aircraft or to communicate with its pilots.

Furthermore, Mr. Linnik continues to press the preposterous allegation that the Korean airline flight was on a U.S.-sponsored espionage mission. There is no justification in either legal or moral terms for Soviet actions or for Moscow's attempts to evade responsibility.

We are awaiting a full and honest account from the Soviets, and this is clearly not it.

Q John, doesn't it look as if civilians are trying to put the blame totally on the military now by statements like this, calling the pilots "trigger-happy" and saying they wouldn't have shot the plane down had they known it was civilian?

A I guess there's an element of that in what is being said. This is not a totally unknown technique, I think, within the Soviet Union when there's a slight shift of opinion -- to have it come out from lesser and non-official individuals, but I think you have to make your own judgments as to what that means.

Q Have there been other signs, John, that the Department is aware of Soviet officials, diplomats, trying to distance themselves a little bit from the military?

A I think there was a journalist earlier --

Q *Pravda*.

A Was that *Pravda* earlier this week?

Q Yes. Is that significant at all in your --

A No. I think it's interesting, but it doesn't change the facts, and it doesn't change the fact that they haven't accounted and they haven't come up with a satisfactory explanation.

Q John, same subject, please. Do American government experts on this KAL incident put any stock in the notion that the Soviet fighters were not at sufficient altitude to detect the distinctive outline of the 747?

A No. We do not place any significance on such a thesis.

Q John, do you know what the significant wreckage the U.S. Navy picked up --

A No. Don't know. As soon as we have -- we might have something for you fairly soon on the arrangements to pick up that wreckage, and as soon as we have that, we'll let you know. But we don't know what it is.

Q Is there any suggestion that it might be the tail end of the fuselage or the --

A Don't know. Have no idea what it is.

Q Have the Soviets accepted the U.S. note on the demanding of an apology --

A No.

Q They still have not accepted it?

A They have not.

Q What is being done about that?

A Don't want to go into -- as we have said, we're considering what action we might take now, but are not able to get into any detail on that, Bernie.

Q John, Soviet officials here are saying that they want an explanation from the United States about what the plane was doing over Soviet territory for so long.

Is that something that we --

A They want an explanation from the United States about what a Korean airliner was doing over Soviet territory?

Q Yes. Is that something we reject out of hand?

A I think we have been as frank as we possibly know how in making available the information we have and have answered such allegations with all the facts at our disposal.

Q So we are not going to provide --

A It doesn't seem to me there's anything else we have to offer. We have made -- as you know, over a period of some days as additional information became available, we did make it available very frankly and up front, and I think that's the end of the story as far as we're concerned. If anything else emerges, we would similarly make that public.

Q Do you have any comments on Charles Manatt's statement at Georgetown University a couple of nights ago where he called this incident a moral outrage and compared it to the President's request for MX funding which he called a similar moral outrage?

A No. Didn't see his statement, I'm afraid.

Q One reason why you might particularly want to look at that is as he said that, he was flanked by Averell Harriman, George Shultz's sometime adviser and go-between for discussions between Shultz and Andropov.

A You're making a number of statements which seem to go beyond reasonable questioning.

Q He went between the two. Shultz received the guy here.

Q Did you have anything on the Kuwaiti report the other day about 50,000 Soviet troops ready to go into Lebanon?

A No.

Q Any evidence that there might be any validity to that report?

A I don't think we have any evidence of 50,000 Soviet troops about to go into Lebanon.

Q Do you have any statement on the action by the House Appropriations Committee last night on the Marines?

A No. I think the White House would have any comment on that.

Q How close are we on a cease-fire? Any progress?

A We continue to work very vigorously at it, Bernie. Ambassador McFarlane is in Damascus today. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut. They are in touch, and the diplomatic effort continues on a very active basis.

Q Do you have anything that you could tell us about the policy of the government regarding the United Nations? Has there been some change in what the U.S. is willing to do at the United Nations, in paying for the United Nations, or in connection with United Nations?

A No. I don't think so. Not to my knowledge.

Q The words that have been spoken suggest the United States has changed its attitude toward the United Nations. Is this the case?

A Spoken by --

Q First by the Deputy Ambassador, and then by the President.

A No. I don't think so. I think the President's words were perfectly clear yesterday. There was no change in position.

Q Do you have anything on the unrest, the riots, in the Philippines, the demonstrations, and so on?

A Yes. In the light of the demonstrations in the Philippines we're continuing to monitor that situation closely. Insofar as the President's trip is concerned, that, of course, is a White House matter. But also as the President said yesterday, there are no plans to change the trip. As of now planning for the Asian trip is going ahead on schedule.

Insofar as the violence in Manila is concerned, naturally we deplore all violence as a means of resolving political problems. As you know, there were deaths on both sides. Our hope for the Philippines is that both the government and the opposition will deal with their political problems in a way that contributes to political stability, the strengthening of democratic institutions, and respect for human rights.

In this regard, it's important that the May 1984 parliamentary election be one in which the legitimate opposition will have a free and fair opportunity to participate.

Q Copies of that, John, and may I follow up?

A Sure.

Q Any reaction to Marcos' threat that if the President did not go, the future of the U.S. bases would be in question?

A No. No response to that.

Q Would the declaration of martial law as hinted at by the Philippine President last night -- would that in your view contribute to the resolution of these problems and the goals that you seek to --

A Sorry, I missed the earlier part of your question.

Q The Philippine President last night hinted at reimposing martial law in the Philippines, and I was wondering if the State Department had an opinion as to whether that would further the goals that you just set out?

A I think it's sort of academic at the moment. Some people read that as a threat, but he hasn't done it, and we would wait until that happens.

Q John, does the Department have any reaction to the indications from the Philippines that government personnel were involved in the assassination of Mr. Aquino?

A No. I think that obviously we maintain an interest in the inquiry as it proceeds, as it will proceed, and I think we will wait until that inquiry is complete.

Q If I recall, in the immediate aftermath it was said that the United States was -- I don't know if the word was "insisting" on, but rather urgently asking for explanations as to what had happened out there on the part of the Philippine Government.

A I'm not sure that -- I don't like to pluck words out of the air. I'd like to go back and look at what we said, but I think basically our position is that obviously it is an internal Filipino affair, but also obviously we have an acute interest in the outcome of that investigation.

Q Is the U.S. satisfied with what has happened about the investigations so far?

A I think it's not for us to make a decision or an appraisal of various legal matters that are going forward in the Philippines. That's up to the --

Q Could I follow that up, John? When you say we haven't --

A The investigation into the death of Aquino.

Q The military announced it was pursuing its own investigation on Saturday, and the civil investigation has been suspended, so I was trying to --

A Suspended, but that doesn't mean that it's --

Q But it's the civil -- it's the presidential commission and --

A I think we're obviously interested in any investigation, but I'm primarily speaking to the civil investigation.

Q Is our interest acute enough that we are looking into this ourselves?

A Independently?

Q Yes.

A We'll await the outcome of their investigation.

Q There's no separate investigation as far as you're aware?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q There's a report out of Manila, John, that Ambassador Armacost is strongly urging that the President cancel his trip for security reasons, if for no other.

A He has denied that, and we would underscore his denial that he has made such a recommendation.

Q John, you used the phrase "as of now," written guidance, about the President's plans. Should we read that the door is still open for a change?

A I mean, I think you have to ask the White House. The fact is that the President's trip to the Far East is on track and as of this moment he's going to the Philippines. I think that's the situation.

Q John, would it be possible for the President of the United States to visit the country under martial law?

A I don't know.

Q As a general rule, I'm asking.

A I don't know whether there's a general rule about that. I think it's a hypothetical situation. I mean, I'm sure in terms of security the President's security advisers are always looking at the security that prevails in any country he goes to.

Q John, is there in the program of the visit a meeting between President Reagan and the Cardinal -- Roman Catholic Cardinal?

A Is there a problem concerning the visit?

Q It's in the program. A meeting.

A Is it in the program? I don't know. You'd have to ask the White House.

Q John, do you have any comment or reaction to the statement this morning of former Foreign Minister Manglapus that the trip is a security risk for President Reagan?

A The trip is --

Q A security risk for President Reagan.

A No. As I say, I'm sure that the President's security advisers look at the security situation in every country that our President goes to, but as of the moment that trip is on.

Q John, has there been activity lately to set up the visit of the Prime Minister of China to this country?

A I don't think really, Bernie, I should get into discussions that might or might not be going on between the two governments.

-- MORE --

Q Why not?

Q The Chinese are acknowledging that there have been intensified discussions in terms of setting up the date for the visit of the Prime Minister.

A I think we will just leave it. I mean in the event that there should be visits in prospect, I'm sure the White House at some appropriate time, if it came to be confirmed, would make that announcement.

Q Are you ready to make public the new guidelines on the new trade categories for China?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Does the State Department or Secretary Shultz think it's wise diplomatically for the President to go to the Philippines at this time?

A Planning for that trip is going forward.

Q But has he made any recommendations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Could you tell us, if he has? Would you look into this?

A Probably not.

Q John, could you just take another question on this China thing? Do you know if it was decided at senior levels of this Administration that one way the United States would respond to the Soviet downing of the airliner was to try to speed up the visit of the Chinese Premier to Washington?

A I do not know the answer to that question, but I think it's a very unlikely thesis. I do not think that there'd be a connection between the two.

Q In other words --

A I mean, as you know, I'm not getting into the question of confirming Chinese visits. But, as you know, the prospect of such a visit has been discussed and it hasn't been any secret that it would eventually take place; but, as to the dates, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, are we to understand Vice President Bush's speech in Vienna yesterday to be a departure in U.S. policy toward the Eastern European countries?

A No. That's no change in the situation. That's been the same position we've had on differentiation as between countries in Eastern Europe, as has been consistently the case. The Vice President's speech reflected the Adminisration's policy of differentiation with respect to the countries of Eastern Europe.

It's not really appropriate, I guess, to engage in a point-by-point discussion of the Vice President's remarks, one needs to read the entire text; but I think particularly important are the Vice President's comments that we're ready to respond to each country to the extent it meets its own people's aspirations and pursues an independent foreign policy.

That has been our policy, so there's no change on that.

Q For example, did the Hungarian Foreign Minister, who happens to be in town -- has he made any response?

A I don't know.

Q Was that cleared by the State Department, that speech?

A I don't know specifically whether that speech was, but it's certainly not any contradiction of policy.

Q John, yesterday Secretary Shultz in his testimony blamed Soviet-armed Syria for the problems in Lebanon; and then he said later under different questions that he believed that President Assad was independent-minded and he really didn't view -- if I remember right -- Syria as a client state of the Soviet Union. What was he trying to say about Soviet influence in Syria -- that President Assad was acting on his own without Soviet influence? I mean there were two conflicting thoughts.

A No. You know, he had a long day, in which he testified for many hours; and probably it would be very unwise for me to attempt to paraphrase that testimony. But, in essence, what he was saying is that clearly there is Soviet involvement in Syria, a Soviet presence, and, therefore, influence. But I think he also was saying that President Assad is an independent leader who obviously makes up his own mind ultimately about a variety of questions.

Q Can you try to reconcile the assessments by the President and the Secretary about the nature of the conflict in Lebanon? If I'm right, the President said something the other day that he was surprised about how outright a civil war there is in Lebanon.

A Yes.

Q And the Secretary yesterday struck quite a contrary (inaudible).

A No, I don't think there's any contradiction. I think both the Secretary and the President have been making the point that you have a conflict in Lebanon, the roots of which go back the better part of two centuries, and obviously there are differences and tensions as between various confessional groups. But I think also the point has been made that, clearly, there is increasing evidence of involvement and support from outside forces.

Q He kept hammering away yeterday -- the Secretary -- about "non-Lebanese." Can you be a little more specific about that -- "non-Lebanese"?

A I think that a fair amount of his thinking was directed towards the Palestinian presence.

Q John, can you get into that Palestinian question, please? The implication here in the briefings has been, it seems to me, you're talking about PLO types. The stories out of Lebanon seem to suggest the PLA, which is quite a difeent thing.

A I think there are a variety of Palestinian factions.

Q You're saying that there are PLO units as distinct from individuals who might have been -- the stories were very explicit today quoting sources as talking about brigades from the PLA, which, as we know, is a Syrian component.

A Yes. I don't really have much of a breakdown to give you beyond what we've said up to now, but I think that --

Q Because the Druze -- I mean it's important. You don't want to get into it, but you raise Palestinians. The Druze say they don't want the PLO in there. And by leaving it open, you're suggesting the Druze are not telling the truth. I'm just trying to see whether you --

A No, no. I'm suggesting that there are a variety of Palestinians in there. I mean there are Palestinians loyal to Mr. Arafat; there are Palestinians not so loyal to Mr. Arafat. There are various factions, I think, in play.

Q John, do you have a number that would go with those charges?

A I don't. Not beyond anything we've given you before.

Q John, what is the evidence of this, other than statements by the Lebanese Government?

A I think there has been some evidence of capture of individuals and recovery of bodies.

Q And one more thing: Is the American military naval bombardment a reaction to protecting the American presence in there or is it because there are foreign elements involved in there?

A It's the former -- for the protection of the Marines.

Q Protection of Marines.

Are you, therefore, acknowledging that the war there is a civil war of a sort or --

A I think we're acknowledging that it's a civil war plus the complicating involvement of others from the outside. There are elements of both.

Q And if the Marines are not shot at, the Marines will not involve themselves in the war, although you're acknowledging a foreign presence there. Is it safe to assume that?

A The fire will be returned by the Marines if they're shot at. As we have said, there are certain other circumstances. If various commanding points are in danger of being overrun by elements likely to fire on the Marines, that may draw American gunfire too.

Q John, the British and the French, as well as the United States, seem to be amassing an enormous armada -- in post-World War II terms, anyway -- in the Eastern Mediterranean. Is this a message to Syria and to the Soviets about the increasing commitment to the Multinational Force? Is it a result of the consultation? Is it coincidence with NATO exercises? How would you spell it out?

A I think it's an indication on the part of various countries involved in the MNF that they're going to do what needs to be done to protect their forces. Their forces are there at the request of the Government of Lebanon. They are there in concert and in consultation with the four countries involved in the MNF, and those countries will take measures that they consider to be appropriate to protect their men.

Q John, we know that the Saudi diplomatic shuttle was largely or in part directed toward trying to broaden, to find a way of broadening the base, of the Gemayel Government. May we assume that that is what Ambassador McFarlane is talking about in Damascus or one of the things that he's talking about?

A I don't want to get into his discussions, but I don't think it's really been much of a secret that there are diplomatic moves afoot to bring about a cease-fire and to assist in the process of national reconciliation in Lebanon. So I think those have been helping.

Q Would that include broadening the government?

A I think that's up to the parties directly involved to make that decision.

Q John, do you characterize the Druze fighting in Suq al-Gharb or elsewhere as terrorist?

A As terrorist?

Q Yes.

A No. I guess I don't have a characterization for you.

Q And do you have any comment on the demonstration by Druze in Beirut today against the United States' actions?

A No. Simply that there was such a demonstration -- I understand about a thousand people involved. It was peaceful. I understand they talked with a number of American Embassy personnel and then dispersed.

Q John, yesterday the Secretary said that there were 7,000 Soviet troops in Syria --

A Yes.

Q -- advisers. Right?

A Yes.

Q Is there any indication that any of them may have been transferred to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and/or replaced and/or numbers augmented?

A Not beyond that guidance we gave you, I think two or three days ago, on the Soviet presence in Lebanon, in response to a question.

Q On that question, what is the U.S. estimate as to whether the Soviets are acting as a constraint on Syria escalating the possibility of a spreading conflict?

A No, I cannot say.

Q You have nothing on what sort of advice?

A I can't.

Q Is it the U.S. view that the Soviets would like to see this thing escalate?

A I can't give you an estimate.

Q Not even on that?

A No.

Q What about --

Q Wait a minute. One final question, please.

What is the U.S. view as to who is perceived as doing the bulk of the fighting now, in anti-government terms, in Suq al-Gharb? Is it these Palestinian units that the Secretary was talking about or is it the Druze? Who is carrying the brunt of that fighting?

A I think you'd really have to talk to someone with a little more military expertise, but I think it has varied from day to day. I think there has been rotation.

I don't mean to suggest that the forces have been rotated in their entirety, but I think there's been a rotation in terms of the emphasis as between those two groups in various days. Perhaps as one group gets fired on and withdraws to regroup, others come in obviously. And I think there may have been a shift from day to day in the make-up.

Q In the negotiatins, are you getting any hints that the Druze might like to strike some sort of cease-fire package but cannot because the Syrians won't allow it and the Palestinians won't allow it?

A That's a good, clever question; but I think I will not respond to that because it seems to me I'd be going into the detail of the negotiations. And while I'm eager to respond to your question, I think I will decline the lure.

Q Do you have anything at all on the Soviet weaponry going to Syria?

A No, nothing new.

Q Nothing has changed?

A No.

Q John, last night CBS reported that the new U.S. proposals for INF would provide a formula on counting the British and French nuclear forces. Will you confirm or deny this?

A I think it's extremely unlikely that there would be any change in our position concerning inclusion of British and French forces, but I think I will not respond to any questions about a change in the INF position because I think Larry Speakes addressed that today and suggested that the President might have something on it.

Q John, are you familair with the article in TASS today by the Soviet general?

A One yesterday. We had a little guidance yesterday that you can get from the Press Office.

Q This is not a new one on the INF weapons?

A I think in fact it was yesterday. I think there was some guidance on it.

Q John, can you confirm the reports yesterday that the U.S. Government relayed a message from the Gemayel Government to the Israelis to use their air force?

A No, I cannot confirm that.

Q One more thing. A clarification, John, if I misunderstood you.

You said that the Marines are responding to attacks on them.

A Yes.

Q Previously, a few days earlier, somebody mentioned here -- I think you -- that the U.S. was repsonding militarily to atacks on the Lebanese Army.

A Where such an attack would cause a position to fall into hostile hands, which might then fire on the Marines.

Q John, do you have anything on granting certain Salvadorans refugee status in this country?

A There's some fairly lengthy guidance, which is complex and technical, and so I will refer you to the Press Office.

Q John, on Central America, the Costa Ricans have said that there was an alleged plot by a Spanish terrorist organization to kill Pastora and other anti-Sandinista leaders, and also threats against Costa Rican officials, and that Costa Rica has asked the United States for some kind of help -- militarily or whatever. Do you have any information you can give us on that?

A There was a false report, I think several days ago, that Costa Rica had asked for missiles, I think, from the United States; and we gave you some guidance on that at the time, which you can get. But it doesn't sound like this is connected, no.

Q Do you have any comment on this alleged plot --

A No.

Q -- by a Spanish terrorist group?

A No, no.

Q Anything on the article about the Guatemala Indians?

A I think we do have a piece of guidance.

Q O.K., John; thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, September 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #167

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. One housekeeping announcement in connection with the visit of the Finnish President, the President of Finland. There will be a briefing on background in connection with the visit of the Finnish President. That will be 3:00 this afternoon in the White House Briefing Room.

That's all I have.

Q What can you tell us about prospects for a cease-fire in Lebanon?

A I think not much beyond what we have said in recent days. Obviously there are some optimistic reports out there we've seen on the wires from Lebanese Government sources, but I think we will just continue our cautious position of not making predictions.

Both Ambassador McFarlane and Ambassador Fairbanks are in Beirut today. They continue with their diplomatic efforts, and we'll have to wait and see how these evolve.

Q Would you be prepared to do anything here over the weekend by way of a backgrounder on that if something does, by chance, come to fruition?

A I think if there were events on any weekend that justified moving with the dispatch for which PA is renowned, we would of course gin up something.

Q Where did these optimistic reports come from?

A I've seen something on the wires and I saw something on -- maybe it was even your network this morning with the Lebanese Ambassador -- maybe not.

Q Anything on a meeting this weekend between the Secretary and the Lebanese Foreign Minister, who is theoretically supposed to be flying --

A No, I don't. I think Mr. Salem is coming to the U.N. but I don't have anything on any meetings. You might ask the Lebanese Embassy. I don't have anything.

Q What about Khaddam?

A I don't know whether Khaddam will come to the U.N. I think he probably is, and I think if he does there probably would be a meeting between them.

Q Do you have anything tentatively on the Secretary's schedule for next week?

A No. We'll give it to you day by day.

Q Will you give us at least Monday's today, maybe?

A Well, Sunday and Monday his schedule will be in tandem with that of the President.

Q Will he have a schedule of any consequence after the President leaves on Monday?

A On Monday? Let me check that. I'm not sure what he's got after, in the late afternoon.

Q Are you still going to brief?

A I would expect so.

Q Is the briefing still the same, Monday morning and Sunday night?

A Yes. But why don't you check with the White House because this is their show.

Q Do you have any statement for the State Department on American policy toward the U.N.? Anything like that? How do you feel about the Senate vote?

A The reaction to the Senate action, sure. We obviously oppose the action taken in the Senate. While we share many of the concerns that precipitated this action and agree that the United Nations has its deficiencies, we feel the United States' interests are best served by constructive participation in the United Nations family of organizations.

Q Does the Administration take any responsibility for the feeling which preceded that vote, the critical of the U.N. and its attitude toward the United States?

A I think those involved in this action did suggest that they thought there were deficiencies in the U.N. budget administration. I think they were zeroing in specifically on that. And, as I say, we don't disassociate ourselves from time to time with various criticisms of the U.N. on that score, and on other scores, as you well know. But I don't think there was any confusion about official U.S. policy toward the U.N.

Q Could you deal with the accuracy, John, of this report by the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: "Lebanese President Gemayel this week appealed to Israel for assistance via the U.S. The U.S. relayed the request but did not adopt an explicit position on it?"

A As you know, Bernie, we don't get into diplomatic --

Q I didn't hear the question.

A Didn't hear the question? You want to do it again, Bernie?

Q Lebanese President -- Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, saying Lebanese President Gemayel this week appealed to Israel for assistance via the U.S. The U.S. relayed the request but did not adopt an explicit position on it.

A As you well know, we don't get into, from the podium, confirmation or discussion of diplomatic exchanges, but perhaps we might have a word about that after.

Q Just to pursue the same avenue, there was a report yesterday that Greece and Turkey had refused the United States the use of facilities.

A I think we had some guidance on that yesterday. The Press Office can give you that.

Q Was there an offer by Israel to the United States to let the United States use the facilities at Haifa?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q What about this business of Greece not allowing the U.S. to use facilities of Greece in the Middle East, and allowing Czechoslovakia to use facilities for the transport of military aircraft to Syria and calling them civilian aircraft. Anything on that?

A I don't have anything specifically on that, no.

Q Do you find it amusing?

A Not amusing, no.

Q John, can you tell us if Ambassadors Fairbanks and McFarlane are merely carrying messages between the Lebanese and the Syrians or are they coming up with their own ideas on the cease-fire?

A Many governments from time to time carry messages for other governments -- and, certainly, the United States does from time to time -- but I'm not going to get into the specifics of what --

Q No, I'm not asking for specifics. Are they proposing their own ideas from time to time?

A Are who proposing their ideas?

Q McFarlane and Fairbanks.

A In connection --

Q -- with how to reach a cease-fire.

A I think they are being helpful, and I think a mediator from time to time does offer his own ideas, surely.

Q In connection with their mission, is there any coordination with M. Gutman, the French Secretary General of the French External Relations Ministry? He just went to Damascus. Is there any U.S.-French --

A There is consultation and coordination, but I'm not able to give you specifics on specific individuals. I don't know whether they were in touch directly with him or not.

Q What's with the President and Manila? Is that trip still on?

A The President outlined his position on that earlier this week. There was no change in that position.

Q In other words, the trip is on as of now?

A As of now, the trip is on.

Q There were some ugly scenes, apparently, this morning in which the U.S. Ambassador was burned in effigy and such. Do you have any comment on that?

A I just have a little situation report. We're continuing to follow the situation closely. Apparently the demonstrations at the Embassy are over; there was adequate protection by the local authorities. I don't have anything beyond that for you.

Q If I could just change the country, John, anything on the amnesty declared in Argentina?

A No.

Q John, is there any belief in the State Department that the shootdown of KAL flight 007 could have been the result of a mixup or confusing set of circumstances?

A Well, we have had a very great deal to say about that --

Q I know.

A -- over the days, and certainly there seems to be no justification for that allegation.

Q During the meeting this morning with the labor leaders, did the State Department try to encourage them to take further action, more action at all, or did you stay neutral on that?

A I don't know. I wasn't down at that meeting. I don't know what transpired on it. Sorry.

Q John, on the same subject, two days ago, in Erie, Pennsylvania, Dr. Henry Kissinger said that he thought that the shootdown of KAL 007 could have been the result of a mixup.

Given that he has this view, for which there can be no justification, has Secretary Shultz changed his recommendation that Kissinger is competent to serve in his current position in the Department as Chairman of the Commission on Latin America?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q How could someone who could develop such wild ideas possibly serve in that sort of conpetent policy-making role?

A (A) I haven't seen what Dr. Kissinger said; (B) you're characterizing it as a wild idea --

Q Well, you said it could have no justification.

A Well, but you're giving me a second-hand version of what he said.

Q Stick to your characterization.

A I think I would prefer to read his words myself rather than take your version of --

Q O.K. So you will take a look at his words, and look into the question of whether the Secretary --

A Given the source this is coming from, I don't think so.

Q John, can you explain what that is supposed to mean?

A No.

Go ahead. Ask your question.

Q Do you have anything to offer on what is going on on the Hill with the War Powers-Lebanon resolution? It took sort of a beating this morning in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

A No, I don't.

-- MORE --

Q John, do you believe that the Associated Press is an unreliable source? They are the source of this story.

A I'm not going to answer that question.

Q John, has the black box been found in international waters, or is there some indication of that?

A Not to my knowledge. Obviously a search is going on, but I think you ought to ask the Pentagon for any details. But I don't think --

Q One other on the plane: Is there some evidence that the order came from higher than the local commander to shoot the plane down?

A Don't have anything further on that.

Q How is the U.S. characterizing the military situation around Suq al Gharb now?

A It was relatively quiet there last night, Bernie. Skirmishing continued in the area. There have been some reports of shells and rockets falling in Jubayl north of Beirut. As you know, seven French soldiers were injured yesterday in two separate incidents during the night. Last night several rounds landed near the U.S. Marine positions at the airport; nobody injured.

There was no shelling in the vicinity of the Ambassador's residence last night, and no indication that any of our forces fired back during the night.

Q Would you call it a stalemate at this point?

A I think I'd really prefer to leave that to the military.

Q Can you tell us anything more today beyond what you couldn't yesterday to back up the President's assertion about Soviet-sponsored aggression, a phrase along those lines?

A No. Don't have anything beyond yesterday.

Q Regarding the French element in all of this, have we consulted with the French and offered them any naval assistance?

A I don't think we'd get into that degree of specifics, but there certainly are and have been consultations and coordination between ourselves, the French and the other MNF members.

Q For example, do we trade reconnaissance?

A I can't answer that, Jim. I don't know.

Q What is your view of the sorties that the French have flown? Apparently they're --

A They're obviously protecting their forces.

Q Beg pardon?

A They're obviously protecting their forces as we protect ours.

Q John, a minor question my editors want to know the answer on. AP moved a correction last night about that picture where the Secretary has his hands like this (places hands over eyes).

It said that you didn't know what the Secretary really was thinking or doing at that time.

A What he was doing at that time?

Q Can you just get his view of what he was doing with his hands, or was he just rubbing his face?

A I think we all saw the CBS playback of that film. I don't know what he was doing at the time. I think the AP asked me last night whether I could offer them any of his reaction to the publication of the picture.

I don't know that he really had any reaction. I think he considered it all rather entertaining, and when I said -- I did mention to him this morning that a number of you had been interested in getting his reaction to its publication, he really had none. But I think he's taking it allrather lightly.

Q But the question really is, did he put his hands up out of surprise at the remark by General Kelly or --

A I don't think that's the case. I think the tape makes clear -- he had rather a long day testifying, as you know, and I can't remember quite at what point in the day that was. But he had just finished speaking. The General, I think --

Q It was early in the day.

A Was it early in the day? He had been going for an hour or so, but -- (laughter) -- that testimony takes it out of you, I can tell you -- (laughter) -- and I think he was simply by that gesture indicating that there was a pause in his testimony and he was rubbing his eyes, or whatever he was doing. I don't think it was a direct response to the General's --

Q What did he do when he saw the caption? Did he go like this? (Places hands over eyes) (Laughter)

A No. But I'm delighted to see that AP and CBS are sitting together in a remarkable gesture of collegiality this morning.

Q On Bush's speech in Vienna the other day in Eastern Europe, there have been some strong criticisms by the Soviets and a couple of the East European countries.

Have you had any official reaction from those countries?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #168

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1983, 12:40 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have just one brief announcement. Available in the Press Office at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon will be the testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Robert H. Pelletreau before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. The subject is the Middle East.

I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the resignation of the Lebanese Cabinet under Prime Minister Wazzan?

A No, I don't. I just saw a wire on that before I came in. I don't have any comment.

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrians surrounding Arafat's forces?

A Not really. That's a matter, it seems to me, that's between Syria and the PLO. I've only seen press reports of it. Nonetheless, while this is not part of the ceasefire agreement, we continue to believe that the departure of the PLO fighters, along with Syrian and Israeli troops, is necessary.

Q So you mean that this could be interpreted by you that this is what the Syrian are attempting to do to get the PLO out, and after that, they will follow suit? They will get out, or what?

A I'm not trying to interpret it. All I'm doing is reiterating what our standing, long-term policy is about withdrawal of all the foreign forces.

Q Alan, was there any suggestion, if you can say, in the negotiations that the PLO was giving something of an acquiescence to this, or were they resisting it, or what? What was their posture?

A I have no idea what kind of discussions were held with the PLO on this issue. If there were such discussions, they were not, obviously, ones which we conducted.

Q What do you anticipate next to be in Beirut? Meetings of heart and minds, or whatever is going to be the situation? Were you there -- I mean, Mr. McFarlane was there in Beirut when the agreement was announced by Prince Bandar and Abd-Halim Khaddam, in Damascus?

A He is in Beirut. I don't know how to address it beyond that. I mean, the announcements were made as have been described in the press. I don't know what the next steps precisely will be. I can't outline that for you, and I think that probably we're not going to try to do that. That will be something which will be coming out of Lebanon as they move forward with the various elements that the Lebanese Government has announced.

Q We read this morning that the Syrians and the Saudis, other than the Lebanese factions, would be taking part. Somehow, the United States was missing. Is that the intention? Is it true that the United States will not play a role in this reconciliation committee that will continue the discussions and negotiations?

A I will refer you to what was said in the Government statement from Lebanon as to who the various parties are and who has been invited to participate. I would think it is quite clear that we will remain in close touch with developments, and we would be ready to be helpful as we can be. But I think that in terms of who is invited to participate, the Lebanese Government has already addressed that.

Q Was the United States invited? Can you tell us if the United States was invited?

A At this point, I would have to say that -- Well, one can never, of course, rule out changes. I would refer you to the parties who were named in the announcement, and the United States is not named there as one which would be participating.

Q We see that the Syrians have shown sort of good faith, or good intentions, so the cease-fire could be achieved, or is it just because of the "aircraft diplomacy?"

A No. I think I'll refer you to what the Secretary said and what the President said in New York about that, and I'll leave it at that. They addressed this yesterday.

Q Alan, in the announcement, the announcement was actually made by Prince Bandar and the Syrian Foreign Minister. The absence of McFarlane there was quite conspicuous.

Does this mean anything about our lack of role or about the quality of a role in there?

A No, I don't think so, and I don't think I would agree with the use of the term "conspicuous." He has not been in every conversation which has taken place. There have been many, many conversations which have taken place throughout, particularly in recent days, in which various people were going back and forth between the various capitals. So I don't see anything remarkable about that.

Q Are we being sidelined in any way?

A No, I wouldn't put it that way.

Q You don't usually talk about McFarlane's plans. Is he due back in the States because of --

A No. He's in Beirut at this point. Ambassador Fairbanks is coming back here for a while. I don't have an exact period of time, but I would expect he would be returning probably to the area. He will be back. He is on his way, I gather, now or will be shortly.

Q Alan, does the plan to use the U.N. monitors -- and I would appreciate it if you could tell us a little more about them -- does that signal any greater involvement of the U.N. in the ceasefire?

A I think you may be getting ahead of the game. I'm not sure there is a plan to use U.N. monitors.

Q I think they took that up at the U.N. -- told the press that today, didn't they?

A I'm not aware that there has been any decision about who these neutral observers will be. I think the Secretary has addressed the possibility of using U.N. observers, but I'm not aware that there has been a decision to do that.

Q Alan, have the Syrians communicated to Ambassador McFarlane, or any other representatives of the United States, what their requirements would be for advancing the process further? Have they set specific requirements that they've made known to us -- to the United States?

A I think the process is now going to take place in Lebanon, along the lines that have been outlined in the Lebanese Government announcement and in the statement by Foreign Minister Khaddam and Prince Bandar.

I don't see how I can really address in any greater detail from here what is likely to happen. I think we have to let the situation unfold.

Q Do you know, though, if the Syrians have set any specific criteria against which the events in Beirut would be measured?

A Again, I just don't think it is appropriate to try to get into that kind of detail.

Q Alan, is there anything you could offer from the podium on what is envisioned for the U.S. Navy and the Marines there?

A I don't know of any particular change that is envisaged --

Q They're going to stay there for the time being?

A That's my expectation.

Q Were the boats also?

A I don't know of any plan at this point to change the deployment.

Q Do you see any inconsistency in the number that we've been given? All along it's been a fact that there were 1200 Marines on the ground, and now the number has been augmented to 1600.

A I don't think that's a correct characterization, but I would refer you to the Pentagon which has guidance explaining this question of numbers. Let me just do that.

Q I am aware of what categories they fall under, but for the longest time we kept hearing that it was really 1,200.

A Again, I think that they have explained this. We are talking about an MAU, and its component forces, and I think that they have explained the situation, so I just don't have anything beyond what they have said about it.

Q In this situation, Alan, is the agreement on the withdrawal of the PLO forces from Lebanon that was achieved last year still in effect with regard to the safety of the Palestinian refugees that are left there in Lebanon, and what are the steps which have been possible to be implemented in these agreements to guarantee their safety again?

A I don't have anything for you on steps, specifically, in that respect. Clearly the safety of Palestinian civilians, indeed of all the civilians, is a matter of concern, but I just don't have anything in particular to address on that.

Q There is a Reuters report today that if Lebanon were to request it, U.S. Marines would go into the Shuf Mountains. The Pentagon has said that if there is a statement, it is going to come out of here. Is there any confirmation of that report, or anything you can say about it?

A Again, I would refer you to what the Secretary said, which was that he envisaged no change at this point in the Marines role, deployment, etc.

Q But was there a request?

A I don't have anything beyond what I said the other day, which was that we have had no formal request to do this. I think that the question, again, of neutral observers is something that is being worked out.

Q Alan, one more thing. Does the Administration believe the agreement that we are talking about was reached as a cease-fire, and that further steps that will be taken, is that being interpreted as also a Syrian acceptance of the agreement on withdrawal at all?

A On withdrawal?

Q On withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

A I don't think I can --

Q Or is it only limited to the situation inside Lebanon, right now?

A My understanding is that everybody's efforts at this point have been directed specifically toward the question of cease-fire, and the follow-on effort at political reconciliation.

I would leave it at that, although ultimate assertion of an extension of Lebanese Government sovereignty throughout the territory of Lebanon is, in our view certainly, not able to be carried out without the withdrawal of all the foreign forces.

Q A different subject. I was just wondering on the INF talks, the President's proposal, has that already been laid before the Soviets in Geneva, and if it has, have they made a formal response within the negotiation framework?

A It has, in some way -- I don't know in what detail -- been put before the Soviets. I cannot tell you, and I don't think I would be able to get into the question of what sort of dialogue there has been on that.

Q Only in a bare-bones manner, though, isn't it, Alan? It hasn't been laid out in great detail.

A Again, I don't have detail on that, and I assume that there was some briefing on this subject this morning. I know that there was to be a briefing before the speech, and I assume that there have been others around to address it, and I just feel I should leave it to them.

Q Do you have any comment on an altercation, or apparent altercation, with the Norwegian Ambassador involving the knocking on the door of a woman in the middle of the night and not leaving her alone?

A Our Embassy in Oslo issued a full statement on those allegations, I believe, on Saturday, expressing regret that such a misunderstanding occurred, and that a press account had appeared which was based on inaccurate information. I don't have anything to say beyond what the Embassy said on that.

Q The press accounts say that the police there believe that he was intoxicated.

A Again, I refer you to what the Embassy said.

Q What did they say? I mean, where do we find out? How do we get that?

A I can make that available to you. I have a copy of that statement.

Q Has this caused waves over here, though?

A Caused waves?

Q Yes. (Laughter)

A Again, I refer you to what the Embassy said. I think that the Ambassador was concerned about this report, and they issued a statement explaining the circumstances. I don't have anything beyond what the Embassy said about it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the article this morning in the Post --

A Excuse me, about what?

Q -- the article this morning in the Washington Post about the alleged arrogance of the United States in East/West trade?

A No. I think that you are referring to an article relating to Mr. Root. Mr. Root was expressing his personal views, obviously. The policy of the U.S. has consistently been to work closely with our allies on these matters, and I will leave it at that. We have got many statements on the record about our policy, but our policy is to work closely with our allies.

Q Have they set a time that Secretary Shultz will meet with Khaddam at the United Nations?

A I don't know what the latest on that is, and I think you are going to have to check with the State Department Press Office at the UN Plaza Hotel. We understood that Foreign Minister Khaddam was planning to come to New York, and an effort was being made to set up such a meeting, but I don't have any detail as to whether all of that, in fact, has happened.

Q I don't know if anybody asked this question last week, but do you have any comment on the column of Evans and Novak in the Washington Post of September 21, last Wednesday, about the three-staged plan to withdraw the Marines, the cease-fire, and the reconciliation in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines? That was last week.

A No,I don't have any comment on that. I think, again, I would refer you back to what the Secretary said. There is no plan, at this point, to change the mandate, role, or deployment pattern of the Marines. I can't get ahead of events on that.

Q Do you have anything on the Philippines, on Marcos advising the opposition and changing, I think, the composition of the investigation?

A I don't have a great deal, particularly on the latter. I have just seen the one wire report from this morning on the last point.

As far as developments there, and concerns with demonstrations, we are watching developments in the Philippines closely. We are not going to have comments on every occurrence. Our policy regarding the consequences of the Aquino assassination for the Philippines, and for U.S./Philippine relations, was spelled out on September 13 by Deputy Assistant Secretary Monjo of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and by Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs on September 22.

Those statements speak for themselves. We continue to place the highest value as a first step on a free and open political dialogue in the Philippines.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the legislation before the House today on limiting, I guess, trade and financial ties with South Africa?

A Yes, very briefly, I do. The Administration has put forth its views on South Africa-related legislation on a number of occasions, most recently in testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Frank Wisner, before the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 14.

Although I would refer you to the Administration's testimony for details of our position, basically we have opposed the type of legislation proposed because we don't believe it will work, and we believe it would be counterproductive to our objective of encouraging positive change away from apartheid within South Africa.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #169

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWSISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple announcements. To tell you first, in the Press Office is available the testimony of the Director of the Bureau of Political/Military Affairs, Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. The subject is Lebanon.

Also available in the Press Office is the testimony of Under Secretary for Management Jerome W. Van Gorkom before the House Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs. The subject is the Foreign Commercial Service.

One other item, in the sense of personal privilege. About a week or two weeks ago -- I can't remember when -- an issue arose here regarding a question which I answered and to which a number of you, the next day, took exception. I am perfectly comfortable with the answer I gave on that occasion, and I stand by it.

However, I was particularly disturbed by some remarks that Bernie Kalb made regarding candor and integrity. Bernie has since explained to me that I perhaps took that wrong, while he still felt that there was a problem with the answer with which I disagreed. But nonetheless, it hadn't been addressed in quite the personal terms that I had taken it.

I will accept that if Bernie will accept, having taken on the role of Spokesman, a plaque which states the Spokesman's credo, which states, "I know you believe you understand what you think I said, but I'm not sure that what you heard is not what I meant."

I'll give this to you, Bernie. I don't know if you --

(LAUGHTER)

MR. KALB: I have this on my door. Where did you plagiarize this from?

MR. ROMBERG: You're now going to charge me with plagiarism, Bernie? (LAUGHTER)

O.K. That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

MR. KALB: Alan, I feel impelled to say something. Since you have raised a personal conversation that I had with you and made it public, I think it is only fair to say that in the course of that, you put me on notice that you would not take any questions from me -- me, specifically -- since I had made some observations about candor, and I sought to assure you that in those remarks, while I was speaking for myself, I do not believe that I was soloing, in so far as articulating a general feeling here about the candor of the reply on that particularly controversial issue.

MR. ROMBERG: As I said, it addressed both candor and integrity. It was the integrity point that I particularly felt concerned about. Having taken what you said to me and thought about it, I decided to do what I've done today. I still stand by the answers I gave you at that point. I have checked out the record; I'm quite comfortable with the answers that I gave you at that time.

Q Alan, do you have anything you can tell us on the search for the black box on the KAL jetliner?

A Not really. I've seen reports which suggest some recovery is imminent. I think that the Navy has denied that.

There have been black box soundings from time to time, but as I understand it, there have been none since the weekend. We have absolutely no information that would confirm the Japanese media reports on recovery. Obviously, the search operation continues.

Q Have we invited foreign observers aboard any of our ships?

A Yes. On September 21, CINCPAC offered the opportunity for official representatives of the nations that had citizens who were passengers on KAL Flight 007 to observe recovery operations in the Sea of Japan aboard a U.S. Navy ship.

The United States recognizes, and is sensitive to, the interest and special concern of the countries that had citizens aboard that flight. U.S. Navy ships, along with Japanese ships, are in the crash area, in international waters, searching for the wreckage and remains.

Our only concern is to do this in as expeditious a manner as possible, and to maintain properly any recovered material for completely open processing for any informational value that it may have.

Q Alan, is that information in any way tied to an expectation of a finding of some kind?

A No. As I say, this was a week ago, and it is for the reasons which I have just given to you.

Q Is a copy of your statement available?

A I can make a copy. It's not identical to what I just said, but it's close enough for reference purposes.

Q Alan, so we're clear here -- "no imminent recovery." Could you be a little more specific?

A Not really.

Q Are you preparing to --

A No. You might want to check with the Pentagon, but it is my understanding that there is no indication that anybody has located the flight recorder, and is about to haul it up or anything of that sort.

Q Physically, it may be the same as it was many days ago?

A That's my understanding. Again, check with the Pentagon.

Q New subject? Alan, what can you say about the story that rebels have apparently moved from Honduras into Nicaragua with the backing of the Honduran army? Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Alan, do you have any further comments regarding the TASS or the Kremlin's reaction to the President's speech in the UN?

A No. I think that the point for negotiation of this is going to be in Geneva, and that's where we would expect to get a serious response, if there is to be one.

Q You would not expect the response to be next week at the United Nations when the Soviets do --

A I can't tell you what the Soviets would do in their speech at the United Nations, Mike. I don't have access to their --

Q You'd expect your reply to come in Geneva then?

A I think that that is certainly where the negotiation is going. As I indicated, I guess yesterday, the President's proposals have been put to the Soviets in Geneva, and that's where we would negotiate them.

Q Along that line, can you say what the response has been from other nations, non-Soviet?

A I'd refer you, basically, to press reports and quotations which have been out there; very favorable responses to the President's proposals.

Q Alan, is there anything new on the deployment of the Marines in Lebanon? Has there been a request from the Lebanon Government for them to patrol in the Shuf or to perform any kind of role in areas other than where they are performing?

A There is no change in any of that, and certainly, there is no change in their role, mandate, or deployment pattern.

Q But no change in --

A No change in the question of whether there has been a formal request.

Q Has there been an informal request?

A No. Bob, what I've indicated from time to time is that certainly the question of what one does has been the subject of discussion, but that's quite different from the question -- and I'm not trying to suggest to you that there is anything new in that regard -- but that's quite different from the question of whether we have been asked to, and are, addressing in some systematic way, informal way, a response to a Lebanese Government request.

Q So there has been informal discussion?

A Oh, I indicated that a long time ago.

Q But there has yet been no conclusion to that discussion?

A I don't look to a conclusion. I think right now what we would look to is the issue of the neutral observers, for example. I think the Secretary and others in New York have addressed this issue. I would not take my answer at all to suggest that there was something else going on other than that.

Q Do you have any observations today about the Syrians and the PLO? What that might mean? The developments yesterday?

A No, no. Again, I would separate that, though, from the question of the cease-fire agreement.

Q Has there been any change in that, or any other development?

A On the cease-fire?

Q No, on the Syrians and the PLO.

A No, I'm sorry. I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Where is Ambassador McFarlane today?

A He's in Beirut.

Q He's in Beirut?

A Yes.

Q When do we talk to the Syrians in any way again? Do we know?

A I don't know. We have an Ambassador in place. I'm sure he talks to them on a reasonably regular basis. I don't know whether --

You're talking about a special envoy of some sort?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any schedule for somebody going into Syria at this point.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, what neutral observers are you talking about, the Syrians and the Saudis, or are you talking about what was mentioned yesterday as United Nations troops to oversee the cease-fire?

A I am talking about the question of neutral observers in the cease-fire context, not the Syrians and Saudis, in which context people have raised the question of possible UN observers. But, as I indicated yesterday, I am not aware that any decision has been taken on that. I am pretty sure there has not been.

Q One more thing. Bob's question mentioned U.S. Marines in the Shuf. Was that the question, and actually do you accept that thesis? Are there U.S. Marines in the Shuf?

A No, no. I think you probably didn't hear his question. His question was: Was there any request from the Lebanese -- formal request from the Lebanese Government -- to put Marines in the Shuf, and I said, "No, there is not." Then we got into a discussion of the informal discussions which have taken place in the past. This does not refer to a recent question where I think the focus has changed on it.

Q Is the cease-fire holding as far as you know?

A Yes, essentially it is holding. There are a few incidents involving small arms fire, but no incoming fire on the Marine and MNF positions since the beginning of the cease-fire.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Chinese Foreign Minister's speech in New York on Taiwan?

A No.

Q One final thing on the Middle East, Alan. Are there any plans within the Administration to change U.S. military aid to Israel from loans to grants? Is the Administration contemplating something like this? The Israeli media has mentioned something with the Israeli Embassy requesting actually to minimize aid and to increase the grants.

A I don't have anything new on that today. I think that in the past, going back over a period of years, that has occasionally happened, that grants have been forgiven, I guess. I am not quite sure what the technical term would be. However, I am not aware of any new development on that, and I don't know what is happening on the Hill with respect to that.

Q Has there been any, as has been indicated in at least one newspaper report, any undertaking by the United States that what the national reconciliation talks produce on Lebanon would be binding on President Gemayel, that the United States would use its good offices to insure that the decisions that are reached as a result of these negotiations will be accepted by President Gemayel?

A Again, as is usually the case with regard to any private conversations, without going one way or another on that, I just can't get into it. I would say that the U.S. certainly supports the national reconciliation process, as does President Gemayel, but you are asking me to get into a question of our diplomatic exchanges, and I just can't do that.

Q Alan, I can't resist on a discussion like this. Why is it that this process of national reconciliation isn't regarded as "power-sharing" and permitting armed elements to "shoot their way into power?"

A We discussed this a long time ago. I don't remember; maybe you were on vacation. It really is a word game, if you are trying to play that. Clearly, the political situation and the history in Lebanon is quite different. The situation on the ground right now and the history of how the various confessional groups have shared power is different from the situation which we have addressed with regard to Central America.

So this is not an analogous situation, and I think to introduce the term "power-sharing" with quotes around it, and all of that, is simply to throw a red herring into the situation.

Q Well, can I just ask, when you addressed this question while I was on vacation, did you address it in any greater length than you did just now?

A No, not really.

Q Alan, can I follow up on Bernie's question? There was a report yesterday that the United States and the Saudi Government, as the mediators who brought about the cease-fire, have assured the parties that whatever results would be concluded by the national reconciliation, these two parties -- the U.S. and the Saudi Government -- would make sure that they will be implemented. They don't say how that is. Now, are you saying that these things are not correct?

A Again, I have answered the question before, and it is a question of your asking me to get into diplomatic conversations, and I am just not going to do that.

Clearly the decisions to be taken in those discussions in the national reconciliation dialogue are decisions for the participants to take. President Gemayel has committed himself to the national reconciliation dialogue. As the Secretary indicated last week, we strongly support President Gemayel's stated willingness to broaden the base and composition of his government to reflect a true sharing of power. But I just can't take it beyond that in terms of who said what to whom.

Q The question is relevant, Alan, because President Gemayel also, while the fighting was going on, could not really do the job on his own, and he called on U.S. help, military help, and the U.S. came forward.

Now, I don't know if you would accept that hypothesis, but --

A I am not sure I do accept that.

Q Okay, but in the same line, what is there to assure other parties in Lebanon to the national reconciliation that even if President Gemayel wants, in fact, to implement those things that he actually can?

A That, I think, is something for the various parties to work out in the dialogue, and I am not going to try to pre-empt the process by proclaiming on it from the podium.

Q Do you have any comment, or is there any change in the President's trip plans? I notice he gave an interview saying that he might not be able to go to the Philippines, after all.

A I have no indication of trip plan changes, and I thought he, in fact, indicated that he had no planned change, and that he was not trying to indicate that in that statement. I think, basically, you ought to go to Larry Speakes, but I believe that you will find that --

Q Well, he said the Congress might be in session --

A I understand that.

Q -- and if they were in session, I mean, obviously it would make an excuse so he wouldn't have to go if he doesn't want to, but I just wondered if you had an official comment here at the State Department.

A I don't know that I would accept your "obviously" phrase, but in any case, I don't have a comment.

Q Where was that?

A I gather The New York Post.

Q It is in The New York Post.

Q Do you have anything on the elections in Guatemala?

A Elections in Guatemala? No, I don't today. I am not sure whether we have something from before. We may have. You might want to check the Press Office.

Q Do you have anything on a new agreement between Chile and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation here on the future extension of loans to that country, despite the 1979 action by Carter?

A No. You might want to check with OPIC.

Q I did. Can you look into it? The State Department had a role in that decision, apparently.

A Well, I don't know about the role in the decision, but if it is an OPIC loan, I think it would be up to OPIC --

Q It is not a loan, it is an agreement.

A Excuse me, an agreement. It would be up to OPIC to comment on.

Q When will Ambassador Fairbanks arrive in Washington, and are there any plans for him to participate in President Mubarak's discussion during his visit to Washington?

A I don't know the answer to your second question as to whether he would participate in the talks with President Mubarak. As far as his arrival, he will be arriving shortly, but I don't have a specific schedule to give you on it.

Q Alan, just one more. Right now, the IMF is having its annual meeting at the Sheraton Washington, as you may know. Does the hotel where a meeting of that sort is taking place have the status of an Embassy for legal purposes?

A I am not aware of it, no.

Q I only ask you that because the Washington Metro Police insisted that for purposes of demonstrations and things like that, the regulations that apply to Embassies now apply to the Sheraton Washington.

A Check with the Washington Police.

Q Wouldn't that be a State Department decision?

A I think it would probably, in the end, be a police decision. I don't know what consultations there were.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #170

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Just one announcement -- I guess one announcement and one clarification.

The announcement is that tomorrow, September 29th, at 2:30 p.m., we will have a BACKGROUND briefing in the Briefing Room here on Lebanon. For your information only, not for publication, the briefer will be Richard Fairbanks.

Q What time?

A 2:30.

Also, just to make sure we are on the same wavelength, yesterday a question arose about any conversations coming up with Syria, and we addressed that both in terms of questions and answers, in terms of people going to Syria. I just want to make clear that there has also been made known in New York that the Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam later this week. So I don't want to have a misunderstanding on that.

O.K., that's all for announcements. I'd be happy to take questions.

Q Speaking of Lebanon, Alan, do you have a situation report today; and can you bring us up to date today, to the extent that you can, on the cease-fire and the use of the Marines?

A O.K. On the situation report, the cease-fire is generally holding. Although there has been some sniper fire directed at Lebanese Army units in Beirut, there have been no incidents reported at the Ambassador's residence in Yarze. The Marines have reported that two rounds of small-arms fire were received near their position. No casualties were sustained, however.

The Security Committee -- that is, the committee composed of representatives of the Lebanese Army, the Lebanese Front, the National Salvation Front and the Amal Movement -- met earlier today to discuss consolidation of the cease-fire.

That really is all I have on the cease-fire or any movement on any of that, and I think that the only thing I could say about the MNF is to repeat what we have been saying here and in New York before -- that there is no change planned for their deployment -- role. That's all.

Q One more: the Gulf. Do you have any reaction to Iran's latest threat to restrict shipping in the Gulf for any country that provides port facilites for weapons going to Iraq?

A Yes, I do. As we've said on previous occasions, the United States deplores continuation and extension of the fighting between Iran and Iraq and urges the parties to agree to a cease-fire and negotiate their differences. We would view with grave concern attempts by any party to interfere with the right of passage of non-belligerent ships through international waters.

The principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf is, we believe, an important interest of the international community. If this principle should be challenged, apart from whatever action we may deem it in the United States interest to take, we would consult urgently with those states most directly concerned -- both in the region and in the wider international community.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

Q A copy?

A Yes. We can make copies available.

Q Are there any indications that Iran is preparing to follow through in that direction?

A The only thing I can say is that we understand that there have been press reports of an Iranian military buildup around the Strait of Hormuz, but we have no information to confirm those reports.

Q Back to Lebanon, Alan: Will you today make any comment about the fighting around Tripoli?

A I don't have anything on that, Ghassan.

Q Do you have anything more on the black box?

A Not a lot more on the black box. We're essentially, I guess, where we were on this yesterday. The general search area remains the same; but within that area the Navy has established a grid, based on very precise navigational coordinates, in order to cover the area methodically and with a minimum of double coverage.

Yesterday the Navy searched a portion of the grid in international waters north of Moneron Island, using a deep drone. A different portion of the grid will be searched today.

I understand that in the past 24 to 48 hours, the search has been focused on a 14-square-nautical-mile area in which the Navy feels it has the best probability of picking up another signal from the black box if it is still transmitting. But, as I indicated yesterday, there's been nothing in that regard since the weekend.

Q Do you have any comments on some members of Congress, let's say, sounding not very happy with the Secretary's remarks about the Executive Branch not wanting to give up its role on the Marines and in foreign policy in general?

A No, not really, Ghassan. The issue was addressed yesterday in the letter that the President sent to the Congress, and I would refer you to that letter.

Q Has the State Department gauged the international reaction to the President's speech at the United Nations?

A I'm sure that there has been some effort on this. There usually is a general round-up of reaction. I don't happen to have it at this point, but I would refer to what I said yesterday -- that if one looks simply at the press, there has been, I think, a rather strong supportive reaction from certainly our major allies, so I would refer you to that.

Q Do you have anything on Caspar Weinberger in China and the talks there?

A No, I really don't have anything on that. I think that he's had a press conference, I guess, in China, and I believe that the White House addressed this issue this morning and I'm sure that Larry Speakes will be addressing it further at noon -- the question of the exchange of visits between the President and Premier Zhao.

Q Do you have anything on McFarlane's plans? Is he in Beirut?

A He's in Beirut. I don't have anything on further plans.

Q He's not coming to report to the President?

A I don't have anything on further plans at this point. I don't rule out that he would come back at some point and report, but I just don't have anything to give you on that today.

O.K., anything else?

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, September 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #171

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have two brief announcements.

First, a reminder that there will be a background briefing today here in this briefing room at 2:30 on Lebanon. I will ask you to stay in touch with the Press Office. I think that schedule will hold, but just stay in touch in case there is any change in that.

For your information only, not for publication, the briefer will be Richard Fairbanks.

Second, there will be a background briefing on September 30th at 2:00 p.m. here in the briefing room by a senior Department official on the visit of President Aristides Pereira of Cape Verde.

President Pereira, who is on a private visit, will be in Washington October 3 to 7. He will meet with President Reagan on October 3.

Again for your information only, not for publication, the briefer will be Deputy Assistant Secretary Frank Wisner.

Q Excuse me, what was that country?

A Cape Verde.

Q Is that also known as Cape Verde?

A Okay, Lester, I will yield, to you.

Q I am just inquiring.

A I would guess that would probably be close to the same.

I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, can you bring us up to speed on what is happening in the negotiations to get the United Nations cease-fire observers deployed in Lebanon?

A Not really. This is being discussed, as you know, in a variety of places. It was a subject that was addressed in New York. The MNF contributor nations' Foreign Ministers met in New York, as you are well aware, and they, and others, support the view that the UN could play a useful role in the situation as it has in Lebanon over the years. But I think I would have to stay away from any discussion of specifics on this while discussions are underway. Obviously there was, in the cease-fire agreement, a provision calling for neutral observers.

Q Is there any change in the Syrian/Soviet position on this?

A You would have to ask the Syrians and the Soviets.

Q That word "neutral" in the U.S. view, in the cease-fire agreement, is that applicable to a UN force?

A Again, I think that I would repeat what I have said, that the MNF foreign ministers and others have indicated that they think that the UN could play a useful role in the situation. I don't think we can specify from here what the ultimate form or even composition of such a group might be.

Q Is it the United States' position that we should be a part of --

A I'm sorry, I missed that.

Q -- the United States should be a part of such an observer force?

A That the U.S. should be a part of such an observer force?

Q Yes.

A I have not heard suggestions that the U.S. would actually contribute forces to such --

Q There are already U.S. troops in the observer force, aren't there, Alan?

A In the UNTSO?

Q Yes.

A In the UNTSO, but I think in terms of this, I have not heard a discussion of this. I can't really project what is going to happen with this, so let's let things evolve.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the reports published by the Aviation Week that there is a proposal for the formation of sort of a Middle East peacekeeping force?

A No. I saw a wire story on that this morning. I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, if I am quoting him correctly, there was a report on the wire quoting Prince Bandar saying that the U.S. among others -- if I have it right -- called on the Israelis to remain in their position in the Shuf for another day or two, because they felt they were on the verge of a cease-fire agreement, and retention of those positions by Israel might have made a difference in the final round of negotiations.

Did the U.S. ask the Israelis to remain in position, at that point?

A I don't have anything on it at all, Bernie, but I am not clear. I saw that story, too, and I wasn't clear what the time-frame was on that. Anyway, I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, two questions. One, do you have anything on a report about two Marines being detained by Amal --

A No. Again, just before I came out I saw a wire on this, but I don't have anything. You might want to check with the Pentagon.

Q Okay. Another wire report was that the Progressive Socialists were asking for U.S. reparations for the damage done during the bombardment of the Shuf. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Charles Hudson, British Independent Television News. On the question of these off-the-cuff remarks by Vice President Bush yesterday, hitherto the official line on the British and French nuclear forces has always been that they would not be brought into the present round of INF Geneva negotiations on medium range nuclear weapons.

However, if I can just quote from the official transcript of these remarks, the Vice President said, "I don't feel that it is correct to have the INF talks fall apart because the Alliance is not willing" -- the Alliance meaning NATO -- "is not willing to consider the British and French at this juncture in the INF talks."

Is there a change in the U.S. position on these talks?

A No, there is no change on that. This Administration, like all of its predecessors, considers that U.S./Soviet parity is the only acceptable basis for negotiations between our two countries on nuclear forces.

At the same time, we have taken note of statements made by the British and French Governments, as well as by the Chinese Government, indicating that at some future time, under conditions in which there have been significant reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, that they might be willing to reconsider their own positions regarding the inclusion of their own nuclear forces in arms control. And in responding to questions, the Vice President was simply reflecting our support for the positions taken by the British and French Governments.

Q But he was saying that they should be brought into the INF talks now.

A No, he was not.

Q I mean, he quotes the word --

A No.

Q He said "at this juncture in the INF talks." I am quoting from the official transcript.

A I think you may be misreading that. As I was listening to you, it seems to me you were emphasizing words that I would not have emphasized just in the way you were reading it. But, in any case, he was not suggesting that, and there is no change in the U.S. position.

Q Can we have a copy of that statement?

A Of what I read?

Q Yes.

A Yes.

Q In light of the Syrian reluctance, or the speech of Mr. Khaddam yesterday at the United Nations, although you do not want to comment a lot on this, but are there any talks on the matter of getting the Golan

Heights, or some negotiations in the package of wheeling and dealing to get the solution on Lebanon, and getting also the Golan Heights to be returned to Syria?

A Our position on the Golan Heights is well known, and there is no change in that. I think we have made clear that there were no deals made in this process of moving towards a cease-fire--no deals with the U.S., no secret understandings with Syria.

Obviously, we would look to have improved relations with Syria over time, but I just don't know how to get more at your question.

Q This is, I think, one of the reasons the Syrians, according to some reports, are not accepting, or they are not willing now, to accept the United Nations or the MNF to have the United Nations observers to police the cease-fire, unless they will have some commitment coming from all points, from all directions, including Israel, that they will have some serious talks about the future, or the situation and conditions of the Golan Heights.

A I don't think that was part of this dialogue. Whatever the Syrian attitude may be, I can't speak to, but I don't think that was part of this particular dialogue.

(MORE)

Q On the UN, Alan, the transcript of the White House news briefing Tuesday reveals that when he was asked if President Reagan disagrees with Mayor Koch's description of the United Nations as a "cesspool," Larry Speakes said "No," that is, that President Reagan does not disagree with the Mayor's assessment.

And my question is, does Secretary Shultz believe that Mayor Koch is wrong to have described the United Nations as a cesspool?

A Number one, I guess I don't want to address Larry Speakes' briefings, but I tend to think that you are probably taking out of context what was said.

Q No, no. It is right here. I brought it along for your benefit --

A I read those transcripts.

Q -- right here in my hand.

A Good, Lester.

Q It isn't out of context, Larry (sic). He said "No." "What does the President think? Does he deny it is a cesspool, Larry?"

"MR SPEAKES: No." It's right there in black and white, so it isn't out of context.

Can I have an answer? What does Shultz --

A No, I don't have an answer as to the Secretary's attitude towards Mr. Koch's remark. I don't know that he has addressed that.

Q But he is aware of it, isn't he?

A I don't know. I haven't asked him.

Q You don't think he is aware?

A I haven't asked him, Lester. He has been in New York.

Q Could you take the question?

A No, I don't think so.

Q Why won't you take the question, Larry (sic)?

A Because we have addressed it. Larry is the fellow who briefs at the White House.

Q No, no. This is the Mayor of the largest city in the United States. He is certainly a responsible individual don't you think, Alan?

A Lester, our attitude toward the UN has been expressed on recent occasions. The President was in New York and he expressed himself. I will just leave it at that.

Q The President didn't object to the description of the UN as a "cesspool." Does the Secretary of State -- he disagrees with the President, in other words?

A I say I haven't asked him, and I don't intend to ask him.

Q I see.

Q Do you have any comments or --

A -- I guess I would have to say I am sure he would not take any pejorative stand of that sort, basically Lester, but I haven't asked him and I cannot speak --

Q "Pejorative?" I'm sorry, could you --

A No, I think you can look it up in the dictionary, Lester. (Laughter)

Q I know what the word means. How would he be pejorative? Do you mean he would be pejorative if he disagreed with the Koch --

A Why don't you read the transcript of what I just said and you can figure it out for yourself, Lester?

(Laughter)

A Yes. I would like to know, how does the Administration read the Syrian objection to the placing of UN forces in Lebanon to police the ceasefire? And do you believe this is the last from Syria about this subject, or do you think they are capable of changing their view?

A I can't answer for the Syrian view, and I don't think this is the place to address that. As you know, the Secretary is going to be meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam. I think the Foreign Minister has met with others in New York. And I am just not going to get into that.

The first part of your question is --

Q How do you read that?

A I am not going to try to read it. I think that the discussions are going on about how there could be an observer group there, and I don't think it would be helped by trying to read other people's views in public from here.

Q I have a sort of technical quetion, if I may? Do you have any explanation why the Secretary today should meet with three Egyptian ministers who are all working for the economic sector, all one-by-one?

A Are you looking at the schedule for today?

Q Yes. That is what I am talking about.

A I am not aware it was Secretary Shultz who was doing that. I think it was somebody else on the schedule who was doing that.

(MORE)

Q Maybe it is the Under Secretary or the Assistant Secretary, but I don't understand why --

A I don't know what topics are being covered in these meetings, so I don't know the answer to your question, but I don't think it is the Secretary who is having those meetings.

Q Can you give us any guidance, Alan, on the focus of tomorrow's meeting with Khaddam and what Shultz might expect to come out of it?

A No, I don't think that I would do that. I assume that there will be a read-out in New York after the meetings, and I am going to have to leave to that, rather than try to pre-brief it.

Q Have you got a time for it?

A I don't have a time for it, but I am sure that when the Press office in New York opens again tomorrow morning, they will have a time for it. I think it is in the afternoon, but check with them tomorrow morning.

Q At the meeting which is supposed to be taking place tomorrow between Secretary Shultz and Secretary Khaddam, the Foreign Minister of Syria, do you have any idea what will be the -- I know that the topic will be comments on the cease-fire, and other things -- but what do you hope the Secretary will accomplish from that?

A That is what Greg just asked, and I don't have sort of a pre-brief to give you on that.

Q Alan, there was something yesterday, but do you have anything in greater depth in response to President Andropov's remarks?

A No. We issued something last night. I think Larry Speakes may have something more that he would be saying about it, but I don't have anything further here.

Q Alan, on an unrelated question on the UN, have you denied the truth of reports that Secretary Shultz spoke with Mr. Lichenstein of his disapproval of Lichenstein's offer to wave goodbye to any departing members of the UN? You are familiar with that statement, undoubtedly.

A Yes, I am familiar with the statement. I am not aware of any conversation that took place.

Q There have been definite reports that Secretary Shultz was highly displeased and expressed his displeasure to Mr. Lichenstein. Is that untrue?

A I am simply unaware of any conversations that took place.

Q In other words, you don't know whether he mentioned it.

A I will stick with what I just said.

With regard to the schedule -- let me just go back to the previous question on the Egyptian ministers -- I see here that they are to meet with Ambassador Veliotes, and I don't know specifically what the purpose of those meetings may be, whether it is related to President Mubarak's trip or not, but I would also note that Ambassador Veliotes, of course, is the Ambassador-designate to Egypt, so I suppose a number of purposes might be served by such meetings. But I don't have a specific answer.

Q If I could finish -- does the Secretary -- in other words, you are not aware that he in any way reprimanded or expressed displeasure to Mr. Lichenstein. So my question is this: Does Secretary Shultz disagree in any way with what President Reagan observed as Lichenstein having "had the hearty approval of most people in America?"

A Lester, I haven't asked the Secretary his views on this, and I think that there has been --

Q Can you take the question?

A No. This issue has been addressed by a lot of people, and it is in the past, and I am not going to go back.

Q Why is it in the past?

A Because it happened previously. (Laughter)

Q Is that ancient or modern history, Alan? Come on, now, Alan--.

Q Thank you, Alan.

Q Do you want to talk about these new security rules for State Department correspondents?

A They have been published in The Federal Register, and I refer you to those. I would also take note, having looked at the story in this morning's paper, that neither the fellow who wrote that piece nor the people in Editor and Publisher who wrote on the same piece, bothered to call John Hughes for his views on this. So, I would just refer you to --

Q What would he have said?

A I don't have a --

Q I will ask for John Hughes' views.

Q Maybe he would have refused to take the question, like other people.

A I think that some representatives of the State Department Association have reviewed these various questions, and I would refer you, Bernie, if you are not familiar with what has been discussed with them, to go and speak with them, and then I am sure that John will be happy to talk about it, or we could talk about it in the Press Office, but they have been published in The Federal Register.

Q Do you know when?

A When they were published? July 12th.

Q Alan, just for the record, the fellow who wrote the piece in today's paper discussed the matter several times with Mr. Hughes, with his predecessor, Mr. Fischer, and with you.

A I don't think that this article and the way it was described there was discussed.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, September 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #172

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1983, 12:03 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I will be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, did you have any comment on the severity of the charges, the indictment in Poland, against the former Solidarity leaders?

A Yes, I do have something on that.

We are, of course, pleased that these Solidarity advisers no longer face the death penalty, and continue to call for the ending of criminal penalties for trade union activities. We urge the release of all political prisoners, including these individuals.

Q Do you have an estimate on the number of political prisoners now held in Poland?

A I do not.

Q Could you take that, perhaps, and give us an update on that figure?

A No, I don't think we have any updates on this, Mike. One of the problems is, indeed, trying to get a handle on numbers, so I don't think at this point we are prepared to try to box that one in publicly.

Q Alan, there are several stories in the paper today suggesting that the United States is now tilting towards Syria, I guess would be the way to capsule it, in its relations and in its dealings with Lebanon. What can you tell us on that subject?

A Basically, I guess, Bob, I would refer you to what Larry Speakes said this morning.

Q What did he say?

A That our policy is consistent; that we have backed, as you well know, the policy of reconciliation within Lebanon, as does President Gemayel, and we strongly support his efforts in that regard; that it is true that the Syrians as well as the Saudis will be observers at the invitation of President Gemayel at the talks; and that is simply what the facts are.

The idea that there has been some shift in U.S. policy is simply wrong.

Q Have we suggested, Alan, some adjustment that would give Syria some voice in the political affairs of Lebanon?

A I have indicated before that we have made no deals in that regard at all. It is obvious, and we have indicated before that it is obvious, that Syria, as well as other countries, has an interest in what goes on in Lebanon, and the Secretary talked about that, for example, with regard to their security.

But the answer to your question is, no, we have not done that.

Q Do you have any comment on what President Mubarak of Egypt said yesterday in front of the Foreign Affairs Council, saying that the United States cannot be totally biased towards a specific state while it is mapping out its Middle East policy?

A "Cannot be totally biased towards a specific state?" I don't quite know what that is supposed to have reference to.

Q I think it is a clear indication to Israel.

A I think that the U.S., obviously, has strong and important ties with Israel, but also has strong and important ties with quite a number of Arab states, including strong ties and important ties with Egypt; and I think that we would not -- I haven't seen President Mubarak's remarks, so I can't comment on those, but certainly we have not tried to have relations with one state at the expense, as it were, of another. We have approached our relations with those states, both individually and as we saw them fitting into the entire pattern in the Middle East, and we have valued that broad spectrum of ties.

Q Alan, has any progress been made on determining who is going to be the neutral observer force in Lebanon?

A I don't know whether there is any progress on that, Bob. That issue continues to be discussed. I think in New York today there will be further discussions. The Secretary is meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam and with others. I think discussions probably are going on in the UN itself. As I have indicated over the last couple of days, the Secretary has indicated, and others, that there certainly is a view that a UN involvement of some sort might well be useful, but precisely how that is working out, I can't tell you.

Q We don't insist that it be a UN force only? There could be other alternatives?

A I think there are alternatives that the briefer yesterday, I think, declined to get into specifics on. The idea that there are, perhaps, alternative views or alternatives as to how this might be worked out is clear, but I just can't take you anywhere on the specifics.

Q When do you think the dialogue of national reconciliation can begin?

A I don't know.

Q Is there any schedule? Has anybody set a time, or a tentative time?

A I am not aware, Bob. I don't think I am going to try from here to keep up with that. I would have to let that story come out of Lebanon, where the arrangements would be made for that.

Q Is the cease-fire still holding?

A Yes. I can give you a little sitrep on that. The cease-fire is holding, although there have been occasional exchanges of fire in the southern suburbs of Beirut and elsewhere. The Security Committee is scheduled to hold its third meeting today. Beirut International Airport is open, and more arriving and departing flights are expected today. There have been no incidents near the Ambassador's residence or the Marines' positions.

Q The briefer, yesterday, as you said, did mention neutral observers, but eventually it was stated that even those groups would be within the United Nations area -- I mean, under United Nations auspices. Now, the other part of the question is, Prince Bandar, yesterday at the White House was quoted saying that if they wanted

United Nations observers, they would have stated so at the negotiations leading to the cease-fire agreement. He said it was not really decided to be the United Nations, so I heard him saying. So, can you put these things together?

A I don't think I could take it beyond what I said before, which is that the discussions on this subject are continuing, including in New York, and that there is a view that UN involvement would be a useful thing. The UN has played a positive role in Lebanon over the years, but I really am not prepared to try to get more specific about that while these discussions are going on.

Q But the United States, Alan, would not look negatively at an outside-the-United-Nations neutral force?

A Again, I don't want to take it beyond what I have said. I think that the Foreign Ministers of the MNF countries addressed this in New York, and I would refer you specifically to what they said the other day. I don't happen to have a text of it here, but I think that afterwards there was a reference to what their views were. John may have briefed, or some other official may have briefed, I am not sure. So I just can't take it anywhere beyond that.

Q Forgive me if this was brought up at yesterday's briefing or earlier today, but what is the U.S. attitude towards the Lebanese-Israeli accords of May? Do we have a stated position on that?

A We still stand behind that. We recognize it as a valid accord.

Q Is there any attitude towards preserving it in the context of the negotiations on national reconciliation?

A I am not aware that that is a particular issue at this point. Obviously the withdrawal of all foreign forces is an important objective. It remains one of the three principal objectives we have been talking about in Lebanon, and that is not changed, and that agreement addresses itself in part to that subject.

Q Alan, is there anything new on the Soviet-Korean airliner incident, specifically the possibility of U.S. intelligence intercepting a radio communication from the Soviet pilot saying that he realized he shot down a passenger plane?

A On the general issue, I don't have anything new to offer you.

And I saw that report. I don't have anything to offer on that. If there were such a thing, it would get us into an intelligence area; and if there were such a thing and it had not been released, I am not in a position to release it.

Q Is the State Department working on a White Paper to sweep up the details on this?

A There was a paper that was being worked on -- I wouldn't call it a White Paper, but sort of a summary report paper. I don't know if that is, in fact, going to emerge in the end. There are a lot of things that are started that don't end up. I just don't know the answer to that.

But there is nothing that I am aware of, just to give you a general point, that would change our view about what happened. Again I go back to the point that we feel that the Soviets certainly should have known and could have known that that was a civilian airliner, and that if they didn't know, they had a responsibility to do so, and it was either extraordinarily negligent or extraordinarily incompetent, or both.

Q Well, if this information is true, it would tend to support you, then.

A I agree with that. I understand the point. I just don't have anything new to give you today on that subject.

Q Alan, The Washington Post editorial this morning points out, I believe, that in your statement of two days ago responding to the remarks of President Andropov, there was an omission of one of the demands, that being the one for an apology.

A Yes. Let me just say that I took note of that, that there is no change in our position. That statement was crafted with an eye, perhaps not totally successfully, but with an eye to trying to make it as short as possible, and so some of the things that we have normally talked about were not included in the formulations. But I think that that statement did refer to the Soviets needing to take responsibility for what had happened, and that would encompass such things as making an apology, and so on. So there is no change in that.

Q Costa Rica has recalled its Ambassador in Nicaragua. Do you have any information or any comment on this?

A I can only comment really on the incident which I believe led to this. It is our understanding that while the Nicaraguans claim they mistook the Costa Ricans whom they fired at for ARDE troops, the Costa Rican Government has indicated that this was an intentional attack and invoked a special OAS meeting on October 4 on this issue. We support their call for this meeting.

Q To follow up on this question, do you have any comment on the final communique coming out of the meeting of the Finance Ministers of Central America?

A No, I don't.

-- MORE --

Q I mean, in particular, their rejection of the U.S. Administration pressure to boycott Nicaragua?

A Oh, I think, in terms of the question -- I think we had some guidance on this question yesterday or the day before that you might want to check. I think we would --

Well, let me refer you to the guidance and leave it at that. I don't know that specifically with regard to that Finance Ministers' meeting, but the issue was in the press and we did do something on it.

Q Alan, any more information about the capture yesterday of two U.S. Marines than what we know about it from the press?

A Sorry, I don't have anything further on it.

Q Who were these people that were captured in Lebanon yesterday? They were not Marines, as a matter of fact.

A I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon.

Q They were Army people.

A I just don't know who they were.

Q You don't know what their role was?

A No, but I assume the Pentagon has that.

Q I know you're not a spokesman for the Kissinger Commission, but do you have any idea where this report came from that Richard Nixon was going to join them there or --

A No, I don't. But my understanding -- and, again, I'm not speaking for them --

Q I understand.

A -- my understanding is that that is not an accurate report. I don't know what Mr. Nixon's plans are --

Q I thought you might have gotten a cable or something from people down there explaining.

A No. I saw that --

Q Did anyone here send a cable to ask, "What is this about?" when this report came in?

A   I assume that people are looking at what happened here; but in any case, my understanding -- and I am not speaking for the Commission -- but my understanding is that that is not an accurate report.

Q   It sure would have been a good story, though, if it were true.

(Laughter)

A   Sorry, George, sorry.

Q   Do you have a run-down on Ambassador Richard Stone's activities in the next couple of weeks?

A   There is guidance -- let me see if I have it here; yes, I do -- he will be leaving Washington on October 1 for travel to nine European capitals where he will consult with senior host-country officials and parliamentarians on U.S. Central American policy. He will return to Washington on October 20.

Q   Do you have the countries?

A   Yes. He will be in London, October 2; Brussels, October 5; Madrid, October 7; Rome, October 8; Athens, October 11; Vienna, October 12; Paris, October 13; the Hague, October 17; and Bonn, on October 18.

Q   Nice trip.

Q   Is he taking press? (Laughter)

A   He will, as on his previous trips, Fred -- the ones he has taken to Latin America -- hold no press conferences or other scheduled on-the-record meetings with the press, so I don't think he is taking any press with him.

Q   Do you want to give us a run-down on what he is trying to sell or is he just bringing people up to date?

A   As I said, he will be discussing our Central American policy.

Q   Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:18 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE [redacted]/ Glennox

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #173

MONDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. One announcement. Following the meeting between President Reagan and President Carstens of the Federal Republic of Germany, a senior Department official will brief on BACKGROUND in the White House Press Briefing Room on Tuesday, October 4 at approximately 11:30 a.m.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, does the United States see the recent moves by the Druze to be the beginning of a fragmentation of Lebanon?

A We've noted the announcement in the press over the weekend, and also Mr. Jumblatt's public statement that this step will in no way prejudice Druze participation in national reconciliation talks.

It should be very clear that our support for the principle of Lebanese unity would rule out measures by any of the communities or factions that would perpetuate factional strife. Until we know more about the practical effect of the measures proposed by Mr. Jumblatt, we would have no comment on them.

We urge that the political process leading to national reconciliation begin as soon as possible under the leadership of President Gemayel and with the full participation of leaders of the various Lebanese communities as provided for in the ceasefire agreement.

Q Would you understand him to be saying that he will still take part in this dialogue?

A As I say, he apparently indicated publicly as well that this step in no way prejudiced Druze participation in national reconciliation talks.

Q How do you intend to find out about -- is there going to be a meeting with Mr. Jumblatt -- between Jumblatt and American officials, or what?

A I don't know of any meeting scheduled, Ghassan. There could well be at some point meetings. There had been discussions from time to time, of course. I just don't know. I saw a press report that he was in Greece, so I don't know when he will be around to talk.

There are discussions going on all the time among the various groups, and we are obviously, as I said at the end of that statement, looking for the national reconciliation dialogue to begin as soon as possible. So there will obviously need to be continuing discussions leading to that.

Q A copy of that?

A Yes, sure.

Q He also urged Druze officers to desert from the Lebanse Army. Did you have any comment on that?

A I didn't see that. I've seen, in fact, some reports that there were purportedly some desertions, but I also saw in one report this morning, for example, indications that the Lebanese commanders had let Druze leave their units, and so on. We don't know what the facts are. We're looking into them, but I can't confirm any of that.

Q The basis of that report, I believe, was he addressed a Lebanese Army barracks where there were any number of Druze militia.

A Again, I can't confirm reports until we've seen them, but we're looking into them.

Q Any progress on the observers, the neutral observers?

A Those discussions continue in New York and elsewhere, but I don't have anything to report to you on progress.

Q There was this morning of -- a report this morning of a break of the ceasefire. Can you confirm that or do you know anything more about it?

A The Marines have reported that two mortar rounds impacted in the vicinity of their positions earlier today. There were no casualties. They did not return fire, and this appears to be an isolated incident in which fire was not directed at the Marines.

We've also seen press reports describing a limited exchange of gunfire between the LAF and unidentified gunmen in the southern part of Beirut. So I don't have anything here that would suggest that we would conclude there has been a "breakdown" of the ceasefire.

Q Do you have any comment on what Jumblatt said, that he believes that the army, the Lebanese Army should be used after the achievement of national reconciliation, not before?

A No. I think that the question of what might be done on the spot, the question has come up in terms of observers, who might do that and what other functions might be fulfilled by others, that's the kind of thing which I think has to be worked on the ground. There are the ceasefire military discussions going on; we're looking to the political dialogue, and I just don't think I can really address that from here at this point.

Q Does the United States Government regard the Jumblatt actions of the last 24 hours as indirect pressure from Syria on the government of President Gemayel?

A I don't have any characterization to offer you in that respect. We've seen the reports of what he's done, what he said, and I made the comments that we have to offer on that at this point.

Q Can you tell us where McFarlane is, and Fairbanks, and also what their mission is now at this very moment? Are they still discussing with Syria the question of troop withdrawals or is everything sort of on hold during the ceasefire, and are they dealing with the national reconciliation talks? What exactly is involved?

A Having been away from us, Ralph, you may have missed it. Ambassador Fairbanks is, indeed, back here, and he is still here. McFarlane is in Israel today.

Their role, I think as it has had, has various elements to it. They certainly will be staying in close touch with the situation regarding the ceasefire, regarding the national reconciliation dialogue. Ambassador McFarlane has also indicated they will clearly want to turn their attention, as well, to the broader issues within Lebanon. That is, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, but I don't have any specifics to offer you regarding that at this point.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that the Israeli Embassy in Washington was directly asking for new conditions of U.S. aid to Israel and for the increasing of the grants?

A I think I got asked this last week, and I don't have anything on it; didn't have anything then. I'm sorry, I don't have anything now.

Q Do you have any readout on the Mubarak visit at all?

A I don't have a readout on it beyond what was said by briefers. I do not have anything.

Q One last thing from me. There's a report this morning that a ship moving from Cyprus to Tripoli, Lebanon, was captured by the Israeli navy and that 25 Palestinians that were on it were taken by the Israeli forces. The ship is reported to have been in international waters. Are you aware of this incident?

A I'm personally not aware of the report at all. I can check and see if anybody has anything on it, but I don't have anything on it at this point.

Q Change the subject. Do you have anything on the death squad activity in El Salvador?

A Yes, I do. We have consistently deplored political violence regardless of its origin. And in the context of reports over the past few weeks, do so again in the most categoric terms.

We support the U.S. Embassy's strong statement last week against this violence. It is an anathema to the very centralist and moderate basis of support on which the development of pluralistic democratic institutions in El Salvador depend.

It is particularly deplorable that the political violence in El Salvador has been directed against those moderate groups who have accepted the risk of supporting democratic reforms. We strongly support the efforts of the Government of El Salvador to restore the efficacy of the rule of law in that country. This is a central objective that we all share.

The on-going democratic political, economic and social reforms being undertaken by the current government remains essential to ending this violence.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Yes.

Q Do you have any statistics?

A I don't have any statistics.

Q With respect to the latest threats that have been made on Mr. Maldonado, who is a frequent visitor to Washington, and to his boss, Mr. Camacho, who is also a frequent visitor and has ties to AIFLD, are you urging that the Salvadoran Government take special precautions with respect to their safety, particularly after the denounciation of the Constitutent Assembly president?

A I don't think I could get into the details of diplomatic exchanges, but our attitude towards the violence is clearly stated in what I just gave you.

-- MORE --

Q Also, another on El Salvador. One, do you have any comment on the meeting that took place in Bogota late last week between the Peace Commission and the Left; and, secondly, do you have any statement with respect to the report that the CIA is now using Ilopango Air Force Base, as well as Honduras, to carry supplies to the FDN in Nicaragua?

A On the Peace Commission/Left talks, we had something on that last week, and I would refer you to the Press Office to get that.

On allegations of CIA activities, obviously we don't comment on allegations of intelligence activities.

Q One more. With respect to the elections again, I understand that the Peace Commission's position when they left was that there would be no further dialogue until the guerrillas agreed to take part in the electoral process in El Salvador.

Can you tell us now, in view of this renewed death squad activity, what possible guarantees could be provided for the safety of those who might participate?

A Two things on that. First of all, I don't think my understanding of the Peace Commission's position is entirely that which you just expressed, and I think we would have to leave it to them to talk about it themselves, rather than talking about it from here.

Second, as far as safety and assurances, and so on, obviously this is an area we have indicated before where we recognize that there would have to be arrangements made, and people would have to discuss this issue quite thoroughly. But I can't spell out for you the kinds of arrangements that might be made.

Excuse me, George, you had a question, and I will come back to you.

Q If El Salvador were being used to help anti-government rebels in Nicaragua, would this not be a brazen attempt by El Salvador to export its revolution?

A Hypothetical.

Q In your original statement, are you implying that the El Salvador Government should or could be doing more to halt these death squads?

A I am explaining our attitude towards the death squad activity, and I am not going to try to get into what would constitute possibly the subject of dialogue between ourselves and the Salvardoran officials.

Q Let me put it more bluntly then. Do you think the El Salvadoran Government could be doing more to halt the death squad activity?

A Beyond the statement I have given you, Jim, I just don't have anything to offer you on that subject.

Q Alan, could I take one more try at this, because if a senior foreign ministry official of the El Salvadoran Government is not safe from being abducted and held incommunicado, presumably, or killed, by death squads, how is it even remotely conceivable that under this government there could be the kinds of guarantees needed supplied to the left if they decided to enter the electoral process?

I think that is a legitimate question that your answer just doesn't really answer.

A The answers to those kinds of questions would have to come out of a dialogue between the Peace Commission and others involved in El Salvador and those who would participate in the election. I can't answer that from here.

I suppose a starting point is some sort of agreement that there would be participation in the election.

Q Do you have anything on a decision by the Administration on the President's trip to the Philippines?

A I don't have anything on that. I think Larry Speakes addressed that somewhat this morning, and indicated he would have something later when he briefs this afternoon.

Q Is there anything that has happened during the past month that has diminished Secretary Shultz' expression of revulsion at the Soviets' shooting down of the Korean Air Lines Flight 007?

A No.

Q If this was a sincere expression of outrage that has not been watered down, as you say, could you tell us, Alan, why Hayward Isham of the Department of State is participating on Wednesday night with Vitaliy Cherkin of the Soviet Embassy in a National Cathedral program entitled -- quote -- Understanding the Soviet Union?

A I don't know anything about it, Lester. Why don't I look into it and see what there is available on it.

Q Right. While you are looking, in your extensive knowledge of modern diplomatic history, Alan, is there any record that you know of that any State Department officials ever participated in any programs in the late 1930's for understanding Germany's National Socialists?

A Lester, I am afraid I would have to refer you to the history books and records for that. I don't have a research service --

Q But you will take this question and I can expect an answer.

A I said I would look into it and we will find out what we find out.

Q Alan, will the Secretary be seeing Tariq 'Aziz, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, again this week?

A I have to refer you to New York for the schedule up there. I just don't have it.

Q But were there plans for further talks about the Iran/Iraq War?

A I don't know what there was. You have to check with John and see what he has up there.

Q Is there anything new on the Iraqi/U.S. relations in the light of the meeting held by the Finance Minister of Iraq with the Assistant Secretary?

A No. I think that I had something last week on this and there may have been something -- I don't know if there has been anything in New York at all, but I don't have anything new to give you. Let's just leave it at that.

Q I hate to do this, it also refers to a Washington Post article on Saturday. Do you have anything about that mishap that apparently killed an Argentine atomic research reactor operator, or about the move by the House to cut off nuclear technology transfers to countries such as Argentina, which refused to open up all their atomic facilities to international inspection?

A I don't have anything on either of those subjects.

Q Could you look into them, especially the mishap one?

A I will take a look. On the first one, I don't think I will be looking at. I will look and see if there is anything at this point that we want to say about the second issue.

Q I apologize in advance for what may sound like a lengthy and somewhat tendacious question, but because of it, you will understand why.

On September 15th, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, John Monjo, spoke to the House Foreign Affairs Committee in a policy statement regarding Cambodia, Kampuchea.

In restating U.S. policy he said -- quote -- We do not provide aid of any kind or have any contact with the Khmer Rouge, and our welcoming of the coalition in Cambodia does not imply any support for the Khmer Rouge. Unquote.

In its current issue, Newsweek magazine says, "The Central Intelligence Agency is working with the Chinese to supply arms to the forces of former Cambodian ruler, Pol Pot, which, of course, is the Khmer Rouge, now waging hit and run attacks on the current Saigon-supported regime."

My question is: Was Mr. Monjo correctly stating the policy of the U.S. Government or only the policy of the State Department? What is the status of his statement that the United States does not provide aid of any kind to the Khmer Rouge?

A I would, I guess, address that in two parts.

First of all, obviously, I can't address directly the Newsweek point since it alleges intelligence activities, but I would refer you to Mr. Monjo's statement as the statement of policy of the United States Government, and I would refer to it as a valid statement and what you should take as our policy.

Q Could I go to one other one of a similar nature?

As you know, in 1975, I believe it was, Congress passed the so-called Clark Amendment which forbids the United States Government, the CIA and other people, from aiding covert, undercover activities regarding Angola.

The current issue of Newsweek Magazine says that CIA training, arms, and financial assistance are also given to military forces in Ethiopia, Angola, and the Sudan.

Is the Reagan Administration abiding by the 1975 Clark Amendment, which has not been repealed?

A Don, to my knowledge, it certainly is continuing to abide by the Clark Amendment, but I would also suggest you might want to get reaffirmation of that from the CIA since it affects their operations.

Q Alan, does the Administration have a position on House Resolution 323, which is Congressman Gonzales's resolution calling for an investigation of Henry Kissinger's conflict of interest in his current position?

A No, I don't have anything on it?

Q Alan, is there anything new on the black box?

A No. The search continues. There is nothing new, no new pings, no new developments, but, again, I would refer you to the Pentagon, just to be sure there is nothing, but I am pretty sure that is where we are.

Q Do you have any reaction to the demonstrations in Moscow?

A No.

Q Alan, before asking this question, I want to disagree with my friend, Don. I didn't think it was a tendentious question. I thought it was a very legitimate question that needed some preface, so I think that the precedent has been established, and I think it was a very good question.

A Since you like to give prefaces to your questions. (Laughter.)

Q Right, and I think -

A Could we have the question, Lester?

Q -- we should all have this opportunity. I don't often agree with The Washington Post, but I think this was a good question. (Laughter)

Does Secretary Shultz agree or disagree with The Washington Post that opposition to the $8 billion IMF funding is from a -- quote -- cuckoo alliance of the left and right, and which alliance, I note, includes former Secretary of the Treasury, William Simon.

Do you think he is a cuckoo? Does Shultz think he is a cuckoo?

A I think that the Administration's position on the IMF has recently been restated by the President of the United States --

Q I know that --

A -- and I would refer you to that speech, Lester.

Q But, Alan, I am asking about Secretary Shultz. Does he agree --

A You can rest assured that the Secretary supports the President's position.

Q He doesn't think that Simon is a cuckoo, does he?

A I haven't asked him that specific question, but I think you can rest assured he supports the President's position.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, October 4, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #174

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1983, 12:16 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one announcement. Following the Spanish-American Council meeting at the Department of State this afternoon, a senior Department official will brief ON BACKGROUND here in the Department Briefing Room at approximately 4:30 p.m.

Q When is that, Alan?

A This is after the Spanish-American Council.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Do you have anything regarding the efforts to start the reconciliation talks between the factions in Lebanon? How far along they are or --

A I don't have anything on the reconciliation talks; no.

Q Nothing on it regarding the U.S. role in that?

A Nothing beyond what we've said before on that.

Q There is a report from Lebanon that they may be starting as soon as this weekend in Saudi Arabia?

A I saw that report. I don't have anything to give you on it.

Q While still on Lebanon, would you care to comment on the reports this morning that some American weapons intended for the Lebanese Government's use are being filtered to the Lebanese Forces or the Phalangists' forces?

A I can only give you a few things on that. First, I would refer you to the reported remarks of Colonel Thomas Fintel, who is the head of the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in Lebanon, to the effect that these allegations attributed to Druze officers named in the report are unfounded.

As you know, we have a long-established security assistance relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and for details of that I would refer you to the Pentagon. But any transfers of this equipment to militias, such as the LF or anybody else, would be a violation of our agreements with the LAF. And, as I say, the allegations cited this morning in the press are unfounded.

Q That's according to the news or to the American Government's own investigation?

A I think that Colonel Fintel talked to this this morning, and I would go to the Pentagon for what they might have on the fill-in on that. I'm not sure they've got any more than was in the press. That would be his reporting channel, and I would have to refer you to them.

Q Also on Lebanon, Foreign Minister Salem gave a press conference this morning in which he expressed some displeasure at the steps that Walid Jumblatt has taken. Have you yet had a chance to assess the practical effects of these steps, and decided to make any sort of position --

A I don't have anything different from what I had yesterday on that.

Q I have a couple of Don Oberdorfer-type questions, and I hope I can count on the same forebearance and courtesy from our colleagues.

A Time will tell, Lester. (Laughter)

Q They won't be any longer than Don's. The Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America, including Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association here in Washington, have written and telegraphed President Reagan, and they note that the State Department's own country reports have detailed limitations on the freedom of speech, press, religion, right to strike and belong to an opposition party in Hungary. And they note that this was, in effect, denied by Vice President Bush on September 19 in Budapest when Mr. Bush said, "In the relationship between our two nations, human rights and fundamental freedoms have not represented a point of discord, but instead brought us closer together. May this aspect of our relations serve as an example to the rest of the world."

Question: Which of these two obviously conflicting statements do Secretary Shultz agree with? Does he agree with the State Department report or with the Bush statement?

A Lester, I'm not familiar with the Vice President's statement on this, and I would have to refer you to the Vice President's office on that. And in the absence of any confirmation of all of this, I'm not going to comment.

Q Well, then let me follow up -- a couple of quick follow-ups.

Since Vice President Bush's press secretary, Shirley Green, credited the State Department's Mark Palmer with assisting the Vice President in preparing this statement praising alleged Hungarian human rights, does the State Department agree with Mr. Bush's ad lib that Janos Kadar is a "man with an enormous capacity in leadership capability," when the record shows that Kadar executed more than 2,000 Hungarian freedom fighters and deported 50,000 more to the Soviet Union?

A Again, I don't have facts on all of this, and I'm just am not in a position to address your questions.

Q Could I ask a question about South America? On Argentina, has the Administration made a decision yet on certification of continuing aid to Argentina?

A I have nothing new on that.

Q You have nothing new?

A No.

Q Can you tell me anything in that connection, vis-a-vis the Secretary's trip to South America beyond the stop in Brazil?

A I don't know that there is anything planned. I think it was addressed yesterday at a briefing in New York, and indications were that while one obviously never rules anything out in terms of additions, neither was anything being ruled in. The trip that's been announced is to Brazil, period, and if there are additions, we'll have to go with that when we have it. But I don't have anything new on that.

Q How long is he expected to be there? Is that one day or two days?

A I don't know precisely how long that's going to be.

Q Do you have anything on the debt crisis in Argentina, the arrest of a banker there, and what's going to happen in terms of the repayment to the debt to our country?

A No, I don't have anything on the arrest. I also don't have anything on the debt issue. But on the arrest, I've seen the reports but don't have anything on it.

Q That was my Argentina question. But if we're on Latin America, I'd like to ask about the revival of CONDECA and whether the United States is a party; and why, if it isn't, General Gorman was there when it was revived?

A For the most part, I guess I'm going to have to refer you to the Pentagon on that issue. I understand that General Gorman was invited by the parties as an observer. But, again, I'd refer you to the Pentagon to get a specific and authoritative readout on that.

Again, I understand the text of the communique is not -- well, we haven't seen it in any case. I don't know whether it's been made public down there, but we haven't seen it, so I don't have any comment specifically on that.

This Central American Defense Council has been in existence since the mid '60's. It's not a new organization. And given the efforts of Nicaragua to destablize the area, it is not surprising that its neighbors might want to look at ways in which they might cooperate and consult.

Q There was this interesting article in the Washington Post about how "revolution without borders" didn't originate in Nicaragua. Do you have any clarification on that?

A I don't have anything on that. I think that there was reference in that article to a letter which was written to the Hill by Mr. Drischer, and there were quotes from that in the press this morning.

I can't tell you from personal knowledge what the facts are in terms of who said what, when. It is clearly, however, the Administration's firm position that this slogan, whoever may have used it and however it may have been used, represents a description of a policy which is being followed.

Q But it's always placed in quotation marks on the part of State Department officials, and the presumption is that this relates to Nicaragua's avowed policy. Is there any evidence that the State Department has, that in fact, that slogan has been used by Nicaraguan officials?

A Again, I think the issue -- I don't know who might have used it when, as I just said to you. In terms of whether it represents a reasonable "slogan," if you will, to describe the policy, I think that that is the assessment, and if you would refer to what he House Intelligence

Committee has said, for example, in talking about activities in and through Nicaragua in supporting insurgency elsewhere in the region, I think you'll find that same policy is described there.

--MORE--

Q I just want to know, does the United States support the agreement apparently reached to revive CONDECA by those three countries to spy? And what considerations, if any, if there is such support, are being given to the fact that the United States is forbidden by law from providing military assistance or having a military relationship with Guatemala?

A I think you would have to go to the Pentagon in terms of what CONDECA is about, and what General Gorman's participation in it is. As I say, I understand he was there as an observer, which would, I think, push away some of the specifics that you are getting at. There is nothing beyond that that I am aware of in terms of involvement, but you would have to go to the Pentagon. I don't have anything on that.

Q But my question is, do we support a military alliance between those three countries?

A This organization has existed for some time. It is not a new thing, so I don't have anything to offer on that.

Q Alan, one question that deals obliquely, and then I -- it is a two-part question -- and then I must ask to be excused.

A Whose briefing are you forsaking us for, Lester?

Q The White House. The Hungarian Committee asks this question. They say it is hard to understand a policy which views the Communist system as oppressive and dangerous in Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, and at the same time embraces it in Hungary as an example for the world to follow.

Do you have any clarification of that?

A I am not aware that we have stated our policy in the way you characterize it.

Q Well, Bush did in Budapest, and there was State Department involvement in this.

A I am not sure that I, again, can accept your characterization.

Q One last question on this. Why, if we forgive Kadar these mass murders of Hungarian freedom fighters, does the Department of Justice bother prosecuting Nazi war criminals? Do you have any --

A Lester, --

Q I mean, you are stating --

A You are going to run out, and I am going to tell you that I am not going to try to get at any of those questions. In terms of what the Justice Department does, go to the Justice Department. In terms of our policy on Hungary, I am sure there are many statements on the record you can refer to. I don't happen to have one with me to give you today.

Q Alan, other than exchanging tough language at the General Assembly and around the environs of the UN, do we have anything going on now in terms of diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Nicaragua? Is there anything fresh in the Stone initiative? Is there anything going on, or is all that dead in the water right now?

A We obviously have diplomatic representation. There are conversations which do take place from time-to-time. I am not going to try to characterize "dialogue" or "fresh" or any of that. There certainly are channels of communication which can be used, but I am not going to try to get into the substance of our exchange on this.

Q Your language was "can or could be used." It doesn't sound like there is anything really active right now.

A As I say, I am not going to get into the question of what is or is not going on.

Q What about Ambassador Stone? What is he doing?

A He is in Europe. We announced that the other day. He has a rather extensive schedule which is available in the Press Office.

Q Are there no immediate plans for him to return?

A I don't have anything on any immediate plan for him to return. I think he is going to be there in Europe for a little while, but why don't you take a look at his schedule.

Q Back to the Middle East, if I may? Is there any further information on the outcome of negotiations between President Mubarak of Egypt and President Reagan, and the U.S. Administration, in general?

A I think there was a readout at the White House, and I would refer you to that. I don't have anything new.

Q Anything on the coming visit of the head of state of Israel?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Would you take the question on the reconciliation talks, and see if you can --

A No. I indicated the other day, Ralph, that I am not going to try to give updates from here. If we have something to say, I will be happy to give it to you, but we are not going to try to be a reporting agency on talks which are taking place involving other people in Lebanon, essentially with a couple of outside observers, but I am just not going to do that.

Q Is the Secretary planning to make any remarks down here in the lobby after a while when he comes out with the German?

A I don't know if he intends to make any remarks. It is not his usual habit, as you know, to make remarks when escorting a guest downstairs.

Q Do you know if he has anything planned?

A I don't know that he has anything planned.

Q Alan, do you have anything today on the U.S. attitude toward contributions to the United Nations, and specifically whether it is now Administration policy that the United States should withdraw from UNESCO?

A I guess a couple of things. One, Ambassador Kirkpatrick testified at some length yesterday, and I would refer you to what she said. With regard to the proposal for deep, across-the-board cuts, the so-called Kassebaum amendment, the Administration opposes this amendment. The Administration believes that if adopted, the amendment would raise serious questions about U.S. compliance with treaty obligations, and that deep, across-the-board, non-programmatic cuts are not the way to bring the UN budget under control. Such cuts would penalize many extremely worthwhile UN activities, such as the operation of the World Health Organization.

As far as UNESCO specifically is concerned, at the present time, as I think you probably know, the Administration is conducting a major review of U.S. relations with UNESCO and our participation in that organization because we share the view that UNESCO has moved far from the purposes for which it was founded.

The results of the study will determine our future relationship with UNESCO, but I don't have anything to announce on that.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q I guess you don't have anything more, but Kirkpatrick seemed to say that she favored a withdrawal at least temporarily, if not -- quote -- forever -- unquote -- from UNESCO. So, at this point, with the review uncompleted, your position is that she was speaking on her own behalf.

A I am not familiar with exactly what she said with regard to that, Jim. She was -- I don't know whether she identified remarks at that point as personal remarks. I think she did at various times during the course of that appearance, however. And at those times she was speaking, obviously, personally; otherwise she was speaking officially.

Q But if we looked back at the transcript and we find that she didn't qualify her remarks about UNESCO and whether we should withdraw from it as personal, can we take it as Administration policy?

A You can take what I have just given you as the Administration approach to it, and we will determine our future relationship based on the conclusions of that study.

Q The Washington Post has an article this morning saying that King Hussein is interested at this time in reviving the peace talks concerning the West Bank.

Do we have anything to say about that?

A No, I don't have anything specific to say about that. We, obviously, would welcome any development which holds the promise of moving the Middle East peace process forward, but as far as King Hussein's position, the position of the Government of Jordan, I would have to refer you to the Government of Jordan. I just don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, this is a question -- let me explain by saying that eight weeks ago or so, it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask here, but because of a certain precedent established by Jim Anderson of UPI, and apparently accepted by John Hughes, I feel compelled to ask it. It involves a question of journalistic professionalism and ethics.

We currently have a situation where a resolution has been introduced into Congress by an elected Congressman, Henry Gonzales, calling for an investigation of Henry Kissinger, which has documented what would seem to be conflicts of interest that Henry Kissinger has which would make him unable to serve in his current position as Chairman of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

Now, there appears to be a conspiracy of silence among most of the media represented in this room to black out any news of that event which seems to me to be of unquestionable public importance and interest. I would point most importantly --

A Excuse me, is there a question?

Q Yes.

A What is the question?

Q I will get to it.

A You are going to get to it very soon, or we are going to cut it off.

Q Fairly soon. You will give me the same forebearance you do to a reporter for UPI, I hope.

A You had better make it quick, Stan, or we are going to cut the whole briefing off.

Q I would single out in particular the major wire services, UPI and AP, who are depended on by many local outlets around the country for their national news coverage on foreign policy.

A I don't think this has anything to do with this briefing room. Ralph?

Q Alan, I have a question on arms control. There were numerous reports last night and this morning about a new proposal going to Geneva.

Do you have any comments to make at the beginning of the talks?

A There is going to be, I gather, a background briefing at the White House and also I understand that there will be a public statement later on in the afternoon, so why don't you check with the White House and see what they have on that.

Q Alan, on Angola, there was an article that appeared today in --

A There was what -- I'm sorry?

Q On Angola, there was an article appearing today in the Post which mentioned direct South African support for UNITA in the capture of a town last month.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Can you confirm that it took place?

A No.

Q Can you look into it?

A No. I don't think I have anything on it.

Q Do you have any comments on today's report of Israeli settlers uprooting, so to speak, Arab olive trees from Arab land into the Shiloh settlement? Have you seen the reports?

A No, I guess I haven't seen those reports.

Q Would you look into it?

A No. In terms of policy, U.S. policy, towards settlements, that is quite clear and on the record. I don't think I am going to respond to a specific incident which is reported, but our basic approach on this is quite clear.

Q One more thing about UNESCO and the U.S. reviewing its ties to UNESCO, is it because of the Israeli/Arab conflict there and UNESCO's voting in some aspects?

A I think Ambassador Kirkpatrick cited, with regard to UNESCO, the fact that it has succumbed to politicization, created obstacles to free press, instead of promoting the free flow of information, and ignored fiscal restraint. So I would refer you to what she said about it.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:37 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #175

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr. Walesa?

A Mike, I do not. I think Larry Speakes addressed this briefly this morning, and I understand the President may address it in the remarks he's making in about 40 minutes.

Q Do you have a reaction to the speech at the United Nations yesterday, the one by Mr. Gromyko, in absentia, and the chief delegate regarding -- accusing the United States of whipping up war hysteria?

A I don't think Mr. Gromyko made a speech; I think that Ambassador Troyanovskiy --

Q That's what I said, in -- it was his speech, part of it -- portions of it were read.

A I have a general reaction to that speech. I think that the question about whipping up war hysteria partially also came out in a TASS report this morning, and it simply doesn't merit comment.

With regard to the Soviet address, obviously, we'll study it carefully. Our initial impression, however, is that it contains very little that is new. In the speech, the Soviet Union has repeated familiar declarations about the world's tensions and problems, while continuing to deny before the international community its own responsibility for the Soviet actions and policies which have created and exacerbated so many of those very tensions.

It is positive and constructive deeds and not more words that are now required from the Soviet Union.

The address had some specific points regarding issues such as nuclear freeze, outer space, non-first use of weapons, nuclear weapons. Again, I think that what I've said before about containing very little that is new is what applies, although, as I say, we'll study it. But I would call attention to the fact that yesterday, in his meeting with the U.S. START delegation, the President announced specific new initiatives for substantial strategic arms reductions and reaffirmed our commitment to seek, with energy and flexibility, mutually acceptable resolutions of our differences with the Soviet Union in START and our other on-going negotiations. We look to the Soviet Union to respond in a serious and realistic manner.

Q Copy?

A I think I can give you some of that. You're going to have to refer mainly, though, to a transcript later on for a full version.

Q There's a story out of Israel today about a decision by the Cabinet, or the Ministerial Committee, to start six new -- to turn over six military outposts to civilian settlements. Do you have anything new to say?

A In the West Bank?

Q Yes.

A I haven't seen that story, Bernie. I don't have something specific, therefore, to respond. I'm not aware of the facts; but as I indicated yesterday in response to a question about settlement activity, our position on the unhelpful nature of continuing settlement activity is quite clear.

Q Do you have anything on the shooting down of an airplane in Nicaragua?

A I don't. I saw, I guess, a wire report on that, but I don't have anything on that.

Q I was going to ask about the Nicaraguan plane. It's on the FBIS in quite some detail with serial numbers of the plane and what it contained and the names of the survivors and so on.

A As I recall, in thinking through George's question and yours, that it also was related to alleged intelligence activities, so I guess --

Q It doesn't say anything about intelligence activities.

A I think that the wire I saw, in fact, did.

Q Well, the FBIS doesn't, so --

A Okay.

Q I need a clarification here. I'm hopelessly baffled.

A I'm surprised.

Q You're saying that it is related to --

A No, I'm saying that's the wire I saw that indicated that that was the charge.

Q Would you pledge to look at the FBIS report which makes no reference to intelligence activities, and look into whether you have a comment on that report?

A We'll look into it and see whether we have anything on it at all.

Q How does the United States look upon planes that are apparently loaded with military equipment travelling across an international boundary into another area?

A I don't have a general comment to offer you. You're asking me to address, in a way which you can use with regard to a specific report, something that I don't have information on. I'm not about to play that game.

Q What about another plane reportedly shot down over Beirut by Israeli-modified American missiles? The plane is supposed to be a MIG-25.

A I have seen nothing about a plane shot down -- a year ago, some of your colleagues are saying.

Q Oh, was that a year ago? Interesting. (Laughter)

Something else: the reports of demolitions of houses in south Lebanon by Israeli forces as a means of preventing "Palestinian activities against Israeli forces."

A We are aware of the reports, the press reporting on that; haven't got anything on our own at this point. We're checking into it. If I have something later, I'll be happy to make it available, but we're still looking at that.

Q And just a correction. I'd like to have it on the record. A few days ago I asked questions about an

Israeli force, naval force, stopping a Cypriot ship or boat. I did not say that it was carrying Palestinians to Tripoli.

My question was the seizure of this boat and the holding of 25 Palestinians on it.

A Fine. My recollection is, and it's just a recollection, that you did say it was travelling between Cyprus and Tripoli.

Q Right. The answer that I saw there quotes my question as having said that it is carrying Palestinians. I didn't say that.

A Okay. I take your point. I'll look into it.

Q Do you have any comment on reports that the possibility of Angola agreeing to send back the Cubans is just about down to zero and that, in fact, over the last year, the number of Cubans in Angola has been greatly augmented?

A I don't really have a specific answer to that. The number of Cubans that we're carrying in Angola is around 25,000. I would have to refer you back to the record as to what we have said over a period of time as to that number.

Basically, our position continues to be that we continue to negotiate in good faith and are determined to obtain Namibian independence based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 435.

Q Can you get for us some estimate now of the likelihood or the situation regarding those negotiations?

A No, I don't think I can do that. I would simply, as I say, refer you to our very firm, standing position, which is that we are continuing in this effort and we -- I'll just leave it at that.

Q There was a time when the people in charge of the negotiations came down here and said if it ever looked like if we were just going through the motions we wouldn't do it; we'd stop it right away. Has the time come when we're just going through the motions on this?

A No, I would not agree with that.

Q Alan, on that Nicaraguan shooting down of the U.S. plane, is your "Nothing on it. No comment" a decision based on having reviewed what you know in deciding not to speak about it?

A I haven't even seen anything other than one wire on it and as I said to Ralph, I will ask that it be looked at to see if there is anything to say, but I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the report in The Times this morning that the Administration has decided to change the controls on oil and gas to the Soviet Union?

A Simply that the oil and gas items in question have been, and continue to be, controlled for foreign policy purposes.

Q Is that it?

A That's it.

Q Can I ask you to take a procedural question on that?

Recommendations made by ASEP mentioned in the article, do those stand unless contradicted, or do they have to be endorsed by a higher body?

Can you just take that question?

A I will see if I can provide you an answer on that, Steve. We have not talked about recommendations by ASEP either in this case or in any other case. It gets -- I believe we indicated before, that as a recommendation, anything -- which is how the press stories have portrayed this issue -- would get into the question of our internal deliberations, and we wouldn't do that.

Actually, I think I will back off of that. I just think I will not go further unless we have a change in the situation. I will stand on the one statement I gave you that they continue to be controlled for foreign policy purposes, and leave that as where we are at this point, and I am not going to try to suggest a projection or a change or an internal process.

Q Well, if it will change your mind, the only reason I am asking is because Administration sources and officials and Members of Congress, all of whom have talked about this, seem to be divided down the middle.

A About?

Q About whether the ASEP recommendation will stand unless contradicted, or if it needs to be endorsed higher up.

A I think what I am giving you is an accurate rendering of where we are, and I don't want to go beyond that and try to get into people's views. This is the question of what the policy is. That is the policy.

Q I am just asking you if you can take a question on procedure.

A I will put all of what you just said before the people who deal with the issue and see if they can do anything further for you.

Q Do you have anything on the dissolution of the Guatemalan State Council?

A No, I don't.

Q Can you look into it?

A I can look into it. I don't know that we'll have anything in particular.

Q Originally you hailed its formation, and I am curious as to what your response is to its dissolution.

Also on Angola, I didn't detect any optimism, as has been traditional, in talking about the negotiations with respect to Namibia. Is there a change, is there a sense that we are further away, and our initial optimism wasn't justified?

A I don't think I have from here tried to convey a sense of optimism or pessimism. I think what we have done from here is try to give you either a statement of the policy or, if there is any particular development in the negotiation, to report on that. But I would not steer you in one direction or another. I am just trying to state what our approach to this is, and that we do continue, and that I did not accept the position, as Don suggested, perhaps that we are at a stage where we would give up, that it was a useless exercise. I did not accept that.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Post report this morning quoting Moscow sources as saying that some Soviet Air Defense people have been fired?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Does the State Department have any comment on reports that our policy towards Syria has significantly changed?

A I think you are referring back to stories that go several days back, and I have addressed this. I would not suggest to you that there has been a significant change. We have articulated the policy towards Syria and regarding Syrian involvement and the Syrian role in Lebanon over a period of time, and I refer you back to what was said about that. There is no change in that policy.

Q On the same area, Alan, there are reports from Israel saying that -- I mean, sounding dissatisfaction (sic) with what they perceived to be that. Have you heard from the Israelis, or can you tell us if you did?

A I don't think I can get into the question of what exchanges we may have had with the Israelis. I would again refer you to what was said about the policy. There is no change in that policy. The Israelis, obviously, are free to speak about their own approach.

Q Alan, in that area also, there is a report from Beirut this morning that says that McFarlane has told Lebanese officials that if necessary to get Syria out of Lebanon the Israeli/Lebanese agreement could go down the tubes. I am not quoting directly because I don't have the quote in front of me, but that is the gist of it.

A That Ambassador McFarlane made such a statement?

Q That's right.

A I am neither aware of that report nor is it consistent with anything that I know that Ambassador McFarlane has said or that this Government holds as policy.

Q Alan, do you have anything on events taking place in Argentina, the strikes and the banking business?

A No. I was asked about this yesterday, and I really don't have anything on this.

Q There is a World Watch report -- not World Watch, America's Watch report -- that talks about the State Department is going to certify something on Argentina before the election at the end of the month.

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, could you take that question?

A No. If we have something to announce on it, I am sure we will announce it, but I am not going to try and get ahead of any -- I don't know the process myself, but I just am not going to try and get ahead of whatever announcements we may be making.

Q Can you confirm The Washington Post report concerning -- that King Hussein --

A Excuse me, George, I can't hear the question.

Q -- is sending new signals concerning the future of West Bank negotiations?

A No, I don't have anything on that. As I indicated the other day about another report regarding possible reactivation of the whole peace process question, anything that would move the peace process forward would obviously be welcome, but I can't address Jordanian policies in that respect.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the report in The New York Times today that there will be military exercises through March of next year and beyond in Honduras?

A Basically I think you are going to have to go to the Pentagon for any sort of a schedule on exercises. As you know, we have participated in a series of exercises in the past, and while we can't rule out the possibility of something in the future, there has been no announcement on any such exercises, beyond what they have already made public.

As I say, I think I would have to refer you to the Pentagon for that question.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the revival of the security pact in Central America?

A I addressed this yesterday. That is all I have got to say on that.

Q Alan, are you talking with the Government of Honduras about extending the duration and the scope of these military exercises there?

A I am not aware of that. My understanding is that the exercises now going on are going to end as scheduled. But, again, I think you would have to talk to the Pentagon about any specifics on dates, and so on. I just don't have that.

Q But if there are negotiations, they would be conducted by the State Department, or has the Pentagon taken over this?

A I think that there are various channels that operate in terms of -- depending on what it is you are specifically talking about.

As I say, I am not aware of any change in the schedule. I think the exercises do go beyond the first of the year. This particular set of exercises does go into the first couple of months of next year.

I am not aware, though, of a schedule change, or an anticipated schedule change on that.

Q Alan, is Secretary Shultz now recommending that Dr. Kissinger be given policy positions regarding the Mid-East, West Europe, and East/West relations at the conclusion of his responsibilities on the Central America Commission?

A I don't have any information on that, Stan. I think that Dr. Kissinger indicated that he is concentrating on Central America.

Q You made --

A I wouldn't make -- without suggesting to you that such a recommendation exists, obviously I don't get into the question of what recommendations the Secretary would make.

Q You made no bones about Shultz' recommendations for Kissinger in his current position.

A Once the appointment had been announced. But, as I say, I am not suggesting, by saying that, that there is anything else to it.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, October 6, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 176

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon.

I have two announcements:

First, available in the Press Office are copies of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams' speech today before the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Conference on Cuba. The subject of his speech is the evolution of the Cuban revolution and its impact on the human rights situation within Cuba.

Second, the Department of State has expressed its deep regret at a recent decision of the President of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal not to hire an individual who is a Bahai. Iran had objected to the individual on unspecified "political" grounds. In the view of the United States, as set forth in an exchange of correspondence between Department Legal Adviser Davis Robinson and Tribunal President Gunnar Lagergren, the decision of the President can only be described as acquiescence in Iran's practice of religious discrimination against the Bahais. Copies of the relevant correspondence are available in the Press Office.

Q Who is the President of that commission?

A It is Gunna Lagergren. It is a rather extensive correspondence, so I don't think I want to summarize it. I think it is rather self-explanatory, but it is lengthy.

Q What is his nationality? He is an American?

A No, he is not an American.

Q There will also be a copy of that statement, won't there, Alan?

A We will have a copy of the statement. There is a little background, too, as to the Tribunal and how it is set up.

Q Is he an Iranian citizen?

A Is he an Iranian citizen?

Q Yes, either one, Iranian or American?

A The President of the Tribunal?

Q Yes.

A I do not believe he is.

Q Alan, I am glad we protested this. Could I ask a couple of questions, and then I must fly.

Last night at the Washington Cathedral, the second --

A Excuse me, Lester, I think we have a normal practice of letting the wires ask the first question, if it is not on that particular subject, so I would like to go on with that.

Q It is not on that particular subject. We have a report from Lebanon that the cease-fire is in a rather parlous state and that the eventual negotiations about national reconciliation are now being delayed indefinitely.

What do you hear from them?

A I take it this is a very up-to-the-minute kind of report that you are talking about, Jim, or something that is several hours old.

Q It is several hours old.

A Several hours old. Okay. My information is -- let me give you a little sitrep, and then tell you what I know about that.

As far as the situation on the ground, my latest information is that there have been some exchanges involving Lebanese army units in the southern section of Beirut and in the town of Qabr Shmun.

Yesterday afternoon Beirut time, a U.S. Marine helicopter was hit by two rounds of small arms fire, but there were no casualties.

The situation was quiet around the Ambassador's residence and also at the MNF positions. Operations continued normally at Beirut International Airport, and meetings of the Security Arrangements Committee are continuing.

Now, to give you in essence, I am afraid, a sort of non-answer, I don't have any information. I don't have anything to confirm what you just said, but I also don't have any read-out to give you on the status of the talks. There have been reports, obviously, which went the other way earlier in terms, perhaps, of moving faster, and I don't have any comment on either dimension of that, whether they are speeding up or slowing down in terms of moving towards a reconciliation. You are talking about the national reconciliation dialogue? I just don't have anything. We do continue, obviously, to work vigorously on these questions, but I can't give you an up-date.

Q And on the specific issue of the composition of the cease-fire force, when and if it is formed, do the Syrians now indicate that they would accept a United Nations presence?

A I don't feel I can speak for the Syrians, Jim. I think they are going to have to do that themselves. I don't have a read-out specifically on where that particular discussion is.

Q You have no comment at all on the Post story this morning?

A I really don't, no.

Q What about the reports that stated that the Marines are giving arms and intelligence to the Lebanese Army, and the Lebanese Army are giving these to the Phalange?

A I am afraid I addressed that the other day. There is guidance on it, but let me ask you to check in the Press Office afterwards. There is a response to that.

Q Alan, can you tell us more about this helicopter that was shot at? What was the helicopter doing, and where was it flying, and any more details about it?

A I don't have a lot of detail about it. As I say, apparently, two rounds of small arms fire hit it. Nobody was injured.

Q Was it over Beirut or over the Shuf, or where was it?

A It was in the Beirut area. I don't know precisely where, but it was not over the Shuf.

Q Yesterday?

A This was -- what did I say -- yesterday afternoon, Beirut time. Not today.

Q There were reports from Israel of some discussion of sealing off the Awali River line. Do you have anything specific?

A We have seen reports and are looking into them, but I don't have anything specific on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement attributed to an official, a Lebanese official, saying that the President of Lebanon is ready to look at the cancellation of the agreement between Lebanon and Israel in case there is a good alternative to it?

A I guess I would make two points on that.

First of all, I will reiterate our own position which is to stand firmly behind the validity of that agreement.

Secondly, as I read those reports, there was involved in it, at least implicitly, a reaffirmation that that accord provided -- first of all, that the agreement was still valid in the view of the Lebanese Government, and also that the accord provided a vehicle for looking toward the withdrawal of all the Israeli forces.

So, I didn't see anything which suggested that there was a backing away from that. I know what you are talking about, but it seemed to me that that was a point in the comment that was made, that it provided that vehicle which we have also discussed.

Q To follow up with this, don't you see in this sort of a probability that the cancellation of the agreement would be one of the subjects on the agenda of the committee-to-be?

A I cannot speak to the subjects on the agenda. That has to be something that the participants would speak to.

Q Shafiq Wazzan was saying that Israel's withdrawal from the Shuf constituted a violation of the agreement; it was in effect negated. Do you have anything on that, any response?

A My understanding is that the Government of Lebanon has not taken the position that the agreement has been negated, so you will have to ask them for confirmation of that position, but that certainly is my understanding.

Lester.

Q Last night at the Washington Cathedral, the Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Mr. Vitaliy Cherkin asked, and I quote, "What would you think of us if our Supreme Soviet were to adopt a resolution on the need to deliver the countries of Western Europe and, say, the state of Texas from the yoke of capitalism?"

My question -- and I have a couple of follow-ups -- since there were on the same platform, two veteran State Department Officers, Messrs. Isham and Garrison, who took no issue at all with this, no clarification, could you tell us, Alan, has the State Department detected in Texas any of the same yearning for delivery from capitalism as Poland's apparent yearning to be delivered from communism?

A No.

Q He raised the issue, I didn't.

A I haven't detected that. I can't really speak for the State Department. I don't think there is a cleared position on that, Lester, but --

Q Okay, great. A follow-up. What is the State Department's response to Mr. Cherkin's statement, "When Nazi Germany was defeated, we fulfilled our promise to join you in the war against Japan to help you defeat the Japanese, but the American atom bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not so much aimed at Japan as to intimidating the Soviet Union."

A Well, Lester, I am not going --

Q I didn't raise that, he did.

A I understand that. It is also an historical question, and I am not going to try to address it from here.

Q In other words, it is far-fetched --

A Lester, it is an historical question --

Q -- and you have no comment.

A It is an historical question, and I am not going to try to address it from here.

Q All right, here is one that is right up to date. (Laughter)

Mr. Cherkin described the people of Afghanistan as, in his words, 95 percent illiterate, and "people who chop the ears off teachers and children."

Does the State Department agree or disagree with this Soviet contemporary non-historic report?

A Our position on the Soviet role in Afghanistan is more than abundantly clear, and I refer you to the record. I think that our concerns about the Soviet position there, their attitude towards Afghanistan, is more than clear. I am not going to --

Q You are not agreeing with the report. In other words, you have no evidence that they are chopping off children's ears in Afghanistan.

A I don't have any evidence of that.

Q That is great. That is what I wanted to know. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Q Alan, the White House has referred to the State Department any questions about what the Administration's position is on raising our diplomatic representation in the Vatican to full ambassadorial level.

What is the Administration's position?

A I will have to check on that, Jim. I am not sure where that issue is. I will check on it for you.

--MORE--

Q Do you have anything more on the shooting down of the plane in Nicaragua?

A No, and I checked on it just before I came out here. The only thing I can say about it is that we have seen the Nicaraguan statements, but we don't have any independent confirmation of it, and that's where I'm going to have to leave it.

Q On the article that appeared in the New York Times today with respect to the plane that crashed at Managua Airport and its heritage.

A You mean the bombing incident?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Can we get it for the record why you don't have a comment on it?

A I addressed it at the time, Jim. Go back and look. I mean this issue was discussed, and it's on the record.

Q Is the United States enforcing, in its view, the Neutrality Act with respect to Nicaragua?

A Is it enforcing the Neutrality Act?

Q A person from that podium has addressed that on a number of occasions.

A I don't know what -- I will look into it and see what the position on this is.

Q The attempted coup in Niger, and especially any evidence of Libyan involvement?

A On the latter question I don't have anything at all, simply to say that the Government of Niger announced the coup attempt on October 6 had been foiled. Our Embassy reports there was gunfire in Niamey in the early morning hours of October 6, but that Niamey is now quiet. There are approximately 250 Americans in Niger, and no report of harm to any Americans.

Q Do you have something on the State Department's view of Iraq's alleged support for international terrorism and the legislative process on the Hill concerning that?

A The Government of Iraq has publicly denounced international terrorism since at least September 1982. Based on the evidence available to us, we have no reason to believe that the Government of Iraq has supported acts of international terrorism since about that time. Accordingly, we do not consider that there is justification to redesignate Iraq under the Export Administration Act as a country that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Appropriate members of Congress and Congressional staffs are aware of our views.

Q Isn't there still some evidence that one particular terrorist group is still operating, or at least based in Iraq?

A Members of at least one international terrorist group reportedly are still in Iraq, apparently under certain constraints. We will continue to register our strong view that there can be no advantage to Iraq or to other countries that face a terrorist threat in permitting terrorists to transit or reside in Iraq. However, we see no prospect of such punitive measures as withholding certain U.S. exports to Iraq will further the objectives of our vigorous and promising diplomatic efforts on this issue.

Q What about other countries that may be scheduled to go on this list?

A We are continually monitoring policies of governments regarding support for or involvement in international terrorism to determine whether we should designate such countries as repeated supporters for acts of international terrorism under the Export Administration Act, but I don't have anything to give you in specifics in terms of any individual countries that might be considered.

Q Copies of all three of those?

Q They are off the list anyway, aren't they?

A Yes. The question, I think, is whether they were to be put back onto the list.

Q Or taken off?

A That's the issue. There is, as I understand it, an effort on the Hill to consider that, putting them back on the list.

Q Basically, this is an old statement? You're standing by what you have said previously?

A We're standing by the policy, the determination previously. It's not an old statement.

Q The thrust of it is the same as when they were designated eligible, right?

A It, however, also reflects developments since September 1982 as we have looked at them.

Q Do you have any commnent on the new House restrictions on military aid to El Salvador, on the story about Maldonado and D'Aubuisson in the Post, and/or the report by Marlise Simons in the Times on Cuba and Pastora?

A Three for one, huh?

Q I'm just trying to speed it up.

A Okay. On certification proceedings on the Hill, it would be premature to offer a specific reaction to Congressional action thus far in the early stages of a lengthy process. The final outcome -- or outline -- of Congressional decision on this issue are far from clear. We have previously addressed the general issue of country specific legislation and the so-called all-or-nothing judgments which would be required at six-month intervals by previous certification requirements.

Our position on the level of funding for military assistance has been clear. This assistance is critical in support of the overall political, economic, and diplomatic objectives of our Central American policy as stated by the President on April 27. The current request of $86.3 million is $5 million more than the $81.3 million that was available in FY-83.

So far as the article this morning about contacts with Pastora, as far as the report of our own Embassy contacts are concerned with Mr. Robelo and so on, we're not prepared to get into specifics of diplomatic contacts by U.S. Embassy officials, but you should expect our Embassies do make an effort to maintain contact with a full range of political contacts. In the specific case, obviously, it's a matter of public record that Alfonso Robelo has met with U.S. officials both overseas and in Washington.

I don't have anything to offer you on the report of Cuban contacts with ARDE.

As far as the Maldonado matter is concerned, we have consistently condemned terrorism of both the extreme left and right in El Salvador, and addressed this issue generally earlier this week. Samuel Maldonado is well-known to officials of the U.S. Government. He is a leader of the Salvadoran Communal Union, the largest and oldest of the Salvadoran Campesino organizations. His organization is particularly active in the country's agrarian reform process, a process which we fully support.

We deplore public accusations which might jeopardize the lives and safety of those who have committed themselves to the process of democratic and economic reform in El Salvador. We believe that the on-going democratic process, along with such crucial developments as land reform, are essential ingredients for peace in that country. If there is evidence of anyone's participation in subversive activities, this should become a matter for the courts, not for public charges that tend only to heighten the level of conflict.

Q Can we get a copy of the latter statement?

A Yes.

Q Can you also say whether the United States does provide -- the charge is very specific, and the charge is that the U.S. Embassy has been giving Maldonado money and he has been funneling it to the guerrillas. Does the United States give Maldonado money?

A I don't know, Jim, and I'm not sure how I would address that particular --

Q Anything on the announcement that Central American countries have reached an agreement with respect to Contadora on basic principles; and on Betancur's remarks yesterday at the UN about U.S. policy?

A I don't have anything on the remarks at the UN by President Betancur beyond specifically talking about the Contadora document. That is, we understand that the five Central American governments have agreed to the 21-point Contadora document of objectives. This is an important step forward. We have previously expressed our support for the objectives, and our encouragement by the inclusion of key provisions on democratization and verification and control. Although the 21 points are objectives, not self-executing commitments or operational agreements, they provide an agreed framework for regional negotiations to translate these principles into specific, verifiable commitments. We have no illusions about the difficulties inherent in trying to convert a statement of principles into concrete treaty language, but the difficulties yet to be faced should not obscure a broader appreciation of the significant achievement represented by the Document of Objectives.

Q Can we get a copy of that also?

A Yes.

Q Can you just respond to one more on that particular issue? Since this has been signed, will this have any impact on U.S. activity in the area, specifically with respect to maneuvers in Honduras?

A Well, you're talking about exercises that we're having?

Q Yes.

A I'm not aware of any plan to change exercises that are scheduled, but the fact of the matter is that our support for the Contadora effort has been consistent and this is a piece with that, so I don't see a reason to expect that.

Q Do you have any response to Dr. Kissinger's _Spiegel_ interview in which he said that the shooting down of the Korean airliner was not an essential event in East-West relations and simply the result of a malfunction in the system?

A We've addressed before the question of what that event represents, and I think that our treatment of it is clear that we have, while expressing the outrage of the world community at this action, addressed it largely in terms of trying to seek corrective action, although we have done some other things to make clear our outrage. But obviously, as we have indicated, the negotiations on arms control go forward, and so on.

I refer you back to the policy statements we've had on this before.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:38 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, October 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC # 177

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon.

Just a housekeeping announcement, essentially. Monday, October 10, is an official government holiday, Columbus Day. There will be no daily press briefing on Monday. The Press Office will operate on a Sunday schedule.

I would also like to remind you that access to the building on Monday will be limited to State Department and White House press pass holders.

Also, on Tuesday, because of scheduling conflicts, at this point we tentatively plan to brief at about 4 o'clock, but I would ask you to stay in touch with the Press Office on that.

Q What is the conflict?

A The conflict is availability of the briefers.

Q Alan, Columbus Day -- a few weeks ago, John said that that was the day when you would renew passes, October 10th.

A Check with the Press Office on what is going on on that. I don't have that. I am sure Brian can help you with that.

Q Will they be ready next week?

A Talk with Brian afterwards.

Q All right.

Q Are you finished?

A I am finished.

Q What can you tell us about preparations for the Soviets to ship a new family of missiles to Syria?

A I don't really have anything to give you specifically on that, Jim. We are aware of a pattern of Soviet arms supplies in the Middle East, and we follow those developments closely, and were new important weapons systems introduced by the Soviets into the region, it could only serve to increase the level of tension which already exists. But I don't have any comment to offer you specifically about the reports which appeared last night and today.

Q Is that report true?

A As I say, I don't have anything to offer you on those reports.

Q Why is that? Why don't you have anything to offer, when everybody else has it on background? What is the reason for not going public?

A Sometimes, Bernie, I don't have anything for you.

Q You do not confirm that report at all?

A I have nothing for you.

Q The odd tense that you used there, "were they to do so", are you trying to send a message to the Soviets that if, at some point in the future, they would do so, the United States would view it with displeasure and they should not therefore do it?

A All I am doing by using the conditional there is simply to stay away from the question of whether those reports are true or not at this point.

Q Have you been in touch with the Soviets on this?

A I don't have anything for you on that, Bernie.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the press reports on a new attempt by King Hussein of Jordan to come again to the table?

A No, nothing beyond what I had earlier, which was that anything which would contribute to progress in the peace process would obviously be welcome, but I can't speak for King Hussein.

Q Alan, getting back again to the missiles for just a minute, the issue, it seems to me, in this particular report is more the nature of the weapon which is a mobile launcher.

If we ask a question about a change of status of going from fixed to mobile launchers, would that help in any way?

A What you have done at this point is exhaust all I am prepared to say on it today.

Q Alan, is there anything on Israeli moves to seal off the south of Lebanon?

A We are continuing to work in Lebanon for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the emergence of a strong central government based on national reconciliation and the extension of Lebanese unity and sovereignty throughout its territory, as well as to seek appropriate security arrangements for Israel's northern border.

We would hope that all parties would pursue policies consistent with these objectives.

Q Alan, I am not being facetious, but how can it be a "strong central government" if Syria has, as it now has, a veto power over everything that is decided by the present government and the supposed parties to a national reconciliation conference?

A That is your characterization. I am not going to comment on it other than to say that --

Q It is also the characterization of people in this building who say on background that Syria has a role to play in Lebanon, an historical role that it has always played, and so on.

A I am not sure "a role to play" is what has been used, at least by the authoritative officials who have briefed this subject. I think what they have talked about is an interest, simply a reality of being a neighbor, and so on. But, clearly, our policy, and I would say clearly the policy of the Government of Lebanon, is to achieve the objectives which I have just stated.

Q What would be our reaction if the Government of Lebanon annulled, put aside, rejected -- however we phrase it -- the accord worked out by the Secretary between Israel and Lebanon?

A I don't want to try to speculate on that.

Q But you are aware of the statements made by the current Lebanese Prime Minister to that effect, and by the Director General of the Foreign Ministry to that effect.

A As I said, my understanding is that the Government of Lebanon does indeed still stand by that accord in its current status. As I said, our policy -- I have said it before; I haven't said it again today -- but our policy is to stand by that agreement, and I would refer you to what the President said on May 17, which was that the agreement offers hope for ending the suffering of the Lebanese people and that it "will initiate a process which will culminate in the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon and the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity."

Q Alan, is there anything new on the talks by Minister Khaddam of Syria?

A Minister Khaddam -- ?

Q Of Syria.

A By the talks -- I'm sorry? He met with the Secretary --

Q Any new talks between Mr. Khaddam and the U.S. Administration during the last 24 hours?

A No.

Q He is reported to be in Washington. Has he seen anybody? Has anybody seen him?

A No. My understanding is -- and really you should check with the Syrians on this -- but my understanding is he was here on private business, but that he has not seen any officials, and, indeed, he may already have left, I don't know, but it is a private visit.

Q Do you have anything on this report in the Post today that U.S. officials are not fuming over the fact that the Secretary was displeased by Clark's trip to Rome?

A Not really, Bernie. I think it actually talks about the Secretary, as opposed to U.S. officials.

Q It says that officials have denied that Shultz is fuming.

A Yes, "that the Secretary is fuming." As you are well aware, without going one way or the other on this, we don't get into the question of our dealings between buildings and agencies, and so on and so forth.

I will say to you, however, that it is my clear understanding that the Secretary has not expressed a view on this matter, and therefore anybody who purports to talk to him, whether they say he is fuming or he isn't fuming, is really making up their own view of it.

Q Has not expressed a view to whom?

A He has not expressed a view, period.

Q That doesn't answer whether he is fuming.

A As I say, I don't intend to get into the question of how we deal, without leading you one way or the other on that, but the fact is he hasn't expressed a view.

Q Can we just ask whether he was satisfied with the period of notification that he received that Clark would be going to Rome to meet the other U.S. officials?

A Again, you are asking me to comment on what I just said I am not going to comment on, whether he was satisfied or not satisfied, or anything else. On this or any other matter of that sort, I am simply not going to get into that, and we have traditionally refused to get into that.

Q Alan, was he filled in on the results of the trip?

A I don't know. I haven't asked him.

Q What would you say about the gathering impression that in one area after another, the appearance exists of the Secretary losing his central role in deciding policy over a specific area?

A Again, I think if you asked the Secretary the question about who is deciding policy, he would make it very clear to you that it is the President who is deciding policy.

But setting that rather important fact aside, I don't think there is any change, and I don't think you would find that the White House would disagree with that, that there is any change in the Secretary's role as the principal foreign policy adviser and articulator. So that would be my response to that.

Q Alan, is there an attempt underway to make Shultz and the White House take the rap for the strategic foreign policy disasters that actually -- I mean, Clark and the White House -- take the rap for the disasters that actually Shultz and Kissinger are planning?

A I am not going to respond to that sort of stuff.

Q On another subject, do you have any comment on the report in the Times this morning that U.S. officials have concluded that the Soviet pilot did not know before firing at the Korean plane that it was a civilian plane?

A Obviously, we don't comment on intelligence reporting or analysis, so I can't address it in a specific way. But I will say that nothing has changed our view that whether or not the Soviet pilot and his commanders knew that KAL 007 was a commercial airliner, it is clear they did not fulfill their obligations under international law and established ICAO procedures to identify the aircraft or warn it effectively.

There is simply no justification for the shooting down of a civilian airliner, and, as I have said here many times before, if they didn't know it, they should have.

Q Did they know it? What's the official position?

A I don't have an official position to give you beyond what I have just said on that.

- MORE -

Q Alan, do you have any news on Argentina?

A No. I don't have anything on Argentina.

Q Is the Administration certifying to Congress that Argentina complies with the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment?

A I am not aware of a decision on that, Roberto.

Q Can I just pick it up on the plane again, Alan?

A Yes. Sure.

Q So that, your statement is that the U.S. has no position on whether the Soviets knew it was a civilian airliner?

A No. I am saying -- well, I will refer you to what I said. I think in terms of -- We don't know for sure. How can we possibly know for sure? We have never said that we did. But we have said that they had every opportunity to know; that they had every responsibility to take steps which would have let them know by coming up alongside that airliner in circumstances where it was clearly visible; and if they didn't do it, they were negligent or incompetent or both.

Q Well, to answer your rhetorical question how would you know, you would know in the same way that you know what you know already from radio intercepts. But the implication is that you are holding back some radio intercepts for whatever reasons while you put some forward.

A I can't really go beyond what we have said on that before, Jim. But the conclusions are as they have been stated; there is no change in any of that.

Q Alan, you said that if they didn't know they were negligent, incompetent or both. Before we were talking about the Soviets being an evil, this being evidence of the Soviets as an evil nation and that they are barbaric. Are we now backing off that kind of characterization?

A As I said before, there is simply no justification for what they did, for shooting down a civilian airliner.

Q But negligence and incompetence is different than barbarism, knowlingly killing civilians. And that is really what we were talking about from the earliest days.

A I think I would refer you back to the specifics instead of taking your characterization of it.

Q The extended life of the battery pack on the flight recorder should be over now, Alan. Will the search continue in any organized way?

A You would have to ask the Pentagon. I don't know what the plans are on the search.

Q Alan, would it be a mitigating circumstance if it were a case of misidentification of the aircraft by the Soviets?

A I don't know what kind of mitigating circumstance you have when there is both a legal and a moral obligation to do the things which would have let them know what kind of an aircraft they were shooting at. And if they didn't do them, as I say, they had every responsibility to do that. So, I don't see that as a mitigating circumstance.

Q That suggests there is no difference between barbarism and incompentency.

A I would suggest that even, for example -- and this really tends to get us off the point, which is that they really intended to shoot that aircraft down and they didn't really pay much attention other than trying to get in a position to shoot it. But even if it were an RC-135, which would have been a very strange thing since they know all about how our RC-135s fly, it still would have been an unarmed aircraft.

But that is really not the main point. The main point is that they shot down a civilian airliner which they have every ability to know was a civilian airliner and if they knew it and shot it down, the meaning of that is quite obvious. If they didn't know and they shot it down, it seems to me the meaning is also quite obvious, and that is, as I say, that they were negligent or incompetent or both.

Q Is it the U.S. position that they did not know?

A I can't take a position on that. I haven't got a judgment or a final judgment to offer you on that.

Q Well, Alan, you know, you are implying that we are asking an unreasonable question.

A You are asking an unknowable question.

Q Well, just a minute.

Setting aside for a minute the emotional freight that might or might not be attached to your stating the conclusion, you said that you don't -- how should we know; we don't know for sure. Well, I don't think any of us is saying that you do know for sure. All we are asking for is whether the U.S. has concluded now to the best of its ability on the basis of the information it has -- which information we don't want to know about or pry into -- have you drawn the conclusion that the Soviet Union was incompetent and negligent because it did not know in advance, whether it should have or not.

A The conclusions we have drawn are the ones that I have given to you in the opening response.

Q Just to repeat then, what you are saying is you don't have incontrovertible evidence that the Soviets were aware that this was a civilian aircraft.

A We never said that we had incontrovertible evidence that they knew it was a civilian airliner. We did have incontrovertible evidence and do that they purposely shot that airplane down.

And they haven't now denied that. Finally they came around and said that, yes, that is true.

Q Well, Alan, I am not asking whether you said you have the evidence. I am simply asking: you don't have the evidence?

A No. We don't have that evidence. We never claimed we did.

Q Back two questions, please, on the Middle East.

You mentioned something like that the Department of State is the articulator of U.S. policy.

A I am sorry. That the Department of State?

Q Is the articulator of U.S. policy, foreign policy.

Can you from that point tell us who did Mr. Clark, Judge Clark, see there and if he in particular happened to have seen Walid Jumblatt who was in Rome at the same time?

A You would have to ask the White House about Mr. Clark's, Judge Clark's, schedule. I don't answer questions about him. But I don't think you would find that Judge Clark would or his office would disagree with what I have said.

Q Okay. One more thing, please.

An aide to Walid Jumblatt is also in town here. That is Hammadi. Can you tell us if he has seen anybody or if he intends to see anybody or if anybody intends to see him?

A I have no idea. I mean there has been contact, as there is with a variety of people involved in the Lebanon situation at various times with all the -- well, not all, but many of the various parties involved. But I don't know in this specific instance whether there is a contact proposed.

Q There have been additional reports since that first report on the shooting down of that DC-3 in Nicaragua.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any comment on it today?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Is there any way you could look into it as to whether the U.S. -- the accusations that are being made, we have a position on?

A No.

Q Also I notice that Secretary Shultz is meeting with a group of foreign ministers referred to as the Core 4. Can you tell us where that appellation comes from? That is on his schedule.

A I don't know where it came from and I don't really want to take on the task of doing the research on how certain phrases come up.

Q Why is he meeting with those four foreign ministers in particular? Did they request the meeting to meet as a group?

A I don't know. You would have to address that question to John in New York, who is addressing the Secretary's meetings, please.

Q Has there been any move by the United States Government to open an official contact with North Korea since the resolving of the case involving the North Korean diplomat at the United Nations in an attempted rape?

A A move to open contact with North Korea?

Q Yes. A move to contact North Koreans through your diplomats in various places.

A I don't think there is a move in the sense of any sort of assertive effort to do that. There has been a minor change in the ground rules in terms of ability, on an occasion where they might be together coincidentally, to respond and talk about Korea policy, but certainly not to negotiate, but to explain our position.

But I think what I would refer you to is some guidance which exists in the Press Office on this to be much more precise about how that goes.

Q Is that new guidance within the last day or two?

A It is not in the last day or two.

Q Is this ground rule recently established or was it longstanding?

A Yes. What are we today? The 7th. I would guess it is a week or so.

Q You stated earlier that the entire air-to-ground communication from that Soviet fighter plane, the several planes, was released. Is that still the position? Have there been any additions, any new information that has come out through further analysis of those tapes?

A No.

Q So, the entire thing is on the record?

A The entire thing is on the record. I can't promise you that some people won't look at the Russian, for example, and decide that maybe it should have been rendered a little bit differently at some points in English. But in terms of further enhancements and all of that sort of thing, there is no change. There is no movement on that.

Q Back to the Nicaraguan plane --

A Excuse me.

And nor, as we said at the time when we finally made those three changes to it, to my knowledge there is no effort being made to further enhance it. Those were the only three things that people felt might be enhanceable.

Q Back to the Nicaraguan plane for just a moment.

Nicaragua says it has filed a formal protest over the incident with the U.S.

A Yes.

Q Will you answer whether the U.S. has received a protest, whether it will accept the protest, or how it considers the protest?

A Well, we have received a protest, a diplomatic protest note, and we are studying it.

Q Does Assistant Secretary Motley plan to travel to Nicaragua next week?

A I don't have his schedule, Jim. Why don't I look into it and see if I can get you something on that?

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Excuse me. One more back there.

Q Alan, a group of Western nations had a team in Warsaw the last four or five days looking into the economic situation. Is the U.S. prepared to make any further moves on rescheduling the Polish debt?

A I have some guidance in the Press Office on that. That is a technical team which has gone to get data. And I don't have anything further for you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:32 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #178

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1983, 4:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. First, available in the Press Office are copies of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams' speech scheduled for tomorrow, October 12, before the Georgetown University Leadership Seminar. Note that the speech is embargoed until 9:15 a.m. Wednesday, October 12. The subject of the speech is the Reagan Administration's human rights policy.

Second, I have an announcement regarding Assistant Secretary Motley's trip to Central America. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Langhorne A. Motley will be visiting Central America from October 12 to 14. He will be in Belmopan, Belize, on October 12 and Managua, Nicaragua, October 13-14, with departure for return to Washington on the 15th. This will be his first visit to both countries.

In Belize, Ambassador Motley will be meeting with officials of the government, including Prime Minister George C. Price. In Nicaragua, he will be meeting with Sandinista leaders, including Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega.

In both instances, the visits will afford Ambassador Motley an opportunity to exchange views on regional issues, including the on-going Contadora process and the recently announced Contadora Document of Objectives. Although the U.S. is not a direct participant in the Contadora Group, we do expect that a discussion of the issues raised by the Contadora will be a central theme.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Has the United States had any indications from the Soviet arms negotiators on the talks in Geneva that they are preparing to drop out of them, or suspend them?

A The negotiations are continuing. There have been continuing Soviet suggestions that they might interrupt the Geneva talks as part of Soviet tactics designed to undercut support for planned U.S. INF deployments to Europe. However, the Soviets have not asked for a recess either in START or INF talks at the negotiations.

For our part, the United States has made clear that we will stay at the INF and START negotiating tables in Geneva. Moreover, President Reagan has made it clear that the United States seeks equitable, verifiable agreements in both sets of talks. We will continue to work for progress and if the deployment of Pershing and ground-launched cruise missiles has to begin because we have not reached an agreement in the INF negotiations eliminating the need for such deployments, the U.S. is prepared to remain at the negotiating table as long as it takes to reach agreement.

In that event, if an equitable agreement to reduce or eliminate U.S. and Soviet long-ranged INF missiles can be reached, the U.S. stands ready to halt its deployments or reverse them.

I should point out that the United States has continued to negotiate with the Soviets despite the fact that Soviet deployment of SS-20s has continued unabated. Over 100 Soviet SS-20s with over 300 warheads have become operational since the negotiations began in November 1981.

Q Copy, please?

A Yes.

Q What about the wire service back at Geneva that says there's a fresh Soviet threat to withdraw?

A I can't help what the wire services from Geneva said.

Q Not true?

A I think I just answered your question.

Q On the INF business, particularly continuing after deployment, you then simply don't believe the public statements by various Soviet officials that they will not negotiate after deployment?

A I'm not going to try to predict. I'm simply telling what the facts are, and the facts are, that the talks are continuing. I checked on this before coming out. There are further talks scheduled. I'm not going to try to predict future behavior.

Q I'm not asking you to predict. What I am asking you is, do you not then believe the statements by the Soviet officials who say that they will drop out of those talks if deployment begins?

A You are asking me to predict. You're asking in a very real sense, and I'm not going to do that. I'm simply going to tell you what the state of play is. I'm not going to try to read their minds on this.

Q If the Soviets, in either case, should ask the U.S. to join in a suspension of the talks for a period of time to suit the Soviet requirements, whatever they may be, would the U.S. be prepared to do that?

A I think that our position on this is quite clear. That is, we will stay at the negotiating table, and we would like to continue these negotiations so that we can get success in them. I don't know how I can really take it beyond that.

Q So you would negotiate any Soviet -- you would reject any Soviet proposals that would either propose a suspension or a postponement?

A First of all, you're raising a hypothetical situation, and I really don't know how to address that sensibly. I think that we just have to wait and see what happens. But our position is, we are prepared to stay at the table, and we made clear that this is our position.

Q You said that the Soviets have not asked for a recess at the negotiations. Have there been indications that they are interested in a recess in either INF or START outside of the official negotiating channels?

A I think that there have been -- some of the questioning here indicates that there have been Soviets who have talked in various ways publicly, threatening again, to do this as part of the tactic to affect the deployment schedule. So we're not denying that this kind of issue has been raised in that sense, but the fact of the matter is that they have not asked for a recess and the talks are continuing.

Q Just a factual matter since you bring up the 100 SS-20s with over 300 warheads. What's the total number of SS-20s that the U.S. knows are deployed now?

A We are still carrying 351. That's as of -- what -- last March, I guess, and have not updated it since then.

Q That's in both theaters?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on the talks held here by the Chinese Foreign Minister?

A I don't. As you know, there was a BACKGROUND briefing by a Senior Department official yesterday, and we anticipate having a read-out following the conclusion of the visit. Stay tuned, but I would think probably late Thursday because the Foreign Minister leaves Thursday afternoon. But I think between now and then we will not give updates on this.

Q Alan, do you have an update on Iran-Iraq, particularly on the Entendards?

A I don't have much of an update, really. We've seen the reports of delivery of the Super-Entendard in the media, but any confirmation of that would really have to come from the governments concerned. I can't do that.

Q On the same lines, Alan, what do you have on the redeployment of, you know, 2000 Marines who were offshore of Lebanon to the Indian Ocean?

A The only thing I really have is very general. The bottom line is, you have to go to the Pentagon, and I'm not sure that they're going to be willing to say very much about their deployments. But the general point would be that since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened tension in the region, the Navy has maintained a substantial presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area. But, as I say, any specific information beyond that would have to come from the Pentagon. By saying that I'm not suggesting that I know they have some ready answer to give you.

Q What is the U.S. attitude about the delivery of these new weapons to Iraq on the part of France, or if it's taken place or not?

A We're able only to enforce our policy of not providing U.S. arms to either Iran or Iraq. However, because of the importance of this region, we are in touch with the regional states and with our Allies about the security situation in the Gulf.

We deplore the continuation of this conflict, and we continue to cooperate with all parties interested in restoring peace to the region and we share with the states of the region concern about any widening of the conflict.

Q But what is the U.S. attitude about the delivery of new generation war planes into the situation?

A I'll have to refer you to what I just said.

Q Don't have an attitude; right?

A This was a response to that question.

Q Is there anything that the United States can do, or is doing, in a situation of greatly heightened tension in the Persian Gulf?

A In general terms, we continue to, as I said, discuss this situation with the regional states and with our Allies, and we will continue to do that. We have supported consistently a negotiated outcome, but I can't take you beyond what I've given you in terms of United States action.

Q Does the United States believe that Iraq should be able to export oil through the Persian Gulf?

A I don't have a specific response to that. Our attitude towards the Persian Gulf and freedom of navigation, and the concern with which we would view hinderance of that, was made clear in a statement the other day, and I would refer you to that. It was not limited in its application.

Q But does it apply to the ability to export oil? In other words, they are now unable to export oil because their facilities are inoperable.

A Any impedance of the freedom of navigation in that area would fall under what we issued the other day.

Q Can I take you back to the Chinese Foreign Minister for a second?

A Yes, go ahead.

Q The senior official who briefed us spoke of a large number of impediments in the way of a transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to China. Just today, China was admitted to IAEA, does that make the transfers of technology easier?

A Let me refer you to some guidance which exists on this. The shorthand answer is that there would still need to be some other steps, and the adherance to IAEA does not answer all the requirements, but there is some specific guidance in the Press Office. Why don't you take a look at that?

--MORE--

Q Alan, would we be correct in viewing the moving of the 2,000 Marines to the Indian Ocean within the context of our heightened concern about the Iran-Iraq war?

A First of all, I'm not confirming that there are 2,000 Marines moved which, if I responded wrongly, your question would --

Q The Pentagon has.

A Sorry?

Q The Pentagon has.

A Fine. That's up to them to confirm. Again, I can't go beyond the general answer that I've given you, and you would have to check with the Pentagon on whatever their deployment --

Q Could you please develop your answer as to what might happen should the scenario that Iran has warned about in fact take place?

A No. The other day we discussed this again in the statement. I'm not prepared to get into the specifics of what we might do should that contingency arise.

Q Would the U.S. be prepared to use force?

A I say, I'm not prepared to get into that question.

Q On the Gulf thing again, how does the United States feel about any development which diminishes the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union and in any way diminishes its reliance on the Soviet Union for supplies of arms or economic aid?

A I don't have a specific answer to give you on that. I don't have a response prepared to give you on that, Jack.

Q If you take aside the inflammatory nature of the weapons system that's under discussion, the Super-Etendard and what it may do on the Gulf, hasn't it been -- haven't we looked with approval on arms shipments that were not inflammatory to Iraq?

A Our position has been to refrain from shipping arms to either party, and we think that that policy fosters a resolution of that conflict.

Q I've been told we didn't lean very hard on the French on this.

A I can't help what you've been told. I can only tell you what our policy is on that, Jack.

Q Could you just extend that a little bit? Do you believe that other states should refrain from shipping arms to either party?

A Again, Jim, we've talked about this before. We are articulating our own policy and our policy is known to others. As I said before in response to the specific question today, we can only enforce, obviously, our own shipments, and I'm not prepared to go beyond that.

Q But when it came out that Israel may have provided some weapons to Iran, you issued a statement which I believe deplored that action, did you not?

A I don't recall specifically what we did in that case. Again, I would reiterate our own policy which I think we have generally done when there has been any question of arms shipments to either of the belligerents, and it has been along the lines I just gave you today.

Q Do you have any comment on the resignation of the Aquino Commission in the Philippines?

A Yes. I think I do. As we have previously stated, we believe that an independent, thorough and impartial investigation of the assassination is necessary. Disturbing questions about the assassination remain. The investigation is, of course, first and foremost a Philippine matter, though we are following events closely.

Q Can you comment at all on the reports of some of the evidence that apparently was found on the guardsmen who were accompanying Aquino when he got off the plane?

A No. We've seen the report, but don't have anything further on it.

Q About a week and a half ago you read a statement saying that you wished the civilian commission to pursue its work. Now you seem to be saying something else.

A Apparently the civilian commission, or at least a number of the members have resigned, so what would you like me to do?

Q Well, I don't know. I guess that's up to the State Department.

A I guess you don't know.

Q Alan, can you confirm the reports about the incidents in Rangoon involving the capture of Korean terrorists?

A No. I saw those reports on the wires. I don't have anything specific on it.

Q Does the United States have an attitude on the question of whether South Korea is entitled to take some action in the form of punishment against those it believes are responsible for the bombing in Rangoon?

A I don't have anything specific to offer you on that. I think that the fact of the matter is at this point we don't know really who was responsible. We've seen reports that were referred to a moment ago. I've seen other reports, and I think that it really is quite premature to talk about that sort of thing.

In any case, I think that it is clearly the hope of the United States that tensions in the region will not escalate, and I'll just leave it at that.

Q The U.S. has a responsibility here in that there is still a joint command in Korea under one flag or another. Would the United States permit forces to be used to retaliate against North Korea in this situation?

A Again, I would say I don't normally get into the question of military plans and operations, as you know, Don. But I would reiterate what I said before, that we would hope that tensions in the area would not escalate.

Q A variation on that same question: Are we urging the Koreans to exercise restraint?

A That would get us into the question of diplomatic dialogue, and I think I would have to back off answering that kind of a question, George.

Q There are reports, Alan, that again the military thing has a foreign policy implication that U.S. troops are also on the alert in South Korea.

A Again, that I would have to refer to the Pentagon. I don't have specific information on that.

Q Referring yet again to the Korean aircraft incident, can you say whether the following is an accurate interpretation of intercepted Soviet Union ground communication? "Our pilots told us they shot down a passenger plane."

A I addressed this at some length last week, and I don't have anything new to add to what I said at that time.

Q Does the State Department take the position that it would be legal for U.S. trainers in Honduras to train Guatemalan soldiers at the new regional training center?

A I think that takes us into the realm of the speculative, Jim. We can't confirm any plans for training Guatemalan troops, or even as currently the one report indicated, Peruvian or Venezuelan troops at the Honduran Regional Military Training Center.

In principle, in a hypothetical sense, the regional character of the center was addressed in the initial Honduran Government communique in May of this year.

It noted that the Honduran Government will control the real estate, provide physical security, and that Honduran personnel would direct the operation of the Center.

It also pointed out that the Government of Honduras would be able to negotiate bilateral issues in the future with governments in the region and outside of it which wanted to make use of the facilities that the Center would offer.

But, as I say, I can't confirm that there is any specific plan on Guatemalan forces as was reported in the press this morning and in the wire this afternoon.

Q Despite its speculative nature, could you look into the legality of that question, because one might argue that part of the agreeement provided -- part of the facilities to which you referred might be Green Beret or U.S. Army instructorship, and --

A Again, the U.S. involvement would have to be decided on a case-by-case basis, and this issue has not

CONT

arisen. I don't think I'm going to try to give you a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question.

Q One other if I may, on Maldonado, the AIFLD person whose life may have been threatened, it was reported this weekend that U.S. officials had counseled him to remain in the United States and not to return. Can you confirm that?

A No, I can't. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Why is Secretary Shultz going to El Salvador?

A Why is he going to El Salvador? He is going to stop in El Salvador on the trip previously announced. He's going to Brazil, obviously a country of some importance to the United States in the region. We have a lot of important ongoing programs, relationships. I don't think it's particularly unusual that he would stop there.

Q On the way back?

A On the way back? Not clear.

Q On the way back or to?

A He's going on the way down.

Q On the way down to Brazil?

A Yes.

Q Will he spend the night there or just a matter of hours?

A I don't have details on that, Barrie. My sense is he will probably then continue on the plane and will not be overnighting there, but I can't confirm that to you at this particular point.

Q Any other stops?

A I don't know if there are going to be any other stops at this point. That's the only one that I can confirm as of this moment.

Q What is the date in El Salvador? Is it the 16th?

A No. The 24th I think is the date.

Q And you don't have any idea to whom he might be speaking there at this time?

A I don't have a detailed agenda of whom he might see. No.

Q Alan, on Sunday The Washington Post reported about a Russian general defecting to Turkey and has been flown to the United States.

A I don't know anything about it, and if I did, I guess I couldn't tell you anyway.

Q But --

A But I don't know anything about it.

Q The State Department has neither denied nor accepted --

A I think that as a matter of principle on a case of an alleged defection, we would not get into it.

Q Alan, something further on the KAL follow-up. This is a little off the wall, but I'd like to follow it up, if you don't mind.

Following the Security Council vote in the U.N., has the United States taken any action with regard to economic aid to Zimbabwe beyond the comments you made regarding Mugabe's visit on the day, or the day after he visited here?

A I don't have details. There was some guidance the other day, I think -- you might want to check in the press office, Ralph -- about where we stand on aid to Zimbabwe. I think that there is a request which is pending before the Congress for, I guess it must be FY-84 at this point, and I don't know of any change in that. But why don't you take a look at the guidance which was there.

Q Alan, has there been confirmation here of the Motley visit to Nicaragua?

A My announcement today.

Q Oh. Sorry.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 4:26 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #179

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1983, 12:17 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. It's nice to be able to reclaim the podium from Mr. Romberg after couple of weeks. I'm afraid I don't have any announcements for you. I'm afraid I don't have any news for you, but it's still nice to reclaim the podium.

Q What was Ambassador Dobrynin doing here in the building this morning?

A He was in seeing Under Secretary Eagleburger. He came in at his own request. Ambassador Dobrynin asked for the meeting.

Q Specifically, with Mr. Eagleburger? How come he didn't meet with the Secretary?

A I think he asked for it specifically with Mr. Eagleburger.

Q The subject, please?

A I don't have a subject for you. They were still meeting when we came down. The meeting ran long the meeting was still going on when we came down.

Q Can we get something on that later in the day?

A I expect we will be as forthcoming as usual on those kinds of meetings which, as you know, is not --

Q Can you tell us whether, at the talks in Geneva today, there was any indication on how long this round of INF talks will continue?

A I'm not aware that there was. So far as I know that meeting was held routinely and went off in a normal manner. I haven't seen anything which would shed any light on that.

Q Has another meeting been scheduled?

A So far as I know, the next meeting will take place on schedule.

Q No request by the Soviets for a recess or a suspension?

A Not so far as I know.

Q Do you know whether they have suggested dates going beyond about a week from now, for further meetings?

A I don't. I haven't seen anything on it.

Q Do you care to comment, John, about the Evans & Novak comment this morning about a deal with Syria?

A Let me tell you a little bit about my reaction, and the Secretary's reaction. I was concerned about it and brought it to his attention. One of the things that disturbed me about it was the line in the column concerning Judge Clark's visit to Rome. The line that said, "Secretary Shultz had made a surprising public outburst through his spokesman over Clark's sudden trip to Rome."

I took the opportunity of talking to the writer of the column, pointing out the Secretary had not made any comment whatsoever on Judge Clark's visit to Rome, and I had not. The writer said that he thought that this was my colleague Mr. Romberg last week. I pointed out that that, too, was not correct; that there had a story in the Washington Post and that Mr. Romberg had responded to that and, as a matter of fact, had specifically said that, "the Secretary had not expressed a view on this matter and therefore anybody who purports to talk to him, whether they say he is fuming or isn't fuming, is making up their own view of it." That's a quote from the transcript.

The writer of the column asked for a little time to check this out, and then called me back later in the morning to say that he had been mistaken and that there would be a correction published in a footnote to his column on Friday. That's as far as the Spokesman's involvement.

As far as the Secretary is concerned, I think his reaction is more one of sorrow rather than anger. I think it underlines for him the problems of trying to conduct business sensibly in Washington when one is beset by these occasional, factually incorrect, and gossipy columns.

I think the Secretary feels that this is a further attempt to sow the seeds of division between the State Department and the White House, and he's confident that such attempts will not succeed. As for his own attitude, he is not going to pay a great deal of attention to this kind of column, and he's going to proceed to do the job he came to Washington to do.

In terms of the facts, the facts are that the State Department and Mr. McFarlane are working closely; Ambassador McFarlane -- there's a great deal of telephone conversation. Insofar as policy is concerned, Secretary Shultz testified recently at considerable length on our Middle East policy, on Lebanon, and Syria. When he did that, he was expressing the view of the Administration. His testimony was cleared throughout the Administration.

The President made some statements about the Middle East on Saturday, and all those statements speak for themselves. Clearly, the Secretary and the President are in total coordination in terms of substance and implementation of foreign policy.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A You can refer to the transcript. It's me, so I'm afraid there isn't a copy of it.

Q Who does the Secretary think is sowing these seeds of division? Does he think there's a guerrilla in the White House. (Laughter)

A A G-o-r-i-l-l-a?

Q No, in all seriousness. I'm trying to see if you're getting in your remarks here that he thinks this is the press that is stirring up this trouble or does it think it's some people in the Administration who are stirring up trouble?

A I think he thinks that this is an inaccurate column, but this does not -- I think we'll leave it at that.

Q But what does he feel the genesis of it is? Is it someone in the White House who's trying to stir up trouble here? Someone in the State Department?

A Can't answer that.

Q Was he fuming when he read the column this morning?

A As I say, I think his mood is more one of sadness rather than -- sorrow rather than anger.

Q It's an interesting thing here because I've heard questions in this room about Jack Anderson's columns, and generally they meet with a lofty dismissal. Why is it that Evans & Novak get this long and very interesting rebuttal but poor Mr. Anderson doesn't seem to fare that well, even though he seems to report also titillating material?

A I don't think there's any conscious inequity, Lester. I'm just giving you my reaction to the column this morning, and insofar as it affected me.

Q He hit an exposed nerve?

A He hit on one of my nerves when he said that the Spokesman had done certain things the Spokesman hadn't done.

Q Is there any comment from the State Department on the Supreme Court action this morning?

A No.

Q Can I follow up on my question, please?

A Sure, go ahead.

Q I do thank you for what you presented us, but I would like, however, to have an answer, if there is one, about the supposed deal between the U.S. Government and Syria in pushing the PLO out and not threatening the Israeli northern border: is there any substance to that? Can you comment on that?

A I think what you have you to do is go back to the Secretary's testimony and what the President has said, and our position on Syria and the actions that Syria has taken and the actions that have been taken in Syria by the Soviet Union; we've commented on all these. We have talked about Syria's interests, understandable interests, in Lebanon, but we have also talked about Syria's unhelpfulness at various stages of the negotiations. But I think you really have to go back to the testimony which is an official exposition of U.S. policy.

Q Therefore, John, the other part of the article today, or the op ed piece, that there is a deal to push the PLO out of Lebanon which is a beginning of a new Syrian-U.S. policy --

A No deal. There's an unchanged policy on the part of the United States which is to secure in the shortest possible period of time the removal of all foreign forces, which certainly includes the PLO and it includes the Syrians, and it includes --

Q But is it to be done by the Syrian Government? I mean, actually, you're saying that, yes, there is something like this but it's not our policy?

A I'm not suggesting that at all. What I'm suggesting is that our policy is unchanged and there are no secret deals. We're working to secure the goals that have long been set.

Q John, can I take you back to Bob's question, and see if you can do a little better this time around? You're saying the Secretary feels this is "a further attempt to sow the seeds of divison between the State Department and the White House." What are some past attempts that you have in mind; and since you've made this accusation, can you take the next step and identify those who are making the attempts?

A I don't think the Secretary is looking to any conspiracy here, Bernie. There have been stories in the past suggesting divisons and tensions between various branches of government, various agencies, and there certainly have been stories suggesting tensions from time to time not only in this Administration, but previous Administrations between the State Department and the White House. I think those are obvious and probably, one of the unpleasant facts of political life in Washington.

Q Yes, but I think what everyone is trying to get at here is, does the Secretary feel that he's being unfairly treated by the press and it's the press that's stirring up this trouble, or does he feel that these are various factions within the Administration? That's what I don't understand from your question.

A I don't think the Secretary is making blanket -- that's not his style, and in any case he's not making blanket accusations against either individuals or against the press.

I talked to him this morning about a specific column. I think that there are aspects of that column which are inaccurate, and I think that there are aspects that are unfair to him personally, and to the Administration, and I think he shares that feeling. He was simply talking about this column.

There have been other stories suggesting differences between the State Department and the White House, and he's simply saying that here's another story, and it's not going to divide the White House and the State Department. We are coordinated in terms of policy.

Q Is it the stories that are sowing the seeds? Is it the sources of the stories that are sowing the seeds? You used the phrase "sowing the seeds." Who's sowing?

A You have the story which describes inaccurately tensions between the White House and the State Department. That story is inaccurate. There have been other stories, not for some time, but there have been.

Q What it says -- if I may just continue -- it says "another attempt to sow seeds of division." People don't sow seeds of division by being inaccurate.

A It may be the effect of their efforts.

Q If something is inaccurate, that's a mistake. But when you make a conscious attempt to sow seeds of division, that would be a different matter, would it not?

A I think you would be going down a dead end street if you were to look for some kind of analysis by the Secretary beyond this particular column. What he's saying is, from time to time there are stories, not only involving the State Department but other agencies of government, suggesting dissent and division within an Administration, not only this Administration. There have been such stories; here's another story, but he's not attempting to put it into a conspiratorial framework. He's remarking on this story, which seemed to be inaccurate to him today.

Q So this is not another attempt to do something? This is simply another inaccurate story that's come up?

A It's an inaccurate story, the effect of which would be to sow discord if people believed this story. I think that's about where we are.

Q The most recent such attempt, if I could use quotes around "attempt," was the story in the Post on Friday which, as you've indicated, you really haven't commented on. Is that one inaccurate?

A I think that where we stand on that is that the Secretary has had no -- he has not made any comment to anybody about Judge Clark's trip to Rome. So anybody who is attempting to interpret the Secretary's viewpoint must be inventing that opinion because he has not had any comment on it.

Q But in this case the silence almost makes the point, because you've gone to great efforts here to say that this column is inaccurate and there's no division over Syrian policy.

A Perhaps I'm the culprit in having drawn this to his attention, so perhaps you should blame me. Perhaps my reaction has been a little more wordy than it should have been. I was just trying to convey his reaction to the column.

Q Following the story on Friday, has the Secretary had a conversation with Judge Clark to make sure that they both think the same way about Clark's trip?

A I don't know whether they have talked about Judge Clark's travel plans, but there certainly have been conversations between the Secretary and Judge Clark.

Q What I meant was, the previous trip to Rome --

A I don't know whether it's been discussed.

Q Could you tell us, if it's not a confidential matter, who you mean when you refer to "the writer"? Was it Evans or Novak? (Laughter)

Q Was it the Prince of Darkness, who's seen the light?

A I think I'll just leave it where it is. They have been gentlemanly with me in responding, and I think I'll be gentlemanly with them.

--MORE--

Q While I understand what you're saying about the inaccuracy of the part about Judge Clark, should we also conclude that it is untrue that there is any impending deal between the United States and Syria about keeping the PLO out of the Shouf so that they cannot attack the northern border of Israel?

A I'm torn as to how I should respond to your question because I ought to respond by saying, obviously we're not going to get into the confidential negotiations that we're having with the various parties -- and I guess I will say that. But having said that, I think I would steer you away from the suggestion that there are any secret deals.

Q If it is not secret, John, -- (laughter) would the United States support efforts --

A You're pressing me because I've tried to be so helpful. You're taking unfair advantage.

Q I'm trying actually to -- I'll try it from another side: Will the United States support efforts by Syria, underway now, of removing the PLO out of Lebanon?

A Obviously, we favor the removal of PLO from Lebanon by any means that that can be achieved, as we favor the departure of the Syrians and the Israelis.

Q Who is going to remove the Syrians, the Israelis? Then, who is going to remove the Israelis?

A You've pressed me to the limit of my indulgence.

Q John, are you accepting the premise of his question that the Syrians are trying to move the PLO by force from Lebanon?

A I think I'm going to stop and be reclusive from here on in on our negotiations.

Q John, just one more, please, on the Friday Post story. By discussing today's Evans and Novak column in such detail, and by saying that Shultz has made no comment to anyone on the Friday Post story, you leave a pregnant silence about the Friday Post story. Is that the impression the Secretary wishes to leave?

A No, no, no.

Q What did he say about the Friday Post story when you asked him about that subject this morning?

A What we're saying is that I am reiterating to you today what the Secretary said on Friday and what Alan gave you on Friday, in the transcript. What I was objecting to in the Evans and Novak column was the suggestion that there had been some emotional outburst of criticism, while the fact was --

Q All of which sidesteps the question. You dealt with the facts on today's Evans and Novak column; you said -- you first dealt with the issue of who talked to whom.

Then, you said, "on the question of the facts." Let's do the same thing with Friday's story. You've dealt with the question of whether he made any comment to anyone on it. Let's deal now, if we could, with the question of how he feels about the Rome trips and about Judge Clark.

A That would be hard to ascertain, because he hasn't made any comment on it.

Q You didn't discuss that with him today --

A No.

Q -- and he did not reveal his feelings to you when you talked about that subject today?

A No, no.

Q So we don't know if he thinks it's a good idea or not?

A That's right. We know that he has not commented to anybody on Judge Clark's trip to Rome.

Q O.K.

Q Let me ask just one more question: By saying that someone -- that there is an "attempt to sow seeds of division," you're not accusing anyone, either in the government or in the press, of deliverately misstating the facts?

A No. Absolutely not.

Q That was not the purpose of your statement?

A No.

Q Then, why did you make it?

A My eye was caught, Bernie, by an inaccurate reference to myself, which I thought reflected on my integrity, which I consider rather highly. And when I found out that the comment was not directed to me but to Mr. Romberg, I felt just as strongly: I value his integrity highly, too. And I was at pains to have that corrected.

It seems to me that a rather basic error like that in a story might raise the question that there are other parts of it that are inaccurate, too.

Q So in the use of the word "attempt," you don't wish to be conveying any sense of intent, is that correct?

A No. Perhaps my phrase was injudicious. I don't mean to suggest anything beyond an assessment of this particular story.

Q John, on the same subject, would you care to comment on the journalistic ethics or professionalism of The Washington Post in printing these sorts of stories? It's a subject on which you have commented in other contexts.

A I have commented on journalistic ethics.

Q I'm just wondering whether honesty has anything to do with intent, with ethics, or --

A Yes, I think the writers of this column have behaved very professionally in saying that they concede that a mistake was made, and they will publish a correction. I think that is ethical.

Q John, that includes the Friday Washington Post story as well?

A I don't understand the question about Friday.

Q Well, do you think that the authors of that article behaved very professionally, with, in your view, of ethics, in reporting that the Secretary "fumed", which, from everything you've said, must have been something they made up out of whole cloth?

A Well, I don't like unsourced stories, but I suspect that during my tenure in government, they will continue.

Q At least, we've pinned down what your view of professionalism and ethics is.

A I think my record on professionalism and ethics is quite clear, and stands up over 30 years or so.

Q I agree with you.

Q New subject? Can I ask you about the Iran/Iraq situation again? Is there anything new you have to tell us about the delivery of the planes -- the U.S. view of that delivery, if any?

A No. I really don't have anything beyond what Alan gave you yesterday. As a matter of fact, I have nothing beyond what Alan gave you yesterday.

Q Is there anything you can say about what is at stake for the United States at this point, beyond a certain number of barrels of oil a day? Is there anything --

A It's not only for the United States; it involves a lot of others. I think about 8 percent of our oil comes from the Gulf, but obviously, the flow to others is more substantial. Particularly Japan, Western Europe, and some of the developing countries are much more heavily dependent than ourselves on the Gulf for their oil supplies; and serious interference with the flow of oil would obviously be a matter of concern to the international community, but we have indicated our concern, should the right of traffic in the Gulf be impaired.

Q Is there anything beyond that in terms of connecting Soviet presence in Syria and perhaps Soviet desires for the oil fields. Is there anything beyond the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz that the U.S. has seen at this point?

A No, I don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Do we know for sure that the Etendards have arrived in Iraq?

A I don't know.

Q You don't know?

A I don't know. I personally don't know. Maybe somebody in our government knows, but I don't know.

Q Are the reports that American ships or amphibious ships are heading in that direction correct? Can you tell us that?

A I don't know where Alan left that yesterday, but I think the Pentagon would have to tell you, if they are prepared to tell you, where ships are.

Q John, how far is the United States willing to go? And can you refresh our memory: what are our obligations to the allies if their flow of oil is cut off?

A Why don't we assist you in getting from the Press Office the guidance that we've used before on that which sets that out.

Q John, those three amphibious assault ships are in the Red Sea, but their deployment is scheduled -- I mean they are headed for the Indian Ocean where the Ranger is. Might that not act as a trip-wire that would trigger Khomeni, since he is so anxious to get into the fray?

A Without confirming where they are -- because I honestly don't know -- I don't see why it would be a trip-wire. I mean, the ships are not doing anything that is provocative or hostile in any way, so I don't see --

Q He doesn't need much encouragement.

A Well --

Q May I ask another question? Dr. Wadia Haddad, the Lebanese National Security Adviser, is in the building with the Lebanese Ambassador. Who is he meeting, do you know?

A I think he's seeing Larry Eagleburger later in the day, and I don't know what other appointments he might have scheduled. I think he's on a private visit here, and is certainly seeing Larry Eagleburger later in the day. He may see others. I don't know.

Q John, do you have anything on the sabotage-bombing of that port in Nicaragua?

A No. We received a note from the Nicaraguan Government, and we're looking at it.

Q Are they blaming us for --

A I haven't seen the note, but I assume that may be the thrust of it.

Q Do we have any general comment on this kind of activity?

A No.

Q You have no general comment?

A No.

Q Do you have anything at all that you can say now about the Secretary's three meetings with the Chinese Foreign Minister?

A Not really. Why don't we leave that until Mr. Wu's visit comes to an end, I think, tomorrow afternoon. We will have a backgrounder for you tomorrow afternoon on the entire visit. They met for many hours yesterday in the morning and the afternoon, with the Secretary and others; the Vice President gave a lunch yesterday; the Secretary gave a dinner last night. I think the Chinese have a dinner tonight, and a message from the "front," is about to tell me something else, (Laughter) and that is that Wadia Haddad may also have seen Dick Murphy -- may have seen or be seeing.

Q Can you give us the time on this backgrounder?

A I think it will be toward the end of the afternoon when the appropriate senior official gets back from the airport. Five-ish, something like that.

Q Tomorrow?

A Tomorrow, yes.

Q But you can't give any kind of -- "cordial talks," or anything?

A The talks seem to be going very well. They were back in again this morning. I didn't sit in for all of them this morning, but the talks seem to be going well. They certainly did yesterday.

Lester.

Q Since you've been very forthcoming this morning --

A Obviously, too forthcoming, I can see that.

Q (Inaudible) well, am I correct in presuming that the Secretary is, and must be, well-acquainted with the economic picture of the United States in order to answer questions from foreign governments?

A He is not the Secretary of the Treasury, but I think he is well-informed about the economy.

Q Certainly, has a good grasp. Then, could you tell us, does the Secretary have any reason to disagree with Senator Glenn's statement that former Vice President Mondale was the first mate of the Titanic?

A I haven't heard the Secretary deliver himself of an opinion on that, Lester.

Q In other words, you answer is that he would certain not dispute a United States Senator's judgment?

A No, that was not my answer, Lester. My answer was, I hadn't heard him deliver himself of an opinion on that.

Q He'll let that go? I mean, he's not going to comment on it?

A I have no idea that he's about to comment on it. He hadn't indicated he would be about to.

Q Is there any evidence from Burma that would supply any information on the bombing of Sunday?

A No, not really, Bernie. You've seen reports that a number of people have been arrested by the Burmese authorities, that at least one of them is being interrogated. We don't really know who they are or whether they are indeed involved. The investigation is going forward, and that's about all we have.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements that have been made in Seoul, by officials of the government to the effect that they plan to take diplomatic measures against North Korea as a result of this, rather than military measures?

A I think those statements are conditional, are they not, saying upon the outcome of the inquiry and the apportionment of blame, should North Korea be --

Q They've already concluded who is reponsible.

A They may have concluded that, yes. No, I don't think we would have anything on that.

Q John, on El Salvador: all the radio stations in the country have cut down on their news broadcasts pursuant to a threat issued by the ESA -- Secret Anti-communist Army -- one of the death squads -- including the station that broadcasts Voice of America, and they've been asked not to make any broadcast with reference to the Christian Democratic Party, union activity, and the civil war.

Do you have any statement with respect to what appears to be an attempt to censor the press there? And do you know of any Salvadoran government efforts to stop the recent spate of death-squad activity?

A No. No, I really don't have any comment because I'm not familiar with the report. Obviously, our position on the freedom of the press is quite clear, just as obviously our position on death squads in El Salvador is quite clear -- we've spoken out very strongly against them. It's not the kind of activity we expect to see in El Salvador, but I don't have any specifics on that.

Q Does the fact that no senior government official has yet issued any specific condemnation -- that is, any government official in El Salvador -- of this resurgence of death-squad activity indicate to you any complicity on the part of the government?

A Oh, I don't have anything on that, Jim.

Q John, you said earlier that the Secretary had not made his views known about the Clark visit, as far as you know.

A He hasn't talked to anybody about it.

Q Has he discussed that whole trip with Clark himself?

A I don't know.

Q In Manila, Ambassador Armacost is quoted as having said that if the resignation of this inquiry commission then leads to the formation of a new commission to find further evidence, it would be a good thing? Do you have anything to say about this?

A I think he was commenting on the developing situation. I think he was saying that if, in fact, the outcome of this is a full, fair, objective assessment of what happened to Mr. Acquino, that would be a good development. That, of course, is our position.

Another message from the "front" --

Q Whoops! (Laughter)

A What did I do wrong this time? This takes the question of Wadia Haddad one more -- (Laughter)

Mr. Haddad is not meeting with Larry Eagleburger today, so I assume that leaves us the state of play that he either has, or is about to meet with Mr. Murphy, and is not meeting with Mr. Eagleburger today. I don't know about any other meetings he might have with Mr. Eagleburger or others.

Do you think there is a little confusion on the --

Q Do you think it's possible he is wandering the halls and not meeting with anyone?

(Laughter)

A No.

Q Can't go above the second floor.

A Even above the second floor.

(Laughter)

Q Can I go back to Manila? It has now been more than seven weeks since Mr. Aquino was killed, and yet there has been no discernible movement to find out who did it. The Commission that was formed now has resigned; nothing has come out from the government there.

At the time, it seems to me, the United States was rather anxious to get to the bottom of the whole matter. How does it feel now? How does your Government feel now?

A Still very -- it's your government, too -- still very anxious to get to the bottom of it, but necessarily it must be a Filipino investigation. We are encouraging, there is no question -- without interfering in internal Filipino affairs -- we have indicated our encouragement for a speedy inquiry and a speedy finding.

Q What do you think the implications are of the fact that it has been almost two months, and there has been none.

A I think we regret the delay, but as I say, it is an internal Filipino matter; and there is a course of events that has been followed.

Q Is there any review being made of the situation in South Korea as to whether the President ought to go there, or is that situation still as it was?

A Not to my knowledge. Still as it was, and the Presidential visit is still on as far as I know.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.

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Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #180

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. A couple of announcements. There will be a readout at 5:00 this afternoon in this briefing room on the Chinese Foreign Minister's visit to Washington. It will be on BACKGROUND, attributable to a senior State Department official.

Also in the Press Office is a fairly lengthy statement on a new wave of repression in the Soviet Union. It involves the jailing of three human rights activists.

That's all I have in the way of announcements.

Q On the announcements, John, are you expecting any major announcements at this 5:00 briefing? Prior to the visit you were not expecting any announcements.

A No, it will be a straight readout on Foreign Minister Wu's visit here.

Q You don't expect an announcement of the exact dates of the Premier's visit here?

A I don't. I think that would come from the White House.

Q Today?

A I'm not aware of it.

Q On the Soviet Union, do you now have any official notification from the Soviets on their intentions in the various arms talks?

A No, nothing official. There's been no official announcement that the Soviets have decided to interrupt the Geneva talks, nor have they proposed a recess in Geneva. As of today, sessions are continuing and further sessions have been scheduled.

For our part, we're prepared to continue our active negotiating efforts until we reach an equitable agreement. Should an agreement not be reached before deployments begin, we stand ready to halt or reverse our deployments through continued negotiation.

The statement by Mr. Zamyatin is simply the latest in a serious of Soviet threats directed toward Western public opinion. Soviet threats to walk out of the talks because of U.S. deployments are totally unjustifiable. The United States is negotiating seriously, actively and continuously with a view to reaching agreement as early as possible.

The United States has been so negotiating for two years during which Soviet deployment of SS-20s has continued unabated. Over 100 Soviet SS-20s with more than 300 warheads have become operational since the negotiations began in November '81.

Q You don't consider Mr. Zamyatin an official?

A Don't consider that an official notification by the Soviets. The meetings are going on. No termination date has been set for this round.

Q What would it take to be an official announcement?

A I think they would have to give notification at Geneva in those talks.

Q Without hedging words on this, Mr. Zamyatin does not go off on his own to make statements like this. He's obviously representing the Soviet Union.

A All I can say is that even as we meet, these meetings are continuing; they are scheduled to resume Tuesday and Thursday of next week. There's no suggestion that there's a cancellation, as of today.

Q John, anything at all that would confirm the reports that the Soviets are going to put a new proposal, somewhat more flexible proposal --

A Nothing to confirm that. There's been an awful lot of speculation about that which I've seen, but nothing to confirm that.

Q Have they said anything as far as you know at the negotiations that would indicate --

A No, not to my knowledge.

Q You mentioned in your statement that the Soviet deployment of SS-20s continued unabated during the period of the negotiations. Does that include unabated in the period since March, which was the last time the U.S. acknowledged a solid number of SS-20s?

A Just of my own knowledge, I'm unable to give you a specific indication of when which missile was put into operation.

Q No, I don't mean to get that, specifically. I want to get at the question of whether -- since March, there have been a lot of changes at the negotiating table, both on the U.S. part and perhaps on the Soviet part as well. And what I'm trying to get at is whether there has also been a concomitant change in the deployment of the Soviet missiles?

A I just can't --

Q You can't help with that?

A I don't know.

Q On the arms talks, just so we're sure we're talking about the same thing, when you talk about suspension or cancellation, you're talking about both INF and START?

A This particular statement referred to INF, but as of today the same pertains to START; yes. There's no suggestion that there's a cancellation.

Q Also on the Soviet Union, can you confirm reports that Soviet ships harassed a Japanese ship in the airliner search?

A I think basically the Pentagon may have more on that than I do. We do have a little on it which I cannot, for the moment, put my hand on -- yes, I can.

As I say, basically the Pentagon would be talking about that. But it is correct that a Soviet vessel approached a Japanese vessel chartered to the U.S. Navy which was participating in the search and recovery effort. And, as I say, for more specific information, check with the Pentagon.

The encounter took place in international waters. This is a ship chartered by ourselves. It has a special capability to anchor in deep water and is used to provide precise navigational information for the search force. But, again, for details, I think the Pentagon is the place to go.

Q Was that the subject of yesterday's conversation with Mr. Dobrynin?

A I guess, as a matter of fact, we probably should stand by what we said yesterday. We're not getting into the subject of that particular --

Q Have you brought it up with the Soviet Union?

A We are looking at the situation, and we'll decide how to proceed.

Q In other words, you have not yet brought it up?

A We're looking at it, looking at the details.

Q Can you do anything better than "approached this ship?" Is that all you have, really?

A The Pentagon may be able to do better than that.

Q That's all you have is the word "approached?"

A That's all that we have, yes.

Q Would this be comparable to the U.S. approach of the Soviet ship in the waters off Nicaragua?

A Why don't you ask the Pentagon, but I think the cases are somewhat different.

Q In the new twist that the Secretary has put recently on our Lebanese policy, we now --

A A "new twist?"

Q In the sense that where we were for a strong central government, now we are for a strong -- we are for reconciliation talks, encouraging reconciliation talks. Yet, today, in her interview with President Gemayel, Flora's interview, she has Gemayel saying that he really doesn't believe much in these talks; they are a camouflage, and he kind of indicates that the U.S. has been pushing the Lebanese Government in the direction of talks that he doesn't want. He seems to indicate that the May 17th accord, which the Secretary helped set up, is in danger.

A We're obviously not going to comment on newspaper reports of what foreign heads of state have said. But the facts are quite plain. We consider that national reconciliation in Lebanon is a vital part of the process that we're embarked on and others are embarked on there.

The facts of the matter are that President Gemayel has worked vigorously himself to bring about national reconciliation. But beyond that, I don't think we'll have any comment on a newspaper interview.

Q There's a story, I think, from Israel radio to the effect that the United States and Jordan are working on the creation of a Jordanian force to be used in other parts of the Persian Gulf, or what have you? Some funding has been sought from Congress on this?

A I'm not going to confirm or deny that particular report. Jordan is an important friend of the United States with which we have long-standing and well-known military supply relationships. It is in the interest of the United States to continue these relationships.

As both countries have an interest in regional security that is equally well known, it should surprise no one that questions of regional security are regularly discussed.

That's the background of the relationship, and we're not going to have any comment on this story or any other speculation along these lines.

Q Has there been any request of Congress or any plans to request from Congress any additional military assistance for Jordan?

A I'm just going to leave you with those words, I'm afraid.

Q Could we have copies?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the discussion in Israel about linking the Israeli economy to the United States, making the dollar an Israeli currency?

A Obviously, Israeli economic decisions are -- that's a matter for Israel to decide. The Israeli Government announced earlier this week some decisions with regard to devaluation of the shekel and reduction of subsidies. These seem to represent positive moves to deal with their economic problem which should produce positive results.

According to Israeli Finance Minister Aridor, the Cabinet will continue to consider measures to strengthen the program of economic adjustment. We cannot speculate on what their considerations might be. Decisions concerning management of the Israeli economy are a matter for Israeli determination, and I think we would have to refer you to the Israelis for any further discussion.

Q There were announcements that this move to link the economies was in discussion for six months; there was a secret plan that was drawn up; there were discussions with American officials. Can you comment on those?

A There certainly have been discussions of a general character. The United States Government has an interest in the strength and the vitality of the Israeli economy. Israeli and U.S. officials have regularly discussed their perceptions of the imbalances besetting the Israeli economy. We continue to consult, but the decisions to deal with Israel's economy are Israel's decisions.

Q Has the Director General of the Israeli Treasury asked the United States for special help to help stablize the Israeli currency?

A I don't know. I can't answer that. Sorry.

Q John, on the same subject. Do you know anything about a high-level Israeli delegation coming to the United States next week?

A There was an earlier report that Mr. Aridor himself was coming. I think that is not now true. I think he's not coming, but I don't know what other Israeli officials might be.

Q Another question on the Gemayel interview in the New York Times. When Gemayel refers to these talks as a camouflage and a distraction, doesn't that indicate to other parties in the negotiations something to the degree that -- wouldn't it erode their confidence in being able to get anything out of the talks? Might it not hurt prospects for accomplishing anything?

A I don't know. We're talking about a newspaper report of what he said. I mean, the facts are that he has worked vigorously to bring about national reconciliation and been deeply involved in getting these diverse factions together. Those are the facts. That's what he has been involved in.

Q Do you have some information that makes you think maybe the report is not accurate?

A No, not at all. I think it's probably unwise for the statement -- to have an instant response on a press report of what a foreign head of state has said.

Q Hasn't he said those very same things to the United States several times?

A The facts are that we have been working vigorously with him over a period of months, and he has been pursuing very vigorously this question of getting these -- there has been no suggestion of any reticence on his part in what he's been doing, in what he's been trying to bring together and which now seems to be coming together in terms of meetings.

Q On this, it's well known that President Gemayel favored, first, getting the foreign forces out of the country; then embark on the national reconciliation. He changed course in the last two months, after you pressured him.

A You're making a statement, or you're asking a question?

Q I'm asking a question.

A Is it well known -- what is the question?

--MORE--

Q The question: for now, a year and some months, President Gemayel has refused to accept any proposal for national reconciliation saying, "First, let's get the foreign forces out of the country. Then we will talk among each other for a national reconciliation."

He has changed this by accepting to talk about the national reconciliation while the Israelis, Palestinians, and Syrians are still in.

Is this the result of your convincing him, pressuring him?

A I guess we would have to get an expert to respond to your thesis, but I am not sure that your thesis is correct. It seems to me that President Gemayel has, from the time he acceded to the Presidency, had in mind the broadening of the base of his government, and he has similarly had in mind the withdrawal of foreign forces.

I don't think those are contradictory. It is certainly true that the current process of national reconciliation has taken some time to put together.

Q They are not contradictory?

A I don't think they are contradictory. To achieve national reconciliation in Lebanon and at the same time to have all foreign forces removed -- I don't see why those are contradictory.

Q Do you want to see why?

A No, I don't see why they are contradictory.

Q Can you tell us why Mr. McFarlane is back?

A I think he is back for a review of the overall Middle East situation, Bernie. It seemed an appropriate time for him to come back. Ambassador Fairbanks remains in Beirut. Ambassador McFarlane came in last night. He met with the Secretary for a fairly lengthy period, and other officials in the Department. He is having lunch with the Secretary today, and undoubtedly will see other officials while he is here.

Q Can you tell us something more about the review, what kind of review is it that is taking place? Does it have any particular goal, or is it just a way of looking at what the developments have been?

A I think it is an appropriate time to take a look at the situation. Having gone through this particular phase, and the reconciliation talks now apparently about to begin, it seems an appropriate time to take a look at where we are in the Middle East.

Q Will he be going back to be in those talks?

A We are not present at the talks, Bernie.

Q Let's say with his ear against the door.

A With his ear against the door?

Q Will he be there at the time of the talks?

A I am not sure when he is going back. I am not sure if even he is sure of his departure time.

Q How long do you anticipate this review is going to continue?

A I have no idea, Don, how long his talks here will take.

Q You said he saw the Secretary and some others. Was this last night or this morning?

A He saw the Secretary last night, right.

Q If I can just follow up, is this review designed to introduce new emphases or accents in U.S. policy towards the Middle East?

A I think it is designed -- the communication --

Q May we get a new policy shift out of this?

A I don't know about a new policy shift. The President's September 1 proposal is there, and nobody has come up with a better proposal.

We have been working vigorously to produce a resolution in Lebanon, and he has been out -- I forget how many days he has been out there, since he was in Washington on this particular cycle, but it seems a good time for him to come back and have the kind of face-to-face, in-depth discussions with the Secretary and others that obviously he can't have quite as effectively by phone and by cable.

Q Then, you are not going to come up with a whole new policy kind of thing.

A The President's September 1 policy on the Middle East is in position.

Q Has there been any response to these -- there have been several stories that the Jordanians have indicated new interest in the proposal, and Mr. Arafat has made some moves.

A Seen the stories.

Q Is anything really going on?

A I don't think we would get into anything that might be going on.

Q John, who is heading up the review?

A I think we have kind of gotten rolling with this word "review" here. I think in terms --

Q I think you used it.

A Maybe I used it, but I was using it in a rather less dramatic sense than you now seem to be using it. It is a tour of the horizon. Perhaps I will come to regret that phrase now. (Laughter)

But it is a question of his coming back and relating what has transpired to the extent that we have not been able to fill in the gaps by phone and by cable, and looking at what happens next, where we should proceed next, with our over-all Middle East policy.

It is not a question of changing, it is a question of reviewing how we proceed.

Q The Middle East, in general, or just Lebanon?

A The Middle East, in general.

Q I think we are a little confused here. That is what most of the questions are trying to get at. Is this a major review that could result in a new policy initiative on the part of -- or the dropping of old policies, embarking on new ones? What exactly is going on?

A There is certainly no hint of that, because the policy is there, and it is a good one, and it is the basis on which we are operating.

I don't know how the discussions will proceed this week.

Q And the discussions, are they being held at State, the White House, or who is -- ?

A I would think that, traditionally, it has been the case that our Middle East negotiator has seen the President, and I would think he would, while he is here, sure. You might check with the White House.

Q The President gave a radio talk on Saturday about the Middle East, and in it he said that -- as I read it -- his September 1st initiative is still his policy, but that it couldn't really get implemented until the situation in Lebanon was taken care of, which leads me to the question: For the situation in Lebanon to be resolved, does that mean the foreign forces have to leave, or is just a cease-fire good enough?

A For the situation in Lebanon to be resolved, sure. For what we would consider to be a resolution of it, yes. We would want to see the removal of foreign forces.

Q Because that could be a long time.

A Yes, but the one does not hinge upon the other. As we have always said from the beginning, we intended to pursue the Lebanon track while pursuing the over-all Middle East track.

Now, obviously the situation in Lebanon deteriorated, and obviously it was an impediment, no question about that, to over-all movement on the over-all Middle East plan. But that doesn't mean that nothing can happen on the Middle East until you have one hundred percent resolution of the Lebanese situation, and we have some movement in Lebanon which seems to be gratifying, and by which we are pleased.

Q Are you aware of any discussion of a Shamir visit to Washington?

A No, not at all.

Q Why is the Israeli ambassador seeing Mr. Eagleburger today, do you know?

A I didn't know he was seeing Mr. Eagleburger.

Q He is seeing him right now.

A Is he? Okay, you are ahead of me. On the public schedule, is it?

Q John, there are reports of a magazine interview with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam in which he said that Syria wouldn't withdraw until Lebanon cancelled the Lebanese/Israeli agreement. Have you seen those? Do you have any comment?

A I have seen those reports, but, again, I think we would be unwise to comment on a press report of an official of the Syrian Government. Our position on what is needed is quite clear -- the withdrawal of foreign forces, and I think we won't have any comment on Mr. Khaddam's statement.

Q John, on the Jordanian comments you made earlier, you said that as is well known, the U.S. consults with Jordan regularly, discusses with Jordan regularly, its relationship, military relationship, and so on.

Is the U.S. also consulting with Israel on whatever is being referred to in the comments you made?

A I think I am just going to leave you with those comments, Ralph.

Q So you are going to leave it with "consulting with Jordan" on it but not consulting with Israel?

A We consult with Israel about all kinds of things.

Q Do you have anything new to say on the Iran/Iraq situation in the Persian Gulf?

A No. I have seen those reports of some action out there, although I must say they seem to be confused and they are changing all the time. We don't have anything to confirm the suggestion that there have been strikes on ships.

Q Do you have anything about the American ships and Marines going out to that area?

A No, I don't have anything on that for you.

Q John, there are reports today -- and I am referring to the Boston Globe reporting that you are thinking of having a joint maneuver with the Saudis, sending some F-15's for the joint maneuvers, to protect --

A I don't, but I have an idea that Alan was asked about that a day or two ago. No, sorry. No.

Q You have nothing on it?

A   I have nothing on it.

Q   Will they happen or what?

A   Try the Pentagon.

Q   John, do you agree with the thesis saying that sending Marines to the Indian Ocean and to the Gulf is an indicator to easing of the situation in Lebanon and the Middle East, in general?

A   Oh, I don't think I would really attempt an assessment. You know, the military takes a look at the situation, what they have in terms of forces on the ground, and what they need to support them, and I think I will leave to the Pentagon their analysis of why these additional Marines were withdrawn.

Q   John, could you confirm that the United States, or the State Department, has proposed a fifty percent cut in aid to Zimbabwe because of the stand that Zimbabwe took on the airliner incident in the Security Council?

A   Let me get you something on that later, Jim. We will have a little something on that. I don't have it with me at the moment. Let me get you something.

Q   John, on Central America.

A   Yes.

Q   Is Dr. Kissinger or any other member of his Commission planning to meet with Guillermo Ungo or any other member of the Salvadoran guerrilla political wing?

A   I don't know. The Commission made some statements about who they would be meeting with on this trip, but it is a Presidential Commission, and --

Q   But it is on that trip, is what they are talking about. How about when they come back?

A   I don't know. They are a very independent body. It is not a State Department operation. It is a Presidential Commission.

Q   You mean when Kissinger says that the Salvadorans have to improve their human rights situation in order to continue aid, he is speaking for himself and not for the government?

A   I assume that he was speaking for himself on that occasion. I am sure that those views coincide with our particular views. We are very concerned about human rights in El Salvador, but he said what he said.

Q Was he asked by the government to transmit that view?

A No, absolutely not. He is there as the Chairman of a Presidential Commission, but I am not suggesting we are in disagreement with what he said, but he is speaking as the Chairman of an independent commission.

Q Is that view going to be transmitted by the Secretary on this trip?

A That we are concerned about human rights in El Salvador? That has been transmitted on many occasions by many levels of US Government officials.

Q Especially now with death squads.

A We have made very clear our opposition to the death squads, our concern -- the question Jim asked yesterday about the pressures that are being put on the press in El Salvador. That concerns us. We consider that to be improper and have made our views well known.

Q But former President Duarte, coming out of a meeting with Kissinger, said that he thought it might be possible, based on what he heard from Kissinger, that military aid could be cut to El Salvador on the basis of this.

Are you associating yourself with that warning?

A No. What we are saying is Dr. Kissinger is heading a Presidential Commission, which is operating independently, and what that Commission does, and indeed what it says, is something that it itself determines.

Q No, but you said that there was a coincidence of views here, and I am asking whether that coincidence extended to those remarks by Duarte.

A I am not going to respond to every remark, but certainly on the question of human rights there is no divergence between what Dr. Kissinger said about concern over that and the concern of the Administration.

Q John, the Foreign Minister of Honduras, before leaving Washington this morning told me that they had invited Guatemalan troops for training at the same military school in Puerto Castilla where we are training Salvadoran troops.

My question is, would the Green Berets that are over there training Salvadoran troops also train the Guatemalans, or would this be counter our restrictions on military aid to Guatemala?

A I don't have anything on it, but I think Mr. Romberg had something a few days ago. If you want to check with the Press Office, I think there is some guidance on that.

Q Do you have anything on the Inter-American Commission's report on Guatemala?

A No. Have seen it and will be looking at it, but, of course, our views would be published in our report on human rights, anyway, but I don't have anything specific on it.

Q One more on Central America. Anything on the reports that Costa Rican Interior -- well, security -- ministries are threatening to expel all of our (inaudible) from Costa Rica?

A No, I haven't seen anything on that.

Q John, while you are looking into that Zimbabwe thing, did you have anything recently on the different bombings on South Africa?

A No, I did not.

Q Are you going to say anything about that, or will you look into that?

A I haven't planned to.

Q Will you?

Q John, back to the Kissinger Commission, the President did issue an Executive Order setting up the Commission which gave it certain limited duties and responsibilities.

You said a moment ago that what the Commission says and does is what it decides to do on its own. Are you saying now that the limitations imposed on it by the President really don't matter?

A Oh, no. I am sure the Commission is operating in terms of its Presidential charter, but the point I was making is that it is not a State Department entity. It is operating independently.

Q Why don't you kick them out of the building?

A Well, I think that is rather a silly suggestion.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:39 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, October 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #181

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I understand there is an acute interest on the part of some of getting out of here early today.

Q For what?

MR. HUGHES: I don't know. I was told that some of you have an engagement --

Q Not for others.

A Not for others? Oh, I see. It's one of those selective things.

I really don't have any have any announcements, but I might mention that somebody -- I think Jim Loeb -- asked me the other day whether there had been any statements out of El Salvador on the activities of death squads, and we do have a few of those statements available in the Press Office, including a very recent one by the Salvadoran Political Commission which actually has not yet appeared on FBIS. So you might be interested in that one, which is in the Press Office.

That's it.

Q Some other unfinished business: During his visit, did the Chinese Foreign Minister meet with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency?

A I don't know of my own knowledge that he did, Jim. He may have. I don't know.

Q It seems more and more that we get more of our news these days from Xinhua, the New China News Agency, on things like that because according to them, he did meet the CIA, despite that briefing which we had yesterday which was supposed to be a summary of the meeting.

A I don't know, but if he did and if it's in Xinhua, I wouldn't see any reason why CIA wouldn't confirm it.

Q Do you see any reason why it wasn't mentioned on the schedule put out by you?

A I wasn't down for a senior administration official's briefing --

Q Well put.

A -- so I haven't caught up with it.

Q I don't see any reason why it shouldn't have been, either. In fact --

A Was he asked about it?

Q No. How would we have asked?

A I don't know that he would routinely have related every visit with every official in Washington that Mr. Wu had. But I honestly don't know anything about it.

Q The presumption is that when you do put out a schedule, that, unless there is some last-minute revision, that it is complete.

A Uh-huh. I don't know. I don't know what was on the schedule, and I don't know whether it was or was not on the schedule that you got.

Are you saying it wasn't on the schedule?

Q It was not.

A Ok. I just can't help you. I don't know.

Q John, what can you tell us about the review of the Middle East that is going on? Mr. Shultz is over at the White House again today?

A The Secretary has been over at the White House and will be over at the White House on a number of occasions today. He was over there, I think, with Wadia Haddad earlier in the morning; he was over with Ambassador McFarlane; and I'm sure that the talks that have been going on in the Department this week, I'm sure the input from that went into the session that Ambassador McFarlane had with the President. He would have reported on where we stand in Lebanon, and I'm sure would have had some general thoughts about the outlook in the Middle East.

Q Could you just tidy up that word "review" again? Are we going back to a review of our policy with an intention to redesign and make changes, or is it essentially a review of developments, etc.?

A A review of developments and where we go from here.

Q Just again to clarify, you said McFarlane had a meeting with the President. Was Shultz involved in that meeting also?

A Yes. The Secretary took Mr. McFarlane over to the White House, and they met with the President.

Q Ok. And that was a separate meeting from another meeting that Shultz had with the President --

A Wadia Haddad was over there earlier today, and the Secretary was over there for that meeting, too. He saw the President.

Q The additional meetings that you mentioned, will the Secretary also be meeting with the President and McFarlane at the White House today?

A I don't know that he has any more meetings with the President and Mr. McFarlane, but I think he will be meeting again with the President.

Q And can you tell us whether the subject of the meeting in which McFarlane was present was exclusively Middle East policy, or would you --

A I think it was, but I don't know. I wasn't at the meeting.

Q Well, more directly, would you say whether the subject of the new National Security Adviser would have been brought up?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q Would you take that question?

A No, I don't think we'd tell you what the President talked to the Secretary about.

Q Do you have any comment at all on the announcement --

Q -- except on the Middle East?

A I think it's a logical conclusion that Mr. McFarlane would have reported on his Middle Eastern --

Q Is it an illogical conclusion to suggest that the next NSC adviser would have also come up at that meeting?

A I didn't know that the next NSC adviser had been appointed. I haven't heard the President make any announcement.

Q You don't think that subject would be a logical subject for the meeting?

A It might, or it might not. I don't know; I wasn't there.

Q Would you comment on widespread reports of jubilation within the State Department at the transfer of Judge Clark from one post to another?

A All I know are the facts, Bernie -- what I saw yesterday. I didn't see any jubilation. I know that the Secretary of State received the news at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, somewhere around there; that immediately after the public announcement he talked on the phone with Judge Clark, congratulated him. They went over what the Secretary believed to be the achievements for the President's foreign policy that they have jointly made in the past year; he talked about the good working relationship there had been between them.

He said that he hoped to draw on Judge Clark's counsel in Judge Clark's new role, and said that he would look forward very much to a cordial working relationship with him as a Cabinet colleague.

Q Are you saying he rang Judge Clark?

A He called Judge Clark, yes.

Q Was this news a surprise to the Secretary of State, just like all the other people, as it seems?

A I think he first became aware of it in mid-afternoon; he had no indication before that, so in that sense I suppose it came as a surprise.

Q Who was in the meeting with Wadia Haddad? Can you tell us from here, John?

A I think -- I honestly don't know. I know the Secretary went over. I'm not sure whether Judge Clark was in that meeting or not. I don't know; you'll have to ask the White House. It was a White House --

Q Did he see the President?

A He did see the President, yes.

Q Did McFarlane attend that meeting?

A I think McFarlane was there, but I'm a little loathe of giving you what was to have happened, as distinct from what might have happened. I think you ought to check with the White House as to who was there.

Q Can you tell us the subject of the noon luncheon between the President and the Secretary?

A No.

Q Although I don't want to ask about the Jordanian force for the Persian Gulf because you have made your position yesterday very well, I just want to ask you your comment on a statement or an item in the story this morning in The Washington Post, that President Reagan plans to appeal personally to Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens to intercede with pro-Israeli members of Congress and to persuade them that such a force would be in the interest of the United States and Israel.

Do you have a comment on this?

A No. No.

Q Do you have anything else to say on that Jordanian force?

A No.

Q John, is it true that Congress has actually enacted some portion of a bill giving money to this planned Jordanian force?

A Can't answer that. Can't answer it.

Q Can't answer it because you don't know, or they won't let you?

A I can't answer it because I don't know.

Q Can you explain the reason for the lack of information on that from the lectern?

A I don't think it is a lack of information. We gave you some words on it yesterday, Bernie, and we're going to stand by those words.

Q John, is there any change in the U.S. possible sale of F-16s to Jordan?

A I think you ought to see the F-16 situation in a separate context, and I think that we would refer you to the kind of guidance we gave you on that sometime ago: Should there be a formal request for F-16s and advanced weaponry, we would consider it. There has not been such a request, but I would really like you to dig out the language that we used specifically some months ago.

There has been no change in that situation.

Q So the United States is not "offering" F-16s is the way you're putting it now?

A That's correct.

Q What can you tell us about the circumstances of the Marine's killing today in Beirut?

A That is, obviously, a sad story. We are deeply concerned that our Marines continue to come under fire; we're saddened by the death today of another Marine. Nevertheless, the fact that the cease-fire is holding, by and large, and that the national reconciliation process is moving forward indicates that the Multinational Force is exerting a positive influence in moving Lebanon towards stability, security, and eventual peace.

Insofar as detail on the incident is concerned, I think that the Marines' position at the airport in Beirut came under sniper fire from positions northeast of the airport at approximately 4:30 EDT today.

One Marine was wounded on the perimeter road and was medevac'd to the Iwo Jima. A second Marine died of wounds. The Marines did return fire, but as of about an hour ago there were no further incidents. No further incidents had been reported.

Q Who controls, to the best of our information, the area from which the fire originated?

A I don't know, Bernie. I think you would have to see whether the Pentagon maybe has any more detail on that. We don't.

Q On what basis do you draw the conclusion that the cease-fire is holding "by and large," when another Marine has been killed?

A Because I think you would have to see this in terms of a relatively isolated -- it's a sad incident, but it is a relatively isolated incident. The whole area is not in the midst of a firefight.

-- MORE --

Q Do you know, John, if the Marines' positions were the target or other --

A I don't. I can't answer that. The Pentagon may be able to help you.

Q Do you see any relation between this killing and the departure of the other 2,000 Marines from --

A I don't draw any connection.

Q Will the death of the Marine prod any reconsideration of the mission of the Marines in Lebanon?

A I'm not aware of any reconsideration.

Q Do you have any news -- the latest news about the reconciliation meeting that's supposed to be taking place between the factions in Lebanon?

A No, I don't. I think it's scheduled for Thursday.

Q Next Thursday?

A Next Thursday. I think that's what President Gemayel announced.

Q Do you have any information about the visit taken by the Israeli Ambassador yesterday to this building?

A No, I'm afraid I don't. No, I don't.

Q John, on the Gemayel thing, Flora Lewis, in her column -- I don't know if you answered it yesterday -- reported that, or quoted almost President Gemayel saying that the reconciliation is only to respond to American pressures and it's a cover for something else.

Did the American Administration pressure Mr. Gemayel, and do you consider it a cover, really, for --

A I elected not to comment on that interview yesterday, and it was probably a rather wise thing to do because I understand that the Lebanese Embassy has a clarifying and correcting statement today.

Q The Warsaw Pact countries issued a statement today that was carried by Tass which says that the INF negotiations should continue even if no agreement is reached by the end of this year. Do you have any comment on that? And, also, do you have any comment on the claim in the same statement that the Soviet freeze on SS-20 deployment in the European part of the Soviet Union is in place?

A The communique appears to agree with the position of the United States and its Allies in two respects: first, that there still remains the opportunity for an agreement this year; and, second, that negotiations should continue even if agreement is not reached by the end of the year.

Beyond that, Soviet conditions for continuing after the end of the year are unclear. The United States, in concert with its Allies, has been and remains prepared to negotiate without pre-conditions, with a view to reaching agreement at the earliest possible time. We call upon the Soviet Union to unequivocally adopt a similar stance.

At the same time, with respect to the Soviet position at Geneva, the communique does not reflect any evolution of the Soviet position or any change in the tactics the Soviet Union has adopted to undermine NATO's LRINF modernization.

The Soviets still seek to retain a monopoly of LRINF missiles, with large numbers of these missiles for themselves and none for the United States.

The Soviets continue to attempt to mislead publics by giving the impression that SS-20 deployments have been frozen. In fact, during the two years of the negotiations, the Soviets have increased their inventory of deployed SS-20 missiles by more than 100 missiles with 300 warheads, and the buildup is continuing.

The Soviets continue to threaten to take countermeasures if NATO proceeds with its modernization program under the 1979 dual-track decision, and otherwise seeks to achieve its goals through intimidation, rather than negotiation.

Q Can we have a copy, please?

A Sure.

Q You mentioned the Soviet conditions for continuing beyond the end of the year. Are there any conditions? You said they're not clear.

A I think that the communique is a little ambiguous. There are some ambiguities in it.

Q About whether there are any conditions or not?

A There are a number of ambiguities in it.

Q This number that you mentioned, this 100 -- new missiles or warheads on that?

A A hundred missiles; 300 warheads. I think there are three warheads on each missile.

Q What does that bring it up to, accounting to your count?

A We gave you a figure, I think, within the past few days that we're standing by.

Q In New York, a senior State Department offical say in the order of 350 -- 351 I think. But the Defense Department is still giving out a different number -- 380.

A You need to check with the Pentagon for the specifics, but I think the discrepancy is, we're talking about those deployed; they're talking about missiles that are presently under construction, assuming they become operational. I think that is the difference between those two figures. But I think the Pentagon would be prepared to clear that up for you.

Q So that your "more than 100" is a reference to actually deployed?

A Correct.

Q And does your figure refer, as the Warsaw Pact Communique does, to missiles deployed in the European portion of the Soviet Union?

A Let me do a little checking on that for you, Ralph.

Q The Lebanese sources suggested that the May 17 agreement could be abolished if this means solving the problems in Lebanon. What's your position on that idea?

A I'm sorry. I didn't get the beginning of the question.

Q The Lebanese sources, some Lebanese sources, suggested, I think some Lebanese officials said, that the May 17 agreement between Israel and Lebanon could be abolished if this means solving the problems in Lebanon. What's your position on the idea; and part of the question, Israel has established a liaison office in Lebanon although the articles of implemention of the agreement were not exchanged. Do you have any idea on it; do you have any comment on that?

A We stand by the agreement. As for the establishment of the liaison office, that's a matter between Lebanon and Israel.

Q John, Hikmat Hsihabi, head of the Syrian intelligence services, is in Washington, I understand. Can you tell us if he has seen anybody in the Department or intends to?

A I didn't know he was here so I don't know if he's seen anybody.

Q You don't know he's here now?

A I didn't know.

Q Do you have anything on the number of Soviet advisors or personnel who are accompanying the new missiles being sent into Syria?

A I don't have anything new today. I'm not sure whether we have -- I think the Secretary has mentioned a figure of Soviets in Syria. I guess I would refer you to that. I don't have anything new today.

Q Is that since the discovery of the SS-21s or is that --

A No, I think that predates it. I don't think we have used a post -21 figure.

Q The only reason I ask is that there seems to be idea running around certain circles in the Administration that the Syrians are being weaned away from the Soviet Union. There seems to be some evidence to the contrary. Do you know anything about this idea that Hafiz Assad can now be trusted?

A No. I think the Secretary's testimony on our attitude toward Syria is an exposition of the Administration's position. There's no change in that.

Q Do you have any more information from Rangoon regarding the circumstances of the death of the Korean diplomats and others there?

A No. Sorry, Don. That investigation is continuing, and obviously we looking at it. But I don't have anything new.

Q I think Weinberger said that the South Koreans have put together a circumstanial case, a strong circumstantial case that it was North Korea. Have you seen this?

A They certainly have been saying that. I guess there are South Korean investigators in Burma, although I don't know what role they have played or are playing.

Q What advice is the United States giving South Korea about its possible reaction?

A I think it's a question of what South Korea has been doing and been saying. And I think South Korea has been exercising great restraint. Obviously, we are in touch with them, and there seems to be no division of viewpoint between us.

Q Are you urging continued restraint?

A I think we are in tune with the restraint that they themselves are exhibiting.

Q Are we aiding in the investigation?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q We had offered to help, if they wanted it.

A I'm not sure of that of my own knowledge. Are you stating that, or are you asking me?

Q Didn't we say that?

Q We did say that.

A We did say that? Ok. If we said it, I'm sure --

Q The Secretary and Mr. Clark volunteered --

Q It was said the first day.

A I'm not sure what the state of play is. I'm not sure whether we're involved.

Q Any comment on the missile protests in Europe?

A No.

Q Any comment on continuation or non-continuation of the black box search in the Sea of Japan?

A The Pentagon. It's going on; we're still there. We're still looking.

Q Any status on the review with respect to aid levels to Zimbabwe?

A No. Nothing. No change beyond what we gave you belatedly yesterday.

Q Do you have anything else on the reported breakdown in talks between the rebels and the Peace Commission in El Salvador, or any plans by Ambassador Stone to travel to the region again?

A No. Ambassador Stone is in Europe, and I think will be there for another week or so.

Q And you have nothing on that Peace Commission?

A No.

Q On the aid -- maybe you can take this question. Guyana, which was also then a member of the Security Council, also abstained. Is the State Department also reviewing the aid level for Guyana?

A Let me take a look at that for you, Jim.

Q Do you have anything on the latest developments in Chile?

A No. Are we done? Ok.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 P.M.)

Glennon/Becher

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #182

MONDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1983, 12:10 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have got a number of, first, some housekeeping announcements and then one statement.

Because of a scheduling conflict, again, tentatively we plan to brief late tomorrow, and I ask you to check again. At the moment, we're talking about 4:00, but I would ask you to stay in touch regarding possibly having the briefing at the normal hour, so just be alert to all of that if you would.

Second. There will tomorrow, at a time which we will provide to you as soon as we have it, be a press conference here in this room by David Packard, the U.S. Chairman of the U.S-Japan Advisory Commission, regarding the first report of the Commission to the President and to the Japanese Prime Minister. A copy of that report will be available in the Press Room tomorrow in connection with that, I believe after the press conference.

The time is to be determined. The reason for hesitation is that there is also a briefing tomorrow afternoon. In preparation for the visit of Italian Prime Minister Craxi, a senior State Department official will brief on BACKGROUND in the White House Briefing Room at 2:30. Again, that's Tuesday, October 18.

One announcement regarding the naming of a new Cabinet in Korea. We note the appointment on October 14 of a new Cabinet in the Republic of Korea. This Cabinet change came in the wake of the tragic assassination of several key Korean officials in the October 9 Rangoon terrorist attack.

We have previously expressed our shock and sorrow concerning the Rangoon tragedy, and our own sense of loss over the deaths of the admirable public servants who lost their lives in that attack, men known to us both as professional colleagues and friends.

We wish to extend our best wishes to the new members of the Korean Government as they take up their heavy responsibilities. We have had the privilege of working with many of them in the past, and look forward to continued close ooperation in the future.

That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, on Lebanon, the latest killing of the Marine, do you now believe that there is a concerted attempt by forces in Lebanon to attack the Marines and create some political reaction in this country.

A Let me respond in this way. First, to confirm, obviously, that last night one Marine was killed, three others wounded as a result of small arms and RPG fire in the vicinity of the Lebanese University. Two of the wounded Marines, whose condition is serious, have been medivaced to the U.S.S. Iwo Jima.

We profoundly regret this senseless loss of life and are disturbed that the MNF continues to be the target of attacks which are aimed to undermine the national reconciliation process that is underway in Lebanon.

We commend our Marines for their dedication and exemplary performance in a difficult and trying situation and urge a cessation of these pointless attacks against those who are in Lebanon to serve the cause of peace.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q And in answer to my question, do you believe that there is a deliberate attempt to attack the Marines with the purpose of creating a political effect in this country?

A Again, I can't -- in this country? I don't know that I could really address that beyond what I said here which is that -- what I said was that the targeting of the Marines seems aimed at undermining the national reconciliation process underway in Lebanon. That's what I gave you before. I can't take it beyond that. We also are not able, really, to identify those responsible.

Q To say that the MNF continues to be the target of attacks, is that the first time we have said that they are a target?

A I don't know if it is or isn't. I think the fact is what you have, obviously in this situation, is sniper fire which is unmistakeably in this case targeted.

But, again, there's no way of determining responsibility in a larger sense beyond -- obviously, there are individuals who are there but we don't --

Q Alan, who would be interested in undermining the reconciliation talks? Which groups, which countries?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on that.

Q On Friday, John, in answer to a question, said he believed the ceasefire was still in effect, still holding, because he felt the area was not part of an overall fire-fight. Is it still this government's position that the ceasefire in Lebanon is holding?

A Yes. The ceasefire is holding, though there are sporadic exchanges involving Lebanese army and militiamen in and near Beirut.

We have the problems, the shooting of the Marines that I just talked about, in addition to which two Italian soldiers were wounded last night in the southern Beirut suburbs. But, basically, yes, the ceasefire is still holding.

Q Can you tell me why those shootings are not violations of the ceasefire?

A They may be. Again, it depends on how you're defining it. I would refer you back to what John said. There is not a general breakdown; they're individual incidents which are taking place, so our judgment is that the ceasefire is, indeed, holding despite these incidents.

Q You talk about not being able to determine. I think there was -- one of the television broadcasts -- I think it was over the weekend -- had a U.S. Marine Colonel identifying the snipers, saying that it was deliberate fire, and I think he named the PFLP, because the Marines were deliberately firing back.

Can you go beyond your uncertainly about who's behind the triggers?

A No.

Q Cannot?

A No.

Q Do they intend to drive out the Multinational Force? I mean, is that the purpose of the fire?

A I can't tell you whether they intend to drive it out. That get's basically back to the question I think that Jim started out asking, whether there was an attempt to cause public opinion reaction in this country. I can't tell you that.

Q At the White House on Friday, Dr. Haddad, the National Security Advisor to President Gemayel, said that he had asked the President and his closest advisors to use America's influence to deal with people who are trying to destablize the movement for national reconciliation, to try to neutralize that. It was made plain to us later that he was talking about the Syrians.

Since you say that this targeting of the Marines is aimed at undermining the national reconciliation movement, it sounds like similar language. Are you telling us that we're talking about the Syrians?

A No, I just said that I cannot identify who is responsible, and I think you're really stretching it to come to that kind of a conclusion. No question that we are trying to use our influence and I think others are as well to promote the national reconciliation process. But that's a different question from our specific responsibility in this case.

Q We have shot back and I guess killed some of the snipers that have been shooting at the Marines. Is there any consideration being given by the Administration to taking some specific action that would stop this killing now of two Marines during the ceasefire?

A The Marines are operating under the same rules of engagement that they have heretofore, and they will obviously defend themselves as --

Q The Administration is satisfied, basically, with the way things are going and that these are unfortunate incidents, but nonetheless you're on the right track.

A I think that the concern over the killing of the Marines is a little more serious than simply an offhand remark of that sort, but nonetheless, basically, the ceasefire is holding; they're moving ahead with the political reconciliation process. We are supporting that.

Q Did the permission to shoot back come from a higher level than a commander in the field? Did it have to come from Washington?

A In this individual instance?

Q Over the weekend, yes.

A You would have to check with the Pentagon, but I believe that there is authority to defend themselves which resides in the Marines on the ground. But check with the Pentagon. They would have to tell you about that.

Q Alan, to go over the geography. Did the firing on the Marines come from what is usually referred to as Syrian-controlled territory?

A Again, why don't you get the details on that from the Pentagon. I think they must have that.

Q Because the question about who firing obviously is critical, as whether the Syrians are behind it or whether the PLO individuals may be behind it, whereas the Syrians may in fact want to preserve the ceasefire for their own reasons.

A I have no way of assigning responsibility in this case, Bernie. I'm going to have to leave you with that.

--MORE--

Q Over the weekend, one of the networks showed two of the Amal Shi'ite leaders in one area from which there was some firing, and they came and they talked to the Marine officers, if you recall the story -- we saw the report.

A Yes.

Q After they talked to them, the firing stopped from the other side. Can you determine, or could you imply that the firing or the shooting continued after possible local ceasefire there between the Marines and (inaudible) or is that error?

A I don't have that sort of detail.

Q Have you been in direct contact with the leader of the Amal group in Lebanon during the last, say, three days or so?

A I cannot tell you specifically, but there has been, as we have indicated in the past, a continuing pattern of contact with the various groups in Lebanon. We've done that all along, so I certainly don't rule it out, but I can't specifically confirm it.

Q I mean, relating to the latest casualties of the Marines.

A I don't have anything on that specifically.

Q How about the contact with the Syrians. Have you had any contact lately?

A Any contact lately with the Syrians?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any specific contact to offer you, but we have had a continuing contact both at higher levels and through regular diplomatic channels.

Q Is it the U.S. impression at this time that the Syrians want to preserve the ceasefire?

A I can't give you a judgment of what the Syrians do or don't want on that, Bernie. You'll have to ask them.

As I say, our judgment is that the ceasefire is basically holding, but that there are these disruptive and tragic incidents that are going along with it.

Q Alan, can you tell us more about how does shooting at the Marines will disturb the national reconciliation? Can you go a little more into it?

A I think I'm going to leave it at that. I don't want to get taken further down that particular path.

Q Do you have any further comment on the shooting in Nabatiye and the disturbance that took place between the Israeli forces and --

A No, we've seen the reports, but don't have anything beyond that on it.

Q Alan, on the matter of the Shi'ite Moslem areas where some of this has been coming from and meetings with the Shi'ite leaders, officials of the biggest Shi'ite Moslem state have publicly denounced the recent ceasefire agreement.

Do you not draw a connection between what is eminating from Tehran and these other Shi'ites in Lebanon?

A Again, you're trying to get me to assign responsibility for these particular shootings, and I can't do it.

Q I mean, you're surely looking into it, when these guys are shooting our Marines, right?

A We always try to pay attention --

Q We'd like to know what is behind it, right?

A We try.

Q I mean is that underway?

A I don't have anything specific to give you, Max.

Q What is the status of the Middle East review? And what are the options that may be under consideration?

A I have nothing new for you on that, Barry, beyond what John has said before. Ambassador McFarlane is back here. We've reached a certain point in developments in Lebanon: that is to say the agreement on the ceasefire and the formation of the various committees trying to move forward on both the ceasefire consolidation front and the reconciliation front, so it is an appropriate time to look at where we are and where we should be going.

But I don't have any conclusions to offer you or any broad judgments to offer you. I would refer you back to what John said about the type of review it is, keeping it in small case rather than upper case.

Q Is there not a specific meeting called for tomorrow to look at it at the National Security level?

A I don't have anything on meetings. I don't address meetings at the National Security level from here. I'm sure there have been meetings and there will be further meetings. The Middle East is an area of major interest to us, and it would be quite natural that there would be reviews at a higher level.

Q Alan, are any of the members of the party that was traveling with Ambassador McFarlane still in the Middle East, or is everybody back here?

A Oh, no. There are various people who have stayed out there. Of course, Ambassador Fairbanks is out there and others. I don't have names of people to offer you at this point. But the question suggests, has the McFarlane mission been pulled back, and the answer to that is no.

Q To come back to the Marines just for a second, will the latest casualties force any reconsideration toward a decision to pull the Marines out of Lebanon?

A No. And I refer you to what Larry Speakes said about that this morning.

Excuse me: To go back onto the housekeeping chores, on Mr. Packard's press conference, it will be at 12:45 here tomorrow, ON THE RECORD.

Q Could you say what mandate that Commission has?

A I prefer not to try to go into all of that. I think that when it was announced -- and we can probably help you get that out, George -- there was a fair amount of material; and I'm sure that Mr. Packard will have that. I just don't happen to have that with me at this point.

Q On the housekeeping announcement, the time 12:45, does that then mean that it is now firm that the other briefing will be at 4 p.m.?

A No, it doesn't.

(Laughter)

Q I'm trying to save you a little work.

A I understand that, Jim. I think that the answer is that it is going to be at 4, but I don't want to commit until John is back, and he is going to be doing this.

Q Before you go to that, one more question: How do you characterize the quality of the communication between Mr. McFarlane's mission, which as you say is essentially still in the Middle East, with the government of President Assad?

Are their lines of communication open? What is the quality of that communication? How often is there communication? Can you characterize it?

A No, I'm not going to try to characterize that. As the U.S. Government, we have had and are having various sorts of communication with the various parties, including the Government of Syria, and part of that includes, as I said before, normal diplomatic channels; others include visits; but I'm not going to get into the details of it.

Q Are you concerned about increased reports of defections from the Lebanese army by different factions such as the Shi'ites or the Druze? And would that not be undermining some of the efforts of Mr. McFarlane and his assistants?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Nothing new?

A No.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Grenada?

A I don't have a lot, really, for you on Grenada. The situation remains fluid. At this point, it's unclear who is in charge. The military seems to be exerting an increasing amount of power. But as you know, foreign journalists continue to be barred from the island, and news reports, therefore, are sketchy and incomplete.

That's really all I've got on it.

Q You mention that the military seem to be increasingly in charge, Alan. Reportedly, the head of the military is also the country's ambassador to Cuba.

A You've exhausted my guidance on this subject, so --

Q O.K.

A -- you can press, but I think that --

Q Alan, what's your analysis of the meeting over the weekend between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Genscher?

A Don't have an assessment to give you on that, Barry. I think we certainly will be talking with the Germans about it, but I don't have an assessment to give you on that.

Q Do you have any more clear idea as to what the Russians are going to do? Have you heard from the Germans on that score?

A I have not seen a readout yet of it, so I can't answer that question in specific terms. I think that that has not yet arrived here.

Q Are the plans for McFarlane's return to the Middle East still on or have they changed?

A I think you're asking me another question.

Q Yes.

A I have no idea what his specific plans are. I don't know that he had a specific timetable for returning to the Middle East, and I don't have any information on that.

Q Has the Department had any signs of anger or displeasure from Ambassador Kirkpatrick about the recent job descriptions and changes around this place?

A I'm not aware of any, Jim.

(Laughter)

Q What are the chances of a Motley briefing?

A We're looking into that, and we'll let you know whether and when we can set something up on that.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports about the Nicaraguan oil depot raid last week and U.S. involvement in that?

A Well, --

Q Do you have any comment on the Nicaraguan protests of that raid?

A I think we had some guidance on this, actually -- Didn't we, at the end of last week? I think there may have been.

In any case, there may have been some guidance on the protests. As far as any involvement is concerned, obviously, that gets us into an area of alleged intelligence operations, and I couldn't do that.

Q What about the action itself, Alan? Do you have any comment with respect to that kind of action?

A I don't have any comment.

Q Alan, reports of the NSC notwithstanding, what are the chances of getting a backgrounder from McFarlane? You mentioned, or rather we had asked John, I think, last week.

A John said that he would put that forward. I don't have anything new to report back to you on that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Briefing concluded at 12:36 p.m.)

Becker/Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday October 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #183

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1983, 12:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I just want you to know that I am now one of the world's leading experts on fish, and ready to take any fish questions.

Q Smoked salmon?

A Smoked Salmon. I'm really up on smoked salmon. (Laughter)

A couple of reminders: Available in the Press Office are copies of the testimony given at 10 o'clock this morning by Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, before the House Committee on Agriculture. The subject of his testimony was Agricultural Export Promotion and Trade.

Also, a reminder that right after this briefing, at 12:45 today, there will be an ON-THE-RECORD press conference by David Packard, U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Advisory Commission, regarding the first report of the Commission to the President and to the Japanese Prime Minister. As I say, that will take place right after this briefing at around 12:45, but the press conference is embargoed until 2:00 this afternoon.

Then, at 2:30 over at the White House, there will be a BACKGROUNDER by a senior State Department official on Prime Minister Craxi's visit. I think that was already announced, but that's just a reminder.

I don't have very much, but I'll be happy to --

Q Do you have confirmation now of what the Soviet General said in this German magazine interview, that there are Soviet nuclear weapons stationed outside of the Soviet Union?

A I think we might have some words for you a little later in the morning, Jim, but as an interim comment, nothing very new in what is being suggested here. We have long been aware of the capacity of the Soviet Union to target the United States and direct missiles here in a matter of minutes -- just with seaborne capacity alone. But I think a little later in the morning, we will have some more formal words for you.

But initially, I don't find anything terribly revealing in what he is saying.

Q You're talking about Eastern Europe, right?

A Yes. That's also been well known, their capacity in Eastern Europe.

Q Are you including in that, SS-20s?

A Why don't we wait until we give you the words that we will in a few minutes.

Q What is the form? Do you expect this is going to be a posting, or what? What do you plan?

A We can post it, yes. It's simply that we're a little tardy on producing the guidance.

Q John, I have a follow-up on that, if I may. Do we perceive his statement to the German magazine as just another part of the ongoing propaganda campaign, or is it something special?

A I think clearly the Soviets are in a war of nerves with us. I think they are aware of the determination of the Allies to proceed with the NATO dual-track decision and in the absence of an agreement, to deply. That's all going forward.

So I assume that they are -- not assume, we know -- that they are resorting to a variety of means to try to shake the Allies.

Q Do you see the Russian General's statement as being a declaration of his own views or a reflection of the Politburo?

A I think the President addressed that yesterday.

Q Do you have anything further today about the identity of the snipers who were firing at the Marines?

A No, we really don't. It is very difficult to determine the identity, you know, of several individuals who are firing at the Marines, so we don't have anything on the identity.

Don't rule out -- I mean, we've seen a variety of suggestions -- don't rule out those, but we do not have proof of the identify of those actually firing.

Q I think it was the Lebanese Radio who said that a description by the Marines coincided with the uniforms of the PFLP.

A I can't confirm it, but certainly don't rule it out.

Q Do you have anything further you can say regarding the United States position in the Iran-Iraq war? Has the United States departed from its position of neutrality in that war? Does it plan to take some new action with regard to that war?

A No. I'd like you to go back to the Secretary's exact words on the aircraft yesterday coming back from Halifax. But as he said at the time, there is no change in our policy on the Iran-Iraq war, which is neutrality. Obviously, we have given a lot of thought to this question over the months and indeed years, and we are concerned should there be any interruption of traffic in the Gulf as has been made well known, and we continue to consider the implications of what is going on there, but there is no change in our policy.

Q But he said this neutrality is conditioned by the flow of oil in the Gulf straites.

A I don't think he said that yesterday.

Q I'm trying to clear up this from you.

A And the question is?

Q If the neutrality of the United States in the strife between Iran and Iraq is conditioned by the _status quo_ in the Gulf area now.

A Well, we have made it clear that we would consider it a matter of great gravity should there be any interruption in international passage through the Gulf, but we haven't said what action we might take.

Q I don't remember his saying that we would remain neutral, and no change in our policy yesterday.

A Then, I guess we will all have to go back to the transcript, Bernie. But there is a transcript.

Q I'm retty sure he did not.

A O.K. But the position is that our policy is unchanged.

Q But you have dropped any protest to the French about the delivery of the jets, assuming they haven't been delivered already?

A I think the Secretary addressed that also yesterday on the plane, and I would refer you to his words.

Q Did that not reflect a change in policy?

A He said the French have made their decision, and I think he left it at that. I prefer you to go back to his exact words.

Q John, a different subject: Can you tell us at this point anything further about McFarlane's plans to return to the Middle East, or anyone else's plans is to return to the Middle East?

A I'm not aware -- I assume Mr. McFarlane is, you know, taking up his new responsibilities; I'm not aware of any plans of his to return to the Middle East. Ambassador Fairbanks, of course, is on the scene, and continues with the kind of activity in which he has participated all along when Mr. McFarlane was there too.

Q Has any decision been made today about the future of the efforts to revive the President's September first initiative?

A Well, I don't think we would have any comment on that.

Q Are you saying, John, that Fairbanks would be now the top official?

A No. What I'm saying is Ambassador Fairbanks is there, that the question of a Middle East negotiator -- That is a Presidential appointment, and I'm sure when the President has made up his mind who should fill that position, he will announce it.

Q You are of the understanding that there would be an appointment (inaudible) --

A I would assume so. I would assume so.

Q John, has the review on the Middle East been concluded over at the White House now or is that an all-day business or --

A I think that we'll let the White House address that, Bob.

Q Are you expecting them to say anything about that today?

A I think that's up to them. That's their call.

Q I mean, they haven't told you.

A No, they have not.

Q Do you have anything on the general review of the middle eastern situation?

A That's sort of what we were talking about here. I think we would leave to the White House any discussions that the President might be having on that subject.

Q Do you have any clearer picture now what happened in Grenada?

A No. We really don't. The situation still seems to be pretty fluid, Jim. It's still unclear who is in charge. The reports that we have are sketchy and incomplete. We're watching the situation carefully but don't have much in the way of confirmed information. I pass on to you, as you know, the United States has no Embassy in Grenada but we cover the island from our Embassy in Bridgetown, Barbados.

Q John, in the past you show some concern with some of the policies of the Government of Grenada.

A Yes.

Q Now that apparently a group that is more closely linked to the Cubans and to Moscow seems to have taken power, does this increase your concern at all?

A Should that be the case, I think it obviously would. But I think we'll wait and see how the developments emerge.

Q Do you have anything on the allegations made apparently by D'Aubuisson with respect to death squads?

A That was, obviously, some kind of disussion that went on with the President's Bipartisan Commission, so I don't really have anything on that. But, as you know, we're on record as deploring these atrocities in the strongest terms. The Salvadoran Government, through the Political

Commission and Armed Forces spokesman condemned these activities in categoric terms.

Political violence in all its manifestations continues to be an extremely serious problem. It's seriousness is recognized by the Government of El Salvador and those moderate groups who have accepted the risks of supporting democratic reforms within that country.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q If I could just follow. The principle twist in this latest story was that D'Aubuisson, as a senior member of the government, was saying that the military is responsible and that these death squads do operate there. Is that the position of the U.S. Government?

A As I say, his remarks that he made to the Kissinger Commission, we haven't seen them yet. But our feeling about death squads is very obvious.

Q That's not my question, though. I know that we deplore the death squad activity. What I'm asking is whom do we consider --

A Are we able to confirm that they're run by the army? No.

Q No. Whom do we consider to be responsible for participating in this activity?

A I can't answer that, Jim.

Q Were you surprised when he said that the death squads are formed by people that are members of the armed forces?

A I don't know what reaction there was in the Department.

Q The New York Times front page story about massacres in Lebanon, what do you have on that for us today, if anything?

A We've persistently deplored massacres. And I guess what I would really do is refer you to our previous statement on that, a copy of which we have in the Press Office.

Q Do you have anything further on -- in terms of updating numbers?

A No.

Q John, back on those death squads for just a second. Is that statement that you just read something which Secretary Shultz will be featuring or repeating when he meets with President Magana next week, or would that be considered preaching to the converted, or --

A I don't know what he will raise, but it seems to me extremely likely that the whole question of human rights will be a topic of discussion.

Q Back to the Middle East. There is a report yesterday in the New York Times about Saudi Arabia's treatment of U.S. citizens in Saudi jails. Do you have anything on it?

A Yes, I think there was some guidance on that yesterday that the Press Office can produce for you.

Q Is the Chadian Foreign Minister's visit to Washington now, does Secretary Shultz plan to meet with him for discussions --

A I'm sorry, I missed the country. Who's country?

Q The Chadian Foreign Minister's visit to Washington.

A I'm not aware of any plans. I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q Can you take the question?

A Sure; take a look at it for you.

Q Back to Salvador for a while. There have been in the last few days rumors of coup d'etat and unrest within the armed forces in Bolivia. How is the U.S. following this, the democratic process in that country, and what kind of initiative, if any, is the U.S. taking to support that process?

A I don't have anything on that. I'll be glad to look and see whether we did, in fact, do anything within the past couple days, but I don't have anything on it.

Q Mr. Oberdorfer has a statement to make.

A   A statement to make? (Laughter)

Q   This is a straight question this time. The Burmese Government, or at least the Burmese state radio has now said that Koreans are responsible for the bombings, the killing of their Korean Cabinet officers. Do you have any information on it, or do you have any comment on it.

A   The United States welcomes the report as an indication that the Burmese Government is investigating the circumstances of the October 9 atrocity in a careful, objective and independent manner.

We assume that when their investigation is completed, the Burmese will make full, public disclosure of all relevant facts.

Q   At one stage the United States offered to be helpful or to assist in the investigation. Has that offer been taken up in any way?

A   That's right, and somebody else asked that last week and I said we would look into it, and therefore I'm sure we did but I don't know what the response is, but we'll get back to you.

Q   Will you find out?

A   Yes, I'm sure.

Q   Another question regarding that general area of the world. In addition to its political turbulence, which seems to be continuing, the Philippines now is in more serious economic difficulties, having to halt payments on its debt, and so on. Do you have any comment on the situation as it exists in the Philippines, or the other turbulence which continues against the Marcos Government?

A   Not insofar as the economy is concerned. Insofar as changes in the electoral code are concerned, we have seen those reports as well as the reports that the opposition has rejected them.

As we've noted previously, we hope that acceptable ground rules can be worked out by Philippine political leaders so that all legitimate political groups will find it in their interests to participate in the electoral process. As we've stated before, the United States supports free elections in the Philippines.

Q On that same subject, on the denunciation by the opposition as to the latest formula for the composition of the Commission looking into Aquino's death, do you have any statement on that?

A Nothing beyond what we've said before, except our continued interest in the outcome of the investigation.

Q I've got a question here. In the espionage case which came up in California, an engineer is alleged to have passed a lot of secrets to some Polish intelligence people. Has anybody been expelled from the Polish (inaudible) staff as a result of that?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q John, in her statement yesterday, Mrs. Kirkpatrick said that she was committed to remaining in her present job until the end of the General Assembly. Do you and the Secretary take that as an implicit resignation, and what's your reaction to it?

A I don't think that the Secretary has had any comment on that. As you know, it's a Presidential appointment. That's a Cabinet-rank appointment, so I think that any comment that Mrs. Kirkpatrick might have in that regard would go to the President, and he would have any reaction or non-reaction.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:22 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #184

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. At 4:00 this afternoon, here in the Briefing Room, there will be a Press Conference announcing a trilateral agreement for cooperation in the development of automated systems and exchange of information about new technology among the European, Japanese and U.S. Patent Offices. The heads of the three offices will be on hand to answer questions. They're Gerald Mossinghoff, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks; J.B. Van Bentham, President of the European Patent Office; and Kazuo Wakasugi, the Director General of the Japanese Patent Office.

Also available in the Press Office at 2:00 is the testimony of William Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. That testimony was before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, and on Asian and Pacific Affairs. The subject is the Soviet role in Asia.

We are trying to set-up a BACKGROUND briefing on the Secretary's trip to El Salvador and Brazil next week. The most likely day is this Friday, and we hope to be able to give you an exact time by tomorrow's noon briefing. But as there was obvious interest in this, we wanted you to know that a BACKGROUNDER is in the works.

Finally, a statement on the possibility of a challenge to Isralei credentials at the United Nations. The Credentials Committee of the U.N. General Assembly makes its report to the Assembly tomorrow. Last year, a challenge was made to Israel's credentials. We do not yet know whether any delegation will attempt similar action tomorrow, but if this occurs, the United States will oppose it with all available diplomatic resources.

The United States has always made clear that any attack on Israel's right to participate in any United Nations organization, if successful, would have grave consequences for our own continued participation and support.

As Secretary Shultz stated on October 16, 1982, if Israel were excluded from the General Assembly, the United States would withdraw from participation in the General

Assembly and would withhold payments to the United Nations until Israel's right to participate was restored.

This policy reflects the strong sentiment of all elements of the United States Government, and the Congress expressed the same sentiment in a concurrent resolution last December.

Q Copy?

A Sure. That's all I have for you. Happy to take your questions.

Q Can you tell us how you see the situation developing in Lebanon? Particularly, do you think that a useful national dialogue can take place without the participation of the Druze, for example?

A The parties are still working on that question of the national reconciliation process, and conference, and obviously we hope that all the parties will participate.

Insofar as the situation on the ground is concerned, clearly, there are problems. We are concerned about them. The Lebanese Army positions at Suq el-Gharb came under heavy fire last night. That was mortar fire, artillery fire, and some indications of a ground assault which was beaten back by the Lebanese Army.

There were also reports of fighting near Khalde. Today, there are reports of renewed shooting in southern Beirut. U.S. Marines did not report any incidents throughout the day, but at the end of the day we did see this late report of a car bomb explosion and the possibility that two Marines were injured. I don't have anything more on that.

Q A car bomb?

A A car bomb exploded, apparently, in southern Beirut. But, nevertheless, the parties involved in the diplomatic front continue to work at the reconciliation process and the establishing of a suitable venue for the Reconciliation Committee to meet.

Q You mean, the earlier agreement to meet at the airport is no longer in place?

A The parties involved are discussing the venue. Insofar as the airport is concerned, if the National

Reconciliation Committee meets at the airport, the MNF, obviously, would be involved in offering security, but we have to wait and see how those talks about a venue proceed. They are up in the air.

Q Can I repeat the one part of the question which you didn't answer? Do you think that useful, meaningful negotiations can take place without the participation of some of the elements, such as the Druze?

A It's hard for us to dictate the form of those discussions. The Lebanese are, themselves, involved in that process, and I think they have to make their own decisions and accommodations.

Q Have any decisions been made to improve the security situation for the Marines, such as new rules of engagement regarding the use of the Sixth Fleet, *et cetera*?

A We obviously will defend our Marines, and I think there has been some suggestion that the Pentagon is looking at rules of engagement, but I'd have to refer you to them, the Pentagon.

Q Any comment on the *Washington Post* report that the White House now believes Syria is not interested in peace talks in Lebanon?

A I think there are certainly questions arising, Bill, about serious behavior and intentions, but the fact of the matter is that the United States has heard nothing from the Syrian Government to indicate that it is backing away from the commitments it has made under the ceasefire agreement.

Q What about the renewed fire? Isn't it seen to some degree as being instigated by the Syrians?

A It's always difficult to pinpoint the source of fire. I think there isn't any question that some of that fire is coming from areas under Syrian control. As I said, Bernie, I think that's one of the factors that raises questions about Syria's role. But the fact is that the Syrian Government has made certain commitments and we have not heard any suggestion from the Syrian Government that they're backing away from those.

Q Of course, what they're arguing about now is some things that were not really decided in the ceasefire agreement. That is to say, exactly where these meetings were going to take place, under what detailed circumstances.

So even without going back on the agreement, would you say that Syria is being helpful or doing its share regarding the unsettled matters that were--are under contention at the present time?

A It's awfully difficult to characterize their actions in a situation like this, where you have a lot of turbulence, you have a lot of gunfire, but cannot pinpoint exactly what guns that it's coming from.

Syria certainly was a key player in the arrangements that were worked out for a ceasefire, and the steps that will be taken thereafter. We have to call upon them to come through and honor their commitment.

Q Have we renewed a call to them in the past 24 or 48 hours to honor those commitments?

A I think there are regular diplomatic consultations going on with Syria and with others involved in this process. They're close and fairly constant, I would say.

Q Could you just itemize what the commitments are? I don't have those clearly.

A I don't know, Bernie, that it's a question so much of looking at a piece of paper and itemizing commitments. The fact is that Syria was involved in those discussions, and whether those agreements are spelled out or tacit, there isn't any question that Syria has been a principal player in bringing these arrangements to a conclusion -- the ceasefire, the establishment of the Security Committee, and the decision to go forward with the Reconciliation Committee.

Q If I may just follow up. If you're now calling upon them, as you have just done, to come through and honor those commitments, the implication is that they are trying to undermine and sabotage them, however you choose to describe that. Is that the fact? You're just sort of raising questions that hang in mid-air; can you be more specific?

A No. I think the two statements are not contradictory. I think that as one looks at the situation in Lebanon, clearly, questions are arising in the minds of some people about Syria's intentions.

Having said all that, in terms of our official relationship with Syria and the Syrian Government, we have not had any indication that they're backing away from the understandings and commitments that were agreed upon, so we will hold them to those.

Q A follow-up to that. There have been press reports that in this White House Mideast review, one thing that has been decided to counter Syrian intransigence is to strongly increase the collaboration, political and military collaboration, with Israel. Is there anything on that?

A I think the discussions that surround the "review", as it has come to be called, are going forward, and there were discussions yesterday, and I think they are still going on. So I think that I probably will not get into how those discussions are going or what recommendations might be being considered.

Q How long will it go on then, John?

A I don't know.

Q It could be the rest of this week, the balance of this --

A I honestly don't know how long further discussion would take.

Q Who are the participants now?

A I think the obvious participants are the State Department and other interested and involved agencies of the government.

Q Are we any closer to a decision on a replacement for McFarlane?

A I don't know. The President will make that announcement when he's ready, Barrie, I'm sure.

Q On Lebanon, specifically. What happens if this dialogue on national reconciliation does not take place? Is that the end of Lebanon?

A Oh, I don't know it's the end of Lebanon. Certainly, the reconciliation process is something that we believe in very strongly. We think that the various parties who have been overtaken by violence and bloodshed, who are getting people killed in Lebanon, certainly should have an interest in moving this process forward, and we're continuing to work along those lines to be helpful wherever we can to bring them to the table. Certainly, that is a much better prospect than the kind of violence and loss of life that one sees in the country at the moment, which has been overtaken by so much already.

--MORE--

Q In the case of Syria, which is not losing any people, what incentives are you giving for the Syrians to cooperate?

A I think a stable Lebanon is in the interest of most governments in the region.

Q Except Syria.

Q John, has the United States reemphasized to the government of President Gemayel our profound concern that he widen the participation in his government to include all these diverse elements? Have we reemphasized that lately?

A I don't know that there has been need to reemphasize it because he has been working in that direction all along, as we have. I don't know that there has been a need to reemphasize it. He's been working vigorously.

Q He characterized to Flora Lewis the National Reconciliation Conference as a "camouflage."

A As you recall, at the time I declined to comment on that particular press report, and there was a lot of back and forth after it, including some statements by President Gemayel and the Lebanese Embassy here clarifying those alleged statements.

Q I might follow on this, because there are press reports that not President Gemayel, that Pierre Gemayel, his father, and Camille Chamoun, who is also a Christian leader, that they are also opposing the idea of power sharing or reconciliation, national reconciliation.

Also, even, there was a report that if national reconciliation will come about, or power-sharing, some elements in Lebanon are ready to have a coup d'etat against Amin Gemayel. What do you comment on such reports?

A Don't have any comment.

Q Do you have any ironclad commitment from Gemayel, the father, or Camille Chamoun, or the other factions besides the President, that they will share power and that they will abide by the National Reconciliation Conference, whatever it is?

A No, I don't have anything on talks that we might have had over the months with various political leaders in Lebanon. The fact is that the President of the legitimate government of Lebanon has been moving in this direction, and there are many indications of his sincerity and the vigor with which he has moved on this front.

Q John, have there been any contacts with Jumblatt or any of his people, not necessarily just with the Syrians but with the other sub-groups that are supposed to take place in that National Reconciliation Conference?

A I don't think that we would get into the details, but I think you can rest assured that we're involved and have had discussions with many of the political players in Lebanon.

Q Where is Fairbanks today?

A Fairbanks was to be in Jerusalem, and may be by now. I'm not quite sure of his location as we speak, but he was to have gone to Israel today.

Q John, on the difficulties of Syria that you said there are some questions about, the way we understand it, the difficulty of gathering the parties to the national reconciliation is a site where they would meet.

Has the United States recommended any sites other than the national airport, which the Druze -- not the Syrians -- are the party that opposes it?

What I'm saying is, has the United States proposed any sites for the national reconciliation, if this is the problem with gathering them?

A I'm sure we've been involved in the sense of being helpful to moving the process forward; I'm sure we have been involved in discussion about sites. But as to whether we have specifically recommended sites, I don't think so. I think our role would be simply to be helpful in getting everybody to agree on a site, and making sure that that is a site that provides security for everybody.

Q If the meeting is to be held at the airport, is the United States, in fact, taking on the responsibility for the security of it? I mean, obviously, the Marines are there, but would they be the responsible parties for security?

A I think the MNF would be responsible for security, or would be involved in providing security.

Q John, may I ask you on the statement that you made before, I understand that it is kind of an ironclad rule here for you to not to answer "if" questions. You told us that you don't know if any party was about to challenge Israel's credentials, yet you gave a very serious statement.

A Uh-huh.

Q How are we to read that, in light of the fact that you usually you don't answer "if" questions?

A Well, it's a restatement of our position last year -- and indeed our position as it has existed over the years -- that we consider this question of non-discrimination in terms of credentials a very important one. And we are just making sure that everyone understands how seriously we consider that issue -- we take that issue. But we do not know whether there will be a specific challenge. We thought it might be useful to --

Q Does that amount to a warning?

A I don't know that I would characterize it as a warning; I think we are just underlining the seriousness with which we approach this question.

Q John, since you don't make the same warning about South Africa, for example, I presume you are not opposed to the process of the challenging of credentials.

A I'm sure that the principles that underline our position are constant, Jim.

Q Well, no. It's a serious question. You don't object to that process, the legitimacy of the process of challenging credentials in the General Assembly?

A The legitimacy of the process: I think I would let our legal people respond to that phrase.

Q Well, I'm --

A If you mean is our principle constant, the answer to that is yes, but --

Q I'm drawing the inference from the fact that you don't make the same warning when South Africa is challenged and expelled.

A Well, let me go back and look at our position on South Africa and what we have done in the past.

Q John, on this matter, I think last week, in Geneva, the United States already issued a warning that if the credentials of Israel in the International Atomic Energy will be challenged or will be withdrawn, that you will follow suit the same way almost--

A I'm not personally aware we issued that statement, but our position would be the same.

Q My question is, since you condemned the Israeli bombing and the destruction of the Iraqi atomic reactor -- the United States condemned that -

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and the whole thing was related to an ironclad commitment from Israel that this would not be repeated. I think it was shown that you almost departed from your initial position in the matter of the atomic reactor by espousing the position that you made, which amounted to a threat that you will withdraw and cut your participation in that.

How do you interpret this? How do you explain this position?

A I'm not sure that I see a contradiction in taking a position on the actions of member nations of the U.N., but upholding their right to membership.

Q Well, anybody who violates what you just said -- you condemned this attack, and the action which was requested by the international community and Arab countries was to bring about Israel to commit itself, and the Third World countries not to repeat this -- another Third World country or Arab country, to bomb their reactor.

You came about and you said that you would withdraw and you would cut finances to this agency if Israel would be challenged, their credentials. And there were other --

A If it would be successfully challenged, yes.

Q Yes. Does this sound to you that this is, I mean, legal from the point of your vote at the United Nations of condemning Israel --

A The answer to your question is yes, it does sound to us that that is legal.

Q John, does the United States believe that the Reconciliation Conference in Lebanon would be speeded up, to say the least, if President Hafiz al-Assad gave his blessing to the participation of those whom he supports?

A I think we've gone through a long process where the Syrians and others have been involved in making their views known and in supporting reconciliation.

We presume that those declarations are still valid.

Q You would like Assad to restate them publicly?

A I'm sure that would be pleasant, but I mean, we're not asking for that specifically to be done.

Q Or at least to tell the Druze to go ahead and do it, and sit down at the table?

A I think all, you know -- various participants are talking to various parties and making their positions known.

Q Change of subject?

A Sure.

Q There is a long article today in the New York Times with respect to the drought situation in Africa. Is the United States considering taking any emergency action beyond that which it has already announced?

A I think I'll refer you to AID on that. I know that that is the place where consideration is being given to that particular problem.

Q Also, with respect to the expected vote tomorrow on an aid cutoff to anti-Sandinista forces, Congressmen Wright and O'Neill have charged that the United States Government is seeking the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government? Do you have any reply?

A No. We would respond to that in the same way we have in the past. I think Secretary Shultz has sent a letter to a number of Congressmen in connection with that, and we would be happy to make that available to you in the Press Office.

Q A letter with respect to the upcoming vote, or to the question of the vote itself?

A To the vote, to the vote.

Q Could we get that?

A Sure, sure.

Q And finally, with respect to --

A Nothing new on Grenada, no. We're obviously watching the situation, but nothing beyond where we were yesterday.

Q On the review which is going now on in the White House, I believe there was talk about the possible participation of King Hussein in the peace process. What are the incentives the U.S. Government is giving or promising -- promises -- to King Hussein that if he will "come aboard," that something might materialize, such as the freezing of settlements and other things.

A The same as we have all along -- peace.

Q Were you able to get an answer to my question regarding whether any of the parties out there in Burma had availed themselves on the -- to the U.S. --

A Pursued it vigorously, and we did not; but we will try to get it later in the day.

Q John, one other on Nicaragua: the principal leader of the FDN, the main Honduras-based group, said yesterday that if the Congress did cut off, that he was sure that the money, or funding, or support, would be "washed" through other channels.

Do you have any comment on that?

A No. It's an unusual statement. The United States has done and will stand by its constitutional and legal obligations and commitments.

Q John, have you been able to make up your mind what are the effects of this coup in Grenada?

A No. Still looking at it.

(The briefing concluded at 12:53 P.M.)

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Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #185

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1983, 12:21
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. Just a housekeeping announcement on Prime Minister Craxi's visit. After the meeting today between Prime Minister Craxi and President Reagan, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the visit. It will be in the White House briefing room at about 1:30. For your information, and not for publication, the briefer will be Ty Cobb, senior member of the NSC staff for European Affairs.

That's all I have for you.

Q ·What can you tell us about the situation in Grenada?

A The situation in Grenada?

Q Is it Grenada or Grenada?

A Grenada is the way I was asked. Based upon news reports from the area and principally the official broadcasts of Radio Free Grenada, we are assuming that Grenadan Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was killed in the violence which erupted yesterday. Diplomatic relations, as you know, with Grenada are conducted from our Embassy in Bridgetown, Barbados; and that presents, even under the best of circumstances, communications problems, but especially under these circumstances. The telephone communication has frequently been disrupted, and a number of regularly scheduled air flights to Grenada have been turned back.

The Radio Free Grenada's announcement of Prime Minister Bishop's death also announced a 24-hour curfew, which is in effect through 6 a.m. on Monday and also announced was the warning that anybody out of their houses will be shot on sight. This obviously raises our concern about American nationals in Grenada.

The most recent Radio Free Grenada announcements have been made in the name of the armed forces, but apart from accepting the assertion that the military is currently ruling the country through a revolutionary council, we are in no position to make any comment on the current state of affairs or the likely outcome.

We are continuing to monitor developments there. The number of U.S. citizens in Grenada is somewhere between 800 and 1,000. Prior to the recent outbreak of violence, we had communicated our concerns about U.S. citizen welfare to Grenadan authorities, and as I say, we are obviously monitoring events with particular care in this regard.

I think that's really about all I have for you.

Q Do you think that the U.S. policy which isolated the Bishop government economically and politically, or tried to do so, had anything to do with leading to his overthrow?

A No, I don't think U.S. policy had anything to do with recent developments.

Q John, in a more general way, how would this Administration view political murder as a route to power in the Caribbean, especially by pro-Cuban forces?

A I think we have to be careful here, Bill. We have to know what we're dealing with -- it's basically radio reports from a regime that has announced it has taken over; and I think we need to have some first-hand reports of what has happened ourselves before we start making either judgments or analyses.

Q How do we get those first-hand reports?

A I think we'll leave it that we are trying to get better information than we presently have.

Q John, have you talked to the missions they have here? They have an OAS mission.

A I don't know. There is, obviously, a lot going on in connection with Grenada today on our part. There were meetings in the Department last night; there are meetings during the day. I don't know what kind of contact --

Q Did the Secretary participate in those meetings?

A Yes.

Q Is that to understand that the Bishop killing, you can confirm that or are you just quoting the radio?

A We're quoting the radio, and so far as we know, what the radio is saying seems to be the case.

Q Have you tried to establish diplomatic contact with the Government of Grenada -- diplomatic contact?

A I think we're just going to leave it where we are, and give you the indication of the problems we have with communications, but not get into the diplomatic back and forth that is going on.

Q Can you say at this time whether we have received any assurances from the current authorities in Grenada about the safety of American nationals?

A Not in the present confused situation. We have not received assurances, to my knowledge.

Q Have we asked for them?

A We are certainly seeking assurances about the safety of U.S. citizens.

Q You said that prior to the outbreak of violence, there had been a communication from the U.S. Government to the Grenadian authorities about the welfare of Americans. Can you say when that was?

A I can't say. I think that was fairly recent. Obviously, this has been developing within the past few days. I can't say when that came --

Q Would you say within the past several days or some weeks ago?

A No, I think it's within the past several days.

Q What was it that brought that concern here?

A Well, there has been some turbulence there for the past several days.

Q The British Government has official representation there. Can anything be learned from that?

A I am sure that many channels of communication are being worked by us.

Q Is the military government that has apparently taken over a more hard-line Marxist government than Bishop?

A We'll have to wait and see. As I say, it's premature for that kind of analysis.

Q Did we make a mistake, though, in retrospect in not being more open to Bishop when he was here before the OAS, and wanted to meet and wanted to talk? Was that now a mistake, in retrospect?

A You mean, we were too open?

Q He wanted to meet with the President and he wanted to, discuss relations between the two countries, and we put him off at the time.

A I'm not sure that statement is correct. I'd like to go back over the sequence of events; but as I recall the situation, I think we set up a meeting, and the Prime Minister did not appear for that --

Q The President wouldn't meet with him.

A The President -- I don't think there was any suggestion the President would meet with him.

There was a meeting with Middendorf, and I'm not sure Judge Clark -- Let me go back over the sequence, but certainly, there was a lot of activity on our side in order to bring about contact and dialogue there. There was no --

Q President Reagan turned down a meeting with him?

A There was never any suggestion that the President would meet with Mr. Bishop. There was never any suggestion on our side.

Q Yes, but wasn't it the case that Bishop himself requested a meeting with the President, and that that was turned down?

A He may have done.

Q Then, just for the record, did he meet with Judge Clark and Under Secretary Dam?

A My own memory plagues me I'd like to be sure whom he asked to see, and who he did see and did not see. But, certainly, there was not a reluctance on our part to have him see officials in the Administration.

Q Are you taking that question, John?

A Yes, I will take it.

Q Also, the Barbadian Prime Minister, Tom Adams, today said that they had fears since last week that Bishop's life could have been in danger. Did you receive any of those reports, and are you in touch with the Barbadian Government over this?

A I don't know whether we're in -- As I say, we're working many channels on this, Jim; but I'm also not aware of any reports earlier.

Q John, in connection with President Reagan's expressed concern about the 10,000 foot runway in Grenada, is the United States any more or less concerned now about the presence of that runway or the use to which it might be put?

A Why don't we wait and see what kind of regime emerges?

Q On a related matter, can you tell us whether Father D'Escoto, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, is coming here today to see either the Secretary or Mr. Motley, or someone high in the Government?

A He is not coming to see the Secretary, but he is going to see Mr. Motley, or he is scheduled to see Mr. Motley. I don't just know what time, but certainly that is the plan.

Q And what is the understanding on the Department's part about what this is about? Are you anticipating some new proposals from the Nicaraguans, or what?

A I've seen some suggestions that Nicaragua has some proposals; we have not seen those yet. If this meeting takes place with Mr. Motley, perhaps we will have a better idea after that.

Q Is it expected this morning or this afternoon?

A I think it was expected late this morning, but I'm not just sure what time.

Q John, on that precise issue, I'm very confused by this turn of events. On the basis of the briefing received from a senior official who briefed us on Secretary Motley's trip down there last week, on the one hand, the official seemed to dismiss any possibility of negotiations -- direct -- between the United States and Nicaragua, referring them instead to regional negotiations under the Contadora Group, in which the United States would not take part.

But he also indicated that he wouldn't be adverse to continuing visits to the area, back and forth, but again stressed there would be no negotiations between the two. Now, we hear that the Nicaraguans may be actually proposing something for the United States --

A Well, we hear from the press. I was asked whether I knew anything about it. I read in this morning's papers that there is a proposal.

Q I just wonder if you could get a clarification of this question: Is the United States prepared to enter into direct negotiations over bilateral and regional differences between it and Nicaragua, or are all such differences to be undertaken exclusively under the Contadora Group?

A I'm not going to play on words with negotiations. The fact is that Assistant Secretary Motley met with a number of officials in Nicaragua, and the fact is that this particular official has asked to see Mr. Motley, and Mr. Motley has said, yes, he will see him. That meeting is, presumably, going to take place.

Q Has the meeting begun, John?

A I don't know, Barrie. I think it was scheduled for late morning, but there was some confusion about the actual meeting time.

Q John, how does this impinge on the activity in the House today, on Nicaragua? Do you see any connection?

A I don't see how it impinges. We have a request from this gentleman to see Mr. Motley, and he is going to see him.

Q What is Stone doing these days?

A I think Stone is still in Europe -- I think.

Q Does he have any plans now to return to Central America that you're aware of?

A I don't have anything on his travel plans, Jim.

Q New subject, John?

A Sure.

Q President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria is quoted widely in the press today in response to President Reagan's remarks last night, as saying, "No compromise on Lebanon is possible with the United States," and he goes on -- I won't bore you. Anything --

A No, I don't think -- I'm not sure you're correct in saying that he spoke after the President. I think his remarks were, in fact, made before the President's press conference.

-- MORE --

Q Well, maybe he knew what the President would say. (Laughter.)

A But no, we don't have any response on that.

Q John, the Syrian Ambassador was visiting this building this morning. Do you have any information about the object of this visit?

A I don't, no; I'm sorry. I don't.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Schultz' meeting last night with Ambassador Rosenne?

A No, I don't, Bernie.

I can clear up the question of Mr. Bishop's earlier meeting. He did meet with Acting Secretary Dam, which we said at the time, and he did meet with the National Security Adviser Judge Clark.

Q Do you have a date on that, perhaps?

A The date of the guidance was June 8. The meeting was requested by Prime Minister Bishop, with a duration of about an hour. The guidance does not say -

MR. ROMBERG: It was the day before.

A The day before, is it? O.K., then it would be June 8th.

Q June 7th?

A June 7th. June 8th was the guidance, and June 7th apparently would be the meeting.

Q Could I just follow with one other question on --

A Yes, O.K. He's talking about yesterday, so it would be June 7th.

Q There's a regional --

A So I think that responds to your question about any reluctance on the part of the United States to meet with him.

CONT

Q The United States helped establish a regional kind of defense grouping of the eastern Caribbean states, the smaller ones, headquartered in Bridgetown, in Barbados. There were reports yesterday that they were meeting. Now, has the United States been in consultation in the last 24-48 hours, say, with respect to any role it might play insofar as the regional defense group is concerned?

A I don't know. I can't answer that, Jim. I honestly don't know.

Q The Brazilian Government just took some emergency measures in its capital -- Brasilia -- yesterday regarding the approval of a new wage-increase law.

A Yes.

Q It was defeated in Congress. And it's part of a big financial package that's been supported by the United States --

A Yes.

Q -- with the IMF. How does that defeat, and the new emergency measures taken, affect Secretary Shultz' visit?

A Not at all. It doesn't affect it at all.

Q Is he going?

A Sure, yes.

Q John, can I ask back on Syria? Is it the understanding now of the Administration that Syria is foot-dragging or stalling in order to fulfill a "Greater Syria" scheme, as the President said yesterday?

A I think the President's remarks speak for themselves. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Well, I mean, did I understand him well? If I understand what I just said now, will I be correct in assuming so?

A I don't think I will give you my interpretation of your interpretation of what the President said on it. I'll just let you go back to his words.

Q John, have we alerted any naval vessels in the vicinity of Grenada to be prepared possibly to evacuate, anything of that nature?

A Not to my knowledge, but why don't you talk to the Pentagon about our capability in that area?

Q Can you give us a precise number, John, of how many Americans there are in Grenada?

A The figures are a little vague, between 800 and 1000.

Q Most of them --

A About 500 of those, I understand, are at the medical school. I think at St. George's, yes. Five hundred students and faculty, I think.

Q John, do you have any comment on the report yesterday from Jerusalem that Israel asked the United States to restrict flights of the aircraft --

A No, I don't have anything on that; sorry.

Q No comment on that. Do you have any comment on the Pakistani forces using helicopter gunfire against the demonstrations against the government?

A Sorry. The which forces?

Q The Pakistani Government.

A No; no, I don't.

Q John, in New York -- returning to Brazil -- Secretary Shultz said that he was confident that this wage decree would be approved. Secretary Regan said a few weeks ago that he would shudder to think of the future of Brazil if the Brazilian Congess would not vote that wage decree. It was voted down by a majority of the Brazilian Congress. Do you have any comment about it now?

A No. I don't think we would have any comment on what is clearly an internal Brazilian affair, but the Secretary hasn't made any secret of his confidence in Brazil's economic viability and potential.

Q Even after this vote?

A Sure. That confidence remains unimpaired.

Q Anything on yeserday's report in The Washington Post on anti-semitism in Argentina?

A We did have something yesterday on that, Bernie, and I'm sure the Press Office can dig that out for you. I don't happen to have it with me.

Q Is a time fixed for a briefing on the Brazil trip?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes. You've got it on one of those papers I gave you.

A I've got it on one of those papers which I didn't read, apparently.

10:30, tomorrow morning, here in the Briefing Room. And it will be the obvious briefer.

Q John, I didn't hear your response to Roberto's question. You're saying that despite yesterday's vote Secretary Shultz remains confident in the Brazilian economy's creditworthiness?

A What I said was that we're not commenting on a specific internal Brazilian action, but the Secretary has consistently expressed his confidence in Brazil's economic viability and future.

Q And that remains undiminished, is that correct?

A Yes, of course.

Q John, on the President's assertion of foot-dragging on the part of Syria, what can the United States do to change that posture?

A I think that the diplomatic campaign goes foward, Bernie. People are very active in that still today, ourselves and others.

Q That's all you have to say on that?

A I think diplomacy is certainly the most effective way to --

Q Well, has diplomacy produced any results at all?

A We're moving along.

Q That is the entire response after the indictment of Syria last night by the President? That's all the U.S. can do?

A I think I'm not giving you an exclusive list of options, but I'm just saying that the focus today is on diplomacy.

Q John, Iran claims to have mounted a major offensive against Iraq. Do we have any indications?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q John, do you have any comment on a speech two days ago in East Berlin -- that was not widely reported -- by Gromyko in which he made his first comment on the START proposals by President Reagan on October 4th?

A No, I don't.

Q Along the same lines, John, yesterday Ambassador Hartman was called into Gromyko's office for what Radio Moscow said was an important meeting or a meeting of important U.S.-Soviet matters. Do you have anything on that session?

A He wasn't called in. He sought the meeting and did meet with Mr. Gromyko prior to his departure from Moscow today. And, obviously, we wouldn't get into the substance of their discussions; but it was at our instigation.

Q Let's not get into the substance, John. How about the superficiality? (Laughter.)

A I thought we had overwhelmed you with superficiality on that already. (Laughter.)

Q Why is he coming back?

A He's coming back, I assume, for regular consultation.

Q Is it Syria's lack of cooperation with the United States -- the hard-blood factor that the President said last night -- which is sabotaging the peace efforts in Lebanon, or is it the lack of consensus on reconciliation in the actual meeting which didn't happen today between the warring factions which is stifling the peace efforts there?

How would you characterize this situation?

A How to place the emphasis on those two?

Q Yes.

A No. I can't give you percentage I'm afraid.

Q John, there are now denunciations throughout the Middle East regarding the Jordanian rapid deployment force.

A Yes.

Q I was wondering if you've had any response or any further guidance on that.

A No. I don't have anything beyond what we gave you a few days ago, I'm afraid.

Q John, in line with what President Reagan said yesterday, do you have any comment or do you agree with the assertion of Speaker O'Neill that Secretary Shultz has requested advance support of a U.S. policy of arming those seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua? What do you make of that assertion?

A I'm sorry. Speaker O'Neill's assertion?

Q Yes -- about the letter of Secretary Shultz.

A No. I don't have anything on it for you.

Q (Inaudible) in Lebanon, the airport as a location for reconciliation has been turned down.

A Um ...

Q And chances of collapse, total collapse, are there.

A Um ....

Q What can you tell us would be the next step?

A I think at least some of the participants are working on the question of an alternative venue that would be agreeable to everybody. I assume that will be the next step.

Q Do you have anything in mind, in particular?

A Geneva has been mentioned. I don't know whether that is today the key --

Q Camp David?

A I haven't heard Camp David. (Laughter.)

Q John, on another matter, has the State Department asked its officials to sign that document saying you won't tell secrets for the rest of your life? (Laughter.)

A Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge as yet, Bernie. I think those documents have not been issued.

Q John, going back, the rapid deployment force of Jordan which was reported in the news -- the Jordanian official statement by the Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Armed Forces says -- the Israeli story coming out from Israel about this indicates that this is another Israeli attempt to foil Jordan's efforts to obtain the advanced arms it seeks from the United States and this is why they leaked the story from Jerusalem and talked about it.

A Uh-huh.

Q What do you comment on this?

A No comment on that Jordanian --

Q Did you say in answer on the "no tell" statement that the documents aren't ready yet?

A I don't think they have been distributed in the Department yet.

Q When will they be?

A I think in about a couple weeks' time.

Q John, how are you going to explain to the Contadora Group countries, the words of President Reagan yesterday, when he was defending the covert activity? And since they have opposed these covert activities as some obstacle to --

A I think we will say the President's words speak for themselves.

Q But --

Q John, do you have anything on the presence of an aircraft carrier off Rio de Janeiro?

A No, I don't; but try the Pentagon.

Q O.K. And the support of this Administration for democracies everywhere is well known. Is that suspended, however, in the case of countries that don't comply with the IMF?

A That is a very broad and sweeping question, and I think the attitude of this Administration on human rights and the development of democracy in various countries is well known. We also face certain realities that confront us in various countries.

Q John, do you have any comment on the chief Soviet delegate to the INF talks today and his remarks about the prospects for an agreement and Soviet willingness to remain on the talks?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on a Pravda report, a Pravda commentary, talking about nuclear-powered submarines off U.S. coasts?

A No, I don't. Obviously, we are in a kind of war of nerves, I think -- the allies, on the one hand, and the Soviets, on the other. I assume they must be frustrated at the direction of events and the steadiness of the allies in adhering to the NATO two-track decision and the steadfastness of the determination of the allies to deploy in the event of no agreement at Geneva. So I presume that a number of the things that you mentioned are a reaction to that steadfastness.

Q John, do you have any comment on David Owens' speech asking for postponement of deployment of Pershing IIs?

A No, I don't, Jim; no.

(Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

Alennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1983

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FRIDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon.

Two announcements:

First, Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam will deliver an on-the-record Middle East address to the American Jewish Committee's National Executive Council at dinner on Thursday, October 27, at 6:30 p.m. at the Bellview-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia. If you wish to cover this event, please contact Natalie Flatow of the American Jewish Committee at (212) 751-4000 this week, which I guess means today. And next week, she may be reached at the Bellview-Stratford at (215) 893-1776.

Q What is the date and time?

A That, again, is on the 27th, next Thursday at 6:30 p.m., Bellview-Stratford Hotel in Philadelphia.

Q Do you have an advance text on that?

A We will have a text available as much in advance as we can, Jim.

Also available in the Press Office are copies of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams' testimony before the joint hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and Western Hemisphere Affairs. The subject of his testimony, which was this morning at 10:00, was the human rights situation in the southern cone of Latin America.

That's it for announcements. Happy to take your questions.

Q Has the State Department now had a chance to look at the set of proposals given yesterday by the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister?

A Let me say a number of things about that question.

Q Can you say them slowly? (Laughter)

A You can get a copy afterwards, if you would like.

Q Copy, please.

A We made clear once again in yesterday's meeting, which was the latest in a series of contacts with the Government of Nicaragua, that the appropriate forum for carrying out negotiations is the Contadora process.

We have met periodically with GRN officials and those of other participants to facilitate that process. It is the Central American countries themselves which have already developed, along with Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela, an agreed framework through which to consider all of these issues in a comprehensive and verifiable manner.

We have supported the on-going Contadora process consistently, and we continue to regard the 21-point Document of Objectives as the benchmark against which any proposal such as these should be judged.

The Nicaraguan proposals recites some general principles that everyone could agreed on. However, they also contain strident anti-U.S. polemics, and even at this point it is clear that they are deficient. For example, they lack any specific means of verification and focus on only a few of the 21 points agreed to by the Contadora countries. We are still reviewing the proposals.

Q A couple of points. First of all, the Nicaraguans say they did give it to the Contadora countries first.

A I don't know when they gave it to the Contadora countries. I don't think that vitiates anything I've just said.

Q And, second, one of the treaties that they proposed in this series of four is a specific agreement with the United States. Do you object to the United States being included as a specific party?

A I think I'll refer you back specifically to what I said, Jim, which is that we have made clear, made clear in the meeting yesterday, that the appropriate forum for carrying out negotiations is the Contadora process.

To the extent that the U.S. has to be brought in, depending on what the nature of the involvement would need to be, we would have to look at that. We've already made clear, for example, that on withdrawal of advisors around the region and prohibition of weapons, large weapons, introduction into the region, we would certainly be looking to that on a verifiable basis, and so on. So, obviously, the U.S. would in certain ways be involved. But right now, at this stage, clearly the focus and the appropriate forum for negotiations is the Contadora process.

Q Also on the subject of verification, these papers that the Nicaraguan Embassy put out says it specifically provides for verification by the Contadora Group.

A It doesn't talk about any specifics. That's where proof of the pudding would obviously come.

Q Alan, how is this going to work? Say the Nicaraguans take these proposals to the Contadora Group and there's a process and the Contadora Group emerges with treaties or plans or ideas for resolving it, and say they happen to be along the lines of what the Nicaraguans are now proposing.

How would we respond to those? Would we then go through a process of negotiating with Contadora, to yet revise or come up with -- or will we accept what Contadora decides?

A I think you're going off into a hypothetical area at this point, and I would say we would await events to decide precisely how it would be appropriate to deal with what would come out of it. I'm not going to try to speculate on it.

Q Alan, it may not be as hypothetical as it seems. But you just said the appropriate forum for handling this is in Contadora, and I think that specific proposals have been made. I think we should indicate what we're going to do, or don't we have an idea of how we're going to handle what Contadora does?

A I also just said that the way we would deal with this would depend on specificially what came out and what would be appropriate, and I can't speculate on that.

Q So what Contadora comes up with, we will have the right then to revise and further discuss?

A I'm not -- you can use you words; I'll use my words, and I just used them.

Q From a U.S. point of view, does even a preliminary analysis of the Nicaraguan proposals represent an advance in the direction of some sort of negotiated solution?

A   I'm going to withhold that kind of a judgment, Bernie. As I said, we are examining -- continuing to examine these drafts that have been submitted, apparently both to us and to the Contadora countries, and I don't think it's appropriate to try to make a judgment until we have concluded that examination.

Q   You have left the impression now that what the US objects to in the proposals that it got yesterday from Nicaragua is the procedural way in which those proposals are being put forward.

A   No, I didn't say that. Why don't you take a look at the statement when you have it.

Q   Is that an impression that you intend to leave?

A   I think I also talked about deficiencies in the specifics of it, so why don't you take a look at the --

Q   Can you be specific about what the deficiencies are?

A   I cited one. But until we're finished with our examination, no, I'm not going to try to do that.

Q   I just want to try and pin you down on one thing here, to follow up on Greg's line of questioning. Is the United States ruling out a possible treaty between Nicaragua and the United States as part of an overall Central American regional settlement?

A   I'm not here prepared today to rule in or rule out anything beyond what I've just given you, Jim. So I think that it would be a mistake to try and make judgments on that. I will leave you with the statement I've given you.

Q   Alan, do you all see in the documents a clear and specific commitment on the part of the Nicaraguan Government to halt their aid to the El Salvadoran guerrillas if we will halt our aid to the Contras?

A   You're asking me again to comment on something I've said we're still examining, Rick. And I think I'm just going to have to not try to make that kind of analysis, or give you that kind of analysis at this point.

Q That's not an assessment. That's just a facual -- they're saying that that is what is in the document.

Q A number of you have the documents, apparently, and I'm going to have to leave it to you to make your own judgment on that at this point. I can't help you in terms of the U.S. Government judgment on that. I'm not going to try to articulate that at this point from here.

Q Do we see any movement in their position on that point in the documents they handed us?

A Again, I think I would have to withhold assessments until we have made or completed our review.

Q Alan, you're leaving the impression that we're not interested in direct bilateral negotiations with Nicaragua. Is that the impression you wish to leave?

A I think the point that was made is that in terms of negotiations -- we get back to the point that John discussed yesterday -- are we talking about negotiations or are we talking about discussions.

In terms of negotiations on the issues in the region that have been discussed through the Contadora process, the Contadora process is, indeed, where we feel the negotiations should take place. As I said, to the extent the U.S. needs to be involved at some stage, we would have to figure out how that would be done, depending on the nature of that involvement.

In terms of discussions, obviously we've had discussions. This was, again, the latest in a series of discussions that Assistant Secretary Motley has had, or others have had.

So in terms of ability to communicate, that's there; but in terms of negotiations, I think what I gave you is quite specific on that.

Q Are you saying, then, that we can have discussions with the Nicaraguans but all negotiations, then, have to be through Contadora?

A I think in terms of these issues that we're discussing, yes.

Q Are we a party in any way to the Contadora process, Alan?

A I don't know how you define "party." We certainly are not attending those, no. I would say we're not a party, and therefore we would have to get back to your earlier question to figure out what it is that comes out and how we need to deal with it.

Q Two questions, if I may. What is the latest update on the flow of arms through Nicaragua into El Salvador?

A I don't have a new reading to give you on that, Bernie.

Q Is it the U.S. assessment that that is still going on?

A Yes.

Q The flow is still going on. When Motley was in Managua last week, he must have made the same point that you're making. If you're going to negotiate, you've got to do it through the Contadora, but we'll have talks.

Why, then, wasn't it clear to D'Escoto that from the U.S. point of view he was wasting his time coming here?

A First of all, I wouldn't address what was discussed between Ambassador Motley and the Nicaraguan officials on his trip. There was a briefing that addressed that, a background briefing here, and I would refer you to that.

As far as what motivated Minister D'Escoto to table these proposals, or provide them to us, or however you want to describe it, you'll have to ask him what his reason was.

Q In proposing this deal, do you find an implicit acknowledgment on the part of the Nicaraguans that they have, in fact, been doing what you've been accusing them of?

A I think we made the point -- I guess it was last summer -- when they first made similar kinds of proposals, that one could draw that implication from what they were saying. I think they might describe it differently, but I think one could draw that kind of a conclusion of them.

Q Yesterday, did Mr. Motley inform D'Escoto that he would or should turn things over to the Contadora Group, and did D'Escoto say that he had or had not already done so?

A I don't have a detailed readout to give you on that, Rick, beyond simply saying that, again, in yesterday's meeting, it was made clear to Mr. D'Escoto that the place for negotiations, the appropriate forum, was the Contadora process.

Q What was his response?

A I'm not prepared to go into the dialogue beyond saying what our position on it was.

Q Do you have any comment on the vote yesterday in the House of Representatives to stop the covert CIA aid to the Contras, and do you see any connection between either the activities in the area or the votes in Congress and this diplomatic initiative?

A As far as the first is concerned, I really would refer you to what Larry Speakes said this morning. I believe he addressed the issue, and I don't have anything to add to that.

As far as the connections and the motivations of the Nicaraguans in making this particular step, taking this particular step at this particular time, I'm not going to try to divine their intentions. I'll have to leave that analysis to you.

Q I still want to go back to the question raised by Greg a few minutes ago and pursued by Bernie. The Contadora process accords no formal role of any kind to the United States Government. Nicaragua is saying that they would feel very -- that ultimately there is going to have to be some kind of bringing in of the United States, either directly with them or through some other means.

Do you accept the Contadora countries -- that is, not the five Central American countries, but the original Contadora Group -- to be in a sense a mediator or the main negotiating party in any possible discussions leading to a treaty between Nicaragua and the United States? Can you flesh this out?

A Again, you're trying -- I'm not going to be pinned down more specifically than I have been on this, Jim. The negotiating process at this stage for the issues that we've been discussing with regard to the Central American region, the forum for that is the Contadora process.

In terms of how the U.S. would relate to that process at such time as there were -- and, of course, we have strongly supported that process -- but how we would relate to specific steps that were proposed to implement the 21-point Document of Objectives, we would have to see. We'll have to see what we're talking about.

Q So the United States does not consider itself bound in any way by the Contadora Group process; is that correct?

A As I said to Greg earlier, I am going to stick with the words I'm using and express the policy in the way I've expressed it rather than, I'm afraid, using yours.

Q Am I too early to change subjects?

Q Yes.

A Yes. Go ahead, Greg.

--MORE--

Q Alan, we're telling the Nicaraguans they should negotiate with Contadora. But I think we need to look at that. This seems like an incomplete response for the following reason: We're not a party to the Contadora process, and the Nicaraguans have reason to believe that we are engaging in a covert military action against them which is obviously hurting them.

Their oils -- they've lost a lot of their oil; there have been a lot of deaths; their economy is suffering from this. There seems to be a sense of immediacy if they want to resolve the problem. We're pointing them to a process in which we are not a party.

It seems to me that they do have bilateral issues to discuss with us. Don't they have a right to approach us?

A I just said that this is the latest in a series of discussions, and certainly we will have discussed, and I would expect we would continue to discuss the issues.

In terms of negotiations, however, the issues, we have made very clear in the past, can only effectively be dealt with on a regional basis. Therefore, the existing effective forum for doing that is the Contadora forum.

Q Proposals that we have made earlier on to the Nicraguans have now been withdrawn from the table. The Enders and Quainton proposals, negotiations -- those are all now off the table in favor of the Contadora.

A I don't have a way of describing that to you in any direct way. I think that the official who briefed the other day indicated that a lot of that had been incorporated -- the concerns that were expressed in those various points -- incorporated into the 21 points.

To the extent that there are some things for the U.S. to do or Nicaragua to do on a bilateral basis, as I say, I think we've got to wait until this process in the regional context has gone forward; and that is where the negotiations at this point are to be concentrated.

Q Since the U.S. supports the Contadora process, weren't we on the phone yesterday encouraging the Contadora Four that, on the basis of what the Nicaraguans proposed, let's get cracking to see how we can defuse the situation?

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A I don't have specifics for you. There is obviously an active diplomacy between ourselves and the various parties involved here.

Q Can't you tell us whether there was a positive reaction to try to expedite the process? Because otherwise I get the feeling of the U.S. stalling on this whole process to keep the Contra pressure on. That's what you're projecting.

A As I just indicated, what I am projecting is that we're studying what has been presented yesterday, less than 24 hours ago, and I don't think that's an unreasonable position to take.

Q Alan, not in terms of negotiations, but in terms of discussions, our bilateral discussions with the Nicaraguans, do we in any of the recent diplomatic contacts that Motley has had, both yesterday and previously, detect any greater willingness on the part of the Nicaraguan Government to exchange their withholding, their support for Salvadoran guerrillas in return for our withholding our support for the Nicaraguan Contras?

A Again --

Q Leave aside Contadora, leave aside negotiations -- just discussions.

A Again, though, I think the focus would be on, for example, these pieces of paper that were presented yesterday, and that would be the vehicle certainly you have looked at and others have looked at as a way of expressing that. I think we're going to wait until we've examined them before we make a statement as to our judgments.

I understand your trying to abstract it from that process, but I'm not able to do that at this point.

Q Did D'Escoto say anything, or did he merely come into the office and sit mute and deliver four pieces of paper?

A I'm not prepared to go into the discussion yesterday.

Q One of the treaties is a specific bilateral treaty with the United States. Are you saying, then, that you would allow the Contadora countries to negotiate and work out the arrangements for a treaty that would involve only the United States and Nicaragua?

A No. I'm not saying that, but I think I've said everything I really intend to say on this subject. Why don't we change it?

Q Alan, just one more, please, if I could. You keep saying, "We're studying what was presented 24 hours ago, so it's too soon to expect..." The implication is that it's too soon to expect a U.S. reaction to the specific proposals.

On the other hand, you're saying the kinds of things that Nicaragua talked about ought to be negotiated in the Contadora process.

A That's right.

Q Are you leaving open the possibility that the U.S. will react to these proposals, or are you saying we're studying it, but in any case we won't react because we don't think that we ought to be dealing with this in a bilateral format?

A No, I'm not ruling out. I can't promise you that we will have a reaction to give you from here. I'm not ruling that out at this particular point. What I'm saying, though, beyond that, as you have pointed out, is that the negotiations on the issues in the region should be dealt with through the regional forum which exists.

Q Can I remind you that you had a reaction at the very outset, that there were general principles but that they are deficient?

A I said I gave you a very brief -- and you wanted to go into more detail, and I'm not able to give you a more detailed reaction than that. That is correct. I gave you a little bit on that.

Q Grenada, Alan. Have you got anything new on what happened?

Q Can we have one more on Nicaragua? I'm sorry. I beg your forebearance.

A Go on.

Q Thank you. Did you have any reaction to the attack on the town in northern Nicaragua that took place the day before yesterday?

A No.

Q None at all?

A No.

Q Anything new on what has or is happening in Grenada, plus the status of the Americans there and any attempts to get a diplomatic body on the ground?

A I don't have anything on that last part. In terms of what's happening and welfare and whereabouts questions, according to the information available to us, all is quiet in Grenada. Our citizens there are unharmed, and they're apparently not specifically the target of this trouble.

We understand that the Revolutionary Military Council lifted the strict curfew today for four hours -- from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. -- to permit persons to buy food and so on. But that's about the extent of what I have in terms of the situation on the ground.

I think you're well aware of the reactions which have been widely reported of regional governments who have been quite upset. Some have broken relations with Grenada and are extremely concerned about the violent military takeover.

Q Would we follow their lead, Alan? Jamaica has broken relations, Trinidad and Tobago may or hinted at it, some other Caribbean states, such as Dominica have denounced it.

Why are we so silent at the moment?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Alan, in that connection, do you have any reaction to Cuba's apparent reaction, a statement by Castro that's reported on the FBIS today?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence or suspicions that Cuba may have had something to do with the fact itself?

A I don't have any judgments to give you at this point, Jim -- I'm not sure that I will -- on that question or a question of outside involvement.

Q Does that mean there wasn't any?

A I say I don't have any judgments to give you on it. I don't have any comment to make or --

Q One other on Grenada. Tom Adams, the Premier of Barbados, last night seemed to be indicating that people in the eastern Caribbean expected an intervention by the United States, and that it was definitely possible.

Have you been in consultations with him over the last 48 hours, and do you have any reaction to that remark?

A No, I don't have any specific reaction to that remark or any others on that subject. I think that, as John indicated yesterday, we have, obviously, been in touch with a number of governments and continue to be on the question of what's going on. But I don't have a specific remark or reaction to give you on that.

Q What do you have on the fighting between Iraq and Iran, and do you have anything on a Libyan report of an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein?

A No. I have nothing on either of those.

Q This morning the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee at a news conference in Washington charged that U.S. Customs officials using the practice of body cavity searches -- they've been harrassing and doing illegal searches of both permanent residents and citizens of the United States and Canada entering the United States, and they have affidavits to the effect that there is one woman who said that she was asked to be searched, or she was forced to be searched and that the statement which come out from the ADC -- which is the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee -- this is no more than a bureaucratically legitimized rape, and they are going to pursue this.

Are you aware of this subject?

A I'm not aware of it, but I also think that it's something that you would have to address to the appropriate officials. I don't think that's our --

Q Doesn't the State Department have anything to do with the entering and exiting from the United States to Canada and vice versa?

A I think you just indicated it was a Customs/Immigration kind of matter, and I would refer you to them.

Q Alan, do you have anything at all on the status of the INF talks? Have the Soviets continued to reiterate their threat to walk out of those talks? Has there been any change in the Soviet attitude that the U.S. has seen?

A I don't have anything new to offer you on that. The meetings have continued, and I'm not aware of an adjournment date that has been set for those meetings.

As far as any changes in the negotiations, I don't have anything new to offer you today on that.

Q Have the Soviets continued to reiterate what they said some time ago about walking out or leaving or ending the talks, aside from specific adjournment?

A I don't have anything new to give you on that. I'm not going to try to judge -- I don't think I want to get into the diplomatic exchange. I think a number of Soviet officials have expressed themselves in a variety of fora, and, of course, there have been a couple of things that have come out of the Warsaw Pact, and I'd refer you to that. I don't want to try to speak for them on this.

Q New subject, please? Alan, will there be an American team at the planned Geneva meetings on Lebanon next week?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Is an American team expected to be there?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Anything at all on Lebanon today, Alan?

A A little bit. Ambassador Fairbanks is in Beirut. As far as the situation on the ground is concerned, latest reports indicate the fighting in and around Beirut is reduced but periodically intense.

The Marines report that their positions near the airport have been quiet, though a jointly manned Marine-LAF checkpoint at the airport came under fire last night with the LAF returning fire.

There's been some sporadic major caliber weapons fire in the vicinity of Suqal-Gharb. Again, I think that probably my guidance is a little behind -- at least the

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wires' question that Bernie raised -- just in terms of what is actually happening on the talks.

What I have, when I came down, is that we understand the Lebanese Government has announced the parties have reached agreement on the issue of venue for national reconciliation talks, but I don't have anything more specific than that.

Q Did they state a date on that?

A I don't have a date.

Q You don't have a date.

A I don't have a date to offer you.

Q Alan, are there new thoughts being considered in letting the Marines seek out sources of shooting at them, or sources of fire, around the international airport of Beirut?

A Personally, I'm not aware of a change in that sort of rule of engagement, but I guess you really have to go to the Pentagon. I don't think you can depend on my personal awareness on this specifically. You'd better ask them what their state of play is on rules of engagement. But I'm not aware of any changes.

Q Alan, last night 42 Senators voted to halt construction on the new embassy. Do you have anything on that at all?

A Construction on what?

Q On the Mount Alto facility, Soviet facility?

A No. I don't have anything on that. I think we've made it clear in the past what our position on the construction of our respective embassies is, and I think there will probably be something in the past record on that.

Q What about the U.N. vote in the Senate, the U.N. funds vote?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, there are a lot of reports coming out of the Middle East about a U.S.-Syrian deal. Arafat is accusing the U.S. and Syria of being in collusion, and there was something in the London paper, Al-Majallah, about a very detailed plan.

Do you have anything to refute that?

A A deal on what?

Q A deal on the reconciliation talks, breaking up Lebanon, all that sort of --

A We have made very clear before that there were no deals struck.

Q Congressman Stratton, in an article in the morning newspaper here, says that with the sniping against the Marines, the situation in Lebanon has entered a new and more dangerous phase, and that this is of a different character than their being in the way of the shells falling previously, and the United States should now reconsider whether the Marines should stay there.

Do you have any comment on this or on that general line of thinking that this sniping represents a more dangerous situation since it is specifically directed against the Marines and not just something where some shells may be directed at somebody else that are falling in their midst.

A I guess a couple of things. One is that, as I've indicated, the firing near the Marine positions, except this one jointly manned station, apparently has fallen off, and I think as a general matter has fallen off.

Secondly, there simply is no consideration being given to withdrawing the Marines. The President made that very clear. I'd refer you to his remarks on that.

Q Do you see this sniping as a more serious problem?

A I'm not going to try to compare. If people are in danger and get injured, that is a matter of concern, but in terms of the intention to remain there, there is no question about that.

Q Alan, do you have any reaction to some comments from Arab circles, especially Syrian circles, that the latest escalation in Lebanon, which was the bombardment and everything that caused the death of two Marines, was the

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response or the result from the United States' rearming or resupplying the Lebanese army for four days constantly after a period which was -- things were moving towards possibly coming to stability in a way or coming to an agreement.

Do you have any reaction to that?

A I'm not familiar with that particular statement, so I don't have a specific response to it. The U.S. has been engaged in trying to build up the Lebanese Armed Forces as the military arm of the Government of Lebanon, and that program is ongoing, and I think that -- I'll just leave it at that. I don't see a connection between them, but I'm not familiar with the statement, so I can't respond specifically.

Q Any new efforts on the part of the U.S. Government to try to persuade Walid Jumblatt and some of his group to be a little more forthcoming in the negotiations for a national reconciliation?

A As I say, my understanding is that there has been an announcement that they're in fact going to go -- that there will be talks.

Q No, but any particular prodding from the U.S.?

A I don't think I'd get into the question of prodding any one or another party. The U.S. has had contact with a broad spectrum of elements in Lebanon and will continue to do so.

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:58 p.m.)

Aikman

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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DPC ~~#184~~

MONDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1983, 12:21 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just two scheduling announcements, one regarding the Secretary's schedule this afternoon. The Secretary will be testifying on the Hill on the Senate side at 1:45, and the House at 3:00.

Q Open?

A Closed. Closed session, both sides.

Q Subject? (Laughter)

Q Why are these closed?

Q You say "testifying." Is it a briefing?

A I think it is largely in the form of a briefing.

Also, what you already know, which is that the tragic weekend events in Lebanon which required the Secretary to remain in Washington and to return to Washington from Augusta have made it impossible for him to make his scheduled October 24-27 visits to El Salvador and Brazil.

He has reluctantly had to postpone his visit to a future date. The two governments have been notified and indicated their understanding of the postponement under the circumstances.

Q Alan, there was some suggestion that the postponement might be just a few days. Is that ruled out?

A As far as I know, George, there is no date at this point. It has not been rescheduled.

Q Is there any consideration by the Secretary to traveling to Beirut or to the area?

A I again know of no plans at this point. Obviously, at some point in the future, but in the near-term timeframe, I know of no plans for the Secretary to go to Beirut.

Q Radio Tehran has announced that -- or it has officially denied that it or any of its people have been involved in the bombing.

Do you accept that?

A Jim, we're aware of that report. I can't go into the details of the investigation which obviously continues, but I would have to say that, as Secretary Weinberger indicated, there's a lot of circumstantial evidence around, pointing in different directions. But some of it points to Iran, and the possibility of Iranian complicity is one aspect of our continuing investigation.

Q Are you, for example, cooperating with the French in this investigation with the Lebanese?

A We certainly are in close contact both with the Lebanese and with our MNF partners on this question. Of course, the French, having suffered a similar attack, we are in close contact with them within that context.

Q On the future of the MNF, are you now discussing with the British, the French, and the Italians what their role will be?

A As I say, there have already been contacts with the MNF partners. There will be continuing contacts. I'm sure that specifically what will happen in Beirut would be addressed in all of that as we go on.

I would refer you, in terms of general intentions, however, to what the President said when he came back from Augusta and also to what I think it was Larry Speakes said on the subject of the U.S. continuing in the MNF in Lebanon. So in that respect, I'd refer you to those statements.

Q Alan, has the President asked for a meeting of the MNF Foreign Ministers?

A I don't know if there -- I guess at this point the only thing I can do for you is to say that there has been contact. The Secretary has been in communication with the Foreign Ministers -- with Foreign Minister Cheysson, Foreign Minister Andreotti, Foreign Secretary Howe -- but I don't have anything further to give you at this point.

Q How was he in communcation? By phone or what?

A It differed in each case, but there has been direct communication with the Foreign Ministers.

Q Alan, it has been reported in Europe that President Reagan has sent a letter to the Italians, explicitly saying that there should be a meeting of the four.

Can you confirm that?

A No. I can't confirm it. I'm not addressing it. As I say, the best I can do for you at this particular point is to say that the Secretary has been in touch with his colleagues, but I can't take it beyond that at this particular time.

Q Was the United States aware of President Mitterrand's visit to Lebanon, to Beirut last night? Was there any planned consultation with their government about this?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Following up on that question, does the U.S. have any consideration to sending someone high level to Beirut quickly, immediately?

A General Kelley has gone. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Q Someone higher than General Kelley. I mean --

A I think the Commandant of the Marine Corps is a fairly senior official.

Q You would equate that to the President of France? No, I'm --

A I consider the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who's going out there at the President's direction and representing the President, to be a high-level official.

Q I'm asking a serious question.

A I'm answering you seriously.

Q The French President went immediately. The United States had much larger casualties than the French did. Is there any consideration at this point to sending a Cabinet-level official to Beirut or someone higher than a Cabinet-level?

A I don't have anything to give you on that at this point.

Q Is it believed that Syria, directly or indirectly, played a role in this?

A I'm not prepared to go, John, beyond what I've really said, that we're continuing to look into it and we will continue to do that. We haven't reached any conclusion.

Q Alan, there have been reports about contacts with the Israeli Government concerning the last tragic events. What is the nature of these contacts?

A I think that the Israeli Government made it known that Minister Arens had been in direct touch with Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Shultz to offer condolences, so I think that that addresses that.

Q Alan, for the record would you mind explaining again what the Department's position is on why the Marines are in Lebanon?

A There is a whole record on this, Bill. I would refer you back to --

Q A lot of people on the Hill don't seem to know.

A I think, first of all, the Secretary will address that on the Hill today, so I'm not -- I think that whatever questions are there can be addressed. We have made the point before that there is a presence -- to facilitate by their presence the re-establishment of Lebanese Central Government authority throughout Lebanon and the withdrawal of all foreign forces and, indeed, the security for Israel's northern border. That three-pronged objective, if you will, remains our basic objective, and that presence, as we've described it all along, including in reports to the Congress, remains there as a facilitating presence.

Q Henry Kissinger yesterday voiced some concern about the lack of cooperation or coordination between the Israelis on the Awali River and the Multinational Forces there to bring about possibly securing the safety of the Marines and others, or giving some thoughts to that.

What do you comment on that?

A I don't have any particular comment on that. On a variety of issues relating to the region, of course, we do consult not only with the Israelis but the other governments in the region, but I don't have a specific comment.

Q I was going to follow up on that, in that Kissinger has also said that it was the Israelis who got us in this in the first place. I understand it to mean "this mess."

A I think we're going back over a lot of old ground that we've covered in the past.

Q There are reports of Israeli offers to take in American casualties, but apparently they haven't been taken up on that, and everybody is being flown to Germany. Is that correct? Can you comment on that?

A Yes. The United States Government is deeply grateful for offers of medical assistance received from Israel and other countries. Our wounded Marines are being moved to hospitals aboard the U.S. amphibious ships offshore and to U.S. military hospitals in Europe by U.S. Air Force Med-Evac aircraft.

To date there is no requirement for additional medical facilities, but the Secretary of Defense has made clear that if there should be, we will turn for assistance to those who have offered help.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q A Syrian newspaper this morning published an item that says the U.S. is not taking a neutral role in Lebanon, and another publication in the region suggests that this incident shows that the U.S. is incorrectly assessing the degree of Lebanese resistance, both to Gemayel and to the Multinational Force presence in Lebanon.

Can you offer any comment on the neutrality of the U.S. forces and the assessment of degree of resistance within Lebanon in light of the attack over the weekend?

A We have made clear before that we were not there to back one faction or another within Lebanon; we were there as backing for the Lebanese Government. Obviously, there is a major effort underway right now at national reconciliation, and presumably that will have effect over time on how Lebanon is governed. But it is for the support of the Lebanese Central Government and, as I said before, the re-establishment of the authority of that government over the totality of Lebanon that we are working.

As far as resistance, again, you're asking in a way who is responsible for the attack.

Q No.

A But it gets to that question, and I can't do that.

Q But resistance to that goal, the statement you just made --

A That's part of the reconciliation dialogue and so on, and I think that's what we've been going through for the last several weeks, and that is an ongoing process.

Q But has the U.S. assessed correctly the -- the U.S. has been trying to get the parties to agree to this national reconciliation conference.

Has the U.S. assessed correctly the amount of resistance to that idea to the point of recognizing that it could cause this kind of a disaster?

A You're making an assumption when you get to the last "that it could cause this kind of a disaster." Again, that gets to the question of who is responsible and assuming that perhaps one of the major parties in that reconciliation dialogue is directly involved, and I'm not prepared to make that kind of a judgment.

Q Alan, what's your assessment of the relationship between reconciliation talks and this bombing attack? Do they have any relationship?

A I would be careful about drawing any direct relationship between that. As far as the effect on those talks, my understanding is that that process is still moving forward and is scheduled to take place in Geneva.

Q Another thing. Do you have anything on this Islamic group that claimed credit for this bombing?

A No. Not really. I guess the name of this organization, which was previously unknown, is the Free Islamic Resistance Movement. But, as I said before, we can't verify who's responsible or that they're responsible or anything of that sort.

Q Have you found something about this group?

A No.

Q I just want to go back to the question of responsibility. You did suggest or you repeated Secretary Weinberger's remarks and suggested Iranian complicity, or that you would go on that, but you wouldn't comment on any others.

Are you going in any respect beyond what Secretary Weinberger -- where he went yesterday? And by just mentioning possible Iranian complicity and refusing comment elsewhere, do you mean to be saying that's the strongest possibility?

A I think I'll leave you with the words I've used, Jim.

Q Alan, to get back to the question that was asked earlier about why we're in Lebanon, in your own recitation of the reasons, of which you said there is a substantial record, you didn't make any mention of the thrust of what the President suggested yesterday, which was that there's a vital strategic interest to the United States in Lebanon.

Why have you not repeated that here, and in your judgment did the President carry the reasons for American presence in Lebanon farther than it has been carried before by the United States Government?

A Just a general answer. I'm not trying to give you a major statement of U.S.-Middle Eastern, or, indeed, global foreign policy, and you're asking for broader strategic -- what are our strategic interests in the region. Those have been stated many times and many places, and I don't intend to go through that all again today.

Q No, no. What I'm asking you is whether the -- why you did not repeat today in reciting why we're there, what the President said yesterday.

A I'm simply repeating -- it's not a relevant question in the sense of the way we've been addressing the issue, which is within Lebanon. Not "Why Lebanon?" and "Why our interest in Lebanon and the region?" which is what you're getting to. We're talking about our objectives within Lebanon, and that's why I addressed it that way.

Q You seem to be trying to distance the goal of the Administration's use of the Marines in Lebanon from the bombing. Are you trying to suggest that anyone, including the Phalangists, for example, might have rolled that truck in there yesterday?

A No. I think I was in fact taking it the other way. I would be careful about drawing conclusions about any of the major factions or groups within Lebanon being responsible.

Q Alan, you pointed a figner at the Iranians. Can you tell us anything about why the Iranians are there, how many are there, what they're doing there, who invited them in, where they came from?

A I don't have details on the Iranian presence. Obviously, there are Iranians there, but I don't have details on their presence.

Q Could you just for the record give us some idea what the Secretary of State's schedule has been yesterday and this morning? I noted they didn't publish the schedule this morning other than he is going up on the Hill. Was he at the White House this morning? Was he at the White House yesterday?

A He certainly was at the White House yesterday.

Q We saw him get off the helicopter, but after that?

A Yes. And he went to meetings then, and there were meetings later in the day, and I think that the White House can probably provide you with a schedule of those meetings. I think that Larry Speakes spoke after those, the second session as well.

Q (Inaudible)

A I don't have details on what he's been doing today. I think he may have been over there at some point during the morning. He's back and getting ready for his session on the Hill.

Q And you did say he didn't. He was in contact with some of the others in the Multinational Force.

A He's been in communication, yes. He has been in communication with the Foreign Ministers, that's right. that's both over yesterday and today that it took place.

Q Alan, when you were asked before about the U.S. not being neutral and you answered that the U.S. is backing the Central Government in the hope that it could extend its writ throughout the country, is that not seen by many factions within Lebanon as not being neutral -- that is to say, that they see the Central Government as a question of Phalangist authority and that, therefore, we are siding only with one group?

A The fact is that we are not siding only with one group. There is certainly representation of the various groups within the Lebanese Government.

If there is a perception that we're siding with only one group, that is a misperception; and we want to be clear that that is the case.

Q Alan, I take it you have rejected the option described by Henry Kissinger yesterday -- which is to expand U.S. presence, in conjunction with allies in Lebanon, to change the balance of force there. How firmly have you rejected that, and can you tell us for the record why you rejected that?

A I think I'm not going to try to go into a lot of questions regarding Dr. Kissinger's statements yesterday. The fact is that the President reiterated his determination and his policy with respect to Lebanon. The fact is also that within that context and in light of the bombings that took place, we are in touch with our MNF partners, consulting with the Government of Lebanon and so on. That process continues, and I think it would be premature to try to go beyond that at this particular point. But I think that the basic thrust of policy was addressed by the President, and I think Secretary Weinberger addressed himself to some of the questions that you're raising as well with us.

Q Have you not ruled out the possibility of a greater MNF presence there?

A I don't want you to walk away and say, "The State Department today refused to rule out such-and-such." The fact of the matter is that we're in consultation. I think if you're talking about some huge increase, some qualitative change, I'm not aware of that at this point certainly; and I would leave it again, though, in the process of consultation with our allies within the context of the present policy of support for the Lebanese Central Government and the MNF presence of what will specifically be done.

A Well, Alan, do you have any response to Walid Jumblatt's statement that this could happen again, and Senator Nunn who said that perhaps UN forces should replace some of the Marine force -- at least, within the next few weeks?

Q I don't have have any specific comment on that. In terms of the question of whether it could happen again, one of the things that General Kelley is going to be looking at and one of the things that Secretary Weinberger has talked about, obviously, is the question of how one reduces the vulnerability of the MNF forces.

Q Alan, are you seeing the event only in the light of the Lebanese struggle or, also, in light of the leaning of the American position towards Iran in the Iran-Iraq struggle?

A We're addressing this issue in the context of Lebanon.

Q This morning a former CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, said on "WRC Radio" that the Marines were also responsible for their own security and that they were guarding 200 people in that barracks by only one Marine carrying an M-16 rifle. What is your comment on the security arrangements?

A I don't know about security arrangements. You'd have to address that question to the Pentagon.

Q The Kuwaiti Under Secretary of State said that this is a result of the American policy toward the Middle East. What can you say about that?

A I'm not aware of that particular statement and I don't have any comment to offer. I think I've given you a restatement of our policy there.

Jim?

Q Yes. I wanted to change the subject. Are you --

Q Can I ask just one more before you change?

A Yes.

Q On Friday you were asked, on the basis of a statement by Congressman Stratton. It did not seem particularly significant in a new trend in this that the Marines were now being specifically targeted by snipers rather than being the, perhaps, inadvertent target of shelling in the area. If I recall your answer, you did not feel it was particularly significant or you gave no indication that it was. Now do you think that the change in this kind of action regarding the Marines was particularly significant; and is it correct, as some have said in the State Department and Government, following this change was especially active in the area to try to do something about it? (sic)

A I'm not sure what the last point means, but let me just try to address your general question. I think I did not address your question on Friday specifically in the context of "was this more dangerous or not" -- that we have a concern when Marines are in a situation in which they're threatened, that we try to deal with that. And I think we've also addressed in the past the fact that the efforts to target the Marines, including the sniper fire we're talking about, was apparently designed to disrupt the process in Lebanon -- the reconciliation process -- and the issue was raised here and one presumes that there may be validity to it. But I can't judge the motives of people we haven't identified of trying to get the U.S. and the other MNF contributors to pull out, thereby again disrupting the process within Lebanon.

I don't know what to say in terms of the judgment. The Marines are there, the MNF is there. The President has indicated, as have other leaders, determination to continue the policy, and efforts are being made now to address the question of vulnerability and to try to reduce that.

Q I received the impression over the weekend that following this change in the type of threat to which the Marines were subject, that the United States was quietly active to try to do something about it because officials here realized that it was a very serious development.

A Meaning what though, Don, to do what about it? What do you mean?

Q Diplomatically and through other means, to see if they could not reduce this threat.

A Yes. I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, I'm a little confused by what you just said, compared to what you said a few minutes ago. You said, "We're addressing the issue in the context of Lebanon."

A Yes.

Q A few minutes ago you said you wouldn't necessarily steer us in the direction of understanding that any of the parties to the reconciliation talks may have been involved in any way in this respect.

Is the Administration precluding the possibility that, in fact, this attack had nothing to do with the U.S. role in Lebanon but may have had something to do with something else, somewhere else in the world?

A I'm not precluding anything. When you look at the nature of the attack, it certainly strikes one as a direct attack on the U.S. and French MNF presence in Lebanon.

The question, you may recall, that I responded to had to do with the Iran-Iraq war and whether that was the context in which we were addressing this issue. And I said we were addressing the issue in the context of Lebanon.

Q Alan?

A David.

Q Since you're saying this was a direct attack, do you consider this to be combat or are the Marines now in a combat situation?

A I don't think there's any change overall in that.

Q Is the Administration satisfied that the Gemayel Government has done enough to change this perception of the U.S. not being one-sided by attempting to broaden the base of that government?

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A The Gemayel Government has made it very clear that it is dedicated to the proposition of a reconciliation dialogue --

Q I'm talking about something beyond rhetoric from the Gemayel Government.

A I think that there is a meeting scheduled in Geneva which talks to that.

Q Do you see any relationship between this bombing and the one of the Embassy earlier or were they isolated incidents?

A That's very hard to say. The investigation of the April bombing of the Embassy is continuing and we're cooperating in that effort. But there are obvious similarities between the bombing of the Embassy and the two bombings which took place over the weekend, and we're not excluding the possibility that there's a relationship and that perhaps some of the same people are involved.

Q Are American personnel involved in that investigation of the Embassy?

A I'd say we're cooperating with that investigation, but it's a Lebanese investigation.

Q Alan, I think I asked this question last week or asked John, but I'll try to put it differently. Are you aware that some of the Christian participants in the reconciliation talks -- namely, Pierre Gemayel, who is Amin Gemayel's father, and Camille Chamoun -- stated openly their (inaudible) reconciliation and power-sharing in Lebanon which could come out of the upcoming talks?

A I think we'll let the talks process proceed and not try to get into the middle of them by commenting from here.

Q Is the United States prepared to evacuate or help in the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Grenada?

A I don't have anything specific on that, Jim. We have at best sketchy reports from Grenada. What we have is based on the visit to Grenada by four U.S. officials, one of whom returned to our Embassy in Bridgetown yesterday and gave us some report. The officials were there with the primary objective of ascertaining the situation regarding the some one-thousand U.S. citizens who are on the island, including about 500 students and faculty at the St. George's Medical School.

Q How many? I'm sorry.

A There are 500, roughly, students and faculty at the Medical School, about a thousand total U.S. citizens on the Island.

As you're aware from reports from the region, while there have been indications and reports of possible opening of the airport at St. George, there, in fact, has been no normal flow of traffic in the past days, and that situation apparently continues. No one has been leaving the Island through either regularly scheduled or chartered air flights. And while the reports of violence have dwindled, the situation remains unstable, troubled, and considerable uncertainty remains. But I really am not in a position to talk about contingency plans beyond that, and I'm just going to have to leave it at that.

Q Now that you know something about the situation or the composition of the new military commission, does the question of recognition arise?

A I don't have anything to offer you at this point on the question of recognition. I simply --

Q In other words, in the absence of raising it, then recognition continues as before.

A Well, I don't know what the strict legal situation is. We have tended to emphasize recognition of countries rather than governments per se. I don't know, though, Jim, what the situation is legally with regard to that.

Q Western diplomats are being quoted as saying at least a couple hundred of the Americans on Grenada want to leave. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it. As I say, we still have three people there, we had four altogether. We are looking into their welfare and so on.

Q Perhaps if I recall, you said that this official has sent to you information about the situation of the U.S. citizens. Do you have that information yet?

A I don't have anything specific to give you, no.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the charges by the Grenadian Government that the U.S. is preparing an invasion of Grenada?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q There are reports that the Jamaicans and Antiguans have sent troops to Bridgetown, Barbados. Are we in contact with the Jamaican Government?

A I think we're in contact with a variety of governments in the region. There's been a great deal of concern expressed by a number of governments about what has gone on in Grenada, but I don't have anything specific on that subject to give you.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Cuban statement on the events in Grenada?

A Not really. The Cubans have been involved there for a long time. And, obviously, they're not indifferent, it's quite clear, to what's going on. But I don't have a specific comment to offer on their comments.

Q You don't have any characterization of the statement itself which includes, sort of, condemnation of the events in Grenada?

A No. I think that the comments that they've made and some of the communiques they've issued have been rather lengthy and have addressed a number of specifics regarding that situation -- some of which go in that direction, some of which have sort of a different element to it. I'm just not prepared to comment on the Cuban --

Q (Inaudible)

A O.K., we're going to have about five more minutes then. Because of the Secretary's testimony I'm going to have to leave.

Q O.K. Iran-Iraq?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on new fighting there, (a); and there were reports over the weekend that Iraq had mined an Iranian port.

A   Yes. As far as fighting, I don't have anything for you. As far as the reports that Iraq may have mined the approaches to Bandar Khomeini -- as they in fact, I gather, had previously done -- we have seen those reports. The area in question, as I understand it, is in Iraqi territorial waters.

There is an inherent danger in such mining because the mines could drift into the international waters of the Gulf and thus endanger commercial and other shipping, and we believe it is incumbent upon the Iraqis to ensure that any mining done does not pose a threat to international waterways.

Q   Alan, do you have any comment on the Contadora statement yesterday -- that was issued yesterday -- the fresh thing?

A   No, I don't have anything on that.

Q   Alan, any further reaction on Nicaragua's peace?

A   No.

Q   Alan, I don't know why, if you have some information about U.S. citizens in Grenada, you don't release that information.

A   Partially that information, too, is private and they're private citizens and I'm not aware of what we have in the way of privacy act waivers and so on and so forth.

Jim, did you have a question?

Q   Do you have anything there, Alan, on the announced intention of the Soviets to go ahead with deployment of nuclear warheads in East Germany and Czechoslovakia?

A   I don't think I really do have anything on that. There's some older guidance which talks about deployment of Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe, and I guess I'd refer you to the Press Office on that. I don't think I have anything here on that.

Ralph?

Q   Do you have anything on why Ambassador Hartman is in Washington this week?

A   I think John indicated last week that he is back on consultations.

Q   Are they routine consultations?

A   There's nothing that I would look for that's beyond what an Ambassador normally does when he comes back on consultation.

Q   O.K., thank you.

A   O.K., you're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 12:53 p.m., the briefing was concluded.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, October 26, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #188

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1983, 12:31 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I just have a housekeeping announcement up front first. There will be a BACKGROUND briefing today on the President's forthcoming trip to Japan and Korea. That will be at 2:30 in the White House Press Room by a Senior Administration official.

I imagine we might as well get right to what I have on Grenada. Obviously, we're not able to get into a number of areas while military operations continue, and we are going to have to refer you to the Pentagon on specifics on the military side of the situation.

Most of the U.S. citizens on the island are under the control of U.S. forces. We have no information on any U.S. civilian casualties. The Governor-General is alive and well in Grenada. U.S. Air Force C-141s will today begin evacuating U.S. citizens on Grenada who want to leave.

An initial group was due to leave Point Salines Airport, Grenada, this morning. Those flights will proceed to the continental United States, but you will have to get the destination--they will be coming into U.S. Air Force bases in the United States, and you will have to get the location of those bases from the Pentagon. We do not have that for you. We expect they will arrive -- the first ones -- this afternoon or this evening.

American consular officials on Grenada tell us that about half of the 800 to 1000 Americans on Grenada have requested evacuation. That figure: 800-1000. We think about half of them have asked to come out.

The United States will also be evacuating foreign nationals who are permanent residents of the United States, and foreign nationals who are dependents of U.S. citizens or permanent residents.

We've also been asked to assist in the evacuation of other third-country foreign nationals, and we will do that.

That is about all I have for you.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q On the evacuation of civilians, did this government have any specific request from any civilians there or families here that their people on the island should be evacuated?

A Insofar as the consular officials that were sent in to the island under very difficult and limited conditions, Jim, yes. You have to understand that in the light of the instability that existed on the island before the military action, in light of the fact that they were only permitted in for brief periods, in light of the fact that they could really find no authorities with whom to deal, these were not very formal consultations. This was a question of getting to the college campuses and talking with students.

But, yes, the consular officials estimate that of those they talked to, about 100 requested evacuation or said they would like to leave the island, but were unable to.

Q Revolutions and other such civil disturbances are not unusual in this world today. Can you recall any other case where the United States invaded to protect the safety of U.S. civilians under such circumstances?

A I don't have such data in my head, Jim. I'll be glad to take a look at it and see what those are.

Q What was it that distinguished this one incident from the others where you did not take action?

A I think what precipitated the U.S. action was the request from the OECS.

Q John, in the more than 24 hours since the President announced the invasion of Grenada, the Reagan Administration has been unwilling or unable to detail any pre-invasion U.S. diplomatic efforts to arrange for the peaceful evacuation of Americans.

That leads to speculation that diplomacy was never seriously tried. Are you willing or able to detail any American diplomatic efforts before the invasion?

A Yes. I think we can give you later in the day -- I think some paper is being prepared on the chronology of consultations and discussions we have had with the

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regime on Grenada. But in addition to that, there are these discussions that I've just mentioned in terms of those that took place between the consular officials and the students.

Q Can you in a general way describe for us the quality and the kind of diplomatic dialogue that took place between 12 October and the invasion?

A I think I'll wait until we give you that very specifically. There was an exchange of some paper, and there was some contact by consular officials on the island, but very confused contact because it was not at all clear who was in charge. It was very difficult to find people in authority.

Q There are those who would say that the United States was clearly interested in exercising the military option as opposed to the diplomatic options. It has been said by some people on the Hill. How do you respond to that?

A The facts speak for themselves. We had a request, an absolutely legitimate request, from a regional organization in the area to assist. We considered that, and do consider it, a legal, legitimate request, and there have been two considerations as the Secretary and the President have indicated.

There is the question of the safety of U.S. citizens, and, of course, there has been the desire to restore peace and stability to a very restive island.

Q You link them very closely and inextricably apparently.

A You asked me what were the motivations. I give them to you as best I can.

Q Regarding the OECS request, can you tell us what the position of Montserrat was?

A I cannot specifically, but I think the position is that Montserrat -- I may be off a little off my expertise here -- is not fully admitted to the organization. I think that is the answer, but let me check that for you, John.

Q Because how does this affect their rules that all the decisions must be taken by unanimous consent of the membership of the --

A The decision was taken by unanimous consent of the members, but specifically insofar as Montserrat is concerned, let me do a little research. But I think the preliminary answer I've given you is the correct one.

Q One other question, please. Did Milan Bish, our Ambassador in Barbados, call the Chancellor of St. George Medical School and ask him to say that the U.S. students were in danger?

A I don't know. I don't know whether they talked or not.

Q On that last question, is Grenada a member of the OECS?

A I think it is.

Q Did it take part in the unanimous decision to --

A My understanding was it did not, and it's my understanding that the other members of the grouping determined that there was not a valid government in Grenada to participate in that decision.

Q Then --

A But you'd have to ask them, since it's their organization.

Q May I ask if we could have a filing break for what we have thus far?

A Sure. Filing break.

Q Can you tell us what messages of encouragement or support the United States has received from any world nation for this action?

A I can't. I don't have a list of them or --

Q Have there been any to your knowledge?

A I don't know, Ralph. Obviously, there's a lot of back and forth. There certainly have been diplomatic exchanges and expressions of support, but obviously, we're not going to be able to give you those. But I don't have a list of what people have said publicly.

Q Have any of those diplomatic representations come from any countries which have publicly not supported the invasion?

A Not going to get into private, diplomatic exchanges.

Q John, the French Government has now gone sort of out of its way on three separate occasions at the highest level -- except for the President -- condemned the U.S. participation in the invasion of Grenada.

Do you have any response, first, to the French condemnation?

A We took the action we did in concert with other countries, other countries in the area with an acute interest in this. We took the action we did for serious and, in our view, valid reasons. Obviously, we regret that there may be other countries that do not share our view. Some do; some do not.

Q But are we at all concerned, John, that, given the French position and the British position to which the Secretary addressed himself yesterday, that the Grenadan incident could have unfortunate consequences for the Western Alliance?

A I think people are always raising questions about the validity and the coherence of the Western Alliance, and it seems to survive pretty well. We have many common bonds, but there are also diversities of opinion in that Alliance.

In the case of a well-knit family, differences of opinion are often expressed, sometimes volubly, and they have been.

Q Let me follow this just a little bit more, because it does strike as being unusual this very severe condemnation by the French. So how does this Administration now feel about France which has followed its own course of policy in Africa?

A The Secretary of State will be leaving this afternoon, will be talking with the Foreign Minister of France, will be talking --

Q He will be talking to him?

A Of course. The agenda is not this particular subject. It is another matter -- obviously, Lebanon and the MNF -- but the relations are good. The family is still closely knit together. Within the family there may well be differences of opinion. I suspect this is -- I know this is not the first. I suspect it will not be the last difference of opinion, but we seem to function pretty well.

Q John, could you explain again for us -- we didn't understand it yesterday -- how this action jibes with the Organization of American States agreement?

A I think our legal experts have produced a piece of paper, which we'll be glad to make available to you afterwards. I'll just read -- it's a long piece of paper. But the fact is that in our view the collective actions of the United States, Jamaica, Barbados and the OECS states are consistent with the OAS charter.

The charter specifically allows OAS members to take collective action pursuant to regional security treaties in response to threats to peace and security. The OECS states are not parties to the Rio Treaty, and the OECS Treaty is their regional security arrangement.

The OECS Treaty concerns itself in part with matters of collective security. Article VIII of the OECS Treaty authorizes that organization to coordinate the efforts of member states for collective defenses.

Q What is that again? I'm sorry. I interrupted.

A Okay. Then I'll continue. As far as the U.N. Charter is concerned, regional and collective security measures are expressly contemplated by Article 52 of the U.N. Charter. Paragraph 1 of that Article provides for regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

So I understand that there are other viewpoints, but our argument is that the action we have taken in concert with these other nations is not inconsistent with either the U.N. Charter or the OAS Charter.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure. This is a fairly long --

Q Plus the legal documentation.

A This is the legal document. I was reading a couple paragraphs from it, but we'd be glad to --

Q Is it longer than that?

A It's two good long pages of closely typewritten material.

Q If I could follow on that, however, two questions: (1) On the question of Article 18 of the OAS Charter which is binding on all OAS states, including the Eastern Caribbean states which signed that, that is non-intervention and excluding the means specifically of force.

Does the United States consider itself in compliance with Article 18 of the U.N. Charter as was recited by Greg yesterday?

And, secondly, what is the external aggression to which Article VIII of the Eastern Caribbean Treaty -- to what does it refer in the case of Grenada?

A I think you have to place great significance on the views of the nations in the area. And the nations of the area who are members of OECS maintain that what has happened in Grenada is a threat to the stability of the area. That is their determination. We accept their viewpoint.

Q Are you saying the United States has delegated its responsibility for finding facts sufficient to comply with its own international agreements to the fact-findings of other nations?

A No. What we're saying is that they have made their case, we have accepted their case, they have made certain requests of us, and our decision was to participate, accede to that request.

Q To what extent was weighed within that, the opinions of other Caribbean states in the region such as Trinidad, the Bahamas, Guyana, and even Belize which is threatened by Guatemala?

A I'm sure the opinions in the area and, indeed, in other parts of the world were weighed. As the Secretary of State indicated yesterday, this was not an impulsive decision. It was a decision weighed carefully over a period of some time. Emissaries were sent to the area to talk to the countries involved. And at the end of that process -- a rather careful process -- the decision was made to proceed.

Q John, on the question of the threat to the Americans, both the Grenadans and the Cubans have revealed that they sent messages to the United States in the days preceding the invasion, assuring the United States that their nationals and other foreigners were safe. In fact the Cuban note, which was made public, also suggested discussions about ways of taking care of foreigners, and that the Cubans said they did not get a reply to their note until the invasion had already started.

I gather from what the White House said, the U.S. sent some kind of message to the Grenadans on a TELEX machine?

A I think we can document that for you later in the day.

Q Can you just discuss why it seems to be that the U.S. did not take into consideration these messages, or, if it did, it just threw them away?

A I'm sure it took into consideration such messages, Bernie, but I also think it would weigh those against the overall evidence that it had available to it.

There has been a difference between pronouncements by those who claim to be in control in Grenada, and the actions that in fact ensued. For example, there have been statements about the curfew and its duration and its lifting that were not carried out.

There have been statements about the ease of passage for charter flights. I think one network yesterday incorrectly reported that charter flights left Grenada. That's not true.

There is the question of our own consular representative trying to get in there, being given a signal that an aircraft might be permitted to land, and in fact the aircraft being turned away.

There is the treatment of a consular official -- our consular official -- upon arrival to have a plane surrounded by a bunch of young men pointing guns at the aircraft. It's not your traditional method of arrival in a country.

So I think that you have to weigh what has been said or what may have been said against the situation that in fact prevailed, against what we were told by students and others on the ground, and a variety of other assessments.

The President considered carefully the various strands in all this, and then made his decision.

Q Are you convinced that --

A Excuse me. Let me take a couple of other people here.

Q Can I take you back to the legal issues that you raised, please? Is it the Department's opinion that the request by these OECS countries has precedence over both the U.N. and OAS Charter that talk about non-intervention by force?

A It is the position of the United States that that request is not a violation. It is not in contradiction of either the OAS Charter or the U.N. Charter.

Q Not the request, but the response to that request. You are saying that the request is legal?

A Yes.

Q But the response of the U.S. is legal also?

A Yes, of course.

Q John, what do you know about reports from Barbados that Soviets on Grenada have abrogated their diplomatic status and have taken up arms?

A I know nothing of such reports. Certainly, you have to bear with us because, obviously, it is a confused situation on the ground. But the latest information we have is that these Soviets of whom we are aware are in Soviet diplomatic buildings and have not ventured out.

Q A follow-up on the precedence, please?

A I'm sorry. Excuse me?

Q Please? Mr. Hughes?

A I'm sorry. Oh, here.

Q On the precedence, you said that the United States had to reply for an urgent appeal by those neighboring countries which were concerned with what is happening in their neighborhood.

Suppose that next time Honduras, Guatemala and Salvador would decide that they are disturbed or concerned with what is happening in Nicaragua and they would ask the United States to help and intervene, would you intervene, using this precedence?

A I mean, I don't want to suggest that anybody has been doing any thinking about that. What I would suggest is that is a hypothetical situation, and, should that occasion arise, as with any hypothetical situation, then we would confront it.

Q Can you comment on an OECS Minister's statement this morning that the U.S. Marines probably would not need to remain in Grenada beyond six months?

A Six months?

Q Yes.

A That sounds surprising in the light of the way the President addressed it. The President made the point that those U.S. troops will be out as soon as that is possible. I think he --

Q How long is that? I mean, six months could be "as soon as possible."

A I think you'll have to ask the President what he means by "as soon as possible." I think he means as soon as possible.

Q Following on that, Mr. Charles (sic) said today at the OAS, "After normalcy has been restored, non-Caribbean forces -- presumably meaning the United States -- will withdraw from Grenada."

How do we define "normalcy"? Do we defer to their definition of normalcy? Can you answer those two questions?

A I think that as soon as the safety of U.S. -- as soon as the evacuation is complete, as soon as the safety of our citizens and others in whose well-being we are interested is assured and peace and stability has returned to the island, then arrives the question of our departure.

Presumably, the other forces would remain on. I think that has been suggested by various leaders of their countries. I think Prime Minister Seaga suggested that, but I would assume that we would be gone.

Q But how are you going to define -- I mean, what is "peace and stability"? Are you going to be in consultation with the OECS to define what "peace and stability" or "normalcy" mean?

A I think it's something that you know when you see it, Jim. I think we will know peace and stability when we see it.

-- MORE --

Q John, how do you visualize the creation of a new political entity in Grenada? What institutions are you looking at? Does it revert to the previous constitution, the 1979 constitution? Just how is that being thought of at the moment?

A It's early days, obviously, but our thinking is that the Governor-General is the constitutional authority. As I said, he is known to be safe and on the island.

Q It's Paul Scoon, is it?

A Yes. And I presume that he would take any constitutional intitiative. Now, what that will be, whether the appointment of some kind of provisional government, I don't know. But I would think that that's where one would look now for the next constitutional move.

Q When did you find out he was safe, and where is he?

A I do not know where he is, and I really can't tell you when we knew he was safe.

Q His whereabouts were unknown for a time early on?

A I think that was probably true in the initial analysis.

Q Doesn't this require the permission of the British throne to do this?

A I don't know, John. You're asking me a constitutional question.

Q He is the voice of the throne?

A As I understand it, he is the legitimate constitutional authority.

Q Do you contemplate any role at all for Sir Eric Gairy?

A I don't know about that.

Q There are people on Grenada, presumably alive, who are responsible for the murder of Maurice Bishop. Would they be arrested by U.S. or other forces and detained for the U.S. Government?

A I don't know what is happening in terms of arress, but it certainly seems to me that in terms of any process against them, that would be a matter for the Grenadan authorities --

Q But there are no Grenadan authorities, John. That's the point.

A One hopes that that situation will be remedied soon.

Q In other words, they wouldn't walk around loose, I presume, until that point?

A I don't know what the situation is. I know that we have some Cuban nationals under arrest, but I do not know what is the situation concerning Grenadan nationals.

Q What will happen to those Cuban nationals, John?

A I can't really give you much on that. I think that that is a matter that we're in touch with the Cuban authorities about, and we'll tell you a little bit later.

Q How many of them are there?

A I think they're a couple hundred; 200 to 250 at the moment.

Q Are we going to require the evacuation of Americans there?

A No.

Q It'll just be voluntary?

A Sure.

Q Does that suggest that the situation there is now safe enough so that people can stay there?

A Safe? I don't know how safe it is today. Certainly, one of those campuses is secure and under U.S. control. I gather that the second campus is pretty much under U.S. control, although I gather that also some students have moved from that campus to the other campus. It is obviously going to be safe enough to get people out of that airport.

Q But if it's not -- if there's some question about the safety and we went in there to secure the safety of the Americans, why wouldn't we require them to leave?

A Because I assume that the situation is much improved over what existed there several days ago, or shortly will be.

Q Do you have any indication that the difference with the French is a spelling out maybe in other areas like the Middle East?

A No. I think that they have their view of this particular situation, and we have our view of it.

Q Is Shultz prepared to answer questions on Grenada at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris?

A By other Foreign Ministers? Oh, I would think so.

Q So long as we are on whereabouts of people, can you tell us where Mr. Austin is?

A Sorry?

Q Austin?

A No, do not. I've seen wire reports that he's in the Soviet Embassy, but I do not know that.

Q When will the Administration allow United States journalists on the island?

A I don't know. The Pentagon, obviously, is in control of that situation.

Q John, it was a political decision to go in. When will the political leaders of this country make the decision to let us in? Are you saying that the Pentagon is saying no reporters to the island?

A First of all, it's not our island. First of all, it belongs to somebody else, so there's that factor.

Q Who does it belong to, John? Wait a minute, John.

A I'm not playing games, but it's not quite as clear-cut as someone in this building --

Q Are we not the authority on that island right now?

A As of this moment, I suppose we are.

Q Okay. If the United States is the legitimate authority on that island, why, then, cannot U.S. journalists go onto that island?

A You're going to have to talk to the Pentagon about access and how you get onto that island as of 12:57 on a Wednesday morning.

Q In 1965, they brought you in on military transports to Santo Domingo.

A Well, times have changed.

Q Would the State Department find it appropriate to get into that question? I mean, not with the press, but with the Pentagon?

A If we were asked for a view on that, sure. I don't see why we would be reluctant to offer a view.

Q We're asking for that view, John.

A We'll be glad to talk to the Pentagon about it and see where they stand.

Q John, did you just say that the United States is the legitimate authority on the island?

A Sorry?

Q Did you just say that the United States is the "legitimate" authority on the island?

A I'm not speaking in a legal sense, but if you mean, if you walk around in the capital, who do you see on the streets? I imagine you see a lot of United States soldiers.

Q So it's not in a legal sense; is that correct?

A I've told you that the Governor-General is safe. I've told you to look to him for constitutional developments. Our communications with him are not exactly instant. By the time we end this briefing, maybe he's taken some action.

Q You were in touch with Cuban authorities with respect, I guess, to the repatriation of the prisoners, and so on. Castro said, I guess early this morning, that they were open to the idea of talking to the United States about a laying down of arms.

Is this process what you're referring to when you say you are in touch, and can you say how it is that you are in touch?

A No. Can't tell you how we are in touch, but we are in touch with the Cubans on this question of their nationals in this country.

Q And on the question raised by Castro this morning?

A Which is what?

Q That they were willing to engage in a dialogue with the United States regarding the continuing fighting on the island.

A I think the dialogue with those who have been shooting at our troops and who have been captured is over. They have been disarmed, and they are in our custody. Insofar as the others that are still out there who seem to be, or who have seemed to be demonstrating a remarkable degree of military capacity for construction workers, I assume those discussions are going on.

Q You have said you have consulted with some members of this regional association. You have consulted with the United Kingdom; with two members of two other Caribbean nations. Others were consulted about this?

A I'm sure we have talked with a large number of countries about this.

Q Beforehand, you mean?

A I can't give you the timeframe.

Q Can I clear up one chronological detail? Was the planning and the possibility of this invasion a consideration in the Secretary of State cancelling his trip to Latin America this week?

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A I'm trying to remember the chronology. The answer to that is no, but I'm trying to remember the exact hour at which he cancelled his trip, and I think it was Sunday, post-Beirut. I think the Beirut factor was the motivation for it.

Q And Grenada was not a consideration at all?

A No.

Q May I ask a question about the State Department's position on whether journalists should be permitted on the island? You said the State Department would be willing to consult with the Pentagon. Does the State Department believe journalists ought to be permitted there?

A I assume that when it is safe for journalists to go to the island, which is a factor, and when the authorities there are agreeable, I would assume that our position would be favorable. I'm not able to tell you what recommendation we have made to the Pentagon.

Q Have you already made one?

A No.

Q It's not safe?

A I said I assume that one of the factors would be the safety of getting people in, and this whole question of getting people out. There are logistics and security, and a variety of reasons.

Q John, you know none of those are legitimate reasons.

A I spent a lot of time in Vietnam, and it does --

Q Are you equating this with Vietnam?

A No, I'm absolutely not. I'm trying to be helpful to you, and if you choose to interpret my remarks that way, then I'll cut this off right now. Let me finish.

I happened to move around Vietnam quite a lot, and it certainly seemed to me the questions of security and questions of transportation certainly played a role in the way journalists were able to move around Vietnam.

Q John, agreed. But if we have those airports secured -- there are two runways on that island -- why is not possible, then, for us --

A Be a little patient, you know.

Q The operation will be over.

A We're just able to get these people out there today.

Q Can I ask you two questions that relate, the sending of the forces to the Grenada and the sending of the forces in Lebanon? One, does the Administration view the status of the War Powers reporting the same way in connection with Grenada as it does in connection with the Lebanon Marines; and, two, does the Administration see the duration of the stay in Grenada to be on the same kinds of terms as the stay in Lebanon, namely, stability of the central government?

A You have two very different situations, and, obviously, the duration of the troops in Lebanon and Grenada are quite different questions. The President has said he wants those troops out as soon as possible, and it seems to me you have a much different situation.

Q Could you explain why?

A No. I don't think so. I think it's rather obvious. In terms of the notification, I think you ought to talk to the White House and get any interpretation from their (inaudible).

Q Hasn't the President and the Secretary both said that they want foreign forces out of Lebanon as soon as possible?

A Yes, but there are a multiplicity of problems in Lebanon. The problem may be a more simple one in Grenada.

Q John, you said that your discussions with Cuba at the moment are centering on the question of those construction workers who are still fighting. Do I infer correctly, then, that the question under discussion is of the nature of the surrender of those construction workers?

A No, no. Discussions with Cuba involve all Cuban nationals presently in Grenada. But somebody said,

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are you entering into a dialogue about the future, and I was just making the division between those who are already in custody and those who are still out there. But, no, we're not talking about a dialogue.

Q Can you offer us any hard evidence that medical students and other Americans were jeopardized?

A The fact that the consular officials went in there, talked to them, about a hundred of them that they talked to said they wanted to leave and were unable to leave, and the fact that about half of them apparently have expressed a desire to leave, seems to indicate something afoot there that caused them concern.

Q Why didn't you say that on Monday when you got that information?

A I wasn't here.

Q Alan was asked about that, and he said he couldn't give that information because it was something like private information, or something like that. Why didn't you give that information?

A I'm not sure when we had that information. I just want to point out that the suggestion that the consular official flew into that island, went through customs, went through formalities, had freedom to move where he wanted, was able to stay as long as he liked, was able to leave whenever he wanted to, that is a very fanciful description of what happened. It was very difficult to get in there, it was difficult to move about, difficult to know who was in control, difficult to know when you could leave.

The discussions that were undertaken were of a sporadic character. You had to talk to people where you could.

Q Do you have contacts with the Soviets on this problem in Grenada?

A Yes, we're in touch with the Soviets on this.

Q Have the Soviets filed an official protest?

A I'm not aware of that.

Q When are these documents going to be ready?

A I think within a very short time.

Q Will this also include --

A The chronology may be a couple hours, but certainly the legal document is available. Certainly, I have a copy of it. I don't know how long it'll take.

Q Will you also make public the document the Secretary referred to, the message that got him at a meeting at 2:00 in the morning, Saturday, from the eastern Caribbean countries?

Q Also, John, I have some more historical questions for you, you and the rest of the record. Did the United States approach any of these Caribbean countries prior to Saturday and talk with them informally or in any other way --

A Not to my knowledge.

Q -- about the possibility of some kind of operation?

A Not to my knowledge. I really think one of the good things to do would be to talk to them. They have taken a number of unilateral actions, a number of these countries. They've taken a number of multilateral actions outside this operation, and there's no doubting that they were and are deeply concerned. You don't need to invent concern on their part.

Q What can you tell us about arrangements with the Cunard Lines, to use one of their cruise ships, The Countess, as early as Saturday to evacuate Americans from the island?

A Don't know anything about it. The evacuation of which I'm aware is by air. Don't know anything about a cruise ship.

Q This was prior to the invasion.

A Prior to the invasion? No, don't know anything about it.

Q There is a report that the Embassy in Barbados asked State Department permission to use this cruise ship which was in Grenadan waters to evacuate people, and the State Department never replied.

A I still don't know anything about it.

Q The implication being that the State Department wanted this invasion no matter what?

A I never heard of this; never heard of such a report.

Q Never heard of it?

A No.

Q Can you check on that, please?

A Let me take a look and see what we can find.

Q Where is Ambassador McNeil? Is he still down there?

A I'm not quite sure where he is, John. Be glad to look at that one for you.

Q Are the discussions that the U.S. is having with Cuba over the Cuban nationals who are on the island aimed at stopping the fighting? Are they aimed at removal of Cuban nationals from Grenada, or what?

A I think they're basically designed to discover -- I guess I really shouldn't go into it. I almost fell there. I guess I really shouldn't go into it.

Q Does the U.S. want the Cuban nationals to leave Grenada?

A It's not a question of that. It's a question of our going in there, having assured the Cubans and the Soviets that no harm was intended to their nationals, and now seeking to facilitate exit if that's what they want of those nationals.

Q It's not a question of getting the Cubans off Grenada?

A If they want to stay, they can stay.

Q What is the status, John, of the Grenadan Ambassador to the U.S.?

A I don't know about the Grenadan Ambassador. I understand the Grenadan Permanent Representative to the U.N. has --

Q The diplomatic personnel; put it that way?

A I don't know the specifics, but some of them are certainly dispersed and unavailable.

Q Why is that, John?

A I don't know.

Q John, you say the Cubans and Russians can stay in Grenada if they feel like it, what, then, was the purpose of the invasion?

A We're talking about basically Soviet diplomatic personnel. That's one question. As far as these construction workers are concerned, we did not initiate action against them. But they fired on U.S. troops, the U.S. fired back, and so a number of them were captured and disarmed. There has to be an intelligent resolution of what happens to those.

Q But they can still all stay --

A This is the kind of discussion we're in with Cuban authorities at the moment.

Q Until the establishment of civil authority on the island, who or what's in control? What's the paramount authority? Is the commander of the American forces?

A As I say, you're asking a legalistic question, and I can't give you a legal answer. If you say, well, who is in physical control of the main points today, I guess it's U.S. military troops, but I also point out that there is a Governor-General and one expects to hear from him soon.

Q On the question, again, on control or authority, when you were asked about Eric Gairy you didn't know -- you said you didn't know what it was, what his status might be. But Eugenia Charles, again, at the OAS said that Eric Gairy and other undesirable elements will not be welcome in Grenada for the foreseeable future.

This raises a question, because you're saying that the United States is in physical control; they're saying that they've already made agreements with respect to the transitions to elections and when U S. forces might leave. And then you're also asserting that the Governor-General is in legal authority.

There seems to be -- I mean, I hate to be -- well, no. That would be facetious. Who exactly is making decisions of a political nature on the island today, and is there such an authority, or is there no government effectively?

A There obviously has not been an effective government for some days. That has been the cause of concern for Grenada's neighboring states. That is what has so deeply concerned them. I don't know that the situation has improved very much. I think you have to be a little realistic. This operation has been going on for just a day. There was fighting yesterday. Such questions as getting newsmen in and finding the Governor-General may have taken a day to resolve.

Q But we're talking about restoring elections and democracy, and the OECS is already talking about excluding various kinds of politically undesirable individuals, and the Governor-General was just found.

A I'm not going to interpret Prime Minister Charles' comments. We have said what we're going to do. We're there for the protection of our citizens and the restoration of peace and stability, and when that is achieved we will be gone and others will have to chart Grenada's future.

Q Today, in Evans & Novak, there was something about retribution against Syria for the blast at the Marine headquarters, and that Secretary Weinburger talked to the President and other Administration members out of it for fear of angry, moderate, Arab countries. (A) Do you have something on that; (B) is there any retribution being considered; (C) since Mr. Eagleburger is going to Israel at the end of the week or the beginning of next week, is any contact being considered with Syria -- has there been since the blast?

A I'm sure there have been diplomatic contacts with Syria since the explosion.

Let me try to answer your three questions.

No comment on Evans & Novak.

As far as the explosion is concerned and the question of retribution, the investigation is still ongoing. This occured on Lebanese territory so it is primarily a Lebanese investigation. But the United States -- our own military investigation is proceeding with great vigor.

The French are proceeding vigorously with a similar investigation. We are coordinating very closely with the French and with the Lebanese, and when we find out the results of that investigation, that will be the time to raise that other question.

Q As far as the Syrian contact is concerned, is it at the level high enough that would diffuse the tension of all the rhetoric that is going back and forth for the last few days?

A I don't know what level the contacts have been. I don't know. For example, I don't know whether the Ambassador there has seen the Foreign Minister. I honestly don't know.

Q Will the Secretary stop off in Israel after his consultation visit to Europe?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the assassination attempts on the Jordanian Ambassadors in India and this morning in Italy?

A No, I don't.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:15 P.M.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, October 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #189

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1983, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements. First, available in the Press Office following the briefing will be copies of the speech by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam before the American Jewish Committee in Philadelphia; that is, tonight. The subject is, "The Price of Peace: U.S. Middle East Policy." There is an embargo on that, and I'd ask you to pay attention to that, please.

Q What time is that?

A The speech?

Q What time is the embargo on that?

A I don't have the embargo sheet on that with me. Sorry.

Q The speech is at 6:30.

A I'm not sure the embargo is at 6:30, because I think the dinner starts then. Anyway, take whatever the embargo sheet says.

Also, Deputy Secretary Dam will deliver an ON THE RECORD keynote address on U.S.-Soviet Relations before a conference entitled, "A Search for Solutions: U.S.-USSR," sponsored by the International House on Monday, October 31, at 8:30 a.m. at Mandel Hall on the University of Chicago campus. If you wish to cover this event, please contact Christopher Anderson of the Unversity's News and Information Office at (312) 962-8353.

Q Will you have a text of that?

A I don't know at this point what is available. We'll see what we can do for you.

You want a copy of the announcement, did somebody say?

Q A copy of the speech.

A A copy of the speech. I wondered. (Laughter) I didn't think it was that hot a -- we'll try.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have a general readout, please, on the conditions today in Grenada?

A I don't have a very broad readout, Mike. I guess I would have to refer you to the Pentagon for any military readout.

On the political/diplomatic side, the Governor-General is in Grenada now. And as has been indicated, he is the legal authority. He has, in fact, been the legal authority since the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop. I don't know what his plans are. I can't give you an indication of that, except that I do understand he's planning to address the nation of Grenada by radio on his plans and presumably other questions this afternoon, or tonight -- I don't know, but sometime today. And if we can get a readout on the timing of that, I'll be happy to give it to you.

Q The Canadian Government says that it is trying to get permission, but the United States has refused, for one of its military aircraft to land at Grenada to pick up some 20-30-40 of its citizens. What is the status of that request, and why has it been denied so far?

A The Canadians have urged us to allow such a flight to take place as soon as possible, as have several other countries. We want to honor this and all similar requests. The Canadian plane will be authorized to land just as soon as the military situation permits, and we can be that this will not expose the Canadians and others on the scene to undue danger. Meanwhile, we've offered to evacuate Canadian nationals along with American citizens on departing U.S. military flights. And, in fact, I believe that -- let me just check. I think there had been some Canadians on these --

Q You have the number of how many have --

A I have a total number. I really don't have a breakdown by each nationality other than the U.S. The figures at the moment -- again, certain imprecision on this -- but that a total of 377 Americans and other nationals have been evacuated from Grenada, including 343 U.S. citizens and some 34 third country nationals.

Q What was that last figure?

A Thirty-four. They come from Canada, France, Romania, Greece, U.K., Nigeria, Iran, Yugoslavia, India, Philippines, Korea --

Q Which one?

A Don't have which one. Germany --

Q Which one? (Laughter)

A I repeat my previous answer.

-- Turkey and Lebanon.

Q Which one?

A Now, now, now. (Laughter)

As I understand it, there have been six planeloads so far, but the totals obviously will be going up, and I would ask you to stay in touch with the Pentagon on it.

Q How many more are standing around and requesting evacuation -- Americans or other nationals?

A I don't have a number on that, Mike. There are more, but I don't have a number on it.

Q Are they having to pay for this themselves?

A The fact is that normally evacuees are required to pay, but in this case we are looking into ways to see if the U.S. Government can't pick up the tab on it.

Q Can you clear up the question on the charter flights because you have U.S./OAS -- a citizen who is operating there under OAS auspices -- who says that, in fact, four charter flights took off Monday despite what the Administration said about no charter flights being permitted in and out.

You also have the allegation that's contained in the Post story about the Canadians, that, in fact, the invading nations prevented any charter flights or commercial aircraft from going in or out.

A I think I've addressed that in response to the Canadian question, what has happened since our forces, the Caribbean forces, have control of the air fields. That is true. We have said that we didn't -- until this safety factor permitted it, we didn't want them in there.

On the other, I can only tell you that my information is no further along than what John gave you the other day on that.

Q Just to get that straight, the United States Government is still maintaining that the Government of Grenada or the non-government of Grenada was permitting no charter flights or commercial aircraft to arrive in Grenada to take people out of there; is that the U.S. position?

A I have nothing further than was given you the other day.

Q Is that a correct characterization?

A I refer you back to what was said. I just refer you back to the words that were used. I don't quarrel with the sense of it, Jim, but I don't have what was used.

Q What is the status of the repatriation, if you want to call it that, of the Cubans that have been taken prisoner, arrested, in custody?

A We continue to be in touch with the Cubans and with others who have expressed a willingness to be of assistance in this effort on repatriation, but I don't have any details to give you at this point.

Q None have left the island?

A To my knowledge, none have left the island at this point.

Q (Inaudible)

A I think that there have been some wire accounts coming out on that. I don't haven't have any -- that's what I'm really referring to.

Q There was a press conference, I gather that the Prime Minister of Barbados, in which he said an American official -- he didn't identify him -- first approached his government back when Prime Minister Bishop was under house arrest and suggested the idea of a joint rescue operation. He said this is what started -- which triggered the planning and everything that eventually changed its focus, of course, from a rescue operation of Bishop to that of the American students. Can you comment on that?

A I don't have anything on that, Bernie. I think that we have indicated before that in terms of this operation that we received a formal OECS request on Sunday, October 23, from Eugenia Charles, who is, as you know, the Chairperson of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States and the Prime Minister of Dominica.

We had been informally approached on an urgent basis by the Caribbean states as early as the weekend of October 15-16 --

Q This is something new.

A -- after the takeover by the Revolutionary Military Council on the 13th. These informal approaches became more urgent following confirmation of the assassination of the late Prime Minister Bishop.

Q Were these informal approaches that we have a kind of military operation?

A Again, I don't have details to give you on this. There were concerns, though, about what was going on. I really can't take it beyond that.

Q What was the approach exactly? What do you mean, "you were approached?" By whom to do what?

A I don't have more detail other than the fact that they were concerned about what was going on and were consulting, in essence, with us about what was a mutual concern. We had a lot of people there. They had people. They have, obviously, concerns as neighbors.

Q Do you know whether this same group turned to the British and asked for similar assistance?

A You would have to ask them about that.

Q Who is "they?"

A The OECS.

Q (Inaudible) in this informal approach?

A I can't tell you. What do you mean -- in terms of us? Simply the Caribbean states is really what I've got here, and I don't think I would be able to give you a breakdown.

Q In terms of the U.S. Government, who in the U.S. Government was approached?

A Again, I don't have details.

Q Which Caribbean states, Alan?

A I don't have details.

Q So it wasn't necessarily the OECS; is that correct?

A I think that it may have gone -- whether there were countries who are not in the OECS who were involved in discussions, I can't tell you.
But certainly the countries who were involved, many of the countries who are in the OECS were involved and the OECS as an organization, perhaps, too.

Q This is a critical point. Is there any possible way of getting clarity or whether we're talking about the informal approach by OECS or by a Caribbean country that was not a OECS member?

A In the end I'm not sure it's such a critical point. In the end what we had was -- I think basically we are talking about the OECS countries -- but in the end what we had was a request, first, informal, urgent and specific, and later formal from the OECS to go in.

Hold it, hold it. Let's try one at a time.

Q Can I just walk through with this with your permission? Secretary Shultz said, as far as I know, the first request we had from the Caribbean states was Saturday after they had met on Friday. That was Saturday, whatever it was -- the 21st.

A Saturday was the 22nd.

Q The Prime Minister of Barbados said that in fact the first inkling he got of any discussion about any military operation was right after Prime Minister Bishop was put under house arrest on the 13th.

A Excuse me, Bernie, let me just stop there a second.

Q You're not confirming that?

A That's correct.

Q You're saying now that we did get an informal request from some Caribbean nations on October 15?

A An informal approach.

Q And the informal approach was to do what?

A I don't have a characterization to offer you other than that it was on an urgent basis about what was going on there.

Q What was the American reaction to this urgent, informal approach?

A Specifics, I don't have. We continued to discuss the issues over the next several days, and eventually they made a request to us to which we responded.

Q Did the U.S. Government, during this period, undertake any preliminary military planning?

A I think the Secretary went through that entire scenario, and he addressed it in as much detail -- certainly, more detail than I could do it, and I think in a rather complete fashion.

Q The reason I ask is, clearly, an operation of this size requires some detailed planning. The impression we got from the Secretary -- I'm not casting any doubt on his good will -- was that the first serious planning by the U.S. Government occurred on Thursday when Vice President Bush chaired a meeting of his crisis group following the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop. But the information which has come from Barbados and from you is that actually planning must have gone on even before Bishop was killed.

A I'm not suggesting to you planning went on. I don't know what contingency planning goes on on a routine basis. In terms of the specific situation in Grenada, and the events there, I would refer you to what the Secretary said about when a decision was taken to have some ships stay in that area and that that was to be available on an if-needed basis. He was rather detailed in that scenario.

Q You also used the word before that the informal request was "urgent and specific."

A Informal approach.

Q Informal, and you said "urgent" and "specific." What specifically was the approach -- that the U.S. take military action?

A I'm sorry, I don't remember using that.

Q But you said a moment ago, "informal, urgent and specific."

A In terms of the informal request that was made later in the weekend prior to going in. That's what I'm talking about. I'm not talking about the 15th and 16th.

Q The 15th and 16th was simply an informal approach?

A That's correct.

Q You're not using words like "urgent" and "specific" in that connection?

A "Urgent" in that connection; not "specific." What I am saying is "specific" was that they were making an informal request -- I think I recall Saturday; I would refer you back to what the Secretary said -- that we do what we've done. They then made that a formal request on Sunday. That's what I'm talking about when I say "specific," Marvin. Not the previous weekend.

Q Prior to this initial, informal approach, around the 15th, was there any American official contact with any of the nations in the region which would have suggested either directly or indirectly that we would be open to such an informal approach?

A I think that you're leading this, all by this questioning, away from what I think is essentially the fact on this; and that is, we all had an interest in what was going on. I'm sure that in the course of normal diplomatic discourse with the countries of the region that there was discussion about what was going on in Grenada.

Your question suggests something, however, which we've made very clear was not the case; and that is, the suggestion in your question is that we stimulated a request from them, and that simply is not the case.

Q Alan, could I bring you back to Marvin's question. Did the informal approach, which began on the 15th of October and continued after that, was that concentrated on coming up with a rescue plan for Bishop?

A I don't know what the answer to that is in terms of -- a rescue plan for Bishop?

Q Yes, sir; he was still alive.

A No, I didn't say that.

Q You were making a distinction between Bishop and the students and then the larger military action itself.

A No, what I was making distinction between was the timing which was that there was -- the Revolutionary Military Council took over on the 13th. The informal approach that I referred to here, on the 15th and 16th, was following that. What I said, then, was the informal approaches became even more urgent, or became more urgent following confirmation of the assassination of Prime Minister Bishop. That's what I said about that.

--MORE--

Q My question is, then, between those two periods, between the 15th and the confirmation of Bishop's assassination, were the informal contacts centered on a plan to get Bishop released?

A I'm aware of no planning of that sort.

Q Then, what were they about?

A Again, I said, Fred, that I don't have -- I think -- put it in the context of what was going on there and the concerns that people had. There was an increasingly uncertain situation, and we've gone through the chronology. You're well aware of it -- of curfews and all the rest of that --obviously leading to the execution of Bishop and others. I think the concerns were evident from the very beginning. I don't see why that's so strange.

Q Is it not vital to the credibility of this whole operation to determine what that request was -- what specifically?

A I didn't say it was a request. O.K.?

Q O.K. Approach -- what that approach was all about?

A Let me see if I can dig something out further. There is, obviously, a reluctance to get into diplomatic discourse. But I would suggest to you that -- go back to the point I made to Mike, that the idea that the U.S. stimulated a request to take military action is off-base.

Q Did the United States informally respond to the informal approach made by the Eastern Caribbean States?

A I'm sure we talked with them. We're talking about diplomatic exchanges.

Q But did the U.S., when you talked with them, respond in terms of just listening and saying, "Thank you for your views," or did the U.S. --

A Ralph, you're trying to probe into something which is --

Q I'm just trying to make sure you're not in one of those situations where you may be quoted in a way you might find not to your liking. The Prime Minister of a country is saying that a U.S. official approached him and suggested the idea of some military operation right after Bishop was put under house arrest. You're saying, "We did not stimulate this."

You're saying that we did not stimulate what, the formal request?

A What I've been talking about is stimulating a request for U.S. military action.

Q Are you positive that no American official, maybe from some agency other than the Foreign Service, did not go to the Prime Minister and suggest the idea of some planning on some military operation?

A Let me go back and get you a formal answer to all of this, and see if we can clear it up that way. But I --

Q Can you also handle the Cuban question? There was a briefing yesterday at the White House which suggested that by going in when we did, we headed off a possible Angolan-type, Cuban build-up?

A What I would say to that, Bernie, is the following, that the President and the Secretary have laid out the reasons for the decision for going in on this operation. It would be foolish to suggest that people, when they thought about Grenada, did not have in their minds concerns about the Cuban presence in Grenada. And, in fact, I think what we're finding is that those concerns were all too valid and justified.

But in any case, the reasons for the decision, in terms of the safety of Americans, in terms of the request from the OECS and the concerns for restoring order, peace, and stability are the reasons that were behind the decision.

Q Going on to the students, Alan. Do we have good intelligence information that this country was about to face a new hostage situation in Grenada with the students?

A I can't get into the question of what intelligence we might have had on that.

Q Can I go back to the informal approach for just a second? Do you distinguish between what you call an "informal approach on an urgent basis" from the normal give-and-take between the Caribbean nations in the area and the United States that took place in this crisis?

Why are you singling out, saying there was this informal approach on an urgent basis, if it was nothing other than that?

A Simply pointing out that as early as 2-3 days after the Revolutionary Military Council took over, the countries there expressed to us, on an urgent basis, their concerns about what was going on.

Q If I could just follow once, this informal approach, did it -- and I'm not saying the United States initiated it; put that to rest -- did this informal approach --

A Good, good. (Laughter)

Q For now. -- did this informal approach contain within it the possibility of any military action by any state or states in the region?

A Again, I will see what I can get on what was the nature of this informal approach. I'm not sure what I can provide for you, but I will look into it.

Q In connection with this same thing, maybe it could be helpful. Was the approach, (1) to do something about trying to save Bishop; (2) trying to evacuate, in a quick in-and-out sequence, the students who were there; or (3) what we have now done, which is to move forces into an island? Could you check on that?

A I'll see what I can do about factoring that in.

Q What is the size of the Cuban -- I mean, there are some reports of 2 Cuban battalions. Now I see on the wires some White House -- Speakes is talking about a "combat engineer battalion." Is that what --

A I don't have detail on that beyond what was said at the Pentagon yesterday.

Q Is there still fighting going on? There are press reports that it's all over, the last of the resistance -- reports out of Barbados and --

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon on the status of that.

Q Alan, you said you are now finding that the concerns on the Cuban presence were all too justified. What do you mean, that the military presence was larger, that they were taking a more active role in controlling the government?

A I don't have details at this point that I can give you, but I think that that information will be made available in due course.

Q Do you have indication that in the last days of his government, Mr. Bishop was trying to align his policies closer to the U.S.?

A I don't have a comment on Mr. Bishop's policies.

Q Alan, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, which chaired the CARICOM meeting which took place last weekend also, has put out a press release apparently to the effect that the Revolutionary Military Council had contacted the Governor-General to be in touch with Trinidad and Tobago, and to ask the Governor-General to act as an intermediary, and that Trinidad and Tobago had been discussing the creation of a provisional government with the RMC through the Governor-General at the time of the invasion, about which Trinidad and Tobago was not informed.

Does that ring --

A I'm not going to address something that went on between the Governor-General and somebody else. You might get your questions put to the Governor-General.

I might note that in Deputy Secretary, or Acting Secretary Dam's statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this morning, he noted that the Governor-General of Grenada made a confidential, direct appeal to the OECS to take action to restore order on the island.

Q When?

A I don't have details. I would assume that this question may have been addressed. I haven't heard what the testimony was -- I mean, what the exchange might have been up there, so I don't have further details.

Well, I guess I do. I'm sorry. That confidential appeal was over the weekend -- I think, on the -- Well, no, no. I don't have it.

Q To whom was it addressed, Alan?

A To the OECS.

Q Not to Trinidad, is that correct?

A I just said, it was to the OECS.

Q (Inaudible)

A I can only tell you what I just said, which was to the OECS; and, presumably, questions about what the Governor-General did can be addressed at some point to the Governor-General.

Q Do you have an independent knowledge of the transmission of such a direct appeal, and do we know whether it was in verbal or in written form?

A I'm not going to get into the details of what the Governor-General of Grenada did with other countries other than to say that --

Q Did the British Foreign Secretary today ask Secretary Shultz for an immediate withdrawal of American troops?

A I have no idea, Bernie.

Q It's on the FBIS.

A I have no idea.

Ralph, what was your question?

Q Alan, which weekend? You said it occurred over the weekend.

A I don't have -- I'm backing away from the timeframe. I don't have the detail.

Q The 15th?

A No, I think it would have been in the later timeframe.

Q On the repatriation of the Cubans, have you received any formal request or formal approach by Colombia and Spain?

A I'm not going to get into the details of what we've been doing. As I said before, though, we have been in touch not only with Cuba, but with other countries who have expressed a willingness to be of assistance in this repatriation question.

Q What is the attitude here to Senator Childe's suggestion that the return of the Cuban prisoners be a package deal, that you have to return the imprisoned refugees here?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you confirm reports that the coup that ousted Bishop and finally assassinated him was master-minded by the Soviet Ambassador, or four-star General, by the name of Genardy Sakenev?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Have your forces found, in the materiel that they have captured, any more evidence concerning the Soviet angle in this?

A I don't have any details on what has been found beyond what Secretary Weinberger talked about yesterday, at this point.

Q To follow up, another report by a French high official to our paper in Paris today saying that after Bishop visited the United States in June of this year and talked to Dam and Clark at that time, the Soviets decided that he might have passed on sensitive information, and decided that he had to be removed.

Any further confirmation on this?

A I don't have anything.

Q Alan, another subject?

A Yes.

Q Can I ask whether you have any comment on Soviet leader Andropov's statement about the INF missile talks?

I'll be more specific if you want to be more specific.

A I do have some fairly long guidance. It's what was put out last night. So why don't you get it from that, Ralph? It's a very long statement.

Q Can I ask you about one portion of it?

A Sure.

Q The suggestion of reducing the number of Soviet missiles to 140. Can you respond to that portion of it?

A The Soviet offer to reduce to about 140 missiles in Europe suggests Soviet recognition that a balance does not now exist, and should be established through Soviet reductions. The Soviet Union still seeks, however, a monopoly on INF missiles which would leave it with some 750 warheads on launchers, while the U.S. had none.

Q Where does that 750 figure come from?

A Sorry.

Q How do you get that 750 figure?

A I don't have the calculation of this. I guess it's 250 -- well, you would have to include presumably the Asian deployments here, but I don't have the math to give you from here, but --

Q Why do you think the Soviet Union made this proposal public at this time?

A Ralph, I'm afraid I'm just going to have to leave you with that statement at this point.

Q Have you anything more on Lebanon in regard to the statement made by the White House Sunday night that once we find the perpetrators, we would take retaliatory action? Have we yet identified the perpetrators? And is there anything underway?

A There have been a variety of expressions of what we have in the way of circumstantial evidence. I don't have anything new to offer you on that. There have been no firm conclusions drawn on that. And I think that the Secretary indicated, as reported by the wires coming out of his trip -- the current one -- that there are a number of options which one might consider, and that we might well use one of them. But he was not more specific, and I'm not going to be more specific.

Q Alan, has there been any communication with the Government of Surinam?

A Has there been any communication?

Q On the subject of its expulsion of Cuban advisers.

A I have no idea.

Q Have you had anything at all on that subject?

A No, I have nothing on that subject.

Q Back to Beirut, there are reports in today's New York Times that the number of warnings has been coming in to Washington and to the Marines in Beirut that an attack was imminent -- or attacks were imminent.

Do you have anything on that? Why weren't they --

A I think it's been addressed by others. The fact of the matter is that there are a lot of reports about possible terrorist activities, and we certainly pay attention to those reports. But I think it was also indicated that there was nothing that was specific in terms of what actually happened.

But, sure, there are reports of potential --

Q I mean, you wanted the warnings to tell you that the guy was going to come in with a truck full of explosives?

A That there was going to be an attack on that Marine battalion headquarters, for example, specifically, or whatever.

In any case, there are reports. People pay attention to the reports, and they do what they can.

Q I've got to get back to the missiles -- one more. Does the U.S. still believe that there are 351 SS-20s deployed?

A I think that there was a -- No, there's a change in that number to 360. The Soviets recently activated a new base with nine SS-20 missiles in the central USSR.

And thus, as I said, the number of operational SS-20s now stands at 360. I would also note that construction continues at several other bases in the central and eastern USSR.

Q That means east of the Urals in any case?

A East of the Urals.

Q Alan, can you take the question with respect to Surinam in view of the statement a couple of weeks ago?

A No, I don't think I'm going to get into the dialogue between ourselves and specific countries on this.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:10 P.M.)

- - - - -

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, October 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #190

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1983, 12:22 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I don't have any announcements, but why don't I give you a little bit of a sitrep on Grenada, an update of the situation there.

As we have made clear before, we are going to have to refer you to the Pentagon for the specifics on the military situation; but in general, it is our understanding that the major objectives either have been or are in the process of being secured, although, as I believe Secretary Weinberger made clear this morning, there still is some action going on and total control of the island has not been gained yet.

There is still no word on the whereabouts or condition of the political prisoners believed to have been at Richmond Hill Prison. At this point, we have a number of conflicting reports and have no confirmation on the question of the number of political prisoners.

Governor General Scoon has not yet addressed the nation and has decided to wait until St. Georges is entirely secure so that he can speak from the Government House. We'll try to keep you updated, but our expectation as of this point is that he will speak later today.

Also, I have nothing for you on the question of the whereabouts of General Austin and the reports yesterday about holding hostages.

On repatriation, yesterday a delegation of three persons from the Soviet mission in Grenada, travelling I might note in a Mercedes-Benz -- (laughter) -- came to one of our Department representatives in Grenada with the following general information: There were 49 Soviets, including dependents, at the Soviet mission, along with a number of North Koreans, Bulgarians, East Germans, and Cubans. They brought a protest note against the multinational security forces action, but indicated that they had no communication with Moscow.

Based upon their representation, we have communicated with the Soviet Union, reassuring them as to the safety of their personnel and asking if they wanted us to facilitate their evacuation. At this point, we have had no response.

Q Could you go over the list of country people in there, Alan?

A North Koreans, Bulgarians, East Germans, and Cubans.

Q That's besides the total of 49?

A In addition to the 49 Soviets -- the total of 49 includes dependents.

Q Well, Alan --

Q Who are these people?

A Let me just keep on going and we'll come back to that.

Q Go ahead.

A The presence of North Koreans, Bulgarians, and East Germans came as a surprise to us and was reportedly a shock to the Governor General. We are still involved in an active exchange with the Government of Cuba on the question of the repatriation of Cuban personnel and have been in touch with Spain and Colombia on their offer to assist, but no firm arrangements have yet been worked out.

O.K.

Q Who are they?

Q Can we get a copy of all that?

A I can give you as copy of parts of it.

Q Who are these people?

A I don't know --

Q What is the role of the North Koreans, Bulgarians --

A Excuse me. Let's do one at a time.

Q What is the role, the purpose, of these North Koreans, East Germans, and Bulgarians?

A That's a good question.

Q Do you have numbers on them, Alan?

A No. I don't have numbers to give you.

Q Are they accredited diplomats, Alan?

A Don't know.

Q Does Grenada have diplomatic relations with these countries?

A I don't know.

Q Did they convey a wish to leave the Embassy grounds, or get out of Grenada, or what is that status?

A I think that they indicated on behalf of basically everybody that they wanted --

Well, let me go back to what I said before. They gave us the numbers of people, indicated that they had no communication, and -- I guess I don't have the information specifically as to what they've asked for on repatriation from their side.

Q To whom did they give this information?

A They went out and gave it to a Department representative who was down there.

Q A consular official? How would --

A I don't know the specifics of whom they gave it to, but they gave it to a --

Q State Department?

A -- State Department representative.

Q Is Ambassador Gillespie on the island?

A Sorry?

Q Is Ambassador Gillespie on the island?

A He may be there. He was there yesterday, I guess, and I don't know whether he went back to Barbados last night or not; but I would expect that, in any case, he probably is back in Grenada today. I don't have confirmation of that.

Q I asked yesterday a senior official after the briefing whether he had, in fact, gone to the islands. As far as they knew, he hadn't. When did he go to Grenada?

A My understanding is that he went to Grenada for the first time yesterday.

Q But what time, I mean?

A I don't know.

Q Can you give us any more information, Alan, on what kind of facilities the Cubans were in the process of building? What kind of military facilities were there? Is there any evidence that there were any kind of missiles or preparations to install missiles on the island underway?

A Bob, I don't have any detail on that. One, I would refer you to the Pentagon; but, two, I believe that there are going to be more correspondents going in to Grenada today, and I'm sure that they will have an opportunity at least to go to those arms caches and ask questions of our military people who are down there about they have found. But I just don't have that kind of information at this point.

Q Alan, did we find a cache of documents outlining some kind of Cuban-Grenadan plan to take people hostage?

A There was a fair amount of documentation that was discovered, and after we've had a chance to thoroughly review it, we might have something to offer; but I don't have anything at this point because we haven't really done that. So I think I'm going to have to withhold --

Q Alan --

A Excuse me.

-- I think I'm going to have to withhold any comment at this point.

Q Alan, you say that it was a shock to you that these North Koreans, Bulgarians --

A I said it was a shock to the Governor General.

Q How? I mean, what --

A How?

Q What really ripped him up?

A I guess he was the Governor General of Grenada and didn't know they were there. I can understand that.

Q Do you happen to have the specifics of numbers on the Soviets? And you've ticked off four nationalities about which you have no numbers and have no sense of job.

A I don't have the numbers here.

Q Was that information given, in fact, to the State Department?

A I don't know, Bernie, whether there was detailed --

Q Because it just raises the question that we may find out there may be one or two, and this could be an exploitation.

A My understanding is that there wete not as many in terms of Koreans, Bulgarians, and East Germans. I think the number of Cubans was not -- I think there may have been some numbers associated with it; I don't happen to have it -- and I think the number of Cubans was not given to us.

Q These were all within the Soviet compound?

A They're in the Soviet -- yeh, whatever they're in, they are all in that same place.

Q Can you get us those numbers today?

A I'll look into it. I don't know whether I can give you those numbers or not.

Q The Soviets, did they purport to say that that was the entire, the total amount of Soviet citizens on the island?

A I don't have anything which specifically says that, Jim, but I also have no information that would be to the contrary.

Q O.K. And do we have any estimate now as to the numbers of Cubans who were on the Island, both those who have been captured and those who may yet be fighting?

A Not beyond what we've already given to you.

Q Alan, yesterday, I gather there was a go-around here about just what kind of contacts Tom Adams did or didn't have and when. Correct me if I am wrong, but my understanding is that you were supposed to get more information including the name of whoever it was from the U.S. Government --

A There are two things on that: One, a story this morning said I undertook to get a formal response to that question. That's wrong. I didn't undertake a formal response, but I did say -- I talked about another aspect of what we were discussing. I did say I would look into it and see what I could find out.

At this point, I have not found anything out about who might have done that, so we're still checking; but at this point I haven't found any confirmation on that.

Q It's now clearer than it was yesterday that what the Prime Minister was talking about was a U.S. offer for a transport plane to take Bishop out of the island if he was released or smuggled out, I guess.

Do you know anything about that offer?

A No, I don't.

Q Also with respect to that same guidance that was posted, when it says, in the first paragraph, that the OECS Prime Ministers felt, had their belief that direct action might be necessary, can you say what "direct action" means and whether it implies any kind of military action?

A As I say, to go to the second paragraph of that guidance, as time went on, particularly after the 19th, they did begin to raise the issue which would include military action because it included U.S. military assistance to their possible action, and during that period we were in a listening mode --

Q Please --

A -- so the answer to that is in that context.

Yes, Mike.

Q Again, how many Soviets were in this Mercedes-Benz? Who was the head of the delegation? How was the meeting arranged? Was it a direct channel, through a third party?

A I don't have the details, other than that there were three. And I don't think I'm going to be able to start going into all of the details, but this is -- in terms of the number of people who were there, I thought that was a relevant --

Q You are not able to identify who the leader, if there was indeed a "leader," of these three, or what?

A I don't know who the leader might have been.

Q Why did they --

A Excuse me, Lester --

Q Did he just bump into this Department official, or what arrangements were made for this meeting?

A I don't know that there was any particular arrangement made. There was none made ahead of time, that I know of. I suppose they -- Well, I don't want to guess at it.

Q So they just left their compound and happened to run into a Department official and --

A Oh, I suspect -- I guess they asked where they might find a State Department official, and they were directed to one.

Q Alan, why did they recognize the make of automobile but not the identity? Is the make of the automobile considered more important than the identity?

A That was a little color, Lester.

Q You mean you're more interested in color than identification?

A I think they probably know who they were; I don't have to --

Q But they're not telling us.

Q Do you have any idea whether the Soviet Ambassador was among them?

A I do not believe he was among them.

Q Do you have anything further on the evacuation of civilians? Are the American nationals still being taken out?

A You would have to check with Defense. I understood -- and this, again, is to come from Defense -- I understood that perhaps at this point they had taken all the Americans who wished to come out, out. Whether they actually had arrived back or not, I don't know.

The total number, as of 9 o'clock this morning, was 435 -- that includes both Americans and third-country nationals -- coming out on eight flights to Charleston Air Force Base.

I tried to get a further breakdown of numbers as between that, but there are some discrepancies in the numbers in the breakdown; but the nationalities, again, to review, of other countries whose nationals were included are Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Canada, Colombia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Grenada, India, Iran, Italy, South Korea, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Romania, Trinidad, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, and two of what is listed as "unknown documentation."

(Laughter)

Q Like the three Russians in the Mercedes-Benz.

Q Alan, could you help us out on why it came as a surprise to you that you had these North Koreans, Bulgarians, and East Germans?

A I think it came as a surprise because we didn't know they were there. It was also of some interest that they were there and what it may say about the kind of role they were playing, and particularly in light of the fact that the Governor General of Grenada had no idea they were there.

Q But he hadn't been in office for five years, had he?

Q How about the Romanians, Alan? The Romanians?

A Apparently -- I don't know what their role, who these citizens were, these who came out. I mean, Grenada -- there were a lot of people around; but these were people who were in the Soviet mission.

Q Are you saying they all have some kind of official capacity?

A I don't know what their capacity is at this point.

CONT

Q I guess the point is why is it any more surprising that somebody from North Korea is there than anybody from South Korea?

A Well, again, I think that there is a suggestion that because they are there and in the Soviet Mission, that perhaps they had some official role being there.

Q Mrs. Charles said at the U.N. that there was a large Libyan Embassy also on Grenada. Do you have anything on that?

A Don't have anything on that.

Q I don't understand exactly. Why would the Governor General be shocked by this if he hasn't held any formal office, other than a titular one, for five years?

A I think he probably has some interest in how Grenada is being run, and he is the legal, constitutional authority at this point. Anyway, they're there.

Q Is there action on repatriation of the Cubans through the offers from Spain and Colombia?

A I'm sorry. Is there any repatriation?

Q Yes. Is there any action on how we are going to arrange this?

A I said before, Mike -- maybe you missed it.

Q I'd like the details on it, if you have something else --

A We're in active exchange with the Government of Cuba on that question, and have been touch with Spain and Colombia on their offer to assist; but no firm arrangements have been worked out. That's what I indicated before.

Q How many Cubans have you arrested? And how many Cubans do you estimate are on the island?

A You'd have to check with the Pentagon about how many Cubans have been put under detention. My understanding is it is somewhere around 600. I can't give you an estimate of how many there are on the Island. We'll have to find that out in time.

Q The White House says that the public response to the President's remarks about Grenada and his defense of going into Grenada was unprecedented in support.

Is there any indication that nations who were critical of our invasion are now somewhat more supportive or have softened their positions in light of the discovery of the Cuban military facilities?

A I can't answer for what the other governments' reactions are. You'll have to ask them.

Q You haven't heard any --

A I don't think I would get into trying to speak for other governments. Again, I think that's up to them.

Q A convoy of Canadians was fired upon yesterday as they tried to go to the airport. The Canadian Ambassador came here two days ago, I believe, and made a protest over the way the Canadian evacuation situation has been handled.

Do you have anything on why Canadian military aircraft were turned back today, why one was allowed to land for 10 minutes, and then sent away before Canadians could be boarded? Is there fighting in the area where they are staying? Is that why?

A I don't have details on that. Again, as I said yesterday, we have received several such requests -- that is, to get planes in to bring nationals out. That permission will be granted as soon as safe security can be assured. In the meantime, we are prepared to evacuate the nationals of any of those countries.

I have every expectation that this will happen reasonably soon; but I cannot predict that, and you're really going to have to check with the Pentagon. It's their determination on the security side of the --

Q Alan, a State Department issue, then: There is a lot of talk about trying to establish some kind of peacekeeping force in Grenada.

A You mean the Commonwealth idea? Is that what you're thinking of?

Q There are other ideas in addition to the Commonwealth idea that I've read about. But can you tell us what ideas are floating around, what role the State Department is playing in helping or facilitating the organization of this force?

A I can't really, Marvin. As you suggest -- you're right: There is more than one; there is the Commonwealth suggestion and there are other suggestions. I understand that Governor General Scoon has taken this question, generally speaking, under consideration. He has a number of options, I think, of his own that he is thinking about on which I don't have details, and he is going to have to make final decisions on this.

Q Well, O.K. But do you know what the U.S. role is? Are you facilitating the formation of such a force?

A I don't think we are in a position to facilitate the formation at this point. I think the state of play is that the Governor General is considering the various options, and he will decide what he wants to do. I don't think you go to form a force until you've decided what you want to do about it.

-- MORE --

Q Do you want to see a force formed?

A Again, I don't have anything specifically on that at this point. I'd have to leave it where I just did, in terms of being his --

Q Don't you want to see a force like that formed? Wouldn't that be the way the U.S. would leave?

A I think this is the call of the Grenadian authorities as they re-establish that authority.

Q Speaker O'Neill said today the Administration had been looking for a chance for two years to invade Grenada. Do you have a view on that comment?

A I think that the President and the Secretary have addressed very clearly the decision process and the factors that went into it. I would refer you to that. I don't think it is consistent with that particular viewpoint.

Q Alan, you've said that the United States didn't stimulate the request from the OECS. Given what Tom Adams has said, what some Jamaican officials have said, are you willing to concede, though, that it wasn't just passive listening that was going on by the United States, we weren't just sitting back waiting?

A I think that it was, in terms of the dicussions, through the time of their request, we were listening to them. After that, I think the discussion turned more in terms of, well, what might we do. Clearly, people, I would think, were thinking about what might be done in any case. But in terms of this dialogue, I'd refer you to what we said on that.

Q At what point did it turn that way, into more what can be done and not just listening?

A I say I think when they've made their request to us.

Q What about with respect to the article today in the Post that Seaga says that a representative from the State Department with Ambassador title was in Barbados Friday, and the Americans had been involved in the talks before Friday?

Who was that individual, and did that come before any formal request?

A I think you, yourself, identified the individual, who is Tony Gillespie, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs -- for those interested in the formalities, it's Charles Anthony Gillespie -- who had been making an orientation tour of the Caribbean quite aside from the issue of Grenada, in line with his new responsibilities in the Bureau; and he had been down there previously accompanying the Vice President on his trip. He was asked to remain in Barbados after we received the informal request from the OECS. But he was down in the region, again, first with the Vice President and then on an orientation tour.

Q So his arrival in Barbados, or participation, dates only from Friday; is that correct?

A I don't know when he was down there in Barbados -- whether he was in Barbados immediately before the 21st, but I would leave that description of what his role was.

Q Was he there with the Vice President -- did he stay on when the Vice President left?

A Yes. I don't know where he left off from the Vice President's party, but he did stay in the region after the Vice President's party left.

Q Was he down there on the 15th?

A Sorry?

Q Was he down there on the 15th?

A Was he down there on the 15th? I don't know whether he was. When did the Vice President go down?

Q The Vice President went on a Sunday. When was that? The day we went to Canada.

A Sunday would have been the 16th.

Q Alan, could we shift to Lebanon?

A Sure.

Q I would like to ask you, after we left Paris yesterday, reports came out from the French and some of the others that the Secretary had raised the question of retaliation among the other Foreign Ministers yesterday. What can you tell us about that?

A I can't tell you anything about the discussions. We have addressed this before, Bob, as you know. The President's talked about it; the Secretary's talked about it; various other spokesmen have talked about the fact that we are seeking still to ascertain specifically who was responsible, and that there are a number options open and that we would anticipate probably utilizing one of those options.

Q If you utilize one of those options, would the United States favor a joint exercise of one of those options among all the nations of the peacekeeping force there?

A I don't have any details to give you on what those options might be.

Q And could you also --

Q Alan. Alan --

Q Just a second, Lester. May I also ask you one more question? Would you discuss with us -- how should I say it -- the advantages of a retaliation? Are there preventative assets or results that come out of a retaliation?

A I think that, in fact, the Secretary, when he talked about this, or others -- I guess other officials -- talked about this on the way back; and the fact is that there still are possibilities of further terrorist attacks. As has been indicated, you get those kinds of indications all the time, and perhaps in light of that possibility one wants to take a certain degree of preventative measure; but I'm not prepared to go into it beyond that.

Q What you're saying is that when people get in a position, people who have done this kind of thing before, get into a position to do it again, they might exercise that option. So the United States might consider some sort of preemptive strike to prevent it from happening again?

A I think I'll just leave the words where I left them at this point.

Q Alan, to follow up on that, if I may?

A Go ahead.

Q In your role as a well-informed Spokesman for the Reagan Administration's foreign policy, could you tell us if the President's statement last night about bringing justice to the terrorists who blew up the Marines in Beirut, was this restatement of, or some kind of revision of his statement in January that you'll remember he said -- January 1981, in welcoming the hostages back -- he said, "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution." He said that in January 1981.

Was his last night's statement a revision or was it a restatement of this January 1981 policy?

A Why don't you ask Larry Speakes?

Q No, no. Alan. All right, then I take it it's not a revision; it's the same policy?

A Lester --

Q Could I --

A No, I won't take a speech because the fact is you have to --

Q No, no, not a speech. I just want to ask this question like Bob. You gave Bob five questions. Now, I'd just like to ask this.

A You have one more and then the briefing closes. So go on.

Q You gave him five --

A Lester, just ask your question --

Q -- and I only want four.

A Ask your question.

Q What swift and effective retribution, Alan, took place after last April's bombing of our Embassy in Beirut with the death of 17 Americans?

A We're still looking at the question of who's responsible, Lester.

Q My last question. What does the Reagan Admistration mean by the word "swift" and the word "effective retribution?"

A I refer you to one of several dictionaries.

Q Dictionaries? Oh, come on now, what is "swift?"

A Do you have a question?

Q What do you comment on the Syrian claim that the Western forces are preparing to invade it? Yesterday, they said that on the radio.

A I'm sorry. Who is preparing to invade?

Q The Syrians said that the Western nations are preparing to invade them.

A I know of no basis for that.

Q Alan, yesterday, the President emphasized the importance of Lebanon in terms of U.S. national security. Could you tell us categorically if the priority has changed so that U.S. national security is really the important factor now rather than just getting all the foreign forces -- and, also, another thing. Today, a former leader of Amal, who is in Washington, said that we we can expect the U.S. to freeze its efforts as far as reaching a solution in Lebanon and the Middle East until after '84. Would you care to comment on that?

A On the last, that certainly is not the case, as the President made very clear in his speech last night; and I refer you to that text.

As far as Lebanon and what is important, it goes back to a question that, I guess, Jim McCartney raised here a few days ago. What we've been addressing, mainly, when we've talked about the specific objectives within Lebanon -- the establishment of Lebanese Government authority throughout the sovereign territory of Lebanon, the removal of all the foreign forces, the security for Israel's northern border -- we've been talking about goals within Lebanon to establish a stable, secure Lebanon and the things that go along with that.

If you want to talk about the broader strategic interests that we have in the Middle East and how Lebanon fits into it, then you're moving it from sort of a smaller micro-level up to a macro-level, and there's no inconsistency between those. Our interests in the Middle East have a variety of dimensions to them, including a strategic dimension.

Q I guess the reason I'm asking this is because the objectives as far as Lebanon is concerned have been played up all this time for the last few months, and it's only within the last couple of weeks, I think, that we have been hearing more about the East-West confrontation factor of it.

A No, I think that's a misreading. I think that the U.S. interests in the Middle East, in terms of strategic interests and so on, are well established in a variety of major policy statements. But when we've talked about Lebanon, we tended to talk about it in specific terms.

Q Is there a possibility that the U.S. might play some kind of role in a multinational force in Grenada?

A That's a very hypothetical question. I haven't heard it discussed it all.

Q You said that the Governor General is considering --

A Yes, but you're talking about a U.S. role and you're talking about a multinational force that nobody has created yet. I don't have an answer for you.

Q It has been said, though, that the force of 300 Caribbean-nation troops are by and large policemen and not what you would call a well-trained army. And, indeed, if they're not up to it and apparently there are still several hundred Cubans at large in the hills of Grenada, is it possible that the Governor General might say the only way to assure peace here is for the U.S. to play a role, and would we consider playing a role under those circumstances?

A Again, I think that the President has made very clear what our intention is in terms of the forces we have there. If you're talking about some other sort of role, (a) I've not heard it discussed, and (b) it would be very hypothetical at this point, and I can't take you further on it.

Q Alan, when you're talking about options in Lebanon in response to the attack, one of the options obviously would be to do nothing, but I assume you're talking about doing something rather than nothing when you say we expect to exercise one of the options?

A I wouldn't quarrel with that.

Q Hmm?

A I wouldn't quarrel with that.

Q Do we have any further idea today about who perpetrated the bombing?

A We continue to try to get information, and we do get some information, but we don't have any conclusions offer at this point.

Q This is an incident in the Federal Republic of Germany this morning at 9:00 a.m. The Weisbaden political police raided the headquarters of a corporation called

"Campaigner Publications," which is a publisher of the German-language paper New Solidarity. This is a U.S. company, and the raid took place in the context of a legal action by a known West German terrorist against the company for identifying him as such.

The situation is a little bit complicated because, as you know, under West German law truth is no defense. But there are indications now that the files and contact lists that were seized from this company's headquarters may be leaked to terrorists elements in West Germany, and it comes in the context of a series of --

A Excuse me. Have you got a question?

Q Yes. A pattern --

A What is your question?

Q I'm just identifying certain elements of this thing --

A Yes, but I would like to know the question.

Q There is a pattern of surveillance and attacks against employees, against U.S. nationals --

A Bernie, do you have a question? Go ahead with your question.

Q I wanted to ask --

Q Is the State Department prepared to look into these type of incidents?

A Do you have a question?

Q My question is, to what degree --

Q It's unfair, Alan, and you know it.

A Lester, I don't need a speech from you.

Q That's very unfair --

Q May we go on with the briefing, please?

Q You gave Don Oberdorfer a 143 --

Q Thank you.

Q -- words in his question. Why don't you let him answer the question?

A Excuse me. Bernie, did you have a question?

Q You want to answer that question?

A I gave him a chance to ask the question, and he didn't ask it. Go ahead.

Q That's not true.

Q To what degree will there be constraints, should the investigation lead to a group that carried out the attack against the Marines, should the group turn out to be positioned in an area where you may have, to begin with, Syrian troops and you may have, say, some of the reported Soviet advisors that are within Lebanon?

A I can't really begin to address that kind of question since we don't know yet, have not reached a conclusion yet, on who is responsible. I'm sure that when it is determined who is responsible, a whole variety of factors will be applied, or brought into play, with respect to what kind of option one will choose in response.

Q Alan, can you give us any details on when Mr. Eagleburger will be going to Israel, who he will be seeing, what other stops he will be making on his trip, who else will he be seeing?

A As far as when is he going, the plan at the moment, and it is somewhat tentative, is November 1 through 6. I don't have anything further for you on the specific itinerary.

In Israel, he will meet with Prime Minister Shamir, Defense Minister Arens, Deputy Foreign Minister Ben Meir, Director General Kimche of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other Israeli officials and prominent Israelis.

His purpose in going there is to continue the ongoing high-level dialogue between Israel and the United States on bilateral matters and other issues of mutual interest. He, as you know, has been planning to go for some time, and given the events of the past two weeks in Lebanon, his visit has taken on added significance.

I would also note that as Secretary Shultz stated before the Congress on October 24 following the tragic and senseless attack against our Marines in Beirut, Mr. Eagleburger has been charged to review with our Israeli friends the situation in Lebanon as well as the broader issues of Middle East security.

Q Let me follow up. Do you anticipate a visit to Washington this year, this calendar year, of Mr. Shamir, Arens, any other high-level --

A I have no information at this point, Mike, that a visit is scheduled, but obviously Mr. Shamir or Mr. Arens would be welcome at any point; but there is no visit scheduled.

Q Is there a Syria on Eagleburger's itinerary?

A As I say, I don't have anything further on his itinerary beyond the Israeli stop.

Q Is there any thought being given to Eagleburger as the Middle East envoy?

A I don't know the answer to that question, Bernie, but I think, again, it would be a Presidential announcement to make and not for me to address.

Q When do you expect that announcement?

A I can't tell you. I don't know. The President, I thought, said he was going to make it very soon. That was --

Q What's holding that up?

Q Are we really warm?

A As I say, it's a Presidential announcement.

Q "Are we warm." (Laughter)

Q What is the status of the search for the Glomar Java Sea? Is there any indication of foul play with the Vietnamese?

A Unable to report on the whereabouts of the ship. We are aware of media reports the ship has sunk, but we cannot confirm that. We have continued our efforts to search for the Glomar Java Sea and to keep the Vietnamese Government informed of our efforts.

Q Are they being cooperative?

A I don't have a readout to give you on their attitude. As I say, we've indicated to them that what we're doing, the fact that it might drift into their territorial waters, and asked that they provide all assistance that might be needed.

Q Is the reason you don't want to take my question, Mr. Romberg, is because some of Kissinger friends may be involved in the situation?

A No, it's because you didn't ask a question.

Q Thank you, Alan.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #192

MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1983, 12:21 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements up front. Available in the Press Office are copies of Deputy Secretary Dam's address this morning at The International House in Chicago. The subject of the address was "The Challenges of U.S.-Soviet Relations at the 50 Year Mark."

An announcement on the Argentine elections: The United States Government and the American people extend our heartiest congratulations to the Argentine people, their political parties, and their government for their successful step in the process of return to democratic and constitutional rule. Throughout what has been an intensive campaign process, we have maintained that democracy was our only candidate. We look forward to the inauguration of the new government and to cooperating with the elected authorities in strengthening the bonds between our nations and people.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Can we follow on that? Do you have anything on certification or intentions to certify?

A No. That situation is still under consideration.

Q Under consideration?

A Haven't been talking much about El Salvador recently, but there is one thing we'd like to pass along. The Government of El Salvador announced on October 28 that Judge Rauda has raised the case of the four murdered American churchwomen to plenario. That, as we understand it, is the final stage of the trial.

The Salvadoran prosecutor's office estimates that this stage will last between two and three months, concluding with the presentation of the case to the jury.

On Grenada -- maybe I should give you what I have. Mopping up operations continue. There's been occasional sniper fire. General Hudson Austin, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, was detained Sunday afternoon along with the Council's Vice Chairman, Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne, and another member of the Council, Leon Cornwall. All of them are currently in the custody of the U.S. military.

On Saturday, the peacekeeping force detained Bernard Coard and his wife; also the former Information Minister, Selwyn Strachan, and RMC members, Lieutenant Colonel Liam James and Major Basil Gahaghan. All of them were placed under detention by U.S. forces after the location of their hideout was brought to our attention by Grenadan civilians.

Supplies of electricity and water are improving but service is still interrupted in some parts of the island. Yesterday, the United States sent three 30-kilowatt generators and several types of water storage tanks to Grenada. We understand that stores will reopen today. Supplies of food and fuel are said to be adequate for at least a week, and steps are being taken to resume the normal flow of supplies to the island.

Also, yesterday, OECS Chairperson Eugenia Charles said that the OECS will immediately lift the sanctions which it imposed on Grenada following the military coup. Those sanctions included a ban on flights to Grenada by LIAT, the regional airline.

In his radio address to the Grenadian people on October 28, the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, thanked the countries involved for coming to Grenada's assistance. Sir Paul said that the people of Grenada have welcomed the troops as a positive and decisive step toward the restoration "not only of peace and order but also of full sovereignty." He announced that he would name a interim government in a few days which would govern until elections could be held.

The number of homeless people in the camps for displaced persons continues to go down, and it's now less than one hundred.

No additional U.S. citizens wished to be evacuated yesterday, Sunday. The current total for the evacuation effort are 599 U.S. citizens and 121 people of other nationalities.

Plans are underway for the repatriation of wounded and dead Cuban combatants; that's with the cooperation of the International Red Cross, but I don't have any time schedule on that for you.

Discussions with the Cuban Government and third countries are ongoing as to the details of the repatriation of Cuban combatants following the cessation of hostilities.

Soviet diplomatic repesentatives have been in touch with U.S. diplomatic representatives in Grenada. At their request, they've been provided with food and water. We've been in communication with the Soviet Union about this contact and have indicated that we would be happy to facilitate the evacuation of their personnel, that's the Soviet diplomatic personnel, from the island if they request it.

The bona fides of other third country and Soviet-bloc personnel, including the North Koreans, will be determined, and once their diplomatic status is clear, they will be treated accordingly.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Sure.

Q John, what can you tell us about the bombing of the hospital, the mental hospital?

A I can't tell you anything. I think you would have to go to the Pentagon for that. I know they're looking into that.

Q What are the possibilities of the American and other forces there being replaced by another force, such as a Commonwealth peacekeeping force?

A As I think we said last week, Jim, that's something that is being looked at.

Q What response have you had from the British?

A I think we won't get into the discussion of who's involved; I'd just say it's something that we're looking at, and obviously it's been raised by others.

Q Is that the most likely course?

A I don't know. I think it's too early to say.

Q What are some other possibilities?

A I'm not going to go beyond what I said.

Q On the Commonwealth, if I can ask about our ANZUS partners, do you have a statement on the New Zealand offer to send forces to that force?

A Yes, I do have something on that. The United States was most pleased with the New Zealand -- this is not on the sending of forces; this is on their statement -- the United States is most pleased with the New Zealand Government's expression of understanding of the circumstances which led to the multinational military rescue operation on Grenada, and of the objectives of that operation, and particularly with the clarity of the analysis of its legal basis. I don't have anything on the suggestion that they would send troops there.

Q Do you expect to have something on the second parliamentry offer to send troops? That was the statement yesterday.

A I think, you know -- as I say, this is something that's been suggested by a number of countries, and we're involved in some consideration of that.

Q One more, on Australia. Now, Australia has ruled out involvement in a force and has criticized it. It says that they find it hard to justify the use of force in Grenada. Do you have a reply to that?

A No, no specific response to the Australians.

Q Do you know how many Prime Ministers, or heads of government, the President has spoken to? Prime Minister Hawke says the President phoned him.

A I don't, no.

Q Could you get us that?

A I think the White House would have to answer that.

Q On the 599 Americans evacuated, do you have a number on those who chose not to be evacuated?

A I don't, Bernie. It is possible the Pentagon has a number; especially as they have said, I think, that they are aware of the location of the other students. They might have a number on the students that are left. Whether they would have a number on all American citizens, I don't know, but I think the Pentagon would have it.

Q During that entire period of Bishop, there was no American Embassy there?

A Yes.

Q There was no American Consulate?

A That's right.

Q There was no official American representation?

A There was representation from Barbados.

Q But nothing on the island?

A Nothing on the island.

Q Does recognition come up at all here?

A I think that Mr. Gillespie who is a Deputy Assistant Secretary is currently on the island. He is the senior operating State Department representative on the ground. He has the personal rank of Ambassador. He's currently responsible for the non-military side of our presence there, and he is the Charge'-designate. We expect that he will be in charge of the mission that will be accredited in Grenada.

Q Does the United States have any view on -- I understand that Governor General Scoon has sent a message to Secretary General Waldheim (sic) and to the President of the Security Council, saying that the representatives of Grenada are no longer authorized to represent that country at the U.N., and that pending notification from him as to who the new representatives will be, Grenada is not to be seated or heard from at the U.N. Is that --

A I think that we're all aware of the controversy surrounding Grenada's "representative" at the U.N., and I assume that the Governor General is clarifying the situation and will send someone who legitimately represents Grenada, which has not seemed to be the case during the debate.

Q John, could you clear up -- excuse me, if this has already been cleared up in my absence. What is the authority or reason why the United States has detained these former Grenadian officials? Why U.S. troops -- under what reason or authority are these people put into detention?

A I'm not sure that I can or should respond in a strictly legal sense, Don, but it's my understanding that as they have been moving through areas and have had them pointed out by citizens, they have arrested them, and I'm sure that we are in discussion with the Governor General as to their disposition.

Q Why were they arrested, is the point I'm getting at?

A I presume in pursuit of our objective to return peace and stability to the island.

Q One other question. Yesterday, on television, Deputy Secretary Dam spoke of documents which were going to show or do show the greater involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in supplying arms and other materiel to Grenada, or in Grenada.

Is the State Department or someone else in the government in a position to make those public, or how will this be done; what is the status of these documents?

A I don't know quite how they will be made public. Obviously, we will need to be discussing these documents -- those that are official Grenadian documents -- with the Grenadian authorities. And anything that we or they might do, in terms of disclosing the content, would be done after that consultation with the Grenadian authorities. Just how soon that would be, I honestly can't tell you.

Q The Deputy Secretary seems to have disclosed, at least, a version of the contents from what he said on television.

A I think he said that there are such documents and there are. I think he said that there are such treaties between the Soviet Union and Grenada, between North Korea and Grenada, and between Cuba and Grenada. They are secret, and they provided for substantial movement of weapons over a period of several years to Grenada. The treaties were to be secret, and the weapons, certainly from the Soviet Union, were to be moved not directly and openly but through Cuba. But I think beyond that we will have to wait until -- as I say, these consultations are taking place.

Q Are you thinking of that today or --

A We would move as soon as we're able to.

Q Who will have the word? Would it be a U.S. decision exclusively on dealing -- on revealing, disclosing the Russian --

A There are various kinds of documents, Bernie. And I think the ones that we would be particularly concerned about are those that are Grenadian documents. They really belong to them. They are their treaties. There are other documents, and we might take a somewhat different tack, but I think that consultation with the Grenadian authorities would be the yardstick in the case of all of these documents.

Q John, don't these documents go back months to include the Bishop government? These weren't negotiated by the Revolutionary Military Council?

A Some of them do. I see a story in one of our newspapers over the weekend suggesting that the documents contain minutes of a meeting conducted, or certainly involving, Mr. Bishop. So, surely some of them are going back over some time.

Q Do you regard those treaties as now in force?

A I wouldn't answer a question like that. I think I'd leave that to the experts.

Q Speaking of treaties, the OECS Treaty, under the U.N. Charter no treaty which hasn't been registered with the United Nations can be invoked before any U.N. body. The OECS Treaty has never been registered with the United Nations and, hence, cannot be invoked before any U.N. body under the Charter of the United Nations.

In view of that, do you have any additional international treaties which you can invoke before the United Nations to justify under international law the request?

A I don't know, Jim, whether there are such, but I think you raise a good, legal question, and I wouldn't attempt to answer it from here. I'll be glad to try to get somebody with more expertise to answer it for you.

Q There's one report that, I think, up to 57 people were killed in the attack on that -- in the accidental hit on the mental hospital. I know you referred us to the Pentagon, but they have declined to provide a figure. I'm just wondering if you know?

A I don't. I know they are looking into it urgently, but I don't have any information on it. I think we'll have to leave that to them.

Q (Inaudible) Senator Chiles for talks with the Cubans on repatriation of the Cuban prisoners?

A I don't think I'm going to get into those channels, but there are a variety of such channels which include direct contact and also contact through other governments and intermediaries. Various ones have been used.

Q John, has the Secretary of State been in consultation with the NATO Allies regarding the deployment of the missiles in light of the Grenada thing? Obviously, the Thatcher government is having a lot of problems from its oppostion. It seems to be that there were a half a million people that demonstrated in the Netherlands on Saturday.

A Yes. I don't know to what extent he has been directly involved over the weekend, Bob. Of course, he met with the French Foreign Minister and the British Foreign Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister last week in Paris, and I know there has been discussion with our Allies, both on the part of the President and the Secretary; but I'm not aware specifically of what he's done over the weekend.

Q But it would seem that the situation is changed even since he met with the Foreign Ministers in Paris, and I just wondered, has he had any conversation since then or has the President?

A I don't what dialogue -- you know, there was close dialogue between ourselves and our Western European Allies at other levels. I just can't specifically answer your question as to what the Secretary's involvement has been.

Q Can you give us some indication of how you see that situation now?

A Well, as I think we said last week, certainly there are differences of opinion between ourselves and a number of our allies on the question of Grenada, and we regret that. But, nevertheless, our Western European allies, the governments, are moving forward in pursuit of their European interests, and we expect them to go forward as planned.

There may have been demonstrations and expressions of opinion, and of course that's a display of democratic expression; but we are confident that despite such differences over Grenada, basically our feeling, our goals, and indeed the strength of our relationship with these nations is not diluted.

As I think I said last week, it's a family and there are family disputes and arguments from time to time -- some of them serious -- but the broader range of ties that bind us are still there, are still very strong, and we have no suggestion that those are eroding.

Q If I could ask just one more question, it seems to me I recall the Secretary saying that it might end up being a plus on the aircraft.

A I don't recall him saying that, Bob, and I can't quite remember in what context he was saying that.

Q I was kind of wondering if -- well, if you don't recall it, okay.

Q John, on the question Bob raises, could you tell us if the decision-makers weighed the effect of the Grenada operation on European opinion as we approach the December date for deployment of the missiles?

Was this an element that weighed on the minds of our American leaders when they made this decision?

A It's hard for me to answer, because I wasn't at Augusta.

Q You're one of them --

A Well, I wasn't at Augusta when the decision was made, but I'm quite sure that the global consequences of this action certainly were considered, as were the consequences of the appeal from Caribbean nations and the consequences of not responding to that appeal, the consequences of not going in to rescue those students, the consequences of leaving them there, and the consequences of there being no return to peace and stability on Grenada should we not have moved.

So I'm sure these things were weighed in the balance. The President, as you know, took a little time to make that decision, sent emissaries down to the Caribbean, and eventually made his decision based on legality as he interpreted it, on principle and on the national interest.

Q John, the Administration has charged that Grenada was a terrorist training base. Have you any more evidence that you can reveal to us now that would substantiate that?

I mean, you've mentioned you won't go into the documents, but other things that would substantiate that?

A I think if the documents are made available, I think more facts will come out. As Deputy Secretary Dam said yesterday, in a preliminary sense those treaties certainly seem to involve the dispatch of a large amount of weapons for a small country like that, and there is also the question of Grenadans leaving Grenada for training, the question of others --

Q Where were the Grenadans going for training?

A I think I'll leave that until those documents are made public.

Q That's a new twist.

A I think that I will just leave it until those documents -- until the further facts come out.

Q On the documents, there were supposedly documents that were taken during the invasion which indicated that there were 1100 Cubans on the island.

(a) What is our best guess as of today as to how many Cubans were on the island at the time? And (b) were these -- was that indication from those documents taken from a batch of documents of which Secretary Dam spoke yesterday?

A I think Secretary Dam -- I don't know whether Secretary Dam has seen the documents that were mentioned earlier by the military about the command and control center, and it may be that in those documents there is reference to the number of Cubans on the island.

I don't know whether he had seen those. I think he was talking of different documents that have come to light since then.

But as far as military estimates of Cubans on the island, I think you're going to have to go to the Pentagon.

Q John, talking about documents, Ambassador McNeill, according to information in The New York Times, took a suggestion, a request, written in Washington, to Barbados so that this text could be used by the OECS -- the Organization of East Caribbean Countries -- to in turn make the request to the United States. Can you confirm this information?

A I'm a little leery of talking about the timeframe without all the data in front of me, but I think he went down there on Sunday, as I recall, but what documentation, if any, he took with him, I don't know.

Q Can you check this, because this is important information, right?

A I don't know that we would really get into too much detail about the substance of his discussions. He was sent as a Presidential emissary, and he went down and talked with various people down there and reported back to the President. I doubt that we would reveal the substance or the techniques of those discussions.

Q But, John, is there a question here of, after all, the legality of this request?

A Not in our minds.

Q If we get confirmation that the request was actually written in Washington?

A What you seem to be returning to is this tired old line that the United States somehow set this up, and --

Q I'm not -- I'm asking a question. I'm not going to get into any kind of a dialogue.

A No. I think underlying your question --

Q And I would like to get my answer -- my question answered on the basis --

A I don't think we're going to tell you what papers he had in his briefcase and how his discussions went. The fact is that those nations asked us to move, that they were enthustiastic; and the suggestion that the United States in any way pushed or prodded them to take this action -- I think that it's well borne out that's a ridiculous suggestion. I think that is well borne out by the kinds of statements that various Caribbean leaders have made since.

Q Change of subject?

A Let's stay with this.

Q Given the concern that has been put forth as one of the motivations for the U.S. move, why is it that we did not have as much as a Consulate in Grenada so that the students might have direct access to American diplomatic facilities?

A I can't answer that question, but I'm sure there's a reason for it and a rationale for it, but I'm not sure what that rationale is as to why we have not been in there for some time. It's a fairly small island, fairly small population, and I don't know what other islands are covered from Barbados by the Ambassador there.

Q Yeh, but you don't move on other countries to rescue the students.

A Yes, but I mean the fact is that it still is a small island and still has a small population, and there are students, American students, on other islands, too.

Q Kind of related to that point, I'd like to know is it the State Department's position that following the meeting in June between Bishop and Clark and Dam here, was there any change in relations between Grenada and the United States in any respect? And did the United States support loan applications by Grenada at the IMF or the international financial institutions? Was there any change at all following that visit?

A I'm not able to answer that question, Jim, because I simply don't know. I'd be glad to take a look at the loan part of it, sure. The first part is rather a sweeping question and maybe requires a sweeping answer, but on the loans specifically I'll be glad to take a look at it.

Q And I wondered if you could look after Don's question, if you could take that, as to the authority under which the United States is holding members of the Grenadan Government?

A I'd be glad to take a look at that, sure.

Q John, in a more general sense, can you say whether the Grenadan action sends any kind of message to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua?

A I think the Secretary addressed that at his press conference, and, as I recall, basically he said we went to Grenada for a number of considerations -- firstly, the safety of those students; secondly, to return peace and stability. If there's a message, if someone draws a message from it, I think "so be it" is about the way he put it, but it wasn't intended to send a message.

Q John, was it the U.S. view that Bishop, having experimented with his Marxist approach, was in fact considering doing something of an ideological turn and moving toward parliamentary elections?

A I'm not aware that we had any evidence of any movement towards elections, Bernie.

Q There was some speculation over the weekend that maybe the Cubans or the Russians, nothwithstanding the Cuban expressions of regret, were in fact the driving force behind the execution of Bishop. Do you have any comment on that?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q In the U.S. view, who carried out the killings, and were the killings carried out in any way at the encouragement or instigation of any foreign power?

A I don't think we have anything on that, Bernie, at this stage. Might in time emerge a little more clearly, but even people on the island -- my namesake, Mr. Hughes, I think has been unable to shed any light on that.

Q John, changing topics here, anything either on the appointment of a new Middle East envoy and/or any action toward lifting some of the sanctions on Poland?

A On the Middle East envoy, that would be a Presidential announcement, and I guess I would look to the White House on that.

No, I don't have anything on Poland. Might have -- why don't you keep in touch with us on the Polish situation.

Q Do you have anything to say today about the opening of the reconciliation talks in Geneva, and about Jumblatt's threat to withdraw?

A Not on the threat. Obviously, we're pleased by the opening of the conference. Ambassador Fairbanks is there. We're not a participant in the talks, but we'll be in contact with the varius parties and we want to be helpful. We, of course, welcome the start of the national reconciliation dialogue as a further step towards Lebanese national unity and the re-establishment of a stable, representative and fully sovereign Lebanese central government.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q John, in the event that the various representatives at the Geneva conference try to undo or modify in some way the May 17 Lebanese-Israeli troop withdrawal agreement, do we have a position on that?

A Our position, of course, is that we support the agreement. We were involved in that, and it was signed by the respective governments, and we support it.

Q Does that mean we would oppose a move in the conference?

A I don't think it's for us to. We're not at the conference. I think that's for the participants to discuss; but, as far as our position is concerned, we still support the agreement.

Q In a slightly different vein, do you have anything on reports that the former Israeli Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan is starting up a political party that calls for estblishment of new settlements on the West Bank?

A No, I don't. I saw something, I think, on the wires this morning about that, but don't have anything on it.

Q John, do you have anything on the situation in Morocco?

A No. (Laughter) What did you have in mind?

Q There was a late report just about minutes before you came in here about 18,000 Moroccan troops moving into that break-away area that --

A That just underlines that everybody in this briefing room is always better informed than the Spokesman.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Eagleburger's trip to Israel? When he's going, who's going with him?

A No, I don't. I guess he left this morning. I'm sure he has one or two members of his staff with him. I don't have any details.

Q There's a report that the Defense Department has refused to send someone with him because of a dispute within the government. Would you address that?

A I was unaware of that. I (a) didn't know that someone from DOD was going with him, and (b) I didn't know, if that is the case, that someone is now not going with him.

Q Would not someone from other departments normally be part of a high-level delegation such as this?

A I don't know whether "normally" is the right word. Certainly it has been the case, but I don't know whether it's obligatory.

Q Who has gone with Mr. Eagleburger?

A I don't know.

Q Could we find out?

A Sure. Take a look at it.

Q Is that only Israel on his itinerary?

A Only Israel on his itinerary, so far as I know.

Q John, Shamir made a statement opposing the Jordanian Rapid Deployment Force today. That's the first time there's been an official word. There's been a lot of editorializing against it. Do you have any comment on that?

A No.

Q I understood earlier that American officials were encouraging the Lebanese legal authorities, the Government of President Gemayel, towards reconciliation. Foreign Minister Salem yesterday said that they have not heard from the Americans on this --

A On reconciliation?

Q Right.

A I think that must be a misunderstanding.

Q So you're saying that the American Government has encouraged President Gemayel's Government to go towards reconciliation?

A Oh, yes, of course, but not only President Gemayel's Government. We've encouraged all the participants to move with enthusiasm and --

Q Can I also ask you one more thing, please?

A Sure.

Q The Israeli Minister of Defense yesterday said that his Government believes that the Syrians -- he provided three different reasons why he thinks the Syrians are or were behind the bombing.

Can you tell us if you agree with those assessments of the President or what about your own by now, the U.S. Government's assessment?

A I don't think I would go beyond Deptuy Secretary Dam's remarks yesterday during his television appearance. He spoke of circumstantial evidence, and I think we would just leave it there. The Lebanese investigation is progressing. We are moving forward our investigation vigorously, as are the French. There is an exchange -- a very intimate exchange of information -- and while that investigation goes forward, I think we'll just leave it at what Mr. Dam said.

Q Do you have any comment on the statement attributed to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington, criticizing the United States for invading Grenada?

A I hadn't seen that statement.

Q John, is it fair to say that the U.S. Government is the _de_ _facto_ authority or government on that island now?

A No. I think the Governor General is the constitutional authority on that island.

Q No. But the _de_ _facto_. The one -- well, my question is --

A I think, increasingly -- if it ever was the case, I think increasingly less so in view of the role that the other Caribbean nations are playing, and in view of the apparent movement towards normalcy that is being orchestrated by the Governor General.

Q Can you say how many people have been detained, Cuban or Grenadan, altogether, by the U.S. Government?

A I can't. That Cuban detainee figure I think the Pentagon has and has used frequently. There's no problem about getting that. I don't know whether they have given figures for other detainees. I think they have, as a matter of fact.

Q Can you just give us some idea of the disposition of these people that have been detained -- what you have in mind doing with them, what might be done with them -- other than the Cubans?

A Other than the Cubans. I'm sure in the case of the Grenadans, that's a matter that I'm sure is now under discussion with the Governor-General.

Q John, one more, please on Grenada. Do you now have any evidence that Grenadan or -- hard evidence, that is -- Grenadan or Cuban forces were planning a hostage situation with the Americans who were there or other foreigners?

A I think I'm not going to get into that particular question.

Q And one other: Do you -- from where did the Governor General give his radio address on the 28th, a Friday, to which you referred?

A I don't know. I thought it was Government House, but I'm not sure.

Q Can you check into that for us?

A It's kind of tough. I mean, you've got people down there. Why don't you --

Q No. Not on St. George's. You know, it's a problem. (Laughter)

A I didn't think it was a problem today or as of yesterday.

Q It's still been a problem this morning for our people to get on.

A You weren't able to --

Q Not this morning.

A You didn't make the plane trip with the other 88?

Q We tried to get on, but there were only so many seats.

A Okay.

Q About elections in Grenada -- what are you estimates on how long it will take for a government to hold elections in the --

A I don't know. I think you have to ask the Governor General.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:56 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, November 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #193

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afernoon all. A couple of housekeeping announcements: Peter McPherson, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, will hold a press briefing on the restoration of basic public services to Grenada. That will be ON THE RECORD for sound and camera, but not live. That will be Wednesday at 11:00 a.m. in this briefing room.

Just like to remind you that Ken Dam, the Deputy Secretary of State, will be speaking to the AP Managing Editors Convention in Louisville, Kentucky, on Friday. That is a lunchtime speech. The subject of his speech will be the Caribbean, including Grenada, and Central America. And if you want to talk to anybody about arrangements for that, I suggest you talk to Jo Collinge in our Public Affairs Department.

Q Who?

A Jo Collinge. She's on 632-2733.

Q You're not piping that in?

A We are not piping that in; no. It's Friday. Louisville. It's the APME Convention.

Q There will be a text, though?

A There will be a text, but when we will have it I'm not quite sure.

Q (Inaudible).

Q I think it's Lexington.

A No, I think it's Louisville. Well, maybe you've got the (inaudible). When somebody asked me to --

Q Is there anything in that speech? (Laughter)

A I just point out, Bernie, that the subject -- part of it will be Grenada. It might be worthwhile keeping an eye on it. No, I think it'll be an important speech.

Q (Inaudible)

A We know you never give stale speeches, Bernie.

Q Will he be releasing documents?

A It'll be a fresh speech. I don't know about documents, but I would take a look at that speech.

Finally, --

Q Is he filling in for the Secretary?

A No, the Secretary never made a commitment to speak at APME. That was a Ken Dam invitation; he accepted it.

Finally, second from your right, in the row over there, is Greg Davis who is joining the Press Office as a press officer for several weeks; part of a personnel rotation program within the Bureau of Public Affairs. His real job as distinct from his time here, is as a writer and editor in the Bureau's Office of Public Communication. He will be deputizing for Sue Pittman, who is going off on a planned weight reduction program. (Laughter)

Let me give you what I have on Grenada, in terms of an update. There's really been little change in the situation in Grenada since yesterday. The harbor at St. George's has been reopened to commercial traffic today. Schools, markets and businesses opened yesterday in St. George's. The Governor General is discussing the question of a peacekeeping force with other countries, but we don't have any details to offer you on those discussions.

On the question of repatriation, nothing more beyond what we said yesterday.

We've been in communication with the Soviet Union about our contact with Soviet diplomatic representatives in Grenada, and indicated that we would be happy to facilitate the evacuation of their diplomatic personnel from the island, if they request it.

The bona fides of other third country and Soviet-bloc personnel, including North Koreans, is being determined, and once their diplomatic status is clear they will be treated accordingly.

Two companies of the Marines responding to a report of some Cuban activity landed on Carriacou -- I'm not sure I'm pronouncing it --

Q Carriacou.

A Carriacou -- is that how you pronouce it? -- Island about 4:30 this morning. They met no resistence, and earlier were preparing to re-embark, and I suspect by now, are back on their ships.

As to documents which were captured during the hostilities, a number of them obviously belong to the appropriate Grenadian authorities and are being returned. The question of dissemination --

Q Have been?

A Are being returned. The question of dissemination of information from the documents, or the documents themselves, is being discussed with Grenadian authorities, and we'll let you know just as soon as there's any decision on that.

I think that copies of a statement by Peter McPherson are available in the Press Office in addition to the briefing that he'll be doing. The statement that is already available details about $475,000 in assistance which has been provided thus far to Grenada. AID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is coordinating all U.S. Government humanitarian assistance to Grenada.

A disaster survey team is currently in Grenada to assist the short-term relief and reconstruction needs of the Grenadians; and as soon as AID receives the team's report, we would expect to provide additional humanitarian assistance.

Q John --

A Let me just finish this.

Insofar as the Cuban dead and wounded are concerned, the U.S. is cooperating fully in efforts to evacuate them. These efforts are being coordinated through the International Red Cross and the Cuban Government, and any delay is due to logistical problems confronting the International Committee of the Red Cross as it attempts to make arrangements for the flights to Cuba.

Q Is that a response to Mr. Alarcon comments?

A It's not really a response, but it is a statement of the fact; the United States is no way impeding the return of the dead or the wounded. It is an ICRC situation. I don't quite know what the problem is, although I do understand that the pilot of the Swiss plane had some doubt about their ability to land in Grenada due to the length of the runway, or something.

Q Isn't there a Red Cross plane on the ground there -- the whole day?

A I don't know whether it is in Grenada, Barrie. I think it went through Barbardos. Whether they have -- I think that -- it may be that the pilots flew to Grenada on a smaller plane to look over the runway.

Q On the question of the unwounded Cuban prisoners, what is the holdup there?

A Nothing further. We're still involved in discussions with the Cubans, and I don't have anything --

Q What's to discuss? Are you trying to link it with anything else?

A No, we're just walking through what's involved here with them.

Q You said yesterday that -- I thought you said that they would not be repatriated until hostilities ceased?

A That's correct.

Q That remains the case today?

A It depends what the situation is on the ground. There's not much activity on the ground in terms of -- there's some isolated firing, I think, still today, but I don't think there is major activity.

Q Do you have any figures on the Cuban dead and wounded now?

A No, I don't, Jim. The Pentagon may. They may.

Q John, the situation on the repatriation of the Soviet diplomats -- they have not officially requested --

A Correct.

Q Are they free to remain, if they don't want to leave?

A That's up to the Grenadian authorities. They're free to remain.

Q Who are the Grenadian authorities?

A The Governor General is, as we've said for several days now, the source of constitutional authority, and I understand he is moving fast to form an interim administration.

Q When you use the plural John, I don't understand that. Does the Governor General now, in his constitutional position, have the power to hire and fire other people besides the Prime Minister?

In other words, can he set up an acting government and hire a bunch of people to go through all these papers, or is it really -- is he the only authority of the authorities on land?

A I don't think anybody is questioning his authority to install an interim administration and to announce the kind of steps that he has already mentioned.

Q But that's not my question. When you say that it's being handled by the Grenadan authorities, we know that that includes the Governor General, but the Governor General hasn't yet formed a government.

Can he hire people to serve under him to go through some of this stuff? Is that why you used the plural of the word "authority" --

A No, I don't think so.

Q -- in advance of forming a new government?

A No. I think he is moving with despatch. I don't know what he has done already in terms of announcing names, or whether he is rolling names out one by one, or two by two. I just don't know at what stage he is; but I know that he is moving speedily to get an interim administration in place.

Q John, can you be of a little more help on the question of -- the U.S. has proposed to the Soviets that if they want their 30-odd diplomats evacuated, the U.S. will do so.

A Will facilitate, sure.

Q Have they ignored that? You've mentioned it a couple of days now.

A Yes. Right.

Q Have the Soviets simply ignored this offer?

A Well, in terms of responding that they want to either stay or to move out, yes, we have not heard from them.

Q Just ignored it?

A Yes.

Q How many times have we communicated with them on this, John?

A I don't know.

Q Several?

A I don't know whether there has been need to communicate several times. I don't know; we may have done. But, I mean, the message is the same.

Q . John, just to be clear: When you say they could remain if they want to, they could remain presumably in their Embassy, or mission, and can move --

A We're not impeding their movement, but I think as a matter of fact they have tended to stay within the Soviet compound.

Q Is it expected that Genada will maintain diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and in Cuba under the new set-up?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask the Grenadians.

Q Are we giving them any advice?

A I'm not aware of it.

Q John, all those comments about the Soviets --

A Sorry. Let me take -- because Lester wants to move on out of here.

Q One question, and then I'm trying to get to another briefing -- it's unrelated -- I'll be very -- In this State Department's posted answer, as to why Ambassador Heyward Isham was presiding over "Understanding the Soviet Union" night at the Washington Cathedral, there was no mention in this guidance that Isham is actually working for Director William Casey of the CIA. And I'm wondering why was this piece of newsworthy information not included, and how can Isham, as a State Department official -- it was advertised on all of the posters -- is it appropriate for him to call the police and have them drag out Afghans and Hungarians who were trying to protest?

A Is that the question?

Q Yes. In other words, why weren't we told that he's working for Casey in this guidance? Why is that covered up?

A I don't know that he is.

Q And does the Secretary think that it is appropriate for a man advertised as a State Department official to call the police to drag people out of a church.

A Can't answer your question.

Q Could you take that question?

A Well, I don't know that we're in the business of -- and I'm not suggesting that Mr. Isham does or does not work for the CIA -- but I'm not --

Q Are you denying it --

A I have no idea.

Q -- because one of my editors inquired and found that that is the case. I thought it quite interesting.

A One of your editors has the advantage of me. I don't know.

Q Great. If you can just make discreet inquiries, I know we can --

Thanks very much, John, and gentlemen and ladies.

(Laughter)

A Lester has asked his one question. Yes.

Q John, your comments on the Soviets -- just to be clear -- all those references you've just been making refer to Soviet diplomats.

A Diplomats, that's correct.

Q Who are the other Soviets on the island? Can you tell us what they do on the island there?

A I don't know that we're aware of Soviets other than in the Embassy purporting to be diplomats. But I think we will want to make sure that when they emerge, who is a diplomat and who is not a diplomat.

Q John, on those third-country nationals who were in the Soviet compound, you say you are determining their bona fides. How are you doing that? Do you have a list of names provided by the Soviets?

A I'm not sure how that is being done. Can't answer that.

Q Have any of them come out and contacted the United States -- the Bulgarians, the North Koreans, or any of the others -- contacted you in the way the Soviets have?

A Not to my knowledge. I think that the contact on behalf of that group was the initial one by a party of three Soviets who sought out a U.S. official, gave them a list of who was in the Embassy, indicated that they were out of touch with Moscow themselves, and asked us to intercede in terms of sending information about their condition. I don't think -- there may have been -- but I'm not aware of anything (inaudible)

Q Did the Soviets give any indication that these people were from the Embassies of their countries, and then trying to stay in the Soviet compound?

A I can't answer whether they said that. They gave the figures which we have given you; no figures on the Cubans who were in the Embassy, but I don't know whether they gave a breakdown. Whether they said everybody in the Embassy was a diplomat, I don't know.

Q John, are you offering any legal justification for the invasion of Carriacou today, or are we just chasing Cubans throughout the Caribbean area?

A I don't know that we have any further words on the legality of our action than we've already given you. There may be on one or two specific questions that we've been asked, and we're doing some --

Q On the invasion of Carriacou, the one that took place this morning --

A I don't have anything on that.

Q -- you said they were looking for Cubans.

A Yes.

Q Isn't that an independent island?

Q What kind of intelligence did we (inaudible).

(Laughter)

A I think the Marines were following up reports of Cubans on the island.

Q But they found no --

A Apparently they found none.

Q What's the status of the Grenadan nationals, including members of the previous government and the previous government before that, since they are being taken into custody? Do we have anything?

A I think that is a matter that we would be discussing with the Grenadian authorities, in the shape of the Governor General, asking what disposition he wishes made of them.

Q The last time you raised that, you said that they were being held under U.S. custody.

A Yes.

Q Are they being granted visits by ICRC?

A I don't know.

Q Are they being held essentially incommunicado, or --

A I don't know. I can't answer that.

Q Will you look into that, into (inaudible).

A I think you ought to ask the Pentagon; they're holding them.

Q John, on the documents that you mentioned that are going back to Grenada, can you give us some idea of what they are, and does that include the treaties that have been mentioned by you and Ken Dam?

A I think what we are making sure goes back to Grenadian possession is documents that are legally those belonging to the Grenadian Government. I'm not sure what will happen to other documents, but obviously, we're consulting with the Grenadian authorities about documents that are not Grenadian property.

Q What about the treaties?

A I'm sure that the originals are in the hands, or will be in the hands, of the Grenadian authorities.

Q Can you say where these agreements that you alluded to yesterday were taken from? Were they taken from official buildings of either the Cubans, or from private buildings?

A I can't, Jim, because I don't know. I think they were taken from various locations including some from private houses in which various people were found and detained.

Q What's the legal attitude now towards the Grenadians accredited to the U.S. diplomatically, and to the U.N.?

A I can't answer the question about the U.S., but as far as the U.N. is concerned, I think that the Governer General has asked the U.N. not to recognize the existing Grenadian representatives pending his examination of the situation and some further communication from him indicating who does represent Grenada.

Q So, in terms of the -- the ones referred to the U.S., you don't have any --

A Can't answer. I don't know what the situation is.

Q If I can just turn that around, John? What about -- I heard a report that we plan an Embassy of some 20 to 30 diplomatic personnel on Grenada. Does that sound right?

A I don't know what size. I don't think it could be anything like that -- and it isn't an Embassy; it's a Mission. I think we have a very few people there at the moment working under rather primitive conditions. What the size of the mission will end up at, I don't know.

Q Will it become permanent, though? Will there now be a U.S. Embassy there?

A There will be a U.S. Mission on Grenada.

Q Why don't you call it an embassy?

A Because it won't be an embassy, initially at any rate; it will be a mission.

Q John, on the documents again, there are obviously a lot of documents that are not the property of the Government of Grenada, or at least they have been described as being Cuban documents.

Can you tell us what the status is with those? Are they still under analysis or are you going to release those? When can we expect them, et cetera, et cetera?

A Well, I think the overall question of documents is something that is under discussion primarily with the Grenadian authorities. I'll give you something just as soon as we have. My expectation is that we would probably make one release of whatever we can release rather than of a series of releases, but that, honestly, isn't something that we're able to tell you yet.

Q Are you discussing with the Grenadian authorities -- whoever the plural may be -- these documents which are obviously not Grenadian property?

A We're consulting with the Governor General on various documents, yes.

Q Why are you doing that?

A I think it is the proper thing to do.

Q I'm not arguing with you, but why is it proper?

A Well, certainly documents that are property of the Grenadian Government, that is clearly very proper to do; and I think, as a matter of form, we have decided to consult with the Grenadian authorities about various other documents that we found on their island.

Q But these documents were with a government that you did not have the highest regard for. What is the point of suddenly introducing these diplomatic proprietary (sic) (inaudible)?

A I think government documents are government documents, Bernie, whatever regime subscribed to them or wrote them; and there is a new government emerging in Grenada, and we think it is proper that we should consult with them.

Q Do you have a sense that you're running against some sort of a credibility problem on this whole question of documents, and in fact, really, that there is a major effort to expedite it while the credibility questions pile up all around, the fact that documents have not yet, in fact, been released?

A There may be a credibility problem in not having released them, but I don't think that this Department should be in the least apologetic for not having released Grenadian Government documents without having consulted with the Grenadian authorities. I think it perfectly proper. And if it takes a day or two to do it, then I think, so be it.

Q Let me just follow up, John? Is there a rush on; that is to say, is the process being expedited?

A I think we're responding to a number of urgent demands from you and your colleagues, trying to be as expeditious as we can.

Q But the burden in fact may be on you, in the final analysis. How many diplomats or personnel have been assigned to this whole process, and how many has the Governor General assigned to go quickly sifting through what, in fact, can be made public?

A I don't think it is a major problem to determine which are Grenadian Government documents and which are not the property of the Grenadian Government. I think that is something fairly easy to establish.

Q Were you suggesting a timeframe there when you talked about a day or two?

A One hopes; one hopes, you know -- I have to reiterate what you all know, that communications are not of the best, that the Governor General is limited in the kind of staff support that he has, I presume. We are certainly very limited in the kind of staff support and communications that we have in terms of diplomatic officers on the scene.

Q John, have we brought Grenadian officials here? If I understood you correctly yesterday, you said there were documents in this building being studied.

A Yes.

Q Did Grenadian officials come up here to the Department to do a side-by-side study?

A No.

Q Then, how do you take these Grenadian-owned documents up here? Since you're making such a point about their being Grenadian, how do you do that?

A I don't really understand the question.

Q The question is, to what degree do you help yourself to documents that you've made clear are not yours, and bring them to Washington?

A I think that the legal position, Bernie, is very clear in terms of soldiers in an operation seizing strong points, or seizing points where people are firing upon them. I think the law really is quite clear as to the seizure of such documents.

I'm sure that those documents underwent an initial field-screening for obvious intelligence and military purposes, and then were handed to others better able to analyze the significance of what was contained therein. That's been done.

Q I don't understand: Why are some here and why some there?

A The facilities are very limited. The analysts who are able to pass judgment on them and assess them are not in Grenada in strength, so they may have been taken to points elsewhere for that analysis -- copies of them.

Q John, just to follow this, can we expect any more selective releases of these documents? I mean, we've had the President of the United States saying things based on the documents. We've had an Admiral referring to specifics from the documents. We've had Ken Dam and you telling us about the specifics -- some of the specifics of treaties which are part of the documents. So there has been a selective release of these already.

A I can't speak for the others you've mentioned, but in view of the feeling of some of you here yesterday that I was too loose-lipped, I don't plan to release any more details. I have learned my lesson, and therefore, will not talk about anything else that I know that is in them.

Q Well, have others learned their lesson, too? I mean --

A That seemed to be not treated with total enthusiasm yesterday.

Q The point is, isn't it, there has been a selective release. Some of the material has been released, so you're not going to release -- we're not able to see the whole documents to assess and put what's released in the context, so you've given us what you think we ought to have. We've not seen the entire material --

A That's correct.

Q -- that we need to make a judgment.

A Correct. I can't dispute your statement.

Q How is it legally consistent that you say -- documents that are the property of the Grenadan Government -- how is it that they can be taken here presumably prior to consultation about that with the Grenadan Government, or was the procedure such that the Governor General said, "Anything you can find, you can take to Washington and analyze, just don't release it publicly."

A I'm not sure what originals have moved or what copies are here, so I'm not sure who is analyzing from an original document or who is analyzing from a copy of that document.

I think you may take it as a given that the documents have been copied and catalogued, and we're in the process of analyzing the entire body, a lot of which is trivia.

Q Sure. But I just don't understand. Whether they're copies or they're originals, the point is that the United States is using them for their own purposes now, presumably, and has not yet consulted with the Grenadan Government about the use of those documents which are the property of the Grenadan Government.

A They came upon the documents in the course of hostilities --

Q Right.

A -- in various points --

Q I don't dispute that.

A -- throughout the island.

Q Right.

A The fact is that the military took those documents, as is traditional in combat --

Q I'm with you.

A Those documents which later were determined to be the property of the Grenadian Government are going to be returned to the Grenadian Government.

Q Are those documents -- have they been subjected to any analysis --

A Sure.

Q -- by U.S. Government officials?

A Sure.

Q And did the analysis only involve the determination whether or not they were Grenadan Government documents, or did they go beyond that analysis into what was actually in them?

A I'm sure that as the analysts read through the documents, they absorbed the contents. (Laughter)

Q Since these documents were the property of the Grenadian authorities, how then did you help yourself to the right, unilaterally, to disclose what is someone else's property?

A I don't think that there has been widespread disclosure. I think there have been suggestions as to what is contained therein. But I think Ken Dam, for example, on Sunday said we're going to wait until we can make an overall assessment and analysis of these documents, and then give you the facts. And you seem to be sniping at us on both counts.

Q John, is there anything that's come to light in the last 48 hours or more that is evidentiary in support of the Administration's contention that the lives of the Americans on Grenada were in fact endangered? In these documents that were seized --

A Oh, in the documents.

Q Either the documents or radio intercepts or anything, has any new evidence come to light that substantially supports the Administration's contention that American lives were at stake and/or that a hostage situation was a likelihood?

A I don't know that anything has come to light beyond what was already in the public domain. You have to listen to the words of Alister Hughes on Grenada, you have to listen to the words of the students, you have to listen to the words of Caribbean leaders, all of whom have spoken at great length on the unsettled situation that existed. But I'm not aware of any further information that underlines what already has been said about the conditions of the students.

Q Let's go to a new subject.

Q Let's just have one more.

A One more.

Q At least I just have one more. Weinberger and Vessey gave a briefing this morning to the Senate leadership, and apparently Baker came out saying there were more than a thousand Cuban troops on the island.

Are we revising our estimate again?

A I don't know. The Pentagon has the figures on the Cubans.

Q Are you aware of any change in the estimate that was made over the --

A I'm aware that there have been estimates from the beginning, but I don't know what the figure specifically the Pentagon is suggesting today.

Q John, what can you tell us about the Administration's intentions about Polish sanctions?

Q Could we stay on Grenada for a --

Q No.

A Why don't we switch subjects? The vote, consensus --

Q Yes.

A Why don't you keep in touch with us on Poland? Might have something later.

Q John, can I have a clarification on something? Did I understand you to say that there were copies, and, if so, is it only the originals that are being returned to the Grenadan Government, or will the copies be kept?

A I would think that certainly documents that are the property of the Grenadian Government, of course, the originals will be returned to them.

Q And the copies will be kept?

A I assume the copies might be kept.

Q What about documents that belong to other governments, other than the Grenadan or U.S. Governments?

A You have to talk to the legal people about the legal possession of those documents.

Q You mean you don't know the answer on that?

A I do know the answer to that question, but I prefer you get a strict legal interpretation. For example, there isn't any question that a force in combat with another force is legally entitled to take documents belonging to that power with which it is engaged in combat, if they're seized in combat -- if you're talking about Cuban documents, for example.

Q John, in view of the Administration's --

Q John --

A Hold on. I can only take one at a time. Go ahead.

Q John, does the U.S. Government believe that Syria is poised to attack the naval task force off the coast of Lebanon, and why is it any more of a danger now than it has been for the last few weeks, or months for that matter, considering they've had the weapons available to them?

A We've seen reports, but I think you need to go to the Pentagon. That is a military question, so why don't you ask them about any methods or preparedness that they're engaged in.

Q But isn't there a diplomatic answer for that? Isn't there something that --

A I can't answer. I don't have any comment on reports that Syria has threatened to launch missiles at American ships, which I gather is the story you're referring to.

Q How about an undiplomatic answer?

A No. I don't even have an undiplomatic answer.

Q John, in the last days several columnists raised questions about the existence of this Soviet-American agreement or understanding concerning Cuba as a consequence of the 1962 crisis.

Does the State Department believe that such an agreement or understanding exists?

A The Secretary has testified at great length on that situation, and I don't have anything to add to what he said.

Q Do you have any information unequivocally --

Q He testified in secret.

A There were fairly extensive reports on that testimony, Bernie. But I don't have anything on that.

Go ahead.

Q Do you have any information which unequivocally involves Syria in the bombing of U.S. Marines company in Lebanon, and what do you comment on Israeli Defense Minister Arens' accusations of last Sunday that Syria is responsible?

A Maybe you weren't here yesterday when I answered that question, but our investigation is continuing, and we're in close coordination with the French and the Lebanese who are similarly conducting their investigations. When those are complete, we'll have a better idea.

Q In view of the Administration's repeated statements that it wants the troops to be out of Grenada as soon as possible, does the Administration have any objections to Capitol Hill voting to require the troops to be out in 60 days?

A I'm sure the White House would have specific thoughts about legislation and the Administration's reaction to legislation, but the President has said that those troops -- he wants those troops out of Grenada as soon as possible, and we stand clearly by that statement. I can't give you a timeframe.

Q Can you comment on a BBC interview in which Paul Scoon said that he asked for help, not an "invasion?"

A Not really, but I think you have to read what he said in its entirety. He was clearly expressing gratitude for the involvement of ourselves and the Caribbean nations. He clearly said that the situation was deteriorating very fast, and I don't think there's any suggestion in what he said that he was opposed to our involvement.

Q Except that he asked for "not an invasion."

A You know, you can quibble about words, an "invasion" and so forth and so on, but the fact is he was not, in what I saw, objecting to what the United States, in fact, did.

Q Isn't there an enormous difference, John, between objecting to _fait accompli_ and whether or not the only authority the United States recognizes on Grenada actually asked for American armed intervention?

A I don't think that the Governor General was reacting to a fait accompli. I think there is an abundance of other evidence, and I think you should use what he, himself, has said that he in no way resisted the American involvement. Far from it. Quite to the contrary.

Q Isn't is different language than saying, as this Department and other agencies of the Government have said in recent days, that Mr. Scoon asked for the American response?

A Why don't you go back and look at the record, and I think you may find that to be the case.

Q John, do you have any comment on the bombing or any apology on the bombing of the mental hospital in St. George's?

A I don't. Obviously, that is a very tragic event. But I think the Pentagon is conducting its own inquiry, and we don't have anything --

Q And also, there is one firm -- talking about the credibility, there is one firm, one British firm, apparently in charge of the construction of the airport that says there were no facilities that are needed for a military base.

A No facilities needed for a military base?

Q This was the British firm --

A I wonder how they would interpret all the weapons that were discovered, all the other materiel that was discovered, and I wonder how they would interpret the fact that as the United States forces went in there, they were fired on by anti-aircraft weapons.

Q No. They apparently say that there were no facilities especially needed for an airport to be a military base.

A Well, I think the facts speak for themselves.

Q Have diplomatic personnel in Central America and South America been told to -- been warned to be more careful or been put on a state of alert or asked to take any more specific anti-terrorist precautions?

A There are some reports that there are death threats against Americans in Latin America, and that these emanate from Cuba. This is obviously a subject of the gravest concern to the United States. We are obliged to take reports of possible terrorists' activities very seriously indeed, especially under current circumstances, and we do.

There have been some terrorist acts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Puerto Rico, and perhaps elsewhere. A bomb exploded outside the Binational Center in Medellin -- I may be mispronouncing that -- Colombia. No casualties occurred but there was serious damage to the building.

So we are looking into the circumstances surrounding these various incidents. Not going to get into communications we may or may not have had with the Cubans, and not going to speculate on what actions would be taken. But, obviously, Cuban instigation of terrorist actions against U.S. targets, if proven, would be a very serious development.

Q Can we have a copy of that, John?

A Sure.

Q What about the attack, or whatever it was, explosion at the -- in Martinique -- Fort de France?

A As I say, there may be others, and we're taking a look at these various developments.

Q Do you have reason to believe this report is coming from Cuba? I didn't understand; you said there were reports?

A There are reports.

Q Where are these reports?

A I think there was some material in the press this morning suggesting that, and --

Q Do you have reason to believe that these reports are true at this point? Do you have any evidence?

A We are looking into it.

Q John, same subject: Are there any reports, or could you share with us any activity, that might be happening around Guantanamo?

A No. Don't have anything on that.

Q John, do you have anything on the arrest of Bishop Muzarewa in Zimbabwe?

A No, I do not, Jim.

Q You don't?

A I don't.

Q I have two questions. They're not Grenada. They're Central America.

A Okay. Be quick, because we've got to go pretty soon.

Q Rivera y Damas, he was threatened -- the Archbishop of San Salvador was threatened with death, or presumably with death, and his assistant by the usual suspects.

Do you have any statement on that?

A Yes. Both the White House and the Department of State have condemned right-wing violence in El Salvador. Such threats are reprehensible and only serve to sustain the atmosphere of antagonism in El Salvador which has already cost too many lives.

Q And, also, if I could follow, I understand that the United States wants to say something about the dialogue in Chile? It wants to say something to Pinochet?

A I don't know that we want to say something about it, but always attempting to anticipate your questions, we may well have something on that.

Q I'm surprised.

A We have on repeated occasions expressed our full support for a peaceful transition to a democratic government in Chile. In this context we welcome the three earlier rounds of talks between the Chilean Government and democratic opposition.

While it by no means is the only avenue for exchanging views on how to accelerate the transition to democracy, the dialogue offers a useful framework for discussing possible solutions, and for giving urgency and direction to the transition process.

We regret to note that the formal dialogue which was interrupted in late September remains suspended. In the absence of such a dialogue or exchange of views on a democratic transition, it is a matter of concern since this situation can only favor those opposed to a peaceful return to civilian government in Chile.

Q Copy, please?

A Sure.

Q Just for the record, Speaker O'Neill had some unkind things to say about the Secretary of State. Would you care to explain?

A No. I don't have anything on that, Jim.

Okay?

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:06 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, November 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #194

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a couple of announcements up front. Available in the Press Office are copies of the following testimony: Deputy Secretary Dam's testimony this morning before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs and Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. The subject of his testimony was Grenada.

Also available is the testimony of Rear Admiral Jonathan Howe, Director of the Bureau of Political/Military Affairs. That was before the House Committee on Armed Services this morning. The subject of his testimony was U.S. Marines in Beirut.

I just want to remind you that Deputy Secretary of State Dam will deliver an ON THE RECORD luncheon address on Grenada and Central America to the Associated Press Managing Editors' Convention in Louisville, Kentucky, on Friday. That's at 12:30 p.m. If you want to cover this event, a contact now with APME is Bob Stiff, who's at the AP registration booth in Galt House in Louisville, and his number is (502) 589-5200.

Why don't I just run through what we have on the Grenadan situation. The Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, has ordered the closing of the Cuban Embassy and the prompt departure from Grenada of all personnel now in that Embassy. The Embassy has been cordoned, consistent with the Governor General's action, and in consultation with him, for the security of Embassy personnel pending their return to Cuba.

As far as the Cuban wounded and dead are concerned, the Cuban wounded, accompanied by Cuban medical personnel and International Committee of the Red Cross officials, were scheduled to be transported from Grenada this morning by U.S. C-130 aircraft to Barbados. At Barbados, they will be transferred to a DC-8 aircraft leased by the International Committee of the Red Cross, and will be flown to Havana. They should arrive in Havana late this afternoon.

Q How many people are we talking about?

A Hold on. As for the Cuban dead, the Red Cross is making separate arrangements for their return to Cuba. We understand that as far as wounded are concerned, there will be 57 on the aircraft along with 8 women and 3 children from the Cuban Embassy.

The United States is now prepared to authorize the prompt return of the able-bodied Cuban detainees with repatriation to begin as soon as the technical arrangements can be agreed upon.

Q These are all the captured?

A These are the captured; right. The wounded are going out on a plane right now, the dead will go next, and then as soon as arrangements are made for those detained, they will go out.

Q What is the number of dead and those --

A I don't have a figure on that.

Q What about the number of detained?

A I don't have that.

Q What does that mean, John? The technical --

A I think as soon as the International Red Cross and the Cubans and ourselves can agree on how that will take place.

Q There's a declaration there that cessations of -- active hostilities have now ceased.

A As we said earlier, we would be prepared to repatriate those Cubans when hostilities had ceased, and I guess our estimate is that hostilities have ceased.

Let me go on. I have some more for you, and then why don't we discuss it after? Insofar as the Soviet Union and Libya is concerned, the Governor General has announced that he has broken relations with those two countries and has also asked their personnel to leave Grenada. He has asked that the departure of the Soviet Embassy personnel be worked out in cooperation with the Caribbean peacekeeping force. I don't have any details for you, but that is being actively worked on.

Insofar as the East Germans, the Bulgarians and North Koreans who the Soviets have informed us were in their embassy, we really don't have anything very definite on what happens to them. It is possible that they will leave with the Soviet personnel, if that is their wish.

Insofar as the Cubans in the Soviet Embassy are concerned, they will be moved to some other location, pending arrangements for their departure with the other Cuban personnel. That's about it.

Q Has that been agreed to by the Soviets about leaving and all that sort of thing?

A That is being worked on, Bernie. They have been asked to leave. And as you know, they have had communications difficulties but we have facilitated their communication with Moscow, and I think that is their decision now, to decide how to respond to this --

Q They're leaving, in other words? They've agreed to leave?

A I don't know that they have agreed to leave. I know that the Grenadans have asked them to leave, and we will now have to see what happens.

Q The Cuban wounded -- on the Cuban wounded, did Havana ask for the wounded to be evacuated or is this just being done?

A I'm sure this has been done in consultation with the Cubans.

Q Is Scoon coming to the United States today?

A No, no knowledge of any such visit.

Q Is he already here?

A No.

Q No?

A No, he is not here, to my knowledge.

Q Just for the record, John, Grenada has not then broken relations with East Germany, Bulgaria or North Korea, is that right?

A I'm not sure with which of those countries they have formal diplomatic relations, Russ. But as far as we're concerned and are told, Grenada has broken relations with the Soviet Union, with Cuba and with Libya.

Q On the Hill this morning, Secretary Dam gave a lot of information from the so-called "secret treaties." Are you now going to put out the rest of them?

A Still waiting to hear from the Grenadan authorities. I think that --

Q In other words, the Grenadan authorities have given permission for that much to be divulged, or what?

A No. I'm not aware of that. I know that discussions were to be held between our representatives on the island and the Governor General. I can't tell you what the status is of those negotiations. As soon as we hear, and as soon as there's any decision, we'll let you know.

Q Can I get the chronology straight on the departures, because the Cubans issued a statement saying they would not leave their -- their Embassy would not leave until the wounded and the captured had been released?

A That's right.

Q Is that timetable possible? You've now said the wounded are leaving today, and the captured will leave as soon as logistics are worked -- you -- Are you asking that the embassy people leave immediately, or what is that?

A We're not asking anything. The Grenadans have broken relations.

Q But you're controlling logistics after a fashion.

A In consultation with the Governor General, yes. We're certainly involved in those arrangements. I think the Grenadan request was for departure within 24 hours. I think that might well slip, but I can't tell you how that conforms --

Q You're not planning on the 82nd Airborne storming the embassy that seized the --

A Haven't heard any talk of that, Bernie.

Q Explain what you were saying? You said the embassy was cordoned?

A Yes.

Q By whom? What does that mean?

A I don't know whether any of the other Caribbean forces are involved. But certainly we have cordoned the -- the United States forces have cordoned the embassy.

Q In other words, we've set up guards there and said people can't go in and people can't come out?

A No.

Q What does "cordon" mean? I don't understand it.

A It's a protective cordon. I haven't said they can't come in and can't go out. But I think when they do leave the embassy, they are being escorted to wherever they wish to go.

Q Is this to protect them? You said it was for security; is it --

A I think it's at the request of the Grenadans, but, clearly, the fact that relations have been broken; clearly, the fact that there is some unpopularity of those particular nationalities on the island -- yes, I think there's a security --

Q What is the U.S. responsibility?

A Because the Grenadans have asked us to do it. I don't know whether any other Caribbean forces are involved, Bernie. I'm just talking for us.

Q Now that active hostilities have apparently ended, can you give us a time when the American forces will be able to leave the island?

A I can't, Bernie. As you know, the President has said as soon as possible, and obviously he'll make that determination.

Q On that point -- Bernie's point -- as you may know, just a little while ago in this room the Director -- the Administrator of AID was here, Mr. McPherson, and he suggested, or he said, that under consideration now in the

Administration is the use of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on the island. How would that jibe with the withdrawal of U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps troops?

A I don't think there's any conflict or contradiction there. I don't know what he had in mind in terms of duration, but Seabees operate with great dispatch and are able to work miracles in terms of putting up bridges or whatever it is, or clearing a road or whatever it is they might do, and I think -- I wasn't here, I didn't hear what he said -- but I think what is envisaged is while U.S. forces are there, maybe the Seabees can get in there and repair any damage that might have been done.

Q With regard to the able-bodied troops that are going to be released as soon as technical arrangements can be agreed upon, in your words: to what degree is the State Department or the White House considering, seriously considering the proposals made on Capitol Hill in letter form, by a majority of the members of the House and in a resolution passed by the Senate, to link the return of the able-bodied Cubans captured on Grenada with the return of the Marielito Cuban prisoners that are held in Atlanta, and other places around?

A I think Larry Speakes had some words on that this morning, and I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Would you just clarify one thing?

A Sure.

Q From what I gather, the Soviet Government has not yet indicated what it wants to happen to its people. Is that correct?

A That is my understanding.

Q So they're in kind of a --

A Assuming that communication were to come back through us, yes. Insofar as we know, that -- it certainly has not come back through us.

Q Are they in a limbo status, or will they be evacuated?

A I think they're waiting for instructions from their government.

Q Now, Cuba is in a similar situation, or have the Cubans accepted --

A You've seen what the Cubans have said. They have said, as I understand it, that they will not leave until all their people -- or their diplomats will not leave -- until all their people are out of the island.

Q Is the Soviet Embassy also cordoned off?

A Yes.

Q I still don't understand, John, what that means. Does that mean you're halting people or you're not allowing people to go in; you're not allowing people to come out? If they do go out, they're escorted by --

A If they go out, they're escorted; that's right. If they go out, for example, to buy food or whatever they need to do, go shopping, or if they need to make representations, official representations, or if they need to go see the Governor General, they are escorted.

Q By the U.S. -- it's cordoned by U.S. troops?

A I do not know whether other Caribbean troops are involved in that.

Q But there are U.S. troops?

A There are U.S. troops.

Q Do you envisage the possibility of a forced departure of the -- for example--the Soviets? You say that the Governor General has broken relations with Libya, the Soviets, asked their departure. You've heard nothing so far from Moscow?

A No.

Q Is there a possibility the Soviet personnel may be packed up and sent out?

A I haven't heard any suggestion of that, Bernie.

Q I don't understand how Libya comes into it. There are no Libyans on the island, are there?

A Oh, yes, there's a Libyan Embassy.

Q Where are they?

A I don't know where it is located physically, but there are Libyans.

Q Will they also be transported out?

A I presume so.

Q How many people?

A I don't know.

Q On the subject of the U.S. troops and when they might leave --

Q (Inaudible)

A I do not know of my own knowledge whether Libya is cordoned, Bernie. I think you would have to ask the Pentagon. It would seem to be in line with the cordoning of the other two embassies. I wouldn't find that surprising.

Q So it's Cuba, the Soviet Union, possibly Liyba. Do you know of any others there?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you know if they're all diplomats or are they there in any other capacity -- the Libyans?

A I don't know whether we know -- the Libyans? I don't know whether we're able to -- whether we have been able to determine that yet. We've been given some numbers by the Soviets, and I think we've been given a different set of numbers which didn't jell with the first set of numbers. So there may well be confusion or uncertainty as to who is a diplomat and who is not.

Q Why by the Soviets?

A Beg your pardon?

Q Why by the Soviets?

A Why what?

Q Why were the numbers given by the Soviets?

A Because they came to us, because they have no communications with Moscow, and said we have "X" Soviets, "X" North Koreans, "X" East Germans, "X" Bulgarians, and a large number of Cubans in the Embassy.

Q Her question was about "Libyans."

A I don't know how many Libyans there are now.

Q Are the Libyans in the Soviet compound?

A The Libyans, I assume, are in their embassy.

Q And they do have an embassy there?

A They have an embassy.

Q When you say "cordon," are we talking about what? A half a dozen American troops?

A I don't know, Bernie.

Q Any sense?

A I don't know. The Pentagon can probably help.

Q On the subject of U.S. troops there, have we been in touch with the Commonwealth people who are trying to arrange an alternate peacekeeping force?

A I'm sure we've been in touch, and are in touch with the Eastern Caribbean Organization. They're talking -- may well be talking with the Grenadan authorities about this.

Q Would we consider a force from Commonwealth countries replacing United States troops?

A Certainly, a number of ideas have been suggested and in that sense, necessarily, we will be considering it. But it's basically a decision for Grenada and the Eastern Caribbean countries.

Q I understand. But considering that some of the members of the Commonwealth are among our best friends in the world, I wonder why we aren't dealing directly with them?

A I think that really is a matter for the Grenadan authorities. I think they would have to make that --

Q Can you update us on the (Inaudible)

A I don't know. The Pentagon can tell you that.

Q Have any been pulled out since the Marines left for Lebanon?

A I don't know. The Pentagon can tell you that. They may well have done so.

Q Can you update us on any threats against Americans in Central America, or any new incidents?

A No. Nothing beyond what I gave you yesterday.

Q The Cubans issued a statement saying they received this note from the United States Saturday, and they rejected it as --

A Yes.

Q -- paraphrasing it "preposterous." Do you have any comment on that? Can you confirm that?

A We don't think it's preposterous. We take it very seriously.

Q Any new evidence of any --

A No, don't have anything beyond what I had for you yesterday.

Q (Inaudible) say that hostilities have apparently ended. Does this mean that we're satisfied that there are no more Cubans running loose on the island?

A I think that is the kind of question the Pentagon will have to answer, and I don't know whether they can. I don't know whether you can make a judgment about that.

Q John, can I try again on that linkage between the Cuban criminals and the captured on Grenada? The question was, to what degree has this been discussed seriously at the State Department, and you just said that Larry Speakes may have had something. I'm not aware of what he said this morning. Can you give me some idea of how this issue has been dealt with here at the State Department; whether it's been seriously considered; whether it's been dismissed out of hand?

A No, I really can't go into the kind of detailed discussed that might have taken place. Obviously, we understand and sympathize with the feeling on the Hill that inspires the kind of suggestion that they have been making. But there are international obligations concerning the return of prisoners. The question of domestic situation, domestic laws, and how they relate to interational laws is a very complicated and a difficult subject.

Q Does that mean that it was never seriously considered as a --

A I think I'm just going to leave you with what Speakes has already said on that.

--MORE--

Q John, can you clear up something? Mr. McPherson said a while ago that there is consideration being given to sending the Army Corps of Engineers.

A I think that -- the Seabees. I think that's what he was talking about.

Q No. He told us Corps of Engineers.

A Okay.

Q I'm just not clear on -- can the Corps of Engineers be dispatched around the world by the President, or do they come under a Congressional --

A I don't know. That's a question I can't answer, Bob.

Q You don't know either.

A I don't know the answer.

Q Do you know to what extent that is being discussed and where that is?

A I think the suggestion that while the military is there, Army construction engineers could be helpful-- they are very skilled at moving with great speed and could leave Grenada in perhaps slightly better shape than we found it. I think that is something that is quite seriously being considered.

Q Is that something that's going to happen immediately, or --

A I don't know. I think McPherson would know more about that.

Q John, just two questions again on just loose ends. You seem to be -- yesterday you were rather insistent that as far as North Koreans and everybody else in the Soviet Embassy were concerned, their bona fides as diplomats would have to be ascertained before you decide what to do.

Today you haven't mentioned that. Is there now an assumption you'll let everybody go just in one shipment?

A As I say, what will happen with the North Koreans and the Bulgarians and the East Germans in the embassy, I'm not quite sure. Whether they will go with the Russians -- whether the diplomats will go with Soviet diplomats is something that I think has not really been determined yet.

As far as non-diplomats are concerned, I think that would be a question for the Grenadan authorities to rule on.

Q Can you take a more philosophic question here?

A Uh, oh.

Q Here we have an island, Grenada, which before the episodes of recent days, we had neither a diplomatic mission or, I think, any aid program, and now, almost overnight, I guess as a result of our military intervention, or at least in the aftermath, we will have a small but not tiny diplomatic mission and Mr. McPherson, to be believed, says we're now interested in a long-term economic buildup of Grenada.

I mean, is there some point you might like to make about how countries can get American support? (Laughter)

Q I think it's called "The Mouse That Roared."

A I'm not sure that -- I hope you're not suggesting, Bernie, that what has transpired in Grenada is an ideal formula for bringing that about. (Laughter)

Q Why are we now -- I mean, there is a -- is there some reason other than the fact that we want to show what good guys we are after we bomb the place? Or why should a country which had no interest in the United States beforehand now become a kind of priority Caribbean interest?

A I think we have had an interest in Grenada all along. The -- perhaps the climate has not been totally appropriate for us to have had this kind of representation or involvement before.

But I do think that what has happened there, clearly, and I think this already is emerging and will emerge, is that the economy is in not -- certainly preceding the military operations -- is in fairly dire straits, and I think that assistance to the economy will certainly be welcomed and would be something that we would want to do.

Q John, on that question, with respect to the economy, (1) did you ever get an answer as to what the U.S. attitude toward lending by the IMF and other IFI's was prior to Bishop's demise?

A We certainly set the great machinery in operation to get an answer. I do not know, Jim, whether we have actually received that answer yet. That was on the question of whether we had changed our position on the granting of loans to Grenada following Mr. Bishop's visit. Don't have it yet.

Q Also, is it the judgment of the U.S. AID officials and other development specialists that Grenada's economy is in more dire straits than other countries of the Eastern Caribbean and hence needs all of this attention? Or that it's just we should make it, as Bernie's question seemed to hint, kind of a, you know, showcase of our generosity?

The reason I ask is because Grenada's economy has essentially been growing faster than the others in the region for about the last four years, and it is a poor country, but so are all the others there.

A I can't make a judgment in terms of comparison. You have enjoined me from giving you any further pearls from these various documents that we have, so that makes it difficult. But I think that in due course it will emerge that the regime considered their economy to be in rather dire straits.

Q Why has that become a sudden, urgent problem to the U.S.?

A I think it is an expression of our typical humanitarian desire in a case like this, Bernie.

Q John, did you have consultations with the Grenadans about the priorities into which the money might go, or are these all command decisions unilaterally made by the U.S.?

A I'm sure that there were discussions. There was an AID team on the ground in Grenada very fast, Bernie, and I'm sure they've held discussions with Sir Paul, I assume.

Q With whom? Themselves?

A With Sir Paul.

Q John, is the United States going to pay compensation to the people killed in the accidental bombing of the hospital?

A Don't know. Can't answer that question.

Q Has this question been raised by Grenada?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you have any new figures on the casualties in that hospital?

A No. Don't, Bob. The Pentagon may.

Q John, back to the Cubans: if the deadline of 24 hours set by the Governor stays, I mean, what do you do with the Cubans? Where do you take them, and how?

A As I say, I think that's a little hypothetical, and it may well be that that suggestion that he has made of 24 hours may slip. I don't know. But he --

Q He has?

A He has what?

Q He has set that deadline, hasn't he?

A He has said that it will slip?

Q No. The 24 hours deadline is set by him?

A He suggested a 24-hour deadline. He requested that they leave within 24 hours. That's correct.

Q Who?

A The Governor General.

Q That all three leave?

A Yes.

Q You're saying that might slip a little.

A I assume it is conceivable that it might slip.

Q Earlier you referred to the non-diplomatic Cubans as "detainees" and then you said "prisoners." Are we talking about -- I presume there's a difference between the military and the civilians. What is the status of the Cuban civilians? Are they all classed together?

A I think the military are holding the entire able-bodied Cuban contingent as prisoners. I'm not sure that they can differentiate between --

Q By "contingent" you include doctors and airport workers and building workers?

A I can't answer that. I know that some Cuban doctors are assisting their own people, but I don't know what their legal --

Q But is it true that the majority of the Cubans are civilians and not military?

A I don't know. You'll have to ask the Pentagon. Certainly most of the Cubans there were able to operate with great dispatch in organized units and with a great deal of military proficiency.

Q John, does the U.S. think it's in the best interest of peace in the Caribbean area for the Soviets to be expelled from Grenada?

A If the Grenadan authorities have decided to break relations, Bernie, then that's one of the realities. That's a fact.

Q My question still stands. Do you think it's in the interest of peace for the Russians to be expelled from Grenada?

A It depends on what grounds the Grenadan authorities had for expelling them. I'm sure that will emerge.

Q Do you have any sense at all, John, just as guidance, if we're going to see or hear anything further about those documents this week?

A I would certainly hope so. I can't just give you a date on that. It will happen just as soon as the Governor has talked with our people there and has made his decision.

Q John, do you have anything more that could at least fill out what Secretary Dam has in his text here, about any more details of those agreements?

A I don't know what's in his text, so I think I'll probably let you stand on his words.

Q For instance, he talked about agreements with the Soviets, Cubans and North Koreans for a total, I guess, of $37.8 million in military equipment.

Is it possible to break it down by country -- which country had the largest of these agreements?

A It is possible to break it down by country, but I'm not going to do it.

Q John, going back to this subject of a possible Commonwealth force, would the United States find it acceptable if there were a peacekeeping force on Grenada, including nations such as Britain who had sided with the Cubans and the Soviets in this issue?

A I think when specific nations are suggested, and when there is a specific proposal for such a peacekeeping force, that's the time to look at it and its composition and who's involved. But I think we would rely very heavily indeed on the thinking of the Grenadan authorities and the Eastern Caribbean nations.

Q Does the United States have any role whatsoever in the decision of Mr. Scoon to break off diplomatic relations?

A No. That is a Grenadan decision.

Q This is something you did not recommend one way or the other?

A No. That's his decision.

Q Has he been getting any sleep?

Q Could you explain -- (Laughter)

A I shouldn't think he's getting much sleep. No.

Q Could you explain the difference between the actual release of a document, these so-called captured documents, and the fact that Kenneth Dam is releasing the contents of the documents?

What's the difference between the two?

A Let us hope that very shortly, Bernie, we will be able to put this whole thing to rest, and we'll have --

Q You are saying it's the Grenadans who have the final say on release?

A On certain documents, yes.

Q Who has the final say on releasing content?

A You'd have to ask the Deputy Secretary on that.

Q John, --

Q Well, John --

Q Wait a minute. Wait a second. You're the Spokesman here. You can't pass us up to Dam now. You do enough of that with the White House and the Pentagon, but now if you start to point us in different floors --

A Bernie, I am not going to give you any more contents of the documents, and indeed we've had a fair amount of discussion about this in the past two days. We've told you the process which I think is the proper process to go through. That is going on, and as soon as that is resolved, we will let you know.

Q John, since we've now reached the point where we're complaining about matters, could I for the record issue a mild complaint.

Last night there were reports from Barbados about the encirclement of the Cuban Embassy, about the order to expel the Cubans, and, at least, repeated inquiries here to your Press Department got no information and no comment, which is understandable.

But then at 11:30 or 12:15, I'm told, Mr. Burt, whose European Bureau has presumably no interest in this Grenadan operation --

A Oh, I wouldn't say that.

Q -- then confirmed the whole story on television, and it just seems to me that we could have got out what you told us today a little faster last night.

A Let me take a look at it. I'm personally unaware of that sequence, but I will take a look at it. Sure.

Q John, on the treaties, were these -- not as to their contents, but as to their ownership -- are these treaties -- were they captured in places on the island where it could be inferred that they were not the property of the Grenadan Government, but were the property of other governments? Or were -- are these treaties to which he's referring today in his testimony considered to be the property of the Grenadan Government?

A I don't know where all the documents -- I think that various documents -- there are many, many pieces of paper, some of them quite trivial, and I can't tell you where the Pentagon found them. I think they found them in diverse places.

Q These are military aid agreements, and I'm just trying to establish --

A Certainly some documents that are considered to be official documents were found in private homes.

Q John, can I change the subject?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment today on the arrest of Bishop Muzorewa in Zimbabwe? Is that a good thing, you think?

A Not really at this stage, Jim. We're taking a look at it. The details are rather sketchy, but we might have something a little later on.

Q I find that remarkable enough to ask why there's no comment. This was the man who used to be Prime Minister. In an analogous situation in Grenada, it led to a large-scale U.S. involvement in such a situation.

Why is it that the United States appears to be so indifferent?

A Maybe it's a little further away, and maybe it's taken us a little time to find out some more about the circumstances.

Q John, a question: do other Eastern Caribbean States Organization members have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Cuba and Libya?

A I don't know. You'd have to ask them.

Q From your information do you have any reasoning for expulsion of the Libyans from General Scoon? Why -- because I think the United States broke diplomatic relations with the Libyans a few months ago as a result of accusing them of illegal --

A I think you'll have to ask the Grenadan Government for their reasoning. It's their decision. You're talking about two other governments.

Q Which?

A You're talking about Grenada and you're talking about Libya.

Q Would you clear up one other thing? There was a news account today that attributed to Secretary Shultz in a White House briefing yesterday morning the statement that he felt a fact-finding mission by Congress now would simply add to the U.S. presence on the island and would hence be unhelpful.

Did he really say that?

A I don't know. (a) I didn't see that report, and (b) I didn't know that he had said -- and I don't know that he said anything along those lines.

Q Do you have an attitude on it?

A In terms of attitude, I well understand why Congressional representatives would want to go to the island, would want to take a look at the situation, and obviously we would be cooperative.

He may well have been underlining some rather obvious deficiencies on the island, like there isn't any water to drink, and there isn't any food, and there isn't anywhere to stay. But I'm sure that the Pentagon would be helpful in facilitating such a visit.

But if he said -- and I really don't know whether he said anything like that -- but I think that he would simply have been underlining some realities.

Q Do you have any comment on the remarks by Tip O'Neill -- a characterization of the Secretary?

A No, I don't.

Q John, could I -- on I guess a related subject -- is it just a coincidence that this naval task force, I guess headed by the aircraft carrier America and three guided missile destroyers --

A I think the Pentagon had something on that this morning.

Q -- is sailing by Cuba, I guess calling at Guantanamo?

A Why don't you get the statement the Pentagon issued this morning?

Q What about the State Department? Do you think it's --

A We don't talk about movement of ships, as you well know, John, with your long experience.

Q It's been suggested by some television reporters that this is intended at least in part to send a message to Mr. Castro. Is that --

A Why don't you go to the Pentagon and take a look at their statement?

Q John, can I ask you two questions on the Middle East, please --

A Sure.

Q -- since we switched subjects already? (1) There was yesterday -- Congress killed funding of a plan for the Middle East. Without naming that plan, because there hasn't been any serious effort really to emphasize that issue -- I don't want to name it -- is the State Department and the Administration set on seeing that plan going through, whatever it is -- call it X or Y, whatever?

A Congress took what action it did on that unnamed program, and we don't have any comment on it.

Q I mean, do you consider the subject dead?

A I am sure Congress considers the subject dead.

Q But what about the Administration?

A We'll wait and see.

Q Okay. The other question, John, please: a senior State Department official briefed at the Foreign Press Center today, and he said that Syria agrees on seeing Lebanon independent and free and sovereign.

I understood the Secretary and the President referring to "Greater Syria," which would mean Lebanon would have to come under Syria.

Is this a new policy posed in the President's speech or did the Administration -- the senior Administration or State Department official was referring to something else? I would like to know if there is something new regarding Syria and Lebanon.

A No. I don't think there's anything new, and you have me at a slight disadvantage, because I don't know what happened at the Foreign Press Center today, but I don't think there's really any contradiction between what Syria's ambitions and hopes might be and what our goals for Lebanon are, and what we believe we can accomplish along with others.

Q But then my understanding of what the President said as -- he said it openly that nobody -- everybody knows Syrian ambitions for Greater Syria.

My -- as a person of the Middle East, I would understand that as being Syria wanting to have Lebanon back under the plan of Greater Syria --

A But the President's reference to what Syria's thinking or inclinations might be doesn't necessarily mean that that is our objective or that that is the objective we believe can be achieved.

Q John, do you have anything about the report in the *Times* today about information having reached the U.S. on October 20 about a possible attack on the Marines?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing on that story at all?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

~~German~~/
Becha

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, November 3, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #195

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. Why don't I give you what we have on the Grenadian situation?

The situation in Grenada remains relatively calm. The general services are being restored. We understand the commercial airport at Pearls will be reopened soon.

Q What?

A Pearls, the airport in the north.

All but a handful of Grenadian Armed Forces -- and I understand Grenadian is the correct pronunciation -- and militia or Cuban military personnel have been captured or have turned themselves in. Sixty-seven Cubans, including 57 wounded and 10 medical personnel, were evacuated from the island yesterday and returned to Cuba. Discussions about the evacuation of Cuban, Soviet, and other diplomatic personnel are in process. I may have something later in the day for you on that.

On the timing of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Grenada, that is, obviously, something that is being worked out with the Grenadian authorities and the members of the Caribbean Peace Force. The Pentagon had an announcement on that last night, and I'd refer you to the Pentagon for more specific details.

Insofar as the position of Cuban diplomats in their Embassy are concerned in Grenada, there is no apparent change in the Cuban position that their diplomats will not leave Grenada until all Cuban prisoners have been repatriated.

The documents -- captured documents -- still consulting with the Grenadian authorities on that subject. We'll let you know as soon as we have something. Keep in touch with us this afternoon on that.

Insofar as the Cuban wounded are concerned, as I said, 57 went out yesterday. Two critically wounded Cubans had been evacuated on an emergency basis earlier to Puerto Rico, where they remain; and those two, with the 57 that went out yesterday, as far as we know, amount to the total Cuban wounded.

As for the able-bodied Cuban detainees, we're in touch with the Cuban Government on this matter, and as we've said, they will be returned as soon as the transportation arrangements have been finalized.

Q Do you have a number on that?

A I don't have a number on that, sorry.

As far as U.S. citizens on Grenada are concerned, the State Department remains in contact with a small number of families who have not heard from relatives whom they believe are still on Grenada.

In addition, U.S. Consular officers are beginning to visit smaller villages on the island to try to locate any remaining Americans. Until these visits are completed, we're not able to say how many unofficial Americans remain on the island. For the most part, they seem to be Americans whose residence is there, including U.S.-Grenadian dual nationals.

On students, after consulting with officials of St. George's Medical School, we're satisfied that all the students at that institution have been accounted for. Americans evacuated -- the total was 603. An additional small number of Americans remained in Barbados when the evacuation flights transited there; in other words, 603 were flown back to the mainland, the United States. Some additional, small number, got off in Barbados and stayed there.

I'm not aware of any American civilian casualties.

That's about --

Q How many students are on the island, do you know?

A I don't have a number of how many are left there, Bernie. I'm sorry.

Q What is the problem -- or what is the delay caused by -- in the evacuation of Soviet personnel?

A Soviet authorities have come back and given their instructions to their personnel, and it's simply a question of getting them out of there, transporting them out of there.

Q On the Soviets, we have a report that the intention is to fly them to either Mexico or Caracas.

A Yes. I'm not sure what the destination will be. I think that's one of the things that is still being worked on.

Q But not Cuba?

A I'm not sure about that; I don't think so.

Q Have the Soviets given the O.K. for the departure of their diplomats?

A Yes, I think that's correct.

Q John, on Grenada, does the Secretary sympathize with all of the big media protests about being excluded from the Grenada landings like the British excluded reporters during the Falkland campaign? Or does he agree with the Washington Times National Review Columnist, Joe Sobran -- I think is the pronunciation -- who wrote this morning, "When mounting an invasion, why take along enemy troops?"

A I haven't anything for you on the Secretary's view on that.

Q Can I make one follow-up, and then I must run?

(Laughter)

Q You'd better. (Laughter)

Q The Marine Commandant, General Kelley, testified yesterday, "Nobody is addressing the root cause, terrorism, and that's very frustrating. I want the perpetrators, and I want them brought to justice."

Does the Secretary agree or disagree with this? And is there any news of any of the swift and effective retribution to terrorism which President Reagan promised in January of 1981?

A If you're referring to terrorism in connection with our Marines in Beirut, as you well know, that investigation is proceeding with despatch.

Q I meant both bombings. The one last April -- I don't remember that there was any swift and effective retribution to that.

A Well, retribution -- it's difficult to deal out retribution until you know exactly who did what.

Q I didn't make the statement; the President did. Thank you, John.

Q Do you have anything on the fate of the other nationals that fell under the Soviet umbrella, such as the Libyans, for example?

A I don't know where we stand on the Libyans, but as you know, they've been asked to leave by the Governor General. But I don't know what their status is. I think the focus today is on those who are in the Soviet Embassy.

Q You still don't know the numbers? You don't have any figures?

A No, not other than the figures that the Soviets have given us. Until they come out, we won't have a better idea.

Q Can you help us a little on the plans and the release of the documents? Will it definitely be sometime today? Might it slip till tomorrow?

A Can't tell you. We're looking to hear. Everybody understands your concern about this and our concern. As soon as those talks with the Governor General have taken place, and we get word on what they are, we will move.

Q John, can you just clarify something on the Soviet Embassy? You're saying that the Soviets have given the U.S. the O.K. to evacuate Soviet diplomats.

A They have given their diplomats the O.K. to leave. I think that's the position.

Q What's the status of the Bulgarians, the East Germans, and I've forgotten who else, who were inside the Soviet Embassy?

A They will come out, presumably, with the Soviets when the arrangements are completed for the departure of those who are in the Embassy.

Q Are the arrangements for the departure of those who are in the Embassy, or are the arrangements for the departure of Soviet diplomats who are in the Embassy?

A I can't break down specifically what may happen to each nationality, but I think there certainly is the prospect that some others might leave with the Soviets. After they've come out of the Embassy, they might physically leave Grenada.

Q And that's part of the deal, with the U.S. offering to help them to get out?

A Well, the U.S. is certainly going to have to provide the transportation to get them out of there, yes.

Q What if those people who come out with the Soviets, John, do not have bona fide diplomatic identity cards or passports?

A I think that their diplomatic status will certainly be checked when they come out.

Q And if it is not a genuine diplomatic status, what happens to them?

A I think it depends somewhat on the nationality and the circumstances of those individuals. For example, I don't know how the Grenadian authorities would want to treat North Koreans. I mean, there is not a question of diplomatic status there, as far as I know.

I don't know how they would react to Bulgarians and East Germans who are not diplomats. I assume they would also go out at the same time; I assume the Grenadians would not want to keep them.

Q Are the Embassies still cordonned off, both of them, Cuban and Soviet?

A Yes.

Q What are the whereabouts of Mr. Austin and Mr. Coard?

A I do not know, Jim, beyond the fact that they were at one stage on our ship offshore; but I don't know where they are at the moment.

Q Can you check on that, please?

A I can check on where they are, sure.

Q They are in some kind of U.S. custody?

A They're still in custody, oh, yes. Oh, yes.

Q How will those cases be handled?

A Well, I don't know if "custody" is the right word, but they are certainly in U.S. hands. And we have informed the Grenadian authorities and asked what disposition they would like made of them. I'm not sure that we've had an answer yet.

Q Rickey Singh -- he's the editor of *Caribbean Contact*, which is the organ of the --

A *Caribbean* -- ?

Q -- *Contact* -- it's the organ of the Church Council of the Caribbean -- has been given 24 hours to leave Barbados, where he has resided for some time.

A Yes.

Q And his work permit was cancelled by Tom Adams himself, apparently, last night. Could you look into this and what the United States would have to say about it?

A He's a U.S. citizen?

Q No. He is a Guyanese citizen; but it goes, I think, to the question of freedom of the press and possibly freedom of religion because it is a Church Council publication.

A Well, there isn't any question about our position on freedom of the press, but insofar as a Guyanese citizen expelled from another country by those authorities, I think it is probably their business. I don't know what --

Q You're not going to comment on --

A No, I don't have any comment in it because I haven't heard of it.

Q Not at this time, but if --

A I don't have anything at this time, no.

Q Does the U.S. have a position on the possibility of the Lebanese negotiators agreeing to freeze the May 17 Lebanese-Israeli agreement?

A Well, Bernie, as you know, our position on the May 17 agreement is very clear. We think it is an excellent agreement, and we think it is a very good first step leading to the total withdrawal of all foreign forces.

Insofar as what various delegates at Geneva might be discussing, obviously, we're not directly involved in those negotiations, and would have to wait and see. But our position on the agreement is very clear: we think it is a good agreement.

Q What about the reports that say that Fairbanks is saying, "It's fine with the U.S. if it's put on freeze?"

A As you know, Ambassador Fairbanks is there, and is certainly on the fringes of the conference that is going on, but I don't have anything on any diplomatic discussions that he might be having.

Q What kind of advice is the U.S. providing through Fairbanks on the May 17 --

A Our position on the May 17 agreement is that it is a good agreement.

Q Yes. I heard you; I heard you.

The question is: What kind of advice is the U.S. giving through Fairbanks on the May 17 agreement?

A It's a good agreement and should be adhered to.

Q Are you denying that the U.S. is saying, "It's O.K with the U.S. to freeze it?"

A I'm not getting into discussions that Ambassador Fairbanks might be having.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you have anything on the talks by Mr. Eagleburger in Tel Aviv?

A No. I think he said that he would prefer to discuss his visit at the end of his visit rather than at the beginning. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Just to follow, do you have any comment on the unfavorable position taken by the Israeli press against Mr. Eagleburger's mission?

A The unfathomable position -- ?

Q Unfavorable position taken against it?

A No.

Q Almost all the Israeli press is somehow against the mission and talking about failure.

A No, I don't have any -- About failure of the mission?

Q Yes.

A No, don't have any comment on that.

Q John, when you described the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement as a good first step, does that imply that the real point of the agreement was to get the Israelis to leave the country and the Syrians to leave the country, and if there were another way to do it, then, adhering to that agreement, that that might be acceptable to you?

A I think that's hypothetical. I haven't heard anybody suggesting another way of getting the exodus of troops.

Q The question is, if the price of getting the Syrians out of Lebanon is the abrogation of that agreement, how would you look on that?

A We're not for the abrogation of the agreement.

Q John, yesterday, a State Department official said OFF RECORD that the agreement was frozen; it won't freeze. So whose talking about freezing it?

A I don't really think it is very smart of me to respond to anonymous State Department officials talking OFF THE RECORD.

Q Shall I tell you his name?

(Laughter)

A No. That's a matter for your conscience. If you had an OFF-THE-RECORD conversation with somebody, I would think you would be having journalistic second thoughts about putting it ON THE RECORD.

Q Do you have anything to add regarding Rumsfeld's appointment as Middle East envoy?

A No. As you know, the announcement was made this morning. I don't have anything for you on travel plans. Mr. Rumsfeld has visited both Israel and Arab countries before, but I don't have anything really beyond that. I think the President --

-- MORE --

Q Can you clarify his status? Will he be a part-time, or will he be on contract, or what?

A That, I can't clarify, Bernie. You probably got the official title, which is the President's Personal Representative for the Middle East, and he will hold the personal rank of Ambassador, but I cannot answer your specific question about what --

Q Well, for instance, will he need confirmation?

A I think he does not need confirmation in this title; no, I think he does not.

Q John, what will his mission be? Will it be dealing with renewing the negotiations on the fate of the Palestinians, or will it be dealing with Lebanon?

A It's both, as has been the role of the Middle East negotiator in the past, as with Mr. Habib and with Mr. McFarlane.

Q Could you give us some guidance as to what he's going to deal with first? When McFarlane came back, the suggestion was that it was a good time to reassess the overall process; is that --

A No, I can't tell you. Mr. Rumsfeld was just announced this morning, and I'm sure he's immersing himself in a great deal of detail and historical background, and it's going to be his decision where his emphasis first is in concert with the Secretary and the President. I'm sure they'll be talking and deciding how he proceeds.

Q The same region, different country. Anything on reports of final confirmation of delivery of the Super Etendard to Iraq?

A No. Seen the reports. The United States is unable to confirm that, but we've seen the reports; sure.

Q What about the situation in Lebanon? There seems to be considerable violence there today. Do you have any kind of a report you can give us on that?

A Not on the Tripoli situation, Bob. I really can't give you much on that. Insofar as the Beirut area is concerned, it's relatively quiet. The ceasefire continues to hold, although there have been some violations in Beirut and the suburbs, and the Alay Ridgeline. The Marines reported that their positions near the airport have received some stray, small-arms fire, but there were no Marine casualties. As for Tripoli, we really don't have a readout on that.

Q And as for the talks in Geneva, there was one report on the FBIS that the participants have agreed to a government of national unity.

A Haven't seen that; not up on that. Sorry.

Q Do you have anything on the INF talks? There's been a report in the Boston Globe which said the U.S. is considering a request by Ambassador Nitze for yet one more try?

A Well, I know. We are sort of traditionally leery of commenting on press reports on alleged diplomatic exchanges, as you well know.

As President Reagan stated in March, while our ultimate goal remains the elimination of longer-range INF missiles on both sides, we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement setting equal, global levels for the United States and the Soviet Union below the level of planned U.S. deployments -- 572.

We believe that building on earlier U.S. proposals, President Reagan's September initiatives on geographic scope aircraft and appropriate reductions within the Pershing GLCM force offer all of the elements for a mutually advantageous agreement.

The United States and its Allies are constantly reviewing the negotiating situation as part of our effort to reach an INF agreement at the earliest possibile moment. We intend to study the ideas contained in Mr. Andropov's October 26 interview, as they are explained to us in Geneva, and we hope that the Soviets are truly interested in achieving an agreement. The test will be whether they decide finally to negotiate seriously there.

Q A copy of that?

A Sure. Yes.

Q John, question on Guatemala. Is it the position of this Administration that the human rights situation under the new regime in Guatemala has improved, and are you going ahead with the sale of helicopter parts?

A I think we might have something for you a little later in the day on that, if you want to check with the Press Office on the helicopter sale.

Q May I go back to the INF thing? It would appear that the opposition to the deployment of the missiles has increased since the Grenada invasion. What is your analysis of that?

A You've made a statement up front, Bob, and I really don't have a way of gauging whether your statement is correct or not. The position of the United States is that we're going forward; we don't see any erosion in the position of the Allied governments. I assume you're talking about the public --

Q My statement is based simply on what's been going on in the British Parliament, and also the fact that this weekend the demonstrations in Holland were twice as large as they had been the previous week. I wondered if you sense that there's growing opposition to the deployment as a result of Grenada?

A I don't really have a sense of whether the demonstrations were larger or smaller than had been anticipated. Everybody had been predicting large-scale demonstrations this fall. Demonstrations have taken place this fall. I've seen some reports that the turnout for some of them was substantially lower than had been hoped for, and obviously there are reports also that turnout in some cases was larger. But it's very hard to make a judgment about where public opinion stands. As I say, as far as the governments are concerned, there doesn't seem to be any erosion.

Q Do you have anything today on the detention of Bishop Muzorewa?

A Yes. We are continuing to watch that situation. We are, of course, concerned about the arrest of a prominent, political figure such as Bishop Muzorewa, and we are following the matter closely.

The United States believes, as a matter of principle, in rule by law and due process and in the right of freedom of expression and peaceful, political opposition. So we would always be concered by any effort to abridge these rights.

We do understand that Bishop Muzorewa was given access to his personal attorney within 24 hours of his arrest on Monday.

Q A copy?

A Sure.

Q Are you saying his rights were abridged?

A No, I'm not saying anything beyond this --

Q Why?

A As I say, we're looking at the situation and continuing to monitor it. We're just making a general statement about rights. But insofar as the specifics, we've really given you all we've got.

Q In this particular case, why do you bother bringing up the potential abridgment of his rights?

A One is always concerned about the abridgement of rights, especially when political figures are arrested.

Q (Inaudible).

A Yes, beyond what we've said.

Q John, there was a wire report yesterday which in the total flow of events, I guess, did not get much attention. But it said that the Zimbabwe Government had told foreign missions in the capital that it would not attend a joint funeral service in honor of the French and American people who were killed in Beirut, and sort of suggested that this was a bad idea.

Did we at that time make any remonstrations to the Zimbabweans, or do you have anything to say about that?

A I don't know whether it was an official Zimbabwean position, Bernie, and I don't know whether we have made any official remonstrations. But, clearly, the United States would find it incomprehensible that anybody would seek to boycott a memorial service for Marines who were engaged in a peacekeeping operation.

Q Back on Africa again. The South Africa vote, do you have anything on that?

A Yes, I do. As we have stated repeatedly, it is not appropriate for the United States Government to propose or endorse any particular blueprint for political change in South Africa. This applies also to the proposals just approved by the white voters of South Africa.

We believe that the 66 percent "yes" vote by South Africa's white electorate in yesterday's referendum is a reflection of a growing consensus within that electorate of the need to move forward toward broader participation by all South Africans in the country's political process. In that sense, November 2, 1983, is a potentially significant date in the modern history of South Africa.

As a multiracial democracy, the United States can only welcome a collective decision by a clear majority of white South African voters to take a step which opens the way to constructive, evolutionary change toward a system based on consent of all of South Africa's citizens, over 80 percent of whom are not white. The referendum results also indicate that the South African Government now has a firm and broad mandate to move decisively along this road so that South Africans of all races can enjoy the blessings of an open society and the chance to participate in all sectors of human endeavor without regard to race.

It's our hope that the South African Government will use its mandate to address the problem of the political rights of South Africa's black majority -- for the sake of the people of South Africa and of southern Africa, and for the sake of South Africa's relations with the rest of the world, including the United States.

Q Get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Just a quick follow-up. With respect to the fact that both the progressive Federal party and almost every black leader opposed the "yes" vote on this, that does not in any respect change your judgment on the matter?

A No. There's no question of our opposition to apartheid. There's no question of our position that South Africa should be moving to a government with the consent of the governed, but we think that this process opens up possibilities towards that end. I'm not specifying how that is to be achieved; it's a matter for South Africa to achieve, but there's no question of where we think the ultimate ideal is.

Q John, to go back to Muzorewa --

A The Bishop.

Q The Bishop. Thank you. Did you have any comment on the substance of the charges lodged against him, seeking to destabilize Zimbabwe?

A No, I don't.

Q Also, to go back to Lebanon and Tripoli, Arafat and the PLO have been warning of a Syrian offensive against their forces for a long time. You don't have any opinion regarding such an offensive? Do you have any comment on that at all?

A Don't have anything good to give you, I'm afraid, at this stage.

Q I'm not asking for the facts on the ground. I'm asking about a general attitude towards such an offensive.

A The State Department is very cautious; it usually gets facts before it offers --

Q All right.

Q Can we return to a couple of questions about Grenada again for a minute? Can you explain now that the hostilities have ended, according to the President and the Pentagon, what the U.S. prospects are for Grenada in the short-term future? Do you anticipate the appointment of a Cabinet by the Governor General; do you anticipate elections in the short-term future? What are the U.S. prospects?

A We anticipate some kind of interim administration. I don't know what form it will be. I think Sir Paul has been in touch with -- he's obviously been in touch with a large number of people discussing this, but I think he's been in touch with specific individuals. I think he's having a press conference today and may have or may already have had something to say about that.

Q What about lections? Does the U.S. anticipate elections?

A I think we certainly anticipate elections. I think it's been said that there would be elections there.

Q Can you tell me whether the U.S. now considers the Cuban presence on Grenada to be finished; not to draw an inept analogy, but in the same way that the Israelis declared that the PLO was finished in Beirut?

A I guess the Pentagon does not feel that there are large numbers of Cubans at large. It's in line with what I gave you at the beginning of the session. If the

Cubans in the Soviet Embassy and the Cubans in the Cuban Embassy and those who are presently detained leave the island, there's not going to be much of a Cuban presence left.

Q Will the U.S. rebuild or continue the construction of the airport at Point Salines?

A I think that Mr. McPherson said that was unlikely.

Q Can you tell us what the number and makeup is currently of the non-military U.S. Government personnel on the island?

A I think it's around -- between 40 and 50.

Q Between 40 and 50; and who are they?

A There's Mr. Gillespie, who is the Charge-designate. I don't know what immediate staff he has, and I'm sure there's some AID people, maybe some Public Affairs people. I assume the usual kind of mission complement.

Q When you're talking about the Cubans, you are saying that there has been no change in the position that they want to remain until the prisoners leave?

A Those in the Cuban Embassy; that's correct, such as we're aware of.

Q That means they are, indeed, staying there until the prisoners are safe. That you agree with?

A Unless the Grenadians decide that something should happen to them, they presumably will stay in their embassy until they leave.

Q Any reaction to the General Assembly vote, and any change on the U.S. position on the Kassebaum Amendment which is supposed to hit the floor today?

A Nothing on the latter. On the question of the U.N. vote, yes.

In our view, the passage of the resolution in the U.N. General Assembly which deplores the Grenada action has more to say about the state of the United Nations today than it does about recent developments in Grenada. We find it sad that the U.N. sees fit to deplore actions taken for humanitarian reasons, actions which were taken to save innocent lives and protect human rights, and which were taken in full accord with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

We were also deeply disturbed that certain countries forced an immediate vote, thereby muzzling debate in the Assembly. We find this contrary to a fundamental purpose of the United Nations which is to provide for free and open debate.

We would like to note, however, that there were several positive elements in the resolution which, in the paragraph-by-paragraph vote, we supported. These included the call for the respect of Grenada's sovereignty and independence, the regret for the deaths of innocent civilians, and the call for free elections as soon as possible so that the people of Grenada can determine their own future.

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q And why wouldn't this affect the Administration position on the Kassebaum amendment?

A Sorry, I don't have anything for you.

Q Just have nothing on it?

A Don't.

Q Do you have anymore on the Cuban terrorist threat against U.S. personnel?

A No, no change beyond what we had said before, that we --

Q Any comment on the AP story that some officials in this building said that was an irresponsible statement?

A No, I don't have any comment on that. And certainly anybody who said that in this building would not be speaking with authority or, I think, for the majority.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, November 4, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #196

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a number of announcements and statements up front, so perhaps I should go through them all and then take what questions you have.

The documents -- the captured documents: U. S. representatives in Grenada have discussed with the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon, the release of the captured documents over which he should exercise judgment. He's been reviewing the documents, and at this point we understand that, within the capacity to reproduce the documents on the island, the documents the Governor General has reviewing will be released sometime today.

On that basis, we expect to be able to provide copies of those documents today by 5:00. If you'll check with the Press Office around mid-afternoon, we might be in a position to get them out earlier. And as soon as we can, as soon as we get the word, we will do that. So we are hoping for earlier than 5:00.

Available in the Press Office are copies of Deputy Secretary Dam's luncheon address before the AP Managing Editors Conference in Louisville. This address is embargoed until 1:30. The subject of the address is the Larger Importance of Grenada. And barring any technical difficulties, the address will be piped into the briefing room beginning at 1:30.

I have an announcement on a trip by Secretary Dam to Europe. Secretary Shultz has asked Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam to travel to Western Europe from November 6-9 in order to consult with governments of our NATO Allies on current issues of interest. Although details of the Deputy Secretary's schedule are not firm, he plans to arrive in London on November 6. He will consult with leaders of Her Majesty's Government on November 7, and after that he will travel to Rome, Paris, Bonn, The Hague and Brussels.

In Brussels, he hopes to have the opportunity to meet with the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council as well as with leaders of the Belgian Government. Mr. Dam expects to return to Washington on November 9.

I have a statement on the announcement by the Government of Burma today on North Korean terrorists. The Government of Burma today announced that North Korean terrorists carried out the bombing attack in Rangoon on October 9 which killed 17 South Koreans, including six senior members of the South Korean Government. The Burmese Government has taken strong action severing diplomatic relations with North Korea and ordering members of the North Korean Mission to leave Burma within 48 hours.

While there had been strong circumstantial evidence from the outset pointing toward North Korean responsibility for this outrage, the Burmese Government quite correctly wished to make a thorough investigation before drawing its conclusions.

According to the Burmese Government statement today, the terrorists have now been identified as officers of the army of North Korea.

Q As what?

A Officers of the army of North Korea. This confirmation, though not unexpected, is chilling in its implications. This North Korean barbarism has not only been a national and personal tragedy for the people of Korea and Burma, but an assault on the entire international community.

This act of terrorism against another country on the territory of a third is a threat to the civilized conduct of international relations.

The Governor of the Republic of Korea has acted with commendable statesmanship to this abominable attack. We have previously expressed our sympathy to our South Korean friends for their profound losses, and our strong support for their security in the face of the bellicose and dangerous threats that continue to emanate from the North. We wish to reiterate those sentiments today.

We will be consulting with our Korean friends and with many other governments around the world on an urgent basis to consider an appropriate international response to North Korea's uncivilized, outlaw attack.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

I have a statement on the bombing of the Israeli army building today.

The United States is revolted by the tragic bombing by terrorists of the Israeli army building in Tyre, Lebanon, today and we extend our sympathy to the victims and their families. Attempts to thwart the objective of returning peace and stability to the Lebanon through violence and terrorism will in the end, fail.

Those who believe that they can work their will through terrorists actions are sadly mistaken. Only negotiation can pave the way for the withdrawal of foreign forces and a return to a peaceful and independent Lebanon.

We rededicate ourselves today to the objectives to which we have adhered since we undertook partnership in those negotiations.

Our hearts go out to the people of Israel and Lebanon in this tragic loss of precious human lives. We stand ready to assist in anyway that we can in this hour of national travail.

Q Copy?

A Sure.

Q Copies of everything?

A All right.

And, finally, let me give you an update on Grenada.

All of the Soviet, Bulgarian, East German, North Korean and Cuban personnel who were in the Soviet Embassy compound in Grenada were evacuated very early this morning by U.S. military aircraft to Merida, Yucatan, Mexico. The aircraft left Grenada at 1:21 a.m. EST and they arrived in Mexico about five hours later, this morning.

It's our understanding that an Aeroflot flight will pick them up there.

Earlier yesterday, all of the personnel in the Libyan People's Bureau in Grenada were evacuated to Bridgetown, Barbados. Their onward, travel was to be by commerical carrier.

The departure of the flights was delayed for some eight hours by the refusal of the Soviets to cooperate with security procedures established for the departure. Search of unsealed crates marked for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed a significant quantity of arms and ammunition; specifically, 38 AK-47s, 300 loaded AK-47 magazines and 5 pistols with loaded magazines.

The evacuation was carried out at the request of and in accordance with the instructions of the Governor General of Grenada. The Governor General informed the Soviet, Cuban and Libyan Embassies on Tuesday, November 1, of his decision to break diplomatic relations and asked that all personnel leave Grenada.

It was the Governor General's wish that the East German, Bulgarian and North Korean personnel also be evacuated. The diplomatic notes said that the evacuation was to be carried out with the cooperation and assistance of the Caribbean peacekeeping force.

The Soviet Government requested that the personnel to be evacuated be flown to Mexico. The United States is most grateful for the Mexican Government's cooperation in this matter.

A total of the personnel on the aircraft, 126; 49 Soviets, 6 East German, 15 North Koreans, 3 Bulgarians, and 53 Cubans. Nobody was left in the Soviet Embassy. In other words, all of the personnel in the Soviet Embassy were evacuated on the flight.

The United States protested the Soviet attempt to smuggle out automatic weapons on U.S. aircraft. (Laughter) We pointed out that this was unacceptable behavior. The Soviet actions could have seriously endangered the safety of the American aircraft and the aircrew.

A few more items. I don't really have anything --

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure, but I haven't finished yet. I don't have anything very specific on the assistance program. That's what we're looking into. Assistant Secretary Motley will be arriving in Grenada today, accompanying a Congressional delegation, and we'll want to hear what his first-hand observations of the situation are, particularly on the aid front.

You asked about General Austin and Mr. Coard. We understand that the Richmond Hill Prison in Grenada is undergoing emergency repairs, and former Grenadian military detainees will be transferred there very shortly under supervision of the International Red Cross.

General Austin and Mr. Coard, who are now in the custody of U.S. forces, will be turned over to the Governor General when adequate detention facilities are available.

Insofar as the Cuban detainees left on the island are concerned, we're discussing with the Cuban Government the methods for returning them. We've told the Cubans that we will transfer their detained personnel to them in Barbados on a phase basis, with each planeload of the detainees being picked up immediately in Barbados by Cuban aircraft.

The Government of Barbados has agreed to this procedure. One contingent of Cubans should be delivered to Barbados sometime this afternoon for immediate onward transfer to Cuba.

As for the personnel in the Cuban Embassy who remain, the Governor General of Grenada has given notification that the Embassy is to be closed, and the diplomatic relations between Grenada and Cuba are to be severed -- are severed. They remain in the Embassy for the moment and will be evacuated with the other detainees.

That's about all I have for you.

Q Can we get a copy of all of that?

A Sure.

Q Have any of the other Caribbean nations given an indication that they, too, will wish to sever relations with the Cubans?

A I'm not aware of that. I'm not aware of that.

Q Barbados?

A I'm not aware of it. I really don't know.

Q Anything on the Libyans in Grenada?

A Yes, they went out yesterday.

Q All of them, to the best of your --

A As far as I know, yes.

Q (Inaudible).

A All of them in their Embassy went out yesterday.

Q All bona fide diplomats --

A No. I don't know quite whether their documents were checked, but they all went out.

Q Is there a discrepancy between the numbers originally released --

A Yes.

Q And what is the reason? What is the explanation for that?

A I don't know. The original numbers were given to us by the Soviets; and as you very accurately perceive, the numbers that came out did not jibe with the numbers they had given us, but we cannot offer an explanation for that.

Q Do we believe that any of those personnel have remained on the island of Grenada?

A I don't know that we believe that. It's obviously something one could not rule out.

Q Do you know who those others were?

A Excuse me?

Q Do you know who those others were? Did you find out when they came out?

A No.

Q Were they diplomats, or --

A No, they never did. As you recall, the Soviets gave us a list of the people they said were in the Embassy, and they gave us the nationalities. But the number came out and the documents relating to them, are clearly different than the numbers they gave us, but we didn't --

Q Did you check their documents as they came out?

A I think their documents were checked; yes.

Q (Inaudible)

A No. We never had a list of names.

Q A noticeable difference of the North Koreans: 15 listed, and I think there were 23 before?

A Right. I think it was 24 before. Yes, I think it was 24.

--MORE--

Q Is there any particular concern about them, in light of the Rangoon --

A I'm sure people are looking into that discrepancy.

Q John, right now, aside from the Cubans, do you know of any other third-party nationals who are detained on the island?

A No, I do not; no, I'm not aware of any.

Q Do you know if the Governor General has requested United States cooperation in apprehending U.S. citizens who may have been complicit with Coard and Austin?

A I haven't heard of such a request.

Q Are you aware of reports from students returning from Grenada of the relationship between Geoffrey Bourne and Peter Bourne, Carter's ex-drug-pushing adviser?

A Unaware of it.

Q Did you get anything on Rickey Singh overnight?

A No, I don't have anything for you on that.

Q John, what did you do with the automatic weapons that you found in the Soviet crates?

A I think they were held at the airport.

Q Was anything else held --

A It is conceivable, but I'm not aware of it.

Q Can you tell us anything more about what went on during this eight hours? I mean, was there some kind of a standoff at the airport, or how did all this proceed?

A I think there was an altercation at the airport. I think the Soviet Ambassador objected to the search of his car. I think the Soviets objected to the search of the luggage and the crates that were unsealed, and our position was that we were responsible for the departure formalities and for the safety of the aircraft, and we had a right to be aware of what was going onto the aircraft that conceivably could be dangerous during the flight.

Q Were there some sealed crates or sealed packages that you did not --

A I think there were some sealed items as well, but I really don't know.

Q Were those inspected, too?

A It's my impression that they were not. I think what the concern was, was luggage to which there might be access during the flight.

Q Was there any (inaudible)?

A I don't think so, but I honestly don't know.

Q John, were the various East Bloc personnel on the flight subjected to body searches or metal detector stuff, that sort of thing?

A I honestly don't know -- not aware.

Q John, when you say "unsealed crates," do you mean that they were going to carry these crates into the passenger compartment?

A I really don't know. What I'm saying is, there may well have been. All I know is that unsealed crates were searched. Whether there was other equipment that went into the hold, I don't know.

Q How was this problem resolved?

A I think it was resolved by our searching the unsealed crates and the luggage.

Q You said there was an altercation.

A I assume that in the end, they agreed the search go forward.

Q Does "altercation" mean fighting?

A No. I think it was discussion.

Q A verbal altercation?

A I think it was verbal, but, you know, I'm not there, and we're, obviously, getting a second-hand report.

Q Did U.S. security forces during the search have -- not use, but have -- weapons visible, or was this a diplomatic altercation?

A Oh, I would think that under the circumstances military folk at the airport would have their weapons with them.

Q Were there U.S. journalists or journalists from any other countries present when all this took place?

A Don't know; don't know.

Q A question on Lebanon?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli retaliation?

A No, no comment.

Q Does the absence of any comment mean anything?

A No. The Israelis took a terrible blow, and they responded as they so decided.

Q John, do you have any indication --

Q Sorry. Does the United States have any plans -- I'm sorry -- to take similar action?

A I don't know about similar action. I think the President and the Secretary have talked about retaliation and, steps to deter a repetition of the outrage against the Marines headquarters.

Q Can you be any more specific than that?

A No.

Q Do you have any indication whether President Gemayel plans to come here within the next two or three days?

A I think the situation is, no plans. Obviously, he would be welcome at any time; but we are unaware, at this stage, of any specifics. And of course, the President and the Secretary will be leaving early on Tuesday, so I don't know how practical it would be.

Q John, just a quick switch. You mentioned the President's trip. Has the news from Burma detailing how the North Koreans behaved there, has that prompted any heightened concern for the President's security?

A No, there is no change in the President's trip or his plans to visit Korea.

Q Has it heightened concern about his security?

A Obviously, there has been concern about his security, but I think, as the Secretary said yesterday, we aresatisfied that the precautions that are being taken by the South Koreans and by ourselves will be adequate.

Q Do you know whether the United States Government is privy to the evidence presented by the Burmese Government which proved to the --

A I do not, Fred, no.

Q Can we find out? Will you take that?

A Let me look at it. That might well be in that area that we continue to shy away from of diplomatic interchange. But let me see if there is anything there that might --

Q Do we infer from your statement that you're satisfied that their conclusion is correct?

A We're satisfied that there has been a very thorough Burmese investigation. They have taken their time about it, and we are well satisfied with the thoroughness of their investigation.

COURT REPORTER: Can we have one person talking at a time?

A That would be a precedent to have one person talking at once in this room, but let's give it a whirl. (Laughter)

Why don't you go ahead?

Q O.K. Two things: one on the reconciliation conference. There are very conflicting reports coming out of that from Geneva. Do you have any kind of a readout?

A No. You have seen the statement.

Q No, I'm speaking really and specifically in regard to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement.

A No. Our position on the agreement is well-known. We think it is a good and an excellent agreement. Nothing that we have seen coming out of Geneva suggests that there is abrogation of that agreement.

Q The other thing is, do you have anything on the fighting in the north, in Tripoli with Arafat?

A No, not really. Obviously, it is extensive and vigorous. But don't have any analysis of it.

Q John, can you see a connection between the bombing of the Israeli army headquarters in Tyre and the postponement of the reconciliation talks for 10 days to enable President Gemayel, as the report says, to look for ways of evacuating the Israelis out of Lebanon?

A Well, I suppose there could well be a connection in the minds of those who, in such cowardly fashion, undertook this bombing, but apparently there isn't in Geneva. As I understand from some of the reports coming out of Geneva,various participants have said that they will not suspend or will not be deterred from their discussions as a result of this.

Q What I mean to say by this, asking if there is, you know, to your knowledge, any connection by some people who are participating in the reconciliation talks, who are using this as a pressure element in order to evacuate the Israelis, since now it is sort of agreed upon by all of the participants to look into ways of how to get the Israelis out of Lebanon?

A I don't know. I mean, you'd have to be inside the minds of the murderers and the terrorists, wouldn't you, to know what their motivation was?

Q John, you have noted that the United States is considering some kind of steps that might be taken to deter future such terrorist acts.

A Yes.

Q Is there any sense of feeling that we perhaps waited too long, and that this new attack has taken place? Or does this new attack provide new impetus for the United States to do something?

A I think we are proceeding and will proceed with our investigation, as are the French and as are the Lebanese. We are working at the pace we think is prudent, and will take whatever steps we decide to take when we decide to take them.

The Israelis have made their judgment and made their response, and, you know, they respond as they will and we respond as we will.

Q Is Eagleburger still in Israel?

A Yes.

Q John, the Baltimore Sun had a couple of correspondents locked up in Zaire last week, and your people seemed to have a substantial role in getting them out. Is there any enduring effect from that? Have you filed a protest with the Zairian Government, or whatever?

A I'm not sure about a protest. We did have a little guidance on that yesterday which I don't happen to have with me -- and I apologize for not having with me -- but maybe you could get that from the Press Office afterwards.

Q John, there is apparently a TASS report to the effect that the United States is planning a massive intervention in Lebanon, and that the Soviet Government has warned the United States not to do this because it would view it as a grave matter, and would respond in some fashion.

Can you tell us if they have indeed given us such a warning?

A Sounds like TASS is as about as unreliable as they traditionally are.

Q John, in that connection, there is a Soviet radio report which says that there is no Soviet presence in Syria whatsoever. Do you have any comment on that?

A Sounds about as unreliable as that source traditionally is.

Q John, Eagleburger was reported this morning on American television from Israel saying that these two attacks on the American Marines and the Israelis in Tyre make us, that is the United States and Israel, work closer and cooperate more.

Can you tell us anything about what he meant by that?

A I think he was responding to the immediate shock. We have undergone recently such a terrible tragedy ourselves; now, so have the Israelis. That, I think, tends to strengthen bonds that are there. But aside from that, obviously, he is here for discussions to strengthen the traditional ties between ourselves and Israel.

Q One more thing, John. You did give us something about the Israeli retaliation. The United States chose to allow the Lebanese authorities to investigate and find out who was responsible, if it ever was found, to really retaliate.

A Yes.

Q Do you think the Israeli retaliation, immediately, without really taking the way or the road that the U.S. did, was a proper one, without finding out who did it, to immediately retaliate?

A Of course, the United States was and is conducting its own investigation. The Lebanese are also conducting their investigation. We're appreciative of that, and will look for their findings. I'm sure they will be very useful. But the Israelis made their judgment of who was responsible and how they would retaliate.

Q May we have a filing break?

A Filing break? Sure.

Q Have we sought advice from the Israelis on their investigative technique which seems to have yielded fruit so much more quickly than our own?

A I'm sure there is close cooperation with the Israelis at various governmental levels, but I don't know specifically whether the security people exchange views.

Q John, the reverse of that. Will the U.S. be cooperating with the Israelis to supply them with information about their findings in the bombings of the Embassy and the Marine headquarters, while the Israelis are investigating -- if they do -- who was behind the attack of their headquarters?

A I can't answer that. I honestly don't know. I wouldn't rule out the possibility of exchanging intelligence.

Q Would the U.S. be making available such information to the Israelis?

A As you know, there has been speculation that some of the same factions might be involved in both outrages, so I wouldn't rule out that we might be exchanging information. But I honestly don't know.

Q O.K. A quick follow-up: Can one assume or conclude that your "no comment" on the Israeli retaliation is perhaps, in a way, that you may be condemning it?

A No, that's not what I said. I just said we will have no comment on it. I think I have to leave the interpretation to you.

Q If you say that you have no comment, or are not condoning the attack and the criminal attack, and the goals, you know, bombing, destroying -

A I didn't say we were condoning it or we were not condoning it. I'm saying "no comment" on it.

Q I'm saying -- without condoning -- nobody iscondoning. I'm just saying that, you know, reacting to the retaliation by Israel, immediate retaliation, or the retaliation comes immediately on the heels of this -- it looks like, you know, the planes were in the sky, and you know, this happened, the bombardment. It makes you think that this will escalate the tension as much as it is there, by having the bombardment --

A I'm sorry; that this would what?

Q Escalates the tension in the area, exacerbates the situation, and couldn't make anything easier for anybody.

A If it does escalate tension, then that clearly is the fault of those who launched this attack -- the initial attack.

Q John, you're not condoning this? Nobody is condoning this?

A If there is an escalation of tension, it clearly was not generated by the Israelis. It was generated by those who bombed their headquarters.

Q John, isn't what you are saying today, in a sense, a different approach from previous statements or non-statements on violence in the region? Haven't you ordinarily condemned whatever violent act is taken, and asked that all parties restrain themselves in order to end the cycle of violence? Isn't that usually your approach to these things?

A I don't know. I'd have to go back and see how today's statement -- But the Israelis suffered a terrible tragedy, and they reacted speedily as they did, and we have no comment on that.

Q John, I have a question about retaliation in general. Since the President has reserved the right to retaliate for the bombing of the Marines and the Embassy in Beirut, and now that, to jump to another part of the world, the Burmese have proven, I guess to your satisfaction, that the North Koreans are responsible for the killing of the South Koreans, do you allow that the South Koreans now have the right to retaliate? Or can you just give us your thoughts on retaliation, in that case?

A I think what we have said is that we have appreciated the commendable restraint which the South Korean Government has exhibited up to now, and what will happen now is consultation with a number of governments to see how they might register their reaction.

As you know, the Burmese Government has already severed relations with North Korea. It may well be that others will take the same tack.

Q A related question: Does the United States plan to go to the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly in condemnation of the North Korean action?

A I think there already has been some activity at the U.N., and I can't answer your question because I simply don't know the answer to that.

Q Another area? Would that be possible? Could I make an appeal to George to just hold it off for a second?

Q No. (Laughter)

Q O.K. I wanted to ask about El Salvador, and the news reports out of there, specifically with respect to -- Apparently the father of the Archbishop has been arrested. Also, if you had a comment on the military situation there. And you probably didn't get it early enough, but the long Reuters report saying that the U.S. Embassy knows very well who is directing the death squads.

A Don't have anything on the Embassy report. You're right; haven't seen that.

Insofar as the military situation, there is a piece of guidance you can get from the Press Office.

Q Can you make it available then, immediately after?

A Sure, yes.

Q With respect to the land reform?

A Land reform?

Q There is a report that they decided not to pursue it to the end of the year.

A It may well be that we've had something in the past day or two, but I don't have anything new today.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #197

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon all. I have a few announcements up front. This afternoon at 3:00 there will be a BACKGROUND briefing in this room on the subject of the recent visit to Israel by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

An announcement on Secretary Shultz' December trip to Brussels. The Secretary will travel to Brussels for the regular semi-annual Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 8-9. The meeting of all 16 NATO Foreign Ministers will be an occasion for consultation on matters of interest to the Alliance, including East-West relations. Similarly involving Brussels, the United States and the Commission of the European Communities will hold Ministerial-level consultations in Brussels on Friday, December 9. A Commission delegation chaired by President Gaston Thorn will meet the U.S. delegation which will be composed of the Secretary of State, George Shultz, the Secretary of the Treasury, Donald Regan, Secretary of Agriculture John R. Block, the Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldridge, and the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador William E. Brock. The agenda will be determined in the next few weeks.

Why don't I give you what I have on both Grenada and Lebanon?

Q On the Secretary's trip first, John, any other stops you can add to that?

A I can't add to them at this time, but there may well be stops both before and after Brussels.

Q Eastern Europe, Western Europe?

A I'm not going to get into where they might be.

Grenada: We can confirm that the site of a possible mass grave, in which former Prime Minister Morris Bishop's body may be, has been located south of the Point Salines Airport. A U.S. military graves registration team is investigating the possibility, but I don't have anything further to give you at the moment.

Insofar as the Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and General Austin are concerned, they have been turned over to the Grenadians. The two are now in Richmond Hill Prison at the disposition of Grenadian authorities. They are being guarded by contingents of the Caribbean Peace Force.

On the departure of Cuban diplomats and detainees from Grenada, of the approximately 800 who were there, more than half have been returned to Cuba. Repatriation of the remaining Cubans is continuing as promptly as conditions permit. The Cuban diplomats remain in the Cuban Embassy.

On wounded, the total is the same as I gave you before: 57 wounded Cubans have been returned to Havana; two others with severe wounds were earlier sent to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, for treatment. Insofar as the Cuban dead are concerned, I refer you to the Pentagon.

That's about all we have on Grenada.

Q Can I ask you one thing that you said?

A Sure.

Q That Cuban diplomats are still there.

A Yes.

Q You announced on Friday, I believe, that Grenada decided to sever relations with Cuba, and previously, we understood that they would leave some representation open -- one person.

A Yes.

Q Can you clarify what the status is?

A Well, I'll try, although it's a little confusing. It is our understanding that Grenada has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. Originally Governor General Scoon was willing to permit one Cuban official to remain on a temporary basis after the evacuation of the others in order to deal with the residue of the Cuban presence.

Since the Cubans refused to leave within the time the Governor General had stipulated, we do not know if this still reflects his view. In other words, it is our understanding that diplomatic relations were broken; it was our understanding that one Cuban diplomat would be permitted to remain for some unspecified time. Whether the Grenadian authorities will now permit that, I don't know.

Q Will permit the one person to remain?

A Permit that one person to remain.

Q But your understanding is that relations have been broken?

A That is our understanding.

Q O.K. And one other question with respect to your opening on Grenada, you said that a mass grave had been located south of Point Salines, and then you said, "We are looking into this possibility."

Were you looking into the possibility of mass graves or the possibility of --

A No, I think it's well established that there is a mass grave there, but I think the graves registration team is looking into who is in that grave.

Q The possibility to which you were referring then related to the possibility that Bishop would be there?

A It's possible.

Q That's what you were referring to?

A Yes, sure -- would be involved in identification.

Q What makes you think the former Prime Minister Bishop's body is there?

A I think the presumption is that this may well be the grave for those who were executed.

Q You think 150 were executed or were killed?

A We think there are 100 to 150 people in that grave. How -- what?

Q Well, executed or killed in the fighting?

A Don't know.

Q Weren't the original American estimations as many as 200 may have been killed in that --

A I don't recall that, John. Maybe.

Q I remember the White House mentioned it using that figure.

A I don't know.

Q Do you have anything on the defacing of the Cuban Embassy by U.S. Forces?

A No. I think you'd have to ask the Pentagon.

Q Do you have anything on the situation in Lebanon, --

A Yes, I do.

Q -- in Tripoli, what our reaction is to Arafat's situation?

A Sure. On the security situation in Beirut, there have been violations of the ceasefire along the Alayh ridgeline, overlooking Beirut, and in Beirut's southern suburbs. Last night, Marine positions at the south end of Beirut International Airport received several mortar rounds. There were no Marine casualties in that incident.

This morning, the Marines briefly exchanged small arms fire with suspected infiltrators at the airport, but there were no Marine casualties this morning.

Just a few minutes ago, the latest we got is that there was fighting in the southern suburbs of Beirut and shelling from Shuway-Fat. This started about mid-day their time in Beirut, and escalated during the course of the afternoon. There was a slight slackening around 5:00 p.m. Beirut time, but it picked up again around 6:00.

At 6:30 p.m., local time, air traffic was suspended after the runway at the airport had taken several hits. One Marine was slightly injured. The Security Arrangements Committee is meeting, and we obviously hope that this will come to a swift termination.

Insofar as Tripoli is concerned, we don't have a very detailed readout on what is happening there, but we are concerned about the threat to innocent persons in the camps and in Tripoli itself, who are caught up in this fighting; and of course, we fully support the efforts of the U.N. Relief Works Agency to help Palestinian civilians in the camps.

The United States does not see how this fighting is likely to lead to any practical steps for helping the Palestinian people achieve their legitimate rights.

Q Do you have any confirmation of reports that Syria is mobilizing its forces?

A Don't have confirmation, Jim; seen the reports. If they are correct, we would urge restraint and prudence, especially in the light of the progress that seems to be being made on the national reconciliation front.

Q In those reports that you speak of, they give as justification the potential threat from U.S. Forces. Do you have any reaction to that?

A No, none.

Q What about the missile batteries that are --

A No, nothing on that. If there were to be such missiles in place or rocket batteries, naturally, we would be very disturbed by their presence.

Q But you can't confirm that they are in place?

A No.

Q Can we have a copy of what you said on Lebanon?

A Yes. Sure.

Q Do you have any feelings, one way or another, on an official basis of Mr. Arafat's apparent losing all control in Lebanon?

A In terms of an analysis, Bernie? No. We really don't. We're seeing the same kind of reports as you are.

Q Arafats has been reaching out to just about anybody whom he thinks might listen for help. Is there any indication that he has been reaching out to the United States through third parties?

A No. No.

Q Just a point of clarification: Does the U.S. consider Arafat to be one of the innocent persons who is threatened in the fighting in Tripoli?

A I don't think we were addressing our remarks to the combatants; we were talking about the refugees.

Q Could I also follow up on the situation report at the airport? You detailed shelling that was coming from Shuway-Fat this afternoon and this evening. Did the Marines respond in any way to that? I may have missed it; you may have said they did, but I --

A I don't know whether they -- This is a very, very late report, Ralph. They certainly have responded during the course of the day, but whether they did specifically on this, I don't know.

Q Can you say whether U.S. Forces at all -- in other forces, other than the Marines on the ground responded in any way?

A I don't know. I don't know. It may well be. I just don't know.

Q One more follow-up, if I might: On the movement of the task force into the Eastern Mediterranean, the carrier task force, do you relate that at all to the announcement by Syria of the military alert at all?

A No. I think the Secretary of Defense responded to that yesterday and explained what was happening.

Q Earlier on, you talked about the progress, "In light of the progress in the reconciliation talks." What progress are you referring to?

A I think the fact that they took place. I think the fact that leaders who have been at loggerheads for many months and years, in fact met and agreed to resume we think is progress.

Q "Agreed to resume," you mean after the recess called (inaudible)

A Yes.

Q What is the date? What is your understanding of when they are going to resume?

A I do not know. I saw an initial date, and then I saw the possibility that that date might be postponed a week or two.

Q Do you regard it as progress if the end result is the freezing of the Lebanon-Israel Agreement?

A We think it's a good agreement and have consistently said so, and we think it should be implemented.

Q In light of what was said in Geneva last week about the agreement, I was a little thrown by the thought that that is progress; but I guess you meant just the fact that they met.

A Sure.

-- MORE --

Q Do you have any date for Mr. Gemayel to come here?

A No. He is always welcome here, but I don't have any indication of any specific date or plans.

Q Any date for Shamir and Arens?

A No. I think that is something the White House would announce when that is brought to a conclusion.

Q John, do you have any information to substantiate the press reports that there are actually 12,000 Syrian commandoes around Tripoli fighting Arafat, according to a Washington Post story.

A No, I don't have anything to substantiate it.

Q John, on another subject. Prime Minister Thatcher is quoted in a newspaper interview today as saying that she would find it acutely difficult to give the U.S. policy any support if the United States goes ahead and sells arms to Argentina.

Do you have any comment?

A No. I haven't seen that statement.

Q What is the situation with the U.S. arms sales?

A I think that is -- I guess I don't have anything for you on that.

Q What does that mean?

A I think it means we are probably taking a look at it.

Q Would it be reasonable to expect that a certification would be forthcoming?

A No, nothing moving on certification that I have for you today.

Q No, but in terms of an expectation.

A I am sure it is under consideration.

Q Before the civilian government takes power?

A I can't give you a timetable.

Q John, do you have anything today on a Commonwealth Peace Force in Grenada, and anything on the New Zealand offer of 24 troops?

A No. Again, I think that that is something that the Caribbean nations and the Grenadian authorities are looking at, and their views, obviously, will weight very heavily with us.

Q Are we pleased by the offer of troops?

A As I say, I think that is something that the Grenadians and the Eastern Caribbean nations have got to take a look at to see what kind of peacekeeping or military or police force might be necessary.

Q John, do you have anything on south Lebanon where there are reports that the bridges on the Awwali River were shut for a while, and maybe they still are?

A We understand why the Israelis would have felt obliged to take that action in the light of the tragedy that they suffered. We would hope that such a closure would be of very short duration, and indeed I think there are some reports already today suggesting that there has been some easing of that ban on traffic.

Q John, do you know if those bodies in the mass grave were burned?

A Were they burned?

Q Yes.

A Don't know.

Q John, do you know what particular subject the NSC is addressing today in its meeting?

A Never talk about NSC meetings, sorry.

Q Is it the Middle East?

A Never talk about NSC meetings, sorry.

Q Can I ask you one other question on another subject?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any independent indications that there may be something more seriously wrong with Mr. Andropov than a cold?

A No, I don't have any comment for you on Mr. Andropov's state of health.

Q John, you have addressed yourself in the past to possible threats to U.S. personnel in Latin America arising from Cuba, Cuban surrogates, in the wake of the Grenadian thing. Do you have anything on threats to U.S. either official government personnel or private personnel in Europe also stemming from Cuban, Libyan or Iranian terrorists during the state of alert?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Let me ask you about something that is of particular concern to me and perhaps to you in this situation.

On Wednesday, there is a conference scheduled in Rome which my publication is sponsoring on the implications for Europe of President Reagan's beamed defense policy. Amongst the people attending are --

A Why don't you get to your question, and I'll be glad to answer.

Q The questions is this: People attending include Lyndon LaRouche who has been a target of terrorist threats, General Volney Warner, a retired general of the U.S. Army --

A You are giving me that list when I don't need it. What is the question?

Q The question is that we have requested certain security assistance from both the authorities in Rome, we have also requested assistance from the U.S. Embassy there, particularly given what we believe is a threat to U.S. citizens involved --

A And the question is?

Q -- in the conference. Can you look into why Mr. Johnson in the U.S. Embassy in Rome said that he would not cooperate with us because LaRouche is not a legitimate Democrat. It seems like an odd judgment for the Embassy to make --

A Let me see what I can get on that --

Q -- also an odd policy.

A A conference is being held in Rome this week and your allegation is that the American Embassy has refused to cooperate in providing security. Let me look into it and see what I can find.

Q Okay, fine.

Q John, does our government have a view on Arafat's situation? Is it a good thing or a bad thing in terms of American Middle East policy, considering that he is now down to what is called his last stronghold, if he has got that?

A No, we don't have a view on that.

Q John, following what you said earlier about the action in southern Lebanon and closing the Awwali bridges, you said that you understand that Israel will undertake this action.

Bearing in mind that some actions already done by Israel in other areas were creating a fait accompli, and possibly dissolving fears over complete closing, subsequently they will open the door today or tomorrow, it might not be forever. With this understanding, you have a proviso that you are insisting that this will not lead to a partition or complete closing or possible future closing of this area.

Do you have any apprehensions about such action in the future, if it will persist?

A Our position is very clear. Obviously we are opposed to partition of Lebanon. All the parties involved know that. The fact is, there is a May 17th agreement which provides the manner in which Israel would leave Lebanon.

Q John, do you have any indications from the Israelis that the closing of the border at that point is of short duration, and have they mentioned to you when they plan to open it again?

A I don't know what specific conversations might or might not have gone on over this. There isn't any question that Israel is well aware of our general views on closure or impediment to traffic, but the fact of the matter is that I think this, we hope, was a short term duration activity taken for understandable reasons. They were responding for reasons of security. We hope that it will be of short duration, and, as I say, there are indications today that it was and is of short duration.

Q Have they assured you that they would be, and that they would be -- the Israelis would be reopening the border?

A That is why I say I am not sure what specific conversations might or might not have gone on between us and the Israelis on that.

Q John, can I go back to your earlier question about the possibility of rockets near to the American positions? They have been there for a long time, and, as we know, the Marines have already been hit by small rockets.

Are you talking about something new, something qualitatively different?

A I think there have been some press reports of more sophisticated -- I don't know whether it is greater range, or whatever it is -- but I think that there have been some reports of new rocket batteries moving in, Jim.

Q Are these the famous SS-21's that you were talking about?

A I don't know what they are.

Q Is it something in that order that we are talking about, rather than the Katusha's?

A I honestly don't know what is involved.

Q Can I ask you something about Lebanon, John, on the negotiations in Geneva?

There are indications from Lebanon and Israel that the Syrian Government is willing to accept a solution which would guarantee a military way of guaranteeing Israel's northern border, minus the political implications of the agreement between Lebanon and Israel.

How would the United States respond to that?

A I think the United States would respond that the various conditions laid down in the May 17th agreement, and which have been agreed to by Lebanon and Israel, and obviously at which we were present during those negotiations, that is the basis for some kind of accommodation.

Q But in terms of Syrian approval to something like this, which would obviously move things forward -- without it, it looks like things are going to be stalemated.

A You say it would move things forward, but I suppose others would say it is a negation of the agreement, and therefore unacceptable. Because what you seem to be suggesting is that these various sources and reports are suggesting that a major part of the agreement should be abandoned.

Q Right.

A You know our position on that.

Q In what circumstance would the United States reconsider opening the agreement in favor of something, such as --

A We think it is a good agreement, carefully negotiated.

Q John, what are the plans of Ambassador Rumsfeld now?

A He certainly is still here. I don't know what his departure plans are.

Q John, can we change back to Grenada for a second? Stewart Taylor in The New York Times yesterday, wrote a lengthy article where the rhetoric of the Administration and what has been disclosed thus far, he contended, did not match. I wondered, number one, whether you had any guidance prepared on the article to rebut some of the charges that he makes.

A No.

Q Then, if not, with respect to the documents, senior officials, including Pentagon officials and State Department officials, have cited documents for the number of Cubans who were on the island at the time, and the number of Cubans who are expected to arrive imminently, apparently referring to about a 4,000 number figure, which seems to be the basis of President Reagan's statement that we had arrived just in time.

Are documents indicating that in the possession of the United States or the State Department, and if they are, can we be provided them in addition to those we were provided on Friday?

A I don't know whether documents in the possession of the State Department or the Pentagon which have not been released make that point. I do not know.

Yes, there are other documents, and I think we are still considering how and when and if they might be released.

Q Do you know whether they relate to those points that were raised, as to the imminent arrival of more Cuban troops?

A I do not. There are a large number of documents.

Q With respect to -- Jeane Kirkpatrick again raised it on Thursday, as to who may have been behind the ouster in terms of an external force, of Bishop and perhaps his eventual execution. She says that there is an abundance of evidence that indicates the Cubans and the Russians were involved.

Does the United States Government have documents, and, if so, can they make them available, which indicate the truth or falsity of that statement?

A As I say, there are a large number of documents still which are being looked at, and as soon as we can let you have any more that it is decided it would be released, we will let you have them.

Q John, one very short one, and a simple one, on the documents themselves.

The ruble figures that were quoted in the Russian treaties, did the State Department arrive at the figure of $25.5 million total through an official exchange rate, or did they do it through --

A You have got me at a disadvantage. I really don't know.

Q Could you look into that question?

A I will take a look at it.

Q John, on another subject, do you have anything on a guy who works in the Comptroller General's office who is being assessed $17,000 because he gave some overseas employees a raise?

A I saw that story this morning. I don't have anything on it, but I saw it in one of the papers this morning.

Q Yes, in the Times. Can you look it up, please?

A What would you like me to look at?

Q If in fact it is true?

A If it is true? Yes, sure.

Q John, does the United States plan any follow-up to the Rangoon announcement that North Korea was responsible for that attack?

A I think, as we said a day or two ago, we are conferring with a number of people, as are the South Koreans, considering what appropriate action might be taken by the international community. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:53 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, November 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #198

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of brief announcements: Secretary Shultz will address the Council of Jewish Federations in Atlanta on Saturday, November 19. The 9:00 p.m. meeting will be held in the Grand Ballroom of the Hyatt Regency Hotel. If you plan on covering, please telephone Frank Straus of the Council in New York at 212-751-1311, or in Atlanta after November 11, at 404-577-5606 or 5607. I understand that the press office of the Council of Jewish Federations at the Hyatt Regency will be room 335.

Also, following up on something John announced yesterday, a sign-up sheet has been posted in the main Press Office for those of you who wish to apply for a seat on board the Secretary's plane for his trip to Brussels, December 8-9. The sheet will be taken down and applications closed at noon on Monday, November 21. No applications will be accepted after that time.

Then, let me give you a little bit -- I don't have very much today -- on Grenada, but let me just give you the bit that I have. I've got a few numbers for you, basically.

Q Before we bury it? (Laughter)

A I'll refer you to the Pentagon on U.S. figures. On Cuban figures, regarding those killed in action or wounded, we have approximately -- and I stress "approximately" because they're still having question identifying bodies -- approximately 50 killed in action and 59 wounded in action. The number of Cubans remaining at the detention camp is 101, with 37 Cubans at their Embassy, including 11 women and children.

The detainees and the women and children in the Cuban Embassy are scheduled for evacuation today. The remaining Cuban diplomats will be returned in future flights.

Of the some 1800 Grenadians of the Peoples Revolutionary Army and militia who have turned themselves in, there are some 200, or I guess 233 is the exact figure, who are currently being detained for disposition by Grenadian authorities.

Q What happened to the others?

A I don't know what happened to the others.

Q Alan, on the subject of the Cuban Embassy, since you mentioned it, has Grenada severed relations or not? That seems to be --

A I think John addressed that yesterday, and gave you our latest understanding on that, Bill.

Q You don't have anything later on it?

A I don't have anything new on that.

Q That's it?

A That's it. Be happy to take your questions.

Q What can you tell us about the grave or not a grave site having been discovered? Where are we now?

A Well, on that issue, the statement late yesterday afternoon indicated that apparently we were ahead of the facts a little bit, as determined by U.S. personnel on the ground (laughter) in Grenada. As they have done since rumors of the mass grave site first surfaced -- and there have been a lot of rumors, as I think you know, U.S. personnel there have continued to investigate with the assistance of the U.S. military graves registration team, which is an integral part of the U.S. military command that is there, and in fact, or the face of persistent rumors, they have asked for some forensic expertise. But to date, there is no evidence to confirm the rumors that a mass grave site exists.

I think as you were aware, there was some confusion in the communications yesterday on that, so I hope that that clears up where we are as of this moment.

Q Alan, last week the AID Director hinted that the Army Corps of Engineers would be brought in to do reconstruction, and when asked about it, John replied as though it might be Seabees. Can you bring us up to date on that? Has any decision been made?

A I can't really, Ozzie. I think that both kinds of military construction experts have been referred to, considered. I don't know what the actual situation is on the ground. Obviously, there are some Army engineers, I think, who are with the units that are actually there and doing some work; but you really ought to check with the Pentagon.

As far as any work beyond that, to my knowledge, as of this point there has been no decision. I may be somewhat behind the curve, but that was my information as of this morning.

Q A related point: Some of the Cubans, presumably, were carrying out service infrastructures -- medical, and things of that sort -- teaching cadres and whatnot on the Island; they're simply all going to go.

Is the U.S. Government going to do anything to make up for, or has it been asked to do something to supply that kind of aid in the form of Peace Corps or something like that?

A I don't have anything beyond what AID has given out on that so far.

Q Back on the number of Cubans, are you able to deduce how many Cubans now there were at the time of the invasion on the Island?

A I don't have anything new on that, Jim.

Q Okay. Also, following up on Ozzie's question, the Governor General has asked that the airport that was begun by the Cubans be completed, because it is needed, he said, for tourism and the economy.

Is the United States undertaking any survey work to see the feasibility of finishing it?

A I don't know. I gather that there is an AID official in Grenada who is talking about this to some extent, and I don't have anything beyond what was said there; but I would caution -- I understand that the initial reaction of people who looked at it, perhaps without performing a very detailed survey, was that that would be a very expensive project, and so there was some skepticism about the ability to do that. But I really don't have a recent update to give you on that.

Q When you confirmed yesterday the existence of this site that was purportedly that of a mass grave, you said it had been discovered south of the airport.

Was something discovered south of the airport? And if so, what?

A Why don't I leave it to the correspondents who are on the ground to talk with our folks on the ground to figure that all out?

Marvin?

Q Do you want to open another subject: what the Syrian role is on the various attacks now taking place against Palestinians in Tripoli?

A Marvin, I don't have anything specific to offer you on that question.

Q Do you have anything on Lebanon?

A Yes. I can give you a little sitrep, I guess. Marines have reported their positions have come under periodic fire, which they have returned. There have been no Marine casualties since yesterday when one Marine suffered a flesh wound.

According to Lebanese authorities, Beirut International Airport is now open to air traffic. We have seen reports of exchanges last night in Beirut, its suburbs, and along the Alayh ridgeline. As of this morning, the southern suburbs of Beirut were quiet. We hope that all parties will do their utmost to preserve and respect the ceasefire.

Let me see if there is anything beyond that, really, to give you. I don't have anything to volunteer, particularly. We have nothing new on President Gemayel and a visit here.

Q In their talk in London, did Prime Minister Thatcher warn the United States against any precipitous action in Lebanon?

A There was a BACKGROUND briefing, I believe, by a senior American official. You're talking about the discussions with Deputy Secretary Dam?

Q Right.

A I think there was a BACKGROUND briefing by a senior American official following that. I don't recall, frankly -- I haven't absorbed the totality of that briefing -- but I think that the briefer did talk about that a little bit. Maybe we can help you find those, if your reporter didn't get it, whatever was said on that.

Q What was this, in London?

A Yes.

John?

Q Iran/Iraq?

A Go ahead.

Q There was a report today that a high Iraqi official said that an attack on Kharg Island was the only way the stalemate could be broken and was inevitable. Do you have any comment on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the French apparently confirming that the Super Etendards are indeed in Iraq?

A No, I think actually that was confirmed a few days ago, John. This specific date, I gather, was reported this morning on the 8th of October, is what I saw. But I don't recall what we said, frankly, the other day when they actually had confirmed. I don't think we had a particular comment. Both the Iraqis and the French confirmed that delivery had actually taken place.

I'd ask you to go back and look at the record, but I don't think we had a --

Q Aside from these factual matters, do you have any kind of an analytic comment to offer us on how these various facts affect the situation there?

A No, I don't. Our position on it and our hope for a negotiated solution remains as before, but I don't have the kind of analysis that you're asking about.

Q Do you have anything there on the situation in Tripoli -- the number of people who are being killed, who is doing it?

A No, I don't.

Q Nothing?

A No.

Q Do you care about what's going on there?

A We certainly are watching it with interest, and we are concerned about this -- I think John indicated yesterday -- about the innocent casualties which were being inflicted on people who live there, who were not involved in the combat. But I don't have a comment to offer on the politics, intra-PLO politics, or anything else.

Q What about Moscow? Do you have anything for us on the situation there?

A With regard to Mr. Andropov?

Q Yes.

A No, I don't.

Ralph.

Q Is the Administration working on the assumption that Iranians aided by the Syrians were responsible for the bombing on the Marine headquarters in Beirut?

A Don't have anything new to offer on that, Ralph, beyond what was said before.

Q You have nothing to offer on the Iranian connection at all?

A Nothing beyond what we've said before.

Q El Salvador? There may be other Mideast questions.

Q Do you have any comment on the bomb which exploded last night at the Capitol building?

A No, I don't have anything.

Q I have something else: Do you have any comment on former President Carter's and Ford's warnings, or advice, to the United States Government, not to retaliate in Lebanon or Syria, from their conference in Atlanta?

A No. I think we've addressed ourselves to that issue as much as we can at this particular point.

Q Alan, this speech by the Secretary which you just announced about, it sounds as if it is sort of counterbalancing the conference held by former President Carter and former President Ford in Atlanta.

A I think that would be a misreading of the situation.

Lester?

Q On the Middle East, if I may, did the State Department have any condemnation or reservations about the Israeli action within one hour of their command post, near Tyre, being bombed?

A I'll refer you back to what John said on that the other day.

Q I mean the White House -- The reason I ask this is that Larry Speakes, at the White House, said that that is the Israelis' business. Does the State Department agree with that?

A I refer you back to what John said the other day, Lester.

Q I wasn't here. Could you just refresh my memory?

A I don't have --

Q You don't disagree, then?

A I said I refer you back to what we said the other day. Jim.

Q On El Salvador, did you have anything over these whisperings and leaks, and so on and so forth, about the death squad activity, and who is managing them, which took place over the weekend?

A Well, we have seen the various press reports on the subject, obviously, but don't have a specific comment on them. In general, we have expressed our concern on a number of occasions about political violence in El Salvador, regardless of origin, in the strongest terms.

We deplore such violence and have noted that it often has been directed against those moderate groups who have accepted the risk of supporting democratic reforms within the country. Obviously, we would like to see those responsible for political violence brought to justice.

Q Do you have any information to confirm the reports coming out of there?

A I said I don't have a specific comment on those reports.

Q Do you know, was it an authorized leak?

(Laughter.)

A Did you have a question?

Q Do you have anything on Ambassador Stone's travels in Central America?

A Yes, he is in Caracas at the moment. He arrived from Bogota last night. I don't have anything on his onward plans.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, on Guatemala, Fred Ikle was there yesterday and said he talked about the possibility of a resumption of military aid. And, as I recall, there was supposed to have been an announcement released here late last week, and I don't believe it ever was, on this subject.

A I am not sure of what "supposed to" means.

Q Well, I think John said something about "we'll have something on that later in the day," and it never appeared. In any case, do you have anything on what Mr. Ikle said or on that subject in general?

A No.

Q Alan, back to the Middle East for a moment: I know you referred us to something that was said previously from here about possible U.S. retaliation. However, there are some movements in the Mediterranean being reported and bringing --

A There are some what being reported, I'm sorry?

Q U.S. Navy units, and bringing about a mobilization in Syria, a full alert, and similarly in Israel. Do you care to comment to ease the tension, if you consider it as such in there?

A Obviously, we are not in a position to comment or speculate about Syria's intentions, though we will monitor that situation closely. But I don't have anything on the fleet movements. The Pentagon, I think, has commented to the extent that anybody is going to comment on that.

Q Is this normal?

A Sorry?

Q This movement of the fleet, this force in the Mediterranean, is this normal?

A Well, I would refer you to what the Pentagon said about it. I think they have indicated that, but I would refer you to what their words are on that.

Q Alan, where is Rumsfeld and what are his plans?

A I don't have anything on his plans at this point. He is here. He is still in Washington.

Jim?

Q Do you have anything on the article that appeared in the Times today about how former U.S. intelligence and military personnel were involved in the anti-Sandinista effort?

A No, I don't.

Q And do you have anything on former Vice President Gutierrez of El Salvador, his remarks to the Christian Science Monitor, about how things are?

A No, I don't.

Lester?

Q On another subject, two-part, has the State Department expressed any concern over the imprisonment of Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa by the Mugabe government, with a ZANU crowd outside the prison carrying a casket and saying, "We're going to bury him"?

A Lester, the other day, John had some words on the arrest of --

Q He did?

A -- Mr. Muzorewa, and I would refer you to those.

Q If I could follow this up? Senator Symms has asked why is Secretary Shultz overruling his report? He indicated that Secretary Shultz overruled McPherson, Kirkpatrick, and Eagleburger, who recommended, according to this letter, that $75 million given to Mugabe by the United States be reduced due to Zimbabwe's vote to condemn our action in Grenada and, then, before that their refusal to support the resolution on KAL 007.

Could you explain, Alan, why Secretary Shultz believes that we should go on supporting this Marxist dictator?

A I have not asked him recently about his views on Zimbabwe. But on the first subject --

Q Senator Symms did.

A Well, I think that there were people who addressed it recently, and I will refer you to the record. I think there is a fair amount on the public record --

Q Allen --

A May I finish?

Q Of course you may finish.

A Thank you. As far as the consideration of internal recommendations or who took what positions, I am not going to confirm what you said in terms of who took what positions, and I am certainly not going to comment on what positions the Secretary may have taken. When the Government has a policy, that policy is what we articulate.

Q May I just ask an internal thing? Alan, I mean, I think you are a very eloquent and knowledgeable person. Yet, I see time and time again --

A What is your question?

Q -- that what you do is, when there is a difficult question, you always refer it to somebody else and what is said before. Can't you speak for yourself or are you being told not to take anything that has been discussed before?

A No. I make the judgments as to what I say.

Q You dodge. You dodge.

A Sorry about that, Lester.

Q John, I mean Alan, you were concerned --

A John's on an airplane some place.

place.

(Laughter.)

Q You expressed your concern about the casualties, and from the vantage of the reports that the Red Cross is having a hell of a time in Lebanon and Tripoli and in the refugee camps to try to give assistance and aid, and from the point of humanitarian assistance, if you could put it under humanitarian assistance, or just the Sixth Fleet or whatever you please, which is in the Mediterranean there on the shores of Lebanon, are you able to offer any assistance, medical assistance, to these people who have been --

A I am not aware that there has been a request to do that, and I think, again, I am going to have to leave the lead on that, in terms of talking about what can be done, to the Red Cross and the others that are working on the humanitarian side.

Q Alan, next week the new members of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights are going to be voted on by the General Assembly. And it is my understanding the United States has put forward someone named R. Bruce McColm who, unlike any of the other candidates in the history of the Commission, has no training in law of any kind. And he is mostly known for two books that he has done: "Where Have They Gone--Rock and Roll Stars?" and "Suburbia: The Last Hurrah of the Golden Horde."

(Laughter.)

A What is your question?

Q My question is, is the United States seriously putting him forward as a candidate for being a commissioner?

A I personally don't know the name of the nominee. I am afraid, Jim, my knowledge is not complete. But the U.S. nominated somebody, I gather, in September. The nomination and the qualifications were made known to all of the concerned parties, and they will make their decision based on their judgment of the candidates.

Q The Carter Administratin sent Muhammad Ali. Is there any objection? I mean --

A I got a couple more questions. Excuse me.

Q Let me try one more on this PLO situation. The position of the United States is that we support some kind of autonomy negotiations involving Palestinian representation. Is there no feeling that the outcome of this battle in Tripoli, in which the Syrians are trying to impose a more radical leadership on the PLO, is there no feeling that it might have some outcome on the expressed U.S. policy?

A Well, I think questions have been raised in the past about the issue of who, indeed, may claim to speak as legitimate representatives of the Palestinians. I am not prepared to address that in more detail today, but that question is not a new one.

Q Alan, a moment ago you earlier said that the U.S. was monitoring that situation closely, in answer to a question on Syria. What is the U.S. monitoring closely about Syria?

A The Syrian mobilization.

Q The Syrian mobilization in Syria?

A Well, that is what I --

Q Or in Lebanon?

A Well, we are obviously keeping track of what is going on within Lebanon to the extent that we can, yes; and we are watching that very carefully. But I was referring in that case specifically to the mobilization within Syria.

Q In that connection, do you have anything new to say about the rockets, the reported rockets movement in Lebanon?

A No. We will keep our eye on that situation.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, November 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #199

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 1983, 12:45 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry for the delay.

Q Alan, we have something we found in our trash bag. (Journalist presented burn bag fully packed.)

(Laughter)

Q Not much of it is Top Secret! (Laughter)

A Touche.

MR. ROMBERG: Okay, announcements: Available in the Press Office are copies of the following testimonies: the testimony of Edward J. Derwinski, Counselor of the Department of State before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The subject of his testimony this morning was "Human Rights in East Europe and the Soviet Union."

Also available is the testimony of William A. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The subject of his testimony this morning was the Pell Amendment, Senate Resolution 74, "The Future of Taiwan."

Second, a statement with regard to the situation in Tripoli: We are revolted that once again the people of Lebanon have been subjected to terror and injury -- this time around Tripoli by the radical and brutal behavior of Palestinian factions and their supporters.

It is tragic that once again the civilian population of Lebanon is again victim to hostilities not of their making and over which they are unable to exercise influence or control.

We urge governments in the area to bring their influence to bear constructively to end the fighting. We suggest that all governments be open to any suggestions from appropriate international organizations, such as the ICRC or UNRWA, for humanitarian and relief efforts to alleviate the suffering.

As a first specific step to assist, we are in the process of contributing $1 million to the ICRC to be used for relief activities in Lebanon. The United States is already a major contributor to UNRWA. We are currently holding discussions with that organization to determine what further steps should be taken.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A A copy? Sure.

Let me give you a little sitrep on Grenada, and then we can go to questions.

There has been, obviously, a lot in the papers on figures, casualties, and so on and so forth. For U.S. casualties, I will refer you to the Pentagon. I think the figures I have here are also available at the Pentagon. They have indicated that dead and wounded Cuban and Grenadian -- which is based upon field estimates and still subject to change -- but the current estimates indicate 59 opposing forces. That is again total, Cuban and Grenadian killed in action.

As to departures, at this point the reporting indicates that all the Cuban detainees, as well as 8 women and 3 children from the Cuban Embassy, have departed Grenada. Today we expect that most of the Cuban Embassy staff, including the Ambassador, will depart Grenada. It is unclear at this point, as we said yesterday, who or how many Cuban staff might remain behind temporarily to clear up remaining details.

On graves, our understanding on the recent discovery of a grave site is that it appears to contain the remains of three males and one female, but forensic evidence will be required for any positive identification.

Also, Governor General Sir Paul Scoon was expected to address the issue of a provisional government at 11:00 Grenadian time.

I have seen a wire report reporting that we do not have details to offer -- confirmation from our own people -- but we would, of course, welcome the announcement of a provisional administration.

Q On a follow-up on that --

A Let me just see if I've got anything else to volunteer. I don't think so. Yeah, go ahead, Greg.

Q Do you have anything else on civilian casualties in Grenada?

A I don't, Jim.

Q In your statement on Lebanon, which neighboring states were you talking about?

A I don't have -- "We urge governments in the area." I am not going to try to be more specific than that.

Q Are you assuming then or are you implying that it's not simply an intra-PLO fight, that it involves any influence of these neighboring countries?

A What I said at the beginning of the statement, what I made reference to, was the "radical and brutal behavior of Palestinian factions and their supporters," but I'm not prepared to go beyond that.

Q Is the U.S. ready -- prepared or willing -- to allow -- to help out in any evacuation of people from Tripoli?

A I haven't heard any discussion of that, Bernie. I don't have anything to offer you on that.

Q Has there been any contact with the Soviet Union concerning the situation in Tripoli?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that specifically. At this point, I guess I don't really know what the most recent communication has been about that; but I don't think I can find out for you either. I think that's the kind of thing that we --

As you know, we have discussed the Lebanese situation in general several times with the Soviets, but I don't think I want to get into the details.

Q To follow up with this, I understand from what you said that the U.S. is in contact with Arab countries "in the area," which means Arab countries. But what Arab countries are in good relations with Syria to get into contact with?

A Let me leave you with the statement I gave. I really don't have any amplification to offer you. I didn't say "Arab countries," but let me make the text available.

Q Has the U.S. spoken to Syria itself?

A Again, I am not going to be able to go into the details of any diplomatic dialogue.

Q There are some reports in the last couple of days, quoting now that Syria is actually a puppet of the Soviet Union, are you still holding that Syria and Assad is a man of his own -- or he is his own man; is not in any, way, shape or form --

A I'd refer you to what a senior official said from this podium in a BACKGROUND briefing about that subject. I think he indicated very much what you've just said is our position; but the most recent statement from a senior official that I am aware of was in that BACKGROUND briefing. Ralph?

Q Alan, can you be anymore specific about the aid to the ICRC? Is it intended for use in Tripoli, and if so, will the U.S. in any way become involved in delivery -- will U.S. personnel be involved in delivering that aid?

A First of all, we are in the process of doing this, so I can't give you a lot of detail. I don't have any indication that U.S. personnel would be involved. I think what we will be doing is supporting the efforts of the ICRC.

Q In Tripoli? In the Tripoli area, as opposed you said in Lebanon.

A Yes. Well, again, I would refer you to those organizations, UNRWA and ICRC, to determine what they are doing. But this is a response to the specific situation in Tripoli. How they would be able to dispense that assistance, I can't tell you.

Q I have questions on another subject, question on the documents that were returned to the State Department.

A Yes.

Q Can you tell me whether the State Department has discovered how the documents got into the hands of prisoners in a maximum security prison?

A It is a serious matter, and let me assure you that we are doing everything possible to prevent a recurrence of it, and I will give you a sitrep on this; but I would note that the Secretary has been informed, and that he wants a full investigation of this, and there will be appropriate disciplinary action taken as the facts warrant.

The facts as we know them at this point are the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR, was performing microfiche operations, reducing files, and in the process, several safes were emptied, and arrangements were made to turn over those empty safes, which were excess at that point to the State Department warehouse operation for ultimate use in a refurbishing project.

In the first week of August, a State Department team of laborers removed empty safes from INR to a warehouse designated "State Annex" or SA-7, which is at Newington, inadvertently removing one full, but unsecured safe, as well.

On September 1st, the full safe, as well as a variety of other safes and cabinets, were removed to Lorton. The safes were stored in a Lorton warehouse area of limited access for ultimate use.

On October 25th, Lorton personnel inspected the safe and discovered classified documents. They called the Department of State Office of Security, SY. SY recovered the documents that day. An SY investigation commenced then, that day.

Initial indications of the investigation were that all classified documents inadvertently sent to Lorton were recovered. But on November 8th, the Department was informed that additional documents beyond those returned on October 25th were apparently in the possession of the press, turned over to them by a Lorton inmate. A packet of documents was turned over to the Department last night, the evening of November 8th, by Senator Mathias and a reporter of WTTG Metromedia.

To answer -- let me try and anticipate a few questions. What is the refurbishing program? Desks, file cabinets, and other furniture items are routinely sent to Lorton by U.S. Government agencies, including the Department of State, for refurbishing. They are returned, then, to the agencies for reuse. This has been an operation -- I don't have an exact figure -- for more than five years.

As I said, the safes came from INR. Why don't I just at this point -- We will, of course, respond to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a full report, and we will also make public what we can -- keeping in mind the need to protect classified information -- but what we can, in terms of what is discovered, when the invwestigation has been concluded.

Q Can we have a copy of --

A I think I'm not going to be able to do that because I've drawn from a number of pieces, and you're going to have to get it from the transcript.

Q First of all, just to make sure -- I didn't hear it in the original statement -- but the documents that were in the filing cabinet and the documents that were in the desk were all classified documents. Is that true?

A I don't know that all the documents were classified documents. I can't tell you that, but certainly there were classified documents.

-- MORE --

Q And the follow-up to that would be, since some of them obviously were found on October 25th, doesn't anybody in the Department miss a classified Top Secret document sometime between October 25th and November 8th? Doesn't somebody say, "Wait a minute. We're missing this thing"?

A Well, as I indicated in my opening description, the initial investigation suggested that everything had been returned. Obviously, that is a very pertinent question. The fact of the matter is, obviously, that they missed the fact that there were some things missing.

I'm in a somewhat difficult position because I can't really go into great detail about what these documents were. But essentially, as I understand, what was returned last night were sort of attachments to other things. And, therefore, it is not necessarily the case that it would have been easy on first examination to detect that those attachments would have been missing.

Q Can you say anything more about what the Secretary had said when he was informed it?

A No, I can't. He was informed when the President's party was in Elmendorf.

Q Alan, considering that some of the documents wound up in the hands of one or more prisoners at Lorton, and some of those documents were marked "classified," is there some reason to believe that some other documents, or additions to them, might have been sold, might have gotten out of Lorton? And that, in fact, perhaps some very secure documents might now be in the hands of people who shouldn't have them?

A We don't know. It's possible, and we're investigating to find out.

Q The ones that turned up last night, do you think they were taken out of the safe or did they come out of --

A It appears, Bob, that everything that was classified, or all the documents all together, were all in one of the safes.

Q Were in one of the safes?

A Were all in one of the safes. The assumption, I think, the people are operating on -- and, again, this is subject to investigation -- but the assumption is that these documents that were returned last night may have been removed from the safe prior to October 25th from that safe, and put someplace else. So that when the State Department officials retrieved the documents from the safe on October 25th, they took everything that was still in it. But that's a working assumption.

Q Right. In other words, they were taken out of the safe before it went out to Lorton --

A No. No.

Q -- or while it was at Lorton?

A At Lorton. That's the assumption. Again, I can't promise you that, but the facility, the State Department facility, where they were stored temporarily is a limited access facility. It's guarded. It's got alarms -- that kind of thing. So it seems rather unlikely that there would have been access at that facility.

Q Alan, can you give us an assessment at this point --

A Sorry?

Q What was the Secretary told about an assessment of what, if any, damage to foreign policy conduct, national security? Is there any danger involved in the release of these documents should they have been copied, perhaps, while they were at Lorton?

A Well, there is a damage assessment underway. I don't think that the Secretary, since it hasn't been completed and so on -- I don't think that he could have been informed of the nature of the conclusions. There are no conclusions at this point, but a damage assessment is underway and he certainly will be kept informed.

Q Alan, without asking for specifications, may I ask if those documents are covering different areas or one certain area?

A No, I think it covers a broad area.

Q Alan, are you concerned that there were Soviet missile placement papers among those on with Metromedia, and that was the information that we had? If so, are the inmates going to be interviewed? Lie detector tests and so forth?

A I won't comment on the specifics of what kind of information may have been in the documents. As far as interviewing people, yes, they are being interviewed. I think there are people being interviewed today. I can't tell you whether lie detector tests will be administered. I don't know the answer to that question. But, certainly, people will be interviewed.

Q People in the Department, or people at Lorton, or both?

A Well, I'm sure people in the Department will be interviewed in terms of how a full safe was allowed to leave the Department.

Q Is this a loaded safe? Or how big a safe? I mean, how many documents are you talking about?

A I think it was probably a four-drawer safe and it had a lot of stuff in it, most of which -- as far as we knew October 25th, all of it -- but obviously not correctly -- was returned.

Q Alan --

A Excuse me?

Q Would you finish the answer? People in the Department?

A People in the Department, I am sure, will be interviewed for that part of it. As far as what happened to the documents once they got to Lorton, that's what the people in Lorton obviously would be interviewed on.

Q And the information?

A Excuse me?

Q And the information, as well as the documents? What happened to the information in the documents?

A Well, I think that there will be a complete investigation as to what might have happened to those documents. Sure.

Q What is a four-drawer safe? Is that, like, it looks like a file cabinet, but it has the combination lock on it?

A I don't know what the specific one is. Typically, that would be what it --

Q What it looks like?

A Yes.

Q Alan, are you satisfied that all documents have been retrieved?

A As I said -- I think it was in answer to Jeff's question before -- I can't answer that question. That's one of the things, one of the urgent things, that an investigation is to determine.

Q So there is a search underway at Lorton for more --

A Well, there's an investigation underway. Sure. Absolutely.

Q Would you be searching, like, the prisoners' possessions and things of that nature?

A I can't tell you. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Don't know the answer?

A No.

Q Usually when someone breaks a code of some other country, they change the code. Do you intend, or the Department, intend to change the strategy or the thrust of the plans, the schemes, or the designs of all of these plans?

A Schemes? designs?

(Laughter)

Q If there are such things, you know.

A I'm offended by your vocabulary. (Laughter)

Q No, I --

(Laughter)

A I'm just not going to be able to answer you. Seriously, I am just not going to be able to get into the question of -- in terms of the kinds of information that might have been compromised --if it has been -- and what we would do about it.

Q Alan, can we assume that the safes are kept locked, and that, when it was removed to Lorton, somebody must have unlocked a locked safe?

A No, I indicated at the beginning, Dana, that apparently the one full safe that was removed, together with the empty ones -- all of them, obviously, supposed to be empty -- was unsecured. It was not locked at the time it was removed.

Q So, that means the combination won't have to be changed?

A Thanks, Fred.

(Laughter)

Q Alan, is the Department embarrassed by this incident?

A I wouldn't steer you away from that conclusion.

(Laughter)

Q Alan, can you tell us which office in INR this occurred in? The front office?

A No, I can't tell you. I don't know that we'd go into that kind of detail. But, Bernie, it was in a situation where they were doing microfiching of it, so the idea that it would be in the front office, I think, would not be a reasonable thought.

Q Were the other safes full of anything?

A No. My understanding is that the other safes were empty, as this one should have been.

Q But, I mean, one would guess that, when they came to move them, they would have noticed there was something different about this one. It was heavier.

A One might guess that, yes. I suppose that's one of the things that questions will be asked about.

Q How hot was the information in there?

A I'm not going to get into the nature of it.

Q As I understand from Lorton officials, they had expected to keep those safes as surplus, to use in their classrooms and other facilities down there. They said they've gotten surplus material from other agencies, including the State Department and other Federal agencies, and would not be returning it.

A I'll be happy to check on that. My understanding, in talking with the people who were involved from the administrative side here, was clearly that we expected those safes to come back into use, and that there's a typical program to paint and fix them up and so on; and that was what was going on, not that they were being contributed for use there.

Q One follow-up: Have there been any other shipments of surplus furniture to Lorton since then?

A Since then? I don't know the answer to that.

Q Alan, why are you talking about this? Is this something of a precedent? I don't understand why you're talking so much about documents --

A Well, I'm not talking a lot about the documents, as you may have noticed.

Q But is that -- I mean, I don't understand.

A We try to be upfront and straightforward, Jim.

(Laughter)

Lester isn't here today, that's --

(Laughter)

Q Could you give us any guidance --

A -- I'll refer him to the record.

Q -- as to how current these things were? If they were being microfiched, I assume that they were two or three years old.

A No, they weren't that old. The documents, apparently, dated from January 1st to late March.

Q Of this year?

A Of this year.

Q Can we change the subject?

A Sorry?

Q Can we change the subject?

A No, let's stay on the subject until we're done with it.

Q Alan, can you confirm that some of these documents included the Secretary's Morning Summary?

A The documents did include the Secretary's morning briefing papers, intelligence reports, and analyses. That was included.

Q One could kind of draw from that, that there probably couldn't be anything more sensitive, from a standpoint of classified information, than what the Secretary of State sees each morning as he starts his day. I mean, would that be correct?

A Well, I don't want to try to make the judgment. The fact of the matter is that these were sensitive documents that were in that safe.

Q But, I mean, some of the most sensitive documents that there would be in this Department, I would think?

A I really wouldn't argue with it, but I don't want to try to put one piece of information off against another.

Q Alan, has there ever been this kind of massive release outside of this building of classified documents?

A Well, keep in mind that our asssumption is that the great bulk of this, in fact, was not released; that it was not compromised, I guess -

Q Except to Lorton prisoners.

A Okay. I don't know what degree of compromise. And I think that the assumption -- well, the investigation will have to go into that, and I can't really comment on that. So, I don't think I can really respond to that question.

Q Well, has anything like this ever happened before, to your knowledge?

A That a safe full of documents has ended up in a prison?

(Laughter)

Ralph?

Okay? Can we finish off -- filing break? Yes.

Q Can we go back to Lebanon?

A Yes, go ahead.

Q Do you have anything about the proposed visit by President Gemayel to the States?

A No, I've nothing new on that.

Q Nothing new on that?

Q Reports from Israel today indicate that the Government is ordering a full mobilization of its forces.

A Israel, you are saying?

Q Yes.

A I think we indicated the other day, and I think the Government of Israel has indicated, that they've had sort of a long-term plan. I don't know the details of it, but I've seen this in the press. So, I mean, that doesn't strike me as something extraordinary, but I guess I would have to refer you to the Government of Israel to get that.

Q What do you expect from the talks of David Kimche in Cairo?

A You would have to talk to the Israelis and the Egyptians about that.

Jim?

Q The head of the Franciscan Order in Guatemala was assassinated, and groups are claiming the Government did it. Do you have any remarks? And, also, on their expulsion of priests from the country?

A No, I don't have anything on any of that.

Q Look, please?

A Well, I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on Dam's return? When will he return, and will he make a statement?

A I don't have details on it. I suppose we can find out when he is returning, and I would guess we would be able to find out whether he's going to have a statement, too. We'll try to keep you posted on that.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 1:10 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Glennon

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING DPC #200
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 1983, 12:38 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Sorry to be late.

A couple of announcements: First, tomorrow, as I think you know, Friday, November 10, is a federal holiday -- the 11th. That's the first error. That's okay. Well, you'll just have to listen up, Mike. We'll be on a Sunday schedule. There'll be no briefing -- and on Saturday and Sunday, we will follow the normal schedule for those days.

Announcement about the Deputy Secretary's travel: Secretary Shultz has asked Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam to travel to Ottawa November 14-15 to discuss with the Government of Canada current issues of common concern. This is as part of the process of consultation with allies which has involved visits this week to London, Rome, Paris, Bonn, The Hague, and Brussels.

One other thing -- we had let you know previously that there had been a slight change in the ground rules for U.S. diplomats in dealing with North Korean officials on certain occasions. But in view of the Burmese determination of North Korean responsibility for the October 9 assassinations in Rangoon, we have suspended implementation of the recently revised guidance on contacts between U.S. diplomats and North Korean officials. Consequently, if approached by DPRK officials at third-country social functions, U.S. officials may say only that because of DPRK responsibility for the October 9 assassinations in Rangoon, U.S. officials have been instructed that they may not engage in any discussion whatsoever with North Korean officials. Other restrictions on contacts with North Koreans remain in effect.

Q What was the previous? Copy?

A I'll give you a copy. I have the date -- We'll have to get that out for you in the Press Office, Bernie, but it was asked about here in the briefing. I think what I did is refer people to the Press Office on that occasion.

Q Alan, you know if it ever was implemented? You said "suspended implementation?"

A Well, it was implemented in the sense that an instruction went out to people saying, "You may do this. I don't know whether anybody encountered any -- "

Q How long ago was that?

A Again, we'll check that in the Press Office -- make that available.

Just to give you a couple of updates on items of interest -- On Grenada: We welcome Governor General Sir Paul Scoon's announcement yesterday of the selection of a nine-member Advisory Council, with responsibility for overseeing governmental operations in Grenada until elections can be arranged.

On the question of Cuban departures, all detainees, as well as the Cuban Embassy staff, have now left with the exception of a Cuban diplomat/representative and a communicator, who will remain for a brief period to settle remaining details.

The exhumation of Cuban combat dead is underway, and I don't have any new numbers to offer you today.

A U.S. forensic team has arrived in Grenada to assist in identification of the recently uncovered, four-person grave site which was referred to yesterday; but at this point, no identification of bodies has been made.

On the question of the documents at Lorton, a couple of things: First of all, I misunderstood, I guess, yesterday the kind of safe this was. As I think we tried to notify many of you yesterday, it was a bar-lock cabinet, not a combination safe; secondly, I saw in a number of reports with reference to, supposedly, the Secretary having directed that polygraphs be used. I said no such thing. It is not true. In fact, polygraphs have not been either used or suggested by the Department of State. As far as what other people will be doing, I don't know.

There was late guidance last night, which I don't know if all of you got, regarding early notification -- that is notification on November 4 -- to the Office of Security that there were documents at Lorton. The guidance which came out last night was not precise because the information -- more complete information about it wasn't obtained until this morning. So let me give you something on that.

Special agents in the Department were contacted on November 4 by a local law-enforcement agency which related that one of their regular sources had information that State Department classified material was in the possession of inmates at Lorton. Our agency immediately requested access to that source. The source was interviewed at State later the same day. He related to the State security agents his awareness that classified materials were in the possession of Lorton inmates and that he had attempted unsuccessfully to pass the information on to other U.S. Government agencies three weeks prior to the November 4 interview. The SY agents interviewed took the source's information to the Office of Security division responsible for investigations of the protection of classified information. The agents were not aware that an investigation of the inadvertent delivery of classified information to Lorton had been in progress since October 25.

Those agents who then went to this other division within SY were informed that SY was aware of classified information which had been at Lorton, but that the material had been retrieved on October 25. The agents, noting that their source's information concerned the situation at Lorton three weeks before -- that is, prior to October 25 and the recovery of the documents and initiation of the investigation -- took no further action. So that is why nothing further happened at that particular time.

One other question that came up concerned what was going to be the disposition of the cabinet. I think you asked yesterday whether they were going to keep it. It turns out that, in fact, that cabinet and some other items were to be turned over as excess property to Lorton.

When furniture and office equipment is considered excess by the Department, it is normally sent to our warehouse for disposition, as happened in this case. If it is still serviceable, it is available for use by other Department offices when requested. Desks and other wooden articles are often sent to Lorton for repair and refinishing.

Excess equipment may also be transferred to other agencies, and in the present case, Lorton officials requested a number of furniture items for use in a new facility. Included in the shipment, in addition to six file cabinets, were desks, tables, chairs, and metal shelving. The cabinet containing the classified material was one of those six cabinets which were transferred.

Let me just see if there is anything else. Mainly, to just sort of --

Q Alan, copies of anything that may be available?

A I can give you some of it; I don't know if I can give you all of it.

I guess the investigation apparently is continuing at Lorton. Yesterday or last night, two cell blocks containing general population, meaning general prisoners, were searched. No documents were found, although yesterday during the day a document from 1959 was found in the possession of an inmate.

Q From when, sir?

A 1959.

Q I don't understand that.

A Let me just go on. Yesterday -- They did a search at Lorton yesterday. During the course of that search, a document was turned up. Okay. Last night, two cell blocks containing general population were searched; no documents were found. Also last night, the Lorton library was searched. Today, I understand, that four maximum security cell blocks are being searched -- all of this under, as I gather -- but I would suggest if you want to pursue it, check with Lorton authorities -- but under the authority of Lorton Administrator Charles Lindsay.

INR, in the meantime, is conducting an exhaustive research and inventory of their documents, the ones that were recovered, to determine their condition, and certify that all missing documents have been recovered. So they're still looking at that.

There is also one report that I guess I should comment on, that somehow the State Department had requested special handling for the person who turned the original 30 or 31 pages, whatever it was, over to Metromedia. The State Department has made no request for special handling of that inmate. I think that basically covers what I have to offer.

Q What I don't understand is that yesterday we were told that the documents dated from January to March of this year.

A That's correct. This was an additional document that turned up during the day, Jim.

Q So this document could have been in the prison for a long time? It was not necessarily from that batch?

A Oh, I think the assumption is it was from that batch, yes. And the investigation is continuing, and again, all of this, in time, will presumably come out in some nice neat fashion rather than in inchoate comments from the podium.

Q Alan, what I still don't understand is how did this 19 -- What date was this document from?

A 1959.

Q 1959. What was it doing in the papers between --

A Jim, I don't know.

Q -- of January '83 or whatever?

A I'm not sure it was in the papers of 1983. That cabinet -- safe was, presumably, used over a period of years and not simply from January 1983. So somebody had that other document in there.

Q In other words, there are papers beyond the 3-month period?

A I said yesterday I didn't know what there was. Evidently, one assumes on the basis of this that, yes, the answer is that, at least in the terms of this one document, the answer is yes; whether there were more, we don't know. An investigation is going on.

Q When was the Secretary first informed of this?

A As I indicated yesterday, he was informed when the plane was on the ground in Elmendorf on their way out.

Q Why, in that case, was he not informed on October 25 when you first found out about the documents being missing?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Who was the highest official informed that the documents were missing?

A I also don't know the answer to that question. I think all of that, Marvin, is the kind of thing that in the course of this investigation, one will want to go through in a rather neat and orderly manner --

Q I'm sure --

A -- to find out precisely what happened.

Q I'm sure that you'll want to do that, but isn't it logical to assume that if Top Secret documents are missing in that number, or perhaps even not in that number, that the highest officials in this building would want to be notified immediately?

A As I say, I'm sure that this is a question which will be addressed during the course of the investigation. I can't really comment on it now. I think that that is a question which is quite relevant to the investigation, and I just don't think I can get ahead of that.

Q Was the answer you gave about the other official that informed officials here, was that in response to the person being interviewed on television last night --

A No.

Q -- who said that he had come to the State Department with information that these documents were missing, and couldn't get anybody interested?

A Was what in response to that?

Q The answer you gave about all this connection --

A Yes.

Q You're talking about that fellow who was interviewed on Channel 5?

A I don't know if that was the fellow; I can't verify that. But it's the same story.

Q Alan, what was the classification level of the 1959 document?

A I do not know what it was, but it was classified.

Q It seems to me that it is important to determine whether the law enforcement agency that you're referring to as having reported the extra documents on the 4th is the same law enforcement official who has publicly said that he reported them. And I think that's important only because it suggests that the State Department may have gotten several warnings from at least two, perhaps more, law enforcement agencies about these documents being there.

A I'm not aware that that's the case.

Q Can you say whether it was one law enforcement official?

A I can't speak to whoever was on Metromedia last night.

Q No, but speak for what the State Department got. How many warnings did the State Department get, one?

A I just gave you what we had. We had gotten a call initially on the 25th, and went and picked up those documents. That was from the Lorton Administrator, or his office -- I don't know precisely who placed the call.

Second, there was the occasion on the 4th; and third, there was the call from Senator Mathias this week.

Q Alan, is there any document accounting system, something that should tell you what document you have or should have, so that you could go to it, and that would indicate what is missing, if anything?

A The problem, as I indicated yesterday, is that, particularly the kind of documents which were turned over on -- what was it? The 8th, I guess we're dealing with now -- were in the nature of what would have been an attachment to an entire package; and that package would have had a control number on it so you could tell -- you know, you could put it in series and so on, but not necessarily every piece of paper within it, so that's one of the reasons it's a little complicated.

Q Does that indicate that there is a need to change the system that you currently use?

A I don't know. I can't really comment on it.

Q Can we change the subject?

A No. Let's stay with this one.

Q Who all is investigating, the FBI --

A The FBI has joined in this investigation now.

Q And your people, the State Department?

A State are investigating.

I think, actually, probably at this point, at Lorton, as I understand it -- and again, I'm not sure that I have the last word -- but at Lorton the FBI, together with the Lorton authorities would be doing that, the FBI having jurisdiction over Lorton.

Obviously, our Security people have been involved in the investigation within the building, and were involved in the investigation in Lorton previously.

Q Can you describe for us, Alan, the circumstances under which the 1959 document was turned up? Was it volunteered, was it found in bedding, was it found --

A The only thing I can say about it is that I'm informed that during the search -- it was a search yesterday -- it was offered up by a prisoner. But I don't know anything more beyond that.

Q Alan, on that document, do you know that it was in the packet that was in that file cabinet, or could it be that there was a previous case of disclosure?

A This is the first instance, Jim, of Department safes or locked cabinets being sent to Lorton, so I think that one would reasonably assume that this is (inaudible)

Q All right. Sometimes classified documents are kept in desks, for example. Could there have --

A I know of no suggestion by anybody that this was in any way connected to anything other than this same file cabinet.

-- MORE --

Q In other words, the document was relevant to whatever other information was --

A Not necessarily.

Q Well, then how do you know it wasn't from an earlier disclosure? Maybe it was there for twenty years.

A If you want to write that, go ahead and write it.

Q Is it proper procedure to keep classified documents in a bar-lock file cabinet, or should they be kept in a safe?

A No. The bar-lock cabinet was in a vault, so that was a perfectly proper procedure. Normally, if you were keeping them outside of the vault, you would do something with more highly classified things that would be more secure.

Q Was it in the vault when they took it away?

A No, but it was being kept --

Q Was it just sitting around?

A I refer you back to what I said yesterday, John. I don't think I want to go through it again.

Q The documents that the Metromedia reporter turned in, were they Xeroxes, or were they original copies? Do you have any idea whether they were copies of something that had been made --

A I don't think I can really comment on the progress of the investigation, and that would be part of what would be looked at to try and assure that -- whether they were indeed, quote, originals or Xeroxes, and I just don't think that I can comment from here on that.

Q Keeping in mind what you just said about the investigation, can you say at this point whether there is anything to suggest this was anything other than a horrendous mistake? I mean, could there have been a conspiracy? Was this espionage?

A There is nothing to suggest that is was anything other than a horrendous mistake, to use your words.

Q Alan, the inmate who turned in these documents to Metromedia reportedly is in solitary confinement. Are there any plans to intercede to -- I can understand him being kept out of the way so that he could be debriefed, but are there any plans to have him put in maybe more comfortable surroundings?

A I am not sure that is why he is in solitary confinement. I think you might want to check with Lorton as to why he is -- I think it has to do with other matters, but it is not for me to comment on that.

Q Alan, have any personnel here been suspended, placed on leave -- anything regarding the investigation?

A No, not at this stage.

Q For what has this inmate been convicted?

A I don't know. You would have to check with Lorton.

Q Alan, if you don't mind, I would like to just quickly check with you the chronology of things and when people were notified.

On or about the first week of August, the documents left the State Department and went to the warehouse in Newington, is that correct?

A I would refer you back to what I said yesterday. I gave you the chronology yesterday.

Q The next time we hear about them is September 1 when they get moved to Lorton.

A That is right. I recall that.

Q But they are not in the workshop at that time.

A That is entirely right. They were put in a limited access storage area.

Q Then the next time we hear about them is October 25. So between September 1st and October 25, was the Department contacted by anybody who said, "Hey, we've got some papers here"?

A No.

Q No. So, October 25 was the first contact the State Department received.

A That is correct.

Q Between October 25 and November 4, was the State Department contacted by anyone?

A No.

Q About papers?

A No.

Q Thank you.

Q Are you checking to see where other excess properties have been shipped in this batch? Did they all go to Lorton? Did they go other places?

A My understanding is that all the safes went to the warehouse I referred to yesterday, and it was from there that they were shipped to Lorton. I don't know whether all of the things that went -- in fact, I would guess, given the range of items that went to Lorton, that other things were included, beyond what was simply in the INR. There was furniture, and so on and so forth, so I can't tell you precisely how things were assembled to send to Lorton. I don't have an answer.

Q Have you been checking to see where other pieces of property may have gone?

A I don't think there is any other piece of property involved at this stage.

Q Alan, is it the case, and do I understand correctly that for more than a two-month period, no one in INR noticed that any classified documents were missing?

A I don't have any information on that, Bill, but, again, I think this is the kind of thing that an investigation will want to look at.

Q Is it true that the informer had been trying for three weeks to tell people unsuccessfully?

A Apparently he had -- I can't really get into detail on this -- apparently he had tried to inform -- or had, unsuccessfully -- others about this three weeks prior to November 4, so then I gather, in frustration, he tried again, and this time the State Department was contacted, but I don't have the details on how that worked.

Q Is part of the investigation, then, as to why people did not pay attention to this man's report?

A I have no -- will the investigation look at that? I would guess that that would be a possibility.

Q Did he come to the State Department? Did he try ever to get in touch with the State Department in the course of that three-week period when he says he was trying?

A I have no information to suggest that at all, and that is consistent with what I said to Ralph before.

Q Do you have a suggestion as to what channels he was trying to use?

A No, I can't get into that. We are talking about other -- I can talk about the State Department. I don't think it is appropriate for me to go beyond that.

Q Could you tell us whether any steps are being taken now on an interim basis, either disciplinary steps or procedural steps, such as the stopping temporarily of the flow of desks to the warehouse, or the checking of empty furniture that is about to be, or checking of furniture in the warehouse -- anything like that? Are any steps being taken?

A I think that people are sensitive to what all of this has revealed. Bernie.

Q Do you have any comment on the Syrian action today in shooting an American plane?

A I don't, Bernie. The Pentagon, I think, has some explanation of what was precisely going on, what the plane, the F-14, was doing, and so on. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Any political discussions with the Syrians?

A On this subject?

Q This subject, or just the general build-up in the area.

A We obviously have diplomatic contacts with the Syrians, and we do use them, but I don't have any specifics to offer you.

Q Any fresh contacts with the Syrians in the last 48 or 72 hours?

A As I said, I don't have any specifics to offer.

Q How about Arafat, do you have anything new on his situation?

A No, I don't have anything new on him. Let me just see if I have got anything on Tripoli at all.

I have seen reports of a cease-fire, but I can't confirm that the fighting has, in fact, ceased. Obviously we would welcome an end to the fighting in Tripoli, which has needlessly subjected the people of Lebanon to additional hardship and suffering, but I don't have any specifics on Mr. Arafat.

Q Do you have anything on the Geneva talks, Alan?

A No. I guess we are not going to comment on the progress of the talks in Geneva except to say that it is our understanding that the various Lebanese parties would continue to work on the issue of national reconciliation. I have seen the same press reports you have coming out of Geneva, but I don't have any comment on them..

Q Do you have anything on reports that Governor General Scoon in Grenada is cracking down on human rights, forbidding public meetings, that sort of thing?

Q Let's just stay on Lebanon?

A I don't have anything. Let's go back to Lebanon, but in answer to your question, I don't have anything on that at all.

Q Lebanon: have any troops, Marines or otherwise, been moved to the ridge-line east of Beirut?

A I guess you would have to ask the Pentagon on that, Jim. I am not aware that there is any decision to change the deployment pattern, role, mandate, et cetera, so there is nothing new to offer you on that.

Q Is it the State Department view that with reference to the Geneva talks, that anything can be done with the May 18 agreement --

A The May 17 agreement?

Q -- May 17 agreement in terms of putting it aside in any manner?

A Again, John addressed this the other day, John. I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q Alan, there are reports today that Israeli planes also went up at the same time the American planes went up. Do you have anything on that?

A I don't.

Q Is there any kind of coordination that you can comment on or tell us about?

A No, I don't have anything new on that.

I will just go back to your question, John, and repeat what John said in terms of standing by the May 17 accords, but I would refer you to his words.

Q Have you been in touch with the French and the Italians about possible plans to rescue Arafat and Palestinian fighters loyal to him in Tripoli?

A Well, possible plans -- are we planning, are we involved in planning to rescue them?

Q Well, there have been statements by both governments that they would be prepared to take certain actions. Have you talked to them about this? Have you expressed the U.S. view on that subject?

A I can't tell you. I don't know the answer, and I think I would also not look for it because of diplomatic exchange rules on that.

Q What about the Greeks and Italians: the negotiations for an observer force?

A I don't know where that stands at this point. You might want to check with them and with the Lebanese and see where that stands.

. Q It was sort of brushed aside quickly before -- that Scoon business.

A I don't have anything on it.

Q You had nothing on it. Wait a minute. Are any American forces involved in the crack-down orders?

A American forces involved? I don't know that there are any crackdown orders, so I can't take that as an assumption.

Q No? It is an announcement by the government.

A I have seen a wire report. I don't know that that constitutes an announcement. I have no confirmation of it, and we are checking to see, but I didn't get anything back on that. I don't think that the --

Well, why don't I see what I can get on that question, at least as a starting point, and then we will see if I can find anything out -- if there is, in fact, an order what the U.S. role might be.

Q And if you could put into the hopper, as well: has the U.S. been in discussion with Scoon as to the advisability of this kind of crack-down?

A I don't think in that case I will put that into it, just on the general principle of not getting into discussions between two governments.

Q That is fair enough, except the government has not yet been formed and it exists only because the United States took certain specific actions.

A I don't accept that, Marvin.

Q Huh?

A I don't accept that as a basis for trying to distinguish -- I don't accept it as a statement, but I don't accept it as a basis for trying -- come on, let's not argue about it.

Q No, I don't want to argue, but I do think there is an issue here. If Scoon has taken --

A Scoon is certainly the lawful authority in Grenada, and we are not going to get into those kinds of discussions as to what we are carrying on.

Q Alan, do you have any explanation for the reports coming out of London of appreciably higher American casualties than were announced?

A Basically I will refer you to the Pentagon, but I have checked with the Pentagon, I have checked with the White House, and those reports are simply untrue, but I think -- Bud McFarlane said so on television, in fact, this morning, and the Pentagon has words to give you on that, too, but I don't want to leave you with a misimpression that there is any ambiguity on that.

Q In other words, the figures that you announced earlier of eighteen Americans killed in action is, as far as you know, correct.

A That is correct, yes.

Q Alan, I know you have addressed this before, but I want to ask the question today: Is the United States neutral as to what happens to Mr. Arafat, even though -- ?

A We are not getting into the question of intra-PLO problems, and the statement that I gave yesterday on our concern for civilian casualties was not related to trying to come out on one side or another in that problem. It was specifically related to the civilians and the suffering that they have had to endure.

Q Let me just follow that up. Although we don't formally recognize him, does the United States recognize him informally as the leader of the Palestinian movement.

A John, I am not going to try to do that.

Q Alan, earlier this morning, Secretary Weinberger in a meeting with foreign correspondents said about the defeat of Arafat that it was comparatively unimportant and that it had no strategic consequences, whether or not he was at the head of the PLO or someone else replaced him.

Now, is that his personal view, or is that shared by other members of the Administration?

A I am not going to try to get into that question. As I said before, we are not going to get into the subject from here of intra-PLO problems. Larry Eagleburger talked a bit about this when he was on television the other day, and I would refer you to what he said as far as the State Department is concerned.

Q Alan, in the past, you have criticized governments that take measures that restrict freedom of the press. There has been a statement by Mr. Scoon today, and you don't have any comment? That is because this was recently announced?

A We are starting from the point that I don't have any confirmation, so I certainly am not going to comment, and once we find out whether it happened, we will decide what we will say.

Q The lack of response to the questions about the fate of Arafat from this Administration: does it stem from the fact that there is uncertainty about what is going to happen, or does it stem from the fact that you really don't care about what is going to happen to the Palestinians, and this is the bottom line of what is happening there? They were kicked out of Lebanon, of Beirut, and then they were in a diaspora and other things, and they are trying to stand somewhere in this mother earth. This is what -- question that comes to mind.

A It stems from the fact that we don't think it is appropriate to comment on it. Ralph.

Q Do you have any comment on a report out of Lebanon, out of Beirut today, that the Soviet Union has moved SS-21's into Lebanese territory on Mount Sunni?

A I just saw a wire to that effect before I came out here. I don't have anything on it.

Q Would we be erroneous if we related that report to the reports of the U.S. reconnaissance flights?

A I think I would have to refer you to the Pentagon about the reconnaissance flights. I don't know the answer to the question, and I frankly think that they are not going to talk about what the reconnaissance flights do, so I am not leading you to believe that they have something specific.

Q On those reconnaissance flights, did this government notify in advance any of the parties involved there, including MNF countries, Syria, Lebanon, Israel?

A Again, I would refer you to the Pentagon on reconnaissance flights and their operations. I am not going to get into that.

Q Do you expect Grenada to be taken up at the OAS next week?

A I don't know.

Q New subject, Alan? I'd just like you to look for something on a question which I know the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is aware of -- you may not be aware of it. It's a case of two people in particular in the Colombian anti-drug coalition, Fausto Charras and Maxmilio Londono, who have been the target of death threats and attacks on their apartment, and so on, for basically supporting an anti-drug program which is both a Colombian Government program, and also one that has been publicly supported by the United States. They have requested assistance in getting security protection from the Colombian Government, which is now looking into the question, but they have also requested assistance from various other nations --

A What is your question?

Q My question is, do you have any comment on their safety? Have you taken any actions to let it be known to the Colombian Government that you would like to see -- them protected?

A You say the Embassy there is aware of it. I would refer you to them.

Q Thank you.

A You are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:13 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, November 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #201

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1983, 12:36 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have several announcements to make. First, as opposed to a departure statement and arrival statement, on Saturday November 12, 1:51 p.m., Susan Pittman gave birth to an 8-pound, 1-ounce baby girl. (Applause) Both mother and child are doing well. The baby, who will be named Lauren Elaine, is reported to have almond eyes, fair skin, rosy cheeks, and an uncanny ability to withhold comment. (Laughter) We extend hearty congratulations to Sue and Doug, and hope to arrange a photo opportunity in the near future. (Laughter)

A technical reminder, if I may, to those of you who are using portable tape recorders during the press briefings. Tape recorders apparently have been placed too close to microphones on the tables and have caused a distortion in the sound quality when the microphones are activated, and makes it impossible for others to hear the question being asked. So we urge that you either use the mult box at the back of the room, or put portable tape recorders a distance away from the microphones, if you would.

Also, I'd like to introduce a new member of the Press Office, Lynn Crammer -- if you'll stand up -- who begins work today as a Public Information Assistant. Lynn has served in the Department for two years in both the Office of Security and the Foreign Service Institute. We are pleased to have her with us, and I know you'll make her feel welcome.

Announcement of a BACKGROUNDER this afternoon. A BACKGROUNDER on the INF negotiations will be held at 2:30 this afternoon here in the State Department briefing room.

Also available in the Press Office will be the testimony of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy. Please note the time of the testimony has been changed. He will testify at 1:30 in Room 2200 of the Rayburn Building. The subject is the Middle East review, focus on Lebanon.

Available in the Press Office after this briefing will be some additional documents which were captured in Grenada. We're making these documents available with the concurrence of Governor General Paul Scoon. Included with the package are an abstract and an index. Because of the limited quantities available to us, we will again provide one copy per organization, and request your cooperation with that.

Q How extensive are those documents?

A There are somewhat over 30 documents, I guess. It's a fairly thick pack.

Q What do they cover?

A You'll get a whole abstract and list of them. I'm not going to go into it here.

Finally, a statement regarding the CDE. Ambassador James Goodby, our representative to the Helsinki Preparatory Meeting for the European Security Conference, known as the CDE, has advised us that agreement has been reached and the preparatory meeting adjourned on November 11. We are gratified that, through agreement on procedural questions and an agenda, this important first step has been taken toward convening of the CDE, which will begin in Stockholm on January 17, 1984. This conference will form an important part of the process of increasing security and cooperation in Europe, which began in 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act and which continued at the Madrid CSCE review meeting, which concluded in September.

That is it for announcements. I'll be happy to take questions.

Q Will that be a Foreign Ministers' meeting?

A The Helsinki meeting? I'm sorry. The Stockholm meeting?

Q The Stockholm meeting.

A I don't have anything on that, Bernie.

Q Alan, before it disappears into history, in the documents story, do you now have cause to believe that there was an earlier slip-up?

A An earlier slip-up?

Q Than before August 1?

A Oh, I see. You're going back to Lorton documents, as opposed to Grenada documents?

(Laughter)

Q Yes; those captured documents.

A Sorry. The investigation on that continues, Jim. I don't have any readout at this point on the possibility that there may have been documents in Lorton before that. I gather that a prisoner has claimed he had a document for a while. We don't have information to confirm that at this point. The investigation, obviously, will look at that.

Q Alan, in that connection, can you tell us today whether anyone besides Secretary Shultz was notified of the problem between October 25 and November (inaudible).

A I'm not going to try to go into a great deal more detail on this, Ralph. I think we'll let the investigation proceed, and when it has been concluded, as I indicated to you when I first spoke on the subject, I think we'll be making available whatever information we can, that is setting aside the classified part of it. But I'm just not going to go beyond that.

Q Are you able to say if anything further has happened here at State to insure, at least at this point, that we won't have repeat of that?

A I am not in a position to say; I simply don't know what measures might have been taken. Obviously, there are a lot of measures in force to control the dissemination of classified information. Specifically, what lessons will be learned from this, I think will depend on what people find out in the investigation; but I don't have anything further on that today.

Q Alan, who now is in charge of the investigation? Is it still Security here, or is the FBI now --

A I don't know how to indicate "in charge." The FBI, as I indicated last week, is involved in the case; and is, I think, very much doing the Lorton end of the investigation. I know that SY has been talking to people in this building. Whether the FBI will be doing that as well, it might well do so.

Q Does SY have authorization to go to Lorton and talk to people there?

A I don't know about the question of authorization. At this point, my understanding is, SY is not planning to go on to Lorton, but that the FBI will be doing that portion of it. If I'm wrong, I will correct that later, but I believe that's correct.

Q Can you amplify what the Secretary of State said this morning, that you're not supposed to talk about retaliation any more? I mean, is there actually a decision?

A I will refer you to the Secretary's words.

Q On Grenada, there are stories coming out in The Post today about a large number of prisoners being held by the U.S. Army in Grenada. Can you tell us under what authority that's being done, and whether full due process rights are being accorded those people?

A I think on the specifics, Jim, you're going to have to go to the Pentagon. The fact is that the Governor General has delegated to the combined Peacekeeping Force responsibility for screening those Grenadians whom it is felt might constitute a threat to the maintenance of order and assumption of responsibilities by the Advisory Council. The U.S. is assisting in this effort.

The figures on the number of remaining Grenadian detainees, as reported by U.S. officials at St. George's, is approximately -- and I stress the word "approximately" -- 148, but that is, at best, an advisory estimate.

There have been, obviously, a number of press reports indicating varying time frames for how much longer those individuals might be detained. I'm simply not in a position here to give you a fix on that. A number of the individuals have been released, a number remanded to Richmond Hill Prison; but I simply don't have any figures to give you on that. That's the answer.

Q Alan, you've got I don't know how many people in the Embassy there, and I understand that the State Department does deal with human rights from time to time. Here we have a situation in which people are being picked up under laws that would never pass muster in the United States, and may not be charged with anything, may not be granted access to lawyers. Is the United States interested in whether these due process guarantees are being provided to those that they pick up and hold?

A I've given you what I have in terms of the authority. In terms of specifically what is happening on the ground, go to the Pentagon.

Q Can you take the question as to whether any due process guarantees are being provided those that are being picked up? We have lectured many, many countries about the importance of due process, and now we're involved ourselves in something -- it seems.

A I will leave you with what I've just said.

Q Alan, to follow on that, is the United States and its forces in Grenada currently functioning in the role of the martial law authority police force under the direction of the Governor General? Is that what we should see it as?

A I think I will leave you with what has been said before about the role, and in this case, specifically, about the Governor General's delegating the responsibility in this particular instance.

Q Alan, I'd just like to know, in terms of the goals that the United States set forth when it went on the island, how does the United States forces' rounding people up on charges that "they may constitute a threat" to order? How does that further our goals?

A I would refer you to -- I think we have a statement posted, did we not, the end of last week, in answer to this?

Q The answer is outdated. It says that none of these measures have been applied in any respect, and they would be only "if necessary."

A No. I think it talks further about the detention of people

Q New subject? On Friday, The New York Times reported that the United States sat in on a discussion among El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama military chiefs of staff regarding joint military action by those countries against Nicaragua, with U.S. logistic support.

Can you comment on that report?

A No. I don't know the facts of sitting in except I think that at a meeting -- any meeting -- first of all, I think we did indicate some time ago that when the CONDECA group met, that we did have somebody there as an observer, but not as a participant.

In any case, regarding the question about Nicaragua, I don't have anything to say about that at this point. I think that is quite hypothetical, and, I think officials have been on-the-record over the weekend talking about that subject. I don't have anything to add to what they said.

Ghassan?

Q Can we go to the Middle East?

Q Can we stay on Central America?

A No. We'll come back to it.

Go ahead Ghassan.

Q A report yesterday on one of the networks stated that the United States may, or is considering playing a more active role in what is happening in Tripoli -- that's actually on NBC by Marvin Kalb.

Do you have anything to tell us about -- is there any consideration of such an American role in northern Lebanon?

A I don't have anything to give you today. Our concerns about the plight of the civilians there has been expressed, and I think we've also made clear, though, that we're not going to get into the intra-PLO dimensions of that, so I don't have anything to offer you on that today.

Q One more thing, please. There were recent shootings and deaths on the West Bank by Israeli authorities. Do you care to comment on those?

A We very much regret the increase in tension on the West Bank and the incidence of violence it has spawned. The unrest appears to stem from a variety of factors, including Palestinian concern over developments in Tripoli, and the continuing friction between the local inhabitants and the Israeli settlers. Such developments underscore the need for all parties to take the steps necessary to realize the promise of the President's Middle East peace initiative.

Q Can I follow up, please, Alan? Do I understand you correct -- if I would understand, that you're saying the source of what happened on the West Bank is the violence or the demonstrations by the Palestinian students in there?

A I think I'll stick with the words that I gave you which is rather more carefully crafted than that, if I might say so. Why don't you take a look at that afterwards and see.

Q Following up on Ghassan's question about expressing concern about the plight of civilians, to whom was that concern expressed?

A I'm not going to go into the diplomatic dimensions of it. I had a statement here last week.

Q It was rather vague.

A Oh, I thought it was rather strong, actually.

Q Okay. May I follow up, please? Another thing, about the south of Lebanon, there was a report that the Awwali River bridge was closed off by the Israelis. Have you heard of such reports, and do you detect a trend in that since the bridge was closed off last week as well for a brief --

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Have the Bulgarians protested to the United States about some airliner incident over the Mediterranean?

A Why don't I take a look at that, Jim. I have seen the wire. I understand we asked for something on that, and I haven't gotten anything yet. I'll take a look at it and see what we get.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on a report that at the last or the first meeting in Geneva where Mr. Kimche was attending from Israel, Israel agreed or has some understanding to freeze the agreement with Lebanon on condition that Syria controls the PLO and Lebanon completely remove PLO forces from all of Lebanon?

A I don't know anything about that. I guess I'd have to ask you to ask the Israelis about it.

Q Alan, on Tripoli again, do you have any comment on the reports that Arafat is holding the six Israeli prisoners in Tripoli?

A No.

Q Reports this morning.

A No.

Q I'd like to go back to Bernie's question. What did the Secretary mean when he said that we weren't going to talk any more about retaliation? Was he withdrawing the President's words?

A I think I'd refer you to the full conversation he had with Bernie Kalb about that this morning, but I don't intend to amplify on his remarks.

Q Alan, back to Central America again. Eden Pastora, better known as Commander Zero, is in town seeking American support at universities and is traveling around the country. Does the State Department intend to discuss with him what he intends to do on an official basis?

A I'm not going to get into the question of specifics, but at his request -- that is, at Mr. Pastora's request -- he will be meeting today with Assistant Secretary Motley. But I don't intend to get into the subject matter.

Q When is that meeting on?

A It's later this afternoon.

Q Do you have any comment on the just finished Gulf Cooperation Council summit conference which was ended in Doha, Qatar -- I believe it was -- ended last Thursday, and there were all kinds of activities related to the GCC conference and some resolutions?

A No. I don't have anything on that.

Q Does the Department have any comment on the proposals by Prime Minister Trudeau to open up a new process of consultation among world leaders, particularly nuclear armed powers?

A We share Prime Minister Trudeau's desire to see progress in arms control and the creation of a more stable East-West relationship.

The Administration has put forward a number of positive proposals on strategic arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, conventional forces in Europe, and in other areas in pursuit of these objectives.

We attach a high priority to efforts to move these negotiations forward. We are, of course, looking carefully at the ideas put forward by Prime Minister Trudeau who has also written to the President on these issues.

President Reagan has responded to that letter along the lines indicated above. I might note that Deputy Secretary Dam will be delivering that response when he travels to Canada.

It would be premature to comment on any specifics until we've had a chance to study Prime Minister Trudeau's ideas further and to discuss them both with the Canadians and with other interested Allies.

Q To follow on that, are you aware of any mechanism being set up for a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister on this subject?

A I'd have to ask you to check with the White House on that.

Q Is there any concern that this kind of initiative by the Canadian Prime Minister interferes with the carefully developed INF negotiating strategy?

A I think I'd refer you to what I said, which I think conveys our attitude towards it.

Q There are reports of a U.S. warning to Syria, or to whoever shot at the F-14s. Is there such a thing, and can you refer us to where that's coming from, or can you make comment on it?

A No. I don't have anything --

Q Is there a warning to Syria?

A Again, as usual, I would not get into the description of what we may or may not have discussed in diplomatic channels. But what you're getting into, in a sense, is the question of rules of engagement and so on, and I'm just not going to get into --

Q Do you have any date for Gemayel coming?

A No, I don't, Bernie.

Q Do you have any date for the reconciliation conference in Geneva to reconvene?

A No.

Q Because it's supposed to be meeting the 14th, today.

A At one point they had announced the 14th. I've seen a lot of stories since then that it was not going to be the 14th. In any case, it apparently is not the 14th.

Q Anything about the acid-reported disease, sickness, or --

A No.

Q Anything on Rumsfeld's plans?

A No. Nothing on his plans. He's in Beirut conferring with the Lebanese, obviously. On his way he stopped in Europe, conferred with MNF partners, but we're going to pursue the Habib-McFarlane formulation of not getting into what they're saying or where he's going.

Q Two senior administration officials in Central America late last week said that -- made some comments about the death squads in El Salvador, and they said that they were enjoying the protection of Communist guerrillas.

Can you tell us whether you stand by that statement, and what protection are the Communist guerrillas providing them?

A I would refer you to what specifically was said there, again, to the entirety of what it was. I don't have any new --

Q I've checked all their offices, and they have nothing to say.

A I don't have any particular remarks to offer on that.

Q Is that an official U.S. view?

A As I say, I don't have any particular remarks to offer on what was said. I read it -- I guess I'm going to have to leave the analysis to you, but I think that you ought to look at both what Mr. Ikle said and what Mr. Abrams said about that.

Q But if they don't provide me with the remarks, I can only take it from what's in the record, and what's in the record speaks for itself. I'm wondering if that is an official U.S. position?

A Well, I don't have anything on it.

Q Alan, about ten days ago John had no comment on a story involving the involvement of Peter Bourne and Jeffrey Bourne in collaboration with the Coard-Austin junta, or whatever it was, in Grenada.

Since then, that story has received some publicity. There was an article in The Washington Times towards the end of last week, supposedly bylined by a White House official under a pseudonym which also mentioned the involvement of Robert Pastor who is an adviser to Walter Mondale in writing a strategy paper for Austin even after the assassination of Maurice Bishop.

A Do you have a question?

Q The question is that in light of the State Department's reports on Soviet active measures, do you have any comment on evidence surfacing that within the Mondale campaign apparatus there's an apparent Soviet agent?

A No.

Q It seems to be actually much more significant than the petty forgeries that you --

A No. I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on the two AID workers in Guatemala whose bodies were discovered? And, do you have anything on the arrest of this month's head of the Democratic Alliance leader in Chile?

A I don't have anything on either of those. I have heard about reports of the AID workers' bodies. I don't have myself -- I can't say the U.S. Government -- but I personally don't happen to have confirmation of what's involved here, so I think I'm not able at this point, Jim, to offer you a comment on that.

Q Alan, I want to go back to your answer to my colleague about the shooting and the killing in the West Bank. You made the statement and, you know, you put the people onto the promise of the Reagan peace plan.

Can I ask you to possibly have the State Department make a position about the settlers in the West Bank carrying guns and tooting around them and threatening the people there, because this is not part of the security arrangements which are supposed to be on people in the West Bank.

A I think that that subject may have been addressed at various times in the past. In any case, I think that as far as the West Bank and the situation there is concerned, I'm going to stick with the statement I've just given you.

Q Do you have anything to say on the record about the arms report in the Post this morning, the new proposal?

A I can give you something on that on the record. The United States, after consultation with its Allies, has decided to elaborate further on its position and on the initiatives announced by the President in September by indicating to the Soviets that while we continue to prefer the complete elimination of the entire class of land-based, long-range INF missiles, and while we would be prepared to discuss other interim global ceilings on such missiles, the U.S. would be prepared to accept an interim equal global ceiling of 420 warheads on long-range INF missiles.

This would equate the global limit of 140 of the Soviet three-warhead SS-20 missiles, which is, as you recall, the number to which they have proposed to limit their SS-20 forces in range of Europe.

Q Could we have a copy of that statement, please?

A Sure.

Q Does the U.S. consider this revision or this elaboration to be a specific answer to Andropov's 420 offer, or is there further change necessary in either side's proposal?

A I can't go into a lot of detail, but the Soviets have proposed that they be permitted under the agreement to deploy 140 SS-20 missiles with 420 warheads in or within range of Europe.

We're attempting to be responsive to the Soviets by accepting this level of deployment while consistent with our own criteria for an agreement proposing it as an equal global limit.

Q It means they would have to remove missiles that they did not include in their earlier proposal that would be stationed in --

A I think in terms of further follow-up, I refer you to the backgrounder we're having this afternoon.

Q Has this been made or are you announcing this after it had been made in Geneva?

A This proposal or this information has been presented by Ambassador Nitze to the Soviet delegation in Geneva today.

Q Today?

A Today.

Q You said you were prepared to discuss other global ceilings. Does this refer to regional, such as Asia, the SS-20s in Asia?

A A global ceiling is a global ceiling.

Q What are the other ceilings? Other numbers?

A I'm sorry. There are other elements of the negotiation, presumably, and our various initiatives will continue to be pursued in negotiations. But as far as the long-range INF missiles *per se* are concerned, this is where we are.

Q Do the other ceilings include bombers?

A Again, I think that that is the kind of thing that was discussed previously. But I would refer you, in terms of getting detail on this, to your backgrounder this afternoon.

Q Do we have a copy of their signature agreement?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #202

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 1983, 12:20 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I have one statement to issue on the Turkish Cypriot situation. We have learned today of the declaration by the Turkish Cypriot community of its independence. The announcement came following a resolution reportedly approved in that community's legislative assembly creating a polity called the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."

This move by the Turkish Cypriots comes as a complete surprise to us. We are dismayed by the move which we consider unhelpful to the process of finding a settlement to the Cyprus problem. We are actively meeting with all parties to the Cyprus problem both in Washington and other capitals to urge calm in the wake of today's developments.

The Turkish Cypriots should reverse their actions. We have urged the Government of Turkey to use its influence with the Turkish Cypriot community to bring about such a reversal. We will not recognize the new polity, and we urge all countries of the world not to recognize it.

We urge all parties to the Cyprus question to support the efforts of the Secretary General to bring about a fair and final negotiated settlement of the problems of that country. In our opinion the secession of the Turkish community from the Republic of Cyprus represents potentially serious damage to that process.

Q Alan, it is a surprise to me that you were surprised. They have been threatening for weeks to do this.

A A threat, Dick, is different actually from moving ahead and taking action.

Q Alan, you urged Turkey to withdraw its recognition? It's just recognized the republic.

A I understand that, and, as I indicated, we condemn the move by the Turkish Cypriots to declare their independence, and we regret that the Government of Turkey has recognized this new polity. We strongly urge that no further international recognition be granted to this self-declared country.

Q Alan, for what reason would this move hurt the efforts to reunite the people of that island?

A I think that's rather self-evident, Ralph, in terms of the way the dialogue has proceeded to this point. This is not a positive contribution to that dialogue.

Q Do you expect the negotiations to resume in light of this or not until the reversal of decision?

A At this point we are, as I said, in touch with the various parties who are concerned. We are carefully studying what further actions we should take, and I really don't have anything further to give you.

Q In other words, let me just pose the question from a Turkish Cypriot view, if you could give the answer. They would say that there has been de facto partition for nine years, that no progress has been made, they have declared themselves independent but ready to federate with the Greek Cypriots in some agreement that they will not unite with Turkey.

What's wrong with this since obviously the world community has not been able to do anything over all these years for them?

A Again, I think I'm not really going to go beyond the statement that I've given you, Bernie, that this is disruptive to the process which has been ongoing, and we would like to see it reversed. Mike, did you have a question?

Q Has the Ambassador of Turkey been called in, or is there any meeting planned with him regarding this matter?

A I guess I really don't want to get into the details, but as I said, we are actively meeting with all the parties to the Cyprus problem.

Q Alan, what would be your attitude towards any Greek military action?

A I think you're asking me to get into hypotheticals, and I think I would really prefer to stay with my statement.

Q Do you take that into consideration?

A Sorry?

Q Do you take that into consideration?

A Again, I'm just not going to go beyond what I've given you thus far.

Q Is there a governor-general on that island? (Laughter)

A Fred, did you have a question?

Q I have no questions, Alan.

A You have no questions. Mike?

Q I came in late -- pardon me -- but have you made a statement regarding the assassination in Athens of the --

A I did not make a statement. I don't have information beyond what we did this morning, and I think that Larry Speakes talked to this a little bit. I think you probably have the details, the names, the time, and all that.

Q I wonder if (1) you can give us any information on the background of this gentleman, and (2) exactly who is responsible, if you have any information?

A As far as his background, I would refer you to the Pentagon. I think they will have personal information on Captain Tsantes.

As far as what happened, his assailants have not yet been apprehended or identified, but we're in close contact with Greek Government officials who have expressed their shock and condolences and have pledged every effort to apprehend the criminals. I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Do you think American military aid and economic aid should be given to Turkey in light of its recognition of Turkish Cypriots?

A Should be given to Turkey?

Q Should there be any move to cut it?

A I don't have anything to offer you on that, Bernie. Jeff?

Q Alan, it was only two weeks ago that terrorists shot two guards from the Jordanian Embassy in

Athens as they walked down the street. There's been a pattern of incidents at American military bases in Greece.

With that as background, can you tell us why the U.S. Ambassador in Athens failed to order an anti-terrorist alert for personnel under his command before today's murder?

A I don't know what the situation is regarding advisories to personnel on terrorism, and I'm not prepared to address that.

Q The murdered naval officer was traveling in a U.S. Government car bearing the license plates routinely issued to the embassies of foreign governments.

Will the United States now take steps to make its personnel less visible, and therefore less vulnerable?

A I can't tell you the answer to that question. I don't know. Ralph?

Q Do you have anything on a second attack outside Athens, a car fire, to the car of another different U.S. military official?

A I've heard something about that. I don't have anything to confirm it myself, but I have heard there might have been such an incident. Again, in this case I would refer you to the Pentagon.

Q Is there any reason at this point to believe that this attack or these attacks, if there were two, are in any way related to the Beirut bombing or other events in Lebanon?

A As I said earlier, we don't know who is responsible for this attack. I have no information for it, and I don't see how I could possibly speculate about that.

Q Have there been warnings from --

A I don't think we would get into warnings, Ralph. But, anyway, I can't speculate about responsibility. Let's hope that the murderers will be caught, and that we'll know more about it.

Q Alan, do you think the fact that the United States has not retaliated on Beirut has in any way encouraged assailants to select other American targets?

A I couldn't speculate on people's motives, Bernie.

Q Alan, the Secretary is making a speech in Atlanta. When will you have a text on that?

A I don't know the answer. Obviously, to the extent that we have one in advance, we'll try to provide it to you, but I don't have it.

Q Do you have anything on the -- comment on the aid program that was adopted by Congress?

A I'm sorry. The aid program adopted by Congress?

Q Adopted by Congress.

A I don't.

Q Nothing at all?

A No.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q On the Salvador case, the murder of Shauffelberger and the person who was arrested but later deemed innocent by us, I've heard reports in the building today that the State Department has undertaken an investigation to find out the source of that story.

Do you have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it, but I don't know that we would get into the question of what investigations might be underway. I don't happen to know personally.

Q Also, can you bring us up to date on Grenada today and how many people U.S. forces are holding?

A Yes. I can give you a sitrep on that. First, I'd simply like to note that we are pleased to note that the advisory council was to be sworn in this morning between 11:00 and 11:30 local time in Grenada.

On figures, while we don't have an update, it's our understanding that provisions have now been made to conduct the screening of the remaining detainees at the

Richmond Hills Prison where the individuals will either be released or remanded to Grenadian authorities for their disposition.

We can confirm the Governor General has asked some 30 individuals of non-Grenadian nationality to leave the country, but have no specifics on their nationality or any time-frame for their departures.

On the general question of the detention of Grenadian nationalities, the U.S. involvement in this process has been taking place in the context of Governor General Sir Paul Scoon's request to the participants in the Caribbean peacekeeping forces, in the absence of a current capacity within the Government of Grenada to perform the role themselves, that the peacekeeping force temporarily assist in the maintenance of order.

Grenadian authorities will decide whether individuals will be prosecuted for criminal offenses under the laws of Grenada.

With respect to your question yesterday, Jim, about the sort of a chain of that request, the request for assistance was made by the Governor General through the Charge'-designate, Ambassador Charles A. Gillespie.

Q Could we get a copy of that?

A I can give you a copy of most of that. Yes.

-- MORE --

Q Okay, and if I could follow up for just a second, two things aren't clear to me: One is, when you said yesterday that the Governor General had given the Peacekeeping Force responsibility for screening the Grenadians that have been detained, does that mean that he gave them specific guidelines or specific names of people to be interrogated by the U.S. and other officers, or that he just gave them a general authority to detain whomever they wished and to screen them?

A Don't know the answer.

Q Could you look into that?

A I could look into it, but I would suggest that you might want to get your people on the ground in Grenada to ask the Governor General or his spokesman their views on the subject. It's their authority that is being exercised here.

Q The authority, according to your statement yesterday, was "delegated" to the Combined Peacekeeping Force, and was not exercised by the Governor --

A (Interrupting) As I say, I'll look into it; but I would suggest that you put your questions directly.

Q Could I ask one more, please, on that?

A Go ahead.

Q The Human Rights Report of the United States Government on Grenada has maintained over the last three years that the government there has maintained a functioning and relatively independent judiciary throughout the period of their rule.

Is it the U.S. position that when Bishop was killed, the judicial system, as well as the executive authority on that island, ceased to exist?

A I can't tell you, why don't I see if I have anything on that. I'm not sure whether it's a question of the U.S. role, or U.S. view, as opposed to the Governor General and his interim administration's view. But I'll see whether we have anything on that.

Larry?

Q Israel announced its intention to build five new settlements in the occupied West Bank. What do you think of this?

A Uh-huh.

Q What do you think of this? And, second, a back-up question on this, don't you think that this is detrimental to the new initiative that the President has started by sending Don Rumsfield to the area?

A Well, why don't I answer with just one response to this? We regret Israel's apparent intention to implant additional settlements on the West Bank. Our position is clear: we regard settlements as an obstacle to peace.

Our policy remains as put forward by the President in his September 1, 1982 Peace Initiative. In calling for a settlement freeze, the President stated that "Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel, and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated."

The President also asserted that the position the United States will support in negotiations is "self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan."

As regards one specific aspect of the story that I saw this morning reporting intention to hamper the possibility of a return of the West Bank land to Jordanian control, the President stated in his initiative that the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, with its formula of territory for peace, applies to "all fronts," specifically including the West Bank and Gaza.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q In that general area, last year or several months ago, Secretary Shultz spoke in defense of academic freedom on the West Bank. Can you confirm, or have you heard reports that the acting president of one of the leading universities in that territory has been arrested?

A Don't have anything on it, Larry.

Q Do you have any comment on the report from Geneva this morning that says that the Soviet Union left the bargaining table in the INF talks after only 35 minutes of negotiations, the shortest session in the duration of the talks?

A I don't have specifics; I wouldn't quarrel with the report except to say that the negotiations are continuing. A working group is scheduled to meet tomorrow, a plenary session is scheduled for Thursday, and the Soviets have not requested a recess.

Q What about any comment on apparently they have rejected the latest U.S. proposal?

A Ambassador Nitze has discussed the latest proposal in Geneva with the Soviets, in accordance with the President's instructions. Due to the rules of confidentiality, I cannot really comment on that. As we indicated yesterday, the President's elaboration of the proposal for an interim agreement again demonstrates flexibility, on our part, in seeking to reach an agreement at the earliest possible moment; and we look forward to continuing the talks at the table in Geneva.

Q Didn't TASS just say it was totally unacceptable?

A I don't think we're going to respond to TASS; I think we will respond to the Soviets at the table.

As I say, it was discussed at the table, and I just don't want to go into the nature of that discussion.

Q Can we come back to Cyprus because --

Q Can we stay on the Middle East a second, please?

Q Let me just ask my question? You said the U.S. was surprised by this move. I just wanted to make sure we understand what you mean by "surprise." Does that mean the U.S. Embassy in Cyprus, the intelligence community, was not infoming Washington that this was about to happen, or was it just a case of officials in Washington not paying any attention to it and being surprised?

A I don't think it is a question of either of those things, Bernie; it's a question of being aware that there was discussion of this kind of consideration, but being unaware that in fact a move was to take place.

Q In other words, our contacts were so poor with the Cypriots and with the Turkish Government that --

A I'll refer you to my statement. Ralph?

Q Let me go back to the arms again, for a second, please: specifically the question of scheduling further sessions, you said there is a session tomorrow and another one Thursday -- have there been any plans for sessions beyond Thursday made at this point?

A I don't have anything to give you beyond what I've been able to give you.

Bernie, I might point out one other thing I saw, at least, in the press today. I can't tell you whether it's valid or not, but I saw a statement by a Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman that they were surprised by it; so I'm not sure that I would accept the premises of your question.

Q Alan, on Bernie's question, isn't it just that you know that if you said you weren't surprised, that The Times would accuse you of setting the thing up?

A I think we try to reflect the facts as we know them. Excuse me, go ahead Mike.

Q On Donald Rumsfield, where is he today? Where is he going? Do you have anything for his meeting with President Assad, or is he able to receive visitors yet?

A I don't have anything on the schedule beyond where he is at the moment, which is in Rome. He has met with Foreign Minister Andreotti, but I don't have an onward schedule for him.

Q On the Middle East, do you have anything today on Assad's comments to Evans and Novak? Is he coordinating more closely now with Moscow?

A I don't have any comment on that column.

Q Do you have any dates to announce on Gemayel or the Israelis?

A No. I don't.

Q To follow up yesterday's question on the Shultz remarks on retaliation for the attack on the Marines in Lebanon, is it still an option on whether we're going to retaliate, or is decided now that we're not going to retaliate?

A Again, Greg, I will refer you to what the Secretary said, and not go beyond that. David?

Q On Arafat in Tripoli, do you have anything on that and his offer to negotiate with King Hussein?

A No, I don't think I really do. I don't have anything at all on Tripoli, or on Arafat. Ralph?

Q In that area, how about anything on the Syrian Foreign Minister's meeting with Gemayel and plans for the plans for the Gemayal Assad meeting -- anything further on that?

A No. I think you should check with those governments.

Q On another subject, do you have any comment on the report of Soviet planes intruding Japanese air space this morning?

A No. I saw the reports, but I don't have anything on it.

Jim?

Q On the documents made available from Grenada, can we possibly get those documents which might address the question of Bishop's trip to the United States and the negotiations on the IMF, since obviously you have those in your possession.

A I'm not sure that we have necessarily those documents.

Q If they are, can they be made available?

A No. I will simply say to you that the documents which we have are being reviewed. There are a lot of documents and there are only a limited number of people to review them, and it's being done on an inter-agency basis, people looking at them, and that process continues. So there may well be other documents which will be made public. I can't promise you specific documents will be made public, and I can't tell you what we have beyond what we've already related.

Q What are the criteria for release?

A I don't have criteria to give you but they are being reviewed. Joe?

Q Is there any joint effort by the United States and the Soviet Union to halt the fighting in Tripoli?

A Joint effort by the United States and the Soviet Union?

Q Well, you know, not as a formal position, but working in the same direction?

A I can't tell you what the Soviets are doing. You'll have to ask them.

Q What are we doing?

A We've addressed this the last few days. Our concern is with civilian casualties there -- we've expressed our concern about it. I think there are a number of other Arab states who have been involved in trying to bring about a halt to the fighting.

Q A question on the protests over the INF deployment in Europe: Ambassador Burns gave a speech last week, which was voluntarily distributed this morning by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, in which he used, I think, uncharacteristically strong language to describe the young demonstrators as being anti-democratic.

Does his speech reflect Administration policy on criticizing the demonstrators at the time when they --

A I can't comment on a speech if I haven't seen it, Ralph. Larry?

Q Have there been any further developments in the combined investigation of the secret papers at Lorton Reformatory?

A Don't have anything new to give you on Lorton. That investigation continues.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The press briefing concluded at 12:48 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, November 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1983, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a statement on the fiftieth anniversary of United States-Soviet relations, on behalf of the United States Government.

Today marks the fiftieth anniversary of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States. In a letter to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, written on this date in 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt expressed his hopes for the future: "I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world."

President Roosevelt had only these hopes to guide him. They continue to guide us, five decades later, in the conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. But we also have the record of the past fifty years before us. Unfortunately, that record falls short of what it should be.

The nuclear era has presented new challenges to all nations which seek peace, as we do. Soviet expansionism throughout that era has been a challenge in its own right. It has raised the honest question of whether the Soviet Union is as committed to peace as we are. Through strength, through realism, through responsible deterrence, and through dialogue, the peace has been preserved, but the challenge remains. For our part, we will continue in our efforts to build a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union on that basis. In this nuclear age, our two countries inhabit a small and precious planet together. Through mutual cooperation, we have a unique opportunity to reduce nuclear weapons in the world.

Our nations today have significantly different interests and values, as they did fifty years ago. But we are prepared to work with the Soviets to solve the problems that confront us. There is a need on both sides for responsible, predictable behavior, behavior that can lead to reduced tensions and equitable solutions that respect the interests of each. That is our approach. We will do our part to maintain the peace: that objective has guided us in relations with the Soviet Union for fifty years, and that is our objective today.

Q May we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure. That's all I have for you. Be happy to take any questions.

Q Was it to have an overview of the state of the relationship that Ambassador Hartman saw Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A Oh, I think he was discussing a number of bilateral matters and affairs of global interest and so on.

Q What about the arms negotiations?

A I wouldn't go beyond that rather precise explanation I've given you.

Q John, can you give us a situation report on what is going on in Lebanon? And do you have any comment on the Israeli raids? Were they done in conjunction or with the knowledge of the United States?

A No, there was no consultation with the United States, no coordination. Don't have any comment, really, on the raid; it was an Israeli decision.

Q Do we approve of it, John?

A It's not a question of approving or disapproving. We just don't have any comment on the raid.

Q I just want to catch up here for a minute. Are you aware that there was a high-level Israeli military delegation that was at the Pentagon over the weekend?

A No, I wasn't.

Q Can you take that, just check into that --

A I think you ought to ask the Pentagon.

Q --because I think you'll find the Israelis were there. And I wonder whether --

A They may have been; but that doesn't affect the answer to the question.

Q I see. If they were there, they were there for another purpose?

A It was not in connection with this.

Q Is the raid what the United States has had in mind in terms of retaliation?

A As you know, the Secretary of State said on Monday morning that the Administration would no longer discuss the question of retaliation, so we will stand on his words.

If you wanted the sit-rep on what is happening elsewhere in Lebanon, I'll be glad to give you that.

Q One more question on this, if I may, John.

A Sure.

Q I want to ask this question anyway: Does what happened today in any way influence our decision on whether we feel retaliation is still necessary or needed?

A As the Secretary said, the Administration is not going to discuss the question of U.S. retaliation.

Q Do we have any further information on who is responsible for the attack? We're not going to discuss retaliation, but what can you tell us about the investigation and who is responsible?

A Nothing, Bob, beyond what we have said before. Nothing has moved beyond that.

Q Does the investigation still point in the same direction it was pointing?

A Yes, I think so.

Q In light all of the overtures and the visit of Mr. Eagleburger and some of these intermediary press reports that a strategic consensus agreement with Israel, will be reenacted, and a flow of assistance -- miliary assistance, and financial assistance, all this and that -- couldn't this be a very hotbed, or conducive for Israel to -- even without consulting the United States -- to take a shot at Lebanon and these areas, and do things that it did?

A I don't know. I don't think you should look at Mr. Eagleburger's mission or other talks with Israel in that context. Israel, obviously, took its own decision on this particular raid today, and I think that stands alone and by itself.

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Q John, do you feel that the people that were hit in this raid today may well have been the same ones who were guilty of the Marine bombing?

A It's difficult for us to say, Barry. That may well have been the case, but it's difficult for us to respond because we don't know -- I haven't seen any confirmation of what the Israelis -- what the effect of that raid was and who they actually struck. But certainly, they have said, that -- I gather -- or officials in Israel have said that the attack was on those presumed to be responsible for the bombing of Israeli troops and we have said that there obviously is a possibility that the same people might be involved. So there is a logical presumption there, but I, obviously, can't confirm it.

Q Israel Radio, in explaining the raid, added the comment that this was done after it was determined in Israel that the United States was not going to take any action of its own. Do you have any reaction to that?

A There are sort of a couple of angles to that. That presumes -- that suggests that there was coordination, and I have already explained that there was not.

In terms of what the United States has suggested and might do overall in the area of retaliation, as I say, the Administration is simply not addressing that question.

Q Are you aware of a report that was prepared for the Secretary in the last few days on who was responsible for the Beirut bombings?

A I'm not aware of a specific report. I'm aware that a good deal of energy has gone into determining who was responsible.

Q Are you aware of what is in the report?

A No, because I'm not aware of this specific report.

Q Do you want to give that sit-rep now?

A Sure. In general, in Lebanon, last night a hand grenade was thrown at a Marine sentry at the airport. The Marine fired on the attacker, who fled in a car. There were no casualties.

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Heavy shelling continues today in East Beirut, as well as in some parts of West Beirut. There have also been exchanges in the southern suburbs of Beirut, along the Alayh ridgeline and in the Shuf.

With regard to Tripoli, we have seen the reports that the Baddawi camp has fallen. We can't confirm that. In fact there are some reports that heavy fighting continues in some parts of the camp.

The latest round of fighting in Lebanon has caused extensive damage to homes, schools, and commercial establishments. We call on all those involved in the fighting to refrain from taking any actions that needlessly jeopardize innocent civilian lives.

Q What about Yasir Arafat, John?

A Don't have anything on his situation.

Q If in fact he has lost his last redoubt, what does that do to the overall picture of Middle Eastern politics? And how does the Administration feel about Arafat's apparent diminution of power?

A Can't give you an answer; just have to wait and see what emerges and where the PLO is.

Q John, does this general level of fighting say anything to the U.S. Government about the level of the ability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to control their own territory?

A I don't think I've got anything on that, Jim. The Lebanese Armed Forces did perform well in a limited geographic area before, and obviously they are still operating.

What Lebanon needs is a period of -- what Lebanon needs is reconciliation; but so far as the military is concerned, what it needs is a period of relief so that it can continue with the training program that we're involved with, with the Lebanese.

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Q John, did the Israelis use American fighters for this retaliation? Do you know?

A I don't know what they used.

Q Is it of any concern to you?

A We're not -- if you mean is there an investigation of --

Q No. What I mean is, if it is American weapons supposedly it should be used under certain conditions by U.S. Government.

A Yes.

Q Is it of concern to you that they did not use those?

A No investigation of that going on to my knowledge.

Q But, I mean, is it -- what I am saying, John -- therefore, you're saying it's not really of interest to U.S. Government if the Israelis used American fighters or not.

A No. I don't know that anybody is conducting an inquiry into the use of the equipment they used.

Q John, is this any breach of the cease-fire in Lebanon, this attack?

A I can't answer that question.

Q Why are you shying from commenting on this, John? This is -- you know, really disturbs everybody, and the silence is gold, it looks like. You know, you have if not acquiescence, at least, you know, you are --

A I suppose a lot of people are breaking the cease-fire in Lebanon.

Q I mean, this attack on this place exactly, committed yesterday or early today, I mean, is it --

A I'm not going to put it in those terms. The Israelis did what they did. It was their decision, and we have no comment on that strike.

Q John, with respect to the statement you just gave, asking that all parties in Lebanon refrain from taking action that could endanger innocent lives, does that apply as well to the Israelis and to the -- to their attack?

A It applies to everybody in a general sense, but I'm not responding specifically to this Israeli air strike.

Q Do you have anything, John, on any further contacts with the Turks or the Turkish Cypriots on their reversing their decision to -- of independence?

A Not really, Bernie. As we said yesterday, we condemn the action of the Turkish Cypriots in proclaiming themselves an independent state. We urge them to reverse that decision. We regret that the Government of Turkey has recognized the northern Cypriots and urge all nations of the world to avoid granting the self-proclaimed republic diplomatic recognition.

We continue to support the U.N. Secretary General's good offices role in the search for a final and fair negotiated settlement in Cyprus.

Q John, can you give us any idea of whether you have hopes of reversing this decision?

A Certainly have hopes. Yes.

Q Based on?

A On diplomatic activity that's going on.

Q Can you describe that in general, John?

A I thought I did describe it in general.

Q A little more specifically?

A No.

Q The story has gone 24 hours now, so that there presumably has been a response from the people in the different capitals, and I was wondering, based on that response, if you could be a little more descriptive than --

A No. Really can't.

Q How about your hopes?

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A No. Really can't. Still working on it.

Q John, can I ask you -- back on the -- I don't know if you said it before, do you consider this Israeli act as a retaliation? And if it is, or if it isn't, is there a policy about retaliation by the U.S. Government?

A I think you'd have to ask the Israelis what their -- I mean, I don't think we can ascribe motivation to the Israelis, but on the basis of what has been published, it seems to me that's a fair conclusion.

Q Okay. But is there a policy about retaliation in general in the Middle East by either party from the United States Government? There was once, as far as I remember.

A I don't know about a policy.

Q Did you say earlier -- you said there was no consultation, no coordination. Was there any advance knowledge?

A No.

Q Did we -- did the Israelis inform us before this attack?

A No.

Q Has the U.S. Ambassador in Nicosia seen Dr. Denktash in the last 24 hours?

A I don't know.

Q What diplomatic activity are you referring to with regard to --

A Discussion with various governments.

Q John, can I get back to the Turkish Cypriots just a minute? Has any thought been given to what effect it will have on our defense operations in the area in NATO? Has that been studied?

A I'm sure somewhere in the government there may be somebody who's looking at that, but --

Q But you have nothing on that.

A I don't have anything on that.

Jim?

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Q Any updated information on Grenada, the number of detainees held by U.S. Forces?

A No. I don't have anything on the number of detainees. I'll give you what I've got. In his press conference remarks following yesterday's swearing-in ceremony, Acting Advisory Council Chairman Nicholas Braithwaite addressed a number of issues which have been raised recently.

The state of emergency which had covered detentions and deportations has been lifted. The Advisory Council will be addressing the creation of a Statutory Tribunal shortly, which will be chaired by a legal expert appointed by the Chief Justice to review those cases.

Acting Chairman Braithwaite indicated the Council would carry out all governmental responsibilities, including in this sensitive area. The detention facility itself is closed and the physical structure, we understand, will be dismantled today.

The Statutory Tribunal, under the Chairmanship of an individual appointed by the Chief Justice, will also review the issue of those asked to leave the country. As indicated previously, the Governor General invited a number of non-Grenadian nationals to leave the country.

That's really about all I have in terms of an update.

Q So does this mean now that Sir Paul Scoon resorts back to his titular position in that now executive authority is vested in the government temporarily headed by Braithwaite?

A I can't give you a constitutional reading, Jim. You'd have to ask the Grenadians for that interpretation.

Q Are you expecting any West Bank leaders or mayors or former mayors to be coming to Washington in the next few days for consultations?

A I'm not aware of any. I mean, I don't rule it -- I'm just not aware of any.

Q Anything further on the Lorton documents?

A No. Investigation is very vigorously under way. The FBI is pursuing that with --

Q John, anything further on the Grenadian documents?

A No. Nothing further on the Grenada documents.

Q Are you aware of the "Lorton typewriter"?

A Seen some reports of the "Lorton typewriter."

Q Can you tell us what you have on it?

A Don't have anything on it. The investigation proceeds apace.

Q Are there specific concerns?

A I think there are a lot of concerns about the whole episode.

Q Does the State Department know yet what was taken? What --

A I do not know that, Bob. I do not know whether the investigation into that particular aspect is complete. Obviously, State Department Security is very much involved, and the FBI is conducting its investigation. There may be others as well involved. But I do not know whether the -- whether a conclusion has come on that particular point.

Q So they don't know yet whether all the documents have been recovered?

A I do not know whether they know yet.

Q Would that be -- couldn't we find -- that might be of interest, it seems to me.

A As I say, the investigation is proceeding. We have pledged to make public the outcome of that investigation when it's to hand.

Q Speaking about Soviet relations, was that statement delivered to the Soviet Union as a diplomatic message?

A I think the White House had some announcement on an exchange between the President and Soviet authorities.

Q But was that the same message?

A I think the text was not precisely the same, Bernie.

Q On the Grenada documents, apparently The Wall Street Journal obtained a document that has not been generally released yet.

Are those documents -- the 600 pounds or whatever they are -- have they already been cleared by the Grenadian Government for whatever use the United States Government wishes to put to it or for publication?

A I don't quite know where that stands. I know that those documents are being looked at, but I don't quite know what the status is on it.

Q Could you look into the proprietorship of that specific document that was given to The Wall Street Journal as to whether or not the Grenadian Government had given permission to the United States Government to make public that document?

A I'm not going to promise to look at every specific document that is handed to a newspaper or somebody, but I'll poke around and see what I can find out.

Q John, Eden Pastora, who is the leader of the Costa Rica-based anti-Sandinista group, is in town and recently paid a visit to Mr. Motley in this building.

Do you have anything on that meeting?

A No. I think Alan maybe responded to that yesterday.

MR. ROMBERG: There is some guidance.

MR. HUGHES: There is some guidance? Okay. I suspect it's hardly worth digging out. (Laughter)

Q Okay. Thank you. (Laughter)

(The briefing concluded at 12:42 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #204

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1983, 12:26 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a rather slim book for you today, but I'll give you what I have. I have a couple of announcements up front. Just for your planning purposes, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on the upcoming visit of President Nimeiri of the Sudan. That will be by senior State Department officials on Friday, 11:00 a.m. in the Press Room of the White House, 11:00 a.m., Friday, Press Room of the White House.

Q When is President Nimeiri coming?

A I don't have --

Q Monday, isn't it?

A -- a date on that. Anybody know what the date is on that, Nimeiri? Sorry.

Q Monday, Tuesday?

A It was announced by the White House. I don't have the dates.

On the Shamir visit, President Reagan has invited Israeli Prime Minister Shamir for an official working visit which will begin on November 27. The President will meet with the Prime Minister and host a working luncheon for him on November 29.

The Vice President will host a dinner for the Prime Minister that evening.

The Prime Minister, who will be accompanied by Defense Minister Arens, will also meet with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and other high-ranking officials.

That's all I have for you.

Q Sunday -- the formal working meetings begin on that day?

A I don't have the schedule. I guess the White House may be announcing this just about this time and may have a little more detail for you.

Q He will arrive on Sunday.

A He will arrive on Sunday?

Q That's what I understand.

A Okay.

Q John, the French attacked two bases in the Bekaa Valley with aircraft today. (1) Was there consultation with the United States, and (2) do you have any comment on the action?

A No comment on the action. You'll have to ask the French for details of the operation. Obviously, there is consultation and coordination within the framework of the Multinational Force, and, yes, within that framework there was -- we were informed.

Q You were informed?

A Yes.

Q You were not asked?

A We were informed through the MNF structure.

Q What impact will this have on U.S. plans for retaliation?

A The Secretary of State said on Monday he's not going to get into the question of retaliation. Those words still stand.

Q Were you informed ahead of time, John, or after the fact?

A I believe we were informed ahead of time.

Q How much ahead of time?

A Not going to get into the operational details.

Q John, can I -- I mean, I realize what the Secretary said, but you were saying yourself, as others, that the U.S. decision on retaliation and what to do was being closely coordinated with the French, and now you say, well, the French told us they did it, and you're not talking about what we're doing.

Can't you be any more helpful on this?

A No.

Q Have we stopped coordinating with the French? I guess we did.

A No. We're coordinating with the French.

Q But not on retaliation, obviously.

A We're not going to talk about retaliation among ourselves or with the French. We're simply not going to have anything more to say on retaliation.

Q I've got good news, because the French said it was not for retaliation, it was pre-emptive.

A That's right.

Q So now you can talk about it. (Laughter)

A Next question.

Q That's not entirely a facetious question. The U.S. may have decided to stop talking about retaliation, but does the U.S. have any plans to act militarily to prevent future terrorist attacks like the one that killed 237?

A Without trying to lead you in any direction, I just don't have anything for you on that, Ralph.

Q Did we offer comment after we were consulted, John? Did we say something about it ahead of time ourselves? No comment or suggestion on the operation?

A No. I think you'd be going down the wrong road if you went down that one.

Q Was comment solicited by the French?

A This was a process of informing us through the Multinational Force mechanism.

Q Through the Multinational Force, did the United States provide the French with anything like intelligence or reconnaissance --

A I don't know, Barrie.

Q Do you have an opinion on the attack, John? Do you approve of it?

A As we had no comment on the Israeli strikes yesterday, we have no comment on the French strikes.

Q John, do you believe that the people who bombed the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut are still at large?

A Can't answer that question. Some may be and some may not be. It's difficult to answer.

Q John, when you say -- you're putting it in the same category now as the Israeli strike, but as Jim points out, the Israeli strike was taken in retaliation and today's was taken with respect to a pre-emptive move. Yet yesterday you asked for everyone to exercise restraint.

A I don't think the Israelis ruled out the possibility that those in the target area might be active on another occasion against the Israelis.

Q Okay. But with respect to the whole notion of pre-emptive strikes, then, yesterday you asked for restraint on behalf of all parties for any action that might endanger innocent lives.

Do you feel that this in any way comes under that category?

A It's a French decision. I'm sure they made the decision on the basis that this might well protect lives that might be in danger in the future.

Q Are you going to issue a similar statement today, asking for all parties to exercise restraint?

A I've given you all I have.

Q John, is there an agreement that those who committed the three acts against the Israelis, American Marines and the French are the same people?

A An agreement that there is --

Q Do you all see eye to eye on who was behind those acts?

A I think there are some presumptions, but I'm not going to get into the details of intelligence information that might have been exchanged.

Q I'm asking, John, because yesterday we were told that those who committed the act against U.S. Marines may have been the same who did it against the Israelis.

A They may have been.

Q If the Israelis were on target, therefore, there will not be a need for American similar acts, so are we to --

A But I don't know that we went that far.

Q They "may" I said.

A They "may," yes.

Q Okay. So are we -- can we therefore assume that those who did the French -- the attack on the French troops were not the same, or that what the Israelis did yesterday did not finish all the groups behind the act?

A I think that's a reasonable assumption in terms of what the French did. They obviously have targets, and you'd have to ask the French what their assessment is of the number of people that they targeted who may have been involved in some incident that's already taken place, or who might be involved in some future incident of which they have knowledge.

Q Was the United States surprised with the target selection of the French?

A Surprised?

Q Were we thinking about the same area?

A I think that today's strikes were more or less in the same area as yesterday's strikes by the Israelis and I think were aimed at similar factions, so I'm not sure that one would be surprised.

Q Was the United States looking at those factions as well?

A Not going to get into that.

Q Is there anything left to bomb?

A I don't know.

Q John, is that why you said a minute ago that some may still be at large and some may not? In other words, some may still be alive after the bombing on those areas in and some may not?

A I presume that both the Israelis and the French would be looking at after-action reports and seeing how successful they were at eliminating the targets they set for themselves. So I guess you'd have to take that kind of operational judgment, and then I suppose there's a broader judgment whether all those that you thought might be in that area were in fact in that area.

Q But you made your comment in answer to the question about the people who bombed the U.S. Marine headquarters, whether they were still at large, and you said some may and some may not.

A That's right.

Q Is that in connection with the bombing incidents of the past two days, that some may and some may not?

A Some may and some may not.

-- MORE --

Q I understood from you earlier, the French have called it a preemptive act. Usually, you don't answer "if's," but if it becomes known that similar -- that an act is being contemplated against the United States, would the United States take such preemptive acts?

A I think we have made our position plain on that -- I think that a lot has been said on that in the past. I think the President has addressed that, and I think the Secretary has addressed that.

Q John, was it considered that the French action today was an action on behalf of the Multinational Force, or is it seen as a unilateral action?

A No. The French took their decision, it's their decision; but certainly, within the MNF framework, they informed us of what they were going to do. But I think it would be incorrect to say it was on behalf of the MNF.

Q Did they inform us in enough time so that if the United States had wanted to, it could have joined in the attack?

A Just not going to get into the operational details of how that information came to --

Q Did you know about it much before we did?

A I guess I'm really going to draw the line about where I am, your having milked me dry --

Q Is the United States doing anything to help the people in Tripoli? Do you have any statements to make today about the Tripoli situation?

A I don't have anything on the Tripoli situation.

Q Is there anything we can do to help to prevent a massacre?

A We've said what we are doing in terms of humanitarian relief.

Q What about the report from the London Daily Mail --

A Express.

Q -- *Express*, whatever, about Andropov?

A Seen the report; can't confirm it in any way.

Q Is there anyone here who has been led to that conclusion?

A No.

Q Any concern?

(Laughter)

Q What about gun control in the Kremlin?

(Laughter)

A I'm not aware of any pending legislation.

Q In connection with Ghassan's question about U.S. preemptive action, you said that the Secretary and the President have spoken about that in the past.

A Yes.

Q Are you talking about their statements in the context of defending American troops? Or in what context have they spoken about pre-emptive action?

A I think there are two cycles to this. I think the President and the Secretary, prior to Monday, made a number of statements about threats to American forces, and offered words on what we would do to prevent a recurrence of the bombing of the Marine Headquarters, of the Marine building. But as of Monday, there was a decision taken that there would be no further discussion of retaliation. So you have on record our view on deterrence, but you also have a decision not to discuss further the question of retaliation.

Q John, again, let's ask the question of why are we not commenting on the possibility of retaliation? Why was this decision made?

A It was simply an Administration decision that enough talk had been offered about it, and we were not going to discuss it any further.

Q Do you put "deterrence" and "retaliation" in the same category?

A I suppose you might link them if the people that you had, if you had intelligence that those who were about to commit some murderous act had also been involved in a previous act, I presume you would have a combination of deterrence and retaliation.

Q Is that the combination that the U.S. is operating under right now?

A We're not discussing our thoughts about retaliation any further.

Q In light of what is now being reported in Tripoli of the demise of the PLO or the loss of the Baddawi camp to the opposition there, or to the dissidents, is there a new assessment of U.S. policy in this light, or will there be one? Or can you tell us anything about where the United States stands now with the PLO weakened as it is, or perceived to be weakened as it is?

A I think it's a little early. I think we'll have to wait and see in what kind of shape the PLO emerges, or what the factions are. I think it is a little early to make a judgment.

Q There will be one, then, when things become clear?

A I think as events unfold, I'm sure we will have some thoughts about it.

Q What is the origin of the meeting today, or the luncheon between the Secretary and the two former presidents?

A I don't know what the origin of that is. As you know, the Secretary has kept in touch with former Secretaries of State and former Presidents. I don't know specifically.

Can anybody shed any more light on today's luncheon?

I don't think there's -- I think they were in town.

Q Will the Secretary be coming downstairs with them, or what are the arrangements that have been made?

A I honestly don't know whether he is going to come down or not. I, honestly, don't know. But I'll check that for you.

Q Is there a stakeout in the lobby?

A I'm really not sure, Jim, what his plans are on this one.

Q Can I ask one more thing about the Middle East?

A Yes.

Q There are reports now that the Israeli Government is trying to make 12 or 15 American citizens sign some kind of a statement, which would, in American terms, deny them the expression of their political rights. I think the Secretary has spoken about this before.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you aware of this? And do you have anything to say about it?

A Don't have anything specific for you on that, but the views of the Administration, as previously expressed, would also pertain to this case.

Q Could you take Ghassan's question and see if it has happened?

A If it has happened?

Q If you have a specific reaction to this specific event?

A Let me take a look at it.

Q Please.

Q Do you have anything on reports out of southern Sudan that some foreigners who were abducted may or may not have included some Americans, but I think there were some French nationals involved.

A No, I don't.

Q Anything on the INF talks resuming next week?

A No.

You saw Mr. Nitze's comments today, that I think -- he talked about the length of the meeting and the fact that there is a date set for next week.

Q Anything more on the meeting Ambassador Hartman had in Moscow?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the Secretary's meeting yesterday with four Central American Foreign Ministers?

A No, not on the substance. He had a number of bilaterals with the Foreign Ministers who are participating in the current OAS General Assembly. He met in a closed session with a number of Latin American Foreign Ministers on a range of issues; and he met separately with the core four -- Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala -- mainly on the Contadora process.

Q John, there have been increasing notes of alarm being sounded by people in Central America that the United States is planning or is planning participation in some sort of an attack on Nicaragua.

Could you tell us if, in fact, there is such a plan?

A Well, I think the right thing to do is to refer you to the statements that have been made by a number of officials on that score. I think Deputy Secretary Dam responded in the negative. Other Administration officials have understandably said that, in terms of policy, one never rules anything out and never rules anything in. That's not to lead you to the suggestion that such an invasion is being planned.

I think Secretary Weinberger has responded to that and Secretary Dam. I think we'll stand on their words.

Q John, ABC News last night said that the State Department is encouraging Geoffrey Bourne to reestablish the St. George's Medical School. Is that correct?

A I'm not aware of that. Sorry.

Q Can you look into it?

A I'll take a look at it.

Q John, can you give us a report on what Secretary Shultz has now been told about the security breach that he learned of during his trip to Asia?

A I can't. He is, obviously, following it very closely. There are investigations going on in this building, and the FBI is proceeding, but I can't give you where we are up to now.

Q Has he ordered any interim steps to be taken to --

A I think a number of steps have been taken to tighten up.

Q Can you tell us what those are?

A Well, I don't think there is any shipment of furniture or files to Lorton, Virginia.

(Laughter).

Q Has he stopped the program of refurbishing furniture?

A I don't know whether the refurbishing program -- I can't answer that; I don't know. But it's certainly not being done at Lorton.

Q Could you clarify your answer? It's not being done at Lorton, but maybe it's being done at another prison?

(Laughter)

Q Has he decided that, at least until the investigation is complete, no more file cabinets are to be sent down to Lorton?

A I think that the facts of the matter are that the warehouse is frozen and nothing is moving out of the warehouse; so I think nothing is being refurbished at the present time. Whether that means an end to the entire refurbishment program, I do not know.

Q Will the prisoners be brought here, John?

(Laughter)

A I think that those responsible for the investigation are certainly present at the warehouse.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, November 18, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #205

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I'm afraid I have another lean book for you, again, today.

I could give you a little Lebanon situation report. There have been no incidents involving the Marines at Beirut International Airport. The rotation of the Marine units is proceeding smoothly and without incident. Beirut and the surrounding areas are relatively calm today, although French MNF positions in Beirut were fired upon twice today. No French casualties have been reported.

We have seen press reports this morning describing renewed fighting on the outskirts of the Baddawi Camp in Tripoli. Of course, we are horrified by the continued killing in Tripoli. Those responsible, especially for death of women and children, are brutal and irresponsible, and they are clearly not serving Palestinian interests.

That's all I have for you. I'm afraid not much else, but I'll be happy to --

Q Can you tell us about the offer that the Soviets apparently have made at the INF talks -- what you think of it?

A I don't have anything at the moment, Jim, beyond what was offered last night, but why don't you keep in touch with us, during the early afternoon, might have --

Q What was offered last night?

A I think the Press Office had some guidance last night.

Q Do you still have that guidance?

A I don't have it with me, and welcome to it; but I think I would wait for any later guidance today.

Q In other words, it didn't say anything?

A What an unworthy characterization!

(Laughter)

Q John, is that the subject of --

Q What about a possible BACKGROUNDER today or are you just talking about some later guidance?

A No plans for one, Mike.

Q John, is that the subject of the discussions between the German Ambassador and the Secretary right now?

A I don't want to mislead you that we will produce guidance. Do not look for --

Q -- news?

(Laughter)

A (inaudible) said it, but, yes, I think they might talk about INF.

Q John, back to Lebanon: Are you aware of -- a few minutes ago, I heard on CBS that the Shi'ite leadership issued new warnings to the United States, Israel, and France, and all the MNF --

A No.

Q -- that more things like this will happen, if they will be bombarded, et cetera, et cetera.

A More things like what?

Q I mean, you know the overflights, the reconnaissance, the French action, and the Israeli action --

A Their warnings --

Q Yes.

A -- that more overflights will take place? I don't know what --

Q No. They are warning that if there will be more overflights and more retaliations, that more car bombs are going to happen unless "you leave us alone." This is just, you know, the gist of it.

A No, don't have any reaction to that.

Q Is that a tacit admission of responsibility for the car bombing -- their warning about more of them?

A Don't know. It's the first I've heard of the report.

Q John, what did you say in your opening statement -- something about Marine units are proceeding without incident, the relocation of Marine units?

A Yes, rotation. Rotation.

Q Oh, rotation.

A Yes.

Q I'm sorry.

Q Do you have any information on the situation in the Bhamdoun area, in Lebanon? The Druze controlled area.

A No, I don't.

Q There are reports that they have demolished three churches and two seminaries.

A No, don't have anything on that. Sorry.

Q Will you be kind enough to look into it?

A Well, we'll take a look. If there is anything available, will be glad to make it available to you.

Q John, do you have anything on a Chinese protest about a Congressional resolution on Taiwan?

A No, I don't. No, I don't.

Q John, do you have anything on Ambassador Rumsfeld's activities?

A Yes. He is in Turkey today; he was in Saudi Arabia earlier during the day. Nothing for you on his future.

Q Why Turkey?

A Travel plans. It had been planned as part of his Middle East mission.

Q Is he bringing up Cyprus?

A I'm sure he brought up Cyprus as well. I'm sure he expressed our views, of which you are aware.

Q I understand that Ambassador Dobrynin has gone back to Moscow earlier than expected. Do we have any particular interpretation on why he has done that?

A I think you ought to talk with the Soviet Embassy. Obviously, they are the correct ones to ask that. But I'm not sure your premise that he has gone back is a correct one.

Q Is he seeing the Secretary today?

A I think he will be in to see the Secretary this afternoon.

Q I see.

(Laughter)

Q Is it "will be," John?

A (Laughter)

Q Can you help us on the time for that meeting?

A I, honestly, don't have it with me.

Q Is it after lunch?

Q Was this at his request before he goes back?

A I do not know at whose request -- It is after lunch. I do not know at whose request this meeting was set. I think it's a meeting that has been in mind for some time.

Q Is he also seeing the Greek Ambassador?

A Yes. No. I think Greek Foreign Minister.

Q Greek Foreign Minister.

A Sure. I do know what time that is. That is at 4:30, and photographers are going to be escorted to the 7th floor at 4:15, pick up is at the C Street lobby.

Q Is this in fact the Secretary's first meeting with Dobrynin since before the KAL affair?

A I think it is, Bernie. I do not think he has seen him since then.

Q I think he has.

A Do you think he has? Let us check that for you, because I'm guessing and I shouldn't.

Q Could you tell us the subject of the meeting?

A No.

Q (inaudible)

A The subject of the meeting. Could we tell the subject of the meeting?

I'm sure they will discuss matters of bilateral interest. (Laughter)

Q John, could we have the schedule for President Nimeiri's visit? Is that -- when is that?

A I think that will come from the White House. I don't know whether they have already released it, but I think I'm sure --

Q Because we had a briefing on it this morning, but just a breakdown of when he's meeting whom?

A They couldn't give you the schedule this morning at the briefing?

Q No.

A I think that will come from the White House -- Nimeiri -- am I right? Ho, ho, Alan? (Laughter) Nimeiri's schedule, White House?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

MR. HUGHES: Yes.

Q John, on Lebanon, there were reports that U.S. intelligence had information that the terrorists were going to strike at the British MNF forces. Do we have anything on that?

A That we had intelligence? We wouldn't get into intelligence matters, sadly.

Q Can we rephrase that, then, so that it might allow you to respond to it? Do we believe that the actions by the French and the Israelis pre-empted planned terrorist actions?

A I think the French response to that -- I think they made the point that --

Q I'm asking about your assessment of it.

A It was a French strike, and I think we'll leave the motivation to them.

Q Do you think that the French succeeded in removing the targets?

A I don't know. Have to ask them.

Q Anything new on U.S. deterrence?

A No. Nothing more on that front today.

Q The Secretary's speech tomorrow, have you got anything for us yet on the text?

A On when we'll get -- no, I'm sorry. We will proceed as energetically as we traditionally do on that front.

Q That's what I'm afraid of. (Laughter)

A No. I'm sorry. Everybody is aware -- really -- I mean, seriously, everybody is aware of the need to get it to you all as soon as possible, and that's about as much as I can say.

Q Do you have anything on Mr. Shamir's visit to the States?

A No. Nothing further. Nothing beyond what --

Q There are reports in the Middle East that he may postpone the visit.

A Haven't heard those. We don't know anything about a postponement.

Q Anything on the Defense appropriations bill out of conference last night?

A Pleased with the outcome.

Q You were pleased with the outcome?

A Sure. Nimeiri's schedule -- oh, ho, bulletin from the front. We will have the Nimeiri schedule this afternoon in the press office. Excuse me. Sorry.

Q You have nothing --

A (Laughter)

Q I thought we were going to do this without anything. Thank you very much.

Q You have nothing beyond the characterization of "pleased" on that?

A Nope.

Q Do you have anything on the alleged massacre in Copapaya in El Salvador?

A (Loud crash) Small massacre in the back there.

No, not a great deal, Jim. We've heard those reports, and our Embassy in San Salvador is checking those reports. The area is controlled by the guerrillas, and under present circumstances, it's not possible to send U.S. personnel into the area.

If the reports turned out to be true, we would, of course, be horrified.

Q When will President Gemayel be in town?

A Nimeiri?

Q No. Gemayel, Amin Gemayel, of Lebanon.

A I haven't -- I don't think a date has been offered on Gemayel.

Q John, you said we would, of course, be -- I'm sorry, I --

A If the reports were true of a massacre, we would, of course, be horrified.

Q Could I ask one more. Costa Rica declared neutrality yesterday, or promulgated a statute of neutrality. Do you have any comment on that, and do you have any comment on why AID has withheld its disbursement of funds to that country?

A To Guatemala?

Q No. Costa Rica.

A To Costa Rica? No. Don't have anything on the second part of the question. The first part of the question, obviously, their decision, a matter for them. We see no problems in terms of U.S.-Costa Rican relations.

Q And since you brought it up, what about the Guatemala aid suspension?

A I think we had something on that yesterday. Happy to give that to you in the Press Office.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC 206

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1983, 12:29 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. A couple of announcements: Charged by the Secretary of State with examining all aspects of U.S. foreign assistance, the first such study in more than 13 years, the Commission on Security and Economic Assistance will issue its final report today to the Secretary followed by a press conference in this room at 2:30 by Commission Chairman Frank Carlucci. Other members of the Commission will also be present. Report summaries are available in the Press Office, and I understand there are a limited number of copies of the full report also available on request.

There will be a readout on the White House visit of President Nimeiri in the White House press room around 1:45 this afternoon.

There will also be in the White House briefing room tomorrow, at 2:30 a briefing --

Is that right, tomorrow, Alan? Do you happen to know? Shamir?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

MR. HUGHES: Tomorrow, 2:30 on the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Shamir. That's 2:30 tomorrow in the White House, Shamir; about 1:45 this afternoon on Nimeiri. That's all I have for you.

Q John, I see several appointments on the Secretary's list having to do with Cyprus. What is going on there now? What is the state of play, and what are you trying to do?

A I think that is just an extension of the discussions we have been having on that subject, Jim.

Q What are you trying to do?

A Obviously, a number of people are working to discourage the Turkish Cypriots from having taken the action they've taken.

Q Do you think a roll-back is still possible?

A Still working towards it.

Q Why, John? Why does it matter? Seriously.

A Why?

Q Yes.

A We gave you a statement on our position and the reasons for it. There is no change in our position.

Q Why do we have this longstanding policy against people breaking away and having smaller enclaves if that will lead to peace?

A That's a very philosophical question.

Q I've always wondered about it. I'd love to hear an answer.

A I'm not going to attempt an off-the-cuff response to that.

Q Could you look into it? I was serious about that.

A I think our position on Cyprus is well known; the reasons for it are --

Q And on Lebanon, but still --

A The reasons for our position on Lebanon are also very clear, too.

Q Not to me.

Q John, do you have any comment on the demonstrations in Bonn or the Parliamentary debate in Bonn, or the SDP's vote over the weekend?

A No. Internal matter.

Q Internal matter?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have any comment or reaction to Israeli Defense Minister's speech in front of the Moral Majority, whatever it is there, yesterday in Israel?

A Mr. Arens' speech?

Q Yes. The Moral Majority.

A Don't have anything on the Arens speech.

Q Sorry?

A I do not have anything on Mr. Arens' remarks now.

Q You prefer not to comment on that or --

A Just don't have anything for you on it.

Q Do you have any comment on the statements attributed to the Defense Minister of Syria?

A Which statements were those?

Q That Syria is ready to hit back against the ships, U.S. ships, and suicide and kamikaze and all that?

A No. No comment on those remarks.

Q Have you got any dates for President Gemayel's visit here?

A No.

Q On Syria, John, there are reports this morning that Assad's illness was a heart attack. Can you give us any kind of a reading on the credibility of that statement?

A I think you would have to ask the Syrian Government. We've seen the reports; can't confirm them.

Q Do they match the reports that you have gotten independently?

A Can't confirm them.

Q What about on INF, can you confirm the story in The Washington Post today that there will be nine months --

A No, I certainly cannot confirm the story in The Washington Post.

Q What story?

A That's the suggestion that there is a delay in the deployment schedule. There is no change in the deployment schedule of U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs to Europe. Deployment is a sequential process which is to begin at the end of this year, and will continue through 1988.

In accord with a NATO decision of 1979, we and the Allies have repeatedly made clear that U.S. deployments will go forward on schedule in the absence of concrete arms control results in Geneva, which would obviate deployments. We seek an agreement in Geneva before deployments occur, but will continue to seek one afterwards with equal determination.

As we have repeatedly made clear, missiles which have been deployed can be withdrawn if we achieve an agreement.

Q Mr. Adelman said yesterday that it had always been scheduled to be several months between the first deployment and the next deployment.

A That may be.

Q You're saying that there has not been any delay --

A Correct. Or change.

Q -- in the deployment schedule.

A Right.

Q What is the period between the deployments?

A We never have talked publicly about the schedule and are not talking about it now, but there has been no change.

Q Is there any conclusion that has been reached within the Administration so far as you know that the Soviets are not likely to negotiate before the initial deployments have indeed been met?

A I think the Secretary has traditionally refused to speculate on Soviet motivations and intentions, and simply continued to talk about our readiness to talk, our willingness to negotiate, and our intention to remain at those talks whatever the Soviets do.

Q The latest Soviet proposal which I know was addressed here last week, but has any more consideration been given to that as a basis for --

A Nothing for you beyond what we gave you last week.

Q I can't tell whether you're quarrelling with the story that there will be nine months' delay or not from the statement that you made.

A I certainly would be quarrelling with the suggestion that there is a nine-month delay. I would be quarrelling with such a statement.

Q Are you quarrelling with the suggestion that it will be nine months, or may well be nine months, between the time of the first deployment and subsequent deployments?

A Quarrelling in the sense that (a) there has been no change in the deployment schedule; (b) not going to talk about the details of the deployment; but (c) you would be misled if you thought -- in the unchanged, original schedule -- you would be misled if you thought there was a nine-month gap.

Q Could I ask you another question on a nuclear-related matter anyway? Late on Friday, as I understand it, the Argentine Government announced that it now has the capability to reprocess, in its own means, uranium, or highly enriched uranium, which would give them the capability of making a nuclear device.

A Uh-huh.

Q I gather that the initial response of State was rather uncertain about this. Now, several days have gone by. Do you have a comment on it?

A No.

Q Does the United States Government believe that this is true?

A Why don't we take a look at it for you?

Q All right.

Q On that nine-month -- I didn't understand your reply there. There is no nine-month gap -- forget the word "delay?" The idea of nine months is the wrong number, is that what you're saying?

A Correct. My problem is, we have not and will not talk about specifics on deployment, so I, basically, don't want to talk about specific gaps; but I know you would be misled if you inferred that there is a nine-month gap.

Q Even putting aside the word "delay?"

A Yes.

Q John, I think last Saturday, ABC had a report that the Cubans are withdrawing great numbers of their nationals from Nicaragua. Do you have any confirmation of that?

A No confirmation -- have seen those reports. Of course, there is some basis for believing that they are saying they are withdrawaing as part of a war scare by the United States, that the United States is about to invade Nicaragua, which, of course, is not true, so I really can't confirm it. But we have seen those reports.

Q Another matter: Do you have anything on Tunisia's decision to legalize opposition parties, which came over the weekend?

A No, sorry I don't.

Q Can I go back to Nicaragua? I didn't hear exactly. You said there was some basis --

A Seen the reports that some Cubans were leaving. I just note that it is within this context that apparently what some of them are saying is that they are leaving because of the threat of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. That doesn't seem to be a very good basis for --

-- MORE --

Q You didn't see -- I'm sorry, I just heard there was some basis. Do you have anything on the reports that the FDR political leadership is also leaving Managua, and that Managua has eased up on press freedom, or on restrictions on press freedom?

A I have seen the report on Zamora. I can't confirm that. Obviously if that turned out to be true, I suppose that would be a welcome development in terms of press censorship, but it does appear that over the past few weeks the Nicaraguan Government has relaxed some of its restrictions on La Prensa. However, La Prensa is still subject to prior censorship and continues to be denied permission to publish some items. Restrictions on press freedom under the Sandinistas' have eased at times in the past only to tighten up again. So, in our view, it would not be correct to say that the current relaxation of restrictions represents any significant change in the Sandinistas overall attitude towards freedom of the press.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, may I come back to this withdrawal of the Cubans? You are saying that it is just a few. You don't have anything to confirm that it is hundreds of them.

A No, we don't have anything to confirm that.

Q Now, regardless of what their motivations are, if this is confirmed, would this be welcome?

A I suppose it would be a welcome development, sure. The fewer Cubans there are -- it depends what kinds of Cubans they are; it depends whether they are really leaving; it depends what the purpose of publicizing the departure is. But if it is a genuine departure of a number of Cubans who have been doing things in Nicaragua that we don't think they should have been doing, I suppose that would be a welcome development.

Q Have you tried to ascertain directly with the government there exactly what is happening?

A I am not aware of any new initiative in discussion.

Q John, do you have anything about the downing of the Israeli fighter over Beirut on the weekend?

A No. We have seen reports. Don't have anything on the downing of the plane.

Q And about the statement or the speech of Arens to the Moral Majority people, the Secretary very recently reconfirmed, and you did, reaffirmed the U.S. position about the Reagan plan. The statement yesterday seems to, again, bring that plan into a dead end.

How does the Administration plan to break the deadlock in this area?

A I am not commenting specifically on what Mr. Arens said, but in our view, the plan is still viable. The September 1 initiative is still viable. And, indeed, I think there are a number of opportunities and areas in which discussion might go forward.

Q Without commenting on Arens' statement, the Israelis have rejected any withdrawal from the territory which would put it back into "Arab" sovereignty, Jordanians or Palestinians, and this is really a basic fundamental thing in the plan.

How does the Administration plan to go about breaking that deadlock, and bringing Israel --

A On the same basis that we have had movement in the Middle East before, obviously in the area of negotiation and discussion.

Q John, have you anything about Mr. Rumsfeld's activities in the Middle East?

A He is in Rabat today. I don't have anything for you on his onward travel.

Q What about his reception in Syria?

A Don't have anything for you on that, sorry.

Q What is he doing there?

A Talking to various government officials.

Q During his last talks in the region, his last contacts, do you see any change of position, however slight, of Syria towards the withdrawal or the May 17th agreement?

A I know that this is frustrating on a daily basis, but we continue not to talk about Mr. Rumsfeld's negotiations and his discussions.

Q When is he coming back?

A Don't know when he is coming back. As you know, we have some Israeli visitors here next week. He might well be here for that.

Q John, do you have anything on the Iran/Iraq war. It seems to be intensifying at this point?

A No, I don't.

Q John, do you have anything on the famous computer which was seized?

A Yes, I have a little on that.

Q What is the question?

A The famous computer. The computer is thought to be a VAX-11/782, a highly sophisticated computer manufactured by the Digital Equipment Corporation. It is presently at the Swedish port of Helsingborg and is under Swedish Government security control. It is thought to be part of a shipment which passed through South Africa, of which a portion was confiscated by the West German authorities in Hamburg on November 9th.

The United States is in touch with the Swedish Government and concerned private parties. The Swedish Government is now looking into the matter to determine what should be done regarding the ultimate disposition of the material.

Q Do you think it was on its way to the Soviet Union?

A I guess you would have to ask Commerce about that. I think that is a good supposition.

Q Is this seen as an isolated situation, or is this something that comes up fairly frequently and just hasn't come to national attention?

A I can't answer that, I'm afraid, Mike. My expertise on the computer is a little limited.

Q John, yesterday, the Swedish Defense Minister said that if the computer was found to have military purposes, it would not leave Sweden. What has happened since then?

A I guess we are in discussions with the Swedes on it.

Q What is the point of origin of the computer? Where did it start from?

A I don't know that question.

Q Can you take it?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything today new on the travel restrictions, Soviet travel restrictions?

A There is a package in the Press Office about that, John, sure, giving you the detail and the cities, and so forth.

Q Can we have a copy of that Swedish thing?

A Sure.

Q Do you have an advance text of Dam's speech tonight?

A I don't know if we have an advance text, but maybe we can help you out during the course of the afternoon.

Q What is the topic?

A What is the topic, does anybody know what the topic is? Middle East? Okay. It is in New York, tonight.

Q John, have there been any meetings in Washington between United States officials and the Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Faruq al Shar, last week?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q He was in Atlanta at the conference with President Carter and --

A I am not aware of it.

Q John, do you have anything to declare about the coming visit of Mr. Shamir of Israel to the States?

A No. I think the backgrounder tomorrow will attempt to set the scene for that.

Q Nor on the visit by the President of the State of Israel?

A Sorry?

Q Nor anything on the President of Israel coming to the States in a few days, I think?

A No, not unless the White House -- I don't quite know whether the White House has had a backgrounder on that or not.

Q John, excuse me if you have said something on this. Were you asked, or did you have any comment with respect to the Israeli raids over the weekend?

A No, I did not.

Q You have no comment.

A No. It is an Israeli decision.

Q Do you have a situation report on the fighting in Tripoli, or the situation there?

A Pretty slender, but you are welcome to what I have, on Lebanon, in general. In Beirut, Marine positions came under small arms sniper fire last night and this morning. The Marines returned fire, and there were no Marine casualties.

Beirut and the surrounding area were relatively stable on Sunday. There were exchanges of tank and small arms fire in the Suq al-Gharb area yesterday.

This morning, we have seen reports describing heavy fighting in Tripoli between pro- and anti-Arafat PLO forces. We deplore the ongoing violence there. We hope that those with influence will use it constructively in the interest of achieving a cease-fire and an end to the human suffering and loss of life.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, there is a report in The Times today according to which the Administration is linking directly Mr. D'Aubuisson in El Salvador with the latest wave of killings of moderates. Do you have anything about that?

A I don't have anything about the linking of Mr. D'Aubuisson, but our position on the death squads, we have made very clear. This is a totally unacceptable method of behavior, and the United States is opposed to it, and it seems to be directed against those -- some of those assassinations seem to be directed against those who are urging moderation and democratization in El Salvador, and we deplore that very strongly.

Q What about the article that appeared over the weekend with respect to the possibility of moving against El Salvadorans here who may be financing the death squads?

A Yes. I think you should ask the Justice Department about that, but obviously anybody who is involved in any activity that runs counter to U.S. law should expect to pay the punishment.

Q Why hasn't there been any action prior to this? It has been going on for three or four years.

A I can't answer that, Jim. Maybe there has been. I don't know.

Q Can I ask also, on neighboring Guatemala, two questions -- three questions.

One, another AID person disappeared. Did you have any statement on that?

Two, I heard that you -- the Reagan Administration -- has suspended the offer of selling military spare parts as of last week?

A Helicopter parts?

Q Helicopter, yes, and aircraft spare parts.

A I will check that, but I don't think that is true.

Q Okay, I would appreciate that if you would.

Three, the report that appeared in the Post today about 15,000 people having been kidnapped since March of '82?

A No, I don't have anything on that.

Q Do you have anything on the AID worker, in particular?

A No.

Q You have nothing on that.

A I don't.

Q Is the Reagan Administration, to your knowledge, contemplating any kind of measure to express its disapproval of this continuing activity, as it did last time AID workers disappeared?

A Why don't we see what we can come up with on that for you.

Q Thank you.

Q John, at the two unannounced meetings the Secretary had with Ambassador Dobrynin, it was stated that the Soviet Ambassador was going home. Is he going home with any request from the Secretary to explore the possibility of a Gromyko meeting in January?

A We don't talk about, and the Secretary doesn't talk about, his meetings with Mr. Dobrynin, because he believes that those are best accomplished if they are confidential, so that is what I would say on the meetings with Dobrynin.

Not discussing those discussions, I am not aware of any movement on any meeting with Mr. Gromyko.

Q Has there been any discussion of it, do you know, between the two?

A I am not aware of it.

Q John, do you have any additional statement beyond what the Secretary said last night concerning the policy implications of the movie last night?

A I don't think so. The lesson of the movie is that nuclear war is unacceptable. The Administration well understands that. The Secretary well understands that. Presidents for the past forty years have understood that and have been working to control and, in the case of this Administration, to reduce nuclear weapons, with the elimination of nuclear weapons as an ideal.

Q Does the Government believe that the movie-makers were trying to recruit people to the nuclear freeze movement's perspective?

A I think the Secretary's words spoke for themselves. He said that he looked at the movie, and he found it a reminder and an underliner of the unacceptability of nuclear war.

Q Would the State Department or the Secretary and the Administration like to see the movie shown in the Soviet Union?

A I don't know that anybody has expressed a viewpoint about that.

Q Would you like to?

A Would I like to express a viewpoint? Oh, I never express personal viewpoints, John.

Q John, on the export situation, is this export fiasco likely to change our policy on high tech exports in any way?

A As you know, we are exercising great vigilance and attempting to control the export of high tech, but I don't know that any specific steps are being taken other than to continue to pursue that vigorous policy.

Q Despite this last incident, do you think those efforts are generally successful?

A I can't give you a sweeping assessment of how successful we think they are.

Q John, has the Marine mission in Lebanon changed from the initial approach or the initial announcement due to the fact that all of the bombing and the frequent sniper shooting and involvement with other parties there? Are they still a peace mission or a combat mission, or what? What is the situation there?

A No, there is no change in the role.

Q No change.

A No.

Q John, is there any restriction at all to the export of computers that could have a military application to South Africa?

A I would have to do a little research -- I guess the Commerce, actually, would have to do a little research on that for you.

Q John, anything new on deterrence in Lebanon today?

A Nothing new on deterrence in Lebanon.

Q Do you have anything on Alistair Sparks in South Africa?

A Don't have anything on Alistair Sparks.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #207

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm afraid I have lean pickings for you today. Just one announcement up front.

Yesterday we told you there would be a BACKGROUND press briefing at the White House today on Mr. Shamir's visit. That briefing has been rescheduled at the White House for next Monday, November 28, at 10:00 A.M. Insofar as our operations here are concerned, available here in the Press Office is the text of Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams' speech today -- that's before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on our human rights policy. That speech is embargoed until 3:00 this afternoon.

Also, Mr. Abrams will address the National Council for Social Studies in San Francisco tomorrow on educating young Americans about human rights, problems with the process. Available in the Press Office is the text of that speech, embargoed until 3:00 tomorrow afternoon.

That's about all I have except to tip you we will not be operating in this Press Office on Thanksgiving Day.

Q How about Friday?

A I will not be operating in this Press Office on Friday. I will not, but I understand Mr. Romberg --

Q Is there a regular briefing on Friday?

A There will be a regular briefing on Friday.

Q John, Secretary Weinberger today blamed the attack on the Marine barracks on the Iranians, with the sponsorship, knowledge, and authority of Syria. One, what has been said to Syria, if anything, regarding this? How does it affect our relations with Syria?

A I wouldn't get into diplomatic discussions with Syria, and I wouldn't comment on Secretary Weinberger's statement. I think the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have made clear the State Department's position on Syrian involvement in that affair in previous statements, and I think I'll stand on what they said.

Q So, the matter is closed?

A Sorry.

Q The matter is closed as far as the State Department is concerned?

A No, no, no. I didn't say the matter was closed. As you know, we have been pursuing our investigation into this, and as I say, as far as the involvement of Iranians and Syrians are concerned, I think that both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have had some words on that before.

Q John, the Weinberger statement is important because it really is the furthest a high American official has gone in specifically putting blame. So does the State Department share the Weinberger --

A I have just seen the report of Mr. Weinberger's statement. I think we would like to see the statement in its entirety, and I just don't have any reaction to or comment on it.

Q Was there any coordination, before he made these statements, with the State Department? (Laughter)

Q Is this a surprise?

A I'm not aware of specific coordination on this particular speech, Don. That's not to say there might not well have been, but I'm not aware of it.

Q Without getting into the dialogue between governments, would you please characterize and describe for us the state of diplomatic relations between the United States and Syria? Who is talking to who, and how recently?

A Well, for example, Mr. Rumsfeld was in Damascus recently and talked with Foreign Minister --

Q He was rejected.

A He was what?

Q He was rebuffed, wasn't he?

A Who said he was rebuffed?

Q It's not true?

A I don't know where you're getting that from. He had a meeting with Foreign Minister Khaddam.

Q Was it positive?

A Well, we don't characterize meetings, but it was a businesslike meeting.

Q That's one aspect. Is there a continuing dialogue between this government and Syria?

A There is certainly continuing diplomatic consultations and discussions between ourselves and Syria, yes.

Q Could you undertake, on this matter of coordination -- there is an obvious difference between what the Secretary and Deputy Secretary here said and what Weinberger said, at least a difference in emphasis, and I wonder if you could undertake to look at the text of what the Defense Secretary said, and get back to us in written form perhaps later this afternoon, on whether or not the State Department subscribes --

A Why don't we take a look at his statement and see what we find out.

Q -- to what the Defense Secretary said, and whether or not there was prior coordination on the substance of the speech, if not on the moment of it.

A Let's take a look and see what, see what -- I think it was a press conference actually. Let's take a look and see what we might be able to come up with.

Q John, does this Administration know anything about the whereabouts of Mr. Arafat?

A No. Seen the report just before I came out here, suggesting that he has been taken out of Tripoli in a helicopter; but we're not aware of that.

Q That's a press report?

A It's a press report.

Q To pursue that a little bit, though, beyond the question of whether or not he's left Tripoli, has the U.S. been in touch with France and perhaps other countries on Arafat's fate? That same report contained other comments to the suggestion that there is a coordinated effort going on with France and other countries to somehow deal with Arafat and the civilian casualties in Tripoli that are caused by his continuing presence there, and so on.

A I can't answer, Ralph, your specific question as to whether there has been a discussion about Arafat and his future. But obviously, there is coordination through the MNF, and obviously, there is a vigorous interchange between ourselves and France and between ourselves and other interested countries. But I do not know whether Arafat's future, specifically, has been discussed.

Q In light of what you just said there, do you see any coordination in the near future, in the next possibly few days, that the Multinational Force will perform the same duty that it performed last year in the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut -- to get the PLO out of Tripoli and the neighborhood?

A I'm not aware of it. I'm not aware of any such plans.

I'm afraid it's a lean day.

Q Do you have anything further on the state of health of President Assad?

A No, I'm afraid we don't, Barrie.

Q President Andropov?

A No. I'm afraid we don't.

Q How's your health?

A I'm fine. I'm feeling great. (Laughter)

Q John, there is a report that the State Department refused to issue a visa for Ruben Zamora again last week. Can you confirm that?

A I have an impression that we had some earlier guidance on that, Jim, which we'll be glad to make available to you.

Q That relates to the previous time?

A Relates to his latest visa application, yes. There is something we came up with a few days ago. I can't just recall what it is.

Q John, last night in the speech before the American Jewish Congress, Deputy Secretary Dam said -- this is a paraphrase, not an exact quote -- that if

Israel were to get its economic house in order, the United States would be willing to become involved to assist Israel, or something of that sort.

A Uh-huh.

Q Is the thinking that he is reflecting on some new aid program to Israel, specifically targetted to their economic difficulties? What was he getting at in that --

A Well, I don't know that the discussion has become very specific. I'm sure Israel's economic situation would be among those matters discussed during the upcoming visit of the Prime Minister.

As you know, the Secretary has had a keen interest in Israel's economic situation and Israel's difficulties, and has been sympathetic towards some resolution of them insofar as we can be.

On the aid front, obviously, the budget discussions are now underway, and the President will present his budget and suggested aid levels in January. I guess it's really premature to suggest what he might arrive at to recommend.

-- MORE --

Q Well, this statement by the Deputy Secretary suggests, anyway, that the U.S. will discuss with the Israeli leaders some new kind of aid package while they are here.

Is that likely or expected?

A Well, I don't know that it is right to cast it in terms of a new aid package, but I'm sure levels of aid and what might be done to assist Israel will be matters for discussion.

Q John, on the computer, have the U.S. and Sweden resolved the question --

A No.

Q -- of whether the material will come back to the U.S.?

A No, still talking. And the computer is still in Helsingborg.

Q And the U.S. continues to say that it is a computer of the type you described yesterday?

A Yes.

Q Is there a -- do the discussions contain a dispute over the kinds of material that is inside those boxes?

A I don't think that is the issue. I think it's just a question of continuing that discussion with the Swedes, and seeking, getting a resolution of the question. It takes a little time.

Q Does the U.S. have investigators in South Africa at this time to pursue the question of where that computer is going?

A I can't answer that. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Could you take a question on the extent of the U.S. investigation? Or is the Swedish investigation going to serve as the --

A I may be wrong, but I don't think the investigation would be conducted by the State Department. I think you should look to other agencies for that.

Q John, yesterday you said that you would try to find out about the origin of the computer. Have you had any luck?

A I don't know. Did we manage to come up with anything on that yet?

We're still working on it.

Q Do you have anything more on these exchanges of statements about who originated the proposal on the INF cutback?

A Well, we've seen that latest inaccurate TASS statement, the one that suggests that Ambassador Nitze originated this informal proposal.

The TASS statement is plainly false. The correct sequence of events is as noted in our statement of November 18. There would be no reason for the United States to offer a proposal, either formal or informal, which would bar U.S. deployments and allow the Soviet Union to maintain a large monopoly of LRINF missiles.

Q Do you have any thoughts to offer on why there is a dispute over something clearly as factual as who uttered the words on the proposal?

A Well, no. I guess you would have to ask the Soviet Union. Their record of correctly annotating the facts has not always been impressive.

Q John, Lloyd's of London is reporting today that an Iraqi plane, using Exocet missiles, has sunk a Greek cargo ship leaving Khovvannshahr.

No confirmation?

A No. I don't have anything on it. No. Sorry.

Q Do you have any reaction to the decisions, political decisions, in the Philippines regarding the succession process? Mrs. Marcos' decison to take herself out of that? Or her apparent decision, anyway, to do so? Their decisions to institute a new kind of succession?

A No. That's an internal matter for the Philippines. Obviously we are much interested in the future of the Philippines, but it's an internal matter.

Q John, where is Rumsfeld today? And do you have anything on the decision by Israel to move the Palestinians out of refugee-type camps into more permanent type housing, I think?

A Sure. Mr. Rumsfeld is on his way back to the United States. As far as the settling of the Palestinians is concerned, we are familiar with the Israeli proposal -- that's to relocate from the UNRWA camps?

Q Yes.

A We are familiar with that proposal but have neither taken a position on it nor offered to support it.

If and when it is formally presented to us, our reaction will be influenced to a large degree by the wishes of the refugees themselves and the position of UNRWA, which we regard as the international agency responsible for their welfare.

We therefore consider it of great importance that Palestinian participation in any such effort be entirely voluntary, and that any and all steps be fully coordinated with UNRWA.

Q Copies, please?

A Sure.

Q John, I want to go back to the question of the economic aid to Israel. Will the LAVI -- Israeli fighter project -- and the spending of these millions of dollars which were approved by the U.S. Administration, will they assist immediately the economic situation in Israel as you foresee it or the Administration foresees it?

A Well, there may well be discussion of the LAVI during the Israeli visit here, but I don't have anything besides that.

Q I understand the President signed a directive, or whatever it is, about immediate approval of using the FMS money to be used in the project of the LAVI; it is my understanding.

Will this money that will be spent now, assist Israel to get out of the economic situation it is in?

A I don't have any comment on your suggestion that the President will sign that.

Q Back to INF, what does it mean that you will come to your negotiations in Geneva technically? You will keep the delegation in Geneva?

A Sure will.

Q Technically, Mr. Nitze would remain there and wait? Not personally, --

A I don't know what his travel plans are at the end of each cycle. I mean, I don't know whether he will be physically present in Geneva for twelve months of the year. But we are planning to continue our position at Geneva.

Q Have you been asked about Secretary Weinberger's remark this morning about Syrian complicity?

A I have.

Q You have? Well, I'll get it later.

A Okay.

Q John, there is an extraordinary tug of war going on in Bonn today, that has been going on for three days now, at least. And it involves not just demonstrators outside the Parliament, but it involves serious and dedicated politicians inside the Parliament; some of whom took an important vote last weekend on a question of deep interest to the Reagan Administration. But the Administration has had no comment on that tug of war, on the statements being made by Moscow, on the statements being made by the opposition to the Kohl Government, on the moves in the Parliament to delay the debate -- all of which could affect deployment of the missiles.

Can you explain why, beyond just saying it is an internal matter? It's clearly not an internal matter.

A It clearly is an internal matter. It is a matter for the West Germans themselves to decide.

Q It's a NATO deployment.

A Yes, but the Government, their Government, has subscribed to the NATO decision, and that stands. Their Parliament, their Bundestag is debating that decision. That's very properly an internal matter. And it would be improper for us to be involved.

Q John, moving to a different area, have you anything on the reported incursion into Honduras by Nicaraguan-backed rebels?

A That's The Washington Post story this morning?

Q Yes.

A Basically we would confirm The Washington Post story, which is basically accurate. The Honduran military has succeeded over the past three months in breaking up an attempted infiltration of Honduras from Nicaragua by Cuban-trained Honduran insurgents. The report is new confirmation of Cuba's active and long-term policy designed to develop and support revolutionary movements in third countries, particularly in Central America. The significance of this particular report is what it reveals about the timing of the recruitment and infiltration of guerrillas. These Honduran guerrillas were recruited more than two years ago, trained and held ready for infiltration until the Cubans and Nicaraguans felt that conditions and circumstances were right to take action against the Government of Honduras.

Q Copies, please?

A Sure.

Q Do you have anything relating to that on the American Catholic priest who supposedly died during that operation?

A I do not, Jim. Sorry.

Q Could you look into that? It is a two-month old story and it has never been cleared up.

A Were we looking into it? I'm sure you must have asked this before.

Q Well, it wasn't I. It was somebody else.

A Let me see where we stand on that.

Q Okay. And also, if I could ask about another part of the world? Do you have anything on events this morning or last night in Liberia?

Q Can we stay on this subject?

A Let me quickly dispose of Liberia. No, I do not.

Q Okay.

A I didn't mean to dispose of Liberia.

(Laughter)

Q You just disposed Liberia.

A I meant to dispose that question.

Q Could you draw a little more of the significance from the timing of the recruitment? Are you trying to tell us --

A The timing of?

Q You said that what is really significant about it, one of the significant things, is the timing; that they were trained two years ago and held in readiness.

What's the significance of that?

A I think the significance is that it indicates the Cuban and Nicaraguan dedication to long-term insurgency and the fostering of instability.

Q Also, related to that, at the time of these events there were questions here raised over what U.S. Blackhawk helicopters, piloted by U.S. armed personnel, were doing in Olancho Province. And it was said, there was a report that they were ferrying supplies to Honduran troops. That was denied, and it was said that, no, in fact they were providing help to refugees--food in the area.

Could you look into it again in view of these new violations?

A Yes. Although, I think the Pentagon will answer your question very fully, and has some data on it.

Q They have now?

A I think they will have it, but why don't you call them?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #208

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. I just have a couple of housekeeping announcements. Mr. Jay Morris, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development, who has just returned from Grenada, will hold an ON-THE-RECORD press briefing today at 2:00 this afternoon, in this briefing room. The subject is the report of the Inter-Agency Private Sector Survey Team. Mr. Morris will discuss new AID funds for Grenada.

I would also like to take this opportunity to introduce my new Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, John McCarthy.

Why don't you stand up, John? We stole Mr. McCarthy from EB, and therefore have no diplomatic relations with that bureau henceforth, but we are delighted to have him with us, and you will see him frequently.

That's all I have in the way of announcements. Be glad to take your questions.

Q John, the Persian Gulf: do you have any confirmation of the report that a Greek ship was sunk by an Iraqi missile?

A I have a little on that, Jim -- not a great deal. We understand that two ships were recently sunk; have no details or independent confirmation for you.

As far as the United States's reaction to that is concerned, the Iraqi attacks of November 21 were apparently the first since the October 31 Security Council Resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities in the Gulf and its inland ports. However, in our view, continued hostilities, whether in the Gulf or on land, impede movement toward the ceasefire and negotiated settlement for which we and the international community have called urgently and repeatedly.

Q Do you have any knowledge that the ships may have been sunk by an Exocet missile?

A No, don't; don't have anything on that.

Q In the past, you have issued warnings about what the United States might do should shipping in the Persian Gulf be threatened. Does this trigger anything as far as the United States is concerned?

A It doesn't trigger anything, but those statements still stand.

Q Besides your feeling that this impedes movement toward a ceasefire, do you deplore it, condemn it, or what?

A No. We are not going beyond the language we've used here. We consider that it impedes movement toward a ceasefire.

Q Isn't that sort of mild for blowing ships of another nation out of the water?

A Leave you to draw your own conclusions, Don. That's what we're saying, though.

Q Did you say you couldn't confirm the sinking of the two ships? Or what are you reporting?

A No. The question was whether we could confirm that it was with an Exocet missile.

Q No, but you also said you understood that two ships were recently sunk, but you had no independent confirmation.

A I think we are in essence confirming that. I think that's acceptable.

Q What was the other ship? I only know of one.

A I don't have anything else on that.

Q John, would you call this an interference with the freedom of navigation?

A I would describe it simply as I have described it here. Don't have anything more for you.

Q John, did you say the statements that still stand, are those the ones about U.S. freedom of navigation?

A Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

Q I see; they still stand, but you're not repeating them today, and you're not linking them directly to this incident?

A I think they are very clear; be glad to pull out that language for you, but --

Q Do you link them to this incident?

Q The only statements you've made on freedom of navigation were aimed at Iran, that if they close the Straits of Hormuz -- you never said anything about the Iraqis.

A I'm not sure that there is a specific country's name. We talked about freedom of navigation, sure.

Q Has this Government issued any warning to mariners in light of this incident?

A I'm not aware of that, Jim. I'm not aware of that.

Q Isn't that unusual?

A I don't know. It's simply a question of my not knowing whether such a --

Q Could you find out?

A Let me check on it. Sure.

Q (Inaudible) to explain why you're not saying more on freedom of the seas?

A No.

Q It is one of the most long-standing positions of the United States in world affairs.

A No, just standing by what we've said.

Q I realize that it is a hypothetical question, but if some U.S. ship got blasted out of the water by the Iraqis, would you just say it impedes the progress towards the ceasefire?

A Well, we hope we never come to that point, Don, I think when we do, obviously, we'll have appropriate words --

Q John, do you know the nationality of the two ships?

A I do not, Bernie. Let me see if we can help you on that.

Q Is there any effort by the United States to convince the Syrians to open the pipeline that goes from Iraq to Syria?

A Just don't have anything for you on our discussions with Syria.

Q New subject, John, please?

Q On this subject, please: John, does your report that you have indicate that the ships, the two ships which were sunk as a result of an attack on them, or could it have been a collision on the mid-sea?

A I really don't have anything beyond what I've given --

Q Can you find out if --

A Let me see what we have.

Q Could we follow up Mr. Weinberger's comment yesterday, just for precision? He said that, basically, the act, the explosion of the Marine barracks, was carried out by Iranians, with strong Syrian involvement.

Could you be any more precise on that?

A I don't think so. I think the Pentagon discussed last night Secretary Weinberger's remarks, and I think made the point that he had been consistent in what he was saying, with remarks that he had made on a number of previous occasions, and was not sending any special signal.

Insofar as we're concerned, we, of course, stand by what Secretary Shultz has said -- and I refer you to his specific words -- but in essence, what he has said is that if a country like Syria controls territory, clearly it cannot escape responsibility for what transpires in that territory.

Q Does he believe that the Syrians sponsored the attack?

A I think everybody agrees that there is a Syrian dimension to this. Some people express that in different ways; and I think, as far as we're concerned, we would just refer you to Secretary Shultz's words.

Q On a related matter, John, do you have anything on Lebanon severing diplomatic relations with Iran because of the behavior of its gunmen in the Bekaa, and also freezing, I think the phrase was, diplomatic relations with Libya?

A I think that is correct. I think that that is a correct statement. But I don't have any reaction to it. It is obviously a Lebanese decision. But I think you will find that that report is correct.

Q Do you have anything on Weinberger's statement -- picking up Bernie's exploration in pursuit of precision -- that interpreted the President as saying that the President never promised retaliation?

The President talked about the terrorists not going unpunished, and I think the Secretary in one of the trips said that the U.S. was exploring a number of options, and would use at least one of them by way of retaliation.

Is the retaliation threat now vacated?

A I think, as you know, Bernie, there are words by the President and by the Secretary on the record on that subject. But as of a memorable interview with a well-known television correspondent when we were out of the country, the Secretary said that he would henceforth not be commenting any further on the retaliation question. And he has maintained that posture since.

Q Well, but he did yesterday -- Weinberger did.

A I'd have to refer you to Secretary Weinberger's words.

Q Do you have any information as to whether there is an agreement in Tripoli for the evacuation of Mr. Arafat and his people, or what the situation is in that --

A Not a great deal, Don. Be glad to give you what we have on the overall situation in Lebanon, which is not terribly illuminating. Last night there was some small arms fire directed towards the U.S. Marine positions along the shore near Beirut. The Marines didn't return fire, and there were no casualties -- no Marine casualties. We are not aware of any unusual activity today near the Marine positions.

This morning in Beirut there were reports of heavy shelling along the Alayh ridgeline overlooking the city. We have seen the various press reports of a ceasefire in Tripoli, to be followed by the evacuation of pro-Arafat forces, but we don't have any independent confirmation of this.

Q John, I have a follow-up to the question relating to the diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran. Could it be that the Lebanese Government acted under sort of pressure or instigation from the U.S. Administration?

A No, I don't think so. They made their own decision.

Q How do you explain that it came as late as this, since this is being connected to the 23rd tragic action--the 27th October, I mean?

A I think you would have to ask the Lebanese Government why they made the decision at this particular time.

Q John, can I get back to something you said? I have you down in my notes as saying, "Everyone agrees that there is a Syrian dimension to this problem. Some people express it in different ways."

This Administration came into power, before you were in it, promising to speak in one voice. We have the Secretary of Defense saying that an attack that killed 239 Marines was conducted with the authority, the knowledge, and the sponsorship of the Syrian Government. You seem to be saying, "Well, that's their opinion."

A No. What we are saying is, I think, there is general agreement that there is a Syrian dimension to this affair. As I say, people express that in different ways. The Secretary of Defense said what he did yesterday, and we will stand on what the Secretary of State said -- the way he has described it.

Q But you are giving me the impression that the Department of State, in expressing it in its different way, does not agree or does not have evidence to support the contention that the Syrian Government sponsored and authorized this attack?

A There is no disagreement that there is a Syrian dimension, that there is Syrian involvement.

Q At what level?

A No disageement -- at what level, you mean?

Q I mean, what level of Syrian involvement? I mean, there is a difference between the Syrian Government sponsorship and a Syrian lieutenant letting a truck through a roadblock.

A Well, as the Secretary has said, you cannot control territory without being responsible for what happens there. As Secretary Shultz has said, there surely must have been Syrian awareness of what transpired. That is what he has said on the basis of what he has seen, and that is his view.

Q Well, John, when you say that there is no disagreement about a Syrian angle, you seem to be implying that there may be disagreement about the whole situation. That is, otherwise, why wouldn't you say there is no disagreement?

A There is not disagreement that there was Syrian awareness.

Q Awareness --

A Yes.

Q -- of the act, in advance?

A People express that in different ways.

Q Do you have a comment on the Evans and Novak article this morning concerning --

A I'm afraid you have caught me by surprise. Tell me again the thrust of Evans and Novak.

Q He is saying that the Israelis, the bulk of it, that are advising the Americans to deal with the Syrians; that fighting the Syrians is not the right way to deal with it.

A I haven't seen the piece, and so I am always a little leery about responding to a thesis advanced at secondhand, but there isn't any reluctance on the part of the United States to continue diplomatic discussions with Syria. And, indeed, we are doing that.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that the Libyans were collaborating with the Syrians and the Iranians in the tragic explosion of the Marines' headquarters?

A I don't know what the assessment has turned up in that connection. There certainly hasn't been any question about the presence, and the unhelpful presence, of the Libyans in Lebanon.

Q Your reluctance, John, to pinpoint on the Syrians the blame or the responsibility for that attack on the Marines' headquarters, which is different from Mr. Weinberger's, does it stem from the fact that there are two parallels to how to deal with Syria--the carrot and the stick approach --

A No.

Q -- or why is it that you are not coming straight out and saying it?

A No, it's simply a question of people expressing it in different ways.

Q John, on another subject, do you have any contribution to make to the Soviet walkout in Geneva?

A I don't think so really, Bernie. The President made a statement this morning. I think Mr. Nitze held a press conference. There was a briefing here by a senior official.

I think all that needs to be said, has been said.

Q John, do you have anything on Guatemala today?

A Guatemala? I do not think so, Jim. No, I'm afraid I don't.

Q Any Grenada guidance?

A Guidance on what aspect?

Q Troop withdrawals? American troop withdrawals?

A No. No, I don't. You know, obviously, the President has said what he has said. We're looking at it.

Q Thank you, John.

(The briefing concluded at 12:33 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, November 25, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #209

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1983, 12:27 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements: First, Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam will address a World Business Briefing, in the Plimsol Club of the International Trade Mart in New Orleans at noon on Tuesday, November 29. His topic will be the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central America. Anyone interested in covering this address should contact Jim Albins at the Trade Mart, Area Code 504, 529-1601.

Q When is that, Alan?

A It's on Tuesday. We expect to have embargoed text available in the Press Office Tuesday morning.

Q Will there be a Q&A?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q If there is, could we request that it be piped in? That will be an hour before the briefing.

A Well, it's at noon, and I don't know that we're going to put off the briefing on that account.

Q It's noon Central Time.

A New Orleans?

Q It's one o'clock there.

A Central Time? Let me look into it. I don't know what the technical arrangements are, but we can check it out.

Second, to remind you about the backgrounder on Monday at the White House on Prime Minister Shamir's visit at 10:00 a.m.

Third, an announcement about assistance for the Caribbean Peace Force for Grenada: Pursuant to a Presidential determination signed November 22, the Administration will use up to $1 million in Peacekeeping Operation -- that is, PKO -- funds to assist the Caribbean Peace Force for Grenada. The assistance is urgently required to

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train, equip, supply, and provide logistical support for the Force so that it can assume increased responsibilities as U.S. forces withdraw from Grenada.

To date, the Governments of Jamaica, Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent have contributed to the Force. Grenada and other OECS governments believe that the Caribbean Peace Force is essential for maintaining order on the island until Grenadians are able to take on that task alone.

Because only $5 million was available for this unforeseen need within the PKO account, this assistance includes $10 million transferred from the Economic Support Funds account. It follows extensive prior consultation with the Congress.

That's it.

Q Have a copy of that, Alan?

A Sure.

Q That's not from the emergency dispensing power of the President, then?

A Well, the authority, in terms of the $10 million, transferring it from the ESF to this comes pursuant to Sections 552-C and 610-A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The President waived the 15-day waiting period for obligation of the first $10 million, pursuant to Section 614-A of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Q Was that $10 million previously designated, Alan?

A Again, it was ESF.

Q For whom?

A I don't know whether it was ESF for Grenada. Maybe we can check that.

TO STAFF: Can we check and see if we can get an answer on that before --

Q But this $15 million would all be spent on Grenada?

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A That is with relation to Grenada. That is, part of it will be spent actually on Grenada, and part on the home islands. I understand there will be about 100 trainers involved in this, both on Grenada and on the home islands of the Caribbean Peace Force countries.

So go to DOD for the specifics of this. I don't ~~have a lot of detail on that.~~

~~Q So then would it be fair, Alan, to say that part of the money is being used to help create a regional security force?~~

A No, I wouldn't characterize it that way.

Q Do you mean 100 U.S. trainers?

A Yes.

Q One other question on that: You say that it's for the OECS countries who have contributed to the Peacekeeping Force. Will any of that money be spent upon a Grenadian police force, per se?

A At this point, I don't know the answer to that question. Again, on detail, I think that the Pentagon may be able to help you further on that, Jim.

Q ESF funds -- wouldn't the State Department have the major determination on questions like that?

A It's being transferred; it's being transferred from the ESF Fund to this specific purpose.

Q Would it be possible for you --

A How it is going to be then used -- I mean, apparently, the major breakdown of category of equipment would include things like vehicles, communications equipment, small arms and ammunition, clothing for individuals and their equipment, training, logistical support, petroleum and air transport between the home island and Grenada.

I gather that vehicles, communication equipment and training represent the bulk of this funding.

Q Could you take a question with respect to whether Grenadian nationals for a home police force will be used -- will come from this money?

A For a police force?

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Q No. I mean whether Grenadian nationals who are going to remain on the island constitute a police force or a security force of some kind, whether that is included in the $15 million.

A I will look into that.

~~Q Thank you.~~

~~Q How many men would be on that Peacekeeping Force?~~

A They have had, what? about 400 fluctuating from Jamaica, Barbados, and the four eastern Caribbean ~~nations which I mentioned, Antigua --~~

Q About 400 men -- $15 million?

A Well, but the training will also be extended to replacement forces, for those being rotated in that force, so it just isn't being spent on 400 people; it's 400 and their replacements.

Q Right now, Alan, they are using policemen to do that kind of job. Will that still be the core, or will they use military units from the home islands?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Do you have any comment on Alistair McIntyre's apparent decision not to head the government?

A Yes. We regret that Mr. McIntyre's health will not allow him to assume the post that Governor General Scoon had asked him to fill. We understand that the Governor General and his advisory council were meeting this morning to discuss the situation. You would have to refer to them regarding any decisions they take.

Q Alan, on another subject, do you have any response or reaction to the statement made yesterday by Andropov?

A Yes. The Soviet decision to suspend negotiations is unjustified and runs counter to their professed commitment to arms control.

The United States has negotiated in good faith for two years, during which the Soviet Union has deployed over 100 additional SS-20 missiles with over 300 warheads. We

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have indicated our desire to continue negotiating toward a balanced, verifiable agreement, and have put forward several proposals aimed at achieving that goal. Moreover, we have made clear our willingness to halt or reverse our deployments in accordance with the terms of an eventual agreement.

The United States is prepared to continue talks on INF, and we call on the Soviet Union to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

Q Do you take the statement made yesterday to move one step beyond what was said on Wednesday by the Soviet negotiator? In other words, is it more than just discontinued -- is it now broken off?

A I'm not going to try to predict what the Soviets are going to do, Jim. I can only tell you what our position is, which is as I've just articulated it, and refer to the President's statement yesterday and what we said before. But I'm not going to try to predict how those two statements fit together. That's up to the Soviets to explain.

Q Specifically, what I'm trying to get it, what is it that you regret? What is unjustified about the Andropov statement?

A That they have stopped negotiating.

Q How about the announced decision to put to sea some more missiles near the United States?

A All together, in talking about the so-called "countermeasures" that they refer to, there is no justification whatsoever for any Soviet "countermeasures," in view of their current conventional and nuclear force capabilities.

As I indicated before, the Soviets have continued to deploy SS-20 missiles in, or within range of, Europe. Since their moratorium was announced in March 1982, they have long planned to modernize their nuclear forces in eastern Europe and the western USSR. The development of many of these systems began long before NATO's 1979 dual-track decision.

In addition, they have for many years deployed ballistic missile submarines off United States' coasts.

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Q You say "for many years." How long is it? Do you know?

A Don't have a specific time.

Q If I could follow up, do you see this announced decision to put more missiles at sea near the United States as increasing the threat to United States territory?

A I'm not in a position to judge that particularly, Don, except as the Secretary indicated before -- and as what I just gave you indicated -- they've had missiles and submarines off the U.S. coast now for some time. There is nothing new about that.

Q But there may be something new about the numbers or the extent of their alertness, or something of that sort?

A That's all I can give you on that.

Q Alan, in the countermeasures that have been itemized by Andropov, is there anything new?

A I think the statement I gave you on that, Bernie, indicated that (a) they've long had submarines off our coast, and (b) they have long planned modernization of the missiles in eastern Europe and the western USSR.

I can't tell you what the details of their plans were and, therefore, I can't tell you specifically whether there's anything in that package that they weren't going to do that now they're going to add to what they were already planning to do. But a lot of that is already either on the books or consistent with what they've done before.

Q Just to follow up. If that is the case, what do you see is the motivation for Andropov making the statement and TASS giving it that sort bounce around the world? Is it aimed at what?

A I don't think I'm going to try to speculate. I think we all can come up with our own interpretations of why the Soviets have done what they've done. Our view of it, however, is that the stopping of the negotiations is unjustified and any "countermeasures" are also unjustified.

If I may come back to this in just a second; just to go back to the Grenadian situation. The ESF funds were unearmarked; did not come from any particular country.

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Q Do you have any guidance on what the -- or how the United States would view it if the Soviets serviced the seabased missiles out of Cuba?

A You're talking about nuclear missiles out of Cuba?

Q Yes.

A I think I'd refer you back to what's been said in the past about the 1962 understanding.

Q Alan, do you have comment on Ambassador Nitze's remarks about Andropov's statement in which he said he thought it was a hardening?

A No, I don't have any comment on that.

Q Can you confirm that components of the Pershing IIs have arrived in Germany?

A Yes. I can confirm that missile parts of Pershing IIs have begun to arrive in the FRG. Deliveries of missile parts and associated equipment will continue on schedule so that the first battery of Pershing II missiles will be operational by the end of the year.

I might note that this is part of a long-term, ongoing process stemming from the 1979 decision and will continue with a variety of steps, as I said, on schedule, continuing the entire INF deployment through 1988.

Q When did these parts arrive?

A Don't have details for you.

Q Can we get a copy of that original Andropov statement you read?

A Yes.

--MORE--

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Q Alan, I understand that Melvin Beli, representing a group of families who lost people on the Korean Airline, has come up with what he says is evidence that the Korean Airline regularly was paying pilots under the table to fly over Soviet airspace to save fuel.

If that indeed is the case, what would be the American reaction to the whole incident?

A That is obviously speculative, and I don't think I would want to speak to that from here. I must say I'm not aware of flights over Soviet territory before the -- I mean, I would think the Soviets would have reacted to this. But I just don't think I can speculate and give you a reaction to something which is not established at this point, Barrie. I don't think it would be fair to do that.

Yes?

Q Do you have anything more on the unspecified bomb threats or how long security arrangements will remain the way they are now?

A I don't have anything new for you beyond what we said earlier in the week.

Q Do you know where the report came from? Did it come from a local police department?

A I'm not going to get into the question of what the nature of the concern is, beyond what we have already said.

Q What kind of security checks are you undertaking? I understand employees of the State Department were checked this morning as they were coming into the parking garage. Is that true?

A I don't know what specifics, other than that obviously people are being checked, as they always are, coming into the building. But in terms of the specific measures, I don't know. I would assume you all went through some sort of a check, as you normally do coming in here, as well.

Q Alan, how long will these security arrangements remain in force?

A I said before in answer to that, I just don't know, Bernie. I don't have a date on that.

Q May I change the subject?

A Sure.

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Q Is there any U.S. response to the recent announced actions of the Sandinistas in sending the Salvadorans home and claiming to send a lot of the Cubans home, and their advisement to the domestic opposition forces that they will be a bit more lenient?

A We understand that about a thousand teachers are leaving Nicaragua temporarily for their annual end-of-the-year break in Cuba. We have no information to suggest that the Cuban military or civilian presence in Nicaragua has been reduced permanently. And similarly we cannot confirm that the Salvadoran guerrilla presence there has been reduced.

Nicaragua's assistance to guerrilla groups in the region and its close ties to Cuba and the USSR remain issues of great concern to Nicaragua's neighbors and to the United States, and are an obstacle to peace in the region. Any moves by the Sandinista government away from these policies would be welcomed by the United States, but we can't confirm such a move is taking place.

Q Copies please.

A As far as the domestic situation is concerned, as we noted earlier this week, it does appear the Nicaraguan government has relaxed some of its restrictions on the opposition newspaper La Prensa. However, La Prensa is still subject to prior censorship and continues to be denied permission to publish some items. In our view, it would not be correct to say that the current relaxation of restrictions represents any significant change in the Sandinistas' overall attitude toward freedom of the press. Similarly, we have seen no real evidence that the Sandinistas have changed their basic philosophy toward human rights and the expression of views by internal opposition groups.

Q Can we get copies?

A Sure.

Q You've got nothing, then, that would back up the report that the Nicaraguans asked the Salvadorans to leave?

A I can't confirm that their presence has been reduced.

Q The Cuban departure of the teachers for an end-of-the-year recess, is what is happening more innocent than that? Is it possible it is a Salvadoran invitation for these people to leave?

A You mean a Nicaraguan invitation?

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Q Nicaraguan. I'm sorry.

A Permanently?

Q Yes.

A Well, again, as I said before, we don't have any information to suggest that the Cuban presence, military or civilian, has been reduced permanently. I can't tell you that that isn't going to happen at some future point, Bernie, but our information to date doesn't support that.

Q Is the United States interested in gaining an amnesty for those Nicaraguans who have left the country and have been fighting the government? Is that something that interests the United States?

A I don't have anything on that for you, Jim.

Q Has the Administration concluded that the Contras cannot defeat the Sandinistas, as was published?

A I don't have anything on that. That was a published report about an alleged intelligence assessment. I couldn't get into that, obviously, Barrie.

Q Will the State Department or anybody in the State Department see the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister when he comes to Washington?

A Well -- the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister?

Q Yeah. Borge.

Q The Interior Minister.

A The Interior Minister, Mr. Borge. I understand that he has indicated -- he has applied for a visa and expressed a desire to come to the U.S. But at this time his application is under consideration, so I think it would be getting ahead of the game to try to speculate on that.

Q You mean he may not get the visa?

A Well, it's under consideration. So that's where we are. That's the state of play at this point.

Q There was a report out of Managua this morning where he says that he's gotten it. That is not true, then?

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A Well, my information is as I just gave it to you. I am aware of the report, Jim. I checked it, and it was reconfirmed to me. So that's the best I can do for you on it.

Q Do you have any more information about President Gemayel's visit, and the comment or the report that President Gemayel will ask the United States to do some changes in the status of the agreement with Israel of May the 17th?

A Not really. There was obviously the announcement that he's coming on December 1. Our position on the May 17 agreement is quite clear. Our support for it is unchanged. So there is no change in it.

Q Whom is he meeting? How long will he be staying in town?

A I don't have a detailed schedule on his rounds when he's here.

Q Alan, on the Middle East. Do you have a comment on the French mediation of the agreement that led to the release of Palestinian and Israeli prisoners?

A I don't. I don't know specifically how this was worked out. For ourselves, beginning in 1982 the United States has repeatedly discussed the prisoner issue with concerned parties and has sought on various occasions to facilitate a resolution of the problem. We did not, however, play a role in the final talks leading to the exchange of prisoners.

We are pleased the parties were able to come to an agreement, and we view it as a step forward toward resolution of the problems which confront Lebanon.

Q Does that include an attitude towards the French mediation?

A I don't have anything for you on what French role there may have been.

Excuse me. Jim, you've been trying to ask a question.

Q Do you know who the United States is going to send to the Alfonsin inauguration in Argentina?

A I think this has been announced from the White House.

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Q And, also, one other. I understand that Ambassador Pickering is giving a speech today in San Salvador. Is it possible we could get copies of that speech?

A Well, I'll check on it. I don't know that we have copies.

Q Back on the Argentina inauguration. I think the Vice President is going, and I think Foreign Minister Gromyko also will be there. Is it possible there might be some contact there?

A I know of no plan for a contact there, George.

Q Back on Lebanon, you say the United States has discussed the situation with the concerned parties. Do the "concerned parties" include the PLO?

A Excuse me. Discuss the prisoners?

Q Yes.

A No, we have not had any direct contact with the PLO. We've made that clear.

Q Who are the concerned parties?

A I don't think I'm going to get into the details of that. But you're asking specifically about the PLO, and I just want to be clear that there is no change in our position on dialogue with the PLO.

Q Another subject.

A Yes.

Q Do you have a comment on the cease-fire which was achieved in Tripoli from Saudi Arabia and others?

A Yeah, I've got a little bit on that.

Obviously, we welcome an inter-Arab solution to the strife which has taken so many innocent Palestinian and Lebanese lives.

That's it.

Q On China --

Q Is that all?

A I said a "little bit" on it. Yes?

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Q China has lodged another strong protest against the United States, saying that the United States is taking a two-China policy. And this is the second protest in a week. Do you have any comment on either of those?

A No, I don't have on the specifics of your question. There was, I think, some guidance earlier in the week, which you might get from the Press Office, on the earlier protest -- on the Pell amendment. Obviously, our position is not to take a two-China policy, and so on.

But why don't you get that guidance from the Press Office?

Q Ambassador Zhang is meeting with Under Secretary Eagleburger. Do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q Iraq apparently has made another warning to international shipping following their sinking of the Greek vessel and it seems one other vessel. You mentioned two, or John mentioned two on Wednesday.

A We mentioned two, but didn't confirm it. That's right.

Q We weren't sure what the second one was. First, can you tell us anything about the second one or any other ships that have been sunk? And secondly, do you have any further comment on what Iraq is doing or is threatening to do in the Persian Gulf?

A First of all, in terms of the recent reports on Iraqi attacks in the Gulf, they are unclear in many respects, and I can't comment on the specifics of those reported attacks.

As to the general approach, as we said before, the United States deplores continuation and extension of the fighting between Iran and Iraq and urges the parties to agree to a cease-fire and to negotiate their differences. We would view with grave concern attempts by any party to interfere with the right of passage of non-belligerent ships through international waters.

I would also call your attention to our strong support for UN Security Council Resolution 540 which calls on both parties to refrain from further hostilities in the Gulf and its inland ports.

Q Do you consider the sinking of a ship to be interfering with the free passage of waterways, or whatever that phrase was?

A I think it would fit within that definition, yes.

Q Can we get a copy of the statement you just read?

A Yes.

Q And also on that same subject with respect to Iraq, I don't understand why you are saying things are confused. On Wednesday John said -- he referred to Iraqi actions or Iraqi attacks. Are you saying that they may not have been Iraqi? Are you drawing back from that?

A Precisely what happened and what the results of any action were, are not clear. So I'm not going to get into it.

Q But do you confirm that Iraqi military forces took actions on Monday?

A I am not going to go beyond whatever John's words were --

Q But they still stand?

A -- in that respect on Wednesday.

Q Does your word "unclear" encompass the report of a second ship that John made? Are you saying that's not clear?

A Yeah. I think if you look at the guidance on that and his original statement on that, you'll find it says we can't confirm.

Q Do you have any comment on the reports that Abu Nidal and his troops have been moved out of Baghdad?

A I don't have anything on that, Don. Sorry.

Yes?

Q On the restrictions of Soviet travel within the U.S., do you have anything on general policy and why it has been restricted to New Jersey-Bayonne in particular?

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A I don't have a specific piece of guidance on that, but there is some extensive guidance in the Press Office on that question of the change in the travel regulations.

Q Alan, has the United States supported Lord Carrington's candidacy for Secretary General of NATO? It was reported in The Post today.

A I don't intend to get into the question of whatever internal deliberations might have taken place. I'm not aware there has been any sort of announcement made. I've seen the reports about it, but don't intend to get into that.

Q Has Secretary Shultz taken himself out of any decision-making on that because of conflict of interest?

A Again, I don't intend to get into the question of internal deliberations.

Q A few weeks ago a delegation of the State Department, I believe headed by Mr. Bill Kirby went to the West Bank to inquire or to try to ease the Israeli pressure on the universities and improve the economic lot of the people under occupation. The question is, are they planning to present their report to the Secretary? When will this report be presented? And will there be any attempt to possibly brief Middle East reporters about such findings of this delegation?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Will you take the question?

A No. I think what I would do is suggest that you might address any questions on that subject to your briefer on Monday, talking about Prime Minister Shamir's visit, and just address it in that context. I think that's the easiest way to try to get at that.

Q Who will the briefer be for this backgrounder? Is this Mr. Murphy?

A I'm not going to get into the question of who the briefer is for background in the middle of a briefing. We can talk about it later.

Q With respect to all these reports about Nicaraguan steps, do you have any readout now on the extent or pace of arms supplies from Nicaragua to El Salvador?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you look into it now?

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A   No, I don't think we are going to keep on giving you temperature readings on that, Jim.

Q   Well, you haven't given us a temperature reading for about three months.

A   Well, the concern about the relationship between Nicaragua and the Salvadoran guerrillas remains. Precisely what the flow is and so on, I'm just not prepared to try to get into.

Q   I am curious about the evolution of your views on the sinking of this Greek ship. Wednesday it was almost minimized. Today you are viewing it with grave concern. I'm curious. What caused the apparent change in attitude? More information about what actually happened, or has there been a change in policy?

A   I don't think there has been a change in attitude, Jim. I think it is simply a matter of having looked at it further and come up with a further statement of the policy. But I don't think it's a change in attitude.

Q   Thank you.

A   You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

Olennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #210

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983, 12:13 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Two announcements. First, a housekeeping note regarding the Deputy Secretary's speech in New Orleans tomorrow, at the Plimsol Club of the International Trade Mart. A question was asked whether we could feed it in here. We expect to be able to provide a feed into this room of the speech and the subsequent questions and answers. What we're not sure about at this point is whether that will be done live which will be at about 1:30 Eastern time, or on a delayed basis which would be at about 2:30. So keep in touch and we'll try to let you know, but also keep in touch with us as to what's happening there.

Secondly --

Q (Inaudible)

A Do you know anything about a text? Will we have a text? Well, let's check on the text and see if we can provide that.

Q What's the subject?

A Don't have a subject to give you at this point.

Q The Caribbean Basin.

A Yes, I did give you a text last week. It was Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central America.

Q Isn't that what Reich's speech was?

A Sorry?

Q Isn't that what Reich's speech was?

A We have a lot of things to say, Jim.

Q Also, because we wouldn't want to bother you at some early hour to let you know that, for your guidance, the Secretary will be meeting with Prime Minister Shamir tomorrow morning from about 8:00* for about an hour and a half here at the Department. We plan to have a stake-out in the lobby.

---

*Subsequently changed to "7:30 am."

Q (inaudible)

A About 8:00*, here.

That's it for announcements; happy to take your questions.

Q A follow-up on this, please. Excuse me, Jim. Is there a stake-out this afternoon that you're authorizing after the Secretary meets Shamir?

A I think we could do that; yes.

Q What time is that?

A You've got the schedule, I guess, as to the meeting time.

Q 2:30 meeting?

A Yes. So I can't really predict precisely what time they'll be down. But I would expect it to be a reasonably long meeting.

Q To clean-up a matter that we were discussing last week, is the visa to the United States of Tomas Borge, the Minister of Interior of Nicaragua, still under consideration?

A Yes.

Q What is that?

Q We couldn't hear that either.

A A question about Mr. Borge's visa. Don't have anything new for you on that today.

Q He had been planning to arrive in the United States about now.

A Excuse me, I wonder if we could have one conversation.

Q He had been planning to arrive in the United States right about now. Does this mean that he is not going to be given it?

A I'd say it's still under consideration, Jim.

Q Just to follow that up. There have been further reports now of more activity, departure activity by the Cubans and also the provision of newsprint to La Prensa

*Changed to "7:30 am"

3024

to see that it doesn't shut down. Do you have anything more to add to what you said on Friday?

A Not a lot. We would welcome any serious moves to deal with sources of terrorism in the area, and, obviously, it's too soon, though, to evaluate what the various moves that have been talked about in the press mean. So we're going to stand basically on what I said on Friday.

The Sandinistas have clearly been communicating to the press and others an avowed conciliatory posture, but, again, it's too early to evaluate whether this represents a substantive change of position or simply courting public opinion.

Q So what we have is -- well, can you give us an example of how long you expect these trends to continue before you're satisfied as to their good faith or their bad faith?

A I don't have anything of that sort of evaluation to give you. I can't confirm a lot of the specifics either.

Q What is the reason for Borge's visa application being so long under consideration? The Nicaraguans have let in every senior U.S. government official who has requested to go down there in the last six months or more. Is there a reason?

A I'm not going to try to engage in debate on that, Jim. I would disagree with you in substantive terms whether they've been allowed in the country. You will recall there was a problem with Mr. Motley's scheduled visit at one point. The point is that the visa application is still under consideration.

Jim.

Q You say that you're still trying to evaluate whether these statements are simply courting public opinion or not. Would not one way to evaluate it be to sit down and talk with Borge?

A I don't think that we have lacked dialogue up to this point. We've talked about various meetings that have been held. Ambassador Motley, Ambassador Stone, and others have held meetings.

Q On this Nicaraguan point, there was a report over the weekend that they are sending home some Cuban military advisors. On Friday, as I remember, you said that to the best of the knowledge of the Department they were sending home teachers who were going on a regular trip that they generally do every year. Do you now have any further information that they're sending home some Cuban military advisors as reported from the area?

A We don't have any indication that the current level of Cuban presence in Nicaragua, apart from vacationing teachers, has changed.

Q Current level? Do you have any information that the level in a few days from now; will that change?

A I've seen the reports in the press, Don. I can't tell you whether they're accurate. I don't have anything to give you a judgment on that; seen those reports.

Q Suppose they turn out to be accurate, what is your reaction?

A Let's wait and see what it turns out to be.

Q When you say, Alan, you would welcome any serious moves to deal with sources of terrorism in the area, could you address the presence of anti-Sandinista groups in Nicaragua or across the border in Honduras or Costa Rica? Would you welcome any serious effort to deal with them as well?

A We have said consistently that we would favor a regional approach, comprehensive approach to the issues of the region and have supported the 21-point document of objectives as such a comprehensive and regional approach.

Q Is the United States considering any reciprocal gestures such as shortening the exercises that are bringing U.S. military personnel into Honduras, or anything else that would indicate, even in just a tentative way, that it is hearing what Nicaragua is saying and perhaps doing, and that it is willing to reciprocate in some manner?

A I think we've indicated that we hear it; we hear what they're saying. But the question is, specifically, what are they doing, and I think we indicated -- I don't know whether you got guidance over the weekend, but there was -- we made clear that what is being talked about, to some extent, are issues which the Nicaraguans, although having endorsed them in the 21-points, have studiously avoided since that time and if they're willing to move ahead on these issues now, our view is that what they should do is move speedily with the other Contadora countries to implement the entire document of objectives.

Q Wouldn't it be useful to clarify their position by inviting Mr. Borge here and sitting down with him?

A George, all I have for you on Mr. Borge is that there's nothing new to offer you today on that.

Q And one more, if I might, on this, Alan. I know I raised it on Friday. I'd like to raise it again, which is, what is the latest state of the arms flow between Nicaragua and El Salvador?

A My answer is the same. I don't have anything new to offer you.

Q Isn't that a relevant question to this entire issue?

A There are a lot of relevant questions, and our approach is to look at it in a comprehensive way.

Q Why are you absolutely refusing at this time to disclose any information whatsoever about what the level of the arms flow is when you have in times past, on the one hand, and on the other hand you haven't done so in at least three months?

A I don't think I'm going to get myself in a position, or get the Administration in a position where we're going to constantly be reporting what we have information about, but it comes from sensitive sources to begin with, and is indicative but can't be exact and precise in the way you're trying to get it to be in any case.

Q Did you suggest a minute ago there was some guidance you had from over the weekend about all this, that we might not have gotten?

A Yes. Let me see if I've got it; I don't know if I have it with me. Yes, I do.

It was in response to Mr. Borge's statements about possibly offering withdrawal of Cuban military advisors and things -- weapons acquisitions and so on.

We note that these regional issues, among others, are under consideration by the Contadora Group. In September, the nine countries involved in the Contadora process, including Nicaragua, signed a document of 21 objectives that includes the issues that Mr. Borge has raised. Subsequently, the Nicaraguan Government issued a proposal that studiously ignored many of these questions.

We have consistently taken the position that these issues should be addressed comprehensively and on a regional basis. If the Nicaraguan Government has now decided to pursue negotiations on these issues, it should support, along with its neighbors, the speedy implementation of the entire Contadora document of objectives. The United States continues to support the Contadora Group's efforts to seek a verifiable regional solution to these issues.

Q Copy of that?

A Yes.

Q How can you say you consistently took the position they should be addressed on a regional basis when the United States, about a year ago, asked they be addressed on a bilateral basis?

A There was a -- there's been a great deal of evolution over the last year, Don, since the Contadora Group was formed, and the original principles were articulated and the 21-point document of objectives was issued. It has been a quite consistent position.

Q Alan, have you completed your review of the three documents and one agreement that they gave to you about a month and a half ago?

A I don't know whether a review of that in its entirety has been completed --

Q Can we get an answer?

A I don't think we are going to respond publicly. Our basic position is as I have just articulated it.

Q On Guatemala, there is a report this morning that relations have cooled between the U.S. and Guatemala because of the disappearance of one of the local AID employees for us in Guatemala and the murder of another.

Can you comment on that?

A We have stated previously our serious concerns about the deaths of the AID contract workers, and that position is well known to the Government of Guatemala.

Q Could you say something about what we hope for the two major diplomatic visits of this week, Mr. Shamir and Mr. Gemayel?

A No, Dana. I think I am going to defer to briefings, one which was offered this morning, a backgrounder at the White House, and I think one which will be offered a little bit later in the week there also on President Gemayel's visit, and any statements that also will come out -- read-outs, and so on. I think I am not going to address that from here.

Q In light of the announcement last week and the implementation of security measures at State and at the White House, some of those measures were removed this morning and some have been reinstated.

Can you relate that at all to the Shamir visit?

A As far as I can tell, Ralph, none was meant to be removed, *per se*. I think there was some shifting around of vehicles, and so on, this morning, but, as I understand it, things remain essentially the way they were last week.

I don't have anything new to offer you on that subject of the other day.

Q Does that means that the security threat that had been referred to last week is still being evaluated?

A I think a lot of things are being looked at in terms of what is to be done, the various factors, including such things as who is visiting town, but there are a lot of other factors which will go into that kind of a determination. I can't really judge for you precisely what measures will be taken or anything of that sort.

Q Can you comment on the report that the original intelligence that brought the security came from the Middle East in a press report?

A No, I can't comment on any aspect of that.

Q The senior State Department official this morning at the briefing in the White House mentioned something about Peter Rodman and Bill Kirby's mission to Israel, to the occupied territories.

What is the initial reaction of the Israeli Government as to your attempt to improve the conditions of the Palestinians in the area?

A I would have to, one, refer to whatever was said. You have the advantage over me since I didn't attend that briefing; and, two, in terms of an Israeli Government reaction, I would refer you to the Israeli Government.

Q Alan, if I might follow on this, will there be a briefing any time soon, because I understand that the report was submitted to the Secretary as to the effect of the recommendations, to reporters here, possibly the Middle East correspondents, or something?

A I don't know if there is going to be a report on that particular subject soon, but I am sure, as I said to you last week, that you have got some opportunities to ask questions about it during the course of this week, and I would suggest that you take that opportunity.

Q One more point, please. Mr. Hikmat Al-Masri, the former Mayor of Nablus, is in town. Is he going to be meeting with some U.S. officials?

A Why don't I take a look at that? I don't know the answer to the question.

Ghassan.

Q About Prime Minister Shamir's visit here also, it has been reported that he came with many requests to the United States which U.S. officials have stated that they will consider during the negotiations with him.

One thing which is of importance to the United States, the freeze on settlements, the Prime Minister, already before leaving Tel Aviv, in a press conference, in a comment, said that he will not relent from Prime Minister Begin's position.

How do you view these --?

A Again, I understand your question, and the legitimacy of asking it, but the fact is we are going to have a lot of opportunities this week to express views on relations with Israel and the Middle East, in general, and I think rather than confusing it by addressing it from a variety of places, let's leave it in terms of the briefings that will be offered. Some will be on background and some will be on-the-record, and I think you will have ample opportunity to get articulation of that policy.

Q But the statement itself, Alan, by the Prime Minister, he already --

A We have also made a lot of statements on settlements and I am not suggesting to you that there is any change in our position at all, but I just would rather have any new words or rearticulation come out of the various briefings that will be held.

Q One more thing -- in a comment this morning by Evans and Novak, they argue that the Secretary of State appears to be more concerned about what he thinks is American credibility than with the American Marines' lives and safety by not accepting their removal from where they are which would decrease the physical risk for them.

Do you have any comment about that?

A I am not going to get into the question of specific internal discussions of various things. There is simply no plan at this point to redeploy the Marines, reposition them in the way that was suggested in the article. So, I don't really have a comment, therefore.

Q Do you accept the argument, Alan, that the Secretary is more concerned about American credibility than about the safety of the Marines?

A   I think it is quite fair to say that the Secretary of State is very concerned about the safety of American Marines, among other things. Absolutely.

Q   Has redeployment been discussed and the idea rejected?

A   That is why I say, without trying to lead you one way or the other, I am not going to try to get into the question of what discussions may have taken place or might take place in the future. Again, I am not trying to lead you on that, and don't take that as a confirmation of that, but I am just not going to get into internal discussions as a matter of principle.

Q   There was a report, Alan, in one of the papers, I believe, that Israel will be asking the United States to release the sale of the cluster bombs, or the components, which were banned by order from the President when the United States Government found that Israel was in violation of the agreement.

How long will the ban be in force before it will be lifted?

A   Again, I think this is one of those questions that you should ask others who are briefing on this visit. I am just not going to try and confuse the issue by dealing from two different podiums.

Q   Alan, have the U.S., Israel and France completed their evaluation of the air strikes conducted by France and Israel in northern and eastern Lebanon as to their effectiveness at destroying targets?

A   I don't know.

Q   Could you --

A   No, I don't think I would get into that. It would involve, for one thing, talking about other countries' evaluation and getting into intelligence. I am just not going to get into that.

Q   Well, the issue was raised here by the U.S. spokesman who said that if the targets had been adequately destroyed, there might not be a need for further military action.

A   We are not talking about further military action one way or another.

Q Right, but what about whether the targets had been adequately destroyed?

A I am not going to get into it. Don.

Q In Tokyo, the Chinese Communist Party leader, Hu Yaobang, is quoted as indicating that whether the Premier, Zhao, comes here in January depends in part on whether the United States gives a satisfactory response to China with regard to some points at issue that have been raised by the Chinese side in recent days.

Do you have any comment on this? Do you think that there is something that remains unsettled about the Premier's trip? Does the U.S. intend to make some response to the Chinese about their particular complaints?

A I don't think I am prepared to get into the question of the back and forth diplomatically. Both of the measures to which you refer, which are measures coming from the Hill, reflect the views of the Members of Congress who voted for them on those specific issues.

The policy of this Administration has been clearly and consistently enunciated many times. We recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, and we don't think that the Senate resolution or the amendment to the IMF appropriation bill should affect Premier Zhao's visit to the United States.

Q What is the U.S. position, the Executive Branch's position, about whether Taiwan should remain or should not remain in the Asian Development Bank?

A Don, I don't happen to have a piece of guidance with me at the moment. We talked about that some months ago, and there is available guidance on that. There is no change in that position, but I refer you back to that.

Q Can we get that later today, whatever that was?

A We ought to be able to get that out, yes.

Q On China, what can you tell us about the case of the courier who defected?

A The only thing I can tell you is to go to the INS. I don't have anything here.

Q Have you heard from the Chinese Embassy?

A I am not going to get into the question of diplomatic back and forth, but in terms of what the status of that case is, I refer you to the INS on that.

Q Alan, there has been a lot of speculation about President Assad's health. Do you have any specific news about that?

A I don't. You will have to ask the Syrian Government.

Q Alan, I want to go back, just for a second, to Guatemala. The first question is, a former Dean of the University there was killed on Friday, did you have any specific reaction to that?

A I don't think we have any guidance on that.

Q Also, is the January offer to sell U.S. military weapons -- spare parts, rather -- to Guatemala, is that now suspended?

A I think -- did we post an answer to that? I think the fact of the matter is that that offer was made, the decision was made at that point. The sale has not been consummated. That remains the status.

Q Do you have any comment on the military shake-up in El Salvador?

A No.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #211

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1982, 12:   P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: A couple of housekeeping announcements. Available in the Press Office is the prepared text of the speech to be given by Deputy Secretary Dam today in New Orleans. The subject is the Caribbean Basin Initiative and Central America. The text is embargoed until 2:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time. We plan to pipe in the Deputy Secretary's speech in this room at 2 o'clock. That will also include his question and answer session there.

Backgrounders -- this afternoon there will be a read-out in the White House briefing room for all accredited State Department and White House correspondents on the subject of Prime Minister Shamir's visit.

That read-out will begin about 1:45, following the departure statements by the President and Prime Minister Shamir.

Tomorrow at 11 o'clock in the morning, also in the White House briefing room, there will be a pre-brief on the visit of President Gemayel.

Both these sessions are on background.

That is all I have.

Q On housekeeping, John, do you have anything on the trip about the departure of the Secretary?

A No. I might have something on that tomorrow, Bernie.

Q John, what is the status of the request for the visa for Mr. Borge of Nicaragua?

A I understand his application has been denied.

Q On what grounds, can you tell us?

A I do not know because we got this just before we came out, and I simply have the announcement that Borge's visa has been denied, and Mr. D'Aubuisson's visa has been denied, but I don't have any details on the --

Q On D'Aubuisson?

A D'Aubuisson.

Q Did D'Aubuisson apply for a new visit?

A I understand he did.

Q Do you know where or what the circumstances are?

A I do not know where the application was made.

Q Could you post the answer to the question regarding --?

A We will get you whatever we can during the day.

Q On both?

A On both.

Q Is this some kind of a new policy on the part of the United States, which usually welcomes people to come to our shores?

A The United States usually welcomes people in good standing, but reserves the right to make a determination on anybody who crosses its borders, Don.

Q In one case, the man is the Minister of Interior of Nicaragua, and the other is the head of the National Assembly of El Salvador.

A I wasn't linking them. I was simply trying to satisfy the curiosity which you have expressed over the past several days in the travel plans of both of them.

Q By denying Borge's application to come here, is this an implicit comment about what the Administration thinks of the various measures that the Nicaraguan Government has made known in recent days?

A There are plenty of other opportunities for hearing what the Nicaraguan Government has to say. We have an Ambassador there. The Contadora Group is meeting in Panama City, I think, on December 1 and 2. There are lots of channels, lots of opportunities to hear what they have to say.

Q Is it true that the American Ambassador in Managua, Anthony Quainton, assured Mr. Borge some days ago that he would get his visa?

A I don't know. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Could you find out? Could you endeavor to find out if it is true, and, if so, why the Ambassador was overruled?

A Let me give you whatever we can. I am not promising to give you detail on any conversation that Ambassador Quainton may or may not have had with anybody in Nicaragua, but we will collect whatever we can to give you this afternoon.

As I say, I have given you the headline, right off the top here, which I got a few minutes ago.

Q What are the reasons for the denial?

A Bernie, I am trying to give you the news just as fast as I can, which I have done. We will follow up with whatever we can this afternoon.

Q Did the Department endorse the visa for Mr. D'Aubuisson?

A Sorry?

Q Did you endorse the visa request for Mr. D'Aubuisson?

A The Department --

Q Did you recommend granting the --

A The Department has made a decision in the case of the visa application.

Q Not the INS?

Q Could you explain why Mr. D'Aubuisson is not in good standing with this government?

A I can't. Maybe we will be able to give you something on that this afternoon. As I say, I just got the word that both visa requests are being denied, and I thought you would be interested in that.

Q Was this a White House decision?

A We don't get into -- like CBS, we don't get into --

Q But the question, John, is that it does seem exceptional to deny a visa to the minister of a government with which the U.S. has diplomatic relations. That seems to be the difficult part.

A It may not be exceptional. As you know, there is a waiver process.

Q But it doesn't happen that often.

A There are certain grounds which preclude certain people from coming to the United States, and I think I am right in saying that in the case of Mr. Borge that was the case, and his application would necessarily have involved a waiver. But, again, let me get you whatever we can on it this afternoon.

Q When you say that, what is the relevance when you say that there are plenty of opportunities to understand what the Nicaraguans have to say, and then citing the Contadora Group meeting, to which the United States is not a party?

A I think that is a good opportunity if the Nicaraguan Government has anything to say about peace and stability in the area, and about its own plans that contribute to peace and stability in the area, that will be one forum in which that might be communicated.

Q But not to the United States, right?

A I am sure we would be aware of it.

Q John, on this denial on the Nicaraguan, is this the opening shot of a policy you will follow on ministers from the Nicaraguan Government, or is this a case-by-case -- ?

A I think they would be examined case-by-case, Bernie.

Q What do you say to those organizations in the United States -- to my knowledge, they include the Council on Foreign Relations, the John Hopkins School of International Studies, and I am sure many, many more, including news organizations -- which have made arrangements to hear what the Nicaraguan Government was wanting to communicate through the person of one of its senior leaders?

A I think what we will do is offer you whatever rationale is available this afternoon. Obviously this was a careful decision. Obviously the character of the visit was taken into consideration, and the decision was made in terms of U.S. law.

Q John, could I try on D'Aubuisson one more time, knowing that you only have limited knowledge about this --

A No knowledge.

Q Pardon?

A No knowledge, actually, but go ahead.

Q In May, he was given a visa. There was no waiver involved. It was simply determined he represented an important political force in the country as President of the Constituent Assembly.

Now, this decision gives rise to the notion that he has done something between May and the present time that would warrant different treatment on the part of the United States Government, or that the United States Government has changed its policy with regard to D'Aubuisson.

Has he done something?

A Why don't we wait and see what we provide you in the way of rationalization.

Q Just one follow-up on that, John. D'Aubuisson is allied politically with several people who have residence visas who live in Miami.

Is any action contemplated by this Department for those people who have those political connections with D'Aubuisson who live in Miami? Is that under investigation?

A I am not talking about connections with D'Aubuisson, but, as you know, the appropriate authorities are looking at residents in this country who might be involved in activities that are contrary to U.S. law. But I am not connecting that with D'Aubuisson.

Q On an unrelated matter, I am curious, does Faruq Khaddumi, who is apparently visiting New York to give a speech, require a visa, or is he coming in on the UN --

A He is --?

Q The shadow Foreign Minister of the PLO.

A I can't answer that for you.

Q Will you take the question? Apparently he is coming here with a number of senior Department officials.

A Let me see what we might have for you on it.

Q John, one more on the visas, I want you to say whether the decisions with respect to Borge and D'Aubuisson are in any respect linked or whether it is completely coincidental that you are announcing the two together.

A They are not linked. I happened to be able to give you the news on both of them at the same time. Perhaps I shouldn't have done that. But we have had inquiries about both of them and I thought I would satisfy your curiosity.

Q It is entirely coincidental, then.

A It is entirely coincidental.

Q John, but your statement about people in good standing applied to both.

A I am sure that would be taken into consideration.

Q John, Surinam, anything on that?

A No, I don't have anything on Surinam. I have seen the reports.

Q Can I ask you one thing on Nicaragua? What if the Nicaraguans, as it usually happens between states, retaliated by denying entry of U.S. envoys and U.S. Government officials to Nicaragua, which would, in fact, break any contact with the Government of Nicaragua, what do you think that would do to future contacts with the Government of Nicaragua?

A We made our decision on the basis of law and what we thought was the right decision. I am not going to comment on what they might do.

Q But, as I said, some governments do take actions similar to the way their government is being treated. Wouldn't that really hurt future contact with them?

A I am sure that if they have a story to tell, there are many ways in which they can continue to tell it.

Q John, when was the decision made on these denials?

A I don't know when the decision was made, Bernie. I got the news of the decision just a few minutes before I came out here.

Q John, the Andropov letters to NATO heads of state?

A Well, we haven't seen the Andropov letter, so I don't have any specific comment on that. You are talking about Andropov to Kohl?

Q Uh-huh.

A Yeah. We haven't seen it, so we don't have any comment on that. In general, on the question of the Soviet decision to leave the talks, we have regretted it. We have said before and, say again today, that the Soviet decision to suspend the talks is totally unjustifiable in view of the fact that we have negotiated continuously for two years, during which the Soviets have deployed over 100 SS-20 missiles, with over 300 nuclear warheads.

The United States is prepared to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment. We believe it is in Soviet interests, and indeed the interests of everyone, they return to the negotiating table. And we call upon them to do so.

Q John, are there signs that the Soviets are willing to fold the INF talks into the START talks?

A Haven't seen such a suggestion.

Q Would you be interested in that?

A I think that in the background session with a senior Administration official the other day, he, I think, articulated where we stand on that.

Q John, I just want to be clear. Are you saying that you have no confirmation that in the Andropov letter to Chancellor Kohl, he used that phrase about the talks being not irreversible?

A We haven't seen the text of the letter. It is a letter from Mr. Andropov to Chancellor Kohl, so we haven't seen it.

Q How is it possible that it is now 24-hours old, that we are supposed to be an ally and a matter of --

A Well, I'm not sure that everybody routinely shares their mail.

Q You haven't asked to see the letter?

A I'm not sure that we've asked to see it or not.

Q Is Secretary Shultz considering going to Stockholm to open the new round of talks following the Helskini process--whatever they are called?

A Yeah. I don't think there is any change in his thinking on that. Basically the decision has not been made yet, Don.

Q Does it now look as though it will be a foreign ministerial type session?

A I have seen some press reports that it is looking more and more like a foreign minister session. But insofar as the Secretary is concerned, I simply don't think he has made a decision.

Q Has he been inclined not to go, as of now?

A January is a very busy month for him here in Washington. There is a lot of budget activity going on. There is also a China visit. So he has not really wished to leave Washington in January. But how he will decide on this, I don't know.

Q Has there been any coordination, or will there be, prior to the Vice President's going to Buenos Aires?

A Coordination?

Q Well, due to the fact that Mr. Gromyko apparently will also be attending that inauguration

A Didn't know that, John, didn't know that.

Q Do you have anything new on Andropov's health or whereabouts?

A No. Nothing beyond what we've said before, which I realize has been very cautious.

Q John, you specifically mentioned the Kohl letter. Do you have anything on the letter to Mrs. Thatcher?

A No, I don't. Sorry.

Q John, as you know, in South Africa, an African village near Johannesburg was ordered to be demolished or evacuated by the South African Government recently. It caused quite a bit of comment. It's the village of Mogopa, I guess is how you pronounce it. The evacuation of 300 families because evidently they were in the wrong place as far as the South African Government is concerned.

Does the Department have any comment on what is happening in that place?

A Yes. The United States has consistently made clear its view that South Africa's problems cannot be addressed constructively by the arbitrary relocation of peoples on an ethnic or racial basis within South Africa. The South African Government is aware of our view that political progress within South Africa will continue to depend on a dialogue among all its citizens. Statements by senior South African Government officials, including Prime Minister Botha, in the wake of the November 2 referendum, would suggest a commitment on the part of the South African Government itself to such a dialogue. But we believe the relocation of the residents of Mogopa would not contribute to the prospects for a constructive outcome of that dialogue. We deplore any action by any government to remove citizens from their homes forcibly or to destroy their property.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q You began by saying the South African Government knows U.S. views. Has this been communicated to them in some diplomatic manner?

A Well, I just think I will rest on the statement that they are very aware of our views.

Q John, can we come back to the nuclear issue for a moment?

A Sure.

Q Can you give us some sense of whether in this interim period there is any rethinking of American positions going on? Or whether we are simply, as has been sort of publically stated, in the position of having put our last negotiating proposal on the table, and simply waiting for the Russians to come up with something?

A Well, for two years we have been negotiating and offering new proposals, and that has been fairly consistent. We haven't seen such matching flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union.

Q I understand Mr. Nitze is coming back to Washington tomorrow?

A Yes. I don't know quite when he's coming in.

Q Are there any plans for a review of the American position --

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q -- or refinement of any points?

A Not that I'm aware of. I mean, I'm sure that he'll be having discussions with people in the Department. But we have a good position, and there it is. The Soviets have backed away.

Q So, as far as we're concerned, the ball is entirely in the other court?

A That's right.

Q John, do you read anything into the continuation of the START talks vis-a-vis the situation on the INF talks?

A No, I think you'll have to ask our Soviet --

Q You don't relate the two at all?

A No.

Q The Washington Times this morning has a story about the Israeli plan to settle the Palestinian refugees in the West Bank through the removal from refugee houses to permanent houses. Is this the thrust of the Kirby-Rodman mission and recommendations to the Secretary which were submitted recently?

A I think that's a proposal that we had some guidance on a few days ago. Isn't that the same proposal? Isn't that the one we gave you some guidance on a few days ago? I am being told by my good friend in the back that that is indeed the proposal.

Why don't you pull that guidance from the Press Office?

Q Do you know anything about a State Department investigation apparently -- I don't know whether it's formal or informal -- being headed by Larry Eagleburger on this EATSCO matter -- the Egyptian-American Trading Company which was found by the Justice Department to have bilked Americans out of $8 million in shipping charges, which allegedly involved some senior American officials? I understand there is now a State Department investigation.

A No. We obviously have an acute interest in, and sensitivity to, State Department investigations currently. But that's one that slipped by me.

Q Can you take that question?

A And take a look at it? Sure.

Q Apropos of the State Department investigations, can you tell us whether Secretary of State Shultz has been interviewed by the FBI recently, and whether or not he has or will take a lie detector test?

A I am not going to comment on any specific investigation --

Q That's why I didn't ask about --

A -- that might or might not be ongoing. However, the Secretary's position on unauthorized disclosure is very clear. He disapproves of it, and he would cooperate fully in any enforcment of any measure to --

Q Has he cooperated fully?

A I told you, I'm not going to respond to any questions about a specific investigation.

Q How about that Lorton investigation, John?

Any conclusions with that?

A I am delighted to say that I escaped any update on the Lorton investigation while I was away for the past few days.

Q John, I'm sorry. Maybe I missed something when I was away, but are you suggesting someone might order our Secretary of State to take a lie detector test?

A No, I am not suggesting that.

Q Well, is that suggested?

A It has been suggested by one of --

Q Are you saying that that is a possibility within this Administration --

A No. No, I'm not saying that.

Q -- that the Secretary of State --

A No.

Q -- would be put under the lie detector test?

A No. I said that the Secretary of State in general would cooperate in any investigation into unauthorized disclosure of classified information. But I didn't say anything about a lie detector test.

Q But, I mean, is that a possibility that the President might make the Secretary of State take a lie detector test, and that the Secretary would do that?

A I am not aware of such a prospect or such a request.

Q Why don't you take that one? I would be interested.

(Laughter)

Q In what? The question or the test? (Laughter)

A I thought I answered it in a fulsome way, Bernie.

Q Back on Nicaragua for a second. In The Christian Scientist Monitor yesterday, Dan Southerland published an article quoting Secretary Abrams at length, in which he seemed to be shifting U.S. policies, as has previously been annunciated on any settlement with respect to the regional talks or U.S. policy. He seemed to be indicating, in the context in which this statement is made or quoted here, that there should be verifiability on such matters as whether or not the Sandinistas or other governments put pressure on the church, or other such apparently internal matters.

Can you say whether his statements, as reflected in the Southerland article, reflect Administration policy? And if they do, could you make that clear as to the length of --

A Well, I'm sure Secretary Abrams reflects Administration policy, but I'm not familiar with that particular interview or what he said.

Q If I Xerox it for you, would you take it up?

A I'd be glad to look at it. Sure.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:35 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, November 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #212

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1983, 12:24 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I don't have a great deal up front except to confirm that the President's Special Envoy, Ambassador-at-Large Richard Stone, will be in Panama City for a series of meetings early on Thursday, December 1. In keeping with our policy on Ambassador Stone's travel, I am afraid we are not able to give you any more than that, on who he will be meeting with, but obviously what he is doing there is consistent with his role as a facilitator of dialogue in the region.

Q Do you have any details as to the length of his stay?

A I don't, Jim, no, nor any onward travel.

Q Facilitating dialogue with -- ?

A I think the subject of his talks there would be Nicaragua.

Q Pardon?

A Nicaragua would be the subject.

Q The subject of his talks?

A Yes.

Q So, is he giving up the Salvador track?

A No.

Q I don't get it, then.

A I'm just giving you a little extra there -- telling you the subject of this particular session will be Nicaragua. But if it confuses the issue, I will take it back.

Q Do you want to take it back?

A No.

Q The issue is pretty confused, actually.

A The Nicaraguan issue is confused?

Q Somewhat.

Q Lebanon is worse.

A No questions today?

Q John, the Saudi Ambassador today criticized the arrangement, the cooperation agreement with Israel, and said it would serve no useful purpose for stability in the Middle East.

What is your reaction to those comments, and what is the general reaction you found of Arab Governments?

A I haven't seen those comments by the Ambassador. I haven't seen the text of what he said, so we don't have any comment on that.

Insofar as Arab reaction, I think all we have seen is some rather sketchy press reaction up till now, and we don't have any comment on that or reaction to that.

Q There is nothing official from any Arab Governments?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you expect any, John?

A I don't know. That will be up to them.

Q Has the Prince had a -- the Ambassador -- a meeting with the Secretary or any other officials in this building?

A With the Secretary? I am not sure whether he has seen the Secretary or whether he has asked for a meeting with the Secretary. I guess he was over at the White House this morning, was he not?

Q Do you expect him over here? Is there anythng else pending?

A I honestly don't know whether he's seeing the Secretary today.

Q John, was the side letter between the United States and Israel discussed with Shamir during the meeting?

A I am going to stand on what the President and what Prime Minister Shamir said after the talks, and what a senior official said in the read-out on those talks.

Q John, I know we have asked this many times, how does the Administration intend to pursue, (1), the Reagan Plan; (2), the Israeli -- I mean, with the Israeli Government, as to how to bring about a cease to the freeze on settlements? If the Reagan Plan is not yet dead, how do you intend to go on with it, considering Prime Minister Shamir's reply yesterday as turning it down again?

A You know, characters have changed, situations have changed, but the fact is that when the President announced his initiative on September 1, he made the point that the United States was pursuing this for the long haul.

He said that we were under no illusions that peace in the Middle East, which certainly nobody else has been able to create in many years, the United States could facilitate and bring about swiftly; that it will be a long, hard, and arduous negotiation, but that we were in it for the long haul, and that he would continue.

So, sure, it is not easy. Various participants may have reactions to the proposal which initially seem to represent stumbling blocks, but I think his position is that we just have to keep working at that, and try to bring the parties together, try to bring them to the negotiating table. And situations do change, and have changed.

Q There was a briefer yesterday, a senior Administration official at the White House, who was asked about the continuation of the peace process, and he said that the Israelis are waiting for the next Arab head of state to come to the talks.

We could not follow up on that, and if the Israelis reject the Reagan Plan, what are the Arabs to come under? The Camp David they have rejected. I mean, where are we going?

A I think that, obviously, nobody has stepped forward yet, but you are well aware of the prospects that there have been for King Hussein to step forward. You have seen some comments by him recently indicating that there is, perhaps, some fluidity in the situation.

So, I don't want to get into what the senior Administration official meant by that, but I think that is a fact.

Q Without getting into the senior Administration official, John, you, yourself, now, you are asking King Hussein to come in under what terms?

A I think we have enunciated those very clearly in the past. I would be glad to steer you to that language. It hasn't changed.

Q Can I ask you if you would like King Hussein to come under the Reagan Plan of September 1, and if he does, will the Israelis sit and talk, since they rejected it already, I mean, once again and once again?

A I think if you say that the peace plan is dead because of what people say or because people refuse to come to the table, I guess you would drop it right there.

The fact is, the President isn't dropping it. He anticipated such objections and is continuing to work at his peace plan.

Q What would King Hussein come in under, John? Can you tell me?

A I would be glad to go back and refer you to the specific language we have used before, which I'd prefer to do on such an important question.

Q Another senior official this morning at the White House said in a backgrounder on the Gemayel visit that "we are not" -- I am quoting -- "not looking for opportunities to reopen it", and he meant the May 17 agreement.

Is that the signal to President Gemayel that even if he does come up with proposals or requests that it be modified somehow, that this will be the definitive position of the U.S. Government?

A Again, I don't want to go beyond what the senior Administration official said this morning, so I am not going to interpret what he said. But the facts are that we stand by the May 17 agreement; Israel stands by the May 17 agreement; and I haven't heard President Gemayel backing away from the May 17 agreement.

Q John, does this mean that the U.S. Administration support to President Gemayel is conditioned by his stand by the agreement of May?

A No, I don't think it is a conditional stand. President Gemayel was the head of the government which negotiated and signed that agreement.

Q Wasn't the purpose of the United States entering, as the senior U.S. official this morning said at the White House, entering the negotiations or negotiating on behalf to bring about the agreement, the Israel and Lebanon agreement, intended to, possibly the net result of it, to guarantee the independence of Lebanon and to save it from the disarray and the chaos which was there?

If now President Gemayel is arriving this afternoon and he is going to meet with officials tomorrow, and as a condition to resuming the reconciliation talks in Geneva, that this agreement of May 17 has to be rewritten or to be frozen or to be put in different terms than you concede to the Israeli position and you, as the United States, see --

If they will come with this talk, with this approach, what is going to be your position -- to stick with that agreement, or are you going to be reconsidering that agreement if the Lebanese wants it that way?

A We stand by the agreement, but there are a lot of hypothetical points in what you have said here.

First of all, I am not sure you are representing President Gemayel's position correctly. Secondly, you are raising a hypothetical question about what he might say when he arrives, and I think we would prefer to wait and see what he does say when he arrives. But there is no question about our commitment on the May 17 agreement.

Q John, yesterday at the British Commonwealth meeting, they issued a declaration which essentially equated the invasion of Afghanistan with the invasion of Grenada. Do you have anything on that?

A I have something on the Commonwealth statement, but not on that particular aspect. There were some remarks out of that meeting on Namibia, and I have those for you.

Q Also, did they criticize the U.S.?

A I would caution, however, that there was some scurrying after the meeting on the part of some delegations. I think there was some lobbying to revise positions stated in the communique and to make sure that it was clearly understood that not all governments were totally in tune. I think there were some reports out of --

Q With what?

A -- with certain aspects of some of the announced decisions.

But anyway, insofar as Namibia is concerned, the United States shares the widespread frustration, felt most strongly in Africa, that an issue outside the scope of Security Council Resolution 435 should delay the objective of Namibian independence.

The United States and its partners in the Western Contact Group, who have worked so hard on the Namibia process, share a common interest in the earliest movement to implementation of Resolution 435.

We remain convinced that the remaining obstacle can be overcome if it is approached realistically and practically. From that perspective, it is clear that implementation of a Namibian settlement will take place only if the fundamental concerns of all parties are addressed; and, as the Secretary General made clear in his August 29 report to the Security Council, South Africa's position regarding the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola does remain as an issue to be resolved.

For the past two years, we have worked hard on the search for a solution based on reciprocity, with full mutual respect for security and sovereignty on all sides, with the direct purpose of bringing about Namibia's independence.

We will remain engaged in this effort as long as it appears that there is a chance for a peaceful solution.

Q May we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q John, that sounds to me like a rephrasing of past policy. Does that strike you the same way?

A There hasn't been any change in our policy, but you have to be realistic about the stability of the whole area, and the fact of the matter is that the South Africans have a position on Cuban troops in Angola.

That is a fact.

Q Do we share that position at this point?

A It is a fact. You have got to deal with that.

Q But I am asking whether the United States shares that position, not whether or not --

A Shares the position that that is a fact?

Q No, that that is a concern that has to be resolved.

A Sure it is a concern that has to be resolved, as long as they hold strongly to their position.

Q John, why were the Borge and D'Aubuisson visas rejected?

A I do have something on that for you. As I think we said yesterday, the legal basis was Section 212(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act which excludes from admission to the United States aliens whose activities here would be contrary to the public interest.

As far as Mr. D'Aubuisson is concerned, he applied for a visa at the American Embassy in San Salvador to make a private trip to Miami, and he was refused under that section.

As far as Mr. Borge is concerned, he has on several previous occasions expressed an interest in visiting the United States. Prior to his November 1983 application he applied for a visa in August of this year to speak to a number of private groups.

He was found eligible for a visa at that time and was so informed, but Mr. Borge, however, did not travel to the United States at that time.

The D'Aubuisson and Borge cases were decided independently, and yesterday's decision not to grant the visas does not prevent either applicant from applying again at some future date.

Insofar as Mr. D'Aubuisson is concerned, as you are aware the Administration is seriously concerned about the level of death squad activity in El Salvador. We have been engaged in a number of very sensitive discussions on this subject with Salvadoran officials, and the issuance of a visa to Mr. D'Aubuisson at this time was not viewed as appropriate.

Such an issuance might well have conveyed signals, intended or not, which would not have been productive to ongoing discussions.

Let me finish, if you don't mind, Lester.

Insofar as Mr. Borge is concerned, refusal of his visa should be seen in the context of our very clear support to the ongoing Contadora effort to achieve a regional solution to the conflicts in Central America.

We believe that the forthcoming Contadora meetings in Panama -- that's December 1 and 2 for the technical meetings, and December 15 for the meetings of the foreign ministers -- provide the appropriate forum for tabling, discussing, and reaching agreements on the basis of the 21-point Document of Objectives agreed to by all the Central America and Contadora nations in September.

The Nicaraguans have made two efforts to end-run the Document of Objectives. The first was their effort to interject the Central America issue into the United Nations. The second was their attempt to pick and choose among the 21 points and to bilateralize some of the issues in their four treaty drafts.

In our view, Mr. Borge's proposed visit to the United States would have afforded him the opportunity for yet another end run and therefore the decision to refuse his visa at this time should be seen in this context.

As I said earlier, in both cases the matter of timing was important and the decision of the Administration at this time not to issue the visas does not prevent either applicant from applying at some future date.

Incidentally, insofar as the story about Ambassador Quainton is concerned, a suggestion that he had indicated to Mr. Borge that the visa application would be approved, Ambassador Quainton denies that flatly. He says he indicated simply that the visa application was under examination in Washington.

Q Could we have a copy of that?

A Sure.

-- MORE --

Q John, do we regard these two men as more detrimental and more terrorist -- you mentioned the level of death squad activities -- than the PLO, who have an office here in Washington? I mean, are they more terrorist?

A No, I'm not going to get into --

Q They are not?

A No, that's not what I said. I said, no, I'm not going to get into a gradation of undesirability, Lester. (Laughter) The fact is that we made our decision --

Q I love that term.

A You like that one? Okay, then that should satisfy you.

Q Can I follow up?

A I'm afraid so. Yes. Go ahead. (Laughter)

Q The Washington Post reports that one extremely grand personage at the Department of State is said to have exploded with exasperation at Senator Armstrong's insistence that the Tariff Act of 1930 forbidding imports of convict or forced labor from the Soviet Union --

A This is a follow up from a previous question, Lester? It has a relevance which undoubtedly will become clear in time.

Q Sure. Well, it's just trying to see if we can get some standard of --

My question is, is this "grand personage" Secretary Shultz? Or who is it, if you know? And does the Secretary believe that this law should be enforced or not?

A Don't know because I haven't seen that report. Don't know --

Q It was it Sunday's Washington Post.

A Yeah. Well, I don't always read --

Q You undoubtedly read that newspaper, don't you?

A Oh, sure. But I may not have caught every line.

Q So, if I could, this: The Post columnist reported that an unidentified Treasury official described Senator Armstrong as "a nut."

A I think you would have to go to Treasury for a comment on that. (Laughter)

Q Oh, yes. I knew that was coming. But what I wanted to ask in this connection is not the Treasury, because I will ask there, but can we be assured that Secretary Shultz does not share this opinion of Senator Armstrong?

A I've never heard the Secretary call anybody "a nut."

Q Can you take the question? I would like to know, where does Shultz stand? Does he feel that this law should be enforced or ignored?

A Let me see, Lester, if there is anything conveniently at hand on this.

Q Does the United States think that D'Aubisson is connected with the death squads? Or do you make that reference for some other reason?

A No, that is not what we were saying. But I think what we were saying is, we do not wish to convey any signal. That's not to imply culpability, but there has been discussion and speculation and so forth and so on. And in light of that, we decided that we thought it would be unwise to grant him a visa at this time.

Q Can you be any more specific on the signal? You raised "death squads" and there have been some allegations that he is connected. And this would seem to support that.

A Well, we've seen the reports of that connection. That's what I am saying. But it would be improper for the United States to ascribe culpability.

Q John, going back to your guidance on specifically the Borge -- the refusal of his visa, you used the phrase "our view." Does that mean that the State Department at no time in this visa application process recommended to the Administration that he be granted a visa?

A Oh, you know, I'm not going to get into the specifics of this decision, but I think it would be unusual in an institution as large as the United States Government, or indeed a television network, if there were not diverse views. In fact, I would hope that the President always would be presented with a variety of views, rather than being confronted with an Administration of thousands of --

Q Are you suggesting that the State Department recommended one thing and the Administration another?

A No. I was giving you one of those philosophical statements that you ask for from time to time on the general principle of there being discussion and diversity of viewpoint in the Administration, but I am not going to get into this specific case.

Q Where was the decision made?

A Well, the State Department has the responsibility for making that decision. But, again, I'm not going to get into what consultations there might have been with others.

Q John, did Borge indicate that he wanted to meet and possibly negotiate with senior Administration officials while he was here?

A I'm not sure of that, of my own knowledge, Jim, but I wouldn't rule it out. I don't know what he requested.

Q But if -- that's unclear. Why would you consider essentially a public trip, in which he addresses primarily private audiences of private organizations in this country, or university and church organizations, why would you consider that an "end-run" around Contadora?

A I think the thinking might well be that he would use those particular occasions as platforms for the same kind of rhetoric that we have seen before.

Q I still don't understand. How is that a diplomatic or, in any respect, "end-run"?

A Well, I can understand where you might not agree with the decision, but I'm giving you what is the basis for the decision. Whether you agree with it or not, that was the basis on which the decision was made.

Q Could you take up The Post's allegations, which are pretty strong today, which is that, "Can no official" -- and I'll direct the question at you -- "see the absurdity of demanding, under threat of arms, that the Sandinistas open up Nicaraguan society while the American Government, in limited but crucial respects, closes its own?" And it also suggests that the barring "betrays a misunderstanding" --

A You want us to answer the question, "Can no official see the absurdity"? That is a pretty sweeping --

Q Well, that's the question they ask.

A Well, I think it would be unrealistic to attempt to answer that question.

Q Well, they also allege that this betrays something of -- they call it "contempt" -- for the American democratic process; that the American people should be able to distinguish between propaganda, or grandstanding, and truth, and that this is not a good model for Nicaragua in we are trying to persuade them --

A Well, that's a viewpoint of The Washington Post, and obviously they are --

Q How do you respond to that, though?

A Well, I think you have to assume that all aspects of this visa application would have been taken into consideration. And, obviously, there are negatives, and those would have been considered. But on balance, the Administration came to the decision it did. But it would not be unmindful of those aspects of which you speak.

Q John --

A Lester, I'm going to go to somebody else because you've had a couple of good innings already.

Q Not half as many innings as my friend over here, but that's all right.

A Well, that's all right. We'll --

Q Can I go back to Lebanon?

A Sure can.

Q (Inaudible)

A Let me take one over here on Lebanon.

Q Today a senior Administration official said that there is no provision for the withdrawal of the Syrians in the May 17 agreement --

A That's correct.

Q -- while the Israelis said, "Yes, there is." So, to which one do you subscribe?

A Well, I think the fact is that in the May 17 agreement, there is not specific reference to Syrian withdrawal.

Q So the Israelis are wrong?

A Well, I'm not saying that, but I think -- let me say, that in the agreement itself I think there is not reference to a Syrian withdrawal. I'm not suggesting that Israel doesn't have positions which might have been articulated in another form. But I think the statement is correct that in the agreement there is no mention.

Q John, if I can return to this case of the visit of Mr. D'Aubuisson? I don't understand what you did in this statement. You say that Mr. D'Aubuisson is not directly linked to the death squads, but you say there are allegations and it's on the basis of these allegations.

First you cast aspersions on the life of this man, and then you say on the basis of these allegations you deny the visa.

I don't understand this.

A No. I guess I -- perhaps I wasn't clear, but what I was trying to do was to avoid any question of ascribing culpability to Mr. D'Aubuisson, and reiterating the language which we had used--that such an issuance might well have conveyed signals, intended or not, which would not have been productive to ongoing discussions.

That's not ascribing guilt. That's just recognizing some realities.

Q So the fact was, if you were to give him a visa to come to the United States at this time, the discussions that are going on would be hindered; and that's the reason you are denying the visa?

A I think that is a fair implication.

Q So, why this phrase about "death squads"? That seems to come out of the blue.

A Why the phrase?

Q You mentioned in this statement a phrase about "death squads."

A Yes. We're concerned about them.

Q Well, I think everybody is concerned, but I am trying to understand what is the basis for --

A Well, I think I will leave you with the language we have offered you.

Q But may I ask, had he been permitted to enter, what does the Administration believe would have been the signal back to El Salvador?

A I think we will leave you with the language we have offered.

Q John, can I try just one other -- of course another possibility is that it's only because he's a leader, not because he has anything to do with death squads?

A I think I will leave you with the language we have offered.

Q But we've kind of left an impression here that he might possibly have something to do with them or at least there are reports that he does, and that was the reason.

So, which of those two would be the reason?

A I think we are going to stand on the rather specific language we've got.

Q John, same subject. I understand there is supposed to be an announcement somewhere today in this city concerning Salvadoran certification. Do you know anything?

A I don't know whether the announcement is coming today, but I think you should go to the White House for that. That is obviously a Presidential decision.

Q Do you know what the issue is?

A I think there is some legislation pending that the President has to rule on.

Q Can I ask you one more question about --

Q What did you say?

A I think I would ask the President or the White House.

Q I would like to ask one more question, John, about the Middle East.

The President yesterday, and the Prime Minister of Israel, both mentioned the threat from Syria, backed by the Soviet Union, as the basis for U.S.-Israeli cooperation.

What is it that the United States expects Israel to do in order to lessen that threat? Can you give us some answer as to what it is exactly that Israel is being asked to do, or can do?

A Oh, I think strengthened ties in the political and military area, contacts between Israel and the United States are, in part, intended to be a response to instability in the area. And obviously Soviet militancy and the increased arms flow to Syria is one of the factors that tends to destabilize the area. That's something that we're concerned about and something the Israelis are concerned about.

Q John, do you have anything on your assumption that by doing what the President yesterday said the United States Government will do, more stability would be likely to come to the Middle East?

A I think it underlines American and Israeli fortitude and conviction in the area. Sure.

Q And one more thing, John. The phrase of "improving the quality of life" of Palestinians in the territory has been mentioned a few times. Can you tell me or tell us something as to what does exactly that phrase mean?

A I think it means paying attention to, and improving, the lot of Palestinians, irrespective of ultimate political solutions to their problem, particularly in the West Bank. I think it means looking seriously at ways in which life might be made more comfortable and palatable for them.

Q Can you discuss that subject, John? Can you tell me -- I mean, I know the senior Administration official yesterday did mention that the President and Prime Minister talked about it.

Can you tell us if the President did receive some assurance from the Israeli Government that this request by the U.S. Government will be looked into, considered? Or was the answer affirmative by the Prime Minister?

A I think that the Israelis emerged from those discussions well aware of our viewpoint, and I presume that there will be ongoing discussion on the matter.

Q John, do you have anything on pending legislation that would have the U.S. recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you have anything on Andropov?

Q Could we go back to death squads for just one moment? Any reaction to the reports from Salvador that some officers, including I think Major Pozo, who have been linked to death squads, have been transferred?

A Yes, I do have --

Q Does this appear that the Salvadorans are moving in the right direction?

A Well, I have something on the military changes that have taken place. We understand that a decision was made by Salvadoran authorities to restructure the military command and to transfer senior officers in such a way as to provide more aggressive leadership for the troops in the field. Under the previous arrangement, there were over a dozen field commanders reporting back to San Salvador and it was decided that this was too cumbersome to coordinate actions effectively. Under the new arrangement, there are six regional commanders responsible for all activities in their respective areas. The Salvadorans have selected proven, competent officers to staff the new positions, and to the extent that military coordination and operations improve, we consider this a positive development.

To the extent that these transfers also reflect a conscious decision to remove known or suspected human rights violators from positions of sensitivity in this area, we would welcome them.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q Wasn't Golscher, the guy who was in charge of San Vicente, transferred--the Conara program?

A I don't know, Jim. I don't have those specifics.

Q John, this morning Ambassador Clovis Maksoud of the Arab League in the United States made the statement that the emergence of U.S.-Israel strategic access definitely has lowered the expectations of the Arabs, and confirmed the perception that the United States can no longer be a mediator or a broker.

Would you comment on this?

A No, I haven't seen that statement, so I don't have any specific comment on it except to say that the discussions and decisions that have gone on in connection with Israel in no way preclude cooperation between the United States and the moderate Arab nations.

Q John, Newsweek reports that Secretary Shultz wants some answers as to who it was in the State Department who sent old filing cabinets with Top Secret material to the Lorton Reformatory by mistake.

My question is, has he gotten any answers? And have there been other such instances of State Department carelessness of Top Secret material, aside from the various espionage cases?

A I don't know of any other cases. I don't know of any other cases, period, but I certainly don't know of any other cases under investigation, Lester. Yes, the Secretary is acutely interested in carelessness or any illegal action. And that investigation --

Q From what Department did this come from?

A I think it came out of INR, but I think you are a little bit behind the curve because I think there has been an exhaustive discussion of the "Lorton Affair", as it has come to be known.

Q I am sorry. I have been in California. I, you know, just wondered if there is anything.

Could I follow up -- one quick follow-up? Do we regard the French and Israeli air raids in Lebanon as wrong, or do we regard them as our surrogate for President Reagan's promise of swift and effective retribution for terrorism, made in 1981?

A Again, I am afraid your vacation has kind of taken you out of the curve, Lester. We've had a lot to say on that, and the position hasn't changed.

Q Would you regard -- if you could just verify -- we look upon them as doing our work for us or are we going to do it or what?

A No. There's a lot of stuff on the record there, and I refer you to it.

Q You'd rather evade?

A No, I'm not evading.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:55 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, December 1, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #213

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1983, 12:23 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. A few announcements up front: Available from the Press Office later this afternoon will be a statement on the November 28-December 1 Washington visit of the Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Lee Won Kyung. The readout on President Gemayel's discussions with President Reagan, I understand, has been postponed from 1:30 to 4:00 this afternoon at the White House.

There will be a background briefing on Secretary Shultz' travel that starts next week. That briefing will be in the State Department briefing room on Monday, December 5 at 11:00 a.m.

As to the trip itself, in addition to his December 7-9 trip to Brussels, the Secretary will travel to the Federal Republic of Germany, Morocco, Tunisia, and Portugal. He will begin his trip in Bonn on December 6, where he will hold meetings with President Carstens, Chancellor Kohl, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher, and other political leaders. These discussions will continue the regular series of high-level exchanges between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Following his visit to Brussels, the Secretary will make two steps in North Africa where he will be consulting with President Bourguiba, in Tunis, on December 10 and King Hassan in Morocco on December 11, and members of their governments. The visit is to reaffirm our close and strong ties with both countries and are in response to long-standing invitations which the Secretary is pleased to be able to take up at this time.

The Secretary will conclude his trip with a visit to Lisbon December 12-14 in response to an invitation from Foreign Minister Gama. Then, he will meet with President Eanes, Prime Minister Soares, Vice Prime Minister

Mota Pinto and Foreign Minister Gama. The Secretary looks forward to this opportunity to maintain close contact with the leaders of our long-time close ally, Portugal.

That's about all I have, in terms of announcements. I'll be happy to take any questions.

Q Can we get a copy of that trip announcement?

A Sure can, yes.

Q Can I ask you -- the announcement is on the Kyung visit --

A Sorry. On the which visit?

Q On the Korean visit.

A On the visit of the Korean Foreign Minister.

Q That's in the Press Room now?

A Press Room, this afternoon.

Q John, do you have anything regarding Ambassador Stone's meetings in Panama City -- the outcome of those meetings?

A No. I think that a White House official offered some information on that this morning, and I think we'll let the White House carry the ball on that.

Q You have nothing to say on how the proposal is to be conveyed to Nicaragua?

A No.

Q John, is it still the Administration's position that the Nicaraguan Government must adhere to the promises it made to the OAS in 1979?

A Sure.

Q Do you have the travel plans for Stone?

A Don't know of anything that's been announced, Ralph.

Q We've been hearing an awful lot of reports that the Administration now would like the Contras to turn themselves into a political party, instead of a military fighting force.

A Uh-huh. I think there may have been some words offered at the White House this morning. Be happy to refer you to the White House on that.

Q How is it that the White House is handling this dissemination?

A Well, Ambassador Stone is a Presidential appointee, so that's not so unusual.

Q But Latin American and Central American policy is still being formulated here?

A The Administration speaks with one voice; it's the President's foreign policy.

Q Just checking.

(Laughter)

A No change.

Q On the Middle East, please?

A Sure.

Q There are reports today that the Israelis, in fact, were not the party of the two -- Americans and Israelis -- that brought the issue of the resale of cluster bombs, or cluster shells to be more precise, to the talks. Can you clarify this? Had the Israelis requested -- or were they offered it by the United States?

A I don't know quite how it came up, but I think the Secretary responded to that question at a press breakfast this morning, and I refer you to his words on that.

Q Can we look at the text of that? Is it available somewhere?

A As soon as it's available, to be sure.

Q When will it be?

A I don't know. I guess it's being typed.

Q One more thing about that: The briefer, a senior Administration official at the White House, following the departure statements, said that there would be talks about a usage agreement by the Israelis.

A Right.

Q Is this part of the military committee that was established?

I don't think it will be done in that committee. I think there will be separate talks. I don't quite know how those will be conducted; but that's absolutely correct, that the ban on the sale of cluster weapons was listed conditional upon negotiation of a satisfactory agreement governing usage.

Q John, can I go back to Nicaragua for a moment?

A Sure.

Q It's been reported, and the Nicaraguans have said themselves, that they are planning to offer amnesty to those political prisoners inside Nicaragua --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and passage home to those rebels unhindered who might want to come home. What is the Administration's position on that, as well as reports from Managua that the Sandinistas are embracing or about to embrace the church, and about to offer better accommodations for the Miskito Indians?

A As I think the Secretary said -- but I really would refer you to his remarks specifically -- but as he said this morning, in essence, certainly some of the statements that some Nicaraguan leaders have been making have sounded somewhat more positive lately; but there is a difference between statements and reality, and I think we might wait and see what the reality of the situation is.

On the amnesty, we have seen reports -- can't confirm -- that the Nicaraguan Government is considering these policy changes. Currently, we believe that there are about 3,800 political prisoners in Nicaragua. There is also the case of the Miskito Indians -- about 15,000 of them -- refugees, in Honduras.

The United States has made clear the serious concern with which it views Nicaraguan violations of human rights, as well the need for all countries in Central America to take measures to allow full participation by their peoples in democratic political life.

I don't have anything specific on the church questions.

Q John, have you got anything either on the Dixon Amendment or on Congressional attempts to put Iran and Iraq back on the list of countries that support terrorism, or on alleged tilts?

A No. No. No.

(Laughter)

Q Anything on the Salvador pocket veto question?

A As you know, the President, the White House has addressed that, but certainly a statement released by the White House yesterday was clear in stating the rationale for the President's decisions and the reservations we've had concerning H.R. 4042. We have copies of that available in the Press Office if you haven't already seen them.

As you are aware, the State Department has traditionally opposed country-specific legislative restraints. Our foreign policy interests in Central America include support for human rights, democratic institutions, land reform, and justice in the case of slain U.S. citizens. These are important objectives upon which the Executive and Legislative branches agree, and upon which we have consulted and will continue to consult with the Congress. The only issue has been whether the procedure of requiring Executive Branch judgments on an "all or nothing" basis at arbitrary six-month intervals has contributed to these policy objectives.

As you know, provisions of H.R. 4042 are already addressed in this year's Continuing Resolution which requires a separate certification on progress in the area of land reform and withholds 30 percent of military assistance funds until the Government of El Salvador has completed the investigation and trial in the churchwomen's case.

In addition, as yesterday's White House statement indicated, the Department will continue to provide the Congress with periodic public reports on the political, economic and military situation in El Salvador with January 16, 1984 being the next date.

Q I thought you didn't have much to say there.

A Sorry, I haven't finished yet.

We have been and will continue working with the leadership of the Government of El Salvador in our mutual efforts to take whatever action is necessary to help that government end the unacceptable activities of both the extreme right and left, and to extend the progress achieved in land reform, to support the forward motion toward open and democratic elections next year.

Q What actions are necessary?

A I think we have made clear what actions we think are necessary, and have had a considerable amount to say on that.

Q We really haven't made it clear what actions are -- charges filed? People arrested? We've never really said. We just said we want it stopped.

A I think the Secretary has made abundantly clear -- and the President -- the position of the United States, certainly on the question of these court cases and their requirements; and I don't think that there can be any misunderstanding of our view on the activities of the death squads which we have seen in recent weeks. I don't think that there is any doubt on that.

Q Can we get a copy of your statement?

A Sure.

Q Also, I'd like to ask, you were concerned about sending signals, whether intended or not, down to El Salvador yesterday. I'd like to know what signal you think this sends to El Salvador and what signal it sends to Congress, which passed it, for the future of bipartisan policy?

A I don't think there could be any misunderstanding about the President's intentions, if you read what he has said. There is no diminution of our concern for human rights. What we are objecting to is the somewhat artificial method under which the reporting procedure has gone forward hitherto.

Q In what respect is it artificial?

A I think the Secretary again addressed this this morning. He made the point that if you had to report at artificial, six-month intervals, there may be a tendency to accumulate information to bolster a certain conclusion, or indeed a certain certification.

The real question is whether the government, in whatever country you're talking about, is really committed to those measures. That is a more important objective to achieve than simply producing data for a certification report.

Q You mention a January date as the next date for certification. Does the veto make that unnecessary?

A Well, this will not be certification. This will be the date agreed for the next submission of a report.

Q The Secretary, if I understand correctly, this morning said that if the current situation that exists today exists in mid-January, he would find it very difficult to certify.

A Go back to his specific remarks, but that in general -- that is the thrust of what he said.

Q Does that mean that there is some daylight between him and the President's action on this matter?

A No. What we're saying is that --

Q Isn't the effect of this veto to implicitly approve the situation in --

A Not at all, because we will not stop saying what we feel and what needs to be said about human rights activities in El Salvador.

Q Doesn't it have that effect?

A Not at all. Not at all.

Q It certainly would be interpreted that way, wouldn't it?

A Not by us.

Q John, hadn't the Government reached a point where it could not certify human rights progress in the face of the death squads, and so would have had to cut off military aid?

A I think you really have to look at the Administration's position on this issue of certification, which has been a long-standing one, and the White House has addressed it. I really think you have to look at that particular viewpoint of that procedure, and detach that from -- I mean, look at what we say on El Salvador -- that's the test -- and look at what we do.

-- MORE --

Q In terms we can understand, John, what was the Secretary's attitude towards the veto, the President's veto. Did he support it?

A Did he indicate what his position was? No, we never discuss that, John.

Q Did he oppose it?

A It is just like Hearst newspapers, on all their internal discussions, they have these discussions, and they speak with one voice.

Q Yes, but we publish.

Q Senior officials have testified before Congress on a number of occasions, including Assistant Secretary Enders, and I think even Under Secretary of Defense Ikle said in fact the certification process has been useful in getting cooperation or in stimulating greater efforts on the part of the Salvadoran Government and military. Now, why this change?

A I suppose, Jim, if you were to move away from the certification process and you did nothing else, that would be lack of progress, but that is not what the Administration is suggesting or is proposing to do.

Q What is the other something else that you are proposing to do?

A I think listen to what we say and look at our actions. I think that is the test of how strongly we feel.

Q What actions should we be looking at right now?

A Sorry?

Q What actions should we be looking at?

A I think you should be looking at various pronouncements we have made recently, and I think you should be looking at visa decisions. I think you should look at all that, put it together, and come to your own interpretation.

Q Let me ask you about the public report that you are going to make in January.

The previous certifications have included numbers of civilian victims. Will this public reporting also deal with those numbers?

A I don't know the answer to what that report will include.

Q John, the Secretary said, the last time he certified aid to El Salvador, that it was very difficult for him to do, yet he did it.

Is there any change in his view from that time to what he said this morning about the situation that exists now? I mean, maybe it will be difficult, but whether that affects --

A I would like you to go back to his specific words this morning, but in essence I think what he said was that if there were not major improvement between now and mid-January, if the certification process were still in effect, it would be very difficult for him to append his signature to certification.

Q He said the last time he appended his signature that it was very difficult, but he appended his signature anyway.

A That is right. He thought about it and anguished about it, and came to the decision that he did in that case.

Q All of which leads to the conclusion -- the question about, your comments about, watch the actions we take and not (sic) the words we say, and the actions that the U.S. takes are to approve certification, to approve aid, regardless of how difficult Secretary Shultz may have found it the last time.

A That depends over what period you are judging them, but I would refer you to statements in recent days, in particular.

Q John, back to the Middle East, if I may, do you have any comment on the latest developments in Lebanon, and if you see them in the light of the visit by President Gemayel to this country?

A No, I don't relate them to President Gemayel's visit. I will give you what we have on the situation.

Yesterday the Marines' positions at the airport in Beirut came under brief sniper fire twice. The Marines returned fire; there were no Marine casualties.

Since the shelling of the airport's western runway yesterday, there's been no direct or indirect artillery or rocket fire at the airport, but the airport does remain closed, and obviously that means there is still a threat.

There has been heavy fighting along the Alayh ridgeline and the PSP publicly has warned civilians to avoid or vacate areas near military targets in East Beirut.

There has also been some fighting in the Suq al-Gharb region and skirmishes in the southern suburbs of Beirut.

This morning we have seen the press reports that a Druze religious and judicial authority, Shaykh Taqi' al-Din, has been murdered.

Today there are reports that three French soldiers were injured when their jeep was the target of a grenade in the Shiyyah area. Yesterday, according to reports, a French soldier was killed, and our report says that a second was wounded by sniper fire, and a third declared missing as a result of a helicopter crash.

I think the Pentagon may have some more up to date figures, and I think in fact there are now two French killed in that incident.

The increase in the level of violence in Lebanon during the past several days in the view of the United States only can serve to increase tensions between Lebanon's confessional groups. We deplore this unnecessary violence and deeply regret the loss of innocent lives and the destruction of private property.

We call on all responsible parties to respect the cease-fire in order to minimize civilian casualties and to promote the achievement of the worthy objective of national reconciliation.

I think as far as Tripoli is concerned, the feeling is that the uneasy cease-fire is holding today.

Q Can we have a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q John, do you relate all of the things you just ticked off in a sort of routine fashion, do you relate that all to Gemayel's visit here as any kind of signal to the U.S. of how worthy that goal is or how likely it is to be achieved?

A I can't. I suppose people who are shooting weapons may have the intent of sending signals, but I can't give you an analysis.

Q But the signals are not being received here, I take it.

A Received by us, you mean?

Q By the U.S.

A President Gemayel is here. We are talking national reconciliation. We are talking troop withdrawal. We are talking a strengthened Lebanese Government, and that is an indication of our commitment.

Q John, Prime Minister Shamir today did not exclude that the guerrilla activity against the Syrians was not discussed on the committee level, is that right?

A I don't think that statement -- if you are suggesting that Mr. Shamir left the impression that there was discussion of guerrilla activity, I don't think that is correct.

Q No. He said on the committee level maybe. I mean, he did not exclude that.

A I think you would be misled in thinking that there was any discussion of guerrilla activity.

Q John, if I could go back to Nicaragua just for a second, today a group calling themselves "Witnesses for Peace" is going to Nicaragua to go up to the Jalapa area along the border. They say they have told the Department of their plans but they have received no response.

Is there any reaction to that?

A I don't know. I would be glad to take a look at it. I haven't heard anything about that.

Q John, do you have any advice for them?

A As I didn't know anything about it, I don't have any advice for them.

Q John, just one more on Central America, if I could.

I know you are referring all questions relating to today's briefing at the White House to the White House, but in view of the positions that appear to be taken with respect to the possibility of negotiations, is the United States now going to modify its position with respect to negotiations in El Salvador with respect to advocating negotiations on the basis of the promises made in 1979?

A I am not aware of any modification of our position on El Salvador.

Q So that remains the same despite the apparent inconsistency.

A As far as I know, yes.

Q John, could you clarify something, was there any discussion with Mr. Shamir when he was here about a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon?

A Not that I am aware of.

Q Partial withdrawal?

A Not that I am aware of.

Q The United States didn't suggest that in any shape, manner or form?

A No. There was common agreement on the May 17th agreement.

Q Simultaneous withdrawals, is that correct?

A The May 17th agreement provides for unconditional Israeli withdrawal. The circumstances under which that withdrawal might take place, obviously what the Syrians do is a factor in that decision to implement the agreement.

Q To follow up the same question of my colleague on the guerrilla activity --

A Gee, I hope I give you the same answer.

Q -- I just want to understand if denying the discussion in itself does mean that it is a matter to the other parties to find for themselves what to do?

A The point I was making is that I don't think it is correct to suggest that Mr. Shamir left any hint that there was any discussion of this. I haven't seen what he said, but I think you would be misled if you went down the road of thinking that there was discussion of this.

You place me in a difficult position, because always we never want to talk about diplomatic negotiations, but I think this is an important point, and so I would steer you away from the suggestion that there was a discussion of this.

I think Mr. Arens made some remarks about this, and as far as that is concerned, that is his view, and I would refer you to the Government of Israel for any clarification of that.

The fact is that the political/military committee which we have discussed has not met yet. It will meet probably in January. The American Chairman will be Admiral Howe, and as has been said on a number of occasions, they will consider contingencies and possibilities in the area in the light of a Soviet buildup, and will consider various ways in which they might plan to meet those contingencies, and that might include prepositioning and it might include military maneuvers of some kind.

Q Would that also include guerrilla activity, maybe?

A There has been no discussion of such activity.

Q John, you just ticked something off again in answering John about May 17th on unconditional withdrawal. Did you mean --

A The Israelis outlined their withdrawal plan, and it is in that agreement.

Q But I mean, if it is unconditional, why then is Israel still in Lebanon?

A As I say, there are certain realities. The Israelis have set out the conditions under which they would withdraw, and you have seen the agreement. The reality of the fact is that they are not going to implement that until there is a Syrian withdrawal.

Q But the fact is that they are not actually directly simultaneous, because the side letter simply assures the Israelis that they don't have to withdraw until the Syrians withdraw, but that doesn't necessarily mean simultaneously.

A I am not going to get into the question of side letters or alleged side letters, and I am not going to get into the question of simultaneity, if I may use that dreadful word, but I think under the appropriate conditions, the Israelis have made clear how they will withdraw, and obviously one of those conditions is the withdrawal of Syrian troops.

Q On my previous question, John, whenever those talks about the use of the cluster shells is completed, will its terms become public? Will we know about them, or is it something between the United States and --

A I don't know. I honestly can't answer that question. I don't know what the precedent is, and I don't know how or when those talks will be conducted. So, I am sorry, I just don't know.

Q John, on another subject, is the Secretary --

Q Excuse me, one more on the Middle East, if I may? I just want to ask if you came to the conclusion by any means that the Soviet Union is responsible the same way as the Syrians were for the tragic event against the Marine headquarters?

A Whether the Soviet Union was responsible for that?

Q Yes.

A No, there was general discussion of the Soviet presence and its unhelpfulness in the region, but there was no discussion of Soviet culpability for the Marines bombing.

Q John, yesterday you made a statement about the characters changing in the Middle East in relation to another subject. I would like to ask about the same kind of idea, though, with respect to Syrian President Assad.

Does the U.S. take the view at this point that something has changed in recent weeks regardless of what the facts are about President Assad's illness, that something has changed in Syrian -- that might allow the Syrian position to change, or might allow the Israeli and Lebanese and American position to change on Lebanese withdrawal?

A If you are referring to President Assad's health, we have seen the reports that he has appeared in public again, so that is a fact. But, no, I don't think we have any characterization of Syria's position, or any shift in position.

Q You don't think that the stands that the Syrian Government and the Syrian President will take now may be changed by whatever illness he might have?

A I think you will have to ask the Syrians and make your own acute observation.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:48 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, December 2, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #214

FRIDAY DECEMBER 2, 1982, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, all. Available in the Press Office after the briefing will be Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam's speech on the political economy of the Caribbean Basin. That's before the Caribbean-Central American Action Conference in Miami, Florida.

Just to remind you, there will be a BACKGROUND briefing on Secretary Shultz' upcoming trip. That will be here in our briefing room on Monday at 11:00 a.m.

I think the Secretary may come down with President Gemayel after their lunch around 1:30-1:45 and pass through the lobby. They may or may not have some remarks, but it might be worthwhile being prepared for that. That's really all I have.

Q John, why was the morning meeting, why was it cancelled?

A I think it was cancelled at the Lebanese request, Mike, apparently because of their schedule. And I think the Secretary will have -- I don't know whether that meeting is rescheduled this afternoon, whether it's that particular group, but the Secretary will see President Gemayel, with an unscheduled additional meeting sometime this afternoon.

Q Are there any meetings scheduled tomorrow?

A I don't know of any meetings scheduled tomorrow. As with the Israelis, various members of the two delegations are meeting. I don't want to mislead you. There may be some meetings on the fringes, but I don't know of any full delegation-to-delegation meetings tomorrow, although I think probably the Secretary will be involved with departure ceremonies for President Gemayel.

Q But he will have a meeting following this one that ends at 1:45?

A Yes, there's another one.

Q When will that begin?

A I think that's around 4 o'clock this afternoon.

Q John, what was cancelled, for some of us who are not as "hot" on things?

A There was on the schedule -- was it 10:15? -- a meeting with President Gemayel and his delegation and the Secretary and his party this morning. That was cancelled at the Lebanese request.

Q John, the Secretary is going to come down with him after the lunch --

A Yes.

Q -- suggesting that he won't come down with him after the 4 o'clock meeting is over?

A I'm not sure the 4 o'clock meeting is in this building. It may be at a location designated by the Lebanese, but that's not quite clear yet.

Q In other words, there is no in-depth briefing planned?

A Not at the moment. Not at the moment.

Q Maybe a shallow BACKGROUND briefing?

(Laughter)

A We never provide shallow BACKGROUND briefings. (Laughter) But there is no briefing scheduled, Bernie. But as I say, I'd kind of keep an eye on the Secretary's --

Q You'll let us know where the 4:00 meeting will be held?

A Try to get back to you with -- or just keep in touch with the Press Office.

Q John, anything on Stone's travels?

A Senator Stone got back to Washington late last night. He will be meeting with various officials in the Department and the Administration, consulting with them about his recent conversations.

At this point, no future travel plans, or any future travel plans have not been fixed. I hope to keep you in touch with his travel plans as we become aware of them.

Q Will we be able to talk with him? Will he come down and tell us --

A I don't think he has any plans to come down to talk.

Q Can we ask?

A Be glad to ask. I think you've probably got the answer already, though.

Q Has he seen the Secretary yet?

A He may have seen the Secretary briefly this morning, but I don't think -- in view of the Secretary's involvement with other activities, I doubt that there has been a lengthy session between Stone and the Secretary -- if there has been one at all this morning.

Q What was accomplished exactly? I don't understand why he did this, especially when all those same groups had made the same things clear previously. I don't understand that.

I don't understand why it was made so public when after all, he's been pursuing quiet diplomacy so skillfully for so long.

A I don't know that he's --

Q And I don't understand why he said on the record that he's giving $24 million to the Contras without conditions for the first time.

A I don't know that there was a great surge of publicity about it. I expect that all of you were devilishly clever in extracting from him --

Q At the White House? At a White House briefing? Gratuitously? Come on.

A We have tried to keep you informed on his travels, which we did -- that's what we did. He met with various Contra groups down there, and this is within the framework of his mission to continue to facilitate dialogue.

Q What was accomplished?

A We don't go into Senator Stone's diplomatic mission.

Q So something may have been accomplished, but you're not talking about it?

A That's right.

Q Okay. And also, why wasn't this referred to the Contadora Group process after we made such strong efforts to direct all inquiries to the Contadora --

A Can't tell you who he might have talked to about his discussions.

Q But why did the United States choose to inject itself into this at this time when you already have this mechanism to which you keep referring?

A Well, he was not -- Senator Stone was not participating in the Contadora sessions.

Q I'm aware. Borge's visa was denied ostensibly because any new peace proposal should be given directly to the Contadora Group, and you talk about end-runs by Nicaragua.

A Uh-huh.

Q And then the Special Envoy goes to Central America and, without any particular reference to Contadora, announces through the White House that they have this negotiating position. Why didn't you refer it to the Contadora Group?

A I think "announces" is a misreading of the situation. As I say, I think you are pressing for information, and information is leaking out, but I think "announcement" is not a proper characterization.

Q John, do you have any comment on the statements made by King Hussein on the U.S. policy hurting the U.S. mission?

A No, not really. I think, at his breakfast meeting yesterday, the Secretary referred to the moderate Arab states, made the point that while we certainly have understandings with Israel, there have been military exercises with Arab states, and there is access to facilities with Arab states, so I think the Secretary explained where we think we are in terms of our relationship with moderate Arab states. But no, we don't have any reaction.

Q To follow up, is there any relation between the meeting held this morning between Under Secretary Wallis and Egyptian Ambassador Ghorbal and the Arab reaction?

A Between -- I'm sorry. Who met with Ghorbal?

Q Under Secretary Wallis.

A Wallis. Not that I'm aware of. I don't know what they talked about. It doesn't sound -- that sounds like one of a series of ongoing sessions with the Egyptian Ambassador. I wouldn't read anything special into that.

Q John, this is my first briefing this week, so this may have been addressed, but I understand that we have a story out of Central America quoting D'Aubuisson as saying he did not request a visa.

A Well, Mr. d'Aubuisson did, in fact, request a visa, and he did it on November 14, 1983, at the American Embassy in San Salvador.

Q In person?

A I don't know how it was done.

Q John, can I ask you if you heard, first of all, the comment from King Hussein -- did he send them in a formal form to the United States or are you just answering to what was reported in the media?

A No, I think you're all talking about a press report, a press interview.

Q You've not heard from King Hussein directly, from government to government?

A Not to my knowledge

Q Did the Administration hear from any other Arab government about the visit of Shamir?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q Not yet.

Q Does the Administration or the State Department, or the Arms Control Agency, to the extent that you speak also for them at times --

A If it's a hot question, we probably won't speak for them, but go ahead.

Q -- have a plan to now publish shortly a list of Soviet violations of various treaties, including arms control treaties? Remember, this has been up and down many times in the past.

A Yes.

Q A column in a morning newspaper today says there is about to be this thing unloaded. Do you have any guidance for us on that?

A No, I don't; not a thing on it, Don, I'm afraid.

Q Do you have anything on the announcement of amnesty for Miskitos?

A Yes. We have heard about the announcement of the amnesty program, but we cannot confirm the reported release of 300 Miskitos from prison.

While the amnesty program may benefit those Miskitos jailed under vague charges of counterrevolutionary activity, it does not address the reasons why most of the estimated 15,000 Miskitos fled Nicaragua, such as the relocation of 10,000 Miskitos from their ancestral homes to GRN camps, the destruction by GRN troops of Miskito villages near the Honduran border, and the reported killing by soldiers of those Miskitos unwilling to move to relocation camps, as well as GRN interference with Miskito customs and religion, and restrictions on their livelihoods, such as fishing and forestry.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q That seems like a rather harsh reaction to something that you've been urging for the last three years. Can you explain why you do not welcome this move?

A I think what we're saying is very factual. We can't confirm the release of 300, but there are a lot of others whose fate is undecided and who are in dire straits.

Q Who are they?

A If you took 300 from 15,000, I guess that would leave you 14,700.

-- MORE --

Q Yes, but it says,according to the decree issued yesterday, some 13,000 to 14,000 who are in Honduras are permitted to return under a general amnesty. Why wasn't that taken into consideration in the preparation of the guidance?

A I guess you would have to ask them why they're not returning.

Q You mean, they should have returned since yesterday --

A I guess you'd have to use your logic and deduction as to why they think they are in jeopardy.

Q John, can you tell us if President Gemayel requested or if the United States offered help to the Lebanese Government in the face of what is being reported -- potential violence erupting back in Lebanon because of what they perceive to be a U.S. denial or rejection of the Lebanese consenses in Geneva; that is, an alteration or an amendment of the May 17 agreement?

A I'm sorry, I lost the thread there.

Q What I'm asking is, has President Gemayel requested -- did he request or the U.S. offer to help him in the face of potential violence erupting there as a result of his visit to Washington?

A Violence in --

Q In Lebanon, because of the impression that he was coming here to have the May 17 agreement amended and he's going back without that?

A I'm sorry I'm being -- and the question is, did he ask for special security, and so forth?

Q In the military area, and the military security field?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q On that May 17 agreement, a matter of definition. Seen from the United States point of view, does the agreement -- let me put it another way. Are the side letters an an integral part of the agreement?

A I think we've been reluctant to talk about side letters, Jim.

Q I'm not asking about the substance. I'm just asking that when you talk about the May 17 agreement, do you consider it to be that single document or does it also intrinsically include the attachments?

A That's a very good legal question. I'm not sure I can give you an accurate legal response. When we talk about the agreement, we're talking about the agreement. But if your question is, are other understandings still in force, to my understanding they are. But I think in a strictly legal sense, when you're talking about the agreement, you're talking about the agreement.

Q In other words, then, strictly -- following from you say, then, it would be possibile to maintain the agreement intact while changing some of the accessory documents?

A I think you would be going down the wrong track if you thought that any attendant understandings that accompanied that agreement had changed or were considered null and void.

Q I'm not saying they are. But should they, in some sense, in the future be modified, you would consider the May 17 agreement to be intact and unchanged?

A I suppose you would have to go back to the parties who had been signatories or had been involved in the understandings that accompanied the agreement. I assume that those still stand, and the parties to those would have to be agreeable to modifying them.

Q The Israeli Ambassador just arrived now to the State Department. Can you tell us anything about if he is joining the luncheon, or the talks?

A I can't. I didn't know he had, and I don't know who he's seeing. Sorry.

Q Five minutes ago.

A We have a lot of people coming out of the building. It's to keep track of; sorry, I don't.

Q We've been getting very mixed signals about the Syrian position. All through the week there was a tough stand about the Syrians being negative, etc. Yesterday, a senior official said (he was) quite encouraged by the Syrian position, the fact that Geneva took place; acquiesced on the fact that Haddad visited Beirut.

While just a few hours earlier, the Secretary of State was in a breakfast meeting and he spoke quite tough words about the Syrian position. Can you just elaborate a little bit; give us some idea of what the Administration thinks of the Syrian position? Are they or are they not cooperating? Do you expect them to or not?

A I think you'd have to make your own deduction on the basis of the words that have been offered by the various officials, but I don't really see any contadiction in --

Q The officials don't seem to agree on one thing or the other.

A I don't think there's any question that Syria has been taking a tough stand; that Syria has been bolstered by a lot of Soviet weaponry which is very disturbing and destablizing to the area. But at the same time diplomatic negotiations go forward. I don't think there's any contradiction in those two positions.

Q Is there any expectation that the Syrians will cooperate now with President Gemayel as a result of the talks here, despite the strategic agreement with Israel, despite adherence to the May 17 agreement?

A Have to wait and see. Ask the Syrians. Can't read their minds.

Q Is there anything in the agreement that forbids an agenda for the withdrawal of the Israelis?

A No, not to my knowledge; but I would refer you back to the text of the agreement, but I don't think in terms of a specific --

Q Because we understand that the U.S. refused this agenda to President Gemayel for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

A I don't have any comment on that, but obviously the text of the agreement is available. Why don't you go back and take a look at it.

Q To go back to the side letters, a senior Lebanese official said that the side letters are very complex, more complex than the agreement itself. So, are they now the stumbling block or what?

A We're not going to get into side letters that might accompany the agreement. But the suggestion that any side letters there might be are more complex than the agreement, I would raise a question mark about that statement.

Q Can I just ask a question on the substance, to get around this dueling about side letters. The Secretary said, I think, many times in public at the time of the agreement being negotiated that Israel did not have to withdraw its troops until a similar arrangement was worked out for some kind of simultaneity with Syria. That's still is in force, I take it?

A Yes, sure. That's the Israeli position. That's the reality.

Q And the American position as well?

A We accept the reality of the situation.

Q John, this Administration was always holding to the position that any pressure against Israel during the days of differences was apt to make sort of backfire by the Israelis, making them more tough than they are. Does this apply to the Syrians now?

A I'm not sure that I accept the premise of your question. But the fact is that negotiations are going forward at the diplomatic level with Syria, and you have to make your own deductions about the degree of strength or obstinacy on their part at any given time. But there's certainly communication and the opportunity for exchange, and there are exchanges. There's no problem about communicating each side's position.

Q On the announcement yesterday about the Nicaraguan rebels, there has been some question whether that was new or not. I'd like to ask you, if that was our announcement -- that the rebels themselves are willing to give up their rebellion, the United States is willing to stop its support if democracy can be negotiated with Nicaragua.

A So the question is --

Q If they can win democracy --

A Is that a new development? That they've announced their position?

Q Was that the intention of the announcement yesterday, that the United States is willing to stop its support and the rebels are willing to give up their rebellion?

A I think the Secretary responded to that yesterday morning at the breakfast, and I think declined to comment on the question of U.S. support, or alleged support. But in terms of -- I don't think there is anything new in terms of willing to be helpful in facilitating a dialogue. That's not a new development on our part. If there is movement, I suppose that is new. But it's not a change in our position.

Q Is the text of that conversation yesterday with the Secretary, is it available or not yet?

A I think it will be shortly after this briefing. Sure.

Q John, do you have anything further on those people in South Africa from the village of either Mogopa or Magope, depending on which newspaper you read, as to whether anything further has happened to them; has the United States received any kind of reply from South Africa indicating the South African position about what might happen to them? Do we have anything more to say about it?

A I don't know. We certainly have had a dialogue or an exchange with South Africa on that question, but I don't know what the outcome is or to what extent they have responded.

Q Do you have any comment on the Soviet announcement this morning of a plan to hold another news conference with top military officials on the eve of the NATO Defense Ministers Conference?

A No, I don't.

Q Any comment on the Pravda point that the U.S. and the rest of the West was not taking seriously enough the Soviet walkout from the INF talks?

A No.

Q Anything on the word from Miami last night from a senior Costa Rican official that they are not interested in having U.S. training there?

A No. I think the Pentagon might well answer that question.

Q Do you have anything on Bill Busenberg's question yesterday about the witnesses that were going to the border, the --

A   Yes. As I understand it, so far as we know they have not been in touch with us. But in fact the same kind of warnings about travel to the area would have been given to them had they been in touch with us. I guess I don't happen to have with me that travel notice.

Do you happen to have a copy of that, Brian? If they had been in touch with them, I think we would have made the point that we make to anybody contemplating travel in the area, namely, this was the statement we issued back in June.

"The Department of State advises U.S. citizens travelling to Nicaragua that the northern border area of Nicaragua remains under the military control imposed by the government on November 4, 1982. Persons travelling overland may be subject to military searches at international crossing points and at points in the Nicaraguan territory. Increased fighting between rebel forces and the GRN in the border and central mountain area makes travel off the main highways hazardous.

"It's recommended that travel in those areas be restricted to main roads and undertaken only during daylight hours. Also, it is recommended that due to the fluidity of the situation, travelers make contact with our Embassy there for current information prior to embarking on any travel in the northern and central parts of Nicaragua."

But I think the Department was -- at least the officials we spoke to -- were a little puzzled because they appeared to have had no overtures from this group.

Q   One more on the situation on the Miskitos. Will the United States help in the relocation of the Miskitos back to Nicaragua, in view of the fact that they've been providing food and so on in Honduras, under the amnesty decree?

A   Can't answer that.

Q   Apparently there's an investigation going on of Chinese Government subsidies of exports of textiles to this country. They're saying that this investigation could impair U.S.-China relations. Do you have any comment on that?

A   We did have some guidance a few days ago. That's the countervailing duty case, I think. I think if you check with the Press Office there is some guidance of a few days ago.

Q Is there any conclusion drawn yet in the investigation into the security damage or the damage assessment, if you will, of the State Department papers case?

A Lorton? No. Not that I'm aware of, no.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:40 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, December 6, 1983

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STATE DEPARTMENT
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #215

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. Just one brief announcement. In case any of you missed it yesterday, we posted a statement on the CSCE Semi-annual Report. That's the report submitted to the Congressional Committee on the subject. Additional copies of the statement and report are available in the Press Office. Some copies yesterday apparently had some pages missing. The copies that are available now are correct copies.

Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on Lech Walesa's statement that the United States should lift its trade sanctions against Poland? He said that they have outlived their usefulness.

A Just very briefly, Mike, we have great respect for Mr. Walesa. We have not yet received a full account of his press conference, and we will be studying his comments carefully and will have something to say about them in the near future. But I don't have anything substantive to say about them now.

Q Is it possible you'll have something this afternoon?

A I can't specify. As soon as we have it, we will obviously make it available to you.

Q May I follow that and ask if you have anything on increased tensions in Poland as the anniversary of martial law approaches? Increased security measures by the Jaruzelski Government?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Can you tell us something about what steps are being taken to get back this lieutenant who was shot down and captured?

A All I really can say about that is that we remain in contact with senior Syrian officials, but I can't go beyond that.

Q Can you tell us if, in fact, the Syrian Government warned the United States that the reconnaissance flights would be fired on two weeks ago? There was a report last night that that message had been given to --

A On a network do you refer --

Q Yes, it was a report on CBS that our Ambassadors had been given that information.

A I can't really get into the question of our diplomatic back-and-forth on that. Our position on this is quite clear.

The Secretary explained it, I think, in some detail yesterday. We have a right to be there. We're in Lebanon at the invitation of the Lebanese Government. We're flying reconnaissance simply in -- consistent with our role there, and the Secretary explained all of that. I don't have anything new to explain, and I really am not going to try to go back to explain what we said to them specifically and what they said to us.

I think our position on the question of reconnaissance and on defending ourselves is unmistakable.

Q Yes. Well, I don't quarrel with that, but that would seem to be rather significant if, indeed, the government had warned that they were going to fire on these flights. Why couldn't you discuss that?

A Just a general matter of our practice of not discussing diplomatic exchanges.

Excuse me, I was asked if I had a sitrep on Lebanon. Let me give you what I do have. No incidents involving the Marines in the last twenty-four hours, although I gather as I walked out here there is some radio report implying there may be something. I don't have anything on that.

Beirut International Airport remains closed. The Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners has claimed responsibility for yesterday's bombing in Beirut that killed 14 and wounded 100.

Last night there were exchanges of fire at several checkpoints in the Beirut suburbs. Last night, there were also exchanges of artillery fire in the Suq al-Gharb, Kayfun, Qabr Shmun areas and local media have reported that these exchanges resumed this morning.

According to Beirut radio, there were heavy exchanges of fire last night in Tripoli which tapered off this morning. We don't have any independent confirmation of that.

Q What do we know about the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon?

A Nothing.

Q Alan, have they taken credit or responsibility in the past?

A They have taken responsibility in the past, but we don't know anything about them.

Q Let me follow up on Bob's question, Alan. The Marines and the MNF troops are in Lebanon or in Beirut now because there is recognition of a problem -- there is a problem there. As long as the problem is there, and the problem is defined by Syrian, Israeli and PLO presence in Lebanon; as long as the problem is not solved, do you think that the Syrians are violating anything by shooting or firing at reconnaissance flights over territories where they are in control and which the United States is there to solve?

A I don't think it's going to be productive to try to get into a great exposition on that subject, Ghassan. What I would say is that we -- as I answered before, our position on this is clear. That we have a responsibility through an agreement with the Lebanese Government to be there in the Multinational Force. That we take prudent steps, including reconnaissance, to protect that force and that we will take steps necessary to defend our people.

Q Has there been any contact with the Soviets, taking into consideration the fact that they are in the vicinity of the operations of the aircraft?

A I don't know whether there have been specific contacts. You're talking about specifically with regard to this weekend's activity?

Q Yes.

A I don't know that they're have been any specific contacts in that regard. Obviously, we have had contact with the Soviets before on the question of the Middle East in general and of Lebanon specifically, but I don't have details to give you, Mike?

Q Do you have anything on the return of the remains of the airman who was killed?

A No. It's really the same situation as with regard to the airman who is a prisoner. That is, that we're in contact with the Syrians about that. I think we ought to let that process move forward. You might want to check eventually with the Pentagon and see about that. But at this point we are in contact with the Syrian Government, and I don't think they'll have anything different to tell you about it.

Q What about return of the Marines' bodies from Beirut?

A I don't know anything about that.

Q Can you at least clear up the precise circumstances beyond the fact that his plane was shot down, under which Lange died, and do you have any word that this government assumes is the truth about Goodman's condition?

A I don't have any details to offer you on that.

Q You can probably correct me if I am wrong. At some point the United States position was, about these overflights and reconnaissance with Israel, who used to do them, that Israel should cease doing so.

Am I, first, correct and, if I am, how does their decision now justify doing the same thing that it preached others not to do?

A You have to look back at the record to see what we've said. You may find that more easily than I could. But in any case, our position is that, clearly, we are there in the Multinational Force at the invitation of the Government of Lebanon, with an agreement that was reached with the Government of Lebanon. They agreed to reconnaissance flights. So I just don't see the problem with that.

Q Alan, have you got any comments on the reports that the Italian Government is considering pulling out of the MNF?

A No, we don't have any information that they are considering withdrawing its forces from the MNF. We are in close contact with all of our MNF partners with respect to all the aspects of the situation in Lebanon. Indeed, I believe the Secretary will probably meet with is counterparts from the MNF this week while they're together.

We continue to believe, obviously, that solidarity of the MNF in support of or shared objectives in Lebanon remains very important.

Q Can you tell us -- I don't know, maybe the Pentagon will be better, but you could try. If -- since the downing of the two U.S. aircraft, has the United States flown anymore of those reconnaissance --

A I don't know the answer to that, Ghassan. You would have to check with the Pentagon.

Q Alan, what is the Administration's assessment of whether or not the risk of a superpower conflict is growing in the Middle East because of the past week of violence?

A I think I will have to refer you, really, to what Larry Eagleburger said on television this weekend. He was asked something about this, and he addressed himself to it, and let me refer you to those remarks.

Q A daily assessment on the --

A A daily assessment?

Q You don't keep a running track of the -- I know you do. I mean, you don't have anything fresh to tell us since Eagleburger? We don't perceive any change? The Soviets, since then, held a press conference which is not the usual state of business in Moscow.

A Yes, and they were also mostly talking about arms control issues. They mentioned the Middle East. But I don't see that, frankly, as relevant to the kind of assessment particularly, at least in terms of what said to your question.

Q The Syrian Ambassador to the United States said yesterday that there is a danger of a superpower confrontation if American policy persists in attempting to intimidate Syria militarily. And I was wondering whether you had any response to that?

A You're making a statement that the United States is intimidating Syria militarily. Obviously, our approach is not that approach. Our approach is that we took a limited, proportionate and timely action in response to an action against our unarmed reconnaissance aircraft. So I don't see that that tracks.

Mike.

Q Alan, do you have anything on a complaint by Congressman Green of New York that a West German company had a license granted by the United States to sell bullet-proof vests to Syria?

A No. Don't know anything about it.

Q Have you had any inquiry from him --

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Could you take that, please, if you have a view on that?

A I'll look into it. I'm not sure this is where that would come, but I will look into it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the very critical view expressed by the Egyptian Government regarding the U.S.-Israeli agreement?

A No, I really don't. I think the various briefers over the course of the visit and following the visit of Prime Minister Shamir made clear what the nature of our relationship with Israel is, and I would refer you back to those remarks. I don't have anything new to offer or a response to a particular comment by any government.

--MORE--

Q President Mubarak has been particularly saying that the U.S. policy is putting the so-called moderate Arab governments in a very difficult position.

How do you read this?

A He'll have to obviously speak for himself on that, and I don't have a response to offer you. I think we've made clear that our relationship with Israel, we think, is consistent with good relations as well with moderate Arab governments.

Q Can you in fact tell us, Alan, if you received such a statement from the Egyptian Government, if you received it in a formal way?

A No. I don't have information on that, and I think that probably would not -- we would not get into the question of that sort of thing.

Q Are any specific steps planned to deal with these criticisms expressed by various moderate Arab governments to the U.S.-Israeli pact?

A I don't know whether I can offer you anything on specific steps. Obviously, we have a very active diplomatic dialogue with a variety of countries in the region, including those moderate Arab countries, and I'm sure that we will continue to discuss issues relevant, including the relationship with Israel, through that dialogue, explaining what our policy is and so on. But I don't have any specifics to offer you on that.

Jim?

Q I was going to ask specifically if you had a response to the TASS statement specifically about the danger of further escalation and the serious threat to peace beyond the Middle East, and also where Rumsfeld is going today, if he's going today?

A The answer to the first question is, no, I don't have a response. The answer to the second question is that Ambassador Rumsfeld is in Washington, and he -- I think the Secretary indicated he had imminent travel plans, but I don't have anything for you on his destination as such, as is consistent with our standard pattern on our Middle East negotiator.

Q Yes, but he's leaving today or not?

A Sorry?

Q Is he leaving today or not?

A Yes. He will be leaving today.

Q Is Damascus still available to him?

A I have no reason to think it's not.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the European economic summit?

A No. I really don't have anything on that. No.

Q Alan, do you have any specific response to a comment on the Orgakov press conference yesterday?

A On what? I mean, it was a rather broad-ranging --

Q I can go into specifics. I thought you might have a general response.

A Without a long question, what specifically are you interested in?

Q Well, my reading of the statements were that Orgakov called the U.S. retaliatory raids on Syrian positions an act of war against Syria under U.N. regulations.

A We obviously don't accept that.

Q Okay. Two, he compared the placement of Euromissiles in Europe to the aggression of Hitler against the United States.

A That's absurd.

Q Okay. Three --

A You're telling me that's what he said. I haven't got that in my head, but if that's what he said, that's absurd. Go ahead.

Q I hold no (inaudible) for him --

A I understand. I'm just assuming you're quoting him accurately. Go ahead.

Q Three, he said when asked about Chancellor Kohl's statement that the Soviets had returned to the negotiating table on INF, he said that Kohl has a rich fantasy life. (laughter)

A You'd have to -- the Germans would have to respond to that.

Q Except that U.S. officials have also repeatedly said that they expect the Soviets to come back to the negotiating table. I would assume that the remarks apply also to his view of U.S. officials on that score.

A I don't think I have offered any predictions as to whether the Soviets would return to the negotiating table. Our position --

Q President Reagan has, Secretary Shultz has.

A Our position is that an early resumption of the INF negotiations offers the best prospect for progress towards genuine arms control and is in the interests of everyone, and we're ready to resume the negotiations at any time, and we call on the Soviets to do so at the earliest possible moment.

Q Thank you.

A We've got some more questions, Mike.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

Q Would you characterize as friendly the views expressed by Israel regarding the shooting down of the two U.S. aircraft by Syria?

A As friendly?

Q Yes.

A I don't have any characterization to offer.

Q Last night the Inter-American Foundation ousted its president. Do you have any comment on that since Motley and McPherson and Mittendorf all voted to do that?

A No. I think I'd really have to refer you to the Foundation. I don't have anything on that.

Q What about the Soviet hint that they might withdraw also from the START negotiations in Geneva? Today they did meet, and it was --

A Yes. And I understand that they have a meeting for Thursday.

Q Exactly. That should be the last one of the year, so what do you make out of that?

A I don't have anything on that at this point. They're due to meet again.

Q Do you have anything on planes -- apparently Honduran air force planes attacking Nicaraguan fishing boats and a border post yesterday?

A No. I saw reports which weren't quite consistent with your question. But in any case I don't have any information on any of those reports however they may be cast.

Q Wait, wait, wait. You can't confirm that there were any such attacks?

A I can't confirm that, no.

Q Could I just pursue that for a second? You've got a radar device in the area in which that took place which require manning of 60 American technicians, and you have 4,000-5,000 troops in Honduras, some of them very near that --

A All with little radars, right?

Q No. Some very near that. And I'm just wondering, are you certain that the United States is in a position to confirm an attack across the border by aircraft?

A I'm certainly not in a position to do so.

Q There were 200, mostly nuns, who were turned away from Honduras last night in a vigil. Do you have any comment on that?

A Very little. The Honduran Government indicated that it considered that proposed activity to be political in nature, and their position is that political activity of this type by foreigners is not legal, and therefore they could not legally enter Honduras for those purposes.

Q Do we agree with that?

A It's not a question of whether we agree or don't agree or whether we can pass judgment on it. It is -- as I say, this is their law and their intrepretation of their law. We had no advance knowledge or consultation regarding -- or consultation particularly. I think there was some information as it was developing, but we were not consulted and we were certainly not part of that decision.

Q Alan, our government passes judgment on the behavior of foreign governments all the time. Why not in this case?

A I'll say this is their interpretation of their law.

Q Also on Central America before we end this, is the Reagan Administration currently involved in giving a calculated cold shoulder to the Nicargauan initiatives, or is there a genuine, deliberate effort by this Administration to conduct a diplomatic dialogue leading to a political solution?

A I refer you to what the Secretary said yesterday, that the statements being made by the Government of Nicaragua now are vastly different from statements that were being made about six months ago, and while we welcome the statements, as he said, "What we want is for a reality to be put behind the rhetoric."

Q What would that be?

A I'm not going to try to spell it out, but we have embarked on a policy in Central America which has included a concerted effort to deal with the problems posed by Nicaragua. There are now some signs that policy may be working.

As the Secretary indicated, caution is necessary in interpreting the current signals, and we don't know whether the signals represent a real willingness to deal with the substantive issues. The test is going to come in the actual negotiating process.

Q Where is that process?

A If Nicaragua is serious in its public declarations, then this should facilitate the negotiation of reciprocal and verifiable measures to implement the 21 objectives of the Contadora Group.

For our part, we are prepared to intensify our efforts in support of the Contadora's 21 points to fully test Nicaragua's intentions.

If Nicaragua is prepared to implement the 21 points, it can count on reciprocity from us and its neighbors in the effort to restore peace in Central America.

Q Copy of that, please?

A Can't give you a verbatim, but I can give you -- why don't we wait until we have the transcript on that?

Q Follow on that, please, Alan. There are people who believe that this is largely smokescreen, that the Reagan Administration is committed to a military solution.

Is there something that you'd like to say in response to that in general? I mean --

A I think I just did.

Q Well, 21 points. Does that mean that it has to be all 21 or it's no deal?

A We have said that we think that the 21 points -- we and the countries, other countries involved in the Contadora process, have said that these 21 points represent a comprehensive approach and not things that you could sort of pick at piecemeal and choose what you want off the menu. It represents a comprehensive approach to the problems of the region, and we think that is the appropriate way to deal with the problems.

Q Does that mean that the Sandinista regime would have to change its root character completely before the United States Administration will be satisfied?

A I think I'll stick with what I just said.

Q Alan --

A Lester.

Q AP reports from San Francisco, that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opposed the U.S. invasion of Grenada because she is a woman. U.S. Information Agency Director Charles G. (sic) Wick said, "Margaret Thatcher's a great Prime Minister. She's also a woman." (Laughter)

What is the State Department's reaction?

A I don't have any --

Q You wouldn't dispute the fact that she's a woman, but other than that what --

A Very perceptive, Lester.

Q Thank you.

A I don't have a particular reaction. I think you probably would want to ask others about that. I don't know precisely what was said. I've seen a newspaper account of it. Obviously, we have very close relations with the Government of the U.K. and with Prime Minister Thatcher and --

Q You wouldn't say that she opposed this because she's a woman, would you? I mean, you'd disagree, wouldn't you, Alan?

A I think I would say that we have very close relations with the Government of the U.K., and we have good relations with Prime Minister Thatcher, and --

Q So you wouldn't agree with this?

A -- that's the nature of that relationship.

Q You wouldn't agree with this.

A Did you have a question?

Q Let me follow up one question, Alan. Am I correct in saying that you would disagree with Wick on this, or do you subscribe to Ruyard Kipling's statement that "a woman is only a woman, but a good cigar is a smoke."? (Laughter)

Q Thank you.

A Lester, I'll let you answer that question, and then you come back. Okay. We'll end it.

(The briefing concluded at 12:38 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Wednesday, December 7, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #216

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1983, 12:09 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: I don't have any announcements, so I'll be happy to take questions.

Q The wires pass.

Q Do you have any guidance today, Alan?

A Do I have guidance? (Laughter) I don't have any comment for you on that.

Q What's new?

A No questions? I'll be happy to end it.

Q Do you have any statement with respect to the State Department's position on IDA and the negotiations that are going on?

A No. I don't have anything. I wouldn't get into the question of an agency position in any case. There is some guidance, though, which exists, Jim, in the Press Office -- on IDA-VII, you're talking about. I'll refer you to that.

Q The old guidance?

A It's the same guidance we've had for a while. There's nothing new to report.

Q Do you know when the Administration will determine what its position is?

A I don't know when and if we will have anything new, that is to say, beyond that guidance.

Q Okay. And is Ambassador Stone going to Nicaragua next week?

A Ambassador Stone, as you doubtless know, is going with the Vice President as a member of the delegation, and then he will proceed from Argentina to a round of visits of the Contadora countries, including Central America.

I don't have specifics to give you of the countries that he will visit, and we'll do that as we have in the past, sort of one at a time as we can. So I can't answer your question specifically at this point.

Q Is this what you were referring to yesterday, one of the tests that you were referring to yesterday?

A I don't want to try to be more specific about what I was saying yesterday in terms of the response on the question of Nicaragua. But the fact is that he will be making a round of the Contadora countries, including Central America.

Q When you say "including Central America," do you mean all of the Central American countries?

A I don't have details on which countries, so why don't we just --

Q Was your description inclusive or non-specific?

A I'm not going to try to define it for you further. Sorry.

Q Are you saying the Contadora Four and the Central American Five, one or the other -- can you be more specific than you were?

A Not really. I'm saying that he will go to Contadora countries, including the Central American -- including Central America, but I'm not specifying -- I'm not in a position at this point, because of our general rules, to specify which countries, whether he's going to all of them or only some of them.

Q Is he going to link up with Henry Kissinger and his Commission, which is leaving on Monday?

A I have no indication that he's going to do that, George.

Q Alan, any progress on the contacts between the United States and Syria concerning the American pilot?

A I don't have anything further. This is on the prisoner?

Q Yes.

A Goodman? I don't have anything further to offer beyond what I said yesterday, which is that we are in contact with senior Syrian officials, but I don't have anything.

Q What about the corpse of the --

A The remains, which we believe are those of the deceased U.S. airman, were turned over to the LAF this morning at about 6:00 a.m. Washington time. They were then transferred to the Marine MNF contingent and later taken by helicopter to the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy.

Beyond that, I would have to refer you to the Pentagon.

Q Why was it returned to the LAF?

A Why?

Q Yeah. I mean, why --

A You would have to ask the Syrians that.

Q What do you mean?

A That was their decision.

Q Well, I understood that there was some contacts with the U.S. Embassy in Damascus.

A We were certainly involved in the process of knowing how this was going to be done, but it was their decision to do it that way. Anyway, as I say, those remains, which we believe are those of the airman who was killed, are apparently on the Kennedy at this point.

Q Do you sense a softening of Syrian position on the captured airman, Goodman?

A I don't want to describe it one way or another. I simply will stick with the position that we are in contact with senior Syrian officials on that.

Q The Defense Minister, Talas, insisted that they would not release the prisoner until the end of war. Do you have -- I mean, are you in war with Syria now, officially?

A No. We're not at war with Syria.

Q So why are they holding him?

A I've seen other Syrian officials quoted, saying other things. I'm not going to try to get into this question, though, beyond what I've said to you.

Q You mean there is no unified Syrian position toward the prisoner's state, or there is no unified position except --

A I'm not going to try to speak for the Syrians. You'll have to find out what their position is.

Q No. But you indicated that Talas was the only man who spoke about this.

A No. I don't believe that's correct. But in any case, I'm not going to try to articulate a Syrian position on this. Our position is --

Q What's your position?

A -- that we are in contact with senior Syrian officials on this question. We've indicated -- the Secretary indicated in his press conference -- we've made strong representations and hope for early release. Period.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, can you characterize for us the level and the kinds of diplomatic contacts that are underway between our governments?

A No. No.

Q Can you give us a general situation report on Lebanon?

A Yes, I can do that.

Q Is the U.S. still hoping that the UN is going to intervene --

A Excuse me, I have a question to answer.

Q Oh, I'm sorry.

A Yesterday our Marine position at Beirut International Airport came under heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire. The Marines returned fire and hostile fire ceased. There were no Marine casualties.

Today there have been no incidents involving the Marines. Exchanges have been reported along the Alayh ridgeline. No significant incidents have been reported in Beirut's southern suburbs.

Exchanges have also been reported near Khaldah and Suq-al-Gharb. Beirut International Airport remains closed.

In Tripoli, we understand, the cease-fire is holding, and we have seen press reports that arrangements for the departure of pro-Arafat PLO forces are nearing completion, but I cannot confirm that.

Q Are we still flying reconnaissance missions?

A I have no information on reconnaissance missions, Mike. You would have to ask the Pentagon.

Q Alan, regarding the evacuation of the Arafat factions out of Tripoli, is the United States playing a particular role in this operation?

A No.

Q Where is Rumsfeld today?

A He is in London.

Q How long is he going to stay there?

A I don't have anything for you on his onward travel.

Q Surprise.

Q Alan, do you have anything on this business about the Syrian bullet-proof vests?

A No, Steve, I think you would have to go to the Commerce Department on that question.

Q Do you have any reaction to The New York Times editorial today that suggests we set a date to pull out the Marines out of Beirut, or to Congressmen who suggest that the policy of the War Powers Act has been changed, the agreement with the Administration?

A On the first, I believe the Secretary addressed that in his press conference, and on the second, I believe Larry Speakes addressed that either yesterday or the day before, so I don't have anything to add to either of those things.

Q Alan, anything on Foreign Minister, Australian Foreign Minister, Hayden, to come to Washington to discuss Cyprus?

A No, I don't have anything on that. Don't know anything about it.

Q Okay. Do you have anything further from yesterday on Walesa's looking for us to lift the sanctions?

A No, I don't have anything new on that today.

Q How about the Iraq frigates?

A Iraq?

Q Iraq frigates. (Laughter)

A Frigates? No, don't.

Q It was before your time.

Q Alan, does the United States see Haddad's news conference yesterday as indicating a more conciliatory position by Syria?

A I don't have a judgment to offer you on that one, sorry.

Q On Rumsfeld, can you tell us, has he sought a meeting with Syria? Has he sought to add that stop, and, perhaps anticipating your answer to that, do you consider that it would be useful for him to have talks with the Syrians?

A I am afraid you are going to have to anticipate the same answer to the second part of it. As you know, we simply don't talk about his schedule, beyond confirming when he has arrived someplace, so I am not going to try to address either part of that.

Q Do you consider, in the broadest terms, that diplomatic talks with the Syrians on the situation in Lebanon, in its broadest terms, would be useful at this time?

A We certainly have ongoing dialogue with Syria. We have an Ambassador in place, and so, certainly, dialogue is a useful thing.

Q Can you tell us with whom he spoke in London, or has spoken?

A I don't know, so I can't tell you.

Q Alan, there are reports from the Middle East that the "Geneva II" -- quote -- will not be held.

Do you have any information to shed on that? Do you know?

A No. I think -- are you talking about the Lebanese reconciliation effort?

Q Right.

A I think we would have to leave any statements on that to the Lebanese.

Q U.S. officials are playing observer--

A We have -- sure, we have been, well, not observer in a formal sense. We had representation in Geneva. We have talked about the importance of national reconciliation, but as far as reconvening the talks and what the prospects may be on that, I am really going to have to let you turn to the Lebanese for that.

Q Alan, do you have any expectations out of the OPEC meetings that start today?

A I don't have anything on that, sorry.

Q Yesterday you didn't have anything on the Inter-American Foundation change. Do you have anything today?

A No.

Q There was a report a couple of days ago that there is a plan for the territorial brigade in southern Lebanon -- I don't know if someone asked this question or not -- proposed for southern Lebanon to assist in furthering the Israeli withdrawal from the area.

Will you comment on this?

A Don't have a comment on that specifically. Our position on troop withdrawal, all foreign forces withdrawing from Lebanon, is quite clear, but I am not going to try to get into some sort of discussion of how, in specific terms, this might happen.

Q Is Stone going to Nicaragua?

A I think you may have come in late. I am not going to be able to say specifically where he is going. After he has accompanied the Vice President to Buenos Aires, he will go to Contadora countries, including Central America, but I can't say specifically what countries.

Q Which day exactly will he leave Buenos Aires to go to Central America or the Contadora countries?

A I don't have a specific date on that.

Q Is Abrams planning to go to Nicaragua?

A I don't know.

Q Can you look into that?

A I will look into it. I don't promise you to necessarily come up with an answer on it, but I will look into it.

Q Have we exhausted your guidance for today?

A Try and see. It depends what you are interested in.

Q Newsweek Magazine reported this week that there are complaints from the Israeli occupying authorities in East Jerusalem about the operation and the functions of the American Consulate, that they are accusing the Consulate of conducting arrangements for U.S. visitors and Congressmen with -- quote/unquote -- "radical Palestinians," and this is to the displeasure of the Israeli authorities there.

Would you comment on the function and the activities of the East Jerusalem Consulate?

A We have a guidance on that but I don't have it with me today. Why don't you get it from the Press Office? -- but there is some guidance on it.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you are welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:21 p.m.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
Thursday, December 8, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #217

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1983, 12:35 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements for you. First, to tell you that available in the Press Office after the briefing will be the text on an embargoed basis -- Are we going to put it out afterwards -- Excuse me, let me interrupt myself -- Brian, or put it out later? The Adelman speech.

MR. CARLSON: Afterwards.

MR. ROMBERG: Right afterwards. A speech by ACDA Director Adelman on the future for arms control. As I say, it's embargoed, so please observe that.

Q Where is the speech being made?

A The Arms Control Association, I believe.

Second, on Friday, tomorrow, December 9, at 3:00 p.m., there will be an ON-THE-RECORD press briefing here in this room in preparation for the Forum on Afghanistan. This forum will take place next Monday and Tuesday, December 12 and 13, in the Loy Henderson Conference Room, and is co-sponsored by the Department of State and the Center for Afghanistan Studies of the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

The purpose of the Forum will be to examine the implications of the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan on the eve of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet invasion.

The Forum will be open for media coverage. A press release describing the Forum is available in the Press Office.

The briefers on Friday will be Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies of the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Recently prepared informational materials on Afghanistan will be distributed at Friday's briefing. Correspondents interested in covering the Afghanistan Forum or who would like to interview any of the participants should contact Joe Reap in the Press Office.

Q What time is this thing tomorrow?

A 3:00 o'clock.

On the release of the SCG progress report: NATO's Special Consultative Group, the SCG, on INF met today in Brussels during the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. As is customary for each Ministerial, the SCG has prepared a progress report on the implementation of NATO's 1979 dual-track decision.

Given the events of recent weeks and the intense interest in INF among Allied publics, the SCG has decided to declassify the report and release it to the public. The report provides a comprehensive account of the rationale for NATO's 1979 decision, the close consultations within NATO on INF arms control, and the extensive efforts made by the United States to achieve an arms control agreement during six negotiating rounds in Geneva.

Copies of the SCG progress report and a press summary are available in the Press Office.

Q Is that being released in Brussels, too?

A I think it already has been. Yes.

On Vietnam: We note Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach's statement that he had some information on the search for American servicemen listed as missing as a result of the Vietnam war. He said he would turn the information over to the U.S. Government.

We welcome Mr. Thach's statement which is in the spirit of the Vietnamese memorandum of August 16, 1983. This memorandum stated that they would continue the search for missing Americans in keeping with the humanitarian nature of the accounting issue.

We especially welcome Mr. Thach's pledge to turn over this information directly to the U.S. Government since the only way to achieve the fullest possible accounting is through government-to-government channels.

We hope the Vietnamese will be contacting us shortly regarding this matter.

Q Copy, please?

A Copy. And, finally, on certification of Argentina. Argentina has made significant progress in meeting internationally recognized principles of human rights.

Accordingly, effective December 10, President Reagan will make the certification called for in Section 725 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. A report setting forth the basis for the President's determination will be forwarded to the Congress.

This certification is particularly appropriate at this time as the December 10 inauguration of the democratically elected government of Raoul Alfonsin represents a major step in Argentina's continuing progress in improving human rights performance.

As previously announced, Vice President Bush will represent the President at this important event.

That's it. Happy to take your questions.

Q Alan --

Q Copy of that?

A Copy of the statement of certification? Sure.

Q Alan, can you expand upon what improvements they have made in human rights in Argentina in the last few years?

A Sure.

Q What are the most significant aspects of that improvement?

A In the past year and a half there's been a dramatic improvement in the human rights situation in Argentina, including the following specific improvements:

National elections for president and congress were held on October 30, 1983, which were universally applauded as open, fair and honest; all PEN prisoners were either released or remanded to the Ministry of Justice for trial or completion of sentences previously handed down for specific criminal offenses; the phenomenon of "disappearances" has all but ceased in the last three years; the ban on political activity was lifted and a new political parties law was promulgated; restrictions on the press and other media were gradually removed; constraints on trade union activity were relaxed; and, the state of seige was lifted.

Overall the improvement in the human rights situation was dramatic and clearly met the requirement of the law.

Q Copy of that, Alan?

A Copy. Yes.

Q Alan, has there been a satisfactory accounting of the numerous political activists and others who vanished during this period? There are still some unanswered questions about their condition.

A The major human rights question remaining in Argentina involves the accounting for the abuses of the past. The United States has consistently encouraged the Argentine Government to provide as full an accounting as possible on the disappeared to the Argentine people.

A related issue, I might note, is the Argentine Government's decision to issue an amnesty decree on September 23, granting immunity to all those who may be liable for legal prosecution for acts committed during the so-called "dirty war."

Both of these issues are the subject of much discussion within Argentina, and the Alfonsin Government has pledged to address them.

The President, in reaching his decision, has taken into account the requirements of the law. As I indicated, the

United States has deplored violations of basic human rights that occurred during the 1970s in Argentina, including the thousands of disappearances.

The United States has also continuously encouraged, as I noted, that the Argentine Government provide as full an accounting as possible on the disappeared to the Argentine people.

Q In practical terms, what does this certification mean?

A I hadn't finished.

Q Sorry.

A When the Argentine Government's report on the disappeared, released in April, did not provide a satisfactory accounting, the United States expressed its disappointment that an occasion had been lost to begin the resolution of this question.

Nevertheless, the United States believes that the overall human rights situation in Argentina with respect to the rights of the person, as well as to civil and political rights, has improved dramatically over the past year and a half and merits certification.

Moreover, the United States believes that a democratically elected government is one of the best guarantees of respect for human rights. And, as I indicated before, the newly elected government of President Alfonsin is committed to trying to resolve this difficult question of the disappeared.

Q Do you have a copy of the last, too?

A Yes. George?

Q Now that they're certified, or will be very shortly, what does that mean in practical terms? Does it presage arms sales?

A The effect of certification is twofold. First, it is a clear acknowledgment by the United States of the progress Argentina has made in human rights, one major reflection of which will be the inauguration of the President-elect on December 10.

Second, it removes the ban on security assistance and arms sales to Argentina which had been imposed in response to the human rights situation in that country. Argentina is thus once again eligible to purchase arms and receive security assistance. In this respect it will be no different from most other countries in the world.

It should be emphasized that certification only lifts a prohibition against the reestablishment of a security assistance relationship with Argentina. Should Argentina wish to make arms purchases from the United States, its requests will be carefully considered on a case-by-case basis as we do with all other countries which purchase arms from the United States.

Q Copy of that also, please?

A I'll see if we can do that.

Q Are any arms sales planned, then?

A We'll have to wait and see what they request.

Q Have you received any objections from the U.K. regarding this decision?

A Mike, about all I really would say about that is that we have engaged in extensive contacts with a variety of concerned parties, including the U.K., but I'm not going to go, as we usually do not, into the question of the content of our exchanges.

Q We also have a dispute with Chile. Have you assured the Chileans, who have not been certified, that care will be taken not to upset the balance down there?

A We have -- as you suggested, there is an issue with Chile, and we have consulted with Chile as well and been in contact with them. We're sensitive to the implications of the certification. Argentina and Chile, under the auspices of Papal mediation, are currently seeking a peaceful solution to the Beagle Channel dispute, with both countries expressing optimism that an agreement can eventually be concluded, and we fully support the mediation process.

The U.S. is not a major arms supplier to the southern cone region, and we will review any requests for arms transfer in the context of the regional balance and efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Beagle Channel dispute.

Q Are you sensitive to the concerns of the British as well, in particular the Falkland Islands dispute?

A Sure. And the lifting -- as I say, the lifting of the prohibition against such sales is not the equivalent of such sales or a threat against British forces.

We have consistently supported a peaceful, negotiated resolution to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute, and after certification we will review each request carefully.

No arms transfers are contemplated that would increase the prospects of renewed conflict, either in the Falklands/Malvinas or the Beagle areas.

Q May I ask two other questions on that, Alan?

A I'm sorry?

Q Two other questions on this certification.

A Sure.

Q The first is, when the Reagan Administration came in, it indicated that Argentina and Chile would be certified or not certified more or less together.

For the record, why aren't you certifying Chile at the same time as this time?

A The criteria for certification are similar but not identical. In the case of Chile we continue to monitor the situation carefully in the context of this certification requirement. The overall human rights situation has improved since 1976. In recent years, however, the performance is mixed, with clear improvement in certain areas including some positive but still incipient political changes, coupled with controversy and serious human rights problems in other areas.

Q Alan, what about their progress toward democracy, do you have anything on that?

A On -- ?

Q On Chilean democracy.

A I don't have anything more to say on Chile.

Q Okay. One more on --

A Excuse me, Connie had a question. I'll come back to you.

Q Thank you. On Argentina, what is the status of their nuclear development, and could you expand on your sentence that it won't increase the risks of conflict in the Falklands/Malvinas thing?

A No. I think I will stand on what I said, which was that the sales would not -- let me get the exact words that I used for you -- no arms transfers are contemplated that would increase the prospect of renewed conflict either in the Falklands/Malvinas or Beagle areas.

That is obviously a judgment that will have to be applied in the case of each request.

I don't have a general statement to give you on the status of Argentina's nuclear development. We have some existing guidance on that, but I would note that certification is made on the basis of requirements of the law, namely that significant progress in human rights be made and that it is in the national interest.

Our view on the enrichment facility and desirability of IAEA safeguards is well known. As I say, if you need guidance, that is available, but the two issues are separate questions and are not linked.

Q On the certification of Argentina, this may seem a little like nitpicking, but is the certification being actually made, or when it takes effect, will it be after Alfonsin takes office or before? In other words, how is it being communicated to the Argentine Government? Is it being communicated to the military junta that remains in power or will it be held up as a formal communication until after Alfonsin takes power?

A I don't think I am going to get into that kind of detail, Jim, but, as I said, it is going to be effective on December 10, which is the day of the inauguration.

Q Alan, may I ask that same question more generally? Congressman Barnes and some people on his subcommittee, said that some people in the Administration wanted to make a gesture to the present military government. Is any sort of gesture still being made to them under this arrangement?

A I don't think I am going to go beyond what I have given you on this, Jim.

Q Alan, there is a question as to which government is being certified, whether it is the military junta or whether it is the new civilian government.

A It is not a question of certifying a government. It is a question of certifying a situation, and that is what we are doing.

Q Through your network this morning, Assistant Secrtary of State Richard Murphy, when he was asked about Prime Minister Shamir's statement of not allowing Arafat and his soldiers to leave Tripoli until the agreement negotiated with the help of the Saudis, Mr. Murphy repeated the United States position that it wants all foreign forces out of Lebanon.

The (inaudible) position as to the new obstacles which might stand in the way of evacuating more than 4,000 Palestinian fighters that the Israeli Prime Minister announced about this morning?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Alan, do you have any statement on the Soviet decision regarding the START talks?

A As I think you probably know, Ambassador Rowny issued a statement this morning which -- sorry?

Q Can you elaborate on that or give any further judgment?

A I can't. I would note, of course, that the round which is the fifth round, Round Five, ended as scheduled, and as the press reports indicate, the Soviets have not agreed with Ambassador Rowny on a specific resumption date for the next round.

I just want to emphasize it is not a walk-out. It is something that was scheduled to go on, and they have picked up their marbles and left.

I can read, if you want, the press statement that Ambassador Rowny made, or I can make it available to you. I don't care. Either one. It is his statement. It is not mine.

Do you want me to make it available afterwards?

Q Will you make it available?

A Sure.

Q You do not consider this a walk-out, a termination of the talks?

A As what?

Q You do not consider this a termination of the talks, insofar as they have terminated the medium range --

A They have said that they have not set a resumption date for the next round, and I refer you to what they have said and also, again, if you want to see Ambassador Rowny's statement, I will read it for you. I think it pretty much addresses the kinds of questions in terms of what our view is on this situation, but it is the regularly scheduled conclusion at this point of the round without agreement on a specific resumption date. For the next round, we have proposed -- Ambassador Rowny made it clear -- we have proposed that we resume Round Six in early February, and we hope that they will soon agree on a date for resuming the negotiations. It is in our common interests that we do so.

Q Have they indicated their intentions?

A I leave it to them to express their intentions.

Q Alan, do you have any further information on the three submarines -- two Soviets and one Libyan -- overshadowing the U.S. ships in the Mediterranean?

A No.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the statements made by a Syrian official yesterday that the release of Captain Goodman will depend on the development of relations between Syria and the U.S.?

A No. I am going to maintain the posture I have the last few days on this. Contacts do continue at senior levels, and that is all I really am going to say.

Q Do you have any information on the talks that were held between Mr. Shultz and the Foreign Ministers of the MNF in Lebanon?

A Sorry --

Q There is a report that Italy may decrease the number of its troops in Lebanon.

A No. I think that I am really going to have to refer you to what has been said over there by the party, but my understanding is that in briefings that have been given, it has been made clear that there is no change in number contemplated. David?

Q There was a meeting this morning between some Arab/American representatives and some State Department officials regarding the release of Goodman, and they are going to Syria. Do you have any comment on it?

A I don't know anything about it.

Q Do you have any information about the Secretary going to the Arab world this weekend, or in his upcoming visit to Egypt?

A The Secretary?

Q Yes, Secretary Shultz.

A No. The Secretary is in Europe and he will be --

Q After Europe, from Europe. Possibly will change his route.

A No. Jim?

Q I want to try again, with your forbearance. The law states that it is the Government of Argentina. It doesn't say Argentina as a situation, number one. And, number two, if it is a situation that you are certifying, and not a government, why isn't certification being made effective today?

A Why don't you just read the certification when it is made available on the 10th and you will be able to see it. Connie?

Q Is the United States planning to change the location of the Marines?

A I don't have anything on specifics on deployments. I think that, again, something that has been made clear following the Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, is that there is no change in mandate or role or anything of that sort contemplated.

I can't tell you whether anybody is thinking about some adjustments here or there, but the basic mandate and role is not changing. Mike.

Q Alan, is the government working in any way with the International Red Cross for the return of Mr. Goodman, the POW? Are they involved in negotiations with the Syrians, or whatever you wish to call it?

A Again, I am just not going to get into any aspects of our efforts to get Lt. Goodman released. It is a subject of great importance and also sensitivity, and it isn't going to serve any useful purpose anyway for us to talk about it from here.

Q Would you deny, therefore, the statement by Senator D'Amato that you are involved?

A I am not going to address the question, Mike.

Q Do you welcome the efforts on behalf of this Arab-American organization which met this morning?

A I'm sorry?

Q Do you welcome the efforts of the Arab/American organization's representative who came this morning to intercede with Syria to release Mr. Goodman?

A I don't know anything about it, about the efforts. I don't know anything about the meeting, it was raised before, so I can't really comment on it.

Q Have the Red Cross been allowed to see Lt. Goodman, do you know?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any comment on the PLO evacuation or the Arafat evacuation from Tripoli?

A No. We have seen press reports indicating that the arrangements have been completed, but that is all I have on it.

Q On the missing persons report, I understand that Mr. Andropov has been seen in Moscow this week, last week, as well, going to his office in a motorcade.

Do you have any observations on that, if he has been seen in his limo anywhere in the streets around the Kremlin?

A I think we will let the Soviets talk about the whereabouts and welfare of their leaders.

Q Can you say if your Embassy has had any indications that he is around?

A Mike, I said I think I will let the Soviets address that. Steve.

Q Speaking of missing persons, the Swedish press yesterday reported in an interview with Richard Mueller that he denied having anything to do with the illegal computer shipments that were stopped in Sweden last week.

Does this government have anything to say about that?

A I am afraid I am not familiar with the report, so I can't really comment on it.

Connie?

Q Do you have anything on the French pulling out of the Contact Group?

A Yes. We have received assurances from the French Government that it is neither withdrawing from the Contact Group nor calling for the breakup of the Contact Group. France sees no need for Contact Group meetings now. No meetings currently are scheduled.

We have been associated with France and our other Contact Group partners since 1978 in our common effort to bring Namibia to independence in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, and we look forward to continued collaboration with all of our partners in seeking this objective.

Q Copy?

A Yes, if it will reproduce.

Q Do we consider their statements of the past two days helpful or unhelpful to the process?

A I think I have said all I really intend to say. Jim?

Q That was going to be my question. But if they don't see a need for meetings, what consultations are you referring to?

A Again, I will stay with my statement.

Q Do you know, where is Mr. Rumsfeld now?

A He is in Beirut at this point. I think he was in Paris earlier today, but he is in Beirut at this point.

Q Do you know if the Human Rights Department of the State Department is conducting an inquiry about the prisoners and the prisoners exchange since, according to the information, Zia Abu Eain, who was extradited to Israel a couple of years ago, was released and instantaneously he was snatched back and put back in Israeli jail?

Do you have any -- this is the representative of the ABC who met with the Department (sic) of Human Rights on November 29th, and they said that they would agree to make an inquiry into the prisoners.

Can you take the question and check on that?

A I will look into it. I am not sure, since we were not a party to this prisoner exchange effort that we will have very much to say about it, but I will take a look and see if there is anything I can say on that.

Q Alan, do you have anything on efforts to upgrade relations with the Vatican?

A Yes, I do. Very simply, that Congress has authorized exploration of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Vatican and we are consulting with the Vatican on this question.

Q Was there a message sent yesterday by the President to the Vatican on this subject?

A I think I will repeat what I just said, George. We are consulting with the Vatican on this question.

Q Alan, would you take a question asking if Mr. MacFarlane's mission will cover --

A Mr. Rumsfeld's mission?

Q Sorry -- Mr. Rumsfeld's mission will cover the prisoners status?

A No. I am not going to get into the specifics of what Ambassador Rumsfeld is covering. His mission is the Middle East, and we have not been specific and I am not going to, I am afraid.

Steve.

Q Have you got anything more on Walesa's call for an end to Polish sanctions?

A As you know, the President had a statement on this yesterday. I don't have anything new. Jim?

Q What about the vests to Syria, have you got anything there?

A No. I am going to leave you with the Commerce Department on that.

Q Alan, is there anything on spare parts sales to Guatemala, as claimed by them?

A Yes. There is really no change in that situation. Last January, the Administration approved the cash sale of certain previously requested items, including a limited quantity of spare parts and safety flight equipment. That commitment remains unchanged. It is a fact, however, that no deliveries have been made pursuant to the order.

Q So are you denying the report by their acting head of state that there are shipments underway?

A I don't know who said what. I saw some reports indicating that there were some deliveries that had been made, and that report is in error.

Q One more, if I could, on El Salvador. Do you have anything on a Christian Science Monitor report identifying the secret Anti-Communist Army with the national police?

A No, I don't.

(The briefing concluded at 1:00 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, December 9, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #218

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1983, 12:18 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have several announcements for you.

First, a reminder that today at 3:00 p.m., here in the briefing room, there will be an ON-THE-RECORD press briefing in preparation for the Forum on Afghanistan. As I mentioned to you yesterday, the briefers are Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, and Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies of the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Second, available in the Press Office is a statement by Secretary Shultz on the 35th Anniversary of Human Rights Day.

(I have) a press statement on the death of Sir Keith Holyoake.

The Department of State notes with sorrow and regret the passing of Sir Keith Holyoake, former Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Governor General of New Zealand. Sir Keith was a man of great personal warmth and dignity and a good friend of the United States. His distinguished career in public service in New Zealand and in the pursuit of world peace will long stand as a model for selflessness and devotion to duty.

Regarding the election of Lord Carrington as Secretary General of NATO, the United States welcomes the election of Lord Carrington as the next Secretary General. We consider him extremely able and dedicated to the ideals of the Alliance. We look forward to the closest and most productive cooperation with him in coming years. I also want to stress our respect for Secretary General Luns and his strong leadership of the Alliance. He has acted with distinction and inspiration during his years at the helm of NATO.

On the sentences in Rangoon: We note the announcement in Rangoon today of the results of the trial of two North Korean Army officers charged in the October 9 bombing attack which killed twenty-one people, including four members of South Korea's Cabinet. The Burmese Government's investigation of the bombing and the Burmese Court's finding of guilty represents a serious determination to see justice done. In the course of the investigation and trial, it was clearly established that these officers carried out their murders at the direction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

That's it for announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Can a copy of that be made available?

A Yes.

Q Alan, Secretary Shultz said he understands Mr. Andropov is back at work in the Kremlin. Can you offer what evidence of any indication, knowledge, the United States Government has that he has recovered from his cold and he has returned to work?

A Nope. (Laughter)

Q Any idea on what basis the Secretary was speaking?

A I'm just not going to get into it, Mike. The Secretary addressed it, as you suggest, and I think his words speak for themselves.

Q Alan --

A Steve.

Q Two quick questions on Argentina. Can you tell us what will be available, where, tomorrow on the Argentina determination?

A I don't know the answer to that. I think that we were trying -- we were trying to pursue this earlier, and if you would check with the Press Office later, let's see. But my understanding is that it will be a Presidential certification and I would guess most likely available primarily therefore in the White House. But why don't you check later and see what we find out about that.

Q Have you got anything there or can you provide anything on this determination's impact on commercial arms sales, by which I mean the permissibility of commercial arms sales, by which I mean how will this be implemented, what will be changed within the government to allow sales to be made?

A It's a certification which was required under the law in order to allow sales to proceed. As I indicated yesterday, such sales would be approved on a case-by-case basis, so the normal procedures for arms sales which are followed in all cases would be followed in these.

Q I guess what I'm asking is, does there need to be a further step beyond this certification -- in other words, do regulations have to be changed and do we then have to wait for that?

A I see. You're asking a technical question on that. I guess I don't really know how that happens, whether there's a posting in the Federal Register or precisely what happens with that.

Q Can you take it?

A We can look into that, sure.

Q Same general subject: Do you have anything on who Vice President Bush and Ambassador Stone plan to see tomorrow in Argentina?

A No, I don't.

Q Middle East? President Mubarak gave a lengthy interview to Al Ahram. I haven't seen the whole interview. I've only heard reports from it. Maybe we can short circuit this.

Do you have any comment -- do you have any guidance regarding that interview at this point?

A No. I don't know anything about it. I saw one brief FBIS wire just before I came out here.

Q Could you take a question? According to I think, the same wire, he said that he was going to submit the return of the Ambassador to Tel Aviv to a general referendum in Egypt, and I was wondering how the United States, as a partner to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, regards that. Is it in keeping with the Treaty?

A I don't think we would likely get into that in the kind of detail that you would probably be looking for. Our attitude towards viewing the importance of good Egyptian-Israeli relations is quite well known. Where there have been problems in the relationship, we have expressed our sincere hope that they could be worked out between them, but I don't think we're going to get into the sort of question that you're asking specifically.

Q Has the Red Cross reported back yet on the condition of Lieutenant Goodman?

A I do have something on that. Two things I guess I would say. First of all, we understand the American Red Cross has issued a statement, and we're gratified that the ICRC was able to obtain access to Lieutenant Goodman.

The ICRC informed us of their visit, but I don't have any details because ICRC interviews with prisoners are confidential and any public statements regarding their interview would have to come from the ICRC.

I'm sorry. Go ahead.

Q To follow up with the same question about the referendum in Egypt about the diplomatic relations with Israel, will you expect this to be a subject on the agenda of Mr. Rumsfeld's talks with Egyptian officials?

A Again, I'm going to have to stick with the rule I've been using before. We're just not going to talk about the topics which Ambassador Rumsfeld is going to cover in his talks, and I haven't confirmed that he's going to be talking with Egyptians or going to Egypt, in any case, so I can't address that aspect of it either.

Q If it is covered by the mission itself, I meant, does this --

A That's all very speculative -- if he goes to Egypt, would he talk about this. If he goes to Egypt, we'll tell you that he's in Egypt; but we just can't, on the basis of these rules, get into the subject, so I'm not going to be able to do that. Sorry.

Q Do you have any comment on the Israeli attack on the Palestinian positions in Tripoli?

A Yes. We have no confirmation of the reports regarding the shellings, but we hope that plans to evacuate the PLO from Tripoli will proceed unimpeded in order to resolve expeditiously a situation that has already led to many civilian casualties.

Q Could we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q On the Egyptian referendum, Alan, the results of that for some of us who are Middle Easterners are almost known what they will be, and in light of that, which would really be a detriment to Egyptian-Israeli relations, would you comment anything, would you look into it, would you tell us anything about it, because we perceive the results most clear that would support not sending the Ambassador back to Tel Aviv. (Sic)

A I (a) would prefer not to prejudge the results of a process going on, either in this country or another one; and (b) I don't think I will take it. What I will do, though, is if we have something to say on the subject, let you know. But I think we will most likely stick with the propositions I've offered to you earlier.

Q More on Mr. Arafat and the PLO departure from Beirut. In the past you refrained and yesterday you refrained from commenting on his departure. Why this heart warming today?

A I think that our concern over the question of civilian casualties in Tripoli has been expressed many times before. This is the arrangement that's been worked out, and so we hope that it will proceed and the civilian casualties -- the infliction of civilian casualties -- will come to an end.

The Secretary addressed this, too, I see by a wire report, and basically indicated too, according to this report, that the evacuation of Arafat seemed to be the best solution to the problem of trampling on Lebanese soil and Lebanese citizens.

Q The impediment to this process would be the Israelis, no? And their express --

A Well, I don't know. I've seen statements indicating, again in the press, that the Israelis were not planning to impede the process, so I think you're going to have to ask the Israelis about this.

As you know, we supported the Secretary General's statement last weekend.

Q Did the Israelis inform you in advance of their decision to shell the area -- assuming that you will defer your lack of confirmation? Did they inform you that they were undertaking something?

A I just guess as a general principle and not meant to steer you one way or another, I'm not going to get into the question. I think that the Israelis are quite capable of taking independent action, however.

-- MORE --

Q Going back to the matter of Egypt and the referendum, are you surprised at the deterioration of the relations between Israel and Egypt at the present time to the point of almost breaking relations that is just about to happen?

A That is your characterization. I have said that we believe that good relations between Israel and Egypt are important, and we hope that the problems that they have between them will be resolved to their mutual satisfaction as quickly as possible.

Q Are you also surprised about the Israeli denunciation, Mr. Shamir's denunciation at the United Nations yesterday, because they are assisting in the evacuation of the PLO forces from Tripoli?

A As I said before, we supported the Secretary General's statement of last weekend.

Q Alan, can you give us anything on the purpose of the visit of Defense Minister Vides Casanova and his meeting with Secretary Dam?

A He is here primarily to see the Kissinger Commission, the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. When they visited Central America in October, he was not there. He was out of the country, so they could not meet with General Vides Casanova, so they arranged that he would come up today.

Among the meetings, therefore, that he is having while he is here are meetings in the Department with Under Secretary Eagleburger and Acting Secretary Dam. I am sure he is having other meetings around town, as well.

Q Do you know anything about those other meetings?

A No. I believe he is meeting with officials at the Pentagon, but you would have to check with them.

Q Also, do you have the names of any other members of his party?

A I don't. Check with the Salvadorans.

Q Do you have anything today, incidentally, on the secret anti-Communist army and the national police?

A No.

Q Alan, can you say anything about the intention of the United States and Japan to give a bridge loan to the Philippines to tie them over a rough period?

A I don't have anything on it, Spence.

Q Alan, it sounds somehow strange if you say that you don't have confirmation about the attack by the Israelis against Tripoli at a time when you have this very large armada of ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

A I don't think they are standing off of Tripoli.

Q Still it is quite near, and I hope you have information about the so-called blockade by the Israelis against the evacuation of Arafat.

A I think that the statement that I gave you expressed our view on the movement of Mr. Arafat and others out of Tripoli, and I will stand on that.

Q Can you call on Israel from this podium to please lay off and let Arafat and his forces get out of there peacefully under the United Nations flag?

A Again, I think that the statement that I gave you addresses that question. I said I would make it available, so let me ask you to look at it.

Q In the meeting with Mr. Casanova, will Secretary Dam and Mr. Eagleburger reaffirm the U.S. concern for the death squads' activities in El Salvador and ask for actions?

A I think that you can assume that the full range of issues of interest between our countries will come up in discussions, including political violence of both the right and the left.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the OPEC decision to keep oil prices at the record level they have now?

A No, I am not going to comment on the OPEC meeting *per se*. Our general position, of course, is that we think that the prices should be set by the market place.

Q Alan?

A Go ahead, Connie.

Q Do you have anything on the statements by the moderate Palestinians who condemned the PLO bombing in Jerusalem?

A Yes, I do. We view it as extremely positive and potentially significant. We hope it will contribute to an atmosphere in which peace negotiations can eventually take place.

Q Alan, there was a Palestinian girl who was killed yesterday in the West Bank. Do you have any comment on that?

A Yes. We very much regret this tragic event and the context of tension and confrontation surrounding it. We hope that the appropriate authorities will conduct a thorough investigation of the incident and that both sides will take steps to improve the atmosphere.

Q Can we have a copy of these?

A Yes.

Q Alan, do you have anything on the King of Nepal's visit?

A I don't. I think there have been a number of briefings on the visit, and I don't have anything beyond that. Jim.

Q Crocker had a big meeting with South African officials in Geneva last week, late last week. Can you give us any guidance on the results of those meetings and what they were about?

A I don't have anything on it.

Q Also, do you happen to have anything on the legal adviser and the author of the constitution in Grenada leaving the Scoon Government, saying that Scoon doesn't really have an intention of returning very much to civil rule at the present time?

A There is some guidance, I think, from a couple days ago. It is in the Press Office. Why don't you get it there.

Q You don't have it there?

A I don't have it here.

Q Anything further on the French pulling out of the Contact Group?

A No, and I don't expect to have anything beyond what I gave you yesterday.

Q Anything on the stories that new training camps will be put into El Salvador, U.S. training camps?

A No, I don't have anything. You might check with the Pentagon, but I -- let me just leave it at that.

Q Has the U.S. Government got some evidence to support the suspicions of President Reagan that the left might be responsible for some of the death squads' activities in El Salvador?

A I think that this has been addressed. Under Secretary Eagleburger talked about it on Brinkley on Sunday, and I will leave you with his words on that.

Q Nothing new?

A I don't have anything beyond that.

Q Does Secretary Shultz still believe that the Soviet Union is going to return to the INF and START talks? And secondly, Lord Carrington is quite well known in Western Europe, I believe, as advocating the decoupling of Western Europe from the United States. Is the Secretary aware of this program of Lord Carrington?

A What was the first question?

Q The first question is about the Soviets returning to INF and START.

A As far as the first question is concerned, I don't believe the Secretary has said much about Soviet intentions, except we will have to see what they do. He has talked about our intentions, and so I will leave you with his words on that.

As far as Lord Carrington is concerned, our views, I think, are expressed in the statement I gave you, and I think that we feel he will indeed be a very strong Secretary General of the Alliance and all that it stands for.

Q Alan, can you confirm a report concerning opposition in Pakistan against President Zia?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q And also, they are preparing an immediate conflict with India.

A I am not aware of reports to that effect.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(The briefing concluded at 12:38 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Monday, December 12, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #219

MONDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1983, 12:24 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements:

First, regarding Ambassador Stone's travels. As we have said in the past, and as we've done in the past, we will announce Ambassador Stone's travel on a day-by-day basis. This morning he will be meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo and will travel to Caracas, Venezuela, this afternoon. Tomorrow afternoon he will travel to Bogota, Colombia, and at both stops he will be meeting with government officials, and the main focus of the discussions will be on our ongoing support for the Contadora process.

Second, regarding the bombings in Kuwait, let me give you a rather extensive rundown of what we know, and it may also -- just to caution you -- pretty much exhaust current information.

At approximately 0630 Greenwich Mean Time, which was 9:30 a.m. local time today, a Mercedes truck crashed through the main gate of the American Embassy compound in Kuwait. The truck proceeded about 50 yards to an Embassy annex, where a large bomb was detonated. The explosion collapsed part of the annex building and caused extensive damage to the Chancery and to other buildings in the compound.

Information on casualties is still incomplete. Initial reports indicate that four persons were killed and 37 injured; two persons are missing. Two of the dead have been identified as foreign nationals who were working in the Embassy's maintenance section. The two other fatalities have not been identified. Of the 37 people injured, 20 were foreign service nationals; the other 17 were visitors to the Embassy or private contractors. Some of the foreign service nationals injured are in serious condition.

All Americans are accounted for, and, although some American employees suffered minor injuries, none was hospitalized. Efforts to clear the debris are continuing.

We have received reports of other bombings in Kuwait. Information is fragmentary, although the targets included the French Embassy and the Kuwait Airport's control tower. Another location was reportedly near the SAS Hotel and the adjoining offices of the Raytheon Corporation. The extent of casualties and damage is unknown.

Any more specific information would need to come from Kuwaiti Government authorities.

We deplore all of the attacks in the strongest terms. They will not deter us from pursuing a steady policy in the Middle East.

As to responsibility, we have seen media reports that a group calling itself the "Islamic Jihad" has claimed responsibility for the attack. We have no independent confirmation of these reports. An organization calling itself the Islamic Jihad, among other organizations, claimed responsibility for the bombings in Beirut. We have no idea whether they are related.

As to prior warnings, there was no prior warning of this attack. The Embassy has in the past received several security threats and has tried to take appropriate security precautions, especially in the wake of the recent bombings in Beirut. Obviously, though, embassies by their nature must be accessible to the public and cannot be made into armed fortresses. This limits the type of protective measures that can be taken.

On some specifics, there are about 3,000 U.S. citizens in Kuwait. There are some 65 Americans assigned to the Embassy, with about 237 dependents.

I should note that the Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah, came to the Embassy compound shortly after the blast to express condolences on behalf of the Emir of Kuwait, the Crown Prince and the Kuwaiti Government. The Foreign Minister offered to the Embassy his government's complete cooperation and assistance. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Shaykh Saud Nasir al-Sabah, who has been in Kuwait on consultations, also went to the Embassy to offer his condolences and assistance.

The State Department is monitoring the situation very closely. Because of the uncertainty of this situation in Kuwait at this time, we recommend that non-essential travel be deferred for a few days until we have a clearer reading of the situation as it would affect the safety of Americans.

That's it for announcements.

Q Copy of that statement?

A Yes. Happy to take questions.

Q On the bombing, Alan --

A Sorry. Well, does the wire have any questions?

Q No.

A Okay. Go ahead, David.

Q There are reports that they captured one of the people who did the bombing. Do you have anything on that?

A No. I've seen those reports, but I don't have any information specifically, and I think we would, in any case, want the Kuwaiti authorities to talk about those sorts of issues.

Q Alan, could you go over for us -- you talked about increased security in light of what happened in Beirut. Could you discuss with us what that gate was like and why it was so easy for a truck not unlike the one that crashed into the Marine compound to go through a gate? Do you know anything about the structure of the entrance to the Embassy?

A Don't know anything about that. Can't really talk about it.

Q Alan, you talked about appropriate measures -- precautions, rather, having been taken there. There was reporting this summer that there were previous threats to the Embassy --

A I just said there were.

Q -- and that that had been turned off. What kind of appropriate precautions? I mean, are these physical precautions that you're talking about?

A I think, as we have consistently done, John, I'm going to stay away from the specifics of what we do on security. Providing information can only be of assistance -- although it's of legitimate concern, it could also only be of assistance to those who would like to breach that security, so I think we're going to stay away from details.

Q Alan, when you talk about insecurity (sic) in Kuwait, are we worried about the stability of the regime over there right now?

A No. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about this particular situation and the aftermath of these bombings, but, no, I'm not suggesting that sort of thing.

Q Alan, were there any Kuwaiti guards at the Embassy or have there been in the past since the threats have been received?

A I don't know what the guard situation is. There obviously are guards at our Embassies.

Q Not our own guards, but I'm thinking about Kuwaiti guards.

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Have we taken any security measures like having national police of the countries in which we're represented in the countries where we might be attacked with the -- to have them on guard at our Embassies?

A Again, I don't have specifics of what's been done. We have looked at the security threats. The question of security of our Embassies and personnel has been a matter of great concern for many months, but I'm just not going to be able to get into the details of what measures have been taken.

Q Alan, has there been any consideration given to the -- taking measures such as skeletonizing our staffs in these countries so that our -- the casualties may be lowered?

A I'm sure we're always aware of the various considerations, Joe, including number of people around, the mission they're to perform, and so on. Bob?

Q Moshe Arens is linking this to the PLO and saying it's another good reason to not let them out of Tripoli. Do you have any comment on that?

A As I say, we don't know who's responsible, and I can't make any linkage with anybody. You've got this organization which claimed responsibility, the Islamic Jihad. Don't know who they are and whether they represent an organization of the same name in claiming responsibility in Beirut or anything of that sort, so I really don't have any way of commenting on that.

Q Can you comment on the similarities, if there are any, between this bombing and the Beirut Embassy bombing?

A No, I can't. Don't have anything.

Q There has been in Kuwait lately, during the last 24 hours, any American delegation, political/military delegation, headed by the Assistant Under Secretary of State for Near East Affairs? Or is the delegation still in Kuwait today?

A I don't have anything specific on that question today. I think there's some existing guidance on the consultations we've had, but I'm not aware that there's any delegation there now, or that there was yesterday.

Q There was a high-ranking Kuwaiti Embassy official at the State Department I was told this morning. Is it in relation to that, or can you tell us anything about it?

A Don't know. Don't know anything about it.

Q How do you describe, Alan, the relations between the United States and Kuwait in light of what CBS this morning, I believe, said that Kuwait is considered an ally of the United States? Is this a fair term or this is something which you cannot subscribe to it in the way it's --

A Certainly we have very good relations with Kuwait.

Q By saying that the Embassy must be open to the public and it can't become an armed fortress, are you basically saying there's not that much that can be done to stop these kinds of attacks?

A I don't want to try to characterize it or qualify it in terms of that much that can be done. There are, obviously, limits to what you can do and still provide the services and perform the functions that an Embassy is supposed to provide and perform.

But we are aware of threats, and we do what can be done to try to prevent those threats from becoming reality.

Q Are you saying --

Q They can't be stopped, in other words?

A Excuse me?

Q They can't be stopped is what you're saying.

A I'm not -- I don't think -- "can't be stopped" is a very broad description. I think we can take measures to try to minimize the risks, but I'd have to leave you with the description I just gave.

John? No? Okay.

Q With the last explosion in the American Embassy in Beirut, there was some sort of connection or reports that it happened -- in time -- when the chief expert of the CIA was in Beirut by that time, and I think he already was killed in the explosion.

Do you think, or do you have any reason to believe there are similar reasons in the Kuwaiti explosion?

A As you know, we don't comment on matters having to do with the CIA, so I'm just going to have to -- without trying to steer you one way or another, I'm going to have to stay away from that question.

Q Not necessarily the CIA -- maybe any other sort of delegation or any other high-ranking official --

A I don't know of any particular reason why there should have been an attack at this moment in terms of people who were there. I would point out to you, of course, that there were obviously several attacks which took place in roughly the same timeframe.

Q Do you think the attack -- that Kuwait always supports Iraq against Iran?

A   I have no basis for commenting on the motivation for that attack. Jim?

Q   Alan, were any defensive actions taken, shots fired, anything at all, to try to hinder the truck as it went through the gate?

A   I'm not aware that there was time to do that, Jim. My understanding is that the truck came careening around the corner, smashed through the gate, and very quickly was at the -- having gone a distance of 50 yards -- was outside the annex and went.

-- MORE --

Q What about the driver, Alan? There was some speculation early this morning that he might have survived?

A I saw that. As I said before, I don't know. I've seen the reports to that effect: (a) I don't know; and (b) we're going to have to leave it to the Kuwaitis to talk about those responsible and what action might be taken.

Q Do you think this at all, or U. S. officials believe that this is part of the whole general threat that resulted in the increase in security at State, White House and all those various buildings in this town?

A Without knowing what the motivation is and who's responsible for it, it's very hard to draw specific links. Obviously, there is a concern about terrorism in general, and the Secretary addressed this to some extent this morning. But I can't possibly make linkages which require me to make conclusions or draw conclusions about this attack.

Q Is the increased security around left to the discretion of local people or is there a coordinated program run from here, saying do this, this and this?

A I don't know the answer to that.

Q Still on the Middle East. Can you confirm, first, that King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was supposed to visit Washington in January, and that that trip is being postponed now indefinitely?

A I can't confirm that, no.

Q Do you have anything today on the PLO evacuation, the Israeli displeasure with that, and the Israeli complaint on the U.N. flags on the evacuating vessels?

A As we have said before, we support sparing the city of Tripoli from further bloodshed caused by fighting by PLO factions. We join the U.N. Security Council consensus endorsing the use of the U.N. flag in effecting the evacuation from Tripoli of PLO fighters loyal to Arafat.

The Arabs have worked out an arrangement whereby Arafat would depart Tripoli by ship. Arafat has asked that the ships fly the U.N. flag. We went along with this decision. We did so out of humanitarian concern and through the departure of a large number of PLO fighters as a step consistent with our objective of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes. Sure.

Q There's been a request for a filing break.

A Any objection? Okay, filing break.

Q On this matter, there was a statement by the Secretary, I believe, from Morocco, and it was only made once on this matter and I understand over the weekend that the Secretary sent a direct or indirect message to Israel to lay off. And last Friday I asked you if you can address this question, to ask Israel to lay off, and you stuck with your statement.

Would you please make it more clearer at this point that the Secretary and the United States would like to see this coming to an end and the evacuation will come peacefully without all the interference?

A I think we'll choose how to express ourselves on this. The Secretary, as you say, did talk about it. I think this statement is rather direct, and I think our views are quite clear and quite well known to the Israelis. They're aware that we are in favor of the departure of Mr. Arafat and his forces.

Q This morning Mr. Arens said that he is not going to be allowing Arafat to leave.

A I don't think that's quite what he said, if you would look at his words.

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Can I have a follow-up on this question: do you have any further information about the talks made by Secretary Shultz in Arab North African countries?

A Sorry, I don't. I'm going to have to leave that to the party, whatever they have said. I just don't have information to brief you on that.

Q Alan, there were a couple more computer busts over the weekend; one in Miami and one reported this morning in England. I just wonder if the State Department has anything?

A I don't have anything for you on that. Sorry.

Ghassan.

Q Wasn't the Secretary also planning to visit Algeria and the trip was called off by the Algerian authorities? Can you tell us anything on that?

A In the planning for the trip, the possibility of an Algerian stop was discussed and scheduling basically relating to domestic Algerian calenders made that not possible at this time.

Q You're not relating it to the effects of the Shamir visit here?

A No.

Q One more thing on that subject, Alan. Is the State Department surprised, or did it expect the Arab reaction which is reported to be hostile and angry with the United States? I mean, were you expecting these things or are you surprised a little bit by the level of the Arab hostility to Shamir's visit here?

A I don't think I'm going to try to address surprise or expect, or whatever. Our position remains quite clear, that we have had, have and will have a strong relationship with Israel, on the one hand; and we also have had, have and hope to have good, close, strong relations with moderate Arab states and the others. So we do not see an inconsistency between these two parts of the policy.

Q Alan, what do you mean by "domestic reason?" Is it the visit of the Soviet marshal to Algeria?

A No. In terms of the specific days that were being discussed, there were some domestic Algerian considerations which apparently precluded --

Q They're not available; the Foreign Minister is not available?

A I think you would have to talk to the Algerians. I don't think I should go further in terms of detailing it. It's a question of their calendar. It was not a question of some policy different prohibiting or preventing that visit.

Jim.

Q Do you have anything on Urquhart's comments that were published in the Post today about the peacekeeping force?

A About the --

Q Peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

Q We have great respect for Mr. Urquhart's talents, experience and contributions to the United Nations. Nevertheless, we do not share his assessment of the MNF which continues to play a valid and valuable role in Lebanon. As to Mr. Urquhart's criticism of action by U.S. forces in Lebanon, I would repeat that they have only taken military action in self-defense.

Q Rumsfeld, where is he?

A He is in Abu Dhabi. He was earlier in Muscat.

Q What was he doing in Muscat?

A He's continued on his mission to discuss issues relevant to his charter.

Q He was welcome to Damascus; why didn't he go to Damascus since the issue of securing the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon takes the highest priority for this Administration (inaudible)

A As you say, the Foreign Minister of Syria indicated that he would be welcome there, and I don't have an onward schedule to give you because we don't do that. But the fact is he was scheduled to go to Abu Dhabi and Muscat as he has, and so that's what he's done.

Q Will he be going soon to Damascus?

A Again, just out of a matter of general principle and procedure, I'm not going to try to give you a future schedule.

Q He's not scheduled to go to Kuwait, Alan?

A He was not due in Kuwait today, if that's your question. Again, I'm not going to try to project a schedule. I gather there was some report that he was due in Kuwait today. That was factually incorrect.

Q Has there been any protest to the U.N. Secretary General about Urquhart's statement?

A I am not aware of any, Joe, but I don't think I'd get into it.

Q Are we going to make any?

A Again, as I was about to say --

Q Can you take the question?

A No, I won't.

Q Do you have any comment on King Hussein's statements yesterday on ABC as to a myriad of things and the participation, the conditions for participating in the peace talks?

A No, I don't have anything.

Q Back on Kuwait, do you have anything to say about possible retaliatory measures?

A No. I'll stick with the information I've given you.

Q Alan, have any further directives gone out to the embassies to re-enforce their security or are any going out as a result of the Kuwait incident?

A I can't tell you specifically. Obviously, in addition to the concerns that we've had in the past and the measures that have already been taken, when you have an incident of this sort, it is rather natural to review the bidding on that and see what more might be done, but I don't have anything specific on directives, instructions that might have been sent out.

Q Is the U.S. looking for a new wave of terrorist attacks, because we've had Lebanon in April, Lebanon in October, and now we have Kuwait.

A As I say, we have been concerned over many months about terrorist threats and the possibility of terrorist attacks, and we will continue to take measures which we feel are appropriate to that circumstance.

Q But do you expect new ones?

A I can't tell you what we expect. We will continue to take measures as appropriate.

Q Sir, is the State Department constantly reviewing its own security arrangements? It seems that the security arrangements are very slim with these light automobiles blocking the entrances?

A Certainly, there is concern always about the security of buildings such as this one, and people do look at that question. And when they reach conclusions, they may take some other actions on that.

Q Do you consider that the events of Kuwait are rational (sic) enough to redeploy the RDF in the Gulf area now?

A I don't have anything to offer you on the RDF. I think that whatever -- I just don't have anything new to offer you today. I know of no reason to reconsider what it is we've had in the past and said in the past about this. I just leave you with that thought.

Q Alan, there are reports over the weekend out of Vienna that the Soviets may now leave the MBFR talks. Have you had anything at all on that, any indication from the Soviets that that would be --

A I don't have anything to offer here at this point. I don't know what their schedule of meetings is. So I just don't have anything for you on that.

Q Anything on Bangladesh today?

A Yes. We can confirm that on December 11, Bangladesh President Ashanuddin Chowdhury -- pardon my pronunciation -- resigned and General H. M. Ershad assumed the presidency, but we don't wish to comment on specific developments in that country's domestic politics.

We reiterate, however, our hope that Bangladesh will find a way to resolve its internal political differences, continue the process of building representative political institutions, and carry on with the urgent task of economic development.

Q Did the President send a congratulatory message? Sorry, withdrawn.

Q Do you have any comment on the organization, "Terror Against Terror" which placed bombs in East Jerusalem and other markets, according to a story in the Washington Post this morning?

A I'm sorry, the organization -- ?

Q Calling itself "Terror Against Terror" which has claimed responsibility of putting bombs for revenge inside the occupied territories?

A Don't have anything on it. Sorry.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:44 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, December 13, 1983

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STATE DEPARTMENT
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #220

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1983, 12:28 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I don't have any announcements, per se, but let me go through what I can for you in terms of an update on the situation regarding Kuwait.

We still do not have a complete accounting of the dead. Three of the deceased have been identified as Foreign Service Nationals, who were working at the Embassy. One, and possibly two bodies, remain unidentified. Due to the condition of the remains, it is impossible at this point to determine if they represent one or two people.

All of our Foreign Service National and contract employees have otherwise been accounted for. As reported yesterday, no American employees were seriously injured. Of the 21 Foreign Service National and contract employees who were hospitalized -- that's one more than I noted yesterday -- seven are still undergoing treatment. One of these is in intensive care and the other underwent surgery today. All are expected to survive.

Of the seventeen visitors or private contract employees hospitalized following yesterday's explosion, three outside contractors, one Kuwaiti National Guardsman and three visa applicants are still undergoing treatment. One of the latter -- that is, of the visa applicants -- is reported to be in very serious condition. Of the three Foreign Service Nationals who have been identified, one was Syrian, another Jordanian and the third Egyptian.

Embassy operations continue, but obviously because of the December 12 bombing, it will be some time, perhaps several months, before operations return to normal.

The Government of Kuwait is conducting an investigation, an intensive investigation, and has taken people into custody for interrogation, but we are awaiting the results of the Kuwaiti investigation and have nothing further to say about responsibility therefore at this time.

That really is all I have for you on that. Happy to take your questions.

Tell us about the Lebanon situation, the shelling, if you would, Alan?

A Mainly, I think your story, John, is going to come from DOD, but let me give you what I do have on this. First of all --

Q Can we request, before you go on, that we get a copy of that update?

A Yes, I think we can --

Q On Kuwait.

A On Kuwait.

Q Please.

A Yes.

Q Let me go on with the question I was just given and we'll go back.

On Beirut, first of all, no incidents involving the U.S. MNF contingent at the airport in the past twenty-four hours. But two U.S. Navy F-14s conducting a reconnaissance mission this morning north of Hammana were fired on by SAM's and anti-aircraft fire. The aircraft successfully completed their mission.

U.S. Navy ships offshore fired on the sites which had fired on the aircraft; and, as I said before, details and further information will really have to come from the Pentagon.

As to other dimensions of the Beirut situation, as of 1000 Beirut time today, there have been no reports of security problems in the greater Beirut area, and the airport remains closed.

Q Can you identify the sites in terms of who controls them?

A I cannot, John. I don't know if the Pentagon has any further detail on that.

Q Which navy ships that fired -- did the firing; do you know?

A For all that detail go to DOD. I just don't have all that information. I'm sure they do.

Q Alan, going back to Kuwait, the Secretary of State, from the statements that he had at the news conference at Lisbon, it was interpreted that the United States already picked up some sites for retaliation inside Lebanon. Could you elaborate more on this?

A I don't believe that's correct. I think that there were press reports citing unnamed sources in Washington saying that there had been sites already picked out. I don't think the Secretary talked about that.

I don't have an official report of what the Secretary said, but you have wire reports on that and I have one in front of me which has a quote that says "If the offenders can be clearly identified, then I think there will be ways of getting at them." But he didn't want to comment specifically or elaborate on that, and I'm not going to.

Q Do you have the text of the news conference?

A I don't have it.

Q Later on, you'll have it available?

A I doubt very much we'll have it in the next several hours. But, sure, as soon as it's available, we'll make it available to you.

Q Alan, do you have a view on the renewed shelling of Tripoli today by Israeli warships?

A I don't have anything specific on that, Mike. I've seen the reports of it, but I don't have anything beyond what wire reports I've seen, but --

Q Can you comment on how helpful this is?

A Let me say that we have continued to be in touch on this issue; that is, of the PLO evacuation. We continue to be in touch on this issue with the appropriate parties. We support the evacuation both to spare the people of Tripoli further bloodshed and to see the withdrawal from Lebanon of a large number of PLO fighters. We believe that no nation should interfere with the evacuation. The time has come to bring this matter to a conclusion and move ahead with the evacuation.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A Yes, we can provide a copy of that.

Q Alan, have you communicated that to the Israeli Government?

A Fred, I think I will have to stick generally with what I said yesterday, which is we have talked with the Israelis; we've expressed our views. I don't want to be specific beyond that.

Q Have you said whether or not we favor them going out under a U.N. flag?

A We have indicated that we did support for humanitarian reasons, and the other factor in terms of getting PLO forces out of Lebanon, the Security Council President's statement on this. I think we had some guidance on this some days ago. So that's not a new position, John. That goes some days.

Phil.

Q Alan, what happened to that fellow who was supposedly one of the drivers of the truck in Kuwait and who is supposedly still alive?

A I don't know precisely, and I can't confirm that he was -- that the person referred to in the reports was, in fact, a driver or a participant in the bombing. That person, I have heard reports, is still in the hospital. But I think that probably in terms of his role or interrogation of him, and so on, we would turn to the Kuwaitis to determine that.

Q And, also, is there any plan to send the FBI investigators in there as they did in Beirut, or has the Kuwaiti Government asked for that?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q And, also, could you tell me, what kind of -- how much explosive was used and what it was?

A I have no detail on it.

Ghasson.

Q There were reports, or there are reports that the Government of Greece has requested MNF members officially to secure the exit of the PLO from Tripoli. Can you tell us if your officials received anything from the Government of Greece, and if you did, what was the response?

A No, I don't think I will get into the question of diplomatic back and forth. Our position is unmistakably clear on this, and I've just given it to you again today and with some new words, and I refer you to that.

David.

Q Can you tell us in regard to the reconnaissance flight if Syria was informed before the flight took place?

A Before a specific flight took place? I think you'd have to --

Q Yes, before that flight, there was a reconnaissance flight and I presumed unarmed?

A Surely unarmed. I am not aware that we are specifically informing others of -- I guess you would have to check with the Pentagon, but we have, as a general matter, said that we would continue reconnaissance. I really haven't got more detail, nor would I get it.

Q Where is Mr. Rumsfeld today?

A He is in Abu Dhabi.

Q Alan, wouldn't the MNF responsibilities actually stretch to the departure of the people from Tripoli now, the PLO?

A I'm not aware of any suggestion that the MNF would be involved in that departure. You're thinking of the departure from Beirut, for example, whether there would be a repeat of that? I'm not aware of any suggestion that there would be a repeat of that particular formulation.

Q Can't you, or aren't you able to tell us if the Government of Greece requested such guarantees from MNF members?

A As I said, I'm not going to go into the diplomatic exchanges.

Q Alan, do you have any indications to the fact -- I mean, if the explosion in Kuwait is more linked to the U.S. policy towards the Iran-Iraq war or to the U.S. military presence in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything further to give you today. I had nothing on the question of motivation yesterday. As you all know, several sites were hit. But I can't give you anything further on motivation, so I really can't answer your question.

Q Can you comment on what President Saddam Hussein said that he appreciated the understanding of the U.S.A. Government of the Iraqi-Iranian war, the new approach.

A The new approach?

Q Yes, of the American --

A Our approach is as we have discussed it before. We would like to see that war brought to a conclusion through peaceful dialogue.

Q In that regard, there was a FBIS item that Baghdad said it would retaliate against Iran for the Kuwait explosion because it wants to defend all the Gulf Arabs. I was wondering if you were aware of it, and if you had a comment.

A No, no.

Q Alan, do you have anything at all on that Aviation Week story that said that one of the Israeli raids on the Syrian positions last year in Lebanon had resulted in the death of 200 Soviet advisors?

A No, I'm not aware of the report, frankly, but I don't have any comment on it.

Q Do you know the purpose of the visit of Mr. Sokolov here today, the Soviet charge'?

A To see Mr. Eagleburger? I don't think it's taken place yet. As I recall, it's this afternoon.

Q Who arranged --

A He came in at our request, but I'm not going to get into the subject matter -- or he is coming in; excuse me.

Q Can you offer anything on the delegation headed by Mr. Placke from the State Department or the Department of Defense, the Pentagon, which went to the Gulf? I think they've been somewhere in the Gulf.

A Yes, I think I indicated yesterday there was some guidance in the Press Office on this subject. I don't have anything on it here.

Q There are reports from the West Bank of the demolishing of three more houses and the closure of another four, something like that. How does that really fit within, or if you can answer it, and then if you apply it within the U.S. Government's request to Prime Minister Shamir to improve the quality of lives of Palestinians under occupation?

A I think I can simply say to that that we have seen the report of the Israeli military spokesman on the destruction and sealing off of West Bank houses. Our position on this issue is well known.

We have firmly and consistently opposed the use of collective punishment which affects the innocent as well as the guilty.

--MORE--

Q Alan, there is a statement attributed to Mr. Kamal Hassan Ali, Egyptian Foreign Minister, in which he said the U.S. support for Israel ends the U.S. neutral position which a full partner in the peace process enjoys. Do you have any comment on that?

A I commented several times on that issue. I don't intend to comment on anybody's specific statement, but we've commented before several times that there is nothing inconsistent between the strong relationship we have with Israel and the strong relations we have with the moderate Arab states.

And I think many spokesmen, including the Secretary and others, have talked to this point and there's only so much one can say, and then it really all has been said. And that is there is nothing -- no new direction pointed in this. This is a reaffirmation, the Israeli visit, and I think that the Secretary noted in one of his meetings with the press in the last couple of days that there's an erroneous impression that there was some sort of a treaty or agreement signed with Israel. That, of course, is not true.

But this is a reaffirmation of a very strong, important relationship we have. But, as I say, there is no inconsistency between that relationship and the important and strong relations we have with moderate Arab states.

Q Have you been presented with any official protest or presentation regarding the agreement between the U.S. and Israel?

A You say "the" agreement. I would --

Q From Egypt, I mean.

A Oh, from -- again, I would point out you're talking about "the" agreement, and I'm saying to you there is no "the" agreement, there is no piece of paper that we're talking about. We're talking about the results of --

Q -- an agreement.

A We're talking about the results of a visit, and we're talking about the overall relationship. In any case, I guess I'm not going to get into the specifics of what any given country may have said to us. Surely this whole topic of U.S. policy in the region is a topic which is frequently discussed between the United States and other governments.

Q Alan, since apparently there is a feeling among moderate Arab states that there is such a discrepancy between our relationship with Israel and our relationship with them, does this in itself become a matter that has to be addressed?

A As I say, the question of our policy in the region, including relations and the peace process -- the relationships involved there -- certainly is something that is talked about a lot. It has been for some time. It's a natural topic. It's one that's of concern to all the parties involved.

So in that sense I suppose the answer to the question is yes, but there's nothing particularly unusual about that fact.

Q Alan, in light of Israeli rejection by Mr. Shamir and Mr. Arens of the peace initiative of the President of last year, and the Arabs willing to discuss it further, and now this morning there was in one of the papers an interview with Salah Khalaf Abu Iyad who is the man number two in the PLO who said that if it will be the right of the Palestinians for self-determination, it will be accepted, to the Reagan plan.

How do you see that you can be moving this out of this --

A There's no change as we see it. That is, that that proposal, the President's proposal, is out there as we think a standing, good proposal on which to move forward with negotiations.

The next step, as we would see it, would be to come to the table, including Jordan, with the backing that it feels it needs from Arab states and Palestinians, and talk about the problems. So that position hasn't changed. There's nothing different about that.

Q Do you know if -- is Jose Napoleon Duarte seeing anybody in this Department tomorrow when he visits?

A I believe he -- well, he's here on a private -- under private sponsorship, as I understand it -- let me just check here -- as a guest of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation which is a private German group. He'll be meeting a lot of people and organizations over the next few days, and I understand he's to hold a press conference on Wednesday morning at the Embassy Row Hotel.

Here he will be meeting with the Acting Secretary, Mr. Dam, today and also with officials in ARA. But on other specifics of his calendar and schedule, I'm afraid I have to refer you to the Adenauer Foundation.

Q What time is the meeting with --

A I don't know precisely what time that is. Sorry.

Q Also, could --

Q Same subject.

Q -- same subject. One more. Can you explain why this report by Judge Tyler on the nuns' case in El Salvador has been classified?

A Yes. I think it's pretty much out in the reports which talked about it this morning. The Department received Judge Tyler's report on the Churchwomen's case on December 3. The document was classified upon receipt pending an assessment of the implications of public disclosure before the trial is completed.

We are awaiting a report from our Embassy in San Salvador on this issue. Our overriding concern in this case has been and will continue to be that the guilty be brought to justice.

If we decide that public release at this time could frustrate that objective, we will defer its release until after the trial is completed. If we conclude that earlier public release will not prejudice the case, we will release the report.

The Department has made the report available to concerned committees of Congress immediately on a classified basis.

Q So the determination can be made --

A The determination as to whether it will be released before or after the trial? I can't tell you. As I say, we're awaiting now a report from our Embassy in San Salvador, and we'll see what comes out of that report.

We know and appreciate the need that there is indeed a need for a timely decision in view of the public interest regarding this issue.

Again, if we conclude the report is possible under the present circumstances, we will do so without being asked to do so. We will volunteer it.

Q Can we have a copy of this?

A I can give you a copy of the first part of what I said.

Q Do you have a judgment as to when the trial will be held?

A I can't really tell you when the trial would be held. What applies here, obviously, is the Salvadoran judicial system and its rules of evidence and appellate procedures and so on. So I really can't try to give you that, Mike.

Q Is there a new policy or line about America retaliations? There are new reports surfacing now that there is a list of targets and likely American retaliation in the "Israeli style," quote, unquote.

Can you tell us anything about that?

A I addressed this earlier, I thought. That is to say, that I'm not -- those reports come from unidentified sources, and I'm not going to comment on them and I wouldn't comment on them in any case.

As far as commenting in general on the issue of retaliation, I don't have anything to say beyond what was said and I reported to you earlier on the Secretary's remarks. I'm going to have to leave it with that.

Q Where is Mr. Stone today? What are his plans? Who is he seeing?

A He is -- well, let me get you the words. He leaves Caracas today for Bogota, Colombia, and will consult with government authorities in Bogota today and tomorrow.

Q Alan, I do have another question on the Middle East. What -- do you confirm or deny reports that Syria is now taking a more conciliatory position towards the whole affair in Lebanon?

A I don't think it's up to me from this podium to try to characterize Syria's position. Our positions and policies are well known, and we think that there needs to be progress, and we will be working together with the other parties involved toward that end.

George?

Q Just could you provide us with a copy of your response on Judge Tyler's report?

A Yes. I said I would do -- I don't know if I can give you all of it, but I can give you part of it.

Q Alan, just on -- the vote on IDA was 32 to 1 with the rest of the countries voting against the United States' position.

Do you have any statement on that?

A I don't. I'd refer you to Treasury. They're handling that.

Jim?

Q On Grenada, do you have any response to the America's Watch letter, and also are we going to get more papers since they seem to be in the process of being leaked selectively hither and thither?

A The America's Watch report on which part? There have been a couple of different reports.

Q On Grenada, on the holding of detainees by both U.S. and Caribbean forces, and the lack of notice to attorneys and access and so on.

A There is extensive guidance on the authority under which the U.S. Military Police and others are operating within the Caribbean Force. I can give you some of it, but I don't know that I'm going to go through the whole guidance at this point.

As far as documents -- while I'm looking at this, as far as documents are concerned, we -- as I've said before, we will be releasing more documents. I would hope we could release some quite soon, but, in any case, there are a lot of documents, and they are being gone through systemically, and they will be released as that process goes forth.

Q Would you post the response to America's Watch?

A No. I'm not going to post. I think that what I can say here in terms of -- I guess I don't have a direct response to the question, but what I can say is that the Military Police who will be remaining behind as the other -- the combat forces have been withdrawn, will be an integral part of the Caribbean peacekeeping force and will perform duties as necessary under the peacekeeping mandate.

However, the chain of command for U.S. forces will flow from the U.S. military command structure. The Military Police units will be within the Caribbean peacekeeping force and will assist in maintaining security in Grenada.

On November 15, 1983, the Grenadian Advisory Council designated all members of the Military Police Corps of the U.S. Army as "authorized officers" with authority to apprehend, detain, search and interrogate persons who are acting or are likely to act "in a manner adverse to the interests of public safety, public order or defense."

So that is the authority under which they are operating, and that's really all I've got on that.

Q Copy of that?

A I can give you a copy of that.

Q How is that -- well, I think the America's Watch letter was directed specifically at psychological operations.

A I really would have to refer you to the Pentagon to go further on that.

Q How is the command structure consistent with Grenadian authority? I mean, in other words, if they're reporting to the Pentagon on decisions such as picking people up, how -- at what point do they report to Grenadian authorities about how that individual should be treated or whether or not he should be picked up?

A I don't have a lot of detail. I'm sure there are others in this building you can pursue that with.

Go ahead, Mike.

Q Housekeeping. What time --

Q Filing break?

A Excuse me. There's been a request for a filing break. Okay. Filing break.

Q Do you have an estimate on when the Secretary will arrive, and do you expect him to make a statement?

A I don't have any indication that he will make a statement on arrival, Mike. He's -- the last I heard he is due in at about 9:30 tonight.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, December 14, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #221

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1983, 12:27 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Got one announcement, or statement, in light of a press report this morning which led people to believe perhaps a clarification of our understanding of an action taken in El Salvador was appropriate, with regard to the land reform:

As we understand the action taken yesterday by the Constituent Assembly, it provides for implementation of Phase II of the land reform program. It does not affect Phases I and III, which we have supported.

The new provisions on Phase II represent a compromise among the various parties in the Constituent Assembly on the amount of land that can be retained by small-to-medium landholders. We are encouraged that an equitable compromise was worked out through the democratic process that will allow for a beginning of implementation of this phase of the land reform program.

Q Get a copy?

A Yes.

Q Take questions on that now or --

A I really cannot take any questions at this point. I don't have anything further to give you, so why don't we go to something else?

Q Just -- it's confusing because apparently only 34 voters, or Assembly members, voted for it, with D'Aubuisson, and it was D'Aubisson's compromise. The Christian Democrats apparently didn't vote for it.

How is that then a compromise among all the democratic forces in the Constituent Assembly?

A Well, the Constituent Assembly is a democratic body. How they -- how people choose to participate or vote is not something I'm going to comment on, Jim. I don't know the facts. I can't verify what you've said, but without addressing that, it's their process and it is a democratic process.

Bernie?

Q New subject?

A Yes.

Q Alan, how do you explain the escalation of the U.S. in the Lebanese situation by the introduction of the firepower of the *New Jersey*?

A I would refer you basically to DOD, but I think your description of it as an escalation, although apparently the *New Jersey* did fire and, I gather, for the first time, it has been there, it's been prepared to be used in a defensive mode as it was today in response to an attack on our reconnaissance aircraft. And in that very real and important sense it is not a change.

Q The President said this morning that aside from achieving our goals in Lebanon the other way to get the Marines out would be if there were a total collapse.

Given the current situation of Druze firing on the Lebanese army, the United States and Syria exchanging rounds, PLO factions exchanging rounds with each other and the Israelis, what would a total collapse be?

A I'm not going to try to define that. We certainly don't think that this represents a total collapse.

Bernie?

Q Yes. I may be behind the times here, but is Mr. Rumsfeld going to Syria? There was some announcement he was going, but apparently he's not there.

A I don't think there was any announcement that he was going. There were some press reports that he was going.

Q I mean, that was --

A The fact is he is in Amman. We have said that the Syrians indicated that he would be welcome in Syria. We have not, as you are well and frustratedly aware, announced his schedule ahead of time, and we're not going to do that. But, as I say, the Syrians have indicated that he would be welcome to go there, but we'll stick to the normal procedures of announcing his stops as he has arrived.

Q Alan, if he --

A   Excuse me one second, Fred. Go ahead.

Q   They haven't said he's not welcome?

A   No. They have both privately and publicly said that he would be welcome there.

Q   Alan, if he does go, is it indicated to the Department whether Assad will see him or whether it will be the Foreign Minister?

A   I think I'd have to stay away from that question, Fred. You'll just have to let the visit, if it happens, happen, and not try to project that.

Q   Alan, the Secretary said the Monday before he left, "We'll have to take our signals on Assad's health in whether he sees foreign visitors."

Can you give us anything on that, whether we have --

A   It really is not appropriate for me from this podium to talk about Assad's health. I think I'm going to simply let the record stand as it is, let the Syrian Government speak to President Assad's health.

Ghassan?

Q   Due to the fact that you said that he was welcome by the Syrian Government -- that's Rumsfeld -- in private and in public, and considering the situation, what we will still insist on calling escalation -- that is, people in the press, I think -- why hasn't Rumsfeld gone to Damascus?

A   Again, I know it's frustrating, but I'm not going to try to get into the whys and wherefors of his trip. He has a mandate to address the issues of the Middle East. He's been doing that throughout the course of his travels, and I'm just going to have to let the trip unfold without trying to explain it, I'm afraid.

Q   You know, I'm just relaying something, Alan, that I'm reading some things from the Middle East press that they believe that he is trying to avoid actually meeting Syrian officials due to what is happening and what they believe is -- will happen.

A   No. That much I will say is not a correct interpretation. Bernie?

Q Alan, you talk about the fire from the New Jersey as being defensive. Can you explain why it is necessary for the U.S. to carry out reconnaissance missions over Syrian territory -- held territory?

A Well, it isn't Syrian territory.

Q Syrian-held.

A Well, but the point is exactly that. It is Lebanese territory. The Multinational Force is in Lebanon at the invitation of and with the agreement of the Government of Lebanon. That includes the defense of the Multinational Force and the -- anything that goes with that that is necessary.

That obviously is a military judgment. The Government of Lebanon has no problem with that, understands it, is fully part of that. That is, they're briefed on it, they know that it's going on, and so it is a part of the normal precaution to protect the MNF.

Q So the reconnaissance is part of that normal precaution --

A Sure.

Q -- and Lebanon has no problem with it.

A That's right.

Q And that's why it's carried out.

A That's right.

Q We understood Rumsfeld's mission was to mediate for Lebanon. What's he doing in Jordan or Cairo? Does these countries have something to play in Lebanon?

A His role is as the negotiator/representative for the Middle East. It is not limited to the Lebanon problem, so I am not going to get into what he has discussed at his various stops or where he may be going that he hasn't yet visited -- where he hasn't yet visited -- but his mandate certainly is beyond Lebanon.

Q Alan, do we check with the Lebanese when you carry out a New Jersey strike, or is there some sort of understanding with the Lebanese that when American aircraft are attacked, the U.S. will respond as it sees fit and in the measure it sees fit?

A I guess there are two parts to that response. One is I think that it is understood that we will defend our forces, and that we would --

Q With the Lebanese.

A With the Lebanese. But in terms of notifications of specific actions, I guess you'd have to check with the Pentagon as to how such notifications are made. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Are there notifications?

A I don't know whether in each individual instance there are or whether there is a general notification, simply that we will respond, and therefore they understand in that manner. You really have to check with the --

Q No negative fallout from the Lebanese on the *New Jersey* or --

A I can't say on the *New Jersey* specifically --

Q -- or air strikes, U.S. air strikes.

A -- but the Lebanese Government certainly understands and has expressed no problem with the idea of reconnaissance or the defense of the MNF forces.

Q Can I ask -- just to follow up on the previous question of Bernie? As I understand it, the MNF are there, among other things, to secure the -- until -- I mean, they will be there until the foreign forces are out of Lebanon.

Until they're out of Lebanon, I mean, don't you think that the overflights of the civilians are actually kind of contradicting the idea of MNF are there to bring about the removal of foreign forces? That is, recognizing that there is a problem that they are there for to solve, and until that problem is solved, the escalation therefore is --

A Two things -- well, three things, now you've introduced the word "escalation." I don't accept the word "escalation."

The second thing is, in terms of the duration of their time there, I'd refer you to what the President said in his Saturday speech, his noon speech.

As far as whether this reconnaissance and the defense, when they are attacked, whether that complicates the situation, the fact is that we have made clear that reconnaissance is believed to be militarily necessary in defense of the MNF, and that we will defend our forces, and that we will take the action as it is necessary.

So I don't see that if these defensive actions and protective actions, in terms of gathering information so that our MNF forces are not endangered -- if those are perceived, as they are indeed meant to be, as defensive, benign, not to attack or provoke anybody, and proceed without incident, I don't see why that complicates the situation.

Q Alan, can I just follow up on this. Just to be the devil's advocate, the Syrian Minister recently said if the Americans, and I understand the Ambassador in Washington repeated that, if the American naval force in the Mediterranean would allow us to fly over them, also, in order to see if they have any offensive intentions against us, then we will let these F-14 surveillance flights do their job without us firing on them. What would you tell this Syrian Minister?

A I think that the question of what we're doing in Lebanon -- I don't think I'm going to prolong this --' what we're doing there and with what authority we're doing it, at the invitation of the Lebanese Government, and all of that makes what we're doing a pefectly legitimate and acceptable thing to do.

Q Alan, in the past the United States has used lesser than battleships to respond; it has used aircraft to respond. Today for the first time it has used the New Jersey, which takes it on a different level of military response.

What sort of political signal is there beyond the bombing and the fact that the Americans are ready to move that high up -- military responses?

A Again, I can't -- first of all, I think in terms of the overall situation, the fact that we responding, whatever it is we're responding with, is not new. So you're saying it's been ratcheted up, and I'm saying that it is part and parcel of the standing policy and procedure.

Why a particular method of responding is chosen, the New Jersey or the Ticonderoga or airplanes, that I don't know and that is a military decision. You would have to ask the Pentagon about that.

Q New subject?

A Sure.

Q Alan, there's a report today from Helsinki that Mr. Gromyko has definitely decided to go to the conference in Stockholm. Do you have any -- are you aware of that report; do you have any confirmation of this?

A I'm aware of the report. I don't have any confirmation on it, and I can't offer you anything on that.

Q Can you say if that came up in the conversation with Sokolov yesterday?

A No, I don't think I would get into the nature of our conversations. I would leave you with my response, though. I can't confirm that, and I think it would really be up to the Soviets to announce whatever Mr. Gromyko's plans are, in any case.

Larry.

Q Do you have an up-to-date report on the situation with the bombings in Kuwait?

A Yes, I have a little bit. There's not a whole lot new that I can tell you.

Regarding casualties, our latest information indicates that there are three confirmed dead and at least one, possibly two, more unidentified persons killed in the blast.

Of the 21 U.S. Government Foreign Service Nationals who were hospitalized following the bombing, eight remain in hospital, two of whom are in serious condition.

Of the 17 visitors who were listed as injured, seven remain hospitalized. We don't have any new information to offer on who was responsible for the bombing, but I would note that at the request of the Government of Kuwait, the United States will be assisting in the investigation into the circumstances surrounding the attack.

I do not, however, to anticipate your question, have any details on what that might constitute.

Q Does that include the FBI?

A I'm not aware that it includes the FBI, Larry, but I guess I would ask you to go and ask the FBI. My understanding this morning, and I do not give you this as something to use as coming out of here, was that it probably did not; but ask the FBI, if you would.

Q Alan, could we ask for a copy of that, those figures, the statement you just read out?

A Yes, I can give you that. Sure.

Q How about this second man who was supposed to be in the truck; you were kind of fuzzy about it yesterday. Weinberger said he was counting on getting some information from him, and the New York Times says he's dead.

A I'm afraid the New York Times may be ahead of our information, but I don't have that information that he's dead.

I remain, to use your description, "fuzzy" on it at this point. I'm not sure that that individual is necessarily involved, but I think that the information on that is still coming in. So I think we have to wait for further clarification.

Q What does that mean, "you're not sure that he's involved?" You're not sure there was a second man in the truck?

A No, I think that we're all talking -- there was an individual who was apparently hospitalized and there was a belief that he might have been involved. I think, as I indicated yesterday, and I would continue to indicate, there's some doubt about that, and I think the doubts may be growing. But I saw a very late report on that which indicated that, so I would continue to caution you about that particular report.

Bernie?

Q The Iranian Government has denied any involvement in this. Have we had any -- has the U.S. had any contact with third parties or otherwise with the Iranians at all on these incidents over the last several months?

A I honestly don't know whether we have had any messages passed, per se. Our concerns about Iranian activity, in general, forgetting any specific incident, but in general, I think have been pretty well pointed out. I'm not aware of specific contacts, but I don't know, Bernie, that I would be able to get into that in any case.

But on this particular one, as I said before, we do not know who is responsible; don't have any information to update you on that.

Q Can you talk about the concerns about Iranian activity, can you in any way explain that a bit?

A No, I'd just have to refer you back to a variety of statements that have been made over a long period of time.

Q Do you have anything today more on Tripoli than you said yesterday?

A No, I don't. I would refer you back to what we said, though, on Tripoli.

Q There was a report this morning that Federal Government buildings throughout the country were going on a "gray alert." Is that in response to anything beyond the Kuwaiti bombing or is that --

A I don't know the answer to that. I simply know that, as you all have doubtless observed around this building, there have been some rather more permanent installations put up, and I gather that at the U.N. Mission, our U.N. Mission, there probably has been some action taken which was the decision of that Mission. But I think this is all part of a -- in terms of our action -- I can't speak to this gray alert you're talking about -- part of an effort to address sensibly the question of possible threats, not necessarily the ones we've talked about in the past, but just as a general matter.

Q You know of no new intelligence about threats --

A I think I'd leave you with what I just said. I'm somewhat leery of getting into the question of specifics, but I would leave you with what I said about the general question of review of security.

Bill?

Q Alan, the New York Times this morning from Kuwait also says that the Embassy had a number of threats against it and it was unable to respond, or to take precautions because of budget constraints. Could you respond to that, please?

A I can't address that in detail. I don't have details of what budgetary issues may have been involved. But following the bombings of the Embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon, a number of specific security steps were implemented to better control access by vehicles and individuals, and additional steps to upgrade security at the Embassy were also planned, but I don't have information at this point about the budget question.

Q At the Kuwait Embassy?

A Yes.

Q Alan, the Long Commission in the Pentagon has produced a report on the question of security procedures for the Marine forces at Beirut Airport, and so on, and there's been a lot of speculation in Congress and elsewhere about responsibility for what some people believe is a breach in security.

Can you say what specific recommendations the State Department made regarding the forces in Lebanon? There's been some speculation that perhaps the State Department ordered a low level of security or advised a low level of security so that the force would look more pacific than --

A No, the State Department -- it's not a State Department matter to discuss the kinds of specific security arrangements that those forces would employ. That's a decision for them to take.

I'm not aware that the Long Report has actually been made public, and I'm sure that once it is there'll be a lot of discussion of it simply because it's an important report.

Q But you're denying that the State Department made any recommendations whatsoever about level of security at the Beirut Airport?

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on the Red Cross report on the prisoner exchange in the Middle East?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on the story in the New York Times about how heavily-armed the U.S. forces are in Aguacate in Honduras?

A I'm not sure I have anything on how heavily armed --

Q On that article; what they're doing, and so forth?

A Basically, you've go to DOD for specifics. But I think the basic point is that since October '83, the U.S. engineers have been making improvements to the existing Honduran dirt airstrip at El Aguacate in support of Big Pine II exercise objectives. So I think that you should talk to DOD about that, but that is the purpose of the activity there.

Q Alan, anything on a phone call made by the Secretary to Australian Foreign Minister Hayden concerning the docking of the H.M.S. Invincible?

A I don't have anything on it. I believe the Secretary addressed this with the press at one point. I don't happen to have his words, and I believe that Mr. Hayden said something about this, too, publicly. I just don't have anything new to update that record.

Q Judge Tyler's report on the slayings in El Salvador was reported to have been classified because publicity here would hamper the case. Is that the reason for the classification and, if so, how?

A Let me refer you back to what I said the other day on this subject. I think you'll see that.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

Clenner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, December 15, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #222

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1983, 12:30 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements for you up front.

First of all, I would like to introduce the newest member of the Press Office staff, Joanne Reams. Why don't you stand up, Joanne, so everybody can see who you are and knows who to call up at 3:00 in the morning. She comes to us as part of the ongoing personnel rotation program in the Bureau of Public Affairs. She'll serve as a press officer. She's worked in the Department for four and a half years in the PA Bureau's Editorial Division where she is in charge of editing and producing the Department's Background Notes. We are pleased to have her with us here, and I know you'll make her feel welcome.

I have an announcement on the Washington visit of the Thai Foreign Minister; that's Air Chief Marshal Siddhi. He's visiting Washington this week for talks with the Secretary and other officials. He will meet with the Secretary on Friday, December 16. On Wednesday, he joined with the Attorney General in a -- I guess it's an extradition treaty -- signing ceremony at the Justice Department. Also, this coming Friday he'll see the Secretary of Defense. He's leaving town on December 19.

A statement on the relief of Dayr al-Qamar. We are pleased to note that the relief of the Lebanese town of Dayr al-Qamar is underway, and that all is reportedly going well. Many thousands of refugees have been unable to leave that town in the Shuf Mountains for over three months. True to its traditions, the International Committee of the Red Cross has been active in providing food and medical assistance.

Throughout these months the United States has worked closely with the parties involved in Dayr al-Qamar. The successful beginning of the evauation can be attributed to the sustained combined efforts of the Government of Lebanon, the Druze and Christian communities in Lebanon, Israel and the United States in parallel with actions taken by the International Red Cross.

The United States applauds this humanitarian achievement, congratulates all the parties who worked together in planning for the evacuation and hopes that this step can be offered as a model for further progress in the reconciliation process in Lebanon.

A little more background. The Lebanese Forces militia and the refugees are being evacuated. Some residents of the town may wish to leave, but we think that most of them are going to remain in their homes.

A contingent of the Internal Security Forces -- the Lebanese police -- has entered the town to ensure the safety of these residents. The surrounding area remains under the control of largely Druze militia.

The Israelis have provided trucks to transport the Lebanese Forces from the town. The Government of Lebanon is contracting for private ships for onward travel of the militia, who, I guess, are going up the coast.

In addition to escorting the Lebanese Forces, a temporary Israeli Defense Force presence in the area is helping to ensure the safety of the town's residents.

The Israelis were instrumental in developing the evacuation plan and in negotiating an agreement on its implementation.

That's about all I have.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure. I'll be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Q John, can I ask you a question about El Salvador? Can you tell us something about this letter that was delivered to the Salvadoran Government linking a cessation of the death squads with future American aid?

A As you know, Jim, we don't go into the nature of private diplomatic exchanges, but it's also very clear what Vice President Bush said in his public statements, and I'd just remind you that he said, "If these death squad murders continue, you will lose the support of the American people and that would indeed, be a tragedy." He also said, "It's going to be extraordinarily difficult to give the support this country" -- that's El Savador; that's when he was there -- "deserves if something is not done about all of this."

So I'm not going to get into the details of the diplomatic exchanges, but I think it is quite clear -- has been clear, that we feel very seriously about these death squads and that the Vice President was very forthright when he was there in suggesting that there would have to be reform and improvement, and this will have to be done in a fairly speedy timeframe.

Q Did the United States ask for the expulsion from El Salvador of those responsible?

A That's what I say, I'm not going to get into the detail of the diplomatic interchange, but I think you can take it as a given that there was a very direct discussion about this matter.

Q Would you welcome that idea, of their expulsion, those responsible?

A We certainly would welcome a cessation of death squad activity.

Q Do you have anything there on military aid levels?

A No, I don't.

Q What is -- the date January 10 was mentioned there as a kind of deadline. Is there anything special on January 10?

A I'm not going to get into what dates may have been suggested, but all I would reiterate is what I just said, that the Vice President, as have other Administration officials, made it very plain that there should be a progress on this front in a very short period of time.

Q Can you -- just to reiterate what Michael asked, do you think that exile or expulsion would be something that could contribute to the goals you seek in cessation of death squad activity?

A I think that's for the Salvadoran authorities to work out how best to come at this problem. What we're saying is that it needs to be tackled.

Q John, there are reports from Kuwait that the local authorities --

Q -- stay on Central America?

A Would you like to stay on Central America and return to Kuwait?

Q Would you have any suggestion as to where these folks might go should the Salvadoran Government in its sovereignty decide to exile them?

A No, I think that's their decision.

Q Alan, why is this now? I mean, the U.S. has been saying variations of the same thing for some time. Is it taking a different form; is there an ultimatum built into it this time?

A No, I think there was some skepticism in this room not long ago, you remember, when we announced the new move on certification. I think I said at that time, why don't you keep an eye on what we say and what we do. And I would think what the Vice President has said and did say in Salvador in very direct form and what the Secretary has been saying, I think, tends to bear out that piece of counsel: to keep an eye on the seriousness with which the United States tackles this problem.

Q So that there's a different thrust at this point in the U.S. approach?

A We feel very strongly about this activity, and are making no secret of that -- have not made any secret of it.

Q You say watch what we say and watch what we do. You haven't told us what you're doing.

A I think that what the Vice President said is one indication of such direct and forthright activity.

Q John, is there anything new on possible declassification of Judge Tyler's report?

A No, I don't at this time have anything on that. That is something that's --

Q Have you received a report from the Embassy on his judgment on doing so?

A I think it is -- I'm sure it's in the building, yes.

Q What's the Embassy -- its viewpoint on?

A What the Embassy's viewpoint is? I'm not sure. I don't know whether we have that.

Q Do you dispute, agree with, the Post story this morning regarding the interpretations that have been placed on that report of people who read it?

A You put us in a difficult position because it's still, at this stage, a classified document, and we will give you the standard reply, I'm afraid, that we don't get into discussion about classified documents.

Q On El Salvador, two other issues. One, do you have any statement with respect to the completion of the Constitution; and do you have anything on the military situation in the eastern part of the country?

A No, not on either subject, Jim, I'm afraid.

Q Also, one other on Central America before you leave. There's this report in the New York Times that Honduras is now raising questions about the Contadora Group, and the thrust of the article is that Honduras and El Salvador are now dragging their feet on progress with respect to the Contadora Group. Do you have any comment on that?

A I suppose you really ought to go to Honduras to ask them about that, but it's our clear understanding that Honduras is a firm supporter of the Contadora initiative and shares with its Central America partners the goal of full, reciprocal and verifiable implementation of the 21-point Document of Objectives.

As we've stated on numerous occasions, we believe that document is an important step toward peace in Central America. We support the efforts of the Contadora and the Central American states as they work to translate those objectives into verifiable commitments. So we're not aware of any foot-dragging, but I think you ought to go talk to the Hondurans.

Q Can we get a copy of what you just read?

A Sure.

Q And also related to the same, Kissinger is reported in the New York Times as saying that his Commission favored "greater specificity" with respect to the 21-points. Do you have a comment on that? Does he speak for the Administration?

A I don't have a comment on that, but speaking broadly, the Commission speaks for itself.

Q Do you have anything on -- perhaps this was asked -- reports of fighting between Nicaraguan and Honduran forces today?

A No, I don't. It wasn't asked -- (a) it wasn't asked, and (b) I don't have anything on it.

Q Where, please, is Mr. Stone today, and what is he doing?

A He's back in Washington.

Q Stone?

A Stone? Senator Stone? Yes, he came back last night.

Q Was he not scheduled to go to Nicaragua, and why didn't he go?

A He came back last night and is in Washington. Don't have anything for you on his travel plans.

Q Was he not supposed to go to Nicaragua? Haven't plans been made for that?

A I don't know that he was scheduled to go to Nicaragua. One never rules out his going anywhere, but he did not, in fact, on this trip.

Q Did he inquire about being received there?

A I cannot answer that question, Mike. I do not know.

Q Would you take it and find out, if he inquired about being received there; if he received a negative response, or his plans did not permit him?

A All right.

Q Where did he go besides the initial stops, Venezuela and Colombia?

A I am going to have to do a little homework on that one for you. Unless anybody knows -- anybody know where he was? Obviously, he was in Argentina, but I don't know where else --

Q Could you post the answer on that?

A Sure, we'll look into it.

Q John, I have a couple of questions on visa denials. Did the Department deny the visa of an Italian general, a NATO general, Nino Pasti?

A I'm not aware of it. Be glad to look into it, though, if you think there's something there.

Q Yes. I think it was in October. A second question: The American Civil Liberties Union today said the law you cited when you denied Mr. Borge and Mr. D'Aubuisson's visa says that denials can be done for the activities these people might engage in, not for what they might say, no matter how repugnant.

Were those denials for what they might say or for what they might do here?

A I think I'd go back and look at the specific section in the Act and the specific phrase cited, which I don't have in my head at the moment.

Q All you said was, it was not in the public interest, and that's why I'm --

A Ah hah. Well, then, I guess that's what we stick with.

Q A final question. Could you give us a list of the people that you have denied visas for, because it was not in the public interest, recently?

A Before I fall into that particular trap, let me seek some counsel here. Let us, without guaranteeing -- I don't know what that list involves and what the issues are, but we will take a look at that request.

Q Could you inquire if you have a new request for a visa from Mr. D'Aubuisson?

A I do not think there is any visa request pending for Mr. D'Aubuisson.

Q John, what's going on in Beirut today? Do you have any situation report?

A Yes. I'll be glad to give you what I've got, Bob. According to reports this morning, Beirut International Airport came under fire. I gather that was some artillery and some rocket-propelled grenade fire. We do not believe there have been any U.S. casualties.

There are reports today of renewed clashes along the Alayh ridgeline. Yesterday, there were exchanges and in some cases heavy fighting in the traditional areas of confrontation.

The United States greatly regrets the loss of a French soldier killed yesterday when a shell struck a French LAF checkpoint. Two Italian soldiers were also wounded in a separate incident.

Beirut International Airport remains closed. I don't have anything further on the evacuation plans from Tripoli.

Q Has the New Jersey open fire again today?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Does that include maximum alert for the Marines at the airport, John; and has there been any tank fire there today?

A I do not know what the state of alert is at the airport, but if they're being fired on, I would think they're fairly alert. But I don't quite know what the exact technical definition is of the state of readiness.

Q John, the President's use of the word "collapse" yesterday, was that in the context of a collapse on the military front or in the context of a collapse of the national reconciliation talks, and that such a collapse, a political collapse, could lead to a U.S. MNF pullout?

A I think the White House had some words, to offer on that this morning, Bernie.

Q Is Rumsfeld in Damascus? Who is he seeing?

A No, Rumsfeld has left Damascus and is today in Israel.

Q Do you have anything at all on the Damascus stop?

A No.

Q Even who he saw?

A He saw Khaddam.

Q He said Khaddam. He did not see Assad?

A He did not.

Q There are stories on the wire to the effect that the State Department had advance warning of the attacks on the Kuwaiti Embassy and took improper precautions?

A The Embassy certainly did request additional security back in September. The initial problem at the State Department was no funds. Very swiftly, however, funds were found, and those in the appropriate position moved as expeditiously as was possible and, in fact, developed a package for the protection of the Embassy with one of the Embassy officers who was here in Washington.

The cable authorizing such steps was overtaken by the incident itself and the tragedy is that the steps that the Department finally was able to take were not implemented in time.

Obviously, there is a lot of intelligence about possible threats to various missions of the United States and the Department right now is engaged in a major effort to increase security overseas at all of our Missions. At the present time, the State Department has approximately 200 projects underway at 120 posts which directly or indirectly improve security. But obviously this is a problem of worldwide terrorism, and just as obviously the Department is reassessing its allocation of priorities and resources to see what can be done in different areas.

Q Can we have a copy of that?

A It's pretty much from notes, out of my head, but let's see what we can do for you.

--MORE--

Q A follow-up, John --

Q What was the figure --

Q John, a follow-up, if I may. Can you tell us what -- some of the steps that were taken and some of those that were planned but were not taken?

A I cannot. There were -- steps were undertaken in Kuwait, I think modest steps, by the Embassy personnel, but the major package, of which I spoke here, was not implemented. It had not been implemented.

Q John, there were reports --

Q When you talked initially -- they asked in September -- is that correct? -- for an improved security arrangement.

A Yes.

Q Initially no funds were available.

A Correct.

Q Then "very swiftly." When was this "very swiftly" that the funds were found?

A I don't have a date on that.

Q Could you find out when it was?

A Sure. Let me see what --

Q And when was it that this -- the next thing we have in your chronology is that a cable authorizing it was going out at the time of the explosion. Right?

A That's correct.

Q Now, what happened between this "very swiftly" funds being found and December when the explosion took place?

A Well, what happened was moving from a position of having no money to freeing money on an emergency basis from other accounts, of developing a package in concert with an Embassy officer from Kuwait who was here in Washington, and of setting the seal of approval on that package and indicating that it could go forward.

Q John, was their initial request based on some specific threat or a more general sense of an increasing environment in which they, the Embassy, was being threatened?

A I cannot tell you how specific the initial threat was in the initial mention, described in the initial cable. I would say that Kuwait is not unique in having assessed its situation and perceived a threat. In some cases those threats are general; in other cases they're quite specific, on the basis of the information received.

Q One other thing: Had the package of measures authorized in the cable that was going out, to which you referred, been implemented, would it have stopped the truck bombing which took place several days ago?

A I can't answer that question. Obviously, in the minds of those who created the package and planned it, obviously it would have made the Embassy more secure. But it's a very hard question to say, well, could such and such an incident have taken place. Certainly it would have been better protected.

Q How much money was that package?

A I don't know how much money was involved.

Q What was the initial request for funds?

A I don't know that there was an initial dollar figure.

Q You said that there was no money available. Was there --

A Yes, but, I mean, what I don't know is whether the Embassy at Kuwait said we would like X hundred thousand dollars or X million dollars or whether they said we would like X, X, X, X, X, without a dollar figure on it. That I don't know.

Q Can you tell us --

Q And talking --

Q Could you take the question?

A Why don't we look into it and see what --

Q Can you tell us how much was in the package?

A Well, I think what we -- yes, exactly. I think that's what we can tell you, what would have been in the package.

Q John, there are reports --

Q For the 200 projects --

A Excuse me. Let me take one at a time.

Q There are reports coming from Kuwait telling that the Kuwaiti authorities are investigating what they call "Asian connection," relating to the latest explosions in Kuwait.

Are you aware of this side of the investigation?

A No. I don't know what they mean by that. They certainly are conducting an investigation, as are we -- there is a State Department team on the scene -- but I don't know what the term "Asian connection" means.

Q They are talking about the parts played by -- maybe played by -- the Asian, Filipino and South Korean workers working in Kuwait and who are supposed to be somehow regimented in the country.

A I'm not aware of that. That's something that the Kuwaitis are obviously taking a look at.

Q You don't have any comment on that?

A I'm not aware of it.

Q John, it's probably going to strike a lot of people as an inexplicable delay, in view of what happened to the American Embassy in Lebanon and other embassies in that part of the world, that protection could have been requested in September and still by December had not been put in place and there was indeed a tragedy.

A Uh-huh. Well, I've tried to tell you as best I can what took place. I'm sure the priorities and the procedures followed are certainly being reviewed by appropriate people in the Department.

Q John, what are the modest steps of security that were taken by the Embassy personnel while they were waiting for approval of this package?

A I don't know. What I'm saying is that, obviously, they moved on the ground with perhaps modest funds that they have available and resources that they have available to do certain things. I'm not suggesting that nothing was done, but what I am saying is that the major package involved was not in effect.

Q John, after October 23, wouldn't any prudent Ambassador have at least put a truck in front of each vehicular entrance?

A Well, I'm not sure what happened on the scene.

Q But we know that there was no barrier of that kind.

A I'm afraid I can't guess -- you're second-guessing the Ambassador on the spot. I'm not prepared to do that.

Q John, did the package include the positioning of more U.S. Marines?

A I'm not sure about that, Bernie. I'm not sure.

Q John, did the September warning include the step-up in Kuwaiti policing of the Embassy block at that time?

A I'm not sure of that, Jim. I can't answer that, and I'm not sure, indeed, whether there -- I mean, there may well have been some increase -- I don't know -- by local authorities of protection. I don't know.

Q John, to what extent did the Kuwaiti refusal to accept our nominee for an Ambassador in any sense color our attitudes about what might be done at the Kuwaiti Embassy?

A Oh, I don't think at all, Barrie. I don't think that had any bearing on security measures.

Q John, the United States mission, the Marines' mission, in Lebanon supposedly is a peaceful mission and the people who are there are as peacekeepers.

My question is, how is the whole thrust of what's evolving lately about the shelling and air strikes and other things put into context of that the U.S. forces is attacking or fighting or answering the enemies and everybody -- just a repetition of the word "enemy," the enemy forces, Syrian, whatever -- Syrian or Shi'ite, Druze, PLO, whatever it is. (sic)

The concept of putting that the Marines now are sort of in an enemy situation -- there is a combat situation --

A The question is?

Q The question is, how this terminology of "enemy," answering the "enemy" back? Are they there to fight "enemy" or are they there to make peace? And, you know, discarding or taking aside that they have been attacked, but is this an "enemy" situation? Are they in an "enemy" zone that everybody's talking about the "enemy"? (sic)

A Well, I don't think they attacked anybody, and I think --

Q Excuse me?

A I do not think that the MNF -- it's a Multinational Force -- attacked or took the initiative in attacking anybody, but they certainly have fired upon those who fired on them, and I think as far as the United States is concerned, and I think so far as the others are concerned -- but certainly we speak only for ourselves -- we will continue to fire on those who fire on us.

We will defend our Marines who are there in a peaceful presence.

Q If I may refer the same question of my colleague, would you accept the characterization of the Syrians or the national Lebanese as "enemies"?

A Well, I don't -- what I think we're doing is keeping those Marines there as a presence to permit stability and a return of sovereignty and independence to Lebanon. And I don't think it is -- you know, it's not a very easy task to divide up various factions and say these are enemies and these are friendly.

The fact is that we're going to fire on people who fire on those Marines. The Marines are going to defend themselves, and I'm sure that someone who fires on a Marine is thought by that Marine to be an enemy. That isn't a blanket label for an entire faction or an entire country, but when unprovoked fire comes in on those Marines, I'm sure in the mind of the Marines, the person they fire back at is an enemy. In that narrow sense, I suppose they are.

Q Had the New Jersey achieved its -- I mean, target -- destroyed that target which it aimed at and now we don't know what --

A I think you'll have to ask the Pentagon, but I think in fact, if you're talking about the New Jersey, I think the fire was fairly effective yesterday. But I think the Pentagon can be helpful.

Q We had only one soldier being killed, that's it, and no destruction of other installments, and they moved them out, so it's only --

A Well, maybe that's what the -- maybe that's what the people who were fired at are saying, but I think the Pentagon feels that the counterfire yesterday was fairly effective.

Q John, what response did Ambassador Rumsfeld get when he asked for the return of the American airman?

A I don't have anything for you on Rumsfeld's mission, I'm afraid.

Q I presume he did make such a request.

A I would think that the question of Goodman would have come up, yes.

Q Can you tell us with whom he met when he was in Syria?

A Khaddam.

Q John, do you have anything for us on a statement on --

Q Did he see Assad?

A No.

Q Did they deny his request to see Assad?

A I don't know what the exact -- exactly what the orchestration of it was, but the fact is he did not. Foreign Minister Khaddam was the representative of the Syrian Government he saw.

Q John, do you have any guidance on the situation of the Vienna talks, the Soviet-American dialogue?

A Well, yes. The MBFR?

Q Yes, please.

A As you know, the Soviet Union has broken off the INF negotiations and now avoided setting dates for resumption of the START and MBFR talks.

The United States regrets these Soviet actions and hopes that the Soviets will resume these important negotiations at an early date.

I suppose that in the aftermath of the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to reach an agreement in these various arms control areas, and as a result of the initial deployments that the allies have undertaken, I suppose the Soviet Union is reassessing its position, and this may well also be part of an attempt to pressure the United States and its allies.

But, for our part, we remain at the table. We stand ready to continue negotiations towards equitable agreements and to maintain established patterns in all three arms negotiations, and we believe it would be in the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union to make early progress towards agreement to reduce arms and to establish a more stable military balance.

Q Any word --

A We will be there. We will be at the table. It's up to them.

Q Do you have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Any word from Moscow on Gromyko's coming to Stockholm?

A No. I mean, there are various press reports, and one has seen different surmises and rumors, and so forth and so on, but there's no firm indication.

Q John, is the United States considering pulling its resources and participation out of UNESCO?

CONT

A That is under consideration. I think a review of that issue began in June. No decision has been taken, but it certainly is under review.

Q Why was it brought up?

A For about ten years there have been serious difficulties with UNESCO, as far as we're concerned, including politicization, budget mismanagement, attempts to restrict the freedom of the press and impose economic regulation. So on June 26, 1983, the United States began a review of U.S. participation in UNESCO, and withdrawal or continued full participation are the options being considered. No recommendation has yet gone to the Secretary.

Q Wasn't the outcome of that Paris --

Q Can we have a copy of that?

Q Wasn't the outcome of the Paris meeting -- I guess it was last month -- favorable to what the U.S. position was in regard to --

A On --

Q -- world press credentials?

A On world press? Well, I would say that there have been cycles, but that's not the only issue that disturbs us with UNESCO. The whole budgetary question is another area. But I don't think most journalists would consider that we're entirely out of the woods on a new world information order yet.

Q Could you develop the politicization, please? Along what lines?

A I can't -- well, I think there have certainly been voices and viewpoints expressed which seem to be incredibly partisan and opposed to, certainly, the forces of freedom and, in particular, the United States.

Q Does this follow-up the expulsion of Israel from it?

A Well, I think we'll stick with the words we've offered you here.

Q How much money does the United States contribute?

A I don't know how much money is involved. We probably have that in a piece of earlier paper, this having not been the first time we've discussed this UNESCO participation.

Q What is the U.S. share?

A As I say, I think that's on an earlier piece of paper, this not being the first time.

Q John, is this a serious threat to UNESCO by the U.S., or is it some sort of semantic threat to see if you could manipulate affairs within UNESCO?

A Well, if you mean is it a phony consideration of the issue, no. It is a serious consideration of the issue, but I'm not predicting which side the United States will come down on it.

Q Have we considered withdrawal in the past as well?

A I don't know whether we have ever gone to quite this formal state of recommendation, but it certainly is not a totally novel idea in this building.

Q John, on that same subject, first of all, could we get a copy of your initial statement in reply?

A Sure.

Q Secondly, do you expect -- is there a time when you expect the review to be completed, because according to the Times they expect it the middle of this month, which is about now.

A No. I can't really give you a timeframe on it.

Q You have no idea?

A No.

Q Okay. Thanks.

Q John, let me ask you some questions about the Secretary's interview with the Gannett News Service.

A Uh-huh.

Q I take it he said that in World War II the press was with us, but now the press is against us and seems to have an interest only in revealing information that screws things up. I believe that was his words.

A Well, he talked --

Q But let me just ask -- first, my question -- who is the "us" he is referring to? Is he referring to the country, to the Administration, to the State Department?

A I don't think I will attempt a kind of horse-back interpretation of his remarks, Bob. He talked at some length about the press, and I guess I'd refer you to the transcript. And, indeed, he said he --

Q Where do we get the transcript?

A I think the White House would have a transcript.

Q Because they don't have it back here in the Press Office?

A Well, it was a Presidential event, and I think the White House will have a transcript.

Q Well, the remarks suggest that at best he's accusing the press of being unpatriotic, and perhaps some might take it that he's accusing the press of being traitorous.

Do you think that's what he had in mind?

A No. I don't think that's what he was saying, and I think you really ought to read his remarks in their entirety because he said a number of things about the press, and he's talked about the need for a free press and his support of it. So why don't you read the whole thing.

Q That's the only comment you're prepared to make on the interview, is to read it?

A Well, what else did you have in mind?

Q Well, do you agree with him?

A I don't express personal opinions from this podium, Bob.

Q But you are his press adviser.

A My job is to articulate policy as far as I see it. I have many personal views, and I'm sure you don't always agree with editorial viewpoints on CBS.

Q We don't have an editorial viewpoint, necessarily. (Laughter)

All right. You've answered the question.

Q John, why can't we get it here, the transcript, please?

A Well, it is possible that we can make it available here, but it was a White House --

Q Could you arrange for us to have it here?

A Let us see what we can do for you.

Q You know, when the White House has bad news, they release it as far away as they can. Is that what the State Department's doing now? (Laughter)

Q John, just one more on UNESCO. When you say the choices are either withdrawal or full participation, are you excluding the possibility of participation in IPDC, for example, in subsidiaries of UNESCO and not in UNESCO itself?

A No. I don't think I'm going to elaborate on where we are at the moment, Jim.

Q John, when you said "politicization," what did you mean by that?

A I think I took a crack at that in answering Mr. Kalb's question. Okay?

Q Okay. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:04 p.m.)

Summary

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, December 16, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #223

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1983, 12:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have a little information for you up front on the third batch of Grenadian documents which we're releasing today.

Over the past few weeks, we've released numerous documents found by the U.S.-Caribbean security forces in Grenada. We've released two sets previously. A third is being released today. In the next several months, with a few exceptions because of privacy or security considerations, we expect to release all the documents to some appropriate public repository where they'll be available for the press and scholarly examination. In the meantime, we'll continue to process documents and make them available as we have the three sets thus far.

To pull together some of the basic information contained in the first three sets, the Department of State and the Department of Defense today are jointly issuing a report entitled "Grenada -- A Preliminary Report." Copies will be available in the Press Office after today's briefing. And I gather they're in a little short supply, so we're going to ask you to bear with us as we limit you to one per news organization.

This is a preliminary report in that it covers only materials contained in the documents already released or those we're releasing today. Just to give you an idea of the magnitude of what remains, for example, there are some 50 linear feet of documents which we've not yet been able to analyze or even catalogue. Work to inventory the weaponry found on the island is also still going on.

Thus far, we've found five secret military agreements -- three with the Soviet Union, one with North Korea, and one with Cuba. We may find more. In fact, there are written indications of additional military agreements with both Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. But these five agreements alone provide for delivery by 1986 of more than 10,000 infantry weapons, including modern automatic rifles and submachine guns. Deliveries were also agreed for more than 130 crew-served artillery pieces, plus armored personnel carriers, coastal patrol boats, rockets, grenades and land mines.

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Evidence in the documents points to plans for four active battalions and 14 reserve battalions. That would make 18 battalions with a strength of somewhere between 7,000 and 10,000 soldiers for an island of about 100,000 people.

All the information I'm giving you is borne out in the documents -- indeed, based on the documents -- which clearly show that the Cubans led the way in this build-up. Within two months of the 1979 coup, which brought Mr. Bishop to power, Cuba had delivered 3,800 infantry weapons and 36 artillery pieces. Cuba also served as a Soviet intermediary. All Soviet-bloc military shipments to Grenada were routed through Cuba.

In all, there were almost 900 Cuban, Soviet, North Korean, Libyan, East German and Bulgarian personnel on Grenada at the time of the combined military operation.

The report we're releasing today makes clear that the New Jewel Movement's close working relationships with both the Soviet and Cuban Communist Parties helped the NJM to organize Grenada's domestic and foreign policies.

That's about all I have for you.

Q Will we get a copy of the statement you just made?

A You're welcome to a copy of that and also the report and the documents.

Q Is this report a synthesis of the documents you've been able to analyze?

A Yes.

Q John, on Lebanon, can you bring us up to date on what the situation is today? And in light of the new cease-fire, do you take this to be any change in the attitude on the part of Syria?

A Well, that's hard to judge, Jim. As far as the situation on the ground is concerned, the parties have agreed to establish a consolidated cease-fire, although there have been some violations today.

We urge the parties to respect the cease-fire and to end the violence that has cost many innocent civilian lives and caused extensive property damage.

Last night the U.S. Marines in the MNF came under fire for about three hours. The Marines returned fire. One Marine was slightly wounded. The New Jersey also fired its five-inch guns in support of the Marines.

We understand that Beirut International Airport will reopen after the Lebanese authorities have had an opportunity to repair damage to the runways and facilities there.

Insofar as Tripoli is concerned, pro- and anti-Arafat PLO fighters were engaged in heavy fighting yesterday.

Q And do you still believe that the Israelis will not interfere with the evacuation of the PLO?

A Yes. No change in our expectation.

Q On that, John, the Israeli Defense Ministry said in a report that the United States did not in fact appeal or request of Israel to allow for the exit of Arafat from, and his people from, Tripoli.

A Uh-huh.

Q He said he denied that there were U.S. appeals, which we were told here were communicated to the Israeli Government. Can you clarify that?

A Well, we certainly have been in diplomatic consultation with the parties concerned, including Israel.

Q I'm sorry?

A We certainly have been in diplomatic consultation with the various parties involved, including Israel.

Q So you are not taking seriously those denials from Israel or what?

A I'm just telling you the facts, that we have consulted with the various parties and that does include Israel.

Q Is Israel one of them?

A I beg your pardon?

Q Is Israel one of those parties that you consulted?

A Israel is one of them. Yes.

Q John, have we decided not to fly reconnaissance flights over the Syrian-occupied part of Lebanon?

A Not to my knowledge. No change in our position, as far as I know.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on any changes in U.S. policy in terms of arms supply to Israel and Egypt?

A Arms supply to?

Q The arms aid --

A As you know, there is general consideration of the philosophy underlying arms sales. Insofar as any discussion of the President's budget for Fiscal '85 is concerned, of course, I can't get into that before the budget is formally submitted to Congress.

However, we are concerned about the debt burden of developing countries and the fact that U.S. security assistance loans may add to that burden.

In this context, consideration is being given to making our security assistance program more flexible so that assistance could, in appropriate circumstances, be made concessional.

If greater flexibility is proposed, it could be applied to the security assistance program world-wide, and the degree of concessionality received by any nation would be decided on a case-by-case basis.

Q What does that mean in terms of Israel as a case?

A Well, it's not special consideration for Israel. As you know, the Carlucci Commission has reported, and there has for some time been discussion about the advisability of making aid available more on a grant basis rather than on a basis in which the receiving country faces a heavy debt load and has to repay --

Q Well, would the Administration recommend the $1.4 billion, or, let's say, the Fiscal --

A I can't get into specifics on the budget or the recommendations --

Q But you said --

A -- but what I'm telling you is the underlying philosophy that is presently being discussed, which would apply across the board on a case-by-case basis.

Q Is the report in The New York Times, then, ahead of the Administration or what?

A Let me repeat: I'm not going to get into details of what we're talking about in terms of the budget, but the Secretary has talked, the Carlucci Commission has reported -- it isn't any secret about the thought that is going on towards revision of the aid program to make it more direct grant.

Q Can we have a copy of what you just read us now?

A You can have a copy of what I just read you. Yes. I added a lot which isn't in that piece of paper.

Q John, it was announced that the cluster bomb shells to Israel will -- is under consideration to be resumed.

A I'm sorry? Who announced?

Q It was announced that the cluster bomb shells to Israel that Israel bought and it was suspended, that it is still under consideration, or it will be delivered after you will get the assurances from Israel that will be used only for defensive purposes, or what's the status of the cluster bombs? (sic)

A So far as -- you're absolutely right in that there would have to be agreement on the conditions attached to their use. Insofar as I know, there has not yet begun any discussion about that agreement since Mr. Shamir was here.

Q This is going to be the next month's meeting with all of these joint political/military committees?

A I don't know whether that -- I doubt that that -- well, I shouldn't say that. It's not my impression that that is something that would be discussed by the political/military committee, but I really don't know who will

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talk that agreement through. But, so far as I know, there's been no movement on it.

Q John, are you aware of this controversy, I guess you'd call it, about stamps on letters that come from Iran?

A I'm aware that --

Q Does the Department have anything on that?

A I don't have anything on it, but I'm aware that the Post Office either is in process or has asked the State Department for some counsel on a new Iranian stamp. I'm not quite sure what it is they are asking -- what the Post Office is asking of the State Department yet. Be glad to take a look at it for you.

Q Okay.

Q John, back on the arms aid question. You mentioned the Carlucci Commission. Is serious thought being given to implementing its recommendation about a new agency attached to the State Department that would coordinate both security and economic assistance?

A I don't quite know where the discussion -- as you know, we were on a trip -- I'm not quite sure where the discussion lies, Jim, but I know that the report of the Commission is something that the Secretary is much interested in.

Q President Gemayel is in Libya today. Do you know anything about this?

A Sorry?

Q President Gemayel of Lebanon is in Libya.

A Yes. I think he is.

Q Do you know why he decided to go to Libya? Did he coordinate this with you?

A Yes. I think he was flying to -- and did fly to -- Morocco prior to his visit to London. It's our understanding that he received a last-minute surprise invitation from Mr. Qadaffi to visit Libya and accepted that invitation.

Q In Morocco the invitation came?

A It's my understanding that he received the invitation while he was in Morocco and flew from Morocco to Libya.

Q John, Mr. Wallach, who has lost his voice, wants to know if you can tell him where Don Rumsfeld is.

A Does he have an interpreter?

MR. WALLACH: Right.

A What is Mr. Wallach's question?

Q (Hoarsely) Where is Rumsfeld? (Laughter)

A Rumsfeld is in Lebanon, having been earlier in the day in Israel. I don't know who to look at now for the follow-up.

Q Do you have anything on the talks with Assad that he had?

A With Assad?

Q Was it Khaddam or --

A It was Khaddam. No. Nothing on the talks with Khaddam.

Q Do you know if Rumsfeld plans to spend the weekend in Lebanon?

A (A) We won't tell you where he's going until he's gotten there, but (b) I'm not quite sure. I really don't know what his travel plans are.

Q John, is the United States in any way trying to have the Geneva II take place? What I'm trying to ask is, is the United States involved in discussions about the Geneva II about the Middle East, about the reconciliation? I mean, are you involved in --

A Involved in discussions? Yes, in the sense that the United States is enthusiastic that the national reconciliation process should go forward. As to how the parties group themselves and where they come together and when they come together, that, obviously, is their decision; but, yes, I think that's a fair statement that we are acutely interested in that.

Q One more thing, John, on this. There are reports that Syria may be now less interested in abrogating or amending the May 17 agreement. Can you tell us if that's true or anything about it at all?

A No, I can't.

Q Mr. Hartman met with Mr. Gromyko yesterday, I gather.

A Yes.

Q Did he get any indication from the Soviet leader whether he's going to Stockholm?

A Let me -- obviously, we're not going to get into Ambassador Hartman's talks yesterday in detail except to say the obvious, that among other things they discussed was the Middle East.

Having set that aside, we don't have any indication, any new indication, of any movement either way on Mr. Gromyko's attendance in Stockholm.

Q One other thing on the Soviet Union. There's a wire report quoting Western diplomats in Moscow as saying nobody has seen Andropov going to work, and questioning the report by the Secretary, as well as in the New York Times. Do you have any confirmation, or was that a bum report?

A I think the Secretary was -- this was a few days ago, and the Secretary was talking about reports that Mr. Andropov had been seen going to work. What the situation is as of today or as of the past few days, I don't know. I don't have any update.

Q What information do you have on the hostage situation in Peru which ended up in one American nun being killed?

A It's something we are monitoring and discussing with the Government there. I'll be glad to give you what I have.

Our Embassy in Lima is in close consultation with the local authorities. The Minister of the Interior has ordered a full investigation and extended his official and personal regrets, and we are awaiting the results of our Embassy's and the Peruvian Government's inquiries.

Some earlier background on the incident indicates that on December 14, about midday, several prisoners at the Lurigancho Prison in Lima took four American nuns hostage.

The nuns had been teaching at the prison. The prisoners demanded their own release. The prisoners then released one hostage nun and told her to go to the Director of Prisons and to her Embassy to relay the prisoners' demands.

Peruvian authorities allowed the prisoners and their three hostages to leave the prison in a vehicle described as an ambulance. About 6:00 that evening the vehicle was fired upon by Peruvian authorities.

One American nun and seven Peruvian prisoners were killed. The nuns involved: Joan Mary Sawyer, a Sister of St. Columban, was killed. Sister Theresa J. Pasterczyk, a Marist nun, suffered a bullet wound to the arm. The bullet was removed and the Sister was released from the hospital, and the third nun in that group, Sister Ellen Conway, also a Marist nun, was not injured.

Q John, what involvement, if any, was there of the U.S. Embassy in the decision-making process, or were they just advised or were they not advised until after the shooting took place?

A Can't answer that, Jeff. I don't know what their involvement was.

Q Do we know how this nun died? Was it due to the prisoners' fire or the authorities' fire?

A I don't know. I guess that's something that we're continuing to look at. But clearly the authorities fired on the party. Whether the prisoners fired back, I don't know.

Q Before we finished that, if they had been given a vehicle to leave the prison, why, then, were they fired on?

A You've got all I've got, Jim.

Q Is that something you're looking into?

A Yes, sure; of course.

Q Do you have anything on the reports that South Africa is talking about a ceasefire in southern Africa, in Namibia?

A I sure do. Sure. As you know, the military situation on the ground in Angola and across its borders has been of concern to the United States both because of the cost in lives and because it has not been conducive to progress on a negotiated settlement.

So in this context the United States welcomes South Africa's public confirmation of its readiness to disengage its own forces from Angola effective January 31. We believe that this step has important potential to contribute to a climate that could facilitate further movement in the southern Africa negotiations, and we hope that conditions on the ground will permit a cease-fire as soon as possible. We also welcome South Africa's reaffirmation of its commitment to implement U.N. Security (Council) Resolution 435 as soon as the Cuban issue is resolved.

A durable settlement of the Namibian question will clearly depend on mutual respect for security and sovreignty in the region. We would therefore hope that once a cease-fire came into effect, it would extend beyond the initial thirty-day period proposed by the South Africans in order that these conditions could have a chance to take hold.

Communication of the South African proposal to the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, underscores his constructive and active role in the peace process there, and reflects the continued validity of the Namibian negotiating effort in which the United States and our Contact Group partners are involved.

Q Can we get a copy of that, please?

A Sure.

Q When you say they're confirming, or they're making a public confirmation, is this because that they had assured Assistant Secretary Crocker about this in his meeting two weeks ago with the Foreign Minister?

A Assistant Secretary Crocker has been, as you know, very closely involved in the whole southern African situation, as has Frank Wisner and as has the Secretary himself in Libson in the past few days, and I think -- certainly, I would like to think that the United States' involvement has played a helpful role in this.

Q John, sometime ago, on this point, it seems as though that the number of Cuban troops in Angola, rather than going down, as the United States had hoped, was going up. Does that situation still continue? What is the latest on what the Cuban troop situation is in Angola?

A Okay, Don, I don't know whether the Cuban figure is going up at this particular time, but certainly it did go up some while ago and I do not believe there's been any reduction. Whether they're still moving additional Cuban troops in, I don't know.

Q Could you check and see if that's the case?

A We'll see what we have.

Q Is there some expectation that this initiative could cause the reduction? Is that the gist of what you're saying?

A I think there's hope that this is a good, positive step on the part of the South Africans. It's movement that, I think, various parties have been looking for; and our hope is that this would take hold, that the ceasefire would expand, and that therefore you could disengage the various parties and we could achieve the goal that we've all been looking for in Namibia plus the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

Q Does the United States have any view as to what action the insurgent forces in Angola -- that is to say, UNITA and whoever else may be there -- should do about ceasefires and so forth?

A As I say, we would hope that this will contribute to a mood in which that kind of discussion can go forward. Of course, in this particular instance, we're talking about cross-border activity by the South Africans. In the case of UNITA, we're talking about factions operating within their own country, and we've always said that the various factions in Angola will have to settle the conflict among themselves. That still pertains, but we would think that a lessening of tension would be helpful, as they look at the prospect, too.

Q Can I follow on that? As a result of this, is a new meeting of the Contact Group foreseeable in the near future?

A I guess it's foreseeable. I don't know of any plans, Jim.

Q Did you have any statement with respect to the bomb that went off in the Foreign Ministry in South Africa?

A No, I don't. I just saw an initial press report on that.

Q John, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, said on CBS Wednesday, December 14, that Syria pledged to Saudi Arabia in writing that it will withdraw from Lebanon. Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't think the United States has seen such a pledge in writing.

Q John, has the United States asked to talk to the apparent survivor of the truck that blew up the Embassy in Kuwait?

A I don't have anything on that. I know the Kuwaiti investigation, as I understand it, is coming to a conclusion. I really don't know whether we have asked to talk to him.

Q Did he survive?

A There are reports that there is an individual --

Q Can you confirm a report in the Washington Post this morning that the Secretary of State said that he would resign rather than take a lie detector test?

A No, I can't. As I said to you before on that issue, the Secretary has an acute interest in stopping the improper and illegal publication of classified documents and would cooperate in any investigation, but I, at the time, steered you away from a suggestion that he had been asked to take a lie detector test, and that still stands.

Q So you can't tell us if that report is true or false as written?

A I would refer you to what I said before, which were very good words.

Q I remember it well; I asked the question.

A I remember you asking the question.

Q You're saying it never came to that?

Q You're saying it didn't come to that?

A I would steer you away from any suggestion that the Secretary of State was asked to take a lie detector test.

Q But the report didn't say that. It said that he might be asked, and he let them know that he would resign rather than take a test, I believe.

Q Well, "might be asked?" To my knowledge, he has not been asked.

Q Do you have anything on a report that Lebanon -- that Italy is considering diminishing its troop presence in Beirut?

A Not really. At the MNF meeting in Brussels, the four-member nations confirmed their commitment to the MNF role. I think there has been some talk out of some Italian sources about their committed troop level and variation in levels from time to time, but I think you really have to ask the Italians what --

A Given the fundamental commitment given in Brussels, you wouldn't have any quarrel if they did diminish the troops?

A As I think the Secretary made clear, the various components of the MNF have various committed levels. The United States has, and the Italians have. I think their commitment was for 1,100 troops, and they in fact have had a peak of 2,200 troops there. If they should make a decision to draw down to a committed level, I guess that would be a decision for the individual member nations of the MNF, just as our forces fluctuate from time to time.

Q John, do you have anything on the purging of the death squads from the Salvadoran Army, any movement in that direction? Anything you've heard, any statements made by the government to our government?

A We're pursuing that, as you know, very vigorously, and we'll see what movement there is.

Q Anything from the Government of El Salvador --

A I don't think I would get into our diplomatic discussions with them.

Q John, where do things stand on the countervailing tax case against Chinese texiles?

A I think the White House may have something on that.

Q Today?

A I don't know whether it's today.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:50 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

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Monday, December 19, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #224

MONDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1983, 12:26 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a few announcements up front. We note with great sadness the passing last Thursday of Milan "Jerry" Jerabek who was a Public Affairs Advisor and Press Officer in the Bureau of (European) Affairs for many years before his retirement in 1979. Those who worked with Jerry will recall his unfailing helpfulness and patience and professionalism, but I think he'll best be remembered for his genuine sincerity and extraordinary kindness toward everyone he knew. We will miss him very much.

I have an announcement on the trial of Gabor Demszky. We understand that Gabor Demszky, a Hungarian editor of samizdat publications, will be tried in Budapest on December 21. The charges against Mr. Demszky will reportedly be assault on a police officer, growing out of an incident that occurred in September when he was stopped for a police inspection of his car. Allegedly, Mr. Demszky refused, claiming that the police did not have a warrant, and he suffered a concussion as a result of the ensuing struggle.

We note with regret that this will be the first trial with political overtones in a decade involving the independent Hungarian intellectuals. We trust that Mr. Demszky will be afforded the opportunity to defend himself in a fair and open trial, and that this will remain an isolated incident.

Finally, on Laos, I have a statement which is being released by the Governments of the United States and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. In response to the request of the United States Government, the Government of Lao People's Democratic Republic, prompted by its humanitarian policy toward the families of Americans missing in action, has agreed to the visit of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center delegation to the Lao People's Democratic Republic on December 19, or between December 19 and 22 of this year.

That's all I have. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q Any comment, John, on the election upturn in Japan; what effect it may have on U.S. policy in defense and economic relationships?

A Of course, the Japanese political process is an internal matter. But, having said that, we anticipate continuation of friendly and close relations with the Japanese government and people, and we see no prospect of any change in their current defense policy.

Q No change?

A No change.

Q John, can you bring us up to date on what is going on in Lebanon, particularly with the evacuation?

A Sure. Let me give you a little rundown. On the security situation, there have been no incidents involving the U.S. Marine contingent in the past 24 hours. Yesterday, the Ticonderoga and the Tatnall, between them, fired sixty 5 inch rounds at Syrian anti-aircraft positions. That was after U.S. reconnaissance aircraft were fired upon.

We've seen reports that the Israeli Air Force this morning bombed targets in the Bhamdun area, along the Beirut-Damascus highway.

Yesterday, the ceasefire remained in effect throughout the confrontation areas, although there were some exchanges along the Alayh ridgeline and in the Kharrub region. As of this morning Beirut time, we have no reports of security-related incidents in the greater Beirut area.

Insofar as Tripoli is concerned, we note the same press reports as do you. Last week we expressed our strong hope that the city and people of Tripoli would be spared from further broodshed caused in part by the prospect of renewed fighting by PLO factions. We believe that the evacuation from Tripoli of PLO forces loyal to Arafat would address this concern, and would be consistent with our objective of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

Concerning the evacuation of PLO forces, the Israelis have stated publicly that "We" -- that's Israel -- "have not said anywhere that we will attack them." The United States hopes and expects that impediments such as recent Israeli actions to the expeditious evacuation of Arafat and his forces will be removed.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Last week you put those assurances somewhat differently, somewhat stronger, that you did have assurances that the Israelis were not going to impede. Do you still believe -- do you have such assurances?

A I'm not going to get into obviously the detail of the various diplomatic conversations we might be having with various parties, but I think our statement of today speaks for itself, that we hope and expect that the evacuation will proceed without impediment.

Q John, do you think the Israeli actions are consistent with the sense of the recent talks the U.S. had with Israel on closer political and military cooperation?

A I think you'd have to look at that in a broad context. I'm not going to attempt to characterize Israeli actions in this particular instant, and I think the words we've offered you today speak for themselves. But in general, of course there may well be differences of opinion between ourselves and Israel on a variety of topics and there's never been any question about that despite what emerged from Mr. Shamir's visit here.

Q Was this a difference of opinion that the Government of the United States alleged --

A I just told you, I'm not going to get into specifics on this particular incident. But, speaking in general, I think it would be unrealistic to think that we would never have a disagreement with Israel, good friends and good allies though we are.

Q John, you have been reiterating the whole week, you and Mr. Romberg, that you expect Israel not to shoot and you think that Israel will not shoot, and so for a whole week you are giving us this thing. And now we see that all these expectation and hopes is --

A What we have been saying is that we hope and expect that the Israelis would offer no impediment to the evacuation. That's what we're still saying.

Q What dangers do you see, John, in the area if Israel would keep its blockade and Arafat from the other side is surrounded by his rivals if the situation would create a stalemate there?

A Well, that's a hypothetical situation. We hope and expect that that will not arise.

Q You said a minute ago that it is an incident. This incident could develop an accident and it could have a far-reaching impact in the area; you have any fears like this?

A As I repeat, we hope and expect that this evacuation will go forward.

Q Does Israel have any consultation with you about what --

A We have certainly had consultations with Israel, among other parties, on this whole question. Sure.

Q On this issue of hitting yesterday, on sinking two (inaudible) ships.

A I'm not sure what is the frequency of the consultation or what is the detail of the consultation, and I wouldn't get into that anyway. But if your question is, have we conferred with Israel and others on this whole question, the answer is, yes, of course.

Q Can I please ask you, John, in light of what you just said now that -- you said that Israel nowhere, according to Israel's statement saying that nowhere they said that they would attack. Are you laying the responsibility for lack of PLO departure on the PLO or what are you telling us?

A I'm just recalling an Israeli statement.

Q Yes, but I mean, are you -- you're saying that Israel said that they will not, therefore the PLO should leave; is that what you're saying?

A No, that's not what I'm saying. All I'm doing is recalling a specific Israeli statement that was made in connection with the evacuation.

Q Okay, but how -- if you still insist the PLO should leave, how do you then --

A It's not a question of "insisting that the PLO leave." The parties have taken certain decisions, and the decision that the PLO should leave Tripoli seems to us to be within the framework of the goals that we and others

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have set in Lebanon, namely, the departure of all foreign forces. We think that would be a good thing to happen.

Q How then do you really -- tell us, or how can you explain to us Israel's action in light of what you said now and in light of what you told us the U.S. Government had communicated to the State of Israel?

A I think Israel should explain its actions. I don't think it's for the United States to explain Israel's reactions. It's for us to say that we hope and expect the evacuation will go forward, which is our position. But if you want to know why Israel is firing, I think you ought to ask the Israelis.

Q But I mean you are allies, not in the formal sense, John. You're asking, appealing the State of Israel --

A In the case of good allies, we try not to speak on their behalf. We try to speak for the United States.

Q No, no, I'm not saying that you should speak on their behalf. What I'm trying seriously to understand and, sincerely, how is it that the U.S. Government has been appealing with the State of Israel for about two weeks now to let the PLO depart in light of U.S. policy for Syrian, Israeli and PLO departure and the Israeli continuously bombard Tripoli and prevent the PLO from leaving. Can you tell us exactly what it --

A Why don't we wait and see how the events of the day transpire. I'm not sure that you could make the statement that Israel has prevented the PLO from leaving at this stage.

Q What do you think is preventing them -- because there are ships, John -- there are ships ready to leave?

A I don't know. This is a difficult problem and various people are working on it. It takes time.

Q How do you comment on the sinking of the ship, the Cypriot ship by Israel?

A I don't have anything for you on that.

Q Can you tell us about Ambassador Rumsfeld's stop in Baghdad; who he saw?

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A I think he's just arrived, or recently arrived in Baghdad. He was in Beirut, Riyadh and Cairo over the weekend. We will continue to frustrate you, I'm afraid, by not talking about his consultations nor, indeed, his advance travels; simply telling you where he went after he got there.

Q Can I put it this way, John. He is the highest ranking official that I know of that's ever gone to Baghdad.

Q Habib.

Q Did Habib go to Baghdad? All right, I withdraw that.

Q What is the significance of the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld has gone there, in your view, and what occasioned his going there?

A He is the President's Middle East and Lebanon negotiator, and he's gone there in that connection, in connection with his mandate.

Q Is there some part in this that Iraq is now playing to a greater degree before that suggests it would be a good idea for him to go?

A I'm really not going to get into the detail of what he's doing there, but he's there, obviously, in pursuit of the President's overall goals in the Middle East, and Iraq clearly is involved in the Middle East.

Q Is his going there intended as some kind of a signal of United States interest in carrying forward its relations with Iraq at this time?

A In general, there isn't any question that we have favored resolution of the Iran-Iraq war, but I'm not suggesting that he is there in that regard. And if you're asking, is there a tilt in favor of Iraq, the answer to that is no.

Q I wasn't asking if there was tilt, but I'm glad to have the answer. Does this suggest that the U.S. at this time is seeking actively an improved relationship with Iraq?

A He is there in connection with his Middle East mission. There isn't any question -- I think we are publicly on record as saying that we would have no objection to an improvement in relations with Iraq. That's well known.

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Q Exactly what is the situation -- John, give us the official line; what is the relationship with the United States and Iraq? We don't have relations with them?

A We have an Interests Section.

Q You have an Interests Section. What is our position on the Iran-Iraq war?

A Our position is that if there were a feeling on the part of Iraq that we should exchange Ambassadors, the United States would be ready to do that. That's a public position that we have made known before.

Q And what is our position on the war other than we would like to see it cease? Do we favor one side or the other?

A No, absolutely not. And as you know, we have not supplied arms to either side and have not taken a position on the war.

Q Is Mr. Rumsfeld going to go Iran?

A I don't have any idea. I'll answer that in two ways: We don't comment on his onward plans, but I think it will be a little fanciful to think that he might be going to Iran.

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Q John, can you make the same statement for Iran about the exchange of Ambassadors and improved relations?

A I really don't have an update for you on our relations with Iran. (Laughter.) That seems to fall into a somewhat different type or class.

Q John, there have been indications that even Gulf states which have been supportive of Iraq have already paid the price or may the price in terms of terrorist attacks for their support of Iraq over Iran. Is there concern in this building and the Administration, that by Rumsfeld's mere arrival in Baghdad and by the Government's statement that we'd like to exchange Ambassadors, by stating it publicly at this time?

A We've stated it publicly before. You're pressing me. I'm trying to detach Mr. Rumsfeld's present mission from our general viewpoint towards Iraq, and that's what you asked me about. There's nothing new in the United States' willingness to exchange Ambassadors.

Q I understand that, but I'm suggesting in the current environment of suicide terrorist attacks, are we concerned that Rumsfeld's mere arrival in Baghdad might be an irritant to those people?

A No, we have no concern that Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit to Baghdad would trigger increased terrorism; no.

Q John, can you refresh my memory on this? Secretary Shultz met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister --

A Correct.

Q -- in --

A Paris.

Q -- back in June.

A Right.

Q Did Weinberger, who was also in Paris -- did he meet him or not, also?

A Can anybody check it? I can't remember.

Q He met with the Saudi Minister.

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A Yes. I'm not sure whether Weinberger has met -- I'm sure the Pentagon can clarify that for you.

Q That was in May.

Q John, do you have anything for us on --

A I've taken a few here, so why not take the gentleman over here?

Sure, go ahead.

Q Do you have anything for us about the surprise visit of Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali?

A Not a great deal -- and, indeed, if I can't put my hand on it (laughter). Nothing at all. I believe we have a piece of guidance on it that you can get, but it's not a tremendously revealing piece of guidance.

Q John, just to follow the same question, please, does it relate more to the Palestinian dilemma in Tripoli now or to the determination of relations between Egypt and Israel?

A No. I don't think you should read any great significance. I mean, obviously it is one thing when the Egyptian Foreign Minister is here, there's a visit of importance; but I think you'd be going down a barren pole to read great significance in terms of current developments to --

Q Do you accept the characterization of the visit as a surprise one?

A As a what? Sorry.

Q As a surprise one.

A I can't answer that one. I'd have to go back and find out how long it was planned. I honestly don't know.

Q Thank you.

Q Do you have anything new you can tell us about the health of Syria's Assad? I keep hearing that he is paralyzed.

A No.

Q Near death?

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A No, no. We've seen all the same reports you have.

Q When was the last time anyone's seen him that you know of?

A I guess you'd have to take your cue from various film that has been taken of him and various interpretations of that film.

Q The State Department or diplomatic circles haven't had any contact lately?

A No, no.

Q John, were there any consultations over the weekend between Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Shultz over the Mideast?

A I don't know that you'd call them "consultations." They had lunch on Saturday, as they do from time to time.

Q I saw Dr. Kissinger this morning on CBS. He said that possibly the only way to get the Marines out of Lebanon, if the conditions will be created as a *de facto* partition of Lebanon -- that is the only way to get the Marines out. What is your comment on that?

A I have heard only a secondhand report of what Dr. Kissinger said, and what you just said doesn't sound like what I heard. But even if it were, I don't think I would have any comment until we had seen the transcript anyway.

Q Well, I might say the whole statement if you want to. (inaudible)

A Well, I think we'll wait until we see the transcript?

Q Was it two just of them?

A Sorry?

Q Was it, as someone suggested, two of them, or was it with someone else?

A I think it was one on one, Don.

Q John, do you have any guidance on the Administration's ongoing efforts to get that computer back from Stockholm?

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A No, don't have an update on that for you.

Q Has the Red Cross been allowed to see Lieutenant Goodman since that first visit?

A Since that first visit? I'm not sure. No, don't know. But you might try them and see what they say.

Q Any word from Moscow on whether Gromyko will be in Stockholm?

A No. Not yet.

Connie?

Q On this South African-Angolan situation, now Angola has rejected the South African position --

A Yes.

Q -- and I believe some others also -- SWAPO, I believe.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any statement on that?

A No, nothing on it.

Q John, do you have anything on the reports coming from India that several Indian Army officers had sold information to the CIA?

A No. Never talk about alleged intelligence matters.

Q John, Israel was saying that there is a secret side to the agreement. I know that a State Department official has already turned that down. But I also understand that the answer was in part that you have not had received -- the State Department has not received by them a statement or text of what Israel radio said. Do you have any more to say about it now, and if you have received the text of what the statement was?

A I don't know whether we've received the text, but I've got a few words on it to offer you. We're still in the process of formulating our fiscal 1985 budget aid figures, and have not yet started considering specific figures for fiscal 1986.

Of course, our commitment to Israel's qualitative military edge in the region is well known; and we remain prepared to make our best effort, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, to meet Israel's military assistance needs.

Q Can we have a copy of this first?

A Sure.

Q And then this is not really a secret agreement. Radio Israel is saying there is a secret understanding between the United States and Israel regarding the military activities of both states and over Syrian-controlled Lebanese territories.

A Yes.

Q And the answer from the State Department this morning was about a secret agreement.

A Yes.

Q But what you read us now is not, really. I mean is it in answer to what I --

A I think it answers the question: "Is there a secret agreement?" This is where we stand; this is how we're looking at the relationship with Israel. And this is where we are on the planning for the budget.

Q Do you have any comment --

A Let me take one more.

Q Can I go back to India for a moment? Can you confirm that the Indian Government contacted the U.S. Embassy with allegations that members of the Embassy staff had been engaged?

A No, cannot.

Q Were any departures of Embassy staff in recent weeks related to those allegations?

A Don't know.

Q Do you have anything new on the Kuwaiti bombings or a reaction to the Kuwaiti statement over the weekend?

A No, don't. Obviously, the judicial process is going forward in Kuwait and we will await the outcome of that.

Q Can you comment on the Koch-Weinberger feud and the investigation of the FBI which entered the picture?

A I think there's a little guidance -- earlier guidance in the Press Office on that one.

Q On Angola, you had such a positive statement Friday. Are you surprised or disappointed by the rejection?

A I just don't have any reaction to it, Connie.

Q What was the explosive used in the Kuwaiti bombing?

A I don't have anything on that, Bill, I'm afraid.

Q Why is that -- they came off quite quickly in the Marine bombing and said what the explosive was and then they corrected it? And I believe they did in the Embassy bombing, too.

A I guess our investigation is continuing, and I haven't seen anything from that that I could give you.

O.K., thank you.

Q What about the investigation into the Lorton thing?

A Insofar as the internal investigation is concerned, we have not concluded that yet. And so far as the FBI's investigation at Lorton, I'd guess you'd have to ask them where they stand on it.

Q What do you intend to say and when about that investigation?

A I think we have said that the outcome of the investigation would be made public.

MR. ROMBERG: Yes, we did.

A Yes.

Q But when?

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A I guess we have to wait until it's finished before we make --

Q Oh. In other words, you don't intend to comment at all until the investigation -- Would that mean all the way through trials or would that mean --

A Oh, no. I'm talking -- there are two parts of it. I think, there's our internal investigation -

Q -- until it's taken to the Supreme Court?

A -- and there's the FBI investigation.

Q Yes.

A I'm talking about our internal investigation.

Q Yes.

A That's not complete, and as soon as it is then we'll --

Q O.K.

A -- trigger what we can determine for you.

Q Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m. the briefing was concluded.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, December 20, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #225

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1983, 12:15 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have no announcements and a slim book. Let us proceed from there.

Q Could you believe I have no questions?

A No questions. Then great. (Laughter)

Q Why don't you give us a reading of what is going on in Tripoli in the evacuation of the PLO?

A Why don't I give you a sit-rep on the Lebanese situation in general. No incidents involving the U.S. contingent in the MNF in or around the airport for the past 24 hours. Yesterday, the ceasefire generally held, although there were some intermittent exchanges in the Suq al-Gharb and Qabr Shmun areas.

As of local time this morning in Beirut, there have been no reports of security-related incidents in the greater Beirut area.

In Tripoli, we understand that the vessels which will evacuate pro-Arafat PLO fighters are either in, or in some cases, have departed the port of Tripoli.

That's about the extent of it.

Q Did the Americans have any involvement at all in the evacuation?

A Not physically on the scene, no. Obviously, we've been involved in diplomatic activity in that question.

Q Do you have anything more on Mr. Rumsfeld's talks in Iraq, what they accomplished?

A Nothing more on his talks. Mr. Rumsfeld is in Rome today. I don't have anything on his future travel plans.

Q What can you tell us about the letter that was delivered, according to the Iraqi news agency, to Iraqi officials from the United States Government?

A I'm afraid, nothing.

Q I see in the FBIS, for instance, there is a letter from President Reagan to the President of Tunis, of Tunisia. Has the White House been sending letters to all the Arab countries?

A I'm not aware of a general series of letters, Bernie. I'm just not sure. But I think "to all the Arab countries," I'd have a question mark about that.

Q I mean the moderate ones.

A I'm not aware of a series even to the moderate Arab countries.

Q When Shultz was in Tunisia, did he carry a letter from the President?

A He may well have done. I'd have to go back and check on that.

Q Now, going back to the Iraqi question, you yesterday depicted this Rumsfeld meeting as just sort of an ordinary step of base-touching, et cetera. But now a letter has gone from, if one credits the Iraqi news accounts, from President Reagan to the head of state of Iraq, which seems to cover some fairly important matters as far as both the regional and bilateral questions are concerned. Yet nothing is coming out of here.

Could you not give us, or arrange for some one to give us some indication of what the current U.S. thinking is toward Iraq? It seems to have been made known to that Government.

A I'll be glad to move that request along, but I don't offer much hope for a very positive response. There is not an inclination to talk about Mr. Rumsfeld's diplomatic activities, on the one hand, and there is always very little inclination to talk about the contents of Presidential letters, on the other.

Q I'm not putting it so much in the context of Presidential letters, but this is a country with which the United States has had very little diplomatic contact over the past several years, and it seems as though there may have been some substantial developments here, which are known to the Iraqi Government, but don't seem to be known, at least as far as I can tell, to the American people.

A I don't think the guidance I gave you yesterday was off the mark at all, but I will be glad to pass the request along for a background briefing.

Q What can you tell us about the meetings between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Hassan Ali?

A They met last night. I think the Secretary is having a working lunch with the Foreign Minister today. I think it is in the public domain that the Foreign Minister is bearing a letter for the President, and I guess you should ask the White House how that letter will be delivered.

Q Is there going to be a meeting between President Reagan and Minister Ali?

A I think that's why you should ask the White House -- see what they have to say about it.

Q What can you tell us about what they did last night at their meeting?

A They chatted about bilateral matters of interest.

Q Well, the Egyptian news agency put out a great deal more than that.

A We don't necessarily always follow the pattern of others in indicating what went on between two Foreign Ministers.

Q What was the main topic?

A What was the main topic?

Q What was the main topic?

A I think the Middle East. (Laughter)

Q John, do you have any comment on the reported arrest in El Salvador of a suspect wanted in the 1981 slaying of two American labor advisers?

A Well, simply that the United States is hopeful that this would bring to resolution that particular court case - would help in bringing to resolution that court case.

Q John, what role, if any, has played the United States in this arrest?

A Sorry, what role?

Q What role, if any, has played the U.S. in this arrest?

A In his arrest?

Q Yes.

A I think the United States' role in urging a swift process of various court cases in El Salvador is well known, and is self-evident.

Q May I go back to the Egyptian question, to Minister Ali's trip?

Are you going to make known here, or will it be done at the White House, or what, what has been discussed or what the results are of this trip?

A I think you should talk to the White House, Bernie, about any meetings that might take place there. And should there be any meetings, I don't know what they might have in mind.

Q What about from the State Department angle?

A No. No. Don't plan on any.

Q You're not going to say anything about it?

A No. Usually do not when the Secretary receives a Foreign Minister -- we don't give a detailed readout on what they talked about.

Q Well, you often do if it is a -- for example, we had the most recent visit of the Israeli ministers, to which this one is at least pertinent. There was a great deal put out about what had been discussed and decided.

A I think that was the Prime Minister -- Prime Minister Shamir.

Q Yes.

A And I think he came down and offered some remarks in the lobby.

Q Are you expecting that today?

A I don't know whether the Egyptian Foreign Minister will say anything or not. That's his call, but we don't plan to.

Q He's not going to say anything?

A No.

Q John, he asked to come here; is that right?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q Was that something done at the last minute?

A I don't know just when we received the request, Marvin. I don't know, but I think it's within the past week or so.

Q Before, you said that they talked about bilateral issues; was that exclusively bilateral?

A Oh, no. I wouldn't think that it would be exclusively. I would think they would have discussed the Middle East situation in general -- Lebanon, the Middle East peace process.

Q Was the talk -- could the talk be seen as a follow-on to the Shamir talks here?

A I don't know whether you would describe it as a follow-on. But certainly we have had visits here by Prime Minister Shamir, by President Gemayel. We have had General Ben Shaker from Jordan, and I think it's a kind of logical consultative process with various of our friends in the Middle East.

Q Except that he seemed to want to come here --

right?

A Yes, sure. Our friends want to talk with us sometimes, too.

Q I understand that. What do you think is on his mind?

A I assume that he's probably reviewing the general situation in the Middle East.

Q Does it have anything to do with American economic and military aid to Egypt?

A It may well have been discussed.

Q Is there any sign of dissatisfaction by the Egyptians with amounts?

A I don't know. I don't know what, if anything, was raised in that connection, or if that subject was raised. But it would seem to be logical that it might well be discussed.

Q There's a lot of reports that the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Israel. For example, refusing any invitation of one of the senior official -- senior official in Egypt refused an invitation by Israel; there's some incident against the consul, Israeli consulate there in Alexandria. Is that anything relating --

A I don't know specifically -- it wouldn't surprise me if that subject was discussed. As you know, the United States has consistently favored a better and stronger relationship between Egypt and Israel, and whether it came up or not, I don't know. It wouldn't surprise me if it did.

Q Do you have anything to comment from here about the arms subcommittee on the Beirut bombing?

A No, I think the Pentagon might have any comment on that, but we don't.

Q Have you received any information about the meeting that was held in Tripoli, Libya between Quaddafi and President Gemayel of Lebanon?

A No, I do not. I have not. As you know, there was a meeting, I think, arranged pretty much at the last minute, and I'm not aware of what the two leaders discussed.

Q Do you expect sort of a briefing by the Lebanese Government to the U.S. Administration about this meeting?

a I don't know whether we expect it or whether it will come in a logical course of things; I don't know. Maybe it already has come in the logical course of events. I honestly don't know.

Q How do you read the meeting in itself?

A I don't know what --

Q Do you find it as a positive step or something that may affect the Lebanese-U.S. relations?

A I don't have any comment on it. It's a meeting between two other foreign leaders. It's not for us to comment on.

Q Would it be helpful to the whole Middle Eastern problem, or otherwise?

A I assume it depends on what they discussed and how they came out of what they discussed; I don't know.

Q John, a Soviet Politburo member was quoted today as saying that the Soviet Union has already taken countermeasures against U.S. territory. He was talking about the deployment of U.S. missiles in Germany.

A I don't know what he means.

Q Are you aware of any measures that have already --

A No.

Q Have you detected anything?

A No, don't know what he means.

Q Was the Secretary's speech for tonight scheduled at the last minute, and what will he be talking about?

A It's not a speech. He is going to be receiving a medal at the dinner, I think, given by the American Committee of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and he's going to make remarks which will be on the record and which will be available tomorrow morning.

It's a dinner celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; and if you want to talk to them, he's simply the guest. It's their call. But if you want to talk to them about covering it, the contact is Carol Usher of the U.S. Committee of the IISS, and she's at 628-1144. Carol Usher, 628-1144.

Q Will there be Q&A?

A I don't know. I don't think so.

Q Any decision, John, on UNESCO membership?

A No, no decision.

Q John, do you have any comment on the arrest of somebody in El Salvador in the killing of the two American labor people?

A Yes, already covered that.

Q John, you were asked on that subject whether the United States had played any role and you said, of course, the United States had urged his arrest. There have been reports --

A I didn't say arrest.

Q I'm sorry I --

A We said that we had urged the prosecution.

Q There have also been reports that the United States supplied specific information to Salvadoran authorities about reports of the man's whereabouts, that the United States may have supplied investigative help; do you have anything on that?

A No, I don't.

Q In his interview with the chief editor of the U.S. News and World Report, President Reagan said that all it needs to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon is to get a pledge from both Syria and Israel that they are sincere in getting their forces out. Doesn't this constitute sort of a change, complete change in the conditions for the withdrawal of the Marines?

A No, I don't think there's been a change in the President's position. We've always talked about the withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon.

Q But things, as I understand, are that the Syrians are already having their pledges and the Israelis already pledged to withdraw?

A It depends on what you understand by Syrian pledges. The fact is that that there hasn't been any Syrian response to the agreement between Lebanon and Israel for the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Q Thank you.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:30 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #226

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1983, 12:23 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have no announcements. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Could I ask just two questions --

A No, excuse me. No, we're going to follow protocol. Sorry, Lester.

Q Yes, on Lebanon: Do the -- does the Administration believe that the MNF eventually will have some sort of training mission with the Lebanese Armed Forces?

A I can't tell you whether people who are in the MNF have performed training. You'd have to check with the Pentagon. I think we've talked about training that has been provided to the LAF. I don't know specifically -- I don't know whether anybody who is associated with the MNF specifically has been doing that. You would have to check with the Pentagon and see what's been going on.

Q It goes to the question of what is the writ of the Marines who are in Beirut?

A Why don't you check with the Pentagon, Jim, and see what -- how -- whatever training is being provided is being provided. I just don't have the details on that.

Q The point is that we have come away from these briefings with the impression that their assignment is only one of security, and that in a relatively small area. From what you say and from what the President said last night, I'm getting the impression that there may be something more.

A I don't think we've used the term "security" specifically. In any case, I'm not trying to steer you in the direction of your question. I think we've -- I'd refer you to the specific words. I think we've had a more careful formulation than a broad term of that sort.

In any case, I'm not suggesting to you there is a changed mandate for the MNF, and I don't think the President was suggesting that. But in terms of who is doing what, I refer you to the Pentagon.

Lester?

Q Yes, as you know, Alan, last night the President was asked about Secretary Shultz's widely-noted statement that in World War II reporters were, on the whole, on our side but now they're always seeking to report something that's going to screw things up.

My question -- and I have a follow-up: Since Larry Speakes says in this transcript I've got here, that reporters "never try to screw anything up. All press are patriots; all press are great Americans," could it be that Secretary Shultz very low opinion of the press is due to the fact that he has to deal with the State Department correspondents rather than the White House press corps? Has he ever explained to you why he has such a low opinion, and Larry has such a high one?

A (A) all of the assumptions that you're making and statements that you're attributing to the Secretary are your invention. I'm not going to make them.

Q No, that was reported by AP and Gannett.

A Okay, what's your second question?

Q My second question: Since Secretary Shultz approved the cutting of the $35 million from our annual $75 million gift to Zimbabwe, could you explain why he believes we should give any money to this government that has thrown a Christian bishop and a former prime minister into prison on transparently bogus charges?

A Every time you've raised the question, we've referred you to the record. I'd do that again.

Q The Washington Post quotes what it calls one State Department official as saying "Most countries we deal with would run over their grandmothers to get $40 million in aid." Could you identify these countries, or repudiate this statement --

A I don't address --

Q -- or tell us if we have a medical aid program for African grandmothers? Could you explain this?

A Connie, do you have a serious question?

Q You'd like to duck both questions? Okay.

A No, I just don't take it seriously.

Q Fine, good.

Q At the risk of quoting the Post again, they had an interesting article about Soviet troop expansion in Southeast Asia. Can you verify any of the figures, or do you have any comments on that, on the general Soviet buildup in that area?

A Without going into details of the report, we have expressed our concern several times in the past few years about the growing Soviet military presence in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam, where the Soviets have been expanding their capabilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

The Soviets are also giving essential military assistance to support Vietnam's continued occupation of Kampuchea, which has been condemned by a majority of the world's nations. Vietnam depends overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance in excess of $1 billion per year, and has in turn provided the Soviets an important facility for projecting Soviet military power into Southeast Asia.

Q Do we have any effective way of countering it with our troops spread so thin around the world?

A I don't think I would try to address that question from here, Connie.

Q Thank you.

Q Alan, can we have a copy of that?

A Yes.

Q On another, do you have anything late about a bomb attack in Beirut, on a French facility?

A I just heard there was such a report before I came out. I can't give you any confirmation or any details, or anything of that sort, Jim. Sorry.

Phil?

Q Alan, is the inference in the New York Times article on Page 1 this morning, that the troops -- that the MNF in Lebanon has a broader mandate than before; they're to go around and establish authority in the train of the Lebanese Army? Is that -- Does this represent a change?

A There is no change. As I said before, in answer to Jim's question, in the mandate. I think the White House addressed this also this morning in Larry's early briefing. I just would ask you to look at what the President said. He did not say what you just described the Times piece as saying. I'm not disputing that the Times said that, but the President didn't say that.

Q He didn't?

A No, he didn't. So there is no change in the mandate. He was talking about the operation of the MNF in the Beirut area, not going out beyond the Beirut area. He was talking about the LAF, perhaps, establishing control outside the Beirut area, but the MNF continues to function in that area.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the story written today in the Washington Post by Evans & Novak?

A No. I think our -- I don't know what particular aspect -- we don't generally comment on columns, but our position is fairly well laid out and clear.

Q Is it a correct characterization of the policy of Mr. Shultz?

A I think, again, our position -- the one specific that I recall from that column referred to the May 17 agreement. Our position on the May 17 agreement is quite clear and consistent. We support that agreement.

Abdu Salam?

Q The story about Mr. Rumsfeld handing a letter from President Reagan to Saddam Hussein? How do you characterize now at this juncture the relations between Iraq and the United States? What do you hope to achieve?

A I don't have a general characterization to offer to you. I think we've described what has gone on to the extent that we can at this particular point.

Obviously, Ambassador Rumsfeld was there; he had his discussions; the Secretary's met in the past with the

Foreign Minister; we have interest sections; but I don't have a sweeping characterization of the relationship to offer you.

Q Can we expect a resumption of diplomatic relations on the level of ambassadors between the United States and Iraq within some time, early time next year?

A I can't tell you. I think John addressed this the other day in terms of our attitude towards that, but I can't predict that for you.

Jeff?

Q Alan, in 1958, the Marines established a 20-mile-radius security zone around Beirut. I know the situation is different now, in terms of the forces that are arrayed, but would it be within the current mandate of the Marines for them to move out of the airport area behind the LAF?

A Again, I can't -- I'm not going to try to pin the MNF down to the airport or any specific location within the Beirut area. The Beirut area is the area the MNF is operating in, so I would refer back to what I said before in answer to Bill's question. There is no change in that mandate.

Q But within the context of that mandate, would spreading out fit?

A That depends how you define it. I'm not prepared to try to define it from here. I guess all I can do is repeat what I've said before: there is no change in the role, the mandate, or the general deployment pattern. Now what is done within that, whether anybody makes any decisions within that mandate to do something different, I don't know. I'm not aware of any decision at this point, and I just am not going to try to speculate about what would or wouldn't be possible.

Q Regarding the MNF, what is your reaction to the announcement yesterday in Rome that the Italian Government is reducing the number of people it is going to have as part of its contingent of the MNF?

A Again, Don, John addressed this the other day, I think on the 16th, and I can --

Q I don't think he addressed it since they made this announcement.

A There was a story saying that they were going to do this, and he addressed our attitude towards it in what he said at that time. There's no change in that.

Q Was the U.S. pleased, displeased or it doesn't have any view of it?

A As John indicated, at the MNF meeting in Brussels, the Foreign Ministers, the four nations, recommitted themselves to the MNF role. The specific troop levels is another question, and I think he pointed out that they had originally gone in with -- I don't know the figure -- about 1,100; it was now at a higher figure; we had had different numbers on the ground at different times, too, but that's different from a continuing commitment to participate in the MNF. So that's where we are on that. There's no change, and I would refer you back to the transcript of the 16th.

Barrie?

Q Last night, the President also suggested that one of the conditions -- hypothetical, he said -- under which the United States might consider pulling out the Marines would be if there was a change in the course of the government of Lebanon. Could you give us any indication of what that might mean, what he might have had in mind?

A I think the thrust of what the President said was clearly that we are there, committed to a mission, and that we are going along that course. What he was, I think, also doing was trying to put into context the reports on earlier statements, and a suggestion that we were looking for an excuse to cut and run. He was making it very clear that was not the case.

Q Is what you're telling us here is that the President was not encunciating anything new last night?

A That's right.

Q That he was not -- he did not -- we should not take anything he said to mean anything beyond what this Administration has said before? (Laughter)

A With regard to that issue, yes. I can't --

Q No, no, I'm talking about last night.

A No, he was not announcing any change in the mandate or role. He was not announcing any change in policy about commitment to be there and perform the mission that he talked about at some length; that's correct.

Q Let me -- may I ask just one other question: The President also, on a different subject, offered an explanation of what the Secretary of State was talking about when he made his remarks about the press.

Is the Secretary of State satisfied with the explanation that the President gave last night? Does he wish to add to it, take away from it, or comment on it in any way?

A I don't have any further words to offer you on that subject, Bob. My reading of the President was that he stayed away from the question of what the Secretary said and expressed his own views.

Q No, I think he did -- he did give an analysis. I believe when asked to define the "us," I believe he defined that, and I just wondered if that is, indeed, what the Secretary said. That question has been posed here and there was no comment on it.

A Again, John addressed it, to the extent that I think we're going to address it, the other day, and I don't have anything further to add to it.

Q So the Secretary -- has this been discussed with the Secretary since yesterday? I would be interested to know if he's comfortable with the President's explanation.

A I'm not aware that it's been discussed with him.

Q Alan, now that Arafat is out of Tripoli, if Arafat and King Hussein will get together, what will the United States offer him as an incentive to join the peace process, in light of your strategic agreement with Israel?

A The incentive to join the peace talks, for anybody, is the prospect of peace, and that has been our consistent position. There is no incentive I can cite to you beyond that. But the issue -- there's no change in all of this about looking to participation by King Hussein, if he can get the kind of backing he feels he needs, and we would move on that.

Q Excuse me, I want to follow this.

A Let me come back to you. You had a few questions.

Q The Foreign Minister of Egypt yesterday said that they have contact with all the Lebanese factions and the people there. What role do you think Egypt can play, really, in Lebanon?

A I don't think it is up to me, from this podium, to try to define the role that Egypt can play in Lebanon. I simply would let the Egyptians speak for themselves.

Q So why did they discuss with you the Lebanese problem, I mean --

A We discussed -- first of all, I think there was a briefing this morning, to which I would refer you, following the Foreign Minister's meeting over at the White House.

Obviously, we have interests, as does Egypt, in both the specific Lebanon issue and in the broader Middle East issue, so it doesn't strike me as particularly unusual or surprising that those issues would be discussed, but I'm not about to define for Egypt what role it might play.

Marvin?

Q Just some clarification on the MNF, going back to Jim's original question: Are you saying that what the President has in mind is that the MNF's role is to be limited only to the Beirut area, and that as the Lebanese army emerges from that region, the MNF would fill in behind it, but not go beyond it?

A The MNF role is as defined, for example, in correspondence with Congress, which refers to the Beirut area. Whether that role would ever change, which is perhaps part of that question, I can't say; but that's not what is happening now; that's not what we're talking about; it's not what the President was talking about last night.

Q It was not what he was referring to --

A He was not talking about a change.

Q -- geographically, going beyond what had been the original idea, because months and months ago we discussed the possibility here of the MNF going into an area along the Beirut-to-Damascus Highway.

A Beirut-to-Damascus Highway, that's right.

Q And when that came up at that time, it was said that that would be something you might look upon favorably, if the time --

A Depending on circumstances. But that's not what is being addressed at this moment in terms of what the MNF is doing. You know, whether, if the MNF moved out -- let me say this -- if the LAF moved out and did other things, and it was decided the MNF could play a useful role doing something somewhat different from what it is, I'm sure people would look at it. So I don't quite --

There's no puzzle there; they would look at it. But the role has not changed, the mandate has not changed; they have not got some instruction now to move out of the Beirut area.

Q Does that not suggest an almost open-ended, literally open-ended, commitment on the part of the MNF, of all of the components of the MNF? You don't see that as --

A I don't see that, and in terms of the MNF presence, I would refer you back again to the President's Saturday speech -- what was it? -- a week ago, I guess -- a week and a half ago.

Q Can you point to any sign of the LAF extending its writ in Lebanon?

A I don't have anything at this moment that I can pull off the top of my head to cite to you, but I think that the policy clearly is aimed at the extension of the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout this territory of Lebanon as the sovereign authority. Obviously, a component of that would be controlled by the military where that is appropriate. So as that policy or those objectives are achieved, presumably that will happen. But I don't have anything specific to offer you today on that.

Q Just one more, on a different question.

A Yes.

Q Do you have anything on the Antonov release from prison in Rome to house arrest at the Bulgarian Embassy?

A No.

Q Can we turn for a moment to your saying that there was nothing new in what the President had to say about American support for Lebanon -- the U.S. commitment? Does that also mean that what he said last week, what he regarded as, according to what he said last night, as a hypothetical situation, also stands, from your point of view?

A Look, the President addressed himself to what he said last week, and I'm not going to go further into it. He was very clear about that last night.

Q May I go back to my question and I'll phrase it in a different way? You said that the incentive is to join in the talks as a prospect for peace. Now, Arafat, from one side, you know, will not be able, possibly, from all the information, to join the peace process unless in the Reagan peace plan will have the rights for self-determination -- the three words which are very precious to the Palestinians -- and from the other side, King Hussein will not be able to join unless he will have the complete assurance that no more Israeli settlements will be built in the West Bank.

In light of what Mr. Shamir said a few weeks ago, that it was a silence, dead-end, almost, by the Reagan peace plan, how are you going to play and juggle with these facts on the ground in order to give the incentives and to come out and speak up for these people to come for peace talks?

A I don't have any new words to offer you today on that subject. Those are important, but not new issues, and I don't have any new thoughts to offer you today.

Q Has the final decision been made for -- let me put it this way: Have the United States and Egypt concluded a correspondence of views, or have they agreed on some proposed level of aid to be recommended by the Administration for military aid in the next year, or is that still under discussion, as Mr. Ali seemed to suggest yesterday?

A Don, I simply don't have anything on that. I don't know what was said at the briefing this morning following the Minister's visit. I just don't have anything on that. Sorry.

Connie.

Q On another topic, or are we still on --

A No. Go ahead.

Q There were two South African stories, one about a meeting with Mozambique rebels. Do you have anything with that? I'm sorry -- a meeting with Mozambique, discussing the rebels.

A What, the South African meeting with Mozambique?

Q Right. And also there were some bombings in South Africa. Do you have anything on either one?

A Don't have anything on that. On the meeting between South Africa and Mozambique -- and the question also was raised, I think, in the story, about a U.S. role -- let me just tell you what our policy is. Our policy has consistently been to urge all those involved in southern Africa conflicts to sit down and work out their differences through negotiation, rather than confrontation and violence.

That approach is at the core of our policies in southern Africa. Specifically, we have encouraged for some period of time the dialogue between Mozambique and South Africa; but we did not play a role in the more specific sense of having arranged this particular meeting.

Q On that same area?

A No, I'll come back to you, Jim. Go ahead.

Q Do you have any comment on the kidnapping of a U.S. bishop in Nicaragua?

A I do have something on that. The facts, I think, are somewhat unclear. The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry has issued a communique alleging that the FDN is responsible for a reported kidnapping of a U.S. citizen, Monsignor Salvador Schlaeffler and others, and that they were being taken in the direction of Honduras.

We have consistently condemned kidnappings by any group, but we cannot confirm the substance of the allegation. We are checking into the reported incident and thus far have conflicting but unconfirmed reports, including one suggesting that there has been fighting in the northeastern area of Nicaragua, and that Monsignor Schlaeffler is among several individuals who are voluntarily leading the civilians of the area, primarily Miskito Indians, away from the fighting.

But at this point, as I said before, we are simply seeking to clarify the circumstances and the whereabouts of the individuals involved. But I can't confirm any of that.

Q Can we get a copy?

A Yes.

Q And also, do you have any response to the junta leader Daniel Ortega is blaming the Reagan Administration for that?

A For what?

Q For the responsibility of the kidnapping in helping the rebels.

A No, I don't have any comment on that. I don't see the connection, but I don't have any comment on it.

Jim, did you have a question?

Q On this particular issue, when you're checking into this reported incident, can you tell us with whom are you checking? Nicaraguan -- Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, obviously, but are you checking also with sources in the FDN in Honduras, and is the Honduran Embassy looking into it?

A I think I'll just leave you with that we're checking into it.

Q All right. Also, if I could go back to southern Africa for a sec: I wasn't here yesterday, and I don't know whether you were asked about the report on Zimbabwe.

Were you asked about the report on Zimbabwe and the alleged cut in aid? And is there a final U.S. position on it?

A Yes, I think -- Didn't John address this yesterday?

He wasn't asked yesterday? O.K. He had guidance on it, which I have with me.

The allocation for Zimbabwe in FY-84 will be $40 million in economic support funds.

Q That's the answer?

A Well --

Q And is there a reason for that drop?

A The reduction in ESF for Zimbabwe and other countries was required because Congress reduced -- or appropriated -- less than AID had requested for its overall programs. The figures are $2.94 billion requested, versus $2.90 billion appropriated.

In addition, Congress earmarked more for other countries, causing a shortfall of about $200 million, which had to be absorbed by other potential recipients. It was in that context that the aid to Zimbabwe was reduced from the original planning figures.

Q $200 million represented just an African shortfall, or world-wide shortfall? And what other countries lost in Africa?

A   No, overall, I said.

Q   Overall. So, of the $200 million, they lost $35 million; is that correct?

A   I don't know how you -- When you start shuffling around the numbers, I don't know if you can quite do it that way. But in any case, that's the fact.

Q   And were there any political considerations taken into account into reaching that decision?

A   Decisions on aid levels to any country are not made on the basis of single factors.

Q   I didn't suggest they were.

A   But in balancing priorities, you've got to take into account a variety of things: overall appropriations levels, relative need, status of bilateral relations between the countries. And it is no secret that there have been differences of opinion between the U.S. and Zimbabwe, particularly in the international arena; and we have had consultations with the Government of Zimbabwe aimed at a better mutual understanding, and we will continue to do so.

Q   O.K. One more, please, on Uruguay: They have closed down all the party newspapers in that country. Do you have a statement on that?

A   I think we had some guidance on this the other day, Jim. I don't have it with me. Why don't you check in the Press Office?

Q   Alan, in recent weeks, there have been several stories indicating some disquiet among the East European countries over the Soviets' plans now to move these additional missiles into those countries, the latest story again today with The Times.

Is there any U.S. position on that? Do you see a rift, as The Times said today, amongst those countries?

A   I saw the story. I really don't have any comment on it.

Q   Have you had any discussions with any of the East European countries about the whole question of the deployment of the INFs and the Soviet response?

A Based on our usual reticence to talk about diplomatic discussions, I think I will also duck on that particular issue.

Q One more, just let me just ask, on Eastern Europe: Some weeks ago, the President and the State Department said that they were reviewing these sanctions against Poland, particularly in light of Lech Walesa's call.

Has there been any move on that, any idea of when the decision will be made? Or what will come out of it?

A I just don't have anything today to offer you on that.

Q Do you expect something soon?

A Can't tell you. Don't know.

Q Do you have any comment on the story which appeared in FBIS today about the meeting between Mr. Ben-Eliezer and Mr. Shultz concerning the East Jerusalem Consulate? I understand that he met with him the day before yesterday, and they discussed a few things. I don't want to go through the whole thing, but is there any status report on these talks that were held two days ago?

A Yes, well, General Ben-Eliezer has been in the U.S. on a private visit, and we took advantage of his presence here to discuss issues of concern to us in the occupied territories.

The principal focus of the discussions with the Secretary on December 19 and with Assistant Secretary Murphy, William Kirby, and Peter Rodman on December 13, was the U.S. interest in addressing the human dimension of the Palestinian problem in the West Bank and Gaza. As the Secretary has made clear on several occasions, we think much can be done to improve the quality of life of the Arab inhabitants of these areas. By "quality of life," we do not mean living standards, which are relatively good in the West Bank and Gaza, but rather the scope permitted to the local inhabitants for economic development.

Improvement in the quality of Palestinian life is not meant as a substitute for progress in the peace process. Our effort in this direction does not in any way change our positions on the peace process, which are well known. We are committed to the principles of UNSescurity Council Resolution 242 andto the position set forth in the President's September 1, 1982, peace initiative.

Q Copy?

A Yes.

Q On the part about the Consulate: They've raised, apparently, some objections to some operations of the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem.

A I don't know whether this came up in the conversations with Mr. Ben-Eliezer. This issue has come up before with the Israeli Government, and we have made clear that we think that that Consulate is operating in a proper manner, under guidance from the Department, and that there is nothing amiss with what it is doing.

Q Alan, do you have anything fresh for us on a possible Shultz-Gromyko meeting?

A No, I don't have anything new for you on that.

Q The President indicated that there had been a decrease in terrorist threats. Have you previously released any statistical information on -- do you have anything on the extent of those threats against State Department offices around the world?

A No.

Q On the matter of terrorism, are you satisfied that the Kuwaiti Government has arrested those, or identified those, responsible for the bombing of the Embassy?

A I don't have a comment on that, Jim. I understand they are going to trial shortly -- in the next couple of days, and I guess we'll let that process move forward. There is a judicial process here, and I don't think it would be proper for me to proclaim from here about whether those people are innocent or guilty. But the Kuwaiti Government obviously has moved in a very forthright manner and with dispatch.

Q Right. But since the United States was participating in the investigation, I would like to know if this Government is satisfied that those responsible are under arrest?

A Yes. You want me to pronounce their innocence or guilt, and I'm not going to do that from here. They are about to go through a trial.

Q Let me get back to the U.S.-Iraqi relations. There was a report on one of the main three networks two days ago that the U.S. and Iraq are now exchanging military intelligence.

Do you have any comment on that report?

A No. Just as a matter of general principle, obviously, I would not comment on an issue involving intelligence, so I'm not trying to steer you one way or another, but I'm not going to address the issue.

Q Do you think that the MNF mission can be extended to Tripoli if the LAF moved to it?

A I'm not going to try to speculate on what might happen in the future. I'm not trying to suggest to you that that is likely or unlikely. I'm just not going to speculate on it.

Q On this story about the Consulate, Alan, there is a report here that says that the United States, according to the story, has been conducting under-the-table means to improve the quality of life, or improve the infrastructure. Have you been launching this type of under-the-table projects in the occupied territories?

A I think, again, I would refer you to what I said before about the proper behavior of that Consulate.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:51 p.m.)

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Becker

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, December 22, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #227

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1983, 12:08 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a felling that a combination of the "Ice Age" last night and the approaching holidays is diminishing our little group here -- a bit thin. Anyway, I have no announcements. I know you want to get out of here speedily for Lt. Goodman's mail, but I'll be glad to answer whatever questions you might have.

Q John, can you tell us what you know about the bishop in Nicaragua?

A Not a great deal. It's a pretty confused situation, but our Embassies in both Honduras and Nicaragua are trying to get information. To date, Embassy staffs in both countries -- Nicaragua and Honduras -- have not been able to obtain any first-hand confirmation of the widely-conflicting reports from the region.

In Managua, our Ambassador has raised our concerns for the welfare of the American citizens -- that's Bishop Schlaeffler and Father Schafer -- raised these concerns at senior levels of the Government of Nicaragua; and the Embassy has also been in touch with the Capuchin residence, of which Bishop Schlaeffler is a member.

In Tegucigalpa, in Honduras, Embassy officers have been in contact with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees which, along with the Government of Honduras, is preparing to assist any refugees who cross the border. Our Embassy officials plan to be present when any refugees do cross the border into Honduras.

As I said at the beginning, the reports continue to be conflicting -- in conflict. The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry communique and other reports from the Government of Nicaragua on the origins of the current situation are unconfirmed, and indeed are in conflict with other reports by the Misura Miskito Indian organization in Tegucigalpa. The Miskito Indian group claims that as many as 2,500 Miskito Indians from the Francia Sirpi camp, led by Bishop Schlaeffler, are fleeing towards towards the Honduran border.

We have no confirmed information as to the well-being of either American citizen. Our primary concern at this point is clearly with the safety and well-being of the two Americans and the Miskito Indians with whom they are reportedly traveling.

We have seen the reports reportedly received by radio contact with the group that they were bombed by a plane in Nicaragua, but have no confirmation of that. So we continue to check on the story, but we don't have very much information for you.

Q May we have a copy of what you just said?

A Yes. What I just said?

Q Yes.

A Sure.

Q John, on that, the Detroit Capuchin -- I don't know what the ecclesiastical expression is --

A Order, yes.

Q -- that section that Schlaeffler comes from, they said that this morning, the Nicaraguan Air Force plane flew Capuchin members from the mission in Managua to Puerto Cabezas. Were any U. S. Embassy officials aboard?

A I was not aware of that, and do not know whether there were or not.

Q Has the U.S. Embassy asked the Nicaraguan authorities to transport them to the region?

A I don't know the answer to that. I don't know exactly what kind of detailed investigation is going on.

Q John, the Israelis have made a major, have expressed strong concern or irritation with the fact that Yassir Arafat has been received by President Mubarak; and I think some of the Israeli officials are claiming this is in violation of Camp David.

Has the United States looked at the situation? Do you have any comment on the statements in Cairo? Have you had any contact with the Israeli Government on this issue?

A No, nothing on any consultations with Israel, but the United States views renewed Egyptian-PLO discussions as an encouraging development, given Egypt's adherence to the Camp David Accords and its outspoken support for the Reagan initiative.

We are hopeful that such talks will serve to persuade Mr. Arafat that peace negotiations within the framework of the President's initiative are the best means of achieving Palestinian goals.

Q Now let me -- I think the Israeli complaint is that since Arafat has not renounced terrorism, by Mubarak's meeting with him, he is violating a provision of Camp David saying Egypt will not encourage terrorism.

A I guess that dispute would be between Israel and Egypt.

Insofar as we are concerned, we are not meeting with Mr. Arafat, or the PLO; and our position on talks or recognition of the PLO remains absolutely unchanged.

Q Does, however, the United States now see Mr. Arafat and his organization as a possible key to the settlement of the situation?

A Well, as you know, we have urged Palestinian -- we have urged Jordanian and Palestinian involvement in the peace process. Just where those Palestinians would be drawn from, what kind of Palestinians they would be -- also our position is unchanged on that. That's for the Palestinians and for King Hussein to decide. But clearly, involvement of Palestinians in the process is something that we hope moves forward.

Q Mr. Arafat and the PLO, specifically?

A Well, our position on the PLO and Mr. Arafat remains unchanged. In terms of the recognition of Israel and the acceptance of certain U.N. resolutions, our position has been spelled out, and there is no change on that.

And as far as our recognition of Mr. Arafat is concerned, he would have to meet those conditions, but (inaudible) we consider it to be helpful, in the interim, that these discussions are going on with the Egyptians.

Q Is there any evidence beyond the discussions with the Egyptians that Mr. Arafat and the PLO are at all more ready to meet those conditions?

A Haven't seen any announcement.

Q John, the statement today, and the contrast with the statement from Israel, suggests that the United States disagrees with the assessment of Yassir Arafat as representative of the Palestinians. You keep referring to "Palestinians" and say that Arafat's meetings are helpful in getting the Palestinians involved in the talks with Jordan. The Israelis take exactly the opposite view; that is, that Arafat doesn't represent the Palestinians.

A The Israelis have a certain viewpoint. We have a certain viewpoint. In terms of how we regard Mr. Arafat and what he would need to do for our estimate of him to change, there's no change in that position.

We have always recognized that involvement with the PLO, without renunciation of some of their positions, would be a major hurdle. But it's not for us to specify which Palestinians would be involved. That's for the parties to decide when they get to the negotiating table.

Q John, are there any indications that Arafat or the PLO are ready to give the go-ahead to Jordan?

A Haven't seen any announcement of that, Bernie.

Q On what basis, given Arafat's repudiation by some of the Palestinians, do you see Arafat's go-ahead to Hussein as having any substance?

A His go-ahead to Hussein?

Q Yes, assuming if he were to do that.

A I think we would have to wait and see what is Mr. Arafat's thinking post-Tripoli. I think that's not yet clear.

Q Can I just follow up please? On this question of terrorism, you say that it would be a hurdle. Does the United States insist in advance that such terrorism, or whatever one chooses to call it, be renounced by Arafat before any Palestinians could be embraced in a double delegation, Jordanian/Palestinian?

A Let us pull out the specific language. But in essence, it is acceptance of those appropriate U.N. resolutions and recognition of Israel.

Q (Inaudible).

A I think that implies the abandonment of terrorism.

Q Before you left it -- you said it's a hurdle to be resolved.

A The question of the PLO sitting down with Israel is a hurdle, clearly. We've always understood that would be unacceptable to Israel.

Q John, you keep talking about -- that the Palestinians will give Hussein the go-ahead. The go-ahead for what, precisely?

A To enter the peace talks.

Q Under the aegis of the Reagan plan?

A Yes.

Q But what is the point of that since the Israelis have already rejected it?

A People have different positions. We have our position. We have always -- the President set out his position on September 1, a year or so back, and that is the United States' position -- entering those discussions.

Q Following your giving hope that this will allow a go-ahead, supposing they do get together --

A I didn't say we hoped -- I mean, we have discussions going on between President Mubarak and Mr. Arafat; we don't know how those discussions will turn out. We don't know what pronouncements they will make. But if the PLO were to emerge as a more moderate organization and to adopt the position that we have consistently urged on them, of course, that would be a change.

Q All right, suppose that happened, with whom then would they be talking?

A I assume -- I can't lay out the scenario, but I assume that the next step would be for Mr. Arafat to resume his talks with King Hussein.

Q Right. And supposing they do get together and Arafat gives Hussein a go-ahead, as you say, with whom then will Hussein and the Palestinians be talking?

A I mean, we're going far down the theoretical road, but I think it would be up to Hussein and the appropriate Palestinians then to announce their readiness to be involved in the peace talks, and it will be up to the other parties to pronounce on the acceptability of the delegation that King Hussein would offer.

Q If you got an acceptability from Arafat on the part of his followers, and you got a rejection from the other side in the PLO on the part of their followers, for joining Hussein under the Reagan peace plan, what would the U.S. position be on that?

A I think we would have to look at that at the time. I think it would be up to Hussein to indicate who would be in his delegation, and then for the other participants to indicate whether that membership of that delegation was acceptable.

Q John, just -- a devil's advocate question -- they'll be some who'll say if the U.S. and Israel differ in their political assessment so widely as they do on this question of whether Mubarak should even discuss matters with Arafat, the question would be, what was the significance of the discussions that were held with Prime Minister Shamir at the end of November on closer political and military coordination?

A I think, as we have said before, the closer association with Israel, or the underlining of a traditionally close association with Israel doesn't always mean that we will agree on every single issue. Haven't done so in the past; probably won't in the future.

Q John, coming back to Jim's line of questioning, it may be called "theoretical," as you did as to who Hussein or Arafat will be talking to, but the truth is that if that answer -- if that question is answered, it may actually open some opening in this vicious circle as to who Arafat and Hussein -- if they agree, which they have begun to talk earlier last April -- who will they talk about?

The Israeli Government says that "reassured", or "reconfirmed" their commitment to the Camp David --

A That's correct.

Q -- but they rejected the Reagan plan. I mean, if there is an answer from here, it may be a signal to Hussein and Arafat to take it realistically and start talking. But they will have to meet Arab hostility, which is already there, and then eventually to be -- to have nobody to talk to on the Israeli-American side, then why should they take the risk? What can you tell them?

A I think, as the President has said, the peace process -- he recognized that this would not be a speedy evolution. When he announced his initiative, he said that he was prepared to continue to support it over the long haul, and it was a long and difficult road. I think if you automatically build in rejection and negative response to every development along the road, you would never get anywhere. I think you have to move step-by-step. We have to wait and see.

If you had an indication from King Hussein that he was prepared to enter the negotiations with an acceptable Palestinian delegation, I think at that stage Israel will have to determine what its response would be.

Q Can I follow up, John? At some point there was rumors, or reports actually, in the America media that the United States officials, high senior officials, assured King Hussein that if he receives the okay from Arafat, in a combined Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, that then the United States would do its best or some points -- words were used as "influence Israel or pressure Israel."

First of all, do you confirm these things, and if you do, are they still valid now?

A I confirm the language which we used before in response to that question. And, of course, the language is still valid.

Q John, did we know --

A I would prefer to go back to the -- there was a carefully spelled-out statement, and I would like to go back and refer to those specific words.

Q You mean the original statement that you read?

A The statement that was just referred to. The suggestion of what the United States would do should Hussein come forward, I'd prefer to go back to the specific language we used at that time.

Q Do you have that statement available?

A I'm sure we can pull it out for you.

Q The last statement?

A Yes.

Q John, there was a statement attributed to Mr. Arafat saying that it would be unrealistic to ask Egypt in this time to abrogate the Camp David Accords. How do you read this statement?

A I don't have any comment on that.

Q In the light of the talks with Mr. Kamal Hassan Ali, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, do you have any information if Mr. Arafat intends to go ahead with the Egyptian proposal to have a PLO Government, a Palestinian Government, in exile?

A No, we have no information on that.

Q There was a report yesterday by one of the networks that the United States is actually considering Arafat and the PLO faction that he leads as a necessary, positive element in the Middle East combined issues, so to speak. Is there any truth to that? Does the United States see Arafat and his faction of the PLO as a positive thing?

A No, I think that was a report that suggested that the United States had shifted its position. There's no shift in position but, as I said, in the words I offered you, we see these talks as an encouraging development. If they led to movement, the President's peace initiative, that would be an encouraging development.

Q You wouldn't be able, or can you tell us if you do see Arafat versus the other factions of the PLO or the other side of the PLO as a positive --

A No, I think we have to wait and see what Mr. Arafat says after his talks with Mr. Mubarak and what he says about his willingness and enthusiasm, if any, to meet with King Hussein. I don't think we can speak for Mr. Arafat.

Q John, picking this up, do you see Arafat now as the leader of the Palestinians?

A I don't have an analysis for you, Bernie.

Q I ask that question against the background, if my memory is right, about the Secretary once raising the question of who elected Arafat in the first place to represent the Palestinians.

How do you reconcile what you are putting out as an encouraging beat if there were movement on that, and what the Secretary said some months ago?

A I think any discussion between Mr. Arafat and moderate forces in the Middle East is something that is useful. But insofar as who would speak for the Palestinians in peace negotiations, I think that's something that the Jordanians and the Palestinians will have to work out between them.

--MORE--

Q John, going back to what Bernie just said, it involves the question of the Arab League mandate for the PLO to speak on behalf of the Palestinians.

Does the Secretary still think that Mr. Arafat should "use it or lose it," if I recall his words correctly?

A I'd have to go back and look at what he said. I'd prefer not to --

Q It was a public press conference.

A Yes. Well, I'd like to go back and look at the actual words.

Q John, on the Multinational Force question for a minute, has the United States asked 15 other countries to join the Multinational Force, and has the United States run out of countries?

A I saw a press report along those lines a few minutes ago. I'm not sure what the Secretary of Defense has specifically in mind. I'm not aware of any recent overtures. It could well be that over a period of time we've talked with a number of countries about possible involvement, but I'm not aware of any recent such overtures.

Q If it creates the impression of the United States desperately banging on doors to share the danger, that's a wrong impression?

A I do not think that would be a correct impression.

Q Is this in reference to the Weinberger statement about 15 countries rejecting --

A Yes.

Q Let me go back to this other thing about Arafat. You speak of other parties accepting whatever may come out of Hussein-Arafat talks.

Could you name the other parties?

A I think, clearly, Israel would have to agree to whatever Palestinian/Jordanian delegation were to be present at the peace talks. If people won't sit down with each other, you won't get very far.

Q Yes. Is that the only party and nobody else?

A Of course, there's Egypt and the United States.

Q Egypt and the United States also would have to agree with it -- or Egypt would have to agree.

A Well, I assume that anybody who sits down at a table has to pretty much agree that the others should be present.

Q Do we understand correctly that the parties can sit down at a table without agreeing to the Reagan plan?

A The Reagan plan is the United States' position -- that's the United States' position -- and that is the position with which we would enter such talks. Other people may have other views.

Q No. What does that mean, actually?

A It means exactly what I said, that that is our position.

Q That we would not enter into the talks unless the other parties agreed to the Reagan plan?

A I didn't say that. I said that we would enter into the talks on the basis of the Reagan plan.

Q That would be our position --

A That's right.

Q -- that we would sit down and talk regardless of whether any of the other parties --

A Other people might have other views, but that's the United States' position.

Q Would the others enter talks without the U.S. present?

A I am not aware of any suggestion that they would.

Q Do you have any information, John, that the Israelis still see the Reagan plan as drifting away from the Camp David? The President said that the Reagan -- his plan was a continuation or branching out of the Camp David. The Israelis rejected it because they thought it was not the Camp David.

Do you have any indication what this is?

A No. I think you'd have to leave that -- I mean, I think you'd have to ask the Israelis what their interpretation is. We know what we think.

Q Could I pursue that question a minute ago? The key, it seems to me, that you're pointing to is that it doesn't matter whether Israel agrees to the Reagan plan; it only matters if they sit down and talk, no matter what they call those talks.

A I'm not sure I'd phrase it in that -- quite in that way.

Q I'm sure you wouldn't phrase it that bluntly.

A But the fact is the United States can only speak for itself, and that would be our position going into those negotiations. Others might have different views.

Q But the U.S. is no longer pressing for anybody to agree to the Reagan plan, but if Reagan --

A It's our position because we think it's the best plan. It would be a happy development if everybody came to that same conclusion.

Q John, going back to Secretary of State Shultz's testimony before the House and Senate Foreign Affairs or Foreign Relations Committee and also his speech -- it was, I believe, to the United Jewish Appeal shortly after the U.S. plan was announced -- if I recall correctly, didn't he say several times on those occasions that if somebody else has a better plan, let them come forward with it? You know, we're talking about the --

A Sure.

Q -- the important thing is, is to get people together.

A Sure. That's right.

Q So that is what the U.S. first or short-term objective is --

A Is to get --

Q -- is to get a negotiation going.

A To get the people together, of course.

Q John, go back to Central America briefly: President Reagan met with Ambassador Stone today and issued a statement saying that Stone informed him of the current status of the various efforts at achieving a peaceful settlement in Central America.

What are those efforts? Could you give us an update?

A Don't -- as you know, Ambassador Stone came back from a trip to Latin America, has been involved in consultations in the Department, and I think the President said that he would go out again. I forget if he put a timeframe on it --

Q After the 1st of the year.

A Don't have anything for you on the consultations or on the progress of events in Central America other than as contained in the President's remarks.

Q Do you have any itinerary for Ambassador Stone's --

A No, I don't.

Q -- forthcoming trip?

A No. I don't.

Q Is Rumsfeld meeting with the Secretary today?

A Yes. Mr. Rumsfeld came in last night, saw the President this morning. Saw the Secretary, of course. Is having --

Q Has already?

A Yes. Sure. Will lunch with the Secretary today.

Q Any future plans for him? Is he going home for Christmas?

A I'm sure he's going home for Christmas, but I don't know beyond that what his plans are.

Q You're not going to have a backgrounder this afternoon before he leaves?

A I think it's rather unlikely.

Q Do you have anything on the unrest report?

A He's well aware of your interest.

Q Do you have anything on the reported unrest in Suriname?

A No.

Q Do you have anything on UNESCO today?

A Still where we were. Looking at it within the Department.

Q Is there something for tomorrow?

A No. It's not tomorrow. I think there was a --

Q Yeah. But he's leaving tomorrow.

A Well, but that doesn't mean that he can't make decisions. He has a very efficient operation that travels with him.

Q Is the UNESCO decision going to be made before the end of the year?

A There are some deadlines involved in that, Bob, but whether it will be made before the end of the year, I don't know.

Q What about on economic sanctions against Poland? Is there a review under way, any decisions --

A I don't have anything on that for you, Bernie.

Q Because the President had said he's looking at it.

A Yes. He may well be. I don't have anything on it.

Q Do you have anything on the bombings of yesterday in Beirut?

A Just a -- probably no more than you really already have, but be glad to give you that.

The first reports from our Embassy indicate that one French paratrooper was killed and at least 12 were injured when an explosives-packed truck detonated outside a French MNF contingent base in Beirut yesterday afternoon.

Lebanese civilian casualties from the blast are high. The Lebanese Minister of Information and Justice and his wife were in the area at the time of the explosion and suffered minor injuries.

The United States deplores this act of senseless violence and offers its condolences to the Governments of France and Lebanon, and to the families and friends of the victims.

Insofar as events today are concerned, there have been no incidents involving the Marines -- Marine contingent of the MNF in the past 24 hours. Yesterday, however, a U.S. Air Force dog handler was shot in the arm by a sniper. The wound was minor, and he was medevaced to the U.S.S. Guam.

Our latest reports indicate that the cease-fire is holding, although there were heavy exchanges yesterday near Suq al-Gharb and in the Kharrub region. That's all I have.

Q There were reports of threats on some organization in Beirut or Lebanon to both U.S. forces and the French. Do you care to comment on that, or --

A No.

Q John, there has been sort of obvious emphasis on the impact of the Egyptian policy on Mr. Arafat. How about the other way around, with the public opinion in Egypt clearly not very much for the Israeli policy towards the Arab world. Don't you believe that Mr. Arafat maybe will have his impact on Egyptian policy at this time?

A I don't know. I guess you'll have to ask the Egyptians.

Q John, just one question about security of our own installations. Is there some means being adopted by our people overseas to prevent trucks from approaching Embassies or other American installations within say 200 yards or 300 yards --

A Various means. Sure.

Q Including that?

A Well, I won't get into what the means are, but there are various means. Sure.

Q What's the current position on --

Q John, got a completely different question. Could I --

A Sure.

Q There's a Canadian press report that Under Secretary Eagleburger made some forthright comments about Pierre Trudeau, and I wondered if you'd been aware of that, and if you had any comments?

A Well, I could offer you the same statement as was issued, I think, by our Embassy in Ottawa. There have been reports in the Canadian press alleging unfavorable remarks made by Under Secretary Eagleburger regarding Prime Minister Trudeau.

As evidenced by the extremely successful visit of the Prime Minister to Washington last week, relations between our two countries and between the President and the Prime Minister are close and cordial.

Consistent with our general practice, neither the Department nor Mr. Eagleburger is prepared to comment in detail on remarks purportedly made during an off-the-record meeting.

However, Mr. Eagleburger has asked me to say that the reports of his comments are grossly distorted. He has further asked me to say that he regrets the report and has the highest regard and respect for Prime Minister Trudeau.

The views of the United States Government with regard to the Prime Minister's initiatives are as stated by President Reagan on December 15.

Q Can we have a copy?

A Sure.

Q Have you been asked about the reports about the American priest who was kidnapped in Nicaragua, saying now that he has died at the hand of the anti-American --

A The reports are conflicting, but I did give at the outset of this session what we had on that.

Q John, what's the U.S. position now on the wisdom of replacing the Multinational Force with some U.N. force?

A The President said what he said on that. I have nothing to add to his remarks.

Q John, have you got anything at all on reports that the U.S. is planning to put in Pershing missiles in Pakistan?

A Ridiculous. Nonsense.

Q John, the President said Tuesday night -- called the Palestinian -- the PLO terrorists again. Does the State Department support that statement fully?

A I think we have offered some careful words in the past on the involvement of the PLO in terrorism. Be glad to provide those for you again.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:30 p.m.)

Glennon

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, December 23, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #228

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1983, 12:35 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one announcement, or statement, to give you on the Tyler Report:

The Department has consulted widely, including with Salvadoran legal counsel, to determine the implications of public disclosure of the report before the trial of the defendants in the case is completed. We have concluded that dissemination of the report, beyond the transmittal on a classified basis which has been made to concerned committees of Congress, could prejudice the outcome of the case just as it is about to be completed. Consequently, we will not release publicly the document at this time.

As we announced in classifying the report following its December 3 receipt, while we appreciate the public interest in this issue, our overriding concern in the case must be that the guilty be brought to justice.

The case, as you know, was raised to plenario -- that is, the final stage of the Salvadoran trial procedure -- in late October. This decision has been appealed; however, the appellate court reviewed the case earlier in this year and the defects identified at that time, in our judgment, have been remedied. Therefore, we hope that the present appeal will be decided quickly, allowing the case to move to a conclusion in the early months of 1984. And I would stress to you what we have said before: the issue is not whether to release this report but rather when, and so I have given you what the judgment has been on that. We will, of course, continue to keep the question under review.

Q Can I ask a related question now, or do you want to hold it?

A That, really, is all I've got. I think I'm going to turn to you.

Q Copy?

A Yes, I think we can do that.

Q Alan, I don't have anything to ask.

A Okay. Jim?

Q That related question was, the L.A. Times and the Albuquerque Journal have been running a long series on death squads, and so on. Is there contemplated any kind of reaction to an awful lot of allegations that are made in there about the involvement of present members of the high command in death squad activity?

A We're not going to comment on specific allegations raised in those stories or other stories. The President and the Vice President have publicly condemned death squad activities and also other similar terrorist acts.

The death squads are jeopardizing El Salvador's prospects for democracy as much as are the guerrillas, and we will continue to do what we can to help the Government of El Salvador to end that terrorism.

Q A related question, too, on the death squad issue: The arrest of this Captain Avila, is that a positive step? Is that enough for the time being?

A We addressed this the other day. Let me refer you back to what we said.

Q Alan, in the same area, do you have anything on the fate of Bishop Schlaefer?

A I have something I can give you; but based on wire reports, I'm not sure whether it is totally up to date, George. So, with that caveat, I will give you what I have.

Q May I just to ask one question? Please stick to the text so we can get a copy of it later and don't have to wait. (Laughter)

A I may or I may not. There are second-hand reports based on radio communication with the Miskito Indians that Bishop Schlaefer and Reverend Schafer have crossed over to the Honduran side of the border near Rus Rus with an initial contingent of some 500 persons.

An undetermined number of persons are reportedly still making their way to the Honduran border. If that report is correct, then Bishop Schlaefer would be in Tegucigalpa presumably by midday. As I say, I've seen some reports indicating that there are some further developments since this guidance was prepared.

An Embassy officer has been sent to the border to assure that we obtain accurate information as soon as possible and will be in a position to render assistance to these American citizens. At this point, however, we are awaiting word from the Embassy regarding confirmation that Bishop Schlaefer and Reverend Schafer are safe.

Beyond that, I really don't have anything to offer you on it.

Q Do you have anything on the alleged -- the Misura is saying that the group that's remained in Nicaragua hasn't left, is being subjected to bombing and is surrounded, and that they have asked the United States Government to provide air support for those who are continuing to flee. Do you have any reaction to any of that?

A I don't have anything on that.

Q Can you confirm the bombing?

A I don't think I would -- I can't confirm what's going on within Nicaragua, but I assume that once this group is out, they will have things to say; so let's wait and see what they have to say about it.

Q Alan, if the information is so hazy, and particularly if the information reaching you is so hazy, how is it, then, that you were able to file a complaint or a report with the Inter-American Human Rights --

A I didn't say the reports were hazy. I said that they are, in this case, second-hand, based on a radio communication from the Miskito Indians, so that there is reporting. What I'm saying to you now is that in terms of the up-to-date situation regarding whether they are out, who is out, and where they are, that is not probably up-to-date as of the time we're standing here, sitting here talking.

Q The information that you had that the Nicaraguan Government is bringing danger to the Bishop and to the Miskitos, that is based on other information, harder information?

A I think that there -- first of all, there was a letter yesterday which, I think, was made available to you, Ambassador Middendorf's letter. I think there was something done up at the U.N., and I understand that there may be some briefing up there.

3.13

Why don't I refer you to them, since it's their concern at this point and their representaion that they are talking about. I don't want to preempt them on that.

Q Who is briefing at the U.N.?

A It may be a background briefing, so I don't think I'll do that on the record.

Q Is it the American Mission to the U.N.?

A Yes. I understand it may be.

Q Was there one at the OAS?

A I think there was also one at the OAS.

Am I not correct, Brian? There will be one up in New York?

Q Pardon me?

A There will be a briefing up in New York, I believe.

Q What about the OAS, did you say?

A There was a letter yesterday which you may have missed.

Q Alan, yesterday, on the Middle East, if I may, you characterized the meeting between Mubarak and Arafat as an encouraging development.

Have you received any reports about what took place at the meeting that sustain that estimate, given the view that you think such a meeting might be hopeful in promoting the peace process?

A As of this point -- I guess I have to say two things: One is we don't have a report, but I also am not, by that, going to suggest that once we have information that we will necessarily share that or judgments about it. So I really don't have anything to say at this point.

Q Do you have any comment on Israeli objection to the meeting or the protest that they filed yesterday when Mr. Rosenne was here?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment on the call by Italian President Pertini to withdraw the Italian units from Lebanon?

A No. I think we addressed this the other day. The Italian Government has indicated that it will be reducing the number of people it has there, but that they have reaffirmed their commitment to do that. I don't have any comment particularly on President Pertini's statement, though.

Q About his talking about the Marines' mission, transforming from a peacekeeping force into a one-sided part? (Sic)

A Well, that, as you know, is not our view; but I don't have a particular comment on his remarks. I haven't seen them; I have only seen them reported. In any case, rather than commenting on his remarks, I'll refer you back to what we have said, which is still valid, about our position, our view of what we're doing there, and so on.

Q May I understand that coordination is not as it was before with the Italians?

A No, I don't think you could understand that. I don't know -- I think there is reasonably good coordination at various levels, including on the ground in Beirut, but elsewhere as well.

Q This means that you have been expecting, to a certain extent at least, expecting, anticipating, such a step to be taken by the Italians?

A To reduce?

Q To withdraw.

A No, they haven't said they were withdrawing.

Q Alan, any comment on the European Community's decision to allow the various economic sanctions against the Soviets because of Poland to lapse, or to expire quietly?

A The EC has decided its Poland-related sanctions against the Soviet Union were no longer a necessary part of the EC's response to the situation in Poland and have therefore allowed them to lapse. This decision does not affect NATO's Poland-related sanctions, however, which remain in effect.

Q What does that mean?

A That means that the EC as an organization apparently had some sanctions, but those are different from the sanctions that were addressed -- you recall there was a NATO meeting, and there were announcements made after that.

Q But the ten are in NATO.

A Sorry?

Q The EC is in NATO.

A No.

Q European Communities.

A But --

Q The countries that make it up, etc.

A But there are different sanctions in different actions.

Q Do you have a list of the sanctions there which are not affected, the NATO sanctions?

A I have some. I don't know if it's a complete list. I can tell you a little bit about what this is. The EC import restrictions consisted of limitations of 75 percent and 50 percent on nearly 100 tariff items representing a total 1980 import value of 830 million ECU. At that point an ECU was worth $1.03.

This is about 3.8 percent of the EC trade with the U.S.S.R. at the time. I can give you the goods if you're interested -- fish and cultured pearls and so on, a number of things.

As far as those which were -- I can't give you a definitive list of what is still in effect. There were a variety of things. Individual countries actually announced different moves to tighten export credit or restrictions, and I guess you'd have to go to individual countries to get those.

As far as the U.S. is concerned, we have -- I can make available to you the list of the sanctions which I think you probably have from --

Q Could we have it anyway?

A I can make it available afterwards.

Q Alan, clarification on one thing. You said "individual actions that were taken by individual countries."

A Coming out of an agreement at NATO.

Q Yeah. I mean, this is under the NATO --

A That's right.

Q -- and not the EEC rubric, right, that you're referring to?

A That's correct.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the Evans & Novak allegations this morning about the treatment of the union leaders by the Polish Government, being subjected to malnutrition?

A I have a little bit I can give you: We remain deeply concerned about reports of mistreatment of political prisoners in Poland. The Polish Government is aware of our concern. We continue to call for the unconditional release of all political prisoners, including the "Solidarity 7" and the "KOR 4."

Q Alan, an Egyptian citizen committed suicide in a prison in Israel a few days ago, and it was said it was because of at least mistreatment by the Israelis.

Do you have any comment on that?

A I don't have any facts on it, and I don't have any comment on it.

Q Alan, do you see any connection between the meeting between Arafat and Mubarak yesterday and the upcoming Arab Summit Conference scheduled for March, next March, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia?

A Do I have any comment on --

Q Yes. I mean, you know, the meeting which took place. Will it -- do you think that this will be in the direction of what's going to happen? What's your anticipation of what is coming up?

A I'm not going to try to do that.

Let me just go back for one second on Poland.

There was, of course, a NAC declaration on January 11, the North Atlantic Council, and I would refer you back to that as a joint action which was looked to at that point.

Q On Poland, Alan, one more question, if I can.

A Yes.

Q When does the United States expect to review its sanctions?

A All I can really do on that, Jim, is to refer you to what we've said before, and what the President said before on that subject on December 8, and you've got that language, so I don't have anything new to announce to you at this point. That's where I have to leave it.

Q I didn't hear you say anything about what the U.S. view is of the EC action. Does the U.S. think it's a good idea?

A I didn't particularly express a view.

Q That's what I was waiting to hear.

A Yes. Well, I don't have a particular view to express.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on the statements made by Mr. Joseph Churva, claiming that the U.S. played the role of informer to the Libyan regime about "plots" against the Qadaffi regime in 1971?

A No. I don't know anything about it, but it sounds to me like something that is rather convoluted, and also would suggest we were -- well, it goes -- let me just leave it with a "no comment." Right? (Laughter) I can't even begin to grapple with that one.

Jim?

Q Have you seen a report -- I mean, have you seen the reports of this?

A I haven't seen that report.

Q Do you have anything on South African raids into Angola in the context of the cease-fire offer and Angola's refusal?

A I don't have anything on Angola's reaction to the South African statement. We, I think, talked about that the other day.

As far as reports of military action, we deplore cross-border violence in southern Africa. It resolves nothing. We remain firmly committed to seeking means of addressing peacefully the problems of the region.

Q Thank you.

A You're welcome.

Q Merry Christmas!

(The briefing concluded at 12:52 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Tuesday, December 27, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #229

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1983, 12:37 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of announcements up front, the first concerning the Secretary's travel to Stockholm.

The Secretary of State will travel to Stockholm January 16-18 to attend the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. As was announced at the NATO Ministerial session in Brussels early this month, all the Alliance foreign ministers intend to participate in the opening session of the CDE.

The Conference on Disarmament in Europe will consider proposals to limit the risk of surprise attack by improving information and observation of military forces and activities in Europe. The conference is being convened on the basis of a mandate agreed at the Madrid meeting of the CSCE which concluded with a foreign ministers' meeting last September.

We will post an application list for members of the press who wish to accompany the Secretary on that trip to Stockholm, and that list will come down at noon on January 5.

I have an announcement on Angola. We've seen reports suggesting apparent conflict between military activity in southern Angola and diplomatic efforts to produce a disengagement of forces and an overall settlement. The South African Government has proposed a disengagement of forces in southern Angola with an effective date of January 31.

The United States believes that this development offers an opportunity to begin a process of disengagement of conflicting military forces and a reduction in the levels of violence. The United States has seen nothing to suggest that this opening is unacceptable to any of the parties, and we believe it should provide a useful basis for exploring practical ways of implementing a cease-fire which should be the first step towards a broader settlement leading to implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 435.

An atmosphere of confidence is crucial at this important juncture of events in the region. We're concerned at reports of wide-scale fighting inside southern Angola and hope that all sides will exercise restraint so as not to jeopardize the prospects for exploring the disengagement proposal.

The United States is willing to assist this process in any way it can and is so indicating to the various parties, including our Contact Group partners.

And, finally, a statement on dissidents -- a court action against dissidents in the Soviet Union. It's a fairly lengthy statement. It's available in the Press Office as a State Department statement on a series of recent court actions against dissidents in the Soviet Union.

This is the second such wave of convictions to take place in the Soviet Union since the conclusion of the CSCE adjournment in Madrid in September.

That's all I have. Be happy to take your questions.

Q Copies of both of those statements, please?

A Sure.

Q John, do you have anything beyond what was said yesterday about the Reverend Jackson's activities?

A Well, yes, I do.

Q Who's he meeting with?

A He's meeting with Assistant Secretary Murphy and Under Secretary Eagleburger this morning.

Insofar as our diplomatic efforts are concerned, we have been pursuing the release of Lieutenant Goodman in a direct and a continuous manner at a high level with the Syrian Government. We will continue to do so.

Ambassador Paganelli, our Ambassador to Syria, is our representative for this matter, and we repose full confidence in him. As for other official visitors to Damascus, they have and will support Ambassador Paganelli's efforts. Insofar as unofficial visitors to Damascus are concerned, they clearly are operating on their own authority and cannot speak for the United States Government.

As we said with regard to the visit of an Arab-American group, we have no objection to private Americans seeking Lieutenant Goodman's release on humanitarian grounds. We are concerned that these private contacts could be self-defeating, and we're concerned that the Government of Syria understand that it is Ambassador Paganelli who speaks for the United States Government.

Q Copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Could I go back to Angola for a second?

A Yes.

Q The Angolan Government at the United Nations -- I think it was early last week or late the week before -- said they weren't interested in pursuing this proposal at this time and took the position which is backed by the Security Council that South African forces have no right in any case to be in Angola.

What is your position on this, especially in light of the reports of the recent fighting by a considerable number of South African aircraft and forces?

A Clearly, that the fighting is not helpful, and that we and others will do whatever we can to bring that to an end, but we do not believe that the South African Government's initiative is barren. We have not seen anything which indicates that it is no longer valid.

Q Do we have any statement with respect only to the South African Government's military presence and recent offensive in Angola? Why aren't we condemning that particular initiative by them and instead using this very general thing which takes South Africa's position in terms of how a disengagement can --

A I think you're misrepresenting what we said. I don't think that the condemnation of violence excludes the current activity.

Q John, to go back to your statement on the Jackson visit to Damascus, what did you mean when you said you had concern about these private visits being self-defeating? What does that mean?

A Concern lest they interrupt or in any way negate the official United States Government efforts that are extensive and vigorous and ongoing to secure the pilot's release.

Q John, a follow-up on that. Have you got any word yet that the Syrians have privately told Jackson that they will in fact release or turn over Goodman to him?

A I'm sorry, Bernie, the Syrians have told --

Q Yeah.

A Told who?

Q Jackson. Do you have any word here --

A Oh, no.

Q -- or has he in any way informed you?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q John, did Ambassador Rumsfeld raise it or not?

A We don't get into what Ambassador Rumsfeld talks about with Syrian authorities, but I just refer you to the statement that official visitors to Damascus are supporting Ambassador Paganelli's efforts. He is the principal representative, but that does not imply any lack of support by other official visitors.

Ambassador Paganelli did see Lieutenant Goodman on Christmas eve. He was able to pass messages to him from his family. He told him that thousands of letters are currently enroute to him. Lieutenant Goodman told Ambassador Paganelli -- this was a meeting that lasted about an hour in Lieutenant Goodman's place of confinement --

Lieutenant Goodman told Ambassador Paganelli that he is physically well. His injuries to his shoulder, knee and ribs are healing rapidly. Lieutenant Goodman said that he was visited every other day by an English-speaking doctor. He has plenty of food. He watches Syrian television on which there are some English-language programs, including soccer matches in which Lieutenant Goodman has a vigorous interest, and he is supplied with an American newspaper which is the International Herald-Tribune.

While he is looking forward to his release, clearly, Lieutenant Goodman said that he's being well treated, and that he had no specific request to make beyond a chance to have more exercise.

Ambassador Paganelli did have the opportunity to take in a Christmas dinner to Lieutenant Goodman which included ham, potato salad, applesauce, homemade chocolate chip cookies, and pumpkin pie. I think the Ambassador also took in some gifts and books.

-- MORE --

Q Can we have a copy of the menu?

A The menu, I ad libbed on so you'll have to wait for the transcript on that. I thought that might be an extra little detail that might interest you.

Q So you don't have an answer to Bernie's question, you're not going to get involved in Rumsfeld?

A I thought I answered Bernie's question. I just went on to tell you about the visit.

Q As I interpreted your question, you're simply saying Ambassador Rumsfeld supports Paganelli's work in the effort?

A Of course.

Q You've not indicated that he -- the suggestion is that Rumsfeld himself did not feel it necessary to raise the matter.

A Yes, and we have consistently refused to get into Ambassador Rumsfeld's discussions, and he has made that plain with whom he's negotiating, that he would not talk to the press or reveal the content of his negotiations, so we're going to stand firm on that position.

Q John, one point of clarification. Bernie just said to you, in other words, Rumsfeld did not feel it necessary to go into it, and you said, "Yes." Would you say "yes" to Bernie's --

A Let me disregard Bernie's question and say, it is quite clear that other officials who have visited Damascus support the efforts and support Ambassador Paganelli, who is our principal representative in this matter. They clearly support his efforts.

On the specific question of what was discussed between Foreign Minister Khaddam and Ambassador Rumsfeld, we're going to not indicate.

Q Do you think it absolutely beyond the realm of possibility that Jesse Jackson could in some way secure Goodman's release, and if he were able to pull off a miraculous release, would that not please the State Department?

A I think the release of Lieutenant Goodman would clearly please the State Department, but I think we have a number of efforts underway through diplomatic and official channels, and I'm not going to get any further into Mr. Jackson's visit than what I have suggested earlier.

Q Do you think it totally improbable that he would be able to do that, since that --

A It seems to me that you're seeking to lure me into the realm of a hypothetical, and I must be well disciplined and refuse to be lured.

Q Except to hypothetically say it could damage official efforts?

A I think there is that possibility. We are concerned that there should be no damage to the efforts we're making to secure his release.

Q Can you tell us what the meeting between Mr. Eagleburger and Ambassador Rosenne is about?

A Ambassador Rosenne is coming in this afternoon. That is at our request, and that is to pursue a variety of consultations we have underway with the Israeli Government.

Q Do you expect that the Israeli protest and the statements from Mr. Shamir will be highlighted in this meeting between Mr. Rosenne and Mr. Eagleburger?

A I have no idea what the agenda is.

Q Do you have any additional comment with respect to the meeting between Mubarak and Arafat, beyond what you said on Friday?

A I don't know that it really goes beyond what was said on Friday. The Egyptians have made clear to all concerned that Egypt remains committed to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty and the Camp David framework. Egypt has also taken a positive position toward President Reagan's peace initiative of September 1, 1982, which is fully consistent with the Camp David framework.

We understand that President Mubarak's decision to meet with Arafat was taken with a view to furthering the prospect of Jordanian entry into peace negotiations with Israel. It should be clear to all that we remain full partners in the Camp David process, and there's been no change in our position with respect to the PLO.

CONT

Q Can we get a copy of that?

A Sure.

Q Do you have any indication that the objective of Mubarak in his decision to meet Arafat, in fact, is a bit closer? Has he had any success in encouraging Arafat to --

A I don't have anything on that for you, Bernie.

Q There's a story in the Israeli press that said the U.S. urged or asked the Egyptians to go all out to persuade Arafat to accept the U.S. conditions for recognition of the PLO. Is there any new effort by the U.S. to --

A Without leading you one way or the other, I wouldn't get into any of our diplomatic consultations. But our position on the PLO remains absolutely clear -- the acceptance of the U.N. resolutions and the recognition of Israel, and nothing will change in our position until the PLO changes its position which we consider unacceptable.

Q John, could you offer anything on the statement or the report this morning in the Washington Post that Kamal Hassan Ali, when he was in Washington, he had some place for the Fez Summit Resolutions for peace in the Middle East, and he was supportive of it?

A I don't. Sorry, I don't.

Q Anything on the Lebanon situation now?

A I have a little update for you. Despite more heavy fighting -- this was a report as of morning Beirut time -- despite more heavy fighting near the airport, there were no instances involving the Marines in the past 24 hours. That was the 24 hours up to about mid morning their time.

We understand, although this is not confirmed, that after that report there was some mortar fire into the airport, but at the time we heard that report, it had not been returned by the Marines, and there were no casualties.

The British report that two British soldiers were lightly wounded by a bomb which detonated as they were passing along the western approach to the port area. Two French soldiers and an Italian were slightly wounded December 26 in the fighting around the Sabra/Shatilla refugee camps. The fighting continues in that area. Intermittent fighting was reported yesterday around Suq al-Gharb and in the Kharrub. The Beirut Airport is open.

Q What is the U.S. understanding of the reason for the French withdrawal from its positions and any coordination between French forces and the Lebanese Army?

A I don't have anything on that for you.

Q Do you have anything on these guns being held by Florida authorities, or U.S. authorities, that were destined for Guatemala?

A Yes. We've had some discussion with Guatemalan officials. The shipment of old, bolt action rifles was seized by U.S. Customs because of lack of proper documentation. Our Munitions Control Office has been contacted on the subject by a representative of the Israeli shipper who was told of the steps necessary to obtain an in-transit license authorizing the goods to transit the United States. No application for such a license has yet been received.

I understand from Customs officials that the rifles are not of U.S. manufacture.

Q So do you expect them then to be released when the application is received?

A I guess we'll have to wait and see what happens with the submission of an application.

Q Do you have any comment on Mr. Andropov's health?

A No.

Q Do you have any any comments on the Afghanistan fourth anniversary of the Soviet occupation?

A Sorry, on the Afghanistan --

Q The fourth year of Russian occupation?

A No. Nothing beyond our well-known position on Afghanistan and what needs to happen there to get a resolution of that situation.

Q John, the President this morning said he felt Lebanon was on the verge of new progress toward national reconciliation. Do you have anything further on that? Are they on a specific verge of any kind?

A No. I'll just leave you with what the President said.

Q Do you have any more indication about a meeting between Secretary Shultz and Gromyko in Stockholm?

A No, nothing for you on that; no.

Q Thank you.

A Okay.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:55 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Wednesday, December 28, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #230

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1983, 12:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. HUGHES: I have one announcement and a very lean book today. The announcement is on land reform in El Salvador.

Yesterday, the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador approved a third extension of Decree 207 of 1980, extending the "land to the tiller" phase of the land reform for six months. This program, Phase 3 of land reform, had been due to expire on December 31 of this year.

Earlier this month, the Constituent Assembly approved articles in the new constitution guaranteeing the legality of the land reform and mandating the distribution of medium- and large-sized properties. There was concern voiced here at the time, however, that many eligible campesinos would not have the opportunity to apply for title to lands they rented or sharecropped because of the December 31 expiration of Decree 207. The real test of Salvadoran intentions, vis-a-vis the land reform program, would come in the decision on 207 extension. The Assembly's nation-wide extension of the decree is an important step towards ensuring that campesinos who wish to apply for their rights under the land reform can continue to do so.

The United States applauds this action of El Salvador's Legislative Assembly and welcomes the commitment to democratic reform that underlies it.

That's all I have. You're welcome to take --

Q Copy?

A -- Sure -- any questions you might have.

Q Anything on the health of Mr. Andropov?

A No.

Q Do you have any comment at all on what's been happening in Moscow --

A No.

Q -- in the last couple of days?

A No.

Q Can you confirm that the U.S. Ambassador to UNESCO this morning, or whenever it was Paris time, but today delivered the U.S. letter to UNESCO informing it of the U.S. decision?

A Ambassador Gerard? I can't confirm that. There have been some diplomatic consultations, but I'm not -- of my own knowledge, I do not know that she was involved in transmitting a communication.

Q Has a communication gone forward?

A There are some diplomatic consultations going on.

Q But no -- formal notice hasn't been delivered, to your knowledge?

A No. I think where we stand is that the State Department recommendation to the White House has been considered by the President who has referred the matter back to the State Department, and we would expect to have an announcement in a day or so.

Q Will that be here?

A It'll be here.

Q What is sacrosanct about December 31? Why couldn't notification be given, say, at the end of January instead?

A I think it's a U.N. provision affecting budget.

Q Will any announcement come in the form of a briefing as well?

A Might well do. Why don't you keep in touch with us about developments tomorrow.

Q It could be -- only tomorrow, but not today?

A It will not be today.

Q Do you find that you still have the kind of united support on the MNF in Lebanon that you had two, three months ago?

A Well, no change. The last MNF meeting of the four was in Brussels where the four expressed their continuing commitment to the MNF role. There hasn't been a meeting of the four since then, and I haven't seen any change in the collective viewpoint of the governments.

Q There have been actions taken by the Italians, for example.

A Yes, the Italians, I think, are going down to somewhere -- I don't know where they're going down to, but as you know, they were over their commitment. They, I think, were committed to keep 1,100 troops in Lebanon and have been up as high as 2,200.

Q What is the U.S. commitment on the number?

A I don't know what our number commitment is. We've been above our commitment, but I guess the Pentagon would have to give you the exact number of what we're committed to. I don't know --

Q Do you plan to go down to the number of the commitment?

A No, I'm not aware of any plans.

Q Anything on the review of the sanctions on Poland?

A No.

Q John, there were reports today from Israel that the Finance Minister has recommended in the new Israeli budget a freeze on allocations for the settlements. Do you have any comment on that, and would you see this as a positive step or as change in policy by the Israeli Government that would meet U.S. requirements as far as the Reagan plan is concerned?

A We don't have any comment on it because the reports are a little conflicting, and indeed there's some suggestion that that report has been denied by Israeli sources. So I think we would not have any comment. It sounds a little confused.

Q On the MNF, John, I don't know -- if you answered it while I was away, just refer me to it. Did you say anything about Spadolini's news interview where he said that the United States is in Beirut or in Lebanon only to defend Israel, protect Israel, or something like that?

Q Pertini.

Q Pertini. I'm sorry.

A I've been away for a few days, too. I don't know whether we have anything on that. We did have? There was some guidance, apparently. You can get it in the Press Office.

Q Anything on this situation in southern Lebanon today?

A No.

Q Anything on the situation in southern Angola today?

A No.

Q Anything on the Jesse Jackson situation?

A About his plans? I guess you'd have to ask him.

Q You have nothing no update from yesterday?

A On the meeting?

Q Well, whatever.

A Well, we could give you a colorful -- give you a colorful --

Q Be careful.

A -- account of the meeting. The meeting lasted about an hour and a half. It was cordial. It was with Under Secretary Eagleburger and Assistant Secretary Murphy.

They briefed Mr. Jackson on our relations with Syria and on our efforts, beginning immediately upon Lt. Goodman's capture, to ensure that he received proper medical treatment, that our Embassy could have access to him, and that he could receive and send messages, and, of course, to secure his early release.

Mr. Jackson had a number of questions which were answered, and he explained his view of the situation and his proposed trip.

The State Department remains available for further consultations with Mr. Jackson on Lt. Goodman and the most effective way of obtaining his release from Syrian custody.

Q A copy of that, please.

A Sure. As a matter of fact, I think there may have been some more phone calls this morning between State Department officials and Mr. Jackson.

Q John, on this -- again, if you answered it, you could refer me to it -- did in fact Ambassador Rumsfeld meet, or when he met with the Syrian authorities, did he actually bring the subject of the U.S. captor (sic) to --

A To the intense disappointment of everybody in this room, we will continue not to talk about the substance of Ambassador Rumsfeld's discussions.

Q Anything new on Goodman himself?

A No.

Have I stunned you all?

Q One more thing.

A One more thing.

Q There is a report today from Israel where Prime Minister Shamir is quoted, saying that President Reagan's plan is dead and they made their views known to the U.S. officials and their -- during his last visit here.

I know you said something before about this, but you are also on record calling for King Hussein to resume his talks with Palestinians, as you stated it here.

Do you have anything to put -- to kind of bridge the two, encouraging the Arab side to going to --

A No. We don't think the initiative is dead. We're still working on it. We think others are interested in it.

Q But the Israelis aren't, and they are a major factor.

A I can't speak for the Israelis. You'd have to ask them what their viewpoint is.

Q Can you go into any details on any recommendations or requests made by the allies on the UNESCO membership?

A No --

Q Specifically the French.

A The French have indicated to us their support for the cultural role of UNESCO. We support the cultural role of UNESCO, but there are other aspects of UNESCO's performance that worry us a great deal, and so I think that kind of discussion -- it's logical to assume that that kind of discussion would have gone on.

Q Could you go into some detail, John, on what other aspects concern us?

A No. I think we would probably wait for any announcement that we might have tomorrow.

Q Do you have anything on the meeting the Israeli Ambassador had here yesterday, or I might have missed a question over there. I didn't hear it. The Israeli Ambassador was here yesterday talking to Eagleburger. Can you give us any guidance of --

A Was the Israeli Ambassador in yesterday?

MR. ROMBERG: Yes.

MR. HUGHES: What did I say? (Laughter)

MR. ROMBERG: You said he was coming in at our request.

MR. HUGHES: I said he was coming in at our request, so he came in at our request.

Q At your request, and that's it.

A That's about it.

Q Did you just mumble off something there before that there will be a statement tomorrow on UNESCO?

A Why don't you keep in touch with us about any announcement on UNESCO tomorrow.

Q Reverend Jackson said yesterday after his meeting here that the Syrians do not necessarily want the reconnaissance flights to stop, but they want a 30-minute warning so they can distinguish with Israeli flights.

A Uh-huh.

Q Can you tell us anything about that?

A No. I don't know anything about it. I heard what he said, but I don't know a thing about it.

Q John, what's your evaluation of the judicial process that's going on in Argentina, if you have anything on the military --

A Don't have anything for you on it.

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 12:29 p.m.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Thursday, December 29, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #231

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1983, 12:10 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. I have one statement and one related announcement.

A statement on U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO. The United States Government notified UNESCO on December 28, 1983, that we will withdraw from the organization effective December 31, 1984.

The notice was given in Paris by our permanent representative to UNESCO, Ambassador Jean Gerard, to the Director General of the organization, The Honorable Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

The decision to withdraw was made by President Reagan on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. The recommendation was based upon our experience that UNESCO has extraneously politicized virtually every subject it deals with, has exhibited hostility toward the basic institutions of a free society, especially a free market and a free press, and has demonstrated unrestrained budgetary expansion.

Six months ago our Bureau of International Organization Affairs commissioned an in-depth policy review of U.S. participation in UNESCO. Now at the conclusion of that review, we have concluded that continued U.S. participation in UNESCO does not serve the interests of the United States.

We will continue to further the international cooperation in education, science, culture and communication that UNESCO was originally created to promote. With regret, we have been forced to conclude that we are not now able to effect the major changes in UNESCO that would permit us to continue to participate as a member.

Other means of cooperation between governments, however, and various forms of private sector activity also can serve UNESCO's original objectives. To them we will give our support.

That's it for the statement. An announcement related to that is that Assistant Secretary for

International Organization Affairs Gregory Newell will brief ON THE RECORD here in the briefing room at 3 o'clock this afternoon. There will be some related material available on an embargoed basis about 15 minutes before that -- embargoed, that is, until the briefing -- so you may want to get a hold of that. Because of that, I will not take any questions related to the UNESCO situation.

Q Can we get your comment or --

A Sorry, Bernie, that is the situation.

Q -- materials --

A No, we cannot.

Q Filing break.

A Filing break? Yes. Go ahead. Filing break.

Q This is an irrevocable decision, there's no conditions that if there is any moves on the part of UNESCO to alter its character, the U.S. might go back in.

A You can put your questions to Mr. Newell this afternoon.

Q Copy of that bulletin, Alan?

A Yes. Copy can be made available.

Q For cameras?

A Yes.

Q What is the nature of the stuff that's being provided on an embargoed basis? Does it include the report that has been written up for the review that started in June?

A No. It will not.

Q Will that report be made available?

A I don't know the answer to that question. You can ask those questions this afternoon.

Q Can I try one vaguely related one? Are we considering such actions against any other international organization?

A Again, I would suggest you put your questions this afternoon. I'm sure that you will get satisfactory answers to all those questions.

Q Thank you.

Q That means the U.S. doesn't have any more interest in the United Nations?

A That would be an incorrect conclusion, but I refer you to the briefer this afternoon.

Q Why did you answer that one?

A Because it was so extreme, Bernie, that I couldn't let it go.

Q Do you have anything on the announcement by Israel that it will have to cut back on some of its settlement policy for budgetary reasons?

A No. I have seen the various press reports coming out of Israel on that subject. Our position on settlements is well known -- I don't think I have to repeat it here -- but I don't have any comment on those reports.

Q Anything on the Egyptian visit to Israel?

A Obviously, we have long urged that there be a good dialogue between Israel and Egypt, and that they take steps to improve the atmosphere of their bilateral relations and discuss directly Middle East issues, and we welcome the visit. Believe it will contribute to the direct dialogue that we've been talking about at senior levels.

Q Do you have anything to indicate if this visit by the Egyptian diplomat is somehow connected to the visit of Mr. Arafat to Cairo?

A I don't have anything that would lead me to that conclusion, but the decision on the visit and what the atmosphere and the -- excuse me, the agenda of that visit are obviously things that have been decided by the Egyptians and the Israelis, so I would really refer you to them with that question.

Q Alan, is the Department or the United States, the Administration, now reviewing sanctions against Poland?

A I don't have anything new to say beyond what the President said a short while ago regarding that question. I refer you back to his words. But I don't have anything new to announce to you today on that question.

Q Staying on the Middle East, do you have anything on this renewed spate of attacks on Jordanian diplomats, and any suspicion that it may fit into what President Reagan has termed "state-supported" terrorism?

A Can't answer you in any specific terms on that, Bill. I saw a wire report just as I came out that there had been yet another attack. Obviously, it's a deplorable, tragic kind of situation where you have people being attacked, assassinated, subject to terrorist activity all over the world. But I can't give you any specific judgments on how this relates to any particular pattern of (inaudible)

Q Do you have any comment on the Marine report, the Pentagon report?

A No.

Q Anything new on the fighting in Angola/South Africa?

A No. I refer you to what we said the other day.

Bernie?

Q Alan, picking up Bernie's question, the Long Commission report talks about "an urgent need for reassessment of alternative means to achieve U.S. objectives in Lebanon."

Do you see this as a military commission poking into the political and diplomatic area?

A You have a way of asking questions, Bernie. I am not going to try to make any statements or have any reaction to that. The report is available; you can draw whatever conclusions you want to. I'm not going to make any comment.

Q Well, could you tell us whether that statement and what would seem like a recommendation to the Reagan Administration to find a different diplomatic approach to Lebanon has caused a debate within this building?

A No, I'm not going to respond to any questions about the report, in particular. I think that the President addressed himself to the policy the other day -- also talked about considering other ways of handling perhaps the narrow aspects of deployment, and just looking at those things -- and I think there may have been something out of the White House yesterday on this, too; but there is nothing new, basically, to say to you on that subject.

Q I'm not talking about deployment. My question is, is there any consideration being given now by the Administration to come up with an alternative means to achieve U.S. objectives in Lebanon?

A There is no plan to change the MNF role or mandate or deployment that I have to offer you.

Q The Commission Report says very clearly that the mandate of the MNF changed very rapidly over the months it has been there. Are we still operating on the same four basic principles it went in?

A It is operating on the same mandate that we have talked about that is written into the various documents that have been made public.

Q Do you have anything on the strikes in Suriname? Suriname.

A Suriname. No, I don't have anything on the strike in Suriname.

Q Just one other, if I may follow up: There are no alternate diplomatic tacks that are now being explored to deal with Lebanon?

A That's a very sweeping statement. There is a lot of active diplomacy that has been ongoing and that is ongoing, and that will be ongoing with regard to Lebanon and various other aspects of the Middle East.

If you're suggesting that there is some new policy that is emerging, I think the answer to that would be no. The President has made his policy very clear.

Q Alan, Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze, held a news conference in Damascus in which he said that there was no longer any hope for a dialogue of national reconciliation.

Would that indicate inching closer to what the President held out as a possibility of collapse? Do you have anything on his statement?

A We've seen the report, that is the press report, but we don't have any confirmation that it is accurate. In any case, we don't agree with the alleged assessment contained in that report, so that would be my response to you on that one.

-- MORE --

Q Alan, do you have any comment on reports that this Administration is now considering resuming diplomatic relations with Iraq?

A No, I think John addressed this a week or more ago in terms of our attitude and approach. I don't have anything new to add to that.

Q Because the -- most of the reports coming out during the last week are contradictory with what was said on this podium when Mr. Rumsfeld was in Baghdad.

Q In what sense?

A In the sense that it was not only within the context of his mission as Presidential representative to the Middle East, because so many reports said that he was discussing diplomatic relations with the Iraqi Government?

A I'm not going to comment on any specific aspect of his conversations obviously. But I will repeat what I know that I said, and I think John said as well, and that is that his mission to Iraq was consistent with and part of his mandate from the President as representative to the Middle East.

Q The break was by Iraq so that the United States Government is willing at any time, isn't it, to resume relations?

A We've indicated that.

Q No problem here?

Q Do you have anything on the creation of the government in exile of the anti-Sandinistas? It was announced yesterday by --

A Yes, I saw that report. No, I don't have any reaction to it.

Q Alan, do you have any comment on Jesse Jackson's plans to travel to Syria?

A No. I gather he has either just had or is having a press conference at this point. No, I don't have any reaction. We have said some things about that in the last few days both here and the White House. Don't have anything new to add to it.

Q Is there anything we're missing today, Alan? Anything what you have? (Laughter)

A You tempt me; you tempt me. No.

Q Well, go ahead. Indulge yourself.

Q Anything statement on foreign policy triumphs?

A You still got another day, Bernie.

Q You referred the question on Poland to the President's comments in early December. If I recall correctly, what the President said was that we want to see actions, not words, evidence of real change; is that --

A I'd go back -- I'd refer you back to specifically what he said rather than trying to wing it from here. I think you'll find that.

Q Given that statement of U.S. policy by the President, is the Department currently reviewing the status of those sanctions?

A Well, again, I don't think that I would normally get into the question of what we are or are not doing until we would have, if we have something to announce. But I would refer you back specifically to his words and not -- I would suggest you might want to check what those words were.

Q Do you have anything new on Lieutenant Goodman?

A I don't have anything new on Lieutenant Goodman; no.

Q Do you have anything on the continuing press crackdown in Uruguay or the setting of bail, or the deposit of bail by LAN Chile in New York, and whether that affects U.S. relations with Chile?

A I don't have anything on the latter. On the Uruguay question, there was some guidance that was available. I don't happen to have it with me, so if you want to --

Q Was it for today?

A No, it wasn't for today.

Q Was it old, old?

A It was not old, old. Why don't you check the Press Office and see if it meets your requirements.

Q Alan, wouldn't you say that the State Department or the Reagan Administration is supporting the mission of Mr. Jackson to Damascus today?

A Is supporting it?

Q Yes.

A I think we have expressed our views about it. If, assuming he is going ahead with it, it is a private mission, not representing the United States Government. That doesn't mean we have not cooperated in terms of briefing him or in other ways, but he would go as a private citizen.

Q But it seems you're stopping short of saying that you support the mission?

A Stopping short of saying we support it?

Q Yes.

A As I say, it's a private mission. It's up to him.

Q Thank you.

A Okay, you're welcome.

(Press briefing concluded at 12:25 P.M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

Friday, December 30, 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPC #232

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1983, 12:34 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. ROMBERG: Good afternoon. A couple of announcements. First, the Press Office is going to operate on a normal Saturday schedule tomorrow, but it will be closed on both Sunday and Monday. The Press Office wishes you all the best in the coming year.

Available in the Press Office are a limited number of copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952 to '54, Volume IV, "The American Republics." Please note on the press release the embargo until 6:00 p.m. January 3, 1984. A summary of the volume prepared by the Office of the Historian is attached to the press release which is included with each volume. Again, that embargo goes into next week, so please note that.

Also, to let you know that Ambassador Stone will be leaving on Tuesday morning for a round of travel in Central American countries; consultations there on the Contadora process. His first stop will in Guatemala, and as is our usual practice, we'll let you know on a day-by-day basis after that.

Q Will he be visiting Nicaragua?

A As I say, we'll let you know on a day-by-day basis.

Q I'm not asking when.

A I know. It applies to where as well.

Q Okay.

A That's all I have on announcements. I'll be happy to take your questions.

Q In connection with Central America, there was a report on one of the morning television shows -- I cannot remember which -- about the Salvadorans taking steps to expel from the country these death squad members. Obviously, in respose to the American request.

Do we have anything to say on this, or any indication this is in fact happening?

A I don't have anything for you today on that, Bernie. Our attitude on death squads is quite clear, and has been expressed by everybody from the President on down.

I think probably we will, however, let the Salvadorans speak for themselves, both through whatever words they have to issue and whatever actions they take, at least at this stage of the game.

Q The United States isn't offering a place for them to be sent, are they?

A I'm not aware of a center for them; no.

Q Alan, since you're talking about Guatemala and Central America, there was a story on December 23 on ABC, "Good Morning America," and Mark Potter says that -- and if you will pardon me, if I will read that -- that short story about $600 thousand dollars worth of World War I rifles on their way to Guatemala were seized by U.S. Customs --

A Excuse me, we did address this, I think. I don't have -- this is the Customs seizure of rifles, and I think -- I don't have guidance here with me on this, but I think we have some guidance in the Press Office.

A Okay.

Q I was just wondering now in the light of the Stone travelling plans, do you have anything on the announcement by Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras that they're going to present a new initiative in some of the 21-points of the Contadora Group on the 7th?

A As we've said, we strongly support the Contadora efforts to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that covers all 21 objectives. While we don't have any specific knowledge with respect to the proposal which you're talking about, we would welcome all efforts which would help reach that goal.

Q Is it safe to assume that Mr. Stone might be in the meeting or --

A In the meeting? In the Contadora meeting?

Q Oh, maybe not in the meeting but in the place where it's going to take place.

A We have not participated in Contadora meetings, so it's --

Q Anything at all on whether Gromyko is going to be in Stockholm?

A Yes, we have been in touch through diplomatic channels with the Soviet Union, and it has been agreed that the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet in Stockholm on the afternoon of January 18.

--MORE--

Q Anything on Jesse Jackson's trip to Syria?

A Not really. He arrives, as I understand it, evening local time, which I guess would be about now. He is going to be met by Ambassador Paganelli who will offer him an Embassy briefing, and afford him appropriate courtesies as are afforded to prominent Americans who are travelling abroad on a regular basis.

Q Do you expect that when he comes back, if he comes back along with Mr. Goodman or something like that, that he will be briefing the government officials at the State Department?

A That's quite speculative. I'm not going to try to address that.

Q What are the expectations of the Gromyko and Shultz meeting?

A Don't have any words to offer you on that, Bernie. All I can do today is to confirm to you the fact that a meeting has been arranged.

Q When did this word come in, Alan?

A I don't have the specifics on that.

Q No agenda set, just a date set?

A That's all I have ......

Q Was it a U.S. proposal that they meet?

A I don't know how to characterize it in that sense, and I don't think I'm going to go back and try to go through the history of it. The Secretary had made known his willingness to meet with him and so on, so there has been some back-and-forth on this agreement to meet has now been reached.

Q You said that it came about as a result of diplomatic communications between the U.S. and the Soviets?

A That's right.

Q Initiated by whom?

A I don't have the history of that.

Q There are reports of explosions or bombs in mosques on the West Bank and churches -- would you care to comment on those things?

A I don't have specific words for you on that. I don't know what the facts are. Obviously, these represent terrorist incidents which are to be totally condemned; but as far as any responsibility or words beyond that, I simply don't have anything I can offer you on that.

Q On this point, this thing which I asked you about a month ago, about a new organization in the West Bank, from settlers which is called "Terror Against Terror," which has claimed responsibility in the last few weeks or few, you know, some incidents which happened before, and also they are responsible for some of the things, according to the news stories from Israeli itself, which happened in Hebron and other places, can you possibly raise this issue again, or if you haven't raised it so far, with the Israeli authorities about the activities of this group of people, because some of these people are U.S. citizens, according to information?

A I don't think it is appropriate from this podium to talk about we will or won't be talking about, in specific terms, with other governments; but our attitude on terrorism -- and I think you can take from the words of the Government of Israel, as well, their attitude on terrorism is quite clear. So I don't think there is any difference of view on that.

Q One more thing, Alan: there are also reports that officials here are especially alert or aware of the likelihood of some airplanes flown by Iranians to do some of those suicide attacks on American ships in that area.

A Yes.

Q Can you confirm that story? And do you have anything to say about it?

A I can't confirm it, and I really can't comment on it, because without leading you one way or another, it would involve alleged intelligence information, if there were such information, and I just can't do that on general principle grounds.

Q Yes, do government officials, let's say in the State Department, have a special alert, or are they concerned about something like this happening because they know that it may happen?

A I don't really have anything to offer you on that today, Gasson.

Q Do you have any comment on the Amnesty International report that was published in The Washington Post last Monday, that blamed 117 countries of abusing the human rights, including the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.?

A No, I don't. Our view on human rights is expressed in our annual report which comes out around the end of January, so I would refer you to that.

Q It was confirmed in Western Europe that the first Pershing II and Cruise Missiles will be operational by the end of this year. In the light of this development, does the U.S. still feel that the deployment will prod the Soviets to go back to the negotiating table -- to go back and negotiate seriously?

A I can't predict what Soviet behavior is going to be. I have not tried to do that. What we have said is that we think an agreement is important, and we are going to remain prepared to negotiate, and we hope they will come back to the table and negotiate seriously. What they do, I cannot predict, though.

Q Is the U.S. willing or even considering a change in its negotiating position?

A I think our position is quite clear. I don't have anything on any changes to suggest to you.

Q Is Rumsfeld planning to go back to the region after the holidays, or what are his plans?

A Frankly, I don't know, but I don't think I could tell you, in any case, ahead of his schedule, for all the usual reasons. He is in Washington at this point, but I can't project.

Q Thank you.

A O.K.

(The briefing concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

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